Özkal-Sanver, ISanver, MR2024-07-182024-07-1820050165-48961879-3118https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.003https://hdl.handle.net/11411/899327th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design -- AUG 21-28, 2004-2005 -- Bodrum, TURKEYWe consider a two-sided matching model where agents' preferences are a function of the types of their potential mates. Matching rules are manipulated by type misrepresentation. We explore the implementability of the G-core in G-Strong Nash Equilibria. Although direct type pretension mechanisms rule out bad equilibria, the existence of equilibrium cannot be generally guaranteed. However, taking G as the discrete partition, the individually rational matching correspondence is partially implementable in Nash equilibria. On the other hand, incorporating a certain degree of hypocrisy in the mechanism, i.e., allowing agents to pretend different types to different potential mates, ensures the full implementability of the G-core in G-Strong Nash Equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessMatchingEndowmentsType Pretension MechanismMarriage ProblemsConference Object2-s2.0-2394452503910.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.0033173Q230450Q4WOS:000232035800006