Aslan, FatmaDindar, HayrullahLaine, Jean2024-07-182024-07-182019978-3-030-21711-2978-3-030-21710-51865-1348https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21711-2_3https://hdl.handle.net/11411/69581st Joint Meeting of the 19th Annual International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) / Behavioral OR Conference -- JUN 11-15, 2019 -- Loughborough Univ, Loughborough, ENGLANDWe consider the elections of a seat-posted committee, and investigate the propensity of seat-wise majority voting to choose a committee that fulfills the majority will with respect to preferences over committees. Voters have seat-wise preferences and preferences over committees are derived from seat-wise preferences by means of a neutral preference extension. Neutrality means that the names of candidates do not play any role. The majority committee paradox refers to a situation where a Condorcet winner exists for each seat, and a Condorcet winner committee also exists but does not coincide with the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners. The majority committee weak paradox refers to a situation where the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners is not a Condorcet winner among committees. We characterize the domains of preference extensions immune to each of the paradoxes.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessCommittee ElectionVoting ParadoxesMajority VotingSeparable PreferencesOstrogorski ParadoxTheoremConference Object2-s2.0-8506730879510.1007/978-3-030-21711-2_342Q233351N/AWOS:000561020200003