Nizamogullari, DuyguOzkal-Sanver, Ipek2024-07-182024-07-1820221434-47421434-4750https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00297-4https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7147Classical roommate problems define individual rationality by conceiving remaining single as the outside option. This conception implicitly assumes that there are always some empty rooms to be shared. However, there are many instances when this is not the case. We introduce roommate problems with a limited number of rooms, where the outside option is having no room. In this general framework, we show that the core equals the set of Pareto optimal and stable matchings.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessIndividual RationalityPareto OptimalityCoreExistenceStabilityArticle2-s2.0-8512573105510.1007/s10058-022-00297-45604Q255326Q4WOS:000765657400001