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**AN ANALYSIS OF THE FREUDIAN ECONOMIC THEORY:
BISEXUALITY AND THE HISTORICITY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS**

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Historicity of the Unconscious**

**Freudcu Ekonomik Teorinin Bir Analizi: Çiftcinsellik ve Bilinçdışının
Tarihselliği**

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, the concept of “bisexuality”, which firstly emerges in Freud’s work in 1890s in his correspondences with Fliess, and the critics which is directed to Freud for his conclusions that directly or indirectly related to bisexuality, are discussed. For this purpose, Freud's “economic theory” has been adopted as a method and “the tension points” that intersect with the manifestations of bisexuality in his oeuvre have been analyzed.

In accordance with this, owing to the discussion on the “presuppositions” and the “structural necessity” which belongs to the centre of these critics, the arguments that can support the claim that the bisexuality is a structural necessity are put forward. Parallel to these, hypotheses regarding “the economic nature of historicity” and “the instinctuality of the unconscious” in his work have been tested in various contexts.

For examining the relation between bisexuality and “the timelessness” of the unconscious, Freud’s thoughts on “the economy of the aetiology of neuroses” are handled in the first chapter and the claim that Freud’s thoughts on inheritance and historicity cannot overlap with presuppositions, is tried to be supported. In the second chapter, this timelessness discussed with das Ding (or the void) and the reality and pleasure principles and points have been put forward where any presuppositions run counter to the preontological possibilities (and the structural necessities) of psychoanalysis.

The relation between the bisexuality and the psychoanalytic historicity and “the libidinal economic revolution” is analyzed with Freud’s article named “A Child is Being Beaten” in the third chapter.

Keywords: *Unconscious void, bisexuality, drive, Freudian economic theory, psychoanalytic historicity*

ÖZET

Bu tezde, Freud'un eserinde ilk kez 1890'lı yıllarda Fliess ile mektuplaşmalarında ortaya çıkan "çiftcinsellik" kavramı ve Freud'un çiftcinselliğe doğrudan ya da dolaylı göndermeler ile vardığı sonuçlara binaen kendisine yöneltilen kimi eleştiriler tartışılmıştır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda Freud'un "ekonomik teorisi" bir metot olarak benimsenmiş ve onun eserinde çiftcinselliğin tezahürleriyle kesişen "gerilim noktaları" analiz edilmiştir.

Bu doğrultuda, Freud'a bahsi geçen hususta yöneltilen eleştirilerin merkezinde bulunan "ön varsayım" ve "yapısal zorunluluk" tartışmasına binaen, Freud'un eserinde çiftcinselliğin yapısal bir zorunluluk olduğu iddiasını destekleyebilecek olan argümanlar öne sürülmüştür. Bunlara paralel olarak Freud'un eserinde "tarihselliğin ekonomik oluşu" ve "bilinçdışının içgüdüsellikğine" ilişkin hipotezler çeşitli bağlamlarda sınanmıştır.

Çiftcinselliğin bilinçdışının "zamansızlığı" ile ilişkisini incelemek maksadıyla birinci bölümde Freud'un "nevrozların etiyolojisinin ekonomisi" üzerine görüşleri tartışılmış ve Freud'un kalıtım ve tarihsellik üzerine düşüncelerinin ön varsayımlar ile örtüşemeyeceği iddiası temellendirilmeye çalışılmıştır. İkinci bölümde bu zamansızlık, das Ding (ya da boşluk) ve gerçeklik ve keyif prensipleri ile tartışmaya açılmış ve herhangi bir ön varsayımın psikanalizin önotolojik ihtimâllerine (ve yapısal zorunluluklarına) ters düştüğü noktalar öne sürülmüştür.

Üçüncü bölümde ise çiftcinselliğin ve psikanalitik "tarihselliğin" libidinal ekonomik devrim ile ilişkisi Freud'un "Bir Çocuk Dövülüyor" başlıklı makalesi ile analiz edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Bilinçdışı boşluk, çiftcinsellik, dürtü, Freudcu ekonomik teori, psikanalitik tarihsellik*

INTRODUCTION

The concept of “bisexuality” is used by Freud for the first time in his letter to Fliess dated December 6, 1896. He writes: “In order to account for why the outcome [of premature sexual experience] is sometimes perversion and sometimes neurosis, I avail myself of the bisexuality of all human beings.”¹ Therefore, the first appearance of the concept in Freud’s work is related to “the aetiology / the choice of neuroses (*Neurosenwahl*)” and inheritance.

However, even if the bisexuality is referred to as the set of masculine and feminine predispositions (which is not) that every human being has, it is not the ultimate determinant of neuroses and, moreover, as a determinant, there is no evidence that it “precedes” the structure (the neurotic formation). More precisely, the permanent existence of the bisexuality in neurotic phenomenon says nothing about the relation between itself and the phenomenon; their coexistence cannot be reduced to an *uninterrupted* causation. What is certain is as a structural necessity, bisexuality is immanent in *heredity*. In other words, what will give the inheritance its aetiological importance is its historicization by structural bisexuality. Freud begins his letter as follows:

...As you know, I am working on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come into being by a process of stratification: the material present in the form of memory-traces being subjected from time to time to a re-arrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances-to a re-transcription. Thus what is essentially new about my theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but several times over, that it is laid down in various species of indications.²

¹ Sigmund Freud, “Letter 52 from Extracts from the Fliess Papers” in *The Standard Edition* (Hereinafter: S.E.) *of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume I (1886-1899): Pre-Psycho-Analytic Publications and Unpublished Drafts* ed. J. Strachey, A. Freud, A. Strachey, and A. Tyson, 238. The editions of Freud's works available on *Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing* (PEP-Web) have been referred throughout this thesis.

² Freud, “Letter 52”, 231.

The psychic structure, which Freud described as “stratified” and “not necessarily topographic (in structure)” in the next paragraph, is, as might be expected, the premise of his first *topique* that he will propose about 20 years later in his metapsychological works. Indeed, when Freud supported this topology with dynamic theory (the second *topique*) in 1923 (Cf. “The Ego and the Id”), the effect of what he claims here (in “Letter 52”) as “essentially new in his thesis,” is indisputable: By 1923, writing, register and the memory-trace force Freud to go through the change he envisioned in 1896 in his theory. What Freud named in his letter as “three different registers (*Niederschrift*)” (perception, unconscious and preconscious) can be seen on the following schema:




Fig.1 Freud's schema from Letter 52.³

W *Wahrnehmungen* – Perceptions

Wz. *Wahrnehmungszeichen* – Indication of perception

Ub *Unbewusstsein* – Unconsciousness

Vb *Vorbewusstsein* – Preconsciousness

According to Freud, each register has its own characteristics (I am going to show in the first chapter that these characteristics do not correspond to *qualities*) and these are related to “the subject's history”; *the necessities of life (Ananke)* and the psychic stratification dictate a new form of registration *time to time* and this is the *fate* of

³ Freud, “Letter 52”, 234. This schema which is drawn by Freud was transferred (and re-drawn) to Volume 1 of *S.E.* by the editors.

the memory trace. I will examine these features in detail in the following chapters, but for now, I am going to sort them (and show the relation between the memory-traces and the causality and time) briefly to legitimize the form of my further examination:

1. According to Freud, perception (W.) bears no trace of any experience, because perception and memory are mutually exclusive; “a psychic expense” is required for memory.
2. The first register, perception, (Wz.) has the capacity to carry the traces of instant experiences. In this plane, the relationship between traces is based on “simultaneity”.
3. Unconsciousness (Ub.) is the second plane of registration. Here the order of the traces, according to Freud, is “probably” based on causation.
4. The third plane is preconsciousness (Vb.), and according to Freud, here, the order is based on word-representations (Cf. 2.2., *Wortvorstellung*).

Freud calls the fate of the memory-trace as “translation” in this letter, and the flaws in this translation, namely, *repression*, constitute the “specific” causes of the various psychoneuroses. So, at this point, heredity (or fate, *Shicksale*), the aetiology of neuroses and the bisexuality intersect. He writes:

In a purely male being there would be a *surplus* of male release at the two sexual barriers as well—that is, pleasure would be generated and consequently perversion; in purely female beings there would be a surplus of unpleasurable substance at these times.⁴

What Freud called as the “two sexual barriers” refers to another schema in the same letter, and in this way the psychic and sexual developmental stages which the subject passes are matched by Freud. I will summarize it as it is not directly related to the subject that I will discuss here: According to Freud, there is a psychoneurosis that corresponds to the age range to which the “forgotten” experience belongs. However, psychologic, and sexual development are not “exactly” parallel;

⁴ Freud, “Letter 52”, 238, italics are mine.

bisexuality, which cannot be reduced to “duality”, opens to “the forgotten” experience the different neurotic possibilities that can arise in infinitely different manifestations and it interrupts this relation. It should be noted that in this nearly-simultaneous development, “the energy ready to discharge” unceasingly produces a *surplus* in the psychic economy, which is the cause of the neurotic symptom that will manifest as perversion or repression; bisexuality effects the investments of this profitable / loss-making economy⁵ in such a way that *answers, revolutions and the possibilities of living* can be produced from them (investments) (Cf. 3.3). Freud describes the aetiology of neurosis in two different ways in the same year (1896). One of them is, as I have stated above, the specific cause of neuroses is “an error in translation” and the second one is “neuroses are the economic disorders of the nervous system” (Cf. 1.1.).

As I am going to elaborate in the following chapters, the discussion of bisexuality is scattered throughout Freud's work, and he never said “*the last word*” on the subject. In this thesis, I am going to examine the relationship between the timelessness and historicity of the unconscious (which Freud points out in the 52nd Letter when he says that memory is reconstructed repeatedly) and his remarks on bisexuality, which spanned nearly 40 years. First, within a short detour, I would like to present my personal attachment to the subject.

I am going to start with the main concepts that I have discussed in this thesis. First, when I encountered with Judith Butler’s criticism of Freud for the first time in her *Gender Trouble*, I was already working on the concepts of bisexuality and timelessness in Freud’s oeuvre. However, before this encounter, I was thinking that the concept of bisexuality may lift (*aufhebung*) *the sexual difference* in his work; I thought Freud's work could offer sex-neutral explanations. Butler's criticism made me revise this naïve thinking, and the first conclusion I have reached from my further research is that, in Freud's oeuvre, as I said above, bisexuality’s itself, which has been dispersed in all sorts of discussions for 40 years, was representing all the

⁵ The concept of *plus-de-jouir*, which Lacan uses for *surplus*, simultaneously means “more” and “no more”.

manifestations of the tension of sexual difference. So, I would have thought that the phenomenon I am facing is some kind of “structural necessity”. So, to summarize what I have been trying to do from this point forward, I would say that I am trying to give a Freudian answer to Butler's criticism of Freud.

Secondly, I encountered with the *timelessness* of the unconscious for the first time in a footnote written by Freud to *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* in 1907: “The unconscious is quite timeless”.⁶ Then, these two issues I encountered while investigating what was “the structure” that Freud puts forward in response to this timelessness shaped my second hypothesis, namely, “the unconscious is instinctive”, in particular. These two issues are:

1. “... consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace...”⁷
2. “If inherited mental formations exist in the human being—something analogous to *instinct* in animals—these constitute the nucleus of the *Ucs.*”⁸

I appreciate these points because I believe they are valuable references for understanding “the prehistoric” in Freud's work. I think it would be appropriate to consider these together with the 23rd Lecture that I quoted in 1.1. Here, Freud describes “a historical instinct”; and more importantly, as we know, again, from the 23rd Lecture, this instinct *continues* to be historicized. Based on these, it can be said that “the unconscious is instinctive”; the part of it which is *instinctive* is its “historicized nucleus”.

My first hypothesis has a methodological source. As I will examine in detail in the first chapter, “the surplus” that Freud encountered in his studies on aetiology constitutes the point of tension in his economic theory. I have used the method of this economic theory to determine the “structure” which is indifferent to the chronological time. Therefore, by considering the manifestations of bisexuality, I have subjected these points of tension of Freud's various texts to a reading on this

⁶ Sigmund Freud, “Psychopathology of Everyday Life” (1901) in *S.E. Vol. VI*, 274.

⁷ Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920) in *S.E. Vol. XVIII*, 25.

⁸ Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious” (1915) in *S.E. Vol. XIV*, 194-195.

method. The question that led me to this work and the hypotheses that I will explain the first one below was as follows:

Based on Butler's criticism of Freud, it is possible to ask the following question: *What is the difference between presuppositions and the structural necessity?*

As I will explain in 1.3., the method I used could not make possible to postulate another “structure” instead of “timelessness”. Therefore, my first hypothesis should have been about the economy, tension, and *difference*: “In Freud’s thinking, historicity is economic.” Before I move on to rest of my introduction, I would like to present a *lejangd* for the manifestations of my *conceptual* keywords for each chapter:

A) Manifestations of the Surplus/Void;

1. The function of the void in the inequality of aetiology
2. The function of the void in the construction of “reality / memory”
3. The function of the void in “the beginning”

B) Manifestations of the Bisexuality;

1. The function of bisexuality in “the choice of neurosis (*Neurosenwahl*)”
2. The function of bisexuality in the structural necessity
3. The function of bisexuality in “the libidinal economic revolution / revolutionary answers”

C) Manifestations of the Historicity;

1. Historicity and “the inheritance”
2. Historicity and the reality principle / historical reality
3. Historicity and the beginning / end of the (beheaded) history

I continue. In his article which I will call (and explain its reasons) as “the myth of this thesis” in 3.3., “A Child is Being Beaten”, Freud criticizes Fliess’ “bisexuality” and Adler’s “masculine protest” in only one paragraph length discussion. According to Freud, Fliess derives his presuppositions from *anatomy* and Adler derives his from *sociology*; and (according to Freud again) these two sources are *inadequate* for the issue that I am going to call “sexuation”. Well, is it really an “inadequacy” in question? Is it the researcher or the object who/what will give the *form* to the question? Who holds the *fate* of the question in his/her hands, what holds the *fate* of the question in its *millions* of possibilities for the Future? Undoubtedly, the *zeitgeist* continues to present us the important results of multidisciplinary studies. Freud himself mentions 9 different disciplines in which psychoanalysis can work together in his article entitled “The Claims of Psychoanalysis”⁹ written in 1913, in a year that could be called early for such studies, but perhaps not for psychoanalysis. As is also known, some of Freud's most important works can be considered within the field of study that will be called “applied psychoanalysis” in the following years of psychoanalysis¹⁰. Therefore, it is understood that, according to Freud, the issue is not an inadequacy inherent in the disciplines in question, but a dilemma stemming from the subject being dealt with. I (by taking a risk) will refer to Heidegger's *Being and Time*: “This is no less true of “*psychology*” today. Nor can the missing ontological foundations be replaced by building anthropology and psychology into a general *biology*.”¹¹

The problem, according to Heidegger, is not about the way these disciplines work together. They approach their objects by accepting them as *already given*; they miss the openness of Being, not because of their ontological deficiencies or inadequacies of their justifications (hence their presuppositions) and their

⁹ Sigmund Freud, “The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest” (1913) in *S.E. Vol. XIII*, 165-189. These disciplines are respectively: Psychology, linguistics, philosophy, biology, developmental psychology, history of civilization, aesthetics, sociology, and education.

¹⁰ Such as: *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, *Totem and Taboo*, *Civilization and Its Discontents* and “Moses and Monotheism”; and his writings on arts such as his examination on Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo, Dostoyevski, E.T.A. Hoffmann etc.

¹¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* trans. J. Stambaugh, (New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 46.

questions, but because of their *inappropriateness*. The object that is accepted as given has already ceased to *give* (to give the Being's imperceptible *ajar*); from now on, it can only be subjected to a *finite* examination¹². The possibilities of sexuality (and sexual identity) that is free from *discontent* will not yet be met only by the intervention from outside by the information that its discovery has been promised; *the born-free* sexuality does not exist. The ontological deficiency of the sciences caused by "inappropriateness" will be evaluated together with the theories of the child-scientists about sexuality based on erogenicity within discussion on *the reality principle* in 2.2.

As it implies that his work will be discussed in this thesis, referring to Heidegger at this point is primarily a risk; except for a reference in 3.3., in this thesis, I will not return to Heidegger again. However, this is also a legitimate risk since in the first four week of his *Seminar XI*, while discussing "the causality in psychoanalysis", Lacan refers to Heidegger by saying that "he is not a Heideggerian". Thus, since I am going to begin my discussion on presuppositions and structural necessity with "the aetiology of neurosis" (and, naturally, "the causality in psychoanalysis"), referring to Heidegger is risky and yet legitimate at the same time.

On October 1st, 2019, at Istanbul Bilgi University, in his lecture titled "Plato and Ignorance" Kaan Atalay said that: "According to common acceptance, philosophy began with Thales' question: *What is the source of everything?* Even so, this question is not necessarily a starting point for philosophy simply because it is a question of *origin*. Thales had the courage to ask questions and assumed that knowledge is questionable and accessible to man." To the questions I asked about the question and object in the first paragraph, I add a third one: *What does the question do to the researcher?* I think the *tension* in the child's body exemplifies

¹² This is my first reference to "the impossibility of sexual intercourse to not cease to be written"; the expression in quotation marks belongs to Lacan's *Seminar XX* and will be reconsidered in many places throughout this thesis.

this; theories of the children on sexuality are the theories of questions posed in gas pains, writhing, twisted, via “turning into a question mark”.

When it comes to the aetiology of neuroses, “inheritance” was a presupposition to be considered for Freud and was strongly adopted by his preceptor Charcot (and Charcot's students). It can be said that Freud never denied the importance of inheritance, as I have tried to show while dealing with the concept of “fate” (*Shicksale*) in this thesis; this is so even where he expressly rejects Charcot's views. Fate (or inheritance), as I will try to present its evidence, points to a “structural necessity” inherent in Freud's thought because of its relation to historicity and reproduction in psychoanalysis. Starting with the first subheading of this thesis (“The Void of the Aetiology”), I will discuss the concept of “fate” in Freud's work. I am going to talk about fate as a structural necessity (the fate of the drive, *Triebshicksale*) for the first time in 2.3 when I discuss Dr. Mehmet Mansur's reading on “A Child is Being Beaten”.

What makes the fate critical as a concept for this study is that it prepares the ground for the void in the core of causality in psychoanalysis as a structural necessity and a timelessness peculiar to the unconscious in psychoanalytic thought. Ultimately, this void and timelessness make reproduction possible in a psychoanalytic sense. Freud's discovery shows that the past is not a presupposition for the subject's fate; the history of the subject is not limited to the potential presence of events that have happened in the past including all the possibilities for the Future. As a result of the psyche's openness to a libidinal economic Event, the Past is the very possibility of being re-historicized by the Future; The Past, as a structural necessity, is not passed, unless it is historicized. In 10th Week of the *Seminar XI*, Lacan writes: “Let us not forget that when Freud presents it to us, he says —what cannot be remembered is repeated in behaviour. This behaviour, to reveal what it repeats, is handed over to the analyst's reconstruction.”¹³ What is important here

¹³ Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI – Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998), 129.

and will be discussed primarily in 2.2. and 3.3 is that the past does not *stand by*¹⁴ for the analyst's discovery. To assume something that cannot be remembered and to reduce psychoanalysis to its construction would mean admitting that psychoanalysis is just another example of the sciences that empowered itself to “discover the origin.” Freud is a revolutionary, as described by Marx in “18 Brumaire”. He writes:

The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself, before it has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier revolutions required world-historical recollections in order to drug themselves concerning their own content. In order to arrive at its content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead. There the phrase went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond the phrase.¹⁵

“The libidinal economic revolution” and the possibility of an Event in Freud are discussed in 3.3.¹⁶

The subject of the chapter 1.3., titled “Differenz and Famillionaire Ways to Die”, inspired by Derrida's article “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, is the relationship between the origin and the origin of the quality versus quantity debate. Derrida writes:

No doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, *différance* (deferral). But we must be wary of this formulation: there is no life present at first which would then come to protect, postpone, or reserve itself in *différance*. The latter constitutes the essence of life. Or rather: as *différance* is not an

¹⁴ Cf. Dora and “turning on” in 3.1.

¹⁵ Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” in *The Marx-Engels Reader* ed. R. C. Tucker (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978), 597.

¹⁶ The whole 3.3. carries *traces* of Dr. Mehmet Mansur's lecture titled “Violence, Trauma and Reconciliation” which is given at Istanbul Bilgi University.

essence, as it is not anything, it is not life, if Being is determined as *ousia*, presence, essence/existence, substance or subject.¹⁷

This subheading consists of the implementation of the libidinal economy (and the neurotic currency) introduced in 1.1. and discusses Freud's economic analysis of the technique of jokes and reproduction and it aims to show that the reproduction is “the reproduction of the reproduction of the reproductive mechanisms” for psychoanalysis and how it (reproduction) creates the very condition of the circulation of surplus (or *plus-de-jouir* (*Lustgewinn*)) in symbolic chain. This subheading is also important for the concept mentioned here as *as if* and *the void* and after the reading of Lacan's *Seminar VII* in 2.1. its name is given as *Das Ding*. Another importance of this subheading is that it prepares the necessary ground for the “historicity and reconstruction” discussion in 2.2. by underlying the importance of the logic of quantity in psychoanalysis, which grounded Freud's thought on the economic aspects of psyche since his *Project* that he wrote in 1895. This continues in the discussion on the “prehistoric guilt” in 3.2. The purpose of the discussions that I mentioned briefly is by sticking to the concepts of *trace* and *difference* that emphasized in Derrida's aforementioned article and at the same time without pointing out an origin, essence or original (or centre), showing how the Real, which is structurally necessary for psychoanalysis, re-constitutes (again and again) psychoanalytic historicity while it is continuously *granting* the void and the surplus.

Another issue that has been discussed in 1.1 is Freud's (endless) thoughts on “masculine and feminine”, and following this theme, “primary bisexuality” begins to be discussed in 1.2. I believe that “triples”, one of the direct results of this endless debate, spread to many points of Freud's work. For this reason, while claiming that “A Child is Being Beaten” is the myth of this thesis (*which never ceases to give*), I consider these triples with an *impossible* one in 2.3. As a matter of fact, these two discussions (masculine-feminine¹⁸ & primary bisexuality) are at the centre of the

¹⁷ Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing” in *Writing and Difference* trans. Alan Bance (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 201.

¹⁸ I am using the “hyphen” here not to make masculine and feminine opposed to each other, but to connect them with a “trace”.

criticism of Butler on Freud's presuppositions. Her determinations regarding "Mourning and Melancholia" and "melancholic internalization", which have an important place in her studies on Freud, lay the foundations of notions such as "gender" and "character" that she *found* in Freud. Although this quotation will be made again in 3.1., I found appropriate to quote these lines here as well to reveal why this study is essentially about the relationship between presuppositions and structural necessity:

But what is the proof Freud gives us for the existence of such dispositions? If there is no way to distinguish between the femininity acquired through internalizations and that which is strictly dispositional, then what is to preclude the conclusion that all gender-specific affinities are the consequence of internalizations?¹⁹

Throughout this work, I have tried to examine Butler's conclusion: Do we have the "psychoanalytic" evidence needed to judge as what Freud called primary bisexuality is "acquired" if there is an undetectable *difference* between the internalized and the inherited (hence thinking such a phenomenon is based on Freud's presuppositions)?²⁰ The evidence, of course, does not have to be psychoanalytic, however, if one has to determine a "beginning" for an interdisciplinary study, when the signal flare fired for it? Can we argue that this undeterminable *difference*, the *difference* that makes the choice between inheritance and acquisition impossible, *sexual difference*, perhaps, producing answers to the thing (I say *thing*, not *process* since a process assumes a beginning and an end), aporia, called *sexuation* and again can we argue that this production never stops? Can we claim that no one can bring the ax of the judgment of sexuality to *the heart of difference*, by an external intervention, by speaking at the end of history, thus

¹⁹ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 78.

²⁰ With a Freudian attitude, perhaps, I am not excluding the possibilities which can be distilled from another evidence or sources (or disciplines) as I indicate in 3.1. However, if I should proclaim my position, I can only say that I traversed Freud's work for reading the concepts that I summarized here.

attributing a Copernican centre to history? If such a claim is possible, can it be supported psychoanalytically?

A discussion on the presuppositions and the structural necessity must take the possibility of the *two beginnings*, two beginnings that can be opposed to each other or the two beginnings that give birth by *dividing* the beginning or infinite-number-of-beginning that can be considered when one looks directly to the impossibility, into account. In this thesis, I, am going to discuss, without making any choice, infinite-number-of-beginning by taking *it* as an unfinishable, *interminable*, or *beheaded* beginning; I am going to discuss it by virtue of Freud's triples, by virtue of the structural necessity that constructed these triples. In doing so, I will always consider the risk of basing my argument on a metalanguage or *metahistory*. Therefore, I will try to explain the nature of the structural necessity without basing it on an initial state where this necessity does not exist, and thus, without ignoring the fact that the structure is constructed and deconstructed from the inside with the death drive.

The death drive and primary masochism, as the forces that splitting the structure not with an ax but from inside, as the forces that subjected the structure, in Derrida's terms, to the *death economy*, as the forces that marking the drive with the drive itself and concurrently as the forces that give the drive *uninterruptedness* (*Drang*), as the forces that taking the living things to the death via the way that "*familiar* to them" (as Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" points out) and finally, as the forces that are related to *the* beginning and structural necessity, will be the primary subjects of investigation in this thesis.

Ultimately, this thesis is about a question that has been asked in many other places: "The source of Freud's knowledge". Here, I will be concerned with how the primary predispositions that Freud never said "the last word" about can be read with psychoanalytic concepts such as the void, fate, and historicity, and whether it is possible to say a "last word". While doing this, I did not choose the titles in a way that they "have a temporal relationship with each other" to be able to handle the nature of the concepts I mentioned in psychoanalytic theory in an all-out manner; I

believe every chapter can be a beginning. Therefore, if the first chapter of this thesis starts with Freud's psychoanalytic texts before 1900, it is not because of the "priority" of "the aetiology of neuroses", but that these texts are simply the "first" examples of a form that can be followed in Freud's work.

Finally, I would like to say that although this thesis will come to the brink of the ethics, it does not take the responsibility of putting forward an answer for the ultimate question: *What should one do?* One might well ask what does to attempt an analysis of the situation without developing an answer to this question, mean. Moreover, in the last chapters of this thesis, it can be said that I have mentioned a sense of guilt that refers to an absolute passivity. So, far from proposing an "ethics," I am aware that I almost seem to promote inertia. While following the *Shicksale* of the drive in Freud's work, I have encountered the necessities of life, *Ananke*, many times; after all, what kind of possibility of action can be found in *Triebchicksale*?

Freud, as is well known, regards Oedipus as heir to Kant's "categorical imperative"; this heritage/inheritance cannot be denied, accepted, or changed. Thus, the absolute passivity to which it impels the subject is, on the other hand, an absolute activity; this heritage can be "lived". If inertia were an option, would not choosing it mean reproducing the matrix that made options possible, as it would bring a possible option to life? Yes, this thesis does not offer an answer, but it is intended to analyze the ironical matrix that may offer an answer (or revolution).

CHAPTER 1: “THE NEUROTIC CURRENCY”

1.1. The Void of the Aetiology

*Indeed, the term ‘traumatic’ has no other sense
than an economic one.*

- Freud, “Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis”²¹

In “Heredity and Aetiology of the Neuroses” (1896), Freud describes the results of his work devoted to the “aetiology of the major neuroses” in these years as: “disorders of the *economics* of the nervous system”²² and fifteen years later, in “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911), he promulgates psychoanalysis’ currency as: “One is bound to employ the currency that is in use the country one is exploring – in our case a *neurotic currency*.”²³

Freud relocates an economic problem he discovered in his neurologic works to another field, namely, *talking cure, depth psychology, or psychoanalysis*. Because, in the economy of the psyche (which at that time Freud tried to conceptualize through neurology), a “surplus”, which *gives itself* again and again in the cases that observed by Freud, cannot be evaluated, be valorized, by this economical system, or this currency²⁴. This is what prompted him to reassess the role of heredity in the pathogenesis of neuroses. He discovers this in the very early years of his

²¹ Sigmund Freud, “Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis” (1917 [1916-1917]) in *S.E. Vol. XVI*, 275.

²² Sigmund Freud, “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses” (1896) in *S.E. Vol. III*, 149, italics are mine.

²³ Sigmund Freud, “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911) in *S.E. Vol. XII*, 225, italics are mine.

²⁴ He writes in his “Hysteria” (1888) as: “It may, perhaps, further be emphasized that in hysteria the influence of psychical processes on physical processes in the organism (as in all neuroses) is increased, and that hysterical patients work with a surplus of excitation in the nervous system—a surplus which manifests itself, now as an inhibitor, now as an irritant, and is displaced within the nervous system with great freedom.” – Freud, “Hysteria” (1888) in *S.E. Vol. I*, 49-50.

psychoanalytical research (1890-1900): Arguments that based on heredity is desperate against this surplus:

As regards nervous heredity, I am far from being able to estimate correctly its influence in the aetiology of the psycho-neuroses. I admit that its presence is indispensable for severe cases; I doubt if it is necessary for slight ones; *but I am convinced that nervous heredity by itself is unable to produce psychoneuroses if their specific aetiology, precocious sexual excitation, is missing.*²⁵

At this point, this question becomes legitimate: How does the nervous system bring into existence energy (or a surplus) from nothing? He quickly gets away from mysticism and begins to answer this question from its end: How can energy behave *as if* it does not exist? As we shall see, these two questions lay the groundwork for the most fundamental finding of psychoanalysis: An act, or energy, always produces a surplus while it is moving towards its intended purpose, or more directly, its purpose is the movement itself.

Since his earlier works, the questions about the “reality” of the infantile sexual excitation have been erroneously formulated: Psychoanalysis is not a practice that can confirm the reality of the statement (or story or phantasy) by looking at the patient's history²⁶, on the contrary, psychoanalysis itself is a historiographical practice that finds its evidence in the statement itself, in the presence of the statement, that is, in the uttering itself. In *Seminar I*, Lacan writes²⁷, “History is not the past. History is the past in so far as it is historicized in the present – historicized in the present because it was lived in the past” and he continues, “The path of

²⁵ Freud, “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses”, 156, italics are mine.

²⁶ Cf. Sigmund Freud, “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (1896), in *S.E. Vol. III*, 191: “When we set out to form an opinion about the causation of a pathological state such as hysteria, we begin by adopting the method of anamnestic investigation: we question the patient or those about him in order to find out to what harmful influences they themselves attribute his having fallen ill and developed these neurotic symptoms. What we discover in this way is, of course, falsified by all the factors which commonly hide the knowledge of his own state from a patient...”

²⁷ Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book I – Freud's Papers on Technique 1953-1954*, tr. John Forrester (New York: WW Norton & Company, Inc., 1991), 12.

restitution of the subject's history takes the form of a quest for the restitution of the past.”

Historicization of the past is not filling, stitching, the gaps in the subject's speech, history, story; the attitude that psychoanalysis displays while approaching all kinds of emptiness, hesitation, and disruption, will be the main component of the theoretical structure of this thesis. It would be theoretically legitimate to say the following: A study on psychoanalysis cannot be carried out without considering over-determination and the gap from the very nature of causality.²⁸ For now, I summarize as follows: If this gap is not considered, the discontinuity of the unconscious and the impossibility of sexual relationship (*Fr. Rapport*)²⁹ will be missed.

What I have said so far can be gathered around three concepts: the surplus, *as if* (or the reality of the real), and the history and now I will start to re-read “A Child is Being Beaten”, to lay the foundations of the research to be carried out in this thesis.

It is surprising how often people who seek analytic treatment for hysteria or an obsessional neurosis confess to having indulged in the phantasy: ‘A child is being beaten.’ *Very probably there are still more frequent instances of it among the far greater number of people who have not been obliged to come to analysis by manifest illness.*³⁰

²⁸ The first subheading of this first chapter, in which the neurotic currency will be discussed, is devoted to a discussion of the gap in aetiology. The second and third subheadings are related to the manifestations of this gap in sexualization (only briefly because the second chapter will be directly related to this topic) and *difference*, respectively. In this chapter, I will refer to these three manifestations to open the psychoanalytic economy to discussion and discuss its relationship with sex-ontology.

²⁹ As it is known, Lacan's famous expression is: “Il n’y a rapport sexuel”. The word used by Freud to define the intervention of the physician is also “rapport”: “If one can succeed in getting into *rapport* with the patient during an attack...” See. Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “Preliminary Communication” (1893) in *S.E. Vol. II*, 14. For now, I will leave the relation between these two uses aside, saying that the issue is related to *transference love*; as we know from Freud's article of the same name [“Observation on Transference-Love” (1915)], the analyst should not respond (by accepting or rejecting) this love, and on the contrary, should oscillate it and should leave the open wound (or leave the gap) *open*.

³⁰ Sigmund Freud, ““A Child is Being Beaten” A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions (1919)” in *S.E. Vol. XVII*, 175-204, italics are mine.

This means, the phantasy occurs continuously (and produces an enjoyment which is also its *obligatory* surplus or intended purpose³¹), and it is highly likely that many people who do not come to analysis suffer or *enjoy* this *masturbatory* phantasy. He, firstly, attempts to deconstruct these fantasies; tries to determine whether there is a duality related to sex in their structures³² or not, or a constant *vicissitude* between sadism and masochism:

Who was the child that was being beaten? The one who was himself producing the phantasy or another? Was it always the same child or as often as not a different one? Who was it that was beating the child? A grown-up person? And if so, who? Or did the child imagine that he himself was beating another one? Nothing could be ascertained that threw any light upon all these questions—only the hesitant reply: ‘I know nothing more about it: a child is being beaten.’³³

As I will explain in 2.3., sexuation (or *sexual difference*) makes “the” *duality* impossible, just as an act that produces more than itself, a surplus, by overtaking, surpassing itself, it produces more than a duality. In summary, it can be said: Sexuation produces something or *one – missing – thing*, but never two sexes.³⁴ However, if this is the case, that is, if sexuation itself is to be defined by its movement, as an act or by its *vicissitude*³⁵ as a drive, it is necessary to return to the aetiology of neuroses and discuss Freud’s view on the relation between sexes and neuroses at this point.

³¹ “At first this takes place voluntarily, but later on it does so in spite of the patient's efforts, and with the characteristics of an obsession...”, “A Child is Being Beaten”, 179.

³² What I mean, in summary, Freud discusses some psychic manifestations, fantasies or symptoms, whether can be directly attributed to any sex (therefore this discussion can be seen in various texts).

³³ Freud, “A Child is Being Beaten”, 181.

³⁴ One of the topics to be discussed in the third subheading of this chapter will be on “beyond” in Freud's article titled “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” and Zupančič's reading on Hegel's *aufhebung* and Freud's *verneinung* will be briefly mentioned at the end of the same subheading. To prepare the reader for these upcoming discussions, I will say the following: What makes the duality impossible is the same as what makes the “one” (or unity) impossible.

³⁵ I will discuss the consequences of the incorrect translation of the German word *Shicksale* as *vicissitude*; this word goes through all of Freud's work. In some texts, we meet with it as “vicissitudes of the drive” while in others it represents “the fate of psychoanalysis”. However, I do not believe that these two represent two different issues and I will elaborate it.

The importance of the active element in sexual life as a cause of obsessions, and of sexual passivity for the pathogenesis of hysteria, even seems to unveil the reason for the more intimate connection of hysteria with the female sex and the preference of men for obsessional neurosis.³⁶

At first glance, these are beyond dispute: Freud attributes different sexes to different forms of neurosis. But interestingly, there is a contradiction between Freud's description and his cases. One year before this article, in "Obsessions and Phobias: Their Psychological Mechanism and Their Aetiology" (1895)³⁷, Freud shares his observations on eleven cases and only one of them is a man. This contradiction manifests itself in many other texts. It seems incomprehensible that Freud's later work, continue the same explanation in one way or another in the face of such a recurrent phenomenon. Throughout this thesis, I will try to prove that such a situation, contrary to what it seems, is not an inconsistency. On the contrary, what looks like a contradiction is the surplus itself, which Freud realized that he could not valorize within the economics of the nervous system.³⁸ Here I will try to take a Freudian attitude and say: This contradiction, which can be believed to exist, is not due to anything other than the worldview (Ger. *Weltanschauung*) of the researcher dealing with this problem: Psychoanalysis has fallen victim to a *wild analysis*.³⁹

As I said, Freud attempted to deconstruct the phantasies and the first conclusion he reaches is that these fantasies were not copies (or recurrences) of the "real" experiences: "The individuals from whom the data for these analyses were derived were very seldom beaten in their childhood, or were at all events not brought up by the help of the rod."⁴⁰ With a phrase that I will re-evaluate, again and again, *these fantasies are produced around a void*, around an *Erinnerungssymbole*, or, according

³⁶ "Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses", 156.

³⁷ Sigmund Freud. "Obsessions and Phobias" (1895 [1894]) in *S.E. Vol III*, 69-82.

³⁸ For the causality and "residue", Cf. "The Aetiology of Hysteria", 193-194: "Let us suppose that the symptom under consideration is hysterical vomiting; in that case we shall feel that we have been able to understand its causation (except for a certain residue) if the analysis traces the symptom back to an experience which *justifiably produced a high amount of disgust...*" There is a "certain residue" on the verge of the causality.

³⁹ Cf. My discussion on Freud's criticism on Adler in 3.3.

⁴⁰ Freud, "A Child is Being Beaten", 180.

to Freud⁴¹, “consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace” (das Bewußtsein entstehe an Stelle der *Erinnerungsspur*). Speaking of hysterical conversions, he likens the presence of the memory-trace to a parasite, along with the symptom established around it⁴². This gap, this trace, which is turned around, consumes a certain load/investment (or cathexis⁴³); while the parasite initially needs the body it accommodates to survive, over time the body begins to exist just for the parasite and the phantasies share the same nature with it. In another context, Freud uses the “open wound” as an analogy similar to this parasite: “The complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies—which in the transference neuroses we have called ‘anticathexes’—from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished”⁴⁴; it consumes the entire economy. This surplus, trace, or void at the level of the *as if*, is on the same plane with the sexualization, or, put it differently, sex is the *as if*. Freud gave up hypnosis exactly at this point: “On the other hand, it was found that no result was produced by the recollection of a scene in the doctor's presence if for some reason the recollection took place without any generation of affect.”⁴⁵ At this level, there is a distinction between *Vorstellung* (representation/signifier) and affection and the *as if* settles in this gap.

In “Five Lectures”, Freud draws a very interesting portrait of a physician: So much so that this physician was disappointed by the hysterical, was desperate, and as a punishment, he drew his attention from the hysterical⁴⁶. These two physicians,

⁴¹ Sigmund Freud. “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920) in *S.E. Vol XVIII*, 25.

⁴² Cf. Sigmund Freud. “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894) in *S.E. Vol. III*, 49.

⁴³ According to the well-known dictionary of Laplanche and Pontalis: “Cathexis: Economic concept: the fact that a certain amount of psychical energy is attached to an idea or to a group of ideas, to a part of body, to an object, etc.” – Jean Laplanche & Jean Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, tr. Donald-Nicholson Smith (London: Karnac Books, 1988), 62. It can be thought that cathexis is the equivalent of the neurotic currency discussed throughout this chapter, even itself. The issue is the *shicksale* of this economic load within the economy of neurology; the paths this load takes to make profit from itself within its movement will be discussed in detail in the third subheading. Here, the “profit”, which I have considered as “as if” and I am not afraid to call as “surplus”, will be mentioned in the second part, with its name in Lacan’s algebra: *objet petit a*.

⁴⁴ Sigmund Freud. “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917) in *S.E. Vol. XIV*, 253.

⁴⁵ Sigmund Freud. “Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis” (1910) in *S.E. Vol. XI*, 18.

⁴⁶ “He cannot understand hysteria, and in the face of it he is himself a layman. This is not a pleasant situation for anyone who as a rule sets so much store by his knowledge. So it comes about that

who practice hypnosis and who punishes hysterics, present two false examples of transference love. The physician who practices hypnosis pulls the patient to the gap (to the amnesia) in an isolation tank; here the possibility of reproduction or historicization (of the forgotten scene) is taken from the hands of the resistance (and transference). The second case is that this physician does not know the preciousness of being deceived by the hysterical; tries to bring his practical knowledge to the amnesia of neurosis. The economy of science is desperate against the lie, or rather, the “surplus” of the hysterical, against his/her question. The main mistake of these two approaches is that they attribute “a continuity” to the unconscious, try to complete it and eventually they fail to recognize the “un-realized” or, within the terminology of this thesis, the *as if*. For this reason, when Freud says in the text we have mentioned above (“A Child is Being Beaten”), the “second stage of fantasies” is *produced* in psychoanalysis, it must be read literally; this fantasy was produced *by analytic construction* and Freud describes this product (and the whole consequences of the pervasive libidinal investments) as: “unusual residues”⁴⁷ (Cf. 2.3.). And this is the currency that is in use in the land of the neurotic: “The phantasies possess *psychical* as contrasted with *material* reality, and we gradually learn to understand that *in the world of the neuroses it is psychical reality which is the decisive kind.*”⁴⁸

Let us repeat the question that prompts us to question the reality of real: Freud is in discussion with Charcot since his earliest writings on aetiology and he never underestimates the role of heredity. But there is a gap in the *navel* of the chain of causality that build on heredity; although causality can determine the possibility of neurosis, it says nothing about the “type” of it. Freud starts his study from this gap and his intention is not to stitch it, but to ask the question directly into this gap; this is the invention of psychoanalysis, namely, to understand this gap as the place of the “un-realized or un-historicized”. For this reason, it is an unacceptable mistake

hysterical patients forfeit his sympathy. He regards them as people who are transgressing the laws of his science—like heretics in the eyes of the orthodox.”, “Five Lectures...”, 12.

⁴⁷ Freud, “A Child is Being Beaten”, 192.

⁴⁸ Freud, “Introductory Lectures...”, 368.

to read and explain the *breaks* (that named with various *objects*) and the journey of the *Shicksale* of libido as “psycho-sexual development”. A process that can be named as “development” has its end and purpose, as we will see, sexuality has no purpose other than itself. Who would have assured Oedipus that if he did not try to oppose to his *Shicksale*, he would not have experienced what he experienced? *Rat Man*⁴⁹ encounters with his father at the *navel* of the scene that he built to *a-void* killing his *dead* father, where his *uncle* brings back his *prehistory*, *his inheritance*: “His uncle, lamenting the loss of his wife, had exclaimed: ‘Other men allow themselves every possible indulgence, but I lived for this woman alone!’”⁵⁰ Undoubtedly, psychoanalysis is not the first to speak of the *repetition* of fate and history but it is psychoanalysis that speaks for the first time of the surplus produced by this repetition, probably. The surplus produced during the repetition of *Shicksale* continues to *write Shicksale* and inheritance for the next generation:

The manifestation of the innate disposition is indeed not open to any critical doubts, but analytic experience actually compels us to assume that purely chance experiences in childhood are able to leave *fixations* of the libido *behind them*. Nor do I see any theoretical difficulty in this. Constitutional dispositions are also undoubtedly after-effects of experiences by ancestors in the past; *they too were once acquired*. *Without such acquisition there would be no heredity*. And is it conceivable that acquisition such as this, leading to inheritance, would come to an end precisely with the generation we are considering?⁵¹

Throughout this thesis, the gap in heredity, causality, and prehistory will be discussed together with the gap in sexuation; as I discussed above, the interrelation between sexes and neurosis seemed inconsistent and trying to elaborate this

⁴⁹ *Rat Man* is a well-known case story of Freud. He was suffered from obsessional neurosis and Freud started his analysis in 1907. This case story will be mentioned especially in the third chapter of this thesis. I will try to discuss *how* Rat Man takes over “his father's debt” and in which ways he “tried” to pay it.

⁵⁰ Sigmund Freud, “Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (1909), in *S.E. Vol. X.*, 175.

⁵¹ Freud, “Introductory Lectures...”, 361, italics are mine.

inconsistency brought us to the point where we are. Now I will re-start this discussion from another point, namely, *the pregenital stage*. Freud writes:

If we wish to bring our hypothesis into contact with *biological lines of thought*, we must not forget that the antithesis between male and female, which is introduced by *the reproductive function*, cannot be present as yet at *the stage of pregenital object-choice*.⁵²

The conclusions that can be drawn from this sentence can be listed as follows:

1. In terms of biological line of thought, sexuality is limited with its reproductive function.
2. Their positions in reproductive function explain “only a part” of the relationship between male and female.
3. As a direct consequence of these, activity related to the genital organs is sufficient to explain fully neither sex nor sexuality. Sexuality “exceeds” the genitals or it “overflows” from them.

The paragraph continues as follows: “We find in its place the antithesis between trends with an active and with a passive aim, an antithesis which later becomes firmly attached to that between the sexes”⁵³; Freud, here, makes it clear that what is active is masculine and what is passive is feminine. So, what does this tell us about the sex of the masculine and feminine? What is certain is that this masculine and feminine has nothing that can be explained with anatomy, or, more precisely, these are not anatomically determined. At this point, it is necessary to return to 1919 and underline Freud's criticism of Adler (and his theory about *masculine protest*): “Such a theory as this can only have an intelligible meaning if we assume that a person’s sex is to be determined by the formation of his genitals...”⁵⁴ Here, we have three dualities: male and female, masculine and feminine, and active and passive; I

⁵² Sigmund Freud, “The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis, a Contribution to the Problem of the Choice of Neurosis” (1912), in *S.E. Vol. XII*, 322, italics are mine.

⁵³ Freud, “The Disposition...”, 322.

⁵⁴ Freud, “A Child is Being Beaten”, 201.

do not believe that Freud's theory on neuroses and sexes can be criticized without agreeing on the relation between them (Cf. 2.3.). Throughout this thesis, I will continue to discuss this topic and the line I will follow while conducting this discussion will not be separated from the criticism about what I have referred to as the *Weltanschauung* above; this worldview sets the scene for criticism of psychoanalysis as *phallogocentrism*. At this point, I will appeal to another criticism that Freud directed to Adler to summarize the worldview and its relationship with the *dualities* – and as we will see, along the discussion, it will be impossible for us to mention them as “dualities”. Before the following quote below, it would be appropriate to say: One page after this quote, Freud states: “In the girls’ fantasy of being beaten, the child who was beaten (or caressed) “may ultimately be nothing but a clitoris” and without considering this, discussing the “penis envy” is nothing but falling into positions that Lacan criticizes as “culturalist”⁵⁵. At the end of this article (“Anatomical Distinction”), Freud points out that criticism from “feminists” is inevitable (Cf. 3.1. & 3.3.). There is no doubt that psychoanalysis’ economy, also, was not acceptable for neurology, too.

In my first critical account of the ‘History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement’ (1914d) [Standard Ed., 14, 54-5], I recognized that this fact represents the core of truth contained in Adler's theory. That theory has no hesitation in explaining the whole world by this single point (‘organ-inferiority’, the ‘masculine protest’, ‘breaking away from the feminine line’) and prides itself upon having in this way robbed sexuality of its importance and *put the desire for power in its place! Thus the only organ which could claim to be called ‘inferior’ without any ambiguity would be the clitoris.*⁵⁶

Here, I will return to the economy and the surplus. The discussion I have made so far, by drawing circles that do not close, that misses its starting point, the movement of this text, is not at all independent of its *object*; when I try to approach the same

⁵⁵ Jacques Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus” in *Ecrits* trans. Bruce Fink (New York, NY: 2016), 578.

⁵⁶ Sigmund Freud, “Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes” (1925) in *S.E. Vol. XIX*, 253, italics are mine.

question from different directions, what I do cannot be expressed in any other way than attempts to capture a “whole”, an elusive “whole”, one by one (or *une by une*). It should be said immediately that this movement does not aim the complete knowledge of this whole; the aim is not to complete an infinity with singularities juxtaposed: One is not equal to one, i.e., “il n’y a *rapport* sexuel”. If *one* is not equal to itself in value when it is circulated in the economy, it means, by its movement, by this circulation, it creates more than itself, like the *tortoise*⁵⁷ and Achilles.

Lacan says: “When Achilles has taken his step, gotten it on with Briseis, the latter, like the tortoise, has advanced a bit, because she is ‘not whole,’ not wholly his.”⁵⁸ The distance is uncertain: *Has advanced a bit*⁵⁹... No unit that can determine this amount among the units that measure the distance. This “amount”, *a bit*, can only be determined by the movement by which it is produced; the movement creates the distance. *The distance, a bit, has no other sense than an economic one.*

⁵⁷ ‘La *tortue*’ in French. The similarity between the word *tortue* (or *tortoise*) and “*tortu*”, which means waste/sediment/residue in Turkish, is noteworthy.

⁵⁸ Jacques Lacan, *Encore – The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX* trans. Bruce Fink (New York, NY: 1999), 8.

⁵⁹ “Bit” means “*lice*” in Turkish. The relationship of this creature with distance and residue can be compared with the example of “parasite” and the obsessional phantasies above. For a more advanced but risky analogy, “traumatic experiences that break through the protective shield (i.e. ‘consciousness’)” can be looked into (Cf. “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Chapter IV). The lice pierce the skin of the living creature and feed on its blood and secretions.

1.2. A Short Circuit: Between Aetiology and Death

Psycho-analytic research is most decidedly opposed to any attempt at separating off homosexuals from the rest of mankind as a group of a special character.

- Freud, "Three Essays on Sexuality"⁶⁰

In psycho-analysis the concept of what is sexual comprises far more; it goes lower and also higher than its popular sense.

- Freud, "Wild Psycho-analysis"⁶¹

Freud discovered human sexuality as a problem (in need of explanation), and not as something with which one could eventually explain every (other) problem.

- Zupančič, *Why Psychoanalysis?*⁶²

The first quotation above is added to "Three Essays on Sexuality" (1905) by Freud as a footnote in 1915. Before this footnote, Freud discusses the origins of homosexuality and draws a clear boundary between his explanations and the first ones that regard homosexuality as a kind of "degeneration". So that homosexuals are separated from people who are considered "normal" (this "normal", also, invented by those who declare homosexuality as degeneration) only by being homosexual; homosexuality can be found at the highest levels of civilization (at this point Freud reminds the reader of ancient Greece) as well as in most wild and primitive races. Therefore, it is impossible to see it, an *orientation* that as old as humanity itself, as a kind of anomaly, a kind of mistake, a kind of deficiency, by defining it as degeneration. As I will base later in this thesis, sexual orientations are *re-generations* not degenerations. All kinds of possibilities regarding sexuality are reproduced in every attempt of sexual intercourse. Generation (production) is only a regeneration (reproduction); reproduction is the reproduction of the means of

⁶⁰ Sigmund Freud "Essays on Sexuality" (1905) in *S.E. Vol. VII.*, 167.

⁶¹ Sigmund Freud, "On Wild Psycho-analysis" in *S.E. Vol. XI.*, 222.

⁶² Alenka Zupančič, *Why Psychoanalysis?* (Arhus: NSU Press, 2008), 7.

reproduction.⁶³ But unless the refusal of this view (i.e. the acceptance of corruption) is grounded, the discussion we will have here will go no further than political correctness (i.e. a kind of *Weltanschauung*); this is why I wrote the word “orientation” by emphasizing it in the previous sentence. As the discussion will show us, the word “orientation” is not clear enough and if I called it as “phenomenon” I would contradict Freud (since I would appear to emphasize an *isolated* phenomenon).

In the former case we must ask in what respect it is innate, unless we are to accept the crude explanation that everyone is born with his sexual instinct attached to a particular sexual object. In the latter case it may be questioned whether the various accidental influences would be sufficient to explain the acquisition of inversion without the co-operation of something in the subject himself. As we have already shown, the existence of this last factor is not to be denied.⁶⁴

The criticism brought by Freud to these two hypotheses grounds his theory of drives (*Trieb*). With Lacan's short and clear definition⁶⁵ “Let me say that if there is anything resembling a drive it is a montage”; it is not attached and fixed to a sexual object. So what this montage is problematizing is not only homosexuality but also heterosexuality: “Thus from the point of view of psycho-analysis the exclusive sexual interest felt by men for women is also a problem that needs elucidating and is not a self-evident fact based upon an attraction that is ultimately of a chemical nature.”⁶⁶ Zupančič says⁶⁷: For Freud, the “deeper and harder problem” behind different practices, allusions and meanings is sexuality; sexuality is not something that constitutes identities, it de-constitutes them. For this reason, homosexuals cannot be identified as a *differentiated group* by their *orientation*⁶⁸. It is precisely at this point that Copjec, with a short and clear definition as much as Lacan's, says

⁶³ I will use this formula, which I expressed with inspiration from Althusser, many times throughout this thesis.

⁶⁴ Freud, “Essays on Sexuality”, 167.

⁶⁵ Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 169.

⁶⁶ Freud, “Essays on Sexuality”, 144.

⁶⁷ Alenka Zupančič, *What is Sex?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), 6-7.

⁶⁸ Or with *their answers*. Cf. 3.3.

about this deeper and more difficult problem: “We are obliged to note that the theory of the drive substitutes for an ontology in Freud.”⁶⁹ If we explain Copjec's definition with Copjec's herself: “What does Lacan substitute for the vast and shareable being of the philosophers? Object a, or jouissance as that bit of nonbeing at the subject's core.”⁷⁰ I will return to this point later, but now I need to consider my first quote from Freud to lay the groundwork for this later discussion.

What I have quoted above is very important for this thesis (and for Freud's work), and it takes place at the discussion of homosexuality. To show that Freud's manoeuvre here is a manoeuvre that is characteristic for his work, one can look at his *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Freud writes at the end of its fourth chapter as: “Sometimes one seems to perceive that it is not only the pressure of civilization but something in the nature of the function itself which denies us full satisfaction and urges us along other paths.”⁷¹ Freud does not say clearly what is this *something*, but this might derive from the fact that *something* is nothing but the *void*, the *as if*, the *non-realized*. Indeed, Freud writes a footnote exactly at this point and once again discusses *bisexuality*: “For psychology the contrast between the sexes fades away into one between activity and passivity, in which we far too readily identify activity with maleness and passivity with femaleness”.⁷²

I will read Judith Butler in this thesis and deal with her criticism directed to Freud; I believe that such a reading can pose the right or necessary questions to psychoanalysis. But in answering these questions, I will sometimes deviate greatly from Butler's answers. Copjec writes:

One must be careful not to mistake this indivisible and invincible remainder of the process of erasure—this “hard kernel” that Lacan would come to call the real—for some essence or quasi-transcendental a priori

⁶⁹ Joan Copjec, *Imagine There's No Woman* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 8.

⁷⁰ Copjec, *Imagine...*, 6.

⁷¹ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* in *S.E. Vol. XXI*, 105.

⁷² Freud, *Civilization...*, 105.

that manages to escape the contingent processes of history. Judith Butler, in her continuing argument with the real, seems not to want to let go of this misunderstanding, but I see no reason for this.⁷³

Here, Copjec refers to the void (and the Lacanian “Real”) via reminding Freud’s history-writing in “Moses and Monotheism” and reminds us of Butler’s criticism and summarizes the position and the path of my thesis well enough. But to make all this clearer, I should go over the discussions above.

The reason I started with homosexuality was that before moving to the fragmented structure conceptualized by Freud, I wanted to make it clear that my position at this point was different from any idea of social construction. As Freud shows, psychoanalysis does not use sexuality as a skeleton key to explain or to cure other problems. If so, what is *sexuality*? It is possible to answer this question quickly: something that its trademark is a *gap*. However, Copjec’s words about Butler when she speaks of this void (and gap) undoubtedly deserves much consideration. This gap is unthinkable without a discussion of the Law and *sexuation*. But it will be seen, Butler’s psychoanalytic readings in dealing with these notions often have the same criticism: Psychoanalysis starts with an a priori, and this a priori is phallogocentric and where an a priori exists, one cannot talk about *performativity*. At this point, we must summarize the common tone we mentioned in Butler’s critiques.

In *Bodies That Matter* Butler argues that in the discussion of sexuality and gender the concept of “matter” should be opened to the discussion instead of the notion of construction, and she writes: “Thus, the question is no longer, how is gender constituted as and through a certain interpretation of sex? (a question that leaves the “matter” of sex untheorized), but rather, through what regulatory norms is sex itself materialized?”⁷⁴ While this question is the main question (and criticism) that Butler asks Freud, the answer to the question is given by a shape that Butler distills from “Mourning and Melancholia”. Butler’s problem with “internalization”

⁷³ Copjec, *Imagine...*, 92.

⁷⁴ Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), xix.

in melancholy can be summarized as follows⁷⁵: Obviously, no theory that takes “I” as primary or predetermined can explain why “I” was *the object* first when the aggression was internalized, and the loss was rejected. Another criticism of Butler on Freud’s presuppositions is as follows: “But what is the proof Freud gives us for the existence of such dispositions? If there is no way to distinguish between the femininity acquired through internalizations and that which is strictly dispositional, then what is to preclude the conclusion that all gender-specific affinities are the consequence of internalizations?”⁷⁶

Zupančič writes: “Sexuality and sexual difference are absolutely, and irreducibly, linked to the signifying order, yet this does not mean that sexual difference is a symbolic construction. Sex is real...”⁷⁷ In the earlier pages of the same book, Zupančič says that Butler sees in the *Gender Trouble* that the acceptance of gender social or cultural remains in an inevitable duality of nature/culture.

This short subheading serves as a “link” not only for this chapter but for the whole of this thesis. Therefore, I am going to continue to deal with the discussions I have implied here in the following chapters.

⁷⁵ Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power – Theories in Subjection* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 189-190.

⁷⁶ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 82-83.

⁷⁷ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 46.

1.3. Differenz or “Famillionaire”⁷⁸ Ways to Die

*And what if the item was worthless, asked Bloch.
He had nothing to do with items that had no market
value, the tax officer replied, at least not in his work.*

- Handke, *The Goalie's Anxiety*⁷⁹

It all seems to be a question of economy.

- Freud, *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*⁸⁰

Bloch repeats Freud's question⁸¹: If “serious and trifling” experiences are evaluated together in the aetiology or in the void of the aetiology of hysteria, what is the *value* of the *quality* of the experience? Our discussion so far forces us to reformulate this question as: *What is the value of value?* However, our form of question assumes a constant, a centre, such that this constant is able to attribute value to things; this constant is the reference point of values, it is what can make the story of the subject legible, at least we suppose it is, and by assuming it like that, we double the idea of constant. This is where Freud begins to prove the existence of the unconscious. Our idea of constant cannot avoid the paradox produced by reassessing constant and Freud asks those who denied the existence of the unconscious: Is it more reasonable to assume the existence of more than one consciousness instead? According to Freud, the existence of the unconscious must

⁷⁸ Sigmund Freud, “Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious” (1905) in *S.E. vol VII*, 1-247. “Famillionaire” is the first and the most famous joke (from Heinrich Heine’s *Reisebilder*) Freud had studied in this book; very briefly, the joke is produced with a combination of the words “familiar” and “millionaire”. It would be appropriate to liken this subheading, in which we will talk about millions of familiar (and impossible) ways to die, to a joke.

⁷⁹ Peter Handke, *The Goalie's Anxiety at the Penalty Kick in Three* by Peter Handke trans. Michael Roloff (New York, NY: Avon Books, 1977), 43. I want to thank Belfin Erçikti for encountering me with this novel. Her advice was like a familiar voice from the dark while I was in a quandary about how to continue my argument.

⁸⁰ Freud, *Jokes...*, 42.

⁸¹ Cf. “The Aetiology of Hysteria”, 201.

be accepted since the information of consciousness have a *very large number of gaps* in them⁸². Throughout Handke's novel, we encounter the "signs" that Bloch has applied to fill this gap, but in the continuation of this thesis, I have to follow a different path than his since I have already started to discuss that we do not have the exact *knowledge*, the knowledge that derived from this gap. Surely, this gap *gives birth something* and I named what it gave in various ways in Chapter I. We have the knowledge of the existence of the void and I will continue to deal with the lack of the objects (or *missing objects*) at the level of being (objects that exist with lack) but the ontology of this lack is another matter, namely, *preontology*. Freud writes:

It is clear in any case that this question—whether the latent states of mental life, whose existence is undeniable, are to be conceived of as conscious mental states or as physical ones—threatens to resolve itself into a *verbal* dispute. We shall therefore be better advised to focus our attention on what we know with *certainty* of the nature of these debatable states.⁸³

One of the evidence of the unconscious' existence is its inconvenience for a verbal dispute; as can be clearly seen in Freud's statements, in the continuation of the same paragraph, he says that precise information about the unconscious is obtained from the "points of contact". We need to discuss the nature of what is lost in the "verbal dispute" of these evidence-presenting (but not *self-evident*) contacts. At first glance it seems clear: The discontinuous structure of consciousness overlaps with these contact points. Contact is not continuous, or in other words, as a defence mechanism, repression is imperfect. This explains the first thing that makes a verbal dispute risky: The unconscious is not continuous, and psychoanalysis is not a practice responsible for *producing* information that will reconstruct the unconscious as a continuous *one*; psychoanalysis reproduces. But what does it reproduce?

⁸² Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious" (1915) in *S.E. vol. XIV*, 166, italics are mine.

⁸³ Freud, "The Unconscious", 168, italics are mine.

It is necessary to reconsider the expression of *re-production* itself. If reproduction is exactly repeating the results of the previous production, it is not a reproduction performed in psychoanalysis; for psychoanalysis, every production is reproduction, more precisely, reproduction is not a repetition of the *original* production. If this reproduction (for psychoanalysis) were reproducing the previous product exactly, we could mention that the constant at the beginning of this discussion is already functioning unconsciously. This does not mean that the subject cannot have a story (or history). The subject has a story, and moreover, *this story does not stop inscribing itself*. This gives us the opportunity to reconsider Freud's statement above: Verbal dispute is impossible just like *sexual intercourse* of course, or, to put it more correctly, one should ask exactly here: *Are these (these impossibilities) two different?* Lacan writes on Copernicus:

The Copernican revolution is by no means a revolution. If the centre of a sphere is assumed, in a discourse that is merely analogical, to constitute the pivotal point (*point-maitre*), the fact of changing pivotal point, of having it to be occupied by the earth or the sun, involves nothing that in itself subverts what the signifier "centre" intrinsically (*de lui-meme*) preserves.⁸⁴

The abandonment of the centre itself, this is what Lacan thinks about what the revolution requires, can be read for psychoanalysis, with the abandonment of the History. Lacan thinks that, in this context, the main revolutionist is Kepler. Because, unlike Copernicus, Kepler has not put forward a new signifier that everything will turn around and he diverted the motion from its path. Such a finding made it unquestionable where the centre is located, or with our words, the constant. Lacan says: "The earth continuous to turn and that all sorts of effects, for example, the fact that you count your age in years."⁸⁵ The centre of the universe and the motion of the earth becomes suddenly related to the temporality of your story. So, it is possible to say the following: The world is turning for the sake of the impossibility of sexual

⁸⁴ Lacan, *Encore*, 42.

⁸⁵ Lacan, *Encore*, 42.

intercourse and there is no wonder that we are counting our age this way. Freud argues that the relation of the perception-consciousness system with the chronological time may be nothing more than a defence mechanism⁸⁶. When he pointed out that time was determined by the signifiers this was not only to undermine classical causality; he offers to read the whole history or at least it offers to try to read the whole history, yet, what is uncertain here is the *whole*, or, the beginning (Cf. 3.2.). It can be summarized as follows: When Freud says the existence of the unconscious is not suitable for a verbal dispute, it is necessary to deal with it *literally*. The issue is not that Freud's interlocutor does not share his desire for truth to discuss the existence of the unconscious. I believe a similar statement of Freud could advance our discussion:

But I must warn you in advance that I shall not be able to offer you the same position in relation to me this year as I did last year. At that time I set great store on never taking a step without remaining in agreement with your judgement; I discussed a great deal with you and gave way to your objections—in fact I recognized you and your ‘common sense’ as a deciding factor.⁸⁷

The word that Freud choose, *common sense*, can be placed next to the word *verbal* in our discussion. In the continuation of this statement, Freud underlines that he is the one who experienced in the clinical field⁸⁸ and therefore, the verdict on this issue cannot be left to the inexperienced audience. In these two interesting statements, we sense that Freud is trying to control the form of the discussion between his interlocutors; the information that will be brought to the agenda in a short time is not suitable to be discussed in some ways. A similar statement takes place in the previous paragraph of the second of the quotations I made at the beginning of this subheading: “If only this convenient suspicion were not contradicted by the one incontestable fact that *the joke invariably disappears as*

⁸⁶ Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, 28.

⁸⁷ Freud, “Introductory Lectures...”, 243.

⁸⁸ The first part of these conferences was devoted to parapraxes and the second part to dreams by Freud. The conference I cited above is the first one in the third (“General Theory of Neuroses”) part.

soon as we eliminate the operation of these techniques from its form of expression!”⁸⁹ What is the meaning of this note of admiration?

It is possible to say that it refers to a warning, so that this implies the severity of the warning; it is possible but not enough. One cannot deny the warning here, but, also, this exclamation indicates a beat, like heartbeat, an impulse; this exclamation is related, above all, to something elusive. The moment when a joke is subjected to a *reduction* of psychoanalytical theory, it disappears, or in other words, *it resolves*. When discussing all this, it should not be forgotten that we are in the field of impulsive evidence. This is what Freud refers to as “contact points”. This contact, again, is a discontinuous one but the pressure (*Drang*⁹⁰) of the drive is continuous; to repeat once again, it is that the repression’s imperfectness (or its discontinuity) as a mechanism that allows us to access the evidence (for a moment), but, at the same time, it is this mechanism that simultaneously renders the same evidence to an unusable leftover (we will see how this relates to childish thinking and adult logic). To summarize in Freud's words: *It all seems to be a question of economy*. The discontinuous nature of repression is related to the economy, where it costs psyche⁹¹.

The process of repression is not to be regarded as an event which takes place *once*, the results of which are permanent, as when some living thing has been killed and from that time onward is dead; repression demands a persistent expenditure of force, and if this were to cease the success of the repression would be jeopardized, so that a fresh act of repression would be necessary.⁹²

⁸⁹ Freud, *Jokes...*, 42, italics are mine. Interestingly, this exclamation mark was omitted in the translation of the text into Turkish. Cf. Sigmund Freud, *Espriler ve Bilinçdışı ile İlişkileri* trans. [Tur.] E. Kapkın (İstanbul: Payel, 2016), 74.

⁹⁰ Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” (1915) in *S.E. vol XIV*, 122.

⁹¹ Cf. Freud, *Jokes...*, 44: “Is not the economy in words uttered more than balanced by the expenditure on intellectual effort? And who saves by what? Who gains by it?” Two issues should be underlined here: Should intellectual effort be evaluated in the same currency as unconscious work (i.e. “*die Witzarbeit*”)? And why Freud suggests that *die Witzarbeit* should not be confused with the discussion (and reduction) of joke's technique?

⁹² Freud, “Repression” (1915) in *S.E. vol. XIV*, 151.

Repression is not the ultimate end but the question arises here: What should one do with the absolute beginning? Freud deals with a joke in Chapter 7 of the technical part of his book on jokes and writes: “Anyone who is not born is not a mortal man at all, and there is no good and no best for him.”⁹³ Fifteen years later, elsewhere, he talks about death as follows: “What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion.”⁹⁴ This is the place to repeat the question I asked before: *Why Freud suggests that die Witzarbeit should not be confused with the discussion (and reduction) of joke's technique?* According to Freud, it is the disclosure of its technique by psychoanalytic reduction that makes joke disappear. If so, is “the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion” a joke made (and reduced by psychoanalytic method throughout “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”) by Freud to us? To answer these questions, we need to repeat our above statement about reproduction: Reproduction in psychoanalysis is the reproduction of production conditions and production is nothing more than reproduction of the conditions of production. This is where I will re-discuss the title of Freud's last article on technique: “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1939)⁹⁵. It problematizes *the end of the analysis* and if we follow the line of thought that we have maintained until now, it is economically convenient to read it as “Beginningless/Beheaded Analysis” (Cf. 3.2.). This is what a revolution like Kepler's did to the history. To attribute a centre to the orbit of the world is first to confirm that a centre is necessary; this centre *unifies* the image of the world. Before we decide whether to laugh at Freud's joke, let us go back to *the very beginning* of the second part of the *joke*, namely, its title: “*Beyond* the Pleasure Principle”. Is what is being discussed in this article a “beyond” or a “surplus”? This title deserves a careful reading.

When this, this *beyond*, is uttered, various preliminary assumptions suddenly fill in it and make it difficult to hear: *Beyond*. First, talking about the *beyond* makes

⁹³ Freud, *Jokes...*, 57. I shared the discussion I continued in this paragraph elsewhere as a short note, See: İbrahim Şahin Ateş, “Freud’un Bir Esprisi,” *Felsefe Sanat Psikanaliz*, <https://www.felsefesanatpsikanaliz.com/freud-un-bir-esprisi/> (accessed May 11, 2020).

⁹⁴ Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, 39.

⁹⁵ Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1939) in *S.E. vol XXII*, 209-254.

linearity (or, within our context, *diachrony*) essential, on the other hand, this *beyond* involves some form of overcoming. However, both possibilities are not compatible with the movement of the drive: Firstly, it cannot be said that this movement is progressing, a “direction” assumed by progress cannot be attributed to this movement, and secondly, this movement cannot be overcome since overcoming this movement requires a predictable reproduction: Could a movement, the product of which is the conditions of reproduction, be a predictable movement? For which demand is this product a supply? Lacan writes on *feminine jouissance*: “You will notice that I said “supplementary.” If I had said “complementary” what a mess we’d be in! We would fall back into the whole.”⁹⁶ Reproduction in psychoanalysis is not a kind of mass production; that’s what creates the problem of the *beyond*. This *beyond* is *beyond* as far as (or as much as) the prehistoric past *is* past.

Let us go back to Freud's joke. Reading Freud like a historian is not the ultimate way; based on the fifteen years between the two statements, it is possible to expect the next statement to be consistent with the previous one. However, if psychoanalysis claims that the information that makes it possible is not subject to chronological time (put it more correctly, *timeless*, *Zeitlos*), psychoanalysis itself also has the right to request to be read *untimely*. Lacan writes: “What is nice about what I tell you – don’t you agree? – is that it’s always the same thing. Not that I repeat myself, that’s not the point. It’s that what I said before takes on meaning afterward.”⁹⁷ The *fact* that “the organism wanted to die in its own fashion” is not more or less *real* than the once murdered mythical father; only *Real* can be mentioned in this place. Therefore, the death that will be tried to be completed is not a death whose knowledge comes before. I will try to rewrite Freud's expression in 1920 as follows: *The organism only wants to die in a fashion that it will have known when it dies*; the death does a double take. The most important evidence for the existence of the joke technique for Freud is that psychoanalytic reduction

⁹⁶ Lacan, *Encore*, 72. Cf. the last footnote of 1.1. for *feminine jouissance*.

⁹⁷ Lacan, *Encore*, 36.

removes joke from joke; Freud almost apologized to the reader for this⁹⁸. So, to listen to Freud's joke like a historian would make it impossible to laugh at it. Freud found the economy in the technique of the jokes and the joke we are dealing with now also has its own economy or *the economy of death*⁹⁹. In summary, the life of the organism begins with a death that is intended to be completed and ends with a compulsion to continuation (or “repetition compulsion”, *Wiederholungszwang*); only the end of a beginningless end could turn into a compulsion to continuation, or, a beginning that does not start ends with an endless continuation. If we go back to Lacan's reference to Kepler: A history to be written with a trajectory whose centre is constantly out of hand can only be as linear as continuity of the centre; the deviations of history coincide with the discontinuity of the unconscious¹⁰⁰. After this relatively long detour, I will return to the discussion about the word *verbal*. Freud writes:

In a play upon words, in our view, the word is also only a sound-image, to which one meaning or another is attached. But here, too, linguistic usage makes no sharp distinctions; and if it treats 'puns' with contempt and 'play upon words' with a certain respect, *these judgements of value seem to be determined by considerations other than technical ones.*¹⁰¹

At this point I think I must start a speculation: I am going to deal with this passage for two reasons. The first one is Freud's way of handling the *word* as a concept; the word is a sound-image (*Klangbild*) for Freud that can carry one meaning or another.

⁹⁸ Freud, *Jokes...*, 24: “If at this point a reader should become indignant at a method of approach which threatens to ruin his enjoyment of jokes without being able to throw any light on the source of that enjoyment, I would beg him to be patient for the moment.”

⁹⁹ Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, 198.

¹⁰⁰ Lacan says: “At this point, there springs up a misunderstood form of the *un*, the *Un* of the *Unbewusste*. Let us say that the limit of the *Unbewusste* is the *Unbegriff* – not the non-concept, but the concept of lack.” Lacan, *Four Fundamental...*, 26. Therefore, timelessness is not a non-concept. The timelessness of the unconscious processes can only be explained by applying to the neurotic currency; when Freud was talking about overdetermination (Ger. *Überdeterminierung*) in the nature of the symptoms, what he was trying to do was not get out of a sense of causality, it was to overthrow the logical plane that causality required. According to Freud, what will break this causality in the technique of the jokes is the *verbal* ways the technique uses. Therefore, it would be theoretically legitimate to expect to find *a temporality structured like language* in the timelessness of the unconscious.

¹⁰¹ Freud, *Jokes...*, 46, italics are mine.

Therefore, it seems that there is no theoretical drawback in dealing with this “word” as a *signifier*. The signifier should be evaluated within the economy of the joke. In the second chapter titled “The Motives of Jokes – Jokes as a Social Process” of *Jokes*, he discusses this issue in the context of the sociality of the joke. At the beginning of this chapter, the debate about hereditary causes that predispose anyone to the technique of joke is left aside by Freud. As I tried to explain in the opening part, this is not due to Freud being indifferent to the heredity. However, psychoanalysis has nothing to say about heredity, at least if what we understand from heredity is genetic factors. In this chapter, Freud tries to examine the factors that determine whether a signifier has been selected for a joke. Exactly this, this intention of Freud will force us to evaluate the sentence that we wrote in italic in the quote above. For this reason, the way I take this quote will certainly be speculative since I will continue to deal with a word that Freud uses and claim that there is an implication in this use.

Freud warns: “If one laughs at a joke really heartily, one is not in precisely the best mood for investigating its technique.”¹⁰² The practice of the technique requires a distance, a gap with the joke; if the researcher attempts to establish a hierarchy between different forms of the technique, he must base it on an economic basis, at least, within the scope of psychoanalysis. Such points of Freud’s work reveal his aim that he set for psychoanalysis: Psychoanalysis does not provide a manual on exactly *what* this distance is and *how* to maintain it. Lacan writes: “Believe me, I myself never re-open it [the void of the unconscious] without great care.”¹⁰³ This is what verbal dispute does to the *form*: It attempts to attribute content to it, to fill it, without losing a moment. I will once again apply to the economy to deepen our discussion on this distance and continue it *within* this distance.

I considered the discussion I started above after my last quote from Freud as a speculation. In the context we are in, we can attribute another name to this speculation: “empathy”. Freud writes: “It is these processes of *empathy and*

¹⁰² Freud, *Jokes...*, 49.

¹⁰³ Lacan, *Four Fundamental...*, 23.

comparison that result in the economy in expenditure which we discharge by laughing.”¹⁰⁴ In both “The Unconscious” and “Mourning and Melancholia”, Freud makes it clear that we are not inclined to interpret our unconscious. In the second article, he even asks, briefly, “why do we approach the truth about ourselves only when we get sick?”. However, within a few pages, another dimension of the truth in the complaints of melancholy appears; I am going to discuss this dimension in 2.3. under the title of “The Narcissistic Masochism”.¹⁰⁵

I would like to elaborate on what I said about speculation and empathy with an example: A scene maybe I can call as *a scene of recognition* from the *Jokes*. According to Freud, three people are needed to complete the *scene of joke/smut*¹⁰⁶. The first person is the person who undertakes *die Witzarbeit* and makes the joke and the second person is the *victim* of this joke. However, the main interlocutor is the third person. The position of this third in the scene of smut can be explained in different ways. From this point forward, all statements I will use to explain the position and function of the third are *speculative*. But this speculation is not an effort made by the reader, that is, me, to complete a place where the theory lacks; on the contrary, the theory says that this gap generates speculation, and that speculation should not be interrupted. Speculative thought is not realized to complement the lack, the gap, the void of the theory. What is supposed to be uninterrupted is speculation and this is because the unconscious is discontinuous. In psychoanalysis, empathy is not something that is directed towards the other and expected to complete the missing information we have about the other; the third

¹⁰⁴ Freud, *Jokes...*, 186, italics are mine.

¹⁰⁵ The fact that the narcissistic can affect the nature of reality (or/and knowledge) is an issue that I will not discuss the consequences here for now (Cf. 2.2.). I will refer to Lacan and his concept of “objet petit a” at the end of this discussion and this section for the relationship between the narcissistic and truth and knowledge with love. And finally, when I say that psychoanalysis does not offer a manual, it should not be considered separately from the “reproduction”. This detour is necessary to appreciate the Derrida’s interpretation. The fact that I miss him continuously is not independent of his determinations on Freud. As I said before, it cannot be thought that the movement of the text may be independent of the movement mentioned by the text. Just as I try to read Freud as “untimely”, it should be read in the same way that this article is constantly missing. It is not intended to miss. However, since intention always produces more than it is intended, it is inevitable to miss it. Considering this, it can be understood that missing Derrida is the only way to approach Derrida.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. “The Motives of Jokes – Jokes as a Social Process” in *Jokes*.

person is, primarily, a racketeer: “It seems as though in the case of a jest the other person has the decision passed over to him on whether the joke-work has succeeded in its task...”¹⁰⁷ The third person has the power to legitimize the smut and he obtained this force without giving anything; speculation has begun. The presence of the third person is necessary to end the smut with pleasure; there is a distance between joke and pleasure and if there is a need for a third person for the satisfaction of joke, what will make the joke economical for the psyche? *Who gains by it?* If a hierarchy of joke techniques is accepted and this hierarchy would be based on *common-sense*, not quantity, it is a matter of violation of the distance between us and unconscious evidence. We must keep in mind that we are still discussing the impossibility of verbal dispute; I am going to continue to examine how the verbal evolves into common-sense, but in doing so it should not be missed that what I mean by the verbal one now has a *signifier* status. Missing this would be a form of comic that Freud called as “naïve”. Now I am going to go back to the “scene of smut” to elaborate the relationship of this naïve with it.

The exchange is simple for the Racketeer: *Die Witzarbeit* is not a cheap task for the psyche; it demands a lot. The third person who enjoys the joke is not the addressee of this heavy work. He is only expected to enjoy it. If so, does the first person who shoulders this heavy burden (or load, investment, *cathexis*) only need the third one to recognize the success of his joke? Applying to the “other” for the legitimacy of the joke (i.e. *subjection*) is an issue that I will discuss under the topic of sexuation. Here, for now, I want to ask this question: What *die Witzarbeit* bring to the economy of the psyche as an unconscious process? Is this *arbeit* profitable? If it remembered, I started this chapter with the following discussion that I can summarize as: *How the nervous system brings into existence energy (or surplus) from nothing? He (Freud) quickly gets away from mysticism and begins to answer this question from its end: How can energy behave as if it does not exist while it exists?* I have stated that the relation of this energy with being (and ontology) can be explained by *as if*. In the economy of the techniques of jokes, this energy is

¹⁰⁷ Freud, *Jokes...*, 144.

explained in another way: *Lustgewinn* (Eng. “yield of pleasure”). Freud writes: “And, since we know that in both cases of the use of tendentious jokes pleasure is obtained, it is therefore plausible to suppose that *this yield of pleasure corresponds to the psychological expenditure that is saved.*”¹⁰⁸ If I am excused to carry my analogy forward, I can say the following: The first person who called the third person to recognize his joke is *laundering pleasure* with the recognition he received from him. However, this analogy is inadequate for the following reason: It is true that this laundered pleasure is *grey*, we are talking about the “grey economy” here. However, this informal pleasure is not a surplus that joins the economy from the “outside”; this surplus is produced inside, by the economy itself yet this mode of production is not recognized, it is informal. To examine this, I must go back to the role of the third.

It would not be correct to say that the third one was defrauded, because he will preserve the pleasure he received from the joke in any case, but there is another variable that he does not consider. This does not affect his profit, but it affects the position he occupies as the other, perhaps undermines his position. I continue with the exchange of the Racketeer. Freud writes:

One probably recovers from the impression the joke makes on a newcomer some of the possibility of enjoyment that has been lost owing to its lack of novelty. And it may be that it was an analogous motive that drove the creator of the joke in the first instance to tell it to someone else.¹⁰⁹

The question here is about the essence of the joke and it is related to its being told to the third person. So, the question of why we do not laugh at a joke is one and the same question as to why we laugh at it; this does not mean that laughing and not laughing is one and the same thing. The essence of the joke is to tell the joke to an addressee. The economic burden of joke technique gains a possibility of pleasure

¹⁰⁸ Freud, *Jokes...*, 118. In German: “Ergibt sich nun, daß in beiden Fällen der Verwendung des tendenziösen Witzes Lust erzielt wird, so liegt es nahe, anzunehmen, daß solcher *Lustgewinn* dem ersparten psychischen Aufwand entspreche.“ – Sigmund Freud, „IV: Der Lustmechanismus und Die Psychogenese Des Witzes“ in *Gesammelte Werke VI*, 133.

¹⁰⁹ Freud, *Jokes...*, 154.

(i.e. profit) with its expression; and expression is not *a* way to make this enjoyment possible, it is the only way. At this point, I would like to remind you of the reproduction that full of repetitions, even the above definition itself: Reproduction is the reproduction of production conditions. This is what Freud meant by “novelty” in the above quote: What will bring joke its novelty is the smile that the narrator hopes to find on the face of the third. In this *novelty*, *the exclamation mark* and *judgement of value* should be heard. Here we can now ask: Is this “novelty” a qualitative one? It is this question that will legitimize our reading of the tax officer's memory along with Freud's aetiology studies. I was tangent to Derrida above, now, I will try to approach him once again. The *essence* of the joke and death is novelty, and this novelty is a quantitative one; this is the reason why Freud attributes more importance to the “memory-trace” in aetiology of neuroses than the nature (or more correctly, *quality*) of the experience. If the organism dies in its own fashion, this is what makes it possible. Freud writes:

The naïve, then, would be a species of the comic in so far as its pleasure springs from the *difference* in expenditure which arises in trying to understand someone else; and it would approach the joke in being subject to the condition that the expenditure economized in the comparison must be an inhibitory expenditure.¹¹⁰

This paragraph is an evidence of speculation that operates within the distance between the joke or the comic and the person who hears them; speculation arises from *differenz*. Freud himself warns his reader before making a “joke of death”: “*What follows is speculation, often far-fetched speculation, which the reader will consider or dismiss according to his individual predilection. It is further an attempt to follow out an idea consistently, out of curiosity to see where it will lead.*”¹¹¹ There is a direct relationship between Freud's speculation and the third person's position in the joke technique. What I am going to examine to deal with this relation,

¹¹⁰ Freud, *Jokes...*, 188, italics are mine. Seven pages later, translator James Strachey glosses the word “difference”: “The German word here (and regularly in this connection throughout the rest of the book) is ‘*Differenz*’, not the usual ‘*Unterschied*’, It is the term used in mathematics and means a quantitative not a qualitative difference. The English word has to cover both meanings.”

¹¹¹ Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, 24, italics are mine.

as can be guessed, is the “fort-da” game described in Freud's “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”¹¹². This game is an *interesting ritual*¹¹³ of a child observed by Freud. In summary, the child tries to compensate for the moments when his mother disappears with a toy that he can throw and pull by a cotton-reel. These two movements are accompanied by two different verbal reactions: When the child throws the toy, he reacts to this part of his game as “o-o-o-o”. This repetitive sound is thought to correspond to the German word “fort” (Eng. “gone”) by Freud and the mother. When he pulls the toy, his reaction is a “da” (Eng. “there”). According to Freud, although the child's pleasure from the game is particularly related to the second action, the “exact repetition of the game” is not independent of this pleasure; this repetition, which can be “boring” for an adult, is a pleasure for the child. Observing such a game is boring for the adult because, as an observer, the adult tries to “grasp the logic” of the game, and from that moment on, he watches the game with a familiar logic for him for years and there is nothing *unpredictable* in the game. At this point, the factor of the “novelty” of the game and of course the joke immediately comes to mind. But this is not enough. *Why something “not new” is boring for an adult?* It is now clear that this “new” is not a new production, nothing new to enjoy. The third person will open space for pleasure as it will enable reproduction. But there is no such thing for the child. Not needing the third for pleasure means being able to enjoy reproduction itself; what will disappear in a verbal dispute is the possibility of enjoying reproduction itself. Freud discusses this in his article “Repression”¹¹⁴: According to him, as I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the structure of the unconscious is discontinuous; the activity of repression as a mechanism is in harmony with this structure. More precisely, the two situations are different manifestations of the same economic structure: As

¹¹² See. Page 14 ff. in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”.

¹¹³ It is interesting for us, adults, as readers, but it is not fun; it is interesting because it is meaningless, for us, readers. As can be seen in the ongoing discussion, this is not an ordinary detail. Even Freud implies, through the eyes of an adult, that this ritual is not at all reasonable: “The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. *It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, for instance, and play at its being a carriage.*” – Freud, “Beyond...”, 15. Italics are mine. Freud asks why the toy is not “turned into an object of an understandable (or a *logical*) game”. My discussion here, which as Freud takes care of it in *Jokes*, is about the “understandable”.

¹¹⁴ Freud, “Repression”, 253.

Freud puts it through *Jokes*, the psyche tries to get rid of the intense cost of the repression mechanism thanks to the joke. However, the joke itself has a cost. This cost causes the void of the unconscious to close again; such a gap became open to the outside with a joke. I will now reassess the relationship between this elusive evidence and the third person by applying to Lacan. Lacan writes in the *Seminar XI*: “This is the place to say, in imitation of Aristotle, that man thinks with his object.”¹¹⁵ I will try to rewrite this definition as follows: *The man laughs with his object*. It will be immediately apparent that this definition just coincides with the position of a third person who gave the recognition of the joker to an *object*; but one should not hurry to say that this change on the third’s position is a kind of “descent”; this would undoubtedly be like that of a researcher who made false judgments on joke techniques.

According to Lacan, the way the child plays with the reel creates his attempts to deal with a *ditch*. It is not about filling the ditch, but the movement around the ditch. Likewise, the issue is not that the toy corresponds to his mother, but the form of the toy and the game. To say that “the mother is represented by the toy” would be to *listen* to the game like an adult. This is not sufficient on the plane of psychoanalytic research. I will take the risk of breaking out of our context for a moment and quote Zupančič’s utterly clear statements on this subject (although Zupančič’s discussion in this article is on “negation”): ““Mother” becomes interesting for analysis because she is marked by repression and not because “mother” is supposedly always significant in analysis...”¹¹⁶ Here the author refers to the “*differenz*” between *aufgehoben* and *aufhebung*¹¹⁷; it can be considered that the *aufhebung* of the repression mechanism is not *aufgehoben*, just like the “beyond” of the “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”; the important thing when the analysand talks about his mother

¹¹⁵ Lacan, *Four Fundamental...*, 62. I would like to remind the reader that Lacan's discussion on these pages is about the game "fort-da".

¹¹⁶ Alenka Zupančič, “Hegel and Freud: Aufhebung and Verneinung,” *Crisis & Critique*, no. 1 (2017): 485.

¹¹⁷ The author refers to the third paragraph of Freud's article “Negation”. The English equivalent of *aufgehoben* is “to remove”. In the English translation, “*aufhebung*” has translated as “lifting”. Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Negation” (1925) in *S.E. vol. XIX*, 233-240.

is “*he is talking* about his mother”; the emphasis here is on the presence of the “mother” as a signifier in *enunciation*. At the beginning of this chapter, I tried to read the *surplus* of the economy together with the “reality” of the beating phantasies. As I approach the end of this chapter, I would like to bring this up again. I can say the following for this wide detour to be excused. The footnote I will cite now was added to this article by Freud 28 years later: “All this is true; but it must be remembered that at the time I wrote it I had not yet freed myself from my *overvaluation* of reality and my *low valuation* of phantasy.”¹¹⁸ How should one evaluate this confession? What is the source of this *over* and *low*? What is this comparison, *differenz*, based on? Could it be *common-sense*, for example? It will be recalled at the beginning of this chapter I said that the manoeuvre in Freud’s thoughts on the reality of fantasies (and memories of very early childhood) is related to the reality of the real; the reality of the real is placed on an economic level by Freud. For this reason, it is not the qualities that distinguish experiences at the level of the aetiological equation, but their *differences*. For this reason, at the end of his lecture, Freud asks his audience to recognize his method, not his findings¹¹⁹: Because this method, with his own words, “is not *the fruit of the idle speculations*”. *Differenz* in the speculation of the method cannot be generalized to the findings; it is the method that gives more than the “expected” or “demanded”, not the finding. As Lacan quotes from Picasso: “I do not seek, I find”¹²⁰.

It was possible to summarize the whole discussion as follows, or in other words, the whole discussion was “to put value” to the following:

No doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, *différance* (deferral). But we must be wary of this formulation: there is no life present at first which would then come to protect, postpone, or reserve itself in *différance*. The latter constitutes the essence of life. Or rather: as *différance* is not an

¹¹⁸ Freud, “Aetiology of Hysteria”, 204.

¹¹⁹ Freud, “Aetiology of Hysteria”, 220.

¹²⁰ Lacan, *Four Fundamental...*, 7.

essence, as it is not anything, it is not life, if Being is determined as ousia, presence, essence/existence, substance or subject.¹²¹

Freud begins “speculation” at the end of his life (Is he?), in an unfinished text, on Eros’ *schicksale*, as follows: “If we *assume* that living things came later than inanimate ones and arose from them...”¹²² We see that Freud's joke, which is now 33 years old (Is it? What about Kepler?), is a *serious* one. Freud suggests: Let us pretend it is, *as if*, living things came later... So, what is the opposite of that? Or should we need the opposite of Freud's assumption to continue our speculation? As a matter of fact, Freud himself gives up this assumption after a few lines. The point is not that the assumption itself is wrong. The point is that this idea assumes an origin, a “first state”, a “reference point”.

I am going to begin the “preontology” discussion, which I have implied several times here, in the next chapter. In this direction, I will discuss the pleasure and reality principles, phantasies, and the “dualities” in Freud's work in order to talk about “difference”.

¹²¹ Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, 201.

¹²² Sigmund Freud, “An Outline of Psycho-analysis,” (1938) in *S.E. vol XXIII*, 148-149, italics are mine.

CHAPTER 2: LOGIC and CHRONOLOGIC

2.1: The Name of the Void

*It is clear that the letters which upset us so much that we call them,
God only knows why, by a different name, "characters".*

- Lacan, *Encore*¹²³

*History is structured as a language, and just like language it does not
exist but nevertheless has material consequences for the subject.*

- Tomšič, *The Capitalist Unconscious*¹²⁴

The first chapter of this thesis started with a discussion of *a void*; there I laid the foundations for different discussions (on aetiology, sex, and *differenz*) to be able to approach this void. But, from another point of view, it can be said that I have *avoided* this void by doing so. Ultimately, I never mentioned the serious difference between talking about it as *a void* or *the void*. However, I mentioned that these three discussions should not be read based on the logical or chronological relationship between each other. But, replacing hierarchy with concurrence is not psychoanalytically legitimate, or, at least, it is not an adequate manoeuvre; concurrency also works with the assumption that the centre exists, just like diachronicity. To follow Lacan, who claims that the past can only be historicized in the present, a temporality in which these two intersections must be accepted. I do not see any problem in re-formulating Lacan's statement as follows: history is historicized without a cease. This does not mean that history is constantly relativized or its relativization does not stop¹²⁵. Leaving aside this relativity, this

¹²³ Lacan, *Encore*, 36.

¹²⁴ Samo Tomšič, *The Capitalist Unconscious* (London: Verso, 2015), 25.

¹²⁵ The reason why I have used the term "relativization" for what I have called "historicization" in different places throughout this work is to refer to a discussion Lacan made at the *Seminar XX*. In the second week of this seminar, Lacan criticizes Saussure's statement that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is "arbitrary". One of the two terms that I will cite in this chapter in

is exactly where Freud speaks of the concept of over-determination¹²⁶ but the fact that psychoanalysis does not explain this over-determination based on an “adult logic” makes this point incomprehensible. Freud's famous auto-analysis, maybe, in this respect, can also be considered as: *He was a man who did not need the third to laugh at his joke.* I am going to summarize the features of the void¹²⁷ that I mentioned in the first chapter.

I said, “the features of the void”. It seems clear that this kind of statement is not logically acceptable¹²⁸; a void that its features can be mentioned, a void that has *qualities*, is not a void at all. I will use this paradox as my first reference to Lacan's Seminar VII: *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* but before I move on to Lacan, I want to reconsider the elements of the discussion I have been holding here.

I mentioned the paradox of “a gap that may have features”. However, as the discussion I have held up to now shows that this gap can take over the task of regulating the quantitative field; the name of this quantitative field in Lacanian algebra is “signifying chain”. A *thing* that cannot be represented is inherent in this chain as *the constructor*. This is what I was trying to show at the beginning of the first chapter: Aetiology is an incomplete story; however, this does not mean that it can be completed, too. When I talked about Freud's portrait of the physician, he drew in “Five Lectures”, I wanted to summarize that the physician has no task to complete the patient's story. Rather, he must leave this story with its

relation to relativity is overdetermination, which I discuss in the next footnote, and the other is “afterwardness” (*Nachträglichkeit*).

¹²⁶ Overdetermination (*Überdeterminierung*) is a concept Freud uses especially in his research on the aetiology of neuroses. For an example of over-determined phenomenon, my discussion on jokes may be recalled. A word can represent, for example, the intersection of many different experiences, complexes, within the symbolic network with the sounds it contains. Therefore, overdetermination is an extremely important concept for understanding the nature of causation from a psychoanalytic perspective. Lacan devotes the first 4 weeks of the *Seminar XI* to explaining the causality that “has a gap in its structure”. This void is nothing more than the void that is constantly referred to throughout this thesis. In sum, Freud substitutes overdetermination for inheritance. When I talk about Freud's concept of “somatic compliance” (*somatisches Entgegenkommen*) in 2.3., I will mention this once again.

¹²⁷ I said, “the void”, I will have shown the reason for this preference when I mention this void's name.

¹²⁸ At this point I am aware of how serious philosophical literature I have left out. So, I can say at least that I mean: The void of psychoanalysis is “productive.”

incompleteness. As I have also shown in the footnote in the same place, the incompleteness of this story is one and the same with the discovery of the *transference*. What makes it possible to speak and what makes it impossible to say everything is the same thing, as Lacan says: “I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there’s no way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail.”¹²⁹ Words fail since “history is historicised without a cease”, Tomšič says: “Retroaction does more than merely modify the meaning of historical events from the viewpoint of the present. In a certain sense, this very retroactive modification constitutes the history and memories of the past.”¹³⁰ When Freud discovered the role of sexuality in the aetiology of neuroses, his discovery coincided exactly with the following: Sexual functioning shapes the *structure* around this void. But on the other hand, sexuality itself is also characterized by this void. Zupančič describes it in an extremely clear way in her intervention that she named “Sexuality and Ontology”: “(human) sexuality is a paradox-ridden deviation from a norm that does not exist.”¹³¹ So when Freud discovered sexuality’s role at this point, he did not offer a solution to the problem he faced. It is evident that sexuality is not an Other for the economic problem of neuroses. In other words, psychoanalysis, as a practice with knowledge of sexuality, is not an interlocutor for the elimination of the economic problems of neuroses. It is also possible to read Zupančič's statement in the article I made at the end of the first chapter: Psychoanalysis does not eliminate (*Aufgehoben*) any problems with sexuality. If it is legitimate to use such a statement, this is where “psychoanalytic ontology” should be mentioned; an *ontological possibility* that sexuality, or more precisely, sexuation, gives to the signifying chain. It (the possibility) renders the phenomena examined by psychoanalysis discontinuous. In summary, an ontological problem is inherent in psychoanalytic knowledge. Lacan writes: “I don’t want to begin developing a theory of knowledge here, but it is obvious that the things of the human world are things in a universe

¹²⁹ Jacques Lacan, *Television* trans. Jeffrey Mehlman & ed. Joan Copjec (New York, NY: W.W Norton & Company, 1990), 3.

¹³⁰ Tomšič, *The Capitalist Unconscious*, 25.

¹³¹ Zupančič, *Why Psychoanalysis?*, 7.

structured by words...”¹³² For this reason, the problem of knowledge and *being* comes together, I am going to go back once again and examine the features of the void and read the historicization and reproduction (and *re-construction*) together.

I think, Freud reconsidered one of the results of the article “Negation” and “*verneinung*” as a psychic labour (*arbeit*) in 1937, “Constructions in Analysis”: “How should the patient's response to the psychoanalyst's interpretation be evaluated?” What is the nature of the “yes” or “no” expressed by the patient in response to the psychoanalyst's interpretation? The interpretation is the point where psychoanalysis began to construct, or even “re-construct”, as Freud put it. Therefore, this important question that questions the legitimacy of psychoanalysis is directly related to the interpretation of the psychoanalyst, and therefore the knowledge that specific to psychoanalysis. Our discussion of temporality showed that this information was not suitable for any centre, and therefore for any presuppositions. But if the psychoanalyst finds evidence of the information that s-he believes s-he “discovered” in the patient's negation, how can we determine and under which circumstances is the psychoanalyst not wrong? As will be noticed, the problem of relativity in temporality arises once again in knowledge. Indeed, Freud argues that it would be a more accurate expression to call the analyst's “interpretation” as “construction”. He writes:

But I think that ‘construction’ is by far the more appropriate description. ‘Interpretation’ applies to something that one does to some single element of the material, such as an association or a parapraxis. But it is a ‘construction’ when one lays before the subject of the analysis a piece of his early history that he has forgotten...¹³³

Consequently, the reconstruction of the patient's history takes place with simultaneous interventions to place this history in a *diachronic* chain¹³⁴ (As we

¹³² Jacques Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* trans. Dennis Porter & ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 45.

¹³³ Sigmund Freud, “Constructions in Analysis” (1937) in *S.E. vol. XXIII*, 261.

¹³⁴ “‘Interpretation’ applies to something that one does to some single element of the material, such as an association or a parapraxis. But it is a ‘construction’ when one lays before the subject of the

shall see, when the “historicity of historical reality” is brought into discussion in terms of Freud's concept of “afterwardness”, this “diachronic chain” will not be the right name for the product of reconstruction.). In this reconstruction, the patient's response is used as a reference point, as a proof. As such, this kind of intervention is vulnerable to abuse, and criticisms of psychoanalysis are based on this sensitive point. Freud discusses this problem in depth in this article I cite but I find it appropriate to reach his conclusion in a different way. Ultimately, the reconstruction of (patient's) history is a reconstruction of reality, and if we are going to discuss the analyst's interpretation with references to “ethics,” we should start with “the reality principle” (As it is known, Lacan's *Seminar VII* starts in this way. Considering that we are now finally examining the features of the void in depth, it would be appropriate to follow this manoeuvre). Before proceeding with this discussion, I would like to remind that I had problematized the “reality of real” when discussing the void of aetiology. There was a reason I called this void as “as if”; this void had a relationship with an energy that did not come into existence from nothing.¹³⁵

Freud speaks of memory as follows: When the psyche feels an urgent inner need, it will have needed a familiar outside world. The task of the conscious and attention is to collect data for the construction of this familiar world. As a result of this work, a “system of *notation*” appears; according to Freud, this system is only a part of the *memory*. Whether a particular idea is in harmony with reality is decided by

analysis a piece of his early history that he has forgotten...” – Freud, “Constructions in Analysis”, 261.

¹³⁵ In 1.3., I mentioned that the unconscious labour, *witzarbeit*, can profit without an external capital and I called it “grey economy”. Samo Tomšič explains this in his book titled *The Capitalist Unconscious* as follows: “Marx's point is rather that capitalism can exist without capitalists because the capitalist drive to self-valorisation is structural, systemic and autonomous - but there cannot be any capitalism without the proletariat.” Here, Tomšič's emphasis is on “arbeit”; as I said before, the movement of the drive has no purpose other than itself. From here on, I will discuss the relationship between the reality and pleasure principles. As will be seen in my references to Lacan's *Seminar VII*, it should not be forgotten that the relation between the reality principle and pleasure principle is direct and constant; they are working at the same time (this principle of work can be considered with what I said about *aufgehoben* and *aufhebung*). If this point is examined in detail, it will be understood that those who question the legitimacy of the analyst's interpretation have missed the nature of the reality principle in psychoanalytic theory. Such inquiries assume that they know the reality meant by the reality principle. Reality principle is not a wall of intellectualization that stands against the pleasure principle. Cf. Tomšič, *The Capitalist Unconscious*, 66.

considering the elements of this system, namely memory-traces¹³⁶. These traces that constructs memory also construct the subjective temporality of the subject. So, the question should be asked: What does “a part of memory” mean?

From our discussion on *differenz*, as can be remembered, two conclusions came out. The first is that these traces are not fixed. Therefore, a trace represents only a part of the reality in relation to another trace; *this relation between the traces is the result of the labour of the pleasure principle*. So, which corresponds to the second result, the continuous relationship of these traces is not an arbitrary one. In the first chapter, I mentioned the following statement of Freud in this regard: “consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace”. Now I will continue my work on this formula, following the same text and considering what I have covered so far in this section. Freud writes:

On the other hand, our abstract idea of time seems to be wholly derived from the method of working of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.* and to correspond to a perception on its own part of that method of working. *This mode of functioning may perhaps constitute another way of providing a shield against stimuli*. I know that these remarks must sound very obscure, but I must limit myself to these hints.¹³⁷

The claim that our understanding of time can be regarded as a “defence mechanism” can be considered as revolutionary; of course, psychoanalysis does not turn the temporality “upside down”, I have to make this correction to make it clear that the word revolutionary is not used *banally* (Cf. 3.3.). It is not about replacing linear temporality with another line or centre. This was one of the things that could be understood from Lacan's interpretation of Kepler. But if time can be a defence mechanism and reality is tested based on memory traces, we are once again at the heart of analyst's interpretation and reproduction in psychoanalysis. What is emphasized by Freud in both articles (“Negation” and “Constructions in Analysis”) is that the patient's answer to the analyst's interpretation alone is not sufficient,

¹³⁶ Freud, “Two Principles of Mental Functioning”, 220.

¹³⁷ Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, 28, italics are mine.

whether it is an approval or a refusal. If the patient's "production" does not follow the interpretation, the interpretation has no effect in the analytic process. It is the patient who will carry out the excavation. Psychoanalysis is likened to an archaeological excavation by Freud in "The Aetiology of Hysteria" only by this condition. This type of excavation is recommended by Freud as a method for a historical discovery; for the same discovery, the narratives of the natives can be used instead of excavation. I referred to Lacan's *Seminar XI* in the first subheading of the first chapter to show this: When the natives¹³⁸ begin to tell and write the history, the first rule of psychoanalysis is broken; there is no room for "free association" in such a narrative¹³⁹. In a superficial expression, the patient needs to perform a kind of labour while talking, it is not about the consistency of the story. If the patient tries to maintain the consistency of the story, this is only a waste in terms of psychoanalytic economy. A waste, on the contrary, should appear in the analysis in its meaninglessness/uselessness. The thing that will prevent analytical labour from being a waste is not to give meaning to it: The energy spent is saved from wasting only when the product itself is "waste". Almost at the risk of abusing the terms a little, the following can be said: the patient should talk so much that the exchange value of the patient's speech should be on the agenda of the analytical labour¹⁴⁰. When you try to explain your joke, die *witzarbeit* will become useless.

¹³⁸ Cf. "Aetiology of Hysteria" for Freud's analogy between psychoanalysis and archaeology.

¹³⁹ I wrote as follows: *At this point, it needs to be noted that: the historicization of the past is not filling, stitching, the gaps in the subject's speech, history, story; this attitude, which psychoanalysis displays while approaching all kinds of emptiness, hesitation, and disruption, will be the main component of the theoretical structure of this thesis.* Here, I implicitly pointed to the second week of Lacan's *Seminar XI*. I think it is appropriate to remind this reference, since I have started the ontology discussion, I prepared here in the first chapter.

¹⁴⁰ Freud writes about the labour that the patient's share in the analysis: "First and foremost, the initiation of the treatment in itself brings about a change in the patient's conscious attitude to his illness. He has usually been content with lamenting it, despising it as nonsensical and underestimating its importance; for the rest, he has extended to its manifestations the ostrich-like policy of repression which he adopted towards its origins." See. "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through" (1914) in *S.E. vol. XII*, 152. Tomšič addresses the emphasis on *arbeit* in this article, and I will deal with this in the future. Before starting this important discussion, I need to consider the concepts of negation and transference. For now, I will present the following short comment about the quote I have made: Psychoanalytic theory is clear about the presence of pleasure from the symptom. The relationship between this pleasure and the patient's knowledge about his/her symptom and his/her demand for recovery should be examined. At this point, although it is very roughly formulated, it becomes legitimate to ask the question: Is this pleasure *real*? If it is not true, is it because it is "sick"? The point where the rituals enjoyed by the obsessional bring him/her to

The analogy (excavation) here is used for comparison between anamnestic investigation and the psychoanalytic method. Freud ends this analogy as follows: *Saxa loquuntur!*¹⁴¹ But here it is necessary to ask: Will our ears be ready to hear them when the stones speak?

I will continue to examine the encounter I mentioned in the footnote. Freud writes: “Neurotics turn away from reality (*der Wirklichkeit*) because they find it unbearable—either the whole or parts of it.”¹⁴² This followed by a warning: This does not have to be a psychotic mechanism. This reality is not waiting outside to be perceived. The difference between neurosis and psychosis is not about *how much* of objective reality is rejected. Lacan explains:

In neurosis, inasmuch as reality is not fully rearticulated symbolically into the external world, it is in a second phase that a partial flight from reality, an incapacity to confront this secretly preserved part of reality, occurs in the subject. In psychosis, on the contrary, reality itself initially contains a hole that the world of fantasy will subsequently fill.¹⁴³

Being a theoretician, the child begins to construct the theory of knowledge with his/her assumptions about sexuality and genitals. The judgment that childish theories consist of some kind of naivety is a part of the defensive mechanisms of adults; it is clear that there are things the child does not “know” yet, but the *speculation* he/she performs is no less legitimate than that of an adult. Moreover, this statement directly belongs to Freud, what drives the child to theoretical work is a desire to have and fear of losing. The first issue that the child puts on his agenda

treatment is that the *intensity* of the ritual has reached an undeniable level (remember my parasite analogy in the first chapter); these rituals, which were enjoyable until then, suddenly become agonizing with some kind of encounter. Here, since it is implied that the patient's knowledge and study are located on two separate planes, it should also be mentioned how intellectual function and emotional function are separated. For now, I will postpone this discussion to the point where I will reconsider *verneinung*. For now, I will summarize as follows: Freud calls the relationship of emotions and thoughts in obsessional rituals as “*mésalliance*”. I will talk about what makes this relationship inappropriate when I return to the principles of pleasure and reality.

¹⁴¹ Freud, “The Aetiology of Hysteria”, 192. *Saxa loquuntur* means “stones speak!”.

¹⁴² Freud, “Two Principles...”, 218.

¹⁴³ Jacques Lacan, *Book III – The Psychoses 1955-1956* ed. J. A. Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.), 45.

the moment he starts talking is “property”¹⁴⁴. In this context, it is necessary to evaluate once again the speculative thought that I have tried to emphasize its importance in the previous chapter. An adult's effort to eradicate the child's so-called ignorance is, above all, a precaution. Precaution for what? Freud clearly shows this in two places: Infantile sexuality is a reminder of the narcissism that the adult had to abandon for a long time, and this joke is not funny for the adult¹⁴⁵.

As Freud showed us, not only “the question of property/difference” triggers this speculative labour. Two questions attract the child’s curiosity¹⁴⁶: *What happened to the other child's (his sister's) penis and where do babies come from?* Freud suggests varying views as to which of these two questions preceded the other. I will leave this aside for now, yet it is certain that the child tends to perform speculations around the genitals and moreover, the same speculation appears to cover all erogenous organs and ultimately, as we will see, every organ can be erogenous. In addition, we have no evidence to think that the problem of property and speculation from erogenous organs have nothing to do with each other. Before I summarize the point we arrived I would like to quote Freud:

It is to be assumed that this masturbation is attached to the Oedipus complex and serves as a discharge for the sexual excitation belonging to it. It is, however, uncertain whether the masturbation has this character from the first, or whether on the contrary it makes its first appearance spontaneously as an activity of a bodily organ and is only

¹⁴⁴ Sigmund Freud, “On the Sexual Theories of Children” (1908) in *S.E. vol. IX*, 205-226. I will discuss the relationship between “identity” and infantile theories on property in the last subheading of this chapter.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Last chapter of Sigmund Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914) in *S.E. vol. XIV*, 67-102 and Chapter VII of Freud, *Jokes*. I can summarize the example Freud described in this chapter to explain “naivety” as follows: A sister and brother, in front of their families, stage a play they have prepared. According to the play, the husband of this family, who suffers from subsistence, goes on an overseas journey to earn more money. Returning from the journey with good news, the husband shows the money he earned to his wife (his sister). Her sister replies to her husband as follows and shows her husband a room full of children.: “Look, I didn't stay idle either!” Adults find this play laughable because of its naivety.

¹⁴⁶ Freud has varying ideas about which of these two questions comes first. I will not track these changes here.

brought into relation with the Oedipus complex at some later date; this second possibility is by far the more probable.¹⁴⁷

The child theorizes the tension in his/her body; this is, perhaps, the most inspiring of attitudes that can be taken in the face of inherent excitements. This is where knowledge and sexuality, epistemology, and ontology overlap. Much of Butler's criticism in the *Gender Trouble* is based on this point: sexuation in Freud and “the realm before the Law”. As I mentioned above, Freud's thoughts on masculine and feminine are already heteronormative for Butler. To address this, Butler refers to Freud's handling of the penis as a prototype for erogenous organs (in “On Narcissism”). However, if someone reads the texts “Anatomical Distinction” and “On Sexual Theories of Children” it will be immediately revealed: There is an ignorance at the origin of infantile speculation. This ultimately does not stem from anything other than the nature of sexuality; the issue is not that the child does not know enough, the issue is that s-he does not do science of a sufficiently knowable object. I do not think the child's attitude at this point is different from a scientist: Her/his speculation is based on her/his observations, and Freud warns us right here: If these observations were not available, s-he would still be able to speculate. How? Because, as I mentioned, childish masturbation is not a discovery that follows Oedipus; just as drive drives only for itself, the body is only body for itself, erogenous. At this point, if we think about the penis, we must consider “property”. Despite these, I am aware that the theory is still open to phallogocentric criticism, but I am not finalizing my explanation here. Before completing this topic, I would like to extend my discussion of the theories of children with Lacan's views on “jealousy and knowledge”. He writes:

All human knowledge stems from the dialectic of jealousy, which is primordial manifestation of communication. It's a matter of an observable generic notion, behavioristically observable. What takes place between two young children involves this fundamental transitivity

¹⁴⁷ Freud, “Anatomical Distinction”, 250.

expressed by the fact that one child who has beaten another can say – *The other beat me*. It's not that he is lying, he *is* the other, literally.¹⁴⁸

As will be seen later, this short paragraph can be evaluated in different contexts within the scope of this thesis. For example, “the other child” and “being beaten” can be a starting point for my discussions in 2.3. and 3.3; when I talk about Dr Mansur's reading “A Child Is Being Beaten”, it becomes clear how important this “literally” is. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that here, Lacan discusses the source of knowledge of paranoia in the context of “master-slave dialectic”; the discussion of a similar dialectic (*the scene of smut*) covers a considerable part of 1.3. and finally, “jealousy” can be thought together with what I said in this chapter on “property”.

This is also the place where some of Freud's thoughts are intertwined, which can be summarized in a rather rude manner, escaping from outside stimuli, and resorting to mechanisms for those coming from inside; now, can it be said that it is sufficient to apply to the body to draw the boundary between inside and outside? Moreover, given all this, what can be said about the boundary between neurosis and psychosis? It is not sufficient to resort to whether some or all of the reality is rejected to make a distinction between these two; it is not a trivial matter, it is extremely important, but cannot be evaluated as such. The quote I made in the previous chapter from Derrida said that the essence of being is a difference: I used this expression to justify my thoughts on reproduction, and what I mean was that, in summary, an “origin” in reproduction could not be sought. So, in summary, the reality principle does not aim at the internal construction of a reality that can be considered original or objective; on the other hand, which we have not yet examined the issue in this respect, this principle does not correspond to an authority, an authority that sets the bar for prohibited tastes.

¹⁴⁸ Lacan, *The Psychoses*, 39.

2.2: The Verse of Freud¹⁴⁹

The psychical apparatus is intolerant of unpleasure; it has to fend it off at all costs, and if the perception of reality entails unpleasure, that perception—that is, the truth—must be sacrificed.

- Freud, "Analysis Terminable Interminable"¹⁵⁰

"All the needs of speaking beings are contaminated by the fact of being involved in an other satisfaction" - underline the last three words - "that those needs may not live up to."

- Lacan, *Encore*¹⁵¹

Tomšič talks about the *scene* that I mentioned in the previous chapter (Cf. 1.3.) in the subheading named *Lustgewinn* in his *The Capitalist Unconscious*¹⁵². As it will be remembered, this scene consisting of three people is organized for the pleasure of the first person, the agent. This scene, the feature of which is the smutting of the agent, is at an extremely important point in how psychoanalysis examines the discourse; at this point, I do not want to repeat myself, so I will summarize what I have to say: Sometimes too much, sometimes too little is spoken, but never enough, not enough; never as required. The talking subject (or *parlêtre*) is not subject to *homeostasis*. This is the result of the demand being enunciated; there is no demand isolated from desire. Whether it is smut or joke, the other will be on stage as soon as something is enunciated. Tomšič asks a very important question at this point: *What is the difference between the labour and the work?*¹⁵³ Before I consider his question, I would like to remind the following: For Freud, the

¹⁴⁹ In his lecture titled "Violence, Trauma and Reconciliation" at Istanbul Bilgi University, Dr. Mehmet Mansur used an expression as "Freud's vers'" referring to Freud's concepts starting with the German prefix "ver". I dedicate this title to these lectures started with Karl Marx's words in *18th Brumaire* on "poetry of the future".

¹⁵⁰ Freud, "Analysis Terminable Interminable", 237.

¹⁵¹ Lacan, *Encore*, 51.

¹⁵² Cf. Tomšič, *The Capitalist Unconscious*, 117-130.

¹⁵³ I will come back to this in the last subheading of this chapter, which I will discuss the "Superego".

value of the *witzarbeit* can only be determined by analytical reduction, any presupposition is not a way to assess the labour of the unconscious; unconscious processes only form the material, the only thing it takes into account in its work is form, *differenz*, *quantity*. A presupposition is the product of a *weltanschauung* one way or another. Here, I cannot continue without talking about the legitimacy of psychoanalysis, as a science that rejects any presuppositions, is the subject of critics, even though I believe that what I have said about historicization clarifies this issue. Moreover, this short detour about the *knowledge*, *truth*, and *discourse* can serve as a preparation for the discussion below on the reality principle and *verneinung*.

Verheaghe writes in his article on Lacan's discourses: "The paradoxical result of this Freudian approach, focusing on the individual, even on the individual symptoms of one individual patient, is that Freud is the only one who succeeded in making a general theory on the human psyche."¹⁵⁴ The "uniqueness" of psychoanalytic knowledge is emphasized for many reasons: For example, psychoanalysis does not have a manual for diagnosis, the findings of it are not reproducible etc. Some approaches on this matter are affirmative¹⁵⁵, others are not, and ultimately, all of them are wrong. They are wrong because they aim to compare psychoanalysis with psychology; there is no premise to associate psychology with psychoanalysis. The uniqueness of the psychoanalytic knowledge is based on two reasons: Firstly, the unconscious labour produces the exchange value, not the use value¹⁵⁶ and secondly, psychoanalysis has no reason to *bless* the unique. If Freud says that we are all neurotic, this does not mean that neurosis is nothing to be taken seriously. If we are all neurotic, this is about an immanent dilemma for human

¹⁵⁴ Paul Verheaghe, "From Impossibility to Inability: Lacan's Theory on the Four Discourses" in *The Letter - Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis*, 3, 1995, 91-108.

¹⁵⁵ Such views emphasize that the psychoanalytic theory, built on unique structures of symptoms "respects subjectivity." This is not entirely wrong, but it is incomplete, and this may make the interpretation of the theory dangerous. For example, it cannot be denied that what establishes the relationship between signifiers is "subjective," but this subjectivity is split off by sexuality. So, psychoanalysis respects subjectivity "because it is impossible otherwise", and sexuality is "everything" at this point. I will elaborate these below.

¹⁵⁶ Although there will be a rough analogy due to the theoretical burden of these concepts, I imply the distinction between "quantity and quality" here.

condition, and this dilemma arises from sexuality¹⁵⁷. Psychoanalytic knowledge is unique because the investments around this dilemma follow the detours of desire; the desire has a habit of extending the path; it goes, as I will discuss below, if necessary, even to the construction of reality. Desire does not distort the reality because there is no reality before distortion. However, these does not mean that we cannot speak of any (consistent) structure in psychoanalysis: Oedipus exists, but, nevertheless, the existence of Oedipus does not imply the sameness of the Oedipal experience (Cf. 3.1.). The relationship between the difference of this experience's consequences and sexuation should not be missed.

Freud says about psychoanalytic research in "Five Lectures" as: "At first, I must confess, this seemed a senseless and hopeless undertaking. I was set the task of learning from the patient something that I did not know and that he did not know himself. How could one hope to elicit it?"¹⁵⁸ Lacan's phrase "I learn everything from my analysands", which is often quoted, points to the same place¹⁵⁹. The demand starts to refract at this point. The analyst is supposed to know. This information does not carry out the analysis, but, perhaps, *grosso modo*, it makes the

¹⁵⁷ The expression "we are all neurotic" requires much more explanation, but this is not a place where I can attempt this. I would like to quote a paragraph of mine published elsewhere. This article was about *Antigone* and the void. In the next subheading, I will deal with this issue in a different way, albeit briefly. "“Here, in the field of dream, you are at home. *Wo Es war, soll Ich werden*” says Lacan¹⁵⁷. He translates “Ich” as “subject” not “Ego”. Where Id belongs, where it appears, exhales, gives voice, blinks, subject takes place but not *dislodge* Id. Therefore, what articulates the question of *es-sence* with signifiers that born here, the question that concerns what is *underlying* sub-ject, at where the void belongs, is sub-ject. Discontinuity makes psychoanalysis possible, legitimizes neurotic’s questions; at this pre-ontologic void, subject *must come into existence* but not psychotic who is certain about his knowledge, who is certain about his *being*, whom thought and being overlaps; he doesn’t have that pre-ontologic void. The crack, the discontinuity that belongs Freud’s famous cogito, makes possible *subject of statement* and *subject of enunciation*. At that crack, consciousness *cracks* and subject tries to cover that crack for not being a *crack*. Psychologist tries to *stitching up* that crack, void with his knowledge about what is *ontic* — Heidegger says: “This is no less true of ‘*psychology*’, whose anthropological tendencies are today unmistakable. Nor can we compensate for the absence of ontological foundations by taking anthropology and psychology and building them into the framework of general *biology*.” —. Therefore, what takes place where unconscious blinks not Ich (I) but a distance between so-called I and who articulates that. This distance is as short as breathe or as long as waiting for Messiah or future’s *song*. This duality makes home/*heim*/field of dream at the same time *unheimlich* par excellence; this is where Freud discovers *wiederholungszwang* via traumatic neurosis.” Şahin Ateş, “Antigone Yaşıyor: Psikanalizde Öznenin Kurucuları Olarak Anı İzi, Boşluk ve Travma”, in *SURET – Psikokültürel Analiz* ed. Hakan Kızıltan, 11, 2019, 169-195.

¹⁵⁸ Freud, “Five Lectures”, 22.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 62-73.

analysis *staged*. Verheaghe refers to Lacan: One can function as psychoanalyst only for a certain period¹⁶⁰. The statement is clear: The analytical scene is built through positions. The fact that the psychoanalyst functions with the “knowledge” in the required position is undoubtedly the condition that the patient suits him, but this is not the whole “truth”. What psychoanalysis seeks here is not the patient's sincerity. If the patient is “lying”, then, firstly it is necessary to evaluate it at the following level: The patient is saying something. Lying is producing something (a memory, for example, or a phantasy or a story). Psychoanalysis is not obliged to reveal this lie, it should listen to this lie, and more precisely, the question should be asked: On what basis can psychoanalysis expect the patient to tell the “truth”? Should it wait for an actual event to be told for the “historical reality (Cf. 3.3. and the Conclusion)”? The subject can find the Real only by “re-finding” it, with Lacan’s words, “not exactly *it* but its pleasurable associations”¹⁶¹. So, in a brief detour, I want to re-articulate a well-known Freudian expression, “the return of the repressed”, as “the return of the repressed does not mean that the repressed return to its place.” I do not mean that the return is possible if “the meaning” is changed, on the contrary, I think, there is no meaning (and *a place that can be returned*) before “the” return. So, the principle of constancy (*Nirvana*) is not a starting point for the organism. I do not deny that it (homeostasis) can be a phantasy, the phantasy of the scientist maybe, but the truth is, like all phantasies, it would want one and only thing: not become realized. This is what *beyond* the pleasure principle.

I can now return to *Verneinung*. Freud writes:

Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is already a lifting (*Aufhebung*) of the repression, though not, of course, of acceptance what is repressed. We can see how in this the intellectual function is separated from the affective process.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Verheaghe, “From Impossibility to Inability...”.

¹⁶¹ Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 52.

¹⁶² Freud, “Negation”, 235-236.

It is necessary to underline this distinction: The repression does not abolish (*aufgehoben*) something, its level changes. So, the negation is not a kind of “rationalization”. But if negation is not rationalization, how could the pleasure reach the level of consciousness? In the second week of *Seminar VII*, Lacan reminds us: The unconscious is the place of thought. Thought only falls within the scope of “consciousness”, and therefore the principle of reality, by *words*. I am aware that here I express consciousness and the reality principle as if they were the same. The discussion I had so far was to show that this was not the case, it was a preparation. For this, I re-read various texts of Freud and tried to approach the situation in different ways. Now, to explain Lacan's thought I just mentioned, I will consider the sources of his thought in Freud.

Vorstellung has been considered as a single concept so far in this thesis. In *Standard Edition*, this concept is almost always translated as “thought”. You may encounter footnotes written by the editor in various places in *Standard Edition*¹⁶³: The reader is warned that the concept in question may also mean “image or representation.” It is not a matter of *Vorstellung* that it can mean differently in various contexts. The problem is to look for a fixed *meaning* to meet the word; it *signifies* the signifying chain for another *signifier*. Based on the quotation from Freud (the quote that he mentioned the “sound-image”, *Klangbild*, which I referred to in 1.3.), I explained the manifestation of this situation in the jokes in the previous chapter. I wrote as: *The signifier (Vorstellung) should be evaluated within the economy of the joke. Saxa loquuntur.* Freud explains how the stones speak, in the sixth chapter of the “The Unconscious”.¹⁶⁴ The point to be noted here is that when *Vorstellung* and the reality are the subject of discussion, Freud makes his explanation almost always compared to psychosis¹⁶⁵. The danger of this line of

¹⁶³ Cf. e.g. Footnote 12 of “The Unconscious”.

¹⁶⁴ What I imply here is the word that Freud used, *instinkt*. So, here, Freud “actually” talking about “instincts” not “drives”. He writes, as I quoted before in my Introduction: “The content of the *Ucs.* may be compared with an aboriginal population in the mind. If inherited mental formations exist in the human being—something analogous to instincts in animals—these constitute the nucleus of the *Ucs.*” – Freud, “The Unconscious”, 194-195.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. e.g. “Two Principles...” (1911); “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1917) in *S.E. vol. XIV*, 217-235; “The Unconscious”.

thought is that in a superficial reading, it seems as if only a situation valid for psychosis is mentioned. I do not mind following Freud as we have made the necessary preliminary discussions on the reality principle. He writes:

If we ask ourselves what it is that gives the character of strangeness to the substitutive formation and the symptom in schizophrenia, we eventually come to realize that it is the predominance of what has to do with words over what has to do with things.¹⁶⁶

Freud explains that in schizophrenia, object-cathexes are given-up (*aufgegeben*); only *Wortvorstellungen* remains. However, in a conscious representation, we encounter two types of *Vorstellungen*: *Wortvorstellung* and *Sachvorstellung*. This is the place that will take us to the reality principle: Freud refers to two concepts for “the representation of the thing” in this text. The first one is *die Sache* and the second one is *das Ding*. *Das Ding*, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is what we refer to as “void” in our discussion. The name of the void is *das Ding*; the name of the void is *the thing*. So, what is “*die Sache*”? Lacan writes: “*Sache* and *Wort* are, therefore, closely linked; they form a couple. *Das Ding* is found somewhere else.”¹⁶⁷

Freud defines *die Sache* as: “the latter (*die Sache*) consists in the cathexis, if not of the direct memory-images of the thing, at least of remoter memory-traces derived from these.”¹⁶⁸ This is the breaking point: If this couple constitutes a/an “reality / object” representation and the second consists of derivatives of memory-traces, the reality principle is already subject to the functioning of another mechanism. I will venture to leave my discussion for a moment to elaborate on this sensitive point. Freud writes about what he called “screen memories”¹⁶⁹ in 1899. These are *products* that “cover” childhood memories that can only be remembered “partially”. Freud concludes his article with the following words:

¹⁶⁶ Freud, “Unconscious”, 199, italics are mine.

¹⁶⁷ Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 45.

¹⁶⁸ Freud, “Unconscious”, 201, italics are mine.

¹⁶⁹ A screen memory is, according to Freud (cf. “Screen Memories” and “Constructions in Analysis”), a kind of memory that is quite clearly (Ger. *Überdeutlich*) remembered by a person but detached from a context that can be associated with its content.

The recognition of this fact must diminish the distinction we have drawn between screen memories and other memories derived from our childhood. It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all *from* our childhood: memories *relating to* our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, *emerge*; they were *formed* at that time. And a number of motives, **with no concern for historical accuracy**, had a part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves.¹⁷⁰

As I will mention again below, Lacan says that the signifying structure is interposed between perception and consciousness exactly at this point. Freud's explanation is clear: There are motifs that serve the construction of memory, and these are free of historical validity (or one can say that *they constitute the historical reality*); it is therefore pointless to distinguish between the “real” memories and “screen” memories. The only real thing is the mechanism that “forms” memories. If what is understood from “real memories” is the “chronological history” of the subject, then surely there is something “real” in the screen memory, but on the other hand, what continues to historicize the “chronological” is nothing but the mentioned mechanisms. Many fantasies can intersect in a screen memory, so a screen memory, here I ask you to remember my footnotes at the beginning of this chapter, is overdetermined.

For exactly this reason, I have said that Freud's manoeuvre here is suitable for misunderstandings: If we only consider that “derivatives” are what the reality is based on, can we achieve the distinction between neurosis and psychosis by fitting the reality to neurosis? If the psychotic structure suffers from a distorted reality,

¹⁷⁰ Sigmund Freud, “Screen Memories” (1899) in *S.E. Vol. III*, 322, bolds are mine.

where exactly is the neurosis differentiated from it? I am aware that these exaggerated questions put neurosis and psychosis on the same scale. Of course, this is not the case. But just as Freud uses cases of neurosis to explain the nature of “the normal functioning”, I must resort to this (naturally) incomplete and incorrect comparison when explaining the nature of the neurosis. Now, I will tell what other functioning is involved in the reality principle: As can be guessed, this is nothing more than the pleasure principle. Considering what I have said above, this should make us think immediately: What is the relationship between the patient's “real” suffer and the “demand for recovery” that he calls on the psychoanalyst and the pleasure principle? Lacan mentions that the signifying chain – the pleasure principle – interposes itself between perception and consciousness¹⁷¹. He summarizes as follows: “For what the unconscious does is to show us the gap through *which neurosis recreates a harmony with a real* — a real that may well not be determined.”¹⁷² Neurosis recreates the harmony between reality and pleasure based on the pleasure principle (this is the logic of the pleasure from the symptom). The psychoanalysis is not to close this gap and correct this “broken” harmony, as Lacan explained later in this quote. It does not matter, says Lacan. The gap between symptom and real can be closed, undoubtedly psychology tries this; the point is not to stitch in this void. One way or another, but there is always an effort to close this gap. However, neurosis produces another symptom in response to this intervention. The knowledge of psychoanalysis shows that this gap is characterized by something that has not *realized*: “Observe the point from which he sets out — The Aetiology of the Neuroses — and what does he find in the hole, in the split, in the gap so characteristic of cause? Something of the order of the non-realized.”¹⁷³

In the famous phrase of the “Negation”, Freud writes: “A negative judgement is the *intellectual* substitute for repression; its ‘no’ is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin...”¹⁷⁴ In this sentence, I am reading two important points:

¹⁷¹ Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 51.

¹⁷² Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 22, italics are mine.

¹⁷³ Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 22. I have begun to discuss the discussion about pre-ontology that I have prioritized in the previous chapter.

¹⁷⁴ Freud, “Negation”, 236, italics are mine.

Firstly, the hall-mark of negation (*Verneinungssymbols*) is a trace of a lack. Speech carries this lack; the lack, as I said above, makes it possible to speak. The origin is expressed with a “no” since, according to the psychoanalysis, *there is no origin*; all that is done is to repeatedly articulate a *no-origin*. Secondly: Negation is intellectual and related to knowledge; it is articulated, but that does not mean that it is about the truth, it is part of the truth, this is definite. But it cannot be more than just a part of the truth. Zupančič writes:

What comes light at this point is also the difference between (correct) knowledge and truth. On the one hand, there is knowledge which, albeit correct, has no implications or consequences (for analysis). This is the situation were we can “bring about a full intellectual acceptance of the repressed; but the repressive process itself is not yet removed (aufgehoben) by this.” And, on the other hand, there is knowledge as truth, knowledge that “makes place” for the very negativity that has produced it.¹⁷⁵

So, we can draw the following conclusion: *Die Sache* is unconscious, it is the representative of memories. If it creates a couple with *Wort*, the unconscious material can reach consciousness; I also said that the memory-traces that make up a pair with *Wort* are “derivatives”. So, something unrepresentative must remain. Lacan writes: “... at the level of the *Vorstellungen*, the Thing, is not nothing, but literally is not. It is characterized by its absence, its strangeness.”¹⁷⁶ In this way, memory and history are associated with ontology, or rather pre-ontology.

Let us go back to *Verneinung* and *aufhebung*. Freud defines two types of repression: *Urverdrangung* and *Verdrangung* and Tomšič addresses them as “constitutive” and “constituted”¹⁷⁷. In other words, if we follow Tomšič’s interpretation, we can mention that the constitutive repression leads to labour;

¹⁷⁵ Zupančič, “Hegel and Freud: Between *Aufhebung* and *Verneinung*”, 488.

¹⁷⁶ Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 63.

¹⁷⁷ Tomšič, *The Capitalist Unconscious*, 133.

Verdrangung has no end. The theory becomes complicated here. It is not possible to establish a chronological relationship between the two types of repression; I already mentioned the reasons that led to this. Repression is a constant labour (*Verdrangungsarbeit*). I will examine the relationship between *Verdrangungsarbeit* and Superego's imperative in the next subheading. For now, I need to continue to examine the relationship between continuity of the repression and reproduction.

Freud describes the addressee of *Urverdrangung* as “the physical (ideational) representative of the drive (*der psychischen [Vorstellungs-] Representanz des Triebes*)”¹⁷⁸ or, in other words, *Vorstellungsrepresentanz*¹⁷⁹. The logic of *differenz* and timeless structure of psychoanalysis arises from here. As Freud said in 1924, more than one principle is in struggle: the pleasure and reality principles, and the death drive¹⁸⁰. But the triumphant is always the pleasure principle. Not because the pleasure principle has “taken down” others. *Aufhebung* is here. There is no downfall, they are intertwined, they rise together. Lacan says: “... the reality system, however far it is developed, leaves an essential part of what belongs to the real a prisoner in the toils of the pleasure principle.”¹⁸¹ I will now refer to Chapter 6 of Beckett's *Murphy* to illustrate this:

Murphy conceived his mind as a large hollow sphere, tightly closed to the outer universe. There could be no talk of impoverishment because no element in the outside world was missing within this sphere. There could be no talk of impoverishment because no element in the outside world was missing within this sphere. Everything that was virtual or real in the outer universe, transformed from virtual to real, or falling into from real to virtual had found or would find its place in its inner universe.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Freud, “Repression”, 148. I used "drive" instead of "instinct" which is the choice of translator.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Freud, Chapter III of “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Sigmund Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924) in *S.E. vol XIX*, 153-170.

¹⁸¹ Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 55.

¹⁸² Samuel Beckett, *Murphy* trans. [Turkish] Uğur Ün (İstanbul: Ayrıntı, 2017), 79-80. In this thesis, Turkish translations of Beckett's works (except *First Love and Other Stories*) were used. Therefore, I was the one who translated these works from Turkish to English.

Beckett immediately warns the reader in the next paragraph: “Murphy was not an ‘idealist.’” At this point, I ask the reader to remember what Freud said about “screen memories” and *Nachtraglichkeit*: Anything potential in the universe can be historicized in symbolic chain and this includes the body, which I will discuss further in the next subheading. In this context, Murphy's mind, which includes the entire universe, did not exclude or “subordinate” his bodily experience; there was a relationship between his mind and his body, but the “rules” of this relationship could not be explained by Murphy:

Thus Murphy felt himself divided into a body and a mind. There was an intercourse apparently; otherwise, how could he know that they have common things. But he felt his mind isolated from his body and could neither understand the way in which communication was provided, nor how the two experiences spilled over into each other's domains. He believed they were both independent of each other. He neither thought a kick because he felt one, nor felt a kick because he thought one.¹⁸³

At this point, I would like to talk about a concept that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, “somatic compliance”. This concept was of paramount importance to Freud's research into the aetiology of neuroses. As I said earlier, Freud never denied the role of inheritance in aetiology in his research, but his thoughts on inheritance (as I will discuss once again in the next subheading) were not like the conventional understanding. For the hereditary predisposition to turn into a neurosis (like screen memories) it had to be processed; in other words, the neurosis used the body for symptoms like a parasite. Freud writes: “... somatic side of a hysterical symptom is the more stable of the two and the harder to replace, while the psychological side is a variable element for which a substitute can more easily be found”.¹⁸⁴ Immediately after a line, Freud refers to the Gospel and says “new wine is put in the old bottle” for the symptoms that

¹⁸³ Beckett, *Murphy*, 80.

¹⁸⁴ Sigmund Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905), in *S.E. Vol. VII*, 54.

Dora has reproduced; the body is a “potential” for neurosis. To repeat, repression is a dis-continuous force; this force on the other hand corresponds to the “reproduction”. Symptoms are “compromises” that occur at points where the sustained force of repression corresponds to costs that the psyche cannot afford.

I will refer to Lacan to summarize this subheading. In a text he wrote in 1954, Lacan says: “The word is a gift of language and language is not immaterial. It is subtle matter, but matter nonetheless. It can fecundate the hysterical woman, it can stand for the flow of urine or for excrement withheld.”¹⁸⁵

In this subheading, I have made a preparation for the discussion in which I talk about the “historicity of the body” in the next subheading by dealing with various psychoanalytic mechanisms.

2.3. “The Narcissistic Masochism”

*In truth, we will see that we must turn things around,
and instead of investigating a signifier (un signifiant), we must
investigate the signifier “One” (Un) – but we haven’t reached that point yet.*

- Lacan, *Encore*¹⁸⁶

*I could say that the sexual relates [rapporte] what there is of relation [rapport],
but its report – its account and its narrative – its not totalizing and does not close
the circle.*

- Nancy, “The “There Is” of Sexual Relation”¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ Jacques Lacan, “Fétichisme: Le Symbolique, L’imaginaire et le Réel”, [freud2lacan.com, https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/FETISHISM-bilingual.pdf](https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/FETISHISM-bilingual.pdf) (accessed August 20, 2020).

¹⁸⁶ Lacan, *Encore*, 20.

¹⁸⁷ Jean-Luc Nancy, “The “There Is” of Sexual Relation” in *Corpus II – Writings on Sexuality* tr. Anne O’Byrne (Fordham University Press, 2013), 9.

Freud uses this expression, “narcissistic masochism”, to describe the transition from sadism to masochism in “A Child is Being Beaten”¹⁸⁸. I will use it both as a tool to talk about the general structure of the common criticism directed at Freud, and to give an introduction to the structure of Superego, which I hope to address in this subheading.

Freud's work is usually read through dualities: pleasure principle versus reality principle, libido versus the death drive, penis versus penis envy, man versus woman, masculine versus feminine etc. However, at the most critical points of Freud's work, there are triples, not dualities. In my discussion so far, I believe that I have explained why it is a matter of triplicity rather than duality, at least I have laid the foundations of this. In order to discuss Freud's views on masculine and feminine, I dealt with his texts on aetiology; I talked about the libido and the death drive by mentioning Freud's thoughts on jokes, and in this context, I discussed the issue of reproduction that would bring us to the *das Ding* at the beginning of this chapter and finally I discussed the nature of the reality principle in this chapter and I tried to prove that it is theoretically incorrect to treat it as the opposite of the pleasure principle. As I will try to show, although they have been discussed in different contexts, all of these are different ways to approach the same “antagonism”, or Lacanian “Real”, and ultimately, they cannot be dealt with separately in a decent discussion.

There is “three”, not “two” in Freud, and this “three” is born above all from the impossibility of *the* “One”. A “duality” to be found in a text is undoubtedly a mainstay for the reader; such a duality, hence *tension*, may well be exploited for “deconstruction”¹⁸⁹. The issue is not duality itself. If there is a duality, it indicates the existence of a detectable centre; if there is a duality, a tension, an imbalance,

¹⁸⁸ Freud, “A Child is Being Beaten”, 194.

¹⁸⁹ I do not use this concept in the Derridean sense of the word, if there is such a meaning; if there is no such meaning, then the “three” discussion I will continue below can be considered as a deconstruction attempt. In any case, I do not think Lacan's comments on Copernicus and Kepler are independent from what I am going to say here.

there is also an archaic state (for example: prehistorical bisexuality) and, of course, such a situation can lay ground for many criticisms: *The text claiming that duality exists uses this archaic situation to justify the duality; discourse is legitimized by the pre-discursive*. The issue is not just which of the aspects that make up the duality is preferred. The author does not have to be openly biased (I realize it sounds “funny” but I am trying to simplify the situation), because s-he talks about duality means that s-he uses (thus reproduces) the tools of domination that make up duality; for example (according to some of the criticisms of Freud), as I will elaborate in the third chapter, primary bisexuality establishes a heteronormative structure, as it only speaks of bi-sexuality, such an archaic state, prehistory, accepts the masculine and feminine as “given / natural”. As I said, I will keep this discussion in the next chapter, but for now I believe it would be useful to quote Copjec: “But the difference between deconstruction and psychoanalysis is that the latter does not confuse the fact of bisexuality - that is, the fact that male and female signifiers cannot be distinguished absolutely with a denial of sexual difference.”¹⁹⁰ Trying to tame duality to eliminate tension, resorting to a myth (for example, to the myth of Aristophanes) will undoubtedly be the first way that comes to mind, but as Freud shows, there is nothing about the Real in that myth¹⁹¹, moreover, resorting to such a myth eliminates the legibility of Freud's famous “anatomy is destiny”¹⁹²; as I said earlier, I believe that destiny (*Schicksale*) is a psychoanalytic concept and should be read in this way. A common mistake is made here, and destiny is treated as a myth; in the Freudian sense, nothing predetermined can be found in that destiny. This destiny can only be rewritten or reproduced by the subject in its historicity. Therefore, for now, it can be said that such a historiography is a “performative” action but at this point a warning is required: Such performativity should not justify dealing with sexuality and sexuation in a purely discursive way. Reproduction is reproduction of *subjection*, reproduction of conditions of *subjection*¹⁹³. This is

¹⁹⁰ Joan Copjec, *Read My Desire – Lacan against the Historicists* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 216.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Chapter VI in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”.

¹⁹² Sigmund Freud, “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex” (1924) in *S.E. Vol. XIX*, 178.

¹⁹³ Cf. Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power – Theories in Subjection*.

where the *particular* and the *singular* should not be confused because when performativity is considered as a kind of “praise of singularity”, the discursive is exalted against the anatomical. Duality may arise from some kind of “discursiveness”, but then it is necessary to agree on exactly what this discursive signifies: “Sexual difference is not binary/differential, it is an antagonism that binary symbolic difference tries to “normalize” by translating it into symbolic oppositions”, says Žižek¹⁹⁴. When the praise of subjectivity ignores the *particularity* that passes through subjectivity, it is inevitable to adopt discursiveness or “symbolic” as a form of salvation; this is where the “three” is missed and “pseudo-two” remains. A friend of mine, Batuhan Demir, suggested the term “fantasy” for this pseudo-two based on his Luis Izcovich readings. Considering the destiny of the myth of Aristophanes, I believe that fantasy is a pretty good suggestion. Another example belongs to Dr. Mehmet Mansur: In his lectures he frequently refers to “the fantasy of simultaneous orgasm of Hollywood” to show the impossibility of sexual intercourse; it is a common manoeuvre to refer to tame the two¹⁹⁵; it is necessary not to confuse simultaneousness with psychoanalytic retroactivity. Kafka's parable can be remembered: The gate of the law is mine if I wait in front of it. There is no door for me before I wait there. What makes the gate mine is my waiting; nothing about me except this wait makes this gate mine.

“It does not close the circle” as Nancy says. Marquez writes: “Trust, order, happiness; things that can look like love, almost love, when written and collected one under the other. But these were not love...”¹⁹⁶ Not two, but more than two. Not three, but less than three. Not one, because it is impossible, almost like the Sphinx's riddle. Now, I am going to start giving examples of the triples I mentioned, and I believe it would be appropriate to start with the obsessional.

¹⁹⁴ Slavoj Žižek, *The Incontinence of the Void - Economico-Philosophical Spandrels* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017), 16.

¹⁹⁵ Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in *Writing and Difference*, 278-295.

¹⁹⁶ Gabriel Garcia Marquez, *Kolera Günlerinde Aşk* tr. (Turkish) Şadan Karadeniz (İstanbul: Can, 2020), 261.

Freud writes as follows in 1915: “That it is not superfluous to assume the existence of stage (b) is to be seen from the behaviour of the sadistic drive in obsessional neurosis.”¹⁹⁷ Here, once again, Freud deals with the transition from sadism to masochism. From this point of view, 1915 is an important year; it is the year that Freud wrote his papers on metapsychology¹⁹⁸ and “the primary masochism” does not yet exist in this metapsychology; until 1924, “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, the only form of “masochism” that exists for Freud is derived from sadism. So, the reason why Freud warns his readers about obsessional is clear: If the drive has two forms, active and passive, it will be either sadistic or masochistic and will require the inclusion of “another subject” on the scene under all circumstances. So, what is the situation in obsessional? Freud explains:

There there is a turning round upon the subject's self without an attitude of passivity towards another person: the change has only got as far as stage (b). The desire to torture has turned into self-torture and self-punishment, not into masochism. The active voice is changed, not into the passive, but into the reflexive, middle voice.¹⁹⁹

First, we see that Freud, unlike all other texts, uses two concepts here: the subject and the object. The subject is whom *driven* by the drive. The object, as I mentioned above, is what will be used to determine the nature of the drive; if we are talking about sadism, the object is the other person tortured, if we are talking about masochism, the subject presents itself as an “object” to someone else, but such a distinction is not enough. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the sole purpose of the movement of the drive is itself. Therefore, it is not possible psychoanalytically to determine the quality of the drive through its object. In another way, the drive does not have a nature that can be determined by its quality. The whole discussion I had on “quantity” in 1.3. was all about showing this. Freud divides the structure of the drive into four: The pressure (*Drang*), the aim (*Ziel*), the

¹⁹⁷ Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, 128. I changed the word “*trieb*” which is translated by Strachey as “instinct” as “drive”.

¹⁹⁸ “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, “Repression”, “The Unconscious”, “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” and “Mourning and Melancholia”.

¹⁹⁹ Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, 128.

object (*Objekt*), and the source (*Quelle*). This structure can be summarized as follows: The pressure of the drive is continuous, so satisfaction cannot eliminate this pressure, or in other words, it is impossible to satisfy the drive. This is where we can replace Nancy's circle with the Moebius strip; the drive produces (and reproduces) what makes its satisfaction impossible, that is, *objet a* in Lacanian algebra. Here it is not possible to suggest an archaic arousal state before the act of the drive. My comments on Freud's "joke of death" were based on this, that is, retroactivity. Freud writes:

The object [Objekt] of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim. *It is what is most variable about an instinct and is not originally connected with it, but becomes assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction possible. The object is not necessarily something extraneous: it may equally well be a part of the subject's own body.*²⁰⁰

From this point of view, we can ask the following question: If the relationship between the object of the drive is an "un-natural/un-original", an undetermined relationship and if it is impossible to satisfy the drive, how should we understand what is called as "object" in this text? It is also possible to go further and ask: If the pressure of the drive is continuous and the drive is always active, then how exactly should masochism be evaluated? I will start with the second of the questions: In 1924, Freud introduces a concept he calls "moral masochism." So much so that in such pleasure, the Law itself is transformed into a tool of pleasure. I will leave this aspect of the issue aside, but for now I can say that the obscene implications of the law should not be overlooked. This is not just about legislators. The law, or Superego, itself orders to "enjoy". Now I will refer to another article of Freud to explain what he refers to as "unnatural/unoriginal relationship".

It is as though our children had remained for ever unsated, as though they had never sucked long enough at their mother's breast. But I am not sure whether, if one analysed children who had been suckled as long as the

²⁰⁰ Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes", 122, italics are mine.

children of primitive peoples, one would not come upon the same complaint. Such is the greed of a child's libido!²⁰¹

Here, the quote of Lacan I referred in the previous subheading can be remembered: Hunger comes not from the stomach of the child, but from his mouth. When he opens his mouth, that is, diverts his demand to the other, in Lacan's words, this demand is already contaminated. Dr Mansur sums up this situation as follows: When a Subject is subjected to a division by the Other (S/A), something remains from this process, namely, *a* or *objet petit a*. So, *phase b* in the transition from sadism to masochism, the phase corresponding to the reflexive verb, is related to this object *a*; the narcissistic dimension of the process comes from here. To elaborate this, I will return to the article "A Child is Being Beaten", which I started to discuss in the first chapter, and I will try to read the "triples" in 1915 and 1919 together but before I get to that, I have to say a few more things about obsession. Freud evaluates melancholia and depression together from the "early" psychoanalytic texts he wrote, and there are places where he referred to melancholy as "obsessional states of depression"²⁰². Freud's translator Strachey says in a footnote to "Draft E" (1892): "Freud often uses the term 'melancholia' where modern psychiatry would speak of 'depression'." ²⁰³ The reason that makes all this important for our ongoing discussion here is: "The mechanism of melancholia" has an important place in Butler's work, and the ongoing identification situations caused by this mechanism are indispensable for a performativity strategy to be developed.

I am going back to the article we continue reading in this subheading, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes". According to Freud, identifying the source of the drive is beyond the scope of psychoanalytic research. Here, I believe I should remind you that: The German title of the article is "Triebe und *Triebshicksale*" and, as I said before, Destiny, *Shicksale* is not a metaphor for Freud, it is a concept and in fact,

²⁰¹ Sigmund Freud, "Female Sexuality" (1931) in *S.E. Vol. XXI*, 234.

²⁰² Cf. "Mourning and Melancholia", 251: "These obsessional states of depression following upon the death of a loved person show us what the conflict due to ambivalence can achieve by itself when there is no regressive drawing-in of libido as well."

²⁰³ Cf. Footnote 1 of Sigmund Freud, "Draft E. How Anxiety Originates from Extracts From The Fliess Papers" (1892) in *S.E. Vol. I*, 192.

Freud starts talking about the source of the drive, explaining how it became historical: “By the source [*Quelle*] of a drive is meant the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is *represented* in mental life by a drive.”²⁰⁴ A continuous stimulation that belongs to the subject's body is connected to a representation; this is the condition for this stimulation to be included in mental life. This is where a child begins to develop a theory about his body. In the previous subheading, I mentioned the mechanisms of repression and negation; the signifier, the addressee of these mechanisms, is born in this way. So, when Freud discovered child sexuality, he did not discover child-specific sexuality. Yes, a child may not really have any “technical” knowledge of “the nature of reproduction,” but it makes no sense at all, it does not matter, that is not the point²⁰⁵. Žižek writes:

This is why the addition of “asexual” to the series of positions that compose LGBT+ is crucial and unavoidable: the endeavour to liberate sexuality from all “binary” oppressions in order to set it free in its entire polymorphous perversity necessarily ends up in the abandoning of the very sphere of sexuality—the liberation of sexuality has to end up in the liberation (of humanity) from sexuality.²⁰⁶

Once again, I will remind Copjec: If there is bisexuality (and again if there is polymorphous perversity), so if everything is about sex, then nothing may be about sex. However, one of the main conclusions that can be drawn from Žižek's book, sexuality must be about everything; if sexuality is only about everything, it can be about sexuality. If it is to be remembered again, I mentioned above (while dealing with the reality principle): In *Seminar VII*, Lacan warns his listeners that he does not engaged in epistemology. It is possible to read this warning as follows: When sexuality is scattered all over the Symbolic, it is supposed that sexuality has begun

²⁰⁴ Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, 123, italics are mine.

²⁰⁵ At the 20th of the Introductory Lectures, “The Sexual Life of Human Beings”, Freud talks about a very interesting anecdote: “I have been told that the pupils of a celebrated psychiatrist made an attempt once to convince their teacher of how frequently the symptoms of hysterical patients represent sexual things. For this purpose they took him to the bedside of a female hysteric, whose attacks were an unmistakable imitation of the process of childbirth. But with a shake of his head he remarked: ‘Well, there' nothing sexual about childbirth.’ Quite right. Childbirth need not in every case be something improper.” – Freud, “Introductory Lectures...”, 303.

²⁰⁶ Žižek, *Incontinence of the Void*, 134.

to serve as a tool for reading the Symbolic. However, sexuality cannot be read. If sexuality could be read, there would be no such thing as the Symbolic order. This is where those trying to distil some kind of “literary-theory” from psychoanalysis fail. To do this, it is enough to go to the next paragraph²⁰⁷. Psychoanalysis does not say anything about the origin of the drives, nor is it trying to make a qualitative distinction between the drives. If a classification between drives is to be attempted (at this date, in 1915, Freud speaks of sexual and Ego drives), this would only be a quantitative classification and a quantitative classification ultimately begins with the division process I mentioned above. Drive retroactively creates an object a. This object a is the remainder of the division (S/A); in other words, the Subject enters the Symbolic order with the signifier representing his body. The quantitative (economic) explanation of the drive can be made only when Subject enters this exchange. Ultimately, the “source” of the drive is not important, in other words, the source is not important because it will be produced in the future. For this reason, I would like to remind you once again that “anatomy is destiny”. I believe I have demonstrated: Anatomy is destiny if the drive is represented by a signifier. However, here one should not make the following mistake by saying: *It is not possible to talk about the body before it is marked in the Symbolic*. Such a statement could lay the groundwork for various criticisms: For example, in *Bodies that Matter*, Butler asks: “Why does the body have to be accepted in pieces before it is marked by a law? Why is it necessary to refer to a Law to “integrate” the perception of the body?” I will open these questions to discussion in the next chapter. For now, I will continue to examine the nature of this law.

Lacan writes: “It is thus false to say that there is a separation of the soma from the germ because, since it harbours this germ, the body bears its traces.”²⁰⁸ With this quote, I have once again returned to the nature of sexuality, here, Lacan's submission is undoubtedly to Freud's article we are currently reading and “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. Because in both texts, Freud argues that the body, the

²⁰⁷ Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, 123.

²⁰⁸ Lacan, *Encore*, 5.

Subject may be a carrier of sexuality; the body is the living space of a parasite such as sexuality. I would like to remind you of what I said about “bit / lice”. Sexuality cannot survive without a body; however, it is not predetermined that in “which ways” sexuality will live in the body. On the other hand, the body carries traces of sexuality. This is more than just saying that the body was created because of sexuality. This inevitably brings us to “*Shicksale*” once again. *Shicksale* is written on the body and there is no *Shicksale* before it is written on the body. Superego is born the same way: There is no Superego before the remains of the first objects of the Id (*Es*); these ruins form the Superego. On the other hand, it can be said that what happened to these first objects is nothing more than Superego's intervention. In criticisms directed to psychoanalysis, this is the point where culturalism and historicism are used. In the first subheading of the first chapter, I quoted “Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis” and the purpose of this quote was to show how the history of the Subject became historical. Psychoanalysis does not impose a transcendental law. According to psychoanalysis, this Law may well be historical, the subject is the bringing the law (just like sexuality) to the body. Freud writes in 1924:

The situation is usually presented as though ethical requirements were the primary thing and the renunciation of instinct followed from them. This leaves the origin of the ethical sense unexplained. Actually, it seems to be the other way about. The first instinctual renunciation is enforced by external powers, and it is only this which creates the ethical sense, which expresses itself in conscience and demands a further renunciation of instinct.²⁰⁹

Therefore, culturalism should not be confused with the historicization in the psychoanalytic meaning. Two things can be critical for this: First, as I quoted, Freud says that the first intervention above comes from “outside.” We cannot think of this “outside” independently from the discussion on the reality principle that I pursued in the previous subheading. Second, which I believe will elaborate the first one, if

²⁰⁹ Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, 170.

the features of sexuality I have just mentioned are missed, the belief that there is a transcendental law for psychoanalysis can easily be drawn from such an understanding. To preserve duality, a thought must refer to transcendent. So much so that this duality must be distilled from this transcendental, and ultimately it must constantly refer to it. However, the law is not transcendent, it is obscene²¹⁰. It cannot be used to control sexuality (or some form of sexual orientation). If we could separate the soma from the germ, we could envision such a law, but according to Lacan, we cannot, we should not. There is no unified body before the law, but that does not mean that the intervention of Law would make such a thing possible. The law has only one order: *Enjoy!* As Freud said in the Postscript of “The Question of Lay Analysis” (1926), the Law should speak very little, so, it does not say how to enjoy²¹¹. This does not mean that the law's transcendental knowledge of sexuality cannot be included in the Symbolic. The law is strong if it says very little, but the only reason it says very little is that: It has no idea what it is talking about. But there are ways in which the law applies to control whether the subject enjoys or not. Now I will refer to Freud's different texts to examine them (“On Narcissism” and “The Economic Problem of Masochism”). But I think it is better to say this before: There is more than one way. If there was a way, it would not be said that the Big Other did not exist. If there was a way, we could talk about a transcendent Truth. If there was a way, we could talk about the “metalanguage”. If there was a way, we would not need to talk, and finally, if there was a way, psychoanalysis would not exist.

In the first chapter, I mentioned a sentence of Freud that follows his critique of Adler: In this sentence, Freud hinted that “the child” who was beaten or caressed in the fantasies of beating could be “the clitoris”. Undoubtedly, Freud's thoughts on anatomy and destiny attracted much more attention than this sentence. I intend to treat this second sentence (which was published a year after the other), just like the first one. For this reason, perhaps the following question may be asked: *Can the*

²¹⁰ The obscene cannot be “expressed” just like the transcendental one; a constitutive obscurity can be mentioned here. I will return this point, while I am talking about the second stage of the beating fantasies, which is unknown, remained in the dark, also.

²¹¹ Cf. Chapter VI of Sigmund Freud, “The Question of Lay Analysis” (1926) in *S.E. Vol. XX*

clitoris be beaten or stroked be read, regardless of whether this phantasy belongs to the girl? Here, I can remind you again, Chapter 6 of Beckett's *Murphy*: Undoubtedly, there is a relation between the body and what Beckett called "mind". But is there a "one way" for this "relation"? Or at this point, should we leave ourselves to the trust of the structure of the unconscious, considering what we say on logic? Beckett begins this chapter with these words: *Amor intellectionalis quo Murphy se ipsum amat*: "The intellectual love with which Murphy loves himself." We cannot ask these questions by ignoring the love. As a matter of fact, Freud's works were read by thinking both together, even in the criticisms brought to him. Ultimately, there is no other way than to reach "phallogocentrism" in a reading on "On Narcissism". However, our discussion above showed us that making an absolute judgment about the "penis" without taking the relation between the drive, erogenicity and the signifier will clearly mean to ignore some of Freud's claims. Therefore, this situation can be turned into a question from another angle (but not the opposite): *Is Freud a clitoris-centrist theorist?* While this may be a legitimate question, it cannot be a psychoanalytic one. Beckett writes in *Murphy*: "In the beginning, was the pun". We are still in the field of jokes here, so there is no reason not to continue the discussion on logic and economy that I started in 1.3.: an ironical matrix versus a phallic matrix. Only in the presence of the unconscious can we speak of an "ironical" matrix: Perhaps this is another form of saying "the unconscious is structured like a language". It is not devoid of structure, but it is ironical. An "ironical matrix" is ironical as a noun phrase; but on the other hand, if an ironical matrix were possible, a metalanguage would also be possible. It is impossible but it is possible as it must be impossible, can psychoanalysis say anything more Real than this? Erogenicity is ultimately an irony of drive, like "the sadistic masochism". As soon as you accept the penis and phallus as one and the same, this matrix collapses, because in this way you make this matrix *possible*, not ironical. Murphy makes a joke "in an inappropriate moment". Beckett says that even if it is not an inappropriate moment, Celia will not laugh at this joke. However, he, Murphy, laughs so much that his joke, almost faints. Even if he does not faint, he collapses. Celia goes and *lifts* him. *Erects him* if it is possible to say that. Freud

uses this verb, *to erect*, in two very critical places: In the first, in the “Five Lectures”, when he talks about the mourning that a man has lost to his wife, and in the second, when he explains the nature of the fetish to his reader. I will leave this important issue aside for now.

Dr Mansur, in a lecture he held on March 13, 2018 in Istanbul Arel University, spoke of the “second” of beating fantasies, “I am being beaten by my father”, as follows: This fantasy is not based on a memory, experience. Therefore, it cannot be taken within the symbolic network. This fantasy is Real, it is the structural necessity. I quote his sentences exactly: “According to Freud, the main structural necessity, that is, what is actually repressed, is trauma. So, trauma is not “really” something that happens; the main thing is the symbolic that gives rise to duality... What makes the other face of the experience possible is the object a... It turns out that the other was what made it possible for the child *to beat himself*.” At this point, I would like to remind you how Beckett started Chapter 6: “The intellectual love with which Murphy *loves himself*.” The reason I refrain from providing a summary of Freud's related article directly is because I strive to elaborate on every issue that I believe legitimates the reading I am trying to accomplish here. For this reason, I will once again postpone return to Freud and try to explain the conclusions that may have arisen from the reading of Dr Mansur's words and Beckett together.

According to Freud, the drive represented an uninterrupted (*Drang*) force, if remembered. So, no drive is passive; yes, its form can give a passive impression, just like masochism, but masochism is definitely not the same as passivity. The masochist imposes a “contract” on the other to enjoy his own body. Indeed, according to Freud, the object of drive may well be a part of the subject's own body, which is not important at all. He talks about this in “On Narcissism” as follows: “In the first instance, however, it is a matter of indifference whether this internal process of working-over is carried out upon real or imaginary objects.”²¹² What he calls “process” here is the “processing of the drive in mind”, which is impossible to find satisfaction via discharging for the moment. The intervention of the reality

²¹² Sigmund Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914) in *S.E. Vol. XIV*, 85-86.

principle can never be predicted. For this reason, when trying to explain Superego, attributing it to the title of “a representative of reality or society” is to make two overlapping errors: First, the reality principle is misread, and the second is Superego is not a representative of anything but pleasure. I will come back to this when I talk about “conciliation” below.

The important thing is how to enjoy this object. Form has a clear advantage over content here and I think it is related to the psychoanalysis's explanations on quality and quantity, on economy. While masochism was not yet an economic problem for Freud, there was no “death drive” in his theory yet, and this is certainly not insignificant. Murphy's rocking chair seems to be a perfect example for masochism in the beginning: Murphy ties every extension of his naked body to this chair with eight pieces of cloth. This gay ritual is merely a precaution for the link that Murphy cannot understand and which is between the intellect and body; he does not need an object to fix his shattered body, as I mentioned above, reason was arranged in “another mood, modality, tense, paradigm, matrix”. Lacan says:

It is the libido, *qua* pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, or irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life. It is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction. And it is of this that all the forms of the *objets a* that can be enumerated are the representatives, the equivalents.²¹³

Here we are once again back to soma and the germ. The ligaments are not “stitch points” that will compile Murphy's limbs, they are not tools of a masochistic enjoyment. Murphy is not looking for an “ideal image” for his body in his mind but at the same time, the rocking chair cannot be considered a separate object from Murphy's body. Freud illustrates this as follows:

This purpose is more easily recognizable in the *specific* inhibitions. Analysis shows that when activities like playing the piano, writing or

²¹³ Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 198.

even walking are subjected to neurotic inhibitions it is because the physical organs brought into play—the fingers or the legs—have become too strongly erotized. It has been discovered as a general fact that the ego-function of an organ is impaired if its erotogenicity—its sexual significance—is increased... As soon as writing, which entails making a liquid flow out of a tube on to a piece of white paper, assumes the significance of copulation, or as soon as walking becomes a symbolic substitute for treading upon the body of mother earth, both writing and walking are stopped because they represent the performance of a forbidden sexual act.²¹⁴

Objects (or acts) become part of the body as extensions of organs that are “strongly” erotized. Beckett writes: “Murphy never wore a hat. It would be extremely painful for him to remember his mother's womb, especially when he had to take off that.”²¹⁵ I do not think this erogenicity is independent of Murphy's sense of humour. The pun, as an ironical matrix, enables all possibilities of erogenicity. Dr Mansur's words can be re-evaluated by approaching these from another point of view: Erogenicity makes it possible for the subject to “fall” in love with himself; it can also be through self-beating, i.e. masochism, that hatred is a condition for love in psychoanalysis: Hatred is the result of one of the destiny-forms of drive. Lacan writes: “And true love – analytic experience assuredly didn't make this discovery, borne witness to by the eternal modulation of themes on love – true love gives way to hatred.”²¹⁶ In any case, it is clear that what makes love or hate possible is not born by the Law; for now, I have said that erogenicity makes this “fragmented love” possible, but the truth is that erogenicity is not a cause, but a consequence. If I refer to Dr Mansur's words, erogenicity is a structural necessity. For this reason, the issue is not to separate the soma and germ; sexuality is written into the body, but, as Lacan puts it several times in *Encore*, there is always something “resisting to be written” in sexuality: We call the letter as “character”, but the character is pierced by the unwriteable. Let us remember the opening lines of *The Unnamable*:

²¹⁴ Sigmund Freud, “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” (1926) in *S.E. Vol. XX*, 89-90.

²¹⁵ Beckett, *Murphy*, 58.

²¹⁶ Lacan, *Encore*, 146.

“Where am I now? Who am I now? When is it now? I do not question them. I, say I. Unbelieving.”²¹⁷ There is no *suture* can be found to hold the fiction, the I-fiction. Only in this case it can be continued; the writing continues. Not because it will end, but because this is the only way; the impossibility of sexual intercourse is the only thing that makes it possible from this point of view. A fantasy is built around impossibility. The result is predetermined, but the whole scene is reconstructed to be staged “at least once more”. Again, as will be remembered, the first book of Beckett's *Trilogy*, *Molloy*, begins with “an incomplete death”. I will not be able to keep following this track, but I do not believe that what I call Freud's 30-year joke is independent of this “incomplete death”. I do not intend to embark on a literary theory but this manoeuvre I made was one of the ways to show that a drive can only be a “partial drive”; every drive is a partial drive because every one of them is marked by the death drive, in other words, every drive is the death drive. This is the economic problem of masochism.”

The hardest thing is to start with a “definition”. Thanks to what I have said so far, I can now give the definition of Superego. What has been said may not make this definition more explicit, but it could not have begun with this definition without discussing them. This has a counterpart in psychoanalytic terminology. I continue, Freud writes: “It (Superego) came into being through the introjection into the ego of the first objects of the id's libidinal impulses—namely, the two parents. In this process the relation to those objects was de-sexualized; it was diverted from its direct sexual aims.”²¹⁸ We now know what Freud meant by “diverted”: This is what is called the destiny of drive. “De-sexualized”, on the other hand, can be explained by considering what I said about “triples” at the beginning of this subheading: Sexuality is sexual only through the sexualization of everything. Therefore, the first objects are de-sexualized by sexualizing everything. What Freud called the economic problem of masochism was that he discovered that masochism was not a result (of the destiny of drive) but a “structural necessity / imperative”. It is possible

²¹⁷ Samuel Beckett, *Üçleme* trans. [Turkish] Uğur Ün (İstanbul: Ayrıntı, 2015), 311.

²¹⁸ Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, 167.

to find the relationship between this structural necessity (or “categorical imperative”) and the necessity Dr Mansur read in “beating phantasies” directly in Freud:

It can hardly be an insignificant detail, then, that the sadism of the superego becomes for the most part glaringly conscious, whereas the masochistic trend of the ego remains as a rule concealed from the subject and has to be inferred from his behaviour.²¹⁹

As Freud recalls in the next paragraph, the characteristics of the ego's masochistic tendencies are the same as the second of the beating phantasies. Therefore, it may be possible to say: Masochism's itself is not an economic problem. The issue is that masochism reveals a Real inherent to the economy of psyche. This claim requires explanation: Freud says that a “qualitative” factor in the structure of sexuality distinguishes it from other drives. So much so that when sexuality is concerned, the issue is not just an increase in stimulation and a decrease following a satiating activity. Quantitative change is insufficient to provide an explanation for this. Then a “quality” specific to sexuality must be discovered. In this context, Freud says that sexuality does not have to be the “one-of-a-kind” but nevertheless he cannot give any examples of these other drives that may be "of the same type" in sexuality²²⁰. This is not surprising. As I mentioned above, in his “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, Freud clearly states that the research on the quality of the drives is not within the field of psychoanalysis. So, after about 10 years, it is necessary to discuss that Freud is applying for “quality” to explain this situation that is specific to the structure of sexuality. This is exactly why I put forward the above claim, the claim that masochism reveals a Real inherent to the economy of psyche. Undoubtedly, death drive, which makes every drive destined to be a “partial drive”, has a qualitative effect on drives and this effect directly determines the quantitative characteristics of the structure of the drives. The existence of “the primary masochism” is a sign for a masochism that does not have to deviate from sexual

²¹⁹ Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, 169.

²²⁰ Cf. Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, 160.

drives. This does not mean that sexual drives are “secondary” to the death drive, but they cannot be considered separately from each other, which is not contrary to the psychoanalytic theory: Freud mainly focuses to the conciliation of different drives in the structure of the symptom in “Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis”. His words may be summarized as “a symptom is a product of conciliation; it is a compromise”. In 1924, again, he talks about the conciliation of three different principles: the death drive, the pleasure, and the reality principles.

The conciliation I am talking about is not a “midpoint” that will ease the tension of the two opposite poles; this conciliation must be read directly in conjunction with the “triples” of the structural necessities in Freud. For example, obsession is not a kind of “sweet spot” between sadism and masochism. Freud begins to talk about obsessive beating fantasies as:

The phantasy has feelings of pleasure attached to it, and on their account the patient has reproduced it on innumerable occasions in the past or may even still be doing so. At the climax of the imaginary situation there is almost invariably a masturbatory satisfaction—carried out, that is to say, on the genitals. *At first this takes place voluntarily, but later on it does so in spite of the patient's efforts, and with the characteristics of an obsession.*²²¹

This is where conciliation is a compromise. One of the most basic lessons that psychoanalysis teaches us is that the pleasure principle always prevails from this conflict, this antagonism. Within this theoretical framework, if Superego is not a transcultural concept, it is essential that its culture-immanent structure is not confused with “discursiveness”.

²²¹ Freud, “A Child is Being Beaten”, 179, italics are mine.

CHAPTER 3: THE LIBIDINAL ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

3.1. An Impossible Introduction to the Presuppositions

*To put in a nutshell, Oedipus is not an answer but question...
Oedipus, rather than being an easy solution, presents a field of
conflicts and tensions...*

- Dolar, "Not Even: The Politics of Oedipus"²²²

To begin this chapter, I want to provide a summary, just like at the beginning of the second chapter. The fact that I am interrupting my discussion so frequently may give the impression that I am concerned about the integrity of the discussion or that I am trying to control the possibilities the text may offer. As I have said in the first chapter, if such a thing is possible, I intend to carry out a study consisting of chapters that do not require a chronological relationship between them. I have explained this intention before referring to the "timelessness of the unconscious". I will now say (referring to something I have mentioned earlier about Freud's "Wild Analysis"): *Psychoanalysis is concerned with all the meanings of sexuality.* Accordingly, I do not expect any response to emerge because of the discussions built on one another to solve the problem I am addressing, and I believe this is due to "over-determination" inherent in psychoanalytic theory²²³. Freud's notion of over-determination does not imply that an outcome arises from as many causes as possible; the same causes can endlessly produce different consequences (and therefore they are not "same" reasons; they are not identical; this is the necessary consequence of what we have said so far about the signifiers and *differance*): "New

²²² Mladen Dolar, "Not Even: The Politics of Oedipus" in *Jacques Lacan Between Psychoanalysis and Politics* (ed. S. Tomšič & A. Zevnik), Oxon: Routledge, 2016: 62-72.

²²³ I believe why I cannot expect a "response" will be clear at the end of this chapter: I will examine Freud's statements in which he directly spoke of "revolution."

wine is put into the old bottle.” This is where timelessness, causation, and the dilemma of sexuality or Real collide.

Bruce Fink writes in *Lacan on Love* as:

Contemporary discourse tends to highlight the social construction of gender, characterize sexual identity as very polyvalent, multilayered, and perhaps even as a performance. Lacan's approach is more concerned with people's actual capacity for enjoyment than with identifications or identities.²²⁴

I can rewrite the quote of Mladen Dolar as follows: Oedipus does not offer an “ideal” way for pleasure (or having a *sexual* identity). Firstly, it is, as a myth, *indicative of necessity more than one path*. Accordingly, in the same article, Dolar says "Oedipus is not a sign, it is the signifier" and asks: Why did Freud resort to the myth of the most complicated family relationships to describe the “family romance” (this phrase belongs to me) when there were so many myths to choose from? Undoubtedly, as the Dolar expresses, “Oedipus’ doing *it* without knowing” has a huge share in this. Exactly about this earlier, I quoted this from the third of Freud's “Five Lectures” at Clark University, in summary: In what is called psychoanalysis, the analyst expects his patient to talk about something he has no idea about, and at this point the analyst has no idea about the subject that his patient has no idea. This gives us the opportunity to summarize the purpose of psychoanalysis (with an inevitable reference to Freud's article titled “Constructions in Analysis”) as follows: The analyst must never forget what he does not know, and the patient must remember that he forgets what he does not know. For this reason, one of the most important warnings Freud made to analysts is as follows: “Surrender yourself to your patients' words.”²²⁵ Here Freud advises a person who occupies a position that is expected to be “omnipotent” not to be captivated by this position: The psychoanalyst must be open to *the possibility of the Event*, that is, as all of us, be

²²⁴ Bruce Fink, *Lacan'da Aşk* trans. [Turkish] E. O. Gezmiş & Z. Oğuz (İstanbul: Kolektif Kitap, 2019), 85-86.

²²⁵ Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-Analysis” (1912) in *S.E. vol. XII*, 109-120.

surprised. In another article on the psychoanalytic technique, he explains briefly²²⁶: The place of the analyst and the analysand during analysis has a meaning²²⁷. When the psychoanalyst surrenders himself to the words of the analysand, s-he will inevitably “be surprised” at times. To conceal this astonishment is not a precaution against the revelation that the analyst's *supposed omnipotence*; *The tense relationship* between the love of transference and “knowledge” must be preserved. Recall that when Freud made a very satisfying interpretation of Dora's “second dream”, Dora notices Freud's “excitement” and asks: “Did something remarkable come out?”²²⁸ Freud had discovered something, but he had not discovered Dora's decision “to quit analysis” (and her homosexual desire) that she had already made at that moment. Dora discovered, however, that Freud was one of those doctors who did not know her secret, and therefore he did not pose a danger: knowledge is provocative and provocation (and tension) is dangerous, and as I said earlier, the only stimulus that is pleasurable with its suspension may be provocation. I have said that Freud suggested in 1924 that there may be stimuli “qualitatively” like sexual stimulation. However, Freud never provides an example for this. The energy that arises from transference love must be left in an unsatisfied state (or “unloaded” state). Freud's “knowledge” (Dora assumes such knowledge) *turns Dora on*. Lacan writes:

What we want to know – in what constitutes feminine jouissance insofar as it is not wholly occupied with man, and even insofar, I will say, as it is not, as such, at all occupied by him – what we want to know is the status of the Other's knowledge.²²⁹

I will be reviewing this quote from various angles throughout this last chapter. For this reason, I put it aside for now and continue. I am going back to Fink. First of all, I will say: *Oedipus turned on the twentieth century*, and of course this has

²²⁶ Cf. Sigmund Freud, “On Beginning the Treatment” (1913) in *S.E. vol. XII*, 121-144.

²²⁷ For Lacan's comments on the divan, the analyst and the analyst's scope, to the section titled “Being in Love and Hypnosis” of Freud's *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego*, cf. *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 20th lecture.

²²⁸ Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905 [1901]), in *S.E. vol. VII*, 105.

²²⁹ Lacan, *Encore*, 81.

nothing to do with the fact that children who wanted to sleep with their parents or kill them realized that they were not alone. Because the point is not to notice, but to remember.²³⁰ As I said in 1.2., Freud argues that homosexuality is neither inherited nor acquired. Such an interpretation is meaningless only if it is accepted that (sexual) identity is something acquired once and forever: Capacities for enjoyment never ceases to remind themselves²³¹. I have presented variants of this idea before (for example when saying that *anatomy does not stop anatomizing*). Fink says that Lacan's personal handling is not concerned with identifications and identities. So, what does Lacan (and Freud indeed) mean by identification?

Freud's description of melancholy in “Mourning and Melancholia” is often read as the result of a loss that cannot be overcome: the loss of an object is compensated by “taking in” its image. So much so that if this lost object could be accepted by the subject, the remaining libidinal load from it would be transferred to another object, and the subject (and the object indeed), could continue to “live”. Consequently, Freud says that mourning is understandable “up to a certain point”; so much so that what is interesting is that there is no mourning after a loss. But this explanation, namely, attributing a “time” to mourning is not enough at all, and I am not claiming that Freud stopped at this point. Thus, in “Types of Onset of Neurosis” (1912), Freud writes: “It is easier for fate to bring about a cure than for the physician; for it can offer the patient a substitute for the possibility of satisfaction which he has lost.”²³² Throughout this thesis, I have tried many times to show, in different ways, that fate is not a metaphor in Freud's work. For this reason, it would be necessary to emphasise this: It is not the “object” that is lost, but the “possibilities of satisfaction” or in other words: the possibilities of satisfaction lost in the lost object. There is a difference between knowing that satisfaction is related to that object and understanding the nature of that relationship. For this reason, probably as many writers pointed out before me, lovers ask each other without getting tired of this and the like: “Why me? What are we now?” As can be guessed, there is no satisfactory

²³⁰ Cf. “Sigmund Freud, “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” (1914).

²³¹ This is the Freudian explanation of “regression”. I will talk about this briefly in the next topic.

²³² Sigmund Freud, “Types of Onset of Neurosis” (1912) in *S.E. vol. XII*, 231.

answer to these questions (and not answering is also not an option)²³³. I see no hesitation in writing Lacan's definition of love as follows: Love is giving something that you expect your whole life to give to someone who does not know what he/she demands; this demand will not coincide with something that can be given (because the impossible must be given, Lacan's definition says this, "love is to give something you do not have") and the first thing that will appear when *a thing* is given will be a reaction that roughly corresponds to the following sentences: "I do not know what I demand/I could not have asked for this". The first person to whom a demand is directed, the mother, pierces the demand with desire by including *the shadow of her love* in the economy, in the symbiotic relationship. In "The Signification of the Phallus", Lacan writes: "This is why desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the very phenomenon of their splitting (*Spaltung*)."²³⁴

Let us go back to "Mourning and Melancholia": "This, indeed, might be so even if the patient is aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense that he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him."²³⁵ Žižek discusses Butler's interpretation of melancholy that she writes in *Psychic Life of Power* in the last 10 minutes of his lecture titled "On Melancholia" that he gave at the European Graduate School. He says: "According to Freud, melancholy does not come after the loss of the object. While the object has not yet been lost, the melancholy is already there."²³⁶ As can be seen, at this point, there is nothing like the myth argued by Aristophanes: Melancholy does not arise from a lost One but is the revelation of an impossible One. To put it another way: Melancholy is always synchronous with the impossible; it is weaving a fantasy veil to an incomplete

²³³ Cf. Sigmund Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love" (1915 [1914]) in *S.E. vol XII*, 157-171. As Freud describes it in this article, the love of transference "has no analogues in real life". The analyst must neither satisfy nor disappoint the demand (and love) posed to him. The current tension, love should be directed to the analytic work.

²³⁴ Lacan, "The Signification of Phallus", 580.

²³⁵ Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia", 245.

²³⁶ Slavoj Žižek, *On Melancholy*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FNXy-JY9I-M> (Accessed: 26.09.2020).

disaster, to lose something (in someone) that was never possessed. Butler writes in *Undoing Gender* as: “Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing something. If this seems so clearly the case with grief, it is only because it was already the case with desire.”²³⁷ And of course, throughout the course of the book, the following question is raised: How can I mourn, a mourn that never stops *bodying my body*, that never stops historicizing it, in a civilization that does not recognize my body, has its teeth attached to my body, trying to fix it, trying to fix it to my genitals (and in some cases, if these organs are defective, a civilization that imposing genital organs to my body)? Although it is almost never read that way, I believe Freud posed a very similar question in *Civilization and Its Discontents*: The discontent of civilization is that only the impossible melancholy is possible, however, it is made impossible by intervention. *The sexual revolution of the twentieth century had to draw its poem out of the future, out of the possibility of an Event; this poem must have lived forever in the song.* However, instead of it, an attempt was made to give an answer to the past from the past by “liberating” the known possibilities of sexuality, and to fix the pleasure on a body that would be new this time. So, who can promise that the body will cease to be bodied (or the “matter” to be “matterialized”) in the twentieth century? Who can talk from the end of the history? Freud did not make this mistake, and he admitted that civilization was an incomplete project (and not an incomplete project within the framework of libidinal economy but a completely indifferent project to completion). In another way, if I recall once again the quote from Dolar, is it not to say that Oedipus is incomplete? The translation of this text, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, into other languages has always been the subject of discussion: What does Freud mean by “*kultur*”? Is it culture or civilization? How can they be distinguished from each other? I think, above all, civilization is a signifier. Perhaps this could serve as a starting point for discussions on this text. Note that most of the (and already outdated) commentaries on this text treat civilization as a *sign*. Why should the

²³⁷ Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender*, New York, NY: Routledge, 2004, 19.

translation of psychoanalytic texts not get their fair share when Freud proposed a “psychoanalytic translation” by claiming that he “translated dreams”?

Butler's interpretation of melancholy in *Psychic Life of Power* seems to be based on the premises she put forward in *Gender Trouble*. So much so that Butler's criticism of Freud in the second part of *Gender Trouble* can be summarized as follows: One of the topics of my discussion in the 1.1. is Freud's thoughts on the masculine and feminine, and with it the primary bisexuality that always occupied an important place in Freud's work. In this context, again, as will be remembered, one of the “dualities of psychoanalysis” that I discussed in 2.3. was also masculine and feminine, and I devoted this subheading to the discussion of the nature of these “pseudo-dualities” which consist an impossible One. Freud writes in “Female Sexuality” (1931) as: “We have, after all, long given up any expectation of a neat parallelism between male and female sexual development.”²³⁸ I will return to this article, but before I discuss Butler's propositions, I find it useful to say that Oedipus does not offer two opposite paths for the masculine and feminine²³⁹. The masculine and feminine, the speaking being's answers to the Real in the heart of sexuality, drives a possibility of a life, a life transformed into an answer, or as Heidegger said in *What is Metaphysics?*, “Dasein that transformed into a question mark” to write his/her fate; the subject's fate is to be *the answer* (or the question mark). Freud says that he did not deal with this properly in this article:

I have refrained from discussing the complications which arise when a child, as a result of disappointment from her father, returns to the attachment to her mother which she had abandoned, or when, in the course of her life, she repeatedly changes over from one position to the other.²⁴⁰

As can be seen in this, Freud describes the responses to Real as “positions” they are occupied and performed positions, and the issue is “structures”, as Freud has stated since the first aetiology texts. Perhaps for this reason, Freud describes the

²³⁸ Sigmund Freud, “Female Sexuality” (1931) in *S.E. vol. XXI*, 226.

²³⁹ I will discuss the consequences of this in detail in 3.3.

²⁴⁰ Freud, “Female Sexuality”, 241.

obsessional structure as “a dialect of hysteria”²⁴¹ in the introduction to the “Rat Man” case; the structure is a *discourse*. Butler calls the results of the identification mechanism described by Freud in “The Ego and The Id” in *Gender Trouble* as “gender”; so much so that the child's occupation of a position is “reinforcing” a gender. I do not intend to continue this terminology. It is certain that this concept, gender, does not have a single use. In *Undoing Gender* Butler mentions that gender norms are reproduced, evoked by bodily practices and these norms are not fixed. I would like to repeat a question I asked before: Does psychoanalysis claim the existence of a law above time and discourses, such a law that it can occupy the position of a “metalanguage” and such a law that “metahistorical”? I will return to this question after giving an example of how Butler deals with “predispositions”.

Butler writes in *Gender Trouble* as: “As a consequence, dispositions are not the primary sexual facts of the psyche, but produced effects of a law imposed by culture and by the complicitous and transvaluating acts of the ego ideal.”²⁴² Butler claims that the naturalness of these natural predispositions presented by Freud in a way that “precedes the Law”; according to her they are dictated by the Law: “The effort to locate and describe a sexuality “before the law” as a primary bisexuality or as an ideal and unconstrained polymorphousness implies that the law is antecedent to sexuality.”²⁴³ At this point, as I briefly mentioned in the previous subheading, Butler, with a Foucauldian manoeuvre as she puts it, claims that the idea that such sexuality comes before the Law is itself created by the Law; if we can still call this kind of disposition as masculine or feminine, because it is based on the intervention of the Law. Such an interpretation is consistent in Butler's thinking since her belief that an answer cannot be given to the heteronormative matrix “from outside of this matrix”. Therefore, her belief that the performance will come from within the order (or matrix) we are already in, does not comply with the possibility of “external intervention”. Therefore, she writes in *Undoing Gender*: “The question of what it is to be outside the norm poses a paradox for thinking, for if the norm renders the

²⁴¹ Freud, “Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis”, 157.

²⁴² Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble*, New York, NY: Routledge, 1991, 81.

²⁴³ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 94.

social field intelligible and normalizes that field for us, then being outside the norm is in some sense being defined still in relation to it.”²⁴⁴ I do not think that this position, this ethical position, is incompatible with psychoanalytic theory. However, I believe that Butler's way of reading some of the psychoanalytic notions, at least those belonging to Freud (since at this point it is impossible to try to come up with a common answer from the whole area occupied by psychoanalysis for the criticism directed at Freud) is not “psychoanalytic”. I will not claim that they should be read as such, that is, “psychoanalytic”. It would be trying to control the areas of meaning that a text can open, but I believe I have the right to discuss what can happen when not done so.

I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that I am going to present a summary. I would like to pause for a moment to state that I am still on this road. If this study did not pose any questions so far and seemed to develop an answer to an unasked question, it is because so far it has done nothing but try to ask it. I began my discussion by trying to show how “inheritance” (i.e. predispositions) occupied a place in Freud's research of the aetiology of neuroses. Now, at least in this chapter, I believe that I can, based on a partial temporality, deal with the criticisms directed at Freud with the reading I have strived to develop.

Butler continues these sentences I quoted above: “One cannot offer a full narrative account of the citational history of the norm: whereas narrativity does not fully conceal its history, neither does not it reveal a single origin.”²⁴⁵ Here, I would like to remind you of the discussion I made in 1.2., for the law, in a psychoanalytic sense, is not free of this uncovered history, or the history of signifiers who show nothing but one another. As will be remembered, there was a reason why Lacan preferred Kepler over Copernicus (or that the tax officer did not know anything about the qualities of things): the point was not to attribute a hitherto unassigned centre to the signifiers, to find an origin, an archaic meaning that would change all history, as Freud puts in *Civilization and Its Discontents*: “Nevertheless, he is

²⁴⁴ Butler, *Undoing Gender*, 42.

²⁴⁵ Butler, *Undoing Gender*, 52.

entitled to console himself with the thought that this development will not come to an end precisely with the year 1930 a.d.”²⁴⁶ Of course, here, Freud deals with the effects of the technical advances brought about by civilization on man, which “transforms man into a God with prostheses”, but what is clear is that Freud does not attribute discontent to the development itself, and stands against such a view. History will continue to be written with the discontent in its heart. This, maybe, led some theorists to think that Oedipus was coming to an end, but as you can see, history does not stop dictating itself for a moment. Revolution can only draw its poetry from the future by historicizing the past, and moreover, as I have quoted Lacan in the first chapter, it is not possible to talk about a past that existed before historicization, a past that exhausted all its historical possibilities.

Freud does not and would not accept primary predispositions as proof that an experience of sexuality free from any intervention “once existed”, since I do not think Freud considered some kind of “unconstrained” experience of sexuality as “ideal”; in such a thought it seems to be assumed that what is called “restraint” always comes from “outside”. As will be remembered, in a sentence I quoted earlier, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud writes: “Sometimes one seems to perceive that it is not only the pressure of civilization but something in the nature of the function itself which denies us full satisfaction and urges us along other paths²⁴⁷.” I have devoted the previous chapters to what Freud calls “something” here. At this point, once again, in Freud's statement, I would like to highlight an impossibility inherent in sexual intercourse. The cause of this impossibility is not civilization, the development of civilization contains the manifestations of this impossibility. As Fink shows in *Lacan on Love*, many images and stories have been attributed to the impossibility inherent in sexual intercourse (unrequited love, noble love [*l'amour courtois*], love at first sight ...) but the impossibility itself (as the supplier of the whole production) remained unchanged. I am aware that I use love and sexual intercourse as if they were the same thing here, even for a moment. Of

²⁴⁶ Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 92.

²⁴⁷ Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 105.

course, this is not the case, but what makes sexual intercourse impossible is also on stage in love (with its absence).

Butler claims that the primary bisexuality that she says belongs to this period, pre-law and prehistoric, has nothing to do with homosexuality: “Hence, within Freud’s thesis of primary bisexuality, there is no homosexuality, and only opposites attract.”²⁴⁸ Thus, according to Butler’s thesis, Freud’s primary bisexuality, contrary to what it seems to be, is not unlimited. Yes, each Subject has masculine and feminine predispositions, but these predispositions only mean that “*opposite heterosexualities*” exist in one person, that is, for example, the masculine predisposition does not choose his father as an object of love. Here, in a very critical manoeuvre, Butler writes in parentheses: “the young girl may be so oriented [to her mother], but this is before she has renounced that “masculine” side of her dispositional nature.”²⁴⁹ This *renunciation* means, according to Butler, the child “fixes herself to her gender”. First, I would like to return to an article written 35 years before the *Civilization*, namely, “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (1896), by reminding the reader of the subject that Freud confessed that he did not deal with in his “Female Sexuality”. This is also directly related to another issue that I have addressed in Chapter 1, whether various neuroses can be “attributed to the sexes.” Freud writes:

You will perhaps remember that already, at an earlier date, I recommended that hysteria and obsessions should be grouped together under the name of ‘*neuroses of defence*’, even before I had come to know of their common infantile aetiology. I must now add that—although this need not be expected to happen in general—every one of my cases of obsessions revealed a substratum of hysterical symptoms, mostly sensations and pains, which went back precisely to the earliest childhood experiences.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 77-78.

²⁴⁹ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 77.

²⁵⁰ Freud, “Aetiology of Hysteria”, 219.

These phrases of Freud are one of the early examples of the line of thought that later dictated the phrase “obsessional is a dialect of hysteria”, and one of the important conclusions to be drawn from this is that it is clear that childhood sexual experiences are “specific causes” of neuroses, but the form of an experience is not the absolute cause of any neurosis²⁵¹. Accordingly, any neurosis, or structure, does not have to be fixed by a sex.

Butler's phrase in parentheses appears to be a reference to Freud's article “Female Sexuality”, although she does not express it explicitly. This is the first article in which Freud spoke about the long-lasting devotion of the girl to her mother in the pre-Oedipal period; before this date, Freud claimed in his article titled “Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes” in 1925 that the first love object of both boys and girls was the mother, but the first article in which this relationship was, again, examined in detail was “Female Sexuality”. Freud writes:

It is only when all her interests have received a fresh impetus through the arrival of a baby brother or sister that we can clearly recognize such an aim. The little girl wants to believe that she has given her mother the new baby, just as the boy wants to; and her reaction to this event and her behaviour to the baby is exactly the same as his. No doubt this sounds quite absurd, but perhaps that is only because it sounds so unfamiliar.²⁵²

Here, the only thing that can be read as *masculinity* in the behaviour of the girl who wanted a child from her mother, later disclaimed when she replaced her mother, who was her love object, with her father, is Freud's clitoral masturbation performed by the girl in the last stage of this period²⁵³. What should not be forgotten is this: One year before this article, Freud drops a footnote in his *Civilization and Its Discontents*, immediately after talking about the impossibility inherent in sexual

²⁵¹ I will discuss the gap between form and content in 3.3.

²⁵² Freud, “Female Sexuality”, 239.

²⁵³ At this point, one might argue that the experiences that Freud called masculine and feminine were “phallic”. I will not comment on this for now, as there are other issues I should discuss before taking this claim.

intercourse, and he states that one should not be in a hurry to associate the activity with masculinity and passivity with femininity. Geneviève Morel, in her article titled "Psychoanalytical Anatomy", refers to Freud's article in question in 1925 and writes: "For psychoanalysis, sexual difference is not a question of anatomy. Anatomical reality is important, however, if only for its "psychical consequences," as Freud put it in 1925."²⁵⁴ Indeed, in the article mentioned, Freud says: "Be that as it may, the genital zone is discovered at some time or other, and there seems no justification for attributing any psychical content to the first activities in connection with it."²⁵⁵ But Butler claims the exact opposite in *Gender Trouble*. More precisely, she says that what Freud claimed had far different results than what I have read now:

Pleasures are in some sense determined by the melancholic structure of gender whereby some organs are deadened to pleasure, and others brought to life. Which pleasures shall live and which shall die is often a matter of which serve the legitimating practices of identity formation that take place within the matrix of gender norms.²⁵⁶

As will be remembered, in the second subtitle of the second chapter, which I ended with Beckett's *Murphy*, I discussed "erogenicity" and talked about how the infantile sexual theories operate tension in the body. For this reason, here I will continue to address this criticism of Butler, particularly on "The Ego and The Id", to psychoanalysis, where I left off in that part.

Lacan writes in *Seminar XI* as (I am going to quote excerpts from three successive paragraphs):

In the psyche, there is nothing by which the subject may situate himself as a male or female being.

²⁵⁴ Geneviève Morel, "Psychoanalytical Anatomy" in *Sexuation* (ed. R. Salecl), London: Duke University Press, 2000, 28.

²⁵⁵ Freud, "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes", 251-252.

²⁵⁶ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 90.

In his psyche, the subject situates only equivalents of the function of reproduction — activity and passivity, which by no means represent it in an exhaustive way.

Only this division—and it is here that I left off last time— makes necessary what was first revealed by analytic experience, namely, that the ways of what one must do as man or as woman are entirely abandoned to the drama, to the scenario, which is placed in the field of the Other—which, strictly speaking, is the Oedipus complex.²⁵⁷

Therefore, to treat clitoral masturbation as a sign (not the signifier) of masculinity in girls and to claim that there is no place for homosexuality in Freud's primary bisexuality thesis is not a valid currency in a psychoanalytic sense; the subject is represented for another signifier by the signifier whose destiny continues to be written in the field of the Other. Lacan writes: “There isn't any slightest prediscursive reality... Men, women, and children are but signifiers.”²⁵⁸ But one must be careful at this point: Butler says that the girl renounces from “masculinity”, but Freud describes the same thing, the transition of the girl to the father object, as “an escape from disaster.” What is this disaster? Is it homosexuality? Without responding so quickly, it is necessary to start from “disaster”: *Something happens to the girl*.

Freud expresses his despair as a scientist in his “Female Sexuality”: There is *something* that women do not tell Freud anything. What could this “inexplicable” thing be? Is it enough to say that what is happening is a kind of “shame”? “I spoke last time of women psychoanalysts – to try tell us, not a word! We've never been able to get anything out of them” says Lacan²⁵⁹. Something happens to some women; Since they are women (also not impossible for men) it is not necessarily something that happens to them, a detail not trivial at all. Lacan criticizes the names

²⁵⁷ Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 204.

²⁵⁸ Lacan, *Encore*, 33.

²⁵⁹ Lacan, *Encore*, 75.

given to this, for example “clitoral jouissance”. It is something else (*autre*): feminine jouissance, *jouissance féminine*.

This is something that cannot be talked about, and even if it is demanded, given Lacan and Freud's statements, it cannot be talked about.²⁶⁰ It may be related to masturbation or sexual intercourse, but it does not have to be. Fink gives the example of “Dora” in *Lacan on Love*: Dora watches the Virgin Mary painting in an art gallery in Dresden for two hours *ecstatically*. It is not a controllable experience, and as such, it is a complete disaster. There is no story that can be attributed to such ecstasy, and with its structure that resists entering symbolic and language, it reminds us of another thing previously discussed in this thesis: the second of girls' fantasies of being beaten. For this reason, I would like to remind you of a sentence I quoted while talking about an answer Freud gave to Adler, and once again return to the “Anatomical Distinction”:

The child which is being beaten (or caressed) may ultimately be nothing more nor less than the clitoris itself, so that at its very lowest level the statement will contain a confession of masturbation, which has remained attached to the content of the formula from its beginning in the phallic phase till later life.²⁶¹

²⁶⁰ I would like to explain these expressions that can be misunderstood. When speaking of feminine jouissance, it is common to describe it as “something unspeakable” or something, maybe, “mystical.” I can give the following answer to this problem from the Freudian framework: As will be seen in 3.3., the fantasies of being beaten *produce* answers in different “planes” in boys and girls. According to Freud, while the girl gives up “all her femininity” what the boy gives up is his homosexuality. From a Lacanian framework it can be summarized as follows: The boy sets up a scene within the symbolic by making a “surplus” the *exception* (Cf. with *Urvater* in 3.2.), while the girl is completely in the symbolic, without any exception. So, there is no “mystical part” or whatsoever of the girl is beyond the symbolic. Žižek writes: “It is not that man stands for *Logos* as opposed to the feminine emphasis on Emotions; it is rather that, for man, *Logos* as the consistent and coherent universal principle of all reality relies on the constitutive exception of some mystical, ineffable X (“there are things one should not talk about”), while, in the case of woman, there is no exception, “one can talk about everything,” and, for that very reason, the universe of *Logos* becomes inconsistent, incoherent, dispersed, “non-all.”” – Žižek, *Incontenance of the Void*, 88. So, here I just wanted to underline that Freud says almost nothing “about *it*” which he brought us to the brink.

²⁶¹ Freud, “Anatomical Distinction”, 254.

At this point, I would like to ask the following question: Is it enough to think of a girl who wants to give a child to her mother as a child who has not yet given up her masculinity? Moreover, as Lacan says in “The Signification of the Phallus”, if “every demand is a demand for love”, why the request to give a child to the mother is not a request for love? After all, trying to give the impossible is not trying to give what is missing, trying to give what one does not have? It is common to read the psychoanalytic explanation brought to Oedipus as “actually it is not”: *Actually, we do not want to sleep with our parents or kill them.* So, what does this “actually” mean? As I discussed in the second subheading of the second chapter, Zupančič reminds us that at the time of negation, the mother (“I didn't actually mean my mother”) *actually* emerges as a signifier. As Lacan said, the child, too, is also a signifier.

At this point where disaster, fantasy and guilt intersect, I am going to return to *Civilization and Its Discontents* and “A Child Is Being Beaten” to make another start.

3.2. The Prehistoric Guilt

The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego...

- Freud, “The Ego and the Id”²⁶²

Fate is regarded as a substitute for the parental agency.

- Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*²⁶³

After all, the ego is in its very essence a subject...

- Freud, “New Introductory Lectures”²⁶⁴

²⁶² Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and The Id” (1923) in *S.E. vol. XIX*, 26.

²⁶³ Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents”, 126.

²⁶⁴ Sigmund Freud, “New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis” (1933) in *S.E. vol. XXII*, 58.

Freud did not deny the importance of the evidence provided by hypnosis throughout his work. However, according to him, hypnosis is helpless against the *mésalliance* between the affect and thought. The word *mésalliance* is used by Freud for describing the inconsistencies in the chain of causation and means “inconvenient marriage” (mostly because class-related issues)²⁶⁵. In 1933, in the *New Introductory Lectures*, he devotes a lecture to the relationship between “dreams and occultism”; he has no intention of rejecting occultism, or in other words, of course he does, but as I will try to show, that does not matter at all. Ultimately, various parapsychological phenomena, such as telepathy, are of interest to psychoanalysis in various ways, for example, prophetic dreams. Then, says Freud, it certainly deserves to be examined. However, *we can neither prove nor refute their existence*. When it comes to the origin of affections, it is surprising that psychology cannot offer any more explanation than hypnosis. In this subheading I will consider how psychoanalysis speaks of the origin of an affect, of the sense of guilt.

In 1893, in the article entitled “Preliminary Communication” to which I referred earlier in a footnote²⁶⁶, Freud writes: “(During hypnosis) Recollection without affect almost invariably produces no result.”²⁶⁷ At the point we have reached, we now know that this, the void between thought and emotion, is one of the embodiments of the void in psychoanalysis and is a *constitutive* one (with a reference to 2.2.). One page before this, Freud writes: “It consists only in what might be called a ‘symbolic’ relation between the precipitating cause and the pathological phenomenon...”²⁶⁸; *language enters between cause and effect and begins to weave this void*, for example, it begins to attribute reasons to an affect.

²⁶⁵ Articles and books (which is translated into English) that Freud used this word are: “The Psychotherapy of Hysteria” (1893), “Obsessions and Phobias” (1894), *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), and “Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (1909). Indeed, an analogy to be established between this “inconvenient marriage” between unconscious affect and conscious thought and Freud's topology immediately catches the eye. I believe such an analogy should not be rushed, as I do not think this will be consistent. I mentioned a similar (and more reliable) analogy for class relations in my reading of Tomšič.

²⁶⁶ This footnote was about the word “rapport” used by Freud in this article, and briefly touched on the transference-love.

²⁶⁷ Freud, “Preliminary Communication”, 6.

²⁶⁸ Freud, “Preliminary Communication”, 5.

These reasons, for example those of the kind that Lacan calls “stitching in the void”, may well be intellectual or mystical, as when a dream is believed to bring news from the future. Freud writes in “Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894) as:

Both the memory-trace and the affect which is attached to the idea are there once and for all cannot be eradicated. But it amounts to an approximate fulfilment of the task if the ego succeed in turning this powerful idea into a weak one, in robbing it of the affect – the sum of excitation – with which is loaded.²⁶⁹

This explanation forms the basis of Freud's thought of “the existence of unconscious feelings (*Gefühle*)” nearly 20 years later in “The Unconscious”. “But”, says Freud, “there may very well be in the system Ucs. affective structures which, like others, become conscious.”²⁷⁰ A clearer expression is also used by Freud, when he described “the anxiety neurosis” (*Angstneurose*) in 1895: “We may perhaps say that here *a quantum of anxiety in a freely floating state* is present, which, where there is expectation, controls the choice of ideas and is always ready to link itself with any suitable ideational content.”²⁷¹ I think it is possible to combine these two explanations (the one from 1894 and the one I have just quoted) as follows, and this will also be in harmony with the terminology developed in this thesis: As long as emotion does not become an object of consciousness by being attached to a signifier, it remains as an undistorted potential. It continues its existence unconsciously; it is the way in which “the law of conservation of energy” is expressed in psychoanalytic terms. Repression interferes with the void between emotion and thought, works in this space, causes a rift; this form of causation, what Freud called the “symbolic relation,” operates in this void. From this point of view, can it be claimed that the causality that the law “makes up” for the symptom is more “realistic” than occultism? I devoted 2.2. to the explanation of Freud's “reality principle” and as it will be remembered, the reality principle attributes an

²⁶⁹ Sigmund Freud, “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894) in *S.E. vol. III*, 48.

²⁷⁰ Freud, “The Unconscious”, 178.

²⁷¹ Sigmund Freud, “On The Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome From Neurasthenia Under The Description ‘Anxiety Neurosis’” (1894) in *S.E. vol. III*, 93, italics are mine.

explanation in accordance with the pleasure principle to the gap between memory traces and to the signifying chain. Perhaps it is possible to summarize as follows: The judgement of reality in the psyche is arbitrary (Tur. *Keyfi*) (or *in accordance with (Tur. Keyif) pleasure [principle]*), and as I have said before, a neurotic does not hesitate to reject the reality²⁷² *when necessary*. A fetishist, for example, covers the castration anxiety with a fetish. At this point, what could make the fetish less real than sexual intercourse? Ultimately, like sexual intercourse, the fetish is a response to the impossibility; however, this answer, fetish, is ultimate for its owner. If we were to confront a fetishist and argue that fetish is not the ideal way (Tur: *yol*) to enjoy it, we have to offer an alternative, a *real* way. Psychoanalysis has shown over and over that sexual intercourse is not that way; the sexuality of the subject is covered with corruption (Tur: *yolsuzluk*). Perhaps, about a sentence I quoted from Freud in the previous subtitle, I can say that the fetishist's answer may sound interesting, but it is only because we are not used to it.

In summary, Freud's first views on the anxiety neurosis are as follows: In a way, for example, because of an incompetence specific to the subject or an intervention from the environment, the drive that is repressed, which is prevented from being satisfied, returns as "anxiety"; anxiety arises due to the conservation of energy. In such thinking, there is obviously no hint of the inherent impossibility of sexuality. Satisfaction, it would seem, if there was no intervention, it is quite possible, and at this point the intervention is like nothing more than the intervention of the authority, for example, parents. Before mentioning the sense of guilt, or more accurately, the prehistoric guilt, I will quote from Freud's 31st Lecture ("The Dissection of the Psychical Personality"):

It seems likely that what are known as materialistic views of history sin in under-estimating this factor. They brush it aside with the remark that human 'ideologies' are nothing other than the product and superstructure of their contemporary economic conditions. That is true, but very

²⁷² I am well aware that by saying "the reality" here, I am assuming *a reality*, but I believe what I mean is clear after the issues that I discussed in 2.2.

probably not the whole truth. Mankind never lives entirely in the present. The past, the tradition of the race and of the people, lives on in the ideologies of the super-ego, and yields only slowly to the influences of the present and to new changes; and so long as it operates through the super-ego it plays a powerful part in human life, independently of economic conditions.²⁷³

I am aware that this quotation has difficult claims to address in this thesis, but it must be said as soon as possible that such a statement cannot be used as a summary of Freud's thoughts on the Superego or on the sense of guilt. But this is important in this respect: Just before these lines, Freud says that the Superego is essential to understand “delinquency”, but it turns out that a Superego composed from the residues of history is not enough to attribute a reason to guilt. The Superego is not the *raison d'être* of guilt. As I quoted at the beginning of this subheading, when a person suffers from various misfortunes, fate takes the place of parental authority since “the highest power” apparently no longer *loves* that person.²⁷⁴ Should be borne in mind that until this subheading I have not read fate apart from *Triebshicksale* and have also approached it as a concept. Parents become the fate of the Subject, cover his “starry heavens”. Lacan writes:

Here is what constitutes the originality of the case, as will appear to any reasonably attentive reader. The constellation—why not? in the sense astrologers use it—the original constellation that presided over the birth of the subject, over his destiny, and I would almost say his prehistory, specifically the fundamental family relationships which structured his parents' union...²⁷⁵

²⁷³ Freud, “New Introductory Lectures”, 67.

²⁷⁴ Freud writes in *Civilization* as: “We ought not to speak of a conscience until a super-ego is demonstrably present. As to a sense of guilt, we must admit that it is in existence before the super-ego, and therefore before conscience, too. At that time it is the immediate expression of fear of the external authority, a recognition of the tension between the ego and that authority.” – Freud, *Civilization*, 136.

²⁷⁵ Jacques Lacan, “The Neurotic's Individual Myth”: https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Le_mythe_individual-Bilingual.pdf (Accessed: 01.11.2020).

The Rat Man's fate was his father's debt. In "Moses and Monotheism" (1939), Freud writes:

This fact is so remarkable that we feel justified in looking at it once again. Our problem is comprised in it. The Jewish people had abandoned the Aten religion brought to them by Moses and had turned to the worship of another god who differed little from the Baalim of the neighbouring peoples. All the tendentious efforts of later times failed to disguise this shameful fact. But the Mosaic religion had not vanished without leaving a trace; some sort of memory of it had kept alive—a possibly obscured and distorted tradition.²⁷⁶

If these traumatic experiences, known for their profound traces, remained conscious, their extortion from consciousness would be the life of consciousness. In the face of *the dilemma of money or life*, consciousness has fallen into a desperate middle way that extortion is taken gradually with the rebirth of a trace of memory, taken in instalments (Ger. *Raten*) and consciousness that most of which is unconscious, becomes the awe (Tur: *Hayrat*) of these traces, ancestors, in some cases makes himself visible with a marriage (Ger. *Heiraten*)²⁷⁷; ancestors take the lives of their offspring in exchange for debt, and offspring fought in vain in the swamp of debt by compulsively trying to repay their debts to their ancestors with the legacy of their ancestors, by repeating them. Freud writes in "The Ego and the Id" as: "It borrowed strength to do this [to repress the Id], so to speak, from the father, and this loan was an extraordinarily momentous act."²⁷⁸ As he says in "Mourning and Melancholia" (which should be remembered due to the identification issue I discussed in the previous subheading), the Subject, entangled in debt, begins to *devour* himself: The melancholic, in a great sense of guilt (but not in great shame and this is also important), refuses to eat. Freud calls this first "the defeat of the drive," but later it turns out that the guilt of melancholy is accompanied by pleasure. In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, he describes this "pleasure" as:

²⁷⁶ Sigmund Freud, "Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays" (1939) in *S.E. vol. XXIII*, 69-70.

²⁷⁷ The references in these sentences were to Freud's "Rat Man". For this reason, I gave the Turkish and German equivalents of the words when necessary.

²⁷⁸ Freud, "The Ego and the Id", 34.

“When an instinctual trend undergoes repression, its libidinal elements are turned into symptoms, and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt.”²⁷⁹ According to Freud, the melancholic approached the truth about himself “by treating himself as an object”; this truth is revealed that the guilt of melancholic are aggressive drives towards the object he lost, but this explanation is not complete at this point.

As I explained earlier, before 1924, masochism did not exist as a primary orientation in Freud's work, emerging without being a product of the transformation of sadism. Therefore, in both “Mourning and Melancholia” and “A Child is Being Beaten”, guilt emerges because of sadism. However, a prehistoric guilt, *a guilt that will continue to live after the Subject itself* does not yet exist in this explanation and psychoanalysis, which points to the existence of this guilt, is silent about its origin:

Again, the analyses do not tell us the origin of the sense of guilt itself. It seems to be brought along by the new phase upon which the child is entering, and, if it afterwards persists, it seems to correspond to a scar-like formation which is similar to the sense of inferiority.²⁸⁰

In that case, it is possible to summarize the situation as follows: The guilt, which turns into a scar, which is left to the Subject in return for the debt from his past and his ancestors, seizes a certain energy for this debt and the responsibility of the subject is not about undertaking a transgression he has committed. I argue that this is one of the things Freud might have meant when he criticized “ideological statements” in *New Introductory Lectures*: Such an explanation, that is, a statement that reduces man to the product of socioeconomic conditions, leaves no possibility of “an impossible responsibility” that stems from the antagonism of Real can be undertaken. Of course, according to Freud, the Subject cannot be reduced to being subordinate to these conditions, but this – in Tomšič’s expression – does not deny the fact that history is structured like a language, and this structure has material consequences. At this point, at this level of the materiality / problematic of

²⁷⁹ Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 139.

²⁸⁰ Freud, “Beaten”, 199.

language, it is not possible to read such an expression as a “metaphor”; this kind of reading cancels out everything we have said on “the reality principle”.

The sense of guilt, for which nothing can be said about its origin, deserves to be addressed with primary bisexuality, given its structural position. Žižek writes in *The Ticklish Subject* as: “the status of sexual difference is not directly that of a contingent socio-symbolic formation; rather, sexual difference indicates the enigmatic domain which lies in between, no longer biology and not yet the space of socio-symbolic construction.”²⁸¹ We can list the conclusions and problems that can be drawn from this statement:

1. If the sexual difference is no longer biological, that is, if it has *transcended* biology (this transgression may not have been completed) when Freud said "The Ego is first and foremost the bodily Ego", what can this corporeality refer to?
2. If sexual difference is not yet a socio-symbolic field of fiction, does this point to a process that can be completed in the future (e.g. some form of sexual freedom)? *Once again, when it comes to the body, who can claim to be talking from the end of the history?*

The answer to the first question takes us back to the concepts we discussed in 2.2: perception, memory, and the principle of reality. The Ego, with Freud's expression, develops as a separate structure from Id because of the Perception system. However, it cannot be concluded that the Ego is the “bodily Ego” based on the relationship between perception and sensation, which will give the Ego its specific feature; sensation turns into perception through *Wortvorstellung*. So, we need to handle the expression “bodily Ego” as we handle the expression “anatomy is fate/destiny”. Therefore, I believe I follow this theme enough in 2.2 and 2.3. I will not continue this. I just want to say that the boundaries of the body are made up of word

²⁸¹ Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject – The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London, Verso: 2000), 275.

presentations, and this perhaps prompts us to reformulate my quote from Morel in 3.1: *The psychic has anatomical consequences*.

If we can talk about a prehistoric sense of guilt/the guilt, this will prioritize the law represented by the Superego, which is allegedly given its sex/gender to the Ego. If all attempts to talk about the prehistoric, that is, to include it in Symbolic, rely on a chronological temporality, it will miss the impossibility inherent in the Real. This guilt can neither be eliminated once and for all nor allow an explanation to be attributed to it; it resists historicization and makes historicization possible. It should be underlined that *das Ding* can be theorized as “residual” and “void” at the same time. Lacan writes:

The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle. The real is that which always lies behind the automaton, and it is quite obvious, throughout Freud's research, that it is this that is the object of his concern.²⁸²

What I have said so far about “fate” may not appear to be more different than what can be said about it anywhere. After all, when I was talking about *Triebshicksale*, I was not doing more than referring to the existence of “encounters”, coincidence, and Event. However, in Freud's phrase, the work of the Goddess of Fate should be separated from the work of the unconscious mechanism. When the Rat Man's debt is associated with his father's debt (the debt that he knew his father never paid), the symbolic relationship Freud implied in 1893 operates in the void of causation. Fate weaves (signifier) networks. Copjec writes in *Imagine There's No Woman*: “Far from positing the existence of an elsewhere, the real as internal limit of the symbolic—that is, the very impotence of the signifier—is the obstacle that scotches the possibility of rising out of or above the symbolic.”²⁸³ In other words, what is prehistoric is not ahistorical or metahistorical; it determines history from within, just as the regulating feature of the reality principle is not the extension of an outside

²⁸² Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts*, 54.

²⁸³ Copjec, *Imagine There's No Woman*, 95.

intervention. Reality is weaved around Reality *with pleasure*, but it is by no means equal to Real; Real makes reality possible. The guarantee of the structure is the impossibility inherent in the structure. In the face of impossibility, the passivity of the Subject does not render him impotent, incapable of acting. From this point of view, prehistory opens the future to all possibilities. When I talked about history's construction of the human body in previous chapters, I was not referring to anything else. Beckett writes in *First Love* as:

What constitutes the charm of our country, apart of course from its scant population, and this without help of the meanest contraceptive, is that all is derelict, with the sole exception of history's ancient faeces. These are ardently sought after, stuffed and carried in procession. Wherever nauseated time has dropped a nice fat turd you will find our patriots, sniffing it up on all fours, their faces on fire. Elysium of the roofless.²⁸⁴

Like every analogy, this analogy I will attempt now runs the risk of not showing the necessary loyalty to their specific structure by exaggerating the parts of the texts with which they converge. However, I respect the possibility that Beckett's text is not “an example” of Freud's statements that I will bring to the fore; it may not be an example, it may be itself.

At the 22nd Lecture (“Some Thoughts on Development and Regression — Aetiology”) Freud uses the well-known example of “immigration” to explain regression and fixation. So much so that in the early stages of human history, it is highly probable that the communities that migrated from where they lived for “various reasons” could not reach another place. During this immigration, the stopovers - places used by communities to eat and defecate - gradually turn into small settlements, and nothing will be more valuable than this shithole when an obstacle is encountered that makes the journey impossible to continue. Since history is made up of stories of nations “screw ups” (so the revolution cannot take its poetry from the past), the next failure will undoubtedly be explained by “how much the previous one said” about this fresh faeces, it will be remembered by ceremonies.

²⁸⁴ Samuel Beckett, *First Love and Other Stories* (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1974), 21.

However, this whole story is nothing more than the singing of the old melodies of the country, the author's lover Lulu does. The opening lines of *First Love* are as follows: "I associate, rightly or wrongly, my marriage with the death of my father, in time. That other links exist, on other planes, between these two affairs, is not impossible."²⁸⁵ The valid reason for the association in question may be its establishment, albeit once. If there is no other valid reason for this, it is because this association is the founder for all other reasons. These explanations could well be used to support Freud's classic definition of Superego ("the Id emerged as a residue of the *old*²⁸⁶ object orientations") but as I pointed out above, it says nothing about the origin of the guilt; hence the poetry of the revolution cannot be drawn from the past, even by learning from the past. If I had completed my discussion at this point, I would not have mentioned anything other than "genealogy", albeit in a very superficial way. However, I tried to explain how important genealogy is for psychoanalysis in 1.1. I am currently *traversing* the same line of thought from another side of Freud's work. I will repeat what I said at the opening of 3.1.: Although I often talk about time, the relationship between the different topics of this thesis is not temporal but structural / spatial / linguistic. This is not my preference; the subject demands it²⁸⁷. In his article titled "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" Freud mentions "primary repression" and the Superego as:

There is a danger of overestimating the part played in repression by the super-ego. We cannot at present say whether it is perhaps the emergence of the super-ego which provides the line of demarcation between primal repression and after-pressure... It is highly probable that the immediate precipitating causes of primal repressions are quantitative factors such as an excessive force of excitation and the breaking through of the protective shield against stimuli.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ Beckett, *First Love*, 11.

²⁸⁶ This "old" may refer to childhood or "The Neurotic's Individual Myth". This is the subject of Freud's 22nd Lecture.

²⁸⁷ Freud writes in *New Introductory Lectures* (p. 26) as: "In general, indeed, where it is possible, the dream-work changes temporal relations into spatial ones and represents them as such." Another feature of representation in dreams is the lack of conjunctions.

²⁸⁸ Sigmund Freud, "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926) in *S.E. vol. XX*, 94.

In the next paragraph, Freud says that this protective shield is a barricade against “the external stimuli”. This shield has no function in terms of stimuli from the inside. For the sake of the completeness of the subject, it does not seem possible for me to examine in detail the relationship between this explanation, infantile temptations, and phantasy here. But I believe it is now clear that if repression, moreover, primal repression (what Tomšič calls as “constitutive”) is not simply the work of Superego (I am not saying that it is independent from it, I say it cannot be reduced to it), it may become possible to say about prehistoric guilt: If the Superego is the guardian of morality, it is now clear that guilt comes from a time when morality was absent, or that morality has been *enjoyed* from the beginning. So, the Superego is not merely a representative of the law which is internalized because of melancholic identification. Such an understanding might be called a kind of “Superego psychology,” but it cannot as psychoanalysis. Žižek harshly criticizes Butler on this point:

This confusion between phantasmic 'passionate attachments' and socio-symbolic identification also accounts for the fact that - surprisingly - Butler uses the couple of superego and ego ideal in a naive pre-Lacanian way, defining superego as the agency that measures the gap between the subject's actual ego and the ego ideal the subject is supposed to emulate, and finds the subject guilty of failure in this endeavour.²⁸⁹

Butler's conclusion directly affects the issues we discussed in 3.1. She writes in *Gender Trouble*: “As this chapter on “The Ego and the Super-Ego (Ego-Ideal)” proceeds, however, it is not merely “character” that is being described, but the acquisition of gender identity as well.”²⁹⁰

Freud admits that, as Butler mentioned in *Gender Trouble*, he did not pay due attention to the pervasive role of melancholic identification in character formation in “The Ego and the Id”. What makes this confession more important is that Freud rarely uses concepts such as “character” and “personality” in his work. For this

²⁸⁹ Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 268.

²⁹⁰ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 74.

reason, I believe that if Freud's confession is to be evaluated as an expression that will support “construction of gender identity”, many notions such as heredity and historicity should be included in this assessment. This will be the first argument I will put forward in defence of the fact that the topics dealt with in this thesis, at first glance, present a widespread and dispersed view. Butler argues, for example, that if the boy could renounce heterosexual investment altogether, what he would have would be a “feminine superego.”²⁹¹ This is the inevitable consequence of reading the melancholic identification with a psychology of character. However, in Freud's criticism of Adler in the last part of “A Child Is Being Beaten”, it is clear that “the process of repression cannot be sexualized”. To restate with reference to 3.1.: Structure does not have a sex; structure is what makes a coherent “sexual identity” impossible. It makes possible an order that establishes, distorts sexuality into a performance and destabilizes it. Sexuality is not “in this state” because of Structure, Structure is in this state because sexuality makes it impossible for it to be otherwise.

Guilt cannot be treated as a beginning. Moreover, as an incomplete and circumcised beginning, guilt as the engine of a *philosopheme* cannot be “captured” in the full sense of the word, but it can be talked about. Dr. Mehmet Mansur writes in his article titled “Antisemitism and Circumcision in the History of Philosophy” as:

Circumcision is the trace of humility that prioritizes all kinds of affections. It cuts off the beginning before the beginning begins, as an irreducible command of God to Abraham and a promise of “unification”. A ritual that frees itself from dialectic by circumcising the beginning. It cuts off the beginning at the beginning. It is a “practice” (pratique) that “cuts” the space of the intelligible.²⁹²

A scar that “prioritizes all kinds of affections”, the trace of the unhealed wound of *nauseated times*. Freud does not only use the “scar” when he talks about

²⁹¹ Cf. *Gender Trouble*, 76. For Freud, unlike Butler, repression is sexual but not sexed. It is personal but not characteristic (Cf. “Repression” (1915) and “A Child is Being Beaten” (1919)).

²⁹² Mehmet Mansur, “Felsefe Tarihinde Antisemitizm ve Sünnet” in *Varlık*, 2016.

melancholy, but when he talks about Oedipus, he refers to both the scar and the residue, the residue that I have discussed earlier:

What remains of the complex in the unconscious represents the disposition to the later development of neuroses in the adult. In this way the beating-phantasy and other analogous perverse fixations would also only be precipitates of the Oedipus complex, scars, so to say, left behind after the process has ended, just as the notorious 'sense of inferiority' corresponds to a narcissistic scar of the same sort.²⁹³

Undoubtedly, this definition is a continuation of Freud's conclusions in *Totem and Taboo*: It is a guilt left over from the murder of *Urvater* and an obligation to pay a penance for this guilt. There is no price that will coincide with this debt; it makes all kinds of payment attempts possible, and reckoning impossible, because as we know from Rat Man, "there are things that man can kill his father for". When he first told Freud about "the rat torture", his eyes did not match what he said, and he continued to take measures to prevent the death of his father, whom he lost years ago.

I will now return to "A Child is Being Beaten"²⁹⁴ and end this subheading by moving the mention of guilt to this article.

As I have previously summarized and referred to in various parts of this thesis, Freud in this article discusses the "masturbatory" beating phantasies of patients suffering from hysteria or obsessional neurosis; the article begins with an examination of girls' phantasies and then continues with the demonstration that contrary to expectations, the appearances of the same phantasies in boys are not "the exact opposite" of girls. When I referred to the "Beaten" for the first time, I discussed the importance of this "absence of opposition" in my discussion of aetiology, and then in the second chapter, while I was discussing Freud's "triples", I mentioned the "phases of the phantasies" in the "Beaten". This time, as I said above, I bring this article to the agenda on the debate on guilt and prehistory, and

²⁹³ Freud, "A Child is Being Beaten", 193.

²⁹⁴ Henceforth "Beaten".

when I elaborate on the sexualization described by Freud in the “Beaten” in 3.3., I will continue to talk about the void and the triples. Therefore, this article is indispensable for this thesis not only in terms of the subject it deals with but also in the form it has. Perhaps I would argue that this article is a myth for this thesis, referring to the Mladen Dolar, who implies that what gives Oedipus the position of a myth is that it never loses its potential to produce different answers.

First, in this article, the sense of guilt does not seem to occupy the position of the structural necessity which is inherent in the triple. Freud writes: “So far as I know, this is always so; a sense of guilt is invariably the factor that transforms sadism into masochism.”²⁹⁵ But this statement is followed by Freud's sentences I quoted above a few pages later: It says nothing about the origin of the guilt. Consequently, accepting this explanation, namely the explanation that the transformation of sadism into masochism is the cause of guilt, means to assume a “child who should feel guilty because he has a sadistic fantasy”, a child subordinated to the dictates of morality from time immemorial, and beyond that means to assume a moral law that would condemn sadism from time immemorial. As I mentioned in 2.3., Freud concludes his article in which he theorized “primary masochism” with the following words: Morality does not prioritize drives. So even if guilt turns sadism into masochism, it does not do so by “de-sexualizing” it. Consequently, denying the existence of a masculine or feminine Superego and claiming the existence of an obscene Superego are not contradictory. Moreover, the guilt is older than the Superego, and in *Totem and Taboo* the brothers' regret is not because they killed the Father, but because they gave him the opportunity to return as a symbolic Other by killing him. To kill the Father is to get rid of him (*Aufgehoben*) but that is not to lifting him (*Aufhebung*). In my quotation from Dr Mansur, I believe it is possible to read “the freeing of the guilt” in this way. Freud writes in *Totem and Taboo* as:

A sense of guilt made its appearance, which in this instance coincided with the remorse felt by the whole group. *The dead father became*

²⁹⁵ Freud, “Beaten”, 189.

stronger than the living one had been—for events took the course we so often see them follow in human affairs (*Menschenschicksalen*) to this day²⁹⁶.

Rat Man's father continued to haunt him as a ghost, and under these circumstances it is no wonder he could not announce that his father was dead. Freud mentions that in “The Ego and the Id” Superego commands the child “you can be like your father, but not your father”; you cannot be your father, because your father, by dying, has established the Structure that makes possible the conditions in which you can be whatever you *desire*: “Totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay that feeling and to appease the father by deferred obedience to him.”²⁹⁷ The whole ritual is built on holding tight to a victimization bestowed on the Father by the sons, holding on to this victimization and paying the debt. If what has been given does not correspond to debt, it is because the structure established by the dead Father made it impossible forever to overlap. According to Freud, by giving up his own life, Jesus did not free his subjects from guilt, and did not undertake the sin. He repeated the murder of the Father through giving up his own life, took the place of the Father by performing the greatest of renunciations, and bound those who remained to his own body and blood. This is the circumcised beginning: It marks even the most radical of actions, “binds any beginning to itself”. If it seems inevitable that psychosis seems to be a danger next to a performativity to be distilled from the symbolic, this is the reason.

The guilt ties the community to the same scar with ritual, repetition, and history. At this point, even if for a completely different reason, if we talk in Butler's terms, we can talk about the socialization and historicization of sex.

²⁹⁶ Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* in *S.E. vol. XIII*, 143, italics are mine.

²⁹⁷ Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 145.

3.3. “A Child is Being Beaten”

If I mentioned that the “Beaten” could serve as a myth for this thesis, it is because of my belief that all the discussions I have tried to address have their share of this average length article, which is 21 pages in its first edition. Lacan writes in *Seminar XI*: “... in Freud’s field, one has only to bend down and pick up what is to be found.”²⁹⁸

The subtitle of the article, which I have never mentioned before, is “A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions” and, according to the preface by Strachey, Freud wrote to Ferenczi in a letter dated January 24, 1919, referring to this article and declaring that he was writing “an article on masochism”. *Origin* and *masochism* give the article its name and form. Now I will make some determinations in this direction.

“Beaten” promises an exploration of origin, but what it offers can be summed up as follows: The absence of an origin is a precondition for being able to talk about origin. I have tried to show that in the gap of causality that Freud argued that the specific causes of neuroses are prevail, masculine and feminine, reality and fantasy, inheritance and acquisition intersect. Here, I will briefly formulate what I have said in 2.3.: It is futile to try to eliminate the existence of pseudo-binaries with explanations based on “fluidity” to remove the antagonism in the structure. In this context, there is a difference between calling fantasies of being beaten sexless and sexual; for the first stage of these phantasies (“My father is beating the child whom I hate”), Freud says: “Not clearly sexual, not in itself sadistic, but yet the stuff from which both will later come.”²⁹⁹

Žižek begins his reading of Butler in *The Ticklish Subject* by distinguishing the hysterical and the pervert. The pervert, according to Žižek, is the perfect example of “the inherent transgressor” (which takes the possibilities of the reproductive

²⁹⁸ Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts*, 216.

²⁹⁹ Freud, “Beaten”, 187.

conditions he is subject to)³⁰⁰. The pervert goes so far as to stage fantasies inherent in the discourse; the disclosure of the impossible is embodied in him, and therefore, encountering a fetishist, for example, is unsettling, *uncanny*. If it is possible to claim that a neurotic has brought a question to the body and “turned into a question mark”, it is also possible for a pervert to say “s-he is the embodiment of the answer that s-he believes is true”. It is therefore worth questioning whether the expressions Freud uttered at the opening of the article could have “political” implications: “Very probably there are still more frequent instances of it (beating phantasies) among the far greater number of *people who have not been obliged to come to analysis* by manifest illness.”³⁰¹ What does it mean to be obliged to come to analysis with a manifest disease? Simply, following Žižek, it is possible to say that the phantasy has not yet become a question, because what separates hysteria from perversion is that hysterical asks a question about what the pervert embodied. In the fifth part of the “Beaten”, Freud makes a statement supporting Žižek’s interpretation and describes an encounter in which the masochist’s absolute knowledge (enjoyment) is interrupted:

The masochist masturbator finds that he is absolutely impotent if after all he does attempt intercourse with a woman; and the man who has hitherto effected intercourse with the help of a masochistic idea or performance may suddenly make the discovery that the alliance which was so convenient for him has broken down, his genital organs no longer reacting to the masochistic stimulus.³⁰²

It seems as if this paragraph could well be placed in a political context with slight changes, or ultimately *the sexual is political*; an Event can cause the subject’s libidinal economic crisis. According to Žižek, the situation is there is no (sexual) orientation or act has a given political (or pathological) meaning. For example, what would characterize homosexuality as a perversion is not homosexuality itself, but the way that the Subject is registered in the symbolic structure:

³⁰⁰ Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 248.

³⁰¹ Freud, “Beaten”, 179, italics are mine.

³⁰² Freud, “Beaten”, 197.

There definitely is a perverse homosexuality (the masochist or sadist pretending to possess knowledge about what provides jouissance to the Other); but there is also a hysterical homosexuality (opting for it in order to confront the enigma of 'What am I for the Other? What does the Other want (from me)?', and so on.³⁰³

If the entire libidinal capacity of the Subject is devoted to a position or an object, it is possible to speak of perversion because *if everything is going well, at least one thing* (I have dealt with this "thing" in different ways throughout this thesis) *is missed*³⁰⁴. If this is the case, is it possible at this point to attribute supposed meanings to the notions of anatomy and destiny, to what extent anatomy is fate according to the psychoanalytical meaning of the terms? Žižek writes elsewhere as:

Along the same lines, one could say that, even if most of the Nazi claims about the Jews were true (they exploit Germans, they seduce German girls...) –which they are not, of course–, their anti-Semitism would still be (and was) a pathological phenomenon because it repressed the true reason why the Nazis needed anti-Semitism in order to sustain their ideological position.³⁰⁵

First of all, this explanation is made by Žižek to elaborate on how Lacan explains the distinction between “reality and truth” in science but addressing this discussion separately will divert me from my purpose here and I have not done enough research on this issue, but it seems likely that I will be able to address this discussion from this point. This can give us a start: if we are to give science the task of explaining the nature (e.g., sexual nature) of anatomy (or sexual orientation) and our reason for doing so is “objectivity”, it should be remembered that the objectivity that can be expected from the scientist cannot be more than that of the child who speculates

³⁰³ Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 249.

³⁰⁴ Primo Levi writes in *If This is A Man* as: “Sooner or later in life everyone discovers that perfect happiness is unrealizable, but there are few who pause to consider the antithesis: that perfect unhappiness is equally unattainable. The obstacles preventing the realization of both these extreme states are of the same nature: they derive from our human condition which is opposed to everything infinite.” – Primo Levi, *If This is A Man* trans. S. Wolf (New York, NY: The Orion Press, 1959), 8.

³⁰⁵ Slavoj Žižek, “Where Is the Rift? Marx, Lacan, Capitalism, and Ecology in *Res Pública*. *Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas* (2020) 23, 375-385.

about the origin of babies; it is the body that *tensions* the theory. He writes: “A theory may be “objectively valid”, but its enunciation can nonetheless rely on traumatic subjective shifts –there is no pre-established harmony between subject and object.”³⁰⁶

Phantasies are the embodiment of this harmony that never ceases to be established. When Freud attributed stages of development to these phantasies, what he did was embark on a genealogy of phantasies, based on psychoanalytic findings, and the first thing he discovered was: One cannot speak of a genealogy of these phantasies before psychoanalytic research is carried out; this genealogy can only be constructed by this research and (perhaps) *traversed* because of this research.

I am returning to Žižek again. I will summarize the paragraph I quoted as follows: Anti-Semitism has nothing to do with Jews. Jews may *indeed* have the characteristics claimed by anti-Semites (obviously, they do not), but that alone does not mean anything. The explanation for why anti-Semites are anti-Semites is related to the anti-Semites: “the secrets of the Egyptians were also the secrets for the Egyptians themselves” (Tur. *Mısırluların sırları Mısırlular için de sırdır*)³⁰⁷. Unfortunately, there is no way to meet this impressive coincidence in English: their names hide / reveal the secret (Tur. *Sır*) of the Egyptians (Tur. *Mı-sır-lı*). So, the issue is the origin that will support an ideological position and should remind us once again of the aetiology of neuroses / perversion. In summary, Freud says: None of the characteristics of these people (their upbringing, traumatic experiences, or gender) who bring their phantasies to analysis can be considered a cause of these phantasies. The phantasy is not independent of them but cannot be reduced to them. (Until the Event described by Freud overthrows the past-pleasant-organization of the body). The secrets of perverts are also secrets for the perverts. Žižek uses anti-Semitism to exemplify Lacan's explanation of jealousy, and Freud offers a quite

³⁰⁶ Žižek, “Where Is the Rift?”, 377.

³⁰⁷ This expression is used by Žižek in various texts (Cf. Slavoj Žižek, *jacques Lacan/lacan dot com*, “The Most Sublime of Hysterics: Hegel with Lacan”, <https://www.lacan.com/zizlacan2.htm> (Accessed: 24.01.2021)). Dr. Mehmet Mansur is the one who drew my attention to the “coincidence” that the expression has in Turkish.

similar explanation in “Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality” (1922): To justify jealousy, it is not enough to enumerate the characteristics of the situation in which jealousy arose. According to Freud, jealousy is Oedipal and possibly Oedipal because of bisexuality inherent in the psyche³⁰⁸. The issue is a question, such as “What am I, what is the Other's desire?” set up in the form of jealousy. Žižek writes elsewhere: “To put it bluntly: 'Society doesn't exist', and the Jew is its symptom.”³⁰⁹ Instead of saying “There is no Jew”, Freud only follows (*traverses*) the Jew; this is why the study of phantasies is a genealogy (Also in another well-known text Freud enters directly into the genealogy of Judaism). The impossible cannot be pointed out (The Real cannot be inscribed in Symbolic): There is no such thing as a sexual intercourse, and the beating phantasies are symptoms. So, in the beating phantasies, it would be hasty to claim probably, for example, that we have read the parable of homosexuality; it is the fate of the drive.

Another way of approaching Freud's opening phrases and the masochist's “experience” is as follows: I realize it may be risky, but here Freud probably implies an experience of universal significance, that experience that talks about the origin of perversions; origin, masochism, and universality come together. Again, it is highly probable that Freud would strongly reject such an interpretation, but if some kind of *sexontology* is to be undertaken, the beating phantasies can lay the groundwork for one of the Freudian beginnings of this *work*. Recall that in Chapter 2, I mentioned children's sexual theories and their speculation about the origin (the origin of children) and argued that epistemology and ontology intersected at this point. Children's speculation was surrounded by bodily tension and phantasies share the same trait; in the first stage, as I said earlier, they are masturbative in nature, and over time they encircle all libidinal investments of the psyche, they become a compulsion. The fantasy does not allow attention to anything other than itself, and thus we have once again reached “narcissistic masochism”. I would argue that “the narcissistic masochism” is also a *philosopheme*, just as the sense of guilt; where

³⁰⁸ Sigmund Freud, “Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality” (1922) in *S.E. vol. XVIII*, 221-233.

³⁰⁹ Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (New York, NY: Verso Books, 2008), 140.

psychoanalysis can open to philosophical speculation, the death drive and masochism necessarily arise.

However, there is a risk of asserting the importance of the scene in which the masochist “meets a woman” as an Event: For example, when I claim the “universality” of such a scene, how can I answer someone who would say that “a homosexual is homosexual because s-he has not yet met someone of the *other* sex?” Of course, Freud's thoughts that homosexuality is not “inherited or acquired” are clear, but is it sufficient in the face of such a question? So, it must be admitted that the “universality” of the Event is an extreme claim. At this point, it is necessary to talk about the consequences of the Event; it would be futile to try to predict which situations might qualify as Event. As a matter of fact, one might ask: If we were able to predict what could be an Event, would it really be an “Event”? Freud writes about experiences that are thought to cause fixations (and phantasies):

But at this point the enquiry was confronted with the limitations of our knowledge; for the impressions that brought about the fixation were without any traumatic force. They were for the most part commonplace and unexciting to other people. It was impossible to say why the sexual impulse had undergone fixation particularly upon them.³¹⁰

We have seen that claiming the universality of the Event is *qualitatively* risky. However, *quantitatively* the situation may be different. The economic conclusions I have reached regarding the jokes and screen memories are also apply to phantasies here. Recall that Freud was against pursuing any other way than “analytical reduction” in the classification of *techniques*. Repetition is not reproduction since *Das Ding* is both a “void” and a “residue” at the same time. The question is this: *What does an obsessive compulsively repeat (or miss)?* I will leave this question unanswered for now and return to the stages of phantasies and sexualization.

In the previous subheading, I discussed the relationship between the first and second phases of phantasies. It would be appropriate to summarize: According to

³¹⁰ Freud, “Beaten”, 182.

Freud, the transition from the first to the second is the transition from sadism to masochism, and guilt emerges here. But, as will be remembered, this transition says nothing about the “origin” of the guilt. All we know, as I have already shown in Dr Mansur's statements, is it is the analytical research that reveals the second phase, and this phase is “structurally necessary”, as Freud says: “It is a *construction*³¹¹ of analysis, but it is no less a necessity on that account.”³¹² If the relationship between these phantasies and sexual orientation is to be dealt with, it is striking: According to Freud, sex and sexual orientation must be constructed in analysis. Although I am talking about sexuality and construction, I would like to highlight how different this is from “gender construction”; Structure and construction can provide an explanation of the nature of gender and sexual orientation, but it is not possible to establish a direct relationship between these two. I hope that what I have said about neuroses and sex in 1.1. is now clearer. Before you can claim a correlation between any two phenomena, you must assume that these phenomena are “constant” in themselves. Saying “hysterics are usually women” and saying “women are hysterical” are not the same thing. You can find evidence to support the former in psychoanalytic, historical, and socio-economic terms. Indeed, Freud lists such findings in “The Aetiology of Hysteria” but the claim ends at this point. Your suggestion of evidence to support the former does not imply that women are hysterical for a reason stemming from their “essence”. This is exactly the case regarding sex. If it is to be claimed that anatomy is the “essence” of sex, it can be safely said that psychoanalysis is the exact opposite of such a claim. Psychoanalysis also assumes that sex is a construct but formulates it in a strictly different way than “social constructionist” theories. This is the main argument of my thesis.

I am going to back to the relationship between sadism and masochism. Freud's explanation (about sadism, masochism, and the sense of guilt) quoted above continues as follows:

³¹¹ In the first two headings of the second chapter, I focused on “construction” and briefly reviewed Freud's article “Constructions in Analysis”. I will not repeat what I said, but I think it would be appropriate to remind this.

³¹² Freud, “Beaten”, 185, italics are mine.

The sense of guilt cannot have won the field alone; a share must also fall to the love-impulse. We must remember that we are dealing with children in whom the sadistic component was able for constitutional reasons to develop prematurely and in isolation. We need not abandon this point of view. It is precisely such children who find it particularly easy to hark back to the pregenital, sadistic-anal organization of their sexual life.³¹³

The sense of guilt cannot have won the field alone... This conclusion by Freud draws attention because of the similarity with the closing lines of an article I mentioned earlier: “The Economic Problem of Masochism”; what remains is a *residue* that cannot be explained by guilt. Freud calls it as “the essence of masochism” at the end of this paragraph.

From here on, Freud stops generalizing about masochistic fantasy. These fantasies have varying meanings for men and women. But it is possible to say this: The masochism of this stage, which is built by psychoanalysis, is not the result of Superego's sadism and as we shall see in a moment, this sadism would correspond to a “conscious fantasy”; in this case, we only have the masochism of the Ego.³¹⁴ To be specific, Freud speaks directly of “feminine masochism.” Perhaps this point marks the most sensitive issue of the article: *What is feminine?*

Freud discusses these phantasies once again in 1924 and gives a description of what he calls “feminine”:

But if one has an opportunity of studying cases in which the masochistic phantasies have been especially richly elaborated, one quickly discovers that they place the subject in a characteristically female situation; they signify, that is, being castrated, or copulated with, or giving birth to a baby. For this reason I have called this form of masochism, *a potiori* as it were [i.e. on the basis of its extreme examples], the feminine form, although so many of its features point to infantile life.³¹⁵

³¹³ Freud, “Beaten”, 189.

³¹⁴ Cf. “The Economic Problem of Masochism”.

³¹⁵ Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, 162.

I am putting together the last two quotes I have made: The surplus of guilt is a sadistic-anal pleasure, which Freud called “feminine” and according to him, the feminine signifies *being castrated, or copulated with, or giving birth to a baby*. Based on this, I can say that Lacan's *feminine jouissance* has nothing to do with what Freud called “feminine”. To be more precise, this pleasure, which Freud called feminine, is masculine (or *phallic*) in Lacanian terminology. It is the “organ pleasure” described by Freud here. That is why it is labelled as “perversion”; for this pleasure has taken hold of the entire libidinal economy. I will quote directly from Lacan to support this claim: “Phallic jouissance is the obstacle owing to which man does not come (*n'arrive pas*), I would say, to enjoy woman's body, precisely because what he enjoys is the jouissance of the organ.”³¹⁶ I believe this quote is reminiscent of the “masochistic Event” that Freud spoke of. In the seventh week of the same seminar, Lacan writes: “Neurotics have none of the characteristics of perverts. They simply dream of being perverts, which is quite natural, for how else could they attain their partner?”³¹⁷ It is known from Lacan's *Seminar XI* that what awakens from the dream is Real. The masochistic phantasy meets the Real at the time of the Event, the “pleasurable-status quo” of the organ dissolves.

It is possible to say that the beating fantasies are the embodiment of the *crisis* of the phallic jouissance and for this reason, Freud says that there are different embodiments of phantasies in boys and girls and it is not possible to deal with them together. To say that there is a difference is not to claim that there is a difference for the opposite sexes that can be explained by the “difference of the sexes”. Indeed, in the early chapters of the article, Freud attempts to examine only girls' phantasies and says that dealing with boys' may be “about another subject.” As can be seen in a footnote by Strachey, it is the “bisexual” nature of phantasies that Freud previously avoided dealing with; the genealogy of the fantasies of boys shows that for these children the issue begins with the choice of homosexual objects, as opposed to that of girls. As far as I have examined, it is possible to draw the

³¹⁶ Lacan, *Encore*, 7.

³¹⁷ Lacan, *Encore*, 87.

following conclusion: The impasse in the nature of sexuality makes it possible to try different “answers”, as I have said in previous subheadings in this chapter; what I call as the answer is the Subject's structure and the most important common feature is that in both forms of phantasies studied by Freud is the relation to the father. Freud writes: “*In both cases the beating-phantasy has its origin in an incestuous attachment to the father.*”³¹⁸ The difference between the two phantasies stems from the “sacrificed part” of sexuality. And indeed, this difference sets the stage for a very important question for this thesis: Is sexuality possible without sacrifice?

The answer to this question is “necessarily” negative: the problem with human sexuality is not the sacrifice. On the contrary, one cannot speak of human sexuality without sacrifice. Sacrifice becomes visible in the “final” stage of phantasies. The change between the second and third phases is indeed the enactment of the “attitude to be taken” in the face of the dilemma of human sexuality.

To be remembered, according to Freud, the “beaten child” who appeared in the second stage of the girl's fantasy is the substitute for the girl's clitoral masturbation; this is the solution invented by the girl for the guilt and its (pleasurable) residue. The girl gives up that. The child beaten (by her father) in her phantasies is now strictly a “boy,” and the masochistic side of her sexuality, according to Freud, has been transferred to a sadism, in which sadism has no “pleasure”. Freud writes:

...on the other hand, the girl escapes from the demands of the erotic side of her life altogether. She turns herself in phantasy into a man, without herself becoming active in a masculine way, and is no longer anything but a spectator of the event which takes the place of a sexual act.³¹⁹

In the strategy (response) of the girl there is a change in form; “repression” inserts between form and content (for Freud the third stage of girls' phantasies is sadistic in form and masochistic in terms of pleasure). This lays the foundations for a “change of sex”, of a total elimination of certain possibilities. In the boy (as we shall see now) what changes is the object. The boy sacrifices his “homosexuality”,

³¹⁸ Freud, “Beaten”, 198.

³¹⁹ Freud, “Beaten”, 199.

and the girl sacrifices her femininity. The answer is undoubtedly at the “phallic” level in both cases, but the reason why it was considered by Freud as “perversion” becomes clear: In order to give this answer, in order to be able to be inscribed in the Symbolic chain, the subject has to make a sacrifice. Freud explains the boy's strategy as follows:

In the case of the boy the situation remains masochistic, and shows a greater resemblance to the original phantasy with its genital significance, since there is a difference of sex between the person beating and the person being beaten. *The boy evades his homosexuality by repressing and remodelling his unconscious phantasy*: and the remarkable thing about his later conscious phantasy is that it has for its content a feminine attitude without a homosexual object-choice.³²⁰

As can be seen, these strategies, which I call both phallic, have consequences in radical difference. After Freud provides a summary in the rest of the article, he presents his criticism to Fliess and Adler. The subject (about the differences of phantasies) closes almost sharply; he criticizes the explanations offered by the other two theorists for many different reasons via referring to the structure of phantasies. In short, the reason he criticizes Fliess is that he (Fliess) presents a theory of “bisexuality” based on the assumption that sex is determined by anatomy³²¹. Immediately afterwards, the reason for the criticism he presented to Adler is that the difference Adler made between masculine and feminine is based on sociological sources. As will be remembered, this is also why he opposed Adler about clitoral masturbation. In his criticism of his contemporaries Freud refutes, within a few lines, the criticisms that have been offered to him over the years. However, that is all. In the following pages of the article there is no explanation given by him on *why* beating phantasies “manifest in these ways”.

Of course, the intersections of structural bisexuality with the fate and partial objects of the drives causes these manifestations but this requires further

³²⁰ Freud, “Beaten”, 199, italics are mine.

³²¹ Freud, “Beaten”, 200-201.

explanation. Freud writes about paranoia in “Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality”:

The pathogenic phantasies, derivatives of repressed instinctual impulses, are for a long time tolerated alongside the normal life of the mind, and have no pathogenic effect until by *a revolution in the libidinal economy* they receive a hypercathexis; not till then does the conflict which leads to the formation of symptoms break out. Thus as our knowledge grows we are increasingly impelled to bring the *economic* point of view into the foreground.³²²

... and have no pathogenic effect until by a revolution in the libidinal economy they receive a hypercathexis. Firstly, once again, the similarity with the “masochistic Event” is striking. Secondly, the “economic explanation” attributed to this Event is reminiscent of Freud's explanations for jokes. Perhaps it is possible to answer a question I asked above, *what makes an experience the Event?* The answer is simple: An economic revolution in the psyche. This revolution does not occur when the accumulated energy of past experiences causes an “explosion” in the history of the Subject. In the fate of the subject, an Event, an encounter, is enables the past to be *rewritten, reconstructed*; history is made in the revolution of the psyche. I underline: This Event does not relieve the future from the burden of the past; The Event, the Future, is the lifting of the past (*Aufhebung*).

³²² Freud, “Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality”, 228, italics are mine.

CONCLUSION

As I discussed in the first chapter, the fact that Freud abandons from his theory of “the infantile seductions” in the later years of his work has frequently highlighted; with his own words³²³, he *underrated* the importance of the phantasies in his first studies on the aetiology of neuroses. However, a breaking as important as this (which could very well be named as “inevitable” and I would say that this thesis examines the conditions that make this breaking inevitable) shows itself – especially – in the “Constructions in Analysis”. Here, Freud, again and again, underlines the importance of “the historical reality”; an Event, as Freud describes, needs *the libidinal economic revolution* to historicize the historical reality. At this point, perhaps, what separates neurosis and psychosis can be explained as: The neurotic has forgotten that s-he has brought the possibility of a *revolution* into her/his body, s-he started out by forgetting, s-he started because s-he forgot; It will not be the solution to remember that he is a revolutionary (cf. “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through”), an Event must show her/him the labour that is in her/his hands. The psychotic, however, wakes up to the morning of the revolution, nothing more real or nothing *more* present than the omnipresent revolution, and because the revolution as one-and-only-thing closes everything (but not because it *lifts* everything), the psychotic is breathless from the *meaning*.

I am going to return to the “Beaten” once again. As will be remembered, in this text, Freud distinguished the second stage of the phantasies from the others. According to him, this stage would not have become conscious at all if it were not *constructed* by the analytical labour; the historical reality it pointed out was not a fact that could be included in the boundaries of the memory, and therefore could be included in the symbolic; I repeat for the last time that there is no historical reality that precedes movement.

³²³ Cf. Freud, “The Aetiology of Hysteria”, 204.

The sense of guilt, the hallmark of this stage, is a guilt without roots, a guilt that beheaded. Derrida describes Hamlet's debt as follows:

According to a paradox that poses itself and gets carried away by itself, Hamlet does not curse so much the corruption of the age. *He curses first of all and instead this unjust effect of the disorder, namely, the fate that would have destined him*, Hamlet, to put a dislocated time back on its hinges—and to put it back right, to turn it back over to the law. He curses his mission: to do justice to a de-mission of time.³²⁴

At first glance, Derrida's interpretation reminds me Antigone's debt. Ismene offers her help to Antigone as (540-541): "*But now you face such dangers . . . I'm not ashamed / to sail through trouble with you / make your troubles mine*".³²⁵ Antigone rejects the "late" offer of help from her sister Ismene, who accuses her of *being in love with the impossible* (89), by saying that (542-543) "Who did the work? / Let the dead and the god of death bear witness! / *I have no love for a friend who loves in words alone*".³²⁶ Ismene's remorse outweighs her fear of death, but it's too late now. This debt, this duty, or guilt is not "acceptable", it must be *undertaken*. Derrida asks: Since, the history is *out of joint*, can a day of reckoning come from the future, from the past, from a time which is older than the memory, from a time that does not belong to the history, from a Messianic day? I am repeating my question from 3.1.: Who speaks from the end the of history, the limit of freedoms, the place where *more* freedom is impossible, maybe the day of reckoning, the morning of the psychotic's revolution, when the *bodying, anatomization, and fate* of sexuality is at stake? How can we trust her/him, is such a trust possible? Or to be asked more accurately: If possible, would not we be acting like Ismene when we trust her/him? It should be kept in mind that all these questions are on the other hand asked to the analyst's construction, this is what Freud deals within the article in question: When the patient reacts with a "Yes" or "No" to the construction of the

³²⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 23, italics are mine.

³²⁵ Sophocles, *Three Theban Plays* trans. Robert Fagles (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1984), 87, italics are mine. All the further quotations from the play belongs this edition.

³²⁶ Italics are mine.

analyst, on what basis can an analyst accept this reaction (as a proof of correctness of the analyst's construction)? If s-he has sufficient justification for this admission, who can guarantee that s-he did not "put *it* there"? Freud says: *We do not know, we may be wrong, time will tell.* If the patient surprises himself, if s-he leaves himself behind for a moment, surpasses himself, this may be a sign from the unconscious; lightning may strike the stage for a moment. This is undoubtedly a sign from Zeus, but like all signs of the unconscious, this too is momentary. Zeus sends out an eagle, but the eagle says nothing; it could be saying anything, or it could be just passing through. Unless there is a *translation error*, this sign will gain an exchange value and will be talked about; I would like to remind "Letter 52" once again: Neurosis is the short circuit of translation and of the exchange (or *the economy of the nervous system*). The ghost of Hamlet's or the Rat Man's father, or Marx's, *haunts* libidinal economic relations, with a power that, in Freud's words, *he never had while was living.*

In this thesis, I have discussed the different manifestations of taking on this debt by taking Freud's views on bisexuality and sexuation. As can be seen, the problem of beginning, which has been brought to the agenda due to the difference between presuppositions and structural necessity, eventually brought this work to "alternative ends", productions, residuals, if not an "end". This appearance of the fate of my work is the direct result of the Real, which can be considered simultaneously as a void or as a residue; it is the direct result of the conditions that make the Structure possible and produced by this very Structure. At this point, I referred to bisexuality as a *philosopheme*.

The reason why I chose "Beaten" as the myth of this thesis is that it represents the intersection of the construction, historical reality, and the phantasies around the bisexuality; as can be seen clearly in this example, what gives (or *gives again*) *the opportunity to actualize itself as a historical reality* to this intersection is, with Freud's words, *the revolution itself*. Therefore, with taking all the risks of saying this, I am going to claim that in the "Constructions in Analysis", Freud implies that, the analyst rings the bells of the revolution, s-he calls out the analysand for a

revolution. However, this should not be forgotten: “The call” of the analyst does not matter, *the labour of revolution* belongs to the analysand. I think it is safe to say that Freud implies this labour in his “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through”. What is at the stake is not making the analysand believe that “a revolution is necessary”. Knowing very well the conditions under which s-he is (class conditions, for example), the analysand can very well continue to live in those conditions (hence *reproduce* those conditions) for a lifetime; it is not enough for her/him to know very well, s-he must work-through. This is one of the most important lessons to be learned from Antigone: She knows nothing or does not do because she knows. It will be superficial, but it still must be asked: *In this age, really, is there anyone left who does not know?*

Today, if not the end of history, the so-called end of freedoms can easily be spoken of. It has recently been announced that those who practice “gay or gender conversion *therapies*” in the state of Victoria, Australia will be sentenced to fines or imprisonment³²⁷. I believe some questions should be asked: What does this ban say? Where does it speak from? If it speaks on someone's behalf, who has granted it this authority? Can we trust it? Should we trust it? It may be comforting to be convinced that freedom, multiplicity, and the like are the “end” (or “the” answer). But what if enhancing sexuality turns into a kind of “mass production”? What demand will this supply be directed to? Why should not such a future / freedom / law be subject to the same criticism as Freud's so-called “pre-discursive” dispositions? It is believed that when enough is said, anything can one day surely be said. However, if everything could be said one day, nothing would have been said from the first day. I will say at the expense of repetition: It will be easy to put an infinite-number-of-beginning against a beginning that has been *beheaded*, like choosing a side against a duality. While this is easy, it is difficult to predict the consequences, but at least we can say this: Freud's polymorphous-perversity had said so much to explain why so many things can be said and it continues to say. The

³²⁷ “Victoria to ban ‘abhorrent’ practise of gay or gender conversion ‘therapy’”, The Guardian, 2020, Nov. 24: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/24/victoria-to-ban-abhorrent-practise-of-gay-or-gender-conversion-therapy> (Accessed: 27.11.2020).

fact that historical reality has not yet been *discovered* may be stealing the potential for action from all of us every day, over and over again, implying that *it* may someday be discovered; but again, I ask, if, as Freud said, what is at stake is excavation we have to take in the digging shovel, even if our hands are going to get dirty, *saxa loquuntur*, when the stones speak, will we hear them or will we continue to pillage Odysseus' house?

I will end with a salute to Marx and Dr. Mehmet Mansur: *The libidinal economic revolution will draw its poem from the Future, a Future that historicizes the past, a Future that will "lift" the debt.* In the preface to the English translation of *Seminar XI*, Lacan writes: "I am not a poet, but a poem. A poem that is being written, even if it looks like a subject"³²⁸; it is a poem written by shedding the feathers of birds, the skins of snakes, and the leaves of trees.

³²⁸ Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, viii.

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