

ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE PROGRAMS
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THOUGHT MASTER'S DEGREE PROGRAM

FROM THE ETERNITY OF IDEOLOGY AND UNCONSCIOUS CONCEPTS
IN ALTHUSSER TO THE LIMITS OF THE DISCOURSE OF TRUTH

ROJNAME ATAŞ
119679002

Assoc. Prof. Ferda KESKİN

ISTANBUL
2022

**From the Eternity of Ideology and Unconscious Concepts in Althusser to the
Limits of the Discourse of Truth
Althusser’de İdeoloji Ve Bilinçdışı Kavramlarının Sonsuzluğundan
“Hakikat” Söyleminin
Sınırlarına**

Rojname Ataş

119679002

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ferda Keskin

(İmza).....

İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

Jüri Üyesi: Doç. Dr. Zeynep Talay Turner

(İmza)

İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

Jüri Üyesi: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ömer Behiç Albayrak

(İmza)

İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih: 24.07.2022

Toplam Sayfa Sayısı: 89

Anahtar Kelimeler (Türkçe)
(İngilizce)

Anahtar Kelimeler

1) Yeniden Üretim

1) Reproduction

2) İdeoloji

2) Ideology

3) Bilinçdışı

3) Unconscious

4) Hakikat

4) Truth

5) Arayış

5) Quest

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To the woman I love, who has not left my side for ten years,

To my family members who have supported me since I was little,

Dear Philosophy and Social Thought Department lecturers, with whom I gained
different perspectives in their courses,

Thank you so much.

With my warmest regards...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
ABSTRACT	vi
ÖZET.....	vii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1. IDEOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS FROM A REPRODUCTION PERSPECTIVE.....	6
1.1. MODE OF PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION IN ALTHUSSER.....	9
1.2. MULTICAUSALITY/OVERDETERMINATION AND STRUCTURAL CAUSALITY.....	17
1.3. SYMPTOM-BASED READING	24
2. ON GENERAL THEORY OF IDEOLOGIES AND THE UNCONSCIOUS	27
2.1. DREAMWORK AND THE SPECIFICITY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 32	
2.2. THE PROBLEMATIC OF THE SUBJECT IN ALTHUSSER	39
3. THE ROLE OF TRUTH DISCOURSE IN IDEOLOGY AND UNCONSCIOUS	44
3.1. THE PROBLEMATIZATION OF TRUTH AND THE QUEST AS A CRITIQUE OF CONTRACT THEORIES	45
3.2. TRUTH PRODUCTION OF POWER RELATIONS.....	58

3.3. THE ACT OF TRUTH IN THE HARMONIC TOTALITY OF "THE QUEST": PARRHESIA	69
CONCLUSION.....	76
REFERENCES.....	81

ABSTRACT

We prepared this thesis by determining the points where the concepts of Ideology, Unconscious, and Truth touch each other. How do relations of reproduction reveal practices of truth? Is it possible to think of the Quest as a conceptual and a material practice simultaneously? In what contexts does the problem of truth address the concept of Quest? A conceptual perspective was first established for the thesis to answer these questions at the most basic level. Then, Althusser's symptom-based reading technique was tried to be applied both to the texts in the context of the thesis and to the thesis itself. This perspective is the reproduction perspective. We considered this conceptual point of view with the reproduction of production relations problematic in Althusser and Freud. At this point, we examined the concepts of ideology, subject, and unconscious and showed parallels between them. The theoretical frameworks we have tried to establish have paved the way for conceptualizing the "Quest" we will put forward. The concept of truth has given certain clues to contract theories as it evokes "Law." We tried to establish our conceptualization of "truth," "subject," and "Quest" on solid ground through contract theories. Our consideration of the "Quest" conceptualization as being linked to the "truth" theory will offer certain conceptual propositions for reconstructing society. The concepts of "Quest" and "Truth" have enabled us to deal with the discussions of "multitude" and "immanence" as the problematization of contract theories. In this context, we will discuss the concept of "Quest" as our conceptual practice. We aim to contribute to the field of Philosophy through the criticism of contract theories. We tried to produce a new conceptual approach around the concepts that show the parallelism of ideology and unconscious studies. What is important for our thesis is to deal with the concept of "Quest" together with other concepts.

Keywords: Reproduction, Ideology, Unconscious, Truth, Quest.

ÖZET

Bu tezi, İdeoloji, Bilinçdışı ve Hakikat kavramlarının birbirine temas ettiği noktaları belirleyerek hazırladık. Yeniden-üretim ilişkileri hakikat pratiklerini nasıl ortaya çıkarır? Arayışı, bir kavramsal pratik ve aynı zamanda maddi pratik olarak düşünmek mümkün müdür? Hakikat sorunsalı, Arayış kavramını hangi bağlamlarda ele alır? Bu soruların en temelde cevaplarını verebilmek adına öncelik olarak tez yazımı için kavramsal bir bakış açısı yerleştirilmiştir. Daha sonra Althusser'in belirtiyeye dayalı okuma tekniği hem tez bağlamındaki metinlere hem de tezin kendisine uygulanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bakış açısı yeniden-üretim bakış açısıdır. Bu kavramsal bakış açısını Althusser ve Freud'da üretim ilişkilerinin yeniden üretimi sorunsalıyla ele aldık. Bu noktada ideoloji, özne ve bilinçdışı kavramlarını inceledik ve aralarında paralellikler gösterdik. Oluşturmaya çalıştığımız teorik düzlemler, ortaya koyacağımız "Arayış"ın kavramsallaştırılmasına zemin hazırladı. Hakikat kavramı "yasa"yı çağrıştırdığı için sözleşme teorilerine belli ipuçları vermiştir. Sözleşme teorileri aracılığıyla hem "hakikat," "özne" hem de "Arayış" kavramımızı sağlam bir zemine oturtmaya çalıştık. "Arayış" kavramsallaştırmasını "hakikat" teorisiyle bağlantılı olarak ele almamız, toplumu yeniden inşa etmek için belirli kavramsal önermeler sunacaktır. Arayış ve Hakikat kavramları, sözleşme teorilerinin sorunsallaştırılması olarak "çokluk" ve "içkinlik" tartışmalarını ele almamızı sağlamıştır. Bu bağlamda kavramsal pratiğimiz olan "Arayış" kavramını tartışacağız. Sözleşme teorilerinin eleştirisi yoluyla Felsefe alanına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlıyoruz. İdeoloji ve bilinçdışı çalışmaların paralellliğini gösteren kavramlar etrafında yeni bir kavramsal pratik üretmeye çalıştık. Tezimiz için önemli olan, Arayış kavramını diğer kavramlarla birlikte ele almaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeniden Üretim, İdeoloji, Bilinçdışı, Hakikat, Arayış.

INTRODUCTION

From which perspective ideology is viewed or with which concepts it is handled remains current as a philosophical problematic. When we think of ideology as temporal, we attribute historicity to it. But this historicity is not a definition within the science of history. It must be considered an eternal process, entirely outside of history. This idea is an ideology-consciousness debate in Althusser that remains valid even now as general ideologies. When we think about the titles of the thesis, the discussion that we try to establish or open to philosophical thinking is to produce a conceptualization, albeit a risky one. We will begin to deal with the issue by discussing what we mean by ideology as the mental representation of the imaginary relationship with reality. For this, we will especially borrow Althusser's conceptual practices to put forward our thesis. The concepts we borrow will not be handled randomly but within the contexts that we think they intersect with each other within a specific systematic.

Our priority is to establish the perspective of our thesis. We need to develop a boundary of the basic theoretical-practical conceptualization we want to create to place our discussion in the context we want. This limit is to think of a new concept by re-reading the fundamental texts. Our main starting point is the "reproduction" approach, which is found in almost all of Althusser's texts. This concept, borrowed from the Marxist tradition, was explained relationally by Althusser and integrated into ideology's conceptual and material practice. However, textual reading, called symptomatic reading, is a process that requires the analysis of the text. The similarities in the concepts we discuss will enable us to engage in discussions that will pave the way for a new conceptualization. Influenced by Freud, Althusser's comparison of ideology and the unconscious is a necessary consequence of what he calls an "organic" relationship. In this thesis, we will present the method of "Quest" conceptualization, which we will introduce in this context. We will make an attempt to defend from a reproduction perspective based on symptomatic reading, systematically and limited to primary sources. From the perspective of

reproduction, we will rethink ideology that we will consider together with the theory of the unconscious, labeled as Freud's discovery. In addition, we will explain the concepts of multi-causality and overdetermination related to the thesis "Ideology has no history" from the book *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. At the same time, the fact that ideology interpellates "concrete individuals as concrete subjects" is an essential condition for our thesis, which will again enable us to problematize our concept of "Quest."

In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud's assumption of the unconscious, which he developed against both psychology and philosophy, offers a perspective that we can read as a generalization of dream theory to the theory of the unconscious. The "specificity" of the unconscious, which Freud states in chapter 7 of the book, says this: The unconscious deals with what belongs to it through the mechanisms of timelessness, displacement, and condensation, in line with the unknowability of the principle of contradiction. We will try to bring psychoanalysis and philosophy into contact with each other by conceiving these concepts on the borders of ideology and the unconscious. We cannot think of ideology independently of the concepts of displacement and intensification. The main issue to be discussed is the position of this contact in philosophy. Keeping its boundaries within Freud's and Althusser's conceptualizations requires analyzing parts of the text under consideration. The theoretical-practical results of these conceptualizations must be considered with the concept of "Truth." We are trying to offer a new perspective and conceptualization of ideology, the unconscious, and the idea of "community," which we are trying to establish in everyday practice. Here we will again contextualize the discussion of truth through limited texts. Trying to connect all concepts from the beginning based on the principle of causality may lead to the random articulation of assumptions. For this reason, we will try to address the concept of "Truth" from the reproduction perspective. Our limited conceptual paths in these texts are important to materialize the concept of the "Quest."

We focus on and what we want to open to the literature is to think about the "eternal" connection between ideology and the unconscious in the context of Althusser and Freud and to problematize "Truth" and its levels in Foucault in certain respects. For such a thesis, truth should not be seen as a discovery, a creation, or a goal to be achieved. We need to read it from the perspective of the reproduction of the concept of truth as a philosophical practice. We need to consider the concept of "Quest" as reading and analysis of a text that reveals its connection to truth. To make it more understandable, we can explain it as follows. We will try to argue that it is not a coincidence that the concept of ideology overlaps with the concept of the unconscious in a reproduction relation of each subject with other subjects. The relations of power and the practices that take place between these relations do not claim to give us a definitive answer to the "what" of truth. This will show us the necessity of our conceptual quest. It will require us to address the idea of "community" as a practice of opening out within our singularities, where a "Quodlibet" being is outside of all determination. We hope that this "Quest" will not be understood as an individual "Quest" but as a process that needs to be considered in conjunction with our established and determined existence within the social formation.

From Althusser's perspective, we will argue that the "Quest" lies in the relational practice of ideology that interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects. We are concerned that the concept of "Quest" takes on an abstract and mystical form. For this reason, Foucault's power relations need to be addressed. The issue of how we should construct our subjectivities in the context of "truth" is important. We hope that the problematization of truth as the existence of the concept of hermeneutics in a process transcending time will show us the importance of the concept of "Quest." We will deliver the political level from which our subjectivities should be constructed in the places where we deal with these conceptualizations. For this, we will explain the concepts of "immanence" and "multitude" through contractual practices to make our conceptual practice more binding and understandable. The necessity of this is based on both rethinking the

concept of "community" as a perspective of "Quest" and questioning the location of "Quest."

It is a clear problematic for us that those contract theories are important in problematizing the law and truth. The "void" created by the contradiction that the notion of society as the law makes will show us the symptom of revelation. We will open the conceptual tools of Agamben, Negri, and Hardt, the concepts that appear as "immanence" in our concept of "Quest," through the issue of "multitude." For this reason, making this discussion over contract theories makes sense to us in terms of the bindingness of our thesis. For this, we hope that trying to keep the texts limited will reveal itself in a relational practice that will put our concept on its feet.

The aim of our thesis is not to show the perspective of truth in basic statements such as "Philosophy reveals the truth" or "Philosophy is the theory of the quest for truth." The conceptualization of the "Quest" is related to the problematization of "Truth" in Foucault can also prevent deviations of the kind mentioned above. Concepts need to be rethought theoretically and by trying to show their traces in real life. Therefore, we think the two have an "organic" relationship. This relationship does not happen in a top-down manner. We will expose the concept of the unconscious, which Althusser discusses in his discussion of ideology and his interpretation of psychoanalysis, to say that it produces practices of truth in the face of all discursive and non-discursive practices. This is why it is meaningful to think about the thesis that power relations reproduce their own practices as truth through Foucault. Leaving aside the problematic of what truth is, our issue is really to problematize the relationalities in the emergence of "truth" within the framework of our thesis.

The most important implication of our thought is to rethink the fact that the "self-care" and the ideology that interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects are in elbow contact with the unconscious and to try to say that it reveals the material practice and even the theory of a total "Quest." However, I think that

the practice of “telling the truth” as the problematization of the harmonic relationship between "logos" and "bios" in Foucault, which he inherited from Ancient Greece, will once again remind us of the importance of addressing the reconstruction of society in the context of "immanence" and "multitude.” We will try to emphasize this with conceptual ties. As a discussion and a relatively modest proposal, it is a conceptual practice with certain contradictions. It also takes on a concrete and material form.

We hope that the arguments we will put forward to make the concept of Quest explainable will open an introductory discussion. If the practices in a constant state of motion are considered from the perspective of reproduction, they produce themselves as truths born of power relations. At this point, our attempt to conceptualize the "Quest" will thus be able to open a controversial space. We think that the concept of "Quest,” which will enable us to understand the totality of relations we will discuss while problematizing the truth, will also reveal the materiality of an ontological necessity when taken together with the conceptualizations of ideology and the unconscious.

1. IDEOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS FROM A REPRODUCTION PERSPECTIVE

Without defining the concept, we must deal with ideology and the unconscious under this heading. We will establish a philosophical base by adhering to the primary texts. Why do we deal with the interaction of these two concepts? Louis Althusser, who theoretically rethought the treatment of Marxism after Marx, caused breaking points in Marxist philosophy. It is necessary to talk about the effects of these breaking points, their gaps, and the interactions of conceptual practices. This provides a perspective that requires us to continue our exploration and questioning. This is possible by settling on the perspective of "reproduction."

Our perspective deals with ideology within a production mechanism rather than a reductionist philosophy of origins. This perspective, which we consider a window of ideology, is the "reproduction" perspective. In Volume 1 of *Capital*, Marx talks about the reproduction theory of the relations of production. The means of production are about the forces of production. The fundamental movement in this relationship is reproduction. A part of the products produced by the worker is converted into means of production by the capitalist. This indicates power as the means of production in the hands of the capitalist. Labor power has to reproduce itself through these means of production. In this case, capital tries to develop and expand itself continuously.

The worker can receive his share of what he produces for a wage, but this wage is never the equivalent of his labor. The capitalist, who wants to produce surplus value and allocates it to himself, pays the worker only enough to support himself. This is because the capitalist production process buys labor power for a certain period as the first step. The worker is paid for his labor only after he has spent this power. The reproduction of everything that labor power produces, including the capitalist's surplus value designated as the private consumption fund and the worker's wages, is based on this necessary relation. At the same time, the wage received by the

worker is the wage received from the surplus value produced by the worker without burdening the capitalist and damaging his capital. To use the words of Marx, the fact that the product takes the commodity form, and the commodity takes the money form hides this exchange with a veil (Marx, 1992). Here we think that Marx lays emphasis on this sentence. The fact that the obvious manifestation of this exchange between the capitalist and working class must also be concealed by a "veil" is important to emphasize the conceptualizations we will discuss later. It will bring us to another point. We will talk about it in the following sections.

Marx constantly repeats the emphasis on "reproduction" when he speaks of accumulation. We think these repetitions will clarify our point of view, which we are trying to preface. Because we know that repetition takes place in material life practices, and every repetition is not just a simple cycle. We try to problematize the "truths" in the material functioning of repetition. We do not say that repetition is only emphasized in Marx's texts. We are talking about a repetition inherent in the reproduction process in our conceptual practice and the determination of material conditions. This repetition exists in the simplest reproduction process. Even simple reproduction necessarily transforms every capital into a surplus-value. This is only possible if the continuity of the production process is an obvious condition. Creating this continuity also depends on the twofold consumption of the worker (Marx, 1992). Consumption is one of the necessary conditions of capitalist reproduction. The first of these consumptions is that the worker uses the means of production to consume them and transform them into products of more valuable than the capital invested. While Marx calls this "productive consumption," he also refers to it as the consumption labor power by the capitalist (Marx,1992). The second is the workers' consumption of the wages paid to them for their labor in order to provide for their livelihoods. Both sides of this consumption provide profit to the capitalist class. In other words, while the capitalist class buys labor-power and pays wages to workers, it multiplies its own capital by perpetuating the reproduction of the means of production and relations of production and continues to buy new labor-power. This is an unlimited and constantly transforming motion

(repetition) in capitalism. This consumption is also inherent in the reproduction of labor-power, which is one of the indispensable means of production for the capitalist class. Therefore, the survival and reproduction of the working class are necessary conditions for the reproduction of capital (Marx,1992).

The repetition of the concepts of necessary conditions and reproduction prepares the ground on which we want to arrive in Marx's *Capital* and on which we will base our point of view. It is necessary to cite Marx's "fiction juris" of a contract that we can place on the ground we want and then connect with a critical analysis:

"The Roman slave was held by fetters: the wage-labourer is bound to his owner by invisible threads. The appearance of independence is kept up by means of a constant change of employers, and by the fiction juris of a contract." (Marx, 1992).

This quote will lead us to a point that we will not hesitate to use when discussing ideology and the unconscious, the concepts at the center of our thesis. What did Marx mean by these "invisible threads"? To understand the relations of production, we had to explain the reproduction process by following Marx's path. The fact that he states this in a continuous repetition is an important point to be emphasized. Because, we had to address the issue from a space that Marx left relatively and theoretically "empty," as if he wanted to emphasize something else "veil." We will not place its invisibility or these invisible relations in the context of a ghost. We need to look outside the apparent determination of the certain/uncertain. The context we want to create will begin to fall into place by referring to "the fiction juris of a contract" that follows the sentence. It is not accidental that Marx writes this notion in this chapter. These threads already reproduce themselves as an imaginary manifestation of the reproduction relation between the capitalist class and the working class, that is, as ideology. Here we can say that it is the ideology of capitalist relations of exploitation that is invisibly bound together and manifests

itself as "the fiction juris of a contract." At the same time, we can say that it points to the paradox of contract theories.

The revelation of power relations as truth lies in the complex totality of concrete material practices. In order to explain this point, we think it is necessary to take a brief look at the Althusserian consideration of contract and contract theories. We will deal with this issue in the third chapter. We can also see this in Althusser's treatment of the ideology of Christian religion in *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. Marx also noticed this in some respect. "Fiction juris" appear where the relation between "consciousness" and "self-consciousness" is contradictory. This discussion is found in *The German Ideology*, where he discusses it under the title "Ideology in General, German Ideology in Particular" (Marx, 1998). It is not coincidental in this respect that the "fiction juris" that Marx discusses under the title of reproduction in Volume 1 of *Capital* also refer to a legal process in the continuation of the relevant text. As an example, Marx even states that until 1815 in England, the migration of machine-building workers was prevented by banning them and imposing heavy penalties. The contract and its fiction juris also appear at this point as part of the reproduction process. All this shows that reproduction requires the reproduction of social relations. Let us explain this through Althusser.

1.1. MODE OF PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION IN ALTHUSSER

In order to explain the reproduction of the relations of production in Althusser, it is necessary to discuss what the "mode of production" is. The issue of reproduction of labor power and means of production, which we see in Marx, necessarily permeates the relations of production. What does the mode of production mean in Althusser's thought? For the word "society" to have a scientific meaning, it must have a form. This is called "Social Formation." In the idealist sense, we can address the issue of "mode of production" as to why social formation is necessary to leave the notion of a society and put it on a scientific basis. Because the notion we call

society is full of moral, religious, and legal echoes and is ideological (Althusser, 2014).

Taking Marx's concept of mode of production, Althusser mentions four classical theses of Marxism at this point. The first thesis is that all concrete social formations consist of the dominant mode of production. There is not only one dominant mode of production. There may be more than one mode of production in a social formation, but one of them is dominant. Due to the contradictions of the social formation itself, the mode of production realized within it also has a form that reproduces itself in practice.

The second thesis is the notion of unity between the Productive Forces and the Relations of Production. Whether dominant or subordinate modes of production, the Social Formation has its own unity. The idea that this unity must have a special nature belongs to Althusser (Althusser, 2014). The fact that this union occurs naturally is a special case. The unity between the dominant mode of production and the subordinate one is always contradictory. There is also an internal unity between the Productive Forces and the relations of production. These two should not be reduced and confused with each other (Althusser, 2014).

The third thesis says that the material basis of the Productive Forces and the Relations of Production is the Productive Forces. Within the limits and basis of the Productive Forces, the decisive role takes place in the Relations of Production. Althusser says that this thesis is found throughout *Capital* (Althusser, 2014).

The fourth thesis emphasizes the fundamentally decisive role of infrastructure. This is the economy. He underlines that what connects the third and fourth theses is in the relations of production, in material practices. If the unity between the Productive Forces and the Relations of Production is considered narrowly in terms of the existence of a dominant mode of production, it shows us that this is a situation arising from the nature of the social formation. Althusser says that Marx

emphasized this a lot both in *The German Ideology* and *Capital* (Althusser, 2014). This is because production activity is basically the material and a necessary precondition for the continuation of human life. Here, the Productive Forces produce the means of production on the condition of providing the means of subsistence from nature and even dominating nature. The sum of the actual labor processes constitutes the production process of the mode of production. The Productive Forces' processing of nature through labor power and the transformation of the means of production ensures the continuity of labor power operates according to a system. At this point, the issue of qualification in the labor process is essential in this relational practice reaching the present. In order to be able to use the means of production, it is necessary to have received and experienced the training formation within a set of rules. Of course, it is up to each person to decide whether or not to use the means of production. This is a condition for survival and existence. If it is not used, production does not take place, and material life ends. Therefore, this is the case where production is a natural matter (Althusser, 2014). In this case, the means of production are determined by the very nature of production. Here lies the full meaning of the Marxist thesis: The Productive Forces are determined by the means of production, not by the individual. This reproduction of the means of production in the capitalist social formation gives us a clue as to how relations of production are realized.

The reproduction of the means is also determined by the social conditions involved. Here, in conjunction with the development of technology, the development of means comes into play. The labor power of the person acting in the production, whether alone or in different forms of cooperation in the production process, performs itself depending on the condition of the means of production.

Marx calls the sum of the tools of production and labor power the Means of Production. The name he gives to the sum of this situation in which human beings who can technically use the means of production, whether in cooperation or not, spend their labor is Labor Power. Marx's distinct positioning of Labor Power as the

sum of the means of production is of fundamental importance in the capitalist social formation (Althusser, 2014).

Althusser states that separating two things in the production style is necessary. On the one hand, the "Productive Forces" belong to a defined mode of production; on the other hand, the "Totality of Productive Forces" exists in the concrete social formation in which many modes of production exist simultaneously. The totality of Productive Forces, which takes place in the plural form under the domination of the capitalist mode of production, has a kind of unity that includes contradictions. According to Althusser, the fact that there is a plurality, and a set of rules here shows that the labor process is not accidental or a simple sum. These Productive Forces are a combination that has a specific unity within each mode of production and has an empirical material possibility. In *Reading Capital*, Althusser notes that this combination is argued by Balibar (Althusser, 2014). Understanding the relations of production and determining their position within the social formation in the process of reproduction is obvious in Marx. Showing the concreteness of this as a theoretical practice allows us to acquire Althusser's basic point of view.

We have returned briefly to Marx to find out what the Althusserian evaluation of the process of reproduction means. Now, we will enter Althusser's original conceptualization in terms of the contribution of "Relations of Production" to our thesis. In fact, we can understand these concepts, which are clearly stated in Marx, from Althusser's statement that he is in the necessity of addressing them as "the practice of theory" on a structural ground. On this theoretical level, which exists in Marx but which he tries to construct from the "gaps" left by him, the relations of production will enable us to comprehend the mode of production more clearly. Let us state once again that we will take over this conceptualization and apply it to our own thesis in the following sections.

We have already briefly mentioned the process of reproduction in Marx, to be dealt with later through Althusser. We should move on without asking the question of what relations of production are. In Marx, it would be a mistake to divide the

relations of production in class societies into those who own the means of production and those who do not. This is the emergence of the property problem in Marx (Althusser, 2014). This problem is also about law. The question of ownership of the means of production is about law. At the same time, the dominance of technology creates a relationship of subordination in the mode of production. Althusser does not oppose the material reality of these, but the point he wants to explain is this: in addition to all that has been said, what he addresses correctly in the French capitalist formation of his time is that he emphasizes that capitalist relations of production are also capitalist relations of exploitation (Althusser, 2014).

We can understand the development of technology and the reproduction of the means of production as both the production and consumption of means that benefit human beings. Nevertheless, capitalism has never had a production relation or such a formation that favors society. It is always concerned with producing surplus value. Thus, the use of technology for good, including the relations of production, has been used to obscure the main issue. This veil is used by capitalism to cover both the relations in the social formation and all kinds of exchanges within the complex structural totality in which production takes place in the labor process. Legally protected property relations or the "fiction juris of a contract," as well as the pursuit of the common good, play an equally important role in the reproduction of the relations of production. Althusser is not talking about a veil here. We deal with this in the way we read the texts. In Marx, the exchange that takes place in the relations of production was covered by a veil. What we are trying to say is something that Althusser is aware of, but which we are trying to say by taking advantage of his own small theoretical gap in his conceptualization of reproduction. This veil is hidden in the processing of practices that lie in the relations of production. Althusser will, of course, address this in the question of ideology. But what we need to say here is that this is a latent dynamic inherent in concrete material practices behind the reproduction of relations of production. It is also immanence in "repetition" itself. In other words, it takes place in the form of ideological questioning that Althusser invites us to. It even depends on a situation that is inherent in the practice

of questioning itself. For this reason, we need to consider the concept of "interpellation" as "questioning" in English. This is because we will be able to explain what should be understood from immanence to the concept of "questioning," which we will ground in the future, through "Quest."

In Althusser's theory, it is important and very specific that ideology, which is a process in which each concrete individual is interpellated as concrete subjects, and accordingly these relations of production, correspond to the relation of exploitation in the capitalist formation. According to Marx, the value of the labor of the worker, who in the capitalist mode of production is never fully compensated for his labor under any circumstances, is devoid of any theoretical meaning (Marx, 1992). This theoretical lack, in the process we have outlined, never allows capitalism to contribute to the production process as a benefit. Because this is a pure and ideological deception of capitalism.

The fiction juris of a contract is legally concealed by what Marx calls a "veil." To understand this relationship more closely, we need to come to what Marx calls the "social division of labor" in *Capital*. It is the formation of many different branches of business and industry in social production. Here Althusser tried to show the influence of the relations of production as relations of exploitation. He firmly opposes the notions of the technical division of labor, the purely technical organization of labor and the purely technical management of labor (Althusser, 2014). This understanding of this in Marx has been taken by both Marxists and economists as the humanization of the relations of production. Althusser argues that this is simply an ideology of humanism and an economist ideology. He uses both terms and opposes them radically. The technicist inference of the division of the labor process, which is implemented in the composition of the labor process, is here a mere illusion. What Althusser argues here against any technical division of labor is that labor is the social division of labor. Because the technical division of labor, its technical organization and management, can do nothing but prevent us from seeing the real issues that lie in practical relations.

The main problem of the contradiction in this production process, which is based on arm and head labor in a determination where the worker always remains being a worker and the engineer always remains in the same position, is that labor contains a complex integrity that cannot be explained only by the distinction between arm labor and head labor. The relations that workers establish with each other based on these two distinctions point to a problem that the capitalist social formation reproduces ideologically. In other words, if the worker will always be a worker, and the engineer will always be an engineer, waiting over the workers like a watchman - and the engineer can also be a manager, this is not a very important determinant - this shows something about the relations of production within the capitalist social formation process. It shows us that the education received at school, and before that in the family, is ideologically determined by this capitalist social formation. The division of labor processes therefore shows us the condition for the reproduction of the relations of production, both technicistically and economically. But this is not all.

We think we have established our reproduction perspective. From here, we can enter Freud's exploration of the unconscious. Freud's discovery of the unconscious, which is likened to Marx's discovery of the continent of history, is crucial for us to explain Althusser's concept of overdetermination, its symptomatic reading, and its structural causation. Explaining Althusser's general theory of ideologies without explaining these things may make our explanation of the "reproduction" point of view futile. The multi-causality of overlapping structures requires an inversion of the Hegelian understanding of history. This is of course not an inversion in the Marxian sense but is explained in terms of the multi-causality of contradictions within a whole. Therefore, instead of the infrastructure determining the superstructure, it is necessary to talk about the relative autonomy of the superstructure and the multi-causality of overlapping structures. Althusser's reading of Marx is not limited to this. When we look at his texts *Reading Capital* and *For Marx*, where he discusses Marx's texts in detail, we can see that Althusser uses the

method of symptomatic reading. The point is to develop his theory uniquely through this method, starting from Marx's "gaps." Of course, psychoanalysis, and especially Lacanian psychoanalysis and linguistic theory, have great importance here. The parallelism between the emergence of ideology and the unconscious can also be found in this symptomatic reading. Structural causality is a reference to the relative autonomy of structures and even to the determinism of "structure" as the filling of gaps in Marx. It is a structural causality that opposes the unilateral determination of the complex structures in which the relations of production exist in the course of history. As a result, our understanding of ideology, like our understanding of the unconscious, will shed light on both the conceptual practices and the material practices of our concept of "Quest."

It should be noted that reproduction is one of the main centers of Althusser's thought. But what do we understand by what we call the reproduction process of the relations of production? In our daily practices in a social formation, our lives are determined by concrete conditions, and our analyses of these concrete conditions also produce specific results. Our understanding requires thinking about the analysis of most of the practices we engage in and building our lives on this thinking, as well as the rejection of the given conditions by getting rid of the relations of determination. In the philosophy of consciousness, we need to problematize the process of subjectivation as a practice of "revealing the existence" or "self-expression," by getting rid of the determinations that constitute the subject. This practice is also a "symptom" for us.

When we think of the relation of determination in terms of accepting or being subjected to determination, we must say that it produces a dilemma. The dilemma in the relations of production is that ultimately being the determiner or the determined is an existential obstacle to "revealing." So, what is this concept of revelation for us? This is far from an understanding that we can establish our subjectivities through visible, perceived material practices. We aim to problematize our practices beyond the rational ones. According to our approach, ideology and

the unconscious exist outside this rationality. But it takes place within our discursive and non-discursive practices. It takes place in a complex totality that cannot reach the limits of the conscious on the unconscious level and is free from the subject-object relation. How do we understand this multi-causality?

1.2. MULTICAUSALITY/OVERDETERMINATION AND STRUCTURAL CAUSALITY

Due to the content of the concept and its interaction with other concepts, we will limit ourselves to an Althusser-Freud analogy. We will consider three of Althusser's conceptualizations that we consider important. The first is the concept of multi-causality/overdetermination. Multicausality basically deals with the difference between Marxian dialectics and Hegelian dialectics in structure theory. He produces his approach based on this difference. While addressing the Hegelian concept of contradiction, Althusser states that it is based on a simple principle of contradiction. This principle, which is functionally included in the integrity, reflects itself in an "inner principle." Althusser considers the simplicity of contradiction in the Hegelian understanding of history or "philosophy of history" as a reflection of the simplicity of the people's inner principle. This abstract, reflection of the Hegelian contradiction, does not show its materiality, but its abstract ideology (Althusser, 2005).

Hegel's dialectical method treats the totality as homogeneous. The principle of separation also takes place as a "unity" within the integrity. Movement and historical formation are conducted by central categories. On the other hand, Althusser introduces a concept that he defines as relative autonomy. The concept of structure is a concept that deals with the determination of relations in Althusser. The relative autonomy of structures criticizes a pre-given, only deterministic structure. Therefore, the relationship between the structures in each social formation does not occur unilaterally as a flow from one point to another. These structures determine each other due to their relative autonomy. There is an

infrastructure and a superstructure in various positions in the social formation. Althusser develops the classical Marxist view that "The base determines the superstructure." He simply says that there cannot be a correct determination relationship from one to the other, and that there is a complex determination situation arising from the autonomy of their relative structures within themselves (Althusser, 2005). This is where he describes multi-causality. Therefore, the concept of contradiction cannot be thought separately from the structure of a social body in Althusser. The social form must be considered together with the conditions of existence within itself. Thus, the contradiction is also determined by these conditions. Contradiction both determined and is determined by the conditions of social forms. Contrary to Hegelian thinking, the point in which a homogeneous inner principle manifests itself in Hegelian philosophy is explained in this relationality, starting from the relative autonomy of the structures that mutually determine each other, instead of the idea of unity.

When we consider the relation of reproduction through the Hegelian dialectic, we can put consumption as opposition to production. If a human produces an ax, dominates an animal, and meets his basic nutritional needs, this is the basic condition of human existence. If they cannot do this, they will die. Conversely, to feed themselves (it also means "consume"), they must destroy an animal or a tree by producing their means of production, the ax. Here we arrive at an idea of unity in human interaction with nature. Human both produces and consumes to exist and live. The basic Hegelian dialectic is important here. If there is a need to ensure this integrity in order to meet the needs in a simple production-consumption relationship, it is an indisputable fact that a single human being as a single entity can do this.

Why do we read the reproduction perspective through Althusser? Althusser could not have known this simple principle of the Hegelian dialectic. But if there is one lesson we have learned from all of Althusser, it is this: if we are looking for a future or a vision of society through the present, it is necessary to reveal the fundamental

contradictions in power relations and to think about the mechanisms of reproducing society. Why? In the wage issue discussed in Marx's *Capital*, the worker receives the wage from the surplus-value he produces to provide his own minimum conditions and meet his consumption needs. Let's take this consumption from the social formation in which Althusser lived to the social formation in which Hegel lived. We can easily understand that the relationship of exploitation was also a relationship of consumption at that time. According to Hegel, if there is a production, there will be consumption; if we deal with it in unity, this is a natural situation. When we consider the relation of exploitation in terms of rationality, consumption, which is the opposite of production, is also inherent in this relation of exploitation.

The relation of domination, as the exploitation of both nature and human beings, exists through consumption. If we want to live a whole "common" life with nature in nature and if we are trying to transform the material acts of our own immanence by having the potential to produce a social imagination, it is important what we prioritize. Human beings must consume so that they can exist. When this presupposition is said precisely for the present moment, and taken in the "now," it becomes perfectly explainable that we can understand the whole determination of capitalism not only as the creation of surplus-value but also as the creation of this supply of consumption. This also causes us to ignore many determinations. For this, the capitalist formation uses all its weapons through reproduction in the way we will discuss. This is not just technological weapons; it points its weapons against "weaknesses" in human mental processes, "emotions" (a point that we think Althusser leaves relatively incomplete, but at the same time, we think that there are cores) or "desires" by using the determinations in all material relations. At the same time, "surplus-value" becomes immanent to consumption. We could not speak of production and surplus value if it were not immanent to consumption.

When we say capitalist production relations or capitalist exploitation relations, it is possible to realize a thinking through the Hegelian dialectic. Althusser knew that

too. Therefore, the question is where we as individuals or as subjectivized individuals should be situated in this relationship of consumption, or in other words, in the relationship of exploitation. This theoretical positioning is also a political positioning that finds itself in the whole of material relations. In other words, rather than the society we envision, it is primarily a question of where we should position our relations of production within this society. Ignoring the Hegelian dialectic does not mean ignoring a production relation. It is an inadequate theory in the sense that it does not consider the determinations in all kinds of social formations in the structure theory. Marx knew this too. The issue is not the validity or invalidity of Hegel's theory, but the withdrawal of Hegel's theory. Reading Marx as a withdrawal of Hegel's theory is the idea that we should take a position by looking at the relation of production and the contradictions in the reproduction of relations of production. In other words, we think it is important to be aware of the determination relations in Althusser and to position ourselves in another place outside of these determinations. This is our interpretation of Althusser.

We argue that we need to abandon Hegelian dialectics in favor of the necessity of establishing ourselves outside the relation of domination. We are trying to capture the harmony between "logos" and "bios" in the sense of Foucault's Parrhesia, that is, the harmony between all the conceptual practices that we produce and "reproduce" as knowledge of truth and all our material relations that we express as the human way of life. This is why it is important to situate our perspective in the relation of reproduction in order to explain our theory. We could have chosen instead a relation of re-consumption or the reproduction of relations of consumption. This does not negate Hegel's simple principle of contradiction. It's entirely inherent in it. Therefore, what we want to give up, and why we give up, is to determine the exact place we take in the relations of production in which there are multiple contradictions and determinations. What Althusser is talking about here is not pointing "Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon" at Hegel, but at the systems of capitalist formation that deepen the relation of domination and with it the relation of exploitation and consumption for their own "singular interest." From

a different aspect, it is to point this weapon at the instruments and relations of power relations that aim at the determination of the human being as submission to the law we have established, which ignores the subject, uses violence and psychological pressure. At this point, it is important from where we deal with our material-practical relations that lie within the ideology or from where we should address the meaning of the psychoanalytic hermeneutic that we have created to understand the order of the unconscious system.

One of the perspectives underlying Althusser's "Apparatuses" and "Ideology" is the concept of multi-causality/overdetermination. This concept carries complex and multiple judgments, in terms of "structure" established by Althusser. It can lead to what is heterogeneous, plural structures, and even discontinuity. At this point, it does not offer a practical solution to the extent that it leads us to uncertainty. In Marxism, and especially in Althusser, the issue is already debated about the content of this practical solution. Althusser presents the relationality of particular structures in their material practices articulated with each other. While his shaping of Marxism around a structure shows the originality of his theory of multi-causalities, the relations in the determination are as difficult as they are complex. It is just like the analyst's interpretation technique. Althusser rejects the one-sidedness of the contradiction between Labor and Capital, which he states in "For Marx," and argues that it is not a simple contradiction. This implies that the Marxist contradiction should be considered in terms of the temporality and historical conditions in which it emerges, and that it should operate depending on the characteristics of the forms of structures (Althusser, 2005).

In his treatment of Marx, with his theory of "multi-causality/overdetermination," which emerges from the rejection of structure and superstructure as well as mechanistic and economic understanding, Althusser opposes the reduction of ideology to the economic basis, which is approached as a reflection or an inverted echo. This reduction of consciousness is also valid in a particular ideology, namely politics, law, morality, religion, and philosophy ideologies, as well as in the general

ideological field. Of course, one of the main features of the theory of multi-causality is the concepts it obtains from psychoanalysis and linguistics. It is located at the point where they are interrelated.

Althusser borrows the concept of multi-causality/overdetermination from psychoanalysis, which is the starting point of the concept of the unconscious that we will talk about in our thesis, and linguistic theory from a Lacanian perspective. Lacan's analogy of the structure of the unconscious to the structure of language is one of the issues Althusser emphasizes. Marxist determinations of substructure and superstructure are dialectically similar to the process of displacement and condensation. If we consider the concept of overdetermination together with displacement and condensation; if we consider the concept of contradiction discussed in *For Marx* as the fusion of opposites in the dialectic in Marxist thought; it is necessary to explain the unity of opposites by giving the following sentence from Althusser:

“...that is (1) the passage in indeterminate conditions, of one opposite into the place of another, the exchange of roles between contradictions and their aspects (I shall call this phenomenon of substitution displacement); (2) the 'identity' of opposites in a real unity (I shall call this phenomenon of 'fusion' condensation). Indeed, the great lesson of practice is that if the structure in dominance remains constant, the disposition of the roles within it changes; the principal contradiction becomes a secondary one, a secondary contradiction takes its place, the principal aspect becomes a secondary one, the secondary aspect becomes the principal one. There is always one principal contradiction and secondary ones, but they exchange their roles in the structure articulated in dominance (while this latter remains stable).” (Althusser, 2005).

From this point of view, we can understand displacement by considering Althusser's replacement of the principal and secondary contradictions. The same situation is

the displacement of letters, words, and images in Freud's dream work, as the unconscious between the dream itself and the visible content of the dream reveals itself in the language. The message these elements want to convey to the consciousness is displaced for many reasons and is suppressed in what we call the unconscious.

The concept of structural causality also clearly gives us the content. While the structure has relatively autonomous elements, it determines them. However, this determination is not unilateral. It is a concept that contains causality in itself. In the relation of determination, as we have already mentioned, we know that it is not the infrastructure that is determinative in the last instance in the relation between infrastructure and superstructure. Therefore, a Marxian theory emerges here that breaks away from a Hegelian dialectic. Structural causality, articulated with multi-causality, leads the contradiction of determination in the complex structure of the whole to a multi-causal contradiction. This determination in the structure is a displacement relation. Therefore, the concept of structural causality can also be read as "causality based on displacement." At this point, it is essential to consider Freud's unconscious. Structurally, Freud's theory of the general unconscious is dominantly present in all psychic processes and linguistic formations. In other words, the desire of the unconscious in its ever-shifting, decentralized form is present in dreams in a distorted form. This situation, which we can read as the generalization of the dream work in *The Interpretation of Dreams* to the unconscious, is one of the main arguments in Althusser's formation of his ideology. Because the Althusserian Ideology in General and the Ideological State Apparatuses, which are formed by the addition of multi-causality and structural causality, based on the reproduction of production relations, will form the conceptual practice of infinity, uncertainty, and repetition with the "symptoms" created by the complex whole within itself. This is important in terms of how the "symptoms" in our text analysis and our daily life practices should be handled by us.

In Althusser, the principal contradiction in the whole structure is also produced through displacement. The principal contradiction can only create an explosive effect with an effect determined through concentration (Althusser, 2005). One word of Althusser's should be considered here, which can perhaps only be read and passed over. What matters to us is this: Althusser's emphasis on this word "explosion" to draw the text's reading in the direction we want takes us to a "symptomatic" situation if we use a psychoanalytical concept in the relation of determination between these two contradictions. Symptomatically addressing the ultimate explosiveness of the fundamental contradiction should not be understood as a positive or a negative situation. When we consider it with the idea of revealing itself, it shows us the effect of the determiner. At the same time, the question what a determiner is arises. We will mention this later. It makes sense to consider this text reading as "symptomatic reading" borrowed from Althusser. At this point, the issue of its similarity with psychoanalysis is that it resembles Freud's dream work. If these interchangeable contradictions are realized by displacement and condensation, we need to look at the Freudian concepts of psychoanalysis.

Just as the principal and the secondary contradictions mentioned by Althusser are displaced within each other, the unconscious, preconscious and consciousness mentioned by Freud in *The Interpretation of Dreams* are considered together with the concepts of displacement and condensation in this conflict. However, before we move on to that, we need to talk about "symptom-based reading."

1.3. SYMPTOM-BASED READING

The main method of *Reading Capital*, which is based on a re-reading of Marx, is "symptom-based reading." Our aim in this reading is to take over the conceptualizations that Marx explicitly and implicitly says but does not fully articulate, where he leaves them incomplete. At the same time, the aim is to reveal the materiality of the concepts being constructed, as well as the methodology of a theoretical practice. Althusser's concept of multi-causality was applied to Marx's

texts in this way. The symptomatic reading of Marx's texts carries the concern that Marx's text is perceived as a religious text. It is the "symptomatic" reading under the influence of the assumption of the unconscious that eliminates this concern. The analogy of the dream to a rebus in Freud, the practice of analysis, and the conceptualizations of multi-causality, appropriately taken up methodologically while reading Marx, are of great importance in Althusser's own interpretation and analysis technique. Especially in linguistic theory, his aptitude for Lacan will enable this symptom-based reading to be sought and perceived in language and discourse practices, far from being perceived as religious.

When Lacan rereads Freud, the importance he attaches to shifts of words, jokes, and symptoms in the formations of the unconscious is similar to Althusser's reading of Marx with psychoanalytic concepts articulated with the theory of structural linguistics. While Marx describes the political economy in *Capital*, the reading style in the criticism of classical economists has a double meaning, according to Althusser. Althusser says he drew attention to this at the beginning of his text *From Capital to Marx's Philosophy*. This dual meaning contains a binary reading. While criticizing classical economists, Marx thinks that they use "labor value" instead of "labor power" without realizing it. Althusser speaks here of the rift that exists in the second reading of Marx in a space that the first cannot see (Althusser, 2015). This rift is where symptom appears. It is in this "gap" that double reading can take place.

In *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud thinks of the visible contents of dreams and dream thoughts as two texts that are almost copies of each other. He speaks of one text as a translation of the other. By interpreting this silence in the gaps of Marx, Althusser reveals what was not said in Marx as a second translation. This reading technique performed by Althusser shows us a psychoanalytic reading of Marx. The formation of ideology is particularly important in Althusser in this context. In this symptomatic reading, which influenced him and his contemporaries, what we aim to show is not the source of the symptom, but the position of the symptom at the moment of its emergence and the importance of this position.

We have mentioned these three conceptual practices of Althusser that are conceptually important. We will now mention the concepts at the center of our thesis.

2. ON GENERAL THEORY OF IDEOLOGIES AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Leaving aside the question of what ideology is, it is necessary to problematize what Althusserian ideology tells us. It will be enough to think about where ideology will take us in the context we will present. We will try to show the traces of this in its parallelism with the unconscious. In the relation of reproduction in Marx's view, the point Althusser wants to draw attention is that what Marx cannot fully explain appears him as a problematic. This is a situation that can be revealed by symptomatic reading. In other words, the symptom already existed in Marx. Reading him is possible by knowing the analysis method. In other words, it is possible through the practice of interpretation. Althusser reveals this situation with the conceptual practices he explains through relationalities and especially from the categories of the "unconscious." Where does the reproduction of the material conditions of production lead to the Althusserian theory of ideology in our thesis?

Althusser does not make a reduction while re-reading Marx. He only tries to find in the pattern of certain conceptualizations what is missing or incomplete in Marx. Althusser tries to transform the general concept of ideology, which he sees as incompletely explained in *The German Ideology* written in 1845, into a coherent theory. However, he does not subvert Marx's ideology here. He defends Marx by giving it a new content. While dealing with ideology, Althusser problematizes its definition in *The German Ideology*. Marx approaches the ideology as an illusion that emerges from the totality of the material living conditions of the acting human being. It states that ideas are formed as a necessary result of material life practices. Therefore, the mental conception of material life practices is a necessary reality in an imaginary illusion of the acts in our entirely determined material practices (Marx, 1998). This is the ideology of Marx. It is nothing but an inverted reflection of real history. Whether it is the ideology of law or the ideology of religion, these are formed from the real material conditions of human life (Marx, 1998). He attributes the absence of a history of metaphysics and any ideology to the fact that

its entire reality is outside of itself (Marx, 1998). Althusser says that Freud's definition of thought according to his predecessors is similar to this definition of ideology in Marx. Writers before Freud said that the dream arbitrarily is an imaginary effect left over from the remnants of the day. This is why the definition in *The German Ideology* is similar to this. Therefore, in Marx, ideology can be seen as a pure dream. These propositions in *The German Ideology* are unfavorable, according to Althusser. This is why the definition of General Ideology that he tried to establish differs from *The German Ideology*, which he put forward as a positivist-idealist. The thesis that "Ideology has no history." is that to the extent that class struggles are historical, the essential characteristic of ideology is that this structure and functioning exists in the same and unchanging form at all times of history. This is where Freud's thesis "The unconscious is eternal." (Althusser, 2014). If its cause is located outside history, ideology, like the unconscious, is eternal. Thus, Althusser critically deals with the idealist and linear reading of consciousness and ideology in *The German Ideology*.

The "relative autonomy of the superstructure" plays an essential role in this study of ideology. While discussing Marx, he proposes the theory of "multi-causality/overdetermination," which simultaneously emerged with the rejection of the mechanical and economic understanding of the structure and superstructure. In this theory, Althusser, in the last instance, opposes the reduction of ideology to the economic basis, which is treated as a reflection or an inverted echo. This reduction is also valid in the field of the same ideological apparatus, namely in politics, law, morality, religion, and philosophy.

In the beginning, we mentioned the reproduction of the relations of production. Here, in Marx's theory of alienation, the process in which the individual is ultimately alienated from himself is the problem of representation of ideology. The problem of representation of ideology in Althusser lies in the relationship established with the conditions of existence, not the real worlds of ideology in actual conditions of existence. That is, ideology is the imaginary relation

established with the reproduction of relations of production and other relations derived from them. The fact that this imaginary relationship has a material existence corresponds to the relationality in Althusser's "apparatuses." If ideology is an imaginary representation of the relationship between human beings and material conditions of existence, it is necessary to consider the reflection or "questioning" of these material existence practices in "Ideological Apparatuses." As an ideology of religion, all rituals in the Church apparatus, observance of these rituals, and living with these practices in the social formation are examples of the material existence of the ideology. Because ideology always exists in an apparatus and in the practices of this apparatus (Althusser, 2014). Therefore, it is concrete. This material existence can even be shown as much more specific examples in "Apparatuses." For example, the ideology of law has a material existence in the individual, who exists under the ideological illusion of the relative autonomy of the institutional structure, in the determination of the codes that are the object of law and the relations that establish the codes. The same can be said of the institution of the family and its ideological determination, which is legally regulated. Maternal and paternal roles are an infinitely variable process that is determined by the ideology of the institution of the family and established and reproduced by these relations.

The last level of the relation of determination takes place within the structure as an unlimited field of struggle. Althusser emphasizes that elements are constantly shifting within the structure. He deals with the issue of "Ideological Apparatuses," a field that he sees the cores in Marxist state theory and wants to open. Althusser states that relations of production are reproduced through the exercise of state power in state apparatuses (Althusser, 2014). In other words, that is, both in the Ideological State Apparatus and the (repressive) State Apparatus. While the repressive state apparatuses consult to force and violence, the Ideological State Apparatuses functions through ideology. The repressive "State Apparatus" exists through violence and conflict. (Foucault will analyze this in more depth in the future). However, it does not use mere violence and physical intervention. The

importance of this is here: As an apparatus of oppression, the state puts forward such a practice of ideology that it often does not need to use violence and physical intervention, which is its main purpose. Although it primarily resorts to this first situation, a repression articulated with ideology also acts as a deterrent. The opposite is true for the "Ideological State Apparatuses." In the "Ideological State Apparatuses," the ideological element operates predominantly, but this does not mean that there is no element of violence in the relations within the "Ideological Apparatuses." For example, in schools, which are educational institutions, it is considered legitimate for teachers to use violence against students at certain points in practice. This legitimization is manifested in the form of physical disciplines, such as hitting students' hands with a ruler or making them stand on one leg as a method of punishment. Violence and oppression are revealed in the disciplinary method used when "homework" is not done. This is the clearest example that we can give. Therefore, these material practices are the production of certain roles in the social formation in the teacher-student relationship. It is the reproduction of ideological relations or violence as a mechanism of oppression. Apart from this (Althusser may not have said it the way we did), we also see here a concrete practice of displacement as a tactical move. This leads us to say that this dual application of the relations of production realized in the Ideological Apparatuses is more effective than exercising the power of the relatively "repressive" State Apparatus.

The State Apparatus operates differently from the Ideological State Apparatuses. These are Religion, School, Family, Law, Politics (system including different parties), Union, Communication, Cultural, and Ideological apparatuses. Here Althusser criticizes that the state apparatus only belongs to the public sphere, but the Ideological Apparatus seems to belong to the private sphere. Taking Gramsci as an example, he argues that the distinction between public and private is valid in areas where bourgeois law exercises its power because the state sphere cannot be separated into private and public spaces. On the contrary, Althusser says that it is a necessary precondition of these two fields (Althusser, 2014). Therefore, this distinction is not essential for the state sphere. Because what is important in

"Ideological Apparatuses" is the way these material practices function. The method to be used here is related to the concept of hegemony. The concept was undoubtedly borrowed from Gramsci. However, the exercise of hegemony lies in class relations, in the practice of subordinate relations of production. This is Althusser's suggestion. In this case, the primary basis of the form of struggle lies in the practice of the relations of production. This relationship can and should be compared to a general relationship of domination in Foucault because this domination is not only the "managing" or "functioning" of ideology but also the exercise of power relations.

Historically, our established subjectivities are a set of experiences that reveal themselves through the problematization of our truth practices that emerge in determining power relations. From what we call the set of self-revealing experiences we can deduce the strategic use of the emancipatory practice of power. These practices, which are constantly shifting and underlie the unity of multi-causal relations, are an ideological reproduction that we will call "mise-en-scene." To the extent that it is a "mise-en-scene," it offers us a "game of truth." The mobility contained in the concept of "mise-en-scene" is also the echo in the phenomenon as the staging of the game of truth. It takes place both on the basis of institutions and in the spaces where our experiences of subjectivity are established, and in the sum total of all physical and conceptual spaces where these two fields intersect.

What we refer to as "mise-en-scene" also has an equivalent in Freud. In Freud's work on the dream, the fact that the dream can never come to consciousness in its relation to dream thoughts is revealed in puns. Freud's "mise-en-scène" depends on the constant replacement of these words. This will show that the "Laws of Contract," which we will explain later, are also created by specific puns. This is in the individual-society dilemma of the Social Contract, which Althusser addresses through Rousseau. It takes place both linguistically in the practice of discourse and in all other behavioral and institutional practices with conscious or unconscious influence. These puns and their displacement within each other will constitute a theoretical "playground" that constitutes the relationalities through which "Truth"

can emerge, or perhaps examples of the "Truth" fallacy. It will manifest itself in all practices, both discursive and non-discursive. Of course, here, we will have to deal with a few readings of what we call truth and even its "modality" in its linguistic existence. However, what we need to do first is to deal with Freud's unconscious work first.

2.1. DREAMWORK AND THE SPECIFICITY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

Following a scientific-practical theory, Althusser defines Freud's science and related theoretical activity as three stages in his Freud-Lacan text. It is a practical-technical and theoretical whole (Althusser, 1977). This whole is a formal case of Althusser's scientific reading of Freud. This is a formal situation in which all Althusser scientifically read Freud. However, the most critical aspect of this is that it is handled through Lacan's interpretation of Freud. Undoubtedly, we know that Althusser has read Freud's texts, but Freud's conceptual practice gains meaning in Althusser only when it is discussed through Lacan. Because after reading Freud through Lacan, Althusser begins to unpack the concepts of unconscious, displacement, and condensation and tries to ground them in philosophy.

Freud tried to take his concepts from philosophy and linguistic theory, which were not formed yet. In the first part of his article "Freud-Lacan," Althusser mentions that the psychoanalysis founded by Freud was not formed by conceptual practices left over from all other social sciences or even from the field of formal sciences (Althusser, 1977). Because he says that psychoanalysis, through Lacan, has an object that can never be changed. In other words, it cannot be reduced to anthropology, sociology, psychology, or even American psychoanalysis. The practical application of his theory and its conceptual object by Freud's successors is the first step in the originality he established. This is because the psychoanalytic approach argues that the analysis of hysterical cases or symptomatic states in human beings does not proceed from the idea of "reintegration." (Althusser, 1977). Lacan is also against this situation. When we say society, this is, of course, capitalist social

formations and their derivatives. It is not innocent and pragmatist that being sick or having lost one's "consciousness" can restore what is outside rationality or what is "a-rational" to the state of "consciousness" or social practice through its usefulness. We can think of Althusser's reading of this as his attitude towards American psychoanalysts and their reflections in Europe. It is a stand against the institutional establishment of the "ego" as such, but also against the "so-called" organic stages of individual development. Because the content of Freud's concepts has been distorted and turned into an object of consumption and a network of reproduction relations has been formed through new institutionalities.

According to Freud, most psychoanalysts before him were concerned with the apparent content of thought. In chapter 6 of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud distinguishes between the visible content of the dream and the actual thoughts of the dream. At the beginning of the article, he states that the visible content of thought and dream thought are based on signs like a hieroglyphic work. Thanks to the technique of interpretation, it is not easy to reveal this so-called pictorial puzzle (Freud, 2010). Although the visible content does not make sense, the imaginary formations it reflects inform us about the thought of the dream. He argues that in these two distinctions, one copies the other. Freud likens this copying function itself to translation. There are two other factors in this determination process between two. As we mentioned above, one is "displacement," and the other is "condensation."

Considering the period in which Freud lived, we can realize that the theory of linguistics has not yet developed. However, Freud's distinction between the visible content of thought and dream thought clearly points to a theory of linguistics. The visible content of what Freud calls the dream thought, which appears as the first topic, conceals the meaning or reality of the actual thought as something that exists in a hieroglyphic order. When dream thoughts are transferred to language, they reveal what we are trying to say as unconscious through the signs in language. The interpretation of dream thought is likened to putting together the pieces of a puzzle

(Freud, 2010). But its interpretation cannot be handled in an arbitrary way. It must be considered with the scientificity of the analysis technique.

What Freud calls condensation is the process of uncovering the dream thought. When we consider the dream itself, it is suppressed by our thoughts, fictions, and many physical, emotional and imaginative activities in the moment itself, which we then try to think about and remember. Condensation takes place in a way that is wholly superimposed and determined by one's mental process and intellectual activities. Therefore, it is impossible to define thought of dream in the analysis of the dream. From this point on, we can also consider the other pillar of this determination relation, which is displacement. Here Freud distinguishes between dreams and the center of dream thoughts (Freud, 2010). Explaining this from a deduction Freud made in the "Botanical Monograph Dream" will enable us to grasp the displacement more easily. "Botanical" is taken as the central point of the dream content. The dream thoughts, in this case, concerned Freud's "confusions and conflicts among his colleagues arising out of his professional obligations and the costs he was in the habit of incurring for the sake of his hobbies." (Freud, 2010). While "Botanical" seems to be the actual center of the dream, the remaining elements determine "Botanical" from its center. The reason for this distinction here stems from the relationship between the dream and the dream thoughts determining each other. The importance of the determination between dream content and dream thoughts lies in the practice of the analysis. If these determinations were left unsolved, the determination would have no significance. Thus, the plural designations that decide what goes into a dream are essential in choosing which particular elements go into a dream. Because dream materials cannot be brought together without any analysis (Freud, 2010). The fact that the centers of these two things are not the same brings us to the hypothetical relation of a spatial place regarding the substitution of determination.

Freud developed the unconscious hypothesis against both philosophy and classical psychology. The generalization of dream theory to the theory of the unconscious is

discussed in detail, especially in Chapter 7 of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Classical psychology considers dreams as a physiological phenomenon. In the psychological discussions before and during his time, Freud proposes a discussion that consciousness means “psychologic.” All of the physicians' observations on abnormal mentalities assume that the concept is not correct because of this use of the term. Therefore, a psychological state cannot be defined by the conceptual practice of "consciousness." (Freud, 2010). Psychologists and psychoanalysts before him found it wrong to analyze a psychological state by an interpretation based on the phenomena of consciousness. Therefore, he emphasizes that the place to apply the analysis is not in consciousness and material acts performed consciously, but in linguistic acts that take place outside of it. In other words, Freud tries to argue that the object of analysis in psychoanalysis and psychology is not conscious but the unconscious.

He argues that the flow from the unconscious to the conscious is not clearly possible in the mental process. Because, on the way to explaining the unconscious, the hieroglyph-like picture puzzle that emerges as a result of the condensation and displacement of dream elements in *The Interpretation of Dreams* reveals Freud's originality (Freud, 2010). He says that there are two types of the unconscious. More precisely, he talks about two things as the general structure of the unconscious. The first is "unconscious," and the second is "preconscious." The first is the "unconscious" as irreducible to consciousness, a system subject to displacements and intensifications and transmitted through language. The second is the "preconscious," which is determined under certain conditions and where censorship actually takes place. This censorship takes place in the preconscious mechanism. The unconscious impulses come to the conscious by being censored before the conscious. It never obviously comes to consciousness as it is. The fact that these stimulations in the unconscious cannot come to consciousness, that they pass through a hierarchical order called the preconscious, enabled Freud to establish a spatial analogy.

Freud's basic premise is the immortality and indestructibility of desire originating in childhood (Freud, 2010). The relationality that the child establishes with the mother and father begins the periodization of human life and the formation of the pleasure principle. But in Freud, even in adulthood or in old age, these desires from childhood are manifested in every aspect of our lives through factors triggered by consciousness. Therefore, beyond pleasure, the situation causes desire to exist in an inexhaustible timeless place. Through the indestructibility of our desires, the unconscious is the substitute for desire. Our unconscious desires, which are revealed in the formation of dreams, are always active. This process, which is triggered in our conscious states and repressed in our unconscious, continues from birth until death. The fact that the psychic action that takes place in the unconscious manifests itself in language is proof of its immortality (Freud, 1984).

The interaction of all human phenomena in material life with the unconscious is therefore located outside history, but at the same time within everything we perceive in our material life practices, which are infinitely determined within all of history. That is, it is hidden in the unconscious where it causes determinations. There is no unconscious organized by time in any way. There is no regular moment of emergence through a systematic (Freud, 1984). However, Freud tries to systematize this and spread it throughout the analysis process and tries to derive a temporal perspective. The fact that the analysis technique spreads itself over a long period of time therefore requires a long work.

Freud states that the unconscious has a place in the relation of determination, which can occur at any moment in time, even though it does not function completely independently of consciousness. It is obvious that we can understand the timelessness of the unconscious by looking at the relationship of the elements connected to its autonomous system and the properties connected to it. Therefore, the external reality perceived by the consciousness disappears in this determination with the psychic reality of the unconscious. In Freud, the unconscious is fundamental, but it does not have the priority of determining each other with "pre-

conscious" or "conscious," it is an unlimited and infinite process. The "determination" in Freud is indeed the result of hysterical symptoms in the unconscious process, that is, of a psychic conflict. The determination relationship takes place here. Therefore, understanding its relations in the practice of its realization, understanding the real process of the unconscious, determines how to apply the method of analysis. Let us briefly state this situation and return to our subject: Revealing the essential meaning of thought is a relationship of determination with the laws of the unconscious as the revelation of truth.

Freud took the dream study further and discussed the theory of the unconscious, which he explained and positioned under the title of "Unconscious" in *Metapsychology*, by almost separating the centers of the "conscious-unconscious" system and adding new concepts to it (Freud, 1984). In his study, Freud argues that the actual meaning of the thought is determined by the dream thoughts in a kind of distortion. Dream thoughts conceal the original meaning of the thought. And this consists of the multi-causality of the unconscious with the articulation of "displacement," "condensation," and superposition, whose modes of operation we have explained, and their influence on each other in a multiple-way on a complex level. This shows us the originality of the causality of the dream. The ambiguity of dreams or the formation of meaninglessness in language processes that occur through puns shows us the determinations in the unconscious. Revealing this meaninglessness is possible with the practice of interpreting the signs in the language. Here we can see that the unconscious elements, which are more complex than the determination of the main thing in the phenomenon, cannot be explained by simple and one-way causality. From this point of view, we can think of Althusser's determinations in structural causality.

Althusser rejects all historical propositions stating that the understanding of time is one-sided and linear. Firstly, he criticizes Hegel's understanding of time, which he defines as linear, homogeneous, and continuous because of multiple determinations of the production relations in the social unity. He criticizes the thesis that history

takes place in a straight and linear understanding since every kind of structure, whether economic, ideological, or political, has a relatively autonomous structure. Therefore, time cannot be explained only within the temporal limitations of individuals' existence. The temporality in the autonomy of the structure and the singular temporality in the individual's own existence are not considered from the same point of view. The understanding of time in the conscious as seen in Freud is different from the understanding of time in the structure of the unconscious. It is the complex time of the relation of determination based on a complex system of overlapping transmissions. The time of the unconscious thus points to a discontinuous and plural time outside of time. In other words, the analogy between "the eternity of ideology" and "the eternity of the unconscious" is thus established. Ideology is not simply an illusion, just as Freud's dream is not an illusion and delusion. If the content of thought is formed by mechanisms of displacement and condensation, ideology functions through mechanisms of displacement and condensation around these determinations.

Althusser develops the reductionist character of Marxist determination. Here, Spinoza's concept of ideology on Althusser also has a decisive role. Ideology is based on trying to understand the world in which all kinds of discursive and non-discursive human practices are expressed and created and the imagination of their bodies in relation to this created world. Based on this, Althusser established a unique perspective dealing with materiality of ideology. Because ideology cannot be considered only as an imaginary representation of the material relationship established with reality. The material practice hidden within social practices is dependent on relations and reproduction. This attitude of Althusser actually deals with the "functioning" of ideology within the practices, rituals and their mutual determination that exist in Ideological State Apparatuses. It does not contain violence and tyranny like the exercise of power in the State Apparatus. But it is possible to read the implementation of certain practices in ideology in the form of echoes of violence and tyranny as the reproduction of these social practices. Therefore, ideology is not just a simple *mise en scene*, or it cannot be considered as

a simple "game." They are just like the visible contents in dreams. In other words, the materiality of ideology and its relative autonomy from structures only manifest themselves as "fictional games" within these material practices. It does not present ideology to us abstractly. Analysis of these practices is necessary. They must be read in the same way that elements of the unconscious are irreducible to consciousness.

We can easily deduce from this that Althusser established ideology within the framework of the laws of the unconscious. The laws of the unconscious determined Althusser's conceptualization of ideology. The Lacanian subject categorization, which he deals with in the Freud-Lacan text, also shows this situation. From this point of view, we can move on to the context of Ideology's establishment of concrete individuals as concrete subjects.

2.2. THE PROBLEMATIC OF THE SUBJECT IN ALTHUSSER

In Althusser, the subject category cannot be separated from the theory of ideology. In fact, the structure and functioning of the concept of ideology, which it tries to create implicitly, points entirely to the construction of the subject. Ideology, which establishes concrete subjects as concrete individuals, begins with the "questioning" of the subject. The subject is formed by being "interpellation" or, in other words, "questioning." In the famous text, after the moment of "interpellation" (hey you, there!), the physical movement of the individual and the mobility that emerges with the suspension of judgment establishes the individual as a "subject." To what extent can an individual know that he has been interpellated? This must depend on a general law. Therefore, the constitution of the subject emerges in the movement of the individual, that is, in the movement that takes place after the "interpellation." Since ideology is valid in all kinds of history, it takes on a double meaning as the existence of the human being as a human being and the existence of the human being as a subject. This is the construction of a subject related to the "law." This is

where the discourse of being a slave comes from. Submission to the law is present in the return movement of the "interpellated/questioned" subject (Althusser, 2014).

In Althusser, the subject is established through a determination, as in the critical treatment of classical contract theory. Since this establishment is not dependent on time, it happened spontaneously at a specific moment. At the same time, ideology necessarily and eternally "questions" individuals as subjects. We find the clearest example again in the *Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses*. We can think of the example of childhood taken from Freud. Althusser points out that an ideologically determined environment is ready before the child is born. Even the name it is called by is predetermined. It is also determined in terms of gender and cultural structure. Because the child is born into a Family Ideology established by the sovereign. The determination of the subject is related to both the eternity of ideology and the endless reproduction of material practical relations. This situation also emphasizes Freud's concept of the formation of child sexuality. Freud, who argues that the sexuality of the child is determined by the unconscious, supports this argument of Althusser (Althusser, 2014). Moreover, the subjugation of the child to a sovereign before the birth points to the "legislative" of the Symbolic Order in Lacan's *On the Names of the Father*, a reading of Freud (Lacan, 2012).

Lacan's theory of subjectivation is a subjectivation as the humanization of the child in Freud. Like in Althusser, in Lacan, the child finds himself in a symbolic order after birth. Moreover, it is a necessity. Because he was born into this language. In other words, subjectivation in Lacan is counted as the sum of all the unconscious effects together with the symbolic order. The importance of linguistic theory for Lacan is also understood here. The symbolic order is a feature of the "language" formed by human subjects. It is a collection of symbols formed from human interaction. Therefore, combining all these, the human baby's "necessity to open up to the language" is realized (Lacan, 2001).

In Freud-Lacan, Althusser rearranges Lacan's theory, which he calls "Lacan's Symbolic Order," through his conceptualization. He calls this the "Law of Culture." This concept is the Althusserian treatment of the Symbolic Law. Lacan's symbolic order, which is eternal and present in all areas of history, surrounds the life of the human being before he is born and continues to surround him even after death. This means continuing to follow the law (Lacan, 2005). In this respect, the "Law of Culture" emerges through the material practices in life from before the moment of birth until after death and through all the acts we create with the functionality of language. Ideology necessarily becomes an immanent agent of the Law of Culture. Althusser, who tried to apply this to the theory of social formations, formed his conceptualizations of ideology and even the processes of "enslavement" and "subjectification" from here and took it to the example of the ideology of Religion.

Althusser also mentions a fundamental deficiency revealed by the passage of the human act that he explains as the discourse of the unconscious in the Freud-Lacan text. He says that this lack shows us the place of the unconscious as the lack of existence.

“This is the beginning, and has always been the beginning, even where there is no living father, of the official presence of the Father (who is Law), hence of the Order of the human signifier, i.e. of the Law of Culture: this discourse, the absolute precondition of any discourse, this discourse present at the top, i.e. absent in the depths, in all verbal discourse, the discourse of this Order, this discourse of the Other, of the great Third, which is this Order itself: *the discourse of the unconscious*. This gives us a hold, a *conceptual* hold on the unconscious, which is in each human being the absolute place where his particular discourse seeks its own place, seeks, misses, and in missing, finds its own place, its own anchor to its place, in the imposition, imposture, complicity and denegation of its own imaginary fascinations.” (Althusser, 1977).

What do we understand by what is called the discourse of the unconscious in the passage above? As a sign of acoustic order, it exists as the only condition of the Law of Culture, of all discourse. But it is also "a place where it seeks and finds its own place." If ideology, or the material practices of ideology, exist as agents of the Law of Culture, this opens up a controversial area. Our material practices of relation around the determinations of the relative autonomy of structures and superstructures are realized in an eternal and indeterminate act. A factor is hidden in the act of "Quest" here. If the discourse of the unconscious finds its substitute in the Law of Culture but misses it to the extent that it finds it, an ambiguity and inconsistency develops in our behavior impelled by the unconscious. The place where the unconscious discourse finds its place creates its substitution as a "questioning item" beyond a state of satisfaction, and it is displaced to the extent it creates. Where is subjectivation located in this case? In the discourse of the unconscious. If the practice of analysis only gives us clues in the truth of this discourse, what is our subjectivity immanent? We did not quote the previous sentence from the passage we gave. But the footnote he gave to that sentence opens the discussion above. It leads to a concept that Lacan calls "lack of existence." The object of desire deals with the difference in the relationship between the organic needs of the "human subject" in its biological existence and the needs of unconscious desire. There is no determination or continuity between the "organic" need of man and his unconscious desire. The unconscious is established in a completely different place as unconscious. Because desire, as an organic need, has no substitute in human biological existence. In the discourse of the unconscious, desire surrenders itself to an existence that is not the place where the unconscious pushes, an existence without substitutes. There is a substitution of a desire that is constantly postponed. The object of desire is constantly displaced. The question of satisfaction is important here.

The satisfaction of unconscious desires has an endless loop. Satisfaction is not a process that ends as soon as it happens. The structure of the unconscious "order" determines what enables this surrender here. In other words, in order to reach the

discourse of the unconscious, such as the fact that one cannot reach the reality of a person only through the phenomena of their actions, it is necessary to look at the displacement processes in the substitutes of desire. The fact that desire is not subject to determination and is constantly changing must be revealed by following the clues in the Law of Culture.

What do the unconscious substitutions of "desire" as an "interpellated/questioned" element show us? The cornerstone of the theory that establishes Althusser's superstructure is the Law of Culture here. In Althusser, the formation of consciousness and the unconscious emerges as a theory that feeds on the "cracks" and "gaps" created by man in his own performative process. But the location of what we are looking for is clearly elsewhere. The rejection of "submission" as "immanence to the law" and adherence to it is located in a different practice. This practice will show itself in a harmony that Foucault presents as truth. We will try to show the substitution of our theory as an externality of "Law" for "Incompatibility" in contract theories. To explain this, we need to focus on a conclusion we will draw with Foucault from the depths of Contract Theories.

3. THE ROLE OF TRUTH DISCOURSE IN IDEOLOGY AND UNCONSCIOUS

What is the role of ideology and the unconscious in the discourse of truth? This question gives us a start to enter into many different conceptual practices. The fact that ideology is eternal like the unconscious does not put the two concepts on the same level. It brings them closer to each other methodologically and as hermeneutics at different levels. It is meaningful to consider the laws of the unconscious together with the practice of "questioning" in ideology. The concept we define as "Quest" has a meaning inherent to "Questioning." In other words, we are saying that "Quest" is the moving cause within the practice of "questioning." Since "Interpellation" cannot give the exact meaning we want, we prefer the concept of "Questioning" here. Within every practice of "questioning" or "Interpellation" there is a practice of "Quest," both conceptually and as a behavior that manifests itself in material relations. To the extent that one opens oneself to another, the practice of "questioning" takes place and the process of subjectification begins here.

Althusser says, "To exist is to reproduce oneself." (Althusser, 2014). This was the starting point of our issue. This idea was the first place we positioned ourselves to show the connections. We will talk about the "immanence" of our concept of "Quest" not as a starting point but as an interpretation of an already existing evaluation. The issue of "community," which we will explain in the section on contract theories, will lead us to the concept of "Quest" as an immanent "questioning." In the Althusserian treatment of "questioning," the "interpellation" or "questioning" of concrete individuals as concrete subjects is present in all our discursive and non-discursive practices as a concept "immanent" to our process of subjectivation. We say that the concept of "quest" appears as a necessary precondition for the realization of the act. Because it carries a meaning inherent to the act itself. For this, we need to look at the movement of "existence" in Ancient Greece.

Being has an eternal existence as "auto-kinesis." "Auto-kinesis" is also the absolute activator of the process of "reproduction," which is where we place our conceptual perspective in the first place. Therefore, the basic condition of existence is reproduction for Althusser. The reproduction of the relations of production has a multi-causal and eternal determination. For this reason, the concept of the "Quest" takes us to a place where we can find immanence in the movement of the interpreter who interprets it or the questioning subject. "Quest" is not a situation to be recognized, not a practice. It is the movement within the idea of a "community" as an "opening to exteriority" within our own singular subjectivity that we will try to uncover. This is both a conceptual unity and a representation of our potential for "revealing of the existence" that remains isolated within our material relations.

In the work of psychoanalysis, there is a state of revelation based on the power of Freud's "hermeneutics." The performative manifestation of "desire," the object of the unconscious, in discourse and behavior depends on the knowledge of its laws as its truth. Freud's practice of analysis is based on the "interpretation" of a movement both in language and in the totality of time. It deals with the repeated interpretation of existing interpretations. In each symptom, he reinterprets the interpretation of the symptom together with another symptom. Because he pursues the infinite and indeterminate semantic unities of "Desire," which cannot find a substitute for its own "Quest" within the signs. The fact that the child is born into a "language" and a "law" within a network of determinations from birth and even prenatal life points to the difficulty of the "Quest" in Freud. But it can and should always be interpreted.

3.1. THE PROBLEMATIZATION OF TRUTH AND THE QUEST AS A CRITIQUE OF CONTRACT THEORIES

Although the importance and place of the Freud-Lacan text in forming ideology and subject theory is known, we will discuss our issue from a different problematic. The purpose of doing this is to show the details of the thesis we will create

conceptually and materially. Here, we will consider the establishment of the individual as a subject as a critique of contract theories. First, what do we understand by ideology's "questioning" of the individual? In "Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus," being interpellated/questioned appears as one of the stages of subject formation. How does the individual, outside of all determinations, turn around and realize that he is being "questioned" directly? It belongs to fundamental law. In our view, it depends on an intersubjective law that states the relative "necessity" of establishing subjectivities. It appears as the necessary law of the constitution of itself as a "community." This law contains the ambiguity of the constitution of individuals as concrete subjects. The first is arbitrariness, and the second is the establishment of the necessity of a law of nature. That is, a law of necessity. We find this questioning in a place outside the chronological historical context in which the Freud-Lacan text was written. We find it in his explanations in his lecture on contract theories at ENS (École Normale Supérieure). We will discuss the necessity of explaining them in the conclusion.

The main contradiction described in Althusser's lecture is between the sovereign and the people. It is a contradiction inherent in the structure of the whole that individuals have established and to which they are "transferring their rights wholesale." In other words, it also describes the arbitrariness in the emergence of the need for a sovereign in line with the interests of the "community" that unconditionally gives everything to the sovereign. Althusser mentions three incompatibilities in these lectures. In order to explain them, he quotes from the text of the Social Contract the first five chapters of what Rousseau sees as the problem. Since showing the indirect explanations here would require too long links, we will summarize them through Althusser.

What he concludes from the first five chapters is that he discards any assumption of a natural basis for social existence. He rejects the classical approach of resorting to pseudo-contracts with the use of force at their root (Althusser, 1972). In sum, the fundamental problem is the question of what makes a people *the people*. Rousseau

questions what underlies a relationship of subordination. This is the first of the conclusions to be drawn from the first five chapters.

The second is Rousseau's rejection of Locke's theory that majority rule is natural. What emerges, however, as a "first unanimous convention" is that the contract that makes a people a people is unanimous.

The first problem stated in the Social Contract is that the obstacles people face in the state of nature lead them to the point of establishing a boundary. It is not possible to overcome these obstacles alone. Rousseau mentions the belief that man's "manner of existence" must change. For Althusser, this point is the state of war in Hobbes. It is literally a *state of war*. These obstacles are not external. They are not obstacles arising from nature. According to Althusser, these obstacles that Rousseau meant are, at the end of the interaction of all kinds of human relations, ultimately the threat "to the property, liberty, and honor of each person." (Althusser, 1972). As a universal relation, this threat is the threshold of a state of war. The result of these relations is that man is condemned to the state of war as his nature. Within these conditions of nature, the set of material practices and tools that human beings produce through their material existence is the means, the "forces" necessary to oppose the state of war. In the first state of nature, with natural destruction and the development of tools, the forces of human beings are the sum of their body and their freedoms. In the state of war, the forces that man possesses are his "property and possessions" in addition to his body and intellectual forces. Althusser reads this clearly in Rousseau's text. It is the situation in which each individual surrenders himself to the community without excluding all the forces in his hands at the establishment stage of the community. Althusser approaches this surrender as alienation, but this is not alienation as we know it. It is an alienation that can be handled through the modes of alienation. It is an alienation that can be read as "surrendering" all the forces belonging to itself to someone else by presenting one's own existence as an object.

Althusser's mention of the word "Interest" in Rousseau's text indicates an important point to be emphasized in the text. Singular interest emerges only through the mediation of another. It exists through competition with other people. Protecting individual interests alone is not possible, nor is it sufficient to protect the forces that exist in the hands of the individual. The "goods and property" produced as a result of the means of production produced through material relations constitute the backbone of the social contract. This protection of "goods and property" is implicitly introduced in Rousseau in order to explain the necessity of the contract. The issue points to the contract that is necessary to eliminate this state of war. Therefore, according to Althusser, the category of individual interest is a feature specific to the social bonds that exist after the state of war. In other words, a singular interest can become a private interest in case of war. Thus, in Rousseau, the necessity of the contract appears as an agreement made entirely on the protection of this "interest" through the opposition and competition of singular interests. It is even a compulsory agreement made as a "manner of existence" of human beings. But what we see as the main issue in this text is the problematic of the sovereign. Along with this, it is the dilemma of what makes a people *the people*. More precisely, in Althusser's words, it is the "game" created by the "theoretical gap." The real problem lies in the contradiction that will be discussed from this point onwards.

While describing the forces, Althusser speaks of a sum of forces that includes property. The sum of "two things" with freedom attached to it constitutes the "Singular Interest" in Rousseau. Rousseau's Social Contract contains a different situation apart from other contracts. This paradox lies at the foundation of the contract. That is to say, each individual participating in the contract must surrender all his or her rights to the community as a whole. This will enable us to make the introduction of the issue of "truth" that we will focus on more easily. Because this theoretical gap that Althusser reaches through Rousseau will lead us to another point. This treatment of Althusser needs to be thoroughly grasped. What does Rousseau's concept of "transferring" mean? According to Althusser, this discourse

is not the same as "giving itself" and "selling itself." Beyond that, it is something else (Althusser, 1972). The "total renunciation" that Althusser mentions here is one of the modalities of the concept of alienation. Therefore, it is not exactly alienation in the Marxian sense. It is a reading that includes multiple meanings of alienation.

While Rousseau states that freedom is something that cannot be given up and sold, same time, his conclusions in his contract theory show the opposite. Because what Althusser refers to as "renounce" is incompatible with human nature as renounce freedom. Therefore, it is a "renunciation" of the right to freedom in a different way than selling the right to freedom. Therein lies the paradox that develops with this. The condition of "total alienation" of the Social Contract is the solution to the problem created by the state of universal alienation into which humanity has fallen, culminating in the state of war, which will be resolved by the Social Contract (Althusser, 1972).

“Total alienation is the solution to the state of total alienation.” (Althusser, 1972). Rousseau here uses the term “renounce of humanity” instead of a “state of war.” Therefore, the contract that serves to establish the change in the manner of existence is a contract as a renunciation of humanity. He plays with the meanings of the concept. He plays on both the concept of alienation and the concept of renounce. This paradoxical process in the text appears as a condition for being free, as an element in which the sovereign must exercise forces, he must transfer his freedom and everything, and man must be re-established. The disappearance of the state of war between individuals occurs only with this paradoxical proposition. For the community to be formed, the individuals who compose it exist through the community as a manner of existence. The community becomes a community to the extent that it is nothing but the formal sum of these individuals. In other words, these individuals are again immanent in the community. Rousseau makes this clear in his own words. It is enough to look at the quote about the people making the contract with themselves (Althusser, 1972).

Rousseau clearly gave the second example in the Social Contract. Each person actually has a dual nature when making a contract with himself. As a member of the sovereign institution, their commitment to the contract is itself manifested in relation to the promise they make to others. This inevitably shows that Rousseau is necessarily contradictory. It is a reading that shows the arbitrariness of legal ideology in the law. This law clearly manifests itself in Rousseau. "Total self-transfer" is a theoretical game. It is a "mise-en-scène." It is something other than submission to a Prince rather than to a single sovereign in society. It is the submission of the community to its own laws. The individuals who make up this community also bring the acceptance of a system as a transcendence of the state of war. This is in line with Kantian duty ethics. The discourses and practices that begin with the phrase "act in such a way that...", which Kant specifically states, contribute to the formation of a universal human being.

Problematizing the "one" itself through the concept of immanence brings a critique of the Social Contract. At the same time, it also opens the existence of new forms of sociality as "singular" essentialities to discussion. This existential problematic gives rise to "alienation from itself" to the extent that it is inherent in the distinction between the sovereign and the people. It contains a dilemma that is addressed through the modalities of alienation. Opening this dilemma to a discussion on "multitude" leads us to a first point. It points to the effort to transform the relations of reproduction through the temporality and spatiality we are in, through the "now." In other words, it is the existential production of life practices based on the unity of both the self and the non-self. This point is a bit difficult to grasp. This means entering into an ontological relation through discussing the existence of the sovereign and the people as a revelation of certain power relations. The message Althusser wants to convey when he analyzes Rousseau's Social Contract in his lecture at the École Normale Supérieure is that: Ontologically, the "sovereign" and the "people" who want all the rights of individuals to be guaranteed and protected are the same things. This is a paradox. The concept we were dealing with here was

the concept of "alienation." But Althusser does not deal with the concept of "alienation" in one sense.

Alienation involves a wholesale transfer of itself to the sovereign with all its values. This wholesale transfer is not only a wholesale transfer of oneself to the sovereign, but also a transferring "to itself." The dilemma lies existentially in the functioning of the legal level and its arbitrariness. In doing so, Althusser analyzed the Contract in depth. Of course, this analysis also included Althusser's symptomatic reading. The point we want to touch upon in the discussion of the contract we have discussed above is the "total self-transfer" that Althusser refers to as alienation.

How does a wholesale transfer take place? Human beings transfer their entire existence to the sovereign, together with their values, together with all the labor processes they produce. So, who is the sovereign? What is the essence of the structure institutionalized as sovereign? It is a relationship of domination that is realized as the transfer of one's own existence to another within the rules of law set forth for human beings to live together. This relationship of domination has emerged as a condition for human beings to exist with a sense of belonging to a place. At this point, alienation is actually a different reading of the alienation of human beings from their particular and varietal existence. This alienation is a point that brings the necessity of being together into existence with the existence of the sovereign on the legal plane. The paradox that both Agamben, Schmitt, and Althusser mention at this point is the ontological problematic of the sovereign.

When a person transfers his rights wholesale, he actually transfers them to himself, not to an institution or person. The dilemma lies here. It lies in the arbitrary functioning of this legal relationship. Because the emergence of sovereignty also lies within the practice of these human relations. It is a state of "transfer" that takes place within power relations and under the conditions of subordination to power. This contract theory, in which Hobbes and Rousseau emphasize the requirements of the foundations of the state and the importance of the word community, stems

from a misreading of the human will to community. What causes this is the "relation of exception" or, in other words, the "exception of the sovereign." (Agamben, 2007).

We can address alienation through the concepts of "immanence" and "quodlibet," together with the concepts of "multitude" and "singularity." Immanence, as "any" being, is not eternal but assigns importance to being itself, regardless of which being it is. It encompasses by negating its own existence. Therefore, it is meaningful to think with Foucault's practice of "immanent criticism" mentioned in his Enlightenment text. "Immanence" refers to a singular state because it is being in itself. It shows that existence as "Quodlibet" exists as "existence in itself." (Agamben, 1998). Therefore, this being is a part of that totality within its genus since it makes a difference not as a homogeneity but as a particular. It is the entity's acceptance of itself as it is and as it is, without entering into a self-discussion. This piece is "immanent" not as a reflection but "in itself," both as a part of the whole and a part of the whole.

The point at which Quest manifests itself is when existence accepts itself "in the moment" and "as it is realized." It manifests itself here not as a phenomenon hidden under a veil or as a vague phenomenon, but as the totality of the practices we are trying to conceptualize as "Quest." It manifests itself as a "precondition of the act." If it is "immanent" to itself, it differs from everything else. It differentiates itself as "immanent" to the other within sociality. The moment it opens itself to the outside to the extent that it differentiates itself is where the "Quest" becomes apparent. "Quest" is the moving precondition of agency. In other words, it is the precondition for the "community" that opens itself to the other by externalizing itself and at the same time we need to reproduce. There is a need for the other as a "recognition." There is a need for the other as an "immanence" of being in its universal form. This need is the "Quest," which is inherent in the practice of reproduction in human interaction with nature. All kinds of preconditions for the material act of movement manifest themselves in the practice of "Quest."

The breakdown of the social contract is precisely the relationship of "alienation" that occurs to disrupt this holism. In other words, it is a total transfer of itself to itself. It is a "fictional game" created by ignorance to the extent that it recognizes itself. But this alienation that Althusser talks about has an ontological significance as well as a political economy. For this reason, we think it is important to reflect on the concept of "Quest." Because to the extent that human beings is alienated from the immanence of the world whose history he has created, he is trapped in the tangle of power relations. To the extent that he is alienated, he forgets his own singular existence. To the extent that he forgets his own existence, he falls under the yoke of the other he needs. It does not fall into this yoke by itself. He enters because of his own will. The issue is beyond awareness. It is to be imprisoned in the categorization of the a-rational mental process, conscious and even unconscious, by being negated. It has transcended the limits within the particularity of its own existence and has transferred itself with everything.

The dilemma of the contract has to do with the sovereign's assertion of itself as sovereign, immanent to law as an "exception" but outside of law as law or as a "truth" - even, and especially, by excluding itself. Man's own existence as parties to a contract is bound together by law. But the law itself gives rise to a form of sovereignty based on transgressing the law, on "suspending the law." This form is itself a fiction of the sovereign's own being. It is sovereign to the extent that it produces itself as an exception. It is a fictional game.

Is it possible to think of a relation of exception outside the sovereign's state of exception? This possibility emerges only in the will of "community" itself. And this is related to the immanence of being as a singular being to its own totality, to the totality of its own species. The aforementioned concept of "Quest" also reveals itself in a different social unity, "communité," as a rejection of the contract. In other words, in a way, the rejection of the contract appears as both an act of speech and its immanent practical criticism. It contains essentiality that cannot be subjected to

determination outside of itself. (Essentiality should not be thought of as an "essence." It is important to think of essentiality here as a practical activity or a set of relations in human activity). Immanence, therefore, points to the "quodlibet" of being and reproduces it again in a cycle that is not subject to determination (Agamben, 2007). This is what we call immanence in the "Quest." "Quodlibet," as a being, is the particular existence of each existence. It is the uniqueness in existence. If we take an etymological analysis of "quodlibet," this root "-libet" refers to will and volition in Latin. That is, it gives the nature of the activities that reveal the moving forces of existence.

We can think of Blanchot's questioning as a revealing of forces. What drives us to the "communité" or the "community"? The "community" reveals a situation that closes to the extent that it constitutes itself. It is an act of opening out, an act of self-determination, where it can reveal its existence to the extent that it closes itself, its own existence. This is the moment when the "Quest" materializes.

“A being does not want to be recognized, it wants to be contested: in order to exist it goes towards the other, which contents and at times negates it, so as to start being only in that privation that makes it conscious (here lies the origin of its consciousness) of the impossibility of being itself, of subsisting as its *ipse* or, if you will, as itself as a separate individual: this way it will perhaps exist, experiencing itself as an always prior exteriority, or as an existence shattered though and through, composing itself only as it decomposes itself constantly, violently and in silence. The existence of every being thus summons the other or a plurality of others.” (Blanchot, 1988).

Can we think of the idea of "multitude" as the rejection of the Convention as a reconstruction of the social? The contradiction caused by the state of "transferring itself to itself," which emerges from the above-mentioned discussion of immanence and which Althusser identifies as a derivative of alienation, corresponds to the following analogy of Hobbes' theory and reinforces what we have said:

“The necessity of the sovereign is the fundamental truth expressed in the traditional analogy between the social body and the human body. The illustration on the original frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* designed by Hobbes himself captures this truth wonderfully. Viewed from a distance the illustration shows the body of the king towering over the earth, but closer one can see that below the King's head the body is composed of hundreds of tiny bodies of the citizens, making up his arms and torso. The body of the sovereign is literally the social body as a whole. The analogy serves not only to emphasize organic unity but also to reinforce and naturalize the division of social functions. There is only one head, and the various limbs and organs must obey its decisions and commands. Physiology and psychology thus add force to the obvious truth of the theory of sovereignty. There is in each body a single subjectivity, a rational mind that must rule over the passions of the body.

We insisted earlier that the multitude is not a social body for precisely this reason: that the multitude cannot be reduced to a unity and does not submit to the rule of one. The multitude cannot be sovereign.” (Negri, Hardt, 2004).

The multitude cannot dominate, and at the same time, it does not submit to the rule of the "one." "Multitude" exists in social interaction where every particular being reconstitutes itself as it is. It is the place where it creates itself and produces its life through its own subjectivity process without being subject to determination. It is possible to think here of the labor processes and communication practices through which it circulates its existence to the extent that it produces its life. The fact that these Productive Forces characterize themselves as the exploited (or the ruled) constitutes a force against the sovereign. The interpenetration of social formations and the blurring of boundaries is precisely related to the self-organization of the Productive Forces as the exploited. Even though force monopolizes war as the sovereign of death, the processes of self-organization make it difficult for it to

reproduce itself. What Negri and Hardt say at this point opens up a political possibility regarding the importance of this idea of multitude:

“We spoke earlier of the newly hegemonic forms of "immaterial" labor that rely on communicative and collaborative networks that we share in common and that, in turn, also produce new networks of intellectual, affective, and social relationships. Such new forms of labor, we explained, present new possibilities for economic self-management, since the mechanisms of cooperation necessary for production are contained in the labor itself. Now we can see that this potential applies not only to economic self-management but also political self-organization. Indeed, when the products of labor are not material goods but social relationships, networks of communication, and forms of life, then it becomes clear that economic production immediately implies a kind of political production, or the production of society itself. We are thus no longer bound by the old blackmail; the choice is not between sovereignty or anarchy. The power of the multitude to create social relationships in common stands between sovereignty and anarchy, and it thus presents a new possibility for politics.” (Negri, Hardt, 2004).

The community is a social self-organization process that reproduces itself through the concept of the multitude. It is the dynamic of the networks themselves as a reproduction of not only economic but also social relations as a whole. This process itself, which we have referred to in terms of the standoff between the sovereign and the people, shows the following. Apart from the fact that the balances in sovereignty have changed, the absoluteness of the theory of power is always subject to question in this new social order in which the governed organize themselves. The idea of the sovereignty of an absolute single person, or of sovereignty as the decision of the many, as "one," has lost its significance. But the fact that it has lost its importance does not mean it has completely disappeared. Power will continue to reproduce the model of transcendence that constructs a unitary sovereign subject rising above society. But,

"...biopolitical social organization begins to appear absolutely immanent, where all the elements interact on the same plane. In such an immanent model, in other words, instead of an external authority imposing order on society from above, the various elements present in society are able collaboratively to organize society themselves." (Negri, Hardt, 2004).

The opening of the multitude depends on the production of common denominator. Beyond the equality of different forms of labor, the production of this common denominator is possible with the free interaction and communication of these forms of labor. Therefore, agricultural, industrial, and immaterial labor can take on common characteristics with the productive social activities of the poor, with an immanent political practice. This immanence is precisely the emergence of the production of a common denominator as a response to the ontological possibility of being.

“In fact, to the extent that the distinction between economic production and political rule is breaking down, the common production of the multitude itself produces the political organization of society. What the multitude produces is not just goods or services; the multitude also and most importantly produces cooperation, communication, forms of life, and social relationships. The economic production of the multitude, in other words, is not only a model for political decision-making but also tends itself to become political decision-making.” (Negri, Hardt, 2004).

Overcoming this dilemma depends on an immanent critique of power relations outside the dichotomy of sovereign and people, of the idea of the "multitude" and its role in practice. The elimination of the role of power depends on the autonomous structure of the multitude and its capacity for economic, social, and political self-organization. The multitude, as a power with the potential to govern itself, also detaches the sovereign from the field of politics. This shows us an opportunity that

paves the way for the struggle for liberation from wherever we set foot and opens itself to the multitude by sharing the processes of human subjectivity. The Truth contained in the reproduction of the society reveals itself in this "community." In other words, in "Communité." The material practical integrity of the act of "community" is the precondition for the performativity of the "Quest" in practices. In other words, the "Quest" is the comprehension of the individual in the "multitude" that opens itself out in the "any ness" of being.

There are some conclusions that we need to draw from here, both politically and psychoanalytically. We have already seen that "law" appears as fiction juris of the contract. We will be able to address the law as the emergence or manifestation of "truths" and the practices that ground the search for a law through the immanence to the concept of "Quest." At this point, we will enter our final chapter by bringing Foucault's conception of Truth and our conception of Truth into interaction with each other.

3.2. TRUTH PRODUCTION OF POWER RELATIONS

If what we call truth is a practice of relations that resides within these relations and is subject to reproduction (as part of the critical notion that must constantly reproduce itself), this circularity is located within the "practice of philosophizing," which takes place on the question of modern philosophy. Because the process is that discursive and non-discursive practices claim to produce themselves as "truth" based on the mutual determination of two powers. What Foucault says here about power relations producing their own practices as truth shows this: As the relation of the forces of production to each other, this corresponds to the reproduction of the conditions of production. This is precisely the point treated in Marx and Althusser. Ideology manifests itself in the totality of material practical relations, provided that it reproduces itself. In Foucault, we can think of this in discursive and non-discursive practices. It should be read as a much broader interpretation of Althusser. At this point, going back to the Ancient Greek concepts and looking at the nature

of "action," "word," and "kinesis" will take us to the center of the discussion we put forward.

Foucault tries to deal with the ties between rationalization and power relations. For this, he refers to specific examples within power relations. In the practices of madness, sexuality and confinement, which he examines as incompatibilities of power relations, we can think that Foucault's analysis is similar to Freud's and even Marx's. He says that while questioning rationality, it is necessary to look at the a-rational to understand how it is. This is possible by looking at the practice of power relations. However, he attempts a definition of power. "Power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attach him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize, and which others have to recognize in him." (Foucault, 2001a). He even says it is in a relationship of domination established within practical material relationships. The form of power that subjectivizes individuals includes precisely the ambiguity of the subject. The subject, subordinated to another through control and dependence and bound to its own identity through conscience or self-knowledge, carries within itself its two meanings. These forms of struggle are handled in three ways by Foucault. The first is ethnic, social, and religious relations, the second is relations of exploitation in political economy, and the third is struggles against subjectivity and forms of subjugation.

The place where power is seen institutionally is the state. Foucault states that the formation of Western states emerged from the old Christian religious institution, the church. This power technique is pastoral power (Foucault, 2001a). However, the modern western states are the modified forms of this pastoral power. The exercise of power is the attempt to guarantee and secure worldly affairs from religious affairs. In other words, if the church as pastoral power tries to guarantee salvation in the afterlife, the western state tries to guarantee health, welfare, and security (Foucault, 2001a). Analysis of the form of power here takes us to Althusser. Although Althusser's "State Apparatus" does not specify the form of

power, it is known that power is the exercise of a relation of domination. Althusser examines how power is produced through relations of production and how it ideologically transforms individuals into concrete subjects. The situation is somewhat different in Foucault. He deals with power through practical experiences based on rationality. He starts by emphasizing the irrational within the relationality of the rational. If rationality distributes itself within the forms of power as a higher mind, it closes and imprisons all irrational forms and relations -together with modern state power- as the "sterilization of society." The closure of the insane as the opposite of reason, the closure of practices outside the male and female forms of gender norms as diseases etc. To break out of these relations of power is not by discovering what we are, but by rejecting our relationalities, which are determined under the individuality of power as we are now (Foucault, 2001a). By rejecting these relationalities, we must reproduce forms of subjectivity by giving them validity (Foucault, 2001a). How does power produce practices of truth in these forms of struggle?

For this, an analysis of the form inherent in power is required. For Foucault, in the form of power, "power relations," "communication relations," and "objective capacities" should not be confused with each other. These three types of relationships feed on each other. To the extent that they feed on each other, they reveal the effects of power. However, there is no one-way flow between these three relationships. All three determine each other. So, there is no balance between them (Foucault, 2001a). From this point on, we can see a more explicit form of Althusser's structuralist "Ideological Apparatuses" in Foucault.

“Take, for example, an educational institution: the disposal of its space, the meticulous regulations that govern its internal life, the different activities that are organized there, the diverse persons who live there or meet another, each with his own function, his well-defined character – all these things constitute a block of capacity-communication-power. Activity to ensure learning and the acquisition of aptitudes or types of behavior Works via a

whole ensemble of regulated communications (lessons, questions and answers, differential marks of the “value” of each person and of the levels of knowledge) and by means a whole series of power processes (enclosure, surveillance, reward a punishment, the pyramidal hierarchy).” (Foucault, 2001a).

Foucault establishes as disciplines these expanded blocks of prearranged technical capacities, communication games, and power relations mentioned in the paragraph above (Foucault, 2001a). However, the important thing is that as an analysis of these power relations, it will be necessary to deal with the communication relations and the determination of the objective capacities within this bloc, but also within the framework of the richness of the connections with them. This requires another analysis in Foucault.

Power relations should not be understood only as a power of the institutionally repressive state. Power exists in acts as the "exercise" of power by the state apparatus. At the same time, power relations also exist between individuals. In other words, power as a critique of the contract is not just a process of renounce freedom, transferring rights, submitting to the law, or entrusting power to a few people. Power is a “*mode of action*” that acts on the actions of others. That is, it manifests itself as an act in these relations.

Power relations can be articulated based on two situations. The first is the recognition of the “other” as a subject of the action and remaining so. The second is the opposite. It is the opening up of a field of possible inventions as a whole range of responses, reactions and outcomes within the resistance against the violence and oppression of power.

“It operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or

contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.” (Foucault, 2001a).

When Foucault says a set of actions over actions, he puts it into an infinite determination. In these relations, if there is a behavior that will direct the acts of others, it raises the issue of how to get out of this determination or how to direct the behavior of others. "Managing behavior" refers to the domination of the act over the other in power relations. It protects it, uses violence, suppresses it, and closes it. In other words, it operates itself in a managerial form (Foucault, 2001a). In this case, it provides a space of freedom from the capacity to govern oneself. Therefore, power is exercised over "free subjects" only when they are "free." From this we can conclude that power relations take place within a field of encounter, but also operate outside these fields. Therefore, if it is the relations of power that allow us to think about being free, how can we subvert the exercise of this power as a reconstruction of society?

Foucault says that what lies at the very core of power relations and provokes it is the "recalcitrance" of the will and the "intransigence of freedom." (Foucault, 2001a). The place we will look at is the act of the word "intransigence" in the intransigence of freedom. In other words, the acts of freedom most fundamentally determine this relation. The necessary motor for the realization of social existence is the persistence in freedom. More precisely, it may be possible to construct the intransigence of freedom as a mechanism of resistance and realize our free acts in a subjectivity outside the relationship of domination. The place to look for this is the mechanisms of these power relations. Therefore, our issue is how we can achieve the processes of subjectification through the construction of the free act. This is not only a political and philosophical debate but also points to an ontological existence. Therefore, it fits with the perspective of reproduction from which we form our perspective.

Why should the issue of truth be thought through the concept of ideology and unconscious? What do we understand by what we call truth? It lies in its relation to what we call reality in the most general sense of the word. What we call reality is the interaction of all mental and physical practical processes, conceptual or non-conceptual. This interaction is a precondition for our ability to "question" our actions through our perceptions and emotions. The needs of our body are met in the process of reproduction, which is our material condition of existence. But what we call mental process is our "indirect unlimited mental processes," which allows us to survive as a result of our self-moving and mobile biological existence, our communication, and our interaction with nature in material practice. We have no interest in separating these two from each other. We specify it this way to indicate its effects and reflections that develop on a different level. This thing is part of the "cumulative" universe, in the place where we call and act in a "harmonious" way, of our vital practices, namely "logos" and "bios" rather than awareness.

Reality is the knowledge that lies in the relationality of multiple determinations in the mental process of our material practices that are perceived, interpreted, and applied as data. Reality is something other than reality because we call it so. What we call knowledge is a "word" that exists and does not exist within what we call reality, that is handled within the framework of the undeniability of all the practices we perceive, and that is named by questioning and interpreting. It requires that the truth be considered not only in terms of the meaning of a word, but also in the context of the material practices and power relations in which it is embedded. When the concept of "Quest" is taken together with truth, it is for us the conceptual need of a set of relations in practice. This need is open to all kinds of scrutiny, can be criticized and transformed.

What we have been trying to do from the very beginning of our thesis is a concept proposed to meet the practical need for the gaps that occur between concepts. It is not to ascribe a meaning to the concept itself, but rather to uncover a concept that

lies within our material practical relations and even our power relations. To be able to do this is not an analysis of power, but an examination of how power relations reveal the truth. Our concept of "quest" manifests itself at this point. These analyzes show the condition of exercising power as a relation to domination. We should not think of power as the power of a state or the power of a sovereign institution, but as a practice of power relations in the Foucauldian sense. Power lies in the practice of the ruling classes that both categorize the individual's individuality and the socialities that the individual establishes within the framework of the law of truth, articulated with cultural codes. Examining the practices of resistance where there is the exercise of power will lead to an analysis that we will proceed with specifically in this regard. For this reason, Foucault structurally gives us a meta-idea: the relation of domination.

If power lies within individuals and in the practices of their everyday life, then this truth shows us the "dilemma" of socially constructed ideas of the Contract. That is why it is important to include in our text the passage above where Althusser speaks of the dilemmas of the Contract. In this sense, it is important that each individual establishes the community by making a contract with other individuals for the sake of protecting their own singular interest. Although this contains a contradiction, the contradiction itself appears as a law of truth. What we call the law of truth is the need for a sovereign to protect the community by controlling the property, life, and security of individuals in society. This is different from the relationship between Prince and subjects in the classical sense. Because the Prince is not only the prince who creates himself as a separate person, but the subject's obedience to him, and he receives assurance in return. But the dilemma in the Rousseauian contract is that the individuals within the community attribute their "emancipatory power" to an institution as they transfer everything, including their own freedom, to the institution of the "community." Institutionally, it is immanent to the law as the application of the law depends on the ideology of law. We are talking about an instrumentality, which ceases to be an individual and where the law it creates is applied to itself as a power. This place is important. Can a person transfer his

freedom to someone else? Freedom can be managed, but each person's own free act gives birth to another mechanism of power. If our rationally established sociality is excluded from sociality in an irrational act or pushed outside the boundaries drawn by rationality, it is this set of relations that we need to look at. For this, it is necessary to briefly touch upon the etymology of "Truth."

If we relate the first meaning of the word "truth" to the fact that it comes from the linguistic root "hkk" in Arabic language origin, "hakk" means being in accordance with the law, truth, virtue. It includes the meanings of righteousness, truth and legality. The word's second meaning also emphasizes one of the attributes of God. It refers to the state of God being the only true and the only representative of truth. While explaining the ideology of religion, Althusser showed us a contradiction of the subordination relationship between the "Subject" and the "subject." This is also evident in the paradox in contract theory.

At the same time, truth is a synonym for "hak," which in Hebrew is known as "hukka," meaning something carved into stone or metal. It means law, edict, and rule. The processing of law as data is a whole related to the rules that occur both in our discursive and non-discursive practices. As a third meaning, the word "hak" in Aramaic, Syriac, and Hebrew carries the meaning of "hakkak," which again comes from the root "hkk." This is again derived from the verb "to engrave" on stone or metal, "to deserve." (Nişanyan Dictionary). The person who applies it is called a "hakkak." As a lawmaker, "hakkak" also carries the meaning of "truth-teller." The "hakkak" as a figure who submits to his own law as a result of his own material act. There can be many such interpretations within language. This does not negate the fact that we are born into language. But the set of relations outside this linguistic existence and the networks we weave around this language, together with the question of what is immanent to the law, points to a paradox. The "place" where it finds itself as an object outside itself, "immanent" to itself. Foucault problematizes the truth itself as a practice of interpretation based on the subject's hermeneutic of

all these interpretations. Our destination in this context is Foucault's text "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx."

Foucault mentions the doubt that language does not always say exactly what it wants to say. At the same time, another doubt is the existence of a non-verbal articulated language outside language (Foucault, 2011). The meaning of the first of these doubts is "allegoria" in Greek. The second doubt is "semainon." It is meaningful for Foucault to go to Ancient Greek words and texts. Because he states that these two doubts still exist in language and non-language (Foucault, 2011). Each culture has its own interpretation of its language, its own system, techniques and methods. Foucault goes back to the sixteenth century to give an example of the reference of what gives place to interpretation. He speaks of the unity within the overall appearance of interpretation and the overall unity of language that makes interpretation possible. So "similarities." He mentions that since we think and speak from the present moment onwards, the language established as "similarities" seems quite incomprehensible and complex (Foucault, 2011). The formation of the "corpus" of language in those centuries is important in this sense. Foucault explains the five basic notions of the structure of language. He says that from the sixteenth century until Nietzsche, Freud and Marx, language was thought around these notions and language existed around these notions (Foucault, 2011). He says that after these three thinkers, the technique of interpretation developed and opened up new possibilities. He says that books such as *Capital*, *The Birth of Tragedy* and *On the Genealogy of Morality*, and *The Interpretation of Dreams* paved the way for this interpretive knowledge and that other interpreters, together with these interpretive techniques, were transferred to the "endless game of mirrors" by applying the same technique to these three names (Foucault, 2011). This place is significant. Their interpretive techniques did not reproduce the signs of the Western world. On the contrary, they changed the nature of these signs, transforming them into a mode of interpretation of the sign in general. This style itself is that they added a new dimension to the nature of signs. But this depth is not a meaning of

"interiority" as Foucault puts it, on the contrary, it can only be understood if "exteriority" is understood (Foucault, 2011).

What is understood by depth? Foucault states in Nietzsche that what is understood by depth is "pure investigation of truth." Pure truth, too, is revealed only as a "good pit explorer," as Foucault quotes Nietzsche (Foucault, 2011). This is where we get the clue why Foucault's methodology is like an archaeologist. Interpretation must emerge as the deepening of the interpretation, revealing the hidden truth, pushing out, or making a move to the outside. Pure truth is the truth that lies under these veils. We shine a light on Marx. Marx could not have known the fiction juris of the contract. He could not have been ignorant of the truth underlying the concealment of the exchange between worker and employer in the money-commodity-money relationship. Therefore, the depth in this text appears as a "playground" created by the truth. In an inverted form of deep truth is only the truth behind this superficial game. Foucault affirms what we say in the following way. He states that Marx mentions the phrase "diving into the fog" in *Capital*. Because he says that in the bourgeoisie's conception of money, capital, value, etc., everything in the name of depth is "shallowness." (Foucault, 2011). Likewise, the rules that Freud brought to the psychoanalytic interpretation technique show the importance of this. From this point of view, it is important that the practice of interpretation presents itself as an infinite duty. What he calls "duty" here can also be thought of as "Questioning." It has dual meaning. In this space of depth, the deeper the interpretation goes or the farther it goes, the more dangerous it is. In this remote region, the interpretation reverses and eliminates the interpretation at the last point where it came before it can lead to another interpretation. That is, it does not allow another interpretation to be made. It is a practice that can even lead to the disappearance of the interpreter in interpretation (Foucault, 2011). After Nietzsche, Freud and Marx, we see the clearest example in Althusser. We can see this in *Essays in Self-Criticism* and *The Future Last Forever* in the last place Althusser reaches when he puts forward his theories. It was through his own practice of interpretation that he eliminated himself as an interpreter. There he approaches his own existence in the most "immanent"

way. The effect, for Foucault, at the moment when interpretation disappeared and became impossible, was that there was only "something like the experience of madness" here (Foucault, 2011). From this point of view, interpretation should be explained by two principles. If interpretation is something that is never fully completed, there is nothing left to interpret. Therefore, there is nothing that can be the beginning or origin of interpretation because, on the contrary, "everything is interpretation" and "every sign is the interpretation of other signs." (Foucault, 2011). Interpretation, if it is, does not illuminate an item to be interpreted, it establishes dominance over the already existing interpretation. It manages it, breaks it down, reverses it, does violence to it. In Marx, what presents itself as interpretation is an interpretation of a relationship.

What Freud does is similar to Marx's. He does not discover anything new; he extracts the core of a linguistic unity that is already in the human being itself with its "phantasms" and "internal constrictions" within the existing interpretation (Foucault, 2011). What Foucault mentions above as "the task of interpretation" gains meaning here. Interpretation is not just finding the existence of signs. Interpretation is nothing but the practice of interpretation (Foucault, 2011).

We will rightly agree with what Nietzsche says. Foucault points to the interpreter himself as Nietzsche's "utterer of truth." The interpreter voices the truth. Because he is the one who expresses the interpretation that every truth tries to hide (Foucault, 2011). This process continues in an endless cycle. The hermeneutic in Foucault is ultimately a matter of who makes the interpretation. Interpretation in practice is nothing but the interpreter in the last instance. Each interpretation repeats in its circularity. Here, too, the emphasis on Nietzsche's time is essential. It refers to the cyclicity of time. It is also a critique of the dialectic's time. In Foucault's terms, there is a "circular" time of interpretation (Foucault, 2011). The death of interpretation is to "believe" in the existence of the signifier within this infinite rotation. To put it the other way around, "the existence of interpretation" is to "believe" that there is nothing but interpretations. Believing the signs in the face of

two opposite situations does not make interpretation possible. On the contrary, it causes the interpretation to disappear. An interpretation practice that remains within the indicators is to believe in the absolute existence of the indicators. Therefore, with the rejection of these signs, we activate the endless cycle of interpretation with an interpretation of signs (Foucault, 2011). In our thesis that we are dealing with here, the interpretation as the interpretation of the signs leads us to the harmony between "logos" and "bios." How?

3.3. THE ACT OF TRUTH IN THE HARMONIC TOTALITY OF "THE QUEST": PARRHESIA

This section, which we will now discuss, contains links to how the ideological treatment of the Social Contract as a discursive practice that constantly reproduces the "Parrhesia" itself can be realized from within humanism today. These connections are shown in order to make room for a discussion of the contribution of the harmony of "logos" and "bios" to a practical theory of the failures of the Social Contract. It will also be important to show where these concepts ("logos" and "bios") are located in Marx and Althusser.

“Parrhesia is ordinarily translated into English by "free speech" (in French by franc-parler, and in German by Freimuthigkeit). Parrhesiazomai or parrhesiazesthai is to use parrhesia and the parrhesiastes is the one who uses parrhesia, i.e., the one who speaks the truth.” (Foucault, 2001 b)

Parrhesia means "saying everything." The usage of the word is Parrhesia. The one who uses it is Parrhesiastes. In the relevant text, he reveals the meaning of the word Parrhesia by examining its connections with the words "Freakness," "Truth," "Danger," "Criticism," and "Duty." The point that concerns us here is the way Parrhesia is used in the chapter "Socratic Parrhesia," which he gives as an example in the chapter "Parrhesia in the Care of the Self." It is the connection between the concepts of "courage" and "logos" and "bios." In the chapter "Freakness," Foucault

discusses Parrhesia as a "speech act." In the chapter "Truth," he points out that the word is used positively only in Ancient Greek texts. Because for Christianity and later, "parrhesia" as a discourse of "truth" is expressed in a negative sense - since it is one of God's own attributes - and it is stated that its use among the people is relatively forbidden (Foucault, 2001b). The negative meaning here is that truth is nothing but the word of God. No one knows the truth better than him. Therefore, only reflections, signs, and words of God's truth can be seen.

How will a person know that what he believes corresponds to the "truth"? Foucault, stating that this problem is specific to modernism, takes us back to the critical relationship with Enlightenment. However, it is necessary to go to what he calls "Care of the Self." Because this Care of the Self is also related to courage, and it deals with it together with Plato's Laches dialogue. Let us examine this part of the dialogue:

“From a strictly theoretical point of view the dialogue is a failure because no one in the dialogue is able to give a rational, true, and satisfactory definition of *courage*-which is the topic of the piece. But in spite of the fact that even Socrates himself is not able to give such a definition, at the end of the dialogue Nicias, Laches, Lysimachus, and Melesias all agree that Socrates would be the best teacher for their sons. And so Lysimachus and Melesias ask him to adopt this role. Socrates accepts, saying that everyone should try to take care of himself and of his sons [201b4]. And here you find a notion which, as some of you know, I like a lot: the concept of "*epimeleia heautou*," the "care of the self." We have, then, I think, a movement visible throughout this dialogue from the parrhesiastic figure of Socrates to the problem of the care of the self.” (Foucault, 2001b).

From this point of view, "care of the self" is seen as Plato's revealing of the "logos" in every human being. The Parrhesia is about the close relationship that Parrhesiastes establishes with himself and the close relationship he creates with the

other. That is, while Plato was in front of the community, in the agora, or on trial, Foucault is talking about a parrhesiastic game about one's immanent criticism, not a parrhesiastic game based on persuading people. In particular, the purpose of focusing on care of the self; The act of courage that can be thought of as putting forth one's truth and making a critical effort while criticizing. Foucault states that the nature of criticism as an archaeological and genealogical method may be around these limits. Like making an immanent criticism of ourselves with the concepts of the Enlightenment, without being a party to the Enlightenment; he says that self-concern also forms the basis of this situation and that the limits of harmony between "logos" and "bios" should be considered by considering our established subjectivities.

“Just as was the case in the political field, the parrhesiastic figure of Socrates also discloses the truth in speaking, is courageous in his life and in his speech, and confronts his listener's opinion in a critical manner. But Socratic *parrhesia* differs from political *parrhesia* in a number of ways. It appears in a personal relationship between two human beings, and not in the *parrhesiastes*' relation to the *demos* or the king. And in addition to the relationships we noticed between *logos*, truth, and courage in political *parrhesia*, with Socrates a new element now emerges, viz., *bios*. *Bios* is the focus of Socratic *parrhesia*. On Socrates' or the philosopher's side, the *bios-logos* relation is a Dorian* harmony which grounds Socrates' parrhesiastic role and which, at the same time, constitutes the visible criterion for his function as the *basanos* or touchstone. On the interlocutor's side, the *bios-logos* relation is disclosed when the interlocutor gives an account of his life, and its harmony tested by contact with Socrates. Since he possesses in his relation to truth all the qualities that need to be disclosed in the interlocutor, Socrates can test the relation to truth of the interlocutor's existence. The aim of this Socratic parrhesiastic activity, then, is to lead the interlocutor to the choice of that kind of life(*bios*) that will be in Dorian-harmonic accord with *logos*, virtue, courage, and truth.” (Foucault, 2001b).

What we deal with at this point in Foucault is that the practice of all discursive and non-discursive power relations contains a "kinesis" within itself. This movement is related to the "auto-kinesis" of being. Therefore, all our practical acts contain an endless cycle within themselves. The "auto-kinesis" of existence is also inherent in the practice of reproduction. It is present ideologically and in our linguistic practices, discourses, and actions. The problematization of "poiesis" activity by considering creation in connection with Psukhe's being "auto-kinesis" when we consider it with Ancient Greek concepts indicates this. It is a philosophical problematization that shows how both the "logos" as we know it and the collective lifestyle that must be produced in harmony with our lifestyle (bios) can be. The factor that drives the idea here is the "Parrhesia," which Foucault also refers. But Parrhesia states that even the best-established society with the best laws needs this relationship. He explains this through Socrates. Because Parrhesia is not only a philosophical act but also speaks of the possibility of realizing an ethically established unity, a "community." The relationship between "Bios" and "Law" is also important at this point.

While examining the texts of the period, Foucault mentions several perspectives that shed light on the present. He points to the tension between nomos and bios in the Socratic tradition. Parrhesiastes is constantly on a mission to question these two things (Foucault, 2001b). Just as the "task" of interpretation of the interpreter of truth is endlessly conceived. However, as we have already mentioned, to quote Foucault, Parrhesia in Ancient Greek and Roman culture;

“...as it appears in the field of philosophical activity in Greco-Roman culture is not primarily a concept or theme, but a practice which tries to shape the specific relations individuals have to themselves. And I think that our own moral subjectivity is rooted, at least in part, in these practices. More precisely, I think that the decisive criterion which identifies the parrhesiastes is not to be found in his birth, nor in his citizenship, nor in his intellectual

competence, but in the harmony which exists between his logos and his bios.” (Foucault, 2001b).

Still, if it is inherent to our subjectivity, there is a practice that must be done outside the determination of our power relations in a partnership (in the sense of community) of both the practice of philosophical Parrhesia and the practice of political Parrhesia. A "community" that we consider as the harmony of "logos" and "bios" has an importance that cannot be ignored. To summarize, Parrhesia is not a practical act of changing or persuading one's ideas, but the harmony of totality as a way of life (Foucault, 2001b).

The truth we have mentioned above, which is immanent in the meaning of truth, also points to the interpreter of truth. Just as the person interpreting speaks the absolute truth. These traces are illustrated with quotations from Foucault's texts. Our aim here is to problematize the existence of power relations as the reproduction of human beings through relations of production. What we have done is to problematize "logos" and "bios" as an "immanent critique" of ourselves. The purpose of this problematization was not to show the existence of truth but to emphasize the importance of "self-concern" while showing the movement that our truth practices contain. In the main, we tried to show the thoughts that harmony between "logos" and "bios" can be achieved with an immanent critique of our self-concerns in our subjectivization processes.

Beyond all this, and even for the sake of thinking about these concepts together, it is the systematics of a dispute that binds our issue. The dilemma of contract theories necessarily leads us to think about law and a "Community.” In this case, within the framework of all our conceptual investigations, as a truth-teller, as a “*hakkak*” as an "interpreter,” as a "psychoanalyst,” as a "sociologist,” as a "philosopher,” we are trying to show the fundamental factor in the establishment of "Community.” That is, the unity between word and action. But this unity is not a rough unity that has just come together. We have spoken of unity and harmony discussed in Foucault's

Parrhesia. The "harmony" in the "Dor" mode between "logos" as speech act and "bios" as lifestyle lies at the heart of what we conceptualize as "Quest." (Foucault, 2001b). We have long begun to "Quest" for the possibility of this harmony, up to the point where hermeneutic can go, together with our subjectivization practices. This harmony, too, lies within the mechanisms of resistance as an indispensable part of our will to "Community," along with our process of subjectivation as an act. We can grasp it most clearly in these revealing practices.

We can say that the concept of "Quest" also appears in daily practice. In more straightforward language, there was a difference between a "job quest" and a "mate quest." However, there is no difference in the modality of the act of "Quest." Both are inherent in the "Quest" in general. In today's life, working is something we must do to survive, to find shelter and a place. The importance of what kind of business is a separate issue. In this period, when reproducing oneself is of indispensable importance as an existential condition, especially "Quest" becomes instrumental in every respect, both politically and ontologically. The fact that I am in a "search for a wife" shows the modality of the "Quest" in yet another act. In the same way, we can see the concrete foundations of "Quest" in our sexual practices. It is not only a re-production to breed but also sits on a perspective that we can call the "commonality of bodies," where "bodies" open themselves to exteriority, where they can open to the subjectivity of another by becoming externalized. As an interpretation of this, we can look at the explanation of gender categories through "queer" theory. This can show us another modality of the "Quest."

"Quest" is present not only in moments of resistance or important "stops" in social struggles but in the acts of subjects who create their own concreteness in all areas of life. We can access this through interpretive practices. We can find the "quest" in the concrete acts of the processes in the reproduction of Althusser's relations of production. In Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, we can also find the material practices of the "Quest" in the acts of "Desire," which is the object of psychoanalysis and the moving force of the unconscious.

From the point of view of reproduction, we have touched upon the concrete situation of the conceptual practice we call "Quest." Therefore, we think that we have managed to take our concept of "The Quest" out of its mystical basis and put it on its feet. "Quest," which is precisely the necessary motive force of our self-reproduction, is present in the harmony of our material and mental acts. "Quest" is immanent to our existence.

CONCLUSION

What was the Quest in Marx, Althusser, Freud and Foucault?

When Marx considered history as the history of class struggles rather than the history of human beings, he discovered something in the determinism of structures that constituted them, controlled them, and influenced them with their ideas and behavior all the way down to their vital material practices. The social structuring of the labor process. This is one of the defining ideas of structural theory. Although the foundation was laid by Marx, an instrumental concept that Foucault gave us, lastly, is a set of practices. It is a set of relations that extend not only conceptually but also to the whole of power relations.

The concealment by a "veil" of the capitalist class's exchange with the working class, which operates through the mechanism of reproduction, pushed Marx out of his own subjective existence to reveal the practices in this power relationship. It is the same reason that inevitably led Althusser to put forward his general theory of ideologies. Labor power, the motive force for the reproduction of the relations of production, created itself as a relation of power from the very opposite of exploitation and domination. The absence of a history of ideology does not mean that it has never been historical; on the contrary, it is this material relationality, as a manifestation of this material relationality, that enables history to be ideologically constituted in a paradoxical political and legal way in the acts of contract.

Continuing the conceptualization that we started from Marx's reproduction process through Althusser showed us its parallelism with the unconscious. This was the first step of our problematic. The parallelism of ideology with the unconscious led us to analyze material practical relations in the most concrete way. In addressing the issue of ideology, Althusser's political vocabulary in his theory of "Ideology in General" led us to a conceptual unity revealed by an ontological enterprise. The relation of

the reconstruction of the subject and society to labor processes has led us to think of a system of practices of struggle in a narrow sense. Althusser revealed the reproduction of the relations of production in the determinations of our material relations, as a form of structural causality within the necessary conditions of the material existence of an ideology, supplemented by the theory of multiple causality. It enabled us to emphasize the place of "desire," the subject of the unconscious in the process of human subjectivation, in the "Symbolic Order" in which the laws of the unconscious are revealed. The acts of desire, which is the subject of the unconscious, manifested itself in an eternal circularity that can only be expressed and interpreted by "displacement."

It is equally important that Althusser presents his analysis that the human subject is itself in determining the "Law of Culture" before birth and even after death. Althusser's subject surrenders himself to the subordination of Unconscious desire within the determination of the Law of Culture. Althusser, we tried to show the effect of these determinations in detail and depth in Foucault's analysis.

We have dealt with the issue that Freud and Marx can be read in conceptual practice with each other from the "eternity" of the concepts of ideology and the unconscious. The place where we problematized the eternity of ideology and the unconscious then led us to dwell on the importance of hermeneutic in the eternal cycle, both at a point transcending time and in fact as the interpretation of interpretations. We explained this in the sections we linked to Foucault. We talked about the temporality of this eternal cycle, which we discussed in the texts we handled through Foucault, and in fact this eternal cycle is constantly turning back on itself. We tried to show that this is in the immanent practice of our concept of "Quest."

At the point where we dealt with the "fiction juris of the contract," Marx showed the failures in the relationship when dealing with labor processes within its structural integrity. These relations led us to discuss the problematic of the sovereign-people, and with it the issues of subjectivity and subjectivation, through

the issue of the individual's total alienation in contract theories. None of these are the texts we arbitrarily link together, but the concluding connections that we have reached through the themes of the concepts by following the "symptoms" in the readings we have made. The relationship between the sovereign and the people has shown us the place of the theoretical gap between the "Subject" and the "subject" in the categorization of the subject in the process of subjectification in which Althusser explains the ideology of religion.

Althusser's ideas, which ultimately remain theoretically vacant within these infinite determinations as the interpretation of interpretation, Foucault further deepened from another perspective and showed us the practice of a real "archaeological study." He opened up these concepts and relations by externalizing them and provided us with a perspective that shows the relation of power relations to truth. In this respect, the text of Parrheisa had to be connected to our thesis at a basic point. In our reading, starting from the harmony of Parrhesia within a unity of "word" and "action" was an important point for us to concretize our conceptual practice of "Quest." The practice of harmony in word and action showed us clues to the truth of our "Quest" that would enable us to come together. By analyzing power relations and the processes of formation of our subjectivity, we have shown the relation between the concepts of "Truth" and "Quest."

The conceptual opening of the Quest was important for us to deepen our analysis of all these conceptual and material relations. The Quest stood at a fundamental point not only as a theory in conceptual practice or in an academic framework, but also in terms of interpreting our relationships in daily practice. In the living conditions we are in, we do not all have only one "Quest." Therefore, the "Quest" does not stand as a goal to be fully achieved, but as an immanent and mobilizing significance in our material practices. Apart from that, when "Quest" is taken together with its otherworldly and mystical meanings, it would manifest itself in practices of "false conscious," just like ideological illusions.

Indeed, the "Quest" is the activator of a totality of action that is present both in our ideologies and in the desire of our unconscious, but which is covered up and relatively passive in everyday relations. This is why we felt the need to place this concept in a theoretical perspective, in conceptual practice, and in action. Although this thesis does not contain certainty, it has the potential to be developed and deepened later as a conceptual unity. As we stated at the beginning, our aim is that the concept of "Quest" should only be seen as a modest contribution to philosophy and to the "community" relations we are trying to establish in our subjectivity processes.

Instead of a final sentence, I hope the quote below will deepen the significant problematics in the context of the thesis. This excerpt below is the speech of a woman who took part in the protests after George Floyd was killed by a police officer in the USA in 2020. It can be watched by clicking on the link in the bibliography unless the relevant Twitter link is removed.

“Why do you burn down the community? Why do you born down your own neighborhood? IT’S NOT OURS! We don’t OWN anything! We don’t own ANYTHING! There is -Trevor Noah said it so beautifully last night- there’s a social contract that we all have, that if you steal or if I steal, then the person who is the authority comes in and they fix the situation, but the person who fixes the situation is KILLING US! So the social construct is broken! And if the social contract is broken why the FUCK do I give a shit about burning the fucking football Hall of Fame, about burning a fucking Target? You BROKE the contract! When you killed us in the streets and didn’t give a FUCK! You broke the contract when for 400 years we played your game an built your wealth. You broke the contract when we built our wealth again, on our own, by our bootstraps, in Tulsa, and you dropped BOMBS on us! When we built it in Rosewood, and you came in and you SLAUGHTERED us! You broke the contract so FUCK your Target! Fuck your Hall of Fame! Far as I’m concerned, they can burn this bitch to the ground. And it still

wouldn't be enough, and they are LUCKY that what Black people are looking for is equality and not revenge.”

2022, June.

REFERENCES

Agamben, Giorgio (2007) *Coming Community*, trans. Michel Hardt, Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press

Agamben, Giorgio (1998) *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford California: Stanford University Press

Althusser, Louis (1972) *Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster, London: NLB

Althusser, Louis (2014) *On The Reproduction of Capitalism*, trans. G. M. Goshgarian, London: Verso

Althusser, Louis (2005) *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster. London: Verso

Althusser, Louis., Balibar, Etienne., Establet, Roger., Ranciere, Jacques., Macherey, Pierre (2015) *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster, David Fernbach, London: Verso

Althusser, Louis (1977) *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster, London: NLB

Blanchot, Maurice (1988) *The Unavowable Community.*, trans. Pierre Joris, New York: Station Hill Press,

Foucault, Michel (2001 a) "The Subject and Power," in *Essential of Works Foucault 1954-1984*, (editor), Paul Rabinov, trans. Robert Hurley and Others, New York: New Press

Foucault, Michel (2001 b) Fearless Speech, (editor), Joseph Pearson, Los Angeles: Semiotext(E)

Foucault, Michel (2011) “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” in Felsefe Sahnesi, (editor), Ferda Keskin, trans. Işık Ergüden, İstanbul: Ayrıntı

Freud, Sigmund (2010) The Interpretation Of Dreams, trans. James Strachey, New York: Basic Books

Freud, Sigmund (1984) On Metapsychology: The Theory Of Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey, London: Penguin Books

Hardt, Michael., Negri, Antonio (2004) Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, New York: Penguin,

Lacan, Jacques (2014) Baba'nın Adları, Çev., Murat Erşen, İstanbul: MonoKL,

Marx, Karl., Engels, Friedrich (1998) The German Ideology. New York: Prometheus Books

Marx, Karl (1992) Capital Volmue I, trans. Ben Fowkes, London: Penguin Books

<https://twitter.com/tweetingala/status/1268729013415141381>

<https://www.nisanyansozluk.com/>