Aleskerov, FuadKarabekyan, DanielSanver, M. RemziYakuba, Vyacheslav2024-07-182024-07-1820120165-4896https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.001https://hdl.handle.net/11411/8997By extending manipulability indices defined for single-valued social choice rules to the multi-valued case, we explore the degree of manipulability of seven multi-valued social choice rules. Our analysis is based on computational experiments. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessSocial Choice FunctionsManipulationSchemesOn the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternativesArticle2-s2.0-8486178864810.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.001731Q26764Q3WOS:000305919800008