

YEMEN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF FAILED STATE THEORY

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Abstract

The 'failed state' theory, which was introduced with the end of the Cold War, is used to describe many countries that are experiencing civil war, political unrest, humanitarian and social crises and seen as a threat to international security. Yemen is one of these countries. Particularly, in the international media, Yemen is often described as a failed state. The study aims to critically analyze the discourse of failed state on Yemen, focusing on the views that contribute to failed state theory. To understand whether Yemen could be evaluated within the framework of failed state theory, the state structure of Yemen and historical events after unification were discussed. To compare the theoretical discussions with practice, this study contains failed state discourses and criticism along with views and news from articles, books, and newspapers about the social and political events that Yemen has experienced since unification. For this reason, source and survey research and content interpretation method have been used as the primary method in the research. Besides, the general concern of the thesis demonstrated that the failed state discourses have a western-style modern state approach and insufficient analyzing the state structure of many countries around the world, the process of democratization can be experienced violently in regionally divided Yemen and could result in reverse effect. Therefore to emphasize that Yemen should not be classified in the light of obvious facts and the process of state formation should be well analyzed. Another important point to be noted, failed state theories regard Yemen and other so-called failed states as a threat to foreign security and thus make these countries vulnerable to international interventions. For this reason, certain provisions should not be done without analyzing the state formation and historical processes of a country. In any event, any response based on failed state theory will contribute to humanitarian crises.

Özet

Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesiyle birlikte ortaya atılan ‘başarısız devlet’ teorisi günümüzde iç savaş, politik huzursuzluk, insani ve sosyal krizler yaşayan ve uluslararası güvenlik için tehdit oluşturduğu belirtilen pek çok ülkeyi nitelemek için kullanılmaktadır. Yemen’de bu ülkelerden birisidir. Özellikle uluslararası medyada Yemen sıklıkla başarısız devlet olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Bu çalışma başarısız devlet teorisine katkıda bulunan görüşlere odaklanarak, Yemen ile ilgili devlet başarısızlığı söylemlerini eleştirel olarak analiz etmeyi amaçlar. Yemen’in başarısız devlet teorisi çerçevesinde değerlendirilip değerlendirilemeyeceğini kavrayabilmek için 1990 yılında gerçekleşen birleşme süreci ve demokratikleşme çabaları temel alınarak Yemen’in devlet yapısı ve tarihsel olaylar ele alınmıştır. Bu çalışma, teorik tartışmaların pratikle mukayese edilebilmesi için, başarısız devlet söylemleri ve eleştirilerle beraber 1990 yılından günümüze değin Yemen’in deneyimlediği sosyal ve politik olaylarla ilgili makale, kitap ve gazetelerden görüş ve haberleri içermektedir. Bu nedenle araştırmada temel yöntem olarak kaynak – belge tarama ve buna bağlı olarak içerik yorumlama yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak, tezin genel kaygısı şunları gösterebilmektir; başarısız devlet söylemlerinin batı tarzı modern devlet yaklaşımına sahip olduğu ve dünya üzerindeki pek çok ülkenin devlet yapısını analiz etmekte yetersiz kaldığını gösterebilmek, demokratikleşme sürecinin bölgesel olarak bölünmüş Yemen de sancılı yaşanabileceği ve ters yönde etkiye sahip olabileceğini nedenleriyle açıklamaya çalışmak ve bu sebeple Yemen’in belli gerçekler ışığında sınıflandırılmaması gerektiğini ve devlet oluşum sürecinin iyi analiz edilmesi gerektiğini vurgulamaktır. Belirtilmesi gereken bir diğer önemli nokta Başarısız devlet teorileri Yemen ve diğer sözde başarısız devletleri uluslararası güvenliğe karşı birer tehdit olarak görmektedir ve bu sebeple bu ülkeleri uluslararası müdahalelere açık hale getirmektedir. Bu sebeple bir ülkenin devlet oluşumu ve tarihsel süreçleri analiz edilmeden kesin hükümlere varılmamalıdır. Aksi halde başarısız devlet teorisi temel alınarak gerçekleşen her türlü müdahale insanlık krizlerine katkıda bulunacaktır.

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INTRODUCTION

Yemen, located on the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula, is probably better known for civil wars, political instability, poverty, health care problem and the presence of terrorist threats than for its rich history or a successful attempt to democracy.

The Republic of Yemen came into the being in 1990 when the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's of Democratic Republic of Yemen agreed to unify. Former North Yemen and former South Yemen had different governance systems which were two systems of government were discordant when they united in 1990. South Yemen had 20 years of hard-line Marxist experience which stressed political sanction power. In North Yemen, compared with South Yemen, there was weak political sanction. The tribal authority was competing against the central administration. Despite the presence of difference, Yemen's democratic experience is unique for the Arab peninsula.¹ The distinguishing feature of Yemen is that it has initiated democratization attempt since 1990. and also has oldest multi-party system in the region and held first free elections both women and men in 1993. Thus, democratization process of Yemen was met with positive expectations in the early 1990s. Since the unification was made by negotiation, there was no political or military victory; two former state agreed to share to power.

Huntington argues that the modern world has experienced three waves of democratization. Each wave of democratization represents the transformation of a group of a non-democratic regime to a democratic regime and at the same time as the change occurring in the opposite direction.² Democratization and development are clearly related. Good governance and political stability are essential conditions for sustainable development to occur. Yemen was able to a take step towards democracy but also has experienced difficulties in continuing the democratization process and stage civil wars along with social and economic woes since the early 20th century. There is a great concern within the international community at Yemen due to the continued violence and successive civil wars. The question of whether or not Yemen can be classified as a failed state is, therefore, a research question that carries many consequences.

Because of these reasons, Yemen's history through the theory of failed state, the political environment and challenges faced Yemenis will be analyzed. Before assessing

the failed state theory ability to explain Yemen statecraft, research will examine the process of Yemen Republic. The issue of imposed democracy by foreign actors is controversial. The role of the global factors in the transition to democracy in Yemen should be evaluated. Democracy and democratization are elated with an internal political process. Bring democracy may not be enough for democratization. So Yemen's current turmoil and why referred as a failed state by international arena might be discoverable if democratization effort is deeply analyzed. Examining the democratization process will be reinforced by exploring the tribal, clan, family relationships and performance of the elections in Yemen since unification in 1990.

Besides its historical heritage and strategic importance, there is undeniable fact that Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world and has encountered a multifaceted problem such as international terrorism, violent extremism, religious, and separatism. Addition to the blurred economic and social picture, the country's addiction to qat may be given as the cause of the social and economic collapse. The government has unable to provide adequate health and training service.

Yemen has frequently shown as an example of failed state by observers. The common reason cited for this definition is weak governance of Yemen. To understand the Yemen country, it is necessary to examine the historical process. In this study, Yemen elections, civil wars and separatist revolts will be profoundly tested to evaluate governance and democratization process.

To addressing the major turning points of modern Yemen history briefly, 1994 civil war has presented a major challenge for Yemen government. South attempted to recede from unification. It is also problematic for Yemen's international allies because South Yemen has become the home of a resurgent al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In addition, the Gulf of Aden is among the world's most pirated waters with people, arms, and drugs being trafficked in and out of Yemen.³

Houthi insurgency which has been continuing since 2004 and its causes have maintaining uncertainty, is another major challenge in Yemen. The origins of the conflict and its characteristics are debated in the literature, and one could say that there are two distinct schools of thought. The first one takes an essentialist view of the conflict, referring almost exclusively to tribalism and sectarianism as root causes. On

the other hand, in *Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Houthi Phenomenon*, the authors claim that “it is a conflict in which local material discontent and Zaydi identity claims have intersected with the state methods of rule and self-legitimizing.”⁴

The main issue on the country agenda in 2007 was the separatist demands that emerged after the 1994 civil war. Former military personnel wanted to return work which was forcibly taken from their duty during the civil war in the south and also demanded compensation for downtime and goods were taken away. It triggered protests and was called to secede south from center.⁵ By the year 2011 the Arab Spring which started with the suicide of a peddler named Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia spread to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa in a very short time.⁶ Addition to successive riots and political instability for decades, water crisis, poverty, piracy, and presence of terrorist group Yemen has repeatedly been labeled as candidates for failure.

The importance of questioning the success of the state of Yemen arises from its strategic and regional location. Yemen is located on between Saudi Arabia and Oman. About eight percent of the world's oil trade is transported from the Bab-el-Mandeb which is located between Yemen and Arab Peninsula. Yemen's strategic location and Saudi Arabia-Iran regional competitiveness is one of basis factors leading to external intervention.⁷

Yemen also has crowded population rate and one of the highest population growth rates in the world. The weak economy and lack of facilities have been lead to migration even before conflicts. So a migration flow from Yemen is another important issue for its neighborhood and other countries.

One of the most important causes of Yemen's importance in the international arena is the presence of the terrorist group. Al Qaeda has been organizing attacks in Yemen for 15 years. Al-Qaeda in Yemen is known as the most dangerous terrorist action threats in the Arabian Peninsula. ISIS is a serious organization and declared that began to organize in Yemen the end of 2014.

At this stage, to understand of the assessment about Yemen, it should be the mention about ‘failed state’. The outcome of the "failed state" discourse dates back to the Cold War era. Failed state is used in whatever the way that user finds it strategically

useful. There is no consensus has been reached on the definition of state failure in the literature. The common arguments are used defining fail state discourse inability to provide positive political goods to its people, violence, the lack of the central authority and absence of state legitimacy.

When making a brief summary of the appearances in the country, there have been successive civil wars, social unrest and violence, sectarian clashes and external interventions in Yemen for a long time. All these negative experiences are the reasons why Yemen is called a 'failed state'. It is thought that government could not keep its power structures functional and Yemen increasingly become an international threat. According to failed state literature, state failure threatens global stability because national governments have become the primary building blocks of order. International security understanding includes avoiding chaos in the country and preventing the spread of turmoil and anarchy across borders and throughout the world.⁸

The main propose of this thesis critically addresses failed state discourses by examining the ability of these explanations to provide insight into the practice of statecraft in Yemen. For this propose, this thesis will be the focus on historically specific social forms and conditions rather than appearances of a country.

Theoretical Discussion on the Category 'Failed State'

In this chapter, different definitions of state failure will be given. Failed state is started to be used widely after the end of Cold War but correspondingly the question of how the definition of failed states has not yet been fully agreed upon. To define what is meant by the 'failed state' different conception of failed state discourse will be analyzed in detail, and the characteristics of the failed states are tried to be identified.

The most emphasized definition was given by Zartman who defines the state as an authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory. According to Zartman:

‘As the authoritative political system, it has legitimacy, which is therefore up for grasp and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. As a system of socio-economic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed, it no longer receives support from nor exercises controls

over its people, and it is no longer even the target of demands because its population know that it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the right to rule.’⁹

Mainly, as from the events of September 11, failed state discourse was not considered with humanitarian and internal consequences and called as a threat due to destabilizing effects on not only neighboring countries but also all over the world. Now it is said that failed states need more attention and even external intervention because such states could become a suitable ground for international terrorism. For example Helman and Ratner describe failed state as those states descend into violence and anarchy — imperiling their citizens and threatening their neighbors through refugee flows, political instability, and irregular warfare — it is becoming clear that something must be done.’ They also observed failed states as a threat for their neighborhoods and emphasized that help those states is made more critical by the evidence that their problems tend to spread.¹⁰

Another definition which is called failed state as breeding ground for terrorist groups is made by Carment. According to Carment that state failures serve as the breeding ground for many extremist groups is indisputable.¹¹

Similar to Helman and Ratner, Fukuyama refers failed state as the root of many of worlds most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism. Fukuyama support failed state argument as follow:

“State collapse and weakness had already created major humanitarian and human right disasters with hundreds of thousands of victims during the 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. For a while, the United States and other countries could pretend that these problems were just local, but the terrorist attacks of September 11 proved that state weakness constituted an enormous strategic challenged as well.’¹²

Gros, J. mentioned about term; Failed states perennial underachievers. He places the rules on this continuum according to whether they fulfill the Weberian criteria of statehood. As a result, he provides the taxonomy of five types of ‘failed states’. These include so-called ‘anarchic states’, ‘mirage states’ ‘captured states’ and ‘aborted states’.¹³ And he added that it should be clear that not all states in the developing world

are characterized by the same degree of failure, although failure may be traced to a common origin.

Rajan contributes reasons of failed of a state and suggests that the conflict in failed states caused the problems in the economy. Rajan emphasizes brain migration in the failed state and also provides a solution which comprises to elect a foreigner for a while. This foreigner could be identified among the candidates presented by the United Nations or former leaders of other countries. These candidates work for the establishment of the basic requirements of the government and for the sustainable prosperity and power in the country. He also emphasizes economic dynamics;

‘These states need a period of peaceful economic growth, growth that will provide incentives for predators to turn to productive activities, growth that will increase the ranks and the power of those with a stake in a healthy institutional environment, growth that will attract back those who have emigrated in search of safety and opportunity. While it is believed that a good institutional environment is needed to facilitate growth, growth itself can create a domestic constituency powerful enough to demand and sustain the right institutional environment.’¹⁴

The most significant methodological flaw of Rajan analyze is condoned other causes that lead to conflict in a state and just focus on economic reason as mentioned;

‘‘Whatever the original reasons for why a state descends into anarchy, the natural tendency is for it to emerge from conflict with a skewed distribution of economic power.’’¹⁵

Economic distribution is contributed to unrest in a country, but there is a need to focus on identify the historically specific social form and conditions and global relations of a country. The problem with ‘failed state’ discourses explained above is that they just give a knowledge of the surface appearances of social reality. Above-mentioned problems are occurring in so-called failed states, and it is undeniable but as Jones notes there is a problem with their manner;

‘‘The problem with the ‘failed state’ discourse is not with the empirical identification of social, economic and political crisis as such but in the manner of characterizing and above all, explaining the nature and production of such condition. The notion of ‘state failure’ has been so quickly adopted precisely because it holds an obvious appeal. The challenge, therefore, is to develop alternative analytical frameworks and substantive accounts of conditions of the

crisis in the Third World. An outstanding example of this second, explanatory dimension of critique is the work of Siba Grovogui (2002), who exposes the shallowness of the 'state failure' tradition through a genuinely historical account of the inter-related but differentiated production of state forms and regimes of sovereignty in Europe and Africa.¹⁶

Although failed state discourse has been defined by many scholar and has not agreement in the scholarly literature on the definition of state failure, most of definitions are similar in their way to explain what is characteristic of 'failed states'. Similar with Zartman, Helman and Ratner explanations, Rotberg exemplifies the characterizes of failed state as have intense violence tendency. According to Rotberg violence in states is directed against the existing government or regime and groups who are the insubordinate advocate that they are right and demand autonomy or political privilege. And he emphasizes that the reason of the civil wars that characterize failed states is ethnic, religious, linguistic or other inter communal enmity.¹⁷

One of the alternative descriptions of failed state discourse is that understanding what is a successful state. Mainly successful states are defined as states that are able to protect the borders of the country and are safe from internal and external threats. And health and welfare within the country can be sustained. There is some scholarly explanation focuses on flaws of certainly failed state discourse, and according to this perspective, the conceptual vocabulary and associated methodological vision is a flawed starting point for any attempt to understand the historical and global relations of current conditions and processes in Africa and elsewhere. Although these critics ignore the importance of social and political crises, remain incapable evaluating these crises in terms of state failures. The best assessment of the mistake in this approach is to consider alternative historical and social events, for example: Congo (Grovogui 2002), Somalia (Gruffydd Jones 2008) and Sudan (Ayers 2010).¹⁸

Yemen has multifaceted political structure, and that produces lots of challenges. This challenges should be examined to understand Yemen. Nearly all theoretical approaches of failed state discourses focus on issues which are security and humanitarian challenges, lack of legitimacy. If the analyses of Yemen maintained with the framework of 'failed state' discourses mentioned above, the most important issue which is slide into chaos may be ignored; informal structure and regime shaping the Yemeni state.

Yemen can be called as unstable because of the heavily armed population, widespread poverty, the presence of al Qaeda and ongoing revolts. And also there are undeniable realities about Yemen such as out of control violence, not providing welfare, protection, or education even water.

Although under such circumstances, do fail state theories enough to label Yemen as a failed state? The thesis will evaluate the Yemen statecraft within the historical perspective before asked the Yemen state failed or not. Thus this study focus on what Yemen is and is not? I think the misconception of Yemen country and statecraft could be lead incorrect classification. Yemen is little-known country of Arab peninsula. It will not enough just focus on self-evident facts to understand Yemen and in-depth analyzed should be made to determine Yemen is failed state or not?

Research Methodology

In this research, the democratization process in Yemen will be examined by statistical information, historical literature search. Yemen history after unification will explore in-depth by focusing civil wars, historical trends, and social problems.

The research will depend on the available secondary data: books, academic journals, working papers and other published documents. The study will be utilized the qualitative method of research. The purpose of employing the qualitative method is to describe the Yemen historical condition as it taken place during the time of unification to recent civil war and to explore the causes of the particular condition.

Qualitative method is effective in identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion. The objective of qualitative research is examined a case or an issue deeply. Qualitative research is a method that adopts an interpretive approach to focus on a specific subject. This statement means that qualitative researchers should consider the research phenomena in their environment. Qualitative research describes a social phenomenon in its natural environment and its natural formation. Qualitative research tries to understand a situation in relation links, and it reveals the variables that affect an event. When the state structure of Yemen and its historical development are discussed in the light of failed state theory, the separation from other state formation approaches will be tried to

be addressed. And for this reason, it has been deemed appropriate to utilize qualitative research.

The main distinctive feature of the qualitative research is that the approach allows studying people in their natural settings, to identify how their lives, such as the social, economic, cultural or physical context in which they live.¹⁹ Besides the social and economic condition, tribal-base state elite of Yemen will be evaluated in term of effect on regime and examination of a failed state theories therefore qualitative method is thought to be appropriate for the research. Qualitative methods are used when there is a need to understand the meaning and interpretation of aspects of society, drawing on the experiences and expressions of those who are being studied. Qualitative methods are particularly useful for developing and understanding of how people behave and how social systems operate in a natural context.²⁰

These methods generally aim to understand the experiences and attitudes of patients, the community or healthcare worker and seek to answer questions about the ‘what’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a phenomenon rather than ‘how many’ or ‘how much’, which are answered by quantitative methods.²¹ The aim of this research deeply analyzes the Yemen country without skip over any component that makes up country’s life, culture and focus on the reason of civil wars, the social and economic crisis within the failed state theories. A comparative analysis will be given in the section on failed state theories. In addition to the authors contributing to the failed state theory, the descriptions and recommendations of authors who have a critical approach to this theory will be examined in detail. Therefore qualitative research method is the most appropriate research method for the aim of research and planned progression of research.

Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study’s primary emphasis is on the political developments in the country since 1990. First of all, democratization periods and data which are related elections in Yemen will be evaluated and interpreted. Yemen is a new state and has undergone political and social transformation since the unification. Last twenty years Yemen has faced civil wars and secession movement and because of that International media and

politics are often referred Yemen as 'failed states'. But before a definite conclusion is reached, the causes of the war and the negative atmosphere will be sought in unification process, state organization and purpose of the state-formation. The aim of this thesis examines democratization and unification process and question whether Yemen will be described as a failed state. For this reason, the starting point of the study is taken as the unification process which was held in 1990. However, historical influence and remains of South Yemen and Northern Yemen, which existed on the territory of the Republic of Yemen once and which existed before the unification, will not be ignored. Before evaluating the Yemen within the framework of failed state theory, it will focus on failed state theory. The writers and studies contributing to failed state theory, which took place rapidly in the literature since 1990, will be examined. In addition, studies that have contributed critically to this theory will also be included. Thus, a critical approach will be evaluated in the light of ideas that advocates this theory. Finally, Yemen will be assessed within the framework of failed state theory. It will be tried to examine the adequacy of failed state theory in assessing the state structure and formation of Yemen rather than self-evident facts of the present situation of Yemen.

CHAPTER 1

Yemen Governance; After Unification

The Yemen Republic was established by the standardization of the 'Yemen Arab Republic' (North Yemen) and the 'People's Democratic Republic of Yemen' (South Yemen) in 1990. Before then there were two rival states; in the North, the 'Yemen Arab Republic' which has taken place within the Western bloc during the Cold War and in the Southern, 'Democratic Republic of Yemen' which was under the influence of Soviet Union. The unification which was occurred in 1990 also created the first step for country's transition to democracy.

Before examining the democratic initiative process of Yemen, I will focus on the concept of democracy and transition to democracy. Democracy is often defined as a form of government based on public acclaim. In addition to this general definition of democracy, there are many types of democracy. These different applications create many diverse effects. In terms of a country's socio-economic conditions in broad definition of democracy, it can be mentioned two different type of democracy. One of them is normative; the other is "empirical" or "realist" theories of democracy. The normative democratic theory describes the democracy on the basis of dictionary meaning. Normative democracy theories reflect an ideal. In this sense, it must comply fully with the people's tendency to be a democratic regime.

Realist theories of democracy do not focus on the meaning of democracy ideal. It tries to demonstrate that common features of exciting forms of government which is considered as a democratic.²²

Transition to democracy or democratization is a term used to state changes which mostly occur towards to democracy. According to Huntington, the modern world has experienced three waves of democratization. Each wave of democratization says that the conversion of a group of non-democratic governments to a democratic regime during a particular time and also the conversion occurring in the opposite direction. And each wave also contains liberalization in a generally non-fully democratic political system and partial democratization. However, there was also inverse waves from the

first two waves. Some countries that conversion to democracy has returned back to non-democratic governments.²³

Before analyzing the democratization efforts in Yemen, the brief summary of the discussions held on democratization will be introduced. The debate of transition to democracy is mainly focused on the fact that democratic transition process starts to emerge mostly as a result of the elite in the country rather than structural features. The literature which is beginning to appear gaining strength is claimed that democratization and transition to democracy do not depend on social or economic structural transformation and any country easily transition to democracy with elite's decision. Democratic transition process started to emerge largely a result of the rational choice of the elite in the country rather than structural features²⁴

When the need of government in the South for the extraction of oil resources distributed on both sides of the border and the ambition of the government of North accreted with public's unification desire, the Republic of Yemen was founded in 1990. Considered the political, ideological and economic differences between two sides, The Republic of Yemen could provide sustainable political and economic successful only with administering elites who inclined to compromise on both sides. As a matter of the fact that many South Yemeni leaders had the hope of obtaining benefit from multi-party system politically, economically and socially. But this expectation has unreciprocated because of Ali Abdullah Saleh who was elected as a president and South's exclusion from the administrative level. This policy of the Saleh regime, Southerners began thinking faced with pressure from the North along with economic, social and political differences between North and South. In May 1994 the South went to war with North to leave again. This civil war ended with the capture of the southern capital of Aden after a bloody conflict with the Northern force on 7 July 1994. North has emerged victorious from the civil war, and the winning has brought going backward in all areas. With this victory, the Northern elites have controlled over national resources, including land and job opportunities in the country and thus increase the regime's legitimacy problem thoroughly. The discontent of South has continued, and hostility to the North has resulted in the establishment of Southern Movement in 2007. This group brought together Southerner who thought economically neglected, under political pressure and threat to their identity. Saleh has chosen to suppress them with harsh measures instead

of finding solutions to Southerner's problems. However, this separatist movement was not limited to the South. The Northern Houthis could never be integrated with other parts. It has always been a threat to the integrity of the country. Houthis make up roughly 35-40% of the population of Yemen and North of Sanaa is a rebel group came through the Zaydis, a moderate Shiite sect.²⁵

Another issue that need to be addressed at this point, there are many problems observed in the countries that have passed through the democratization process. History that countries had before their democracy experience, culture, geographical conditions, statecraft, formal or informal actors can be considered as an obstacle in the way of establishing the foundations of democracy in these countries. Along with all these features, the most important problem is the violence in these countries. From the day of the Yemeni unification decision, there has been a battle or violence between various groups. Occasionally, the violence of these conflicts has increased and the country has faced civil war. As I will examine in the following chapters, the beginning of civil war and conflicts in Yemen have been rooted long before Arab Spring. This brings into the mind similar problems in countries that have taken the step of democracy and democratization. Before entering into the source of the problems, I will include opinions on relation with newly established democracies, democratization process, conflict, violence and civil wars .The relationship between the process of democratization and the tendency to violence, with the contributions of Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone (2011) can be presented the following thesis; Mansfield and Snyder claim that the process of transition to democracy may involve violence, and the tendency of civil war in countries that are in the process of democratization is quite high. The authors advocate that democratization creates an environment in which is dominated by increasing nationalism and polarization in society and creating conflicts. At this point, there are writers who claim the contradiction of Mansfield and Snyder's views. While some authors support them, some authors emphasize that their thesis is particularly methodologically incomplete. As a result, There has not yet been reached consensus on the subject. The Synder explains how democratization increases the risk of conflict. Synder claims that there are two present situations in the first stages of democratization and they reveal violence. The first one, political elites could abuse nationalism to increased self-interest. The second situation is insufficient of the central government to

prevent from polarization. Democratization boosts internal conflict by creating a few problems. There have been difficult for maintaining mutual trust and intentions by political elites. During the regime change, political actors have difficulty in deciding which group they will support, which group they oppose, and in which party is determined their interests. The old and new political elites vary according to their intentions. For this reason, the promises given during the transitional periods and the agreement may not provide confidence. There can be conflicts with growing suspicion and insecurity. If a state contains various ethnic groups, there may also be a devastating crisis at this point. This situation between political elites and racial groups undermines state authority and creates an ambiguous political framework. Insecurity is most felt in minority groups and Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone continue:

“Weingast has demonstrated that during fundamental political changes in a society, institutions are typically weak and everything is at stake. This implies two things. First, the mechanisms limiting one ethnic group from using the state apparatus to take advantage of another are not effective. Institutions cannot credibly commit to protect the state apparatus from being captured by any group to exploit the other. Second, since the stakes are high during regime change, the critical threshold probability that breeds violence based on fears of victimization is particularly weak. That is, it does not take much for the minority group to resort to violence out of fear during regime change. The extant literature on civil wars shows that minority groups are more likely to have course to violence if they fear that there is a risk of annihilation in the future and the commitments made by the state are not credible .”²⁶

Almost nearly all of the population in Yemen is formed by Arabs. For this reason, as we have seen above, there has not been a situation in which the first stages of democratization have fueled ethnic conflicts. But the struggle for political engagement between elites and also between political parties and the lack of mutual interaction in the process of unification the two countries which were regional, politically diverse, has increased the risk of consecutive conflicts and civil wars. In the view of such information, the political environment after the unification process will be briefly summarized by observations of Kostinar (1996); multi-party system has created a change for elites and tribes to have a say in Yemen politics. But this change has also lead to political struggle. Prior to elections, the political leaders of both countries were agreed that it was necessary an entire dialogue and cooperation between the elite of both GPC and YSP live together. But matters not provided for the necessity of the unification

of the armies and institutions of the two countries. Founding a democratic system, they thought that multi-party elections were enough, but in fact, that was not sufficient for 'integration' of the country. According to Saleh, democracy was the only option for building a nation; participation in the construction of the new Yemen through democracy. If there were a mistake or a problem, democracy would overcome them automatically. So, according to Saleh, the integration of the parties was unnecessary, because in the nature of democracy there was a multi-party system that democracy organized itself. Southern leaders had the same opinion; unification and democratization were aggregated around a social system, And the system desired to establish in Yemen would be depended on the multiparty system, not the united organs.²⁷

Democratization experiences intensified after the Cold War has revealed that most areas transition to democracy expect for some regions, and though it is considered that national elections are held, transition to democracy is not exactly 'democratization'. Transition to democracy does not mean democratization. With the expression of Huntington, even if the most of "third wave of democracy" transition to democracy, in these countries still have unresolved problems and not enough 'deep' or 'consolidation' Yemen is an example of these countries.²⁸

Another important point about democracy focuses on researches carried in the Middle East and North Africa countries, is oil. The income obtained from oil can be an important tool for the necessary development steps in the democratization process, but there are those who think that oil has negative effects on political change process especially studies carried in the Middle East and North Africa have demonstrated that the country depends mostly on oil income has shown anti-democratic and authoritarian rule features.²⁹ This negative a relationship has been traced to phenomena such as the rentier state.

Rentier State is a state which derives a large part of the revenues from the outside world, very small segment of society is included in the process of obtaining or producing income and society benefits from the obtaining income distribution. External sources of income in the rentier state has liberalized the state from society in terms of sources f revenues. The income derived from oil exports in the "rentier" state is distributed randomly. The Economy has taken the form of a hierarchical structure in

accordance with the share taken from income. As stated by Beblawi, tribe organized format of the Middle East and North Africa societies supports hierarchical structure of rentier economy.³⁰

According to the database of International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics and the World Bank World Development Indicators, Yemen oil addiction is 58 percent.³¹ State's economic function is only focused on distribution, and there are serious consequences for the social structure. To increase the capacity needed to fight and challenged by the current capitalist class, the modern state has been able to intervene in the accumulation process directly.

States established in a late capitalist period have conducted supportive development policies for capitalist production due to the insufficient capital accumulation.³² Sometimes they have taken place as direct manufacturer states in the capitalist accumulation process sometimes have implemented supporting economic and politic policies for the existing capitalist class. That state intervention has led social consequences such as the development of production, the strengthening of the capitalist class, the transformation of the rural population to wage labor. These developments paved the way for the process leading to the formation of democratic governance and rise of political and social claim in Europe. A similar transformation of capitalist Europe is impossible in rentier states because of the lack of similar economy policy and capital accumulation.³³ It has been seen that the example of rentier state consolidates to the common form of governance in Yemen. Yemeni tribal forces also continue its active presence, but Yemen is no longer a rentier state.

Another important aspect of democracy and the transition to democracy, failure to deepening the third wave of democracy and the emergence of hybrid regime. Publications focus on a hybrid regime began to condensate since the second half of the 1990s.³⁴ Even though the concept was introduced in the 1990s to describe the authoritarian systems in Latin America, it quite popular in recent years. Now it has become a concept encompassing for all authoritarian regimes which have the specific features of procedural democracy. On the other hand, hybrid regimes' concept could also lead to overlook important differences between these regimes. Therefore, political scientists were quick to create new subcategories. Competitive Authoritarianism and

Electoral Authoritarianism concepts have expanded the scope of regime discussion. Many regimes began to be called authoritarian regime which had assumed that came a long way in the democratic transition. Obtaining political power and practice has occurred through formal democratic institutions and rules at competitive authoritarian regime but this formal process is often largely manipulated by the ruling regime. Unlike the authoritarian regimes, there is no legal obstacle to attend to elections, compete for coming to power. Elections are implemented relatively a straightforward manner. Functioning of the electoral system always creates a risk for authoritarian leaders. Even if the power of legislative is restricted and power of execution is increased, parliaments are areas that rivalry could create public opinion against ruling. In the absence precedence of ruling on legislative, competition can be used legislative power more effectively. In the competitive authoritarian, government efforts to subordinate the judiciary to them. But sometimes it does not enough to continuity of democratization process and effort to create democratic institutions, ruler of country can enhance of its power using the position and try to keep passive the opposition against them with their security forces.³⁵

The electoral authoritarianism concept refers regimes with multi-party, the regular elections. In this regime the election is elements of state or government secret rather than element of democracy so it is open to manipulation. There are officially allowed to be the rivalry parties but they also have a lot of obstacles seen or unseen to compete with party in government.³⁶

Unlike the competitive authoritarian regimes, system is directly manipulated in electoral authoritarianism and overthrown the government through elections by the rivalry appears to be almost impossible. As an example of the authoritarian electoral regimes, Egypt, Algeria and Yemen are displayed, but the ascribe meaning of electoral authoritarianism for these countries is quite different from competitive authoritarian regimes such as Russia and Ukraine. In these countries, there is a possibility of overturning the current potency by elections but there is not such a possibility in authoritarian electoral regimes. Examining the traditional forms of participation in social functioning mechanisms of political power and public decision-making process is elicited the differentiation of authoritarian regimes.³⁷

According to ethnographic studies conducted by Lisa Weeden in Yemen, Yemen has significant differences compared to other authoritarian regimes in the Middle East in terms of public democratic practices. Given the procedural measure properties of representative democracy, it does not seem to have much difference from other authoritarian regimes in Yemen. Elections do not take a change to the rivalry for coming to power as demonstrated by the new authoritarianism studies. However, the meeting of chewing the qat which is a traditional public activity fulfills an essential condition of democracy. This session is taking important function in terms of the public debate on political, organization of rivalry and participation in the political process. Chewing qat is an activity that is carried out in public by local people in Yemen. It is usually carried out collectively by men in similar places with coffeehouses or homes. While people are chewing qat, they also conduct discussions on the political, social and economic issue. Government officials, opposition members and political activists can participate these meetings. According to Weeden observation, many important policy decisions are taken as a result of debates at these meetings. Alliances between political groups and actors and what kind of political attitude to adopt in the face of government applications are formed in these meetings. For example, rival leaders can determine what will follow as a strategy against the government's constitutional arrangements by asking citizens in these meetings. It seems difficult to describe Yemen as a democratic country. Moreover, considering the process of coming to power and repressive politics on the rivalry, Yemen can be seen as an authoritarian regime. However, focusing on the public practice of politics which is an area regime refrains, it stands out entirely different picture. Yemen's government seems similar with other authoritarian regimes in terms of coming to power applications. But with regards to the style of making politics and the involvement of the community, Yemen has its own democratic public policy.³⁸

When considering together Arab countries and democracy, one of the first question that comes to mind the question of whether women should be allowed to vote. Yemen has shown the importance of women's suffrage at the beginning of democratization process. For example, Raufa Hassan, Yemen's most outspoken feminist, has received support from local tribal leaders. The first election after the unification has promised great hopes for democratization process. Thousands of

volunteers monitored and voted the elections. In addition to these positive developments, the presence of the common system in the country has continued to exist as a threat in the democratization process. The elections haven't helped the government assert much control over tribes, either. Tribal representatives won most of the parliamentary seats in 1993. Highways near the capital, Sana'a, are dotted with homemade traffic barriers where Kalashnikov-wielding tribesmen sometimes stop government cars. Tribal areas have their court systems: The sheik and the families often work out compensation for murder. Sheiks typically collect taxes and recruit soldiers. Some tribes kidnap Westerners when they want to pressure the government to reroute a highway or fund the water project.³⁹

It is obvious that there is a conflict between democracy and cultural and social ties of Yemen. According to a Yemeni official involved in the Yemen General People's Congress and Yemen Socialist Party reconciliation process in early 1994 made this telling comment:

“We are tribal and still very far from the modern state. Even I who sit here with you am tribal despite the fact that I have studied in Europe. I talk about dialogue and democracy, and I defend the counter-opinion. But when the moment of truth comes, the tribal spark ignites within me and I forgot all I have studied.”⁴⁰

Political Environment and Elections in United Yemen

Yemen Socialist Party from South Yemen and Yemen General People's Congress from North Yemen took part in the new government after unification in 1990. Thirty-nine-member cabinet consisted of these two parties. Ali Abdullah Saleh has been President and El-Bidh has been the vice chairman in the newly established government and South Yemen's former leader Abu Bakr al-Attas has been Prime Minister of the new government. Following the transition period, which lasted until April 1993, the new parliament has been elected.⁴¹

According to Brian Whitaker (2009) who has been a journalist;

“Once unification occurred, President Saleh was firmly committed to maintaining it: he had staked his reputation on its success. The General People Congress, as one of the president's closest associates remarked, was determined ‘to preserve and protect unity at any cost’. The southern Yemeni Socialist Party,

on the other hand, had been more ambivalent about unification from the start. It seemed willing to go along with it so long as there was a prospect of some tangible benefits for the south and an acceptable level of influence over decisions in Sana'a.⁴²

With the unification in 1990, Yemen has underlined for a democratic form of government throughout the country. However, democracy and understanding of democratic governance cannot always be applied according to its nature. But also the inability to determine to the correct criteria of the governance system to be implemented is also an element that cannot be ignored. Although North and South Yemen were made up of the same ethnic groups in close geographical regions, they were two countries with different population densities, different economic and political backgrounds. This can be seen as a challenge to establish a united democratic-based governance system. The problems have encountered since the first election race of Republic of Yemen are proof of this situation. In democracy, mutual respect, common sense and tolerance must be the basic principle. And most importantly, the trust of the governance system being tried to establish is very in terms of the future of the country and the system. Whereas in Yemen, there seems to be a national consensus, the trust required to build a whole future is lack. This clearly reflects the political environment immediately following the unification. Before the elections, however, a fairly positive atmosphere was created for the future of the country. During the transition period, there was enough time for the elites of both countries to appeal to the whole country. Thus it would be appropriate to have elections under the democratic conditions. In the transition period, 50/50 power-sharing Formula applied to government formation. In addition to this positive atmosphere, both side kept their army intact just in case. Not included integration to military forces and keep them active may be a sign of lack of confidence or Misinterpretation of the purpose of establishing a democratic and liberal system. As mentioned before both party leaders of North and South had claimed that Yemen would be depended on multiparty system, not the united organs. Keeping the armies under separate commands against war or any intervention is already a negative stance for unification. If we return to the elections, the elections were held in April 1993 in a “ free atmosphere. The General People’s Congress (GPC) took 123 seats, the new Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) took 56 seats and Al-Islah took 62 seats.⁴³ The prominent actor of this election was the Islah party. The Islah which had succeeded in the elections, also took part in the coalition, and this situation made YSP quite uncomfortable. The point

that disturbed YSP was Islah's connection with GPC. Islah was conservative party and consisted of businessmen, tribal leaders and Islamist groups. Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar who belonged to Hashid tribal confederation, was the chair of Islah Party. The point is that Saleh's tribe Sanhan was the member of Hashid tribe.⁴⁴

It is necessary to analyze the North and South before the unification to understand the anxiety and tension of YSP that Southern Yemen-based party and feeling of insecurity against GPC and Islah that Northern Yemen-based parties. South Yemen was a state composed of the unification of tribes before British domination. It was under British rule until 1967 when it acquired independence. After independence, there was a Marxist-oriented Arab nationalist regime. On the contrary, Northern Yemen was ruled by Imam of the Zaydi-Shi 'I until the 1962 coup. After military coups in Northern Yemen, civil wars took place and internal balances reached a sensitive point. South Yemen had a secular bureaucratized and planned polity. Political culture in the North has been developed to based on traditional tribal relations and values since 1978, under the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh.⁴⁵

Under these administrative infrastructures, two different countries have decided to unification but it was ignored the deep political differences and the demands of the people. This is also the beginning of Yemen's problems and dilemma. According to paper of Matthijs Bogaards(2006)

“The work by Lijphart on consociational democracy and later also consensus democracy constituted a breakthrough in the thinking about democracy in divided societies as it showed that the two are not as incompatible as was often thought and claimed, not least by authoritarian rulers trying to justify their non-democratic regimes by invoking the overriding need for national unity. Lijphart's research demonstrated that democracy in divided societies was possible if elites cooperated, even when the masses remained divided. In a consociational democracy, elite cooperation takes the form of executive coalitions in which the leaders of all main social groups are represented; proportional representation in assemblies as well as a proportional allocation of offices and resources; autonomy for social groups in the spheres important to them, such as education; and a mutual veto for groups that see their vital interests at stake. For Lijphart and many with him, democracy in deeply divided societies is possible only when power is shared instead of monopolized, devolved rather than centralized.”⁴⁶

However, the situation in Yemen has been the opposite of what should be done. It may not be realistic to establish a western-style democratic form of government in Yemen. As can be observed throughout the Arab world, the political structure and state formation of Yemen have not yet been completed and this mixed and fluid process continues today. This process is quite different from the experience of the western world. In addition to having two different backgrounds and polity in North and South, North Yemen also has a group with different demands and desires; Houthis. These multi-faceted differences, of course, make it difficult to establish a stable order. But this does not mean that some basic values can be overlooked. In order to ability to take into account everyone's request and find common ground, necessary effort must be shown. Democracy is a tolerance regime. Differences learn to compromise and tolerate each other in a democracy. The law is enforced in the same way for everyone; a person, a family or a class have no concession. Democracy has a majority principle. But minority rights are protected alongside the majority. In Yemen, the election results and accompanying practices, Saleh's position has taken the form of 'Majority dictatorship of minority'. Analysis of Abdu Sharif (2002) give us detail about Yemen policy formulation: After the relatively fair and free results of the 1993 elections, the constitutional amendment, which took place in 1994, has been gained absolute dominance and decision-making position to President.

Accordingly, the President could appoint both the prime minister and the cabinet members and have control of the army, and also had the right to legislate when the council session. Moreover, according to the amendment of the Constitution, the President was the chairman of the Supreme Council of Judiciary, which granted him the right to intervene in the legal process.⁴⁷

Relatively fair and free election experience of Yemen was not reached 1997 election. Supreme Commission of Elections and Referendum (SCER), supervisory control, were set up in 1996 and did not have representatives from other parties except for the GPC. This meant that this supervisory control only worked for the benefit of the government and its party. Obtained the majority by GPC in 1997 election have supported this argument. Amendment of 2001 for election law abolished the independence of supreme commission for elections and referendum and began the attempt to maintain the balance of party members in the composition of the SCER

between government and opposition. But these attempts failed. This negative atmosphere is clearly seen in the research of Stephan Day (2012) and Hiroshi Matsumoto, the relatively fair and free electoral environment created by the 1993 elections was not achieved in the 1997 elections. Because the GPC was controlling all public funds and the only media organization in a society where half of it was illiterate was controlled by the government and most importantly the Supreme Election Board of the country was controlled by the government. This situation brought about problems in the electoral records in the summer of 1996. All opponent parties protested the control of SCER and claimed that voter records were not recorded properly. The parties explained that they would not participate in the election. Upon this, GPC made several arrangements and Islah and few small parties announced that they would join the elections. But YSP did not give up its decision.⁴⁸ The GPC increased the number of seats in the elections and gained enough majority that there was no necessary to coalition to form the government.⁴⁹

As stated in the Universal Declaration on Democracy published in 1997, well-organized institutions and organizations can play a balancing role on the differences within a country; because democracy is not just a set of rules, it also consists of institutions that are well-established and actively continuing. Strengthening social cohesion and solidarity in society could be possible through well-functioning democratic institutions. These institutions provide a balance between the differences within the society. Democracy means that each could have a say in public affairs. For this reason, the existence of representative institutions is important.⁵⁰

What is most needed in Yemen is provided of national consolidation. The most important duty here belongs to the elites, institutions, and parliament. However, it should not be forgotten that these changes and requirement are not possible to happen overnight. Suitable political culture environment is necessary for the development of democracy but in 1997 election it clearly demonstrates the impossibility of doing free politics and creating democratic environment due to the GPC's control on the media and take all public funds in addition to control of SCER.

The transition to democracy does not mean to exist democracy forever in a country. It is necessary institutionalization of the democratic election process to sustain

a democratic political system. But Yemen society is characterized by tribalism. The impact of this tribal make-up of society is manifested itself on the democratization process and tribal influences that limit the central government's authority. However, the use of tribes in political life by the administration leads to the unwanted result, Ziad (2003) has claimed that the GPC's policy action led to the development of a mixed tribal policy. Thanks to the GPC, tribal ties became stronger and each election was made one step closer to the one-party regime by means of the loopholes in the current electoral system. Just as in other similar countries where have one party dominated system, the electoral system and democracy in Yemen continued to be violated.⁵¹

The effectiveness of the Saleh and the GPC on politics and government have been decisive for the future elements of Yemen democracy through the constitutional amendment in 1994 and provide great power for direct presidential elections took place in 1999. Ali Abdullah Saleh selected as president with 96.3 percent of the vote on October 23.⁵²

In the parliamentary elections held in 2003, it was observed that the country had made some improvements during the election process. However, there were still concerns about the correctness of voter registration, government revenues mostly used for the ruling party, and media networks under the control of the ruling party. Under all these conditions, the YSP won only 8 seats and the GPC won 226 seats.⁵³

In the 2006 presidential election, Saleh got re-elected, the parliamentary elections for 2009 were postponed and after Yemen revolution, Saleh stood down and Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi was selected as the only candidate in 2012 presidential election.

As mentioned before, Yemen has electoral authoritarian regimes properties. Worldwide democratization process has reverse wave in some countries time to time and could not has progressive improvement. So democratic systems have ended in some countries on reverse wave. Transition to democracy is not mean that country will have democratic characteristics and it will continue forever. In this case, the most important issue is making the democracy permanent. Yemen has made promising transition to democracy but advance toward a system in which violated several criteria of democracy. Due to failure to constitutional state and violation of democracy criteria,

tribal system has been strengthened throughout the country. The political party leader is also head of tribal system. It is attributed to the strong dominance of the tribes drift into the state chaos, the violation of democratic criteria and the alleged injustices in elections. But before making a final judgment on this issue, it needs to address two views about tribal system in Yemen; one of them which is obtained from Corstange (2008) analyzes that tribes are an obstacle for development of Yemen because they resist imposing state's attempt to control over their territory and not volunteer to comply with law. So they cause underdevelopment of Yemen.⁵⁴

The other views obtained by Schmitz (2011) analyzes that the Yemeni government is not able to govern the state either politically or socially. The government acted as if they were ruling a tribal state so that they would rule them and mediate between tribes in order to protect their political position. The government was constantly in contact with tribal leaders. And Saleh is good in this regard. In this sense, the continuity of tribal social connection has obtained by Yemeni system. Yemeni regime has enthusiastic about enhance of the 'tribal social organization'. Moreover, in some cases, the government creates its tribe. For example, after 1994 war, Saleh made an attempt to recreate the Southern tribal network because YSP had destroyed it. Saleh saw it as an opportunity. The aim of Saleh was reaching to the control of YSP territory. In order to enhance his influence, Saleh regime has tried to create tribe network.⁵⁵

Another view about tribal system is belong to Al-Dawsari (2012); according to research Tribes can reinforce the commitment within the country and prevent violence. Some observers who study public opinion about Yemen have assumed that tribes have negotiator role within the community and mitigate conflicts in Yemen. Yemen has been saved in many crises throughout history and observers are referring it to the tribal structure in terms of resolving conflicts and preserving order. But political and social changes have been experienced in the tribal regions in recent years and this has had a considerable effect on the effectiveness of the tribal system and its success in ending the conflicts so that there is no security in these regions and the conditions are getting worse. It is also observed that conflicts among tribes have increased.⁵⁶

When examining the process after the unification, the government has proclaimed democratic development but in fact deliberately reinforced a functional

tribal system for the propose of having a strong role to play in governance. And tribes have shown resistance to state's power so trying to fulfill the specific requirements of democracy, perform the elections in an unsafe environment without strengthening governance has caused conflict and turmoil throughout the country.

Democracy can take shape with features that gain through individual and social values in society. In respect to this, meaning in terms of social values of democracy has preceded democracy features described on paper. Even if legal rules and political structure are constituted in accordance with the democratic system, they can gain a sense of depending on social values. The characteristics of a Western-style democracy make a sense, not with the legal specifications defined on paper, in terms of the values of the society. It is known that each society has different properties from the aspirations of individuals. Individual rights identified in the framework of a democratic regime, can vary depend on society, historical development and principles on which the relationship between society and the state. Because everything is based on mutual expectations between society and the state. These expectations may be different depending on economic developments, historical background, social change, cultural features. After all democracy is not only determined by the features on paper it should be defined taking into account the cultural values of society. The definition of democracy should be made not only according to the characteristics of democracy as expressed on paper but also analyzed in terms of cultural value to the community. Understanding of the concept of democracy according to the prevailing cultural values in society can affect the behavior of individuals in society, the structure and operation of all social institutions. Therefore, the whole issue, a system which should be the appropriate all values makes us human, should be defined to society and ultimately be adopted by the society. Otherwise, even if the system name of democracy, individuals can be crushed by society, other individuals or the state and freedoms and rights can be taken from the hand.⁵⁷

Yemeni Civil War (1994)

After parliamentary elections were held in 1993, political sensitivities began in the country and finally led to brief civil war in 1994 that change of balance in Yemen and continues to influence today. Civil war in 1994 altered conditions of democratic

transition and lead to transforming a democratic governance promise into an authoritarian, northern-dominated politics. Before examination of Yemen civil war history, recapture of prevailing governance strategies of Arab world would be appropriate because it is thought that they are an obstacle to the democratization process of the countries. Arab World governance strategies contains two different types, one of them is personalist regime, prevailing in Yemen, as it is seen in the resulting table which is obtained when the election process is examined in the previous chapter, the other is dynastic monarchies in which is ruled by royal family. Government mainly consists of ruler's family members and they are the decision-maker. Such regimes tend to stay in power for a long time and are closed against the reforms. This is one of the causes of the political unrest that led to civil wars in Yemen. Given the results of parliamentary elections in the country, it is obvious that Yemen has a 'power-sharing' problem.

Democratization process that began with high hopes has been tested in a brief civil war. Flaws in governance arrangement created a conflict which leads to civil war of 1994. Coup or single party dominance creates personalist regime. In general personalist regime ensures benefits to its own environment and tries to stay only power with absolute authority. This kind of regime which is aimed to ensure benefit only certain mass instead of whole country, leads to violence and turmoil in country and it is an absolute obstacle in front of democratization. The people who are not supporters of regime, are kept under control through certain fears over time. The supporters of regime generally consist of ethnic or tribal groups which are belong to ruler's own descent. If the ruler faces with any kind of revolt or rebellion in this regime, the reaction often involves violence as in the case of Yemen in 1994 civil war.⁵⁸

The failure of democratization efforts and evolving personalist/authoritarian regime which is far from the democratic features which is aimed to applied preliminarily, the failure of the one-state creation through unification along with the widespread political corruption of North Yemen, created uneasiness in the South Yemen.

Although the unification occurred jointly in North and South in 1990, the political environment in the aftermath has reveals the dominance of the North. Political

corruption has become widespread and the most of resources and income of the country has been gathered in the hands of the Northern elite. The privilege of the South was just obtained political representation in political terms and provided some economic benefits. Abdullah Bin Hussein Al-Ahmar who was a tribal leader and also head of Al-Islah party, was elected as speaker in the Parliament. The amendment was made to the council to ensure the participation of members of the ruling party to the governing council which led to political unrest. This unrest was resulted in exiled of Ali Salim Al-Bidhki who was Vice President in 1993. This increased political unrest and the tribes have benefited. The Prime Minister from former South Yemen has continued to serve but has failed. The negotiations between the north and the south continued in this political unrest, but the war broke out in May 1994.⁵⁹

It is obvious that the parliamentary election is the real beginning the Yemen Republic went into the war. Considering that the number of seats gained by political parties in election, the YSP won only a sixth of the seats in the new parliament, Southerner leaders were not satisfied with the results of the election are clearly visible. Southern leaders had been unable to get votes elections in the north. The population of the South was so low according to North and this was reflected in the parliamentary election results. The YSP leaders would remain at least equal partners with GPC but the results were failed to provide this hope. This situation is seen as one of the causes of civil war and request the South's secession. The Northern forces took advantage of the war and took Aden and Hadramawt. The war lasted for about two months, and the YSP leaders left the country, and Saleh reunited the country with power.⁶⁰

Houthi Rebellions

Mumin Youths which was a youth organization founded by Bedrettin Bin Emireddin al-Houthi in 1991 was transformed into an armed militia of Ansarrullah in June 2004. The reasons why the Houthis have been starting to armed struggle could be grouped under two headings. At this point, again, government policies of Saleh have been encountered. Security forces in Ali Abdullah Saleh's administration have been consisted of two structures system. One of them was the Republican Guardian which was adhered to the eldest son of Saleh, Ahmet; the other was the army adhered to Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. Because of the competition between the two forces, it is said that Ali

Abdullah Saleh has secretly armed the Houthis and provided them to fight with al-Ahmar. Another reason which allegedly maintains its validity today, Iran has given logistical support to the Houthis against the Saudi Arabia in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Peninsula. It is also stated that the Houthis has obtained serious weapons from the arms merchants, the tribes they had allied with, and from those who was against to Saleh in Yemeni army. With this power, they fought seven times with Yemeni army from 2004 to 2011.⁶¹

Houthi rebellions have prevented democratic developments in Yemen. Parliamentary elections were postponed because of rebellions. Government's response to the rebellion has also upset the balance. President has perceived the riots as an insult to his own regime and has responded mercilessly. Using tribal leaders against the rebels has also been escalating chaos in the country. According to Özbudun (2011), one of the main characteristics of authoritarian regimes have law enforcement agency which will quash any democratic initiative and counter demonstration in absolute terms.⁶² So one of the most obvious signs of oppressive rule in the country is the existence of military which is loyal to Saleh regime and try to take control opposition groups forming political threat to the regime in the country. Yemen is a community consist of tribes. Therefore, It is not easy to provide the personal dictatorship in countries. Indeed Saleh has ensured authoritarian power structure and has tried social and political life through patronage relationship. As we have discussed previously, tribalism in Yemen leads to deteriorate conflicts and tensions in the country and it also stands as the biggest obstacle in front of democratic development and political reforms. Because they are reluctance to share sovereignty over the territory and can easily be directed by both regimes and groups. When look closer events which take places from the unification, there is a state profile which is exposed to political repression by Saleh and his exponent and faced with insecurity triggered by different power centers. The best description about Yemen democratization experience made by Hinnebusch (2005):

“The contemporary experiments that became widespread across the region from the nineties might best be called “political liberalization without democratization”. In all these cases, the president remains politics and although he permits greater but still limited political liberalization, he is invariably in a position to “divide and rule” the political arena, not least by using his tremendous patronage powers. These are hardly democratization experiments

because inclusion in the game is limited to the upper/middle classes, with various impediments erected against the political mobilization of the masses. Hence, rule of law is advanced for property owners, but not to protect political freedoms; party pluralism is increased for the middle class, but if Islamists prove able to use the party system, barriers against their influence are erected.
»⁶³

The Southern Secession Movement

Southern Secession Movement, called as Hirak, has rooted dates back to the 1994 civil war. It is perhaps the most important problem for the United Yemen because it poses a threat to the integrity of the country. The reason why South Yemen want to leave the Yemen Republic is pretense of not benefit from political and social rights fairly within the country. It is claimed that the South has not been given the necessary care for restructuring and the foreign resources and government revenues allocated to the country have been spent on development and investment in Sana'a. The separatist south movement, which continues its existence today wants a local ruling body with the power to make decisions. Their demands can be summarized as prioritizing reforms that strengthen Yemen democracy and reducing corruption.⁶⁴

Over the years southerner movement has taken a new step. According to the consequences of the civil war that took place in 1994 with the Northern dominance, the balance in the country was out of the planned. The protest of the separatist movement turned into independence demands in 2007 on the anniversary of the unification. The demonstrators, composed of Southern Yemen soldiers, who retired in 1994 civil war in the majority, demanded that economic and social rights. However, security forces have been harsh intervention on the demonstrators. Northern domination of political, economic and social aspects, Saleh's privileges to his own relatives rather than the integrity of the country have become unbearable in the eyes of the South. The politics that ignore the demands of the South and the violence against the demonstrators are observed to put the integrity of the country in jeopardy.⁶⁵

But according to the Yemeni Government, Southern Mobility movement is secession movement that wants to turn the wheel of history back meaning immediately dropping the integration-based unity that brought together the two halves of the country into one state. The government also accuses the leaders of the Southern Mobility

Movement at home and abroad of being agents of certain sides and states, which are not usually named, as part of "a conspiracy against Yemeni unity. In the interview conducted by Al-Sharq al-Awsat with Ahmad Abbadi, the ruling General People's Congress official in Al-Dali Governorate;

"The Southern Mobility Movement began with its supporters making human rights-related demands concerning the salaries of [former] military men and pensioners, for example. They also staged protests denouncing the illegal appropriation of land in Aden. The Southern Mobility Movement exploited these issues and others. They exploited democracy. Then, chaos began with roads being blocked, tires burned in the streets, and gunfire."⁶⁶

There are also divisions within the South Movement. While some argue for the necessity of Southern separation, another focuses on the applicability of different types of governance. The proposed solution is to set up federations so that each governor can take their own political decisions.⁶⁷

The ongoing process since 1994 clearly shows that political, social, military and economic integration has not been achieved in Yemen. This situation is a major obstacle to the formation of Yemen's 'one state'.

Arab Spring and Yemen

When all the problems that preceded the Arab spring are taken into consideration, the ultimate answer to be obtained is that if there were no protests in other countries due to democratic demands, Yemen would certainly have scenarios similar to Arab Spring. Because unrest since the unification has not been solved by taking the demands into consideration, it has led to the hegemony of one side. In Yemen, unification has been achieved but integration has not been achieved.

Parallel to the popular uprising that occurred in the Arab countries, on February 11, 2011 Yemenis has demanded reforms by protested in capital Sanaa. Houthis have also participated in the demonstrations in the country. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh was attacked in June 2011 the mosque in the presidential palace. After the attack, Saleh went to Saudi Arabia for treatment. Upon the ongoing demonstrations, Saleh has handed over the presidency to vice president Abdurabbu Mansur el-Hadi. Mansur Hadi has established a cabinet comprising opposition and pro-government political groups for

the establishment of a new government. Chaired by Mansur Hadi, the presidential election was conducted on February 21, 2012 in Yemen. Mansur Hadi has entered the presidential election as uncontested. The country's opposition has presented a prerequisite to Hadi to make changes in the constitution, parliamentary elections and electoral law within two years. In March 2013, National Dialogue Conference began under the supervision of the United Nations Special Representative of Yemen. The Government, the separatist Southern Movement and Ensarullah (Houthis) have joined in conference. According to the statement from the conference, Yemen's security problems, the issue of Sana'a, solution and recommendations to the southern opposition's demands have been included in conference. And also decided that as a president, term of office of Mansur Hadi has extended a year to complete the transition process. Conflicts and political crises continue even if the dialogue process in Yemen.⁶⁸

When Mansur Hadi has continued to work ensuring unity in Yemen, sabotage to oil pipelines, damage to the electrical infrastructure and fighting between security forces and local groups have continue to bloodshed in Yemen. Meanwhile Mansur Hadi unexpectedly have begun to fight central power that was relative Saleh. Therefore, Yemenis have though that Hadi has continued to revolution. The southern separatists have continued to struggle to succession from Sanaa and rejected to call for dialogue. Houthis have established their administration in areas that are heavily populated. Despite the fact that, Houthis have taken their place in the dialogue process. Besides that some structural and social problems have maintained their presence.⁶⁹

On March 26, 2015 Saudi Arabia launched operation "Decisive Storm" in Yemen against the Houthis. The operation began on March 26 announced that ended on April 21 and announced on the same day that another operation called the Restoring Hope started. The leadership of operation has belonged to Saudi Arabia. So the most extensive contribution has made by Saudi Arabia.

Mansur Hadi had left from Yemen and gone Riyadh on 26 March when the operations and air raids started. He could return to the country in September after six month. Aden has become the center of resistance against Houthis after Hadi have left from country. Hadi supporters and southern secessionist have passed against defense to Houthis attacks. Southern secessionist, although a group advocating the independence

of South Yemen, has acted with Hadi supporters in the fight against the Houthis. Houthis have also strongly tended to Aden. operations of the coalition forces in Aden have began intensively in the same period. Coalition forces have carried out an intense aerial bombardment in the region Houthis control. All of regions monitored by the Houthis were under attack.

As mentioned before, Hadi has been appointed by Saleh, and also he was vice president at Saleh Headed. But in an audio recording leaked by Al-Jazeera on January 21, 2015, it has emerged that Ali Abdullah Saleh gave support to Houthis rebels. Audio recording have showed that Abdullah Saleh's coordinate to Houthis military and political steps. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh has seized Sana'a forming an alliance with the Houthis which waged a war in 2009. For this reason, it has been said that Saleh has succumbed to power lust and endanger the national security of the country agreement with Houthis. In 1978, Ali Abdullah Saleh headed the government in the North and 1990 he headed the all country after the unification. So it has occurred the construction of an authoritarian regime like other Arabian countries. The regime has a liberal outlook in the first place but has taken a system which is an absence of public participation and the suppression of the opposition through relationships with tribal patronage in the country. Al-Qaeda, causes the international intervention and Houthis, have begun to revolt to demand independence since 2004, have strengthened civil unrest across the country and also government pressure has reached a high level in public places. The Arab Spring uprising has become an opportunity to hit out of anger accumulated over the years of the Yemeni people. Hadi has taken place at the beginning of the transition process, but there is an important point Hadi has been on Saleh's side for years, so it is clear that the existence of a process of transition and change in the shadow of the status quo. Because of Saleh's sons and his relatives has been a strong effect on economy and military and Saleh has established a good relation with Saudi Arabia for many years, the construction of a fully democratic regime in Yemen and the transition process is adversely affected. It is quite clear that the revolution in Yemen has not yet been completed because It has not met enough Yemenis social and economic expectations in the new area. Support for the formation of the GPC former president party and Houthis clearly show that Yemenis need quick solutions for future. While

fatal problems faced by the people in the country, US led war against the Houthis. According to news obtained from The Guardian (Oct 13, 2016):

“The United States has launched its first strike on Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen in retaliation for days of attacks on a navy warship, becoming an active combatant in a brutal war led by Washington’s ally Saudi Arabia. “These limited self-defense strikes were conducted to protect our personnel, our ships, and our freedom of navigation,” Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook said. A Houthi military official denied the fighters had fired at US vessels. “Those claims are baseless,” the official said, according to rebel-controlled Saba news agency.”⁷⁰

Will it continue this intervention or what will be the consequences, it is unclear right now. Ahmed El Asiri, the operative spokesman of the coalition under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, has announced that air operation which was called “Decisive Storm” ended. Saudi Arabia announced that the air operation against Yemen's Shia Houthis reached its goal. However, the reality is very different. Saudi Arabia has continued to bomb Yemen. And the growing tension between the two countries negatively affects Yemen's political stalemate. The Yemeni people, who had a poor and dense population before the Arab Spring, are struggling under increasing difficulties. International aid is critical for economic and social crises. There is already a political conflict in Yemen. Having to contend with the neighboring country in such an environment causes the solution to be very insoluble. For this reason, it will be a correct step to allow countries to emerge from their internal dynamics. It is necessary to ensure proper control and distribution of international aid, but fighting a country that is already in a civil war will have no consequences aside from innocent peoples death.

CHAPTER 2

Discussion on Failed State Discourses

Nowadays, States that are unable to handle legal and social order because of civil unrest, poverty, dictatorship, and terrorism are seen as 'failed state'. Contrary to this general opinion, there is no definition of failed state that has been the consensus in academic terms. With the end of the Cold War, new states have emerged and many of them have faced serious problems regarding effectively fulfilling state functions. In this context, the state problems in many parts of the world have become the most debated issues in an international arena and political science. In addition to academic researches on failed state discourse, this term is often used by international media and politicians. The concept of failed state was first used by Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner in 1992. In their article 'Saved Failed State', Helman and Steven described these state as deprived of the capacity to commit themselves as part of the international community. In addition to these, when violence, economic collapsed and anarchy have evolved within the boundary of these countries, they have rendered danger for neighboring countries due to political instability and migration flows.⁷¹ Without doubt, the concern in all analyses and strategies on international security forms the basis of failed state discourses.

Another important contribution to failed state discourse is made by Zartman. According to him:

“State can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as states. Essential duties of the state are no longer performed, as analyzed in various theories of the state. As the decision-making center of government, the state is paralyzed and inoperative; laws are not made, the order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced. As a symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and meaning to their social action. As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisioned by a central sovereign organization. As the authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. As a system of socioeconomic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed; it no longer receives supports from nor exercises controls over its people, and it no longer is even the target of demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing

supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the right to rule.’’⁷²

I think, Zartman has approached the theory as a result oriented. Up to the end of this conclusion, countries could go through many stages including state-formation. At this point, a separation is needed. Because each country has owns different social, political, cultural and even geographical background. Having all these different country structures connected to the same conclusion and identifying them in the same way may cause ignored realities of these countries. I think the most important methodological flaw is originated from this approached because it brings light on with such a general approach to a situation that requires special focus points. Moreover, all consequences of being failed state mentioned by the author are the possible situation to encounter in all over the world. In many countries, the decision-making a mechanism may be hindered, halted, laws could not be enforced, and social upheaval or violence could occur. At this juncture, the standard that specifies whether the state is unsuccessful or successful is how it copes with these problems.

Zartman has mentioned about ‘neighborhood intervention’ in his thesis. When state collapsed, neighboring states are abused the collapsed state by political oppression. At this day and age, countries located in the Middle East and North Africa get a lot of press lately with regional or international intervention. If we handle the subject with Zartman’s theory;

“Neighboring states encroach on the collapsing state’s sovereignty by involving themselves in its politics directly and by hosting dissident movements which play politics from neighboring sanctuaries.’’⁷³

This approach maintains its reality today. Neighboring states oppress countries that experience political or economic turmoil and occasionally in military interventions. These interventions claiming that the countries will reach prosperity and peace have resulted in deterritorialization because they have been carried out without regard to civilian, military, terrorist. This conclusion confirms Zartman's thesis, but I would like to point out that; I think all these interventions are not the result of the being 'failed state' as claimed. On the contrary, they induce to the state’s failure entailing these states into insolvency and confusion.

Robert I. Rotberg is another scholar who has an important contribution to the failed state discourses. Like Zartman, Rotberg also receives 'international security' as the basis of his thesis. According to Rotberg, the achievement of the desired sustainability and stability in the international arena has been hampered by the failure or collapse of the new states. Failed state has a bad, mixed and violent atmosphere. According to Rotberg, all failed states have conflict and social disharmony. And in these states, the regime depends on its component. The regime has its heritage. The regime recognizes the privilege of its components. Moreover, unlike strong states, control is weak in places that are geographically remote from the state center in failed state. Violence is another feature of failed state. Violence is increased because of weak state authority. Failed states could not provide basis features of being a modern nation-state. Institutions could not work actively. There is no trust the law. Economic opportunity belongs to those who close the authority. Corruption is widespread.⁷⁴

Beginning with the end of Cold War, the 1990s have been the scene of a rapid spread of democracy in the world. Countries experiencing the process of restructuring are often referred as underdeveloped countries with authoritarian and conservative regimes. The wave of democratization that began in many countries in the 1990s has also brought about problems which Rotberg used to describe the failed state. Many countries have not been able to complete the regime change that desired to be made or have processed a mixed regime. The most obvious example of the authoritarian regimes which are elected. In Central Asia and Middle East, the names of those who have ruled the state for almost two decades are the same in many countries. And in the election period, they have been elected with high voting rates. The question that needs to be addressed at this point is whether these states called as failed state, are the ones that have progressed towards the end of the road or are they still trying to complete the process of democratization? I think the foundation that will enable us to make this distinction does not exist at 'failed state theories'. Maybe every state in the world have similar problems, but eventually, it has gone through different processes on the way to these challenges. Each one has various economic, political, cultural and even geographical features. And all these characteristic features should be evaluated separately in a historical perspective.

Jack Straw who is an English politician associates presence of state failure with the interception of the support of the great powers after the Cold War. And Straw also emphasizes that the interest on failed states should be increased due to the chaos and anarchy in these countries and the humanitarian disasters that has been developed in response to them, the terrorist attacks on 9/11 has indicated that these countries threaten international security. State failure cannot be seen as a local or regional problem. For this reason, it should be developed an absolutely correct foreign policy for these countries. Straw explains the emergence of failed states with population growth. Population growth triggers violence and warfare because these states remain incapable of meeting demands and needs of the community after a rapid increase in population. Especially, population growth is particularly rapid in poor countries and this contributes to the state failure. The aid from these countries was cut off by the end of the Cold War, these countries do not have the capacity to be effective in areas such as social, health, education that needs to a community so the fragile balances have been changed radically. Jack Straw explains how to identify an unsuccessful country and how to implement a policy for that country. Emphasizes that countries should be defined just as patients:

“ In medicine, doctors look at a wide range of indicators to spot patients who are at high risk of certain medical conditions-high cholesterol, bad diet, heavy smoking for example. This does not mean they ignore everyone else or that some of those exhibiting such characteristics are not able to enjoy long narrow down the field and focus their efforts accordingly. We should do the same with countries.”⁷⁵

Straw states that a failed state can define in general according to certain criteria. Like the other theorist, he focuses on the control of country borders and keeping the safety of the citizen on the front first of all. The others could be listed as the sustainability of the order, the protection of human rights and the basic needs of the society. The indicator that he has added by separating from the other theorists is the economy stable or based on certain sectors, agricultural production? In addition to these indicators, high rates of epidemics also weaken the major institutions of the country and affect the economy. However, Straw emphasizes that these indicators are not enough for the determination of state failure. By taking many indicators into consideration, a diagram of the failure process could be drawn and the most important point could be

determined. Boundaries can be drawn by matching the process and the obtained marks. According to Straw, next most important question is about international policy, could it be applied to these countries? How can the state's failure be prevented? Just at this point, he says that establishing a state is difficult and takes centuries. And he has added: "It took us centuries to make ours"⁷⁶ In my opinion, the most important problem in discourse of failed state and afterwards how to intervene in the failed state is that not considering the fact that the process of state formation in these countries, which have already gained independence in the recent past, may not have been completed yet. These countries have lived under the rule of a great empire for centuries, until recently. For this reason, the problems experienced by many of these countries may be originated from the process of state formation. The main question to be asked here in which ways we could relax this process and how we could ensure that these countries could be born from their dynamics.

Another contribution to failed state discourse made by David Carment. Carment exemplifies failed and collapsed states as Congo, Somalia, Liberia, and Bosnia. These states are unable to protect the people living within their borders. The economy is weak and basic services such as health and education become unmanageable. Crime, corruption, and violence are out of control. Moreover, this leads to the emergence of opponent groups. These groups often resort to armed struggle. With these conflicts, people are forced to move, scarcity and outbreaks increases. All these features show the failure of the state. According to Carment, identifying state failure only with assessing the past, present and future performances of countries is not enough. In addition to this, its performance should be evaluated in comparison with other states. This approach distinguishes the consequences of state failure from the causes of state failure. Many scholars working on failed state discourses have encountered with experimental dilemmas. These dilemmas explain with this sentence;

"Each puzzle is drawn from the perspectives of systemic transformation, state-society relations and violent interactions and events."⁷⁷

According to Jean-Germain Gros, there are five different types for failed state. One of them, 'anarchic states' which have not got central government. In these states, the presence of armed groups is widespread, and these groups are sometimes managed by their own and sometimes by a commander. They struggle to seize a region, a city or

even sometimes an institution or building has strategic priorities. The second one is 'phantom or mirage state' which shows its efficiency in a certain area. The third is 'anemic state'. In such states, power is hampered by insecure groups seeking to seize authority. In fact, there is not much that can be done in these states; either the state authorities will fight these groups, or they will evaluate the demands of these groups and create a middle-class solution. The fourth type is the 'captured states'. These states have a strong central authority. But this authority has been seized by insecure elites. The reason for this situation is that the elite in the country could not agree on common management rules. The fifth type is the 'aborted states'. In this failed state discourse, there was a failure even before the state formation process.⁷⁸

The contribution of Gros to failed state discourses seems to could not go beyond creating subspecies. Because classifying certain apparent truth contributes to the lack of problem and the difficulty of solution. For example, the fourth type of failed state description is the naming of the power-sharing problem in these countries. And I think, this is not a type of failure, but rather a phase of the state-building process. Because of being a natural process that all sections of society want to gain represent in authority. And the ability to find mutual self-sacrifice at this stage has accelerated this process. Civil war and violence tendencies appear in societies that could not catch this self-sacrifice, and this situation is clearly visible today. But it must not be forgotten that chaos and civil war may not result in political catastrophes that lead to state failure. Mentioned elite struggle, the atmosphere of mutual negotiation and even civil wars could contribute to the formation of a state. Because of the states are the result of a long historical process involving violence and war.

The issue highlighted by Ignatieff is failed states and human rights. It is impossible to talk about the existence of human rights in a country where could not handle principal institutions. If a society is being threatened by civil war, armed groups and troubled governments, it could not be safe here. Perhaps most importantly, there is not much that could be done for these countries. Because under these circumstances international human rights and humanitarian organizations may not be able to do much more than to protect those in need. In this sense, state sovereignty should regard human rights as basic prerequisites instead of being enemies of these rights. It is imperative that established a legal system to protect human rights in countries where the state order is

unsustainable. This is a precondition for the existence and protection of human rights. Ignatieff says there are many failed states. These states pose a threat both to neighboring countries and to international security. It emphasizes those countries with bad neighbors are at risk. These neighbors are home to terrorist organizations, causing drug production and major migration flows. Afghanistan, for example, is the clearest national security threat today according to Ignatieff.⁷⁹

Until now, the chapter is included the authors have contributed to the theoretical research. Seen as a discourse attempted to come up with different aspects, the common consequence that every author makes out in the failed state discourse is the 'international security threat'. A country deals with in this regard may become open to intervention by other nations. This intervention can be tolerable if it can be in the form of humanitarian aid, but it evolves more towards armed struggles and responses. According to William Easterly and Lauro Freschi, who criticized failed state theory:

“State failure is leading to confused policy making. For example, it is causing the military to attempt overly ambitious nation-building and development to approach counter-terrorism, under the unproven assumption that “failed states” produce terrorism.”⁸⁰

Another important contribution of William Easterly is to reveal the past connections of this discourse. According to the study conducted by Easterly and colleagues, states whose political boundaries are drawn without regard to the demands of the people of the country which are called artificial states, and today they are called failed states. Conflicts and economic difficulties are obvious in these states whose borders left by the former colonial states. These boundaries are drawn regardless of the wishes of the people of the country. Drawing boundaries can be listed as follows. First, they gave border to a group, where another group has the right to a frontier. Second, they have drawn borders, without regard to the present differences, and finally, have combined groups that want independence under a single border. The results have produced an atmosphere of conflict and insecurity that has led to failed state discourses today. Now again these countries are interested and emphasize that intervention should increase.⁸¹

When we look at the research on the civil war that is the fundamental assumptions of failed state discourse, It has come to the conclusion that this process can

contribute to the state's capacity rather than the state's failure. In failed state theory, civil wars are the cause of the disappearance of the state authority, the emergence of armed groups, epidemics, migration waves and leading to not only regional threats but also an international security threat. At this point, each writer who contributed to this discourse focused on 'intervention' options. But according to UCDP Conflict Termination Database which is constituted with the examination of the civil war processes that ended between 1960 and 2000, the civil war is a glory to raise the capacities of both the state and the rebels. Moreover, in countries where occurs civil war, the availability of lootable resources provides sources for rebellions and helps them to increase their capacity but finally developing capacity can be transferred to the state.⁸² I would like to add that civil wars lead to human suffering but it is necessary to not make a definite judgment without observation and research to be able to evaluate this situation for the failure of the state. Because international interventions that we can evaluate within the framework of failed state, make the civil war in countries unresolved and increase the likelihood of human catastrophes. Failed state discourse provides valid reasons for these interventions.

Jack Goldstone collects the roads leading to state failure in five headings:

- “1. Escalation of communal group (ethnic or religious) conflicts Examples: Rwanda, Liberia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon
2. State predation (corrupt or crony corralling of resources at the expense of other groups) Examples: Nicaragua, Philippines, and Iran
3. Regional or guerrilla rebellion Examples: Colombia, Vietnam
4. Democratic collapse (leading to civil war or coup d’etat) Examples: Nigeria, Madagascar, Nepal
5. Succession or reform crisis in authoritarian states Examples: Indonesia under Suharto, Iran under the Shah, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev”⁸³

These titles are handled separately by Goldstone, first ‘mode’ of failed state could be summarized briefly; the ethnic or religion groups within the country do not accept the policies of the government and thus these groups evolve towards the rebellion, at this point government authorities have no power to prevent the revolts. One of the reasons of these rebellions is discriminatory, governments exclude these groups

economically and socially, and when the government loses its 'effectiveness' in later developing processes, it loses power of control. After the loss 'effectiveness' of government, groups which start to rebellion and enemies which against to regime, attack to obtain the place of the ruling. In other cases, increasing conflicts begin with the 'ineffectiveness' of democratic government. Although government is democratic, conflicts within the country can be triggered if ethnic or regional groups believe that corrupt and bribery is common. If the government is weak about suppressing the rebellion, riots could spread and the regime could be threatened. However the group or its representatives, who are elected by democratic elections, want to take control of the society and government, and if corruption and discrimination increase, the government loses its legitimacy. This situation triggers the enemy of the ruler and lead to the challenge of other groups subjected to discrimination. Second mode is State 'predatory' attitude; authoritarian regimes can remain in power for many years and can be supported by prominent political and economic communities within the country. Thus it can provide the necessary support to stay at the head of government. But if the practices of the authoritarian regime threaten the elites and institutions in the country and if it enriches himself and its surroundings, enmity against the regime occurs. Third mode is similar with ethnic rebels. But rebellious group is an economic class or regional group. It happens because of discrimination in the same way. Then government 'ineffectiveness' encourages other groups to join the rebellion and makes the regime vulnerable. Fourth is about democracy. Democratic regimes usually have legitimacy if they include and respect the interests of various groups. The main problem of newly emerging democracies is that they are 'ineffective' and inadequate in meeting economic and social needs. Democratic regimes may be paralyzed by tribalism or may be rendered 'ineffective' as lack of adequate resources to ensure population security. In such cases, the democracies that are perceived as 'ineffective' are often replaced by military regimes. Fifth, crises experienced in authoritarian regimes originated from inability of manage the balances between direct state 'effectiveness' and state legitimacy. In successive crises, government whose legitimacy depends on the existence of a single powerful ruler and his political skill, leads different groups to struggle for power.⁸⁴

Goldstone's failed state description is quite extensive, unlike other authors. However, for the conditions and circumstances which alleged to lead state failure, summarized under the five groups, there is an important issue that needs to be emphasized. Firstly, the distinction between state and government has not been taken into consideration in these explanations. These two terms are often used interchangeably. But the state is more comprehensive than the government. While the government is temporary, the state is a structure with continuity. Governments come and go in a state system and the governmental system can be structured through reforms. The vast majority of situations that Goldstone sees as the cause of failure can be attributed to events that take place today. Countries that have been governed by the authorities' regime for many years have made significant strides but faced challenge due to structural problems come from the past. Many of these problems result in social upheavals. And these problems mostly based on democratization process which has not yet been completed. Just as the failed state discourses based on western-style state formation attempt to give a general name by ignoring the economic, social and political development and background of other countries, while supporting the efforts of democratization, the existing structures of these countries were ignored. For this reason, democratization process has been experienced quite painful and even severe in these countries. I would like to emphasize that it will not be enough to expand the definitions for failed state discourse, if the point of view (especially the attitude of the West) is not deep enough.

Robert H. Jackson is one of the contributors of failed state discourses. While Jackson is defining 'failed state', he refers to 'security dilemma' of Hobbes. According to Jackson, peace exists in these countries internationally, but war is only due to internal causes. And if a state is inadequate to meet the basic needs of the people, it is unnecessary for this state to exist. Anarchy and chaos gain a seat in these countries. Jackson emphasizes that the reason of being inadequate in meeting the basic needs of their people and chaos are the state itself. Another contribution of Jackson, failed state is not related to post-cold war period. Failed state is a reality associated with collapsed of empires:

“They are a price of unrestricted self-determination of former - usually colonial dependencies. They have an international existence only because their

independence is underwritten by international society including the great powers. That external guarantee is primarily owing to the emergence of a post-colonial international society that is highly tolerant of different degrees of statehood across the world. People living in former colonies have an unhindered right to independence within the framework of the former colonial borders if they want it. Recognition of governments is declaratory and not constitutive, i.e., it is not conditional on empirical statehood domestically. That post-colonial international guarantee has brought into existence a significant number of insubstantial or marginal or even nominal states: what for lack of a better term might be called "quasi-states" of which some have clearly failed, or collapsed, and cease to be "states" in any significant empirical meaning of the term.'⁸⁵

Jackson's failed state discourse has a stricter approach than other authors and has a tendency to ignore the societies that obtain their independence. However, this approach ignores that all of the countries around the world are somehow integrated with one another and will not reflect the reality of limiting the state's failure to the internal capacity of a country. Another important point is that establishing a regular state system in countries that have acquired their independence late could not happen overnight. To declare as failed the countries who have lived under the rule of other powers throughout their history and who have no experience of standing on their feet is an unfair approach as soon as empires destroyed. Europe's history shows that violence, social and economic distortions are part of the state-building process. It is necessary to keep in mind the fact that these countries have not yet completed their state formation.

There are authors who criticize failed state discourses, as well as writers who contribute to failed state discourses. Branwen Gruffydd Jones is one of these writers. Somalia is called a failed state by international media organizations, institutions, and scholar. But according to Jones;

“The forces which led to the disintegration of Somali society into intractable violent conflict during the 1990s, after the final overthrow of Barre’s regime, are rooted in the colonial and postcolonial contradictions of the local and regional political economy, which were heavily militarized by international intervention governed by geo-strategic logics. However, the significance of the ‘failed state’ discourse lies not simply in its lack of explanatory power. This discourse, in persistently mischaracterizing social conditions and misidentifying their causes, serves to legitimize and reproduce the very imperial qualities of international order which lie at the heart of so-called ‘state failure’.”⁸⁶

Jones who underscores the link between imperialism and failed state discourses, emphasizes that this discourse is the instrument for legitimizing imperialist intervention. Intervention in countries outside Europe, in order to establish new social, economic arrangements in these countries need a reason and failed state discourse and the accompanying 'weak', 'collapse', 'fragile' state discourses legitimize these interventions. Explaining this situation through the example of Somalia, it emphasizes that the intervention of Western powers and regional allies in Somalia has prolonged and deteriorated the conditions of violence and collapse. Their democratic or moderate powers have weakened and their reactions powers have strengthened.⁸⁷

The general concern about the apparent theoretical weakness of the failed state thesis is summarized by Woodward who argues that it has generated:

“...very bad or superficial research. The measures are abysmal, the studies are tautological (the same empirical measures are used for both cause and outcome), and there is no real effort at causal analysis, identifying the causal links between state fragility and these outcomes of concern.”⁸⁸

Woodward adds that the term failed state is not defined in a way that makes it possible to analyze empirically. Failed state discourse includes uncertainty and presupposition. Failed state speech consists of 'indicators' which are expected situations in failed states.⁹¹ According to Woodward, failed state discourses are insufficient to explain 'the internal social dynamics of the state' and this is due to the theoretical inability to explain state formation. As I mentioned before, the failed state discourse does not distinguish between the state, the government and the organizations that provide security and welfare and Woodward addresses this situation mentions that the conceptual decomposition of the failed state theory is also insufficient. And he adds:

“Only when they are derived from the will of the governed can these institutions become public institutions. The state further comprises those institutions that are materializations of sovereign political power; it is the sovereign that instantiates its power and purposes in institutions.”⁸⁹

The state covering the institutional capacity and called as strong according to the theory may be weak in terms of the social values of society. The collapse of some institutions may be a prerequisite for building on a new social basis, rather than a sign of state failure. And Woodward finally adds that crises throughout history, and

especially civil wars, have been a cause for the beginning of changes in society, and this has contributed to the transformation of society and state relations.⁹⁰

Pinar Bilgin and Adam David Morton have emphasizes that there are not enough references to the process that will make these countries 'unsuccessful' and 'successful' to the other countries. In short, processes that lead to state failure are hardly explained at all. The reasons of failure of these countries are explained by the internal character of the country, and there is not enough reference to the countries' international political position or colonial past. According to Bilgin and Morton, approach to failed state discourses resembles two worlds approaches in post-Cold War international security debates. The place where peace is in the center, where the environment is dominated by violence. Bilgin and Morton emphasize that failed state discourses facilitate the intervention just as other authors with critical views. Another important point that they emphasize about this discourse is the effect of international aid and regulation programs. These organizations have exacerbated political and social welfare in developing countries. According to Bilgin and Morton:

“Further attention needs to be drawn to the institutional processes that have impacted on and constructed conditions of state failure, which are often embedded within wider institutional practices throughout the global political economy that contribute to weakening state capacity. Recognition of globally embedded state failure within IMF structures and policies that have insisted on cutting back the state itself, effectively dismantling modes of authority, mechanisms of social regulation and the maintenance of social bonds within developing states, is therefore essential.”⁹¹

Analyzes of Branwen Jones, once again emphasizes that failed states and related concepts are fragile states, collapsed states are used as a means of foreign policy in the United States, the UK, Canada, Australia and the EU. 'Failed state' discourses and other concepts are used for regions outside these countries in defining certain crisis conditions. Jones notes that the analytical and explanatory framework of the theory is flawed. And this concept continues to be used frequently without in-depth research. Jones classifies this discourse as follows: The ideological approach of the first concept. The concept of a 'failed state' is associated with the ideology of empire and legitimizes intervention. The problem with the 'failed state' discourse is not related with the social,

economic and political formations, but the consequences. The idea of 'state failure' has been adopted so easily because it focuses on clear and precise facts.⁹²

Another important issue about failed state discourses is that the name changed. Countries that have been called failed states have been announced since 2005 by the 'failed state index'. The aim of publishing this index is to ensure that the states that do not comply with the criteria set by the index, have a risk to people living within the boundaries and thus give the necessary attention to these countries. However, in 2014 the name of this index was changed. While explaining the cause of this change, they admit that the term "failed state" is full of problems, but they emphasize that their aim is to draw attention to these countries. The organization indicates that they have reached to aim of obtaining of interest to these states. The reason for going to the name change is that there is much debate about the terminology out of the real purpose and that it is used outside of its purpose by the politicians. The organization describes the purpose of creating the index and the reasons for the name change as follows;

“Our primary goal in creating the Index is to enable people to use it as a platform to discuss what is happening in their countries. We also create it to encourage government responsibility, set priorities, and identify resources to face challenges. We didn't publish it every year to discuss what defined a “failed state;” we created it every year to help prevent the conditions that led to them. Overall our goal has always been to help improve human security in countries all over the world. So while the term certainly gained people's attention, it also became a distraction from the point of the Index, which is to encourage discussions that support an increase in human security and improved livelihoods.”⁹³

I think the decision of name change is a sign that there is little difference between the terms failing, fragile, failing, rogue, and all of them have the same approach at the basis. This leads to questioning the actual purpose of these labels.

In general, failed state discourse discusses the state within the framework of Max Weber's modern state definition. Max Weber defines the state as:

“Human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”⁹⁴

And also states are expected to maintain core functions such as security and well-being of community. When states that fail to meet these core services, have been

labeled as 'failed'. This approach may well be enough to describe a Western-style state formation. The process of formation and development of many states around the world has developed differently from the western style of modern state understanding. Ibn Khaldun has made important research for Arab peninsula state-formation. Although he has made the definition of the formation of Arab societies that lived centuries ago, Ibn Khaldun's views are important in the sense of political-social connotation in contemporary Arab geography. Khaldun developed the concept of 'asabiyyah' when he talked about the process of state formation. According to Khaldun, Asabiyyah refers to tribal solidarity. Asabiyyah refers to cooperation and competition for obtain power, united with other cooperation to an establishment of the state. It is defense and struggle. Ibn Khaldun in the Muqaddime describes this situation as follows:

“aggressive and defensive strength is obtained only through group feeling which means (mutual) affection and willingness to fight and die for each other.”⁹⁵

It is emphasized by Ibn Khaldun that the process of state formation is quite different from the Weberian state view and that the power struggle is part of the state formation in these geographical areas. The concept of asabiyyah refers to group feeling. In addition, the causes of the current rebellion and violence are emphasized by Ibn Khaldun. It is easy to establish a state free of group emotions because the struggle of the government to the existing people can be calmly determined, there will be no rebellion, and no group feeling will be needed. However, in a state with different groups and tribes, group empathy reveals the importance of asabiyyah;

“It should be known that followers in a dynasty occupy different positions in (the) dynasty depending on whether their close contact with the ruler is of old or of recent date. The reason for this is that the purpose of group feeling, which is defense and aggression, can materialize only with the help of common descent. For, as we have stated before, blood relations and other close relatives help each other, while strangers and outsiders do not. Client relationships and contacts with slaves or allies have the same effect as (common descent). The consequences of (common) descent, though natural, still are something imaginary. The real thing to bring about the feeling of close contact is social intercourse, cooperative association, long familiarity, and the companionship that results from growing up together, having the same wet nurse, and sharing the other circumstances of death and life. If close contact is established in such a manner, the result will be affection and cooperation.”⁹⁶

Another important point is that if there are more than one tribe in a region, the greatest and strongest asabiyyah prevails and makes them self-conscious. The strongest asabiyyah, after having dominated his tribe, wants to dominate other asabiyyah. For this reason, Ibn Khaldun power agreement or cooperation does not coincide with the monopoly power center and emphasizes competitive political field for state formation.⁹⁷

The failed state discourses are based on the assumption that these countries can not manage themselves and could not protect their borders. This approach is reminiscent of the mandate system, which is coming after the first world war. According to the mandate system, the administration of the countries to be separated from the central states will be left to the League of Nations. Nations supposed to have not yet been able to become independent will be kept under guard until this ability is attained. This protection would be carried out by a large state. This system was a continuation of colonialism under legal assurances. Nowadays, it can be considered as a continuation of the system of mandate system which is desired to be implemented under the name of failed state discourse. Thus, every writer who contributes to failed state discourses stresses that these countries have acquired new independence after the Cold War and that they do not have the strength to sustain their independence. From this approach, they argue that these countries are threatening international security because of rebellion, civil war and migration, and that they have prepared a suitable environment for terrorist organizations to continue their activities. For this reason, it is advisable to organize policies for increasing interest in these countries and reconstruction.

Finally, in short, to sum up the contributions made to failed state discourses, Zartman, Helman, and Steven generally emphasize that failed states could not fulfill the conditions of being state. The condition of being a state is expressed as follows; Fulfillment of the law, protection of order, social unity, protecting the borders and ensuring the security of the community. In addition, Zartman touch upon authoritarian regimes. According to Zartman, authoritarian regimes could not conduct public relations because they have lost legitimacy.

Neighboring countries have military or political interventions in these countries. Rotberg, on the other hand, emphasizes that these countries threaten international security with a wider perspective. According to Rotberg, failed states are violence and

conflict area. In these states, the only benefit of the regime is its own environment and all privileges are in the hands of the elite. Unlike strong states, these states are not as dominant as distant regions in their borders. Jack Straw develops a different perspective and questions the reasons for the failure of the states. The reason for the emergence of these states is tied to the end of the Cold War, because these states have gained assistance and aid from the great powers but after the Cold War they had to fight on their own. And like any other writer, it is stressed that failed states give rise to chaos and anarchy and lead to humanity crisis. Another important contribution is that population growth triggers state failure. Carment emphasizes similar points and describes the failed states as follows; These states are unable to protect the people within their borders and are unable to meet basic needs such as health and education. Crime, violence, bribery have come out of control and armed groups are widespread. The point that distinguishes the Carment from the other writers is that they should be compared to other countries by means of the performance when evaluating failed states. Gros categorized failed states into subheadings, five different types of failed states; Anarchy, mirage, anemic, captured and aborted state. Ignatieff emphasizes the violation of human rights in failed states. Jack Goldstone applies the same classification as Gros and summarizes the path to state failure briefly as follows:

- Ethnic, religious grouping
- Corruption and looting of resources
- Regional guerrilla revolts
- Collapse of democracy
- Reformative crisis

Finally, Jackson has a similar approach to Straw, linking the existence of state failure to the collapse of empires.

Failed state discourses are in important diagnoses and present problems that many countries face today. Nevertheless, it still contains significant shortcomings. The first point I want to mention is that although it points to specific problems, it has not enough contribute to explain the cause and processes of state failure. Moreover, every

state is classified in the light of the same criteria. Yet states have different political, social and geographical characteristics. Separate evaluation of all these features is important in determining whether these countries are truly failed states. It may also be an incomplete approach to describe authoritarian regimes as a path to state failure. In authoritarian regimes, bribery, corruption and looting of resources are defined. These characteristics could be observed to be widespread in some countries, but there is no civil war or violence tendency in all countries. Of course, these events do not justify bribery and discrimination. But the statements of state failure could not explain why some authoritarian states were dragged into civil war and others did not show the characteristics of violence and civil war and only to generalize.

The common point reached by all failed state discourses is that these states are the scene of violence, unrest and civil war. But the existence of war and political violence may not imply the failure of the state and its collapse. The existence of political or military intervention made by neighboring countries to the so-called failed states is an observed condition and is emphasized by the authors who contribute to the discourse. I would like to point out that I participated to opinion of Jack Straw and similarly Jackson about the reasons for the so-called failed states. The point I leave these writers is that these states should not be named as 'failed'. Because it could not be solved in the short term to be able to sustain the independence obtained after long years of living under the dominion of the great powers and the most important point, there may be uncertainties about the state formation, which can trigger different groups within the country. For this reason, the extreme processes that are said to lead to the failure of the state is quite usual situation to find their own dynamics in economic, political and social sense. Even though not experienced in the same period, many states in the world passed through similar processes.

Critical contributions to failed state theory have been emphasized the major points of the deficiency of state failure discourse I try to emphasize throughout the thesis. Jones emphasizes that failed state discourses misinterpret social situations and make mistakes about the interpretation of reasons. In parallel with Jones, I have tried to emphasize that the failure of state discourse is lacking in the state definition approach and therefore it is not able to interpret the historical development processes of the countries. Woodward's contribution to the criticism of discourse is analytically

inadequate and fairly superficial. Pinar Bilgin and Adam Morton point out that in the failed state discourses, there is no enough reference to describe the states as successful states or unsuccessful states. Like Jones, Bilgin and Morton emphasize that such discourse makes countries vulnerable to intervention. The opinion I try to advance parallel in the thesis is the critical contributions of Jones, Bilgin and Morton. Due to failed state discourses have classified the countries in the light of obvious facts instead of entering the detailed reference. Most importantly they mischaracterize the state formation processes and existing conditions of the countries. Even if each state is basically confronted with similar problems, the processes and causes they live in may present differences. For this reason, it is necessary to provide the methodological contributions without imposing certain attributes to the states.

CHAPTER 3

Yemen within the Framework of Failed State Discourses

The concept of failed state is used widely by public and international arena. But there is no consensus about the definition of failed state theory in the literature. When looking at the reflection of the failed states in literature and media, the states whose legal and social order partially or totally collapsed for reasons such as civil war, poverty, natural disasters and communicable diseases, are called as 'failed state'. This concept is used for states that are unable to fulfill the basic requirements of being the state. These necessary requirements are defined as security, education, and governance. Failed state discourses predominantly emerged from the end of the cold war period. Countries that have violence and chaos were not getting within sight of the developed powers. From the eighties, neoliberalism continued to shrink the state in economic, political and social manners. The meaning of this diminution; after this phase, the failed, fragile and collapsed states would mark the international debate. In a sense, the failed state discourse is a result of 'neoliberal doctrine'. And nowadays it has become a problem for 'followers' of this doctrine.⁹⁸ After this summary of genealogy, I will focus on failed state literature and try to evaluate Yemen condition within the framework of the theory.

There are significant definitions about failed state theory, and one of them is made by Robert Rotberg. Rotberg emphasizes on the definition of a failed state that government in these countries far from being able to provide essential political products to the citizens. Rotberg mentions that these states are far from being a nation-state and states that even if they function as a sovereign state in the international arena and politics, they fail to fulfill the basic state functions equally. For this reason, Rotberg states that these countries in international politics have incomplete service providers and they have lost their monopoly power within their borders. These states are countries that are deficient in terms of security, dangerous, co corrupt politics and bribery. Discrimination in these countries is widespread and economic and social superiority has been gathered on elites who close to the management government. Basic needs such as education and health are not provided throughout the country. According to Rotberg, violence is common in these countries, and the most characteristic situation is civil

wars. In short, there is no failed state in which there is no civil war. There are conflicts between armed groups and other groups in many failed states, and these groups are also an uprising against the rule. Violence is usually directed to government or a temporary regime. Civil war is a characteristic feature of failed states, and civil wars originate from ethnic, religious, linguistic or other hostilities.⁹⁹

Considering the process and civil wars of Yemen since unification, within the framework of Rotberg thesis Yemen can be called failed states immediately. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the last twenty-six years, Yemen has struggled with rebellions and terrorist organizations and continued to this day. It will prevent the release of the events in the country if a country enunciates as a 'failed state' because of civil wars and in parallel with social and economic problems regardless of causes and historical process. All countries have experienced different process under the same titles according to their geographical location, socio-economic structure, and history. The most important process is civil war.

According to failed state discourses of Rotberg, the foundation form of state failure is constituted by civil wars. It is not the right approach that civil war may disrupt the political stability of the country in which it exists. Civil wars can help to reshape and produce the political order of the countries. Civil wars should be seen as part of state formation. States do not get a political order and stability overnight. State formation can involve an extended period and it is normal for violence trends to be seen in the process. For this reason, civil wars should be seen as part of the process of state formation; it is necessary not to evaluate civil wars as a consequence of their structural weaknesses, or use to declare states inadequacies to protect their assets. The discourse of state failure has an approach based on what the state should be, not what it is. It is not taken into consideration that the existence of the insurgent society and non-state actors in the formation of the state, especially during and after civil wars, and 'negotiations' between these actors.¹⁰⁰ This kind of approach contributes to the understanding of state building in the Middle East and West Africa.

Although the controversial deemed legitimate in terms of the future of the country, the ongoing civil war is passed into a new phase with the Supreme Political Council which is formed between the Houthis and the General People's Congress. It is

an executive body formed by and the General People's Congress to rule Yemen. And on August 24th, 2016, The vast majority of Yemenis marched to show that they supported this new formation, which was set up to rule the country. During the march, the people who carried national flags chanted as:

“We will sacrifice our souls and blood for the sake of Yemen”¹⁰¹

At that ceremony in the capital, The President of the Supreme Political Council, Saleh al-Samad has said that;

“It was decided the establishment of the national government in a few days. That decision is made in order to stabilize the country for next year's election.”¹⁰²

The other failed state discourse belongs to William Zartman. According to Zartman, state collapsed is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, or riot. Zartman emphasizes that state failure refers to a situation in which laws, political order, and government are dispersed and need to be renewed. The reason for collapse is not only anarchy and not an increase in ethnic nationalism. This collapse means that state could not fulfill the functions required of being a state. These conditions provide the basic needs, health, law, justice and social order of the people living on their lands. The collapse of the state could not be limited by rebellion or uprising, according to Zartman, this collapse covers an extended period. The collapse of the state is an extreme consequence of the government administration problem that the regime could not fulfill the demands of some groups in society over time.¹⁰³

At that point, it will be appropriate to address two thinkers' views. As I mentioned before, the understanding of state failed state discourses represents Weber's thoughts. In addition to Weber, Ibn Khaldun has also worked in the state. According to understanding of state of Weberian, the state has legitimate, central and legal power monopoly.¹⁰⁴ The state understanding of Ibn Khaldun is ‘narrow, fluid, ephemeral and less formal’. ‘Asabiyya’ which means ‘centralized tribal solidarity’ is fluid. There may be competition and exploitation within the tribes, but after this is over, thanks to the solidarity of the other groups, the 'management contract' continues and thus the 'potential power centers' continue. 'Asabiyya' represents solidarity, loyalty and compelling potentials for the establishment of the state.¹⁰⁵ In other words, Khaldun's

ruling treaty does not account for the existence of a single power, but is open to competition among different groups for the formation of power, thus avoiding the monopoly that leads to political decay. Social ties obtained from tribal solidarity provide state formation. Ibn Khaldun's tribal solidarity continues to exist today, and its presence is felt in political processes in the modern Arab world.¹⁰⁶

Failed state theory, even if there is no consensus among theorists, mainly derived from Weberian state theory and focus on state capacity, the functionality of institutions but ignore formal–informal and traditional–modern institutional lines.¹⁰⁷ Yemen has undergone various political experiments since unification. As I mentioned before, Yemen is a regionally divided country and has many political, tribal, religious actors. In the Middle East, the perception of concepts such as the state, society, and people is quite different from Western-based perception. The Middle East has been home to great civilizations throughout history. Many great empires have been established in this geography. It can be said that the empires are far beyond the modern nation-state structure and dominate the forms of authority and power in the East. When considered in this framework, the concept of the state is a phenomenon that is extremely complex and historically deep in the Middle East geography. Besides all this, Yemen Republic has a unique history in the Middle East as formerly divided into two countries, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic. It can be argued that the ethnic identity of the Arabs, the dominant ethnic group in the region, is based on the religion defined by the language and genealogy, and throughout history has remained a family and tribal community largely. In Arab society; the role, status and distribution of reputation is made according to tradition and is a hierarchical structure according to the dignity. The desire for sovereignty over others for the sake of local unity has induced long-standing political and military struggles¹⁰⁸ and has revealed unreliable, fragmented community structures in the Middle East and has delayed the formation of powerful western-style central states. This struggle in Yemen and the efforts to establish the central state continues today. Although Yemen's administration and state structure are perceived as being managed from one hand, the tribes are shadow actors who dominate the whole history of the country. Since the unification of Yemen, there has been a period of power-sharing among the various players. Geographical conditions, poverty, lack of adequate resources, or aggravating

practices among the actors in the administration have fueled conflict over time. Contemporary theories may refer to Yemen's so-called 'failed state' nomination after the Arab Spring process, Yemen has been struggling with power – sharing problem in the country since the unification and this struggle is important for 'state formation'.

Another reason to be called Yemen as a failed state is the existence of terrorist organization in the country. To refer to Rotberg's contribution to failed state discourse, structural weakness of states with limited international relations has been 'isolated' once upon a time; now it is not threat only the neighboring country and the region but also threat to the global security. It emphasizes that these countries feed terrorism by Rotberg. Similarly,

Helman and Ratner describe failed state:

“as those states descend into violence and anarchy — imperiling their citizens and threatening their neighbors through refugee flows, political instability, and random warfare — it is becoming clear that something must be done.”¹⁰⁹

They also observed failed states as threat for their neighborhoods and emphasized that help those states is made more critical by the evidence that their problems tend to spread.¹¹⁰

The main reasons for the failure of state discourses over Yemen in recent years can be explained by the rhetoric of Rotberg, Helman and Ratner. Because of the impression could be seen that Yemen has a direct connection with terrorism. The most important reason for this is the presence of al-Qaeda in the country. Sarah Phillips, author who has made a significant contribution to the Yemen research, emphasize that talented warriors are important in states where tribal structure prevails as well as state failure. According to Philips:

“In Somalia, bin Ladin’s mujahideen could not offer competitive benefits to their most capable potential recruits, many of whom had no desire to put themselves on the wrong side of tribal militias that were deeply suspicious of foreign interference in local affairs. Such tensions were also important factors in al-Qaeda’s reversal of fortune in Iraq’s al- Anbar province in 2007-2008, when the tribal ‘Awakening Councils’ paramilitary groups successfully marginalized the jihadis. Al-Qaeda in Iraq relied on Sunni tribes for support, but went too far in insisting that sheikhs swear an oath to reject tribal legal traditions—a blatant infringement of tribal traditions of autonomy.”¹¹¹

According to research conducted by Philips, Al Qaeda leaders alienated themselves by marrying people from leading tribes. Al Qaeda's efforts to control smuggling networks from local tribes, aggravated hostilities towards foreigners and hindered the source of significant local resources for the jihad. Tribal opposition against al-Qaeda was created for this reason. Al-Qaeda was a stranger and rival who violated the cultural, political and economic norms that Iraq's tribes were not prepared to give up. But this situation is not available in Yemen. The Yemeni regime's tolerance towards militant jihadists and AQAP's sensitivity to tribal complaints may denote less rivalry and conflict between militants and common groups. Finally Philips emphasizes that Yemen is not a failed state, Al-Qaeda uses an environment where the governmental process is not enough to protection against terrorism, but community is not entirely 'chaotic' in Yemen.¹¹² According to Barbara Bodine who was Yemen's ambassador of the United States between 1997-2001 and also worked in Iraq between 2001-2003, Yemen is not a failed state. Bodine has emphasized that Yemen could not be considered as Iraq thanks to have an integrated national identity in sense of religious and ethnic.¹¹³

As I mentioned in the previous chapter that I have shared the comments of authors who contributed to failed state discourse, many authors attribute the state's failure to internal causes. Today, however, countries are not isolated from each other and therefore the problems that countries have experienced should not be linked to internal factors alone. Although I try to state that the failed state theory has methodological deficiencies and try to show that it is not possible to describe Yemen as a failed state by this theory, it is not possible to ignore the problems experienced in Yemen. Yemen continues to be called as a failed state by international media and politicians. Charles Schmitz, who conducts a detailed analysis on this issue, emphasizes that external interest and benefit are particularly effective in determining the historical development of domestic political order and even political institutions in the post-independence period. Throughout history, Saudi Arabia has been in contact with internal actors in order to be able to influence the Yemeni politics and has materially connected these actors to itself. During the Arab Spring process in 2011, Yemen was dragged into a civil war, Saudi Arabia and the United States intervened in political regimes and helped to establish transition government. The greatest concern of these two countries was that Yemen could endangered them because of political structure. In

addition, not only in 2011, but also before and after the process, Saudi Arabia has been effected its influence on Yemen. The Yemeni state has reached this day as a result of internal problems and external pressures. The political order or irregularity of Yemen, the process that constitutes its institutions are not constitute only due to internal causes but also regional and global politics. It is a wrong approach to see the state as consisting of a set of institutions dedicated to providing only domestic political order and protecting the country from the dangerous effects of the external world. According to Schmitz, the failure of the state in its essence means not to conform to the expected behavioral models derived from an idealized and functional model of the state. The real social and political foundations of states, and even the European context in which the idealized state form is ignored by failed state discourse. The state in this understanding is a moral and political necessity rather than an empirical reality. This discourse has been removed from the struggle for power which is essence of state, and has been transformed into a local political community and a number of international institutions offering community services. Reducing the state to the functional structures measured in the quality of service delivered to citizens and international states obstructs to reveal the dynamics of politics. Schmitz emphasizes that the literature on state failure understands the origins of the state as a social contract that rebels against an egalitarian society of tyrannical rulers in Europe and America. The war and political compromise that took place in 1970 and the process that has continued to this day in Yemen has created a fragile structure. And that makes it easier for Saudi influence. The state is not a functional device serving the internal political community; the state reflects the struggle for power between domestic actors and "foreign" actors seeking influence in the country in Yemen. Schmitz lastly emphasizes that state failure literature fails to conceive of the empirical dynamics of power.¹¹⁴

One other important point about Yemen statecraft, even if Yemen takes important steps towards democratization, occur relatively democratic elections, the regime has not changed, and Yemen has had an authoritarian rule since unification. As I mentioned in the first chapter of the election, election has been occurred without considering the pre-unification political and social situation and the demographic structure of Yemen, led to the development of a 'north' dominated politics. This brings to mind the obstacles to democracy in the regionally divided countries. According to

Stephen W. Day who is author of *Regionalism & Rebellion in Yemen*,¹¹⁵ this 'democracy dilemma' in countries like Yemen, serves the distribution of central and local government authorities to reach common goals. Democratic representatives in the local sense should be established so that the needs and interests of the regional groups can be considered. And also, the nation state must preserve a unity of regional and local parts and provide justice of distribution of wealth among them. Regionally divided countries like Yemen have been struggling to establish the right balance in a democracy. Having unlimited democratic power on a national scale could endanger unity, while power at the national level could deny local democratic rights. There is no specific solution for democracy. Instead, it is a process involving the struggle for power among rival groups. Day adds, given this fact, it is wrong to think that stable democracy can be developed in Yemen.¹¹⁶ Just as analyzes of Day, the elections held in Yemen led to the dominance of the one-party regime and led to concern and unrest for the Southern people in particular. Especially the Southern people thought that their rights would not be protected. I would like to emphasize again this point; it will be a more realistic approach to ensure that democracies take place in accordance with the current conditions of the country. Proportional representation election system could be beneficial for Yemen. Thus, "social forces and political groups" in the society could be represented in the parliament as fair as possible. Yemen has tribalism and power struggle because of the actors who want to maintain their dominance in the northern and southern regions. Considering the election results, the democracy of Yemen is multi-party system. But political co-operation and a permanent political discipline could not been established. This led to the formation of cracks in democracy. The unrest between the southern and northern communities, the problem of power sharing in the administration increased immediately after the election. The election results showed that the leading parties provided support only from their own territories and did not have a national unity.

As I have pointed out the previous chapter, population density and historical prejudice, together with the majority electoral system, led to the problem of power-sharing in the early years of unification. The gap between the perceptions of Yemen's future development became clear after the elections and led to struggle for economic, governance and military power. South peoples declared separatist claims because they

claimed that was ignored and a fair political and social system could not be established in United Yemen. And in the following years, the upheavals of the Houthis strengthened this struggle and made the unification difficult.

Yemen could or still can develop a democracy with some form of rule for its regional divisions. But that process needs to time and avoiding foreign intervention. But It must clearly specify that Saudi Arabia intervention to Yemen has caused devastating consequences. While there has no solution for humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, such intervention made by international or regional actors might extend the solution process. Yemen could be promoted by external actors, through the use of trade, aid, and sanctions as policy instruments rather than military intervention.

This thesis aim to explain that failed state theory does not find useful for explaining Yemen statecraft. While failed state discussions have highlighted the important role of public authority in maintaining stability, they have failed to provide analytical tools that further an analytically precise conception of the state. The formation of state capacity is a structure in which public actors and non-public actors can move or reconfigure in different forms within mutual interaction.¹¹⁷

As Uzi Rabi noted with regards to state formation on the Arabian Peninsula ‘The state should not be seen as an independent political actor but rather as a ‘political field’ an arena in which diverse actors compete for influence and resources.’¹¹⁸ In the world, not all states should be considered in a single pattern. The uprisings in Yemen have ascribed to the competition in the political arena, and the 1994 civil war is the most important example of this. The rebellion and succession of South after the election is a rebellion against political superiority. In Yemen, the state is a fluid arena where there are privileges, claims, strife, and sometimes violence.

Yemen's tribalism-based state system may contribute to labeled it as a failed state on the basis of a 'western' state approach, but it is necessary to make reminders about the tribal structure at this point. If a reference is made to Nadwa Al-Dawsari's writings on tribes, Yemen this structure can be better evaluated. According to Al-Dawsari's research; Yemen tribal law has effectively dealt with conflicts between various tribes, militants and mining companies and between tribes and the government. The tribal system successfully prevented and resolved resources, development services

and conflicts over the land. Nationally, tribal mediators have played an important role in promoting political dialogue and in reaching political consensus among political groups. During the last year when the government forces were withdrawn, the tribes took responsibility and achieved a reasonable level of security in their territories. For many Western observers and urbanizes, the construction of a tribal system in Yemen constitutes an obstacle to the development of Yemen. According to Al-Dawsari, indeed, some tribal leaders who are part of the patronage network of corruption, which changes the needs of its people for political influence and weakens the state.¹¹⁹ But at this point it is worth remembering Ibn Khaldun's views; there may be competition and exploitation within the tribes, but after this is over, thanks to the solidarity of the other groups, the 'management contract' continues and thus the 'potential power centers' continue.

Failed state theory has conceptualized the statecraft with Max Weber's ideal-typical state as the holder of the monopoly of violence, as only provider health, security and law to people within a border. The most important flaw of failed state theory is statecraft on which is insufficient to describe Yemen and tribal governance. According to failed state theory, Yemen has not been evaluated as the fail state but the true Yemen is not a fully democratic country. Since the failed state theory is insufficient to define Yemen's statecraft, it fails to evaluate the problems and wars that have been experienced. This makes it difficult to apply the right diagnoses and strategies to solve the problems in Yemen.

Yemen has also strengthened the existence of tribes in the region, due to the lack of equal conditions for the North and South peoples and inability development and democratization of the whole country. Taking into account the entire process that has taken place since the unification, Yemen has come out of all the crises. However, this situation does not provide the result that all the problems and disturbances in the country are resolved. According to Al- Dawsari, this success can be attributed to problem solver, rule regulator, service provider and conflict prevention role of the tribal system. Many conflicts arising from mismanagement of development, corruption, and competition has been solved by the tribal system. The tribal system continues to thrive despite its long history. Al- Dawsari emphasizes that the tribal system has been played an integral role not only in local conflicts but also in preventing the clash of political

battles. Giving an example, in May 2011. There has been aroused unrest between the government and the al-Ahmar tribes in Sanaa's al-Hasabah district. These conflicts have been alleviated by the prominent tribal mediators of the country. The mediation committee was created, and it included Bakeel, Hashed and Khawlan tribes and other Sheikhs from different parts of the country. In the formal court system, the Arbitration Act, adopted in 1992, integrates tribal settlement and conflict management processes into the provincial legal system.¹²⁰

Rotberg and Zartman have expressed the state as a service provider. In other words, state has conducted public goods to its community such as healthcare, education, social services within a border. State is a resource distributor in economic sense, regulatory in the legal sense. However, when the definition of the statecraft being limited in this way, understanding of government and state of Yemen makes it easier to use failed state discourses. Yemen has also been recognized the 'tribes' as a resource provider and law enforcement officer as mentioned above. Since the failed state discourse limits the 'state' based solely on the western countries, could not imagine how life and its basic conditions could be provided when authority is weak. However, alternative actors could fulfill basic state functions in countries that are unsuccessful today or even claimed to be no longer in the system. These efforts, which are mostly local, do not make it desirable that deficiency of the government or as the theory emphasizes deficiency of the 'state'. On the contrary, I want to emphasize that the situation which is desired to be explained by failed state theory is more likely to arise from the deficiency of the 'government' and in fact state continues to preserve the existence and necessities. What I would like to point out is the 'deficiency of government' in Yemen is that the government could not take into account the concerns and demands of every part of the country, and deepen the regional differences I have mentioned before. The interaction of these local groups or actors with insufficient governments or chaos and civil wars as mentioned in failed state discourse may lead to a new formation that could be able to ensure the continuity of the state. For this reason, these processes should be seen as part of state formation and even transformation of state.

Until now, I have focused Yemen historic turning point to reach a conclusion for Yemen's frequently used as failed state. Yemen is not a failed state, it has 'fragile'

points and face many challenges. The reason for this fragility zone is that the policies applied in the process of democratization do not produce the desired results. Apart from the harm that Saleh has induced to the political development of the country, the 'Western-style' democracy that is tried to be implemented does not create positive reflections in countries with regional diversity such as Yemen. And the desires for 'change' and unrest have been reached at this point. Yemen is a new state founded in 1990. Yemen is a state whose formation continues. Legislative and judicial institutions are not sufficiently rooted, and as we have already examined, the executive power uses justice and elections for its benefit. And I want to say again that one of the most important factors that lead to this situation is democratic election method which is not suitable for the demographic conditions of Yemen. The legal system, institutions and other basic services and systems are still under construction. Yemen needs international help to reconstruction of economic and social problems. Political integration is not yet complete, governance is weak but that is not same as failure. That is true, unification was mishandled. But of course there was some other reason beside Saleh's understanding of authoritarian regimes. It was a unification of two distinct political cultures and history. In regionally divided countries and authoritarian regimes are hard to form the good governance and democratic policy as Western-style state and conditions under which failed state theory is based. But it is not enough to label Yemen as a failed state. The analyze of failed state discourse made by Jonathan Hill is quite valid epilog. According to Hill, state failure literature compares states like Yemen 'A static, non-historical definition' based on the European state system.¹²¹

Yemen has problems about delivering public services, law, and order that need to be addressed. But the failed state discourses have failed to provide analytical tools for understanding statecraft and social condition of Yemen. Failed state discourses have failed grasped empirical evidence, historical trajectory of state formation of Yemen. So they have obtained mis-interpreted conclusions about Yemen. And the probably most important mis-interepted conclusion is compared absence of central government with chaos and civil war. In Yemen, alternative actors, tribal structure of the region, have fulfilled the core state functions that the state no longer performs effectively. Not conforming of this situation to Western or European style state understanding, It is not enough to evaluate the states as failed. This theory limits the state conception to

'western-centered', and as Bilgin and Morton point out, countries are attracted 'two-pole' scheme as in Cold War period. For this reason, it is inadequate to explain the developments and processes of the states outside the West.

CONCLUSION

In the previous chapters, while I try to explain that Yemen could not be evaluated within the framework of failed state discourses, it is one of the issues I try to bring to the forefront, and I think the most important one is democratization process. An important feature of democracy is a regime that protects and guarantees the relationship of people to society and the state. Yemen has taken an important step as a country that has started the process of democratization in the Arab geography where could not mention the existence of democracy here. But the process starting with great hopes, immediately after the elections, which are an important part of democracy, has reached civil war and separatist demands in 1994. The reason for this situation can be briefly summarized as meeting the expectations of the people. The rights of individuals, which are organized and defined within the frame of the democratic regime, the principles on which relations between society and the state are based could be changed depending on the societies and historical development. Because in the end everything depends on what the state is, what the individual expects from the state and democracy should be built on this expectation. These expectations could be different depending on the historical background, social changes, cultural characteristics, economic development. As a result, the concept of democracy must be defined not only by the characteristics set on paper, but also by considering cultural values. In other words, the definition of democracy in a society should be based not only on the characteristics of democracy on paper, but also on the cultural values and history of that society.¹²² The most important way of achieving this equilibrium is to take into consideration the situations that have been set up in the process of democratization. But in Yemen, factors such as demographic conditions, the combination of two different countries have not been taken into consideration and the elections held under these circumstances. As a result, the process of increasing the dominance of a region and leading unrest in the other region, has begun and civil wars and uprisings have reached to this day. This situation has led the country worse economic and social condition which was not very strong enough. This is the basis of the thesis and it is seen as the beginning of the process that Yemen live in today. The most important end of this process is civil war. Although no consensus has been reached on failed state discourse, all the discussions in the literature have focused on civil war. The state of war is seen as an exceptional case for

democracies. The state of war is seen as a circumstance in which political and social necessities of the state are suspended. Wars in failed state discourses are seen as the characteristic feature of these states, and the collapse of the 'state's social, economic and judicial' is linked to wars. However, war could be redefined politics and state formation. For this reason, it must not be seen as a reason for failure. New parameters of politics can be redefined under war status. As in everywhere, war can regulate the relationship between state and society in Yemen. However, the most important point to be noted here is the fact that this process has been more severe in authoritarian regimes. This is happening in Yemen today, there are violent and consecutive revolts, but even in this environment new formations occur. The most important example of this, the Houthi and the former president Saleh, who were enemy each other in the past and had long riots and revolts for this reason, has been trying to cooperate and to create a new government in the country. Although an establishment without the approval of the South is revealed, there is an option in the future that the South can take part in this formation. The participation of all sections of the country must be ensured, otherwise the history may be reversed. Another issue I try to address in the thesis is that failed state discourses are insufficient to explain Yemen's state formation, history, social and political dynamics. The basis of these discourses is Western-style understanding of the state, but it is necessary to have a wider perspective to understand the historical development of Yemen. One of the foundation stones of Yemen is the tribes. Despite the belief that tribes have a negative impact on the country's development, research shows that tribes make significant contributions to the areas where the government is inadequate. This structure should not interpret as a lack of necessity of government, but such social solidarity could be assessed by the government as beneficial to all segments of the country. Failed state discourses describe the state as monopoly power. However, in many countries in the Middle East and West Africa, especially in Yemen, the tribal structure plays an active role areas that governments could not reach. The truth of these countries is tribalism, whether interpreting as positive or negative. For this reason, the evaluation of failed state discourses is insufficient. Without proper evaluation, accurate diagnosis and treatment are not possible. While promoting or establishing democratic regimes, these actors of the countries are taken into consideration, and these actors are used correctly for the future of their country, there may not be many problems that are experienced today.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that In Yemen, the situation led to war and instability originate from the mismanagement of the unification process which can be added to the lack of equilibrium between tribes, the failure of democratization due to the failure to establish a proper democratic electoral system, so the evolution of an authoritarian regime. Failed state discourses are insufficient to assess Yemen's historical development. Failed state discourses focus only on visible facts, and this is one of the most important methodological flaws.

Moreover, as I have already mentioned, the failed state discourse makes the countries open to international interventions. The failed state discourse and the mandate regime, which can be considered as the continuation of the colonialism, can be considered as the submission under different headings. In addition, when they call these countries a failed state, the problems they specify can be attributed to the boundaries drawn in and after the history of bases colonialism. However, failed state discourses ignore this situation and limit the point of view by emphasizing the internal problems of countries such as Yemen.

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