Erdamar, BoraSanver, M. Remzi2024-07-182024-07-1820090040-58331573-7187https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9113-3https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7228We consider the extension of a (strict) preference over a set to its power set. Elements of the power set are non-resolute outcomes. The final outcome is determined by an (external) chooser which is a resolute choice function. The individual whose preference is under consideration confronts a set of resolute choice functions which reflects the possible behaviors of the chooser. Every such set naturally induces an extension axiom (i.e., a rule that determines how an individual with a given preference over alternatives is required to rank certain sets). Our model allows to revisit various extension axioms of the literature. Interestingly, the Gardenfors (1976) and Kelly (1977) principles are singled-out as the only two extension axioms compatible with the non-resolute outcome interpretation.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessPreferences Over SetsNon-Resolute OutcomesSocial Choice FunctionsStrategy-ProofOrdinal ProbabilitiesDecision FunctionsPower SetManipulationAlternativesPreferenceRulesArticle2-s2.0-6994910540810.1007/s11238-008-9113-33844Q237567Q3WOS:000269863600002