

Rivals or Partners? Turkish-Russian Relations in the Greater Black Sea
Region Since 1999

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Rivals or Partners? Turkish-Russian Relations in the Greater Black Sea
Region Since 199

Ortaklık mı Rekabet mi? 1999 Sonrası Büyük Karadeniz Bölgesi'nde
Türk-Rus İlişkileri

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ABSTRACT

This work aims to demonstrate the basic characteristics of Turkish-Russian relations in The Greater Black Sea Region after 1999. Political, Military and Economic relations are analyzed separately since in Turkish-Russian case, it is hard to draw a general picture for all spheres. The Greater Black Sea Region is chosen as the hub of this paper since this study also argues that the region is an indispensable part of Turkish-Russian economic, political, and security policies.

The end of the Cold War polarization gave way to substantial transformation in Turkish-Russian bilateral relations and the Greater Black Sea Region. During 1990s, while the economic relations moved with an unprecedented speed, the military and political relations in the Greater Black Sea Region witnessed the continuation of the struggle.

1999 is considered as a turning point for domestic and external reasons for both countries in this work. Two regional powers, despite the existence of conflicting issues, managed to settle their problematic issues. It is also concluded that both powers have to include and evaluate EU and NATO policies towards the region in order to form regional policies.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma Türk-Rus ilişkilerinin 1999 sonrasında temel özelliklerini ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. Askeri, politik ve ekonomik ilişkiler, Türk-Rus ilişkilerinde tüm alanlar için genel bir resim çizmenin zorluğundan dolayı ayrı ayrı ele alınmıştır. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda Büyük Karadeniz'i Türk-Rus ilişkilerinin vazgeçilmez bölgesi olarak sunduğu için, bölgeyi bu çalışmanın önem merkezi seçmiştir.

Soğuk Savaş kutuplaşmasının bitimi Karadeniz Bölgesindeki Türk-Rus ilişkilerinde önemli değişikliklere yol açtı. 1990'lar da ekonomik ilişkiler eşi görülmemiş bir şekilde ilerlerken, askeri ve politik ilişkiler mücadelenin devamına şahit oldu.

Bu çalışmada 1999 yılı hem iç hem dış faktörler sebebiyle kırılma noktası olarak alındı. Bu iki bölgesel güç çatışan fikirlerin varlığına rağmen problemleri yatıştırmayı başardı. Ayrıca, bu çalışmada her iki gücün de bölgesel politika oluşturmaları için NATO ve Avrupa Birliği'nin bölge politikalarını da hesaba katıp değerlendirmeleri gerektiği sonucuna varıldı.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BSEC	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BLACKSEAFOR	Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group
BSTDB	Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EU	European Union
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova
GUUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova
INOGATE	Interstate Oil and Gas Transport
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCAs	Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
PfP	Partnership for Peace
TACIS	Technical Assistance to CIS
TRACECA	Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

To HIM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War years, the Black Sea was far away from being considered as a region since it was divided between NATO and Warsaw Pact, namely between USSR and Turkey. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the USSR put an end to this distinction and gave rise to the emergence of new regions in the former Soviet areas. Henceforth, systemic change in international relations removed the obstacle standing in the way of becoming a region and the Black Sea has been regarded as one of the new regions of the world. Suffice it to say that scholars had different views on the debate whether the Black Sea is really a region or not right after the end of the Cold War. Yet, it will not be erroneous to assert that the Black Sea is now acknowledged as one of the new regions of the new international system by most of the international relations scholars and thus this work will also admit the validity of analyzing the Black Sea as a separate region. This approach is based on the conception that it is not only geographical criteria that demarcates the Black Sea from the other regions, regional organizations and arrangements like BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, Operation Black Sea Harmony, The Community of the Democratic Choice, GUAM but also make clear that the Black Sea states have consciousness to work together, and to take the responsibility to solve the problems of their region despite the differences between them. Needless to say that regional identity, although the meaning of it is highly debatable, is not formed only with the presence of common language, culture, ethnicity or religion; common threat perception, and more significantly in

the case of the Black Sea region, common economic and political interests can lead to the formation of regional identity and emergence of regional cooperation.¹

The Greater Black Sea component of Turkish-Russian relations is chosen as the hub of this paper for three concerns: to supply the reader a valid understanding of the Greater Black Sea region and its regional dynamics, to reveal the importance of Turkish-Russian relations for the region and vice versa, and lastly to touch on the impact of the western policies of the region on Turkish-Russian relations. The paper aims to cover these points since the interrelated connection between European Union, NATO, Turkey and Russia results in a situation that EU and NATO cannot formulate an effective policy without taking into account the two regional powers of the region: Turkey and Russia, while Turkey and Russia cannot ignore how the West visualizes the region. The regional policies of the external actors are important to grasp a valid understanding of Turkish-Russian relations since the bilateral relationship of the two is a complex and wide topic which goes beyond the sole bilateral relations.

The scope of this work is restricted to 1999-2006 since Russia and to some extent Turkey had to experience external and internal changes in 1999. When Russia and Russian foreign policy is considered, firstly; the country before December 1999 was undergoing a period of uncertainty and instability. Yeltsin, in

¹ For the discussion about whether the Black Sea is a region or not, see Ioannis Stribis, "The Evolving Security Concern in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation," *Journal of South East European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.3, No.3 (2003); James Sherr, "Perspectives on the Black Sea Region," *Bulletin of Harvard Black Sea Security Program*, (April 2004), pp. 81-84; "Symposium On the Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Conflict," *Boğaziçi Journal: Review of Social, Economic, and Administrative Studies*, Vol.9, No.1 (1995). Furthermore, for the discussion of what regionalism and regional identity means, see Dimitar Bechev, "Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism in Southeast Europe," *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.4, No.1 (January 2004), pp. 77-95; Andrew G. Heyde, "Seizing the Initiative: The Importance of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Europe and the Prominent Role of the Southeast European Cooperation Process," *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.4, No.1 (January 2004), pp. 1-22.

his last 18 months (1998-1999), appointed four different prime ministers: Chernomyrdin, Kiriyenko, Primakov, and Stephashin; three of which were members of security institutions.² Lastly, he appointed Vladimir Putin in August 1999 as the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, who became the President in 2000. The leadership of Vladimir Putin is a turning point for Russian foreign relations given that he introduced a new approach to Russian domestic and foreign policy making. Secondly, it can be asserted that he was able to bring stability to the country, which Yeltsin failed to achieve.

When it comes to Turkey, there were two significant developments: the capture of Abdullah Öcalan and recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership in Helsinki summit in 1999. The capture of Abdullah Öcalan has given a new characteristic to Turkish-Russian relations since one of the most conflicting issues between the two was terrorism. Related to this issue, Ecevit's visit to Moscow in 1999 is a significant development for both its timing; it is right after Helsinki summit of European Union and its meaning since bilateral cooperation against terrorism was reinforced and Ecevit denounced Chechen and Kurdish terrorism and underlined the importance that Turkey gives to territorial integrity of Russia.

The analysis of the course of Turkish-Russian relations in the Greater Black Sea region will be formulated around the question whether Turkey and Russia are rivals or partners. In each chapter, it will be attempted to determine the characteristic of the relationship over the terms *rivalry* and *partnership* and the definition of the terms will facilitate to visualize the situation.

² Yılmaz Tezkan, *Kadim Komşumuz Yeni Rusya*, (İstanbul: Ülke Kitapları, 2001), p. 157.

A dictionary definition of “partnership” is “a relationship between individuals or groups that is characterized by mutual cooperation and responsibility, as for the achievement of a specified goal.”³ Although partnership is perceived as a term that is mostly used for the definition of the relationship between business organizations or connotes terms related to economics, it is also useful in defining political and security relations between countries. In international relations, partnerships are created for the purpose of achieving a common political objective, common economic target; common security concerns may draw the two sides towards each other or the purpose sometimes can be preserving the status quo in the region so that the present power balance will not be lost to other powers outside the region or in the region itself. In short, when mutual national interests of two countries are in accordance, mutual security understandings, mutual economic expectations and mutual political choices are parallel, partnership will define the character of the relationship. Moving from this point, it will not be wrong to say that *alliance* as another term can cover and can be referred in a similar situation with the term partnership since it also refers to a condition where the capabilities, goods and resources of the countries are joined together in order to get a common recompense.

Partnership can focus on different sectors of the bilateral relations; that is it can be based on politics, economics or sometimes security separately; which means partnerships differ according to their purpose. For instance, if the main target is achieving economic advantage, then the political aspect of the relationship does not have to carry the characteristic of full partnership. However, it is necessary to add here that while economic

³ “Partnership,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1992 ed, p. 1321.

relations is based on cooperation, political relations will be affected by it. The economic, political or security spheres are all interrelated and they influence each other; that is the fact that cooperation in one sphere doesn't have to result in cooperation in the other one must not mislead us to think that partnership in one sphere and rivalry in another will not cause any problem in bilateral relations. Turkish-Russian relations is a good example to this point, which will be discussed in detail in the rest of the paper.

In addition, partnerships can be formed by governments, communities, lobbies, or institutions and it can function at local, regional or international levels and the distribution of power between partners or allies does not have to be equal but none of the partners must dominate.⁴

When it comes to the definition of rivalry, it is "any of two or more people competing for a single goal; somebody who tries to compete with and be superior to another."⁵ We can say that rivalry emerges when political, economic or military interests or expectations of the two or more countries overlap. While, partners cooperate to achieve a common goal, rivals compete for obtaining it. Additionally, it is significant that in order to be rivals, there has to be rough equality of capabilities and resources so that both will have the capability to block up the other. Besides, competition can include economics, politics, ideology, religion and military targets.

In the case of Turkish-Russian relations, the case is harder than what is presented above. It was easy to describe the characteristics of the relationship during the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia; and similarly it was definite that

⁴ "Collaborative Processes and Partnerships," *Office For the Community & Voluntary Sector*, Accessed October 5, 2005. Available at <http://www.goodpracticeparticipate.govt.nz/the-basics/partnerships.html>.

⁵ "Rivalry," *The Penguin English Dictionary*, 2001 ed, p. 1207.

both the Soviet Union and Turkish Republic during the Cold War did not share any ideological, economic, political or security concerns; thus they were definitely not partners. However, with the dissolution of the USSR, the situation turned out to be more complex than before. This paper will be the illustration and reflection of this complex situation in Turkish-Russian relations.

In the light of these terms, this work will deal political, military and economic relations separately. The second chapter will be an overview of the Greater Black Sea Region which is vital for understanding the dynamics of the region globally and why Turkey and Russia gave importance to it regionally. As well as providing the analysis of the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the region, the reason why the Greater Black Sea region, once considered as being a periphery, became the center of political and economic interest of international relations will be answered.

The third chapter is devoted to the analysis of foreign policy decision making actors in both of the countries since in order to analyze Turkish-Russian relations, which actors affect policy-making in these two states should be made clear. In other words, the actors in decision-making procedures will determine whether there is rivalry or partnership between Turkey and Russia. Since while some foreign policy actors favor partnership, there are also those who still see 'the other' as its rival. Therefore, a key part of this work will be revealing the decision-making structure of the two countries.

After giving a general picture of the region and analyzing the decision making actors, there will be an analysis of Turkish-Russian relations in the political, economic and security spheres separately. In each chapter, I will follow

the same structure; in other words, for each chapter the question whether they are partners or rivals will be asked and the policies of EU and NATO will be displayed briefly. Therefore the fourth chapter will provide information about the political dimension of Turkish-Russian relations in the Greater Black Sea region since 1999 by exploring the partnership and rivalry part of it. In this chapter, there will also be reference to the impact of the change in foreign policy understanding with Putin government, Erdoğan-Putin rapprochement, possibility of Turkey's accession to EU, and western insistence of spreading democracy to the region on Turkish-Russian relations.

The fifth chapter will be devoted to the security component of the relationship. The effect of global terrorism as a unifying factor for the two countries, enlargement of NATO and more importantly EU, BLACKSEAFOR as a regional cooperation arrangement will be the sub-topics in this chapter. After analyzing these pieces, again rivalry or partnership dichotomy will be evaluated from the security perspective.

The next part deals with economic sphere of the relationship, which has different attributes than the political and military relations. In this chapter, there will be reference to tourism, construction, and other trade mechanisms, which lead to partnership between Turkey and Russia. There will also be a discussion about the oil and gas pipelines which created disputes in the past and have the potential to produce more in the future. Lastly, the function of BSEC as one of the most important regional economic organization will be overviewed.

This paper aims to answer the following questions:

- Can we perceive Turkey and Russia as two regional partners or rivals in the context of post-Cold War?
- Why is the Greater Black Sea Region an important geopolitical and geoeconomic component of Turkish-Russian relations? To put in another words, why are Turkey and Russia an indispensable element of the Greater Black Sea Region?
- What are the issues that create tension and cooperation between them?
- What is the impact of EU policies of the region on Turkish-Russian relations?
- What is the impact of NATO policies of the region on Turkish-Russian relations?
- If they are partners, will it be a context specific partnership or can we say Turkey and Russia solved their problems in the long run?
- What can we say about the future of Turkish-Russian relations in the region?

The methodology used in this dissertation relies mainly on a descriptive, interpretative analysis of resources. These resources include both primary sources and secondary sources. The primary sources include treaties, agreements and governmental statements between Turkey and Russia. The primary sources also include the agreements and the charters of the Greater Black Sea Region. However, since this study deals with current Turkish-Russian relations, it is mainly based on secondary sources including scholarly books, periodicals, newspaper articles, articles available on the internet, research reports. I relied on the reports of the business groups like TÜSİAD and DEİK and also the U.S.

Department of Energy Ministry for statistical data while analyzing the economic and energy relations.

CHAPTER II

THE GREATER BLACK SEA REGION

With the emergence of the new independent states in the Black Sea after the demise of the USSR, the dynamics that determined the character of the region have changed and they are replaced by other initiatives. Although the Black Sea was a “Soviet Sea” during the Cold War years, (except the coast of Turkish side) it has turned into a “European Sea” as a result of the foreign policy preferences of these new independent states. Since those which have preferred to join either European Union or NATO form the majority, the Black Sea has become a part of Euro-Atlantic world. Therefore, in order to understand Turkish-Russian relations in this region, it is, first of all, indispensable to identify the present regional dynamics.

2.1. The Region Before and During the Cold War

Being an inland sea, The Black Sea is connected to the open oceans through the Turkish straits and Mediterranean. The rivers of Danube, the Don, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Rioni, the Kuban, the Southern Bug and the Chorokh are also vital links which connect it to the other regions.⁶

The Black Sea had been an area on which many powers had tried to exercise authority in history. The history of it until the end of the Cold War has faced the stages of Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and Russian domination.⁷

⁶ David Baldinger, “The Black Sea Region,” in Rt. Hon Bruce George (ed), *Mediterranean Security and Beyond: A Collection of Essays*, (2004). Available online at http://www.rthonbrucegeorgemp.co.uk/table_of_contents.html.

⁷ Tunç Aybak, “Introduction,” in Tunç Aybak (ed), *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 1.

Besides, until the end of the Cold War again, the area was not considered as a region but rather a “passive geography” or “the periphery” of larger regions.⁸ Named mostly as a sub-region of the Mediterranean, the Ottoman Lake, the frontier of Europe, the Russian Garden; the Black Sea states never had the consciousness to establish their own regions.

Among the different treatments of the Black Sea in history, since the sea can only be connected to the open oceans through the Mediterranean, analyzing it as a part of Mediterranean Region was the most common one.⁹ However, no matter how it has continuously been treated as an extension of the Mediterranean, it does not mean that the Black Sea was an insignificant part of the world; in contrast in its history it has been a geography where different powers applied their geostrategic concepts and apprehensions about the control of the seas.¹⁰ These great powers in order to carry out their plans in Europe, Asia and the Mediterranean focused on the Black Sea area.¹¹

Therefore, first, depending upon who controls the geography in different eras, it always had the characteristic of change, and second as a result of the

⁸ For the general overview of the different treatments of the Black Sea Region in history, see Eyüp Özveren, “The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis,” in Tunç Aybak (ed), *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001).

⁹ The first and most famous work that was written on the history of the Black Sea was in the 16th century and it was by a French historian, Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean in the age of Philippe II*. Braudel in that book considered the Black Sea as an extension of the Mediterranean region. Although it was not completed, a Romanian historian of the interwar period, George I. Bratianu, has written another classic which was about the history of the Black Sea: *La Mer Noire des Origines a la conquete ottomane*. He also shared Braudel’s notion of the Black Sea as a sub-region of the Mediterranean. In these two works, it is narrated that the Black Sea was controlled by the ancient Greek, Asian tribes, the Persians, the Romans, and the Byzantine Empire until the Ottomans conquered Istanbul in 1453. Starting from the conquest of Istanbul, until the 19th century, the Black Sea was in the status of an Ottoman lake. What is significant for our work is the fact that during all of these periods, the Black Sea was treated as a sub-region of the Mediterranean.

¹⁰ George Christian Maior and Mihaela Matei, “The Black Sea Region in an Enlarged Europe: Changing Patterns, Changing Politics,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.16, No.1 (Winter 2005), p. 34.

¹¹ George Christian Maior and Mihaela Matei, p. 37.

dispersed nature of the states in the area-the region has different ethnic and religious composition-the stability and cooperation were hard to accomplish.

In contrast, during the Cold War, the area experienced its most stabilized days since it was frozen between NATO and Warsaw Pact members along with the Cold War dynamics. Turkey, as a NATO member, protected the southern part of the sea and the rest of it was controlled by Warsaw Pact states-Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR. Although the USSR had controlled larger parts of the Black Sea, the Turkish straits of Istanbul and Dardanelles prevented the Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean and from there to the open oceans. The Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, was a determining factor of the situation which left the control of the straits, the right of military settlement, rules on the passage of ships to Turkey.¹² For these reasons, the issue of straits has always been a critical point for the Black Sea powers and the Montreux Convention always created tensions between the USSR and Turkey during the Cold War. Furthermore, the straits issue has to be linked to current Turkish-Russian relations in the Black Sea Region as well since today the Convention is still a controversial issue between the two, which will be discussed in the next parts of the paper in detail.

Along these lines, the Cold War years worsened the situation (it was already difficult to form a regional cooperation due to the reasons discussed before) and made it impossible to form regional cooperation for the Black Sea states. Combined with diverse nature of the states in the region, the fact that the sea was both militarily and ideologically divided between the two superpowers

¹² David Baldinger, p. 4.

had been a prominent obstacle to overcome. In addition, due to the polarization in the Black Sea area, rather than regional policies global strategies dominated the Russian and Turkish policies of the region.

2.2. New Dynamics in the Black Sea Region: Security Challenges versus Economic Bridges

The Black Sea was one of the most affected regions of the world from the fall of the Soviet Empire since centuries old hegemonic system ended and in response multi actors started to control the region.¹³ In other words, after centuries of Persian, Greek, Ottoman or Russian hegemony in the region, for the first time in its history, the Black Sea states had the chance to establish a region and to be a player in their own regions. Thus the end of the Cold War both changed the divided situation in the Black Sea and brought freedom to the regional states to establish regional cooperation. After forty-five years Soviet control, they were at last relieved from the hegemony of the USSR.

As a result of the disintegration of the USSR, the newly independent states have entered in a process of attempt for regional cooperation. This process includes numerous efforts to create political, economic or security cooperation agreements.¹⁴ The process had two phases: the first step is the one taken by the regional states; that is regional organizations established by the regional states; and the second one is regional arrangements established by the EU and NATO to cooperate with the regional states.

¹³ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "From Hegemony to Pluralism: The Changing Politics of the Black Sea," *SAIS Review*, Vol.17, No.1 (Winter-Spring 1997), p. 2.

¹⁴ P. C. Latawski gives a detailed information and analysis of these different cooperation initiatives. See P. C. Latawski, "The Limits of Diversity in the Post-Soviet Space: CIS & GUUAM," *The Defense Academy of the United Kingdom*, (July 2003).

With the establishment of the BSEC (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation), the first phase to become a region has been taken. The conspicuous interest to join the BSEC showed that the Black Sea states see the Black Sea as a region, which they can work together and solve the problems of the region through organizational mechanisms despite differences between them.

The establishment of the BSEC as a regional organization in 1992 is a critical point since it led to developing bilateral economic relations between the states in the region. The BSEC, being established in June 1992, was an idea of a Turkish diplomat Şükrü Elekdağ.¹⁵ Although it was established in 1992, BSEC became a full regional economic organization both officially and institutionally on 1 May, 1999.¹⁶ The member states are Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova and Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁷

Apart from BSEC, again initiated by Turkey, BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group), which is established in order to improve peace, stability, environmental protection and regional cooperation, was inaugurated in 2001.¹⁸ Since both Turkey and Russia are members of the BSEC and the BLACKSEAFOR, the detailed analysis of them will be given in the following chapters.

GUUAM, which is a multilateral Black Sea organization, is established by Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. The group was established as a

¹⁵ Tunç Aybak, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and Turkey: Extending European Integration to the East?," in Tunç Aybak (ed), *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 31.

¹⁶ Mustafa Aydın, "Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood," *Journal of Southeast and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.5, No.2 (May 2005), p. 267.

¹⁷ Mustafa Aydın, p. 267.

¹⁸ See Bilge Buttanrı, *Bölgesel Güç Karadeniz*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2004), p. 193.

security, economic and political alignment by “Pragmatic Westernizers” against “Russophile/Slavophil” in the CIS body and included Uzbekistan afterwards.¹⁹ The existence of GUUAM represented a challenge to the integration model where the road goes to Russia. As Taras Kuzio puts forward “Unity in the face of Russian unwillingness to recognize their territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence is a common theme uniting GUUAM countries.”²⁰ However, with Uzbekistan’s departure in 2002, although it was suspected that the group would not have a future, the adoption of a new charter, rules of procedure and financial regulations in Kiev Summit on 23 May, 2006 indicated that the group reawakened, which is expected to irritate Russia once again.²¹ The group was also renamed as “Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM.”

On December 2, 2005 in Kiev, another group, which is again activated against the CIS mentality, established by Ukraine and Georgia. Named as “The Community of the Democratic Choice”, the group determines the “promotion of democratic values, regional stability and economic prosperity” as its targets.²² Like GUAM, this arrangement includes neither Turkey nor Russia.

2.2.1. The EU and the NATO Perception of the Region

Apart from these four regional cooperation agreements pioneered by the regional states, the rise of the Euro-Atlantic interest in the region had also a

¹⁹ Taras Kuzio, “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM,” *European Security*, Vol.9, No.2 (Summer 2000), pp. 81-82.

²⁰ Taras Kuzio, p. 96.

²¹ Liz Fuller, Luke Allnutt, Claire Bigg, “GUAM-A Regional Grouping Comes of Age,” *RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova Report*, Vol.8, No. 20, (June 2006). Available online at <http://www.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2006/06/20-020606.asp>

²² Jean Christophe Peuch, “Ukraine: Regional Leaders Set Up Community of Democratic Choice,” *RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova Report*, Vol.7, No.41, (December 2005). Available online at <http://www.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2005/12/41-081205.asp>.

contributing effect on Black Sea's process of becoming a coherent region. Both NATO and the EU sponsored and supported regional arrangements in order to promote cooperation, stability and peace in the region.

Almost all of the states in this region either applied for membership or have signed cooperation agreements with the European Union and NATO in economic, security and political spheres. Among the BSEC countries, Greece is already a member of the EU; Romania and Bulgaria will be included in 2007; Turkey is expected to be in the club between 2015 or 2020; Russia, Moldova and Ukraine have signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), lastly Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are members of the Council of Europe and are included in PCAs. This situation demonstrates that the EU will be a significant member of the Black Sea region with the inclusion of Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Therefore while analyzing the region, NATO and especially EU policies have to be included as well.

The EU policy of the region came into existence with EU initiated multilateral programmes, convenient with its wider Europe concept. TRACECA (The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), which was started in 1993 with the aim of connecting the eight post-Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus with Europe, has a duty of developing transport alternatives on the East-West energy corridor.²³ INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe), which is another EU developed programme, serves for technical assistance and investment support for hydrocarbon infrastructure in the Greater Black Sea Region since 1995.²⁴

²³ Mustafa Aydın, p. 272.

²⁴ Mustafa Aydın, p. 272.

NATO also sponsored Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme for the Greater Black Sea Region. As evident in the President Bush's words "the enlargement of NATO to all of Europe's democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and all that lie between", the Black Sea has a significant role for the future of NATO security as well.²⁵ PfP serves for "security-sector reforms, and joint military exercises" in the region.²⁶

This attempt demonstrated that the Black Sea has turned from "a backwater" of international politics to an important axis both politically and economically for the Western World, the reasons of which will be discussed in the following.

These initiatives starting with the end of the Cold War were positive efforts for forming regional identity and regional cooperation; however the region had its own domestic problems. Regional conflicts, which emerged right at the end of the Cold War, were the most important hindrance standing in the way to be a stable region. The end of the Cold War resulted in regional conflicts just like in any other ex-Soviet areas. The emergence of these new states with the demise of the USSR created ethnic disputes and territorial conflicts in the Black Sea, some of which are still waiting to be resolved today. These so called frozen conflicts are in Transdnier, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabagh. As Vladimir Socor underlines rightly, the Western world, at the beginning of 1990s, did not give enough interest in these conflicts, considering them to be problems of the Russian sphere of influence.²⁷ Russia, on the other hand, supported the

²⁵ David Baldinger, p. 3.

²⁶ George Cristian Maior and Mihaela Matei, p. 44.

²⁷ Vladimir Socor, "Frozen Conflicts in the Black Sea-South Caucasus Region," *Harvard Black Sea Security Program*, (April 2004), p. 89.

secessionist movements which created problems for these new states in the Black Sea. Today, the status of these conflicts can be defined as “no peace, no war”.²⁸ With a delay during the Cold War, the Black Sea has always been facing “uncertainty, insecurity, invasions, and migration” in its history.²⁹ Therefore, the regional conflicts arisen with the end of the Cold War has brought back the insecure, unstable environment.

2.2.2. The Strategic, Economic Importance of the Region

As discussed above, although political and social conditions of the Black Sea had always been changing according to who controlled the area, the strategic importance of the Black Sea has been an important characteristic of it from the antiquity to today. Nevertheless, the rise of Euro-Atlantic interest in the region elevated the strategic importance of the Black Sea and the geopolitics of the region has changed dramatically since.

The region has started to be considered as both “an entry point” to the Middle Eastern, European, Eurasian spaces, and “a frontier” of security threats coming from these regions for Europe.³⁰ Furthermore, since the wider Black Sea states have better developed democracies compared to the others in Central Asia, or in Middle East, it has been both a testing ground for spreading democracy towards the other regions around it. The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the

²⁸ Quoted in Özkan Şenol, *Cooperative Security in the Black Sea Region*, Thesis-Master’s, (Ankara: Institution of Social Sciences Bilkent University, 2003), p. 35.

²⁹ George Cristian Maior and Mihaela Matei, p. 40.

³⁰ Testimony of Bruce Jackson, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, March 8, 2005, p. 2; Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom,” *Policy Review*, (June-July 2004). Available at <http://www.policyreview.org/jun04/asmus.html>.

Orange Revolution in Ukraine demonstrated the success of pro-democratic movements and inclinations of the regional states towards the West.³¹

Vladimir Socor underlines another (actually interrelated) three important points, which led to alteration in Western perception of the Black Sea. Firstly, as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of the Russian powers from the region opened ways for the new states to follow a Western orientation and secondly the area became one of the strategic regions which has a promising future for democracy.³² Lastly, the discovery of the Caspian oil and gas in the 1990s, and the emergence of the Black Sea as a transit route for transportation of these natural resources have raised the importance of the region further.³³

The Black Sea has always been a transportation link from Asia to Europe and vice versa. George Bratianu refers to the same point by describing the Black Sea as “a pivotal historical area for international trade.”³⁴ In the past, the Black Sea was an important area for it was the starting point of the Silk Road; and now it is again at the center of interest for oil and gas transportation, especially by regions like the EU who depend on this region’s reserves to meet their energy needs.³⁵ The European Union meets %50 of its energy needs from outside and in 2020, it is expected that this proportion will rise to %70 of the total

³¹ Scholars like Vladimir Socor, Ronald Asmus, Bruce Jackson continually argue that the Black Sea can be the model for the countries in Middle East and Central Asia in terms of their democratic developments. The rose revolution and the will of most of the countries to join the European Union and NATO are indicators of this interpretation for the scholars.

³² See Vladimir Socor, “Security Priorities in the Black Sea-Caspian Region,” *Harvard Black Sea Regional Workshop*, (September 2003), p.1.

³³ Vladimir Socor, “Security Priorities in the Black Sea-Caspian Region,” p. 1.

³⁴ Quoted in George Cristian Maior and Mihaela Matei, p. 38.

³⁵ Testimony of Bruce Jackson, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, p. 2.

consumption.³⁶ Therefore, in order to supply its energy needs, the region is important for Europe.

Due to its geographical location, the Black Sea is a conduit for oil and gas transportation; which would have a binding effect among the regional states. On the contrary, the oil and gas pipelines create the most important tensions between the regional powers, especially between Turkey and Russia. Different choices for pipeline projects has been the reason of the friction and became the symbol of political and economic rivalry during the 1990s.

Along these lines, it is now possible to explain what the Greater (wider) Black Sea Region is and why it is so now. As Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer also underlines, to designate the boundaries of the Black Sea Region or Greater Black Sea Region is an arbitrary determination; in other words it seems to depend on individual perspective. In this paper, the Greater Black Sea Region will include the first BSEC states-Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Albania and Greece. Given the fact that for the South Caucasus states' integration with Euro-Atlantic structures can only be through the Black Sea, these two ex-sub regions are now united together and became one of the important regions of the world.³⁷ Moreover, the fact that the transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian basin has to pass through the South Caucasus and the Black Sea also provides an explanation why these two regions has to be analyzed together.

³⁶ Testimony of Bruce Jackson, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, p. 2.

³⁷ Alexander Rondeli, "Black Sea Regional Security: The South Caucasus Component," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April-June 2004), p. 27.

2.3. Conclusion

The Greater Black Sea Region hosted various ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and nationalities, which as a result created a lack of common identity between the regional states for centuries. The region after the end of the Cold War had faced new regional conflicts, most of which are still waiting to be resolved at present. In contrast to this, the area now has the chance to argue to be a region, to form a common identity based on the Black Sea. With the efforts of regional states to form regional organizations and additionally with the Euro-Atlantic projects, various forms of cooperation programs in the economic and security fields have placed the region at the center of interest and a strategic area to analyze. The geography of the region is a significant dynamic in this transformation of the perception of the region since the region is the gate to Europe and beyond for trade and fossil fuels. Furthermore, the transportation of the Caspian oil to Europe increased the importance of the region.

Among the regional states, in terms of economic, military and political capabilities Russia and Turkey are the most powerful Black Sea powers. However, the two has controversial views over some issues in the region as well as compromising ones. When the relationship is analyzed on the regional basis, it is difficult for Turkey and Russia to follow similar policies, which will be seen in the following chapters.

CHAPTER III

MAIN FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS IN RUSSIA AND TURKEY

3.1. Foreign Policy Analysis-Turkey and Russia

Foreign policy analysis is a set of activities dedicated to explain and understand the foreign policy actors of a country. Since decisions are no longer as easy to select or implement as they have been when Louis XIV said *L'état c'est moi* (I am the state), it is a more complex task at present to find out the decision making actors of countries. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf develop a scheme in order to clarify the variables that shape the foreign policy decisions: “the external (global) sources, the societal sources, the governmental sources, the role sources, and the individual sources.”³⁸ In a very basic sense, if we divide this scheme into more pieces, among the reasons and factors that contribute to the formation of a foreign policy decision, the structure of the international system and the status of the state in that system (capabilities and resources of the country), political regime, interest groups, the media, public opinion, political culture of the country, and lastly the individual factor are roughly what influence the decision making process. Additionally, while applying this scheme into practice, although each category is a causal agent on its own, the fact that it also works in conjunction with the others must be taken into account as well.

All of the factors above are not all the time embodied in a state; the variety of the determinants changes according to the political regime of the country.

³⁸ For a comprehensible analysis of this scheme, see Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, (New York: St. Martin's Pres, 1996).

Among the determinants of decision making process, yet, the impact of the individual change, economic resources, the state type, and the international system cannot be denied and are common for all states. First of all, since decisions are taken by individuals or groups shaped by individuals and since they have different beliefs, fears, perceptions and values, the substitution of a political leader with another may result in deviation of foreign policy making of a certain country. Henry Kissinger's words "when you see (history) in practice, you see the differences that the personalities make" explain the importance of the individuals in foreign policy making briefly. Similarly, an economic resource of a country is one of the main determinants of foreign policy making because no matter it is political, economic or security issue, economic resources are vital in order to implement a decision. Lastly, the political regime of a country determines in what degree foreign policy making is distributed among different actors. In other words; whether a state is a totalitarian, authoritarian, democratic or a failed one is a sign of either the indivisibility or diversity of foreign policy actors.

In light of the analysis above, the importance of this section lies in the fact that without discovering the main foreign policy actors of Turkey and Russia, it will be hard to draw the overall picture of Turkish-Russian relations. The main questions of this paper-are Turkey and Russia rivals or partners, how can we explain the change and continuity in Turkish-Russian partnership-rivalry, what are the sources that determine the characteristic of the relationship-cannot be answered in the absence of such an analysis. Therefore, Deborah J. Gerner's

macro question, which is “when and why do certain policy activities occur?”³⁹ will be answered after the foreign policy actors of both Turkey and Russia are identified.

3.2. Russian Foreign Policy Actors: Historical Legacy-Gorbachev-Yeltsin era

During the Soviet period, the state type was highly centralized and authoritarian and thus the Communist Party controlled the foreign policy formulation. The Party as the only institution of foreign policy making was warranted by the article 6 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, which labeled the Party as “the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of state and public organizations.”⁴⁰ The Party controlled the foreign policy mechanism through the Politburo (Political Bureau) and the Secretariat.⁴¹ The administrative branch of the CPSU was under the control of the Secretariat and it managed to dominate the foreign policy through the Central Committee apparatus under the Secretariat.⁴² The Politburo was the other top organ of the CPSU to formulate the foreign policy. monitor

The main guide of the Party, therefore Soviet foreign policy, was to apply Marxist-Leninist ideology and to work for the triumph of communist ideology at

³⁹ Deborah J. Gerner, “The Evolution of the Study of Foreign Policy,” in Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Company), p. 20.

⁴⁰ N. N. Petro and A.Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State*, (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 92.

⁴¹ In order to understand the ideological and influential role of the Party, first of all it is necessary to figure out its structure. The Secretariat controlled the administrative branch of the CPSU and it was responsible for day-to-day policy. Additionally, it scrutinized the government actions in order to see if they are parallel with the Party policy. The Politburo had supreme administrative power, with roughly 20 members, including the General Secretary of the CPSU and the Central Committee. Since Stalin, the Politburo had the real power in policy making. For a detailed analysis of the Communist Party structure in the USSR, see David Lane, *State and Politics in the USSR*, (UK: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1985).

⁴² N. N. Petro and Alvin Rubinstein, p. 93.

home and abroad. This precept provided an excuse for the Soviet foreign policy (The Party) to intervene in countries abroad. That is to say, especially with the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, The Party manipulated the ideology’s internationalist characteristics for interventions abroad, like invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979.⁴³

In contrast to traditional Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev’s “new thinking” (*novoe myshlenie*), replaced the dominance of the Central Committee staff, known as the *apparatus*, in foreign policy with the foreign ministry headed by Shevardnadze.⁴⁴ In addition to this institutional and individual change, Gorbachev tried to replace communist ideology with a concept of “humanitarian internationalism”, which aimed at transmitting Marxist-Leninist ideology to an alternative that can question the notion of class struggle and redefine the Marxist-Leninist ideology in less aggressive ways.⁴⁵ In parallel with Gorbachov’s aims, Shevardnadze initiated the process of reshaping the foreign ministry, changing officials and creating new departments.⁴⁶ With Gorbachev’s new thinking, expansionist, military-oriented character of the Soviet Union was redefined and it was attempted to be abandoned, resulting in withdrawal of the Red Army troops from Afghanistan in 1988 and Southeast Europe in 1989.⁴⁷ To sum up, what distinguished the new political thinking of Gorbachev was weakening the importance of the ideology in foreign policy, questioning the decisions taken by

⁴³ Ulaş Mangıtlı, *Russia, Turkey and Eurasia: Intersection of Turkish and Russian Foreign Policy Spheres in Eurasia*, Thesis-Master’s, (Ankara: Institution of Social Sciences Bilkent University, 2001), pp. 3-4.

⁴⁴ N. N. Petro and A.Z. Rubinstein, p. 96.

⁴⁵ N. N. Petro and A.Z. Rubinstein, p. 95.

⁴⁶ Ulaş Mangıtlı, p. 5.

⁴⁷ Ulaş Mangıtlı, p. 4.

the Party while strengthening the personal control over the direction of foreign policy.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the transformation of the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity determined the character of Russian foreign policy decisions. During the Cold War, the Russians shared the control of the international system with the U.S., but the end of the Cold War reduced the Russian state to a weaker position. The transition from a union to a nation state, the loss of superpower status in international politics had both political and psychological consequences, which were all results of the end of the Cold War. The state and the society had to accept the new geopolitical and geoeconomic status of the country and act accordingly. Therefore, during the first years of Yeltsin period, the first President of the Russian Federation, switch from a bipolar world to a unipolar one was significant causal effect of foreign policy formation.

Similar to Gorbachev, the very first thing what Yeltsin did was to replace the old party *apparatus* with new younger officials who had similar ideas with him and strengthen the personal control over the decision making unit of the Russian Federation. In order to do so he appointed a foreign minister-Andrei Kozyrev who shared similar ideas with himself; playing the same role that Shevardnadze played for Gorbachev.⁴⁸ Moreover, with the 1993 Constitution, he introduced a superpresidential regime, which is still the main reason why the President is the most influential foreign policy actor in Russia. Furthermore, in March 1995,

⁴⁸ N. N. Petro and A.Z. Rubinstein, p. 99.

Yeltsin further reinforced the President's authority over all aspects of foreign policy.

In the initial years of the demise, the transformation from a republic to an independent, separate entity and the challenges of the post-Cold War world gave way to an excited debate between the Atlanticist and Eurasianists in search for a conceptual basis for Russia's foreign policy.⁴⁹ In other words, with the failure of the communist ideology, Russia lost its ultimate global aim (and state identity as well) to promote the ideology outside, which generated "a conceptual void"⁵⁰ in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Since in the first three years the rein of foreign policy making was in the hands of Yeltsin and Kozyrev, this conceptual vacuum was filled with Yeltsin-Kozyrev's consideration of the West as the ideal model to be followed for Russia, focusing on the global economic, environmental and nuclear security, and democracy as universal values.⁵¹ However, this period did not long last and the national interest of the state differed from the first three years, which is named as transition years. During the transitional years (1990-1993), although the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation was characterized with the "romantic euphoria"⁵² with the West, the realization of the geopolitical importance of the country by a large group of people known as

⁴⁹ Some authors call the "Atlanticists", as the "Westerners" or "Westernisers"; while Eurasianist are called as "Slavophiles" or "Eurasians". In this work, they will be referred as "Atlanticists" and "Eurasianists". Furthermore, it must be remembered that this debate is not only restricted to foreign policy, it was about the future character of the Russian state in both domestic and foreign policies.

⁵⁰ Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 112.

⁵¹ Robert.H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, p. 113.

⁵² N. N. Petro and A.Z. Rubinstein, p. 99.

Eurasianists,⁵³ criticizing the Yeltsin regime for taking the West as the ideal model of Russia, put an end to this period.

Eurasianists argued that Russia has a distinct identity, provided by its geopolitical position, and it must act as a mediator between the West and the East whereas Atlanticists argued that Russia must turn its face towards the west as western support & partnership is the only remedy for the Russian economy and the maintenance of democracy.⁵⁴ The top person who represented the opposition camp was Sergei Stankevich, who was also the presidential advisor.⁵⁵ According to his vision of Russia,

“Russia's role in the world is [...] to initiate and maintain a multilateral dialogue between cultures, civilisations and states. It is Russia which reconciles, unites, and co-ordinates. It is the good, Great Power that is patient and open within borders, which have been settled by right and with good intentions, but which is threatened beyond these borders. This land, in which East and West, North and South are united, is unique, and is perhaps the only one capable of harmoniously uniting many different voices in a historical symphony. ...”⁵⁶

While, the Atlanticists supported the quick membership of Russia to Western organizations like International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Bank, WTO, G-7,⁵⁷ the Eurasianists, on the other hand, underlined the importance that Russia had to give to states of Common Wealth of Independence in order to

⁵³ Actually Eurasianist are far from being homogeneous. Some scholars divide the group into two: expansionists and modernizers, while others refer to “conservative Eurasianists” and “moderate Eurasianist”. For a comprehensive detail about the Eurasianist see, Alexander A. Sergunin, “Russian Post-Communist Foreign Policy Thinking at the Cross-Roads: Changing Paradigms,” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol.3, No.3 (September 2000), pp. 216-255; Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's contending geopolitical perspectives,” *East European Quarterly*, Vol.32, No.3 (Fall 1998), pp. 315-335; Ömer Göksel İşyar, *Sovyet-Rus Dış Politikaları ve Karabağ Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım, 2004).

⁵⁴ Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, pp. 113-114.

⁵⁵ İdil Tuncer, “The Security Policies of the Russian Federation: The “Near Abroad” and Turkey,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.2 (Autumn 2000), pp. 97

⁵⁶ Alexander A. Sergunin, pp. 218-219.

⁵⁷ Ulaş Mangıtlı, p. 10.

recover its economic and political status quickly. According to them, economic and political corruption can be healed via quick integration with the former Soviet States. Eurasianists are mostly inspired by Mackinder's heartland theory which argues that the state that controls the central position in Eurasia can develop more power than the naval powers; in other words like the Great Game of the late 19th and early 20th century, Eurasianist assert that Eurasia is "the geographic pivot of history."⁵⁸ Therefore it can be argued that the philosophy of focusing on "near abroad" (*blizhnee zarubezhe*) in order to revive the old power status was driven from the heartland theory.

Although Yeltsin in the initial years of the independence together with Kozyrev and Deputy Prime Minister Gaidar was supporting the Atlanticist school, strong opposition from both the society and political elite forced him to do some concessions, even Kozyrev who was a hard line Atlanticist changed the color of his words.⁵⁹ There were two dynamics which gave way to the transformation of foreign policy attitude and the rise of Eurasianism in Russia: the Russian nationalism, and the influence of the military.⁶⁰ Added to these domestic reasons, some development in the international area also frustrated the Atlanticist school: first of all, the inability of the West to end the war in Yugoslavia disappointed the Atlanticists, and secondly there was the fear that the conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia would spread inside Russia.⁶¹ In this way, The Foreign Policy Concept of 1993, through which Yeltsin replaced the idea of

⁵⁸ Igor Torbakov, "Reexamining old Concepts About the Caucasus and Central Asia," *Eurasia Insight*, (July, 2002). At <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020404a.shtml>.

⁵⁹ N.N. Petro and Alvin Rubinstein, p. 101.

⁶⁰ Suzanne Crow, "Why has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?," *RFE/RL Russian Report*, Vol.3, No.18 (6 May 1994), p. 1.

⁶¹ N. N. Petro and A.Z. Rubinstein, p. 100.

western partnership as the primary foreign policy target with the importance of “near abroad”, was accepted as the international strategy to be followed for Russia. Developing relations with the near abroad-especially Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia-, forming a collective security organization-CIS-settlement of the conflicts in the periphery of Russia only by Russians, guaranteeing the rights of Russians living abroad were the primary goals outlined in the Foreign Policy Concept of 1993, which also aimed to prevent the other states, especially Turkey, to enter into its zone of interest.⁶² In consequence, near abroad understanding intensified the geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. The reflection of these tensions which has arisen as a result of the policies of near abroad will be dealt with in the following chapters broadly.

3.2.1. The Domestic Factor: The Military, Superpresidentialism and Political Parties

Starting from 1918 when the Red Army was established until 1939, the military’s function was the preservation of the Soviet state and defending the state against external threats; while during the Cold War the task of defending the Eastern Europe and Germany was added as an additional task and it served for “deterrence, defense of the homeland, diplomatic clout in bargaining with adversaries, and power projection in the pursuit of influence.”⁶³ Particularly, the military became one of the major players of Russian foreign policy during the Breznhev Doctrine.⁶⁴

⁶² See İdil Tuncer, “The Security Policies of the Russian Federation: The “Near Abroad” and Turkey.”

⁶³ N. N. Petro and A.Z. Rubinstein, p. 132.

⁶⁴ Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, p. 139.

The military officers' opinion, in fact, was never in harmony with the civilian authorities; for instance a survey in January 1991 showed that the military preferred a military-based regime.⁶⁵ With Gorbachev and later Yeltsin followed the same line, the military expenditures were lessened so that the burden of it on Soviet economy were attempted to be reduced,⁶⁶ which would also reduce its influence on foreign policy. However, on matters of military strategy and force, the military's role in Russian state was unchallenged. Yeltsin, for instance, sought to gain military's support as soon as he became the President.

Related to the unchallenged position of the Russian military on foreign policy formation, the near abroad policy is the impeccable example. The military was among those who opposed the liberal westernizing policies of Yeltsin-Gaidar-Kozyrev trio and the most important force which succeeded in realization of the near abroad concept. If near abroad policy was not backed up by the military, Eurasianists would have less voice in foreign policy making.

KGB, The Committee for State Security, was another important foreign (security) policy tool for "espionage and including collection and dissemination of intelligence, the surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad, penetration of "anti-Soviet agencies" abroad, and coordination of the intelligence efforts of other agencies."⁶⁷ Together with the military, KGB was a powerful institution who could easily find a place at the table of foreign policy making.

Apart from the military, another domestic determinant is the political system which was introduced with the 1993 Constitution and the failure in building democratic institutions during Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods, which

⁶⁵ Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, p. 141.

⁶⁶ N. N. Petro and A.Z. Rubinstein, p. 133.

⁶⁷ Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, p. 146.

still determines the main decision making actors of Russia today. The answers offered for questions like “Is Russia a democracy, is democracy in Russia developing or retrograding” are based on an amalgam of both. In other words, Russia stands in between democracy and authoritarianism. Although it is unjust to say that Russia can be compared to a dictatorship or monarchy, it is fair to claim that it still lacks the democratic institutions that will distribute the control of decision making among several actors. Mcfaul is right in underlining the quotation from O’Donnel, who has called Russia as “a delegative democracy”: “a system in which whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as she or he sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office.”⁶⁸ “Managed democracy”, again developed by Mcfaul and Timothy J. Colton or more pessimistically “competitive authoritarianism” by William A.Clark also reflect the ambiguous situation in democratization process in the Russian Federation. The adviser to Putin, Sergei Markov, also characterizes the president day Russia as “managed democracy” and describes it as

“managed democracy...means a combination of democratic institutions and authoritarian institutions. Russia now is in the process not from communist dictatorship, but from the stage of Yeltsin anarchy and chaos to the functioning democratic institutions. And in this way, to make [the] situation stable, [the] Kremlin has to use both democratic and not democratic methods. It is just [the] rule of nature.”⁶⁹

Thus, the views over the level of democratization in Russia swerve from pessimistic to optimistic ones but what is common in all of these descriptions is

⁶⁸ For the term managed democracy and different terminology on Russian democracy see Timothy J. Colton, “Russian Democracy Under Putin,” *Problems of Post Communism*, Vol.50, No.4 (2003), pp. 12-21; William A. Clark, “Russia at the Polls: Potemkin Democracy,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.51, No.2 (March-April 2004), pp. 22-29; Michael Mcfaul, *Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, (New York, Cornell University Press, 2001).

⁶⁹ Quoted in William A. Clark, p. 23.

the idea that Russia is far from a full democracy and it is even retrograding its democratization process.

Linked with the outcomes of the political system in Russia, the political parties play less role in Russia than in the Western democracies where the parties function as a mediator between the public opinion (society) and the state. For instance, in Russia there is no such thing as the party in power; thereby diminishing the role of the public opinion as a decision making actor. East European countries, after the dissolution of the Union, could revive their old party culture; however Russia had little experience with party politics.⁷⁰ Combined with the legacy of the Communist Party rule and political choices during the transition period, the parties do not function as a mediator between the state and society. For instance, most of today's Russian society does not associate themselves with a party, which re-demonstrates the weakness of Russian political parties in politics.

The problems of political parties in Russia are many but three of them should be underlined and recalled in order to make reforms. Firstly, the Russian parties are mostly located in Moscow or Petersburg, which makes it difficult to reach the masses. Secondly, the parties are identified with a single person, in other words one single person directs the policy of the party and it results in low party identification among people.⁷¹ Lastly, the parties do not receive enough economic aid from the state and they rest upon a limited resource.⁷² Additionally, the presidential system with the limited role of Parliament contributes to the weak party formation. To sum up, Russian parties have almost no influence over the decision making of foreign policy.

⁷⁰ See Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change From Gorbachev to Putin*.

⁷¹ Jeffrey Mankoff, "Russia's Weak Society and Weak State: The Role of Political Parties," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.50, No.1 (January-February 2003), p. 29.

⁷² Jeffrey Mankoff, p. 29.

3.2.2. The Individual Factor: Vladimir Putin

Superpresidentialism as a political system is one of the factors that designate the key foreign policy actor of the Russian Federation and places the President-Putin at present-at the center of power to form and implement policies. Bobo Lo even claim that “To a very large extent, Putin *is* Russian foreign policy.”⁷³ As stated before, due to the policies followed by Yeltsin administration, after the collapse of the communist party structure, the Russian state has chosen superpresidentialism as it new political regime.

According to the Russian Constitution, the President has the right to appoint the Prime Minister, to rule by decree, to veto parliamentary legislation and moreover, since overturning presidential decrees necessitate a two-thirds majority in both the Duma and the Federation Council, which is unachievable at present circumstances, the President enjoys the supreme authority.⁷⁴

With a leader like Putin, the authority given by the Constitution is being used to the ends. For instance he controls the decision making more than Yeltsin did since the power of the ministry of foreign affairs over foreign policy decisions has diminished compared to Yeltsin administration. During the Yeltsin Period, Kozyrev developed the concept of partnership (*partnerstvo*) with the west while Primakov referred to multipolarity of Russian foreign policy, both of which were

⁷³ Bobo Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, (London: Blackwell and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003), p. 43. Additionally see Samuel Charap, “The Petersburg Experience: Putin’s Political Career and Russian Foreign Policy,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.51, No.1 (January-February 2004), pp. 55-62.

⁷⁴ Jerome Vignon, *Shaping actors, shaping factors in Russia*, (Forward Studies Series), (London: Kogan Page, 1998), p. 6.

used as foreign policy concepts in controlling the decision making structure.⁷⁵ Hence, both Kozyrev and Primakov were vital decision making actors of the Russia state along with Yeltsin himself; however, in Putin's presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has lost its importance compared to the period of Yeltsin and Gorbachev.

Turkish-Russian relations cannot be independent of how the President of the Russian Federation perceives Turkey. In other words, given the fact that the power is highly personalized and the President is at the center of decision making, Putin is the main actor who decides whether there is rivalry or partnership with Turkey. At this point it is also necessary to reassert that there are also other factors in Russia but it is mostly Putin who will shape the character of current Turkish-Russian relations.

3.2.3. The role of the Economic Elite: Oligarchs versus Sloviki

Apart from the President, the economic elite have been the most important driving force in foreign policy since Yeltsin period. These energy tycoons, mostly referred as oligarchs, have become rich right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and now control more than 40 percent of Russian industry.⁷⁶ They gained their property as a result of "windfall profits or resource rents-massive unearned profits-from domestic sales and foreign exports of oil and gas."⁷⁷ Political analyst Peter Lavelle states in a report that "the group of individuals who control the country's energy resources will be the real political and economic power brokers

⁷⁵ Samuel Charap, p. 57.

⁷⁶ John Hardt, "Putin's Window of Economic Opportunity," *Problems of Post-Communism*. Vol.52, No.4 (2005), p. 15.

⁷⁷ John Hardt, p. 15.

in Russia.”⁷⁸ It was indeed the case with the oligarchs of Russia until Putin came to power.

Yet with the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Yukos affair), it became apparent that Putin will replace them with other names. On October 25, 2003, Russian government arrested Khodorkovsky for charges of fraud and tax evasion and from that time on the government continued to arrest other executives in the company for similar accusations. Considering the developments after the Yukos affair, it was more than the capture of an oligarch for fraud; it gave the other oligarchs the message that their position was not guaranteed by the president any more. The Yukos affair, combined with two other oligarchs’ escape from the country, Boris Berezovskii and Vladimir Gusinksii, show how the oligarchs are quietened by Putin. For instance, after the Yukos Affair, the head of the Lukoil, Vagit Alekperov said that “What is good for the president is good for Lukoil.”⁷⁹

Gazprom, for instance, is a significant decision maker of Russian foreign policy. Although it was a natural gas company, it is also becoming one of the biggest oil companies of Russia after the take over of 75.7 percent of Sibneft, one of the oil companies in Russia controlled by Roman Abramovich, on 28 September 2005.⁸⁰ It is believed that Roman Abramovich could have sold Sibneft with a more expensive price to a foreign firm but the Yukos affair affected his decision.⁸¹ With these developments, now the President Putin will have control over one-third of

⁷⁸ Quoted in Brian Witmore, “The end of Loans-For Shares,” *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, Vol.5, No.31 (2005).

⁷⁹ Peter Maass, “The Triumph of the Quite Tycoon,” *New York Times Magazine*, (August 1, 2004).

⁸⁰ Claire Bigg, “State Monopoly Gazprom takes over Sibneft,” *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, Vol.5, No.31 (2005).

⁸¹ Claire Bigg, “State Monopoly Gazprom takes over Sibneft”.

the country's crude oil production.⁸² Therefore, according to Peter Lavelle's analysis, it is the Russian state who is the real political and economic power broker in Russia. A comprehensive analysis of the influence of energy issue and energy companies on Turkish-Russian relations will be done while discussing the energy dimension of the relationship.

Putin administration showed his decisiveness for changing most of the ruling elite (oligarchs) and replace them with the others who have a background in military and the Federal Security Service (FSB). These elites are called as *sloviki*, which literally means "mighty men" with a macho emphasis and symbolically it refers to Petersburg officials – people who have military backgrounds.⁸³ Between 2000 and 2003, the statistics show that 35 percent of the deputy ministers had a military background and among the seven Russian super-federal districts, five of them are directed by generals.⁸⁴

Oligarchs in Russia used to have substantial control over the media sector as well. The media is one of the key actors who shape the public opinion and who itself have an influence on foreign policy making. However, in Russia the media does not function as the voice of the public since the state is still the largest owner of it. Besides, Putin further consolidated the state control over the media through campaigns against Berezovskii and

⁸² Claire Bigg, "State Monopoly Gazprom takes over Sibneft".

⁸³ Pavel K. Baev, "The Evolution of Putin's Regime: Inner Circles and Outer Walls," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.51, No.6 (November-December 2004), p. 4.

⁸⁴ The data is obtained from Olga Kryshтанovskaya and Stephen White, "Putin's Militocracy," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol.19, No.4 (October-December 2003), pp. 289-306.

Gusinkii, who were independent media tycoons.⁸⁵ The operations against them were attempts to reduce the number of independent media. Briefly, the media cannot be considered as a foreign policy actor which transmit the sentiments of different groups in the Russian society.

Apart from these details about the present foreign policy actors of Russia, there are three constant variables of Russian foreign policy, which have been common targets for whoever runs the direction of the decision making process in foreign affairs. The target of Russian elites to reelevate the state to a superpower position is still in the mind of any ruler and a common drive for all decision makers. The target of achieving “the Great Russia”, which is the product of history, is how the mentality of the ruling class in Russia has worked and is working. The other constant causal effect is the geography of the country, which has been subject to famous geopolitical theories of Mckinder and Spykman. Apart from the fact that he territory in which Russia is located has been considered as the heartland of the world, rich natural resources of the country gives it another peculiarity. On this account, geography becomes an important factor in Russian foreign policy. Combined with the fact that Russia is dependent on the Black Sea and Turkish Straits to link itself with the Europe and the South, since its near abroad is mostly populated by Turkic origin people, this fact makes geography more notable in Russia’s relations with Turkey.

3.3. The Constant Factors that Influence Turkish Foreign Policy

⁸⁵ Thomas M. Nichols, “Presidentialism and Democracy in Russia: The First Ten Years,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.50, No.5 (September-October 2003), p. 45.

Before starting to analyze the main decision making actors of Turkish foreign policy, mentioning the main factors that traditionally contribute to the decisionmaking process in Turkey is necessary. Similar to Russia, geography, history and lastly ideology of the republic have been constant factors.⁸⁶ All of these three factors are vital in analyzing Turkish relations with any country; however the significance of them cannot be as apparent as in its relations with the Russian Federation.

History has an influence on the way Turkish foreign policy is conducted in two ways: one is through the Ottoman legacy and the legacy left by the war of independence. Together with the fact that the country has descended from a vast empire to a *middle power*, the situation of the country during the Independence War and Sevres Treaty is still in the mind of the officials and people. And although it has been long since the country became a republic, the mental transition has undergone slowly, which has created a psychological phenomenon called “Sevres Syndrome” by Turkish scholars. On the positive side of the events, the Ottoman legacy has contributed to the state and institution formation which was lacking in Third World Countries.⁸⁷ And the second way that history influences Turkish foreign policy is related to its relations with the Russian Federation. History framed the perception of the Russian and Russia for Turkish people and elites. Given that the history of Turkish-Russian relations is full of wars and several minor arm conflicts, it in this sense plays an important and a negative impact on present Turkish-Russian relations.

⁸⁶ See Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.36, No.1 (2000); Meliha Benli Altunışık, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*, (New York: Routledge, 2004).

⁸⁷ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, BelgelerYorumlar*, 2 Vols, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001&.2002).

In the early years of Turkish Republic, both the state and the society underwent massive changes and Kemalist ideology, established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, has become the main determinant of Turkish foreign policy, placing the inclination towards the West as the main target of foreign policy; The preference of Kemalism as the state ideology was again a negative determinant for the relations with the Russian Federation as Turkey preferred to side with the Western world in parallel with what Kemalism projected.

And lastly, geography is also a constant foreign policy determinant of Turkey and Turkish-Russian relations. The fact that the country with the control of the straits is located at the center of three separate regions, the Balkans, the Black Sea & the South Caucasus, and the Middle East affects its foreign policy making. For instance, the debate over the identity of the Turkish state- whether it is a Middle Eastern, the European, or a Eurasian country, etc- is emerged as a result of the geographical location of Turkey.⁸⁸ Unlike the other two factors, geography had both positive and negative impacts on the relationship. On the positive side, the geographical nearness of the two created trade opportunities and was a positive impetus to develop the economic relations; while on the negative side, the geography has been the main drive for conflicts and wars since there have been many territorial disputes between the two states.

3.3.1. The role of the External Factors

Although the international system is still one of the primary factors in Turkish foreign policy, it was during the Cold War years that the international

⁸⁸ Meliha Benli Altunışık, p. 89.

system as an actor has reached its highest peak. What was remarkable about the Cold War was its safe environment that designed any country's foreign policy with a clear philosophy: either joining the Western camp or supporting the communist ideology. Turkey from the very beginning sided with the West and became a member of NATO. Therefore, though there were exceptions like the Cyprus issue, most of the decisions are taken according to the international bipolar system. In this period, the character of Turkish-Russian relations is shaped by the division between NATO and Warsaw Pact members; thus the old rivalry revitalized along with the Cold War polarization.

However, with the end of the Cold War, although the main foreign policy target that is having warm relations with the West has stayed the same, Turkey changed the direction of its foreign policy towards the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia. The reason for this shift was the fact that the power vacuum in the Middle East, the Central Asia and the Caucasus opened a window of opportunity for Ankara and thus resulted in a strategic review of the policies towards these regions. Having realized that it could no longer pursue similar policies with the Cold War years, Turkey left its Moscow centered old policy of non-cooperation with the Turkic world and tried to emphasize the cultural, linguistic and religious similarities in order to form closer ties in the political and economic sphere.⁸⁹ Later, Turkey had to acknowledge that neither these newly independent states wanted to be dominated by Turkey nor Turkey has the resources and capacity to materialize its aims.

⁸⁹ Mustafa Aydın, "Foucault's Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.5, No.2 (Summer 2004), pp.2-4.

Apart from the Cold War and the end of the Cold War, another international development caused changes in Turkish politics. The bombings of the twin towers in New York on 11 September changed the traditional security understanding for every country and Turkey-Russia as well. After the end of the Cold War, terrorism appeared as one of the disagreements in Turkish-Russian relations as a result of the domestic crisis in both countries: Chechnya conflict in Russia and PKK crisis in Turkey. Each side accused the other for helping the terrorists in their territory. The details of the issue will be discussed in the security part in detail; however it is important to note here that when “global terrorism” is started to be perceived as the most significant threat to states’ security after September 11, terrorism has turned from a competition issue to a cooperation one. Therefore, the terrorist bombings of September 11 as an external variable of Turkish-Russian relations ameliorated the relationship to a partial extent on the terrorism basis.

Lastly, among the role of external events and players in Turkish foreign policy making, the European Union process has become a vital external factor since 1999. After Turkey was recognized as a candidate country in Helsinki Summit in December 1999 and has been given a date for the start of the negotiation process on October 3, 2005, many constitutional reforms and seven legislative packages have been adopted in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. These reforms are vital in the sense that they have brought new approaches to civil-military relations, the NGOs, the media and the press, which as a result of produced partial shifts in the power balance of the traditional foreign policy actors of Turkey.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Michael Emersen and Senem Aydın, “Turkey in Europe Monitor,” *CEPS*, (May 2005), p. 57.

Despite the fact that Turkey is given a date to open negotiations, it is evident that the negotiation process is not a formality. Saying it with other words, it is first of all unclear whether Turkey will join the EU and secondly, if it joins it is not apparent how many years it will take.⁹¹ On this account, although it is hard to give an exact year, it is for sure that the negotiation process will take a long time and the influence of the EU on Turkish-Russian relations is limited for the time being.

3.3.2. The Domestic Factors: The Classic Tripod with a New Member

Apart from the role of the international system, the structure of the Turkish political system designates the main figures of foreign policy making. Among those, the degree that the president, the prime minister, the parliament, and the parties enjoy in formulating foreign policy changes.

Traditionally, foreign policy decisions in Turkey have been made by few elites. It has been an acknowledged reality that there is a classic “tripod”-the prime minister, the military and the foreign ministry- which have always been the main and constant foreign policy figures in Turkey.⁹² The foreign ministry owns the major expertise on foreign policy issues and it is responsible for the day-to-day foreign policy.⁹³ The fact that the foreign ministry is highly a respected significant office originates to the Ottoman times. During the Ottoman Empire,

⁹¹ See the speech by Romano Prodi, The President of the European Commission, at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, (14 January 2004) in Michal Emerson and Senem Aydın (eds) “Turkey in Europe Monitor,” *CEPS*, (May 2005), p. 4.

⁹² See Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), *Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 2002); Suat Kınıkoğlu, “Structural Problems Challenging Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Turkish Daily News*, (August 2005).

⁹³ Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, p. 4.

the foreign ministry was “an elite within an elite”.⁹⁴ The role that the foreign ministry played in shaping the decisions related to the foreign affairs continued in the Turkish Republic and though there was an exception period-the one when Ali Bozer became the foreign minister who did not enjoy any influence due to the way Özal followed in decision making process-, foreign ministry is still an influential actor, which is reflected in Abdullah Gül’s Ministry. On this account, the importance attributed to the foreign ministry in decision making is still apparent in the Turkish Republic and she/he has to be considered while explaining the foreign policy decisions.

The prime minister also has been the member of the constant tripod of decisionmaking process but the degree of his/her involvement varies according to the intensity of the interest he/she has in foreign affairs. For instance, while Ecevit gave more importance to external issues, Süleyman Demirel, when he was the prime minister during 1960s and 1970s, was more interested in domestic issues.⁹⁵ Therefore, although the office of the prime minister is a powerful position to shape the decisions in foreign policy, the individual knowledge, will, interest or plans affect the intensity of the prime minister’s involvement.

When it comes to the president, Turkey, from the very beginning, is a parliamentary democracy; thus the president does not enjoy the power as the presidents in the presidential system for in a parliamentary system, the president is more limited and has to share power with others.⁹⁶ However, most of the Turkish scholars agree that the role of the president in foreign policy has increased with

⁹⁴ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 72.

⁹⁵ Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, p. 4.

⁹⁶ Philip Robins, pp. 69-70.

the introduction of the 1982 Constitution. Although the parliamentary system did not change, the 1982 Constitution has given more authority to the president compared to the 1961 Constitution through amendments that made the decisions of the president independent of the judiciary and gave new executive authorities.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, despite the new authorities given by the 1982 Constitution, the president cannot enjoy the monopoly of power like in presidential systems.

The argument that the president emerged as an important actor of foreign policy-making after the 1982 Constitution is enhanced by the presidencies of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel,⁹⁸ while the opposite is enhanced by the fact that the same degree of interest in foreign affairs cannot be found in Kenan Evren (president from 1982 to 1989). Current President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was the chief judge at the Constitutional Court, can be considered as an active president in relations with the Russian Federation. Therefore, even though the 1982 Constitution brought new authorities to the office of the Presidency, it is still a matter of individual characteristic which decides how much the president will be an actor.

The parliament in a developed democracy has to have a say in decision making process as well, however the situation is more complex than that in Turkey. The parliament does not have an effective participation in day-to-day foreign policy making in Turkey but it is still a significant figure of Turkish foreign policy making. For instance, the approval of the parliament is required in order to declare a war, allow foreign troops inside or send Turkish troops

⁹⁷ Oğuz Eriş, "Körfez Krizi ve Türkiye'de Karar Alma Süreci," in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed), *Değişen Dünya ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1996), p. 252.

⁹⁸ Philip Robins, p.71.

abroad.⁹⁹ For instance, there was a specific case where the parliament has played a central role, which was about prolonging the existence of Operation Provide Comfort that established a no fly zone in northern Iraq after the second Gulf crisis.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, although it is being argued that the parliament is rarely an actor, only in marginal cases, the overturn of the 1 March (2003) motion which was about allowing and sending troops to northern Iraq demonstrated that the parliament has an influence on foreign policy decisions in strategic cases.

Related to the parliament, the structure of the political parties that enter the parliament has to be evaluated. Turkish society was introduced to the multiparty system in 1950 and until the 1960 Constitution; the party politics was a game between the Republican People's Party and the Democrat Party. After the military coup of 1960, the new constitution provided a more liberal approach to the political activities of different groups and let different movements exist; thus caused the rise of new political parties.¹⁰¹ However, the military coup of 1980 abandoned all party leaders' political activities for ten years. Two most referred reasons of this military coup were the necessity for rebuilding law and order and bringing the state authority back and forming a political infrastructure which would wipe out the turbulence experienced in 1970s.¹⁰² In order to achieve this aim, the military banned all parties and party leaders from political activities for

⁹⁹ Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, p. 5.

¹⁰⁰ Actually, the existence of Operation Provide Comfort during the Second Gulf Crisis was not supported by the parliament directly. Although the parliament did not allow the existence of Operation Provide Comfort, the government referred to the 126th resolution of the Turkish Council as a justification, which devolved its authority on this matter to the government on 17 January, 1991. See, Baskın Oran, p. 262.

¹⁰¹ Birol Akgün, "Aspects of Party System Development in Turkey," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.2, No.1 (Spring 2001), p. 75.

¹⁰² See Birol Akgün.

ten years.¹⁰³ In 1990s, the most important development for Turkish political parties has been evolution of political Islam, politicization of ethnic identities as an influential factor in Turkish society.

Though the today's Turkish political parties are either left-center or right-center, there are also marginal groups in both sides, including the Islamists. Besides, political parties in Turkey have three common characteristics. First of all, personal aversion, which emerged as a result of high polarization among them, is a noteworthy characteristic of Turkish political parties and secondly, despite the personal aversion, coalition governments dominated the Turkish political life: "dissenting groups within parties break off to form new political parties and contribute to the tendency of governments to operate in the context of coalitions."¹⁰⁴ Therefore, as Esra Çuhadar and Binnur Özkeçeci argue while designating the decision making actors of Turkish foreign policy, the role of the coalition governments has to be mentioned as well.¹⁰⁵ Although the recent election in 2002 did not result in a coalition government, analyzing the decision making process in a coalition government is still necessary since in the future Turkey may have another coalition government periods. The third characteristic of the political parties in Turkey is that they are highly centralized and controlled by the leader, which proves what Kamuran Inan says: there is "political feudalism" in Turkey.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ During this period, the Turkish military allowed three new parties to enter the election. In the election, military backed National Democracy Party was not successful, which was regarded demonstrated that the Turkish society preferred the civilians against the military. In result, Özal's Motherland Party won the elections with 45.6 percent votes.

¹⁰⁴ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*. (Westport: Praeger, 1999), pp. 21-22.

¹⁰⁵ See Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, "Decisionmaking Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.5, No.2 (Summer 2004), pp. 43-78.

¹⁰⁶ Philip Robins, p. 79.

In what way the party leaders in Turkey perceive the Russian Federation varies according to the philosophy of the party. For instance, National Movement Party and other parties which have nationalistic inclinations like Grand Unity Party, and the Islamic oriented parties like Virtue Party strongly opposes rapprochement with Russia. On the other hand, right wing parties support the opposite and favor the rapprochement, emphasizing the necessity and advantage of good relations with the Russian Federation on Turkish economy.

3.3.3. The Military versus the Civilian Authority

The military has always been a critical actor in shaping foreign policy decisions in Turkey, which is evident in four military coups (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997-mostly called as a post-modern coup). Moreover, there are periods in which the military's already existing power has been amplified. The military coup of 1980 and the following constitution of 1982 started the first period through which the military authority against the civilian was enhanced. The second period emerged as a result of two domestic issues at home: Kurdish separatism and political Islam in 1990s.

The military influences security and foreign policy of Turkey through two means: one is through the institution of the National Security Council (NSC), and second is through the impression (or suppression) that if it is not satisfied with the direction of the government, it would pursue another intervention.¹⁰⁷ Actually, the NSC has to be an advisory institution; however the decisions of the NSC have been always regarded as compulsory by the civilians in Turkey. Along with this

¹⁰⁷ Yasemin Çelik, p.21.

situation, since it was founded in 1949, the NSC'S power has grown increasingly. The article 118 of the 1982 Constitution says that "the Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSC concerning the measures that it deems necessary."¹⁰⁸ In 1983, a new law, which added a general secretariat in its body, is applied by the military government, giving the secretariat the authority to prepare all the background work and to designate the NSC meetings.¹⁰⁹ For instance, the importance of the secretariat was reflected in 28 February military coup since the NSC's "28 February Decisions" in 1997 are prepared by the secretariat.¹¹⁰ Apart from the NSC, the military has founded new sophisticated institutions. It has an extensive degree of administrative and judiciary independence through the Military Court of Appeal and the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which separates the military jurisdiction from civilian and which is responsible for promotion and dismissal of officers.¹¹¹ Additionally, the position of the chief of the general staff demonstrates the dominance of the military since the article 117 of the Constitution says that he is only responsible to the prime minister, which makes him equal to the cabinet members.¹¹²

Apart from these well organized institutions, there were two domestic developments that contributed to the power of the military. As a result of the end of the Cold War, the shift in Turkey's security understanding and more importantly the emergence of Kurdish separatism and political Islam in 1990s, which had both external and internal dynamics, put the security at the center of

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Gencer Özcan, "The Military and the making of Foreign Policy in Turkey," in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Pres, 2002), p. 24.

¹⁰⁹ For a detailed description of the duties of the secretariat see, Gencer Özcan, in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds).

¹¹⁰ Gencer Özcan, p. 25.

¹¹¹ Gencer Özcan, pp. 21-22.

¹¹² Gencer Özcan, p. 22.

Turkish politics. In order to fight against these two domestic threats, the military became (or made itself) a compulsory institution. Therefore, it was natural that the existing active involvement of the military in foreign affairs has expanded.

There are also other security establishments that have a rather weak but still relative role in foreign policymaking. The MIT (National Intelligence Service) as an intelligence organization serves for foreign espionage. The activities of the MIT were increased especially after the 1970s against the PKK insurgency and ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) attempted coup against the Azerbaijani president Haidar Aliyev in 1995 by the MIT is another example to the activities of the agency, which shows that even if it is in marginal cases, it can be an actor in foreign matters.¹¹³

The military's power has been lessened by the reforms undertaken within the Copenhagen Criteria framework. The seventh package which was adopted in August 2003, emphasized that the NSC is only an advisory body, and it lessened the frequency of its meetings to once in two months.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the package removed the military officers as judges in the State Security Courts, changed the political parties law and made it difficult to close down the activities of a political party.¹¹⁵ On the whole, reforms undertaken by the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition and following AKP government in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria have reduced the authority of the military and changed the character of civil-military relations. Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that the military and the NSC's have been reduced to an advisory body; on the contrary, the military is still a crucial

¹¹³ Philip Robins, pp. 77-78.

¹¹⁴ Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead-Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy," *Turkey in Europe Monitor*, (May 2005), p. 61.

¹¹⁵ Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, p. 61.

foreign policy actor of Turkish Republic. Therefore, the perception of the Russian Federation by the Turkish military is still crucial.

The military of both Turkey and Russia has been important foreign policy actors in shaping the character of Turkish-Russian relations. In both countries, as a result of past wars and conflicts between the two nations, the military is rather suspicious about the intention of the other, which will be reflected in the military relations.

3.3.4. The Role of the Interest Groups and NGOs

The economic transformation of the country and the emergence of the Turkish private sector after the 1980s resulted in the proliferation of actors in foreign policy decision making. Before 1980s, Turkish economy was highly centralized and was mostly controlled by the state, which made the business groups dependent on the state.¹¹⁶ However, after the liberalization programme, Turkey entered into the process of integration to the world economy, especially during Özal's presidency, which increased the role of "the economy bureaucracy" in decision making procedure of the country for they were the experts on economic affairs.¹¹⁷ The significance of these businessmen appeared in their affirmative contribution to Turkish-Russian relations, which will be discussed in the economic relations.

Other interest groups than the economic ones had also participated in foreign policy making with an increasing trend after 1990s. From ethnic lobbies like the "Chechen lobby" or the "Balkan lobby" to civil society organizations, the

¹¹⁶ Philip Robins, p. 84.

¹¹⁷ Meliha Benli Altunışık, p. 92.

foreign policy issues are started to be discussed.¹¹⁸ For instance, one of the ethnic pressure groups, the Caucasian Chechen Solidarity Committee (CCSC) helped the Chechen refugees in 1995, which carried Turkish-Russian relations to a more problematic stage.¹¹⁹

Business associations have more influence on the decisionmaking process than issue-oriented civil initiatives or civil societies in Turkey.¹²⁰ The role of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) in foreign policymaking is an example to this argument. Another example is Turkish International Cooperation (TIKA) as an economic organization that helps the Turkish businessmen in the Turkic Republics and “Russian lobby” that facilitates the activities of the Turkish businessmen in Russia.¹²¹ For example, since the Russian lobby and TUSIAD are afraid of the deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and Russia, it supports Turkish-Russian partnership while the foreign ministry and the military is more suspicious about it.

Energy issues of Turkish politics have become significant when Turkey’s dependence on oil and gas has increased with the industrialization process. Therefore, energy companies emerged as another Turkish foreign policy actors. Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), BOTAŞ, and Turkish Petroleum Refineries (TÜPRAŞ), are the most influential energy companies in Turkey. In relation to the issues about the energy politics, for instance, the foreign ministry and the energy ministry have different views since while the energy ministry

¹¹⁸ Meliha Benli Altunışık, p. 93.

¹¹⁹ Philip Robins, p. 88.

¹²⁰ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Turkish Democracy: Patronage or Governance,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol.2, No.1 (2001), p. 61.

¹²¹ Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus,” in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Pres, 2002), p. 231.

supports to import Russian and Iranian oil and gas, the foreign ministry is suspicious about those countries.¹²²

3.3.5. The role of the Media and the Public Opinion

By the end of 1980s, the number of private televisions and radio channels in Turkey has increased while before 1990s, the media was owned by the state.¹²³ At present, Turkish society can have access to diverse TV or radio channels, magazine and book publication.

The media is an increasingly important actor in foreign policymaking; yet the fact that there was a proliferation of the media does not mean that there was a proliferation of the media owners. Turkish media is mostly controlled by a few groups, currently by Doğan Grubu, which Ian Lesser compares to the monopoly of Berlusconi on Italian media outlets.¹²⁴ Still, Turkish media can be regarded as a device to express the sentiments of the diverse groups in the society, from right and left to Islamic groups. For instance, there are Islamic oriented TV channels like Samanyolu and Kanal 7 as well as the press like Yenişafak and Samanyolu, which express the sentiments of the Islamist people in the country. Moreover, with the reforms performed in order to get a date from the EU, the state owned TV channel, TRT, has started to broadcast in Kurdish too. Therefore, compared to the years before the EU process (1999), the media and the press have gained more voice and have been tools of reflecting the different ideological voices in Turkey.

¹²² Gareth M. Winrow, p. 242.

¹²³ Meliha Benli Altunışık, p. 93.

¹²⁴ Ian O. Lesser and Stephen Larrabee (eds), *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica:RAND Publications, 2002), p. 55.

The media is also used by the Turkish state in order to develop closer ties with the Turkic republics in Central Asia, Caucasus, and Europe.¹²⁵ Furthermore, Ankara established Avrasya television network with the aim of manipulating the cultural, linguistic and religious ties in order to achieve better political and economic relationship.¹²⁶

The media in Turkey has the power to form the public opinion. The media images of the Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq or Kardak/Imia crisis with Greece have significant examples of the power of the media to affect the public opinion. Therefore, especially in relation with the Chechnya crisis between Turkey and Russia, the media will be an important actor.

3.4. Conclusion

The phenomenon of Vladimir Putin stands as one of the most remarkable decision making actor of Russian foreign policy. Considering the state's large control over the energy sector, the media, the weakness of political parties and the superpresidential political regime, the main decision making actor in the Russian Federation will stay as the individual political leaders in the foreseeable future. A strong power center as a characteristic of Russian political system has been attempted to change by Yeltsin to some extent but this process is being backtracked with Putin's leadership and has put the state at the center of politics.

Apart from the individual factor, the energy companies have emerged as significant decision makers with Yeltsin's presidency again. Among these companies, Gazprom, which is a state natural gas and oil company, is becoming a

¹²⁵ Philip Robins. p. 81.

¹²⁶ Philip Robins. pp. 81-82.

crucial decision making actor. Yet, since the state's control over these companies increased after the Yukos affair, it became harder to talk about free energy companies in the Russian Federation, which again places the rise of statism in the country. Thus, according to Kegley and Witkoff's scheme of foreign policy analysis, the individual and governmental sources have control of the decision making structure in the Russian Federation.

When it comes to Turkey, the picture is more complex than the Russian Federation. Geography, history and ideology have been three constant factors that designed Turkey's relations with any country. These factors mostly constrained Turkish-Russian relations except geography also playing a contributing role on the economic relations. Turkey and Russia has been historical rivals and to change this perception, in other words to neglect and forget the history requires time. In this sense, without referring to history, analyzing Turkish-Russian relations will be incomplete.

The traditional decision making actors of Turkey have been the military, the prime minister, and the foreign ministry. This classic tripod still has significant foreign policy voices but the privatization process after 1980s, and the reforms adopted in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria have added new actors such as business organization, the media, NGOs to foreign policy making in Turkey. Moreover, with the reforms of 1999 and afterwards, the traditional decision making actor, the military, has been referred in these reforms as an only advisory body. On the whole, decision making actors are more diverse in Turkey than in the Russian Federation.

CHAPTER IV

TURKISH-RUSSIAN POLITICAL RELATIONS

“If it had not been the Russians, the victory of the new Turkey over the invaders would be won with much greater losses or it would not even be possible. Russia helped Turkey both spiritually and psychically; and to forget this kind of support will be a crime.”¹²⁷

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

In this section, the development of Turkish-Russian relations on the political basis after 1999 will be analyzed and in the end, it is aimed to reach a conclusion whether the issues that formed the general framework of the political relations resulted in partnership or rivalry. Before moving on 1999 and afterwards, the history of Turkish-Russian political relations will be referred briefly so as to understand the connection of history and present relations. For this reason, the chapter will start by touching on the relationship before the end of the Cold War and then it will continue with the course of Turkish-Russian political relations in the Greater Black Sea Region after 1999.

4.1. Brief overlook to the Relations before the end of the Cold War

The history of Turkish-Russian relations dates back centuries ago. The first Russian state was a small territory around Kiev, which the Ottoman Empire did not consider important enough to establish direct diplomatic relations, and thus the connection has been through the Crimea Khanate.¹²⁸ The first Ottoman

¹²⁷ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Kuruluşunun 80. Yıldönümü. Rus-Türk İlişkilerinde İlk Adımlar, ” *The Russian Embassy of Turkish Republic*. Available at http://www.turkey.mid.ru/20-30gg_t.html

¹²⁸ Saime Yüceer, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Ankara-Moskova İlişkileri*, (Bursa: Erkin Kitabevi, 1997), p.1.

and Russian relationship has been through the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray in 1492 (during Bayezid the Second) and the first Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Michail Pleşçeyev, was accepted by the Ottomans in 1497.¹²⁹ The rise of Russian influence through the Terek River and the closure of Astrakhan road for Turkish pilgrims and merchants by the Russians resulted in the Ottoman military expedition on Ejderhan in 1569, which was the first tension between the Ottomans and Russians.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, the most important period, which formed the basis of Turkish-Russian perception of each other, has not started until Peter the Great became the Tsar in 1689. The target of him, which resulted in a long history of wars and conflicts, was expanding towards the warm oceans, which could only happen by controlling the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and from there the Mediterranean. Since then the fact that Turkey's geopolitical location prevented the Russian foreign policy target of expanding towards the south created nine major wars and many minor arm conflicts between the two nations.¹³¹

As a natural result of these wars and conflicts, the image of *Türk* for Russians and *Moskof* for Turks has not been a positive one. The interwar period, therefore, appeared as a chance to reverse the situation since a short period of mutual empathy and understanding between the Bolshevik Russia and new Turkish Republic, especially between Lenin and Atatürk emerged. Ankara and Moscow signed *The Friendship and Neutrality Treaty* in 1925, which

¹²⁹ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917'ye Kadar*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987), pp. 117-118.

¹³⁰ Akdes Nimet Kurat, pp. 159-160.

¹³¹ For a comprehensive history of the conflicts between Ottomans and Russians, see Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri (1798-1919)*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1970).

demonstrated how the two countries perceived each other as friends during those years, if not allies.¹³² However the sudden end of cooperation between Turkish Republic and Bolshevik Russia with the death of these two leaders and with Stalin's demands on the eastern part of Turkey and the straits demonstrates how hard to forget the past and ameliorate the relationship.

Combined with Stalin's policies towards Turkey and Turkic Republics, Turkey's siding with the NATO camp augmented the mutual perception of the other as *the enemy* during the Cold War period. On this account, the end of the Cold War was a welcomed event that was expected to normalize the Turkish-Russian relations. However, the policies of Russia and Turkey in the Greater Black Sea Region during the 1990s have not progressed in an ordered line; in other words where political and security dimension of the relationship carried the characteristic of rivalry, economic relations reversed the situation and developed with an unexpected speed.

4.2. Basic Character of Political Relations: 1991-1999

While explaining the incidents that formed the political relations of Turkey and Russia during the 1990s, first, the impact of the end of the Cold War on foreign policy formation, and second political choices of the decision making actors of the two countries will be considered as the determinant elements of political relations. Only after, it can be either argued that Turkish-Russian foreign policies were in harmony with each other or the

¹³² This treaty was abrogated by Stalin on November 7, 1945 on the ground that the treaty was not appropriate for that time's political conditions. For the articles of the treaty, see İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları: 1920-1945*. C:1. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989), pp. 268-270.

relationship displayed the characteristic of rivalry between the years 1991 and 1999.

Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and Russian Federation, which was signed by the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel on 25-26 May 1992, formed the legal basis of the political relations.¹³³ Since the *Friendship and Neutrality Treaty* in 1925, this agreement was the first political contract between Turkey and Russia and a significant agreement for both sides named the other as *the friend*.¹³⁴ It was aimed to be a major document reflecting the friendship and solidarity in Turkish-Russian relations; however, despite this positive start of the political relations with the end of the Cold War, the latter developments did not follow the same line.

One of the most significant developments by the end of the Cold War was the change in the power balance between Turkey and Russia; Russia losing its superpower position and Turkey being excited about the emergence of new Turkish states. The shift in the power balance between Turkey and Russia enabled the possibility of talking about Turkish-Russian rivalry to some extent since the two has been considered having balanced powers, if not equals.¹³⁵ Russia, despite its weaknesses compared to the Cold War years, was still a more powerful country with its nuclear weapons, energy reserves than Turkey; nevertheless the fact that it has condensed to a weaker position changed the perception of each other. In other

¹³³ Baskın Oran, p. 546.

¹³⁴ Baskın Oran, p. 547.

¹³⁵ Duygu Bazoğlu argues that after the end of the Cold War, Russia's role in international politics can be termed as a "regional power." Similarly, Turkey has been termed with either "middle power" or "regional power". See Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Düşmanlıktan 'Fiili Yakınlaşma'ya," in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası*, (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2002).

words, Turkey, considering the fact that Russia is limited and less effective in the post-Cold War, started to perceive Russia as a country which it could challenge.

Related to the power status of Russia in the post-Cold War context, the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state in international politics was one of the contributing developments as it changed the geostrategic situation of the Black Sea.¹³⁶ With the independence of Ukraine, which had been the most important guarantor of Russian dominance in the Black Sea, the Russian power ratio in the region has decreased compared to the Cold War years.

In the initial years of the end of the Cold War, Yeltsin-Gaidar-Kozyrev trio were hard supporters of the Atlanticist approach, which as a result Russia neglected the ex-Soviet areas and developed a completely Western based foreign policy approach. In other words, Russian rulers of the time departed from traditional Russian foreign policy towards the ex-Soviet territories.

Turkey as well departed from its traditional foreign policy making towards the region.¹³⁷ The demise of the USSR and the power vacuum left by the Atlanticist school animated the forgotten idea of Turkish unity “from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese borders.”¹³⁸ Expectations of Turkey from close political

¹³⁶ See Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "From Hegemony to Pluralism: The Changing Politics of the Black Sea," *SAIS Review*, Vol.17, No.1 (Winter-Spring 1997); Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, "Rusya Federasyonu'nun Yeni Güvnelik Politikası Çerçevesinde Türkiye'ye Bakışı," in Mustafa Türkeş and İlhan Uzgel (eds), *Türkiye'nin Komşuları*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002).

¹³⁷ Gareth Winrow explains that until the end of the Cold War Turkish foreign policy makers neglected the Turkic people in the ex-Soviet areas and were careful not to interfere in the region. The traditional foreign policy toward the region had been shaped by Atatürk's ideas, which showed high distaste for any pan-Turkist inclinations. On the topic, see Gareth Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet-Central Asia*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).

¹³⁸ Şule Kut underlines that the concept of “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China” was first used by Henry Kissinger. See Şule Kut, “The Contours of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s,” in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds), *Turkey in World Politics*, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002), p: 16. The idea was backed by the President Turgut Özal and the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in Turkish official lines where the military on the other hand was attentive not to be attracted by the idea.

activation in Eurasia and the activation of the “Turkish Model”¹³⁹ in the region were first of all to prove the importance of itself for the West once more and secondly to amplify its regional profile.¹⁴⁰ The promotion of the concept of the Turkish Model to the new states of Eurasia was not backed up by the Turks only; it was also supported by the West so as to prevent the spread of radical Islam by Iran.¹⁴¹ Supported by the West, among the efforts that Turkey did in order to materialize its leadership claim right after the independence of the states in Eurasia, the meeting of Turkic summits has been inaugurated in Ankara in November and December 1992 by the presidents of Turkic states; a satellite broadcast TÜRKSAT 2 was established; and the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) was formed in 1992 and various state level visit to the newly independent states have taken place.¹⁴²

The Turkish Model, however, has not been welcomed by the new Turkic states of Eurasia for several reasons and the excitement for the unity of the Turks has short lived. Since 1991, there were three major handicaps that prevented the plans of Turkish decision makers towards the region: first and foremost, Turkey did not have the necessary economic, technological resources, and also experts who could have supply knowledge about these new states.¹⁴³ Secondly, the social and political structure of the new Turkic Republics did not embrace a unity based

¹³⁹ The term Turkish Model means the model of development which carry the characteristics of secularism, market economy, cooperation with the West, and a multi-party system in a Muslim country; that is the process which Turkey underwent. See İdris Bal, *Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and the Fall of the 'Turkish Model'*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000); İdris Bal, “Turkish Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument in Post Cold War Era: The Cases of Turkic Republics and the Post September 11th Era,” in İdris Bal (ed), *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, (Roca Baton: Brown Walker Press, 2004), p. 280.

¹⁴⁰ Gareth Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet-Central Asia*, p. 1-2.

¹⁴¹ Gareth Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet-Central Asia*, p. 13.

¹⁴² Mustafa Aydın, “Foucault’s Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” p. 5.

¹⁴³ Robert Olson, *Türkiye’nin Suriye, İsrail ve Rusya ile İlişkileri: 1979-2001*, Süleyman Elik (trans), (Ankara: Orient Yayınları, 2005), p.

on nationalism and religion, which was an outcome of the communist culture; and lastly Russia's foreign policy shift that decided to give priority on the ex-Soviet areas after 1993 was a preventing post.¹⁴⁴

In 1993, when the dominance of the Atlanticist school on foreign policy making is replaced by the Eurasianists and when even the Yeltsin administration and his followers had to converge with the Eurasianists, the development of near abroad policy as a result deteriorated the relations with Turkey, which was during that period perceived as a country trying to establish a pan-Turkist unity.¹⁴⁵

Therefore, the political shift from a foreign policy pattern that regarded the West as the ultimate remedy and model for the recovery to an intense focus on the ex-Soviet territories has to be regarded as a significant development which ended the three years silence (1990-1993) in the relationship and gave way to the start of political disputes in Turkish-Russian political relations. The perception of Turkey as a political rival after 1993 is evident in the White Book of Russian Special Services, which named Turkey as "an aspiring regional power that supports "Muslim movements", cherished "pan-Turkic ideas", and might move into the "geo-strategic niche" in the Caucasus created by Russia's weakening state."¹⁴⁶ Along these lines, with the emergence of Turkish Model and near abroad as a reaction, Turkey and Russia were political rivals until the end of 1990s.

In this period the role of the NGOs and cultural associations, which also functioned as important political lobbies, should be referred as well. Among them, Kaf-der, Caucasus-Chechen Solidarity Committee (Kafkas Vakfı, Çeçen

¹⁴⁴ Robert Olson, pp. 90-91.

¹⁴⁵ Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, p. 334-337.

¹⁴⁶ Igor Torbakov, "Turkey and Russia: Competition and Cooperation," *Eurasia Insight*, (27 December, 2002). Available online at <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122702.shtml>.

Dayanışması Grubu), Azerbaijan Amity Association (Azerbaycan Dostluk Derneği) are the most influential lobbies.¹⁴⁷ Actually; these lobbies becomes important causal agents of the military relations which will be discussed broadly in the next chapter; however the fact that they are also influential political lobbies has to be mentioned. For instance, Turkish citizens of Caucasus origin, who are mostly supported by these lobbies, hijacked the Avrasya ferry from Trabzon port in order to show the disapproval of Russian war on Chechens in 1996.¹⁴⁸ Considering the fact that the Chechen issue is Russia's soft belly, the impact of the activities of these associations on Turkish-Russian relations is inevitable. These lobbies are supported both by Turkish public and Turkish officials, which deteriorate the relationship between the political leaders as well. Russian Federation demands the closure of these Caucasian and Chechen associations and foundations in Turkey, blaming them for financing the Chechen terrorists in Russian territory. Related to this demand, many official visits have been made to Turkey. For instance, the visit of Albert Çernişev on 20 July 1997, who was the Deputy Prime Minister and who knows Turkish very well on 20 July, 1997 was about ending the actions of Caucasus-Chechen Solidarity Group in Turkey.¹⁴⁹

Just like these NGOs who are against any level of partnership with the Russian Federation, there are political figures in Russia who feel the same for Turkey. In current Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Alexander Dugin are the two political figures who back up the philosophy of Eurasianism for Russian foreign policy. Vladimir Zhirinovskii is the leader of the nationalist and pro-

¹⁴⁷ Bülent Aras, "Turkey's Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 48.

¹⁴⁸ Bülent Aras, "Turkey's Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options," p. 48.

¹⁴⁹ Robert Olson, p. 95.

Eurasianist *Liberal Democratic Party*, while Alexander Dugin who established Eurasian Party in 2001 and is considered as the recent spokesman of this philosophy. According to Zhirinovskii, all problems and calamities that the Russians faced in its history originated in the South and as a consequence Russia has to control the South, which includes Turkey as well. In comparison, Zhirinovskii is a more nationalist figure while Dugin's understanding of Eurasianism is a more sophisticated one,¹⁵⁰ however what binds these two figures is the fact that they see Turkey as a rival rather than a partner.

4.3. Political Relations After 1999: “The Action Plan in Eurasia” and Political Visits between Turkey and Russia

Relations on the regional level are generated through the concept of *multidimensional partnership* in Eurasia, which refers to a wide area including the Greater Black Sea Region. The basis for achieving that aim has been provided by “The Action Plan for the Development of Cooperation in Eurasia: From Bilateral Cooperation to Multi-Dimensional Partnership”¹⁵¹, which formed the legal foundation of the new stage in Turkish-Russian relations. Although it is not an agreement, it is evident that after *Friendship and Neutrality Treaty* in 1925 and *The Treaty of Good Neighborhood and Friendship* in 1991, the foundation of current Russian-Turkish political relations aims to develop the bilateral relations further in Eurasia through this plan. The Plan is signed by the Foreign Minister of Turkey, İsmail Cem and Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov in New York on

¹⁵⁰ see Alexander Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiğinde Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2003).

¹⁵¹ “The Action Plan for the Development of Cooperation in Eurasia: From Bilateral Cooperation to Multi-Dimensional Partnership” is available online at the website of the Russian Embassy of Turkey: http://www.turkey.mid.ru/relat_2_t.html.

the sixteenth of November, 2001. Needless to add that the plan also demonstrates the effective role of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

According to the plan:

“Russia and Turkey share the characteristic of both Asia and Europe as a result of their common geography, history, and culture. Being two significant countries of Eurasia, Russia and Turkey have similar approaches on issues how to enhance the international law, democracy, human rights as well as peace, stability, and economic development in the region. This mutual understanding and cooperation will also bring a new dynamic, perspective, and depth to Turkish-Russian bilateral relations.”¹⁵²

Under these circumstances, the structure of political relations, when compared to the relations between 1991-1999 has been anticipated to move towards a better stage. Along this line, since 2001 there have been summits. It can be argued that The Action Plan has been a rather passive one although Turkey and Russia could have carried their relationship further with it. Actually, the concept of multidimensional partnership has been a term which was referred before the formation of “The Action Plan” document and it has been emphasized almost in every meeting between Turkish-Russian officials after 1999. In the political visits, the insistent stress by the officials on the fact that the concepts of rivalry and competition in the relationship have been left in the past; in other words the emphasis of Turkish-Russian officials on multidimensional partnership between Turkey-Russia now plays a significant role in order to develop a cooperation

¹⁵² “The Action Plan for the Development of Cooperation in Eurasia: From Bilateral Cooperation to Multi-Dimensional Partnership.”

ground in the overall bilateral relations. At this point, the mutual official visits between Turkey and Russia are contributing factors.

An active political dialogue between the officials of Turkey and Russia after 1999 created a series of high level contacts. These mutual political visits have been positive impetus in the process of removing the former misperception and mistrust between Turkey and Russia. Until 1999, except the official visit of Suleyman Demirel to Moscow in 1992 and Cernomyrdin's visit to Turkey in 1997, who was the first Russian Premier to visit Turkey, the two countries did not have any state level visits. However, starting with the visit of Bülent Ecevit to Moscow on 4-6 November, 1999, there has been a flurry of official visits between Turkey and Russia. Especially Putin's visit to Ankara on December 5-6 2004, which is the first visit of a Russian head of state after Soviet Union's President Nikolay Podgorny in 1973, laid emphasis on the shift of the strategic perceptions of each other. His visit is followed by his Turkish counterparts. Additionally, *The Declaration on the Enhancement of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership*, which was signed by Presidents A.N. Sezer and V.V. Putin in December 2004, is an explicit evidence for both sides' will to keep the relationship on the positive track.

These visits definitely will play a significant role in the development of the relationship and in lessening the political stereotypes of the decision making elites.¹⁵³ As a result of these official visits, both conflictual issues will have the chance to be discussed and Russia and Turkey will get to know each other better, which is the only way which goes to rapprochement (even partnership) between

¹⁵³ Aleksandr Lebedev, "Some Observations on the RF President's Visit to Turkey," *Russian Journal of International Relations*.

the two. However, a long time is needed in order to overcome these stereotypes and wipe up the mistrust with these visits.

4.3.1. Status Quo versus Democratic Movements: Conciliatory Element

Positive stimulus in Turkish-Russian relations created by active political dialogue after 1999 is propped with external causal agents, which always influence Turkish-Russian relations since the region these two states are located has been and is still a strategic area in which many powers are interested as discussed in the second chapter. While during the 1990s the end of the Cold War and reconfiguration of both Russia and Turkey's power status in world politics accordingly was the most significant development that gave new tone to Turkish-Russian political relations; after 1999, however, it was the reformation of the world political order by "September 11" terrorist attacks on the twin towers in 2001. Although the impact of September 11 on Turkish-Russian relations will be discussed broadly in the contexts of Turkish-Russian military-security relations, it is necessary to refer to it briefly now as well in order to understand the political changes.

Apart from effects on military relations, what was important about September 11 for Turkish-Russian political relations was the acceleration of the Western exportation of democracy to the Black Sea Region. The Velvet Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 emerged in post-September 11 context. Followingly, the establishment of "The Community of Democratic Choice" which values the promotion of democracy to the Black Sea Region as the most significant target of itself is the continuation of

the colorful revolutions and it contributes to the political divisions further in the region.¹⁵⁴ The Community is inspired by Ukraine and it includes nine states from the Baltic, Balkan and Black Sea Region; which are Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Macedonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Moldova, Estonia, and Lithuania.¹⁵⁵ The regional stability, the development of democracy and economic cooperation are articulated as the main objectives of the group. Although the president of Yushchenko stated that “our initiative is not directed against any third countries or institutions; on the contrary, I see the Community of Democratic Choice as open dialogue between friends, adherents of ideas for promoting democracy and the supremacy of law”, in most of the Russian, Georgian and Ukrainian media the community is perceived as a counter association against the CIS mentality in the Black Sea Region.¹⁵⁶ Analyzing the other declarations, the real intention of the organization can be seen. In other words it is evident in the stress of the Ukrainian president Yushchenko’s words that it is established as a political group against the CIS. Yushchenko at the Borjomi summit said that;

“we (Saakashvili and myself) both understand that if we want to see our countries develop democratically, then the issue of democracy is, thankfully, not restricted to our sole national boundaries. We must now know whether our neighbours’ values correspond to ours. If they do not correspond, then perhaps the time has come for us to consider creating a coalition, a coalition of states for whom freedom and democracy are basic values.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ The President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko and the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili signed a joint declaration on cooperation at the Georgian governmental residence in Likani, near the resort town of Borjomi, on August 12, 2005.

¹⁵⁵ Jean Christophe Peuch, “Ukraine: Regional Leaders Set Up Community of Democratic Choice”.

¹⁵⁶ The examples of newspapers that interpreted the aim of the forum as an attempt to limit Russian influence in the Black Sea Region is given by Jean Christophe Peuch at the following news line. See Jean Christophe Peuch, “Regional Leaders Set up the Community of Democratic Choice.”

¹⁵⁷ Jean Christophe Peuch, “East: Leaders meet in Ukraine to Create New Regional Alliance,” *RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report*, Vol.7, No.42 (December 2005).

Both Turkey and Russia are reluctant to support democratic movements in the Black Sea Region; thus exportation of democracy by the West to the Greater Black Sea Region creates a common ground between Turkey and Russia since these two regional powers support status quo against any kind of transformation in the region. The Russian side opposes these movements since it perceives them as efforts to diminish the Russian power in the region. In other words, according to the Russian perception of these revolutions, the real target behind them was wiping out the Russian influence on these states. Given the fact that Turkey itself argues to be a “model” as a democratic country to the new states in the ex-Soviet areas, although it might be expected that Turkey would be on the Western side on this issue, the developments indicate that Turkey is not pleased with the situation as well. Just like Turkey considers the developments in Iraq as creating chaos, instability, and damage to Turkish interests in the region, while on the contrary the US considers it as the first test area for spreading democracy and freedom, Turkey does not support the US initiated reforms for freedom and democracy in the Black Sea Region similarly.¹⁵⁸ As Zeyno Baran further indicates that, as former empires like Turkey and Russia, both perceive the Black Sea as their “special zone of influence” and they oppose to any foreign presence in the region, where they want to stay the major powers.¹⁵⁹ Preserving the status quo of the region, which is the main target that both Turkey and Russia want to achieve, is the driving force in this reluctance to support the initiatives taken by Ukraine and led by the West.

¹⁵⁸ Testimony of Zeyno Baran, Director for International Security and Energy Program, Before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Nixon Center, (March 2005), p. 9.

¹⁵⁹ The Testimony of Zeyno Baran, Director for International Security and Energy Program, Before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Nixon Center, (March 2005), p. 10.

4.3.2. The Role of the Domestic Developments

When it comes to the domestic determinants, Putin's election first as the Prime Minister in August 1999 and later as the President in January 2000 opened a new phase first of all for Russian foreign policy and secondly for Turkish-Russian relations. Although Putin is successor of Yeltsin, it can be argued that his understanding of foreign and domestic policy making differs. In other words, Russian foreign policy has and is going through a change in tone, direction, and tactics. It should be remembered that there are other actors and factors that contribute to Russian foreign policy, as discussed in chapter two; yet, to analyze Putin as the leader of the country is an indispensable part of Russian foreign relations due to his share in foreign policy making pastry in Russia.

On the domestic sphere, Putin is or appears to be nostalgic about the Soviet Union and he refers to the Soviet and Russian patriotism together when he speaks; which fulfill the sentiments of the society. Just like the ordinary Russians, he states that he regrets the demise of the Soviet Union but he is aware of the fact that it is impossible to revitalize its borders.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, choosing "stability" as the first ultimate goal to be achieved for Russia was a strategic choice of Putin because it was a period in which instability emerged in the last tenure of Yeltsin infested the country at home.

According to Erhan Büyükkakıncı, which is shared by most of the scholars, Putin's foreign policy can be divided into three periods: the first phase is the year when he became the Prime Minister (1999-2000), which is characterized by

¹⁶⁰ Mark N. Katz, "Exploiting Rivalries for Prestige and Profit: An Assessment of Putin's Foreign Policy Approach," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.52, No.3 (May-June 2005), p. 26.

nationalist tendencies; the second period starts with 2000 and ends in September 11, in which the process of statism is accelerated and the Eurasianist school dominated the foreign policy; and lastly the period after September 11, in which the Eurasianist approach is softened and the Atlanticist approach is also referred, forms the last phase of Putin administration.¹⁶¹ This scheme is helpful to understand until 2005 when Russia cut natural gas transmitting to Ukraine since it is perceived as a return to Eurasianist policies. The variety of periods and the difficulty to characterize the foreign policy understanding of Putin show that Putin is an amalgam of both foreign policy schools.. In this paper, it is argued that Putin is neither of these schools. In other words, the reason why Western or Eastern scholars cannot decide whether he is a liberal, authoritarian, Eurasianist, or Atlanticist lies in the fact that Putin is an amalgam of all these school. In other words, just like the Russian state, which was named as managed democracy in the third chapter, Putin is a combination of all liberal, authoritarian, Eurasianist or Atlanticist schools.

In the first phase of his administration, in order to maintain the territorial integrity of the Russian state, Putin held a decisive attack on Chechens in the second Russo-Chechen war in 1999. Although the influence of the Chechen issue on Turkish-Russian relation will be discussed in the military context broadly, it is necessary to talk about it now in order to show how Putin's political popularity among the Russians was strengthened. The fact that the second Chechen war coincided with his presidency was a chance for Putin to prove himself for

¹⁶¹ Erhan Büyükakıncı, "Vladimir Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasına Bakış Söylemler, Arayışlar ve Fırsatlar," in Erhan Büyükakıncı (ed), *Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna*, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004)

Russians and he used it to the ends.¹⁶² Media channels like Gusinskii's NTV, Brezovskii's ORT and the state channel RTR has supported Putin by giving news about how Putin was successful in the Chechen war, the military funerals which are performed according to Orthodox procedures and which Putin himself attended, and how nationalist he was.¹⁶³

Having achieved to become the president of Russian Federation, in the second period, Putin portrayed a statist, an authoritarian and Eurasianist leader. The acceleration of state's control over the media, the oil and gas companies as discussed in chapter two are the most significant examples which gave way to this interpretation. Moreover, the process of restructuring the state institutions, reducing the other actors except the state were two important paradigms of the Eurasianist school, which meant the acceleration of CIS politics in foreign policy; an example of how a domestic dynamic has a foreign policy outcome.¹⁶⁴ Besides, just like the Foreign Policy Concept of 1997, the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000, which restates that the CIS territory will be Russia's foreign policy priority, Putin further underlined the importance of making Russian Federation preeminent in ex-Soviet areas.¹⁶⁵

However, Putin's post-September 11 policies represented a decisive turn from his old policies. Putin has been one of the first leaders who called George Bush and condemned the responsible terrorists for the attack. From this date on,

¹⁶² Murat M Taşar, "Kremlin'deki Yeni Çar: Vladimir Vladimiroviç Putin," in Yılmaz Tezkan (ed), *Kadim Komşumuz Yeni Rusya*, (İstanbul: Ülke Kitapları, 2001), p. 139.

¹⁶³ Peter Rutland, "Putin'in İktidar Yolu," in Yılmaz Tezkan (ed), *Kadim Komşumuz Yeni Rusya*, (İstanbul: Ülke Kitapları, 2001), p. 164.

¹⁶⁴ Erhan Büyükkakıncı, p. 160.

¹⁶⁵ Mark N. Katz, p. 27.

Russian-U.S. relations was characterized by a more pragmatic approach which was based on mutual benefit.¹⁶⁶

On the whole, Analysis of these three different periods reinforce that Putin's foreign policy approach is neither Eurasianist-he does not see the East as an alternative to the West- nor Atlanticist- who sees the West as the only model that Russia has to take; on the other hand his foreign policy is characterized by "mutually beneficial cooperation" (*vzaimovыgodno*).¹⁶⁷ In other words, according to Putin's foreign policy understanding the value of regional bilateral relationships lies in their security, political, and economic benefit.¹⁶⁸

When it comes to the Turkish side of the track, the election of an Islamist government in November 2002 was thought to create a tension in the bilateral relations considering the fact that Islamist people have been the one who supported the Chechen separatists in Turkey. However, the insistent stress of AKP on being a moderate Islamist party abated the fear that AKP government would pursue an Islamist foreign policy. The initial Prime Minister Abdullah Gül in an interview told that "Our aim is to show the world that a country which has a Moslem population can also be democratic, transparent, and modern and cooperate with the world."¹⁶⁹ Erdoğan's own stress on the fact that Turkey should work with Russia to fight against terrorism and the attitude taken according to these statements relieved the expectations that AKP would emphasize its Islamist line of thought.

¹⁶⁶ Esra Hatipoğlu, p. 287.

¹⁶⁷ Samuel Charap, p.57.

¹⁶⁸ Testimony of Celeste A. Vallander Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Center for Strategic and International Studies, (2005), p. 9.

¹⁶⁹ Quoted in Bülent Aras, *War in the Gardens of Babylon*, (Istanbul: TASAM Publications, 2004), p. 81.

The friendly personal dialogue between Erdoğan and Putin is also quite significant in order to improve the relationship. It is known that Putin gives importance to establish personal relationship with the state leaders and along with this, he has close relations with Silvio Berlusconi, Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schröder and R. Tayyip Erdoğan as well. Actually, as well as differences Erdoğan and Putin have some similarities: both have been against oligarchs in their country-Uzan Operation of Erdoğan and Yukos Affair of Putin-and define their country as being both Western and Asian. Besides, in Eurasian geography, personal contacts between the state leaders direct and guide the relationship between the states and institution.¹⁷⁰ Therefore, bearing in mind the fact that the leader change may reverse the situation as well, the personal amity between Erdoğan and Putin is a positive impetus to form partnership in Turkish-Russian relations.

4.3.3. The Role of the other Actors-European Union and NATO-in the Region

The policies of the European Union towards the Greater Black Sea Region can be divided into two categories: first one is the economy policies formed by the bilateral trade agreements, economic development and humane aid packets; and the second one is the foreign and security policy of the club.¹⁷¹ However, in the political realm, the EU has not been as active as it is in the economic sphere. The most important reason of this situation is the fact that the European countries do

¹⁷⁰ Sinan Ogan, "Erdoğan'ın Moskova Ziyareti," *Stratejik Analiz*. Vol.5, No.58 (February 2005), pp. 6-7.

¹⁷¹ Burak Tangör, "Avrupa Entegrasyonu ve Karadeniz," in Öztürk, Osman Metin and Yalçın Sarıkaya (eds), *Uluslararası Mücadelenin Yeni Odağı: Karadeniz*, (Ankara: Platin Yayınevi, 2005), p. 60.

not have similar foreign policy objectives and concepts; in other words it is hard to argue that there is a harmony in European Union foreign policy.¹⁷²

With the first enlargement of the European Union, ten Southeast and Central European Countries-Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia-have been included in March 2004. Bulgaria and Romania, which are the littoral states of the Black Sea, will be included in 2007 or 2008. As a result of its last enlargement process, once Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey become members, the EU will be either an actor or at least will be bordering the Black Sea Region.

At this point, the decision of the European Union to give Turkey first a candidate country status at the Helsinki Summit and later opening the process of negotiations has to be taken into account while analyzing Turkish-Russian relations. In order to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, the Turkish governments (first Ecevit-Bahçeli-Yılmaz coalition and later AKP) have initiated the materialization of many reforms in the political sphere in Turkey. The growing role of the interest groups or non-state actors and the laws that reduced almost unquestionable place of the Turkish military on foreign policy making, as discussed in the second chapter, emerged after Turkey got a candidate status. As a result of Turkish efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the European Union has decided to start the negotiations with Turkey on the fourth of December, 2005.

Apart from these domestic developments, which definitely have foreign outcomes, if Turkey joins the European Union, Russia, first of all, will have to deal with the whole European Community rather than a single country. The state-

¹⁷² Burak Tangör, p. 61.

level declarations indicate that the Russian Federation supports Turkey's joining the European club, which creates a positive atmosphere for Turkish-Russian political agenda. Given the fact that EU has relations with the Russian Federation as well, in which EU depends on the other for natural gas, Turkish-Russian relations will have to be analyzed on the European Union basis. For the time being, Turkish membership is a positive (or rather passive) issue in the political relations. Since it is unclear whether or not Turkey will become a member of the EU, or at least even if it becomes, it is clear that it will take a long time, Turkey's EU membership can be categorized as an issue which preserves the status quo of the relationship.

When it comes to EU's regional politics, the most important political target of the European Union is to guarantee democracy, and peace in its near abroad and the Black Sea Region.¹⁷³ For this reason, the European Union developed *Wider Europe Neighborhood* concept for its enlargement process. Although three Greater Black Sea states-Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were neglected in *Wider Europe Neighborhood* initiative on 16 June 2003, with Luxembourg Council Meeting of June 2004 all of the Greater Black Sea states are included in European Neighborhood Policy.¹⁷⁴

Similarly, during the 1990s, NATO had taken a series of steps towards the region. It developed Partnership for Peace (PFP), which is formed in order to train the states aiming for NATO membership, and included both Transcaucasus and Central Asian States. Until the end of 1995, twenty-seven members, which are mostly ex-Soviet and ex-East Block countries, have been included to the

¹⁷³ Burak Tangör, p. 71.

¹⁷⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.5, No.2 (2005), p. 261.

project of PFP.¹⁷⁵ The first NATO enlargement has been towards three ex-Warsaw Pact members- Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary-in 1999. Followingly, with the second NATO enlargement, seven East European states which are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, have been included. The most significant development for the Black Sea Region has been the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in NATO camp in the Istanbul Summit in 2004. Although, through Bulgaria and Romania's membership, NATO has become one of the important players of the Black Sea Region, it is still necessary for NATO to include Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and lastly Russia, which seems impossible now in order to be more influential.

4.4. Conclusion:

Considering the issues above, it is hard to come up with a concrete conclusion about the relationship based on one dimension. It is evident that during the 1990s Turkish-Russian political relations carries the characteristic of rivalry. Saying it more assertively, it will not be erroneous to argue that rivalry rather than partnership dominated the political agenda of Turkish-Russian political relations until 1999. In addition to Turkish efforts to materialize the "Turkish Model", the formation of "near abroad" policy in response, anti-Russian or anti-Turkish political lobbies of the two countries, political figures which portray a scene of rivalry, mistrust, and suspicion, there have also been a political rapprochement in this period especially compared to the Cold War years.

¹⁷⁵ Serdar Kesgin, "NATO ve Karadeniz," in Osman Metin Öztürk and Yalçın Sarıkaya (eds), *Uluslararası Mücadelenin Yeni Odağı: Karadeniz*, (Ankara: Platin Yayınevi, 2005), p. 122.

Existing complexity, which is carrying both the elements of cooperation and competition, of Turkish-Russian political relations during 1991-1999 continued in this period as well. However, while the period between 1991-1999 was characterized by rivalry more than partnership, the phase after 1999 reversed the situation and partnership areas increased compared to rivalry areas. Considering “The Action Plan”, mutual feelings of the state leaders (Erdoğan and Putin rapprochement), September 11 developments, partnership dominated Turkish-Russian political agenda. Nonetheless, it is hard to destroy the old-age rivalry and the idea of the other as “the rival” in influencing and controlling the Black Sea Region. It is still doubtful if the leader after Putin will support partnership with Turkey since there are still ruling elites like Vladimir Jirinovski or Alexandr Dugin who are suspicious about Turkish intention to remove the Russian influence in its ex-territories. Similarly, if a more nationalist group takes over the government in Turkey, the situation could be reversed.

The importance of the public opinion in both societies cannot be denied as well while analyzing the political relations. Since public opinion is becoming more effective in decision making in Turkey, the role of the political lobbies who are anti-Russian, the perception of “Russians” for Turkish society have to be added to the basket. For these reason, although the conclusion of current Turkish-Russian relations underlines partnership more than rivalry, it cannot be argued this partnership is established on well and stable grounds.

CHAPTER V

MILITARY-SECURITY LEVEL OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Compared to the political relations of Turkey and Russia, military field has been and is still the most controversial are of the bilateral relations. First of all the fact that they have been old military rivals still influences the present military relations and thus military officers in both countries, which both have a powerful position in foreign policy making, do not trust the other; second despite this historical legacy, they were nevertheless able to find a common ground at least on some issues.

In 1990s, the military-security level of Turkish-Russian relations displayed the same dualism that the political relations did; in other words Turkey and Russia both competed with each other and cooperated in the military field. Yet one must remember that when it is compared to the political relations, rivalry dominated the character of the relationship more than partnership; that is to say Turkey and Russia could not get rid of seeing the other as rivals and military relations did not develop as much as the political relations..

When it comes to years after 1999, it can be argued that although the old negative perception of the other is decreased by developments like September 11, regional security organizations, Turkish-Russian security interests do not coincide which made the military relations the most problematical sphere to interact.

5.1. The Reflection of Russian Security Policies on the Relationship during 1990-1999

In the initial years of the demise (1990-1993), the Russian Federation pursued a foreign policy line which designated the USA and the EU as remedies for quick integration to the world system. Notwithstanding, the foreign policy shift from the Atlanticist school to the Eurasianist one altered the way Russian security policy is conducted and influenced the course of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian military relations. Convenient with Eurasianist ideas and near abroad policy, the Military Doctrine of 1993 came out as a complement to the Foreign Policy Concept of 1993, both of which were formed under the framework of near abroad policy. The army and the military officials were crucial actors who formed the Doctrine, which displayed the importance of the military in foreign-security policy making in the post-Soviet era.¹⁷⁶

Known also as “Karaganov Doctrine”, The Military Doctrine emphasized the importance of near abroad for Russian security, the activation of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and abandoned the principle that it will not be the first country that uses the nuclear weapons.¹⁷⁷ Nuclear deterrence, establishing a security mechanism in near abroad under the CIS umbrella, therefore, was chosen one of the most important target of Russian security policies in the Military Concept of 1993. More importantly The section which referred to non-nuclear country joined with a nuclear one was prepared especially for Turkey. was prepared especially Turkey Within the framework of this doctrine, Russia relegitimized the military bases in Caucasus and Central Asia and

¹⁷⁶ İdil Tuncer, p. 100.

¹⁷⁷ Baskın Oran (ed.), p. 542.

proclaimed that the security interests of the CIS was the security interests of the Russian Federation, which in other words meant that the formation of a collective security understanding was required in ex-Soviet areas under the “Russian umbrella” and this collective security mechanism required the settlement of Russian military forces outside Russia’s borders.¹⁷⁸

The physical reflection of the idea of collective security has been the acceleration of the activities of the CIS, established in December 1991. The Foreign Policy Concept, like the Military Doctrine, claimed that solving the regional conflicts and disputes in Russian near abroad only by the Russian Federation was one of the most significant task of Russian security policies.¹⁷⁹ As stated the CIS was established before the concept of near abroad, however, the importance of it for Turkish-Russian military relations emerged after the Military Doctrine of 1993 since only after that year the Russian Federation started to use the organization to enhance its status as “the regional leader”.

The decisive return to ex-Soviet areas in these years has to be perceived not only as an outcome of the growing influence of the Eurasianist school in foreign policy making but also the Russian efforts to save its status as the big brother of these new states in the region. Besides, it should be noted that the Military Doctrine of 1993 and the Foreign Policy Concept had a complementary role to the near abroad policy. As a status quo power, Russia sought to preserve the old balances and power relationship in near abroad and tried to damage any efforts of the newly independent states to get rid of the Russian influence.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ İdil Tuncer, p. 101.

¹⁷⁹ İdil Tuncer, p. 99.

¹⁸⁰ Ulaş Mangıtlı, p. 36.

The CIS mentality, namely how Russia perceived the developments in its near abroad as its own problem, was reflected in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, which has been again one of the conflictual issues for Turkish-Russian relations during the early 1990s. Turkey supported the idea of sending peacekeeping forces, especially OSCE, to the region while Russia supported the Armenian side. Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov, the then commander of the CIS forces, warned Turkey if it intervened in the crisis, Russia will not hesitate to use nuclear means.¹⁸¹ The reason why Russia was not pleased with Turkish idea of sending peacekeeping forces to Karabakh could only be explained with the CIS and the 1993 Military Doctrine mentality.

As a result of Turkish policies in “Turkic World”, how the perception of Turkey as a major threat to security interest of the Federation can be seen in words of academicians, military officers, and politicians as well. Alesei Arbatov who was Russia’s director of the Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecast has defined Turkey as a military adversary of the near future; and Vladimir Zhrinovsky referred to “wiping out Turkey in the process of re-creating the Russian Empire”.¹⁸²

Considering the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, clash of Turkish-Russian military interests can be explained by their different visions of the regional roles to the conflicts in the Black Sea Region as well. Therefore, as Sezer-Bazoğlu argues the fact that Turkey and Russia differ in their view of Eurasia, solving the

¹⁸¹ Oktay F. Tanrıseven, “Turkey and Russian Federation: Towards a Mutual Understanding?,” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (eds), *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*, (USA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p. 126.

¹⁸² Ersel Aydınli, “Russia’s Kurdish Car in Turkish-Russian Rivalry.” Available at <http://members.internettrash.com/pkk/a-russia.html>. p. 2.

regional conflicts bring about Turkish-Russian confrontation,¹⁸³ of which the Nagorno-Karabakh is the best example. While Turkey supports the territorial integrity of these new states and tries to avoid interference in internal affairs of them-Chechnya being the exception-, Russia, in order to preserve its status as the leader of this space, supports the separatist movements and manipulate the instability in the region.

Another significant discord that affected the development of the relationship in 1990s was the disagreement over the CFE Treaty (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). The CFE Treaty was established on 19, November 1990 in Paris and came into force on 17 July, 1992 after the negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact members.¹⁸⁴ The Treaty covered the territory from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (ATTU).¹⁸⁵ Since it was formed according to the dynamics of the bipolar world order, the main aim was to arrange the conventional forces balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact members.¹⁸⁶ As indicated in the fourth article, each side has to reduce its armory to 20.000 battle tanks, 30.000 armoured combat vehicles, 20.000 pieces of artillery, 6.800 combat aircraft, 2.000 attack combat aircraft.¹⁸⁷

When Turkey's security is concerned, the CFE's fifth article which was about the flank limits has been a good achievement as 24.4 % of the country's total territory was left outside the CFE area since its southern neighbours were not included in the Treaty. Moreover, with the cascading arrangement, Turkey was

¹⁸³ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkish-Russian relations: Geopolitical Competition and Economic Partnership," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1 (2000), p. 76.

¹⁸⁴ Nurşin A. Güney, "AKKA'nın Yeni Koşullara Uyarlanması ve Türkiye'nin Güvenliği," in Şule Kut and Gencer Özcan (eds), *En Uzun On Yıl*, (İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 1998), p. 172.

¹⁸⁵ Nurşin A. Güney, p. 172.

¹⁸⁶ Nurşin A. Güney, p. 172.

¹⁸⁷ For the full text of the original and adapted version of the CFE Treaty, see http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/cfe/osce_cfe.pdf.

able to buy arms from other countries that exceed the arms limits specified by the treaty.¹⁸⁸ Both the fifth article and the cascading arrangement demonstrate that Turkey achieved a militarily advantageous position with the original version of the CFE Treaty. The full adaptation of the fifth article would prevent the accumulation of Russian military forces on the Caucasus, which was a delicate issue for Turkey's security understanding.

According to the original treaty, all equipment reductions, which needed to be complied with national and overall limits, were to be completed by 1995. However, arguing that the treaty was a product of the Cold War conditions, Russia rejected to obey the flank restrictions by sending a diplomatic note to other states in December 17, 1993 and requested the reconsideration of it.¹⁸⁹

While Turkey was insistent on the complete application of the fifth article, which would prevent the increased Russian military presence close to Turkey's borders, Russia requested the other states to make concessions and to prolong the deadline to conform to the treaty. Naturally, the fact that Russian Federation violated the limited amount of equipment in the Caucasus the treaty permits harmed the development of Turkish-Russian military relations during 1990s. Since both NATO and other states did not want to sacrifice the treaty, after negotiating on many alternatives in a new conference on 15-31 May, 1996, it is decided on a formula which left some regions outside the flank limits and according to this formula, Pskov, Krasnodar and Rostov were removed from the treaty area.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ Baskın Oran, p. 207.

¹⁸⁹ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), *Türkiye ve Rusya İlişkilerindeki Yapısal Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri*, (İstanbul: Lebib Yalkım Yayınları ve Basım İşleri, 1999), p. 19.

¹⁹⁰ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 20.

At the Istanbul summit of the OSCE, nine years after the original CFE text, the 30 CFE states¹⁹¹ signed an adaptation agreement on November 19 1999, that updates the Cold War-era treaty structure. The agreement abandoned the bloc-to-bloc and zonal limits of the original treaty and replaced them with a system of national and territorial ceilings.¹⁹²

Due to the flank issue, some commentators in Turkey interpreted the violation of the CFE limits as a plan by Russians to assault the Turkish borders in the Black Sea area. More important than this weak argument, Ankara was concerned over the fact that as a result of its military potential, Russia would intensify its influence on regional states.¹⁹³ Briefly, the adaptation of the CFE Treaty has been one of the most debatable issues between Turkey and Russia. Although Turkey has achieved benefit from the CFE regime at the beginning of 1990s, later the adaptation of the treaty as a result of Russian objection, the debate is solved only after making concessions to the Russian Federation since Turkish concerns over the implementation of the CFE was not shared by its NATO allies and this delicate issue for Turkey is solved by making concessions to Russia.

Another security trouble in 1990s was triggered by Chechnya crisis in Russia and PKK problem in Turkey. Russia accused Turkey of helping the Chechens while Turkey did the same by blaming the Russians for assisting the PKK. It is true that people who have Chechen or Caucasus origin in Turkey, and other Turkish groups-mostly Islamic ones- supported the Chechens by sending

¹⁹¹ CFE states-parties in 1999: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom, the United States, and Turkey.

¹⁹² The report is available online at: <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4781.htm>.

¹⁹³ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 20.

voluntary fighters or economic aid packages in the first war in Chechnya in 1994-1996. When how Turkish officials dealt with Chechens is considered; there is not an explicit position of the Turkish state.¹⁹⁴ In other words, there is a dilemma between the appearance and reality; there it is not apparent whether they acted in parallel with the public or they were careful not to show any sign of support that would mean interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Although Turkish officials kept saying that they support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation, their ignorance and sympathy of Chechens in Turkey was evident. Moscow was never optimistic about the Turkish response to Chechnya crisis; because Turkey both condoned the responsible people who hijacked the Avrasya ferry in 1996 and permitted the attempts of Caucasus or Chechen origin NGOs.

What the Russian did in response was the argument that it manipulated the Kurdish crisis in Turkey, even permitted the inauguration of “the Kurdish House” in Moscow in 1995.¹⁹⁵ The immediate visit of the Domestic Affairs Ministry, Nahit Menteşe, with national security authorities to Moscow to discuss the problem signified the importance of the level Turkey had been annoyed with the incident.¹⁹⁶ When the head of the Duma Geopolitical Matters Committee Viktor Ustinov accepted to host a Kurdish international congress in 1995 and stated: “If

¹⁹⁴ There are scholars who argue that Turkish state remained away from what the public wanted; for example see, Fiona Hill, “Seismic Shifts in Eurasia: The Changing Relationship Between Turkey and Russia, And Its Implications for the South Caucasus,” *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.4, No. 3 (2003), pp:55-75. However, it is hard to back this argument. For instance, a park in İstanbul was named as *Dudayev Parkı (Dudayev’s Park)* and a square in Ankara was named as *Dudayev Meydanı (Dudayev’s Square)*. Besides, it is well known that the Turkish state condoned what the Chechens did in the Turkish territory.

¹⁹⁵ Robert Olson, p. 92.

¹⁹⁶ Robert Olson, pp. 92-93.

Turkey is interfering in internal affairs of Russia because of Chechens, we know how to prevent this”, Turkish-Russian relations became even worse.¹⁹⁷

Actually, in both sides, although there were solidarity groups and lobbies that supported the other’s separatist movements, neither Turkish governments nor Yeltsin administration accused the other side directly about the Chechen-Kurdish crisis. Nevertheless, considered the overall influence of this issue on Turkish-Russian relations, it can be stated that it has been the most significant problem to deal with during the years 1991-1999.

Amid all these lists of contradictions in Turkish-Russian military relations, there was one area through which we can state that the two decided to cooperate rather than compete. The first one is the sales of arms which created cooperation between Turkey and Russia even in the early periods of the end of the Cold War. With an agreement signed in 30 October 1993, Turkey even became the first NATO country that purchased nineteen helicopters, armored vehicles, long barreled weapons and binoculars from Russia for use against PKK militants, which was a significant military trade at that time since Turkey did not have the chance to get arms from other NATO countries at the time on the ground that Turkey violated the human rights in dealing PKK problem.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, the military trade of 1993 was a significant development of Turkish-Russian partnership in sales of arms.

However, the arms issue has not always created cooperation between Turkey and Russia. When Russia decided to sell its arms to Turkey’s neighbors, Turkey reacted it by sharp criticism. The possibility of Russia’s selling S-300

¹⁹⁷ Robert Olson, p. 96.

¹⁹⁸ Baskın Oran, p. 544.

missiles to Cyprus in 1997, which annoyed Turkish sensitiveness about the power balance in the Cyprus Island, was not an issue that Turkey would receive calmly.¹⁹⁹ The sale of S-300 annoyed Turkey for two reasons: one was that those missiles had the range capacity to shoot Turkey from that distance and the second was the selling would mean that Russia supports the Greek Cypriots politically.²⁰⁰ The USA supported Turkey in this matter and the spokesman for the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the U.S. criticized Cyprus in a severe way.²⁰¹ At the end, Russia gave up the idea of selling the missiles to Cyprus and they are settled in Crete at the end of 1998.

Linked with the S-300 crisis, the visit of İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, the chief of staff in Turkey, to Defense Minister Marshall Igor Sergeev, Chief of General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin and National Security Council Secretary Andrei Kokoshin in Moscow in May 18-21, 1998 was a critical one for the development and solution of the crisis. Karadayı pronounced Turkey's concerns over the sale of the weapons and asked for clarification regarding their intentions.²⁰² Although a memorandum of understanding was signed on mutual cooperation in the military and defense industry field, there were still questions about whether the two regional powers were able to remove out their considerable differences during the meetings, apparent in Karadayı's words: "they are evaluating our suggestions; however, there is not a clear Russian position on the issue. We do not know what

¹⁹⁹ Savaş Yanar, *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde Gizli Güç: Kafkasya*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültürsanat Yayıncılık, 2002), p. 103.

²⁰⁰ Savaş Yanar, p. 104.

²⁰¹ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 12.

²⁰² Nikolay Novichkov and Metehan Demir, "Turkey, Russia at Crossroads over Missile Transfer to Cyprus," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Vol. 148, (1998), p. 32.

the Russian will do”²⁰³ In the meeting, not only the sale of S-300 missiles to Cyprus but also the support of Russia for Iranian missile and nuclear technology was discussed²⁰⁴, which was again a harmful for the relations.

5.2. The Development of the Relationship after 1999

In this period of Turkish-Russian military relations, the theory that Russia manipulated the PKK problem in Turkey in order to deter the Turks who are believed to help the Chechen fighters in their war of independence has gone into past with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan. When Öcalan requested from Russia to take shelter in their territory toward the end of the 1998, Duma side of the Russian Federation approved the idea while Yeltsin government rejected it; which prevented emergence of a serious military crisis between Turkey and Russia. Duma has always been soft on the PKK problem by permitting the inauguration of Kurdish House or other conferences arranged by PKK supporters; however since Duma did not have much power in shaping foreign-security policies, what they decide is usually not implemented; which can be seen in Öcalan case perfectly.

However, the idea that there is a connection between the Chechen fighters and Turkey maintained, even revitalized by the second Chechen War of 1999. Putin, by blaming the Chechens for the bombings and other crimes in Russia, provided the public support for his war against the Chechens which is started in the autumn of 1999. For the public, Russia was fighting against the Chechens for

²⁰³ Nikolay Novichkov and Metehan Demir, p. 33.

²⁰⁴ Nikolay Novichkov and Metehan Demir, p. 33.

two reasons: one was that Russia had the legitimate right of defending itself since Basayev and his team, who were defined as “anti-democratic” and “radical Islamists”, attacked Dagistan; and the second reason was the opinion that Chechens were after the bombings in Russia,²⁰⁵ which makes them “terrorists” and which gives Russia the right to go on war against them. However the limit of public support decreased when the war lasted long although the Russian press tried to keep the interest of the public alive.²⁰⁶

When it is compared to the first Chechen War, Turkey was more careful not to recall (dig up) the Russian sensitiveness about the subject. The signing of mutual cooperation agreement on terrorism during the visit of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to Moscow in 1999 was thought to overcome the problem. Nevertheless, there were developments which caused disputes related to the Chechen issue. In March 2001, Chechens captured a Russian passenger jet from Turkey to Saudi Arabia but more importantly one month after this incident, pro-Chechens seized the Swiss Hotel, which reshadowed the positive developments on cooperation against terrorism supposed to be reached with the visit of Ecevit and more importantly September 11.²⁰⁷

When the effects of September 11 events on Turkish-Russian military relations are considered, both constructive and negative results can be seen.

Terrorism linked with the new security system formation binds the interests of

²⁰⁵ Both Hasan Kanbolat and Oktay F. Tanrısever agree on this two reasons of this wide public support; see Hasan Kanbolat, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Kafkasya Politikası ve Çeçenistan Savaşı,” *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.6, No.4 (2001), p. 171; and Oktay F. Tanrısever, “Moskova’nın Çeçenistan Çıkması ve Çıkış Arayışları,” *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.6, No.4 (2001), p. 190.

²⁰⁶ Tanrısever refers to a theory that although there was no need, the Russian army prolonged the war for two reasons: first, in order to try the new types of arms on Chechen civils and second, as a result of the war the budget separated for the army was increased and the army wanted to preserve the situation. These ideas were written in a report prepared in November 2000 by Ruslan Hasbulatov who was the old head of the Russian Parliament.

²⁰⁷ Bülent Aras, *War in the Gardens of Babylon*, p. 79.

both Turkey and Russia. The concern over the spreading of terrorism is shared by the two of which have been one of the major targets of terrorist.²⁰⁸ Therefore the need for forming a common measure to fight against the terrorism became a common point for the national security of them.²⁰⁹

As discussed in the previous chapter the softening of the Atlanticist school after September 11 influenced the military field as well. Emergence of global terrorism as the most significant security threat to states in post-September 11 atmosphere offered Putin what he needed in his desire to attract the attention of international actors for his Chechnya campaign.²¹⁰ Turkey, who had been suffering from terrorism for years, welcomed the priority given to the problem of terrorism as the most important security issue. Russia still being troubled by Chechens, and Turkey concerned over the revival of PKK terrorism²¹¹, found a common ground to justify their own problems related to terrorism. As a result of these concerns when Russian Chief of Staff, Anatoly Kvashin, visited his Turkish counterpart, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, in Ankara, the two sides signed a military cooperation agreement in January 2002 and decided to exchange the officers for training and more significantly they decided to prevent terrorist organizations on their territory acting against each other.²¹² Putin's statements as "Turkey does not support the Chechen separatists. I am contended with Turkish policies towards

²⁰⁸ Viktor Panin and Henry Paniev, "Turkey and Russia," in İdris Bal (ed), *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War era*, (Boca Raton: BrownWalker Pres, 2004).

²⁰⁹ Linked with the idea, Viktor Panin and Henry Paniev thinks that in the new security system, states cooperate with each other not only by mutual interests but also by mutual threats. Terrorism as a concept, therefore, will push states to cooperation.

²¹⁰ Esra Hatipoğlu, "11 Eylül Sonrası Rusya ve ABD'nin Orta Asya Politikası," in Erhan Büyükkakıncı (ed), *Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna*, (Ankara: Phoneix Yayınevi, 2004), p. 287.

²¹¹ The capture of Abdullah Öcalan was regarded as the end of PKK terrorism in Turkey; but the developments in the eastern part of Turkey after 2005 showed that the terrorist group is still a threat for Turkey. Therefore, the concern over the issue in Turkey is not lost.

²¹² Bülent Aras, *War in the Gardens of Babylon*, p. 80.

Chechens”²¹³ contributed to the positive atmosphere as well. In this sense, September 11 was a constructive development for Turkish-Russian security relations.

Nevertheless, it is evident that Russia did not trust Turkey since in October 2002 when the Russian soldiers used gas against Chechen guerillas who this time seized a Moscow theater and took patrons hostage; Turkish media was accused of not being objective by the Russian officials while reporting the seizure.²¹⁴ The Russian Ambassador of Turkey, Alexander Lebedev accused Turkey of hypocrisy in the global war on terrorism by sending a diplomatic note to the Turkish Ministry²¹⁵ and stated “Is opposition to Russia a genetic syndrome in Turkey?”²¹⁶, which signifies the difficulty of forming trust between the two countries. He went further by comparing this incident with Turkish operations against the PKK guerillas. “Is a terrorist who carries out terrorist attacks against Turkish citizens in Turkey a completely different thing to the Chechen terrorist who carries out sabotage against Russians in Russia?” said Lebedev in his letter.²¹⁷ In other words this diplomatic episode revealed Chechnya’s potential to damage relations or to rekindle the existing mistrust between the countries. On the whole, it is true that the most important result of September 11 for Turkish-Russian relations has been rapprochement on Chechen problem; yet it appears that Russian bureaucrats or

²¹³ Putin made this statement in France two months after September 11, see Sinan Ogan., “2004 Yılı Türk Dış Politikasında Rusya-Ukrayna Bölgesi ve 2005 Yılı Beklentileri,” *Stratejik Analiz*, Vol. 5, No. 56 (2005), p. 28.

²¹⁴ The press in Turkey either Islamic oriented or the rest generally has a sympathy of Chechens. *Yeni Şafak*, which is an Islamic oriented daily in İstanbul, reported the theater incident as Russia’s brutal operation on 28 October . Other dailies referred to Turkish experts who perceived the operation a disaster.

²¹⁵ Jon Gorvet, “Chechen Question Harms Turkish-Russian Relations,” *Eurasia Insight*, (11 July, 2002), p. 1.

²¹⁶ Bülent Aras, *War in the Gardens of Babylon* , p. 80.

²¹⁷ John Gorvet, p. 2.

military will not cease from blaming Turkey and it is hard to form confidence on this issue between the two.

Russia's new military Doctrine is also Chechen related. Although the Military Doctrine of 1997, which attached importance to nuclear weapons and referred to threats inside the country, was revised by Putin and his team the Military Doctrine of 2000 appears to be the continuation of the previous one with some amendments of the developments in past three years. Similar to the previous one, it again stresses the change in Russia's understanding of the security of the country. The idea that the most important threat to country's security was not the international system but Russia's internal conditions, which refers to the Chechen separatist movement, was repeated again. Nevertheless, Russian military doctrines always cause concern in Turkey.

Military bases of Russia in the Black Sea Region, which are legitimized by the Military Doctrines, is another point which displeases Turkish security understanding. It can be stated that although less intense than 1990s, top military officers still estimate these bases as a potential security threat. But the positive developments on this issue may remove this from Turkish-Russian military agenda. Russia agreed to withdraw its military actions at the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases in Georgia by 2008,²¹⁸ which is a positive development for Turkish security concerns over the Russian military bases in South Caucasus and for the future of Turkish-Russian military bases.

While any intense military tie between Russia and other Black Sea states is not welcomed by Turkey, similarly Russia is not pleased by extensive Turkish

²¹⁸ Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security Cooperation: Building Bridges and Barriers," *Publications*, (2006), p. 3.

interest or cooperation with the other states of Black Sea. In other words, extensive military cooperation between Turkey-Azerbaijan, Turkey-Georgia or Turkey-Ukraine does not please Russian military. Military training that Turkey supply for Georgia is significant. As Zeyno Baran explains, despite the political leaders Turkish military has always gave importance to Georgia and started to establish military ties with the country.²¹⁹ For instance, a particular event that caused some concern in Moscow was Turkish assistance in modernizing the Marneuli airbase near Tbilisi.²²⁰ Turkey and the U.S. established “Caucasus Working Group” in order to improve and train the Georgian military.²²¹ Similarly, the trilateral agreement on regional security signed in January 2002 in Ankara between Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan can be perceived in the same way.²²²

One positive development in Turkish-Russian military relations is related to the military industry of the Russian Federation. Russia is interested in selling its Kamov type Russian-Israeli joint Ka-50-2 (or Erdogan helicopters) to Turkey and is competing with the U.S. Bell King Cobra helicopters which is twice expensive than the Kamov helicopter.²²³

The list of security problems in the Black Sea Region is a significant problem for Turkey and Russia since they still have different visions of solution to the problems. These regional problems are related to the field of both hard and soft security. The arm conflicts in ex-Soviet space: between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Georgia (Abkhazian and Ossetian), in Moldova (Transdnestria) are

²¹⁹ Zeyno Baran, “Turkey and Caucasus,” in İdris Bal (ed), *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, (Roca Baton: Brown Walker Press), 2004, p. 280.

²²⁰ Igor Torbakov, “Turkey and Russia: Competition and Cooperation,” *Eurasia Insight*, available online at: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122702.shtml>.

²²¹ Zeyno Baran, p. 286.

²²² Igor Torbakov, p. 2.

²²³ Mark A. Smith, p. 4.

still not solved. Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Transdnistria in Moldova claim independence.

All these frozen conflicts present a security challenge for Turkey and Russia and NATO as well. In addition to traditional security problems, environmental degradation, illegal migration, illicit human (women), weapon, drug trafficking, smuggling also needs to be dealt with, which is hard to do without Turkey and Russia and without creating regional security cooperation.

5.3. The Influence of NATO Policies of the Black Sea Region on the Military Relations

In order to analyze Turkish-Russian military relations in the Black Sea Region, it is first necessary to refer to alteration in western perception of the region. Therefore, the reflection of NATO policies is important for the region and regional powers just like the reflection of regional powers' policies (Turkey and Russia) are important for NATO. The reasons of rising Western interest on the region is discussed in Chapter II. Apart from those details, it is necessary to add that that for NATO, the Black Sea Region is first a source of disorder (as a result of regional conflicts); and second it is also a vital link, frontier to surrounding regions, namely the Middle East, the Balkans, the Central Asia.

The importance of the Greater Black Sea Region increased after the emergence of a new threat understanding in post-September 11 world. NATO members ratified a new "Military Concept For Defense Against Terrorism" at the 2002 Prague Summit, which settled four roles for NATO military operations: anti-terrorism, consequence management, counter terrorism, and military

cooperation.²²⁴ Besides, at the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, which was held at the heart of the region, a brief reference to the importance of the region for a future security strategy of NATO was expressed. Therefore, the Greater Black Sea Region became an interest point for NATO in the twenty first century.

What was another important development for Turkish-Russian relations was the establishment of a Founding Act and NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997.²²⁵ Although the ratification of NATO-Russia Council in Rome Summit of 2002 was expected to give a new tone to NATO-Russia, the post-Rome Russian relations with NATO remained the same; which can be considered as “a recycling of the Founding Act”.²²⁶

Related to the enlargement of NATO both Russia and Turkey want to maintain the status quo in the region. It is well known that Russia is opposed to NATO enlargement but as a NATO country Turkey also do not want extensive NATO presence in the Black Sea Region.

In terms of the military establishment of the Black Sea Region and Turkish-Russian relations, Ukraine stays in a strategic position. NATO considers Ukraine as a counterbalancer against the Russian Federation while Ukraine sees NATO with a similar purpose, which puts Ukraine in a different category with its relations with NATO.²²⁷ With the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state of the Black Sea Region, the Black Sea cost of the Russian Federation was already decreased; but more importantly the election of western supporter Yuşchenko on 21 November 2004, reduced the military influence of Russia and

²²⁴ Jeffrey Simon, p. 5.

²²⁵ Robert E. Hunter, “NATO-Russia Relations After 11 September,” *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.3, No. 3 (2003), p. 29.

²²⁶ Robert E. Hunter, p. 48.

²²⁷ Kemal Çiftçi, p. 143.

therefore created a kind of balance in the region. Besides Ukraine became a testing ground for domination between NATO and Russian Federation.²²⁸

5.4. Regional Security Organizations

Blackseafor which is a Turkish initiated security organization is established on 27 September 2001 in a ceremony in Gölcük, Turkey. At first, the duties of the organization were determined as seek and rescue operations, mine measures, environmental protection, human aid operations, and goodwill visits.²²⁹ However, Blackseafor has broadened its facilitations on 31 March 2005 and included terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with a text called “Maritime Risk Assessment in the Black Sea.”²³⁰

Black Sea Harmony, which is another Turkish idea with the same objectives, similar to NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean. Both Romania and Bulgaria perceive these organizations as efforts of Turkish domination in the region.²³¹

The Montreux Convention of 1936 despite the expectation that Turkey and Russia would compete over the issue creates cooperation between them. Changing the articles of the convention is something which both Turkey and Russia opposes. The Convention gave Turkey the control of the straits; that is Turkey had the right to close the straits in wartime to warship of all countries when it was at war while trade ships were allowed to pass freely during peacetime except for countries at war with Turkey. A review of the 1936 is not a development that

²²⁸ Kemal Çiftçi, p. 146.

²²⁹ Kemal Çiftçi, p. 151.

²³⁰ Jeffrey Simon, p. 3.

²³¹ Jeffrey Simon, p.3. According to Romanians and Bulgarians, Turkey aims to preserve its status in the region and prevent OAE. Both want to maintain maritime dominance

Russia would want although it is supposed to be so and Turkey as well. If the treaty is reviewed, Turkey would hand over its authority to arrange to International Navigation Organization while Russia would not want the removal of the limits on type, tonnage, and arms on warships.²³² In other words, the treaty limits for the Black Sea will risk Turkish and Russian domination; in this sense, the Montreux Convention creates an unmentioned strategic tie between Turkey and Russia.²³³ The straits in fact become more important when the energy issue comes into the scene, which will be discussed in the economic relation.

5.5. Conclusion

Turkish-Russian military relations was shadowed with terrorism issue during the 1990s. While Russia accused Turkey of aiding the Chechens, Turkey did the same by accusing the Russian of helping the PKK supporters in its territory. The emergence of terrorism as a global unifying factors after September 11 had the potential to reverse the scene but since the Russian Federation could not solve its Chechen problem, the situation has stayed the same. Moreover, the military officers of both sides still suspect each other and the idea of the other as the military enemy has not been removed yet.

²³² Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 18.

²³³ For the argument see: Simon, Jeffrey. "Black Sea Regional Security Cooperation: Building Bridges and Barriers," p. 2; and Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD).

CHAPTER VI

ENERGY AND ECONOMY DIMENSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Economics has always been an important source of foreign policy decisions for they are required in order to implement policies. For instance, Plato viewed money as a cause of war and suggested that a republic should stay poor so as not to be worth attacking.

The analysis of past and present Turkish-Russian economic relations presents a different delineation from the political and military one. As explained in the previous chapters, as well as bearing in mind the rise of rapprochement in the political and military relations of the two, the conclusion was that they were dominated mostly by rivalry rather than partnership. However, when it comes to the economic relations, the panorama moves to another space and economic sphere becomes an area in which Turkey and Russia finds a common ground in comparison to the others.

The reason why the economic level of the relationship during the 1990s had been an exception in the overall Turkish-Russian relations was the result of increased partnership in the construction, textile, food, tourism and gas exports sectors. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that talking about a complete partnership is still not possible due to the rivalry over the energy routes. Therefore, during the 1990s, although complementary structure of Russian and Turkish economies has been a significant impetus, there were still handicaps in the bilateral economic relations.

The Russian economic crisis in 1998 is noteworthy as it reduced the level of trade in some sectors like construction, tourism and suitcase trade and this standstill in 1998 and 1999 has not been recovered yet. Especially with the diminishing of the suitcase trade and Turkey's dependence on Russian natural gas, it became impossible to talk about a balance in the bilateral trade. Despite this imbalance, when the statistics about the foreign trade, construction, tourism, and energy are analyzed, Russia is Turkey's significant economic partner and vice versa. Thus; in brief it will not be erroneous to say that partnership rather than rivalry dominated the overall Turkish-Russian economic relations.

6.1. Historical Perspective: Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union

In the first days that the Ottoman Empire settled Istanbul, Russian trade vessels were the majority among the others and the first thing what Fatih the Conqueror materialized was to demand from these trade vessels the necessary equipment, arms and bullets to be used in the war.²³⁴ Moreover, he made sure that after he conquered Istanbul, Russian sailing boats that carry food could sell these products in Istanbul without tariff application.²³⁵ Although the fall of Istanbul to Muslim Turks was a devastating development for the Orthodox Russians, the Ottoman Empire stayed as a favorable market for the Russian merchants. Therefore, since what was important for the Russian merchants was to keep the existing trade with the Ottoman Empire, they did not share their Orthodox brothers' agony over the loss of Istanbul. It is also known that Russians before the

²³⁴ Haydar Kazgan, "Tarih Boyunca Osmanlı-Rus Ticareti ve Sanayi Devrimi Ülkelerinin Ticaret Politikaları," in Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Ulcenko (eds), *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), p. 33.

²³⁵ Haydar Kazgan, p. 33.

conquest of Istanbul was in good terms with the Ottomans in the economic field; they were even well known in Bursa,²³⁶ the capital of the Ottoman Empire during that time. More importantly, although there was no direct political connection until Ivan the Third and Yıldırım Bayezid (1492), trade also functioned for this purpose and opened the way of political connection.²³⁷

Until the Napoleon Wars, it can be argued that the Russians remained important merchants in the Ottoman Empire; however, after that time since England and France also emerged in the Ottoman market as rivals, the Russians lost their position.²³⁸ For that reason, after the 19th century, Russia not completely but considerably lost its advantageous position to other European countries, namely England and France.

Turkish-Russian rapprochement after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia is well known but incomplete. In other words, although the political and military dimension of Turkish-Russian rapprochement during the Turkish War of Independence is emphasized, the economic side of it is hardly discerned. “The Trade and Navigation” agreement on 11 March 1927, which is the first mutually beneficial trade agreement of the young Turkish Republic,²³⁹ and other economic aids from the USSR underline the economic rapprochement as well. Besides, the first five year development Plan of Turkish Republic was prepared by a Soviet committee headed by Prof Pavlov and new associations like Soviet-Turkish Association (RUSSO-TÜRK) has played a key role in the development of

²³⁶ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990), p. 4.

²³⁷ Akdes Nimet Kurat, p. 4.

²³⁸ Haydar Kazan, p. 37.

²³⁹ During this period, it was the first mutually beneficial trade agreement between Turkey and the USSR. As well as diplomatic privileges, Russia permitted Turkish merchants to enter into the country without visa application. Only after these privileges, Turkish Merchants started to use Batum port. See Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD).

bilateral trade.²⁴⁰ It was also thanks to the 8 million dollars credit given by the Soviet Union in 1932 that Turkey could establish Nazilli and Kayseri factories, through which Turkey reached the biggest textile capacity of the Middle East.²⁴¹

In this period, since both Turkish and Soviet economies were controlled by the state, economic relations was either developed or frozen by state interference, which has been the case with Stalin's leadership. Just like the political relations, with Stalin's coming to power, the economic rapprochement was frozen until 1970s. Nevertheless, the relations of both states with the Western World has unlocked the obstacles standing in the way of cooperation.²⁴² Due to Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974, the economic embargo, which was a stroke to Turkish economy added to the oil crises, created a tension in the economic sphere between the West and Turkey. It was also the period Turkey started industrialization process and needed new credits and technologies from the West, who did not acceded to fulfill these demands at the time.²⁴³ Since it was only the Soviet Union who could meet Turkey's demands, and besides with the détente period in the Cold War, the frozen economic relations of Turkey and Soviet Union started melting.

²⁴⁰ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p.106.

²⁴¹ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1997), pp. 63-64.

²⁴² Gülten Kazgan argues that when total Turkish-Russian economic relations is analyzed, the result is their relations is dependent on their relations with the Western world. Even during the Ottoman times, it was the case. So Turkish-Russian relations cannot be explained in terms of their bilateral interaction but their interaction with the Western world. See Gülten Kazgan, "Batı İle İlişkilerin Gölgesinde Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri," in Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Ulcenko (eds), *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003).

²⁴³ Gülten Kazgan, p. 151.

6.2. Consequences of the End of the Cold War: Globalization

Combined with the collapse of the bipolar world, the influence of globalization process made the economic dimension of the relationship more vital. The consequence of globalization/liberalization/privatization in both Turkish and Russian economies has been important determinants of Turkish-Russian economic relations during the 1990s. The appearance of private sector and removing the state monopolies in foreign trade in Russia after 1993 was a turning point for the bilateral relations.

In 1990, both Turkey and Russia adopted liberal market economy; however, since the necessary institutional infrastructure in both countries was being developed slowly, they faltered in how to operate (run) the system.²⁴⁴ In this faltering period, their economies were open to crisis, the widening of the foreign debt, the corruption in the society, the inequality in the distribution of national revenue, and became weak with the developments in the world.²⁴⁵ Foreign debts, on the one hand, increased the dependence of both Turkish and Russian economies on institutions like IMF and World Bank (*Western capital*), on the other hand, disrupted the distribution of income inside both countries, which also augmented the instability.²⁴⁶

The problems caused by globalization that Turkey and Russia had to handle were similar but the process of liberalization in the Russian Federation has been more painful and it is far behind Turkey. One of the first reasons of this case

²⁴⁴ Gülten Kazgan, p. 155.

²⁴⁵ Gülten Kazgan gives a detailed explanation for each of these categories. See Gülten Kazgan, pp. 155-164.

²⁴⁶ Gülten Kazgan, p. 153.

was the fact that Turkey started this process in 1980 while in Russia, it had a fifteen years past.²⁴⁷

Although Turkey and Russia pursued similar economy policies during 1990s, the political leader alteration in the Russian Federation changed the direction of Russian economy policies. Putin administration, unlike Yeltsin period, altered its energy policies, stopped using IMF credits, enlarged the control of the state on economy. The details of this alteration and its impacts on Turkish-Russian economic relations will be discussed in the energy section.

Globalization, on the whole, has been a difficult process for both Turkey and Russia. Unlike the developed countries that benefited from globalization, middle income countries²⁴⁸ like Turkey and Russia were damaged by it. It is also important to add here that there were also positives consequences of globalization for Turkish-Russian relations and the Black Sea Region as well.

6.2.1. Positive Outcomes of Globalization: The Black Sea Economic Cooperation

In parallel with globalization process, regional cooperation agreements have increased in the world. The first reason of this outcome was that individual countries could not withstand the difficulties that the globalization caused on their own, like in the Turkish-Russian case. Regional cooperation organizations and associations became widespread so as to overcome these handicaps. Necessary to add that regionalism does not work against the globalization process; on the

²⁴⁷ Gülten Kazgan, p. 153.

²⁴⁸ According to classification of the World Bank, countries are divided according to the GNI per capita. The groups are low income: \$825 or less; lower middle income: \$826-\$3,255; upper middle income: \$3,256-\$10,065 and high income:\$10,066 or more. This division does not necessarily show the development status. See www.worldbank.org.tr.

contrary, these two concepts support each other. In other words, in an interdependent world, regionalism is an instrument of globalization (global economic security of countries). Thus, regional economic associations play a complementary role to the globalization process.

Reasons of the difficulties to form regional cooperation in the Black Sea are touched upon in the third chapter. However, there were also considerable efforts to reverse the situation and Turkey has been the leading country to fill the gap occurred as a result of the collapse of the Cold War polarization. One of the foremost reasons of Turkey's endeavors for leading the process of regional cooperation was that since she faced the mentioned problems above before than the other regional states, she had a better understanding of how to handle the situation: that is through regional cooperation.²⁴⁹ Secondly, due to the deep-rooted transformations in its nearest sea basin, Turkey regarded the end of the Cold War polarization in the Black Sea as a potential opportunity to fulfill the gap, which as a result created the BSEC.

Turkish initiated organization, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and BLACKSEAFOR association functioned for this purpose. Among the other regional associations, the BSEC can be characterized as the most institutionalized one in the Black Sea Region. The excessive affinity to the organization lies on both permanent and transitory factors: above everything else, the Black Sea is the heart of Eurasian economy-politics; therefore the importance of the region came to light with the collapse of polarization.²⁵⁰ Secondly, except Turkey and Greece, all of the other regional states had to redefine their economy

²⁴⁹ Gülten Kazgan, p. 166.

²⁵⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), p. 266

policies as result of the demise of the Eastern Block; and for that reason while transiting to free market economy, these regional states tried to overcome the difficulties through benefiting from regional market opportunities.²⁵¹

The BSEC is defined in Article 1 of the BSEC charter as “a regional economic organization” and the Article 4 determines the cooperation areas as “trade and economic development, banking and finance, energy, transport, tourism, science and technology, exchange of statistical data and economic information, all acts of terrorism, etc.”²⁵² The BSEC believes that the regional stability could be promoted by economic orientation. Therefore, there have been some attempts to develop the organization at this line. In order to include the private sector in cooperation efforts, the Business Council was established in 1992 and the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank was established in 1998, which became operational in 1999.²⁵³ The BSTDB’s initial fund is US\$300 million and is supposed to rise to US\$1.5 billion, in which Greece, Russia and Turkey shares 16.5 percent each, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine 13.5 percent each and Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova 2 percent each.²⁵⁴ It is also transformed to a regional economic organization with a legal status and a Charter in 1999, in which the international community granted the Organization of the BSEC observer status by the United Nations resolution.²⁵⁵

All of these efforts show that the member states have committed themselves to social interaction and development of the economic situation in the region. It is

²⁵¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, p. 277.

²⁵² BSEC Charter. Available at <http://www.bsec-organization.org/main.aspx?ID=Charter>

²⁵³ BSEC BC is in Article 21 and BSEC BSTDB is in Article 22 of the BSEC Charter.

²⁵⁴ Mustafa Aydın, “The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighbourhood,” *Journal of Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.5, No.2 (2005), p. 269.

²⁵⁵ BSEC Economic Agenda For the Future Towards a More Consolidated, Effective and Viable BSEC Partnership. available at: http://www.bsec-organization.org/main.aspx?ID=BSEC_Economic_Agenda

no doubt that when the Black Sea Region is examined in terms of the effectiveness of its regional organizations, the BSEC is the most influential and most referred one. As Aral refers “no one can deny the positive synergy spread by the BSEC in the Black Sea Basin, the Balkans and the Caucasus.”²⁵⁶ As a result of the BSEC, inter-regional trade has increased since 1992 as well. More importantly, considered the difficulty to form regional cooperation in the Black Sea Region, it is hard to deny the results obtained through so far.

However, it does not mean that the BSEC have been successful in attaining all of its targets. The economic problems of each country in the region have played an important role at this point. Besides since regional states have not been successful to fulfill the demands of free market economy, that is they are far behind the privatization process, developing the trade between the member states has been slow and far less than expected. The institutional deficits of the organization are well designated in the *BSEC Economic Agenda* in 2001.

According to the report, they are:

“the shortage of financial resources and failure to attract significant investments from abroad; a lack of coherent definition of aims, priorities and long-term issues; a discrepancy between the proclaimed objectives and the degree of implementation of projects adopted under the BSEC aegis; low efficiency in implementing adopted resolutions and decisions; insufficient coordination in important parts of the Organization and too much bureaucracy.”²⁵⁷

Apart from these two factors that indicate the deficiencies of the BSEC, the most important one is that the regional states gave BSEC second importance as an organization since they are mostly inclined to form alliance with the EU or

²⁵⁶ Berdal Aral, “The Black Sea Economic Co-operation after Ten Years. What Went Wrong?,” *Alternatives*, Vol.1, No.4 (Winter 2002), p. 74.

²⁵⁷ BSEC Economic Agenda For the Future Towards a More Consolidated, Effective and Viable BSEC Partnership.

NATO.²⁵⁸ Moreover, instead of putting the BSEC at the center of their political structure, member states have a tendency to see the organization as an alternative trump to other initiatives.²⁵⁹

The success of the BSEC could not be abstracted from Turkish-Russian economic relations since it has the potential to influence the bilateral relations. It is no doubt that the BSEC forms an area of diplomatic contact for regional states in the Black Sea, in which Turkey and Russia stands at the center of this area.²⁶⁰ In other words, Turkey and Russia can be considered as the locomotives of the BSEC; thus Turkish-Russian relations which will regard the Black Sea as the hub their bilateral relations will both contribute to the development of the BSEC as an effective organization and to the development of their economic relations additionally.

6.3. The Role of the Domestic Determinants on the Economic Relations

With the demise of the USSR, the efforts of establishing the market economy in the Russian Federation was backed up largely by Yeltsin administration. As a result of his economy policies, influence of the economic lobbies and gas companies such as LukOil, Yukos and Sibneft in foreign economic relations increased. Since these companies supported rapprochement with Turkey, the outcome was cooperation in Turkish-Russian economic relations. Similarly, Özal functioned for the same purpose in Turkey. Özal's liberalization policies starting in 1980s caused and contributed to partnership in the economic sphere for he encouraged the Turkish businessmen to enter the

²⁵⁸ Berdal Aral, p. 76.

²⁵⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, p. 278.

²⁶⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, p. 280.

Soviet market, of which the opening of the Eximbank is the perfect example.²⁶¹ Turkish Eximbank has been established in order to provide credits for Turkish businessman in exportation to the USSR, thus playing a crucial role in Turkish-Russian economic relations. In this way, as Duygu Sezer puts forward, Turkish businessman were given attractive inducements by both “Soviet and Turkish perestroikas.”²⁶²

In the light of the developments above, it is necessary to note that Turkish-Russian economic relations has been and is developed mostly through state initiatives of the two countries. In other words, the inclination of the state offices like the Economy Ministry, the Energy Ministry, and the Finance Office in both countries is significant. For instance, decision making actors of energy sphere-TPAO, BOTAŞ, TÜPRAŞ, Russian Lobby, the Energy Ministry often have conflict with he Foreign Ministry over economic issues in Turkey; while the Energy Ministry is willing to export more Russian natural gas, the Foreign Ministry is reluctant about the situation as a result of its age-old suspicion about the country.²⁶³

The fact that state offices are significant foreign policy actors in both countries is also one of the reasons why Turkey’s economic relations with the Russian Federation is different from its relations with its other economic partners. While the economic relations with EU countries and the USA is developed

²⁶¹ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), p.108.

²⁶² Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), p.108.

²⁶³ Gareth Winrow, “Turkey and the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus,” in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Press), pp. 241-242.

through individuals or companies, entering the Soviet market has been through agreements between the states, through state channel.²⁶⁴

However, the state control on Turkish-Russian relations has been trimmed down with the increasing influence of private associations towards the end of 1990s. In other words, the character of present Turkish-Russian economic relations is not decided by state institutions only in view of the fact that private associations and companies also have an impact on the relationship. The share of the Turkish Eximbank, Turkish construction and textile companies and private Russian oil companies in Turkish-Russian relations is as large as the state-controlled companies of both countries.

6.4. Sectoral Share of Economic Relations: Foreign Trade, Tourism, and Construction

The large population of the Russian Federation, the nearness of the countries to each other, the massive need for consumption goods and services in the Russian Federation right at the end of the Cold War created trade opportunities for Turkey.²⁶⁵ Above everything else, with the massive change in the Eastern block, Turkish private sector turned towards “Eurasia” and Russia has been the country which became the locomotive of Turkish economic activities in Eurasia.²⁶⁶ Besides, since economic relations with the Russian Federation has the potential to influence the economic relations with the other countries in the Black Sea region, this fact places Turkish-Russian economic relation at a different position.

²⁶⁴ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 103.

²⁶⁵ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 15.

²⁶⁶ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 101.

The end of the Cold War is a determinant based on systemic change but while analyzing the trade between Turkey and Russia, the main trade policies of the two has to be taken account as well. The main principles of present-day Russian foreign trade are chosen as: to augment the proportion of raw materials, export machinery and high technology products, limit the consumption goods in exportation, and protect the local industries.²⁶⁷ When it comes to Turkey, according to a report published by the Turkish Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, Turkey's main economic development policy is altered from "import substitution industrialization to export led growth" strategy.²⁶⁸ The report underlines that "economy opened up to world trade, export-promoting incentives were initiated (including tax exemptions, rebates and favorable credit terms), direct import controls have been eliminated, and quantity restrictions have been dismantled. State intervention in the economy was reduced to minimum level."²⁶⁹ As this proves, while the state intervention in the economy in Turkey is diminishing, the reverse condition is occurring in the Russian Federation. The fact that the Russian economy's main target is to give priority to exportation and the development of local industries, which demonstrates that import substitution industrialization has been chosen as the trade policy, influences Turkish-Russian trade since import substitution industrialization makes it difficult for Turkish exporters to proliferate in the Russian market. The

²⁶⁷ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 114.

²⁶⁸ Turkish Undersecretariat of Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, "Turkey's Foreign Trade: 1990-2004-Main Development in Turkey's Foreign Trade." Available at: <http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/ead/english/basinyayin.doc>. p. 1.

²⁶⁹ Turkish Undersecretariat of Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, "Turkey's Foreign Trade: 1990-2004-Main Development in Turkey's Foreign Trade. p. 1.

reflection of Russian economy policies after 1998 will be observed in the following.

Turkey's main exports items are textile products, agricultural products (nourishment goods), medicine supplies, leather, construction materials, automotive products and other consumer goods. Russia, on the other hand, exports natural gas, iron-steel, oil products, and coal to Turkey. Therefore, Turkey and Russia have complementary economies, which form the main driving force between Turkish-Russian trades.

The leading sectors that removed the obstacles in the way of economic cooperation have been energy, tourism and construction. Construction is an important item in bilateral economic relations since Turkish construction firms materialized several projects and achieved high contract values in Russia; ENKA being one of the Turkish construction companies which has done the highest business volume in the Russian Federation. Turkish construction companies supported cooperation and Turkish engineers were involved in many construction projects such as the repair of Duma, airports, industrial buildings and hotels during 1990s.²⁷⁰ Between 1989-1999 Turkish construction companies has done about 10 billion dollar work in Russia.²⁷¹ In this sector, Russians complain about the opportunities given to Turkish firms since Turkish companies in Russia have been given contracts of \$6 to \$7 billion while Russian companies in Turkey could win contracts about \$100 million.²⁷² However; the construction sector is the one which is affected by the Russian financial crisis the most. In 1997, the Turkish construction companies have taken project of 1126 billion dollar, however, this

²⁷⁰ Bülent Aras, *War in the Gardens of Babylon*, p. 77.

²⁷¹ Bülent Aras, *War in the Gardens of Babylon*, p. 77.

²⁷² Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds), p. 216.

number has decreased to 732 billion dollar in 1998 and to 181 billion dollar in 1999.²⁷³ Yet, in 2005, the numbers shows that the situation is being reversed since Turkish construction companies have done works of 2.292 billion dollar.²⁷⁴

Tourism is also another important item of bilateral economic relations. Turkey is the favorite holiday destination for Russians and the remarkable growth of Russian tourist visiting Turkey influences the economic relations. In the period between 1992 and 1995, Russians visited Turkey in order to buy cheap products; in other words, those visits were mostly for trade opportunities rather than touristic reasons.²⁷⁵ After 1995, however, the motive for visiting Turkey became touristic and Turkey became the fourth country that Russians visited the most during 1990-1997. One of the most significant features of the Russian tourists is that they are not open to political developments as the other nations; for instance while Germany and other European countries are affected by terrorist threats and other political crisis, Russians are less interested in these developments.²⁷⁶

The Foreign trade, tourism and construction activities reached its peak until 1998. However, the Russian economic crisis of 1998 drew back the level of trade between Turkey and Russia. The Russian economy had to close itself to the outside world and in a sense dynamics that operate the market economy were abandoned as a response to the economic crisis. For this reason, since Russia gave priority to its local products instead of exported ones and since the Russians, who rapidly lost their purchasing power, started to buy cheaper product from Far East,

²⁷³ T.C. Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, "Güncel İstatistikler," (Haziran 2006), p.1.

²⁷⁴ T.C. Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, "Güncel İstatistikler," (Haziran 2006), p.1.

²⁷⁵ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 130.

²⁷⁶ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 131.

Turkish-Russian trade has decreased.²⁷⁷ While in 1997, the level of trade between the two accounted about 4 billion dollar, in 1998 it fell down to 3.5 billion dollar, which shows the negative effects of the Russian economic crisis.²⁷⁸ Although Turkey experienced an economic crisis in 2001 as well, it can be said that Turkish businessmen are not affected by the crisis in terms of their economic relations with the Russian Federation. In both countries now, existing achieved economic stability compared to last five years, in other words, “the positive economic trends both in Turkey and Russia” provided a good impetus for further development of the bilateral economic ties.²⁷⁹

In this new period, Putin’s desire to mend the Russian economy through foreign trade cause a positive thrust for overall Turkish-Russian economic relations as well. In 2003, the trade volume of Turkey and Russia was 6.7 billion dollar and in 2004 it rose to 10.8 billion dollar, and in 2005 it rose further to 15.1 billion dollar,²⁸⁰ which was the level of trade that both countries have been trying to reach.

The 1998 Russian financial crisis had lessened the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey as well since Russian’ tourists capability to afford a holiday decreased. However, with Russian economy being more stabilized and with Turkish financial crisis in 2001, which reduced the holiday prices in Turkey, this number increased again. For example in 2003, 1.28 million Russian visited Turkey, making Turkey the second countries that had been visited by tourist after

²⁷⁷ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 120.

²⁷⁸ See the table about Turkish-Russian Trade in Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 116.

²⁷⁹ The website of the Russian Embassy of Turkish Republic gives declarations of the officials in both sides related to the economic relations. See at <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/>

²⁸⁰ DEİK/ Türk-Rus İş Konseyi (Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey), “Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkileri,” (Mart 2006), p. 2.

Germany and lastly, it rose to 1.86 million Russian visiting Turkey in 2005.²⁸¹ With these figures, Turkey became the first country that the Russian tourists visit the most.

6.4.1. “Suitcase Trade”

Between Turkey and Russian Federation, there is an unofficial but considerably large amount of “suitcase trade”. The increase of Russian tourists visiting Turkey has been a positive development for the overall trade volume; creating a new phenomenon of “suitcase trade”.

The suitcase trade factor, which refers to goods that they take with them when they return to their home, should also be taken into consideration in analyzing the economic relations. Although it is not possible to give exact numbers, the experts estimate that the annual trade volume for the suitcase trade during 1991-1996 was \$6 to \$10 billion.²⁸²

Suitcase trade had positive economic impacts on both Turkish and Russian economies. While Turkey won an excessive amount of foreign money, many unemployed people in Russia became the middle scale entrepreneurs in their own country and the deficit in products has been overcome through the suitcase trade.

Apart from this trade issue, tourism also created the suitable environment for interaction between two societies to overcome the old stereotypes. In other words, suitcase trade also had social consequences. Despite these positive outcomes, both as a result of political frictions and economic ones, the Russian

²⁸¹ DEİK/ Türk-Rus İş Konseyi (Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey), “Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkileri,” (Mart 2006), p. 5.

²⁸² Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds), p. 215.

perspective of the suitcase trade has changed after 1995. The economic reasons are:

- Russian administrations have been forced to limit the unofficial trade by international institution like WTO and IMF;
- The Russian aim to limit the exportation had a negative impact on suitcase trade;
- The low quality of the products brought through the suitcase trade had created conflict;
- Lastly, the strength of local firms in Russia, which started campaigns against the suitcase trade, has increased.²⁸³

According to the Turkish Republic Central Bank's final statistics, the suitcase trade figures indicate that after 2002, the trade volume decreased in each year and finally, it fell down to 1.9 billion dollar in 2005.²⁸⁴ The figures tell that the suitcase trade is losing its importance in Turkish-Russian bilateral trade.

6.4.2. Energy Dimension: Competition and Rivalry

Although both construction and tourism sectors emerged with the end of the Cold War, Turkish-Russian rapprochement in the energy sphere is not a post-Cold War phenomenon. In 1984, Turkey already signed an agreement about Russian exportation of natural gas to Turkey, which was activated in 1987.²⁸⁵

²⁸³ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 124.

²⁸⁴ According to the statistics, the highest amount of suitcase trade has been materialized in 1996 with 8.8 billion dolar and the lowest one is the year 2005. See in DEİK/ Türk-Rus İş Konseyi (Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey), "Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkileri," p. 4.

²⁸⁵ Baskın Oran (ed), p. 547.

Russia is one of the countries which owns a considerable amount of energy resources of the world. It is the largest natural gas owner of the world with 1.680 trillion cubic feet, the largest natural gas producer with 22.4 tcf and thus the largest natural gas exporter with 7.1 tcf.²⁸⁶ Combined with Turkey's lack of sufficient oil and gas resources and Russia's need for exportation of its resources for money, the energy sector forms a strategic cooperation area between Turkey and Russia. However, the case does not have one dimension and the situation is more complex than that since energy issue has also the potential of producing rivalry. In brief, question of energy resources is an example of how Turkish-Russian economic relations can swerve from partnership to rivalry, which will be observed in dealing the transportation of the energy resources.

In analyzing Turkish-Russian relations in the energy sphere, the domestic energy policies, existing demand for importation and exportation of both will be the main elements which determine the character of the relationship in this sector.

Starting with the Russian Federation, how much stress the government lays on the energy politics is significant. According to Putin, in order to restore the economy, the hydrocarbons were the most important tool and the best way to benefit the country's large hydrocarbon reserves was through state regulation of the sector or through creating companies that will work in accordance with the state.²⁸⁷ Therefore as long as the prices remain high, to restore the economy, or to improve the investment climate will be easier. When he addressed the National

²⁸⁶ These numbers are taken from the Department of Energy in U.S. and they belong to 2004; but these numbers are expected to be the same for a couple of few more years. According to the Department of Energy in U.S., Russia has the largest reserves but as a result of "aging natural gas infrastructure, monopolistic industry (Gazprom's monopolistic control), state regulation", the production result is less than the existing reserves. See <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/pdf.pdf>

²⁸⁷ Roman Kupchinsky, "Putin's Former Colleagues make up Today's Energy Team," *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, Vol.6, No.5 (February 2006).

Security Council on 22 December 2005, his reference to Russia's role in international energy security was as follows "today it is mainly energy that ensures the growth of the world economy. It has always been that way and will remain so for a long time."²⁸⁸ With this type of approach what the state aims to achieve is to recover the country's economy and to expand its economic influence (therefore political) and get the status of an "energy superpower".²⁸⁹

In doing so, the first and the most important means of the Russian state is Gazprom company since it produces nearly 90% of Russia's natural gas, which makes one-third of the world's natural gas reserves.²⁹⁰ By law, Gazprom can sell natural gas at the prices designated by the state. More importantly, the take over of Sibneft, Russia's fifth largest oil company, by Gazprom at the end of 2004²⁹¹ means that it will not stay just as a natural gas firm but it is planning to become an energy giant of both natural gas and oil. These developments indicate that Gazprom is becoming a more significant decision maker of Russian foreign policy.

When it comes to the exportation of oil and natural gas, since the state-owned pipeline operator Transneft also has monopoly power over the pipelines and does not permit the other companies to develop other pipelines, that is to say

²⁸⁸ Speech of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, "Opening Address at the Security Council Session on Russia's Role in Guaranteeing International Energy." Available online at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/12/22/2222_type84779_99439.shtml

²⁸⁹ Victor Yasman, "Is Russian Gas Crisis Evidence of Moscow's New Energy Strategy?," *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, Vol.6, No.2 (January 2006).

²⁹⁰ For the importance of Gazprom in Russian energy strategy see Testimony of Zeyno Baran, Before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, (September 27, 2005).

²⁹¹ See Claire Bigg, "State Monopoly Gazprom takes over Sibneft," *RFE/RL Russian Reports*, Vol.5, No.31 (2005).

in Zeyno Baran's words it creates "massive bottleneck" in Russian exportation of energy.²⁹²

The combination of Gazprom's acquisition of Sibneft, Rosneft's acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz,²⁹³ the Yukos affair and Putin's approach to the energy issue have backtracked the privatization of the last decade. In other words what Putin has chosen as a way in order to be an energy superpower during his regulation was to consolidate the state influence on the energy sector and bring oil and gas private companies under Kremlin's control.²⁹⁴

When Turkey is considered, its energy policy is formed according to the country's domestic needs and geographical location. With Turkey's economy becoming more industrialized after 1980s and a population of over 60 million people, Turkey's energy demand is growing rapidly. Starting with 150 billion cubic feet in 1991, Turkey reached up 748 bcf consumption level in 2003, which was almost all imported.²⁹⁵ Among these, 19 and 14 percent are separated to the industrial and residential sectors; 65 percent to the power sector and the remaining 2 percent is used in the fertilizer production.²⁹⁶ Today, according to BOTAŞ's

²⁹² Testimony of Zeyno Baran, Before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, (September 27, 2005).

²⁹³ As a result of these take overs, %25 of the Russian oil production is in the hands of the Russian state.

²⁹⁴ Testimony of Robinson West, Before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, (September 27, 2005).

²⁹⁵ . The state firm BOTAŞ has signed contracts about 1.6 trillion and it took it down to under 0.9 Tcf in 2005, which means that Turkey has signed contracts far more than it is expected to need. See U.S. Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html>

²⁹⁶ U.S. Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html> <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html>.

revised contracts after the economic crisis of 2001, 0.7 tcf comes from Russia while the remaining 0.2 tcf is exported from Iran.²⁹⁷

When it comes to the oil issue, around 90 percent of Turkey's oil consumption is exported from the Middle East and Russia. Although Turkey's oil demand, which covers 40 percent of Turkey's total energy requirements,²⁹⁸ is increasing as well; compared to natural gas its importance is diminishing while the importance of natural gas is increasing, which is also the fact for the whole world. The most important reason is first of all natural gas is preferred for environmental reasons since it is a more clean form of energy, the second is it is a low cost one and lastly in the electricity production, it is taking the place of coal or oil-fired power generation.²⁹⁹

This high level of natural gas exportation from Russia, in other words Turkey's dependence on Russian natural gas at this amount lessens Turkey's maneuvering power in its relations with the Russian Federation. In 1997, having decided to reduce its dependence on oil, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia, known as "Blue Stream"³⁰⁰, for the purchase of 16 billion cubic meters of gas a year. The project, which intended to deliver the Russian natural under the Black Sea to Turkey, avoids third countries' issues since it is a direct connection between the two. Within the framework of this intergovernmental agreement in 1997, Gazprom started to have commercial contact with the Turkish state firm

²⁹⁷ U.S. Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html> <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html>.

²⁹⁸ U.S. Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html> <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html>.

²⁹⁹ Gareth M Winrow, "Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.5, No.2 (2004).

³⁰⁰ The total length of the pipeline is 1213 km long. Russia's land section is 373 km long and the marine section is 396 km long. Turkey's land section is 444 km long going from Samsun to Ankara. The total cost of the Blue Stream is USD 3.2 billion, including USD 1.7 billion to construct the marine section of the pipeline.

BOTAŞ and specialist from Italy as well contributed to the construction of the pipeline.

Blue Stream was intended to be the foundation for a “strategic partnership” between Turkey and Russia. However, the pipeline created conflicting approaches in Turkey. On the one hand, it has been regarded as a perfect solution to Turkey’s energy problems; on the other hand the Turkish public and the media has criticized the pipeline since it multiplied Turkey’s dependence on Russian natural gas, which was dangerous for Turkey in light of the various conflictual issues. Mostly pro-Islamic and left wing and nationalist groups and parties opposed to the project. The Turkish Military was also among those who attested objections to the project.

The issue has been discussed in the Turkish Parliament broadly; the Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz supporting the pipeline and accusing those of fearing US criticizing Turkish-Russian cooperation at this extent.³⁰¹ The Prime Minister, Ecevit of the Social Democrats, Energy Minister Cumhur Ersümer and Güneş Taner and Turkish construction companies including Enka, Entes, Gama have played a crucial in enforcing the necessity of such a project for a salvation to Turkey’s energy problems.

Turkey attempted to involve in other gas project in order to lessen its dependence on Moscow. The Iranian-Turkish gas deal of 1996 and the agreement with the Turkmenistan on November 29, 1998 were all efforts to find other gas suppliers than Russia. One of the alternatives was the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project (TCGP) which would carry Turkmen gas to Turkey; however, the project

³⁰¹ Gökhan Bacık, “The Blue Stream Project, Energy Co-operation and Conflicting Interests,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol.2, No.2 (2001), p. 89.

was doomed to end for several reasons including the financial problems. Turkey had to either finance the Blue Stream or TCGP and the disputes over the Caspian Sea resources in which Turkmenistan sided with Iran was among the other reasons. The Blue Stream has received criticism from the Turkic leaders as well including the Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov and Azeri President Haydar Aliev saying “Turkey doesn’t need Blue Stream.”³⁰²

Despite all these debates and problems including technical, political, and economic; the pipeline has started flowing gas to Turkey. On January 1, 2006, Turkey has received a total of 9.6 bcm of gas since the pipeline was launched and contractual deliveries for 2006 are at 8 bcm,³⁰³ which means that Turkey has failed to lessen its dependence on Moscow.

6.4.2.1. The Competition over the Pipeline Routes: The U.S. and the EU Participation

The transportation of rich hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian basin, which has 200 billion barrels, has been an issue in Turkish-Russian and the Western world agendas. As well as for its growing energy needs, Turkey wants to make some money from transporting Caspian oil and natural gas to Europe.

It is conceivable that Turkey can become a major transit energy center due to the country’s strategic location. The official site of the U.S. Energy Department introduces Turkey as "an energy bridge" since it stands in the middle of major oil producing areas in the Middle East and Caspian Sea regions on the one hand, and consumer markets in Europe on the other. As well as diversifying its energy

³⁰² Gökhan Bacık, p. 90.

³⁰³ Official site of the Gazprom firm: www.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article8895.shtml

suppliers, the transportation of natural gas to European markets through Turkey on the one hand could enhance its relations with the Turkic world which will enhance its political influence in the Caspian Region and on the other hand could benefit from transit revenues.³⁰⁴ The US government and the EU puts emphasis to the key role of Turkey as “an important transit corridor”.³⁰⁵ Moreover, if BOTAS is buying more natural gas than the Turkish consumption level, Turkey could become an important transit center for natural gas exports to Greece and Europe.

However, the Russian Federation considers that it has the right to exploit the region’s oil and gas resources in parallel with its “near abroad” approach. The disagreement over the gas prices between Ukraine and Russia in late December 2005 has to be linked to this issue. Although the crisis has been solved by a five-year agreement signed on January 4, 2006 in which Russia agreed to sell 580 bcf of its natural gas at 2.691 mcf,³⁰⁶ the important point with this crisis has been the fact that it brought light the problems of the energy policies of both the Turkey and the EU. First and foremost it exposed the issue of gas prices in Turkey. Turkey provides natural gas supply with "take-or-pay" contracts with Russia, which means Turkey theoretically could be forced to pay cash penalties up to \$1 billion per year if it fails to purchase contracted gas.³⁰⁷

The crisis was important for its another dimension. This was the first time that a supply transportation affected the flows to Europe. The EU is sensitive about the issue since most of its natural gas important from the Russian

³⁰⁴ Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor,” p. 23.

³⁰⁵ Testimony by Julia Nanay, Before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, (April 30, 2003), p. 4.

³⁰⁶ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs: Russia.” Available at www.eia.doe.gov.

³⁰⁷ U.S. Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html> <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/turkey.html>.

Federation, which makes both Turkey and the EU dependent on Russian natural gas. That is why *The European Union Green Paper* of 2006 has focused on Russia. The Paper has put forward the new strategies of European energy strategy and the oil&gas prices and the safe transportation of them to Europe are outlined. According to the paper, the EU energy policy should have three main objectives which are sustainability, competitiveness and security of the supply. The paper continues:

“In order to react to the challenges of high and volatile energy prices, increasing import dependency, strongly growing global energy demand and global warming, the EU needs to have a clearly defined external energy policy. To this end the Commission proposes: A new energy partnership with Russia, deepening energy relations with major producers and consumers, developing a pan-European Energy Community Treaty.”³⁰⁸

When it comes to the U.S. “to support the security of energy markets by ensuring the free flow of supplies unfettered by the policies of regional competitors; to strengthen the independence and prosperity of the Caspian states through the revenues obtained from energy production; and finally to decrease the Russian monopoly over these resources” are the most important aims. This strategy is reflected in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project in which the American motive was to break Russian monopoly over the region’s transportation system.

The BTC project was one of the most significant controversial issues of the Turkish-Russian energy agenda during the 1990s. The tension was a reflection of Russian-Turkish different approach to the energy transportation. Supported by the United States, Turkey worked for the activation of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline while Russia insisted on Baku-Novorossisk which would bypass Turkish

³⁰⁸ “Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,” *Commission of European Community*, 2006.

territories. The United States in parallel with its target of increasing and diversifying the number of fuel transportation supported the creation of the project while on the contrary, Russian perceived the situation as “a long term Turkish-American plot” to undermine Moscow’s position in its near abroad.³⁰⁹

It can be argued that with the realization of the BTC oil pipeline in 2005, one of the most significant controversial issues of Turkish-Russian relations has been resolved. Besides, Strategic Energy Partnership conclusion in 2002 between the USA and the Russian Federation improved cooperation in the energy field.

6.4.3. The Straits

In relation to the BTC, the issue of straits brought back the rivalry into the scene again since Turkey always referred to the disadvantages of continuing to use the Bosphorus channel as a primary oil-shipping route.

The vast amount of Russian oil is transported by tankers to the Black Sea and from there to the Turkish Straits. Besides Russian trade is relied largely on the straits. The straits has several difficulties of navigation As a result of its labyrinth-like twists, the ships need to change course at least twelve times.³¹⁰ For instance, at two points, Kandilli and Yeniköy, the ships’ navigators are unable to see the port and starboard side which requires great skill to continue to navigate.³¹¹ When the bad weather conditions are added to this situation, the sailing becomes harder.

³⁰⁹ See Amikam Nachmani, *Turkey: Facing a New Millenium Coping With Intertwined Conflicts*, (UK: Manchester University Pres, 2003).

³¹⁰ Brent Sasley, “Turkey’s Energy politics,” in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emergng Multiregional Power*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Press, 2001), p. 296.

³¹¹ Amikam Nachmani, p. 128.

For these reasons, between 1983-1993, there have been 167 large scale accidents in the straits and during the 1990s, over 150 accidents took place.³¹²

In order to prevent such accidents Turkey adopted the Bosphorus and Çanakkale Safety of Passage Act in 1994, imposing restrictions such as ships over 300 meters long could navigate only after the Turkish maritime authorities let them sail, ship over 190 feet height could not pass and some traffic management systems.³¹³ The Russian Federation strongly opposed to the new regulations taken by the Turkish Republic, arguing that it was a violation of the Montreux Convention and international law; thus carried the issue to International Maritime Organization. Moreover, the Russian Federation argued that between 1994-1997 349 Russian ships are stopped for 1887 hours at the straits and this has cost Russia about 926,000 dollars.³¹⁴ Turkey made adaptations to the 1994 version of the treaty and brought into force the regulations in 1998 with some changes.

One of the arguments is that Turkey is comfortable in changing the arrangements of the straits due to its belief that Russia also will not be willing to change the Montreux Convention; reasons of which discussed in the previous chapter.

6.5. Conclusion

Economics is an area with fewer hitches than politics in the panorama of Turkish-Russian relations. The geographical nearness of both countries had been one of the driving forces in this process.

³¹² Brent Sasley, p. 296.

³¹³ Amikam Nachmani, p. 130.

³¹⁴ Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), p. 59.

When 1990s and afterwards is considered, Turkey and Russia cooperated in the economic sphere rather than compete. Due to their complementary nature of economies, Turkey and Russia cooperated in sectors like trade, construction, and tourism. The efforts of the business groups, organizations and the state leaders to further the partnership in these sectors are noteworthy.

When the energy dimension of the relationship is analyzed, the relationship has a more complex nature since it both creates partnership and rivalry. Moscow is an important natural gas supplier of Turkey; however issues like the prices of the natural gas and Turkey's search for diversifying its suppliers cause friction. Moreover, Turkey and Russia has different views over how to transport the Caspian oil and natural gas. On the one hand, Turkey argues that it is an energy transit country; on the other hand Russia is not pleased with this idea.

CONCLUSION

This study attempted to reveal the new dynamics of Turkish-Russian relations after 1999 with a focus on the Greater Black Sea Region. This study argues that the main question of our paper-can we perceive Turkey and Russia as two regional partners or rivals in the context of post-Cold War?- cannot be answered without giving different answers for political, military and economic relations and analyzing them separately. During the period between 1990-1999 Turkish Russian political and security relations carried the characteristic of rivalry more than partnership while the economic relations has been a partnership area with the partial exception of the energy dimension. There have been attempts to improve the political-military relations after 1999; however it is still impossible to define Turkish-Russian political-military relations with partnership.

Today, the Black Sea area is certainly more of a region than it was in 1990s and it has a growing significance as it is located at geopolitical and economic crossroads between Europe and Asia. Despite the existence of regional conflicts, new regional initiatives have emerged in the region. The BSEC, GUAM, Blackseafor, The Community for the Democratic Choice can be named as the most effective and the most significant regional cooperation arrangements in the region. Turkey and Russia are both members of the BSEC and Blackseafor; however while Turkey supports a more active, effective BSEC and Blackseafor, Russia is cautious about the idea since it is suspicious of any attempt which will danger its status in the region.

Russia and Turkey, (to some extent Ukraine) can be classified as the main regional players in the Greater Black Sea Region. The enlargement of EU and

NATO and regional arrangements introduced by the two has contributed to the stabilization of the region. In order to promote democracy, stability and in order to secure the energy issue, the EU and the NATO has focused on the region more than 1990s. However, the enlargement of NATO and the EU, combined with the democratic movements, are not welcomed by two main regional players of the region since both Turkey and Russia are after preserving the status quo in the region.

Russian Federation, although lost its old superpower status with the end of the Cold War, continues to be an important power with its massive nuclear armory, enormous size and substantial natural resources in global and regional terms. In the initial years of the end of the Cold War, the country witnessed a domestic debate between the pro-Western Atlanticist and conservative Eurasianists, resulting in a conclusion that Russia's economic, political and military might could only be achieved if it focuses on its "near abroad", where Turkey also intended to establish closer ties in order to be a regional power. Therefore the ideological and global terms are abandoned and regional terms are started to be emphasized as a main guide in Russian foreign policy making. From Yeltsin to Putin Russia's foreign policy has moved to a more assertive and more centralized one.

On the Turkish side, Turkey departed from its traditional foreign policy of non-involvement with the Turkic world and ex-Soviet areas and followed a more active foreign policy line to fill the Soviet vacuum in the initial years of the end of the Cold War. As a result, along with the concept of near abroad and Turkey's attempts to promote the "Turkish Model" to the Turkic world, Turkey and Russia

found themselves in another Cold War environment until the mid 1990s. However, after it was understood that Turkey did not have the required resources to establish closer link with the Turkic world, and could not challenge the Russian Federation on this issue as a result of the infrastructural and economic interdependence between these states and Russia, this intense geopolitical rivalry has gave way to less friction and tension in political and military relations. Besides, mutual active political dialogue starting with 1999 has been a contributing element in the development of political and military relations.

While analyzing the Turkish-Russian political and military relations, the influence of the history is noteworthy. Since a long history of wars and conflicts characterizes the Turkish (Ottoman)-Russian relations, the perception of the other as *the enemy*, which goes back to 17th century, has been one of the main obstacles to form partnership. Since both Russia and Turkey are the heirs of two old military and political enemies-the Ottoman Empire and the Tsarist Russia, the historical legacy on the bilateral relationship has been a significant determinant. Although perception of the other as *the enemy* preserved until the end of 1990s, it can be argued that the archenemy image of the other has entered into a process of fading.

In contrast to political and military relations, economic sphere has been an exception and both Turkey and Russia has developed their relationship on the economic basis in an unprecedented speed. Because Turkey and Russia have complementary nature of economies in trade, tourism, construction and energy sectors, the relationship can be defined with the term partnership.

On the whole, this work has also argued that Duygu Bazođlu Sezer’s “virtual rapprochement” has been considered as the term which defined the scope of Turkish-Russian relations in a paramount way in 1990s, which said “a hard kernel of mutual fear, mistrust, and suspicion remains in the minds of the decision makers and political elites.”³¹⁵ Therefore, the long history of wars, and conflict left a legacy on each side, as a result of which the political elites of both countries suspected each other for years. Yet, surely there have been a real rapprochement in relations since then. Considering the active political dialogue, and the complementary nature of their economies, it is obvious that Turkish-Russian relations is improving and will improve more in the political, economic and security domains. “The Action Plan in Eurasia”, numerous political visits, complementary nature of their economies, Turkey’s growing energy needs, and lastly the acceptance of the necessity to cooperate in order to fight against terrorism are the most important forcible paradigms for Turkey and Russia to cooperate rather than compete. In both Turkey and Russia, there are still politicians and military officers who are suspicious of the other’s intentions; yet the number of these elites are decreasing compared to 1990s as a result of the factors above.

³¹⁵ Sezer, Duygu Bazođlu. “Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Düşmanlıktan ‘Fiili Yakınlaşma’ya,” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), *Türkiye’nin Yeni Dünyası*, (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2002).

APPENDIX I

Milestones in Russian - Turkish Mutual Relations During the Post-Soviet Period

1992 – Süleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of Turkey visited Moscow. Signing of the "Principles of bilateral relations between the Turkish Republic and the Russian Federation". In June the president of Russia Boris Yeltsin came to Istanbul to the summit of leaders of "Organization on economic cooperation on the Black Sea" states.

1993 - Tansu Çiller, the Prime Minister of Turkey visited Moscow. The agreement on creation of a Joint committee and Working group in the sphere of telecommunications, energy, industry and hi-tech was signed.

1995 - Tansu Çiller participated in May 9th celebrations of the 50th anniversary of victory over the fascist Germany. Çiller and the head of the Russian government Victor Tchernomyrdin discussed the future of mutual relations.

1996 - Süleyman Demirel, ex-Prime Minister of Turkey participated in Moscow summit of leaders of "Organization on economic cooperation on the Black Sea" states. Parliaments of two countries signed the Protocol on cooperation and the Memorandum of cooperation in fighting terrorism. Construction of Turkish Trade center started in Moscow.

1997 - Victor Tchernomyrdin came with an official visit to Ankara in December. It was the first visit of the Russian Prime Minister to Turkey after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The parties agreed on a long-term program on cooperation in economic, commercial and scientific sphere.

1999 – The Prime Ministers Bülent Ecevit and Vladimir Putin signed in Moscow the Joint declaration on fighting terrorism and the Report on creation of the Incorporated economic committee, which lays a foundation for further economic cooperation.

2000 - the Prime Minister of Russia Michael Kasyanov visited Turkey. The parties signed the agreement on creation of Joint committee on cooperation in the field of military industry.

2001 - Igor Ivanov's, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, visit to Turkey laid down a basis for the bilateral cultural cooperation. Representatives of both countries signed in New York the "Eurasian cooperation agreement".

2002 – General Anatoly Kvashnin, commander of the Joint Staff of the Russian Federation, visited Ankara in January. The parties signed the frame cooperation agreement in military sphere and the Cooperation agreement in preparation of the military personnel. General Hussein Kivrikoglu, Turkish Chief of Staff visited Russia in June. The Joint bilateral Committee on military and technical cooperation met in Ankara in September. The "Blue stream" gas pipeline was activated.

2004 – Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdalla Gul came to Moscow to discuss with his Russian counterpart the issue of the Chechen and the Kurdish separatism, and the situation in Nagorny Karabakh and in Cyprus. Official visit to Turkey of the Russian President Vladimir Putin took place in December. The parties signed several documents, including the Joint declaration of friendship and multi-plane cooperation strengthening.

2005 - Official visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took place in January. The visit was dated for the opening of Turkish Trade center in Moscow.

2005 - Official visit of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation took place in December. The Joint Declaration on increasing friendship and multidimensional partnership between the Russian Federation and Turkish Republic was signed.

APPENDIX II

STATISTICS

June 2006

TURKISH-RUSSIAN FOREIGN TRADE

Source: Turkish Foreign
Trade Ministry

billion dollar

	Years						January-April		VARIATION
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2005	2006	%
EXPORTATION	644	923	1.172	1.368	1.859	2.371	679	817	20,3
EXPORTATION	3.887	3.476	3.892	5.451	9.033	12.818	3.724	5.084	36,5
BUSSINESS VOLUME	4.531	4.399	5.064	6.819	10.892	15.189	4.403	5.901	34,0
TRADE DEFICIT	-3.243	-2.553	-2.720	-4.083	-7.174	-10.447	-3.045	-4.267	40,1
EXPORTATION SHARE (%)	2,3	2,9	3,3	2,9	2,9	3,2	2,9	3,4	
EXPORTATION LINE	9	7	6	8	8	9	9	7	
IMPORTATION SHARE (%)	7,1	8,4	7,5	7,9	9,3	11,0	10,5	12,6	
IMPORTATION LINE	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	1	

Construction

Years	Bussiness volume (milyon \$)	Number of Projects
1989-1992	3.538	97
1993	671	33
1994	1.055	91
1995	1.674	124
1996	717	56
1997	1126	80
1998	732	75
1999	181	31
2000	165	19
2001	343	38
2002	428	40
2003	1.033	70
2004	746	56
2005	2.292	61
2006 (Ocak-Haziran)	368	20
TOTAL	15.069	891

RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOREIGN TRADE (milyon \$)

January-April 2005			
exportation	importation	volume	Extra
69.539	26.627	96.166	42.912
January-April 2006			
Exportation	importation	Volume	Extra
90.777	33.735	124.512	57.042
30,5	26,7	29,5	32,9
2005/2006 Variation (%)			

Source: RF Federal Customs House


**TURKISH FOREIGN
TRADE**

billion dolar

	Years						January-April		Variation
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2005	2006	%
Exportation	27.775	31.334	36.059	47.253	63.167	73.122	23.369	24.182	3,5
Exportation	54.503	41.399	51.554	69.340	97.540	116.048	35.328	40.312	14,1
Foreign Trade Volume	82.278	72.733	87.613	116.593	160.707	189.170	58.697	64.494	9,9
Foreign Trade Deficit	-26.728	-10.065	-15.495	-22.087	-34.373	-42.926	-11.959	-	34,9
Exportation/Importation	51,0	75,7	69,9	68,1	64,8	63,0	66,1	60,0	-2,7
GSMH	201.463	144.606	182.928	238.408	301.635	360.876			
Exportation/GSMH	14	22	20	20	21	20			
Importation/GSMH	27	29	28	29	32	32			

APPENDIX III

WORLD MARKETED ENERGY USE BY FUEL TYPE (1980-2030)



Source: Energy Information Administration <http://www.eia.doe.gov/>

APPENDIX IV

Turkish-Russian Foreign Trade: 45 Years

	EXPORTATION	IMPORTATION	BALANCE	VOLUME
1960	5	6	-1	11
1961	4	8	-4	13
1962	5	6	-1	12
1963	7	9	-2	16
1964	9	8	1	17
1965	19	17	2	35
1966	18	26	-7	44
1967	28	27	1	56
1968	30	30	0	60
1969	30	33	-3	63
1970	29	39	-9	68
1971	34	64	-30	98
1972	42	120	-79	162
1973	50	125	-75	176
1974	77	95	-18	172
1975	74	74	0	147
1976	81	89	-8	170
1977	80	82	-2	162
1978	105	68	37	174
1979	127	108	19	235
1980	169	183	-14	352
1981	194	164	30	357
1982	124	11	113	135
1983	89	238	-149	326
1984	139	313	-175	452
1985	190	221	-31	411
1986	141	353	-212	493
1987	169	307	-137	476
1988	271	443	-171	714
1989	705	625	80	1.330
1990	531	1.247	-716	1.779
1991	611	1.097	-486	1.707
1992	442	1.041	-599	1.483
1993	505	1.542	-1.038	2.047
1994	820	1.045	-225	1.866
1995	1.238	2.082	-844	3.321
1996	1.510	1.900	-391	3.410
1997	2.056	2.147	-91	4.204
1998	1.348	2.155	-807	3.503
1999	587	2.372	-1.785	2.958
2000	644	3.887	-3.243	4.530

2001	924	3.436	-2.512	4.360
2002	1.172	3.892	-2.720	5.064
2003	1.337	5.425	-4.088	6.762
2004	1.859	9.033	-7.174	10.892
2005	2.371	12.818	-10.447	15.189

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