

A CRITICAL APPROACH TO MODERNITY'S ANXIETY OF BEING TOGETHER: THE
ONTOLOGICAL PROXIMITY OF SINGULAR BEING WITH COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

In recent decades Western Europe's most popular political discourse has been based on being a multicultural society. Recent developments, centring on Angela Merkel and David Cameron's speeches, and Anders Breivik's massacre in Norway, show that multiculturalism marks an anxiety and raises the question of being together. It is not a crisis or a failure. If one considers these developments as anxiety rather than failure, it clearly necessitates examining new possibilities of being together in the context of singularity and community. This study, by focusing on early Christianity and modern forms of the associations of humans that were morality oriented, aims to pave the way for an idea of ethical togetherness. In this regard, Jean Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben's singularity-community arguments introduce a co-existential space for the sake of being singular plural within an ethical community.

ÖZET

Batı Avrupa'nın son dönemdeki en gündemde olan siyasi söylemi çok kültürlü toplum olma üzerine dayanmaktadır. Anders Breivik'in katliamı, Angela Merkel ve David Cameron'un çok kültürlülüğün başarısızlığına dair konuşmaları birlikte olmanın sorunsalına ve endişesine işaret eder. Ne var ki, bu bir kriz ya da başarısızlık değildir. Son gelişmeler, başarısızlık yerine, endişe olgusu olarak ifade edilirse, bu durum, tekillik ve cemaat temelinde, beraber olmanın yeni formlarının analizini gerektirecektir. Bu çalışmada amaçlanan, ahlaki temelde şekillenen erken dönem Hristiyanlık ve modern birliktelik biçimlerine odaklanarak, etik bir cemaat fikrinin önünü açmaktır. Bu bakımdan, Jean Luc Nancy ve Giorgio Agamben'in tekillik-cemaat savları etik bir cemaatte tekil çoğul olma adına ortak varoluşsal bir alan sunmaktadır.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The last two years has seen two important speeches, made by UK Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, about the failure of multiculturalism. The deadly attack on the Norwegian island of Utoya, targeting left-wing labour party camp, represents an example of anxiety of being together.

At a security conference in Munich, David Cameron asserted that the UK should have a stronger national identity in order to prevent all types of extremism. According to him, the main traits of the society that are to be established in the UK are principles such as “freedom of speech,” “freedom of worship,” “democracy,” “the rule of law,” “equal rights,” and no discrimination on the basis of “race,” “sex or sexuality.” The aim of the “doctrine of state multiculturalism” is to “encourage the living of separate lives.” By proposing the term “muscular liberalism” for the stance British society must adopt, he claims that the UK has so far failed to provide such a society under those principles, even if extremist communities that are against them, were tolerated: “Instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity, open to everyone.”¹ The second speech, by Angela Merkel, addressed the non-inclusion of immigrants and referred to a failure of “multiculti,” meaning “living side-by-side.” Two points from her speech are crucial. Firstly, “we should not be a country either which gives the impression to the outside world that those who don’t speak German immediately or who were not raised speaking German are not welcome here.”² Then, she expresses what a multicultural society aims at: “And of course, the approach [to build] a

¹ Oliver Right, Jerome Taylor, Cameron: My War On Multiculturalism, in <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994>.

² <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451>

multicultural [society] and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other... has failed, utterly failed.”³

In parallel, in the deadly attack by Andres Breivik, more than 60 children died in Norway. In his interview after the murders he said that, “Muslim individuals who are not assimilated 100% by 2020 will be deported as soon as we manage to seize power.”⁴ In his declaration of independence, or manifesto, he said that the reasoning behind our concern and opposition is the fact that mass immigration, racial mixing and adoption of non-Europeans harm the unity of our tribe – it harms the degree of social cohesion any given country has.⁵ Who does he address with his more than one-thousand-page manifesto? Why are two leading politicians, or presidents, of Europe so anxious about “living side by side”? Then, following such an argument, inclusion or assimilation, which are explicit and implicit components of multiculturalism, would not go well with the modern society’s expectations, as long as ‘others’ keep their local identity. The theory of multiculturalism can be criticized, but not as policy. It ought to be questioned more deeply. Multiculturalism here is only a dominant form of being together. It is a policy that is no more than the greatest example of hatred towards ‘others.’ The greatest concern here is not a failure or crisis; rather it is the feeling of ‘anxiety’ toward coexistence or being together. It is not being able to live together without having qualities or categories of *Being*, like identity, ethnicity or culture. In other words, *Being* is identified by those qualities. They exist and come together through them. Such identification always creates an ‘other.’ When the other started to join with these homogeneities through immigration or other processes, the question of being together arises. This is not failure. This is ‘anxiety’ at living with others. To be in a community is to be exposed to others. ‘Community’ is not to possess a common substance or identity. ‘Being together,’ as the

³ Ibid.

⁴ <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2084895,00.html>.

⁵ This manifest can be retrieved from “<http://www.kevinislaughter.com/wp-content/uploads/2083+-+A+European+Declaration+of+Independence.pdf>.”

community itself, is not to share a common identity, substance or culture. It is to share existence. Therefore, it is coexistence. We are not born into this collectivity. It happens to us and it is an emerging community. And ethics that is not immanent to the community is inherent within it. It is aesthetics of existence⁶. It marks the singularity, plurality and co-relationality of *Beings*. It does not determine inter-*Beings* relations. That is to say, “the fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realize.”⁷

Thus a community is not without ethics.

These three facts are the expression of an anxiety of being together rather than a crisis or failure of a multicultural society. This is the main purpose of this study. In other words it aims to question not multiculturalism but being together through multiculturalism. To question multiculturalism is to criticize the new design of an old house. As long as the old house still remains, the new design brings nothing different. It only changes the facade. Thus the matter is to shake its foundations. It is to deconstruct.

This study is initiated by two naïve questions that do not address any solution: what is the reason of for the inability to coexist? Or: Why are we anxious about living with others? The purpose of this project is to start a debate on singular *Being* and ethical community. Such a purpose requires examining *Being* and its relation to other *Beings*. In the modern understanding or not, *Being* is a substantial entity. Therefore, it is *res* (thing). So, it carries out the characteristics of a thing like a motion, figure or shape. The human *Being* then inevitably

⁶ I consider aesthetic of existence from the perspective of Michel Foucault. So, it is to make life a work of art. From this point of view, ethics ought to be understood as an aesthetic of existence. In turning the life into a work of art, the relations to the self and others are important. Ethics is neither code nor set of principles which man should obey. It is the care of the self. To sum up, ethics as an aesthetic of existence transforms the relationship with oneself into a life which is a work of art.

⁷ Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community*, trans. Michael Hardt, University of Minnesota Press, p. 43.

has some qualities like identity, sexuality or ethnicity. In other words, it is a corporeal thing that possesses all of these. In a related manner, Heidegger points out that “a corporeal Thing that maintains its total extension can still undergo many changes in the ways in which that extension is distributed in the various dimensions, and can present itself in manifold shapes as one and the same Thing.”⁸ Modern theory constitutes the individual as a single and indivisible entity who firstly forms itself as a free subject. Then, this free subject individually relates itself to a community or others. This defines the individual as a solitary figure. According to Nancy, “solitude par excellence is solitude of the self insofar as it relates to itself, outside of itself *in extremis* and *in principis*, outside of the world, ex-isting existence.”⁹ The other is always there. The question is how we understand the other and share our existence. The other is not what we stand against. It is another *Being* whom we are together with. This togetherness is not operated by morality. *Beings* experience ‘being together’ (coexistence) through ethics, insofar as it describes a *Being’s* experience of its own potentiality in relation to itself and to others. So it cannot be a work, productive and a common substance. It occurs and comes. The question is how community happens to *Beings*. Morally? Without contact and touch? Without the principle ‘with’? Singularity-community discussions endeavour to bring an answer to these paradoxes.

The first step of this study is to focus on monotheism’s role – especially that of Christianity – in man’s acquisition of moral and theological character as a quality. Thus, this acquisition is a purposiveness that is attached to *Being* in order to exist for God and unite with religion. That is to say, man and his environment were created by God. We owe our existence to God. Therefore, we perform our existence with faith and moral standards, and sustain it by determining codes of conduct. As Foucault remarked, “morality also refers to the real

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell Publishers, 2001, p. 124.

⁹ Jean Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, trans. Robert D. Richardson, Anne O’Byrne, Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 79.

behaviour of individuals in relation to the rules and values that are recommended to them: the word thus designates the manner in which they comply more or less fully with a standard of conduct, the manner in which they obey or resist an interdiction or a prescription; the manner in which they respect or disregard a set of values.”¹⁰ Some verses from Bible, St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas’ theories on the “City of God and Contemplative Life” will be taken as the core of this part in order to understand how Christianity considers *Being* and ‘being together.’

Secondly, I will take into account how modernity considers society, which can be explained as being individually together. To open up this subject, I will focus on the notions of human nature and modern morality. The reason to use these two titles is that they explain the organic relationship between the individual and society. Human nature signifies why society is necessary, while the latter determines how to live with others. Beginning with Thomas Hobbes, David Hume and John Locke, I will constitute the theoretical basis of this part. Modern society indicates the fact that individuals seek self-preservation and protection from mutual danger, which then evolved into a sociality. At the end of this chapter I will also analyse its reflection on multiculturalism by means of a brief overview. Multiculturalism is a response signifying the togetherness of different cultural or religious groups.

In contrast to the modern association of humans, I will deconstruct the notion of individual and society through singularity-community discussions. Contrary to the idea that modern society is oneness; I will claim that ‘being together’ is a plural community that is ethical and comprises the coexistence of singulars. Thus ethics is closely linked with community; namely, it is more than a borderline between good and evil. As Hannah Arendt asserts, the fact that we usually treat matters of good and evil in courses on ‘morals’ or ‘ethics’ may indicate how

¹⁰ Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure*, Vol. 2, trans. Robert Hurley, Pantheon Books, 1986, p. 25.

little we know about them, for morals comes from *mores* and ethics from *ethos*, the Latin and the Greek words for customs and habit, and the Latin word associated with the rules of behaviour, whereas the Greek is derived from *habitat*, like our habits.¹¹ In addition, ethics is a matter of aesthetics of existence, while morality is perceived in terms of codes of conduct. At the same time, it tells us how we establish relationships with others. A community is not without ethics and denotes being ‘singular plural.’ *Being* is ‘being with’ or plural.

¹¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Life of The Mind*, A Harves Book: Harcourt Inc. , 1978, p. 5

CHAPTER 2

Christianity, led by Jesus of Nazareth, strengthened the one and supreme God's divine rule through obedience, faith or morality. This was different from the *Pax Deorum* (Peace of the Gods). Its main concern was festivals, sacrifices or rituals. There is another difference: the penetration into existential relations. That is to say, *Being* exists through faith. That is to say, the way we exist is not a matter of seeking a happy or good life. In addition, humans' relationships with others were influenced. That morality referred to codes of conduct with which man must be (act) in accordance can be considered as the main indicator of this.

I. JUDAIST BACKGROUND IN CHRISTIANITY

Even if Christianity emerged from the life and death of Jesus, it still bears the influence of Judaism. In other words, without this Judaist background, Christianity would be incomplete, since religions do not delineate distinct, unrelated historical periods. For Christianity, it can be said precisely that, "it began as a renewal movement within Palestinian Judaism, and its first members regarded their faith in the risen Jesus not as a new religion but as a confirmation of God's promises to Israel."¹² In 1 Corinthians 8:6, it is stated that, "but to us [there is but] one God, the Father, of whom [are] all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom [are] all things, and we by him."

In reference to Judaism, "the formation of the Jewish people, which may be traced back to the Exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt, is closely bound up with a divine revelation, and with the commitment of the people to obedience to God's will."¹³ Accordingly, it can be said that, "Christianity is a way of life, embodied in a corporate society or fellowship and centred on the

¹²W.H.C. Frend, *The Rise of Christianity*, Fortress Press, 1985, p. 12. Verses from Holy Bible are quoted from The King James Version of Holy Bible retrieving from 'http://www.davince.com/bible'.

¹³Geoffrey Parrinder (ed.), *World Religions: From Ancient History To The Present*, Facts on File Publications, 1985, p. 385.

worship of the One God revealed to the world through Jesus of Nazareth.”¹⁴ Judaism is a religion in which Jews worship a God without an image or myth and it is considered that “the first generations of Christians inherited their Scripture and many of their characteristic attitudes and beliefs as well as much of their organizations from the Jews.”¹⁵ Genesis 1:1 and 1:2 indicated us that the world is the creation of One God, and it follows:

“In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness [was] upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.”

II. MONOTHEIST NOVELTY IN THE EXISTENTIAL CONDITION OF MAN

The reason I prefer to use the term ‘novelty’ is that there has been a change in the existential knowledge, together with the transition from ethical practices to monotheistic understanding of morality. What I mean by monotheistic understanding of morality is that “Christianity is usually given credit for replacing the generally tolerant Greco-Roman life-style with an austere lifestyle marked by a series of renunciations, interdictions, or prohibitions.”¹⁶

A) ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT ON MAN IN CHRISTIANITY

What I mean by “ontological argument on man in Christianity” is Christianity’s intervention into man’s existentiality with purposiveness. A *telos* (purpose) has been added to the existence of man. In 2 Thessalonians 3:6-7 and 3:14-16, it is stated: “now we command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ that ye withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly and not after the tradition which he received of us,” and “for

¹⁴Ibid. p. 420.

¹⁵The Rise of Christianity, p. 12.

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress”, in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Second Edition With an Afterword by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, eds., Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, The University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 244.

yourselves know how ye ought to follow us: for we behaved not ourselves disorderly among you.” Additionally, 3:14-16 remarks what to do with men who do not have faith in Jesus and God: “And if any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be ashamed;” and “yet count [him] not as an enemy, but admonish as a brother;” then, “now the Lord of peace himself give you peace always by all means” and “the Lord [be] with you all.”

Thessalonians 3:18-21 reminds mankind, “wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord; husbands, love [your] wives, and be not bitter against them; children, obey [your] parents in all things: for this is well pleasing unto the Lord; fathers, provoke not your children [to anger,] lest they be discouraged; servants, obey in all things [your] masters according to the flesh; not with eye service, as men pleasers; but in singleness of heart, fearing God; and whatsoever ye do, do [it] heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men; knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance: for ye serve the Lord Christ.”

Namely, existence is owed to God, insofar as our attitudes should be in accordance with his commandments. Therefore, the salvation of man is closely linked with faith toward God through Jesus Christ and God. Therefore, there should be some rules regarding that which should and should not be done. From such a consideration all things are imposed upon man. In Matthew 12:35-7, due to the unforgiveness of sinful man, “good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things; but I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment; for by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned.” In fact, Augustine, in the “City of God,” glorifies that “Christ with divine authority denounces and condemns the offences of men, and their perverted lusts and he gradually withdraws his family from all parts of a world which is

failing and declining through those evils, so that he may establish a whose titles of eternal and glorious are not given by meaningless flattery but by the judgment of truth.”¹⁷

This subjection and obedience is rewarded with heaven. To deserve it, we should be worthy of God. Romans 1:29-32 reminds us of how we are not worthy: “Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers; backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents; without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.” All those “do” and “do not do,” as commandments of God, are rules of conduct to enact God’s commandments.

Moreover, St. Augustine had already mentioned that God was the core of life. Primarily, we should accept that “He is the God omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and everybody; participation in him brings happiness to all who are happy in truth and not in illusion; he has made man a rational, consisting of soul and body; and when man sins he does not let him go unpunished, nor does he abandon him without pity.”¹⁸ Broadly speaking, Thomas Aquinas elaborated on Augustine’s omnipotence of God and wrote: “God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place.”¹⁹ Thus man is directed by the providence of God.

¹⁷ St. Augustine, *City of God*, (e-book version) ed., Philip Schaff, Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1890, p. 59.

¹⁸Ibid. p. Book V, Chapter 9.

¹⁹Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part I, trans., Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2006, p. 46.

B) SPATIAL INTERPRETATIONS IN CHRISTIANITY

Such a title is necessary to clarify the way we exist together. How you describe *Being* influences also how you consider ‘being together.’ When one describes space as God-created, it is not difficult to define *Being* and its relationship with others like this: in God’s space, we exist only for God. The space or world ought to be where *Beings* coexist.

In *The Life of The Mind*, Hannah Arendt asserts that “we are of the world, not in it” and adds: “we, too, are appearances by virtue of arriving and departing, of appearing, disappearing; and while we come from a nowhere, we arrive well equipped to deal with whatever appears to us and to take part in the play of world.”²⁰ Genesis, 1:1-2 starts by saying, “in the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth; and the earth was without form, and void; and darkness [was] upon the face of the deep; and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.” But we are warned to do something else. Matthew 6:19-21 gives us the instructions with respect to the earth: “Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal: For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.”

1. ON CITIES OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND THOMAS AQUINAS

The Cities of St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas will clarify how space has been considered by Christianity. St Augustine’s separation of “Earthly City”-“Heavenly City” and Thomas Aquinas’ “Active”-“Contemplative Life” will concretize the discussion. Accordingly, Hannah Arendt gives us a broader sense: “the active way of life is ‘laborious’, [the] contemplative way is sheer quietness; the active one goes on in public, the contemplative one in the ‘desert’;

²⁰ *The Life of The Mind*, p. 22.

the active one is devoted to the ‘necessity of one’s neighbours’, the contemplative one to the ‘vision of God’.”²¹

In Book XV in *City of God*, origin of two cities is investigated; the first is the Earthly City and the other the Heavenly City (City of God). The Earthly City, where we live with human standards, “which, though it be mistress of the nations, is itself ruled by its lust of rule.”²² The foundation of these two cities is traced back to the birth of Abel and Cain. Cain belonged to the city of men and Abel to the city of God. St. Augustine adds that, “when these two cities began to run their course by a series of deaths and births, the citizen of this world was the first-born, and after him the stranger in this world, the citizen of the city of God, predestinated by grace, elected by grace, by grace a stranger below, and by grace a citizen above.”²³ The City of God is where God’s rule prevails. It has to be defended against the earthly city, which is the primary concern for St. Augustine: “since those Romans were in an earthly city, and had before them, as the end of all the offices undertaken in its behalf, its safety, and a kingdom, not in heaven, but in earth – not in the sphere of eternal life, but in the sphere of demise and succession, where the dead are succeeded by the dying.”²⁴

The main theme in this separation is based on the life of man. From this point of view, Thomas Aquinas states, “all the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of well-ordered activity.”²⁵ Even if contemplative life is applicable to human actions, it is above them. In it, holy truth and God are contemplated. There are four essential elements to the contemplative life: “First, the moral virtues; secondly,

²¹Ibid. p. 6.

²²City of God, p. 14.

²³Ibid. p. 457.

²⁴Ibid. p. 165.

²⁵Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part II, trans., Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2006. p. 969.

other acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself.”²⁶

In relation to this, the contemplative life is continuous in the sense that we work not as bodies, but as souls or via the intellect. In this context, the active life has an end. Furthermore, in the active life, we are directly concerned with our friends or neighbors; whereas the contemplative life is directed by the love of God and faith. Thomas Aquinas points out that “the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is external work to which the active life is directed.”²⁷

To return to the discussion, what Thomas Aquinas clarifies is that “progress from the active to the contemplative life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the contemplative.”²⁸ From such a consideration, spatial interpretations in Christian thought express why we exist. The space is no longer where we coexist. *Being*, space and community are interrelated with each other. If space is defined as a place to only live with faith, the others exist for the same reason, as well. How we come together functions only with this reason. Thus morality controls this relationality.

²⁶Ibid. p. 971.

²⁷Ibid. p. 978. Interestingly, St. Augustine strictly makes a separation between earthly city and heavenly city, by contrast to Thomas Aquinas who does not totally reject contemplative life, in which there can be found similarities with heavenly city; but differentiates active life from contemplative life, in favor of contemplative life. This could stem from the cruel attitudes of Rome against Christians in the first centuries. Probably Christianity’s spread into Europe and strength of its position in the time of Thomas Aquinas enabled him to draw a more harmonious relationship between the two lives.

²⁸Ibid. p. 986.

III. ON HOW MORALITY IS CONSIDERED

It could be said that the term morality has been defined as more than a borderline between good and evil: the harmony with ‘public customs’. The question here is the measure of the harmony. From this perspective, it can be said that the term morality is problematic, “...because it has its origin in ‘mores’, in other words, because it postulates a harmony between the public customs in a country and the moral, ethically correct behaviour, the moral life of the individual.”²⁹ In other words, the measure of the harmony with public customs is the imposition of ‘correct’ behaviour on individuals. In monotheism, the notions of sin and fear are fundamental ways of such an imposition to maintain togetherness obediently at the level of faith. Sin and fear are strictly linked to each other. They are the main catalysts of the moral order of society: not to commit sin and fear of God. These two principles indicate that morality took the form of codes of conduct. In this context, existence is not become an aesthetic one. From Michel Foucault’s point of view, men voluntarily intend to change and transform themselves through aesthetic values that aim at a life as the work of art.

A) ST. AUGUSTINE’S ‘OF PUNISHMENT OF MAN’S FIRST SIN’

According to St. Augustine, God desires not only that mankind is associated with natural similarities, but also that they are bound together with harmony and peace. Clearly, in contrast with Antiquity, the harmony and peace of mankind that he signified is maintained via renunciation of self, realized with worshipfulness, faith, or sinlessness. Therefore, the form of the community is centred upon God’s presence with absolute obedience. In other words, the core of happy and harmonic life is to live with God’s standards which are worshipfulness, faith and obedience, and is to adopt moral rules and standards like fear from sin and

²⁹ Theodor W. Adorno, *Problems of Moral Philosophy*, eds. Thomas Schröder, trans. Rodney Livingstone, Polity Press, 2000, p. 12.

punishment, which turn into “austerity.” Only such a strong moral understanding can maintain society and its peace.

“Disobedience” and “punishment” are two main themes of St. Augustine in conducting moral life. “Being in accordance” is a matter of living according to God, which is truth itself. Regarding Adam and Eve, who committed sin because of disobedience, he claims that the nature of man became liable and subject to sin-death duality; “and the kingdom of death so reigned over men, that the deserved penalty of sin would have hurled all headlong even into the second death, of which there is no end, had not the undeserved grace of God saved some therefrom.”³⁰ Thus, sin is corruption in the soul, not in the body. In other words, “for the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, is not the cause but the punishment of the first sin; and it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible.”³¹ St. Augustine tells that the devil too wanted to live according to himself, and he became the father of lies and the founder of them as sin. Even Angels live according to God’s commandments:

“When, therefore, man lives according to himself,—that is, according to man, not according to God,—assuredly he lives according to a lie; not that man himself is a lie, for God is his author and creator, who is certainly not the author and creator of a lie, but because man was made upright, that he might not live according to himself, but according to Him that made him,—in other words, that he might do His will and not his own; and not to live as he was made to live, that is a lie.”³²

How we ought to live according to God’s standards tells us how we constitute togetherness or the conditions of the community. As stated in Hebrews 5:8-9, “though he were a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered; and being made perfect, he became the

³⁰City of God, p. 372.

³¹Ibid. p. 379.

³²Ibid. p. 380.

author of eternal salvation unto all them that obey him.” Men left the esthetic of existence for the sake of God’s commandments. According to Galatians 2:16, “knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.” Regarding the community of evil men, St. Augustine remarks that “the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances.”³³ Because good will comes from God, while evil is to fall from him. Only God can make good evil will within man to commit sin. In the City of God it is known that man is by nature not evil, but by vice; “for though God formed man of the dust of the earth, yet the earth itself, and every earthly material, is absolutely created out of nothing; and man’s soul, too, God created out of nothing, and joined to the body, when He made man.”³⁴ The existence of men in one sense is to follow obediently God’s commandments as a virtue. Thus St. Augustine says that “God commended obedience, which is, in a sort, the mother and guardian of all the virtues in the reasonable creature, which was so created that submission is advantageous to it, while the fulfilment of its own will in preference to the Creator’s is destruction.”³⁵

“Therefore, because the sin was a despising of the authority of God,—who had created man; who had made him in His own image; who had set him above the other animals; who had placed him in Paradise; who had enriched him with abundance of every kind and of safety; who had laid upon him neither many, nor great, nor difficult commandments, but, in order to

³³Ibid. p. 389.

³⁴Ibid. p. 391.

³⁵Ibid. p. 392.

make a wholesome obedience easy to him, had given him a single very brief and very light precept by which He reminded that creature whose service was to be free that He was Lord.”³⁶

B) THOMAS AQUINAS’S ‘OF GIFT OF FEAR’

The will of God and his providence have not only changed how morality is understood, but has also installed theological character into humans. This theological character is much more than ‘duty’. Ton Van Den Beld, in his article “The Morality System with and without God” writes that morality’s demands have become the policies of universal actions, and “God’s moral authority seemed to be replaced by my own as evinced in my moral judgments.”³⁷ A moral action enables individuals to get along under social rules. Needless to say, morality has been theorized as a ‘code of behaviour.’ By rejecting and doubting the independence of morality from ‘theistic religions,’ Ton Van Den Beld claims, “the dominant attitude to a God-centred morality in the modern philosophical milieu is one of benign neglect.”³⁸ Fear of God is another means of maintaining the moral order of society for the sake of spiritual life.

In *Summa Theologica*, Thomas Aquinas presupposed that God is goodness itself and the core of life. With the fear of God such a life can be sustainable. In his one of responses to objections about fear, he writes that “in respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under different aspects.”³⁹ The evil in the fault does not come from God; but the punishment comes from God himself so as not to make man withdraw from God. Morally, becoming distant from God is to intertwine oneself with evil.

³⁶Ibid. p. 395.

³⁷Ton Van Den Beld, *The Morality System With and Without God*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, Vol. 4, No. 4, *Is Theological Ethics Relevant for Philosophers?* (Dec., 2001), p. 383.

³⁸Ibid. p. 384.

³⁹*Summa Theologica*, Part 2, p. 117.

Eventually, in contrast to the fact that a thing which is good by being ‘ordered to an end,’ evil refers to a lack of such an order. Accordingly, it is written in Psalms 1:1 and 1:6: “Blessed [is] the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful”; and “for the LORD knoweth the way of the righteous: but the way of the ungodly shall perish.” Also, in Matthew 12:35, to be good is encouraged: “a good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things.” Thus, on the basis that withdrawal from God leads to evil, God should be feared so as not to be captured by badness. Undoubtedly:

“Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not numbered among these kinds of fear.”⁴⁰

Paradoxically, punishment in the sense of the worldly fear a servant has towards his master differs from that of divine fear; it is ‘servile’ and ‘initial’ in turning away from God or getting closer to him. He draws a framework for human action within punishment and fear in order not to detach oneself from God; because of an action’s being deformed when it lacks an intrinsic form and due to its goodness stemming from attachment. However, man’s trust in worldly love and fear of the loss of that which he loves are always evil. Therefore, “worldly fear is that which arises from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is always evil.”⁴¹ It is written in Ephesians 5:20-1 that “giving thanks always for all things unto God and the Father in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ; submitting yourselves one to another in the fear of God.” In another sense, fear is considered as the beginning of wisdom in serving God with joy and conducting one’s life. Thus, since life is also directed by divine life, not only by human law, Thomas Aquinas put an emphasis on the fact that “our life is ordained

⁴⁰Ibid. p. 118.

⁴¹Ibid. p. 119.

to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom.”⁴² Psalms 111:10 gives a more precise explanation: “the fear of the LORD [is] the beginning of wisdom: a good understanding have all they that do [his commandments:] his praise endureth for ever.” Because a man who is blessed has fear of God and enjoys his commandments.

IV. CHURCH AS FORM OF ‘BEING TOGETHER’

Since monotheism has existed, the primary purpose of a community has become to unite under supreme good, which is God, rather than a common good. The Church, as an institutional form of being together in Christianity, can be considered a concrete expression of pursuing this supreme good. I believe that elaboration of the Church from such a perspective will be helpful in understanding its moral aspect.

That the term *ecclesia*, where the word church is originated, refers to an assembly of men leads us to think of it as a form of being together. Accordingly, this assembly of men in Christianity refers to a form of being together. Nevertheless, the Church ought to be elaborated upon from two aspects: ontological and spatial. Ontologically, in addition to that mentioned above, it is to constitute *Being* in communion with God. Spatially, Church as a spiritual institution is the concrete form of the ontological approach. Thus, John Zizoulas, one of the late Christian theologians, defines *Being* as communion. According to him, church is not a simple institution, but a ‘mode of existence’ or ‘way of being’. And to him, “the mystery of the Church, even in its institutional dimension, is deeply bound to the being of man, to the being of the world and to the very being of God.”⁴³ In addition, such an existence has become necessary and moral attainment is expressed as follows: “a human being is a member of the

⁴²Ibid. p. 123.

⁴³John Zizoulas, *Being As Communion: Studies in Personhood and Church*, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985, p. 15.

Church, he becomes an 'image of God,' he exists as God Himself exists, he takes on God's way of being."⁴⁴

Primarily, what I mean by coexistence in Christ is stated in Ephesians 2:5-6 and 1 Peter 4:13: "Even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, (by grace ye are saved; And hath raised [us] up together, and made [us] sit together in heavenly [places] in Christ Jesus"; and, "For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also [in the likeness of his] resurrection." In accordance with Christ himself and the coming together of men in the Church, relatedly in Acts 11:26 the church in Antioch is described by Paul as a coming together: "And when he had found him, he brought him unto Antioch. And it came to pass, that a whole year they assembled themselves with the church, and taught much people. And the disciples were called Christians first in Antioch." In parallel to coming together, Colossians 2:19 preaches this: "And not holding the Head, from which all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered, and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God." This verse is used, by Aquinas, as one proof of the unity of Church that stems from mutual connection of people and their subordination to it. That the head is Christ himself makes the Church a sovereign power. St. Augustine had given already a different account of Church, saying that "for a house is being built to the Lord in all the earth, even the city of God, which is the holy Church, after that captivity in which demons held captive those men who, through faith in God, became living stones in the house."⁴⁵

Meanwhile, Zizoulas asserts that Church ought to have the correct faith and vision regarding the being of God. Therefore, the fact is that "the being of God is a relational being: without the concept of communion it would not be possible to speak of the being of God."⁴⁶ Consequently, man alone is not considered free; therefore, "man cannot exercise his

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵City of God, p. 237.

⁴⁶Being As Communion, p. 17.

ontological freedom absolutely, because he is tied by his createdness, by the ‘necessity’ of his existence, whereas God as ‘uncreated’ does not experience this limitation.”⁴⁷ He then equates the ecstatic character of God with communion; “this ecstatic character of God, the fact that His being is identical with an act of communion, ensures the transcendence of the ontological necessity which His substance would have demanded and replaces this necessity with the free self-affirmation of divine existence.”⁴⁸ Man’s existence is realized within God; therefore, Jesus becomes mediator and the Church institution as an assembly of men. Furthermore, pneumatology, here, embodies this linear and ontological relationship between *Being* and space. Ontologically, this is the ecclesial way of *Being* as communion. Broadly speaking, “communion normally corresponds to states of collective ecstasy, which are usually only of short duration; that is why communion, in current social life, is only a latent potency, actualized at rare moments.”⁴⁹

Biblically, whence Colossians 2:2 says, concerning men’s communion with God, “their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgement of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ.” Further, 2:8 states, “So being affectionately desirous of you, we were willing to have imparted unto you, not the gospel of God only, but also our own souls, because ye were dear unto us.” Nevertheless, the biggest claim of Zizoulas is the relationship between one and many, or many’s turning into one in Christ. Also, there should be a community that is ontological if there is oneness of many or unity’s way of being. That is to say, “there is no Church without the community, as there is no Christ without the Body, or the one without the many.”⁵⁰ Ontologically, if *Being* is a communion with God, then, the church is the expression

⁴⁷Being As Communion, p. 44.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Georges Gurvitch, Mass, Community, Communion, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 18 (Aug. 28, 1941), p. 492.

⁵⁰Ibid. p. 137.

of it as an ecclesia. In 1 Corinthians 10:16-7, it is questioned that “the cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? For we [being] many are one bread, [and] one body: for we are all partakers of that one bread.” In 2 Corinthians 6:14, with whom believers are together is questioned and asked: “Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness?”

Here, I have aimed to question not only the coming together under faith or divine rule, but also how this happens. This is the Christian novelty in the community – or communion – where men are brought together by faith or the existence of God as common principle of it. Thus, more or less, the birth and advancement of monotheistic religions is mainly established upon this idea. Ontologically and spatially, it brings with it a kind of obligatory relationship. Nevertheless, it does not mean that this has remained linear. There have been historical changes in the forms and in how it is elaborated. Compared to pre-modern Christianity, its modern understanding has paved the way for the obligatory and individual establishment of ontological proximity with space and therefore to what extent coexistence is formed.

CHAPTER 3

I. MODERNIST APHORISMS

The hallmark of modern society is that it is based on the idea of ‘individually together’. Being individually together, as an ‘association of humans,’ can be explained in terms of injunction. That is to say, modernity creates inevitable conditions for individuals to allow them unite under an association that is itself an injunction. In other words, what he means by tautology is that it signifies how the relationship between individual and society is established. Therefore, anxiety of coexistence or *modern sense of anxiety* is not a failure or crisis. In his words:

“The question of Being and the meaning of Being has become the question of being-with and of being-together (in the sense of the world). This is what is signified by [our] modern sense of anxiety, which does not so much reveal a ‘crisis of society’ but, instead, reveals that the ‘sociality’ or ‘association’ of humans is an injunction that humanity places on itself, or that it receives from the world: to have to be only what it is and to have to, itself, be Being as such. This sort of formula is primarily a desperate tautological abstraction- and this is why we are all worried. Our task is to break the hard shell of this tautology. What is the being-with of Being?”⁵¹

From his point of view, I will outline the notion of modern society and its meaning. Even if the meaning of the society varies with historical developments encompassing production and power relations, in essence it is explained by the necessity of security, protection from mutual harm, or peace. Furthermore, it is based on the fact that man, who has a distinct natural state, enters into society via contracts. In other words, the conditions mentioned above describe the tautology. For instance, what is meant by the need for security is that man in the natural state has a desire to hurt the other. Depending on that sort of condition, men come together with covenants or compacts to enjoy each other’s company. Therefore, by their nature men do not seek society.

⁵¹ Being Singular Plural, p. 35.

Thus, if there is tautological relationship between man and society, it is none other than an injunction or exigency of association. To be more precise, Hannah Arendt's view of "the rise of the social" can give some clues to concretize this insistence on injunction. It is stated, in *The Human Condition*, that "the natural, merely social companionship of the human species was considered to be a limitation imposed upon us by the needs of biological life, which are the same for the human animal as for other forms of animal life."⁵² Such a definition enables us to question whether society is an injunction that reveals exigency.

The tautology operates mainly through morality. In particular, I do not correlate 'ethics' with modern society, because "we have hardly any remnant of the idea in our society, that the principle work of art which one has to take care of, the main area to which one must apply aesthetic values is oneself, one's life, one's existence."⁵³ Thus, needless to say, morality imposes harmony on public customs in an austere way that comprises restriction and prohibitions. This tautological harmony is not without moral concepts. Therefore, if we should go into the matter deeper, the question ought to examine the tautology between individual and society. To do so, an essential effort should to pave the ways for new ideas and possibilities without the reproduction of the same notions such as society, individual or morality.

II. PLACING MEN INTO SOCIETY OR THEORIZING SOCIETY AS A FORM OF COEXISTENCE

This topic includes a twofold explanation of the formation and operation of society: human nature and morality. Broadly speaking, human nature forms and morality operates, then homogeneity excludes. Needless to say, these three factors contain a range of social practices related to each other. Here, I presuppose that modern society comprises the togetherness of

⁵² Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, The University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 24.

⁵³ On the Genealogy of Ethics, p. 245.

undivided and separate entities According to Hannah Arendt, it is known that “the emergence of society from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public sphere, has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen.”⁵⁴ On the other hand, this transformation enables man to constitute itself as a solitary figure in multitudinousness. In Heideggerian terms, it is well known that *being alone is a deficient mode of Being-with*. According to Jean Luc Nancy, this is articulated as *Being is not without Beings*. Nevertheless, such a scheme ought not to be based on a natural necessity, homogenous or individual practices. On the contrary, it contains co-existential relations of *Beings*. The modern understanding of society draws a different framework than these two statements. To understand this claim better, it seems less possible to begin the discussion without an emphasis on the ‘nature’ of the individual in relation to society. Discussion of the individual’s relationship to society through morality will be the other parameter in this context. I believe these two fundamental points will contextualize the tautological abstraction in modern society.

A) ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE OF NATURE AND SOCIETY

What makes me focus on the notion of ‘tautology’ is that it signifies the role of the state of nature in its relation to society. That there is a human nature is certain. By virtue of this, there should be certainty in the acts of man or acts will be in certain manners. That men in the natural state have the desire to hurt each other embodies this certainty in the understanding of nature. Then what do we mean by nature or state? In order to take this debate a step further, it is important to put an emphasis on Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and David Hume, who theorized the notion of nature in different times.

⁵⁴ The Human Condition, p. 38.

1. Hobbesian State of Nature

First of all, Thomas Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, articulates that nature is *by the art of man*, insofar as the art is made by God and controls the world. “For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.”⁵⁵ *Leviathan*, as an artificial man, bears connotations of the fact that “pacts and covenants set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation.”⁵⁶ To preserve peace and “government of mankind,” men come together to make “covenants” and “conditions” that are related to being born fit for society. Hobbes tries to explain what he means by being a creature born fit for a society not by nature but through education. That is to say, society is not the natural acquisition of men, but it is constituted by togetherness with pacts or covenants. This is not to neglect the relationship between state of nature and society. The state of nature functions with the desire to create bonds between each other by coming together.

Human nature consists of some faculties like nutrition, motion, generation, sense and reason, which he uses to define ‘man.’ The importance of these faculties is that they put an emphasis on man’s natural condition in his relation to society. In his words, by elaborating the faculties of man “...we will declare in the first place what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bear towards each other, and whether, and by what faculty they are born, apt for society, and to preserve themselves against mutual violence; then proceeding, we will show what advice was necessary to be taken for this business, and what are the conditions of society, or of human peace; that is to say, (changing the words only) what are the fundamental

⁵⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 7.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

laws of nature.”⁵⁷ These faculties are divided into two: faculties of body and mind. In general, it can be thought as four kinds: *bodily strength*, *experience*, *reason* and *passion*. In particular, he sorts the faculties (powers) of the body as nutritive, motive and generative. And the main faculty of the mind is cognition.

“For the understanding of what I mean by the power cognitive, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the image thereof, and of all those things which he had before seen and perceived in it; every man by his own experience knowing that the absence or destruction of things once imagined, doth not cause the absence or destruction of the imagination itself.”⁵⁸

What happens in the body of man is called an endeavor. This endeavor, as motion, is called either “desire” or “appetite”; but it is “aversion” when it is directed away and “appetite” when directed toward something. To apply these two principles on man’s condition, this can be said: “so also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object.”⁵⁹ Because these exert an influence on the motion of bodies of men over pleasure or hate, or urge them toward or away from the object. That is:

“But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no Commonwealth; or, in a Commonwealth, from the

⁵⁷ Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive or The Citizen*, Appleton-Aentury-Crofts Incorporated, 1949, p. 21.

⁵⁸ Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, Cambridge University Press, 1928, p. 4.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 32.

person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof.”⁶⁰

In respect to a mechanical connection between human nature and motion, man in the state of nature desires good or the will to hurt. Therefore, the linear relationship between behaviour, motion and human nature can be seen in *De Cive* under the title of “Of The State of Man Without Civil Society”: “for every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth, by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward.”⁶¹

Men, who are made equal by nature in body, mind and their abilities, exert an influence upon their relationship with each other. So, “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.”⁶² In the state of nature, men do not enjoy companionship with others. In this situation, there are three principles: “competition,” “diffidence” and “glory.” The first principle stimulates “gain”; the second “safety”; and the third “reputation.” The most remarkable point in Hobbes is that “nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience.”⁶³ A known reality in Hobbes is that men have the desire to hurt each other if there is no power to control them: “the original of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had towards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each other.”⁶⁴ Broadly speaking, in the presence of mutual fear “it is manifest, that during the time

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 33.

⁶¹ *De Cive or The Citizen*, p. 26.

⁶² *Leviathan*, p. 82.

⁶³ Ibid. p. 84.

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 82.

men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man.”⁶⁵

Therefore, in the state of nature, everyone is directed by his own reason and they seek self-preservation. So, *lex naturalis*, the law of nature, as a general rule, is “found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”⁶⁶

Therefore, as a general rule of reason and the first fundamental law of nature, “every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.”⁶⁷ Secondly, seeking peace stems from the other: “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; nature and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.”⁶⁸ In this framework of analysis, two terms – the right of nature having the liberty to use man’s own power “for the preservation of his own nature” and transferring the right that is abandonment of bondage or obligation – lead men to build up the contract.

Accordingly, due to the fact that pacts or covenants are the complementary aspect of contract, it is expressed in *Leviathan*, that “both parts may contract now, to perform hereafter: in which cases, he that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith; and the failing of performance (if it be voluntary) violation of faith.”⁶⁹ And those covenants are obligatory in order to enjoy one other’s company. So, the consideration of oath, as a form of speech to guarantee promises, has no contribution to obligation. This is why Hobbes insists that “for a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of

⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 84.

⁶⁶ *Leviathan*, p. 86.

⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 87.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 89.

God, without the oath, as much as with it: if unlawful, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an oath.”⁷⁰ That is to say, in the event there is no government or mutual fear, men are liable to civil war. From his point of view, it can be said that “the passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.”⁷¹ Hobbes considers society in the sense of bonds, not mere meetings. Even if you choose to enter into the society rationally, you compulsorily bind yourself with conditions, pacts or covenants.

2. John Locke’s Formation of Society Over The State of Nature

John Locke, in the “Second Treatise on Civil Government,” elaborates on the state of nature in order to understand the “political power right.” He writes that “all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power.”⁷² Therefore, the matter becomes that “what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a *state of perfect freedom* to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.”⁷³

Also, it is accepted that all men are born into the same advantages with the same faculties and without subjugation. For this reason, Locke claims that “all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and *preservation of all mankind*, the *execution* of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 95.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 86.

⁷² John Locke, *The Two Treatises of Civil Government*(Hollis ed.), The Online Library of Liberty, 2010, p. 95.

⁷³ Ibid. p. 97.

transgressors of that law to such a degree.”⁷⁴ On account of such equality, “as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, *by the right he has of preserving all mankind*, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature has a power to kill a murderer, both *to deter* others from doing the like injury.”⁷⁵ Generally speaking, in parallelity of state of nature and society or by the essential law of nature within the self-preservation of *Being*, John Locke clearly defines that “men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is *properly the state of nature*.”⁷⁶

In this way, it follows that the state of nature is not free from the state of war, as a state of *destruction or enmity*. Also, it is “a sedate settled design upon another man’s life puts *him in a state of war* with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel.”⁷⁷ Then, Locke, by putting forward a difference between state of war and nature, asserts that “some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another.”⁷⁸

As a matter of fact, in transition from the state of nature to an association for the protection, he primarily stipulates that the “state of war” is “one great reason of men’s putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by *appeal*, there the continuance of the *state of war* is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power.”⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 98.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 100.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 102.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 103.

⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 104.

On the other hand, we have to add that there ought to be separation between civil and political society. Locke reminds us: “GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into *society*, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it.”⁸⁰ Prior to political and civil society, *conjugal society* is the first form of a compact that is voluntarily achieved between men and women; and however, “tho’ it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection.”⁸¹ In the notion of state of nature, man is entitled with *perfect freedom* in order to enjoy impulses of the law of nature “equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it.”⁸²

The essential condition for the establishment of political society is that “every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it.”⁸³ The difference between the society and the state of nature is that men establish a law within an authority in order to take common decision to punish offences. Otherwise, if each man is in the *perfect state of nature*, there ought to be common *judge* or *executioner* in order to settle same rules for all. That is to say, “by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 128.

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 128.

⁸² Ibid. p. 131.

⁸³ Ibid.

that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in *political society* together.”⁸⁴ To sum up, “where-ever therefore any number of men is so united into one society, as to quit everyone his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a *political or civil society*.”⁸⁵ “And this *puts men* out of a state of nature *into* that of a *commonwealth*, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the common-wealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it.”⁸⁶ John Locke claims that there have been a few examples of community where men live in their state of nature or natural condition. Simply to maintain togetherness, they united themselves into one body within the demand for society due to the inconvenient conditions in the state of nature.

Man’s entrance into civil society means resigning from the punishment of offences that are against the *law of nature*. Therefore, “civil society being a state of peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their *legislative*, that the members of a common-wealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body.”⁸⁷ That is to say, the state of nature and society are not the same thing. Thus, in parallel to the political one, “that which makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into *one political society*, is the agreement which everyone has with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and so be one distinct common-wealth.”⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 132.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 186.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

The reason men incorporate themselves into a society, as a compact and individually, is “the preservation of their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society.”⁸⁹ At the same time, as an exception, it is already stated by Locke; “for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature.”⁹⁰ Even though, Norbert Elias underlines the current usage of the term individual as autonomous, or the fact that “the primary function of the term ‘individual’ is to express the idea that every human being in the world is or should be an autonomous entity, and at the same time that each human being is in certain respects different to all others, and perhaps ought to be different,”⁹¹ the composition of a society from separate entities seeking self-preservation makes ‘distance’ inevitable.

3. David Hume’s Resignable State of Nature

The idea of mutual harm in Hobbes or the idea of interest in Hume is linked to the notion of society: “NOTHING is more certain, than that men are, in a great measure, governed by interest, and that even when they extend their concern beyond themselves, ‘tis not to any great distance; nor is it usual for them, in common life, to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance.”⁹² In *The political essays*, David Hume states that “man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit,”⁹³ and “order in society is much better maintained by means of government; and our duty to the

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 148.

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 101.

⁹¹ Norbert Elias, *The Society of Individuals*, ed. Michael Schröter, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Continuum, 2001, p. 156.

⁹² David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Clarendon Press, 1965, p. 534.

⁹³ David Hume, *Political Essays*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 20.

magistrate is more strictly guarded by the principles of human nature than our duty to our fellow-citizens.”⁹⁴

At the same time, he puts an emphasis on three essential laws of nature to maintain society: the stability of possession, its transference by consent and the performance of promises. To him, without those, it is not possible to preserve the peace and security of society, in the sense that society becomes a “well-being” of men. Regarding what he states in “A Treatise of Human Nature,” society prevents men from falling into their *wretched* condition in the state of nature. Such a quality of human nature, which is “wretched” and “savage,” not only endangers society, but also any ‘remedy,’ which only can occur with the principle of consent. So, “if men be incapable of themselves to prefer remote to contiguous, they will never consent to anything, which wou’d oblige them to such a choice, and contradict, in so sensible a manner, their natural principles and propensities.”⁹⁵ In parallel to Hobbes’ “pacted” society, David Hume articulates that “the state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and must subsist with the conjunction of many families, and long after the first generation.”⁹⁶ He also determines three principles of government: public interest, right to power and right to property.

At the same time, there are other principles: “self-interest,” “fear” and “affection”: “when men have once perceiv’d the necessity of government to maintain peace, and execute justice, they wou’d naturally assemble together, wou’d chuse magistrates, determine their power, and promise them obedience.”⁹⁷ In other words, just as the necessity for a contract or covenant as government is shown in David Hume, he insists that “the people, if we trace government to its first origin in the woods and desarts, are the source of all power and jurisdiction, and

⁹⁴ Political Essays, p. 21.

⁹⁵ A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 536.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 541.

⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 541..

voluntarily, for the sake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and companion.”⁹⁸ In addition, such a consideration makes Hume’s principle of justice necessarily a key point for society within property relations: “As the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, which require mutual abstinence from property, in order to preserve peace among mankind; it is evident, that, when the execution of justice would be attended with very pernicious consequences, that virtue must be suspended, and give place to public utility, in such extraordinary and such pressing emergencies.”⁹⁹

As already implied, men, as source of ‘power’ ‘and jurisdiction,’ choose to found an association with their consent by subjecting themselves to an authority. On condition that they quit their state of nature or “native liberty,” government is first established based on contract and consent. If it is needed to be more precise, he brings forward that “we must assert, that every particular government, which is lawful, and which imposes any duty of allegiance on the subject, was, at first, founded on consent and a voluntary compact.”¹⁰⁰

B) ON THE MORAL ASPECT OF MODERN SOCIETY

As mentioned in the previous sections, the state of nature and morality are the main components of society in forming and operating it. It can be considered that morality is the reflection of man’s nature. Hobbes, Hume and Locke develop a theory on society in parallel with the notion of state of nature. For example, according to Thomas Hobbes, the essential law of nature is to seek peace and to accommodate oneself to others. To break this law is *ingratitude*. Otherwise, he would not say that “man is apt for society” by state of nature or right:

“For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in men’s aptness to society, a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of

⁹⁸ Political Essays, p. 187.

⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 202.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 189.

affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of figure, takes more room from others, than itself fills; and for the hardness, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of nature, will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of society, as cumbersome thereunto.”¹⁰¹

Taking all these points into consideration, it can be said that the relationship between the state of nature and society is not without the notion of morality. For the sake of the maintenance of the social order, the fundamental theme of morality is that it represents the way the harmony is realized. To enjoy each other’s company is possible with the resignation from the state of nature and with morality; insofar as morality is used in the sense of public harmony with customs. Regarding Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, morality corresponds to the laws of nature divided into natural and positive. “Natural are those which have been laws from all eternity; and are called not only natural, but also moral laws; consisting in the moral virtues, as justice, equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace, and charity.”¹⁰² He has already taught us that the role of the law of nature is to preserve life and to forbid the doing of something injurious toward society. Because the condition of man is the condition of war, the laws of nature, as the grounds of morality, are “immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful.”¹⁰³ Broadly speaking, as a matter of moral philosophy, it “is the science of what is good, and evil, in the conversation, and society of mankind.”¹⁰⁴

John Locke signifies that moral principles as an agreement of all, claims that morality functions to preserve “compacts” is also in relation to divine rule. In this context, it is noteworthy that he puts an emphasis on divine rule: “for God, having, by an inseparable

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p. 101.

¹⁰² Ibid. p. 189.

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 105.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

connexion, joined virtue and public happiness together; and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do.”¹⁰⁵ Precisely, for him, “the great principle of morality, ‘to do as one would be done to’; is more commended than practised.”¹⁰⁶ In addition, moral principles bring restrictions to desires and “human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumstances, they are framed into distinct complex ideas, are, as has been shown, so many mixed modes, a great part whereof have names annexed to them.”¹⁰⁷ Exceptionally, Locke proposes that it is not enough to say that there is only certain type of action that should be known to be morally good or bad. Describing good and evil as pleasure or pain, what it is meant by moral good is “the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker: which good and evil pleasure or pain, attending our observance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward and punishment.”¹⁰⁸

According to Thomas Hobbes, the separation between good and evil stems from pleasure or displeasure: “Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common distinction of good and evil.”¹⁰⁹ The analysis on the virtues and vices completes the discussion on morality. In this regard, David Hume asserts that “moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever mental quality

¹⁰⁵ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Thomas Davison, 1825, p. 24.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* p. 250.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p. 251.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, Cambridge University Press, 1928, p. 18.

in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflexion, is of course virtuous; as everything of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious.”¹¹⁰

Regarding the moral rules, Hume supposes three laws – divine law, civil law and philosophical law – to which morality is related. These laws refer to human actions. From this consideration, he focuses on these three laws. Firstly, the law of God or divine law, as “the only true touchstone of moral rectitude,” is that God intervenes in men’s actions. In parallel with Hobbes, he writes that “for the law of nature, which is also the moral law, is the law of the author of nature, God Almighty; and the law of God, taught by our Saviour Christ, is the moral law.”¹¹¹ Secondly, civil law, again in reference to actions, is that men be judged to reveal whether they are criminal or not. Thirdly and lastly, the philosophical law or the law of opinion, is that in which virtue or vice is measured. Concordantly, Hume asserts this: “so that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions, or by what standard so ever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, they consist only, and are made up of collections of simple ideas, which we originally received from sense or reflection, and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law.”¹¹²

David Hume, regarding morality, articulates that “morality is a subject that interests us above all others: we fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it; and ‘tis evident, that this concern must make our speculations appear more real and solid, than where the subject is, in a great measure, indifferent to us.”¹¹³ Hence the essence of morality is linked to agreement or disagreement with reason. Furthermore, it becomes the fact that “morality is more properly felt than judg’d of; tho’ this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our common custom of taking

¹¹⁰ A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 575.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 105.

¹¹² Ibid. p. 256.

¹¹³ A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 455.

all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other.”¹¹⁴ That is to say, “all morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it.”¹¹⁵

However, David Hume develops another argument on the place of morality in the society by questioning its need to answer the question of whether, since government is a human invention, we ought to have moral duty or not? Exertion of some restraints on *natural* appetites is urgently required. Of course, natural obligation is not alone in the maintenance of society; there is also “the moral obligations of honour and conscience.” Thus, it is already known that “all men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain peace and order; and all men are sensible of the necessity of peace and order for the maintenance of society.”¹¹⁶ In other words, “for as all government is plainly an invention of men, and the origin of most governments is known in history, ‘tis necessary to mount higher, in order to find the source of our political duties, if we wou’d assert them to have any natural obligation of morality.”¹¹⁷

Furthermore, thinking of modernity’s morality as a rational formation, it can be summarized with the fact that the rational formation of morality envisages or justifies man’s individual and isolated existence in society. Morality is not only an individual’s relation to customs, but also an existential imposition on another by another. At the same time, modernity allows the individual to experience and practice their identities as moral commitment or moral conscience, also with respect to the relation established with space.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 498.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p. 517.

¹¹⁶ Political Essays, p. 20.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. More plainly, I will discuss the moral duty in societal relationship later. First, it is necessary to outline under what conditions societies are founded, regarding human nature over rational choices of pacts or government. As mentioned above, Hume adds two more principles: first invention and moral obligation. To overcome inconveniences, as a remedy, these become for him a necessity for society in which the three fundamental laws of nature are needed: the stability of possession, its transference by consent, the performance of promises.

III. ON THE CRISIS OF MULTICULTURALISM

The most popular definitions of multiculturalism as a form of coexistence are based on the explanation of it as a togetherness of diversities. The notions of individual and society remain the same and untouched. By which I mean that *Being* remains composed of identity, which is sexual – male or female – or national. From this consideration, Will Kymlicka describes multiculturalism as “characterized as a feel-good celebration of ethno-cultural diversity, encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, music, and cuisine that exist in a multi-ethnic society.”¹¹⁸ In this respect he signifies that “all struggles for multiculturalism share in common a rejection of earlier models of the unitary, homogenous nation state.”¹¹⁹ From this perspective he asks, “what does it mean for citizens with different cultural identities, often based on ethnicity, race, gender, or religion, to recognize ourselves as equals in the way we are treated in politics?”¹²⁰

Plural or not, multiculturalism is a political response to explain the involvement of “others” into homogeneity – mainly via migration – which is society or state. In another sense, multiculturalism is constituted on the basis of modern society. And multiculturalism carries out its practices with different perspectives, which can be considered constitutional recognitions or official policies. The question here is not developing or inventing different multicultural policies to recognize cultural identities and to create a tolerant life. Recent decades in the West have been based on the reproduction of policies by presupposing those diversities through identities. Only definitions of states have been exposed to change in terms of multiculturalism. States that are national have distinct social, cultural, economic or

¹¹⁸ Will Kymlicka, *The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies*, in —The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices(eds.) Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, Routledge, 2010, p. 33.

¹¹⁹ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating The New International Politics of Diversity*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 61.

¹²⁰ Amy Gutmann , Introduction, in “Multiculturalism: Examining The Politics of Recognition”, ed. Amy Gutmann, Princeton University Press, 1994.

religious practices, something that even Will Kymlicka accepts. They are treated as if they are historical facts:

“Until recently, most states around the world have aspired to be ‘nation-states’. In this model, the state was implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) seen as the possession of a dominant national group which used the state to privilege its identity, language, history, culture, literature, myths, religions, and so on, and which defined the state as the expression of its nationhood. Anyone who did not belong to this dominant group was subject to either assimilation or exclusion.”¹²¹

The main emphasis is that the notion of the multicultural state took over the nation-state as an old idea. Thus, he explains this transformation of nation-state, or answers the question of what a multicultural state looks like, by not denying that there can be differences from one country to another: “it accepts that individuals should be able to access state institutions, and to act as full and equal citizens in political life, without having to hide or deny their ethnocultural identity.”¹²² This is the greatest scheme of struggles for multiculturalism politics; that the state does not belong to a dominant group and implements recognition policies instead of assimilation and exclusion. In accordance with his liberal multicultural argument, a liberal notion of multiculturalism guarantees the protection of the rights of ethnocultural groups. The question is not one of transforming a state into more egalitarian, tolerant, or democratic one:

“As a doctrine of tolerance of ‘ethnic’ difference, it preached a change of consciousness, leaving social structures and institutions largely unchanged. The liberal imperative to ‘tolerate’ cultural difference, predicated though it is on a doctrine of equal rights, is inherently hierarchical, the structural privilege and prerogative of the ‘majority’; for in what sense can a minoritised culture be asked to ‘tolerate’ the majority or ‘national’ culture that assigns it the marginal status of a minority? Such are some of the charges levelled against multiculturalism for its ‘culturalism’, or its tendency to translate racial, ethnic and sexual difference as cultural diversity, inequality as multiplicity.”¹²³

¹²¹ Multicultural Odysseys, p. 62.

¹²² Ibid. p. 66.

¹²³ David Bennett, Introduction, in “Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity”, ed. David Bennett, Routledge, 1998, p. 6.

The problem is the identification of individuals categorically. Multiculturalism is a contemporary example of this process and is always taken into account at the state level. As soon as a deadly attack or problem occurs, as in the case of Anders Breivik, the fundamental concern turns to a debate in which multiculturalism is criticized as policy in order to find remedies for xenophobia, discrimination, etc. Who can guess that multiculturalism, as a concept, will prevail? There is no difference between refraining from the use of race and promotion of the concept of culture. Culture, like race, denotes individuals as symbolical and categorical entities, which fixes behaviour.

I aim to approach the question ontologically by signifying the notion of singularity and community. Humans can be together singly together; therefore in plurality. Such an approach will not take this issue as a solution for the crisis of society. Rather, it is a response to the ‘anxiety of coexistence’. Reproduction of new policies in concepts like society, and individuals who have categories of identity, nationality or sexuality, only justifies the ‘crisis of society’ and neglects the anxiety. In addition, nation-state – be it modern, multicultural or not – exists with its practices as either homogenous or assimilative. Otherwise multiculturalism is no more than the destruction of any nation-state, the supporters of which do not wish to see. Here is the destruction plan of the former governor of Colorado:

“I would then invent ‘multiculturalism’ and encourage immigrants to maintain their own culture. I would make it an article of belief that all cultures are equal: that there are no cultural differences that are important.”¹²⁴

In the summer 2011 edition of “The Social Contract” journal, which had the theme of “Crime and Immigration,” Michael Cutler clarifies what I mean by nation-state practices: the purpose of our nation’s immigration laws is to keep out foreign nationals (aliens) whose presence in

¹²⁴ Richard D. Lamm, I Have a Plan to Destroy America and Many Parts of It Are Underway, *The Social Contract*, 2004, p. 180.

our nation would be harmful or even dangerous. This implies the necessity and the importance of new concepts that do not carry any categorical meanings. Beings or existence have horizontal relations – not hierarchical – between each other, without presupposing any category of identity. By using modern concepts like individual and society, it is not possible to explain forms of togetherness or togetherness itself. In itself, the term individual refers to an indivisible one or substantial form. Descartes asserts that *substance*, as a thing, tells us of existence without dependence on the other. That is to say, it cannot say anything about coexistence. This is why singularity-community discussions are necessary to think about coexistence without identity, being substance.

CHAPTER 4

From Heideggerian point of view, it can be said that *Being* comports itself towards the *Other*. This is different to what Thomas Hobbes meant by “to accommodate oneself” with others, as the main principle of modern society. “To accommodate oneself” means that men adapt themselves to others harmonically for security or protection from mutual fear; because man, in the state of nature, has a desire to hurt the other. Therefore, the fundamental parameter of society becomes a ‘desire to come together,’ which is based on ‘lack of security.’ ‘Comporting oneself’ with other *Beings* does not express the ‘desire to come together.’ I refer to community, which is neither a necessity nor desire. It is non-closed, finite and non-immanent community. It is what happens to singular *Beings* who are in-common:

“Being is with Being; it does not ever recover itself, but it is near to itself, beside itself, in touch with itself, its very self, in the paradox of that proximity where distancing and strangeness are revealed. We are each time an other, each time with others. With does not indicate the sharing of a common situation any more than the juxtaposition of pure exteriorities does.”¹²⁵

The question is not to identify *Beings* categorically, or to give them any identification, at all. This creates an organic relationship with society or others. Being identified is not simply to carry a ‘title.’ At the same time, it is to possess characteristics of that title, as common property. Thus, the description of a *Being* as an individual who is German or Kurdish makes reference to a society, which reduces them to a sphere of fixed relationship and behavior. By which I mean that individual and society are confronted with the norms of identity as common property. This is why there is the need to reformulate the notions of individual and society. The first claim is that *Being*, which is singular, is naked. In this sense, singular *Being* is neither a title nor property. They are not born into a collectivity. On the contrary, the community happens to them. Therefore, we ought to discuss singularity at the ontological

¹²⁵ Being Singular Plural, p. 35.

level and within its ethical relation to community. The ontological expression of being singular or its co-existentiality with community, assuredly, can be found in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Heidegger mentions existence through Dasein in this work. Heidegger signifies that Dasein exists with or relates itself to other *Beings*. In “Being and Time,” Heidegger says: “Dasein is essentially Being-with”¹²⁶ and “Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with.”¹²⁷ “To exist then means, among other things, to be as comporting with beings.”¹²⁸ Thus that is to claim that “Being is singularly plural and plurally singular.”¹²⁹

I. ON THE ONTOLOGICAL EXPRESSION OF SINGULARITY

The haecceity¹³⁰ of the singularity is that it addresses somewhere else, rather than the term individual, who has nature, identity or structure. In other words, haecceity (thisness) denotes that it is not a qualitative property of substance. Therefore, it is not identifiable. In this regard, “singularity never takes place at the level of atoms, those identifiable if not identical identities.”¹³¹ The critical point here is to analyze it through some concepts like Jean Luc Nancy’s analysis of *ecstasy* and *clinamen*. Nevertheless, the first step ought to scrutinize the ontological expression of singularity through its plurality. While I discuss Jean Luc Nancy, I will also be in dialogue with Giorgio Agamben’s theory of “whatever singularity.”

The primary task in the formulation of Nancy’s point ought to elaborate that *we are meaning*. In other words, there ought to be an outline of the ‘meaning’ of *Being*. In fact, the ‘meaning’ that is ‘lost’ is us:

“Whether it is aware of it or not, the contemporary discourse on meaning goes much further and in a completely different direction: it

¹²⁶ Being and Time, p. 156.

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 157.

¹²⁸ Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 157.

¹²⁹ Being Singular Plural, p. 25.

¹³⁰ The term derives from Latin *haecceitas*. Haec means ‘this’. It refers to non-qualitative property of *Being*.

¹³¹ Jean Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, Simona Swahney, Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991, p. 6.

brings to light the fact that ‘meaning,’ used in this absolute way, has become the bared [*dénudé*] name of our being-with-one-another. We do not ‘have’ meaning anymore, because we ourselves are meaning - entirely, without reserve, infinitely, with no meaning other than ‘us’.”¹³²

The meaning signifies sharing. In Nancy’s words, “meaning is itself the sharing of Being.”¹³³

In other words, the meaning of *Being* is being common. And the meaning of *Being* does not imply any “givenness,” in contrast to modern *Being* which is qualified as ‘substance’ or *res* (thing). In addition, Giorgio Agamben’s conception of “whatever singularity,” being “such as it is,” can make a contribution to such a meaning of *Being*, even if it does not seem to be in the same context Jean Luc Nancy mentions. That is to say, if *whatever* is translated not in the sense of that which does not matter, it refers to “being such that it always matters.” Then, “the whatever in question here relates to singularity not in its indifference with respect to a common property (to a concept, for example: being red, being French, being Muslim), but only in its being *such as it is*.”¹³⁴ Additionally, this tells us that *Being* is detached from any category or belongingness to a common qualification. Thus the meaning of *Being* does not signify any category or property. “In this conception, such-and-such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims) – and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its *being-such*, for belonging itself.”¹³⁵

To return to the discussion, this meaning is that it is in circulation and shared.

In other words, the meaning of *Being* can be also signified as: “Being cannot *be* anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the *with* and as the *with* of this singularly plural coexistence.”¹³⁶ Thus, “circulation – or eternity – goes in all directions, but it moves only

¹³² Being Singular Plural, p. 1.

¹³³ Being Singular Plural, p. 2.

¹³⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community* trans. Michael Hardt, University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 1.

¹³⁵ Ibid. p. 2. To put it in different way, singularity implies incommensurability. If we recall Bataille’s definition of homogeneity, which I mentioned above, this is why the community of singularities cannot be homogenous. So there are no fixed and commensurable human relations.

¹³⁶ Being Singular Plural, p. 3.

insofar as it goes from one point to another; spacing is its absolute condition. From place to place, and from moment to moment, without any progression or linear path, bit by bit and case by case, essentially accidental, it is singular and plural in its very principle.”¹³⁷ It can then be said that there is no “continuity” between singulars. Rather, Nancy claims that there is contiguity between them. This tells us that the multiplicity of *Being* is “dislocated” or “disposition.” Therefore, “the plurality of beings is at the foundation [fondment] of Being.”¹³⁸

Nevertheless, language also speaks:

“Let us say we for all being, that is, for every being, for all beings one by one, each time in the singular of their essential plural. Language speaks for all and of all: for all, in their place, in their name, including those who may not have a name. Language says what there is of the world, nature, history and humanity, and it also speaks for them as well as in view of them, in order to lead the one who speaks, the one through whom language comes to be and happens (“man”), to all of being, which does not speak but which is nevertheless-stone, fish, fiber, dough, crack, block, and breath.”¹³⁹

The question is how language speaks. According to Giorgio Agamben, the paradox is that language attaches *Being* and its meaning to a “common property.” He gives such an example: “The word ‘tree’ designates all trees indifferently; insofar as it posits the proper universal significance in place of singular ineffable trees (*terminus supponit significatum pro re*).” Agamben also proclaims that “linguistic” being belongs to a class, but signifies “singularity.” In his words, “linguistic being (being-called) is a set (the tree) that is at the same time a singularity (*the tree, a tree, this tree*); and the mediation of meaning, expressed by the symbol £, cannot in any way fill the gap in which only the article succeeds in moving about freely.”¹⁴⁰ After an inquiry into what “meaning” means, principles can now be set out that will play a complementary role in the singularity’s ontological expression. According to Jean Luc Nancy,

¹³⁷ Ibid. p. 5.

¹³⁸ Ibid. p. 12.

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ *Coming Community*, p. 9.

“the ontology of the ‘common’ and ‘share’ would not be other than the ontology of ‘Being’ radically removed from all ontology of substance, of order and origin.”¹⁴¹

A) *BEING IS NOT A SUBSTANCE*

Therefore, it is neither a thing nor a property.

There are two historical developments that avoid our thinking that *Being* is a thing and has a purpose in its existence. Firstly, monotheism imposed ‘purposiveness’ and a ‘theological character’ on *Beings*. That is to say, there is an ultimate purpose and essence of existence. And these must be an endless faith in God. Secondly, modernity attached substantial meaning to *Beings*, like being a thing or indivisible entity that can exist alone. In this part I will refer to a modern understanding of *Being*.

When I say “modern understanding of *Being*,” I place emphasis on substantial *Being*, which is a thing or an object. As mentioned before, Descartes puts forward that substance can exist independently from others. According to Heidegger, “substances become accessible in their ‘attributes’, and every substance has some distinctive property from which the essence of the substantiality of that definite substance can be read off.”¹⁴² *Being* is considered through substantiality. It seems this is one of the reasons why Jean Luc Nancy signifies singular *Being*, the substantial condition of which ought to be “undone” or “dislocated.” Needless to say, *Being* as *res* (thing) that carries some qualities or categories such as identity has been located extensionally. By which I mean that *Being* has been located in the world. Contrastingly, Jean Luc Nancy asserts that there is no substance of *Being* and that it does not exist as a state or quality; it is an action and ought to be dislocated.

¹⁴¹ Jean Luc Nancy, Tracy B. Strong, *La Comparution /The Compearance: From the Existence of “Communism” to the Community of “Existence”*, *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Aug., 1992), p. 374.

¹⁴² *Being and Time*, p. 73.

The presupposition of *Being* as substance means that it does not need anyone to exist. That is to say, it can exist alone. My essential claim is that *Being* is always with others or is not without others. Therefore, “*Being* cannot *be* anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the *with* and as the *with* of this singularly plural coexistence.”¹⁴³ Then, in this context, society, which is composed of single substances, becomes no more than the togetherness of separate entities. There is no piece of coexistence, only sharing of the existence.

How and why the tradition has folded and closed the concept of being in-common within the concept of an essence of community is not something I seek to examine. But I start from the idea that such a concept – the concept of community as essence – is in effect the closure of the political. Such a concept constitutes closure because it assigns to community a *common being*, whereas community is a matter of something quite different, namely, of existence inasmuch as it is *in* common, but without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance.

B) BEING HAS INCLINATION TOWARDS OTHERS

From such a consideration, it is meaningful to say that being singular or singularity is indissociable from its multiplicity. *Being* cannot be one the way individual is: identical, alone, indivisible. By contrast, singular *Being* is relational and plural. That is to claim that it experiences inclination toward others. This is the condition that Jean Luc Nancy names as *clinamen*:

“Singularity never has the nature or the structure of individuality. Singularity never takes place at the level of atoms, those identifiable if not identical identities; rather it takes place at the level of the *clinamen*, which is unidentifiable.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Ibid. p. 3.

¹⁴⁴ The Inoperative Community, p. 7.

This can lead us to think that in any case *Being*, or anything, does not pre-exist. However, *Being* coexists, insofar as “existence is the original singularity of *Being*”¹⁴⁵ and its essence is coessence, which he calls “being-with.” And the “with” principle is *Being* itself. This presents us with the plurality of singular *Being* or being singular. If being singular in plural is the essence of *Being*, there ought to be coessence, or *being-with*. Accordingly, co-essentiality of *Being* is not a totality of essence. Rather, it indicates *the essential sharing of essentiality*: in other words, “if *Being* is being-with, then it is, in its being-with, the ‘with’ that constitutes *Being*; the with is not simply an addition.”¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, “when we say *being-with-one-another*, this is the singular plural in such a way that the singularity of each is indissociable from its being-with-many and *because*, in general, a singularity is indissociable from a plurality.”¹⁴⁷ In his words, *singular is plural*.

In fact, the individual relations within society consider themselves to exist separately from each other. Nevertheless, it can irreducibly be said that “*Being* is not without *Being*, which is not another miserable tautology as long as one understands it in the co-originary mode of being-with-being-itself.”¹⁴⁸ The co- indicates the copresence in *Being*. *Being-with* is not a question of sociality, but rather it is how we are in common. Here, Nancy develops some concepts like “compearance,” “coexistence” and “transimmanence,” which enable him to discuss a plural community. I will clarify these concepts later under another title.

Nancy’s ontological formulation of *Being* which is plural also shows how we are *in* the world that is external to existence. *In*, italicized, derives from *innan* which means to reside. On the other hand, *an* signifies “I am familiar with.” *I am* or *ich bin* refers to “residing alongside.” *Being*, as the infinitive form of *I am*, is already “to reside alongside,” “to be familiar with.”

¹⁴⁵ *Being Singular Plural*, p. 18.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 30.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 32.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 38.

Thus, Heidegger's analysis guides us to the fact that being-in-the world is the basic state of Dasein. In his words, "Being-in is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state."¹⁴⁹ Therefore, we can infer that *Being-in* indicates *Being-with*, which is the condition of coexistence. Then, being in the world is be together. That is to say, being in the world is not being without others. It is to be with others. This "with" is one of fundamental principles of being singular plural: "the 'with' is or constitutes the mark of unity/disunity, which in itself does not designate unity or disunity as that fixed substance which would undergird it."¹⁵⁰ Heidegger accentuates:

"In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated 'I' without Others is just as far from being proximally given. If, however, 'the Others' already *are there with us [mitdasind]* in Being-in-the-world, and if this is ascertained phenomenally, even this should not mislead us into supposing that the *ontological* structure of what is thus 'given' is obvious, requiring no investigation"¹⁵¹.

C) *BEING IS BEING SINGULAR PLURAL*

I ought to reformulate singularity. Nancy brings forward the Latin origin of singularity. The meaning of the term *singuli* already exhibits plurality. The reason is that "it designates the one as belonging to one by one."¹⁵² Therefore, the singular is plural and cannot be dissociated from its multiplicity. It exhibits itself also as *ego* that it is not a subject or ipseity, not in the sense of *the relation of a self to itself*: "As a result, it is also always an instance of with: singulars singularly together, where the togetherness is neither the sum, nor the incorporation [*englobant*], nor the society, nor the community."¹⁵³ *Being* signifies "with," and being in common. Even coming into the world is nothing more than being in common. In other words,

¹⁴⁹ Being and Time, p. 80.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 61.

¹⁵¹ Being and Time, p. 152.

¹⁵² Being Singular Plural, p. 32.

¹⁵³ Ibid. p. 33.

Being is always in common, because its ontological condition is not independent of others. Therefore, it is not independent of exposure to others. This does not mean the establishing of an organic relationship between *Being* and others. Furthermore, being in common is not the totality of substances. It is to share existence. Therefore, *Beings* are already plural and in common. Conversely, individual brings something else to mind. According to Nancy, “it immediately evokes individualism, the atomism of the ‘solitary crowd,’ the scattering of little egos floating in an empty space or else savagely exercising the rights of the strong over the weak who have no rights at all.”¹⁵⁴

Individual refers to a unity that is atomic and a solitary figure. Therefore, it is an indivisible entity and close to others. There is then the necessity of a contract or compact to open up its *Being* to others by being individually together. When Norbert Elias reformulates the notion of society, he puts forward that it does not happen by plan or the intention of individuals, and that we form it together. In his words, regarding society, “it only exists because a large number of people exist, it only continues to function because many individual people want and do certain things, yet its structure, its great historical transformations, clearly do not depend on the intentions of particular people.”¹⁵⁵ Needless to say, *Being* itself is ‘with’ and it is not without other *Beings*. *Being* is inseparable from its multiplicity:

“From the very start, the structure of the ‘Self,’ even considered as a kind of unique and solitary ‘self,’ is the structure of the ‘with.’ Solipsism, if one wants to use this category, is singular plural. Each one is beside-himself insofar as and because he is beside-others. From the very beginning, then, ‘we’ are with one another, not as points gathered together, or as a togetherness that is divided up, but as a being-with-one-another. Being-with is exactly this: that *Being*, or rather that *to be* neither gathers itself as a resultant *commune* of beings nor shares itself out as their common substance. *To be* is nothing that is in-common, but *nothing as* the dispersal where what is in-common is dis-posed and measured, the in-common as the with, the beside-itself of *to be* as such, *to be* transfixed by its own transitivity: *to be* being all beings, not as

¹⁵⁴ Jean Luc Nancy, *Our World: An Interview*, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 2003, p. 48.

¹⁵⁵ Norbert Elias, *Society of Individuals*, ed. Michael Schroter, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Continuum, 2001, p. 3.

their individual and/or common ‘self,’ but as *the proximity that disperses [écarte] them.*”¹⁵⁶

II. THE COMMUNITY AS A FORM OF ‘BEING TOGETHER’

“We compear: we come together (in) to the world. It is not that there is a simultaneous arrival of several distinct units (as when we go to see a film together) but that here is not a coming (in) to the world that is not radically common; it is even the “common” itself. To come into the world is to be-in-common.”¹⁵⁷

How community has been understood is not independent of historical developments: “a society of the faithful, as in the Middle Ages, or a society of property-owners, as in Locke, or a society relentlessly engaged in a process of acquisition, as in Hobbes, or a society of producers, as in Marx, or a society of jobholders, as in our own society, or a society of labourers, as in socialist and communist countries,”¹⁵⁸ At the same time, it can be said that “community can be exemplified in all kinds of ways, by all kinds of paradigms; the natural family, the Athenian city, the Roman Republic, the first Christian community, corporations, communes, or brotherhoods.”¹⁵⁹ It certainly addresses a form of togetherness taken in different senses. None of them connotes sharing or being in common, in essence. More or less, they contain immanentism, infiniteness and moral standards. On the other hand, even if they refer to togetherness, it lacks of the principles of “with” in terms of coexistence.

The essential emphasis on community is that it is finite and non-immanent. One can describe immanence as the state of being within. According to Deleuze, it is being in itself: “It is not in

¹⁵⁶ Being Singular Plural, p. 96.

¹⁵⁷ La Comparution /The Compearance, p. 374.

¹⁵⁸ The Human Condition, p. 31.

¹⁵⁹ The Inoperative Community, p. 9.

something, to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject”¹⁶⁰. In this regard, immanentism refers to a closed community that produces itself as ‘work.’ In Nancy’s words, “the immanence of man to man, or it is *man*, taken absolutely, considered as the immanent being par excellence, that constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking of community.”¹⁶¹ Immanence is not unique to totalitarian regimes. It also refers to “democracies” and “their fragile juridical parapets.” It is characterized by *Beings* belonging to totalities of other *Beings*. When we define *Being* as relational and plural, this definition rejects immanence and its absolute relation to other *Beings*. At this point, the term ecstasy responds to this immanence and absoluteness. “Ecstasy answers – if it is properly speaking an ‘answer’ – to the impossibility of the absoluteness of the absolute, or to the ‘absolute’ impossibility of complete immanence.”¹⁶² Community is the impossibility of immanence. Nancy signifies this apart from immanence and substantial identity or presence. Here, ecstasy or ecstatic *Being* is a response to absolute immanence: “the question of the community is henceforth inseparable from a question of ecstasy – which is to say, as we are beginning to understand, from the question of *Being* considered as something other than the absoluteness of the totality of being.”¹⁶³

Then why ecstasy or ecstatic *Being*?

Normally, ecstasy is defined as being outside of the self. Ek(out) and stasis(standing) is the origin of the word. In Nancy, the reformulation of the relationship between ecstasy and the possibility of community introduces boundedness between singular beings. In the ecstatic state, the singular being is outside of the self. By being exposed to others, boundaries are

¹⁶⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays On Life*, trans. Anne Boyman, Zone Books, 2001, p, 26.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 3.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* p. 6.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* p. 6.

established. In other words, this state let singular beings become outside of the self by being aware of the other. That is to say, they incline towards each other.

Singular *Beings* experience inclination – not immanence or belongingness – towards others; so they are exposed to others. This is the condition which encompasses ‘ecstasy’ and it is *clinamen* that “opens up being-in-common.”¹⁶⁴ *Clinamen*, which is not a simple atom like individual as an undivided entity, is the inclination towards others. Atomic individuals constitute togetherness which they do not touch other and share their existence. “Community is at least the *clinamen* of the individual.”¹⁶⁵

“Singularity never takes place at the level of atoms, those identifiable if not identical identities; rather it takes place at the level of the *clinamen*, which is unidentifiable. It is linked to ecstasy: one could not properly say that the singular being is the subject of ecstasy, for ecstasy has no ‘subject’ but one must say that ecstasy (community) happens to the singular *being*.”¹⁶⁶

Therefore, ecstasy turns immanence upside down. Regarding ecstasy, Nancy notes: “Strictly speaking, it defines the impossibility, both ontological and gnological, of absolute immanence (or of the absolute, and therefore of immanence) and consequently the impossibility either of individuality, in the precise sense of the term, or of a pure collective totality.”¹⁶⁷ Community is the ecstatic experience of *Beings*. And it is the impossibility of being immanent. “And for us the question of the community is henceforth inseparable from a question of ecstasy – which is to say, as we are beginning to understand, from the question of Being considered as something other than the absoluteness of the totality of beings.”¹⁶⁸

According to Nancy, Bataille was the first to experience community “as space itself the spacing of the experience of the outside, of the outside-of-self.”¹⁶⁹ This presents us *the*

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 4.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 4.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 7.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 6.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 6.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 19

exigency of clear consciousness, which is “everything but that abandonment of community that would favor, for example, a reversion to the positions of the individual.”¹⁷⁰ If an individual is a thing, by mentioning Bataille, Nancy ascertains that it is without communication and community. On the other hand, ecstasy can be interpreted as being ‘outside of the self’ by being conscious of others. In other words, no one can be outside themselves without being conscious of others.

“Clear consciousness of the communal *night* – this consciousness at the extremity of consciousness that is also the suspension of Hegelian desire (of consciousness’s desire for recognition), the finite interruption of infinite desire, and the infinite syncope of finite desire (sovereignty itself: desire outside desire and mastery outside itself) – this “clear” consciousness, then, cannot take place elsewhere than in community, or rather it can only take place as the communication of community: both as what communicates within community, and as what community communicates.”¹⁷¹

Therefore, this clear consciousness can only happen in community. It is realized as *the communication of community*. Therefore, “community, which is not a subject, and even less a subject (conscious or unconscious) greater than ‘myself,’ does not *have* or possess this consciousness: community *is* the ecstatic consciousness of the night of immanence, insofar as such a consciousness is the interruption of self-consciousness.”¹⁷² So, what becomes meaningful and significant is this: “This consciousness – or this communication – is ecstasy: which is to say that such a consciousness is never *mine*, but to the contrary, I only have it in and through the community.”¹⁷³

Furthermore, the question of communication arises. Before anything else, I ought to mention the notions of finitude or being finite. They will contextualize where communication is placed in the community. So, another point in Nancy’s notion of the community is that it is finite. Therefore, the following part ought to clarify the community of finite *Beings*. According to

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 19.

¹⁷¹ Ibid. p. 19.

¹⁷² Ibid. p. 19.

¹⁷³ Ibid. p. 19.

Nancy, finitude and being-in-common are not different from each other. Finite is the constitutive principle of community, insofar as “finite existence” is that which we share. That is to say, community represents singular *Beings*’ mortality and is revealed with the death of others. Singular *Beings* are already finite. “A singular being *appears*, as finitude itself: at the end (or at the beginning), with the contact of the skin (or the heart) of another singular being, at the confines of the *same* singularity that is, as such, always *other*, always shared, always exposed.”¹⁷⁴ In other words, “it is the presentation of the finitude and the irredeemable excess that make up finite being: its death, but also its birth, and only the community can present me my birth, and along with it the impossibility of my reliving it, as well as the impossibility of my crossing over into my death.”¹⁷⁵ Thus if singular *Beings* are finite and mortal, how are we exposed to others through death? What is the inseparable relationship between death and community? These questions will clarify this relationality, as well as the finiteness of the community.

According to Nancy, death was reduced to salvation and was considered the immortality of *Beings*. There is no birth or death that is alone in the universe. That is to say, community is *my existence outside myself* through death and birth. By giving reference to Bataille, Nancy puts forward that death is the communal activity of *Beings*. Nancy puts forward that others happen upon us and this happening signifies *the experience of mortality* in the community. Mortality is known with the finitude of others. In contrast, within monotheism, immortality – life after death – is the fundamental principle. It is said that one must have eternal life after death in the kingdom of God. Therefore, man is made eternal. In the earthly life, if you obey God’s commandments then you can have eternal life.¹⁷⁶ Being finite indicates ‘being together’

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 28.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 15.

¹⁷⁶ In Matthew 19:16-22, Jesus indicates some moral behavior for an eternal life: “Thou shalt do no murder, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness. Honour thy father and [thy] mother: and, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”

and reveals itself as being-in-common. To be finite is the essence of *Being* and it signifies itself as “the sharing of singularities.”¹⁷⁷ Thus:

“Sharing comes down to this: what community reveals to me, in presenting to me my birth and my death, is my existence outside myself. Which does not mean my existence reinvested in or by community, as if community were another subject that would sublimate me, in a dialectical or communal mode. *Community does not sublimate the finitude it exposes. Community itself, in sum, is nothing but this exposition.* It is the community of finite beings and as such it is itself a *finite* community. In other words, not a limited community as opposed to an infinite or absolute community, but a community of finitude, because finitude ‘is’ communitarian, and because finitude alone is communitarian”¹⁷⁸.

In reference to the discussion of communication, finitude shows itself as communication. So how can we consider communication within the community? Communication, which Nancy articulates as communicating with *the gods, the cosmos, animals, the dead, the unknown*, is different in community. Communication – which is neither simply a matter of ‘language’ nor ‘speech’ – is not to be involved in a mutual affair. In contrast with the fact that language is not unique to communication, nor is it an instrument of *Being* or a bond. It is *Being* itself. Therefore, it signifies sharing and community, not simply an affair. Communication tells us that there is common point in a different sense. This difference is that singulars’ relations to or communication with each other is not based on a communion, *self-recognition*, mutual affairs or immanence. In fact:

“These singular beings are themselves constituted by sharing, they are distributed and placed, or rather *spaced*, by the sharing that makes them *others*: other for one another, and other, infinitely other for the Subject of their fusion, which is engulfed in the sharing, in the ecstasy of the sharing: ‘communicating’ by not ‘communing.’ These ‘places of communication’ are no longer places of fusion, even though in them one *passes* from one to the other; they are defined and exposed by their

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 27.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

dislocation. Thus, the communication of sharing would be this very dislocation.”¹⁷⁹

III. THINKING COMMUNITY WITH ETHICS

Ethics is the *transcendental unrepresentability of that most concrete presence*.

Unraveling the description made by Jean Luc Nancy in “Being Singular Plural” is key to my perspective in constituting *Being’s* ethical relation to community. As mentioned above, I have argued that community is a way of plural, co-existential, shared, non-immanent, finite and communicative relations between singular *Beings*. Needless to say it is thus a form of relations. Therefore, from Jean Luc Nancy’s perspective, ethics cannot be treated without relation to an ontological approach. The main concern is to become good as a character, and to seek value for the fulfilment of a good life. This enables us to think of ethics through existentiality, therefore ontology. Thus, the relationship between ethics and ontology cannot be neglected. In other words, if community is co-existentiality of *Beings*, its ethical activities play a complementary role in this relationality.

Then, it is noteworthy that the first task should be to begin with a comprehensive definition. This will determine the way I treat the question of ethical community. Inevitably, ethics, derived from *ethos* (character), deserves further elaboration. Primarily, we have to do this by clarifying the fact that it is a code or a form of act which is ‘aesthetical-existence’ oriented. It is correct that when it is described as a ‘code’ it tells us that it imposes a certain mode of behaviour on human beings. That is to say, it has regulatory power on humans through restrictions and prohibitions for the sake of public harmony with customs. On the website of a project called “The Community Tool Box” which aims at “promoting community health and

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 25. According to Jean Luc Nancy’s interpretation of Rousseau in terms of ‘bond,’ “society comes about as the bond *and* as the separation between those who, in ‘the state of nature,’ being without any bond, are nonetheless not separated or isolated. The ‘societal’ state exposes them to separation, but this is how it exposes ‘man,’ and how it exposes him to the judgment of his fellows. Rousseau is indeed in every sense the thinker par excellence of compearance: it may be that a paranoiac obsession is merely the reverse side – morbid because detained in subjectivity – of the communitarian assignation.” p. 30.

development by connecting people, ideas and resources,” ethics is defined exactly in parallel with that which I mention above: “Ethics is a code of thinking and behaviour governed by a combination of personal, moral, legal, and social standards of what is right.”¹⁸⁰

If ethics is defined as a code then its relation to community is disqualified. It becomes the procedure of community to regulate inter-*Beings* relations. From the very beginning, I have rejected community as not being where *Beings* unite under a ‘oneness,’ like society. The community present itself as the best space for ethical existence of *Beings*. The question then arises: which ethics? Even if it is hard to make a certain explanation, it more or less refers to the relation to self in the sense of seeking the care of the self and aesthetic existence. It is also how we cultivate ourselves in a relationship with others. The relationship with others is linked to the ‘care of the self’ within an aesthetic existence. The meaning of ethics in Antiquity was used in the sense of the ‘care of the self’: “the precept of the ‘care of the self’ was, for the Greeks, one of the main principles of cities, one of the main rules for social and personal conduct and for the art of life.”¹⁸¹ In other words, it is the potentiality of one’s existence.

By this I mean that the potentiality has the potential not to be. Giorgio Agamben evaluates the ‘potentiality to not-be’ in parallel to his thought of “whatever singularity,” which “has no identity, it is not determinate with respect to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather it is determined only through its relation to an *idea*, that is, to the totality of its possibilities.”¹⁸² Since *Beings* are considered substantially, this has meant that they have to be a thing that their ‘potentiality not to be’ has been neglected:

“There is in effect something that humans are and have to be, but this something is not an essence nor properly a thing: *It is the simple fact of one’s own existence as possibility or potentiality*. But precisely because of this things become complicated; precisely because of this ethics

¹⁸⁰ http://ctb.ku.edu/en/tablecontents/sub_section_main_1165.aspx

¹⁸¹ Michel Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity, Truth, in “The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 1”, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and Others, The New Press, 1997, p. 226.

¹⁸² Ibid. p. 67.

becomes effective. Since the being most proper to humankind is being one's own possibility or potentiality, then and only for this reason humans have and feel a debt. Humans, in their potentiality to be and to not-be, are, in other words, always already in debt; they always already have a bad conscience without having to commit any blameworthy act."¹⁸³

Such a potentiality, which is linked to ethics, also expresses how we are exposed to others as well. That is to say, ethics in this meaning reveals that *Being* is expositive. "This is why ethics has no room for repentance; this is why the only ethical experience (which, as such, cannot be a task or a subjective decision) is the experience of being (one's own) potentiality, of being (one's own) possibility – exposing, that is, in every form one's own amorphousness and in every act one's own inactuality"¹⁸⁴

By putting emphasis on this, what I want to say is that ethics is a performance on oneself without any relation to social codes or subjection, but in relation to others. This fact enables us to separate ethics from morality in that sense. Likewise, from Foucault's point of view, ethics is different from the notion of morality, insofar as it contains 'codes of behavior' and 'forms of subjectivation.' Foucault describes the latter explicitly in the third volume of "The History of Sexuality": "that is, in terms of a difficulty in the manner in which the individual could form himself as the ethical subject of his actions, and efforts to find in devotion to self that which could enable him to submit to rules and give a purpose to his existence."¹⁸⁵ The transition from ethics to morality is not only a change in the borderline between good and evil. At the same time, this transition exhibits historical transformation. It is that "the will to be a moral subject and the search for an ethics of existence were, in Antiquity, mainly an attempt to affirm one's liberty and to give to one's own life a certain form in which one could

¹⁸³ Ibid. p. 44.

¹⁸⁴ The Coming Community, p. 44.

¹⁸⁵ Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality: The Care of The Self, Vol. 3, trans., Robert Hurley, Pantheon Books, 1986, p. 95.

recognize oneself, be recognized by others, and which even posterity might take as an example.”¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Michel Foucault, “An Aesthetic of Existence”, in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings of Michel Foucault*, ed., Lawrence D. Kritzman, Routledge, 1990, p. 49.

CHAPTER 5

I. CONCLUSION

In this project, my essential aim has been the demonstration of the relationship between the ontology, ethics and the community. Modern ontology is closely linked with the notion of society. This is same for Christian ontology and communion. Individual *Being* does not only signify a solitary figure in itself; but also in relation to others. This is why there had been different experiences of ‘being together.’ From this perspective, it is very important to discuss a notion of *Being* and community within ethics differently from monotheism and modernity. Ontologically speaking, such a beginning undoes the perception of the togetherness of multiple cultures, identities or substances for the sake of ethical coexistence, or *with*, without becoming a thing. Simon Critchley asserts that “the ontological dimension of the ‘with’ which is the co-existential foundation of any sense of self and any making of sense is always already an *ethos*, an originary ethics.”¹⁸⁷

In this regard, my concern was to focus on morality-oriented forms of being together, since monotheism at the level of Christianity, modern and multicultural society. As mentioned in the introduction, recent developments in Western Europe consider multiculturalism as a failure. These claims overlook another problem: the anxiety of coexistence within the notion of society. In this regard, there is the necessity of reformulating the question of coexistence through the notion of an ethical community by giving examples from historical experience. From this perspective, I have determined two periods in order to examine earlier forms of coexistence: early Christianity and the modern period between Thomas Hobbes and David Hume.

¹⁸⁷ Simon Critchley, *With Being-With? Notes on Jean-Luc Nancy's Rewriting of *Being and Time**, in *after1968.org*, p, 14.

In general, the community in the communist ideal takes human beings as producers and immanent *Beings*: “human beings defined as producers and fundamentally as the producers of their own essence in the form of their labor or their work.” The community I emphasize grapples with the Christian, communist and modern understanding of society, which considers humans as individual and communal *Beings*. Morality is essentially the dominant factor that operates it.

Ethics is not only a relation to the self; but also others. Therefore, ethical togetherness, the community, introduces a co-existential space in order to experience of being singular plural. And it happens to them. That is to say, the community as a form of coexistence offers no sociality of men. Rather, it introduces a possibility of plural and ethical ‘being together,’ because the world of *Beings* is not the sum of all things surrounding us, or the separate existence without the other. It can certainly be said that “the world men are born into contains many things, natural and artificial, living and dead, transient and sempiternal, all of which have in common that they appear and hence are meant to be seen, heard, touched, tasted, and smelled, to be perceived by sentient creatures endowed with appropriate sense organs.”¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, ‘being together’ is not a matter of a compact relationship with each other. It is to share existence.

¹⁸⁸ The Life of The Mind, p. 19.

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