

TURKISH NATIONALISM AND MINORITY SEXUALITY:
THE CASE OF WOMEN, PROSTITUTES AND NON-
MUSLIMS IN THE CONTEMPORARY TURKISH CINEMA

MURAT GÜNGÖR
103611010

İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
KÜLTÜREL İNCELEMELER YÜKSEK LİSANS
PROGRAMI

BÜLENT SOMAY
2007

Turkish Nationalism and Minority Sexuality: The Case of
Women, Prostitutes and Non-Muslims in the Contemporary
Turkish Cinema
Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Azınlık Cinselliği: Güncel Türk
Sinemasında Kadınlar, Fahişeler ve Gayrimüslimler

Murat Güngör
103611010

Tez Danışmanı Öğretim Görevlisi Bülent Somay:

Jüri Üyesi Doç. Dr. Ferhat Kentel :

Jüri Üyesi Öğretim Görevlisi Fatih Özgüven :

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih : 7 Mart 2007.....

Kitap Sayısı: 45

Yazar: Murat Güngör

Milliyetçi

Azınlıklar

Cinsel Kimlik

Sinema

Türk kimliği

Turkish Nationalism and Minority Sexuality: The Case of
Women, Prostitutes and Non-Muslims in the Contemporary
Turkish Cinema

Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Azınlık Cinselliği: Güncel Türk
Sinemasında Kadınlar, Fahişeler ve Gayrimüslimler

Murat Güngör
103611010

Tez Danışmanı Öğretim Görevlisi Bülent Somay:

Jüri Üyesi Doç. Dr. Ferhat Kentel

Jüri Üyesi Öğretim Görevlisi Fatih Özgüven:

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih

: 7 Mart 2007

Toplam Sayfa Sayısı: 60

Anahtar Kelimeler (Türkçe)	Anahtar Kelimeler (İngilizce)
1) Milliyetçilik	1) Nationalism
2) Azınlıklar	2) Minorities
3) Cinsel kimlik	3) Gender identity
4) Sinema	4) Film
5) Türk kimliği	5) Turkish culture

ÖZET

Bu çalışma güncel Türk sinemasını inceleyerek milliyetçilik, cinsellik ve azınlılık kavramlarının kesişimini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, Eğreti Gelin ve Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü? filmleri bu kesişimi tarif edebilmek adına kullanılmıştır. İki film de farklı zamanlardaki azınlıkların yükselen yeni devlet düzeni içine alınmasını anlatmaktadır. Hacivat Karagöz filminde Anadolu'nun İslamlaşması ile Şaman, Ortodoks ve Kadın azınlıkların yeni sistem içine alınışının hikayesi anlatılırken, Eğreti Gelin filmi buna benzer bir oluşumu erken Türk milliyetçiliği içinde anlatmaktadır. Bu film, erkek, kadın ve sapkın kategorilerinin yeni düzen içinde nasıl yerleştiğini tasvir ederken, aynı zamanda bu düzene uymayan gayrimüslimlerin ve de cinsel birlikteliklerin de yeni düzen içinde yutuluşunu göstermektedir.

ABSTRACT

This study aims at investigating the intersection of nationalism, sexuality and minority concepts. In this respect, the study uses Eğreti Gelin and Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü? films to depict this intersection. Both films describe the appropriation of minorities in different eras in newly rising state orders. While Hacivat Karagöz film tells the story of appropriation of Shamans, Orthodox and Women in the new system, Eğreti Gelin film explains a similar incident within early Turkish nationalism. This film not only portrays the ways in which the categories of men, women and pervert are established within the new order, but also shows the gulping of non-Muslims and inappropriate sexualities in this system.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Nationalisms and Sexualities	3
2-1 Current Literature on Nationalism (and Sexuality).....	3
2-2 Western Nationalism and Sexuality	7
2-3 The Rise of the Bourgeoisie and Perpetuation of their Morals	9
2-4 European Notions of Nationalism and Sexuality	11
2-5 Non-Western Nationalism and Sexuality	18
Chapter 3: Studying Film	31
3-1 Murdering Hacivat and Karagöz: Islam’s Role in Ottoman State Formation.....	31
3-1-1 Confrontation of Islam, Orthodoxy and Shamanism	33
3-1-2 Appropriating the Minorities – Women and Shamans:	34
3-1-3 Sacrificing for the State	37
3-2 Borrowing the Bride: Turkish Nation-State Formation in the Early Republican Era	39
3-2-1 Defining Men and Women.....	42
3-2-2 Sacrificing Deviant Minorities.....	46
3-2-3 Turkish Bourgeois Morality.....	50
Chapter 4: Conclusion	54
References	56

Chapter 1: Introduction

Nationalism is a frequently studied subject. Yet, its study is limited to its ideological formations. However, although nations emerge to guarantee equal citizenship to all, it is in fact coded as the domination of bureaucratic/military/bourgeois elite. Thus, nation perpetuates the norms of this ruling class, including their sexuality. In fact, nations are embedded within a broader gender matrix, where abnormality is subordinated. Thus, heterosexual middle class men rule over the nation by diffusing its gender norms over the rest of the society. Nevertheless, nationalism is a Western invention, which makes its sexuality also Western. Discriminatory power is already invested in Western values. Hence, its sexuality is exclusionary.

Nationalism as an ideology is an exclusionary one. It is erected on maintaining male bourgeois order at the expense of what it is not. Consequently, women, non-reproductive sex like masturbation and homosexuality and religious minorities are threatening for the idea of the nation. Nevertheless, nations need those Others as they construct their identities through what they are not. Therefore, sexuality in nationalism is taming of these Others within the heteronormative order of the bourgeois men, while not completely annihilating them. Sexual Others remain as a site of national perpetuation. To make its analysis in non-Western nations is a complicated one as Western values of national sexuality cannot be fully extrapolated into non-European contexts.

Turkish nationalism is the culmination of various ideological attempts in the Ottoman era. In this process, the rising ruling elite's sexual norms are dispersed into the Turkish nation. Yet, it differs from its European model. Although in many ways Turkish national sexuality mirrors the European form, Turkish nationalism differs mainly in its relation to religion, Islam. To this end, studying contemporary Turkish cinema is an appropriate medium as it reflects the outward projections of the Turkish nation. Eğreti Gelin (Borrowed Bride) and Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü? (Why were Hacivat Karagöz Murdered?) are two films, depicting the Turkish nation's story at the intersection of nationalism, sexuality and minorities.

Turkish nation-state building process is the story of gender sacrifices of minorities to maintain the new form of patriarchy created. To this end, non-Muslims, women and prostitutes are contained within the discourse as they provide services to perpetuate the heterosexual male domination of the nation. Although referring to six centuries before the Turkish Republic was founded, Hacivat Karagöz shows the ways in which contemporary Turkish nation perceives the rising rule of Islam in order to sustain the newly formed state. Similarly, Eğreti Gelin piece is also a story of nation-building, where the modern order of nationalism appropriates the Anatolian culture into its rule. Islam is again an important factor, making the nationality of non-Muslims questionable. Both motion pictures illustrate the ways in which the minorities sacrifice their genders in order to preserve the new state rule.

Chapter 2: Nationalisms and Sexualities

2-1 Current Literature on Nationalism (and Sexuality)

In modern era, everyone has a nationality, as well as a gender; Anderson contemplated when forming his nationalism theory¹. However, gender has not really been included within the study of nationalism. Ivette claims that gender is rarely taken into consideration in the studies of nation, nationalism and nationality². These theories dismiss the somatic problems like skin color and gender, and rather focus on history of ideas³. Yet, nations act like gender as they define the Other⁴. Scholars have been increasingly including gender in the theories of nationalism.

Nelson, for instance, articulated that United States was built as a union of white men across the line of class conflict that constructed an impassible gender and race barrier⁵. Following the same vein, Becki Rose observes that “nationalist projects have always involved process[es] whereby populations are divided into racialized, sexualized and gendered categories of belonging and otherness”⁶. Similarly, Jacqueline Stevens

¹ B. Anderson (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 5.

² V. Ivette (1998). Men, Women and the Construction of Nationhood. [Electronic Version] *Feminist Collections*, 19:2, 4.

³ J. S. Alter (1994). Celibacy, Sexuality and the Transformation of Gender into Nationalism in North India. [Electronic Version] *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 53:1, 46.

⁴ A. Parker, M. Russo, D. Sommer & P. Yaeger (1992). *Nationalism and Sexualities*. New York, NY: Routledge, 8.

⁵ E. Cheyfitz (2000). National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and Imagined Fraternity of White Men. [Electronic Version] *American Literature*, 72:1, 221.

⁶ O. Howlett (2005). Sexuality and Nationalism: The Impact of Sexual Regimes on Gay and Lesbian Belongings. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Carleton University, Canada*, 34.

points out that state is not separate but embedded in sexual institutions⁷. Likewise, Connell contends that state is a part of gender system and therefore it is gendered⁸. Nationalism is embedded in a greater system of discourses. Drezgic remarks:

“Population discourses; the dominant discourses on gender and gender relations; and nationalist discourses (about origin and development of nations, and about survival of and threat to the national ‘stock’) ... emerge as not only mutually dependent, but actually, mutually constitutive.”⁹

There have been contemplations about constructing these links¹⁰, like the work of Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality. However, before him, the well-known theorist of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, was already hinting at the connections.

“Nations inspire love and often self-sacrificing love” said Anderson¹¹. “The nation is always conceived of deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings”¹². Nations are *limited* as they

⁷ B. S. Somerville (2005). Notes Toward a Queer History of Naturalization. [Electronic Version] *American Quarterly*, 57:3, 660.

⁸ P. A. N. Frederick (2002). Sexing the nation: State regulation of prostitution and homosexuality in Britain and the Netherlands in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, United States*, 15.

⁹ R. Drezgic (1985). (Re)Producing the Nation: The Politics of Reproduction in Serbia in the 1980s and 1990s. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, University of Belgrade, Serbia*, vi.

¹⁰ Alter, 45.

¹¹ As quoted in Somerville, 659.

¹² Anderson, 7.

have defined populations and boundaries¹³. Nations are *imagined* through the diffusive powers of mass media “because members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”¹⁴. Nations are also *imagined* because nationals need to relate to each other although they don’t interact. Nations are deep, horizontal communities, while inequalities and differences prevail¹⁵. For Anderson, “communities are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness, but the style in which they are imagined”¹⁶. Since nations involve imagining a community in a particular style; national identity and citizenship encompass discursive operations of identity productions¹⁷. Hence, these discursive productions erase the differences to form deep and horizontal communities, through creating rigid categories of gender and sexuality. In these operations, nations function like gender, to define each other on the basis of what they are not¹⁸. In sexual terms, it is the world of the ‘Other’, that is deviant and non-reproductive, whereas ‘Us’ is the heteronormatives, defined by men.

According to Iris Marion Young, “founded by men, the modern state and its public realm of citizenship paraded as universal values and norms that were derived from specifically masculine experience: militaristic norms of honor and homoerotic camaraderie; respectful competition and

¹³ Anderson, 7.

¹⁴ Anderson, 6.

¹⁵ Anderson, 7.

¹⁶ Anderson, 6.

¹⁷ Wray, 3.

¹⁸ Anderson, 5-7.

bargaining among independent agents; discourses framed in unemotional tones of dispassionate reason”¹⁹. To gain access to these fraternalistic notions of citizenry, appropriate sexual conduct is crucial²⁰. Yet, feminine components are also present in the comradeship of the nation. Parker et al. record that passionate brotherhood is always accompanied by the “‘respectable’ ideally feminine Mother, who produces, secures and represents the nation”²¹. Definition of women is a process that operates vis-à-vis the conceptualizations about what men are. Yet, these processes are not static to delineate national belongings, but rather an on-going process that can never be fulfilled²². David Evan notes that the citizenship machinery makes various status shortcomings of some to qualify as less than full citizens²³. Thus, gender and nation are defined in performative terms, such that nationals pass as citizens with respects to their ability to perform the conventions of nationalism. However, all this process is a Western project, requiring re-definitions when applied to other contexts.

This project entails review of two contemporary Turkish films that depict state formation efforts of country’s nationalism, where outcast communities like non-Muslims and prostitutes have a distinctive role and function in realizing nationalist and sexual discourses. Yet, to start the task, western notions of nationalism and sexuality should be revisited to be appropriated to the Turkish context.

¹⁹ Quoted in Wray, 4.

²⁰ Yom, 8.

²¹ Bhaskaran, 6.

²² Wray, iii.

²³ Wray, 4.

2-2 Western Nationalism and Sexuality

Nationalism and nation-states have tendencies of inclusion and exclusion. Maintaining its security and autonomy, nations justify the exclusion of a few for the unification of the remaining within the state. In sexual terms, it maintains compulsory heterosexuality²⁴. Nation depends on a construct of 'deviance' to build its 'seemingly immutable borders'²⁵. Bringing back the process of otherization, the contours of 'Us' is defined in reference to productive heterosexuality, whereas the 'Other' is the 'deviant', who is discriminated to have limited access to national resources. Stychin remarks:

“Once sexual orientation is accepted as an illegitimate basis for discrimination and recognized as legal, political, and cultural identity worth of protection, then the definition of citizenship (and correspondingly the composition of the nation) broadens and depends along sexual lines”²⁶.

Pryke identifies three interconnections between nationalism and sexuality:

1. National sexual stereotypes are often linked with race and ethnicity. They exhibit excess or absence of correct national sexuality.

²⁴ Howlett, 112.

²⁵ J. L. Tvordi (2002). *Deviant Bodies and the Reordering of Desire: Heterosexuality and Nation-Building in Early Modern England*. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Arizona, United States*, 7.

²⁶ Quoted in Howlett, 3.

2. During national conflicts ‘sexual others’ are villainized to defend national culture and identities from immoral and unconventional sexual practices.

3. It involves regulation of sexuality for the well-being of the individual and the nation by supporting acceptable sexual behavior²⁷.

These interconnections, according to Mosse, are formed with the rise of the bourgeoisie and spread of their moral values²⁸.

²⁷ Howlett, 33.

²⁸ Mosse, George, L. (1985). *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.

2-3 The Rise of the Bourgeoisie and Perpetuation of their Morals

With the increasing power of the bourgeoisie in Europe, Mosse claims their mores started to define the conventions, which he calls as *bourgeois respectability*²⁹. It is defined against the lower class, involving sexual morality of rigid gender roles and ‘sexual behavior through which a national ideal is expressed’³⁰. In that respect, national identity is defined through the lens of rigid sexual morality³¹. According to Mosse, respectability entails correct and decent manners and morals, as well as proper sexual attitudes, involving identification of manliness, role of the women, and the opposition of insiders and outsiders. He further claims that their norms started to be dictated to rest of the society as they gained economical control. To maintain perpetuation of this order, bourgeoisie controls sexuality through institutions³².

Sexual discourse is contained within the institutions of medicine, education and law through their normalization of man and criminalization of deviance³³. These institutions set the norm as the heterosexual bourgeois man. Thus, they also create the deviant against it. Manliness contrasts the categories of women and homosexual to claim for national resources. Bourgeois man emphasizes the strength of body and mind, not brute force because energies, especially sexual passion, need to be contained to be

²⁹ Mosse, 1-3.

³⁰ Frederick, 1-2.

³¹ Frederick, 1.

³² Mosse, 10.

³³ Mosse, 10.

channeled for political power³⁴. In that respect, hyper-sexuality and non-reproductive sexuality are sanctioned. Furthermore, manliness also has a militaristic articulation.

Fraternity is crucial to protect the nation from outside forces³⁵. Although manliness has a long history, manly ideals were crystallized with nationalism. It stood for the nation's spiritual and material vitality, and asked for the strength of body and mind, as well as self-control, making the cult of manliness as a 'powerful and pervasive middle-class moral code'³⁶. According to Hyam, manliness was associated with hard demeanor and cleanliness of body and mind, which in part explains the military's occupation with soldiers' body. As men serve in the army, they become the literal representation of the nation's readiness³⁷. Men serve in the army to protect the women as they are the heart of the motherland, where virtuous women live³⁸. Thus, nationalist construction of masculinity and femininity create a division of labor whereby women reproduce the nation physically, culturally and symbolically, while men protect the nation³⁹. Motherland is a feminine private country. Hence, this explains the link between rise of the liberal state and the distinction among the public and the private spaces, where the latter is exclusively feminine, while man is the head of this private space- the household⁴⁰.

³⁴ Mosse, 11.

³⁵ Howlett, 20.

³⁶ Frederick, 170.

³⁷ *ibid*

³⁸ Yom, 34.

³⁹ Drezgic, 9.

⁴⁰ Frederick, 15-6.

Nationalism provided the framework to regulate sexuality. Thus, nationalist discourse, in the name of its concern over the welfare of its citizens, occupied itself with the proper definition of gender roles and appropriate sexual behavior⁴¹. On an important note, these definitions mark the European notions of nationalism and sexuality.

2-4 European Notions of Nationalism and Sexuality

European Heteronormativity is defined against the formulation of the deviant. According to Foucault, Homosexual is a 19th century product, which before was grouped under the general category of sodomy, including all the sexual deviance, like non-reproductive sex. However, its definition outside of this group makes the Homosexual a unique species⁴². This way, it can be further articulated to define heterosexuality.

Man cannot be homosexual. Homosexual is perceived to lack the capacity to control his sexual energies. This contrasts greatly with the bourgeois man⁴³. Homosexual needs to be exorcised, as he confuses the sexes. Similarly, the masturbator is someone who cannot pass as a man because he is not using his resources, his sperms, wisely. Thus, bourgeoisie abolishes non-reproductive sexuality through the institutions of medicine and law. Doctors somatize these sexualities as they define physical features of homosexuals and masturbators being amorphous and grotesque,

⁴¹ Frederick, 16.

⁴² Tvordi, 11.

⁴³ Mosse, 25.

contrasting with Greek male beauty of proportionate and harmonious body⁴⁴. Abolishment was not only limited to sexual deviants.

Like the homosexuals, racial deviance is sanctioned. With the invention of race, certain groups in the urban metropolises were defined as ‘dangerous classes’, like the Irish, and the Jew⁴⁵. Racial minorities are perceived to be less manly. In Germany, Jews fulfilled this function⁴⁶. Similarly, in the film Borrowed Bride, Tavit has a similar role, as Armenian Turks are pushed to the periphery in the nationalist discourse. Women also, as being the opposite of men, define manliness through women’s deviance.

Women function as contrasting category with respects to men, as they provide services of chastity and modesty⁴⁷. They dedicate themselves to the well-being and preservation of the normal for the society by securing male-male arrangements⁴⁸. Mosse points to three examples of Britannia, Marianne and Germania for Britain, France and Germany, respectively to illustrate his case⁴⁹. Among his illustrations, the case of Queen Luise of Prussia is telling for the Turkish case, as it parallels with Iffet Hanim, Ali’s mother. For the German case, Queen Luise of Prussia served as the image of ideal woman as she preserved traditional values, but was very careful in not trespassing into the men’s world, further defining the division between two genders. Women preserve traditional values in the active world of men

⁴⁴ Mosse, 50.

⁴⁵ Frederick, 167-8.

⁴⁶ Mosse, 146-7.

⁴⁷ Mosse, 90.

⁴⁸ Mosse, 90-7.

⁴⁹ Mosee, 90.

because they are not corrupted⁵⁰. However, they are politically active as they instill manliness to their sons. Still, women are deviant and must be avoided at all costs. They contaminate men, who would otherwise live both sexually and spiritually upright Christian lives⁵¹. Historicizing this and similar notions about women's suppression would help to define the constructivist nature of these concepts. Feminist theory reflects on it from a different angle.

There is no transhistorical 'nation' or 'patriarchy', but feminist scholars agree that the nationalist discourses subjugate women as M/Other. Due to Father's order, women's role as citizens is reduced to Mother. Reformulating Adrienne Rich's affirmation that "a women's body is the terrain upon which patriarchy is erected", national formation discursively constructs woman "as a symbol of national terrain upon which patriarchal political power is erected for the sake of 'fathering' the land and future generation of citizens"⁵². Similarly, Yuval Davis claims that women are contained as Mothers within the nation, controlled by the institutions and discourses of the nation⁵³. However, prostitutes do not fall under this categorization, although they are women. The other Other women, the prostitutes are demonized as the enemy of the nation⁵⁴. Thus, further exploration on heterosexuality is necessary.

⁵⁰ Mosse, 97.

⁵¹ Tvordi, 154.

⁵² M. A. Carsillo (2003). *Missionary Positions: Unpinning Women from Under the Paradigms of Patriarchal Discourses of Nation*. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine, United States*, 3.

⁵³ Crasillo, 35-6.

⁵⁴ Yom, 28.

Heterosexuality is not necessarily the desire for the opposite sex. If that was the case, prostitution would have not been as controversial as it is. It is, rather, man's desire for political and religious domination, which sacrifices the women⁵⁵. When this concept is extrapolated to homosexuality, it seems that homosexuality poses a great threat to the foundation of nation and nationalism- heterosexuality as a political power of control. Nation is built upon the capitalist family. Therefore, homosexuality shakes the foundations of the heterosexist construct of the nation, the family⁵⁶

Marriage and traditional family are crucial building blocks of nations, letting them reproduce themselves. Through these institutions and incentives, sexual regimes encourage citizens to procreate. At this point, women's reproductive capacity is emphasized for the reproductive needs of the nation. These institutions marginalize alternative sexualities to keep compulsory heterosexuality intact⁵⁷. Marriage and motherhood can only exist within this framework of heterosexual matrix⁵⁸.

According to M. Jacqui Alexander, the nation has always been within the heterosexual matrix as biology and reproduction have been at the heart of the nations. That is why women's sexual agency poses a threat to the foundation of the nation. Sexually autonomous women pose a threat to the nuclear family, through which the fiction that the family is the cornerstone of a nation perpetuates. Thus, erotic autonomy signals a danger

⁵⁵ Tvordi, 140-1.

⁵⁶ Howlett, 35; Frederick, 2.

⁵⁷ Howlett, 112.

⁵⁸ Bhaskaran, 3.

to the heterosexual family and the nation. Because loyal citizenship is colonized within the heterosexual reproduction, erotic autonomy brings with it the possibility of undoing the nation, a possible charge of no citizenship⁵⁹.

To sum up, Yuval Davis argues that women represent the future of the nation because of their reproductive capacity; such that they need to be protected by men. Thus, nationalism, centered on the family, creates hostility towards non-reproductive sexualities, like prostitution, homosexuality and masturbation. The prostitutes are not chaste and motherly women, as they tempt the chastity of men, while the homosexuals are not men enough to ensure the nation and the empire's preeminence⁶⁰. Thus, sexuality is contained within a nationalist discourse.

According to Foucault, a regime of power-knowledge-pleasure sustained the discourses in the West and the preoccupation with sexuality coincided with the rise of the nation-state. It may be because population became an important political and economical agent, so was sex⁶¹. 'The truth', in this articulation, has the power, where the truth about sexuality and biology, according to Rich, creates heterosexuality and motherhood as Nature, a nature that is not open to question⁶². In 'the production of truth' certain institutions like military, church, medicine and the state are more privileged⁶³. Thus, bourgeoisie sustained its control over 'the truth' through an alliance of medical and legal registers.

⁵⁹ Bhaskaran, 7.

⁶⁰ Frederick, 180.

⁶¹ Frederick, 14.

⁶² Crasillo, 37; Frederick, 39.

⁶³ Frederick, 39.

Medicine stigmatizes the deviants- women⁶⁴, homosexuals and masturbators. The medico-legal apparatus of the state, according to Connell, “criminalizes stigmatized sexual activity, embodies masculinized hierarchy, and organizes collective violence in policing, prison and war”⁶⁵. Jeffrey Weeks attributes the rise of repressive laws regarding sex to the industrial capitalism and urbanization:

“The late nineteenth century sees a deepening hostility towards homosexual, alongside the emergence of new definitions of homosexuality and the homosexual. I believe these developments can only be understood as part of the restructuring of the family and sexual relations consequent upon the triumph of urbanization and industrial capitalism. The result of these changes was the emergence in a recognizably modern form of concepts and meanings which are now common places of public discussion: for example, the notion of ‘the housewife,’ ‘the prostitute,’ ‘the child’ and the concept of ‘the homosexual’ ... as social norms became more clearly defined ... so the condemnation of male homosexuality increased ... This is clearly seen in the developments of sharper legal penalties in the last decades of the nineteenth century ...”⁶⁶

Along similar veins, Tilly accounts for state’s preoccupation with sexuality to the nationalization of military. State was responsible for the health and education of the young males of the nation. This way, military

⁶⁴ Yom, 14.

⁶⁵ Quoted in Frederick, 15.

⁶⁶ Quoted in Frederick, 19.

entered to the sexual lives of the citizens⁶⁷. Nevertheless, Western sexuality sought for ways to find libertarian platforms.

Mosse argues that middle-class respectability did not favor naturism and pornography⁶⁸, and ‘all the printed material that could produce an erotic effect’⁶⁹. However, ‘Oriental Sex’ provided an outlet.

According to Foucault, Western sexuality opposed to *Ars Erotica* of China, Japan and India. However, it provided a libertarian discourse for the Victorian sexuality. Along the same lines, Edward Said recorded that ‘Oriental Sex’ after 1800 became an obsession for the European travelers and they had to refer to it all the time⁷⁰. Moreover, notions of sodomy, especially in England extended to Africa, North America and the East. This way English not only constructed itself as normative spiritually, but also sexually⁷¹. Through such operations, Western bodies were configured in opposition to the Eastern.

⁶⁷ Frederick, 14-5.

⁶⁸ Mosse, 7.

⁶⁹ Quoted in M. Jefferies (2006). ‘For a Genuine and Nobel Nakedness?’ German Naturism in the Third Reich. [Electronic Version] *German History*, 24:1, 63-4.

⁷⁰ J. Puri, (2002). Concerning Kamasutras: Challenging Narratives of History and Sexuality. [Electronic Version] *Signs*, 27:3, 613.

⁷¹ Tvardi, 22.

2-5 Non-Western Nationalism and Sexuality

Eastern nationalism is an interesting dualism because nationalism itself is a Western concept. According to Chatterjee, Eastern nationalism seeks a balance between French and German models of nationalisms⁷². French model emphasizes Enlightenment ideas, universality and individual liberty⁷³. On the other hand, according to Mosse, Germany developed a distinction between culture and civilization, which led to their acceptance of culture and the rejection of civilization⁷⁴.

Eastern nationalism, continues Chatterjee, both imitates and is hostile to the model it imitates. It imitates the alien culture to accept its standards. It also rejects traditional ways those were obstacles to progress, but perceived as marks of identity. Therefore, Eastern nationalism tries to transform the nation culturally, while retaining its distinctiveness⁷⁵.

Similarly, Radhakrishnan argues that the subject positions in these settings struggle two spaces; one internalizing the Western epistemological modes of pragmatic purposes and the other maintaining a true self, a culturally authentic one, that is uninfluenced by outside⁷⁶. In this context, women's subject position is similar to that of Western women's. Women are expected to part alongside with men in nationalism as the preservers of

⁷² A. Kadioglu (1996). The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity. [Electronic Version] *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32:2, 179.

⁷³ Kadioglu, 178.

⁷⁴ Kadioglu, 179.

⁷⁵ Kadioglu, 179.

⁷⁶ R. Sayigh (1998). Gender, Sexuality and Class in National Narrations: Palestinian Camp Women Tell Their Lives. [Electronic Version] *Frontiers*, 19:2, 166.

‘ahistorical inner domain’⁷⁷. Like this parallel, the case of Indian nationalism draws similarities in terms of abstaining from sex.

Gandhi’s sexual control is an important block in Indian nationalism. His control is linked to the notions of Hindu celibacy. Celibate body is regarded as supremely fit to maintain national integrity. Similarly, the semen retention of the Brahmacharya (Indian wrestler) is a sign of control over his body with rigid diet, exercise and rest. He would radiate an ‘aura of vitality and strength’. Someone with semen loss, on the other hand, will have an ugly look⁷⁸. These two examples, Gandhi’s celibacy, and Brahmacharya’s semen control and his fit appearance parallel bourgeois respectability.

On a note similar to Radhakrishnan’s observation, Indian nationalism also seeks a balance between British material world and the Indian Hindu value interior world⁷⁹. This case is telling for the Turkish case. Official Republican ideology stated that a patriotic Turk should seek to balance the West and the East: science and technology, and spirituality⁸⁰.

In this context, sexuality and the deviants are defined mainly in reference to Islam. Women’s sexuality and desire within the heterosexual conjugal arrangements was acknowledged along with men’s sexuality⁸¹. By reference to Islam, as illustrated in Borrowed Bride, non-Muslims are

⁷⁷ Sayigh, 167.

⁷⁸ Alter, 53.

⁷⁹ Alter, 46.

⁸⁰ Kadioglu, 177-8.

⁸¹ P. Ikkaracan (2004). Women and Sexuality in Muslim Societies. [Electronic Version] *Resources for Feminist Research*, 31:1/2, 58.

pushed out of the nationalist discourse to the periphery, where they could have non-aligned sexualities. Turkish nationalism interacts with these and many other factors.

Turkish nationalism in so many ways was articulated in reference to Ottoman history. Broadly speaking, Turkish nationalism is the end product of various consecutive failures of ideological attempts of Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkism. At this point, it is important to iterate the Ottoman conjecture in late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The empire had a very cosmopolitan structure in terms of religion and ethnicity. In 1870s and 1880s, 40% of the population was made up of non-Muslim millets of Jews, Greek Orthodox (Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek) and Gregorian Armenians, while Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Circassians and Albanians accounted for the Muslim population⁸². Thus, identity has an important function for the Ottoman context.

In this multicultural environment, place of origin and religion determined the identity for the Ottoman subjects. This aspect also had organizational ramifications for the Ottoman subjects. Jews, Greek Orthodox and Armenians had their administrative systems and codes. Therefore, there was not a single citizenship to unite them all⁸³. Yet, with

⁸² Cetinsaya, G. (1999). Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” in Modern Turkish Political Thought. [Electronic Version] *The Muslim World*, 89:3/4, 351-2.

Taspinar, O. (2001). Kemalist Identity in Transition: A Case Study of Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, United States*, 18-9.

⁸³ J. S. Tiregol (1998). The Role of Primary Education in Nation-State-Building: The Case of the Early Turkish Republic (1923-1938). [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, United States*, 4.

the Tanzimat Reforms, Ottoman state changed its attitude towards the non-Muslim subjects.

Tanzimat Reformers secularized state's treatment of its non-Muslim population with the 1839 imperial edict, the 1840 new penal code, and another imperial edict of the 1856. These reform efforts aimed to create equality for all the Ottoman subjects⁸⁴. On top of that, with the fear of rising ethnic nationalism, the leadership of the time started to experiment with new ideologies.

Tanzimat Reformers and Young Ottomans were interested in the idea of Ottomanism to unite all subjects of the empire under the banner of Ottoman. However, it had a Western tone, privileging non-Muslim subjects and alienating the Muslims. Consequently, after Ottomanism, Abdulhamid II tried to emphasize Islam with Pan-Islamism. It was a form of proto-nationalism that the sultan wanted to use against the rising challenge of Young Ottomans. He was aware that with the constitutionalist efforts, Young Ottomans appealed to the educated populace. Thus, Abdulhamid II tailored his message for the lower-class population, in the form of 'folk Islam' to unite all the Muslim subjects of the Empire⁸⁵. With the 1877-88 Russo-Turkish War, great deal of Christian territories was lost and large quantities of Muslim refugees migrated to the Ottoman lands. Within this context, Abdulhamid tried to unify the Muslim subjects with the pan-Islamism project⁸⁶. As the sultan emphasized the religiosity of his

⁸⁴ Taspinar, 23.

⁸⁵ Taspinar, 26-7.

⁸⁶ Taspinar, 61.

nationalistic efforts, Young Ottomans tried to fine tune different attributes in the face of rising ethnic nationalism in Europe.

Eastern nationalism, as it is stated above, strives to find a balance between the indigenous characteristics of the populace and Westernism. To re-emphasize, Indian nationalism, according to Radhakrishnan, sought a balance between British materialism and Indian Hindu values⁸⁷. Similarly, Young Ottomans tried to cope between Westernism and traditional Islamic values⁸⁸. Young Ottomans tried to resolve materiality of the West and the spirituality of the East, to portray compatibility of modernization and Islam⁸⁹. By this time, the nationalist ideology was gaining more of an ethnic tone. The writings of Namik Kemal illustrate the shift from a cosmopolitan ideology to a more ethnocentric one.

Change of viewpoint in Namik Kemal's works is telling. His earlier works emphasized all-inclusive concepts of fatherland and freedom for all Muslim ummet and non-Muslim millets. However, with Slavic and Hellenic irredentism, the focus of his works shifted to the Turkish language and Turkish history as the unifying agent of all Muslims of the Empire⁹⁰. This change in attitude can be attributed to the disaster of World War 1 and separation of Arab territories⁹¹. Through time, nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire changed its focus.

⁸⁷ Alter, 46.

⁸⁸ Taspinar, 59.

⁸⁹ Kadioglu, 181.

⁹⁰ Taspinar, 60.

⁹¹ Cetinsaya, 359-60.

As Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism failed, they gave emergence to new ideological trials. The focus shifted from Pan-Turanism to Pan-Turkism to finally Turkish nationalism. Although it molded into an ethnocentric form, Islam still had a very prevalent influence. Islam was a unifying agent as Turkism provided the framework.⁹² Islam was the unifying agent, and the official monolithic absolute Turkish identity suppressed or ignored multiple identities at the periphery⁹³. This attribute makes citizenry of non-Muslims problematic.

For the Turkism idea, Along with Namik Kemal, Ziya Gokalp's works are credited as inspiration for Turkish nationalists. Ziya Gokalp had been a very influential figure for the Young Ottomans and Kemalists as he attempted a synthesis of European elements with Ottoman Muslim civilizations⁹⁴. He believed in putting sociology into the service of investigating the reasons why Turkish nation lacked to be a modern nation. He diagnosed it to be the dichotomous representation of the East and the West, as he tried to reconcile the two with his attempts in adjusting culture and civilization⁹⁵. According to Gokalp, social unit of nation was the source of culture within the boundaries of civilization. This view created a paradoxical synthesis of cosmopolitan French and anti-Western, anti-Enlightenment German nationalisms. Therefore, the new cadre of

⁹² Cetinsaya, 359.

⁹³ Kadioglu, 192.

⁹⁴ Taspinar, 72.

⁹⁵ Kadioglu, 183-4.

intellectuals was invested by the duty of transforming the popular psyche by an elitist project from above⁹⁶.

Ziya Gokalp differentiated between culture and civilization. He asserted that while the local culture had elements of Islam, the road to modernity passed through the appropriation of European civilization. Thus, the real challenge appeared to be adoption of this civilizational mode while preserving the culture's Turkish and Muslim national character. It was a 'reconciliation of national-Islamic pride with European civilization'⁹⁷. Gokalp's attempt can be characterized as *Turkiyecilik*, Turkey-based-nationalism, where he combined Turkish nationalism, Islamic beliefs and Western civilization⁹⁸. Islam belonged to national culture, while Westernization was a matter of civilization⁹⁹.

These discourses were pre-conditioned by various other historical events. The collapse of Ottomanism with Greek, Serbian, Armenian and Arab nationalist agendas made it apparent that the Turkish core within the Ottoman society did not have another alternative but to construct its own nationalism¹⁰⁰.

By the end of World War 1, Ottomanist, Islamist and Pan-Turkist dreams came to an end. Young Turks legitimized the rule of the nationalist and secularist elites. The military members of this class were eager to

⁹⁶ Kadioglu, 184.

⁹⁷ Taspinar, 29-30.

⁹⁸ A. G. Altinay (2001). *Making Citizens, Making Soldiers: Military Service, Gender and National Identity in Turkey*. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, United States*, 28.

⁹⁹ Taspinar, 72.

¹⁰⁰ Taspinar, 53.

establish a secular nation-state¹⁰¹. Therefore, Kemalist secularization is a result of a trend that started with Tanzimat and culminated with the Young Turks ideology¹⁰².

With the victory of Independence War, Turkish military took over the command of the country. The military controlled in the name of modernization, to change the society into a nation with stress on secularization¹⁰³. Along with this vein, Ataturk regarded Islam to be incompatible with nationalism and tried to strike it out from the nationalist discourse¹⁰⁴. However, Islam was maintained as an important feature in the lives of the Turkish nationals.

Turkish Republic inherited the Ottoman legacy of state control of religion. In line with the Ottoman *raison d'état* of hegemony over religion, modern Turkish state did not separate religion from state completely. Rather, it was incorporated into the state bureaucracy and religious establishments¹⁰⁵. Turkish nationalism emphasized a form of secularism, where the state had an active role in shaping the religion. This feature is manifested in the control of religion through Directorates of Religion Affairs and Pious Foundations¹⁰⁶. Similarly, religion courses represented a Republicanized-Islam or a nationalized Islam, which supported the separation of state and mosque¹⁰⁷. Therefore, Turks and Turkish nation

¹⁰¹ Taspinar, 30.

¹⁰² Taspinar, 31.

¹⁰³ Karpat, Kemal, H. (2001). The Rise of Modern Turkey. [Electronic Version] *The Journal of Military History*, 65:3, 771.

¹⁰⁴ Cetinsaya, 362.

¹⁰⁵ Taspinar, 9.

¹⁰⁶ Taspinar, 34.

¹⁰⁷ Terigol, 109.

were Muslim, implying that a Turk is a Muslim while a Muslim is not necessarily a Turk¹⁰⁸. Within this context, main responsibility of a Muslim was to become a model citizen¹⁰⁹.

In most nation-state building processes, nationalism of minorities was problematic. When transforming a multicultural empire to a nation-state, ethnic and religious minorities faced great challenges in adapting to the cultural homogenization of the center¹¹⁰. For the non-Muslims of the modern Turkish state, nationalism also had similar ramifications.

Non-Muslims in Turkey face various difficulties within the nationalist discourse. Ethnicity related minority rights were perceived to be as betrayal to the indivisibility of the nation and the state¹¹¹. Non-Muslims were Turkish citizens, but since they were not from the Turkish-Muslim ethnic of the Ottoman Empire, they were not incorporated completely¹¹². Behind the civic façade of the Turkish nationalism, religion determined the level of Turkishness. Turkish nationalism lacked the cosmopolitan tolerance of Ottoman Empire. Secular Turkish Republic perceived all Muslim ethnic communities as members of the Turkish millet, while discriminating against non-Muslim minorities¹¹³.

Taspinar lists several examples of the discriminatory attitude of the state against the non-Muslims minorities. In the early years of the Republic,

¹⁰⁸ Terigol, 110.

¹⁰⁹ Taspinar, 44.

¹¹⁰ Taspinar, 77.

¹¹¹ Taspinar, 85.

¹¹² Cagaptay, S. (2003). *Crafting the Turkish Nation: Kemalism and Turkish Nationalism in the 1930s*. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, United States*, 35.

¹¹³ Taspinar, 91-2.

Christian and Jewish subjects were excluded from military schools and academies. In 1939, with the break of World War 2, all Armenian, Greek and Jewish males between the ages of 18 and 45 were mobilized to the camps in Anatolia. 1942 Wealth Tax was almost exclusively levied on non-Muslims¹¹⁴.

Turkish Jews had a different position compared to the Armenian and Greek Turks. Turkish nationalism formed anti-Armenian and anti-Greek sentiments, while staying neutral to the Jews. Jews were loyal millet. However, as they gained economic wealth, anti-Semitism emerged on the grounds that Turkish Jews did not speak Turkish but Judeo-Spanish and French¹¹⁵.

Turkish nation is perceived to be as a military nation. Every male Turk is born as a soldier. Military is one of the main institutions where masculinity is reinforced. Various sites of military define the experiences and identities of men and women. Limiting military service to only men is ‘a major source of gender difference that *was defined and administered by the state*’¹¹⁶. Military service is a criterion to judge manhood. It is both the matter of serving the nation and proving manliness. Therefore, military service marks the difference between men and women¹¹⁷. However, women are also invested with militaristic duties.

Women’s military service did not come from serving in the army of military, but in the army of educators. Being educators was the military

¹¹⁴ Taspinar, 92.

¹¹⁵ Cagaptay, 36.

¹¹⁶ Altinay, 98.

¹¹⁷ Altinay, 65-6.

service for the women¹¹⁸. Education and educators have nationalizing and militarizing roles, where school functions in parallels to the army. Arif Dirlik claims that education serves as an extension of military. “Just as army is a school, so is the school an army”¹¹⁹. Ataturk refers to army as ‘a great national school of discipline’¹²⁰. As military service is universal and compulsory, so is education¹²¹. Following the same vein of argument, soldiers are the most fit citizens of the population as primary school education wanted to produce a fit body and a fit mind for strong, healthy and enlightened generations¹²². Through creation of a militaristic education system, women served their military service as educators. The Ministry of Education also created women through some other operations.

The Ministry of Education album of From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey – How was it? How has it Become? (Osmanli Imparatorlugu’ndan Turkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne – Nasildi? Nasil Oldu?) is an illustration for the discursive construction of woman identity in the early years of the nation-state. This is album was created to celebrate the 10th year anniversary of the Republic, contrasting backward Ottoman Empire with the glorious Turkish Republic. Generally speaking, the work points out that in during the Ottoman times, women were kept ignorant whereas in modern Turkey, they are active participants of their society¹²³.

¹¹⁸ Terigol, 177.

¹¹⁹ Altinay, 163.

¹²⁰ Altinay, 87.

¹²¹ Altinay, 85.

¹²² Terigol, 89.

¹²³ Terigol, 39.

The conventional mode of Eastern nationalism, that is balancing the West and the East, had been imprinted on the Turkish psyche, where women have an important process. Women of the Turkish Republic are expected to look modern while retaining their traditional virtues like modesty; such that they would not step into the realm of men. If this balance is not preserved, they are tagged as either loose or out-dated¹²⁴. Mosse's illustration for the case of Queen Luise of Prussia, as debated above, parallels this observation. In that sense, nationalism, either Western or Eastern, is an extrapolation of the division between men and women into the nation-state mode, where women are modernized at the expense of preserving their position vis-à-vis the men. Along with women, minorities are challenged with nationalism.

The militarist component of Turkish nationalism serves a challenge for the minorities. The discourse in the army assumes that all soldiers are Muslims as non-Muslims are perceived to be potential threat, then Turkish citizens¹²⁵. According to Corrigan and Sayer, official discourse suppresses differences in its nationalistic project. However, not all differences are equally threatening¹²⁶. Armenian and Greek Turks face more prejudice, compared to Jews, as they had been viewed negatively because of their atrocities in the Ottoman Empire and during War of Independence¹²⁷. The case of 'internal Other' as an agent to unify suitable citizens within a nation can apply for the Turkish case¹²⁸. Therefore, the sexual colonization of

¹²⁴ Kadioglu, 178

¹²⁵ Altinay, 92.

¹²⁶ Altinay, 95.

¹²⁷ Altinay, 93.

¹²⁸ Howlett, 36.

minorities internally can extend to the non-Muslims of Turkish Republic in their non-normative sexuality.

Chapter 3: Studying Film

Kracauer, in his analysis of German cinema history, states that “film, whether fictional or documentary, can reveal the ‘outward projects’ of a people and represent a ‘collective mentality’ that can reveal the hidden ‘psychological dispositions’ responsible for a nation’s conduct”¹²⁹. This is where the films of Hacivat Karagöz and Borrowed Bride come into play to describe the discursive formulation of minority sexualities. Furthermore, these films come around at a time when the notions of modernism and its project, the nation, are facing challenges.

The two films, Hacivat Karagöz and Borrowed Bride depict a postmodern look at the relationship between sexuality and the nation. Atif Yilmaz inherently and Ezel Akay consciously provide the audience with a critique of modern identities, in this case national identities, at a postmodern era when all the identities are dead. In that sense, these two films portray a deconstruction for the national sexuality.

3-1 Murdering Hacivat and Karagöz: Islam’s Role in Ottoman State Formation

“You betrayed my mother, her faith, the sisterhood and everything. And to whom? Why? I’ll tell you why: Because you converted only for the Ottoman power” exclaimed Ayse Hatun to his father, Kosem Mihal¹³⁰.

Why were Hacivat Karagöz murdered? (Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü?)

¹²⁹ Quoted in Yom, 7.

¹³⁰ B. Atay (Producer), & E. Akay (Director) (2006). *Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü?* [Motion Picture]. Istanbul: IFR AS.

– Hacivat Karagöz) is a contemporary illustration of the tensions involved in state building processes of the newly forming Ottoman state. As these two characters of Hacivat and Karagöz were traditional shadow puppets, their filmic story in the age of emerging Ottoman rule informs the spectators about the conjecture of the era. It might be argued that studying a filmic depiction of early Ottoman history to understand modern nationalism is anachronism. Although Ottoman state formation cannot be fully compared to modern notions of Turkish Republican Nationalism, Hacivat Karagöz serves a modern day projection of Turkish society's imagining of Ottoman Empire through the lens of modern nationalism. Furthermore, it is a case study to portray the ways in which Turkish nationalism is informed by the Ottoman state's legacy, particularly on the role of Islam. As Islam provided the unifying element for Turkish nationalism to be articulated¹³¹, similarly, Islam also had an important function in conceiving the Ottoman state. Therefore, studying Hacivat Karagöz through the lens of modern nationalism is not anachronistic. Rather, the study allows to investigate the ways in which contemporary Turkish nation extrapolates its codes for nationalism to a different setting. To reiterate Yom's point, cinema is an outward projection of a society's collective psyche responsible for a nation's conduct¹³².

Hacivat Karagöz depicts the state formation processes of the Ottoman Fiefdom into an empire. Set in 1330 in Bursa, Hacivat, an envoy for Esrefoglu Fiefdom, meets with Karagöz, nomadic, Shaman Turkomen.

¹³¹ Cetinsaya, 359.

¹³² Yom, 7.

They entertain the public as they work for the construction of the new mosque in the city. As their fame gets bigger, royal family turns their attention to these two characters. Meanwhile, the Ottoman ruling family in Bursa is busy configuring a way to reconcile Greek Orthodoxy within an Islamic rule.

3-1-1 Confrontation of Islam, Orthodoxy and Shamanism

Islam, as manifested in Hacivat Karagöz, had pre-conditioning effects on the future of Turkish nationalism. It served as an agent to put in place the bourgeois respectability notions of ideals of men, and images of women. Thus, the film illustrates the tensions between the Greek Orthodoxy's treatment of sexes and Turco-Islamic interpretation of men and women in the functioning of state. It is a story of sacrifices of women, Orthodoxy and Shaman religion in the service of building the Ottoman rule.

The film depicts the tensions involved among Islam, Orthodoxy and Shaman in the Islamization of Anatolia. The scene for competition between Orthodoxy and Islam in gaining recruits illustrates the tensions involved in this period. While lining up in front of a mosque, to be converted to Islam, Karagöz is tried to be recruited by the Orthodox priest. The priest tries to convert the Shaman into Orthodoxy, and says "Are you changing your religion? What's the hurry? Why would you change your religion? ... Your [Shamanistic] religion does not count. Let's make you an Orthodox. What do you say?"¹³³ As the imam notices the priest's move, he furiously

¹³³ B. Atay, & E. Akay

intervenes to keep him away from the ‘ignorant Turkomen’¹³⁴. The film is full of similar depictions of this process.

Tatars’ and Greek rulers’ conversion into Islam is also telling. Tatar, a non-Muslim state, converts into Islam to claim legitimacy in the region. Eredna, through conversion into Islam, replaces the non-Muslim ruler, Demirtas Khan. In the scene where Eredna meets with Pervane, outside of Bursa, remarks about Demirtas Khan and says “Demirtas is no more with us. In Egypt, we had him delivered to the Caliph and they quartered him. I am the governor of Rome now”¹³⁵. Similarly, Kosem Mihal, originally Michael, leaves Greek Orthodoxy to be able to reign within the new Islamic state governance¹³⁶. Islamization also brought the tensions in defining roles for men and women.

3-1-2 Appropriating the Minorities – Women and Shamans:

Definition of men and images of women can best be described in the contrast of Pervane’s Islamic order and Ayse Hatun’s Sisterhood (Bacilar) norms for both sexes. In this dichotomy, Pervane, the new financial minister for the Ottoman Fiefdom, represents the new order of patriarchal Islam and Turks, while Ayse Hatun symbolizes the order for Greek Orthodoxy. They differ in their views of women in public and private spaces. Pervane, while conversing with Kosem Mihal, claims that politics is an unpleasant environment. Women need to reproduce and stay away from politics. They should be contained in more pleasant environments, where

¹³⁴ B. Atay, & E. Akay

¹³⁵ B. Atay, & E. Akay

¹³⁶ B. Atay, & E. Akay

they can serve their domestic services¹³⁷. Similarly, Pervane is astounded with Sisters protecting the city, while Orhan Ghazi, the new Ottoman ruler, is away on crusade¹³⁸. This worldview parallels with that of the bourgeoisie, as Mosse explains that men retain power to be in the political scene, while women are expected to uphold chastity and honor¹³⁹. In contrast to this view, Ayse Hatun preserves an alternative space for women.

Ayse Hatun is a character of resistance to the new order. She, like others in the film, disguises under Islam to preserve her earlier beliefs in Greek Orthodoxy. She criticizes her father's attitude towards conversion into Islam, and resists against converting a church into a mosque. Furthermore, she also maintains manly values like horseback riding and protecting the city¹⁴⁰. Similarly, Nilufer Hatun, Ayse's older sister, is portrayed as having an authority in the state's governance. Her acknowledgement of Pervane as the new financial minister is expected in order for his initiation¹⁴¹. However, eventually, Sisterhood falls under the order of Islamic patriarchy. As the contrast between Ayse Hatun and Pervane reveal the challenging elements of Sisterhood to be absorbed by Islam, Shamans are another category that the religion needs to appropriate.

Shamans are the ignorant, uncivilized people, who need to come under the order of Islam. Imam's exclamation of Turkomen as 'ignorant' illustrates the point. Hacivat Karagöz paints an Islam that does not only

¹³⁷ B. Atay, & E. Akay

¹³⁸ B. Atay, & E. Akay

¹³⁹ Mosse, 90.

¹⁴⁰ B. Atay, & E. Akay

¹⁴¹ B. Atay, & E. Akay

contain spiritual registers, but also economic and scientific. Karagöz and his mother seek to settle down in an urban environment. Karagöz shows his frustration at the nomadic lifestyle in Anatolia throughout the film. Consequently, they come to Bursa to become part of the city life. However, urbanization also brings along many ‘modernizing’ processes, where Islam comes into place. Karagöz, to be able to survive in an urban setting, needs a job. Yet, he can only be economically better off if he converts to Islam. This way, new job opportunities will be available to him, along with reduced tax levies. He also shows ambition in learning counting numbers and becoming literate. Karagöz needs to acquire scientific knowledge to be able to live in urban Bursa. In this way, through Islam, he can be modernized from an ‘ignorant Turkomen’ into a civil Muslim. In that sense, the processes of urbanization that the nomadic Turkomen go through resembles the intertwined structure of European nation-state formation in nineteenth century and urbanization¹⁴². Islam serves as an agent of nationalization as it absorbs Turkomen through urbanization. As Islam has economical and scientific registers, it also has spiritual one for Shamans.

Hacivat Karagöz shows Islam’s absorption of Shaman religion. Karagöz’s contemplations on converting into Islam religion is a clear manifestation of this fact. However, the most striking scene in illustrating the point is when Karagöz’s mother gets buried under minaret’s cement. While she goes into a Shamanist trance, frustrated by her jinn not showing up, falls asleep by the minaret of the new mosque, which is still being built.

¹⁴² J. Weeks (1977). *Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to Present*. London: Quartet Books, 1-2.

Pervane's men, sabotaging Hacivat and Karagöz's construction plans for the mosque, let the unhardened cement flow out of the minaret's structure over Shaman woman. Minaret's cement engulfs and completely buries her body under the hardened cement¹⁴³. This scene is a symbolic illustration Islam's engulfing of both Shaman religion and women. Islam in all means contains the nomadic Turkomen into the new Turkish Islamic order.

3-1-3 Sacrificing for the State

Hacivat Karagöz is a filmic depiction of ironic sacrifices made for the Ottoman state. Sisters fight for the pinnacle of the new mosque's minaret. They put their service into use for an ideology that will bring their end soon. Shaman secret of converting water into stone is exploited to build a minaret, which will come to engulf the Shaman woman. Although Shamans and Sisters served the state in different ways, they came to be disparaged out of the new state order. Their sacrifices helped Ottoman Islamic rule to construct itself. However, there had been spaces to challenge the authority as well.

Hacivat and Karagöz's theatrical performance provided a medium to challenge the Ottoman authority. As they conducted plays, mixed with fictive and non-fictive elements, their performance was able to criticize the rule, as long as they did not pose a clear threat. To put it differently, Ottoman power was able to sustain its rule through defeating its anti-image. It needed a threat to pull all its forces together and define itself vis-à-vis what it is not. Baudrillard explains power's strategy as the following:

¹⁴³ B. Atay, & E. Akay

“Everything is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form. Every form of power, every situation speaks of itself by denial, in order to attempt to escape, by simulation of death, its real agony. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy.”¹⁴⁴

Following Baudrillard’s argument, Ottoman power needed its negative form, its antithesis. Thus, through letting Hacivat and Karagöz’s performance flourish, it created its inverse, which needed to be silenced for the order’s perpetuation. Hacivat and Karagöz’s execution strengthens the Ottoman rule.

Minorities of women, Greeks and Shamans put their service in the building of the Ottoman state. They not only provided inverted images for the Ottoman rule, they also ironically sacrificed themselves to perpetuate its system. Eventually, as depicted in the film, Sisterhood, women, Greek Orthodoxy and Shaman religion were assimilated into the Islamic patriarchy. Ottoman state was formed over Islam’s agency. Islam’s legacy in Ottoman state puts certain institutions in place for the Early Republican Turkish nationalism to pick them up and act upon them.

¹⁴⁴ Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulations. (n.d.). Retrieved January 8, 2007, from http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html/

3-2 Borrowing the Bride: Turkish Nation-State Formation in the Early Republican Era

“Our happiness with your mother depends on my borrowed bride” says the Mayor to his son Ali in the film Borrowed Bride (*Eğreti Gelin*)¹⁴⁵. Borrowed brides are sexual trainers for young men when they have reached the age of marriage. As depicted in the film, the practice of borrowed bride, not necessarily its institution, lasted until the early days of the Turkish Republic¹⁴⁶. This practice has a vehicular importance for the Turkish nationalization project in its capacity to instill manliness into men. Nevertheless, as a traditionalist, pre-modern and pre-Republican practice, it cannot also be housed within the growing nationalism. In this sense, this case study will serve the function of exploring the link between sexuality and the nation-state, which is very limited¹⁴⁷. The existing literature mainly refers to the European case. In that respect, surveying Turkish nationalism and the ways in which it contains sexuality will help to investigate that link to a non-Western context.

In its depiction of control over sexuality and the position of minorities, the film Borrowed Bride illustrates parallels with Hacivat Karagöz. Akay’s film portrays the story of women, Shamans and Orthodoxy in the face of Anatolia’s Islamization. As discussed in the previous section, Sisterhood, Shaman women with charismatic powers and the Turkomen are all appropriated in the new Ottoman Islamist discourse.

¹⁴⁵ J. Onanc (Producer), & A. Yilmaz (Director) (2005). *Eğreti Gelin* [Motion Picture]. Istanbul: Yesilcam Filmcilik AS.

¹⁴⁶ C. Baslangic. (2005, February 2). Gelin mi Eğreti kafalar mi?. [Electronic Version]. Radikal.

¹⁴⁷ Ivette, 4.

Similarly, fast-forwarding six centuries, this time Yilmaz presents the audience of the story of an impossible love relationship of a bourgeois son and a borrowed bride, in the era of early Turkish nationalization process. As depicted in the film Borrowed Bride, Turkish nationalization and its containment of sexuality retains the main three pillars of bourgeois respectability- ideals of men, images of women and the definition of the deviant, upon which the European model is formulated, while it also deploys away non-national and non-heteronormative practices from its discourse.

Nationalism is a modern project that constantly gets re-defined throughout time. In that sense, the film Borrowed Bride, would only account for a particular moment in this process, the early Republican era. The film is set in a Western Anatolian town, during the Alphabet Revolution, around 1928, just 5 years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. Ali is the Mayor's son and is 18 years old. He is expected to marry his father's business partner's daughter, Nese. However, he does not act like a man and plays with his dolls and secretly acts in a traveling theater company, run by Tavit, an Armenian Turk. His mother thinks the remedy is to hire a borrowed bride, who will make him ready for the marriage. Emine, the borrowed bride, is a poor woman, living at subsistence level while looking after her younger sister, as she waits for her fiancé to get out of jail. Although she hesitates to accept the offer, she is later convinced as her economical condition is unbearable. As she trains Ali, mainly through Islamic verses, they both unexpectedly fall in love and try to find a way out

of this situation and be together¹⁴⁸. However, a marriage of a bourgeois man with a borrowed bride is unacceptable and therefore impossible in the early years of the Turkish nation.

The play of the two roosters, one modernist, one religious, outlines the Kemalist vein of secularism. After the modern rooster salutes the crowd, the religious one enters to the stage and accuses the crowd of being sinful because men and women intermingle together and the women do not wear veils. The modern rooster's response to him further accounts for this era's ideology, in that the people are enlightened¹⁴⁹. These three elements; gender equality, unveiling of women and the enlightenment of the people are the three main pillars of the new nation. The Turkish nation-state was founded on this tension between the binaries of modern anti-religious secular Republicanism and religious backward monarchy¹⁵⁰. In that regard, in its heavy emphasis on secularism and science, it mirrors the European model of nation-state formulation. Although European nationalism rests upon the bourgeoisie's conceptions, it is not easy to extrapolate a similar concept to the Turkish nation-state context. Since the Turkish bourgeois of the early Republican era and the European bourgeoisie of the 19th century are not completely commensurable, it is safer to figure the Turkish bourgeois man, as an 'intended' one, an economical class that intends to be its European counterpart. Nevertheless, the intended Turkish bourgeoisie is the elite bureaucratic class, defining sexual norms for the entire nation.

¹⁴⁸ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁴⁹ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁵⁰ Cetinsaya, 363.

Turkish nationalism modernizes the gender categories. In the process, it brings a rigidly defined categorization system for men and women, which inversely define each other. Nonetheless, it is a definition process that sexually and politically subjugates women. They need to be housed in private sphere and not trespass into the public, further delimiting the boundaries between genders. Iffet Hanim's case in her exertion of power from the private is illustrative. Bourgeois men also define the deviant category. As Turkish nationalism emphasizes Islamic religion as a unitary bond between its ethnically diverse constituents, non-Muslims' nationality is put into question. In that sense, Tavit, a non-Muslim Turkish national, provides spaces of escape for non-heteronormative and non-national arrangements. Nevertheless, Tavit and his space need to be shipped away from the nationalist discourse. Thus, whatever left of Ottoman cosmopolitanism can be further squeezed into a narrower definition of identity, along with non-national relationships.

3-2-1 Defining Men and Women

As George Mosse explores, nationalism contains sexuality through bourgeois respectability, in that men, women and the deviants have certain images and definitions¹⁵¹. In these ideals, the European image of man overlaps with the Turkish image of national man. Benedict Anderson notes that the Nation is a comradeship of men; they form fraternity bonds¹⁵². The film shows many accounts of this phenomenon in Ali's daily interactions with his male friends. He goes to an all-boys school; he drinks with his

¹⁵¹ Mosse, 22.

¹⁵² Anderson, 7.

male friends and his friends try to take him to brothels¹⁵³. Through this all-male environment, Ali is supposed to be cultivated to become a man. This fraternity, however, creates men's sexual subordination of women for political gains¹⁵⁴. Masculinity comes from "doing" women, it is a sexual act. One of Ali's friends mentions of an 18-year-old girl, who just came to the town brothel and all the men have lined up to do her. In the same vein, although borrowed brides serve an important function of training boys to make men out of sissies, they are degraded to prostitution and are seen as whores, who should only be used for sexual practical training, and nothing else. In the film, Iffet Hanim listens to Ali's bedroom door during night, to make sure that he is able to satisfy her and actually have sex. This 'doing' of a woman is so crucial that Iffet Hanim cannot restrain from making the following remark to his Mayor husband about their son's sexual ability: "You couldn't do anything the first fifteen days. My lion son did that slot in the first night"¹⁵⁵. Although, borrowed brides serve an important function, they cannot be anything more than an outcast.

Borrowed brides do not figure as a model for the new Republican, modern and national Turkish woman but configures modern men and women via their vehicular function. Borrowed brides, as outmoded practices, serve as mirror opposites for the modern nationals. Nevertheless, they are tools in creation of manly men and womanly women. Through providing pre-marital sexual training, Emine is responsible to instill manliness into Ali, while preserving his future wife's chaste and virginity.

¹⁵³ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁵⁴ Tvordi, 140-1.

¹⁵⁵ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

Nevertheless, since this practice is not representative for the new national order, it needs to be shipped away, with Tavit's theater, letting men's norms reign in the new national discourse.

The division of the public and private spaces, and men's and women's housing of these spaces respectively, is instructive in explaining the ways in which categories of men and women are elaborated. Men, having political power, reign in the public. On the other hand, women are expected to uphold chastity and honor and should be closed away in private¹⁵⁶. The ways in which the "borrowed bride" and Ali interact manifest this hierarchical arrangement. Ali, as a man, possessing productivity and resourcefulness, carves out templates for his father's textile workshop. In the same space, Emine, on the other hand is depicted as knitting and again later trying to entertain Ali by playing a form of string instrument¹⁵⁷. Therefore, women provide service in nationalism through their oppositional definition vis-à-vis the men.

Women, as contrasted to men, provide services of chastity and modesty in their private spheres. Nationality for women only comes through their marriage with a man¹⁵⁸. Emine hopes for her sister to get married with a decent man because she has potential. She is pretty and she is picking up the new alphabet very fast¹⁵⁹. She is becoming a modern woman, and she needs to get married to gain her national subjectivity. Nationalism creates certain female images to uphold these ideals.

¹⁵⁶ Mosse, 97.

¹⁵⁷ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁵⁸ A. Parker, M. Russo, D. Sommer & P. Yaeger, 6.

¹⁵⁹ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

Images of Britannia, Marianne and Germania are idealized forms of females for the British, French and German cases, respectively. For the German case, Queen Luise of Prussia served as the image of ideal woman as she preserved traditional values, but was very careful in not trespassing into the men's world, further defining the division between two genders¹⁶⁰. Queen Luise's image is also important to illustrate the ways in which through the figure of Iffet Hanim, as a mother, Turkish women in some ways parallel this image, and in others configure it.

Iffet Hanim, as a modern woman of the new Republic, clearly delineates the lines between the genders. She is almost always depicted in the private sphere and she works her powers out to preserve the manly ideals of the society. Although she in this sense mimics Queen Luise, her active usage of her sexuality and her control over her son's sexuality diverges her from the Queen of Prussia. She is *the* guarantor of her son's masculinity. She comes up with the idea of hiring a borrowed bride and she is the one who spies on his son's sexual experience with Emine. Iffet Hanim ensures that Ali is capable of having sex with women and is not nervous about the encounter. Iffet Hanim also makes use of her sexuality in convincing the Mayor to allow a borrowed bride to come home, who at first opposes the idea, as it would not be appropriate to practice such outdated institutions in a Republican house¹⁶¹. Borrowed brides also have a similar function, but a vehicular one, in the nation-state. They are tools to make sure that men behave like men. Furthermore, they also preserve the chastity

¹⁶⁰ Mosse, 95-7.

¹⁶¹ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

of other women- the modern women, who are supposed to preserve their virginity for their husbands. They do so by providing extra-marital experience-related sexual service. Emine, in her encounter with Nese, Ali's fiancé, paraphrases Mohammed's hadith: "Our prophet says that a good woman is the one who makes you happy when you look at her, obeys you when ordered, and preserves her chastity and property on her [husband's] behalf"¹⁶². Women's sexual activity in the Turkish context rests heavily on the fact that Islam within the heterosexual marriage acknowledges women's sexual desires. Women are supposed to have sexual pleasure during intercourses¹⁶³. At this point, Turkish women depart from European ones in their active use of their sexuality for the nation. Emine, again as a tutor for Ali, makes the following statement about women: "Some herbs give out odor when they are touched. Women are like these herbs. They need to be caressed and touched in order to release their odors"¹⁶⁴. No matter how active the borrowed brides in their usage of sexuality, they still cannot escape the stigma of being an outsider.

3-2-2 Sacrificing Deviant Minorities

The Turkish nationalism model, like the European one, rests heavily on the definition of the outsider, or the deviant¹⁶⁵. Men set the rate of normalcy which contrasts with women and non-heterosexuality. Ali's family's, primarily his mother's, attitude towards his non-manliness and him acting as a sissy raise concerns. Ali must be contained within the

¹⁶² J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁶³ Ikkaracan, 58.

¹⁶⁴ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁶⁵ Mosse, 22.

heteronormative marital norms. He must not confuse rigid gender categories by playing with dolls at the age of 18; he must not be deviant. The formulation of deviance also has a racial component to it. For instance, Jews provided the Other for the Germans¹⁶⁶. Similarly, not so much of the race, but religion is an important agent in the nationalism process in Turkey¹⁶⁷. Islam serves as a reference point for the definition of who is a Turkish national and who is not. At this point, non-Muslim Turks' nationality becomes problematic. Tavit, the Armenian Turkish owner of the traveling theater, illustrates the point.

In its relation to representing the opposite for the project of nationalism, Tavit and his theater company, reflect on the modernist national identities. As being an Armenian Turk, a non-Muslim, he symbolizes the last crumbles of Ottoman cosmopolitanism. As Turkish nationalism uses Islam as a way to unit its subjects, Tavit's nationality becomes problematic. Thus, his theatrical space serves an important function in the form of an escape for the non-national subjects. He provides alternative spaces for the outcasts- the bohemians and the extravagant people, and also for the love of Ali and Emine, which cannot survive within the normal society. Their non-aligned arrangement can be legitimate in this non-national space. In one scene, Tavit acts as an engagement servant and symbolically weds Ali and Emine. He says to Emine, that "I hope your nubility stays permanent". This expression sharply contrasts with Ali's father's wishes about her, when he first meets her: "I hope your nubility

¹⁶⁶ Mosse, 146-7.

¹⁶⁷ Cetinsaya, 364.

comes and goes fast”¹⁶⁸. Only someone like Tavit can legitimize their marriage, and only someone like the Mayor can de-legitimize their love. However, Emine, as a borrowed bride cannot escape the destiny of being a prostitute and the stigmas associated with it.

A borrowed bride, although perceived as a prostitute, has a different status because she is an outsider within; she is a prostitute who comes to the private. She is in no way disparate from a prostitute. She provides her body and her sexuality for the maintaining of ideals of man. Her mother gets angry at Ali when he gives flowers to Emine. Iffet Hanim makes it clear that “She should not be given flowers. She should only be slept with”¹⁶⁹. Similarly, when Ali tries to ask for permission from his father to get married with Emine, his answer is straight: “What do you call a woman who sleeps with other men: a whore”¹⁷⁰. However, she is also not a prostitute because firstly she comes into the house and secondly she gets to be a borrowed bride through some form of conjugal arrangement. In that sense, she becomes to be an outsider within. That is why Ali and Emine’s arrangement is made legitimate by solemnization through Islam. Borrowed bride practice is not representative of the new modern Turkish women. Yet, its practice makes possible virile men and chaste women. Thus, they are not the face but the agents for modernization, as depicted in the film.

Emine challenges the heteronormative nature of the new national man by domesticating Ali and making him fall in love with her. Therefore, their affair threatens the nation and cannot survive in the national space. Ali and

¹⁶⁸ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁶⁹ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁷⁰ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

Emine's relationship is absolutely unacceptable as it is conceived as a free love between a bourgeois son and a pre-modern borrowed bride. Furthermore, the film shows instances for Ali's domestication. Emine domesticates Ali, therefore undermines his virility. For example, Ali helps Emine with her knitting, as she explains that a wife expects her husband to be helpful with her light chores. As the film illustrates, in its non-virility, men's domestication is contained in the borrowed bride's private space. Therefore, their free love cannot go outside and have a voice in the public. Thus, Ali and Emine's affair either need to be wiped out or shipped away. In either case, such a non-national love needs to be annihilated.

As depicted in the film Borrowed Bride, Turkish nationalism mirrors the swallowing reflex of Anatolia's Islamization in Hacivat Karagöz. Just like the Orthodoxy, women, Shamans and Turkomen are digested within an emerging Ottoman Islamist order; Turkish nationalism swallows Tavit and his space, along with Ali and Emine's affair, since they are incommensurable with the new order. Tavit's theater company, at this point, is a space of escape for the two, but nevertheless need to be sent away, along with their love. As discussed above, since Tavit is a non-Muslim, he represents what is left of Ottoman cosmopolitanism. In this vein, his nationality is problematic and thus his theatrical space is the only place where non-aligned arrangements can flourish, like Ali and Emine's affair. Nonetheless, Turkish nationalism, with its imposition of a whole universe of unitary sexual and religious identities, leaves no room for non-national relationships and spaces. At the end, as illustrated in the film, the

theater company with Ali and Emine needs to leave the city. With the nationalism's reign, the three pillars of bourgeois respectability- the ideals of man, the images of woman, and the deviants, define the ways in which nation-states contain the body. As an addition to this formulation, drawing from these three elements is the place of the family within the nation.

3-2-3 Turkish Bourgeois Morality

Bourgeoisie class dictates its morals to the rest of the nation. Mayor and his family are depicted as belonging to this group. They go pick-nicking by the river and follow European fashion. The Mayor also draws Ali's attention to the needs of the Republic. Turkish nation needs enlightened young people like Ali and Nese. He plans of sending them to Germany, where Ali can study engineering and Nese can pick up the language¹⁷¹. This attitude, again, shows the ways in which men are accommodated into more industrious tasks, whereas women are expected to have non-economic endeavors. As Weeks points out, the formation of the nation-state and its structuring of sexuality are a story that cannot be told without reference to the economical changes in Europe¹⁷². As for the Turkish nationalism, its history also coincides with heavy modernization and industrialization. The Mayor's plans of turning his textile workshop into a factory and doing so by appealing to German engineering is clear manifestation of this process¹⁷³. In other words, putting Weeks and

¹⁷¹ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

¹⁷² Weeks, 1-2.

¹⁷³ J. Onanc, & A. Yilmaz.

Foucault together, Ali's family's pre-occupation with his sexuality matches with the time of rising nationalism, modernization and industrialization.

Turkish nationalism and its pre-occupation with sexuality mirror in many ways the European model. As outlined by Mosse, bourgeoisie with their increasing restlessness as an economical class took the initiative to define sexuality with respects to men, women and the deviant, for their well-being¹⁷⁴. This in turn was adapted for the non-Western contexts like that of the Turkish nation in its early ages. In many ways, Turkish nation captures rigid definitions of the gender categories. Nation as a comradeship of men, a form of fraternity, holds true. Men's subordination of women is again a reflection of the principles of bourgeois respectability. In that sense, men reign over women in the Turkish state.

Similarly, the main function of women as the oppositional definer of men is preserved for the Turkish nationalism. Women serve as a category to create men. Their submission into the private sphere further delimits the binary and puts the two genders in appropriate spaces¹⁷⁵. Although this feature is sustained for the Turkish case, the ways in which it is manifested diverges from the European framework. Turkish women actively engage into the nation-state formation process through their upbringings of sons, just like European women. What is interesting about the former is that, they assume this agency through control of sexuality. Mothers watch over their sons' sexuality; borrowed brides are used to ensure that boys turn into men. They actively use sex for the nation-state project. Although this fact does

¹⁷⁴ Mosse, 4.

¹⁷⁵ Mosse, 97.

not emancipate them from men's oppression, they have a say about their and men's sexualities.

The other oppositional definer of men, the deviants, is also present. Men are not supposed to confuse gender categories. A womanly man can be alarming for a bourgeois family. Every subject is expected to appeal to heteronormativity. Furthermore, the deviance for the European case also has a racial component, where those belonging to a certain race group are cast into the outsider category. As for the Turkish case, religion serves this purpose. The insiders and outsiders are defined over the axis of Muslims and non-Muslims. However, non-Muslims provide spaces for alternative arrangements. Non-normative subjectivities find a place within this non-national space. Nevertheless, they are assimilated within the nationalist order.

Last but not least, bourgeois family is essential for the nation. Foucault accounts to this fact as he claims that nations started to view families as economically important and felt the need to regulate them¹⁷⁶. Through these modern families, nation-state reproduces itself.

The Turkish nation-state projected in the early Republican era captures the three main features of bourgeois respectability, the man, the woman and the deviant. In its imposition of a unitary universe, Turkish nationalism narrows the space for non-heteronormative arrangements. Thus, the theater company, as it represents the Ottoman cosmopolitanism

¹⁷⁶ M. Foucault. (1990). *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I*. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 25.

and can accommodate such love affairs, is sent away to leave the scene for a male-reigned nationalism.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

Turkish state-formation processes as they are represented in Hacivat Karagöz and Eğreti Gelin are based on the sacrifices of the national Others. In the adventures of Hacivat and Karagöz in Bursa in 1330, the rise of Islam on the Anatolian territories contains its anti-image in its rule. The old ruling religion of Greek Orthodoxy is converted into Islam, while Shamans settling in Islamic urban settings, give up of their nomadic lives. Similarly, women's role within the old rule is appropriated into the Islamic Ottoman order. The new form of male domination pervades the society. The sisterhood needs to be abolished, women must be contained in the private space in order to maintain man's Islamic rule. Similarly, minorities in the newly formed Turkish nation also sacrifice their sexuality for the new order of nation-state.

Eğreti Gelin illustrates the ways in which the new Turkish nation contains sexuality through sustaining bourgeois respectability, while at the same time annihilating non-national arrangements. Ali cannot confuse the gender categories of the new modern order. Therefore, he must retain the image of a man. Emine delivers her body to train him sexually; such that he is virile and his future wife Nese is a virgin. Men are also defined in oppositional ways via women. This binary is elaborated by their respective housing of the public and the private spheres. Thus, women work their powers out from the private in order to make sure their sons are men, not sissies. Furthermore, as men define the norm for the society, they also define the abnormal, the deviants. Since Turkish nationalism emphasizes

Islam as a unifying character for its diverse constituents, non-Muslims, like Tavit, are questioned about their nationality. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the film, his theater provides room for the non-national affairs. In this case, since Ali and Emine's affair challenges national foundations of heteronormativity, they find refuge in Tavit's company. On the other hand, Tavit and the two lovers need to be sent away and leave the city to a male dominated nationalist discourse. Just like Islam swallows the Orthodoxy, Shamans and the Turkomen in Hacivat Karagöz, non-Muslims and non-heteronormatives are digested within Turkish nationalism.

Contemporary Turkish films provide platforms to study the relationship between nationalism and sexuality. As they represent the psyche of a society, these films depict the ways in which minorities are sexually contained within the new national order. Heteronormative male rule dominates the discourse both in the imperial and national Turkey.

References

- Alter, J. S. (1994). Celibacy, Sexuality and the Transformation of Gender into Nationalism in North India. [Electronic Version] *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 53:1, 45-66.
- Altınay, A. G. (2001). Making Citizens, Making Soldiers: Military Service, Gender and National Identity in Turkey. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, United States*, 1-271.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Atay, B. (Producer), & Akay, E. (Director) (2006). *Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü?* [Motion Picture]. Istanbul: IFR AS.
- Baslangic, C. (2005, February 2). Gelin mi Eğreti kafalar mi?. [Electronic Version]. Radikal.
- Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulations. (n.d.). Retrieved January 8, 2007, from http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html/
- Bhaskaran, D. S. (1998). Media in India? Nationalized Genders and Colonized Sexualities. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, United States*, 1-215.
- Cagaptay, S. (2003). Crafting the Turkish Nation: Kemalism and Turkish Nationalism in the 1930s. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, United States*, 1-554.

- Carsillo, M. A. (2003). Missionary Positions: Unpinning Women from Under the Paradigms of Patriarchal Discourses of Nation. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine, United States*, 1-276.
- Cetinsaya, G. (1999). Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” in Modern Turkish Political Thought. [Electronic Version] *The Muslim World*, 89:3/4, 350-376.
- Cheyfitz, E. (2000). National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and Imagined Fraternity of White Men. [Electronic Version] *American Literature*, 72:1, 221-2.
- Drezgic, R. (1985). (Re)Producing the Nation: The Politics of Reproduction in Serbia in the 1980s and 1990s. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, University of Belgrade, Serbia*, 1-295.
- Foucault, M. (1990). *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
- Frederick, P. A. N. (2002). Sexing the nation: State regulation of prostitution and homosexuality in Britain and the Netherlands in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, United States*, 1-42.
- Howlett, O. (2005). Sexuality and Nationalism: The Impact of Sexual Regimes on Gay and Lesbian Belongings. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Carleton University, Canada*, 1-124.

- Ikkaracan, Pinar. (2004). Women and Sexuality in Muslim Societies. [Electronic Version] *Resources for Feminist Research*, 31:1/2, 56-62.
- Ivette, V. (1998). Men, Women and the Construction of Nationhood. [Electronic Version] *Feminist Collections*, 19:2, 4.
- Jefferies, M. (2006). 'For a Genuine and Nobel Nakedness?' German Naturism in the Third Reich. [Electronic Version] *German History*, 24:1, 62-84.
- Kadioglu, A. (1996). The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity. [Electronic Version] *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32:2, 177-192.
- Karpat, Kemal, H. (2001). The Rise of Modern Turkey. [Electronic Version] *The Journal of Military History*, 65:3, 771-775.
- Mosse, G. L. (1988). *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Onanc, J. (Producer), & Yilmaz, A. (Director) (2005). *Eğreti Gelin* [Motion Picture]. Istanbul: Yesilcam Filmcilik AS.
- Parker, A., Russo, M., Sommer, D., & Yaeger, P. (1992). *Nationalism and Sexualities*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Puri, J. (2002). Concerning Kamasutras: Challenging Narratives of History and Sexuality. [Electronic Version] *Signs*, 27:3, 603-640.

- Sayigh, R. (1998). Gender, Sexuality and Class in National Narrations: Palestinian Camp Women Tell Their Lives. [Electronic Version] *Frontiers*, 19:2, 166-185.
- Stevens, S. E. (2001). Making Female Sexuality in Republican China: Women's Bodies in the Discourses of Hygiene, Education and Literature. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, United States*, 1-239.
- Somerville, B. S. (2005). Notes Toward a Queer History of Naturalization. [Electronic Version] *American Quarterly*, 57:3, 659-676.
- Taspinar, O. (2001). Kemalist Identity in Transition: A Case Study of Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, United States*, 1-311.
- Tiregol, J. S. (1998). The Role of Primary Education in Nation-State-Building: The Case of the Early Turkish Republic (1923-1938). [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, United States*, 1-219.
- Tvordi, J. L. (2002). Deviant Bodies and the Reordering of Desire: Heterosexuality and Nation-Building in Early Modern England. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Arizona, United States*, 1-282.
- Weeks, J. (1977). *Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to Present*. London: Quartet Books.

Wray, B. J. (2000). *Imagining Citizenship: Nationalism and Sexuality in English Canadian Lesbian Texts*. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, University of Calgary, Canada*, 1-257.

Yom, S. S. (2003). *Sex and the American Soldier: Military Cinema and the War on Venereal Diseases, 1918-1969*. [Electronic Version] *Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, United States*, 1-187.