

**CLASS AND NATIONALISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL
CAPITALISM:
POST-1980 PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY**




**A Thesis Submitted by Cemil Boyraz
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Umut Özkırımlı**

**İSTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE
POLITICAL SCIENCE, PhD
2012**

**CLASS AND NATIONALISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL
CAPITALISM:
POST-1980 PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY**

**KÜRESEL KAPİTALİZM ÇAĞINDA SINIF VE MİLLİYETÇİLİK İLİŞKİSİ:
TÜRKİYE'DE 1980-SONRASI ÖZELLEŞTİRME SÜRECİ**

Cemil Boyraz
105802003

	Adı, Soyadı	İmzası
Tez Danışmanı:	Prof. Dr. Umut Özkınımlı	
Jüri Üyesi:	Prof. Dr. Nihal İncioğlu	
Jüri Üyesi:	Doç. Dr. Yüksel Taşkın	
Jüri Üyesi:	T.İ. Doç. Dr. Bülent Uyan Saueri	
Jüri Üyesi:	Yrd. Doç. Dr. Bafar Erozan	

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih :

07.08.2012

Toplam Sayfa Sayısı:

260

Anahtar Kelimeler (Türkçe)

- 1) Neoliberalizm
- 2) Özelleştirme
- 3) Sınıf Çalışmaları
- 4) Marksist kuram
- 5) Milliyetçilik

Anahtar Kelimeler (İngilizce)

- 1) Neoliberalism
- 2) Privatization
- 3) Class Studies
- 4) Marxist Theory
- 5) Nationalism

STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date

Cemil Boyraz

ABSTRACT

This dissertation, based on the particular case of the privatization experience of Turkey since the 1980s, is firstly an attempt to analyze the subjective experiences and perceptions of this structural transformation by the workers themselves; secondly, how the internationalization of capital phenomenon (namely, hyper-mobility of capital beyond borders) introduces new challenges to the collective struggle of labor unions against neoliberal globalization; and thirdly, how all these political-economic processes are theorized as well as what kind of counter-discourses are developed within leftist political circles and the labor movement in Turkey. The importance of such an attempt lies in the belief that theoretical answers and political strategies against the multi-dimensional effects of neoliberal globalization processes could be developed by means of an accurate analysis of how working-classes and labor organizations experience and perceive this process in the new era of capitalism.

The study analyzes how workers, in daily life practices, experience and face the material conditions caused by structural contradictions, namely stemming from internationalization of capitalist relations. In these terms, it will be argued that a tripartite analysis of political, economic and cultural processes is crucial in understanding working-class politics and workers' perceptions of neoliberal globalization and privatizations in Turkey. In the Turkish case but not only there, these reactions and perceptions are channeled into nationalism (associated with the discourses of etatism, economic protectionism and national developmentalism) and such internationalization of capitalism incites nationalist reactions rather than the development of class politics. This study will examine the reasons and sources of such nationalist reactions and argumentations in the Turkish Left and labor politics with reference to the post-1980 privatization process in Turkey and the debates that surround it. Moreover, it will be argued that theoretical and political problems seen in the Marxist theory and practice have also been influential in such nation-based formulations ignoring the class character of the internationalization process of the capitalism after the 1980s.

ÖZ

Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de 1980 sonrası özelleştirme deneyimi özelinde, ilk olarak işçiler tarafından küresel kapitalizmin 1980 sonrası yapısal dönüşümünün öznel olarak nasıl deneyimlendiği ve algılandığını incelemekte; ikinci olarak sermayenin sınır tanımaksızın artan akışkanlığı olarak düşünülebilecek uluslararasılaşması sürecinin, işçi sendikalarının neoliberal küreselleşme karşısında verdiği kolektif mücadele üzerinde yarattığı yeni zorlukları tartışmakta ve üçüncü olarak da Türkiye örneğinde emek hareketinde ve sol siyasette söz konusu siyasi-iktisadi sürecin nasıl kuramsallaştırıldığını ve ne türden karşı söylemler inşa edildiğini ele almaktadır. Neoliberal küreselleşme sürecinin işçiler ve emek örgütleri açısından nasıl deneyimlendiğinin ve kapitalizmin bu yeni aşamasının nasıl algılandığının ortaya konması, sürecin çok yönlü etkilerine karşı kuramsal analizlerin ve siyasi stratejilerin geliştirilebilmesi açısından önemlidir.

Çalışma, kapitalist ilişkilerin uluslararasılaşması sürecinin ortaya çıkardığı yapısal çelişkilerin işçilerin gündelik yaşam pratiklerinde ne gibi sonuçları ve ne türden deneyimleri beraberinde getirdiğini Türkiye’deki özelleştirme süreci üzerinden tartışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’de işçi sınıfının neoliberal küreselleşmeye ve özelleştirmelere verdiği tepkiler ve bu süreçlerde ortaya çıkan olguları nasıl anlamlandırdıklarının ortaya konulması; ancak siyasi, iktisadi ve ideolojik süreçlerin üçünü de bir arada bulunduran bir analizle mümkün olabilir. Başka bir çok örnekte de görüleceği üzere Türkiye’deki özelleştirme süreci, sermayenin uluslararasılaşmasının korumacı tepkileri nasıl tetiklediğine (devletçi ve ulusal kalkınmacı söylemlerle eklemlenen tepkiler), bu tepkilerin ve sürecin algılanmasının milliyetçi bir söylemle ifade edilmesine önemli bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Çalışma, söz konusu milliyetçi tepkilerin ve tartışmaların ortaya çıkmasında hem küresel ölçekteki yapısal süreçlerin nesnel etkilerinin, hem de tarihsel çerçevede Türkiye’de sol ve emek hareketinin milliyetçilikle kurduğu ilişkinin rolüne odaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca, Marksist kuram ve pratikte ulusal sorun ve milliyetçiliğe dair kuramsal tartışmaların ve politik formülasyonların söz konusu ulus-devlet eksenli çözümlenmelerde 1980 sonrası kapitalizmin uluslararasılaşması sürecinin sınıfsal karakterinin göz ardı edilmesine yol açan etkisi tartışılacaktır.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I started my research for this dissertation in 2006. Over the years, I have accumulated debts in many ways to a number of people. Now finally, it is my pleasure to acknowledge them. My special thanks are to my supervisor, Umut Özkırmılı, since he believed in the value of this project and supported me since our first supervisory meeting. He has always been a supportive and patient reader of my drafts, and his dissertation tutorials have been the main source for me in formulating my questions and narrowing my focus on the subject. I would also like to express my thanks to Nihal İnciođlu and Bođaç Erozan for their contribution especially while writing the historical chapter, and Pınar Uyan Semerci for her support during the fieldwork. In this journey, again with the support of my department, I spent six months in Denver, CO. as a visiting scholar to write the first draft of the dissertation. Here, debates with Micheline Ishay on theories of nationalism and George Demartino's lecture on political-economy were a great chance for me at a time when I was formulating the theoretical chapter.

Another special thank is to Emre Erdoğan. It was impossible for me to conduct the field study without his contribution during all steps of the research. In each stage of the field study, he was always there to answer my questions and to help me finish the project within the planned schedule. And my friends from the room of assistants of 508, Ege Özen and Sedef Turper's help to analyze the results was so valuable for me in troubled times when I was lost with such huge data. Moreover, the support from union professionals in the conduct of the questionnaire was crucial; special thanks especially to Aşkın Süzük from Petrol-İş union for his help both in formulating sound questions and conducting the pilot study in Aliğa region.

My thanks also go to Yavuz Tüylođlu and Can Cemgil who accompanied me in my journey as my brothers in the Political Science PhD program and shared the whole process with me in my hard times. Especially with Yavuz, it was easier for me to reach any book in the literature. Thanks to him, it was impossible for me to miss any article recently published about my field of interest. Moreover, without his contribution, I could not publish the articles in different topics while grappling with writing the dissertation. Obviously, the support of Oktay Tutkun of Mastercopy Center of Dolapdere campus was so vital to get the books and articles in short time.

My colleagues at İstanbul Bilgi University, Department of International Relations always encouraged me in the process. With their support, I could present my first drafts in international conferences in London, New York and Toronto. Murat Borovalı's support has been essential especially for my visit to Denver to give a start for writing which would have been impossible with intense assistant work. By the same token, Yaman Akdeniz reminded me the importance of the dissertation, at the moments when we were lost in administrative files, at the rector's office. I shared the most troubled times with Ömer Turan, my colleague and my friend who also finished his dissertation recently and shared the same excitement with me.

I would never have been able to complete this dissertation without the support of Aysun Boyraz, my wife and my love. I needed to think on my dissertation and questions in my mind; for other things Aysun was always there with passion and understanding. While I was working on the final chapter, my son Ali was welcome in November, 1st, who has been everything to balance my mood in difficult times of the final draft. Now, I have relatively much more time to spend with them, which I missed so much. The same is the case for my mothers Mercan and Akkız, and my sisters Fatma, Selma and Zeliha. I am grateful to my father Halil Boyraz, a retired shipyard worker, who taught me the value of labor from my early childhood and did everything to provide education for his four children.

And the workers who I have known during the field study. They shared their food, time and friendship with me during the study. As I promised them, I tried to narrate their story and experience of the privatization process. Together we attempted to reach a critical praxis after long hours of interviews and discussions based on the political mistakes made and collective problems experienced during the privatization process. I believe that we will all share a much more just world in the near future.

To Aysun, my source of inspiration....

Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER I: CLASS AND NATIONALISM: A HISTORICAL FAILURE OF MARXISM?	9
Introductory Remarks: Theoretical Concerns	9
Marxism, Nationalism and the National Question	11
Marxism and Nationalism in the Third World: Political Repercussions of Theoretical Pitfalls	22
Marxist Theories of Nationalism: Recent Critics and Debates	26
Reactions to Neoliberal Globalization: Debates and Strategies after the 1980s within Marxism.....	33
Conclusion: Bridging Marxist Theories of Class and Nationalism.....	48
CHAPTER II: NATIONALISM IN THE FORMATION OF THE TURKISH WORKING CLASS AND POLITICAL FORMULATIONS WITHIN THE TURKISH LEFT	57
The Legacy of the Late Ottoman and Early Republican Periods: The Rejection of Class Struggle and the Promotion of Kemalist Nationalism-National Developmentalism.....	58
Radicalism of the Turkish Left and the Labor Movement: Ideas of National Developmentalism and National Democratic Revolution after the 1960s	70
Reactions to the Internationalization of Capital and Neoliberal Policies after the 1980s: Theoretical Debates and Political Strategies	90
A Critical Analysis of Theoretical Debates among Turkish Leftists and Strategies of Labor Unions against Neoliberal Globalization: Concluding Remarks on the Historical Legacy	111
CHAPTER III: WORKING CLASSES AND NATIONALISM: REACTIONS AGAINST NEOLIBERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY	115
Introductory Points: Methodology and Scope of the Field Study	115
Privatizations: A Key Element of Neoliberal Restructuring in Turkey.....	117
Methodology of the Field Study: Details of the Quantitative and Qualitative Research	127
Neoliberalism and the Internationalization of Capital Movements: Workers' Approaches to the Role of the State for "National Developmentalism".....	146
Workers' Reactions to and Perceptions on the Privatization Process in Turkey: Privatization as "Foreignization"	151
Privatization as Degradation of Labor and Decomposition of Working Classes in Turkey: Nationalism as a Strategy to Escape from the Neoliberal Maelstrom	173
Political Preferences and Perceptions of the Workers: The Continuous Reproduction of the "Foreign Threats and Enemies" Discourse and Division Lines	190

Concluding Remarks: A Critical Analysis of Reactions to Neoliberal Globalization and Alternative Formulations.....	200
CONCLUSION	205
BIBLIOGRAPHY	220

LIST OF TABLES

- Table 1. Lists of the Former State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in the Questionnaire
- Table 2. Lists of the Former State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in the Focus-Group
- Table 3. Age, Sex, Education and Monthly Income Information of Respondents
- Table 4. Permanent and Sub-Contracting Workers Have Shared Interests?
- Table 5. Employment Type, Work Status, Social Security Type and Content of Union Membership of Respondents
- Table 6. Workers' Approaches on the Unions-Politics Relation
- Table 7. Workers' Protests in the Workplaces
- Table 8. Reasons of Protests in the Workplaces
- Table 9. Workers' Views on the Role of the State in the Economy
- Table 10. Management of the Factory
- Table 11. Support for Privatizations
- Table 12. OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variables
- Table 13. Workers' Views and Approaches on the Privatizations (1)
- Table 14. Workers' Views and Approaches on the Privatizations (2)
- Table 15. Political Views I
- Table 16. Political Views II
- Table 17. Political Views III
- Table 18. Political Views IV

LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 1. Mode of privatization in Turkey
- Figure 2: Share of International Investors in Privatizations
- Figure 3: Privatization Revenues in Years (1985-2010)
- Figure 4. Privatization revenues (1985–2011, \$million)
- Figure 5. Privatization Implementation
- Figure 6: Privatizations in Sector Terms

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFL-CIO	The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
ATO	The Chamber of Trade of Ankara
CHP	Republican People's Party
CM	Communist Manifesto
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DİSK	Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions
DP	Democrat Party
ERDEMİR	ERDEMİR Iron Steel Co.
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Hak-İş	Confederation of Turkish Just Workers Union
ICEM	International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Foundation
KİGEM	Public Administration Development Center-Foundation
MAI	Multilateral Agreement on Investment
MDD	National Democratic Revolution (MDD)
MİSK	Confederation of Nationalist Labor Unions
MNCs	Multinational Companies
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
Öİ	Privatization Administration
PETKİM	Petrochemical Corporation
Petrol-İş	Turkish Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber Workers Union
SEEs	State Economic Enterprises
SEKA	Cellulose and Paper Plant Co.
TEDAŞ	Turkish Electricity Distribution Corporation
TEKEL	Tobacco, Tobacco Products, Salt and Alcohol Enterprises

TİP	Turkey's Workers Party
TİSK	Confederation of Union of Turkey's Employers
TKP	Turkish Communist Party
TMMOB	The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
TOBB	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TUC	Trades Union Congress
TÜPRAŞ	Turkish Petroleum Refineries Co
Türk-İş	Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions
Türk Metal-İş	Union of Metal, Steel, Ammunition, Machinery, and Automobile Assembly and Related Industry Workers of Turkey
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association
WB	World Bank
WCL	World Confederation of Labor
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

INTRODUCTION

In a popular debate within Marxist theory between E. P. Thompson and Perry Anderson, two important figures of British Marxism, Anderson criticizes Thompson's "voluntarism" and his specific focus on the working classes' experiences and shared world of beliefs, perceptions and feelings to understand class relations. For Anderson (1980), in the *Arguments within English Marxism*, Thompson prefers to focus on workers' experiences and subjective factors while ignoring the role of objective factors such as the mode of production in determining class processes. In this debate, Anderson argues that Thompson underestimates the importance of "class in itself" which could be considered as an economic category and merely focuses on "class for itself" which reflects the political expression of such economic dynamics. In a nutshell, this exchange goes to the heart of the debate on the question of whether the question of class could be reduced to an economic category or represents a wider network of social relations, namely class *habitus* (P. Bourdieu, 1990) plays a crucial role to understand it. In the *Making of English Working Class* and especially after that in *Poverty of Theory* which could be considered as a critic to such structuralist and determinist explanations, Thompson (1970) argues that an analysis based on capitalist relations and form of production is crucial but would be insufficient to understand class reality if repercussions of such structural processes on subjective conditions, processes, experiences, perceptions and life worlds of workers are not included in the final analysis. In a similar manner, in his analysis of the working class culture in *Culture and Society: 1780-1950*, Raymond Williams (1983) both conceptualizes and underlines the importance of class culture in terms of the shared experiences and ideas of working classes leading to collective imaginations, significations and perceptions as well as tendencies.

This study, focusing on the post-1980 privatization processes in Turkey, aims to overcome such duality between two theoretical positions and suggest that macroeconomic or structural processes and subjective-collective experiences as well as social contradictions stemming from such processes should be taken into consideration together and in a relational perspective. As part of the attempt to understand the phenomenon of class in the global age, particular attention will be paid to the nationalist and protectionist reactions of working classes and their intellectual and organizational leaders to the privatization process in Turkey, a crucial component of neoliberalism as a hegemony project initiated after the 1980s. An analysis of the reactions and perceptions workers (as well as unions and leftist intellectuals)

develop against such structural dynamics will shed light on both the theoretical and political dimensions of the international failure of class solidarity as foreseen by Karl Marx in his early writings in the mid-19th century.

To be more precise, accelerating internationalization process of capitalism after the 1980s posed serious challenges to both working classes within nation-states, and international class solidarity and unionism. In particular, during the privatization process in different countries, we observe that labor unions and workers failed to develop a common strategy against such policies, which is a historical failure of the international labor movement of the 20th century. When reactions of workers, labor unions and leftist parties to neoliberal globalization in general and privatizations in particular are analyzed, we see that nationalist reactions and discourses of “national interest”, “national developmentalism” and “economic nationalism with a protectionist focus” dominate political formulations developed against the current hegemony of neoliberalism. Especially with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and acceleration of internationalization of capital movements, nationalist political and economic formulations replaced (or obstructed the development of) the class-based alternatives and internationalist strategies against such hegemony of global capital, although the end of the national developmentalism was visible in all aspect. In such a conjuncture, it is suggested in this dissertation that an analysis of the relation between nationalism and class is more crucial than popular debates within Marxism on the role of the state and decline of the nation-state.

This dissertation argues that both theoretical-political discourses and strategies developed by labor unions and political Marxists, and the content of reactions and perceptions of workers have been influential in explaining the failure mentioned above. Thus, as a first step, the political content of those discourses and strategies will be analyzed and their potential to stand against the international hegemony of neoliberalism will be discussed. In the second step, the question of how workers and unions experience and perceive these dynamics of internationalization of capitalism - as well as develop strategies and discourses against it - will be investigated. In other words, the position of working classes will be considered both objectively, as reflected by the material conditions they live in and subjectively-discursively, as manifested in their reactions and struggles. Within this context, as a particular case which illustrates general reactions and strategies developed against the internationalization process of capital after the 1980s, the study will focus on Turkey, mapping working-class

consciousness, strategies and perceptions, and discussing how nationalism plays a historical role both within the strategies of the Turkish left and the labor movement in Turkey.

Here two important questions need to be addressed: first, which objective conditions play a role in these nationalist reactions and struggles, and second, is political economy still an important method of analysis to understand the characteristics of these reactions and struggles? From a theoretical perspective, these questions are important to investigate whether there is a theory of nationalism within Marxist theory and if there is, what prospects and pitfalls it contains. In political-practical terms, these questions are important to understand the reasons why recent anti-neoliberal strategies (in Turkey as well as in other developing countries) mostly take the form of national developmentalism and protectionism associated with nationalist discourse, rather than internationalist and class-based alternatives. This study contends that privatization debates and struggles in different countries constitute a prime example of the theoretical pitfalls within Marxism and political-practical problems of class politics.

In this context, it is crucial to discuss how Marx and Engels approach the national question in their early texts and how it is related to the class struggle. Then the contributions of various Marxist figures (especially Lenin, Stalin and Mao who became influential in the discussions) to the "national question" in both theoretical and political-practical terms should be considered. The aim of this historical diversion is to show how these different approaches influenced the political practices and theoretical discussions in different national contexts and how nationalism is problematized in each of them. It will be argued that these approaches still play an important role in the debates and struggles within the Left in general.

For the purposes of this study, it is also crucial to question how the problematic relation between nationalism and class struggle has become an important debate after the 1980s when the effects of globalization and neoliberalism are widely experienced and new debates on the role of the state, emerging class dynamics as well as political struggle practices have come to the fore. In this context, two issues need to be highlighted: i.) the particular historical context is important to analyze the themes such as class struggles and the reconfiguration of the role of the state in terms of internationalization of capital, and the tensions, reactions and discursive-political strategies that come with it; ii.) Such an analysis should equally stress

both structural processes and subjective-collective experiences. In this way, it is believed that the pitfalls within Marxist theories of nationalism can be identified and Marxist theories of nationalism can be improved. The first part of the study, therefore, is devoted to a discussion of Marxist theories of nationalism and an attempt to develop an approach that will help us make sense of the relation of class to nationalism in the global age. In addition to classical theories, contemporary critics and recent debates on the failure of Marxism to understand the phenomenon of nationalism in a multidimensional way will be considered. An analysis of these theoretical debates and pitfalls within Marxism are key to understanding the roots of essentialist, reductionist and progressive strains today and their implications for the labor movement and socialist politics in the age of globalization. This is also important to comprehend the hegemony of nationalism in the Turkish Left since inspirations from these broader theoretical formulations and international experiences are quite visible.

The second part of the study is devoted to the Turkish case. It first focuses on the reflections of debates on the national question and nationalism (as well as their theoretical pitfalls) on the approaches developed by the Turkish left historically. This section also addresses the privatization process in Turkey which gained momentum after the 1980s, with several implications for the particular and problematic relation between nationalism and class in the new age of capitalism with reconfigured class dynamics. While doing this, two points will be taken into consideration: first, the results of similar structural-historical processes and theoretical debates do not eliminate nation-specific dynamics of class contradictions, theoretical debates and political strategies. I will analyze the Turkish case with this proviso in mind. Second, although the substitution of nationalist responses for internationalist ones to the traumas associated with global neoliberalism is in fact the case, nationalist responses may be highly dangerous and likely to fail even on their own terms. This study thus also questions the possibilities or prospects for local and national strategies which may not be necessarily parochial or nationalist. Therefore, the questions of how Marxist conceptions of international solidarity of workers can be integrated into local political struggles, and how a policy space at the local and national level can be developed to free localities from the straitjacket imposed by global neoliberalism and how indigenous forms of development could be pursued without exploitation of this space for nationalist and reactionary purposes will also be addressed.

In the second part of the study, the historical legacy of theoretical pitfalls of Marxist theory as to the analysis of nationalism on the Turkish left is briefly discussed. This analysis is critical for questioning how nationalist discourse became dominant and powerful within the Turkish left and labor organizations as seen in workers' reactions against the neoliberal globalization process in general and the privatization process in particular. Through such an analysis, we can identify how the problematic relation between Marxism and nationalism applies to the Turkish case. Although this is not a comparative study, it could also be argued that strategies and discourses developed in Turkey on privatizations after the 1990s are not peculiar to the Turkish case and could be seen in different geographies. Moreover, it could be suggested that the historical legacy of the relation with nationalism in the Turkish left and labor politics has obstructed the development of class consciousness and class-based politics in Turkey, and constrained its capacity or potentiality to develop strategies against the hegemony of neoliberalism and capitalist globalization after the 1980s.

The literature on the historical legacy of the 1960s and 1970s is critical to understanding how the principles of anti-imperialism and national developmentalism were ambiguous in terms of their class characters and were not usually supported by an anti-capitalist discourse. Moreover, Third-Worldist tendencies in the Turkish Left have become a major obstacle to the development of a political strategy shaped by specific historical conditions and cultural particularities. The part of the study will focus on how the labor unions and leftist scholars approach globalization, the post-1980 neoliberal restructuring and privatization processes, through an analysis of their discourses, reactions, political-practical strategies and organizational capacities in comparison with the debates and practices of the 1960s and 1970s. An analysis of the points of departures and similarities in the labor movement between these periods (in terms of their discourses, organizational capacities and characteristics of the repertoires of political action) is of critical significance figuring out the effects of the post-1980 process of the retreat from class politics in Turkey.

Obviously, the following five factors should not be underestimated in such an analysis: i) the increasing role of the state in oppressing labor politics in and after the 1980s, ii) official attempts to create divisions among unions based on nationalist (as well as religious) values after the 1980s, iii) the hegemony of nationalist discourse within the labor unions after the 1980s, especially during the privatization process, as privatized enterprises were mostly under

the control of nationalist labor unions, iv) the pragmatic public manipulation of the nationalist discourse by domestic capital fractions to reap the benefits of appropriating the label of the “domestic” vis-à-vis their “foreign” rivals during the privatizations in “the nationally strategic sectors of Turkish economy”, v. and finally dominance of the nationalism within the Turkish politics and society especially after the 1990s as a result of the debates on the Kurdish question and ethnic-religious minority issues, reactions against the EU accession process . In addition to these, the reactions and discourses of leftist parties, organizations and intellectuals will be evaluated on their own terms via their publicly announced reports and documents, to understand how the various political and economic organizations became part of the process and developed strategies against the effects of neoliberal restructuring in general, and the massive wave of privatizations in particular.

The third part of the study is devoted to the field research on the privatization process and its effects on the workers and strategies of labor unions so as to assess the possibilities and prospects of alternative strategy formulations for the future of international labor movement. In the field research, the post-1980 privatization process in Turkey, as both the most important moment of globalization and neoliberal restructuring process, and the area on which labor unions-workers’ protests came to concentrate, will be analyzed within the framework of the subjective and collective experiences and perceptions arising from these very processes. The pertinence of the fieldwork as the core part of this study lies in the fact that it tries to find out the reasons *why social contradictions that workers experience and perceive appear as national ones and reflected in nationalistic manner* -put differently, *why nationalist and reactionary attitudes and discourses have gained prominence among workers* - and *how this situation affects workers’ attitudes, reactions, perceptions as well as political-ideological stances in the current conjuncture.*

The following questions will be guiding the field research: i.) in general, is there a relationship between the perceptions of neoliberalism amongst the workers (in terms of its effects as seen by the worsening of the daily life and working conditions of working classes) and the resurgence of a nationalist agenda among labor unions and politics? ii.) What do workers think and feel about the privatization of state economic enterprises (SEEs) and the increasing inflows of foreign capital in Turkey? iii.) How are their reactions articulated politically and discursively? iii.) What are the main motives behind workers’ discourses

during the protests? iv.) What are the political positions of labor unions and how these affect workers' protests? v.) What are the political and practical implications of discursive processes and strategies in the struggle against neoliberalism in general, and privatization in particular? vi.) What are the possibilities of transforming the struggle into one based on class politics, with an anti-capitalist-cum-internationalist character?

During the field research, both quantitative and qualitative research methods were applied to analyze the relation of nationalism to class. The use of both techniques was important to understand such complex phenomenon for two reasons: quantitative analysis helps us to identify the basic demographic and educational background of workers, whereas qualitative analysis enables us to investigate workers' experiences of privatization, their perceptions about the internationalization of the economic processes and the political discourses-strategies they developed to protect their rights. In view of such considerations, the field research was structured in four consecutive steps. In the first step, as part of the pilot research, there was a series of in-depth interviews with those intellectuals and labor union professionals who have taken active part in the privatization debates in Turkey. These interviews gave the opportunity to ask coherent and well-structured questions in both questionnaire and focus group interviews. Thereafter, as another part of the pilot research, a questionnaire was presented to 20 Tüpraş and Petkim workers in İzmir who were subjected to the privatization process. After this preliminary research, as the second stage, the format of the questionnaire was finalized and applied in 5 selected former state owned enterprises (476 questionnaires in total). Selected (former) SEEs are Seydişehir (Aluminum), Tüpraş Oil Refinery, Petkim (Petrochemical), Erdemir (Iron-Steel) and Tekel (tobacco and alcoholic drinks). It should be noted at this point that the selection criteria was the importance of these enterprises in Turkish economy, i.e. they were the focus of intensive public debates and protests on the part of labor unions and workers during their privatization process. The workers who were asked to fill in the questionnaire were selected randomly. In the final and third step, a total of 5 focus group interviews were conducted with workers (again randomly selected) in the SEEs subjected to the privatization process. These are namely, Seka (paper production), Erdemir, Petkim, Tüpraş, Petlas and Tekel. In both the questionnaires and focus-group interviews, the demographic characteristics of the workers, their social/educational backgrounds, subjective experiences and perceptions during and after the privatization process, their daily-life practices and political views on domestic and international issues, their political behaviors and

preferences are depicted to find out the ideological positions shaping their views together with the diverse dynamics that have become influential in the development of class consciousness and politics. To conclude, I argue that the analysis of intellectual debates and formulations of political strategies in Turkey during the massive wave of privatizations provide an opportunity to assess the relevance and utility of the Marxist theory of nationalism and its political implications in terms of class dynamics today.

CHAPTER I: CLASS AND NATIONALISM: A HISTORICAL FAILURE OF MARXISM?

Struggle of the proletariat with bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle.

Working men have no country... We can't take from them what they have not got... proletariat as leading class of the nation must constitute itself "the nation", not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

(Marx & Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, CM)

Introductory Remarks: Theoretical Concerns

The analysis of nationalism has always been a problematic issue within Marxist theory due to different reasons. This chapter is devoted to an investigation of Marx's and other leading Marxist figures' approaches to the national question and nationalism; it then attempts to analyze recent critiques of Marxist theories of nationalism. Moreover, it investigates the prospects for developing an alternative theoretical framework to understand the complex phenomenon of nationalism with its relation to Marxism. Such an analysis is crucial for our case to analyze whether the Marxist argument "the internationalization process of capitalism will necessarily lead to the internationalization of labor movement and struggle" is relevant today, when responses to the effects of the current internationalization of capital movements are taken into account. This will also help us understand how nationalism may play an important role within the responses given against global capitalism, superseding class-based politics. In this respect, the case of privatization and responses of workers and socialists to the internationalization process of capitalism accelerated after the 1980s brings out serious questions and debates about the relevance and legacy of the Marxist theory of nationalism. These responses are visible in discourses of developmentalism, protectionism and economic nationalism as models suggested against the hegemony of global capitalism and increasing foreign direct investments in periphery countries. The problem that will be discussed in this chapter is that such discourses, with their overemphasis on the role of the economic base over superstructure (thus, ignoring the role of the political and ideological levels which are considered as mere reflection of the economic relations), overemphasizing the capacity of the state to regulate internationalization dynamics of capitalism (thus ignoring the fact the role of the state could only be understood by a focus on the dynamics of class struggle) and finally

reducing the socialist project and labor emancipation to a mere issue of economic development, reproduce the theoretical pitfalls we find in Marxist approaches to nationalism.

To start with, the analysis of the “difficult dialogue” between Marxism and nationalism is crucial for this study because of its theoretical-practical implications on the political strategies developed by Marxist scholars, labor unions, and workers’ movements against the structural transformation process of global capitalism after the 1980s. Such implications could be seen during the privatization process of state-owned enterprises in different countries by the 1980s as a result of the execution of new liberal policies. . In this context, it can be argued that such conceptual pairs as “progressive vs. reactionary nationalisms”, “oppressed vs. oppressor nations”, “bourgeois vs. revolutionary nationalisms” and theoretical debates on imperialism¹, socialist-autonomous development model, dependency theory and Third World approaches cause a confusion in the analysis of the national question within the Marxist theory. This confusion is mostly derived from the perceived need for a political and pragmatic strategy to use nationalism in the service of Marxism in different instances, while in some discussions nationalism is strictly rejected as the enemy of the principle of internationalism. Nationalism is also favored by some other arguments as a partial emancipation from the pressures of world capitalism, especially in economic terms. It should be noted that there were attempts to rehabilitate nationalism within Marxist theory and practice; e.g. the conceptualization of the national question in the classical works of Marx-Engels and Lenin; the principle of self-determination suggested by Lenin (as a realistic and political-pragmatic approach to nationalism); and the retreat from the principle of labor internationalism or it being completely ignored after them. To sum up, in Munck’s words (2000, p.126), “Marxism-Leninism was becoming a promoter of ‘non-capitalist’ national development in the Third World. The lines between Marxism and nationalism were becoming very blurred indeed and in many cases a marriage, whether of conviction or convenience was consummated”². I will focus on these conceptual pairs, other theoretical formulations and their problematic nature in the following sections.

¹ On the debate on imperialism, some of the important landmarks include *Imperialism: A Study*, published by Hobson (a non-Marxist) in 1902; Rudolph Hilferding’s *Finance Capital*, largely written in 1905 and published in 1910; Rosa Luxemburg’s *The Accumulation of Capital*, published to a storm of criticism and debate in 1913; Bukharin’s *Imperialism and World Economy*, written in 1911 but not published until 1917; and Kautsky’s articles on the subject in *Neue Zeit*.

² Munck, R. 2000, *Marx@2000*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

The aforementioned solutions have also been influential in contemporary Marxist discussions on nationalism, hence naturalized in Marxist thought and practice. The political consequences of these theoretical approaches are criticized in terms of the principle of internationalism and its replacement with the “national level” as the pertinent area of struggle in the struggle against the effects of globalization. The first part of this study focuses on such approaches that epiphenomenalize and rehabilitate nationalism within Marxist theory.

Marxism, Nationalism and the National Question: A Brief Study of Early Debates and Approaches

The Legacy of Marx and Engels: Principled Internationalism

It has been widely argued by Marxists that nationalism and Marxism are philosophically incompatible, and that national antagonisms as well as differences will vanish with the ascendancy of the proletariat on the international scale. On the other hand, during the long 20th century, although Marxism and Marxists argued that class consciousness and divisions are more important than national ones, the most fundamental division has been that between national groups, and national consciousness has proved to be more powerful than all international divisions including that of class. This simple observation brings another question into the theoretical and political agenda: are national struggles and nationalism separate from class struggles and class consciousness, or are they an integral and prominent part of them? To put it another way, is there a contradiction between national struggle and class struggle, or is “Marxism incompatible with nationalism, even the most just, pure, refined and civilized nationalism”³? In this first section of Chapter 1, a brief discussion of early debates within Marxism on the national question and nationalism will be presented to find answers to these questions in Marx and Engels’s works, followed by an account of attempts to develop a much more coherent theory of nationalism in the First and Second International, which were mostly prompted by the political-practical necessities of the age.

What was the importance of the terms “nation”, “nationality” and “nationalism” for Marx and Engels, and what was their relation to class struggle and consciousness? Did they simply consider these terms in economic terms or as having particular political and cultural characteristics? Can we talk about a coherent theoretical framework in Marx’s and Engels’

³ Cited in Carr, E. H. 1950, *Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. 1, Penguin Books, London, p. 432.

analysis of the national question and nationalism? If we cannot, why is that so? Is there an incompatibility between Marxist assumptions and national realities? The answers to such questions are important to identify the theoretical pitfalls within Marxist theory and its attempts to suggest a satisfying answer to the contradictions arising from the national question.

In his *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory*⁴, Walker Connor (pp. 10-14) sketches the basic propositions of Marx and Engels on nationalism as follows:

- a. The nation and its ideology (nationalism) are part of the *superstructure*, byproducts of the capitalist era.
- b. Nationalism (and perhaps all national distinctions) is therefore an *ephemeral* phenomenon which will not survive capitalism.
- c. Nationalism can be a *progressive or reactionary* force, the watershed for any society being a point of developed capitalism.
- d. Whether progressive or reactionary, nationalism is everywhere a *bourgeois ideology* pressed into service by that class in order to divert the proletariat from realizing its own class consciousness and interests.
- e. This stratagem cannot work, for loyalties are determined by *economic realities* rather than by ethno-national sentiments.
- f. Communists may support any movement, nationalist or otherwise, when the movement represents the most *progressive alternative*.
- g. But Communists themselves must *remain above nationalism*, this immunity being their single defining characteristic.
- h. An ostensible alignment with national aspirations through the public endorsement of the abstract principle of *self-determination* is good strategy, but, at the non-abstract level, the decision whether or not to support a specific national movement must be made on an individual basis.
- i. The ultimate test in determining support or nonsupport is not the relative progressiveness of the specific movement but its relationship to the broader demands of the *international movement as a whole*. (Italics are mine)

Among these propositions, I will try to highlight the most important ones with reference to early debates and writings. Until the Revolutions of 1848, a year of numerous national uprisings, it could be said that the analysis of nationalism did not play a prominent place in Marx's writings. Marx argued in *The German Ideology*, which was written in 1845-1846, that national consciousness was part of "illusory communal interest," as contrasted with the true communal interest (passages from GI in Tucker, pp. 123-25⁵). For him, "generally speaking, big industry created everywhere the same relations between the classes of society, and thus

⁴ Connor, W. 1984, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

⁵ Tucker, R. 1978, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, Norton Company, New York&London.

destroyed the peculiar individuality of the various nationalities.” (Ibid, p. 185) Moreover, in *The Communist Manifesto*, he was describing the current situation in the following terms:

National differences and antagonism between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto ... In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the whole proletariat, independently of all nationality (Passages from CM, Ibid, p. 488)⁶.

In CM and other essays, Marx and Engels are first of all saying that national differences will tend to disappear as the universalizing effects of capitalism take effect, notably the cosmopolitan character and internationalization of production. Marx links these effects to the emergence of international labor solidarity and disappearance of “national one-sidedness” and narrow mindedness”. Likewise Marx and Engels comment at the 1845 Festival of Nations in London that “the great mass of proletarians are, by their very nature, free from national prejudices and their whole disposition and movement is essentially humanitarian, anti-nationalist”⁷. For Munck, however, the effects of the internationalization of production for different nations were not uniform so this prospect and idea of the international solidarity of workers was naive⁸.

Parallel to Munck’s arguments, Löwy (1989, p. 217)⁹ argues that a peculiar combination between economism and the illusions of linear progress (inherited from the Enlightenment) led to the belief that nationalism would inevitably and soon decline, as seen for instance in the passage from *The Communist Manifesto*. The first condition for an effective confrontation with nationalism is therefore, as Löwy puts, to give up the illusions of linear progress, i.e. the expectations of a peaceful evolution, and of a gradual withering away of nationalism and national wars, thanks to the modernization and democratization of industrial societies, the internationalization of productive forces, and the like. (Ibid, p. 217)

⁶ As Benner argued, national differences often reflect an uneasy relationship between strands of the Marxist theory which encourage an economic-determinist or polar-class view of nationalism, and those which suggest the need for strategically oriented analyses of nationalist motives, doctrines, and actions (1995, pp. 13-14). Benner, E. 1995, *Really Existing Nationalisms, A Post-communist View from Marx and Engels*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

⁷ In Munck, p. 1986, p. 6. Munck, R. 1986, *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism*, Zed Books, London

⁸Ibid, p. 24.

⁹ Löwy, M. 1989, “Fatherland or Mother Earth? Nationalism and Internationalism”, *Socialist Register*, Vol. 25. See also Löwy, M. 1998, *Fatherland or Mother Earth? Essays on the National Question*, Pluto Press, New York.

As noted above, international realities proved the opposite. Therefore, Marx revised his approach, emphasizing the political importance of nationalisms especially in Europe. The reason was that under the impact of the revolutions of 1848 and the political turbulences of this period, class antagonisms had been increasingly replaced by national antagonisms, warfare between nations supplanting class warfare (Connor 1984, p. 15). As widely argued, Marx and Engels' appreciation of the importance of nationalism assumed the form of "strategic considerations" (Connor 1984, Munck 1986). This concern was mostly related to the strategies and tactics of socialist and internationalist revolution of workers. This grand strategy of working classes took precedence over ideological purity and consistency. Therefore, one can argue that the main criteria to support different national movements, for Marx and Engels, were their progressiveness and contribution to the principle of internationalism; support for nationalistic forces during a progressive phase in their history was quite acceptable (Connor, p. 10). By the term "during a progressive phase", a dialectic view of progress and progressive movements was meant; therefore, this was not a fixed and rigid principle but could change in time and have a different characteristic¹⁰.

Marx's ideas in terms of support for progressiveness could be better understood if his support for the independence movement in Ireland from British hegemony is considered. Marx's analysis of the Irish question pointed to one of the main contradictions of labor internationalism today: "Every industrial and commercial center in England now possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who forces down the standard of life"¹¹. To accelerate the processes and dynamics of crisis in imperialist order, support for national struggles, as in the Irish case, was considered as essential¹². As Munck argued, "they were, of course, practical politicians and they were guided on national issues largely by action considerations rather than theory"¹³. Moreover, it was assumed that such contradiction that

¹⁰ On the dialectic of 1st Internationalism and Marx's contribution, see Felix, D. 1983, "The Dialectic of the First International and Nationalism", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 20-44.

¹¹ Marx and Engels, CW; 43, pp. 474-75 cited in Anderson, K. 2010, *Marx At Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 149.

¹² In another case, Marx and Engels were equally sympathetic to the ongoing process of national unification in Italy: "No people, apart from the Poles, has been so shamefully oppressed by the superior power of its neighbors, no people has so often and so courageously tried to throw off the yoke oppressing it" (Marx and Engels, CW, 10 cited in Munck, 2000, p. 119)". As Munck argued, here we get a hint that support for nationalist demands were not unconditional for the founders of Marxism. Rather, it was tied to the great power politics of the day and in particular the dominating role of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires (Munck, R. 2000, p. 119).

¹³ Ibid, p. 120.

occurred between English and Irish working-classes would cease with the increasing development of productive forces and social division of labor.

Another issue that is visible in Marx and Engels's writings was their tendency to explain the phenomenon of nationalism with economic dynamics and conceptions. Can we analyze nationalism simply in economic terms? Would the internationalization of capitalist economic relations bring labor internationalism as its logical outcome? Can economic categories be considered as the only determinant of all social processes, and could the modern nation-state be seen as a product of the rising bourgeoisie? Could we relegate nation and nationalism to the "superstructure" or a mere expression of an economic base? Finally, did Marx and others reduce national diversity and differences to the relatively superficial differences between capitalist states? As mentioned previously, it is obvious that Marx and Engels tried to formulate a theory of nationalism in terms of strategic responses to broader global developments, especially economic ones. Rather than a cultural entity, nation was first and foremost an economic category, and economic causation was primary to understanding national phenomenon. Can we consider these as a proof of economic reductionism in Marx and Engels's writings on nationalism or is it inevitable to focus on economic processes to explain nationalism? As their discussion of the Irish case demonstrates, it is hard to accuse them of economic reductionism since Marx saw the Irish question as not simply an economic question.

On the other hand, the progressive and evolutionary conceptualization of the future of nationalism was implying the primacy of the economic realm and its objectivity independent from human will, aspirations and motivations. Their unquestionable universalist approach was derived from this objectivity of economic processes. I will discuss different views on their approach which relegates nationalism to the economic realm in the following section with reference to the recent debates on Marxist theories of nationalism.

Another point related with our discussion concerns Marx and Engels's arguments on the scale and character of class struggles. Although stressing its international character in their political and economic writings and suggesting its defeat by an international struggle of labor around the globe, capitalism for Marx and Engels was a national phenomenon in the first instance and

struggle against capitalism was “at first” a national struggle¹⁴. On the other hand, class struggle was only national in form rather than its substance, which becomes evident when they asked “what is the international role of German working-class?”¹⁵ The idea of internationalism was not simply solidarity among nations: it was about principled solidarity among wage-workers and strategic solidarity with political forces whose projects furthered the advancement of the proletariat (Forman, 1998, p. 63)¹⁶. As they argued in CM, struggle in nation form does not or in fact cannot exclude that communists should follow an internationalist perspective:

The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only: (1) In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. (2) In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole (cited in Tucker, 1978, pp. 483-484).

For this reason, while in the writings of non-Marxists such as J.G. Herder and G. Mazzini the nation as the primary unit of humanity¹⁷ is almost compatible with an international outlook, for Marx and Engels they are incompatible. Although it can be argued that Marx and Engels have contradictory explanations in their approach to the national question and nationalisms, it is difficult to argue the same for their principled internationalism of the class struggles. Benner in this context argues that Marx and Engels meant by statements such as “Working men have no country” and “proletariat must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word” that:

“(a) the workers have no exclusive allegiance to the nation-state, and no stake in the survival of institutions and cultural practices which help to sustain class dominance over them. They therefore lack nationality in the ‘bourgeois sense of the word’, which holds that the interests protected by existing states are identical to those of society as a whole, and prior to the sub- and transnational interests of classes, (b) by expanding and strengthening their political organizations, workers can start to differentiate the national interest of the dominant class from their own class interests, which require

¹⁴ CM, cited in Tucker, p. 482.

¹⁵ Or, it was “national in form”, “socialist in content” as Lenin argued later.

¹⁶ Forman, M. 1998, *Nationalism and the International Labor Movement: The Idea of the Nation in Socialist and Anarchist Theory*, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania.

¹⁷ Such interchangeable use of the term “nation” with the terms “people” or “peoples” without any ethnic connotations could also be seen in the writings of Fichte.

both domestic alliances within the wider national society and transnational alliances with opposition movements abroad.” (1995, pp. 54-55).

In summary, their approach to the national question and national struggles was modified and updated in line with the political and strategic demands of world revolution and labor internationalism, whether they contribute to them or not¹⁸. This shift also required a reconsideration of nationalism not simply as an economic question, and recognizing the relative power of national consciousness vis-à-vis class consciousness. Is it possible to say that they formulated a coherent theoretical framework and analysis of the national question and nationalism, one that is free from contradictions and ambiguities? My answer is no, at least on a theoretical level. However, such theoretical coherence was not their primary objective or concern. To say it in Benner’s words, we may call a non-theory of nationalism in Marx and Engels’ writings (2005, p. 3). As a matter of fact, it seems that Marx and Engels, rather than building a coherent theoretical framework on the question of nationalism, attempted to deal with a great variety of national questions and to respond them by considering their peculiar political characteristics. Therefore, it is safe to say that their attempt is much more valuable in terms of underlining the importance of the political level and providing a much more dynamic analysis of nationalism. As Munck (2010, p. 46) argued, they focused on the international political conjuncture and the developments of the class struggle—or lack thereof—in each national situation: “they were, of course, practical politicians, and they were guided on national issues largely by political action considerations rather than theory.”¹⁹ The problem is that their followers ignored such dynamic character of political processes and multi-complexity of the question of nationalism and thus analyzing the nationalism question within a universalistic perspective, namely evolutionary strands mentioned above. Therefore, it could be said that they attempted largely to formulate sound policies for coping with the diverse forms of “really existing nationalisms” that confronted them (Benner, 2005)²⁰. In the next section, I will discuss the main debates and discussions within Marxism on the national question and nationalism from the First International to October Revolution and the alternative formulations during 1920s and 1930s.

¹⁸ This is also argued by Hobsbawm: “they assessed national movements only in relation to the process, interests and strategy of world revolution”. Hobsbawm, E. (ed.) 1982, *Marx, Engels and Politics: The History of Marxism*, Vol. 1, p. 249.

¹⁹ Munck, R. 2010, “Marxism and Nationalism in the Era of Globalization”, *Capital & Class*, 34; 45.

²⁰ Benner, E. 2005, *Nations and Nationalism: A Reader*, Rutgers University Press.

The National Question and Nationalism in the Debates of the International

One may easily argue that the most fruitful discussions on the national question and nationalism took place in the Second and Third Internationals. Especially, the contribution of Austro-Marxists or social democrats, and debates based on the nature of imperialism gave a new twist to Marxist theories of nationalism. These debates are crucial for our study which analyzes the character of contradictions stemming from the internationalization of capitalism. In the wake of the colonial expansion of Western European powers and the proliferation of nationalist movements throughout Europe and the Third World, as well as the contradictions arising from imperialism and colonialism, it became much more important to come up with a political-practical response for the Marxists of the early 20th century. As a matter of fact, these responses and theories were also influential on the ones developed throughout the end of the 20th century as well.

Among the debates on imperialism, colonialism and the theories of self-determination, one may summarize the main arguments during the First and Second Internationals as such: for the first camp, national and socialist aspirations are considered to be incompatible. The most important figures of this camp were Rosa Luxembour and Pannekoek who argued that in the long run, the detrimental power of nationalism could not be overcome only “by the strengthening of class consciousness and focusing on class interests”. It was obvious for these figures that conditions of economic development would lead to the demise of the nation-state and a high degree of economism and evolutionary vision was dominant within their arguments. For the second camp, a much more critical approach to such economism could be seen. The most important figure of this camp was the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer. In his influential work *The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy*²¹, Bauer suggested that the appeal of nationalism was rooted in lived experience and called for a different analysis and different strategies. It can be safely argued that Bauer was highlighting the national substance of international class struggle. For him, there was a close relation between national and class differences. He argued that capitalism did not produce a non-national class proletariat, but on the contrary a nationally class conscious proletariat. Bauer’s arguments in the Second International had provided a fertile ground for a sound analysis of nationalism as an important tool to realize socialist aims.

²¹ Bauer, O. 2000 [1924] *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* (trans. by J. O’Donnell, ed. by E. J. Nimni), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

On the other hand, Gramsci also had a different approach to nationalism within Marxist theory and his ideas have been influential in the struggles within the Third World against imperialism. His category of the “national popular” was implying a radically different political practice than that of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. In spite of its cultural origins, the term “national popular” has now taken on a clear political meaning in practice. Essentially, it involves the recognition that ideologies have no necessary class connotations and that popular democratic struggles must be included within the socialist project. National oppression would be one such form of domination which cannot be subsumed under the economic-class rubric. Gramsci’s contribution is essential within Marxist approaches to nationalism since he developed an approach that reconciles the necessity for political analysis and strategic change, beginning at the level of the nation-state, but with a fundamentally international perspective. This meant an incorporation of the term “national-popular” into an international perspective. Only a political movement organized on an international scale could successfully defeat capitalism, and no revolution within one national territory – i.e. Russia – could survive unless it took on an international character (Gramsci, 1978, pp. 27-28)²².

The Italian working class knows that the condition for its own self-emancipation and for its ability to emancipate all the other classes exploited and oppressed by capitalism in Italy, is the existence of a system of world revolutionary forces all conspiring to the same end. (Gramsci 1977, p. 377)²³

On the other hand, in *Prison Notebooks*²⁴, he was also criticizing abstract and schematic conceptualizations of internationalism, introducing a much more concrete and historical understanding of the national-popular related to the shared cultural and ideological assumptions of political groupings (McNally, 2009, p. 62)²⁵. For Gramsci, an understanding of specific cultural and socio-economic concerns of the masses as well as the demands of the *people-nation* was essential. This also meant a consideration of the historical conditions of the nation during that time. Following Marx and Engels’s position, he argued that the struggle of

²² Gramsci, A. 1978, *Selections from Political Writings 1921–1926*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare, Lawrence & Wishart, London.

²³ Gramsci, A. 1977, *Selections from Political Writings 1910–1920*, ed. Q. Hoare, trans. J. Matthews, Lawrence & Wishart, London.

²⁴ Gramsci, A. 1971, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. by Q. Hoare and G. Novell Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, London.

²⁵ McNally, M. 2009, “Gramsci’s Internationalism, the National-popular and the Alternative Globalisation Movement”, in *Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance*, edited by Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel, Routledge.

each national proletarian movement, as a vital preliminary stage to transforming the international order, should begin by winning the battle with the bourgeoisie on its own national terrain (Gramsci, 1971, p. 174). This was also the only realistic strategy, especially when the historical conditions and tendencies within Italy of the age – namely the rise of fascism with the integration of different social classes into fascist mobilization – are taken into consideration. The concept of national-popular could thus be considered as an enrichment rather than abandonment of the internationalist perspective. As McNally (2009, p. 64) argued:

Gramsci, in fact, saw no contradiction in asserting that the “the point of departure is ‘national’ – and it is from this point of departure that one must begin”, and envisaging an expansion of each national revolution beyond its borders to link up with other forces working for the international defeat of capitalism.

Of course, it is difficult to say that such an attempt to balance national and international perspectives was common to approaches to the national question in Marxism in general. With the Third International from 1919 to 1943, the first camp (see above) and orthodox vision would be dominant. Especially with Lenin’s political opening to the idea of self-determination which could be considered as a third camp, it was suggested that nationalist antagonisms had a potential in the struggle against imperialist powers and in promoting socialism. The slogan of national self-determination developed by Lenin was a part of such strategy. Lenin in a way was trying to place the politics in practice, namely to develop political strategies to get support of underdeveloped and colonized nations against the common enemy, imperialism. He argued that Marxism should take into account both tendencies of advocating the equality of nations and the struggle against bourgeois nationalisms. For Lenin, nationalist antagonisms had a potential in the struggle against imperialist powers and promoting socialism. In the 4th Congress in 1922, it was declared that the Communist International supports every revolutionary movement against imperialism.

As Lenin did in 1920, the other important figure of the revolution, Trotsky, in 1938-1939 was calling for the seemingly contradictory policy of Lenin, namely uniting with national bourgeoisie against imperialism, while continuing the struggle against them. Of course, such views of Lenin were theoretically easy to say but difficult to realize in the political practice. Lenin was using the national question to supersede nationalism, and argued that in fighting for national independence, socialists were not fighting for nationalism. Using national movements for the purpose of promoting socialism would cause certain problems in the future

as well, especially when selective support to national autonomy and political succession demands are considered. Lenin's approach of providing tactical support for the struggles of oppressed nationalities,²⁶ while maintaining the primacy of working-class struggle through a vanguard party and maintaining relations to the International, was soon to be replaced by the Stalinist approach: a geopolitical contest carried out in the name of the construction of socialism and the struggle against imperialism reduced to a national development program aiming to produce socialism in one country²⁷. Forman argues that whereas earlier thinkers had linked socialism with the working-class project of extending democracy, the Third Internationalists now made the national project into a precondition for socialism. Forman criticizes this development, as nation-building thus became the priority, preparing the ground for the transformation of Marxism into a doctrine of national liberation: "working-class lost its centrality to the socialist project and it was replaced by the nation or identification of it with the nation" (Forman, 1998, pp. 116-122).

The present study with a fieldwork on privatization processes attempts to locate working classes in the age of global capitalism, and questions how such replacement could still take place when different reactions and political strategies against internationalization dynamics of

²⁶ In a similar vein, Löwy argues that the struggle for liberation of the oppressed or colonized nations has to be taken seriously (and should not be confused with other forms of upsurge of nationalism) as Lenin did. According to Löwy, the recognition of national rights is an essential condition for international solidarity: "Although Marxism is as such opposed to the nationalist ideology, it must very clearly distinguish between the nationalism of the oppressors and the nationalism of the oppressed. It has therefore to support all struggles for national liberation, or for the right of self-determination of the oppressed nations, even if their ideology (or the ideology of their leaders) is nationalist. Of course, Marxist internationalists taking part in a movement for national liberation should keep their independence, and try to persuade the exploited popular masses of the need to develop the struggle (in an uninterrupted way) beyond the national aims, towards a socialist-revolutionary transformation. But they cannot ignore or under-rate the significance of the popular demand for national self-determination". (1989, pp. 218-219). This point is also crucial and needs elaborate analysis. Although Löwy argues that the distinction between oppressed and oppressor nationalism is important, he also mentions that such a distinction is a relative and not an absolute one. In other terms, Marxists need to be careful while using this distinction and approach to each peculiar issue with a focus on their particular internal political dynamics and power of classes: "First, because very easily the oppressed from yesterday become the oppressors of tomorrow: there is no lack of historical evidence, in our own times. . . Secondly, because the nationalist ideology (or movement) of oppressed nations has often a double cutting edge: liberating against their oppressors, but oppressive towards their own national minorities. And thirdly, because one can find in both forms of nationalism elements of chauvinism, global rejection of the 'other' and (sometimes) racism" (1989, p. 220).

²⁷ Forman, 1998, p. 170. Previously in the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East of Baku in 1920, it had been stipulated that the national interests of the Soviet state were taking precedence over the world revolution and there were violations of the right of self-determination after the October Revolution. These critics would become harsher during Stalin's reign when national inequalities and injustices in the Soviet system as well as the centralized abuse of power against various "subordinate" nationalities were much more visible. Among the debates in this congress, there were also arguments by Sultan Galiyev calling for a national communism that reconciles socialism with the Muslim religion and the traditions of Eastern borderlands. I will discuss the legacy of Galiyevism on Turkish socialists in Chapter 2 devoted to the analysis of the relation of the Turkish Left with nationalism.

capitalism are considered. In the following section, the effects of this dominant orthodox vision will be discussed with reference to different country cases and experiences of struggles, especially in the Third World.

Marxism and Nationalism in the Third World: Political Repercussions of Theoretical Pitfalls

The debates of the Second and Third Internationals had political repercussions in the Third World; now Marxist theories of nationalism and approaches to questions of national autonomy and self-determination could be tested in the political terrain. It will be asserted that theoretical confusion would also lead to political-practical mistakes since the international emancipation project of workers was replaced with nationalist aspirations and developmentalist aims. In Africa, Amilcar Cabral was adopting Marxism into the reality of nationalist aspirations; in Latin America, the Cuban Revolution was providing an impetus to both nationalism and socialism; and lastly the Chinese Revolution, together with Maoism as the ideology of Third Worldism, became the model and inspiration for numerous national movements around the world.

To start with, the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle of a broad alliance of national forces in different countries of Africa such as Mozambique, Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, were mostly guided by the argument of Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon during and after the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa in 1966. They both supported the revitalization of the idea of *nation-class* (first formulated by Marx and later developed by Gramsci) and gave emphasis to the cultural factor where the impetus for struggle against imperialism could be found. It was mainly argued that nationalism could have a *positive role* in the anti-imperialist struggle and would eliminate divisions within the nation. For Cabral, imperialist domination, rather than class struggle, was the motor of the history. Through a denial of internal contradictions and portraying the nation as a victim of imperialism, nationalism was revitalized and used as a progressive instrument providing the main rationale for the struggles. As a result, national and class contradictions have been intertwined²⁸.

²⁸ Another important figure of African revolution was Frantz Fanon who also introduced a realistic approach to nationalism within the framework of anti-colonial struggle. See Fanon, F. 1963, *The Wretched of the World*, Grove Press, New York. One can easily find such fusion in many national struggles of the 20th century; for some interesting examples, see Richmond, Douglas W. 1987, "Nationalism and Class Conflict in Mexico, 1910-1920", *The Americas*, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 279-303; Spektorowski, A. 1994, "The Ideological Origins of Right and Left Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-43", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 155-184; Jelinek, Y.

However, it was important to ask in this context, first, to what extent was any liberation also a class struggle and, second, who would manage the state after independence and for whose benefit. On the one hand, a positive potential was attributed to nationalism in mobilizing masses and providing the necessary framework for the transition to socialism in societies dominated by imperialism. On the other hand, the problem was that nationalism in these instances has more often used and controlled socialism, and created pressures on working classes, than the other way around²⁹. This would mean the ignorance of Lenin's caution to the socialists on the political and class character of the struggles against imperialist domination. These are indeed important questions, especially if we consider the political content of recent reactions (which suggest the primary role of the national bourgeoisie for developmentalist aims to eliminate dependency relations) to the increasing volume of foreign investments and the further liberalization of national markets.

In addition to the idea of national liberation in Africa propagated by Cabral, the Cuban Revolution, with the slogan of *Patria o Muerte* (Fatherland or Death), has become very inspirational for other national liberation movements in Latin America, such as Tupamaros in Uruguay, People's Revolutionary Army in Argentina, Chilean MIR and Bolivian ELN³⁰. As Hobsbawm argued, "Developmentalist, anti-imperialist [...], popular and concerned with the condition of the mass of the people, and politically leaning to the Left: such has been the main current of Latin American nationalism since the 1930s" (cited in Goebel, 2007, 312)³¹.

Uniting broad social forces against a common enemy (the imperialism of USA) and its local representatives (the dictator Batista), Che Guevara, the leading figure of the Cuban Revolution, was arguing that "there are objective contradictions between the national bourgeoisies struggling to develop and the imperialism which inundates the markets with its products in order to destroy in unequal competition the national industrialists"³². For many orthodox communists, this class was a progressive element in the struggle. On the other hand,

1975, "Nationalism in Slovakia and the Communists, 1918-1929", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 65-85; Lockman, Z. 1994, "Imagining the Working Class: Culture, Nationalism, and Class Formation in Egypt, 1899-1914", *Poetics Today*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 157-190; Mukherjee, A. 2002, *Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class 1920-1947*, Sage.

²⁹ Munck, R. 1986, pp. 108-112.

³⁰ For a discussion on the new nationalism in Latin America see Whitaker, A. P. 1973, "The New Nationalism in Latin America", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 77-90.

³¹ For another discussion on the left-nationalist tradition in Latin America, see Goebel, M. 2007, "Introduction: Nationalism, the Left and Hegemony in Latin America", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 26: 311-318.

³² Cited in Munck 1986, pp. 116.

Guevara claimed that “The autochthonous bourgeoisie have lost all their capacity to oppose imperialism – if they ever had it – and they have become the last card in the pack. There are no alternatives: either a socialist revolution or caricature of revolution”³³. This view was repeated in the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) which issued a declaration that broke decisively with traditional communist conceptions of the national bourgeoisie:

It would be absurd to suppose that, under such conditions, the so-called Latin American bourgeoisie could develop political action independent of the oligarchies and imperialism in defense of the interests and aspirations of the nations.³⁴

In practice, Guevarist organizations were based on quite restricted radicalized sectors of the population; yet their discourse was predominantly nationalist. Nationalism was in many ways seen as the “lowest common denominator”, and a distinction between bourgeois and revolutionary nationalisms was taken for granted. However, this distinction was telling nothing about which classes’ interests are being realized in the wake of the struggle for independence from imperialism. Moreover, as Bill Warren (1990) noted, the struggle against imperialism led to gross violations of basic political principles, and the damage done by nationalism to socialism was considerable in the Third World³⁵. Political mistakes and theoretical misconceptions would be reproduced in the reactions against the internationalization process of capitalism after the 1980s.

Another inspiration for these national liberation movements and a revision in the classical socialist ideal of struggle with internationalist content came from China through Maoism. The main influence of Cuban and Chinese revolutions were to boost the self-confidence of revolutionary nationalist movements throughout the world. Mao was arguing for independent economic development with a *self-sufficient internal market* and *effective protective measures*. Moreover, the discourse shifted from a class vocabulary to the nationalist one, underlining the preminent role of Third World countries in socialist struggle and supporting the unification with national bourgeoisie in common struggle³⁶. Such peaceful coexistence between the working class and national bourgeoisie could be achieved through “the strategy of independent economic development with a self-sufficient internal market and effective

³³ Ibid, p. 114.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 114.

³⁵ Warren B. 1990, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*, London: Verso

³⁶ See Gregor, A. J. and Chang, M. H. 1978, “Maoism and Marxism in Comparative Perspective, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 307-327

protective measures to build up an industrial base” (Munck, 1986, p. 123), which was gaining popularity for other Third World countries. Or to put it in other words, China has been an admirable model of nationalization of Marxism. As Mandel argued, Stalin’s notion of “socialism in one country” has encouraged a tendency for socialist states not to look beyond the boundaries of their own nation. The general interests of world revolution were replaced by the narrow interests of defending self-privilege. This model still has effects on socialist practice when reactions against increasing internationalization of capital movements are considered. Effects of this model on socialists in Turkey will be discussed in the following chapter.

As Bill Warren (1990) pointed out, the distinction between bourgeois democratic and socialist revolution was blurred in Third World countries, just like the distinction between anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist (or socialist) struggle. Munck (1986) argues that the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles conducted in Asia and Latin America, especially after the Second World War, have thrown the Marxist and Leninist theory of nationality, which was focused on evolutionism (Hegel), economism (political economy tradition) and Europeanism (French model), into a crisis. Reducing it to simple epiphenomena of economic processes with mono-causal explanations, the orthodox view saw nationalism as a problem to be examined only so as to overcome it. In such Eurocentric and reductionist analyses, nation and nationalism were not considered as an integral element of the human condition, but as “problems”. In my terms, it was highly difficult to see that cautious analyses of Marx and Lenin on the national question were forgotten in the Third World struggles and among many socialists and their fellow travellers in Europe and a much more orthodox view had been dominant.

At this point, it is important to note that Marxist theories of imperialism, underdevelopment and dependency contributed to this confusion and became instrumental in the justification of national Marxisms. Warren argues that the theory of neo-colonialism – which has been the ideological outlook to reinforce populist nationalism in the Third world working class movements, tending to divert and dampen internal class struggles by orienting discontent toward alleged “external enemies” – served a valid social function in the underdeveloped world, providing the ideological support for Third World bourgeois nationalism (1990, p. 185). This point is highly crucial to understand recent nationalist reactions against increasing

volume of foreign investments in the world trade and accelerating internationalization of capital movements, for which privatizations of key national industries are vital to realize sustainable profits for core countries.

Political mistakes of important Marxist figures during the anti-imperialist movements have disarmed the working classes of much of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the struggle for their political and cultural independence of the bourgeoisie, and especially bourgeois nationalism. It has strengthened the mechanical economic strain in Marxism that views the advent of socialism in the West as the product not of “conscious political action” but of “economic crisis or stagnation” (Ibid)³⁷. In the following section, recent debates on and critics of aforementioned formulations will be analyzed.

Marxist Theories of Nationalism: Recent Critics and Debates

After an analysis of the main arguments of Marx and Engels, and the leading figures of the International to find a solution to the question of nationalities and the rising influence of nationalisms in different countries, I will continue to present the contemporary debates and criticisms within the Marxist tradition. These debates, together with the theoretical and political positions I outlined in the first two sections, will help us better understand the power of nationalism in relation to working classes and their struggle today.

Main Constrains of the Marxism in the Analysis of the Nationalism: State, Development and Class

For many scholars of nationalism and Marxist political economy, Marxism has a “difficult dialogue” with nationalism and remains a largely unexplored field of study with an inadequate theoretical understanding of the nation³⁸. Walker Connor (1984) identifies three strains of thought bequeathed by Marx and Engels to their ideological successors:

³⁷ In the same economy-determinist approach, poverty is considered to be a result of underdevelopment and dependency as well as nationalism as the product of imperialism, without giving reference to internal class dynamics and class character of imperialism.

³⁸Bottomore, T. 1983, “Sociology” in D. McLellan (ed.) Marx: The First 100 Years, Fontana, London, p.140. Pointing to the incomplete and contradictory legacy of Marx and Engels, Poulantzas (1978, p. 93) argues that “there is no Marxist theory of nation” and the reality of the nation is underestimated by many Marxists. See Poulantzas, N. 1978, *State, Power, Socialism*, Verso, London. Similarly, Avineri (1991, p. 643) argues claims that the complexities of Marx’s attitude to the question of nationalism left the socialist movement an ambiguous heritage, in so far as it relied upon Marx as a guide to its policies towards the national question: “Where does all

The first strain, which we earlier termed classical Marxism, was predicated upon the *primacy of class consciousness and the indispensability of class struggle*, and was therefore irreconcilable with nationalism. The second strain, strategic Marxism, revolved about *formal support for the right of national self-determination* in the abstract, coupled with very *selective support for national movements in the realm of action*. Though classical and strategic Marxism were not naturally harmonious, a measure of concinnity was possible if Marxists never forgot that nationalism was a bourgeois and therefore ephemeral ideology whose progressiveness and life expectancy dwindled as society progressed from feudalism through capitalism toward socialism. The final strain, national Marxism, was reflected in references to national characteristics that transcend epochs, and to the role of nations as the principal *instrumentality of historical forces*. Though potentially compatible with an internationalist, non-Marxist interpretation of history, national Marxism was irreconcilable with classical Marxism's emphasis upon classes and class warfare. (Italics are mine, pp. 19-20).

Beyond these theoretical strains, following Munck's categorization of contemporary debates, this chapter will focus on three key areas, which are central to the framework of this dissertation: 1) nationalism and development, or how the first is seen as functional for the latter; 2) nation and state, or whether the two terms are inseparable; and 3) nationalism and class, or the issue of whether nationalism represents any particular class interest or not.

To start with the relation between nationalism and development, Munck argues that Marxist and non-Marxist writers on nationalism tend to agree on the role this ideology plays in the process of economic development or modernization (Munck, 1986, p. 144). For example, Gellner from a non-Marxist perspective argues that it is an objective need for industrial society that homogeneity manifests itself as nationalism³⁹. For Tom Nairn, from a Marxist

this leave Marxism today? The basic flaw of the Marxian analysis of nationalism has been the attempt to reduce all its phenomena – including the cultural aspects of nationalism – to socio-economic causes and deny nationalism, and culture in general, an autonomous status in the scheme of human things. Viewing nationalism as merely superstructural is, of course, only one facet of the general Marxian analysis of historical development – yet it makes it extremely difficult for Marxists to assess concrete nationalist movements” (Avineri, 1991, p. 649). Similarly, John Ehrenreich says that “Marxists have failed in their efforts at incorporating the reality of nationalism into their theoretical understanding, and ... this failure is deeply rooted in the nature of Marxist thought itself (1983, p. 1). Ehrenreich, J. 1983, “Socialism, Nationalism and Capitalist Development”, *Review of Radical Political Economists*, 15, 1, pp. 1-40. Löwy asserts that “Marx offered neither a systematic theory of the national question, a precise definition of the concept of ‘nation’, nor a general political strategy for the proletariat in this domain.” (1976, p. 81). See Löwy, M. 1976, “Marxists and the National Question”, *New Left Review*, 96. Horace B. Davis (1973, p.78), on the other hand, notes that “Marxism had still to answer the questions of how these nationalist movements were justified, how far they were legitimate concern of the working class” and underlines the need for a “general principle”. He also asks whether we can still consider national interest as a bourgeois term used to mask the real state of affairs as Marx argued. See Davis, Horace B. 1973, *Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

³⁹ Gellner, E. 1992, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. Jeff Pratt in his important attempt to analyze the relation between class, nation and identity argues that Gellner weakens his account of nationalism

perspective, nationalism is a natural response of disadvantaged regions or the periphery against uneven development⁴⁰. Although one can argue that uneven development can indeed explain the economic basis of national divisions, the political and cultural aspects of nationalism are still ignored. Moreover, we should be careful against a version of the Marxist theory of nationalism which conceives of the nation as a bourgeois ideology simply masking the reality of class struggle⁴¹. Moreover, I believe that we cannot continue to see the formation of nation simply as a bourgeois project. Balibar argues that there existed “different bourgeoisies”, each connected to different sectors of exploitation of the resources of the world-economy. In the last analysis, it is the concrete configurations of the class struggle and not pure economic logic, which explains the constitution of nation-states, each with its own history, and the corresponding transformation of social formations into national formations (Balibar, 1990, p. 90).

by trying to develop a general theory of conflict in modern society, by treating class as an *epiphenomenon of nationalism*. See Pratt, J. 2003, *Class, Nation and Identity: The Anthropology of Political Movements*, Pluto Press: London.

⁴⁰ Figures such as Samir Amin relate nationalism to the theory of anti-imperialism. See Amin, S. 1978, *The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles*, Zed Books, London, and Amin, S. 1980, *Class and Nation*, Heinemann, London. To show the different paths nationalism and development or capitalism take, Ehrenreich notes that “nationalism is the ideological offspring of the contradiction between world-unifying and world-fragmenting tendencies of capitalism”. See Ehrenreich, J. 1977, “The Theory of Nationalism: A Case of Underdevelopment”, *Monthly Review*, 27, 1. This problematic economy-determinist approach could be seen in the analyses of dependency theorists (most important figures of which are A. G. Frank, P. Baran, S. Amin). For an analysis, see Leys, C. 2009, *The Rise of and Fall of Development Theory*, Indiana University Press. Some notable leaders of the day, such as Michael Manley (Jamaica), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Salvador Allende (Chile), also adopted this perspective. Uneven development thesis of Tom Nairn and the “internal colonialism thesis” of Michael Hechter share a similar problematic approach. While Tom Nairn rightly underlines the problems of Marxist treatments of nationalism, both in theory and practice, he himself contributed to this economy-centric conceptualization of nationalism, considering nationalism not as a result of the quest for national identity or culture, but of the uneven development of history since the eighteenth century. See Nairn, T. 1981[1977] *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, Verso, London. See also (1997), *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, Verso, London. For a critic of Nairn, see also Nimni, 1985, p.78. When dependency theories and internal colonialism theses are considered, similar problem appears and nationalism and the persistence of national identities are the result of the persistence of economic inequalities, by ignoring the power of nationalism in regions with developed economies.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, pp. 147-148. The tendency to equate the rise of nationalism with that of capitalism is indeed in fact a common one. For example, Lenin argues that “throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked up with national movements. For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speaks a single language”. *Ibid*, p. 148. At this point, Poulantzas suggests conceiving of the modern nation as an outcome of a relationship of forces between modern social classes, not only the creation of bourgeoisie. For Löwy, the idea that “nationalism is a bourgeois ideology and its power over the popular masses is one of the main forms taken by the ideological domination of the bourgeoisie in capitalist societies” is not wrong, but insufficient to explain the power and attraction of nationalism, sometimes over significant sections of the labor movement (1989, p. 218).

Following Nimni (1991), one might argue the most influential European Marxist discussions on the national phenomenon show a recurrent thematic unity and a relatively cohesive line of argument, despite important political and intellectual differences between them.

The theoretical and epistemological bases of this thematic unity have been called the Marxist parameters of analysis of the national question. These are: a.) the theory of the universal evolution of the forces of production, understanding the process of social transformation as universally explicable in terms of developmental laws, b.) the theory of economic reductionism is the epistemological stance which defines the privileged causal status of the productive process and establishes that all meaningful processes of social change occur through changes in the process of production which is located in the economic arena, c.) the Eurocentric bias in concrete discussions of the universal process of change.⁴² (p. 185)

Nimni in this context argues that one of the most important theoretical pitfalls of Marxism is the “epiphenomenalization of nationalism”, the economic determinism which reduces it to a direct outcome of underdevelopment and a question of “false-consciousness” masking the true class struggle. Marxist discussions of nationalism were, with few and relatively unknown exceptions, clouded in “epiphenomenal terminology”: concrete instances of nationalist agitation were to be explained in terms of the “class struggle” or a pervasive “false consciousness” that distracted the workers from their real aim, namely the destruction of the bourgeois order (1991, p. 4). This is related to the generalizing and universalizing developmental logic that has its origins in the European continent, a key factor in the failure of many Marxist figures to conceptualize diverse forms of the national phenomenon.

The second key area Marxist analyses of nationalism focus on are the relation between nationalism and the state. Although analyses of the history of nations mostly relate it to the formation of nation-states, it should be noted that state formation and nation formation are not simultaneous processes and the birth of nations cannot be reduced to modernization and the rise of bourgeois nation-states. Here the problem is that, as Munck argued:

Marxist analysis of the national question has tended towards a certain *reductionism* which assimilates the national in general with the particular form given it by the bourgeoisie in its nation-states. The nation was never defined theoretically by Lenin, precisely because of this negative definition of the nation as *superstructural reflection* of the economic base of capitalism. As the national is assimilated into the bourgeois nation-state; so nation, nationality, nation-state and nationalism become practically *synonymous* terms. (1986, p. 150)

⁴² Nimni, E. 1991, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis*, London: Pluto Press. See also 1989, “Marx, Engels and the National Question”, *Science and Society*, 53 (3): 297-326.

Criticizing theories of nationalism which reduce the latter's function to that of modernization or the rise of modern nation-states, and as a permanent expression of particular social groups, Poulantzas (1978, p. 152) argued that the relations between nation, state and bourgeoisie, take place on the same terrain but they are not reducible to each other. In his writings on the theory of the state, he pointed out that both state and nation-state are the sites of the struggle between social classes and suggested that state stands at the center of antagonistic class relations and struggle. Poulantzas' call for the importance of the politics to understand the role of the state is also underlined by Breuilly who argued that nationalism cannot be reduced to any particular class interest or economic relationship; it is simply a form of politics (1982, p. 153)⁴³.

Moreover, as I will discuss in the following section, recent debates on the role of the state and its relation with social classes show that a critical engagement with the conceptualization of the state and nationalism is very crucial. Despite the internationalization dynamics of capital, it is suggested that national economy is still the primary object of economic management; hence the control of nation-state on international capital flows are exaggerated. Based on the analysis of the crisis of the state and its new reconfiguration after the 1980s at the global level, arguments parallel to dependency theory and theories of imperialism-underdevelopment are put forward against a more cosmopolitan, neoliberal demand for free market and for less state in a more open economy. Detached from social classes and internationalization dynamics of capitalism, the state is presented as an autonomous agent revitalizing the ideas of national interest, development and competitiveness. The recent resurgence of protectionism to defend national economy could be understood within this framework. This is not only problematic since it neglects the class character of the nation-state but also calls for a unity of *national classes* to achieve goals of national developmentalism and thus for a harmony of interests between social classes, which are deeply antagonistic. For this purpose, a politically authoritarian discourse and economically autarkic discourse become visible and dominant. To summarize, the problematic theorization of the idea of development and the role of the state led to a more nationalist, populist and authoritarian discourse.

⁴³ Breuilly, J. 1982, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester University Press. Although his first analysis of the function of nationalism as "seeking to bind people in a particular territory in a bid to gain and use state power" seems still somewhat functionalist, his second analysis noting that it is a way of making a particular state legitimate in the eyes of those it controls deserves consideration, which could also be linked to Gramsci's conception of hegemony and the role of legitimacy in its reproduction. The view of nationalism as an "expression of nationality" and a "response to simple oppression" are both rejected by Breuilly, who contends that nationalism becomes "an effective form of politics only under certain specific conditions"

The third area of debate in contemporary literature identified by Munck concerns the relation between nationalism and class, which also constitutes the main problematic of this study. Gellner argues that, with his “The Wrong Address Theory” of nationalism attributed to Marxism, the awakening message was intended for classes, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to nations (1992, p. 162)⁴⁴. One may argue that the process of internationalization of production and economic activity as a whole creates an objective basis for the rise and development of internationalism of working-class struggles, due to the homogenizing effects of capitalism which create identical conditions of life and struggle among the exploited of all countries. This is what Marx and Engels argued in CM and Marx in his other writings.

On the other hand, the opposite could also be said because these objective processes may facilitate competition and hostility between nations and working-classes. At this point, we should remind ourselves, as Lenin, Bauer and Gramsci suggest the political character of struggles. Historical wager and its conditions and expression of interests are highly important: “Marxist internationalism – as well as the hope of revolution – is based not only on an objective analysis of world economy and world politics, but also on a historical wager: a wager on the rationality of the working people, on the capacity of the popular masses to understand, sooner or later, their objective historical interests” (Löwy 1989, p. 223)⁴⁵. This means that objective class interests and consciousness cannot be taken for granted *a priori*: it is all about political struggles and objective expressions of those interests (Benner, 2005, pp. 144-145). Moreover, two important clarifications should be made on the relation between class and nation. The first is that the material and social conditions of life and cultural practices are not identical among nations.

One cannot neglect the importance of the national peculiarities for the “making of the working class” in each country and for the development of its own tradition of anti-capitalist resistance and struggle (Löwy, 1989, p. 216).

⁴⁴ In this context, Gellner (1992) criticizes Marxism for holding that real conflict occurs only along “class” lines (classes are defined in terms of the relationship to the means of production), whereas other conflicts, the existence of which can scarcely be denied, must be superficial, epiphenomenal, or somehow camouflaged or distorted versions of the “real” conflict.

⁴⁵ This is what exactly Marx’s famous differentiation between class in itself and class for itself tells us: the former as economic class situation and uniquely objective determination of class by the process of production and the latter as class endowed with its own ‘class consciousness’ and an autonomous political organization, namely class struggle.

Second, classes are not structured prior to struggle; they are strictly the effects of the strategies of collectively organized actors:

Those strategies may themselves be conditioned by the legacies of past struggles and by a host of structural properties of the society – political institutions, legal institutions and property relations.⁴⁶

Therefore, this study suggests that a combination of material and superstructural processes plays a crucial role in current resurgence of nationalism among working classes. I propose, it would not mean being reductionist to argue that concrete material and economic conditions are still important to understand the power of nationalism, i.e. the competition between workers of different nations (or states), resulting from the nature of capitalism itself.

It is a question of short-range interests – for instance, to prevent the entrance of foreign commodities which can provoke unemployment – but their real weight can hide from the competing workers their common historical interest: the abolition of exploitation. This, incidentally, happens also inside one single nation, when unemployed workers volunteer to replace striking ones. Marx himself recognized in the Manifesto that the competition among workers constantly threatens to divide and destroy their common organization (Löwy, 1989, p. 218).

I also propose, nationalism continues to articulate social discontent and is the source of new solidarities as well as the expression of older ones. Moreover, nationalism may sometimes be a source of inspiration and of mutual commitment among very large groups of people. As Calhoun notes (1997, p. 126), “if it were merely illusion and manipulation it could not have the power that it does”⁴⁷. Therefore, rather than clinging to essentialist and one-dimensional explanations, we need to understand the complexity of the phenomenon of nationalism expressed through political practices and discourses.

In this study, my focus will be on an analysis of the complex relation between nationalism and class with reference to both political-economic dynamics and subjective-collective experiences stemming from the unifying tendencies of global capitalism in the context of the internationalization of capital and national political-cultural particularities. In the age of neoliberal globalization which incites nationalist and protectionist demands more than have ever been, I believe that it is now more crucial to understand the power of nationalism among

⁴⁶ Wright, E. O. 1989, *Debate on Classes*, Verso, London, p. 297.

⁴⁷ Calhoun, C. 1997, *Nationalism*, Open University Press, Buckingham.

working classes and within many leftist circles than to engage in endless critiques of economic reductionism, Eurocentric evolutionism and false-consciousness approaches, which might be significant in their own right but not as urgent as the former. Such an analysis may also help us figure out whether the appeal of nationalism among leftist circles and working-classes carry a progressive political character in terms of creating a more democratic, egalitarian and free society or not.

The impetus behind the nationalist revival in many regions of the world and among workers-leftist movements could also be understood by answering the question *why national sentiments and strategies have become one of the most popular forms of collective social response to the whole range of global political-economic dynamics*. This will also lead to an analysis of the prospects of the idea of internationalism or international solidarity of labor movement, which cannot be carried out without a critique of the engagement of Marxist theory and practice with nationalism. More importantly, an analysis of the social world of workers, namely categories of perception and appreciation, their experiences of structural dynamics and cultural-political processes could help us make sense of the complex relation between nationalism and class. This study, to reiterate, is an attempt to analyze these issues in their multidimensionality and complexity.

In the following section, I will discuss how the process of internationalization of capitalism and the rise of neoliberal hegemony are experienced, perceived and reacted to by working classes and what kind of political strategies and theoretical solutions are proposed by labor unions and Marxist scholars. This is crucial both to understand the implications of theoretical discussions given above and to analyze the relation between nationalism and class under the specific historical circumstances of the current age of capitalism.

Reactions to Neoliberal Globalization: Debates and Strategies after the 1980s within Marxism

Theoretical debates and approaches in the analysis of nationalism within Marxist theory are critical for the goals of this study, namely to understand how the labor movement on various levels and the Left are reacting to the current phase of internationalization of capital on a global scale – i.e. the acceleration of capital flows and increased mobility of capital – and the outcomes of neoliberal globalization nowadays. In this section, I will analyze debates among

Marxist scholars on the internationalization process of capitalism and reactions among working classes and labor unions against the hegemony of neoliberalism. This will help us shed light on the problematic legacy of theoretical approaches and analyses presented in previous sections, which has implications on current theoretical formulations and political strategies.

Before analyzing the effects of neoliberal globalization or the internationalization of capital on working classes and labor unions, some further theoretical and conceptual clarifications are necessary to understand what is meant by neoliberal hegemony after the mid-1970s and the internationalization of capital that gained rapid ground after the 1980s, as well as the reconfiguration of the role of the state⁴⁸ and class balances. Neoliberalism emerged in the wake of the deep crisis of the early 1970s, took the form of Thatcher-Reagan doctrine in the 1980s, and was further consolidated in the 1990s with the setting up of institutional free trade forums such as the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the IMF (International Monetary Fund). Altvater rightly argues that the project of neoliberal hegemony began with the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1973 and the following liberalization of financial markets in Margaret Thatcher's Great Britain in 1979 and Ronald Reagan's USA in 1981⁴⁹. Neoliberalism is thus identified with a specific capitalist regime of accumulation, characterized by the dominance of finance capital over productive capital. It is usually argued that a weak state that is unable to resist market forces was the necessary condition for the execution of neoliberal policies. However, in this study, I conceptualize the neoliberal state as functioning as a market facilitating state. To put it in another way, as Bonefeld argued, for neoliberals not only does the free market require the *strong, market-facilitating state*, but it is also dependent on the state *as the coercive force of that freedom* (Ibid, p. 17). Thus, I also underline that neoliberalism is not simply related to the economic realm but also the political realm, meaning a new configuration of the state-class relations and antagonistic class relations. This point is central to my argument because of the fact that the execution of

⁴⁸ As mentioned earlier, in this dissertation I will not focus on debates on the role of the state in this new age of capitalism. The literature on this issue, especially in Marxist theory, is wide ranging. For some early debates, see Murray, R. 1971, "The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State", *New Left Review*, 1/67 and Poulantzas, N. 1978, *State, Power, Socialism*, New Left Books, London; for later debates, see Bryan, R. 1987, "The State and the Internationalisation of Capital: An Approach to Analysis", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 17 (3): 14-26; Clarke, S. (ed.) 1991, *The State Debate*, St. Martin's Press, New York; Barrow, C. W. 1993, *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison; Panitch, L. 1994, "Globalisation and the State", *Socialist Register*, 30: 60-93; Aranowitz, S. and Bratsis, P. 2002, *Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London.

⁴⁹ Altvater in Bonefeld, 2010, p. 15. Bonefeld, W. 2010, "Free economy and the strong state: Some notes on the state", *Capital&Class*, 34, 15.

neoliberal policies and the implementation of the respective theoretical foundations of contemporary neoliberalism are based on the idea that free economy require a strong state for its ‘facilitation’ and protection⁵⁰, rather than a weak state as even Marxist scholars suggesting state-centric arguments to escape from the neoliberal maelstrom based on a problematic analysis of the role of the state in the new form of the capitalist hegemony after the 1980s would have us believe. In this perspective, neoliberalism is conceptualized not as an attack on the nation-state but working classes, thus the struggle against it must take on a class character, rather than focusing on a mere defense of the nation-state.

With the hegemony of neoliberalism after the 1980s, most leading enterprises from Japan, Western Europe have also become multinational in scope; the process of “liberalization” of capital movements was largely complete in the main capitalist countries and a vast private global capital market emerged, fuelled by the recycling of the temporary petrodollar surpluses of oil exporting nations, and escaping largely any effective national or international regulation (Radice, 2001, p. 117)⁵¹. In this context, neoliberal globalization refers to a rolling back of the economic and political gains of the working classes during the postwar years (Ibid. p. 118). In developing and underdeveloped countries, which suffer from a chronic public debt and trade deficit problem, this project was executed through structural adjustment programs suggested by the IMF and the WB (World Bank), liberalization of domestic markets and trade, drastic cuts in social expenditures or the erosion of welfare state policies, and putting an end to import-substitution development model which is replaced by export-substitution model.

This process has been followed in the 1990s with the execution of strict monetary policies, deregulation or reregulation of public services and labor market in terms of flexibility and competitiveness, privatization of state economic enterprises and the declining role of the state in economic activities in many countries. Privatizations, in Harvey’s words “accumulation by dispossession”⁵², in public utilities of all kinds (water, telecommunications, transportation),

⁵⁰ Similar to the strong presidential systems of Latin American countries such as Argentina (Carlos Menem) and Mexico (Carlos Salinas) during the 1990s, it is not surprising that large scale of privatizations in Turkey were initiated under the reign of the Justice and Development Party after 2002. Therefore, the new configuration of the state does not mean the decline of the nation-state as such in the neoliberal era.

⁵¹ Radice, H. 2001, “Globalization, Labour and Socialist Renewal”, *Capital & Class*; 25.

⁵² By this term, Harvey (2005, p. 160) means “the continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx treated of as ‘primitive’ and ‘original’ during the rise of capitalism. These include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial,

social welfare provision (social housing, education, health care, pensions), public institutions (universities, research laboratories, prisons) and even warfare (as illustrated by the “army” of private contractors operating alongside the armed forces in Iraq) were key to this process. Harvey argues that all of these processes amount to the transfer of assets from the public and popular realms to the private and class-privileged domains (Ibid, p. 161). In addition to these, domestic production and services were subjected to international arbitration with the introduction of international standards, and independent regulatory institutions⁵³ became dominant in controlling economic sectors. In other words, a new period began in which economic processes are regulated by market rationality and capital is internationalized with the new regulating role of the state. Increasing internationalization of production and capital, as well as the growth of multinational and transnational companies in international production, trade and finance are essentially an outcome of the geographical expansion of the capitalist regime and historical development of capitalism, even if unevenly⁵⁴.

It should also be noted that debt relations developed on a global scale after the 1980s with the elimination of barriers for direct foreign investments and money transfers, high rates of interest and strict monetary policies, intensive short term speculative capital flows. Through debt relations, both domestic and foreign, an atmosphere emerged which allowed individual consumption to expand throughout the world. Moreover, in Susan George’s (1988) characterization, the 1980s were a time in which *everything was privatized, except the losses*, which were *socialized* by means of debt bondage and repressive labor market and welfare state reforms⁵⁵. By the extension of debt relations and socialization of losses, class contradictions and social relations in different countries were reorganized and reformulated.

neocolonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade; and usury, the national debt and, most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as a radical means of accumulation by dispossession. The state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting these processes”. See also Harvey, D. 2005, *Spaces of Neoliberalization: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development*, Franz Steiner Verlag.

⁵³ I will discuss these independent regulatory institutions in the analysis of Turkish privatization case in Chapter 3. It should also be noted that not only the aforementioned international institutions such as IMF, WB, WTO but also multilateral agreements such as MAI, GATT, GATS and TRIPS have been influential in the regulation of the neoliberal order on both international and national scales. Such increasing role of these institutions and agreements could be considered as a cause of internationalization process of capital and economic flows, rather than the result.

⁵⁴ As Bonefeld (2010, p. 16) argued, redistribution of wealth from labor to capital was such that by the early 1990s, *about two-thirds of the world’s population have gained little or no substantive advantage from rapid economic growth*. (Italics are mine).

⁵⁵ In Bonefeld, 2010, p. 16.

What were the outcomes of these post-1980 macro-economic processes on workers and labor unions on national and international levels? To begin with, the substantial structural transformation of the state in line with the principles of market-oriented internationalization, post-Fordist transformations that promote a vertical disintegration and fragmentation of production, neoliberal economic policies such as deregulation, financial liberalization, trade liberalization, the rolling back of the welfare state, the privatization of a number public services and remarkable cut downs in social expenditures after the 1980s (Klein, 2008⁵⁶) brought up increasing sentiments of “fear”, “anxiety”, “insecurity”, “suspicion” and “anger” amongst working classes. Secondly, these selfsame factors have led to “fragmentation”, “decomposition” and “dispersion” among working classes through subcontracting, poor working conditions, competition among workers in the labor market as well as a decline in labor union membership and the bargaining and organizational power of labor unions. As P. Meiksins (1998) argues⁵⁷, the rise of global capitalism, increasing capital mobility, the shift towards “flexible” production, technological change, and a series of other developments have transformed the occupational structure and stimulated the development of a variety of “new” employment relationships. The result of these processes has been disaggregated and disorganized working class and failure of labor unions to resist them.

Increasing competition and fragmentation becomes crucial in this context given that competition among workers functions as a means of control over workers, due to “the reserve army of labor”. As Ticktin argued:

This is a complex concept not reducible to unemployment, which is the central aspect but not the only one. The worker in the economy competes with other workers for jobs in the market. He is an atomized provider of labor power to the employer who pays him a wage or salary. In a truly atomized workforce, the worker has little or no bargaining power, given the existence of large numbers of other workers, who are unemployed and seeking work. His wage will therefore be reduced to the minimum consistent with his ability to sustain his physical well-being. (2009, p. 16)

In addition, increasing labor migration is another factor intensifying competition among workers; hence if immigrants are willing to work for lower wages than resident workers, then this can drive down the salaries of the latter or even cost them their jobs⁵⁸ (Castree et al. 2004,

⁵⁶ Klein, N. 2008, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, Vintage, Toronto.

⁵⁷ Meiksins, P 1998, *Rising From The Ashes? Labor in the Age of Global Capitalism*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

⁵⁸ Castree, N. et al. 2004, *Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and the Geographies of Labour*, Sage, London.

p. 88). This unfortunate fact proves that building and developing solidarity among workers especially in countries with high immigrant population is very difficult because resident workers in those countries consider immigrant workers as the main reason for the decreases in their wages and the precarious working conditions they experience, rather than comprehending this situation from the perspective of class relations. Obviously, in political terms, reactions against migrant workers can easily assume a nationalist and even racist character and they are easily manipulated around nationalist discourses and policy formulations. Not only competition among workers, but also casualization of labor, divisions between temporary (and sub-contracting⁵⁹) and long-term workers, between mental and manual workers, etc., have been used and continue to be used as means of dividing workers (Ibid, p. 19). What is more, pre-existing and increasing social, cultural and ethnic divisions after the 1980s should not be forgotten to understand the composition of working classes today. Therefore, although collective production activities of workers are increasingly interconnected through the internationalization of capital, their labor remains divided in the many and complex ways already described. To put in another way, in a world of multiple workers and firms in multiple places, classes in-themselves are geographically fragmented⁶⁰.

At this point, contemporary debates on the possibility of developing international solidarity among working classes need to be considered. On the one hand, some scholars take an optimistic position on labor internationalism considering capital's tendency to homogenize labor across national borders and to increase opportunities for workers to actively break down divisions among themselves and cooperate across previously existing divides. Radice (2000, p. 14) puts forward three reasons for this optimism: firstly, although labor market conditions remain unfavorable to effective organizing, the deeper integration of production transnationally makes workers more aware of their common concerns; secondly, the technologies required for transnational communication are now far cheaper and more widely available; thirdly, legislative initiatives, such as the European Union's directive on European Works Councils and the labor "side agreements" under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) give an important legitimation to the transnational extension of the

⁵⁹ Castree et al. (2004, p. 104) point to the importance of subcontracting relations and argue that "there is a general trend for firms to make more use of externalized networks (extra-firm relationships) as compared to internalized networks (intra-firm relationships) when constructing international spatial divisions of labour. This dynamic is reflected in the growing levels of international subcontracting and strategic alliances".

⁶⁰ Of course, this competition is not only valid for workers but also refers to increasing competition among states and internal competition among capitalist classes within and beyond states.

bargaining and negotiation horizon. In addition, in the context of NAFTA and the OECD's (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) abortive efforts to create a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, there is now a lively debate on the practicality of pursuing regional and global agreements on labor standards⁶¹. It is debatable after declining bargaining power of labor unions to influence their governments, workers will once again find themselves without a "fatherland" and labor politics will turn internationalist once again⁶². Defenders of labor internationalism⁶³ criticize nationalist and developmentalist-protectionist theses favored by labor unions and suggest that international labor solidarity is the strategy for unions to pursue in an increasingly globalizing international economy. It is argued that only through labor internationalism, of the kind seen in the mid-19th century, that labor unions may get rid of their reliance on the state and develop innovative responses to new situations (a new "repertoire" of labor action and new projects of cross-border cooperation), organize-generate a transnational collective action against the increasingly organized and totalizing logic of capitalism.

On the other hand, some scholars are not so optimistic about the future of labor internationalism due to already mentioned divisions among workers, as well as harsh and disciplinarian control of the labor markets on the national and international levels. States – still an effective force in taming and disciplining the labor movement – have taken strict measures seeking compliance by labor unions to the dictates of global capital. In studies of geographical division of workers, it is possible to see some other reasons for such pessimism and barriers to cross-national labor movements⁶⁴. For example, one of the causes for optimism mentioned by Radice in terms of integration of production through its internationalization as well as increasing mobility of capital coupled with technological development could also

⁶¹ Radice, H 2000, "Responses to Globalization: A Critique of Progressive Nationalism", *New Political Economy*, 5/1, pp. 5-19.

⁶² Silver 2003, pp. 12-22. Silver, B. 2003, *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization Since 1870*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. See also Waterman, P. and Munck, R. 1999, *Labor Worldwide in the Era of Globalization: Alternative Union Models in the New World Order*, St. Martin's Press, New York; Waterman, P. 2001, *Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms*, Continuum, London, New York.

⁶³ For example, see Herod 2001.

⁶⁴ For some important examples of such studies analyzing the relation between workers-labor movement and spatial divisions, see Andrew Herod's *Organizing the Landscape* (1998) and *Labor Geographies* (2001), and *Space, Place and the New Labour Internationalisms* (2001) co-edited by Jane Wills; *Working Classes, Global Realities* (Panitch and Leys, 2001), *Globalization and Patterns of Labour Resistance* (Waddington, 1999), *The Global Economy, National States and the Regulation of Labour* (Edwards and Elger, 1999), *Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms* (Waterman, 1998) and *Workers in a Lean World* (Moody, 1997).

cause difficulties and contradictions in developing cross-national labor solidarity due to ongoing diversification and differentiation of production processes, industrial relations and thus the emergence of very different work experiences and strategies.

It should also be noted that “beyond” the national scale, the profound scalar restructuring of the global economy over the last few decades has created both challenges and new opportunities for transnational labor union organization. Processes and dynamics described above also have repercussions on the present conduct and the future fate of international labor organizations⁶⁵. Actual effectiveness of international labor organizations has diminished due to lack of essential economic and institutional resources. In addition, as discussed above, divisions among workers in different countries constitute another problem for international organization of labor and develop solidarity through institutional mechanisms. In most parts of the world, labor unions still act and think nationally, although they are aware of the importance of the international scale. At this point, it is difficult to find an answer to the question of how to develop class solidarities internationally where there were once so severe divisions lie beyond the institutional structures of global labor (Stirling, 2010)⁶⁶. For Lillie and Lucio (2004, p. 160), the interesting questions from the perspective of labor movement revitalization are as follows: first, how do national industrial relations, institutions and strategies mediate the development of internationalism?; second, what new challenges are emerging in the realm of international renewal strategies and labor coordination?; and third, which preconditions, structures, and strategies generate international worker and union solidarity?⁶⁷ Like many scholars (i.e. Panitch), Lillie and Martinez (Ibid, p. 163) think that the form of labor internationalism depends on the strength and character of national unions in their national institutions. Moreover, it could be argued that the nature of union influence within these institutions affects union perceptions and strategic options in their international relations. In this respect, national economic regulation on a very basic and implicit level can shape the structures and strategies of national unions. For these scholars, despite the

⁶⁵ Castree et al. (p. 114) draws the following picture of international labor organizations: “Growing numbers of workers in different countries are working for different branches of the same corporation. International labour organizations and links between workers have existed since the mid-nineteenth century. The years between 1870 and 1914 marked a period of particularly intense international organizing that saw, for example, the establishment of some 30 international ‘trade secretariats’ (as they are called) to foster cooperation between unions in particular industries. Currently, trade unions cooperate internationally through three sets of institutions” (see Herod, 2001)

⁶⁶ Stirling, J. 2010, “Global unions: Chasing the dream or building the reality?”, *Capital & Class*; 34; 107

⁶⁷ Lillie, N. and Lucio, M. M. 2004, “International Trade Union Revitalization: The Role of National Union Approaches” in C. Frege and J. Kelly (ed.) *Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

transnationalization of production, the nation-state still plays an important role in economic regulation.

Although I agree with these authors on the importance of national regulatory systems to develop labor unionism at the national scale, it should not be forgotten that labor unions which are organized nationally in most parts of the world also have feeble links with international labor organizations and have been reluctant to develop or be part of international labor solidarity, which causes further divisions in the labor movement on the global scale⁶⁸. Moreover, such nation-based organization of labor unions stands as a barrier to the internationalization of labor movements because it becomes difficult to develop such solidarity with a defensive response to globalization identifying the national level as the most feasible site of struggle and where labor is relatively better organized⁶⁹. It should also be mentioned that the unequal development of capitalism after the 1980s and the discrepancy between developed and underdeveloped regions sharpened polarization between unions in these regions. In a similar vein, Eder rightly argues that struggles, strategies and concerns of labor unions between advanced developed countries and developing countries differ to a great extent although control strategies of national and transnational companies on labor are similar:

The increasing depoliticization of labor movements particularly in the core countries has come as a result of the effects of improved working conditions, which has brought a clear embourgeoisment of the workers. Facing the breakdown of the class compromise which has led to increased workers' rights and better living conditions throughout the postwar era, the unions in advanced industrialized countries became increasingly defensive in their strategy and focused on wage issues and job security.... Not having gone through the same improvement in their lives, the workers in the newly industrializing countries adopted an entirely different strategy. Instead of exclusively focusing on bread and butter issues, even though they faced even lower declining wages than their industrialized counterparts, they joined forces with other social movements and broadened their agenda. The labor movements in South Africa, Brazil and more recently in South Korea built crosscutting alliances with various religious groups, women's groups and political parties and became a credible voice in

⁶⁸ As argued by Van der Linden, labor history proves that from mid-19th century it was possible to develop some sort of international links and solidarities, but the integration of working classes to nation-state projects has increased as well. See Linden, M. 2008, *Workers of the World: Essays Towards a Global Labour History*, Brill, Leiden and Boston. E. H. Carr also argued that this incorporation of workers into national-state projects was at the root of the collapse of 19th century labor internationalism. See Carr, E. H. 1945, *Nationalism and After*, Macmillan, London.

⁶⁹ Eder, M. 2002, "The Constraints on Labour Internationalism: Contradictions and Prospects", in J. Harrod and R. O'Brien (ed.) *Global Unions: Theory and Strategies of Organized Labour in the Global Political Economy*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 168.

pushing for democratization and overall opening up of their country. The divergence of goals, aims and strategies of the core country unions from that of the developing country unions creates yet another barrier to the creation of international ties⁷⁰. (Eder, 2002, p. 169)

Obviously, pressures of competitiveness and the hegemony of “national interest” discourse also led to such an outcome, so we should question whether the national economy is still a proper target for the socialist strategy of international labor movement or not. As Radice argues, “despite occasional successes, organized labor failed to create effective transnational structures, particularly as labor market conditions turned against workers in most countries after the end of the postwar boom” (2000, p. 14). This failure, for Radice, then provided grounds for pro-labor progressive nationalists (who seek to promote a conventional progressive agenda within a fundamentally national political arena) to argue that labor should concentrate on recovering and extending its political influence at the national level (Ibid, p. 14). Therefore, discourses of national protectionism and developmentalism gain popularity among labor unions and workers instead of class-based strategies. Indeed, a defeatist politics, “calling for the state back” to revitalize the principle of etatism and economic protectionism to fight against the outcomes of neoliberal globalization is becoming much more popular⁷¹. Radice notes that the capitalist world economy is now so thoroughly integrated across national boundaries that an autonomous national economic strategy is no longer possible (Radice 1984, p. 111⁷²):

The reassertion of national sovereignty offered socialists the possibility of appropriating “the nation” as their own, and overcoming the perennial marginalization of socialist thought in the national culture. It also linked up with the romantic identification of the left with national liberation struggles in the Third World: after all, they too were fighting against “imperialism”. (Ibid, p. 112)

As Radice rightly puts (Ibid, p. 114), these arguments center their analysis firmly on the politics of nation-states rather than appropriation of labor power by capital. However, there are no longer any significant nationally-limited capitals and the response of the labor movement should be in the same internationalist direction. Therefore, as Bonefeld argues, these state-centric approaches and overemphasis on the role of nation-states “favor the strong and capable national state in abstraction from the social constitution of capitalist social

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 169.

⁷¹ See P. Meiksins 1998, Munck 2002, Herod 2001, Dunn 2004 and Bieler&Bonefeld et al. 2006.

⁷² Radice, H. 1984, “The national economy: A Keynesian myth?” *Capital & Class*, 8; 111. On arguments based on developmentalism, see also Chibber, V. 2005.

relations” (2006, p. 47⁷³). Especially in the case of privatizations and reactions against increasing foreign investments, such misreading of the state could be easily seen in political formulations and alternative strategies against it. Another important point mentioned by Radice is that the most influential progressive nationalist writers largely omit labor from their analysis of capitalism and this removes from consideration what is potentially the most important foundation for an internationalist challenge to the neoliberal ideology of globalization (Ibid, p. 16). As a matter of fact, this is a common problem in Marxist criticisms and analyses of capitalism, where subjects of neoliberal globalizations disappear from analyses and proposed solutions. One of the most important goals of this study is in fact to bring them back in.

At this point, it can be argued that the ongoing unmaking and making of working classes which create dislocations and competitive pressures bring a tendency for workers to draw non-class boundaries as a basis for claims for protection from the maelstrom, a special treatment in the terms of nationness (Silver 2003, pp. 22-23). Moreover, as Harvey argued⁷⁴, the nationalist discourse is used for the promotion of neoliberal policies by the state with a view to obtaining competitive advantage in global economy:

The neoliberal state needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive. Forced to operate as a competitive agent in the world market and seeking to establish the best possible business climate, it mobilizes nationalism in its effort to succeed. Competition produces ephemeral winners and losers in the global struggle for position, and this in itself can be a source of national pride or of national soul-searching (2005, p. 85).

It should be also mentioned that concepts such as “national interest”, “national harmony”, “national economy” and “national wealth” are still powerful premises to be defended among workers. In this context, the state is called for strict regulation and control against external forces that limit these premises and to play its role and function to eliminate the import of this disharmony from “outside”. As Bonefeld argues, “the nationalist conception of equality in terms of *Volk* (equality as a nation or *Volk*, rather than equality of labor) entails the projection of a classless ‘national community’ whose existence is threatened by the *external enemy within*” (2006, p. 56).

⁷³ Bonefeld, W. 2006 “Anti-globalisation and the Question of Socialism”, *Critique*, 34: 1, 39-59.

⁷⁴ Harvey, D. 2005, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

In terms of political implications of these conceptualizations, in many Third World and developing countries, the first and foremost case being Latin America, recent anti-neoliberal strategies are mostly taking the form of “left economic nationalism and populism” and “national developmentalism” (Munck 2004, Ercan and Oğuz 2007). Munck (2002) argues that national unions are also changing under the impact of globalization and promoting nationalist, economic and corporatist strategies, as seen during the NAFTA⁷⁵ process. NAFTA debates on labor unions provide a good example of how national union and state strategies can actually converge in excluding and limiting the creation of such global networks whenever the national union’s interests have outweighed the advantages of creating such global ties:

Despite significant lip service paid to the creation of cross-border solidarity of Mexican and US workers, the opposition of most of the US unions to NAFTA have not emerged from a concern for their Mexican comrades but from the growing anxiety for the US capital to flee to Mexico and the consequent unemployment (Eder 2002, p. 167).

In another example, Third World delegates to the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1997 interpreted demonstrations not as evidence of a new labor internationalism, but rather as the expression of a national-protectionist agenda on the part of Northern labor in alliance with Western governments⁷⁶. Thus, the labor organizations’ concern for world trade issues is often motivated by protectionism. This means that the globalization of industrial production has been a contradictory process that simultaneously produced elements of both *convergence* and *divergence* in the material conditions of geographically dispersed working classes – a contradictory process that has similarly contradictory implications for the future of labor internationalism (Ibid, p. 11). Therefore, it should not be forgotten that approaches of labor unions and workers to international institutions and agreements in the North may diverge from the ones in the South or developing countries.

In this way, the opposition to “globalization” usually seeks a return to national capitalism and developmentalist protectionism. As Hensman (2001, p. 431) argues, the idea that capitalism can overcome problems of poverty, unemployment and crisis provided that it remains national, and that the real enemy is the foreign “Other” (depriving workers of their “global

⁷⁵ Also see French, J. D. *Labour and NAFTA: Nationalist Reflexes and Transnational Imperatives in North America, 1991–1995*, in R. Munck (ed.) 2004, *Labor and Globalisation: Results and Prospects*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.

⁷⁶ Silver (2003, p. 11).

solidarity”) is popular among labor unions nowadays. For many Marxist intellectuals and labor movement actors, such a nationalist approach could still be instrumental in the struggle against the effects of neoliberal globalization involving i.) implementation of new rules by multilateral agencies such as the WB, IMF and WTO; ii.) the concentration of market power in the hands of multinational corporations and financial power in the hands of transnational banks and iii.) the subordination of many developing and Third-World countries to global institutional forces. It is in this context that calls for bringing the nation-state back in and creating a “national alliance or front” (that includes fractions of national bourgeoisie) are heard to realize the strategies of national developmentalism, protectionism and sovereignty that “should not be left to the control and interests of international or foreign capital”. Resulting in a pervasive reproduction of the internal-external duality and misconceptualization of global tendencies as exogenous to national economies, nationalist solutions are increasingly put into the agenda. These solutions and discourses are mostly visible during privatizations in different countries after the 1980s due to the increasing amount of foreign investments with further neoliberalization.

It should be noted that those debates are not peculiar to developing or third world countries. An example of similar debates and proposals can be seen in the Canadian labor movement. Smith (2000, p. 7) notes that the “tendencies toward capitalist crisis manifest themselves unevenly across the world economy that creates an opening for ‘nationalist’ explanations of economic downturn”. For this reason, Smith argues, “left nationalism remains an important weapon in the arsenal of those who would seek to disrupt the capitalist status quo” (Ibid, p. 12). Thus NCPE (New Canadian Political Economy) theorists are criticized for espousing a nationalist, etatist and reformist project suggesting the expansion of “public ownership” and democratizing the role of the existing state in the allocation of economic resources and the regulation of markets⁷⁷. Actually, the tendency to forget the class character of the state is a common misunderstanding within Marxist circles. Moreover, in the Canadian case, it is

⁷⁷ For a well-articulated analysis of the left-nationalist arguments in Canadian political economy in 1970s, see Kellogg, P. 1989, “State, Capital and World Economy: Bukharin's Marxism and the ‘Dependency/Class’ Controversy in Canadian Political Economy, *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June), pp. 337-362. Kellogg argues that Steve Moore and Debi Wells, (*Imperialism and the National Question in Canada*, Toronto: S. Moore, 1975) are by no means the first to have embarked on the project of disentangling Canadian nationalism from the struggle for socialism. For Wells and Moore, such struggle of socialists for Canadian “independence” was a mistake that served to obscure the antagonistic class divisions between Canadian capitalists and workers: “Nationalism... is the perfect ideological vehicle for cementing an alliance of ‘national unity’ with the bourgeoisie.” (1975, p. 113, cited from Kellogg 1989, p. 338)

argued that “collaboration and alliances between the working class and ‘progressive’ elements of the national bourgeoisie might be an appropriate strategy for socialists” (Ibid, p. 15). The implication of such an approach on Canadian labor politics, similar to the Turkish case, is that “the international unions are considered as an obstacle to the development of the fighting capacity of Canadian workers in the struggle for their ‘national’ as well as their class interests” and leads to the “rejection of the task of campaigning for a class-struggle, socialist program within the North American labor movement as a whole” (see also Albo 1997, 2002). These arguments firstly underestimate the internationalized character of relations of production and limit the scale of struggles to the national level for the sake of looking for national solutions to the problems, which are actually experienced by a vast majority of workers around the world.

Similar discussions could also be seen in the USA, Britain and the EU countries. Owen Worth⁷⁸ argues that ideological disparities can be separated into those more socially enlightened macro projects, which he calls “progressive” and those that focus upon protecting the national and cultural heritage of the nation-state from the influences of globalization, which he calls “nationalist” (p. 306). He continues to argue that nationalist and populist responses in Anglo-America stem from a belief that the neoliberal hegemonic order is not only a serious threat to the sovereignty and identity of the nation-state, but that transnational business poses a similar threat to home-grown businesses and jobs (Ibid, p. 307). For example, in the USA, the campaign of Pat Buchanan in 2000 saw free trade as a European invention, alien to the idea of America and promoted the idea of “Economic Nationalism” which, if implemented, would retain the free market and individualism at home, but construct a high national tariff protection, so that foreign competition would be vastly restricted. (Ibid, 307-308). In Europe, as Worth argued, Eurosceptic campaigns have focused upon populist and nationalist support that has ambiguously and implicitly stimulated nationalist and populist counter-hegemonic forces: New Parties such as the “National Democrats” and the “Progressive Democrats” in Britain advocate policies such as immediate withdrawal from the European Union, restriction of foreign imports, and restoration of capital punishment and reintroduction of a strong defense mechanism against what? (Ibid, p. 310) These examples show that not only in Third world countries but also in advanced capitalist countries, forms of economic nationalism and national developmentalism is suggested as a panacea against the

⁷⁸ Worth, O. 2002, “The Janus-like Character of Counter-hegemony: Progressive and Nationalist Responses to Neoliberalism”, *Global Society*, 16: 3, 297-315.

internationalization of capital investments and flows. Not surprisingly, the arguments of socialist and nationalists do not diverge to a great extent in this respect and reflect close similarities.

Within this framework, the practical implications of such misconceptions and nation-based political strategies on the part of the working classes, labor unions and leftists have been an understanding of the real contradiction to be between core and periphery (or North and South) rather than antagonistic class relations. This problematic approach is deriving from 1) Marxian conceptions of nationalism systematically analyzed in the first section, in terms of reducing socialist projects to developmentalist ideals and framed within national boundaries, 2) national developmentalist and various other Marxian discourses that posit neoliberal globalization and imperialism as a relation between states rather than as a class arrangement, which then argue that eliminating state-state exploitation should take precedence over class exploitation. Both the legacy of earlier theoretical formulations and political strategies could be seen in the debates that revolve around privatizations. It is still widely suggested that the role of the nation-state (the national level and the state as an institutional-political form) is crucial at this conjunction to realize national-developmental and protectionist strategies, a view which underestimates the general laws of motion of world capitalism, the globalization of capitalism conquering and manipulating the capacity of national markets and economies as well as the states' new role on controlling workers and labor unions. Thus, the basic political implication of the ambiguity regarding the class character of such projections is the impossibility of an alternative vision to overcome the global subsumption of labor under capital. As Wood argues, "It is in the very nature of capitalism to intensify the contradiction between its expansionist imperatives and the territorial divisions of its original political (and economic) form" (2003, p. 30).

On the other hand, expansionist imperatives of capitalism in the neoliberal age also introduce new relations among classes and contradictions to the labor movement on the national and international level as discussed in the second section. Thus it could be argued that contradictions among nation-states are associated with contradictions among classes on different levels and so national contradictions are intertwined with class contradictions. Therefore, the notions of class and the overall Marxist approach towards nationalism need to be strategically reconfigured in this conjunction, more crucial a task than ever. In the

following section, such an attempt will be outlined in terms of bridging structural processes and subjective-collective experiences, and macro and micro level analyses of the effects of neoliberal globalization.

Conclusion: Bridging Marxist Theories of Class and Nationalism

As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, a non-reductionist conceptualization of nationalism which bridges structural processes and subjective experiences is essential to understand it in its multidimensionality. Recent studies on nationalism focus on such a perspective, namely to track nationalism in everyday life practices, rather than simply reducing it to economic categories and broad generalizations and general processes. At this point, Balibar (1990) rightly argues that a social formation only reproduces itself as a nation through a network of apparatuses and daily practices. The crucial question is under which historical conditions, internal and external relations of force and by virtue of which “symbolic forms”, nation/nationness are invested in elementary material practices. The same is relevant for class studies, which should also investigate the relation between “political-economic dynamics of world capitalist development” and subjective-collective experiences arising from those dynamics (working-class experiences within capitalist relations and working-class organizations within class conflicts) as well as perceptions and reactions (or unrests) developed against them. The theoretical interventions of Pierre Bourdieu and E.P. Thompson are crucial for such an alternative approach, which also guides this study. In Bourdieu’s work (1990, pp. 55-65), both the concept of *habitus* defined as a socially constituted system of dispositions that orient “thoughts, perceptions, expressions, and actions” (“subjective” identifications, cultural orientations, and lifestyles) and the analysis of *symbolic systems* are crucial. Similarly, E.P. Thompson’s observation that the conception of “experience”, which mediates between structure and process, social existence and consciousness, is important to understand working class reality. Against objectivist, and inherently economic definitions of the working class, Thompson argues that both structural and action-based or experiential accounts could be found in Marx’s writings: “class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences, feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against those whose interests are different from theirs” (1970, p. 9). In the spirit of Thompson, I would argue that it is impossible to understand the phenomenon of class without considering its formation in its historical, social and cultural context, which was shaped in a long historical process. This study can be considered as an attempt to bridge those processes

(macro level structural changes-micro level subjective experiences) and theoretical approaches (theories of nationalism and class) to understand class in both experiences and socio-cultural as well as political-economic contexts. At this point, the first issue to be underlined is that we cannot assume workers to be passive agents of aforementioned neoliberal globalization. This means that workers have agency,⁷⁹ having the capacity to act, to change, to challenge and to resist. In many places, workers have the capacity to decisively alter their circumstances. Put simply, wage laborers can be “active participants” (Herod, 2001: 16) in the creation of the socio-geographical situations in which they find themselves⁸⁰.

In these terms, I argue that there is a dialectical relation between workers’ nationalist demands and the position of labor unions and the Left: they affect each other’s perceptions of recent trends and their political constraints and possibilities. Or to put in other words, it may be argued that a “dialectical” relationship between the attitudes of workers and leaders exist, wherein the relatively autonomous developments among each cohort shape/constrain the possibilities and sensibilities of the other. For workers both in the North and the South, such “nationalist” protection from the maelstrom of neoliberal globalization may seem to them to be in their “real interest” in a given historical conjunction and space. As a result, they may force labor unions to protect their material benefits and rights in a given territory against “foreign threats”. Since it is easier for labor unions to think and act nationally, due to unions’ difficulties to adapt to changing production relations as well as the existing political boundaries of their organization, they may also contribute to the production and representation of such nationalist demands and political-discursive agendas.

Secondly, the symbolic-discursive reproduction of terms/concepts such as national development, national competitiveness and national protectionism in favor of “national interest” and “national wealth” are also important in the rise of such demands and nationalist outlook among workers. As discussed previously with reference to Harvey, the nationalist discourse is used for the promotion of neoliberal policies by the state to achieve competitive advantage in global economy. Competition produces winners and losers in the global struggle for an advantageous position, and this in itself can be a source of national pride or of national

⁷⁹ Castree et al. (p. 159) argues that what is meant by the “agency of labour” “refers to the capacity possessed by individuals and groups to act for their own benefit or for the well-being of others”.

⁸⁰ As Castree et al. argued (2004, p. 159), it is also important to note that “the degree and kind of human agency is both constrained and socio-geographically variable. The constraints arise because all people think and act within sets of relationships that place definite limits on what is possible. We called these relationships structures”. Thus, as Giddens noted (Ibid, p. 160), structures condition agents and agents, collectively, affect structures (usually reproducing, them but now-and-then transforming them).

soul-searching. This point is highly crucial and also mentioned by Adam Harmes: “economic nationalism as developed by Friedrich List and others is first and foremost an ideology which seeks to promote the values of national unity, power, autonomy and sovereignty... economic nationalism can be associated with a wide range of policy projects, including the endorsement of liberal economic policies” (2012, p. 60)⁸¹.

As a result, class struggle in a given territory can be replaced with struggle between nation-states to gain economic advantage in the world economy against “alien” nations and workers in other regions of the world. In fact, this developmentalist-protectionist agenda does not provide an alternative to the culmination of antagonistic class relations but reproducing and justifying them by a focus on nationalist considerations and formulations. The privatization process in Turkey proves that problematic theoretical approaches and their repercussions on political practice may lead to such a result.

In addition to this, it should not be forgotten that workers have been active participants of national independence or decolonization struggles and subjects of nation-state formation processes. They have also been subjected to processes such as the national education system and duties such as the military service (both giving priority to national unity, national homogeneity and national interest in domestic and foreign policy), as well as being socialized first in a given space and culture. These processes have an important effect on workers’ perceptions and their search for the sources of problems. Through such processes, it could be argued that nationalism could easily articulate social discontent stemming from the internationalization dynamics of capitalism and become the source of new solidarities as well as the expression of older ones. Of course, it may also be an important barrier to establish intra-national and transnational class solidarities. As mentioned previously, the history of labor movements at the national and international level (especially Labor Internationals) is full of these examples where different nationalisms had divisive effects on workers’ struggles and international solidarity. On the other hand, one of the most important arguments of this study is that it is not only nationalism but also the structural dynamics of capitalism that lead to fragmentation and divisions in class processes and struggles. This argument guides my discussion of the question of and debates on the scale and agency of struggles against the hegemony of neoliberalism and capitalism in general.

⁸¹ Harmes, A. 2012, “The rise of neoliberal nationalism”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 19:1, 59-86.

At this point, a third issue relates to aforementioned economic reductionism and class-centric approaches which suggest that the organized working class plays, or ought to play, a pivotal role in transforming world capitalism and decentralizing power relations imposed by it. As Catherine Eschle (2005, pp. 28-29), in her analysis of constructing “the anti-globalization movement” (or “critical globalization movement” in her terms), argues:

I see several interrelated problems here. The first is economism. The argument that the mode and relations of capitalist production are causal of all other developments associated with globalization implies that gendered and racialised hierarchies, cultural processes, etc., are superstructural and that struggles focusing on them are distractions or deviations from the more fundamental struggle against capitalism. This brings me to a second problem, the consequent privileging of class as the locus of resistance. Some effort may be made to redefine working-class-based resistance in a broad and inclusive manner... However, it still tends to be strongly emphasized as the emancipatory vehicle, given the structural position of workers within capitalism, and either its role is talked up or political effort is focused on the need to strengthen it... A third problem is the lack of attention then paid to how to construct relationships between workers’ organizations and others on a democratic basis. Given the structural primacy afforded to organized labor, the danger is that the relations pursued with other groups will be hierarchically organized and many groups will simply be excluded...⁸²

In this way, a non-hierarchical and decentralist approach including class struggles and other social movements against neoliberal hegemony of capitalism and negative outcomes of globalization may be developed. Thus, a dialogue with social movements such as the anti-globalization and anti-capitalist movement, World Social Forum, European Social Forum, Global Justice movement, demonstrations against World Trade Organization and D8 summits, is essential for the prospects of transnational labor solidarity and alternative strategies developed by labor unions and socialist movements. As Bieler et al.⁸³ argue, the globalization of the working-class condition has clearly not worked out in the way that Marxists (and other socialists) assumed or hoped for:

Instead of generalizing and homogenizing the condition of the industrial proletariat (of mid-19th century Britain), we see proletarianization occurring without the Marxists’ internationalist and revolutionary proletariat. Differentiation rather than homogenization seems to be the rule. The appeals, ‘Workers of the world unite!’, ‘You have nothing to lose but your chains!’, ‘You have a world to win!’, ‘One solution,

⁸² Eschle, C. 2005, *Critical Theories, International Relations and the ‘Anti-Globalisation Movement’: The Politics of Global Resistance*, Routledge, London.

⁸³ Bieler, A. et al. 2008, *Labour and the Challenges of Globalization What Prospects for Transnational Solidarity?*, Pluto Press, London and Ann Arbor.

revolution!’, or ‘Black and white, unite and fight!’ fail to appeal to workers who experience international competition, who may also have a job, or television or pension to lose, and whose religious, ethnic or local identity may be as significant to them as their class (pp. 257-258).

In addition to these different identities and socio-cultural diversity among workers, as Rupert (in Eschle, 2005) notes, a variety of grassroots mobilizations and activist-oriented non-governmental organizations – perhaps predominantly but by no means exclusively from the global North – are coalescing into ‘a movement of movements’ resistant to neoliberal globalization and a new kind of social movement has started to emerge and develop during the last decade of this century:

Among them could be found critics of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization; advocates of debt relief for developing countries; proponents of re-regulation and taxation of global finance capital; groups critical of the heightened power of multinational firms; movements of and for small farmers and landless peasants; environmentalists; women’s groups and lesbian activists; labor advocates; direct action networks; and anti-capitalist groups inspired by various articulations of anarchist and socialist ideologies (p. 36).

In addition to the importance of the articulation of different (mostly identity based) social movements to labor movement, it can be said that the growing presence of international unions within the global justice and solidarity movement in general, or the World Social Forum (WSF) in particular, might suggest a development in the direction of some kind of ‘international social movement unionism’ (Ibid, p. 258). As Bieler et al. (p. 264) argue, workers in transnational companies and transnational chains of production or distribution are beginning to link up with each other to protect their common interests. In this way, although there are serious problems to overcome, new forms of solidarity between labor unions in different countries and new forms of union organization are developing. It is argued that despite increasing informalization of work in particular and the hegemonic neoliberal ideology causing divisions among workers both in the North and South, three strategies could nevertheless be pushed forward i. establishing transnational links between existing trade unions, ii. strengthening organizations in the informal sector⁸⁴, iii. intensified cooperation between unions and other social movements (Ibid, p. 276).

⁸⁴ It could be argued that especially strengthening organizations in the informal sector are much more important at the national level due to the fact that informalization of the work led to further divisions and competition among workers in a given country and limited solidarity. There are many attempts and cases for developing cooperation among such workers. As Castree et al. (p. 227) argue, “Given the sheer number of non-unionized

An additional point relates to the need to understand such demands in their particular social contexts and formulate alternative strategies to bridge geographically dispersed workers and their demands, rather than solely labeling them as “regressive” or “progressive”. At this point, it is wrong to see local level worker actions as simply politically “regressive”. Moreover, in certain circumstances transnational labor activism can be positively exclusionary, even competitive⁸⁵. As Herod argued (in Castree et al., p. 228), alliances between labor unions organized on an international level may be selective as seen in the activities of the AFL-CIO (The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) in Latin America as the largest federation of unions in the US from the 1950s onwards. Therefore, the particular content and context of struggles may become much more important than their scale. As Castree et al. remark:

Many Left-wing commentators regard thinking and acting locally as perpetuating inter-place competition for jobs and investment – and therefore as undermining worker solidarity across space. While this judgment is a reasonable one, it is no simple matter weighing the gains and losses entailed. When workers in one place successfully retain or attract employment opportunities this cannot be categorically dismissed as a “bad thing” because workers elsewhere may have lost out in the process. The real question is whether it is possible to weigh socioeconomic benefits derived in one place against actual or potential benefits foregone elsewhere. (2004, pp. 157-158)

Therefore, struggles on different spaces and scales may carry progressive elements or *vice versa*, namely regressive elements eliminating different prospects for solidarities among workers. The important question here is how to develop strategies and alternatives appropriate for workers at different geographical scales. The positive or negative role of nationalism should be questioned as to whether it helps to develop strategies or eliminates prospects for new forms of solidarities. Hence, a systematic analysis of particular social and cultural contexts in which nationalist formulations take place would help to find an answer to the

and informal workers worldwide, an inclusive transnational worker movement will surely be one of the hallmarks of labour organizing in the years to come”.

⁸⁵ “Operating in a climate of Cold War fear and American economic growth (at least until 1989 and 1974 respectively), the AFL-CIO tended only to support ‘moderate’ Latin American unions that were not ‘tainted’ by the ideas of communism. Indeed, more than this, Herod argues that the union actively tried to weaken unions that seemed ‘anti-American’ and unreceptive to the import of US goods. In this sense, the AFL-CIO was frequently an ally of US businesses, laying the ground for American investment in, and exports to, Latin America. The kind of transnational solidarity it built between the United States and non-US workers was thus a very partial one, predicated on excluding those Latin American workers considered too radical for the AFL-CIO’s taste” (Ibid, p. 228).

question of whether they are used to put pressure on demands of working classes and eliminate class-based politics for the sake of rearrangements of economic relations in capitalist terms on the national level or not.

As a final point, it needs to be remembered that discussions of nationalism in early and contemporary Marxist theory had a crucial significance, especially during the rapid internationalization of capitalism by the mid-1970s. Marxist analyses, as a result of realist and pragmatic political reasons, mostly approached nationalism within the framework of the national question and focused on how to *solve* it as a *problem* or how to *instrumentalize* it for a principled internationalism. In this chapter, after an analysis of theoretical pitfalls within Marxist theory and practice, it was argued that nationalism cannot be simply analyzed as an epiphenomenon of economic relations and in terms of structural dynamics of capitalism. Therefore, a focus on class processes and analysis of subjective-collective experiences of working classes is necessary. On the other hand, as discussed in this chapter, this does not mean that an analysis of structural economic factors relating nationalism to class amounts to reductionism. It is argued that attempts to relate nationalism to class must be based on a wider framework bridging structural dynamics and subjective-collective experiences, or macro and micro level analyses of economic as well as class processes. As discussed in this chapter with reference to the debates on the rapid internationalization of capitalism by the mid-1970s, those structural dynamics play a crucial role in the composition of working classes, prospects and limits for labor internationalism as well as the workers' perceptions on and reactions to those dynamics. However, the cultural and political character of class formation and struggle should never be underestimated or reduced to those structural economic dynamics and instrumentalist-reductionist approaches. The contribution of this dissertation lies in its suggestion that situating working classes' experiences and perceptions at the center of analysis, in a Thompsonian way, has crucial importance⁸⁶.

Therefore, an analysis relating nationalism to class processes is very important for both the literature on the Marxist theory of class and Marxist debates analyzing the internationalization process of the capitalism, namely neoliberal globalization. Firstly, although there is a

⁸⁶ In contemporary debates, Ellen Meiksins Wood (1986), analyzing the phenomenon of *class as a process and relation*, also underlines the importance of such an analysis relating the working class formation and consciousness to the experiences. In these terms, this dissertation may be considered as an attempt to develop such an analysis on the basis of working classes experiences and perceptions on the privatization process in Turkey, rather than simply remaining within the limits of theoretical criticisms of the relation between nationalism and Marxism.

substantial literature in Marxist theory on the structural dimensions of class formation, the same cannot be said for an analysis of political and ideological processes as well as subjective-collective experiences that have been influential in working class consciousness (political preferences, class solidarity and perceptions) formation. In this chapter, it is argued that class formation and consciousness are not simply a structural process, but cultural, political dimensions have crucial significance. An analysis of these dimensions is also important to develop counter-hegemonic discourses for the development of class politics. An account of the relation of nationalism to class is only one part of this picture, but constitutes the most important one when theoretical debates and political formulations discussed in this chapter are taken into consideration. Secondly, as pointed out earlier, contemporary debates on the internationalization process of the capitalism mostly focus on the role of the state and new debates on imperialism. In these debates, there is a lack of attention to the political character of reactions in different country cases and alternative formulations, which I call “national developmentalist and protectionist” arguments, suggested to protect the working class from the maelstrom of the dynamics of capitalism developed since the mid-1970s. This chapter suggests that a comprehensive critique of those policy formulations is crucial to reflect more on alternative formulations and strategies, which is possible with an analysis of theoretical shortcomings and political-practical problems within Marxist debates on nationalism.

With these considerations in mind, this study analyzes the Turkish privatization case after the 1980s. As discussed above, the privatization process of previously state-owned enterprises in the age of increasing internationalization of capital movements and foreign investments (and the tensions stemming from these processes) are not peculiar to Turkey. In many developing and also advanced capitalist countries’ workers, unions and leftists react against these processes in different forms. Among these forms, the most prominent one is to defend the importance of the nation-state as a regulating body and to realize national aspirations by aspiring to developmentalism and breaking dependency relations. Here the role of workers and labor unions is articulated to nationalist aims. As mentioned previously, the nationalist discourse is also used for the promotion of neoliberal policies by the state with a view to achieving competitive advantage in the global economy. When the pressures of the internationalization dynamics of capitalism or structural political-economic processes’ effects on workers and unions are taken into account, these competing conceptions of nationalist

purposes dominate the political agenda and become highly influential on workers' perceptions of the processes in question. As a result, nationalist solutions and aspirations increasingly become a basis for claims for protection from the neoliberal maelstrom. This study aims to analyze the Turkish privatization experience within this framework. Strategies and discourses of labor unions and leftists in Turkey as well the reactions of workers to the internationalization process of capital and the neoliberal hegemony of capitalism will be analyzed as a particular case to test the debates and formulations presented above, but also to reflect on the general effects of political-economic dynamics on different countries. It is believed that an analysis of the Turkish case in its particular historical and social context may also give an answer to the question of what aspects of Marxist approaches to nationalism, as analyzed in the first part of this chapter both with their problematic legacy and inspirational formulations, have been influential on the historical relation of leftist politics in Turkey to nationalism.

CHAPTER II: NATIONALISM IN THE FORMATION OF THE TURKISH WORKING CLASS AND POLITICAL FORMULATIONS WITHIN THE TURKISH LEFT

In the first chapter, the relation of nationalism to Marxist approaches was analyzed in theoretical and political-practical terms. It was argued that Marxist approaches to the national question and nationalism have several problematic aspects. Moreover, it was suggested that we cannot talk about a coherent theoretical framework within Marxism to understand the nationalism due to essentialist, reductionist and political-pragmatic strategies which lead Marxist scholars and thinkers to ignore its multi-dimensionality and negative outcomes on the development of an internationalist vision.

As mentioned above, for most Marxists and in many socialist projects, nationalism is thought to be instrumental for progress and ideas of developmentalism. Obviously, such an approach to nationalism in theory has implications on practice, and nationalist ideas in both political and economic terms were promoted for pragmatic reasons, which would also influence the development of socialist projects and the labor movement in many countries. This chapter will attempt to analyze the reflections of the theoretical debates and political-practical strategies discussed in the previous chapter on the development of socialist theory and labor movement in Turkey. Such an attempt, i.e. to cover the theoretical positions and to understand the political strategies of leftist groups in Turkey in their relation to nationalism, is crucial to identify the dangers and problematic aspects of the use of nationalist discourses and strategies in the development of socialist thought and labor movement in a particular case. Obviously, those aspects are not only peculiar to Turkey and could be traced in strategies promoted in different countries.

Before analyzing the relation of socialist approaches and labor movement in Turkey to nationalism, it should first be noted that this section does not aim to analyze the historical development of the leftist politics in Turkey or the formation of working-classes in Turkey in general. My aim is simply to focus on the role and outcomes of nationalism and nationalist approaches on the debates and strategies of the Turkish Left. It is thought that such a focus would inevitably show us implications for the formation of working-class consciousness and movement in Turkey as well. The reason behind this is that the socialization and politicization of workers (as a part of the formation of the Turkish working class) through nationalist aims

and aspirations have been promoted by the state in Turkey, not simply in the single party era when the main ideological motives and principles of the regime were shaped. It needs to be also mentioned that there are significant attempts in the literature on the Turkish Left to analyze the different political and theoretical ideas influential in the Turkish Left. In these studies – on the Turkish Communist Party (TKP), Galiyevism, Kemalist nationalism and anti-imperialist thought, *Kadro* (Cadre) Movement, Turkey’s Workers Party (TİP), *YÖN* (the Direction), National Democratic Revolution thought (MDD) – the role of nationalism is partly mentioned with reference to the development of such ideas and movements in Turkey until the 1980s. However, this section does not limit itself to the development of such nationalist ideas and projects in the Turkish Left until the 1980s but also aims to analyze how nationalism continued to be instrumental and having a particular role in the Turkish Left after the 1980s. Within this framework, the reactions given by large sections of the Left and labor organizations in Turkey to neoliberal policies and political-economic outcomes of the internationalization of capital in general are taken into consideration particularly. Finally, the historical legacy of the debates— within the context of the peculiar role of nationalism from the early development of the socialist thought and labor movement in Turkey until today— will be linked to early and modern debates in Marxist theory’s and socialist projects’ (such as the movements in the Soviet Union, China, Africa, Latin America influenced by ideas of Stalinism and Maoism) approach to the national question and nationalism. Moreover, rather than simply remaining within the limits of the relation between the Turkish Left and nationalism, its repercussions on working classes, in terms of the formation of class identity in Turkey, will be analyzed in these respects.

The Legacy of the Late Ottoman and Early Republican Periods: The Rejection of Class Struggle and the Promotion of Kemalist Nationalism-National Developmentalism

If one analyzes the development of socialist thought and labor movement in Turkey, it is an obvious fact that nationalism has been one of the founding principles in both theoretical approaches developed by a large group of leftist intellectuals as well as the political strategies developed by workers and labor unions in organizational terms. This situation could be analyzed with reference to both the internal dynamics of the socialist movement and labor politics in Turkey and to international dynamics. This means that both theoretical and political-practical formulations within the framework of socialism and labor movement in a given country are influenced by: i. peculiar socio-economic, political and cultural

characteristics of that country, ii. the international historical context, dynamics and currents of socialist thought and practice within it. In this section, the legacy of the late Ottoman and early republican period in terms of socialist movement and labor activities in Turkey will be analyzed. This has crucial importance to trace the historical relation of the Turkish Left and labor movement to the nationalist projections from early debates and political formulations. These projections and formulations, namely an amalgamation of the idea of national developmentalism (national planning and industrial development, which was a common denominator of many socialist and communist parties of colonized and semi-colonized countries before the Second World War as an antidote to imperialism), etatism and Kemalist nationalism (conceived as an adaptation of the anti-imperialist position to Turkey) would constitute the principle characteristics of the Left and labor movement in Turkey and will be influential on the progress of them.

It should be first mentioned that first workers' organizations and socialist ideas in Turkey and their relations to nationalism date back to the emerging social movements after the Second Constitutional Period (1908). Between 1908 and 1913, the political organizations of workers and socialist intellectuals reached a remarkable level, although the pressures on them intensified just a year after 1908 with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)'s enactment of Strike Law (which remained in force until the Labor Act was enacted in 1936) and Martial Law to eliminate the political mobilization of workers⁸⁷. As a matter of fact, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 also adversely affected the mobilization of workers from 1908. During the 1908 strikes, as Karakışla argued, the participation of workers to nationalist protests and ethnicity-based divisions had not been observed, but in the aftermath of the 1908 wave of strikes, these became widespread (1998, p. 198)⁸⁸. At this point, the most influential actors in such attempts belonged to non-Muslim minorities within the Ottoman Empire, such as the Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians and Jews. However, the establishment of labor

⁸⁷ The atmosphere of freedom for the emerging labor movement came to an end shortly after 1908, when the government took measures to control the wave of strikes that were widespread throughout the country. As Makal argued, the parliament, under the control of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), enacted the Strike Law [Tatil-i Eşgal Kanunu] in 1909, prohibiting union activity in establishments performing public services. Moreover, the CUP's enactment of the Strike Law and the martial law powers that it retained from 1909 to 1918 functioned as a tool to clear the way for capitalist relations of production that the committee wanted to establish in the economic sphere (Kansu, 2001, also in Urhan and Çelik, 2010). Karakışla (1998) states that while between 1909 and 1912, the number of strikes reach 32, after 1913 with the consolidation of the CUP regime it fell to only 5. See also Y. Akkaya (2010, pp. 47-50) on the 1908 Revolution and working-class mobilization in its aftermath.

⁸⁸ Karakışla, Y. S. 1998, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 1908 Grevleri" in *Türkiye'de Sol'un Kaynakları, Toplum ve Bilim*, Fall 1998, No. 78.

organizations was mostly based on ethnic divisions and affected by the nationalist struggle of minorities during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, i.e. for an independent Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece and so on. Because the majority of the industrial workforce was composed of minority ethnic groups who were drawn to and pursued their own nationalist movements, a class consciousness in the modern sense of the word did not take shape in the late Ottoman period⁸⁹. Therefore, ideals to unite different activities of labor organizations and socialist parties in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire had been unsuccessful. Moreover, as Tunçay (1978) argued, some of those organizations were aiming to benefit from the increasing popularity of socialist ideals among workers for their pragmatic purposes and thus had no socialist program⁹⁰. Due to the support of Russia to national independence struggles within the borders of Ottoman Empire, it can be said that socialist ideas were first popularized among those minorities mostly struggling within Balkan territories – an amalgamation of nationalist inspirations with socialist ideas for tactical reasons (to increase the popularity of the struggles and get support from international actors). Since major organizations and activities were established mostly among these minorities, after the declaration of their independence, the legacy of this social mobilization within the Ottoman Empire to the early Republican period remained highly limited.

Another issue which is very important for the subject matter of this dissertation was the ethnic configuration of working classes in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. In the industrial workforce, non-Muslim workers from different ethnic identities were mostly specialized and responsible from the management of labor relations as skilled workers, while Muslim and Turkish workers were working in non-qualified and temporary jobs (Güzel, 1996). As a result, ethnic differentiation was reflected in the differences in wages. Similarly, the proportion of Muslims having capital among industrialists and merchants was low. During the dissolution process of the Empire, both nationalist movements and labor mobilization (manifested through strikes and unrests regarding wages and working conditions) intensified and priority had been given to national struggles rather than class struggle⁹¹. Scholars

⁸⁹ In Urhan and Çelik, 2010, p. 4. Because trade unions were not in existence, the labor movement was highly limited and workers could only organize under the name of charities and associations. Some associations that used “labor” in their name (such as the Ottoman Labor Association) were eliminated, and their administrators arrested and banished (Makal in Ibid. p. 4).

⁹⁰ Tunçay, M. 1978, *Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar (1908–1925)*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara.

⁹¹ Ünsal, 2002, pp. 34-35. Ünsal, A. 2002, *Umuttan yalnızlığa: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961-1971)*, İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları. See also Zürcher, E.J. ve Tunçay, M. (ed.) 1995, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik (1876-1923)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

analyzing the conditions of the labor movement in the pre-Republican period (such as Koç, 1998⁹² and Güzel, 1996) agree that strikes and unrests based on wage differences and working conditions among workers would in fact have an impact on the development of Turkish nationalism and the intensification of ethnic competition in the following years and decades.

Obviously, the First World War, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the national resistance movement would have negative effects on the development of an emerging working-class identity and consciousness. Following the end of the independence struggle, during the early-Republican period, ideas of anti-imperialism and independence in close relation with the idea of nationalism have been the main motto of both socialist thought and working class organizations and activities⁹³. As a matter of fact, a large section of the Turkish intellectuals of the age had a relation with socialist thought in the context of an anti-imperialist struggle given for national independence in political and economic aspects. For CUP leaders⁹⁴ and Turkist intellectuals, the establishment of a national economy, based on the principles of etatism, developmentalism and protectionism, could only be possible through the elimination of foreign pressures and elements. Such elimination would also mean saving the state from the dynamics of imperialism and non-Muslim minorities having the economic power in commerce and trade. This had a crucial importance for political independence, too.

The nationalist cadres of the CUP suggesting the principles of etatism and developmentalism were influenced by its socialist member Parvus' ideas of independence and anti-imperialism through economic development. Such ideas would lead many nationalist intellectuals of the age, i.e. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör (leading figures of the *Kadro* movement in the 1930s), as well as a large portion of the first socialist generation, i.e. Mustafa Suphi (the leader of TKP), to suggest nationalist formulations and approaches. For the first generation of the TKP, nationalist ideas were not questioned due to tactical reasons which are in line with Soviet support for national independence struggles formulated by Lenin in terms of the self-determination principle (discussed in Chapter 1).

⁹² Koç, Y. 1998, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi Tarihi*, İstanbul, Kaynak Yayınları; Güzel, Ş. 1996, *Türkiye'de İşçi Hareketi (1908-1984)*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul.

⁹³ For example, as Karakışla (1978) argued, a total of 19 strikes took place between 1919 and 1922 in the railway companies owned by foreign enterprenurs.

⁹⁴ The CUP dominated the political sphere after 1908; especially consolidated its power after 1913 and their policies-principles could be considered as the first laboratory of early Republican ideology and practices.

This has crucial importance to understand developing socialist ideas and organizations in Turkey between 1919 and 1923. As Tunçay (1978) argued, the reason behind the Kemalist cadres' relative support for the establishment of communist parties and socialist organizations in Turkey, as well as nationalist intellectuals' seeming sympathy to socialist ideas and formulations during this period, was mostly based on political maneuvers to realize national independence, which could only be possible through Soviet support⁹⁵. However, this sympathy and tolerance to socialist ideas and organizations during the 1910s and 1920s would come to an end when there is no more need for tactical maneuvers⁹⁶.

As both a source of such anti-imperialist and national independence ideals and another face of the pragmatic-tactical approach to socialism, the ideas of Sultan Galiyev, who had been relatively less influential in the leftist circles in Turkey, should be mentioned at this point. In the Baku Congress of Eastern Nations in 1920, Soviet support to “oppressed nations” had been discussed to find a solution to the Eastern question against the hegemony of advanced capitalist countries in the West. Galiyev was arguing that the proletariat in Islamic countries (and Muslim population in the Soviet Russia) had different characteristics and thus the nationalist struggle of Islamic countries had shared principles with the socialist movement. Galiyevism was one of the most notable examples of the attempt to adopt Marxist and socialist principles to nations' peculiar political, economic and cultural conditions, namely “Third Worldism” (on Third Worldism, see also Chapter 1). In this respect, Galiyev's ideals included the emancipation struggle of Islamic nations oppressed under Russian nationalism for a long time. On the other hand, there was close similarity between his earlier pragmatic and tactical formulations – suggesting that oppressed nations could use Soviet support for national emancipation for a certain time and Muslim populations would unite under a shared regime (Islam is considered as “true socialism”) – and later national independence and anti-imperialism formulations within the left in Turkey. Galiyev also suggested that the dynamic and progressive element in world history is not classes but nations; therefore, *nationalist sentiments would always precede class solidarity*⁹⁷.

⁹⁵ Tunçay, M. (1978). On the Soviet support to the Turkish nationalists, see also Gökay, B. 2006, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991: Soviet foreign policy, Turkey and Communism*, Routledge, New York.

⁹⁶ Aydın S. 2002, “Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik: Galiyefizmden Kemalizme Türkiye’de ‘Üçüncü Yol’ Arayışları”, in Bora, T. (ed.) *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 4, Milliyetçilik, İletişim, İstanbul.

⁹⁷ See Kakinç, H. 2003, *Sultangaliyev ve Milli Komünizm*, Bulut Yayınları, İstanbul and Kaymak, E. 1993, *Sultan Galiyev ve Sömürgeleer Enternasyoneli*, İrfan Yayınları, İstanbul.

Such formulations in Turkey were most visible in the *Kadro* movement of the 1930s⁹⁸. The leaders of the *Kadro* movement, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör, İsmail Hüsrev Tekin and Burhan Asaf Belge, had all been involved in various socialist activities in Moscow and Germany, become members of Turkey's Workers and Peasants Socialist Party (TİÇSF⁹⁹) and later of the TKP. In the division within the TİÇSF, the group which later would be the members of *Kadro* would distinguish themselves from Şefik Hüsnü group¹⁰⁰. *Kadro* intellectuals were suggesting a nationalist socialism "peculiar to Turkey"¹⁰¹ and a "non-capitalist" accumulation strategy (actually, state-led capitalist accumulation) based on the principles of etatism and a corporatist-protectionist economic program¹⁰². These ideas and principles were considered as key to become a nationally independent, industrialized and developed country. For *Kadro* intellectuals, the main and determining contradiction in Turkey is not between classes, but it is a result of the imperialism's effects on developing countries, namely antagonism between colonized countries and metropolitan countries. The purpose of the Kemalist regime (presented as a model for "oppressed" nations and the ideal of "anti-imperialist struggle"), therefore, had to be to formulate an etatist (state-led), corporatist (coalition of national classes for national purposes and nationalist ideals) and protectionist (import-oriented developmental strategies) program. In this respect, *Kadro* intellectuals' views on socialism were simply based on instrumentalist views for national developmentalism¹⁰³ and pragmatic concerns for Soviet help to national development and planning¹⁰⁴.

Kadro intellectuals suggested that the end of class conflict within a country would not mean the end of international conflicts. Therefore, an anti-imperialist national liberation struggle (the achievement of political liberation through national independence war with a social-

⁹⁸ Between January 1932 and 1935, *KadroKadro* journal published 36 issues and debates and analyses within the journal constitute the most important examples of the age in intellectual terms.

⁹⁹ TİÇSF was founded by Şefik Hüsnü and Ethem Nejat in 1919.

¹⁰⁰ Mete Tunçay argues that although TİÇSF used Marxist terminology in its discourse, they still had a nationalist perspective (1991, p. 336)

¹⁰¹ This notion, *memleketçi sosyalizm* is used by Aydemir also in his writings in *Yön* journal in the 1960s, see Aydemir, Ş. S. 1962, "Memleketçi Sosyalizmin İlkeleri", *Yön*, 58

¹⁰² Aydemir, S. Ş. 1934, "Programlı Devletçilik", *Kadro*, 3, 34.

¹⁰³ It may be argued that they were inspired by the New Economic Plan in the Soviet Russia in the 1930s for developmental concerns.

¹⁰⁴ On the views of *Kadro* intellectuals, see Bostancı, N. 1990, *Kadrocular ve Sosyo Ekonomik Görüşleri*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara. See also Türkeş, M., 1999, *Kadro Hareketi*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara; Yıldırım, E. 2005, "Bir Sol Milliyetçi İdeoloji Modeli: *Kadro* Dergisi", *Doğu Batı*, 8 (31), s. 249-264; Yanardağ, M. 2008, *Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Kadro Hareketi*, Siyah-Beyaz Yayınları, İstanbul.

economic one) is suggested instead of class struggle¹⁰⁵. They also underline the concepts such as *national will, national pride, national excitement, national unity, national welfare, national independence and national economy*, while concepts such as *internationalism, proletarian revolution, Marxism and class struggle* had negative connotations¹⁰⁶. This approach would be influential within the Turkish Left in the following decades and reproduce the problematic theoretical and political formulations discussed in the first chapter.

At this point, two issues should be noted: first, the principles of anti-imperialism and national developmentalism were usually deprived of the anti-capitalist character. This means that *Kadro's* etatist path to development was actually a capitalist type of accumulation project although they considered it as a “third way” and “peculiar” type of developmentalism different from socialist and capitalist types. This approach would continue to be influential in later movements in the left in Turkey, such as in the Kuvâcımılı movement which was a fraction in the TKP after the 1940s and then the *YÖN-MDD* line in the 1960s. We thus need to ask whether the above-mentioned conflict between oppressed and oppressor nations and struggles of national independence were considered as giving way to class conflict, or was the class struggle denied altogether? Obviously, as a general motive in the left in Turkey, as will be discussed in the following section, notions of class struggle and the class character of imperialism and capitalism were usually ignored in both theoretical formulations and political practices. Both ideas of national independence and imperialism, and a particular focus on the peculiar character of the *Turkish Revolution* and path to development through state-led economic policies would be the guiding principles for a large section of socialist groups in Turkey during the 1960s and the 1970s.

In addition to this brief analysis of nationalist formulations and approaches that have been influential in the left in Turkey until the 1960s, the general problems of the socialist movement in political terms and of the labor movement in legal-organizational terms need to be discussed. This is important to understand the reasons for such nationalist formulations with a seemingly socialist face and the limits of the socialist movement's influence on emerging working classes in different aspects. It should be noted that during the single party period in Turkey (especially after 1925 to 1946) , and the Democrat Party (DP) reign between

¹⁰⁵ See Tökin, İ.H. 1934, “Millet İçinde Sınıf Mes'elesi”, II, *Kadro*, 3 (25), s. 20-26. Such conceptualization of Kemalist Revolution and the need to complete it with national democratic revolution in economic terms would be influential in the theses formulated by the *YÖN* movement of the 1960s.

¹⁰⁶ See Tekeli, İ & İlkin, S. 1984, “Türkiye'de Bir Aydın Hareketi: *Kadro*,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 24, pp. 35-67.

1950 and 1960, the activities of socialist parties and labor organizations were strictly controlled by the state. The principle result of this control was their inability to mobilize working classes and large sections of the society around class-based politics.

In terms of the conditions of the labor movement until the 1960s, within state's official nationalism, workers and their organizations were considered as important elements in the *socialization of nationalist ideas*¹⁰⁷. For this purpose, nationalist ideas and principles of etatism were promoted by the Kemalist regime to eliminate *foreign ideologies* and to realize “nationalist harmony in interests”. The discourse of *nationalist Turkish worker* was dominant and workers' activities and organizations had to be in line with the principles of “national interest, unity and security”. Due to the Kemalist conception of the organic society ideal, the founding principles of the new regime would be based on ideals of *classless society*, *organic solidarity* and *homogeneity of interests* between classes. It might be argued that such ideas, principles and projections have still crucial influence on workers' and unions' political discourses.

Thus during 1920s and 1930s, workers' organizations and activities were largely banned for the sake of the consolidation of the political and economic regime within the framework of those principles. As Çelik (2010, pp. 83-84) argued, due to both *Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu* (The Law for the Establishment of Public Order, 1925) and other mechanisms, it was mostly impossible to talk about leftist political movements and labor organizations between 1925 and 1938. With the legal framework introduced in 1936 and 1938, it was obvious to see an authoritarian control on these organizations. During the single party era of Republican People's Party (CHP), labor relations and labor activities were constrained' by a legal framework (i.e. Labor Code of 1936) and unions could not organize around the principles based on class interests and cannot act against *national interests* – for example they could not organize strikes which are considered as threats to *national interests and harmony*¹⁰⁸. For

¹⁰⁷ Akkaya, Y. 2002, “Korporatizmden Sendikal İdeolojiye, Milliyetçilik ve İşçi Sınıfı”, in T Bora (eds), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, vol. 4, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul. See also Akkaya's new work on the conditions of the workers and the labor movement in Turkey during the early republican period, Akkaya, Y. 2010, *Cumhuriyet'in Hamalları: İşçiler*, Yordam, İstanbul.

¹⁰⁸ See Harris, G. S. 1967, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey*, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Press. See also Makal, A. 1999, *Türkiye'de Tek Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri:1920-1946*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara.

Makal (2007)¹⁰⁹, as widely misunderstood by scholars analyzing labor history in Turkey, this law did not carry a corporatist character (due to its authoritarian character excluding mutual contract and cooperation¹¹⁰), but was based on an understanding of populism rejecting classes-class struggle and aiming to create a *national harmony* between interests in industrial life for *national* purposes.

Not only the Labor Code of 1936, but the Law on Associations (*Cemiyetler Kanunu*) enacted in 1938 forbade class-based associations, depriving workers of the opportunity to establish labor associations and trade unions¹¹¹. When the debates on strikes during the 1940s are analyzed¹¹², it was evident that the Kemalist regime had no tolerance for strikes which it saw as one of the most important mechanisms for workers to protect their rights that would also lead to the development of a political consciousness in time. Strikes were always identified with being *hostile to national interests and nationalist principles* as well as security concerns of the regime¹¹³ (similar to the policies of the CUP after 1913). As Makal (2007, p. 273) argued, whereas in former decades (especially the 1930s), the rejection of the right on strikes was justified with an *etatist* and *populist* discourse, after the mid-1940s it was increasingly justified with a discourse based on *nationalism* and *the unity of the state and nation*¹¹⁴. Rather than considering the right to strike as an issue of labor relations, it is discussed in terms of the *nation, nationalism* and *patriotism*.

¹⁰⁹ Makal, A. 2007, *Ameleden İşçiye: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihi Çalışmaları*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 104-107. Makal argues that the general secretary of the RPP in this period, Recep Peker, also underlined that considering this law in terms of corporatism would be a mistake (p.105)

¹¹⁰ Makal rightly argues that in the labor history literature on Turkey, authoritarianism is usually confused with corporatism. See 2007, p. 111.

¹¹¹ See Çelik, A. 2010, *Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık (1946-1967)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 84-85.

¹¹² For an analysis of the debates on the right to strike during the 1930s and 1940s, see Sülker, K. 1976, *Türkiye’de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler*, Gözlem Yayınları, İstanbul. It would be interesting to note that some labor unions supported the ban of the right to strike due to similar concerns suggested by the RPP.

¹¹³ As Çelik argued, the cancellation of the strikes with the concerns of “national security” is a historical practice seen in all decades in Turkey, not only before the 1960s but also during the period of 1963-1980 (with the law no. 275, Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Grev ve Lokavt Kanunu-TİSGLK) and from the post-1980 period onwards (with law no. 2822 of TİSGLK). See Çelik, A. 2008, “Milli Güvenlik Gerekçeli Grev Ertelemeleri”, *Çalışma ve Toplum*, No.18.

¹¹⁴ For some examples of the speeches given by the ministries of Labor of the RPP period, see Makal, 2007, pp. 273-274. The most interesting one, for the purposes of this dissertation, belongs to Fuat Erciyes from the Ministry of Labor, who claims that “Grev isteyen işçinin Türklüğünden şüphe duyarım” [*I am suspicious of the worker’s Turkisness, who demands the right to strike*] (Ibid, p. 274). It is still possible in contemporary Turkey to see such a vision and discourse, against not only the workers’ demands for going to a strike but also in other issues such as demands for the development of precarious working conditions and elimination of negative effects of sub-contracting and informalization in labor relations.

The prohibition on founding associations based on class struggle, which was regulated by the Law on Associations of 1938, was lifted in 1946 as a result of the influence of the international conjuncture, and subsequently many labor unions were established with the new amendments in the Law of Associations in 1946. Moreover, the Law on Labor Unions was put into practice in 1947 by the RPP government (Law No. 5018, *İşçi ve İşveren Sendikaları ve Sendika Birlikleri Hakkında Kanun*), with its famous 5th article stating that “labor unions cannot engage in politics and act against the principle of *nationalism* and *national interests*” (Italics are mine)¹¹⁵. This law did not only introduce obstacles to the politicization of workers and unions, but also to developing relations with international labor organizations, or the internationalization of the labor movement in Turkey.

The most important development on the organizational level during the 1950s under the DP reign was the emergence of the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (Türk-İş) in 1952 as the first national confederation of labor unions in Turkey. One of the most important reasons for the DP to support the formation of a nation-based labor union organization and pass legislation favorable to it¹¹⁶ was to control the labor movement in Turkey in accordance with nationalist interests. This was an effort to prevent political action based on class interests¹¹⁷. When the idea behind the formation of Türk-İş is analyzed, it was obvious that the DP was attempting to control the labor movement in Turkey against socialist and communist ideologies. Therefore, Türk-İş declared itself a “nationalist organization,” independent of political parties and the government, namely “above party politics”¹¹⁸. According to its governing by-laws, the confederation would not be used in political party propaganda or as a

¹¹⁵ See Koç, Y. 2010, p. 142. Makal (2007) argues that after an authoritarian control of the labor organizations between 1923 and 1946, a debate on the development of corporatism in industrial relations is possible by 1947 with the legal framework introducing rights for establishing labor organizations.

¹¹⁶ These attempts could also be considered as the DP’s strategy for appealing to workers in order to mobilize popular support without transforming the enduring limits and controls on working class associations and therefore without transforming prevailing state views of the legitimacy of class based politics (Mello, p. 8). It should also be noted that similar attempts had been seen in the last years of the RPP in government. Similarly, the RPP had provided financial support to labor unions in Istanbul (Union of Workers in Istanbul, İstanbul İşçi Sendikaları Birliği-İİSB) both to control their activities and to get electoral support in return. It is interesting to note that İİSB, under the control of the RPP before 1950, was one of the leading labor organizations championing nationalist ideology. For example, it may also be considered as an example of the pragmatic use of nationalist discourse by labor unions in order to open up a space in organizational terms: “One of the main characteristics of the Turkish labor unions is their *nationalism*, therefore, employers at least should conduct good relations with labor unions at least within this context” (Translation and Italics are mine, Makal, 2007, p. 259).

¹¹⁷ See Makal, A. 2002, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri: 1946-1963*, İmge Yayınları, Ankara, which is also a comprehensive study focusing on the working class relations of the DP period.

¹¹⁸ Çelik (2010, p. 561); above party politics could be considered as the inability of the labor movement building a working class party and politicization through it. Moreover, Çelik argues, such politics is also a pragmatic approach resulting from concerns on balance of powers (not to be punished by the government and seeming to act in an objective way) and realities of the age.

tool for spreading it, nor would it be “a tool for the advancement of foreign state ideologies” – a code for the confederation’s rejection of communism (Mello, 2010, p. 8). Türk-İş’s “above party politics” and organic and friendly relations with the governments and state principles would produce tension in the 1960s and lead to the formation of a much more politically radical and class-based labor confederation in the 1960s, namely Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DİSK).

Although a much free atmosphere was seen during the multi-party period starting in 1946¹¹⁹, such pressure on political organizations of the Left would go on; for example, the famous figure of the left in Turkey, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı’s Vatan Party (founded in 1954) would be closed after the 1957 national elections as well¹²⁰. The same was true in the widespread establishment of labor unions by 1946. Especially the TSP and the TSEKP had been influential in the establishment of many labor unions in 1946 (Karpas, 2007)¹²¹ and could have the capacity to develop labor rights and class politics if they were not banned immediately after their establishment in 1946, together with the labor unions they mobilized. Another important point was that both parties aimed to develop relations with labor federations organized on an international level. However, this potential was eliminated by the RPP government with a discourse of *struggle against communists and dangers of conducting activities with the agents of the international*, as seen in the RPP’s Minister of Labor Sadi İrmak’s and Prime Minister Recep Peker’s speeches in 1947. Therefore, until the 1960s, socialist parties and labor organizations could not find a pluralist political spectrum to suggest their alternative formulations and practices¹²².

¹¹⁹ Political parties such as Turkey’s Socialist Party (Türkiye Sosyalist Parti-TSP, founded by Esat Adil in 1946) and Turkey’s Socialist Labor and Peasant Party (Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi- TSEKP founded in 1946), Independent Turkish Socialist Party (Müstakil Türk Sosyalist Partisi), Turkey’s Socialist Workers Party (TSİP) were founded during this period.

¹²⁰ Moreover, through the claim of collaborating with socialist parties, many local-based labor union organizations would be closed by martial law officers.

¹²¹ Karpas, K. 2007, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi*, İmge Yayınları, Ankara. See also Çelik, 2010, p. 89. On the relations between TSP-TSEKP and labor unions, see Çelik, 2010, pp. 92-105.

¹²² Such pressure was not only limited to labor relations, labor activities and union organization but also socialist organizations and parties were continuously banned from the political sphere. For example, the history of Turkey’s most famous communist party, TKP founded in 1920, was mostly based on such bans from political activities. TKP, for a long period, also continued its activities as an underground organization and could never succeed in mobilizing workers and socialist organizations under its party structure. Other political parties would share the same fate with the TKP, such as the ones established after the end of the First World War, namely Social Democrat Party (Sosyal Demokrat Fırkası), Turkey’s Socialist Party (Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası, as successor of Ottoman Socialist Party-Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası) and TİÇSF. During the single party period of the RPP between 1923 and 1946, similar to the fate of Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party) and Serbest Fırka (Free Party), socialist and communist parties as well as activities could not

In addition to the pressure on socialist political parties and working class organizations, three important issues need to be mentioned, which are very crucial for the subject matter of this dissertation. From the early Republican period, internationalist views could never become popular due to the internal and external dynamics: for example; with the elimination of the internationalist wing with the support of the state in the 1920s (Şefik Hüsnü's TKP), nationalist wing led by Şevket Süreyya would be both popular and the only ideas which are allowed to survive. In such tension, and, nationalist arguments could survive within the authoritarian policy of the RPP. Moreover, to legitimize such state oppression, both the Cold War conjuncture and the deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations with Stalin's demands from Turkey led to a political and ideological atmosphere in which an amalgamation of nationalism and anti-communist struggle is promoted among workers and labor unions¹²³. Obviously, such promotion of the anti-communist struggle does not indicate that there is an actual danger of communism in Turkey and unions will become a vehicle of this. Rather, this was another face of the state's and the RPP-DP governments' allergy to labor unions because whoever demanding rights in terms of the improvements of conditions of the workers were accused of being communist. Another important issue is that the way how socialist parties and labor organizations were inspired from different theoretical formulations and political experiences in different country cases. As mentioned previously, Soviet influence especially in terms of the idea of a socialism in one country and national economic plan imposed by Stalin and Comintern during 1930s and 1940s, national independence struggles of colonized countries and Comintern's support to these for tactical reasons, as well as later debates in the Bandung Conference (Non-Alignment Movement of Independent Countries) during the 1950s have inspired various socialist fractions in Turkey¹²⁴.

When the period between 1946 and 1960 is analyzed in terms of workers' protests, it is obvious that the promotion of a perception based on the "communist threat" had been successful in such tutelage and hegemony attempts on a possible working class mobilization¹²⁵. This may also be related to the new interest of the USA on the idea of

find a place in the political arena and mostly conducted their activities as illegal organizations and abroad (i.e. the TKP).

¹²³ See Çelik (2010, pp. 121-141).

¹²⁴ Affects of the debates during the Bandung Conference would be much more visible in the political practices of the Third World countries especially in the 1960s.

¹²⁵ Çelik's analysis in *Vesayetden Siyasete Türkiye'de Sendikacılık (1946-1967)* [From Tutelage to Politics: Labor Unionism in Turkey], based on an analysis of such tutelage and hegemony attempts of the RPP and the

developmentalism by the 1950s with the Truman Doctrine, as a competing formulation to the Soviet inspiration to the 3rd World in this regard. The third was related with the concerns for legitimacy to survive in an authoritarian political atmosphere and to maintain the hegemony of Kemalist nationalism, with authoritarian policies continuing from the CUP reign into the single party era. In a nutshell, as Zürcher rightly argued, there was a marked continuity between the Unionists and the Kemalists in their firm rejection of the role of the classes and class struggle¹²⁶.

Control and oppression on the labor movement and labor unions continued during the DP period as mentioned above. As a result of such authoritarian control of the socialist movement and labor organizations, channels for mass mobilization could never be built. Moreover, this would push socialist parties, fractions and labor organizations to organize and formulate strategies only at the national level. Pressures on socialist parties and labor organizations would partly change after the 1960s; however, debates on internationalism and nationalism of the socialist struggles within the leftist circles in Turkey would continue.

Radicalism of the Turkish Left and the Labor Movement: Ideas of National Developmentalism and National Democratic Revolution after the 1960s

In this section, the question of how nationalism historically became a strong ideology in socialist movement and labor organizations in Turkey during the 1960s and the 1970s will be addressed. It will be argued that leftist groups' problematic approach to the questions of state, development and imperialism, as well as their close relation with Kemalist nationalism and Third Worldism (and Maoism-Galiyevism), naturalized nationalism within the theory and practice. Through such an analysis, I expect to reveal the difficult dialogue between Marxism and nationalism and its historical legacy to the Left in Turkey and labor-politics have affected the development of class consciousness and class-based politics in Turkey after the 1960s. The peculiar historical conditions of the development of the labor movement in Turkey, with its relation to nationalism, by the 1960s will be analyzed in this context.

To start with, as mentioned above, pressures on the development of socialist movement and labor organizations would partly be removed after the 1960s, with the 27 May 1960 coup. The new constitution of 1961 provided a much freer environment for the political organization of

DP governments on workers and labor unions, provides very rich documents proving such an argument. Especially see pp. 135-137.

¹²⁶ Zürcher, E. J. 2010, *Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, see chapter 11.

socialist parties and development of working class mobilization¹²⁷. In terms of the conditions of labor rights and unionization, the new constitution expanded and safeguarded important labor rights, including the right to organize, form unions, and to strike¹²⁸. These reforms, combined with important changes within Turkish society associated with urbanization and rapid industrialization expanded the organizing opportunities for labor activists¹²⁹, and contributed to the growing importance of organized labor within Turkish politics. However, the same tension among socialist organizations and the labor movement mentioned previously was still dominant: between the national developmentalist formulations peculiar to Turkey in nationalist tones (based on the principles of Kemalist nationalism and etatism) and anti-capitalist/internationalist socialism. Moreover, in addition to the effects of Kemalism and Stalinism in the left in Turkey until the 1960s, new inspirations and strategies from different country experiences (such as Maoism, Nasserism¹³⁰, and Third Worldism with reference to struggles in Cuba, Vietnam and other underdeveloped countries) started to be influential¹³¹. Not only these, an emphasis on the “progressive role of the army” and inspirations from other national democratic revolutions in Arab countries led by the military would be visible in the left in Turkey.

The Revitalization of Class Politics?: The Experience of Turkey’s Workers Party

In political terms, the first fruit of this relatively free political environment and the necessity for a new formation that would voice the demands of developing working classes due to urbanization and industrialization processes was the establishment of the TİP in 1961. Rather than analyzing debates leading to the establishment of TİP, this section will focus on its socialist vision and strategies as well as the divisions within TİP in relation to nationalism.

¹²⁷ Empowered with new freedoms and protected by greater civil liberties, the next two decades would bring increased political participation, as well as ideological polarization to Turkish political life. Ideas of “social justice” and “social state” stated in the new constitution would provide legitimacy to many socialist parties and labor organizations after the 1960s. Moreover, parallel to the trends in European capitals, a youth movement would develop during this period and produce different formulations on the future of Turkey.

¹²⁸ Not only the framework of the 1961 Constitution but also other legal amendments during the early 1960s, such as the Law on Labor Unions (*Sendikalar Kanunu*, No. 274, dated 1963) and the Law on Strikes, Collective Bargaining and Lockout (*Toplu İş Sözleşmesi, Grev ve Lokavt Kanunu*, No. 275, dated 1963) would contribute to the development of labor relations and labor in organizational and political terms

¹²⁹ On the effects of rapid urbanization and industrialization on the working classes in Turkey in the 1960s, see Rozaliev (1974), Sülker (1976).

¹³⁰ An example of such influence may be seen in the increasing focus of *YÖN* and *Devrim* writers on the experience in Egypt, see Tümer, M. 1961, “Nasır’ın Sosyalizmi”, *Yön*, 1 and *Devrim Dergisi* 1970, “Atatürk’ün İzinde Milliyetçi Bir Lider: Nasır”, *Devrim*, 51.

¹³¹ See Doğan, G. M. ve Ünüvar, K. 2009, “Üçüncü Dünyacılık, Maoculuk, Aydınlikçılık”, in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, v.8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, s. 705-709.

TİP was established by 12 labor unionists and a heavier emphasis on the terms of socialism and class-based politics was visible in its program and discourse. On the other hand, TİP also targeted the middle classes and progressive-Kemalist intellectuals and the youth. The founders of TİP embraced Kemalism as framing their guiding principles. A focus on the anti-imperialist struggle legacy of Turkey and an emphasis on the “progressive” character of the Kemalist revolutions were highly visible in the program of the party. Similar to the theses of *Kadro* movement of the 1930s, TİP leaders believed that the Kemalist revolution bringing political independence had not been completed by a second war for economic independence. This argument was highly popular in the left of the 1960s in Turkey not only in TİP’s discourse but also in *YÖN* (also in *Devrim* journal) and MDD theses¹³² which will be analyzed in the following section.

TİP’s approach to Kemalism would give a nationalist character to its policy formulations as well. It could be argued that TİP’s references to Kemalism should not be only considered as a means of seeking legitimacy or of tactical necessities and conditions peculiar to Turkey. TİP was also attempting to extend its popularity among people by giving references to the memories of the Independence War. TİP’s political views were not exclusionary and called for equality of citizens before the law in terms of different identities based on religion, language, ethnicity and religious sect. In economic terms, TİP’s nationalism would mean being against the *domination of foreign powers within the country* (Ünsal, 2002, pp. 120-121). Thus, independence would be meaningful only with the elimination of the dependence of Turkey in economic and military terms. National Independence was inevitable for the socialist struggle, as a result, for TİP leaders, it meant being against to NATO, CENTO, Common Market (the EU), foreign capital and especially the USA¹³³. On the other hand, TİP was critical of the RPP because it had lost its populist character and became the defender of the *status quo* excluding laborers from power and their demands from its political program. Similar critical stance was visible in the case of the army, which in the famous declaration of the 1960 coup had reiterated Turkey’s loyalty to NATO and CENTO. An emphasis on Kemalist principles and critical stances to both the RPP and the army as traditional vanguards of those principles would lead to further debates and divisions in TİP. The problematic approaches to Kemalism and the relations established with its traditional safeguards (the RPP

¹³² For example, in Doğan Avcıoğlu’s writings in *YÖN* and *Devrim* journals.

¹³³ See, Mumcu, U. 1996, *Aybar ile Söyleşi: Sosyalizm ve Bağımsızlık*, Um:ag Yayınları, Ankara.

and the army) within the left in Turkey had always created dilemmas and tensions, and would continue to be so in the following decades.

A similar problematic approach was visible in TİP's economic policies; thus its socialist vision would carry parallel contradictions when policy formulations in the economic sphere were suggested. TİP was suggesting a “non-capitalist path to development”, which is conceptualized as the antithesis of capitalism and the only way to socialism. Before analyzing TİP's *anti-capitalist path to development* thesis, it should be firstly noted that this thesis shared similarities with the formulations of the *Kadro* Movement of the 1930s. As discussed in the first chapter with reference to the attempts to build a link between socialism and developmentalism, socialism was reduced to a *project for national developmentalism*. As a matter of fact, non-capitalist path to development theses were popular in many underdeveloped countries and socialism projects of the Third World (in Asia and Africa) after their independence wars in the wake of the end of Second WW¹³⁴. TİP considered such theses as the realization of mixed economy principles with central planning led by the state and favoring working classes in the formulation and execution of them. For some oppositional groups within the party, these views, seemingly having a socialist content, were simply suggesting a state-led capitalist accumulation and development project, which also gives value to social justice for workers rather than a class-based politics¹³⁵. Beyond its content, such theses were suggesting controversial arguments to the classical evolutionary line of Marxism, passing from feudalism to socialism without capitalist development. At this point, I think, the main problem both within the TİP and in other country cases where non-capitalist path to development theses were suggested, a particular focus was given to national bourgeoisie and middle classes as having a progressive and revolutionary role in the struggle for independence. Moreover, in the writings of some intellectuals within the party such as Selahattin Hilav and Fethi Naci (in journals of *Ant* and *Sosyal Adalet*), non-capitalist path to development theses were conceptualized as a version of principles of “populist and etatist Atatürkism” congruent with the political conditions after the 1960s. When the YÖN-MDD movements during the 1960s also started to use such theses in their political-economic program, TİP leaders would focus on socialism and the class content of economic policies

¹³⁴ These theses were also suggested by famous Marxist economists such as Maurice Dobb, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy during the 1960s.

¹³⁵ For example, Ahmed Hamdi Dinler was stating that the idea of non-capitalist path to development was included in TİP's party program due to its popularity among “progressive intellectuals” who are uncomfortable with the term class struggle (in Ünsal, 2002, p. 125).

much more than early-1960s to differentiate themselves from the *YÖN*-MDD theses (Ünsal, 2002, p. 126).

Although having a problematic content, TİP had a much more explicit socialist vision and focus on workers' rights. This would create a tension among intellectuals and labor unionists who had a focus on Kemalist principles of etatism and developmentalism with nationalist tones and attributing the army a progressive role in the social transformation of Turkey. These intellectuals were expressing their ideas around the *YÖN* journal by 1961 and had been supported by the RPP and journals and newspapers which had an organic relation with it, such as *Akis*, *Kim*, *Forum*, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. Moreover, labor unionists within Türk-İş (such as the leader of Türk-İş, Seyfi Demirsoy) who did not support socialist and class-based politics of TİP (although TİP had members from Türk-İş) were supporting the formation of a new workers' party. As a result, the establishment of such a party, with the name of Turkey's Workers Party (*Türkiye Çalışanlar Partisi*, TÇP), started to be discussed and preparations were completed by 1962. Kemalist and nationalist intellectuals such as Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhami Soysal, Mümtaz Soysal and members of Association of Socialist Culture (*Sosyalist Kültür Derneği*, which was supporting national developmentalism in parallel to Kemalist principles and the idea of national independence) have taken place actively in such preparations. However, those preparations did not lead to the formation of the party as a competitor of the TİP¹³⁶. On the other hand, the theses and formulations posed by the *YÖN* movement would become highly influential in the Turkish Left in the following years. As a matter of fact, the leaders of TİP (especially Mehmet Ali Aybar¹³⁷) were also focusing on the close ideological relation of TİP with Kemalism and calling for a second Independence struggle which would complete Kemalist revolution in economic terms. Clashes between nationalists and internationalists of TİP that started to be dominant after 1966 and that between the supporters of socialism peculiar to Turkey and national democratic revolution would lead to divisions within the TİP.

¹³⁶ On the experience of unsuccessful attempts for the TÇP and tension between the TİP and the TÇP, see Çelik, A. 2010, pp. 407-417.

¹³⁷ On Aybar's views on Marxism and socialism, see Aybar, M. A. 2002, *Marksizm ve Sosyalizm Üzerine Düşünceler*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul. See also Ünlü, B. 2002, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Major Sources of Nationalism within the Left in Turkey in the 1960s and the 1970s: YÖN Movement and National Democratic Revolution Theses

An analysis of the *YÖN* movement and of major formulations and theses of *YÖN* intellectuals is crucial to understand the role of nationalism in the Turkish Left, not least in terms of the establishment of new socialist political parties in the 1960s. The *YÖN* journal began publication in 20 December 1961 and soon became the center of the main theoretical debates and political formulations of the 1960s. Some of the major figures and intellectuals formulating the characteristics of left-nationalism and a socialism peculiar to Turkey were Doğan Avcıoğlu (we may consider him as the leader of the movement¹³⁸), Mümtaz Soysal, İlhan Selçuk and İlhami Soysal. *YÖN* authors attempted to formulate a synthesis between Kemalism and Marxism, called “left-Kemalism” or “left-nationalism” in different circles. Here, “true socialism” required the realization of the six arrow principles of the RPP (including nationalism and etatism) proposed in the early Republican period. According to *YÖN* authors, the principles of Kemalism would be guiding the left in Turkey¹³⁹. Although some authors in the journal stated that the Kemalist discourse was used as a means to socialism – unlike the *Kadro* movement of the 1930s – I believe that for both *YÖN* and *Kadro* socialism was instrumental to justify the Kemalist project and its ideals¹⁴⁰. Moreover, socialism was considered as the most suitable method for national developmentalism which would end the underdevelopment of Turkey. For *YÖN* authors, there were three types of socialism: the first one was Soviet type socialism which entailed the development of underdeveloped countries with a totalitarian content; the second one could only be possible in the West through organized working classes; and the third one was *peculiar to* underdeveloped countries like Turkey where capital accumulation and growth in national welfare could only be possible under the guidance of the state and the implementation of a mixed economy, central planning and national developmentalism. Socialism for underdeveloped countries, according to *YÖN* authors, was only meaningful in the context of

¹³⁸ For a brief analysis of Avcıoğlu’s analyses, see Macar, E. 2001, “Doğan Avcıoğlu”, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, Vol. 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

¹³⁹ See Avcıoğlu, D. 1965, “Az Gelişmiş Ülkelerde Antiemperyalist Mücadele – Halkçı, Devletçi, Devrimci ve Milliyetçi Kalkınma Yolu”, *Yön*, 111. See also Atılğan, G. 2007, “Türkiye Sosyalist Hareketinde Anti-Emperyalizm ve Bağımsızlıkçılık (1920-1971)” (ed.) Gültekingil, M., in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce; Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 662-704.

¹⁴⁰ A parallel view is suggested by Atılğan, G. 2002, *Kemalizm ve Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar, Yön-Devrim Hareketi*, İstanbul, TÜSTAV. For a different view suggesting that while *Kadro* had no relation with socialism, *YÖN* movement had a socialist vision, see Aydınöğlu, E. 2008, *Türkiye Solu (1960-1980)*, Versus Yayınları, İstanbul.

the developmental needs of these countries. Therefore, it could be argued that the *evolutionary* and *progressive* constraints of Marxist theory and the reduction of socialism to a means (for developmental needs), as discussed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, was much more visible in the left in Turkey during the 1960s.

It should also be noted that the main debates and proposals within *YÖN* and its followers during the 1960s and the 1970s reflect similarities with the proposals of *Kadro* movement of the 1930s: the priority of the national question both politically and economically, the formulation of social contradictions as international ones between oppressed-oppressor nations rather than classes within nations. As discussed earlier with reference to problematic conceptual dualities within Marxist approaches to nationalism, *YÖN* authors emphasized the distinction between the “nationalism of oppressor nations” and the “nationalism of oppressed countries.” Through such distinction, a revolutionary and progressive content is attributed to the nationalism of oppressed nations. The “real nationalism” could only be possible through socialism which is seen as a guide to realize economic independence and development. In these circles, a particular attention is paid to the notion of “anti-imperialism” during the 1960s and the 1970s, while nationalism was perceived as natural response to imperialism¹⁴¹.

YÖN authors argued that it is impossible to state that “workers have no homeland” in the imperialist era and such a discourse was not applicable when the realities of Turkey are taken into consideration. On the other hand, similar to the formulations of *Kadro* in the 1930s, there was rarely a focus on the class character of imperialism and the role of working classes in socialist revolution. In Marxist theories, on the other hand, imperialism is conceptualized not only as a domination relation of the advanced capitalist countries on less-developed countries, but also refer to class contradictions within “oppressed nations” based on the capitalist relations of production. In addition to the absence of an analysis of the class character of imperialism, and again similar to *Kadro*, *YÖN* was not highly critical of capitalism in the final analysis. Although the third path formulated for the underdeveloped countries, called a “non-capitalist path to development”, this was actually suggesting state-led capitalism and support

¹⁴¹ In other words, nationalism in those countries under “imperialist domination” satisfied two essential needs: namely independence and development. In his magnum opus, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* [The Order of Turkey], Avcioğlu argued that development meant the transformation of the order and gaining independence back, which was impossible in the time of “nationalist revolutionaries of the independence movement” due to the weakness of industrial working class and its struggle as seen in the 1960s (1996, p. 955).

for the national bourgeoisie and inward-looking capital accumulation, which had a value for the *national independence* of Turkey¹⁴².

In this view, it is evident that national economic development cannot be possible via foreign capital because of imperialist economic relations¹⁴³. Moreover, it is argued that workers are the main beneficiaries of the developmentalist policies. As discussed in the first chapter with reference to Marxist theories of imperialism, national liberation movements could be considered progressive as long as they weaken imperialism (as formulated by Lenin principally). However, there was no coherent answer among *YÖN* authors to the question of how would the development of a national bourgeoisie and inward-looking capitalist accumulation policies lead to the disappearance of class contradictions and to the emancipation of labor.

As noted in previous sections of this chapter, similar formulations had been suggested by Young Turks, the CUP, early Republican Kemalist elites and *Kadro* thinkers. However, they all shared the view that labor organizations and activities should be oppressed in an authoritarian manner, unlike *YÖN* thinkers. On the other hand, although *YÖN* authors argued that working classes had a role in the struggle for socialism alongside peasants¹⁴⁴, the main and guiding role was attributed to a combination of Kemalist elites and intellectuals, Atatürkist youth and the Turkish army, treated as the progressive elements of such struggle, or the “national democratic front and coalition of national classes”¹⁴⁵. Therefore, the role of working classes was indexed to the national unity and harmony of classes in the realization of struggle for independence in both political and economic terms. In this context, class struggle had negative connotations for *YÖN* authors¹⁴⁶. Especially, the role of the army was peculiar in this struggle, which could be considered as a continuation of the Kemalist “revolution from

¹⁴² At this point, it should be noted that for some *YÖN* thinkers, etatism as considered non-capitalist path to development was an instrument to the transition to the socialism, differently than Kemalist conception of etatism suggesting its necessity for the capitalist capital accumulation process. Therefore, there may be found critics in *YÖN* journal to the RPP of the age in its inability to defend *true essence of Kemalist principle of etatism*. However, there is still no answer how transition to socialism would be possible with a coalition including national bourgeoisie fractions and armed forces.

¹⁴³ Avcioğlu, D. 1965, “Emperyalizmi Tanıyalım.. Yabancı Sermaye ile Neden Kalkınma Olmaz”, *Yön*, 109. See also Avcioğlu’s article in *Yön* on the nationalist mission of private enterprises in Turkey, 1965, “Özel Sektöre Düşen Görev”, *Yön*, 113.

¹⁴⁴ In the attempts to search a way peculiar to Turkey emphasizing the role of peasants in revolution, ATÜT (Asian type mode of production) theses have been influential, too. For a detailed analysis, see Doğan and Ünüvar (1997).

¹⁴⁵ See Avcioğlu, D. 1964, “Milliyetçilere Sesleniş”, *Yön*, 78.

¹⁴⁶ For example, see Avcioğlu, D. 1963, “Sınıf Mücadelesini Kim Körüklüyor?”, *Yön*, 57.

above” ideal. This “revolution from above” ideal, for *YÖN* movement, was based on an idea of extending the social base of the revolution to the masses by the progressive forces mentioned above.

At this point, it should be mentioned that the intellectual movement based on the journals of *YÖN* and *Devrim* (published after 1969) has not always supported juntaism between the period 1961 and 1971. As Şener argued (2010, p. 351), parliamentarism has been thought as an instrument of struggle between 1961 and 1965. Between 1965 and 1967, after the victory of the JP in the 1965 elections, such schemes were replaced with the idea of establishing an anti-imperialist national front (including the *revolutionary military*). And finally after 1967, especially in their writings in the *Devrim* journal, they suggested the vanguard role of the progressive forces and the army in the way to revolution. Calling the *Revolutionary Military Force* (“Devrimci Ordu Gücü”) to complete the mission inherited by Mustafa Kemal and his fellows (namely to complete the incomplete Kemalist revolution with national economic independence through national development), especially in *Devrim* journal by 1970, the main figures of the movement championed juntaism and military intervention¹⁴⁷. In sum, short term projections and pragmatic concerns to hold the power preceded the long march towards the revolution. Especially after the 1969 general elections and in the writings in the newly published journal *Devrim*, the idea of socialism was replaced with Kemalism and national independence revolution. With the 12 March 1971 coup, when the military intervened in political life, suppressing the political mobilization of socialist youth organizations, parties and the labor movement, such progressive and revolutionary expectations from the Turkish army considered as “vanguards of Kemalism” gave way to an atmosphere of disappointment. Moreover, such disappointment also proved the problematic content of such formulations as a socialism “peculiar to Turkey” or diluting the class content of the socialist revolution in accordance with national particularities.

For *YÖN*'s leading intellectuals, therefore, Kemalism has been a major intellectual source for the idea of national democratic revolution. Kemalist revolution is considered as the pioneering model for other third world countries, together with essentialist claims to “originality. Those

¹⁴⁷ It should also be mentioned that in the wrtings in *Devrim* journal by the end of the 1960s, another issue as a part of such national independence struggle was the threat of reactionary forces (*irticai güçler*, extreme religious and anti-secularist forces in Turkey). This issue would be visible also in left-nationalists of the 1990s and 2000s, as will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter. For the juntaist views and concerns on the Kemalist notion of secularism in *Devrim* journal, see Hürkan, S. 2006, *Üç Dergi Üç İnsan*, Sinemis Yayınları, Ankara.

theses have also been influential within the TİP, despite criticisms within the party by major figures such as the party's leader M. A. Aybar and Behice Boran. Aybar and Boran objected to national democratic revolution theses based on the alliance of national classes and the Turkish army for the survival of the state, as well as the top-down transformation task of the state, since these gave priority to national bourgeoisie-army rather than working classes and their vanguard party, with no reference to socialism and democracy and giving priority to the concepts of "nation and nationalism" and "etatism and corporatism" over any class ideology.

On the other hand, it is nevertheless difficult to fully equate Kemalism with the ideas of all YÖN thinkers due to important differences between two. This is the reason I call them *left-nationalists of the 1960s*, rather than calling them left-Kemalists as many do in the relevant literature¹⁴⁸. For example, contrary to Kemalist nationalism's conception of harmony and unity in ideals between classes, some YÖN thinkers underlined the existence of classes and a class struggle ongoing in Turkey. However, the term class struggle had negative connotations and the vanguard actors of such a struggle were not the working classes due to pragmatic reasons stemming from the conditions of the period as discussed above¹⁴⁹.

If three major intellectuals were to be named on the left in the 1960s, while the first two would Mehmet Ali Aybar (who had been influential in TİP's parliamentary victory and the formulations of the latter's vision) and Doğan Avcıoğlu (who had been highly influential in the formulation of YÖN's theses which would gain popularity in the RPP and leftist youth in the 1960s), the third would be Mihri Belli, the originator of a synthesis between socialism and nationalism, based on the idea of National Democratic Revolution (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*, MDD)¹⁵⁰. It should first be noted that the idea of National Democratic Revolution had been developed by Stalin. As discussed in Chapter 1, the political and tactical strategy of the Comintern to support national independence struggles during the Lenin era transformed into

¹⁴⁸ In *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, Avcıoğlu uses this term "left-nationalism" which refers to the ideology of social groups (workers, peasants, military officers, bureaucratic staff and nationalist intellectuals) loyal to Kemalism and the principle of nationalism. See pp. 955-956, in Avcıoğlu, D. 1996, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, v. 2, Tekin Yayınevi, İstanbul.

¹⁴⁹ Another example of the differences between two traditions related to their views on the Kurds. It was possible to see in YÖN articles arguing that the Kurdish question had an ethnic character, rather than approaching the issue with a traditional outlook rejecting the existence of such an ethnic identity. In this respect, it is also difficult to find parallels between YÖN's left nationalism and the left-nationalists of the 1990s in their approach to the Kurdish question. However it needs to be also mentioned that YÖN thinkers, in line with some left-nationalists of the 1990s, saw the solution of the Kurdish question in the elimination of anti-feudal relations in the Eastern region of Turkey.

¹⁵⁰ On a biographical note about Mihri Belli, see Atılğan, G. 2009, "Mihri Belli" in *Sol*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

the idea of socialism in one country with Stalin, who was supporting anti-imperialist struggles of the nations – namely, national democratic revolutions – even when they did not aim for socialism. In this context, the development and popularity of the idea of the NDR or MDD in the left in Turkey could be considered as another mark of the historical importance and legacy of Stalin’s views.

It needs to be pointed out at this point that formulations parallel to the theses of MDD could be seen in TKP’s traditional “revolution in stages” perspective. This is also mentioned by Mihri Belli who states that although MDD theses were first suggested during the 1960s with the name of MDD, they were a version of the theses developed in the left in Turkey in the 1920s, especially those developed by Şefik Hüsnü and his friends in TKP. Atılğan (2009) argues that there were four new additions to the idea of MDD in the 1960s compared to the earlier TKP version: i. creating an “Easternist” movement contrary to the “Westernist” approach of intellectuals since the First Constitutional Period (from 1839 onwards), ii. reproducing the TKP’s theses with nationalist tones, iii. articulating socialism to Kemalism as a step to juntaism (creation of a fraction in the army supporting ideas of “Kemalist revolution” and an alliance with it) and iv. accepting a juntaist perspective for holding the power¹⁵¹. The MDD idea would constitute one of the most important dividing points within the left in Turkey and its impact would be more visible from the mid-1960s to the 1980s¹⁵².

If we turn to Mihri Belli’s views on the idea of MDD which reflects his attempts to link nationalism with socialism, it should first be noted that in his analyses there was no place for the idea of a non-capitalist path to development as suggested by the *YÖN* movement. This was an evidence of Belli’s peculiar understanding of the MDD (different from *YÖN* thinkers) and

¹⁵¹ It is generally accepted that the first intellectual formulating the main framework of the MDD theses was Doğan Avcıoğlu of *YÖN*. For example, Murat Belge and Yalçın Küçük highlight this point. See also Atılğan (2007, pp. 552-553).

¹⁵² Theses based on the MDD idea were also known with the name of Mihri Belli, because he used the term National Independence Revolution in his writings in *YÖN*, *Türk Solu* (the main journal where those theses were expressed after the end of *YÖN* journal in 1967). A final point that needs to be mentioned is that Belli in cooperation with *YÖN* and Avcıoğlu attempted to hold the power in TİP in the Malatya Congress of the party in 1965. However, he was not successful and was excluded from the party like other supporters of the MDD thesis. The MDD movement could be considered as a product of the opposition that came out within the TİP. The emergence of such opposition started with a series of articles written in *YÖN* journal, called “Discussions over TİP” (TİP Tartışmaları). After the article written by Mihri Belli published in *YÖN* journal in 1965, “The Brochure of the National Democratic Revolution”, the opposition became visible and the expulsion of some MDD supporters from TİP in the Malatya Congress of 1965 prompted the MDD to continue as a separate movement. For a general discussion on the divisions and debates within the Turkish Left between 1965 and 1970, see Aydınöğlü (2008) and also Yetkin, Ç. 1998, *Türkiye’de Soldaki Bölünmeler*, Toplumsal Dönüşüm, İstanbul. See also Karpat, K. 1966, “The Turkish Left”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1, (2):169-186

his loyalty to Marxism's progressive-evolutionary scheme. Secondly, and related with the first point, Belli did not have a critical stance to capitalism in his MDD perspective. He was thinking that alliances with national fractions of capitalism were inevitable for economic independence in both tactical and strategic terms. The development of national capitalism would also mean the development of working classes and then the democratic content of such national capitalism would develop in stages. Thus, before being socialist, there was a need to be "nationalist"¹⁵³. The democratic content of the MDD included the nationalization of the economy and a coalition of national classes to realize national developmentalism. In this logic, even pan-Turkism (the idea of unity of Turkic nations in the world) was progressive in terms of such nationalization of society and economy. Thirdly, Belli's views also reflected a remarkable peculiarism: "we are not Maoist, Castroist or Moskowitz... we are *Türkiyeci* and we are the defenders of Turkish proletarians"¹⁵⁴. This peculiarism was also associated with a strong focus on nationalism in Belli's writings in both *YÖN* and *Türk Solu*, where he argued that Turkish socialism is a *national movement in its deepest meaning*. Lastly, his theses on the MDD were suggesting the "revolutionary role" of the army and the "progressive content" of Kemalist principles. For Belli, the safeguards of Kemalism, namely "armed and civil intellectuals", had no benefit from dominant capitalist relations in Turkey and would support a national democratic revolution in Turkey. However, the historical evolution of these Kemalist elites' ideas and political preferences would not prove his theses in the following decades.

We can explain the increasing popularity of the MDD theses within the left in Turkey¹⁵⁵, in addition to the political formulations of Lenin and especially Stalin, with the effects of the

¹⁵³ For a critical analysis on the dichotomy between nationalism and socialism in Belli's views, see Karsan, G. 2005, "Eski Tüfek" Bir Sosyalistte Milliyetçilik Sosyalizm İkilemi: MDD ve Mihri Belli", *Doğu Batı*, 8 (31), s. 233-238.

¹⁵⁴ Belli, M. 1968, "Türkiyenin Devrim Stratejisi Ne Olmalıdır?", *Türk Solu*, No. 9. As discussed previously, Kemalist idea of *classless society with an harmony in interests* was also based on such peculiarism attributed to Turkey, as a different case than the West that needs to be analyzed.

¹⁵⁵ The theses based on the MDD idea developed by Mihri Belli would be influential in the Turkish Left during the 1970s, around *Sosyalizm* journal (Kıvılcımlı fraction), THKP-C (The Front of Turkey Liberation of People Party-Front) led by Mahir Çayan, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* Journal (Proletarian Revolutionist Luminousness) and movement led by Doğu Perinçek and Deniz Gezmiş's THKO (People's Liberation Army of Turkey). However, all these fractions have stopped to continue their relations with Belli fraction due to different reasons: Kıvılcımlı noted the lack of the idea of leading role of proletariat party, Çayan group (THKP-C) criticized juntaism of Belli and revolution could only possible through the struggle of workers and peasants (as subjective elements of the revolution) starting from rural areas to industrialized cities, Gezmiş group (People's Independence Army of Turkey, THKO) noted the importance of armed struggle (a much more active struggle needs to be built) and finally Perinçek group declared that Kurds' right of self-determination needs to be

Chinese Revolution and Mao's revitalization of the idea of national democratic revolution in late 1960s. In line with Galiyev who considered the agent of historical change to be the nation, not class, groups supporting the MDD theses in Turkey argued first that the real contradiction in a world of nations-states was between the international bourgeoisie and oppressed nations. Secondly, the proletariat in developed capitalist nations had an interest in the continuity of capitalism's unequal development structure, thus proletarian revolutions in these countries are impossible¹⁵⁶. On the other hand, in the leftist circles in Turkey during the 1960s, Mao's ideas were much more central in such formulations, especially within the national democratic revolution-MDD line¹⁵⁷ and the youth movement in Turkey¹⁵⁸. Maoism was considered to be the only way for underdeveloped countries to realize national developmentalism through the coalition of classes. Thus, it was the ideology of the Third World, namely Third Worldism (*Üçüncü Dünyacılık*). As discussed earlier, for many Marxist scholars, Maoism was the best way for non-historic nations to become historic nations. Moreover, it was a clear indicator of progressive and evolutionary strains within Marxism in the analysis of the national question and nationalism, with its focus on the strategy of economic development with a self-sufficient internal market and effective protective measures to build up an industrial base, which reduces socialism to developmentalism. As a matter of fact, Maoism could be seen as a continuation of the Stalinist vision which became dominant in communist movements in the world from mid-1920s. The main problem in this context was the attainment of national economic development in an underdeveloped country before the social revolution. In these terms, class struggle is considered on a national level and national democratic revolution precedes socialist revolution as part of an analysis based on the idea of "revolution in stages".

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the debates, strategies and policy formulations within the left were not peculiar to Turkey and could also be observed in different country

supported, juntaism was not a proper way for national democratic revolution and Belli was inconsistent in true application of Mao's ideas.

¹⁵⁶ For some debates, see T. Bora (2007), S. Savran (1996, 2006, 2008), Y. Akkaya (2002, 2007), Güllalp (1998).

¹⁵⁷ According to Suavi Aydın, Maoism is the most important source of the "national democratic revolution" line in Turkey, See Aydın, S. 1998, "Milli Demokratik Devrim'den 'Ulusal Sol'a Türk Solunda Özgücü Eğilim", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no: 78.

¹⁵⁸ It should also be noted that, as Akın (2007) argued, for young masses that preferred the MDD movement, Maoism was the most convenient theory. See Akın, Y. 2007 "Türkiye Sol Hareketinin Önemli Polemikleri", (ed.) Gültekinil, M., in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, v.8, İstanbul, İletişim, pp. 86-105. Similarly, Aydınoglu (2008) states that it was the supporters of the MDD thesis who translated the texts prepared by the Chinese Communist Party, and the relatively radical position of the Chinese theses were much more attractive for the youth movement in Turkey. For a discussion, see Şener, M. 2010, *Türkiye Solunda Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset: YÖN, MDD ve TİP*, Yordam, İstanbul, pp. 69-73

cases. In this sense, inspirations from such experiences were visible, too¹⁵⁹. It can thus be stated that such interpretations of socialism, namely those that emphasize the “independence struggle of oppressed nations”, became very influential in numerous African, Arab and Asian countries and gave rise to the emergence of “socialist nationalism” in those countries. Especially the Vietnam War, Chinese and Cuban revolutions have been quite influential in the development of “anti-imperialism” with nationalist tones during this period¹⁶⁰.

Moreover, similar theses and political struggles based on the idea of National Democratic Revolution were widespread in other underdeveloped countries, such as the communist parties in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Indonesia. After the military coup of radical officers in Syria (a country having tactical relationships with Soviets), the Baath Party suggested the nationalization of the economy (defining it as a “non-capitalist path to development”) with a coalition of national classes (namely workers, peasants, elites) under the leadership of the army. In Iraq, similar reforms of the military were considered by the Communist Party of Iraq as the realization of the principles of national democratic revolution. In another case, perhaps the most remarkable example of Arab nationalism, communists in Egypt allied with the military government of Nasser in the mid-1960s. Comintern was also supporting such nationalist movements led by radical military officers in Arab countries as a proof of its policy of “non-capitalist path to development” suggested for underdeveloped countries. Policies of Nehru in India, Tito in Yugoslavia, and Sukarno in Indonesia regarding the nationalization of economic sectors were all considered as part of the radical revolutionary transformations of these countries on the way to socialist revolution. In sum, a combination of i. Comintern’s support for nationalist movements and military-led reform attempts in the Third World, ii. the effects of debates between developed and underdeveloped countries in the Bandung Conference and iii. the tendency of nationalist movements to realize the principles of economic developmentalism through national economic independence, has been influential in various nationalist front formulations of the leftist movements in Turkey during the 1960s and the 1970s.

Of course, the theses based on the idea of national democratic revolution and the experiences learned from different visions of socialism contributed to the emergence of rich theoretical

¹⁵⁹ For such a debate on the inspirations from international dynamics and debates in the socialist camp, see Akin (2007).

¹⁶⁰ See Liakos, 2008, p. 42.

debates among the leftist movements in Turkey. However, such divisions on formulations/visions would lead to the intra-left struggles in Turkey by mid-1970s, which are mostly based on the question of “leadership” for socialist struggle. In other words, again short term political-practical needs and pragmatic concerns had started to be influential to get and hold on to power. Much more importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, it could be argued that the formulations among leftist movements in Turkey in general – based on the struggles in different countries – led to the reproduction of problematic theoretical and practical approaches within Marxism as presented in the first chapter. To recapitulate briefly, socialism was reduced to a matter of development on the national level and economic determinism in various forms became dominant. Moreover, peculiarist and essentialist approaches led to difficulties in comprehending capitalism and imperialism in terms of class contradictions by simply overemphasizing national contradictions (hence the lack of a systematic critique of capitalist relations of production and contradictions stemming from it). And finally a narrow nationalist vision rather than an internationalist one became dominant in both theoretical and political-practical terms.

The Labor Movement after the 1960s: The Political Radicalization and Mobilization of Workers

As analyzed above, the 1961 Constitution which provided a much freer atmosphere for the organization of leftist parties and movements would also lead to the emergence of a more militant political unionism in Turkey. Critics of the “above party politics” of Türk-İş union and its state-centric approach put forward the idea of a new labor union which makes use of the extensive rights proposed in the constitution to mobilize the working classes created by rapid industrialization and urbanization in Turkey by the 1960s. In terms of the development of labor union organizations, the most important event was the formation of DİSK in 1967¹⁶¹. DİSK adopted a policy of economic and political struggle in the name of the working class, and did not abstain from conflict with government, employers and competing trade-unions (Mello, 2010)¹⁶². Moreover, DİSK criticized Türk-İş policies which were based on the idea of

¹⁶¹ Before the formation of DİSK in 1967, another confederation attempt among labor unions had been made, with the name of TÜRK HÜR-İŞ. This also criticized Türk-İş’s state-centric policies, but shared a common discourse as noted in its document on the rationale for a confederation: nationalism (treating workers as defenders of “national interests”). See, Koç, Y. 1996, “Unutulmuş Bir Konfederasyon: TÜRK HÜR-İŞ”, pp. 289-299. See also Koç, Y. 2010, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi*, Epos Yayınları, Ankara, p. 210.

¹⁶² DİSK leaders suggested that “Türk-İş is failing to implement with much effort the principles written in its constitution and decided on in its congresses” (DİSK, 1967: 5). Unlike the state-controlled union Türk-İş, which

balance, solidarity and peace between classes in Turkey and a negative attitude to the conception of *class struggle*. Moreover, Türk-İş's nationalist discourse was much more dominant than a class-based one. Türk-İş, in its constitution and policy formulations, gave priority to the issues of national unity, harmony and developmentalism and underlined the dangers of class politics which is considered *as a threat to the nationalist identity of working classes in Turkey*.

The fact that Türk-İş and DİSK are organized in different enterprises (the former in the public sector, the latter in the private sector) is important for our subject matter and fieldwork as public sector labor unionism (*kamu sendikacılığı*) and private sector labor unionism (*özel sektör sendikacılığı*) have different characteristics. In the former, the aim has always been to develop good and friendly relations with governments in congruity with the principles of the state (as mentioned in the legal framework on labor unionism) due to pragmatic concerns, namely to benefit from governmental policies. For the workers, this is also the case because public sector workers have benefited from populist policies (namely redistribution policies) and had much more extensive rights (social rights and different wage policies) between 1962 and 1976¹⁶³. This was the reason why DİSK could be mobilized in the private sector in a faster and more effective way. Direct confrontation of labor unions and workers in private enterprises with the state and governments led to a much more positive approach to the terms of *class struggle* in these enterprises and support for DİSK. It may be argued that public sector unionism is still under the influence of the state and governments, and workers have a much more etatist vision. Therefore, the division of labor organizations based on private and public enterprises has always affected the struggle on collective-common class interests in Turkey¹⁶⁴. These analyses also indicate that there are differences in political attitudes and cultural-ideological perceptions between labor unions as well as the workers in these

was organized predominately in the public sector, DİSK rapidly organized in the private sector as a confederation of trade unions that had separated from Türk-İş.

¹⁶³ See Boratav, K. 2010, *Türkiye'de Popülizm: 1962-1976 Dönemi Üzerine Notlar*, Yordam, İstanbul [first published in *Yapıt* journal in 1983 October-November issue]

¹⁶⁴ It may also be argued that this situation still continues as seen in the reactions given to the privatization process in the state economic enterprises (SEEs) and public sector workers' perceptions on the role of state in the economy, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. On the other hand, it may be foreseen that the effects of such a division between public and private sector labor unionism had been questioned more after the massive wave of privatizations in the SEEs in Turkey from mid-1980s onwards, especially in the 2000s. I will discuss these issues in the following chapter.

enterprises¹⁶⁵. Different approaches of unions to privatizations in the last decade could be partly understood within this framework.

Although the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) government attempted to curtail the power of DİSK through different amendments in the 1961 constitution¹⁶⁶ in the mid-1960s, the members of DİSK reached 100,000 by 1970 from an initial of 40,000. Moreover, the mobility among workers and students has increased and socialist movements gained strength (Güzel, 1996, p. 238). While DİSK continued to increase its power at the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, another important development was the shift in the discourse of the RPP, as manifested in the “left of the center” idea (“ortanın solu”) formulated by the general secretary of the party Bülent Ecevit. Although there are different views on the reasons of such a shift in the RPP’s discourse, it is widely accepted that RPP elites had been uncomfortable with TİP’s increasing popularity among working classes, youth movements and intellectuals by the mid-1960s¹⁶⁷. “Left of the center” policy formulated before the 1965 general elections would be much more systematically suggested by the RPP with the election of Ecevit to the leadership of the party in 1972. Although the 12 March 1971 memorandum introduced extensive limits to working class activities and organizations as well as socialist movements in Turkey, the 1970s would be a period where the radicalization of the labor movement and the power of socialist organizations would be much more intensive than the 1960s.

Obviously, in such radicalization and revitalization, the remarkable shift in the RPP’s discourse and its policy formulations were influential. Under Ecevit’s leadership, to attract labor union activism and increasing masses of working classes in big industrial cities, the RPP began to suggest a program of land reform, tax reform, and advocacy for greater democratic rights for workers and laws against the exploitation of labor by the mid-1970s. However, similar to the theses developed by *YÖN* intellectuals, the RPP’s stance excluded radical formulations developed by TİP (especially by Mehmet Ali Aybar and Behice Boran) and

¹⁶⁵ On the legitimacy of the terms of “class interests” and “class struggle”, unionists in public sector were more hesitant than the ones in the private sector. This point is also mentioned by Çelik (2010, p. 551). He argues that one has to consider labor unions as moments of class formation, class struggle and consciousness since workers are mostly politicized through labor unions and the approach of labor unions to politics has crucial significance. In these terms, Çelik states that particularism (p. 556) was generally dominant in the labor unions’ struggle in the period of 1946-1961, rather than having an over-encompassing class approach, dealing with particular problems of workers with a short term projection.

¹⁶⁶ This indicates that there is a continuity from the early republic to the 1960s in political parties and governments’ attempts to control labor unions and sustain tutelary relations.

¹⁶⁷ İsmet İnönü, the leader of the RPP during the 1960s, proves this with his declarations. In one of them, he was stating that “TİP is our main competitor” (cited from Ünsal, 2002, p. 213).

rejected the idea of class struggle. The RPP's policies were generally proposing social reforms in political and economic issues. For example, they still gave priority to *national developmentalism* and *coalition of classes* in Turkey to realize national economic objectives¹⁶⁸. Although they had a concern for a fair distribution of national welfare among classes and for improving labor rights, the RPP never questioned current capitalistic relations and property relations. The main objective was thus to reform Turkey's market economy in line with European social democratic parties. Ecevit was aware of the emergence of labor as a new social and political force. Therefore, remaining within the framework of capitalist relations and developmentalism and in parallel with the Kemalist principles of etatism, nationalism and populism, the support of labor unions and workers were key for electoral victory. In sum, the "left-of-center" approach of the RPP, its new populist formulations in economic policies and the increasing power of DİSK revitalized the dynamism of the labor movement more than before.

Consequently, the pursuit of a social democratic agenda and working class alliances became an important pillar for RPP throughout the 1970s, contributing to RPP's electoral success in 1973 and 1977 general elections (Keyder, 1987, p. 57). Towards this end, while actively and consistently opposing the political agenda of the right, DİSK supported the Republican People's Party in the 1977 general elections¹⁶⁹.

¹⁶⁸ For an analysis of the left populist character of Ecevit's discourse, see Erdoğan, N. 1998, "Demokratik Soldan Devrimci Yol'a: 1970'lerde Sol Popülizm Üzerine Notlar", in Türkiye'de Sol'un Kaynakları, *Toplum ve Bilim*, Fall 1998, No. 78.

¹⁶⁹ DİSK's electoral concerns included: freedom of thought, organization, and expression in Turkey comparable to what other European countries enjoy; freedom for workers to choose the union they want; an end to lockouts; the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike for all workers and civil servants; unemployment insurance; wage equality for women workers; social security for all workers; a fair tax system for all workers; protections for Turkish workers abroad; an end to the extraordinary power of the State Security Courts; the democratization of the regulations regarding martial law; the declaration of May Day as a state holiday; an end to limits on the right to strike; an end to all limits on democratic rights and freedoms (especially those imposed after the 12 March 1971 military intervention); and an end to the influence of the United States and NATO on Turkish politics. See *DİSK'in 1977 Genel Seçimlerinde RPP'yi Destekleme Kararının Gerekçesi ve Nedenleri* [The Reason and Need for DİSK's Decision to Support the RPP in the 1977 General Elections], Istanbul, Yeni Ofset Basımevi. Moreover, DİSK was increasingly concerned that the exploitation of workers was becoming easier with the rise of a "fascist order." In such a political climate, it was thought that the opponents of the labor movement "will want to prohibit even the smallest strikes by citing [concerns for] 'national security'" (Ibid, p. 3). For DİSK, in order to advance this agenda and counteract these trends, the decision was made "to support the closest party to these concerns in the 1977 general election, the RPP" (p. 4). Obviously, on the one hand, the support of DİSK to the RPP would mean the participation of labor unions which were previously member of Türk-İş to DİSK (i.e. Genel-İş union). On the other hand, the decision to support the RPP would create tensions within DİSK, between the supporters of a much more radical and socialist perspective and of a social democratic and national developmentalist vision. At this point, it should be noted that DİSK was unique in terms of developing relations with labor unions in other countries – for example, labor unions in Muslim countries such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq as well as in European countries such as French and Italian labor unions, and of course those in the Soviet Union (Güzel, 1996, p. 118).

On the other hand, the increasing polarization of Turkish society around the left and right divide during the 1970s would have repercussions on the labor movement and organization as well. As a matter of fact, this polarization had increased before the 12 March coup and labor unions were divided into two camps whether it is extreme nationalist (*lkc*) or revolutionary (*devrimci*). In addition to the opposition between DİSK and Trk-İŖ, there were now different labor unions based on such division, for example the Union of Revolutionary Workers (*Devrimci İŖçi Birlięi*) vs. the Union of Extreme Nationalist Workers (*lkc İŖçiler Birlięi*). While for labor unions with a title Revolutionary (*Devrimci*), the main contradiction was between labor and capital, the ones with the title *lkc* had a discourse based on the ideal of being a Turk and on Turkish nationalism. Moreover, the struggle given against the enemies of Turkishness had also a value for the realization of Islamic ideals; therefore a synthesis of Turkish-Islamic arguments was visible in their discourse, combined with anti-communist concerns¹⁷⁰. Such divisions were much more visible in regional and city-based labor union federations.¹⁷¹ The most important of these labor unions with an extreme nationalist discourse was the MİSK (The Confederation of Nationalist Labor Unions). During the 1970s, in addition to Trk-İŖ, the formation of MİSK and its support for the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*, MC) governments, anti-communist struggle and policies against the radicalization of labor after the mid-1970s proved the importance of nationalism as a historically important ideological motive for working class organizations and movements. MİSK was supporting an economic and political organization of the society in line with nationalist principles and rejecting class-based politics in Marxist terms.

According to this nationalist doctrine, capital and labor were not antagonistic terms but inseparable parts of national production. The number of unions joining MİSK has increased to a remarkable level during the MC governments in 1975 and 1976. Between 1975 and 1978, MİSK especially attempted to extend its organization in regions where DİSK were influential and coalesce with other labor unions defining themselves as nationalist, with the help of Idealist Hearths (*lk Ocakları*, the radical youth organization of Nationalist Action Party, MHP). The mobilization of MİSK supporters against DİSK constituted the most important

¹⁷⁰ For examples on the discourses of *Devrimci* and *lkc* labor unions, see Koç, 2010, pp. 218-219.

¹⁷¹ In addition to these, there were many and idealist organizations founded within different occupations and labor associations pursuing the ideals of nationalism, such as *lkc İŖçiler Derneęi*, *lk-Tek*, *lkc Memurlar Derneęi* etc.

fragmentation within the labor movement after mid-1970s¹⁷². It should also be noted that those nationalist labor unions and those based on religious values (in close association with the National Salvation Party, MSP – namely *HAK-İŞ* was founded in 1976) have been instrumental in the struggle against “communism”, especially in the mid-1970s¹⁷³. In a sense, Turkish-Islamic synthesis had been formed in these labor unions against the increasing power of DİSK at all levels. Whatever its content, the mobilization and politicization of working classes had been remarkable in this period compared to the labor movement in Turkey in previous decades.

In 1980, the total number of strikes reached 220 and the number of lost workdays in total reached 8 million approximately (Yıldızoğlu and Margulies, 1984, p. 18). Moreover, as mentioned above, the confrontation between leftist and rightist groups became widespread among all sections of the society (at average, 10 people from both sides were killed daily in this conjuncture). With the increasing mobilization of working classes leading to political and economic instability, the basis for a military intervention was already existent. As a result, in 12 September 1980 the army intervened in political life the 3rd time in the Turkish political history, this time in a much more violent.

To sum up, the radicalization of the labor movement and the increasing polarization of both workers and labor organizations have come to an end with the 12 September 1980 coup. The post-1980 political environment in Turkey has eliminated both developing working class organizations and socialist movements. After the 1980 coup, the most important labor organization, DİSK, and various socialist organizations, as well as the RPP (developing “the Left of the center policy” during the 1970s and partly contributing to workers’ mobilization) were closed down and banned from political activities. The military elites would champion both nationalism and conservatism as the most important ideologies for “desired national

¹⁷² It can be argued that the main function of MİSK has been as a rival labor organization against the increasing radicalization of workers around DİSK, in coalition with other social organizations fighting against “communism”. After the 1980 coup, MİSK has lost its function and its organizational capacity came to an end in mid- 1980s under the new conditions of Turkey.

¹⁷³ In addition to HAK-İŞ (Confederation of Turkish Just Workers Union), there were also workers’ and public servants’ associations with Islamic values, such as *Akıncı İşçiler Derneği* and *Akıncı Memurlar Derneği* founded in 1978, whose power and popularity among workers were negligible when compared to extreme nationalists’, but important in the struggle against “communism”. See Koç, 2010, p. 264. Moreover, important figures of these Akıncı organizations founded in different regions of Turkey would be the future leaders of the Hak-İş union.

unity and harmony” rather than political fragmentation, polarization and different alternative projects to transform the society.

Reactions to the Internationalization of Capital and Neoliberal Policies after the 1980s: Theoretical Debates and Political Strategies

This section will focus on how the labor unions and leftist politics approach globalization, the post-1980 neoliberal restructuring and privatization processes, through an analysis of their discourses, reactions, political-practical strategies and organizational capacities developed against these processes in comparison with the debates and practices of the 1960s and 1970s. Such an analysis of the points of departures and similarities in the labor movement between these periods (in terms of their discourses, organizational capacities and characteristics of the repertoires of political action) is of critical significance figuring out the effects of the post-1980 process of the retreat from class politics in Turkey.

The following four factors should not be underestimated in this analysis: i.) the increasing role of the state in oppressing the labor movement and leftist politics during and after the 1980s, ii.) attempts to create divisions based on nationalist (as well as religious) values after the 1980s, iii) the hegemony of nationalist discourse within the labor unions after the 1980s, especially during the privatization process, as privatized enterprises were mostly under the control of nationalism-oriented labor unions¹⁷⁴, iv.) the pragmatic public manipulation of the nationalist discourse by domestic capital fractions to reap the benefits of appropriating the label “domestic” vis-à-vis their “foreign” rivals during the privatizations in “the nationally strategic sectors of Turkish economy”. In addition to these analyses, lastly, the reactions and discourses of socialist parties, professional associations, trade and commerce chambers will be evaluated via their publicly announced reports and documents to understand how various political and economic organizations became part of the process and developed strategies against the effects of neoliberal restructuring in general, and the massive wave of privatizations in particular.

Whereas the 1960 military coup sought to open up the political system, the 1980 military intervention specifically sought to promote stability by depoliticizing society and ending the

¹⁷⁴ 1980 constitutes a critical turning point in Turkey for the expansive oppression of working-class organizations, labor movement, support for the formation and development of nationalist labor unions to eliminate the so-called pre1980 militant working class activities and to conduct neoliberal policies in a politically-economically stable setting.

era of ideological confrontations. The effects of the military regime between 1980 and 1983 have been disastrous: the parliament was dissolved, the cabinet was deposed, the immunity of the deputies was lifted, political leaders were arrested, political parties were abolished (even the RPP, which is always considered as the vanguard of the Kemalist regime and republican ideals in coalition with the army). In addition to restrictions in political structure, political life in all aspects has come to an end¹⁷⁵. In accordance with the requirements of the regime, the new constitution introduced drastic limits to civil rights of freedom of the press, freedom of association, as well as the limits to rights and liberties of the individual. Thereafter, rights and liberties could be annulled, suspended or limited on the following considerations: the national interest, public order, national security, threats to the republican order and public health. This was the case for limiting working class mobilization and their political and organizational rights. It could be safely argued that the tradition of negative attitude to labor organizations and activities ongoing from the early Republican period had been given a new lease of life in Turkey by the 1980s¹⁷⁶.

Following the military's intervention, the National Security Council (NSC) suspended radical labor union confederations, DİSK (also outlawed) and MİSK (not outlawed)¹⁷⁷. Moreover, compulsory arbitration replaced collective bargaining; and the right to strike was suspended. Nearly two thousand labor activists from DİSK were arrested. As Yalman (2009, p. 299) rightly argues, the bourgeoisie and the military perceived the demands of the working class organizations like DİSK as being incompatible with a "democratic regime"¹⁷⁸. There was nothing surprising about this perception since DİSK had been the symbol of class based politics in a political environment where there had been no tradition of working class parties with strong grass roots support, given the ever present serious limitations on the functioning

¹⁷⁵ Martial Law was declared; local commanders, under martial law, gained wide-ranging powers to control political life. Moreover, closures of newspapers, arrests of authors, journalists and editors, complete control of the judiciary through military courts have become the norm in political life. The military regime also enforced radical changes before handing power back to the civilians such as the introduction of an anti-democratic (both in content and the way it was presented to the public) constitution in 1982, which led to the concentration of power in the hands of the executive formed by commanders, increasing the powers of the president and the NSC.

¹⁷⁶ For a general analysis on the conditions of the labor movement in Turkey, see Koç, Y. 2010, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi*, Ankara, Epos, pp. 275-305.

¹⁷⁷ The nationalist federation MİSK was reinstated in 1984 but DİSK was treated very differently and remained banned until 1991. Türk-İş supported the military regime of 1980-1983 and conducted friendly relations with the military regime. Moreover, its general secretary (Sadık Şide) also had the position of Minister of Social Security (Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı) of the military government.

¹⁷⁸ See Yalman, G. 2009, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in The 1980's*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul.

of such parties even during the relatively more democratic regime under the 1961 constitution.

These measures introduced by the NSC curtailed the power of the labor movement which had been radicalized and mobilized during the 1970s and delinked them from socialist movements. Moreover, parallel to restrictions in civil rights, the new laws (Law on Labor Unions and Law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout covering organized labor) restricted the scope of legal strikes, the politicization of labor unions, their activities as well as membership principles to a labor union¹⁷⁹. As a result of these arrangements, the activities of labor unions would come to an end and the revitalization of labor unions would only be possible with the end of 1980s¹⁸⁰.

An analysis of the post-1980 process in Turkey is not only important to highlight extensive political and organizational restrictions on the labor movement through systematic bans of labor unions and socialist groups' activities. Such an analysis is also crucial to understand the conditions of workers affected by the strict execution of neoliberal policies after the 1980s parallel to international tendencies mentioned in the first chapter. It should first be noted that the 24 January decisions – prepared by Turgut Özal under the guidance of the IMF and World Bank – served to discipline the labor markets through extra-economic coercion. To execute neoliberal policies in a strict manner, both the military regime and capital groups in Turkey openly declared support to Özal for the execution of the above-mentioned policies, achieving macro-economic and political stability via a strong government led by Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (ANAP) during the 1980s. In these terms, the post-1980 process would signify that the relations between capital and labor would be significantly transformed under the newly created politico-legal structures, to the detriment of the working classes in Turkey.

¹⁷⁹ In addition to the introduction of the new Labor Law, the High Board of Arbitration (Yüksek Hakem Kurulu-YHK) had been influential in decisions decreasing wages systematically by the 1980s. As Yalman (2009, p. 316) argued, "During the military regime, the resolution of pay settlements through the High Board of Arbitration might have created the impression that there existed a kind of state corporatist framework since only one trade union federation (Türk-İş) was allowed to participate".

¹⁸⁰ Not only in organizational terms, the conditions of labor in terms of wages also deteriorated during the military regime between 1980 and 1983. Real wages fell particularly drastically in 1980 as collective bargaining negotiations for about 80.000 workers were postponed by martial law authorities prior to the coup. Negotiations were about to take place for further 200,000 workers at the time of the coup and were therefore also postponed. As a result, a large number of workers did not receive a wage increase between 1979 and 1981 although the price index rose to 761 in 1980, 1047 in 1981 and 1389 in 1982 if the 1975 index is assumed as 100 (Yıldızoğlu and Marguiles, 1984, p. 20). To sum up, the military regime achieved so called "political and economic stability" through the oppression of labor unions and workers' mobilization by 1980, which would provide a "healthy" environment for the execution of new political-economic processes after the 1980s.

As Yalman argued (2009), the military regime made it abundantly clear from the beginning that their intention was not to go against the interest of the bourgeoisie, but to act as an autonomous agent above social classes. Rather than subordinating those interests to that of the autonomized state, the military regime's top priority was to ensure both the external financial circles as well as the domestic bourgeoisie that it is going to remain loyal to the structural adjustment program¹⁸¹. The military simply smashed organized working class as well as the intelligentsia on the left of the political spectrum that was considered to have organic ties with the working-class movement. Throughout the 1960s, and particularly in the 1970s, the growing strength of the working class, reflected in their militant demands in collective bargaining, and the support they received from the wider society, increased the worries of the bourgeoisie who were not able to run the economy without running into endless crises.

In addition to the calls for a strong state facilitating the rules of free market, such worries were also expressed through a nationalist discourse by the bourgeoisie, mostly by TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association) in Turkey as well.

A vociferous press campaign would be launched by TÜSİAD during the spring of 1979 against the Ecevit government so as to de-stabilize it. In fact, the press campaign was aiming to utilize the 'free market' rhetoric so as to discredit a government which the various members of the association had increasingly been perceiving as being detrimental to their class interests, by portraying it as a threat to private property and hostile to market economy, thus being *detrimental to the 'national interest'*. (This episode which had signaled the *disillusionment* of the Turkish bourgeoisie with the social democrats' attempts to maintain a 'state-led' industrialization strategy, also makes clear the futility of trying to account for the 'policy change' within the parameters of rent-seeking analyses (Italics are mine) (Yalman, 2009, p. 307)¹⁸².

The restructuring of the state with the 1980 military take-over and the authoritarian 1982 Constitution simply put an end to *class-based politics*, which could be described as the core of the new hegemonic strategy which accompanied the restructuring of the state¹⁸³. Moreover, the military rule played a significant role in the implementation of this hegemonic strategy not only by establishing an authoritarian regime, but more importantly, by gaining the 'consent'

¹⁸¹ Yalman, 2009, p. 300. For Yalman (Ibid, p. 300), it is noteworthy in this respect that one of the first things the military junta had done was to ask for the support of TÜSİAD in transmitting this message abroad, while the activities of all other associations were banned.

¹⁸² A similar discourse was visible in the reports of the Confederation of Union of Turkey's Employers (Türkiye İşverenler Sendikası Konfederasyonu, TİSK), suggesting that the balance between employers and workers should change in favor of the former in the name of "national interests". TİSK, in this context, suggested that the social state principle should not be included in the new constitution of 1982. For the main framework of TİSK's demands from governments since the 1970s, see Koç, Y. 2010, pp. 288-289.

¹⁸³ Ibid, p. 308.

of the masses who were disenchanted by the repercussions of the political as well as the economic crisis on their daily lives during the pre-coup era:

The 'law and order' rhetoric was particularly effective among the working class neighborhoods which had particularly suffered from the civil strife during the 1970s... the availability of the goods which had disappeared from the market during the crisis years would play a similar role for the 'liberal' economic policies that would have detrimental effects on the living standards of the wage and salary earners. The military regime's economy minister Turgut Özal was particularly effective with his rhetoric of 'There Is No Alternative', borrowed obviously from the Thatcherite Britain, in convincing the people that economic crisis could only be overcome, if and only if the new policies were pursued steadfastly over a sufficiently long period of time.¹⁸⁴

With these considerations, the role of the labor unions was redefined. In the new market economy, the role of the trade unions was simply reduced to negotiating wages without being in a position to discuss economic policies with the government¹⁸⁵. Only pro-government trade unions were allowed to exist throughout the 1980s, as the left wing labor union confederation DİSK was outlawed. The new legislation enabled employers to dismiss workers arbitrarily, to replace unionized workers with temporary non-unionized workers and use subcontractors to avoid direct confrontation with workers on issues relating to wages and social security. With the decentralization of labor unions, and with repressive union laws that increased workers' vulnerability and susceptibility to unemployment, the working class was forced to fight to keep their jobs rather than pushing for higher wages throughout the 1980s¹⁸⁶.

Discredited by the military regime and Özal governments and championing consumerist and possessive individualist ideals for the society, it was very difficult for labor unions to survive and defend the rights of workers during the 1980s. This would also lead to the dissatisfaction of workers from labor unions in terms of meeting their expectations. As a result, membership rates to labor unions have started to decline. With the first years of the 1990s, labor mobilization would increase due to reactions to pressures on wages, working conditions and

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 310-311.

¹⁸⁵ As Yalman (p. 316) argued, "it became clear with the labour legislation that came into effect at the end of the military period that the labour containment strategy for the post-military regime era would be in line with the general thrust of the New Right politics which aimed to put the trade unions in their place. Parallel to the experience of certain authoritarian regimes in the Third World, Pinochet's Chile being the prime example, the new labour containment strategy opted for the market as a mechanism to control and weaken the unions as much as possible".

¹⁸⁶ Aydın, 2005, p. 56. See Aydın, Z. 2005, *The Political Economy of Turkey*, Pluto Press, London.

economic objectives of the neoliberal policies in Turkey, though in a much less radical and collective manner compared to the pre-1980 period¹⁸⁷.

As a result of and against such dynamics, the end of 1980s and the first years of the 1990s marked the revitalization of labor movement in Turkey. A massive mobilization, called as Spring Protests (*Bahar Eylemleri*), started by the end of the 1980s against the negative attitudes of the MP government to workers' rights (especially to the rights of unionization) and its neoliberal policies leading to the deterioration of working conditions. Protests, including strikes and meetings targeting government policies, have been widespread in different regions in Turkey and they are also supported by the public. The most remarkable characteristic of the protests was their heterogeneous character, i.e. workers with different identities (political views, religious beliefs, ethnic identity, etc.) and from different regions actively involved in the process. On the other hand, the protests of workers were targeting political elites and the government. Thus it was difficult to see a critic of systematic sources of their problems, namely antagonistic class relations. This actually indicates a regression in the political consciousness of working classes compared to the pre-1980 period¹⁸⁸. Moreover, again in marked difference to the pre-1980 period, protesters participating in the strikes were mostly composed of public sector workers rather than private sector workers. The most important reason for this was privatization which has become part of the political agenda of governments in the mid-1980s, which meant for workers to lose their jobs and high inflation rates above the moderate raises in wages in the public sector.

On the other hand, it could be argued that workers' increasing mobilization by the end of the 1980s would be one of the most important reasons for the electoral failure of the MP as a party championing neoliberal policies in the 1980s. Another outcome of such mobilization would be remarkable increases in wages after protests due to new collective negotiations

¹⁸⁷ As a result of the neoliberal policies and reforms executed in the 1980s, temporary employment has risen and unionization has declined (union density fell from 27 in 1980 to 10 in 1988), employment prospects have deteriorated (The share of the bottom fifth in national income decreased from 5.6% in 1983 to 4.2 in 1997) and employees' earnings (wages index fell from 128 in 1980 to 65 in 1988) have diminished in real terms. Such processes also caused a growing inequality in overall income distribution (in 1997, Turkey was ranked as the second most unequal society after Mexico amongst OECD countries (Cam, 2002). See Cam, S. 2002, "Neoliberalism and labour within the context of an 'emerging market' economy— Turkey", *Capital and Class*, No. 77, pp. 89-114.

¹⁸⁸ *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, p. 111. For example, the most popular slogan during these protests was "Çankaya'nın şişmanı, işçi düşmanı [The fat man of Çankaya, the enemy of workers]. For another analysis of the Spring Protests, see Dogan, Mustafa G. 2010, "When Neoliberalism Confronts the Moral Economy of Workers: The Final Spring of Turkish Labor Unions", *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 11.

between the governments and workers. In sum, Spring Protests proved that the collective and united act of workers could change governments¹⁸⁹ and give an end to the deterioration of their rights and economic conditions in Turkey¹⁹⁰.

Before continuing to analyze the conditions of the labor movement and the debates among leftists in Turkey during the 1990s in detail, it should be noted that one important event has been quite influential in the formulations of the left in Turkey, namely the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union would lead to a crisis within the left in Turkey, just like other socialist organizations in other countries, because one of the most important concrete examples of (and a source of legitimacy for) the socialist experience had come to an end. Not only the dissolution of the Soviet Union but the expansion of capitalist relations and drastic cuts in social rights (in social security, education and health especially) in China, another inspirational case for leftist groups in Turkey before the 1980s, under the Chinese Communist Party reign further deepened the crisis within the socialist camp. Therefore, to understand the crisis of the left after the 1980s and the failure of nation-stated based solutions within leftist groups in Turkey, the effects of these international dynamics should also be taken into account, a factor which is rarely underlined in the literature.

In addition to all this, the pace of the internationalization process of capitalism in the 1980s would also lead to the question of whether the “national level” into question is the pertinent area of struggle or not. It was not only the debates on the scale of struggles which mattered now, but also the future of nation-state per se in the face of the internationalization of capital movements. As discussed in the first chapter, approaches to the role of the state indicate problematic nationalist approaches and formulations within Marxist theory and practice. I will now focus on the effects of such formulations, summarized in the first chapter with reference to Ronaldo Munck’s analysis of the relationship between *nationalism and development*, *nation and state* and finally *nationalism and class*, on the debates among leftists in Turkey who try to develop formulations in this new conjuncture of the end of Cold War, neoliberal capitalism and globalization¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁹ The winners of the 1991 elections were the social democrat SHP and the center-right DYP (True Path Party).

¹⁹⁰ For example, in the collective bargaining process in 1991, as a result of workers’ mobilization after 1989, a serious increase was seen in real wages. The reaction of the capital against such wage increases in Turkey between 1991 and 1993 was enhancing the subcontracting and informalization relations in the labor market, which had been already suggested by the MP by the mid-1980s. See Koç, 2010, pp. 338-339.

¹⁹¹ Following the dissolution of the Soviets and the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was an accelerated wave of privatizations in different regions of the world, especially in Central and Eastern European countries as a result

The crisis of the left in Turkey and labor unions in the 1980s (due to the authoritarian regime of 1980-1983 and neoliberal policies of the MP government) and the dilemmas in the era of the reconfiguration of the state with the increasing internationalization of capitalism and execution of neoliberal policies led to a fertile environment for nation-based alternative formulations and nationalist explanations to get rid of the maelstrom caused by such processes. First of all, on the relation of the rapid internationalization process of capitalism and the role of the state, it should be noted that the restructuring of the latter undertaken by the military regime and continued by civilian regimes could and should be seen as an integral part of a new hegemonic strategy. Against such a hegemonic project, and the internationalization of capitalism, the reactions of labor unions and certain leftist organizations and intellectuals have been “defending the nation-state”. The debates on the role of the state in this period indicate that the problematic conceptualization of the state continues. It is often argued in this context that it is the task of leftists to defend the nation-state against the internationalization of capitalism and the increasing gap between “core imperialist countries” and “developing and underdeveloped countries”. In these analyses, the state is conceptualized as an entity autonomous from class contradictions and struggle, having an ontological status in it. In other words, the state is considered as a political body that can control the internationalization process of capitalism and mediate emerging class contradictions within a given nation. Such considerations were similar to the analyses of the left during the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey.

In this context, the debates on corruption which became widespread in Turkey during the 1990s constitute an important example of such problematic approaches to the role of the state. In such approaches which allocated a central role to the state in economic processes and suggested that there is an external relation between the state and capital relations, the main reason for corruption was attributed to the decline of the role of the state in the economy and the inefficient administration of state elites and bureaucracy. In other words, the main solution was having a “strong state” organized along the principle of national interests. As a matter of fact, such arguments calling the state back into politics shared a common basis with neoliberal explanations which stressed the need to downsize the state’s role in the economic processes.

of the increasing volume of the international capital flows. Therefore, the mid-1990s wave of privatizations is not a phenomenon peculiar to Turkey but also seen in other countries liberalizing their capital markets. For a report on increasing foreign investments after the mid-1990s, see <http://www.dtm.gov.tr/ead/DTDERGI/OCAK2003/d%C3%BCnya.htm>.

Both sides considered the main source of the problem to be the reconfiguration of the state¹⁹², rather than class contradictions. While nationalist arguments suggested a stronger state regulating the inner contradictions stemming from the internationalization process of neoliberal capitalism, neoliberal and New Right arguments popularized the view that the main reason for widespread corruptions was the irrational administration of the economic field¹⁹³.

In a similar way, such arguments have also been successful in shaping people's perceptions on the main reason for the most severe economic crisis seen in the 1990s (popularly known as "5 Nisan Kararları" [April 5 Economic Decisions] in 1994)¹⁹⁴. Thus, during the 1990s, debates on corruption and inefficient public spending due to "populist" practices of governments (claimed by major capital fractions in Turkey as well as the IMF and WB) have been influential in popular perceptions on economic crises which were linked to the inefficiency of the state and the need for further liberalization through structural adjustment programs and neoliberal restructuring of the state. In the third chapter focusing on the privatization case in Turkey, I will continue to analyze the debates on corruption which also cited as one of the bases of the justification of the massive privatization wave of state economic enterprises.

It needs to be noted at this stage that in the Turkish case state-centric approaches which criticized the declining role of the state and saw the root causes of such decline in external dynamics ("imperialism guided by the IMF and WB) have also been popular among leftists and labor unions. In addition to problematic approaches on the relation between state and capital, from the 1990s onwards, the revitalization of nationalist explanations to explain the economic crises of the neoliberal era in Turkey has been seen similar to the debates in the periods mentioned earlier. The response of many leftists and labor unions to the internationalization process of capitalism and neoliberal globalization has contributed to the reproduction of internal-external dichotomy in the analyses of economic dynamics. During this period, in the debates on the effects of neoliberal restructuring and structural adjustment policies as well as the increasing speed of foreign direct investments and capital flows,

¹⁹² For an analysis of the new right policies (in the context of the structural adjustment) and their effects on public administration-national development relation from a state-centric approach, see Güler, B. A. 2005, *Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi: Yapısal Uyarılama Politikaları 1980-1995*, İmge Yayınları, Ankara.

¹⁹³ See Bedirhanoğlu, P. (2007) for a critical political economic analysis of the debates on the corruption in Turkey.

¹⁹⁴ For a general analysis on cyclical economic crises within Turkish economy, see Aydın (2005).

nationalist formulations have again been popular within certain groups in Turkey and labor unions suggesting national independence, developmentalist and protectionist policies in their discourse against such processes.

The Resurgence of the Left-Nationalism in Turkey in the 1990s: Labor and Left's Responses to the Neoliberalism

The historical legacy of the relation between nationalism and the left in Turkey could be seen in the debates after the 1990s, especially in the reactions to the internationalization process of capitalism and to the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. In this section, I will discuss how these reactions are channeled into a nationalist discourse within the Left and the labor movement. As one of the subject matters of this dissertation (macro level dynamics' effects on workers' subjective and collective experiences), particular attention will be paid to political-economic dynamics, namely neoliberal economic policies and internationalization of capital movements in general and privatization process in particular.

Obviously, in addition to those processes, by the 1990s reactions within the Left and labor movement to certain domestic and foreign policy issues contributed to the rise of an amalgamation of nationalist arguments with the leftist discourse, the so called "left-nationalism". I will not touch upon how nationalist sensibilities within the left dominated the reactions to such issues as: identity-based problems and foreign policy debates, such as the EU Accession process (perceived as the end of national sovereignty), the Kurdish question (regarded as an artificial problem created by imperialist forces to divide Turkey), Cyprus and Armenian issues (considered as the violation of national interests in foreign policy issues), and finally the rise of political Islam in Turkey by the mid-1990s (linked to conspiracy theories schematized as part of the imperialist concerns of the USA in the Middle East¹⁹⁵). It should be noted that as a reaction to these processes, calls for alliances between left-nationalists and radical (right-wing) nationalists were heard during the 1990s within the framework of defending the role of the state in an anti-globalist perspective, revitalization of the principles of etatism and national developmentalism, calling the military as a progressive force to duty against the violation of the principle of secularism by political Islamic

¹⁹⁵ On the conspiracy theories of the *Kızıl Elma* supporters (cooperation of the leftist and rightist groups based on nationalist ideals) on issues such as the Kurdish question, the rise of political Islam, see Yaşlı, F. 2006, "Kızıl Elmacılık ve Komplö Zihniyeti", *Birikim*, No. 204.

movements. The possibility of a coalition between rightist and leftist groups under the umbrella of “nationalist politics” was widely argued for during this period¹⁹⁶.

Although left-nationalists choose the term of “ulusalcılık” (henceforth, left nationalism) instead of “milliyetçilik” to distinguish themselves from “right-wing nationalism”, there is no objective criterion, especially when economics programs are considered, to distinguish the two. Therefore, my focus will be on *how those economic processes are discussed within leftist politics theoretically, within the labor movement collectively and of course, experienced by working classes subjectively*. As mentioned above, state-centric discourse which is always embedded within the history of the Left in Turkey gained much more popularity by the 1990s, due to the effects of globalization on nation-states and the reconfiguration of the state’s function in the economic sphere. Left-nationalists have concerns on the role of the state and future of the nation-state in the face of globalization process. This concern mostly stems from increasing internationalization of capital movements by the 1990s due to the liberalization of economic systems against state protectionism and regulation in the economy. It could be argued that formulations on the role of the state and reactions against its reconfiguration after the 1980s constitute the Achilles’ heel of left-nationalists in Turkey. Moreover, it could be asserted that there is continuity in the arguments based on the role of the state in the economic sphere against “foreign domination” between certain leftist groups in Turkey discussed in the previous sections and left-nationalists of the 1990s.

To be more precise, the increasing internationalization of capital movements on the global scale, the articulation of national capital fractions into the world economy after the 1990s, and its repercussions on the role of the state are considered as a major threat to *national sovereignty, unity and harmony* among left-nationalists in Turkey. The arguments and reactions against such processes could be more directly seen in the debates on the

¹⁹⁶ *Ulusalcılık* exhibits a stance that can be at times aggressive and xenophobic. As Bora argued (2003, p. 439), while the fundamental concept of previous left-nationalist groups was anti-imperialism and independence, in the 1990s this was replaced by secularism. Moreover, the motifs of anti-imperialism and independence continued to be main markers of the anti-globalist discourse. The supporters of *ulusalcılık* could establish close relations with radical nationalist groups and the state, pursuing the common aim of protecting the survival of the state. For instance, the *Kızilelma Coalition* (Red Apple Coalition) represents the cooperation of left-nationalist groups with right nationalist groups. Examples of such attempts to build a “national front”, as also seen during the 1960s and 1970s in the left in Turkey, include: “Red Apple Front (*Kızilelma Cephesi*)” (the cooperation of left-nationalist groups with right nationalist groups), “Patriotic Front (*Yurtsever Cephe*)”, “Revolutionary Kemalists” (*Devrimci Kemalistler*), “Nationalist Front (*Ulusalcı Cephe*)”. According to Atalay, etatism was another common concern which brought the *Kızilelma Coalition* together. (Atalay, 2007, p. 123). This cooperation was established in the late 1990s through numerous meetings, joint demonstrations and references in newspaper articles.

privatization of state economic enterprises, which will be analyzed in the third chapter as the case study of this dissertation. It is claimed that “imperialist forces” and foreign capital “strive for forcibly interfering with the Turkish economy”¹⁹⁷. According to this perspective, Turkey is one of the oppressed nations and it has been “exploited” by great nations through the IMF, World Bank, the European Union (Fırat, 2006, p. 570)¹⁹⁸. The role of the state against such domination is noted as it should control the allocation of resources but does not possess the means of production as socialism presupposes. In other words, the state should attempt to support “national bourgeoisie” fractions which will pursue the national interests. The role of classes is again considered in such nationalist terms: since national development is essential in a less developed country like Turkey, there is a need for all classes of the society to act in accordance with this national aim. In these terms, it is argued that there is no contradiction between workers and national capital fractions, as well as surplus-value creation and exploitation in capital-labor relations in any given nation-state. As a result, the main contradiction is defined as between oppressed and oppressor nations. In line with their positions regarding various domestic and foreign policy issues, left-nationalists argue that “the major aim of privatizations in Turkey is to dissolve Turkey, to bring Sevres¹⁹⁹ instead of Lausanne and to take revenge from Atatürk”. In this way, such different processes and their repercussions on Turkey are linked to general economic dynamics and political formulations²⁰⁰.

Privatizations and foreign capital access to Turkey are considered as a threat to the economic independence of Turkey, without discussing neoliberal hegemony in general and privatization process in particular in terms of their effects on working classes and the reconfiguration of capital-labor relations in Turkey. Moreover, the internationalization of contradictions, namely struggles between different fractions of capital in Turkey to benefit more from international

¹⁹⁷ For an example, see Manisalı, E. 2006, *Türkiye ve Küreselleşme*, Derin Yayınları, İstanbul.

¹⁹⁸ Fırat, G. 2006, “Ulusal Sol İdeoloji: Atatürkçü, Milliyetçi, Sosyalist Teori”, *İleri*, İstanbul.

¹⁹⁹ Sevres Treaty parceled out large chunks of the Ottoman Empire to the victorious allies, including much of the territory Turks regard as their homeland. Greece received Eastern Thrace and the area around Izmir; France and Italy were allocated “spheres of influence,” which they later occupied, in southern and southwestern Anatolia, respectively; and an independent Armenian state was to be created in the northeast. Lastly, Kurdish Anatolia was to remain an autonomous area within Ottoman boundaries, but after one year its inhabitants were to be granted the right to request independent status from the League of Nations through a referendum or similar mechanism (Uslu, 2008, p. 78).

²⁰⁰ On arguments of left-nationalists, see Zileli, G. 2007, *Ulusalçılık: Bir İdeolojinin Krizi* [Left-Nationalism: The Crisis of an Ideology], İstanbul, Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı and Başkaya, F. 2007, *Milliyetçilik, Yurtseverlik ve Sol*, Özgür Üniversite Yayınları, İstanbul. See also Umruk, F. (ed.) 2007, *Sosyalizmin Milliyetçilikle İmtihani*, Versus Yayınları, İstanbul and Bora, T. 2006, *Medeniyet Kaybı: Milliyetçilik ve Faşizm Üzerine Yazılar*, Birikim Yayınları, İstanbul, especially the last part “Yurtseverlik ve Sol”.

economic dynamics, stemming from the internationalization process of capitalism which is a general tendency of world capitalism historically are not considered as an important element to understand the dynamics of imperialism. Although it is not the subject matter of this dissertation, apart from the positions of labor unions, it is interesting to note how domestic capital fractions have used a “pro-globalization” discourse that supports the overall shift to the global scale, but opportunistically tried to benefit from the label “domestic” against their “foreign” rivals by simultaneously using a discourse against the “dangers of foreign investments” in critical and national-strategic sectors (Ercan and Oğuz, 2006)²⁰¹. For example, large scale internationalized capital groups such as Koç and Sabancı pursued a “dual strategy” – on the one hand in close alliances with international capital, on the other hand, focusing on the dangers of multinationals’ ownership of strategic sectors²⁰².

Moreover, in the privatization cases of Erdemir, Tüpraş and Petkim, professional associations such as TMMOB (The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) and trade-commerce chambers such as TOBB (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and ATO (The Chamber of Trade of Ankara) claimed that those privatizations in “nationally strategic sectors” cannot be accepted and their struggle against the sale of those public enterprises aims “to save the nation” and protect “national sovereignty”²⁰³. It is suggested that if those enterprises are privatized, they should be sold to national companies, which was also supported by some labor unions²⁰⁴ and left-nationalist intellectuals²⁰⁵. Since those associations and trade chambers have close ties and relations with labor unions as well as the capacity to affect workers’ reactions against the privatization process to a certain

²⁰¹ Ercan, F. and Oğuz, Ş. 2006, “Rescaling as a class relationship and process: The case of public procurement law in Turkey”, *Political Geography*, no. 25, pp. 641-656.

²⁰² The pragmatic use of nationalist discourse or in Murray’ terms “political opportunism of capital” (1971), could also be seen in other sectors such as energy. For example, the newspapers of the largest media group in Turkey, Doğan Group (which also has investments in the energy sector, one of the most important sectors in privatization) criticized privatizations as “sale of the nation by capitulations” when they conflict with its own interests as seen in BOTAŞ case due to contradictions in the procurement process. On various debates for privatization cases, see www.sendika.org website.

²⁰³ On these nationalist reactions, see Bora, T. 2000, “Türkiye’de Meslek Kuruluşları: ‘Kamu’, ‘Sivil’ ve ‘Milli’nin Muğlak Kesişim Alanı”, in *Türkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik*, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert and Nuray Mert, pp. 265-310, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

²⁰⁴ For example, the labor union of Erdemir workers, Türk Metal-İş, cancelled its protest meeting when it is announced that Erdemir was purchased by OYAK (Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund), which is considered to be a guarantee of running of factories in accordance with national interests. However, the sale of 41% of dividends of Erdemir to Arcelor (which is the world’s second and Europe’s largest company in this sector) just a few days after privatization caused a change in discourses and it was declared that this choice would be better for national interests in economic terms.

²⁰⁵ In another case, the privatization of Tüpraş oil refinery, left-nationalist columnists such as İlhan Selçuk in *Cumhuriyet* daily newspaper supported the sale of TÜPRAŞ to Koç Group (in partnership with Shell), which is assumed as reliable in terms of national interests.

extent, an analysis of their discourses is crucial for our case. As Bora argued, even in the discourses of chambers and professional associations aiming to have a distance to official nationalism and extreme nationalist campaigns popular during the 1990s with a social democrat and sometimes leftist discourse, an anti-imperialist and national independence stance is crucial (2000, p. 295). While in leftist organizations, such anti-imperialist and national independence discourse is articulated with a tradition of Third Worldism which is discussed with reference to the left-nationalists of the 1960s and 1970s, in social democrat and Kemalist ones, a reactionary nationalism and etatism is visible.

As discussed earlier, rather than analyzing it in terms of the internationalization of capitalism, imperialism is considered as a new form of colonization and penetration of imperialist relations to colonized countries. As a result of the aforementioned weakness of leftist politics on the national and international level during the 1980s, such anti-imperialist discourse of the 1960s and 1970s has lost its popularity. However, with the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of neoliberal globalization after the 1990s, such discourse has revitalized. The privatization process in Turkey, therefore, cannot be simply discussed in economic terms but is also related to political and ideological processes through the rise of “national sovereignty”, “national developmentalism”, “competitive nationalism” discourses that do not conflict with accelerating processes of capital accumulation and rehabilitate antagonistic class relations.

As a result, national interest discourses are proposed against the “colonization of national economy by foreigners” and veiling the truth of increasing demands of capital fractions in Turkey for the integration with the world economy and gain advantage from the world trade²⁰⁶. Therefore, it is evident that those specific political dynamics and positions associated with an anti-imperialistic and national-developmental discourse detract from class-based politics, leading the discussions to a nationalist direction during the 1990s and 2000s²⁰⁷.

²⁰⁶ For the best examples of such theses, see the works of Y. Koç (2005, 2006, 2009) and İ. Ertuğrul (2004). The titles of these books are self-explanatory: “Privatization: A Means for Dividing Up Turkey” [Özelleştirme: Türkiye’yi Bölmenin Bir Aracı], “Working-Class in the West is the Partner of Exploitation” [Batı’daki İşçi Sınıfı Sömürüye Ortak], “Affects of Imperialism on the Turkish Labor Movement” [Türk Emek Hareketi’nde Emperyalizmin Etkileri] and “Ten Years of Privatization: We Go On to High Treason” [Özelleştirmenin On yılı: Vatan Hainliğine Devam Ediyoruz].

²⁰⁷ Since theoretical programs and ideological boundaries of “left-nationalists” are not drawn clearly yet, I think there is still need for time to analyze them in a more coherent framework. Although I cannot get in the details of this political agenda, I will have a chance to analyze the effects of those views on workers through the outcomes of the field research. For an attempt on this way, see Firat, G. (2006).

Not only in terms of approaches linking the role of the state to nationalist formulations, left-nationalists' concerns regarding development could also be related to nationalism again with reference to the reactions to the privatizations in Turkey. In this context, left-nationalists' focus on anti-imperialism is only limited to notions of economic independence which is necessary for developmental reasons. As mentioned in the previous chapter – with reference to Tom Nairn's arguments that nationalism is a natural response of disadvantaged regions or a periphery reaction against uneven development – left-nationalists argue that nationalist formulations are essential for the realization of developmentalist ideals and political-economic independence. In this view, national economic development could provide harmony between different sectors of the economy as well as classes. As a result, socialist and anti-imperialist struggle is reduced to developmentalist concerns and even domestic capital fractions having “nationalist ideals” is a crucial element of such struggle against foreign domination. Here, it is again easy to see that the class content of such developmentalist ideals and the anti-capitalist character of this struggle are ambiguous. Moreover, similar to arguments within certain sections of the left in Turkey, the relation between capital and labor is considered as complementary rather than contradictory. The notions of class struggle and Marxist theory-practice are not suggested as guiding such a struggle because they are considered to be *hampering such harmony and unity between classes under the fabric of nation*”.

Parallel to their views in other political issues, left-nationalists put a particular focus on the early Republican period. Therefore, left-nationalists stress the Kemalist principle of etatism for the realization of national economic independence and developmental ideals. In this context, the distinction between left nationalism and Kemalist nationalism has been increasingly blurred. At this point, it should be noted that it is highly difficult to differentiate between left-nationalists and radical right-wing nationalists in Turkey, since for both the aim is “protecting the state” and “defending the nation-state”²⁰⁸. Such coalition between left-nationalists and radical nationalists has also been much more visible in their approach to the rise of the political Islamic movement in Turkey by the mid-1990s and electoral victories of the Justice and Development Party (henceforth, AKP) Turkish acronyms are used now. Change all during the 2000s. Secularist concerns and national security-unity concerns of these

²⁰⁸ Although this is the case, there are also some intellectuals and scholars putting a distance to such extreme nationalist positions while approaching the issue still in developmentalist, national independence and sovereignty terms. For example, see Boratav (2010) and Yeldan (2009).

groups have increased due to AKP's policies in foreign policy issues, the Kurdish issue and the strict execution of neoliberal policies which facilitated further integration of domestic capital fractions into the world economy.

Although it is not the aim of this dissertation to analyze wide-ranging debates in Turkey in terms of the clash between secularists and conservatives seen after the electoral victory of the AKP in 2002, it should be noted that there is a shift in political discourse of left-nationalists with such victory of a political party coming from an Islamist tradition. This development in Turkish politics had a number of implications on left-nationalists: the first is that although it was possible to see critics of Kemalism in earlier left-nationalist movements (i.e. in *YÖN* and MDD theses), though it continued to be an integral part of their discourse, now left-nationalists consider Kemalist principles as absolute to the realization of political goals and the most successful model for modernizing a country without Westernization (Atalay, 2006, p. 165). The second point, also related to the first one, is that after the AKP's electoral victory in 2002 and ongoing power in Turkish politics, left-nationalists focus much more on the issues of "secularism" and "unitary state" than the subjective and collective effects of the aforementioned internationalization process of capitalism/the AKP's strict neoliberal policies on working classes. In other words, the concerns of left-nationalists mostly concentrate on the continuation of the principles of *raison d'état* and "red lines" of the Kemalist regime. When objectives of left-nationalists are summarized, this becomes much more obvious: "free Turkey from imperialist domination", "establishing unitary state", "enforcing secularism" and "ensuring that local entrepreneurs work for national interests"²⁰⁹.

In the last part of this chapter, I will focus on the effects and contradictions stemming from such processes and policies of the AKP on working classes. However, before that, there is a need to note how left-nationalists consider the existence and power of the AKP, as a party whose members come from the National View Movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*) but have a different political strategy and discourse to consolidate its power in Turkish politics. Since its foundation in 2001, the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) recorded successive general election victories in 2002 and 2007, with local ones in 2004 and 2008, and via its candidate Abdullah Gül's election as President of the Turkish Republic in 2007, just one month after the general elections. In addition to electoral victories, the AKP's amendment of the constitution,

²⁰⁹ For a brief analysis of the general objectives of left-nationalists, see Uslu, E. 2008, "Ulusalçılık: The Neoliberal Resurgence in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, 9(1): 72-97.

which was finalized in a referendum in 12 September 2010 (with 26 articles of the 1982 Constitution changed), indicated the most important attempt for a democratic constitution desired after the 1980s. Moreover, the party's quest for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem, an active foreign policy targeting the European Union (EU) membership and becoming a model country in the Middle East consolidated the party's power in Turkish politics. Finally, through a strict execution of neoliberal economic policies in accordance with structural adjustment and stabilization packages guided by the IMF and the World Bank, the Justice and Development Party also recorded high growth rates in gross domestic product, despite failing to meet expectations in terms of unemployment rates and fair distribution of national welfare.

The electoral victories of the AKP and its policy formulations in different areas have been considered by left-nationalists as a threat to the traditional pillar of the state in Turkey, namely secularism, through "the Islamization of the society". Moreover, the AKP is regarded as the collaborator of the United States in realizing its Greater Middle East Project, which will transform Turkey into a "Moderate Islamic" country. As a matter of fact, the rise of political Islam had repercussions on labor organizations and movement as well since the early 1980s. For example, Hak-İş (founded in 1983) mostly suggested a philosophy of Islamic brotherhood with employers against conflict-oriented unionism. A focus on moral values and Islamic ideals has started to be the cornerstone of certain labor unions. After the mid-1990s, the establishment of Memur-Sen (founded in 1995) was another indication of such a tendency. On the other hand, especially during the 28 February Process²¹⁰, the secularist concerns of some labor unions had become much more visible in confrontation with the policies of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) government. Labor unions were divided in their approach to the rise of political Islam in Turkey. For example, DİSK and Türk-İş unions (including TOBB and TİSK) declared their concerns for the principle of secularism during this process. KESK (Union of Confederation of Public Workers), including other professional and civil society organizations, declared their concerns for a possible *coup d'état* and urged for staying in the line of democracy²¹¹. Hak-İş and Kamu-Sen firmly criticized the National Security Council

²¹⁰ 28 February process indicates 4th intervention of the Turkish army to the civil politics with the claims that Welfare Party as the coalition partner of the government violates secularist principles.

²¹¹ During the 1990s, many professional and civil society organizations as well as trade chambers declared their views on the debates on Kurdish politics, the Cyprus issue, the European Union accession process, the rise of political Islam and secularist concerns against the 28 February process, not to mention neoliberal economic policies (especially privatizations). Some of these civil society organizations, such as TOBB, TMMOB, TZOB,

decisions and concerns of other labor unions on secularism. Such divisions and concerns on secularism among labor unions (including professional organizations and business chambers) would increase during the reign of the AKP after 2002.

In addition to this, the neoliberal economic policies pursued by the AKP are considered to serve the interests of “imperialist powers” and “to divide Turkey” through imperialist motives. Obviously, for left-nationalists, not only the economic program of the AKP, but also its vision on the solution of the Kurdish question in Turkey is considered to be another aspect of such “imperialist plans”. Similar to problematic approaches within Marxism on the solution of the self-determination problem, left-nationalists reduce the solution of this problem to further economic development of the eastern region of Turkey, although the Kurdish population is now living in metropolitan cities of Turkey to a great extent. The slogan of “one nation, one language and one flag” has been main motto of left-nationalists on the Kurdish issue, which is a slogan currently used by the governing AKP. Their extreme nationalist approach constitutes another Achilles’ heel for left-nationalists, which makes it difficult to understand what is “left” in their formulations and projections. Moreover, as mentioned previously regarding the approaches to the role of state, borders between left nationalism and Kemalist nationalism/radical nationalism are increasingly blurred when we consider their views on the solution of Kurdish question in Turkey. Even racist and xenophobic discourses could be seen on this issue in left-nationalist journals such as *Türk Solu*, *Aydınlık* and *İleri*²¹², in which a focus on Marxist concepts is much more visible than in other journals and newspapers subscribing to Kemalist nationalism and Third Worldism. Obviously, this situation makes it quite impossible to expect from left-nationalists to offer an alternative socialist-leftist vision for the totality of working classes whose ethnic composition could not be reduced to a single ethnic identity.

gave a reaction to these processes in a nationalist manner stressing their concerns for the future of the state (*devletin bekası*). See Bora (2000).

²¹² In *İleri* and *Türk Solu* journals, the conception of the “Left” is considered as inseparable from the terms “secularism, etatism and nationalism”. Moreover, symbols of the national independence movement and elements of Kemalist nationalism are considered as principles guiding a leftist and socialist politics. In these journals, historical references are always given to the “anti-imperialist” independence struggle. They also define themselves in a series of “anti” positions, such as anti-imperialist, anti-American, anti-EU, anti-Islamic, anti-Kurdish, anti-AKP, anti-globalist, anti-Westernist and so on and references to the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism and its effects on workers and labor movement are rarely seen. In these respects, it could be argued that they diverge from previous left-nationalist journals such as *Yön*, *Devrim* etc. in terms of criticisms of capitalist relations of production, which are given only in a limited fashion. Moreover, as Bora also argued (2003, p. 439), the anti-globalist discourse of those circles signify a reaction to national sovereignty and unitary state issues, rather than globalization’s effects on working classes in Turkey. See Bora, T. 2003, “Nationalist Discourses in Turkey”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, No.102:2/3, pp. 433-452.

In terms of their effects on labor politics, it should be noted that the rise of Kurdish identity politics and activities of the PKK during the 1990s has been another factor dividing working classes and labor union politics. Concerns on territorial unity have increased both in labor unions and workers, in the context of AKP's attempts to find a democratic solution to the issue. It needs to be also noted that, with the ongoing rapid migration of the Kurdish population to big cities in Turkey, such concerns intensified as a result of increasing difficulties in finding jobs due to competition between workers as well as the limits of the labor market²¹³.

In addition to secularist and unitary state concerns, the approaches of left-nationalists to the accession of Turkey to the European Union (henceforth, EUAP) mainly equate this process as the realization of "imperialist plans" on Turkey rather than through its implications on the working classes. The EUAP is considered as an attempt to "divide Turkey" and to "end the rights of national sovereignty"²¹⁴. Here, a particular focus is given to the debates on the Cyprus issue, the Armenian and Kurdish questions as well as other issues which are related to the EUAP, such as the demands of the Orthodox patriarchate from Turkey, the so-called missionary activities and policies provoking minorities in Turkey. The AKP's policies on reducing the role of the army in Turkish politics through certain reform packages and legal investigations on failed coup attempts are also considered as a part of such plans on Turkey.

Within these considerations, the concerns of left-nationalists on secularism and unitary state are expressed over the *Sèvres Syndrome*, with left-nationalist reference to the "eternal imperialist plans" of foreign countries on Turkey²¹⁵. To sum up, both the economic policies of

²¹³ Another important issue, which is usually underestimated in the analyses or considered to be an issue limited to the EU and United States, is the rapid increase of migrant workers from different countries (especially from the post-Soviet countries and Africa) from the mid-1990s which intensifies these contradictions within working classes because migrant workers accept to work for lower wages, without social security in order to survive. For an analysis, though discussing the issue in a reactionary manner and nationalist terms, see Koç, 2010, pp. 348-349.

²¹⁴ Such an approach could also be seen in the discourses of major labor union confederations in Turkey, the most notable example being Türk-İş, see Topak, O. 2008, "Türkiye Sendikal Hareketi, Enternasyonalizm ve Milliyetçilik", in *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı ve Emek Hareketi Küreselleşiyor mu?*, SAV Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 127.

²¹⁵ Uslu (2008, p. 78) describes the Sèvres Syndrome in these terms: "the Sèvres Complex has often given birth to irrational fantasies bordering on paranoia, its genesis lies in a genuine national trauma. The Sèvres Treaty parceled out large chunks of the Ottoman Empire to the victorious allies, including much of the territory Turks regard as their homeland. Greece received Eastern Thrace and the area around Izmir; France and Italy were allocated "spheres of influence," which they later occupied, in southern and southwestern Anatolia, respectively; and an independent Armenian state was to be created in the northeast. Lastly, Kurdish Anatolia was to remain an autonomous area within Ottoman boundaries, but after one year its inhabitants were to be granted the right to request independent status from the League of Nations through a referendum or similar mechanism.

AKP and its policy formulations in different areas are always linked to imperialism, which leads left-nationalists to support an anti-imperialist struggle with an inadequate critique of the dynamics of capitalism in the neoliberal era. However, different from the theoretical approaches and political strategies of the left in the 1960s and 1970s, even a limited focus on other important elements of Marxist theory and practice, such as anti-capitalism and the class-based nature of the struggle against capitalism is dropped in such approaches and strategies. Moreover, reductionist and essentialist formulations analyzed in the first chapter are systematically reproduced by the supporters of left nationalism especially after the consolidation of the power of AKP in Turkish politics.

Debates on the privatization process which was strictly implemented by AKP governments after 2002²¹⁶, which will be given in detail in the following chapter, are a prime example of the problematic approach of left nationalists in the 2000s. Discourses and strategies of leftist parties, intellectuals and labor unions against the privatization campaign under the AKP government intersected with the struggle against AKP's political program in the context of secular-nationalist-anti-imperialist (but not anti-capitalist and internationalist in Marxist terms) concerns²¹⁷. During the reign of AKP in Turkish politics from 2002 on, left-nationalists continued to focus on the concerns of the 90's left-nationalism: reactions to neoliberal hegemony in terms of the crisis of the state and secularist concerns with the successive electoral victories of the political Islamic movement.

It should also be noted that, as will be analyzed in the following chapter, similar debates and discourses triggered by the privatization process (the internationalization of capital, increasing flows of foreign capital and domestic contradictions as well as alliances in discussions of public procurement law) could be seen in labor unions' and workers' reactions to and perceptions on the privatization process. During the protests of the labor unions against

²¹⁶ While the history of privatization efforts can be dated back to mid-1980s, the major privatization campaign was executed by the Justice and Development Party government after 2002, who came to govern the National Program (prepared by Kemal Derviş after the 2001 economic crisis) suggesting that "major public banks, state-owned telecommunications, electricity, airlines, petroleum, steel, tobacco and spirits, sugar, natural gas and electricity distribution industries would be privatized and opened to global markets, just like a wide range of social services such as education, health and social security systems" and issued the Turkish public procurement law in January 2002 with the rationale of "more efficient public spending" and as a typical element of neoliberal fiscal policies.

²¹⁷ For the main framework of such a struggle, see Koç, Y. (2005) and (2006).

privatization (also visible in the discourse of the Labor Platform, *Emek Platformu*,²¹⁸ and its “Labor Program”, *Emek Programı*), it was stated that “national sovereignty cannot be sold to the international capital” and “privatization has damaging effect on Turkey’s national defense and economy”. Although there has been critics by KESK and partly DİSK unions to such nationalist tendencies and they sometimes emphasized the importance of an international struggle, these views can be considered as a proof of such dominance of nationalism oriented discourse within the labor politics as well. As will be analyzed in detail later, the slogans of the workers during these protests took the following form: “They sold out our country!”, “Damn the IMF, independent Turkey!”, “Tekel, Tüpraş, Türk Telekom mean homeland, they can’t be sold” “This is the Second National Liberation Movement”. Privatizations are considered as a threat to the unity and integrity of Turkish nation state, and linked to other issues such as “they will empower ethnic and religious community identities”. During the 2000s, especially in the protests organized by Türk-İş, it was also possible to see such examples of a nationalist discourse in other foreign policy issues of Turkey: “We will not be a colony of the EU”, “We damn imperialism’s plans in Cyprus”, “We damn the lies of the Armenian genocide”, “we will not let a new Sèvres plan for Turkey”.

Generally speaking, it could also be argued that due to structural dynamics decomposing and fragmenting working class structure and the aforementioned political concerns of labor unions and leftist parties, a collective struggle could not be given against the worsening conditions of the workers. As a result of the policies started by the 1980s, subcontracting relations in production and services which brought increasing fragmentation between sub-contracted and contracted workers, the informalization of production²¹⁹ and competition within the labor market as a result of high levels of unemployment and finally privatizations in different sectors of the economy have become major problems workers and labor unions faced. On the side of labor unions, they continuously lost their members since 1994 due to these processes

²¹⁸ Labor Platform was formed in 1999 as a coalition of major labor unions in Turkey in public and private sectors in response to the draft laws on social security reform, privatization and international arbitration.

²¹⁹ Such informalization of the production and the development of sub-contracting relations also brought increasing problems in the working conditions due to insufficient measures especially for security in the workplace. The most notable and traumatic experiences during the late 2000s were seen in the shipping sector (especially in ship producing companies in Tuzla) and mining industries in Turkey. Especially in the Tuzla case, public opposition was high. On the other hand, the AKP government (as well as some journalists) used a well-known nationalist and conspiracy theory argument suggesting that such precarious conditions due to sub-contracting is the rule of the game in such an *internationally competitive industry* and *foreign powers* plan accidents in those companies to increase their power in this sector against the increasing *power of Turkey*. For a detailed analysis on informalization and sub-contracting relations developed in Tuzla, including public debates and media critics, see Akdemir, N. 2008, *Taşeronlu Birikim: Tuzla Tersaneler Bölgesinde Üretim İlişkilerinde Enformelleşme*, SAV Yayınları, İstanbul.

and could not lead a collective struggle against these as seen in the failure of the Labor Platform and Labor Program experience in the early 2000s. These tendencies have accelerated and labor politics as well as workers' conditions worsened much more than other decades during the AKP reign as mentioned above. In the third chapter of this dissertation, these processes and worsening conditions which result from AKP's strict neoliberal program will be analyzed in further details.

Obviously, the failure of leftist politics and labor unions in analyzing the dynamics mentioned above and their effects on working classes in both collective and subjective dimensions are important to understand the nationalist approaches discussed above. In the last section of this chapter, a critical analysis of the repercussions of those processes and debates on the labor unions and workers in collective and subjective terms will be presented.

A Critical Analysis of Theoretical Debates among Turkish Leftists and Strategies of Labor Unions against Neoliberal Globalization: Concluding Remarks on the Historical Legacy

As analyzed and discussed throughout this chapter, there are numerous dimensions to understand the relation of nationalism to both the development of the left and the labor movement in Turkey. To summarize, firstly, it should be noted that in the early republican and the first decade of the multi-party period, the strict control and tutelage of the state, as well as the promotion of the idea of organic unity and harmony in interests between classes with an etatist-populist-nationalist discourse, adversely affected the development of the labor movement and leftist politics in both political and organizational terms. In such a political atmosphere, for both labor unions and socialist parties it was impossible to open up a legitimate political space to express alternative views (i.e. internationalist and class-based struggle) to transform the society. In contrast, also due to constitutional and institutional boundaries limiting political activities, nationalist and state-centric formulations were dominant. These formulations and a pragmatic use of nationalist discourse were understandable when the concern to find a source of legitimacy for political activities is taken into consideration. Furthermore, it was also impossible for labor unions and socialist parties to develop relations with workers in terms of political mobilization. It is argued that in this weak relation between the left and the labor movement in Turkey, the role of the oppressive and authoritarian conception of politics should not be underestimated. Moreover, workers and

unions were considered as important elements in the inculcation of nationalist values and the main actors of national developmentalism and economic independence. Thus, they were the active agents of this nationalization project which preceded/obstructed a struggle based on class antagonisms.

Secondly, with the 1961 constitution introducing more freedom for labor unions and socialist parties in both organizational and legal terms in an environment where industrialization and urbanization dynamics accelerated for working-classes, a remarkable level of political mobilization of workers could be possible. However, with the military interventions in the early 1970s and 1980s, the prospects for such political mobilization and organization were eliminated. Moreover, in the period between 1961-1980, due to both peculiarist-essentialist-reductionist theoretical approaches and international inspirations from different struggles in the Third World and the Soviet policies analyzed earlier, the Turkish Left continued to prioritize the relation with nationalism over class politics. The idea of socialism was equated with nationalist aspirations for developmentalism and protectionism, associated with nationalist desires for independence and sovereignty. This was visible in the discourses of TİP and YÖN-MDD movements, reflecting itself in the concepts of “national democratic revolution” and “national developmental path”. Similar to the formulations in Egypt, India, Iraq, Algeria and other Soviet-supported countries, the Turkish type of socialism viewed nationalism as an integral element of the struggle and has become highly influential among workers and unions who aspired for rapid national economic development for their material interests. During this period, the influence of Kemalist nationalism was also dominant among workers and labor unions especially with “the center of the Left” stance of the RPP in the mid-1960s. The idea of socialism had only meaning with a focus on developmentalism, and such kind of developmentalism was completely compatible with ongoing class antagonisms. Especially with the establishment of new state economic enterprises for developmental needs and the resulting growth in the gross domestic product during the 1960s, such articulation with nationalist-developmental ideas and workers’ demands and expectations could never be questioned or problematized. On the contrary, a kind of state capitalism was even defended in certain leftist circles and a critical reading of this development and its repercussions on the capital-labor-state relation could never be done.

Thirdly, in the post-1980 period, the traumatic effects of the 12 September 1980 coup in Turkey on both the labor movement and socialist politics led to the crisis of the left and the labor movement in Turkey through extensive political bans. As a result, labor unions and leftist parties could not find a space in the political field of the post-coup Turkey and were unable to give an organized class struggle against the execution of neoliberal policies implemented in the 1980s. The early 1990s were a critical junction for workers' mobilization against the negative effects of neoliberal policies. However, due to both domestic and international dynamics mentioned above, labor unions and leftist politics were much more disorganized than the previous decades to initiate a collective resistance to the decomposing effects of neoliberal policies on the working classes. Moreover, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and bipolar world order and the failure of the Maoist experience by the early 1990s led to another legitimacy crisis for leftist politics in Turkey. In such a conjuncture and with the acceleration of the internationalization dynamics of capitalism throughout the world, essentialist and peculiarist formulations with a nationalist content have started to become visible again. These nationalist formulations were suggested by certain leftist and social democratic parties as a solution to escape from the maelstrom of neoliberalism. For working classes and their political-collective organizations, to speak in terms of the subjective dimension referring to experiences stemming from these processes, a viable political atmosphere was available to perceive ongoing adverse effects of the neoliberalism and internationalization of capitalism as processes imposed from foreign actors. Moreover, the dynamics which incited nationalist reactions were considered by workers as sourcing from the crisis of the nation-state rather than the labor movement. Both labor unions and the left in Turkey failed to mobilize these reactions in favor of class struggle because of a misreading of the class (as a social and cultural formation that came out of a long historical process) and capitalism, perceived as a relation belonging to the categories of the nation-state and the national, not between labor and capital. In the following chapter, the results of a fieldwork on the privatization process in Turkey after the mid-1980s will be presented within this framework. It will be argued that the privatization process in Turkey firstly constitutes a good example of the theoretical pitfalls within Marxism in the analysis of nationalism and the dangers of economic determinism and the progressive-evolutionary scheme ignoring the political character of the struggles. Secondly, it will be claimed that it is also a good example for understanding class experience in the age of neoliberal globalization and the kind of reactions and discourses witnessed against the internationalization dynamics of capitalism. It

will be argued that as a general tendency of the age of globalization, subjective-collective experiences stemming from structural and peculiar socio-cultural dynamics lead workers to develop nationalist solutions suggesting much more developmentalist and protectionist policies to escape from the neoliberal maelstrom. These reactions of working classes also show that the internationalization of capital does not necessarily lead to the internationalization of workers' struggles if the political content of those struggles and discourses are not taken into account in a critical way.

CHAPTER III: WORKING CLASSES AND NATIONALISM: REACTIONS AGAINST NEOLIBERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY

Introductory Points: Methodology and Scope of the Field Study

As discussed in previous chapters, the reactions of workers, labor unions and Marxists against the accelerating internationalization of capitalism after the 1980s reflect the still ongoing problematic relation between Marxist theory and nationalism. This is particularly visible during the process of privatizations in different countries which is an important component of the neoliberal project targeting the further internationalization of capital investments and creating new surplus values in different national markets. The Turkish case is a good example in these terms: both to see how theoretical pitfalls within Marxism caused problematic political approaches reproducing the idea of nationalism rather internationalism, and how the internationalization of capitalism does not necessarily lead to the internationalization of the labor movement if such kind of political-theoretical formulations are reproduced.

Therefore, in the first chapter, it was argued that to overcome problematic approaches within Marxist theory on the questions of nationalism and class politics, an analysis of political and ideological processes as well as the subjective-collective experiences that have been influential in shaping working class consciousness (political preferences, class solidarity and perceptions) has crucial significance. Thus, to understand the relation between nationalism and class, the inevitability of an analysis bridging structural factors and subjective processes was underlined.

For this purpose, in the second chapter, the reflections of such problematic theoretical and political approaches on the development of leftist politics and theory in Turkey were discussed. It was argued that the Turkish case is a good example of how the internationalization process of capitalism introduces new challenges for workers and labor unions and how reactions and political formulations are usually displayed in nationalist and protectionist tones by workers, labor unions and leftist politics. It was pointed out that these processes are not peculiar to Turkey and could be seen in different national contexts. The historical relation of the Turkish Left and labor unions with nationalism has been highly visible, especially when reactions against privatizations and increasing foreign investments in

Turkey are taken into consideration. The peculiar character of the Turkish case relates to the high level of state tutelage on labor unions and hostility to class politics especially during the early republican years and after successive military interventions in politics. Thus, it was impossible for labor unions and socialist parties to develop relations with workers in terms of political mobilization. Moreover, such tutelage on labor politics was also accompanied with the problem of absence of intellectual leadership and the legacy of theoretical pitfalls within Marxism to understand the national conditions of working classes. Rather than developing alternatives which correspond to the reality of working classes in Turkey and their material problems, models are derived from different socialist countries and ideological leaders such as Stalin and Mao. These models had also political repercussions and have become a vehicle to bypass working classes by giving priority to “national” interests and demands. In this picture, when the post-1980 conjuncture is considered, we observe a political atmosphere attributing the adverse effects of neoliberalism and internationalization of capitalism (namely, intensified transnationalization of production and finance in world economy) to foreign actors and dynamics, which in turn incited nationalist reactions, associated with a state-centric approach suggesting that the origins of the problems lie in the crisis of the nation-state rather than the labor movement. Moreover, developmentalist-protectionist formulations within the Turkish Left since the early decades of the Republic have become more visible during the neoliberal age and they did not provide an alternative to the culmination of antagonistic class relations, but reproduced and justified them by a focus on nationalist considerations and formulations. The privatization process in Turkey proves that problematic theoretical approaches and their implications for political practice may lead to such a result.

The third part of this dissertation is based on a field research aiming to scrutinize and elaborate on the discussions and approaches mentioned above. Whereas a vast majority of the studies on the effects of privatization on workers focus on simply questioning “whether privatizations are good and bad for workers, “whether workers are against privatizations or not”, or “was it rational to privatize certain state economic enterprises in terms of economic rationality and productiveness-profitability”, the aim of this chapter is to find out the political repercussions of such criticisms and reactions against privatizations as well as the perceptions of workers about the privatization process in general. I will discuss emerging social contradictions stemming from structural and objective processes and how they influence

workers' experiences and perceptions, without reducing class to economic categories and without falling prey to idealizations about the class phenomenon.

For this purpose, the field research focuses on the experiences of labor unions and workers during the privatization process as the most important sector of Turkish society directly affected by privatizations. Moreover, privatization is not simply an economic process and cannot be merely represented in terms of the economic inefficiencies of the public sector. Such technical-economic representations of privatization would ignore its unavoidable political character and the results of privatization decisions on different social groups with costs and benefits. Since privatizations also initiate the debates on the increasing volume of foreign direct investments (FDI) across borders and the role international actors play in planning privatizations in different countries, political reactions against these processes are inevitable. It is an important question to consider where these reactions will be channeled and whether they could become a part of class struggle. Thus both the privatization experience of workers and the political content of their strategies-discourses against it are crucial to understand privatization in a comprehensive way.

To sum up, the pertinence of the field-work as the core part of this study lies in the fact that it tries to find out *“how privatization process as a case of neoliberal policies in a developing country affects workers' attitudes, reactions, perceptions as well as political-ideological stances (an amalgamation of objective and subjective dimensions) in the current conjuncture”* and *“why all social contradictions appear as national ones and reflected in nationalistic manner”*.

Privatizations: A Key Element of Neoliberal Restructuring in Turkey

Privatization is a key element of the neoliberal globalization process and different definitions of it exist due to diverse economic and political approaches. This study takes privatization as an important component of the liberalization of various economic sectors and transfer of public ownership and services to private ownership, while limiting the state's role in economic life. The privatization process cannot be simply considered as the sale of a public sector company to a private one, however; in many privatization cases we see that factory is closed and replaced by private actors, i.e. privatizations in cement industry and paper production (SEKA case in Turkey). As stated in the definition, in “asset sales” method, which

shares a limited volume in revenues derived from privatizations but remarkable in the total number of privatized assets, changing relations of ownership are considered as an important motive for privatizations.

This content and definition of privatization is also clearly visible in various reports, which link privatizations to “the major program of structural adjustment since the 1980s to accomplish the goal of placing greater reliance on market forces and reducing the scope for state intervention through pursuing certain policies”²²⁰. In addition to other policies, such as monetarism, financial deregulation, reducing controls on prices-wages-exchange rates-interest rates, lowering taxation and reducing government spending, privatizations constitute the most important element of the neoliberal program executed in Turkey since the 1980s. As a matter of fact, as discussed in the first two chapters, this is the case for many developed and developing countries, which engaged in rolling back the state involvement in the economy since the mid-1970s and adjusted their economy to integrate to the world economy.

One may speak of different methods of privatization. In the Turkish case, those methods are all used but the most important one is the block sale of the SEEs remind us what SEE is (rather than public offerings nationally and internationally, sale at Istanbul Stock Exchange, IMKB, asset sale, paid-up transfer of operational rights) with a 50% share in total revenues between 1985 and 2011²²¹, to get the highest revenues in the short term and facilitate the process.

²²⁰ For example, see the definition of the Directorate of Privatization Administration (DPA) at <http://www.oib.gov.tr>.

²²¹ Between 1985 and 2002, block sales constituted 61% of the offers of public assets, to be followed by 18% in international offerings and 11% in offerings via the Istanbul stock exchange market. As Yeldan argued, the block sale, as the outright direct sale of the majority of public shares to a single buyer, is regarded as the least desirable method from the point of view of economic competition and efficiency, since it is often the case that bloc sale of the majority shares often leads to creation of private monopolies. On the other hand, originating from the failure of the first privatization attempt during Özal’s government in the case of Teletaş, due to the weak interest of domestic investors, the block sale method has thus been the most preferable one in Turkey.




Figure 1. Mode of privatization in Turkey.

Source: Privatization Administration Publications, 'Privatization in Turkey', <http://www.oib.gov.tr/yayinlar/yayinlar.htm>, 22 March 2012²²².

The most important privatizations in terms of the volume of revenues were executed by the block sale method, such as the privatization of the Türk Telekom, Erdemir, Petkim, Tüpraş (block sales mostly over 50% of shares, respectively 55%, 46%, 51%, 51%). Among these sales, between 1986 and 2010, the share of international investors in the privatization process reached 41%, while sale to local investors gets the higher ratio with 59%²²³.

Share of The International Investors in the Privatization Implementatio (1986-2010)




Figure 2: Share of International Investors in Privatizations

(Source: <http://www.oib.gov.tr/yayinlar/publications.htm>)

²²² Cited in Öniş, 2011, p. 712.

²²³ For the scope of privatizations in the world in these terms, see http://rru.worldbank.org/Images/Privatization/Graphs/Region/global_num_trans.gif. For privatizations in the world in sectoral terms, see <http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/Sector.aspx?sectorid=999&view=proceeds&tab=2>, and in regional terms see <http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/Sector.aspx?sectorid=999&view=proceeds&tab=2>. For the privatization database, see <http://rru.worldbank.org/privatization/Default.aspx>.

At this point, it should be noted that the critics of various local capital fractions to get a share in privatization operates with an opportunistic use of the “nationalist discourse” (as discussed in Chapter 2)²²⁴ and the annulment of certain privatization deals by appeals to the Council of State and the Constitutional Court with the claims of “the violation of public interest, national strategic concerns in terms of security and dependency” constituted an important factor in this slightly larger share of local investors. This also proves that the privatization process is not simply executed by external pressures, but domestic actors also gain substantial benefits from the auctions. As discussed in the previous chapters, similar to the Argentinean experience where domestic industrialists have been a significant source of resistance to privatization if they feel that they will not be able to participate in and benefit from this process (Öniş, 2011, p. 710), a similar shift has been seen in the Turkish case as key domestic industrialists shifted from passive resistance to active support, thereby constituting an important turning point in the fortunes of a privatization experiment²²⁵.

In terms of the legal structure of privatizations, a brief note should also be pointed out. The privatization program in Turkey was initiated in 1983. In 1984, the first related regulation (Law No: 2983) was enacted and later in 1986 (Law No: 3291). In 1986, Morgan Guarantee Trust, with close collaboration with the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası), Bank of Industrial Development and Credits (Sınai Yatırım ve Kredi Bankası), Industrial Finance Co. (Yatırım Finansman A.Ş.) and Price Waterhouse Co., prepared a Master Plan for the main targets of the privatization program, which gives priority to the sale of SEEs to foreign companies. Yeldan summarizes the objectives of the master plan as follows:

(1) to transfer the decision making process from the public to private sector to ensure a more effective play of market forces; (2) to promote competition, improve efficiency and increase the productivity of public enterprises; (3) to enable a wider distribution of share-ownership; (4) to reduce the financial burden of the state economic enterprises (SEEs) on the general budget; and (5) to raise revenue for the Treasury²²⁶.

²²⁴ ÖİB also champions such nationalist discourse in its documents mentioning the vision of the institution in a different manner in terms of “national competitiveness”: “to pioneer privatization applications under global competent power objective of Turkey”.

²²⁵ See Öniş, Z. 2011, “Power, Interests and Coalitions: the political economy of mass privatisation in Turkey”, *Third World Quarterly*, 32:4, 707-724

²²⁶ Yeldan, E. 2005, “Assessing the Privatization Experience in Turkey: Implementation, Politics and Performance Results.” Report submitted to the Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC. http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane/EPI_Report2005_Yeldan.pdf (accessed July 10, 2011).

In 1990, the Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund was divided into two “extra-budgetary funds”, namely the Mass Housing, and the Public Participation Administration via (the Decree Law no. 414) Law No. 3291, which remained as the main privatization law until 1994. Within the framework of the provisions of Law No. 3291, the Council of Ministers was authorized to take a decision on the transfer of SEE’s (State Economic Enterprises) to the PPA (Public Participation Administration) and the High Planning Council was authorized to decide on the transfer of partially state owned companies and subsidiaries to the PPA for privatization. In 1992, with the Statutory Decree No: 473, PPHC (Public Participation High Council) was authorized to approve privatization transactions. The PPA changed its name to the Privatization Administration (*Özelleştirme İdaresi*) and became autonomous with full responsibility for taking all decisions concerning revenues of sales. Upon formation of a political and social consensus on the needs for privatization, the new privatization law has been enacted on 27 November 1994 with the new Law No: 4046²²⁷. Moreover, based on this law in 1994, an amendment was made in 1999 in the constitution²²⁸ where the 47th article entitled “Etatization” (*Devletleştirme*) was changed as “Etatization and Privatization”. With this change in the constitution, it was mentioned in the constitution that “procedures and principles of the privatization of the SEEs are indicated in the law”, which made law no. 4046 effective. Moreover, to facilitate privatization efforts, a new law amendment was introduced in 2003 under the AKP government, namely law no. 4971 (“Bazı Kanunlarda ve Milli Piyango İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Kuruluş ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamede Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun”). In this way, the implementation of privatizations could be accelerated in administrative and legal terms, through regulations making bureaucratic processes easier and simpler²²⁹. As Öniş (2011, p. 711) argued, “associated with these legal and institutional shifts are major shifts in economic and political

²²⁷ In the introduction of the new legal framework for privatizations, the currency crisis of 1994 has been influential on the government’s decision (during the 50th coalition government formed under the prime ministry of Tansu Çiller who was a keen supporter of privatizations and prepared a reform package for this purpose) to adopt a stabilization program on April 5th, 1994 as a result of the IMF stand-by agreement, which put a great emphasis on the privatization of the SEEs.

²²⁸ In 1999, the privatization concept was included into the Constitution in 1999 when *international arbitration* was recognized, a development which elucidates increasing power of international actors vis-à-vis the Turkish state.

²²⁹ As Blind (2009, p. 89) argued, although legal preparations for privatizations took place in the early 1980s, by the term “opening to the public”, privatization was first mentioned in 1972 in a decree of the military government saying that: “SEEs shall be transformed into corporations and linked to holdings compatible with the principles of free market economics. They will then sell their shares (1) first to the workers of the SEEs being privatized, (2) then to the local population, (3) followed by the emigrant workers outside Turkey, and finally to (4) the national firms with good standing. If shares are left after that, private foreign firms can be considered as prospective clients, given that they invest in technology.

power that create an opportunity space for certain key powerful actors, such as domestic and foreign conglomerates, as components of the new powerful pro-privatization coalition, while closing the opportunity space for other actors such as organized labor or state employees, who find themselves increasingly marginalized and weakened in the process”.

Not only those changes and a complicated but sophisticated institutional organization of the ÖİB (The Directorate of Privatization Administration) for making the necessary preparations for privatizations, but also a significant reform attempt was made for the infrastructure of the legal framework of the privatization process and attracting much more Foreign Direct Investment-encouraging private initiative/entrepreneurial skills. Major legislative changes took place in Turkey in recent years such as: Electricity Market Law, Natural Gas Market Law, Telecommunications Law, Sugar Law, Tobacco Law, Banking Law, Petroleum Market Law, Foreign Direct Investment Law, Company Law, Law concerning the elimination of FDI restrictions in some sectors, Law regarding several amendments which is aimed at accelerating privatization, provisions authorizing real estate purchases to foreigners. In addition to these legislative changes, regulatory bodies to govern the private sector are established to favorably affect privatization applications. These regulatory bodies, founded first in the early 1980s and mostly before the AKP period and under Kemal Derviş program, such as the Board of Capital Markets (SPK, 1981), Board of Competition (RK, 1994), Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency (BDDK, 1999), Board of Telecommunications (TK, 2000), Regulation Board of Energy Markets (EPDK, 2001) Regulation Board of Tobacco and Alcoholic Drinks Market (TAPDK, 2002), have been instrumental in the internationalization of policy-making processes from public administration to governance. Moreover, they have been a tool for legitimizing neoliberal restructuring and structural adjustment reforms as well as the reconfiguration of the role of the state in Turkey, with a discourse of “transparency and good governance” which would “eliminate corruption and ineffectiveness” of the SEEs (see debates on the corruption given in the second chapter) and liberalize the markets with the removal of the state from the economic sphere.

In addition to the economic reform programs and development strategies introduced by the AKP government since 2003, other binding documents are the harmonization packages for the EU Accession Process aiming to abolish the limits for the flow of foreign capital and Stand-By agreements with the IMF (19th Stand-By) where promises were given for the completion

of the privatizations in the portfolio of ÖİB until the end of 2009²³⁰. On the other hand, it should be particularly noted, as also discussed in chapter 2 with reference to attempts of domestic capital groups' opportunistic use of national interest discourse to benefit from privatization auctions, it would be a mistake to argue that the privatization process was initiated in Turkey with the pressure of external or foreign capital actors, although they have crucial roles. This is because of the fact that domestic political and economic forces have also played an active role in both the justification of processes since the 1980s and its strict execution for further integration to the world economy. For example, TÜSİAD was one of the major actors always attempting to be influential in policy-making and execution for privatizations since the 1980s²³¹. Moreover, as also pointed out by Balkan Şahin (2010), by appealing to a wider set of interests and identities, the association tried to transcend its members' material interests and justify its demand for privatization by claiming to represent *the general interests of the country*.²³² The same TÜSİAD would criticize the new trend of block sales of SEEs to foreign capital. As seen in the cases of Sümerbank and particularly PETKİM (petrochemical producer), the privatizations of those SEEs led to harsh criticisms on the grounds that the decision was totally against "national sovereignty." As a matter of fact, the opposition of business groups, such as TÜSİAD, was based on their concerns for increased competition due to the involvement of foreign investors in the process²³³. Therefore, nationalist discourse has become much more visible.

Actually, it could be discussed that capital groups in Turkey usually give reference to national and religious elements in their discourses. In certain cases, the national interests discourse is

²³⁰ World Bank is another important player in the execution of privatizations, especially with its contribution to post-privatization effects. *Privatization Social Support Project*, consisting of compensation payments, labour redeployment services and monitoring the social effects of the economic reform program, have been carried out with the loan granted by the World Bank (70% of the loan worth of 355 million dollars was sourced by the World Bank in 2000). Target groups in the project comprise individuals who have been made redundant due to preparation for privatization, privatization, downsizing or partial or full cessation of activities, closing down or liquidation of SEEs (priority target group); individuals who have lost their jobs due to ERP; and other individuals who are having difficulty in entering the job market.

²³¹ For example, the major benefactor of the internationalization of the economy since the early 1980s was the only representative of large capital groups having international networks, namely the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD) which had put strict pressure on government since then for less state intervention in the economy and more rapid implementation of the privatization program. After the electoral success of the AKP as the single-party government dominating the parliament, TÜSİAD increased its criticisms on the late implementation of such a program, which is concerned as a barrier to more foreign direct investment which is mostly flowing to more business-friendly and market-oriented economies. See Öniş, Z. 1991, "The Evolution of Privatization in Turkey: The Institutional Context of Public-Enterprise Reform." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, No. 2, pp. 163-176.

²³² For a debate, see Balkan Şahin, S. 2010, Privatization as a Hegemonic Process in Turkey, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 483-498.

²³³ See Öniş, Z., 1991.

combined with or supported by the necessities of religious rules and sometimes used interchangeably. In the Turkish case, nationalist references include the claim that “workers should be concerned with national duties and interests” in all aspects of working life for further economic development, and privatizations are said to be key to this purpose.

On the other hand, major domestic capital groups were not principally against foreign firms’ participation to the process but such national interest discourse provided them a fertile environment to be a part of the process or tenders. In light of the increasing international economic activities of domestic firms in the last decade and the development of practices of strategic partnerships with foreign partners, it was much easier for the AKP government to justify or legitimize privatizations. This could be easily seen in AKP’s globalist discourse justifying privatizations as a necessary condition of closer integration with the world market.

Until the electoral victory of the AKP in 2002, privatizations in Turkey were limited to small and medium-scale privatizations with the only exception of the block sale of Petrol Ofisi (POAŞ, petroleum products and distribution agency) in 2000. It should be remembered that a great deal of the privatization of the companies in the portfolio of ÖİB was completed by 2010 under the strict execution of privatization program by the AKP. Since 2003, completed privatizations are as follows: 100% of the shares/stakes held by the government/state in 55 companies; partial divestitures in 6 entities; 58 plants, 8 hotels & social facilities, 3 vessels; transfer of operational rights of 6 seaports/harbors and concession rights of 2 public services. Moreover, over 1000 real estates/assets/properties were sold off during the aforementioned period. The total of overall privatization proceeds realized by the Turkish Privatization Administration have reached 41 Billion of USD as of today and 80% of this revenue was realized under the AKP government between 2003-2010 (see Figure 3). 15,6 billion of USD revenue has been generated from the privatization of *blue chip* companies which included Turk Telecom, Tüpraş, Erdemir and Petkim.




Figure 3: Privatization Revenues in Years (1985-2010)²³⁴




Figure 4. Privatization revenues (1985–2011, \$million). Source:

<http://www.oib.gov.tr/yayinlar/publications.htm>

As seen in the Figure 4, the most important privatizations were completed between 2005 and 2008 in terms of revenue generation and those are listed below in Figure 5²³⁵:

²³⁴ Cited from Öniş, 2011, p. 712.

²³⁵ Source: <http://www.oib.gov.tr/yayinlar/publications.htm>

1. Privatization Implementation -2005

Company	Sector	Proportion	Amount
ETİ ALUMINIUM	Mining	100%	305 Million USD
TURK TELEKOM	Telecommunication	55%	6,5 Billion USD
ISTANBUL HILTON OTEL	Tourism	Real Estate	255 Million USD
TUPRAS	Refinery	%14 (IMKB)	454 Million USD
PETKIM	Petrochemical	%34 (IMKB)	274 Million USD

2. Privatization Implementation -2006

Company	Sector	Proportion	Amount
TUPRAS	Refinery	51%	4,1 Billion USD
ERDEMIR	Iron&Steel	46%	2,8 Billion USD
BASAK SIGORTA	Insurance Trade	56%	204 Million USD
BASAK EMEKLILIK	Insurance Trade	41%	63 Million USD
IZMIR EFES OTEL	Tourism	Real Estate	121 Million USD
MERSIN PORT	Port Operating	36 years	755 Million USD
BUYUK TARABYA OTEL	Tourism	Real Estate	145 Million USD
TEKEL SALT MINE	Salt Mine Operating	Real Estate	119 Million USD
THY	Airport Transport	20%	207 Million USD

3. Privatization Implementation -2007

Company	Sector	Proportion	Amount
HALKBANK	Banking	%25 (IMKB)	1,8 Billion USD
IZMIR PORT	Port Operating	49 years	1,2 Billion USD
KGM (Ist.Levent Real Estate)	Real Estate	Real Estate	800 Million USD
VEHICLE INSPECTION STATION	Otomotiv	20 years	613 Million USD

4. Privatization Implementation -2008

Company	Sector	Proportion	Amount
TURK TELEKOM	Telecommunication	%15 (IMKB)	1,8 Billion USD
PETKIM	Petrochemical	%51	2 Billion USD
ANKARA NATURAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTION	Energy	Sale of Shares	510 Million USD

Figure 5. Privatization Implementation

In this context, ÖİB announced in 2009 that electricity distribution companies, power generation entities, sugar processing plants/assets, national lottery, gas distribution companies

and motorways/bridges are/will be prioritized in the very near future. For this purpose, the rate of asset sales of privatized enterprises reached 1.8 billion dollars in 2009 and the process/execution of the program continues. When the scope of privatization in economic sector terms is considered, it could be said that the state has no stake largely in important sectors of petroleum distribution, petrochemical (TÜPRAŞ and PETKİM), paper and cellulose (SEKA), telecommunications (Turk Telecom) and iron/steel industries (İŞDEMİR, KARDEMİR and ERDEMİR). This situation led to many debates on the role of the state in the age of neoliberalism and concerns based on “national security-interests” and national developmentalist demands.

Privatization in Sector Terms		
The Sectors of which the state has no stake directly/indirectly	The Sectors of which the state has no stake largely	The Sectors of which the state has no stake partially
Cement Animal Feed Milk and Milk Products Forestry Products Alcoholic Drinks Petroleum Distribution Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Iron&Steel Textile Ready-to-Wear Sea Transport Fertilizer Airport Ground Arrangements and Catering Services	Tourism Paper and Cellulose Industry Petrochemical	Port Operating Meat and Fish Products Natural Gas Distribution Telecommunication Sugar

Figure 6: Privatizations in Sector Terms,

Source: <http://www.oib.gov.tr/yayinlar/publications.htm>

Methodology of the Field Study: Details of the Quantitative and Qualitative Research

In the fieldwork, the post-1980 privatization process in Turkey, as both one of the most important moments of the neoliberal restructuring process and the realm in which labor unions-workers’ protests came to concentrate, is analyzed within the framework of the subjective and collective experiences and perceptions stemming from these very processes. The field study in this context takes the privatization process as a key component of the

degradation of labor and unions in Turkey. Moreover, the field study also questions the political character of the reactions of workers and unions to the internationalization of capitalism in general and privatizations in particular, with reference to the Turkish case which reflects contradictions seen in many countries that attract foreign direct investments with their SEE portfolio.

The following questions will be guiding the field research: i.) What do workers think and feel about the privatization process of state economic enterprises (SEEs) and the increasing inflows of foreign capital in Turkey? ii.) What are the main motives behind workers' discourse during the protests? iii.) What is the political content of their reactions at discursive level? iv.) What are the political positions of labor unions and how this affects workers' protests? v.) Is there a relationship between the perceptions of neoliberalism amongst the workers (the worsening of daily life and working conditions of working classes) and the resurgence of a nationalist agenda? vi.) What are the political and practical implications of the discursive processes and strategies used in the struggle against neoliberalism in general and privatization in particular? vii.) What are the possibilities of transforming the struggle into one based on class politics, with an internationalist character?

The prevailing strategy during the fieldwork is to direct attention towards the interactive relation between working classes' perceptions on the recent trends and political-economic-ideological conjuncture in general, and the privatization process associated with foreign capital flows in particular. Moreover, it is asked through which processes and discourses these perceptions and reactions are articulated to other ideological processes. My approach to the field is to map how the working class community in these places is interacting with surrounding political-economic and ideological dynamics. Furthermore, a particular attention is paid to the question of how the position of labor unions and the Turkish Left influences working classes' perceptions on recent trends. In order to accumulate adequate knowledge of their social behavior channeled into different forms of political discourses, an understanding of their perspectives on life and description of their feelings, attitudes, reactions and positions in the face of the conjuncture challenging their social reproduction and well-being. In brief, it is expected that the outcomes of the fieldwork will contribute to finding out their understanding of class-identity and nationalism.

The field research combines both quantitative and qualitative research methods, namely in-depth and focus group interviews and the administering of a questionnaire respectively. The rationale for combining quantitative and qualitative research relates to the concerns about the complexity and multidimensionality of the subject matter I try to analyze and hypotheses I attempt to test. Since my aim is not only to ask formal questions on the workers' experiences during the privatization process in Turkey but also to pay attention to the interactive relation between workers' perceptions and reactions/actions during the privatization process, participant observation and questioning both formally through interviews and informally through conversations enhanced my chances of understanding the worldview and perspectives of workers. After the field research, it was quite obvious that the workers' experiences and reactions during the privatization process could not be comprehended in their entirety without such hours-lasting conversations and discussions which also helped me to develop an intersubjective approach. In sum, the time spent in workers' communities in the regions where privatizations were executed, during the processes of preliminary questionnaires, questionnaires, in-depth interviews and focus group interviews, were important to understand the worldviews and everyday life experiences of workers and the way they posit a relation with nationalism and also other possible forms of political mobilization and discourses.

In view of such considerations, the field research was organized and formulated in terms of four consecutive steps.

I. Pilot Study: In-Depth Interviews and Sample Questionnaire

As the first of the pilot research, there was a series of in-depth interviews with those intellectuals-unionists who have taken part in the privatization debates in Turkey. This step was important for the fieldwork because it provided the background information about the field under study. In-depth interviews also contributed to the formulation of the questions in both the pilot study and the main questionnaire. Moreover, through in-depth interviews, the question of how and in what ways labor unionists and specialists as well as leftist intellectuals have become influential on the resulting resistances, reactions and discourses of workers against neoliberal globalization and privatization. This enabled me to question whether intellectual and organizational leadership plays a role in understanding the reactions of workers during the privatization process or not.

As part of these interviews, visits to Ankara made it possible for me to gather data about the statistics on the massive wave of privatizations in different sectors of the Turkish economy, especially the ones conducted by the official institution responsible from the execution of privatization processes, namely ÖİB. As a matter of fact, Post-Privatization Follow up Department (*Özelleştirme Sonrasını Takip İşleri Grup Başkanlığı*) provided a huge amount of material in addition to the reports and statistics given via the official website of ÖİB²³⁶. Those reports and statistics including the privatization history of the related SEEs, privatization tender process and conditions of sale, post-privatization conduct of factories (such as capacity rates, post-privatization investments, and number of workers with contract) were important for a background information about the scope of the privatization in the factories included in the fieldwork.

In the following, a preliminary questionnaire was prepared and tested due to concerns on the content of the questions and time efficiency. Obviously, in-depth interviews with the intellectuals and unionists, as well as the analysis of official documents and reports on the privatization carried out earlier, helped to include relevant questions in the questionnaire. The pilot study was completed in (İzmir-İzmir) Tüpraş-Petkim oil refinery and petro-chemical factories) enterprises in August 2009. Sections of the preliminary questionnaire forms such as demographic characteristics of workers, working conditions and union membership, approaches and reactions to privatization and political preferences were kept in the original questionnaire forms. A number of minor changes were made by excluding some open-ended questions about intra-class divisions and they are reserved for the focus-group interviews step. Moreover, some new questions on class identity and on workers' political preferences and approaches to certain political issues debated recently in the public were added to the original and final form of the questionnaire.

²³⁶ See www.privatization.gov.tr. Through this webpage, it is possible to access annual reports and statistics about the privatization implementations. For the only English documented annual report, see <http://www.oib.gov.tr/2010/dosyalar/oibfaal2009.pdf>. For a brief analysis of implementations until 2011, see <http://www.oib.gov.tr/program/implementations.htm>. In 2011 Performance Report (http://www.oib.gov.tr/2011/dosyalar/oib_performans_2011.pdf), it is also possible to find the aims and targets of ÖİB, its institutional organization and the privatized companies in the portfolio of the ÖİB. For a list of the SEEs that will be privatized in the future by the ÖİB, see http://www.oib.gov.tr/program/uygulamalar/devam_edenler.htm.

II. Questionnaire Step

After the results of the preliminary questionnaire in the pilot study were obtained, the final form of the questionnaire was prepared after a long process of deliberation based on these results. As a second step, the questionnaire was administered and a total number of 476 questionnaire forms were filled up by workers subjected to the privatization process. Almost all forms were completed by the workers, though some workers hesitated to give answers to certain questions such as political preferences or views on the respective labor unions. Moreover, in certain questionnaire forms, there were further notes taken by workers. In these notes, especially by those who quit their jobs after privatization and work as temporary workers in another state economic enterprise under the status of 4-C²³⁷, workers were aiming to give details about their situations and reactions.

The criteria in the selection of (former) SEEs subjected to the privatization process was the importance of those enterprises in Turkish economy, the level of protests, reactions and debates raised against the privatizations. Those enterprises for a long period continued to be the locomotive of industrial production in Turkey, especially providing necessary raw materials for industrial development. Moreover, these enterprises were the members of the major labor unions in Turkey, namely Türk-İş, DİSK, and Hak-İş. This diversity among labor unions in the fieldwork was considered as important to analyze the differences and similarities in their strategies, discourses and activities during the privatization process. Selected enterprises for the questionnaire are Tüpraş (oil refinery-production), Petkim (petrochemical refinery), Petlas (a major plant for tire production), Erdemir (iron-steel), Seydişehir-ETİ (metal-aluminum production) and Tekel (tobacco and alcoholic drinks monopoly, in addition to a huge amount of assets for sale). Especially, the sale of Tüpraş, Erdemir, Petkim and Tekel constituted the most important targeted and realized sale revenues of the ÖİB²³⁸.

At this point, a brief history of the privatization attempts of these SEEs needs to be given for a better understanding the reasons for such selection. The first three enterprises actually belong to petroleum related industries. The first enterprise, TÜPRAŞ (Turkish Petroleum Refineries

²³⁷ According to the law on civil servants regulating temporary employment (657, 4-C), workers who are forced to quit their jobs after privatization could be employed temporarily in other SEEs and this status is called 4-C.

²³⁸ It should be noted that the sale revenue of Turk Telekom (communications) constituted another important sale revenue derived by the ÖİB.

Co)²³⁹ was placed under the privatization program on 10 July 1996, and its capital ownership was transferred to the Privatization Administration Council. After several attempts for privatization, in October 2003, the remaining 65.76% of the public shares was auctioned to be privatized. This auction was concluded in January 2004 and a consortium of Russian *Efremov-Kautschuk* and Turkish *Zorlu* group was declared the new owner for a total of \$1.3 billion. However, The Petroleum Workers' Union (Petrol-İş) filed 8 cancellation suits to date against the privatization program over Tüpraş alone and has been successful in those suits until 2005²⁴⁰. TÜPRAŞ in 2005 was sold to a consortium led by the Turkish conglomerate Koç Holding²⁴¹, and including Royal Dutch Shell, who submitted the highest bid of \$4.14 billion in the privatization tender for a 51% stake in the Turkish oil refinery. The sale of TÜPRAŞ marked the second largest privatization in Turkey's extensively delayed privatization history after the sell-off of the 55% stake in Turk Telecom for a price tag of \$6.55 billion to Oger Telecoms Joint Venture Group. For the subject matter of this dissertation, TÜPRAŞ privatization is also important because of a left-nationalist campaign and arguments that have been highly visible during the privatization process, supporting the "national" KOÇ Group.

The second enterprise, PETKİM Petrochemical Co. had been placed under the privatization program on 30 October 1987 with the Council of Ministers decree no 87/12184. After several attempts and annulment of the privatization deals, the final result came in 2007 and it was sold to a consortium led by the Socar-Turcas-İnjaz, who submitted the highest bid of \$2.04 billion in the privatization tender for a 51% stake in the Turkish petrochemical industry²⁴².

²³⁹ TÜPRAŞ is a product of the national developmentalist period of Turkey, built in 1961, currently having 4 plants in İzmir, İzmir, Kırıkkale and Batman.

²⁴⁰ Debates in the media during the sale of TÜPRAŞ to Efremov-Kautschuk attracted a lot of public attention due to the national (i.e. Russian) origins of the buyer and economic activities of the company.

²⁴¹ This is not the first acquisition of Koç Holding among the massive wave of privatizations. Together with the \$0.7 billion payment for the acquisition of Yapı Kredi (one of the major banks in Turkey) and the \$390 million payment for Tansas (one of the leading supermarket chains) take-over, Koc Group's investment outlays for acquisitions will exceed \$4.8 billion.

²⁴² Petkim's products can be grouped under five headings: commercial plastics (PVC, PP and PS), raw materials such as acids, monoethilens, and glichol, rubber materials (stryen butadiens and carbon blacks), others (ammonium sulfates, hydrogen gasolines, benzen parameters), Commercial final products (light and heavy duty plastic bags, films of various grades, vacuumed products). PETKİM's first plants were established in 1965 with the leadership of Turkish Petroleum Inc. (TPAO) and with the contributions of the Turkish Retirement Fund (Emekli Sandığı). The construction of additional plants in Izmir/Aliaga began in 1969. PETKİM became an affiliate of the Turkish Chemicals Industry Association in 1980, and grew rapidly over the 1980s to become one of the major integrated petro-chemical complexes of the Middle East and Europe. The transaction for the block sale of the 51% of Petkim Petrochemical Inc. shares was concluded in May 30, 2008.

The sale of this enterprise also attracted public attention and similar debates based on “national interest and security” were observed during the tender process.

The third enterprise, PETLAS was one of the earliest major privatizations in the mid-1990s and has crucial significance in terms of its privatization history and struggles by workers. The privatization process was started by 1991 under the coalition government of True Path Party (DYP) and Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP). After several attempts between 1991 and 1994, with April 5 Economic Decisions leading to one of the most severe economic crises in Turkey and the enactment of the new law on privatizations in November 1994, the privatization process accelerated. In 1995, a company originated in Iran made a bid for the factory with an offer valued \$65 million but the privatization tender was canceled due to the failure of the company to meet requirements. Then in 1997, under the coalition of Welfare Party (RP) and True Path Party (DYP), the factory was purchased by a national venture, namely Kombassan Holding, for a value of 35.7 million dollars with complete shares. Since PETLAS has also been the leading enterprise in war craft tire production, similar debates based on possible threats of privatization on the national security industry were popular in public debates, especially among left nationalists in Turkey. Moreover, the relations with the RP and Kombassan Holding as one of the main representatives of the “Islamic” bourgeoisie gaining power in the mid-1990s were questioned during the privatization of PETLAS. Following 8 years after 1997, no investment had been done for the factor and in 2005 it was sold to Abdülkadir Özcan group, which would increase capacity from 40% (in the 1990s) to 90% by 2010.

The fourth enterprise Erdemir (Iron and Steel Plant) is a jointly owned iron and steel industrial complex which was on the privatization list since 30 April 1987. 2.93% of public shares was sold at public offers in 1990 and 6.05% of them were sold at İMKB in 1994. Following attempts for block sale privatization of the factory in 1994, 1995 and 1997 gave no result, and in 2005 OYAK (Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund) purchased %46,12 of shares for a value of \$2.770 billion (Privatization Administration, decision no. 2005/51). The contract was signed in 2006. The Erdemir privatization, similar to TÜPRAŞ and PETKİM privatizations, has attracted public attention as it was Turkey’s largest steel and iron producer and the transaction was the largest privatization in the steel sector worldwide in 2005. Moreover, the privatization of Erdemir has attracted a great interest from major international

investors in this industry, such as Mittal, Arcelor, Severstal and others. Thus, critical voices were heard regarding the involvement of other steel/iron giants in the world to the privatization tender process. Much more importantly, the sale of 41% of dividends of Erdemir to Arcelor (which is the world's second and Europe's first company in this sector) just after a few days from privatization had increased nationalist fears and the sense of "being cheated" among workers and unions as well as among left-nationalists supporting the sale of the company to a "national company". A similar left-nationalist campaign was again visible in this privatization and the sale of Erdemir to the national company OYAK relieved many sections of the society having concerns on "national interest and security".

The fifth enterprise in the questionnaire step is Seydişehir ETİ Aluminum factory, sold to a national company Cengiz Group (CE-KA), at public offers for a value of \$305 million in 2005 through block sale (complete shares) method. Although this value is relatively less when compared to other cases of privatization in the fieldwork, the factory was selected since it has a peculiar place in the aluminum production of Turkey (the only integrated aluminum enterprise) as well as its importance for industrial production, highly crucial for social life in the region (Konya, central Anatolia of Turkey) and the different dynamics of its privatization.

The last enterprise in this step is Tekel (tobacco and alcoholic drinks monopoly) which had numerous plants in different regions of Turkey (many plants and estates were closed down). The privatization of Tekel's main assets (Tobacco, Tobacco Products, Salt and Alcohol branches' assets) was completed. Other privatization works related to real estates have continued and reached a remarkable level of \$2.5 billion by 2002-2010 (major estates in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir were sold). Tekel did not take place in the initial plans for the questionnaire; however, workers' intensive protests in 2010 lasting 78 days have attracted intense public attention and thus were included in the study. Especially the offer of temporary employment status under the 657 Civil Servants Law, well known as article 4-C, to an important number of workers in Tekel by the AKP government intensified the level of protests and public criticisms. Tekel protests reflected a partly different sort of political reaction including class-based reactions but still with a focus on "the defense of the nation" discourse. The reasons for this will also be discussed in the following sections.

Workers in these factories were randomly selected and the questionnaire step was concluded in close collaboration with labor union professionals. The list of the state economic enterprises in the questionnaire step is given below:

Table 1. Lists of the Former State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in the Questionnaire

FACTORY	PLANTS
TÜPRAŞ	İzmir, Kırıkkale, İzmit and Batman
PETLAS	Kırşehir
PETKİM	İzmir-Aliğa
ERDEMİR	Zonguldak
TEKEL	Ankara (Türk-İş Headquarter)
SEYDİŞEHİR-ETİ	Konya

III. Focus Group Interviews

In the third step, a total of 6 focus group interviews were conducted with the workers in these enterprises. In the focus group process, SEKA (paper production) factory was added to the Erdemir, Tüpraş, Petkim, Petlas and Tekel cases. The reason for such a selection was that SEKA privatization was one of the earliest privatizations, one that has attracted a great deal of public criticism and media attention. Moreover, SEKA factory constitutes a peculiar example among those cases where the factory stopped production and was closed down with a transfer of ownership to the local municipality. I am of course aware that further studies, focusing on other sectors of the Turkish economy for potential differences and perceptions during the privatization process have crucial importance²⁴³. Focus group interviews were mostly held in the regions of privatized enterprises, except Tekel workers coming to Ankara for protests²⁴⁴, each lasting an average of 3 hours, and the number of workers attending the focus groups ranged from 6 to 15.

²⁴³ For example, by the end of 1994, only about \$2.3 billion worth of shares of public enterprises had been sold, and among this, over a half was in a single industry, namely cement (Sertel and Adaman, 1995, p. 5). As Sertel and Adaman argued, among the cement factories sold, five went to a French company, and it is difficult to decipher what reasoning, let alone economic calculus, was pursued by the public agencies making the sales (p. 6). A similar process was visible in the banking sector of Turkey and international financial companies were attracted by the sales of public banking institutions for two decades.

²⁴⁴ Petrol-İş union's guest house in Ankara-Kızılay, where focus group interview of Tekel workers was conducted, was one of the centers for workers arriving to the city by late night to stay and join the protests in the following day. Accompanying the workers in the protests, at Türk-iş headquarter, I was able to observe workers' discourses against privatization and experiences-perceptions about the privatization process directly.

In the questionnaire, the questions are composed of 6 parts. In these parts, the demographic characteristics of the workers and their social/educational backgrounds, their working conditions, their relations with the labor unions as members, their experience based on union activities and protests, their experiences of and approaches to the privatization process, their political preferences and values were asked respectively. The total number of questions asked in the questionnaire is 48 and listed in 10 subsequent pages.

In focus group interviews, the results and tendencies derived from the questionnaire were analyzed in detail with a particular focus on the subjective experiences and perceptions of the workers during and after the privatization process. The interactive and intersubjective atmosphere for a free debate during focus group interviews provided a great deal of knowledge about their daily-life practices and political views on domestic and international issues, their political behaviors and preferences which enabled me to identify the ideological moments shaping their views and life worlds, together with the diverse dynamics that have become influential in the development of class consciousness and politics. Moreover, focus group discussions provided clues to the everydayness of nationalism and its reproduction through different processes, especially subjective-collective reactions and perceptions stemming from macro political-economic processes. During focus-group interviews, while reactions and approaches to privatization and subjective-collective experiences were discussed as a major issue, recent political debates in the Turkish society as a whole and developments in foreign policy as well as macro-economic processes were also mentioned by the workers. Focus group interviews were held in Tüpraş, Petkim, Erdemir, Petlas, Tekel and Seka between October 2009 and late January 2010.

Table 2. Lists of the Former State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in Focus-Groups

FACTORY	PLANTS
TÜPRAŞ	İzmir (Aliğa)
PETLAS	Kırıkkale
PETKİM	İzmir (Aliğa)
ERDEMİR	Zonguldak (Ereğli)
TEKEL	Ankara
SEKA	İzmit

After these brief notes on methodology, the demographic characteristics of workers and background information about their union membership and working conditions will be presented. Following this, the results of the qualitative and quantitative researches will be presented under three main headings: workers' approaches on the internationalization process of capitalism and the role of the state in economy and development in the neoliberal age of capitalism, and finally workers' approaches and reactions to the privatization process and subjective-collective experiences during this process. In the selection of these three topics, historical and contemporary theoretical debates on the relation between nationalism and Marxism have been influential.

Demographic Characteristics of the Participants

Table 3. Age, Sex, Education and Monthly Income Information of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Age				
	18-25	8	1,7	1,7
	26-40	286	60,1	61,8
	41-50	150	31,5	93,3
	51-60	32	6,7	100
	N	476	100	
Sex				
	Male	457	96	96
	Female	19	4	100
	N	476		
Education				
	Illiterate	1	0,2	0,2
	Only Literate	0	0	0,2
	Primary School	30	6,3	6,6
	Secondary School	31	6,5	13,1
	High School	331	69,5	83,1
	University	78	16,4	99,6
	Post-Graduate	2	0,4	100
	N	473		
Monthly Income (TL)				
	451-600	16	3,4	3,4
	601-750	57	12,1	15,5
	751-1000	30	6,4	21,8
	1001-1200	35	7,4	29,2
	1201-1500	77	16,3	45,5
	1501-1800	90	19,1	64,6
	1801-2400	104	22	86,7
	2401-3000	30	6,4	93
	3000-...	33	7	100
	N	472		

As pointed out earlier, former state economic enterprises where the questionnaire was conducted are Tüpraş, Petkim, Petlas, Erdemir, Seydişehir and Tekel. Table 3 shows that the respondents are mostly male (96%), aged between 26 and 50 (92 %), at least high school educated workers including university degreed (total percentage is 86%). Since the nature of the work requires both labor-intensive processes and skilled work, it could be argued that such characteristics fit into the general demographic characteristics of workers in state economic enterprises in industrial production.

Monthly income of workers ranged between 450 and 3000 Turkish Lira (from 300 to 2000 dollars) with a percentage of 71 having 1200 TL (800 dollars) and above. The educational background of workers is mostly high school (70%), and %16 of workers has a university degree. Participants are mostly males (%96) and their ages range mostly from 26 to 50 (%92, with %60 of them between 26 and 40 ages).

Working Conditions and Union Membership

Questions regarding employment type, work status, social security type and the content of labor union membership were also asked in the questionnaire forms. Such questions were important to see whether certain class divisions among workers emerge or not. As seen below in Table 4, four most important divisions in the labor processes or employment type are blue-collar workers (30%), technicians (28,4%), foreman (33%) and white collar workers (7,4%). Obviously, such divisions occur due to the nature of production, namely industrial production combining labor-intensive and skilled job. Although the sub-contracting work status has developed in different sectors of Turkish economy especially after the 1990s, a large amount of workers (94%) in these factories has a permanent job (*kadro*lu). Since there is a traditionally high level of union membership in these factories, almost all workers have social security (99,4%). To note it again, sub-contracting relations (*taşeron*) may develop in time but in a limited fashion because of the specific characteristics of production processes requiring specialization and technical skills. During focus-group interviews, it was noted by workers that sub-contracting relations have started to develop after the privatization process but now only limited to the services provided for the workers in these factories (such as cafeteria, lunch).

At this point, as mentioned in Chapter 1 with reference to the general conditions of working classes reconfigured in the neoliberal era, such divisions among workers such as permanent-subcontracting and public-private sector workers have gained much more importance²⁴⁵. Although a large amount of workers in the fieldwork had a permanent status, they state that the most important division among themselves is the division between permanent and sub-contracting workers (64,4% listed it as the most important division). This indicates that, as also stated by workers during focus group interviews, workers have a fear of the general tendency to develop sub-contracting relations in different sectors of the Turkish economy and other privatized enterprises in related industries. When workers are asked “whether the interests of permanent and sub-contracting workers are common or not”, %53,4 percent of them state that their interests diverge. During focus group interviews, it was observed that this fear of workers support their ties with the respective labor union to protect the status quo but also increase the fragmentation between permanent and sub-contracted workers.

Table 4. Permanent and Sub-Contracting Workers Have Shared Interests?

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	104	34,9
Disagree	55	18,5
Agree	44	14,8
Strongly agree	95	31,9
Total	298	100

Second and third most important divisions among workers were listed as between skilled-unskilled workers and white collar-blue collar workers. It could be said that with the new technological innovations used in the production processes requiring skilled and specialized expertise, such divisions began to be much more apparent among workers. Not only such divisions but also traditional divisions between public and private sector workers were also mentioned during focus group interviews. Public sector workers in the fieldwork pointed to the difficulties in building developed relations and collaboration with the workers in private sector due to relatively higher wages and social safety nets in the public sector. It was also noted by public sector workers in the fieldwork that unemployed workers in their neighborhood have a negative attitude against them. Moreover, it was stated that they

²⁴⁵ It should be noted that sub-contracting relations in the public sector developed by the decree 399 amended by the Motherland Party government in 1985, led by the champion of neoliberal policies in Turkey after the 1980s, namely Turgut Özal. Delays in the “successful” execution of this law occurred due to the counter decisions given by the Constitutional Court since it endangers job security.

approach privatization in a positive manner in order to find new jobs in these privatized enterprises. This situation was considered by workers as a source of difficulties to mobilize people in their region at the local level due to the competition to find a job in the labor market as mentioned in the first chapter.

Table 5. Employment Type, Work Status, Social Security Type and Content of Union Membership of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Employment Type				
	Blue-collar	138	29,9	29,9
	Technician	131	28,4	58,2
	Foreman	152	32,9	91,1
	White-collar	34	7,4	98,5
	Other	7	1,5	100
	N	462		
Work Status				
	Permanent	442	93,8	93,8
	Sub-contracted	10	2,1	96,0
	Temporary	18	3,8	99,8
	Other	1	0,2	100
	N	471		
Social Security				
	Yes	470	99,4	99,4
	No	3	0,6	100
	N	473		
Duration of Union Membership (Years)				
	0-5	100	24,8	24,8
	6-10	162	40,1	64,9
	11-15	35	8,7	73,5
	16-20	45	11,1	84,7
	21-25	40	9,9	94,6
	26-30	22	5,4	100
	N	404		
Type of Union Membership				
	Simply member	116	28,7	28,7
	Attending union activities regularly	116	28,7	57,4
	Attending union activities rarely	68	16,8	74,3
	In the administration of union	28	6,9	81,2
	Simply visiting union for socialization	76	18,8	100
	N	404		

When background information on workers' union membership and activities is observed, the first thing to note is that the rate of union membership reaches 88% in a total number of 467 respondents. The remaining workers who are not members to a union state that "they are not allowed being a member to a union due to the conditions of their job contract, namely 4-C status". The duration of union membership ranges between 1 and 30 years and 65 % of workers have less than 10 years' experience in the respective labor union (see Table 5). So far as the workers' relation with labor unions is concerned, only 29% of workers state that they regularly attend union activities while another 29% define their status as "simply member", and 19 % of workers state that "they just visit union for socialization", 17% of them say "they attend union activities rarely". Although 80% of workers state that "the union is successful to protect workers' rights" and have a positive stance to their labor union, workers' unwillingness to attend union activities shows that it is highly difficult to say "degree of workers' relation with labor unions is a qualified one".

Another question about the relation between the workers and labor unions relates to their views on the labor unions' political engagements (see Table 6). 70% of workers answered this question as "labor unions should not actively engage in political activities"²⁴⁶. This was not surprising due to two reasons: firstly, it was also seen in focus group interviews that workers define politics as an area of "cheating, lying, and dirty business". For example, they especially underline that "former labor unionists forget workers' rights and conditions when they are elected as deputies and getting seats in the parliament". Most importantly, as also witnessed during the protests of Tekel and Seka, in the interviews workers state their mistrust in politicians and do not recognize the parliament as the place for the representatives of the people but "particular interests". Trust in politicians, state institutions, legal bodies and conventional forms of political participation and representation were low, especially among workers who had lost their status to a great extent, such as Tekel, Petlas and Seka workers. Especially Seka and Tekel workers state that their perceptions about the state have changed a lot after they are attacked by police forces during protests in a violent way. Secondly, workers think that "those political engagements may harm workers' rights especially when the governing political party changed". Thus, developing good relations with the state and

²⁴⁶ Similar results could be seen in other questionnaires conducted in different studies. For an example where the ratio of workers who think that "unions should not engage in politics" is almost same with the results of this study, see Altan, Z. Et al., 2005, *İşçi Profili Araştırması: Eskişehir Örneği*, Anadolu Üniversitesi.

governments and “not taking part” are considered by workers as important for their material interests. Moreover, for the workers who suggest that “labor unions should engage in political activities”, such engagement remains limited to elections and having seats for their representatives in the parliament.

Table 6. Workers’ Approaches on the Unions-Politics Relation

Unions and Political Activity	Frequency	Percent
Labor Unions Should not Engage	208	51,1
Labor Unions Should Have a Moderate Role	78	19,2
Labor Unions Should Engage	121	29,7
N	407	

Another important issue was the level of workers’ activities and protests in the light of recent changes in their working conditions. Different kind of protests were observed in their factories, such as legal strike, interrupting work, slowdown strike, meal boycott, press statement and meetings (see Table 7).

Table 7. Workers’ Protests in the Workplaces

Protests in the Workplace	Yes		No	
		%		%
Legal Strike	81	17	395	83
Interrupting work	118	24,8	358	75,2
Slowdown strike	157	33	319	67
Meal boycott	131	27,5	345	72,5
Press statement	291	61,1	184	38,7
Attending meeting	329	69,1	147	30,9

When these different kinds of protests are analyzed, it was obvious that less radical kinds of protests were more frequent, with 61% releasing press statement and 69% attending

meetings²⁴⁷. In parallel with the general tendency of declining levels of legal strikes in Turkey, the percentage of workers having a legal strike experience is only 17%. This point has crucial significance because of the fact that low level of workers' experience with strike and thus solidarity seriously hampers collective action. Moreover, as will be discussed later with reference to the long struggle experience of Tekel workers, such absence of strike experience also obstructs possibilities for workers to share a common space for a time and interact.

While some workers and union professionals stated that the nature of the production process makes it impossible to go on to strike, others stated that aforementioned divisions among workers became influential in this situation:

There is also a problem about having a status of public sector worker, thus not considering themselves as “laborer”. Moreover divisions of labor in the production process (skilled and unskilled labor or technicians, operators vs. practitioners) become influential²⁴⁸. This is especially the case in state economic enterprises such as Tüpraş, Türk-Telekom and Turkish Airlines.

When reasons of such protests were asked to workers (see Table 8), the main sources are privatization process, wage disputes in collective bargaining and job dismissals (which could be linked to privatization as well). It may be also argued that workers protest only when certain threats to their working conditions emerge; protests or activities for getting new rights, for example, relatively remain at lower levels. This point, namely short-term benefit or “pragmatic” approach of workers to different processes that influence them, was also noted during the interviews:

The discourse and approach of the labor union is influential on workers. Unions seek to protect their status quo and not to lose members. Workers also have a pragmatic approach and concerns about losing their jobs, working with lower wages or not.²⁴⁹

We kept silent during other privatization cases; I wish we could react then when necessary. We thought that our conditions will not change and these privatizations are necessary for the *higher interests* of the state.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ The influence of attending a meeting was described by a labor professional in the following terms: “Those meetings, even with 500.000 workers, only work for a temporary relief for workers since there is no political program or message given in these meetings”. Interview dated in August 2009.

²⁴⁸ Interview dated in August 2009 in Petkim.

²⁴⁹ Interview dated in September, 2009 in Erdemir.

²⁵⁰ Interview dated in January 2010, with Tekel workers in Ankara, Türk-İş headquarter.

As mentioned above, while some workers develop a self-critical outlook for having such an approach, criticisms against labor unions were also visible. The reason for that were labor unions' inactivity until they were threatened and their inability to provide sufficient information about the content and potential threats of the privatization process.

Another difficulty regarding workers' mobilization mentioned during interviews is younger workers' lack of interest in the protests and low level of experience of mobilization:

A new generation is coming after the 1980s and inexperienced about the struggle and protests, mostly apolitical. They have to get some background information during the socialization process and this task belongs to labor unions. However, this is really a difficult task to achieve when the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm by the 1980s is taken into account.²⁵¹

Table 8. Reasons of Protests in the Workplaces

Protests in the Workplace	Yes		No		N
		%		%	
Wage dispute in collective agreement	242	77,3	71	22,7	313
Getting new rights	131	50,6	128	49,4	259
Violation of certain rights	134	52,5	122	47,5	257
Administrative dispute	95	39	149	61	246
Protests against job dismissals	187	66,5	94	33,5	281
Protesting privatization	335	92	28	8	364

Obviously, there are various factors limiting labor unions' influence on workers. In addition to the state's control mechanisms on the labor movement and unions (especially constraints related to the legal framework on the activities of unions), the most important factor noted by a worker actively attending labor union activities was:

We have structural problems. A large amount of workers come from small and middle scale enterprises where the level of union membership is mostly zero. Moreover, a vast

²⁵¹ Interview dated in July, 2009 Tüpraş.

amount of workers are employed in the informal sector and it is highly difficult to reach those workers and develop a dialogue with them. Thus, it does not sound realistic to expect so much from the labor unions²⁵².

In terms of the difficulties of unions, as noted by labor professionals during the fieldwork, the flexibilization of the production process (flexibilization has been key to the discipline of relations in working life and the internalization of such discipline among workers) and a more active and effective use of technological means led to significant changes in the composition of labor force, and labor unions have failed to develop strategies to adapt to those changes in their organizational body and activities. During interviews, labor union professionals also mentioned another important source creating divisions among workers, namely the establishment of pro-government unions, which could be considered as a historical phenomenon which is not only peculiar to the AKP period (as discussed in Chapter 2 with reference the pre-1980 period)²⁵³. When the declining rates of labor union membership and other sources of divisions among workers are taken into account, it becomes highly difficult for labor unions to mobilize workers against neoliberal policies detrimental to the working conditions of workers. That is one of the reasons why they develop short-term, pragmatic and populist discourses associated with nationalism, which works as a mechanism to find other “enemies” to explain such adverse conditions.

In the following section, the results of quantitative and qualitative studies (questionnaires and focus group interviews) will be given under three headings: firstly, workers’ approaches to and views on the role of the state in the economy and development; secondly, their approaches to the privatization process in their factory and in general as well as their experiences during this process; and thirdly, worker’s political preferences and worldviews regarding the given macroeconomic changes in Turkey.

²⁵² Interview dated in August 2009 in Petkim.

²⁵³ In an interview, it was noted by a worker actively taking place in union activities that “governments targeted militant unionist leaders such as in Maden-İş, Hava-İş and Kristal-İş unions with different tactics and strategies and nothing could be done against this”. In another interview, when it is asked whether patronage relations have a crucial importance in finding jobs in the related SEE, the answer of a worker has been “political patronage relations in finding jobs were not seen in this factory but the government has always attempted to bring a client union here”. When other works and graduate theses on the effects of privatization process in Turkey are analyzed, it is seen that the dominance of such political patronage relations in the state economic enterprises are mostly accepted and underlined by the workers as respondents of questionnaires.

Neoliberalism and the Internationalization of Capital Movements: Workers' Approaches to the Role of the State for "National Developmentalism"

As we discussed in previous chapters, the role of the state in economy is one of the most debated issues in the neoliberal era and there are different approaches within the literature on this issue. Approaches to the role of the state in the economy are crucial to understand the use of nationalist discourses in terms of support for such a role in economic terms (national developmentalism, national protectionism and economic nationalism) and in political terms (national sovereignty and independence, by relating the role of the state to the conception of sovereignty of the nation-state vis-à-vis international economic dynamics).

Table 9. Workers' Views on the Role of the State in the Economy

	Frequency	Percent
1 (Completely state)	142	32,1
2	25	5,7
3	33	7,5
4	48	10,9
5	3	,7
6	146	33,1
7	12	2,7
8	4	,9
9	7	1,6
10 (Completely private sector)	14	3,2
No difference	8	1,8
Total	442	100,0

One could expect that workers would give more role to the state in economic life through a state economic enterprise which traditionally provided them certain material benefits and social security. Thus, it was not surprising to see the results for the question, namely "whether the state should direct and control economic life or not", in Table 9.

As seen above, if 1 is accepted "the state should direct economic life completely" and 10 is assumed as "the private sector should do so", the rate of supporting state's ascendancy between 1 and 6 reach 85%. These results raise the question why workers think that the state should have a dominant role in the economic life. During interviews, it was noted that the less the state's role in economic life, the less material benefits and social security previously provided by the state (through the potential removal of social safety nets under the private

sector). Workers have a fear of losing benefits in terms of protection against lay-offs, access to pensions and social insurance and even company-provided housing and day care. As a matter of fact, similar concerns could be seen in former socialist countries and “mixed economies” (i.e. Egypt) where civil servants and public sector workers enjoyed such benefits for a long time. As mentioned in the previous section, this situation, the division between public sector workers and their organizational bodies and the private sector workers and their union organizations, constituted one of the most important divisions in the labor movement in Turkey. And now privatizations of the state economic enterprises and public services signify a new stage for the working classes in Turkey due to the increasing blurring of such divisions between workers, while introducing new ones as mentioned earlier.

In addition to workers’ views on the role of the state in economy, their views on “who should lead the management of the factory” were also questioned.

Table 10. Management of the Factory

	Frequency	Percent
State	258	60,7
Private sector (National)	92	21,6
Private sector (International)	17	4
Labor Union	3	0,7
Workers	47	11
Others	8	1,9
N	425	100

As seen above, again 61% of workers think that the state should manage the factory they work. The rate of workers who support the management by a national company is 22%, with a total of 83% of workers supporting having the label of “national” rather than “foreign” ownership and management of the factory they work for. These views on the management of the factory indicate that almost all workers reject the management and ownership of their factory by an international or multinational company, or “foreign capital” in their terms²⁵⁴.

This issue was discussed by workers attending the focus group interviews in detail. It should be firstly noted that the state is considered as the only mechanism to regulate working relations and the relation between capital and labor:

²⁵⁴ It was also interesting to note that workers do not view positively the management and ownership of the factory by workers or labor unions.

The state should be regulatory, the state must control and regulate the relation between worker and employer, and this relation should not be left free.²⁵⁵

Secondly, for workers it was considered that the state should direct economic activities on the national level and have investments in different sectors of the economy for the sake of “national developmentalism”. On the other hand, according to workers, such failure of the state in directing economic activities and investing in different sectors of the economy is firstly due to “imperialist plans”, a topic mentioned among workers in all focus group interviews:

Our country is the real colony. They don't allow us to develop. Our state is not independent. America plans the future, even 50 years later. We are part of this plan and scenario.²⁵⁶

These privatizations are all plans of the foreign powers, enemies...They use the AKP as subcontractor. We provide cheap labor for these foreign companies²⁵⁷.

At this point, it should be noted that while some workers criticize those “imperialist plans on Turkey” by reference to the processes of the EU Accession and Greater Middle East Project of the USA (*Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi*, BOP), some state that Turkey should accept the realities of world political economy and play an active part in this scenario to further national interests.

Ok, we are in this plan and scenario. Then we need to ask what we can win in this scenario in terms of our national interests.

Another reason for such a “failure of the state” is related to the inability of political elites to champion national interests due to a lack of “love for country”.

A *really* nationalist government won't be in Turkey? Politicians who love their nation and behave just like as a *Turk* won't be seen? We shall wait for a new Atatürk? In Europe, there is no way to sell similar companies owned by the state; our politicians want to direct the country to a different path.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ Interview in Erdemir, 2009.

²⁵⁶ Interview in Tüpraş, 2009.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Tekel workers, 2010 January.

²⁵⁸ Interview in Petlas, 2009.

This “lack of love for country” is sometimes related to the issue of “high treason”, which is also linked to the ethnic origins of the ministers in the cabinet with a chauvinistic discourse:

Now many ministers are Kurdish, their grandfathers were tortured by this state in the past. Now they try to get revenge from the state, thus they sell these companies for any price.²⁵⁹

On the other hand, some workers point to the social realities of Turkey:

Our representatives in the parliament are members of this society, we elect them, we are all traitors, and nobody thinks of the country and nation, we are all selfish, aiming to realize our self-interest.²⁶⁰

In addition to the support for the role of the state in the realization of developmentalist goals and regulating the capital-labor relations, workers attending the interviews perceive the internationalization process of capitalism and increasing volume of foreign investments to Turkey as “endangering the state’s sovereignty rights within its territories”. The state is considered as a mechanism “having the power and capacity to control the internationalization process of capital for the sake of national sovereignty rights”. Thus defending the state, or calling for a “protectionist agenda”, has a meaning in terms of realizing nationalist ideals which do not conflict with the workers’ interests. Rather than approaching the state as a manifestation of the relation and struggle between labor and capital, whose role is configured in accordance with the content of such relation and struggle between two, workers perceive the ongoing neoliberalization process as a threat to the state’s national developmentalist goals. Then, the sources of those threats are considered as forced by international actors or “foreign elements” who “desire to eliminate the realization of such goals”. Those international actors and elements are conceptualized through a historically well-known rhetoric of “the U.S. imperialism” and the EU imperialism”, considered as the enemy of the sovereignty rights of nation-states in both political and economic terms.

Moreover, dynamics which lead to the worsening of working conditions of labor are firstly perceived as attacks on “Turkey” (“dividing it to pieces”) and the role of the state in the realization of national developmentalist goals within protectionist logic. Therefore, the discontents of neoliberal policies are cloaked in nationalist tones associated with an etatist discourse and increasing the role of the state in the economy is considered as a means of

²⁵⁹ Interview in Erdemir, 2009.

²⁶⁰ Interview in Erdemir, 2009.

escaping from the maelstrom of neoliberalism. Historical references for this idea are also given, i.e. Atatürk's etatism of the 1930s and "golden years" of state economic enterprises starting in the 1960s, considered as the periods of the realization of "true" national developmentalist goals and sources of "anti-imperialist" struggle.

At this point, it should be also remarked that while some workers consider that the so-called weakness of the state due to "dependency" and "imperialism" relations causes problems in national development and economic protectionism and thus call for a "strong state", some argue that it is impossible to struggle against the state policy of privatizations which is "guided by foreign enemies". For some of the workers, these are the reasons to resist privatizations, but for some it becomes a reason to justify their passivism:

We were in front of the factory to protest privatizations and noticed that some of our friends do not support us. One of them said to me: 'there is the state, there is the USA, and so it is not meaningful to fight them'. For some of our friends, these arguments were used to justify their decision on the future of SEKA²⁶¹.

In terms of views of workers on the role of the state in economy, not only traditional rights and the relatively privileged position of workers in public enterprises, but also labor union's approaches and relations with the state have a crucial importance. It could easily be said that labor unions organized in different sectors of the Turkish economy traditionally have a statist discourse. This is the case even for the most radical and class-based labor union, namely DİSK, in terms of supporting the role of the state in economic activities. If the relation between workers and labor unions is considered as a dialectical one, workers' tendency to protect the status quo within given enterprises and unions' concerns not to conflict with state mechanisms for similar concerns lead to such a result. Thus, reactions to ongoing privatizations and solutions suggested against it simply call for "planned capitalist economy" under the guidance of the state.

As discussed in the second chapter with reference to the problematic conceptualizations of leftist parties and unions on the role of the state, the state is conceptualized as an entity autonomous from class contradictions and struggle, as a political body that has full control on the internationalization process of capitalism and mediates between emerging class contradictions within a given nation. Again, these considerations on the role of the state, as

²⁶¹ Interview in SEKA, 2010.

noted in Chapter 2 in the analysis of political-theoretical approaches within the left in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s, the continuous reproduction of theses based on dependency theories and theories of imperialism has continued to be influential on workers' approaches and perceptions on the role of the state in the neoliberal age. In the following section, focusing on the workers' experiences, perceptions and approaches during the privatizations process, reflections of such approaches will be discussed in detail.

Workers' Reactions to and Perceptions on the Privatization Process in Turkey: Privatization as "Foreignization"

After an analysis of workers' views on the role of the state and discourses suggesting more intervention in the economy with an etatist, protectionist logic to realize developmentalist goals, their perceptions about the privatization process will be given in this section through detailed narratives of subjective and collective experiences during this process. It should first be mentioned that after a long process of 30 years, the privatization process of state economic enterprises was almost completed in Turkey. In addition to state economic enterprises in industrial production which are the subject matter of this dissertation, significant attempts were made in the last decade for the privatization of education and health and other social services. In the new projections, the AKP government also declared that state owned roads, bridges and communication and electricity services as well as natural resources will be privatized in the near future. In this context, it should be kept in mind that the privatization process is not limited to the sectors represented in this fieldwork and will effect different sectors of the economy and social life as well, in the form of flexibilization of employment and working conditions (the development of sub-contracting and informal economy) and decreasing level of social expenditures.

It should also be noted that the privatized enterprises have been the historically most developed industrial complexes, and workers in these enterprises have always been the most organized sections of the working classes. In these respects, attitudes, reactions, mobilization capacities as well as traditional power of workers and unions in these enterprises have always been important for the improvement of the organizational capacity of workers in Turkey. Thus, privatization of these enterprises also has a crucial importance of the success of the neoliberal hegemony project in Turkey, which explains why the privatization process has been the first policy priority of the AKP government

As mentioned previously, studies on the political economy of privatizations generally focus on the economic dimensions of the process and consider issues of profitability and effectiveness. As a matter of fact, debates on the economic rationality of privatization, which have been going on since the mid-1980s, have been influential during the privatization process of the SEEs in terms of the justification of this process to create a public opinion in this direction. Moreover, even within labor unions and leftist intellectuals, such debates have been popular and were used to react against the privatization process.

On the other hand, privatizations in all country cases introduce new challenges to working classes in terms of the reconfiguration of the working relations and restructuring of the labor market. Thus, the experiences of working classes and collective and subjective dimensions of the privatization process in terms of the reactions and arguments against the privatization process have crucial importance to understand the political character of the process. The tables below show workers’ support and views on privatizations.

Table 11. Support for Privatizations

	Frequency	Percent
Totally Against	276	62,4
Somewhat Against	57	12,9
Somewhat Support	79	17,9
Totally Support	29	6,6
N	441	100

In the questionnaire, it was asked whether the respondents support privatizations in general in Turkey. Table 12 shows the results of regression analysis to estimate reasons for being against privatizations or the extent of support for it. As seen below, there are 3 dependent variables to understand workers’ approaches to privatizations: the degree of support for privatizations in general (E.04. questions in the questionnaire form, see appendix), the degree of support for privatizations in terms of its effects on labor (E.05.01, 02, 4, 5 in the questionnaire) and lastly the degree of the support for privatizations with nationalist arguments (E3.01, 03, 06, 07, 08, 09, 11 in the questionnaire).

Firstly, in terms of support for privatizations in general, it is observed that with higher level of participation in privatization protests, such support decreases. Moreover, as seen in the Table 12, if workers call themselves as more nationalist in the scale of nationalism, such support again decreases. This is the same if workers support more state intervention in the economy (question D.01 in the questionnaire); then they tend to be against the privatizations. In other words, when workers assign fewer roles to the state in economic affairs, they give more support to privatizations. It was also observed that, in terms of being against privatizations in general, there is no significant relation between this level of support and control variables such as job satisfaction, years of employment in the factory, skill of the workers, workers' income, education and age. This proves an argument I already made in this study, that there is need for other variables to understand the level of workers' support for privatizations apart from demographic characteristics and working conditions. And here, nationalist approaches and perceptions and views on the role of the state within the economy play a crucial role in terms of support for privatizations.

Secondly, in terms of the effects of privatizations on workers and labor in general, the degree of participation in privatization protests, nationalist perceptions, views on the role of the state matter to a certain extent. Especially if workers attend union activities and privatization protests more, they are more sensitive to the effects of privatizations on working conditions and labor in general. The correlation between the nature of union membership and (less) support for privatizations in terms of its effects on conditions of labor is especially remarkable. Similar results could be seen when the satisfaction from their jobs is lower. As a matter of fact, this result could be observed during the interviews in Petlas and Tekel, in which workers due to precarious working conditions develop reactions based on labor-capital relation.

Thirdly, so far as the degree of support for privatizations with nationalist claims is concerned, it is observed that when workers actively participate in the privatization protests, they show more nationalist reactions to the privatizations. Similar results could be seen when workers call themselves "more nationalist" and on the right of the political spectrum, and support more state intervention in the economy. Moreover, when job satisfaction ceases, such nationalist reactions to the privatization process increase. Therefore, it could be argued that reactions

against privatization in class terms cannot be separated from such nationalist perceptions and aspirations. It shows that nationalism has been one of the key elements of class language and the moral-cultural expression of such contradictions stemming from the internationalization of capitalist relations and their repercussions in Turkey. After a brief discussion of the results of regression analysis highlighting the main motives to resist privatizations, we can now turn to the main dynamics and contradictions during the privatization process.

Table 12. OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variables

	Support for Privatization (general)	Support for Privatization (labor)	Support for Privatization (nationalism)
participation	-0.13*** (0.03)	0.19** (0.08)	1.03*** (0.19)
nationalism	-0.03** (0.015)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.21** (0.11)
ideology	0.01 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.04)	0.14* (0.09)
state intervention	0.12*** (0.02)	-0.09** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.12)
domestic capital	0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.14)
quality of union mem.	0.03 (0.03)	0.12* (0.09)	-0.17 (0.21)
years of union mem.	0.003 (0.01)	0.0003 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.07)
union membership	-0.11 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.49)	0.97 (1.14)
anxiety	0.003 (0.003)	-0.01 (0.008)	0.005 (0.02)
job satisfaction	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.01* (0.007)	-0.03* (0.02)
years at work	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.018 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.08)
skill	0.06 (0.05)	0.15 (0.14)	0.35 (0.33)
income	-0.03 (0.02)	0.12** (0.07)	0.56*** (0.16)
education	0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.18)	-0.18 (0.42)
age	0.01	0.02	0.02

	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.07)
constant	1.32***	10.29***	10.51***
	(0.46)	(1.39)	(3.25)
R-squared	0.21	0.07	0.17
N	441	441	441

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (one-tailed tests)

Table 13. Workers' Views and Approaches on the Privatizations (1)

	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly Agree		N
		%		%		%		%	
Privatizations would increase the unemployment rates	28	6,7	23	5,5	67	16,1	299	71,7	417
Union organizations, working conditions and workers' rights would be affected adversely	24	5	24	5	62	13	292	72,6	402
Privatized enterprises would be run in a much more profitable way and contribute to national economy in a positive manner	136	35,1	116	29,9	80	20,6	56	14,4	388
Private monopolies will emerge and prices of goods and services will increase	40	10,6	57	15,1	89	23,5	192	50,8	378
Political patronage relations in privatized enterprises are highly visible	81	21,5	96	25,5	77	20,5	122	32,4	366
Competition in economic life will increase and prices of goods and services will be less	116	30,1	114	29,6	83	21,6	72	18,7	385

Table 14. Workers' Views and Approaches on the Privatizations (2)

	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly Agree		N
		%		%		%		%	
Privatization of the state economic enterprises are against national interests	47	12,8	36	9,8	55	14,9	230	62,5	368
Privatization of the state economic enterprises would mean violation of workers' rights	30	8,2	41	11,2	56	15,3	238	65,2	365
Privatization of the state economic enterprises have a strategic importance for national security	18	4,9	21	5,8	52	14,3	273	75	364
Unproductive state economic enterprises can be privatized	58	15,8	32	8,7	103	28	175	47,6	368
Privatization tenders of the SEEs should be obtained by national companies	36	10,2	43	12,2	77	21,9	196	55,7	352
I would prefer to work in a SEE owned by a national company even wages are lower	106	29,9	67	18,9	70	19,7	112	31,5	355
SEEs should not be privatized for economic and political independence	40	11	33	9	48	13,2	244	66,8	365
In privatizations, national interests are prior to workers' interests	43	12	49	13,7	74	20,7	192	53,6	358
Accelerated foreign investments in Turkey are dangerous.	29	7,8	30	8	54	14,5	260	69,7	373
Privatizations are necessary for the economic development of Turkey	176	48,6	81	22,4	57	15,7	48	13,3	362
Privatizations of the SEEs are executed by the pressure of international capital fractions	40	11	39	10,8	47	13	236	65,2	362

In the analysis of privatizations and their effects on subjective and collective experiences of workers, we need to first discuss the influence of various discourses and approaches that have been crucial in the justification of privatizations in Turkey, especially focusing on economic criteria. During the field study, it was clearly observed that discourses of corruption and inefficient public sector have been influential in workers' perceptions on privatizations, even

among workers who are against the privatizations. While a significant amount of workers clearly reject the execution of privatizations and a minor part of them support them (especially if they also support the current AKP government), among the former ones there are also views stating that non-profitable and corrupt state economic enterprises which constitute a burden on the state may be privatized.

As also discussed in the second chapter, before the massive wave of privatizations has been implemented in Turkey, these discourses on corrupt, unproductive and inefficient state economic enterprises were the first to be publicly debated starting with the early 1980s. Since then, such discourses constituted the base for a justification of privatizations:

- “The SEEs make losses and cause a burden on the national budget”
- “The SEEs are an obstacle to free market and competition
- “The SEEs are not productive”
- “There is over-employment in the SEEs”
- “The SEEs will be privatized and in this way extra revenues will be provided for the governments to decrease debts”
- “Investments will be accelerated and competitive power of the country will increase”
- “The capital will spread to the society in general”

In addition to TÜSIAD reports from the 1980s demanding urgent implementation of the privatization program to influence state policy, media discourses played a crucial role in justifying privatizations after the 1980s. When the findings of the questionnaires and debates in focus group interviews are analyzed, it was obvious that these discourses have been influential among workers to varying degrees. If Table 11 is analyzed, it is seen that %75,3 of the workers in the fieldwork reject privatizations while %24,7 support it. Although the number of workers who support privatizations is not itself negligible, the more remarkable result was the justifications given in Table 13: “Unproductive state economic enterprises can be privatized”. %75,6 think that unproductive SEEs can be privatized, and this shows that an important proportion of workers are not against privatizations in principle or due to ideological-political reasons, but object to the form of the execution of privatizations and the selection of targeted privatized enterprises. Moreover, as seen in Table 12, %52,9 of workers state that political patronage relations in privatized enterprises are highly visible. When the

term “profitability” is added to the statements and views on privatizations in the questionnaire, support for privatizations – “Privatized enterprises would be run in a much more profitable way and contribute to national economy in a positive manner” – reaches %35.

During interviews, these discourses— namely, corruption, burden on the state and patronage relations— were also discussed among workers and it was clear that they caused a source of confusion on their views on privatizations. Moreover, workers always gave reference to such discourses and attempted to prove that their factories do not make a loss, not unproductive and the ones in these conditions may “of course” be privatized.

If these companies make a loss, I will not oppose privatizations. Companies in loss may be privatized, really the ones which are non-strategic and constitute a burden on the state may be privatized, but not with a sale to the client capital groups and in a transparent way.

There were also criticisms of the representation of the SEEs by the media. When a survey is conducted on the newspapers of the 1980s and 1990s, it was evident to see these discourses of corruption and inefficient public sector as a burden on the state. These discourses were championed by both the large capital groups (i.e. TÜSİAD) and the governments (i.e. the Motherland Party and Özal)²⁶². Thus a worker from Erdemir notes:

In the press, it was only and always the negative characteristics of the factory were portrayed, a factory in deep loss and having lazy workers with high wages. On the contrary, our profit approaches 1 billion TL annually.

There were also some other views which underline the fact that many SEEs were forced to be closed down because necessary investments and renovations were not made and governments systematically delayed such projects²⁶³:

²⁶² For some examples, see Appendix. Moreover, for such representations of the SEEs in the media (i.e. as functioning with backward technology and crippled by political patronage relations, thus suggesting the inevitability of privatizations for effective administration and increasing productivity), see Yıldız, A. N. 2002, *Türkiye Basınında Özelleştirme Haberleri* [Privatization News in the Turkish media], Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, Ankara and Tırman, C. 2007, *Representations of Labor Protests against Privatization in Turkish Press: The Cases of SEKA and TÜPRAŞ*, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.

²⁶³ The word “fact” is used here deliberately because there are many reports proving the systematic decrease of the share of investments in SEEs within the public expenditures. In a report prepared for Türk-İş, it is argued that the share of SEEs exceed 50% among total public investments made between 1979 and 1985, it decreased by a 23% after 1995. In this decrease, the SEEs in the productive sectors of the industry played a major role. This was

Many places, for example Oluklu Mukavva (a plant of SEKA in paper production), was privatized for making a loss, but after privatizations, the machinery was modernized and now the factory makes huge profits... There are many political reasons that impede investments and renovation in technology: then it seems that the SEEs make a loss.²⁶⁴

At this point, although this lack of technological capacity investments and renovations were again mostly linked to the phenomenon of “imperialism and pressures of foreign enemies”, as seen in the SEKA case, there were also those who were aware of the fact that national companies also play a role in these processes:

Koç and Sabancı (two major moguls in the Turkish economy) had investments in paper-production and played an important role in the factories that were closed down or whose ownership rights were transferred to the capital.²⁶⁵

Moreover, workers are critical of the lack of public support during the struggles given against privatizations, especially the support of the local population of the region where the privatized enterprise has a crucial importance for the economy and social life. This actually shows that, as witnessed in focus group discussions, the discourse of corrupt and inefficient state economic enterprises has been highly influential within the Turkish society as well. Although major privatized state economic enterprises are highly profitable and the levels of productivity in them are high, and thus profitability and corruption cannot be the main rationale of privatizations, it was interesting to note that workers appropriate such a discourse as part of their views on privatizations. Diverse reasons have been influential in the absence of such a support by the local people. One of the most important reasons noted during the interviews was that local people mostly consider privatizations as a new chance to find a job, especially “for their children”. When high levels of unemployment and competition among workers to find a place in the labor market are taken into consideration, this is highly critical. Moreover, relatively higher levels of wages in the SEEs cause further divisions and jealousy for workers in private sector and civil servants in the bureaucracy.

Especially the discourse of corrupted SEEs has been influential in the privatization process, local people also thought that their children would find new job opportunities and didn't support us. There was an intensive reaction against us because we were

the case for TÜPRAŞ for example. The General Director of TÜPRAŞ, in 2005 during the debates on the privatization of the enterprise, stated that they cannot make further investments for the refinery and employ more personnel. These problems, according to him, are the major reasons listed to justify the privatization of the enterprise.

²⁶⁴ Interview in SEKA, 2010

²⁶⁵ Interview in SEKA, 2010

getting higher wages and had a higher life standard and thus we could not get support.²⁶⁶

In all focus groups, lack of public support at the local level was underlined. In addition to the influence of discourses of “corruption and inefficiency”, Erdemir factory (located in the northern Turkey, in the Black Sea region) workers also mentioned “hostility” of the local people:

Local public did not support us since we have high wages comparatively. “Workers in the SEEs are a burden for the state” discourse has been powerful. There is also a hostility seen among other civil servants in the region and people working with minimum wages in the private sector. Thus, they did not support us. Moreover, there is also discrimination while shopping from the local shopping places. Whenever our wages increase annually, goods in the local market become much more expensive. Thus, we go to different places out of town for shopping and then local people’s hostility is much more. We pay higher rents for houses as well.²⁶⁷

When the documents and reports of the labor unions on privatizations are analyzed, we see that they simply list their counter arguments against privatizations mostly in economic terms. Moreover, in developing counter arguments for these discourses, unions could not focus on the possible effects of privatizations in terms of the flexibilization of the labor market, the worsening of working conditions, the deterioration of job security and the introduction of sub-contracting and informal relations – namely the effects on working classes. This was not only peculiar to state-friendly unions but also for others who attempted to oppose privatizations in political terms. For example, when reports and documents of Petrol-İş²⁶⁸ union are analyzed, counter arguments based on the profitability and productivity of TÜPRAŞ and PETKİM, and their contribution to national treasury becomes evident. Moreover, in these reports rather than a systemic criticisms of privatizations as a reflection of labor-capital relations and struggle, debates on the “market prices” of these enterprises (“these enterprises are sold for less than their exact value”), a stress on the violation of the rules of “competition” (“during privatization tender process, rules of competition between firms were violated”), and much more interestingly, and on the fact that “small investors are making a loss in the stock market due to the devaluation of the shares of the companies” took the pride of place.

²⁶⁶ Interview in Erdemir, 2009.

²⁶⁷ Interview in Erdemir, 2009.

²⁶⁸ Petrol-İş is the first union to become a member of an international labor organization, namely IFPW (International Federation of Petroleum Workers), in 1958 when it also joined the Türk-İş labor confederation. It is also a member of other international labor organizations such as ICEM and EMCEF.

In addition to the discourses given above, much more importantly for the subject matter of this dissertation, labor unions generally developed counter arguments based on nationalist discourses, such as the strategic importance of the SEEs for *national security and sovereignty*, their role in implementing *national developmentalist principles*, in upholding the *legacy of the early Republic* and thus in providing *guarantees for the political regime*. Again, it was difficult to differentiate between unions utilizing such discourses although they have different approaches to unionism.

Firstly, there is a specific focus on unions' discourses on the importance of these privatized enterprises for national economy and the *future and pride of Turkey*²⁶⁹. Thus, the struggle against privatizations is considered as a “national duty” and “owning up to the past and the future of the country”²⁷⁰. Secondly, another focus is seen on the strategic importance of these enterprises for national independence, national sovereignty and especially for national security. It is argued that if these enterprises are privatized, those elements will come under threat. For example, in the privatization of TÜPRAŞ (Petrol-İş), it is claimed that this enterprise provides the oil for the armed forces of Turkey and its privatization would be dangerous for *national security*. In another example, in the case of Turk Telecom, respective labor union (Tüm-Haber Sen) claims that “The T of the PTT (Telecommunication) is the T of Turkey, communications networks will be owned by *imperialist monopolies*, the heartlands of the country will be owned by foreigners”²⁷¹. Thirdly, this consideration leads many unions (as well as many left nationalist intellectuals) to a support for national companies which will buy these enterprises to eliminate these threats. In many documents, rather than the effects of privatization on workers, there is a specific focus and concern on increasing foreign investments in Turkey and their shares in different sectors of the Turkish economy as a “great danger”.

When debates in the media are analyzed, it is also possible to see that these concerns and debates are mostly voiced by left-nationalist journalists and intellectuals. For example, in many newspaper articles, it is claimed that privatizations are *a strategy of the imperialists and foreign powers on Turkey*. In one of them, privatizations are portrayed as part of the Greater

²⁶⁹ For such articles in newspapers, see *Tüpraş Gerçeği*, Petrol-İş.

²⁷⁰ *Özelleştirmenin Kamu Yaşamına Etkileri*, Harb-İş.

²⁷¹ *Telekomünikasyonda Özelleştirmeler Kitabı*, KİGEM.

Middle East Project of the USA and its invasion of Iraq²⁷². Similar to its role in justifying privatizations during the 1980s and 1990s, the media played a key role after the 2000s by focusing on such artificial “foreign capital-national capital” debate. Moreover, there is also an attempt in these writings to prove that the origin and background of these companies constitute an obstacle to privatization because of the *foreign plans* behind them. Fourthly, it is also possible to see the well-known discourse of “public interest” in privatizations, which is also linked to the idea that “privatized enterprises are owned by the nation and the nation cannot be sold”. Fifthly, it is argued that privatizations mean “de-etatization” and that the solution against it is to defend the state²⁷³. Finally, there are also views supporting the development of “public entrepreneurship” instead of privatizations²⁷⁴. Here, privatizations are simply conceptualized as reducing the role of the state in economic activities.

To sum up, it could be argued that various discourses on the privatized enterprises in public debates and the media have considerable effects on the perceptions about privatizations both among the workers and at the societal level. This actually shows that neoliberalism is not simply an economic process, but executed through political-ideological processes and mechanisms. It seems obvious that both labor unions and leftist organizations and intellectuals have failed to formulate counter arguments against these discourses as they remained limited to economic rationale and criteria. In the following paragraphs, the discussion will be continued with an analysis of the reactions and perceptions of workers during the privatization process with a specific focus on their experiences rather than profitability and efficiency concerns, as well as the effects of such discourses on workers’ perceptions and approaches.

To start with the experiences of workers during and after the privatization process, during interviews the workers underlined that they were disorganized and unaware of the massive wave of privatizations. This point is cited by workers as a reason for reacting to and

²⁷² See *Tüpraş Gerçeği*, Petrol-İş.

²⁷³ *YDD Kıskaçında Türkiye*, Harb-İş.

²⁷⁴ This view is mainly championed by KİGEM (Public Administration Development Center-Foundation), which has played an important role in the court cases to cancel the privatization tenders. KİGEM has also functioned as a source for the popularization of nationalist arguments during the privatization process and published many books and reports as well as organizing many conferences and seminars in close cooperation with many labor unions. Left-nationalist figures such as Mümtaz Soysal, İlder Ertuğrul, Bilsay Kuruç also contributed a lot to the activities of the KİGEM and developed its theses based on the support of “public entrepreneurship” and other nationalist arguments against privatizations. In addition to the privatization cases in this study, KİGEM also focused on the privatization of education and health and social security systems and considered these attempts as a major threat to “Turkey and Atatürk”. Privatizations are also considered not only as a major threat to national unity, but also to the national harmony, national consciousness and national culture.

struggling with privatizations late and collectively. Moreover, such situation may also explain why workers' struggles against privatizations could carry a political character and struggles are limited to and highly affected by the dominant debates in the media, especially "national strategic enterprises" and "domestic-foreign capital duality" discourses.

As noted earlier, discourses to justify privatization since the 1980s had already been influential among workers and divisions among them were already there due to the success of those discourses. Moreover, many workers stated that they had no clue that privatization will happen in their workplaces. One of the reasons for this was that these companies produced a great surplus for the national economy as the "driving motor" of national industry and production. Moreover, the "strategic importance" discourse which is always mentioned by unions and leftist intellectuals to support the survival of the public sector had also been influential in such an understanding. When the state is taken to be the main mechanism for realizing national developmentalist goals, this leads them to a feeling of being shocked in that why state relinquish from the surplus value created by these enterprises for the overall national economy. In these terms, workers shared a similar understanding with the labor unions that mostly support statist approaches and leftist intellectuals hailing the *state as the only defender of national interests and ideals*. Thus, it could be argued that due to the importance of these factories in national economy and the disorganization of unions, there was a fertile environment for inciting nationalist reactions and discourses during the privatization process.

It could be safely argued that the main mechanism workers and unions as well as leftist intellectuals employed to stand against privatizations has been the "necessity of giving a legal struggle". This point is also important to understand how these nationalist discourses and arguments have been a crucial component of the struggle. Despite the 1994 and 1999 amendments in the constitution eliminating legal barriers against massive privatizations, the field of legal struggle and annulment of privatization deals has been the major mechanism for workers, unions and leftist intellectuals in Turkey. If one analyzes the content of the reasons given for cancelling these privatizations, nationalist concerns defending "the public sector ownership of the strategic sectors and public interest" which are closely associated with "high national interests" stand out. Although these legal cases have played an important role in the late execution of privatizations for a long period, they could never establish a platform for a

collective struggle with the collaboration of unions (a notable exception being the attempts made in the late 1990s under the body of *Emek Platformu* [Labor Platform]). It should be also noted that many of court decisions cancelling the procurement of privatizations were not implemented because of those counter-national interest arguments suggesting that privatizations are key to Turkey's further integration into the world economy and an improved macro-economic performance. Of course, divisions among labor unions due to political reasons have also been influential. Moreover, the concerns of labor unions and workers to protect their status quo in the workplaces were another important factor.

At this point, a focus on these discourses of “national strategic sectors and “public interest”, popular among workers, unions and left-nationalist intellectuals is essential to understand the political character of the reactions and strategies developed against privatizations. To start with the first argument, namely “strategic sectors”, it might be asserted that it constitutes the most important element of the nationalist discourse during privatizations – “being *strategic enterprises* and industries, modeling *the national industry* and products of *national development period*”. By this conceptualization of the “strategic sectors”, it is meant that some factories, including those examined in the fieldwork of this study such as Tüpraş, Petkim, Erdemir, Petlas, Seydişehir and Seka, should not be privatized because each of them have a crucial importance for national development and security in the related industries of oil refinery, petrochemical industry, steel and iron production, tire production (mostly for aircrafts), aluminum production and paper production. Obviously, there were other factories (that are not included in the fieldwork) mentioned by the workers for their importance for national security, such as Türk Telekom and TEDAŞ (Turkish Electricity Distribution Corporation) in the related industries of telecommunications and electricity-energy. As we can see in Table 13, the most significant support (89,3% of workers) is given to the statement “The privatization of state economic enterprises has a strategic importance for the national security”. Therefore, the first result derived from the questionnaires is that workers who oppose privatizations point to the strategic importance of those factories for national economy and thus national interests. During the focus group interviews, this point is mentioned insistently by workers as a reason for being against the privatizations:

Telekom, Tüpraş, Petkim, Erdemir have all strategic importance for national economy. Thus, strategic SEEs such as in the petrochemical, electricity and telecommunications industries should not be privatized, but others could be privatized with real prices.

This “strategic importance” discourse is also linked to the national interest conceptions. As seen in Table 13 again, %77,4 of workers agreed with the statement that “Privatizations of state economic enterprises are against national interests”. Although a great deal of workers also reacted against privatization with reference to their effects on working conditions and union relations in the questionnaires, many workers gave a priority to the effects of privatizations the national interests in developmental and security terms in the focus group interviews, rather than their possible outcomes on working conditions and their lives. For example, one worker argues that:

We have to focus on whether privatizations contribute to national economy or not; national interest is important.

This point has crucial importance because workers on the one hand show their reaction in nationalist terms and on the other hand feel a need to attempt to justify their reactions not due to their concerns and self-interests. As seen in the Table 13, a similar result could also be observed in the statement “In privatizations, national interests are prior to workers’ interests” supported by %74,3 of workers. This approach was also clear during the interviews.

If we are against privatizations, it is for this nation and country, not for our self-interests. Thus we said “Tekel is the homeland”, “Turk Telekom is the nation that cannot be sold”.

The above statement shows that workers do not seem to be opposing privatization for their own material benefits and social rights but for abstract reasons such as the “nation”. Many workers during the interviews hesitated to explain their opposition to privatization in terms of their interests and rights. The main reason for this hesitation is a concern about the discourses popular in society which claim that these enterprises, and thus workers, are a burden on the state. During the interviews, they didn’t want to seem to be opposing privatizations for their own class interests but for the national interests. This proves that different discourses justifying privatizations have been influential on the discourses of workers who oppose privatizations. It seems that due to the power of discourses of “corruption” and “inefficient public sector and burden on the state”, which are also supported by their local environment and the society at large, workers internalize these nationalist discourses to prove the opposite. It also shows that the struggle over privatizations was partly due to such hegemony of discourses about privatizations and only nationalist arguments were used to justify being against the privatization process. Thus, it could be argued that a struggle against privatization

needs to have a discursive basis and such base could never be achieved, which explains the failure of the struggle against privatizations.

Workers also mentioned that they are angry with their workmates supporting privatizations for different reasons – partly political (supporting the government party) or partly pragmatic (to have the right to transfer to another public job while protecting his/her status quo such as wages-social rights) – calling them with different adjectives such as an “enemy of the nation” and blaming them with high treason (*vatan haini*). At this point, it should be mentioned that there were competing and different conceptions of the “national interest” among workers:

When we said that we are against privatizations, other workers said “you are the enemy of the nation, why don’t you want national development and an increase in national welfare”. We also see this claim in the media, on TV and newspapers and it is highly influential among other workers supporting privatizations.

Obviously, as discussed in previous chapters, in the uses of nationalist discourses, the position of labor unions have also been influential. This point is mentioned during in-depth interviews with labor union professionals:

Nationalist discourses have always been powerful traditionally in labor unions. Many labor unions were too late to react against privatizations. Public interest debates have become visible; those arguments should be posed carefully because they may tend to have references that do not target systemic causes and problems. In certain unions, there is no opposition to privatizations; some others only reacted when their doors were knocked and pragmatically champion this nationalist discourse to *save the day and make their faults invisible*. This nationalist discourse was *an easy one to resist* and also manipulated by the opposition parties in the parliament.

Nationalist discourse has been instrumental for the justification of the privatization process. In the last instance, a *capitulation* is given for the benefit of the Shell Company ... It was evident that such nationalist discourse would not be instrumental to resist privatizations when *general tendencies of capitalism were taken into consideration*.

In addition to these reactions, privatizations are also considered by workers to be Turkey’s invasion by foreign capital, namely “foreignization”. In this way, workers also reflect their perceptions about the internationalization of capitalism, their approaches to increasing foreign investments in the Turkish economy especially for the purchase of profitable enterprises and sectors. Moreover, this also brings back a well-known debate on the promotion of “national capital” against foreign capital ownership due to national developmentalist, protectionist and

security concerns. Lastly, this foreignization is considered as a threat to the “national and economic independence of Turkey”.

As a matter of fact, such concerns on foreignization were visible since the first implementation of privatizations in Turkey, namely the privatization of Teletaş (the government-owned telecommunications company) by Özal’s MP government in 1988. The government opted for the method of public sale of shares for this first privatization attempt, which failed because of the weak demand by domestic investors due to the general decline in stock markets and the announcement of a major investment cut by the Turkish telecommunications (PTT) (Blind, 2009, p. 92).

Blind (2009, pp. 92-93) argues that promises of popular capitalism were soon abandoned following the Teletaş disaster²⁷⁵:

After that, the privatizing governments turned to the method of block sales, mainly to foreign purchasers, since the local entrepreneurs did not seem to be interested in privatizations, the latter due again to weak domestic capital markets. Selling SEEs to foreign companies, however, created *nationalist resentment*, leading many observers to dub Turkish privatizations “*foreignization*.” Ertuzun (1990), for instance, likened the sales to foreigners to the infamous capitulations, that is, *economic privileges* given out by the late Ottoman sultans to Europeans and believed to have contributed to the downfall of the empire. Comparisons were constantly drawn between privatizations at home and those in industrialized countries, mostly Western Europe, where privatizations have always included a cap on foreign ownership, typically ranging from 15 to 25 percent. Public opinion, which initially was in favor of privatizations thus quickly turned against them after the initial attempts at “*foreignization*” toward the end of the 1980s.

In the fieldwork, it was obvious that such perceptions of privatization, in terms of foreignization and giving “capitulations” to foreign powers who nurture “eternal aims” on Turkey, have still been playing an influential role on workers’ views. To start with a brief overview of the answers given to the questionnaires, as seen in Table 13, a remarkable

²⁷⁵ By “popular capitalism”, Blind means that by offering the shares of Teletas to the public, ANAP’s leader, Özal, was acting in line with his campaign rhetoric, which emphasized popular capitalism as the main goal of privatizations: “His stated objective of privatizations was the incorporation of the middle class and the workers into decision-making processes. ‘Workers,’ he said, ‘from now on, will not only be owners of the company where they work but will also have a chance to participate directly in its management. In case a worker loses his job, his/her share will continue to be a source of revenue for him’... The 1983 and 1987 government programs reiterated that the SOEs would be sold to the Turkish citizens, thereby facilitating the spread of capital to the masses (Ertuzun in Blind, 2009, p. 92). Blind, P. K. 2009, *Democratic institutions of undemocratic individuals : privatizations, labor, and democracy in Turkey and Argentina*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

amount of workers (%84,2) agree with such statements about privatizations “Accelerated foreign investments in Turkey are dangerous”. In another statement, %77,6 of workers agree with “Privatization tenders of the state economic enterprises should be obtained by national companies”. %80 of workers agrees with the view that “SEEs should not be privatized to protect economic and political independence”. And finally, %78,2 of workers agree with the statement “Privatizations of SOEs are imposed by international capital”.

The same views were expressed during the focus group interviews. Hence accelerated foreign investments and increasing interest of international investors for the privatization tenders of state economic enterprises are considered by most workers as a great threat to Turkey, in accordance with the results mentioned above. The most important reason for such a view, as also noted by %80 of workers in questionnaires, was that the increasing interest of multinational companies for state enterprises would bring “the end of political and economic independence” as well as “sovereignty rights” of Turkey within her borders. During the interviews, such interest of multinational companies is linked to their imperialist plans “to divide up Turkey” and develop “dependency relations” with it. Thus, as also noted by %78,2 of workers in the questionnaire, the dominant view is that privatizations of SOEs are carried out with these “imperialist concerns” and “the pressure of international capital”.

Interestingly, there were also views, although hardly mentioned not to appear as the “enemy of the nation”, supporting those foreign investments in Turkey. Some workers claimed their support for foreign investments, but again with a “nationalist” explanation, reminding us Harvey’s focus on the power of the discourse of neoliberal competitiveness discussed in the first chapter. As a worker from Erdemir notes:

Foreign investments may be welcome but conditionally, they should built factories with investment projects, which would contribute to the national economic development in order to compete with other countries to get an advantage.

As also seen in the questionnaire results, foreign interest for state assets and enterprises are linked to the issue of “foreign ownership” of them. It is a general tendency among workers to equate *privatizations with foreignization* and thus foreign ownership of these factories create a tension. There were different reasons for perceiving such a threat. One of those reasons is mentioned by a Tekel worker in the following way:

If foreign companies win the privatization tenders, there would be *discrimination* against Turkish workers; *Türk has no friend other than a Turk*.

In addition to the perceived effects of privatizations on working relations as noted in the above statement, only having the label “foreign” was enough for many workers to oppose the privatizations and the “national strategic sectors” discourse was again visible to reject foreign ownership in these factories. Actually, it was not openly declared, but observed in workers’ considerations, that one of the most important reasons for foreignization is the threat to their working conditions and certain rights:

We said that this is a national company, it has a *strategic importance* for the nation, thus should not be sold to a foreign company”. Thanks God, this did not happen²⁷⁶. Then, it was a relief for us, too.

As discussed in the first chapter with reference to nationalist-protectionist reactions to neoliberal globalization in the world and in the second chapter in terms of the approaches within the left in Turkey, debates on “foreign capital vs. national capital” or “foreign company ownership vs. national company ownership” were not seen only among left intellectuals and various professional associations, but also have been influential in workers’ perceptions and reactions against privatizations. Even among the workers who oppose privatizations, there were those who support it if a “national company” wins the privatization tender. The debates on “ownership” in these terms had an important effect on workers’ attitudes against privatizations. In other words, approaches championing national companies’ ownership of the state economic enterprises have been influential in dividing workers as well. Workers who support the ownership of the national company in the privatization process were much more visible during interviews than the workers who reject privatizations in any way in the questionnaire results. Moreover, such an approach was not only seen in workers who belong to Türk-İş union, well known for its state friendly and nationalist approaches, but also among workers in Petrol-İş union which is famous for its radical approach rejecting privatizations in political-ideological terms and beyond the “national vs. foreign ownership” vision. As noted by a worker in Petkim:

In general, such a discourse was not dominant and Petrol-İş’ position had been “no matter whether it is national or foreign”. On the other hand, obviously some of

²⁷⁶ Interview in Erdemir, Ereğli.

workers said that “rather than an Armenian or Arab company, a Turkish company should win the privatization tender”.

This point had also been mentioned by a labor professional in Petrol-İş:

Differently than Erdemir, in Petrol-İş and Tüpraş-Petkim cases, the nationalist discourse was not a cause for objecting to privatizations. On the other hand, some workers found it positive that the privatization tender was won by a national company, the Koç Group.

Another union professional also states that it was impossible to ignore the fact that such debates have been influential among workers to “divide” them and that the privatization of SEEs through the ownership of a national company was achieved with the discourse, “they should not be sold to foreigners”. It is also noted by another union professional that not only with its effects on workers’ approaches and perceptions, and insistence to give a struggle against privatizations, in such an environment it was difficult for the union to oppose this “championing of national company ownership” which is also supported by a large section of the society and people living in the related region.

...behind the veil of “being against foreign capital”, the scene was set for the sale of state economic enterprises to national capital. In all privatizations, those arguments have become popular among unions and workers.

While union professionals also underline the impact of such debates on workers’ perceptions and approaches during the privatization process, it is also mentioned that these debates have been influential in giving a collective struggle of unions against privatizations. This point is noted by one of the unionists in Petrol-İş:

For example, Erdemir-OYAK relation, it was thought that the nation was saved with the purchase of OYAK. The idea that “it should not be sold to a foreign company, a national company should win the privatization tender” was promoted even by Türk-Metal labor union. Türk-Metal (Türk-İş) rejected our attempts for collaboration against privatizations; they even did not come to the meeting.

Other union professionals from Hava-İş (union of workers in Turkish Airlines) and Petrol-İş also touch upon this point and unions’ similar approaches to resist privatization in nationalist terms:

Unions also feed the *fertile environment* for nationalist and chauvinistic tendencies ... Some of them openly declared that national companies are better and should win privatization tenders.

The nationalist discourse was used to mobilize the workers and public opinion to take action in the short term; however, against such a massive attack, workers must be carefully prepared, have an idea about the general structure and systemic dynamics of capitalism. Exploiting reflexes should not be through political mistakes.

In these terms, one of the most important divisions among labor unions, partly the historical legacy of earlier periods discussed in the second chapter, is that some unions attempt to distance themselves from such discourses with ideological references to protect their status quo. As also seen in the questionnaire results discussed in previous sections, some unions were unwilling to resist privatization with political-ideological stances not to seem “in conflict with the ruling AKP”. For example, during interviews, union professionals criticized each other for being “loyal to the ruling party” vs. having “political-ideological approaches”. This controversy is a historical one as discussed in the second chapter and reflected in “state-friendly” unionism (Türk-İş) vs. “class-based unionism” (DİSK). In addition to this duality, it was also observed in the shift in certain unions’ approach supporting the “end of ideologies in class struggle” and the “need for a social dialogue” between labor and capital, and “unions as civil society organizations”. A union professional from Hak-İş (Seydişehir Eti Aluminum) explains this new type of unionism in the following way:

There is *no such revolutionary worker*, the age of *unionism with ideological motives* have come to an end. It should be so. The earlier divisions among unions such as Hak-İş representing Islamist Outlook, MİSK representing Nationalist Vision and DİSK representing revolutionary unionism were all mistakes. There is no independent field of maneuver for unions; they cannot act like civil society organizations in the *spirit of the age*, and this should be achieved.

Another union professional from Petrol-İş criticizes other labor unions for adopting statist views and social dialogue discourses:

Petrol-İş is criticized by other unions for its politically particular approach, radical attitude and ideological unionism. Thus they did not support us as seen in the privatization protests of TÜPRAŞ and PETKİM.

At this point, also due to the unions’ pragmatic strategies and public debates in the media reducing the problem to the “foreignization of Turkish economy”, it could be argued that references to the “nation” as a larger collective entity were thought as instrumental in such a

struggle. Moreover, it was also observable that workers had concerns about increasing foreign investments in Turkey. They clearly assert that the problems they experience during the privatization process are originated from the international pressures. It was stated that these different political tendencies and polarizations among workers were accelerated by the 1990s. As discussed by two workers actively participating in union activities²⁷⁷:

In previous decades, we could go on a collaboration with workers owned by the same company and could put pressure during the signing of collective agreements. But by the 1990s, this has started to be a much more difficult strategy to use. Moreover, *we were also confused by the rising debates of nationalism by the 1990s.*

We should question the fact that while there was social unrest in Argentina after the economic crisis, why nationalism, ethnic separatism and communitarianism have gained strength in Turkey?

In another case, discussed during focus group interviews with Petlas workers, workers told that all these political divisions were highly visible and led to the elimination of the possibility for collective struggle against privatization.

During the privatization process, we were all divided: conservative workers supporting the Welfare Party, nationalists who were influenced by the discourses of the Nationalist Action Party and critical about worker militancy supported privatizations, and the socialists supporting a militant struggle against privatization were marginalized. Our friends previously supporting a more militant style started to take part in these nationalist-conservative groups, too.

In short, these political divisions and different approaches by unions play a negative role in the collective struggle against privatizations. The same could be said for such divisions among workers. When workers are asked about their privatization process, they first mention their disorganization before the massive privatization wave and different political tendencies among unions and workers which have been obstacles to collaboration and collective resistance. In focus group interviews, some workers hesitated to give political-ideological references for their opposition to privatizations. This was especially the case with workers who oppose privatizations as a reflection of their reactions to the discourses and policies of the ruling AKP. In contrast, some of them who support the AKP's policies also defend privatizations as a reflection of their pro-government stance but only if they are sold to "national companies" with the "right prices". Political preferences of the workers will be

²⁷⁷ Interview in Petkim, Petrol-İş.

analyzed in the following sections; however, this point is crucial to understand that political divisions also play a crucial role in reactions and perceptions about privatizations. During focus group interviews, there was a focus on the AKP's policies not only in privatizations but in different fields such as debates on secularism, the role of the military in Turkey and foreign policy issues. Thus, as will be discussed in detail while examining the political preferences and views of workers on different political issues, it could be briefly argued that there are subjective elements for the popularity and use of nationalist discourses. This means that in addition to the role of objective elements inciting nationalist reactions among workers such as the internationalization of capitalism and its results on the national level, discourses and actions of the government party monitoring the privatization process enforce such nationalist arguments and discourses as well. Thus, the reactions of workers against privatizations match with the reactions to the policies of the AKP. Put differently, opposing privatizations also means opposing the governing party, rather than the systemic dynamics of capitalism and the nature of capital-labor relations.

In the following section, workers' experiences during the privatization process will be analyzed to understand the subjective dimension of the effects of the privatizations. It is believed that such an analysis is both crucial to understand the sources of different approaches, reactions and perceptions of workers on the privatization process, and how and why the privatization process in Turkey incites nationalist reactions and reflexes among workers.

Privatization as Degradation of Labor and Decomposition of Working Classes in Turkey: Nationalism as a Strategy to Escape from the Neoliberal Maelstrom

As discussed above, debates and reactions during the privatization process in Turkey reflected the serious problems in the labor movement and problematic approaches in the left in Turkey derived from the legacy of earlier periods. In terms of workers' experiences, it should be first noted that the privatization process of state economic enterprises constituted the most extensive attack on workers' conditions and composition of the working classes in Turkey. In this section, workers' experiences during the privatization process will be analyzed with a focus on the results from the focus group interviews.

Before starting a discussion on how privatizations were experienced in different cases, it is crucial to note the wide-range effects of privatization on working-classes in Turkey in general. These effects may be summarized under three major headings: first, on the working conditions of workers; second, on workers' collective organizations (pressures on unionization, decrease in union members, weakening power of unions for collective bargaining), and third, on the employment structure of the labor market (increasing number of laid off workers due to privatization). To start with the last, for example, while in 1991, 700.000 workers were employed in the SEEs (3,6% of total workers), this number decreased to 506.00 in 2000 (2,5% of the total) and continued to decrease in 2001 (495.000, 2,3% of the total), 207.000 in 2005 (1,3% of the total). When statistics in 2009 are analyzed, it is 207.000 workers with a ratio of 1% of total employment, although many enterprises had already been closed down. Finally, the ratio of laid-off workers in privatized enterprises increased to 68% in general²⁷⁸. As seen above, the most direct result of privatizations is on the employment structure of the SEEs²⁷⁹.

To continue with the second heading, effects on unionization, it could be safely argued that privatizations mostly target the historical power of labor unions in SEEs as the more organized section of unionized workers. The most direct result of privatizations for unions is the number of members. In many enterprises, all the employed personnel were laid off and any chance for unionization was eliminated. Moreover, the power of unions for collective bargaining has been significantly weakened with privatizations²⁸⁰. One of the main reasons for this contracting number of workers under collective bargaining was the newly introduced forms of employment such as sub-contracting and part-time workers²⁸¹. In these terms, general tendencies for flexible production and informalization severely damaged unions' status. This also leads to a weakening of unions' power to mobilize workers and discretion to take radical measures against privatizations – for example, going on a general strike could never be possible as an effective measure. When unions' concerns for protecting their *status*

²⁷⁸ <http://www.dpt.gov.tr>

²⁷⁹ For example, in Turk Telekom 45%, in TDİ (marine enterprises) 28%, in EBK (meat and fish enterprises) and in SEK (milk products) 67% of workers were laid off. When they do not have the right to be retired or transfer to another SEE, the number of workers unemployed due to privatizations reaches ten thousands. TÜRK-İŞ's research in 1998 shows that the members of the union who are forced to quit their jobs are 82 percent on average, including 4.377 workers in Sümerbank (textile) and all of 2.150 workers in Havaş (airport services). See TÜRK-İŞ, 1998, *KİT'ler ve Özelleştirme: İddialar ve Gerçekler*, Demircioğlu Matbaacılık, Ankara.

²⁸⁰ At the end of the 1980s, while Türk-İş could sign collective bargaining with more than 600.000 workers, now the number fell to half of this, about 300.000 workers.

²⁸¹ PETROL-İŞ, 1997, *Özelleştirme Kimin İçin?*, Petrol-İş Yayınları, İstanbul.

quo and tendency to negotiate with the state to eliminate significant decreases in their members are taken into account, we can see why this feeds the fertile environment for workers' disbelief and mistrust in unions.

And finally, the effects of privatizations on working conditions in general which could be summarized as follows: precarious working conditions, the introduction of flexible production and subcontracting, and performance-based evaluation systems. Especially increasing precariousness of working conditions (less wages, longer working hours and insecure workplaces²⁸²) and the growing number of sub-contracting workers to decrease the costs of administration and curb the power of labor unions are the most important results. The introduction of 4-C status for the workers who are laid off and transferred to other SEEs not only mean a significant decrease in wages but also worsening working conditions. The introduction of performance-based systems and flexible forms of production threatens conditions of safe working and intensifies the competition among workers, thus constituting contributing to the decomposition of working classes overall²⁸³. Obviously, the effects of privatizations could also be seen on workers individually in terms of their private lives and perceptions-political views on different political issues. In the following paragraphs, these effects will be analyzed and workers' experience of the privatization process will be narrated in a multidimensional way based on fieldwork results.

Although struggles against privatizations (both workers' protests and legal struggle) were visible in state economic enterprises such as Tüpraş, Petkim, Erdemir, Seka and Seydişehir, workers mostly criticize the absence of a collective base for struggle among unions and workers. For example, in many enterprises, while workers opposed privatization in their factory, they supported privatizations in other "unproductive and costly" enterprises, as seen in the Tüpraş case. Under these circumstances, court decisions annulling privatizations are not

²⁸² Turkey ranks 1st in terms of work accidents among European countries and 3rd in the world as a whole. Miners' Union (Maden-İş) President İsmail Aslan says that "Turkey's current workplace health and safety legislation holds only 2 percent of all workplaces responsible for fundamental health and safety needs. Ninety-eight percent of the workplaces in Turkey employ less than 50 workers. These workplaces make up 58 percent of all workers in Turkey. So, 98 percent of all workplaces and 58 percent of all the workers perform their jobs in high-risk conditions". Moreover, a significant amount of workers in those workplaces work outside the social security system and are therefore deprived of pension rights and labor protection. See <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-235452-frequent-work-accidents-call-for-urgent-action-to-ensure-workplace-safety.html>. It is not difficult to foresee that new working conditions and forms of employment in many state economic enterprises would worsen this picture with privatizations.

²⁸³ This has been one of the major concerns of the International Labor Organization (ILO) for the last two decades. On the other hand, in the Turkish case, it is safe to say that ILO suggestions on working conditions are ignored.

implemented either. More importantly, the decision of a “general strike” and “collective struggle” could never be taken due to differences in material interests and political views among unions and workers. Moreover, public support against privatizations could not be obtained and discourses justifying privatizations, as discussed above, have been highly influential. For example, in many cases the discourse of “state economic enterprises are a burden on the state” played a crucial role in the lack of such support at all levels. This was also due to the absence of a political-ideological atmosphere opposing privatizations. Instead, those abstract “national interest” discourses and problematic “foreign capital-national capital” distinction dominated public discussions.

In focus group interviews, firstly, many workers stated that there was a lack of information about the scope of privatizations, and concerns about its possible outcomes have started when the privatization process reached their own factory. The feeling of shock is narrated by a worker when the privatization tender has been publicly announced in the following terms:

First we could not believe it happens at all, such gossips were always there in the past. When tenders had come, we started to believe and fear that we would lose our jobs²⁸⁴.

One of the workers adopts a self-critical approach about this situation and their unawareness about the process:

When it was the time to discuss the new Labor Code or collective agreements, we got quiet since we do not have an idea; however, we know the features of a good car or house as members of this consumption society. And doing anything to get rid of this? No!²⁸⁵

As mentioned above, workers stated that one of their major concerns was whether they will lose their jobs after privatization. This, for workers, was one of the main reasons for increasing feelings of insecurity and concerns for survival. When the disorganization of unions to develop collective action against privatizations and the success of discourses justifying privatizations are taken into consideration, workers stated that this sense of insecurity increased and they felt “helpless” about what to do against privatizations. Thus, for many workers, especially for the ones who could continue to work after privatization, support for the struggle against privatizations was not a viable option:

²⁸⁴ Interview in Erdemir, 2009.

²⁸⁵ Interview in Erdemir, 2009.

Workers do not even have an idea about the scope of privatization; they mostly sought to protect their job security. Thus many of them considered how to find a job in local municipality governed by the AKP. This situation divided the struggle in SEKA.

During interviews in other enterprises such as Erdemir, Petkim and Tüpraş, job security was the main concern among workers rather than worsening working conditions. It was observed that these feelings of insecurity and accelerating divisions among workers led to a fertile environment for aggressive attitudes and workers naturally attempt to find “scapegoat” who caused such an outcome. This is sometimes the *labor union* which failed to protect workers’ rights, sometimes *the state* which did not behave like a “father” and sometimes *foreign enemies* who benefit from such a divide among workers. In general, all those experiences resulting from privatization processes are linked to the weakening power of the state due to “imperialist concerns” and continuation of “national dependence on foreign powers”, such as the IMF, EU, USA. This was much more visible among workers who still continue to work in SEEs, such as Tüpraş, Petkim and Erdemir. During interviews, rather than focusing on privatizations’ effects on working conditions which are increasingly precarious even in those enterprises, workers had a tendency to talk in terms of Turkey’s national dependence (“importance of those SEEs for the independence of Turkey”), Turkey’s national development concerns (“games played on Turkey to eliminate this) and increasing foreignization of “critical sectors” in Turkey (“threats to Turkey’s sovereignty). Thus, for workers, there were no reasons to privatize those “profitable” enterprises if foreign powers did not “plan” and “force” the government to do so. During interviews in Tüpraş, Petkim and Erdemir, increasing relations of sub-contracting, the introduction of performance based evaluation systems, lowering wages and the curbing of social rights were not the main concerns of workers. On the contrary, it was their factory they identify themselves with and the “nation” under threat. So the existence of the factory and continuity of production was highly important for workers, which meant that they would not lose their jobs and “both them and country will continue to win”. Many workers in Erdemir, Tüpraş, Petkim and Petlas even told that they can sacrifice from themselves by working longer hours, with fewer wages. Unions also supported such concerns by saying “yes” to privatizations but “workers should not lose jobs and unions should protect their status quo”.

Workers underlined that their commitment to respective labor unions for the struggle against privatizations was high at the beginning; however, they also stated that unions do not have enough power to resist the process and organize a collective protest. This situation is also

considered by workers as a reason for increasing a sense of insecurity. Especially in certain focus group interviews, workers also mentioned their feeling of “being cheated” by labor unions. The workers who could retain their jobs did not express anger for unions; those who lost their jobs or forced to retire, or transferred to another SEE under the temporary employment status with an average wage (4-C), such reactions with “damning words” against unions’ “collaborating approach” were highly dominant. In one of them, SEKA workers summarized this situation in the following way:

The central committee of our union told us that “we are nationalists, we love our nation, we love our country and we won’t allow them to privatize the factory”. We believed in them and started to wait for an action. But in a way they collaborated with the government and could not resist privatization. They said to other labor unions, “this is our special problem, do not interfere”. We had tensions with labor union professionals about their passive attitude. The union did not lead workers who are inexperienced about struggling and have no idea about privatizations. Some unionists attempted to stop the protests; for example, the collective march to Ankara was prevented. They told workers that our activities and protests are illegal. Sometimes they cursed some of our friends, especially the ones with much more a militant attitude. They told other workers that those who protest workers won’t have a job in the local municipality. The protocol was signed and many workers are transferred to the local municipality.

Critics against the passivism of the labor unions and their inability to organize a collective struggle and strikes against privatizations were visible in most focus group interviews. This situation is considered by workers as one of the major reasons for the failure of struggles against privatizations. The words of SEKA workers above also show that such nationalist discourses by labor unions have been instrumental in eliminating any possibility of worker activism and militancy, namely “we are all in the same ship”. Moreover, there were also criticisms against the historical problems of unionism in Turkey:

Unionism has been an *occupation, a profession, to make and control huge money*. They are alienated from working-classes with these higher statuses. A unionist gets 5500 TL, a 4-C worker gets 600 TL, no need to speak more. During protests in SEKA, I told one of them, when a person gets closer to money, you lose your control. Unions are in this position. Moreover, there is no democracy in labor unions, central committees are appointed by the government and there are always political interventions and trade-offs. Unions should engage in political activities but union professionals should not take place in advisory positions for political parties who mostly ignore the problems of working classes. Rather than giving credit to such huge slogans and discourses such as “this is a national independence struggle”, we could organize much local and micro struggles, we could focus on the mechanisms of union democratization; only these could make a difference.

Protests of SEKA workers attracted public attention and unionists, intellectuals and politicians with different political views took part in the protests to support workers. During interviews, a SEKA worker especially underlined that they see no distinction between unions representing different political stances. After listing the names of many union professionals with a leftist orientation, one of them said:

You would be afraid of labor unions, especially of the ones where there are *seemingly* leftist union professionals. They know so many tactics to break the struggle, too.

Those reactions were also visible among workers in Petkim (Petrol-İş) and Tekel (Tek-Gıda İş, a member of Türk-İş confederation). In addition to this strong feeling of distrust in unions, there were also criticisms against the attitudes of different leftist groups and their way of supporting workers:

It is better for us when those activists from other leftist groups and parties do not come to support us. They come here and attempt to teach workers being a communist, they do not have a connection with the life of workers and working class realities. Some groups came to support with the banners and flags in colors of the PKK. This is unbelievable; you have to build a common ground and voice... Maybe they have read two books in their life, no relation with the street and life, assume that *they are making a revolution*. They will organize workers in this way? Some leftist parties attempted to play a leading role rather than extending solidarity. You will come there only for solidarity, to support workers, not for the publicity of your party or ideology. You won't come here to compete for the leadership of the protests. As a result, some workers even attacked some young leftists. This *literature on idealized class struggle* is fine but where to find the subject of such class struggle?

Such difficult dialogue between different leftist groups and workers were underlined as one of the most important problems, which leads to reductionist approaches to understand the “reality of class in the global age”. Similar observations were seen in other studies on privatizations. In one of written on Tekel protests, Bilgin points to the problematic character of crude idealization and characterization of Tekel protests in terms of the “return of the working classes’ struggle against capitalism”²⁸⁶. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that it is a tough and long process to transform the prejudices and perceptions of workers who are already divided into different political and ideological lines as well as cultural ones. Therefore, in line with E. P. Thompson, class formation should be seen as a “process” learned

²⁸⁶ Bilgin, K. 2011, “İşçi Sınıfı Kamusalığı Açısından Tekel Çadırları”, in *Tekel Eylemine Kenar Notları*, ed. by. Yıkılmaz and Kumlu, Phoenix, Ankara, p. 109.

by shared experiences, and the political character of the class struggle should never be underestimated.

Obviously, workers also accept the fact that such passivism of labor unions is not only dependent on the union's different political-pragmatic concerns. It was argued that workers' attitudes also constitute an obstacle in the way of defeating such passivism. The lack of solidarity among workers whose workplaces were privatized in different regions of Turkey and the conduct of struggles against privatizations at the factory level rather than a nation-based level were also mentioned by them. For example, during the focus group interviews with Seka and Petlas workers, at a time the massive protests of Tekel workers had started and were continuing in Ankara, workers underlined this problem:

To support Tekel workers in Ankara, only two buses moved from İzmit yesterday. This is the final point we are in²⁸⁷.

Now Tekel workers understood the reality of privatization when it is their turn. Before that, they were highly unwilling to support privatizations in different factories. This is the same for many other cases. Nobody supports each other but asks for support if their factory is put on the privatization agenda. Workers in sugar production, petrochemical and oil refinery factories are angry with each other in these terms²⁸⁸.

Further divisions between workers in workplaces are also considered as another reason for such failure. For example, a worker from SEKA tells:

In SEKA, if blue collars went to protests against privatizations, white collars did not support them. Sometimes the opposite was the case. We are all divided during the struggle process.

In addition to these problems, workers in different focus group interviews also highlighted the impact of some tactics employed before the privatization process in their factories. As mentioned previously, besides the adversary effects of dominant debates based on the contradiction between national and foreign capital, debates on the factory ownership model by workers could also be influential:

For example, the development of sub-contracting relations was usually underestimated although it was one of the important signs of privatization. Divisions among workers then started. In some places, for example Oluklu Mukavva, some workers wanted to have share in factory ownership. These debates divided the struggle.

²⁸⁷ Interview with SEKA workers, İzmit.

²⁸⁸ Interview with Petlas workers, Kırşehir.

The manipulation of political divisions among workers was also mentioned, as another tactic to divide the struggles during privatizations:

In Kastamonu, the factory was later sold to Sabancı; the union leader said we won the election for union leadership and defeated the leftists. Then they said that privatization could be prevented without militant fighting and struggle but only with dialogue. Later time passed and the union leader became invisible, privatization took place and workers quit jobs. The union leader told them that if they have paid for your deserved rights, your retirement pension, it is ok and no problem. We then felt so sorry for not supporting leftist friends who politically opposed privatizations.

During focus group interviews, it was observed that in the cases of Erdemir, Petkim, Tüpraş, a collective struggle against privatizations was not possible due to only a limited number of workers who are forced to retire, quit their jobs or offered to employ with a 4-C status. As the earliest example of 4-C experiences, as mentioned previously, Petlas is an interesting and important case to understand the effects of privatization on workers in different terms. A significant amount of workers quitting their jobs since 1992 started to work as a temporary worker under the 4-C status in different state economic enterprises. Thus, it should be noted that the first 4-C experience was seen in Petlas before the massive protests of Tekel workers in 2010 against the current AKP government's policy of 4-C. As noted by a union professional of Petrol-İş:

In July 1999, we went to Ankara with workers to protest the government and at the end of November, 498 workers found jobs in other SEEs with the status of 4-C. 225 of them started to work in sugar production factories, 35 of them were in Tekel factories and 238 of them were in state railways. The ones going to sugar factories started to be employed by September 2000, which meant that they were unemployed for 3 years between 1997 and 2000 and experienced a traumatic event for themselves.

In the focus group interviews of Petlas, there were also workers employed under the status of 4-C and it was easy to see how traumatic the experience was by the stories of the workers. 4-C meant for workers the annulment of their existing contracts, being forced to accept part-time positions with significant loss of pay and social rights. The stories of Haydar and Adalet were highly indicative of the results of working under 4-C status²⁸⁹. Haydar was a high skilled worker in Petlas who went to England for several months for acquiring technical ability in the production of airplane tires. He states that he was producing 3 F-16 tires in a day which was worth 20.000 dollars and thus surprised for losing his job. Haydar was one of the first to be

²⁸⁹ I purposefully gave Haydar and Adalet's names since they stated that they would like to see "people learn about their own story and what they experienced during the privatization".

forced to quit his job because of his political views and unionist activities against privatizations. He also says that some of their friends who told the employer about their political background also shared the same fate. Haydar underlined the fact that a collective struggle against privatization could not be possible due to these political divisions in their factory. It is also mentioned by Haydar that some of those political divisions were purposefully manipulated by different groups who have an interest in privatization and have been successful to a great extent. The lack of public support for workers was another issue, a result of the expectation that “new channels of employment” would be created for other people. His experience of the 4-C process exemplifies the multi-dimensional effects of the privatization process on workers. In addition to remarkable decreases in wages, the loss of the right to retirement pension, temporary employment, privatization also has effects on his family life and personal psychology. He was particularly resentful of the fact that “4-C was offered as an alternative and gift to workers, something that they should be thankful for”. However, in Haydar’s words:

They did not kill us, which was better. We are just like creeps having a miserable life. After being unemployed for 3 years following the privatization of Petlas, I went to Eskişehir under the 4-C status. It was painful for me to be away from my family. Moreover, employers use a tactic telling the workers that “they could not acquire permanent worker status because of these newcomers to the factory under the status of 4-C”. In this way, hostility emerged between workers with different employment status. Later I came back to town to work at the sugar production factory. We are employed only for 10 months with annual contracts²⁹⁰. Thus we do not have a right to retirement pension any more. Our wages decreased to a 1/3 of the wages before privatization. We do the same job but there is a huge discrimination, so we are all divided.

Apart from these, Haydar also started to tell the effects of privatization on his relations with his wife and children as well as his personal psychology.

You also lose the respect of your children as a father. One of my friends from Petlas now works at a school as cleaning staff and his daughter goes to the same school with my son. Obviously, my son, Deniz, started to feel embarrassment, fight with other children at school and got angry with me. In the past, when we went to bazaar, I could purchase some of what he demanded from me. But now, I am afraid to go to bazaar with him. Now Deniz is preparing for the national exam to enter a university and tells me that “Father please do not talk about privatization at home, do not talk about

²⁹⁰ It should be noted that by a new amendment in the law on civil servants regulating temporary employment (657, 4-C) in 2006 by the AKP government, workers who were forced to quit their jobs after privatization could be employed temporarily more than the previous term of 6 months.

financial issues, I am feeling stressed, thus please go to another room”. He was 6 years old when privatization took place. Your family life comes to an end, even your sexual life with your wife. Many of our friends had to sell their car, house; some of them are divorced. There are also incidents of suicides. Some nights, I cannot sleep thinking about the future of my family. One of my friends was posted to a primary school as a cleaning staff and his wife works there as a teacher. Recently, he expressed his anger in this way “I will kill her if she demands a cup of tea from me at the school”. That is the psychology we live in.

Another worker from Petlas, Adalet, also touches upon similar problems with much more anger and “damning words”:

We, 4-C workers, are worse than aborigines. At least they could provide food for their children. At the moment, my wage is 844 TL (about \$520). I have worked 19 years for this state, I have a university degree. With the new regulation after Tekel protests, my wage will be 956 TL (about \$640). Whenever they like, we may be forced to retire and quit jobs, thus no job security. I can work temporarily for 10 months, so what the hell am I going to do for the remaining two months? Your chief in the factory may force you to quit your job because of your political views or any other reason. There is no way to resist unfair practices in the factory. There is no payment for overtime work. No payment for your travelling money. If you get sick, there are cuts from your wage. There are cameras at the workplace, just try to give a break for a cup of tea. Your chief is your God at the factory. Am I son of a bitch? What is my status, am I a human being? I question it and just forget about my class identity or status. Why am I getting less money although I work so hard? Other workers get 1700 but I get 844 TL. They say that “you should be thankful to God, you should pray, at least you have a job”. I was unemployed for 15 months and some of my friends could not find a job for 5 years. Could you understand what this means? Why should I be thankful like my other friends? There are even further divisions among workers, who work under the status of 4-C. Kill me, it is really better than this.

On the other hand, for workers who have lost their jobs after privatization or work in different SEEs in much more precarious conditions, not only nationalist reactions but also a different reading based on the state-capital relation was visible. As the latest and most successful collective action against the 4-C status after privatization, Tekel workers’ struggle constituted one of the prime examples of how workers may attract public attention with a high level of solidarity. Although the support of other labor union confederations remained highly limited and Tekel workers’ reactions against privatization projection of the AKP government had come out too late, it could be argued that workers from different political camps supported the protests in Ankara and showed a “rare” example of working class solidarity.

As mentioned before, 4-C debates have been highly visible in the public agenda with the resistance of Tekel workers. As a brief note, TEKEL was a former state economic enterprise which employs more than 12,000 workers in 43 factories and workplaces in 21 cities across Turkey. In addition to massive sales of assets belonging to Tekel between 2002 and 2010, British-American Tobacco, the new owners, sacked thousands of workers in 2009. Although there was no drastic decrease in wages compared to Petlas workers, TEKEL workers' new wages was 800 TL (roughly \$550) a month with a 1/3 fall from 1200 TL (roughly \$800). Similar to other workers under 4-C status, Tekel workers were offered job contracts for 10 months, with no guarantee of renewal. This 10-months term is also flexible and may be 3 months according to demand. More importantly, workers are not paid in the months they are not employed and they are not allowed to find another job. Moreover, their wage may be cut under the discretion of the managers of respective state economic enterprises and they are deprived of social security rights. Similar to Petlas workers who told their experiences during the focus group interview, they may be forced to work out of regular working hours in the weekdays and weekends without any extra payment "until the task is completed". These conditions of workers were the main reason for the protests in the capital city of Turkey, in Ankara and workers spent 78 days in one of the central streets of Ankara, in Sakarya Street, in tents and in the freezing cold of winter from 15 December 2009 to 2 March 2010. As I mentioned before, the Tekel case was not included in the field study originally, but the workers' insistence for improvement of their situation and wide public attention to the protests led me to go and observe protests and finish the field research there²⁹¹.

To begin with, Tekel workers' protests in Ankara mainly targeted the government for the application of 4-C status for workers and their precarious working conditions, rather than opposing privatizations in general. The workers' first aim was to improve their working conditions and 4-C statuses. While some workers claimed that taking a decision for a "general strike" is the objective of protests, others simply demanded a rise in wages and employment for 12 months rather than 10 months. It was obvious that – even many argued that – it was too late to resist, and workers were aware of the increasing precariousness of their working

²⁹¹ Although the number of studies studying workers' experiences during privatizations in Turkey is highly limited (this is one of the rationales for this study), Tekel workers also attracted social scientists and 4 studies appeared in a short time period. These are, Türkmen, N. 2012, *Eylemden Öğrenmek: Tekel Direnişi ve Sınıf Bilinci*, İletişim, İstanbul; Yıkılmaz, G. and Kumlu, S. 2011, *Tekel Eylemine Kenar Notları*, Phoenix, Ankara; Kolektif, 2011, *Tekel Direnişinin Işığında Gelenekselden Yeniye İşçi Sınıfı Hareketi*, Notabene, Ankara; Kolektif, 2011, *Bir Direniş Öyküsü Tekel*, Evrensel, İstanbul.

conditions which would affect thousands of them, and thus this was a struggle of “death or bread” for them. Although many observers of the protests of Tekel workers in Ankara rightly criticized the unwillingness of Türk-İş for a decision of “general strike, it could be also said that the different attitudes of workers were also an important source of the absence of sufficient pressure to force the respective union to such a decision. Moreover, although the participation of Tekel workers to the strike was high (90% of them), pro-government confederations Memur-Sen and Hak-İş decided not to participate in the last minute. As for Türk-İş in general, they decided only to participate in the demonstrations in Ankara on the level of trade-union officials and representatives and lots of pro-government trade-unions within the Turk-Is confederation opposed the decision for general strike. Such divisions among labor unions, seemingly political but mainly based on material interests and benefits, again played an adversary role; however, it should be noted that there was also lack of pressure by workers to force respective pro-government labor unions to join the struggle. Moreover, similar to other privatization cases, for some workers, there was a high level of mistrust in union leaders and bureaucracy, and this caused a certain level of tension between them during the protests. The same negative stance could also be seen in workers’ reactions to leftist groups who have come to tents to support them. While some workers state that this is a good development, contributing to the struggle, for others “tents should not be an area where leftist groups compete to show how they are revolutionary and how only they can play the role of intellectual leadership, because they are the agents here and demanding for change rather than passive objects within the picture”. In some interviews, workers complained that there is a cultural-political identity clash between themselves and the members of leftist groups because of the dominant conservative and nationalist identities of workers coming from different regions of Turkey.

Workers’ tents at the center of Ankara were highly impressive and it was obvious that it was an important moment for many socialist activists to see such a struggle of resistance which is not seen in Turkey since the early 1990s. “Tent city”, in workers’ terms, had been a center for workers’ solidarity and had turned into a symbol of the “nation”. This was similar to TÜPRAŞ workers’ tents during protests, called “Memleket Nöbeti” (“To Stand Guard for the Country”). Different kinds of materials, such as food, clothes, and blankets were arriving to the tent city each day regularly. Workers usually preferred to stay in the tents with the workers coming from the same city. Therefore, such names were seen in the tents, Hatay tent,

İzmir tent, Adıyaman tent etc. As previously mentioned with reference to the criticisms of SEKA workers, there were some socialist organizations who attempted to benefit from this struggle to make their own political propaganda. Not only socialist organizations, ironically, some political parties, such as the Republican People's Party which is known for its support to privatizations in its party program, were there for the same purpose. However, this time, generally it was different than other cases and workers were the key actors of struggle. For socialist organizations, the main task was to eliminate the everyday difficulties of the cold Ankara days, and especially nights. Moreover, workers who were subjected to same precarious working conditions under the 4-C status had come for the solidarity struggle and with a hope to change their current status. Some of them, for example the ones coming from Petlas, were angry about Tekel workers who had not supported other struggles until it was their turn to experience the 4-C status. Nevertheless, a ground for hope was there and they were attending the struggle of Tekel workers as much as possible (since they had to go back to their workplaces the next day not to lose their current jobs).

As mentioned previously, working conditions for workers in other privatized enterprises (such as Tüpraş, Petkim and Erdemir) were not so drastic when compared to Tekel. For many workers and especially for unionists, such precarious condition of Tekel workers was the main reason why ten thousands of workers resist against privatization in the capital city of Turkey. Tekel workers found the support they could not get at the local level due to the influence of those pro-privatization discourses mentioned previously. Nevertheless, for many people who had come to watch workers' protests, a similar understanding was there: "they now protest because they lost their privileges of being a worker in a state economic enterprise". Tekel workers told that this was similar to what they have heard from people in their local settings. Workers during interviews underlined three points: the first is their feeling of shock when they have first heard about the privatization of Tekel enterprises because they have never thought that this will be an issue for Tekel, that "privatization process will hit them"²⁹². This problem of "being caught unprepared" and thinking that "they are still under the state guarantee" could also be seen in other privatization cases mentioned in previous sections. Related with the first one, the second issue was their feeling of "regret" because "they have never thought of supporting other protest movements against privatizations". The third and the last issue was their feeling of "insecurity and despair". During interviews,

²⁹² Interview with Tekel workers in Petrol-İş union quarter in Ankara, in January 2010.

workers stated that when they first heard the news on the privatization of Tekel, they were first concerned about their “future plans, especially for the future of their children”.

This strong feeling of insecurity and despair about the future gave the struggle a different political content and led to new forms of solidarity. In these terms, as another difference observed during protests, although there were visible differences among workers in terms of political views (conservative, extreme nationalist, social democrat, socialist), ethnicity (Turks, Kurds), workers coming from different regions of Turkey had achieved a base for solidarity against such precarious conditions created by the AKP government. Women, similar to SEKA protests in İzmit, were also playing an important role in the struggle and sometimes reflecting a higher degree of will to resist. In this, women’s concerns about the future of their children had also been influential, as observed during interviews. In that sense, such precarious conditions, which have been called by Petlas workers as “conditions of death”, were not maybe eliminating these differences but unifying workers for struggle under a collective will and shared material interests. For example, at the same time with these protests, the current AKP government’s opening for a democratic resolution of the Kurdish question was discussed in Turkey, and Tekel workers were declaring that “they were making the ‘real opening’ for brotherhood in the cold winter of Ankara by resisting such ‘conditions of death’”. In other studies on Tekel protests, this issue was also observed by many researchers:

The system divides people along political and ethnic lines. They construct obstacles anyway²⁹³.

This is the real opening for democratic solution, contrary to what the Prime Minister claims. Here, Kurdish and Turkish workers from different regions of Turkey develop solidarity, share their food and blankets²⁹⁴.

Slogans such as “brotherhood of Kurdish and Turkish workers”, “alliance of workers and civil servants”, “no bread, no peace”, “the real solution for the Kurdish problem is here” were also heard. a positive sign for collective action that transcends divisions among workers. These slogans actually prove what E. P. Thompson writes, talking about the formation of “class” through shared beliefs, thoughts and experiences which are defined in an antagonistic way. On the other hand, when compared to previous protests at the local level in towns and other small cities, nationalist slogans, flags and symbols were again visible (“Tekel Workers are the

²⁹³ Interview with a worker in Adıyaman tent, cited from Yıkılmaz and Kumlu, 2011, p. 89.

²⁹⁴ Interview with a worker in Denizli tent, Ibid, p. 90.

Vanguard of the Nation”). Therefore, it cannot be suggested that such feelings of despair, insecurity and anger do not take the form of nationalist reactions against privatizations. However, this time a common place was also shared by workers to resist such conditions and identify the main source of the problems they experienced – in class struggle terms.

As in other protests since the late 1980s, , the main target was the current government and its leading figures such as the Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan and the Minister of Finance Mehmet Şimşek, who had led to a strong sense of anger by their speeches during the protests of workers in different places. Many Tekel workers told me that one of the main reasons for the decision to protest in Ankara was the Prime Minister Erdoğan’s and the ministers’ humiliating statements about the situation of workers in the SEEs subject to privatizations as they felt themselves to be “social parasites” and “useless”²⁹⁵. Moreover, protesting workers were blamed to be a member of the PKK or other terrorist organizations, since Tekel has also plants in southeastern regions where the Kurdish population is concentrated. Even workers who had voted for the AKP government in previous national elections were there to protest the government and feeling “disappointed” with such practices of the government. This led the workers to question the “state” which was previously considered as the sole mechanism guaranteeing their rights and status. In this respect, it may be suggested that the privatization process has changed workers’ perceptions about the role of the state as a body regulating labor-capital relations, sometimes resorting to violence, sometimes through legal mechanisms. On the other hand, some of those workers voting for the AKP explained the changes in AKP’s policies in the following way: “Maybe the USA and international capital has been influential on this and put pressure on the government. They cannot be so unfair and heartless”. Thus, it could be argued that the “foreign enemies and threats” discourse is visible in this context as well.

The most important result of Tekel workers’ struggle had been the moral dimension of such a struggle and the reconstruction of their identities during the resistance in terms of labor-capital conflict. Firstly, in the eyes of Turkish society, workers showed their reactions against social inequalities and delegitimized many justifications of pro-privatization government representatives. A battle to “win the hearts” and having the upper hand at the discursive level

²⁹⁵ In one of them, the Minister of Finance Mehmet Şimşek says: “The only mistake our government made was being too compassionate towards our workers who will lose their jobs due to privatization”. See <http://bianet.org/bianet/emek/119655-tekul-iscileri-merhamet-degil-haklarini-istiyor>. For such belittling speeches of the cabinet members, see also Türkmen, 2012, p. 66.

were important components of the protests. During the interviews, workers also stated that people's interest and support for them – from different sections of the society – has been high and this meant that “only through struggle, it was possible to change the public perception about privatized enterprises and workers in those enterprises”. This moral battle which changed the direction of ideological processes is highly important in a conjuncture where collective forms of solidarity are dissolved; workers are more directly subject to the pressure of market mechanisms, without having job security, social security and under increasingly flexible working conditions, which all caused a sense of despair and loneliness.

Secondly, as mentioned above, beyond their ethnic, regional, religious (Alevi and Sunni workers) and gender identities²⁹⁶, workers shared a common language, although many communication problems between workers were visible, to resist injustices and social inequalities in class terms²⁹⁷. Thus, the element of hope was there which shows that the increasing precariousness of working conditions among workers in different sections of Turkish economy may bring such forms of solidarity and that “Workers become aware of themselves as a class”, as E. P. Thompson underlined. Moreover, as discussed during interviews with Tekel workers, rather than simply relying on the power of labor unions (which was reduced to a great extent) and considering civil servant employment as a “never ending job status”, workers now have an understanding of the fact that “their fate is in their own hands” and “they have to form coalitions with different sections of the society” to resist macro-economic dynamics.

Tekel workers' resistance proves that while the internationalization of capitalism and the privatization of SEEs incite nationalist reactions, the increasing precariousness of working conditions and blurring distinction between public and private sector workers may lead to a unified struggle of workers against those dynamics. In these terms, the Tekel case also shows that the experience of “different forms of solidarity through struggle” may lead to the development of “collective will to resist and a shared ground for struggle”, rather than nationalist reactions which partly stem from the disorganization and fragmentation of

²⁹⁶ It should be noted that during the struggle against privatizations, it was observed that women and men solidarity was highly visible among Tekel workers, especially in the later days of protests. Many women workers stated that “they feel now more empowered and have a wish to be more active in the protests”.

²⁹⁷ A similar argument is made by Özügürü in his recently published article; see Özügürü, M. 2011, “The TEKEL resistance movement: Reminiscences on class struggle”, *Capital & Class*, 35: 179. In another article, a Tekel workers states that “if it is a matter of bread, we have realized that everyone is getting together whatever his/her ethnicity”. (Türkmen, 2012, p. 104).

workers' demands and expectations as well as fears for the future. Therefore, the extension of struggles against macro-economic dynamics that negatively affect workers and "the struggle experience itself" may halt the reproduction of "foreign enemies" discourse, which directly implies that the internationalization of capitalism is a result of foreign plans rather than class antagonisms²⁹⁸. In such a way, a "struggle for rights" may replace the so-called "struggle for the nation". Moreover, through sharing a common space, they may be much aware of the difference between the struggle for their rights as members of working classes and the struggle for their other identities and political views. In the following section, the political preferences and views of the workers and their influence on nationalist perceptions and reactions will be discussed.

Political Preferences and Perceptions of the Workers: The Continuous Reproduction of the "Foreign Threats and Enemies" Discourse and Division Lines

In last two decades of Turkish politics, the conflicts between secularly oriented modernizing elites and religious conservatives and between official Turkish nationalism and Kurdish separatism dominated the public agenda. One might easily notice nationalist reactions against not only the economic policies of the AKP (discussed above), but also its opening for a democratic solution to the Kurdish question, progress in the EU Accession process and debates based on the rights of ethnic minorities in Turkey. During the fieldwork, it was observed that various domestic and foreign policy issues have also been influential in workers' perceptions on the ongoing process of privatizations in Turkey. These different issues are linked to the implementation of privatization in Turkey and constituted one of the most important reasons for the lack of a class-based approach in the struggles against privatization.

As discussed in the second chapter, nationalism has always been a troublesome issue, but integral to the approaches and discourses of various leftist groups in Turkey. It could be argued that the same situation is valid for the workers which responded to the questionnaire and attended the focus group interviews. The results indicate that a combination of nationalist arguments with the leftist discourse, the so called "left-nationalism", was also dominant among many workers. Their reactions and debates about identity-based issues and foreign

²⁹⁸ During interviews, workers' expressed their happiness for the support given by international labor unions which proved that the experience of struggle may also lead to the awareness of the international character of class struggle and problems.

policy debates reflect a similar understanding. Those issues are criticized within the framework of the discourse of “the end of national sovereignty and independence”, or regarded as an artificial problem “created by imperialist forces to divide Turkey” and also linked to various forms of conspiracy theories that pointed to imperialist powers. While the ratios of workers, who consider themselves to be leftist or social democratic reach 50%, those who consider themselves as nationalist are more than 80 %. The results of the scales for nationalism and left-right political positions are given below:

Table 15. Political Views I

Scale for Nationalism: 1 (not nationalist any way) to 10 (extreme nationalist)				
	Score	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	1	13	2,7	2,7
	2	5	1,1	3,8
	3	4	0,8	4,6
	4	8	1,7	6,3
	5	20	4,2	10,5
	6	31	6,5	17
	7	38	8	25
	8	74	15,5	40,5
	9	44	9,3	49,8
	10	191	40,1	89,9
	No Answer	44	9,2	99,1
	No Idea	4	0,8	100
Scale For Left-Right: 1 (Extreme Leftist) to 10 (Extreme Rightist)	Score	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	1	53	11,1	11,1
	2	17	3,6	14,7
	3	21	4,4	19,1
	4	32	6,7	25,8
	5	95	20	45,8
	6	24	5	50,8

	7	16	3,4	54,2
	8	35	7,4	61,6
	9	11	2,3	63,9
	10	59	12,4	76,3
	No Answer	100	21	97,3
	No Idea	13	2,7	100

Table 16. Political Views II

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	N
	%	%	%	%	
Problems of Turkey mainly originate from foreign factors	4	7	17	72	395
It is better to be a Turkish citizen than any other	8	12	18	62	407
Citizens should continue to support their country whatever the case is	5	6	14	75	396
Whatever the causes and consequences, it is right to go to war for our national interests	15	13	20	52	387
There are certain issues which make me feel ashamed of being a Turkish citizen	52	11	21	16	400
Foreign movies, publications and music are a threat to our national culture	9	12	23	56	398
National lore and traditions must be known by everybody	3	4	8	85	399
Turkey's interests are prior to my interests	4	6	21	69	400
I would prefer to buy a domestic product even it is more expensive	13	13	23	51	410

When the answers to these scales are analyzed, we can see that there is a remarkable intersection between those calling themselves “nationalist” and the ones who call themselves as “extreme leftist”. This was also visible during interviews and such left-nationalist arguments were mainly based on an anti-imperialist national independence discourse. Such

conceptions of “national interest”²⁹⁹ and existence of “foreign plans on Turkey” were dominant among workers when their approaches to various domestic and foreign policy issues were described. For example, on foreign threats, 89% of workers agree with the view that “Turkey’s problems mainly originated from foreign factors” – with 72% strongly agreeing with that. In another example, when workers were asked “what disturbed you in last 10 years”, “the acquisition of land by foreigners in Turkey” is mentioned by 90% of workers.

Table 17. Political Views III

What disturbed you in last 10 years?	Yes, it did		No, it did not		N
	%		%		
Resolution Attempts in Cyprus	61		39		354
The Kurdish opening	75		25		387
Rise of unemployment	98		2		419
Society is getting more conservative	66		34		332
Increasing foreign investments in Turkey	74		26		385
Inflation and decreasing purchasing power	95		5		407
Acquisition of land by foreigners	90		10		420
Increasing social insecurity	94		6		404
Progress in the EU Accession Process	39		61		355

Another major issue was the AKP government’s opening for a solution to the Kurdish issue which “disturbed” 75% of workers. 78% of workers, when their support on the current government’s policies was asked, also stated that they do not support the AKP’s resolution attempts of the Kurdish question. The ratio of workers, who agree with the statement

²⁹⁹ In terms of the notion of “national interests”, it was remarkable to note that 73% of workers agree with that “whatever the causes and consequences, it is right to go to war for national interests”.

“Turkey’s unitary structure is under threat due to ethnic divisions”, reaches 80%. These show that the Kurdish question still plays an important role in the reproduction of nationalist reactions and perceptions.

One other issue mentioned by workers was that “Turkish society is increasingly getting more conservative”. 66% of workers think that Turkey is getting more conservative. This is considered as a threat to their lifestyles. Regarding concerns for secularism, described as a “threat of a religious order” replacing the secular order, many workers expressed views similar to left-nationalist intellectuals in last two decades:

We started to question Atatürkist principles and go to a change in the political regime. Religious orders administer Turkey.

They made us feel “insecure”. For example, 34 new members were appointed to the “Court of Appeals” recently, no one has any idea about this, “disinformation” is everywhere. Fethullah Gülen monitors the domestic political agenda.

People were much free in their dressing in the past. People even hesitate to order an alcoholic drink in a restaurant, and usually it is not even asked whether you would like to order.

There were also concerns about the unitary structure of Turkey. Addressing the Kurdish question, many workers underlined the necessity for a “strong state” to solve the issue.

There are no such obstacles for Kurdish people. They are everywhere. So there was no need for such political attempts for a democratic solution of the Kurdish question.

It is the state. You have the power. You have a strong army. Just do it any way.

Especially this dialogue between two workers in Erdemir shows that there is a common tendency among workers to identify the Kurdish question with the terror:

If we get angry when China violates the rights of Turkic population, we should not do the same...

But we have a problem of terror. Nobody questions their ethnicity. Indeed, they are practicing ethnic nationalism.

As these examples show, the main domestic political issues dividing Turkish society in the last two decades, namely concerns on secularism due to the rise of Islamist parties and

concerns on Turkey's unitary structure due to the rise of Kurdish politics, have been influential on workers' perceptions and an important element of their daily talks on politics. Thus, when the first three most important divisions within Turkish society were asked to workers, the first two divisions were said to be the Turk-Kurd and Secular-Religious divides.

Table 18. Political Views IV

Views on Foreign Policy Issues	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	N
	%	%	%	%	
Each country should act in order to defend their interests	3	5	15	77	395
Developed countries exploit underdeveloped countries	4	3	7	86	405
Inequalities among countries will always exist	3	5	12	80	400
All countries should increase military expenditure for survival	8	13	22	57	396
Strong political leadership is a must to be powerful in world politics	5	5	11	79	396
Turkey should seek a much more active foreign policy	3	5	15	77	395
Turkey has enough power and resources to solve her own problems	5	8	18	69	403
Turkey must be a leader country setting the international agenda	2	3	11	84	402
Turk has no friend but a Turk	8	8	11	73	403
Turkey is not independent in foreign policy decisions	4	7	17	72	387
Turkey will not be a member of the EU whatever she does for it	5	9	19	67	396
What Turkey contributes to world peace is more important than her interests	34	22	22	22	380

On Turkey's foreign policy vision, while some workers pointed out that they are proud of Turkey's recent pro-active foreign policy ("Turkey replaced Israel as a major actor accompanying the USA in the Middle East plans"), for many of them those policies are not sought independently to be a major actor in foreign policy but under the "orders of foreign powers". Although it is not supported by a majority of workers in the questionnaire, workers found its foreign policy vision the most positive side of the AKP government. 29% of workers thought that AKP's foreign policy vision was positive. Especially the ratios of workers who supported AKP's relations with the EU reach 28%. This again may be related to Erdoğan's nationalist statements on foreign policy issues, which are attractive for workers as a source of "national pride". For the ones who are critical of AKP's vision, even such pro-active foreign policy is not enough to defend national interests and the ratio of those who believe that "it should be more active" reach 96%. This is important to take decisions independently and 90% of workers think that Turkey cannot pursue an independent foreign policy. For this, 90% of workers stated, there is need for a "strong political leadership".

A realist view dominated the discussions on foreign policy issues. 70% of workers state that "each country should seek her own national interests". 94% of workers believe that "developed nations oppress underdeveloped countries" and 92% agree with the statement "inequalities among nations will always exist". Security is a main concern and 80 % of workers state that "all countries should increase security expenditures to survive". Thus, in the light of these results, it can be safely argued that workers mostly believe in the impossibility of a peaceful world order in which interests do not conflict.

It is a lie that we have foreign relations, we have allied powers. These are not true, there are eternal clashes of interests. Our allies will only exploit us...

For another worker, this is also relevant for the prospects of the international solidarity of workers:

Each worker in a given country support his or her own national interests, especially in economic terms and this is one of the most important obstacles for the international unity and alliance of workers. European workers consider their own interests and unions follow this path.

Those perceptions and views, moreover, are easily related to the privatization process and considered as part of "foreign plans to divide up Turkey". Privatizations are then considered

as an attack on “Ataturk” and “the nation-state”. When privatizations are finalized, it is believed that the “unitary structure of Turkey will be dissolved”. Similar arguments could also be seen in many reports published by labor unions. In this context, “increasing foreign investments” are considered as a major issue, with 74% of workers stating that this is a serious threat on Turkey. 92% of them agree that “the state should adopt the necessary measures for the development of domestic capital”. The statement “the employment of migrant workers should be limited strictly” is supported by 81% of workers and those who suggest that the “sale of foreign products should be limited” reach 83%. In workers’ perceptions, only a strong state giving priority to national interests could solve both their problems and those issues in domestic and foreign politics.

In relation to the economy and the nation, without exception, in all focus group interviews, it was observed that workers naturalize the “nation” as a “sacred place” and “the main arena of economic processes”. In many cases, the desire for a closed economy or autarchic order was expressed by workers. The discourse of “Turkey having enough resources for her own national economic development model” was reproduced, and it was argued that “foreign elements could be the main obstacle to such desires”. There were also references to authoritarian populist cases in the world that were presented as a model for Turkey, i.e. various nationalizations in Latin American countries. Privatization was an important element of plans “to prevent Turkey’s national economic development”, thus, to oppose privatizations is considered as a duty for the “nation”. Typically, public state workers strictly identified themselves with their factories as having strategic importance for the nation and national independence. Such perception of the nation usually led to another type of sacralization of the “working”, as contributing to the national economy. In all interviews, many workers insistently underlined their desire “to work and produce for the country” and “to win both as workers and country”. Such naturalization of the nation and the social division of labor for the sake of national economy was also based on moral-religious elements, namely, “working as a moral obligation and religious duty”. The importance of national and religious duties dominated the answers to the question “what should be prior while raising a child”. In the first 3 rankings; workers first mentioned the importance of “having national consciousness and will” (44%), secondly “religious duties” (21%) and thirdly “equality and justice” by (28%). These results may be considered as a proof that religious-national identity is one of the most important identities of workers, having priority over working class identity. As discussed

before, social-political identities and the perceptions of workers on ongoing political-economic processes in Turkey continue to be an important source of divisions in addition to the divisions created by working conditions. The same could be said about the problems of international solidarity among workers, and the cooperation between trade unions can be hampered by cultural-ideological differences that are related to nationalism or religion.

On the other hand, it should be also stated that, especially in the Tekel case, during the struggle experience itself, workers started to question some of their political prejudices, values and preferences. In contrast to other struggles studied in this dissertation, the long process of struggle experience of Tekel workers developed their political consciousness. For example, many workers who previously voted for AKP and underline his/her conservative outlook stated that “they now realized that the problems they experience are about the political-economic system and would not improve even if Islamists come to power”. This is also the case for other workers voting for different political parties, which are now considered “parties produced by and favoring the system”:

The truth is that, I had prejudices. I have never voted for a party other than MHP. When university students protest something, we were saying that “they attempt to create a chaos atmosphere”. They could not protest in our region, for example. When we come here, we realized that whoever called by the Prime Minister as marginal groups support us the most. Now people at least learn something here, struggle and question their prejudices. Of course they cannot change in a day³⁰⁰

In other privatizations cases, while workers state that political views divide the struggle and obstruct prospects for workers’ solidarity, many Tekel workers stated that they now realized that those political divisions should not be an obstacle to the collective struggle since the common purpose is the same for everyone, “having bread”. Nevertheless, it could still be argued that workers’ approach to politics reflects some problematic issues. It should firstly be noted that workers are still hesitant to speak in political terms and underline that “they struggle against privatizations *for their bread*, not for political purposes”. Such hesitation and focus on “bread struggle” rather than “class struggle” discourse could be seen more among women workers. Unions’ particular inability and blindness when it comes to mobilizing women workers could be considered to be one of the most important reasons for such a result. Especially for women workers, as observed during the interviews, the level of mistrust in labor unions remained high when compared to male workers. Moreover, women workers

³⁰⁰ Interview with a worker in Hatay tent, p. 96-97, from Kumlu and Yıkılmaz, 2011.

stated their particular problems in dealing with union activities and protests because of their constructed roles within the household, which are highly time consuming. This also shows that a focus on gender problems should be one of the most important agenda issues for the labor movement in Turkey.

During interviews, many workers stated that “they are happy with some political parties’ support for them but unhappy when they become the instruments of their political propaganda”. Therefore, workers’ demands for a change in their material conditions do not correspond to or transform into some political language demanding a change in the political-economic system. Especially, many workers add that this struggle is just for “bread”, not for ideological purposes: “there is no ideology here but right claims”. However, it could be argued that when a common deterioration is the case in workers’ conditions and the former status quo (wages, social rights) is under serious attack, workers can develop common reflexes and this may lead to the development of a political consciousness in the future. For that reason, a “common space” for struggle and the “shared experience” of struggle itself may lead to a struggle based on “rights demands” rather than the dominance of political divisions. In other words, instead of the pragmatic-populist use of totalistic political discourses that do not attract workers who are already divided in these terms, a discourse focusing on “shared conditions, problems and experiences” of workers could bring some prospects for class solidarity and consciousness. During the field study, this point is especially observed during the 78 days protests of Tekel workers against privatizations in general and 4-C system in particular. Due to shared precarious conditions of working and the deterioration of social rights, workers coming from different regions of Turkey organized a collective resistance, and solidarity among them developed day by day. Not only solidarity but also different forms of prejudices and political conflicts ceased to exist during the protests. The privatization process in Turkey proved that regardless of their ideology, political stance and the employment status (public sector employment as having more guarantee for “job security and rights”), workers are subjects of political economic dynamics implemented after the 1980s, having shared “problems and degradation”. During all interviews, this point is clearly stated by the workers as the final solution.

Concluding Remarks: A Critical Analysis of Reactions to Neoliberal Globalization and Alternative Formulations

As discussed above, the Turkish privatization case could be shown as a good example of how political-economic dynamics and tensions stemming from both from these and national-cultural particularities may influence further divisions among workers and lead to a channeling of political reactions to different forms of nationalist reactions, protectionist demands and inward looking alternatives. As a result of the internationalization dynamics of contemporary capitalism in general and the privatization process in particular, divisions and such tensions become much more visible since the 1980s.

As discussed above with reference to the Turkish privatization process, it was argued that, firstly the divisions between permanent and sub-contracting workers increase due to the informalization and flexibilization of working relations. These diverging interests among workers in terms of the employment status are one of the most important factors influencing working class solidarity adversely. Secondly, the utilization of new technological innovations used in the production processes adds another source of division between skilled-unskilled workers and white collar-blue collar workers. Thirdly, the traditional division between public and private sector workers also affects such solidarity and intensifies the competition which is already intense due to the increasing number of unemployed workers.

This picture of divisions among workers has serious repercussions for union membership and union politics. In this context, the results of fieldwork prove that neoliberal policies have been successful in decreasing the number of union members and in curbing the power of labor unions to have a say in the policy agenda about their working conditions and social rights. The reduced power of labor unions also leads to increasing suspicions on the necessity to be a member of labor union in the current conjunction. The participation of workers in labor union activities and the level of protests in different issues are in decline as well. It might be argued that the legacy of pre-1980 period in terms of unions' power to determine the political agenda and workers' mobilization to defend their rights has almost disappeared. Thus, it is highly difficult to say that workers have weak ties with labor unions and relation is not a qualified one. When the state's control mechanisms on the labor movement and unions (creating divisions among workers by establishing pro-government unions as well) and the employment of a greater amount of workers in informal sector and in small scale enterprises are considered

as other important factors, it is to understand why the organizational capacity of unions and the mobilization capacity of workers are highly limited.

In addition to the problems of accelerating divisions among workers and the declining power of labor unions, another problem to be mentioned is the issue of political leadership. In an atmosphere where leftist-socialist political parties have weak ties both with labor unions and workers, such vacuum is filled by left-nationalist arguments suggesting that privatizations is a “game of imperialism” and there is a “need for a new national independence struggle against foreign invaders of Turkish economy”. As noted above, state-centric approaches are highly dominant among workers and the nation-state is conceived as the only safeguard against the neoliberal maelstrom. High numbers of workers supporting such arguments as “the state should direct economic life completely and continue to manage factories”, “the management and ownership of SEEs by an international or multinational company is a threat to the nation-state and national sovereignty” and “it impedes national independent development” indicate that the internationalization dynamics of capitalism incite nationalist reactions and state-based approaches. For most workers, the regulatory capacity of the state is exaggerated and all internationalization dynamics in general and the privatization process in particular are perceived as “plans of the foreign enemies of Turkey to dissolve it again as in the past”. Those foreign enemies are usually labeled as “American imperialism” and “EU imperialism”. Not only the privatization process, but also the debates in Turkish politics dominate the political agenda since the 1990s; issues such as the Kurdish question, the EU Accession process and turbulence in the Middle East and the role of Turkey in the region are all associated with the “hidden agenda” of foreign powers on Turkey. Thus, for workers, a “strong state” is also essential to cope with these different political and economic dynamics. In terms of perceptions of national history, these state economic enterprises are considered to be the products of the early Republican legacy of the 1930s and the developmentalist period of the 1960s, namely “works of national pride”. Their sale, in workers’ perceptions, means “the sale of national pride and history”.

In this defense of nationalist-protectionist agenda, obviously, labor unions’ strategies and discourses also play an important role. In all privatization cases analyzed in the fieldwork, it was observed that labor-union politics has failed to meet expectations in the organization of a collective struggle against privatizations and to adopt sound strategies. Rather, unions adopted

nationalist-etatist discourses to extend their influence throughout the society. Populist discourses of “imperialists invade Turkey through privatizations of state economic enterprises” have mostly been the sole discursive strategy for many labor unions. This was attractive for workers; however, the same cannot be said for Turkish society. At this point, it should be briefly noted that the discursive struggle against privatizations had already been lost due to the promotion of pro-privatization discourse since the mid-1980s. Those pro-privatization discourses had also an important effect on workers, too. As discussed above, a significant amount of workers think that unproductive SEEs can be privatized, which is expectable when the high circulation of ideological discourses suggesting a rationale for privatizations (“unproductive, home of political patronage relations, burden on the national budget”) is taken into account. When the battle in discursive terms is lost, which was observed during interviews, such references to higher political ideals, such as national interest and national security are becoming dominant among workers. Moreover, workers give references to the nation in order not to seem they are giving a struggle for their own right and self-interest.

It could be argued that nationalist discourses and approaches have been influential and found fertile environment during the privatization process in Turkey due to the following reasons: firstly, the habitus of workers and forms of their socialization and politicization; secondly, the absence of political leadership (unions, leftist political parties and organizations) to develop alternative strategies that do not fall back to nationalist reactions – indeed promoting nationalist-developmental-protectionist arguments; thirdly, with the loss of struggle at the discursive level, the rise of nationalist incitements among workers, who perceive the privatization process as “foreignization”, “betrayal of national interests” and a product of the “eternal plans of foreign enemies of Turkey to divide it up into pieces” and identify SEEs with the “nation” (national pride, national history or legacy). When the effects of political divisions among workers, the pressures stemming from competition in the labor market, and worsening working conditions are also considered, it is not surprising to find increasing sentiments of fear, insecurity, suspicion and anxiety among workers, which eventually feed into national sentiments and strategies as one of the main forms of collective social response to the whole range of global political-economic dynamics in general and privatization in particular. For workers, left-nationalist intellectuals and traditional labor unionists, privatization has been the symbolic form of devaluation of the nation-state and traditional state-led economic model; in the struggle against privatizations, this reactive and defensive

moral mood and anxiety has been influential on the ascendancy of nationalist ideology. In the post-1990s conjuncture— when debates about the future of the nation-state and welfare state abound and the internationalization dynamics of capitalism and Turkey’s integration into global dynamics have accelerated—reactions against these processes have led to the rise of the nationalist agenda. Moreover, the privatization process of Turkey has been executed in a radical way and incited perceptions and concerns which could be summarized as “Turkey being under threat”. Discourses and political approaches of prominent left-nationalist figures that are also influential in labor unions (such as Alpaslan Işıklı, Yıldırım Koç, Mümtaz Soysal, İlder Ertuğrul) have also played a crucial role in the creation of a political climate channeling workers’ reactions to a much more nationalist and defensive direction than a class-based one.

It should be also noted that nationalist discourses have been an arsenal for pragmatic concerns for unions and workers to protect their status quo and have been instrumental for the justification of privatizations which were not rejected by both as long as job guarantees for workers and organizational survival for unions are possible. During interviews, it was observed that the tensions stemming from fear and anxiety regarding unemployment and increasing competition among workers to find a job in the labor market were highly influential in workers’ concerns to protect their status in the given enterprise or to be employed another place (as offered by the state in the SEKA case). As a result of such competition and problems of unemployment, many workers state that “they need to *pray the God* for their conditions, since the labor market is highly competitive”. Thus, protecting job security and work status becomes the chief target.

The Tekel case, in this context, marked a difference and showed that the increasing precariousness of working conditions created a basis for collective struggle beyond national, religious, cultural and even gender identities. When the fact that similar conditions started to emerge in other privatized enterprises is taken into consideration, it may be argued that the short term and pragmatic approaches mentioned above will cost a lot for workers in the future. Whatever the case, the privatization process as the most important component of neoliberal hegemony project was completed and achieved with a great success in favor of domestic and international capital fractions in this storm of nationalist reactions against its implementation. As a matter of fact, these reactions also proved the organizational

incapability of labor unions to develop alternative strategies against the new dynamics and pressures of contemporary capitalism; and The Turkish privatization case is a prime example to think about the internalization of the tensions stemming from the internationalization of capitalism, the effects of these dynamics on working class composition and the prospects or problems for an international solidarity of workers under such global dynamics. While it is possible to see new forms of solidarity among workers in different national contexts emerging, such nationalist reactions to the internationalization of capitalism and increasing competition among different national interest conceptions constitute one of the most important obstacles to such solidarity.

CONCLUSION

This study argues that the globalization or internationalization process of capitalism in the neo-liberal age introduces new challenges to the formation and structure of working classes, as well as their struggles against those political-economic dynamics. The forms of class responses to those processes constitute the most important element of the formation of class consciousness and the process of “learning through experience and struggle”. Working-class consciousness is shaped by the “experience itself” during the struggling process. Moreover, workers get an understanding of different commonalities and shared systems of values with other workers, as well as developing a capacity to question and change existing social relations. Through such a process, a critical praxis could be established and political ideologies having a divisive effect on workers could then be problematized with reference to class identity.

The responses of workers to the privatization process in Turkey and other countries should be analyzed within this perspective. Workers’ experience during the privatization process and their struggles obviously correspond to the problems of class consciousness and lead workers to think more on political alternatives to escape from the maelstrom of neo-liberalism. On the other hand, the political content of these reactions is also important and determines the prospects for such alternatives. As discussed in the Chapter 1, the political character of struggles should not be underestimated and objective class interests and consciousness cannot be taken for granted and *a priori*. This means that such learning through experience and the struggle itself may not always lead to a positive development in the construction of an alternative imagination, depending on the character of political reactions and formulations. At this point, ideological leadership and the organizational capacity and reflexes of labor unions are also important. In the Turkish case, similar to other countries where foreign direct investments and interest in profitable state economic enterprises incite nationalist reactions, one might argue that the reactions of workers-unions and the political-theoretical formulations against privatization could be considered a complete problematic. In such a failure, this study argues, nationalist arguments and solutions played a crucial role and undermined the prospects for the development of a class-based struggle. Obviously, as this study underlines its importance, not only political but also economic processes (competitive pressures on workers and their dividing effect on the labor movement with the acceleration of the

internationalization dynamics of capitalism after the 1980s) play a crucial role in such rise of protectionist demands and nationalist concerns among workers and unions.

One of the most important reasons leading to such a result, this thesis suggests, is the inability of the Left in general to develop class-based alternatives and theoretical approaches against the hegemony of neo-liberalism and the reproduction of historical-theoretical mistakes within Marxist practice. As discussed in the first chapter analyzing the problematic legacy of Marxism with regards to nationalism, which epiphenomenalize and rehabilitates nationalist discourses within Marxist theory and practice (evolutionary and economy-reductionist strains of the theories of dependency and internal colonialism, reducing it to a direct outcome of underdevelopment and a question of “false-consciousness” masking the true class struggle), the internationalization process of capitalism after the 1980s was not matched with a similar internationalization of the labor movement and the development of international labor solidarity. The Marxist argument that national antagonisms as well as differences will vanish with the supremacy of the proletariat on the international scale was proved wrong especially after the 1980s with the increasing internationalization of capital movements and the hegemony of global neo-liberalism. As a matter of fact, not only after the 1980s but during the 20th century, national consciousness and identity has proved to be more powerful than all international divisions including that of class. Obviously, in such a result, international economic dynamics and state coercion to limit the labor movement at the national level also plays a crucial role, while opening much more space for the international capitalist actors.

Moreover, in such problematic formulations, what Marx, Lenin and Gramsci suggested was forgotten: only a political movement organized on an international scale could successfully defeat capitalism, and no revolution within one national territory could survive unless it takes on an international character. Stalinist and Maoist arguments have been highly influential in many national movements, especially in the Third World countries in Latin America and Africa, against imperialism and colonization and they mostly suppressed working classes and reduced socialism to a matter of economic development in a given nation. Through a denial of internal contradictions and portraying the nation as a victim of imperialism, nationalism was revitalized and used as a progressive instrument providing the main rationale of the struggles. As a result, national and class contradictions have been intertwined. As discussed in the Chapter 1, working-class lost its centrality to the socialist project and it was replaced by the

nation or identification of it with the nation. It is one of the arguments of this study that such theoretical and political-practical mistakes were reproduced especially after the 1980s and mostly after the end of the Cold War under the hegemony of global neo-liberalism.

Early figures of Marxism from Marx to Lenin and Gramsci also remind us that political character of the struggles given in different spaces is important for the prospects for future international labor solidarity. Therefore, this study focuses on such political character of reactions, discourses and perceptions during the internationalization process of capitalism after the 1980s. Since the internationalization of capitalism or global neo-liberalism after the 1980s brings new contradictions and challenges to workers and unions in different ways, the political character of many labor movements and political formulations within the Left against those processes reflected a nationalistic character rather than internationalist one. Among such problematic formulations, not only the state but also the national bourgeoisie is represented as an agent of the struggle against international capital. However, in this new age of global capitalism, it is also understood during the privatization process that major national companies have certain common interests with foreign capital, and both resistance and competition have lost their “national” character. On the other hand, for both workers and unions, a fertile environment called “national competitiveness” may be created through political-ideological processes, as Harvey argued, to hide or smooth over the contradictions between the interests of opposing social classes in a given nation and to place workers of different nations in opposition to each other. The neo-liberal logic of national competitiveness produces ephemeral winners and losers in the global struggle for position, and this in itself can be a source of national pride or of national soul-searching.

As discussed in the second part of the first chapter on the transformation after the 1980s, privatizations have been the most important component of the neo-liberal agenda, especially in terms of curbing the power of labor unions, to decompose working classes and liberalize markets with lesser role of the state in the economy. Thus, the peculiar characteristics of the period after the 1980s has been a massive attack on working classes through practices of flexible production, the development of sub-contracting relations and the informalization of the labor markets. Neo-liberal economic policies nurtured the sentiments of “fear”, “anxiety”, “insecurity”, “suspicion” and “anger” amongst working classes. Moreover, these factors have led to “fragmentation”, “decomposition” and “dispersion” among working classes

accompanied by subcontracting, poor working conditions, competition between workers in the labor market; decline in labor union membership as well as in the bargaining and organizational power of labor unions. The rise of global capitalism, increasing capital mobility, the shift towards “flexible” production, technological changes, and a series of other developments have transformed the occupational structure and stimulated the development of a variety of “new” working relations. Moreover, with the annihilation of temporal and spatial limits for capital after the 1980s and the acceleration of international capital flows, namely in a world of multiple workers and firms in multiple places, classes in-themselves are geographically fragmented. In such an environment of promoted economic competitiveness among nations and increasing competition among workers to find a job in this new configuration of the labor markets, labor unions and workers’ reactions and political formulations have been shaped by nationalist and developmentalist-protectionist theses which mostly eliminated prospects for international labor solidarity against the international hegemony of capitalism. Put differently, struggles, strategies and concerns of labor unions between developed and developing countries differ to a great extent although the control strategies of national and transnational companies on labor are mostly similar.

This study argues that the ongoing unmaking and making of working classes brings a tendency for workers to draw non-class boundaries as a basis for claims for protection from the maelstrom, a special treatment in terms of nationness. Nationalist reactions and nation-based political formulations against privatizations in different country cases could be understood within this framework. Workers seek for a refuge to escape from the maelstrom of neo-liberal globalism in many Third World and developing countries, the first and foremost case being Latin America but also in the USA and Canada as advanced capitalist countries, recent anti-neo-liberal strategies are mostly taking the form of “left economic nationalism and populism” and “national developmentalism”. This study claims that in many the opposition to “globalization” discourse usually seeks a return to national capitalism and developmentalist protectionism. The Turkish privatization case constitutes the prime example of such problematic formulations, workers’ dislocations due to neo-liberal policies and massive sale of state economic enterprises to different capital groups at different scales. In the Turkish case, both labor unions and leftist intellectuals suggested that nationalist approach could still be instrumental in the struggle against the effects of neo-liberal globalization. Historical reasons for such a result were discussed in the 2nd chapter.

In Chapter 2, it was first argued that Kemalist nationalism and populism suggesting the ideal of a “classless and organic society free from contradictions” and thus rejecting class-based politics and organizations in the early Republican period through legal and when necessary violent measures had obstructed the development of the class politics in Turkey. Populism and nationalism has been consent mechanisms of the workers to the conditions they suffer. In such conditions, an independent development of a labor movement has been impossible and both unions and workers had to internalize these nationalist and populist principles. In addition to this legacy, it was secondly argued that nationalism has been as one of the most problematic issues within the Turkish Left and the repercussions of the theoretical pitfalls within Marxism are highly visible in political formulations and practice. In addition to the effects of Kemalist nationalism and Stalinism in the left in Turkey until the 1960s, new inspirations and strategies from different country experiences (such as Maoism, Nasserism, and Third Worldism with reference to the struggles in Cuba, Vietnam and other underdeveloped countries) suggesting nation-based solutions to imperialism have also been popular. From Galiyevism and Kadro movement to YÖN and MDD, with theses of “national democratic revolution” and “non-capitalist path to development” which define the main contradiction as between core and periphery countries rather than antagonistic class relations, nationalism has always been an integral element of socialist approaches and practice in Turkey. Within these approaches, there was a distinction between “nationalism of oppressor nations” and “nationalism of oppressed countries” and thus nationalism was suggested as the only way out. When those approaches and formulations appeared in the common form of “anti-imperialism”, they mostly reflected an anti-capitalist character but with an ambivalent attitude towards class-based politics and finally giving way to state capitalism. Here, it could be also suggested that socialism was instrumental in justifying the Kemalist project and ideals (national political-economic independence) and considered as the most suitable method for national developmentalism which would end the underdevelopment of Turkey. In these projections and formulations, there was no peculiar role assigned to workers as subjects of such an emancipation project. Indeed, pressures on workers’ rights and the organizational capacities of labor unions were justified with respect to nationalist objectives, such as “national unity and harmony” and “national interests”. For these purposes, coalitions with “true nationalist bourgeoisie and army” were considered as viable options to win the struggle. These actually corresponded to the problematic implications of the prioritization of the

“national” before the “class”. The most important result of such formulations has been their divisive effect on socialist struggle between 1960s and 1980s.

With the decentralization of labor unions, and repressive union laws that increased workers’ vulnerability and susceptibility to unemployment, the working class was forced to fight to keep their jobs rather than pushing for higher wages throughout the 1980s. As a result of the neo-liberal policies and reforms executed by the 1980s, temporary employment has risen, unionization has declined, employment prospects have deteriorated and employees’ earnings have diminished in real terms. Due to the oppressive pressure of the post-1980 regime on labor unions (for example, DİSK was outlawed and all labor unions had to seek a statist approach), the dissatisfaction of workers from labor unions in terms of meeting their expectations has been the most visible issue in working life. As a result, the crisis of the left in Turkey and labor unions with the 1980s (due to the authoritarian regime of 1980-1983 and neoliberal policies of the ANAP government) and dilemmas in the era of reconfiguration of the state with the internationalization of capitalism and execution of neoliberal policies led to a fertile environment for nation-based alternative formulations and nationalist explanations to get rid of the maelstrom stemming from such processes. In the age of neoliberal globalization, especially after the end of the Cold War and in the context of debates based on the decline of the nation-state, similar formulations have appeared again in political formulations and practice to fight neo-liberal hegemony and the internationalization of capitalism. Similar to other country cases, in Turkey not only leftist political parties and intellectuals but also workers and labor unions supported such formulations and perceived the process as injected from abroad, rather than considering internal elements. Against such a hegemonic project, the reactions of labor unions and certain leftist organizations and intellectuals have taken the form of “defending the nation-state”. In these terms, the historical legacy of the relation between nationalism and the left in Turkey could be seen in the debates after the 1990s.

The alliances between left nationalists and radical nationalists were not limited to the reactions against the internationalization of capital movements in Turkey, but also affected opinions on such issues as the EU Accession process, Kurdish question, Cyprus and Armenian issues, and finally the rise of the political Islam: in terms of defending the role of the state in an anti-globalist perspective, calls for the revitalization of the principles of etatism and national developmentalism – since “imperialist forces and foreign capital strive for

forcibly interfering with the Turkish economy” – the military as a progressive force against the violation of the principle of secularism by the political Islamic movement were issued. These processes have also been influential on workers’ political attitudes and labor unions. Moreover, similar to the approaches on the role of the state, borders between left nationalism and Kemalist nationalism/radical nationalism are increasingly blurred so far as their approaches on the solution of the Kurdish question in Turkey are concerned. Further political divisions among workers emerged through religious identity, and offering an alternative socialist-leftist vision for the totality of working classes whose composition could not be simply defined by class identity became even more difficult. Such divisions were also visible among labor unions and this prevented the formation of a common ground for collective struggle against repercussions of political-economic dynamics on workers. A massive wave of privatizations started in such a political and economic conjuncture where privatizations were already justified with economic analyses and working classes and labor unions were politically divided and decomposed.

As one of the most important components of the neo-liberal program in Turkey and the subject matter of this dissertation, privatizations have been the most important issue on the agenda of workers and labor unions in Turkey. In Chapter 3, the results of the field study based on the Turkish privatization case were given within a framework of political economy of nationalism in Turkey. Privatizations, not only in Turkey but implemented in many countries as part of the neo-liberal hegemony project, have been a laboratory for understanding how structural political-economic dynamics are experienced and perceived by workers and labor unions. Since privatized SEEs have historically been the most developed industrial complexes, workers in these public enterprises have always been the most organized sections of the working classes. In these respects, their attitudes, reactions, mobilization capacities made them important to understand the organizational capacity of workers in Turkey. This also makes sense in the context of the neo-liberal logic and policy priorities of the JDP government which aims to defeat working class reactions and their mobilization capacity through privatizations. Moreover, the privatization process in Turkey shows how theoretical pitfalls within Marxism cause problematic political approaches to understand the complex relation between class and nationalism. Moreover, in terms of debates within Marxism, the reactions against privatization brought the old question back to the

agenda: whether the internationalization of capitalism leads to the internationalization of class struggles and the priority of international over the national.

The first result of the study concerned the justification process of privatizations in Turkey. Since the mid-1980s, debates on the economic rationality of privatization have been influential during the privatization process of the SEEs. To get public support for privatizations, state economic enterprises were shown in the public as sources of corruption, patronage relations, unprofitability, non-productivity. Moreover, a call for a strong and stable government was made by both large capital groups in Turkey and also international actors and financial institutions (especially the EU and IMF). This was mainly caused by the limitations of the constitutional framework on privatizations and thus the cancellations by the courts and weak coalition governments of the 1990s failing to insist on a stable privatization program. This was especially criticized by TÜSİAD and the association pioneered the campaign to justify its demand for privatization by claiming to represent the general interests of the country. Based on their concerns for increased competition due to the involvement of foreign investors in the process, the same association would criticize the participation of foreign investors since they are totally against “national sovereignty.” Thus, the national interest discourse provides them a fertile environment to be a part of the process or tenders. Finally, despite several differences, there was a common ground between the discourses of left-nationalists and large capital groups in Turkey. Nationalist discourse was always dominant, yet the same cannot be said for a debate on the future conditions and rights of workers after privatizations.

The era of the JDP starting in 2002 has remarked a turn to privatizations, and a massive wave of privatizations was initiated in the period of 2004-2010. During the fieldwork based on major state economic enterprises such as Erdemir, Tüpraş, Petkim, Tekel and also Seydişehir and Petlas, it was first observed that such justification process of privatizations has been influential not only among the society but even among workers and labor unions. This has been one of the most important factors dividing the struggles against privatizations and the source of the absence of societal support for such a struggle.

The second result is that the effects of neo-liberal policies on working conditions in general and the privatization process in particular brought about the decomposition and fragmentation

of workers, which obstructed the prospects for a collective struggle against privatizations. In addition to the differences within labor processes (such as between skilled and unskilled workers and white collar and blue collar workers), the division between permanent and sub-contracted workers was highly salient. Moreover, the historical construction of the division of interests between public and private sector workers had the most negative effect on the mobilization of a collective resistance against privatizations. Similar to the perception of the SEEs in the public, it is known that private sector workers also criticize relatively higher wages of public sector workers and this makes the organization of a collective struggle the most difficult task. In terms of the effects of such divisions, two further issues should be underlined: one is that the increasing disappearance of the division of “public sector-private sector workers” with the privatization process in Turkey may bring some opportunities in the future for the construction of shared material interests and benefits among workers. The second one is a more negative effect. Similar to the general dynamics within the labor market in Turkey, workers have a fear of the general tendency of developing sub-contracting relations in their factories. This would mean for workers much more pressure on wages and other social rights, or namely the end of their so called “privileged status”. When other effects of privatizations such as collective dismissals, declining rates of union membership, flexible form of production (such as flexible types of production, flexibility in working hours, i.e. temporary working, flexibility in wages) are also taken into account, it could be argued that privatizations led to the increasing fear and insecurity for workers. I argue that this sense of insecurity and concerns about future working conditions provides a fertile environment for inciting nationalist reactions to the maelstrom of the internationalization of capitalism and neo-liberal attack on workers’ conditions. These nationalist perceptions are not only stemming from workers’ perceptions about structural processes but also socially manipulated by capitalist groups to put a veil on class contradictions. Similar to the functional role of religion in Turkey in normalizing the destructive effects of neo-liberalism, the increasing precariousness of working conditions stemming from structural economic processes and the resulting sense of insecurity among workers are also cured through a moral authority or cultural hegemony in nationalist terms suggesting that “we are in the same boat” and “work for the nation”. This is not a discursive construct that could be considered as imposed on workers but a crucial component of working relations reproduced every day.

The third result is the disorganized character of labor unions in Turkey and their pragmatic use of nationalist-etatist discourse. Labor unions have only become a mechanism workers remember when they are faced with the reality of the privatization campaign. Workers were caught in privatization unprepared and it was evident that unions had no collective plan to mobilize workers before privatizations. The fieldwork also shows that “degree of workers’ relation with labor unions is not a qualified one”. In this result, unions’ failure and inability to adapt to the changing dynamics in working relations, to develop alternative strategies to the pressures of the rise of unemployment, social insecurity, and flexible forms of production and the effects of technological innovations in the production process have been influential. Moreover, in terms of trust index in social organizations, this study and other studies show that the level of workers’ trust in labor unions remains too low. A significant amount of workers in the study also think that labor unions should not engage in political activities due to concerns on different political motivations of workers and the dangers of such political relations in terms of relations with the anti-union AKP government. Workers also believe that unions simply have a concern about protecting their number of members and to continue union activities after privatization, rather than collective resistance to the effects of privatizations. Indeed, during privatization campaigns, unions mostly considered legal mechanisms as the most viable option to resist privatizations with the claims of “violation of national interests” rather than organizing a resistance. Moreover, the “national interest” discourse replaced class; the struggle against privatizations is considered as a “national duty” and “defending the past and the future of the country”. This could not be only related to the etatist-nationalist tradition of unions in Turkey but also to unions’ organizational structure which remains national with weak international ties. More importantly, unions considered the use of the national interest and national strategic importance of the SEEs discourses as an alternative to attract mostly disinterested public attention. Thus, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, as a historical legacy, nationalism with realpolitik reasons replaced the idea of class struggle.

The fourth result of this study indicates that in order to resist neo-liberalism in general and privatizations in particular, we should come to terms with workers’ perception that the privatization project has started because of the “decline of the nation-state” and constitutes a threat to “national sovereignty” – an “imperialist” plan executed by “foreign powers”. Workers suggest more roles to the state in economic life and the management of their

factories. As a matter of fact, a reduced role of the state is equated with less material benefits and social security, with the potential removal of social safety nets by the private sector. In such perception, the role of labor unions and left-nationalist intellectuals should not be underestimated. The state is considered as a mechanism “having the power and capacity to control the internationalization process of capital for the sake of national sovereignty rights”. This statist discourse also corresponds to a nationalist discourse and the question of workers’ material interests finds an answer in this nationalist logic. As mentioned above, the absence of a discourse to resist privatizations beyond “nationalist claims” also leads workers to give reference to the “nation” and “state” as “higher ideals” to be defended. Finally, workers’ feeling of insecurity due to the absence of a collective and organized struggle against privatizations and incapacity of unions to organize such a struggle affects their perceptions and discourses, as well as solution proposals.

In terms of workers’ reactions and perceptions on privatizations, as well their experience during the process, this study shows that the aforementioned justifications for privatization have also been influential among workers. For example, a significant amount of workers think that unproductive and non-profitable state economic enterprises can be privatized. Workers also point to the difficulty of finding support for anti-privatization campaigns at the local level. Increasing difficulties and competition to find a job in the Turkish labor market (thus low wages) lead to a reaction against workers in those SEEs who have relatively higher wages and called as “labor aristocracy”. In recent studies on the conditions of workers in Turkey, it is generally observed that a significant amount of private sector workers support privatizations because of these higher wages compared to their average wages. This is also associated with popular discourses regarding the so called “productivity and profitability” problems of the SEEs as well. This shows that hegemonic attempts of capital groups since the 1980s and especially the current AKP government’s neo-liberal project to justify privatizations have been successful among workers in different sectors. Therefore, in such a political atmosphere, many workers felt a need to underline during the interviews that “this struggle is not for their material class interests but for the interests of the *nation* as a whole” to justify their anti-privatization stance. In such failure of anti-privatization campaign, losing the struggle at the discursive level is thus highly important.

It needs also to be mentioned in this context that workers mostly think that privatizations of the SEEs are implemented with “imperialist concerns” and “the pressure of international capital”. It is also stated that “SEEs should not be privatized to protect economic and political independence” and “Privatization tenders of state economic enterprises should be obtained by national companies”. Here, it is obvious that workers are highly influenced by the division between “foreign capital” and “national capital” which dominated debates on privatization in Turkey, similar to the debates in many countries open to the foreign direct investments and the internationalization of capital movements. Moreover, the “national strategic importance of the SEEs” discourse championed by left-nationalists and unions has also been popular among workers to find a legitimate base to resist privatizations. In such terms, privatizations are considered as a strategy of imperialists and foreign powers on Turkey. In such a result, in addition to other factors mentioned above, a point made by workers to the effect that “they were not organizationally prepared and aware of the effects of privatizations” has also been crucial. In their words, they “are caught in a storm”. It is also accepted by union professionals that championing such discourses was the easiest way for unions which had concerns to protect the status quo, not to confront the strong government of the.

In terms of perceptions of workers about the privatization process, it should be stated that privatizations are considered as “foreignization of domestic sectors”. For a significant amount of workers, “accelerated foreign investments in Turkey are dangerous” and this is considered as a threat to their material and working conditions. For many workers, if it is a “national company” winning the tender, privatizations is not something rejected in principle. For that reason, views championing national companies’ ownership of the state economic enterprises have been quite influential to divide workers during protests. On the other hand, both union professionals and workers also stated their disappointment and anger about the alliances between international companies and tender winning national companies. Some also stated that they are “now aware of the illusion” and “privatization of the SEEs have been possible with first transferring the ownership to a national company and then opening them to international actors”. In other words, “behind the veil of *being against foreign capital*, the scene was set for the sale of state economic enterprises to an international capital.” As noted during interviews, labor unions also feed the fertile environment for nationalist and chauvinistic tendencies and some of them openly declared that “national companies are better and should win privatization tenders”. It should be also stated that the differences among

workers have also been manipulated during privatization struggles. For example, pro-government workers supported the policy of the government, but only if SEEs are sold to “national companies” with the “right prices”.

In terms of degrading and decomposing effects of privatizations on workers, privatizations affected the working conditions of workers, their collective organizations (pressures on unionization, decrease in union members, weakening power of unions for collective bargaining), and the employment structure of the labor market (increasing number of laid off workers due to privatization). The introduction of performance-based systems and flexible forms of production not only threaten conditions of safe working but also intensify the competition among workers which constitutes one of the most dangerous factors leading to the decomposition of working classes overall. On the other hand, increasing relations of sub-contracting, the introduction of performance based evaluation systems, lowered wages and declining social rights were not the main concerns of workers. On the contrary, it was their factory with which they identify themselves and the “nation” under threat. So the existence of the factory and continuity of production was highly important for workers, which meant that they would not lose their jobs and “both them and country will continue to win”.

On the other hand, in SEEs where much more traumatic experiences were observed, such as Petlas and Tekel with workers who are forced to work under the 4/C status, this picture has partly changed. Especially Tekel protests could be considered as a landmark. Tekel workers who were subjected to same precarious working conditions under the 4-C status had joined forces for the struggle, with the hope of changing their current status. Nationalist slogans, flags and symbols were again visible (“Tekel Workers are the Vanguard of the Nation”). Therefore, it cannot be suggested that such feelings of despair, insecurity and anger do not incite nationalist reactions against privatizations. However, this time a common place was shared by workers for resistance against such conditions and a tendency to define the main source of the problems in class struggle appeared. Firstly, in the eyes of Turkish society, workers showed their reactions against social inequalities and delegitimized many justifications of pro-privatization government representatives. A battle to “win the hearts” and having the upper hand at the discursive level were important. This “moral struggle” to change the direction of ideological processes is highly important in a conjuncture where collective forms of solidarity are dissolved; workers are more directly under the pressure of market

mechanisms, without having job security, social security and under increasingly flexible working conditions.

Secondly, beyond their ethnic (Kurdish and Turkish workers), regional, religious (Alavi and Sunni workers) and gender identities, workers shared a common language, although many communication problems between workers were visible, to resist injustices and social inequalities in class terms. Thus, the principle of hope was there as the increasing precariousness of working conditions among workers in different sections of the Turkish economy brought such forms of solidarity enabling workers “to become aware of themselves as a class”, as E. P. Thompson underlined. Moreover, rather than simply relying on the power of labor unions (which were nominally non-existent to a great extent) and considering civil servant employment as a “never ending job status”, workers now have an understanding of the fact that “their fate is in their hands” and “they have to get into a coalition with different sections of the society” to resist macro-economic dynamics. Tekel workers’ resistance proves that while the internationalization of capitalism and privatization of the SEEs incite nationalist reactions, the increasing precariousness of working conditions and blurring distinction between public and private sector may lead to a unified collective struggle against those dynamics.

The Tekel case also shows that the experience of “different forms of solidarity through struggle” may lead to the development of a “collective will to resist and share a common ground for struggle”, rather than display nationalist reactions which partly stem from the disorganization and fragmentation of workers’ and their demands as well as expectations and fears for the future. Therefore, with the increase of struggles against macro-economic dynamics that negatively affects workers and “the struggle experience itself” may bring such dominance of the reproduction of “foreign enemies” discourse among workers and unions to a halt. This way, “struggling for rights” may replace the so called “struggle for the nation”. Moreover, through sharing a common space, they may become aware of the difference between the struggle for their rights as members of working classes and the struggle for their other identities and political thoughts.

One final result of the study is that the experience of privatization by workers showed that “workers now realized the problems they experience are about the political-economic system and would not change even Islamists or Turkish nationalists come to power”. Moreover, their

perceptions about the role of the state, legal mechanisms and unions have started to change after such an experience: regardless of their ideology, political stance and the employment status (public sector employment as having more guarantee for “job security and rights), workers are subjects of the same political economic dynamics executed after the 1980s, having shared “problems and degradation”. In theoretical terms and political formulations, for the Left, the privatization process also brought the need for a new approach beyond economic reductionism and class essentialism.

This brings a new consideration of the internalization of the tensions stemming from the internationalization of capitalism, the effects of these dynamics on working class composition and politics, and the prospects or problems for an international solidarity of workers under these global dynamics. As a matter of fact, while it is possible to see new forms of solidarity among workers in different national contexts emerging, such nationalist reactions to the internationalization of capitalism and increasing competition among different national interest conceptions constitute one of the most important factors undermining such solidarity. Therefore, this study suggests that a new praxis needs to be developed to understand the complex relation between nationalism and class, and that the theoretical pitfalls within Marxism should be reconsidered in the light of reactions to the privatization process and political formulations suggested to escape from the maelstrom of neo-liberal policies in general.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akdemir, N. 2008, *Taşeronlu Birikim: Tuzla Tersaneler Bölgesinde Üretim İlişkilerinde Enformelleşme*, SAV Yayınları, İstanbul

Akın, Y. 2007 “Türkiye Sol Hareketinin Önemli Polemikleri”, (ed.) Gültekingil, M., in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, v.8, İstanbul, İletişim, pp. 86-105

Akkaya, Y. 2002, “Korporatizmden Sendikal İdeolojiye, Milliyetçilik ve İşçi Sınıfı”, in T. Bora (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, vol. 4, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

----- 2007, “Türkiye Solu ve İşçi Sınıfı”, in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

----- 2010, *Cumhuriyet’in Hamalları: İşçiler*, Yordam, İstanbul.

Albo, G. 1997, “A World Market of Opportunities? Capitalist Obstacles and Left Economic Policies”, *Socialist Register*

Altan, Z. Et al., 2005, *İşçi Profili Araştırması: Eskişehir Örneği*, Anadolu Üniversitesi.

Amin, S. 1976, *Unequal Development*, Harvester Press, London

----- 1978, *The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles*, Zed Books, London

----- 1980, *Class and Nation*, Heinemann, London

Anderson, P. 1980, *Arguments Within English Marxism*, Verso, London

Anderson, B. 1983, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London

Anderson, K. 2010, *Marx At Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Aranowitz, S. and Bratsis, P. 2002, *Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London

Atalay, O. 2006, *Kızıl Elma Koalisyonu Ulusalçılar, Milliyetçiler, Kemalistler*, Paradigma Yayınları, İstanbul.

Atılğan, G. 2002, *Kemalizm ve Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar Yön - Devrim Hareketi*, Tüstav, İstanbul.

----- 2007, “Anti-Emperyalizm ve Bağımsızlıkçılık”, in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

----- 2009, “Mihri Belli” in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Avcıoğlu, D. 1964, “Milliyetçilere Sesleniş”, *Yön*, 78.

----- 1965, “Emperyalizmi Tanıyalım: Yabancı Sermaye ile Neden Kalkınma Olmaz”, *Yön*, 109.

----- 1965, “Özel Sektöre Düşen Görev”, *Yön*, 113.

Avcıoğlu, D. 1996, *Türkiye’nin Düzeni*, v. 2, Tekin Yayınevi, İstanbul.

Avineri, S. 1991, “Marxism and Nationalism”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 26/3.

Aybar, M. A. 2002, *Marksizm ve Sosyalizm Üzerine Düşünceler*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

Aydemir, S. Ş. 1934, “Programlı Devletçilik”, *Kadro*, 3, 34.

----- 1962, “Memleketçi Sosyalizmin İlkeleri”, *Yön*, 58

Aydın, S. 1998, “Milli Demokratik Devrim”den “Ulusal Sol”a Türk Solunda Özgücü Eğilim”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, No. 78, pp. 59-91.

----- 2002, “Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik: Galiyefizmden Kemalizme Türkiye’de ‘Üçüncü Yol’ Arayışları”, in T Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, vol. 4, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

----- 2007, “Türkiye Solunda Özgücülük ve Milliyetçilik”, in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Aydın, Z. 2005, *The Political Economy of Turkey*, Pluto Press.

Aydınoğlu, E. 2008, *Türkiye Solu (1960-1980)*, Versus Yayınları, İstanbul

Balibar, E. 1990, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology”, *New Left Review*, XIII (3), pp. 329-61.

Balibar, É. and Wallerstein, I. 1991, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, Verso, London and New York

Balkan Şahin, S. 2010, "Privatization as a Hegemonic Process in Turkey", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 483-498.

Balta, E. 2002, "Türkiye Solunda Milliyetçilik: Üç Kaynak Üç Dönemeç", *Praksis*, no. 6, pp. 153-174.

Baran, P. 1968, *The Political Economy of Growth*, Modern Reader Paperback, New York.

Barrow, C. W. 1993, *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison

Başkaya, F. 2007, "Türkiye'de Sol Hareketin İdeolojik Geri Planı Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler", in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

----- 2007, *Milliyetçilik Yurtseverlik ve Sol*, Özgür Üniversite Yayınları, İstanbul.

Bauer, O. 1996 [1924], "The Nation", in G Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation*, Verso, London

Bedirhanoğlu, P. 2007, "The neoliberal discourse on corruption as a means of consent building: reflections from post-crisis Turkey", *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 28, Issue 7

Belli, M. 1968, "Türkiyenin Devrim Stratejisi Ne Olmalıdır?", *Türk Solu*, No. 9

Benner, E. 1995, *Really Existing Nationalisms, A Post-communist View from Marx and Engels*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

-----2005, *Nations and Nationalism: A Reader*, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey.

Bieler, A. & Bonefeld, W. et al. 2006, *Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labor: Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York.

Bieler, A. et al. 2008, *Labour and the Challenges of Globalization What Prospects for Transnational Solidarity?*, Pluto Press, London and Ann Arbor.

Bilgin, K. 2011, "İşçi Sınıfı Kamusalılığı Açısından Tekel Çadırları", in *Tekel Eylemine Kenar Notları*, ed. by. Yıkılmaz and Kumlu, Phoenix, Ankara.

Bina, C. & Yaghmanian, B. 1991, "Post-war Global Accumulation and the Transnationalisation of Capital", *Capital and Class*, 43 (3): 107-129.

Blaut, J.M. 1987, *The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism*, Zed Books, London.

Blind, P. K. (2009), *Democratic institutions of undemocratic individuals: privatizations, labor, and democracy in Turkey and Argentina*, Palgrave Macmillan.

Bonefeld, W. 2006 "Anti-globalisation and the Question of Socialism", *Critique*, 34: 1, 39-59.
----- 2010, "Free economy and the strong state: Some notes on the state", *Capital&Class*, 34, 15.

Bora, T. 2000, "Türkiye'de Meslek Kuruluşları: 'Kamu', 'Sivil' ve 'Milli'nin Muğlak Kesişim Alanı", in *Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik*, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert and Nuray Mert, pp. 265-310, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

-----2003, "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey", *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102:2/3, pp. 433-451.

----- 2006, *Medeniyet Kaybı: Milliyetçilik ve Faşizm Üzerine Yazılar*, Birikim Yayınları, İstanbul

Boratav, K. 2010, *Türkiye'de Popülizm: 1962-1976 Dönemi Üzerine Notlar*, Yordam, İstanbul

Bostancı, N. 1990, *Kadrocular ve Sosyo Ekonomik Görüşleri*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara

Bottomore, T. 1983, "Sociology" in D. McLellan (ed.) *Marx: The First 100 Years*, Fontana, London

Bourdieu, P. 1990 [1980], *The Logic of Practice*, translated by Richard Nice, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.

Breuilly, J. 1982, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester University Press.

Bryan, R. 1987, "The State and the Internationalisation of Capital: An Approach to Analysis", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 17 (3): 14-26

Bulut, A. 1998, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçi Devrimcilik Üzerine", *Ulusal*, 5-6.

Calhoun, C. 1997, *Nationalism*, Open University Press, Buckingham

Can, K. 1998, “Türkçü-Devrimci İttifakı” [Turkist-Revolutionist Alliance], *ArtıHaber*, 4 (viewed 10-16 January).

Carr, E. H. 1945, *Nationalism and After*, Macmillan, London

----- 1950, *Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. 1, Penguin Books, London.

Castree, N. et al. 2004, *Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and the Geographies of Labour*, Sage, London.

Chibber, V. 2005, “Reviving the Developmental State? The Myth of the National Bourgeoisie”, *Socialist Register*, vol. 41, pp. 226-46.

Clarke, S. (ed.) 1991, *The State Debate*, St. Martin’s Press, New York

Connolly, J. 1987, *Collected Works*, vol. 2, New Books, Dublin

Connor, W. 1984, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Çelik, A. 2008, “Milli Güvenlik Gerekçeli Grev Ertelemeleri”, *Çalışma ve Toplum*, No.18

----- 2010, *Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık (1946-1967)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

Davis, H.B. 1973, *Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

----- 1978, *Towards a Marxist Theory of Nationalism*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

Debray, R. 1977, “Marxism and the National Question”, *New Left Review*, no. 105, pp. 25-41.

Degras, J. (ed.), 1956, *The Communist International: 1919-1943 documents*, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, London and New York.

Devrim Dergisi 1970, “Atatürk’ün İzinde Milliyetçi Bir Lider: Nasır”, *Devrim*, 51.

Doğan, Mustafa G. 2010, “When Neoliberalism Confronts the Moral Economy of Workers: The Final Spring of Turkish Labor Unions”, *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 11

Doğan, G.M. and Ünüvar, K. 2007, “Üçüncü Dünyacılık, Maoculuk, Aydınlikçılık”, in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Dufour, G. F. 2007, “Social-property Regimes and the Uneven and Combined Development of Nationalist Practices”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 13(4), pp. 583–604.

Dunn, B. 2004, *Global Restructuring and the Power of Labor*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Edensor, T. 2002, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*, Berg, Oxford.

Eder, M. 2002, “The Constraints on Labour Internationalism: Contradictions and Prospects”, in J. Harrod and R. O’Brien (ed.) *Global Unions: Theory and Strategies of Organized Labour in the Global Political Economy*, Routledge, London and New York

Edwards, P. and Elger, T. 1999 (eds.), *The Global Economy, National States and the Regulation of Labour*, Mansell

Ehrenreich, J. 1977, “The Theory of Nationalism: A Case of Underdevelopment”, *Monthly Review*, 27, 1

----- 1983, “Socialism, Nationalism and Capitalist Development”, *Review of Radical Political Economists*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-40.

Ercan, F. and Oğuz, Ş. 2004, “Between National-Developmentalism and Anti-Capitalism: The Limits and Prospects of the Labor Movement in Turkey”, Paper presented at the *Annual Conference of the Society for Socialist Studies*, Winnipeg, Canada, June 5.

----- 2006, “Rescaling as a class relationship and process: The case of public procurement law in Turkey”, *Political Geography*, no. 25, pp. 641-656.

----- 2007, “Rethinking Anti-Neoliberal Strategies through the Perspective of Value Theory: Insights from the Turkish Case”, *Science&Society*, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 173–202

Erdoğan, N. 1998, “Demokratik Soldan Devrimci Yol'a: 1970'lerde Sol Popülizm Üzerine Notlar”, in Türkiye'de Sol'un Kaynakları, *Toplum ve Bilim*, Fall 1998, No. 78.

Ertuğrul, İ. 2004, *Özelleştirmenin 10 Yılı, Biz Vatan Hainliğine Devam Ediyoruz Hâlâ*, Ümit Yayınları, Ankara.

Eschle, C. et al. (ed.) 2005, *Critical Theories, International Relations and ‘the Anti Globalisation Movement’: The Politics of Global Resistance*, Routledge, New York

Escobar, A. 1984, "Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of his Work in the Third World", *Alternatives*, 10 (3), pp. 377-400

Fanon, F. 1963, *The Wretched of the World*, Grove Press, New York

Felix, D. 1983, "The Dialectic of the First International and Nationalism", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 1

Fırat, G. 2006, *Ulusal Sol İdeoloji: Atatürkçü, Milliyetçi, Sosyalist Teori*, İleri Yayınları, İstanbul

Forman, M. 1998, *Nationalism and the International Labor Movement: The Idea of the Nation in Socialist and Anarchist Theory*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania.

Fox, E. J. 2008, "Everyday nationhood", *Ethnicities*, vol. 8(4), pp. 536–563.

Frank, A. G. 1969, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

French, J. D. 2004, "Labour and NAFTA: Nationalist Reflexes and Transnational Imperatives in North America, 1991–1995", in R. Munck (ed.), *Labor and Globalisation: Results and Prospects*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.

Gellner, E. 1992, *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca

Goebel, M. 2007, "Introduction: Nationalism, the Left and Hegemony in Latin America", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 26: 311–318

Gökay, B. 2006, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991: Soviet foreign policy, Turkey and Communism*, Routledge, New York

Gramsci, A. 1971, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, (ed. and trans. by Q. Hoare and G. Novell Smith), Lawrence and Wishart, London

Gramsci, A. 1977, *Selections from Political Writings 1910–1920*, ed. Q. Hoare, trans. J. Matthews, Lawrence & Wishart, London

Gramsci, A. 1978, *Selections from Political Writings 1921–1926*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Gregor, A. J. and Chang, M. H. 1978, "Maoism and Marxism in Comparative Perspective", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 3

Gülalp, H. 1998, "The Eurocentrism of Dependency Theory and the Question of 'Authenticity': A View from Turkey", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 19, no 5, pp. 951-961.

Güler, B. A. 2005, *Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi: Yapısal Uyarılama Politikaları 1980-1995*, İmge Yayınları, Ankara

Güzel, Ş. 1996, *Türkiye'de İşçi Hareketi (1908-1984)*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul

Harb-İş (?), *YDD Kıskaçında Türkiye*, Harb-İş Yayınları

Harrod, J. and O'Brien, R. 2002, *Global Unions? Theory and Strategies of Organized Labor in the Global Political Economy*, Routledge RIPE Series

Harris, G. S. 1967, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey*, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Press.

Harvey, D. 2005, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

----- 2005, *Spaces of Neo-liberalization: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development*, Franz Steiner Verlag.

Hensman, R. 2001, "World Trade and Workers' Rights: In Search of an Internationalist Position", *Antipode*, 33, pp. 427-450.

Herod, A. 1998 (ed.) *Organizing the Landscape*, Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press

----- 2001, "Labor Internationalism or the Contradiction of Globalization, or, Why the Local is Sometimes Still Important in a Global Economy", *Antipode*, 33, pp. 407-426.

Hobsbawm, E. (ed.), 1982, *Marx, Engels and Politics: The History of Marxism*, Vol. 1, p. 249.

Hürkan, S. 2006, *Üç Dergi Üç İnsan*, Sinemis Yayınları, Ankara

James, P. and Nairn, T. 2005, "Introduction: Mapping Nationalism and Globalism", in T Nairn and P James, *Global Matrix: Nationalism: Globalism and State-Terrorism*, Pluto Press, London

Jelinek, Y. 1975, "Nationalism in Slovakia and the Communists, 1918-1929", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 34, No. 1.

Kakıncı, H. 2003, *Sultangaliyev ve Milli Komünizm*, Bulut Yayınları, İstanbul.

- Kara, M. A. 2008, *Yön 'ün Devrim 'i Devrim 'in Yönü*, Cumhuriyet Kitapları, İstanbul
- Karakışla, Y. S. 1998, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda 1908 Grevleri” in Türkiye’de Sol’un Kaynakları, *Toplum ve Bilim*, Fall 1998, No. 78.
- Karpat, K. 1966, “The Turkish Left”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1, (2):169-186
- 2007, *Türkiye ’de Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi*, İmge Yayınları, Ankara
- Karsan, G. 2005, “Eski Tüfek” Bir Sosyalistte Milliyetçilik Sosyalizm İkilemi: MDD ve Mihri Belli”, *Doğu Batı*, 8 (31), pp. 233-238
- Kautsky, Karl [1907/08] 2009, “Nationality and Internationality”, trans. by Ben Lewis, *Critique*, 37: 3
- Kaymak, E. 1993, *Sultan Galiyev ve Sömürgeleler Enternasyoneli*, İrfan Yayınları, İstanbul
- Kazancıgil, A. 2006, “Anti-emperyalist Bağımsızlık İdeolojisi ve Üçüncü Dünya Ulusçuluğu Olarak Kemalizm”, in A. İnel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye ’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, vol. 2, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Kellogg, P. 1989, “State, Capital and World Economy: Bukharin's Marxism and the ‘Dependency/Class’ Controversy in Canadian Political Economy”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June), pp. 337-362
- Keynes, J .M. 1936, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, Macmillan
- KİGEM, 1998, *Telekomünikasyonda Özelleştirmeler Kitabı: İddialar, Örnekler, Gerçekler*, Ankara.
- Klein, N. 2008, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, Vintage, Toronto.
- Koç, Y. 2004, *AB emperyalizmi ve İşçi Sınıfı*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul
- 2005, *Batılı İşçi Sömürüye Ortak*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara
- 2006, *AKP İşçilere Nasıl Zarar Veriyor*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul
- 2010, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi*, Epos Yayınları, Ankara, p. 210.
- 2012, *AKP ve Emekçiler: 2002-2012*, Epos Yayınları, Ankara

Kolakowski, L. 1981, *Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. 2: The Golden Age*, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Kolektif, 2011, *Tekel Direnişinin Işığında Gelenekselden Yeniye İşçi Sınıfı Hareketi*, Notabene, Ankara

Kolektif, 2011, *Bir Direniş Öyküsü Tekel*, Evrensel, İstanbul

Kuhn, R. 1982, "Alternative Strategies: Left Nationalism and Revolutionary Marxism", *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, 12/13, pp. 93-109

Kuyaş, A. 2001, "Yeni Osmanlılar'dan 1930'lara Anti-Emperyalist Düşünce", in A. İnsel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 2, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Laçiner, Ö. 2007, "Kopuş Düşüncesi: 1960'lı Dönem Bir Kop(ama)ma mıdır?", in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Lenin, V. I. 1976, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, in CW, Moscow.

Leys, C. 2009, *The Rise of and Fall of Development Theory*, Indiana University Press

Liakos, A. 2008, *Dünyayı Değiştirmek İsteyenler Ulusu Nasıl Tasavvur Etiler*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Lillie, N. and Lucio, M. M. 2004, "International Trade Union Revitalization: The Role of National Union Approaches" in C. Frege and J. Kelly (eds.) *Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Linden, M. 2008, *Workers of the World: Essays Towards a Global Labour History*, Brill, Leiden and Boston

Lloyd, D. 2003, "Rethinking national Marxism", *Interventions*, 5: 3, 345-370

Lockman, Z. 1994, "Imagining the Working Class: Culture, Nationalism, and Class Formation in Egypt, 1899-1914", *Poetics Today*, Vol. 15, No. 2.

Löwy, M. 1976, "Marxists and the National Question", *New Left Review*, no. 96, pp. 81-100.

----- 1989, "Fatherland or Mother Earth: Nationalism and Internationalism from a Socialist Perspective", *Socialist Register*.

----- 1998, *Fatherland or Mother Earth?: Essays on the National Question*, Pluto Press

----- 2001, “Nation state, nationalism, globalization, internationalism”, Text presented at the *World Social Forum*, January 2001.

Makal, A. 1999, *Türkiye’de Tek Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri: 1920-1946*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara.

----- 2002, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri: 1946-1963*, İmge Yayınları, Ankara

----- 2007, *Ameleden İşçiye: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihi Çalışmaları*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

Manisalı, E. 2006, *Türkiye ve Küreselleşme*, Derin Yayınları, İstanbul

McNally, M. 2009, “Gramsci’s internationalism, the national-popular and the Alternative Globalisation Movement”, in *Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance*, edited by Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel, Routledge

Meiksins, P. 1998, *Rising From The Ashes? Labor in the Age of “Global Capitalism*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

Moody, K. 1997, *Workers in a Lean World*, Verso, London.

Moore, S. and Wells, D. 1975, *Imperialism and the National Question in Canada*, Toronto.

Mukherjee, A. 2002, *Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class 1920–1947*, SAGE.

Mumcu, U. 1996, *Aybar ile Söyleşi: Sosyalizm ve Bağımsızlık*, Um:ag Yayınları, Ankara

Munck, R. 1985, “Otto Bauer: Towards a Marxist theory of nationalism”, *Capital & Class*, 25: 84-97.

----- 1986, *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism*, London: Zed Books.

----- 2000, *Marx@2000*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

----- 2001, “Globalization, Regionalism and Labor: The Case of Mercosur”, *Labor, Capital and Society*, 34 (1), pp. 8-25.

----- 2002, *Globalisation and Labor: The New ‘Great Transformation’*, Zed Books, London.

----- (ed.) 2004, *Labor and Globalisation: Results and Prospects*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.

----- 2005, *Globalisation and Social Exclusion: A Transformationalist Perspective*, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT.

----- 2007, *Globalization and Contestation: The new great counter-movement*, Routledge.

----- 2010, "Marxism and Nationalism in the Era of Globalization", *Capital & Class* 34 (1); pp. 45-53.

Murray, R. 1971, "The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State", *New Left Review*, No. 1/67, pp. 84-108.

Nairn, T. 1981 [1977] *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, Verso, London.

----- 1997, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, Verso, London.

Nimni, E. 1985, "The Great Historical Failure: Marxist Theories of Nationalism", *Capital and Class*, Issue 25, pp. 58-83.

----- 1989, "Marx, Engels and the National Question", *Science and Society*, 53 (3), pp. 297-326

----- 1991, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis*, Pluto Press, London.

Oğuz, S. 2005, "Reconsidering Globalization as the Internationalization of Capital: Implications for Understanding State Restructuring", Paper prepared for presentation for the panel *State Restructuring and Social Transformation: Confronting Neoliberalism* at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Western Ontario, London, June 2005.

Öniş, Z. 1991, "The Evolution of Privatization in Turkey: The Institutional Context of Public-Enterprise Reform", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 2 (1991), pp. 163-176.

-----1997, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective," *Third World Quarterly*, IV, pp. 743-766.

-----2011, "Power, Interests and Coalitions: the political economy of mass privatisation in Turkey", *Third World Quarterly*, 32:4, 707-724

Özdemir, H. 1993, *1960'lar Türkiye'sinde Sol Kemalizm: Yön Hareketi*, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul.

Özüğurlu, M. 2011, “The TEKEL resistance movement: Reminiscences on class struggle”, *Capital & Class*, 35: 179.

Panitch, L. 1994, “Globalisation and the State”, *Socialist Register*, Merlin Press, London

Panitch, L. & Leys, C. 2001, “Working Classes, Global Realities”, *Socialist Register*, Merlin Press, London.

PETROL-İŞ, 1997, *Özelleştirme Kimin İçin?* Petrol-İş Yayınları, İstanbul

PETROL-İŞ, 2003, *Tüpraş Gerçeği*, Petrol-İş Yayınları, İstanbul

Poulantzas, N. 1978, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, Verso, London.

Poulantzas, N. 1978, *State, Power, Socialism*, Verso, London.

Pratt, J. 2003, *Class, Nation and Identity: The Anthropology of Political Movements*, Pluto Press, London.

Radice, H. 1984, “The national economy: A Keynesian myth?” *Capital & Class*, 8; 111

----- 2000, “Responses to Globalization: A Critique of Progressive Nationalism”, *New Political Economy*, 5/1, pp. 5–19.

----- 2001, “Globalization, Labour and Socialist Renewal”, *Capital & Class*; 25.

Richmond, Douglas W. 1987, “Nationalism and Class Conflict in Mexico, 1910-1920”, *The Americas*, Vol. 43, No. 3.

Saul, G. 2004, “Globalization, Imperialism, Development: False Binaries and Radical Resolutions”, in L Panitch and C Leys (eds) *The New Imperial Challenge: Socialist Register 2004*, Merlin Press, London.

Savran, S. 2008, *Kod Adı Küreselleşme*, Yordam, İstanbul.

Sayın, M. 2007, “Milliyetçilik ve Demokrasi Arasında Sol Düşünce” in T. Bora and M. Güntekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Schwarzmantel, J.J. 1987, “Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism”, *Political Studies*, 35, pp. 239-255.

Sertel, M. and Adaman, F. 1995, "The Changing Role of the State from a Turkish Perspective," *Working Papers 9510, Economic Research Forum*, revised May 1995.

Silver, B. 2003, *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization Since 1870*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Somay, B. 2007, "Türkiye Solunun Kemalizmle İmtihani", in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol. 8, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Somel, C. 2002, "Türkiye'de Küreselleşmeye Tepkiler Üzerine", *Praksis*, no. 7, pp. 35-56.

Spektorowski, A. 1994, "The Ideological Origins of Right and Left Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-43", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 29, No. 1.

Stalin, J.V. [1913] 1954, *Marxism and the National Question*, in CW, vol II; Moscow: FLPH

Starr, A. 2000, *Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization*, Zed Books, London.

Stirling, J. 2010, "Global unions: Chasing the dream or building the reality?", *Capital & Class*; 34; 107

Sülker, K. 1976, *Türkiye'de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler*, Gözlem Yayınları, İstanbul

Şener, M. 2010, *Türkiye Solunda Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset: YÖN, MDD ve TİP*, Yordam, İstanbul

Tabb, W. 2005, "Capital, Class and the State in the Global Political Economy", *Globalizations*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 47-60.

Tekeli, İ. & İlkin, S. 1984, "Türkiye'de Bir Aydın Hareketi: Kadro," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 24, pp. 35-67.

Thompson, E. P. 1970, *The Making of the English Working Class*, Harmondsworth: Penguin

-----, 1978, *The Poverty of Theory* Monthly Review Press, London.

Ticktin, H. 2005, "Marxism, Nationalism and The National Question After Stalinism", *Critique*, 33: 1, 15-48

Topak, O. 2008, "Türkiye Sendikal Hareketi, Enternasyonalizm ve Milliyetçilik", in *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı ve Emek Hareketi Küreselleşiyor mu?*, SAV Yayınları, İstanbul

Tökin, İ.H. 1934, "Millet İçinde Sınıf Mes'esi", II, *Kadro*, 3 (25)

- Tucker, R. 1978, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, Norton Company, New York&London.
- Tunçay, M. 1978, *Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar (1908–1925)*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara
- Tümer, M. 1961, “Nasır’ın Sosyalizmi”, *Yön*, 1
- Türkeş, M. 1999, *Kadro Hareketi*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara
- TÜRK-İŞ, 1998, *KIT’ler ve Özelleştirme: İddialar ve Gerçekler*, Demircioğlu Matbaacılık, Ankara.
- Türkmen, N. 2012, *Eylemden Öğrenmek: Tekel Direnişi ve Sınıf Bilinci*, İletişim, İstanbul
- Umruk, F. (ed.) 2007, *Sosyalizmin Milliyetçilikle İmtihanı*, Versus Yayınları, İstanbul
- Uslu, E. 2008, “Ulusalçılık: The Neo-nationalist Resurgence in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 73–97.
- Ünlü, B. 2002, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul
- Ünsal, A. 2002, *Umuttan yalnızlığa: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961-1971)*, İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları
- Waddington, J. (ed.) 1999, *Globalization and Patterns of Labour Resistance*, Mansell, London
- Warren B. 1990, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*, London, Verso
- Waterman, P. and Munck, R. 1999, *Labor Worldwide in the Era of Globalization: Alternative Union Models in the New World Order*, St. Martin’s Press, New York.
- Waterman, P. 2001, *Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms*, Continuum, London, New York.
- Whitaker, A. P. 1973, “The New Nationalism in Latin America”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 1973).
- Williams, R. 1983, *Culture and Society: 1780-1950*, New York, Columbia Univ. Press
- Wood, E.M. 1986, *The Retreat from Class: a New ‘True’ Socialism*, Verso, London.
- 1999, “Unhappy Families: Global Capitalism in a World of Nation-States”, *Monthly Review*, 51 (3): 1-12

----- 2003, *Empire of Capital*, Verso, London.

Worth, O. 2002, "The Janus-like Character of Counter-hegemony: Progressive and Nationalist Responses to Neoliberalism", *Global Society*, 16: 3, 297-315.

Wright, E. O. (ed.) 1989, *Debate on Classes*, Verso, London.

----- (ed.) 2005, *Approaches to Class Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Yalman, G. 2009, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in The 1980's*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul

Yanardağ, M. 2008, *Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Kadro Hareketi*, Siyah-Beyaz Yayınları, İstanbul

Yaşlı, F. 2006, "Kızılmacılık ve Komplo Zihniyeti", *Birikim*, No. 204

Yeldan, E. 2005, "Assessing the Privatization Experience in Turkey: Implementation, Politics and Performance Results." *Report submitted to the Economic Policy Institute*, Washington, DC. http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane/EPI_Report2005_Yeldan.pdf (accessed July 10, 2011).

Yetkin, Ç. 1998, *Türkiye'de Soldaki Bölünmeler*, Toplumsal Dönüşüm, İstanbul

Yıkılmaz, G. and Kumlu, S. 2011, *Tekel Eylemine Kenar Notları*, Phoenix, Ankara

Yıldırım, E. 2005, "Bir Sol Milliyetçi İdeoloji Modeli: Kadro Dergisi", *Doğu Batı*, 8 (31), pp. 249-264.

Young, Robert J. C. 2001, 'Subjects of violence: Algeria, Ireland', in *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell

Zileli, G. 2007, *Ulusalçılık: Bir İdeolojinin Krizi*, İstanbul, Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı

Zürcher, E.J. ve Tunçay, M. (ed.) 1995, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik (1876-1923)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

Zürcher, E. J. 2010, *Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*, I.B. Tauris, London and New York

APPENDIXES

A. QUESTIONNAIRE

CEMİL BOYRAZ

İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SİYASET BİLİMİ DOKTORA PROGRAMI

ARAŞTIRMA ANKETİ

cboyraz@bilgi.edu.tr // 0536 3132792

Şimdiden değerli vaktinizi ayırdığınız için çok teşekkür ederim

Anket No: id_1. [.....]

Anketin Yapıldığı İşletme: id_1. [.....]

Görüşmenin yapıldığı tarih: [-!- "Gün/Ay/Yıl" şeklinde kodlayın]

Tarih. [... / ... / 2009]

A. DEMOGRAFİ

A.01. Öncelikle hangi yıl doğduğunuzu öğrenebilir miyim? **A.01. [19]**

[-!- Lütfen Yazınız] 19__ __ 99. Bilmiyor/Cevap Yok

A.02. Cinsiyetiniz? [-!- Lütfen İşaretleyiniz] **A.02. [.....]**

1. Erkek 2. Kadın

A.03. En son mezun olduğunuz okul düzeyini öğrenebilir miyim? **A.03. [.....]**

1. Okuma yazma bilmiyor 99. Cevap yok
2. Okul mezunu değil, okuma yazma biliyor
3. İlkokul mezunu
4. Ortaokul (veya ilköğretim okulu) mezunu
5. Lise Mezunu
11. Üniversite mezunu
12. Yüksek lisans veya doktora mezunu 90. Diğer: **[Lütfen Yazınız]**

A.04. Toplam aylık hane halkı gelirinizi öğrenebilir miyim? Hanenizin aylık geliri aşağıdaki aralıklarından hangisine girmektedir [-!- Bütün aile fertlerinin maaş, kira emekli aylığı vb. gelirlerini de göz önünde bulundurarak yanıtlayınız] **A04. [.....]**

1. 451 – 600 YTL (451 – 600 Milyon TL)
2. 601 – 750 YTL (601 – 750 Milyon TL)
3. 751 – 1.000 YTL (751 – 1 Milyar TL)
4. 1.001 – 1.200 YTL (1 Milyar – 1 Milyar TL)
5. 1.201 – 1.500 YTL (1,2 Milyar – 1,5 Milyar TL)
6. 1.501 – 1.800 YTL (1,5 Milyar – 1,8 Milyar TL)
7. 1.801 – 2.400 YTL (1,8 Milyar – 2,4 Milyar TL)
8. 2.401 – 3.000 YTL (2,4 Milyar – 3 Milyar TL)
9. 3.001 YTL ve üzeri (3 Milyar TL'den fazla)

98. Fikri Yok / Bilmiyor 99. Cevap yok

A.05. Aşağıdaki ifadelerden hangisi hanenizin şu anki mali durumunu daha iyi tanımlar? **A05. [.....]**

1. Sık sık yemek ve kira gibi temel ihtiyaçlarımız için bile yeterli paramız olmaz.

2. Maaştan maşa ancak idare edebilecek kadar paramız var.
3. Eğer pahalı ve zorunlu olmayan şeyler satın almazsak geçinebiliyoruz.
4. Rahatça yaşamak için yeterli gelirimiz var.

99. **[-I- Okumayın]** Cevap yok

B. ÇALIŞMA HAYATI

B.01. Şu anda çalıştığınız işyerinde ne kadar zamandır çalışıyorsunuz? Lütfen yıl olarak belirtir misiniz?

Yıl **[Lütfen Yazın]**: B01. [.....]

B.02. İşyerinizdeki vasfınız/ünvanınız aşağıdakilerden hangisine daha yakındır?

99. Cevap yok
1. Düz işçi
 2. Teknisyen
 3. Usta
 4. Büro işçisi
 90. Diğer (Belirtiniz).....

B.03. İşyerinde çalıştırılma biçiminiz aşağıdakilerden hangisine daha yakındır?

99. Cevap yok
1. Kadrolu işçi
 2. Taşeron işçisi
 3. Geçici işçi
 90. Diğer (Belirtiniz).....

B.04. Sosyal güvenceniz (sigorta) var mı?

99. Cevap yok
1. Evet,
 2. Hayır,

B.05. İşsiz kaldığınız bir dönem oldu mu?

99. Cevap yok
1. Evet,
 2. Hayır

B.06. Genel olarak düşündüğünüzde çalıştığınız işyerinden memnun musunuz?

99. Cevap yok
1. Hiç memnun değil;
 2. Pek memnun değil;
 3. Biraz memnun;
 4. Çok memnun;

B.06a. Memnun değilseniz nedenini kısaca belirtir misiniz?

Neden **[Lütfen Yazın]**: B06a. [.....]

B.07. Genel olarak düşündüğünüzde yaşamınızdan ne kadar memnun olduğunuzu 1'in "hiç memnun değilim" 10'un ise "çok memnunuz olduğunuz" olduğu aşağıdaki cetvelde işaretler misiniz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hiç Memnun Değilim									Çok Memnunuz

98. Fikri Yok / Bilmiyor

99. Cevap yok

B.08. Kendi adınıza ya da çocuklarınızın adına gelecek korkusu yaşıyor musunuz? 1'in "hiç yaşamıyorum" 10'un ise "sürekli yaşıyorum" olduğu aşağıdaki cetvelde işaretler misiniz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hiç Yaşamıyorum									Sürekli Yaşıyorum

98. Fikri Yok / Bilmiyor

99. Cevap yok

B.09. Aşağıdakiler arasında çalışma hayatında sorun olarak gördüğünüz en önemli üç şeyi sırasıyla işaretler misiniz? Lütfen en fazla üç tane işaretleyiniz.

B09. [.....]

Görüşler	Sıralama
İş güvencesinden yoksunluk	B09.01. [.....]
Sosyal sigortaların yetersizliği	B09.02. [.....]
Emeklilik yaşının yüksekliği	B09.03. [.....]
İşsizlik	B09.04. [.....]
Ücretlerin düşüklüğü	B09.05. [.....]

Yasal düzenlemelerin yetersizliği	B09.06. [.....]
Sendikaların güçsüzlüğü	B09.07. [.....]
Sağlıksız çalışma koşulları	B09.08. [.....]
Taşeronlaşma	B09.09. [.....]

C. SENDİKALILIK

C01. Şu an herhangi bir sendikaya üye misiniz? C01. [.....]

1. Evet, 99. Cevap yok
2. Hayır,

C02. Cevabınız Hayir ise, bir sendikaya üye değilseniz bunun nedenleri nedir? Aşağıdakilerden uygun olanları işaretler misiniz?

Görüşler	Geçerli (1)	Geçerli Değil (2)	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (C.02)
Patronum ve yöneticilerim izin vermiyor	1	2	99	C02.01. [.....]
Sendikaların işten atılma tehlikesi var	1	2	99	C02.02. [.....]
Çevremde kimse sendikalı değil	1	2	99	C02.03. [.....]
Sendikanın çalışma yöntemini onaylamıyorum	1	2	99	C02.04. [.....]
Sendika dünya görüşüme uygun değil	1	2	99	C02.05. [.....]
Sendikaya güvenmiyorum	1	2	99	C02.06. [.....]

EĞER SENDİKAYA ÜYE DEĞİLSENİZ, BÖLÜM D'YE GEÇİNİZ. ÜYE İSENİZ DEVAM EDİNİZ

C.03. Ne kadar zamandır sendikalsınız, yıl olarak belirtir misiniz? C03. [.....]

Süre **[Lütfen Yıl Olarak Yazınız]:**

C.04. Sendikaya üye olmanızın başta gelen sebepleri nelerdir? Aşağıdakilerin her birinin sizin için geçerli olup olmadığını işaretler misiniz?

Görüşler	Geçerli (1)	Geçerli Değil (2)	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (C.04)
Herkesin üye olması	1	2	99	C04.01. [.....]
Zorunlu olması	1	2	99	C04.02. [.....]
İşçiler olarak dayanışma içerisinde olmak	1	2	99	C04.03. [.....]
Sunduğu imkanlardan faydalanmak	1	2	99	C04.04. [.....]

C.05. Aşağıdakilerden hangisi sendika üyeliğinizi en iyi şekilde açıklar? C05. [.....]

1. Sadece üyeyim, 99. Cevap yok
2. Aktif olarak sendika faaliyetlerine katılıyorum,
3. Ara sıra sendika toplantılarına katılıyorum,
4. Yönetimde görev alıyorum,
5. Sendikalı arkadaşlarla ara sıra sohbet ediyorum

C.06. Sizce sendikanız işçilerin çıkarlarını yeterince koruyabiliyor mu? C06. [.....]

1. Hiç koruyamıyor; 99. Cevap yok
2. Pek koruyamıyor;
3. Biraz koruyabiliyor;
4. Kesinlikle koruyabiliyor;

Bu soruyu cevaplarken kendinizi yakın hissettiğiniz görüşe göre 1-10 arasında bir puan veriniz. (1 puan sendikaların kesinlikle siyasetle ilgilenmemesi; 10 puan ise sendikaların siyasette tamamen aktif yer alması)

C.07. Sizce sendikalar siyasi faaliyete karışmamalı ve sadece işçi hakları ve çıkarlarıyla ilgilenmeli mi yoksa işçilerin hak ve çıkarlarını korumak için gerekirse siyaset ile ilgilenmeli, parti kuralı ya da aday göstermeli midirler? C07. [.....]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Sendikalar siyasi faaliyete karışmamalı

Sendikalar siyasetle doğrudan ilgilenmeli ve aktif olarak siyasi faaliyet göstermeli

98. Fikri yok / Bilmiyor

99. Cevap Yok

C.08. Aşağıdakilerde hangisi sendikal eğitimlerin konusu olmalıdır? Lütfen 3 tanesini işaretleyiniz.

1. Konu [Lütfen İşaretleyiniz]: C081. [.....]

2. Konu [Lütfen İşaretleyiniz]: C082. [.....]

3. Konu [Lütfen İşaretleyiniz]: C083. [.....]

1. Sendikacılık []
2. Güncel siyaset ve ekonomi konuları []
3. İş hukuku []
4. Sanat, çocuk eğitimi, stresle başa çıkma teknikleri []
5. Mesleki eğitim []
6. Verimlilik ve kalite, güzel konuşma sanatı, yabancı dil []
7. Sendikal mücadele []
8. Çevre sorunları []
9. Hepsi []
10. Diğer []
99. Cevap yok []

D. İŞÇİ EYLEMLERİ-SINIF İÇİ FARKLILAŞMA

D01. İşçilik yaşamınız boyunca çalıştığınız işyerlerinde aşağıdaki toplu işçi eylemlerinden hangileri gerçekleştiğini belirtir misiniz?

Görüşler	Gerçekleşti (1)	Gerçekleşmedi (2)	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (D.01)
Yasal Grev	1	2	99	D01.01. [.....]
İş bırakma	1	2	99	D01.02. [.....]
İş yavaşlatma	1	2	99	D01.03. [.....]
Yemek boykotu	1	2	99	D01.04. [.....]
Basın açıklaması, yürüyüş	1	2	99	D01.05. [.....]
Mitinge katılma	1	2	99	D01.06. [.....]

D02. Eylemlerin temel nedenleri aşağıdakilerden hangileriydi? Uygun olanları işaretler misiniz?

Görüşler	Geçerli (1)	Geçerli Değil (2)	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (D.02)
Toplu sözleşmedeki ücret anlaşmazlığı	1	2	99	D02.01. [.....]
Yeni haklar elde etmek	1	2	99	D02.02. [.....]
Hak ihlali	1	2	99	D02.03. [.....]
İdari anlaşmazlık	1	2	99	D02.04. [.....]
Sendikaların ya da işçilerin işten çıkarılmasını protesto	1	2	99	D02.05. [.....]

D.03. Mezhebinizen, Etnik kimliğinizden , Dini inancınızdan ya da geldiğiniz yerden ötürü işveren tarafından ya da diğer işçiler tarafından dışlandığınızı, ya da size ayrımcılık yapıldığını düşünüyor musunuz?

(Diğer işçiler tarafından yapıldığını düşünüyorsanız)

D.03a. Neden ayrımcılık yapıldığını düşünüyorsunuz?

Neden [Lütfen Yazınız]: D03a. [.....]

(İşveren tarafından yapıldığını düşünüyorsanız)

D.03b. Neden ayrımcılık yapıldığını düşünüyorsunuz?

Neden [Lütfen Yazınız]: D03b. [.....]

D.04. Sizce fabrikadaki işçiler arasında aşağıda yazılı olan ayrımlardan önem sırasına göre (1. 2. 3. şeklinde sıralayınız), en belirgin olan üç ayrım hangileridir?

Peki bu farklılardan hangileri işçilerin birlikte hareket etmesine ve eylem yapmasına engeldir? Lütfen işaretler misiniz?

Ayrımlar	En Önemli Ayrımların Sıralaması	Ortak Eyleme Engel Olan Ayrımlar
Kadro-taşeron işçi	D04.01. [.....]	D04.01. [.....]
Vasıflı-vasıfsız işçi	D04.02. [.....]	D04.02. [.....]
Eski-yeni işçi	D04.03. [.....]	D04.03. [.....]
Etnik köken farkı	D04.04. [.....]	D04.04. [.....]
Mezhep farklılığı	D04.05. [.....]	D04.05. [.....]
Kadın-erkek farkı	D04.06. [.....]	D04.06. [.....]
Siyasi görüş farklılığı	D04.07. [.....]	D04.07. [.....]
Büro-üretim işçileri farkı	D04.08. [.....]	D04.08. [.....]
Memleket farklılıkları	D04.09. [.....]	D04.09. [.....]

D.05. Aşağıdaki görüşlere katılıp katılmadığınızı lütfen belirtiniz.

Görüşler	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Pek Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (D.05)
İşverenin ve işçinin çıkarları ortaktır	1	2	3	4	99	D05.01. [.....]
Taşeron işçiler ile kamu işçilerinin çıkarları ortaktır	1	2	3	4	99	D05.02. [.....]

E. ÖZELLEŞTİRME

E.01. Bazıları devletin bazıları ise özel sektörün ekonomik faaliyetleri yönlendirmesi yönünde görüş bildirmektedir. Sizce devletin mi yoksa özel sektörün mü ekonomideki yeri daha fazla olmalıdır? (Önem derecesine göre 1 ile 10 arasında puan veriniz, örneğin 1 tamamen devlet ekonomik hayatı yönlendirmeli, 10 yalnızca özel sektör ekonomik hayatı yönlendirmeli)

1	2	3	4	5,5	6	7	8	9	10
Tamamen devlet			Eşit derecede				Tamamen Özel sektör		

98. Fikri Yok / Bilmiyor

99. Cevap yok

E.01.a Özel sektör içerisinde de yerli sermayenin mi yabancı sermayenin mi ağırlığı daha fazla olmalıdır?

E.01a. [.....]

1	2	3	4	5,5	6	7	8	9	10
Tamamen yerli sermaye			Eşit derecede			Tamamen Yabancı Sermaye			

98. Fikri Yok / Bilmiyor

99. Cevap yok

E.02. Sizce çalıştığınız bu fabrika ya da işletme en iyi kim tarafından işletilebilir?

E02. [.....]

1. Devlet;
2. Yerli Özel Sektör;
3. Yabancı Özel Sektör;
4. Sendika
5. Çalışanlar-İşçiler
6. Diğer

99. Cevap yok

E.03. Özelleştirmeler konusunda aşağıdaki ifadelere katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtir misiniz?

Görüşler	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Pek Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (E.03)
Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri (KİT)'nin özelleştirilmesi ulusal çıkarlara aykırıdır	1	2	3	4	99	E03.01. [.....]
KİT'lerin özelleştirilmesi işçilerin haklarına saldırıdır	1	2	3	4	99	E03.02. [.....]
KİT'ler ulusal güvenlik için stratejik önemdedir	1	2	3	4	99	E03.03. [.....]
Verimsiz çalışan KİT'ler özelleştirilebilir	1	2	3	4	99	E03.04. [.....]
KİT'lerin özelleştirme ihalelerini yerli sermayenin kazanması önemlidir	1	2	3	4	99	E03.05. [.....]
Daha düşük ücretlerde dahi olsa yerli sermayeye ait bir KİT'de çalışmayı tercih ederim	1	2	3	4	99	E03.06. [.....]
Ekonomik ve siyasi bağımsızlığın korunması için KİT'ler özelleştirilmemelidir	1	2	3	4	99	E03.07. [.....]
Özelleştirme söz konusu olduğunda, milli çıkarlar işçilerin çıkarlarından önce gelir	1	2	3	4	99	E03.08. [.....]
Türkiye'de hızla artan yabancı yatırımları tehlikeli buluyorum.	1	2	3	4	99	E03.09. [.....]
Türkiye'nin iktisadi kalkınması için özelleştirmeler şarttır	1	2	3	4	99	E03.10. [.....]
KİT'lerin özelleştirilmesi uluslararası sermayenin baskısıyla gerçekleşmektedir	1	2	3	4	99	E03.11. [.....]

E.04. Genel olarak düşüncünüzde Türkiye'de yapılan özelleştirmeleri destekliyor musunuz?

E04. [.....]

1. Hiç desteklemiyorum;
2. Pek desteklemiyorum;
3. Biraz destekliyorum;
4. Kesinlikle destekliyorum;

99. Cevap yok

E.05. Destekleyip desteklememe yönündeki görüşlerinize bağlı olarak, özelleştirmelerle ilgili aşağıdaki iddialara katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtir misiniz?

Görüşler	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Pek Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (E.05)
----------	------------------	------------------	-------------------	------------------------	---------------------	----------------

Özelleştirmeler yeni işsizler ordusu yaratacaktır	1	2	3	4	99	E05.01. [.....]
Sendikal örgütlenme, çalışma koşulları ve işçi hakları gerileyecektir	1	2	3	4	99	E05.02. [.....]
Özelleştirilen işletmeler daha karlı çalışarak, ülke ekonomisine daha fazla katkıda bulunacaktır	1	2	3	4	99	E05.03. [.....]
Özel tekeller oluşacak ve üretilen mal-hizmet fiyatları artacaktır	1	2	3	4	99	E05.04. [.....]
Özelleştirilen işletmelerde siyasi kadrolaşma üst düzeydedir	1	2	3	4	99	E05.05. [.....]
Ekonomik hayatta rekabet artacak ve üretilen mal-hizmet fiyatları düşecektir.	1	2	3	4	99	E05.06. [.....]

E.06. Çalıştığınız fabrikanın ya da işletmenin özelleştirilmesini destekliyor musunuz?

E06. [.....]

- Hiç desteklemiyorum; 99. Cevap yok
- Pek desteklemiyorum;
- Biraz destekliyorum;
- Kesinlikle destekliyorum;

E.07. Sizce kamuoyunun (Türk toplumunun ve yaşadığınız bölge insanların) özelleştirmeler konusundaki tavrı ne yöndedir (1 ila 10 arasında bir puan veriniz, örneğin 1 tamamen karşıt, 10 tamamen destekliyor)

E07. [.....]

1	2	3	4	5,5	6	7	8	9	10
Tamamen karşıt			Nötr			Tamamen Destekliyor			

98. Fikri Yok / Bilmiyor

99. Cevap yok

F. DEĞERLER ve SİYASİ GÖRÜŞLER

F.01. Genel olarak düşündüğünüzde kendinizi ne kadar milliyetçi sayarsınız? Lütfen 1'in hiç milliyetçi olmayanları, 10'un ise en milliyetçi olanları gösterdiği cetvelde kendi yerinizi işaretler misiniz?

F01. [.....]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hiç Milliyetçi Değil					Tamamen Milliyetçi				

98. Fikri Yok / Bilmiyor

99. Cevap yok

F.02. Siyasi konulara yaklaşım açısından düşünüldüğünde, bazı kişiler kendilerini siyasi yelpazenin sol tarafında görürken, diğerleri ise sağ tarafında gördüklerini belirtirler. Siz, siyasi görüşleriniz açısından düşündüğünüzde kendinizi 1'in en sol, 10'un ise en sağ ifade ettiği bu cetvelde nereye yerleştirirdiniz?

F02. [.....]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Sol					Sağ				

98. Fikri Yok / Bilmiyor

99. Cevap yok

F.03. Aşağıdaki ifadeler hakkındaki görüşünüzü işaretleyiniz.

Görüşler	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Pek Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılmıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Cevap Yok / Bilmiyor	Katılma (F.03)
T.C. vatandaşı olmayı başka bir ülkenin vatandaşı olmaya tercih ederim	1	2	3	4	99	F03.01. [.....]

T.C. vatandaşı olmaktan dolayı utanç duyduğum kimi konular var	1	2	3	4	99	F03.02. [.....]
Diğer ülkeler bize benzese dünya daha güzel bir yer olurdu	1	2	3	4	99	F03.03. [.....]
Genel olarak Türk vatandaşı olmak başka bir ülkenin vatandaşı olmaktan daha iyidir	1	2	3	4	99	F03.04. [.....]
Ülke olarak hatalar yapıldıysa da vatandaşlar ülkesini desteklemeye devam etmelidir	1	2	3	4	99	F03.05. [.....]
Türkiye'nin yaşadığı sorunların ana kaynağı dış/yabancı faktörlerdir	1	2	3	4	99	F03.06. [.....]
Yabancı filmler, yayınlar ve müzikler milli kültürümüzü-değerlerimizi tehdit etmektedir	1	2	3	4	99	F03.07. [.....]
Milli gelenek ve görenekler herkesçe bilinmeli ve yaşatılmalıdır	1	2	3	4	99	F03.08. [.....]
Azınlıklara ve yerel kültürlere kendi gelenek ve göreneklerini yaşayabilmeleri için devlet desteği verilmelidir	1	2	3	4	99	F03.09. [.....]
Sebepleri ve sonuçları ne olursa olsun, ulusal çıkarlarımız adına savaşa girilmesini doğru buluyorum	1	2	3	4	99	F03.10. [.....]

F.04. Kendinizi şu tanımlamalardan hangisiyle özdeşleştiriyorsunuz? Önem sırasına göre sıralayabilir misiniz?

[1. Sırada Belirtilen] F041. [.....]

[2. Sırada Belirtilen] F042. [.....]

[3. Sırada Belirtilen] F043. [.....]

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Türk | 90. Diğer |
| 2. Kürt | 96. Hiçbiri |
| 3. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Vatandaşı | 98. Fikri yok / Bilmiyor |
| 4. Sünni Müslüman | 99. Cevap yok |
| 5. Alevi | |
| 6. Yaşadığınız Şehir-Bölge (örnek, İzmirli vs.) | |
| 7. Türkiyeli | |
| 8. Müslüman Türk | |

F.05. Aşağıdaki konuların her birinde bu ülkenin vatandaşı olmaktan ne kadar gurur duyduğunuzu ya da duymadığınızı belirtir misiniz?

Konular	Çok Gurur Duyuyorum	Kısmen gurur duyuyorum	Pek gururu duymuyorum	Hiç gurur duymuyorum	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (F.05)
Demokrasinin işleyişi	1	2	3	4	99	F05.01. [.....]
Azınlıkların hakları	1	2	3	4	99	F05.02. [.....]
Sağlık ve eğitim sistemi sisteminin işleyişi	1	2	3	4	99	F05.03. [.....]
Ekonomik gelişme düzeyi	1	2	3	4	99	F05.04. [.....]
İşçi haklarının durumu	1	2	3	4	99	F05.05. [.....]
Türkiye'nin dünya siyasetindeki yeri	1	2	3	4	99	F05.06. [.....]
Sanat ve edebiyat alanındaki başarıları	1	2	3	4	99	F05.07. [.....]
Tarihi ve kültürel mirası	1	2	3	4	99	F05.08. [.....]

Askeri gücü	1	2	3	4	99	F05.09. [.....]
Uluslararası spor müsabakalarında kazanılan başarılar	1	2	3	4	99	F05.10. [.....]

F.06. Aşağıdaki gelişmeleri düşündüğünüzde bunların her birinin sizi rahatsız edip etmediğini söyley misiniz?

Görüşler	Rahatsız Etti (1)	Rahatsız Etmedi (2)	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (F06)
Yabancıların Türkiye’de toprak satın alması	1	2	99	F06.01. [.....]
Ergenekon kapsamında soruşturmaların yapılması	1	2	99	F06.02. [.....]
Sosyal güvencesizliğin artışı (sigortasız çalışma)	1	2	99	F06.03. [.....]
AB sürecinde ilerlemelerin kaydedilmesi	1	2	99	F06.04. [.....]
Kıbrıs’ta Türk ve Rum tarafların anlaşma olasılığı	1	2	99	F06.05. [.....]
Kürt sorununu çözme yönünde çeşitli açıklamaların gündeme gelmesi	1	2	99	F06.06. [.....]
İşsizliğin artışı	1	2	99	F06.07. [.....]
Toplumun giderek muhafazakarlaşması	1	2	99	F06.08. [.....]
Yabancı yatırımların Türkiye’deki artışı	1	2	99	F06.09. [.....]
Enflasyon/hayat pahalılığı	1	2	99	F06.10. [.....]

F.07. Bu Pazar günü bir genel seçim yapılacak olsa, oyunuzu hangi partiye verirsiniz? F07. [...]

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) | 96. Hiçbiri |
| 2. Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) | 97. Kararsız |
| 3. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) | 98. Fikri yok / Bilmiyor |
| 4. Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) | 99. Cevap yok |
| 5. Demokrat Parti (DP)- Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) | |
| 6. Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP/DEHAP) | |
| 7. Genç Parti (GP) | |
| 8. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) | |
| 9. Saadet Partisi (SP) | 90. Diğer: [Yazınız] |

F.08. Geçtiğimiz Mart ayında yapılan Belediye seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiniz? F08. [.....]

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) | 96. Hiçbiri |
| 2. Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) | 97. Boş/geçersiz oy kullandım |
| 3. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) | 98. Fikri yok / Bilmiyor |
| 4. Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) | 99. Cevap yok |
| 5. Demokrat Parti (DP)- Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) | |
| 6. Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP/DEHAP) | |
| 7. Genç Parti (GP) | |
| 8. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) | |
| 9. Saadet Partisi (SP) | 90. Diğer: [Yazınız] |

F.09. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümetinin aşağıdaki konularda izlediği politikaları destekleyip desteklemediğinizi işaretler misiniz?

Görüşler	Destekliyorum (1)	Desteklemiyorum (2)	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (F.09)
Kürt sorununa ilişkin yaklaşımı	1	2	99	F09.01. [.....]
Özelleştirme politikaları	1	2	99	F09.02. [.....]
Yeni iş yasası	1	2	99	F09.03. [.....]
Dış politika konuları	1	2	99	F09.04. [.....]
Ekonomi politikaları	1	2	99	F09.05. [.....]

Toplu sözleşme ve ücretler	1	2	99	F09.06. [.....]
Yabancı sermayenin teşviki	1	2	99	F09.07. [.....]
AB ile ilişkiler	1	2	99	F09.08. [.....]

F.10. Peki aşağıdaki ifadelere katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtir misiniz?

Görüşler	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Pek Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (F.10)
Daha pahalı bile olsa Türk malı kullanmayı yabancı malları kullanmaya tercih ederim.	1	2	3	4	99	F10.01. [.....]
Türkiye'nin çıkarları kişisel çıkarlarımdan üstündür	1	2	3	4	99	F10.02. [.....]
Türkiye'de Türkçe dışındaki dillerde eğitim yapan okullar olmalıdır	1	2	3	4	99	F10.03. [.....]
Türkiye etnik olarak bölünme tehdidi altındadır	1	2	3	4	99	F10.04. [.....]
Türkiye'de Türkçe dışında yayın yapan TV'lerin sayısı artmalıdır	1	2	3	4	99	F10.05. [.....]
Yerli sermayenin gelişmesi için devlet gerekli önlemleri almalıdır	1	2	3	4	99	F10.06. [.....]
Yabancı malların Türkiye'de satışına sınırlamalar getirilmelidir	1	2	3	4	99	F10.07. [.....]
Devlet yabancı yatırımcıları destekleyen önlemler almalıdır	1	2	3	4	99	F10.08. [.....]
Yabancı göçmenlerin Türkiye'de çalışmasına sınırlama getirilmelidir	1	2	3	4	99	F10.09. [.....]
Ulusal çıkarların korunması için daha aktif bir dış politika izlenmelidir	1	2	3	4	99	F10.10. [.....]

F.11. Size göre çocuk yetiştirirken dikkat edilmesi gereken gereken en önemli 3 husus önem sırasına göre aşağıdakilerden hangileridir?

- [1. Sırada Belirtilen] F111. [.....]
- [2. Sırada Belirtilen] F112. [.....]
- [3. Sırada Belirtilen] F113. [.....]

1. Milli şuur ve bilince sahip olması
 2. Dini vecibelerini yerine getirmesi
 3. Vatandaşlık bilincine sahip olması
 4. Çalışkan olması
 5. Paylaşmayı sevmesi
 6. İtaatkarlık ve söz dinleme
 7. Sorumluluklarının bilincinde olması
 8. Yardımsever olması
 9. Hoşgörülü ve başkalarına saygılı
 10. Eleştirel ve özgürce düşünebilmesi
 11. Eşitlik ve adaletten yana olması
90. Diğer
96. Hiçbiri
98. Fikri yok / Bilmiyor
99. Cevap yok

F.12. Ülkeler arasındaki ilişkilere dair aşağıdaki görüşlere ne derece katılıp katılmadığınızı lütfen işaretleyiniz.

Görüşler	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Pek Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (F.12)
Ülkeler arası rekabet dünya barışına zarar vermektedir	1	2	3	4	99	F12.01. [.....]
Her ülke çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmelidir	1	2	3	4	99	F12.02. [.....]
Ülkeler arası ilişkiler karşılıklı güven esasına dayanmaktadır	1	2	3	4	99	F12.03. [.....]
Gelişmiş ülkeler az gelişmiş ülkeleri sömürmektedir	1	2	3	4	99	F12.04. [.....]
Ülkeler arası eşitsizlikler hep varolacaktır	1	2	3	4	99	F12.05. [.....]
Her ülke varlığını koruyabilmek için askeri-güvenlik harcamalarını arttırmak zorundadır	1	2	3	4	99	F12.06. [.....]
Ülke olarak dünya siyasetinde var olabilmek için güçlü bir lidere ihtiyaç vardır	1	2	3	4	99	F12.07. [.....]

F.13. Türk dış politikası ile ilgili aşağıdaki ifadelerle katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtiniz.

Görüşler	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Pek Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	Cevap Yok /Bilmiyor	Katılma (F.13)
Türkiye daha aktif bir dış politika izlemelidir	1	2	3	4	99	F13.01. [.....]
Türkiye'nin kendi sorunlarını tek başına çözebilecek gücü vardır	1	2	3	4	99	F13.02. [.....]
Türkiye, dünya ve bölge gündemini belirleyen lider-örnek ülke olmalıdır	1	2	3	4	99	F13.03. [.....]
Türk'ün Türk'ten başka dostu yoktur	1	2	3	4	99	F13.04. [.....]
Türkiye küresel sorunların çözümünde diğer ülkelerle işbirliği içerisinde olmalıdır	1	2	3	4	99	F13.05. [.....]
Her şeyi yapsa bile Türkiye Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olamayacaktır	1	2	3	4	99	F13.06. [.....]
Türkiye dış politikada bağımsız kararlar alamamaktadır	1	2	3	4	99	F13.07. [.....]
Türkiye'nin dünya barışına yapacağı katkı ulusal çıkarlarından daha önemlidir	1	2	3	4	99	F13.08. [.....]

F.14. Sizce aşağıdaki ayrımların hangileri bugünün Türkiye'sinde çok önemlidir? Lütfen en önemli bulduğunuz üç tanesini sırasıyla işaretler misiniz?

[1. Sırada Belirtilen] **F141.** [.....]
[2. Sırada Belirtilen] **F142.** [.....]
[3. Sırada Belirtilen] **F143.** [.....]

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. İşçi-işveren | 90. Diğer |
| 2. Türk-Kürt | 96. Hiçbiri |
| 3. Eğitimli-eğitimsiz | 98. Fikri yok / Bilmiyor |
| 4. Zengin-yoksul | 99. Cevap yok |
| 5. Sünni-Alevi | |
| 6. Solcu-sağcı | |
| 7. Köylü-kentli | |
| 8. Laik-dinci | |

Anketin Sonuçlarını Sizlerle Paylaşmaktan Mutluluk Duyacağımı Bildirir, Çok Teşekkür Ederim.

MODÜL A