Sanver, M. RemziChatterji, ShurojitSen, Arunava2021-02-242021-02-242013-050022-0531https://hdl.handle.net/11411/3289https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005In this paper, we investigate domains that admit "well-behaved" strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982) [13]. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessStrategy-proofnessRestricted domainsSemi-single-peaked domainsArticle2-s2.0-8487760360810.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005Q3WOS:000319790200006