Laine, Jean2024-07-182024-07-1820150165-48961879-3118https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.06.002https://hdl.handle.net/11411/8999We introduce a new consistency property for social welfare functions (SWF), called hyper-stability. An SWF is hyper-stable if at any profile over finitely many alternatives where a weak order R is chosen, there exists a profile of linear orders over linear orders, called hyper-profile, at which only linearizations of R are ranked first by the SWF. Profiles induce hyper-profiles according to some minimal compatibility conditions. We provide sufficient conditions for hyper-stability, and we investigate hyper-stability for several Condorcet SWFs. An important conclusion is that there are non-dictatorial hyper-stable SWFs. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessArticle2-s2.0-8493942439610.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.06.00280Q27077Q4WOS:000361250900010