

**ULUSALCILIK:  
THE RECENT RESURGENCE  
OF  
LEFT NATIONALISM  
IN TURKEY**

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**Sevgili anne ve babama....**

## ABSTRACT

### ULUSALCILIK: THE RECENT RESURGENCE OF LEFT NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

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This thesis presents a theoretical and historical framework for *ulusalcılık* and attempts to reveal main proposals of *ulusalcılık* in order to analyze the convergences and divergences with the previous movements in Turkey.

With the influence of the thesis of national independence put forward in the early 20th century for tactical and strategic reasons and political movements referring to socialism for independence and development in the decolonization period, various groups in Turkish left tried to reconcile socialism with nationalism and formulate a way of development peculiar to Turkey. *Ulusalcılık* which emerged in the late 1990s and accelerated after the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power, can be regarded as the recent resurgence of the attempts to associate nationalism with leftist discourse in Turkey.

After analysis of theoretical roots that led to the attempts to reconcile nationalism with socialism in the first chapter; the reflections of these attempts in Turkish politics in the second chapter and the basic proposals of *ulusalcılık* in the third chapter, the thesis concludes that *ulusalcılık* can be regarded as the recent form of the attempts to reconcile socialism with nationalism which initially appeared in the 1960s. However, with the influence of globalization and several current issues, it has transformed into a nationalist movement which can be at times xenophobic and which strives for sustaining the nation-state

**Key Words:** Left Nationalism, Ulusalçılık, Kemalism, Anti-Imperialism, Socialism, Third Worldism

## ÖZET

### TÜRKİYE'DE SOL MILLİYETÇİLİĞİN SON TEZAHÜRÜ: *ULUSALCILIK*

Ezgi Ulusoy

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Bu tez, tarihi ve teorik bir çerçeve çizerek ulusalcılığın önceki hareketler ile birleştiği ve ayrıldığı noktaları saptamayı ve temel önermelerini belirlemeyi hedeflemektedir.

20. yüzyılın ilk yıllarında stratejik ve taktik nedenler ile ortaya atılan ulusal bağımsızlıkçılık fikri ve dekolonizasyon döneminde sosyalizmi bağımsızlık ve kalkınma stratejisi olarak kabul eden hareketlerin etkisiyle Türkiye'de de birçok grup sosyalizm ve milliyetçiliği bağdaştırmaya çalışmıştır. 1990'lı yılların başında gelişen ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AKP) iktidar olması ile hız kazanan ulusalcılık, Türkiye'de milliyetçiliği sol söylem ile bağdaştırma girişiminde bulunan hareketlerin son tezahürüdür.

Tezin birinci bölümünde milliyetçiliğin sosyalizm ile birlikte ele alınışının teorik altyapıları incelenmiş, ikinci bölümde dünyadaki bu girişimlerin Türkiye'deki yansımaları araştırılmış ve üçüncü bölümde temel önermeleri üzerinden yola çıkılarak ulusalcılığın özellikle 1960'larda yoğunlaşan bu girişimlerin güncel bir tezahürü olduğu, ancak küreselleşme ve çeşitli güncel sorunların etkisiyle önceki hareketlere göre milliyetçiliğe daha yakınlaştığı, kimi zaman zenofobik bir söylem sarfedebilen ve ulus-devletin korunmasını hedefleyen bir harekete dönüştüğü sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

**Anahtar Sözcükler:** Sol Milliyetçilik, Ulusalcılık, Kemalizm, Anti-Emperyalizm, Sosyalizm, Üçüncü Dünyacılık

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## ABBREVIATIONS

As-ADD	: Aşağı Saksonya Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (The Ataturkist Thought Association in Lower Saxony in Hannover)
ADD	: Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Ataturkist Thought Association)
ADKF	: Atatürkçü Düşünce Kulüpleri Federasyonu (The Federation of Ataturkist Thought Clubs)
AKP	: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
AP	: Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
BOP	: Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi (Greater Middle East Project or Partnership for Progress and Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa)
BTEU	: Avrupalı Türk İşadamları Birliği (Union of European Turkish Businessmen)
ÇYDD	: Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (The Association in Support of Modern Life)
CHP	: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
DEKÜ	: Doğu Emekçileri Komünist Üniversitesi (Eastern Proletarians' Communist University)
DTU	: Türk Alman İşadamları Derneği (Turkish-German Businessmen Association)
DITIB	: Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (Directorate of Religious Affairs Turkish-Islamic Union)
EKİP	: Ergenekon Köylü ve Çiftçi Partisi (Ergenekon Peasant and Farmers' Party)
IMF	: Uluslararası Para Fonu (International Monetary Fund)
İP	: İşçi Partisi (Workers' Party)
MDD	: Milli Demokratik Devrim (National Democratic Revolution)
MHP	: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
NEP	: Yeni Ekonomi Politikası (New Economic Policy)
PDA	: Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik (Proletarian Revolutionist Luminousness)
PKK	: Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
TESUD	: Türkiye Emekli Subaylar Derneği (The Association of Retired Army Officers of Turkey)
THKO	: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (People's Liberation Army of Turkey)
THKP-C	: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephe (People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey)
TİP	: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Workers' Party of Turkey)

- TKP : Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Communist Party of Turkey)
- TKP-ML : Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marksist Leninist (Communist Party of Turkey-Marxist Leninist)
- TRNC : Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus)
- TSEKP : Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi (Socialist Laborer and Peasant Party of Turkey)
- TSP : Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi (Socialist Party of Turkey)
- USİAD : Ulusal Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği (Association of National Industrialists and Businessmen)

## INTRODUCTION

*Ulusalcılık* which emerged in the late 1990s and accelerated after the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power, is the recent resurgence of the attempts to associate nationalism with leftist discourse in Turkey. With the influence of the thesis of national independence put forward in the early 20th century for tactical and strategic reasons and political movements referring to socialism for independence and development in the decolonization period, various groups in Turkish left tried to reconcile socialism with nationalism and formulate a way of development peculiar to Turkey. However, with the changing political and economic life after the 1980s, these movements have totally distanced themselves from socialism except for referring some concepts of it and have transformed into a nationalist movement which can be at times racist, xenophobic and disparaging. It has become an ideology which can act in cooperation with the state and radical nationalist groups in order for survival of the nation-state. There are several interrelated and intermingled political, economical and foreign policy issues which have shaped dynamics of Turkey since the 1980s and which eventually led to rise of *ulusalcılık*. These issues will be discussed in the third chapter in detail while analyzing the main proposals of *ulusalcılık*.

As it has been the case in almost all developing and underdeveloped countries, Turkey pursued import-substitution development strategy in the 1960s and the 1970s. However, since the 1980s, and at an accelerated pace during the 1990s, Turkey has been exposed to globalization process and has undergone political as well as economical transformation. During the 1980s, an accelerated reform program took place in each sector of Turkish economy. Outward oriented development strategy was launched replacing the import-substitution strategy. In accordance with this new

strategy, the foreign trade and financial sector including the capital accounts were liberalized by consequently changing the whole structure of policy-making environment radically. Non-residents were allowed to purchase real estate and real rights as well as to invest and engage in commercial activities. The globalization process and the attempts for integration of the Turkish economy to the world economy continued during the 1990s with a greater pace. Turkey established Customs Union with the European Union (EU) on January 1st, 1996, by eliminating all duties and other charges imposed. And, it put into practice new economic programs proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Privatizations took place and foreign direct investments increased.

In accordance with the improvements in the economy, Turkey's social and cultural life has exposed to essential changes as a consequence of global, national and local interactions. New social movements and effective civil society organizations have emerged and influenced the social, political as well as economical life. These changes and accelerated process of globalization have led to reactions in the society, which have increased with the AKP's victory in 2002. In addition to accelerated process of Turkey's accession to the EU, numerous privatizations have been realized and foreign capital access has increased under AKP government. Therefore, its neo-liberalist policies have augmented reactions. AKP is also confronted with opposition as a result of concerns regarding secularism because it is considered as the successor of the Islam-oriented political parties<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party-RP) gained victory by being the first party in the elections in 1995 but was banned by the constitutional court after the 28 February 1997 military operation. The *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party-FP) was established in 1998 and banned by the Constitutional Court in 2001. Finally, the *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party-SP) was established in 2001.

Moreover, the Kurdish issue which rose in the 1990s is still one of the most debatable issues in Turkey. The attacks of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a militant organization fighting for foundation of an independent Kurdish state, has recently escalated. This has given rise to increase in nationalist-chauvinist discourses of the nationalist groups. Similarly, the debates on the minorities in Turkey flared up in the 1990s. The Armenian genocide claims, Greek Patriarchate and the Theological School of Halki in the island of Heybeliada created an animosity against minorities in Turkey.

Eventually, the perception of the demise of the nation-state and the loss of its hegemony has appeared. Globalization is regarded as the "ideal system" of "imperialism" by the supporters of *ulusalcılık*. As a result of globalization which has incited nationalisms of small ethnic groups besides paving the way to the world integration, the flaring-up of the Kurdish problem, the re-emergence of the Armenian genocide claims with the increase of global awareness; the perception of the EU as a "threat" due to the prolongation of the EU accession and EU's provisions regarding the "national matter" Cyprus, the image that "the national unity is in danger" has been created and spread to the majority of the society. As it gives voice to common concerns, it has gained a considerable support from the society.

Aforementioned developments necessitate a comprehensive analysis of theoretical and historical roots as well as proposals of the ideology of *ulusalcılık*, which constitutes the aim of this study. In order to accomplish this aim, this study strives for answering several interrelated questions: What renders *ulusalcılık* distinct in the Turkish politics in the 2000s?, What is new about *ulusalcılık*? To what extent it represents novelty? Can we find historical roots of *ulusalcılık* in the 1960s and 1970s?

What is leftist in the proposals of *ulusalcılık*? To what extent are its proposals compatible with socialism or international left? These questions will serve for revealing a portrait of *ulusalcılık*.

The study will attempt to establish a theoretical framework for *ulusalcılık* which will reveal its historical ties and particularly ground it on the disputes regarding the relation between socialism and nationalism in the 1960s and the 1970s. However, it will encompass the 1930s as well, which bear two essential aspects: the foundation of the historical link between Turkish left and Kemalism and the etatist policies put into practice in those years. The contributions of the leading movements and figures in 1930s, 1960s and 1970s will be handled together with the aforementioned developments in the 1990s. Following the establishment of a theoretical framework, the fundamental arguments and proposals of the supporters of *ulusalcılık* will be systemically evaluated, and consequently the theoretical and historical links will be analyzed.

The study faces three essential challenges. Initially, the subject is too recent to analyze. Secondly, there is not a comprehensive work in the literature focusing on the issue which can provide leading lights for the study. Finally, the fact that there is not a unique organization of *ulusalcılık* but various groups, parties and journals pursuing the ideology render the issue more complex, as ideas can alter according to different organizations and fora which complicate determining common attitudes and arguments of the supporters of *ulusalcılık*. The study attempts to cope with these three challenges, as it gathers fragmented, unorganized discussions and proposals of *ulusalcılık* and establishes a systematic evaluation. Simultaneously, in order to render the picture more concrete and clear, this study attempts to evaluate all these

discussions and proposals by establishing historical and theoretical ties. Drawing a portrait of *ulusalcılık* and by this way filling the gap in the literature constitutes the primary aim of this study.

Within these considerations, the study is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, the discussions on the relation between socialism and nationalism will be discussed in order to determine the main theoretical roots that led to the attempts to reconcile nationalism with socialism. The theoretical and political relation of socialism and left respectively with nationalism has been discussed by several scholars especially after the 1990s in the context of criticism of Marxism and Marxist view of state. This study will briefly go through the works of some of these scholars.

In the second chapter, historical roots of the attempts to reconcile nationalism with socialism will be discussed. The 1960s and the 1970s are determinative in the formation of *ulusalcılık* given to the fact that the left was very influential in those years when the debates within left were very intensive leading to the schism eventually. *Yön-Devrim* (Direction-Revolution) in the 1960s, MDD (National Democratic Revolution) in 1970s and the successor movements together with dominant figures formed as a result of splits in the Turkish left will be discussed as they constitute the historical roots of *ulusalcılık*.

This chapter will also briefly refer to the 1930s and the *Kadro* (Cadre) movement in those years as well as 1940s and 1950s. Particularly, *Kadro* in the 1930s abides two essential features which are significant in identifying *ulusalcılık*. By assigning an anti-imperialist aspect to the Kemalist revolution in the 1920s, a historical tie was founded between Kemalism and Turkish left. This relation constitutes the essence of *ulusalcılık*. Secondly, the etatism and planning as the motor

of national developmentalism was the strategy of the state in 1930s to which the supporters of *ulusalcılık* feel longing and frequently refer in their discourses. The evaluation of the movements and leading figures between the 1930s-1970s and onwards will essentially contribute to the establishment of a historical framework for *ulusalcılık* and will constitute the mainstay to determine what extent *ulusalcılık* represents novelty.

Finally in the third chapter, initially convergences and divergences will be analyzed between *ulusalcılık* and similar previous movements discussed in the second chapter. Then a grouping will be made in order to clarify slight differences among diverse groups of *ulusalcılık* and leading organizations and figures will be discussed. Afterwards, their main proposals and perceptions regarding the recent issues will be analyzed. This chapter is important because diverse works, discourses and articles of the supporters of *ulusalcılık* will be gathered and evaluated systematically here in the lights of theoretical and historical framework structured in the first and second chapters.

To sum up, this study attempts to draw a portrait of *ulusalcılık* as an introductory study in order to provide a leading light for further studies by focusing on particularly the historical background and main proposals of *ulusalcılık*. It tries to accomplish its aim by initially constituting a theoretical framework by referring to the general discussions on the relation between socialism and nationalism and the historical roots of such attempts in Turkey through a comprehensive literature review, by mostly evaluating secondary sources in the first and second chapters. Yet the third chapter is based on primary sources of *ulusalcılık*. Given to the fact that *ulusalcılık* is pursued by various sections of the society, the study has attempted to take into



account materials of almost all groups supporting *ulusalcılık*, for instance the organizations of retired military officers, businessmen associations, “leftist” journals and organizations, organizations which are close to official ideology, and have systemically evaluated them in order to detect common characteristics of *ulusalcılık*.

Last but not least, the terminological problem relating to the translation of “*ulusalcılık*” should be mentioned here. *Ulusalcılık* is the modern Turkish synonym of the Turkish word “milliyetçilik”, which corresponds to “nationalism” in English. However, because it is a term which has been deliberately coined by the supporters of it in the late 1990s, in order to emphasize there is an ideological difference between other previous and contemporaneous forms of nationalism in Turkey, it is impossible to find an English equivalent to this word. Although some academic scholars and journalists prefer to use ‘neo-nationalism’ for its English equivalent, still this is not sufficient to reciprocate the meaning that the supporters of *ulusalcılık* assign it. Therefore, the Turkish word “*ulusalcılık*” will be used to refer to the movement after the 1990s and during the 2000s, whereas the earlier movements will be discussed under the title of “left nationalism”.

## CHAPTER I

### NATIONALISM AND LEFT: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The relation between nationalism and socialism has been one of the most controversial and ambiguous issues in the Marxist theory. Numerous scholars and intellectuals have written abundant articles on this issue especially after the 1970s, when the Marxist theory of the state re-appeared. Some of them argue that this is an outcome of the nature of nationalism, which is not a distinct ideology, but a framework that needs a mainstream ideology to be filled out, whereas some claim that it is a consequence of the fact that there is not any systemic and complete conceptualization of nationalism in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin (Nimni, 1994: 6).

In this chapter, the theoretical attempts to reconcile nationalism with Socialism will be discussed through leading contemporary works on the issue, in order to analyze the main historical and intellectual motives that led to such attempts.

So-called left nationalism or nationalist left<sup>2</sup> is an attempt to reconcile some concepts of socialism with an acceptance of reality and legitimacy of the nation-state (Schwarzmatel, 1988: 240). However, this association reveals a contradictory picture. Internationalism constitutes one of the fundamental components of socialism, whereas nationalism is particularist. Furthermore, concept of “class conflict” of socialism is totally exterminated by nationalism, by putting the concept of “nation” instead. These contradictions render the concept of “left nationalism” problematic.

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<sup>2</sup> Various scholars use different terms to refer the attempts to associate nationalism with Marxism. In this study, left nationalism will be used.

Nationalism is regarded as the major evidence of failure of Marxism by several Marxists and non-Marxists<sup>3</sup>. Some of them argue that nationalism is too rooted and old to be comprehended and explained by Marxism, and Marxism overlooked nationalism by focusing merely on class ideologies. The fact that Marx never discussed nationalism in a systematic way has rendered the issue one of the major debatable questions in socialist movement (Avineri, 1991: 638).

For instance according to Nimni who claims that there is a large theoretical gap in the Marxist tradition, the main reason of Marxism's failure of conceptualizing nationalism is because it flourished within the boundaries of the European continent, it is Eurocentric. Therefore it overlooked the cases in Asia and Africa. He argues that Marx was incorrect while explaining concrete instances of nationalist agitation in terms of the class struggle or a pervasive false consciousness that distracted the workers from their real aim (Nimni, 1994: 4). Other reason of Marxism's failure regarding nationalism is stated to stem from Marxism's perception that national struggle has its own logic, so there is not a national question but national questions (Nimni, 1994: 5).

In other words, Marx and Engels viewed the national movements as series of political programs based on conflicting social interests, rather than perceiving it a sui generis phenomenon (Munck, 2003: 155). For this reason, self-determination was not an absolute right, but dependent on the international political conjuncture and the development level of class conflict in that society. By using Hegel's distinction between historical nations and non-historical nationalities, they stated that the former were led by strong middle classes which are capable of maintaining cultural unity to

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<sup>3</sup> For further reading about this premise, see Nairn, Tom 1981. 'The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. New Left Books: London and Nairn, Tom 1997 '*Faces of Nationalism*' Verso: London

establish conditions for capitalism, whereas the latter is lack of strong middle classes and their opposition to assimilation impeded transition to capitalism (Gans, 2003: 9). Therefore, because they saw the great nations as the leaders of civilization and development, which deserved to establish their nation-states through their victorious independence struggles, they supported France' conquest of Algeria and the U.S.' invasion in Mexican lands, by stating that the "energetic Yankees" would develop the area more quickly and more favorably than the "lazy Mexicans" (Martin, 1968: 240). In other words, it is widely known that Marx and Engels supported the civilizing mission of some forms of "progressive colonialism" (Nimni, 1994: 13). According to Munck, this stance of them originates from their perception of non-European world as a reflection of Europe, and from their unawareness of the internal dynamics of those societies (Munck, 2003: 157).

As a final point, Marx and Engels were opposed to any ideologies which overshadow class conflict, and they regarded democracy as litmus paper and internationalism as the major aim (Munck, 2003: 159). The main concern of Marxism with nationalism was with political strategies rather than definitions (Munck, 1986: 159). Moreover, they occasionally emphasized that "the working men have no country", which characterizes the cosmopolitan and internationalist aspect of socialism. However, their altering attitudes towards nationalist movements have left a problematic heritage to the socialist movement (Avineri, 1991: 639-640).

After Russian Revolution in 1905, nationalism became more noticeable in socialist policies. Lenin suggested the right of self-determination for nations. He emphasized the contradictions between the oppressed and the oppressing nations, bourgeoisie and revolutionary nationalism and assessed the nationalist movements

through the contribution to the interests of working class (Munck, 1986: 3). He stressed the relation between nationalism and democracy, but like Marx and Engels, this attitude was tactical, as some of the nationalist liberation struggles were expected to contribute to the weakening of tsardom, by leaving again incomplete legacy to conceptualization of nationalism in Marxist theory. Also Lenin did not agree with Stalin when he claimed that the bourgeois in the colonial and semi-colonial nations were revolutionist (Balta, 2002: 156).

When the Soviet Union failed to spread socialism to West, it turned to East, which was a turning point in terms of relation between nationalism and socialism. In the first Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku in 1920, nationalism was given a wide attention by the leaders and the participants. In the second Congress of International in 1920, a major debate on nationalism between Lenin and Indian socialist Roy occurred which led to shifting in the relation between Marxism and nationalism. In the Fourth Congress of Communist International in 1922, it was declared that the Communist International supported every national revolutionist movement executed against imperialism. Since then, socialism started to be adapted to the nationalist movements of Third World. Marxism and Leninism then became the leading incitement and ideology of the non-capitalist, national development.

After the World War II, decolonization of the world started through series of colonial revolutions in non-European countries. These revolutions aiming for national independence were realized through tough struggles against the colonialist states. After obtaining political independence, these countries got closer to socialist idea, while the socialist regimes approaching to these countries as well as a consequence of diplomatic interests in the cold war era (Doğan and Ünivar, 2007: 706). By this way,

the border between the Marxist movements and national independence movements blurred, and these two diverse movements came together in some cases. An ideological framework was established for these former colonies in an international conference in Moscow in 1960. In this conference, the concept of “National Democratic State” which will be achieved through “National Democratic Fronts” was formulated. By this way, nationalism was stated as a strategy of development in those countries. “Anti-imperialism” became more essential and influential in the world history, while nationalism was perceived as natural response to imperialism. In other words, nationalism in those countries satisfied three essential needs which are independence, decolonization and development (Munck, 1986: 145). As a consequence, the class struggle was transformed into struggle between proletarian revolutionary nations and imperialist nations. Moreover, the anti-capitalism which accompany anti-imperialism in Marxist theory was removed, while anti-imperialism was perceived as anti-colonialism.

The most significant intellectual contribution to socialism in the Third World was implemented by Mao, the founder and the leader of People’s Republic of China<sup>4</sup>. The term “Third World” represents the Asian, African and Latin American countries, while the first and the second are constituted by the two super power states; the United States of America together with the capitalist European states and Japan, and the Soviet Union respectively. The principal elements; the anti-imperialism, impartiality in the cold war era (neither in the side of the Soviet Union, nor in the counter-side of it) and opposition to any Western influence and any imperialist capital inside the nation, the dominance of the public sector as the strongest device of an authoritarian

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<sup>4</sup> For further reading about Mao, see Short, Philip 2001. ‘*Mao: A Life*’. Owl Books; Chang, Jung and Halliday, Jon 2005. ‘*Mao: The Unknown Story*’. Jonathan Cape: London; Feigon, Lee 2002. ‘*Mao: A Reinterpretation*’. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee

developmentalist regime became very influential in the third world, especially after the 1950s (Doğan and Ünüvar, 2007: 710-711). The third world countries were called to establish “national democracy front”, with the participation of communists, nationalist intellectuals and national bourgeoisie, against imperialist nations. The nations that accomplished those principles were regarded as “national democratic states”. Proletariat (also including peasants) was used to refer a whole nation, instead of defining a social class, essentially in order to relate national independence to socialism and legitimize it.

As a consequence, socialism in the Third World changed into an authoritarian developmentalist, national independentist and essentially a nationalist movement, by defining national independence the initial and crucial step to socialist revolution. This interpretation of socialism became very influential in numerous African, Arab and Asian countries and gave rise to emergence of left nationalism in those countries.

In the 1960s, the Turkish left was greatly influenced by these developments. As it will be discussed in the following chapter, the emergence of Third Worldism as a reaction to the “imperialist” states became very influential in the Turkish left. In accordance with the premise that nationalism is the most dominant concept that shapes the internal and foreign policies of the less developed countries (Oran, 1997: 19), nationalism which emerged as a consequence of particularist stance has become more apparent. While the socialist revolutionists pursued international revolution, the national democratic revolutionists embraced Kemalism as the first step of Turkish revolution and pursued the ideal of “Independent and Democratic Turkey”.

Providing a theoretical framework on historical and intellectual motives that led to attempts to reconcile Socialism with nationalism will be helpful to understand

such attempts in Turkey. Although approach of Marx, Engels and Lenin to nationalism is instrumental, socialism was perceived as a development strategy in the less developed countries after the 1960s and was re-interpreted with nationalism. Therefore, reconciliation of an internationalist ideology with a particularist ideology has created a problematic combination.



## CHAPTER II - HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LEFT NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

There have always been claims to be unique and sui generis within Turkish left. Internationalist left perceives the world as a whole and tries to analyze it in terms of relations of production and class conflict. However, any attempt to establish a strategy based on local distinctions and peculiarities will lead to deviation from internationalism towards nationalism. This distinction within Turkish left became so profound after the 1960s that great disagreements occurred which followed by schism in the Turkish left. This split and the movements and political figures that led this deviation towards nationalism constitute the historical roots of *ulusalcılık*.

Regarding the foundation of the Turkish Republic as a result of Turkish independence war, Gülalp compares two versions of Ottoman-Turkish history: modernization and Kemalist versions (Gülalp, 1994: 156). The modernization version assumes that foundation of the Turkish Republic is a natural outcome of modernization process, which dates back to the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Kemalist version presupposes that Kemalist revolution is the single historic event that severed the ties with the Ottoman Empire, through an anti-imperialist revolution. According to it, the Turkish independence war was a classless national revolution originating from the metropolis-colonial conflict in the world system. This vision constitutes the origin of the attempts of several groups to reconcile nationalism with Socialism in Turkey and therefore the *ulusalcılık*, this study aims to explicate. The ideology of these groups is named as left nationalism or left Kemalism in Turkey (Alpkaya, 2001: 477).

The left nationalism in Turkey attempts to base its ideology on socialist discourse however, at the same time, it prioritizes nationalism or the concept of “nation” to any class ideologies. Because it accepts the Kemalist Revolution as the beginning of Turkish anti-imperialist struggle, it has always had great ties with Kemalism<sup>5</sup>. The Kemalist struggle, which was a nationalist struggle for independence replaced the class struggle for socialism.

Lenin’s statement of the right of self-determination and his distinction of oppressed nations’ nationalism and oppressing nations’ nationalism in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of Comintern constitute one of the fundamental basis of left nationalism in Turkey. Another essential contribution to the formulation of left nationalism in Turkey was implemented by the members of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) who attended the Eastern Proletarians’ Communist University (DEKÜ)<sup>6</sup>. The doctrines of Sultan Galiyev<sup>7</sup>, one of the most influential figures in DEKÜ, would be one of the mainstays to whom and to whose ideas the Turkish left nationalist groups have occasionally referred. Sultan Galiyev, a Muslim in Russia who was born in 1882 attempted to congregate the identities of “Turk”, “Muslim” and “Marxist”. He divided the world into two: the international bourgeoisie and oppressed nations. Since the classes in the colonies (or oppressed nations) had not been formed yet, national liberation struggle was the priority rather than class struggle. Thus in his socialist terminology, “class” was replaced by the “nation”, and wars of liberation gained a

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<sup>5</sup> For further reading about the relation between Turkish left and Kemalism, see Somay, Bülent 2007. *‘Türkiye Solu’nun Kemalizmle İmtihanı’*. Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 8 Sol. Murat Gültekingil (ed.) İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları pp.647-660 and Alpkaya, Faruk 2001 *‘Bir 20. Yüzyıl Akımı: Sol Kemalizm’*. Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm. Ahmet İnel (ed.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

<sup>6</sup> *Doğu Emekçileri Komünist Üniversitesi*, one of the education institutions established by Comintern in order to educate communist in various regions of the world in 1921.

<sup>7</sup> For further reading about Sultan Galiyev, see Kakinç, Halit 2003. ‘Sultan Galiyev ve Milli Komünizm’ Bulut Yayınları

“socialist” aspect. He believed that the socialist revolution would occur gradually, by defining the national liberation as the first and the most significant step (Aydın, 2002: 446). The left nationalism was also greatly influenced by Maoism and other national independence movements in the third world countries in the 1960s.

According to left nationalism, the main conflict in capitalism exists between the developed and underdeveloped nations, rather than between classes. Since the proletariat in developed nations has an interest in the continuity of capitalism’s metropolis-colony structure, the proletarian revolutions cannot provide a solution to this conflict. Eventually, it argues that Marxism failed to see this fact stemming from unequal global development. However, absence of a bourgeois-proletariat conflict is perceived as an opportunity in terms of establishing a classless society.

As a matter of fact, anti-imperialism is the key concept that the left nationalist groups refer in reconciliation Socialism with nationalism. It should be noted here that when anti-imperialism is in question, the border between the socialism and left nationalism blurs, as almost all left currents in Turkey have favored the idea of anti-imperialism and independence<sup>8</sup>. As mentioned above, the reason of the underdevelopment in Turkey is attributed to the imperialist nations. Therefore, anti-imperialist struggle against imperialist nations, namely European nations and the United States, and their collaborators within Turkey, will be perceived as the essential task of left nationalism. This attitude sometimes brings forward a xenophobic manner.

Kemalism is the most significant component of left nationalism. The Kemalist revolution is considered as an anti-imperialist struggle of the Turkish nation, which started the Turkish modernization at the same time. Kemalist revolution, which is

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<sup>8</sup> For further reading about the anti-imperialism and independence in Turkish socialist movement, see Atılğan, Gökhan 2007. ‘*Anti-Emperyalizm ve Bağımsızlıkçılık (1920-1971)*’. *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce* Cilt 8 Sol. Murat Gültekingil (ed.) İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları pp 661-704

regarded as the pioneering model for other third world countries (Kazancıgil, 2001: 241), is also the greatest mainstay of the “originality” claim of left nationalism. As a result of adopting Kemalism, it undertakes the main mission of Kemalism, which is maintaining the survival of the state and at the same time the top-down transformation task of the state. On the other hand, it gains social legitimacy thanks to the pursuing the “founder of the Turkish Republic”.

Nevertheless, the left nationalism assumes that the Kemalist revolution, executed against imperialist nations has not been completed yet. According to them, the development of a nation can only be realized through independence from the capitalist world system and since there is no social class that can accomplish this in the underdeveloped countries, the state should take over this mission. In other words, state planning is considered as the primary condition in order to achieve economic development and social welfare, and it is greatly on this question that socialists and their opponents differ (Karpat, 1966: 186). As a result, etatism is stated as the third alternative for development to socialism and capitalism (Alpkaya, 2001: 478) and perceived as an essential successor of a national revolution. This presupposes a strict control on foreign trade, private enterprises, foreign investments, and import-substituting industrialization program which was implemented in Turkey in the 1930s, in the aftermath of 1929 world economic crisis. This opinion in a sense stands for isolating national economy from the world economy.

In addition to the foregoing characteristics of left nationalism, it also claims that the cadre consisted by the civil-military intellectuals is always progressive, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and also anti-capitalist. The left nationalist groups started to

hope support from the military, in transforming the Turkish society especially after the 1960s.

In this chapter, left nationalist movements in Turkish political history will be discussed in order to establish a theoretical and historical framework for *ulusalcılık*. The groups in the 1960s and the 1970s are very influential in the formation of *ulusalcılık* in the 2000s. Nevertheless, the study will discuss briefly the 1930s and *Kadro*, a political journal in those years as well. Because the 1930s are very significant in terms of two crucial points: the foundation of the historical link between Turkish left and Kemalism, and the etatist policies put into practice in those years. Then, *Yön-Devrim* in the 1960s, the MDD movement and other groups which emerged within TKP and Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP) and pursued this ideology in the 1970s will be discussed. While studying these movements and groups, special attention will be paid to some of the leading figures in order to display there is even continuity in terms of figures. For instance, some of *Kadro* writers took place in *Yön-Devrim*, while some of *Yön-Devrim* writers led the MDD movement in 1970s who are now leading columnists of *Cumhuriyet*<sup>9</sup> (Republic) journal or leaders of political groups of *ulusalcılık*. . This chapter is important in terms of revealing the historical ties of *ulusalcılık* and founding a theoretical framework with the contribution of the first chapter.

### **The 1930s and Kadro Movement**

In the early years of the Turkish Republic, there was a discomfort among Turkish intellectuals against the imperialist practices of the Western countries. This

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<sup>9</sup> Cumhuriyet (Republic), Turkish daily newspaper that was established in 1924 and named by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It will be mentioned in detail in the third section. For further reading, see Erten, Bağış 2001 '*Cumhuriyet'in Cumhuriyeti: Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*'. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm. Ahmet İnel (ed.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

anti-imperialist stance brought them close to socialism, which was reinforced with Lenin's distinction of oppressed nations' nationalism and oppressing nations' nationalism in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of Comintern and the influence of DEKÜ on Turkish socialists, mostly within the TKP.

In the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of Comintern, Lenin stated that the national liberation wars would contribute significantly to the world socialist revolution and named them as "national revolution", by arguing that these movements should be supported (Kuyuş, 2001: 251). Moreover, some members of the TKP attended the DEKÜ in Moscow, in which numerous professors from the Third World taught, emphasizing the necessity of the national liberation movements. This idea, in which Sultan Galiyev was very influential, was adopted by a lot of Turkish intellectuals and was spread through the activities of TKP (Kuyuş, 2001: 251).

At the same time, in order to protect Turkish economy from the negative effects of the crisis of 1929, the Kemalist regime represented by the Republican People's Party (CHP) on power pursued etatist economic policies during 1930s. An import-substituting industrialization policy was introduced and the first Five-Year Industrialization Plan was initiated in 1932. Some academic scholars agree upon the fact that this plan was basically influenced by NEP<sup>10</sup> of Soviet Union. (Keyder, 2003: 137).

These economic policies were accompanied by political measures, which aimed to complement the economic planning with ideological solidarity (Keyder, 2003: 138). In the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress of CHP, the principles of secularism, revolutionism and etatism were added to republicanism, nationalism and populism introduced in the

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<sup>10</sup> NEP: New Economic Policy, which was proposed by Lenin and ratified on March, 21 1921. It presupposes restrictions for private sector, while it gives the state the control of key sectors. It was ended by Stalin in 1929.

2<sup>nd</sup> Congress. At the same Congress, the political regime was defined as single party regime and it was declared that the CHP had undertaken the responsibility of administration on behalf of the society. It was declared that the principle of populism and social solidarity would be essential. The concept of class was attempted to be removed, by introducing “*içtimai nizam ve tesanüt*” (internal order and solidarity). The class conflict was attempted to replace by a corporatist model. During 1930s, a national solidarity which generally brought xenophobia was encouraged (Keyder, 2003: 150).

Between the years of 1932-1934, in which the etatist policies were implemented intensively, *Kadro*, a monthly journal of socio-economics and politics, began to be published. The leading writers were Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, the ideologue of the movement, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, the legal licensee, Vedat Nedim Tör, editor, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Mehmet Şevki Yaman and Burhan Asaf Belge, regular authors. The main task of *Kadro* was to provide an ideological framework for Kemalist revolution, by suggesting new economic policies to be pursued by the Kemalist regime. (Türkeş, 2001: 91). Its publication was ceased by the Kemalist regime in 1934.

Although the *Kadro* writers were influenced by socialism, they were loyal to the regime and cautious about leftist expressions in the journal. They attempted to analyze international system and divided it into three groups: the imperialist countries, the countries that struggled against imperialism and the Soviet Union, and the reason of the economic backwardness and industrial retardation of the countries in the second group including Turkey, was stated as the European imperialism. They believed that the existing international political and economical system would collapse, that

accelerated after the collapse of New York Stock Exchange in October 1929, which they called “a structural crisis of capitalism”.

According to them, the fact of nation cannot be neglected. As a consequence, they coined the term of “*sosyal milliyetçilik*” (social nationalism), which presupposes a classless nation, a nation with no privileges. For this, national liberation struggle was regarded as essential (Aydın, 2002: 454),

They believed that the private sector was too weak to undertake the mission of industrialization, so the state should not allocate its resources to protect private sector but invest in industry itself. Therefore, etatism was perceived as a third alternative to liberalism and socialism. They emphasized the significance of economic development in order to achieve social development (Türkeş, 1998: 93-94). They were totally opposed to the entry of foreign capital. They criticized capitalism, socialism and fascism, and argued that capitalism brought poverty and Marxism failed to explain the differences between industrialized European countries and non-industrialized Asian countries, by falling short in solving differences between east and west (Nas, July 2008). They also attempted to analyze Turkey’s eastern problem and rural development by stating that the main problem originated from the landownership and because they had huge power, the state failed to penetrate the society. The *Kadro* writers almost never referred to Islam (Atalay, 2006: 112)<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> For further reading about *Kadro* Journal, see Türkeş, Mustafa 1998. ‘*The Ideology of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey*’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34:4, 92-119, Yıldırım, E. 2000 ‘*Bir Sol Milliyetçi İdeoloji Modeli: Kadro Dergisi*’ *Doğu Batı*, 8 (31), pp 249-264 and Türkeş, Mustafa 1999 ‘*Kadro Hareketi*’ İmge Kitabevi Yayınları: Ankara and Bostancı, Naci 1990 ‘*Kadrocular ve Sosyo Ekonomik Görüşleri*’ Kültür Bakanlığı: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara and Tekeli, İlhan and İlkin, Selim 2007 ‘*Kadro ve Kadrocuların Öyküsü*’ *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce* Cilt 8 Sol. Murat Gültekin (ed.) İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları



The fact that it was a sort of spokesman of the policies of the party in power at that time distinguishes *Kadro* from succeeding left nationalist movements which have struggled against the party in power in order to obtain power.

Moreover, the etatism which continued until the end of the war is defined as “non-capitalist development strategy”. These two facts constitute the major reasons why the following left nationalist movements and the supporters of *ulusalcılık* now feel longing for the 1930s. The 1930s are defined as ‘Golden Years’ by the supporters of *ulusalcılık*<sup>12</sup>.

Apart from *Kadro*, there were some individuals who attempted to establish ideological background for Kemalist revolution through synthesis of different ideologies in the 1930s and 1940s. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, a member of Parliament stated that Kemalist revolution could also be named as Turkish Peasents’ Revolution, as new Turkish Republic was a people’s state. He emphasized the necessity of establishing unions for every profession and representation of professions in the national assembly which would be essence of economic independence and national development (Uyar, 2002: 217). He frequently referred to Karl Marx in his writings and criticized government’s liberal economic practices by stating etatism in which owning of private property was allowed but the state controlled the rights of entrepreneurship in order to prevent human exploitation. He argued that there were classes in the Turkish society and claimed that the Kemalist revolution did very few things to protect the workers’ rights. However, he was Kemalist and nationalist as well. Therefore, the ideas of him can be regarded as one of the leading mainstays of the successor attempts to associate socialism with Kemalism and nationalism.

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<sup>12</sup> For further reading about the politics and economy of 1930s: Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar İletişim Yayınları* 2003 İstanbul

It is also beneficial here to discuss briefly about similar but ineffective left movements which emerged in the liberalization process initiated by transition to multi-party regime. Among approximately 9 “left” political parties, the *Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi* (TSP-Socialist Party of Turkey) is significant because it has given the initial signals of a strategy of socialism peculiar to Turkey, except for some individual voices within TKP. TSP was founded by Esat Adil in 1946 with a program proclaiming that socialism could be interpreted according to peculiarities of a society and Sovietism was not the only method (Gökmen, 1998: 168). It emphasized the concepts of “national” and “independent”. However, it did not participate in the elections in July 21, 1946 due to its opposition to “regime”. However, since “left” parties in the late 1940s and early 1950s enjoyed a liberal political environment just for a while and remained ineffective due to the restrictions brought by the regime. Nevertheless, existence of such a party and its debates with *Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi* (TSEKP-Socialist Laborer and Peasant Party of Turkey) founded by Şefik Hüsnü and regarded as the legal branch of TKP, provides evidence that the disagreements within Turkish left date back to before 1960s.

### **The Turkish Left and Nationalism in 1960s and 1970s**

Beginning in the 1960s, significant disagreements and separations occurred in the Turkish left due to the emergence of the idea of national democratic revolution (MDD) as an alternative to the socialist revolution with the effect of international conjuncture. The decolonization of the world brought the idea of “Third Worldism”<sup>13</sup>. This was perceived as a socialist movement, since it was developed against the

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<sup>13</sup> The U.S. and the Soviet Union were perceived as the two leading block, while other nations constitute the ‘Third World.’

imperialist nations. However, its main aspect was nationalism (Aydın, 2002: 457). It prioritized the liberation of the underdeveloped nations over class struggle, and it emphasized the necessity of unification of oppressed nations against the imperialist nations. The first and vital stage of this struggle was stated as the “National Democratic Revolution”, while socialism remained as the long term aim, which should be considered after the realization of the first and vital stage. In other words, in contrast to socialism which is based on class struggle, National Democratic Revolution, which is a term coined by Lenin, reflects the conflict between the oppressor nations and the oppressed nations. National Democratic Revolution was actually an attempt to reconcile the national liberation movements with socialism, referring to Lenin’s distinction between the nationalism of the oppressing nations and the nationalism of oppressed nations.

Actually anti-imperialism and the independence have been essential components of Turkish left. Nevertheless, influenced by the international conjuncture mentioned above in addition to the ideological structure created by the military intervention in 1960, the anti-imperialism and independence concepts were reconciled with the Kemalism and nationalism. By this way, the Turkish left could display itself as “authentic” and “national”. On the other hand, the left gained the social legitimacy as a result of referring to with reference to Kemalism (Atılğan, 2007: 681). The MDD branch representing the aforementioned division of Turkish left has been influential in Turkey and constitutes the most significant root of *ulusalcılık*.

### **The *Yön-Devrim* Movements**

*Yön*, a socio-political journal started to be published on December 20, 1961, with a manifesto of “Neo-Etatism”, known as “The Manifesto of *Yön*”, signed by

1,041 intellectuals in the first issue. These intellectuals were mostly from the CHP. Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhan Selçuk, Mümtaz Soysal, İlhami Soysal, Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu and Hamdi Avcıoğlu are the regular writers, while some important writers of *Kadro*, such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu also partook. Besides being a journal, it became a political movement with the first issue. Its major aims were stated as fulfilling the ideological gap of the military intervention on May 27, 1960, which they called “revolution” (Atılğan, 2002: 232) and complementing “uncompleted” Kemalist revolution with socialism. The publication of *Yön* was ceased twice. The first one was implemented by Martial Law Commandership after the article of Prof. Dr. Bahri Savcı was published in the 77<sup>th</sup> issue, for it was perceived as the journal applauded the Colonel Talat Aydemir’s unsuccessful attempt of military intervention in 1963. However after 14 months, it resumed to be published. It ceased to be published again by the journal itself on May, 1963 as it declared that it had achieved its primary aim.

After the publication of *Yön* was ceased, the same group led by Doğan Avcıoğlu started to issue the *Devrim* journal on October 1967. The leading writers were Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, the owner, Doğan Avcıoğlu, editor, Uluç Gürkan and Hasan Kaya Cemal, desk editor, Uğur Mumcu, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İlber Ortaylı, Altan Öymen, Oktay Akbal, Cemal Madanoğlu, Doğan Hızlan and some retired military officers that took place in military intervention on May 27, 1960. Like *Yön*, a manifesto written by Doğan Avcıoğlu was published with its first issue, stating that Turkey was being exploited by the imperialists. On the other hand, unlike *Yön*, *Devrim* was not a journal in which various thoughts were discussed. On the contrary, as Atılğan claims, its main arguments were pre-determined, and its ideological

boundaries were drawn clearly (Atılğan, 2002: 314). It became a journal principally targeting the support or enthusiasm of the army. For this reason, its target audience was limited, compared to the *Yön*.

In *Devrim*, the authors continued to write similar ideas but this time totally with the Kemalist jargon, surpassing the concept of socialism. Its aim was stated as “establishing independent and modern Turkey, which was foreseen by Kemalism”. In this new era, the movement transformed itself into an organization. At the same time, the book written by Doğan Avcıoğlu “*Türkiye’nin Düzeni*” became very popular among military officers. The *Yön-Devrim* writers and military officers eventually attempted to obtain power through a military intervention on March 9, 1970<sup>14</sup>. Nevertheless, it turned out to be unsuccessful and the writers were imprisoned after another military intervention took place 3 days later, on March 12, 1971. The Martial Law Commandership closed the journal on April 27, 1971<sup>15</sup>.

In order to achieve economic development, *Yön-Devrim* suggested that the principles of Mustafa Kemal should be pursued, and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu renamed the principles of Kemalism as “national socialism” (Aydın, 2002: 460). That Kemalism was the first national liberation movement and a magnificent model for other oppressed nations was occasionally mentioned. Doğan Avcıoğlu defined Kemalism as “a populist, etatist and revolutionary policy nourished by nationalism in a secularist nation” (Aydın, 2002: 461).

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<sup>14</sup> For further reading about military intervention attempt on March 9, 1971, see Gürkan, Celil. 1986. “12 Mart’a Beş Kala”, Tekin Yayınevi.

<sup>15</sup> For further reading about *Yön-Devrim*: Atılğan, Gökhan, 2003. *Kemalizm ve Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar: Yön ve Devrim*. Tüstav: İstanbul and Kara, Muzaffer Ayhan 2008 ‘*Yön’ün Devrimi Devrim’in Yönü*’ Cumhuriyet Kitapları and Özdemir, Hikmet 1986 ‘*Kalkınmada Strateji Arayışı: Yön Hareketi*’. Bilgi Yaunevi and Atılğan, Gökhan 2002 ‘*Yön’ünü Ararken Yolunu Yitirmek*’ Praksis 6, pp 119-151 and Avcıoğlu, Doğan 2006 ‘*Yön ve Devrim Yazıları Atatürkçülük, Milliyetçilik, Sosyalizm*’ İleri

The *Yön-Devrim* writers thought that the Kemalist etatism had been degenerated. Therefore they coined the term of “Neo-Etatism”. They believed that the industrial development, national independence and socialism could only be maintained by neo-etatism. According to them, the task of development could not be left to the private sector and active role of state in economy was vital.

They declared that “the western nations” were the major enemy of the oppressed nations like Turkey. They argued that the agreements signed with the United States were against Turkey’s interest, by occasionally mentioning the United States’ secret plans on Turkey.

Kemalist revolution was regarded as uncompleted, which would be completed by socialism. However, they claimed that Kemalism was blameworthy in two issues: it did not put into action the land reform and it preferred to create a national bourgeois to etatist policies. The populism, etatism and nationalism principles of Kemalism were emphasized. In 1961, İlhan Selçuk argued that there was a harmony between nationalism and socialism, rather than a contradiction, by being the first writer who used “socialism” after the May 27, 1960 military intervention (Atılğan, 2002: 105). According to Avcıoğlu, socialism was a method of rapid development within social justice, there was one and universal socialism, but various countries use various ways to achieve it. For Turkey, the primary step should be anti-imperialist struggle (Macar, 2001: 162). Nevertheless, because there was not a powerful proletariat in Turkey, this “revolution” would be completed by the cooperation of military-civil forces. Therefore, it is explicit that the biggest source of support and power was designated as the “Turkish Army”, which “emerged from the heart of the Turkish Nation”. As a consequence of this attitude, Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhan Selçuk, İlhami Soysal and Cemal

Reşit Eyübođlu, the leaders of the *Yön* movement, gathered with the leading officers of army (Atılđan, 2002: 235) and were involved in the Madanođlu Junta in 1970<sup>16</sup>.

Unsurprisingly, they did not believe the necessity of democracy. Dođan Avcıođlu explained the reason of this view in his book “*Türkiye’nin Düzeni*” (The Order of Turkey) in 1998 as follows:

*“General elections executed in a society which still has remains of pre-capitalist period, has failed to eliminate the dominant classes such as ağa, bey, Sheikh, usurer, merchant etc., but strengthened them”*<sup>17</sup>.

*Yön-Devrim* was disappointed by the victory of Justice Party (AP), as the only party in power in 1965 general elections. After this disappointment, they started to call for the ‘socialists’ against this “unfair” victory. (Atılđan, 2002: 206). They also argued that the Kemalist single party regime was much more democratic than the AP. The *Kadro* and *Yön-Devrim* movements were very influential on the emergence of left nationalist groups in the future.

### **Mihri Belli and the MDD Movement**

In 1965, MDD movement, which was formulated and led by Mihri Belli<sup>18</sup> emerged within TİP. The MDD is an association of the ideal of gradual revolution of the 1960s with the thought of *dođuculuk*, which may be translated as “easternism”, adoption of junta movement and more intensive nationalism and Kemalism. (Atılđan,

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<sup>16</sup> Cemal Madanođlu, leading figure of the 27 May 1960 military intervention. Madanođlu Junta was an underground organization, which was organized following the model of the Committee of Union and Progress, as it was cautious in accepting members and included new members after they took an oath upon ‘Flag’, ‘Atatürk’ and ‘Gun’ (Atılđan, 2002: 236). The *Yön* writers constituted the civilian branch of this military organization. The program of ‘revolution’ was established, determining a military coup as the first stage followed by the establishment of a revolutionist party, which would complete the revolution as the second stage.

<sup>17</sup> Avcıođlu, Dođan 1998 ‘*Türkiye’nin Düzeni*’ cilt 1 pp 254-255.

<sup>18</sup> For further reading about Mihri Belli, see Atılđan, Gökhan 2007. ‘Mihri Belli’ Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 8 Sol. Tanıl Bora and Murat Güntekingil (ed.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

2007: 555-556). Influenced greatly by Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mihri Belli believed that the national democratic revolution would be realized by “civil-military intellectuals” composed of two main groups: the Kemalist group consisted of nationalist military officers, bureaucrats and the intellectuals within *Yön-Devrim* movement, and the “proletarian revolutionist movement” led by himself. He attempts to reconcile socialism with Islamism in order to create a current of “easternism” and at the same time with nationalism as he believed that being nationalist would lead people to socialism. Accordingly he claimed that socialism could only be founded in a nationalized society (Atılgan, 2007: 560). While explaining the motto “*An Independent and Democratic Turkey on the way to Socialism*”, he asserts:

*That does not correspond to retardation of the socialist struggle. On the contrary, it will give rise to socialism and create a democratic revolutionist Turkey... the socialists are also the most trustworthy and consistent warriors of independence and democracy* (Belli, 1988: 2144).

He attaches great importance to Kemalism and avoids criticizing it. This attitude of him distinguishes him from Doğan Avcıoğlu and *Yön-Devrim* as Avcıoğlu and other writers of *Yön-Devrim* could clearly state the failures of Kemalism. After the 1960s, the disagreement within Turkish left deepened. While TKP and TİP pursued the ideal of Socialist revolution and discharge several groups and figures who did not obey this policy from the parties, numerous groups and figures emerged who adopted the MDD ideal. However, after a while disagreements and detachments occurred within MDD as well.



## Other MDD Movements

The disagreements within the *Aydınlık Sosyalist Journal*<sup>19</sup> which was the leading representative of MDD and in which Mihri Belli, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı and other MDD followers took place, led to separations and establishment of several MDD groups in 1970. Despite pursuing the same ideology, these groups differed in the method of action and the cadres which would realize the MDD.

Hikmet Kıvılcımlı<sup>20</sup>, who was a member of TKP and then pursued MDD in the 1960s and 1970s, believed that revolution could only be achieved by the unity of a progressive junta and a legal and united proletarian party and criticized Mihri Belli as Mihri Belli did not prioritize the necessity of the latter group. Mahir Çayan<sup>21</sup>, the leader of THKP-C, claimed that the revolution would be realized by the subjective forces of proletariat and peasants, and pointed this view as the reason of disagreement and isolation from *Aydınlık Sosyalist Journal* with a letter in 1971<sup>22</sup>. Furthermore, Mahir Çayan supported that anti-imperialism cannot be separated from anti-capitalism. İbrahim Kaypakkaya<sup>23</sup> who also followed the MDD ideal founded the

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<sup>19</sup> *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* (Luminousness Socialist Journal) was founded by Dr. Şefik Hüsnü, the leader of TKP, in 1921 but was banned in 1925. Its publication was resumed by Doğu Perinçek and Vahap Erdoğan. Many socialist such as Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, Mahir Çayan, Mihri Belli were writers in the journal. It was the leading publication which pursued the MDD ideal. However, following a disagreement among the writers, it was divided into two, as *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik-PDA* and *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* in 1970. In spite of some intervals originating from the military interventions and martial laws in Turkey, it is still published and is the journal of the Worker's Party of Doğu Perinçek.

<sup>20</sup> For further reading about Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, see Bilgiç, Arif Ulaş 2007. 'Hikmet Kıvılcımlı' Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 8 Sol. Tanıl Bora and Murat Güntekinil (ed.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

<sup>21</sup> For further reading about Mahir Çayan, see Kozaklı, Süreyya T. 2007. 'Mahir Çayan'ın Siyasi Düşüncesi'. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 8 Sol. Tanıl Bora and Murat Güntekinil (ed.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları and Kozaklı, Süreyya T. 2007 'Mahir Çayan'ın Mirası' Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 8 Sol. Tanıl Bora and Murat Güntekinil (ed.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

<sup>22</sup> The letter of Mahir Çayan and THKP-C: <http://www.kurtuluscephesi.com/eris/asd.html>

<sup>23</sup> For further reading about İbrahim Kaypakkaya, see Bozarslan, Hamit 2007 'İbrahim Kaypakkaya' Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 8 Sol. Tanıl Bora and Murat Güntekinil (ed.). İstanbul:

TKP-ML (Marxist-Leninist). He adopted Maoism as well and believed that revolution could be realized by armed forces. Deniz Gezmiş, the leader of THKO, pursued the ideal of MDD but thought that Mihri Belli and his movement was incompetent in terms of “active struggle”. Doğu Perinçek<sup>24</sup>, follower of Maoism, separated from Mihri Belli and *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* and established PDA (Proletarian Revolutionist Luminousness) in 1970. The Journal of PDA supported the MDD encouraged by national bourgeoisie, which was “anti-imperialist”, “anti-Americanist” and “anti-NATO” (Aydın, 2002: 473). It became the leading representative of ‘Leninist-Marxist-Maoist’ thought in Turkey (Doğan and Ünivar, 2007: 721). The name of the group was changed into *Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi* (Revolutionist Workers and Peasants’ Party of Turkey) afterwards. The propaganda activities in the villages, active participant to the meetings of workers as well as meetings of “Independent Turkey” were the leading activities of the party.

In spite of some differences, the groups which attempted to reconcile nationalism with Socialism in 1960s and 1970s followed similar ideals. They have all favored the idea of national economy by supporting the state’s active role in the economy, have pursued anti-western sentiments, and have tried to gain the support of Turkish military, as they have believed that their support is essential to realize the revolution. Kemalist revolution has been regarded as the first and the greatest step to national independence, which is uncompleted and should be completed with national democratic revolution.

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İletişim Yayınları and Behram, Nihat ‘*Bir Komünistin Biyografisi: İbrahim Kaypakkaya*’, Altınçağ Yayıncılık: İstanbul

<sup>24</sup> For further reading about Doğu Perinçek see Ünivar, Kerem 2007 ‘*Doğu Perinçek*’ Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 8 Sol. Murat Gültekinil (ed.) İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Therefore, it can be concluded that their stance towards Socialism has been instrumental, by focusing on the concept of “anti-imperialism” in a nationalist manner, rather than adopting socialist ideology with one of its main components; internationalism. In other words, what differentiates them from other left groups is that they have followed the aim of “National Democratic Revolution”, rather than “Socialist Revolution”, and the possibility of renunciation of democracy for the sake of “revolution”.

Discussing the main differences between the major currents, Socialist Revolution and MDD, in Turkish left in 1970s over their bilateral criticisms will further clarify the intellectual characteristics of left nationalist movements. The supporters of MDD accused the other of being the “Communists of Moscow”, whereas the supporters of socialist revolution accused the other of being undemocratic and nationalist. In this regard, the arguments of Mehmet Ali Aybar, the leader of the TIP at that time, against the MDD movements would make a clear explanation of this distinction. According to him, national liberation struggles and anti-imperialism should serve for the socialist revolution in Turkey, a country which almost totally completed its national democratic revolution. He asserts that the national bourgeoisie cannot take part in the socialist struggle, as the proletariat will be the pioneer. He also states that the socialist struggle is democratic, therefore cannot support military interventions (Aydın, 2002: 470). Because one of the most significant differences between two leftist currents is that the national democratic revolutionists were elitist. They favored top-down revolution, in cooperation with the military. That is the reason why the socialist revolutionists accused the national democratic revolutionists of being “undemocratic”.

The differences between these currents reflect the attitude of the groups towards Kemalism and the official ideology, for obvious reasons. Since the socialist revolutionists are on pursuit of changing the regime, whereas the national democratic revolutionists struggle for the keeping of the status quo, the former has always remained as marginal and inefficient, while the latter has gained support from the officials, army officers and the society. This distinction becomes more profound after the 1970s. The left nationalism has gradually diverged from socialist ideology except for referring to the socialist concept of “anti-imperialism” and become an ideology whose primary aim is to protect the unity of nation-state.

To sum up, nationalism constitutes one of the main factors that have led to conflicts within Turkish left. After the 1960s, these conflicts grew too strong that it led to massive secessions in the Turkish left. Left nationalism, which has a particular stance as a consequence of nature of nationalism, was pursued by various groups until the end of the 1980s. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the distinction between left nationalism and Kemalist nationalism further blurred. It started to hardly refer to socialism except for some basic concepts of it. And eventually it became a political current that can establish close relations with the radical nationalist groups and the state, pursuing the aim of protecting the state.

### CHAPTER III - *ULUSALCILIK*: THE RECENT RESURGENCE OF LEFT NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

Lenin's distinction between oppressed and oppressing nations in the 1920s as well as the attempts to adapt socialism to nationalism as a development ideology in the non-European countries after the 1950s have been influential in Turkey as well and led to a schism in the Turkish left. As a consequence, conflict and divergence between the followers of the socialist revolution and the followers of the national democratic revolution increasingly deepened after the 1960s. As mentioned in the second chapter, there have been numerous "left nationalist" groups and figures which attempted to reconcile socialism with nationalism in the 1960s and the 1970s. *Ulusalcılık* can be considered as the recent form of left nationalism which emerged in the late 1990s in Turkey. In this chapter, a portrait of *ulusalcılık* will be attempted to be revealed through discussing the main organizations of *ulusalcılık* and its main proposals. Before that, it will be beneficial to reveal the factors that are influential on formulation of *ulusalcılık* and to discuss the convergences and divergences between *ulusalcılık* and the previous movements.

The left currents in Turkey have lost their social ground after the military intervention on September 12, 1980<sup>25</sup>, and their ideological sources and model after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. While the influence of left currents has diminished, the social and political life has changed

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<sup>25</sup> For further reading about the influence of military intervention on September 12, 1980, see Taşkın, Yüksel. 2001. "12 Eylül Atatürkçülüğü ya da Bir Kemalist Restorasyon Teşebbüsü Olarak 12 Eylül" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Vol.: 2 Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnsel. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

as a consequence of neo-liberal economic policies, which were started to be implemented after 1980.

Although it has been formulated on the same elements of left nationalism; anti-imperialism, etatism-national economy and Kemalism; the recent form of left nationalism in Turkey bears differences at the same time, when compared to the previous left nationalist movements in Turkey. Initially, the distinction between *ulusalcılık* and Kemalist nationalism has become more ambiguous. Kemalism which was questioned and criticized to some extent by the previous left nationalist groups, especially by *Yön-Devrim*, has been perceived as absolutely accurate by the supporters of *ulusalcılık*. It is regarded as the most successful model for modernizing a country without westernization (Atalay, 2006: 165).

Another dissimilarity is related with their perception of nationalism. *Ulusalcılık* exhibits a stance that can be at times aggressive and xenophobic. (Bora, 2003: 439). The fundamental concept of the previous left nationalist groups was anti-imperialism and independence, while in the 1990s this was replaced by secularism, to which the motifs of anti-imperialism and independence once again were added as a consequence of anti-globalistic discourse (Bora, 2003: 439). The supporters of *ulusalcılık* could establish close relations with the radical nationalist groups and the state, pursuing the common aim of protecting the survival of the state. For instance, the *Kızılçelma* Coalition<sup>26</sup> represents the cooperation of the left nationalist groups with right nationalist groups. Furthermore, there is also divergence between *ulusalcılık* and the previous movements in terms of the groups which support them. The previous

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<sup>26</sup> Kızılçelma Coalition is used to refer to the coalition constituted by left and right nationalist groups in the late 1990s. According to Atalay, etatism was another common concern which brought two nationalist groups together. (Atalay, 2007: 123). This cooperation was established in the late 1990s through numerous meetings, joint demonstrations and references in the columns.

movements struggled against the system and although they mentioned the term of “national front”, they used to criticize sharply the practices of the bourgeoisie. However the “national bourgeoisie” actively partakes in *ulusalcılık*. Moreover, the groups that stand closer to official ideology can support *ulusalcılık*. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that although some groups supporting *ulusalcılık* express themselves as representing official ideology, there are fundamental differences in terms of perception of West, provided that the official ideology is assumed to represent by the Turkish army. The official ideology pursues the aim of the EU membership which sometimes lead to criticisms of the army by the supporters of *ulusalcılık*.

*Ulusalcılık* is a term that has been created by its supporters. The synonymous words “*Millet*” and “*Ulus*” are the Turkish equivalent of the English word “nation”. *Milliyetçilik*, derived from “*millet*” and “*ulusçuluk*” derived from “*ulus*” mean nationalism. However, they have differences indeed. *Millet* was used in the Ottoman Empire to refer to religious communities. After the foundation of Turkish Republic, under the influence of the pure Turkish language current, the Kemalists did not want to use a word referring to the millet system in the Ottoman Empire. *Ulusçuluk* was coined to refer to Kemalist and secular nationalism, which was generally used by CHP. On the other hand, “*milliyetçilik*” was perceived as the word belonging to the rightist and radical nationalist groups, which had Islamic tendencies. As a matter of fact, *ulusalcılık*, a word coined by left nationalist groups in 2000s, can be regarded as an evidence of their attempt to distinguish themselves both from “radical right wing”

nationalism which has Islamic elements, and from “*ulusçuluk*” which has been used mostly by CHP and other political parties “left of center” but is not used anymore<sup>27</sup>.

The fact that the globalization challenges the existence of the nation-states led the supporters of *ulusalcılık* perceive it as the system of “imperialism”. The world integration and gradual vanishing of national borders is believed to create an anarchic world system, in which the super power nations will colonize the relatively small nations. The current (and interrelated) issues such as growing influence of the United States on the Middle East, Kurdish and Armenian issues, the European Union and Cyprus play the leading role in that perception of them.

Moreover, in 2002 AKP became victorious in the general elections as a sole party in power. Because the party is constituted mostly by members who have been previously associated with Islamic movements in the past, this victory has been considered as a threat to secularism and the republic through Islamization (Menderes, 2006: 469). It is considered as the successor of the Islam-oriented political parties. Furthermore, as mentioned above, AKP is regarded as the collaborator of the United States in realizing its Greater Middle East Project<sup>28</sup>, which will transform Turkey into a “Moderate Islamic” country. Finally, the neo-liberal economic policies pursued by AKP are considered to serve for the interests of “imperialist powers”

All these factors are combined in and expressed over the Sévres Syndrome of supporters of *ulusalcılık*. Treaty of Sévres was the treaty which was signed after the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in the World War I, and which officially demolished the Empire. According to the Treaty, the Greeks took the Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia, the French and Italians took the Southern and Southwestern Anatolia,

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<sup>27</sup> However, there is not a sufficient evidence why they choose to use *ulusalcılık* instead of *ulusçuluk*. It may be because they find it old and out-of-date or degenerated.



Cyprus was given to Britain, the Northeastern Anatolia was allocated for an Armenian state, and an autonomous Kurdish state was planned to be founded in the East. Thus, the Treaty of Sévres represents the “occupations”, “imperialism” and “dependence”. It is called as the “Document of Death” by supporters of *ulusalcılık* (Ataberk, 2004: 182). The Sévres Syndrome is the perception of supporters of *ulusalcılık* that the allied powers which forced the Empire to sign, still pursue these aims. The fact that Turkey still has problems with the issues of “Kurds”, “Armenians” and “Cyprus” keeps the image of Sévres alive. These problems to which the *ulusalcılık* reacts will be analyzed in detail while discussing the proposals of *ulusalcılık*.

To sum up, secularism, anti-imperialism (as a consequence of anti-globalistic discourse), national economy (which presupposes state’s active role in economy, while preventing foreign capital within Turkey) and nationalism (which can be racist, xenophobic and disparaging) can be regarded as the main elements of the *ulusalcılık*. In other words, nationalization has been introduced against globalization; an ideal of undemocratic and introverted political and economical regime has been introduced against democratization and global economic policies (Atalay, 2006: 69).

### **Main Organizations of *Ulusalcılık***

*Ulusalcılık* is not an ideology of a single well-organized institution, rather it is represented by loosely-connected various organizations and individuals. Sections of leftists, rightists, businessmen, academics, retired military officers, bureaucrats, in other words people from all sections of society constitute the supporters of *ulusalcılık*. There is a wide and loose coalition of *ulusalcılık* organizations, magazines, TV channels and newspapers. Kemalism and anti-globalistic discourse (expressed through anti-imperialism) are the common features, while their stance towards socialism as

well as official ideology and the content of nationalism alter. For instance, some associations like ADD (Ataturkist Thought Association) and ÇYDD (The Association in Support of Modern Life) are closer to the official Kemalist ideology. They rarely use racist expressions. They hardly ever refer to socialism, and they regard themselves as “social democrats”. They are considered as the inheritor of Kemalist thought, and are the most widely known Kemalist organizations.

On the other hand, a group of authors including the former authors of *Yön* and *Devrim* journals like Mümtaz Soysal, Atilla İlhan, İlhan Selçuk represent the “national left”. Most of them write in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper and pursue the policies of *Yön* and occasionally refer to the Galiyevism and Third Worldism.

The third group, which is constituted by so-called “Marxist” organizations and parties, stand more remote from the official Kemalist ideology. In addition to the Workers’ Party of Doğu Perinçek, *Türksolu* journal, *İleri* are leading forums in this group. They often refer to Marxism, Leninism and some revolutionists like Che Guevara, and Deniz Gezmiş and Nazım Hikmet in Turkey (see appendix I for poster of *Türksolu*). They are reactionary, aggressive and extremist.

However, the foregoing classification can be problematic and objectionable, for it is really hard to make a clear distinction among them. In order to clarify and formalize, it is beneficial to mention some of the groups:

- **ADD**

As mentioned above, ADD stands closer to the official Kemalist ideology. It seeks a doctrinal and ideological basis, by usually following the six arrows of Kemalism. In its statute, it is mentioned that ADD was established in order to countervail “increased assaults on revolution and principles of Atatürk” by “negative

forces inside and outside Turkey which take strength from the physical absence of Atatürk". In order to accomplish this task, the action plan of the association is stated as follows:

*ADD has been established in accordance with the laws of Turkish Republic, in order to conduct progressive, scientific, social and cultural activities about Atatürk and Atatürkism<sup>29</sup>.*

Numerous professors, retired military officers and students constitute the members. It has branches in many provinces of Turkey (see appendix II for a picture of Tekirdağ ADD in Republic meetings) as well as abroad, and has 4,852 members nation-wide (Uslu, 2008: 87). Nevertheless, apart from the core group, the ideological structure of the members varies. Therefore, it is not accurate to call all members as supporters of *ulusalcılık*.

- ***Kuvayı Milliye Derneği (The National Forces Association) and Müdafaa-i Hukuk (The Defense of Rights Association)***

*Kuvayı Milliye Derneği* is named after various national forces during the Turkish liberation war<sup>30</sup> (see appendix III for a picture of the association in Republic meeting). Similarly, *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* (The Defense of Rights Association) takes its name from the association under which all fragmented national struggle groups were united during Turkish liberation war. Retired diplomats, bureaucrats, professors and lawyers<sup>31</sup> partake in these organizations.

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<sup>29</sup> For further information, see [http://www.add.org.tr/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=51&Itemid=160](http://www.add.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=51&Itemid=160) (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

<sup>30</sup> For further information, see <http://www.kuvvaimilliyenet/index.php> (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

<sup>31</sup> For further information, see <http://www.mudafaai-hukuk.com.tr> (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

- ***Türksolu* (Turkish Left)**

*Türksolu* refers to socialism more often than other sections of *ulusalcılık*. In its website, the Turkish flag and the pictures of Atatürk, Nazım Hikmet and Deniz Gezmiş, leader of a socialist students' organization who was executed after the 1971 military intervention are juxtaposed (see appendix IV for a picture of *Türksolu*'s stand in TÜYAP book fair). In its manifesto, it is stated that the problems of the Turkish nation can only be solved 'through leftist thought and activity'. *Türksolu* which regards itself as "the follower of the *Kuvayı Milliye*" (National Forces Movement) states in its manifesto that it pursues the revolutions of Atatürk:

*It is the inheritor of the revolutionist tradition initiated by Atatürk's national liberation war and followed by the foundation of the Republic.*

*This revolutionist tradition has been symbolized with the personality of Atatürk<sup>32</sup>.*

*Türksolu* announces itself as the inheritor of "independentist, revolutionist national leftist tradition" in Turkey. It uses racist expressions while referring to Kurdish and Armenian issues.

- ***Büyük Hukukçular Birliği* (Great Union of the Jurists)**

*Büyük Hukukçular Birliği* is the organization of the lawyers who have brought numerous lawsuits under the Article 301<sup>33</sup> against several intellectuals, such as author Elif Şafak, Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink, Armenian journalist who was assassinated in 2007.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> For further information, see <http://www.turksolu.org/haber/manifesto.htm> (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

<sup>33</sup> Article 301 is the article that concerns the humiliation of Turkishness. For further information, see <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html>

<sup>34</sup> For further information, see <http://buyukhukukcular.org/> (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

- **İP (Workers' Party)**

İP is the inheritor of the Third Worldist and Maoist tradition in Turkey (Erten, 2002: 464). Doğu Perinçek who was one of the significant figures to take lead in secessions within TİP and to resume to publish the journal of *Aydınlık* in 1968 is the leader of the party. In the statute of the party, the aim of the İP is stated as follows:

*...to complete the national democratic revolution which started with the constitutional monarchy and stepped forward a long distance with the Kemalist revolution; to re-found the national state and the will of people; to terminate the oppression and control of the imperialism; to eliminate all connections with the institutions of the middle ages and to bring the society to liberty, well-being and to light.*<sup>35</sup>

İP and its leader Doğu Perinçek frequently refer to socialist discourse while stating their main task of protecting the unity of nation-state. Doğu Perinçek is also a dominant figure in various platforms of *ulusalcılık* especially in the ones that are established against the Armenian genocide claims.

- ***Türkiye Emekli Subaylar Derneği* (TESUD-The Association of Retired Army Officers of Turkey)**

*TESUD* is constituted by retired army officers. The aim of the association is stated as reacting against:

*'any internal and external assaults and violation to the Republic, National Unity and Sovereignty, the principles of Secular, Democratic*

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<sup>35</sup> For further information, see <http://www.ip.org.tr/lib/pages/detay.asp?goster=tbelgeler&belgetur=1> (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

*and Social State, the Principles and Revolution of ATATÜRK, the Doctrine and Personality of ATATÜRK*<sup>36</sup>.

In its journal *Birlik* (Unity), articles of the retired army officers on various subjects such as secularism, nationalism, Armenian issue, PKK, national unity, political Islam are published.

- ***Ulusal Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği (USİAD-Association of National Industrialists and Businessmen)***

*USİAD is an organization* established by the businessmen and industrialists<sup>37</sup>.

This bears significant evidence that the national bourgeoisie actively partakes within *ulusalcılık*, in which the “nationalist intellectuals”, the “socialists” and national bourgeoisie act together.

- ***Cumhuriyet***

*Cumhuriyet* is one of the media channels which increasingly embrace the ideas of *ulusalcılık*. It is a daily newspaper of the left nationalist intellectuals which was established in the first years of republic. İlhan Selçuk, one of the leading authors in *Yön-Devrim*, Mümtaz Soysal, left nationalist intellectual who denominated *Yön* and many other intellectuals who took part in *Yön-Devrim* and other left nationalist groups afterwards write in *Cumhuriyet* (see appendix V for the advertisement campaign of *Cumhuriyet*). It is one of the leading publications that promote the ideals of *ulusalcılık*.

In addition, there are TV channels such as *BRT* and *Ulusal Kanal* which are also supporters of *ulusalcılık*. Apart from them, plenty of journalists and columnists in popular newspapers like *Milliyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Akşam*, and singers stand close to

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<sup>36</sup> For further information, see <http://www.tesud.org.tr/tuzuk%201.html> (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

<sup>37</sup> For further information, see <http://www.usiad.net/> (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

*ulusalcılık*. These columnists support the activities of *ulusalcılık* and sometimes participate in some platforms, especially the ones established against PKK. The fact that various organizations and groups support *ulusalcılık*, necessitates a systematic media analysis regarding their attitudes to recent incidents in order to reveal its general arguments as well as slight diversions among different groups of *ulusalcılık*.

### **Main proposals of Ulusalçılık**

The supporters of *ulusalcılık* have several interrelated proposals, most of which are grounded on the perception of threat to the survival of Turkish Republic. It should be noted here that some of their concerns have transcended them and pervaded to several sections of Turkish society<sup>38</sup>. In order to provide a concrete basis of the characteristics of *ulusalcılık* and to provide evidence to the general implications of this study, main proposals of *ulusalcılık* will be discussed, by utilizing from convergences and divergences between its proposals and the previous left nationalist groups in Turkey which were discussed in the second chapter, the internationalist left in Turkey and finally the right nationalist organizations in Turkey. This analysis will tremendously contribute to clarify the essential characteristics of *ulusalcılık* and at the same time will constitute the mainstays and justifications for the responses of this study to the basic questions mentioned in the introduction.

Eventually, as it was mentioned above, there is neither a single organization of *ulusalcılık*, nor a systematic evaluation of it. Therefore, while discussing the proposals of *ulusalcılık*, the study will try to gather ideas of various organizations and figures of

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<sup>38</sup> However, it does not mean that people who share similar concerns with the supporters of *ulusalcılık* support the ideology of *ulusalcılık*. Most of the Turkish society embraces the ideals and reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. For this reason, there is a prevalent sensitivity regarding the issues about him.

*ulusalcılık* based on the aforementioned grouping, analyze them and finally determine unanimous premises of *ulusalcılık*.

**Debates on Globalization: “*Globalization: Ideal System of Imperialism*”**

*Ulusalcılık* sees the world as an arena of inequality, in which the dominant powers exploit the rest of the world economically, politically, militarily and culturally, and globalization process is regarded as the system of these great powers’ monopoly. Since globalization is believed to aim for “gradually annihilating the national borders”, it is perceived as a threat to nation-state as well as national sovereignty. Because it claims that the most significant feature of nation-state is that the sovereignty belongs to the state and nation (Özkırıklı, 2008: 105). Following the loss of sovereignty, *ulusalcılık* believes that Turkey is being “disintegrated” and “broken into pieces” in favor of the interests of great powers (Tayman-Kalkan, May, 21 2005: Tempo).

According to *ulusalcılık*, there are two dominant factors in the global system; multinational corporations and developed economies. Multinational corporations are controlled by developed economies, namely Western nations. Both of them aim for increasing their shares in the world market, by imposing certain forms of consumption instead of local ones (Manisalı, 2006: 3). Multinational corporations “penetrate in the internal trade in less developed countries and begin to dominate the commercial system, by marketing their own goods”.

Partnerships and privatizations are regarded as the instrument of these dominant factors in order to make the companies in less developed or developing countries dependent. Therefore, industry and trade in less developed or developing



countries start to act in accordance with the interests of multinational corporations and great nations.

According to this perspective, Turkey stands among oppressed nations and it has been already being “exploited” by great nations through IMF, World Bank, European Union (Firat, 2006: 570). The partnerships of Turkish companies with multinational corporations render them dependent, while the bureaucracy and the government start to work for their interests. Consequently, “the share of multinational corporations in Turkey’s import increase tremendously, the foreign trade deficit and debt grow rapidly” (Manisalı, 2006: 3-6). According to it, this situation will eventually lead to colonization of Turkey. Hence, defending globalization is indeed “defending the destruction of the nation-state”.

In order to prevent Turkey from being colonized, they suggest that national revival is vital. As a response to claims about the rise of nationalism in Turkey, they state that it is quite natural and instinctive to embrace nationalism which is the founding ideology of nation-state, “just like a mother loves her child” (Firat, 2006: 525).

While expressing its perception of globalization as a challenge to the national unity and national interests, it frequently refers to socialist term of “anti-imperialism”. However, this term has lost its real meaning in socialist ideology but has become a term that connotes anti-globalistic discourse of *ulusalcılık*. It does not indicate any meaning associated with “anti-capitalism”. On the contrary, “imperialism” is considered to exist among nations rather than classes. Given to that premise, it supports cooperation with national bourgeoisie in order to protect “national interests”. Therefore the attempt of *ulusalcılık* to moderate the conflict between labor and capital

can be viewed as a consequence of the role it attributes to the national bourgeoisie (Somel, 2002: 52). In this regard, it is difficult to distinguish the discourse of *ulusalcılık* from the discourse of radical right nationalist groups. For instance, Öztürk, the President of *Ülkü Ocakları* (Foreges of Ideal), proclaims that the “enemy is globalization and imperialism<sup>39</sup>”.

### **Debates on the European Union: “European Union: Realization of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sévres”**

Loss of sovereignty and fears of disintegration of Turkey constitute the main concerns of *ulusalcılık* regarding the European Union membership. Accession to European Union is regarded as the greatest phase of globalization which is a threat to national unity and interests. There is a common view that the EU will destroy the nation-state as a result of transfer of sovereignty. Moreover, it is believed that concessions during EU negotiations will accelerate this process of transfer.

Concerns of *ulusalcılık* concentrate on particularly political and economical issues. Turkey’s Customs Union agreement with the EU countries is believed to weaken Turkish economy, by rendering it dependent on the EU foreign trade policies. Given to the fact that numerous proceedings, especially the cases of headscarf, torture, freedom of expression and minority rights, filed against Turkey have been tried in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the Court ruled against Turkey for several times, ECHR is regarded to intervene Turkey’s legal system by causing humiliation of Turkey. The non-recognition of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by EU and membership of the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus to EU in 2004 give rise to reactions among the supporters of *ulusalcılık*. EU’s provisions regarding the restriction of authorization of the military as well as exclusion of the

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<sup>39</sup> Öztürk, Harun. “Küresel Kimlik Karşısında Ülkücü Dünya Görüşü,” *Ülkü Ocakları* <http://www.ulkuocaklari.org.tr/genelbaskan.asp?yazi=63> (last accessed on December 28, 2008).

army from the Turkish politics are considered as a threat to the survival of one of the essential element of the “nation-state”. Finally, Turkey is supposed to ameliorate the practices regarding the minority rights in accordance with the EU harmonization process and prevent the violations of the human rights of the minorities by recognizing their freedom of mother tongue and religion. These are believed to serve for loss of sovereignty and a perception that the “center of hegemony is passing to Brussels” has emerged.

In accordance with the Customs’ Union ratified in January 1996, Turkey has to apply the EU’s common external tariffs on import from the third countries and provide preferential access to the countries to which EU grants access through free trade agreements (FTA). However, because there is not any sanction for sealing a FTA with Turkey for the third countries, Turkey’s provision of preferential access to some of the third countries is unilateral. For this reason, Turkey’s membership of Customs’ Union is regarded as ‘the document of imperialism’<sup>40</sup>. As Soysal states, “Turkey depends on the sovereignty of the Union and its sanctions in its foreign trade policy and its relations not only with the European countries but all regions of the world”<sup>41</sup>. Aygün, the President of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce and one of the leading figures of *ulusalcılık*, names Customs Union as the “one-sided submission of Turkey”<sup>42</sup> and similarly Manisalı regards the Customs Union as the “Armless occupation of Turkey” and argues that:

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<sup>40</sup> Manisalı, Erol. “Eczacıbaşı, Koç, Sanayi, AB ve Nazilli Hattı,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 2, 2008.

<sup>41</sup> Soysal, Mümtaz. “Avrupa Esrarı,” *Hürriyet*, April 21, 2000.  
<http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2000/04/21/199918.asp> (last accessed on December 28, 2008).

<sup>42</sup> Mutlu, Mustafa. “Gümrük Birliği’nden Hemen Çekilmeliyiz-3,” *Star*, September 5, 2002.  
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=22259&l=1>, (last accessed on December 28, 2008).

*Turkey is being made backyard of Western capitalism through EU ... The control of Turkish Republic on its foreign trade policies is captured and is transferred to EU” (Manisalı, September 15, 2006).*

Since Turkey accepted the right to apply individually to apply to ECHR in 1987, there have been abundant cases tried in the ECHR against Turkey. As a consequence, Turkey has been sentenced to compensations in numerous cases which are mostly about violations of minority rights, headscarf and torture. Therefore, the European Court of Human Rights is regarded as an institution which “advocates the interests of the European countries” (Hacıbrahimoglu, May, 2005). Regarding the trials of headscarf in the European Court, it is claimed that “constitutional provisions are tried in the European Court which is evidence for loss of state sovereignty”<sup>43</sup>. Also, the fact that the “national issues” are tried in the European Court is considered to lead to “humiliation of Turkey before the eyes of the world”<sup>44</sup>. However, the decisions of the European Court in favor of the ideas of *ulusalcılık*, such as the ones about headscarf, are praised: “Again no passage to headscarf from European Court”<sup>45</sup>.

The Cyprus issue is one of the most sensitive issues regarding the EU membership. Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960. Three years after the independence of Cyprus from Great Britain, battle broke out between the Greek and Turkish communities in the island. In 1983, the northern Turkish side declared itself as the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC), which is still recognized only

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<sup>43</sup> Perinçek, Doğu <http://www.ip.org.tr/lib/pages/detay.asp?goster=haberdetay&idhaber=206> (last accessed on December 28, 2008).

<sup>44</sup> Public Release of ADD on October 15, 2007. [http://www.add.org.tr/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=1137&Itemid=101](http://www.add.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1137&Itemid=101) (last accessed on December 28, 2008).

<sup>45</sup> “AİHM Türbana Yine Geçit Vermedi,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 2008.

by Ankara<sup>46</sup>. In 2004, the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus became a member of EU. The EU does not recognize TRNC and considers it as “occupation”<sup>47</sup>. Despite the negotiations, the Cyprus problem still remains unsolved by delaying Turkey’s accession to the EU. Because of the perception that the EU does not accept any proposal done by Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue is intentional for delaying the accession indefinitely, antagonism towards EU augments. Furthermore, by regarding Cyprus as strategically “one of the most significant territories” and by attaching it a historical significance and adding assumptions of existence of oil in the island, it is stated that the TRNC will never been recognized, due to the “great plans of the imperialist powers”. According to *ulusalcılık*, these plans hinder “the initiation of economical and political relations between the TRNC and the world” (Yıldız, 2008: 33). Consequently, campaigns have been initiated by the supporters of *ulusalcılık* with the slogan “The National Struggle Begins In Cyprus”. Rauf Denktaş, the former president of the TRNC, is also very active in these campaigns and occasionally takes place in the organizations. He argues that the Cyprus issue is the outcome of the economic and political plans of the great powers. In a speech he addresses in a meeting of Talat Pasha Committee, he asserts that the major aim of the EU, the United States and the United Kingdom is ‘to attach us to the Romoies<sup>48</sup> and diminish the active role of Turkey in the island”. He also argues that the EU wants to make Turkey an Islamic country by severing the principles of Atatürk on pursuit of its secret aim of revival of the Treaty of Sévres:

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<sup>46</sup> “Turkey, Accession and Cyprus,” February 24, 2005 [online], Available: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-accession-cyprus/article-135940> (Last accessed on December 30, 2008).

<sup>47</sup> “Member States of the EU: Cyprus”. [online], Available: [http://europa.eu/abc/european\\_countries/eu\\_members/cyprus/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/cyprus/index_en.htm) (Last accessed on December 30, 2008).

<sup>48</sup> Romoies: Greek Cypriots

*Why may Turkey turn into a radical religious state? Because EU wants to separate it from the principles of Atatürk. ...EU explicitly states that Kemalism is not compatible with the EU's norms. U.S. suggests Turkey to have a regime of moderate Islam. By deterring Turkey from the principles of Atatürk, they want to bring Turkey back to the Treaty of Sévres.”*<sup>49</sup>

There is a common belief that the EU harmonization period incites the nationalisms of ethnic groups within Turkey, particularly Kurdish nationalism, and brought the Armenian issue into agenda again<sup>50</sup>. Moreover, the EU regulations regarding the minority rights, especially the ones about the foundations and re-opening the the Theological School in Halki are considered threat to the national unity. EU's criticism regarding the obstacles in freedom of expression in Turkey and the Article 301 further flares up these concerns of *ulusalcılık*. Eventually, the EU provisions also include the restriction of the authority of the army, abolishment of the National Security Court (DGM), demilitarization of the National Security Council (MGK) by assigning a civil Secretary General Military, as these practices are regarded as undemocratic. However, *ulusalcılık* views Turkish army as the guardian of the secular republican regime and opposes to any restriction towards its purview.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the Treaty of Sévres signed after the World War I allowed invasions of the allied powers in Turkey. Because conditions of accession to the European Union that Turkey is supposed to implement include some of the issues mentioned in the Treaty, the European Union talks are considered as the efforts to revitalize the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sévres. Moreover, there is a very

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<sup>49</sup> The speech of Rauf Denktaş, Former President of TRNC, in the meeting of Talat Pasha Committee in November 1, 2007.

<sup>50</sup> These concerns of *ulusalcılık* will be discussed below independently.

prevalent opinion that Turkey will continue to act in accordance with the interests of the European Union but will never be accepted as a full member. The inevitable consequence is stated as “colonized and mandated Turkey”.

The proposals of *ulusalcılık* regarding the European Union bears great resemblance to the basic concerns of MHP (Nationalist Action Party), the radical nationalist party, particularly in terms of Article 301, minority rights, Kurdish and Armenian issues. In the European Union Report of the Party, it is stated that “Turkey’s attempts for EU membership are futile”. The report points out that EU forces Turkey to “accept the Kurds as minority and Kurdish as official language” and also “obliges Turkey to open her harbors to Cypriot ships<sup>51</sup>”. It is clear that there is unanimity between *ulusalcılık* and right nationalism in terms of European Union. *Ulusalcılık* frequently refers to “anti-imperialism” while criticizing the EU, but does not communicate any concern relating to capitalism and neo-liberalist policies that EU pursues. While Marxist and internationalist left groups in Turkey criticizes EU’s practices in terms of class conflict and labor abuse, and strives for protecting the rights of proletariat in the European Union countries, *ulusalcılık* reacts against EU in terms of “national unity” and “survival of the nation-state” in a anti-westernist and xenophobic manner. Therefore, apart from expressing its opposition to EU through a Marxist concept, there is not any intellectual difference between *ulusalcılık* and radical right Turkish nationalism.

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<sup>51</sup> “2006 Progress Report and Document of Strategy,” *MHP Center of Research and Development*, 2006, <http://www.mhp.org.tr/raporlar/avrupabirligi/2006irpdolumsuz.doc> (last accessed on December 28, 2008).

## **Debates on AKP: “AKP: Collaborator of the United States and Threat to Secularism and Republic”**

The electoral victory of AKP, which enabled it to found single-party government in general elections in 2002 was followed by the second victory of the party in general elections in 2007. The foreign policy strategies, the neo-liberal economic policies and political practices of the AKP have caused reactions among the supporters of *ulusalcılık*. The *ulusalcılık* debates on AKP’s foreign policy strategies revolve around three main issues.

Initially, AKP government's practices on northern Iraq are regarded as failure, especially after the incident in July 2003, when Turkish soldiers in Sulaymaniyah, northern Iraq were made put sacks on their heads by the United States troops<sup>52</sup>. In addition to so-called “sack incident”, AKP is regarded to fail in intervening and fighting against the terror incidents in Kirkuk, where PKK troops were deployed. The government’s contact with the regional administration leader of Northern Iraq Massoud Barzani is regarded as a strategic failure. AKP is also accused of acting in accordance with the Greater Middle East Project of the United States, which is regarded as the continuity of the New National Security Strategy of the United States in the Middle East formulated after September 11, 2001. The fact that Turkey was invited to the G-8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia on June 2004, where the Greater Middle East Project was officially discussed for the first time by George Bush arouse the suspicions that Turkey will take a central role as a “Co-President” of this project which is believed to “presuppose political transformation” of the countries in the

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<sup>52</sup> Çalışkan, Emre “Government’s Red Lines in Northern Iraq Failed,” *The New Anatolian*, February 23, 2007, [online], Available: <http://www.onuroymen.com/docs/The%20New%20Anatolian.%2023%20%C5%9Eubat%202007.doc> (Last accessed on December 30, 2008).



region “in accordance with the interests of the United States”<sup>53</sup>. Therefore, AKP which is already seen as “Islamic oriented” political party is believed to change the secular republican regime into “Moderate Islam”, in cooperation with the United States. The practices of AKP such as facilitating the students’ entrance to the universities with *turban* (headscarf), assigning people who are close to AKP to the key bureaucratic positions, enabling the graduates of religious high schools to attend universities have been perceived as the steps paving way to this aim. In addition, the accelerated negotiation process of EU membership under the rule of AKP is also perceived as an outcome of AKP’s policies that serve for the disintegration of Turkey and interests of the “imperialist nations”. According to Perinçek:

*Erdoğan commits a crime of killing a nation and slaughtering the republic (Perinçek, Dec. 16, 2007: 11)*

Finally, the neo-liberalist economic policies of AKP which lead to increase in the privatizations and its efforts to attract foreign direct investments to Turkey are believed to contribute to losing national economic sovereignty by the supporters of *ulusalcılık*<sup>54</sup>.

### **Debates on Kurdish Issue: “Kurds: Instrument of the Imperialist Powers within Turkey”**

Since the foundation of Turkish Republic, the Kurdish issue has been always one of the most debatable issues in Turkey<sup>55</sup>. The Kurdish issue was discussed in terms of integration problem and backwardness. However, since the 1980s when the

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<sup>53</sup>Ozankaya, Prof.Dr. Özer ‘Atatürk Türkiyesi mi Yoksa Sömürgecinin ‘BOP’u Mu?’

<http://www.add.org.tr>

<sup>54</sup> The economic perspective of the supporters of *ulusalcılık* will be discussed below in detail.

<sup>55</sup> For further reading about Kurdish issue, see Özhan, Taha and Ete, Hatem. “Kürt Meselesi: Problemler ve Çözüm Önerileri,” *Seta Analiz*, November, 2008. [online], Available: [http://www.setav.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=641&Itemid=89](http://www.setav.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=641&Itemid=89) (Last accessed on December 28, 2008).

PKK emerged, the Kurdish issue has transformed into the most sensitive problems which take attention of each section of Turkish society, given to the fact that the battle between the Kurdish nationalist terrorist organization PKK and the Turkish army is still continuing in the Southeastern part of Turkey and many soldiers are dying. Therefore it is difficult to distinguish the reactions of the supporters of *ulusalcılık* from the rest of the society, as well as from the right nationalist movements. Moreover, since the supporters of *ulusalcılık* voice their concerns regarding the PKK in occasionally held demonstrations and meetings, they gain considerable support from the society.

The Kurdish problem is considered to be an artificial problem created by external forces in Turkey (Yeğen, 2002: 890). The capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, in Kenya and the inclusion of Greek and Syrian authorities in the incident, and the support of the European countries to the Kurds, and the arms with foreign certificate of origin found on the PKK militants are some incidents that have reinforced this common belief.

Apart from the common anxiety of the Turkish society regarding PKK, the Sèvres Syndrome lies beneath the attitude of supporters of *ulusalcılık*. Referring to the Greater Middle East Project, it is argued that the United States is planning to break the region into pieces. Given to this assumption, disintegration of Turkey and foundation of a Kurdish state, namely Kurdistan, is regarded as a part of this project. Therefore, the Kurds and the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq (with Mesut Barzani being its leader), which is accused of providing asylum to the PKK militants are perceived as “collaborators of the United States and Europe” on pursuit of their “secret agenda”. In other words, it is believed that the Kurds are being used by the

great powers regarding them as “strategic instrument of the United States”, as Perinçek sternly argues:

*The efforts of Kurds were insufficient, so they sought support from the counter-fronts, side of imperialists. The consequence is the war among Kurds themselves, the poverty and the frustration of the collaborators with the imperialists (Perinçek, 08.09.1996).*

A large space is allocated to the Kurdish problem in the website of Türksolu<sup>56</sup>. The PKK is equated with all Kurds in plenty of articles, in which cautions are announced, in order to prevent Kurds’ ‘reproduction’. Under the title of “*There is not a Kurdish problem, there is a Kurdish invasion*”, this “invasion” is shown on a map of Turkey by arrows from the East stretching to the West, and the “strategy” of the Kurds is explained on the homepage of the website of Türksolu (see appendix VI for the map). Similarly, Firat claims that Kurdishness is not a nation but was artificially created. Therefore, like the “other artificial European nations”, Kurds pursue racist strategy to be accepted as a “nation”.

*Calling himself Kurd is a problem. Because saying that I am a Kurd is racism. Because there is no Kurdish nation. (Firat, 2006: 533).*

There are badges of ADKF (The Federation of Atatürkist Thought Clubs) as “*I am shopping from Turk, therefore my money does not go to the PKK*” (see appendix VII for the badge). Moreover, in order to prevent the impact of Kurdish culture, *Lahmacun* and *Kebab* are counted in the food which the Turks should refrain to eat (İleri, Dec. 3, 2007).

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<sup>56</sup> www.turksolu.com (May 30, 2008)

As it was mentioned in the previous section, the Turkish left nationalist groups focused on the Kurdish issue as well, and frequently accused the Kemalist revolution that failed to realize land reform. However, there is a sharp divergence in the discourse of *ulusalcılık*. The view of *ulusalcılık* regarding the Kurdish issue is a consequence of its perception of the world system as two groups: the oppressed nations and oppressing nations. According to them, the oppressing nations realize their plans on the oppressed ones through the collaborators within those nations. In terms of Turkey, the Kurdish issue is regarded an artificial problem created by the external forces. The quotations stated above show that *ulusalcılık* uses racist expressions when referring to Kurdish issue. In this regard, it is hard to distinguish it from the radical right nationalist groups.

**Debates on Armenian Issue: “*Armenian Genocide Claims Imperialist Conspiracy to Break Turkey into Pieces*”**

The issue of Armenian genocide claims has become one of the leading international policy issues of Turkey since the 1980s. After Turkey’s application for membership to EU in 1987, the European Parliament declared a recommendation of “The Political Solution to the Armenian Issue”, which referred to the Armenian genocide recognition of the United Nations in 1948. Although there is not any provision that compel Turkey’s recognition of the genocide, many countries have already recognized the Armenian genocide. The accusation of the Turkish Republic with the genocide claims led to reactions among the Turkish society. As it is also the case in Kurdish issue, the supporters of *ulusalcılık* voice concerns which seem to be widespread among Turkish society.

The reactions of supporters of *ulusalcılık* to Armenian genocide claims<sup>57</sup> emanate from the Sévres syndrome, since they regard the claims as the outcome of the efforts of the “imperialist powers” to realize the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sévres. The supporters of *ulusalcılık* accept that the Armenians were forced to deport during the independence war and justify this by arguing that the protection of the fatherland was crucial during the Turkish independence war and the situation required the deportation. However, they sternly object to genocide claims. According to them, these claims are the instrument of the “imperialist powers”, namely the Europe and the United States to revive the sanctions of the Treaty of Sévres and “break Turkey into pieces”, while the Armenians are regarded as “puppets”.

Talat Pasha Committee was one of the platforms that was established by various organizations of *ulusalcılık* (see appendix VIII for the logo), in order to counter these claims. The Committee stages demonstrations in various places and issues press releases with the participation of various sections of the society. The essential goal of the Committee which is chaired by Rauf Denktaş, the former president of Cyprus, is to countervail international offences to Turkey (Özcan, Oct. 11, 2007).

The supporters of *ulusalcılık* argue that the Turkish nature is not compatible with any action associated with genocide and justify the incidents with the necessity of defending the country (Perinçek, 2006: 21 and Uysal, May 18, 2006).<sup>58</sup> However,

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<sup>57</sup> After the Sarikamış Battle and the defeat of the Ottoman army commanded by the Unionist Enver Pasha in 1914 during World War I, the Eastern border of the state was opened to the Russia. In order to prevent any possible collaboration of the Armenians with the Russians, the Unionists in power gave the order of deportation of the Armenians (Birikim, May-June 2005)<sup>57</sup>. During deportation, numerous Armenians died. Whether it was a genocide or not has been recently one of most debatable issues.

<sup>58</sup> <https://www.ip.org.tr>

they assert that the Turkish authorities fail to counter these claims because they are afraid of offending the great nations, as Perinçek claims:

*We defended our fatherland under the leadership of Atatürk. ...However, the authorities in Turkey cannot object to imperialists by saying that I defended my fatherland between the years 1914-1923 by making war of independence, and if it is required, I fight again. The Turkish authorities cannot defend that the war of independence was fair because it was against the imperialists. Reminding this means quitting to yield to the imperialism of the United States (Perinçek, 2006: 25).*

The first demonstration of the Committee took place in Lausanne in 2005, in the 82. anniversary of Lausanne Treaty with the slogan of “*The Armenian Genocide is a lie of imperialist powers*”. This was followed by the demonstration on March 15, 2006 in Berlin in which it criticized the “Armenian Genocide” decision of the Germany Parliament, in Paris and then in Lausanne for the second time on June 2007.

The Turkish associations in Germany including As-ADD (The Atatürkist Thought Association in Lower Saxony in Hannover)<sup>59</sup>, *Hannover Türk Toplumunu* (Hannover Turkish Society), *Almanya ADD Birliği* (Union of ADD of Germany), *Türk Akademisyenler Birliği* (The Union of Turkish Academic Scholars), DITIB (Directorate of Religious Affairs Turkish-Islamic Union)<sup>60</sup>, BTEU (Union of European Turkish Businessmen)<sup>61</sup>, DTU (Turkish-German Businessmen Association), Alevi Cem Association, *Hürtürk* (The Libertist Turkish-German Friendship Federation), *Garbsen Veliler Birliği*, *Hannover Veliler Birliği* and *Hannover Karadenizliler Derneği* (Hannover Black Sea People’s Association) issued a press

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<sup>59</sup> <http://www.as-add.de>

<sup>60</sup> <http://www.ditib.de>

<sup>61</sup> <http://www.bteu.de>

release titled “We Deny the Accusation of Genocide which is aimed to burden on Turkish nation” on January 26, 2007. In the release, they claim that the reality has been distorted for political reasons:

*It is worrisome that the so-called Armenian genocide claims have become an issue which is being discussed in political platforms rather than an issue which the historians discuss. ...We should not allow the groundless claims and the propandas of the Armenians on pursuit of their unilateral and nationalist thoughts to change the realities.*<sup>62</sup>

Prior to the assassination of the Armenian Journalist Hrant Dink, *Büyük Hukukçular Birliği* had brought lawsuit under the Article 301 against him, and the *Türksolu* conducted a survey to define “the Fascist of the Year”, stating him in the first place (see appendix IX for the logo). After assassination of Dink, the debates on Armenian issue increased. The slogan chanted in his funeral “*We are all Hrant Dink, we are all Armenians*” was criticized and contra-slogan “*We are all Mehmed, we are all Turks*” was created.

In a meeting report of the office of TESUD in Gallipoli that has been broadcast in the general website of Gallipoli, the officers evaluate the assassination of Hrant Dink. In the meeting report it is stated that the Armenians were deported because of the cruelties they did in Anatolia. They consequently declared that they did not approve the assassination of Hrant Dink but they knew that he was murdered by “foreign and secret forces”.<sup>63</sup>

Similarly, *Türksolu* and *İleri* regard him “an Enemy of Turkey”, stating that “a man like him” cannot be hero just because he was assassinated. According to

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<sup>62</sup> <http://ydhhaber.com>, January 26, 2007 ‘Türk Milletinin Sırtına Yüklenmek İstenen Soykırım Suçlamasını Reddediyoruz’. Yurttaşlık Hareketi Derneği website

<sup>63</sup><http://www.gelibolu.org>, January 26, 2007 ‘TESUD Haftalık Sohbet Toplantısı Düzenliyor’.

them, Hrant Dink was a harmful person for Turkey and “Turkey and Turks lost an enemy” (Firat, Apr.-May-June 2007:204).

As a consequence, *ulusalcılık* uses racist discourse when referring to the Armenian issue, as its attitude cannot be distinguished from the radical nationalist right groups. In fact, the leading figures and groups of *ulusalcılık* frequently gather with the radical nationalist groups and figures in the demonstrations against Armenian issue. Moreover, the participants of the Talat Pasha Committee confirm this consensus in terms of opinion as well as action.

***Debates on Economy: “Foreign Capital and Privatizations: Threat to the Economic Independence”***

Based on one of the major premises of left nationalism in Turkey, the supporters of *ulusalcılık* argue that development of Turkish nation can only be achieved through independence from the capitalist world. This presupposes a strict control of state on economy and protecting the national economy. Therefore privatizations and foreign capital access to Turkey are regarded as a threat to economic independence of Turkey. It is argued that state’s loss of control on economy will lead to crisis and “colonization” of Turkish nation. According to the supporters of *ulusalcılık*, the public sector is being destroyed and then an economic system is being constituted by the politicians and the employers on pursuit of their interests, which will ruin the independence of Turkish economy (Firat, 2006: 551). Moreover, regarding the privatizations of the public enterprises, companies and banks to the foreigners, they state that Turkey is “losing the control of the economy” (Kazgan, Jan.-Feb.-March, 2008: 8-9).



The etatist policies during the 1930s are frequently referred and 1930s are called as “Golden Years”. Accordingly, regarding the recent economic crisis which has started in the United States, they frequently mention that the great nations “embrace” etatist policies in order to recover from the crisis:

*What does the Western capitalism do? ...They embraced etatism... when the neo-liberalism collapsed and the capitalist system is in crisis, ... the state became the saver, the state became the interventionist, the state became SOS. (Selçuk, October 15, 2008)*

As a consequence of the idea that the state should take over active role in economy for national development and independence, the privatizations and sales of the national enterprises to the foreign companies are regarded to lead to loss of national control mechanism. Under these circumstances, the foreign capital can easily penetrate to the economy and jeopardize the economic independence and national unity. Eventually, Turkey will become a colony exploited by the great nations. In his article titled “*Privatizations are attacks against Turkey and Atatürk*”, Koç views the “workers and unions’ rights” and “elimination of social-state” as the secondary concerns regarding privatizations, since he believes that the anti-privatization activators only in developed nations can react privatization in terms of these issues. However:

*...the major aim of privatizations in Turkey is to dissolve Turkey, to bring Sévres in stead of Lausanne and to take revenge from Atatürk (Koç, 2008: 12).*

This statement provides great evidence that the major concern of *ulusalcılık* is the survival of the nation-state. Any concern relating to class conflict is criticized; as

such attitude overshadows the “major concern”. It can be concluded that in a “less developed nation” like Turkey, all classes should pursue nationalism and act in accordance with national interest. According to this proposal, reactions against class conflict, uneven income distribution or labor abuse can only take place in developed nations. Nevertheless, the supporters of *ulusalcılık* does not react to privatizations to Turkish companies. Accordingly, regarding the sale of Erdemir, Selçuk supports the “national entrepreneur”, particularly Koç Holding and criticizes the sale of Oyak Bank to foreign investors:

*When Oyak involved in the privatization, we got happy. Oyak, which is a national institution, ... When Koç won the Türpraş tender, the wise people of this country felt relieved (Selçuk, April 4, 2006).*

Moreover, another indication that *ulusalcılık* does not imply any leftist concern is the fact that national bourgeoisie takes part in ‘national front’ of *ulusalcılık*. While there is a *ulusalcılık* association of USİAD which was founded by the businessmen, some Chambers of Commerce and/or Industry such as Ankara Chamber of Commerce and Eskişehir Chamber of Industry use expressions of *ulusalcılık* in their publications and declarations. Furthermore, *Genç Parti* (Young Party), a political party which was established by one of the wealthiest businessmen of Turkey, was praised by İlhan Selçuk in *Cumhuriyet*, only because the party declared that it was against IMF (Selçuk, June 2003). Because IMF is considered as an “imperialist” force, which “strives for forcibly interfering Turkish economy”.

*Ulusalcılık* refers to etatist policies and the concept of “anti-imperialism”, and presents these references as the indication of its “leftist” ideologies. However, it is

mistaken by confusing etatism with socialism. *Ulusalcılık* presupposes a system in which the state controls the allocation of resources but does not possess the means of production as socialism presupposes (Minibaş, November 10, 2008). In other words, the state strives for creating a national bourgeoisie which will pursue the national interests. Because it claims that national development is essential in a less developed country like Turkey, and all classes of the society should act in accordance with this national aim.

Since the globalization and the neo-liberalist policies put into practice in the 1980s in Turkey as a consequence of globalization process are believed to serve for the colonization of Turkey, *ulusalcılık* reacts against *globalization*. Nevertheless, while reacting against the neo-liberalist policies and re-structuring of the state after the 1980s, it does not criticize the inequalities in the income distribution that capitalist system brings. Suffice to say, it claims to be “anti-imperialist” however, it overlooks the concept of “anti-capitalism” of socialism.

Moreover, while it views the foreign capital as an “imperialist force” which forcibly accesses into Turkey, it ignores the fact that the national capital and the international capital pursue the joint aim. It overlooks the internationalization efforts of the national capital. Nevertheless, it fails to generate any alternative economic model except for suggesting a model of national economy. This stance of *ulusalcılık* resembles the left nationalist movements in the 1960s and 1970s. There is also unanimity between *ulusalcılık* and radical right nationalist groups regarding the economic issues. In its economic report, referring to foreign direct investments in Turkey, MHP states there is a threat of “alienation” and criticizes the neo-liberal policies of AKP:

*The AKP prefers alienation to privatization and becoming an international market to national development model<sup>64</sup>.*

This unanimity shows that *ulusalcılık* and radical right nationalism meet at a point of “survival of the nation-state”.

#### **Debates on Role of Army: “Turkish Army: The Guardian of the Regime”**

The Turkish military is regarded as the guardian of the secularism and the republic by the supporters of *ulusalcılık*. While there are organizations established by the retired army officers like TESUD mentioned above, some of the leading organizations are chaired by retired officers. For instance, the chairman of ADD is retired General M. Şener Eruygur, a retired four star general and former commander of gendarme.

Especially in the context of the democratization process provisioned by the EU, the attempts to decrease the role of the army in Turkish political life is criticized and perceived as a threat to the “natural guardian of the regime”. The intervention of the military in the politics is tolerated and justified by most of the supporters of *ulusalcılık*, although many of them were imprisoned or accused by military administrations after the interventions (especially in 1971 and 1980). The intervention of the army in politics can be regarded as natural and should be tolerated because of its ‘good intention’, as Soysal states:

*Isn't it normal that the army which founded the republic with its blood and leadership comes first in overtaking the responsibility to protect it?  
...In spite of some significant mistakes, its good intentions which are not*

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<sup>64</sup> “Ekonomide AKP Dönemi,” *MHP Center of Research and Development*, [online], Available: [http://www.mhp.org.tr/raporlar/ekonomi/2002\\_2008\\_ekonomide\\_akp\\_donemi\\_ozet.doc](http://www.mhp.org.tr/raporlar/ekonomi/2002_2008_ekonomide_akp_donemi_ozet.doc)

*exploited for personal reasons do not annoy the society, rather they have been embraced* (Soysal, Nov. 20, 2002).

Especially, the intervention on May 27, 1960 and the constitution of 1961<sup>65</sup> are regarded as a “revolution” by the majority of them. According to them, the liberties including the freedom of expression were brought to Turkey with the constitution of 1961 (Manisalı, June 6, 2008), and it is called as “revolution”:

*The revolutionist youth, together with the Army made an Atatürkist attempt and overthrew the power* (Fırat, 2004: 20).

Moreover, ADKF displayed banners calling the military forces for intervention:

“*Ordu Göreve*” in ‘Republic March’ on October 25, 2003 in Ankara (see appendix X for the banner). This attitude of *ulusalcılık* can be regarded as the continuity of the view that the cadre of “nationalist military officers and civil intellectuals” will complete the “national democratic revolution” of Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the supporters of *ulusalcılık* are aware of that they cannot obtain power through democratic ways, they hope support from the Turkish military which they call “the real reference of Turkish nationalism” (Ekinci, March 26, 2006).

To sum up, the foregoing proposals of *ulusalcılık* explicitly show that the recent resurgence of left nationalism in Turkey has practically diverged from socialist ideology, and has become a form of nationalism which is anti-globalist, anti-western, xenophobic and racist that may apply undemocratic practices on pursuit of its essential aim of protecting the unity of nation-state and secular and republican regime. It formulates its ideology on the reactions. However, it fails to generate

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<sup>65</sup> For further reading about the influence of military intervention on May 27, 1960, see Mazıcı, Nurşen. 2001. “27 Mayıs, Kemalizmin Restorasyonu mu?” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Vol.: 2 Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnse. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

alternative models to the system it opposes. Therefore, it appeals to secondary issues such as secularism, Armenian and Kurdish issues, in order to gain support from the society as well as Turkish military. It serves for the maintenance of system, which constitutes the major contradiction with its 'left' discourse.

## CONCLUSION

With the neo-liberal policies put into practice after the 1980s and the transformation of the political economical and social structure as a consequence of these policies, debates on the survival of the nation-state has risen. After the AKP have come to power and the EU membership process has been accelerated, a perception of loss of sovereignty and threat to secular republic regime have become prevalent in various section of the Turkish society. *Ulusalcılık* which emerged in the 1990s and accelerated in the 2000s has become a widespread Turkish nationalism that voices common concerns regarding the survival of the Turkish Republic while resisting against globalization. In accordance with its raison d'être, secularism, anti-imperialism because of its anti-globalistic discourse, national economy which presupposes state's active role in economy and preventing foreign capital within Turkey and, most dominantly nationalism which can be racist, xenophobic and disparaging are main proposals of *ulusalcılık*. It is essentially formulated on reactions and on a continuous perception of threat to the survival of the nation-state. Since it is recently one of the most debatable issues in Turkish politics, this study has attempted to provide a concrete basis through several interrelated questions in order to identify it.

In order to accomplish primary aims of this study, intellectual and historical motives that lead to the attempts to reconcile nationalism with Socialism have been discussed in the first chapter. By this way a theoretical framework has been established through leading contemporary works that discuss the relation between nationalism and Socialism and it is been concluded that the problematic association of Socialism and nationalism initially for tactical and strategic reasons has led to

emergence of contradictory ideologies in particularly less developed countries. The study attempts to reveal the reflections of these attempts on Turkish politics and historical and theoretical roots of such attempts in the second chapter. Based on an analysis of their intellectual characteristics, a theoretical framework has been constituted for “left nationalist” movements in Turkey. In the third chapter, *ulusalcılık* is viewed as a resurgence of these movements, notwithstanding several divergences. Following the discussion on convergences and divergences between *ulusalcılık* and the previous movements, leading organizations and forums of *ulusalcılık* have been discussed based on a grouping. Finally, proposals of diverse organizations and forums have been gathered and analyzed systematically in order to define unanimous premises of *ulusalcılık*. While discussing its main proposals, convergences between the right nationalist groups and *ulusalcılık* have been taken account in some issues. Thereby, contradictions in its premises and discourse have been identified.

After these theoretical and political analysis to respond the questions mentioned in the introduction, this study concludes that *ulusalcılık* fails in terms of two major concerns. The first contradiction emanates from its relation with Kemalism. Kemalism is the founding ideology of Turkish Republic and it aims to establish a “classless” society in pursuit of solidarism. *Ulusalcılık* regards the Kemalist revolution as the initial and greatest step of Turkish national democratic revolution. However, Turkish national independence struggle was implemented by a cadre of civilian-military bureaucrats and did not ever carry a class concern. By this way, *ulusalcılık* ignores class conflict of Socialism and replaces it by ‘nation’. Imperialism is perceived as a phenomenon existing among the nations, while state is



viewed as a non-class concept. Such a stance is particularist and conflicts with internationalism of Socialism. Moreover, Kemalism is accepted as the ideology of the state. Failing to sever its ties with official ideology (Başkaya, 2007: 24) makes it a movement which strives for protecting status quo, rather than a revolutionist movement implemented towards status quo. It supports top-down transformation implemented by the state. Suffice to say, because it does not dissociate from Kemalism, it cannot transform into internationalist left aiming for socialist revolution. Anti-imperialism is confused with xenophobia and anti-westernism. After the 1990s, secularism has become a central concept and survival of nation-state is believed to be achieved by maintaining the secular republican regime.

The second essential contradiction originates from its attempts to cooperate with national bourgeoisie. The belief in ‘national front’ against imperialism constitutes the main motive of this attitude. *Ulusalcılık* tries to protect the interests of national capital. It defines the international capital as a force which tries to access to Turkey by force. However, it fails to explain the difference between the national capital and international capital and turns a blind eye to the internationalization efforts of the national capital. Being in alliance with the capitalists in Turkey, it sees the proletariat in other countries as “other”, because it believes that proletariat of other countries can work for their national interests when it is required. It claims to be anti-imperialist but it is not anti-capitalist. Moreover, it confuses etatist policies with socialism. However, the etatist policies proposed by *ulusalcılık* are different from the state concept in socialism. In *ulusalcılık*, state is responsible with controlling the allocation of resources but does not possess the means of production. The state strives for creating a national bourgeoisie which will pursue the national interests.

The aim for protecting nation-state and national interests lie beneath the attempt of *ulusalcılık* to establish a national front in cooperation with national bourgeoisie. Accordingly, nationalism is considered as a necessity for development in a less-developed country, whereas class struggle is perceived to take place merely in developed countries. It presupposes of an existence of a non-class concept of state in less-developed countries. Therefore, it claims to be “anti-imperialist” but it is not “anti-capitalist”, which conflicts with Socialism. It does not endeavor for an internationalist proletariat revolution which is primary aim of Socialism.

Reacting against several issues, *ulusalcılık* fails to generate any alternative models, but is based on reactions. It criticizes globalization and the efforts for the European Union membership; it does not suggest any alternative foreign policy strategy. It fails to put forward any strategy for Cyprus. It opposes to privatizations but does not have any coherent economic alternatives. As it fails to respond to basic contradictions and generates alternatives to the practices to which it is reacted, it emphasizes widespread concerns such as Kurdish issue, Armenian issue, secularism and republic and creates an image that the existence of Turkish republic is under threat.

In this study, *ulusalcılık* is viewed as a form of ordinary nationalism. What distinguish *ulusalcılık* from other forms of Turkish nationalism is the discourse and the method it uses while expressing itself. As mentioned in the introduction, *ulusalcılık* is a word derived from “ulus” (nation) and created by the supporters of it in the late 1990s. This reflects their efforts to differentiate themselves from other nationalist groups which they find degenerated and ineffective. *Ulusalcılık* expresses itself as the “innocent oppressed nation nationalism” whose primary aims is

independence of Turkey by instrumentally appealing to socialist discourse. Believing that nationalism is rehabilitated within socialist discourse, it presents its nationalism as a well-intentioned and justifiable nationalism, while proclaiming Kurdish nationalism for instance, as a malicious “separatist” nationalism. Nevertheless, *ulusalcılık* cannot be assumed to be different from ordinary nationalism. The difference of *ulusalcılık* from other Turkish nationalisms is the fact that it expresses itself through socialist discourse. It is not a distinct ideology but bears the fundamental characteristics of nationalism. Therefore, it is argued that an attempt to associate Socialism and nationalism will eventually lead to emergence of nationalism as the dominant partner. As a consequence of perception of a common enemy in terms of its attitudes towards the EU, Kurdish and Armenian issues, it acts in cooperation with radical right nationalist groups.


The study also concludes that very similar attempts to reconcile Turkish nationalism with socialist discourse were made especially after the 1960s following the internal and external developments. Yön-Devrim in 1960s and numerous groups emerged within TİP and TKP pursuing the MDD after 1960s constitute the historical roots of *ulusalcılık*. Nevertheless, there are several differences between previous movements and *ulusalcılık* and these differences provide evidence for the aforementioned statement that association of nationalism with other ideologies will always lead to emergence of nationalism as the dominant partner at the end, when the conditions change. The previous movements were seeking an alternative for development by referring to socialism. As a consequence of absence of a real model for socialism in the 2000s, the devastating impact of the military intervention on September 12, 1980 on the left groups as well as the effects of globalization and

structural transformation of Turkish political and economical life, the left nationalism has almost totally distanced from socialist ideology. Referring only to a concept of socialism, “anti-imperialism, it has become an ideology which can act in cooperation with the state and radical nationalist groups in order to protect the unity of nation-state. The cooperation of supporters of *ulusalcılık* with secular extreme right nationalist groups under Kızılelma Coalition shows that they share a common ground. Their reactionary expressions towards Kurdish issue for instance are racist and full of violence. However, the previous movements sought peaceful solutions. For example Doğan Avcıoğlu accused the Kemalist regime due to its failure in land reform, while İbrahim Kaypakkaya suggested right of self determination for Kurdish community.

To sum up, there is not a single “Turkish nationalism” but “Turkish nationalisms” which express them through different concepts. These diverse Turkish nationalisms struggle for hegemony, since the emergence of Turkish nationalism in the late 19th century. Being one of the contenders in this struggle, *ulusalcılık* is the recent form of the attempts to reconcile Socialism with nationalism which initially appeared in the 1960s within Turkish left as a consequence of the national independence thesis suggested in the early 20th century for tactical and strategic reasons. However with the globalization as well as several current issues, it has transformed into xenophobic movement which strives for merely sustaining the nation-state.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I



APPENDIX II



APPENDIX III



APPENDIX IV





APPENDIX V



## APPENDIX VI



APPENDIX VII



APPENDIX VIII

**PARİS**

**2007**



**TALÂT PAŞA  
KOMİTESİ**

APPENDIX IX



APPENDIX X



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