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IDENTITY AND CONSCIENCE:  
A CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP

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**IDENTITY AND CONSCIENCE:  
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OF CITIZENSHIP**

**ÖZDEŞLİK VE VİCDAN:  
BURJUVA YURTTAŞLIK  
DÜŞÜNCESİNİN BİR ELEŞTİRİSİ**

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## ABSTRACT

This study intends to examine the bourgeois or liberal-democratic idea of citizenship by concentrating on its two main categories: 'General Will' and 'Public Opinion.' We discuss these two categories by clarifying their relations with 'Identity' and 'Conscience.' Firstly, the results of the human-citizen identity that liberal democratic citizenship aims to establish through the general will category is touched upon. This identity implies the construction of a 'universal self-consciousness,' which means associating the moral subject and the political subject under the concept of the citizen subject. Furthermore, a critique of the idea of liberal democratic citizenship is presented based on Etienne Balibar's assessments on distinctions such as active-passive citizen and human rights-citizen rights. Secondly, the study focuses on the role of the reduction of conscientious judgment to opinion in the formation of the Public Opinion category. It is pointed out that the category of modern public opinion is designed as an organ devoted to the spread of public virtues, to equip generations with these virtues, and to ensure that citizens reach the ideal of the public use of reason through education. It is claimed that the category of public opinion is the rationality of bourgeois publicity. In order to justify this claim, an evaluation of the concept of 'instrumental reason' is made. The thesis to be put forward in this study is that the relevant categories of liberal democratic citizenship thought have inherent contradictions, and these contradictions are rooted in the identifying thought in the Adornian sense. The crisis of citizenship in the 21st century is understood as a result of this thought. The last part of the study is framed as an introduction to the evaluation of the consequences of the crisis of citizenship. The situation of the citizen subject is analyzed in terms of the dissolution of social citizenship and the category of public opinion. Then, it is expressed that the failure of the attempt to identify the political subject with the moral subject has gave rise to a movement for the citizen subject, a movement that is called the return to morality. Finally, it is argued that this movement means the replacement of the collapsing universal identity by conscience. The ideological character of the concept of conscience gained as a result of these developments is elaborated.

**Keywords:** General Will, Public Opinion, Identity, Conscience, Instrumental Reason

## ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Burjuva ya da liberal demokratik yurttaşlık fikrini, onun 'Genel İrade' ve 'Kamuoyu' olarak adlandırılan iki ana kategorisi üzerinde yoğunlaşarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu iki kategoriye, 'özdeşlik ve 'vicdan' kavramlarıyla bağlantılandırarak değerlendirmek suretiyle tartışacağız. İlk olarak, liberal demokratik yurttaşlık düşüncesinin genel irade kategorisi vasıtasıyla tesis ettiği insan-yurttaş özdeşliğinin yarattığı sonuçlar üzerinde durulacaktır. Bu özdeşlik, bir 'evrensel kendilik bilinci'ne işaret eder. Ahlaki özne ile siyasi öznenin yurttaş özne konsepti altında birleştirilmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Yine, Liberal demokratik yurttaşlık düşüncesinin eleştirisi; Etienne Balibar'ın aktif-pasif yurttaş, insan hakları-yurttaş hakları gibi ayrımlar üzerine yaptığı değerlendirmelere bağlı kalınarak sunulacaktır. İkinci olarak, kamuoyu kategorisinin oluşumunda vicdani yargının kanıya indirgenmesinin rolü üzerinde durulacaktır.

Modern kamuoyu kategorisinin kamusal erdemlerin yaygınlaşmasını, nesillerin bu erdemlerle donatılmasını, yurttaşların eğitim yoluyla aklın kamusal kullanımı idealine ulaştırılmasını sağlamaya ayrılmış bir organ olarak kurgulandığına işaret edilecektir. Kamuoyu kategorisinin burjuva kamusalığın rasyonalitesi olduğu iddia edilecektir. Bu iddiayı temellendirmek için 'araçsal akıl' kavramı üzerinden bir değerlendirme yapılacaktır. Bu çalışmada öne sürülecek tez, Liberal demokratik yurttaşlık düşüncesinin ilgili kategorilerinin içkin çelişkilere sahip olduğu ve bu çelişkilerin temelinde de Adorno'cu anlamda bir özdeşleştirici düşüncenin yattığıdır. Yurttaşlığın 21. yüzyılda yaşadığı kriz bu düşüncenin sonucu olarak kavranacaktır. Son olarak, çalışmanın son bölümü yurttaşlığın krizinin yarattığı sonuçların değerlendirilmesi yönelik bir giriş olarak kurgulanmıştır. Yurttaş öznenin durumu, kamuoyu kategorisi ile sosyal yurttaşlığın çözülmesi açısından değerlendirilecektir. Bunun ardından, siyasi özneye ahlaki özneyi özdeş kılma girişiminin başarısızlığının yurttaş özne açısından bir ahlaka dönüş hareketine yol açtığı ifade edilecektir. Bu hareketin, çöken evrensel özdeşliğin yerini vicdanın alması anlamına geldiği iddia edilecektir. Kavramın, bu gelişmeler neticesinde kazandığı ideolojik nitelik üzerinde durulacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Genel İrade, Kamuoyu, Özdeşlik, Vicdan, Araçsal Akıl

## INTRODUCTION

“In the general relationship which the philosopher sees between the world and thought, he merely makes objective for himself the relation of his own particular consciousness to the real world.”<sup>1</sup>

In this study, a critical reading of the bourgeois-liberal democratic-citizenship thought will be presented by focusing on the concepts of 'General Will' and 'Public Opinion,' which seem to be its main political categories. The study is dependent on close reading of Philosophers named Theodore W. Adorno, Etienne Balibar, and Reinhart Koselleck's relevant texts. We will discuss the idea of liberal democratic citizenship in relation to the two concepts of 'conscience' and 'identity,' which has been distinguished because of the defining features of concepts, that enable us to clarify the framework and crisis of liberal democratic citizenship thought. The questions of this thesis are listed as follows: What are the immanent problems of the "general will" and "public opinion" categories? What are the philosophical foundations of the liberal democratic citizenship idea that proposes a logic of identity? Why has the identity sought to be achieved through citizenship failed? How does this failure relate to the postmodern forms of political subjectivity?

The concept of conscience has been chosen not only based upon guilt and innocence but also with consideration of both its characterization to a whole field of morality and its close relationship with the notions of '**judgment**' and '**truth.**' In other respects, 'conscience,' as well as being a suitable concept for a comprehensive hermeneutic reading, is one of the favorite concepts of 'voice' and 'call' oriented phenomenological analyzes.

However, in this study, we will focus first on the modern determinations and consequences of the phenomenon of conscience and then on the explanatory importance of its appearance in the postmodern period for the liberal democratic citizenship paradigm, hence its ideological entity. In fact, this ideological entity will

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, 2006. *The First Writing of Karl Marx*, Brooklyn, New York: Ig Publishing, p. 102

point to the normative-legal validity of what comes out of the critical judgment of the bourgeoisie as a collective historical subjectivity. This validity will take its ultimate-holistic form in constitutions. The concept of the “general will” as the product of the conscientious-critical judgment of the Enlightenment thought will replace the sovereignty of the prince. Also, the general will category of the modern bourgeois public will provide the establishment of the concept of publicity.<sup>2</sup>

The theory of modern sovereignty will be read here as the gaining political content of moral judgments produced by the social organization of a class that positions itself as apolitical, as Koselleck emphasizes.<sup>3</sup> At this point, the concept of 'identity,' whose theoretical background is almost entirely formed by Adorno's critiques of Enlightenment and especially of Kant, will come into play. Now that people have become identical under the bond of citizenship, which is dependent on publicity instead of princely sovereignty, the authenticity originated from a *secret*. Thus, the rationalization of sovereignty means the citizens' leaving the laws to which they will be subject to the concept of 'general will,' which they choose with their free will.<sup>4</sup> The rationalization of sovereignty operates 'from the inside out,' from conscience to identity.

The first chapter named “The Truth of Non-Identity: General Will” will focus on the dilemmas of the identity that is desired to be achieved through the general will. The identification of man with citizen is one of the main results of the general will conceptualization. Within the framework of various contexts of contract theory, the theoretical failures of the human-citizen identity will be explored.

Citizenship is accepted as one of the most comprehensive attempts to solve the dilemma of the particular-universal relationship brought by modern political developments. The concept of liberal democratic citizenship, defined as a 'universalized form of self-consciousness', is based on identifying the moral subject

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<sup>2</sup> Jurgen Habermas, 1989, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 54

<sup>3</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, 1988, *Critique and crisis: Enlightenment and the pathogenesis of modern society*, MIT Press, p. 49

<sup>4</sup> Ibid: 54.



with the political subject, that is, the identity of the man and the citizen. This act of identification will bring with it the necessity of subordinating everyone to everyone and constructing the whole that constitutes the sovereign decision, through the concept of the general will, which embodies constitutive exceptions.

The emergence of the bourgeois society, which started to organize as guilds, literary societies, and reading clubs in the era of absolutism, as the ruling class, will mean the transformation of the moral norms they produce into laws. The critical judgment of the Enlightenment will bring about the institutionalization of norms derived from the field of morality as a modern legal order. Through the concept of the general will, liberal democratic citizenship aims to bring together the subject under the absolute rule of the prince and the "human" who adhere to various divine truths in consultation with the "conscience" as the citizen. The general will, later equated with the nation, will replace the prince's absolute sovereignty. The citizen will be regarded as autonomous, not subject, since the source of the sovereignty is the contract, just as the citizen is identical with everyone by being subject to the general will.

Balibar points out the first problem of the human-citizen identity, such that the general will was created by a "*collective moral body*," which is not a category that emerged after the contract. Since the incoming will is defined as indivisible, the conflicting interests and differences between the community of citizens equalized before the law should be preserved in a '*harmony*' not to threaten the existence of the whole. Yet, the relationship between human rights and citizens' rights and the contradictions of the consequences created by the act of renunciation demanded from the citizen by the general will make the intended harmony impossible.

The necessary condition of modern citizenship is the absorption of 'differences' by universal categories. These universal categories, according to Balibar, force the citizen subject to a permanent renunciation. Since the concept of the general will is not related to concrete social strata. However, on a juridical-philosophical jargon in which antagonism is neglected, the popular strata's antagonism, considered an abstract totality, will directly result from an inherent ideal citizen-empirical citizen distinction. Therefore, far from ensuring that social differences are abolished in favor of identity, the law will give way to a kind of suppression. So, what kind of duty does

the Conscience, which guides the decision-making of the authentic subject, perform for the rational citizen subject who is destined for freedom? Before the Enlightenment, the Conscience of the subjects, who were called by each of the sects to their truths, was first reduced to the level of conviction, purged of its theological power. Later, it left the power of pointing the truth to the reason. The truth will be determined and pointed out by the -instrumental-rationality of bourgeois publicity in the world of identical and autonomous citizens.

Balibar emphasizes that Kant's citizenship framework transforms the citizen into a pathology that heroically humiliates itself. It always appears a need to renounce against the 'pathological,' externally determined, desires for freedom to justify the general. The citizen is also obliged to rationalize this renunciation. The emphasis on 'pathology' here is understood as the influence of external-heteronomous elements on the pure will. However, as a singularity, the same citizen will be deemed responsible for reconciling the difference between public opinion and its convictions for the sake of the common self because of the absoluteness of the general will concept. Individuals do not merely rectify themselves under the organized, uncanny gaze of the dominant mass opinion. At the same time, the rationality imposed by the general will envisages raising the new generations by following the virtues it has established, which in the broadest sense is through education.

The rationality imposed by the general will is called public opinion. In liberal democratic citizenship theory, the political imperative is determined by the category of public opinion. Through this category of public opinion, the liberal democratic notion of citizenship aims to create a specific universality that provides an ethical criterion for human behavior and forms his view of himself. The rational citizen subject who is raised by the public will also shape public opinion. Ultimately, the category of public opinion takes on creating, spreading, and protecting the virtues that will keep the republic alive, as in the modern state structure which aimed identity, differences are shaped by universal categories like public opinion. In this sense, the identity that is established by the general will make autonomy possible as a legal and social form. The 'Public Use of Reason' section analyzes how public opinion is formed by the Kantian principle of publicity. Kant made a distinction between the private and the public use of reason. Property owners who do not serve anyone but the

commonwealth, as Habermas emphasizes, shape modern public opinion. Although they compete for their private interests, they maintain their public identity. Kant envisioned that the liberating effects of free trade and people's inherent inclination to progress would jointly form publicity. As an ideal, publicity stands on the legal basis that envisaged 'world citizenship' and eternal peace. The principle of publicity makes it possible to participate in public opinion even for passive citizens who only exercise the private use of reason. Since sovereignty derives from the reason based on public consensus, even if they do not use their reason publicly, they acquire this right only by living in a society dominated by such a principle. In this way, a struggle begins between the endless - democratic - demands of the masses and the normative power of public opinion. Even though the citizen subject is free to pursue happiness, it also has to serve the common interest. Balibar argues that the Kantian modern subject is divided between sensibility and reason, *theoretical reason* and *practical reason*. Based on this approach, the place of the general will and public opinion categories in the identity philosophy will be discussed by centralizing the notion of "*Instrumental Reason*" of the Critical School, of Adorno in particular. Adorno characterizes the internal logic of order that has infiltrated categories of judgment as identity. Two key concepts of Adorno's interpretation of the Marxian political economy are abstract equivalence and commodity exchange, along with discussions of culture industry and ideology. He claims that the concepts of the Enlightenment become ideology as soon as they are fixed as transcendence, and he devotes his philosophy to their criticism. At this point, the distinction between Kantian *Verstand (Reason)* and *Vernunft (Intellect)* will be emphasized. This distinction will explain how the category of public opinion is institutionalized as the instrumental reason for identifying thought instead of producing the truth that comes from consensus. Adorno argues that the foundations of the categories of judgment must be seen in the light of the political economy. Sociality has been established depending on the commodity exchange and accordingly the principle of "*Abstract equivalence*." According to this logic developed concerning the Marxian use value-exchange value distinction, capitalist identity will form its own conceptual set. This process, which Adorno calls identifying thought, emerges with the exchange principle and economic praxis thought the cognitive judging of abstract equivalence. Non-identical singularities are made identical under the category of understanding, just as the category of labor is equivalent to wage.

The crisis of citizenship is directly related not only to the claims that politics is dead in its modern sense but also to the debates about the return of morality. The last section will focus about the citizen subject whose political rights have been eroded through the "dysfunctionalization" of the categories mentioned above. The ideal citizen to be built under the guidance of reason and understanding through the category of public opinion has turned to 'sensibility, becoming a part of isolated mass people all because of the dissolution that we will explore in the light of the historical analyses of Habermas. The blurring of class distinctions, the market release of physical and mental labor of the citizen who is exhausted by dispossession and privatization policies will cause the empty promises of the liberal democratic citizenship idea to cease to be the primary reference of the ordinary citizen. In other words, citizenship has almost become a parody of citizenship. A state structure governed by established bureaucracies and strict rules will leave its place to a daily structure that is shaped by the administrative abilities of sector representatives.

Subordinating public rights to an economic terminology shows itself in gentrification practices and the state's prominence with the economy of violence and security practices, eluding its appearance as a mediator in the liberal-democratic paradigm. Moreover, transforming education into a numerical activity widens the gap between the public reason and the experience of the citizen individual. Thus, as objective manifestations of truth become blurred, ideological power is cast in cement. Instrumental reason declares its absolute dominance by castrating the intellect. The only criterion becomes the maximization of the pleasures of the isolated mass person: the negative individual and the self-preservation that finds meaning in the rhetoric of human rights. The individual is also left alone in managing the conflict between the empirical experience of himself and the truth of public opinion, which has now become immanent to the market, and in making this a reality in the vitality of life.

In the last chapter, the collapse of liberal democratic citizenship and its effects on the emergence of postmodern forms of subjectivity and its inherent philosophical problems and historical-social contradictions will be evaluated.

Balibar defines *citizenship* as "a universal self-consciousness." Here, the consequences of the failure of this self-consciousness will be read through the dissolution of "public opinion" and "social citizenship." This dissolution leads to the end of universalist attempts such as reconciling equality with freedom and establishing a universal political subjectivity. At this point, the concept of 'late capitalism' will be emphasized, and the effect of the transition from industrial capitalism to pure or late capitalism on the relevant categories will be discussed. At the turn of the 21st century, the form taken by global capitalism has resulted in the penetration of capital into all social relations. Although it is similar in content with neo-liberalism or pure capitalism, it is preferred because it implies a "continuity" rather than a new stage in the ideology of capitalist progress. According to Balibar, the gains of citizenship have become dysfunctional due to the administrative impositions of late capitalism. These impositions; privatization of public rights and freedoms, the spread of monopolization and financialization instead of industry, and finally, the replacement of political economy with political theology. This nomenclature emphasizes that the crisis of identity, which was desired to be overcome by the universalization of social rights in the moment of industrial capitalism, now means the abolition of social rights.

Although there was a trend that showed itself in various fields such as architecture and literature long before the failure of real socialist experiences, the concept of postmodernism, which was included in the general culture with the 'end of history' theses in the political field, manifested itself in the political field, especially in connection with the discussions of hegemony and deliberative democracy that developed after the structuralist moment. It also encompasses various important and comprehensive debates, such as atomization, which began with globalization, with political focuses that chose an ascetic retreat against the overt victory of capitalism or a pious insistence on vulgar Marxism. While this modest study considers all of these sweeping debates, it will only consider postmodern forms of subjectivity from the perspective of the institutional deconstruction of citizenship. The dysfunctional-instrumentalization of the relevant categories resulting from the transition from industrial capitalism to pure or late capitalism will allow us to make sense of the state of the citizen subject in the postmodern period.

The last section also serves as an introduction to enlarge this discussion. It is devoted to reading the postmodern forms of subjectivity, which are classified as new social movements, through the failure of this universal political self-consciousness. 'Conscience,' which left the claim of being the criterion of truth to the category of public opinion by being equated with opinion in liberal democratic citizenship thought, will become the truth criterion of the citizen subject who has 'returned to morality' as a result of this failure. The Conscience and the conscientious moral citizen existed within limits set by pre-Enlightenment theology. The postmodern citizen subject will experience it as a concept belonging to 'political theology.' The crisis of Liberal Democratic citizenship means the failure of the identity project it seeks to establish. The failure of the given universal form of political subjectivity will purge the citizen subject from its political content and cause moral subjectivity to come to the fore.

The series of problems that we will gather with the concept of Conscience at this point, Badio's Ethical Ideology, Balibar's Political Theology when the crisis is no longer sustainable, is related to the imminent problems of the idea of liberal citizenship. The results produced by these problems are also the practical and theoretical problems of universal identity, which is attempted to be established through citizenship, and of course, the Marxian counter-universality inventing projects. This process, which is often called 'the return to Kant,' revived the concept of Conscience, which was purified from its theological power by being reduced to opinion with the Enlightenment, this time as a substitute for a destroyed identity project.

## FIRST PART

### THE TRUTH OF NON-IDENTICAL: GENERAL WILL

#### 1.1. From Conscience to Sovereignty

The ambiguity of the phenomenon of conscience, the first of the concepts we have chosen to draw the boundaries of the debate in this study, comes not only from the ancientness of its conceptual history but also from the intricacies of its philosophical context. Although it is mainly understood as a free internal judgment mechanism, conscience has also corresponded to various metaphors such as "*voice within*" and "*inner light*" and "*public use of reason*" starting from Socrates' Daimon to Kant. In psychoanalysis, conscience is often paired with the superego.<sup>5</sup> As it can be reduced to a qualification of will, the self's proof, conscience can also be equated with common sense as the distinctive feature of man as a species. It can also be used as a synonym for consciousness.<sup>6</sup> Conscience, which is conceived as innerness, is within the dimensions bestowed by divine sovereignty; "It is the voice of God in man."<sup>7</sup> In this sense, it is the organ that tells the person what the truth is. Although it has not yet reached the meaning given by modernity with the "*judge*" metaphor, it is where 'guilt and "responsibility" are assigned. In pre-Enlightenment, in the field inherently determined by divinity, "The voice of God speaks clearly, and the question is only if I will obey it or not."<sup>8</sup> At that point, either "obedience to command" or "rebellion" is in question. The strict religious meaning of the concept finds itself in natural opposition to the concepts of power-sovereignty, which are the determinants of guilt and responsibility on earth. The conflict between the inner judgment showing the truth and the sovereign's judgment will be put forward by considering the historical adventure of the Enlightenment. Because, from Nietzsche, who claimed that morality consists of pale theological ideas, to Carl Schmitt, who stated that modern political institutions are a secular theology, it has

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<sup>5</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 2001, *Problems of Moral Philosophy*, Stanford, California: Standord Universty Press, p. 91.

<sup>6</sup> Hannah Arendt, 2003, *Responsibility and Judgment*, New York: Schocken Books, p. 84.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid:18.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid: 107.

become an established attitude to understand the changes that modernity brings about in the human imagination as a process from divinity to secularism. The distinctive character of the phenomenon of Modern Conscience manifests itself in this context.

In his work *Critique and Crisis*, Koselleck, drawing on Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke discusses how Enlightenment ideology transformed the absolutist state structure and reflects on the fundamentals of the new subjectivity it created. "Critical judgment" of the 18th-century Enlightenment, with its demand for equality, externalizes the conscience stuck in the inner space. Now, the demand has emerged as an absolute demand, like Koselleck just pointed out: "Critical judgment implies the leveling of everything and everyone, including the King."<sup>9</sup>

This is a demand that will cause problems in the partnership of conscience with suppression. As a subject, the individual is in an absolute subordinate position to the externality dominated by the sovereign. This ineffectiveness against externality will lead to the obligation to keep the conscientious call "asleep" in the border of interiority since the possible conflict between the truth of the sovereign will and the truth of conscience, due to the power asymmetry between them, will have detrimental consequences for the subject. The conscientious judgment is problematic because of the possibility of making any intervention to the sovereign decision: "For a man's conscience and his judgment is the same thing; and as the judgment, so also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law sinneth in all he does against his conscience because he has no other rule to follow but his reason, yet it is not so with him that lives in a Commonwealth, because the law is the public conscience by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise, in such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the Commonwealth must need be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, 1988, *Critique and crisis: Enlightenment and the pathogenesis of modern society*, MIT Press, p. 160

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Hobbes, 1991, *Leviathan*, Cambridge University Press, p. 143



The ethical subject who is stuck between the conscientious judgment either disturbing him or showing the truth, and the external power of the sovereign, will be imprisoned in interiority with the loss of effectiveness of the sects that have divine power -with Koselleck's emphasis- and the rise of reform movements. As a result of sectarian wars, the sphere of morality will not only be regulated by the political sphere but also turn itself into the "supervisory authority of the duty of obedience" under the rule of the prevailing law, following Hobbes' definition of "public conscience." While the conscience-consciousness of the sovereign is absolutely free, the conscience of the subjects will remain void. Acknowledging Hobbes' share in the loss of unique religious meaning of conscience, Koselleck emphasizes that the withdrawal of conscience to interiority is the source of the movement that will bring the order down, rather than maintaining it: "The moral inner space that had been excised from the State and reserved for man as a human being meant (even rudimentarily) a source of the unrest that was originally exclusive to the Absolutist system. The authority of conscience remained an unconquered remnant of the state of nature, protruding into the formally perfected State."<sup>11</sup>

The sphere of morality, as it is now subject to politics as a result of sectarian wars, will form the starting point of the Bourgeoisie, which will reveal itself as a historical class later on. Enlightenment, in this sense, will express the '*inside out*' movement of the class that created itself within the framework of non-political intellectual activity: "The bourgeois intelligentsia set out from the private inner space within which the State had been confining its subjects. Each outward step was a step towards the light, an act of Enlightenment. The movement which blithely called itself 'the Enlightenment' continued its triumphal march at the same pace at which its private interior expanded into the public domain while the public, without surrendering its private nature, became the forum of society that permeated the entire State."<sup>12</sup>

The steps taken outward will make the subordinated morality determine the political field again. That "unconquered remnant of the natural state" with its

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<sup>11</sup> Koselleck 1988: 46.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid: 75.

excellent material development will change the boundary imposed on it. This change forms the basis of the modern rule of law. Eventually, through the invention of modern citizenship with the principle of the general will, the "*natural*" law of the ruler will be replaced by secular laws derived from the moral field.

## 1.2. Identity: Private Vices into Public Virtues

The demand for morality to shape the political sphere has been knotted on the problem of the source of the law. To the extent that the will of the sovereign ceases to be the source of law, a new approach emerges in the pursuit of this foundation: modern bourgeois law based on the general will. This law is meant to be the most extreme counter-position to the principle *auctoritas non veritas facit legem*<sup>13</sup>, which is the juridical relationships, whose authority grew absolute, conceived as the possibility of a mutual constraint, harmonized with the freedom of every single person based on a general law, are originated in practical reason. Along with the general will conceptualizations: According to Koselleck, the prince subject to a permanent arbitrariness will be replaced with the law subject to a rational necessity. Rousseau's concept of general will would be such a substitute. The '*general will*' replaces the Sovereign's will, which is above all restrictions: "Rousseau's crucial step was to apply the concept of the sovereign will, which the Enlightenment had excluded from its purview, specifically to the moral autonomy of society. He claimed the sole, unconditional will, the accepted basis of the sovereign decision of the absolute ruler, for society."<sup>14</sup> The general will would also provide a preliminary projection of a state based on the "*fictive identity of bourgeois morality and sovereign decision.*"<sup>15</sup>

This would also imply the identity of man and citizen. Contrary to the view that portrayed the state of nature as a kind of 'war of all against all,' Rousseau argued that the rift created by civilized progress separating each individual as human (Homme) and citizen (citoyen) would be closed by the social contract. Together with the social contract, each individual submits his personality and property, together with all the rights attached to him, at the disposal of the society; The purpose of this is to

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<sup>13</sup> Habermas 1989: 103.

<sup>14</sup> Koselleck 1988: 163.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid: 164.

make the individual have a share in everyone's rights and obligations through the general will. This process will establish a definition of citizenship as a form of identity. The individual is now identical to others by being autonomous as a citizen, or autonomous to the extent that they are identical with others. All singular wills constitute the general will. But the general will is more than the sum of these individual wills: "The total of voluntary individuals does not develop a total will, nor does the total of individual interests add up to the *general interest*."<sup>16</sup>

With the bourgeoisie coming to power as a historical class, the struggle of the reason of "civil society" against the will of the ruler would also come to an end. On this occasion, modern citizenship would reveal mediation between the reason (*ratio*) and the will (*voluntas*). This mediation enabled the conscience, which had been seen as 'the unconquered remnant of the state of nature.'<sup>17</sup> in the absolutist regime to be generalized and publicized through equating it with conviction.

Thus, morality was freed from the sovereign's insult and gained a form that could only be controlled and shaped by law and norms. The publicly sanctioned identity of the individual brought not only the suppression of given differences but also the assurance of relative autonomy, the limits of which were drawn by the general will. The citizen subject has then been obliged not only to exercise but also to protect the rights granted to him by law in the private and public sphere. Bourgeois society, operating purely aesthetically-critically and organized in the literary societies<sup>18</sup>, or as locals where the property owners congregated and stipulated formal equality, would become a recognized public community with the end of the absolutist age.

For Rousseau, the general will reflects the theme of classical liberalism, which positions the state as an arbitrator. This theme includes the preponderance of the general interest over individual interest. The convention will determine and protect the general interest through state regulations. Balibar emphasizes that Rousseau is

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid: 163.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid: 39.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid: 66.

aware of the implicit problems created by the appearance of the Citizen subject and the Human subject as completely unified in the definition of the general will developed by him.<sup>19</sup>

The citizen will determine the laws to which he will be subject. However, Balibar draws attention to the fact that the general will is not 'the will of everyone' and that it is a concept that precedes the social contract rather than existing together with it: "It would exist before the act which concludes the social pact."<sup>20</sup> Without the formation of a "collective moral body," there can be no general will that will prevail over other wills and be regarded as superior by the state. According to Balibar, the general will is inherited by a cyclical logic: "How would this same act be possible if it did not emanate from a conscious or unconscious will, from a 'self'"<sup>21</sup>

According to Balibar, who brings up the ambiguity of the definition of the people that will establish the general will with its action in Rousseau, the indivisibility of the general will requires the balance of social antagonism under appropriate conditions. This will be possible with an order that will prevent the radicalization of social differences that may cause conflict: In Rousseau's eyes, the condition is such that: differences in fortune would be contained within very narrow limits so that these differences would not produce antagonistic "little societies" in the heart of the social body and, thus, result in factions and parties.<sup>22</sup>

Since the concept is not based on the concrete segments and strata, but on a legal-philosophical jargon in which social antagonism is neglected, the antagonism of the popular strata considered as an abstract totality will be based on an ideal citizen-empirical citizen distinction inherent in the concept. To prevent the problems created by this framework definition, Rousseau engages patriotism to achieve social

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<sup>19</sup> Etinne Balibar, 1994, *What Makes People a People? Rousseau and Kant*. In *Masses, Classes, and Public Sphere*, edited by Mike Hill, 105-132. London and New York: Verso Books, p. 107

<sup>20</sup> Ibid: 107.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid: 107.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid: 107.

consensus: "By making their country an object of adoration to the citizens, it teaches them that to serve the State is to serve the tutelary God."<sup>23</sup>

According to Balibar, although the fact that the equality promised by the preliminary will in the form of identity (citizenship) does not have a counterpart under given conditions leads Rousseau to solutions such as 'civil religion,' the law will result in the abolition of social differences in favor of identity, let alone acknowledging them officially: Not only does this equality fail to imply the suppression of social differences, but, in a sense, it presupposes them: the function of the law is precisely constructed so that, beyond these differences, universal rules are observed so that everyone is "represented" by the State.<sup>24</sup>

The attempt to make man and citizen the same under the concept of the general will would constantly oscillate between the two poles of constitution and insurrection because of the denial of contradiction.<sup>25</sup> A law (contract) that will both coordinate social life as well as administrative functioning and establish the society could be a means of legitimacy that has become the necessary condition of social existence, and it can also be used to justify a revolution that will be undertaken by social groups denied under the formal homogeneity of the theory of rights.

The contribution of Kant, who adopted Rousseau's theory of social contract, in the philosophical formation of modern citizenship cannot be denied. Although oppositions such as the people-state, citizen-human, in the concept of the general will expressed as "a consensus in the hearts" in Rousseau are tried to be overcome with a category called civil religion, another problem has been neglected according to Balibar: the place of the state in this equation. According to him, the main difference between Kant and Rousseau; what is ambiguous in Rousseau in that the dichotomy of people and sovereign (state) is expressed more clearly in Kant.

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid: 108.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid: 191.

<sup>25</sup> Etienne Balibar, 2015, *Citizenship*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 5.

It could be said that the definition of reason, which is establishing identity by means of citizenship, will be found in Kant's philosophy. The theory of sovereignty, based on the wisdom of government (Hikmet-i hükümet) before the Enlightenment, would become clear in Kant after passing through the Rousseau moment with the general will concept as 'publicity'<sup>26</sup>. In Kant, state and people are positioned as categories implying each other by the 'laws of freedom': "Kant just told us that the 'universal sovereign' of the State," considered according to the laws of freedom, can be no other than the united people itself.<sup>27</sup> The definition of the state, meaningless other than the people as an entirety, went beyond 'consensus in the hearts' and placed citizenship at the center of the new civilization based on reason: "The constitution of the people and the State thus reciprocally imply one another: the people do not precede the State (in fact, a people have no existence independent from the State), but conversely, the State (at least that which conforms to its rational Idea) is nothing other than the instituted representation of the people."<sup>28</sup>

The idea of a constitutional state must negate the current state of the masses that make up the people.<sup>29</sup> The various modalities of this process will form the primary function of the modern concept of public opinion, which we will interpret in the next section. Balibar focuses on the conditions for the law to realize this transformation. It points to two fundamental differences between the Rousseau people and the Kantian state. The first of these is the founding characteristic of the distinction between active-passive citizens in Kant: "The only qualification for being a citizen is being fit to vote. But being fit to vote presupposes the independence of someone who, as one of the people, wants to be not just a part of the commonwealth but also a member of it, that is, a part of the commonwealth acting from his own choice in community with others. This quality of being independent, however, requires a distinction between active and passive citizens, though the concept of a passive citizen seems to contradict the concept of a citizen as such."<sup>30</sup> The condition for being an active citizen is that Individuals have a property that allows them to establish

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<sup>26</sup> Habermas 1989: 221.

<sup>27</sup> Balibar 1994: 110.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid: 110.

<sup>29</sup> Balibar 1994: 110

<sup>30</sup> Ibid: 111

free relations with nature (and, of course, man's social second nature). Habermas's description, which is dependent on the work of Werke, lists the characteristics of the active citizen: "The only qualification required by a citizen (apart, of course, from being an adult male) is that he must be his taster (*sui iuris*), and must have some property (including any skill, trade, fine art, or science) to support himself. In cases where he must earn his living from others, he must earn it only by selling that which is his, and not by allowing others to make use of him; for he must in the true sense of the word serve no one but the commonwealth. In this respect, artisans (Kunstverwandte) and large or small landowners are all equal."<sup>31</sup>

Balibar emphasizes that by making this distinction between active and passive citizens, a distinction is also created between human rights and citizens' rights. The concept of people will also be divided, with women, slaves, and children being identified as the main exceptions. The idea of representation will also have a dual meaning since other subjects who have tutelage over others represent not only themselves but also them: "The idea of representation thus acquires a double signification: on the one hand, citizens who actively form the people represent themselves in the State (and in the system of its different 'powers'); on the other hand, certain citizens represent others who precisely 'depend naturally' on them and consequently cannot become autonomous subjects of the law. These are doubtless the same ones who tend to revolt because they always risk preferring the imperative of happiness (or the '*right of existence*') to the categorical imperative or the Idea of reason. We can risk the hypothesis that if the people as such must be represented by the State, only certain 'parts,' certain 'elements,' within the people must represent others."<sup>32</sup>

With the Kantian "cosmopolitical order" predicting the political community (nation) as an organization of states, the process of moralizing politics also faces a contradiction, according to Balibar. The process of subjecting politics to morality also encounters a contradiction with the Kantian "cosmopolitan order" predicting the political community (nation) as an organization of states: "The objective of the

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<sup>31</sup> Habermas 1989: 110.

<sup>32</sup> Balibar 2015: 83.

Kantian cosmopolitical law is to limit this utilization by juridical imposing on States certain moral forms of respect for the human person which anticipate a regime of perpetual peace.”<sup>33</sup> To fulfill these restrictions, a constitution with international sanction power should be assumed. To eliminate this contradiction, "*the republican constitution of each particular State*" and "*the civilizing effects of universal commerce*" should work mutually: "The ideal notion of the people as the 'common self' (moi common) of the citizens is dissolved into a realism of human nature. But at the same time, its essential content, the identity of the subject and of the citizen, which can be considered as the very existence of liberty, has been sublimated under the form of a regulatory 'Idea' of historical progress. We can also truly say that it is a certain idea of the subject's liberty, irreducible to Rousseauian citizenship, and susceptible to initiating this dissolution sublimation."<sup>34</sup>

The category of bourgeois citizenship, in which morality dominates politics through citizenship, will be formed as the application of the norms to the empirical one. Because in Kant, the contract constitutes the "idea" that ensures the legitimacy of the state. According to Balibar, the public should be considered within the legal norms based on this idea and as "political consequences of these transformations"<sup>35</sup> of this law.

### **1.3. Human Rights and Civil Rights**

In this section, Bourgeois citizenship is regarded as not only a result of the 'moralization' of politics but also as a result of its affiliation with liberty. The relationship between human and civil rights is directly concerned with the distinction between the private and public sphere in bourgeois political metaphysics. In the pre-modern era, the only exception to the public regulation of sociality was the domestic activities of the subjects. The critical judgment of the Enlightenment reduces the sovereign's privileges to the form of citizenship with the principle of equality before the law. Human rights discourse will inherit the terminology of the pre-Enlightenment

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<sup>33</sup> Balibar 1994: 112

<sup>34</sup> Ibid: 114.

<sup>35</sup> Balibar 2015: 46.



period, which Balibar describes as the 'divine law,' but will have made the debates of '*human nature*' and '*natural law*' a ground for itself and will mark 'the irreversible opening of the crisis, not the triumph of classical natural law.'<sup>36</sup> For, the argument for human nature serves as a first reason to prove what kind of necessity makes the members of a community come together in terms of their natural inclination.

The human rights discourse only points to an ideal projection as a result of the difference between the discourse of the universality of human rights, not dependent on the land and the condition as an abstract concept and citizen rights dependent on a definite territorial boundary, contingent-institutional conventions, division of labor, and social hierarchy. However, this projection serves not as the establishment of universal human rights, but as an instrument of discourse on which the empirical Citizen relies while dealing with the problems confronted, a sanction-limited reference point that suggests setting social rules according to it. Balibar analyzes one of the inherent contradictions of bourgeois citizenship regarding Kant's distinction between active and passive citizens. According to him, when the public performance of the Citizen coincides with the requirements of "*active citizenship*," which is determined as a norm, the conceptual burden of citizenship, which includes both constitutionalist construction and revolutionary uprising, becomes unbearable. Between public and private, public and moral judgment, the conflict between the principle of action and the principle of the judiciary reappears. Even though the citizen individual is charged with living the pure formal truth of his rights and freedoms, the task in question is subjected to a constant test in the brief memory of the empirical individual. The distinction between private and public spheres is also subject to this test. "It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived. Yet, the appearance of identity is inherent in thought itself, in its pure form."<sup>37</sup>

The interiority of appearance in thought is particularly notable in the citizenship argument. Identification of man and citizen with the impositions of pure form produces the difference between human and citizen rights. Balibar describes this

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<sup>36</sup> Etienne Balibar, 1998, *Dersimiz Yurttaşlık*, Kesit Yayıncılık, p. 67

<sup>37</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 1973, *Negative Dialectics*, London: Routledge, p. 5.

difference as *equaliberty differantial* and states that the historical dialectic of citizenship is the moment of equal freedom, and modern citizenship is the most radical of these moments. In the concept of citizenship not only as a political category but also as an ethical norm based on the "*public use of reason*," both the insurgent possibility and the constitutionalist possibility exist together. This inherent tension might turn into a "duty fetish" in the imagination of the modern nation state's citizen subject limited by the concepts of the commodity exchange. It could also be regressed to protect the legal limits of existing rights. On the other hand, these possibilities oscillate between the effect that the "*active citizen*" will create by making them "*as footholds for future inventions*"<sup>38</sup> by exercising his civic rights and responsibilities, and declaring defects of identity in his action. This oscillatory movement will indicate that the reason that is "*establishing identity by barter*"<sup>39</sup> manifests itself in all social categories. It is not surprising that the bourgeois-democratic ideal contains the kind of nominalism embodied in the concept of citizenship so that "*life is to go on at all, even under the prevailing circumstances of production.*"<sup>40</sup> By exchanging the transcendent authority of the sovereign with the transcendent authority of the general will, modernity equates the human as a category and the citizen who is contingent in its conceptual nature with a technical move. However, it negates this move by disrupting the equality-freedom balance in favor of freedom. Equating the human rights discourse with the civil rights discourse will become "buttressing the established order and limiting future struggles for freedom and equality a pnon."<sup>41</sup> according to Balibar. The citizen individual of modernity also observes the abstraction and ineffectiveness of human rights when the status quo, that is, the public order, is threatened by the rising demands for equality. The public order, which means the postponement of social conflict indefinitely, is obliged to continuously produce exceptions within an '*internal exclusion*' mechanism. Share-less (*part des sans-part*), that is, the oppressed of class society, are permanently obliged to justify the institutional exclusion in themselves. For, every egalitarian step towards the right to property hits the sovereign ideology of the human rights discourse embodied in the

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<sup>38</sup> Balibar 2015: 18.

<sup>39</sup> Adorno 1973: 10.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid: 11.

<sup>41</sup> Balibar 2015: 18.

state power: "This seems to be the price exacted by the establishment of consensus, of equilibrium or homonoia, of political stability."<sup>42</sup>

#### 1.4. Call of General Will: Renunciation

The renunciation demanded by the General Will is different from what is expected of the subjects of the absolutist regime. The subject of the absolutist regime was relinquished from putting the provisions of his conscience into practice: '*The voice of conscience must never emerge; outwardly it has to be put to sleep*'<sup>43</sup> However, the modern citizen will be able to use her freedom and rights without any sanction, only by re-declaring the legitimacy of the "general will" in every single activity. It is also the responsibility of the citizen to legitimize this contradiction. The ideal citizen has assumed the responsibility of limiting his autonomy for the sake of identity, as a natural consequence of his general will conceptualization. The meaning of Rousseau's philosophical approach also comes into play at this point.

Citizen individual finds the opportunity to overcome the dilemma expressed as "security-freedom balance" in popular political discourse within the bourgeois citizenship ideology, only by an act of renunciation. This act of renunciation has a crucial meaning in the philosophical foundations of modern citizenship, and the result of the externalization and generalization of the singular conscience, as well as the rationalization of politics of the enlightenment. This is also an established characteristic of the public conscience that can be described as a compartment reserved for the public. Rousseau, as the philosopher of the citizen's struggle "*to find self-justification in self-accusation*"<sup>44</sup>, allowed renunciation to settle as the founding political gesture of citizenship. "Such is the real meaning of autonomy: to decide himself, generally, in a free manner, the legislation which he, in particular, will obey absolutely"<sup>45</sup>

Autonomy is determined by an act of renunciation. The individual becomes a man and a *citizen* by "*renouncing the freedom of the wild*". It would also mean

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid: 17.

<sup>43</sup> Koselleck 1988: 19.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid: 120.

<sup>45</sup> Balibar 1994: 106.

renouncing inclinations that may contravene the given social norms. In his lecture where he interpreted the origins in Kant, Adorno points out that this gesture of suppression or renunciation, has a strict place to the extent that it becomes a self-preservation principle. Accordingly, civilization makes a promise of happiness in return for our renunciation of primitive and animal motives. This happiness should be understood as the self-preservation of the entirety. The individual, that is, the citizen of one of the particular nations of bourgeois civilization: “may renounce momentarily a certain amount of happiness or pleasure, but he gets it back with interest in terms of the rational organization of his life.”<sup>46</sup>

The rational organization of experiences is the organization created by the rational political form and formed by the compulsions of commodity exchange. This promise of "*getting back with interest*" is constantly postponed with highly academic annotations such as "*equality of opportunity*", "*equality before the law*" or "*pursuit of happiness*" in accordance with the Hollywood utopia. The citizen will be able to establish a family, own property, and travel freely until he receives the 'compensation' of world citizenship, that is the absolute peace that he is entitled to demand from civilization through the act of renunciation. Adorno identifies the inexhaustible nature of this renunciation process and elaborates it: “The problem is that the quantum of pleasure, if I may be permitted to speak in such bluntly rationalistic terms, that individuals are required to sacrifice is not subsequently returned to them a different form, as ought to be the case according to the underlying rational principle. Instead, this entire process of admonition only exists to preserve society as a whole”<sup>47</sup> Thus, the protection of the whole, that is, the welfare of the political and theological entity that constitutes the general will, requires the limitation of the dispositions of autonomous individuals. Although the aporia between "*object and its concept*" is tried to be compensated under the form of universal and non-contradictory integrity in the form of citizenship, only "*the failure*" has been deferred.

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<sup>46</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 2001, *Problems of Moral Philosophy*, Stanford University Press, p. 138.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid: 138.

## SECOND PART

### THE RATIONALITY OF BOURGEOIS PUBLICITY: PUBLIC OPINION

The conscience of the citizen subject, which is determined by the answer given to the call of the divine voice, is faced with the call of the public, whether he will be a sinner or a believer. The autonomy of the citizen subject is his partial freedom to respond to the public appeal or not. With the recognition of equality as the imperative before the law, a definite boundary will be drawn between the internal and the external.<sup>48</sup>

Before the modern state, the relationship between the individual's conscience and the sovereign was only that of domination and subjection. In this era, conscience belongs entirely to interiority; a community in which bourgeois ethics gains a political character and becomes generalized after the *Enlightenment* is accepted as universal. Although the rights and responsibilities defined by citizenship to the individual aim to save from the dichotomy between humanity and allegiance, it failed, as Koselleck put it: "The subject becomes a citizen, but Rousseau was as unsuccessful in eliminating the difference between man and citizen. Conversely, every man lives with the bad conscience of his separate identity as a citizen. The *volonte generale* is always right, and "as such, it continues to look over the shoulder of the sovereign citizen into his private life."<sup>49</sup> The modern category of public opinion would have the function of ensuring that the mentioned renunciation takes place under appropriate conditions.

The individual has been made responsible for justifying in his conscience the supremacy of the general will. This responsibility associates legality to interiority inextricably. The notion of legality gives rise to "causing everything to be sucked into the maelstrom of the public gaze."<sup>50</sup> Morality and legality have become inseparable.

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<sup>48</sup> Koselleck 1988: 57.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid: 166-167.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid: 116.

## 2.1. Law of Conscience

The political simplification of the concept of conscience, which has a strong religious meaning and is referred to by sects that preach the '*summon*' of God, transcends its theological meaning as consciousness became possible by the interpretation of Hobbes. One of the conceptual interventions of the Enlightenment is that conscience is not an organ in which the voice of God is heard but rather a "*subjective belief*." With this move, the theological meaning of the conscience would be disarmed. According to Habermas, who claims that Hobbes acted efficiently by identifying "*conscience*," which combines consciousness and conscience with "*opinion*,"; The Ruler's act, which abolishes the hierarchy between sects, specifies the public sphere and the private sphere. Thus, the concept of conscience, which claims to be "*truth*," that is, obeying God's command, will lose its political determination by equating it with subjective opinion.

According to Koselleck, who depicts conscience as a category absolutized by the sects with theological purity and electoral claims on which the Enlightenment rises, Hobbes' reduction of conscience to personal opinion is a 'cause of civil war' (*causa belli civilis*). It lies in his characterization as: "Mere conscience which, as Hobbes put it, presumes to mount the throne is not a judge of good and evil; it is the source of evil itself."<sup>51</sup> If the subject chooses his conscience when caught between the sovereign's decision and his conscience, which would mean the abolition of the sovereign's law. To avoid this, Hobbes emphasizes that conscience, that is, the plurality of personal moods, which prevail in various churches, cannot be applied to laws, or the sovereign.<sup>52</sup>

The objectification of the conscience of the subject, which is dominated by the dual rule of church and state, was made possible by the emergence of the modern public opinion category. The concept of *opinion publique* will undertake the "*criterion*" that conscience lost by getting equated with opinion. This undertaking will build the social ground that will allow the citizen to condemn himself in the

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid: 28.

<sup>52</sup> Hobbes 1991: 18.

externalized conscience of himself, in terms of the establishment of bourgeois citizenship, in a way that will enable the social formation to move towards the goal of totality's happiness. Claiming that conflict with a State that ignores the subjects' tendencies towards emancipation will be inevitable, Koselleck describes the attempt of the bourgeois enlightenment to dominate the political sphere in a rational form: "Conscience and the needs of the situation are reconcilable no longer"<sup>53</sup>

With the emergence of modern publicity, conscience, which is conceived as interiority or divinity, gained a public attribution. Since the subject was isolated from the political sphere, the conscience of the empirical individual, which was the space of sectarian struggle in the pre-Enlightenment period, is completely outside the political sphere: "The civil war came to an end under the dictate of a state authority neutralized in religious matters."<sup>54</sup>

Locke defines the Law of Opinion as a law on par with divine or state laws and expresses that it regulates virtues and vices.<sup>55</sup> Conscience, which Hobbes made ordinary by reducing it to the subjective opinion to clarify the authority of the ruler, thus acquires a public character: "By his interpretation of the philosophical law, Locke gave a political charge to the interior of the human conscience which Hobbes had subordinated to State policy. Public actions were now not merely subject to the authority of the State but at the same time to the moral authority of the citizens."<sup>56</sup>

The sum of the opinions of others, that is, the modern public opinion, which comprises a significant implication of legality, will become the criterion of the virtues with this theoretical intervention. Habermas stated that the grading of virtues would be measured in Locke by *public esteem* (*public reputation*)<sup>57</sup> Virtue thus turns into an adjective for actions that meet the criteria represented in the public opinion: "The citizens themselves do what Hobbes reserved for the sovereign: they set 'the mark of

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<sup>53</sup> Koselleck 1988: 19.

<sup>54</sup> Habermas 1989: 90.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid: 91.

<sup>56</sup> Koselleck 1989: 58.

<sup>57</sup> Habermas 1989: 91.

the value' of all acts 'and give the name of virtue to those actions, which amongst them are judged praiseworthy, and call that vice, which they account blamable.’<sup>58</sup>

This characteristic, which forms the basis for the formation of modern public opinion, reveals the constitution of interiority in the development of bourgeois self-consciousness. The intertwining of the enlightenment reason with the critical judgment of the modern bourgeois morality will build publicity originated from the private sphere of bourgeois society. This sanction power, which will not even include legality until it reaches Rousseau, will also be called the *law of private censure*. The institutionalization of moral judgment will result in the externalization of the individual conscience (opinion) and the derivation of secular laws from morality.<sup>59</sup> Thus, the law of private censure comes into play at the moment when the *opinion publique* becomes the voice of the general will.

Legal and symbolic authorities, where particular opinions are defined according to them, will become decisive. To the extent that educators decide what virtue is, the public completes its modern meaning: “Public opinion originated from those who were informed and spread ‘chiefly among those classes that, if they are active in large number, are the ones that matter.’ Of course, the “*lowest classes of the people*,” the *sansculottes*, did not belong to them, because, under the pressure of need and drudgery, they had neither the leisure nor the opportunity; “to be concerned with things that do not have an immediate bearing on their physical needs.”<sup>60</sup>

## 2.2. Virtue, Generation, Education

Why the Republic is described as a form of regime identified with virtue reaches significance when considering the concerns of nation states '*raising generations*': “Then the monarchies are sustained with honour, republics are sustained with virtue and the despotisms are sustained with fear”. The category of modern public opinion has an essential place in the national education content, which is shaped according to the principle of raising “virtuous generations” of the nation-

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<sup>58</sup> Koselleck 1989: 56.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid: 143.

<sup>60</sup> Habermas 1989: 102.



states. The existence condition of modern citizenship is the absorption of the "differences", which we have emphasized in the previous chapter, via universal categories. This causes the necessity to constantly produce a public that consists of individuals who are bound together by mutual rights and duties. The "entirety", thanks to which autonomy can be established, can only be established if the discourse of entirety is not only legal but also a material form that affects mass culture: "In the final analysis, the validity, the coherency, the temporal solidity of such a project will be judged by how it will define new rights, new duties, new powers; whether it succeeds or fails to give rise to a historically new kind of 'citizen.'"<sup>61</sup>

This growing generation of citizens will constitute the modern public opinion. The emergence of public opinion will be associated with the capacity of ordinary people "to grasp a thought based on education and communication."<sup>62</sup> However, at this point, a conflict arises again. In the concept of bourgeois liberal citizenship, which attributes active citizenship to "property and knowledge (based) capacity", the *passive citizen* will hardly have any choice but to take sides behind the discourse of journalists and professional politicians as professional opinion producers.

Raising and shaping the nation are among the indicative activities of nation-state practices as the main public goal of education. The upbringing of virtuous generations, that is, objectifying the generation as a means of transmission of value, will enable a modern public opinion to react within *common sense* limits. Non-formal and general education will not only ensure the dissolution of pre-modern forms of sociality, but also the formation of modern public opinion as a social judiciary. It will also organize the nation around a 'profession' oriented life, which is the accepted criterion of the individuality of industrial capitalism, as well as the strength of the critical activity that the bourgeoisie has adopted against the absolutist regime during the rise of the bourgeoisie, with its modern references and practices. Additionally it will ensure the participation of the propertyless to the public opinion, at least at a formal level, with the establishment of the bourgeois public opinion.

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<sup>61</sup> Balibar 2015: 12.

<sup>62</sup> Habermas 1989: 66.

### 2.3. Public Use of Reason

Emphasizing the relationship between the public and the educated should naturally be considered within the historical development of the "*press and publishing*" activity that allows the emergence of modern public opinion. The emergence of public opinion with a political function will be possible through the spread of press activity. The institutionalization of criticism is also based on the generalization of publishing activity. The status of the public, based on the natural common sense of the people, with Habermas's critical convection; When the physiocrats add it to the '*public eclaire*' (the enlightened public), it becomes stronger by dissolving<sup>63</sup> the opposition between '*critique*' and '*opinion*'.

With the theoretical intervention of Rousseau, the public opinion became the controller of whether the "general will" was manifested or not, and with Kant, it became representing the Enlightenment, that is, the "*public use of reason*". In this way, the main principles of the category of public opinion will emerge in the bourgeois citizenship institution. A public opinion that has the function of controlling through ending the dichotomy between the will of the monarch and the reason of the people will be counted as the result of the sovereignty transforming "from a matter of will into a matter of reason"<sup>64</sup> expressed by Habermas referring to Burke. The share of Kant will be to draw the boundaries of the philosophical ground of the modern individual-society relationship, as the conflict between the people and the sovereign takes a more complex form through citizenship.

The rationality of bourgeois publicity reunited morality and politics, which were previously separated from each other, by moralizing politics itself. The critical process that private people engaged in rational-critical public debate brought to bear on absolutist rule, interpreted itself as apolitical: "public opinion aimed at rationalizing politics in the name of morality."<sup>65</sup> The critical process undertaken against the monarchy, defining itself as non-political, reached the idea of a republic through the hotspot of contract theory. For Kant, the active citizens of a people-state

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid: 95.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid: 100.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid: 102.

to be organized according to the laws of freedom are no other than property owners who are '*their own masters*'. Habermas elaborates Kant's publicity approach as follows: "Only property-owning private people were admitted to a public engaged in critical political debate, for their autonomy was rooted in the sphere of commodity exchange and hence was joined to the interest in its preservation as a private sphere: The only qualification required by a citizen (apart, of course, from being an adult male) is that he must be his own master (*sui iuris*), and must have some property (which can include any skill, trade, fine art, or science) to support himself. In cases where he must earn his living from others, he must earn it only by sell in that which is his, and not by allowing others to make use of him: for; he must in the true sense of the word serve no one but the commonwealth. In this respect, artisans (*Kunstverwandte*) and large or small landowners are all equal."<sup>66</sup>

With the organization of the bourgeoisie as a public community, the "*court of reason*" will be settled as a metaphor representing the critical power of modern public opinion. Thus, the free competition of autonomous bourgeois individuals subject to the general will, and the publicity of this competition will form the main axis of public opinion. According to Habermas, this public opinion will commit as a mediator between the state and society.

The idea of the negation of social conflict and the identity of the bourgeoisie who constitute the public is at the origin of the relationship between the private sphere and the public sphere, between man and citizen, as emphasized before: "The fiction of a justice immanent in free commerce was what rendered plausible the conflation of bourgeois and *homme*, of self-interested, property-owning private people and autonomous individuals per se. The specific relationship between private and public sphere, from which arose the duplication of the selfish bourgeois in the guise of the unselfish *homme*, of the empirical subject in that of the intelligible one, was what made it possible to consider the *citoyen*, the citizen eligible to vote, under the twofold aspect of legality and morality."<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid: 110.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid: 111.

The renunciation demanded by the general will imply this duplication as Habermas expresses it. This renunciation means that individuals carry out some of their social activities to express and represent themselves in a manner appropriate to the genre of the political society. With this new method of representation and performance, social differences will be tolerated to the extent that they pursue the *common interest*.<sup>68</sup> The opinion publique will thus define the autonomy of the private sphere in bourgeois society, assigned by the power organized in the form of the state: “everyone was to be permitted to pursue his ‘happiness’ in any way he thought useful.”<sup>69</sup>

The modern category of *opinion publique* has also been defined with the assignment of dissolving the interference between the ideal citizen and the empirical citizen, and the risk of conflict between these two definitions has reached its rational organization with Kant. In addition to the rational theoretical development of the *aporia* in question, the public opinion has been continuously annotated in practical terms and gained new connotations. As it is mentioned before, the nature of the category of public opinion, shaped by the structure of the liberal parliamentary view based on deliberation and publicity, included both the control of the general will and the education of the masses that had not yet reached the public-nation-competence.

Opinion Publique, in the sense defined by the classical liberal thought, regards a citizen united under the category of identity by being a member of a nation ruled by the republic. The public is positioned as a means of establishing equality (identity), equipping the growing generation with qualities such as -arête-, virtue-vertu- that it inherited from the ancient Greek, and creating a society consisting of autonomous individuals in a harmony that will be organized by free commercial competition. The function of public activity and public opinion is therefore inherent in the idea of Enlightenment (progress). In the 19th century, with the generalization of the right to vote, the idea of the identity of the liberal democratic ideal reaches a new phase. The recognition of the right to vote will serve to justify the Kantian argument based on state-people identity. However, in this way, a struggle will begin between the endless

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<sup>68</sup> Balibar 2015: 58.

<sup>69</sup> Habermas 1989: 107.

- democratic - demands of the masses and the normative power of public opinion. With the inclusion of those previously excluded from the concept of 'people', it has caused the public opinion and public negotiation to turn into an '*empty formality*.'

<sup>70</sup>

Balibar argues that in evaluating the citizen subject, the definition by Kant as free self-consciousness indicates a double conflict of the modern subject: '*sensibility* and *reason*, *theoretical* reason and *practical reason*.'

<sup>71</sup> Conflict of reason and sensibility could evolve into the harmony only by seeing the other as "an end within itself" and limiting her desires and impulses within these limits: "Those of reason are reducible to the unique imperative of duty, which imposes itself unconditionally on the consciousness (conscience) and resumes the obligation of always treating others as a person (as an "end in and of itself") and never as just a thing (or a "means")"<sup>72</sup>

Balibar simplifies the dilemma that the modern citizen subject falls into. The citizen is caught between his personal, pragmatic desires and the reason belonging to the world of the state, which Kant positions as the necessary condition of happiness. Balibar will argue that this dilemma that divides the modern subject leaves the citizen subject alone with "presents itself to him as the obligation to disregard motives (mobile) of sensibility, and thus, in practice, to resist them *heroically*."

<sup>73</sup> Citizen Subject experiences the imperative that he lives as a compulsion in his personal life in the form of legal restriction in the public sphere. Because, if we express it under the determinations of Kant's philosophy, as stated before, there are two modes of existence of the citizen subject, empirical and ideal. The reason that imposes moral arrangement of material life produces norms and laws. These laws and norms will be determined as "judicial people", which Kant defines as "*sociability organized in the form of a State*"<sup>74</sup>, not the empirical subjects or the people, which belong to the outside world, not to the reason and which Kant describes as "*pathological*". In this way, morality and legality will come together in the form of law. Balibar participates in the perspective adopted by Schmitt when he said *The People* is a concept in public

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<sup>70</sup> Carl Schmitt, 1988, *Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, MIT Press p. 6.

<sup>71</sup> Balibar 1994: 114.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid: 115.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid: 115.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid: 125.

law.”<sup>75</sup> The People, who come out of the general will on which legal legitimacy is based, are always present in their absence: “It is understood that even if the organization of social relationships by juridical norms moved indefinitely closer to the moral idea of a human community founded on absolute respect for persons, a gap would always remain.”<sup>76</sup>

*Opinion publique* is a conceptualization in which the natural dominance of reason is surrendered, as opposed to the mystical character of the phenomenon of internal conscience. As such, it will have the potential to turn into a device that the active citizen uses as a reason for his actions. During the execution of the “**right to have rights**”<sup>77</sup>, which undoubtedly has a political content, the aim of the active citizen to extend the law in favor of freedom gains legitimacy, albeit vaguely. The opinion publique has turned into a hegemonic ground where the legal and normative requirements of the order are reminded, and a weapon that can turn sweat and return to order itself by a defeatist at any time. Habermas prefers to express this in Marx's words: “to the extent that non-bourgeois strata penetrated the public sphere in the political realm and took possession of its institutions, participated in the press, parties, and parliament, the weapons of publicity forged by the bourgeoisie were pointed against itself.”<sup>78</sup>

However, at the same time with this legitimacy, the idea of the universality of modern citizenship cannot prevent the content of principles from being constantly deformed, as it is always stuck between principles and contingent needs. Generations with virtue will be strained until they become representatives of public authority here and now. The public opinion is the authority to approve, encourage, or condemn-regress the demands of the citizen. The criteria for virtue ownership will be constantly violated at the wheel of necessity and will now serve only a function where the violation of citizens' rights is made. The fact that the citizens, who constitute the public opinion, are stuck between “practical reason” under the yoke of their tendencies and desires and “pure reason” that stipulates publicity will give rise to the

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<sup>75</sup> Schmitt 1988: 16.

<sup>76</sup> Balibar 1994: 120.

<sup>77</sup> Balibar 2015: 65.

<sup>78</sup> Habermas 1989: 126.

stunting mentioned by Habermas. Performing actions that comply with the norms of the opinion publique means that even “in his ‘pathologically enforced’ conduct, the citizen could at the same time appear as a morally free person as long as the concordance of the political public sphere with its self-interpretation”<sup>79</sup> is ensured.

The philosophical groundwork of the modern opinion public category, whose basic characteristics which are tried to gather here, corresponds to the criticism of the concept of identity. The discussion we are conducting will extend to the criticism they developed by focusing on the *Critique of Pure Reason* by Adorno and Horkheimer's famous work *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* and based on the "Pure Reason"-Practical Reason "distinction. The contradiction between publicity based on pure reason and the world of appearances dominated by practical reason will manifest itself in bourgeois sociality as a contradiction between everyone's lawfulness and subjective interests. This stunting, whose foundations are based on Kant's epistemology, will bare the *fragility*<sup>80</sup> of the ideological mask of identity established by the notion of citizenship.

#### 2.4. The Philosophical Architecture of Political Identity: Understanding

Central to much Critical Theory, and specifically to the philosophy of Adorno, is the concept of “instrumental reason,” which was built around *The Critique of Pure Reason* by Kant. The reason that makes law by itself is concurrently subject to it. This law takes legitimacy from merely nature/structure/construction of reason, free from all possible heteronomous factors. Nevertheless, as it is known, Kant's rationalism is not opposed to empiricism. His thought is the synthesis of the two idols of the Enlightenment, Newtonian physics and the empiricism of Helvetius and Hume, which he reconstituted in *The Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>81</sup>. We can remember the famous equation of concepts and senses. Reflecting on the differentiations of Kantian reason in their text *The Dialectics of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer makes a distinction that they describe as *instrumental reason*. Accordingly, Kantian schemes, regulates the given in terms of the suitability of the system. The particular would be

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<sup>79</sup> Habermas 1989: 111.

<sup>80</sup> Koselleck 1988: 167.

<sup>81</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, 2001, *Ethik'in Kısa Tarihi*, Paradigma, p. 35.

taken out of the general and coerced to be identical with it. The transcendental self, in other terms, the subject under the sway of the reason, which is determined by the citizen subject whose utopia is a cosmological republic and eternal peace, is determined within this scope. The relationship between particular-general<sup>82</sup>, put by Adorno as the constitutive problem of the philosophy of ethics will appear as variations of this citizen-people (state) relationship in the chapter of citizenship, one of the absolute universals of the bourgeois world, where sovereignty has become a "*matter of reason*".

Adorno's consideration of *The Critique of Pure Reason* departs from the division between Kantian *Verstand* (*Reason*) and *Vernunft* (*Intellect*). Diving the reason as *intellect* and *reason*, for them, is the result of the subject-oriented epistemology, which traces back to Descartes and evolves with Kant. *The effective application of reason* will lead the reason to no longer exist as a purpose in itself. The definition of instrumental reason corresponds to the reduction of mind into reason.

Understanding competence manages the process of creating representations in imagination through the data of the phenomenal world we obtain with our senses and also the process of generating the concepts under which these representations will be listed. It is a capability that enables the production of synthetic judgments. It operates at the '*Transcendental Analytical*' level. It is related to the phenomena. Our knowledge of the outside world is thus formed. Vernunft, on the other hand, is concerned with the problems such as the immortality of the Spirit, god and freedom. It functions not with the objects of experience but with the antinomies of pure reason. The absolutization of the mind as '*reason*' rather than '*intellect*', according to Adorno, is the result of the inherent contradictions of the envisagement of a society based upon rationality: "The French Enlightenment got a formally systematic touch from its supreme concept, that of reason; yet the constitutive entanglement of its idea of reason with that of an objectively rational arrangement of society deprived the idea of a pathos which it was not to recover until the realization of reason as an idea was renounced, until it was absolutized into the spirit."<sup>83</sup> The categories in which

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<sup>82</sup> Adorno 2001: 15.

<sup>83</sup> Adorno 1973: 29.



Understanding, '*basic furniture of reason*' in Adorno's words, operates, for him, summarizes the Kantian attitude that equalizes freedom with law-abiding: "the categories, that is to say, the fundamental concepts, the *basic furniture* of my mind which I need if I am to be able to bring order at all into my experience, are nothing but the conditions that enable me to organize the world in accordance with laws and hence experience the world as governed by laws."<sup>84</sup> The conclusion to be reached with 'the public use of reason' will enable the 'second nature' to be experienced as if it was under the rule of laws while at the same time regulating it in accordance with the laws.

Kant's associating transcendental self, which accompanies all the representations of the subject as "I think", with the empirical, that is to say, empirical self, affirms his thought of identity: "In the history of modern philosophy, the word "identity" has had several meanings. It designated the unity of personal consciousness: that an 'I' remains the same in all its experiences. This meant the Kantian 'I think, which should be able to go with all my conceptions.' Then, again, identity was what is legally the same in all rational beings—thought as logical universality—and besides, it was the equality with itself of every object of thought, the simple A=A. Finally, epistemologically, it meant that subject and object coincide, whatever their media."<sup>85</sup>

The experience of the citizen subject would be shaped as a constant encounter of the qualities of the citizenship phenomena that is subject to the extrinsic entailments. As a starting point in the discussion of Enlightenment, "the liberation of Understanding from the guidance of another", which is mentioned with reference to Kant, not only occurs in ethical debates, but it is also established as an effective principle as the instrumental (*bureaucratic*) reason of the political institutions that emerged within the course of Enlightenment thought from the 18th century to the 20th century. Adorno and Horkheimer, form their critical bases on the ideas that

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<sup>84</sup> Adorno 2001: 41.

<sup>85</sup> Adorno 1973: 29.

Understanding, both stipulates a system-oriented thinking and supports Kant's argument as "Reason is the "faculty of deducing the particular from the general."<sup>86</sup>

This inference is directly related with their evaluations that perception is limited by the schematic structure of *Understanding* and that the logic of identity is determined by the schematism of pure reason. According to Kant, the homogeneity of the general and the particular is guaranteed by the "*schematism of pure understanding*," or the unconscious operation of the intellectual mechanism, which structures perception in accordance with the understanding. The understanding impresses the intelligibility of the matter (which subjective judgment discovers there) on it as an objective quality, before it enters into the ego. Without such a schematism- in short, without intellectual perception-no impression would harmonize with a concept, and no category with an example; and the unity of thought (let alone of system) toward which everything is directed would not prevail.<sup>87</sup> The principle that "*all empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of the understanding*" constitutes the identity between the subjective experience and the organized experience. The social human being of the established bourgeois world is the idea of a human being who has surpassed the difference of the purposes between the transcendental self and the empirical self in a harmony, in the form of universal categories -citizenship-. transcendental self is described as follows."<sup>88</sup>

This is what constitutes the possibility of citizenship based on the identity in Kant's cosmological political community design; intellect will be "transcendental self". Thus, a conflict arises between the ability to understand, which is '*the court of judgment of calculation*'<sup>89</sup>, where categorical representations of the given are produced. Understanding (Verstand) 'adjusts the world for the ends of self-preservation and recognizes no function other than the preparation of the object from mere sensory material in order to make it the material of subjugation.'<sup>90</sup> This division

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<sup>86</sup> Immanuel Kant, 1998, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge University Press, p. 82.

<sup>87</sup> Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, 2002, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Stanford University Press, p. 82.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid: 83.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid: 123.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid: 84.

in the concept of reason, this equivalence problem which is tried to be overcome by the subjectivity between the sensible world and the conceivable world, corresponds to the problem of "the displacement of ends by means" as mentioned in critical theory. Subjectivity being the only condition of possible knowledge will be understood as the effort of consciousness to dominate nature. Subjectivity is the underlying every identity.<sup>91</sup> The legitimacy of this domination includes not only external nature, but also internal nature with its moral law.<sup>92</sup> In the logic of the Enlightenment, which operates in line with the subject's domination of nature, the reason will be confined to Understanding and will be reduced to the principle of 'protecting self-existence': "The true nature of schematism, of the general and the particular, of concept and individual case reconciled from without, is ultimately revealed in contemporary science as the interest of industrial society."<sup>93</sup> For the realization of the identity-based universality and system ideal of the Enlightenment, it is necessary to check '*whether the principles and factual judgments are connected to each other correctly*'. This attachment process will give us a theoretical explication of the Kantian ideal of 'the *public use of reason*'.

The relationship between the consciousness of the empirical citizen and the judgments of the dominant public opinion category will gain an ideological character as the difference between principles and facts widens. For, objectivity, which is the material for understanding, is created by commodity exchange. Commodity exchange "is the social model of the principle of identification."<sup>94</sup> The instrumental reason, which takes its form grounded in this 'logic of equivalence' of the bourgeois ratio will tend to see citizens as a material.<sup>95</sup> It is the *instrumental reason* that carries the principle of preserving self at its root. And the '*logical subjects*' of this reason are the same as those that constitute the categories of citizenship and public opinion: Respectively "the burgher, in the successive forms of slave owner, free entrepreneur, and administrator, is the logical subject of the Enlightenment."<sup>96</sup> When the notion of

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<sup>91</sup> Adorno 1973: 154.

<sup>92</sup> Adorno 2001: 135.

<sup>93</sup> Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: 84.

<sup>94</sup> Adorno 1973: 146.

<sup>95</sup> Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: 84.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid: 83.

citizenship is taken into consideration, understanding regulates the rationalization of the given. Public opinion, thus, operates as the understanding of the collective body. For the dispossessed citizen, the same principle will appear as rationalizing the relationship of domination, to which they already are the object, and adapting to the given order in accordance with his instrumental reason. The identity logic of the instrumental reason will emerge in the form of public opinion and naturalize the class situation, and it will fulfill the duty of “what has happened to it must be presented, by the thing, as its ‘in-itself.’”<sup>97</sup>

For the establishment of the general will included in its political scope, the public opinion will come to supervise the compliance of the citizen subject's actions and judgments with its categories of understanding, along with supervising everyone on behalf of all. The dialogue that the citizen subject holds with itself through public opinion will be on the conflict-reconciliation between the abstract qualities of the concept of citizenship and his daily experience. The empirical citizen will both find the opportunity to question the reality of his rights, and to worry whether they fulfill what is expected of them. His experience finds meaning with respect to the promise of reconciling collective and individual happiness. Reciprocal criticism of the universal and of the particular; identifying acts of judgment whether the concept does justice to what it covers, and whether the particular fulfills its concept— these constitute the medium of thinking about the nonidentity of particular and concept.<sup>98</sup>

Another aspect of the internal division that the citizen subject experiences as "stunting" is "a contradiction like the one between the definition which an individual knows as his own and his 'role,' the definition forced upon him by society when he would make his living."<sup>99</sup> This contradiction, according to Adorno, is deeply rooted in the rationality of Kantian ethics. Adorno asserts that Kant's ethical principles are "taken the life of the honest merchant,"<sup>100</sup> The merits, claimed as the virtues of citizenship will be determined regarding the harmony or conflict of "the distinction

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<sup>97</sup> Adorno 1973: 148.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid: 146.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid: 151.

<sup>100</sup> Adorno 2001: 117.

between culturally approved norms of the day and norms that flow from the categorical imperative.”<sup>101</sup>

When an 'internal coordination' cannot be established between the construction of virtues supported by institutions and the promise of happiness these virtues imply, and the experience of the empirical citizen; in other words, when the circumstances that impose themselves on the given whole force the moral subject to make a choice between the timely, contingent requirements of the general will category and his subjective interests, there arises the symptoms of the liberal democratic paradigm based on the market relations. For, the ethical principles of the "honest trader," which are put forward as the procedures of public representation, will arrange its *acquis per* competitive market conditions. This arrangement, which aims at maximizing this subjective interest, would mean violating the classical paradigm that presents the moral experience of the glorified, abstract bourgeois subjectivity as the absolute representation-principle to the masses. As the ideal bourgeois public automaton 'transforming subjective sins into public virtues' is interrupted, the principle for the empirical citizen who is under the thumb of social pressure will become clear as to conform to what he experiences as injustice.<sup>102</sup>

Eventually, “A series of fictions in which the self-understanding of the bourgeois consciousness as ‘public opinion’<sup>103</sup> dissolves in proportion to the organization of social labor and the universalization of social rights. For example, as the virtue of honesty lacks public correspondence, its representations produced by education, the media, and the arts are parodied. Increasingly, all public virtues become so formal that they become the basis for the justification of the violation. After all, ordinary citizens organizing their morals according to their representations in communicative means constituted by the the category of public opinion, cannot avoid “falling into the extravagances of the paladins and conceive designs beyond their powers.”<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid: 116.

<sup>102</sup> Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: 192.

<sup>103</sup> Habermas 1989: 117

<sup>104</sup> Rene Descartes, 1998, *Discourse on Method*, Hackett Publishing, p. 20.

Adorno, in this conflict between the experience of the ordinary citizen and the 'public reason' will identify the activity of the instrumental reason -Understanding-. The ideal of the 'public use of reason', which turns into an ideology as it loses its factuality, will mean the determination of citizen judgments before perception occurs, and the public will eventually supervise the actions of citizen subject for the sake of their compliance to the categories of the understanding: "Conflict between administrative, reifying science, between the public reason and the experience of the individual, is precluded by circumstances. The conceptual apparatus determines the senses, even before perception occurs; a priori, the citizen sees the world as the matter from which he himself manufactures it. Intuitively, Kant foretold what Hollywood consciously put into practice: in the very process of production, images are pre-censored according to the norm of the understanding which will later govern their apprehension. Even before its occurrence, the perception which serves to confirm the public judgment is adjusted by that judgment. Even if the secret utopia in the concept of reason pointed, despite fortuitous distinctions between individuals, to their common interest, reason-functioning, in compliance with ends, as a mere systematic science-serves to level down that same identical interest."<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: 84.

## THIRD PART

### THE CRISIS OF CITIZENSHIP

“And no wonder: political movements rest not so much on rational attitudes as on the fantasies, images, words, and archetypes that come together to make up this or that political kitsch.”

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

“The cry of terror called forth by the unfamiliar becomes its name. It fixes the transcendence of the unknown in relation to the known, permanently linking horror to holiness.”

Dialectic of Enlightenment

#### **3.1. The Condition of Citizen Subject in Late Capitalism**

The project of establishing the political identity of the liberal democratic civic ideology also suggested "an ethics of citizenship" through public opinion. In other words, it also determined a criterion to which public opinion and actions would be subjected. This ethical criterion, based on the ideal of 'public use of reason', would position itself as the criterion not only of the legitimate and legal, but also of the 'good' and the 'right', and it would take itself out of 'public negotiation'. It supposes establishing the unity of 'freedom' which implies the laws of reason and 'equality' paradigm based on the principle of equality before the law. The instrumentalization of the reason, which is the ethical criterion of the subjunctive action of the citizen, will mean the sharpening of the "split" between human rights and citizen rights.

If the concept implied by citizenship is "equality," the concept that comes to the mind when "human rights" is mentioned is freedom. According to Balibar, human-citizen identity requires "the identity of equality and freedom." This identity means a project of universal political identity. Balibar, concerning the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights, argues that homme-citizen identity is a moment that transcends the 'human nature' category of the contractual theory. Man is a human

being as a member of the political society. For him, the philosophical foundations of the declaration do not consist of embracing the notion of human nature as a starting point or origin. It has also conditioned a certain kind of universal identity project as the domination paradigm. However, this intervention cannot be regarded as the victory or the victory of natural law theory. Unlike, "It is the irreversible opening of the crisis. It is the opening of the new ideological field in which the political-philosophical ideologies of the 19th century will take place."<sup>106</sup>

Modern citizenship is the main political subjectification of the utopia of *democratic* universality. Therefore, the discussion of subject and subjectivity could also be classified as a plurality of responses to the failure of the modern citizen-subject project. Capitalist modernization, which will be reduced solely to the '*development perspective*' in the process, has eroded the '*general will*' and '*public opinion*' categories as well as many institutions and phenomena. Of course, this erosion, the damage to the purity of the concepts we are mentioning, does not imply that they are detached from their '*essence*' by external intervention. It is essential to grasp the consequences of the "tension between democratic principles and oligarchic realities."<sup>107</sup>

The reason for the crisis we will focus on is the failure of the self-project of the Liberal Citizenship utopia, that is, the attempt to create a union of autonomous citizens. We will focus on is the failure of the self-project of the Liberal Citizenship utopia developed in relation with on the humanist principles of the Enlightenment project, that is, the attempt to create each citizen as an autonomous and homogeneous union. The crisis is associated with the inherent problems of this self-consciousness. In his work "Critique in the 21st century: political economy still, and religion again", Balibar describes citizenship as a 'universalized form of self-consciousness'<sup>108</sup>. The crisis lies at the dissolution of this very self-consciousness. Firstly, the equation of human with bourgeois, and subsequently the failure of the "*unity of man and citizen*" project to be constituted, cannot be thought apart from the inherent logical

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<sup>106</sup> Balibar 1998: 83

<sup>107</sup> Balibar 2015: 57.

<sup>108</sup> Retrieved from: <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/critique-in-the-21st-century>: 30.03.2021.



contradictions of the idea of Enlightenment, as well as the resorts of capitalist expansion. Fredric Jameson, specifies the aforementioned resorts in his piece *Marxism and Form* like this: "Each stage corresponds to a certain technology - steam (market), electricity and automobile (monopoly), computer and nuclear power (multinational) - as well as a certain "cultural sovereign" - Realism corresponding to market capitalism, and imperialism corresponding to Modernism. Postmodernism corresponds to the third stage, late or multinational, or consumer capitalism... to the purest form of capitalism that has hitherto arisen, the enormous expansion of capital into all hitherto uncommodified spheres."<sup>109</sup>

The conceptualization of *Late Capitalism* is cited by Ernst Mandel's analysis of the mode of production that has become established with his work named *Late Capitalism*, published in 1975. Although the term overlaps with theoretical approaches such as "neo-liberalism," pure capitalism, "it differs from them by understanding the new operating models of capitalism as "continuity" rather than "rupture" Mandel states that this nomenclature may seem far from inclusiveness because it is based on a chronological attribution, but it should still be regarded as acceptable because it serves a structural understanding rather than a contingent. The importance of the conceptualization of late capitalism in our discussion lies in the fact that the crisis in the bourgeois liberal citizenship institution, which is trying to solve the identity crisis it experienced in the age of industrial capitalism by "universalizing social rights," is a moment in which it manifests itself as the pruning of social rights. The starting point can be exemplified in a scheme of social rights, which can be regarded as the 'generalization of voting rights', with the welfare state at one end and real socialist experiences at the other. The siege towards citizenship manifests itself in the obscurity of the borders of the nation-state, the liquidation of the 'autonomous' individual of this form, and the 'end of history' and most importantly, forms of subjectivity in our late capital, as it is frequently mentioned in the discussions of globalization.

In the era of industrial capitalism, the categories of 'nation' as the form that defines the political collective and 'autonomous individual' as the subject of this

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<sup>109</sup> Fredric Jameson, 1971, *Marxism and Form*, Princeton University Press, p. 120.

nation have gained established and global institutionalism. The crisis of citizenship parallels the effects of both the nation-state ideology and late capitalism highlighted in the scheme above. Balibar reads the definition of crisis by focusing on citizenship, the most '*famous*' modern phenomena that position people as 'agents of their own history' within the boundaries they live in and the political community they are a part of, and emphasizes that it is under siege: "A particularly acute manifestation of this, as we know, is the fact that democratic institutions have degenerated and been emptied of their content in that part of the world where they were erected as a dominant value, while at the same time remaining conspicuous by their absence in other parts of the world, where they are perceived, at best, as an artificial foreign graft and, at worst, as a masked form of domination and alienation. There are exceptions to this, of course, and thankfully so. But their viability and mutual compatibility have still to be demonstrated. One hypothesis we can formulate, adhering closely to a certain Marxist logic while turning it against some of its postulates about the philosophy of history, is that we are only now entering capitalist society (and, as always, we are only noticing this after the fact, when it is late, perhaps even too late) – or, if you prefer, we're only now entering 'pure' capitalism, which does not have to deal constantly with heterogeneous social forces that it must either incorporate or repress, or with which it must strike some sort of compromise. 'Pure' capitalism is free to deal only with the effects of its own logic of accumulation and with those things necessary for its own reproduction."<sup>110</sup>

Balibar presents as signs of the crisis becoming obvious point to how the identifying ideology suppresses the difference between *concept* and *object* in favor of the General. The transition from an industrial society to information society, from industrial capitalism to late (pure) capitalism, has put the state apparatus and its ideological capacities in a difficult position, which is responsible for establishing a link between "information and organization"<sup>111</sup> and maintaining its administrative integrity, as Lyotard said. The Enlightenment's will to encompass the object, invent universals, the failure of science to 'explain' things in its historical arena, and collapse

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<sup>110</sup> Retrieved from: <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/critique-in-the-21st-century>: 30.03.2021.

<sup>111</sup> Jean-François Lyotard, 1984, *The Postmodern Condition: A report on Knowledge*, University of Minnesota Press, p. 75.

the suprainterpretation, has revealed a plurality of interpretations. Its conventions, which can be considered as the varying consequences of its use, are dispersed under the onslaught of free distribution of capital. This situation will appear as a bending of the forced marriage between citizen and man to the human side. That is, the rod will bend from equality to freedom, from publicity to interiority. Although the crisis has constantly popularized itself with new names, the postmodern situation initiated by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of real socialism, and the revolution in information technologies have paved the way for the emergence of new forms of subjectivity.

The significance of the conceptualization of late capitalism in our discussion lies in the fact that the crisis in the bourgeois liberal citizenship institution, which tries to solve the identity crisis it experienced in the age of industrial capitalism by 'generalization social rights'<sup>112</sup> is a resort in which it manifests itself as the gradual pruning of social rights. The social rights poem, whose basis can be regarded as the "generalization of voting rights", can be exemplified in a scheme that includes the welfare state on one end and real socialist experiences on the other. This siege manifests itself in the fading of the borders of the nation-state, as frequently mentioned in the discussions of globalization, the elimination of the 'autonomous' individual of this form, the 'end of history' and most importantly, the outlook of the forms of subjectivity in late capitalism. The autonomous individual will be replaced by atomized, isolated mass person, and the definitions of individuality and self will be replaced by individualism and utilitarianism.

Bourgeois' projection of publicity which is described by Habermas as: 'civil society as the *ordre naturel* converting *private vices* into *public virtues*.'<sup>113</sup> The failure of the enlightenment's attempt to reconcile the political with the moral through the mediation of 'publicity', which has become apparent, reflects the contradictions of the attempt to unify the rational self and the ethical self. The bourgeois publicity conceived as the space of freedom and the modern subject categories based on the rationality of freedom are dissolved under the functioning of late capitalism, which

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<sup>112</sup> Balibar 2015: 59.

<sup>113</sup> Habermas 1989: 117.

Balibar summarizes as "the disappearance of the political in favor of the economic and the absorption of politics by a pure economic logic.

The points we will focus on in this section by untangling the aforementioned concepts such as late capitalism and postmodernism, will be to identify the current state of the citizen subject that has been dissolved and to investigate the forms of subjectivity emerging as a substitute for it. This research also aims to present an introductory breakdown of the new postmodern ethical notions that come to the fore in response to the crisis of "ethics of citizenship."

### **3.2. Dissolution of Public Opinion**

In the era of industrial capitalism, the 'nation' as the form to define the political collective and the 'autonomous individual' as the subject of this nation had gained established and global institutionalism. As the new ruling class, the conscience of the bourgeois citizen is reduced to the conviction by participating in the general will, but it has dominated the social sphere as a meta-ethic of the kind included in the concept of public opinion, armed with the armor of legality. "Non-public opinion" will be the opinion of the masses who do not have the competence to participate in public opinion. For this reason, they are exposed to the manipulative information explosion under the "widespread publicity concept" referred to by Habermas, and they become the primary buyers of the advertising industry.

Atomized, isolated mass people will replace the autonomous individual ideal, and discussions of individualism and utilitarianism will replace the definitions of individuality and self. The human rights discourse/liberal citizenship ethics, which reveals itself through revisions, expands the rights in various world regions to include the segments previously subjected to an exclusion. However, these moves lead to the ceremonies of the politics of representation rather than structural changes. Because the dissolution of the category of public opinion, which is mainly centered on parliamentary debate and represents the reason to which society is subject, meant that public reasoning was interrupted by an overall expansion of social rights, including political equality. The publicity that continuously improves its effectiveness through the press, according to Habermas, will be revised by the inventors of this terminology

itself: every step in which forms of domination based on race, class, or gender are regressed by social struggles will drive bourgeois publicity, which allows conflicting interests to coexist without creating a friend-foe distinction, into contradiction. Habermas conceives the Chartist movement in Britain and the February revolution as the moments when antinomies become apparent, and the revision of liberal theory arises. According to him, liberal theorists will take a "reactionary" attitude with the effect of these historical developments: "The liberalist interpretation of the bourgeois constitutional state was reactionary: it reacted to the power of the idea of a critically debating public's self-determination, initially included in its institutions, as soon as this public was subverted by the propertyless and uneducated masses."<sup>114</sup>

With the increase in the masses included in the public, the projection of publicity, which generates critical intelligence, will fail to operate in line with the criteria determined as general interest by publicly organized private persons. The right of representation and the empowerment of the dispossessed and the oppressed, based upon the power of the public representation these groups produce, will divide the public opinion, and turn it into a battleground of conflicting interests. The revision of the liberal democratic paradigm, when confronted with the requirements of mass democracy, will now be able to preserve its place almost only through images.

The public, in which the masses are included with the developing social and political rights, will become a "tribune" rather than an "assembly of wise men" where the common truth is produced. Hence, the effort to make it organic would appear as an imposition. It is no longer the solution authority -in accordance with its design- of concrete and contingent problems. If we refer to Badiou, since the radicalization of the logic of capital will mean the reorganization of social organizations following the principle of profitability, the information that becomes anonymized with the blurring of the official and normative criteria leads to the sectoral dominance of the opinion producers. Although maintaining the illusion of discussion and negotiation is aimed on the one hand, "instrumental rationality" as Habermas emphasizes, by an "abuse" of

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid: 136.

the prestige of the concept, will undertake the duty of imposing certain opinions to the public instead of the truth that will be obtained as a result of public negotiation.<sup>115</sup>

Citizenship has left its place to citizenship parody. The "logic of governance" has not been satisfied with privatizing public services such as health and education, it also has led governments to transform their established administrative structures into corporate organizations and, for example, hand over the administration of ministries to representatives of the sector. On the one hand, while public services become privatized, the public opinion also transformed into a public relations department. This reason, which puts generation and national education at the center, with its interest in reviving national values, has to maintain the continuity of these values by using generation and education as a subordination mechanism, yet, it has to pay regard to the organizational requirements of the market order at the same time.

The dispositions of this *instrumental* reason are constantly dissolved in the grip of market anarchism and political antagonism. That imposes a reform of qualities that are each conceived as an absolute and transcendent value. The destruction of the category of right is related to the inadequacy of public opinion in the actions and the sanctions attributed to it. Although the hoped harmony could not be achieved, the public continued to be an authority that is constantly referred to, and legitimacy is collected through it. However, this feature will first have to turn into an instrument to maintain the balance between conflicting interests, and eventually into an organ that inculcates common sense to the citizen in the face of simple and complicated crises.

The problem is not that the "public opinion" as the instrumental political reason of the industrial society is deformed by market needs. Although Wendy Brown argues that this reason 'corrupts' the given democratic institutions and practices, it goes beyond that. She conceptualizes the transformation that Balibar summarizes as "the capture of politics with a purely economic logic" as "the economization of democracy": "My argument is not merely that markets and money are corrupting or degrading democracy, that political institutions and outcomes are increasingly dominated by finance and corporate capital, or that democracy is being replaced by

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid: passim.

plutocracy— rule by and for the rich. Rather, neoliberal reason, ubiquitous today in statecraft and the workplace, in jurisprudence, education, culture, and a vast range of quotidian activity, is converting the distinctly political character, meaning, and operation of democracy's constituent elements into economic ones. Liberal democratic institutions, practices, and habits may not survive this conversion."<sup>116</sup>

Turning to the structural character of the process that Brown calls the "economization of democracy" can be understood by focusing on how the segments formally included in the society through the public remain out of the equation again. After the instrumentalization of the general category that determines the freedom of the autonomous individual, the second 'death' of liberal democracy will occur due to the dissolution of social citizenship.

### **3.3. Dissolution of Social Citizenship**

Balibar emphasizes that liberal democratic citizenship thought from the "capacity of insurrection" of an active citizen; that is, it emphasizes the fear that the demand for equality might radicalize the active citizen. In the moment of late capitalism, this fear will be replaced by the citizen's fear as a result of a process that he describes as the "displacement of antinomy."<sup>117</sup>

Financialization, blurring of national borders in favor of capital, and free movement of capital are the primary principle; It has also removed the last signs of the idea of a public opinion pursuing the common interest organized by public consensus and autonomous individuals based on identity. It has become impossible to manage the energy created by the demand for social equality by raising virtuous generations through education. The *democratic paradox* between insurrection and institutionalization leads to the repetition of the binary oppositions, some of which we have listed above, on a higher, concrete, and comprehensive level.

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<sup>116</sup> Brown Wendy, 2015, *Undoing the Demos Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*, Zone Books, p. 17.

<sup>117</sup> Balibar 2015: 73.

Education functions both as a process that strengthens the class composition in exchange relations and as a means of raising virtuous generations in the modern nation-state. Of course, the field of education, which aims to raise virtuous generations, or nurture and nurture the developing individuality, reveal the autonomous individual, and meet the requirements created by the branching division of labor, is subject to the needs of the 'progress' pathos. Even though it has achieved a kind of equilibrium with the welfare state, the educational utopia of the modern democratic state cannot escape from gaining a purely ideological existence by isolating it from all its content.

Precariousness and disorganization serve the purpose of eliminating the "capacity for insurrection" of the active citizen. Antinomy allows us to pinpoint where the active citizen's demand for equality through social organization coincides with progress. The perspective of progress made it necessary, for example, in the 20th century, to include those previously excluded in the category of citizenship following the idea of identity. Balibar summarized the process as "the universalization of social rights" represents a necessity in terms of the perspective of progress. However, these are also democratic gains achieved as a result of the social struggle.

"The anatomy of progress" commands the abolition of these gains in the moment of late capitalism. The side of ear has shifted. No longer are capitalists afraid of confronting a social revolution, but citizen-workers afraid of being unemployed and the rivalry escalating with the involvement of refugees. In this framework, the possibility of organized experience will be interrupted. The liberal democratic idea of citizenship, which tries to combine theoretical reason and practical reason, man and citizen, equality and freedom, has to give up its initial claims. Equality will be reduced to an emphasis on equality of opportunity whose effect is gradually weakening, while the freedom will be reduced to the internality of the isolated mass people by detaching it from its social context. Because, with the will of the identifying reason to invent the political universal 'self,' the democratic ideal of universality, which is a common theme, albeit controversially, in the counter-



universality projects undertaken against it, will be replaced by "generalized particularism."<sup>118</sup>

The non-contradiction in the fictional world of rational existence has disappeared. The theoretical extinction of both the historical subject and the autonomous bourgeois individual gave rise to the pleasure subject, which was criticized on various occasions first. "Mc Donald's tail"<sup>119</sup> one of the social symbols of the collapse of the Soviet Union, has taken place in the social memory as a sign of this rise. Understanding language as a system of signs through the theoretical intervention of the structuralist moment has also been theoretically admitted that it is not just a mechanical structure involving naming objects at random. Thus, the definition of ideology as "false consciousness" has become unacceptable.

With the shaking of the established position of the tools that will create the public vote in industrial capitalism, the gradual formation of the new media brought unique concepts and enabled the indicators of existing concepts to be better understood and determined. So, how will the new criterion of the relationship between particular and general be determined in the "absence" of an identical citizen subject and the categories that create it?

### **3.4. Return to Conscience: The Banality of Radical Good**

The ambiguous 'ethics of citizenship,' to be constructed will be the work of the reason, the category of public opinion, which will determine the ethical criterion to which actions of the citizen subject are subjected. Therefore, the debate was at least theoretically concluded with the determination of the Good and the Right. However, the expected result of both the identity logic of the liberal democratic citizenship project and the failure of the social liberation ideologies such as Marxism, which envisages social emancipation, is the disappearance of this ethical concept and the rise of "individualism." The postmodern political orientation that Balibar refers to as "political theology", is called "Return to Ethics" by Badiou and "Moralism as Anti-Politics" by Wendy Brown. Following the same path, this section will explain the

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<sup>118</sup> Habermas 1989: 43.

<sup>119</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amx-JHhtsHw>: 05.04.2021.

political exhaustion of the citizen subject concerning the rise of the ethical subject. Therefore, to evaluate the situation of the citizen subject in late capitalism, we will refer to the concept of Conscience, based on the theme of return to morality by the names mentioned above because the concept is directly related to the 'uniqueness' emphasis of the individualist ideology. The determination of the concept of Conscience in the 21st century has made it indispensable for understanding postmodern subjectivity. The concept is crucial in understanding the relationship between socialism that has been transformed into Totalitarianism and individualism that approaches cynicism. The encirclement of the rights of the Citizen that binds him to other citizens causes the artificial balance between human rights and citizens' rights to be broken. At this point, the Conscience will cry out judgment, not outward, but back in. Because the determination or construction of the common good is coded as a totalitarian orientation.

As the isolated mass people fall out of political scope, the Citizen will become merely confined to the responsibility. The Citizen, the sole focus of political practice, and their universal ethics will be replaced by an abstract and transcendent human thought. While the Citizen, as a subject of responsibility and rights, points to the ongoing construction of the Good, the human being will always be in a state of protection and avoidance under Adorno's conception of self-preservation. At this point, all consciences are identical. Every human subject, who gets their share from common sense, the universality of the rights acquired from birth and the law of the individual, has the right to declare the "evil" according to them and avoid it.

Conscience is accepted as the ability to make a 'free' decision of guilt and innocence regarding one's actions.<sup>120</sup> In this sense, the Conscience of each individual is related to their very self. The concept suggests an identity instead of the collapsing identities as the identity is present in all. It also touches on authentic interiority and uniqueness at the same time. Conscience "speaks with an identical voice to all men."<sup>121</sup> This general acceptance will replace the comprehension of human being 'as a political entity'. Even though the appeal to political economy in its Marxian sense

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<sup>120</sup> Allen Wood, 2009, Kant on conscience, *Kantovski Sbornik*, 1-17.

<sup>121</sup> Arendt 2003: 50.

was often crushed under economic reductionism, it avoided the danger of hypostasizing the person and their problems. The expulsion of political economy from the logic of communication has resulted in the rise of the ideology of Conscience in the age of pure capitalism. Falling back upon Conscience, in this sense, resembles an answer to the destruction of trust in the myth of progress.

Conscience, which was previously a concept of separating the special from the general, the moral from the ruler's absolute sovereignty was at the service of the particular. However, this time, not using the "conscience" that demands the restriction of its sovereignty on a rational basis, but using the "conscience" that justifies domination will fulfill the following task stated by Adorno: "It affirms the general by elevating private existence, as protection from it, to the status of a principle."<sup>122</sup>

Citizens' rights again will give way in a hegemonic way to the ethic of human rights. Badiou defines "ethics" as follows: "It is a matter of how subjective action and its representable intentions relate to a universal Law. Ethics is the principle that judges the practice of a Subject, be it individual or collective."<sup>123</sup> When the political context disappears, the principle that judges the practice of the individual is the interiority of the individual, that is, their Conscience. Adorno argued that as the gap between the individual's experience and publicity widened, the Kantian 'ethics of conviction' would settle into the gap created.<sup>124</sup>

Badiou, like the others, is confident that the rising ethical ideology is a kind of return to Kant. So, what does this mean? The disfunctionalization of public opinion and social citizenship has hit the Citizen's power to transform external reality. The gradual elimination of the conditions of organized experience has led to the rise of ethical ideology. At this point, 'ethics of conviction' will be a substitute for the ethics of citizenship. Because it is an ethical conception that the individual does not influence external reality: "The idea that the moral behavior of the individual might decisively impinge on external reality is entirely absent from Kant. And this element of the genuine impotence of the individual in the face of external reality is undoubtedly one of the crucial internal preconditions for the pure construction of

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<sup>122</sup> Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: 76.

<sup>123</sup> Alain Badiou, 2001, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, Verso, p. 2.

<sup>124</sup> Adorno 2001: 10.

interiority in Kant. From the very outset the moral subject plays no part the construction of the world; he has no influence on the world, aside from some extremely abstract meditations on the shaping of history - in which, however, the relation of the moral subject to concrete historical forces plays no role. Because of this lack of influence morality is necessarily turned into a matter of conviction, basically, into the form of action of people who are firmly convinced that their action is quite unable to change the course of the world in the here and now.”<sup>125</sup>

Thus, the orientation meant by "return to Kant" means accepting the ineffectiveness of ethical action in changing external conditions. Since another universal category does not replace the dissolved citizen subject, the recent experience of the Citizen is always explained by referring to the old categories. Now, the condition for an action to be carried out or not is the judgment of the Conscience. In the bourgeois publicity that expects one to be identical not only to others but also to themselves, the Conscience of the Citizen must function as an organ of avoidance because the primary goal is "to bring them to the society," not to create autonomous individuals anymore. It expresses belief in the absoluteness of given conditions. Human is again defined as universal. It has rights arising from its nature. However, the human being is not like a class, a sociality that is defined according to a certain mode of production, or a citizen of the nation-state. Following the apparent victory of globalization and the market economy, the struggle for human and the rights has been conceived as a "radical contingency." Badiou defines the postmodern political position, which he puts forward as an ethical ideology, as "a consensus on what is barbaric." Attempts to determine the Good have been replaced by this consensus. Politics has been reduced to establishing and protecting the people's right not to be harmed in this consensus: "Politics is subordinated to ethics, to the single perspective that really matters in this conception of things: the Sympathetic and indignant judgement of the spectator of the circumstances.”<sup>126</sup>

The judgment in question will be a judgment of Conscience. It always points to evil and seeks to ensure that the physical and social integrity of the person is free

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<sup>125</sup> Adorno 2001: 155.

<sup>126</sup> Badiou 2001: 8.

from this evil. The citizen subject is no longer the representation of a universal. It has become part of anti-universality raising. The impossibility of total social change has been accepted as the only truth. It has become meaningless to pursue a new universal self-project. After Badiou characterizes Leninist political activity as a form of 'active nihilism,' he attempts to describe the political panorama of today: "Where are we today? The figure of active nihilism is taken to be completely obsolete. Every reasonable activity is limited, limiting, bordered by the gravities of reality. What one can do best is to avoid the bad and, in order to do this, the shortest way is to avoid any contact with the real. Finally one finds nothingness again, the nothing-of-the-real, and in this sense one is always within nihilism."<sup>127</sup> Whether it is defined as above or as a "symptom of a broken historical narrative,"<sup>128</sup> as Brown did, the ideology of Conscience will not aim to transform the political reality. The naturalization of inequality has caused the Citizen subject to be drawn to interiority. The ideology of Conscience has resurrected the Hegelian notion of "beautiful soul." The moral attitude replacing the political has removed the holistic context in which the enlightenment establishes happiness through general will.

On the one hand, practice is prioritized over theory. On the other hand, one would be appalled by the lack of objective conditions for the desired practice. Brown would argue that it was precisely this 'impotent anger' that caused the moral action. The hatred of moralism to the theory can be traced back to its practice. In practice, the anti-political moralism moves within the boundaries of a politics of representation. If the citizen subject disappears, his formal existence based on identity continues to exist. Identity based on conscience does not eliminate the old defects, and it also lacks the "sense of reality" given by the institutional and social organization of the citizenship category.

"That emphasis on conscience and uniqueness, however, necessarily collapsed into a self-defeating doctrine of "beauty of soul," of maintaining the purity of one's own convictions independent of the social consequences of one's actions and the

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<sup>127</sup> Alain Badiou, 2007, One divides itself into two. In Budgen, S., Kouvelakis, S., & Zizek, S (Eds.), *Lenin Reloaded: Toward a Politics of Truth*, Duke University Press, p. 15.

<sup>128</sup> Wendy Brown, 2001, *Politics out of History*, Princeton University Press, p. 23.

judgments of others ... The alleged "beauty" of the "beautiful soul" supposedly consists in the way in which the fragmentation characteristic of modern social reality is thereby absent from his unsullied unity, purity, and innocence."<sup>129</sup>

All this is an announcement that the concept of secret is dominant, instead of the concept of publicity. The return of political theology will be read in the practice of the citizen subject defined by the political rights, through 'impotent anger' and the transformation of politics into a 'rhetoric and gesture' activity. If we refer to the ideology of conscience with reference to the epigraph at the beginning of the chapter; It is a divine response to the absence of a universal self-consciousness. It is on duty and alert so that such an attempt does not recur. It does not allow any truth to entice anyone.

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<sup>129</sup> Terry Pinkard, 2000, *Hegel: A Biography*, Cambridge University Press, p. 215.

## CONCLUSION

In this study, by following the line drawn by Koselleck, it is asserted that the idea of modern citizenship, the judgments from the interiority of the bourgeoisie as a collective political subject, tends to establish a human-citizen identity by expanding the identity between the rulers and the ruled. From this point of view, criticism has been developed within limits determined by the concepts of conscience and identity. The discussion grounds the claim that the conscientious-critical judgment of the bourgeoisie acquires political content and establishes an identity through citizenship. For this purpose, the categories of the general will and public opinion were evaluated. These concepts of liberal democratic citizenship thought are the two main organs of unifying the human-citizen identity, the moral subject and the political subject under a universal category. The recognition of man and citizen as one and the same thing equates to human rights and citizen rights relying on a given idea of human nature. However, this time again, the problems caused by the distinction between active and passive citizens, the difference between the territorial boundaries on which citizens' rights are based, and the universality of human rights create instability. The Kantian origins of the active-passive citizen distinction and the nature of the act of renunciation demanded by the general will on behalf of the commonwealth are discussed within the framework of Etienne Balibar's interpretations. The category of public opinion surveils the realization of this renunciation, which is a necessary condition for acquiring autonomy by the citizen who is subject to the general will.

We approached the category of public opinion as to the political rationality of modern bourgeois society. To analyze this category, we used Adorno and Horkheimer's conceptualization of 'instrumental reason.' The critical judgment of the Enlightenment worked for the rationalization of sovereignty. The conscience, the organ to which the truth calls of various sects had been directed before the Enlightenment, was first reduced to the level of conviction. In other words, the general will, which equates everyone with everyone, has abolished the divine halo of the concept of conscience. The conscientious judgment has lost its sanctioning power. The conscience of the subjects, which was previously limited to interiority, confined itself to undertaking a social duty. The conscientious judgment that turns into opinion can command the encouragement or prohibition of any social tradition. The citizen

individual is influenced not only by the laws but also by the moral judgments of the citizens. The public opinion thus acquires a semi-legal character. It has ceased to be an equilibrant between the state and the people, becoming instead a means of drilling particular virtues into the new generations and eventually into all citizens.

The public opinion, which is constructed as the measure of social truth and even the mainstay of the democratic struggle; While the dominance of the mind is a means of rationalization, it is emphasized how it turns into a shoestring, a structure that destroys subjectivity. This transformation has been investigated in the context of Adorno's Kantian 'Understanding-Verstand' criticisms of the relevant category. Understanding organizes the rationalization of the given conditions. It implies that the determination of citizen judgments before perception occurs, and the public opinion will eventually guardians the actions of citizen subject for their compliance to the categories of the understanding. Establishing the political identity of the liberal democratic civic ideology has also suggested "an ethics of citizenship" through public opinion. The last part of the thesis focuses on the failure of this ethical project, namely the crisis of citizenship as defined by Etienne Balibar. Acknowledging that this is a crisis of universal self-consciousness, the situation of the citizen subject in the postmodern period is evaluated in the last chapter by considering the results produced by the transition from industrial capitalism to late capitalism. Contrary to the Koselleckian reading, the conscious judgment which positions it politically and subordinates politics to morality, it is claimed that this time it comprehends itself politically and produces an anti-political result.

In conclusion, elaborating the state of the citizen subject in the postmodern period regarding the consequences of the destruction of the aforementioned universal self-consciousness is suggested by this study. It is also emphasized that the category of public opinion has disappeared with the disappearance of the public deliberation attributed to it, and this category, which has expanded with the generalization of the right to vote and the acquisition of various social rights, renders the political rights of the citizens dysfunctional with the eradication of their social rights. Another claim was that the ethics of citizenship was replaced by the Kantian concept of the ethics of conviction, where this dysfunction constructs itself as anti-universal, as defined by Adorno as ethics in which the ineffectiveness of the individual against the outside



world is accepted. Emphasizing the themes of returning to ethics, the rise of political theology instead of political economy, and anti-political moralism, we stated that conscience, as a concept belonging to political theology, has gained an ideological character, substituting the collapsed ethics of citizenship. It is predicted that reading the concept of conscience through the relationship between active citizenship and activism will bring another efficient dimension to the discussion.

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