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**TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING VIS-À-VIS THE UKRAINE CRISIS:  
FROM SEVRES SYNDROME AND RUSSOPHOBIA PERSPECTIVE**

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UKRAYNA KRIZI ÖZELİNDE TURK DIŞ POLİTİKASI YAPIMI: BİR SEVR  
SENDROMU VE RUSOFOBİ BAKIŞIYLA

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## **Abstract**

In the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the young Turkish Republic, diplomacy and its way of execution were constituted an important aspect for Turkish survival. The experiences (with foreign powers) from these years caused traumatic effects on Turkish state elite, which later became an important component in shaping Turkish foreign and domestic policy-making. We focused on Sevres Paranoia and Russophobia as a lens through which to explore Turkey's Black Sea policy and to clarify Turkey's policy-making in general. These two traumas, while framing Turkish bilateral relations with her long-lasting ally, the U.S., give us insight into relations with her immediate neighbor, Russia. In this thesis, we posit that Turkish policies vis-s-vis the Ukrainian Crisis are very much related to Sevres Paranoia and Russophobia, and separately from her alleged "axis shift" thesis will help us to see that Turkish foreign policy-making is generally about those ups and downs throughout the history.

## Özet

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulduğu andan, ve hatta, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son zamanlarından itibaren diplomasiyi bir varoluş aracı olarak kullanmıştır. Bu süre zarfında edindiği tecrübeler nazarın, siyasi seçkinlerinin aklına kazınan travmalar, hem bu ülkenin dış politika yapımını şekillendirmiş hem de iç politikaya yön vermiştir. Sevres paranoyası ve Rusofobyaya bunlardan ikisi olup, hem Türkiye'nin güncel Karadeniz politikalarını analiz etmemize yarar hem de ülkenin genel olarak üstüne diktiği politika yapımını anlamamıza imkan verir. Bu iki travma, ülkenin Rusya ve ABD nezdinde Batı'yla olan ilişkilerini şekillendirmektedir. Ukrayna Krizi sırasında Türkiye'nin ait olduğu ittifak kampının çok onaylamayacağı adımları atması Sevres Paranoyası ve Rusofobyaya bağlıdır, ve eksen kayması iddialarından bağımsız görülecektir ki, Türkiye'nin dış politika yapımı bu tarz gel gitleri hep yaşamıştır.

## INTRODUCTION

When the Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989, it signaled that the Cold War was over. However, the dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 officially stated the termination of the Cold War. During the Cold War era, the Western bloc and Socialist bloc were in competition not only militarily but also politically, culturally and economically. Putting the question of whether the Western bloc won the Cold War aside, new paradigms, theories on international relations have appeared as an outcome.

Since NATO's establishment in 1949, perspectives surrounding its purpose have undergone many changes over the past 50 years. The NATO was originally established as a military organization; however, it later developed civilian bureaucratic constituencies as well. During the Cold War era, the Soviet threat was suggested as vivid and maintaining the security of members of the Western alliance was the primary job. However, when the Cold War ended, NATO's existence began to be questioned by international actors. Francis Fukuyama even claimed that the end of history was at hand as the U.S. had become the sole superpower in world politics.<sup>1</sup> The need to find NATO a reason to exist became a crucial political agenda for its members. Post-9/11 introduced a new security aspect to the table, and key actors began reshaping their sense of security according to this new phenomenon.<sup>2</sup> Hence, newly appeared global problems like, extremism, terrorism, human and drug trafficking are now in the scope of NATO, alongside with other organizations like UN, World Bank, ASEAN, Shanghai Cooperation Organization etc.

Nevertheless, the unipolarity of the international system was to be challenged after 9/11, with the rise of international terror, and the 2008 economic crisis, which enabled countries like China, Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa, Japan and the EU to emerge as strong actors in the economic arena. Besides the EU emerging as an important actor, countries outside of NATO were developing at a rapid rate and started disturbing the unipolarity of the United States' role internationally. After 9/11, Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" paradigm was revisited and other theories on regionalities and cultural diversifications (e.g. Middle Eastern, Western, Latin American, Asian, Russian Orthodox, etc.) ,were formed.<sup>3</sup> In his article, Huntington had claimed

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<sup>1</sup> Fukuyama, Francis, "End of History?" The National Interest, Summer 1989

<sup>2</sup> Yılmaz Özbağcı, Suhnaz, "Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri", inside "XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası Analizi." (eds.) Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, Özlem Terzi, Der Yayınları 428: Istanbul 2012.

<sup>3</sup> See David Brooks' comments on Huntington's flaws and estimations on today's foreign policy.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04brooks.html> date of access: 30.01.2018. and also for a rather



that religious and/or cultural based alliances would form, and with this new grouping, world politics would experience a multi-polar status.<sup>4</sup> Although presenting conflicting claims, Fukuyama's and Huntington's theories both found lots of support at that time,.

Russia, as the main inheritor of the Soviet Union, took its first step in foreign policy by easing tensions with the US and the West in general. The new country let go of her ex-satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe and seemed undisturbed by those states entering Western alliances. Apart from forging good relations with the West, Russia remained active in her backyard (i.e. in Central Asia, Caucasia and Eastern Europe). Russia created the Community of the Independent States (CIS) on December 1991 and, in 1993, initiated the National Security Doctrine in which Russia defined Caucasia and Central Asia as its "Near Abroad", or, in other words, her zone of influence.<sup>5</sup> These steps were very much linked to Russia's desire not to lose her grasp in the areas which were seen as being highly vital for Russian security, political and economic interests.

With the beginning of the 2000s, Russian leadership acquired new doctrines, which were basically called by the name of the president. Yet again Near Abroad Policy of Moscow also declared that her aspirations to have a voice in her neighboring areas again augmented. Opposing the unipolar status of international politics, Russia started to defend multi-polarity and democratization in decisions that interested the international community. Russia's reaction to the unipolar world was vividly put forward during the Munich Security Conference in 2007 by President Vladimir Putin. The Russian president gave a bold speech in Munich in which he clearly opposed American hegemony and NATO's enlargement plans in Russia's "near abroad".<sup>6</sup> A year later, in 2008, Russia and the United States were nearly on the brink of war over the crisis between Georgia and her two semi-independent regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the changing status of Russian motivations in the region. Since the Maidan protests had begun in Ukraine, the competition between the West and Russia had been triggered with the crisis area broadening to the Black Sea. The official government in Ukraine had changed with a pro-Western president claiming office in 2012. The invasion of Crimea by Russia and

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manipulative approach see, <http://www.ipost.com/Opinion/Samuel-Huntington-revisited-A-wake-up-call-for-the-West-435873>. Date of access: 30.01.2018.

<sup>4</sup> Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

<sup>5</sup> Fatih Özbay, "Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinde İş birliği ve Rekabet, 1992-2012" içinde Bölgesel Sorunlar ve Türkiye" (ed.) Atilla Sandıklı, Erdem Kaya, 2016 Ankara, Bilgesam Yayınları, pg. 387.

<sup>6</sup> Putin's Speech on Munich Security Conference in 2007; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQ58Yv6kP44> date of access: 28.11.2017

the intense civil war that broke out in the east of Ukraine showed that Russia would not easily allow Ukraine outside of its sphere of influence. As NATO wanted to form partnership relations with Ukraine during 1990s and early 2000s, Russia felt threatened and tried to begin expanding her direct influence zones.

Turkey's unique geography has been a constant point of leverage allowing Turkish foreign policy to center around balancing global powers over one – that is, until Turkey joined NATO in 1952. The long-lasting balance of threat and power policies had worked in a successful way since the late Ottoman times until Soviet Russia started threatening Turkey according to her budding aspirations in the Black Sea and Caucasus. Tension with Soviet Russia spurred Turkey to decide on being part of an alliance. NATO became an attractive option when it was founded in 1949. Turkey, in efforts to demonstrate her enthusiasm and determination to join the alliance, sent her troops to serve in the Korean war with other NATO forces. This led to her acceptance to NATO, officially becoming a member in 1952. Ever since, she has been a loyal constituent to the Western security club, in addition to being a member of cultural and political pillars of the Western partnership.

Turkey became a loyal ally and a trustworthy actor in the Southern flank of NATO, and, in return, it was provided technological, military and political support by NATO to maintain territorial integrity and political independence.<sup>7</sup> After the collapse of Soviet Socialist Russia, U.S., as NATO's leading member, used the Turkish card to access Central Asia, Caucasus, and Balkans. During the 90's, Turkey demonstrated again that she was trustworthy by her moves and policy-making on Bosnian War and Kosovo's independence. Turkey staunchly followed NATO's agenda while in Bosnia succeeded in persuading the international community to intervene. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Turkey has started to execute a more pragmatic and proactive foreign policy, as the new government was formed by conservative Islamists, Justice and Development Party,(AK Party) in 2001.<sup>8</sup> Having said that, during the Georgian War in 2008, Turkey followed a much more balanced foreign policy - while she was not keen to see US ships in the Black Sea, she cited the Montreux Convention as an excuse for not allowing over a certain amount of U.S. vessels to help Georgia.<sup>9</sup> This move

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<sup>7</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1999.

<sup>8</sup> Hill, Fiona, Taspınar, Ömer, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of Excluded?" *Survival* vol. 48 no. 1 Spring 2006, pp. 81-92. See also, Keyman, Emin Fuat, "Değişen dünya, dönüşen Türkiye" İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Anlar, Aslihan, "Role and Position of Turkey in the Black Sea Region During the Period from 1946 to 2012." *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, Güz 2015, Sayı 47, pp 17-37 (see page 30). "Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea

please Russians but led NATO and U.S. leaders to question Turkey's motivations toward the Western alliance. However, the first clash of interest in the post-Cold War era happened during the Second Gulf War. Turkish Parliament rejected an invitation to the pact that would allow American troops to settle in southeastern Turkey to fight the Iraqi army from two fronts. The Turkish Parliament's response increased Turkish prestige in the region but also moved American-Turkish relations to a bitter phase.<sup>10</sup> While this was seen as the first divergence in Turkish-American relations, the 2008 Georgian War happened to be the second tip for Turkey's new policy preferences. It is likely that AK Party conducted a much more status-quo motivated foreign policy, which can be seen in their prevention of American deployment on Turkish soil during the Second Gulf Crisis and her resistance to American ships to overuse the Straits during the 2008 Georgia-Russia War. These two moves were in parallel with a Kemalist foreign policy agenda. Non-revisionist and statusquo-ist tendency of Kemalist foreign policy, with a couple of changes in its maneuvering towards Europe and the Balkans was to be observed in the early years of AK Party government. Yet, the Neo-Ottomanist AK Part foreign policy was triggered by Ahmet Davutoğlu's appointment as the chief diplomat in 2011.

The Ukrainian crisis broke out in November 2013 with the mildly unstable country facing a public uprising that ended with the toppling of the Ukrainian president. Soon after Ukraine formed an interim government, clashes between government forces and the Russian ethnic community started to be observed, and, in the pretext of protecting Russian speaking people, Russia announced their claim over Crimea explicitly and eventually annexed the land to Russian soil. Ever since, Ukraine has been living in a state of war, and an intense civil war continues her eastern region.

The Turkish response to the annexation of Crimea was not in Russia's favor, especially since Turkey was concerned about their Turkic relatives, the Crimean Tatars, and their situation after the annexation. On one hand, Turkey gave official declarations to encourage decreasing clashes between Ukrainians and Russians, and, on the other hand defended the territorial integrity of Ukraine.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, Turkey did not join economic sanctions placed on Russia by the U.S.<sup>12</sup> This move should be seen as something that a Kemalist government would have done as

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Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there." (Convention Regarding Regime of Straits, 20 July 1936, p. 7).

<sup>10</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003.

<sup>11</sup> See the official declaration by the Turkish Foreign Ministry; [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ukrayna\\_da-son-durum-ve-ikili-iliskiler.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ukrayna_da-son-durum-ve-ikili-iliskiler.tr.mfa), date of Access: 02.12.2017

<sup>12</sup> See; <https://tr.sputniknews.com/politika/201502121013939645/> date of Access: 02.12.2017

well. Balance of threat and balance of power concepts are the two notions that Kemalist regime got help from when it was about to deal anything accordingly.

The Turkish decision-making vis-à-vis her response to the Ukrainian Crisis can be linked to her policy on the Black Sea security phenomenon that formed after the collapse of USSR. With the end of the Cold War, Turkey began to see Russia, not as a threat but a potential trading partner.<sup>13</sup> Although Turkey's first goal in international relations is to protect her territorial integrity, the notion and perception of the origin of threat appeared to be altered.<sup>14</sup> Turkey started to form multilateral and bilateral partnerships with neighboring countries. In 1990's, the Black Sea region was at the center for building trust and cooperation among littoral states. Turkey pioneered the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which helped Turkey form a more active international policy after the Cold War, especially in the near abroad of Russia.<sup>15</sup> This step was a positive leap forward in the region to build trust with neighbor states and to fight with new post-Cold War threats like trafficking, terrorism, and extremism, just a Kemalist government would do. Someone can easily compare this to the Balkan Pact, which was build on 1934.

My research will center around the international crisis in Ukraine, Turkey's policy responses, and its effects on Turkish-US relations. My question in this study is "Why did Turkey not stand with the U.S. through the Ukrainian crisis?" In this study, I will try to explore the Turkish, American, and Russian foreign policy-making processes in the Black Sea region. We will exploration Turkey's foreign policy toward Ukraine while taking Russian New Military Doctrine into consideration to explain the nature of the relations between Turkey and the US. It is equally important to understand the capacities and constraints of Turkish Foreign Policymaking by examining the history of the diplomacy making process.

It has been long said that Turkey is experiencing an axis shift in her foreign policy, a divergence from the E.U. and U.S while approaching the Middle East and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Turkish-American relations from the Ukrainian crisis perspective is necessary to

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<sup>13</sup> Mufti, Malik, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture" Palgrave, 2009.

<sup>14</sup> Celik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999. See especially Chapter Three. See also Kemal Kirişçi, "Uluslararası Sistemdeki Değişimler ve Türk Dış Politikasının Yeni Dönemleri" pp. 615-632, in "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi." (eds) Faruk Sönmezoğlu Der Yayınları, İstanbul 1998. And also Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türk Dış Politikası", pp. 633-646 inside "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi" (eds) Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları; İstanbul 1998.

<sup>15</sup> Celik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. See especially Chapter Six.

explore in order to understand the competition and clash in Ukraine. It is also very crucial to explore newly assumed competition between the US and Russia in Eurasia -potential "Finlandization"<sup>16</sup> of Turkey by the Russians. While I focus on the crisis in Ukraine and its for the future of the nature of Turkey-US relations, I will investigate the reasons for Turkey not standing along with the U.S., her strategic partner, and trying to avoid problems with Russia in the civil war in Ukraine. Is the response to the Ukrainian crisis a unique case, or it is just another careful move in Turkey's long-time balance of power foreign policy? After the introduction chapter, the second chapter of this thesis consists of a theoretical background that holds the reasoning behind the Turkish policy decision on Ukraine crisis.

In Turkey, like every democratic country, politicians are held responsible for their actions and decisions. Although foreign policy is considered an area of elite expertise, lately public opinion has also invested interest in its execution and outcomes. However, according to Norrin M. Ripsman, public opinion influences policy-making more easily through legislature rather than directly affecting the decision-making of political elites that handle foreign policy in a narrow circle. Interest groups and domestic actors have access to representatives of parliaments while they can easily reach them and bargain with them.<sup>17</sup> Hence, if a country's legislature is not an important part of the foreign policy-making process, public opinion's influence of foreign policy may be limited. As a matter of fact, Turkish foreign policy actors are a narrow group of elites and there is a tripod decision-making mechanism which includes the presidency, army, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Premiership.<sup>18</sup> In this picture, the Parliament stays as a dormant actor in foreign policy-making, which strengthens the idea that public opinion is not very influential in foreign policy decision-making. However, the growing importance of media and its success in mobilizing public opinion in Turkey should be considered a new pressure point for the government.<sup>19</sup> Although to differentiate media, public opinion and interest groups is common in the field, they use the same path to influence elites. Even media uses legislature to pressure national security and foreign policy executives.<sup>20</sup> For example, the Kardak/Imia

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<sup>16</sup> "The total number of restrictions on self-determination that a great power imposes on a weaker neighbor." See <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/fi-finlandization.htm> date of access: 05.05.2018

<sup>17</sup> Ripsman Norrin M, "Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, pp. 170-194 Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 170-71)

<sup>18</sup> Makovsky, Alan, Sayari, Sabri, "Turkey's new world : changing dynamics in Turkish foreign policy" Washington, DC : Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. (Especially see the Introduction)

<sup>19</sup> jbid

<sup>20</sup> Ripsman Norrin M, "Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, pp. 170-194 Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 170-71)

incident between Turkey and Greece in 1996 exemplifies the media's power of influence in a delicate national security issue.<sup>21</sup>

Although actors who are officially commissioned to execute foreign policy-making have access to delicate information about national security, threats, and state resources, domestic actors can affect foreign policy-making as well. Even though, realist perspective perceives the state as a black box and its capability to mobilize domestic actors as unlimited, theory is slightly different than reality. According to neo-classical realists, the state is the most prominent figure in foreign policy-making, likewise in realist approach, but the state also has some constraints vis-à-vis its relations to domestic actors and the nature of the political climate. For example, if a state is made up of elites and societal leaders, it is more likely that foreign policy elite will not be as free to execute whatever decision it wants. In addition to this, as Putnam claims, foreign policy-making of a state occurs on two levels. The first level consists of international negotiations, in which elites are responsible for bargaining with their counterparts according to their nation's interest; while on the second level, foreign policy executives must bargain with local representatives of the nation in order to ratify any negotiated treaty or international agreement.<sup>22</sup> Having said that, when a government faces a strong domestic opposition and veto players exist, it is less likely that a clear-cut foreign policy can be executed by elites, who must bargain with domestic actors.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, when a country is experiencing external threats or a shift in systemic conditions, it is not very likely that domestic actors will veto a foreign policy decision made by the elite or will bargain according to their interests. Foreign policy elites are not seriously restricted during policy-making process.<sup>24</sup>

In this thesis, Turkish decision vis-à-vis to the Ukrainian Crisis, Crimean annexation by Russia and Turkish unwillingness to antagonize her ex-superpower neighbor are questions to be explored by the neoclassical realist perspective. "Why did Turkey not stand with the U.S. during the Ukrainian Crisis?" is a question that neo-classical realist approach may have a grasp of. As already mentioned above, Turkish foreign policy decisions are made in a narrow circle in which

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<sup>21</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and uniforms : Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London : C. Hurst & co , 2003.

<sup>22</sup> Putnam, Robert, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games" *International Organization* 42, 3, Summer 1988.

<sup>23</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, pp. 280-299. Cambridge University Press 2009. (See pages 280-281)

<sup>24</sup> Lobell, Steven E., "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, pp. 42-74. Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 46)n

domestic players' influence is limited. However, even undemocratic states have a need to form coalitions on local levels - bargaining between elites and locals impinge foreign policy outcomes. According to neo-classical realism, not all states act alike to international threats or shifts in systemic conditions, which can differ according to the capability of the elites' public mobilization and extraction of national recourses.<sup>25</sup> Hence, while exploring the Turkish response to the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in the Black Sea, one has to take Turkish foreign policy elites' capability to mobilize public opinion and their ability to extract and canalize useful resources of Turkey into account.

Since my research question is about Turkey's decision making vis-à-vis a crisis that involves both the U.S. and Russia, it is only logical to analyze the historical background of Turkey's relationship with the U.S. and Russia in a detailed manner. Hence, the third chapter will be a historical analysis and the current status of the Turkish-American relationship. To clarify the distinction of Turkey's relation with the U.S., strategic partnership and their NATO alliance are to be discussed carefully. Turkey's strategic significance for the US can be seen in the continuation of their strategic partnership in the post-Cold War era. The strategic partnership has experienced a couple of obstacles along the way. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1964 Johnson Letter, and 1975 Arms Embargo were serious drawbacks in bilateral relations. However, the partnership between Ankara and Washington has never broken apart. The First and Second Gulf Wars too tested the strength of their relations, as the 2003 March 1<sup>st</sup> bill incident in 2003 left an important stain on mutual trust. The situation in northern Iraq and presence of PKK led the Turkish security bureaucracy to be concerned about Western alliance, but it was not sufficient to override its pro-Western status resulting from a long history<sup>26</sup>.

Turkey's partnership with the U.S. is more vivid in the Middle East, yet attention of the thesis will be exclusively on the Black Sea region. Turkey's relations with the Western alliance and the U.S. in the Black Sea ought to be analyzed in detailed nature. For example, tackling the nature of Turkey's relationship with the NATO countries in the Black Sea area in an important issue, while Turkey being an ally to the US, any attempt by the West on Black Sea region is

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<sup>25</sup> Schweller, Randall, "Unanswered threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing" *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall, 2004), pp. 159-201

<sup>26</sup> Lesser, Ian O., "Beyond Bridge or Barrier: Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West" inside "Turkey's New world: changing dynamics in Turkish foreign policy" Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.

seen as mildly paranoid.<sup>27</sup> On the one hand, Washington anticipated that Turkey's initiative through Black Sea Economic Cooperation would enhance Western influence in ex-Soviet republics,<sup>28</sup> in countries like Ukraine, but Turkey has not demonstrated a willingness to change regimes of her neighbors with the fear that it would bring instability.<sup>29</sup> Although, one can ask with Russia to annex Crimea and assume voice on Eastern Ukraine, is Turkey still concerned about prospective instabilities in the region?

The fourth chapter is an analysis of the history of the Turkish-Russian relations aimed at understanding the long-lasting and complex issues between the two regional powers. Besides, Russia being an ex-superpower and newly assumed potential world power, Turkey and Russia relations form a much more balanced manner than the Turkish-American relationship. The two civilizations warred with one another 13 times - most of them ending with Russia's victory. Although they have warred with one another a lot, the last one was during the First World War, newly created Soviet Russia decided on helping war-torn Turkey to achieve her independence. From 1919 to 1923, Turkey had struggled to form a new modern and independent state, and under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Paşa, she succeeded to give birth to a young, modern, independent republic, as the Lausanne Treaty, signed on July 24<sup>th</sup> of 1923, declared so. Young Turkey was settled in the region where Soviet Russia was trying to flourish, demonstrating an appetite for new communist/socialist powers to emerge. The agenda for Turkey's becoming a socialist state was not successful, yet Russia's consent on Turkey staying independent was enough for Soviets to support her new nationalist neighbor in the economy and technology. However, during the Second World War, Soviet Russia's interest in the Turkish Straits and northeastern cities of Kars, Ardahan, and Erzurum, had surfaced and Soviet leader Stalin, himself, desired to assume power of those strategic lands of Turkey.<sup>30</sup> Although it had been claimed that Stalin abandoned his early desires, trust between two states was injured deeply.

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<sup>27</sup> Hill, Fiona and Taşpınar, Ömer, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" *Survival* vol. 48 no. 1 Spring 2006, pp. 81-92.

<sup>28</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn. Praeger, 1999. See especially Chapter Four.

<sup>29</sup> Hill, Fiona and Taşpınar, Ömer, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" *Survival* vol. 48 no. 1 Spring 2006, pp. 81-92.

<sup>30</sup> Selim Deringil suggests that mentioned desires firstly appeared before the Second World War. Deringil, Selim, "Turkish Foreign Policy during the WWII" Cambridge University Press, 2004. According to Erer Tellal, Soviet Russia's disturbance had started during Montreux Convention talks. Turkey did not allow Russia to dictate her interests on the final document. See "Görelî Özerklik- 1" part inside "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar" (eds.) Baskın Oran. (Especially page 321)



After the Second World War, world politics entered a stage called the Cold War, mainly between Soviet Russia and the US. Europe was separated in two camps and Turkey became a member of capitalist/democratic states who were led by the Americans. As already written above, Turkey became a staunch ally in the North Atlantic alliance and held the Southern flank of the NATO successfully. Nevertheless, Turkey created a pattern as for when her relations with the Western alliance deteriorated, she tried to find comfort in Moscow's affection. As matter of fact, during the Cold War, Turkey was the second largest state that received Soviet economic aid, following to Cuba.<sup>31</sup> The Cold War ended in 1989 and Turkey started to develop a more practical foreign policy towards Russia. Turkey and Russia together initiated the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 1992, whereas Turkey's security-based foreign policy was replaced allegedly with trade-based foreign policy.<sup>32</sup> The Black Sea region became the first and the liveliest ground for Moscow and Ankara's partnership and, since the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century, new leadership under Putin and Erdogan enjoys good relations with the exception of the interlude after the Russian jet was shot down by the Turks. Both Russia and Turkey see the Black Sea as "their common territory" and react defensively when it comes to any other non-littoral power trying to interfere to the mentioned territory.<sup>33</sup> Although, several experts on Turkey suggest that Turkey is intimidated by growing Russian influence in the region,<sup>34</sup> the two states seem to improve their mutual trust every day. It is crucial to explore this phenomenon without only analyzing economic interdependence, as the constructivist approach would lean on, and the energy card of Russia has on Turkey.

After 2002 elections, AK Party create a government after it had assumed the absolute majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). AK Party, unlike other parties, opened a war against the status-quo tendency of the state. Even in the foreign policy arena, which had traditionally been beyond the daily domestic political discussion, AK Party had radical plans to implement. According to AK Party elites, the foreign policy-making process had been in the hands of incapable military officers and diplomats, and after their assumption of power, they

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<sup>31</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn. Praeger, 1999. See especially Chapter Three.

<sup>32</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn. Praeger, 1999. See especially pg. 139.

<sup>33</sup> Hill, Fiona and Taşpınar, Ömer, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" *Survival* vol. 48 no. 1 Spring 2006, pp. 81-92.

<sup>34</sup> Lesser, Ian O., "Beyond the Bridge of Barrier: Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West" inside "Turkey's New World: "(eds.) Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, see also Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniform", see also Bazoğlu Sezer Duygu, "Turkish-Russian Relation: From Adversity to Virtual Rapprochement" inside "Turkey's New World: "eds. Alan Makovsky, Sabri Sayarı.

ensured that foreign policy making would be more inclusive and transparent.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, to explore today's foreign policy making (FPM) process and elites' perceptions of the international arena, AK Party leadership's ideological standings and understanding of world affairs, ought to be carefully sketched. Since, the focal point of this thesis is about Turkish elites and their vital role in foreign policy-making, AK Party leadership's apprehension of Western alliance harbors very serious clues about Turkish decision to stay low during Ukraine Civil War. On that account, the fifth chapter is going to mix Turkish perception of world politics with help of elite's preferences and psychological aspect of foreign policy-making process.

To conclude, AK Party elites' perception vis-à-vis world politics was able to divide into three parts. Firstly, during the 2002-2009 era, AK Party followed traditional Turkish foreign policy under Ismail Cem's leadership. While Turkey was willing to form good relations with her Middle Eastern neighbors, the E.U. accession process was considered the key aspect for the Turkish elites. However, with the appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu's selection to the Foreign Ministry, Turkish foreign policy-making nature became Neo-Ottomanist, which was based on an ethnic-based notion. During the period of 2009-2015, Turkey's problems with her neighbors surfaced, the EU membership focus vanished, and her relationship with the West was disturbed heavily. Although Turkey was once again willing to fix her relations with the near abroad under the Premiership of Binali Yıldırım, it is soon to state any potential alteration in the foreign policy-making of Ankara. Overall, in the last 16 years, we can state that the Turkish foreign policy-making has been bound to two leaders at large: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoglu. These two key players in politics succeeded in eliminating traditional players, like the military and bureaucracy, and establishing their own agenda.

Finally, the audience will easily understand that, whether it be Kemalist elites or political Islamist elites, Turkish foreign policy-making is greatly constrained by the paranoia and phobia that was previously mentioned. Both Sevres paranoia and Russophobia seem to be very effective in the hearts and minds of the Turkish security/political/bureaucratic elites, which is particularly surfaced during the FPE dealing with the Ukraine Crisis. Initiatives that Turkey took during 1990s and her relations with a relatively weaker Russia was in a balanced and a more equalitarian way, which was also a link to Russophobic tendencies of FPE of Kemalist

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<sup>35</sup> Özcan, Gencer, "2000'li yıllarda Türkiye'de Dış Politika Yapım Süreci" inside "XXI. YY 'da Türk Dış Politikası Analizi", (eds.) Faik Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, Özlem Terzi, İstanbul: Der, 2012.

regimes. Hence, the foreign policy-making process is both limited by the local ideologues and this inner-outer enemy type of concept.

## 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this thesis, elites' importance and their perceptions/misperceptions in the daily routine of world politics are emphasized. Elites are important actors in the foreign policy-making process as previously mentioned in the introduction. Neoclassical realism suggests, like realism, states are the most important actors in world politics, and, unlike neorealism, it gives an importance to domestic conditions as well as external threats or shifts of power. However, while mixing both domestic and external conditions, it also gives political elites a highly effective position. Elites are the most vital part of foreign policy-making, and, with their bargaining and mobilization ability, states may or may not be successful in foreign policy.

This thesis is mainly focused on foreign policy analysis of the Turkish foreign policy decisions regarding the Ukrainian crisis and its motivations. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is a revised territory for international relations, and many experts on FPA claim that the theorized projections might be impossible to calculate accurately and thus risky to act upon. However the postulated questions need to be discussed and analyzed. Neoclassical realism, as the new current of realist theory, mainly optimized the causes of certain foreign policy decisions by certain state apparatuses. In neoclassical realism, like classical realism, domestic conditions also need to be analyzed, with a conjuncture of international pressures of course. Unlike the neorealist approach, neoclassical realism does not underline external threats or potential/possible shifts to explore foreign policy decision of states; internal pressures, veto players, and bargaining are also vital to make decisions upon clear international policy. Valerie Hudson suggests that:

*“interest in FPA has . . . grown because the questions being asked in FPA are those for which we most need answers. . . . There is no longer a stable and predictable system in the international arena. Now, more than ever, objectively operationalized indices do not seem to provide sufficient inputs to ensure the success of simplified expected utility equations.”<sup>36</sup>*

According to experts like Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jefferey W. Taliaferro, there exists an intertwined linkage between systemic and unit-level actors while conducting any

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<sup>36</sup> Hudson, Valerie M., Vore, Christophe S., “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow” *Mershon International Studies Review*, Volume 39, Issue 2, (Oct., 1995), 209-238. See page 221.

foreign policy making, and unit-level actors are defined as limitations or abilities for states in dealing with systemic conditions.<sup>37</sup>

After this remark, I must explain why I choose elite-based foreign policy analysis in the first place. In Turkey, since the late Ottoman Empire era, foreign policy-making has been commissioned to just a few members of the elite. In Republican times, we see a continuation of this as only the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and, most notably, the army influence Turkish foreign policymaking procedures. That is why elites tend to be very vital to Turkish decision-making in external relations. After the Democrat Party assumed power in 1950, it democratized the foreign policy-making procedure, yet new narrow circles were born and foreign policy-making remained an elite business<sup>38</sup>. Turkey experienced a democratization and progress in nearly all political fields in the 1960s, however the 1971 military intervention heavily crushed this current of democratization and public consciousness successfully. The 1980's presidency was in charge of high politics, i.e. security and diplomacy; yet, military was responsible for setting the country's political direction. Under lack of strong political leadership and weak governments, military grasped the power in foreign policy-making until the AK Party government. The balance between Kemalists and Islamists was thus destroyed, and the civilian government succeeded in becoming the chief policy-maker.

To explore critical foreign policy decisions and conduct a better understanding of the foreign policy-making process, one needs something more than offensive or defensive realism suggests. Although neorealism is a good stepping stone for explaining the possibility of war or a new alliance, it is not flexible in discovering why states behave the way they do. For example, for a neorealist, it is a fact that a weaker state always bandwagons, while a powerful state motivates to expand her influence no matter what <sup>39</sup>. Neoclassical realism is more attuned to structural realism in the sense of reasons and is willing to bring more maneuvering capability to realism, whereas it is criticized of being deductive.

It is rather suitable to trace classical realist theory and its voyage in inspiring neorealist perspective to be born. Classical realism was highly influenced from Western European

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<sup>37</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 4)

<sup>38</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn. Praeger, 1999. See especially Chapter Two.

<sup>39</sup> Schweller, Randall L., "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.

political history and is rather inductive compared to neorealist theories. Its philosophical background was based on the nature of world politics, which is anarchic and chaotic. While the international system is somewhat important for classical realists, units are changing in dealing with pressures and alterations in the international arena. Foreign policy outcomes are considered as a dependent variable, and there exists a causal link between power distribution and foreign policy making. Power distribution determines mostly if a state acts like a status-quo player or a revisionist<sup>40</sup>.

**Table 2.1.** Classical realism, neorealism and, neoclassical realism

<i>Research Program</i>	<i>Epistemology and Methodology</i>	<i>View of the international system</i>	<i>View of the units</i>	<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Underlying causal logic</i>
<i>CLASSICAL REALISM</i>	Inductive theories; philosophical reflection on nature of politics or detailed historical analysis (generally drawn from W. European history)	Somewhat Important	Differentiated	Foreign policies of states	Power distributions or Distribution of interests (revisionist vs. status quo)->foreign policy
<i>NEOREALISM</i>	Deductive theories; competitive hypothesis testing using qualitative and sometimes quantitative methods	Very important; inherently competitive and uncertain	Undifferentiated	International political outcomes	Relative power distributions (independent variable) -> international outcomes (dependent variable)

<sup>40</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See table in page 20).

<i>NEOCLASSICAL REALISM</i>	Deductive theorizing; competitive hypothesis testing using qualitative methods	Important; implications of anarchy are variable and sometimes opaque to decision-makers	Differentiated	Foreign policies of states	Relative power distributions (independent variable) -> domestic constraints and elite perceptions (intervening variables) -> foreign policy (dependent variable)
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*Source: Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009*

Neorealism is a perspective that claims existence of an anarchic international system in which distribution of power is not clear. Power has an absolute vitality and uncertainty, power distribution causes anarchy as a permissive condition. As Putnam also suggests, statesmen are forced to react to external as well as internal environments, according to which, they must mobilize domestic resources and enhance support from local figures<sup>41</sup>. In neorealism, hypotheses are mostly tested in qualitative methods, although one can see quantitative ones as well. As mentioned above, the international system and its nature is very important, and uncertain in comparison to units, which are not defined thoroughly. Neorealism helps experts come up with international political outcomes, with relative power distributions standing as a dependent variable and domestic constraints and elite perceptions serving as independent variables<sup>42</sup>.

Neoclassical realism, born to redefine realism in the need of its repercussions, emerged in late 1990's in the writings of scholars like Thomas Christensen, Randall Schweller, William

<sup>41</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 7)

<sup>42</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See table in page 20).

Wohlforth and Fareed Zakaria, and the term itself was coined by Gideon Rose. According to Gideon Rose:

*“Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure.”*<sup>43</sup>

There is not one neoclassical realist theory, but several theories around, and neoclassical realism leaves us with ambiguity when dealing with hypotheses, policy prescriptions and its own empirical nature. Also, neoclassical realism faces strong criticism over its independence from realism in general. In summary, foreign policy decisions can be explored in a way that assumes both domestic variables and international ones interact with one another while considering the role of the state. Neoclassical realism is also seen as a deductively natured theory while it’s been said that it uses qualitative methods like neorealism. The international system is important in original realist theories with international threats and alterations being defined clearly, unlike neoclassical realism. The outcome in the theory is foreign policy decisions of states, while units are defined, relative distribution of power is an independent variable, in which foreign policy outcomes are dependent variables. In addition, experts observe intervening variables like domestic limitations and elite perceptions/misperceptions<sup>44</sup>. Most importantly, the strength of neo-classical realism seems to cover the gaps that realist theories created, which, according to experts, is a good start in creating a well-articulated theory on the state<sup>45</sup>.

According to Taliaferro, neorealism and neo-classical realism complement one another<sup>46</sup>. While neorealism explains outcomes like; wars, alliances, arms race etc., neoclassical realism seeks to analyze foreign policy decisions of a state such as the question of this very thesis: “Why did Turkey not stand with the U.S./Western powers in Ukraine Crisis?”. This is a clear-

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<sup>43</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy” inside “Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy” (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 5)

<sup>44</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy” inside “Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy” (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See table in page 20).

<sup>45</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy” inside “Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy” (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 13)

<sup>46</sup> Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited” *International Security*, Volume 25, Number 3, Winter 2000/01, pp. 128-161. (see page 133)



cut foreign policy preference question and it can be tackled with the help of the neoclassical realist perspective. Since the question is only about a foreign policy decision but also with its results, neorealism cannot make any predictions about behavior of a state because neorealism tries to explore grand systemic conditions and come up theories like balance-of-power<sup>47</sup>. , Neoclassical realism's approach and its starting point should be enough for this thesis.

Waltz's balance-of-power theory is the most well-known theory when we talk about realism and its branches. According to Waltz, since the world lacks a hegemonic order, states experience difficulties born from anarchy, ambiguous distribution of power, and of the consequent security threats that arise around them. Balance-of-power theory assumes that all states are equal when it comes to extract mobility of its citizens and they have unlimited resources to mobilize its people. Lobell, Taliaferro and Ripsman highly criticize this idea and claim these deductive theories only make realism appear simplistic and pseudo-scientific<sup>48</sup>.

The difference between defensive and offensive realism can offer a preview as to why neorealism and neoclassical realism are two diverse approaches to understand world politics or why realism needed a new fresh perspective in the first place. Offensive realism is about the maximization of power under every circumstance, expansion, and aggressiveness in foreign trade which may easily lead the way to mercantilism. On the other hand, defensive realism is mostly about cooperation, or the perspective that cooperation is easier in comparison with offensive realism<sup>49</sup>. Although both give the security dilemma importance, expansion in defensive realism is only conditional while expansion is the only chance to survive in offensive realism. The foremost notion of the security dilemma that realist theory is that the international system is anarchic, power distribution is unclear, and states are uncertain of the intentions of other states, which motivates states to pursue power maximization. Although defensive realism and offensive realism see power maximization or expansionism from different angles, there is a fine thin line between being aggressive or protectionist in foreign policy. Nonetheless, the debate between defensive and offensive realism is about the nature of the international system,

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<sup>47</sup> Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited" *International Security*, Volume 25, Number 3, Winter 2000/01, pp. 128-161. (see page 134)


<sup>48</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 13)

<sup>49</sup> Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited" *International Security*, Volume 25, Number 3, Winter 2000/01, pp. 128-161. (see page 159).

which creates conflicts about how states should protect themselves in this while trying to assess other states' intentions and next moves<sup>50</sup>.

In neoclassical realism, it is possible to explain and understand different foreign policy decisions of the same state in different time frames but in a similar foreign environment. Neoclassical realism, unlike neorealism, resembles the classical realist approach in that it centralizes the concept of state in foreign policy making with its constraints and limitations coming from not just externalities but localities as well. Unlike other realist theories, neoclassical realism can expand our understanding vis-à-vis the state and its capabilities to mobilize its population, ability to control its policy agenda, and respond to stimulations coming from international environment at the same time. Nevertheless, while achieving these objectives (e.g. like predicting diplomatic and economic response of a state in a scenario), it fails to explain international outcomes of those foreign policy decisions. Maybe it would be correct to state that this is not its target in the first place, anyway<sup>51</sup>.

**Figure 2.1.** The neoclassical realism model of foreign policy



Source: *The neoclassical realist model of foreign policy*

<sup>50</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 15)

<sup>51</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 21)

<http://internationalstudies.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-36?rskey=JtJNsl&result=4>


Neoclassical realism observes that the state is formed by political and bureaucratic leaders like the president, prime minister and other actors officially commissioned for executing foreign policymaking. Leaders are the main decision makers in foreign policy actions who define national interests and execute decisions upon their own assessments, ideas with limitations from internal movements and motivations of other states. This approach never sees the state as completely independent from society like their a priori realist colleagues. According to neoclassical realism, the state does not act as a unitary actor, and its independence from its society may differ from time to time or state to state, which is vital for the state to respond to international alterations and threats efficiently. Neoclassical realism claims that political elites are important in foreign policy decisions, as their understandings and misperceptions are vital to make policy decisions, although always limited by the vetoes coming from local elites and international pressures. Apart from perceptions of elites, disagreement on international developments between locals and top leadership may hamper the decision-making process - even though political leadership understands external threats, its (in)efficiency will be in accordance with its (in)ability to persuade local leaders<sup>52</sup>. According to Norrin Ripsman, national elites are more responsive to local leaders when they feel that the notion of their power is challenged or their dominance/hegemony over the resources and people are in the wake of slipping away from their hands<sup>53</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 32)

<sup>53</sup> Ripsman, Norrin, "Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups", (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 173)

**Figure 2.2.** The neoclassical realist model of the resource-extractive state



*Source: The resource-extraction model treats states' alignment behavior as exogenous. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W "Neoclassical realism and resource extraction: State building for future war" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 214).*

Power is very important in neoclassical realism as well, and its relativity defines how states perceive their interest and conduct a foreign policy agenda accordingly. Power struggles not only exist between states, but also among domestic groups. Neoclassical realism defends that conflicting groups and their identities define group interests in which those groups force top elites in their foreign policy decisions as well. The struggle of those separate groups, may affect decision-making regarding collective security and national interest, while experts cannot be sure if those local elites are aware of national interests or even if they are responsive to national

and security interest of a state at all<sup>54</sup>. Hence, competition inside and outside of a country are complementary and not independent from one another<sup>55</sup>.

Although it is a general understanding that state power is considered in terms of military strength, it is also shaped from ideology which may be diluted or strengthened by domestic struggles<sup>56</sup>. In the long run, states try to mobilize its resources with ideology and states which are successful in doing so are more autonomous in foreign decision-making while leaders that fail to extract resources of their country have great difficulty to make foreign policy decisions easily<sup>57</sup>. According to Thomas Christensen, extraction of resources is not the only clue for a strong state institution, but it is also linked to the leader's ability to manipulate people and persuade them to accept the leader's perception of the world as their own. Christensen claims that national power concept is "the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation's human and material resources behind security policy initiatives."<sup>58</sup> In addition to that, Friedberg, Zakaria and Christensen defend that, states with ability to extract resources and experience external threats are more prone to be successful in hard power building, while states experiencing external threat and not that successful in mobilization of resources and its people, do not easily achieve to make advancement in its hard power. On the other hand, states which do not face threats from abroad can luxuriate in high mobilization of resources, consequently gaining the conditions to head for innovation and execute their own grand strategy. States with low level of resource extraction and external peace/stability are less prone to innovation, but since they are not disturbed by international developments, they continue to enforce their own strategies<sup>59</sup>.

According to neoclassical realists, the society is the entity that defines a state's national interests, which will be shaped by its perception or understanding of democracy. . In other

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<sup>54</sup> Lobell, Steven E. "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 57).

<sup>55</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 35).

<sup>56</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 38).

<sup>57</sup> Taliaferro, Jeffrey W "Neoclassical realism and resource extraction: State building for future war" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 197).

<sup>58</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.11.

<sup>59</sup> Taliaferro, Jeffrey W "Neoclassical realism and resource extraction: State building for future war" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 218-219).

words, state society relations may cause the concept of national survival to be understood as regime survival. Hence, if the bureaucracy is stronger and autonomous from society, regime survival overwhelms national security and interest, meaning that class or group interests become considered as vital and foreign policy-making also gets affected by this narrow interest process. This narrow thinking of national security may cause foreign policy elites to act ineffectively or undynamic in dealing with an external threat or shift in international politics. On the other hand, consensus between foreign policy elites and domestic actors will lead to effectivity and appropriateness of foreign policy-making, leading foreign policy decisions to be quick and affective<sup>60</sup>.

Foreign policy elites constitute an important part in forming security and strategic positioning of a state. While they are examining international shifts and global threats in a long-term manner, they also have access to delicate information on global politics and inner security phenomena to help design and form that state's road map. On the other hand, domestic actors, whether it be inward-leaning nationalist or outward-looking internationalists, are mostly concerned with the local power shifts and its effects on their interests and continuation. Consequently, a shift in power components of a state may ensure another coalition in the foreign policy-making process and foreign policy elites experience unlimited ability to execute verdicts in international arena<sup>61</sup>.

According to complex threat identification in neoclassical realist approach, great powers may feel threatened by international alterations in world politics and changes in domestic power distribution, while regional powers feel threatened by not only international shifts and domestic changes but also alterations in sub-systemic conditions. These three different conditions, domestic-systemic-sub-systemic, are intertwined and their demarcation lines are mostly ambiguous. Therefore, while an actor targets a problem on one level, he or she can easily address another one as well. By only addressing one threat level, foreign policy actors can misunderstand global shifts and other states' intentions<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>60</sup> Lobell, Steven E. "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 46).

<sup>61</sup> Lobell, Steven E. "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 45-46).

<sup>62</sup> Lobell, Steven E. "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 46-47).

To find out who is relevant in foreign policy decision-making, Steven Lobell criticizes other neoclassical realists like Norrin Ripsman and Colin Dueck for analyzing state in a top-down manner. According to many neoclassical realists, state leaders only possess the authority to make foreign policy decisions since they have access to delicate national security information along with the intention of other states. While foreign policy elites are the most important actors in dealing with issues of national security and global threats, social cohesion, public support and quality of administration apparatus are required to form national power. Therefore, the distinction between state power and national power were invented by a couple of neo-classical realist experts and the unified decision-making apparatus idea was revised<sup>63</sup>. Steven Lobell argues that other neoclassical realists including Norrin Ripsman and Colin Dueck fail to see the effect of domestic leaders in defining foreign threats. Although it is true that domestic elites may not have access to security information and intelligence that national security elite/bureaucracy has, their concern of internal and external threats exist. In a nutshell, while domestic leaders have economic concerns vis-à-vis foreign state's intentions, the national elite has more security-based concerns and a long-run grand strategy in dealing with foreign policy. For example, a domestic elite observes attempts of a foreign state from lenses of its economic interest, which is survival for its struggle as well. Any power shift in the international arena is evaluated by domestic leaders with the concern of its production chain, survival of its sector, and if that change will threaten its firms and maximization of its economic welfare<sup>64</sup>. Contrary to Schweller, Lobell argues that the more domestic elites depend on foreign threat identification of foreign policy elites the more they are insignificant or unable to alter or pressure high national security decisions. Counterbalancing another state by foreign policy elites may be experienced by feet dragging from local elites, since they find counterbalancing costly enough to not engage. For example, domestic elites can pressure government to execute a foreign policy agenda even if it is not in accordance with the state's national interest<sup>65</sup>. While defining national interest, Lobell talks something that is more long-term and grand. According to Lobell, states have a grand strategy that is formed by national security elites, bureaucrats and state leaders; this is

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<sup>63</sup> Lobell, Steven E. "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 56).

<sup>64</sup> Lobell, Steven E. "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 57).

<sup>65</sup> Lobell, Steven E. "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 60-61).

not necessarily in a manner of hard power but in nature of financial, economic and political interests of a state as well. This mentioned strategy covers national interest for decades and is not permanent to every government in this country. Apart from that, the grand strategy is clearly perpetual in a state of war or peace<sup>66</sup>.

Lobell further argues that a power shift on the sub-systemic level may cause societal and foreign policy elites to form a coalition, in which foreign policy-making is easier if we compare with other scenarios. A foreign power that threatens both state and local elites, mostly unintentionally, will cause both to unite around a national strategy and lead to an “unconstrained FPE” as no vetoes and pressures to foreign policy bureaucracy/elites to execute a foreign policy decision in this time of despair. On the contrary, in a scenario in which foreign policy elites and its supporters observe a foreign threat resonating from a power shift in the international arena, local elites that are more aligned with the foreign power’s perspective may not see this change as a threat which should be counterbalanced. Opposition to counterbalance consists of local business elites and merchants who are economically dependent on that foreign state and have strong ties with elites in that foreign state. Moreover, opposing societal elites undermines the threat coming from that foreign state; and, if their veto power and pressure is big enough, they can easily manipulate national security elites’ maneuver capability, in which state policy ends up in an inappropriate balancing strategy<sup>67</sup>. Additionally, national security elites, even in a non-democratic country, may be responsive to local elites and their local concerns when national elites believe that they are losing power. Hence, they are persuaded by the idea that taking ideas of local elites would make their rule more resilient, even there is a risk of choosing inappropriate foreign policy maneuvers<sup>68</sup>.

Apart from the economic welfare of local elites and their pressure to state elites on threat assessment of a foreign state, Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider claim that most leaders are attached to the idea that economic interdependence between states make sure that mentioned states end up making peace. There is a strong idea that expanding economic relations

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<sup>66</sup> Lobell, Steven E. “Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model” inside “Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy” (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 61-62).

<sup>67</sup> Lobell, Steven E. “Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model” inside “Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy” (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 64-65).

<sup>68</sup> Ripsman, Norrin, “Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups”, (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 173)



ameliorates ties of friendship<sup>69</sup>. On the other hand, Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins suggest that interaction between economic interdependence and domestic leadership, political preferences and interest of local elites are vital to explore violence inside the state<sup>70</sup>. However, Scott Kasner supports the idea that economic ties between states can alter the notion of state goals and may limit foreign policy behavior of states<sup>71</sup>.

Nationalism and ideology may also be intervening variables to observe the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policymaking. These two concepts help us determine state power and to uncover the limitations that states have. Although Taliaferro uses the concept of nationalism as a political movement for increasing benefits and interests for the sake of this group, there are other dimensions to investigate. For example, nationalism may also be redefined as state-sponsored nationalism, in which the state uses this concept to incorporate different groups into a unifying identity. At this point, an individual is bound to their national identity rather than an ethnic or religious identity. Individuals from different backgrounds are loyal to this national identity apart from their other identities, national identity dominates other identities, which supports social cohesion. However, social cohesion should not be mixed with political unanimity; even in an ultra-nationalistic state, political cleavages and rivalries exist. Social cohesion is about sacrifice that people make especially in a state where external threat occurs, and people are easily motivated to legitimize state's organs. National elites are inclined to manage national resources, and mobilization can be achieved to obtain military power<sup>72</sup>. Although the concept of ideology is related to nationalism, they are not the same. Ideology may be helpful for an elite to extract national resources and obtain mobilization due to whether elite's ideology has shared background with local/domestic politicians, ideologues or population.

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<sup>69</sup> Sterling-Folker, Jessica, "Neoclassical realism and identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 100).

<sup>70</sup> Sterling-Folker, Jessica, "Neoclassical realism and identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 101).

<sup>71</sup> Sterling-Folker, Jessica, "Neoclassical realism and identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 101-102).

<sup>72</sup> Taliaferro, Jeffrey W "Neoclassical realism and resource extraction: State building for future war" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 219-220).

However, in some cases, ideology can be easily manipulative and mitigate state elite's mobilization and extraction capacity<sup>73</sup>.

According to Randall L. Schweller, extraction and mobilization capacity alone are important intervening variables in FPA. Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, offensive realism suggests that states should be in constant expansion but their failure to do so exposed a loophole in this literature. Neorealists have persisted in putting forward international development and distribution of power to explain the tameness of a state to expand their interest and territory. Neoclassical realists like Taliaferro, Ripsman, and Lobell state that under-aggression and under-expansion are linked to state elite's capacity of mobilization and resource extraction. Furthermore, ideology and nationalism may also be supportive for leaders to extract and mobilize as social cohesion is vital to execute foreign policy decisions, yet ideology and nationalism alone cannot be sufficient for states to pursue more aggressive and expansionist policies<sup>74</sup>.

Mearsheimer suggests that, big powers that do not achieve regional dominance are considered as revisionist states and they are going to try dominating their neighbors. In his own words, Mearsheimer says: "... *anarchy and uncertainty about other states' intentions create an irreducible level of fear among states that leads to power-maximizing behavior ...the structure of the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers, causes them to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony.*"<sup>75</sup> If Mearsheimer's argument were right, there would be constant aggression and motivation towards expansion by particular states (revisionist states). According to neoclassical realists, foreign expansion needs a few additional points that structural realists have missed. Foreign expansion requires a compound state that consists of: elites that agree on the state's grand strategy, an effective government which is unconstrained to execute delicate and risky foreign policy decisions, and populations that are ready to sacrifice their own needs for the state's grand strategy. To achieve that, elites should have the ability to mobilize their ideology to nationalist mobilization. According to Schweller,

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<sup>73</sup> Taliaferro, Jeffrey W "Neoclassical realism and resource extraction: State building for future war" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 221-222).

<sup>74</sup> Schweller, Randall L., "Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: expansionist ideology in the age of mass politics." (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press (see pages 229-230).

<sup>75</sup> Schweller, Randall L., "Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: expansionist ideology in the age of mass politics." (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, 2009, (see page 231). According to Mearsheimer there has only been one regional hegemon, the United States. Thus he writes: "Even when a great power achieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved." *John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), page 34.*

realism does not provide that kind of ideology, and it is more likely a theory that explains why things remain constant in politics<sup>76</sup>. However, fascism is such an ideology. Fascism, especially between two world wars, promoted the applicable means for statesmen to mobilize populations and extract resources of countries. Fascism also shares common ideas on world politics and state foundation regarding the role of state and nature of the world politics. However, unlike the core assumption of realism, fascism did extract resources, mobilize population, and manage to form a unified state contrary to people's wellbeing. Wars broke out in the name of fascist ideology which has caused experts and scholars to see the mentioned ideology from a haunted perspective<sup>77</sup>.

Like all paradigms, neoclassical realism has its flaws and loopholes. According to Benjamin O. Fordham, neoclassical realists assume that domestic and international conditions are separable. There exists an overwhelming idea that threats resourced from world politics are defined by a coalition that runs a state, and local interests are influenced by international developments that are born outside of that state. Therefore, it is not logical to see domestic and international variables as cumulative and see national interest and domestic interest as objective concepts. Hence, Fordham comes up with a model called "*interactive model*", which shows that foreign policy outcomes emerge as an interaction between local interests and pressure of international environment<sup>78</sup>. It is a fact that state elites consider both international and local friends and enemies to execute a foreign policy decision. Both domestic and international conditions are vital, yet the distinction the two are important to explore - e.g. weighing their significance in international cases. According to Jack Snyder, international considerations are more vital in democratic or unitary states, while local interests are more influential in foreign policymaking of cartel states<sup>79</sup>. Fordham claims that the nature and existence of an international threat cannot be determined without knowing the identity of the national security elites that are commissioned to execute foreign policy decisions. As well, it is beneficial to theorize that without knowing

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<sup>76</sup> Schweller, Randall L., "Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: expansionist ideology in the age of mass politics." (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, see page 247-48).

<sup>77</sup> Schweller, Randall L., "Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: expansionist ideology in the age of mass politics." (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, see page 234).

<sup>78</sup> Fordham, Benjamin O., "The limits of neoclassical realism: additive and interactive approaches to explaining foreign policy preferences." (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, 2009 (see page 251).

<sup>79</sup> Fordham, Benjamin O., "The limits of neoclassical realism: additive and interactive approaches to explaining foreign policy preferences." (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, 2009 (see page 253).

the interaction of mentioned elites' interests and motives, it is difficult to analyze the perspective of that elite in the decision process on a foreign policy move<sup>80</sup>.

Finally, after a through theoretical background, it is time for a detailed historical background to gain a context for the research question. Hence, Chapter Three will be a loaded histography of Turkish-American relations which will harbor the various waves of animosity and amicability and be significant in displaying an eighty years of time frame.

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<sup>80</sup> Fordham, Benjamin O., "The limits of neoclassical realism: additive and interactive approaches to explaining foreign policy preferences." (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, 2009. (see page 255-56).

### 3. AMERICAN-TURKISH RELATIONS: TRADITIONAL BACKGROUND

*“To conduct politics with big states is like sharing the same bed with a bear.”*

*İsmet İnönü*

Since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Turkey slowly tried to adopt Western system and technologies, since the West was considered powerful, enlightened and advanced. Even Turkey had sent envoys to capitals of the Western states to observe closely the administration, culture and politics of those advanced countries. Before Selim the Third, the Ottoman Empire had not seen any benefit in sending permanent diplomats to foreign capitals, as it thought to other states to be degenerate and backwards. Turkey, with the help of her newly endowed diplomatic skills, was able to survive for at least a century, however in a very ill situated nature. Although, those diplomatic skills that the late Ottoman Empire had acquired were also very helpful for the Turkish Republic to prove herself as an independent nation, was worth to consider as modern and Europeanized.

Between the two world wars, Turkey did not form a committed relationship with the U.S. as the U.S. had not become a considerable transatlantic power yet. However, after the Second World War, United States pioneered the allied forces to create a new world order, which was highly constituted as a capitalist world order. This new world order was supported by institutions which were named after the talks at Bretton Woods, United States, and the institutional structure itself was named after that town as well. The Bretton Woods system was financial, economic and political. With the end of the Second World War, winning states had guaranteed newly established institutions were mostly in their hands. The United Nations was founded, and five victorious powers were situated at the top of the organization's security council with their ability to veto in delicate issues in world politics. Turkey was one of the founding members of the UN, which was the umbrella organization for the world politics. After gaining U.N. membership, Turkey wanted to become a member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), which was the newly formed security organization of the Western-capitalist bloc, in opposition to the Warsaw Pact, which was formed in the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For the sake of being considered for NATO membership, Turkey joined the U.S. and its' allies in the Korean War, and lost the second biggest amount of soldiers during war just after the U.S. Through her participation and performance, Turkey proved that she was worthy of being considered a trusted ally. In 1952, Turkey became a member of NATO along with her long-lasting rival, Greece. As the U.S.-

Turkish alliance is important to understand Turkish foreign motivations and decisions, in this chapter, we will be providing a historical background of American-Turkish relations.

NATO membership is vital to understand Turkish foreign policy-making and its execution. Being an ally within this Western partnership allowed Turkey to protect her territorial integrity but also this alliance shaped Turkey's foreign policy behavior<sup>81</sup>. Although Turkey was a staunch ally to the West, there was always suspicion in the minds of Turkish foreign policy elites that Western European states (who were observed to be neo-imperialists) would support policies that could weaken or dissolve Turkey when the opportunity presented itself. On the other hand, public opinion in Turkey easily shows us that the United States constitutes a bigger fear which can weaken and dissolve Turkey whenever she wishes<sup>82</sup>. Being a member of the Western institutions can only be understood by this paranoia that experts call "Sevres Syndrome"<sup>83</sup>, which can basically be understood as the collective fear that Western states will dismantle Turkey. However, at the same time, Turkey feels a drastic need to be around them and make alliances with Western states, especially in economic and security partnerships. This paranoia is well settled not only in the minds of ordinary citizens, but it can also be observed in the decision-making of the foreign policy elites, be they Kemalists or political Islamists.

As the Second World War came to an end, Turkey's alliance alternatives diminished. Apart from the Soviet Union, who had assisted Turkey during the War of Independence and during the early years of the republic, the United States and Western alliance also served as a rock in Turkey's struggling post-war era. However, Soviet interest on the Turkish Straits and northeastern cities of Kars, Erzurum and Ardahan, put Turkish leaders in a difficult situation. Turkey was on the brink of a crucial decision; however, she didn't want to choose any of the camps at the beginning of the Cold war because she had long learned to play the balance of power card well known in Turkish diplomacy. Yet, the Soviet threat was experienced as very real and challenging, so Turkish elite had to the West and especially on the United States of America. This early postwar era is considered by Turkish Foreign Policy scholars as being in a Western orbit and this unconditional trust in the US alliance continue until the 1960s<sup>84</sup>.

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<sup>81</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn. Praeger, 1999. See especially the introduction.

<sup>82</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniform: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War", Hurst&Company, London, 2003. (See page 100)

<sup>83</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012" İletişim Yayınları 1840, 2013.

<sup>84</sup> Baskın Oran defines this period, from 1945 to 1960 as Turkish Foreign Policy had been settled to the Western Orbit. Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1" İletişim Yayınları 758, 2001.

Likewise, the U.S. had a strong interest in seeing Turkey join the ranks of the anti-Communist camp since the Turkish Straits were a strategic advantage for the Western alliance, and the last thing that the U.S. would want to see is Turkey becoming a Soviet satellite.

From the 1960s onwards, the Turkish-American alliance began to face downturns and challenges. In 1962, Soviet Russia decided to establish a missile system in Cuba, thus triggering the Cuban missile crisis. However, the Americans, feeling threatened by this Soviet move, settled their Jupiter missiles on Turkish soil to countermand the threat. Hence, the two nations nearly came to the brink of a nuclear war. American authorities later decided to remove Jupiter missiles that were settled on Turkish soil without consulting or giving any memo on the issue.

On the other hand, antagonism on the island of Cyprus had been internationalized, against all efforts by Turkish leadership. Turks and Greeks on the island were experiencing ethnic tensions, and clashes began. The possibility of a unilateral operation by the Turks received a harsh reaction from the Americans in the form of a letter sent by then American President Lyndon B. Johnson. The Johnson Letter, in practice, forbade Turkey to use American and NATO-sourced weapons and military technologies in a Cypriot operation, and Johnson threatened that the US might not come to Turkey's help if this operation triggered a Soviet attack on Turkish soil.

Another issue that constrained Turkish-American bilateral relations was the opium issue. Opium farming was considered an important revenue sources for the Turks, especially those who lived in the inner Aegean Region. However, during the 1960's, American presidents were pressured to fight against the usage of narcotics. According to the records in 1968, five hundred thousand Americans were addicted to heroin and similar kinds of narcotics. Washington was convinced that the illegal drugs that ended up in the US were being brought in from Turkish lands, which forced Americans and Turks to hold negotiations regarding this during the end of the 1960s. Americans pressured Turkey to ban her opium production facilities, yet tensions continued until 1978 when the American legislature lifted the arms sales embargo that had been in place for three years<sup>85</sup>.

This move led slight mistrust to awake in the Turks, as Turkish leaders were awakened from the dream that American interests did not always coincide with the Turkish interests. Turkey, now, was coming to the realization that when it came to foreign policy-making, she could not

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<sup>85</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1" İletişim Yayınları 758, 2001. Pp 708.

trust any other state with closed eyes. The bottom line was that Turkey had become very fragile in regards to a possible Soviet assault with the American decision to remove missiles - Turkey's alleged strategic partner. Therefore, Turkey's security bureaucracy and leadership decided to execute a much more balanced foreign policy between the years of 1960s to 1980s. This transition became what Turkish foreign policy experts defined as: "Comparative Autonomy" in Turkish Foreign Policy<sup>86</sup>.

As international politics had experienced a *détente* by the end of the 1970s, this short wind of hope and peace lasted until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. During 1983-1989, Turgut Özal's Premiership, Ankara and Washington's partnership lived its golden years<sup>87</sup>. During those years, American interests were basically the establishment of a stable government in Turkey, Greece's return to NATO's military wing, affirmation of the new (Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement) (DECA) by the Turks, formation of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and reinforcement of bases in Turkish lands, amelioration of Northern tier of the alliance by enlarging cooperation with Pakistan and adapting the Green Belt to counter USSR's power in the region<sup>88</sup>.

Even though, Turkey believed that American aid was not in accordance with her merit and an unsatisfactory exchange to participate in this alliance, the Turkish military industry got better in this period. In a nutshell, the 1980s were observed as one of the most advanced American-Turkish bilateral relations, yet it was built on reciprocal compromise but not on a healthy cooperation of two allies<sup>89</sup>.

The end of the notorious Cold War brought Turkey new opportunities and restraints. Through the late 1980s, due the *détente* between both camps, Turkey's strategic importance had diminished<sup>90</sup>. However, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and dissolution of the USSR brought Turkey's importance back to the fore, and during the 1990s, the Turkish strategic partnership

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<sup>86</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1" İletişim Yayınları 758, 2001. Pp 653-855

<sup>87</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 50.

<sup>88</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 48.

<sup>89</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 80-81.

<sup>90</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002)." Kaynak Yayınları No: 899. Ekim 2007. Pp 775.



became vital to American interests in global and regional politics<sup>91</sup>. Although Füsün Türkmen claimed that throughout the 1990s Turkey had been considered a stand-up ally to American interests, Sabri Sayarı's counterargument on Turkey's importance to the U.S. is an interesting one to mention. According to Sayarı, the first two years of the Clinton Administration, there was a strong belief that Turkey was a declining asset, primarily because of the thought that Saddam could not resist the Operation Peace Comfort and would soon be overthrown by the allied forces<sup>92</sup>. On the other hand, George Sellers Harris contradicts the idea of Turkey being a declining asset by saying that the Gulf War handed back Turkey's geostrategic position in the Middle East, consequently vitalizing Turkey's importance for U.S. interests<sup>93</sup>. From the Turkish point of view, the U.S. has continued to be an important support both in international relations and in Turkey's inner politics. İlhan Uzgel stated that although all problems from the a priori era continued to exist, the Turkish-American strategic alliance and political cooperation did not cease to exist. In addition to that, the new post-Cold War era provided new cooperation zones like Euro-Balkans, Caucasasia, Central Asia and Middle East; yet again, there was a lack of agreement and cooperation on the topics of Kurdish and Cyprus issues, which led to disappointment most of time for Turkey and the U.S. .<sup>94</sup>

On August 1990, the Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait and Operation Peace Comfort (OPC) was launched by the Americans and its allies. Turkey was a part of this alliance, and the First Gulf War of 1990-91 was a major cooperation and conflicting issue for the Washington-Ankara line. American demands to open a new front in northern Iraq, send Turkey's troops to allied camps in Saudi Arabia and pile up Turkish battalions to the Iraqi borders indicated serious commitment to the American cause. Although President Özal had accepted Washington's demands, the Turkish army, Foreign Ministry and public opinion were highly against going ahead. Although there was a perception that only Özal was favoring American conditions, Ekavi Athanassopoulou suggests that the Turkish army's ambitious modernization efforts would be in vain if Turkey did not join the OPC, thus the decision to join the war should not only be

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<sup>91</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 251.

<sup>92</sup> Sayari, Sabri, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 93.

<sup>93</sup> Harris, George Sellers, "Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 80.

<sup>94</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 243.

attributed to Özal but the military elite as well<sup>95</sup>. Turkey had been forced to close the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, and, within the OPC, she also opened her borders to millions of refugees coming from northern Iraq. Overall, the Gulf War could be considered as hazardous to Turkish economic and political life<sup>96</sup>.

As a matter of fact, apart from the overwhelming cooperation tendency of Turkey and the U.S., the Kurdish question happened to be challenging after the Gulf War and there was a common belief, both in the minds of ordinary citizens and the press, that Washington would be willing to create an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, which also would assume the southern cities of Turkey<sup>97</sup>. According to Sabari Sayarı, there existed no other tension that constrained Turkish-American relations than the Iraq and Kurdish issue. Plus, there were no other problems to possibly damage bilateral cooperation between Washington and Ankara<sup>98</sup>. Soli Özel, an expert in American politics, also thinks that the center of the Turkish-American tensions was constituted by the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds and the overwhelming belief that the U.S. wanted to create a Kurdish state just below the Turkey's border<sup>99</sup>.

Other constraints that challenge Turkish-American relations were human rights issues and the Greek/Cyprus conflict that Turkey had been dealing with for three decades. According to İlhan Uzgel, U.S. foreign policy had been involved with the human rights violations more than it had during the 1980s<sup>100</sup>. In addition to that, Turkey's long-lasting nightmare of the Congress aid cuts were to be observed due to the Cyprus and human rights tensions<sup>101</sup>. The Greek-Turkish dispute on Aegean Islands and Cyprus continued to be nerve wracking during the post-Cold War era as well. The real problem is that the American position on Cyprus was in parallel with

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<sup>95</sup> Athanassopoulou, Ekavi, "Strategic Relations between the US and Turkey, 1979-2000: Sleeping with a Tiger.", Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2014. (See the page 3 in the introduction).

<sup>96</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 257-59.

<sup>97</sup> Harris, George Sellers, "Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 81.

<sup>98</sup> Sayari, Sabri, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 98.

<sup>99</sup> See <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/video/2018/01/02/soli-ozel-turkiye-abd-sorunlarinin-temelinde-kurtler-var/>. Date of Access: 09.0.32018.

<sup>100</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 244.

<sup>101</sup> Harris, George Sellers, "Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 82-87.

the Greek ones, and Turkey's policy towards Cyprus was an irritant in relations, from the lenses of the Americans<sup>102</sup>.

As previously mentioned, the first two years of the Clinton administration did not fully appreciate Turkey's importance in regards to America's global interests. For that reason, one can explore why the U.S. had stayed unresponsive to Turkish demands on a stronger NATO role on the Bosnian crisis and her concerns about Russia's resumption of influence in the Caucasus. In addition to this, the restart of the Kurdish insurgency and Turkey's human rights record tended to be exigent in bilateral relations. Yet again, economic sanctions on Iraq during and after the Gulf War should also be considered as a constraining effect on Turkish-American relations<sup>103</sup>. Nevertheless, Turkey's new dynamic foreign policy was also a clue to observe that Turkey wanted to reshape its role in global politics. Turkey's new foreign policy was vital for the West, particularly for the U.S., in the post-Cold war era, and was key in the European security climate. In addition, Turkish and American security tendencies toward regional conflicts mostly overlapped. The most significant regional security advancement was the U.S.'s support of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. The U.S., Israeli and Turkish reaction to proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction (WMD) had coincided, with all seeing WMDs as a threat to regional peace and stability<sup>104</sup>. Turkey was willing both to use the Jewish lobby to counter cuts proposed in the American Congress, negate the efforts of Armenian lobbyists and their repercussions to American-Turkish relations, and to take advantage of her good relations with the Israelis through bypassing import restrictions that Washington had implemented<sup>105</sup>.

Even though, the American administration no longer provided military and economic aids to Ankara, weapons sales and modernization projects constituted an important aspect for the Turkish-American bilateral relations<sup>106</sup>.

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<sup>102</sup> Sayari, Sabri, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 98.

<sup>103</sup> Sayari, Sabri, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 93.

<sup>104</sup> Sayari, Sabri, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 94-96.

<sup>105</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 274.

<sup>106</sup> Harris, George Sellers, "Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 85.

**Table 3.1.** American Economic and Military Aid (1991-1997) (in million dollars)

<b>Military</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>
Donation	500	475	-	-	-	-	-
Loan	50	25	450	405	364	320	175
<b>Economic</b>	250	75	125	120	50	33	22

*Source: Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 285.*

Furthermore, throughout the 1990s, Turkey did receive the biggest amount of sales imports from the U.S. under four channels which were basically almost the same channels that Turkey benefitted from during 1980s -Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales, Pentagon's surplus of arms, cascading-<sup>107</sup>.

**Table 3.2.** Arms Purchase from the US (1990-1999) (total in million dollars)

<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
943	697	741	878	951	536	547	1.270	642	803

*Source: Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 287.*

Under the motto of "less aid, more trade", Turkey achieved to form a Joint Committee on Economic Cooperation in 1993, and consequently, trade volume between the two strategic allies had increased by seventy percent till 1997 and the US would constitute third biggest investor - %14- in Turkish economy<sup>108</sup>. In other words, while the trade volume between Washington and Ankara was 3 billion dollars in 1992, it went up to 6 billion dollars in 1997. The United States had a ten percent share in total Turkish exports and nine percent in Turkish imports. Yet again, there had been restrictions on textiles, processed metals, fig and pasta exports from the Turkish side<sup>109</sup>.

<sup>107</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002)." Kaynak Yayınları No: 899. Ekim 2007. pp 781

<sup>108</sup> Türkmen, Füsün, "Kırılgan İttifak'tan Model Ortaklığa: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri." Timaş Yayınları, 2961, Kasım 2012, İstanbul, pp. 167.

<sup>109</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002)." Kaynak Yayınları No: 899. Ekim 2007. Pp 781

**Table 3.3.** Turkish-American Trade (1991-2000) (in million dollars)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Import	2.225	2.600	3.300	2.400	2.700	3.500	4.300	4.050	3.800	3.887
Export	913	865	986	1.520	1.513	1.600	2.027	2.233	2.437	3.074

*Source: Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 290.*

Turkey's European Union full membership motivations were highly supported by the Americans with great exuberance. The U.S. strong endorsement of Turkish membership to the EU was believed to be very beneficial for the notion and nature of the bilateral relations<sup>110</sup>. The Americans' positive role during the Kardak/Imia crisis, Baku/Ceyhan pipeline project and Ocalan's capture in Nairobi also constituted very significant aspects in reciprocal trust and partnership<sup>111</sup>. According to Füsün Türkmen, the Clinton administration supported Turkish EU full membership process (separately from the Cyprus issue) and Washington believed that a democratic, wealthy Turkey anchored to the EU, overlapped with American interests in the region. Clinton further believed that Turkey was a key point in European diplomacy and any political developments would have great effects in her surrounding regions<sup>112</sup>.

Under the auspices of the agreement accorded by George H. W. Bush and Demirel in 1992, Ankara and Washington were able to build on an enhanced partnership. In 1997, Turkish Premier Mesut Yılmaz's visit brought about an agreement on a 5-part agenda which covered energy, economy, security cooperation, regional cooperation and Aegean/Cyprus chapters<sup>113</sup>. In 1999, democratic socialist Bulent Ecevit, as the new Prime Minister of the tripartite coalition, paid a visit to Washington, and Clinton declared during his visit that Turkish-American relations were considered a "strategic partnership". This mentioned partnership would include supporting enlargement of NATO, Turkey's full integration to the EU, proliferation of WMDs,

<sup>110</sup> Sayari, Sabri, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 101-102.

<sup>111</sup> Türkmen, Füsün, "Kırılgan İttifak'tan Model Ortaklığa: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri." Timaş Yayınları, 2961, Kasım 2012, İstanbul, pp. 168-173.

<sup>112</sup> Türkmen, Füsün, "Kırılgan İttifak'tan Model Ortaklığa: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri." Timaş Yayınları, 2961, Kasım 2012, İstanbul, pp. 169-170.

<sup>113</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002)." Kaynak Yayınları No: 899. Ekim 2007. Pp. 778 and Türkmen, Füsün, "Kırılgan İttifak'tan Model Ortaklığa: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri." Timaş Yayınları, 2961, Kasım 2012, İstanbul, pp. 170-171.

new energy routes, peace and stability in the Balkans<sup>114</sup>. All these developments under the Clinton administration, Füsün Türkmen claims, led to Turkish-American relations that were better than ever<sup>115</sup>.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Turkey-U.S. relations were on a good track, yet some issues like Balkans, Central Asia were to be replaced by cooperation on the war in Afghanistan. However, traditional issues like Iraq and the Kurdish conundrum also continued to occupy American politics, but they began to occupy more of a central position. In addition to these, the inability to agree on the Cyprus and Armenian issues remained on the Turkish-American table<sup>116</sup>. Although, strategic matters have continued to be the main axis of bilateral relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Turkey's importance has increased due to her political identity, regime, and history in the eyes of the American administration. As relations with the U.S. were seen positively because of the Clinton administration's support in Turkey's EU membership and the American role in Ocalan's capture, the Turkish government easily found a ground to back Washington's Afghanistan campaign and its fight against terrorism<sup>117</sup>.

On September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, the United States had experienced the first and only attack on its own lands since the Second World War - Pearl Harbor by Japanese. Four planes were hijacked, two of them crashing into the World Trade Center in New York, one hitting the Pentagon, in Washington D.C., and the last one falling on a Pennsylvanian suburb. Due to this attack, 2,974 people lost their lives, leading Americans to live with this newfound trauma of being hit. Attacks were assumed to be by the radical terrorist group, Al-Qaida, and the American administration determines that the group has taken haven in Afghanistan. Hence, Washington decided to intervene and send troops to Afghanistan in 2001. Under the effects of this trauma, the U.S. started to implement the pre-emptive strike clause and decided to combat the proliferation of WMD. Under this pretext, Washington decided to intervene in Iraq as well in 2003 with the justification that WMDs were being hidden there and posed a great amount of danger to world peace. Unlike the Afghanistan operation, the Iraqi operation was more of a

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<sup>114</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002)." Kaynak Yayınları No: 899. Ekim 2007. Pp 779.

<sup>115</sup> Türkmen, Füsün, "Kırılgan İttifak'tan Model Ortaklığa: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri." Timaş Yayınları, 2961, Kasım 2012, İstanbul, pp. 174.

<sup>116</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 256.

<sup>117</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 256. *NOA: Turkey was suffering from terrorism – mainly from a separatist one but radical one as well- and appreciated by the Americans.*

unilateral decision, which was seen as illegitimate<sup>118</sup> and highly criticized by the several allies of the U.S.

In light of the information above, and despite Turkey's support for Washington's fight against terrorism, Turkish Parliament ruled out the option of Americans deployment of its battalion to south-eastern Turkey, which bordered Iraq, and Turkish soldiers' deployment to Northern Iraq. This obstacle by the parliament was termed as the March 1<sup>st</sup> incident in Turkish-American relations. This was particularly a serious disappointment for Washington by its long-lasting strategic ally. As a matter of fact, the last version of the plan was negotiated fiercely by the Turkish diplomats, which were overwhelmingly officers, and yet the vote in the Turkish parliament was a close one, still not approved by a sufficient number of votes. There was strong opposition from the army and the media calling the idea a "historic mistake"<sup>119</sup> According to Malik Mufti, this decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) shows us that, although, the AK Party government formed a government more active in foreign policy, the security elites were still guided by the principles of the traditional republican, non-interventionist approach, which can also be defined as the Sevres paranoid<sup>120</sup>. He also concludes that, the unreadiness of Turks to deal with the Northern Iraqi Kurds, observation that defines Iraq as a trap to avoid, the reluctance of working with the Americans, were key reasons for security elites to not favor the Turkish presence in Iraq<sup>121</sup>. Although it is a fact that the government had brought the plan to the TGNA, Davutoglu, Abdullah Gül's top advisor at the time, was also aware of the Turkish public's delicate reaction to any foreign troops on Turkish soil. In one of his interviews, Davutoglu stated that AK Party government was not very comfortable with the US inclination to start a war in Iraq, and he further stated that Turkey was always favoring peace over war. Again, he was very much clear on stating that considerable amounts of troops being deployed on Turkish soil was a delicate issue, and it naturally caused discontent among the Turkish population and media<sup>122</sup>.

The disappointment by the Americans was so great that they exacted their revenge through the Sulaymaniyah incident. In July 2003, coalition forces stormed a Turkish Special Forces compound in Sulaymaniyah and detained them for two days on the pretext of their plot to

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<sup>118</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "Son On yıllarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015." Der Yayınları, 463, 2015. Pp. 501-02

<sup>119</sup> Mufti, Malik, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea." Palgrave MacMillan 2009, pp. 153.

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<sup>121</sup> Mufti, Malik, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea." Palgrave MacMillan 2009, pp. 154.

<sup>122</sup> Davutoğlu, Ahmet, "Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış politikası üzerine konuşmalar." Küre Yayınları, 2011. Pp. 92.

assassinate the Kirkuk governor at the notorious Abu Garib prison. The Sulaymaniyah incident deteriorated Turkish-American relations in a serious manner, leading to a huge rise in anti-American rhetoric. Bilateral relations suffered from a great degree of mistrust and insecurity, and yet the relations were defined as a strategic partnership, without any observable improvement to be seen on the technical and military front.<sup>123</sup> After the March 1<sup>st</sup> incident, one can also observe several attempts to compensate Turkish non-interventionist attitude towards Iraq. On 12 March 2003, although, Turkish parliament had allowed 20 thousand Turkish troops to join the fight in Northern Iraq, the caveat was the Kurdish regional government's approval of this action was required. Again, on 22 September 2003, in Dubai, two allies tabled around and signed on an agreement which was named after the city they had met in. According to this treaty, Turkey would receive 1 billion dollars in aid and a 8.5 billion dollars' worth loan under the stipulation of strict cooperation with Washington; nevertheless, the treaty was never brought to Parliament<sup>124</sup>.

İlhan Uzgel suggests that the main reason for the rupture between Ankara-Washington line was the series of issues after the Sulaymaniyah incident, which were Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's accusation of Israel as a terrorist state, couple of AK Party legislatives' declaration regarding the Felucca shootout as a genocide and rising anti-American tendencies in Turkey<sup>125</sup>.

Withdrawal of the March 1<sup>st</sup> bill and the following events led to an increase on American and Kurdish cooperation and decrease in Turkish influence in the Middle East. Most of the Turkish red lines such as protection of Turkmen, PKK's use of Northern Iraq as an operation base, Kirkuk's condition etc...., had been surpassed<sup>126</sup>. Even though, red lines were mostly defined by the republican elite, AK Party elites also appreciated of their survival for the Turkish security phenomenon<sup>127</sup>.

Under the auspices of the Phillips Report in 2006, American cooperation with the Turks showed a visible improvement. Uzgel claims that the decision to reduce American troops in Iraq was

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<sup>123</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., "US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac", SETA Publications 26, 2017. (See the introduction)

<sup>124</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 275-76

<sup>125</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 260-61

<sup>126</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001.

<sup>127</sup> Davutoğlu, Ahmet, "Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış politikası üzerine konuşmalar." Küre Yayınları, 2011. Pp. 212-213.



linked to this turn in strategic relations<sup>128</sup>. The U.S. did not want to choose between Kurds and Turks, and they were willing to pressure these two sides to work together to their mutual interest. The Phillips report on October 2007 led to a consensus on December 2007, in which the PKK was listed as an enemy to the U.S., and their leaders were stated as drug-traffickers, Pentagon opened Northern Iraq's airfield to Turkish aviation, and allowed the Turkish army to conduct field operations, Washington pressured European states to limit PKK's political organizations. In exchange for these developments, Turkey accepted official recognition of the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq and had come to an understanding to reform the Kurds' position in Turkey<sup>129</sup>. Additionally, Turkish Premier Erdoğan's visit to Washington and his meeting with the POTUS was "a dawn of a new era" in the bilateral relations of two long-lasting allies<sup>130</sup>.

Overall, Washington was satisfied by the Turkish leaning towards the Middle East. Apart from the "zero problems with neighbors" policy and Iranian-Turkish rapprochement, the US was mostly anxious about Turkey's potential axis shift. The American administration was on the edge of their chair to see Turkey in a Eurasian tendency in foreign policies. In other words, Russia and China, becoming Turkey's new partners in international relations would be a nightmare for the United States of America<sup>131</sup>. Having said that, Faruk Sönmezoğlu defends that Turkey conducted a soft balance policy in the Middle East. On the one hand, Erdoğan had fiercely accused Israel in 2004, accepted Khaled Meshaal- Hamas leader - on February 2006 in Ankara and Turkey averted a NATO drill in the Black Sea. On the other hand, PM Erdoğan supported the American's suspected Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative in 2004, had approved the American-Israeli-Turkish 2005 military drill in the Mediterranean Sea and visited Israel in May 2005. It is also interesting to see that while Turkish-American relations were in a good mood, Turkey's EU connection was slightly off the road, so there is also a strange balance between Turkey's relations with Washington and relations with Brussels<sup>132</sup>. Yet again, Washington was in favor of the AK Party government during inner political crises like the presidency election in 2007, e-memorandum by the Turkish General Staff to warn AK

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<sup>128</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 288

<sup>129</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 286

<sup>130</sup> Ülgen, Sinan, "In Search of Lost Time: Turkey-US Relations after Bush.", US-Europe Analysis Series, February 19, 2009, Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings.

<sup>131</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 265.

<sup>132</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "Son Onyillarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015." Der Yayınları, 463, 2015. Pp. 504-505.

Party in the mentioned Presidency election, over-closure case of AK Party by the Constitution Court on 14 March 2008, and in the end Condoleezza Rice, the American top diplomat declared that the bilateral relations were “excellent”<sup>133</sup>. In 2010, during the session on the Iranian embargo of the United Nations Security Council, Turkey, which was a temporary member at the time, had voted against the sanctions. Although this move by Turkey was based by her fondness of diplomacy/soft power over hard-power, Americans were highly critical and once again Turkey’s potential axis shift intercourse was out. The famous “Who lost Turkey” rhetoric once again surfaced and until the Arab Spring, relations were questioned in this manner. However, according to Uzgel, although, American and Turkish public opinion were not favoring the strategic partnership, those talks of “Who lost Turkey?” and Turkey’s axis-shift did not do justice to Turkish-American bilateral relations<sup>134</sup>.

Turkey’s disrupted relations with Israel and the reshaping of the strategic importance of the Cyprus issue was also not at the same point for the Americans. Cyprus became more vital for energy security as Israel developed the desire to withdraw gas resources from the northern Turkish Cypriot territory, and the Jewish lobby’s negative effect on the American Congress was not influential on Washington’s approach to the Turks<sup>135</sup>.

Barack Hussein Obama’s election to Washington’s highest post, somewhat eased the two states’ relations and a new opportunity to mend the partnership was appreciated by the both parties<sup>136</sup>. Obama underlined the importance of the multi-lateral policy making in international relations instead of George Bush’s pre-emptive strike and unilateral foreign policy approach, with his worldview somewhat akin to Wilson’s, as he also favored equality and cooperation in international decision making<sup>137</sup>. During the Obama administration from 2009 to 2017, Turkey approved to host missile radar at Kurecik, Malatya, and this move was considered to bypass the axis-shift speeches by the Western countries. Yet, Washington was not happy with the policy of “zero problems with neighbors” because of its inclusion of Iran and Syria. However, as the Arab Spring had spread to Syria, Assad’s harsh response to protests somewhat altered Turkey’s

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<sup>133</sup> Sönmezoglu, Faruk, “Son Onyillarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015.” Der Yayınları, 463, 2015. Pp. 506-507.

<sup>134</sup> Oran, Baskın, “Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)” İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 261

<sup>135</sup> Oran, Baskın, “Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)” İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 300

<sup>136</sup> Ülgen, Sinan, “In Search of Lost Time: Turkey-US Relations after Bush.”, US-Europe Analysis Series, February 19, 2009, Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings.

<sup>137</sup> Türkmen, Füsün, “Kırılgan İttifak’tan Model Ortaklığa: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri.” Timaş Yayınları, 2961, Kasım 2012, İstanbul, pp. 323.

approach to the Syrian regime<sup>138</sup>. The Arab Spring was a huge phenomenon which was triggered by a Tunisian peddler's burning himself as a protest on 17 December 2010. After this event, protests were spread out to nearly whole Middle East and North Africa<sup>139</sup>. Obama's commitment to multilateral international relations affected Washington's approach to the events and NATO had been furtherly re-invigorated by the democratic administration<sup>140</sup>.

Bush and his neo-conservative administration had few common grounds with the AK Party government in Turkey. Tantamount religious conservatism and their approach towards the neoliberal economy happened to be nearly identical. Globalism affected Turkish-American economic relations and the augmentation in trade, finance and investment brought an increase in Turkey's trade volume vis-à-vis the U.S. and several developing countries. While Turkish-American trade volume was nearly 6.3 billion dollars in 2000, it nearly doubled in 2006 and later reached 16 billion dollars in 2008. Having said that, the trade gap between Turkey and the US widened considerably. During those years, it was stated that Turkish share in American trade was nearly one percent, while American share in Turkish trade was observed to be ten percent in 2000s in return. On the one hand, Turkey's import from the American firms had been tripled and again trade gap was raised to 9 billion dollars in Washington's favor. On the other hand, American enterprises to invest in Turkey was numbered as 30 in 2002 and increased to 132 in 2008<sup>141</sup>.

**Table 3.4.** Bilateral trade since the year 2000

	<b>Export (million \$)</b>	<b>Share in Turkey's export (%)</b>	<b>Share in the US' import (%)</b>	<b>Import (million \$)</b>	<b>Share in Turkey's import (%)</b>	<b>Share in the US' import (%)</b>	<b>Volume (million \$)</b>	<b>Balance (million \$)</b>
2000	3.135	10,8	0,3	3.911	7,2	0,5	7.046	-77
2001	3.126	10,0	0,2	3.261	8,0	0,5	6.373	-133
2002	3.356	8,5	0,2	3.099	6,0	0,4	6.279	179

<sup>138</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 333

<sup>139</sup> Sönmezoglu, Faruk, "Son Onyillarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015." Der Yayınları, 463, 2015. Pp. 512.

<sup>140</sup> Ülgen, Sinan, "In Search of Lost Time: Turkey-US Relations after Bush.", US-Europe Analysis Series, February 19, 2009, Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings.

<sup>141</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 306

2003	3.751	7,8	0,2	3.496	5,0	0,4	7.246	256
2004	4.860	7,7	0,3	4.745	4,8	0,5	9.517	137
2005	4.911	6,7	0,3	5.376	5,1	0,6	10.193	-439
2006	5.061	5,9	0,3	6.261	4,3	0,6	11.322	-1.200
2007	4.171	3,9	0,2	8.166	4,8	0,7	12.337	-3.995
2008	4.290	3,3	0,2	11.971	5,9	0,9	16.261	-7.681
2009	3.769	3,6	0,2	8.575	6,0	0,5	8.944	-4.806
2010	3.240	2,8	0,1	12.318	6,6	0,6	15.558	-9.078

Source: Oran, Baskın, “Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)” İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 306.

Although, most experts were defending the good track, especially during the Obama administration, that American-Turkish relations were on, Ariel Cohen seems to be more skeptical about Turkey’s intentions in the region. As the Turkish government was originally running on a Political Islamic platform, its anti-western roots would eventually surface. Ankara’s moves during the March 1<sup>st</sup> bill and her seizing the American ship that was headed to Georgia in 2008, should be considered the state’s decision to prioritize her agenda due to her regional ambitions<sup>142</sup>. Washington once again felt disappointed by the Turks, and the importance of the Montreux Convention was again reiterated<sup>143</sup>. In addition to that, key issues between other fields of cooperation, such as, Iran, Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, seemed to be contradicting<sup>144</sup>.

On August 2014, Prime Minister Erdoğan was elected as the 12<sup>th</sup> President of the Republic of Turkey, in a direct popular vote and the first international gathering after his election was to be NATO summit at Wales on September 2014. During this summit, Obama and Erdoğan held bilateral talks apart from developments in Syria and Iraq, the Turkish side raised the issue of Fethullah Gülen and his extradition to the table. In this regard, Erdoğan declared that:

*“I will tell the US...Since we are strategic partners with you and we have a model partnership between us. Similar to you, sometimes you want us to deport some terrorists from Turkey and*

<sup>142</sup> Cohen, Ariel, “Obama’s Best Friend? The Alarming Evolution of US-Turkish Relations.” The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 100, May 2013. (see the introduction)

<sup>143</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., “US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac”, SETA Publications 26, 2017. Pp. 61

<sup>144</sup> Cohen, Ariel, “Obama’s Best Friend? The Alarming Evolution of US-Turkish Relations.” The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 100, May 2013, pp. 17.

*we do it, we also want you deport this terrorist. Either deport him or give him to us. He [Gulen] says he's not guilty. Then he can come and live here.*"<sup>145</sup>

Although, Turkey and the United States were on the brink of divergence in their approach to the Syrian issue, Turkey announced that the Turkish army would join the coalition against ISIS on September 2014<sup>146</sup>. On November 2015, G20 leaders met in Antalya with the agenda of the Syrian crisis and ISIS terrorism, as 129 people had lost their lives during an attack at Paris. In 2015, Divergence on Syria increased when Washington had decided to team up with YPG to continue fight against ISIS in Syria, as Turkey considered YPG as terrorist organization which was directly linked to PKK <sup>147</sup>. Ankara's regard to Syria can be summarized with the declaration of then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, which he had stated during a talk with Vice President Joe Biden in Ankara on January 23, 2016:

*For Turkey, we do not see any difference between PKK, DHKPC, DAESH and Nusra, no matter what ethnic and cultural base they are in. We have the sensitivity to act the same against all these terrorist organizations. There is no state authority beyond our borders (in Syria). We see 3 threats: regime, DAESH and YPG. Because all of these did ethnic cleansing to the Arabs, the Turkmen and the Kurds who did not think like them. We do not hesitate to take any necessary steps against these threats for sustaining our national security.*<sup>148</sup>

On July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Turkish army officers that were affiliated with the Gulenist organization attempted a coup d'état, and failed. According to official numbers, 265 were killed and 2,194 were injured. This was considered a traumatic blow to the country. Besides that, Turkey's NATO allies seemed to reflect unsympathetic and complex messages during the night of the coup. This unsympathetic reaction from the Americans and other major allies of Turkey greatly confused Turkish people's and state elites' mind. From that moment onward, the conflict in perspective over the Gulenists and Gulen's extradition became the epicenter of their bilateral relations<sup>149</sup>.

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<sup>145</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., "US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac", SETA Publications 26, 2017. Pp. 145.

<sup>146</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., "US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac", SETA Publications 26, 2017. Pp. 147

<sup>147</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., "US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac", SETA Publications 26, 2017. Pp. 160.

<sup>148</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., "US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac", SETA Publications 26, 2017. Pp. 164-65.

<sup>149</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., "US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac", SETA Publications 26, 2017. Pp. 171-75.

On February 1<sup>st</sup> of 2017, Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 45th President of the United States, and although the Turkish side was hopeful that the new President would bring changes in bilateral relations, their hopes were quickly dashed. When Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in the Syrian city, Raqqa, in August 2017, the Trump administration both supported Turkey's active stand against the Syrian regime and expressed concern that the Turkish army ought to keep from clashing with other American allies on the ground. In other words, American government was still allied with Kurdish forces in Syria and saw them as local partners in the fight against ISIS<sup>150</sup>. Besides the conflicting interests in Syria, the two states came face to face again in the Iranian tax evasion case on March 28, 2017 and the mutual visa revocation crisis on October 8, 2017. At the beginning of 2018, the long-lasting allies had declared their intention to resolve their problems and build a couple of mechanisms to cooperate closely in Syria, Gülen's situation and other conflicting issues.

Lastly, when American military officials announced that 30.000 units of border security would be deployed by the YPG component to the Turkish-Syria border triggered the Operation Olive Branch, which targeted the Syrian city Afrin, by the Turkish Army<sup>151</sup>. Both of them were to be considered a trigger point for Turkey's Sevres paranoia.

AK Party's early politics, which can clearly be seen during the Second Gulf Crisis and 2008 Georgian War crisis, would dictate not intervening in the Syrian Civil War. This move is a clear divergence from the Kemalist traditional foreign policy that was built on the principle of "Peace at home, peace in the world" that Atatürk himself had introduced. The Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy, which was introduced and led by Ahmet Davutoğlu, was powerfully distinct from Kemalist foreign policy, which he accused of being ineffective and cowardly, in that it was normative and dynamic. Yet, again AK party has come to, especially in the Syrian conflict, a situation where it has to conduct a more traditionalist and careful policy vis-à-vis Syria and the whole Middle East.

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<sup>150</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., "US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac", SETA Publications 26, 2017. Pp. 187.

<sup>151</sup> <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/16/the-united-states-and-turkey-should-fix-their-relationship-before-its-too-late/> date of Access 20.03.2018.

#### 4. RUSSO-TURCO RELATIONS: FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Ottoman Turks and Russians were in touch approximately from the 15<sup>th</sup> century, mostly through wars, as Russian sought to seek access to the Black Sea and create a (more) powerful empire<sup>152</sup>, an idea that started with the Petro 1<sup>st</sup>'s rule in 1689<sup>153</sup>. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Russian focus was more on the Turkish Straits. The Russian Empire overwhelmingly appreciated the importance of the Straits that unified Europe and Asia, thinking that they would provide an opportunity for Russian merchants to reach the Mediterranean, enable Russian influence in the Balkans, etc.... Under those pretexts, Moscow motivated to seize and open the Turkish Straits to the Russian war ships<sup>154</sup>. Nearly all wars between Russians and Ottomans were centered around the Turkish Straits. Russian interest on the Straits and her provocations on Turks also triggered changing alliances in the Europe, yet the power struggle for the Straits was not resolved until the end of the First World War<sup>155</sup>. Although certain Russian involvement in Turkish lands were justified as the protection of the Orthodox millet living in the Ottoman Empire, the main interest was strictly linked to the domination of the Black Sea and Russian attempts to control Istanbul and the Çanakkale Straits<sup>156</sup>.

By the end of the First World War, the Tsarist Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire had both ceased to exist. The new Bolshevik Russian government and the nationalist-independent Turkish government in Ankara first made contact after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. According to Bülent Gökay, one Soviet representative had met with Mustafa Kemal Pasha during the Amasya Conventions and the nationalist government sent a messenger to Crimea, to engage in the first relations with the Bolsheviks<sup>157</sup>. On the one hand, Hüner Tuncer claims that Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent Halil Pasha as an envoy first to Baku and then Moscow to request arms, money and such in his war against the imperialist states<sup>158</sup>. On the other hand, Erel Tellal writes that the

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<sup>152</sup> Gürsel, Haluk F., "Tarih Boyunca Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Bir Siyasi Tarih İncelemesi" AK Yayınları Limited Şirketi Neşriyatı: 8, İstanbul 1968.pp. 36

<sup>153</sup> Gürsel, Haluk F., "Tarih Boyunca Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Bir Siyasi Tarih İncelemesi" AK Yayınları Limited Şirketi Neşriyatı: 8, İstanbul 1968.pp. 48

<sup>154</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası 1. Cilt: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e (1789-1920)" Kaynak Yayınları, Ekim 2017. Pp. 92

<sup>155</sup> Kazgan, Gülten, Ulçenko, Natalya, "Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler" İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları 45, Sempozyum Panel-1.

<sup>156</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası 1. Cilt: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e (1789-1920)" Kaynak Yayınları, Ekim 2017. Pp. 62-63.

<sup>157</sup> Gökay, Bülent, "Bolşevizm ile Emperyalizm arasında Türkiye: (1918-1923), Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları 68, İstanbul, December 1998. Pp. 82

<sup>158</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 49.

official political relations between Ankara Government and the Bolsheviks were created on June 3<sup>rd</sup> 1920<sup>159</sup>.

According to Erel Tellal, the Ankara government received eleven million golden rubles and ten thousand lira worth gold bullions between 1920 and 1922. Another significant part of the relations was Russian military aid during the Turkish War of Independence. Tellal states that the Turkish nationalist government received 39.275 rifles, 327 machine guns, 54 artilleries, 1000-hit gunpower, 4000 hand grenades, 4000 case shots, 1500 swords and 20.000 gas masks<sup>160</sup>.

Turkish nationalist resistance succeeded in April 1922, as the Turkish army subdued Western Anatolia and guaranteed her achievement was recognized in the international arena, specifically the talks in Lausanne, Switzerland. However, as Russians were persistent in their interests, especially on the topics of the Straits, Ismet Paşa warned Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin about his priority towards a final agreement that would lead to an independent Turkish state which would also be recognized by the world powers<sup>161</sup>.

Turkish Premier Ismet İnönü paid an official visit to four Soviet cities from April 25<sup>th</sup> to May 10<sup>th</sup>, 1932. During Ismet Paşa's visit, the two neighbors agreed on cultural cooperation and stated that their regime differences would not be an obstacle to the mentioned cultural cooperation and economic assistance from Moscow to Ankara. On 21 January 1934, the two neighbors signed a protocol, in which, Soviet Russia would give interest-free 8 million dollars loan in condition to pay in 20 years by the Turkish agricultural products. In addition to those, Soviets would help build factories by assisting on technology and expertise. Another significance of this visit was the fact that Turkish delegate had convinced Soviets to join League of Nations with the USSR becoming a member in 1934. Turkey was already a member of the League at the time, and it is important to mention Turkey had voiced their approval of the Soviets while entering the League and that is what they did when they became member on July 18<sup>th</sup> 1932<sup>162</sup>. Furthermore, Soviet loans had greatly supported the organization of the Turkish First Five Years' Industrial Development Plan and caused Turkey to adopt a more statist economic policy, as well as lead the way for Turks to receive loans from Western states<sup>163</sup>.

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<sup>159</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 165.

<sup>160</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 162.

<sup>161</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 176.

<sup>162</sup> Alantar, Özden Zeynep, "Türk Dış Politikasında Milletler Cemiyeti Dönemi" inside "Türk Dış Politikası Analizi", eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der yayınları 1998. Pp. 85-86.

<sup>163</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 318-20.



1933-36 was a time of firm cooperation between Ankara and Moscow, mostly due to anti-revisionist France and Britain and revisionist Germany and Italy coming to an understanding and signing a quadruple pact. The significance of this pact was that the four states had agreed on topics that could deeply relate to both Soviets and Turks, as they were both subjects of Italian and German irredentist claims. Besides, this agreement had happened outside the auspices of the League of Nations, which also signaled danger for both neighbors<sup>164</sup>. However, while Russia too was threatened by the Italians, Moscow had caused difficulties with the Balkan Pact signed in 1934, alleging the need to protect territorial integrity of the Balkan countries. Kamuran Gürün thinks that should be considered as reluctance in Soviet-Turkish relations<sup>165</sup>. From the Turkish perspective, Montreux Convention should be an indicator for this opinion of Gürün's<sup>166</sup>.

The second half of the 1930s ensured that a breakout of a total war would be just around the corner. As the war approached, Turkish leadership wanted to revise the status of the Straits, which was also very much vital to Soviet interests. As already mentioned above, the Straits constituted a key aspect for the Russians and during the talks in Montreux, they were highly willing to dictate their own Straits agenda. While Soviets presented their wish to close the Black Sea to all non-littoral states, Turkey had come up with a more flexible position, which hereafter exhausted Russo-Turkish relationship. However, Turkish and Soviet interests drove apart on this very topic and relationship between Ankara and Moscow started to be strained<sup>167</sup>. While Turks thought Montreux Convention, signed on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1936, was a success for the survival of their state in the upcoming war, USSR criticized that Turks had cooperated with Britain and submitted on her imperialist agenda<sup>168</sup>.

During the Second World War, the Russians' approach to the Turks were very much linked to the course of the fight. When Russian's were surprise attacked by the Nazis, Moscow was more willing to see Turkey join the war under allied ranks. When Russians were successful in fighting off the Nazis, they became indifferent regarding any potential Turkish decision to enter the war.

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<sup>164</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 116.

<sup>165</sup> Gürün, Kamuran, "Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)", Ankara; Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010, Second Edition, pp. 141

<sup>166</sup> Gürün, Kamuran, "Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)", Ankara; Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010, Second Edition, pp. 315

<sup>167</sup> Gürün, Kamuran, "Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)", Ankara; Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010, Second Edition, pp. 113

<sup>168</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 117

However, as end of the war approached, the USSR were very strict about Turkey's remaining out of war<sup>169</sup>. As the war nearly came to an end, Russian pressure on Turkey, in regards to the Straits and the North-Eastern Anatolia, started to be felt with the Conference held in Moscow in 1943<sup>170</sup>. During the post-War negotiations, Yalta and Postdam, Soviet leader Stalin very vividly defended their interests on the Turkish Straits and territorial demands to be exported as well<sup>171</sup>.

Twenty-five years of Turkish-Soviet relations can be summarized as such: conditions of the post-war 1919 had brought the governments together under the pretext of anti-Western rhetoric, post-Lausanne witnessed a firm cooperation between the two, while post-Montreux gave way to a change in priorities on the eve of the Second World War, which caused drifting away and spoiling of their short history of balanced bilateral relations<sup>172</sup>. On the other hand, Kamuran Gürün argues that Turkey had broken off her relations with the West and her only rock to rely on happened to be the Soviets, yet again Soviet demands during 1945 talks and two note verbales opened eyes of the Turks and this motive of Moscow had rescued Turkey from a big catastrophe, as Turkey was on the brink to become Finland<sup>173</sup>.

Turkish rapprochement with the US, or Turkey's step into the American orbit, was explained differently by several experts. According to Suat Bilge, Turkey's entrance to the Western camps could be understood only by the Soviet demands. Furthermore, Kamuran Gürün also thinks that, without Soviet demands, Turkey's NATO membership would not have realized, as 1929 Protocol inhibited such steps without the approval of Moscow. On the other hand, Feridun Cemal Erkin suggests that, if Soviets had controlled Greece and Turkey, the balance in the Mediterranean would have changed, hence Washington laying claim to both neighbors<sup>174</sup>.

The Turkish government changed with the 1950 elections as the Democrat Party (DP), under the leadership of Adnan Menderes, came into power. Although, DP shared the anti-communist rhetoric of Republican People's Party, their party program was different, mostly in the economic aspect. Anti-Sovietism and anti-communism had caused the new government to work

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<sup>169</sup> Gürün, Kamuran, "Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)", Ankara; Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010, Second Edition, pp. 314

<sup>170</sup> Deringil, Selim, "Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası.", İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, c1994. Pp. 204.

<sup>171</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 259-268.

<sup>172</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 324.

<sup>173</sup> Gürün, Kamuran, "Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)", Ankara; Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010, Second Edition, pp. 315

<sup>174</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 508

closely with the U.S. and hold serious fear of Moscow. With a national consensus, Turkey attempted to join to NATO, which caused another two note verbales by the USSR, on November 3<sup>rd</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> of 1951<sup>175</sup>.

The death of Marshal Stalin brought about a new era to the notorious Turkish-Russian relations. Moscow's note verbal on May 30<sup>th</sup>, 1953 declared retiring of their territorial demands and accepted to revise their position on the Straits<sup>176</sup> under the pretext of enhancing good neighborly relations<sup>177</sup>. However, Hüner Tuncer believes that, although, Soviets had clearly withdrawn their interest on Kars and Ardahan, it was not that clear that their aspirations on the Straits had come to an end. Besides that, Turkish perception was Moscow's not being sincere about this change of politics<sup>178</sup>. On the other hand, Erel Tellal suggests that, at that time, the USSR were mostly willing to break down the encirclement, but Turkey was more in a phase that she was almost sure to strengthen her position in the NATO. Hence, Turkish leaders were being more royalist than the king when it comes to her relations with the Western countries<sup>179</sup>. Peaceful coexistence policy of the Soviets evoked some tips of détente among the other NATO members than Turkey, who sensed this move as insincere and manipulative to spoil relations of the Western alliance<sup>180</sup>. Furthermore, while the USSR took peaceful steps through Turkey, they also threatened her during the Syrian Crisis in 1957<sup>181</sup>, and whereas they recognized torment of Turkish-Cypriots, on the other hand sold arms to the Greek-Cypriots. Suat Bilge comes up with a term of "policy of hot shower and cold shower" which was conducted by Soviets against the Turks, during this era of 1950s<sup>182</sup>.

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<sup>175</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 319-20

<sup>176</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 511-12.

<sup>177</sup> Gürsel, Haluk F., "Tarih Boyunca Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Bir Siyasi Tarih İncelemesi", Ak Yayınları Limited Şirketi Neşriyatı: 8, İstanbul 1968, pp. 238

<sup>178</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 320-21.

<sup>179</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 513

<sup>180</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 383-84

<sup>181</sup> Note of the author: The crisis almost would cause a war between Ankara and Moscow, first ever since 1920. Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 515. The crisis ended after Syria had withdrawn the issue from the UN and Turkey had given assurance to the Syrians. According to Hüseyin Bağcı, this closure ensured that Washington was serious about the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was about American's intentions to support countries which faced communist threat in the Middle East. Thus, Turkey's Middle East policy seemed to be on the right track. See Bağcı, Hüseyin, "Demokrat Parti'nin Orta Doğu Politikası", inside "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoglu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul 1998. Pp. 130.

<sup>182</sup> Bilge, Suat, "Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri (1920-1964): Güç Komşuluk" Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1992, Ankara. Pp 332.

The Baghdad Pact, which was sponsored by the Americans and pioneered by the Turks, fairly disturbed the USSR and their interests in the Middle East. The Soviet's reaction to the pact was much more likely that a new military bloc was to be founded by the West<sup>183</sup>. Although, Turkey officially declared their intention to enhance peace in the region, this move of the Turks was considered a tool of the imperialist agenda<sup>184</sup>. However, according to Hüseyin Bağcı, Turkey had to conduct a pro-Western policy in the Middle East, as she had to protect her utmost security in the region. Whereas, Soviets were a clear threat to the Turkish interest in the Middle East, the American approach was much more reliant on Ankara's perception against the region in general, which were enough for Turks and Westerners to form a military pact during the first half of the 1950s<sup>185</sup>. Having said that, Erel Tellal suggests that this pact that Pakistan and Turkey had signed caused a pro-Soviet stance in the Middle East, as Russian influence raised, Turco-Arab relations had negatively affected by the outcomes of the pact<sup>186</sup>. On July 14<sup>th</sup>, 1958 a coup d'état had been staged by the pro-communist officers at Iraq and the Turkish intention to intervene to her southern neighbor, once again caused Turco-Soviet relations to get tensed up<sup>187</sup>. After all, last years of the DP rule had experienced a détente on Russo-Turkish bilateral relations<sup>188</sup>.

The year of 1959 brought détente between the two camps, which also affected Turco-Soviet relations in a great deal. On the other hand, U-2 Crisis on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1960 and deployment of the Jupiter missiles ascertained the Russian disturbance<sup>189</sup>. Yet again, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Jupiter missiles too had been removed and the relations between Russia and Turkey was once again in the clear<sup>190</sup>. After Turkish disappointment in the Johnson's letter on June 5<sup>th</sup>, 1964, Turkish-Soviet intimacy was strengthened and had been sealed afterw the official visit paid by the top Turkish diplomat, Feridun Cemal Erkin, on October 30<sup>th</sup>- November 6<sup>th</sup> 1964<sup>191</sup>.

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<sup>183</sup> Bağcı, Hüseyin, "Demokrat Parti'nin Orta Doğu Politikası", inside "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul 1998. Pp. 112

<sup>184</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 515

<sup>185</sup> Bağcı, Hüseyin, "Demokrat Parti'nin Orta Doğu Politikası", inside "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul 1998. Pp. 114.

<sup>186</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 515

<sup>187</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 515

<sup>188</sup> Gürsel, Haluk F., "Tarih Boyunca Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Bir Siyasi Tarih İncelemesi", Ak Yayınları Limited Şirketi Neşriyatı: 8, İstanbul 1968, pp. 238

<sup>189</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 388

<sup>190</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 455 and also Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 772

<sup>191</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 476

According to Erel Tellal, Erkin's visit to Moscow led the way to acquire Soviet support on the Cyprus issue and yet again leveled the two states on an understanding which provided a memorandum. In addition to that, it opened a way to other reciprocal official visits by the leadership, causing normalization in the relations and cooperation until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.<sup>192</sup>

Another trigger behind Soviet-Turkish amicable relations came across was the student movements during the 1960s, especially leftist ideology had been spread out to the universities. Clearly, this was a major pressure point for the politicians and Turkish leadership<sup>193</sup>. On the other hand, the notable change of the Russian approach to the Cyprus issue also increased mutual trust whereas Soviet had been more inclined to the Greek position, with the beginning of the 1960s, Moscow started to recognize the Turkish-Cypriots' presence as a founding element of the island. In return, Turkey avoided foreign policy moves that would disturb Russia, as Turkish reserved to join to the Multilateral Force (MLF) in 1965<sup>194</sup>.

Ankara and Moscow came to an understanding to eliminate hard power in their mutual relations through the Helsinki Final Act. Ecevit paid an official visit to the USSR on 21 July- 25 July 1979, during which the two states signed three protocols mostly about political and cultural issues. Yet again, in a joint declaration, the two states favored an economic protocol that ensured three years of trade cooperation. The protocol predicted that Turkey would buy 3 million tons of petroleum, which constituted a political act rather than an economic one, since 3 million tons would consist one-quarter of the Turkish total imports<sup>195</sup>. In addition to this, in a treaty signed on June 5<sup>th</sup>, 1979, in which Soviets approved a loan of 8 million dollars to build a nuclear power plant and improve the existing facilities in Turkey. This treaty between Ankara and Moscow was considered to be the peak in bilateral economic relations, mostly caused by Ecevit's facing towards to the Socialist bloc when the U.S. enforced an arms embargo on the Turks<sup>196</sup>. Albeit, nationalist front that was created by Demirel in 1979 happened to be uneasy against to the Soviet Russia, plus the invasion to Afghanistan did not come across as a facilitator

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<sup>192</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 776

<sup>193</sup> Sönmezoglu, Faruk, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası", Der Yayınları, İstanbul 2006. Pp. 354

<sup>194</sup> Sönmezoglu, Faruk, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası", Der Yayınları, İstanbul 2006. Pp. 355

<sup>195</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 781

<sup>196</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 556

to the bilateral relations<sup>197</sup>. However, according to Faruk Sönmezoğlu, during the 1970s, Turkey was only in accordance to hold good neighborliness relations, not accepted to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, which Turkey felt yet again that Soviets were trying to break her off from the North Atlantic alliance<sup>198</sup>.

On November 10<sup>th</sup>, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev stepped down from the leadership of the USSR and, until the 1985 March 11<sup>th</sup>, an era of uninfluential Russian leaders was observed<sup>199</sup>. With that, in 1982, Turkish-Russian trade volume increased by thirty percent. Hence, by the 1983 Turkish imports had reached the best numbers after the 1924 levels<sup>200</sup>. According to Erel Tellal, during the 1980s, Turkey's decision to multiply her energy resources was very significant, even though she was to supply a great deal of energy from a state, a super-power, from the opposite camp of hers<sup>201</sup>. The visit of the Soviet top diplomat Shevardnadze, in December 1990, led the way to signature of four different treaties, which were basically about; drug trafficking, cooperation in the Black Sea fishery, judicial assistance and mutual intensives to investments. During the visit, officials on both sides, exchanged views on founding the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). On March 1991, Turkish President Turgut Özal had paid an official visit to Moscow, which was decided during the Shevardnadze's visit to Ankara, and he signed the Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty with his Soviet counterpart. This document would be considered as the foundation of the bilateral relations that was built with the Russian Federation (RF), which was the successor of the USSR<sup>202</sup>. Under this treaty, Turkey and Russia had pledged to maintain their common borders, eliminate the use of force against each other, disallow the be used of their territories for the terrorist purposes, cooperation against any kind of terrorism and mutual consult at every level in certain periods<sup>203</sup>.

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<sup>197</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 557 and see also, Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası", Der Yayınları, İstanbul 2006. Pp. 358

<sup>198</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası", Der Yayınları, İstanbul 2006. Pp. 356

<sup>199</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 679

<sup>200</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001" İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 163

<sup>201</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001" İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 163

<sup>202</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001" İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 166

<sup>203</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. Pp. 133

Erel Tellal defends that by the beginning of the 1980s Soviet Russia had started to retire from the communist ideology and considering fact that Turkey was also in the wake of an economical reformation, their good relations easily spread out to the political sphere as well<sup>204</sup>.

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics had been dismantled on December 25<sup>th</sup>, 1991, and fourteen new states were born into the international arena. However, the Russian Federation was almost twice as big of the combination of those other thirteen republics and was considered as the sole predecessor of the USSR. Faruk Sönmezoğlu claims when Warsaw Pact came to an end, a new era started for Turkish foreign policy-making. Whereas the Soviet threat has been dismantled, Turkey started to experience new versatile and ambiguous threats, originating especially around her South-Eastern borders<sup>205</sup>. For that matter, Suleyman Demirel's declaration on Soviet disintegration and birth of new threats is worth to mention:

*“The disintegration of the Soviet Union has eliminated a big threat but ushered in a period full of uncertainties. The world has not achieved stability. It is true that Turkey has been freed from a 400-year old threat. On the other hand, instability in Russia continues to be imminent concern to Turkey. The Russian Federation claims responsibility over the destiny of 30 million Russians living in other Republics. Is the Russian Federation uneasy about the breakup of the Soviet Empire? Are local conflicts there going to be pretexts for the reconstruction of the Empire? To what degree is Russia behind these conflicts?”*<sup>206</sup>

During the early post-Soviet period, Turkey and the Russian Federation faced similar notions of seeking a new role for their international relations and while cooperation could have been easily realized, new conflicting issues also surfaced in the region. One could list the conflicting issues as; Chechnya (North Caucasia) issue, competition on Caspian pipelines, clashes in the Southern Caucasia, the Turkish Straits and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty<sup>207</sup>.

Chechens, a non-Turkic but Muslim nation settled in Northern Caucasia, had overthrown the Soviet regime and administered control in the region on August 1991. On November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1991,

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<sup>204</sup> Oran, Baskın, “Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001” İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 163

<sup>205</sup> Ayman, Gülden, Ateşoğlu Güney, Nurşin, “Değişen Uluslararası Koşullarda Strateji, Türkiye ve Komşuları” inside “Türk Dış Politikası Analizi” eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 432

<sup>206</sup> Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, “Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century.” Inside “Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri.” (eds.) Gülten Kazgan, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları 213, İstanbul, August 2008.

<sup>207</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, “Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt.” Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 768-69

Dzhokhar Musayevich Dudayev, ex-Soviet Air Force General, was elected as the President of the newly proclaimed Chechen/Ingush Republic. This proclamation caused the Russian Federation to start an operation in December 1994, with the war ending between Chechens and Russians on August 31<sup>st</sup>, 1996. However, the Second Chechnya War started on October 1999 and this time Russians were victorious. Although the Chechens are not Turkic, Turkish public greatly sympathized with their cause, not to mention hundred thousand of Chechens originated citizens living in Turkey. The Russian Federation blamed the Turkish government for not preventing Turkish citizens from joining the War in Chechnya and accused Turkey of trying to get use of the lands by Chechen insurgents. Leadership of the Russia also had drawn an analogy between Russia's Chechnya strife and Turkey's Kurdish issue. Hence, Russia did not hesitate to use PKK card against Turkey to solve the issue for its own benefit<sup>208</sup>. Finally, the conflicting nature of the issue had been eliminated as Ecevit declared that the issue was Russia's internal problem and with the end of the second war in 2001, Chechnya faded away from the attention of the Turkish public<sup>209</sup>.

The energy routes issue was also significant in analyzing Russian-Turkish relations during 1990s. After the dismantlement of the USSR, competition to dominate Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin, which are highly rich in energy manner. While Azeri oil consortium company AIOC and Turkish Petroleum Joint Stock Company (TPAO) agreed upon developing oil fields in the Caspian Sea, Russian was not in favor of this joint undertaking of Azeris and Turks<sup>210</sup>. However, this agreement was canceled by the new Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, and Russians too got involved to the new agreement by owning ten percent share of the project. Another competition was also occurred during the agreement on the Baku-Ceyhan pipelines, which would transport Azeri oil to Mediterranean Sea, bypassing the Russians. However, on August 29<sup>th</sup>, 1997, Russian Federation and Republic of Turkey signed an agreement to build 1.200 meters long pipeline, called Blue Stream, which would pass under the Black Sea and would increase the purchased gas by sixteen billion cubic meters.

Although, the USSR had been fallen apart and Soviet threat perception seemed to be vanished from the hearts and minds of the Turkish elites, turmoil in the Southern Caucasus would easily

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<sup>208</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 772-73 and also Mufti, Malik, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture" Palgrave, 2009. Pp. 117

<sup>209</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası", Der Yayınları, İstanbul 2006. Pp. 695

<sup>210</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. Pp. 13



become a conflicting area both for Russia and Turkey<sup>211</sup>. Russian alliance with her neighbors could cause Turkey to feel encircled, like in the Second World War, and yet again existence of the Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia did not help to soften traditional threat perception of the Turks<sup>212</sup>.

Turkish straits constituted historically a key aspect for the Russian interest and during the 1990's it did not stop to be influential for the bilateral relations. Especially, the Straits came about to become very important in the energy transportation issue. While Straits happened to be the cheapest route for Russian energy travelling to Europe, some accidents occurred during the transportation process were rightfully confused Turkish leaderships loyalty to see the Straits as an energy route. In this respect, Turkey started to issue certain policies to regulate the traffic in the Turkish Straits, which was again not very much favored by the Russians<sup>213</sup>. Turkey's regulations on the Straits, in 1982, were a breach to the Montreux Convention and her neighbors issued complaints to Ankara on this topic. And again in 1994, Turkey has come up with a new regulation, which also disturbed Russia handsomely, so Turkey had to cancel the regulation and in 1998, terminal regulation was put into effect with Russian interest were to be considered as well<sup>214</sup>.

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was signed in Paris on November 19<sup>th</sup>, 1990 by twenty-two states, in which, signature states had to limit their conventional armed forces in the next forty months. The maximum number for the conventional forces would be as such: 40 thousand tanks, 60 thousand armed vehicles, 40 thousand artilleries, 13.600 military aircrafts and 4 thousand attack helicopters. Those limitations would concern only the flanks and the same for both Western and Eastern states<sup>215</sup>. However, after two years, Russia started to pressure NATO members to revise her limitation in her southern flank, under the pretext of the Chechen War and conflicts in the Southern Caucasus. By 1993, Russia argued for a revision of the treaty which would allow Moscow to deploy more tanks, artilleries, aircrafts on her southern

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<sup>211</sup> Lesser, Ian O., "Beyond the Bridge or Barrier: Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West" inside "Turkey's New World: changing dynamics in Turkish foreign policy" (eds.) Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. Pp. 211

<sup>212</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 169

<sup>213</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 768

<sup>214</sup> Potskhveria, B. M., "Türk Boğazlarında Trafik ve Güvenlik" inside "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri" eds. Gülten Kazgan, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları 213, İstanbul, Ağustos 2008. Pp. 177-78

<sup>215</sup> Ayman, Gülden, Ateşoğlu Güney, Nurşin, "Değişen Uluslararası Koşullarda Strateji, Türkiye ve Komşuları" inside "Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 441

borders. The Russians' attempt to retire the limitations within the CFE treaty and the lack of objection by NATO members made the Turks feel insecure<sup>216</sup>. Russia's attempt to acquire CFE-free modernized weapons and strengthen her ability to maneuver military forces near Turkish borders constituted a principal issue between the two neighbors. Russian motivations to revise the CFE limitations were also not rejected by NATO members, which also put Turkey in an unpleasant situation regarding her security<sup>217</sup>. Another threat that was faced by the Turks was the CFE-free status of the Russian Navy<sup>218</sup>. To sum up, there was also a breach by the Russians, which had constituted another significant problem for enhancement of the Russo-Turkish relations<sup>219</sup>.

Regardless, according to Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, Turkish-Russian relations during the 1990s were in parallel with the years of 1920s and 1930s, where Turkey felt more and more isolated from Europe, Turkish-Russian dialogue was established out of necessity, and Russian weakness vis-à-vis Turkey. Relations with Russia happened to be a significant source of strength at a time when her status within Europe posed a serious question mark<sup>220</sup>. She also states that the relations in 1990s could be best explained by the term "virtual rapprochement", where declarations of the leaders considered as not hostile and not constituted adversity on the top level. Having said that, mutual fear, distrust and suspicion continued in the minds and soul of the state and political elites<sup>221</sup>.

Turkish Premier Süleyman Demirel paid an official visit to Moscow on May 25<sup>th</sup>, 1992 and signed a treaty with Boris Yeltsin, which went into effect in 1994. The treaty was basically the same as the treaty signed by Turgut Özal in 1991, but since Soviet Russia was dissolved, Özal's one became obsolete<sup>222</sup>. On December 10<sup>th</sup>, 1997, the two neighbors agreed that the Turkish

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<sup>216</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası", Der Yayınları, İstanbul 2006. Pp. 703-704

<sup>217</sup> Ayman, Gülden, Ateşoğlu Güney, Nurşin, "Değişen Uluslararası Koşullarda Strateji, Türkiye ve Komşuları" inside "Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 444

<sup>218</sup> Ayman, Gülden, Ateşoğlu Güney, Nurşin, "Değişen Uluslararası Koşullarda Strateji, Türkiye ve Komşuları" inside "Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 443

<sup>219</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 23

<sup>220</sup> Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, "Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership" inside "Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power" eds. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, Lynne Rienner Publisher, USA 2001. Pp. 166

<sup>221</sup> Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, "Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership" inside "Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power" eds. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, Lynne Rienner Publisher, USA 2001. Pp. 154

<sup>222</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001" İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 547

gas purchase would increase from 6 billion cubic meters to 8 billion cubic meters from the beginning of 2002. On August 29<sup>th</sup> of 1997, a treaty on the Blue Stream project was signed, as already mentioned above, which planned to augment Turkey's electricity by twenty percent and Russian gas supply would reach nearly to 40-50 billion cubic meters in 2015<sup>223</sup>. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's official visit to Ankara constituted another cornerstone for the bilateral relations, since it was the first official visit to Ankara by a Russian Federation Premier<sup>224</sup>. During his visit, two neighbors had signed seven agreements which enhanced cooperation on economy, energy, natural gas, high-technologies and forensic. On the other hand, Turkish Chief of Armed Forces, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı's Russia visit on May 18<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>st</sup> 1998 was also considered as an important attempt for both countries to enlarge their relationship in military cooperation<sup>225</sup>. On October 4<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> 1999, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit had answered Chernomyrdin's visit, during in which two leaders discussed on cooperation in fight against terrorism and measure to take to augment economic affairs.

The years between 1992-1998 trade volume, which was approximately 15 billion dollars, had constantly been short from the Turkish side, and Russians took precautions with suitcase trading. In addition, in 1997, Russia became the second trading partner of Turkey, such that economical changes in Russian Federation would affect the Istanbul Stock Exchange more than the Eastern European stock markets<sup>226</sup>. However, during the Russian economic depression that started on August 17<sup>th</sup>, 1998, economic affairs were negatively affected, and yet Turkish enterprises did not leave Russia, which was symbolic for mutual relations<sup>227</sup>. Even in 2001, when Turkish exports was at a level of 4.3 billion dollars and did not meet the ones in 1997, there was a peak in bilateral economic affairs<sup>228</sup>. According to Gülten Kazgan, détente which was triggered in the Mikhail Gorbachev era, Turkey's seeking days and her increasing lack of

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<sup>223</sup> Matunina, L., "Rus Dış Politikasında Türkiye'nin Rolü ve Önemi" inside "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafli Konular ve Çözümleri" eds. Gülten Kazgan, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları 213, İstanbul, August 2008. Pp. 82

<sup>224</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001" İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 549

<sup>225</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 770

<sup>226</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001" İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 548

<sup>227</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001" İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 549

<sup>228</sup> Kazgan, Gülten, "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafli Konular ve Çözümleri" İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 213, İstanbul, August 2008, pp 3-4

raw material, eliminated Cold War constraints on Turco-Russia relations<sup>229</sup>. Between 1998-2001, Turkish exports to Russia were especially fresh vegetables and fruits, other agricultural products.

**Table 4.1.** Russia-Turkey Trade Progress Graphic (Million dollars)

Years	Russian export	Russian import	Gap	Volume	Russian export	Russian import	Gap	Volume
1988	409	271	138	680	-	-	-	-
1989	579	705	-126	1284	-	-	-	-
1990	1159	531	628	1690	-	-	-	-
1991	1013	611	402	1624	-	-	-	-
1992	1040	439	601	1479	1036	438	598	1474
1993	1542	499	1043	2041	1542	499	1043	2041
1994	1045	820	225	1865	1045	820	225	1865
1995	2082	1238	844	3320	1667	541	1126	2208
1996	1900	1494	406	3394	1686	589	1097	2275
1997	2048	2049	-1	4097	1983	795	1188	2778
1998	2155	1248	807	3503	1935	517	1418	2452
1999	2374	584	1790	2958	1631	313	1318	1944
2000	3864	628	3236	4492	3093	348	2745	3441
2001	3470	930	2540	4400	3200	520	2680	3720

Source: Ulçenko, N.Y., "Rusya ve Türkiye Ticaret İlişkileri: Büyüme ve İstikrarsızlaşma" inside "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri" eds. Gülten Kazgan, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 213, İstanbul, August 2008, pp 182

During the late 1990s and the early 2000s, cooperation building in the Black Sea was also significant for the Russians and the Turks. In 2000, BlackSeaFor has been introduced to the international community and was established on 2 April 2001. This initiative was basically about to perform search and rescue and peacekeeping operations, humanitarian aids, mine-sweeping and good-will visits at ports of the Black Sea and became legally operational on October 2001. Another initiative was called Naval CBMs in the Black Sea, signed on April 25<sup>th</sup>, 2002. This initiative was basically coming into force to set confidence and security

<sup>229</sup> Kazgan, Gülten, "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri" İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 213, İstanbul, August 2008, pp 1

building measures among the littoral states in the Black Sea. It also considered prior notifications of naval actions, port visits, exchange information and it was also beneficial for promoting confidence among the contracting parties of the Black Sea, yet voluntarily<sup>230</sup>.

The 9/11 had played a key role for both states to enhance their relationship in political manner. Ankara and Moscow came to an understanding that cooperation in Eurasia would be more beneficial for both neighbors than rivalry<sup>231</sup>. Hence, on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2001, two states signed Multi-Dimension Cooperation Action Plan Treaty and on January 15<sup>th</sup>, 2002, two parties have agreed on recognizing PKK and Chechen insurgents as terrorist organizations with signing the Action Plan for Cooperation between Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey in Eurasia: From Bilateral Cooperation Towards Multidimensional Partnership<sup>232</sup>. On December 6<sup>th</sup>, 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin had paid an official visit to Ankara, which was followed by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Moscow on January 12<sup>th</sup>, 2005. Those reciprocal visits were an almost peak in Turco-Russian relations, in which Putin seemed to be in accord with Turkish dialect in Cyprus and Armenian issues and two states enhanced their cooperation on energy supply<sup>233</sup>. Russian Federation suspended the CFE treaty on December 12<sup>th</sup>, 2007, which led again to Turkish anxiety and insecurity as in the 1990s<sup>234</sup>. On August 7-8, 2008, Russia had started the Georgian campaign, which gave way to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian declaration of independence. Although, Turkey was in favor of Georgia's territorial integrity, Russia, against all condemnations by the West, achieved to provide independency to the mentioned regions. At this point, Mitat Çelikpala suggests, the Georgian conflict represented a clear divergence of interests in regard to Caucasia by Ankara and Moscow<sup>235</sup>. On October 10<sup>th</sup>, 2009, Turkish President Abdullah Gül's visit to Moscow corresponded to the signing of twelve pages of declaration, which harbored accordance on

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<sup>230</sup> Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, "Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century", inside "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri" eds. Gülten Kazgan, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 213, İstanbul, August 2008, pp 137-38

<sup>231</sup> Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, "Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century", inside "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri" eds. Gülten Kazgan, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 213, İstanbul, August 2008, pp 130

<sup>232</sup> Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, "Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century", inside "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri" eds. Gülten Kazgan, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 213, İstanbul, August 2008, pp 136

<sup>233</sup> Kazgan, Gülten, "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri" İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 213, İstanbul, August 2008, pp 5

<sup>234</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012", İletişim Yayınları 1840, İstanbul 2013, pp. 539

<sup>235</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012", İletişim Yayınları 1840, İstanbul 2013, pp. 539

enhancing cooperation on free movement of goods, services and capital between both states. Likewise, on March 2009, two neighbors made legal changes on enabling using Russian ruble and Turkish lira in mutual trade. During Russian Premier Putin's Ankara visit, two states signed twelve protocols, and two leaders came an understanding to build South Stream. Turkish Premier Erdoğan, Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin, paid reciprocal visits on the year of 2010, which was a significant year for bilateral relations of Moscow and Ankara, 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of founding diplomatic relations. Apart from signing sixteen documents, two leaders agreed on put signature to an agreement on building a nuclear power plant at Mersin and a memorandum of understanding on transportation of crude petroleum in the Black Sea through Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. On March 15<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Moscow to attend Council of High Level Cooperation, formed a basis of signing reciprocal visa-free travel for Russian and Turkish citizens. In 2012, the two leaders attended the High Level Strategic Cooperation at Ankara, and although, the meeting was obscured by Russian aircraft that was held at Ankara for being suspected of carrying arms, Russian-Turkish relations were observed to be deep and continuing in a firm direction<sup>236</sup>. Having said that, NATO's missile radar deployment in Kurecik, Malatya, was also another sour spot for the Turkish-Russian relations, which was settled on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2012, as Russian Federation directed criticism and happened to take some measures on the subject.<sup>237</sup> On 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2013, Russian city Saint-Petersburg had hosted the forth Council of High Level Cooperation, in which Erdoğan and Putin's delegation was able to exchange views on the Syrian crisis and amelioration bilateral trade. A year later, on December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014, fifth meeting of the Council of High Level Cooperation was held at Ankara, Putin and his entourage and their Turkish counterparts had come to an understanding to sign eight agreements including opening of Yunus Emre Cultural Center in Moscow and announcing that 2016 to be the year or bilateral tourism between Turkey and Russia.

Trade volume between Russia and Turkey had increased significantly during 2000s, nearly approached to 37,8 billion dollars in 2008, 23 billion dollars in 2009, 26 billion dollars in 2010 and 30 billion dollars in 2011. While Turkey's exports to Russia leveled as 6.5 billion dollars, Russian exports numbered as 31,3 billion dollars in 2008. Yet again with the end of 2008, Russia became second trading partner for Turkey whereas Turkey was the seventh. On the other hand, trading with local currency between March 2009 and 2011 happened to be topped one

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<sup>236</sup> Özbay, Fatih, "Türkiye-Rusya ilişkilerinde İş birliği ve Rekabet, 1992-2012", inside "Bölgesel Sorunlar ve Türkiye", eds. Atilla Sandıklı, Erdem Kaya, Bilgesam Yayınları, İstanbul 2016. Pp. 419-21.

<sup>237</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "Son On yıllarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015." Der Yayınları, 463, 2015. Pp. 698

billion dollars, in which 800.000.000 dollars' worth was made by Russian ruble and 350.000.000 dollars' worth by Turkish lira.

**Table 4.2.** Turkey-Russian Federation Trade Volume (2000-2011) (million dollars and percentage)

Years	Export	Share in the total export (%)	Import	Share in the total import (%)	Balance	Volume
2000	644	2,30	3.887	7,16	-3.243	4.531
2001	923	3,00	3.436	8,60	-2.513	4.359
2002	1.168	3,32	3.863	7,58	-2.695	5.031
2003	1.363	2,90	5.420	7,88	-4.057	6.783
2004	1.851	2,94	9.009	9,27	-7.158	10.860
2005	2.371	3,24	12.818	11,05	-10.447	15.189
2006	3.227	3,79	17.494	12,77	-14.267	20.720
2007	4.727	4,41	23.506	13,82	-18.779	28.233
2008	6.481	4,91	31.317	15,51	-24.836	37.798
2009	3.2	3,10	19.7	14,2	-16.5	22.9
2010	4.6	4,00	21.6	11,8	-17	26.2
2011	6	4,40	23.9	9,9	-17.9	29.9

Source: Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012", İletişim Yayınları 1840, İstanbul 2013, pp. 543

According to 2012 data, bilateral trade had reached to 33,3 billion dollars, in which only 6,7 billion of it was Turkish exports to Russia, constituted very far to the target of 100 billion dollars of trade volume, declared on 2009<sup>238</sup>. Turkish investment during the year 2012 listed as 3 thousand, and foreign direct investment to Russia by Turkey stayed as 7,3 billion while Russian direct investment came across as 6,7 billion dollars. Another worth to mention fact was, Turkey's energy dependence to Russia. Turkey purchased 63 percent of her gas from Russia, while 23 percent of the petroleum of her consumption<sup>239</sup>. Thus, Mert Bilgin considers that

<sup>238</sup> Özbay, Fatih, "Türkiye-Rusya ilişkilerinde İş birliği ve Rekabet, 1992-2012", inside "Bölgesel Sorunlar ve Türkiye", eds. Atilla Sandıklı, Erdem Kaya, Bilgesam Yayınları, İstanbul 2016. Pp. 418

<sup>239</sup> Özbay, Fatih, "Türkiye-Rusya ilişkilerinde İş birliği ve Rekabet, 1992-2012", inside "Bölgesel Sorunlar ve Türkiye", eds. Atilla Sandıklı, Erdem Kaya, Bilgesam Yayınları, İstanbul 2016. Pp. 400

energy strengthens Russian Federation's hand vis-à-vis her relations with Turkey, as Ankara anticipates balancing this dependency with foreign trade and wish to build a strategic cooperation in the end. Nevertheless, it is not very clear and worth to see whether dependency or strategic cooperation would eventually will win<sup>240</sup>.

**Table 4.3.** Turkey – Russian Federation Foreign Trade Status

<b>2012</b>	<b>Export</b>	<b>Share (%)</b>	<b>Import</b>	<b>Share (%)</b>
Capital goods	627	9,4	30	0,1
Intermediate goods	3.418	51,1	25.841	97,1
Consumption goods	2.628	39,3	748	2,8
Other	10	0,1	1	0,0
<b>Total</b>	<b>6.683</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>26.620</b>	<b>100,0</b>

Source: [http://musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/2012%20yillik%20\(subat%202013\).xls](http://musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/2012%20yillik%20(subat%202013).xls)

To sum up, during 2000, while the two neighbors constituted firm relations on the topics of energy, security, investment, tourism; Cyprus, fight against terrorism, Armenia and Russian blocking in commercial activities stayed as constraints for Ankara and Moscow<sup>241</sup>. Arab Spring phenomenon also brought Libya and Syria as the conflicting interests of two states<sup>242</sup>. However, two leaders, Putin and Erdoğan accession to the rule had affected positively to bilateral relations and according to Erhan Büyükkakıncı, they have put political issues aside and focused on economic and strategic cooperation, which helped to ease the competitive nature of the relations the 1990s<sup>243</sup>, and Davutoğlu's "Loose Eurasianism" had overlapped with Russian "New Eurasianism" in many aspects<sup>244</sup>.

<sup>240</sup> Bilgin, Mert, "Türkiye'nin Enerji Güvenliği ve Bölgesel İlişkileri" inside "XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Özlem Terzi, Der Yayınlar, Eylül 2012. Pp. 794

<sup>241</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012", İletişim Yayınları 1840, İstanbul 2013, pp. 558-59

<sup>242</sup> Özbay, Fatih, "Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinde İş birliği ve Rekabet, 1992-2012", inside "Bölgesel Sorunlar ve Türkiye", eds. Atilla Sandıklı, Erdem Kaya, Bilgesam Yayınları, İstanbul 2016. Pp. 419-21.

<sup>243</sup> Büyükkakıncı, Erhan, "XXI. Yüzyılın Başında Türkiye'den Avrasya'ya Bakış: Yenil Algılama Biçimleri ve Kurumsal Yöntemler" inside "XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Özlem Terzi, Der Yayınlar, Eylül 2012. Pp. 703

<sup>244</sup> Büyükkakıncı, Erhan, "XXI. Yüzyılın Başında Türkiye'den Avrasya'ya Bakış: Yenil Algılama Biçimleri ve Kurumsal Yöntemler" inside "XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Özlem Terzi, Der Yayınlar, Eylül 2012. Pp. 713-14.



**Table 4.5.** Bilateral Trade (in million dollars)

<b>Years</b>	<b>Export</b>	<b>Import</b>	<b>Volume</b>	<b>Balance</b>
<b>2014</b>	5,943	25,393	31,236	-19,350
<b>2015</b>	3,588	20,402	23,990	-16,814
<b>2016</b>	1,734	15,161	16,895	-13,814
<b>2017</b>	-52	-26	-30	

*Source: TUIK (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/rusya-ekonomisi.tr.mfa>)*

Although relations were heading in a better direction every day, Russian support for Syria's Assad has come across as somewhat problematic. Especially, in 2015 November, when a Russian fighter jet was hit by Turkish air forces, Turkish-Russian relations started to experience heavy tension.<sup>245</sup> While Russian and Turkish leaders exchanged accusations, Russia did not refrain to play economy/energy and the Kurdish card.<sup>246</sup> Yet again, Turkish elites did not seem to react to the crisis firmly. One year afterwards, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has decided to apologize from the Russian leader Vladimir Putin, and although, the crisis ended reciprocal trust is not yet how it existed beforehand.<sup>247</sup> On December 2016, three regional powers; Iran, Russian and Turkey came to an understanding on Syria's future and it has been said that this mentioned agreement caused Washington to be obsolete vis-à-vis Syrian crises.<sup>248</sup> The changed of the Turkish policies in the region was also linked to the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's resignation and his replacement by Binali Yıldırım, who was introduced by the new policy of "earning more friends than enemies".<sup>249</sup>

The coup attempt on July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2016, constituted another breaking point with the West. While its leaders did not happen to be supportive for the Turkish government, Russian leader Putin's support was welcomed by Turkish elites – so much to the extent Turkish President Erdoğan's first official visit in post-July 15<sup>th</sup> era, was to Russia, on August 9<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Saint-Petersburg.<sup>250</sup>

<sup>245</sup> Sönmezoglu, Faruk, "Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015." Der Yayınları, 463, 2015. Pp. 700

<sup>246</sup> Demirağ, Yelda, "Krizden Normalleşmeye: Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri" inside "Türk Dış Politikasını Nasıl Bilirdiniz?" eds. Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ, Kripto Kitaplar, Genel Yayın No: 149, October 2017. Pp. 139

<sup>247</sup> Bağcı, Hüseyin, "Son 10 Yıllık Dönemin Dış Politikasına Gerçekçi Bir Yaklaşım: Hatalardan Doğrulara Dönüş Mü?" inside "Türk Dış Politikasını Nasıl Bilirdiniz?" eds. Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ, Kripto Kitaplar, Genel Yayın No: 149, October 2017. Pp. 121

<sup>248</sup> Bağcı, Hüseyin, "Son 10 Yıllık Dönemin Dış Politikasına Gerçekçi Bir Yaklaşım: Hatalardan Doğrulara Dönüş Mü?" inside "Türk Dış Politikasını Nasıl Bilirdiniz?" eds. Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ, Kripto Kitaplar, Genel Yayın No: 149, October 2017. Pp. 121

<sup>249</sup> Demirağ, Yelda, "Krizden Normalleşmeye: Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri" inside "Türk Dış Politikasını Nasıl Bilirdiniz?" eds. Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ, Kripto Kitaplar, Genel Yayın No: 149, October 2017. Pp. 134

<sup>250</sup> Demirağ, Yelda, "Krizden Normalleşmeye: Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri" inside "Türk Dış Politikasını Nasıl Bilirdiniz?" eds. Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ, Kripto Kitaplar, Genel Yayın No: 149, October 2017. Pp. 135

This summit enhanced bilateral understanding between Ankara and Moscow, led the way to cooperation in Syria and helped Turkey with the Euphrates Shield on August 24<sup>th</sup>, 2016. Even though, Russian Ambassador Andrei Karlov's assassination during a meeting in Ankara, was not able to spoil the rapprochement of the Russian-Turkish affaire. The Moscow meeting, following the assassination, did help both countries to come to the same spot vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis and gave way to the Astana Summit, in which three regional powers accorded on the mentioned crisis above.<sup>251</sup>

Events and crises above were delineated to give a detailed background of Turco-Russian relations. Detailed as it be, the crisis alone could be indication of the problematic relations between the two neighbors. Yet again, love and hate relations can be explained by the Russophobic tendencies of both Kemalist elites and the political Islamists who have asserted that their FPM is different and non-traditional. The crisis after the Russian fighter jet was hit by the Turks especially is an event that could not be seen in any Kemalist governments. This led to a very sharp drop in Turkish prestige vis-à-vis Russian leadership and the public. Yet TFP had found a way to eliminate this crisis and cooperate with Moscow nearly as heavily as before. This "apology" by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can be explained only by traditional Kemalist tendencies, if AK Party was not constrained by the sub-systemic nature of the post-Cold War era, a pure political Islamist/neo-Ottomanist reaction to Russian leadership would be more third-Worldist one, which was nearly same to what Erbakan would have done in this situation.

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<sup>251</sup> Demirağ, Yelda, "Krizden Normalleşmeye: Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri" inside "Türk Dış Politikasını Nasıl Bilirdiniz?" eds. Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ, Kripto Kitaplar, Genel Yayın No: 149, October 2017. Pp. 135

## **5. CASE STUDY: UKRAINE CRISIS AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING**

Both Ukraine and Turkey hold a significant role when it comes to geopolitics. Ukraine and Turkey may be considered a bridge and/or barrier in international relations. Ukraine, as an ex-Soviet state and newly Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country, constituted a key element for Russia, which also affected Turkish foreign policy and bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey. As Ukraine is a gateway to the Balkans and Black Sea for the Russians, it is strategically very important, in addition to being prosperous in natural gas and other raw materials. Turkey is situated on an equally strategic hinterland, which connects Africa, Asia and Europe, as well as forming Eurasia with the Russian Federation.

**Figure 5.1.** Ukraine's Political Breakdown by Regions



Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4050281.stm>

### 5.1. Ukraine in Crisis:

Before the last crisis, Ukraine was continuously afflicted by political turmoil and few revolutions.

In 2004, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich's supporters, separatists in Eastern Ukraine, decided to hold a referendum for semi-independence in Eastern Oblasts of Ukraine, with the opposition leader declaring himself as the new President (following Leonid Kuchma). Although Viktor Yushchenko had declared himself as the new Ukrainian President, Prime Minister Yanukovich did not accept the results as he believed that he had become the new President. Thousands of opposition supporters protested in the capital, Kiev, while outgoing President Kuchma urged for sobriety. The official polls stated that Mr. Yanukovich had won with 49.46 percent of the votes;<sup>252</sup> however, the Orange Revolution brought Yushchenko to the presidency regardlessly. Nevertheless, Yanukovich triumphed in the next election held in 2010, becoming the fourth President of the Republic of Ukraine. Before the EU Summit on the 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup>

<sup>252</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4050281.stm> date of access: 26.04.2018

October 2013, Yanukovich had stopped running the preparation committee which caused an outburst from supporters of European Union integration and led to satisfaction in Moscow. On top of that, he signed a treaty with Putin for financial aid and natural gas discount on December 2013.<sup>253</sup> This decision of Yanukovich's triggered the protests widely known as Euromaidan; after three months of police clashing with protesters, Yanukovich resigned and Ukrainian Parliament Rada reached an agreement on new elections for May 25<sup>th</sup> of 2014. However, elections did not achieve for things to settle down, especially in eastern Ukraine as pro-Russian separatists seized governmental offices in Odessa, and other clashes were experienced in the Donbass basin. On top of this, Russian military had moved troops to the Ukrainian border with eleven thousand men stationed just across the border.<sup>254</sup>

The Crimean Peninsula, after the declaration of independence by Ukrainian Rada, was constituted as an autonomous republic with pro-Russian figures supporting unification with the Russian Federation from the beginning. Finally, on March 14<sup>th</sup>, 2014, the Crimean Parliament declared its decision to join the Russian Federation. According to Vladimir Putin, Crimean annexation was a historical reality since most of the population showed an explicit declaration of will to join Russia. On May 2014, pro-Russian elements in the eastern regions of Republic of Ukraine, Lugansk and Donetsk Oblasts, declared their independence and loyalty to Kremlin afterwards.

According to Aleksandr Dugin, the ideologue and academic, Ukrainian independence is the worst option for the Russian geopolitics, which could easily cause military confrontation. Ukrainian independence also constitutes threat for the whole Eurasia, territorial demands and pro-independence movements etc.... and Ukraine ought to continue to be in Russia's orbit, which is very vital for the continental geopolitics. Dugin further sees Ukraine not as an independent state in the international arena but more as a barrier between the East and the West. Hence, according to this famous ideologue, who is also influential in Kremlin, Ukraine's status could only be a barrier or a Russian client.<sup>255</sup> Furthermore, the region of Eastern Ukraine, all lands east of Dnipro, should not be considered as the other Western region in the Ukraine, which is west to Dnipro, harbors Odesa, Kiev and Chernigov, mostly settled by the tribe of

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<sup>253</sup> [https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner\\_site-pbs\\_newshour#p0](https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner_site-pbs_newshour#p0) date of access: 12.06.2018

<sup>254</sup> [https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner\\_site-pbs\\_newshour#p0](https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner_site-pbs_newshour#p0) date of access: 1.05.2018

<sup>255</sup> Ingram, Alan, "Alexander Dugin: geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia", *Political Geography* 20 (2001) 1029–1051. Pp. 1041-42-43

Malorussians.<sup>256</sup> On the other hand, Crimea, due to her ethnic status, could be easily torn away from the Ukrainian state, and that is exactly what Russian did in 2013.

**Figure 5.2.** Separatist Areas in Ukraine



Source: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russian-interests-reshape-ukraines-borders>

## 5.2. Russian-Ukrainian Relations:

Russia and Ukraine have strong fraternal ties dating back to the 9<sup>th</sup> century Kievan Rus, the first Slavic kingdom. Ukraine was a part of the Russian Empire for a long time and again in Soviet era, although they were defined as two separate republics, they were strongly bound to one another. After the collapse of the USSR, on 24<sup>th</sup> August 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament,

<sup>256</sup> Kısacık, Sina, Kaya, Furkan, "Russian Eurasianism versus American Eurasianism Within The Perspective of Brzezinski and Dugin: A Case Study of the Recent Ukrainian Crisis", *International Journal of Arts & Sciences*, 1944-6934: 09(02):161–186 (2016). Pp. 166-67

*Verkhovna Rada*, proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Ukraine, and Leonid Kravchuk was popularly elected as the first President of the republic with 61.5 percent of the electoral votes.<sup>257</sup> Although, Ukrainian independence did not seem to be conflicting, the Russian Federation and Ukraine had to solve the transfer of nuclear weapons to Moscow. This issue was resolved in 1994, under the pragmatic leadership of the second President, Leonid Kuchma, and with the help of the tertiary parties. Later, Ukraine decided to join Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 and the Council of Europe in 1995.<sup>258</sup> Another problematic issue between Kremlin and Kyiv was the status of the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea. Between 1992 and 1997, two states went back and forth in order to agree upon an accord, and finally on April 1997, Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and his Russian counterpart Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin signed an agreement regarding the sharing Black Sea fleet by fifty-fifty, under the condition of Moscow receiving newly built ships and Russians leasing port of Sevastopol for twenty years for 97.75 million dollars. On top of that, the Crimean issue was fairly bound to the status of the Black Sea Fleet, as the peninsula harbors the Russian fleet and comes across as a significant geopolitical land. Russian nationalists were willing to annex Crimea to Russia, as the Russian population represented nearly sixty percent of the peninsula, and they did not recognize Khrushchev's "present"<sup>259</sup> to Ukrainians. Hence, the ethnic, military and economic nature of the Crimean problem was very much intertwined and linked to each other.<sup>260</sup>

In 2008, Russian President Dimitri Medvedev announced the "Near Abroad Policy" and delineated Russia's interest zone as the environs CIS states. With the beginning of 2012, Kremlin attempted to hegemonize Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and Kyiv started to ameliorate her relations with the EU, triggering integration policies with Brussels. In response to that, Moscow initiated the Nord Stream in order to outriveal Kyiv or force Ukraine to give her Western affiliation up.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Büyükakıncı, Erhan, "Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkileri" inside "Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna" eds. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi, pp. 401-436., 2004.

<sup>258</sup> Büyükakıncı, Erhan, "Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkileri" inside "Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna" eds. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi, pp. 401-436., 2004.

<sup>259</sup> Yet again, according to academician and one of the Ukraine's former Foreign Ministers Borys Tarasyuk, defends that Crimean turnover to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine is not likely to be seen as a gift from the USSR leader Khrushchev. It was also very much with the pretext of economic reasons, like Crimea could only be survive by the resources coming for Ukraine and not Russia. See Tarasyuk, Borys "Ukraine in the World" inside "Ukraine in the World" eds. L. A. Hajda, NYC, Harvard Univ. Press, 1998, s. 11.

<sup>260</sup> Büyükakıncı, Erhan, "Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkileri" inside "Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna" eds. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi, pp. 401-436., 2004.

<sup>261</sup> Delcour, Laure, "European Union-Russia Relations in 2012", inside "Russia 2013: Insights of the Observatoire Franco-Russe" eds. Pavel Chinsky, le cherche-midi, Paris 2013. Pp. 282

At the end of the day, Ukraine is an important economic partner for the Russians, which also happens to be a vital energy route and key strategic land for military purposes. Building on that, former American top diplomat, Henry Kissinger states: “*The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country.*”<sup>262</sup>

### **5.3. Importance of Crimea:**

Throughout the whole Ukraine crisis, Crimea held an important status, as sixty percent of its population was constituted by the Russian ethnicity. Crimea was always a strategic port city, a vital part for the Russian agenda. Since Ottoman governance until the Russian Tsarist regime, historical significance of the peninsula was always extant. During the Soviet era, it was part of the Russian Soviet Republic and in 1954, largely under the goodwill of Soviet leader Khrushchev, the peninsula was transferred to the Ukraine Soviet Republic. Additionally, when the USSR was dissolved, Crimea stayed in the newly independent Ukraine, yet Russian Federation achieved to hold on to the peninsula with a new agreement in 1991.<sup>263</sup> According to Washington and the EU, the annexation of Crimea and Russian-backed clashes in Eastern Ukraine were a clear breach of international law. More particularly, this was not in accord with the noninterventionist provisions in the UN Charter; the 1997 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, which requires Russia to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity; and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, which was signed by the US, UK and Russian Federation in order to provide security to Ukraine in exchange with the removal of her nuclear premises. However, the Russians did not accept any of those accusations and instead argued that she was guarding Russian speaking people in Ukraine, as her Near Abroad Policy declares.<sup>264</sup>

### **5.4. Eastern Ukraine in Crisis:**

Today’s crises are also triggered by the ethnic conflicts in the Eastern Ukraine. As already mentioned above, the Russian population in the east was always in favor of joining with the motherland and always saw themselves as the “Outer Russians”<sup>265</sup>. In 1993, with the declaration of the Near Abroad policy, the Russian Federation triggered a new attempt to regain her old

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<sup>262</sup> [https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner\\_site-pbs\\_newshour#p0](https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner_site-pbs_newshour#p0) date of acces: 29.04.2018

<sup>263</sup> [https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner\\_site-pbs\\_newshour#p0](https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner_site-pbs_newshour#p0) date of acces: 30.04.2018

<sup>264</sup> [https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner\\_site-pbs\\_newshour#p0](https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner_site-pbs_newshour#p0) date of Access: 30.04.2018

<sup>265</sup> Büyükakıncı, Erhan, “Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkileri” inside “Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna” eds. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi, pp. 401-436., 2004.



influence zones, former Soviet states. Plus, with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a new tool to protect outer Russians and to recreate their bond with the motherland, was born. On top of that, in September 1993, Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens in the East had come forward with an idea to hold referenda in order to decide on unification with the Russian Federation. And finally, in 1994, Ukrainian President Kravchuk had to accept the semi-independent status of Donbas states- Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts. The mentioned region held significance for both its ethnicity and also its richness in raw materials. As a matter of fact, according to 1989 census, only forty-four percent of the population belonged to the Russian ethnicity. Having said that, the Donbass basin harbored a great deal of heavy industry and mining facilities<sup>266</sup>. Namely, it seems that the issue was mostly economic rather than a romantic nationalistic matter.

### **5.5. Western approach to Kyiv:**

All in all, Erhan Büyükakıncı suggests that, although, the West considers Ukraine as a former Soviet republic, the first two Presidents of Ukraine seemed to be in favor of Washington when it came to European security.<sup>267</sup> As already mentioned above, Kyiv had joined to the PfP on February 4<sup>th</sup> 1994, being the first CIS country to ever join a NATO initiative. On July 1997, at the Madrid Summit, Kuchma signed the charter of special partnership between the EU and Ukraine, which supported territorial integrity and rule of law of Kyiv. Yet again, according to Büyükakıncı, Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO was very much in parallel with the Russian-NATO affair in the 1990s<sup>268</sup>. Having said that, EU's and NATO's enlargement reached the borders of Ukraine, consecutively in 2007 and in 2004, yet again Büyükakıncı further suggests that EU was willing to review Ukraine as a special partner rather than a fully-integrated member state<sup>269</sup>. As the Eastern Partnership Program (EPP) in 2009, envisaged simply the economic and political cooperation between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,

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<sup>266</sup> Büyükakıncı, Erhan, "Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkileri" inside "Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna" eds. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi, pp. 401-436., 2004.

<sup>267</sup> Büyükakıncı, Erhan, "Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkileri" inside "Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna" eds. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi, pp. 401-436., 2004.

<sup>268</sup> Büyükakıncı, Erhan, "Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkileri" inside "Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna" eds. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi, pp. 401-436., 2004.

<sup>269</sup> Büyükakıncı, Erhan, "Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkileri" inside "Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna" eds. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi, pp. 401-436., 2004.

Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, and did not predict any membership agenda, this supports Büyükakıncı's argument.<sup>270</sup>

Apart from Ukraine-Russia bilateral relations, Dimitri Trenin claims that the crisis at hand had caused an eruption of the Western-Russian rapprochement after the end of the Cold War. Again, he further claims that the first tip of this breaking away was seen in the notorious 2008 Georgia-Russian war<sup>271</sup>. American support for the Color Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia as well as attempts to be influential in the Black Sea region, by forming military alliances with Georgia, Bulgaria and Romania, were also a breaking point for Russian-Western relations.<sup>272</sup> In other words, the Western alliance stirred up the hornet's nest.

### **5.6. Turkish-Ukrainian bilateral relations:**

Turkey-Ukraine bilateral relations were first formed at the talks of the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation agreement on June 25<sup>th</sup> 1992. Since Ukraine had declared its independence, Turkish governments tried to form robust bilateral relations with this newly independent republic. Due to Ukraine's independence and strong stance in international relations<sup>273</sup>, Turkey also supported Ukraine-NATO rapprochement and deepening of Ukraine's enjoinment to the European economic and political club.<sup>274</sup> As a matter of fact, during the 1990s, Turkey was not insignificant in the accession of Eastern European countries, which had been the rival camp throughout the Cold War. Their membership to the EU was more hurtful for the Turkish elites than their accession to the North Atlantic alliance, since she was already a member of NATO. On the other hand, Turkey saw the NATO enlargement process in parallel with her bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. While she was not willing to be extreme in her relations with the West, she also did not antagonize Moscow, and gave constant advice

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<sup>270</sup> [https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner\\_site-pbs\\_newshour#p0](https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-crisis?cid=otr-partner_site-pbs_newshour#p0) date of Access: 01.05.2018

<sup>271</sup> Trenin, Dimitri, "The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of the Great-Power Rivalry", Carnegie Moscow Center, July 2014. Pp. 4

<sup>272</sup> Kısacık Sina, Kaya, Furkan, "An Assessment on The Future of Ongoing Turkish-Russian Relations: "Clash of Interests or Convergence of Interests" International Multilingual Academic Journal, Vol 3, No. 2, May 2016. Pp. 179

<sup>273</sup> Çelikpala, Mitat, "Son Yirmi Yılda Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'ya Yönelik Dış Politikası ve Bu Ülkelerdeki Faaliyetleri", inside "Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna: Türk Dili Halklar-Türkiye ile İlişkiler" eds. İsmail Aydınğün and Çiğdem Balım, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayını: 441, 2012. Pp. 313

<sup>274</sup> Öncü, Ali Servet, "Leonid Kuchma Döneminde Türkiye-Ukrayna İlişkileri: Yapıcı Ortaklık", İ.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi No:50. (Mart 2014). Pp. 176-177

that the rapid decision on the enlargement was more likely to be seen as hostile to the Russian leadership.<sup>275</sup>

In the 1990s, the positive relationship between Kyiv and Ankara was also linked to the mutual perception of challenge vis-à-vis Russian existence. Both Ukraine and Turkey were in accord to ease their bilateral relations in order not to draw suspicion of the new Kremlin administration and its potential agenda in near abroad.<sup>276</sup> Turkey's approach toward Ukraine at this point was very much linked to the feeling of the encirclement that she sensed. Russian military existence in Armenia, Georgia and Crimea reinvigorate Ankara'a historical feeling of being surrounded like in the Second World War.<sup>277</sup> Turkish pragmatic approach to Kyiv was in accordance with her traditional foreign policymaking, when economic and political conditions were to be understood. Turkey, which did not want to be perceived as enormously pro-Western, was nonetheless willing to adapt her policies to her European and American allies and its institutions.<sup>278</sup>

According to İsmail Aydıngün, the multifaceted foreign policy of Ukraine, in the beginning of the 2000s, affected both Turkey's status and Turkish foreign policy towards Ukraine respectively.<sup>279</sup> On the other hand, it was not incorrect to state that AK Party's foreign policy's priority did not include Ukraine as Turkish foreign policy elites started to become occupied with the EU accession process.<sup>280</sup>

Despite the existing motivation and will economic partnership between Kyiv and Ankara, the two states were not able to reach their target numbers.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 24-28.

<sup>276</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 166-67

<sup>277</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 167

<sup>278</sup> Çelikpala, Mitat, "Son Yirmi Yılda Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'ya Yönelik Dış Politikası ve Bu Ülkelerdeki Faaliyetleri", inside "Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna: Türk Dili Halklar-Türkiye ile İlişkiler" eds. İsmail Aydıngün and Çiğdem Balım, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayını: 441, 2012. Pp. 313-14

<sup>279</sup> Aydıngün, İsmail, "Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'da Ulus Devlet İnşası ve Türkiye" inside "Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna: Türk Dili Halklar-Türkiye ile İlişkiler" eds. İsmail Aydıngün and Çiğdem Balım, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayını: 441, 2012. Pp. 433

<sup>280</sup> Aydıngün, İsmail, "Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'da Ulus Devlet İnşası ve Türkiye" inside "Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna: Türk Dili Halklar-Türkiye ile İlişkiler" eds. İsmail Aydıngün and Çiğdem Balım, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayını: 441, 2012. Pp. 435

<sup>281</sup> Öncü, Ali Servet, "Leonid Kuchma Döneminde Türkiye Ukrayna İlişkileri: Yapıcı Ortaklık", İ.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi No:50. (Mart 2014). Pp. 189

**Table 5.1.** Turkey-Ukraine Foreign Trade (million \$)

Years	Export	Shift (%)	Import	Shift (%)	Volume	Balance
2000	258	14,3	982	26,9	1.240	-724
2001	289	12,0	758	-22,8	1.047	-469
2002	313	8,3	991	30,8	1.304	-678
2003	445	42,0	1.332	34,3	1.777	-887
2004	576	29,4	2.509	88,5	3.085	-1.933
2005	821	42,6	2.651	5,6	3.472	-1.830
2006	1.121	36,6	3.059	15,4	4.180	-1.938
2007	1.481	32,1	4.519	47,7	6.000	-3.038
2008	2.187	47,7	6.106	35,1	8.293	-3.919
2009	1.033	-53,4	3.156	-48,3	4.189	-2.122
2010	1.261	22,1	3.833	21,4	5.094	-2.572
2011	1.732	37,4	4.812	25,5	6.544	-3.080

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TÜİK)

In 2016, Turkey's exports to Ukraine were 1.25 billion dollars while imports were numbered as 2.55 billion dollars, which made a trade volume of 3.8 billion dollars. Turkish investment on Ukraine happened to stay at 2 billion dollars, as 600 Turkish firms were functional. On the other hand, Turkish construction firms undertook 162 plans which was worth 5,1 billion dollars.<sup>282</sup> Although the low intensity of the bilateral trade, tourism happened to be promising. In 2015, while 707 thousand Ukrainian citizens had visited Turkey, in 2016, this number increased to 1.04 million. Later, in the first ten months of 2017, 1.2 million 212 in total were declared as visiting the southern neighbor.<sup>283</sup>

**Table 5.2.** Bilateral economic relations (million dollars)

Years	Export	Import	Volume	Balance
2014	1.730	4.272	6.002	-2.542
2015	1.121	3.448	4.569	-2.327
2016	1.254	2.542	3.801	-1.293
2015/16 shift (%)	12	-26	-17	

Source: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ukrayna-ekonomisi.tr.mfa>

<sup>282</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ukrayna-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa> date of access: 03.05.2018

<sup>283</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ukrayna-ekonomisi.tr.mfa> date of access: 03.05.2018

During the Ukrainian crisis, Turkey seemed not to be fairly disturbed from this development. While Turkish leadership declared their will on Ukraine's territorial integrity and mostly affiliated with the Crimean Tatars' condition<sup>284</sup>, they reserved to intervene in the issue, and mostly saw it as an internal issue of the Russian Federation.

### **5.7. Arguments on Turkish Foreign Policy-making during the aforementioned crisis:**

Although the threat perception was softened with the beginning of the 2000s, the insecurity complex that was long before penetrated to the Turkish elites' minds comes across as very significant.<sup>285</sup> According to the neoclassical realist approach, political elites are very significant actors in the decision making of external relations, which is what we see in Turkish politics and its foreign policy making.<sup>286</sup>

This aforementioned complexity is not only alive when it comes to the threat perception of 1940s Soviet Russian but goes very much hand in hand with the insecurity complex from the 1920s.<sup>287</sup> According to Faruk Sönmezoğlu, post-Cold War era gave way to the balance of power based on economic interests and disappearing of the ideological nature of the international politics, as all sub-regional systems has its own play in hand.<sup>288</sup> Yasemin Çelik suggests that Turkey's close alliance with NATO and the West in general does contribute to her foreign policymaking procedure as well as maintaining her territorial integrity and independence. After the cold war, Turkish elites tried to find a new purpose and status in the international arena. The collapse of the USSR came at the perfect moment to benefit Turkey in order to soothe anxiety about her territorial integrity and provide her a path to go near the Russian Federation.<sup>289</sup>

Insecurity complex and threat perception issues, already mentioned above, are linked to what Turkey had experienced and what Turkish political/security elites had inherited from those experiences. Those inheritance is more likely explained by the historical luggage that the

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<sup>284</sup> [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu\\_nun-ukrayna-disisleri-bakani-sayin-pavlo-klimkin-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi\\_-10-subat-20.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-ukrayna-disisleri-bakani-sayin-pavlo-klimkin-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi_-10-subat-20.tr.mfa) date of acces: 03.05.2018

<sup>285</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 24-28

<sup>286</sup> Makovsky, Alan, Sayarı, Sabri, "Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. Pp. 4

<sup>287</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 104

<sup>288</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze: Türk Dış Politikası", Der Yayınları: 388. İstanbul 2006. Pp. 469

<sup>289</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999. Introduction

process of Turkish state-building had gathered. First of all, Turkey had fought with the Russian civilization thirteen times, and, in most of them, the Russian Empire happened to be victorious. Apart from this traditional luggage when dealing with the Russian Federation, Joseph Stalin's demands on the Turkish Straits and the North Eastern Turkish lands are still fresh in the minds of the Turkish elites. Apart from the Russophobia, Turkish security elites has this syndrome of Serves, the treaty which was signed but not ratified just after the First World War -had envisaged to dismember the Ottoman lands in Anatolia. In other words, Serves Syndrome is more likely to be defined as, Turkey's motivation towards joining Western/European institutions, and at the same time her suspicion, especially Western Europe, in their secret neo-imperialist political agenda of weaken and dismantle the Turkish state.<sup>290</sup> This syndrome was also linked to the Western relations on 1920s, Greek Asia Minor campaign, occupation of Istanbul, Izmir, Antalya, and other big cities of the Turks and the Wilsonian self-determination principle which evoked independence motivation for the Kurds, and the territorial demands of the Armenian Soviets'.<sup>291</sup> The trauma of 1918-1922, till the Lausanne Treaty, still in the minds of the public opinion and the politics elite, since from the beginning of the republic to at least 1990s.<sup>292</sup> on other respects, one of the former top diplomat of Turkey, Ismail Cem underlined the Turkish elites' fallacy of as much as they seem pro-Western more they were to become more acceptable to the Westerners.<sup>293</sup>

Although, AK Party's foreign policy is introduced as pragmatic, versatile and is mostly about achieving economic benefit, this Sevres syndrome and Russophobia tendencies are still in the minds of the Turkish foreign policy elites. For example, during 1990s, Islamist Welfare Party was able to form a government with Tansu Çiller's True Path Party. The foreign policy of Erbakan was considered a dynamic and multi-dimensional by some journalists and experts on foreign policy at that era.<sup>294</sup> Yet again, anti-Zionist, xenophobic Turkish nationalist and Third-Worldist motivations of Erbakan, although his foreign policy motivation was not able to dictate for a long time period, this rhetoric of Erbakan is able to be observed in AK Party and its leader's rhetoric, mostly in post-Arab Spring period. The clashing ideologies, Kemalism and

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<sup>290</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 103

<sup>291</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 102

<sup>292</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 103

<sup>293</sup> Cem, İsmail, "Avrupa'nın Birliği ve Türkiye", Cilt 2, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005.

<sup>294</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 159

Conservatism, during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, are mostly diverge when it comes to foreign policy goals of the state. While Kemalism is more to do with *Westpolitik*, embracing Western institutions like NATO, WEU, the EU and sustain the Ottoman Empire's emulation towards the West and perseverance of formidable threat from Russia<sup>295</sup>, Welfare party and its follower, despite their declarations on their reborn, AK Party, is more inclined to anti-Western, anti-Zionist and xenophobic nationalism<sup>296</sup> in which anti-Americanism happens to be the major part. Furthermore, according to Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, AK Party era has not been very identical in terms of foreign policy making and alteration from the committed Europeanization was replaced by "soft Euro-Asianism"<sup>297</sup>, which is different than the "hard Euro-Asianism", more Atlanticist elements in the foreign policy elites rather than Eurasianist ones.

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu lists Turkish Foreign Policy's ultimate goals as to protect Turkish nationals and ensure their welfare and security, to deter revisionist states in her close neighborhood - Balkans, Middle East, Caucasia- and to preserve the status quo in the region.<sup>298</sup> At that case, how one is able to explain Turkey's policy vis-à-vis the crisis in Ukraine, accepting that Russian annexation of Crimea and clashes on the Eastern Ukraine endanger regional status-quo? Yet again, as Feroz Ahmad has puts it, Turkey's policies are mostly defined by the external affairs, hence it is not very much in the hands of the Turkish elites per se.<sup>299</sup> This comment of Ahmad's is very much true when one keeps in mind of the neoclassical realism and its reflections of foreign policy making. As mentioned above, neoclassical realism suggests that foreign policy procedure does not only have to do with the political elite or perception of the country, it is about the local and external constraints that a state has to face when it comes to make decisions.<sup>300</sup> Yet again, Steven Lobell would argue about Turkey that, since she is a regional

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<sup>295</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 139

<sup>296</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 146

<sup>297</sup> Öniş, Ziya, Yılmaz, Şuhnaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", Turkish Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, 7-24 March, 2009. Pp. 13

<sup>298</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türk Dış Politikası", pp. 633-646 inside "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi" (eds) Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları; İstanbul 1998. Pp. 639-40

<sup>299</sup> Ahmad, Feroz, "Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu", Kaynak Yayınları: 292, Sixth Edition, March 2004 İstanbul. Pp. 249

<sup>300</sup> Hudson, Valerie M., Vore, Christophe S., "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow" Mershon International Studies Review, Volume 39, Issue 2, (Oct., 1995), 209-238. See page 221.

power, she would not just be influenced by international or domestic development but also with the sub-systemic conditions of her near abroad.<sup>301</sup>

Furthermore, one is also should or able to ask the question: To what extent Turkey trusts NATO? Is she positive that North Atlantic Alliance would come to her help in a possible friction with the Russian Federation? The answer is ambiguous. Plus, one ought to keep in mind that Russia would be in favor of regional conflicts, which would avail Russia in order to exist in those conflicting areas as a peacekeeping force.<sup>302</sup>

Turkish-American relations have not been on track because of the Obama administration's lack of support toward the AK Party government during the July 15<sup>th</sup> coup d'état attempt.<sup>303</sup> Although there is no evidence to suggest of the following, the Turkish government is positive that NATO and the U.S. were behind the coup or already aware of it, as the top leadership of the July 15 event is harbored in the U.S. Hence, the coup attempt has drastically altered Turkey's approach in regard to her Western allies.<sup>304</sup> The post-July 15<sup>th</sup> era, although relatively recent, has caused AK Party to return to its radical origins, which are anti-American and xenophobic nationalism. According to Kemal Kirişçi and Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Turkey's American relations are problematic from the Kurdish perspective as well, whereas Washington sees YPG as an ally in the fight against ISIL. Turkish elites' Sevres syndrome again enters the picture, especially when dealing with the Kurdish issue. As mentioned above, American President Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points had awoken Kurdish independence desires, and their attempt to achieve it also was very traumatic for the young Turkish state, endangering her creation of the national identity during the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>305</sup>

Per contra, even from the beginning of the post-cold war years, dominance of political Islam in Turkish politics has caused another divergence point for Turkish-American bilateral

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<sup>301</sup> Lobell, Steven E. "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 45-46).

<sup>302</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türk Dış Politikası" inside "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi" (eds) Faruk Sönmezoglu, Der Yayınları; İstanbul 1998. Pp. 644

<sup>303</sup> Aydıntaşbaş, Aslı, Kirişçi, Kemal, "The United States and Turkey: Friends, Enemies, or Only Interests." Center on United States and Europe, Brookings Institute Turkey Project Policy Paper, No: 12, April 2017, pp 2.

<sup>304</sup> Aydıntaşbaş, Aslı, Kirişçi, Kemal, "The United States and Turkey: Friends, Enemies, or Only Interests." Center on United States and Europe, Brookings Institute Turkey Project Policy Paper, No: 12, April 2017, pp 2.

<sup>305</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 103 and see also Mufti, Malik, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea." Palgrave MacMillan 2009.



relations.<sup>306</sup> Building on that, Çağrı Erhan claims that, throughout the 2000s, Washington administration has started to consider Turkish political nature, identity, regime, culture and history apart from Turkey's strategical importance.<sup>307</sup> In other words, Turkish ruling elites' political leanings and their approach to democracy and human rights are very much bound to the current or prospective relations between Ankara and Washington. Furthermore, according to Ariel Cohen, AK Party is not another ordinary party that took office, it is a widened political movement that wishes to eliminate the Kemalist elite and replace the Republican institutions by traditional ones, which are very crucial to connect Turkey to the Western values.<sup>308</sup> In other words, AK Party's political leaning and its leader's motivations or world views are not in parallel with almost all previous leaders of Turkey. Yet again, AK Party's political Islam shoes are back on her feet in order to conduct a foreign policy that was more inclined to ethnic and Islamist. Although, it is not very clear whether Obama was aware of it or decided to manipulate or make use of the strategic importance of Ankara, whereas other American institutions like Congress and lobbies that are effective in foreign policy making, were more about to handle Turkish elites and states in a more delicate way.<sup>309</sup>

NATO and EU enlargement to the former communist states implemented the Black Sea as strategic basin for Russian and US to compete. While Şuhnaz Yılmaz suggests that both Washington and Ankara strive to maintain economic cooperation, peace and stability in the region. However, United States is more willing to enhance its and NATO's presence in the Black Sea, Turkey is not very much in favor of it under the pretext that US heavy presence in the region would increase the tension which is already existed.<sup>310</sup> According to Phillip Robbins, it is interesting that Turkey did not want NATO to have access in the Black Sea, yet it does via bases in Bulgaria and Romania, as she was more royalist than the king when it comes to the importance of the NATO vis-à-vis European security.<sup>311</sup> During the early days of the post-Cold war era, NATO was in an identity crisis, as it was form to combat against communist Russia,

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<sup>306</sup> Sayarı, Sabri, "Turkish-American relations in Post-COLD War era" inside "Turkish-American Relations: past, present and future" eds. Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, London, Routledge 2004.

<sup>307</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 256.

<sup>308</sup> Cohen, Ariel, "Obama's Best Friend? The Alarming Evolution of US-Turkish Relations." The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 100, May 2013. Pp. 19-22

<sup>309</sup> Cohen, Ariel, "Obama's Best Friend? The Alarming Evolution of US-Turkish Relations." The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 100, May 2013. Pp. 13-14

<sup>310</sup> Yılmaz, Şuhnaz, "Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri" inside "XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Özlem Terzi, Der Yayınlar, Eylül 2012. Pp. 344-45

<sup>311</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 26

and as the USSR collapsed, NATO had started to become obsolete. Yet, Turkey, apart from her other allies happened to be the strongest defender of NATO, as she thought that dispersion of NATO would decrease Turkey's strategic importance which would also cause Turkey's becoming alone together with Russia. This feeling was very much valid, as Turkish elites were still fearing from Gorbachev's Russia, while Moscow were holding enough forces to threaten Ankara in the border, and again in Georgia and Armenia.<sup>312</sup> Furthermore, cracking down of NATO and transferring those forces to a European security umbrella was most probably not in Turkey's interest, as Turkey was not member of the EU. Hence, Turkey was becoming the rock on the way of formation of a new European security initiative which was triggered by France and Germany.<sup>313</sup> As a matter of fact, Turkey stays distanced to the NATO's initiatives during the First Gulf War, and it is able to be seen in fight against radical terrorism in Syria as well. Robbins' claim is that Turkey was more receptive to her own interest rather than any other umbrella security institutions like NATO dictates.<sup>314</sup> While also approaching to GUUAM<sup>315</sup> and other Black Sea initiatives with reservation, Ankara also does not want to cut a wide swath in the eyes of the regional states.<sup>316</sup>

Ankara had formed similar reactions to the Georgian war of 2008, while she defended the territorial integrity of Georgia, she did not deliver any concrete reaction to the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On top of it, Ankara did not show any visible actions in responses to Chechnya and Putin's policy in the North Caucasian region.<sup>317</sup> Thus, Turkey's policy on Ukraine can be seen as a continuation of 2008. However, before that date, Turkey had rejected the creation of a "Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation" in 2006, as she saw the American initiative as a means of getting access to the region while eliminating Russia and

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<sup>312</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 14

<sup>313</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 20

<sup>314</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the cold war" London: C. Hurst & co, 2003. Pp. 16-18

<sup>315</sup> A cooperation initiative which consists Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (mostly states that are not in Accord with the Russian dominance in the region) Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze: Türk Dış Politikası", Der Yayınları: 388. İstanbul 2006. Pp. 710

<sup>316</sup> Çelikpala, Mitat, "Son Yirmi Yılda Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'ya Yönelik Dış Politikası ve Bu Ülkelerdeki Faaliyetleri", inside "Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna: Türk Dili Halklar-Türkiye ile İlişkiler" eds. İsmail Aydınğün and Çiğdem Balım, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayını: 441, 2012. Pp. 313-14

<sup>317</sup> Büyükkakıncı, Erhan, "XXI. Yüzyılın Başında Türkiye'den Avrasya'ya Bakış: Yenil Algılama Biçimleri ve Kurumsal Yöntemler" inside "XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Özlem Terzi, Der Yayınlar, Eylül 2012. Pp. 703

breaking Turkey's influence.<sup>318</sup> Both are to be considered as Washington's disappointment that Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), initiated in 2001, was able to be a tool to implement American influence throughout the region under the pretext of democratization and economic development the US had promised.<sup>319</sup> Apart from the American influence, it is also a fact that the BSEC project was an indicator for Turkey to become more active in her neighborhood, since BSEC was mostly a Turkish idea, and also diversification of the new Turkish foreign policy making.<sup>320</sup> This project also demonstrates that AK Party's versatile and dynamic foreign policy was originated from the second half of the 1990s, especially during the Foreign Ministry of Ismail Cem. Ilter Turan and Dilek Barlas too acknowledge this new notion of the Turkish foreign policy making phenomenon, as they conclude that attempts to create new partnership with non-traditional allies of Ankara, happened to be about the diversification of the relations rather than replacing one with another. In addition to that, public opinion's growing interest to the foreign policy making also pushed Turkish state elites to form economic and political relations with other states that Ankara's long-running affaires.<sup>321</sup>

Hence, it is not very logical to expect Turkey to cooperate with the U.S. in the operations conducted against Russia in the Black Sea and/or Ukraine. Although Kirişçi and Aydıntaşbaş suggest Ankara uses Russia to balance her relations with Washington<sup>322</sup>, as she was continuously playing this card even throughout the Cold War - several conflicts with the West gave way to alterations in the strategy and foreign policymaking of Turkey.<sup>323</sup> As Ilter Turan and Dilek Barlas point out, this move by the Turks, mostly in accordance to her traditional alliances, was in order to extend Turkey's maneuver capacity.<sup>324</sup>

William Hale states that growing trade with Russia means that Turkey has economic reasons not to risk clashing with Moscow.<sup>325</sup> In addition to that, Duygu Bazaoglu Sezer points out that Turkey's approach to Russia is mostly with the apprehension of Moscow being still a great

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<sup>318</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012", İletişim Yayınları 1840, İstanbul 2013, pp. 525

<sup>319</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999. Chapter 4

<sup>320</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999. Pp. 139

<sup>321</sup> Turan, İlder, Barlas, Dilek, "Batı İttifakında Üyelik ve Türk Dış Politikası" inside "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi" (eds) Faruk Sönmezoglu, Der Yayınları; İstanbul 1998. Pp. 657

<sup>322</sup> Aydıntaşbaş, Aslı, Kirişçi, Kemal, "The United States and Turkey: Friends, Enemies, or Only Interests." Center on United States and Europe, Brookings Institute Turkey Project Policy Paper, No: 12, April 2017, pp 15

<sup>323</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999. Chapter 3

<sup>324</sup> Turan, İlder, Barlas, Dilek, "Batı İttifakında Üyelik ve Türk Dış Politikası" inside "Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi" (eds) Faruk Sönmezoglu, Der Yayınları; İstanbul 1998. Pp. 657

<sup>325</sup> Hale, William, "Economic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy" inside "Turkey's New World: changing dynamics in Turkish foreign policy" (eds.) Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.

player in international politics, while simultaneously knowing that Ankara lacks the resources and capacity to confront Kremlin solely in any potential conflict in the region.<sup>326</sup>

On top of that, there is a resemblance between the Chechnyan issue and Ukrainian crisis. During the 1990s, Turkish public opinion had forced the Turkish government to be overly involved in the Chechnya War to protect the interests of the Chechen people in this South Caucasian region. Although, Turkish elites were inclined to intervene in the issue, the PKK card, which was played by the Russians, also chained the Turks. In the light of this information, one is able to suggest that the Ukrainian crisis and Turkey's stagnancy is very much linked to the PYD cards that Kremlin is not reserved to raise. Needless to say, Turkish reservation's in antagonize Russians and keeping them from using the Kurdish card, especially in Syria (especially considering the recently opened PYD' office in Moscow), are very much bound to the Sevres Syndrome and Russophobia that Turkish elites always harbor in their minds. Plus, tactical usage of this syndrome is also experienced when Turkish elites negotiate with other statesmen.<sup>327</sup>

Turkish Foreign policy-making, as nearly all states' foreign policy-making remains a complex area that harbors several traumas and paranoia. Besides the trauma that Ottoman Empires elites had had, the bureaucratic elites of the young republic had also to face threats and strategize to survive. As mentioned above, apart from the long-lasting neighbor and her rival Russia, Turkish elites also held reservations regarding Western states. Western states, especially the occupation powers during the post-First World War era = (the Sevres era) and supporters of the separatist movements by Kurds and Armenians, were seen as the sponsor of any potential division syndrome that Turkish elites have. This syndrome went hand in hand with the companionship under the organizations such as NATO and European Union accession process. Sevres syndrome and Russophobia, main hypothesis that explains the reaction of the Turkish foreign policy elites, convert and transform each other in a potential foreign policy-making process. While, West/USA is being an ally in the relationship with Russia, lack of trust to West affects Ankara's bilateral relations with Moscow, while Turkish elites' anxiety to Russians kept in mind as well. The Kurdish paranoia that Turkish FPE has is applicable to all governments that have been on duty since the beginning of the republic. Whether it be Kemalist or not, any Turkish government and security/foreign policy elite would respond to the Ukrainian Crisis, in a sensible manner – meaning it would not antagonize and risk her strategic and economic

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<sup>326</sup> Bazoğlu Sezeri Duygu, "Turkish-Russian Relation: From Adversity to Virtual Rapprochement" inside "Turkey's New World: "eds. Alan Makovsky, Sabri Sayarı, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.

<sup>327</sup> Robbins, Philip, "Suits and Uniform: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War", Hurst&Company, London, 2003. Pp. 163

relations with Russia and would balance Russia with the U.S. in a potential crisis (e.g. the fighter jet crises), while trying to figure out what to do alongside the Sevres syndrome that is very influential.

## CONCLUSION

Destruction of the Berlin Wall on November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1989 heralded the news of the Cold War's end. Following this remarkable event, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (USSR) was dissolved on 25<sup>th</sup> December 1991. During the Cold War years, the international political arena had experienced bipolarity, in which Washington and Moscow led opposing camps. Communist Russia was on one end, trying to promote socialist ideology mostly to the in-between countries, and the United States was leader of the so-called "free world," which envisaged democracy and capitalism as the central ideals for their alliance. Apart from the socialist versus capitalist competition, the "Eastern-Western" divergence was also seen, of course with a Third-Worldist led by India and Yugoslavia. This division was very vital to Turkish foreign policy as its leaders were to be adapted to it along with their constant motivation to manipulate it.

Inasmuch as, the research question is "Why did Turkey not stand with the US/NATO in the Ukraine Crisis?", this thesis is mainly focused on foreign policy analysis (FPA) of this particular decision of the Turkish Foreign policy-makers. FPA is a revised territory for international relations, in which many experts highlight the search for answers can be risky, the questions do need a response. Neoclassical realism, a new current in realist theory that was born in the 1990s, is mainly interested in the causes of certain foreign policy decisions by certain state apparatuses. In neoclassical realism, like classical realism, domestic conditions also need to be analyzed, with a conjuncture of international pressures of course. However, unlike the neorealist approach, neoclassical realism does not underline external threats or potential/possible shifts to explore foreign policy decision of states. According to experts like Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, an intertwined linkage between systemic and unit-level actors exist. While conducting any particular foreign policy-making, unit-level actors are putting pressures on state elites, as this can be seen as both limitations or abilities for a state in the decision-making process.<sup>328</sup>

Throughout Ottoman times, elites were very significant in Turkish policy-making. According to Sabri Sayarı and Alan Makovsky, Turkish foreign policy making was generally in the hands of the elites made up of the military, premiership and foreign ministry.<sup>329</sup> They further claim

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<sup>328</sup> Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy" inside "Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy" (eds.) Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press 2009. (See page 4)

<sup>329</sup> Makovsky, Alan, Sayari, Sabri, "Turkey's New world: changing dynamics in Turkish foreign policy" Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. Pp. 4-5

that the Parliament came across as an insignificant player, which would demonstrate that the Turkish public, besides some popular events, was indifferent regarding external relations. Yet again Turkey experts stated this indifference had come to an end with the end of the Cold war. Although during the 1990s, Turkish military was considered the key player in security and foreign policy-making, Turkey experienced a change of elites that was responsible for policy-making in the early 2000s.

Turkish foreign policy was mostly seen as a continuation of the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's non-interventionist, peaceful policy. However, some divergences were experienced as well. For example, during the 1980's, Premier Turgut Özal tended to eliminate traditional foreign policy making players such as Foreign Ministry and the Army and such. With the help of the weakening of Soviet Russia, Ankara turned to a Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy, which was about showing more interest in the former lands of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>330</sup>

Neo-Ottomanism was also favored by the Justice and Development Party- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Party)- and its founding leaders. Although in the first seven years of the AK Party governance, one was able to observe a continuation of Ismail Cem's multi-dimensional and dynamic foreign policy, with Ahmet Davutoğlu's Foreign Ministry, who was the top adviser to Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, this notion of Neo-Ottomanism was once again put on the agenda of the Turkish elites.<sup>331</sup>

Seeing that, elites' importance and their perceptions/misperceptions on a daily routine of world politics are vital to Turkish Foreign policy-making. Elites' significance is already written about by the experts in the realism school. As a matter of fact, neoclassical realism suggests that states are the most important actors of the world politics, and, unlike neorealism, it gives an importance to domestic conditions as well as external threats or shift of power. In the theory of neo-classical realism, elites are the vital part of foreign policy making with their bargaining and mobilization ability.

The American strategic alliance of the Turkish state was a rock solid during the problematic times that Ankara experienced after the Second World War. Soviet interests on the Turkish Straits and northeastern cities of Kars, Erzurum and Ardahan, put Turkish elites in a stressful bind. Although, as happened during the Second World War, Ankara was keen to play the

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<sup>330</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015." *Der Yayınları*, 463, 2015. Pp. 788

<sup>331</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015." *Der Yayınları*, 463, 2015. Pp. 797 and 800

balance of power game. The Soviet threat was a real and challenging one. Hence, Turkish elites chose to turn to the West, especially to the United States of America. Until the 1960's, Turkish Foreign policy-making process was very much bound to their Western alliances.<sup>332</sup>

From the 1960s onwards, the Turkish-American alliance faced a couple of downturns and challenges. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, while Soviet Russia and the U.S. nearly came to brink of war, Turkey also experienced a serious amount of danger from the USSR and by the rapid decision maneuvering of the American administration. Apart from the Jupiter missile crisis, clashes in Cyprus constituted further disturbance in the bilateral relations, especially when Turkish leadership's decision was shut down by the notorious Johnson letter in 1964. While Turkey had postponed her intervention in Cyprus, American leadership clarified its limits regarding Turkish alliance. However, Turkish Premier Ecevit decided to begin an operation in Cyprus on 1974 to stop the deadly clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, later facing an American embargo that would last only for few years. Another issue that constrains Turkish-American bilateral relations were the Opium Issue. Especially during the 1960s, American presidents were pressured to fight against the usage of the narcotics. President Richard Nixon was convinced that the illegal drugs that ended up in the US were being brought in from Turkey. This issue of poppy-cultivation too was a trigger for the American legislature's three years old arms sales embargo,<sup>333</sup> along with the Cyprus conundrum.

World politics experienced détente by the end of the 1970s. Although, this détente came to an end with the Afghan invasion of the USSR. However, in 1983, Turgut Özal, a former bureaucrat, was elected by the new Prime Minister of Turkey. During his rule, Turkish-American partnership lived its golden years.<sup>334</sup> Along with a political one, an economic partnership developed under the current of neo-liberal economic policies that Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan dictated. Turgut Özal too was a prominent figure of this economical novelty.

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<sup>332</sup> Baskın Oran defines this period, from 1945 to 1960 as Turkish Foreign Policy had been settled to the Western Orbit. Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1" İletişim Yayınları 758, 2001.

<sup>333</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1" İletişim Yayınları 758, 2001. Pp 708.

<sup>334</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 50.



The end of the Cold War led a way to new opportunities and as well as new restraints to the Turkish politics. While Turkey's strategic importance had been diminished,<sup>335</sup> Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and dissolution of the USSR have brought Turkey back to the game, especially in the eyes of the Washington administration.<sup>336</sup> Yet again, from the Turkish point of view, the US has continued to be an important support both in international relations and inner politics of Turkey. In addition to that, post-Cold War era has provided new cooperation on Balkans, Caucasia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Even Kurdish and Cyprus issues, considered as areas of progress in the Turkish-American relations.<sup>337</sup> As a matter of fact, cooperation tendency of Turkey and the US in Kurdish issue happened to be fairly challenging after the Gulf War, as Turkish public and elites too happened to believe that the US was trying to create an independent Kurdish state in Iraq.<sup>338</sup> During the 1990s, apart from this and/or bound to the Kurdish issue, human rights and Greek/Cyprus dispute too have shaped the bilateral relations of the long-lasting allies.<sup>339</sup> On the contrary, Turkey's European Union full membership motivations were highly supported by the Americans.<sup>340</sup> Plus, Washington's positive effect to Kardak/Imia crisis, Baku/Ceyhan pipeline project and Öcalan's capture as well created a basis for reciprocal trust and partnership during the last half of the 1990s and the first years of the 2000s.<sup>341</sup>

At the beginning of the new millennium, Turkish-American relations were already in good shape vis-à-vis some issue like Balkans, Central Asia was replaced by cooperation on the war in Afghanistan. In addition to Iraq and Kurdish conundrum, Cyprus and Armenian issues have also been hanging on the head of the Turkish-American relations like a sword of Damocles.<sup>342</sup> On the other hand, American prestige was fairly positive because of the Clinton

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<sup>335</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002)." Kaynak Yayınları No: 899. Ekim 2007. Pp 775.

<sup>336</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 251.

<sup>337</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 243.

<sup>338</sup> Harris, George Sellers, "Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (Eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 81.

<sup>339</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 244.

<sup>340</sup> Sayari, Sabri, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence." Inside "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future." (Eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Routledge London, 2004 pp. 101-102.

<sup>341</sup> Türkmen, Füsün, "Kırılgan İttifak'tan Model Ortaklığa: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri." Timaş Yayınları, 2961, Kasım 2012, İstanbul, pp. 168-173.

<sup>342</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 256.

administration's support in Turkey's EU membership and Washington's role in Öcalan's capture.<sup>343</sup> Withdrawal of the March 1<sup>st</sup> bill and the following events led to an increase in American and Kurdish cooperation and a decrease in the trust that both Americans and Turks had felt for each other.

Although George W. Bush administration and AK Party had common grounds, especially in conservative nature of their politics, Barack Hussein Obama's Presidency facilitated relations between Ankara and Washington in a fair amount.<sup>344</sup> During the Obama administration, started in 2009 and ended on 2017, Turkey had mended her relations with the US, however, the Arab Spring once again surfaced divergence in the political motivation of the two states.<sup>345</sup> On July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Turkey had experienced the most traumatic event of her Republican years. Coup d'état attempt by a fraction of the army was repelled in less than twenty-four hours but ineffective and complex messages of the NATO members caused confusion and anger in minds of Turkish people as well as elites. To this day, the top leader of the coup attempt Fetullah Gulen's extradition from the US happened to wear out the bilateral relations.<sup>346</sup>

The Ottoman Turks and Russians were in touch approximately from the 15<sup>th</sup> century, mostly through wars, as Russian utmost target is to access to the Black Sea in order to create a powerful empire.<sup>347</sup> During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Russian focus was mostly on the Turkish Straits, that unifies Europe and Asia. Russian interest on the Straits and her provocations on Turks also triggered changing alliances in Europe, yet power struggle on the Straits did not seem to be resolved until the end of the First World War,<sup>348</sup> during which, Russian Empire and Ottoman Empire had fought in the opposing sides.

By the end of the First World War, the Russian and the Ottoman Empires had both ceased to exist. New governments held bilateral relations during the Independence War, 1919-1922, the Turks had fought and this good relationship had continued till the 1940s when Soviet leader

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<sup>343</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 256.

<sup>344</sup> Ülgen, Sinan, "In Search of Lost Time: Turkey-US Relations after Bush.", US-Europe Analysis Series, February 19, 2009, Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings.

<sup>345</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2 (2001-2012)" İletişim Yayınları 766, 2001. Pp 333

<sup>346</sup> Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Diptaş, Serra, Jackson Hannon, Dudden, Lesley K., "US-Turkey Relations under the AK Party: An Almanac", SETA Publications 26, 2017. Pp. 171-75.

<sup>347</sup> Gürsel, Haluk F., "Tarih Boyunca Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Bir Siyasi Tarih İncelemesi" AK Yayınları Limited Şirketi Neşriyatı: 8, İstanbul 1968.pp. 36

<sup>348</sup> Kazgan, Gülten, Ulçenko, Natalya, "Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler" İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları 45, Sempozyum Panel-1.

Stalin decided on claiming territorial demands from Turkey.<sup>349</sup> Stalin's death ended those mentioned demands, which was also declared by the Moscow's note verbal on May 30<sup>th</sup>, 1953.<sup>350</sup> The U-2 Crisis on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1960 and deployment of the Jupiter missiles had restrained relations of the two neighbors.<sup>351</sup> However, especially, after the Johnson letter disappointment in 1964, Turkish-Soviet affairs seemed to be in a good track<sup>352</sup> which was able to last till the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.<sup>353</sup>

After the Helsinki Final Act in 1979, Ankara and Moscow came to an accord to not use hard power in their relations.<sup>354</sup> The beginning of the 1980s, Soviet Russia had started to retire from the communist ideology and Turkey was also in the wake of an economic reformation, their good relations easily spread out to the political sphere as well.<sup>355</sup> On top of that, The USSR was dissolved on December 25<sup>th</sup>, 1991, yet, the Russian Federation (RF) was almost twice as big of the combination of former thirteen republics, was considered the successive of the Soviet Russia. Although the Soviet threat has been eliminated, Turkey started to experience new threats, mostly welded from her South-Eastern borders.<sup>356</sup> During the early post-Soviet period, on the one hand, Turkey and the Russian Federation had begun to achieve some part of cooperation, on the other hand, new conflicting issues, Chechnya (North Caucasia) issue, competition on Caspian pipelines, clashes in the Southern Caucasia, the Turkish Straits and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty emerged.<sup>357</sup> Regardless, Turkish-Russian relations during the 1990s was able to observed same with the years of 1920s and 1930s, whereas Turkey was feeling more and more isolated from Europe.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>349</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 259-268.

<sup>350</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 511-12.

<sup>351</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 388

<sup>352</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 476

<sup>353</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 776

<sup>354</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1." İletişim Yayınları 758, İstanbul 2001, pp. 781

<sup>355</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 2: 1980-2001" İletişim Yayınları 766, İstanbul 2001, pp. 163

<sup>356</sup> Ayman, Gülden, Ateşoğlu Güney, Nurşin, "Değişen Uluslararası Koşullarda Strateji, Türkiye ve Komşuları" inside "Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 432

<sup>357</sup> Tuncer, Hüner, "Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1920-2002) 2. Cilt." Kaynak Yayınları no. 899, Ekim 2007. Pp 768-69

<sup>358</sup> Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, "Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership" inside "Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power" eds. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, Lynne Rienner Publisher, USA 2001. Pp. 166

The Black Sea constitutes a cooperation area for the Russians and the Turks, in which both countries put an initiative to set confidence and security-building measures among the littoral states in the region.<sup>359</sup> Despite the cooperative developments, Georgian conflict represented a clear divergence of interest for Ankara and Moscow.<sup>360</sup> On the other hand, 9/11 had also caused to enhance their relationship in order to fight against terrorism and territorial integrity. Having said that, NATO's missile radar deployment in Kürecik was also another sour spot for the Turkish-Russian relations. Besides the sour spot, bilateral tourism, trade, and economic relations were happened to be key factors for the good contacts.

To sum up, during 2000, while two neighbors constituted firm relations on the topics of energy, security, investment, tourism; Cyprus, fight against terrorism, Armenia and Russian blocking in commercial activities formed constraints for the bilateral relations.<sup>361</sup> Although relations were heading in a better direction every day, Russian support for Syria's Assad has come across as a little problematic. Especially, on 2015 November, when a Russian fighter jet was hit by Turkish air force, Turkey started to feel pressured by the Russian accusations and anxious about the potential repercussions that Moscow could take.<sup>362</sup> However, the alteration of the Turkish foreign policy, which was also linked to the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's replacement by Binali Yıldırım,<sup>363</sup> came into life and more constructive foreign policy was started to conduct by the Turkish elites. As a matter of fact, Putin and Erdoğan' motivation towards putting political issues aside and focusing on pragmatic cooperation helped to facilitate the competitive nature of the relations,<sup>364</sup> which was mostly seen on the 1990s.

Being an ally to the Western partnership, Turkey did not only succeed in protecting her territorial integrity, but also this very notion of a NATO membership shaped Turkey's foreign policy behavior.<sup>365</sup> Although Turkey was a staunch ally to the West, there was always a

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<sup>359</sup> Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, "Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century", inside "Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafli Konular ve Çözümleri" eds. Gülten Kazgan, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 213, İstanbul, August 2008, pp 137-38

<sup>360</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012", İletişim Yayınları 1840, İstanbul 2013, pp. 539

<sup>361</sup> Oran, Baskın, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012", İletişim Yayınları 1840, İstanbul 2013, pp. 558-59

<sup>362</sup> Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası: 1991-2015." Der Yayınları, 463, 2015. Pp. 700

<sup>363</sup> Demirağ, Yelda, "Krizden Normalleşmeye: Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri" inside "Türk Dış Politikasını Nasıl Bilirdiniz?" eds. Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ, Kripto Kitaplar, Genel Yayın No: 149, October 2017. Pp. 134

<sup>364</sup> Büyükkakıncı, Erhan, "XXI. Yüzyılın Başında Türkiye'den Avrasya'ya Bakış: Yenil Algılama Biçimleri ve Kurumsal Yöntemler" inside "XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası Analizi" eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Özlem Terzi, Der Yayınlar, Eylül 2012. Pp. 703

<sup>365</sup> Çelik, Yasemin, "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy" Westport, Conn. Praeger, 1999. See especially the introduction.

suspicion in the minds of Turkish foreign policy elite that Western European states, political agenda that neo-imperialists Europe is willing to dismantle or at least weaken Turkish state.<sup>366</sup> This paranoia is called the “Sevres Syndrome”,<sup>367</sup> which is able to be explained by the fear that Western states will dismantle Turkey, but at the same time drastic need to be around them and make an alliance with them. This paranoia is also settled not only in the minds of the ordinary citizen but also in the minds of the security/political elite.

Turkish political elites have held certain traumas from the beginning of the republic. Apart from the trauma that the young republic experienced, fears and anxieties that Ottoman leadership had faced were also kept in the minds and hearts of the new republican elites. Russia was the utmost fear-inspiring rival of the Ottomans, as they had fought thirteen times in the past, and from most of them Russia appeared to be victorious. This concept is to be defined as Russophobia, and not only Kemalist elites has this kind of a condition but also conservative politicians in Turkey is not very fond of Moscow either. Islamist political journey, which was triggered by the formation of the National Salvation Party, in 1960’s, and their rhetoric of “Communists are off to Moscow” was shared by the nationalist ultra-rightist parties as well. Although, Kemalist elites could not be tagged as communist or socialist, its leaning towards leftist ideology is to be seen. Yet again, moderate rightist parties can also be defined as Kemalist or their foreign policy agenda was mostly non-interventionist and status-quo affiliates.

Turgut Özal’s ANAP was the first Turkish government ever to challenge the traditional foreign policy-making of Ankara, and if we do not count Welfare Party’s short governance, AK Party is the second Turkish government that envisages a more proactive, rhythmic/revisionist foreign policy.

AK Party’s leadership was mostly from the ranks of the Welfare Party and pupils of the important political Islamist Necmettin Erbakan. Although, AK Party elites declared their new modern Muslim Democrats type of program, their tendencies, perceptions, and world views are mostly considered as political Islamist. Apart from their first ten years, return to the Turco-Islamist tendencies are to be seen. However, it is only logical to suggest that as Turkish public opinion went nationalistic, AK Party also started to form more nationalist policies and happened to become more rightist than a center-right party. As AK Party retransforms to a nationalist,

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<sup>366</sup> Robbins, Phillip, “Suits and Uniform: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War”, Hurst&Company, London, 2003. (See page 100)

<sup>367</sup> Oran, Baskın, “Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2012” İletişim Yayınları 1840, 2013.

Islamist party, its ideology of anti-Westernism, anti-leftism is to be surfaced. Therefore, AK Party elites' perception of the Western world and Russia is very much linked to arguments of this thesis. While distrusting Americans and Europeans, long-lasting rivalry of Ottoman and Russia was also in the mind of the policy-makers of Turkish external relations.

In the thesis, the audience can follow the nature of American-Turkish relations and the new phase of the last fifteen years. This changing nature is very much related not only to the world politics but also the perceptions of the new Turkish foreign policy elites. Apart from the nationalistic notion of the new policy-making, the "new Independence War" concept that has strongly haunted Turkish inner and outer politics is also triggering new Sevres Syndromes and along with the neo-Ottomanist perspective of Davutođlu, which gives way to new Russophobia tendencies.

Along with the arguments above, one should not eliminate the idea of an independent Kurdistan from the picture. As long as Turkish elites, as well as common people, believe that Kurdistan will form along her southern abroad, this Sevres Paranoia/Syndrome will not easily disperse from the minds of Ankara's foreign policy-makers. At this point, it will be helpful to remind that the Sevres Treaty also designated the creation of an autonomous Kurdistan, east of the river Euphrates, in which a commission formed by Italians, French and British would rule the mandate till this new state were competent to rule itself.<sup>368</sup> Kurdish card that Americans are already playing vis-à-vis YPG and PYD and Russians perception of Kurds as an important actor in the Middle East are disappointing for the Turkish political elites. Yet, those as well stoke with the insecurity complex that was already mentioned in the fifth chapter and the last paragraphs of the conclusion.

Although as this chapter mentions, AK Party's foreign policy nature should be seen as a continuation of İsmail Cem's foreign policy agenda; our main argument is that regardless of political ideology (Kemalism or political Islamism), security and foreign policy elites of Turkey tend to be afflicted by Sevres paranoia and Russophobia. During the early years of the republic or during the 1990s, Kemalist political elites were more about maintaining the status-quo and mostly conducting a non-interventionism in her near abroad external relations. Yet under İsmail Cem's top diplomacy, Turkey became more interested in EU relations. Yet again, Erbakan's foreign policy can be considered a divergence from the traditional Kemalist foreign policy and

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<sup>368</sup> Türkmen, Füsün, "Kırılğan İttifak'tan Model Ortaklığı: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri." Timaş Yayınları, 2961, Kasım 2012, İstanbul, pp. 178

we see this continuation in the late times of the AK Party government. The xenophobic, anti-Semitic and anti-American nature of the AK Party elites tend to derive from Welfare Party's agenda. Hence, as in our main argument, be they Kemalists or not, Turkish foreign policy elite holds Sevres syndrome and Russophobia in their hearts and minds.

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