

The White-Collar Participants of Gezi:
The Relationship of the Corporate Youth with the Movement, Discourse and
Collectivity

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The White-Collar Participants of the Gezi Movement:
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Gezi Hareketinin Beyaz Yakalı Katılımcıları:
Kurumsal Gençliğin Eylem, Söylem ve Kollektiviteyle İlişkisi

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ABSTRACT

This thesis primarily focuses on the impacts of neoliberal politics and work culture onto the socio-political behavior, political approaches and means of collective resistance prevalent among white-collar workers. It also analyzes the socio-political expectations of the corporate-working urban youth who are not members of political organizations based on their experiences during the Gezi uprising. Without speculating on their weight in the Gezi movement, I problematize and ask the reasons for the dominance and popularity of the supposed Gezi generation's peaceful and unorganized characteristics.

I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews in order to pay specific attention to the experiences of white collar youth during the Gezi Park occupation and to discuss the notion of the neo-subject in the commentary on the mindsets of the interviewees. I consider the neoliberal subject to be a result of precarization, which is the socio-economic basis that characterizes these particular protestors, and which caused and even produced the docile nature of their participation in the Gezi uprising.

ÖZET

Bu tez neoliberal politikaların ve çalışma kültürünün beyaz yakalıların sosyo-politik davranışları, siyasi tutumları ve kolektif direniş araçlarına olan etkisine odaklanıyor ve Gezi Parkı sürecindeki deneyimlerini göz önüne alarak kurumsal hayatta çalışan şehirli gençliğin sosyal ve siyasi beklentilerini mercek altına alıyor. Tez, bu grubun Gezi eylemlerindeki ağırlığı veya nüfuzu hakkında önkabullerde bulunmadan sahip oldukları varsayılan barışçıl ve örgütsüz Gezi jenerasyonu imgesinin ağırlık ve popülerlik kazanmasının sebeplerini araştırıyor.

Tez için yarı-yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmelerle beyaz yakalı gençliğin Gezi Parkı işgali sırasında yaşadıklarına eğiliyor ve katılımcıların düşünce yapılarını yorumlarken neoliberal özne kavramını tartışıyorum. Bu tezde prekarizasyon ve neoliberal özne odak grubu olan eylemcileri karakterize eden ve Gezi eylemlerindeki uysal muhalif tutumlarının sosyo-ekonomik tabanı, başlıca sebebi ve hatta üreticisi olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

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To my mother

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP - Development and Justice Party

CHP - Republican People's Party

TKP - Communist Party of Turkey

BDP - Peace and Democracy Party

FMCG - Fast Moving Consumer Goods

TÜSES - Social Economic and Political Research Foundation of Turkey

LGBTI - Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transsexual Intersex

TOMA - Intervention Vehicles to Social Events

BHH - United Movement of June

TTB – Turkish Association of Doctors

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INTRODUCTION

Gezi uprising was the coming of the unthinkable. It suddenly infiltrated and seeped into the zones in which our rational consciousness operates. Indignation shut down usual behavior mechanisms. Masses of disoriented people inexplicably poured into the streets. Without any prominent leader figure or guiding political authority, crowds came face to face with the riot police, presumed by and large a non-aggressive resistance in most sites of confrontation.

The composition of the movement was so unconventional that it occupied the intellectual sphere and flourished efforts to define a 'new person' who was a member of a new generation and who was somehow responsible for everything new and particular that happened during uprising. Among the many terms to explain this specific category of park occupiers, labels such as 'well-educated', 'middle-class', 'apolitical', 'anti-political', 'unorganized', 'intellectual' people well-adjusted to social media or technological developments in general, a bit 'anti-social', 'individualistic' and 'know-it-all youngsters' were used most frequently (ed. İnal 2013, p. 19, 105-106). From one point of view, these people, as members of a new generation, were declared to be the youthful force behind the movement and had caught great attention. The people of this much-speculated category were associated with the actors of movements such as the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, Indignados,...etc, and have been fondly praised for their liberal, humorous and creative perspectives. The young individuals who more or less resemble these presumed characteristics of the Gezi generation have become the poster children of the movement.

Much has been said about Gezi and its non-violent rebels. But repeatedly drawing upon these aforementioned impressions does not assist in understanding how these 'naïve youth' suddenly evolved into people who stubbornly struggled behind the barricades, endured tear gas attacks, got injured, developed an alternative media, built and sustained a communalist society in the park and ultimately conducted a strong opposition (İnal 2013, p.

19). How can a sum of people, without a well-defined political agenda or clearly stated demands; acting from their desire to sustain a peaceful pattern of resistance, affect the overall conduct, values and morals of the Gezi uprising more than organized groups who have experience of struggling with authority and methods that can impact the collectivity? How could self-oriented middle-class youth become eager street activists overnight? More importantly, why is being politically organized so out of fashion for this much speculated group of people?

It is important to note that there were overlapping cycles in the Gezi protests and those were not necessarily united (Tuğal, 2013). In addition, not all of the participating groups lacked the experience for political activism. We do not know much about the exact composition of the Gezi rebels and much of our evidence are based on personal impressions. Yet Gezi has been very often described as an example of a successful non-violent resistance and the urban youth was credited for it. Especially the well-paid professionals rather than white-collar proletarians were argued to lead and predominate the movement (Tuğal 2013, p. 156) and I am specifically interested in the socio-economic grounds upon which the young, unorganized and corporate working white-collar professionals of Gezi have constructed their political standpoints. Due to this fact, in this research, I left out the literature on the new social movements and instead, I focused on the impacts of neoliberal politics and work culture on socio-political behavior and political approaches of the poster children of Gezi. To reach this end, I designed a qualitative research with a group, which allowed me to make my inquiries. I conducted interviews with twelve white-collar workers who participated in the Gezi Park occupation and who possess the features that the supposed Gezi generation is assumed to possess. Based on our conversations and my theoretical framework, I will analyze the political expectations of the corporate-working urban youth under the gradually more integrated world market and the economic competition it brings.

In order to problematize the unorganized sums of corporate working Gezi participants and their addressed features, I would like to rethink the better off members of the middle classes with a conjunctive aspect and consider their situation under the threat of precarization and neoliberal subjectivity. In other words, instead of only addressing the white-collar proletariat as the precariat of the middle classes, I suggest to utilize the notion of precarization as a conflict that every paid worker suffers from, no matter how generously they are paid. In this sense, my research considers precarization as a socio-economic situation that also impacts the relatively upper spheres of the economy by affecting the character of the individual with the cult of the winner, the competition of all against all and cynicism as the norm of action and behavior (Bourdieu 1998, p.5).

Can it be expected from the masses subject to the mainstream political economic regime to sparkle a movement capable of deconstructing the hegemonic political discourse and conjuncture (Bourdieu 1998, p.5)? I trust that this research will bring me one step closer to understanding how the neoliberal mindset with the subjectivity and the choice mechanisms it created impacts the possibilities of collective action and how it prevents people from accumulating collective interests. Of all the general impressions of the Gezi participants, I would like to focus on the ‘unorganized’ and ‘sweet tempered’ discourse of the Gezi movement, stressing the underlying reasons for such discourses as well as question how the urban youth evolved all of a sudden into stubborn, courageous, genuinely creative, pro-freedom street protestors if that is really what happened.

CHAPTER 1

THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW

1.1 Methodologies and Outline of the Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews with White-Collar Urbanites

In order to investigate the mindsets of the poster children of Gezi, I wanted to listen to them talk about their experience in the park, their political approaches and their relationship with collectivity. Thus I decided to conduct semi-structured in-depth interviews with university-educated, working urbanites born between 1985 and 1989 who participated in the Gezi uprising in Istanbul. I narrowed the group down to only white-collar workers, because I would like to analyze the impact of precarization on the collective actions of the working youth. The white-collar workers are under strong precarization and generally unorganized while they are still assumed to possess comparatively advantageous social positions; in that sense, they are assumed to be the educated middle class urbanites.

I searched for my subjects in the workplaces of my friends who have corporate careers. Most of the participants are either office mates or friends-of-friends of my friends.¹ The commune of the park was the most unique part of this particular uprising. It was also the center where the entire Gezi spirit, along with its language and culture, was born. Because of this fact and for the sake of simplicity, I looked for people who witnessed the Gezi Park occupation and I disregarded white-collar workers from other cities. I wanted them to be able to comment on the unusual collective in the park. I also wanted to investigate the ways in which they contributed to the commune and the making of the language and culture in the park.

¹ Although my choice of picking the subjects have the systematic problems of the snowball technique I made sure that none of the subject are friends. I have avoided speaking with couples or people that have been in the same environment during the events. Therefore, I have not spoken with more than one person from the same company. I have tried to have a range of universities and sectors. One problem that I have noticed but could not eliminate is that I have five Bogazici and only two private university graduates.

I spoke with 12 people; six males and six females, all under the age of thirty and all except for one², had been in the park commune. They were all working as white-collar workers during Gezi events; two of them held part-time positions. They attended the following schools: Bogazici University, ITU, METU, Sabanci University, Bilkent University, Mugla University, Uludag University, and their work sectors include, banking, e-commerce, FMCG, education, advertising, real-estate auditing and nuclear chemistry. I decided to quote eight people who I think explained their ideas in more detail in the following chapters.

1.2 General Outline of Questions

Since there were no statistically reliable data to demonstrate that the original assumptions regarding the identities and motivations of the Gezi participants are true (or false), I did not develop any pre-designed questions about their motivations or reasons for participating. Still, I asked them about how they could explain the emergence of such an event. During our meetings I covered three basic topics. The first one was about what they experienced during the park occupation, including how they heard about it and decided to join, how did they spend time in the park, what they saw, did or learned, what sort of people or groups they met and whether or not they felt they could relate with them. I also asked about their work environment. I inquired as to whether or not they had anyone in their social circles that stood against the movement, remained reluctant to join or did not show great signs of enthusiasm for it. The aim in questioning the reactions of their friends and family members was to learn more about their social circles and to see in what ways those aspects may have been affected by the uprising. We then moved on to questions about the period after the park

² Only one of the interviewees has experience Gezi in another city, Ankara. He was added into the subject group because he is a Twitter phenomenon who has over a hundred thousand followers. He was chosen for his special electronic connection. I considered him somewhat like an alpha Gezi person. Though he did not tell a story different than the rest.

occupation. I asked about their thoughts regarding the park forums and also asked whether or not they wanted to join any street marches after Gezi in order to understand how Gezi impacted their relationships with collective acts and protests.

The second major subject addressed in our interviews was about the topics that were discussed during the park occupation. I asked about what police violence meant for them, what they thought about political groups, the visibility of banners in the park and about the utilization of violence by some protestors. We also discussed whether or not they consider themselves apolitical.

The third point of inquiry to which I gave attention was about their thoughts on political parties, political groups and politics in general as well as the news sources that they use to get their news. I also asked about their political approaches, ideals and values.

Before ending our conversations, I asked for their comments about the Gezi events and their explanations once again for why the event occurred as well as their comments on how the Gezi experience affected their lives and political approaches.

1.3 General Outline of the Meetings

To begin with, I asked my informants about the first time they heard about what was happening in Gezi, why they decided to participate and about one of their most unforgettable memories about the events. The last question was meant to recreate their enthusiasm. Most of the unforgettable memories were tense ones dealing with police interference that endangered either their or someone else's life. In answering the former two questions, it appears that they either heard the news about Gezi from their friends or through social media.

Why they participated in the Gezi events, on the other hand, is unclear. Irmak, for instance, openly admitted that she is not sure why she decided to go out on the first night of violent police clashes especially since she has little experience in collective actions, and she

is a person who tries to keep a limited interest in socio-political issues. It would seem that the whole event happened so naturally that the participants did not wait to evaluate the situation before making a choice. The initial responses of the people to the news of the clashes in the Taksim area were ‘let’s go!’ without giving much further thought about it. Reviewing their efforts to address a variety of things that happened before Gezi as reasons to rationalize the subjects’ choices to participate, again, I could not observe a significant pattern other than emphasis on police violence as the main drive for their initial participation. Although it was mentioned as a primary reason by some interviewees more strongly, not everybody mentioned their dissatisfaction with the government’s actions or attempts to change policies targeting parks, forests or lifestyles. Other than that, some subjects underlined an ongoing dissatisfaction and feeling of unhappiness without directly addressing the governance of Turkey while one interviewee pointed out that he was very displeased with Turkish foreign policy concerning matters in Syria.

My interviewees’ initial motivations for participation in the Gezi movement were not the main concerns of this thesis. Consequently, this matter was only dealt with superficially. Still, before finishing the in-depth interviews, I asked my interlocutors *why* they participated again in a different way by paraphrasing the question as, ‘Why do you think so many people were drawn to this uprising?’ This time, I collected answers less related to what the government did or said in the months or days before the Gezi occupation. Instead, their emphasis was more focused more on people being angry at the government or being generally unhappy.

How they spent time in the park was a major part of our interviews. I began by asking the interlocutors about the first time they entered the park, paying attention to what they said they noticed. I also asked how they felt about the people and things surrounding them. I could not observe a pattern in their answers regarding their thoughts or feelings about the people around them. Some agreed that they felt connected with other occupiers while other

interviewees underscored that they did not feel like they were a community whatsoever. Irmak, Deko and Rifat even mentioned that they wanted to keep a distance from the park after certain issues arose.

I then proceeded to ask them about their activities in the park in details, listening to everything they found worth telling. I also covered a list of activities that they could have done during park occupation and asked about which ones they had done. As a result, I realized that although they were not reluctant in participating in group activities like building barricades, collecting garbage and coming face-to-face with the police, for most of the time, they were passive receivers. They walked, watched and listened a lot, but did not act upon self-expressive motivations. I did not encounter with anyone who painted the walls or made personal banners.³ In other words, it appears that, they did not take part in creating the written work that we had encountered with in the park or on the streets. However, most of them mentioned they were actively sharing news and information on Twitter during the days of rebellion.

This group of interviewees did not work in the making of the inter-park institutions either. No one recounted stories of volunteering in places like libraries, food courts, workshops, healthcare centers, or Taksim Solidarity itself; none of these things. It seems that realistically speaking, their observable contributions to the culture and language of the Gezi Park commune is questionable. This makes one even more skeptical about how these people could end up becoming the poster children for the movement. The details of this issue will be analyzed with more attention later on.

The park forums did not create much excitement in my interviewees. Not all of them went to see what was going on in the forums. None of those that attended them became

³ Remember the photos of people with colorful pasteboards that are decorated with funny and mostly nonpolitical wits? I wonder who they are because most of them probably are not white-collars.

regulars and nobody mentioned that they had spoken their minds in the forums. Rather, they listened and observed much like how they did in Gezi Park.

The questions investigating what happened regarding their work and everyday lives revealed that all were hacked during the days of rebellion. Their offices were mostly filled with excitement, with people who stopped working and did not do anything else other than following Gezi updates on a minute-to-minute basis, sharing whatever they learned with their friends or workmates and making plans to go to the park as soon as the work was over. Arda mentioned he even planned to take some time off to spend more time at the park but did not tell me why he could not arrange it. Some claimed that they neglected work for the whole summer while others limited this hiatus to the two-weeks occupation period. In addition, while most of the informants could recall people they knew who showed less or even no interest in the uprising, they were the exceptions. Their friend circles or work environments were rather homogenous when it came to sharing the thrill about Gezi and feeling angry with the police's treatment of the Gezi occupiers.

A couple of the interviewees mentioned that even though it was deeply exhausting to keep up with the happenings in the park after work, they reported the energetic atmosphere in their offices because the happiness of 'being able to do something for themselves and for other people' was fueling everyone. Being needed was incredibly thrilling for some and gave them more motivation to keep going to the park.⁴

Based on the interviews, it appears that the unorganized white-collared workers were not interested in being members of political organizations and this fact has not changed since or during Gezi. They find political groups corrupt and disrespectful to individuality. In addition, they do not think their own inclusion in a group can affect politics in any case. Although I had a limited number of people to talk to, I have a strong reason to believe that

⁴ Arda even credited this abilities of 'doing something for others and achieving something' as the main reason for people to feel in common with others around them during park occupation. We will come back to that eventually.

my sample group serves as a telling representation of their generation regarding their views on political organizations as their attitudes and thoughts on political groups strongly parallel the findings of the research by TÜSES in 2008 (ed. Boyraz 2009) about which I will talk in further detail later.

I could not observe a shared negative approach toward the politically organized groups with banners in Gezi Park. Although the interviewees personally remained distant from and even disliked political groups, most of them did not seem to have a clear position about the banners of the political groups in the park. I have observed that even though they tended to prefer the park banner-free, they still avoided giving negative statements against them to maintain a neutral attitude toward everyone. There were also interlocutors who were supportive of the banners for practical reasons. They argued that the unorganized people could not hold down the park without the experience of the organized people so those people had the right to put their banners in the park.

I also asked whether or not my interlocutors felt disturbed by the images of destructed common property or of the people who were throwing stones or fireworks at police forces. There were only two negative approaches voiced towards the use of violence by the protestors while some of them admitted that they enjoyed seeing destroyed public property or police forces dealing with fireworks. Yet, interestingly, some of those stated that they later found their reaction odd and questioned themselves for supporting violent acts.

It was also a part of my questionnaire to ask the interviewees whether or not they viewed themselves as apolitical. In some cases I did not even need to mention it myself. The majority of the interviewees confidently underlined that they were not apolitical people. Yet, among these people, it was frequently asserted that following the daily news and thinking about politics were indicators of being politically active.

Regarding their news sources, the Daily newspapers Radikal and Birgün were among the most prominent news sources referenced by the group, with Diken, Bianet, Sendika.org,

NTV, T24, Hurriyet, Milliyet and Cumhuriyet mentioned seldom and sporadically. The channels for opposition's nationalist wing news, on the other hand, were not taken seriously by anyone in the subject group.

Although most of the subjects do not view themselves as apolitical people, I needed to rephrase my questions about ideology to obtain more detailed answers about their political standings because, as the word ideology surfaced, the interviewees reacted very critically. They feel very observably distant toward existing ideologies. They do not seem to share the entire political agenda of any political approach although they find some approaches more agreeable. Hence, instead of insisting on details about their ideological standpoints, I asked them about what sorts of concepts do they have sympathy for, what do they value, what do they imagine for their society, what sort of a community they would like to live in and so on. Freedom and democracy appear to be the concepts that they value the most.

Before concluding, I asked how many protests and street marches the interviewees had been in after the Gezi occupation. It seems like most of the subjects attend street marches once in a while. But they did not develop a habit or willingness to attend street protests more frequently because of their Gezi experience. Still, it is worth to note that although only a few could attend the funeral of Berkin Elvan⁵, most of them underlined that they have wanted to but could not because it took place during working hours. Other options from the list of street events I provided for them (May Day, the Soma protests, the LGBTI parade and the Hrant Dink memorial) did not raise as much interest and tenderness as Berkin Elvan's funeral did.

Before moving on to comment upon the results of the semi-structured in-depth interviews, I would like to give a summary of the events of Gezi, how the event was sparked and how it escalated. I will briefly introduce the efforts to explain the dynamics,

⁵ The boy who has been shot on 16th of June by the police in his neighborhood at the age of fourteen and died 269 days later, after a long period of coma.

characteristics and reasons for the movement. I will also include some survey analysis regarding the demographics of the attendants of Gezi Park. Then I will problematize some of the labels attached to the Gezi movement, which have been used as indicators to identify its middle-class characteristics. I will then explain why I prefer to focus on precarization as a common base for the interview group and discuss the neoliberal subject while trying to make sense of our conversations.

CHAPTER 2

THE GEZI UPRISING, BEFORE AND AFTER

2.1 Short History of Before

The emergence of the Gezi resistance was generally regarded as autonomous. But there was in fact an establishment that essentially orchestrated the activism against city reconstruction targeting multiple sights in Beyoğlu; Taksim Solidarity had struggled to stop the transformation of the Taksim Square for over a year before the outburst of the Gezi uprising. Taksim Solidarity did not have a well-defined political agenda or a pre-stated political identity and its structure has proved to be weak in the face of governmental force (Soysal 2013, p. 43), but it did provide a foundation to create consciousness about the park and Taksim.

Taksim Solidarity was founded in March 2012 with the participation of a variety of groups including political parties, workers' unions, chambers of architects, urban planners and engineers and civil associations (Taksim Projesinin Tüm Süreci n.d.). Together they had arranged numerous gatherings and meetings in order to organize campaigns against the transformation plan of the Taksim area, which included the supposed reconstruction of the historical military barrack that used to be located on the area of Gezi Park. The Solidarity's argument was that the plan was meant to serve as a barrier to prevent masses from gathering and demonstrating in Taksim Square. The chambers of architects and urban planners were especially critical about the plan, and they had undertaken a major role in opposing to it. Together and separately these various organizations and associations collected signatures that supported their cause, organized protests and demonstrations, arranged festivals at Gezi Park, wrote an open letter to the city mayor, handed out informative flyers to random people who passed by the square and gave up-to-date press statements in order to inform public

opinion about the transformation plan. They managed to create some pressure on the authorities and raised social awareness but despite their efforts, in February 2013 the plan was approved.

On the night of May 27th 2013, bulldozers entered the park and began to uproot the trees. Around 20 people quickly arrived at the park area and stopped them. The next morning, the destruction continued from where it left off, this time under the guard of the Turkish police force. The police treated the activists immoderately. The use of tear gas and physical force by the police against the environmentalists caught social media interest and generated a wider negative public opinion toward the destruction plan. For the next three days, a slightly increasing number of people spent the night in the park to prevent the construction machines from working over night. These activists started and continued the occupation of the park from the 27th to the 31st of May before the nationwide protests had begun.

Throughout those days (and the following weeks), news has been shared and spread over Twitter and drew more and more attention to the occupation. On May 31st, after two early-morning raids that ended with the burning of the tents of those who stayed in the park, thousands of people gathered to protest in Taksim Square. Although police forces did everything to prevent the crowds from entering the park or the Square, they could not succeed to even disrupt the crowds, since more were coming from every direction⁶. The day after, following CHP⁷'s announcement to relocate their party meeting to Taksim Square, at approximately 17:00, the police completely abandoned the Taksim area, leaving it to the people, and the occupation of the park and the square had begun and continued until June 16th (Yaşarken Yazılan Tarih 2013, 18-23).

According to the Turkish police forces' report (Milliyet 2013), during the 112-day

⁶ Especially the walking thousands who passed the bridge around 06:00 in the morning on 1st of June created enormous excitement and fueled the attempts to enter the Square even at the early hours of the next morning.

⁷ Main opposition party in the parliament

period between May 28th and the first week of September, 5,532 protests and street acts related to the Gezi uprising had taken place in 80 cities around Turkey. Around 3,600,000 people participated in these activities and protests, and as the police forces claimed in the report, 4,329 people were injured due to clashes.

Although the police-free zone could only be achieved in Taksim and masses continued to get injured because of street clashes in other cities (and in politically conflicting neighbourhoods of Istanbul), Gezi Park was quickly transformed into a sophisticated meeting site for anybody and everybody. The occupiers organized multiple forms of first aid, fire brigades, libraries, tent accommodation and a food and pharmaceuticals dispensary, all autonomously. Any occupier could participate in any of these organizations. There were a variety of workshops including yoga classes and mathematics for students who were preparing for university exams. Movies were screened almost every night and small-scale performances like dance acts or piano recitals could be seen anywhere at anytime of the day. The occupiers collected garbage voluntarily. Money was not a part of the equilibrium in the park. All of those services were free. The occupiers even put pressure on street peddlers to stop money-based commerce inside the park.

The day before the day the prime minister was supposed to visit Istanbul to hold a party meeting, Gezi Park was evacuated by a sudden and unannounced police interruption. Although the attempts to regain the park continued the next day and the summer was full of protest movements of different scales, the tent-based occupation and communal experience ended once and for all (Yaşarken Yazılan Tarih 2013, 23-37).

2.2 What Was It All About?

Well, it was not about the trees.⁸

⁸ Reference to the infamous tweet in <https://twitter.com/memetalialabora/status/340177091599400960> of Turkish actor Mehmet Ali Alabora who later became target of pro-government media forces' hate speeches because of this tweet

The unexpected nature and magnitude of the movement was a huge shock for all of those that participated as well as for the governmental authorities and international community. By sifting through the commentaries regarding how people make sense of this unexpected movement, I have categorized arguments that try to explain the motivations of the Gezi participants into four groups. The first group stresses out an ongoing violation of democratic rights. In this group, certain transgressions of rights occurred some time before the Gezi events are addressed as the main reasons for people's sudden need uprise. The second group of explanations heavily blames the use of police violence and the government's attitude during the first days of the park occupation. Even though this argument puts an emphasis on the violation of democracy, it avoids pointing out strong structural flaws of Turkish democracy and ignores any other political issues that might be related to the global system. The third group, however, directly blames structural problems of the global system and the current socio-economic order as the cause of the Gezi movement and movements alike. The last group of arguments, which is generally adopted by pro-AKP media, invites people to see the big picture, claims that there are games played to stop Turkey from growing.

2.2.1 A Violation of Human Rights?

The causal explanations related to the timing of the event were fueled immediately after the first couple of days of the park occupation. It was argued that, as a result of structural problems within the Turkish democracy, certain events, which happened some time before the Gezi outburst, impacted the lives of thousands in a very negative way and thus created a great public reaction against the government. The destruction of Emek Sineması, the deformation or privatization of public spaces, the ridiculously high number of shopping malls being constructed, the increasing violence against women and the party officials' perpetrator-encouraging statements, attempts to prohibit abortion and control the female

body, the hate speeches by political actors that targeted women, ethnic and religious minorities or people with secular life styles, the Internet censorship, the restrictions on alcohol consumption... all made it onto the list of reasons that brought people to the edge of revolting. However, the widely acknowledged explanations of the Gezi movement mentioned here have an escalation bias. If dissatisfaction with the governmental administration was the entire problem, we should have seen more protests in the last two years since the governance of Turkey did not get any better⁹. We do not have enough indicators to address a causal relation between any of those incidents and the Gezi uprising. If only we did, we would be able to predict the next major revolt based on the political conjuncture, however, events like the Gezi movement can never be predicted.

2.2.2 Police Violence and the Government's Foul Attitude?

On 3 June 2013, a user named Monokl started a campaign on change.org, demanding the end of police violence against the Gezi protesters and asking for the support of everyone who defends democracy against authoritarian states:

A protest against the destruction of a park in Taksim (at the center of Istanbul) has turned in a few days into a massive popular uprising bringing together people from various segments of the population with different ideological beliefs. The reason behind this is the uncompromising attitude of the party in power and the prime minister, R.T. Erdogan. The police brutality against the protesters who are for the most part pacifists is extreme and unacceptable. Many protesters are injured as a result and some of them are in critical condition.

We demand that the police brutality stop immediately. We ask that internationals and all those who defend democracy in the world hold accountable a government that now multiplies its authoritarian (and anti-secular) actions as it orients itself toward a totalitarian regime that only forebodes the worst for Turkey's future (Polis Şiddetine Son Verilsin,

⁹ The catastrophe of Soma along with many other worker murders a.k.a occupational accidents, Erdogan's and other AKP party actors' even more aggressive and discriminatory speeches, the destruction of northern forests which caused enormous amounts of loss of trees...etc all are major traumas we have been through since Gezi events. But the following public reactions to those were no match to Gezi. Even though the funerals of Berkin Elvan and Ozgecan Aslan (the 19 year old girl who was brutally murdered by a bus driver who tried to kidnap then rape her.) created noteworthy crowds, there is no visible pattern between undemocratic or suppressive measures taken by the authorities and street opposition.

2013).

The campaign generated support from many noteworthy people including philosophers, political thinkers, writers and academics (Soysal 2013 p. 19-20). Many of the signers mentioned the righteousness of the protests, praised its peaceful approach and condemned police violence (Soysal 2013, p. 21-24). As they write on the petition page, concerns about the Gezi events were heavily focused on issues like harsh police interference and violations of democratic rights (such as the right to keep a park as it is). But a heavy emphasis on democratic violations during the Gezi movement justifies the movement because of its passive manner and creates a delusion that none of it would have happened if only the state authorities could have managed to treat these harmless activists more tenderly. This may be the fact, however we will never be able to confirm this suspicion, as major movements like Gezi are seldomly able to be predicted. It should also be remembered that much more could have happened based on a lot less, as we have seen happen during the slight increase in public transportation prices in Brazil. In conclusion, stressing out the operational wrong-doings of the Turkish state or making any other causal explanations cannot clarify why and how the uprising.

Emphases on the dignity and life-style issues are another important parts of the explanations related to democratic violations. According to this aspect, the main issue at hand for the Gezi protestors was a bit more than the harsh police treatment. AKP was losing its liberal spirit and not respecting the life-styles of certain people. The participators wanted to send a warning sign to the ruling party about their disrespectful attitude towards their life-styles. Gezi was not about supporting a political position. People did not try to take down the government; they just wanted to be heard, to make a point that they do not like to be treated so unfairly. In other words, the movement was not a demand for power against the state but it was a warning against this particular government, or even person, the prime minister. In this reading, Gezi was not necessarily a rebellion against the system; it was a cry

for respect (İnal 2013, p. 24, 25). Yet, the discussion that engages with the argument of life-style conflicts ignores something my interviewees mentioned: an unclarified but ongoing and even entrenched feeling of discontent. The drastic dispossession of the middle classes and the threat of proletarianization that the youth faces due to the neoliberalism grows hand-in-hand with the AKP (Hoşgör 2015, p. 56). We should keep in mind that the conflicts due to the socio-economic impositions of neoliberal politics that create the threat of unemployment and alienation, increase the unpredictability of the future, and feelings of meaninglessness might be expressed through concepts like secularism, democracy, freedoms (Hoşgör 2015, p. 58). This brings us the third group of explanations.

2.2.3 The Structural Problems of the Global System?

The third group of explanations, a point of view that this author also shares, focuses on the structural problems of the aggravation of the neoliberal political economy. The youth revolted due to their lives' reduction to insignificance and emptiness by neoliberal norms and values (Memos, cited in Tuğal 2013, p. 149). This phenomenon is generally based on a deepened economic expropriation and the alienation of people as a result of it. The implicit crisis of neoliberal capitalism is widening in Turkey, as it is worldwide (Hoşgör 2015, p. 21). Zizek (2013, p. 70) argues that the position of the urban middle class against the authoritarian political Islam lies in the close relationship with religious fundamentalism and free market liberalism. Yet the Gezi revolt was not only about secularism or about being against global capitalism. The participants of the protests could sense a feeling of discontent with the capitalism as a system and the necessity to reinvent democracy:

What the majority of those who have participated in the protests are aware of is a fluid feeling of unease and discontent that sustains and unites various specific demands. The struggle to understand the protests is not just an epistemological one, with journalists and theorists trying to explain their true content; it is also an ontological struggle over the thing itself, which is taking place within the protests themselves. Is this just a struggle against corrupt city administration? Is it a struggle against authoritarian

Islamist rule? Is it a struggle against the privatization of public space? The question is open, and how it is answered will depend on the result of an ongoing political process (2013, p. 70).

The dynamics of Gezi are closely related to its conceived opposite, the AKP government. We need to keep in mind that the AKP is a neoliberal government (Saraçoğlu 2015, p. 149-150). The conservative aspect of the ruling party has right-wing roots which do not stem far from its economic agenda. If we suggest that the Gezi movement occurred due to life-style conflicts or in order to defend a vaguely defined cultural space, we can never understand the ‘thing’ that people (consciously or unconsciously) opposed and the particular mechanisms they utilized to demonstrate their opposition.

2.2.4 A Governmental Conspiracy?

The final category of explanation, and the one most circulated in the pro-government media organizations, is that the Gezi movement was claimed to be a conspiracy against the Turkish state. According to this theory, the movement was planned as a part of a larger scheme aiming to manipulate people against the government in order to damage the ruling party and the strong state they maintain. The architects of this plot are purported to be from powerful, unspecified international groups that are uncomfortable with as strong Turkey. As a result, they have rallied around the trees and an environmental cause to agitate the crowds (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü 2013). These allegations have never been supported with evidence, and so will not be addressed in this thesis.

Although I have offered my critique, I do not mean to suggest that other efforts that attempt to answer ‘why’ are de facto meaningless; most of them are reasonably grounded. But as Žižek argues (2013, p. 71), Gezi was not about an identifiable real goal; the problem was something much more. Hence, the aim of this thesis is not the motivations of the white-collar workers to participate in Gezi. The aim is to problematize the way they expressed themselves; the peaceful rhetoric that tends to degrade the means of political organizations

and glorifies the ‘passive’, or in other words, peaceful resistance. Consequently, I will examine the people who fit into the image of the unorganized young urban protestor and middle-class poster children, investigating their behavioral patterns and analyzing their mindsets. For that sake, I will first focus on some survey analyses in order to give a general idea about the political characteristics of the youth of Turkey.

2.3 Surveys on the Demographics and Dynamics of Gezi

The focus of this thesis is on the unorganized and politically inexperienced characteristics of certain participants who had attended in a protest movement for the very first time in their lives, who were assumed to be in their twenties and belonged to the well-educated urban middle classes. No research has been conducted in order to evaluate the proportion and density of these people in the Gezi crowd and we currently have no quantitative studies to make realistic comments about their numbers and impacts on the characteristics of the Gezi uprising and Gezi commune. Still, in order to gather as much scientific information as possible regarding the socio-political demographics of the Gezi protestors other than personal observations, I would like to present some survey analysis regarding the characteristics and motivations of Gezi participants before moving forward to further problematize the label of ‘middle-class’.

I have reviewed the most prominent surveys, including the survey that Konda conducted as well as the one that was released by Bilgi University Press. I have also reviewed surveys regarding the political tendencies of today’s youth in order to have a general idea about the younger generation’s relationship to politics.

According to Konda’s findings, the average age of the park occupiers was 28 (Konda 2014, p. 7). Half of the people in the park were university graduates. One third of them were students and 15% of all of them were white-collar workers (Konda 2014, p. 8-10). Almost 80% of them declared that they are not members of any platform, group, foundation, etc.

(Konda 2014, p. 14). 44% declared that they had never joined in a protest or a political movement before.

To get an idea about the protestors' initial motivations for joining the movement, Konda's survey asked the subjects at what point they had decided to rush out and come to the park. For almost half of this survey's respondents, witnessing the police violence is the milestone (Konda 2014, p. 18). This finding runs parallel to my own observations during my in-depth interviews. For my interviewees, police violence had a serious impact on justifying the actions of the resisters. In addition, it provided a feeling of togetherness against something physical they could address. In this sense, I do not consider the emphasis on police violence in Konda's and in the other surveys as false inferences. But aside from this, all of the surveys that I have seen, gave a scale of amorphous options for the subjects' participation and ended up with a group of people who are highly sensitive towards matters like freedom and democracy. Since the categorizations of the possible 'concerns' for joining the uprising and the related findings of the Konda's survey also scientifically make no sense, I did not feel an urge to note them down.

The self-declared exploratory work of Kafkaslı and Bilgiç from Bilgi University Press also based their research on postulated hypotheses about the reasons for participating in the events. The subjects were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a couple of pre-determined options about their motivations to join the Gezi movement (Demir, E 2013). According to the results, as surprisingly high as 92.4% of the subjects definitely agreed that it was the attitude of the prime minister, 91.3% definitely agreed that their participation was a result of the harsh treatment of the police and 91.1% definitely agreed that it was because of the violation of democratic rights that affected their decision to join the uprising. The same study shows that as many as 81.2% of the subjects definitely agreed that they are pro-liberties and 55.4% definitely agreed that they are democratic people.

Even though the findings of both surveys parallel the hypotheses about the characteristics of the Gezi participators, the accusations of contextual manipulation and critiques toward the methodology and sampling of these surveys are more cogent scientifically than the surveys themselves (Yavuz, 2013). Therefore, only the findings of Konda regarding the socio-political demographics of the crowd in Gezi Park have been taken into consideration and used as reliable data for this present study. Regarding the rest of the material, the predetermined and unclear structure of these surveys' questions tell little to nothing about the political tendencies of the people in Gezi. Thus, I will not use or rely on the presumptions of the weight and impact of my target group. Instead, in what follows, I will problematize the very image of the people who are highly sensitive for 'freedom' and 'democracy'. But before, since the educated urban youth supposedly played the leading role in Gezi movement, I would also like to consider some other researches that deals with the current youth and their political involvement.

With the participation of 1,203 people, a research conducted in 2008 by TÜSES and supported by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation representation of Turkey focused on the Turkish youth and their relationship to politics (TÜSES 2009). The contributors of the research analyzed the subject by focusing primarily on people who were already participating in youth branches or NGOs and thus politically active. But the research gives important hints about the general political approach of young people in Turkey. According to Emre Erdoğan's article (2009, p. 56), the main point about the participation of the Turkish youth in politics is that they do not participate. By going through various field studies about the youth's political participation, Erdoğan points out that the proportion of the subjects who are members of a political party does not exceed 10% in any one of these studies (Erdoğan 2009, p. 66). Erdoğan also mentions (2009, p. 59-60) comparative statistical analyses about the youth's political participation. According to this study, the proportion of the youth that prefer to attend a collective street march is 11.3%. Preferences for boycotts and electronic

protests as political actions are both below 8%. In his article, in the same compilation, Cemil Boyraz (2009, p. 90) underlines that voting is the most dominant method of political participation for the youth. 91% of the overall youth feel negatively towards being a member of any sort of NGOs and do not join party activities. 60% of them feel negatively toward street marches, boycotts or even electronic protests (Boyraz 2009, p. 91). According to Yentürk (cited in Boyraz 2009, p. 92), 75% of the youth between the ages of 15 to 24 are not members of any sort of clubs or associations. Only 1.2% of the participants are members of political parties and 50% of them declared that they are not interested in politics.

The comparative statistical analyses indicate that the lack of involvement in political matters is not only a 'youth' problem. In Turkey, the indifference towards political matters is a shared approach across generations. Only 7% of the people in Turkey are members of an association. The proportion of the people that participate in meetings or street marches is below 5%. Finally, only 31% suggest that they are interested in politics (Erdoğan 2009, p. 59). To sum, although it seems rather odd to encounter so many people that flood to the streets for the first time for a social movement that basically developed after harsh police treatment, a comparison with the results of Konda's survey regarding the political involvement shows that the Gezi participants were doing better than the average in terms of politicization.

Boyraz's analysis (2009, p. 94-97) of the subjects who are members of various NGOs shows that even organized youngsters regard political organizations as corrupt and ineffective. Demet Lüküslü's article, which is also part of the compilation of articles of TÜSES' research in the series, also reveals that even the youth that are somewhat more politically active tend to consider politics dirty (Lüküslü 2009). The subjects find political organizations corrupt and they have no hope in making an effect on their politics. In addition, especially the well-educated subjects view politically organized groups as disrespectful to individuality (Lüküslü 2009, 167).

The generations born after the 1980s do not speak about politics, are not interested in them and do not trust political institutions. For the youth, the institutional corruption of political organizations and their disrespectful structure against individualistic aspects are important downsides of political involvement. These results have significant similarities with the results that I gathered from the semi-structured in-depth interviews I conducted. Institutional corruption, lack of effectiveness and insensitivity towards individuality were the main issues that my subjects brought up when they explained why they are not interested in being politically organized. However, even if the corruption of mainstream political discourse can partly explain the reluctance in being politically organized, it does not tell all about the rise of peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy rhetoric. Hence, I will keep these in mind, but further problematize the context-free ideals and the liberal rhetoric of the unorganized and educated youth during the Gezi movement without speculating on their actual proportion or power of impact. What might have caused the youth to advocate terrifically sweet-tempered and individualistic way of protest? Following this line of thought, in the next chapter, I will start with questioning the suggestion that Gezi movement is a middle class uprising and protestors expressed their class concerns by opposing the park destruction. The aim here is to disrupt the values that are presented as natural assets of middle classes and also unorganized Gezi participants'. Then, I will move on to suggest 'precarization' as a defining attribution for the subject group and discuss the neoliberal subject of Dardot And Laval as a consequence of neoliberal aggravation.

CHAPTER 3

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POSTER CHILDREN

3.1 A Middle-Class Issue

Wacquant (cited in Saraçoğlu 2015, p. 146) sustains that Gezi was a bourgeois uprising and that it was about the cultural bourgeoisie. In the neoliberal phase, economic and political power holders have started to attack cities, which has resulted in the middle class becoming significant subjects of resistance. Gezi has been claimed to be a middle-class uprising various times by others as well, because themes like equality and freedom also run in tandem with supposed bourgeois tendencies and secular republican values.

Addressing the Gezi uprising as a middle-class resistance comes short for two reasons. To begin with, it ignores all the factors and conditions, which impacted the individuals' consciousness. According to Cenk Saraçoğlu (2015), middle class movement analyses put the supposed characteristics of middle class individuals at their cores. In other words, people who regard Gezi as a middle class rebellion base their arguments on a supposed profile of the Gezi protestors. All the urban life practices, consumption habits, rhetoric, means of information and political organization, level of education and other sorts of signs of not being dispossessed have been presented as indicators of being middle-class. From this evidences, the conclusion was reached that the protestors belonged to the middle classes. Thus, middle-classiness was presented as a signifier of being a Gezi protestor (Saraçoğlu 2015, p. 143). Consequently, the objective of the Gezi uprising has been explained in terms of the conflicts suffered by the middle classes: life style conflicts, the struggle for dignity, loss of cultural spaces, the erosion of the cultural bourgeoisie, etc., are all attached to Gezi participators on the basis of their presumed characteristics. But how do we define middle

class? Why do we assume someone actually fits into this category that alludes to a specific notion in economic terms?

Saraçoğlu argues that some individuals are considered to be middle class due to the position they hold in the hierarchy of social stratification (Saraçoğlu 2015, p. 147). Those who are supposedly on the same levels are regarded as belonging to the same classes and their class interests are assumed to be the utility they get from their positions. The assumption here is that the participants of Gezi looked at the situation individually, calculated their interests and took a position accordingly. Actually this is exactly how Irmak, one of my subjects, pictured her decision process to participate in the Gezi uprising. But, with this calculation, as soon as the object of dissatisfaction vanishes, the crowds are expected to dissolve. However, the object of dissatisfaction in the Gezi movement is unclear. Just as the commentators could not agree on the reasons for the Gezi uprising, my subjects were unsure about their motivations. Some of the subjects even admitted that they were unable to explain themselves why they had such a reaction for this particular event. Hence, even though the subjects interpreted their decision to be involved as completely personal, this type of reasoning has logical gaps since they did not seem to have clear-cut personal objectives they were acting upon.

The second problem with the middle-class label is that, it has a very wide definition and it cannot really sum up the economic background of the university-educated and individualistic youth who participated in the Gezi uprising and made a heavy appearance. Middle class arguments fall short of linking the economic challenges to the socio-political problems faced by the educated and corporate working urbanites. To be able to comment on the non-violent manners, idealistic rhetoric and reluctance of political involvement of the young urbanites, I suggest we consider the global economic changes and the socio-economic backgrounds of my subject group. In this vein, in addition to ‘neoliberal subject’ of Dardot and Laval (2012), I would like to use the notion of precarization from Standing (2014),

which refers to a socio-economic situation that emerged through the aggravation of globalization, by keeping in mind that petit bourgeoisie contains precarious groups just as the proletariat (Tuğal 2013).

3.2 The Precarization of the Young

In addition to the misstep of explaining people's motivations based on their assumed socio-economic backgrounds, being born in a relatively well-endowed family is not a sufficient condition to possess its expected labels and privileges. I cannot interpret the experiences of my subject group based on presumptions about an urban middle-class stereotype since I cannot expect them to fully share their parents' mindsets, aspirations in life, political approaches or their socio-political identities. The socio-economic background that impacts the individuals' consciousness differs in time. It is suggested that the era of globalization is between 1975 and 2008 (Standing 2014, p. 120). The first generation that has experienced insecurity in the workforce grew up in the 1980s and entered in the job market at the beginning of the 21st century. The 1980s saw the emergence of more flexible work with less job assurance (Standing 2014, p. 19). The main reason for this problem was the shifting dynamic of labor between capital and production (Foucault 2008, p. 223). According to Foucault (2008, p. 233), today's worker lives in a neoliberal mindset that puts all aspects of life under the formation and calculation of the capital. Aggravated neoliberalism makes every aspect of life a matter of investment and creates a flexible and insecure atmosphere for work by transforming labor into human capital, wages into income of human capital (Foucault 2008, p. 219-225). As a result of this transformation, homo-economicus, which is re-introduced as an economic subject by American neoliberalism, is an entrepreneur with her human capital as her source of investment (Foucault 2008, p. 223-226). As an entrepreneur she produces for her own satisfaction while she works. She collects income or allocates the income from her capital like any other capitalist (Foucault 2008, p. 226). As a

result, the neoliberal worker is restructured to bare all the risk a capitalist bares under the free market of many sellers.

Standing states that (2014, p. 118-119) as a result of social restructuring, wages become flexible and the income of the youth decreases from what their parents earned at their ages. While their parents had stable and secure jobs, today's youth are not going to have futures resembling their parents' past. The economic stability and security of young urbanites is precarious even for the ones that come from families that can be qualified as upper-middle class. The young urbanites are subjects of a neoliberal work culture, and in that sense they are living precarious lives. Due to the fragile aspect of their economic wellbeing, the white-collar workers of corporate Istanbul are haunted by insecurity and ambiguity. Since precariat with all its features is the child of the neoliberal process, the term 'precarization' by Standing (2014), who uses it in order to explain the situation of the subjects of a flexible and insecure workforce, is suggested for the subjects of this research.

According to Standing (2014, p. 20-21), no matter how much money those under the threat of precarization make, they cannot sustain a constant wage or maintain other privileges such as job security. The danger of falling into the insecure and flexible work force threatens the proficient and salaried groups who hypothetically possess advantageous social positions (Standing 2014, p. 74). Thus, job-quality is changing for the white-collar working urbanites no matter how 'cool' their offices look, how comparatively high their incomes are or how much they seem to be promising members of the strata of the middle classes. They live the tension of being unable to fulfill their potential (Bora et al. 2013, p. 40). But how to sustain this person who is always on the edge of a crisis, afraid of not being able to fulfill herself? Here, neoliberal politics comes in handy to give humanity a new life-style to adapt to so that they can avoid all the crises that come along with a market economy taken to the extreme. After all, for the sake of better-applied economic mechanisms, new moral, political and communal frames are needed. For stronger and sustainable adjustment,

neoliberal politics must change the human being itself (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 158-159). The target is the subject as a whole, hence, work and relations with companies become more and more personal, recreate the limits of what is to be offered in terms of work, demand certain behavioral patterns, a certain level of enthusiasm from the employees and certain ways of expressing all of them. Every part of individual life becomes a potential source for the entrepreneurship (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 382).

Since the self is an enterprise in the neoliberal project, managing and mastering it according to appropriate strategies are the new ways of fulfilling life (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 368-372). Work is not only about profits or future gains any more; it must be a life-style. Neoliberal selfhood is not limited to the behaviors at work (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 376). It is deeper; it is a personality, a way of walking and talking, a way of rationalizing or simply thinking. Knowing oneself better is crucial (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 376-378). Mastering the self is somewhat a compensation for the impossibility of mastering the world (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 380-381). When changing the world is not an option, all that is left for the individual is recreating the self. The belief that people are autonomous in their individual lives is what is left.

3.3 The Brave New Person

Deko: Actually I am an incredibly political man. I have never been apolitical at any point of my life. But my approach in life is like- this question brings another one. I have no heroes in my life, no litterateurs, no statesman, no poets, nothing. I have no heroes. Like I am thinking right now but I never had. [...]

I have had religious¹⁰ education in my childhood, I later became an atheist. I have no attachment to the religion. I have no attachment to society. I am bastardized¹¹ you know what I mean, I am bastardized. [...]

I am bastardized to such an extend that it is not being excluded from society or turning your back, it is showing your teeth to society in the most aggressive way. [...]

¹⁰ Translated from 'hafızlık'

¹¹ Translated from 'piçleşmek'

I think I have demolished my being because I have cut off all my bonds.

Here, I would like to introduce my most lucid and sincere conversation of the interviews, which was with Deko. Deko is a Zaza who has lived apart from his family starting from very early ages. He is an engineer, graduate of ITU. He likes to read and think a lot, he had artistic desires and tried to be a screenwriter for two years before he started to work as a white-collar. He spoke for almost two hours and I believe he demonstrated his point of view and his political approach more openly than anybody else. So, I would like to highlight our conversation and discuss the mindset of this individual alongside his statements.

During our meeting, I noticed that Deko is very self-centered. I do not mention this judgmentally. It was interesting to notice that he continuously discussed and interpreted his actions on the basis of the features of his character as if he never takes reactionary steps but only interprets a situation and builds his personal space from it. He presented his personality and qualifications as his only reference points for his choice mechanism. In his statements above, he mentions destruction but he does not praise any counter values to replace all he deconstructed. He has no alternative in place of what he rejects. In that sense, Deko's position is rather passive and stagnant even though he claims to be very politicized.

An important feature of the neoliberal trend is that the bodies or minds of these subjects are not disciplined by external forces; they voluntarily participate in the process (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 366). Changing mindsets is not enough, behavioral patterns must change and this is the specialty of the disciplining techniques of economic and social mechanisms (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 249). Deko describes himself as bastardized and as an individual standing against society by 'showing his teeth'. But this expression does not manifest itself in terms of physical resistance against society. Especially after graduation, Deko attended street marches less frequently and he does not participate in any sort of collective. In the way that he earns his living, he is no different from any of my other

subjects. In the sense of rebelling, he does not do anything to get him in trouble. He stated that he cares about environmental causes, because nature has had an important place in his past. Yet he does not attend any sort of collective meetings for that cause either. His life choices are also far below the extreme. His leisure time practices are even consumerist.¹²

Deko is not the sweet-tempered liberal at heart. He struggles with the surrounding normativity around him. I think his position against society is built from some sort of repulsion because he says he did not turn his back on it, but that he ‘showed his teeth’ at it. He is surrounded with a sense of loneliness because he describes himself as bastardized. From this perspective, he is an angry and failing subject and yet, his life choices are certainly not as aggressive as his statements. In this sense, he is no less disciplined than any other subject in the group. So his edgy phrases express his rejection to get along with the rules. He is a very isolated person with a socio-political approach that only he possesses.

3.3.1 The Deserted Individual

We began our discussion with Deko by speaking about what sort of commonalities he felt like he shared with the community in the park. He stated he did not feel he belonged to the Gezi crowd, since he did not find it sincerely ‘anti-system’. He did not hide his dissatisfaction with the other participators and he harshly blamed them for only wishing to change the ruling party without challenging the system. He explained that he even abandoned Gezi and stopped paying attention to events after a while. I ran into other subjects who somehow did not feel they belonged very much to the Gezi crowd but Deko is by far my most critical interviewee against the whole event. He also mentioned that his close friends were even more reluctant to participate in the uprising. These friends have mocked and ridiculed Gezi but Deko underlines that they are not shallow people. He explained their point of views as follows:

¹² He gave details of how he enjoys going out having fun alone. We’ll come to that too.

They did not stand against the movement but after a point they have ridiculed it. They have ridiculed the entire thing. They have both ridiculed the state authority and the struggle against it. By saying ridiculed I mean it was like oh you know Gezi and stuff, what are we gonna do and so on. Here, apart from social classes or mass movements I have realized that the focus of my friends is seriously on existential issues like they do not really have a state for themselves in life. They have lots of problems about their being. Not problems, sorry, they have questions. They have lots of questions about their existential. When people have such a state of mind, these kinds of things¹³ cannot have a strong meaning for them. Those cannot be strong enough for them. Because they have other problems deep down. They want to solve something deeper down.

Meaningless jobs and incapacity to build a community out of the corporate networks make the subjects of precarization less and less attached to anyone and anything (Standing 2014, p. 44). Weakened communal ties damage the importance of loyalty and solidarity (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 400). How do you stand together beside people to whom you owe nothing? The individual who owes nothing to anyone has no duty to improve his or her ties with their community. During the interviews, some subjects underlined that they were feeling guilty because they had to work during the day so they had to leave the park to go to work, while I have also come across with people who suggested that they were feeling happy because they were ‘doing something’ for other people. But this way of thinking was not predominant among the subject group. There were also others who stayed more distanced and critical towards the community in Gezi. Deko and his friends do not seem like they were affected by the appeal of the movement. The Gezi collectivity even created a sort of repulsion on these friends, which they demonstrated by actions like mocking and devaluing. Their cynical attitude toward the Gezi uprising indicates that even a once-in-a-lifetime movement could not generate a strong enough impact to make everyone desire to belong somewhere.

¹³ He means mass movements.

One of Richard Sennett's key arguments (2014, p. 26-27) is that under the realm of capitalism, individuals face a problem of character. The absence of the 'long run' brings the danger of eroding the qualities that one can create a sustainable self and maintain his or her bounds with others. The main issue of the individual under modern capitalism is that the question of *who on earth needs me* is under attack (Sennett 2014, p. 163). Without rooted qualities for one's character, the precariat falls short of symbolic values they can cherish and develop a social identity around (Standing 2014, p. 45). The subject, who is liberated from symbols or communal ties, utilizes the freedom of choice to find his or her way in life, however, the unlimited variety of choices renders them an indecisive subject (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 402). In addition, seeing everything happening to them as disjunctive events weakens the joining of collective acts as a viable option (Sennett 2014, p. 151). In order to be reliable people, subject needs to know that somebody needs them (Sennett 2014, p. 164-165). Otherwise, it becomes impossible for them to build a common story of struggle, a common sense of fate, when system causes distrust and negligence, more and more people end up suffering existential crises. As a result, even a unique incident like Gezi might fall short of earning people's dedication.

3.3.2 A Non-Community for Deko

Deko is very critical toward political organizations and collectivities even though he mentions that he used to feel sympathetic towards socialism. When I asked him about his political involvement and organization practices, he explained why he could not fit in collective movements:

The thing is, I cannot participate in mass movements. After a point- especially in the last couple of years I have realized that I am not compatible with the masses. It does not mean I am so valuable and the masses are not, you know what I mean? May be I am a shitty person but just cannot get along with the masses. I am a very individualistic person, I rebel on my own. I live my life individually. I enjoy doing stuff individually. I like doing

things with masses but I enjoy more when I do things on my own. When I am alone, I am never bored, I never grunt. At the weekends, on Saturday nights I go out, I go to Taksim and drink whether or not somebody accompanies me. This is a simple example from my social life. Whether or not somebody accompanies me, I go out and wander around, that is kind of a man I am. I am someone who can enjoy an individualistic life style. So when we look at the masses, I realized that no matter which mass I face, I feel disharmonized because I cannot embrace the mass ideology. I cannot understand it. Because the mass ideology is something that kills the individuality.

I found his choice of actions that he narrated to depict his character quite interesting; the way he exemplifies being a misfit toy from something like nightlife habits, which naturally promises pleasure and amusement, signals to me that he expects to receive some calculable gain from his political involvement. He has no worries about what he can contribute to the collectivity. His statement once again shows that Deko is not troubled with questions like what to do for other people. Deko claims to be incompatible with the masses. He rejects mass ideology by becoming more individualistic; he says he rebels on his own. However, as I mentioned in the beginning, his actions and life choices are anything but extreme or anti-system.

Dardot and Laval (2012, p. 429) argue that the rejection of the neoliberal norms require more than passive disobedience. And such rejection is valuable as long as collective and cooperative relations are built in its place. People have to collectively acknowledge and interiorize new norms and act upon them to be able to challenge the ruling ones. Otherwise, even street movements might reproduce the hegemonic mindset they oppose or evolve into spectacles to be consumed. And the subject might end up alone and insignificant even if they genuinely mean to escape from systemic enforcements.

The precarious youth live in between fearing to lose control over everything and overstating the significance of their individual choices. On the one hand, they are haunted by a strong fear of losing control over their lives (Sennett 2014, p. 18). On the other hand, freedom of choice is the main theme of the new norms and shapes the attitudes of the

subjects (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 275). Neoliberalism is not opposing this rhetoric nor is it threaten the individual's freedom of choice. In fact neoliberalism is only manageable because of the concept of freedom of choice and it utilizes this in order to control human behavior (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 450). It mutates the patterns of decision mechanisms and rationalizes abandoning personal interests by devaluing them, not by restricting people. It does not force people to obey; instead, it receives people's consent for the status quo (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 405). While consenting the appropriation of their means and sources of life, the subject construct a fantasy of a limitless world where everyone is unique and everything is possible. As a result, even a human being so self-referential like Deko could not desire a collectivity, not even for selfish reasons but instead states his ideological position as if his deadlock is a natural end result of calculating highly sophisticated ideological positions:

There are seventy-seven million people in this country. Seventy-seven million people means seventy-seven million culture, seventy-seven million perceptions, seventy-seven million perspectives, seventy-seven million expectations. So, your question was individualistic, it was focused on the individual, if we ask this seventy-seven million people most of them will probably tell something different because just like nobody has the same fingerprint, everyone might have different opinions. Take people from the same groups, take from TKP for instance or from BDP, AKP, even similar people have different expectations. How does that person want to come to work, how do I want to come to work, how does a person in Erzurum want to live and so on. There are seventy-seven million different ideas here. How can commonality eventuate? Finding common ground is impossible.

How can commonality eventuate? Finding common ground is impossible.¹⁴ This sentence is a good example of the lack of accumulation of common riches as Wacquant suggests (cited in Bora et al. 2013, p. 36-37). Deko lacks the necessary repertoire of shared images and discourses to imagine possible alternatives. When I asked him what sort of a society he would like to live in, Deko could not suggest a model he would personally enjoy.

¹⁴ Exact sentence: 'Ortak nasıl olacak. Ortak bir payda bulmak imkansız burada.'

Instead he insisted on the impossibility of building any collectivity as if we do not always have to live in one whether we like it or not. His position contradicts the self-oriented pleasure-seeking subject because it trivializes the subject's own interests and desires. While he acknowledges everyone having different opinions, he devalues his own. The question was his side and when he was asked to share his point of view he could not give a complete picture of his political expectations, as I would have expected from an individualist who claims to 'show his teeth' to society.

Deko is aware of the conflicts his rationality is going through but he cannot help himself:

You know as I said before you might judge me for giving in and despairing and for being like this man is gonna do whatever he likes to do why should I rebel but that is not my mindset really. But there is no strong argument. No matter how much we collectively gather, there is no strong argument for change. Like for the environmental causes probably much less people will gather compare to Gezi. There will not be such a crowd. So I don't know, I am really confused, there are lots of conflicting opinions in my mind. On one hand, I love rebellion, I am sensitive toward environment and I love the nature, but on the other hand I am not compatible with the masses, I cannot collectively act with the masses. Another point is I am aware of the power of the Tiran. It does not discourage, weaken or dishearten me but like it is a great paradox.

A paradox indeed.

This is all to say that, before praising the discourse of the new people that we have met during Gezi as a political alternative, we need to focus on how their character motivations and mindsets are constructed. We need to problematize and question the ways in which the neoliberal mindset enforces itself so that we can abandon the inner limits we put on ourselves (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 450).

3.4 Pre-Interviews Conclusions

Was Gezi a movement of love, experience, dance and dream? Alan Badiou (2013, p. 49) describes Gezi protestors as educated youth, intellectuals and members of the middle class

who demand ‘freedom’, ‘true democracy’ and a ‘new life.’ According to Tuğal (cited in İnal 2013, p. 30), starting in 2011, participants of social movements around the globe have developed new characteristics. They tend to participate individually or via friend circles, they stay distanced from organized groups and they reject following commands. Tuğal argues that the individualist characteristics of Gezi are also significant. Gezi participants also liked to protest and have fun at the same time. According to Kurultay (2013, p. 119), #direngezi has a cosmopolitan and politically ambiguous form that has never been witnessed in the history of resistance. A creative multitude should be expected with much hope from this new trend that movements like the Zapatistas, OWS and Gezi share (Kurultay 2013, p. 120).

The white-collar youth belong to a socio-economic category that preserves most of the pre-assumed labels that were attached to Gezi protestors such as college-educated, urbanite, social media user, Y generation, etc. Also, it seems as if most of the arguments about the motives of the youth seem to capture only limited aspects of the youth-revolt phenomenon. How could they become a revolutionary generation overnight? Why do they support a rhetoric that is critical towards means of organization and glorifies the passiveness, sweetness, or in other words peacefulness?

In the upcoming chapter, I will provide details and analyses of the semi-structured in-depth interviews that I have conducted with young urbanites who were employed in multinationals or companies with similar work culture when Gezi occurred. My argument is that, as a result of precarization and devaluation of the means of political involvement, people suffer from a lack of accumulation of collective interests to such an extent that it damages their capability to develop collective consciousness and collective action. Without a collectivity to belong to, the isolated individual cannot characterize his or her social needs. Because they lack any consciousness of togetherness, people under the threat of precarization, insecurity and isolation cannot develop an ideological position that requires

cooperation with others. Their political expectations narrow down to groundless and populist discourses (Standing 2014, p. 15-16). As a result, they become conservative against being politically organized and their political manifestation cannot be more sophisticated than ambiguous universal values. They tend to defend a moral ground built on principles that nobody directly opposes anyway. Such a position damages the exploited groups by creating a conservative approach against their economic and political demands. On moral grounds, everything is questioned for sincerity first, which is why the unorganized rhetoric is more powerful than bold anti-system manifestations of organized political groups. Resultantly, to-the-point manifestations of anti-system organizations lose their power of impacting masses.

The idealism of peaceful and unorganized resistance is itself a product of the neoliberal mindset, which developed the alienation of modern people and is reproduced through that same alienation. Neoliberalism is not management against the freedom of people. The neoliberal force rarely parades in the mask of villain police standing in one's way (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 450). Instead, neoliberalism manifests itself by glorifying the political idealism of individuality, emphasizing that one cannot gather anything more than that on one's own anyway and creating the illusion that one can run away from corruption by staying distanced from collectivities. The economic and political precariousness, losing contact with collectivities and corrosion of the character are the main reasons for the unorganized, sweet-tempered feature of the poster children of Gezi. And the idealism of the nonviolent, unorganized, idealistic urban youth serves to reinvent and reinforce the neoliberal approach in which they are trapped. Hence, nobody evolved to be a part of a new revolutionary generation in one day. The actions, discourses and political expectations of the unorganized corporate rebels of Gezi are not contradicting their own normativity. But to comment further, I will first share the outcomes of the semi-structured in-depth interviews.

CHAPTER 4

THE PROMINENT PATTERNS OF THE SEMI-STRUCTURED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

There were two main focuses of the semi-structured in-depth interviews. The first one was how the subjects experienced the Gezi uprising, especially during the park occupation. How they spent their time in the park, what they felt about the crowd, what sorts of people or groups they encountered and how the movement impacted their work and lives in general. In the first part, I will portray how my subjects viewed the Gezi movement and participated in it. Then, I will briefly introduce the details of their main activities during their park experience and what they thought as a result of the uprising, park occupation, and the forceful means of resistance, about the public space and park forums. Then, I will problematize dominant patterns of their actions by relating them with aspects of the neoliberal subject.

My second interest lies in their political orientation and position towards political organizations. The fifth chapter will recount their standpoints in those matters and will investigate what has formed their mindsets and ways of thinking (their rationale) based on their statements about ideologies and political values. The discussion of Dardot and Laval about the loss of symbols and political values will also be addressed. I separated our conversations into two main chapters accordingly. The results will be interpreted in the same order.

4.1 Occupation of the Park

During our meetings, I began my conversations with my interviewees by asking them about the first thing that came to their minds when they thought of the occupation. Then I moved

on to discuss their decisions to join the crowds. However, I could not observe any predominant reasons. Some respondents even admitted that they were not sure about how they were dragged into participating in this particular event. Their initial motivations or their reasons for discontent are not clear.

I then asked them about how they spent time in the occupied area of the Gezi commune during the first two weeks after its beginning. I noticed the interviewees' desire to absorb as many stimulants as possible that the park could offer whether they came in the form of images, shows or interactions. Sensing, watching, listening and sometimes talking became the dominant ways in which they participated in the occupation. They walked around and collected anything that came across their paths.

Irmak: For me, the movement has passed with walking, walking and arriving at Taksim, to Istiklal Street, protesting there, than heading to Karaköy, to somewhere down and split. I probably have been to the park for five or six times. Every time I went there, I was spending time by walking around. I spent time by viewing what happened around and the life people build in there.

Zeynep: My friends and I, we were really trying to meet with people who were resisting. We were asking what do they do, where do they come from, which district, what do they do for work. I mean we were asking questions like you are doing right now; we were trying to find commonalities. Other than that, we were eating when we got hungry, we were chatting, making gossip. I mean we continued to spend time just like we do in our normal times.

Rıfat: In the weekends we were mostly like walking around and observing people. I mean we were really trying to observe people one-to-one. Not that we were doing a sociological research or something. It was interesting because you live something utterly different. We were observing people and debate over them.

Deko stated that he made this search in order to figure out whether or not there was a commonality between him and the others. It was especially important for him to understand what the people rebelled against:

I was not among the people who have built tents. I did not know anyone who built tents therefore I have never been among the residents of the park. I never stayed in the tents but I wandered around for hours. I was leaving to eat somewhere then get back to the park. Then I was walking

around in the square. I mean at some point, I was trying to understand the feeling of the people. My aim was like for the first time ever people uprising in this country, what did they rise against? I was trying to find that out.

Some subjects connected to one another through their observations while none of the subjects mentioned contributing to the occupation by helping out the autonomous organizations inside the park. Nobody claimed to be a regular in any of those organizations. Still, in order to learn more about their contribution to the process of occupation, along with asking about how they spent their time in the park directly, I gave a short list of options and asked the subjects to tell me which of those they actually did.

According to my checklist, gathering and marching, shouting slogans, clashing with the police (including a wide definition of clashing from being pepper gassed to clashing by throwing stones), building barricades, collecting garbage, bringing material for common use and attending workshops or presentations, one or more interlocutors seem to have participated in at least one of these activities. But not every option that I provided them had similar popularity. For instance, among the people that I spoke with, only Elvan and Ece¹⁵ said they slept in a tent and stayed in the park overnight.

I have reasons to believe that none of my interviewees took part in any of the organizations in the park but I can not be absolutely certain. Elvan and Irmak answered the question with a 'yes' although they did not give any details about what sort of responsibilities they took in order to help those organizations when they talked about their time in the park. So I suspect they either did not understand the question correctly or did not want to give me too many 'no' answers.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ece did it for once.

¹⁶ I was rather reluctant to ask for specifics that the subjects did not want to give if I could not paraphrase the question. I believed forcing too much on details could end up forcing them to make the details up so I thought no details are better than invented ones. Still, I think that Elvan and Irmak did not actually take duties in any sort of intro-park institution because all of the subjects tend to glorify their participation rather than downplaying it.

Most of the subjects mentioned they were active on their social media accounts. But I did not encounter anyone who spray painted the walls, floors or anything of the sort. One interviewee explained she did not come up with anything to write, another one said they did not have any paint.

The Gezi generation with all of its supposed characteristics was heavily praised for its members' creativity and genuine humor. I know I cannot conclude that all the white-collar participants stayed away from the walls. But the fact that I could not find anyone indicates that spray painting was not a largely interiorized act among the educated urban youth of corporate buildings.¹⁷ This is one of the most surprising findings of the interviews for me, because writing on the wall with spray paint is so cool. Why not give it a try? At the beginning of my research, I found it unlikely that random people simultaneously become productive developers of new rhetoric; it would be a hard claim to sustain. Consequently, I was suspicious towards preconceptions like the sweet-mannered kids of Gezi who created an original way of expression. Although I think creating common phrases and mottos require some collective knowledge and experience in street activism, I still assumed that the unorganized participants would reproduce already existing phrases for the sake of action and fun.

The same reluctance was found among participants when it comes to preparing personal banners. Apparently not many white-collar workers gave that activity a try either.¹⁸ One subject prepared a banner for her diploma ceremony.¹⁹ Other than that, none of the

¹⁷ I specifically looked for someone who had written on the walls and I could find one, but she was an intern during that time and was going to school for three days a week, so she was not really in my profile group.

¹⁸ We saw many personal phrases on small piece of papers or colorful cardboards in some people's hands. Some of those made it into the collection of Gezi photo albums. I am not asking for large 'die capitalism' banners to be prepared by white collars. I looked for colorful writings on A4 formats or something smaller to stick on the backpacks.

¹⁹ Only Ece said she prepared something personal to carry around but it was not for the park, it was for her graduation ceremony. She was a part-time worker during June 2013, two classes short of graduation. So she was attending work full time but received her diploma at the end of June 2013. By that time, the graduation ceremonies with student's protests were all over the news so I consider her case more like a collective act like collecting garbage.

subjects prepared any sorts of posters or banners with statements. A few said they never carried one when they walked in a street march.

Do these people lack expressions to share with others whom they loved observing so much? According to Dardot and Laval (2012, p. 280), the most significant thing of the neoliberal turn is that the state not actually backing off. It lives in the metamorphosis of intervention methods for the sake of rationalization and modernization of management. Self-control mechanisms are much more efficient than external supervision. When the individual manages, controls, supervises and values himself or herself from the inside, even after the elimination of the external authority, he/she would not be able to adapt to the new situation. Without any practical knowledge on how to build a community or collective relations, an individual cannot overcome its internal cultivation overnight.

Does watching, praising or consenting to crazy things happen make someone a part of it? Those activities may help destabilizing the authority but they cannot develop any real challenge. If we are to accept the significance of wall writings, banners and autonomous organizations in shaping the language, manners and characteristics of the movement, then the white-collared youth as representatives of educated unorganized urban youth, did not contribute to it.

Nobody really gave a clear answer for their inaction and I did not force the question in order to avoid the interlocutors putting up defend shields. But in some of our conversations, the interviewees interpreted their singular being on the streets as a meaningful statement on their own. As I investigated her reasons for not liking the organized groups, Elvan emphasized a 'voice' she hoped to generate by presenting her existence in Gezi Park:

Let me explain in this way, I was more on the social side of the event. I am not actually an apolitical person. But my aim for participation was not political. More like, I mean of course we wanted to show our reaction like we have a voice too, on one hand I wanted to show that too. But I was more social side.

Also according to Zeynep, the fundamental goal of the Gezi uprising is to be heard:

The reaction in there was actually very simple. We do not want interference to our lives, interference to the nature, we want to be heard when we say there are things that we do not want.

The emphasis on making a statement with a singular existence was retold by İdil as well:

For me Gezi events were not like I want to have this or that result, these are our aims or we demand this or that thing. I interpret my aims for participation like I wanted to show I do not accept what is happening right now and I want to express it some way.

Wacquant defines white-collars workers as people who are not able to connect with the traditional tools of representation and political inclusion (cited in Bora et al. 2013, p. 36-37). They do not have a variety of means to put up a sophisticated challenge, which exaggerates the importance of reflexive and susceptible appearances. Still, there is something preliminary in flooding to the streets to make one's noise heard but being unable to phrase the discontent. According to Standing (2014, p. 217), the precariat does not have a story to tell because when they do not work they just spend time. Their life style is affected by their insecure career paths, which makes it weaker (Standing 2014, p. 218). The desire to be heard but being unable to utilize words and sentences might suggest that the interviewees do not share a common literature with their surrounding communities because they cannot relate their life stories to each other's.

My subjects enjoyed the Gezi movement. They participated through observation and sometimes interaction, but they did not actually participate in the making of it as opposed to what we thought about the epic Gezi generation. Even when they were surrounded with potential public acceptance, beyond the police barriers, beyond the control of any state authority, they did not develop or helped any organization for the greater good of the park commune; they did not create or reproduce social, political or personal statements to be

exposed. If nothing else (like online advocating), their efforts might very well be considered negligible.

4.2 A Story to Tell

Despite their reluctance to take action, it looks like the interviewees are charmed by what they have lived in the park. Almost every subject praised the Gezi uprising as a unique ‘experience’.

Metin: It was definitely something incredible to live. Like perhaps our generation needed to live. It was very beautiful. Like hippies in the sixties and seventies even for a short period of time, anarchism has ruled over there, we lived that. People came from overseas to see it. It was an incredible experience.

Arda: The first thing that comes to my mind is that for the first time in my life I have participated in a resistance. And I was included in it so much like I could have my name on the list of the resisters. I have never experienced such a thing before so I did not know what was I going to live. Which is why it is something that harbors lots of firsts for me.

Rıfat: An unbelievable explosion is happening, an incredible vision, an incredible idea emerges. Nobody knows what he or she is going through; perhaps they are never going to live such an experience ever again. You experience something that in a lot of parts of the world people can never live.

Elvan mentioned the value of the experience for her when she was talking about staying in a tent:

I am telling this by excluding the political matters of the country but I thought that I could never sleep in a tent in the middle of Istanbul again. For me that was the most important case.

She also added ‘It is not possible to live such an experience again’.

Zeynep valued the experience when we went over the list of the activities she was involved during the occupation. She mentioned she helped building a barricade and added:

I am thinking like was I insane? Why did I do such a thing? It was so obviously going to break apart. We built it like I built it with my tiny hand; I had callus on my hands. Then TOMA arrived and destructed all

of it. I questioned why did we build it in the first place but anyway. It was beautiful. It was an impressive experience to be able to build one.

‘We are the Champions’ is the march of the neoliberal subject, Dardot and Laval suggest (2012, p. 391). The neoliberal subject is a person of performance and competition. They live to accomplish, to win things. They internalize not only the rules but also the game that is a full show of beautiful bodies, life styles, hobbies, adventures to live or places to be (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 387-389). Gezi as a unique experience was a huge achievement, a solid badge²⁰ to possess. Being part of it was very fulfilling. It was one of the most interesting, colorful part of the interviewees’ lives. These children fell in love with the originality of Gezi. It gave joy and a unique experience. As an experience, it was less of a political opposition but more than political demands. For my interviewees, and for thousands like them, perhaps the Gezi movement was personal. Perhaps through Gezi, the people who lost the possibility to imagine changing the World, had pleasure from having an object too real and obvious to defend.

4.3 On Violence

From the very beginning the distinction between the peaceful resisters who were not organic members of political and organized groups and the people who utilized violent means became apparent. Nonviolent resistance against state violence was praised as an innocent and righteous stance (İnal 2013, p. 46). But my interviewees do not seem to have a clear-cut approach to the matter of peaceful resistance versus the utilization of force. Although most of them condemned police violence and were not personally involved in harsh clashes, they predominantly did not embrace distinctions like innocent resisters or violent groups.

When I asked the interlocutors to tell me about a moment that they find hard to forget, I listened stories about police violence or about situations in which they felt they were

²⁰ foursquare

endangered. The first time they heard about Gezi was mostly related with police violence against the activists in the park. The infamous police interruption and burning of the tents at one dawn seems to be unforgettable and much problematized along with other images of people being maltreated. Police violence was an important element for the interviewees. Throughout the interviews, the emphasis on it occasionally reappeared and strengthened the cause of the uprising. Facing violence was an essential ingredient of the movement. The victims of precarization do not know their exploiters in person (Standing 2014, p. 13); or their common enemies. For the interviewees, perhaps police violence resembled a physical and reliable enemy to resist; an enemy that does not exist in their normal lives and work. So problematizing police violence helped to develop a strong political position and express their anger.

However, the anti-violent position weakened when I asked about rebel groups using means of physically forceful resistance. I could not observe such a consensus about the destruction of public property or the utilization of violent means against police. Except Deko, the interviewees did not throw stones at the police during the street clashes. Not all interviewees faced the police or had been tear gassed but an interestingly remarkable amount of them said they did help build barricades, which is technically partly destroying public property.

When we discussed the destruction of public property and the physical resistance against the police with Zeynep, our conversation went like this:

-Have you wished the destructed vehicles to not happen?

No, I did not. It is so normal, I mean, people died. When people die in a protest, burning vehicles is very expected, very probable. I was not annoyed like some people can live differently, feel differently, that is a way of reaction.

-Are you against throwing stones to the police officers?

No.

-Molotov?

No I am not. It is war, think about it that way.

I mean, let me phrase this way, of course it should not happen, I wish it would not. Ideally we go out, do our protest, say what we got to say, they come and listen to us like why are these people here, why are they protesting, marching. This is what you would expect from a democracy. But since this is not the case here and they try to disrupt you whenever you gather, you can throw stones and other things. Because if you are not going to throw anything then stay at home, do not protest. This is either one of them; it is in the nature of protest. I am not against it.

Metin was on the opposite side of Zeynep on the issue of using force against the police because he felt estranged when he was confronted with such actions:

That was one of the things that I could not forget, after we have arrived to Gezi. Well, police forces used violence and something but like there were also another kind of violence that other groups perpetrated. Of course Taksim square could not be taken otherwise, they had some serious resistance but it is not something I am used to. In the end, we do not protest like that.²¹

The destruction of public property also causes mixed reactions in the subject group. The only person who threw stones at the police was critical against the destruction of objects.

Deko: I really understand that. I never regarded it strange, never judged a man who tears down an ATM. I never said at least leave the ATMs or anything, I understand that reaction. You cannot damage the argument of the authority because they can throw you into prison. You cannot change yourself but there is this energy bursting inside you so you reflect it onto the object that cannot answer back. You reflect it onto the object but you overdo, rape the object in one sense. I understand the reaction but I think this sort of behavior jams the whole thing in that track. You do not have to be squeezed in that track. It does not take you anywhere. I do not say it is wrong but it is futureless.

Arda considered the images of destroyed sights amusing but then he considered his reaction strange. About dismantling the cobblestones for barricades he said:

There were occasions that I was not bothered by dismantling those²² but later I questioned why I was not bothered. I was later convinced that those actions that I said bravo at the time were actually very wrong.

²¹ Here I want to note that Zeynep was a graduate of METU and she had a busy school life in terms of activism while it was the first time for Metin to ever be interested in a street movement.

²² He is talking about the paving stones.

Idil distinguished destroying objects from actions directed at the members of the police force; she is not disturbed by burned public buses but cannot tolerate throwing stones:

Actually it never did, may be it should have normally. At the end it is vandalizing public property but weirdly you do not care about it at all. A burned bus right there seems pretty normal to you. Like it is a part of everything. I was not bothered.

-Throwing stones?

No, I did not enjoy people throwing stones. It disturbed me. But all extreme acts like throwing stone and cursing disturbed me actually. But like strangely I definitely do not include building barricades and burning public buses to extreme acts. May be because those do not harm people or people's lives, may be that's why.

The unorganized, peaceful and non-political features of the movement have been widely discussed and have also been reproduced through these discussions. Based on the interviews, I do not think the educated young folks consciously utilized peaceful resistance as a mean of collective action. I think the attitudes that the interviewees embraced regarding public destruction and violent resistance do not resemble steady and consistent group reflexes. There is no consensus in the group on the utilization of violent means but I think the right circumstances could make it look like there is a consensus. Their decisions are not consciously made but related with the situations they found themselves in. Depending on how the question is phrased or their experiences during the uprising, each one of them could have answered me very differently. If he had come across one, Metin could have found a destructive sight quite amusing just as Arda did. My point is, I think the subjects' passive bystander behaviors are also illustrated when the topic is about violently resisting police or destructing public property.

4.4 On Space

Defending public space and the common rights of that space were important essentials of Taksim Solidarity and built the grounds for the initial occupation of Gezi Park. After the initial activists were attacked for staying at night in the Gezi park, the public awareness

quickly increased and the police violence became the major reason for common discontent. Although, there were significant talk on urban transformation during the first days of occupation, in a couple of days, the focus turned to police violence and maltreatment of the protesters while the urban issues were looked over (Tuğal, 2013).

The conflicts about a space for common collective use do not seem to be among the top concerns of the interviewees and it is hard to say they are touched by the politics of urban space. They do not consciously wish, demand or long for a space in which they can spend time without spending money. I do not expect the subject group to perceive this issue as a social scientist would, and there are certain words that I am not disappointed for not hearing. But the things they do, support, tolerate or not tolerate define people. These things are some of the major features of our identities in addition to things we desire and we like to include in our lives. They all create our living space (Standing 2014, p. 218). As a result, it is important to mark the absence of public space from their socio-political problems because this absence marks the difference between the subjectivities of the precarious youth of corporate buildings and collectively organized activists.

All the interviewees expressed concerns about the destruction of the natural sights like Northern Forests of Istanbul and they can identify it as a problem they care about. But absolutely nobody complained about the transformation of Istanbul and the way it impacts their lives. Even the case of the Cinema of Emek, which drew a lot of attention during the time it was about to be destructed and generated a popular struggle, was not among the mentioned reasons of dissatisfaction from the pre-Gezi period.

When I asked about the commonalities she observed, İdil praised a 'lifestyle' and emphasized on it as the most important common thing between her and the people around her in the park. But the life style she described was shaped with passive actions like thinking and feeling which do not require a physical space:

I think most important common thing is definitely our life styles. The life styles and point of views that we try to build and keep up. But I mean it is so strange you already feel so common like you struggle for the same thing, you think the same thing, you feel oppressed the same way and you fight against that feeling. So it was so weird to feel that everybody else were feeling that oppression the same way you do.

At the end of every conversation, instead of focusing on their motivations, I asked the interviewees why they think that so many people joined the uprising. What were other people's reasons? When the interviewees looked at the events from a rather distant perspective, blaming of governance and the ruling party lessened although it did not completely disappear. The bottom-line of most answers were unhappiness, dissatisfaction and anger. However, no one in the subject group addressed exhausting city life or the absence of a common space among the reasons for the dissatisfaction or unhappiness. 'The system' as a responsible party made it on the list, yet none mentioned real life problems related with actual daily habits as examples of reasons for feeling trapped.

Arda's answer covered mostly everything that has been said about the urban misery:

I don't know, like people feel oppressed. The subtext of that unhappiness is being oppressed. Because like when you think about it most of them are people who are satisfied with their lives. When they later ask themselves like why they did what they did, they are people who cannot answer that question. [...]

Everyone is planning to get away, to leave İstanbul, to settle in Ege or to start his or her own business. I can find you thousands like that, those are a lot.

Arda points out that people desire to leave İstanbul but the thing that is squeezing people is rather a metaphorical description, it does not have physical roots to actually being squeezed by the diminishing of spaces that do not require spending money. The physical problems related with people's current spaces are not apparent.

Zeynep was the closest to addressing this issue. I find what Zeynep said about restaurants as a good example of the absence of public spaces. While questioning her political approach, Zeynep appeared very distanced from any political context, even from

humanitarian values. I, thus, asked her if it was up to her, what would she dream for the social life of the community:

I have so forgotten my dreams like how should things be. Of course there should not be huge income gaps between people. Everybody should be able to go to everywhere, every sort of cafes or restaurants- there should be places that people from different income groups can go. I mean, I don't know, people should not be like oh my god we cannot even pass in front of that place. From the worker to cooker, to manager, to teacher, to boss everybody should be comfortable in every setting. Such a life would be nice I guess. I don't know.

The person who came closer to talking about common spaces gave an example of restaurants. She could not imagine a place to be in without spending money. Here, I want to mention that the subjects were not particularly excited about the park forums either and Zeynep is the only one to make a comment about missing places to meet with others. While talking about the aftermath of Gezi, she hopelessly complained:

In the beginning when we were hanging out in Gezi, I was hoping like from now on may be we will have a park culture, a spending time in parks tradition or something. Perhaps that's my initial motivation to participate in Gezi, I forgot to mention, it is good that I remember now. Perhaps parks will become places like people can read books, lay on the grass, spend time day and night and not be afraid of the dark, such a culture will develop in Turkey; people spending time outside like in Europe and United States. This does not exist in Turkey; I was hoping Gezi would contribute to that. But nothing changed.

People view any communal crisis more and more as personal issues (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 385). This ongoing mechanism makes the external sources of problems appear as inner ones. Zeynep defines the problem of not having the habit to go to parks as a personal and cultural error. As if, if one could only become someone who likes to spend time in parks, they could improve things. She does not point out the issue as a systematic one, but rather introduces it as a inherent problem of people.

A common space is not among the things that tie white-collared youth together. They can value parks and Northern Forests for environmental reasons. But they do not address the

reconstruction of İstanbul as a part of the destruction of common spaces. They do not demand space for their collective interest. Despite the fact that the Gezi movement was sparked from efforts to prevent the destruction of a common park, I do not think my interviewees can relate their interests with the common spaces. Still, no matter how much technology and globalization enhance, the need for a physical space to exist and interact continues (Standing 2014, p. 217-218). So even though the interviewees cannot address the missing collective spaces in their lives, they are living the tension due to the absence of them.

4.5 On Park Forums

I asked the interviewees whether or not they attended the park forums, as a part of my investigation about their park experience. The purpose of this was to learn more about collective actions in which they had a chance to participate. When we discussed the park forums, it appeared that the interlocutors were not as excited about them as they were about the occupation. They generally viewed the forums as dysfunctional and they were reluctant to attend.

The park forums emerged right after the dissolution of the Gezi commune in various cities, and most of them remained over the entire summer.²³ There were no mechanisms or groups that were generating the forums; anyone who wished could be a moderator of a forum or take another type of responsibility. The forums were not dominated by the signs and flags of political organizations whatsoever. People interacted, shared their opinions or memories, planned for collective activities that were meant to encourage more civil gatherings, or just hung out in the parks. The forums also gave a new air to the socio-political space of the young urbanites.

²³ Etiler forum for instance is still somehow active.

The forums were welcoming to small-scale civil entrepreneurs, such as organizing talks with guest speakers, arranging bazaars or school courses for children.²⁴ It was also a place where one could express their thoughts. The park forums were the least political, most utopian interactions that urbanites in their twenties could hope for. There, they were able to generate micro-dynamics and real actions in there. Therefore, before starting the in-depth interviews, I assumed that the participants enjoyed the unusual aspect of the collective gatherings in the parks, utilized them to express themselves (at least to share their experiences) or at the very least to spend some more quality time in a park environment.

The reality was much different. Park forums never became a trend for the interviewees. Whatever it was that they expected from an autonomous park gatherings, they were sure the forums were not capable of giving it. They regarded the forums inefficient and insufficient in producing outcomes. The interviewees either never attended a forum or had been there for three times at most. None stated that they took the floor to speak out about their opinions but some underlined that they were interested in listening.

Elvan: I was not expecting anything to come up actually. In one hand, it was beautiful but on the other hand it felt like fantasizing, like melancholia.

Arda: There were no moderator or anything, a conversation continuing on its own. It was nice but it was not something that could come through. So if I were to believe in it, I would be there, in the front seats, every night but I do not believe in politics in Turkey, so.

Metin: At the end, everybody has different opinions. I don't really like to argue about those issues. At that point, I rather like to listen. In that regard, I did not really think it could generate any real gain so, well, it was nice to talk but I could not see a solution there. If I were to believe in it, I would attend every day but frankly I did not really believe in it.

Zeynep: I think they were very inefficient, I did not talk much but it was like someone says something and everybody else claps and so on. I did

²⁴ A forum organized bartering bazaar. The people of the park forum I attended in Etiler were trying to organize free educational courses for children of a close neighborhood that was under threat of gentrification. Some young people of that neighborhood attended to a couple of meetings as well. In one meeting, a 'Cumartesi Annesi' was guest speaker and she told the attendants her story of struggle. (Cumartesi Anneleri is a group of women sits in every Saturday in front of Galatasaray high school with the pictures of their children that have been disappeared under State custody or died and their cases were never solved. We should note that Etiler is a neighborhood that the community members are supporters of nationalist left which is not really close with the concept of Cumartesi Anneleri or their lost children.

not really take the floor, I rather listened like what other people generally say but there was not really an output.

Irmak: I have been to Abbasağa. I think Abbasağa was really nice. Back then, I inhabited in the European side. People said Kadıköy was better but Abbasağa was really not bad either. People were taking the floor and telling their opinions about democracy and staff, I really liked it. I have been there two or three times. I have sat and listened; I mean I never speak up.

The momentum of Gezi created a wave, which dragged along thousands with it, including my interviewees. My interviewees walked with them and had a good time absorbing everything they could. But anticipating all play is boring and the joy it brings is limited and temporary because, not before long, pleasure-oriented expectations start to make people impatient against things that are out of joy's reach (Standing 2014, p. 236). In the case of the park forums, the appeal of gaining an unusual experience or a chance for collective interaction could not generate enough motivation to retain the subjects' attention; the potential gains were not enticing enough. The interviewees could not find a place for themselves in the forums because unlike the simultaneously built and reproductive Gezi commune, mutual interaction and real contribution were necessary to spend some quality time in the forums. When the park occupation ended, the 'Gezi spirit' resembled meal leftovers and lost its power to offer a charming experience. At this moment, the poster children abandoned the scene. Meanwhile, the popularity of a humorous, individualistic and disobedient youth resulted in misperceptions about the eventuality of unorganized resistance and made us overlook the possibilities of developing a sustainable social wave and alternative politics to the neoliberal reality.

CHAPTER 5

A NEW VISION OF WORLD

5.1 On Political Relations and Ideologies of the Neo-Subject

During and after the Gezi occupation, many observers focused on the unorganized participants to discuss the dynamics of the movement, embraced the appearance of people who were not members of political organizations, and the ideology-free rhetoric with its unending reproduction of ‘innocence’ as its meta-discourse (Sancar 2013, p. 51). But I would like to problematize overemphasis on individuality and liberal rhetoric before labeling them as characteristics of the new revolutionary.

The problem with these arguments is that they praise unorganized resisters and their supposed features as succeeding essentials of the movement. But Standing points out (2014, p. 14) that the experience of collective insecurity develops a structure that reinforces individualistic features and identities. According to him, citizens and especially the ones under the threat of precarization are losing contact with politics. They sometimes vote for one charismatic leader or participate in one significant movement but they do not preserve a consistent interest in any of these because people lack the quality time they need to be able to make sense of politics (Standing 2014, p. 216).

In order to learn about their political position, I asked the interviewees their position against the banners in the park and political organizations in general in addition to their political values and ideologies. From their answers, I noticed two predominant features regarding the mentality of the subjects. First of all, the interviewees perceive themselves, other people, identity groups and even political orientations as singular agents under any circumstances. They choose their position from a singular agent’s perspective no matter

what the context is. Their interpretation of socio-political matters misses interactions and conflicts. As if people of different political orientations never conflict with each other, all the possible outcomes are calculated from the perspective of the sole agent.

Secondly, the interviewees do not embrace any symbols or bounds that can identify them within a community, political approach or an interest group. They even tend to devalue ideological concepts, even leftist ones. In addition, they look for some sort of moral purity in the political views to respect. They insist on neutrality, which causes them to lack the ideological ground to form and address their own interests.

5.1.1 On Political Groups, Flags and Being Politically Organized

None of my subjects were organic members of any social or political organization before or during the Gezi movement. In order to listen to their perspectives of the organized groups, I have asked them about the banners that were in the park to see whether or not they were disturbed by the visibility of political flags. Then I asked them whether or not they wanted to be a part of a political organization after the Gezi occupation.

I asked the subjects about the #flamasızgezi hashtag that emerged on Twitter to support a banner-free park environment and gained some support but could not achieve its aim. Nobody said they had supported the anti-banner hashtag on Twitter, and in fact very few could recall that campaign. Yet, while none of the interviewees electronically (or in other ways) advocated for mobilized groups to leave the park, most of them did not like the presence of the flags there.

Elvan was feeling uncomfortable with all the banners and flags because she was worried that they could damage the innocence of the movement:

Of course, those bothered me. Because I have noticed that innocent movement have started to be utilized. I mean it was not possible for everybody there to be heard individually but people tried to do that. They have deviated from being there for one purpose. Perhaps we all have

different opinions but we have all been there for one objection. I was bothered when I have realized people were trying to expose their own opinions after a while.

It is important to note that, including Elvan, only two interviewees praised the ‘innocence’ of the movement to stress out the righteousness of the uprising. The rest never used the word innocent to justify their positions.

Meanwhile, only Arda expressed his displeasure with the banner issue by going as far as abandoning the park after realizing he was surrounded with flags of groups that he deeply disliked.²⁵

Arda: It was a movement that did not belong to anything, I have joined it because that is what I supported and I have stopped participating after a while. You know the say it was pleasant no more. Unfortunately, it had become some people’s playground.

Irmak was bothered with the banners and flags of political groups too but she had a more tolerant position:

Turkey is not a country that knows how to protest, I mean like what is protesting, it is people from different opinions coming together and protest for the same causes, so far so good. No interference against that. But this is not the case in Turkey, here, your political standpoint or party affects all the notions that you support so you drift apart from being a more diverse person when you chose such a path for yourself. So in an ideal world, all the protests could be with banners. And everybody could tolerate that-I am not even gonna say tolerate- everybody could normalize that but this is not the case in Turkey. So I guess it was more appropriate to be banner-free for Turkey.

I also encountered with people who were against being against the flags. Rıfat said: I am like against all sorts of slogans that constrain, correct or block somebody else. I am against #flamasızgezi too. Because banners can be there.

Zeynep, the interviewee with a noteworthy experience in political involvement, finds being anti-banner meaningless although she considers the presence of banners a cause of diversion. About the #flamasızgezi she said:

²⁵ He disapproves TGB, a nationalist youth organization, very much.

I did not show support, I think it was unnecessary. I do not think banners was harmful or anything. Actually there is this contradiction. Since people were unorganized, having banners around was normal so be it. I mean each group might want to reveal who they are. Like I am from group x and I am here, so group x is here, let them know x supports this. I think this is okay but it also obstructs being organized so it is contradictory.

-Why?

Because it creates diversity. I mean our purpose to be there is utterly different but when you represent a group, you carry its weight. You always speak by keeping it in mind- you know what I mean?

My subjects predominantly did not welcome the presence of banners, but still, they did not embrace a strict position against them. They were not completely unaware of the leverage that the organized groups generated for the Gezi movement and also for the park's occupation but encountering with organized groups did not cause the interviewees to want to be more active. Two out of the twelve wanted to be organized after the Gezi occupation. Among the eight that I am quoting, only Rıfat tried to be an organized activist by joining Birleşik Haziran Hareketi.

The negative attitude of the subjects towards organized groups and political organizations runs parallel with the findings of the survey compilation of TÜSES on young people's perception of politics. Consequently, the interviewees' perspectives on politics and levels of involvement were not surprising. Almost all of them claim they feel discordant with the collectives and negatively criticized political groups for being incompatible with individuality. When we talked about the dissolution of the Gezi occupation, Metin complained and argued that when the ideology-free trend ends, corruption infiltrates:

We could change a lot more but as I said, there are so many different people; there are extreme groups and ideologies. When those ideologies sit around a table, it is nice in the park but around a table, it is like ideologies' discourse all over again.

Arda considers politics very corrupted when he talks about a decision to enter the political field. His negative reflection towards the downsides of politics is also expressed as if he is a singular being against everyone in the interaction:

I cannot throw myself into this filthy politics, perhaps when I am thirty-five or forty, I mean, I don't believe that a person in my position can change anything by his own self. May be someone else. I don't know may be what happened in Greece can happen here too. But I don't see that skillfulness and patience in myself because I will get sick really, all the plays and tricks will make me sick.

Irmak answered the question about her approach toward political groups very pessimistically:

They are all worse than one and other really. I had the chance to live listen a couple of politicians in my life. I had never looked at one and considered him genuine. As individuals, I think they are really insincere people. I so dislike politics.

She also mentioned she wants to personally (on a micro level) support things:

I try to contribute in my own way by speaking with my friends like more in micro relations. But in macro level, I am not member of any organization. In organizations, which I consider being a part of, I come across with standpoints that I do not agree. And as I say, in Turkey it is not possible to raise your voice against the political organization that you are a part of. Hence, I do not feel comfortable about participating in an organization.

When I asked her why she wanted to keep going to Gezi even though she did not want to be a part of any sort of group she said:

The incidents were concerning me as an individual. I mean we live in this country. Obviously something is going wrong and frankly for the first time there is something that touches me. What's happening was touching my soul. I have participated because I was really personally interested.

To be collectively involved with other people intimidates Deko. He feels like his individuality is not respected inside collectives:

When we look at the mass, I realized that no matter which mass I face, I feel disharmonized. Because I cannot embrace the mass ideology. I cannot understand it. Because the mass ideology is something that kills the individuality.

When I asked why Metin does not like the idea of being a member of an organization, he explained:

Everybody is singular in this world. I do not want to be united around an ideology. I think they all represent one ideology or another. As myself, I do not represent any ideology. I do not feel that way and do not want to feel that way.

It seems that the subjects look for a utopic purity in political organizations. They seem to avoid being politically active for ethical reasons or for the sake of individualism but their insistence on neutrality causes them to lack the formation to be able to address their own socio-political interests. The emphasis on individuality when criticizing organized groups resembles the findings of TÜSES but I consider this lack of interest in political organizations also a problem of the isolated individual. The pessimism towards political organizations indicates a loss of means and common interests. The working subject is exhausted due to the unending demand of its subjectivity by the managerial process (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 398). One of the greatest challenges for the working subject in this issue is that the responsible force of the managerial process is faceless, which destroys the development of meaningful social conflicts. Hence, power appears unachievable and makes the social struggle unnecessary and meaningless to such an extent that 'being politicized' is degraded to 'being informed'.

One of the most discussed things about Gezi were the popular figures of the uprising who were young people considered to be apolitical. People might understand different things from the term apolitical, there is no solid definition. Still, I wanted to ask the question to see what the interviewees understood from being politicized. It turns out that some of them tend to regard reading the daily news as an indicator of being politically involved.

Keeping up with the political updates and following the news on a daily basis are among the predominant evidences of not being apolitical. Arda, for instance, is very confident that he is not apolitical since he reads a lot and tries to learn about the history of Turkish politics. Irmak gave an example about her paying attention to the news and trying to keep up with what is going on:

I am not apolitical. I occasionally ask myself the same question too. I am definitely not apolitical because I have my opinions. But sometimes, not following the news for instance make me question myself. Then I say okay, let's get updates this week. Then I read the news and I am driven into a deep unhappiness, like really deep. I cannot focus, I just think and talk about it, I take people down too. I lose my fun side when I follow the news. Then I tell myself to stop but then something comes up that I care about and I start to follow again and be driven down again, that is the thing about the news. And since I have been through all this, I ask myself if I am apolitical. But no, I am not, I feel really involved at least on intellectual level. Even if not physically.

Rifat and Deko suggested that they were politically involved but that it should not be taken to mean that they are supporters of a particular political persuasion. In Rifat's own words 'people can be politicized without having a certain ideology' and 'I see being political as being interested in it without giving names'.

Before making assumptions on whether or not the unorganized urbanites are political, we may need to investigate what sort of means and grounds they actually have for political action and how they can make use of them. During the Gezi movement, the police forces, the attitude of the ruling party and the speeches of the prime minister provided a figure of a powerful villain so clearly and solidly that it became very easy to identify and develop a dynamic against. The large numbers participating in the Gezi movement may promise an increasingly alarmed, hopeless and depressed generation but they do not foreshadow an authentically politicized youth.

5.1.2 Ultimate Ideology Brings on Democracy and Freedom

Since the corruption of political institutions is a major reason for the disgust that my interviewees feel towards political involvement, I wanted to learn what politically attracts them. The interviewees' statements on political involvement were not unexpected. To learn some more, I wanted to ask them about as individuals what do they care about? What are the ideals they value but cannot find in collectives? Asking about their ideologies and political values was by far the hardest part of the interviews. When I phrased the question as What is your ideology?, the interlocutors showed signs of discomfort and looked alarmed or at least confused. So I modified the question as much as possible. Along with the word ideology I added What sort of a society would you like to live in?, What do you politically value?, What do you dream of?.

In the enlarged version of questions on their political tendencies, some subjects like Metin and Arda still underlined how much they disliked ideologies, while Rıfat kept rejecting having one and Deko shifted the argument from the ideological perspectives, problematizing masses and collectivities.

Rıfat's interpretation of political concepts gives a hint about a general disorientation with existing socio-political values and interests:

Leninist is a really bold term for instance. Or nationalist or liberal democrat. These are all concepts. They mean something, they are on a firm footing. A person can be political and read everything, want to know everything and be interested in daily politics without having sympathy for any political party. Because if you feel sympathy toward a political orientation or a political party, it means like if you say you are a Leninist or like, I have given too much examples from left-wing but I do not know many from right-wing but like if you say you are a pan-Turanist, you have to consider what a pan-Turanist would think in every occasion.

To continue with Rıfat's own words; 'people can be politicized without having a certain ideology' and 'I think of being political as being interested without giving names'. The same negative perception against ideological terms and concepts is also echoed by Zeynep:

Now, there is this Birleşik Haziran Hareketi, they gather and something. They try to gather a group with anti-capitalist discourses. Like we are going to organize anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, that was in the newspaper that I have read. But like, whom exactly are you going to drag with these statements? I think Gezi was something more genuine, it has to progress by preserving that gentility. In 2015, 2020 no one can be like anti-capitalist, we all work in capitalistic companies and corporations and we are all part of this system. The people who are part of this system cannot gather around those discourses. So, in the beginning it has to be more genuine, more populist²⁶, more inclusive.

My interviewees tend to stay distanced from political orientations and share a skeptical position toward their manifestations. They label political approaches, which struggle for real gains, as irrelevant and extreme, regard detailed and straightforward political demands unrealistic, edgy and/or disingenuous. Often, as in the case of Deko's friends, the subjects consider collective actions out of place and ridiculous and distance themselves by mocking those with a cynical perspective. Through this mindset, all the political principles that have been developed with years and years of struggle become caricatures of themselves and consumed by irrationality.

Ideological dispossession is a term that Cenk Saraçoğlu coined in one of his papers on the Gezi movement, inspired by David Harvey. With this, he means the abduction of originally leftist symbols and values by the AKP, which was looking for a solution for its ideological crisis (Saraçoğlu 2015, p. 151-152). I find the term very useful and would like to use it but in a different sense. Upon first reading, the term means to me the loss of symbols and values but does not tell a story specifically related to the AKP. My point is, the depreciation of symbols and ideological values is not only a result of values changing hands. It is also a result of a larger devaluation of ideologies. Arda's claim of supporting some leftist ideas and some rightist ideas looks like a good indicator of depreciation of the political symbols for the young: 'I am neither rightist nor leftist. Couse I cannot position

²⁶ She said halkçı

myself according to a political view.’ And also Irmak’s wish for voting behavior not to divide people:

I wish like AKP voters and CHP voters could be together in Gezi, actually this is my pet hate, this is the biggest segregation you can do in Turkey. I wish AKP voters and CHP voters and like all political groups and people with different opinions could walk together there (in Gezi). That is what I value, everybody to stick up for whatever opinion they believe in, to live however they like. Liberalism, truly, really.

Symbolic and institutional forms are consumed by the neoliberal system and manipulated into greyish, volatile forms, which are easy to twist and turn (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 402). But no matter what the humanistic reason is behind it, dreaming about everyone walking together for some higher ideal is an exhaustion of socio-political interests because it erases the very reason for street marches, which is to oppose the authority that someone else supports. The absence of the conflicting other creates an illusion that there is no struggle of interest between different socio-political dynamics. The fantasy of everyone walking for the same cause obscures the reality of political belongings and approaches.

When contexts are erased, the floor is left to qualitative analysis (Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 402). We are then left with a market of political approaches with rising and falling values of the day. If people can take one point of view from every approach, to be right-wing or left-wing does not matter, individuals become subjects who have no bounds with no approach but at the same time they consume them all. This is a very market based point of action. In such a market, if none of the political parties are supporting gay marriage (for instance), they all end up looking like the same thing to the individual; irrelevant and unworthy of the support. The individual rejects all of them for his or her higher principles. Of course, this takes place during his or her personal time since no collectivity can be bound just based on rejection.

None of the other interviewees identified themselves with a political orientation except Irmak while Deko mentioned that he used to feel closer with the socialist movement.

However, he is strongly against the mass movements today. So moving away from all the political approaches that rocked the world at one time or another, the heaviest emphasis the interviewees made was on the concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. Metin summarized his political views in one word: ‘I can completely say this: freedom.’ He also added that the movements he feels more sympathetic to focus on environmental causes. When it comes to ideology İdil mentions freedom as well in her statements; ‘I hundred percent believe that everybody should be free like nobody should feel discomfort because of other people’s value of judgments’ while Rıfat, Elvan and Arda are self-declared humanists.

Arda: I am pro-human like I am a humanist not that it exists but- I mean it does not exist as a political opinion, but I am a person who would show his reaction wherever human interests, human rights are violated or the lives, the wellbeing or the living space of people are endangered.

The ‘diminishing Other’ changes the dynamic of socio-political conflicts. From a psychoanalytic approach, the ‘Other’ is the base to build a symbolic roof but as the fall of political authorities, the market is the only reference point to build communality among people. According to Lacan (cited in Dardot & Laval 2012, p. 403), this brings the ultimate rejection of all political belongings. This is the biggest reason for the conservative care for innocence and sincerity in the Gezi movement. In a statement like ‘everybody should be free’, there is no hegemonic other, misuser or contradicting wrongdoer who physically exists somewhere and who can hurt you while walking around *carte blanche*. The rejection of symbols and rejection of being defined with symbolic belongings, the pursuit of completeness, the defense of some higher unlimited and bottomless ideal that does not rely on conflicting dynamics is therefore not soiled but impossible to reach... all destruct the collective state of mind and leaves the subjects unfounded and alone. The absence of a socio-political struggle with a real someone makes all the political demands vague and results in an overemphasis of universal values such as democracy and freedom when there is a necessity to build or sustain a collectivity.

Building the collective state of mind of a community has to realize its capacity to develop as well as to destruct. The absence of various political positions that conflict with and also balance each other²⁷, the opposition that could generate mass support just enforces more or less the same textbook morals that nobody, at least directly, attacks or argues. Without a dynamic between the different sides of political approaches, everybody ends up having similar states of minds with populist demagogues. In such cases, people lose contact with the causes of their actual problems and cannot develop a means for resistance. Thus, even if large numbers of pro-freedom humanist youngsters come across a political movement that can drag them into collective action and communal existence, the contradiction between the conditions of belonging and the characteristics of those movements and the reality of the precariat would result in a disruption sooner rather than later. They can only gather to be disrupted right away.

Still, there is no need to be too pessimistic about the incapacity of the precariat to build or maintain collective relations. According to Sennett (2014, p. 151), one of the uncalculated results of modern capitalism is that, it has created a longing for a sense of community. The increasing number of people that modern capitalism sentences to failure increases the necessity for a wider sense of community and a stronger feeling of character. The absence of trust and alliance in the workplace, the incapacity of the individual to make something of themselves from their work causes them to search for the profoundness and dependence elsewhere (Sennett 2014, p. 154). So, the refusal of the symbolic belonging of the subjects does not indicate a refusal to belong and exist without conditions of belonging. Is it possible to belong without the conditions of belonging; to belong without being the subject of any identity? It was possible during the first 36 hours of the Gezi occupation and it happened in a blank space, which no one seems to be able to rationalize or explain. Perhaps people were longing for it for some time without knowing, being cognitively

²⁷ Not like the arguments about the 'methods' that left oriented fractions keep attacking each other.

undefined and a part of something at the same time (Agamben 2009, p. 6-10). Perhaps, Gezi was not a matter of political involvement. For some, it was about questioning where and to whom we want to belong. In such a scenario, we cannot expect the movement to evolve into an organized dynamic for the mainstream political field. But this might not be a bad way to start developing a consciousness outside the box of individuality. I would like to end here with Rifat' final words:

Yes but I think people changed, think about that, a concept enters your life, you learn a new word you never knew before. You are like seven and you learn to say mathematics. You learn mathematical terms and start to use them. You might not talk about mathematics in you daily life but you can still use those terms by adapting them to certain situations. Like a student, think about it like you started to take a class about social science. I think that was the case for us. People learned something called Gezi.

CONCLUSION

This research has been conducted in order to focus on the politically inexperienced characteristics of unorganized young participants of the Gezi movement who were assumed to mark the movement with a new dynamic that resembled movements like OWS, Indignados, etc. Based on the unorganized participants' popular image, which caused a flaming interest in a new generation who made it all, the question here is how can a sum of disoriented people, without a well-defined political agenda or clearly stated demands, dominate the rhetoric of a mass movement more than organized groups who have experience and means to impact the collectivity? Secondly, the research tries to answer why being politically organized is so out of topic for lots of young urbanites that rebelled for Gezi Park. What caused the specifically peaceful discourse to become mainstream for Gezi movement?

I started the work by giving a detailed summary of the semi-structured in-depth interviews that I conducted with twelve subjects who are white-collar workers in their twenties, living in Istanbul and who participated in the Gezi uprising. But before commenting on the semi-structured in-depth interviews, I gave a summary of what happened during the two weeks of park occupation in details, how the whole thing started and escalated. I also briefly introduced the efforts to explain the dynamics, characteristics and reasons for the movement in order to underline the explanation that I analyze more, which is concentrated on the structural problems of the aggravation of the neoliberal political economy. To be able to comment on the peaceful and idealistic rhetoric and reluctance of the political involvement of the young urbanites, I decided to focus on the global economic changes and the socio-economic situation of my subject group. I especially avoided giving credit to popular explanations, which explain the motivations of the participators with middle-class conflicts, because it would not be possible to understand the

‘thing’ that people opposed and the particular ways they utilized to show their opposition by adapting the existing social labels to a group of people that we consider ‘new’.

For the socio-political characteristics of the Gezi protestors, I investigated some survey analysis regarding the demographics and features of the attendants of Gezi Park, some older surveys about the political tendencies of Turkish youth. These surveys showed that the lack of interest in organized political groups was a shared approach for Turkish citizens. People are not interested in politics and do not trust in political institutions. And for the youth, the institutional corruption of political organizations and their disrespectful structure against individualistic aspects are important downsides of political involvement. But I avoided concluding that the political idealism of Gezi was a reaction to corrupt political organizations because this argument only partially explains the insistence on staying unorganized and does not clarify the reasons for the peaceful, pro-freedom and pro-democracy rhetoric of the Gezi movement. Hence, in addition to their Gezi experience, I decided to ask the interviewees a range of questions, which cover their ideological positions and also investigate their reactions toward political groups and organizations.

In order to cover the background of the supposed Gezi generation, I built a theoretical framework and started with problematizing the middle class label. I preferred to pay attention to precarization as a common base for the interview group and discussed a new subject while trying to make sense of our conversations. To this end, I problematized the mindsets of the urban youth under the notions of precarization and neoliberal subjectivity. I argued that, as a result of precarization and devaluation of the means of political involvement, people suffer from a lack of accumulation of collective interests to such an extent that it damages their capability of developing collective consciousness and collective action. Because they lack any consciousness of togetherness, the people under the threat of precarization, insecurity and isolation cannot develop an ideological position that requires cooperation with others. Hence, even when the opportunity emerges for a commonality,

individuals cannot manifest socio-economic interests or to-the-point desires. In order to maintain the community, the unorganized and isolated individuals can only reinforce universal values or supposedly well-accepted moral codes. However, these moral grounds, no matter how peaceful their rhetorics are, damage the interests of the exploited groups by pushing a conservative approach against those groups' efforts to advocate their political approach. Due to an unending trial questioning their 'sincerity', to-the-point manifestations of the anti-system organizations lose their power of impacting the masses. Resultantly, for the unorganized urban youngsters, even under the most unusual circumstances such as the Gezi movement created, supporting and enforcing a context-free care for democracy and liberties can be more attractive than supporting bold anti-system manifestations of organized political groups.

In order to investigate the mindsets of the poster children of Gezi, I gathered twelve subjects who are university educated, white-collar workers born between 1985 and 1989 and who participated in the Gezi uprising. I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with them about their experiences during the Gezi Park occupation and their thoughts on politics.

According to the interviews, inside the park, where the commune was taking place, the interviewees walked, watched and listened a lot, again, enjoyed the unusual scenes and tried to connect and communicate with other people but they did not volunteer in the making of the intro-park institutions such as libraries, food courts, workshops, healthcare centers, etc. They did not act upon self-expressive motivations either. I did not encounter anyone who painted the walls or made personal banners. The interviewees did not take part in creating the written work, which we have encountered in the park area or on the streets. So realistically speaking their real contributions to the written culture and language of Gezi Park commune during the park occupation is questionable. The park forums also did not create much excitement in the interviewees. Not all of them went to see what was going on in the forums. None of those who attended became regulars and nobody mentioned that they

spoke their minds in the forums. They rather listened and observed pretty much just as they did in Gezi Park.

From the interviews, I realized that although the subjects were less reluctant in participating collective activities like building barricades, collecting garbage, coming face-to-face with the police, Tweeting, etc, they were passive receivers for most of the park occupation. Not all of them were involved in street clashes and except one, none of them forcefully resisted the police during street clashes. On the other hand, although the unorganized participants of Gezi movement have been associated with a peaceful and innocent image, the interviewees did not show a consistent commitment to that image. Even though none of them personally destroyed public or private property, some of them willingly helped building barricades. More interestingly, some interviewees confessed that they enjoyed post-apocalyptic scenes and praised violent actions when they came across such events. In other words, they consented some violent actions and were thrilled in the sight of them. Among the others who did not find it so amusing, nobody tried to prevent people from damaging things. Most radically, they showed their discontent by abandoning the scene or distancing themselves from the movement. In that sense, they were not properly non-violent. In addition, they did not have a strict position against the organized groups or people. When they started to feel uncomfortable around the banners of the organized groups, again, they showed their discontent by distancing themselves from the Gezi movement.

The interviewees as representatives of the educated and unorganized urban youth did not contribute to the making or reproducing the discourse of the Gezi movement. They participated through observation and sometimes through interaction, they took responsibility in collective actions like helping to strengthen the barricades or collecting garbage but they did not individually contribute to the making of Gezi rhetoric. They did not develop or helped any organization for the park commune; they did not create or reproduce social, political or personal statements to be exposed in the space that they occupied. In that sense,

they do not personally resemble the supposed Gezi generation who made it all possible, who marked the movement with its special features. As unorganized people, they were not experienced enough to do any of that or to get rid of their internalized discipline. So, nobody turned into a revolutionary generation in one day but we praised the unorganized crowds so much; we overlooked the ones in the kitchen.

In the second part of the interviews, my interest was on their political orientation and thoughts on mobilization to understand why mobilization is so out of topic for them. Accordingly, the fifth chapter focused on their standpoints in political matters and investigated the background of their mindsets and rationality based on their statements on ideologies and political values. I asked the subject their position about the banners in the park and political organizations in general in addition to their political values and ideologies.

Just as in the results of the surveys that I mentioned, institutional corruption, lack of effectiveness and insensitivity toward individuality were the main issues that my subjects brought up when they explained why they are not interested in political mobilization. But detailed questioning on ideologies revealed an overemphasis on concepts like freedom and democracy and reinforcement of individualistic aspects. From their answers, I noticed two predominant features regarding the mentality of the subjects. First, the interviewees pick their position from a singular agent's perspective no matter what the context is. Their interpretation of socio-political matters missed interactions and conflictions as if people or different political orientations never have conflicting ends. Secondly, they strictly distance themselves from the symbols or bounds that can identify them within a community, a political approach or an interest group.

In addition, they tend to look for some sort of moral purity in political positions and ideologies to respect. They insist on a conservative care for sincerity in a political discourse so much that they lack the words to form and express their own interests. On top of this, while they express their criticism for the opposing approaches with a trivializing skepticism,

their ideologically distanced position erases the hegemonic other or contradicting wrongdoer with whom they have a conflict of interest. This is what makes all the political demands out of place and irrational and results in overemphasis on context-free values such as democracy and freedom which cannot trigger a step toward mobilization.

The idealism of peaceful and unorganized resistance is a side product of the neoliberal mindset, which developed the alienation of modern people and which is reproduced through the same alienation. As I underlined in the conclusion of the fifth chapter, the rejection of being defined with symbolic belongings, the defense of some higher unlimited and bottomless ideal that does not rely on conflicting dynamics therefore is not soiled but impossible to reach... all destruct the collective state of mind and leaves the individuals unfounded and let the individual suffer his or her own tragedy, privately and cynically, in the form of existential crisis. The absence of a socio-political struggle with a real someone makes all the political demands vague and results in an overemphasis of universal values such as democracy and freedom when there is a necessity to build or sustain a collectivity.

Economic and political precariousness, losing contact with collectivities and corrosion of character are the main reasons for the sweet-tempered features of the poster children of Gezi and for the idealism of the nonviolent, unorganized, idealistic urban youth, which serves to reinforce the neoliberal approach. Hence, nobody evolved to be a part of a new revolutionary generation in one day. As I argued, the actions, discourses and political expectations of the unorganized corporate rebels of Gezi were not contradicting their own normativity. As much as their perfect in every way image is praised, the neoliberal approach is reinvented.

APPENDIX A

THE NAMES, AGES, OCCUPATIONS, SCHOOLS AND BIRTH PLACES OF THE INTERVIEWEES

- 22.01.2015. Metin, 1987, advertising agency, Boğaziçi University Mechanical engineer, Istanbul.
- 23.01.2015. Elvan, 1985, banking, Uludağ University Economics, Muğla.
- 24.01.2015. Rıfat, 1988, FMCG, Boğaziçi University Chemical Engineer, İstanbul.
- 28.01.2015. Arda, 1986, IT, Bilkent University Informatics, Eskişehir.
- 31.01.2015. Deko, 1987, nuclear chemistry, İTÜ chemical engineer, Bitlis.
- 08.02.2015. Idil, 1988, cosmetics, Boğaziçi University Management, Antalya.
- 10.02.2015. Özgür, 1985, banking, Uludağ University Ekonometrics, İstanbul.
- 18.03.2015. Ahmet, 1986, e-commerce, Muğla University International Trade, Ankara.
- 19.03.2015. Irmak, 1989, e-commerce, Boğaziçi University Sociology, İstanbul.
- 20.03.2015. Ece, 1989, Real Estate Consulting, Boğaziçi University Economics, Bursa.
- 09.04.2015. Defne, 1982, Education, Sabancı University Cultural Studies, İstanbul.
- 09.04.2015. Zeynep, 1986, FMCG, ODTÜ Management, Adana.

APPENDIX B

ORIGINALS OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF SEMI-STRUCTURED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

3.3 Deko: Aslında inanılmaz politik bir adamım. Hayatımın hiçbir noktasında apolitik olmadım. Ama benim hayatımda düşünüşüm ile- bu soru beraberinde şu soruyu da getirir. Hayatımda benim hiçbir kahramanım yok, ne edebiyatçı, ne devlet büyükleri, ne bir şair falan herhangi bir şey. hiç kahramanım yok. Ya şu an düşünüyorum hiç olmadı yani. [...]
Hafızlık eğitimi alan bir adamım çocukluğumda, daha sonra ateist oldum. Dine dair herhangi bir aidiyetim yok. Toplumla dair herhangi bir aidiyetim yok. Piçleştim yani anlatabiliyor muyum, piçleştim. [...]
Yani o kadar piçleşmek çok fazla toplumun da dışına çıkmak değil yani, bir noktada topluma sırtını dönmek değil, topluma en sert şekilde dışlarını göstermek aslında yani. [...]
Kendimi yıktım diye düşünüyordum, çünkü bağımı kopardım yani.

3.3.1 Deko: Yok karşı pozisyon almadılar ama bir noktadan sonra şey yaptılar yani hani alaya aldılar yani. Bütün mücadeleyi alaya aldılar. Hem iktidarı alaya aldılar hem karşı mücadeleyi alaya aldılar. Alaya aldılar derken şu anlamda alaya aldılar işte gezi mezi ya işte falan filan ne yapacağız işte falan filan. Burada sosyal, işte sınıf, sosyal sınıf işte kitlesel mücadeleden ziyade şunu fark ettim yani benim bu arkadaşlarım ciddi anlamda ibreler varoluşsal konularda henüz kendini tam konumlandırmamış yaşamda tam anlamıyla konumlandırmamış falan böyle. Çünkü kendisine dair birçok problem var, sorusu var. problem derken pardon sorusu var. varoluşa dair birçok sorusu var. şimdi e bu kafada olunca bu tarz şeyleri çok fazla anlamlı olmuyor. Çok fazla güçlü olmuyor onun için, çok fazla güçlü olmuyor. Onun daha derinlerde problemleri var yani. Daha derinlerde bir şeyleri çözmek istiyor.

3.3.2 (1) Deko: Ben şöyle, kitlesel eylemlere katılamıyorum. Bir noktadan sonra- ben son zamanlarda özellikle son üç dört senedir kitleyle uyumsuz olduğumu fark ettim. Bu benim değerli ya da kitlenin değersiz, öyle bir şey değil yani anlatabiliyor muyum? Yani belki ben çok boktanım ama yani kitleyle de uyuşmadığımı fark ettim. Daha çok bireysel bir adamım yani başkaldırımı da bireysel yapıyorum. Yaşamımı da bireysel yaşıyorum. Bir şey yaptığım zaman da bireysel yaptığımda haz alıyorum. Kitlesel yapınca da haz alıyorum ama bireysel yaptığımda daha fazla haz alıyorum yani. Yalnız başıma bir şey yaparken hiçbir şekilde hiç şey yapmadım yani sıkılmadım, oflamadım, puflamadım. Haftasonu tek başıma Cumartesi akşamı çıkar, Taksim'de bir yerlerde içer eve giderim yani hiç yanımda birileri olsun olmasın. Bu basit bir sosyal yaşam örneği. Yanımda biri olsun olmasın önemli değil mesela tek başıma çıkar İstanbul'u gezer- böyle bir adamım yani. Bireysel yaşamdan keyif alabilen bir adamım. Dolayısıyla kitlenin- şimdi kitleye gelirsek çoğunlukla son zamanlarda şunu fark ettim, ya hangi kitleye yüzümü dönersem döneyim kitle ideolojisine, bak şahıs ideolojisine değil ama, kitle ideolojisiyle uyumsuz kalıyorum çünkü kitle ideolojisini benimseyemiyorum. Aklım, algım almıyor. Çünkü bireyi bir noktada öldüren bir şey kitle ideolojisi.

3.3.2 (2) Deko: Yetmiş yedi milyon insan var bu ülkede. Yetmiş yedi milyon insan demek yetmiş yedi milyon kültür demek, yetmiş yedi milyon algı demek, yetmiş yedi milyon perspektif demek, yetmiş yedi milyon beklenti demek. Dolayısıyla şimdi yetmiş yedi milyonun, senin sorduğun bireysel, bireye indirgenmiş bir soruydu, yetmiş yedi milyona

sorarsak muhtemelen çoğu biraz farklı söyleyecek çünkü hiçkimsenin parmak izi hiçkimseye benzemediği gibi hiçkimsenin düşüncesi de benzemeyebilir yani. Aynı kitleden mesela TKP'den al veya cemaatin içinden al ya da BDP'nin, AKP'nin içerisinden al birbirine çok yakın iki kişinin de beklentisi, yaşama beklentisi bir tık olsa bile farklıdır. O adam nasıl işe gelmek istiyor, ben nasıl işe gelmek istiyorum, Erzurum'daki adam nasıl yaşamak istiyor falan filan. Yetmiş yedi milyon farklı idea var burada. Ortak nasıl olacak. Ortak bir payda bulmak imkansız burada.

3.3.2 (3) Deko: Yine dedim ya az önce belki kabul edilmişlik, sinmişlik, ya bu adam zaten her istediğini yapacak ben niye başkaldırıyorum falan diye beni yadırgayabilirsin aslında o kafadada da değilim. Ama güçlü bir argüman yok yani. Bir değişim için güçlü bir argüman yok yani ne kadar toplanırsak toplanalım. Mesela bu tarz çevre olaylarında belki Gezi'dekinin otuzda biri, belki ellide biri insan toplanacak mesela. O kadar kitlesel bir toplanma olmayacak. O yüzden çok da- bilmiyorum ya kafam çok karışık o konuda, sürekli çatışan düşünceler var bende yani. Bir noktada aslında başkaldırımı seviyorum, bir noktada evet çevreye duyarlıyım, bir noktada çevreyi seviyorum ama bir noktada kitleyle uyumsuzum, kitlesel hareket edemiyorum. Bir noktada işte tiranın gücünün de farkındayım. Bu beni yıldırıyor, bu beni güçsüzleştiriyor, umutsuzlaştırıyor da ama işte inanılmaz bir paradoks yani.

4.1 (1) Irmak: Mesela eylem benim için hep yürüyerek geçti, yürüyerek ve Taksim'e vararak şey İstiklal caddesine vararak ve İstiklal caddesinde protesto yapıp sonra oradan işte Karaköy'e, aşağıya, yukarıya oradan bir yerlere dağılarak geçti hep benim için. Ben parka herhalde beş altı kere falan gitmişimdir. Gittiğimde de hani içinde yürüyerek, etrafı dolaşarak zaman geçiriyordum hep. A burası böyle olmuş, şurası şöyle olmuş, insanlar da böyle bir hayat kurmuşlar diye inceleyerek vakit geçirdim sadece.

4.1 (2) Zeynep: Bu şeylerle işte direnen insanlarla falan tanışmaya çok çalışıyorduk biz arkadaşlarla, siz ne yapıyorsunuz, nereden geldiniz, ne iş yaparsınız, ne edersiniz, işte hangi semtten geliyorsunuz buraya falan diye konuşup. Yani şu an senin sorduğun gibi benzer yönler bulmaya çalışıyorduk. Onun dışında da yemek yiyorduk acıkınca, işte sohbet ediyorduk, dedikodu yapıyorduk yani normalde biz burada vaktimizi nasıl geçiriyorsak aynen o şekilde devam ettiriyorduk.

4.1 (3) Rıfat: Biz böyle baya şey takılıyorduk haftasonları, etrafta dolaşıp Gezi'nin etrafında dolaşıp etrafı izliyoruz. İnsan- hakikaten birebir insanları izlemeye çalışıyorduk, yani hani sosyolojik bir araştırma yaptığımız için falan değil. İlgi çekici çünkü orada bambaşka bir şey yaşıyorsun. İnsanları izleyip üzerine tartışıyorduk.

4.1 (4) Deko: Şimdi çadır kuran insanlardan biri değildim. Tanıdığım herhangi birisi de yoktu çadır kuranlar arasında, dolayısıyla orada yerleşik bulunan birisi değildim hiç yerleşik bulunmadım. Hiç çadırda kalmadım, ondan sonra sadece parkın içerisinde saatlerce gezdim yani. Gidip karnımı doyuruyordum bir yerlerde sonra tekrar gidip parka bakıyordum. Sonra meydanı geziyordum falan filan yani bir noktada oradaki insanların hissini anlamaya çalışıyordum diyebilirim. Amacım şuydu aslında, ilk defa bir başkaldırı oldu bu ülkede, bu insanlar neye başkaldırdı? Onu öğrenmeye çalışıyordum.

4.1 (5) Elvan: Şöyle söyleyim ben olayın daha sosyal tarafındaydım. Aslında apolitik bir insan değilim. Ama ben oraya giderken siyaset amaçlı değildi yani gidişim aslında. Daha böyle, yani tabi ki tepkimizi göstermek istedik, bizim de sesimiz çıkabiliyor, bir yandan onu da göstermek istiyordum. Ama daha sosyal tarafı benim daha çok.

4.1 (6) Zeynep: Çünkü orada aslında tepki çok basit bir şeydi yani. Biz hayatımıza müdahale edilsin istemiyoruz, biz işte doğaya müdahale edilsin istemiyoruz, biz istemediğimiz var dendiğinde sesimiz duyulsun istiyoruz.

4.1 (7) İdil: Ben Gezi olayları sonucu bu olsun istiyorum ya da şu amaca ulaşmak istiyorum, bizim hedeflerimiz şunlardır, biz bunları talep ediyoruz vesaire gibi hani bir hedefle değil de ben kendi hani gitme hedefimi şey diye yorumluyorum; yani hani bir şekilde dikkat çekmek ve ben hani şu anda olanları kabul etmiyorum, kabul etmediğimi de bir şekilde göstermek istiyorum gibi bir mentaliteyle gittim aslında.

4.2 (1) Metin: Kesinlikle bir kere inanılmaz bir şey yaşandı. Hani demek ki yaşaması gerekiyormuş bizim dönemin. Çok güzel bir şeydi. Nasıl işte altmışlarda, yetmişlerde hippilerse biz de çok kısa bir süre de olsa anarşizm orada hüküm sürdü, onu yaşadık. Yurtdışından insanlar geldi falan görmek için. Sonuçta inanılmaz bir deneyimdi yani.

4.2 (2) Arda: İlk aklıma gelen hayatımda ilk defa bir direnişe katılmış olmam yani. Ve baya da içinde bulunmuş olmam yani gerçekten hani direnişçiler listesinde ismim geçebilecek kadar katılmış olmam yani. Daha önce böyle bir tecrübe yaşamamıştım ve dolayısıyla ne yaşayacağımı da bilmiyordum yani. O yüzden benim için çok fazla ilki barındıran şey.

4.2 (3) Rıfat: İnanılmaz bir patlama yaşanıyor, inanılmaz bir hani görüş, yani inanılmaz bir fikir ortaya çıkıyor. Kimse ne yaşadığını bilmiyor, belki hayatı boyunca insanlar yaşamayacaklar bunu. Dünyanın birçok yerinde de hayatı boyunca insanların yaşamadığı bir tecrübeyi ediniyorsun.

4.2 (4) Elvan: Hani tamamen bu şey, ülkenin işte siyasi olayların dışında tutarak söylüyorum tamamen, hayatım boyunca bir daha İstanbul'un göbeğinde çadırdaki yatamam diye düşündüm. En önemli şey oydu benim için, case.

4.2 (5) Zeynep: Böyle düşünüyorum, manyak mıydım ben acaba, niye yaptım ki böyle bir şeyi diye? Yani hani bozulacağı o kadar aşikar ki yani biz böyle kurduk kurduk kurduk ben küçük ellerimle, böyle buralarım falan nasır oldu. Ondan sonra bir şey geldi, TOMA, pata küte pata küte hepsi gitti yani. İyi de niye yaptık ki biz şimdi bunu diye sorguladım yani. Olsun. Güzeldi. Yani onu yapabilmiş olmayı görmek bile etkileyici bir deneyim oldu yani.

4.3 (1) Zeynep:

-Harap edilmiş araçlar keşke olmasaydı diye düşündün mü?

Düşünmedim ya çok normal, insanlar öldü yani. İnsanların öldüğü bir şeyde, eylemde, arabaların yakılmış olması falan zaten beklenen, olabilecek şeyler. Yani şöyle rahatsız olmadım, yani o kadar bazı insanlar çok daha farklı yaşayabiliyor, çok daha farklı hissedebiliyor bazı şeyleri, o da bir tepki yani.

-Taş atılmasına karşı mısın, polisle karşı karşıya gelindiğinde?

Değilim.

-Molotof falan?

Değilim ya, o bir savaş yani, öyle düşün.

Yani şöyle söyleyim tabi ki de hiç olmaması lazım, keşke olmasa, idealde zaten biz gidelim, eylemimizi yapalım, söyleyebileceklerimizi söyleyelim, bizi gelsinler, dinlesinler ya yani bu insanlar niye toplandılar buraya, ne oluyor, neyi değiştirmek istiyorlar, demokratik ülkelerde olan şey böyle bir şeydir çünkü. Demokrasinin olduğu yerde bunu beklersin, öyle bir şey olmadığı için, sen toplandın diye seni dağıtmaya kalktıkları zaman sen de tepki olarak taş atabilirsin, başka bir şey atabilirsin. Çünkü o şeye dönüşüyor, ya o zaman hiçbir şey atmayacaksın da evine gidip oturacaksın, hiç eylem yapmayacaksın, ikisinden biri, bu işin doğasında olan bir şey. Ben karşı değilim yani.

4.3 (2) Metin: Unutamadığım anlardan biri de oydu, Gezi Parkı'na gittikten sonra. Polis şiddet uyguluyor falan filan da yani orada da bir sonuçta belli bir kesimin uyguladığı başka bir şiddet vardı. Ama tabi ki yani başka türlü Taksim meydanı ele geçirilemezdi yani orada ciddi manada bir direniş vardı ama benim alışkın olmadığım bir şey sonuçta. Biz öyle sokağa çıkmıyoruz falan.

4.3 (3) Deko: Ben onu gayet iyi anlıyorum, hiçbir zaman şunu yadırgamadım, bir adam bankamatiği parçaladığı zaman hiçbir zaman yadırgamadım. Ulan bari bankamatiği şey yapmayın falan filan demedim yani çünkü anlıyorum oradaki tepkiyi. İktidarın argümanına karşı şey yapamıyorsun, zarar veremiyorsun çünkü seni hapse tıklarlar. Kendine zaten şey yapamıyorsun, kendini biçimbozuma uğratamıyorsun dolayısıyla içeride patlayan bir enerji var yani bir barut var, nereye akıtacaksın onu, sana cevap veremeyen nesneye akıtacaksın. Nesneye akıtıyor ama abartıyor bir anlamda nesneye tecavüz ediyor. Hiçbir zaman da şey yapmadım anlıyorum oradaki tepkiyi biraz yani- yani şey diye düşünüyorum. Bu o kulvarda sıkıştırıp bırakır olayı yani. O kulvarda sıkışmak zorunda değilsin yani. Nesnenin de ötesinde, tamam nesneye kinini akıt, ama bir yere varamazsın yani. Akıt. Niye akıtıyor demiyorum, yanlış da demiyorum ama şaysız yani geleceksiz yani.

4.3 (4) Arda: Sökülmesi yani rahatsız etmediği durumlar oldu, sonrasında niye rahatsız etmediğini düşündüm ama. O an ya bravo be dediğim şeylerin yani ne kadar yanlış olduğuna kanaat getirdim mesela.

4.3 (5) İdil: Açıkçası hiç etmedi yani normalde belki etmesi gerekir. Sonuçta hani kamu malına zarar vesaire ama o anda hani çok garip hiçbir şekilde umursamıyorsun. Orada yanmış bir otobüsün olması çok normalize geliyor sana. Yani sanki her şeyin bir parçasıymış gibi. Hiç rahatsız olmadım.

-Taş atılması?

Yok, taş atılması tabi ki hoşuma gitmedi yani. Rahatsız etti. Ama şey taş atılması, küfredilmesi her türlü aşırı hareket rahatsız etti aslında. Ama şey değil bu aşırı hareketlere kesinlikle barikat kurulmasını ya da otobüs yakılmasını katmıyorum, dahil etmiyorum enteresan bir şekilde. Çünkü hani yani şey insana zarar gelmiyor, cana zarar gelmiyor ya biraz o yüzden belki de.

4.4 (1) İdil: Ortak olan bence en önemli şey tabi ki yaşam tarzımız. Oluşturmaya çalıştığımız ve şey yapmaya çalıştığımız, keep etmeye çalıştığımız yaşam tarzı ve bakış açısı aslında. Yani hani çok garip her anlamda kendini zaten çok bütün hissediyorsun ama yani aynı şey için uğraşıyorsun, aynı şeyi düşünüyorsun, aynı şekilde kendini kısıtlanmış hissediyorsun, o kısıtlanmışlığa karşı savaşıyorsun, dolayısıyla hani herkesin seninle o aynı kısıtlanmışlığı hissettiğini hissetmek çok garipti.

4.4 (2) Arda: Ne bileyim insan kendini sıkışmış hissediyor yani, o mutsuzluğun alt metninde sıkışmışlık var. Çünkü aslında baktığın zaman birçoğu da yaşadığı hayattan memnun olan da insanlar. Yani sonradan niye ben böyle bir şey yaptım diye bu soruyu sorduğunda cevap bile veremeyecek durumda insanlar. [...]

Herkes buradan kaçmanın, işte ne bileyim İstanbul'dan nasıl giderim, yok işte Ege'de bir kasabaya yerleşeyim veya kendi işimi kurayım diyen binlerce insan bulabilirim sana yani çok fazla insan var.

4.4 (3) Zeynep: O kadar böyle unutmuşum ki yani hayallerimi, nasıl olmalı. Tabi ki de insanların ekonomik durumları arasında uçurumlar olmamalı. Herkesin böyle her yere, her türlü kafeye, lokantaya, boğazdakine de bir- her bütçeden insanın gidebileceği yerler olmalı. İşte ne bileyim hani ay oranın önünden bile geçemeyiz biz falan gibi şeyler olmamalı bir

ülkede. İşçisinden işte aşçısına, aşçısından müdürüne, öğretmeninden patronuna herkesin her ortamda rahat hissedebilmesi gerekiyor. Böyle bir hayat güzel olurdu herhalde. Bilemiyorum.

4.4 (4) Zeynep: Hep böyle başında şeydim, belki de bir park kültürü, parklarda vakit geçirme kültürü oluşur böylelikle dedim biz Gezi'de otururken. Yani Gezi'ye ilk gitme şeyim bile belki sanırım bunu söyleyecektim bak unutmuştum şimdi iyi oldu hatırladığım. Belki de parklar hakikaten insanların kitap okuyabildiği, çimenlerinde uzanabildiği, akşam korkmadığı, sabah akşam vakit geçirebildiği bir yerler olur. Türkiye'de böyle bir kültür gelişir, yok yani Avrupa'da Amerika'da her yerde olan bir park kültürü diye bir şey vardır ya da dışarıda oturma, dışarıda vakit geçirme. Türkiye'de olan bir şey değil bu, belki ona bir katkısı olur Gezi'nin demiştim en başta. Ama bir şey değişmedi yani.

4.5 (1) Elvan: Hiçbir şey çıkmayacağını düşünüyordum aslında. Yani bir yandan güzeldi ama bir yandan da artık hayal kurma yani melankoli gibi gelmişti bana.

4.5 (2) Arda: Öyle belli başlı moderator birisi de yok, öyle kendi kendine dönen bir sohbet yani. Güzel bir şey ama hiçbir zaman sonuca ulaşabilecek bir şey değil. Yani dolayısıyla eğer ki inansaydım her akşam gidip en önde olurdum ama ben Türkiye'deki siyasete inanmadığım için.

4.5 (3) Metin: Sonuçta oradaki insanların da herkesin düşüncesi farklı yani. Bu konuları tartışmayı ben çok sevmiyorum açıkçası. Dinlemeyi daha çok seviyorum o noktada. O bakımdan açıkçası pek bir yarar getirebileceğini düşünmediğim açısından, yani konuşmak güzel ama bunun bir sonucu, bunun bir çıkışı olacağını göremediğim için. Çok inansam her gün giderdim, pek inanmadığım için gitmedim açıkçası.

4.5 (4) Zeynep: Çok verimsizdi bence yani çok konuşmadım da, böyle biri bir şey söylüyor, herkes alkışlıyor, alkışlıyor falan filan. Çok böyle almadım ben söz, dinledim genelde ne konuşuyorlar falan diye ama bir output yoktu yani.

4.5 (5) Irmak: Abbasağa'ya gittim. Çok güzeldi bence Abbasağa. O zamanlar Avrupa yakasında oturuyordum şimdi Anadolu yakasında oturuyorum da şey Kadıköy falan daha güzel oluyormuş, öyle dediler de Abbasağa da fena olmuyordu. Böyle herkes hani bu konularla ilgili demokrasiyle ilgili fikirlerini çıkıp çıkıp söylüyordu, çok hoşuma gitmişti. İki üç kere gittim onlara da. Şey oturup dinledim ben çıkıp bir şey söylemedim hiç.

5.1.1 (1) Elvan: Yani biraz elbette rahatsız etti. Çünkü kullanılmaya başladığını fark ettim aslında o masum hareketin bir süre sonra. Yani orada herkesin tek tek sesini duyurması mümkün değildi ama insanlar bir yandan da bunu yapmaya çalıştılar. Aslında tek bir amaç için orada olmanın da dışına çıktılar. Hepimiz tek bir amaç için oradaydık elbette farklı görüşleri var belki. Ama bir süre sonra insanların sadece kendi görüşlerini ortaya çıkarmaya çalıştıklarını fark ettiğimde rahatsızlık duydum tabii ki.

5.1.1 (2) Arda: Orası hiçbir şeye ait olmayan bir hareketti, ben onu savunduğum için oraya gittim ki zaten bir noktadan sonra da gitmeyi bıraktım. Hani şeyi çıktı derler ya, öyle olduğu noktada da bıraktım zaten. Çünkü artık birilerinin oyun bahçesi haline geldi malesef.

5.1.1 (3) Irmak: Türkiye zaten protesto etmeyi bilmeyen bir ülke olduğu için yani protestonun anlamını işte bambaşka görüşlerden insanlar tek bir amaç için beraber yürüyebilirler yani bunda herhangi bir sorun yok. Herhangi bir engel yok bunda. Ama Türkiye'de böyle olmadığı için bu durum yani politik duruşunuz ve partiniz sizin katıldığınız bütün diğer fikirleri belirliyor yani siz daha diversed bir insan olmaktan uzaklaşıyorsunuz hani belli bir yolu seçtikçe kendinize. O yüzden aslında ideal bir dünyada

o şey protestoların tümü flmalı da olabilirdi. Ve herkes de bunu tolerans da göstere- yani tolerans da demiyorum buna herkes bunu normal de karşılayabilirdi ama tabi ki de öyle bir durum yok Türkiye’de. O yüzden Türkiye için flamasız olması sanırım uygundu.

5.1.1 (4) Rıfat: Ben çok fazla Gezi’de atılan herhangi bir, birilerini kısıtlayıcı birilerini düzelten, önünü kapatan herhangi bir slogana karşıyım. #flamasızgezi’ye de karşıyım. Çünkü flamalar orada olabilir.

5.1.1 (5) Zeynep: Destek vermemiştim bence gereksizdi. Bence yani orada herkes yani zarar yoktu bence. Aslında şöyle çelişkili bir durum oluyor. Örgütsüz olmaktan dolayı onların olması çok normaldi, o yüzden olsun. Yani her topluluk her şey kim olduğunu belli etmek isteyebilir hani. Atıyorum, ben x grubuyum ve burdayım, ha x grubu da burada, x bunu destekledi, bu bilinsin yani. Bence bir sakıncası yok ama işte bu örgütlenmeyi de çok zor hale getiren bir şey, o yüzden çelişkili bir şey.

-Neden?

Çünkü farklılık yaratan bir şey bir açıdan da bakınca. Yani bizim orada bulunma amacımız bambaşka bir şey ama sen orada bir şeyi temsil ettiğin zaman o, onun ağırlığını taşıyacaksın çünkü. Konuşurken onu düşünerek konuşacaksın falan hani- anlatabildim mi?

5.1.1 (6) Metin: Daha çok şey değiştirebilirdik ama yani dediğim gibi çok farklı insanlar olduğu için, uçlar var sonuçta, ideolojiler var. O ideolojiler masaya oturduğunda, parktayken güzel ama masaya oturduğunda, yine ideoloji konuşuyor falan yani.

5.1.1 (7) Arda: Bu pis siyasetin içine ben girmem ama ben otuz beş kırk yaşına geldiğimde yani ben girip şu an bir kişinin bunları değiştirebileceğine inanmıyorum, yani benim pozisyonumda biri. Başka biri yapabilir tabi. Yani ne bileyim çok yakın geçmişte önceki günkü haberlerde Yunanistan’da olan olay burada da olabilir. Bilemeyiz ama ben şu an kendimde o donanımı ve o sabrı, o iradeyi göremiyorum çünkü ben hastalanırım yani o kadar alicengiz oyunun içinde hastalanırım.

5.1.1 (8) Irmak: Ya hepsi birbirinden kötü bence yani gerçekten. Birkaç tane siyasetçiyi canlı dinleme fırsatı bulmuşumdur herhalde hayatımda. Daha hiç, birine bakıp samimi konuştuğunu düşündüğüm olmadı. Yani birey olarak da çok samimiyetsiz şey insanlar kesinlikle. Siyasetten hiç hoşlanmıyorum zaten.

5.1.1 (9) Irmak: Ben de kendi çapımda hani arkadaşlarımla konuşarak daha mikro seviyedeki ilişkilerde katkıda bulunmaya çalışıyorum. Ama makro seviyede hiçbir organizasyonun üyesi değilim. Üyesi olayım dediğim bazı yerlerde de bazen şeyle karşılaşıyorum yani çok katılmadığım görüşlerle. O yüzden diyorum ya hani Türkiye’de gerçekten hani bir organizasyonda belli bir ideolojiyi benimsiyorsunuz ve onun dışında sesinizi duyurmanız mümkün değil yani. Mensup olduğunuz bir partiye karşıt olarak ses çıkarmanız mümkün değil gibi bir şey. Dolayısıyla kendimi rahat hissetmiyorum bir organizasyona dahil olmakla ilgili.

5.1.1 (10) Irmak: Beni bir birey olarak ilgilendiriyordu olaylar. Yani bu ülkede yaşıyoruz. Belli ki yanlış giden bir şeyler var ve açıkçası ilk defa ruhuma dokunan bir şeyler var. Yani ruhuma dokunuyordu bu olayların oluyor olması. Ben gerçekten kişisel olarak ilgilendiğim için gittim mesela.

5.1.1 (11) Deko: Şimdi kitleye gelirsek çoğunlukla son zamanlarda şunu fark ettim, ya hangi kitleye yüzümü dönersem döneyim kitle ideolojisine, bak şahıs ideolojisine değil ama, kitle ideolojisiyle uyumsuz kalıyorum. Çünkü kitle ideolojisini benimseyemiyorum. Aklım, algım almıyor. Çünkü bireyi bir noktada öldüren bir şey kitle ideolojisi.

5.1.1 (12) Metin: Herkes bu dünyada tektir. Böyle bir birlik, yani ideolojinin içinde olmayı istemiyorum kısacası. Hepsi bir ideoloji sonuçta temsil ettiğini düşünüyorum. Ben hiçbir ideolojiyi temsil etmiyorum kendim. Böyle hissetmiyorum. Etmek de istemiyorum.

5.1.1 (13) Irmak: Apolitik değilim ya bunu ben de düşündüm zaman zaman apolitik miyim diye. Apolitik kesinlikle değilim çünkü fikirlerim var yani ama bazen şey bana kendimi sorgulatırıyor mesela çok haber takip etmiyor oluşum ama sonra diyorum ki okey bu hafta haber okuyacağım diyorum. Okuyorum haberleri ve derin bir mutsuzluğa gömülüyorum ama derin bir mutsuzluk yani. Odaklanamıyorum hani sadece onu düşünüyorum şöyle olmuş diyorum, sürekli insanları aşağı çekiyorum. Mesela kendimdeki eğlenceli tarafı kaybediyorum haber okudukça. Sonra diyorum ki okumayacağım yani sonra tekrar tabi ki önemseydiğim bir olay çıkıyor, sonra tekrar okumaya başlıyorum, tekrar geri çekiliyorum falan böyle haberlerle böyle bir şeyimiz var. bunu yaşadığım için de zaman zaman kendime apolitik miyim acaba diye sorduğum oluyor. Ama değilim yani çünkü hani bazı konularda gerçekten şeyim baya involved hissediyorum kendimi yani. En azından düşünsel olarak işin içinde hissediyorum. Bedensel olarak olmasa da.

5.1.2 (1) Rıfat: Leninist çok sert bir kavram mesela, milliyetçi veya. Veya liberal demokrat. Bunlar hep kavram yani, hep bir şey ifade ediyor, altı dolu şeyler. Politik olur, deli gibi okur her şeyi, her şeyi bilmek ister, siyasette ne oluyor ama bir partiye bir şeye yakınlık duymuyordur. Çünkü bir partiye yakınlık mı, bir ideolojiye yakınlık duymak şey demek ya sen Leninist diyorsan veya işte ne bileyim- şimdi hep soldan örnek veriyorum ama sağdan da çok fazla kavram bilmiyorum zaten de Turancıym diyorsan sen mesela, her şeye hım bir Turancı nasıl düşünürdü diye bakman gerekiyor.

5.1.2 (2) Zeynep: Şimdi birleşik haziran hareketi var, toplanıyorlar ama yine böyle bir antikapitalist söylemlerle falan şey yapmaya çalışıyorlar bir grup oluşturmaya çalışıyorlar. İşte biz şeye antiemperyalist, antikapitalist örgütleneceğiz falan diyorlar, en son okuduğum gazete yazısında böyle bir şey vardı. İyi de kimi toplayacaksın yani böyle söyleyerek? Yani bence çok daha- çok samimi bir şeydi Gezi, o samimiyeti devam ederek ilerlemesi lazım. Yani sene 2015, 2020'de kimsenin ben antikapitalist olucağım- yani hepimiz kapitalist şirketlerde, kurumlarda çalışıyoruz ve bu düzenin parçasıyız. Bu düzenin parçası olan insanlar, o söylemlerle biraraya gelip örgütlenebilirler. O yüzden daha samimi, daha böyle halktan, herkesi kapsayıcı bir şey olmalı başta.

5.1.2 (3) Arda: Ne sağcıyım ne solcuyum yani. Ben bir siyasi görüşe kendimi konumlandıramıyorum çünkü.

5.1.2 (4) Irmak: Keşke orada mesela Gezi'de Akp'lilerle beraber Chp'liler, bu da zaten en sevmediğim şey zaten Türkiye'yle ilgili yapabildiğiniz en büyük ayırım bu, AKP'lilerle CHP'liler, keşke hani bütün şeyler hani siyasi gruplar ya da başka düşüncelerdeki gruplar keşke beraber yürüyebilseydi yani orada. Benim değer verdiğim o, herkesin istediği görüşü savunabilmesi, istediği hayatı yaşayabilmesi. Tamamen gerçek anlamıyla liberalizm yani.

5.1.2 (5) Metin: Tamamen şunu diyebilirim; özgürlük.

5.1.2 (6) İdil: Yani şöyle, tamamen şeye inanıyorum, yani her insan özgür olmalıdır ya hiçkimsenin değer yargıları falan kendisini rahatsız hissetmemelidir.

5.1.2 (7) Arda: Ben insandan yanayım ya, ben insancıyım yani, öyle bir şey yok ama yani öyle bir şey yok derken öyle bir siyasi görüş yok ama ben insanın menfaatinin çiğnendiğini, insanın haklarının çiğnendiği ya da insanın bir şekilde sağlığının ya da hayatının, yaşam

alanının herhangi bir şekilde tehdit edildiđi bir noktada tepkisini sonuna kadar gösterecek bir insanım.

5.1.2 (8) Rifat: Evet ama yani insanlar- bence herkes deđiřti çünkü yani şöyle düşün, bir kavram giriyor hayatına, bilmediđin bir kelime öğreniyorsun. Yedi yaşında gibisin aslında ve işte matematik demeyi öğreniyorsun yani. Matematik terimleri falan öğreniyorsun ve onları kullanmaya başladığını düşün. Sen günlük hayatta matematikten bahsetmiyor olabilirsin ama bu terimleri günlük hayatında aslında belli yerlere odaklayarak kullanabilirsin. Herhangi bir öğrenci yani sosyal bilgiler diye bir ders almaya başladığını falan düşün. Bence öyle oldu yani bizim için de. Gezi diye bir olay öğrendiler. Her yere Gezi, Gezi, Gezi. Haziran ruhu işte mücadele bilmem nesi falan filan gibi, kavramları deđiřti insanların, bu siyasi hayattaki içindeki insanlar için de öyle bizim için de öyle.

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