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THE SEARCH FOR A SELF: MAX FRISCH'S I AM NOT STILLER

Sezgin TAŞ
116679007

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Zeynep TALAY TURNER

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The Search For A Self: Max Frisch's *I Am Not Stiller*

Max Frisch'in *I Am Not Stiller* Romanında Bir Kendilik Arayışı

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Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Zeynep TALAY TURNER


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Jüri Üyeleri: Doç. Dr. Ferda KESKİN

İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ömer Behiç ALBAYRAK

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze the relations between power, truth and self, that Foucault worked on, through Max Frisch's novel *I'm not Stiller*. We will try to observe through what kind of truth games the modern subject constructs itself by focusing on Stiller who demonstrates us a parody of identity. Hence, how *epimeleia heautou* (the notion of the care of the self) which was a positive value for Roman, Hellenistic and Greek periods lost its privileged position by passing through certain lines and contact areas and how it was transformed into *gnothi seauton* (the notion of knowing yourself) will be handled in terms of this study's conceptual framework. This radical transformation which means suspending the subject's relation with the truth is directly connected with our conceptions of the modern subjectivity. According to Foucault, the fact that the behavioral modes which are given on to questioning and are established between the existence of the subject and the essentiality of attaining the truth skidded into the subject's knowing about oneself (*savoir*) resulted in a disassociation. Why we analyze Stiller in this context is to see how the modern subject, as narrative self, when connecting with its own story, is tied to the power with regard to all social relations dispositif through its own story. Stiller who developed a formula/discourse that disables power practices by saying "I am not Stiller!" as soon as he was arrested, moved the law into an uncertainty sphere. If we look at it from this perspective, Stiller who is struggling with the law in this visibility where there is no gap competes against observation, recording and note taking devices surrounding him and a cluster of testimony/knowledge which are centralized and accumulated against him. He tries to make a breach in this disciplinarian mechanism which surrounds his existence. The meaning of the notion of *parrhesia* (telling the truth) which has a significant position in Ancient culture will be questioned for the modern subject and Stiller will be reviewed as the subject of enunciation of the correct discourse. Thus, Stiller will be analyzed in terms of the relations of truth and power within his own personal history.

Key Words: The Care of the Self, Stiller, Subject and Power, Parrhesia

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı Foucault'nun üzerinde çalıştığı hakikat, iktidar ve kendilik arasındaki ilişkileri Max Frisch'in romanı *I'm Not Stiller* üzerinden incelemektir. Modern öznenin kendisini hangi hakikat oyunları aracılığıyla kurduğunu, bir kimlik parodisiyle karşımıza çıkan Stiller'e odaklanarak görmeye çalışacağız. Bu nedenle çalışmanın kavramsal çerçevesi içerisinde Yunan, Helenistik ve Roma döneminin antikleri için pozitif bir değer olan *epimeleia heuatou* (kendilik kaygısı) nosyonunun belirli hatlar ve temas yüzeylerinden geçerek zamanla ayrıcalıklı konumunu kaybetmesi ve *gnothi seauton* (kendini tanı, kendini bil) nosyonuna dönüşümü ele alınacaktır. Öznenin hakikatle ilişkisinin askıya alınması anlamına gelen bu radikal dönüşüm bizim modern özne olma kiplerimizle bağlantılıdır. Foucault'ya göre öznenin varlığı ile hakikate erişme zorunluluğu arasında tesis edilen sorgulamaya dönük davranış kiplerinin öznenin kendisi hakkında bilme (*savoir*) alanına kayması bir kopmaya neden olmuştur. Stiller'i bu bağlamda incelememizin modern öznenin *narrative self* olarak kendi hikayesine bağlanırken tüm toplumsal ilişki dispozitifleri açısından iktidara nasıl tabi olduğunu onun hikayesi aracılığıyla görmektir. Tutuklanır tutuklanmaz "I'm not Stiller!" diyerek iktidar pratiklerini işlevsiz kılacak bir formül söylem geliştiren Stiller yasayı bir belirsizlik alanına taşımıştır. Buradan bakacak olursak hiçbir boşluğu olmayan bu görünürlük içinde yasayla mücadele eden Stiller etrafını çevreleyen gözlem, kayıt ve notlandırma aygıtları, kendine karşı biriken ve merkezileşen bir bilgi/tanıklık kümesine karşı mücadele eder. Varlığını kuşatan bu disiplinci mekanizmada bir gedik, küçük bir çatlak açmaya çalışır. Antik kültürde önemli bir yeri olan *parrhesia* (doğruyu söylemek) kavramının modern özne için anlamı sorgulanacak ve Stiller doğru söylemin sözcelem öznesi olarak değerlendirilecektir. Dolayısıyla Stiller kendi kişisel tarihi içinde hakikat ve iktidar ilişkileri bakımından analiz edilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kendilik Kaygısı, Stiller, Özne ve İktidar, Parrhesia

INTRODUCTION

1.1.The Subject and The Truth

Modern subject's relation to truth which is established with oneself has surely taken an utterly different appearance for the last half century. Today we literally live in a cornea or a layer of reticulum. This world in which illusion has been replaced by the truth and the media has been replaced by the memory is the world of the observer and the observed. While everyone observes "*the other*", they feel they are being secretly observed by "*another*." There is a totalitarian eye behind a visor or a screen split in hundred frames which determines the relations, shapes not only the journey of life but also controls it. Now, all of us are in sight and are tied to bounds of the eye. Therefore, the value attributed to the importance of "seeing" moved ahead of the value of the subject's relation with oneself, the nature and human beings. It shows that today's people both miss the life and ignores the essential link between human and lifetime by engaging development and advancement with technical improvements. Consequently, the techniques of the self which have been occupying philosophy for centuries and directing one's look over oneself are crucial to remove the deadly fatigue on the people. Many philosophers have studied this issue and tried to analyse the relation between the truth and the subject. Foucault developed a *genealogy* of the subject and power, by following a different pathway from his contemporary peers. According to him, what forms the subject with oneself on a certain relation is the techniques of the self which are historically diagnosable and these techniques are in a state of merger with the techniques of domination whose era can be discovered.

As a matter of course, people's relation with oneself and the nature, its resigning oneself with the fate or its striving fearlessly have often been addressed in artworks as much as philosophy texts. Therefore, the art allows people to strike against its passive and limited life which is surrounded by the power. Its function is always to move the *whole* man, to enable the 'I' to identify itself with another's life, to make its own what it is not and yet is capable of being.¹ This is the only way it can go beyond its roles reaped to itself, can get over itself. As Fischer said,

¹ Ernest Fischer, *The Necessity of Art*, Trans. Anna Bostock (Londonra: Penguin Books, 1963), pg. 14.

“tension and dialectical contradiction are inherent in art; not only must art derive from an intense experience of reality, it must also be *constructed*, it must gain from through objectivity.”²

In this regard, the purpose of my study is to see an example of the subject of Foucault’s genealogy through the opportunities of the art of fiction. Max Frisch focuses on the modern subject’s problems of self-identity in his novel, *I’m Not Stiller*. Frisch, just as Foucault, has sought for finding its own voice of the subject who as if speaks by a borrowed voice. So, this focus coincides with the question, raised by Foucault, “What are the relations between the truth, the power and the self?” It is necessary to observe what kind of games in seeking the truth have been played to form the subject itself while developing genealogy of the subject. Because, every subject forms oneself as a narration: A man is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if he were telling a story. This is what fools people, says the hero of *Nausea*.³ So does Stiller form himself as Mr. White through his stories? However, he doesn’t fall in the mistake addressed by the character in Sartre’s, *Nausea*. He is a hero who rescues himself meticulously from these stories. He knows that he will fully be tied to the power as a subject who attaches oneself with his story. So, the *narration* of Stiller is useful to create a safe space for himself against the law. From there, Stiller looks with a bird’s eye view at his non-assignable relation to truth that is formed by himself as a modern subject. He seeks for answers to questions of whether it is possible to be the subject of enunciation of the correct discourse in modern culture, if yes, what the appropriate conditions are.

While seeking for an answer to this through Stiller, I needed to see how ritual deeds and regular methods, were being handled, which connect a certain subject with a certain truth and which Foucault puts them in the center of his work. In the first part, I will analyze primarily the lines which address the notion of the care of the self that is a positive value for the antiques of Roman, Greek and Hellenistic periods, contact areas and the processes in which it loses its privileged position in time to the notion of knowing yourself. Additionally, I will focus on

² Ernest Fischer, *The Necessity of Art*, pg. 9.

³ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*, trans, Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions Paperbook, 2007), pg. 39.

the subject's breaking off oneself in a holistic circularity and its relation to truth as a *parrhesiastes* (telling the truth). By doing this, we will observe that the notion of the care of the self which had covered Christianity from Saint Augustine until the seventeenth century coincided with the Cartesian moment after passing through certain lines. *Epimeleia heautou* (the notion of the care of the self) loses its privileged position that was gained against *gnothi seauton* (knowing yourself) and gets its position radically on the stage of history and the subject who knows. In the second part, I will analyze the relations between the power and the subject and the modern subject's relation to truth that is formed by oneself through dealing with Stiller over the notion of *crime* just as Foucault does in his analysis. I will particularly focus on how Stiller forms himself as a narration named Mr. White against the law and how again he denies himself by saying "I am not Stiller!" Thereby, the analysis of Stiller is an important sample associated with the notion of crime within the contexts of bare life and hegemon power as a citizen against the law, as a singular who is trying to be deprived of its features and as a *parrhesiastes* in terms of its relations to truth formed with itself and the power. One of the topics I aim to think about is how the subject is tied to the power as a *narrative self* (in terms of all societal *dispositive* when connecting with one's own story). At this point I will trace how Stiller responds to the subjectification practices of power technologies with an allegory of a sculptor and the embodiment of resistance with the discourse of "I'm not Stiller". In this regard, we will observe that knowing yourself means entitling yourself with the power through a story. And so, caring for oneself means to possess a *tekhnê tou bio* (art of life) and an *ethical distance*.

SECOND CHAPTER

AFFIRMING AN IRREDUCTIBLE FREEDOM: CARE OF ONESELF

Foucault says that *the care of oneself* is a sort of thorn which must be stuck in men's flesh, driven into their existence, and which is a principle of restlessness and movement, of continuous concern throughout life.⁴ Foucault who gives precedence to this principle over the notion of “*know yourself*” tries to explain it by pursuing the evolution in the set of relationships underlining the care of oneself. He asserts that this notion of the care of oneself, is not solely appeared in thoughts of Socrates, it can be found throughout Greek, Roman and Hellenistic culture. As stated in Lectures at the *College de France* (1981-1982), the key of this idea is *Alcibiades*. According to Foucault, the notion of *epimeleia heautou* (the care of oneself) that we came across at this text became the fundamental principle of all rational conduct in all forms of active life that would truly conform to the principle of moral rationality. As this notion is related with our modern mode of being subjects.⁵ Thus, what put into force is the possibility of innovation that Foucault had discovered in archaic structures. While mentioning “*the care of oneself*”, Foucault highlights Socrates’ following statements in *Apologie*:

"What treatment do I deserve, what amends must I make for thinking I had to relinquish a peaceful life and neglect what most people have at heart, wealth , private interest, military office, success in the assembly, magistracies, alliances and political factions; for being convinced that with my scruples I would be lost if I followed such a course; for not wanting to do what was of no advantage either to you or myself; for preferring to do for each particular individual what I declare to be the greatest service, trying to persuade him to care (epimeletheie) less about his property than about himself so as to make himself as excellent and reasonable as possible, to consider less the things of the city than the city itself, in short, to apply these same principles to everything? What have I deserved, I ask, for having conducted myself in this way [and for having encouraged you to attend to yourselves?]"⁶

⁴ Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of The Subject*, Lectures at the College de France 1981-82, Trans., Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pg. 9.

⁵ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 9.

⁶ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 7.

Therefore, *epimeleia heautou*, as an obligation that encircles the whole existences reveals its specific function. According to Foucault, the principle "one ought to take care of oneself," was an old maxim of Greek culture. Then, what is the content of this bailment? How can it be understood? What does "care for oneself" mean? What happens if we place the care of oneself at the basis of decision acquisition among conflicting and mutually exclusive forces of a person who wavers between stepping into an action or not stepping into an action about any issue? What is the truth underlying the proposition of care for oneself?

Changing subject's perspective on oneself is hidden in "*care for oneself*." Concern heads towards the resource, the subject itself, surrounds it and forces to change its perspective in order to gain a view that enables conversion. Its own compulsory act in terms of practices for finding out the truth is the effort of "*conversion of the self*" that takes a long time. This conversion, in *Alcibiades*, puts *care for oneself* in the center. Therefore, Socrates reminds Alcibiades who wants to govern others that the need to be concerned about the self is linked to the exercise of power. "One cannot govern others, one cannot govern others well, one cannot transform one's privileges into political action on others, into rational action, if one is not concerned about oneself."⁷ If the subject is an executive candidate, he cannot fully figure out the truth without acknowledging his all competence and incompetence; not only cannot he reach the truth but also cannot be a good governor. This link between caring for oneself and governing the city obligates the subject's attachment with its surrounding. In this context, Socrates' interest in Alcibiades includes letting him be himself. He doesn't take his weight on his shoulders devotedly, he leads him to be himself, he enables him to see his particular chances and he clinches this with the care of the self. Socrates' advice is clear: "you should pay heed to yourself; apply your mind to yourself, be aware of your qualities and in this way you will be able to participate in political life."⁸

Being aware of competences in point enforces a set of activities that take place in the care of the self, such as the existence of the subject in figuring out the truth. Foucault draws a clear mind map regarding what the care of the self and conversion of the self are. According to him, "Indeed, going through the texts, the different forms of philosophy and the different forms of exercises and

⁷ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 36.

⁸ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 33.

philosophical or spiritual practices, we see the principle of care of the self—expressed in a variety of phrases like: "caring for oneself," "taking care of the self," "withdrawing into oneself," "retiring into the self," "finding one's pleasure in oneself, "seeking no other delight but in the self," "remaining in the company of oneself," "being the friend of oneself," "being in one's self as in a fortress," "looking after" or "devoting oneself to oneself," "respecting oneself," etc."⁹ According to spiritualism, truth is never given to the subject as a right. The subject, as the way it is, doesn't have the capacity and the right to access the truth. At this point, Foucault asks this question: "What is this subject, what is this point towards which this reflexive activity, this reflected activity, which turns the individual back to himself, must be directed? The first question, then, is what is this self?"¹⁰

Answers to these questions are sought in spiritualism. Spiritualism is clusters of pursuit, experience and practices not for the knowledge, but for the subject itself, such as changing existence and perspective, abandoning, practicing on the self, catharsis stemming from the cost of figuring out the truth. One's special connection with oneself unbinds the existence of the subject to reach the truth. To reach the truth, the subject needs to open an intellectual dialogue with oneself, to question the limits and circumstances of reaching out the truth, to change oneself and to devote oneself passing a holistic circularity. Thereby, reaching the truth which creates an impact of turning to oneself covers subject's own existence all along. The subject which fails to reach the truth as the way it is puts aside all the limitations that keep itself away by girding the truth in a holistic circularity. This conversion is attained against a remuneration that *mentions the subject the subject's own existence*. As for, this remuneration implicates in a set of *eros* (love) and *askêsis* (suffer) practices which mark the notions of the care of oneself and taking care of oneself, which remove the deeds restricting the relation between the truth and oneself, the aspects covering the truth and the obstacles taking away the existence from oneself.

In *Symposion*, it is accepted that a lover is more divine than a beloved and carries divinity inside. Therefore, the oldest and most valuable god is Eros through which/whom people attain happiness or virtue. It is not surprising to see

⁹ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 12.

¹⁰ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 38.

Socrates while in war or against Alcibiades in this text in a position of *anachôrêsis*, a visible flaw, fastening up around his own axis. The care of oneself that frequently recommends taking care of the spirit refers to two intersecting poles in means of digging into oneself deeper: one's dominating over oneself and the subject who has got this domination as a governor over the citizens. Does one take care of oneself to become a good citizen or to prepare oneself for adulthood? This is the first and most visible layer, yet, characteristics of a more holistic call can be seen by removing one's existential layers. At this perspective, the notion of care of oneself is kept separately from the preparation for social life. What it implicates frequently is to be prepared for old age. Thus, it can prevent the spirit (*pneuma*) from falling apart at the moment of death.

At this point, one of the most significant aspects that attracts attention is the integrity of the soul. In Greek thought, during Roman and Hellenistic period, a great amount of value is attributed to the soul in order to intensify the soul, not to be dispersed and to keep its wholeness against the external effects. The subject needs purgation to reach the knowledge of God and the truth. This contiguity finds its place in a self-technology that crosses the limits of subject's knowing itself. Without a ritual purgation, interrelating with the truth that Gods hold is not possible. Thus, it is required not to let *pneuma* to be dispersed, to protect the soul and the breath against the extrinsic threats and to avert *pneuma* from being dispersed at the moment of death. In that case, how does the subject that is an existential mode giving the soul integrity and strength acquire the techniques to intensify and to unify in itself by holding together? For this, Foucault addresses the concept of *anachôrêsis* that has a reputable future in Western spiritualism. This concept that means somehow cutting itself off from the outsider world is a sort of visible deficiency technique which the subject sets up with itself. *Anachôrêsis* which connects the soul with the motive protecting the soul from being dispersed at the moment of death contains opposition modes in itself against this state of breakaway, the techniques of intensifying the soul, the misfortunes that may happen to anyone on earth, unbearable examinations or reclamations.

The way the notion of *epimeleia heautou* was tackled at the schools where Stoicism and Epicurism were being followed during 1st and 2nd centuries AD is also significant within this context. Foucault remarks the way Epicures and Stoics tackle the words *passion* and *pathos* (Cicero: *Perturbatio*, Seneca: *affectus*,

irrational kinesis of the soul). Chronicle levels of the illness happen after *pathos* which means illness as its lexical meaning and the periods following these levels connect with the moment of error (*kakia*) in which the individual disappears in an emotion deforming, capturing and overtaking itself completely.¹¹ Within this context, the connection between philosophy and medicine is important. Seneca, Epictetus and Epicurus cogitated the possibilities of saving the soul by endeavoring philosophy. Therefore, as a doctor deals with the body, they dealt with the soul. For instance, Epictetus sees his school as a community clinic. The notion of *Therapeuin* contains the meanings of curing, serving for oneself and healing. This notion that includes the subject's curing for itself and worshipping itself comes frequently along. In terms of the notion of taking care of oneself and the notion of being oneself, the matter of conversion, obliges a set of practises such as the subject's being folded onto itself, giving itself an eye and covering itself within an integrated circularity. As mentioned previously, these motions predicate on the deeds of subject's conversing itself and empowering the subject's holding itself in integrity until the moment of death.

The affirmative relation between the notions of care of oneself and philosophy gathers all periods of life in an ultimate point, old age. Old age is considered as a positive pole that needs to be headed. The subject turns into a castle which is free of passions by curing itself, giving itself an eye, claiming on itself, honoring itself, escaping itself from time, feeling ashamed of itself and worshipping itself. This conversion protects itself from any kind of misfortunes and disasters as well as forms integrity of the soul. The subject as a castle itself pays no attention on external influences, thus, places its soul on an invulnerable place.

According to Foucault, at the constitution of the subject in ethics, the subject draws the line at the section of those moral practices in which it is being constituted, defines its location in accordance with the rules that it follows and determines a certain existential mode that will enable it to be excelled in terms of its morality. Moreover, to do all of these, it acts towards itself, undertakes to get to know itself more, controls, examines, improves and converses. Again, Foucault asserts that no constitution of the subject is possible without a partial moral act

¹¹ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 98.

that does not refer to unity of any moral attitude, moral attitude that does not call constitution of self as a moral subject and “knowledge of asceticism” or “self-practices” that sustains those through “subjectification modes.”¹²

2.1. What’s Self Layer: Dynamic Telescoping

Notes concluded from Foucault’s studies ease to differentiate at the edge of how modern subject modals undergo a change and which practices today are instrumentalizing the subject’s look over itself. Therefore, we need to concentrate on long range journey of the notion of care of oneself in order to comprehend the history of modern subject better. If we analyze the processes of the notion of care of oneself in this long period of change and conversion, we can better understand the privileged position that it lost. Foucault sees techniques of the self being dispersed in Platonism as the first step of reactivation, regulation and relocation in Hellenistic and Roman period where it will become a big culture of the care of oneself. There are regulations, purgation practices and transitions existing behind all of these ongoing technologies of the self. Foucault says:

“In all of the ancient thought I am talking about, whether it be Socrates or Gregory of Nyssa, "taking care of oneself" always has a positive and never a negative meaning. A further paradox is that this injunction to "take care of oneself" is the basis for the constitution of what have without doubt been the most austere, strict, and restrictive moralities known in the West, moralities which, I repeat, should not be attributed to Christianity (this was the object of last year's course), but rather to the morality of the first centuries B.C. and the first centuries A.D. (Stoic, Cynic and, to a certain extent, Epicurean morality). A further paradox which should be mentioned to explain the way in which this notion of care of the self was somehow overshadowed is that the strict morality and austere rules arising from the principle "take care of yourself " have been taken up again by us: These rules in fact appear, or reappear, either in a Christian morality or in a modern, non-Christian morality. So, Christianity and the modern world has based all these themes and codes of moral strictness on a morality of non- egoism whereas in actual fact they were born within an environment strongly marked by the obligation to take care of oneself.”¹³ He chalked the reason behind the place of the care of oneself was wiped

¹² Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Use Of Pleasure* Trans., Robert Hurley, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pg. 28.

¹³ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 13.

away in antique culture up to Cartesian “moment” because of only conventional reasons and states: It seems to me that the "Cartesian moment," again within a lot of inverted commas, functioned in two ways. It came into play in two ways: by philosophically requalifying the *gnôthi seauton* (know yourself), and by discrediting the *epimeleia heautou* (care of the self).¹⁴

The notion of the care of the self which defined the historical background of self-knowledge had undergone a transformation. According to Foucault who avoids from determining this transformation at a certain point, another new age had started in the history of the subject and the truth since the only condition to reach the truth was believed in the knowledge.

Foucault wishes to show the question of what's self is a reference to the mandate of knowing oneself (*gnôthi seauton*), thus, he wishes to show that there is the notion of the care of the self (*epimeleia heautou*) within this mandate. Because this diachronic range cannot be fully known as long as the mandate of knowing oneself which gained a prestigious position is drawn apart from the notion of the care of the self. The notion of the care of the self is the one that gives range and prestigious to the notion of knowing oneself. Foucault seeks the circumstances that may enable us to understand the paradox stemming from preferring one to another in this dynamic telescopic around in the practices that regulate the premise of knowing oneself. Because the notion of the care of the self that is based on the premise of “the need to take care of the self” is the fundamental modal of the mandate of knowing oneself. For this reason, the notion of the care of the self in *Alcibiades* is once again reminded. Socrates' emphasis on the notion of knowing oneself encourages Alcibiades to think in a more serious way about himself, his capabilities and his expected tasks when he governs the city. The question goes clearly over the answer “you have to know what you are, your abilities, your soul, your passion and whether you are mortal or immortal.” It is more sought in the reflexive *heauton* pronoun. This is reflexive situation of taking care of oneself. As second, the reference to *heauton* corresponds to an answer frequently mentioned in Platon: “*psukhês epimelêteon*” (need to take care of the soul). If we consider *Phaidon* as the base, we can see that when the soul leaves the body and stays all alone by itself as possible, the soul comprehends the

¹⁴ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 14.

existence and works up a connection with the truth; when the soul is deceived by the body, we can see that its connection with the truth is damaged. “If our intention is to know something as its pure state, we need to be freed from the body and see the objects itself only through the soul.”¹⁵ This is a clear indicator that the soul (*Psyche*) is the entity which needs to be cared. Therefore, it is important to recall Socrates’ statement: “Simminas, thus, the souls are separated from the soul and possess the intellect before they are formed as human body.”¹⁶

Incapability of the subject to reach the truth as given to itself, the way it exists, is a fundamental principle and common feature in ancient philosophy. “Unless the subject goes through certain processes, transformations and alterations on which make itself capable of figuring the truth, it is not able to figure out the truth.”¹⁷ Foucault, asserting this as an extremely fundamental theme, believes that Christianity is easily inserted in it by adding a new component that is not found in Archaic age. From the perspective of the subject’s connection with the truth, we need to carefully consider these two contact areas. The first of these is the question of how the subject apprehends directing to itself in Christianity: “Pay attention to all signs and images that come to your mind, do not abandon questioning every motion in your heart so that you can solve the signs and traces of temptation; try to determine what comes to your mind is sent by the God, the evil or by yourself, isn’t there a sensual desire in the ideas that come to your mind and seem to be the purest ideas?”¹⁸ Briefly, in this monastery practice, it is so clear that there is a different type of conversion to the self from the Platonic perspective. Foucault defines the Christian spiritual conversion (*metanoia*) which was particularly developed after the fourth century as an entity that abandons itself. One of the fundamental components of Christian spiritual conversion is to abandon oneself, die to oneself and to reborn in a new entity and form whose existence, form, habits and its ethos have no connection with the previous form.¹⁹ Therefore, Foucault sees Christian and *metanoia* after Christianity as a fraction of the self in its own entity and transformation, a sort of

¹⁵ Plato, *Phaedo*, South Bend: Infomotions, Inc., 2000. Accessed May 27, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central.

¹⁶ Platon, *Phaedo*.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 163.

¹⁸ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 218.

¹⁹ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 211.

trans-subjectivation. He states that the conversion in Ancient culture and the philosophies of the first centuries A.D. is not a trans-subjectivation. This is more a long process of subjectification of the self to oneself. It is based on moving toward an aim to oneself, a motion of a complete existence that needs to move towards itself as the only aim, implementing the intellect into the self and taking itself into consideration. By considering oneself as an aim, it centers its full and appropriate relation with oneself. The tradition mostly developed by Plato is emphasized as a sort of return to ontological base: first of all, turning one's head from images, this turning (from images) component addresses to see one's own ignorance, to the care of the oneself and caring for oneself, therefore, through this act of turning from oneself that will bring the subject to oneself, it returns to the land of subjects, selves, the truth and the existence. These come across as common themes of Platonic *epistrophê* such as "turning one's face", "turning it to oneself", "ability to remember" and "returning to its land, ontological base". Conversion particular to Roman and Hellenistic ages, (differently from Platonic *epistrophê*) is formed by establishing a complete holistic relation with oneself rather than by freeing the soul from the body.²⁰

As mentioned by Foucault, practices of returning to oneself in Christianity differ from the Archaic age. Saint Augustine underlines the compulsory of the knowledge of the truth that can be the base of human soul. He doesn't agree with the innate knowledge unlike Socrates. Because such innate knowledge contradicts with the fundamental Christian doctrines. According to him, only enlightened intellects can reach the realities of the knowledge of truth. This enlightenment stems directly from the God itself. Only an intellect that is enlightened by God is able to figure out the truth. One can't manifest the difference between the good and evil without God. The subject can rescue itself only by God's grace. Therefore, the pursuit of inner self or the knowledge of oneself that Augustine mentions is the subject's pursuit of God at the same time. However, Descartes steers it in a radical way by adding moral resources to Augustine's notion of inner self.²¹ Therefore, the notion of the care of the self that works through the Christianity from Saint Augustine to the seventeenth century concurs with the Cartesian moment after passing through certain lines. Due to all these additions

²⁰ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 209.

²¹ Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), pg. 127.

and subtractions, the notion of *epimeleia heautou* (the care of the self) loses its privileged position gained against the notion of *gnothi seauton* (knowing yourself).

By addressing the Cartesian moment, Foucault states that *gnothi seauton* has been requalified by including the conflict that has been lasting for twelve years between the spirituality and theology and many other contact areas into this removal.²² According to him, the principle of knowing yourself refers to “*knowing its own existence as a conscious form*” which is resolved as a fundamental way to reach the truth. Since the seventeenth century, *epimeleia heautou* (the notion of the care of the self) became blurred by losing its content and excluded from the philosophical thoughts:

It is in order to know oneself that one must withdraw into the self; it is in order to know oneself that one must detach oneself from sensations which are the source of illusions; it is in order to know oneself that one must establish one's soul in an immobile fixity which is not open to external events, etcetera. It is both in order to know oneself and inasmuch as one knows oneself that all this must and can be done. It seems to me then that there is a general reorganization of all these techniques around the prescription "know yourself." Anyway, we can say that in this text, in which there is no mention of all these prior techniques of the self, as soon as the space of the care of the self is opened up and the self is defined as the soul, the entire space thus opened up is taken over by the principle of "know yourself." We can say that there is a forced takeover by the *gnothi seauton* in the space opened up by the care of the self.²³

It is more than enough to become what it is in order to reach a truth that the subject opens its form as a subject within the knowledge.²⁴ In other words, it is enough to open one's eyes and keep on putting forward on ideas by sticking on the proof line and holding on in order to be capable of the truth, so there is no need for the subject to change itself. Also, Kant's proof is added to this: what is that we are not capable of knowing is exactly the subject's own form and this causes us not to be able to know the subject. This approach finds the idea of subject's spiritual transformation paradoxical. According to Foucault, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the knowledge of intellectual knowledge

²² Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 18.

²³ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 68.

²⁴ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 190.

(connaissance) finally completely covered over the knowledge of spirituality (savior) that covers Hellenistic and Roman period together with the end of Archaic age, but not without having taken up a number of its elements.²⁵ Thereby, it is instrumental, a way of knowledge that makes the soul or the self an object of the knowledge. It is impossible that such subject becomes a subject of enunciation of the correct discourse. Because, it is vital that the truth touches the subject and affects it emotionally (*affecte*). That's why, in these techniques of the self and the way these techniques are attached to the nature and objects, there is nothing that can be draft or pioneer of the thing which causes the subject to interpret itself and the conscience to evaluate itself.²⁶

According to Foucault, one of the responsibilities of Enlightenment is to increase the mind's political forces. Thereby, people of the nineteenth century would be soon asking the question whether the mind has got strong too much in our society. It is started to be skeptical of the relation whose existence is doubtful and which is in between a society prone to rationalism and some threats to the individual, its freedom, to all living kinds and to survival of all of them.²⁷ To Foucault, the relation between the extremisms of the political hegemony and rationalism is evidential. However, he states that the subject's being trapped by avoiding the artificial and dreary bait of either becoming rational or irrational needs to be sought in between the various experiences of insanity, death, crime and sexuality and power relations. Thereby, his main focus is the problem of self-identity in relation with the problem of individualizing power.

The purpose behind Foucault's studies is neither to judge the mind nor to question rationalism whose roots are found in the Enlightenment and which seems peculiar to modern culture. He rather aims to analyze the relations between rationalism and power. Instead of handling society's or culture's rationalizing as a whole, he asserts that it is wiser to analyze such process within the framework of various fields that each addresses an essential experience such as insanity, death, illness, sexuality and crime; he aims to show how we indirectly construct ourselves by excluding the insane and the guilty. Also, he focuses on how we

²⁵ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 309.

²⁶ Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, pg. 243-244.

²⁷ Michel Foucault, *Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'*, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at Stanford University, October 10 and 16, 1979, pg. 225.

directly construct our own identities through some techniques of the self that has been developed since Archaic age until now. Besides, he also analyzes how we define ourselves as part of a nation, a state and a social being through a political technology related to individuals.

Pulling the carpet under the truth that the power holds itself enables not only the subject's transformation with the relation between oneself and the truth but also nullifies the beliefs which only ensures recognition.²⁸ In this regard, Max Fischer's novel's hero, Stiller, can be analyzed within the frameworks of the modern subject's care of the self, self-identity trouble, trial, confession, soul-searching, confinement, criminal experiences etc. from the perspective of games seeking the truth with the technologies of power. Thereby, the modern subject's self-identity trouble is materialized within the discourse and identity released by Stiller, as a German American. Stiller is a pretty good sample in terms of the subject's relations to truth with oneself, the practices of telling the truth (*parrhesia*) and undertaken games seeking the truth.

To Foucault, it is possible to formulate the issues of subjectivity and the truth as²⁹: "How does the subject can experience itself, from the moment when it coincides with the possibility or compulsory of acknowledging something true about itself? What kind of a relation can the subject form with oneself from the moment when it is possible or compulsory to pass through the subject's self-discovery to truth - this discovery either is promised or imposed?" These formulated questions highlight the fact that the subject's relation with oneself has a historical source. The matter of subjectivity and truth addressed by Foucault is underlying between Stiller's denial of his own identity and law's insistently enforcement of this identity to him.

2.2. Modern Subject and Truth Seeking Games: I'm Not Stiller!

As a result of *recognition* by Swiss customs officer, Stiller who had not been seen for 7 years got arrested. His slap to customs officer was also added to

²⁸ Michel Foucault, *Subjectivity and the Truth: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1980-1981*, Trans. Sibel Yardımcı, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Uni. Publications, 2015), pg. XXI

²⁹ Michel Foucault, *Subjectivity and the Truth*, pg. 40

his crimes and Stiller was confined in a cell. What happens to Stiller is pretty ordinary, yet, his reaction to these is not what we all are used to. The prisoner who got arrested due to his slap to custom officer seemingly but in reality due to his similarity to Stiller has been targeted for other accusations. What surprising is that Stiller claims unprecedentedly that he is not missing Stiller. He insistently states that “I’m not Stiller!”³⁰ He introduces himself as Mr. White, a German American. However, they don’t believe anything he tells, they, including his lawyer, think that he is lying. This frustrates even his lawyer. Because his client took all the possibilities of defending him at the very beginning. For this reason, the defense can’t function, there is only jurisdiction left however in this context, it is deprived of the object which proves the crime. Stiller says “What’s prominent for me now is that I am now unfortunately someone else that the person I really am.” and rejects all amicable proposals, turns a deaf ear to all.³¹ Stiller is given time to *confess* everything. He is asked to write only the truth in his cell on the notebooks that are given to him. However, he starts proposing strong proofs to prove the opposite and tries to convince people who don’t believe him. He makes up stories.

Foucault states that the price that is paid to degrade the matters of subject and truth or move them into sense of belonging (to a group, a school, a party or a class etc.) is to forget the relations between the truth and the subject. Because, according to him, “there is no subject theory freed from the relations to truth.”³² At the very beginning of the novel, Stiller begins some sort of games seeking the truth. He bases this game upon a matter of sense of belonging. When Stiller gets arrested, he tries to break the relation with the person who he is by attaching his sense of belonging to another nation. The reason of this attempt is judge’s imposition of Stiller’s identity to him. Just like Kafka’s cunning heroes, Stiller wants to make a breach in judiciary circle surrounding him and wants to see what happens when he expands this breach.

The hero of the novel rejects all witnesses and references to his identity by saying “I’m not Stiller!” He developed a discourse similar to the formula that Gilles Deleuze states in *Bartleby*. According to Deleuze, *Bartleby* confronts the

³⁰ Max Frisch, *I’m Not Stiller*, Trans. Michael Bullock (London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2006) pg. 5.

³¹ Max Frisch, *I’m Not Stiller*, pg. 9.

³² Michel Foucault, *Subjectivity and the Truth*, the Lecture on Jan.7th, 1981.

whole language with the silence and turns it into silence by digging a sort of foreign language in it.³³ According to him, this attitude is deconstructive because it eliminates the preferred with the same cruelty as well as the not-preferred. Stiller's status intersects with this discourse because what the law prefers is Stiller's recognition of who he is. However, Stiller is insistent on becoming Mr. White. The formula also gains function in this point: just as it eliminates the object he is directed and rejecting, it also eliminates the other one seemed to be protected or to become impossible.³⁴ According to Deleuze, this attitude opens an area of undistinguishable and indescribable. Thus, he forms a border line against the law; he avoids from becoming someone who is judged by being accused of crime and someone who is subjected to some sorts of confessions.

*Veritas patefacit se ipsam et falsum.*³⁵ Agamben explains the truth by referring to this antique philosophy's dictum. According to him, if the truth doesn't show the wrong one, which is not distinguished and is repressed to somewhere else, it can't display itself; contrarily, according to the meaning of the verb "*patefacere*" attached to *spatium* which replaces the verb "to open", the truth only displays itself by allowing the nontruth, letting the wrong to transpire, by displaying the deepest inappropriateness of the inappropriate.³⁶ Stiller's transpiration as Mr. White allows himself to take advantage of the inappropriate.

To Gilles Deleuze, in Archaic Age, there was another way of understanding the time as modal of thinking and motion of the soul particular to unflinchy monks. Descartes' cogito realizes its secularization and being laicized. *I think* including a designated existence (*I exist*) designating an existence that thinks this existence (*I think therefore I am*) is an instant act of designation.³⁷ However, on what kind of undesigned is relied on designated if undesigned doesn't display how it is designated? Deleuze connects Kant's moaning on this question with being designated in the form of time. Thereby, "*I think*" affects the time and only in time it designates the existence of an "I" that changes and shows

³³ Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical* Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (New York: Verso, 1998), pg. 72.

³⁴ Deleuze, *Bartleby or the Formula*, pg. 71

³⁵ Truth can only be revealed by addressing the wrong.

³⁶ Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community*, Trans. Michael Hard, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007) pg. 12

³⁷ Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical* Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (New York: VERSO, 1998), pg. 29.

consciousness level in time.³⁸ This theme of selfhood that was carrying a positive value as getting the soul severe in Archaic Age is converted into getting the conscious level in a moment severe by Kant. According to Deleuze, “I” is within the time and constantly changes: this “I” who is experiencing changes in time is passive or more a receiver “I”. Then, Stiller asserts that he is Mr. White to beware of passive or receiver existence of “I”. The truth seeking game he began responds as an illusion to a perspective that takes existence as an object of knowledge. He thinks “I” as someone else, he forms: first-person singular (*je*) is a deed (*I am*) that designates my existence, (*I think*) however, he can only designates it in time as a passive, receiver and changing “I” who can display the efficiency of his own thoughts, thus, the first-person singular with I (*moi*) are separated from each other with an essential distinguishing condition and with the timeline that connects them to one another.³⁹ There is this attitude behind Stiller’s narration of himself with the language of “I” against the law. He writes his memories on the notebook given to him. While each notebook makes Mr. White explicit, it grays Stiller. This is an unmasking game. Stiller wants to unmask the judiciary as Mr. White and judiciary wants to unmask Stiller. The novel’s center of gravity has moved towards Stiller’s, so the modern subject’s, self-identity trouble.

I am not Stiller, which I will analyse as a parody of self-identity, also problematises the so-called anonymous European identity that Foucault himself problematises. The protagonist Stiller/Mr. White who can in fact easily disguise, is regarded as a European but whose exact name and identity are not known, therefore when he tries to create an identity for himself through domination, an identity carnival emerges. This is why Foucault says first history as a parody and comedy.⁴⁰ Stiller uses his freedom to choose one of the many European identities for himself. He refuses the history which wishes to establish itself as its self-identity, as well as the law and the citizenship that are the extension of that history. This is a rebellion against the history that neglects the victims and the defeated. Stiller creates a genealogical history of himself.

According to Foucault, the aim of the genealogical approach to history is

³⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 29.

³⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 29.

⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, <https://noehernandezcortez.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/nietzsche-genealogy-history.pdf>, pg. 93

not to find out the origins of our identity, rather it aims at dissolving it as well as at revealing all the contingencies and discontinuities. According to Foucault self-identity itself, which we tend to unite and consolidate under a mask, is nothing more than a parody.

However, if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is “something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.⁴¹

Thus, when the relationship between the subject and the truth is examined through the practices of telling the truth, we can conclude that it has gained a totally different meaning compared to the Ancient Greek account. The subject cannot perceive his/her identity as a unity anymore. What is at stake now is the countless subjectification practices that shapes it. This is the reason that lies behind Stiller’s negating his own identity. He refuses the reductive approach of the law which objectifies the subject through crime. The historical perspective of the law is clear: die or to kill for the land, never be suspicious about the Swiss democracy, be a devoted husband. Foucault says:

The Untimely Meditations discussed the critical use of history: its just treatment of the past, its decisive cutting of the roots, its rejection of traditional attitudes of reverence, its liberation of man by presenting him with other origins than those in which he prefers to see himself. Nietzsche, however, reproached critical history for detaching us from every real source and for sacrificing the very movement of life to the exclusive concern for truth. Somewhat later, as we have seen, Nietzsche reconsiders this line of thought he had at first refused, but directs it to altogether different ends. It is no longer a question of judging the past in the name of a truth that only we can possess in the present, but of risking the destruction of the subject who seeks knowledge in the endless deployment of the will to knowledge.⁴²

Foucault refers to the concept of *Herkunft* while discussing *The Genealogy of Morality*: *Herkunft* is the equivalent of stock or descent, the ancient affiliation of a group. It also involves a consideration of race or social type. Thus *Herkunft*

⁴¹ Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, pg. 78

⁴² Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, pg. 96-97

allows us to find out through and despite which events, a concept or a character occurs.⁴³ Descent, Foucault argues, attaches itself to the body:

It inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the debilitated and prostrate bodies of those whose ancestors committed errors. Fathers have only to stake effects for causes, believe in the reality of an "afterlife," or maintain the value of eternal truths, and the bodies of their children will suffer.

As Foucault claims, will to truth does not in fact come close to a universal truth; it does not make people dominate over nature; on the contrary it continues to increase the risks and dangers; it destroys the illusionary protections; the illusionary unity of the self; it releases everything within the self, eager to destroy it.⁴⁴ This is exactly what Stiller wishes to problematise: Swiss law which wishes to sacrifice him, asks Stiller to declare who he is in complete truth before the law. However, Stiller responds to the law which is in fact ready to accept him as a good citizen, a good soldier who should die when necessary and a devoted husband, through genealogy, that is through a dissolved subjectivity and identity and as such demonstrates a parody of history.

2.3. Stiller/White Before the Law

According to Deleuze, law doesn't leave its judiciary, judiciary doesn't leave its enforcement and execution. If the law comes first, there is no way to distinguish "accusation" "defense" and "judgment". Deleuze states that remarks that the law has left on our hearts and our flesh are mixed and it doesn't give an ultimate information about our mistakes any more. To him, what its prick writes on us: *Act from duty* (not only in accordance with duty). The more we follow the law studiously, the more the law gets stricter. It never waives us, with the results of our virtues as well as our mistakes and faults: its exculpation is always only on appearance and moral conscious, rather than resettling, consolidates with all our give-ups and strikes a bigger blow.⁴⁵ Time leaves us no other juridical options than those of Kafka in *The Trial*: either an "apparent acquittal" or an "unlimited

⁴³ Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, pg. 82

⁴⁴ Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, pg. 95

⁴⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 32.

postponement.”⁴⁶ So Stiller knows that there is no “exculpation” before law. The law demands him to give up being Mr. White and to acknowledge his identity, Stiller. Yet, Stiller begins making a breach in this order and gives them someone else. He carries Mr. White who is as speculative as the law, in the area of law. Because this law subjected to the time reminds us all the time of the loop of infinite debts and prize. Stiller’s presentation of an anonymous identity like himself, Mr. White, before the law is a mirroring parody. There is nothing that the law can take from him.

According to Foucault, bio-power is developed as two main forms: the first form that approaches human body as a machine, is a disciplinarian power. Its purpose is to discipline the body, to improve skills, to make it more useful and meek, to unify it with the systems of economical control; the second form approaches the human body as a natural form and concentrates on a control regulating the population. Bio-power is an essential aspect in the development of capitalism; because capitalism requires the human body to enter the production process in a controlled way and it requires rationalization of population into economical processes. As a result of this development that occurred at the beginning of the 18th century, series of power networks has emerged onto human body, sexuality, family, school, military, factory etc.⁴⁷

Furthermore, one of the reforms that is brought by bio-power, unlikely of other old power forms that identifies power with the law, is that the law blends into background and instead, the norms formed by the power becomes prominent. Or more precisely, the laws obtain, yet, processing them as norms has started. Therefore, bio-power that is a product of bourgeoisie society eventually forms a society of normalization, a society that forces individuals to follow the norms and a society that normalizes them.⁴⁸ Therefore what is expected from Stiller as Stiller is to acknowledge to become a subject of Swiss laws and the citizen Stiller. The laws that aim to present Stiller before the judge are extremely strict on becoming universal and democratic. It can’t bear any doubt in terms of this matter. Hence, the lawyer’s attitude is a clear indicator of this. There are also other indicators.

⁴⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 33.

⁴⁷ Ferda Keskin, *Foucault, Violence and Power Cogito*, Winter-Spring, No: 96, Yapı Kredi Publications, pg. 121

⁴⁸ Ferda Keskin, above-mentioned-work, pg.122

The cell given to Stiller is the only cell in the jail that takes sunlight. According to his lawyer, Stiller must see himself lucky in this regard. In terms of non-discursive normative practices, Stiller's cell opens a window to relations of power and subject.

My cell -I have just measured it with my shoes, which is a trifle less twelve inches long- is small, like everything in this country, so clean one can hardly breathe for our all hygiene, and oppressive precisely because everything is just right. No more and no less. Everything in this country is oppressively adequate. The cell is 10 feet long, 7 feet 10 inches wide, and 8 feet 3 inches high. A humane prison, there's no denying it, and that's what makes it so unbearable. Not a cobweb, not a trace of mildew on the walls, nothing to justify indignation. Some prisons get stormed when the people learn about them; here there's nothing to storm. Millions of people, I know, live worse than I do. The bed has springs. The barred window lets in the sun -at this time of the year until about eleven A.M. The table has two drawers and there is also a Bible and a standard lamp. I have to do my business I only have to press a white button and I am taken to the appropriate place, which is not supplied with old newspapers one can read first, but with soft crepe paper. And yet it's a prison, and there are moments when you feel like screaming. You don't do so, any more than you would in a big store; you dry your hands on a towel, walk on the linoleum, and say thank you when you're locked into your cabin again.⁴⁹

Ironically this perfection refers to concentration camps. We understand better how the only cell with the window which is defined as humane fills the blank in Stiller's imagery and with what kind of games disciplinarian mechanism forces him to confess. Metaphor of "only cell with window" presents shifting of disciplinarian/transformational mechanism by aiming the mind rather than the body. Stiller is able to hear the sounds from the street, the natural flow of life outside: drunk's cry out, a faint voice of a speaker heard from a nearby radio, a compressor drilling the ground, noise of garbage truck... The bars that are extending and growing with the light of street lamp when enters his cell at nighttime makes his incarceration more tragic. Such deeds that come across in classic methods as blockade, stigmatization, edification, tormenting, setting to work etc. are replaced by a hidden punishment. The window of Stiller's cell forces him to question his deep-scaled relation with the world and thus, to confess by soul-searching, and

⁴⁹ Max Frisch, *I'm Not Stiller*, pg. 11

what's more, with no use of physical power required. According to Stiller, if there is a perfection in Swiss laws, it is to give Stiller routinized and sterile cell with window. Stiller has already got the law's hypocrisy, therefore, he knows that he can't give up being Mr. White and that they haven't left any other option to him.

Foucault links politically siege of the body with its economical use.⁵⁰ According to him, the reason of sieging the body by power and hegemonic relations, to a large extent, is derived from the fact that body is a producing power, the body is only a useful power when it is both productive and subordinated. As a matter of fact, Stiller who is a sculptor is already excluded from encircling by technologies of power. He is a loafer, not a good partner and moreover, he is taken to be a Russian agent. The law aims to make him at least an obedient ideal citizen. For this reason, it develops certain strict codes and tools. Firstly, it asks him to write his confession on the notebook. As second, photos, news published in magazines and witnesses who know Stiller will be used as evidences. Foucault sees the relation of guilty with the evidence as an internal regulation of knowledge's absolute corporate power. According to him, criminal prospecting subjected to certain rules to form written, confidential evidences is a machine that is able to re-generate the fact to default the suspect.⁵¹ Due to this phenomenon, although there is no need for such thing in terms of absolute law, this method will direct compulsorily to confess:

Due to these two reasons, because first of all, confession needs to form so strong evidence that there is no need to add anything else on it or to realize indicators' hard and suspicious work; confession, if made in accordance with the procedures, saves the prosecution from the burden of finding other evidences (at least from the most difficult ones). Then, the only way for this procedure to lose unilateral authority aspect and to become a fully accomplished victory is that the guilty charges all offences to oneself and to sign on what has been wisely and darkly constructed by criminal prospecting.⁵²

Foucault, in *The Birth of Prison*, states that the purpose of the power is to order humane variety while mentioning discipline society. According to him,

⁵⁰ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison*, Translated from French, by Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York, Second Vintage Books Edition, May 1995, pg. 26.

⁵¹ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison*, pg. 37-38.

⁵² Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison*, pg. 37-38.

every system of power is presented with the same problem. But the peculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this 'economic' growth of power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system.⁵³ From this perspective, Stiller who strives against the law in this visibility that has no gap struggles against observance, recording and scoring apparatuses that surround himself and a cluster of information/witness accumulated and getting centralized against him. He tries to make a breach in this disciplinarian mechanism surrounding his existence.

2.4. Stiller's *Parrhesia*

Parrhesia which is correlated with the notion of the care of the self (*epimelaia heautou*) in Ancient Greece addresses the matters of wisdom, truth and soul perfection. The word, *Parrhesia*, is often translated into English as “free speech”, in German “Freimüthigkeit” (outspokenness) and in French “franc-parler” (outspokenness). *Parrehesiastes* defines the person who uses *Parrhesia*, in other words, the person who tells the truth.⁵⁴ Then, what are the conditions to be the enunciation subject of the discourse of truth? Foucault answers this question by analyzing the first examples of *Parrhesia* in Greek literature and thinks that *Orestes* entirely deals with the issue of *Parrhesia*. He states that *Parrhesia* is an oral activity through which the speaker forms a relation with the truth by honesty, with oneself and other people by criticism (self-criticism or criticizing others) and with moral rule by freedom or duty.⁵⁵ In *Parrhesia*, the speaker uses its freedom

⁵³ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Prison*, pg. 218.

⁵⁴ Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001) pg. 11.

⁵⁵ Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, pg. 19.

and would rather honesty than deception, truth than silence or disguise, death than life and safety, criticism than flattery and moral duty than protecting one's own profit or moral negligence.

When Stiller is considered from this point of view, at the very beginning of the novel, we understand that he will not be silent depending upon his appeal "Ich bin nicht Stiller!" Stiller in German corresponds to the meaning of *more silent* in English. Thereby, "I am not Stiller!" shows that Stiller prefers the truth rather than silence. Surely by moving this truth's scale into self-identity trouble, he creates a space for himself against the law for his discourse of truth. Perseveringly, he insists on that he is a German American named Mr. White. If we see White as a correspond to innocent/white in meaning, the word gains a binary coded character. It aims to shed light on who he really is. He implies that he is not Stiller and won't stay silent any more. His parody of Mr. White is its first move against the law. Stiller forms the whole game on this move. Therefore, what he has realized is that the subjects who construct their consciousness on the Cartesian doubt cannot accuse him unless they present an explicit evidence.

According to Foucault, a man is deemed to use *Parrhesia* in conditions in which telling the truth poses risk or danger and he deserved to be considered as *parrhesiastes*.⁵⁶ What Stiller faces is the risk of turning the power against him by not confessing what is expected. Besides, he forms a specific relation with himself by putting his life in danger. Thus, he is not a creature who forges against himself, he considers for himself more appropriate to be a truth teller. Because the danger in *Parrhesia* is derived from the fact that the truth is such as to harm or provoke the audience. For this reason, *Parrhesia* is always "a game" in between the one telling the truth and the audience.⁵⁷

"Sie schreiben einfach die Wahrheit", sagt mein amtlicher Verteidiger, "nichts als die schlichte und pure Wahrheit. Tinte können Sie jederzeit nachfüllen lassen!"⁵⁸ The law asks Stiller the pure truth. Moreover, the law has provided Stiller a lawyer in terms of functionality due to the fact that it needs the defense and a subject who knows and uses the language of that position. The lawyer

⁵⁶ Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, pg. 15-16.

⁵⁷ Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, pg. 17.

⁵⁸ "Write only the truth" says the lawyer of the cours, "only pure, plain truth. If you are lack of ink, you can always fill it up."

forces Stiller to confess and asks him to tell only the truth, otherwise, he will not defend him. Then, does “schlichte und pure Wahrheit” correspond to “Freimüthigkeit”? Is it possible to expect someone who doesn’t have the equal right of speech to tell the truth?

Foucault states that *parrhesias* is such as to a guide for democracy besides its respective and ethics manner peculiar to a good citizen.⁵⁹ Athens’ democracy is defined with no holds barred as a regime (*politeia*) in which people enjoy *demokratia*, *isegoria* (right of equal speech), *isonomia* (equal participation in government) and *parrhesia*.⁶⁰ Swiss democracy about which people often boast is also alike. Yet, Stiller expresses in a conspicuous and ironic language that the situation is not alike at all.

Swiss law that is boasted about its perfection is supposed to be the representative of universal law and all humanity as a principle. However, during his stay in prison, Stiller can’t help himself making ironic references to this obsession of perfectionism. His statements towards the Swiss law annoy even his lawyer. His lawyer doesn’t want to utter Stiller’s statements against Switzerland. According to him, nobody should be suspicious about Swiss justice and most particularly shouldn’t criticize his country. After all, it is their country:

My counsel is a thoroughly decent, or at least inoffensive fellow, from a well-to-do family, virtuous though and though, rather inhibited, but even his inhibitions are turned into good manners; and above all, he is just, no doubt of that, just in even the most trivial matter, he is just, no doubt of that, just in even the most trivial matter, desperately just, just out of an almost inborn conviction that justice exists, at least in a constitutional State, at least in Switzerland.⁶¹

A sort of pity has been added to his acrimonious opinions on his lawyer. On the other hand, he finds his lawyer’s relation to truth that is formed with himself in which all hegemonic discourse is internalized tragic. The lawyer is the materialized form of Swiss democracy and laws. Stiller knows that he can’t talk to him since the very beginning. The paradox of Mr. White disables the lawyer and thus the judge.

⁵⁹ Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, pg. 22.

⁶⁰ Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, pg. 22.

⁶¹ Max Frisch, *I’m Not Stiller*, pg. 17.

The word, truth, for the modern subject, is no longer a type of a discourse in which subjectivity can be adopted, by adopting which can take it to its goal, itself. This type of discourse, this game to seek the truth, creates a crisis, a split in the subject's practices of selfhood. Therefore, the subject transfers a further information into its subjectivity rather than oneself as an eventual goal. The process of giving birth to Mr. White lies upon at this point. Stiller who has deep observation skills and never avoids an acrimonious and ironic tone acts exactly like a *parrhesiastes*. When we consider that the first condition to be the subject of truth discourse is freedom, however, under these circumstances, it is not likely that Stiller tells the truth. Stiller knows that prison is no different from being outside so he doesn't hesitate to tell what he thinks. Of course, he doesn't give the law what it asks for, what Stiller aims is more to reveal the law, the modern subjects, the subjectification practices and the relation between the subject and power in terms of self-identity trouble through *the games to seek the truth*.

These statements are the most powerful proofs that Stiller is a *parrhesiastes*: "Should I surrender? I can easily do that by applying to lies, only one word, a word called confession is enough, I will be "free", in other words, in my conditions, I am condemned to play a role that has no connection with me. On the other hand, how can one prove who he really is? I am incapable of this. Do I know who I really am? This is the terrifying experience I have gained in prison: I can't find a way of expression to tell the truth."⁶² Stiller knows that he faces against the danger of borrowing the language of power when he attempts to express himself. This is the danger of being the enunciation's subject of the power that penetrates all expression modals. Therefore, Stiller insistently avoids from this. For him, the cell is beyond the physical location, he also sees the identity that aimed to dress him as a cell.

⁶² Max Frisch, *I'm Not Stiller*, pg 79.

THIRD CHAPTER

THE ZERO POINT OF MEANING AND SINGULARS

The purpose of Stiller is not only to uncover the technologies of the power in which he exists and to strive against them, he, since the very beginning, has been trying to become the subject of enunciation of truth by transforming his relation with himself. Nevertheless, the law puts him through many processes to utter the confessions it asks for: witnesses, forcing him to write who he is, his memories, what he does... Stiller is aware of everything: “How dare they ask me to be him! Maybe to overcome this incident, they need Stiller, whether he is guilty or not, like they need a pawn in chess.” says Stiller.⁶³ The relation between the law and the subject that is being formed within the framework of confession practices draws a circle around Stiller within the scope of a game including both the denial and recognition. It is required that he utters the expected truth regarding himself against the law and then, he confronts the accusations credited to him. However, exactly at this point, by demonstrating a similar vigilance to Kafka’s heroes, he creates a new language that goes beyond the borders of the language between the law and the guilty: “I am not Stiller!” he says. Because the guilty can only talk about his crime, not his innocence. Nancy states that “the soul is the material that intercourses with oneself: that sees oneself and thus, tries to make oneself visible. Besides, it constantly digs one’s impenetrableness deeper, expands it and eventually intensifies it to the eternity or crystalizes it.”⁶⁴ Stiller is the one who is impenetrable and crystalized as Mr. White. What triggers it is not only the desire to survive, it is the desire to stay human which is formed by the ethics. Although Stiller knows that his life and freedom are in danger, he doesn’t give up becoming the subject of enunciation. He seeks ways for uncovering the power’s mask. Again, he creates an opportunity of a new language in the language of power. Because, the language of power is very acquainted, the custom officer repeatedly says while getting him out of the train: “I’m doing my duty!”⁶⁵ This discourse is a way of speaking belong to a political power that, once upon a time,

⁶³ Max Frisch, *I’m Not Stiller*, pg 38.

⁶⁴ Jean-Luc Nancy, *Everything Can Be Found*, Cogito, No: 85, Yapı Kredi Publications, 2016, pg. 55.

⁶⁵ Max Frisch, *I’m Not Stiller*, pg. 8

fills the trains with people and slaughters under the name of “doing one’s duty, enforcing the orders” and reminds of *Adolf Eichmann*. In universal justices and law’s Switzerland, custom officers say “I’m just doing my duty!” (just like Eichmann). This is the most known formula discourse of detainment under the law which is imprinted on the memories.

As it may be recalled, in her treatise on *The Banality of Evil*, Arendt demanded a rethinking of established ideas about moral responsibility.⁶⁶ The existence of the guilty who has been sought and seen as a danger for the society or the state has always been fixed and under the name of power, the law takes them out of the society wherever they are found just as it is in the novel. During Stiller’s detainment, the attitude of the custom officer is pretty strict, yet, Stiller also responds with the same strictness:

I boxed the young customs officer’s ear just as he was telling me, in spite of my polite but unambiguous warning and with the arrogant air of one protected by the Law, that they would soon let me know who I really was. His navy blue cap rolled along the platform in a spiral, and for an instant the young customs officer, now capless and consequently much more human, was so frabbergasted – too much taken aback even to be angry – that I could easily have got into the train. It was just beginning to move off, people were leaning out of the windows waving, and one carriage door was still open. I don’t know why I didn’t jump in. I believe I could have snatched my password, for, as I have said, the young man was completely dumb-founded, as though his whole soul was in the rolling that he was seized with understandable rage. I ducked down among the people, determined at least to brush some of the dust off his navy blue cap with its Swiss cross badge before handing it back to him. His ears were lobster red. It was strange: I followed him as though under some compulsion to behave myself. He didn’t say a word and without taking hold of me, which was quite unnecessary, led me to police station, where I was kept waiting for fifty minutes.⁶⁷

The young custom officer represents the strict reality of the state. When the cap on which there is Swiss’ cross shaped logo is rolled on the floor, Stiller has understood that he touched the state, thus the law not the young customer. Now he is in the eyes of the law just like the country man in Kafka’s story, *Before*

⁶⁶ Judith Butler, *Hannah Arendt's challenge to Adolf Eichmann*, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/29/hannah-arendt-adolf-eichmann-banality-of-evil>

⁶⁷ Max Frisch, *I'm not Stiller*, pg. 8

the Law. Although there are clear differences among them, their fate is same: one of them wants to go out while the other wants to get in. Stiller doesn't run away although he has the chance of escaping. According to the schema of the sovereign exception, law applies to him in no longer applying, and holds him in its ban in abandoning him outside itself. The open door destined only for him includes him in excluding him and excludes him in including him.⁶⁸ The law is inserting the country man by excluding him and excludes Stiller by inserting him.

From this perspective, a similar condition to the story of *Before the Law* occurs. The young custom officer reminds us of the warden at the gate, it is impossible to pass him and go out because there is no closed door that can be used to go out. While Stiller takes the cap fallen to the floor and passes it to the custom officer, he understands that he can't go out of the law. The custom officer doesn't say a word and walks and Stiller follows him: The most powerful state of the law is when it doesn't order anything anymore, in other words, a pure state of prohibition.⁶⁹ Both the country man and Stiller bargain ceaselessly in front of an open door, try to cheat and trick, yet, they can't get a result. According to Agamben, everywhere on earth men live today in the ban of a law and a tradition that are maintained solely as the "zero point" of their own content, and that include men within them in the form of a pure relation of abandonment.⁷⁰

Stiller's formula discourse is not unfamiliar to us. Bartleby who is one of the heroes of the underground breed has also a similar discourse. There is a law facing them and driving both of them into a tight corner. The only resource they have is to create a new language in the language. Let's recall what Deleuze told for Bartleby: If there is a formula, it is definitely not explanatory and "I would prefer not to" is kept as a magical formula just like the formula of underground people who can't obey it although they can't prevent the fact that two plus two equals to four.⁷¹ Deleuze states that this formula is related to the understanding that doesn't take us to the intellect and apprehends life and death are too close. Therefore, Stiller's formula discourse "I'm not Stiller" draws in a way the tiny line between life and death and becomes a symbol of resistance peculiar to

⁶⁸ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (California: Stanford University Press, 1998), pg. 34.

⁶⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 34.

⁷⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 35.

⁷¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 103.

singulars. Both characters' formula discourses intersect at a certain meaning and are engaged: Stiller now says before the law that "I would prefer not to be Stiller!" He is a hero from underground breed. Most of his characteristics look like Melville's, Kafka's, Dostoyevsky's and Musil's heroes: he is not an anonym person who is subjectified by the power practices. Stiller is also genuine like Bartleby, there is nothing particular or general on him. According to Deleuze, originals are beings of Primary Nature, but they are inseparable from the world or from secondary nature, they are effective on it: they reveal its emptiness, the imperfection of its laws, the mediocrity of particular creatures ... the world as masquerade (this is what Musil, for his part, will call "parallel action").⁷² The original, says Melville, is not subject to the influence of his milieu; on the contrary, he throws a livid white light on his surroundings, much like the light that "accompanies the beginning of things in Genesis."⁷³ Stiller materializes this light on himself as Mr. White. As a German American, he mirrors his own society's recognitions of self-identity. He adds another dimension on his visibility before the law by creating a game to seek the truth. He suspends all demands of identity that are imposed to him. This is transforming peculiar discourse of *any singular* who makes oneself visible before the law. According to Agamben, whatever is the figure of pure singularity. Whatever singularity has no identity, it is not determinate with respect to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather it is determined only through its relation to an idea, that is, to the totality of its possibilities.⁷⁴ Stiller's singularity is directed to a deed that is able to disintegrate by engaging his existence with the truth and transforming into the subject of enunciation. This disintegration is *one's, whole's* leaking into all tiny cracks. For this reason, Stiller denies all definitions and characteristics loaded on him. He says "I'm not their Stiller!"

In Deleuze's Melville analysis, Melville will never cease to elaborate on the radical opposition between fraternity and Christian "charity" or paternal "philanthropy." To liberate man from the father function, to give birth to the new man or the man without particularities, to reunite the original and humanity by

⁷² Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 104-105.

⁷³ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 105.

⁷⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community*, pg. 68.

constituting a society of brothers as a new universality.⁷⁵ This is the community of singles in which all possessions are wiped out and all members are directed into an eternal phenomena. We see Stiller's performance in the same community. It is said that he is married and yet he doesn't acknowledge it, he doesn't have any child, he doesn't take place in a relation which is recognized by the society. According to Deleuze, if humanity can be saved, and the originals reconciled, it will only be through the dissolution or decomposition of the paternal function.⁷⁶ This is an optimist human potential with no features that refers to the whole world rather than a nation. We come across to it in Stiller just like we do in *Bartleby*. Nevertheless, *Bartleby* was condemned to the walls of Wall street and died there. And Stiller, by becoming more silent in time (recognizing that he is Stiller) lives alone far away from everyone in Glion which is isolated and in touch with nature. They are only special people who tells the good news of *upcoming corporation* at the costs of their own lives.

It is not an individual or particular affair but a collective one, the affair of a people or rather of all peoples. It is not an Oedipal phantasm but a political program. Melville's bachelor *Bartleby* like Kafka's, must "find the place where he can take his walks" ... America. The American is one who is freed from the English paternal function the son of a crumbled father, the son of a crumbled father, the son of all nations. Even before their independence, Americans were thinking about the combination of States, the State-form most compatible with their vocation. But their vocation was not to reconstitute an "old State secret," a nation, a family, a heritage, or a father. It was above all to constitute a universe, a society of brothers, a federation of men and goods, a community of anarchist individuals, inspired by Jefferson, by Thoreau, by Melville.⁷⁷

However, according to Deleuze⁷⁸, American Civil War knows it is the end just like the fall of Soviets. This is the birth of a nature and revival of a nation state, while sons with no fathers start to die, monstrous fathers run back at full gallup.

⁷⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 106.

⁷⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 106.

⁷⁷ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 107.

⁷⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Critical and Clinical*, pg. 111.

As *parrhesiastes* Stiller, alludes that Swiss democracy and law which is presented as a universal model in all statements of Stiller has remained unresponsive while its sons are in the throes of the death. Monstrous fathers who are targeted by Stiller's sharp irony have developed new methods. Taking the other's life is also an effort that requires quite big economic cost. Sometimes letting them live is much cheaper at cost. One can kill oneself, they don't have anything to say about this:

This Jew was a smart man, the rumor of him killing himself is gnawing away in my mind. Our cluster consists of 10 people, if we didn't soap our backs, most probably I wouldn't even notice his absence. Actually I don't feel the lack of him (I was feeling uncomfortable about this soaping issue). What's gnawing away in my mind is who are not able to wait for the death is always among the smart ones: when I think about not only this man's intellect but also his touching eyes, it seems incredible to me that he doesn't know what's awaiting for him now.⁷⁹

18.1.1946, the first date that Stiller wrote on the notebook is when the Second World War had just finished. When looked at it from this perspective, despair of the Jew is taken on a new meaning. The metaphor of soap strengthens the suspect of whether this death is suicide or homicide. During 20th century, it is claimed that variety of soap samples were made of human body fat. During the World War I, as claimed by the British media, Germans used a corpse fabric to make their own soldiers' bodies glycerin and soap. During World War II, it is widely believed that soaps were made of victims from the concentration camps in Poland under Germany's occupation. What terrifies the people the most is not whether this monstrous attitude is real or not, but that it is already in the circulation as an absolute discourse. The metaphor of soap, as a myth, is the most extreme representation of the relation of power with the human bodies. According to Stiller, Switzerland's standing idle by the fact that 1.1 million people were systematically killed in Auschwitz must be a huge embarrassment. Back then, Swiss law and democracy that have been boasted by the lawyer kept silence in order to protect its own benefits. Stiller wants to prove that he can't be judged at this stage where this embarrassment is exhibited.

⁷⁹ Max Frisch, *I'm Not Stiller*, s. 72.

3.1. Hegemonic Power and Bare Life

Agamben sees exception as a sort of exclusion. And yet, does this hero of the novel represents an exception by saying “I’m not Stiller!”? If yes, Stiller has entered the field of law with this exceptional situation. According to Agamben, life can enter the field of law as an exception. There is a phase of marginal situation/structure and threshold phase in life.

Agamben handles *homo sacer* at hidden junction in between legal-institutional power model and bio political power model. According to him, even though it is hidden, what makes the original nuclear of hegemonic power is that bare life enters in the field of politics. The first act of hegemonic power is to create a bio political body.⁸⁰ Agamben sees that the fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, *zoē*/bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.⁸¹ To Agamben, what defines the modern politics is that bare life becomes one of the fundamental subjects of the State’s power’s projections and calculations.

Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and *zoē*, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested.⁸²

Agamben wonders why democracy, at the very moment in which it seemed to have finally triumphed over its adversaries and reached its greatest height, proved itself incapable of saving *zoē*, to whose happiness it had dedicated

⁸⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 11.

⁸¹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 12.

⁸² Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 12.

all its efforts, from unprecedented ruin.⁸³ Therefore, he wants to show that he is acting as an accomplice with the most fierce enemy of the modern democracy. Because, to him, the modern democracy which doesn't acknowledge any other value than life doesn't acknowledge any other futility than life. This is the inherent relation between the democracy and totalitarianism. Moreover, Stiller's lawyer and his relation with the law include exactly such solidarity. Because the fractures and disconnections addressed by Agamben face us at its most nominative case. It opens another field to us while showing us that the definition of bare life is being transformed into the politics' fundamental principle and that fascism and Nazism will never leave our lives.

Stiller is about to be convicted due to his doubt about Swiss law's being universal and democratic. Such doubt's existence even makes the lawyer worried. According to him, his lawyer is fair because the belief that there is justice at least in Switzerland gets in his blood. He criticizes this fair attitude in an acrimonious way. He says that his lawyer is not fool, he knows a lot and he is trustworthy as much as an encyclopedia in terms of matters related to particularly Switzerland. That's why he thinks that there is no logic to discuss about Switzerland with his lawyer. Because each question showing that Stiller is suspicious about Switzerland is swallowed by the unquestionable historical facts and eventually he understands that he will be always wrong unless he doesn't boast about his lawyer's Switzerland.

Foucault says, "What I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom."⁸⁴ There is reference in the novel about Swiss justice and democracy that is presented as a universal model. The lawyer who constructs what modern Western politics produce as his own subjective experience, his selfhood, thinks over the phenomenon whose testimonies are easy. He doesn't leave any space to suspicions. In his subjective experience, Swiss law adopts to be the representation of universal law and all humanity as a principle; it is perfect or it has scarcely any imperfection.

⁸³ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 13.

⁸⁴ Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton, *Technologies of The Self A Seminar With Michel Foucault*, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1988) pg. 15.

According to Agamben, the modern democracy's dead-end is that people seek for happiness and freedom in bare life where people's obedience and addictions are exhibited. Therefore, there is the sacred human body found, which can be killed but not be sacrificed, behind a long and challenging process in which recognition of rights and official freedoms are resulted together with the power. A similar fact lies behind the fact that the authority which aims Stiller to believe in Swiss justice assigns a lawyer to him. It is said that ironically, there, nobody is sent to death or is imprisoned unless they are not judged fairly. Their obsession for justice is astonishing Stiller, as if all of these such as the perfection of the prison that drives man crazy and the rumor on Jew's suicide were performances to expedite Stiller's confession. There is an allegory of performance society in the novel in which the power subjugates the bodies, penetrates into their language and defines their discourse and so the models of acting and thinking. Agamben describes it as: The sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely both life's subjection to a power over death and life's irreparable exposure in the relation of abandonment.⁸⁵

If we look at the lawyer in terms of the representation of Swiss law, the lawyer's idealized concepts of justice, life and history provokes Stiller, because, the lawyer who is supposed to defend him is incredibly restrained, dull and honest, he is smart, yet he uses all of his intellect not to do any wrong. Stiller disguises such people. Sometimes he also thinks that he would be free if he could think of becoming *Missing Stiller*. But, he immediately abandons this opinion. Because the freedom is only an image. It is not possible to discuss freedom with the Swiss because they can't bear any suspicion on freedom. They act as if they had everything in their hands to make any person a good and free Swiss citizen. For instance, Stiller handles the attitude of Switzerland against Hitler. His lawyer often mentions about what Russians had done in order to legitimize Switzerland, he doesn't even say a word about Hitler. However, Stiller develops an acrimonious attitude towards the fact that Switzerland would remain the only society that doesn't show any eager to fascism although they knew Swiss bourgeois would enhance fascism.

⁸⁵ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 53.

Agamben states that the question “what kind of language does living being possess?” has a point of intersection with the question “in what form does bare life take place in *polis*?”. To him, living being’s possession of *logos* is possible through protecting its own voice and suppressing it in *logos*; taking place in *polis* is possible through excluding its own bare life as an exception. Thus, the bass sounded power of Stiller is taking umbrage at him by excluding him. The democracy that the power is boasting about is insufficient for Stiller as well as the Swiss. It attempts to hide this insufficiency by the discourse developed in the language. It constructs each subject as individuals whose faith is full for democracy. It regulates the *logos* of the subjects and these subjects suppress their own voices in *logos*. This suppression constantly reveals itself as an enunciation. For the lawyer, Swiss democracy is so real that no one can be suspicious about its existence. Stiller understands the game, he responds by *logos* to *logos*, constructs a new language with the language.

3.2. Marriage, Women and Men: Bullfight

Stiller’s judge Rolf talks with him about America. He tells Stiller that his wife loves New York so much, by doing so, a common base is found that they both can talk about. They talk about the American way of life, attractive architect of the cities, vitality of the life and freedoms. He doesn’t correct the mistakes of the Judge about America, he approves him by secretly mocking. The judge asks him whether he knows Rainbow bar or not. Stiller learns that this bar is important in the judge’s life; the judge met his ex-wife that he was divorced years ago. Of course, Stiller starts to talk about America as Mr. White. Stiller vaguely feels pity towards this man who is accusing him, because he is more desperate than he seems, even more than Stiller. The judge opens up the marriage issue or his marriage again and again. According to him, for equality of men and women, it is required to abandon the idea that sexual loyalty is enough and the idea that there can be no marriage if there is no sexual loyalty. The judge finds partners’ demonstrating courage to outside significant. He considers the relationship is over if one of the partners emerged with the surrounding in order to suppress the other partner. While the judge talks about these, Stiller looks through his wife’s photo.

The judge asks Stiller whether he knows *Anna Karenina* and *Effi Briest*. Stiller understands that there is a hesitant decision lying behind these questioning regarding whether it is right to behave insightfully to his wife as an abandoned husband. Sibylle's utterance "You don't need to give freedom to me. What does it mean? If I need a freedom, I take it myself."⁸⁶ is the breaking point of their relationship. We learn all of these from the *fourth notebook* that is written by Stiller. Moreover, Stiller writes the judge's wife dalliance with someone whom she met in a masquerade ball and the judge's condonation with magnanimity.

Foucault analyzes the modern sexuality as a truth producing system. To him, the notion of the sexual freedom is fictional. As if the individual took over the power's strategy called sexual apparatus when entitled to the compulsory of sexually freedom. Therefore, it is required to understand that the modern human being recognizes sexual freedom as a dream of freedom and on which emotion, condition or base discourse of sexuality is constructed. Foucault, in *the Use of Pleasure*, seeks the truth in relation between moral question and physical existence.

It is often the case that the moral solicitude is strong precisely where there is neither obligation nor prohibition. In other words, the interdiction is one thing, the moral problematization is another. It seemed to me, therefore, that the question that ought to guide my inquiry was the following: how, why, and in what forms was sexuality constituted as a moral do- main? Why this ethical concern that was so persistent despite its varying forms and intensity? Why this "problematization"? But, after all, this was the proper task of a history of thought, as against a history of behaviors or representations: to define the conditions in which human beings "problematize" what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live.⁸⁷

The coincidence that brings Stiller to Sibylle again occurs in a masquerade ball. Stiller sees that the cell in which the judge Rolf is convicted is his wife. The judge insistently tries to prove that he is not jealous of his wife. (He states that they can live freely when married.) Sibylle falls in love with Stiller who is an artist (someone who is not considered moral) in order to terrorize her husband Rolf who is extremely self-confident. The purpose of choosing him, as a principle,

⁸⁶ Max Frisch, *I'm Not Stiller*, pg. 191

⁸⁷ Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure*, pg. 122.

is that she thinks he is so modern that he doesn't tell on her. After all, nobody suspects about her or suspecting about a judge's wife is no benefit for anyone. At the beginning, she finds Stiller arrogant, yet, he is humorous, he is secretly narrow-hearted, someone who is carrying invisible *banderillas* on his nape of the neck and someone whose blood is being shed.⁸⁸

While the judge wants to cope with himself and collapse his opinions regarding hegemon manhood a metaphor of a fabric confronts us. This fabric that an American sailor sold to someone else stays with the judge Rolf. He can't escape from this fabric which is strictly lashed. He thinks of having a suit made but as both the judge and a husband, his fabric is definite. As a European, he can't wear an American fabric, even though he tries, he can't. Being jealous of his wife extremely turns into a reversed attitude by giving her freedom. However, he keeps being jealous of her secretly.

Julika, builds a reputation in her surrounding as Stiller's haughty wife, loyal to his missing husband in spite of everything, and waiting for him for ages. They bring her as the first witness against her husband. Everybody believes Julika's identification because she is a praise worthy woman, she is role model and moreover she is so beautiful. Everyone around her, even people who just got to know her are of like mind. Her restrained attitude for relations with other people is always appreciated. Yet, she has been defeated to this desire to be liked and transformed into the person that people desire. Stiller, finds the sculptures that he has made more realistic whenever she looks at this woman who claims to be his wife. Because she has earnestly undertaken the role to be Stiller's wife. She doesn't want to be a mother, Stiller who evaluates the fact that she avoids from ruining perfection of her body as narcissism sees that she doesn't think of anything rather than becoming a ballerina. Their marriage has lost its authenticity. Whenever Stiller behaves independently, he is harshly criticized by his surroundings. They can't make sense of how he is making a woman like Julika upset. Moreover, Julika is always playing the victim and thus, she is sanctified by the society. The society blessing her convicts Stiller. That virtuous woman mourned for her husband when he had gone missing (almost 7 years). Julika is her own cell. She has spelled the death of herself without ruining her sedate attitude.

⁸⁸ Max Frisch, *I'm Not Stiller*, pg. 246.

According to Judith Butler, if the person is condemned to affiliate oneself through certain norms, both questioning the norms and requiring new norms are to carry out a transaction toward the passionate connection to oneself rather than pulling off oneself and terminating to become identical to oneself.⁸⁹ And it means to suspend the narcissist satisfaction of according with norms and the satisfaction of the moment when the person who is taken into frame by the norm believes that he is the same person as the one who is looking at that frame.⁹⁰ In this context, Butler, from a Lacanian perspective, states that this form of identification with oneself is always an illusion, there is no eventual intimacy with mirror image and narcissism is always going off the rails and being denigrated. According to her, accommodating with the norms enables the person to be recognized fully for the moment, yet, the person's restriction can be seen at that accommodating process due to the fact that the aforementioned norm has already been restricted. Butler's points of views take us to both Stiller's and Julika's subjective experiences. Julika has constructed herself in accordance with the expectations around her and Stiller denies all the definitions raised by his surroundings. Butler states that resistance and the moment of standing against occur exactly at that moment we actually understand that we are correlated with that restriction and how we are restricted in our own correlation.⁹¹ According to her, we find less restricted ways of attachment at the extent we question these norms restricting our recognition. Less attachment makes Stiller a missing foreigner, a husband who behaves badly towards his wife and a citizen who violates the laws. As for Julika, she is imprisoned in a bait identity that watches her own illusion in the mirror of traditions in which she has been attached in terms of recognition norms from the very beginning. Both of their relation to truth are established through whether to adopt power's relations or not.

Stiller is asked whether he speaks Russian or not. Therefore, the fact behind claiming him to be Stiller is politicized. They are suspicious of Stiller to be a Russian agent. Because Stiller has an embarrassment from Spanish Civil War that he is frequently being forced to confront. If his gun wasn't jammed (which is also suspicious) he would kill those two who came across Stiller. However, as a

⁸⁹ Judith Butler, *Bodies and Power*, Cogito, Yapı Kredi Publications, No: 70-71, 2012, pg. 284.

⁹⁰ Judith Butler, *Bodies and Power*, pg. 285.

⁹¹ Judith Butler, *Bodies and Power*, pg. 286.

result of bad luck, the gun was jammed. When he meets with Sibylle in his workshop, again this topic is opened. Sibylle wants to hear the truth in the story. Stiller, as always, tells what he creates in his imagination instead of what is expected. He starts to talk about the story behind the *banderillas* in his workshop which were previously used in bullfights. He wants to stimulate this fight in Sibylle's eyes. What Stiller is avoiding is the politicized human life that has the features to be killed and to kill and that is the base of political life. Because, once upon a time, every man was a *sacer* for the father who was roweling his horse to *bare lives*. According to Agamben, as if male citizens must be the object of an absolute discretion of killing at the cost of joining the political life and as if the life can be both killed and sacrificed with a double exception to enter the city.⁹² The crafty hero we come across in the novel develops a discourse of one sentence that expands the boundaries of this double exception: "I'm not Stiller!" For Stiller who is staying in the only cell with the window in prison, Switzerland is a city in which the bars play shadow puppetry day and night. Furthermore, while insistently talking about freedom, human rights, equal opportunities.

3.3. Narrative Self:

According to Macintyre, man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question "What am I to do?" if I can answer the prior question "Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?" We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters-roles into which we have been drafted - and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed.⁹³ According to him, it is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who receive no inheritance but

⁹² Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 56.

⁹³ Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue*, (Notre Dame Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), pg. 234.

must make their own way in the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous living and go into exile to live with the swine, that children learn or mislearn both what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are.⁹⁴ Therefore, Macintyre tells us: “I am forever whatever I have been at any time for others-and I may at any time be called upon to answer for it-no matter how changed I may be now. There is no way of founding my identity-or lack of it-on the psychological continuity or discontinuity of the self. The self inhabits a character whose unity is given as the unity of a character.”⁹⁵ Hence, Alasdair Macintyre tells us that the concept of *personal identity* doesn’t include an *episodic* selfhood that is disaggregated in time, it creates its own continuity in its narrative. What the narrative concept of selfhood requires is thus twofold. On the one hand, I am what I may justifiably be taken by others to be in the course of living a story that runs from my birth to my death; I am the subject of a history that is my own and no one else’s, that has its own peculiar meaning. To be the subject of a narrative that runs from one’s birth to one’s death is, I remarked earlier, to be accountable for the actions and experiences which compose a narratable life. It is, that is, to be open to being asked to give a certain kind of account of what one did or what happened to one or what one witnessed at any earlier point in one’s life than the time at which question is posed. The narrative of anyone life is part of an interlocking set of narratives. Moreover, this asking for and giving of accounts itself plays an important part in constituting narratives. Therefore, Stiller’s story is embedded into Mr. White’s story. As a subject whose self and identicalness get hurt, as a subject who is forced to be a soldier who vows to kill or die, to be a good husband, to work, to be a citizen who obeys the law, Stiller needs to enlighten the breaking points of his whole life in his story. Because the humanitarian plight he has gone through still keeps its temp. We can understand it from his dream he noted on his notebook:

Battery, attention! Shoulder arms! Lockstep forward, march! It’s so hot, stony ground, crooked. The war has been erupted, I certainly know it in my dream: date 3.9.1939. However, it doesn’t seem like something from past just like sitting again in the

⁹⁴ Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue*, pg. 234.

⁹⁵ Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue*, pg. 235.

school desks in our dreams doesn't seem like something from past. I hear a noise behind me, someone is yelping out of anger. One of the soldiers couldn't march lockstep forward. Whoever he is, why doesn't he show up? We are all standing still. One of the captains is ashen-faced by the anger, is addressing me by shouting "Hey you there!" I hear my own voice introducing myself: Machine gunned Stiller! It is so weird that even in my dream I don't feel myself as machine gunned Stiller, yet, I yell my name toward the wild. Captain's lips are shivering, saying very important duties are given to men like me in the war, do you understand? If necessary, he fills my bill, machine gunned Stiller's. Do I understand clearly?⁹⁶

Stiller's identity who is supposed not to obey his home country has been broken. He feels more compulsory to himself than the law to heal this wound. For this reason, threatening faces he faced while he was a soldier doesn't terrify him while questioning him by sermonizing perfect universal democracy. While telling the story of Mr. White, he attempts to remove the dust on him, he feels the necessity of joining parts together and uniting with himself.

Stiller's attitude has common points with Bauman's *being-for* that is positively valued. According to Bauman, *being-for* is a leap from isolation to integrity. This is not a *fusion* that has a mythical dream of unloading the identity, a composition whose valued qualifications are completely depending on the protection of its factors' identities and disparities in it. The relation of *being-for* is entered to defend and protect the Other's uniqueness. And this protection undertaken by the self as its own duty and responsibility makes the self itself – in terms of not being replaced with something else- in its fullest sense unique. Besides, regardless of the number of defenders for the Other's uniqueness, the self can't escape from the responsibility. Therefore, what makes a self out of zero is to undertake such a duty with no help. *Being-for* is the act of moving beyond (surpass) of *being-with*.⁹⁷ If we pay attention, here, the notion of *being-for* is different from being an individual. Because today's individual is directed to become anonym, individualization is also dirigible and passive, doesn't possess a unique otherness. Bauman, interprets the relation of modern individual with oneself and the Other as *fragmentary* and *episodic*: Fragmentary because only a

⁹⁶ Max Firsch, *I'm Not Stiller*, pg. 163.

⁹⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality*, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997) pg. 51.

part of versatile identities and their various desires and interests are related to confrontation; the rest is temporarily suspended, or swept somewhere surreptitiously or clearly defined as an exclusive world (in other words, it is assumed that it is not related to the confrontation happening here.) And episodic because these confrontations occur as if they had no past or future. Whatever is related to confrontation is created in the process of confrontation and again consumed during this process, in other words, it starts, improves and finishes within this process. Every confrontation is being presented in the image of a creature who can create and kill oneself and that is over and done within itself.⁹⁸ While the experience of narrative self prioritizes the individual's flow in integration from the birth to life, from life to death, the episodic self divides the life into fragments over and over. Therefore, bio-power's positioning above the subject, transforming it and dominating its habits and deeds are smoothed.

Episodic memory is usually based on revisiting chimerically the stage of an incident happened before. Man leaves marks on this world not to be disappeared, he immediately presents proofs from these marks when his existence is being questioned by himself or someone else. It is inevitable to leave marks not to be disappeared, however, it is likely that marks can be jumbled or wiped out. Now let's compare Stiller who is presented as missing hero with a real case. One patient of Oliver Sacks that he mentions in his story is also missing just like Stiller. Yet, where he disappears is his own memory. The hero of Oliver Sacks named *Lost Mariner*⁹⁹ loses his vision of time. His memory can't recall after 1945. Jimmie's amnesia* wiped his memory and the time back to around this date for an unknown reason. For this reason, he thinks of himself as 19 years old. He can't form a connection between his memories. When he carries out a mathematical action, he forgets what he has been doing or even the question if the steps are too many and taking so much time. When a photo of the Earth with the Moon is shown to him, he confused the Earth with the Moon, what's after 1945 can't be found in his memory. His doctor holds a mirror to remind him of his age,

⁹⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, *Life in Fragments*, pg. 50.

⁹⁹ Oliver Sacks, *The Man Who Mistook His Wife and Other Clinical Tales*, Published April 2nd 1998 by Touchstone.

at that moment Jimmie feels hot and cold all over and he thinks he has lost his mind. But, due to the fact that he can't form a relation between incidents, after a while, he forgets his face on the mirror. The story of *Lost Mariner* is about what we experience when one of the two forms of the vision is gone. When time is wiped out from the forms of time and space that provides vision, the moments are suspended in the gap independently from each other as image fragments and after a while, one by one, they will be forgotten. Thus, the memory is an undeniable resource to comprehend present, past and future as a flow. This brings us the fraternity of time and space that Kant acknowledges as a mandatory condition for the vision. Since the vision establishes the experience itself together with understanding and intellect's power of producing judgements, there will be no experience or understanding if one of the parts is dropped out. In this story, *Lost Mariner* has lost its autobiographic memory's function to form a life story in a certain order. When a neurologist sees him for the first time, he resembles him to Hume's creatures on earth that wanders around meaninglessly. This is a sort of lost in relation of causality. Jimmy who had gone through a severe Korsakov forgets the information given to him in a few seconds, but, according to the doctor, Bergsonian forms up perfectly in intentional timing. Also, in the works that he intensifies his emotional and spiritual attention such as listening to music, doing arts or joining the ceremonies at chapel, his amnesia is subsided and the hole excavated in his memory looks like it would be closed.

Of course Stiller hasn't fallen in such a hole in memory. We confront with a creative intellect in Max Frisch's Stiller. He doesn't give the opportunity of mocking himself to the people who don't concede from the honest attitude and behave as if they were perfect. He holds a mirror to them through the parody of Mr. White. For this reason, Stiller is an unbearable person. He separates himself from the people that he has a common history by striving for becoming the person he wants rather than the person they desire him to be. Because in past, he was someone who hurts his wife, who is intolerant to his friends and who doesn't know appreciation and also a defective citizen who doesn't follow the Swiss laws and rules. As mentioned before, he has also an embarrassment from Spanish Civil War. Our hero Stiller denies himself who is transformed into an object of information and defined due to many more reasons. Stiller says "what alienates man to his life up to that day slowly or abruptly is to know oneself, and this

recognition is the first step, which is mandatory to take but absolutely not enough. We know so many people who take this first step, are contended with the melancholy arising from the recognition of one's absolute identity and pose the recognition of oneself as maturity.¹⁰⁰ The reason why he feels alienated to himself and others can be seen in this statement. Stiller doesn't run away from anyone or is not missing. The law and people who know him scratch attribution of *missing* on his identity. This is their only irony. What they imply frequently is that he is a citizen who turned his back to his nation and a foreigner to his friends.

Stiller knows that the moment he accepts his identity, he will be condemned of treason and unidentified murders as a Russian spy. Instead of Stiller whom they ask for, he gives Mr. White whose reality has been constructed as much as them. Giving him a notebook and asking him to write only the truth is a similar attitude to Christian practices such as confession and soul searching. They want to know Stiller's life without hiding anything. This is a life or death game designated by a new political rational intellect. The reason of involving Stiller into this game is the possibility of him being a Russian spy. This possibility caused him to be seen and exist before the state. According to Foucault, the individual, from the perspective of the State, exists only if he can make a change in State's power either positive or negative and even at a minimum level. Therefore, the State sometimes asks the individual to live, work, produce and consume and sometimes to die.¹⁰¹ Now the State asks Stiller to tell the truth. The state chooses either to wipe out any factor leaked in from outside or keep it within the field of knowledge. Stiller's reaction to this rational comprehension include all the responses to all the attitudes preventing him from affirming himself in a complete circularity and folding over himself.

The fact that he says he is a German American and the military coat we frequently see on him that is also an American work take us to a precise simulative self. Because there is a judge facing him who is amazed by the American way of life. Baudrillard mentions *simulacra and simulation*, according to him, simulation or hyper reality which means producing the real that is lack of

¹⁰⁰ Max Frisch, *I'm Not Stiller*, pg. 383.

¹⁰¹ Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton, *Technologies of The Self A Seminar With Michel Foucault*, pg. 152.

authenticity and reality through models sends us to a sort of non-existence.¹⁰² Hence, where Stiller directs people who wants to subjectify themselves and the law through Mr. White is *non-existence*. According to Stiller, the law that wants to give itself a perfect appearance has many dilemmas. Even its prisons are sterile places. There is a conscious lying down this obsession of cleaning that remains silent towards deaths and bloodbaths and can't take the stain off its hands even though washing it many times.

Baudrillard asserts that everything that is willingly to get a pure and clean appearance is metamorphosed into its opposite to perpetuate itself in its expurgated form. All the powers, all the institutions speak of themselves through denial, in order to attempt, by simulating death, to escape their real death throes. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy. Such was the case with some American presidents: Kennedy was murdered because they still had a political dimension. The others, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, only had the right to phantom attempts, to simulated murders. But this aura of an artificial menace was still necessary to conceal that they were no longer anything but the mannequins of power. According to Stiller, this is the only thing the modern Western thought possesses. It is a matter of fact that this power which is frequently presenting its own death, demonstrates itself as in danger and under threats obsessively reminds its citizen of the fact that they are safe, equal and free. Therefore, the power constructs its existence on taking more safety cautions against any external threat. And this means that the citizens are being controlled and observed by a disciplinarian mechanism. Additionally, Stiller is not backward in coming forward criticizing the rational State intellect muffledly based upon the church.

I have no doubt that they do wonders there, this time they are trying to expand Christianity among rich instead of poor, it is obvious that this is more profitable; one thief who have had enough of stealing settles down with regrets, he gives away 2, 3, 4 or 9 millions of his money to set his soul in peace or to replace a new ideology promptly against communism, for himself, he keeps only a million not to be a burden on the society when he grows older, there, they do really accomplish this. I wouldn't like such Christianity, they say seven millions, it is better than nothing, and this money is returned

¹⁰² Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser, (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press 1994) pg. 15.

in such a voluntarily way that all workers around the world shouldn't sue this thief if they have any good manners. Because settling down promptly with regrets of such a capitalist thief prove that to correct the world from inside to outside is possible. Thus, if you wish to live in a better world, please do not revolutionize.¹⁰³

According to Derrida, there is a contradictory and paired phenomenon in the reaction affirming the religion's return. The religion is afflicted with "immune to itself", because it is a breaker which grows with modernism's and secularism's apparatuses. He is aligned with his own enemy and uses his apparatuses, carries the Other inside of oneself. Capital and media powers that he uses make him lose his reality completely, switches him from the place pertain to him.¹⁰⁴ This is also what Stiller sees.

Opposite to all of these, what actually does Stiller want to do? We can find a clear answer to this in Alasdair Macintyre.¹⁰⁵ According to him, an integrity of an individual life is an integrity of the narrative of the objects made up in an individual life. Asking "what is best for me?" is same as asking "how can I live and complete this integrity in the best way?". Asking "what is best for men?" is same as asking what is the common point in all the responses to the first question. However, in this phase, it needs to be highlighted, asking these two questions in a systematic way not only in thoughts but also in deeds and the effort of finding answers are what create moral life with its integrity. To Stiller, putting a story's pieces that is materialized in one's life together is to create moral life with its integrity. Therefore, becoming an enunciation subject of the correct discourse and affirming oneself in an integrated circularity are depending on this.

According to Macintyre, an integrity of a human life is the integrity of a narrative pursuit. Pursuits sometimes fail, are prevented, are left or wasted by sinking into despair, hence, human lives may fail at the same extent. But still, the only benchmark of an achievement or failure of a human life as an integrity is the benchmark of an achievement or failure of the pursuit in a story that is either narrated or to be narrated.¹⁰⁶ The identity trouble that designates Stiller's story gains an ultimate meaning by Macintyre's statement "I can legally be a citizen of

¹⁰³ Max Frisch, *I'm Not Stiller*, pg. 391.

¹⁰⁴ Zeynep Direk, "Derrida and Secularity" (Günümüzde Felsefe Sempozyumu, Maltepe Üniversitesi, Türkiye Felsefe kurumu, Aralık 4-5, 2009), pg. 47.

¹⁰⁵ Alasdair Macintyre, *After Value*, pg. 219.

¹⁰⁶ Alasdair Macintyre, *After Value*, pg. 220.

a state, yet, I can't be responsible for what this state has done or been doing if I am not claiming responsibility implicitly or explicitly."¹⁰⁷ He hasn't given the place to establish a moral life to the authority that expects him to be a good citizen and moreover, he has carried himself to the stage of judgements that will deprive himself of his ontological homeland.

3.4. Instrumental Rationality, Cave and American Way of Life

Bio power that aims to seek for the best ways of production to gain the most profit out of the scientific tools it is using considers human beings as machines. Therefore, the goal of the production and marketing network is to create a dependent consumer. It is an act of knowledge than thinks everything can be made by modern machines and believes it can control the nature through these machines. Its goal is based upon transforming the nature for its own profit. For Arendt this element of violation and violence is present in all fabrication, and *homo faber* the creator of human artifice, has always been a destroyer of nature.¹⁰⁸ *Homo faber* that uses the raw material in nature to create the world aims to gain the most profit from the production. According to Arendt, there is instrumentalization, utilitarianism and transforming something into something that is not actually it is in the relation of human being with oneself and the nature. Charles Taylor states that the society constructed around the instrumental rationality results in big constrictions both in the freedoms of individuals and groups.¹⁰⁹ Another threat addressed by Taylor is the society whose people are transformed into introverted individuals. Because in such a society, so few individuals would take part in self-governing activities actively and political freedoms will be lost. There are modern technology and partisans of negative freedom in the goal of the critics of Taylor. These power technologies which interpret critics towards itself as bigotry and ignoring the benefits of science esteem that political freedoms are being exaggerated.

Horkheimer has also a similar interpretation. According to him, the

¹⁰⁷ Alasdair Macintyr, *After Value*, pg. 221.

¹⁰⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) pg. 139.

¹⁰⁹ Charles Taylor, *The Malaise of Modernity*, (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2003) pg. 24-25

rational intellect is related to apparatus and goals, he underlines whether the chosen apparatus is enough to reach the goals more or less accepted at the beginning. He puts the question of whether the apparatus itself is corresponding the intellect on one side. When he starts to deal with the goals, from the very beginning, he acknowledges that they are corresponding the intellect subjectively, in other words, they are serving for the existence of the subject. The opinion that a goal may correspond the intellect with all its values carried by oneself independently from any subjective profit or gain is completely unfamiliar to subjective intellect; it is like this even it goes beyond the closes profitable values and devotes oneself to thoughts related to the society's integrity.¹¹⁰

Stiller criticizes the rational world regulated by instrumental rationality through *The American Way of Life*. He asserts that the age occupied now is the *age of reproduction*. He examines New York: Times Square, Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Building, Broadway and Battery are the places that the judge admires. He tells his observations in these places to the judge who is listening to him with great interest. He mentions how unbearable summer is in New York and how people flow through Washington bridge. He resembles this image to a moving walkaway, people would like to get in touch with the nature but it is in vain. The only place that they can reach is the picnic parks that is an artificial nature in which all the needs are met and barely nobody goes down from their cars. Our age calls out that man is only a create who watches, listens and knows from a distance. This human type sees everything with their eyes but not in its endemic places by going. This is another thing that harms the memory because the memory consists of experiences. The truth that the lawyer, the judge and others seek for is already wiped out. It is replaced by something that it isn't but is so similar to itself. This is what Stiller can't bear. According to him, it is terrifying to consider one who sees the world through the eyes of Heidegger as characteristic feature. The modern subjects have leaped from a *narrative* self through an *episodic* self. This fast flow has been clinched by the modern violence peculiar to *homo faber*. The subject that prioritized the notion of the care of oneself in Ancient Greek and avoided from being *stultus* is being put in fragments due to *episodic* self. The

¹¹⁰ Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 2004) pg. 56.

individual who is the production of *The American Way of Life* is imprisoned in an *episodic* self, far away from an absolute *telos*, and thus, each of them is a *stultus*.

Stultus means the one who is not worried for oneself. Foucault explains this notion by referring to the text at the beginning of *De Tranquillitate*, “*Stultus* is the one who acknowledges these representations without examining and analyzing them. *Stultus* is exposed to outside world within the extent of these representations allow him to be in touch with his own mind together with his emotions, desires, ambitions, habit of thinking and illusions, is the one who doesn’t differentiate between the subjective factors intervening him and the contexts of these representations.”¹¹¹ This situation of being open to all the winds of these representations takes us to the metaphors of ship, steering wheel and harbor. This metaphor valued positively in ancient thoughts refers to subject/self’s possessing an art of life. Just like the metaphor of *peg top*. The peg top acts accordingly with an external power and consists a discontinuity that draws irregular circles. For this reason, Foucault describes *stultus* as the one who splits apart in time. According to him, *stultus* is the one who doesn’t remember anything, lets the life go in flow, who doesn’t unite the life by memorizing what needs to be memorized and who doesn’t direct his will and attention to a certain and pinned goal.

There is a correspondence in between individual’s pursuit of one’s own good through one’s own story mentioned by Alasdair Macintyre together with the pursuit in which there is a *telos* creation and the status of being *stultus* exemplified by Foucault from Seneca. Foucault particularly refers to Seneca’s statement “Let’s hurry up for growing old.” Because this *knowledge of self* is being excluded as a castle in which there is everything that splits human apart and by finding the desire within oneself. It doesn’t allow external effects to approach oneself. And the most important aspect of it is to see man as an integrity without dividing human life into periods. Therefore, he emphasizes that men need to possess an art of existence (*tekhne tou biou*). Foucault states that all the technologies of the self named as the notion of the care of oneself by Platon are the most important phenomena in ancient culture. This notion needs to cover whole life and direct men until the life is completed. Macintyre’s notion of

¹¹¹ Michel Foucault, *Hermeutics of the Subject*, pg. 523.

narrative subject prioritizes a similar understanding. Precisely from those questions which led us to attempt to transcend that limited conception of the virtues which is available in and through practices. It is in looking for a conception of the good which will enable us to order other goods; for a conception of the good which will enable us to extend our understanding of the purpose and content of the virtues; for a conception of the good which will enable us to understand the place of integrity and constancy in life; that we initially define the kind of life which is a quest for the good.¹¹²

From this perspective, we can better understand what the hero who tries to construct himself through stories wants to say if we look at Stiller's cave metaphor. Stiller tells his guardian Knobel that he got lost in a cave while talking about his 4th murder: "It is not impossible to go down to a world of fairytale for someone who knows how to climb. How would I climb up?"¹¹³ He goes down the depths of the cave, overwhelmed by his curiosity, he leaves marks behind with certain gaps. When he goes down, he feels like all his desires are met and yet, he is worried as if he was convicted of not seeing any face or hearing any voice any more. He endeavors to go back and when he finds the first sign, he becomes happy as if he found Ariadne's string*. He talks about a human skeleton he came across there. Knobel comprehends all these metaphors as a plain fact. However what Stiller implies is similar to Odysseus' journey to Itaka. Man needs to go on a journey to return to his ontological homeland, yet, this journey is full of trouble and danger. Therefore, while returning back, he needs to know how to follow the marks belong to him. Because getting worried for oneself is a matched comprehensive rule with the life. The subject needs to return to oneself in an integrity and devote oneself to oneself. Stiller recognized this and he pulls himself back to his own ordinary sanctuary.

¹¹² Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue*, pg. 237

¹¹³ Max Frisch, *I'm Not Stiller*, s. 151.

CONCLUSION

What structures the opposition between the ancient subject and the modern subject is an opposite relation of subordination between care of the self and knowledge of the self. Frederic Gros states that care, in the Ancients, is organized by the ideal of establishing a certain relation of rectitude in the self between actions and thoughts.¹¹⁴ The establishment of the self as subject in the modern subjectification is based on an indeterminate endeavor of *knowing yourself* and this endeavor is only oriented to reduce the distance between who I really am and who I think of myself. In other words, the way that we narrate ourselves is only precious if it helps us to know ourselves better. The subject of the correct deed in the Ancients left its place to the subject of correct knowledge in modern West.

According to Foucault, what constructs the subject with oneself in a certain relation is techniques of the self that can be historically identified and these techniques are in a state of merge with techniques of domination whose dates can be detectable. Thus, the individual subject only emerges in the junction between a technique of the self and a technique of the domination. From this perspective, Stiller confronts us exactly at this contact area with a personal narrative identity.

According to Paul Ricoeur, the determining step towards comprehending personal narrative identity is taken when passing through personality from action. Hence, the category of personality is also a category of narrative and its role in narrative stems from the same intellect with the plotline.¹¹⁵ At this point, Ricoeur states that the problem is what the category of narrative personality contributes on the discussion of identity. In other words, for the narrator, what the individual-subject connects with the verb-process is that it constructs itself as a *narrative* self. Yet, the subject is surrounded when it is entitled to the position of being processor of the deeds at the orbit of narration. The subject who is transferring every detail regarding its life through its story enters in the power's field of knowledge immediately once it utters. By doing so, the individual subject's porter will be made step by step.

Macintyre claims that we sink ourselves into the effort of placing a certain

¹¹⁴ M. Foucault, *Hermeutics of the Subject*, pg. 446.

¹¹⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, Trans., Kathleen Blarney, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992) pg. 192.

incident into a series of narrative history context, both the history of these related individual and the history of their environment, in order to successfully identify and understand someone else's story.¹¹⁶ At this point, the fact that we render the deeds of others through this method is becoming much clear because the deed itself fundamentally has a historical characteristics. Since we fully apprehend our own lives with the stories that we fully live out in our own life and we also live out our own lives, the concept of stories is suitable for understanding others' deeds.

What actually Stiller problematizes is the subject's unknowing attachment to the power while attaching oneself thorough its own story. Ultimately, the *narration* which is created about ourselves can be independent from others' opinions and expectations from us, the state's expectations from us as a citizen. Technologies of the power wants to measure all the details regarding one's own life by connecting one with one's own story. *Narrative self* has become functioned for technologies of the power. The intervention to the individual-subject and the endeavor to change and transform it have gained functionality. What Stiller tries to do as Mr. White is to deactivate the disks of this functional mechanism. Stiller creates an archeology of the modern subject through the parody of Mr. White. He unbinds the knots of the fictional reality that he has been buried. In his story he talks about how the deeds of episodic and narrative selves nested one another and are obscure. Stiller has a political meaning as a missing individual from the perspective of things that he wants to admit, deny and change regarding his identity. He tries to block the straitjacket that is being forced to dress him at every turn through his American style military coat. He carries the relation he formed with the power into an obscure area. Hence, he resists against all domination techniques as Stiller/White. There is no such a plain and easily penetrable subject before the power. Mr. White as being a transparent, attractive white, blocks Stiller's penetration to himself. He binds the law that asks only the truth from him on an obscurity terrain by the parody of Mr. White.

In West, searching for the most private truth of the subject about oneself means that it keeps the obedience. The power wants the individual to be subordinated to itself by requesting a complete blanch of the truth regarding him

¹¹⁶ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Value*, pg. 312

through confession and soul-searching practices. Stiller, facing this situation, leads it into a dead end by turning his narration into a labyrinth by the use of Mr. White. Stiller is not a plain person whose narration can be read at a glance. In one context, his story is buried in World War II (history of Europe). Stiller is *missing* in the histories of non-confronted genocides, big deconstructions, expansionist imperialistic politics and a series of transforming and subjectification practices. He is *missing* among modern individuals who don't possess any sort of immanence, vigilance and a distance ethics. He wants to reach where he is buried layer by layer while talking with his loyal audience Knobel behind bars. He can't explain the fact that he didn't want to adopt killing or being killed as a principle as a soldier in a state which adopts carrying freedoms to universal levels as a principle. The fact that his Russian made gun was jammed in Spanish Civil War is being marked as an embarrassment in his personal history. For this reason, he is threatened as a Russian spy. Moreover, there are other proofs to enhance it. For hegemonic power, the fact that Stiller hasn't been seen around for seven years is a time wise seven years of loss. Not to be able to receive any news from the narrative selves that they want to know make them suspicious. Because Stiller has gone outside of his known story as a Swiss citizen since he went missing, even his contact with his acquaintances was broken.

According to Foucault, the truth (*parrhesia*) is a *logos* that occurs in existence as a reason of living, that perpetuates, intensifies, questions and justifies the existence. The relation to oneself doesn't isolate the individual from any activity form in the fields of city-state, family and friends, rather, it creates a distance between these activities the individual does and what makes the individual the subject of these activities. Hence, technologies of power are directly established in daily life, classify the individuals, divide them through their individuality, attach them to their identities and impose them a law of truth that they must innately recognize. This is the law of truth that Stiller has been trying to reveal since the beginning, therefore, he doesn't want to be attached to his own identity and story. He knows that the power allows him to live as a good citizen asks him to be obedient and to die or kill when needed. While endeavoring to be in an integrity and one as the subject, he crashed down the will of power to know thorough episodic stories belong to Mr. White.

As a *parrhesiastes*, Stiller implements truth telling ethics to individuals

and situations, is directed to them and questions them, thus, what they actually are is being uttered, the missing facts regarding themselves are told to individuals, the real characteristics, the value of their attitudes, the possible results of the decisions that they plan to make are emerged. His attitude towards his lawyer is a clear sign for it. He rejects the statements of the lawyer “the greatness of a country shouldn’t be measured by the field it is covering or its population, the greatness of our country derives from its magnanimous people.” who says “you are feeling a sickly detest against Switzerland!” Stiller who says he can’t be fair towards arrogant people asks him to give an example for magnanimosity. He thanks with a sharp tongue to these people who behave like his freedom upon their hands for not shooting him. He states that there are different types of captivities rather than freedoms in this country. Stiller, as a sculptor, sees shapeless and anonym human figures that believe the same and are produced from a monopoly. Although it is told that speaking in the court like this would put him in danger, he doesn’t stand behind from revealing them and driving them into a corner thorough his questions. Just like Socrates who took the function of questioning from Gods, Stiller is a *parrhesiastes*, too.

The notion of the care of the self is worked through the other’s existence. While Stiller is working through him in an integrated circularity, he creates the character of Mr. White who possess a transparent sculpture. The novel character who knows how to harbor to the notion of the care of the self attempts to measure, in the most correct way, the place he has covered in the world and the system of mandatories that he is put in by drawing the attention on him (at the same time making them busy with Mr. White). In this obscure terrain, he is Stiller as Mr. White and Mr. White as Stiller. He problematizes his non-assignable relation with himself throughout the novel. He shows us that the state is exactly a mould of individualization. The power that binds every individual to itself by subjectification commends the rupture by establishing a distance ethics through its technologies. Therefore, Stiller is an affirmation of an irreductable freedom.

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