

**THE SENSE OF BELONGING OF JEWS IN TURKEY: AFFECTS AND  
ENCOUNTERS**

**by**

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THE SENSE OF BELONGING OF JEWS IN TURKEY: AFFECTS AND ENCOUNTERS  
TÜRKİYE YAHUDİLERİNİN AİDİYET HİSSİYATI: DUYGULANIMLAR VE KARŞILAŞMALAR

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- 1) JEWS IN TURKEY
- 2) MINORITY STATUS
- 3) SENSE OF BELONGING
- 4) SILENCE
- 5) MIGRATION

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE SENSE OF BELONGING OF JEWS IN TURKEY: AFFECTS AND ENCOUNTERS**

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**Thesis Advisor: Prof. Meyda YEĞENOĞLU**

**Keywords:** Sense of Belonging, Affect, Feeling Minority, Turkish Jews, Silence, Migration

This thesis aims to analyze sense of belonging of Jews in Turkey via affective theory and daily encounters. Within the light of the in-depth interviews I conducted, my respondents prefer to define themselves as both Turkish and Jewish. I will try to explain how this image of being both Turkish and Jewish is frequently challenged within the context of daily encounters with both state and general public and how they're being constantly reminded of being a minority and how they're not "really" Turkish or a "full" citizen. Within this context, I will focus emotional descriptions of being a minority rather than legal or political descriptions of it through an affective understanding. I will investigate how feeling minority haunts people as a ghost and how it impacts them. Although feeling of minority could emerge as a consequence of encounters of different nature, it is possible to observe similar consequential affects such as insecurity, alertness, discomfort, uneasiness and being uncomfortable. Thus, the question "Against all negative feelings, what still keeps them here?" becomes imminent to search answers for. While I am investigating the multilayered and dynamic nature of respondents' belongings, I will also try to understand the strategies and processes such as silence and migration they create to cope with the negative feelings.

## ÖZET

# TÜRKİYE'DEKİ YAHUDİLERİN AİDİYET HİSSİYATI: DUYGULANIMLAR VE KARŞILAŞMALAR

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**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Aidiyet Hissiyatı, Duygulanım, Azınlık Hissetmek, Türkiye Yahudileri, Sessizlik, Göç

Bu tez Türkiye'deki Yahudilerin aidiyet hissiyatlarını, gündelik hayattaki duygulanımları ve karşılaşmaları bağlamında analiz etmeyi amaçlıyor. Yaptığım derinlemesine mülakatlar sonucunda, kendilerini hem Türk hem de Yahudi olarak tanımlayan görüşmecilerin kafalarındaki bu tahayyülün, gerek devletle gerekse insanlarla olan günlük karşılaşmalar bağlamında nasıl sınındığından ve onlara azınlık olduklarının, tam olarak Türk veya vatandaş olmadıklarının nasıl hatırlatıldığından bahsedeceğim. Bu bağlamda hukuki ve siyasi azınlık tanımlarından ziyade bir hissiyat olarak “azınlık olma”yı hem karşılaşmalar hem de duygulanımlar üzerinden analiz edeceğim. Azınlık hissiyatının insanları nasıl bir hayalet gibi takip ettiğini ve onların üzerinde bıraktığı tesirleri inceleyeceğim. Bu hayaletle karşılaşmalar her ne kadar farklılaşıyorsa da azınlık hissiyatıyla ilgili rahatsız, huzursuz, tedirgin, tetikte, güvensiz gibi bazı benzer duygulanımların paylaşıldığı görülebilir. Dolayısıyla tezimde “olumsuz hislere rağmen, insanları burada tutan nedir?” sorusunun cevabını arayacağım. Görüşmecilerin aidiyetlerinin çok katmanlı ve dinamik yapısını araştırırken olumsuz hislerle, sessizlik ve göç gibi baş etme süreçlerini ve ürettikleri stratejilere de bakacağım.

*11 yıl önce böyle bir çalışma yapacağıma inanan ve çocukluğumda sağladığı  
duygusal ve entelektüel paylaşımlarla bunda önemli katkısı olan  
Annem Rejin Kan Eskenazi'nin anısına...*

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## INTRODUCTION

A few months before I applied to Cultural Studies Graduate Program, I was sitting in a Cafe in a mall in Istanbul reading an article on the Turkish Jews of Istanbul in a book edited by Deniz Göktürk, Levent Soysal and İpek Türkeli. The article was concerned with, briefly, tolerance as governmentality utilized by the incumbents and Jewish community's preference to render them invisible in the public scene. Rather than the arguments, what hit me was the idea lit in my head after reading the article: a question on Turkish Jews as a study proposal for graduate studies. It was rather a bizarre experience for me. An issue which I spent years contemplating on, experienced directly or obliquely, that is indeed a part of my life; was becoming an academic subject. Surely, in time I adopted a semi-academic point of view via what I learnt from social history and theory lectures; but becoming an academic subject to be studied was an odd thought.

Although I read multiple books and articles on the issue and constantly followed closely daily news for related events, I realized I had limited resources to begin with. Most of the resources I had historical orientation. But then I realized I had one other venue which I gathered vast data from; my memories, lots of snapshots and feelings that lingered. But as far away from deciding on the topic; I was only moved by those lingering repercussions and trying to allocate those feelings to what could be the start of a construction of my thesis.

I decided to upload all the unsystematic wandering thoughts in my head and began typing. As I continued more memories came to light, the more I typed, the more I remembered. It was interesting to realize that so many memories were left idle. One of those is the anxious moment when I was waiting to see the reaction of the staff member at a copy center, while I handed over my identification card to get its copies. Another striking one is what I felt when we were leaving a synagogue. Even a person with a slight knowledge on synagogues would know how strict the security at synagogues. But what took over me is the feeling that rushed over when we were stepping outside of the synagogue (particularly Neve Shalom, the one in Galata) in to the street; the hastiness that surrounds us whilst trying to leave as soon as possible. I recalled my effort to avoid eye contact with the people around, so I typed it all.

Contemplating on my memories and feelings, unearthed a few unfortunate stereotypes about Jews of which I mostly run into in my undergraduate years. Now, looking back, I can easily argue that those were mediocre statements at best; but in my undergraduate years I was utterly shocked by those statements. One of them was the implication of one my peers that I was *neutral* to the Jewish community, when he looked through a short paper I wrote on modernity and picked up the word Jewish which was mentioned once in the paper. His ironic tone clearly stated that he was not and being neutral would be odd. One girl I met at school, one week later than she found out that I am a Jew, told me that I look nothing like one (Jewish person). Apparently, according to her, there *is* a certain kind of properties of being Jew, be it physical or otherwise, I wouldn't know, she wouldn't tell.

I came across a variety of stereotypes that I thought I could use in the proposal I was working on. Coming across multiple times with such stereotypes have an impact, though I did not fully grasp the meaning of the word, they had *affects* on me.

For the Jewish community in Istanbul, an initial observation was that they shared some similar consumption practices. They prefer to be regulars at the same cafes and restaurants, or in general they seem to be sharing similar patterns of behaviors when it came to leisure activities. In relation to that, surely, the fact they roughly have similar financial status and live in similar neighborhoods. Habitus as a concept offered by Pierre Bourdieu, clearly assisted me to form a systematic understanding of all these observations. Focusing further to my personal experience supported my deductions about the community at large. For instance, I was raised in a household where politics was not a day-to-day subject of discussion. In addition to politics, issues regarding the state of Jews were also the subject I was estranged to. I was rarely exposed to such discussions. The rarity of exposure to everyday politics and issues regarding Jewish population, as far as my observations went, was a shared phenomenon for many Jewish families. I recall my friends' families keeping their distance from political discussions.

Being raised in such a culture, it was unlikely that I kept all those memories stuck in somewhere in me. Apparently, I held onto them until they all came to the surface one by one when I started to contemplate on possible proposal topics. I wondered how and why those memories got stuck, or even more interestingly, how and why I held onto them, kept them until it was time for recollection and no even sharing

them with anyone all those years. Thus, the accumulation of what I experienced personally, what I read, what I observed gradually started to look a cohesive bulk of writings, a consisted body of academic work; my thesis.

It was challenging to unearth the topic of my thesis; it took circa one year. The starting point was the community. I began reading on the question: What is community? Shortly after, I knew that it was not the question I had in mind, it was not what troubled me, not the voice of my intent at heart. True, I wanted to work on Turkish Jews but I wanted a topic that would comfort me.

I have spent a considerable amount of time in researching on affect theory, reading theoretical discussions on affect and valuable works depending on it. With all that I have read and also written on affect, I started to see a different image of a story I knew by heart. The story was both sorrowful and striking since it illustrated the desperation of belonging in Turkey. Right then and there, I decided that my thesis would be on the senses of belonging of Turkish Jews. But what I still had to figure out was the ethnographic tools I was going to utilize. Affect, for sure, was going to be a vital pillar of its structure.

As I was trying to figure out methodological tools I could utilize and was deeply concerned with my academic studies; something happened that cut through all my daily endeavors as a student of cultural anthropology and forced on me a brand new realization that surprisingly assisted to shape philosophical context of the thesis. Gezi Park Events erupted. One afternoon, I was walking down from Valikonağı to Harbiye, a stream of consciousness took over me. I looked at the masses moving towards Taksim in harmony, like the ants I used to admire as I was kid. I distinctly remember the first slogan I chanted from the top of my lungs as I joined the activists. As a kid of a petty bourgeois Jewish family, it was a first for me. It felt different. The following evening was the Saturday evening in which police left the Park and Taksim Square. Enthusiastically, I got to the Haciosman metro station to get to Taksim; but it was not going further from Mecidiyeköy in order to slow down the speedy flow of masses to Taksim. I started walking with an imminent and endless energy. I was not bothered by the distance or the weary of the walk.

I came across the streets where Hrant Dink was assassinated in Rumeli Street. The place he lost his life was surrounded with flowers and candles and a sentence was

written: “*YOU ARE NOT A MINORITY TODAY*”. After 2 km walk, another sentence next to French Consulate in Taksim Square welcomed me: *I AM JEWISH, I CAN DIE FOR A TREE OF MY COUNTRY*. I remembered this was a poster in 3-4 meters length.

A few days later, I learnt all my Jewish friends participated to demonstrations. Even those who did not participate were in excitement. What happened to the bodies of these people, who have not ever participated in any protest decided to act, and to stand out? Their fear seemed to be diminished and they were happy. They were feeling happy to be with people in demonstration. What I felt during Gezi events and what the people from this community felt during this period contributed to think about the concept of affect and belonging.

Until now, I have shared the process about how I constructed the framework of this thesis. However, I needed to find ethnographical data to understand the belonging of Jewish people in Turkey. My perception, perspective and also my feelings have enormously changed thanks to the ethnographic work in the one and a half year. I went to every interview with great excitement wondering what I would experience and learn. When I sometimes felt that I was losing this excitement, I was immediately arranging a new appointment for the interview. This always reminded me what this thesis is about and this renewed my motivation. As I learned new information, I started to think about my own transformation with these interviews.

As the questions and the responses to them were coming one to another, I tried to observe the bodies of people. I observed the indifference of people, except two people, towards my topic for this thesis. Especially my close friends helped me a lot to find people for interviews. However, I could not share the information and my arguments with them although I made several attempts. This fed the sense of loneliness in me. I do not even know who is going to be interested in this from the community if I want to share. I do not know who I would share with. Surely, intellectual sharing would be a smaller part of my wish for sharing. This indifference produced worry and fear. I thought even if I prepared well and detailed academic paper/work, it may not touch to them.

As I am now finished with this research, I have another worry or may be a fear recently. As I observe from my environment and as the data says in this research, many people are migrating, planning to migrate or migration becomes an option at least,

especially for young population. This makes me necessarily think if the community becomes smaller and smaller 25 years later. For recent 3-4 years, many people I know have migrated as if they never come back. It is hard and sad for me to describe my feelings about migration of my friends and people I know. I can share that I would prefer to make sure I keep in touch and living with them in the same city/country as we did 7-8 years ago. Unfortunately, I am seriously worried about that. Thus, in addition to my academic desires, my personal fears and concerns, too, led me to a study of belonging that I care for so deeply; both as a scholar candidate and as a Turkish Jewish citizen.

This article would be successful if it presents a detailed and comprehensive analysis on the issue of belonging of Jews in Turkey. I hope this analysis on the belonging of Turkish Jews would help to think about encounters and getting in touch. I have an ethical interference that the encounters among people and getting in touch with people could be so important and they also could have a role to shape the sense, feeling of belonging.

### **Main Questions of the Thesis**

The main question that I had in mind throughout the thesis was to what extent do Turkish Jews feel they belong to Turkey and through which mediums do they communicate their senses of belonging. To put it in detail, I was concerned with their accounts of daily fluctuations (if there's any) on their senses of belonging. Thus, the respondents' feelings, bodily movements and the way they change both physically and emotionally during the interviews as we move from question to question, are the backbone of my analysis. They led me to concepts such as feeling minority (*azınlık hissetmek*) and bubble, which are two of the pillars of argumentation in affective analysis of belonging. Concept of bubble is crucial for the subject matter; since whereas feeling minority provides negative responses as to the reflections of being left out, or feeling as the other; Bubble, for change, provides the answer to a very critical question: *Although they experience all the negativity they described throughout their interviews, why do these people still choose to stay? What keeps them here?*

In addition, cultivated strategies of silence and migration, as traditionally adopted historical methods of aversion are intrinsic part of Jewish sense of belonging. They are somehow practiced by each of us, at some level, in our daily lives; but as

systematic revenues of senses of belonging, I could only have the opportunity to perceive them so vividly from the perspective of the main question. They are, of course, strategies complementary to Bubble, which will be described in detail below in correlating chapters.

### **Within This Framework...**

This thesis is at the intersection of multiple disciplines such as minority studies, affect theory, cultural anthropology and sociology. Scholars of these disciplines may derive valuable arguments regarding Jewish community in Turkey, their senses of belonging and its affective reading. There was a niche in anthropology literature regarding belonging studies focused on Jewish community in Turkey and I hope that this study will fill that gap with its unique perspective via affect theory.

Surely, the valuable works by Ayhan Aktar, Rıfat N. Bali and Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue provide very comprehensive information on the development and gradual transformation of minorities (millets) in late Ottoman and early Republican Era. Particularly, Benbassa and Rodrigue book, *Türkiye ve Balkan Yahudileri Tarihi (14. – 20. Yüzyıllar)* is a crucial book that provides a comprehensive historical data on the Jewish communities of this region throughout the last century. They show how the Sephardic society transformed itself, its traditions, and language and belief system under the influence of major modernization movements. Thus, most data regarding the migration history, transformation of the use of Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) and the general evolution of economic balance between different millets and how Jews stance changed accordingly were benefited from Benbassa & Rodrigue book.

For the early Republican Era history of Jewish community, works of Rıfat Bali and Ayhan Aktar were utilized. As a scholar who produced inestimable works on state-minority relations in Turkey, Aktar's book<sup>1</sup> provided me information on imminent historical turning points experienced in the last century. Particular benefit of the Bali's books<sup>2</sup> provide detailed accounts of what happened during the establishment of the

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<sup>1</sup> Aktar, A. (2010). *Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları; Aktar, A. (2008). Türkiye'de Gayrimüslimler: "Kağıt Üzerinde" Vatandaşlar! in Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi.

<sup>2</sup> Bali, R. N. (2013) *The Silent Minority in Turkey: Turkish Jews*. İstanbul: Libra; Bali, R. N. (2009) *Devletin Örnek Yurttaşları*. İstanbul: Kitabevi; Bali, R. N. (2003) *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri – Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü: 1946-1949*. İstanbul: İletişim; Bali, R. N. (2010) *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri – Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Republic up until the bombings of the synagogues in 2003. Since there's limited academic resource on Jewish community focuses after 1970s, if not none; to be able to have such a source, helped me tremendously. Even though the works of Şule Toktaş<sup>3</sup> includes more, I utilized information on migration of Turkish-Jewish which is certainly a vital part of the Jewish identity.

Additionally, Bali's arguments on the transformation of the Jewish community after the major migration waves to Israel, in addition to the arguments of Kastoryano<sup>4</sup> and Neyzi<sup>5</sup> assisted me greatly to construct my arguments as to their shifting senses of belonging which will be discussed in detail below. Their accounts on transformation of the Jewish community within the city lay the foundations for the context of my arguments on bubble.

But even before the argumentation on transformation on the city, the historical accounts of Çağlar Keyder<sup>6</sup> and Kemal Karpat<sup>7</sup> regarding the Republican Era set the ground for an ill-conceived public space and thus emergence of a state-embedded middle class rather than a westernized model. The image of Turkish middle-classes they portray that are state-embedded and Muslim; helps the reader, from the start, to easily perceive why Jewish community was not able to belong to the "general public" of modern Turkish Republic and the consequent gradual switch to more authoritarian state with non-Muslims left aside as the "other". Marcy Brink-Danan<sup>8</sup> focuses on

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<sup>3</sup> Toktaş, Ş. (2005). Citizenship and Minorities: A Historical Overview of Turkey's Jewish Minority. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 18, pp. 395-429.

Toktaş, Ş. (2006). Perceptions of Anti-Semitism among Turkish Jews. *Turkish Studies*, 7 (2), pp. 203-223.

Toktaş, Ş. (2006). Turkey's Jews and Their Immigration to Israel. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42 (3), pp. 505-519.

<sup>4</sup> Kastoryano, R. From Millet to Community: Jews of Istanbul. in Rodrigue, A. (eds.). *Ottoman and Turkish Jewry: Community and Leadership* (pp. 253-277). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

<sup>5</sup> Neyzi, L. (2004). "Ben Kimim?" *Türkiye'de Sözlü Tarih, Kimlik ve Öznellik*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Neyzi, L. (2009). Eski İstanbul'un Şehir Kültürünü Hatırlamak: Yaşanmışlıklar, Bellek ve Nostalji. In M. Güvenç (Ed.), *Eski İstanbullular ve Yeni İstanbullular* (pp. 78-83). İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi.

Neyzi, L. (2005). Strong as Steel, Fragile as a Rose: A Turkish Jewish Witness to the Twentieth Century. *Jewish Social Studies* (pp.167-189). Gül, D. & Kutluata Z. (2010) Türkiye'de Yahudilik ve Sabetaycılık: Leyla Neyzi ile Söyleşi. *Kültür ve Siyasette Feminist Yaklaşımlar* (pp. 109 – 119)

<sup>6</sup> Keyder, Ç. (2003). *Memalik-i Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Keyder, Ç. (2009). *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

<sup>7</sup> Karpat, K. (2009). *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

<sup>8</sup> Brink-Danan, M. (2011). Avrupalı Sayılmak: Yahudiler ve İstanbul'da Var Olma Politikası. In D. Göktürk, L. Soysal, & İ. Türeli (Eds.), *İstanbul Nereye? Küresel Kent, Kültür, Avrupa* (pp. 360-380). İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. Brink-Danan, M. (2012). *Jewish Life in Twenty-First-Century Turkey: The Other Side of Tolerance*. Indiana University Press.

contemporary era, observing daily lives and practices of the community. While she focuses on tolerance discourse, she also provides valuable insight on the relationship between state and minority status. Without their description, my arguments on the specter of minority status as constant alertness of Jewish community could have been left ungrounded.

One may notice the lack of any reference or mention to Holocaust either in historical background or in the ethnographic analysis. First and foremost this thesis is guided primarily with what I have been told by the respondents. And it should be duly noted that no one mentioned Holocaust. Surely, the lack of any questions referring to Holocaust may be a factor, but it is pressingly obvious that people tend to mention more than what they've been asked. Thus, if it was an integral part of their sense of belonging as to their knowledge, or if they were willing to share it with me, they would have mentioned it just like other points they raised. One other reason why the mention of Holocaust was missing in the interviews could be because people tend to avoid talks of historical traumatic events, even about Capital Levy, events of 6-7 September, which was experienced by their older relatives. Also, as a point I argue within the thesis, these people have no virtual grand narratives that is circulated throughout the community. These two points considered together, may provide enough reason why Holocaust was not mentioned.

However, if one is interested on the impact of Holocaust on Turkish Jews, the recent book of Corry Guttsadt, *Turkey, The Jews and the Holocaust*, (2013), is a first of its kind in the literature that fills the gap. It is concerned with the policies adopted by the state of Turkish Republic towards Jews living in Turkey, as well as Turkish Jews living abroad providing us a unique outlook on the stance of Turkey as a supposedly neutral country to the war.

Under the light of above mentioned works, this thesis would provide a unique anthropological view to Jewish community and how their senses of belonging changes. As a study of belonging, it already is a distinctive thesis with an affective theoretical view which makes this thesis one of a kind. Consequently, I strongly believe, it would assist future scholars of anthropology with the intent to study belonging or affect theory.



## **Methodology**

I believe the questions that designed theoretical framework of this thesis, would best be contemplated on via an ethnographic methodology with in-depth interviews focusing on not only the verbal reactions but also the bodily responses of respondents. I considered the interviews to be informative in a holistic manner. That is why ethnography is the most useful methodological tool for the study at hand.

One other reason for an ethnographic method was the scope of my study. Rather than a macro- historical inquiry with statistical data concerned with relatively extensive political institutions and phenomena, I am focusing on micro-cosmos of a small community and sociological aspects of their everyday life patterns as a human and as a citizen. Being concerned with minute details of an ordinary person's daily life, as I believe could best be met with in-depth interviews with that person since those minute details that I cherish the most, and very fragile bodily movements of split seconds, could not possibly be accounted for any other data gathering method. For me, as a student of cultural anthropology, rather than grandiose data of a nation, extended hours of conversations with a few dozen of people are succinct for the purpose of this thesis.

In total, I got into contact with 32 people and conducted in-depth interviews. To the best of my efforts, I tried to maintain a somewhat balance across age, gender and financial status. There are two age groups that respondents are mostly pooled in; the intervals between 25- 35 (13 people) and 55-65 (12 people). Aside from those two pools, two of the respondents are over 80 years, and three of them are below 25. The remaining 2 are between 35-55 intervals. As for the gender, 18 of my respondents are women and 14 of them are men.

7 respondents reside in Israel, migrated sometime in their lives from Turkey. The reason I conducted interviews in Israel was to get the accounts on the dynamics of belonging of those who migrated. At the beginning I was not totally sure whether or not I was going to use those interview in the thesis; but as will be seen in the referring chapters the data I gathered from those interviews mostly compatible with points raised in belonging chapter as well as the chapter on specter of minority, bubble and the chapter on silence.

The rest of the respondents live in Istanbul. 2 out of 7 of the people who migrated to Israel, spend some part of the year in Turkey every year, in Bodrum, as a constant summer vacation. I conducted the interviews in Istanbul, Turkey and Tel Aviv, Israel. I met respondents in public spaces such as malls, offices, coffee houses, at synagogue and also at residences of my respondents as well as mine with a few. Neighborhoods vary across Şişli, Sarıyer, Beşiktaş and Kadıköy. As for the interviews I conducted in Israel I met them at similar locations with addition to university premises, the building of a foundation (*Türkiyeliler Derneği*). Since the scope of the study is limited to Istanbul, I didn't get in touch with residences of Izmir, Hatay, Bursa or elsewhere. However, I do have a limited scoop of those cities via people who migrated to Israel or to Istanbul from Izmir, Gaziantep and Hatay.

Third factor that I tried to control for was the financial status of the respondents. Most of them are of upper and middle-class families who mainly live in urban city center, which is certainly not out of the ordinary. If one takes a closer look at the community in question, it would be clear that the community itself is mainly made up by families of business owners, high rank white-collar managers, in private sector. One other important similarity is that they are all predominantly secular. Even an interview of a rabbi, could be counted as the interview of one of the most secular respondents, that is how remarkably secular they all are. Turkish as the mother tongue, again was a commonality for all the respondents. Ladino was nowhere near the interviews except for an 88 year old lady who speaks Turkish with an accent whose daughter helped translate. In relation to this non-existence of Ladino during interviews, I could share that an ethnographer with zero familiarity with Ladino could be perfectly comfortable holding a similar study with Jewish community.

I used all of my personal ties to reach out as far as I could in the community. Acquaintances of my family members, my friends and not-so close family members assisted me with this quest. After a few interviews, I also asked my respondents whether or not they had someone in mind that they can refer me to as a prospective respondent. Being a member of this community certainly helped me to get in touch with my respondents very much easily than a non-member scholar could have. People expressed explicitly or implied that the reason they are being outspoken and feel comfortable to talk freely, is because I reached to them via someone they trust. So the chain of trust is

utmost importance here; simply because they subject matter of the thesis focuses on feelings that they are accustomed to hide.

Since I am also the member of the community, I am familiar with the concepts they use to elaborate their stance. I could relate to what they are trying to tell me with so little words and so many feelings. I am confident with the context, as I am, too, a subject to and an object in it. I did not begin with the assumptions but with personal experiences and looked for similarities and differences. When a respondent suddenly stops and takes a sigh mentioning one of her memories from childhood where she was heartbroken not being invited to her best friend's birthday party just because she's Jewish; or prefers to move to much silent speaking volume while talking about Gaza attacks in a public coffee house, I do understand what he/she is doing, and why because most if not all of the time, I do feel the same way as my respondents do.

A possible down side of being a member of the population of my study, could be argued as having blind spots for potential noteworthy phenomena which have been a norm, a casual occurrences in my life. I could be inured to certain feelings and practices that would be accounted as symptomatic by a non-member scholar. To the best of my abilities, I tried to prevent that by going over and over the interviews repetitively, at different times. I also, urged myself to take step out of my Jewish identity, and contemplate on the subject matter as an outsider as well. Thus, I believe, being a member both served me invaluable benefits as an ethnographer combined with my efforts to zoom out and try to perceive it whole, as an outsider.

As mentioned briefly above, I paid close attention to both verbal and emotional responses of the respondents. More specifically, certain words, repetitions of those words, awkward silences and gaps in conversations as well as sudden changes of tone, the way they use their gestures and the changes of their behavior as they move to topic to topic are what I considered to be informative. They, too, have been through a journey throughout the interviews along with me. Their general composition changed multiple times as we move from one topic to another.

An integral contribution of in-depth interviews to the thesis is the ability to trace every single change across those journeys both respondents and I go through. In order to provide a flexible environment for the respondent to move, I constructed the interviews with semi-structured questionnaires rather than pre-determined set of rigid questions to

follow. As most anthropologists, I definitely had certain questions in mind but didn't limit my sight to those and focused on minute details. I was open to being led by the respondents. From what my respondents told me, my questions changed, my pre-set answers evolved. Thus I avoided those pre-set questions to turn into prejudices.

Through in-depth interviews it was possible for me grasp those journeys. It is a method that forces ethnographer to question himself, again and again, and gather vital information that would be unavailable via a quantitative study or a statistical data. Most of the arguments raised and conclusions reached in this thesis, are direct results of in-depth interviews and those minute details captured in them.

It lasted around 1 year to be done with all the interviews. Thus, I interviewed people at different domestic and international contexts that led to being under the dominance of different moods, resulting in production of comparative information. For instance, the interviews conducted during Gaza attacks are remarkably different from those conducted at a different time; or the ones concentrated during Gezi events refer to feelings much different from those referred to in interviews conducted in 2015. Differentiating political contexts caused differentiating claims.

Being a member of the Jewish community, being a Turkish citizen, being a human; I, too, was transformed. I, too evolved into someone different. The interviews changed me as a person and as a student of anthropology. Since interviewing has been process-lead duration; the content of the interviews, the impact they had on me and processing of the "new" information gathered reshaped my thoughts as well. Indisputably, as I changed, as contexts changed; interviews changed. What remained from the interviews transformed my perceptions, the way I interpret data and ultimately my feelings.

Transformation of my perceptions and the way I contemplate has been the result of multiple factors. International context is one of the very effective ones, since I get affected by my respondents as a transmitted impact. For instance, during the Gaza attacks in summer of 2014, the astonishment and horror felt by the respondents became so vividly observable in interviews. The intensity of those affects were so high, I could easily see the difference between the dominant feelings in interviews conducted during that summer and after October 2014 when mostly attacks were blown over. Some sort of solidarity was born out of the shared feelings of fear, anxiety, sorrow and despair,

and it caressed every imaginary inch of that affective space created. That space is predominantly made out of the above mentioned affects that sometimes may even overwhelm you, as it did to some respondents. Thus, once again I could see the impact of affect on people and their ability to contemplate outside the given framework. I, too, being exposed to that space, got to experience those affects, since respondents transmitted them to me through words, demeanor and their mood. That sorrowful space got blown over by the time it was inter of 2014. The overarching feelings of despair and fear were retracted back from the surface; leaving the surface to temporary affects of daily challenges.

Another factor that shook the very ground I walk on. Respondents' strong belief towards migrating elsewhere being an individual choice rather than a characteristic of the community with strong historical roots; startled me beyond what I could expect. Each of them really put great effort in their interviews to make it obvious to me how people choosing to leave Turkey represent individual cases and cannot be taken into account as a community wide phenomenon. Migration has been a 100 years old pattern at fluctuating rates throughout the history of the Republic but somehow respondents either refused to talk of the issue not to cause any displeasing feelings or considered it as a mere individual choice like any other and moved on.

As I continued to transcribe interviews, I noticed repetition of certain words within most interviews. Words like, *other, fear, anxiety, despair, comfort, uncomfortable and uneasiness* kept showing up multiple times as if they are constantly reminding me the affective context of belonging. It was startling at first to see how texts started to light up like fireworks at the end of highlighting all these words. Then I realized the concentration of certain affects and tried to re-read and listen every respondent with that realization of mind.

One other instance that changed the way I used to think about the community is their perceptions on identities of Jewishness and Turkishness. I certainly didn't expect what they told me, how they perceived these two identities and the way they live them in their daily lives. I will get in detail on how exactly they formulate these two identities in In Chapter III but as for the way it had impact on me, I should note that it helped me to find out about something that I had no idea before these interviews. Since identity formulations and to what extent people see them Jewish and/or Turkish was a subject

nowhere to be found within the community, almost as if it is purposefully omitted from conversations; never before I was able to formulate an even prejudiced assumption on the issue. Thus, I was lucky enough to learn something that otherwise I could not possibly have.

One last factor that had an impact on me during the time it took to write this thesis was the concern I felt when my efforts to explain my thesis fell short to excite others. During a couple of years I've been working on, I had long casual conversations with friends, family members, acquaintances about the subject of my thesis. Their lack of interest to the issue and reluctance to ask further on my efforts caused anxiety that people would not be interested on what is so deeply exciting to me, on a subject I care so deeply. I fell into a mild desperate mode as a repercussion but still accomplished to foster the excitement for the subject and thirst to find out what will come out.

### **Structure of the Thesis**

This thesis is about the sense of belonging of the Jewish community residing in Istanbul. Main purpose of the study is to analyze their senses of belonging not only to the land but also to the city, to the community, or to whatever they prefer to answer when asked about where they belong. This study analyzes a number of critical questions. To what extent do they feel Turkish and/or Jewish and are these mutually exclusive or inclusive concepts? What sorts of affects is in play when my interviewees define their "home" as an ideal space and when they contemplate on the actual home they are experiencing? Alertness, restlessness, and insecurity, which are the most common feelings lingering around throughout the interviews, have an impact on respondents' feelings of self, community and home. *What makes them still stay despite all the negative affects?* Moreover, I encounter silence as affect frequently from my respondents. What feeds this lack? What lies beneath their silence?

As the last important question of this thesis, I tried to understand why migration as an ever-existing theme has taken new forms and increasing proportions inside the Jewish community and how it has become a realistic option for a high proportion of the community.

I will start with explaining briefly the theoretical perspectives that will be used in this thesis, such as different views on belonging, and affect theory focusing on being

a minority. First, I will pose a theoretical literature review of the main discussions on belonging and through which mediums it is constructed and/or transformed. I will introduce the multidimensionality of belonging through considering belonging as a personal construction (May, 2011) as well as belonging as a sentiment (Fenster, 2007). Additionally, belonging cannot be thought or analyzed without its relationality with other concepts like home, space and identity (Yuval-Davis, 2011). This relationality broadens the framework towards an understanding of belonging as constructed with social structures, ties and surroundings. The second part of this chapter reviews theoretical discussions on ‘affect theory’. Here, I have chosen a specific path to walk on the theory as the affect theory covers a huge literature ranging from Philosophy to Neuroscience and from Psychoanalysis to Anthropology. My arguments and my ethnographic data mainly deploy anthropological perspectives on the affect theory and gravitate around certain figures of the field such as Sara Ahmed, Patricia Clough, Lawrence Grossberg, Michel Hardt and Gilles Deleuze.

Chapter II is a review of the literature on the history of the Jewish population in Turkey beginning from the last quarter of the 19th century. Initially Jews were perceived as the “exemplary minority group” whose relations with the state elites were unproblematic. Most of the Jewish community members supported Kemalist policies as they considered these policies a step towards egalitarian and modern Turkey. However, the founders of the new state considered the minority organizations as “potentially separationists” or as “potential threats”. Particularly, the Jewish community later came to be perceived as an obstacle for nationalization of economic enterprises and the reconstruction, of the society as a unitary nation.

Incidents and state-led policies like Thrace Pogrom, Capital Levy, violent riots of 6-7 September 1955 clearly illustrate the anti-Semitic and anti-minority tendencies throughout the first decades of the Republic that later led to mass migrations out of the country partly also because of the establishment of the state of Israel. Between the 1940s and 1970s, the anti-Semitic, anti-Jewish/anti-Dönme discourse has been a popular subject in nationalist and religious/conservative political literature. Especially the years during the Cyprus conflict, witnessed rising popular enmity against non-Muslim minorities. As a reaction to the increasing nationalist discourse from 1950s to the 1970s, a growing anti-communist discourse occurs as well. Anti-communist movement quickly became entangled with the enmity against non-Muslims.

The last decade of the twentieth century, Turkish state started to develop a tolerance discourse towards Jews in Turkey, in order to better the country's prestige during the process of integration to the European Union. From the perspective of the Jewish community, in the past 14 years, there has been many incidents that affected their subjectivities and senses of belonging. The synagogue attacks of 2003, the Gaza attacks of Israel in 2008 and the consequent Davos meeting in which PM Erdoğan and Peres had a very aggravated discussion, the 2010 assault of Israeli forces to Mavi Marmara, and the recent 2014 Israeli attack on Gaza and civilian deaths caused by Israeli bombings are all incidents which had an impact on Turkish Jews.

In Chapter III, with the ethnographic analysis, the experience of belonging and the relationship between the identities of Turkishness and Jewishness will be discussed.

In these interviews, I will try to trace the sense of belonging of my informants. The people I have interviewed perceive belonging as a category based on the intersection of two identities of Turkishness and Jewishness. Because belonging is a multifaceted experience involving territory, habitus, culture and space; specific definitions of these identities were asked from the informants. This chapter mainly discusses how these categories are built and how they relate to the sense of belonging.

By keeping in mind the different theoretical approaches to belonging, I will discuss the sense of belonging among the respondents. The interviews revealed a high level of commitment to Turkishness and Jewishness at the same time. Thus, it is understood that these categories are not mutually exclusive but rather they are largely accepted as complementary elements of their community. Most of them have nearly no issues of being Turkish or feeling as one since it is certain that they contemplated on what it is to be a Turk and how one would be considered as a Turk. However, their perceptions of themselves as Jews are individualistic and private, with the exception of a few similar circulating feelings and responses to those encounters. Thus, it is plausible to argue for an existence of a wandering feeling of being minority. What is critical though is not to overlook the details of this feeling.

One significant theme in the interviews is the acceptance of the commensurability and 'peaceful' coexistence of these two identities. Yet, still, the affectionate ruptures for the Jews, that they were not let to see themselves 'proper' Turks, spring out as an astonishing fact, which can be interpreted as a deeply rooted



'knowledge'. This information is somehow 'hidden' or 'not at the surface' and the antagonistic and contradicting experience of having these two identities at the same time has revealed itself in various ways throughout the interviews. This chapter mainly concentrates on these contradictions and incommensurability, where these ruptures especially occur in everyday life and how this antagonism is perceived and felt by the Turkish Jew subject. Throughout this chapter, as I elaborate on the uneasy relationship between being Turk and a Jew at the same time, it is also pointed out that the sense of belonging is created in and through the social relations, practices and encounters. To be more specific, everyday encounters between the Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of Turkey are formative in Jews' sentiments of belonging in Turkey.

Respondents' senses of belonging go in line with the view that belonging is fluid; it cannot be fixed to a definite explanation. Certain respondents preferred to adopt a rather official narrative whose main argument is that their Turkishness is granted by their citizenship status and secured by law; while Jewishness is their religion. Although there is mutually inclusive existence of identities and such a coherent conceptualization of Jewishness, there is no such common narrative on the definition of Turkishness shared by the respondents. One other approach to a conceptualization of feeling Turkish was via a spatial understanding of belonging. They prefer to identify themselves with the neighborhood, the city, or the land. What changes though is the way they conceptualize these spatialities. For those who say that they're Turkish since they were born on this land, the word "land", again, means different things. For some, it is simply the territory, the geography; for others it's the space where their ancestors lived and passed, where they raised their families. Again, a familiarity component of spatial belonging is visible in the interviews. Familiarity creates a secure environment, a *fanus* for that matter, for the respondents to peacefully exist, which is demarcated and also limits the possibilities of being discriminated. Such an approach suggests that respondents primarily look for security, for bubbles where there is limited or no discrimination possibility when trying to construct a sense of belonging.

Another component of belonging, language as a medium of belonging construction stands out as a definitive factor for the harmony of Turkishness and Jewishness. Particularly, the adoption of Turkish as the mother tongue is critical for the respondents since none of them considers any other language as their primary language to converse in. One interesting outcome of this analysis is the speed of transformation of

this community from a bilingual community to a unilingual one. Turkification is not a publicly spoken and shared phenomenon though. It is a naturalization or better put, internalization process that fills the gap left behind by the gradual disappearance of Ladino. The disappearance of Ladino as the mother tongue, thus, requires extensive investigation in future studies.

Similarly, the coexistence of the Turkish and Jewish identities is justified by the respondents via references to their belonging to the “Turkish culture” whose individual meaning differs for different respondents. Cultural norms and references were more visible for those who lived abroad temporarily. Those respondents presented a relatively stronger connection to Turkish cultural characteristics, whatever these characteristics might be according to their understanding of Turkishness.

Chapter IV scrutinizes the feeling of being a Jewish person in Turkey. The interviews provided me with certain affects and feelings, which my interlocutors directly told about or implied and performed in their conversations, mimics, gestures and expressions. The way my interlocutors described their feelings on being a minority manifested that their status as a minority was perceived and experienced as a “negative” part of their lives. But their descriptions also included a number of recurring words to hint their feelings, such as being alert, being restless or uncomfortable, feeling insecure and not being in peace, which will be presented in detail with references to my interlocutors’ expressions.

One of the most striking affect apparent in the data collected was the ever-haunting feeling of minority discussed under the rubric of ‘specter-like existence of the specific existential feeling. In the interviews, it has been observed that although interlocutors do not directly talk about the feeling of being an outsider or minority; they also somehow imply a sense of ever-haunting specter in being minority. The dynamics of this disturbing feeling are discussed in detail in this part of the chapter. Therefore, the encounters that shake the ground of belonging to the imaginary ‘home’ and that create negative affects of distaste, uneasiness and disturbance will be discussed in this chapter around the narratives of the respondents which point out to the haunting existence of being a persona non grata translated into being a minority.

A second set of affects apparent in the interviews arise from the atmosphere of being a minority. It is important to take a closer look at respondents’ definitions of

minority, especially because we see a pattern in the interviewees' understanding. How do they perceive the word itself, and how does the word make them feel? The word itself is naturally imbued with a duality. Minority carries the implicit existence of a majority. Thus the impact of majority on the feelings of the respondents is also a subject matter of this chapter. It is not possible to grasp the understanding of the minority feeling without analyzing how the concept of majority haunts the respondents, in expressions such as "difference, separation, differ, the other, the *wider* society, the bubble". Besides, the mentioned dual understanding of the society they live in, their contemplations on majority/minority were prominent in the respondents' expressions that led me to further analyze the word "minority" and particularly its lingering affect. It never fully leaves the interview; it stays, it lingers in some shape; as a ghost, as a context, as a veil upon respondents' answers. Therefore, it is important to understand this lingering affect.

The affects to be discussed in this chapter pertain to the personalized secure spaces imagined by the respondents. The words "bubble" and "fanus" were used by a number of respondents to refer to these spaces. These words appear especially while discussing where the respondents feel secure, safe, at peace or at home. This concept 'bubble' is highly suggestive as an anthropological tool in order to explain the reason why these people prefer to stay in this country despite the existence of intensely negative affects of being a minority as discussed above. There appears to be a need for some sort of gated area for them as a prerequisite to even begin to think about feeling at home/ secure. This leaves the rest of the public as "others" or "general public/ widened public"; revealing the dichotomous perspective. Thus "bubble" or "fanus" may be referred to as an imaginary protective shield and the perpetuation of the minority status, as the lingering affect of the minority status, as its ghost.

Thus, this bubble is a constructed "space" that is supposedly liberated from unpleasant affects, such as restlessness, fear, insecurity, and whose boundaries are continuously re-shaped/, which makes it hard to grasp even by the interviewee him/herself. It both changes from one person to another, but also is continuously rebuilt by the individual him/herself. It may be the case that the "space" where people are free from unpleasant affects coincide with one another, such as friendship, a certain neighborhood, family gathering etc. On the other hand, just as the duality of majority and minority, the construction of bubbles perpetuates the feeling of being a minority,

since it rests upon the existence of a greater space that includes the majority. Therefore; it can also be thought of as a limited space that is not only free from unpleasant affects, but also a limiting space that reminds one of its feelings on being a minority.

When thinking about the individual expressions of a demarcated space which makes an individual secure, such as the *bubble/fanus*, it is to note the specific features of the historical period we are living today; that this ambivalent concept of the *bubble/fanus* appears in the period where/when communities and old ways of solidarity-forming dissolve and a change occurs in the way individual wellbeing is understood. In this case, this is a period when the Jewish community's old ways of solidarities, the *Cemaat* bond itself, and the *dernekler* which used to be the traditional ways of forming solidarities has weakened. In addition, we see a case similar to the discussions of the literature on the neoliberal period; my respondents are focused on their individual wellbeing.

When we consider the interviews, a number of questions can be put forward with regard to what one understands from this concept of the *bubble/fanus*. Are *bubbles* some sort of coping mechanisms which assist the respondents to manage the discrimination they may face when they interact with the "general public"? Since a number of respondents did not use this expression, what about those who do not mention bubbles? How do these people that do not mention a *bubble/fanus* cope with the possibility of discrimination or the unpleasant feelings such as insecurity, fear and alertness which they also talk about in the interviews? Are bubbles stationary spaces, or rather simply fluid spaces that move with its inhabitants, or particularly move with the respondent him/herself? Or would a single person, (e.g. a boyfriend/ girlfriend) consider a bubble? Are there specific characteristics that infringe on the secure space/the bubble/fanus? These are some of the questions that are to be analyzed in this chapter.

In the Chapter IV, I mainly discuss the tension between feeling secure at the bubble and the disturbing encounters born out of minority status that shake the comfort of the bubble. However, both these contradicting dynamics do not include the agency of the subject of the Turkish Jew in Istanbul. In order to save the subject from this passivity, in the following Chapter, Chapter V on silence and migration, I have discussed the strategies of the self which refrain the subject from emotionally disturbing encounters and contexts. The interviews clearly show that they don't prefer to talk on such matters

which according to some might cause “unpleasant feelings, unnecessary uneasiness, and contingent discontent”. Interestingly, being silent as a community in Turkey can be observed as well. But this silence practice does not necessarily explain the nonexistence of political discussions even within their own “bubbles” because the lack of new encounters is constant in all contexts. Thus, it is striking to trace the consistent will to stay silent whilst being a minority in Turkey.

As the last section of Chapter V, I try to inquire into the ever-existing theme of Jewish community; namely, migration. Although not only in Turkey but also all over the world migration has been destined reality for the Jews; it takes new forms and increasing volumes in the last decades in the Jewish community in Turkey. I will explore this fact how migration as an implicit and strong theme evolves and lives among the community. When I began thinking about migration, I realized that ‘to leave the homeland’ has two fundamental dimensions as a perceived phenomenon. One is the ever-existing ghostly existence of the possibility to migrate inside the community and the other is the fact that the community already lost such high volumes of members through voluntary migration. Therefore, in doing this, I will utilize a comparative perspective contrasting the Turkish Jews’ discourses about the will of people still living in Istanbul and the already-migrated Jews in other countries. Furthermore, I will pay importance to the question whether migration is a collectively shared imagination inside the community which is constructed by social dynamics; or it is a voluntary individual choice of a usual upper-middle class person. In other words, it was fundamental to differentiate the will to leave the country is affected by the very dynamics of being Jewish in Turkey. In that sense, it should be noted that this crucial question directly relates to the above mentioned topic of ‘bubble/fanus’ where the subjects express their relatively comfortable existence in Turkey. In this chapter, the question of migration both as a fact and as potential will be evaluated through the discourses of the Jews themselves.

This thesis which takes a critical look on the association of Turkishness and Jewishness, as well as the affects pertaining to the feeling of minority, or the so called “minority-ness,” shows that the Turkish Jews’ sense of belonging to this space and to the sovereign identity have their own ruptures, contestations, and challenges. These are produced at the encounters with the sovereign identity through the affects of being a minority who does not hold a political stance. This spatial and temporal intersection

creates bodily affects of uneasiness, discomfort, anxiety and discontent which shape the Jewish subjects. First of all, by providing a factual presentation of how Jewishness and Turkishness can exist together according to the expressions of my interlocutors, I explore the contours of their belonging to Turkey. Second, this study, which focuses on the everyday experiences of a small group of people in Turkey, demonstrates how the insights of the affective turn in the social sciences can shed a different light in analyzing minority issues.

This thesis contributes to the literature on the Jewish population in Turkey by studying how these people feel about being a minority and how they interpret their belonging through an ethnographic study. Instead of looking at historical events and ruptures such as Capital Levy, Trace Pogroms or big traumas, as it was carried out by other studies in the literature, I try to understand the state of mind of these individuals in their everyday lives. So, how they perceive themselves and their lives and how they feel about it, is analyzed without trying to bring together a variety of views in a common pattern or a grand generalization. However, a look at the affects, and scrutinizing what the individual feels while he/she talks about their lives, brings forward a list of “golden words” which constantly erupt in the different moments of the interviews of different people. This observation, as a Jewish person living in Turkey, strikes me since I can also relate with some of these feelings, such as uneasiness, alertness, insecurity as well as a sequence of silence when asked about the feeling of being a minority.

Minority studies in Turkey are an interesting and rich literature, although there are limited number of studies on the Jewish community and particularly a limited number of ethnographic works that analyze the feelings of the individuals. I believe this thesis would contribute to this literature in two ways: First, it fills the niche concerning contemporary studies on Jewish minority as there are few studies on this issue, as I struggled while I was doing a literature review on the subject matter. Second, it would enrich the field by introducing an affective perspective on ethnographic studies which is, again, very scarcely used. When I did research on the literature written about Jews in Turkey, I always felt the scarcity of articles and books about the everyday experiences of Jews in Turkey. Therefore, future studies on the affective construction of the Jewish subject would be highly beneficial to fill the gap compared to other ethnic and religious minority groups in Turkey.

## CHAPTER I – THEORETICAL REVIEW ON BELONGING AND AFFECT

This chapter will be composed of theoretical literature review on sense of belonging and multi-dimensionality of the concept itself as well as the literature on affective turn. As I will try to demonstrate in the following chapter(s), the traditional collective bonds among the Jews are getting dissolved and significant numbers of Jews have recently left Turkey and settled down in other countries such as European countries, Israel or the USA. This novel development has been an important topic of discussion among the Jews in Turkey. Migration has become a phenomenon that is in close proximity to most Jews living in Istanbul. In one way or another, people either have a relative or acquaintances that migrated or considered the possibility itself. Thus, it is actually in a part of their daily life. It appears and disappears over the community as a ghost; it is circulated in the daily practices of the community both randomly and occasionally.

Consequently, these constant encounters led me question the senses of belonging the Jewish community members possess towards their locality, community, and the state in Turkey. While examining the Jewish sense of belonging and attachment to Turkey, I refrain from macro perspectives perceiving the Jewishness as a one-single unified homogenous identity. I try to look at their unique narratives of experiencing Jewishness in Turkey and their belonging to this geography and their community. During the interviews, I seek answers to the questions such as: *How do Jews in Istanbul imagine and define a home (land)? How is Turkey imagined and experienced by them? Do they experience Turkey as a homeland? If Turkey does not create feelings of being at home, is there another landscape imagined as a home (land)? If so, where do they imagine their (home) land? How do they relate Jewishness to Turkishness? How do they relate to Turkey and what kind of affects emerge in this relation?*

The responses to the above given questions not only provide data for their perceptions of home and belonging; but also, their bodily language, facial expressions, awkward pauses during interviews and abrupt changes of discourse suggest that emotional baggage behind the surface is large enough to tell a different story. The impact of the affects circulating in the interviews certainly demands to be contemplated on. Thus, a theoretical review of affect literature and theoretical discussions on how one approach to affect is imperative for the purpose of the following ethnographic chapters.

## 1.1 Belonging

The concept of belonging has been a multi-dimensional issue for the scholars in the sense that anthropologists have taken varying theoretical perspectives to tackle the concept. Some scholars like Vanessa May (2011) are concerned with the procedural characteristic of belonging which links “the person with the social” (p. 368). She contends that belonging is a crucial aspect of being a person. According to May “belonging involves a process of creating a sense of identification with one’s social, relational and material surroundings” (Miller in May, 2011, p.368). Thus, a closer look at belonging will assist the scholars who study the links between the self and society. Furthermore, Sarah Wright (2014) argues belonging is “actively created through the practices of a wide range of human and more-than-human agents, including animals, places, emotions, things and flows” (p.2). Therefore, it is an efficient theoretical tool to examine the daily ties one builds with social structures and its surroundings in general.

One dimension that scholars pursue to study the concept of belonging is to consider belonging as a sentiment. Looking at belonging as a sentiment however is tied with other aspects of belonging as well, such as a spatial understanding of belonging, belonging as relations, and also belonging as a performance. Tovi Fenster explains that Michel De Certeau underlines the significance of experiences in the sentiment of belonging. In Fenster’s article *Gender and the City* (2007), Fenster explains de Certeau’s point of view in his literature review on belonging. He states that according to de Certeau, the sentiment of belonging is constructed via “a process of transformation of place, which then becomes a space of accumulated attachment and sentiments by means of everyday practices” (p.243).

Fenster, however, analyzes the multi-dimensionality of belonging and focuses on the spatial dynamics of belonging which underlines the connections between the space and belonging. In analyzing multiple and complex dynamics of belonging among the Jews in Turkey, the spatial dynamics of belonging become a crucial point. The spatial dynamics of belonging which underline the connections between the space and belonging are deeply studied by Fenster (2007), Nadia Lovell (1998), Jeanette Edwards (1998) and Nira Yuval-Davis (2011). Fenster argues that “a sense of belonging to the physical environment can also be associated with an emotional attachment created between a person and a physical place which is based on the person’s subjective



meanings of that place” (2007, p.247). Accordingly, belonging is linked to material physical aspects.

One of the main aims of this thesis is to examine the sense of belonging of the Jews who live in Istanbul. In other words, rather than focusing on the Jewish identity, I focus on the notion of belonging to analyze Jewish experiences in Turkey. However, as much as belonging can be a sentiment shaped in and through space and social relations; as Fenster (2007) argues, sense of belonging is also a personal, private and intimate sentiment. This sentiment has personal and private aspects which transgresses the ethno-religious identity. Due to multiplicities of personal stories and due to various class and sexual identities and/or identifications of the Jews in Turkey, I will rather underline common and shared sentiments of belonging among my interviewees. These shared experiences, I believe, will shed light into Jewish experiences of belonging in Turkey.

As scholars who elaborate on the notion of belonging discuss, the sentiment of belonging is a multi-layered complex sentiment (Yuval-Davis, 2011; May, 2011; Lovell, 1998) and it cannot be defined rigidly and simply. As Wright (2014) notes, it is indeed possible to belong or not belong in many different ways at many different scales. Accordingly, as I will discuss in this thesis, we cannot come to a simple conclusion that the Jews of Turkey or some Jews of Turkey feel that they belong to Turkey. I will rather demonstrate the complexities of this feeling. I will argue that while certain experiences make them feel that they have a stronger sense of belonging to Turkey (for instance, as I will elaborate on later, in the case of Gezi events) some encounters make them feel weaker senses of belonging to Turkey (as is in the case of anti-Semitic discourses and attacks). Moreover, I argue that we cannot even approach Turkey as one homogenous place as Turkey embodies diverse territories and the people and culture in these territories are various. Accordingly, Jewish experiences in different parts of Turkey are diverse. Hence, we cannot claim that the sense of belonging is something rigid and fixed.

Scholars who problematized the notion of belonging argue that belonging is a crucial aspect of being a person: it is “fundamental to who and what we are” (May, 2011, p.368). For Yuval-Davis (2011), for instance, belonging first and foremost is about attachment. Hence, it is a relational sentiment; it is about one’s self-attachment or dis-attachment to another. This other may be a person, a nation, national identity, a

place, and a memory. Accordingly, as May (2011) underlines, “a focus on belonging allows us to study the links between the self and society.” It also allows us to examine “how people engage with social structures in their everyday lives” (p.368). She also underlines the significance of relational approach in understanding the self. Drawing from Elias, she understands the self as a relationship; self is developed in relationships (May, 2011, p.375). Similarly, as Vanessa May quotes from Miller, belonging is a sentiment formed in and through social relations. Belonging becomes a process of creating a sense of identification with one’s social relational and material surroundings or “of recognizing-or misrecognising –the self in the other (Leach 2002 cited in May, 2011, p.368).

In analyzing the Jewish sense of belonging in Turkey, in this thesis I also examine how the Jewish self is related to the (imaginary) Turkish (national) society/Other and what kind of (dis)attachments are developed in and through relation between the Jewish self and the Turkish (national) society. For instance, some of my interviewees shared that in their everyday encounters with Muslim Turkish people, they were constantly being questioned about their Turkishness and being told that Turkishness and Jewishness are mutually exclusive identities; in spite of their self identification as Turkish. Accordingly, one of the points of following chapter on Turkishness-Jewishness is that the sense of belonging is created in and through the social relations, practices and encounters. Everyday encounters between the Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of Turkey are formative in Jews’ sentiments of belonging in Turkey.

May (2011) notes that belonging is achieved by “being” and “doing” in the world. It is not an inherited part of the self. In a similar vein, Wright underlines the performative aspect of belonging: “Belonging as performance, as a set of practices and processes rather than a status that one might hold (or not)” (2014, p.10). She further argues that “belonging is continually (re)made and (re)constituted, and how it is performed in messy, negotiated and in material ways” (2014, p.10). Accordingly, in this study, while demonstrating complex dynamics of Jewish belonging in Turkey, I illustrate which performances make, the Jews of Turkey feel that they belong to or not belong to Turkey.

Fenster (2007) underlines the significance of everyday encounters as well as experiences in the sentiment of belonging. For him, the sentiment of belonging is not only about national identity, citizenship and inclusion and exclusion dynamics that these

formal notions bring out. Belonging is linked to “notions of participation and inclusion in the construction of citizenship identity and membership”; and also, it is linked to family and friends, collective and individual memories, past and ownership (p.247). Accordingly, while discussing the notion of belonging, thus attachment and dis/attachment to Turkey, I focus on formal inclusion to citizenship or exclusion from some citizenship rights together with a focus on all other aspects of belonging.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, as the above given preview of multi-dimensionality of belonging and the vast theoretical literature on the issue, for the purpose of this thesis, it is critical to question the connections between a physical space, a home, and the sentiment of belonging. In this thesis, I approach “home” in two ways: A physical space and a symbolic space of belonging. I ask: What happens if a group of people (in this particular case Jews) have to leave their hometowns and homes? How does the experience of leaving behind one’s home/town due to exclusionary attitudes and discourses affect the Jewish sense of belonging in Turkey? Is Turkey experienced as a home/homeland, a symbolic space of belonging, among the Jews of Turkey? Before tackling these questions, I will elaborate on the links between home as a space and belonging. I will then move into a theoretical discussion about the relationship between belonging and identity which will be followed by a section on Jewish belonging to (Turkish) society that cannot only be understood with reference to inclusion and exclusion dynamics.

### **1.1.1 Home as a Space of Belonging**

Yuval-Davis (2011) underlines the connection between home and sense of belonging. She argues that belonging is an “emotional attachment, about feeling at home” (p.3-4). In line with Yuval-Davis’s contention, I argue that the concept of belonging cannot be thought independent of the concepts of ‘home’ and ‘space’. Hence, home is not only a physical space. It is not merely a house or a flat. Home is an emotional space. To cite Yuval- Davis again “belonging is about emotional attachment, about feeling at home” (2011, p.4). Home is a place where one enjoys the feeling of belonging. Wright also explains that home is “neither strictly a place nor a feeling, but comes about through the intersections of place and feelings” and it “is understood as a

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<sup>9</sup> I use citizenship in its broadest sense, including the notion of “citizenship in practice” i.e. exclusion from the occupation of civil servant.

site for establishing and producing connections that encourage a sense of belonging” (2014, p.5). Home first and foremost means a secure place. It is a familiar place where one feels, he or she is part of or included in. In other words, it is a place where one does not feel as a stranger or an outsider. It is a place where one enjoys the comfort of the familiarity. The feeling of comfort lies at the heart of knowing the habits, the people, and the spatial environment. Edwards (1998) notes that “belonging is forged through a variety of connections and diversity of attachments, which includes links to past and persons, as well as to places” (p. 148). Following Edwards’ emphasis on the relationship between the notion of belonging and diversity of attachments, we can also argue that the (comfortable) home is a space of belonging. Whether it is an apartment, a street, a city, a group or a country, the place that is called ‘home’, is surrounded by familiar objects and people as well as collective memories (Edwards, 1998; Lovell, 1998).

A familiar place which contains collective memories, familiar objects and people provides a sense of rootedness in the world. Yuval-Davis explains Ulf Hannerz’s account as follows: Yuval-Davis argues that Hannerz states that home “can involve a sense of rootedness in a socio-geographic site or be constructed as an intensely imaginary affiliation with a distant local where self realization can occur” (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p.5). One of the main problems I tackle in this thesis is whether the Jews of Turkey feel a sense of rootedness in Turkey or in some parts of Turkey and whether they carry an emotional affiliation towards abroad. As I illustrate above, unlike the official government discourses that link the Jews of Turkey with Israel, many of my interviewees indicated that they do not have much emotional affiliation with Israel and that they feel foreigners in Israel. However, for my interviews, Turkey is the place where they feel rooted although they have been sometimes told that they actually are not Turkish. Also, as I discuss below that they have been sometimes told that they are guests in Turkey thanks to Turkish hospitality. These will be elaborated in the “Multiple Belongings and Jewishness” chapter.

Nadia Lovell (1998) describes the role of emotions in the experiences of ‘belonging’ and ‘feeling at home’ and underlines the significance of the past in developing a sense of belonging. She says that

Belonging and locality as markers of identity often extend beyond individual experiences and nostalgic longing for a particular place... Belonging may thus be seen as a way of

remembering instrumental in the construction of collective memory surrounding the place... Yet, belonging , with all its pragmatic connotations and potential for tying people to place and social relationships, also evokes emotions, sentiments of longing to be in a particular location, be it real or fictive. (p.1)

Hence, 'home' is both a real and a cognitive space where the memories are collected and experienced. It is a space constructed and reconstructed through lived experiences and memories of the past. In that regard, 'home' carries the marks of our movements, bodies, practices, experiences and memories. Related to the same issue and going back to the issue of locality, another question that concerns me is whether it is possible to feel at home or to feel belonging to a place when one does not enjoy traditional bonds of locality and when he/she does not feel connected to his/her neighbors. Thus, it is critical to perceive space not only as a locality; but also, a collection of imagery and senses it creates. Within this context, Lovell (1998) offers a similar point of view by arguing that landscapes are not absolute geographical sites since the site that the sense of belonging resides is "constantly re-enacted in order to transcend (and simultaneously allow) the vagaries of migration, of movement, and of existential uncertainties" (p.10). People feel connected to spaces through their interaction with those spaces and what they entail. In other words, the territory and consecutively belonging is being produced through human interaction with nature, and through the interactions between humans in social practice as mediated through emplacement (Lovell, 1998, p.14). A similar view of Kaj Arhem is presented in his essay *Powers of Place* where he explains that locality and the sharing of territory produces a common tie to the land and "a deep sense of consanguineal community" (1998, p.97). I ask how we can think of "a deep sense of consanguineal community" among the Jews of Turkey where traditional Jewish neighborhoods allowing everyday encounters between their inhabitants disappeared.

"Home is an ongoing project with a sense of hope for the future" says Yuval Davis (2011, p.4). Hence, she underlines the links between belonging, feeling at home and planning a future. In other words for Yuval-Davis, home is not only about the past and the individual or collective memories, it is also about the future. Home is, then, a place in which one feels safe enough to make future plans. My younger interviewees either argued that they are considering of leaving Turkey or at least leaving Turkey as an option for them though not an emergent option. Accordingly, this thesis also reveals the situation of Turkey as a homeland which was already left and of Turkey which can

be still left by many Jews.

While some groups of people do and can feel at home in the countries where they were born in, some groups do not and/or cannot feel at home. Especially in some nation states, certain groups of people are treated as if they do not belong to that country even though they and their ancestors were born in that country and even though they are official citizens of those particular countries. In that sense, feeling at home in one's country is a different experience for the minorities. However, there is an interesting dilemma lying in here. It is not always easy to draw the boundaries of home. In other words, in some cases, the home has rather blurry boundaries. For instance, I have occasionally encountered Jewish friends living in another country for some years as students argue that although they feel oppressed in Turkey, they do not feel at home when they are in other countries. Thus, we cannot assume that feeling at home is directly related to exclusionary policies, discourses and practices. One may not feel comfortable in a country due to the exclusionary practices on certain ethnic, religious and gender groups and to the oppressive state policies. Yet, one can still in a way feel at home in that country due to the comfortable space opened up by the familiarity. The oppression and discomfort one may feel do not necessarily be a result of contemporary discourses and current exclusionary practices. These feelings are also fed by the residues of past events. Something that might have been lost in the past may still linger in the present as a transforming agent of what one might feel today. Thus, a closer look at the literature on loss may help us better understand what today's feelings may be composed of.

### **1.1.2 Identity and Belonging**

Identity is also a beneficial tool to understand the construction of belonging. It is a multifaceted sense which can be traced back to a multiplicity of roots. In spite of its ambiguity, identity is one of those roots. The notion of identity may be misleading within the context of this study since the questions I asked about identity produce differentiated answers within different contexts even for the same interviewee. Nevertheless, I feel the necessity to mention the theoretical literature on the correlation on identity and belonging and why according to some scholars, it might be risky and might be misleading to analyze belonging through the lenses of identity.

Discussing the concept of identity and deploying an analytical perspective trying

to understand the dynamics of identity is a blurry area as Anthias states. He argues that identity cannot escape from the fixity involved with this term even when one talks about multiple identities (Anthias, 2002, p 491). In order to bypass the problems comprised in identity concept, Anthias (2002) offers to focus on processes also because people's stories are "continually being revised and changed" (p.492). Anthias considers the question "*how have you*" is more important than "*who are you*". She tries to capture the dynamic nature of people's belonging by looking at narratives of positionality and location. Anthias shows that people's stories on their sense of belonging depend on the context they are talking in, such as a Cypriot talking in Greek language about his/her sense of belonging in England (Anthias, 2002, p.494). Anthias believes that people's sense of belonging is revealed only when one can go further than the ready-made answers formulated on their identity. I have encountered with the same blurry area when I have asked my interviewees about their identities. For instance, I have witnessed that every time I asked about their identity, they have already shaped cliché answers such as when I asked how you define yourself, one of my interviewees said that he is Turkish.

Moreover, 'identity' as a concept is based on a social presumption that people act collectively according to their identity. It might of course be true but we have to keep in mind that everybody's motive is unique and cannot be unified under one collective objective. Such an assumption produced under the analytical frame of the concept of identity assimilates the singular narratives of subjectivities into one collective identity's stories of victory or defeat although the everyday experiences of people are not such unified and clear-cut in reality. They are always fractured, unique and affectionate that should not be assimilated into one singular narration. Thus, it is important to be able to embrace the dynamic and multi-layered processes of belonging and identity. My research data as I will present in the analysis chapter of this thesis clearly shows that Jews of Turkey have fractured and dynamic experiences of nation-state, belonging and identity. Thus, it is clear that belonging depending solely on the assumptions of identity is not efficient and explanatory within the framework of Jewish community in Istanbul. On the other hand, identity question helps us observe the initial responses of a person regarding their self-positioning within the community, public or world. Or even, it helps us to understand whether or not the respondents contemplated on their stance at all. Thus, the responses are utilized for the as personal perceptions of belonging.

I ask the question “How do they define themselves in terms of identity related to religion, ethnicity, gender or class relations in order to reveal “intersectionality” of the identities?” As Anthias presents, there are various theoretical perspectives and arguments on how gender, class, race can be considered together (2012, p.121). However, there are also a number of drawbacks of intersectionality arguments such as producing an unlimited number of “hybrid” cases. But still, it is important to consider different ways in which a Jewish person’s sense of belonging intersects with class, national or gender identities. Especially, as Anthias introduces the literature on class analysis, some of the ways in which class is conceived are through lifestyle or a sense of elective belonging in which one may distance himself/herself from the other (2012, p.123-125). For example, in the case of an upper-middle class Jewish person living in Istanbul, his/her sense of belonging or feeling at home may be intertwined with his upper-middle class lifestyle in Istanbul. With this in mind, I would like to analyze how one defines his/herself. In detail, I’d like to take a closer look at how these various experiences of carrying different identities at one time affect the perception of the self and the sense of belonging to a certain time and space. In addition, how much of their subjectivity is composed of Jewishness, Turkishness, or femininity, masculinity and their economic conditions will be contemplated on.

### **1.1.3 Conclusive Remarks on Belonging**

Construction of the sense of belonging is selective. As it changes from one person to another, it may change according to an individual’s perception of her/his past and to what extent that person wants to carry the past with him. In this chapter, I posed a theoretical literature review of the main discussions on belonging and through which mediums it is constructed and/or transformed. I have introduced the multidimensionality of belonging through considering belonging as a personal construction (May, 2011) as well as belonging as a sentiment (Fenster, 2007). Additionally, belonging cannot be thought or analyzed without its relationality with other concepts like home, space and identity (Yuval-Davis, 2011). This relationality broadens the framework towards an understanding of belonging as constructed with social structures, ties and surroundings. According to Yuval-Davis, home was not solely a physical space; but also, a space that creates familiarity and a sense of peacefulness for the individual which consequently corresponds to a sense of belonging. A space, thus as I explained above in detail, is not



only a locality; but also, should it be considered a collection of imagery and senses it creates. In other words, people feel connected to spaces through their interaction with these spaces and what they entail. A belonging is being produced through human interaction with nature and through the interactions between humans in social practice as mediated through emplacement (Lovell, 1998, p.14).

As Edwards puts it, people are selective when comprising their stories on how they belong to a particular place. Belonging requires a selection of which elements to pick out, which social relationships to mark (people belong to people as much as they do to places) and which identities to promote (Edwards, 1998, p.150). While constructing a sense of belonging, people adopt a selective behavior through which they leave out unpleasant experiences and somehow create an alternative past for themselves. These constructed stories reveal who belongs to what and to what not (Edwards, 1998, p. 148). Above given discussion of belonging falls short at identifying some of the responses. More importantly, it does not cover some attitudes of the respondents during the interviews. As my respondents promote a certain part of their identity and think about their belonging, they also reveal certain affects.

Certain bodily and facial expressions clearly indicated that there is more to what's been said, which either strengthened their stories or communicated me their feelings on what they experienced. There are some sorts of affects at play during the interviews that challenge and thus shape respondents' behavior and/or approaches to the questions. Consequently, it is prominent to include the affect literature as an addition to belonging literature. Not only questions specifically about emotions, but also, questions about belonging or questions on mundane experiences were responded with emotionally rich answers. This is surely not surprising since in Turkish, "belonging" and "feeling" are used as complementary words. The phrase in Turkish is "to feel you belong (*ait hissetmek*)". Normally, feeling and belonging are autonomous words but when combined together it refers to a specific meaning. Both affect and belonging are practical theoretical tools to unpack the responses of the interviews as well as to understand theoretically mutual literatures. Thus, I will now move on to the theoretical review of affect before continuing to the ethnographic discussion on belonging.

## **1.2 Theoretical Discussions on Affect**

This thesis utilizes affect as one of its theoretical goggles to understand the data at hand. Since it is a vast literature composed of a number of fields, I've tried to form a collection of particular discussions and essential arguments in the affect literature that relates to my thesis. One of the following chapters of this thesis scrutinizes the affects, feelings and sensations of being a Jewish person in Turkey. The interviews provided me with certain descriptions of affects and feelings, which my interlocutors directly told about or implied and performed in their conversations, mimics, gestures and expressions. The way my interlocutors described their feelings on being a minority manifested that this status as a minority is perceived and experienced in relation to a number of recurring words to hint their feelings, such as being alert, being restless or uncomfortable, feeling insecure and not being in peace, which will be represented in detail with my interlocutors' expressions.

I will present a range of perspectives on affect together with how they relate to my research and which perspectives I prefer to install for my own arguments. Below given review of a specific segment of literature will be particularly beneficial to better understand the theoretical tools I used. In particular, I contemplate on major perspectives on what affect is; what emotions do; the parallelism of mind and body and to what extent they are correlated.

### **1.2.1 From Linguistic to Affective Turn<sup>10</sup>**

Conventional descriptions of affect are largely influenced by Spinoza and his approach to the term. Most theorists start with a similar description. The definition only changes with the shift at the semiotic paradigm from a linguistic turn towards an affective turn. In an article by Steven D. Brown and Ian Tucker (2010), this turn is explained by "the linguistic turn has proved the fore bar of a wave of critical thought with a seemingly insatiable appetite to think the human in the world as part of and produced through a multiplicity of context-dependent relations" (p. 233). After the linguistic turn in social sciences, the analysis on cultural studies was perceived as

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<sup>10</sup> It is a heading used by Brown & Tucker in their article *Eff the Ineffable*, 2010, p.233.

problematic by redeemed scholars like Brian Massumi and Henri Bergson. As Patricia T. Clough (2007) reminds, “the affective turn, therefore, expresses a new configuration of bodies, technology, and matter instigating a shift in thought in critical theory (p. 2). This was particularly because taking a snapshot of a case study and conducting an analysis on that static image causes issues of reliability. The fundamental problem with this technique is that the subject at hand is not static but rather ever-changing; there’s movement. The answer to this problem led to the theoretical development of the affective turn. In line with this, Brown and Tucker contends that “Massumi’s renewal of Bergsonism for cultural theory reveals semiotic/linguistic turn as a superior mechanism that cannot, reconstruct the reality of movement and change from its static terms” (p. 235). Therefore, Massumi inserts the dynamism into the analysis via introducing affect to the theory.

Affect neatly links this “two-sidedness” in several ways, it proposes that analysis starts from the situated standpoint of the actual thing as it extracts a foothold in the material flux. It then reminds us that this foothold is interdependent with the relationships that the actual thing can apprehend with other bodies. Or put slightly differently, that there is a material arrangement of relations between bodies that allows for certain potential acts. Since these relationships are by their very definition open and unfinished it follows that the actual thing can only partially sense or feel their possible character rather than render them subject to direct representation. Affect is then significant because it marks a-cognitive or more-and-less-than-rational modalities through which the actual thing engages in worldly activities. Moreover affect marks the indeterminate and eventful nature of concrete action as it expresses and further complexifies the material flux in which it participates (p. 236).

Thus, through affect, the imperfect and partial nature of an analysis may begin to become less unfinished. The addition to the nature of the action; itself while it expresses, it makes the difference.

### **1.2.2 Affection and its Constituents**

In *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Sara Ahmed provides us with an elaborate affect description by utilizing the theoretical tool provided by Psychoanalytic and Marxist Theories. Her approach towards affect is as follows:

The movement between signs or objects converts into affect. Marx does link value with affect through the figures of the capitalist and the miser. He says: ‘This boundless drive for enrichment, this passionate chase after value, is common to the capitalist and the miser’ (Marx 1976: 254). Here, passion drives the accumulation of capital: the capitalist is not interested in the use-value of commodities, but the ‘appropriation of ever more wealth’ (Marx 1976: 254). What I am offering is a theory of passion not as the drive to accumulate

(whether it be value, power or meaning), but as that which is accumulated over time. Affect does not reside in an object or sign, but is an affect of the circulation between objects and signs (the accumulation of affective value). Signs increase in affective value as an affect of the movement between signs: the more signs circulate, the more affective they become ( 2004, p. 45).

Ahmed uses the value theory of Marx in order to explain how affects circulate and increase the effects they produce. Similarly, the effects are decreased whilst the signs are limited. Therefore, the correlation between the sign and the affective value is imperative and establishes how one is impacted by an event and its extent of impact. Departing from the given description of economies of affect by Ahmed, my interviewees' affects will be analyzed inside the frame of signs, discourses and encounters. It is also true that as the number of signs that circulate increases, the impact of affect increases. However, it is also important to consider that certain events which may not be a widespread phenomenon in the society still may be more effective such as a close friend's remark or a neighbors' behavior.

One may question though whether it is the quality or the quantity of those signs that has a greater impact on the individual or the community. In other words, one may challenge Ahmed's position by asking if with lesser quantities one may experience greater affective values. I also encountered instances that challenge this argument as it will be elaborated in the following chapters. Thus, it led me to further think on the relativity of signs. Overall, I prefer to ask whether one could consider this argument of Ahmed's on the relationship between circulated signs and affect as a constant or not.

Just as certain signs have a stronger affect, so are certain environments or imagined spaces. Specifically, my interviewees' references to "bubble" and "fanus" to describe a close environment which they feel secure and peaceful are imbued with strong affects. First of all, a fanus is a demarcated and a constructed space. It is imagined and restricted. Second, the signs that title you as different, as foreign or as one who does not belong are either limited or nonexistent within the territory of fanus. To put it differently, there is either no one or very few people to tag you as different for being a Jew in this secure environment. Thus, the signs targeting you are less in quantity. Yet, the critical point here is that when they do exist. Even though there are very few in numbers, the impact of signs in this secure environment is greater than their impact in "non-fanus" area. Hence, within the borders of *fanus*, signs are less in quantity but greater in quality. Oppositely, there is the "wider public sphere", *geniş*

*toplum/genel toplum*, a phrase used commonly by my interviewees in reference to either the public as a whole or the public that omitted Jewish community. In this setting, the number of signs that point you significantly increases. In the context of the “wider public”, a faster circulation of affect is commonly accepted by the interviewees. Thus, the responses of my interviewees suggest that a faster circulation of affect consequently leads to a strengthened impact of affect and intensified discomfort.

Consequently, it led me to contemplate further on what other feelings might be produced in addition to discomfort. Anxiety of one’s own well-being is, for instance, a central feeling that is under investigation here, too. My interviewees frequently described cases in which they put themselves at a “distance” to certain situations or people. Interestingly, there were many instances when my interviewees exhibit a need for staying at a distance to something. Some of these include changing their names when meeting strangers, migrating when their socioeconomic status deteriorates and when feeling uneasy outside of their comfort zone or “bubble”.

### **1.2.3 In the Absence of Body-Mind Dichotomy**

Patricia T. Clough, a profound theorist who has been concerned with the theory of affect and affective turn, provides a solid but compact theoretical review on affective turn in the *Introduction* section of her book she co-edited, *Affective Turn*. In *The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedicine, and Bodies* however, she focuses on a sort of conceptualization of affect as the “pre-individual bodily force augmenting or diminishing a body’s capacity to act and critically engaging those technologies that are making it possible to grasp and to manipulate the imperceptible dynamism of affect” (2010, p. 207). She uses Massumi’s “canonical text” as a starting point as well, like most. For Massumi, as described earlier, “affect is about opening the body to its indeterminacy” says Clough. Thus, it is necessary to provide a definition of affect which is “autonomous from conscious perception and language” (Clough, 2010).

As can be seen in the above quotation from Ahmed, a macro process is introduced that includes the circulation of affects. However, in the remaining chapters of her work, Ahmed also describes how bodies react with specific affects such as when they are afraid. On the other hand, Michael Hardt discusses affects from a more general perspective of the body and mind. Hardt argues that the causality offered by affect is an

intricate one since it has an active role on both sides of the coin: He contends that affect is in relation with both mind and body. According to Hardt, “they illuminate both our power to affect the world around us and our power to be affected by it, along with the relationship between these two powers” (2007, p. ix). Thus, going forward with Spinoza’s theory, he explains deeper the duality of the correlation between mind and body. He argues that although both mind and body act parallel to each other and in harmony, it certainly does not mean that they design each other’s acts. Quite to the opposite, they are autonomous actors who act in harmony. This is the exact point where the question of affect comes in play and “forces us constantly to pose the problem of the relationship between mind and body with the assumption that their powers constantly correspond in some way” (Hardt, 2007, p. x).

Gilles Deleuze explains the parallelism between mind and body by noting that “there’s a correspondence between the affections of the body and the ideas of the mind, a correspondence by which these ideas represent these affections” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 87). However, this correspondence does neither refer to equality nor to a real causality. He does not deny Spinoza’s account on body and mind being autonomous. “There is one and the same order in thought and in extension, one and the same order of bodies and minds” says Deleuze while affirming his view. Thus, he calls it an *isomorphism* between body and mind that is not equality; but, an equal valence of the phenomena of body and phenomena of mind. So, how should one perceive such a correspondence? Deleuze contends that there is a parallelism between mind and body such that an equality of principle exists in both. “The parallelism between an idea and its object only implies the correspondence, the equivalence and the identity between a mode of thinking and a different mode considered under a specific attribute (...thus the mind is the idea of the body, and of nothing else)” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 88). An epistemological parallelism between an idea and its subject is being reminded by Deleuze. In more detail, he refers to the axiom of Spinoza which dictates that “every idea corresponds something and to each, corresponds an idea. But this parallelism between an idea and its object only implies the correspondence, the equivalence” (p. 88). Thus, as is given the mind and body correspondence is at critical theoretical inquiry for the theory of affect and literature.

According to Clough (2010), affect and consciousness refers to a virtual-actual duality, which means where affect relates to potentiality; consciousness remains

limitative since it is a derivative of a limited version of a potentiality. When consciousness comes into play, a compulsory subtraction is made to the virtually existent so that it would become visible, limited, apprehensible whereas the virtual is limitless, immeasurable.

Then Clough asks what if one adopts an opposite path? What if one look backwards from actual to virtual? Her account is as follows:

“When there is a reflux back from conscious experience to affect, it is registered as affect such that “past action and contexts are conserved and repeated, autonomically reactivated but not accomplished; begun but not completed”(Massumi, 2002, 30). There is an intensification of affect. There is bodily memory – “vectors” or “perspectives of the flesh” – what Massumi calls “memory without content”, which, however, remains indeterminate, the indeterminate condition of possibility determinant theory and conscious perception (59) (Clough, 2010, p. 209).

A move back from the actual to virtual though the affect is met again, it is not relived, and it is met but not “accomplished”. Those memories become indeterminate affects which consequently leads to the discussion of temporality of virtual, of affect. Thus, affect is fluid; it moves, it escapes. It does not stay permanently at one place, within a certain memory. It is what grants affect its mobility and its autonomy in Massumi’s theory.

#### **1.2.4 Actual & Potential**

Since I mentioned Massumi’s recent work in Grossberg’s critique of current trends in affect theory literature, it would be plausible to explain further what it is and how Massumi constructs his “media-effects model” as Grossberg puts it. *The Future Birth of the Affective Fact: The Political Ontology of Threat* (2010) is concerned with the present effects of potential threats that might occur in the future. His main argument is that though such threat *potential* does not become *actual*, its impact in the present will still be as effective as it did actually happen. There was simply a potential. Preemption is, according to Massumi, “a mode of power that takes threat, which has no actual referent, as its object. When the politics of preemption captures threat’s potential for its own operation, it forgoes having an actual object of power” (Massumi, 2010, p. 59). Thus, he argues “if we feel threat, there was a threat. Threat is affectively self-causing... If we feel a threat, such threat there was a threat, then there always will have been a threat. Threat is once and for all, in the nonlinear time of its own causing”

(Massumi, 2010, p. 54).

An example he uses is the anthrax alarm in Montreal. Increased security in airports, everyone being interrogated and cancelled flights are just a few drastic measures taken as a consequence of the fear it caused. It was then discovered to be flour. Canadian public and media continued to experience the “toxic substance incident” though it was not toxic. Massumi explains this behavior by arguing “the affective reality of threat is contagious. Threat is capable of overlaying its own conditional determination upon an objective situation through the mechanism of alarm” (Massumi, 2010, p. 58). Therefore, when the veil of affect is once laid upon a society, it is a challenge to get rid of it. This is exactly the case in Montreal. The affect which was produced out of thin air via the mechanism of alarm became the reality.

He then, moves on to an illustration of C.S. Pierce’s *indications* by using the fire alarm case. The case is as follows:

When we hear a fire alarm, we understand that there is fire. You try to get of there, you get scarred, and you run. Massumi asks what if there is no fire but only alarm. According to Pierce, the reaction would still be the same since the dynamical object in this context is not the fire itself but the reaction of the body to the alarm. He contends that the “performance takes place wholly between the sign and instinctively activated body whose feeling is broken by the sign’s command to transition to a new feeling” (Massumi, 2010, p. 65). So far, Massumi is concerned with the potentials which do not become actual and its repercussions as if they did. He introduces smoke to the case. He is conflicted with the possible ways to make sense of the smoke. Smoke may or may not turn into a future fire. You get anxious not solely by the alarm; but, now you actually see the signs of fire although still not the fire itself. How would a person to correctly understand the smoke? To what extent would it justify anxiety and fear towards a fire and the running out of the building? “What are the experiential political implications of the a priori rightness of smokes of future fires? Since it is almost an impossible question to answer, he does not even begin to try.

### **1.2.5 Patricia T. Clough’s Account on Affect**

Earlier in the Massumi’s account, his perception of affect was given as the immediate bodily response which Grossberg criticized to be too automatic and he



argued affect is more than merely emotional responses. To illustrate this, Massumi conducts experiments to measure bodily responses of participants by showing them certain images and observing their verbal and physiological responses. An illustration monitors the bodily responses of participants and their brain activities and the timing of those responses. It is registered that the brain activity happens half a second before participants' reactions. Such discovery supports Massumi's argument on the autonomous nature of affect from the body and its conscious responses. Clough utilizes these illustrations to support the view on autonomy of affect but also she furthers Massumi's point by stating that

These experiments both illustrate the autonomy of affect and leave a trace of the superempirical, which Massumi expands temporarily with a philosophical conceptualization of the virtual, I am proposing that these experiments are technical and conceptual framings of bodily responses that produce affect and reveal the capture of the virtual. They not only show what the body can do; they show what bodies can be made to do. They show what the body is becoming, as it meets the limit at a postbiological threshold (2010, p. 211).

What is remarkable in this experiment is that the affective repercussions of a sign, of an experience, of an image, of an outer stimulus is more than what our physiological bodies provide with. As Steven D. Brown & Ian Tucker puts it, this means "we can "feel" more than our capacities to adequately experience". Affect is not a mere bodily response; it is more. And what Clough adds to this argument is "that those technologies and technical augmentations that allow to "see" and "feel" beyond the immediate limits of our "organic-physiological constraints" ought also to be considered in terms of how they are inserted into and offer possibilities for "felt vitality" (2007, p. 2)" which then circles back to the "felt vitalities" in the interviews I conducted. There was no apparent or veiled orientation towards the political, towards the state-related issues.

Massumi's and Clough's accounts of affect are autonomous in nature from consciousness but they also create interesting pathways to the discussion of neurological reactions as affect and tracing the neurological symptoms of affect which a discussion on Antonio Damasio would be particularly valuable.

### 1.2.6 Affect: Neuroscience or Philosophy? Feeling and Thinking Combined

Antonio Damasio is professor of neuroscience at the University of Southern California who is interested in the role of emotions on decision-making process and neural system. On *Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience*, Catherine Malabou and Adrian Johnston explain Damasio's account on the essential correlation between brain and emotions. They contend that "there is a profound correspondence between the brain and subjectivity, between the brain and the inner life" (Malabou, 2013, p. 29). In other words, functions of the body cannot solely be defined by the activities of the brain. There, surely, is a relationship "between the inside and the outside (between the brain and the body proper, or between organism and the environment) help to articulate the neurobiological determination of the auto- or heteroaffection relationship". Damasio's account on brain is significant for their argument, though. He contends that brain is "a sensuous and affected organ. Affect are older than the reason and all cognitive mechanisms, even the most sophisticated, need to be rooted in emotion to be able to function. He asserts the existence of a constitutive, necessary link between emotion and consciousness" (Malabou, 2013, p. 30). Thus, he likens consciousness to an emotional response given to an external imposition. Emotion is the predecessor of consciousness. Considering emotion as such, provides Malabou and Johnston a unique understanding of affect. But such an account demands a differentiation between emotions and feelings since both refers to different concepts. As Damasio contends, Malabou and Johnston argue that:

Feelings are more elaborate forms of affects than the basic emotions that are involved in homeostasis. Feelings are important for survival... Emotions determine homeostasis to be the process of the self's attachment to itself. They constitute the elementary form of autoaffection. Damasio defines emotions as simple "internal simulations" with no specific content. Feelings, for their part, transform emotions into what Damasio calls a "concern"... The systematic unity of emotions and feelings takes place in the brain and remains unconscious for the most part (p. 50).

Consequently, it is Damasio's contention that emotions and feelings play a major role in the way brain functions. But how do they stand vis-a-vis each other? He reckons that affects are what link primordial biological emotions to social emotions; consequently with feelings and subjectivity. At this point of his theory, Damasio introduces the term "wonder". He argues that "wonder plays a major role because it coincides with the passage from core consciousness to the autobiographical self.

Wonder marks the opening of the self to the experience” (Malabou, 2013, p. 32). The association between wonder and encounter is critical for the purpose of the subject at hand since we’re always affected by objects or more precisely by “encounters”. The lack of it, as is the case in my thesis, can be related to the reluctance to have closer ties with the “outside”, which in consequence makes an encounter possible. Thus, lack of wonder becomes interesting. Encounters have impact on successor encounters just like they prevent other potential ones from happening. When an interviewee meets with a discouraging encounter or a discriminating attitude, he/she cuts all ties with that place/person; whoever they or whatever it might be. It might be plausible to go back to the discussion on bubble at this point and try to understand it through such context. Bubble or fanus makes it probable to contain as much as possible who you encounter with or what might await you. But, surely, it does not necessarily work flawlessly in real life. You are affected by different layers even if you considered living in a safe bubble/fanus.

Duality of mind and brain also demands a clarification since they refer to different phenomenon but not totally independent from each other. They are two concepts of the same nature. Body and mind are affected together and in the same way. Spinoza generally avoids mentioning the brain on his discussion about mind and body; however, to a great extent it is certain that he saw brain and mind as closely associated.

Malabou and Johnston refer to them as not-so-distinct instances; but, two expressions of the same substance, which are Nature, Being. “If affects are affects of Nature, if they do not belong to human subject as such, and if Nature is equivalent to God and therefore to Being, it implies that affects are always affects of Being” (Malabou, 2013, p. 32). As one can recall from Spinoza, he disagree with the idea of an autonomous mind controlling its own mishaps.

“Affects do not belong to the human mind as such but appear as natural ontological phenomena, the causes of which have to be rigorously determined”(2013, p.36), say Malabou and Johnston. According to them, affection and emotions exist at an ontological level. What do they mean by natural ontological? Interestingly, Damasio likens ontology to biology. In other words, “For Damasio to situate affects at on ontological, non-subjective level is the prefiguration of the neutral and anonymous biological processes of mapping body and mind together neuronal activity.”(2013, p. 36). Ergo, mapping process is parallel to the process of affect at work. For Damasio,

mapping illustrates how events in the body are presented as ideas in the mind. The overlap of these mentioned ideas and events “draws neural maps that, looking apparently very much like the Deleuzian ‘planes of immanence’, inscribe bodily message on an internal projective surface” (Malabou, 2013, p. 54).

An imperative question at this point would be to ask whether or not one can get to “*to feel*” from “*to think*”. Because at some instances, as a result of our learned behaviors; we think, learn and declare what we should feel. But aside from the impact on the mind, the impact of those feeling to our bodies and what that impact corresponds to are what I find critical and contemplate on further in my thesis. For the reason that some feelings are particularly intricate to talk of but probable to read form its expressions of the body. Thus, a comprehensive look at the body, “to feel”, to the impact of feeling on the body is necessary.

### **1.2.7 Affect as a “Magical” Term<sup>11</sup>**

As the term ‘affect’ filled an important gap in the literature, one can easily witness that the concept has begun to be abused. Lawrence Grossberg adopts a critical perspective by stating that affect covering too much ground that it should. He asks whether or not affect has overinvested itself by theory. Somehow, it came to serve as a multifunctional “magical” term, which theorists gladly may name as, when they struggle to find a representational terminology for something (Grossberg, 2010, p. 315). In an interview conducted with him, Grossberg considers the possibility of affect being stretched too much by some theorists that it may end up losing sense. Theoretical literature lacks studies concerned with theoretical tools that set the distinction between affect and effect. Ontological and psychoanalytical limits of affect should be explained according to him.

To put it in more detail, he provides with three different views on affect by Sigmund Freud, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari. He mentions regimes of signification that Deleuze and Guattari explain in *Thousand Plateaus* and Foucault’s discursive apparatuses as machinic assemblages that produce effects. But, some of those effects might be grouped together or simply be called affects. Deleuze’s

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<sup>11</sup> See Grossberg, 2010, p.315 for the term “Magical Term”.

account is essential to understand what affect is, how Spinoza theorized it and to clarify the succeeding approaches of theorists. Deleuze contends that

Some translators translate *affectio* as “*affection*” and *affectus* as “*feeling* (sentiments), which is better than translating both by the same word, but I do not see the necessity of having recourse to the word “*feeling*” since French offers the word “*affect*”. Thus when I use the word “*affect*” it refers to Spinoza’s *affectus*, and when I say the word “*affection*”, it refers to *affectio* (Deleuze, *Le Cours de Gilles Deleuze: Spinoza* (24/01/1978)).

According to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s *Ethics*, there is a distinction between “affect as in *affectio*, a state of the affected body; and affect as in *affectus*, passage from one state to another, taking into account the correlative variation of the affecting bodies”. Deleuze’s *affectus a la Spinoza* is continuous variation that is determined by the ideas one has.

It is thus not reducible to an intellectual comparison of ideas, since “affect is constituted by the lived transition or lived passage from one degree of perfection to another insofar as this passage is determined by ideas; but in itself does not consist in an idea, but rather constitutes affect” (Deleuze, 1988, p.49).

From one stage to another, from one image or idea to another, there are transitions, passages that are experienced, durations through which we pass to a greater or a lesser perfection. Furthermore, these states, these affections, images or ideas are not separable from the duration that attaches them to the preceding state and makes them tend towards the next state. These continual durations or variations of perfection are called “affect”, or feelings (*affectus*).

What of these durations? What is the impact of these preceding states on the body? As Spinoza sees it, the affect’s power lies in its ability to increase or diminish the body’s capability to move, to act. In his lecture, Deleuze explains such movements with this illustration:

When I pass from the idea of Pierre to the idea of Paul, I say that my power of acting is increased; when I pass from the idea of Paul to idea of Pierre, I say that my power of acting is diminished. Which comes down to saying that when I see Pierre, I am affected with sadness; when I see Paul, I am affected with joy. And on this melodic line of continuous variation constituted by the affect, Spinoza will assign two poles; joy-sadness, which for him will be the fundamental passions (Deleuze, *Le Cours de Gilles Deleuze: Spinoza* (24/01/1978))

Although it was highly criticized later by other theorists, it is a particularly important description of affect which assists me to lay the foundation of discussions on affective value.

Within the bulk of literature concerning affect, there is a tendency to perceive affect as possessing the power to immediately effect. Grossberg utilizes Brian Massumi's recent work on the potential threats and their actual effects to explain further the argument of affect being immediately effective. Yet, Grossberg opposes this argument because of causing affect to become solely a representation of effects which he finds problematic. Rather, Grossberg (2010) states that affects are produced through a process that involves a number of agents. His argument is as follows:

It goes through regimes that organize the body and the discourses of our lives, organize everyday life, and then produce specific kinds of effects. Organization of affect might include will and attention, or moods, or orientation, what I have called "mattering maps," and various culturally and phenomenological constituted emotional economies. I say it this way because I am not sure that emotions can simply be described as affect, even as configurations affect (p. 316)

This model might be posed as a counter argument against Sara Ahmed's description. If one adopts Grossberg's argument, it would be plausible to argue that Sara Ahmed "magically" brings body on the table. Suddenly, one is supposed to think about what happens to the body. Grossberg disagrees with the argument on affects immediately implying a bodily response such as the reaction of the body to the flashing of a light. Rather, as the above given quotation shows, affect goes through regimes. Instead, he handles affects with a more complex process that he calls "mattering maps". Consequently, he argues unlike Massumi. One cannot resemble the impact of affect on the body to the flash of a light and the body's immediate reaction. Rather, affects are ideologically formed and constructed inside signification regimes of truth in social collectivities. The effect of an affect is created through a complex process through regimes like mattering maps. The mattering maps is a perception of affect production process which is in close proximity with the way Spinoza's account on the issue. As Hardt reminds in his foreword in the book *Affective Turn*, "affects can be actions, that is, determined by internal causes, or passions, determined by external causes" (Hardt, 2007, p. x).

If one adopts Grossberg's account on affect, a number of deductions may be made: First, affects are openly sensible and visible in all of my interviews. Although I will make a detailed analysis of the affective constitution of the Jewish subjects in the following chapters, I would like to shortly mention how I create the relationship between affect and in-depth interviews I have conducted. One might even observe how their bodies and lives are diverted according to those affects. For instance, the practice

of changing their names with Turkish ones and avoiding certain encounters can be named as a few. However, the articulation and embodiment of emotions are not easily observable because as Grossberg points, out emotions are not affects. Emotions are not necessarily the configurations of affects. Changing a name when felt insecure or feeling uneasy do not necessarily correspond to an emotion, or produce one, although affects are existent. Additionally, according to Grossberg, emotion is the attempt to make sense of affective productions. Thus, since the interviewees did not attempt to understand/make sense of the experienced affects, such as the name changing exercise; would it be plausible to argue that there were not emotions involved? A further investigation of these attempts and how the emotions and the affects of belonging can be analyzed will be presented in the Chapter Five of the thesis.

### **1.2.8 Function of Emotion**

Sara Ahmed's interpretation of affect a la Spinoza is that "emotions shape what bodies can do, as 'the modifications of the body by which the power of action on the body is increased or diminished' (Spinoza 1959, p.85)" (2004, p. 4). Consequently, she takes this description further by pointing out that emotions shape the very surfaces of the body that accomplish this task through the repetition of actions, as well as through orientations towards and away from others. Thus, she prefers to ask "What do emotions do?" rather than asking "What are emotions?" By asking this question, she intends to "track how emotions circulate between bodies, examining how they 'stick' as well as they move" rather than aiming for a singular theory of emotion (Ahmed, 2004, p. 4). Ahmed's account on affect is precisely what I want to emphasize. "What emotions do?" is one of the main critical questions I bare in my mind throughout the analysis of this thesis.

*What emotions do?* is an imperative question. As given above, emotions not only come out as end products of circulation of signs but also as the 'makers' and 'shapers' of body as stated by Ahmed. Being emotional is not an attribution of all bodies though according to her. In her book, *Cultural Politics of Emotion*, she pursues to find ways to interpret being emotional as a characteristic of some bodies and not others. "Hardness", Ahmed states, "does not mean absence of emotions, but a different emotional orientation towards others" (2004, p. 4). This is particularly vital for the current study of such feelings as insecurity, discomfort, alertness, uneasiness perpetuated in certain

discourses which surfaced in the interviews repeatedly. For instance, one might easily ask if keeping their distance from the wider public, particularly from lower classes, would be considered as an interpretation of an emotional body. According to Ahmed, it certainly is.

She also points out that emotions have intentionality. “They are intentional in the sense that they are ‘about’ something: they involve a direction or orientation towards an object (Parkinson, 1995, p. 8) The *aboutness* of emotions means that they involve a stance on the world, or a way of apprehending in the world” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 7). In order to better explain her account she utilizes the commonly used “child and bear” example in psychological literature.

When we encounter the bear, we already have an impression of the risks of the encounter, as an impression that is felt on the surface of the skin. This knowledge is bodily, certainly: the child might not need time to think before she runs for it. But the ‘immediacy’ of the reaction is not itself a sign of lack of mediation. It is not that the bear *is* fearsome, ‘on its own’ as it were. It is fearsome *to* someone. So fear is not in the child, let alone in the bear, but a matter of how a child and a bear come into contact, unavailable in the present, which allow the bear to be apprehended as fearsome.(p.7)

When a child sees a bear, she is afraid and runs away. The immediate reaction of her is to run away and fear the bear. Why? Why is bear a fearsome animal? If she was not taught beforehand that a bear would be a fearsome animal, would she still run away? She states that functionalist models of emotion as a projection of evolutionary theory might say that “fear has a function: to protect the child from danger, to allow survival.” She argues that even if this was a first time encounter of the child and bear the child might run away and this reaction does not necessarily and exclusively be a result of past experiences or taught lessons because an image of bear as a fearsome animal is an image produced by cultural histories and memories.

Ahmed reckons that there are also instances where being emotional is not visible or is not articulated. Emotions might be subordinated or left aside as peripheral. They might still exist, to put it more clearly, but not on the surface. As Ahmed reminds us, “what is relegated to the margins is often, right at the centre of thought itself” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 4). Such is certainly the case in my interviews as well. I’ve met countless instances where emotions were not articulated; yet, were sensed via their affects lingering in the conversations. Emotions were not situated at the centre of discussions. Ahmed’s conceptualization of affect provided me with the theoretical-anthropological frame I have used in the following ways in analyzing my interviews. There was no



interviewees bursting into tears all of a sudden, or even teary eyes. On the contrary, the centre was occupied by reason and rationality. Thoughts and memories that bare emotions seem to be left aside. Interviewees preferred to talk of those memories that impacted them emotionally, but not of those emotions in specific. They prefer to talk of what happened and not how those instances made them feel. They do not leave those memories outside of the conversation as a whole; so those emotions are not left unmentioned. Memories are not pressed away further into the unconscious. On the contrary, they are actively remembering and sensing those moments. However, when it comes to the expression of emotions, except for a couple of interviews; nobody openly experienced their emotions. But, the expression was not needed to be open and loud to grab those emotions from the interviews. There certainly was something in the room with us; some heavy feeling, some moving emotions. In some form, at some point in the interviews, all of the interviewees mentioned whatever those painful/remorseful/impacted memories may be.

Another important aspect of my thesis is concrete historical and statistical data on Jewish community in Turkey. In fact, these both support my ethnographic analysis of the Jewish community's belonging to Turkey. These also complement it as these data on actual human experiences are imbued with emotions. According to Ahmed, emotions are not merely something that one can observe or interpret from an interview; but also, statistics, facts and figures express a degree of emotions (Ahmed, p.19). In fact this goes in line with how Ahmed explains emotions operate on a variety of ways. For instance, for the purpose of my thesis, statistics on immigration are not just factual data on what the Jewish population in Turkey is doing at the moment. As it is concrete people migrating and leaving their homes and beginning a life somewhere else, statistical data on immigration can also be taken as an expression of emotions. As Ahmed expresses "we need to avoid assuming that emotions are 'in' the materials we assemble (which would transform emotion into a property), but think more about what the materials are 'doing', how they work through emotions to generate effects." (2004, p. 9) Therefore, both the expressions of my interviewees and the factual data can be considered as the place where emotions reside, instead I will try to trace the impact and the emotions in the everyday lives and everyday conversations of my interviewees.

### 1.2.9 Conclusion

In this study, both belonging and affect are central concepts deployed in this thesis to explain the belonging of Jews in Turkey. The concept of belonging is utilized in the following chapter to understand the never-fulfilled position of Jews for being a Turkish citizen through their narrations. Thus, above given framework introduces theoretical tools as the concepts of belonging and affect that would assist ethnographic analysis of individual accounts. Sentiment of belonging may be observable via variety of measures as they certainly did in the interviews. Hence, adopting the theoretical perspectives on belonging and affect, which include such a wide spectrum of analytic instruments, would enhance the argumentative capabilities of this current thesis.

Additionally, concept of affect is imperative for the analysis of the subject at hand that cannot be understood inside the linguistic world. Linguistic paradigm falls short to grasp the senses, emotions and bodies beyond speech. Thus, a closer look at the affective turn was required. Affect theory is indispensable for the current study and theoretical framework offered above is equally essential. As observed repeatedly in most – if not all of the interviews, the Jewish subject manages to flee the framework pointed through words and sentences, the above provided review will assist to better capture what's been escaping. In that respect, affect offers a new pathway for the analysis of the emotional subject in her own context. Unique perspective of affect offers this thesis brand new observation that permanently shift the conclusions reached previously by using only the theoretical tools of belonging.

In the following chapters, belonging has been contemplated and discussed on via micro and macro political aspects. However, there are also emotional manifestations of belonging, too. Within this context, affect becomes instrumental. I used the phrase “*ait hissetmek*” in questions concerning cultural belonging and belonging as a remedy of mother tongue. Although belonging and affect are separate chapters in this thesis, the organic relationship between affectionate investments and affects can be observed. Therefore, those chapters should not be read as distinct theoretical cases. From my point of view, the concept of belonging and affect can be translated and discussed to each other especially for my own field experience. In other cases where the manifestations of emotions are observed, a following chapter is reserved after ‘belonging’. Because of that such cases of disruption and manifestation are easy to escape from language and

verbalized categories; the concept of affect offers a wide spectrum for the introduction of feelings.

## CHAPTER II – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Subject matter of the present thesis is the sense of belonging of Jews in Istanbul, Turkey. Thus, it is crucial to take a closer look at the historical background of the Jewish community's existence on this territory. If belonging is to be accepted as a socio-cultural and political economic dynamic which is fluid and changing according to applied policies; then, it would be important to observe how this community was treated by the state as well as the rest of the people in this region across differentiating contexts and decades. Therefore, this section will start with the characteristics of Millet System and how Jews were positioned in the overall layout of Ottoman society structure. The discussion will move on to the early Republican era with a focus on policies concerning the Jewish community. Then, I will continue with a chronological perspective and move on post-Second World War period which will lead to 1970s and 1980s with a specific focus on the impact of increased polarization of the public and mass societal movements on minorities. A depiction of post 1980-coup will assist me to better articulate the current position of the incumbents, AKP and the Jewish community's ties with the state. I would like to end this section with an analysis of contemporary domestic political issues concerning predominantly AKP incumbency, its transformation throughout the latest 15 years and most striking phenomena like Gezi events within a framework of our concerned subject matter; belonging.

### 2.1 Late Ottoman Empire Period and Beginning of the Republic

Taking a closer look at the long standing tradition of *Millet System* in the Ottoman Empire could be a starting point for it had been the main scheme through which hierarchy and relations of the different communities were regulated within each other and with the state. *Millet System's* roots can be traced back to 15<sup>th</sup> century. According to this hierarchical model, Christian and Jewish millets were two of the biggest communities followed Islamic *millet*. They were subject to their own religious law and they were also under the protection of Islamic law if and when they wanted to apply to a higher court (Donald Quataert, 2004, p. 251, p.253-254).

The classical Ottoman system segmented the society across religious lines and managed it accordingly. Both rural and urban settlement models also indicated a similar picture. Cities were designed to have distinct districts for specific religious groups. However, at the practical level, these districts didn't remain to be as homogenous as

they were planned to be. Mixed neighborhoods were as common as homogenous ones. It was possible to observe Jewish families settled in Christian neighborhoods and vice versa (Quataert, 2004, p. 256-258). Most *loncas* (small groups of craftsmen and artisans of same profession, i.e. guilds) demonstrated a heterogeneous structure. Under a specific lonca, one might observe members from not one but multiple religious communities (Quataert, 2004, p. 259-262).

With *Tanzimat Reform* (Administrative reforms of 1839), the principle of superiority of Islamic Law (Shari'at) was terminated. Including the regulations on clothing, all regulations that created segregation among citizens/subjects of the Empire were abrogated (Quataert, 2004, p. 255).

According to Leyla Neyzi, historically Jews have always been in close relations with the central governments. She contends that was the case for Jews living in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Jews reached their peak point in trade in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. However, with the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Christians took the stand and started to take Jewish merchants' place with the exclusive favors provided by capitulations and further trade agreements signed with Western Powers. Neyzi argues that Jews had always competed with Christians economically in the Ottoman era. This competition was displayed in the post-17<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman trade life as well. Nationalist, as Neyzi puts it, adopted the view that "loyal" Jew figure was located against the "traitor" Christian figure (Neyzi, 2004, p. 53).

During the final stages of the Ottoman history, significant portion of the Empire's bourgeoisie was consisted of non-Muslims. Çağlar Keyder points out that this concerned bourgeoisie was on its way of maturing its peculiar civic culture; civil society and western type public sphere. However, this fresh group of the Ottoman society was in a fragile nature because of their lack of determination to bear a political activism and the suspicious attitude of the central bureaucracy towards them. Elimination of this class, before it achieved any political representation against the Republican Bureaucracy's nationalization and centralization policies, constituted a fatal blow over the development of a well established democratic order at the centre and periphery of the modern Turkey. (Keyder, 2009, p. 111-113).<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> In fact, it was not only the non-Muslim bourgeoisie who were fragile in their relationship to the state bureaucracy. Unlike the European bourgeoisie who took an active part in shaping the state and thus

One of the major motives behind the emergence of Jewish minority as a modern bourgeoisie was *the Alliance Israelite Universelle* (AIU) Schools. AIU were French-taught schools in major Ottoman cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Salonika between 1860 and 1920. Sponsored by French Jews, they pursued a modernized western education system that aims to “liberalize” and modernize Eastern Jews (Aron Rodrigue in Neyzi, 2004, p.54). According to some (Franklin Hugh Adler, 2005), such French influence had a particularly significant impact among the educated Jews some of whom supported and sympathetic with the Young Turks. I will elaborate more in detail on the impact of Alliance in the next section.

During the final years of the Empire and the first few years of the Turkish Republic, unlike the Armenians and Anatolian Greeks, who were deemed dangerous in the state discourses, Jews were considered to be “harmless”. As Corry Guttstadt (2012) notes Jews were perceived as the “exemplary minority group” whose relations with the state elites were unproblematic. Most of the Jewish community members supported Kemalist policies as they considered these policies a step towards egalitarian and modern Turkey (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 24-26). However, as Franklin H. Adler argues that Kemalist policies involved a project of *Turkicization* “which left no social, cultural or political space for those who were non-Turks or non-Muslims, for those who had once enjoyed *Millet* status, for those who now would become isolated and suspect minorities” (2005, p. 129). Hence, regardless of Jewish support for the Kemalist project, the Kemalist emphasis on the modern citizenship based mainly on formal equality, they did not or could not become an integral part of the Kemalist state formation process. Keyder’s contention is that Jewish trade-bourgeoisie was similar to Muslim-Turkish merchants in the sense that, they too were not tied to foreign powers as other minorities did, or were acting together with a separatist group. On the contrary, they were integral part for the organization and creation for the Union and Progress Party. The party’s center was in a Jewish town, Salonika. After the fall of Salonika to Greek forces, many Jewish and dönme traders moved their business to Istanbul. This group was the most convenient trade-bourgeoisie that Union and Progress Party was looking for (Keyder, 2009, p. 87)

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bureaucracy during the modern state formation processes in Europe, the Muslim bourgeoisie did not have much force shaping the bureaucracy and rather the newly constituted Muslim bourgeoisie has always been dependent on the Turkish state beginning with the wealth transfer from the Greeks and Armenians at times of Union and Progress. Rather than shaping the ideology of the center, they adopted the ideology of the state elites. (Keyder, 2009).

The legal status of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey was guaranteed by the 1924 Constitution and largely by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. In the treaty, there had been special rights granted to the three non-Muslim minority groups; namely Greeks, Armenians and Jews. There were two reasons behind why the term *minority* was defined exclusively to non-Muslims in the treaty. First was to avoid any international influence on domestic politics through a possible minority related agreements that might occur as a result of the 1<sup>st</sup> World War. There were precedents of such natured Treaties that, to some extent, crippled domestic sovereignty (Baskın Oran, 2008, p. 230).<sup>13</sup> Second reason was, after the War, *the League of Nations (LoN)* adopted it as a norm to secure the rights of the minorities with international organizational protection through the practice of such treaties.

Lausanne Treaty provided three minority groups rights based on religion, migration, freedom of living, rights to use their mother tongue in Turkish courts, rights to establish their own institutions and rights to equal political and legal treatment as the Muslim citizens (Şule Toktaş, 2005, p. 395). Some articles like subsequent titles of article no.42 were never virtually exercised by the government. More interestingly, however, the Jewish community renounced some of the rights granted by the Treaty of Lausanne. For instance, the article on the establishment of minority specific committees to overview and handle all the legal issues on family matters and personal relations was not exercised and later on was renounced by the Jewish population (Oran, 2008, p. 230).

The reason for the “override” of these rights, according to Toktaş, is the universal conceptualization of citizenship. Universal understanding of citizenship that found roots throughout the newly established democratic states was to consider its citizens as a whole and the same; regardless of their race, religion and language. Therefore, Toktaş contends that the spirit of the Lausanne Treaty was in conflict with the spirit of the legislation of universal citizenship; therefore, “the actual practice differed from the actual legal rhetoric on protection of minorities” (Toktaş, 2005, p. 395). One other interesting point Toktaş offers is on the attitude Republican People’s Party (RPP) towards the non-practice of these articles. She contends that there are two reasons. Firstly; they never liked the idea of minority specific committees because the

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<sup>13</sup> The Polish Minority Treaty that was signed between Poland and the Allies on 28th of June 1919 was an example of such Treaties used by Baskın Oran in his above given argument. See Oran, B. (2008), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919 - 1980)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

RPP members, who aimed at cutting the ties with the Ottoman past, believed that these committees would create a two-headed authority for the minorities, which would resemble Ottoman *Millet* System. Second, the past records of minority-led institutions were not quite appealing to the representatives of the new state due to their support of the separations and nationalist practices. For instance, Greek Patriarchy secretly supported the minority groups that worked for the “dismemberment of Anatolian lands”. Hence the founders of the new state considered the minority organizations as potentially separationists or as potential threats (Toktaş, 2005, p.399). The Jewish community did not want to entertain all the rights granted to them by the Lausanne as they were afraid that they would be considered as potential threats, thus enemies, by the state elites (Toktaş 2005, p.398).

The fear of a possible anti-Semitic movement erupting in the newly established Turkish state spread around the Jewish community in the 1920s. In effect, between 1899 and 1924, over 20.000 Jewish people left the country. As they did not feel safe under the authority of the newly established nation-state, they mostly migrated to the United States of America. (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 382). Those who left the country lost their citizenship status. In 1943, 4000 left Turkey for Palestine (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p.383). Thousands of this population consisted of the young workers between 18 and 22 years old. Another wave of migration took place during the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War and in the post-war period. Between 1945 and 1955, 40% of the Jewish population in Turkey left for Israel. While there were 76.965 Jews in Turkey in 1945, this number decreased to 45.995 in 1955 (Benbassa & Rodrigue 2010, p. 386). Although Armenians or Greeks were more commonly stigmatized in the official state discourses, the numbers above indicated that the Jews also did not feel safe in Turkey. As Adler (2005) notes, unlike the Armenians, the Jews did not directly face with organized state violence. The non-Armenian minorities, including the Jews, were afraid that they might face with a similar violence in Turkey (p. 130). Hence, this fear of organized violence against the Jewish community had been effective on the waves of Jewish migration from Turkey. In spite of the migrations, Jews remained as one of the biggest non-Muslim communities and became even more visible for the public eye. The Jewish community later came to be perceived as an obstacle for nationalization of economic enterprises and the reconstruction of the society as a unitary nation (Benbassa & Rodrigue 2010).



## **2.2 Zionist Movement in the late Ottoman and early Republican Era**

Zionist Movement officially entered the Jewish community into Ottoman Empire in 1908 with mostly under the influence of Palestinian Conflict as Benbassa argues. Their main purpose was to provide a channel for communication with the Ottoman authorities and negotiate over Palestine. In order to do that, first, they had to establish a strong popular support from the Turkish Jewish community. Thus, they got in contact with different segments of the Jewish community (Benbassa, 1992, p.225). Surely, the existence of *Alliance Israelite Universelle* created an obstacle for them as the supporters of the existing status quo in the Empire with other communal institutions such as the Chief Rabbinate. Therefore, Zionist movement preferred to get close to the periphery of the Jewish community. Benbassa argues that it was a common practice in the 19<sup>th</sup> century to “position of their forces along the peripheries of the communal institutions. This practice fostered the absorption and control of groups of malcontents or of those whose aspirations simply could not be met within the existing institutional structure.” General idea is that the summoned peripheral forces “would ready its troops for the exercise of power and, in so doing, become structured, or re-structured, as a political force” (Benbassa, 1992, p. 226).

Zionist movement, from the start, followed political desires which set the primary difference between Zionist movement and Alliance. Alliance was originally established in Paris in 1860 as the “incarnation of the reforming impulse of western Jewry vis-à-vis the Jews of the East”. Though it worked also in the field of defending Jewish rights, what it mainly aimed was the field of education. In the late Ottoman Empire, Alliance was established in 1867 as a philanthropic society focused on education which lacked both a political orientation and desires (Rodrigue, 1995, p.248). At the beginning of the century, popularity towards the Alliance increased. Rodrigue argues that it went hand in hand with the growing trade relations with Europe. He says, “There’s no doubt that the opening to the West as a result of western education and growing involvement with European economic interests did lead to upward social mobility among the Jews of Turkey in general. The widespread acquisition of French by the Jewish community was a significant step in elevating the hitherto relatively undeveloped Turkish Jewish bourgeoisie into the ranks of the predominantly non-Muslim mercantile classes that served as intermediaries between the world and local markets” (Rodrigue, 1995, p. 252). The push from Alliance to the Jewish community in economic affairs which was previously dominated by the Greeks and Armenians was an

important turning point in the history of Turkish Jews. The Alliance by teaching French assisted Sephardic Jewry to the path of modernization or as Benbassa calls it “Frenchification”. It contributed deeply to the formation of a French-speaking middle bourgeoisie that gained economic welfare rapidly with their increasing trade relations with Europe (Benbassa, 1995, pp. 4-5).

In addition to the westernization process it ignited and the formation of a French-speaking bourgeoisie, what Alliance also did was to deepen a class-oriented division amongst the Jews of Turkey according to Mahir Şaul (Şaul, 1983, p.326-358, cited in Neyzi, 2004, p.54). Neyzi furthers Şaul’s account and explains that the disparity between French-speaking upper class Jews and Ladino speaking lower-class Jews will form the foundation of the Zionist rebellion against Alliancist communal leaders (Neyzi, 2004, p. 54, note 18). As both the above given accounts of Benbassa and Neyzi shows, it could be seen the grand repercussions of a westernizing Jewish community by creating a bourgeoisie, changing its mother tongue and creating a reactive Zionist movement.

Being a strong pillar for the social upward mobility of Jews of Turkey, one would presume Alliance of adopting a political stance, too with that strong support behind itself. However, Alliance had no political agenda as Benbassa pointing out the fact that its supporters were of good socio-economic conditions; but, that’s all there is to it. Alliance did not possess a motivated mass of troops who could be formed as a body of political force. It mainly depended upon the upper class in order to make its educational program work. As an ideology, Alliance taught the “emancipation and integration of Jews in their lands of settlement” (Benbassa, 1990, p.132) which is obviously contradicts with what Zionists aspire. But, this ideology had little success among the locals. Alliance certainly had nothing to do about it since it lacked the means and vocation to disseminate such an ideology. (Benbassa, 1990, p.133) It is an essential difference which sets the fate of both movements’ future as well as the political communal space. This dichotomy created for a brief period in the history of Turkish Jewish community. I will come back to this point in a bit after I elaborate more on the development of the Zionist movement.

From the start, Zionism adopted an opposition party position against Alliancists, which was an efficient strategy to attract those excluded from and discontented with the community regime in place (Benbassa, 1992, p.228). In return, the prominent Jews

assumed a reserved stance towards Zionism since they felt the necessity to demonstrate their loyalty in order to benefit from Ottoman protection. Thus, most of the upper class Jews – Sephardic Jews to be exact, remained distant to Zionism, not to put their steady ties with the government at stake (Benbassa, 1990, p.131).

Aiming for love and support of the periphery plausibly coincided with the Young Turk Revolution which carried the Alliance from periphery to the center of the Jewish community, leaving all the excluded and dissatisfied masses available for Zionists to influence. They started up by setting up locally

(unlike the Paris-based Alliance), the Zionists were able to work within communities of large urban centers, and consequently to realize their policy at a local level. They established a priority list of populations that they hoped to reach. The leaders of the local Jewish communities were their first targets, since some of them carried considerable influence with the Ottoman authorities. This group, however, sided with the Alliance. The Zionists turned to the rank and file of the community who had nothing to lose in supporting Zionism.(Benbassa, 1990, p.132)

The stance of Chief Rabbinate was of critical importance. Unlike the Alliance, it had the potential to influence a considerable amount of Jewish community members. Immediately after the Young Turk Revolution, the dismissal of the then-existing chief rabbi came into question, Haim Nahum was the natural candidate to assume the position.<sup>14</sup> Prior to being elected as the Chief Rabbi, he taught in Alliance schools and acted as a mediator between the Alliance and Ottoman authorities where he managed to sustain close relations with both Jewish community leaders and officials of the Empire. Consequently, up until his resignation in 1923, he stayed loyal to the progressivist cause of Alliance and stood against the local Zionism in Turkey. “He did not believe that the Zionist political plan was viable. On the other hand, he was sufficiently farsighted not to forget that the Jews had long years to live in a nationalist Turkey little inclined to cherish other brands of nationalism” (Benbassa, 1995, p.39) . He was a very popular and influential man, yet still he did not have the means to form his troops into a party. The mass that supports him was composed of ineffective busy businessmen who were rarely involved in communal affairs. Thus, they were in no way match up to the support behind local Zionist movement. Alliance refused to assist Nahum to fight against Zionism locally. All they offered was their moral support which was nowhere near what he needed to organize his troops against the Zionists (Benbassa, 1992, p. 242).

In response to Allieists’ and Chief Rabbinate’s weak stance;

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<sup>14</sup> Nahum finished his rabbinical education in Paris where he formed contacts with the future Union and Progress party members who would support his candidacy for Chief Rabbinate in 1908.

The Zionists, on the other hand, put the complete arsenal of a modern political party into place in order to achieve their objectives.” Their most effective weapons were representatives of the Zionist Organization, experienced political leaders, a press system, diversified partnerships, local militarism, and the reinforcement from the Organization itself. To this was added a political program. The status and structures of the Alliance itself prevented the elaboration or diffusion of such a political strategy and program...“In order to reach their objectives, the Zionists developed a populist discourse, a discourse heard but rarely before that time, and especially not from the local leaders who had always kept their distance from the people, and had been used to adopting a paternalistic attitude, and maintaining a benefactor/debtor relation with those out of power. The Zionists succeeded in presenting in clear terms the problem of the lack of democracy in Jewish institutional life and especially in putting the oligarchic regime into question. (Benbasa, 1992, p. 243)

Assuming the support of the discontented, Zionists then focused on seizing media outlets. By creating new newspapers or seizing already existing media outlets, Zionists aimed to firstly increase the visibility of Zionism within the community and secondly prevent anti-Zionist discourses from spreading. By assuming and sustaining the power of media, Zionists were able to undermine the power of their principal opponents, the Chief Rabbi and the Alliance oligarchy. Consequently, Benbassa argues Zionists aimed to form a sort of political space to realize their goals (1990, p.135).

The adoption of a hostile position towards the Chief Rabbinate was not a position endorsed by the World Zionist Organization (WZO). It was rather a preference of some local leaders motivated by personal ambitions. This conflict with the international and local Zionism clearly shows that Zionist aims differed from WZO, to local Zionist movement (which could be barely considered as a unified homogeneous movement). Benbassa’s account on the construction of local Zionism is vital to better understand the importance of local leaders:

The Zionist movement in the Ottoman Empire was not a homogeneous entity. From the first, local leaders dominated the movement. In effect, they appropriated an imported ideology. Furthermore, different tendencies of the official Zionist movement manifested on the Ottoman communal scene (p.137). After WW1, official Zionism was nearly absent from politics. With the foundation of the FSO, Zionism became institutionalized. It was in principal an agency of the London-based WZO. But owing to international and national circumstances, the WZO no longer had control locally. Henceforth, a popular movement emerged which was not linked to the FSO. Zionism had impact as an anti-institutional group, which is how it was perceived after its institutionalization. This prompted Meir Diezengoff, the Zionist leader and future mayor of Tel Aviv, to note that “ there are here (in Istanbul) several Zionists and the great majority of Jews from Constantinople call themselves Zionists but there is no Zionism”.p.138

Interestingly, one can trace the difference of international and local Zionism from the relations of Haim Nahum to Zionist leaders. Nahum, as discussed earlier did

not believe in the future of Zionism; however, he certainly did fear its propagation locally says Benbassa. “His hostility was essentially directed against Zionists recruited locally, whom he regarded as personal enemies. He maintained apparently cordial relations with the official leaders of Zionism, seeing them as valuable spokesmen and acting as their intermediary with the Ottoman authorities” (Benbassa, 1995, p.17).

One may also question the accuracy of calling the local movement as Zionism which became active after 1908 and subsequently experienced periods of great popularity as Benbassa & Rodrigue ask. Considering the way (WZO) behaved, it is obviously clear that the local movement used the community arena and its networks for its own personal ends. On the other hand, for most of the Jewish community, Zionism still meant Jewish nationalism as well as hope for the poor. Thus, they conclude Zionism “oscillated between a sort of nationalism, capable of restoring dignity to people who had nothing to lose in an increasingly isolated and hierarchical Jewish society, and an autochthonous social and cultural Jewish nationalism, barely distinguishable from the former. Official Zionism was overtaken by local Zionism and local Zionism by a spontaneous movement, independent of organizations” (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000, pp. 129 - 130).

Zionists worked to gain the support of and to consolidate their alliance with other groups who could help them infiltrate communal institutions” (Benbassa, 1990, p.136).

One of these groups was the Ashkenazi. They were actually the most active Zionists in Istanbul, being the official representatives of the movement until 1919. Considering that the community in the Empire had a Sephardic majority and it was no coincidence that the discontented and underrepresented Ashkenazis were almost became an integral part of the Zionists. The Zionists used the dispute between groups to further weaken the Rabbinate. Their success in communal institutions permitted Ashkenazi Jews to penetrate there. Feeding the existing ethnic conflicts within the community led way to another phenomenon which was a unique: Political socialization of the community which in return caused a politicized public scene (Benbassa, 1990, p. 135).

Zionism created a new space, a political public space within the process of Westernization of Jews. Zionist party strategy as the opposition caused a process of politicization in the communal life among the people. Benbassa argues that “certainly we cannot limit Zionism in this local context to this single aspect of its action. Nevertheless, in this case, it took precedence over the others. Zionism brought a new

dimension of Westernization of Ottoman Judaism and, in so doing, brought a new dimension of modernization: a politicized Jewish public sphere (1992, p.245).

Rodrigue, taking another stance to observe westernization of the Jewish community, offers the account of Alliance; namely the complementary impact of Alliance to the westernization of Jews. Surely, both Zionism and Alliance had played a role in the transformation of the community and according to Rodrigue this is how:

However, three factors marked the Sephardi Jews' engagement to the West and made it distinctive. First, weakened local state and social formations, even though embarked upon westernism reforms, exerted an inconsequential impetus for change, either in a positive or negative way. There was neither a call for liberal assimilation nor for anti-Semitic exclusion. Second, in this context, colonialism in North Africa, or semicolonialism in the Ottoman Empire, set the contours of Sephardi Jewry's encounter with the West. Modern western economic and political imperialism confirmed and deepened the role of the Jews as intermediaries between local and international markets, between the locality and the colonial power. Third, the action of western Jews, engaged on their own *mission civilisatrice* of universalizing their own route of reform and regeneration, of making it normative and prescriptive for the world Jewry, played a crucial role in the reshaping of the cultural profile of Sephardi Jewry, leading to the cultural reorientation of large sectors of the Jewish populations toward the West.

As illustrated by the Ottoman case, but also demonstrated in North Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East, these developments led to the drift of Sephardi Jewry away from its traditional moorings in the Middle Eastern society, to its entry into the orbit of European interests, and to a growing perception by local non-Jews of the Jews as allies of the triumphant and the triumphalist West. The Sephardi route of westernization, unlike that of the Jews of Western Europe, led to the radical dissociation of the Jews from the surrounding societies. And in the local context, to use Ottoman vocabulary, even though the juridical *millet* disappeared, the Jews' *millet* identity remained intact. (1995, p.261)

In that context, Zionism offered a path for the Ottoman Jews to a process of Westernization. The struggle between Zionists and their opponents caused the promotion of a propagated Zionism. This also furthered the process of Westernization of the Jews who were willing to transform to a westernized community; yet, not lose their tradition while doing that. Benbassa and Rodrigue argues that "Zionism, for many, therefore held a position somewhere between tradition and modernity, a stance which served its aims, even if it did not enable it to win over the economic leadership" (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000, p.127).

As a remedy of the diffused central authority of the Empire after the War, Zionism became even more popular and active in the public scene. After the war, Zionists were able to harvest the fruits of their pre-war efforts to participate in the community. With the collapse of the Empire and the invasion of Istanbul, the efficiency of pro-Empire progressivist institutions like the Alliance quickly dissolved and left the stage to Zionists. Since the Empire collapsed and Ottoman power at Istanbul was weakened dramatically under the dominance of occupying forces, it was inevitable for

the Zionism to rise. They were now free to voice their expectations without the fear of Ottoman authorities (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000, p.127). Between 1920 and 1922, they were the ones that hold the “reins of communal power” (Benbassa, 1990, p. 137). But in 1923, with the establishment of the Republic, all forms of nationalist impulses along with Zionism went underground (Benbassa, 1992, p. 245).

Before the influence of Kemalism, one may observe a plenty of Zionist presence. With the establishment of the Republic and initiation of Kemalism throughout the republic, the Zionist activities diminished radically. Benbassa & Rodrigue reckons Kemalist nationalism was a type of exclusivist nationalism, which would not accept another one flourishing on the same territory (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000, p. 131). Therefore, Zionist movement went underground. One may question the difference of influential capacity of Zionism before and after Kemalism. According to Benbassa & Rodrigue, like the Alliancists had done in the past; they also failed. They argue one of the imminent factors why Zionism failed was the incompatibility of spoken language. Turkish Jews could speak Turkish, Judeo-Spanish and/or French but the emissaries sent from Palestine to train local Jews in Turkey, could speak none of those. What also exacerbated the process of Zionism’s fall from popularity was when the Turkish government shut down the Palestinian Office in 1935. It was the only bond agency that virtually connected Turkish Jews with Palestine as well Zionists. Thus, when the Office was closed down, there were no communication channels left (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000, p. 132).

With that being the case, Zionism couldn’t foster and in 1946, it appears only % 1 of Turkish Jews were Zionists. As said above, the conflict with educators from Palestine and their scarce numbers assisted deeply to that end. The establishment of Israel did not help Zionists convince Turkish Republic to change its views on Zionism. But interesting enough, Benbassa & Rodrigue believe that “the ban on Zionism was not due to any specific opposition to the movement, but was one aspect of a nationalist policy forbidding any independent or associational activity with a foreign affiliation. Even today, local Jews who are very attached to Israel, do not engage overtly in an activity capable of being even more remotely related to Zionism” (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000, p. 134).

The ban on Zionism continued after the establishment on Israel. With that, one may observe the community leaders and Chief Rabbinate to openly oppose any Zionist activities. Surely, the attitude of the newly rich, especially those who got rich after 1943

were afraid and they might lose what they have. Zionists, thus, continues their activities underground and tried to get in youth clubs, revisionist Zionist groups and religious societies.

Overall, the discussion on Zionist movement reveals that, although it failed, it succeeded to create a westernized politicized public sphere amongst the Jewish community, even for a little while. This is a critical impact since today, it could be said that no such sphere exists. So an existence of a political public space, at one point in the recent history assists us to better understand the community's memory.

Nevertheless, this movement, too, failed sharing the same fate with the Alliance. But would one be able to trace the remnants of both these movements in today's community? That we do not know; but, these are very interesting questions that can be dealt with. In addition, the failure of both movements raises a vital question that Benbassa & Rodrigue asks. They question the characteristic of the Jewish community by saying that "It is also legitimate to ask whether Turkish Jews were not simply resistant to any political ideology". It may as well be the case, that the community at hand may not be an inhabitable sphere for an ideology which would explain a lot about today's apolitical stance of the community.

One last question that one may pose would be about the possibility of Zionism's survival in today's Jewish community. As Kastoryano explains in detail, in a community who is made out of economically homogeneous, located in Istanbul and highly secular; would Zionism flourish? Or if it would, would it be a clandestine movement as was the case in the post-Republican era?

### **2.3 One-Party Period, the Rise of Nationalism and Anti-Jewish Attitudes**

1930s witnessed the rising nationalism in Europe as well as in Turkey. Tanıl Bora (2011) rightfully argues that nationalism became more visible with the institutionalization of the one-party regime of RPP and consequently with its more pressing authoritarian-fascist tendency. However, the official nationalist ideology became ethnicity-focused in this process. Even the *National History Thesis* (Türk Tarih Tezi) lost its universalistic and humanitarian characteristics (Bora, 2011, p. 87). In many European countries as well as in Turkey, a new phenomenon called "inventive" historiography was manifested itself as introducing to public the mighty history of their own nation. These ventures were called national history thesis. According to Nazan



Maksudyan whose master's thesis was based on the racist context of Turkish nationalism in the early Republican period, Turkish National History Thesis' purpose was to produce a history to be proud of and to prove that Turkish race is a superior one (Maksudyan, 2005, p. 57). Bora's argument on the position of National History Thesis is explained in detail in Semsettin Gunaltay's university lecture, *The Homeland of the Turks and the Question of Their Race* which Kader Konuk thoroughly analyzed in one of her articles. Gunaltay's views on racial legacy of Turks constituted the National History Thesis. Konuk explains that Gunaltay structured Turkishness on whiteness and Europeanness and by simultaneously rejecting any non-Muslim or *dönme* influence on the race.<sup>15</sup> Konuk adopts Homi Bhabha's mimicry to better understand the imitation and authenticity in Turkey and argues that Gunaltay's Turkishness "produces a somewhat Europeanness out of Turkishness but not quite" (Konuk, 2007, p. 12).

Bhabha's notion of mimicry illustrates the difference between the European who represents Europe and the Europeanized Turk who is thought merely as capable of repeating and imitating Europe. We see evidence of this anxiety about becoming an unsuccessful copy of Europe in Gunaltay's speech.

As can be seen from Bora's and Konuk's arguments, the rising nationalism impacted Turkish nationalism gravely in the 1930s and transformed it into a severely ethnicist position. Therefore, the quantity of the minority populations became an issue. The "*lessness*" as Bora puts it became critical since as a gradual consequence of 1930s, a discriminatory and exclusionary racist attitude towards minorities emerged. In this environment, mainstream media became the initiator of such strong racist stances. Most mass media publications supported the construction of a negative Jewish image and promoted anti-Jewish discourses more visibly by accusing the Jews for not being involved in the War of Independence and for exploiting Turks as a means to get wealthier (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 26-27, 135).

Repercussions of this propaganda negatively affected the employment of Jews in both public and private sector. Between 1923 and 1926, with a series of new legislation, the number of non-Muslim employees in private sector decreased dramatically; and employment contracts of all non-Muslim citizens working in public administration were terminated. The public administration employment opportunities were no longer

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<sup>15</sup> In Tanil Bora's analysis, he uses quotes from the National History Thesis such as "The worst kind of Turk, is better than a non-Turk" to illustrate the level of enmity towards the 'other' ethnicities. For further illustrations please see Bora, T. (2011). *Medeniyet Kaybı: Milliyetçilik ve Faşizm Üzerine Yazılar*. Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları.

available for non-Muslim citizens. The limitations on operations of *Alliance Israelite Universelle* – which was a central institution for Jewish education in Turkey—resulted in minimization of Jewish visibility in public space. Moreover, all Jewish foundations were abolished in 1938 (Guttstadt 2012, p. 29-30, p. 33-34). Needless to say, these developments were influential in Jewish migration from Turkey.

Increasing hostility towards non-Muslims shortened any tolerance toward minority languages. Turkishness became strongly correlated with the level of excellence of Turkish one speaks. Hence, with support of “*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş*” (Citizen Speak Turkish) campaign, some regional and local administrators penalized people who spoke minority languages (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 36-38; Maksudyan, 2005).<sup>16</sup> Promotion of Turkish as the sole public language was widely popular in the 20s and 30s. Thus, one may observe gradual disappearance of Ladino, French and Hebrew as the primary spoken languages of Jews. Since speaking Turkish in public had been transformed into a sign of loyalty to the state, Ladino and other above mentioned languages were considered as obstacles that would prevent Jewish people from fully accepted into Turkishness. There were backlashes to the campaign as well. Some Jewish people resisted learning Turkish against all the criticism they received from community leaders. There were even records of lawsuits on the grounds of insulting Turkishness that had been filed against Jews who refused to speak Turkish in public (Toktaş, 2005, p. 401). However, some Jewish families tried to change the course of the situation by donating large amounts of money to Kızılay and Türk Hava Kurumu (Turkish Aeronautical Association) or even naming their children with typical Turkish names to demonstrate their willingness to adjust to the new society (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 40-41).

In spite of all efforts to exhibit the community’s willingness to co-operate with the Turkish central government, the Jewish community could not avoid from the materialization of the reactionary attitude of Turkish public opinion towards the Jews. The year 1934 witnessed a popular act of violence and pillage targeting Jewish population and their properties in some parts of Thrace region as well as in cities of

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<sup>16</sup> Judeo-Spanish had been the mother tongue of the majority of the Sephardim Jews until the Second World War despite of the government’s assimilation policies. By the 1960s, the Turkish language started to become mother tongue of Turkish Jews; but, Judeo-Spanish did not cease to exist within the community. The usage of words borrowed from Ladino became a visible symbol of the culture among the Sephardic Jews (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 402).

Çanakkale, Edirne and Kırklareli. As a result of this act of violence, which is named as “Thrace Pogrom”, the thousands of Thracian Jews left the region and moved to Istanbul, mainly to Balat, while a significant number of them moved abroad (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 140-149; Aktar, 2008 p. 71-101; Toktaş, 2005 p. 402). Thrace incidents are essential in the history of Jewish Turks since it is considered to be the only act that directed specifically to Jews and ignited a regional migration of Jewish community. The first acts of violence started in the south of Thrace. Unsigned threats to Jewish households and extreme right wing publications that border racist discourses quickly were transformed into physical violence against Jewish community of Thrace. Attacks on households and Jewish owned business caused many Jews to sell their properties at much reduced prices and move to Istanbul or even further east to Palestine. These incidents caused 15000 to 20000 Jews to move to Istanbul or to Palestine from Thrace (Toktaş, 2006(b), p. 208).

The trauma of 1934, which was considered by the community as a direct assault targeting the Jewish identity and a collective act of anti-Semitism, was deepened further by the initiation of the *Capital Levy* in 1942. According to Bora, between the 1940s and 1970s, anti-Jewish/anti-*Dönme* discourse which wholly possesses the classical characteristics of anti-Semitism had been a popular subject in nationalist and religious/conservative political literature (Bora, 2011, p.97). The anti-Semitism movement in 1940s Turkey was somehow a differentiated version of global phenomenon. It wasn't only fed by the enmity against Jews in 2<sup>nd</sup> World War but also it had a different domestic motive to transfer the local non-Muslim capital to Turkish Muslim bourgeoisie through the policies such as implementation of “*Capital Levy*”.

The tax was originally introduced as an one-time practice considering all citizens of the state responsible for compensation of the harm of the war conditions over the national economy. However, the non-Muslims who constituted 2% of the society were expected to pay 90% of the calculated amount. According to the data offered by Toktaş, the accurate tax in terms of the proportion of income/wealth paid by Muslims was 5%, by Greeks 156%, by Jews 179% and by Armenians 232% (Toktaş, 2006 (b), p. 207)<sup>17</sup>. Marcy Brink-Danan, an anthropologist who has a particular work on Jews in Istanbul, is in contention that “Keyder described this period as one in which non-Muslims were “eliminated and driven away... Their property, as well as the positions they vacated

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<sup>17</sup> The data was taken from the Benbassa& Rodrigue book by Toktaş in her 2006 (b) article.

became part of the dowry of the new state that could be distributed to the rest of the population” (Brink-Danan, 2012, p.11). Direct impact of Capital Levy on Jewish community was devastating as it was on other non-Muslims communities. Marcy Brink-Danan (Brink-Danan, 2012 p.11) contends that “*Capital Levy*” is what “pilfered the small Jewish (and other minority) businesses to the point of bankruptcy” which was the essential cause for a major emigration of Jews from Istanbul. Accordingly, not many non-Muslims were able to pay the enormous amounts of taxes; thus, they sold most of their properties. The ones that were not able to pay the full amount were sent to labor camps located in Aşkale, Erzurum for the remaining amounts. *Capital Levy* collections during 1942-1944 forced thousands of Jews to sell all of their properties, or go bankrupt or worse, to pay their taxes by working at labor camps (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 153-162). By 1949, more than 31,000 Jews left for Israel which was the newly established sovereign state.

Turkish Republic’s aim to minimize the local Jewish community had been sustained by policies like rejecting the retrieval of Jews from Germany during the National Socialist reign in Germany up until the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 182-183). Although the Turkish state accepted 550 Jews, most of whom were academicians, it should be noted that only a few hundred among ten thousands of Jewish applicants were accepted to Turkey (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 240-246). Turkish state celebrated the “hospitality” Ottomans showed towards Jews when they were expelled from Spain in 1492 and the official discourse was that such hospitality and tolerance towards Jews had always been utilized when Jews were in need. “The case of 550” was celebrated as a perfect example, too; which clearly is a hypocritical since the real tendency of the Turkish state was to not “accept the rejects of another country” (Konuk, 2007, p. 23).

In the same years, Turkish state also terminated citizenship of some of the non-Muslim Turkish citizens residing abroad (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 177, 240-246). The case of *Struma* illustrates further how the anti-Semitism in Turkey during the War was exacerbated. A ship named *Struma* that took off from Romania carrying around 800 Jewish refugees requested to take shelter in Istanbul and then to proceed to Palestine. After having waited for ten weeks, the Turkish and British authorities rejected the ship’s request to continue to Mediterranean. The ship, being in bad conditions, was taken down by the Soviets resulting in near 800 deaths in 1942. Government officials denied

the responsibility of deaths and announced that “Turkey cannot be a homeland for those who are unwanted elsewhere” (Konuk, 2007, p. 23).<sup>18</sup> Thus, one can easily observe the pragmatic approach of the Turkish government about the Jewish refugees. They denied the responsibility of Jewish refugees in order to prevent any conflict with the Nazi forces who at that time already invaded northern Greece. The official position of the government was to avoid actively being in War at all costs. Government’s tendency to reject Jews from central European states and further *Turkification* policies pursued naturally caused further emigration movements from Turkey to Palestine during the war. In other words, not only foreign Jewry was trying to use Turkey as a transit state but also Turkish citizens were trying to leave. Toktaş argues that there are three main reasons for Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine during the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War: The first is the fear against a possible future Nazi invasion of Turkey since they already invaded northern Greece. The second is the possibility of a Jewish state to be established in Palestine. The third is the aggressive nation-building process in Turkey (Toktaş, 2006(a), p. 508).

With the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, thousands of Jews left Turkey for Israel in 1948 and 1949. Up until the establishment of the state of Israel, from 1923 to 1948, an estimated number of 7308 Jews migrated from Turkey to Palestine (Toktaş, 2006(a), p. 507). However, it is important to note as Toktaş points out that the emigration out of Turkey was not a mass movement as one may observe in the European Jewry case. Since the visa permits were strictly controlled by Britain and the priority for visas was given to central European applicants trying to flee from Nazis, a very limited number of Turkish applicants granted visas. This caused fake marriages among Turkish Jews to be able to get a visa via familial ties. Şule Toktaş’ accounts on the Zionist tendencies amongst those who migrate during the end of 1940s explain how weak it was by that time:

Another group of emigrants in the great wave of 1948-51 was that of young Jews. There were many sub-sets within this group, one being that of upper-middle and middle-class youth. Most of them had high school and university educations. They also had a strong sense of Jewish identity, but were more influenced by Zionism. Zionism was not a powerful mass ideology among Jews in Turkey, although during the Second World War some Jews, especially younger ones, came to find it attractive. The Turkish state did not believe that the ideology of Zionism posed a threat to its fundamental pillars. At that

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<sup>18</sup> A quotation from Konuk’s article that was Cited from Rıfat Bali’s book *Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni*. This statement was given by the head of the government, the Prime Minister Refik Saydam.

time Zionist associations and groups were weak in terms of both numbers and organization.<sup>19</sup>

The establishment of Israel certainly expedited the emigrating numbers. One may easily observe the small group emigration parties turning into mass waves of emigration to Israel. One factor was the enthusiasm Turkish Jews experienced for the establishment of Israel. Although Turkish state caused a little trouble for Jews willing to emigrate since it did not immediately recognize Israel in 1948 and consequently suspended all request for emigration to Israel in 1948. The situation was quickly resolved one year after with the official recognition of Israel and thus removal of all suspension to visa permits. The migration numbers reveal the level of enthusiasm experienced by Turkish Jews: 26,000 people in 1949, 2491 people in 1950 and 1388 people in 1951(the decreasing numbers in 1950 and 1951 may suggest plausible information for the liberal environment in Early Democrat Party Period and their relatively flexible regulations on non-Muslims) left Turkey for Israel (Toktaş, 2006(a), p.509).

During the 1950s, the population of the Jews in Turkey decreased by 40 % (Benbassa and Rodrigue 2010, p.386). Such high migration rates can be seen as an indicator of the Jews' discontent in Turkey and their willingness to emigrate from Turkey. It is interesting enough, though, to see such mass migration towards Israel immediately after its establishment since by the Israelis Turkish Jews were considered as "not-foreign". Brink-Danan has a similar take in this respect as she argues that "both Turkey and Turkish Jewry have tended to fall through the cracks as 'not-quite Middle Eastern' and 'not-quite-European'." Although it is a subject matter of another study, it would be interesting to analyze the hospitality of Israel when it comes to migrated Turkish Jews and their coherence with the public. Given the mass-out migration of one-third of Turkey's Jewish community after the establishment of the State of Israel, it would certainly be a necessity to observe the impact it had on both local and migrating communities. For instance, Şule Toktaş draws attention to the change of the people who migrate to Israel after 1951. She argues that those who migrate after 1951 were largely from the middle- or upper-middle class who were mostly tradesmen and professionals. She explains the change by referring to a tradition in the Jewish community.

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<sup>19</sup> Cited from Şule Toktaş' article Turkey's Jews and their Immigration to Israel, 2006, p.509. The information about the Zionist groups in Turkey was originally referenced from Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Devlet'in Örnek Yurttaşları (1950 - 2003), 2009 and Benbassa and Rodrigue book , Sephardic Jewry.

Apparently, “Jews inherit small shops from their fathers or fathers-in-law” (Toktaş, 2006, p.512). However; as a consequence of the stringent financial situation which was largely relied on import-oriented economy, Jews preferred to take the chance and move to Israel from an economy where they saw little chance to prosper. Thus, she contends that these groups had a considerable impact on the migration move in 1970s.

#### **2.4 Democrat Party Period and National Front Governments until the 1980 Coup**

Bora (2011) argues that three decades starting from 1950s throughout the end of 1970s can be classified as an era of popular nationalism in Turkey. Those years, especially during the Cyprus conflict, witnessed rising popular enmity against non-Muslim minorities (Bora, 2011, p. 90 - 92). During the Democrat Party Period (1950 – 1960) started out with the promise of a liberal government under DP but it didn't turn out to be the case. The official program of DP in 1950 promised egalitarian democratic rights to all citizens of Turkey. Liberal characteristic of the party program attracted minority votes especially in the urban areas. With DP incumbency, for instance, one can observe a slight increase in the number of non-Muslim presence in the Parliament (Toktaş, 2005, p.406). According to Toktaş (2005), since the DP was less strict about secular policies, the religious representatives of non-Muslim communities felt less pressure over them. Non-Muslims were able to practice most of their communal rights such as the right to use central funds to construct and renovate religious institution buildings. Jewish community, for instance, could vote and choose their first Chief Rabbinate only during the DP rule (p. 406). That is to say, until the DP rule, the Jewish community was neither allowed to elect a chief rabbi nor the RPP appointed one.

The embeddedness of secularization and nationalization to the modernization period in Turkey was undeniable in the first decades of the republic, especially under RPP rule. Thus, under the DP rule, non-Muslim population felt a relative relaxation regarding the state-led modern Turkish citizenship building process. Throughout the 50s, while the latitude citizenship was widened by political liberties at the social level, doubts on the loyalty of minorities kept provoking questions on their citizenship. As Toktaş (2005, p. 407) contends during the DP rule, the exclusion of non-Muslims from the definition of “modern Turkish nation” continued. Her insight on the changing definition of modern citizenship is critical at this stage. She argues;

It seems that though Islam was an issue to be dealt with in Turkish politics either in the form of prohibition or permission in the public sphere as well as a criteria for

Turkishness both during RPP and DP periods until 1960s, the status of non-Muslims was more susceptible to the centre-periphery cleavage than was Islam. Therefore, setting the centre-periphery relation instead of Islam as an independent variable of the construction of citizenship provides an explanatory key to the changing milieu of non-Muslim citizenship in the 1950s. (p. 407)

Not all promises were kept by the DP government though. The tolerant and liberal environment DP created in the beginning of the 1950s quickly became a similar with the RPP period. For instance, DP promised to pay back the excessive amounts of tax paid by non-Muslims due to the Capital Levy law as compensation. This generated a sustainable vote for the DP in 1950 and 1954 elections particularly from urban centers. They attracted non-Muslim sympathy and votes through the compensation discourse. However, they did not realize this promise. As Güven (2005) describes it, before each local/ general elections, this compensation payments issue was brought to the Parliament agenda by one DP parliamentarian just to be forgotten or let go after the elections up until the next one (p.162). It was obvious and understood by the non-Muslim voters; too, in 1957 that DP used this discourse as a pressure point against RPP.

Nationalist discourse in the statements of the government became more visible by 1954 with the eruption of the Cyprus conflict with Greece. Exacerbated violence between Turkish and Greek residents in Cyprus ignited mob violence in Istanbul in 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> of September 1955 against not only Greek minority properties but all non-Muslim population. This is interesting in the sense that the term “Greek” was used to define all non-Muslims in Turkey, a pejorative word in particular (Bora, 2011, p. 90). One can observe this throughout the history of Turkish Republic. When Turkey gets in conflicts with different international actors, the minority group somehow related to those actors will become an overarching scapegoat of negativity in domestic politics. According to Bora, the word was “Greek” during the 50s, it was “Armenian” during the 80s and during the 2000s, and we observe that the word “Jew” has been used for all non-Muslims as a pejorative and stigmatizing word.

6-7 September events of 1955 caused millions of Turkish liras as the worth of loss for the non-Muslim business people and shop owners whose stores were vandalized. Two days long incidents were the main reason behind the massive migration of non-Muslim’s from Turkey to foreign countries in the 1960s. Consequently, a considerable amount of Greeks left for Greece as many Jews migrated to Israel. The joint impact of “Capital Levy”, of the establishment of sovereign Israeli



state and of the 6-7 September incidents could be measured by the major migration wave that took place between 1948 and 1955. The events of 6-7 September was yet another unsettling experience for the Turkey's non-Muslim minorities in general. Due to the pogroms against the non-Muslims, thousands of Jews and Christians left the country. While there were 33.000 Ladino speakers in Turkey in 1955, this number decreased to 23.000 in 1965 (Güven 2012, p. 179). According to multiple sources (Toktaş, 2005; Toktaş, 2006(a); Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010), the proportion of Jewish population left Turkey was %40. Toktaş specifically reports in her 2006(a) article that the impact of 6-7 September events to the migration was: “ The number of emigrants rose to 1710 in 1956 and 1911 in 1957, compared with only 339 in 1955” (p. 511). As a final note, it should be pointed out that the government, in a way, responded to the mob violence in 6 -7 September incidents, by paying compensation to the victims of violence. These events had an unsettling effect on the non-Muslim citizens who were born and raised in Turkey. While the governments did not introduce any anti-Jewish laws after the 1950s, anti-Jewish discourses have always taken place in the discourses of nationalist and Islamist political parties and organizations (Benbassa & Rodrigue 2010, p.386).

Toktaş expresses that the military coup of 1960 did not change much except for the new Constitution of 1961. The following government of *Adalet Partisi (AP)* (Justice Party) was a party established mainly by the old party members of Democrat Party which was banned after the coup. The 1961 Constitution was a liberal one compared to the 1924 one. This is not to deny the fact that there was a growing support for a nationalist discourse which equally fed an enmity against the non-Muslim movement. As Toktaş contends that “despite the fact that the new Constitution extended grounds of political participation through enhancing it, it is noteworthy that from the 1960s onward no non-Muslim deputy took a seat in Parliament for over 30 years” (Toktaş, 2005, p. 409).

As a reaction to the rising nationalist discourse, a growing anti-communist discourse occurs as well. Anti-communist movement quickly became entangled with the enmity against non-Muslims. According to Tanıl Bora (2011), “urban snob bureaucrats, intellectuals, communists/leftists and non-Muslim minorities were all melted in the same pot as degenerate enemies of national core” as far as the nationalists were concerned (p.91). This view found many supporters as the liberal environment in 1960s

caused leftist thoughts and movements to foster quickly. Jews, in particular, were considered to be the embodiment of “degenerate materialism”; thus, the degeneration of culture and ethics were considered to be the natural end result of “Jewish financial capital and big businesses”. As Bora (2011) puts it, “both communism and liberal-capitalism were tools created by the Jews to rule the world” (p.97). It was a relatively easy connection to make since Jews in Turkey were perceived as an oligarchic community with close ties to the media, financial /credit institutions, big capital and consequently to the government. Within this framework, one might easily choose to see a parallelism between Judaism and communism; between being a Jew or Dönme and being a communist or leftist. Thus, one might choose to argue that anti-Semitism in that era successfully structured the newly erupting left in Turkey as an enemy of the state.

1960s introduces us with a Turkish-Islamic branch of right wing nationalist discourse that primarily targets communism. However, since it inherently fostered an Islamic discourse, too; anti-Semitism lingered as a secondary sub-agenda within the ranks of its supporters. For instance, the growing enmity and hatred statements against non-Muslim institutions like minority schools or religious buildings during the late 1960s was originally initiated by the Turkish-Islamic youth movement *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* (MTTB) (National Association of Turkish Students whose Islamic characteristic stands out more than its nationalist tendencies (Bora, 2011, p.102)

Confrontation between left and right wing activists turned into armed fights on the streets with the 1970s. There was aggravated tension between the Turkish Armed Forces and the government which led to the *12 Mart Muhtırası* (12<sup>th</sup> March Memorandum) and consequently to the resignation of the then prime minister Süleyman Demirel whose seat was taken by Nihat Erim (Bali, 2009, p. 184). This was also a period in which intensified nationalism at the beginning of the 1970s was highly focused on the foreign support communists supposed to be received from abroad (Bora, 2011, p.103). Thus, as a non-Muslim minority in Turkey, Jews were popularly accused of being local agents of communism. Aggravated political polarization turned this anti-minority aggression of the nationalist/conservative wing into marginalized minority animosity. It is particularly important to note at this point, though, that the perception of being a leftist was highly correlated with being a communist which connoted a negative image. Furthermore, the animosity was fed by the conflict over Cyprus with Greece. In this setting, although some pro-Turkish campaigns launched specifically by Jews were

reported (Toktaş, 2005, p. 410-411); they still couldn't miss the hostility of nationalist/conservatives. Their long standing efforts to keep the reputation of "loyal" Jew couldn't dodge the populist aggression.

One instance of the aggravated support for nationalist/conservative discourse being turned into an anti-Semitic discourse could be traced with the number sold copies of publications of *Protocols of Elders of Zion* published in 1970s. In Turkey, the *Protocols* was published 9 times between 1948 and 1960; 17 times between 1961 and 1970 and a shocking 28 times between 1971 and 1980 (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 387). This immediate rise in the publication was read by the authors as the tendency of nationalist/conservative Islamist circles to blaming Jews for anything and everything about the anarchic situation in Turkey.

## **2.5 Post-1980 Period**

The post-1980 period was the era of the rise of Islamist/nationalist populism in general. If one aims to look for the causes of such an era, it would be plausible to look at the policies followed by the Kenan Evren government formed after the military coup in 1980. The coup and the following 1982 constitution were the two incidents that marked the following 20 – 30 years. Considering the fact that 1982 Constitution is by and large still in use, it would have an obvious causal relationship with the rising Islamist conservatism. A few points that are important to understand the spirit of 82 Constitution can be given. It strengthened the powers of the executive branch while reducing the powers of the courts and it centralized universities by unifying them under a state-led institution (Toktaş, 2005, p. 412). Even at an overall first glance one may sense that the constitution aimed to control the civil society by strengthening the powers of the government and to control universities considered as the cradle of activism in the 1970s which eventually led to the coup.

Aiming never to relive the chaos in the 70s, Evren ushered a new ideological path, *Turk-Islam Synthesis*, as the antidote to the extremism in the 70s and promoted Islamism/nationalism as a condition for social and political stability (Toktaş, 2005, p. 413). But, Islamism in the 80s was somehow different from the conservatism of the 60s. As Bora (2011) points it out, the vulgarity of anti-Semitic tendencies were abandoned under *Refah Partisi* (WP) (p. 108). The Islamism WP promoted was a modernized positivist version of Islamism of the 60s which distanced itself from the main discourse

of anti-Semitism/anti-communism. According to Bora (2011), what WP envisaged for the non-Muslim minorities was more of an *Ottoman Millet System* under which religious minorities had been protected by the state as isolated segments in the society (p. 108).

Having said that the WP Islamism had been a modern positivist one, one still should not assume that Islamist/nationalist populism in the 1980s was a coherent one. Surely, there were fractions both outside and inside the WP itself. Although it is possible to observe data on WP officials visiting synagogues and churches; it is also possible to find clear evidence on anti-Semitic statements used by the same party members. Consequently, Islamist movement still had a merely effective fraction who perceived non-Muslims as “the precursor of a novel Crusade force” in relation with the cultural imperialism and cosmopolitan degeneration as Bora puts it (2011, p. 108). Therefore, Turkish Islamism continued to use “*Judaism*” as a curse word as Turkish nationalism transformed “*Armenian*” into a curse adjective which will be discussed in the later on in this chapter. In some cases, the anti-Semitic publications had gone to such extremist levels in the beginning of the 1990s; even some of the Islamist intellectuals felt the need to weigh in and warn not to look for some sort of Jewish-led conspiracy in every instance (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 387).

The 1980s was, therefore, a decade of volatile policies concerning the minorities. Since 1924, Turkish Republic had demonstrated a shifting range of policies with regard to its minority populations and the 1980s were certainly no different. As Brink-Danan puts it “these policies redefine basic ideas about Turkish citizenship and have implications for the way in which Turkish Jews envision their difference” (Brink-Danan, 2012, p.27). However, the response of the Jewish community was not volatile at all. They certainly preferred to abstain from making scenes in public concerning their stance and to pursue not publicized meetings with the officials to make a complaint or make a stand. This was certainly the case in the 1980s with the rise of Islamism and anti-Semitism, even in 1986 when the attack happened to the Istanbul’s largest synagogue, Neve Shalom, causing twenty one deaths (Brink-Danan, 2012, p.28). The attacker was a Palestinian sympathizer who declared that the attack was a consequence of Israeli policies concerning Palestine. Community leaders transmitted their fears on security after the bombings through back channels to the government officials; but they preferred not to make a big public scene about it. Bombing of the synagogue also

caused a vivid actual fear of life for Jews living in Istanbul since the threat of attacks or assaults on a daily basis was not seized afterwards. Brink-Danan describes this feeling of Jew citizens by their own words: “Afterwards, the ongoing threats have created difficulties for Jews to actually feel safe in the space that they, in their own rhetoric, have called home for one for five hundred years” (Brink-Danan, 2012, p. 28).

An interesting impact of these bombings on the public was the awareness towards Jewish people. Being so silent in the public eye and preferring to handle their relations with the state in such tacit channels certainly paid off. This case made it clear that the public was not exactly aware of the Jewish presence in Turkey. Brink-Danan explains this phenomenon in her book *Jewish Life in 21<sup>st</sup>-Century Turkey*:

Despite the popular argument that the deadly violence of the mid-1980s forced a threat, archival press coverage of the event records Turkey’s (and the world’s) surprise to discover Jews still living in Istanbul, indicating that the Jewish community’s effacement from the official Turkish narrative was already happening through *ideological violence* and *symbolic omissions*. (2012, p.85)

The violence of 1986 had the unintended consequence of highlighting the Jewish community in Turkey. Due to this incidence, the society somehow realized that there were in fact Jewish citizens in Turkey and that they had certain problems, too.

The realization of Jewish existence in the public eye was reinforced by the 500<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration of the fled of the Spanish Jews from Spanish Inquisition to Ottoman Empire. The celebrations were conducted in such a way that it also celebrated the tolerance and hospitality Turkey possesses, in addition to the Sephardic Jews coming to Turkish territory (Brink-Danan, 2011, p. 369). Since Turkish Jews are small in numbers and historically are not relatively under the spotlight, they were not considered as crucial actors in Turkish political scenery. However, with this campaign, as Brink-Danan argues, “a public platform to speak up was provided to the Jews as the minority that received the utmost tolerance for 500 years”. On a second note, the 500<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations were used as a PR project of the state which was instrumental for the EU-Accession process.

At the last decade of the twentieth century, Turkish state started to develop a discourse about the historical Ottoman and Turkish tolerance towards Sephardim Jews, in order to make the country’s prestige higher during the process of integration to the

European Union. A series of books, which were contributed with manifestations of historical gratitude from some members of the Jewish Community, were produced in order to influence public opinion of the European community regarding Turkey (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 194). At this point, it is essential to ask why a discourse of tolerance was needed. If Jews have been accepted as full citizens of Turkish Republic, why is the state in constant need of showing tolerance to this specific community? These frequent references to tolerance implicitly illustrate that Jews have never been fully accepted by neither the state nor the public as ordinary citizens. The use of the term minority, again, implicitly hints an isolated stance for the Jews. The reason is the term minority inherently limits the context of any discussion on citizenship, regardless of the time and space of the given discussion.

Another interesting point was raised by Neyzi concerning Istanbul Jews and how they were perceived. According to Neyzi, at the heart of the sympathy of urban middle-class towards non-Muslim minorities in Istanbul lies an imagined class-related and cultural alliance with them against the new habitants of Istanbul who migrated from rural Anatolia. This so called- “eski-Istanbullu” groups rised to the middle-class coincided with the elimination of non-Muslims, or one might even argue that the elimination was caused by it. This last point was originally mentioned by Ayhan Aktar and cited by Neyzi in her paper (Neyzi, 2009, p. 78).

At this point, it is noteworthy to introduce the general setting of the post-1980 period in order to elaborate on the question of citizenship. One other important aspect of the post-1980 period was the rapid globalization and the following civil society development. With the abrupt end to the violence in late 1970s and ban of all political parties with the 1980 coup, new decade could be the decade of both limitations of rights and civilization of the regime (Toktaş, 2005, p. 414). With Turgut Özal government, post-1980 had been swept by globalization too. Economically, a rapid liberalization and globalization of Turkish markets accompanied in the flow of civil society movements, too.

The rise of civil society consequently made it possible for the concept of citizenship to be under the spotlight. Therefore, the impact of coup as the civilization for the regime made it possible for a civil society to be formed again. It also allowed such issues as ethnic conflicts, citizenship and identity to be popularly discussed.

Consequently, there was an increase of publications concerning identity and differences. Combined effect of the globalization and increased civic movement, Toktaş argues that the artificial link between the nation and state shattered and definitions of communities in terms of blood or soil lost its efficacy (Toktaş, 2005, p. 414). Consequently, the emphasis shifted to “communal identity and assertions of the preservation and promotion of ethno-religious cultures” (Toktaş, 2005, p. 415).

In an above-given environment, Kurdish identity and its differences with Turkish had become a popular issue. Similarly, a popular discussion on Armenian identity surfaced as a form of Armenian animosity. It was not a novelty practice though. The word “Greek” was a curse word in the 1950s and 1960s as a direct consequence of Cyprus issue. Now, Armenians were in the spotlight and the word “Armenian” switched places with the word “Greek” as the new popular curse word of nationalists. The animosity against both these ethnic group somehow got merged into one during the second half of the 1980s and a new discussion of “Armenian-Kurdish Separatists” emerged. In Bora’s book, he uses the example of statements of Alparslan Türkeş, the president of Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (NMP) (Nationalist Movement Party) on Abdullah Öcalan’s (leader of PKK) true identity. On several occasions, he claimed that Abdullah Öcalan was an Armenian called Agop Artinyan (Bora, 2011, p. 105). Kurdish nationalist movement had always been perceived as a separatist movement. But the interesting thing in this period was that even the ones supporting Kurdish identity discourse in terms of their demands on human and citizenship rights were accused first and foremost of being a “servant” for the Armenian cause (Bora, 2011, p. 104). The unification of anti-Kurdish/anti-Armenian discourse will emerge into an anti-Kurdish/anti-Jewish discourse in 2000s which will be discussed in the following section.

## **2.6 2000s and the AKP Incumbency**

Turkish Jews have never been so much public visibility in the history of the Republic. The AKP government period has witnessed and especially after 2007 continues to witness a series of animosity discourses specifically targeting Turkish Jews. There are several recent cases in which Jews in Turkey are accused of. Incidents such as the argument of Jewish-Kurds (Yeğen, 2007, p. 143-151), the conspiracy theories constructed that every major incident caused/sponsored/orchestrated by Israeli lobby,

the popular court case of Münevver Karabulut murder<sup>20</sup> in which Cem Garipoğlu – a teenage who murdered his girlfriend and dismembered her body to stuff her in a luggage and dump her- was claimed to be a Jew, and even the mere statements of government officials all either explicitly or implicitly lead to a context that Jews are the primary scapegoat. This again is not a new phenomenon; in fact, a non-Muslim community to be chosen as the primary scapegoats all the negative happenings, was a state policy. For the 2000s and onwards, it has been the turn of Jews. The following discussion will shed some light on this practice.

Currently, Jewish population in Turkey demonstrates relatively coherent social and economic positions. In contrast to the period before the 1960s, Jewish population now seems to share similar class structures. One might observe Jews being concentrated in urban cities and involved in commercial activities and they have closely related consumption patterns with each other. The increasing geographical proximity among Jews enables them to construct a community of their own, knitted through not only religious, cultural or economic ties; but also, through membership of a similar social class. Surely, this does not mean all Jews belong to the same social class with same income levels and employment patterns; but one might still argue that the economic variation among the Jewish community has narrowed down. In tandem with this, it is possible to argue that Jews consumption patterns are close to one another. This transformation is due to multiple reasons, among which the neoliberal transformation in Istanbul is the most influential one (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006).

Starting from the 1990s, compartmentalization of the city in several districts of different purposes such as finance, accommodation, industrial and leisure assisted the process of the creation of gated communities (Kolluoğlu & Candan, 2008). This pattern created neighborhoods of communities with similar affiliations. In this process, the Jewish community began to concentrate in the gated communities in Levent, Etiler and Sarıyer.

The AKP government adopted a policy of tolerance towards the country's ethnic and religious minorities as a part of the EU integration policies. Since the attitude of the state towards minorities was an important issue for the EU itself, Turkish government paid close attention to the stance of the minorities. Toktaş argues, for instance, “with the

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<sup>20</sup> The murderer who disappeared was claimed to be protected by Mossad and to be a Jew.



accession requirements, Turkey faced the question of how to preserve its national and territorial integrity while also recognizing the ethno-linguistic and religious diversity present within society” (Toktaş, 2005, p. 418). An instance of this tolerant change of policies was the change made in the law concerning religious institutions. This policy change granted the right to acquire and dispose of property to the non-Muslim minority foundations. According to Toktaş (2005), in practice, this law did not function as it was supposed to because the procedures of the acquisition of a property were complex and challenging for a non-Muslim (p. 418).

It is widely accepted that the regimes of power against minorities are produced by certain public discourses such that the usage of “the discourse of tolerance”. It was also very common until 2007 in the public sphere. Particularly, the discourse of tolerance involves asymmetrical power relations such as “The tolerant Ottoman Empire, the tolerant neo-Ottoman Turkish state as its successor”. Those perspectives of tolerance, as Wendy Brown argues, implicitly involve an asymmetrical relationship as a technology of governmentality in the Foucauldian sense (Brown, 2008). For example, Marcy Brink-Danan has written an interesting book on the question of tolerance towards Jews in Turkey where she argues that the assumption of tolerance implies a defect at the essence of the other (Jew), which in turn creates this relationship of power (Brink-Danan, 2012).

On the other hand, despite of the ubiquity of the tolerance discourse, one might still observe anti-Jewish discourses and narratives. Even at the height of EU discussions on tolerance, Turkey still experienced two devastating attacks on Neve Shalom and Beth Israel synagogue on 15 November 2003. Some considered them to be shocking events of terrorism that were not expected; but, according to Rıfat Bali, there was a pattern of hatred and aggression aimed Jewish community for a while months before November 2003 and not many people paid any attention to it. He considers assassination of Yasef Yahya, a dentist in Şişli who was shot dead in his dental practice was the first step of a concerning and uncomfortable period that ended with the suicide attacks on synagogues. Murderers acquired the phonebook of the dental office and started to threaten other Jewish citizens on the phone by either paying them off otherwise killing them. The perpetrators of Yasef Yahya’s murder were captured 7 months later. They explained why they murdered Yasef Yahya. The reason was that

they needed funds for the new organization they were planning to establish. They saw the name of him in the dental office sign of him on the side of the building. And that's how they first decided to kill him (Bali, 2009, p. 484). Apparently, a possibility of an attack towards Jewish community was expected by the Chief Rabbi, he told to an Israeli radio station right after the attack. According to an interview with him published in *Cumhuriyet* on 16th of November 2003, he told that he asked the police department to cut the traffic on the street of Neve Shalom since it was impossible to stop every single car and look inside; but, the police didn't responded to that request. Bali quotes from a Jewish community member, Tilly who lost her mother and her daughter in the attacks that says "They (Community leaders) could have warned us. If I had known, I could have prevented them to go. We wouldn't have lost our religion by not going to synagogue for 3-4 weeks" (Bali, 2009, p. 473). Five days after, the synagogue attacks in which 24 people lost their lives were owned by Al Qaeda, the bombing of HSBC headquarters happened in which 34 people lost their lives. This caused both attacks to be merely seen as joined "terrorist attacks" by the media. This interpretation led to an immediate abandonment of the anti-Semitic characteristic of the synagogue attacks (Bali, 2009, p. 473).

The nature of anti-Semitic tendencies got even worse when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) interdicted Gaza Freedom Flotilla on May 2010 known as the *Mavi Marmara* incident resulted in deaths of 8 Turkish citizens and 1 Turkish-American. It raised uproar in the Turkish society caused siege of the Israeli consulate in Istanbul and the embassy in Ankara. It was very critical what the Cemaat and the Chief Rabbinate would say. As a strategy, even before anyone could ask them about their accounts and thoughts on the shocking event, Chief Rabbinate usually issues a media release. Just a few hours after this incident Chief Rabbinate issued a media release, which was precise and succinct:

We are distressed to learn of the military intervention carried out against the ship Mavi Marmara, which was heading toward Gaza. The fact that, according to the first reports we have received, there have been dead and wounded in the intervention, has increased our sorrow all the more. We fully share our country's reaction generated by the stopping of the aforementioned relief effort in this manner and our sorrow is the same as that of the general public.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> The statement was quoted from Bali, *The Silent Minority: Turkish Jews*, 2013, p.456. The original statement can be reached [www.musevicemaati.com/index.php?newsId=72](http://www.musevicemaati.com/index.php?newsId=72).

According to Bali, Turkish media immediately demanded a statement from the only Jewish newspaper, *Şalom*, and from the community's spokesperson on how Turkish Jews felt about the incident. Rather than issuing a statement on its own, the community leadership preferred to limit itself to the Chief Rabbinate declaration and make no further comment. Thus, Bali argues, except for Mario Levi and Roni Marguiles, a novelist and a columnist, there was a general silence overarching the community. This silence is a practice that is conventionally adopted by the community at other instances as well. This will be contemplated on further in Chapter V.

Regarding the same incidence, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the actions of Israel as he warned the public not to turn their emotional reaction towards Israeli state and its institutions towards Turkish Jews. He said that “looking at our Jewish citizens with hatred is not acceptable, it cannot be, it shouldn't be”. One may think of it as a very positive statement of a prime minister embracing the public as a whole; but then again as Marcy Brink-Danan asks “Why should Turkish Jews be punished for the actions of a foreign government?” This is, she argues, exactly what solidifies the perceived correlation between Turkish Jews and Israel. Thus, that type of precautionary statements arouse public reaction towards Jewish citizens rather than calms them (Brink-Danan, 2012, p. 97).

For instance, according to a report on BBC News, Adolf Hitler's book “*Mein Kampf*” became a best seller in Turkey in 2005<sup>22</sup>. Although it cannot be inferred that the recent popularity of this book would result in anti-Semitic practice, one can easily question the representability of this example as an anti-Jewish narrative since *Mein Kampf* was not only in book stores but also sold in mass grocery stores as well. The reasons behind such a book being sold in such markets and the motivations behind it are still questionable. Furthermore, recently at a campaign speech in March 2014, when predecessor Minister of Economics Zafer Çağlayan was talking about the released recordings of their private talks concerning the corruption case, anti-Jewish discourse which once again portrayed Jews as the behind-the-back operators is apparent. Targeting the anonymous recorders of his private talks, he said that “I would have understood these harassing actions if they were conducted by a Jewish, an atheist or a Zarathustra. But if these people call themselves Muslims, shame on them!”<sup>23</sup> Such

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<sup>22</sup> To reach the full report on the particular news, please see; [news.bbc.co.uk](http://news.bbc.co.uk).

<sup>23</sup> Please see ; (Hurriyet, 2014)

examples reveal how totalitarian tendencies make the Jews feel uncomfortable and insecure in Turkey.

Additionally, Vice Prime Minister Beşir Atalay's recent statement about the Jews tells that the anti-Jewish attitudes of state officials still survive.<sup>24</sup> In July 2, 2013; Beşir Atalay accused the Jewish lobby and Jewish Diaspora of being partially responsible for Gezi Park protests. For a better understanding of this expression, a limited explanation on Gezi protests and the demographic outlook of its supporters would be beneficial, especially considering the political participation of the youth in the 2010s and AKP government's attitude towards them. Another interesting symptom of Gezi events in this framework was to see Jewish political activism at an individual level for the first time.

The case of Gezi protests is somewhat different from its entire contemporary alike. After the 2008 crisis, Turkey was accepted as the plausible model in troubled times. Tugal in his article on Gezi contends that its economic success and marriage of religion and liberal-authoritarian democracy in Turkey's model certainly earned the title of "lifesaver" (Tugal, 2013b, p. 154). Thus, analysts were quick to predict the near future in the Middle East which will supposedly be swept away by Turkey's model in multiple locations where Arab spring created new democracies. However, Gezi Park protests implied that the predictions regarding the supremacy of Turkey's model failed which is the reason why Gezi Park protests demands a closer look. Simten Coşar and Gamze Yücesan-Özdemir contend that Gezi is the embodiment of the inability of the AKP government to silence the violence inherent to its neoliberal politics with Islamic sensitivities (Coşar & Yücesan-Özdemir, 2014, p.11). The demands of the neoliberal transformation processes in general and the government policies of AKP that do conflict at different levels are what Coşar & Yücesan-Özdemir refer to in particular. It would be plausible to argue that the classical modernization theories hypothesis on the correlation between capitalist economic development and democratization has been rendered to be problematic especially after the experience of post-2008 process. As the authors argue pre-WWII Europe showed clearly bourgeoisie supported aristocracy interests as opposed to mass democracy, in a similar vein, AKP government has pursued selective policies that provided the benefits of neoliberalism exclusively to the religious-

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<sup>24</sup> Please see (InternetHaber, 2013)

conservatist and nationalist voters rather than the whole public. Thus, AKP created its own unique bourgeoisie who stood by its targeted development policies.

This sort of selective developmental policy was not apparent in the first years of the AKP government. First years of its incumbency was marked with economic consistency and growth. As the tension of the conflict between the incumbent and the civil & military bureaucracy grew over the discussion on regime stability, the optimistic nature changed gradually. In addition to this tension, the above mentioned selective policies that favor specific groups exacerbated the process that led to increasing dissatisfaction of middle classes, government authoritarianism and hegemonic practices. Currently, there exists a clientalist model which distributes state's sources to closer allies with an authoritarian repressive tool that encloses the oppositional masses with this clientalist model and allied media mediums. In line with this model of enclosing oppositional masses, Evren Hoşgör states that Gezi Park protests show when AKP faces opposition; it almost exclusively turns to violence.

When we look at the composition of Gezi Park protesters, Tugal posits the majority of the Gezi Park protesters were mainly middle class professionals. Michael Hardt has also a similar take on Gezi's demographic construction and argues that the composition of Gezi encampment and the post-Gezi movement should be read in terms of labor. Young and highly educated white collar professionals/workers who are often poorly paid and precariously employed were the backbone of Gezi encampment. It is interesting that this specific group is the one that benefited from neoliberal economic system. That is why, both Tugal and Hardt insist on the need to explore the puzzle set by the novelty of intense participation by "well-paid and fashionably dressed professionals" (Tugal, 2013b, p. 157). Gezi, in other words, advanced the understanding of contemporary class composition reconsidering the nature of the working class in light of such newly expanding labor categories.

In addition to the overall interest on the composition of Gezi protesters, Jewish participation to Gezi reveal prominent insight on the conception of belonging in the Jewish community in Turkey. On a previous ethnographic study I conducted for an anthropology course in 2014, I interviewed 4 Turkish Jews on solely their approach towards Gezi. I was interested in the motivations that made some Jews, generally stayed away from political demonstrations, to participate in this particular demonstration. I

observed unexpected participation of high numbers in the community which raised questions on the relationship between the participants' Jewish identity and their other identities (class, political, etc.). Unlike some members of the Armenian and Kurdish community who both participated under the flag of their political organizations and organized according to the demands of their ethnic identities (i.e. Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP)), Jews did not participate with a Jewish organization. That is to say there were no flags of posters that represented the Jews in the Gezi events. I questioned how the absence of Jewish community as a collectivity influence the feeling of the individual Jewish participants. Moreover, I wanted to see how Jews situated their religious identities within the Gezi process and Turkey's political spectrum. In other words, I wanted to observe how Jewish participation in Gezi events affected the Jewish political subjectivities and Jews' political mobilization. The results were informative for the concerned thesis here, especially in terms of observing the variety of the views on the recent AKP governance in the Jewish community and the political participation habits of the Jews.

Data collected from the interviews showed that the Jewish identity was not a political identity as far as the Jewish people themselves are concerned. None of them considered the movement as a statement of identity but as a statement of their sincere concern for the prosperity of liberty. Nevertheless, as long as my observations go, there was a massive active contribution from the community both personally resisting on the streets and supporting through social media coverage. Particularly, as indicated by Tugal previously in this chapter, the participating Jews were mostly young adults who are mid-level professionals or upper middle classes. This high volume of participation alone said a lot about the overall behavior of the Jewish community towards the Gezi protests. Although it was not concerted by an umbrella organization of Jewish foundation, it still would be plausible to argue that massive participation can be meaningful in order to understand community behavior. The past statements of the Community Officials to press as a response to the offensive and derogatory statements of government officials would have created greater amount of anxiety and concern within the Jewish community before Gezi protests. However, as the responses showed clearly, they not only felt anxiety but rather did not take these speeches seriously enough to consider them offensive. In a way, the impact of the discriminating

statements of the government was deconstructed. They instead believed them to be unconsciously said informal speeches or even liken them to comic strips.

The participation of Jews to Gezi protests reveals a few interesting points which demands a closer attention within the context of this thesis. Firstly, within the context of being an equal citizen instead of treating one's self as an isolated member of a minority group, they owned the rights to public spaces as much as any other citizens. So, the sense of possession to the parks of the city of Istanbul is a parameter of belonging and attachment participant Jews possess.

Secondly, if we are to consider Gezi events as a reaction to the policies of the incumbent, the Jewish presence in these protests were the first of its kind, a novel way of Jewish presence which is primarily fed by the individual sense of belonging to Istanbul, to individual rights, to one's personal right to a tree. It is more about being fully entitled to define your stance in a public matter instead of positioning yourself on a spot previously defined by the state. In other words, the presence in the protests was more in correlation to being your own voice instead of adopting a pre-established one. Surely, it is essential not to dismiss the fact that the interviewees did not explain their participation to Gezi events as a Jewish citizen; but as a concerned citizen in general.

From the perspective of the Jewish community, the past 14 years have witnessed many incidents that affected their subjectivities and senses of belonging. The synagogue attack of 2003, the Gaza attacks of Israel in 2008 and the consequent Davos meeting in which PM Erdoğan and Peres had a very aggravated discussion, the 2010 assault of Israeli forces to *Mavi Marmara*, and the recent 2014 Israeli attack on Gaza and aggravated civilians death caused by Israeli bombings are all incidents whose repercussions directly caused consequences for Turkish Jews. In the last 5 years, three discrete Jewish community meetings were held in private, solely to create some sort of in-community solidarity and to provide information on the conducts of the community officials concerning the specific incident at hand. These meetings were held primarily because these incidents caused uneasiness and fear in the community. The last of the meetings was held as a consequence of Israel-Gaza bombings and the recent statements of Yıldız Tilbe, Melih Gökçek and IHH President Bülent Yıldırım. Yıldız Tilbe, who is a popular singer, said that "God bless Hitler, he was so right at his cause, he could have done more" regarding the Holocaust (*Şalom Haftalık Siyasi ve Kültürel Gazete*, 2014).

Melih Gökçek, the mayor of the municipality of Ankara, tweeted that he supported Yıldız Tilbe's statements and even applauded her for her "sensitivity" (T24, 2014). Last but certainly not the least; the IHH President, which is an Islamic charity organization, made a public statement on the civilian deaths of Gaza citizens saying "the Jewish community in Turkey must immediately make a public statement and end Israel's overindulgent actions or else we will end up with scenes in Turkey that no one want to see" (haber7com, 2014). Especially the statements of Bülent Yıldırım caused unrest in the community which led the community leaders to get in touch with the government officials. This ended up with the consecutive soothing statements of Bülent Arınç, which underlines the fact that Jews were also citizens of Turkey and not tied to the civilian deaths in Gaza. During the Gaza attacks, I was conducting the interviews for this study. Although there were no questions regarding the attacks in anyway, respondents mostly touched upon that subject by telling their feelings of fear, uneasiness and concerns. As I will contemplate on further in Chapter IV, the intensity of the respondent's moody nature during the attacks were very much visible then the nature of those respondents that I interviewed after September 2014.

These examples also reveal the importance of such events not only in the sense that they ignited popular attention but also in the sense that they gradually disappeared from the popular discussions. The way one incident went out had clues about the eruption of the next incident or how it will be managed by the state or the community. If it was not dealt with carefully, past discourses may erupt in the future as well. It is also symptomatic within the context of Turkish nationalism. When a conflict occurs, it creates a counter move. But, the original conflict never really goes away in the sense that the possibility of its eruption in the future is not obsolete. There is always a tendency to relive the cold cases of the past.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have dealt with the historical process of Jews in Turkey<sup>25</sup>. Focusing on the last century, I have inquired into the major phenomena the Jews have encountered and gone through. Such an inquiry required mostly archival research written about the Jews in Turkey. At this point, I find important to intersect this historical process with today's experiences of Jewishness. That sort of move certainly requires a change in perspective from macro scene of history to the micro experiences

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<sup>25</sup> What I mean by "Turkey" refers to the land of Turkey's territories in the Ottoman Empire.



of today's Istanbul. As I have put forward my purpose to understand the everyday dynamics of Jewish subjects in Turkey, I have to change my lens in order to see the micro details of daily life.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the major historical experiences of Jews in Turkey mainly encircle around collective traumas. In that sense, after such dedicated introduction on the Jewish history on these territories, the reveal of their history of exclusion, violence, stigmatization and continuous trauma pushes one to think about certain questions of belonging and identity. On the one hand, I observe an intense identification with Turkishness shared by most Jews; on the other hand, such a history of exclusion and trauma produce particular breaks and ruptures in the sense of belonging and on the question of identification. In that respect, this chapter will try to analyze the dynamics of belonging and to answer the question whether the Jewish and Turkish identities are commensurable to each other.

In the next chapter, the reader will witness an analytical shift from past to present, from archival records to interviews, from macro politics to micro experiences of everyday life. As identification and belonging are about the most personal, private and intimate senses of the subject, I will shift the focus from history and politics to the anthropology of everyday routine. Such an analytical move is necessary in order to understand the veins of the Jewish community's experiences. Although the everyday routine and daily experiences are structurally affected by macro politics and state policies; we'll see multiplicity of experiences, senses and affects of identity under the umbrella of grand narratives. Since such stories reveal heterogeneity of various reactions and strategies, I will emphasize these multiple experiences of Turkish Jews around the notions of inclusion and exclusion.

## CHAPTER III – MULTIPLE BELONGINGS

### 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the experience of belonging and the relationship between the identities of Turkishness and Jewishness will be discussed. One significant theme is the acceptance of the commensurability and ‘peaceful’ coexistence of two identities; Turkishness and Jewishness. Despite this peaceful coexistence, the affectionate ruptures, in which the Jewish people were somehow “coerced into”, helped them realize that they were not ‘proper’ Turks, sprang out as an astonishing perception throughout the interviews. These experiences of ruptures in their understanding of the compatibility of Jewishness and Turkishness at the same time pervade their existence in Turkey: The ruptures can also be interpreted as a poisonous ‘knowledge’ within their notion of belonging. This information and this type of belonging is somehow ‘hidden’ or ‘not at the surface’, but rather diffused. Particularly, in most of the interviews, the antagonistic and contradictory experience of carrying these two identities at the same time has come out only after a certain time has been spent in the interviews. This chapter mainly concentrates on these contradictions and incommensurability of the two identities, where these ruptures and coexistence especially occur in everyday life and how these are perceived and felt by the Turkish-Jewish subjects. In the following, a discussion of the coping mechanisms and strategies respondents develop will be made.

As a short reminder, the analysis of this experience of Turkish Jews is provided through 32 interviews. 3 of them are below 25, 13 of these are in the 25-35 age groups whereas the remaining 12 informants were between the ages of 55 and 65. Lastly, two of my respondents were 80+ and remaining two informants are 39 and 50 years old. I have given attention to keep the gender distribution equal in order to categorize distinct experiences of both genders. All of my informants were urbanized, mostly clustered on certain 4 districts of Istanbul, namely Şişli, Beşiktaş, Sarıyer, and Kadıköy. This information about the residential preference of Jewish population should be kept in mind as particular analyses included in this thesis are based on this spatial dynamic. Most of the respondents were from middle and upper class socioeconomic positions, and were either self-employed or worked at white-collar jobs. Besides, all of my respondents were well-educated and most of them had a college degree. One important characteristic of my respondents was their level of religiosity which was significant

enough for them since they define themselves as predominantly secular. Furthermore, I have not experienced any difficulty in contacting these people because they were somehow related to my friendship networks and some of them were from the same circles I spend my life in as a Jewish person. In that sense, I feel myself lucky that my respondents had no reservations about sharing their thoughts freely to me. They felt comfortable talking about especially certain experiences of discrimination.

In these interviews, I tried to understand my informants' senses of belonging, which is a multifaceted experience involving territory, habitus, culture, and space. The people I interviewed regarded belonging as an identity based on the intersection of two identities of Turkishness and Jewishness. Specific definitions regarding these identities were asked to the informants. This chapter mainly discusses how these identities are intersected and how they relate to the sense of belonging. My questions mainly focus on the relation between Turkishness and Jewishness in an attempt to understand how the respondents make sense of and experience these two identities in their everyday lives. Although the Jewish people seemed to be attached to Turkey for some reason, I did not know how the relationship between Jewishness and Turkishness is experienced. However, to my surprise, these two identities are not mutually exclusive but rather are regarded as two reconciled identities. Hence, almost all of the respondents, except three of them, identified themselves as Turks and claimed that they are Turkish-Jews. In their perception, Jewishness signifies their religious and cultural identities; while the meanings attributed to Turkishness vary.

However, as I will discuss at length below, my respondents expressed that their self-identification as Turks do not necessarily mean that they are accepted as “proper Turks” by the “society at large,” as one of my respondents put it<sup>26</sup>. As I illustrate below, the Jews of Turkey entertain the position of “not-quite not the same.” That is to say, in their everyday encounters with Muslim Turks and with faces of the state (i.e. police, lawyers, etc.); my respondents are bound to define and redefine themselves as Turks. In line with this, Jews of Turkey have constantly been reminded that they are not exactly Turks, and that they are “different” and even foreigners (*yabancı*). Throughout this chapter, I will elaborate on the uneasy relationship between being a Turk and a Jew

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<sup>26</sup> The exact expression used by my respondents was “geniş toplum” or “genel toplum” which I chose to translate these to English as “society at large” or “society in general”.

at the same time. Furthermore, one of the points of this chapter is that the sense of belonging is created in and through the social relations, practices and encounters. Everyday encounters between the Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of Turkey are informative in Jews' sentiments of belonging and not-being-able-to-belong in Turkey, since these mentioned everyday encounters cannot be established smoothly without any conflicts. Thus, as well as the harmony of Turkishness and Jewishness, the ruptures and incompatibilities occurring on daily basis construct a vital part of this chapter.

### **3.2 Multiple Belongings to Turkishness and Jewishness**

Before elaborating on the data, first, I must explain what I mean by Turkishness and Jewishness and try to outline what respondents understood by these terms. Turkishness and Jewishness were not provided with any definitive meaning in the questions. Hence, the respondents were prone to provide their individual definitions for these categories after they explained their relationship with Turkishness and Jewishness. Almost all of them defined the categories according to their own understandings. In fact, most of them were aware of the fact that there is no fixed definition of Turkishness. It cannot be easily framed or pinned with one definition; it slips away from a fixed definition every time one tries to do so. For instance, according to Avi, a 29 years old man, definition of Turkishness does not necessarily have to be limited to one dimension. He contends that he is both Turkish and Jewish since according to him being a Turk does not exclusively mean being a descendant of the people, who migrated from Central Asia. He considers himself a Jew with a Turkish citizenship.<sup>27</sup> Same approach was present in Yusuf, a young actor in his early 30s. When he is discussing the definition of Turkishness, he considers a variety of possible approaches to Turkishness. He says, "If one does not assume that being a Turk means having migrated from Central Asia, and if by being an Anatolian or being a Turk means to what extent you are integrated to the society, then an Armenian can be a Turk, too. It is directly related to what you understand from the word 'Turk'".<sup>28</sup> As can be seen in this response, some of my respondents refer to the nationalist discourse on the history of Turks as nomads coming from Central Asian steppes. Yet, they question the applicability of the definition

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<sup>27</sup> From personal interview with Avi: "Hem Yahudi hem Türk. Evet, Türk vatandaşı. Orta Asya'dan gelip Osmanlı'yı kuran olarak görmüyorum. Türk vatandaşı bir Yahudi'yim ben."

<sup>28</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: "Türklükten Orta Asya'dan gelenleri varsaymıyorsak Anadolulu olmak, Türk olmak mantığı toplumla ne kadar entegre olduğunuzsa bir Ermeni de Türk olabilir. Türk kelimesini nasıl algıladığınızla da çok alakalı."

and in some cases are even sarcastic about this discourse. Most of them have a broader and a more civic definition of Turkishness. Particularly, they do not consider Turkishness as a racial category.

A refreshing approach from Selen, a 26 years old woman, shows that not all Jews in Turkey have a clear cut definition of Turkishness. In fact, as Selen argues, one does not have to even confine herself to specific definitions and may change their perception according to different contexts. As she puts it, “If Turkish means being from Turkey, then yes, I am Turkish; if it means race, then no, I do not belong to that race. So my answer changes according to the definition. I haven’t decided on a definition yet.”<sup>29</sup> Interestingly, Selen is perfectly aware of her subjectivity being formed and reformed through each experience and at each context. People do not necessarily have to have a clear-cut definition of Turkishness or self-perception, for that matter. Selen illustrates a perfect example of this. These perceptions might change or be rebuilt by countless factors and parameters. Thus having a set definition is not an issue but equally, not having one is perfectly natural, too.

Hence, respondents have a multitude of attributions in their memories regarding Turkishness and Jewishness. The encounters they experience in their work life, job interviews and in the compulsory military service shape and inform their definitions and perceptions of and relation to Jewishness. They might, thus, have various feelings when asked about Jewishness and Turkishness, all of which pertain to a multiplicity of experiences in different contexts. This constitution of the identity not as a fixed category intersects with the Foucauldian conceptualization of the subject: For him, because the subject is not a rational-intentional pre-given entity; rather than a stable subject essence, we should presuppose a constructed subjectivity produced through the effects of power relations (Foucault, 2000). Michel Foucault suggests two meanings of the word “subject”: “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to it” (Foucault, 2000, p. 331). He broadens the framework that all types of subjection are “merely the consequences of other

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<sup>29</sup>From personal interview with Selen: “Eğer Türk kavramı Türkiyeli kavramıysa Türküm; eğer ırksa o ırka ait değilim. Bunun tanımına göre değişir benim cevabım. Kendi kafamda da karar verebilmiş değilim.”

economic and social processes: forces of production, class struggle, and ideological structures that determine the form of subjectivity” (Foucault, 2000, p. 332) A whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible interventions construct the subjectivity in a diffused net of power.

Although they have the need to attach a specific definition to Turkishness; surprisingly, they do not accept it as a stable term in the interviews, rather they tend to ask what I mean when I say “Turkishness” in these questions. “I mean exactly what you understand from this phrase” was my respond to these inquiries. Hence, the need for an articulate definition of Turkishness does not force them to assume a given Turkishness.

What the respondents understood from belonging is a whole different issue. Apparently, just as in the case with their understanding of Jewishness and Turkishness, there is no unitary sense of belonging that has been interviewed. According to Nira Yuval-Davis (2011, p. 4) for instance, belonging is about attachment. Thus, it can be a relational sentiment; it is about one’s self-attachment to or detachment from another. This other may be a person, a nation, national identity, a place, a memory and etc. In line with Yuval-Davis’s point, my data shows that most common shared perception of Turkishness is about self-attachment in the form of “citizenship” when they’re asked about Turkishness. In this case, their answers involve rights and duties of a citizen. Since they have the right to vote, pay their taxes, do their military service (they personally serve in the military or family members do), and possess identity cards of Turkish Republic, they consider themselves to be Turkish.

A second common way to perceive Turkishness is tied to a territorial understanding. They mostly argued that they were born and earn their livelihood here and not only so but their roots/ancestors were also born and raised here. Because of these, they identify themselves as Turkish.

One other common route to Turkishness is via language. However, one point has to be made clear. Turkish was never purposefully proposed as a supportive argument for being Turkish. Instead, speaking Turkish is so naturally internalized as a part of their culture and accepted as an ordinary feature of their subjectivities. According to most of my respondents, Turkish is their mother tongue which is “naturally” a part of their Turkishness. Respondents tend to consider speaking Turkish

as a part of their life, as an undeniable part of their character. Therefore, there is no specific emphasis on explaining how they relate to Turkish language because it is taken as given. Unlike the historical data presented in the previous chapter, the historical formation of Turkish language as the mother tongue of minorities living in Turkey never came up during the interviews.

But the respondents' identification with Jewishness as religion and with Turkishness as culture is remarkable for the following reasons. Turkish language cannot be ignored as a tool to construct the Turkish culture, such as local drinks and food as I will discuss below. So, Turkish language appeared as an indispensable part of the culture they belong to. Their acceptance of Turkish as a "native language" might be effective in their identification with Turkishness. Moreover, invisibility of Ladino language and its disappearance might be a signifier for the power and embeddedness of Turkishness in their identity construction of Jews in Turkey/"Turkish Jews". Ladino is not a current language for the Jewish community. Although, Ladino is known among the elder members of the community, it is not a part of the Jewish community's daily life anymore and it has not been taught to younger generations for years. As I will discuss at length in the part on language, the invisibility of Ladino in everyday lives of the Jews in Turkey is interesting, especially considering the fact that Ladino was the common language of Jews living in Istanbul for a long period of time.

Cultural practices are also other key issues that affect the Jewish people's senses of Turkishness. The adaptation and practice of cultural imagery of Turkishness is mostly visible in interviews with those who live abroad. In comparison with other states and contexts of being homesick, people tend to come up with cultural arguments, how they miss "Turkish cultural practices" such as drinking raki, eating Turkish food and keep reminiscing about them (e.g. Nino). That is to say, cultural practices and habits are influential in the construction of identity of some respondents. Culture is a broad enough term to mean anything. Respondents preferred to call themselves Turkish for embracing the Turkish "folklore" (in one of the respondent's words) as their own. Turkish cuisine is also an important aspect of the cultural route to defining oneself as Turkish. A number of respondents, when asked about or not they feel Turkish, answered how they loved to have beers with "fish 'n bread" (ekmek arası balık), rakı&fish (rakı&balık), stuffed peppers, kebabs and so on.

The word “folklore” was used by only one of the respondents but most of my interlocutors refer to a similar concept. They talk about ways of everyday living in Turkey and peculiarities specific to Turkey such as the ones mentioned above. That is the reason I use the word “Folklore” mentioned by Nino, a middle aged restaurant-owner (meyhane), to grasp all these similar concepts utilized by other respondents.

### **3.3 Citizenship**

As briefly mentioned above, overlapping of Turkishness and Jewishness presents itself through different rationalizations. Now, a broadened explanation of these rationalizations will be useful to better understand the data presented here. What I frequently encountered during the interviews was a conceptualization of Turkishness within the context of citizenship. Their responses are constructed in a way as if they are talking *to* someone; as if they are telling someone that they, in fact, fully exercised their rights as a citizen and they adopted the duties defined by law.

What I have encountered frequently during the interviews was a highly powerful sense of being dismissed to a position that they ‘truly deserve’. Many of my respondents emphasized that they have always been ‘lawful’ citizens who fulfilled their citizenship duties completely such as tax-paying, military service, voting and perhaps as a by-product claiming being a secular, nationalist citizen. Thus, they seem themselves entitled to the sovereign identity of Turkishness through fulfilling their duties and being proper subjects of Kemalist project for state-building. However, they somehow feel that they have never acquired the true citizenship status which they actually deserve.

Being a citizen may have different meanings for different people, although I encountered two similar approaches. The most common approach among my respondents was to consider Jewishness as a religion and Turkishness as a label one gains by being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. This approach was shared by most of my respondents because they believed that citizenship is defined within the legal boundaries that are constructed by law. In their opinion, if one carries the Republic of Turkey’s identity card, pays taxes or has the right to vote; then he/she is regarded as a citizen. In other words, one approach is to express Turkishness in terms of rights and



duties. A second major approach among my respondents is to embellish citizenship with nationalist sentiments. For instance, national holidays are accepted as one of the indicators of citizenship. Enjoying national holiday celebrations, feeling proud with Turkish bravery and independence history, are all clear indicators of citizenship; of how Turkish they are. It demonstrates their perception of Turkishness and their take on citizenry.

To question the identification with Turkishness and Jewishness I asked two different questions. The questions given for this section were as the following:

- *Sizce hem Türk hem de Yahudi olunabilir mi? Siz kendizi Türk olarak görüyor musunuz? (In your opinion, can a person be both Turkish and Jewish? Do you consider yourself as Turkish?)*
- *Kendinizi hangi kimlikle tanımlarsınız? (Yahudi, Türk, Kadın .. vs ) (With which identity do you define yourself? (Jewish, Turkish, Woman ... etc. )*

These questions were not asked consecutively. They were spread across the interview to serve as control questions to see whether or not respondents changed their course of answers at any point in their interview. In the end, it is revealed that none of the respondents changed their point of view.

A number of respondents established a direct correlation between being Turkish and being able to perform citizenship rights and duties. Paying taxes, for example, according to Viki, Sofi, Yosef, Nir and Rejin is a clear sign of being a Turkish citizen. As a supplementary argument most preferred to consider Judaism as a religion and being a Turk as a citizen of the Turkish Republic which does not conflict in any sense. Thus, for them, being Jewish and a Turk are just as natural as being a Muslim and a Turk. For instance, Sofi, a psychologist in her late 20's and Yosef, a self-employed 38 years old man said that Judaism is a religious identity, thus one can easily be Turkish and Jewish. They both believed they are Turkish citizens since they were born and raised here and they pay their taxes here, all of which have nothing to do with their religious identity<sup>30</sup>. On a further note Yosef says that he feels 100% Turkish Jew (*Tastamam bir Türk Musevisi*). He contends that such coherence may not exist for Kurds since Turkishness and Kurdishness may conflict with each other since both are

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<sup>30</sup> From personal interview with Sofi: "Yahudilik bir dini kimlik hatta kültürel bir kimlik. Ama, ben Türk vatandaşım. Burada doğdum, burada büyüdüm, burada para kazanıyorum, burada vergi ödüyorum. Burada yaşıyorum yani, o yüzden Türk vatandaşım."

two nations.<sup>31</sup> He then continues with how he sees himself as a “libertarian Turkish Jew” since neither religious identity nor nationalist identity defines his life<sup>32</sup>. What Yosef is saying may also be understood as him being a secular Turkish Jew.

The claim of being secular opens a space for the Jews to compromise the two identities; Religion and nationality. Most of the respondents, as already said above have explicitly stated that they do not experience a clash between identities since Judaism is their religion and Turkishness is their nationality. At this juncture, secularism plays an intricate role. The stances of identities may not have been at ease with each other in the past. More religiously oriented Jewry of lower class<sup>33</sup> that lived in Turkey before they migrated to Israel 1950s may have experienced a contradiction with this duality of identity. There might be conflicting approaches to senses of belonging as a proletarian Turkish Jew or as a middle-class western oriented secular Turkish Jew.

Today, if we are to look closer to the Jewry in Turkey, we may observe that they demonstrate a secular community. One may question the scarcity of Jewish religious/cultural practices in Turkey within public arena? Is the lack of public religious/cultural Jewish practices a natural consequence of their secular characteristic? Or is it a result of their avoidance to be publicly visible? They hesitate to be publicly seen, to be recognized as a Jewish citizen. They practice certain behaviors for the purpose of such invisibility as will be mentioned below. Therefore, is the inability of “*culturalization*” of Jewishness a remedy of these practices? These points demand further contemplation for future studies concerning both (in)visibility of Judaism in public and of “*culturalization*” of religion in public scene.

Nir’s and Rakel’s responses were different from the above mentioned group since they surprisingly provided me with a communitarian perspective in addition to an individual one, although nowhere in the questions, I have asked them to answer for the

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<sup>31</sup> From personal interview with Yosef: “Kürtlkle Türklük iki ayrı millet. Ama, Musevilikle Türklük çakışmaz. Yani, kendimi Türk Musevi olarak tanımlayabilirim.”

<sup>32</sup> From personal interview with Yosef:” Özgürlükçü Türk bir Musevi’yim. Dini çok fazla kendi hayatımın önünde tutmayan biriyim. Yani, dini kimlik bir değil, hayatı belirleyen bir şey değil. Türklüğüm de hayatımı belirleyen bir şey değil. Ben bulunduğum yerde huzurlu olmayı isteyen hümanist bir Musevi Türk’üm, kendimi ancak böyle tanımlandırabilirim.”

<sup>33</sup> For further information on lower class Jewry resided in Istanbul before they migrated to Israel after its establishment as a sovereign state, please see *Türkiye’de Yahudilik ve Sabetaycılık: Leyla Neyzi ile Söyleşi* (2010).

Jewish community at large. Nir's approach was state-centered and even he spoke like a state official. Nir, a rabbi in his 60s provided his answers mostly using the pronoun "we" as a clear reflection of his commitment to being a rabbi. But this preference for "we" is one that is strikingly attached to the Turkish state and that would not in any case conflict with the state. He preferred to perceive the interview as Nir the rabbi; and not necessarily as Nir, a Jew living in Istanbul. Thus, he feels he has the prerogative to speak for the community itself by making "we" statements. He contends that they are citizens, they are very pleased being here, they work, pay taxes, and exercise their military duties; no one interferes with their lives in a self-assured manner.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, Nir argued that "Judaism is a religion; and Turkishness is citizenship. I am a Turkish Jew. This is how it is across the world. If you ask this question to a Turk in Germany, he would say that he is a Muslim, but a German citizen".<sup>35</sup> Thus he doesn't see anything extraordinary about being a Jewish Turkish citizen. I feel the necessity to point out that not every official statement issued either by the Rabbinate or by the *Cemaat* adopts a similar tone and makes politically correct statements. This is his personal preference. His effort to be more politically correct may be a result of him being recorded (although I explicitly stated that his answers would remain anonymous) or his position as a rabbi. His whole interview took 40 minutes. Although there were numerous political questions, he refrained from making any political comments. His most revealing answer was that the current incumbent is a powerful government but its relations with minorities are good. And he continued by saying that regardless of the party that takes office in the government, they always have good ties with the government. He contends that though they are a minority they could do anything they want. There are no restrictions on Jews, they can go to synagogue. They have bodyguards and protection but still, they can go anywhere.<sup>36</sup> He somehow believes that having a bodyguard is not restricting. Having a need to be protected from wandering around does not mean a problem in its own. Otherwise, he would have not felt as free to go to places that he may visit with a bodyguard. Sofi, for instance, considers being guarded to practice her religion as being insecure. She contends that Judaism is not equal to being a minority. But in Turkey sadly the situation

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<sup>34</sup> From personal interview with Nir: "Türk vatandaşız, gayet de memnunuz. Çalışıyoruz, vergimizi veriyoruz, askerliğimizi yapıyoruz. Bize kimse bir şey demiyor".

<sup>35</sup> From personal interview with Nir: "Yahudilik bir dindir. Türklük vatandaşlıktır. Ben Türk Yahudisiyim. Bu dünyanın her yerinde böyledir. Almanya'daki Türk'e sorarsanız da ben Müslüman'ım ama Alman vatandaşım."

<sup>36</sup> From personal interview with Nir: "Biz aslında burada azınlığız; ama, her şeyi yapabiliyoruz. Kısıtlama yok, sinagoga gidebiliyoruz. Korumalar içinde geziyoruz; ama, istediğimiz yere gidebiliyoruz."

is otherwise for her as she says “I am a minority; since I cannot practice my religion and my traditions peacefully and in a secure environment”.

When Nir was asked about his knowledge on past traumatic experiences such as 6-7 September Events, he used an astonishing statement. He basically declared that he was saddened by the events, that people lost most of their wealth as a consequence of these attacks. But he then said; “But those events were in the past, and if that government perceived them as necessary...”<sup>37</sup> He left the sentence there. His pro-state tone peaks at this point by such an outrageous comment which suggested 6-7 September Events to be considered as usual, if they were regarded as necessity by the government.

Rakel’s “we” statements are repercussion of partly of her work with the *Cemaat* (institutional body of Jewish community in Turkey) and partly her focus as an activist lawyer of minority rights and the preservation and execution of full citizenship rights. Being a lawyer who is also concerned with judicial matters in the Jewish community, Rakel adopts the same prerogative and she feels more than qualified to freely making community level statements on how Jewish people feel. Additionally, focusing her studies on minority law and minority rights and being an active promoter of minority rights, she uses the “we” statements as easily as any others. She is accustomed to think in terms of a specific group rather than an individual. The “we” attitude is not a common and popular approach, though. Most respondents have individual understandings of Jewishness and Turkishness. Hence, Nir’s and Rakel’s “we” approach may be important within the context of their perceptions of citizenship.

These answers were not simply reflected on the spot or certainly were not instantaneous replies. They obviously were thought beforehand at some point in their lives to console either others’ or their personal predicaments on the possibility of coexistence of identities.

Some others like Rakel, who uses more general and vague statements like being attached to this country with a citizenship tie (whatever it may be she didn’t elaborate on that).<sup>38</sup> She uses a comparative approach in this question by elaborating on why she doesn’t belong to Israel but rather she belongs to Turkey. Being a Jew, thus, does not

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<sup>37</sup> From personal interview with Nir: “Geçmiş bir şey; ama, o zamanki hükümet bunu uygun gördüyse...”

<sup>38</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Vatandaşlık bağı ile bağlı olmak...”

necessarily create a belonging to Israel, she says. She feels more connected to France, in that sense; more than she does to Israel. Being a graduate from a French high school in Turkey, and having a masters degree from a university in France; creates more personal attachment to France, she argues. Learning the language and spending a few years in France created a sense of belonging via the memories she created there. Her belonging to Turkey, though, is also struggling and being rebuilt continuously by the impact of outside effects and her perceptions. She quotes from Sarkis Seropyan to better explain why there was no better time period with less difficulty for Jews in Turkey “ ‘if you are a minority in Turkey, you would get beaten every ten years.’ ” And ever since the Republic is established, Jews have been beaten”.<sup>39</sup> She, then goes on and expresses a more general statement on how Jews in Turkey accepted being Turkish wholeheartedly for years. As she puts it;

Jewish community never struggled with the concept of Turkishness. On the contrary, they’ve always openly expressed how they appreciated the tolerance and hospitality they’ve received and been happy about it. When someone was asked whether or not they’re Turkish, no one responded ‘No, sir, I’m not’. There was no such will, no such social consciousness.<sup>40</sup>

Rakel clearly establishes a contemptuous feeling towards being a Turk both at individual and social levels. Her sense of belonging apparently is ignited not by fixed categories such as religion or homeland, but constructed feelings and interactions with the people. Selim, surprisingly, used a similar hypothetical conversation to explain to what extent it is improbable to see a Jewish person born and raised here to deny being a Turk. He said that “I believe, probably not too many people would say ‘I’m not Turkish, I’m Jewish’”.<sup>41</sup> The moment I heard this sentence was a critical turning point for me as well. Being a member of this community for 30 years, I have never thought of this issue at such length. Such a thought never got in the circulation in public debate. I haven’t even heard it in close family conversations or friendly discussions. On the other hand, this was a familiar feeling to me. Although it may be a contemplation of many, people keep this thought to themselves. I was unaware of people’s disposition towards Turkishness even though I was preparing to conduct a study on that. Selim made me

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<sup>39</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Hiçbir dönem iyi olmamıştır. Sarkis Bey’in bir lafı vardır: ‘Türkiye’de azınlık olarak yaşıyorsan her on senede bir sopa yiyeceksin’ derdi. Musevilerin de Cumhuriyet kurulduğundan beri tabiri caizse bir sopa yemişliği vardır.

<sup>40</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Yahudi cemaati Türklük kavramı ile ilgili hiçbir zaman kavga etmedi. Aksine, bundan mutlu oldu. Açılan kapılardan, hoşgörüden ve misafirperverlikten çok mutlu oldukları dile getirildi yıllar boyunca. Kimse ‘Sen Türk müsün?’ dediğinde karşısına geçip ‘Hayır efendim, ben Türk değilim’ demedi. Böyle bir bilinç, böyle bir istek olmadı.”

<sup>41</sup> From personal interview with Selim: “‘Türk müsün ? Hayır, Ben Yahudi’yim.’ diyecek çok az insan olduğunu düşünüyorum.”

realize the necessity to contemplate on this issue which in return helped me to further my study. Moreover, Selim may be the first to talk about it openly but in the interviews I conducted before Selim, I sensed a similar stance from the other respondents but none of them expressed their position as openly as Selim did. Thus, Selim's interview is a breakpoint for my thought process as a researcher and as a Jew living in Istanbul. Afterwards, I thought more on why so many people accept the Turkish identity and Jewish identity at the same time so naturally. Namely, why are there very few people to say "I'm not Turkish; I'm Jewish" and more importantly; why isn't it an issue of public discussion? Below is an attempt to understand this coherence. Through various modes of thought and conceptualizations, respondents illustrated why it is not an issue of public discussion.

One answer to how the identities of Turkishness and Jewishness are adopted simultaneously is to show concrete evidence: having a Turkish identity card. According to Nino, his identity card is a solidification of his belonging. Nino dismisses the racial attribution of the word Turkish and perceives it solely as a citizenship terminology. He doesn't recognize Turkishness as a race. As far as he's concerned a person of this land can be named a Turk.<sup>42</sup> In addition to this, Nino's perception of citizenship is closely tied to the land and thus may be argued as having a territorial understanding of civic sentiments behind his argument. For instance, he expressed his frustration caused by the current political upheaval in Turkey but he does not think to migrate elsewhere or leave his home for a second. He stated that "he would be the last person to leave the country and turn the lights off"<sup>43</sup> as a metaphor to explain that leaving is not an option as far as he's concerned. The frustration and sadness felt for the domestic political situation, thus, in a way is a sign of the respondents' strong bond with their country, Turkey and well-built sense of responsibility of being a citizen of this land.

The community they live in might not comprehend them as full citizens with such strong bonds and a sense of responsibility, though. Apparently, they encounter people who question them simply because they are of different religion. An encounter shared by Dorin with her then co-workers is a clear example of such. When she was

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<sup>42</sup> From personal interview with Nino: "Ben Türk diye bir şey tanımıyorum; Türk vatandaşı var, bu toprağın insanı var."

<sup>43</sup> From personal interview with Nino: "Ben ışıkları kapatacak en son adamım. Bu ülkeden gidecek son 3-5 kişiden biriyim."

studying to get an undergraduate degree, she was working part-time as a sales person in a store. People who work there asked her if she was Turkish and she said yes when she first started to work there. A few weeks later store manager walked in and asked her in English if she was Jewish. She used the English word “Jewish”. Hearing this, other employees asked her in a frustrated tone why she told them that she was Turkish before if she was not. She tried to explain them that she was in fact Turkish, that she was born and raised here, that she belonged here and that religion and nationality are different things. But as she puts it, they made her feel like she lied to them. Afterwards she stopped saying that she was Turkish.<sup>44</sup> Though she was Turkish, she now feels the necessity to continue with an additional explanation of Jewish Turkish. Considering that probably no Muslim Turkish person responds to the question “Are you Turkish?” as “I was born here but I am a Jewish.”<sup>45</sup>, to feel the need to do so for Dorin is simply disturbing for her.

Some respondents though, do not feel as “full” citizens as others. Engin states that he does not perceive Jewish people as full citizens since they cannot become a judge, a prosecutor or a governor though there’re no legal prohibitions. He feels himself as a second-class citizen.<sup>46</sup> One other respondent, Yosi, has a similar account on the issue. He says that the state would choose “normal citizens” for public service duties. He contends that

I believe that people from ‘general public’ have an unlimited future ahead of them. In what sense? I think a Jewish person would get stuck at one point. Even if all the circumstances are equal between a Jewish citizen and a ‘normal’ citizen, if the decision maker is a Muslim, is from the ‘general public’, they’d go with the normal one. I think if all the circumstances were not even equal, they’d still choose the other one instead of the Jewish. So what is this? What is their choice in politics? We don’t have any possibility to get into

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<sup>44</sup>From personal interview with Dorin: “Ben İstanbul’a geldiğim ilk yıllarda hazırlık okudum. Çok sıkılıyordum, bir iş bulayım dedim. Kimseyi tanımiyordum. Bir mağazada satış elemanı olarak işe girdim. Yabancı dil bilen eleman arıyorlardı. İsmim vs. değişik şudur budur. Orada çalışan diğer elemanlar sen “Türk müsün?” diye sorduklarında “Evet.” dedim. Evet Türküm, dedim. Sonra şey oldu; mağazanın esas müdürü geldi. Onunla konuştum. Bu, birkaç hafta sonra olan bir şey. İşe girdim çalışmaya başladım birkaç hafta sonra patroniçe geldi. Kendi aralarında öyle diyorlardı ona,”Bana Jewish misin?” diye sordu. İngilizce sordu, Türkçe sormadı. Evet, dedim sonra konuştuk, muhabbet ettik, sonrasında da gitti. Diğerleri merak etti, ne sordu ne demek o diye. Musevi misin? diye sordu, dedim. Öyleyim, dedim. Hani Türksün dedin, dedi. Evet Türküm, burada doğdum büyüdüm. Ben öyle hissediyorum, dedim. O din, o ayrı bir şey; dedim. Tabi çok da bilmiyorum. Bu ırkların nasıl ayrı olduğuna çok anlam veremiyorum, dedim. Çok önemli olduğunu da düşünmüyorum. İrk, soy insanız, işte öyle yaşıyoruz diye bakıyorum. Çok şaşırımtım yalan söylemişim gibi hissettirdiler bana; ama, benim amacım orada yalan söylemek değildi. Türk müsün?, diye sorduklarında “Evet.” demiştim. Sonrasında öyle dememeye başladım. Ama onu yaşadktan sonra vazgeçtim öyle demekten.”

<sup>45</sup>From personal interview with Dorin: “Onu yaşadktan sonra insanlar sorduktan sonra ‘Burada doğdum ama Musevi’yim.’ demeye başladım.”

<sup>46</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “Burada kendimizi tam vatandaş olarak göremiyoruz. Kanunda yeri olmasına rağmen savcı, hâkim, vali olamıyoruz. İkinci sınıf vatandaş muamelesi görüyoruz.”

politics; to rise in ranks in military; to get into state departments. You can't be a civil servant, you can't do anything. Sure, there's no law against that but in practice it doesn't happen. That situation gives you an idea of the situation.<sup>47</sup>

They have no chance to climb up the ranks as a statesman, a bureaucrat or a military officer. It is no coincidence that a few of the respondents mentioned it. Though there are no legal prohibitions, it is a state practice not to let minorities to get higher ranks in public offices.<sup>48</sup> It is certainly discouraging to know the existing laws covering the equality of minorities are in practice ineffective. It is highly probable that the lack of trust towards the execution of laws to the fullest extent or mistrust towards the premise of state-led preservation of one's life and possessions feed the tendency to feel as second-class. Lack of trust may result as a voluntary contraction from the public eye. Niso contends that "times of disorder and revolution were good times. Limits were obvious. No one was paying attention to us. Everyone was focusing on other targets; we were no longer a target. When they have their own issue, we are at peace. When their issue is resolved, they come back to us again and make an issue out of us."<sup>49</sup> Thus he contends that Jews are like a safety valve. "When the political authorities are stuck, somehow Jewish community stands out again" says Niso to better explain his argument. According to him Jewish community is being used as a political supplementary artificial scapegoat at times of need.

As I have previously discussed in the theoretical chapter, there is a range of perspectives on the concept of belonging as a *sentiment*. Belonging can be a sentiment shaped in and through the social relations. Fenster (2007, p. 247) argues, belonging is a personal, private and intimate sentiment. Although it might be questioned whether belonging is merely a private matter, the private and intimate aspects of belonging are

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<sup>47</sup> From personal interview with Yosi: "Geniş toplumdan insanlar olunca onların önünün hep daha açık olacağını düşünüyorum bu ülkede. -Mesela ne noktada ? -Senin bir noktada Yahudi olduğun için tıkanacağın düşüncesindeyim. -Mesela specific bir şey var mı aklına gelen ? Mesela, duyduğun yada tahmin ettiğin? -Mesela, bütün şartlar eşit olsa karar veren Müslüman olsun, geniş toplumdan biri olsun karşısında bir tane Musevi vatandaş, bir tane normal vatandaş olsun. Öbür vatandaşı seçeceğini düşünüyorum. Bütün şartlar eşit olsa. Bazen bütün şartlar eşit olmasa dahi öbürünün seçileceğini düşünüyorum. Bu nedir işte seçimi, Siyasette seçimi? Zaten siyasete girme gibi bir şansımız yok. Askerde yükselmek gibi bir şansın yok. Devletin kademelerine giremiyorsun. Memur olamiyorsun, hiçbir şey yapamiyorsun. Olamiyorsun dediğim, hiç biri kanunda yazmıyor ama pratikte gerçekleşemez . O zaten sana bir şekilde fikir veriyor."

<sup>48</sup> For further readings in the discriminatory practices towards non-Muslim Turkish citizens see "Türkiye'de Gayrimüslimler: "Kağıt Üzerinde" Vatandaşlar!" by Ayhan Aktar (2008).

<sup>49</sup>From personal interview with Niso: "İhtilal dönemleri iyi dönemlerdi, sınırlar belliydi. Hedef olmaktan çıkmış; çünkü kendileri başka hedefler üzerine gidiyordu. Çünkü, sağ-sol dinci-laik vb vardı. Söylem değiştiği zaman biz de rahatlıyoruz. Kendi içinde söylem olmadığı zaman bizi söylem haline getirdiklerini görüyoruz."



prevalent in my respondents' expressions of their belonging to Turkey. Regardless of a potential debate on the private/public duality of belonging, belonging as a sentiment is easily detectable in not only Nino's responses but in others' as well. Especially when I asked my respondents about national holidays these sentiments surfaced. National holidays and celebrations are effective in creating nationalist sentiments for some respondents. Selim, Yusuf, Viki and Vivet all were "proud" to mention how they enjoyed national day celebrations. For some (Yusuf) national celebrations give them goose bumps "like every other young Turk". A military band at a celebration is effective to boost this pride, apparently. Yusuf stated their sentiments when they're talking about military bands.<sup>50</sup> It is plausible to argue that sentiments national celebrations create are quite influential in one's self-definition.

National celebrations aren't always the reason one mentions the pride they feel of being a Turk. Sometimes being questioned about their Turkishness might have the same effect. Viki and Dorin, two respondents that were born in Gaziantep and Hatay, experienced these interrogations back in the cities they were born in. Viki was born in Gaziantep in early 50s but then she and her family moved to a more cosmopolitan city, Istanbul because of the rise in the hate mails they received. Viki says that

Religion should not be binding. Religion is one thing and nationalism is another. When asked, I answer proudly by saying that 'I'm Turkish'. On the other hand, when asked about my religion, again, proudly, I answer 'I'm Jewish'. So these concepts have to be separated. But unfortunately, some do not. This is a wrong attitude.<sup>51</sup>

Viki points out the difficulties that may rise as a result of the mentioned attitude. She is concerned about not being correctly understood by the society; by not being able to exhibit her level of nationalism just because she is Jewish. Same concern was apparent in Dorin when she was talking about the time they migrated to Israel from Hatay before they eventually came back and settled in Istanbul. She didn't know it back then, but apparently they too received hate mails which consequently caused that to migrate to Israel for a few years.<sup>52</sup> She also pointed out the fact that being Jewish may

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<sup>50</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: "O konuda milliyetçi damarım fazladır. Ben, bando mızıka çalındığında 'N' oluyor?' deyip keyifle bakabilen bir adamım."

<sup>51</sup> From personal interview with Viki: "Din şeyi bağlayıcı bir şey olmaması lazım. Biz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşıyız. Dedelerimiz atalarımız burada doğmuş büyümüş. Ama din ayrı konu bence, milliyetçilik ayrı konudur. Ben öyle görüyorum. Ben sordukları zaman gururla Türküm, diye diyorum. Diğer taraftan dinin ne diye sordukları zaman da çok gururla da Yahudi'yim, diyebiliyorum. Yani, onu ayırmak gerekir. Ama bazı kesimler ayırmıyor. O da yanlış bir tutum bence."

<sup>52</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: "Daha önce İsrail'e gittim. Biraz daha uzak ve soğuk geliyor. Oraya sadece tatile gittim. Çok küçükken, 5 yaşındayken, bizimkiler 1985-86-işte... Ben 85 doğumluyum, o dönemde Antakya'da tehdit mektupları almışlar."

automatically make you a target of hate mails since in smaller cities, people know whether you are a non-Muslim or not. But people don't pay much attention to whether you consider yourself Turkish or not. Thus they, both pay attention to the proper distinction being proud about Turkish and Jewish. It was a common phenomenon during late 70s in Turkey. Most non-Muslim families experienced such difficulties as explained by Tanıl Bora. He underlines that the conflict between right and left wing political movements in the 70's had a frightening impact on the existence of non-Muslim population<sup>53</sup>. The unstable socio-political environment in Turkey made them to think about the potential risk on them if the cost of conflicts is related to them. It is interesting to note that, though Dorin explains now that they received hate mails back when they lived in Hatay, she didn't know it back then. She was told after years passed by. As far as she was concerned her days in Hatay were splendid. As she puts it:

I didn't feel like a minority in Antakya. On the contrary, it was fun, being a Jew. Everybody was different, so nobody was considered as a minority. I had Orthodox friends, Alevi friends, 'normal' Muslim friends.... Everybody was different; we were making each others' lives livelier, more colorful... It changed when we moved to Istanbul. When I moved to a bigger city, I realized that in large numbers of people, I literally became a minority. For instance my name was an issue. People kept asking what it means, or whether or not I was an Armenian. When I told them that I was a Jew, I realized that most of the people have never met another Jewish citizen before they've met me. In Hatay, having a Jewish acquaintance was standard; it was normal. When I came here, it changed.<sup>54</sup>

These feelings that turn into a sense of citizenship are more popularly revealed in celebrations. But for some it demonstrates itself in the form of possessing the passport<sup>55</sup>, and for some, other forms of images, objects and memories may be the demonstrations of citizenship. What is common though is the multifaceted conceptualization of Turkishness. It may present itself as a mere ethnicity at times; but at other times it becomes a more complex sensation, a mixture of sentiments, memories and objects which almost never fully overlap from one respondent to another. To put it more clearly, for none of the respondents Turkishness meant the same thing: no two respondents came up with an equal definition. There are, of course, equal aspects of

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<sup>53</sup> Bora, T. (2011). *Medeniyet Kaybı, Milliyetçilik ve Faşizm Üzerine Yazılar*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. (p.102 – 103)

<sup>54</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: "Antakya'da azınlık gibi hissetmedim. Tam tersine, çok eğlenceli bir şeydi. Herkes birbirinden farklıydı, azınlık gibi görüp hissetmiyordum. Çünkü Ortodoks arkadaşım da vardı, Alevi de vardı, normal Müslüman da vardı. Kimse kimseyi azınlık olarak görmüyordu, herkes birbirinden farklıydı, sadece renk katıyorduk aslında. İstanbul'a geldikten sonra değişti. Daha büyük bir şehre gelince o zaman işte, çok büyük ortamlarda gerçekten az sayıda olduğumu fark ettim. İsmimden dolayı mesela. İşte anlamı ne? Neden böyle İsmim? Ermeni misin? Dedim işte Musevi'yim. Ve bunun üzerine daha az olduğumu anladım. Üniversitedeki çoğu kişinin aslında hiç Musevi ile tanışmamış olduğunu o ana kadar fark etmemiştim. Antakya'da normal bir şeydi. Standart normal. Buraya gelince değişti."

<sup>55</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: "Türk pasaportunuz varsa Türksünüz."

what they perceive but when each person starts to elaborate on the questions, their stance towards Turkishness deviates from each other and finds its own original structure. For example, when one respondent defines Turkishness as a sentiment, other defines it as a matter of technical possibility that you gain through citizenship.

On the other hand, this multiplicity of Turkish identities set forward by my respondents is not observed when my respondents defined Jewishness. In comparison with the deviant paths in their elaboration of Turkishness, there was relatively a more common understanding of Jewishness. Their approaches to Jewishness were not identical but shared similarities. Thus, I argue that respondents individually construct their level of Turkishness, if they consider themselves as one. As it will be presented in this chapter, there is no consensus at a community level on how to approach Turkishness that is accepted by all the members of the Jewish community. Although I gave each respondent the similar concrete examples that remind one of Turkishness, such as national holidays, public schools, mandatory military service, they came up with their unique perception of Turkishness. However, respondents are relatively clearer on what Jewishness means and its level of impact on their everyday life as well as their personality: a clear response was that Jewishness is a religious identity or a cultural identity.

The reason for the difference between constructions of Jewishness and Turkishness is the fact that Jewishness is widely accepted as a religion. Judaism is accepted as religion by my respondents, too. The understanding of Turkishness is more fractured, also due to the ambiguous nature of Turkishness. To put it more clearly, they're constantly accused of not being Turkish by others via questioning why they have non-Turkish names or not being a Muslim. These inquiries cause a constant battle for the Jewish people to prove him/her Turkishness by utilizing a variety of arguments one of which would be the "we've been here for 500 years" argument. One way or another, one time or another, each and every one of them faces these voyeuristic interrogations in their everyday lives. Some are mere questions proposed out of curiosity while others may be more accusing and aggressive interrogations.

These questions are not responded with a common narrative that is shared by the Jewish population of Istanbul. Although I found out that there are common practices

against these “accusations”, a single constructed narrative to be utilized in the face of such questions/accusations did not exist. Therefore, despite the consistency of the accusations and their defense of their position, it seemed as if my respondents were sort of “unprepared” or ad hoc in their arguments for justifying their Turkishness. Despite this lack of a common narrative on their understanding of Turkishness, they shared common practices which arose from common experiences. Unlike other minorities, such as Armenians or Kurds, who may share a common narrative which may have been reached after years of communication among this group of people, for instance via public discussions, in the case of the Jewish people, as it will be elaborated on this chapter and the next chapter, there is no common narrative. One reason may be the absence of circulation of framed arguments in public sphere both at national and community levels. Neither the questions on Turkishness and Jewishness nor the arguments in response are shared with the public. The historical events that facilitated this lack of a shared public sphere to reach a common narrative were explored in the historical chapter of this thesis. In line with this, my respondents’ responses do not hint a consensus or a debate on Turkishness and Jewishness in the community. Instead, my respondents’ sentences are individualized but share commonalities in the sense that their responses refer to their experiences of proving their Turkish identity in different contexts. But these common experiences are not the outcome of their acquaintance with each other. I did each interview with only one respondent and none of the respondents knew each other. They did not share their notes and thoughts on the questions beforehand with each other. These responses given by the respondents are not predetermined and memorized answers, they are not totalized narratives; rather they are personal responses produced through individualistic experiences.

There is an interesting comparative hint here: While we can witness a standardized and shared narrative of political struggle by Kurds, Alevis, Armenians and other minorities; the same cannot be applied to the Jews’ situation. This implicit comparison of Turkish Jews with other minority identities in Turkey such as Kurds or Armenians have always been an interesting theme that made me further this question. The existence of a shared store of political narrative for Kurds highly contrasts with the absence of a common narrative inside the Jewish community. As one of my interlocutor, Maya points out on this issue:

One can be both Jewish and Turkish. I am Turkish, I was born in Turkey. My religion is Jewish. The case is different for Kurds and also for Armenians. It is a different difference. There is a difference between when a Kurd says “I am Kurdish” or an Armenian says “I am Armenian”; and when a Jewish say “I am Turkish but my religion is different”.<sup>56</sup>

And then I asked her “Do you attribute yourself as Turkish?” she responded “Yes, to use the popular idiom I am Türkiyeli”. I tried to reassure her position by asking “Not a Turk though, Türkiyeli, right?” to which she responded affirmatively.<sup>57</sup> She furthered her point by explaining according to her, the difference of Kurdishness of a Kurd and Armenian-ness of an Armenian:

Because a Kurd and an Armenian were exposed to explicit discrimination, they might have transformed it into a reactionary thing in time. When I compared myself to a Kurd or an Armenian, even if there are the events of 6-7 September, I do not feel the need to say “I am Jewish” when asked if I am Turk or not. However, I understand when a Kurd or Armenian responds “I am Kurdish” or “I am Armenian” respectively, when they are asked if they are Turkish. However, I do not feel the need to say “I am Jewish” when asked if I am Turk or not. When I am asked, I respond ‘I am from here but my religion is different’.<sup>58</sup>

Most of them declared their senses of Jewishness and Turkishness with changing enthusiasm. But at certain point in most interviews, respondents tend to change their position on their sense of Turkishness, or mention how it is particularly challenging to feel that they sense the belonging at certain times more than others. For instance, the past memories of Engin his time in military service are still troubling and haunting him. When asked about what he thinks when one says the word Jew, he responded as “being different, being the other”. He says “my time in military service was not very disturbing. A few of the petty officers caused trouble but there were no major events. They kept asking me whether or not I was a Jew, or if I was circumcised.”<sup>59</sup> Apparently, they made him loose his pants and prove it in front of the whole battalion. Forcibly flashing a whole battalion would certainly be disturbing. But aside from that fact, this is the memory he refers to when asked about his time in military service. And the fact that

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<sup>56</sup>From personal interview with Maya: “Yok hem Yahudi hem Türk olunabilir. Ben Türküm. Türkiye’de doğdum, dinim Yahudi. Dinle Kürt’ünki çok farklı, Ermenininki de... Nedense farklı bir farklılık. Kürdün Kürdüm demesiyle Ermeni’nin Ermeni’yim demesiyle Yahudi’nin ‘Ya bende Türküm ama dinim farklı dinim Yahudi’ demesi arasında bir fark var.

<sup>57</sup>From personal interview with Maya: “Evet, Türkiyeli olarak günümüzün popüler deęimiyle Türkiyeli olarak.” – “Türk deęil ama Türkiyeli deyimi? – “Evet.”

<sup>58</sup>From personal interview with Maya: “Kürt, Ermeni çok belirgin bir haksızlığa uğradığı için bunu zaman içinde bu şekilde reaksiyonel bir şeye dönüştürmüş de olabilir. Ama, ben kendimi Kürt’le veya Ermeni’yle karşılaştırdığımda bu topraklarda; her ne kadar 6,7 Eylül ve Varlık Vergisi olsa da Türk müsün dendiğinde Yahudi’yim deme gereğini görmüyorum. Ama, Kürdün, Ermeni’nin niye ‘Türk müsün?’ dendiğinde Kürdüm veya Ermeni’yim, demesini anlıyorum. Ama, ben Yahudi’yim deme ihtiyacı hissetmiyorum ‘Türk müsün?’ diye sorulduğunda. Türk müsün dendiğinde ben buralıyım ama dinim farkı derim.

<sup>59</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “Sen Yahudi misin? Sen sünnetli misin?”

he mentions it as “not being a big deal”, easily illustrates that in time he accepted this as a “normal” way of conducting relations with the state, with the public at large. Can’s anecdote from his time in military service is also worth mentioning here. His personnel officer individually picks him and calls him to his office simply to warn him not to disclose anyone that he is a Jew. The officer told him “no one will know. Even if a colonel asks you, you will not tell him that you are a Jew. No one will know but me.”<sup>60</sup> Can contends that the officer probably warned him for precaution but since he didn’t think about his Jewishness being a problem before, he certainly felt under threat afterwards such a caution.

One last interesting comment on the above mentioned strength of harmony between Jewishness and Turkishness was proposed by Selen. She contends that Jewish people have a particularly different approach towards the society they belong, different than other minorities. “They tend to own that community immediately and have a strong will to be fully integrated with them. This might be a defense mechanism: In order to avoid being discriminated or outcasted by the general public, they act more royalist than the king. They immediately adopt ‘We’re Turkish, of Turkish Republic’ discourse”.<sup>61</sup> So she approaches to such statements critically and questions their “true” intentions. One example of such over enthusiastic behavior could be the mention of Head of State in a prayer at a wedding. It is something Nino experienced. When he was at a friend’s wedding, some of his Muslim friends were startled by the name of Abdullah Gül they heard in a Hebrew prayer. They asked him why Gül’s name was in the prayer. Nino then told them that it was a tradition to include Heads of State in prayers of health and prosperity.

### **3.4 City, Country and Land: Contours of Territorial Belonging**

This section points out and discusses the impact of the city and land on respondents’ perceptions of self. Issues handled under this section, though are intertwined with the issues of citizenship, language or culture as well. Vanessa May defines belonging as “a process of creating a sense of identification with one’s social,

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<sup>60</sup>From personal interview with Can: “Personel müdürü beni yanına çağırdı, burada albay tuğgeneral bile gelse ona sen Yahudi olduğunu söylemeyeceksin, benim dışımda kimse bilmeyecek”.

<sup>61</sup>From personal interview with Selen: “Yahudilerin ait oldukları geniş topluma bakışları diğer azınlıklardan çok daha farklı. Yahudilerin hemen entegre olmak ve o toplumu benimseme eğilimleri var. Bu, bir defans mekanizması olabilir. Dışlanmamak veya zarar görmemek için geniş toplumdaki... Kraldan çok kralcı olmak. .. Biz Türk’üz, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Vatan-Millet-Sakarya’yı hemen benimsemek...”

relational and material surroundings” (May, 2011, p.368). For most of my respondents, material surroundings are utilized effectively to construct their senses of identification. Thus, I find it essential to gather territorial reflections of belonging under a specific heading. Through such an endeavor, I aim to see the intersections of spatial belonging with other factors. Overall, I plan to scrutinize how the city, the country, the land and the concept of “home”, can construct the belonging of my respondents to Turkey. In order to explore this question, I asked three different questions on territorial belonging:

- *Kendinizi nereye ait hissediyorsunuz? (In your opinion, where do you belong?)*
- *Nerede evde hissediyorsunuz (Türkiye, İsrail, ABD, Nişantaşı, mahalle, ev)? (Where do you feel at home (Turkey, Israel, USA, Nişantaşı, Şişli, neighborhood, home)?)*
- *Evde hissetmek ne demek sizin için? (According to you, what does feeling at home mean?)*

Most of my respondents used territorial arguments to define Turkey as their home. However, the scale of the territory they chose to define their belonging differed among my respondents. A few of them defines spatial belonging through, the area around their home, or certain districts of the city, or the city as a whole whereas some others via the country and some by the land. Interestingly, in contrast to my expectation, not many of respondents emphasized Istanbul, or the city, as an aspect of their belonging to Turkey. Moreover, there was a range of cities my respondents came from and expressed their belonging to, such as Gaziantep, Antakya, Izmir, and Istanbul. Number of respondents expressed their ancestral ties to this land: the fact that they were born and raised here in Turkey is used as a common argument for belonging to Turkey. Yosef, Sandra, Selim, Vivet and Tuna have all said exactly the same sentence: “If I was born and raised here, then I’m a Turk”.<sup>62</sup> Thus, what makes them Turkish is their connection to the territory of Turkey. But it is certainly true to argue that by “here” all of them understand and mean different things.

One variation to be named here would be the word “lands (*topraklar*)” used by Yosef<sup>63</sup>. His tendency to use a politically correct tone becomes explicit with this question. At certain points of his interview such correctedness in his tone surfaces. This was one of them. He said “The nation that I’m in, the society I’m in, the language that I

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<sup>62</sup> In Turkish, the sentence is : “Ben burada doğup büyüdüysem benim doğup büyüdüğüm yer burası ise, ben Türk’üm”.

<sup>63</sup> A literal translation of *topraklar* from Turkish to English is soils which may connote a nationalist sentiment.

speak and the lands that I live in are all here; thus these all show that my name is Turkish".<sup>64</sup> He uses the word nation, which I only heard from a couple of people throughout the entire study. Using such vocabulary, whether they use the words straight up right or not, may surface at different times throughout the interviews. It does not necessarily make him a right wing nationalist relative to other respondents but indicates that he is prone to use a traditional language with almost cliché statements. Although there's not much difference with the other respondents' interviews, Yosef's response is more in line with the traditional narrative in the sense that he explicitly points out being a humanitarian, liberal or being fully Turkish (*tastamam Türküm*). Others do not feel the necessity to emphasize the strength of their Turkishness, certainly not to me since I am a Jewish master's student conducting a study and not a government official recording his responses to be evaluated afterwards. However, Yosef preferred to point out that he is a liberal humanitarian Turkish Jew whose life does not revolve around either religion or Turkishness.<sup>65</sup>

For Avi, being at home means being relaxed. As far as he is concerned he is at most comfortable and relaxed here in Turkey since this is the place he was born and raised in.<sup>66</sup> Consequently, feeling Turkish is limited to feeling at home in Turkey for Avi. A similar approach to Turkishness is visible for those who adopt a regional level framework for belonging rather than national. Sofi, as described above, assumes a generic definition of Turkishness that is shaped around the prerogative to execute citizenship rights and duties. She feels Turkish because she is a citizen. But when asked about her sense of belonging, she explicitly differentiates Turkey from Istanbul. Sofi feels she belongs to Istanbul rather than Turkey.<sup>67</sup> Thus, for Sofi, the city becomes the territory where she feels she belongs to. It might be expected for a young adult in her late 20s to feel more closely tied to the city rather than the country since she is an active individual who takes part in the daily practices that makes up a metropol. But for an 88 year old retiree who mostly stays at home and spends his time watching TV, it might be

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<sup>64</sup> From personal interview with Yosef: "Benim bulunduğum millet, bulunduğum toplum, konuştuğum dil, yaşadığım topraklar burası. Bu, benim adımın bir Türk olduğunu gösteriyor"

<sup>65</sup> From personal interview with Yosef: "Özgürlükçü Türk bir Musevi'yim. Dini çok fazla kendi hayatımın önünde tutmayan yani dini kimlik bir şekli değil, hayatı belirleyen bir şey değil. Türklüğüm de hayatımı belirleyen bir şey değil. Ben bulunduğum yerde huzurlu olmayı isteyen hümanist bir Musevi Türküm."

<sup>66</sup> From personal interview with Avi: "Doğup büyüdüğüm yer burası olduğu için coğrafi olarak Türkiye. Alışmış olduğum bildiğim yerler olduğu için, dünyada en rahat buradayım."

<sup>67</sup> From personal interview with Sofi: "İstanbul'a ait hissediyorum; Türkiye'ye değil belki."



somewhat out of the ordinary. She experienced most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century but apparently his memories were not as effective as other elderly respondents to create a national-level territorial belonging. When asked expressively, she responded: “I was born in Istanbul. I don’t know any other city than Istanbul. I feel I belong to here. I have been here for 88 years.”<sup>68</sup> The transformation of the city didn’t have a loosening impact on his perception at all. This is worth mentioning since the data clearly shows a different tendency from other elderly respondents. It suggests that as the respondents get older and gets detached from the vibrant city life, the city becomes too complex to know and to be known. Hence, it becomes unstable. I will offer couple of examples next, which I believe at this point would be clearer.

Before conducting this study, I, as a Jewish person living in Turkey all my life, had thought that more respondents would express city-level belongings. I expected closer and more apparent ties to the “space”/ bubble where one lives in. The so-called “bubble” is a constructed “space” that is supposedly liberated from unpleasant affects, such as restlessness, fear, insecurity, and whose boundaries are continuously re-shaped, which makes it hard to grasp even by the respondent him/herself. It both changes from one person to another, but also is continuously rebuilt by the individual him/herself. Thus, it may be the case that the “space” where people are free from unpleasant affects coincide with one another, such as friendship, a certain neighborhood, family gathering or a city for that matter. Therefore; it can also be thought of as a limited space that is not only free from unpleasant affects, but also a limiting space that reminds one of its feelings on being a minority. The concept of bubble will be further evaluated and contemplated on in the following chapter.

Such an approach was adopted only by Sofi and the rest provided me with a larger spatial definition that is not simply bounded by the everyday practices of urban experiences but rather a more general territorial belonging at national level. The city rather surfaces more frequently in respondents’ memories. Vivet and Nino talk about a city back then when they knew everybody and everybody knew them when it was much smaller and predictable. Probably the reason city lost its significance as a territory of belonging because it became unpredictable, unfamiliar and impossible to be known.

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<sup>68</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Ben İstanbul da doğdum, İstanbul’ dan başka şehir bilmiyorum. Kendimi buraya ait hissediyorum. Ben 88 senedir buradayım.”

Kastoryano approaches to the transformation of Istanbul through the perspective of Jewish community in her article. She focuses on the local migratory movements of Jewish community in Istanbul throughout the twentieth century and argues that they tend to act cohesively with the national Muslim bourgeoisie who follow a similar pattern to modernization who “use West as their model for its cultural, economic, and political aspirations” (1992, p.272).

With this in mind, if one observes communal migratory moves of Jewish community, one can easily argue that the community’s upward mobility in society certainly marked their current social cohesion. Kastoryano contends that “The aspiration to “modernity”, which in this case manifested itself by economic and urban integration, explain this movement towards the “top”. In other words, just as traditional communal life was reconstituted in the quarter (Balat, Hasköy, Kuzguncuk), the proof of upward social mobility manifested itself through the departure from the “ghettoized” areas.” (Kastoryano, 1992, p. 259). Mentioned mobility towards “top” is actually to those areas where above given national bourgeoisie resides; namely, Şişli, Nişantaşı and latter for those who can afford it, the Bosphorus. It is exactly these local migratory movements, according to Kastoryano, that caused the dissolution of local Jewish communities that initially existed in areas like Balat. A similar argument was provided by Leyla Neyzi in her interview published in 2010. She states that,

After 1948, Jewish community in Turkey was transformed to a great extent. When lower classes left for Israel, ghettos have been emptied. The remaining community has started to become more assimilated then before and they moved to neighborhoods where middle class Muslims reside. Upper class Jewry from Ulus or Nişantaşı that I interviewed, previously lived in Balat, Çengelköy or Galata... I mean, there was a real living Jewish neighborhood (in Galata) but now we do not know/remember this fact. (Gül & Kutluata, 2010, p. 112)

That is probably why, according to the respondents, in the 1960s and 1970s both in terms of the geographical territory and in terms of the population size, it was easier to get to know people. Local communities were small enough in size to easily get accustomed to. However, as far as the respondents are concerned the city itself got too complex as did its inhabitants as a consequent of the local migratory movements. The transformation of the city and the transformation of the local communal groups turned Istanbul into a metropol that is unstable which is certainly not easy to call home, to feel as relaxed as they used to.

Kastoryano furthers her argument by saying that “the dissolution of local communities has given rise to the emergence of one single community. The latter is defined above all by, the transparency in the social relations between its members. In other words, everyone knows everything everyone else, their past as well as their present.”<sup>69</sup>

Consequently, the city remains as a mere nostalgic memory within the context of spatial belonging. Since home, in this context, is the city as a known. It is where you are familiar with its inhabitants. It is where you are familiar with its objects, where you share a common memory. Thus, when the context of this familiarity is blurred, the sense of home becomes blurred.

In reference to the regional/national, traditional/contemporary differences, these respondents feel at ease with being at home. But this is not always the case with some. For example, although Selim defines himself as a Turkish Jew, he says he feels discontent from time to time: “As a Turkish Jew born and grown up here, I feel at home here; however, it is also true that I feel alienated and estranged towards my home.”<sup>70</sup> Therefore, for Selim the feeling of belonging to Turkey is not given but it changes according to time. It is challenged by both individual and societal mechanisms at times. Thus, the sentiment of belonging appears as a complex sentiment which cannot be defined rigidly as a static phenomenon. As noted before, we cannot argue that a sense of belonging is something fixed. As the case of Selim shows what Wright argues is certainly plausible. She states that belonging is “actively created through the practices of a wide range of human and more-than-human agents, including animals, places, emotions, things and flows” (2014, p.2). Thus, for Selim, his sense of belonging is actively being created over and over again by such mechanisms, emotions and places.

Jojo expresses this fact by stating that he loves the land and the people; but not the Turkish Republic (T.C.)<sup>71</sup> I should clarify though that by T.C., he means the institution of state. His affection is for Turkishness that is composed of people and city which is an ever-changing composition. It is never fixed. He does not feel affection

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<sup>69</sup> Kastoryano (1992), p. 261-262.

<sup>70</sup> From personal interview with Selim: “Türk Yahudisi olarak burada doğmuş büyümüş biri olarak burada evde hissediyorum; fakat, her zaman evime karşı bir soğuma ve yabancılaşma hissettiğim de gerçek.”

<sup>71</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “İnsanı, toprağı çok seviyorum; ama, T.C.’yi değil”.

towards the state institution. His disposition is somewhat similar to Vivet's and Nino's in terms of their affection towards the people but it becomes a different composition when he declares his indifference towards the state itself which is not common to see in elder respondents.

The land itself is also imbued with cultural values and cannot be taken merely as territory, as stripped from cultural images. Vivet, the only person among my respondents to directly and openly correlate Turkishness with territory *and* culture of the country, says she is Turkish because she is born and raised here: "I completely know Turkish traditions; not other countries' traditions."<sup>72</sup> Moreover, Vivet gives a reference to a number of countries and she picks Turkey as the country she belongs to because she knows about the traditions of the country she was born in.

Consequently, be it for the city, the land or the people, most respondents possess a territorial understanding of belonging. They prefer to use common narratives such as being born and raised "here," although "here" might be used in a multiplicity of contexts and may mean a variety of things. Thus either Istanbul or the very micro environment people spend their everyday lives may serve as the very bubble people chose to live in; one respondent may prefer to stay in; to acknowledge as "the known", "the safe inhabitable area". The word *fanus* is used when respondents were asked about feeling at home and their definitions of home. It may be essential to keep in mind that they correlate to a safer area when asked about home.

It is plausible to argue that territorial understanding of home embodied in the city does not necessarily provide us with the same limits. Some may prefer a larger circle to stay at ease and others may prefer a smaller one.

For elder respondents, I may argue that the more time they spend at home, the more they lose touch with Istanbul. In return, familiarity of the city is lost rapidly both as a result of their loss of active life out there and the rapid transformation of the city. Thus, known becomes unknown and unpredictable which leaves them uneasy with the current metropolis and its unknown inhabitants. Thus, it is clear that comfort and sense

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<sup>72</sup>From personal interview with Vivet: "Yahudilik benim dinim. Yani ,bir din insanı farklı kılmamalı, bu etiketlendirmemeli insanı. Ama ben burada doğdum büyüdüm; ben Türküm. Ben tamamen Türk geleneklerini biliyorum, başka ülkenin geleneklerini bilmiyorum."

of home, in this territorial context are not solely shaped by the location but also by what it harbors, involves. The streets walked on, homes lived in, friends and acquaintances got to know are all essential pillars of the sense of home these respondents feel towards the city.

### **3.5 An Invisible Agent in Belonging: Turkish Language**

During the interviews, I find it very important to see the impact of speaking Turkish as a mother tongue on the overlap of Turkishness and Jewishness. Speaking Turkish is perceived as a natural and an assumed part of their identity, although the mother tongue of this group of people mostly used to be Ladino up until fifty years ago.<sup>73</sup> Scanning all the interviews conducted, I find out that currently, Turkish is the mother tongue of almost every respondent. The strength of the language connects them to Turkishness. It is their mother tongue and for all of them, this is an ordinary part of their being and daily life, like having a name or eating or brushing your teeth in the morning. I'm not surprised by this outcome which also reveals how speaking Turkish is, in fact, ordinary among the respondents. What I'm surprised by is the non-existence of Ladino in the interviews. In the following section, I should inform the reader that Ladino is Judeo-Spanish which was the language used by Jewish people once migrated from Spain to Anatolia in late 15<sup>th</sup> century and settled at various locations in Ottoman Empire. It then became mingled with the language (Hellenistic language used in Jews of Byzantium) used by the local Jews as well, which in turn created its last form (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 81).

There are two tendencies apparent in the responses that caused me to write this section on language. First one is the tendency to define one's self as Turkish because one speaks Turkish and reads in Turkish. Although not many, such an approach was commonly used, thus it is worth mentioning. A second tendency was to continue and end interviews without talking about Ladino. Most of the respondents didn't even mention Ladino; didn't even remember it. Consequently, an interesting question came

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<sup>73</sup> In 1927 Ladino was the mother tongue of 85% of the Jewish population. The percentage was similar in 1945. But, it began to decline only after the 1960s (Benbassa and Rodrigue, 2010, 402). It must be noted that this is the percentage among the total Jewish population which does not only constitute of Sephardic Jews for whom Ladino is the mother tongue; but, which also includes Mizrahi, Ashkenazi and also small groups from Russia, Georgia, and Poland.

to mind: What sort of relationality exists between being a Turkish citizen and belonging here if one considers the extent of Turkish being usual /ordinary?

But, still, it is critical for the purpose of this study to question how and why this has been possible, especially considering the fact that when not so long ago Ladino was the most spoken language of this community. What happened in the history of the Republic that caused Ladino to wither away? Is Ladino considered to be a “constructed”<sup>74</sup> language, that is not a “real”, a “natural” language, thus, was seen as a trivial element? Is the fact that the non-existence of Ladino in everyday practices caused it to wither away? Or was it removed by force from the public scene as a strategy for self-preservation? Since religious scripts are in Hebrew and the daily spoken language in Turkey is Turkish, such an argument may be plausible for the case at hand. These questions may shed some light on the case of Ladino and how in such a short time (a century may be a short time for a language to disappear) it became obsolete. Although the case of Ladino and how it gradually lost its significance for the Jewish community in Turkey is outside the scope of this thesis, in the chapter on the history of the Jewish community in Turkey I offered a limited account on Ladino in Turkey to understand the historical significance of the language for the community. In this chapter, I explore my respondents’ views on Ladino and Turkish in order to analyze Ladino and Turkish language’s current stance in the formation of Jewish identities today.

Historically, there were both gradual and abrupt attempts to remove Ladino from its everyday usage by the Jewish community in the early Republican period. In 1924 all education activities in Turkey were united under the Ministry of Education,<sup>75</sup> by the legislation of *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* (Zürcher, 2015, p.277). All the medreses were replaced with Faculty of Theology by the ministry who additionally forced Jewish schools to make a preference between Hebrew and Turkish for the language of their teaching. In fact, the ministry considered Hebrew, which is known by a very small percentage among the community, as the mother tongue of the Jewish population, instead of Ladino. Gradually the number of students attending these schools decreased, as well as

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<sup>74</sup> Rejin’s father considered Ladino as a language made-up/concocted by people, as she explains. She says; “Mesela hiçbir zaman babam hiçbir zaman Ladino konuşmama müsaade etmezdi. Ben onu gizli öğrendim. ‘O lisan değil, o, uydurma bir şey.’ derdi.” Thus, rather than Ladino, he preferred to teach her French when she was growing up.

<sup>75</sup> See Zürcher (2015, p.277) on the reform policies between 1923 - 1935.

a simultaneous pressure on the everyday usage of Ladino (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 243-244).

The conventional wisdom from mid 1920s onwards was to solidify the nation via uniform language rather than religion. Thus, Mustafa Kemal expressed the importance of Turkish language by stating that “it’s the heart and mind of the Turkish nation” and “it would be hard to believe the sincerity of a person if he declares his allegiance to Turkishness when he doesn’t speak Turkish” (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 36). There were a few attempts to pass legislation on Turkish becoming the compulsory language to converse in. Although no such legislation was accepted by the national assembly, some local municipalities enforced similar legislations. For instance Bursa Municipality enforced a bill on Turkish becoming the only compulsory language to speak in within the borders of Bursa. According to the records in publications *La Republique* and *Stamboul* In 1928 as presented by Bali in his work *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri*, two Jewish residents were fined in the amount of 5 liras each for speaking in Spanish (Bali, "Türkçe Konuşma" Meselesi, 2010, p. 108). In 1928, nationalist intellectual Moiz Kohen Tekinalp published 10 commandments for the Jewish community. The first one was to "Turkify" your names and the second “commandment” was to speak Turkish. In 1937, the number of municipalities to ban Ladino increased (Aktar, *Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*, 2010, p. 130-131). As an interesting anecdote, I would like to draw attention to a small quote from Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu’s novel *Yaban*. He likens speaking Turkish with an accent, to being torn apart by a *rugged hand*. Guttstadt used this excerpt as an excellent example of the negative attitude towards speaking Turkish with an accent.<sup>76</sup>

At the same time there were rumors in the media on the potential “treachery” of the Ladino population, which speculated the loyalty of Ladinos to Spain. Throughout the 1930s, 40s and 50s another significant pressure on Ladino, as well as on all other minority languages spoken in Turkey, was the “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş” Campaign,

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<sup>76</sup> The excerpt from *Yaban* used in Guttstadt’s book is as follows: “Doğrudan doğruya Rum şivesiyle söylenmiş bir Türkçe diyemem. Bu bağırın belki bir Ermeni, belki bir Yahudi’dir. Türkçenin böyle söylenmesinde, böyle büzülüp didiklenmesinde ne hazin bir şey var! Sanki haşın ve patavatsız bir el vücudumuzu hırpalıyor, vücudumuzun en hassas, en nazik yerlerine kadar sokulup oraya tırnaklarını geçiriyor zannedilir.” ( *Yaban*, Y.K. Karaosmanoğlu, İletişim Yayınları, 2009, 59. Baskı, p. 156) (Guttstadt, 2012).

which dictated Turkish citizens to speak only Turkish. Şaul notes that even in 1969, a Jewish student was admonished for his/her Ladino ancestry and surname due to the potential threat for the Jewish community's loyalty to Spain (Şaul, 2013, p. 239-242) As can be seen, both by state policies and social pressure, Ladino lost its status as the mother tongue of the community.

Gradually, Ladino was let go of either through the emphasis on “Turkification,” or through immigration, and Turkish became the mother tongue for the Jewish community in Turkey. Furthermore today, especially among young generations, it is almost impossible to differentiate between a non-Jewish speaking Turkish and a Jewish speaking Turkish since both speak with clear Istanbulite Turkish. Only one respondent (87 years old) who was one of the two women above 80 years old, had an accent when speaking Turkish since she was born and raised in a Ladino spoken household. But the rest of 27 people speak Istanbul Turkish. One may easily argue Ladino left the public sphere long ago. It cannot be traced in Jewish individuals accents since these respondents regardless of their ages have apparently all been raised in households with “proper” Turkish speaking parents or raised in environments that pay attention to the education in “proper” Turkish. This in return means that Ladino had secondary importance relative to Turkish in the community for some time now.

Some respondents even mentioned French and how they learned French in high school or were taught French at home by their parents secondary to Turkish, which indicates that Ladino were considered to be of lesser importance to be taught to the new generation compared to Turkish and French. Rejin, for instance talks proudly about how her father spoke to her only in French when she was little. This is how she learnt French. Her father considers Ladino as a “constructed” language and forbids her to speak Ladino, she said. Not every respondent has a nostalgic approach to the language, though. Some has a more functional approach. For example, Rejin, who is 88 years old, talks about clear examples of such functionality. In the first decade of the Republic, French and Turkish language were praised relative to Ladino, which was considered by her father as “useless” that caused Rejin to learn Ladino secretly.<sup>77</sup> As the case of Rejin

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<sup>77</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Evde Yahudi olduğumu anladım. Mesela, babam hiçbir zaman Ladino konuşmama müsaade etmezdi. Ben onu gizli öğrendim. ‘O lisan değil, o uydurma bir şey.’ derdi. Tabi bu yanlışlık. Ama onun sayesinde Fransızca öğrendim. Benimle yalnızca Fransızca konuşurdu babam. Türkçe konuşmazdı. Baktı ki ben Türkiye’de yaşıyorum . Fransızca konuşmak güzel ama Türkçe



evidently shows, Ladino had already fallen from grace for some. Then one may question why she tried to learn Ladino anyways. As I understood from her interview, she has a very pragmatist attitude towards the issue of languages. She uses her vacation in Spain and how speaking Ladino “helped her a lot” as a reason why she feels guilty of not teaching her children Ladino.<sup>78</sup> Not out of a despair caused by a melancholy of losing a cultural value of her identity, but losing a chance to help her children be better educated and be more comfortable to converse in abroad.

After every interview, it became clearer that Ladino has either little or no place in respondents’ everyday life. Most respondents didn’t even mention it and the ones that did, only talked about it as a past memory. It exists as a past memory when reminiscing about past days. These memories are not necessarily happy images of their childhood with their families though. For Vivet, for example, Ladino was the language she “had to give up” after the 6-7 September events: “After the events of 6-7 September, do not speak Spanish please speak Turkish. And they started to hide themselves.”<sup>79</sup>

She does not spend much time on explaining in detail about how it made her feel but she says that her father warned her not to speak Spanish after the events. This example substantiates the argument on the possibility of forcibly removing Ladino from the public scene. Ladino’s visibility, thus, was affected by both natural processes as well as conscious interventions. Both public upheaval against non-Muslims and the efforts of the state to promote Turkish as the main language by campaigns such as “*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş*” have an impact on these conscious interventions.<sup>80</sup> This is exactly why a natural disengagement and disappearance of the language Ladino may not be plausible to argue within this context. It is true, that languages have a life span, they born, live and eventually die. But under the light of the responses I got from the interviews, the death of Ladino may be expedited by popular aggression that rejuvenated at certain decades.

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de konuşmam lazım bu sefer Türkçe ye çevirdi. Türkçe öğrenince tekrar Fransızcaya çevirdi. Onun sayesinde Fransızca öğrendim, Fransız okuluna gitmediğim halde.”

<sup>78</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Çocuklarıma hep Türkçe, maalesef Ladino’yu öğretmedim. Çok büyük hataydı. İspanyaya gittiğimde Ladino bildiğim için çok rahat ettim. Oradaki arkadaşlar Türk’tü. benim tercüme etmemi istiyorlardı. Ben Güney Amerikalılarla daha iyi anlaşıyorum. Onların Kastilyanosu bizim lisana daha uygun. İspanyolların daha rahat geldi bana.”

<sup>79</sup>From personal interview with Vivet: “6-7 Eylül’den sonra, aman İspanyolca konuşma aman Türkçe konuş. Sonra kendilerini gizlemeye başladılar.”

<sup>80</sup> For further information on *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş* Campaign and its impact in the Jewish community see Aktar (2010: 122-131).

Ladino is not fully absent from the memories of the community though. Some respondents, elder ones, can speak Ladino to some extent or have knowledge of friends who are fluent in Ladino. Some Ladino words are embedded in their daily language. The traces of Ladino are still visible. They may not use the language itself but they do certainly use its vocabulary. Tuna uses the word *Judiou* when she talks about Jews, for instance. However, she was asked about the language she spoke; she says people used to talk either French or “Ladino” (she uses the word *Musevice* instead of Ladino); not Turkish as they do these days. Jewish community praised speaking French back then according to her; learning French back then was like learning English right now.

What is striking though is respondents don’t prefer to yearn for Ladino and spend more time talking about it in the interviews. Only one respondent said a few sentences on Ladino but the rest doesn’t even feel the need to mention it. One thing has to be made clear though: no one purposefully omits Ladino from the conversation. They simply don’t remember it or don’t feel the necessity to mention it since Ladino has little or no share in their past and memories. Thus there’s practically nothing to share. It is not a subject to be kept in secrecy as decided by the community. No such compromise has been reached by the community. As in the case of Turkishness, it is an individual preference not to include Ladino in the interviews.

The one who mentions Ladino is a young adult, Selen, in her twenties. She has an interesting take on the absence of Ladino in her life. She regrets not speaking Ladino. As far as she is concerned, if she could speak Ladino, she would be exercising an act that is an essential part of her identity. Therefore, she reaches the conclusion that “there’s a lack of belonging, lack of identity in my generation and in my life”.<sup>81</sup> Her inference, regardless of being to the point or not, worth further investigation since it is one of its kind. No one else made a similar argument. One may expect an elder respondent to argue such a point for he/she may remember the times when Ladino was a common language. However, her inference is to the point regardless of her memories on Ladino. Her senses of identity and belonging are, according to her not fully satisfied and

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<sup>81</sup> From personal interview with Selen: “Ladino konuşmak olabilirdi, çok az biliyorum. İspanyolca öğrenmiştim. Bence şu an anladığım şey İspanyolca’yı biraz bildiğim için. Keşke Ladino konuşabilseydim; o bile başlı başına kimliğimin parçası olan bir şeyi yapmak olacaktı. Ama o da yok. Galiba bir aidiyet ve kimlik eksikliği var şu anda bizim jenerasyonun ve bizim hayatımızda.”

in a flux that constantly needs to be filled. More importantly, she believes that her generation is in the same flux, too.

As far as I'm concerned, language, in Selen's case, is turned into a cultural phenomenon that once existed and now longed for by the community. Furthermore, language became an indicator for the identity in her response, as an integral part of both individual and societal identity. But such a correlation between Ladino and identity is not a common phenomenon; it is solely in Selen's thoughts, not others. It can be argued that the rest prefers to correlate Turkish to their sense of self. So, it might be interesting to ask whether or not Turkish is closely tied to their identity too. Only a few of the respondents mentioned speaking Turkish as a justification for them being a Turk among other causes like being born here and raised here. But is speaking Turkish as effective as being tied to the land as far as their Turkishness is concerned? Thus a follow-up question might be about the opposite scenario. Would they still feel as much Turkish as they do now, if according to them, their mother tongue were Ladino? The correlations between language and sense of self, Turkish and Turkishness, Ladino and Turkish could become much clearer if one begins to contemplate on these questions.

The bond between language and self is even more effective than the impact it has on one's identity. It assists you to connect to the outside, to the people, to the other. It helps you to make a bond. For a respondent like Yosi, it is more than a medium to communicate; it is a medium of culture, a medium of bonding. He perceives language as the most important cultural factor. He believes it is struggling to speak some other language than one's mother tongue, even though one is fluent in it, simply because language holds information about how one perceives life, how one thinks. Thus he cannot easily transmit this information through a language that is not his own mother tongue just like he cannot receive others'. Considering the fact that he lives abroad, it is easily arguable that his emphasis on language as a cultural factor of belonging is a clear indication of his desire to speak in his mother tongue. Longing for the familiar, for the known is, again, at work. Although he independently chose to live abroad and be amongst foreigners and speaks daily in a secondary language, he does not deny the day-to-day difficulties he feels. So being fluent is not necessarily enough for communication. Yosi's case reveals that language incorporates more than speaking; for him, it involves a common cultural perception that is shared by the people as a

familiarity, as a sense of belonging. Interestingly though, there were no attempts to question the disappearance of Ladino and Turkish becoming the mother tongue as consequence of nation-state building project. There is no visible resistance, no insistence in keeping Ladino but a gradual and quiet move to Turkish.

As quoted from Benbassa & Rodrigue above, %85 of the Jewish population of Turkey says that their mother tongue is Ladino in 1927. This ratio does not change drastically when we observe the situation in 1940s. It was not until 1960s that Ladino has been replaced by Turkish as the mother tongue of most Jewish population in Turkey (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 402). We also know that the Jewish population is not solely composed of Sephardic Jews. Thus, it can be plausibly argued that the rate would be even higher among Sephardic Jews. Though Ladino was replaced by Turkish in the 60s, it was still used by the Jewish population. However today, the language is almost forgotten; it is lost. Consequently the question of dissolution of Ladino demands closer attention. Which factors cause for such a process?

Firstly, new legislation on centralized education of the Republic (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) and the acceptance of Turkish as the only official language of the Republic might be two major factors. With the acceptance of the legislation, education of other languages except for Turkish at Jewish schools was terminated and the language of primary education became Turkish. Hebrew was accepted as the official language of Jewry and could be taught as the secondary language at Jewish schools. Thus, Ladino was deducted from schools (Bali, "Türkçe Konuşma" Meselesi, 2010). With the introduction of Alliance Schools to the education system in 19<sup>th</sup> century, education in Ladino was already reduced, since the language of education in them was French. Benbassa and Rodrigue state that Ladino was not taught as the primary language in Jewish community schools; thus this ban was not essential for the disappearance of the language. It was rather only used as the daily language of the community (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p. 402)

In addition to the regulations of centralized education, publicly held campaigns such as "Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş" assisted to create a popular and culturally accepted hostility against those who do not speak Turkish in public, or against those who speak

Turkish with an accent.<sup>82</sup> As a repercussion Turkish Jewry gradually withdrew them from speaking Ladino in public. Hence, Ladino was deducted from public sphere, too.

Both are very plausible arguments for the dissolution of Ladino. But they remain inadequate to better explain the transition from naming Ladino as mother tongue to naming Turkish. All the above mentioned factors were at play up until 1965 but we don't necessarily detect a remarkable impact on the use of Ladino. If by 1960s, considering all the popular disadvantages to speak Ladino, still Turkish Jewry use Ladino as their daily language, what was the accelerator of the dissolution process afterwards?

Transformation of the city Istanbul is a relatively reasonable argument that sheds some light on the issue. A move of Jewish residents of Balat, Galata and other Jewish concentrated neighborhoods towards neighborhoods of middle class and upper middle class of Muslim residents is explanatory for the dissolution of Jewish community groups in Istanbul. Such an argument is also shared by Riva Kastoryano in her article *From Millet to Community: the Jews of Istanbul*. She contends that upwards social mobility of ethnic groups leads to the dissolution of the groups and the historical evolution of Jewish communities confirm this argument. (Kastoryano, 1992, p. 259). Move to those neighborhoods of westernized Muslim neighborhoods is certainly a probable cause for the current situation of Ladino but to what extent it explains the whole issue, one might question.

One other imperative factor for the speedy process is major moves of mass migration of Jewry. Particularly with the establishment of the sovereign state of Israel, major moves of migration from Turkey to Israel detected. Those who might be classified as the lower class proletarian Jews living mostly in such neighborhoods as Balat, Haliç or lower Galata prefers to migrate to Israel. Today, Turkish Jewry may look like a somewhat homogenous bourgeois community. But Leyla Neyzi argues, back in the Republican Era, there was segregated Jewish community. She contends that "there were wharf/warehouse porters, Ladino speaking proletariat living in Balat. It was a multi-layered class society back then. As a result of the Turkification policies and

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<sup>82</sup> For example the quotation above, from Yakup Kadri Karasmanoğlu's novel that is already quoted in this thesis, would be excellent for such a popular hostility against those who speak Turkish with an accent.

campaigns, there occurred a reactionary Zionist movement within Jewry that was mostly welcomed by the proletariat.” As Neyzi and Bali both argue almost all of the lower-class Jewry migrated to Israel as soon as the state of Israel was established, thus leaving the Jewry in Turkey relatively more bourgeois and homogenous community. (Gül & Kutluata, 2010, p. 112; Bali, 2003, p. 368). The children of these groups did not have the financial ability to go to an Alliance School or to a state School. Thus amongst these local groups of Jewish communities Ladino was more widely used relative to those who go to these mentioned schools.

These are all strong arguments to reflect partially on the issue of dissolution of Ladino from both public and private scenes. But still, very limited evidence remains to clarify the transitions happened after 1960s. Therefore, such a subject would be very interesting and fruitful for the literature of minorities and the literature on the language of Ladino and Jewish existence in Turkey. Unfortunately, the issue of Ladino’s current existence is not within the scope of this study.

Yet, this long summary on the Ladino’s historical evolution in Turkey carries important aspects on the integration of Jewish identity into the general category of Turkishness. Aside from the theoretical discussions on language and identity, the acceptance of Turkishness and leaving Ladino behind reflects the integration of upper and middle class Jews into the Republic’s hundred year project of secular and responsible citizenship. Departing from here, this discussion on language will show us a fundamental part of what bubble/fanus implies in the following chapter, signifying the space where they relatively feel more secure and belonging. In addition to this, I realized that in counting the themes of belonging to Turkey and Turkishness; language is not a common claim of all respondents. Rather, language, speaking Turkish, is taken as granted and as naturally given which is not questioned by the interviewees.

The following section will move on to the analysis of cultural aspects of the overlap of Turkishness and Jewishness for the respondents.

### 3.6 The Cultural Attributions in the Context of Belonging

In the interviews, there was a bulk of ‘culture’ related responses to a variety of questions. Some define ‘culture’ with the food they like to eat, with the cuisine; some prefer to adopt culture as the traditions they were raised in and some perceived culture with a reference to how they feel when they are present in foreign countries. Thus, a multifaceted ‘culture’ was extremely important to handle within the context of this thesis since there was an emphasis on culture, though through different channels. But the challenge is to define the limits of these various definitions since it becomes vaguer as one tries to dig deeper. Additionally, the individualistic approach to culture makes it even more challenging to understand. Since belonging is a non-static and fluid sense that is constantly changing and being shaped by different factors; here too, belonging to Turkishness and Jewishness is constantly rationalized through a variety of cultural components. Cultural factors that apparently urge the respondents to construct a harmonized sense of Turkishness and Jewishness vary deeply and constantly; most hint an individualistic understanding of culture and a weak societal culture as a Jewish community. Thus taking a closer look will be essential to understand how and why it is so.

General and vague statements of cultural explanations, as might be supposed, are expressed by a few of the respondents. Vivet, Can, Engin, Yusuf and Nino have all used Turkish culture as an independent variable for their sense of Turkishness. While some further elaborated on what they mean by “culture”, some like Engin preferred to leave it at that. He simply said that he was raised in a Turkish high school, he learned Turkish culture there. He uses the phrase “Turkish culture”, as if there is a universally accepted definition of Turkish culture and it is undisputed. But a memory of his days in elementary school might be helpful to begin to understand his perception of culture. He says “When someone says “Jewish” the first thing that comes to my mind is the word “other”. I went to a Turkish elementary school. Some kids from higher levels kept reminding me that I was Jew. They used to take me from classroom to classroom to show me to everyone, saying “Look at the Jew” and they made me repeat Kelime-i Shaadet.”<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “Yahudi dendiği zaman öteki olarak geliyor aklıma. İlkokulda Türk okuluna gittiğim için Yahudi olduğum hatırlatıldı; Kelime-i Şahadet getiriyorlardı sınıf sınıf gezdirip, A‘Yahudi’ye Bak’ diyorlardı.”

It is also plausible and a common practice to perceive culture as the very traditions and customs one grew up in. Within the respondents a few of them preferred to set the limits of culture to the conventions he/she learned in their families. Can was one of them. When he was asked about the possibility of co-existence of Turkishness and Jewishness, he said it is relative. He argues<sup>84</sup>

It is a matter of issue of sub-identity & supra-identity. Are these two identities apart from each other or are they a whole? It is impossible to deny either of them; it is obvious we possess both. Both culturally and legally it is obvious. Inevitably, one possesses Turkish traditions, customs and conventions, Turkish mentality. One cannot stay out, he is in constant interaction. On purpose or unconsciously I highlight my Turkish identity. Occasionally, being Jewish is a cause of reservation, thus one embraces his/her Turkish identity more. Well, I am Turkish... Let's consider the case when some conflict happens with Israel, for instance. My father has always taught me to reply as "I'm Turkish" to people who refer to Israel as "your people". It is a sort of protection from people with negative views.

Conventions and traditions have great impact on how a person defines one's own subjectivity. As can clearly be understood from Can's interview, knowingly or unknowingly, people are largely shaped by the way they have been raised. As well as traditions, repetitive advices and stories told within the family are essential for a person's identity. It would be a futile effort to try to figure out to what extent Can's emotions towards being Turkish is shaped by his father's cautionary sermons and honestly, it would be an illogical endeavor since the reason wouldn't change the outcome. He clearly states what he feels; and what he feels is shaped by collectivity of stimuli.

Conflicts with Israel have been the cause of disturbance, one way or another, for most of the respondents. At changing intensities, they all felt the pressure. Engin explains this problem as follows: "When there is an incident in Israel, it is immediately attributed as the responsibility of Jews living here. A neighbor, who you consider to be

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<sup>84</sup> From personal interview with Can: "Bence kişiden kişiye değişir. Alt kimlik-üst kimlik meselesi... Bu iki kimlik birbirinden ayrı mıdır, bütün müdür? Hangisini ön plana koymakla alakalı. Ben Yahudi'yim. İkisini birden inkar etmek olanaksız. İkisine de sahip olduğumuz aşık. Hem kültür olarak hem resmi statü olarak aşık. Türk gelenek örf adetlerine, düşünce yapısına ister istemez sahip oluyor. Böyle bir kalıplaşma varsa insan bunun dışında kalmaz, sürekli etkileşim içerisinde. Kendi içimde Türk kimliğimi ön plana çıkarıyorum. Bilinçli bilinçsiz, onu bilemiyorum ama Yahudi olduğumuz zaten bazı yerlerde çekince oluyor, o yüzden Türk kimliğine daha çok sarılmış oluyor, ya ben Türküm zaten... İsrail'le sorun olduğu zaman mesela. Babam küçüklüğümden beri bana 'Sizinkiler şöyle yapıyor derlerse, diyeceksin ki ben de Türküm.' Olumsuz bakışlarından koruma gibi oluyor."



close and intimate, might say that ‘Look at what your people have done!’”<sup>85</sup> He says this with a heavy heart. It is frustrating for the respondents to be immediately pushed away as the offenders when something another state has done. Same frustration is mentioned by two other respondents; Yosef and Jojo. Yosef is upset by the same attitude of some that perceives her as an Israeli citizen and accuses her as if ‘her people’ has started a war. Similarly Niso remembers that one of his close friends saying “There’s no reason why a second 6-7 September Events wouldn’t happen with a single ignition” when he was explaining the rise of pressure he feels parallel to the rise of hatred towards Israel.<sup>86</sup> Thus, it is certainly an issue of mutual perception. The tendency of the general public to selectively perceive Jewish people as an Israeli citizen at times of conflict is portrayed as a common practice which gradually constructed a shared frustration for the respondents.

Traditions and customs are not necessarily shaped by the family; they also are shaped by a person’s everyday routines he/she enjoys. For Yusuf, “feeling at home” is closely tied to the small community he lives in, to the people in it. He does not refer to the Jewish community per se; he specifically mentions *esnaf* (artisans) he talks to on a daily basis. He argues that “Home is where you grow up, where you socially mingle with people, where you like the people. A society may be your home as long as you enjoy its inhabitants. You are at home, if you can feel at home when you’re talking to *esnaf*”. The *esnaf* he refers to is mainly the artisans in Büyükada such as the kokoreççi, charcuterie owners or patisserie owners because he openly says that he feels different in Büyükada; like he is in his true hometown. He is certainly moved by local conversations and argues that those dialogues are what ties you to that location, what makes the location a home.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>85</sup>From personal interview with Engin: “İsrail’de bir olay olduğunda, buradaki Yahudilere mal ediyorlar. Yakın gördüğün komşun ‘Bak, sizinkiler ne yaptı?’ diyor.”

<sup>86</sup>From personal interview with Jojo: “Böyle zamanlarda kötü hissediyorum, İsrail’e nefretin artması, baskı hissettiriyor. Benim düğününe gittiğim arkadaşım bile böyle görüyorsa. Tek kıvılcımla 6-7 Eylül olaylarının yaşanmamamsı için bir neden yok.”

<sup>87</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Çok basit anlamıyla para kazandığın yer evindir, diye bir laf vardır. Ama, öyle değil. Doğup büyüdüğün yer, eğitimi aldığın yer, sosyal olarak kaynaştığın, insanlarını sevdiğin yer evin olmalı. Yaşadığın toplumun içini seviyorsan o senin ev olabilir. Esnafla konuşurken adam seni evinde gibi hissettiriyorsa evindedin. Büyükada da yazlıkta da kendimi başka hissediyorum, öz memleketim orası gibi. Yerel diyaloglar... “Gel bira iç, gel dondurma ikram edeyim.” gibi yerel muhabbetler daha seni oraya bağlıyor.

Other sorts of stimuli could be named as folkloric factors. Be them songs, stories, written or oral literature in general, could also be effective in identity building as cultural variables. Nino is the one person uses the word ‘folklore’ when he was asked about how he sees himself. This certainly doesn’t mean that others used similar arguments like Nino did, but he is the one that uses the word itself. First he argues that he sees himself as a citizen of the world who does not have realistic boundaries. But then he narrows his explanation by saying that he sees himself as “a person of this land, a person of this folklore”.<sup>88</sup> In addition to a geographical sense of belonging, his sense of belonging is enlarged by his folkloric approach to culture by including traditional Turkish music and Turkish cuisine as his pleasures. He states that he enjoys when he listens to classical Turkish music (Türk Sanat Müziği) and he enjoys eating kebabs, eggplants which are the very products of this land.<sup>89</sup> The word ‘folklore’ itself is at most value for Nino which he identifies with being a person tied to this land according to his understanding. He says that he does not make any distinction among Armenians, Anatolian-Greeks or Alevites. All has to live together, side by side. So the word folklore is tied to land as much as it is tied to culture.<sup>90</sup> Thus, it is plausible to argue that for Nino culture is closely knitted to the land a society lives in. His emphasis on folkloric components of Turkishness like the music or the food is, again, as he specifically expresses, are products of Anatolia. Consequently, a territorial approach to culture might be plausible for the case of Nino.

Among the group of my respondents, there were a couple of people who experienced migrating to Israel and more interestingly moved back to Turkey. Thus, a closer look at their accounts would be essential at this point. Two of the respondents have temporarily moved to Israel with their families for financial concerns but eventually returned to Turkey. Vivet was an adult when she moved and stayed in Israel for about 7 years whereas Dorin was a small child when her family moved to Israel who turned back after a couple of years. Their point of view is important in the sense that they have experienced to live in Israel as Turkish-Jews. According to both, the situation

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<sup>88</sup> From personal interview with Nino: “Kendimi bu toprağın ve bu folklorun insanı olarak görüyorum”.

<sup>89</sup> From personal interview with Nino: “Kendimi bu toprağın ve folklorun insanı olarak görüyorum. Türk Sanat Müziği dinlediğimde zevk alıyorum. Bu toprağın ürünü kebabını, patlıcanını yemekten zevk alıyorum”.

<sup>90</sup> From personal interview with Nino: “Folklor kelimesi benim için çok önemli; bu toprağın insanı olmak demek. Rum’u da Ermeni’si de Alevi’si de yan yana yaşamak zorunda bu insanlar.”

in Israel for the migrated Turkish Jews is not what it is generally supposed to be. Vivet says that for the duration of 7 years she lived in Israel, she was certainly treated as a Turk. She tells that “When I was in Israel, my identity was Turkish. Turks are in a closely tied segregated neighborhood there. In Israel, you are a Turk; a European is a European. You bring your identity with to Israel; you don’t immediately become an Israeli person.” She does not necessarily talk about an attitude towards migrated Turkish Jews in Israel but her emphasis is on how the migrated people feel. What she describes reminds me of a regular ethnically segregated type of neighborhood, one may run into in any city in Western Metropolis; a neighborhood constructed in a specific location in the city full of certain nationality(ies) who speak the same language or have migrated from the same country. Thus, in such a micro neighborhood, the cultural habits of the migrated could find suitable environment to survive.

According to Vivet, this was the case in Israel. Her identity not only survived, but as she puts it, she was “more Turkish there” than she ever was in Turkey. Such a phrase reveals the intensity of the will of migrated people to hold on to their identities whilst trying to fit in another country, another culture.<sup>91</sup> The resistance may be the result of a variety of causes which certainly are out of the scope of this thesis. But a brief explanation is presented by Dorin which might shed some light on the causes. She is determined that one certainly does not belong to Israel. She says that she knows such an argument is being used here in Turkey, as if Jewish people should belong to Israel but she finds this argument as nonsensical. The same argument is adopted by her close circle of friends and acquaintances as well, as a potential remedy for future dangers but again, she questions their sense of belonging to Israel. She believes that they, Turkish Jews, don’t belong to Israel.<sup>92</sup>

Both of the respondents are clear on where they feel they belong; probably even more certain than others. Having lived elsewhere for even a brief period has such an impact on their perception of self. They experienced being a Turkish Jew in Israel and a

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<sup>91</sup>From personal interview with Vivet: “Kendimi tam Türk olarak hissediyorum. 7 sene İsrail’de yaşadığım süre boyunca ben Türk’tüm. Kesinlikle Türk’üm. Kimliğim Türk’tü. İsrail’de de yaşarken kimliğim Türk’tü. Ne bileyim Türkler daha bir arada. Siz orada Türksünüz, Avrupalı da Avrupalı. İsrail’e kendi kimliğinizi götürüyorsunuz. Hemen İsraili olamıyorsunuz siz gerçekten orada Türksünüz. Buradan fazla Türksünüz”.

<sup>92</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: “Orada hiç bir yere ait olamıyorsun, çok saçma. Oraya ait olmamız gerekiyor gibi bir düşünce var. Duyuyorum çevremde; bir şey olursa İsrail’e gideriz deniyor. Ama, oraya ait değiliz ki.”

Jewish Turk in Turkey which granted them a valuable insight that surfaces within different frameworks. Where Vivet experienced the depth of her sense of Turkishness which she didn't feel as strongly as she did in Israel; Dorin experienced the unattainable sense of belonging in Israel as a local which consequently caused her to question a popular belief's feasibility. A simple and popular last resort for the rest of the community does not make sense to her as an option, simply because she experienced firsthand the unfeasibility of it.

In addition to first hand experiences of migrating to and back from Israel, a few of the respondents mentioned migration stories told to them by family members, friends and distant relatives. Keeping in mind that the reliability of the accuracy of the stories told may be distorted since the respondents are passing on hearsay stories, still, for the purpose of this section, I find the account of Selen's uncle who lives in Israel, complementary to Vivet's and Dorin's arguments. To put it briefly, her uncle dismisses her plans to go to Israel for 6 months when she mentions her plans to spend some time in Israel studying and continuing her academic research. He responds "Why would you bother? It's not worth it. You're very comfortable here. There are all kinds of job opportunities and fun activities in Istanbul."<sup>93</sup> He probably misunderstood her plans by mistakenly thinking she was planning to stay longer in Israel; his response still makes sense. He is either not happy living in Israel or has suffered a lot until he blended in. He does not recommend migrating to Israel although he himself did. But one may question his sincerity, too, since he didn't return back to Turkey and stayed. All in all, all three accounts establish a similar attitude towards Israel. Israel is not a backup homeland as most Jews living in Istanbul believe it is. It is certainly not easy to blend in, to feel you belong and be accepted as a local as well. Thus, it is plausible to argue that being Jewish does not necessarily makes a person welcome in Israel as well as it does not make a person feel Israeli. Similarly, migrating elsewhere does not immediately take the "Turkishness" out of you. It lingers.

There are a number of practices performed by the majority of the respondents which might be significant for a common cultural tendency argument. Having Sabbath

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<sup>93</sup> From personal interview with Selen: "Ne gerek var, dedi. O daha uzun süreli Aliya yapacağımı düşündü benim konuşmamdan. 'Hiç uğraşma ettiğin mücadeleye değmez burada çok rahatsın. İstanbul'da her türlü iş fırsatı var, İstanbul kadar iyi, eğlenceli, zaman geçirecek aktiviteleri bulabileceğin yer de bulamayacaksın.' dedi."

dinner with the family is one of them. Except for 3 of the respondents who are either single or living away from their families, all of the respondents certainly do have weekly get together with their loved ones, be it a Friday night or not. But since these common practices have no correlation to the argument of harmonized Turkishness and Jewishness, these practices will not be mentioned at this point in the thesis.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

Belonging is fluid; it cannot be fixed to a definite explanation. Respondents' senses of belonging clearly maintain this argument. This section above covered through which mechanisms my interviewees sustain their Turkishness with their Jewish identity or more accurately, it showed via which narratives do they rationalize/justify/substantiate their stances.

Certain interviewees preferred to adopt a rather official narrative whose main argument is that their Turkishness is granted by their citizenship status and secured by law. It is certainly understandable why such a narrative would be easily adopted. Such legal arguments, namely, being Turkish since they possess a Turkish identity card or pay taxes, proves beyond doubt that their stance as a Turkish citizen is legally undeniable. Thus, no one has any legal case against their statute. It might be seen more of a rationalization of Turkishness rather than a declaration of why a person feels Turkish. However, Jewishness is categorized as a religion for them. Therefore, there is no logical conflict of being Turkish and Jewish for them. It was interesting to see such coherence on conceptualization of Jewishness whereas no such common narrative on the definition of Turkishness was shared by the respondents. Hence, I argued that the data shows respondents do not adopt a commonly constructed perception of Turkishness and there are no publicly shared open discussions on such an issue.

Secularism is observed, as mentioned above, an almost common characteristic of the respondents. When it is considered together with their reservations of being publicly visible as a Turkish Jew citizen; the causal relationship between "*culturalization*" of Judaism and the attitude of the rest of the society becomes critical. Thus my questions in this study are: is the lack of public religious/cultural Jewish practices a natural consequence of their secular characteristic or is it a result of their avoidance to be

publicly visible? These questions are meaningful inquiries that open up new venues for the discussion of public visibility of Judaism in Turkey.

One should, nevertheless, keep in mind that all of the interviewees, predominantly, are from a secular, middle-class or upper-class family. In addition, if one combines their argument of “Turkish being their nationality and Judaism being their religion” with this fact, it becomes easier not to publicly practice Judaism or to rationalize the absence of such practices. Hence, the causality of the above asked question becomes more ambiguous than it already is. That is exactly the reason why I adopted affect theory as an addition to my ethnographic analysis; to be able to acquire more than can be seen or heard from the interviews.

One other approach to a conceptualization of feeling Turkish was via a spatial understanding of belonging. They prefer to identify themselves with the neighborhood, the city or the land. What changes though is the way they conceptualize these spatialities. For some, the city is Istanbul and its vibrant nature, for others the city is the people they know, the streets they walk on, and the familiarities of that location. For those who say that they’re Turkish since they were born on this land, the word “land”, again, means different things. For some, it is simply the territory, the geography; for others it’s the space where their ancestors lived and passed, where they raised their families and where they lived to know, lived to embrace. Again, a familiarity component of spatial belonging is visible in the interviews. Familiarity creates a secure environment, a *bubble/fanus* for that matter, for the interviewees to peacefully exist, where there are limits to and possibilities for being discriminated. Such an approach suggests that respondents primarily look for security and for safe bubbles where there is limited or no discrimination possibility when trying to construct a sense of belonging. It would be interesting to ask the same questions to others in Turkey and look for whether or not feeling safe is their primary concern when constructing their sense of belonging.

Language as a medium of belonging construction stands out as a definitive factor for the harmony of Turkishness and Jewishness. Particularly, the adoption of Turkish as the mother tongue is critical for the respondents since none of them considers any other language as their primary language to converse in. A few of them mention Ladino and French as ‘other’ languages they are fluent in or have knowledge

of. But there is a certain distinction between interviewees' attitudes towards Turkish and other languages. Turkish is the given medium of conversation regardless of their ages whereas Ladino and French are considered as either cultural wealth they possess or as warm but ancient memories from their childhood which is presented as pleasant amenities they once enjoyed. An interesting outcome of this analysis is the speed of transformation of this community from a bilingual community to a unilingual one. The disappearance of Ladino as the mother tongue, thus, requires extensive investigation as a topic of future studies for two reasons: First, the speed of its disappearance suggests an inorganic cause to its demise. As discussed above, Ladino has been lost in such a short time which suggests strong state-led incentives. Secondly, even with the existence of state-led policies the community's non-existent resistance deserves further notice. How in only 50- 60 years, Jewish people of Turkey became an exclusively Turkish speaking community is an important question which would shed some light on both governmental policies on Turkification in early twentieth century as well as Jewish community's strong incentives to speedily adopt Turkish rather than Ladino or French.

Cultural attributions to Turkishness are also significant within the context of "the coherence of Turkishness and Jewishness" as proposed by the interviewees. When I analyzed the interviews it was rather difficult to classify such responses as "cultural" since the justifications of this coherence are applicable to other classifications of Turkishness and Jewishness mentioned above, such as Turkishness as citizenship. The term "cultural" might be redundant and ambiguous as responses covered in this section refers to a variety of topics from Turkish cuisine and Sabbath dinners to a specific everyday culture of locals in Büyükada.

Cultural norms and references were more visible for those who located abroad temporarily. Those respondents presented a relatively stronger connection to Turkish cultural characteristics, whatever these might be according to their understanding of Turkish culture. For those who never moved away, ties to local and everyday culture are revealed as the main motivations to feel Turkish. Daily conversations with local shop owners (*esnaf*) might be underlined and omitted as a factor of belonging, but as one of the respondents clearly established, such daily routines and ties with locals somehow created a sense of belonging, especially for those who frequently visits abroad for business. In all cases, the term 'culture' is extremely intricate to handle within the

context of this thesis since there was an emphasis on cultural explanations and justifications mentioned numerously by respondents through different references as to what Turkish Culture means for them. The obscure nature of culture led to individualistic approaches to Turkishness.

As mentioned above, interviewees defined Turkishness and Jewishness through the individualistic attributions of these categories. However, there are as many challenging attributions of the collective memories of interviewees' experiences as there are supporting attributions to the coherence of Turkishness and Jewishness. In the previous section, I covered how they justified the supporting arguments. In the following section, I will try to analyze how and when the respondents felt/ are feeling that the coherence of Turkishness and Jewishness is challenged by others and by themselves or more importantly how the conflict between these identities is being "constructed" and "taught". To be more specific, I will explicate through which feelings and affects the Jewish people construct whether they belong to Turkey or not.



## CHAPTER IV – FEELING MINORITY

### 4.1 Introduction

Imagine a word when enounced, recalls multiplicity of emotions; fragility (*kırılganlık*) and even maybe eeriness (*tekinsizlik*). I have witnessed it during a number of interviews. The phrase feeling minority (*azınlık hissetmek*) allows favorable grounds for such emotions to foster. When one steps out of the bureaucratic spot placed by the state and finds himself in the midst of everyday life, and when these two words, minority and feeling, are used complementarily, it touches a number of emotions, it lets these emotions become sensual, become physical, become observable, become communicable.

“Feeling minority” is conventionally used phrase in Turkish for situation where one feels lost in conversation, or his/her point is neglected by the majority. It has a negative connotation. Perception didn’t change for the respondents. They, too, used the phrase for insinuating negative experiences.

The affects apparent in the interviews arise from the atmosphere of being a minority. It is important to take a closer look at respondents’ definitions of minority, especially because we see a pattern in the interviewees’ understanding. How do they perceive the word itself, and how does the word make them feel? The word itself is naturally imbued with a duality. Minority carries the implicit existence of a majority. Thus the impact of majority on the feelings of the respondents is also a subject matter of this chapter. It is not possible to grasp the understanding of the minority feeling without analyzing how the concept of majority haunts the respondents, in expressions such as “difference, separation, differ, the other, the wider society, the bubble”. Besides, the mentioned dual understanding of the society they live in, their contemplations on majority/minority were prominent in the respondents’ expressions that led me to further analyze the word “minority” and particularly its lingering affect. It never fully leaves the interview; it stays, it lingers in some shape; as a ghost, as a context, as a veil upon respondents’ answers. Therefore, I attempted to understand this lingering affect.

Before the analysis of what minority means for my interviewees, I would like to introduce the reader with the concept's historical development in Turkey. Being a minority in the modern history may correspond to a variety of definitions and experiences. Particularly within the borders of a newly established nation state at the wake of twentieth century from the remnants of many centuries old multinational multi-religious empire, the meaning of minority may be hard to pin in the first instance. Though a general legal framework was established by Lausanne Treaty, in time it transformed into something atypical. Though non-Muslims were given the exclusive rights to be a minority, the current situation in Turkey clearly illustrates that neither the conventional wisdom amongst public nor the political practices of the state and the incumbents preserve such status. Minority status is being arbitrarily misperceived and mistreated from what it is legally accepted to be.

Ayhan Aktar claims that the citizenship status of the minorities in Turkey is citizenship on paper, that it is rather a de facto citizenship in which the minorities cannot practice many of their rights associated with full citizenship ( 2008 b, p. 107 - 109). By giving an example from a Jewish-Turkish citizen in Aşkale in 1940s, Aktar explicates how the Jewish citizens of Turkey were devoid of their civil rights as citizens. Aktar further contends that their minorities were subject to discrimination on their social rights such as employment because of state policies and laws. Even though employment in state offices reflected a degree of equal citizenship in the late Ottoman period, Aktar emphasizes the prevention of minorities' employment in state offices first by laws and regulations and later by state practices.<sup>94</sup> For instance the law on public employment issued in the single party period, Turkifies and includes the minorities such as Laz, Bosnian, Circassian and Kurdish, while it excludes the non-Muslim minorities.<sup>95</sup> In this case, what happens to the non-Muslims who are not Turkified would be a reasonable question to ponder upon. Similarly, Tanıl Bora, explains how the relationship of the minorities with the state were a problematic historically in the context of nationalism in Turkey. How the minorities were perceived as the other, how they were discriminated and finally isolated is a common research area in the literature.<sup>96</sup> Bora very well explains the shifting ground of the concept of "minority"

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<sup>94</sup> Aktar, *Türkiye'de Gayrimüslimler: "Kağıt Üzerinde" Vatandaşlar!*, 2008.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, 112.

<sup>96</sup> Bora, 2011, p.81-113 explains the relationship of the minorities with the state in different periods from the single party period up until today. In all of these studies the exclusion of the minorities during the

within Republican history. He analyses the relationship between nationalism and minority and shows how the changing climate of nationalism, from the single part era until 1990s, constantly shaped the content and context of the concept of “minority” (Bora, 2011, p 81 - 112). It is interesting to follow the reference to “minority” as the unnecessary, the enemy or the label for the leftist people. Within the context of the political climate in 1950s, the word of Greek became a defamation used for all minorities in relation to Cypriot Intercommunal Violence and also with the influence of Cold War, Jewishness was connected to communism and leftist ideologies because of the that the nationalists and conservatives attributed Jewishness to cosmopolitanism, financial materialism and cultural and moral degeneration (Bora, 2011, p. 97).

It’s important to note that it is not my intention here to make an extensive discussion about the concept ‘minority’ which lies beyond the purpose of this thesis. However, the brief information on the shifting ground of the concept of “minority” may help to understanding the shifting grounds that cause the challenging situation in the feeling minority. Therefore, in this part of this chapter, I will discuss the haunting specter of being a Jewish minority inside the Turkish society through an extensive analysis of the interviews. Here, my main questions mostly gravitate around the feeling of being minority as an excluded and repressed category both by the state and society.

## **4.2 Specter of Minority Status**

### **4.2.1 Definitions of minority**

It can certainly be argued, though there were few exceptions, when the respondents were asked about how they feel about being a minority, they felt something, they thought of some memories. It is certain that it makes one think, and makes one feel certain feelings, and it even raises some long forgotten memories. They may not be necessarily negative thoughts for every single person but they have important affective impact on the phrase itself.

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modernization period or in the context of construction of national identity are explored. The articles in Aktar (2011) also presents different cases of the discrimination and the exclusionary processes towards minorities in Turkey throughout the Republican period and 1960s. For further information please see Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması*, 2009; Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 2009 and Keyder, *Memaliki Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne*, 2003.

The impact of such a phrase is undeniable and surely unavoidable. I would like to share that I also prepared the questions with a mindset that was also burdened by the same experience the ones who responded to those questions. This section will, thus, explain how the respondents define being a minority, more specifically feeling minority; and its affective reflections.

The responses refer to certain kinds of feelings, words that mark their general perspective on being a minority. These words mentioned to explain feeling and affects were called in unexpected times and different places during the interviews. They were spontaneous and called by different interviewers. Most of them approach being a minority from a different perspective as a reflection of their experiences and certain raised emotions, such as feeling insecure, alone, “negative”. But they will be explained in detail in the following sections. At this section, Jewish perception of being a minority and its affective reflections will be discussed with the addition of data revealed by the responses.

One respondent did not refer to Jewishness immediately but rather gave an abstract definition of being a minority, as not belonging. Etel defined being a minority as “being a member of the minority culture/religion or identity amongst a dominant one”.<sup>97</sup> But in this case, as also in the following, we see an international understanding of being a minority. Vivet’s response to feeling minority is worldwide and is associated with limitations. Vivet: “Wherever you are in the world, when you are restricted and your freedom is bothered, you become like... You feel as minority. For example, the opportunity for promotion is lower.”<sup>98</sup> Being restricted as a citizen, and not having the same opportunities as the others in public was mention by a few other respondents as well either regarding the job opportunities in state institutions or the possibility of being elected by the many to those ranks.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> From personal interview with Etel: “Dominant bir kültür, diğer kültürde dinde veya herhangi bir identityde azınlık olmak, o identitye sahip olmamak...”

<sup>98</sup>From personal interview with Vivet:“Dünya’nın neresinde olursan ol belirli kısıtlamaların olduğu, bir yerinde özgürlüğüne dokunulduğu zaman kısıtlandığın zaman şey oluyorsun. Yani, azınlık hissediyorsun. Mesela terfi şansı az.”

<sup>99</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “Burada kendimizi tam vatandaş olarak göremiyoruz. Kanunda yeri olmasına rağmen savcı, hâkim, vali olamıyoruz. İkinci sınıf vatandaş muamelesi görüyoruz.” And Yosi: “Geniş toplumdaki insanın önu açık. Normal vatandaş olsa onu seçer. “

One approach to Jewishness was its relationship with the Jewishness in the world, in a way Jewish identity in an international context. Instead of talking about a general understanding of a minority, or relating Jewishness with other minorities, the question on “feeling minority” was immediately answered with reference to Jewishness. Yosi’s approach to the question was via his Jewishness. Yet, he responded not as minority but as a Jewish in specific. He contends that “Jewishness means to be minority at anywhere in the world”<sup>100</sup>. His definition was fed by his experiences and he had a gloomy tone while talking about it. It is not presented as a fact that he believes to be true and should be accepted by all; but more of an acknowledgement that is maintained by his everyday experiences so far. He does not use a personal tone but makes a personal statement about an international Jewishness stance. In line with this, one other respondent adopts a similar narrative of internationality of Jewishness as minority. Jacques contends that “Living as a Jew in any part of the world, raises the same emotions; both pride and sense of something hidden. You have to get yourself under protection. There is a historical context to it as well; being one without a homeland, without a home, without a place to belong”<sup>101</sup>. Interestingly, the feeling of not belonging in any part of the world provides us an affective response. Can, contends that “The greatest concept the *psychology of being a minority* brings forward is to be *protected* from the danger of extinction.”<sup>102</sup> First of all, Can, too has a general understanding of being minority, which can be associated with a specific psychology. Second, even though it may at first glimpse look like an exaggerated version of a Darwinist perception of “survival” of peoples, it is important to note the interviewee’s wish for protection which is indeed a strong affectual response.

Just as this affective response came in the passive voice, to be protected, in fact, the most common response to the definition of a minority was conceptualizing one’s self in the passive voice. It is as if being a minority is something that is shaped by the outer world. It is not an intrinsic quality, neither something that one begins to feel by her/him but rather something instigated by the members of the majority or by encountering history of the Jewish population in Turkey. One respondent, Yusuf says

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<sup>100</sup> Yosi: “Yahudilik dünyanın her yerinde azınlık olmak demek.”

<sup>101</sup> From personal interview with Jacques: “Yahudi olarak yaşamak; Yahudi olarak dünyanın her yerinde yaşamak aynı duygu; hem gurur hem de saklı olma. Koruma altında tutmak durumundasın kendini. Dolayısıyla tarihsel bir durum da var ortada. Vatansız, evsiz, bir yere ait olamadın.”

<sup>102</sup> From personal interview with Can: “Azınlık psikolojisinin getirdiği en büyük kavram ,yok olma tehlikesine karşı korunmak.”

that in Turkey, “you don’t feel like minority, *you are forced* to feel like minority. It is unlikely not to feel like minority in Turkey; ultimately *you are forced* to feel like one”<sup>103</sup>. Similarly, Jojo manifests that “being a minority is something that is *taught*. I felt it more intensely when I was in the military service. To be a minority means not to be understood; it means the inability of something so natural to you, to reach the others”<sup>104</sup> What they mean is that the feeling of being a minority is not liberated from the outside intrusions of others’ acts and thoughts; it is not exclusively up to the prerogative of the self. Rather it is consequential, a repercussion. It may not necessarily be about what that specific individual did, or didn’t do. Being distant from the rest of the society, thus, may cause extra effort on the side of the different one, as Selen argues. “Not being able to see the habits/routines of minority society in the general/public wide society. And to spend an extra effort to realize those habits within general public. In short, they are not compatible/coherent”<sup>105</sup> says Selen trying to describe the difficulties she experiences.

How the minority feeling depends on the outside intrusions, is also prevalent in the respondents’ references to “environment”, to “state institutions”, and to “government’s political stance”. Rakel, for instance exemplifies how her frequent interaction with different people due to her profession increases her probability of feeling minority. Especially because of her name, she knows that her minority status will be questioned either “by good intentions or bad intentions”.<sup>106</sup> Her profession was tied with state institutions and a range of people living in Turkey including the Jewish community. But even in the case when a profession did not require frequent contact with state institutions, the state’s point of view, or the government’s point of view are prominent. Ser explains that whenever there is a conflict between Turkey and Israel or between Israel and Palestine, he ultimately feels like minority. In his opinion, being a minority is ultimately the state of difference of one’s own culture and history then from those of the majority. As for the current political incumbent, he contends that he does

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<sup>103</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Azınlık hissetmezsiniz, azınlık hissettirilirsiniz. Türkiye gibi bir yerde azınlık hissetmemek zor; mutlaka azınlık hissettirilirsiniz.”

<sup>104</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “Azınlık olmak öğretilen bir şey. Askerde hissettim ben çok. Azınlık olmak, anlaşılmamak demek. Senin için doğal olan bir şeyin karşı tarafa hiç ulaşmaması demek.”

<sup>105</sup> From personal interview with Selen: “Azınlık toplumunun alışkanlıklarını genel toplumda görememek ve genel toplumda uygulayabilmek için ekstradan efor sarf etmek demek. Yani, uyumlu olmaması...”

<sup>106</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Türkiye’de azınlık olarak hissetmek... Tabi her gün, Türkiye’de yaşıyorsanız benim gibi içinde bulunduğunuz devletin kurumları ile çok sık karşılaşmak durumunda kalacağınız bir mesleği icra ediyorsanız ;bunu yaşamama ihtimaliniz olduğunu düşünmüyorum. İyi ya da kötü niyetli sorular, isminizin Rakel olduğunu...”

not necessarily see himself as a minority since %50 of the population feels like one. His statements, if listened carefully, adopt the above mentioned pessimistic understanding of the phrase feeling like a minority.<sup>107</sup> Ser says “Even though you are a Turk, you are always a Jew”.<sup>108</sup>

Being amongst the %50 of the population may not cause feeling minority for Ser, but for others, like Etel, it may mean otherwise. She argued that because of her political view, a democrat political view, in a more conservative political environment causes her to feel minority. “Or”, she adds “being one of the 18000 Jewish people amongst that large number of Muslims”.<sup>109</sup> So primarily being amongst the Jewish community sets the foundations for the feeling of being distinct, and being form political opposition fulfills the feeling of minority. So as it is obvious, the feeling minority may be a consequence of solid facts of your stance as a community, or merely a perception.

It is not only about the view of the state or the majority but about the “environment”. According to Avi, Jewishness is being a minority where he lives. Consequently, his surroundings, his everyday environment become a deciding agent of his stance of being a minority. He states that “if not every day, I sense it from time to time, I see it; I feel it. Not being like a citizen; the lack of a *setting* for which I could feel I belong to.”<sup>110</sup> The word *setting* (ortam) is a multilayered concept. At first glance, it may seem like a casually selected word; but it also makes one think of a variety of objects, environments, places or people when heard. It does not refer to a specific thing; rather leaves me wondering for what he does not belong to. When I asked him about

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<sup>107</sup> From personal interview with Ser: “Azınlık olmak, sahip olduğunuz kültür ve geçmişin genele göre biraz daha farklı olması. Türkiye İsrail arasındaki gerginlik ya da İsrail-Filistin savaşlarında her zaman kendimizi azınlık olarak hissederiz. AKP'nin durumunda, ben kendimi azınlık olarak görmüyorum; çünkü, ülkenin %50'si kendini azınlık olarak hissediyor. Olayın içine İsrail-Gazze olayları girdiğinde tamamen size azınlık olduğunuz hatırlatılıyor.”

<sup>108</sup> From personal interview with Ser: “Siz her zaman bir Türk olsanız da Yahudi'siniz.”

<sup>109</sup> From personal interview with Etel: “Azınlık hissettiğim nokta 1. Yahudi olmak Türkiye'de. 2. Başka yani belli bir siyasi görüşe sahip olmak. Daha demokratik bir siyasi görüşe sahip olmak. Dominant bir kültürde dediğim gibi şu an siyasetin daha muhafazakâr olduğu bir yerde benim daha demokratik demokrat düşünmem benim azınlık yanım. Ya da Türkiye'de bu kadar Müslüman'ın içinde 18000 kişi olarak Yahudi olmak, azınlık olmak.”

<sup>110</sup> From personal interview with Avi: “Yahudilik, benim için yaşadığım yerde en azından, İsrail için bunu söyleyemedim. Ama, yaşadığım yerde bir azınlık olmak. Etrafımdaki çoğu insanlardan her gün birebir daha farklı hissediyor olmasam da ara ara farklılıkları görüp hissettiğim bir şey”. – “Azınlık hissetmek ne demek sence?” - “Bu ülkenin asıl vatandaşı gibi olamamak, dediğim aidiyet duygusunu çok hissedebileceğim bir ortam olmaması.”

what he thinks feeling minority means, he paused for almost 14 seconds and then said “the lack of a setting which I could feel I belong to”. The pause entailed more than what came out as a sentence. It was an odd moment of silence, an unexpected pause, for a respondent so fluent as Avi, who didn’t take even a few seconds to think what he would say throughout the interview, to take such a long period of time. It either took some preparation to say the words or he searched the proper ones to communicate what took over him for 14 seconds.

The reference to “outside”, to outer world also includes history. Engin’s approach of minority and Jewishness as “the other”<sup>111</sup> surpasses time and bodies. He believes that all Jewish people feel like minority and especially as one goes deeper into history, the feeling of minority is impossible to avoid. As a recurring theme, once again we observe a pessimistic approach to the phrase *feeling minority*, as he discusses the impact of major traumas experienced such as Capital Levy, Thrace Pogrom and other incidents.<sup>112</sup>

On the other hand, the environment can also be a positive one according to one of the respondents. For a respondent who is also a rabbi contends that they, in fact do have freedom of religion. He is not an ordinary respondent. It is worth to mention that he is both a man of religion dedicated to Judaism and he uses arguments that acquit state of its actions. He uses a very optimistic language for which he uses to depict an ideal stance for Turkish Jewry. The interesting thing, though, within this heavenly context that he describes, a small rupture erupts when he suddenly mentions being a minority. According to him, they can freely practice their religion and no one forces any restrictions on them.<sup>113</sup> In this case, even though the respondent describes a positive environment, he still associates being a minority with a negative feeling. Even in the case that he feels good about a certain thing, he refers to how “it is not like a minority” but rather it is something regular. Thus, it is determined, according to Nir, too, being a minority contradicts with having the freedom of religion.<sup>114</sup> Rejin, an 88 year old

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<sup>111</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “Yahudi dendiği zaman öteki olarak geliyor aklıma.”

<sup>112</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “Bu azınlık hissi tüm Musevilerde vardır. Az ya da çok, hepsinde vardır. Bombardıman olaylarında, tarih kitaplarında okudukça babalarımızdan dedelerimizden duydukça... Varlık Vergisi, Trakya olayları... Bunlar, azınlık hissine kapılıyor.”

<sup>113</sup> From personal interview with Nir: “Dini özgürlüğümüz var kimse kısıtlama yapmıyor. Gayet serbestçe dua ediyoruz, düşünleri yapıyoruz.”

<sup>114</sup> From personal interview with Nir: “Azınlığız; ama, hiç öyle hissedilmiyor.”



woman living in Esentepe, reinforces this understanding of minority that surpasses time, saying that “Trakya incidents, Capital Levy, 6-7 September, we still live with it. Nothing has changed. There has always been anti-Semitism.”<sup>115</sup>, possibly also due to the experiences as a minority she has been through all her life. Furthermore, she believes that being minority as a person and as a group are two different things. One may be a personality that is loved and praised by the society, though she is Jew; but Jewry as a community may be disliked. She says that “Turks like the individual; but wouldn’t say anything for the Jewish. They like me as if I am of their own”<sup>116</sup>.

But in any case, still feeling minority has negative connotations; in fact it is “antipathy”: “Being minority is a very antipathy thing” says Rejin when she explains how she feels demarcated from time to time. Notice how the word minority is being used with the recurring pessimistic tone by her as well. She tells an anecdote where her friend uses the word *Yahudi* by mistake when she intended to say *Musevi*; she apologizes from Rejin and says “What I meant was *Musevi*”. She explained as an example afterwards to her friends that there is no reason for an apology; that she is *Yahudi*, and that there’s no need for *Musevi* and they can freely use the word *Yahudi* without a heavy heart. This memory clearly illustrates that there are two different words used for the exact same thing with very different affective values which has varying impacts for both the one that uses and the one that faces these words.<sup>117</sup>

As Sarah explains it, not only the use of certain words, but also the way a person says it, how his/her body moves may also direct to an act of exclusion. She contends that “There is a way to say it. We can understand from the tone one uses when he/she says Jewish out loud even though s/he says “filthy” from inside. As saying Jewish, one swallows the word “filthy”. I understand the use of *Yahudi* (Jewish) instead of *Musevi* (Jewish), I understand the difference. In the war of 67, maybe because I was riding a

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<sup>115</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Trakya olayları, Varlık Vergisi 6,7 Eylül... Hala yaşıyoruz. Değişen bir şey yok. Her zaman antisemitizm vardı.

<sup>116</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Gerçi birey olarak Türkler bizi seviyorlar; ama, topluluk olarak sevmiyorlar. Beni çok severler, Yahudileri değil; çok farklı bir şey. Bireyi severlerdi. Yahudiler için hiçbir şey demezlerdi. Sanki onlardan biri gibi beni çok severlerdi. Ama Müslüman arkadaşlarım var diyorum ya birey olarak severler ama millet olarak değil. Nitekim biliyorsunuz bir sürü şey yapıldı, Yahudilerle oturmak istemiyorlar. Birey olarak beni çok seviyorlar, Yahudi olarak değil.”

<sup>117</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Azınlık olmak çok antipatik bir şeydir. Kendini ayrı hissediyorsunuz. Mesela, arkadaşlarım benimle toplandıklarında *Musevi* diyeceklerine bazen *Yahudi* diyorlardı. ‘Ayy affedersiniz’ diyorlardı. Ben de dedim ki onlara, ‘Affedersiniz filan yok ben *Yahudi*’yim ve memnunum. *Musevi* filan da değil doğrudan *Yahudi* diyin’, onlar da rahatladı ben de.”

bicycle, one Muslim woman said to me ‘what is your business here? go away *Yahudi!*’ I could not remember properly but the place was somewhere near the restaurant Fıçıcı. I cannot forget this event.”<sup>118</sup>

What Vivet points out reveals how certain usage of particular words might have shaking effects on the receiver or the bystander. Thus, such surprising coincidences might distort the feeling of a secure environment which was assumed as an imaginary space. This shows us that there is no clear-cut division between inclusive and exclusionary discourses and practices.

#### **4.2.2 Feeling at Home and Specter of Minority**

The specter of minority haunts. It becomes observable and perceptible at some points of the interview and then it vanishes away. When it gets closer to the surface, when respondents start to show the signs of being haunted, they tend to act in a certain way or say certain things. This section will focus on particularly such behaviors and statements that come out as the affect of their sense of belonging to Turkey. They are more likely to explain their belonging as a justification of their otherwise questioned loyalty to Turkey/Turkishness which was previously explained in length in the previous chapter. This section focuses on the affect of those justifications, affective dimensions of what’s been said; what’s been communicated by their bodies. These communicated affects worth a closer look simply for the reason they deliver contradicting messages. What do these contradictions say about the dilemmas of belonging?

One instance that respondents are apt to feel when disturbed by the instant remembrance of their minority stance is caused by not being known. For instance, Yusuf is frustrated by a recurring situation that he finds himself in. Even though he shows his Turkish identification card to someone, they still ask him whether or not he is

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<sup>118</sup> From personal interview with Sarah: “Bunun söyleme şekli vardır. İçinden pisi söyleyip de yüksek sesle Yahudi söyleyeninde ses tonundan anlayabiliyoruz. Yahudi deyişi vardır, pisi yutar gibi. Fakat Musevi yerine Yahudi diyeni de o farkı anlayabiliyorum. 67 savaşında bir tane Müslüman kadın, bilmiyorum bisikletin üstünde olduğum için mi, ‘Burada ne işiniz? Git buradan Yahudi’ veya ‘Buradan gidin.’ gibi bir laf etti. Tam net hatırlamıyorum ama tam yer Fıçıcının oradaydı bunu da hiç unutmam mesela.”

Turkish.<sup>119</sup> Further in his interview, he stated that the greatest distress of their community is that they cannot express themselves properly.<sup>120</sup> He preferred the word ‘distress’ rather than ‘problem’ or ‘issue’. It may refer to the actual distress he experiences by not being able to reflect himself as he desires to. Nino explains this phenomenon, being unknown by the society at large, with a historical approach. He argues that when the Anatolian people came to Istanbul, they did not feel affection to those non-Muslims who were foreign to them. “Love starts with knowing. There was prejudice at first. Thus, in time, non-Muslims in Istanbul preferred to live in small packs of communities”<sup>121</sup> says Nino as a consequence of this estrangement experienced.

The reason Jewish community in Turkey has left foreign to the rest of the society may also be a result of the miscommunication of the facts about the community to the society. They are not only unknown and foreign; but also may have been introduced untruthfully. Jacques calls that untruthful information as “superstition”. As a repercussion of such stories he says, he is more inclined *to feel minority*.<sup>122</sup>

In smaller Anatolian cities, this may not be the case, though. It is more naturally easy to be publicly known, even as minority. As Dorin points out, in Antakya, no one was perceived or felt as different, though everyone was of different ethnicity/religion. When she moved to a bigger city, to Istanbul, she then realized that she was of a very few people within the midst of many. “I realized at my time in my undergraduate studies, that most people didn’t even meet a Jewish person before me” says Dorin trying to exemplify her astonishment with the behavior of people in Istanbul. It was certainly unexpected after what she’s been raised to in Antakya. But then again, in the last analysis, it is undoubtedly interesting to learn that she feels she belongs to Istanbul rather than Antakya. “It was beautiful to live in Antakya”<sup>123</sup> says her but then she says she prefers to live in Istanbul now. She feels she belongs to Istanbul.

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<sup>119</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Sen Türk nüfus cüzdanı vermene rağmen ‘Türk müsün?’ diye sorma hissiyatına kapılıyor.”

<sup>120</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Bizim en Büyük Sıkıntımız, Türkiye’de kendimizi doğru dürüst ifade edemiyor oluşumuz.”

<sup>121</sup> From personal interview with Nino: “Anadolu insanı İstanbul’a geldiğinde tanımadığı gayrimüslime bir sevgi duymadı. Sevmenin yolu tanımaktan geçer. Önyargı oldu. Zaman içinde İstanbul’daki gayrimüslimler kendilerini komün şeklinde yaşamaya yöneltti.”

<sup>122</sup> From personal interview with Jacques: “Hurafe bilgilerle tanımlama yapılmış hakkımızda. Burada da azınlık hissiyatı oluşur.”

<sup>123</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: “Antakya da yaşamak çok güzeldi. Ama, İstanbul’u artık tercih ediyorum. İstanbul’a ait hissediyorum bence. Antakya’da herkes birbirinden farklıydı azınlık gibi görüp hissetmiyordum. Daha büyük şehre gelince, o zaman işte çok büyük ortamlarda gerçekten az sayıda olduğumu fark ettim. Üniversite’de de çoğu kişni hiç Musevi ile tanışmamış olduğumu fark ettim.”

In line with the being unknown to each other argument, there's a strong tendency in Jewish community not to disclose personal information to outsiders. The will to preserve personal information mostly reveals itself, according to the responses, as the practice of hiding his/her real name and use a nickname instead. When one decides not to reach out and bond with someone new, contact something new; he/she on purpose chooses to change his/her name in order to avoid further questioning and prevent raising the curiosity of their counterpart. There are multiple instances in the interviews where respondents provided examples as such. Indisputably, the act of changing one's own name is an imbued practice of silence which can only be learned gradually in order to become so functional like an instinctive reaction. If one decides to instantaneously change his/her own name according to the circumstance they're in and people they're with, they must have developed it carefully. They might have a portfolio of names they use as Viki does such as Vildan, Vicdan and Semra<sup>124</sup>; or use one Turkish name for a specific amount of time and certain conditions like Nino did introduce himself as Metin throughout his military service.<sup>125</sup> or both, the use of Turkish names was only an instance of their efforts to stay under disguise<sup>126</sup> when they felt the necessity to do so. Viki explains that she only uses fake names when she is amongst a crowd she is stranger to. She says she changes her name in order to avoid possible insulting attitudes of others.<sup>127</sup>

One interesting approach to justifying using a different name was provided by Jojo. He claimed that he uses a different name, if he senses his opponent to be a conservative person. "The act of changing name is not an effort to hide but an effort to speed up the process when I sense that a guy is conservative"<sup>128</sup> argues Jojo, raising

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<sup>124</sup> From personal interview with Viki: "Vildan dedim, Vicdan dedim. Birkaç tane böyle var... Semra dedim."

<sup>125</sup> From personal interview with Nino: "Askerde en başta adımı uzun süre Metin olarak kullandım askerden önce de Heybeliada'da büyüdüm. Telaffuz edemiyorlardı adımı. Metin deyin, dedim. Sonra bunun arkasına saklandım."

<sup>126</sup> From personal interview with Nino: "Genelde Yahudi kimliğimi öne çıkarmamak üzere yaşadım ömrüm boyunca."

<sup>127</sup> From personal interview with Viki: "Devlet bazında değil de bilmediğim bir topluluk içindeysen Yahudi kimliğimi genellikle ifşa etmekten çekiniyorum. Dediğim gibi insanların tepkilerinin ne olacağını bilemiyorsunuz, kendinizi azınlık olarak hissettiğiniz için herhangi bir tepki onur kırıcı davranışla karşılaşmamak için tanımadığınız toplulukların içinde genellikle bazı zamanlarda ismimi bile değişik demişimdir."

<sup>128</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: "İşimi yaparken ters hissettiğim yerlerde Yakub'um diyorum Jojo demiyorum". – "Bu fiks bir isim mi? Değişiyor mu?" – "Evet, hep Yakup." – "Bu ne zamanlar oluyor ?" – "Adam muhafazakar olduğumu hissettiğimde çok uzun laf anlatmamak için zaten diyorum. Bazen de hep

numerous questions. What does he try to speed up? Where is he rushing to? What does he mean by ‘conservative’? As far as I’m concerned there are a number of euphemisms in this argument. Could he possibly mean a discriminatory approach by the word conservatism? Would he avoid using his name when he senses a potential discriminatory behavior? Or when he is frightened? There is an obvious calculation of possibilities for potential encounters he might or might not run into and his choice is made accordingly. So it is certainly a snapshot of a cultivated pattern.

Sandra tells her line of thought at one point where she decided to change her name to Melisa:

We had a client. I thought that if I told them my name, I could lose the job. The reason is that they’re the kind of people who supports those from their own religion, who act according to their belief system. Thus, I change my name to Melisa, since it is a more common name. I change it because it is more familiar and I try not to cause any feeling of discrepancy. When I say Melisa, no one questions anything. I feel the necessity to use such a name.<sup>129</sup>

It serves two purposes: comfort and avoiding of discrepancy. She does not even begin to think the possibility of taking the job using her real name and introducing her true self, building a true some relationship with the client because the cultivated knowledge assures her that it is not to be done. Abstaining from using one’s real name<sup>130</sup>, thus, appears as a practice of silence.

As mentioned previously in the chapter, Dorin had second thoughts about sharing her name with her patients at times of heightened tensions between Israel. She feels under certain contexts, ill at ease using her name.<sup>131</sup> Those instances caused a sense of withdrawal in others, too, like Viki simply because of the international context. If she is in groups that she does not personally know, she refrains from introducing my identity.”We cannot know the reaction of people. I even use different names as Vildan,

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söylüyorum, ‘Jojo ne ilginç’. İş yapıyorsam o detaya girmek istemediğimde hızlı geçiyorum. Gizlemek için değil aslında, hızlanmak için. Laf anlatsam konuşuruz, öyle o şey uzuyor çünkü.”

<sup>129</sup> From personal interview with Sandra: “Bir müşterimiz vardı, bir şirket. Ben düşündüm ki eğer söylersem bana tavırlı davranabilirler ve işi kaybedebilirim. Çünkü onlar kendi dinleriyle hareket eden, onları destekleyen tipler olduğu için. Mesela ismimi Melisa’ya çeviririm. Daha sık rastlanan bir isim olduğu için. Hem ismimi anlamaları zor olduğu için hem de bir farklılık hissettirmemek için. Melisa dediğim zaman kimse bir şey sorgulamıyor. Böyle bir isim kullanma gerekliliği duyuyorum.”

<sup>130</sup>From personal interview with Selen: “Tüpraş’ta çalışırken söylemese miydim acaba diye bir an düşünmüştüm, çekinmişim.”

<sup>131</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: “Gizleme ihtiyacı hissettiğim bir zaman olmadı ama çekinerek söylediğim zamanlar oldu yani. Özellikle Mavi Marmara olayları, İsrail’le ilgili gerginlikler olduğu zaman, yeni tanıştığım birileri olduğunda ya da bir hastam mesela ‘İsmimiz çok değişik.’ vs gibi sorular sorduğu zaman, o zaman mesela söylemekte tedirgin olduğum zamanlar oldu.”

Vicdan, Semra just to avoid feeling minority, hearing a defamating word, experiencing a humiliating attitude.”<sup>132</sup> So for Viki changing names is a tool to protect herself against what might or might not happen. But the possibility of facing those attitudes entail the feeling minority. As Jacques puts it, “It starts with your name, feeling minority at something you use every single day.”<sup>133</sup> Changing your name is the first step of being exposed to the minority status, feeling the sensation of being different.

Another crucial instant where their belonging starts with their “*minority status*” is when a political discussion erupts concerning the conflicts involving Israel. Be it relations between Israel and Palestine or the relationship of Israel-Turkey; it doesn’t matter. Both are enough to suddenly pull them back to a state where they feel segregated, uncomfortable and uneasy.

It is certainly worth to point out that I conducted the interviews from the summer of 2014 until the fall of 2014. Both the domestic and international political context was changing rapidly. At the beginning of this duration we experienced Gaza Attacks that raised international upheaval that had strong domestic repercussions as well. Thus, it should be mentioned that although there were not a single interview question referring to Israeli-Turkish relations or Israel’s Gaza Policy, most respondents that I interviewed in the summer of 2014 were predisposed to mention them and make references to the impact of Israel’s actions to their everyday lives.

Keeping in mind that migration to Israel was and still is a reality of Turkish Jews especially since 1948<sup>134</sup>; most respondents have either a distant relative or an acquaintance if not a close friend, that has migrated to Israel. Thus, it is not unusual to run into phrases as such: “Since we have friends living there (Israel) hostile events against Israel make us sad. We feel as Turk, thus when the repercussions of those events

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<sup>132</sup> From personal interview with Viki: “Devlet bazında değil de bilmediğim topluluk içindeysen kimliğimi ifşa etmekten çekiniyorum. İnsanların tepkisini bilemiyorsunuz. Kendinizi azınlık hissettiğiniz için küçük bir laf işitmek için onur kırıcı davranışla karşılaşmamak için ismimi bile değişik söylemişimdir, Vildan, Vicdan, Semra...”

<sup>133</sup> From personal interview with Jacques: “Başta isimden başlıyor, her gün kullandığı bir şeyde azınlık olduğunu hissetmek.”

<sup>134</sup> Şule Toktaş explains in detail the migratory patterns of Turkish Jewish community to Palestine and Israel starting from the beginning of twentieth century up until 2004 in her article *Turkey’s Jews and their Immigration to Israel* published in May 2006.

spill over and create implications for us, too, it breaks our hearts”<sup>135</sup>. According to this particular respondent the events have dual distressing impact; she worries for her friends in Israel, thus she feels somehow connected to the population there. She feels heartbroken because she is being misjudged as equals of Israeli citizen. She is not the only one for sure who is being distressed by such a reflection of hostility. A number of respondents shared similar worries. For instance, Jojo feels an increase of pressure at times of heightened Israeli conflicts<sup>136</sup> whereas Vivet worries whether she is being hated by her society too, after she says she hears so many horrible things said about Jews when there’s a war Israel’s involved in<sup>137</sup>.

Worry of being perceived as one of Israeli citizen, as in Vivet’s case is not a marginalized thought. It is a recurring theme throughout the interviews. The phrase *your people* that comes up in Engin’s interview, for instance, is a reference he provides to what his close neighbor has said to him with the intention to mean Israel<sup>138</sup>. Etel, provides us with one of her high school memory. Apparently, sometimes she sat in for the course on religious culture and moral knowledge at school. “When there’s an issue with Israel, there was always a negative thought coming up. I neither had the emotional strength nor the knowledge to fight that thought. There were times that I struggled, that I couldn’t defend myself.”<sup>139</sup> She apparently felt obliged to defend *herself*. Mind the fact that she didn’t feel the necessity to defend a nation let alone a community living here; but herself and only herself. So it was an aggression directed to her in person. They asked her directly the question “why did *you* do such a thing?!” meaning Israel’s actions. These memories, says Etel, urges one to think further on who *you are*, who *I am*.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> From personal interview with Viki: “Orada yaşayan dostlarımızdan dolayı olaylar bizi üzüyor. Biz kendimizi Türk olarak hissettiğimiz için olayların bize yansması bizi incitiyor.”

<sup>136</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “Böyle zamanlarda kötü hissediyor, İsrail nefretinin artması, baskı hissettiriyor.”

<sup>137</sup> From personal interview with Vivet: “İsrail’le bir savaş olduğunda Yahudiler için o kadar kötü şeyler söyleniyor ki ‘Acaba ben de hedef olur muyum?’ diye düşünüyorsun. Açılan pankartlar, söylemler size karşı olan davranışlar...”

<sup>138</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “İsrail’de bir olay oluyor. Buradaki Yahudilere mal ediyorlar. Yakın gördüğün komşun ‘Bak, sizinkiler ne yaptı?’ diyor.”

<sup>139</sup> From Personal interview with Etel: “Din derslerine giriyordum bazen onlarla birlikte. Tam ne zaman İsrail’le olay olsa mutlaka Yahudilikle ilgili kötü bir düşünce de çıkıyordu. Onunla savaşıcak bir bilgim ve duygusal gücüm de yoktu. Zorlandığım zamanlar oldu. Kendimi savunamadığım zamanlar oldu.”

<sup>140</sup> From Personal interview with Etel: “Çünkü İsrail’in yaptığı her hareketi Yahudilerin yaptığını düşündükleri için direk bana geliyorlardı. ‘Siz niye böyle bir şey yaptınız?’ diye... Siz kim ben kim... Bunları tabi düşünmek gerek.”

This immediate reaction of making a connection between Israel and Turkish Jews living in Turkey, may as well be a result of what's been argued above; a result of not being publicly known. A university student, Etel, argues that this is the case for the hatred against Jews in Turkey. "When domestic politics is diverted in a way that is against Israel, and every single bad thing is directly tied to Jews, it is certainly bad. On top of it, when the incumbent starts to promote this aggression, people who don't even know one single Jewish person, begins to hate Jews. I once read a study that found out that %70 of Turkish people don't want a Jewish person as a neighbor".<sup>141</sup>

One last but certainly not the least thought regarding to the identification of Turkish Jews with Israel is the case of ignorance. Maya, a fifty years old documentary director, contends that identification of Jews with Israel is simply a result of the ignorance of the public.<sup>142</sup> It is worth to mention, though, she started to speak so low, she became inarticulate; I couldn't hear what she was saying anymore. In general, I don't intervene to such volatility of respondents' change in voice. Knowingly I allow to such changes, to grasp what's behind those more quite moments, the affects at play. But at this particular moment, I had to intervene for no longer I could hear her voice; that was how low she got.

Whatever the causes might be, be it prejudice or being pro-government, all these encounters, makes the respondent to feel like the other/the foreigner. They don't necessarily react at these encounters with a similar tone, though. One explains how it makes them feel whereas another refers to being assimilated or even recalls anti-Semitism. Surely, the mention of anti-Semitism mainly comes up at discussions of historical events and they mostly are referring to a specific period of time in 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Being the *outcasted/ the other/ the different* one is a shared feeling of many respondents. They all at one point in the interview mention an instance in their lives

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<sup>141</sup> From Personal interview with Etel: "Tabii ki de siyaset İsrail'e karşı olduğu için ve İsrail'le olan her kötü şey Yahudilere bağlanması... Olan kötü şey o. Siyaset bunu destekledikçe, bir tane bile Yahudi tanımayan insan Yahudilerden nefret etmeye başlıyor. Türkiye'nin neredeyse %70'i Yahudi komşu istemiyor, diye bir araştırma okumuştum."

<sup>142</sup> Maya: "İsrail'le özdeşleştirildiği için Türkiye'deki Yahudiler bu buradaki toplumun cehaletinden kaynaklanıyor."



where they felt like one.<sup>143</sup> The reasons may vary, their propensity to accept this feeling change; but in the last analysis the affect of being the other does not change. The above given possible arguments may have caused such alienation –not being acquainted as a community, prejudicial and biased opinions about them or hostile domestic policies, they all may have some influence on the construction of *otherness* as affect. Additionally, they all indicate that feeling minority, or as the other is a situational state of mind that may change due to systemic factors such as domestic/international context as well as individual experiences.

Incumbent’s approach to minorities has changed drastically over the course of last decade. A relatively tolerant tone of hospitality have left its course to a more separatist and aggressive tone which, naturally, caused a sharpened hostility in the tone of majority of the public at large. A few of the respondents point out to the increased hostility and the resulting restraints on their liberties. Avi, for instance, he does not necessarily feel different when he’s in close circle of friends but he the feeling of minority is definitely caused by the state according to him.<sup>144</sup> Yosef, similarly contends that the political situation does not have a direct impact on our stance. They have a comfortable life, they can practice their habits. “Besides before the synagogue bombings, there was only superficial security check. But now, current segregationist policies adopt racist discourses against minorities. Such discourses turn minorities into the outcasted/fractured, into the unwanted”.<sup>145</sup> For two of the respondents, such segregationist policies are nothing new and a recurring theme for the Turkish domestic politics. Both Jacques and Etel argue that every 10 years, Turkish Jewish community experiences chaos. When the political authorities are in intricate conflictual situations, Jewish community is put suddenly under the spotlight. Both go further and present an argument with a historical tendency that uses Jewish community as the emergency valve of Turkish domestic political tradition: “Turkish public has always the same reactions, they forget... Political authorities are stuck now, Jewish community stands

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<sup>143</sup>From personal interview with Suzi: “Bu ruh hali ile hiçbir yere ait hissetmiyorum.”; Selen: “Hiçbir yere ait hissetmiyorum bu ara kendimi.”

<sup>144</sup>From personal interview with Avi: “Yakın çevremde specific azınlık olduğumu Yahudi olduğumu negatif anlamda bir şekilde azınlık hissettiğim yok; ama, devlet tarafından var.”

<sup>145</sup> From personal interview with Yosef: “Siyasi durum çok birebir etkilemiyor. Rahat bir yaşantımız var, burada alışkanlıklarımızı gerçekleştirebileceğimiz bir yaşantımız var. Sinagog patlamalarından önce mesela güvenlik tehdidi yoktu, hatta sinagoglara girerken kontrol bile çok yüzeysel yapılıyordu. Huzurumuz çok bozulmadan yaşayabiliyoruz. Ama, şu an mevcut politikacılar azınlıkları ayrıştırıcı, ırkçı söylemlerde bulunuyorlar. Bu tür söylemler bizi ve farklı diğer azınlıkları ayrıştırıcı ‘tü kaka’ durumuna düşürüyor.”

out, again. When there's a financial crisis, or the possibility of one, Jewish community stands out."<sup>146</sup>

Being the emergency valve of Turkish domestic politics is sometimes taken one step further by throwing Jewish minority under fire whenever domestic politics gets stuck. For every offence whose perpetrator is unknown, Jewish community becomes the official offender, the scapegoat of the state. A number of respondents mention that being the scapegoat is in the domestic political culture. Dorin mostly saddened by this fact that that she is being pushed outside of the place where she feels she belongs to. Likewise, Selen says that her affection and belonging decreases as a consequence of being used as a scapegoat.<sup>147</sup>

Engin brings up another point that "Turkey is a beautiful country with beautiful people but Cemaat is getting smaller, there's assimilation. There's constant pressure of anti-Semitism as well." When asked about being target of scapegoating he responded "It feeds anti-Semitic tendencies."<sup>148</sup> The most aggressive version of the emergency valve stance is anti-Semitic discourses. I always find the word of *anti-Semitism* as a very strong word, that sometimes tends to create a direct link between Jewishness and Anti-Semitism. Rakel, similarly explains how scary it is to live in Turkey as a Jew regardless of the context. She says that "Anti-Semitism is even higher than Iran." She then, leaves her next sentence unfinished and with a sigh: "Being Jewish in a country where anti-Semitism has a serious presence."<sup>149</sup> It is particularly important to note that anti-Semitism is a word that one would expect to hear this word more from the people I interviewed. However, a number of interviewees called this word about instances where

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<sup>146</sup> From personal interview with Jacques: "Türk halkı hep aynı reaksiyonlar, unutuyorlar. Siyasal otoriteler tekrardan sıkıştı, cemaat tekrardan öne çıkıyor. Ekonomik krizin olduğu veya olabileceği dönemlerde veya siyasilerin birtakım taleplerinin olduğu dönemlerde ortaya çıkıyor".

From personal interview with Etel: "Her zaman kötü dönemler oldu, Museviler için. Stabil olarak kötü bir hayat yaşamadılar ki hala burada topluluğumuz var. En iyi nedir bilmiyorum; çünkü, her 10 senelik dönemde bir kaos yaşıyoruz. Patlamalar olsun, Varlık Vergisi olsun. Genel olarak durumumuzun bizim kültürel seviyemizde olan insanlardan çok da farklı olmadığını düşünüyorum."

<sup>147</sup> From personal interview with Selen: "Günah keçisi gibi; aidiyet hissinin azalması ve hissettiğim o sevginin ve rahatlığın azalması..."

From personal interview with Dorin: "Günah keçisi; ait olduğumu hissettiğim yerde dışarı itildiğimi hissediyorum. En çok ona üzülüyorum."

<sup>148</sup> From personal interview with Engin: "Türkiye güzel bir ülke, insanları da güzel. Cemaatin azalması, asimilasyon var. Devamlı baskı altındasın antisemitizm var."

In the second instance he said "Aşırı uçlar Antisemitizmi körüklemek için."

<sup>149</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: "Türkiye de Yahudi olarak yaşamak ürkütücü bir duygu ne olursa olsun. Antisemitizmin İran dan da yüksek olduğu ciddi bir şekilde antisemitizmin varlığı olduğu bu ülkede, Yahudi düşmanlığı varken bir Yahudi olmak."

they felt outcasted.

Rejin's explanation of historical events and how the Jewish community is perceived by the Turkish society is yet another manifestation of how the Jewish people in Turkey see themselves as the other and refer to anti-Semitism. She believes that we still experience anti-Semitic incidents. "Back then there was Thrace Pogrom, Capital Levy, 6-7 September Events, no there is something else. Nothing changes. Well then again Turks like as individually, they don't like us as a community"<sup>150</sup>. For the third time in her interview, she says that Turks liked Jewish people only on a personal basis. Apparently they liked her individually and considered her as "one of their own"; but they certainly weren't fond of Jewish community; they don't like them as a *millet*.<sup>151</sup> Considering the fact that there was no direct question to inquire whether or not she was a beloved person by her Muslim peers, it is remarkable how she kept repeating the same phrase throughout the interview. Just as Rejin perceives the anti-Semitism in a sort of long duree and at the same time normalizes it in the Turkish conjecture by putting it in a "given" or an "assumed" position or as a "constant"<sup>152</sup>, Etel, normalizes it by referring to geographical scale of anti-Semitism. She contends that anti-Semitism is everywhere and not just in Turkey.<sup>153</sup>

In fact, Etel's opinion may be relying on her knowledge acquired in her sociology education, while my elderly interviewees distinctly connote and convey where their opinion comes from in their life experiences. Similarly, younger interviewees (all of which do not refer to the history except for Etel) talk about their current experiences as the "other" in the society. However, Etel still situates the otherness of the Jewish community in a greater perspective on otherness and polarization in Turkey and particularly in Istanbul. "Like many other young adults", says she, "politically, I do not have an optimistic vision for future. For Jews or for those

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<sup>150</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: "Trakya olayları, Varlık Vergisi, 6-7 Eylülü hala yaşıyoruz. Değişen bir şey yok. Her zaman antisemitizm vardı. Gerçi birey olarak Türkler bizi seviyorlar; ama, topluluk olarak sevmiyorlar."

<sup>151</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: "Beni çok severler, Yahudileri değil, çok farklı bir şey. Bireyi severlerdi. Yahudiler için hiçbir şey demezlerdi. Sanki onlardan biriymişim gibi beni çok severlerdi." "Ama Müslüman arkadaşlarım var diyorum ya birey olarak severler ama millet olarak değil. Nitekim biliyorsunuz bir sürü şey yapıldı, Yahudilerle oturmak istemiyorlar."

<sup>152</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: "Türkiye' de Yaşamak, valla çok rahat bir şey olmasa gerek. Korku içinde yaşamak biliyorsunuz. Her zaman Antisemitizm korkusu ve Dışlanma korkusu var."

<sup>153</sup> From personal interview with Etel: "Anti- Semitizm tabii ki de var. Ama her yerde var."

who are culturally different like us, the future is not as bright. There is cultural polarization. Even in smaller districts people prefer to live in certain parts of the city. I wouldn't make generalizations for Turkey at larger, but at least this is the case for Istanbul.”<sup>154</sup> Thus, feeling like *other* may be a cultural consequence as well.

Jojo and Selen on the other hand refer to a specific period in their lives and concrete moments when they felt as the other in this country. For Jojo, it was his time in military service where he felt the sense of being different to the fullest.<sup>155</sup> What Selen is telling, though, is more of a striking memory which she immediately started to share. Once, when she told someone that she was Jewish, the man she was talking to be looked scared or annoyed as he was startled by the answer and he stepped in to silence for a while. There was a lull in the conversation apparently.<sup>156</sup>

In line with the above given examples, Dorin's understanding of otherness is also in embedded everyday life: Seeing a Coca Cola commercial in the holy month of Ramadan<sup>157</sup> reminds of her an identity that she can never fully be part of or a culture that she cannot share with the society at large. Again, at a religious ceremony, at a funeral of one of his Muslim friends, Nino feels says he feels different, even though people around him are not the cause of that feeling.<sup>158</sup> It is him, who feels different standing at different corners, away from his friends, just because they are of different religions, somehow they part ways for that duration.

This specter of minority catches people in their most intimate moments when they feel like they are at home or where they imagine being and wanting to be at home. Yosef calls Istanbul his home/nest (*yuva*), the city that he was born and raised in. He thinks no European city may be equal to Istanbul's lively, joyful and exciting

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<sup>154</sup> From personal interview with Etel: “Siyaset açısından iyi bir gelecek olacak gibi görmüyorum, birçok genç gibi... Museviler için ya da bizim gibi kültürü biraz daha farklı olanlar için geleceğin çok parlak olmadığını düşünüyorum. Kültürel açıdan çok fazla kutuplaşma var. Semtlerde bile belli insanlar belli yerlerde oturuyorlar. Türkiye'nin genelini bilmiyorum; ama, en azından İstanbul için durum böyle.”

<sup>155</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “Askerde hissettim en çok. Sen başkasın hissi...”

<sup>156</sup> From personal interview with Selen: “Yahudi'yim deyince adam korkmuş ya da rahatsız olmuş gibi bir sessizliğe büründü. Sen de insansın üzülme gibilerinden.”

<sup>157</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: “Koka Kola reklamı değişiyor mesela.”

<sup>158</sup> From personal interview with Nino: “Ben bir azınlık olduğum için bana hissettirmeseler de ben hissediyorum. Bir Müslüman öldüğünde cenazeye gittiğin zaman, onlarda değilsin ayrı yerde duruyorsun.”

ambiance.<sup>159</sup> Recalling what Yosef said about feeling like a minority above, that discriminatory discourses turning minorities into the outcasted/fractured, into the unwanted, and that he pointed out the instances where he observed a few businesses being outcasted simply because they're Jewish owned, one may imagine how startling and powerful the impact of these observations might be for Yosef. Being or observing other Jewish people being treated that way would make him feel. In line with this context Victoria says that although she lived a happy life, she felt like minority in some instances.<sup>160</sup> Plus, she believes this discrimination can be traced in a few songs in which the minorities' history in Aşkale was highlighted. She is in contention that discrimination against minorities was more rigorously in the East as she could experience it while she was living in Gaziantep. There was a song that told about the days of those who were sent to work camps in Aşkale whose lyrics were in Arabic goes like: "Aşkale'de açan çiçektim / Bir çorbaya talim ettim."<sup>161</sup>

Interestingly, Selen believes that the over-identification with the society and its values are in fact a reflection of the specter of minority. The Jewish people who are aware of their status identify with the society's common values because of their awareness in their exclusion:

The way that Jewish people perceives the general public they belong, is very different from that of other minorities. They have a strong tendency to immediately belong and own that public. This may be a defense mechanism. They may be more royalist than the king not to be discriminated against or be harmed. They may immediately adopt the 'Vatan Millet Sakarya' discourse.<sup>162</sup>

According to Selen, Jewish people prevent themselves from any possible aggression by adopting a heated version of patriotism. They try not to speak of the past tragedies of Turkish Jews whilst adopting a more nationalist tone as well.

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<sup>159</sup> From personal interview with Yosef: "İstanbul benim doğduğum büyüdüğüm, yuvam diyebileceğim şehirdir. Hatta Avrupa'da bir benzeri şehir daha olduğunu düşünmüyorum, canlı neşeli ve heyecanlı."

<sup>160</sup> From personal interview with Viki: "Çok mutlu yaşamama rağmen azınlık olarak hissettiğim zamanlar oldu."

<sup>161</sup> From personal interview with Viki: "Doğuda ayrımcılık daha fazla oluyor. Gaziantep'te yaşadık Aşkale'yle ilgili türkü, Arapça: 'Aşkale'de açan çiçektim bir çorbaya talim ettim.' Sıla özlemi türküleri filan da varmış."

<sup>162</sup> From personal interview with Selen: "Yahudilerin ait oldukları geniş topluma aidiyetleri diğer azınlıklardan çok daha farklı. Hemen entegre olma ve o toplumu benimseme eğilimleri var. Bu, bir defans mekanizması olabilir. Dışlanmışlık ve zarar görmemek için geniş toplumda... Kraldan çok kralcı olmak. Vatan millet Sakarya'yı hemen benimsemek..."

In fact, Nino's justification of his belonging is with a reference to his grandfather in military uniform. He is fostering very strong nationalist sentiments which he matches with his belonging. He says "He is the last man who would close the lights. He is amongst the very last few who would leave"<sup>163</sup> He thinks that if one is troubled by the domestic political situation in Turkey and worries; he/she would belong here. He thus has an affective perspective towards what *home*.<sup>164</sup> He refers to a family tradition of military service. He is moved by the proud of his grandfather's photography in military uniform and his other grandfather's medal and sword.<sup>165</sup> In line with this adoption of the dominant military culture of Turkishness, he emphasizes his "eternal" belonging to the country.

Despite this identification, there is a fragile relationship, because the sense of being a minority haunts the individual both when they learn the history of minorities in Turkey and also in their everyday experiences. Vivet feels that she belongs to Istanbul yet she is also prone to feel like a "stranger": "I feel I belong to Istanbul; it is where I was raised. But when there's a negative issue that is attributed to Jewish community makes me feel estranged. I start to feel identity problems".<sup>166</sup> In fact this goes in tandem with her understanding of being at home, where she associates equality and freedom with not feeling "different". According to Vivet, being at home means being equal with everyone else, feeling no difference whatsoever, and acting freely.<sup>167</sup>

All of these, and particularly the conflicting aspects of feeling at home and the specter, cause a desperation/weariness (yılgınlık/bıkkınlık) on the individual. As Selen exemplifies her disappointment: "If I was not that heartbroken and disappointed by Turkey, I was harboring a love for the country in my childish heart."<sup>168</sup> Similarly, Ser explains his estrangement by denoting that he feels Turkey is his home. As a Turkish

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<sup>163</sup> From personal interview with Nino: "Ben ışıkları kapatacak en son adamım. Bu ülkeden gidecek son 3-5 kişiden biriyim."

<sup>164</sup> From personal interview with Nino: "Bu ülkenin politikası ile ilgili kaygı duyuyorsan burahınsındır."

<sup>165</sup> From personal interview with Nino: "Bir sülale geleneği. Benim dedemin evde üniformalı resmi var. Yüz sene geri gittim. Diğer dedemin madalya kılıcı var. Budur evde hissetmem."

<sup>166</sup> From personal interview with Vivet: "İstanbul'a ait hissediyorum. İstanbul,ı yani büyüdüğüm yer. Ama bazen negatif bir konu olduğu zaman Yahudilere mal edilmesi, o zaman ben burada kendimi yabancı hissetmeye başlıyorum. Bu sefer kimlik problem yaşıyorum."

<sup>167</sup> From personal interview with Vivet: "Evde olmak; herkesle eşit durumda olmak demek, hiçbir farklılık hissetmemek, özgürce hareket etmek demek."

<sup>168</sup> From personal interview with Selen: "Türkiye'ye karşı bu kadar küsmüş ve bu kadar hayal kırıklığına uğramış olmasaydım çocuk kafamda, genç kafamda gerçekten sevgi besliyordum ülkeye karşı."

Jew who was born and raised here, he says he feels he belong here but at the same time, it is a reality that he is being estranged and alienated to his home, too.<sup>169</sup> Thus, he struggles by such conflicting feelings that he feels all at once, all the time.

#### **4.2.3 Challenging Feelings: anxiety, uneasiness, insecurity, being uncomfortable vs. trust**

There were uncalled reactions with an unexpected intensity. Spontaneous eruptions of affects started to make sense after a number of interviews. For an individual respondent, these mentioned words may not be definitive enough; but after taking one step back and taking a holistic look at the interviews in general, I realized that there was a commonality. Spontaneous eruptions of feeling of minority were shared as a display of their anxiety, uneasiness, insecurity, discomfort and more.

What is meant by the spontaneity here? It is referring to the unexpected intensive nature of those responses. They are mostly responses without a question. They are eruptions where a respondent starts to answer one question and then suddenly changes his/her tone and says something immensely affective and dense. Similarly, spontaneity may refer to the repeated phrases where one responded keeps saying the same sentence at different point in the interview like Rejin did when she kept repeating multiple times in her interview that Turks liked Jewish people only on a personal basis and that they liked her individually and considered her as “one of their own” whereas they didn’t like Jewish community. Thus, these responses assist to create an affective space that both constructs and feeds their senses of being a minority.

As the concept ‘affect’ refers to a pre-cognitive state at a deeper level of personality, the construction of particularly shared affects by the community begins in childhood even before they cannot make a total sense of the surrounding context. One of my respondents, Ani has clearly showed this position of affectionate construction:

I guess I was in 7<sup>th</sup> grade at that time. I remember the day because it was the day I returned back from Ankara. The evening the explosion happened I returned with the bus from Ankara. Of course, neither did I realize anything, nor told my family anything to me. Because of my age, I was not really interested in the news. It was not easy to be informed

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<sup>169</sup>From personal interview with Ser: “Evimi Türkiye olarak hissediyorum. Türk Yahudisi olarak, burada doğmuş büyümüş biri olarak, buralı hissediyorum. Fakat, her zaman evime karşı bir soğuma ve yabancılaşma hissettiğim de gerçek.”

in those times, since Facebook or Twitter were not used much. My phone was a regular Nokia which was considered to as a “kid phone” only given to me to say “ I am fine “to my mum. I remembered that when I was off the bus, my mother hugged me. Suddenly, all of my mum’s friends started to say to her “I hope he gets better soon!” and asking whether everyone was ok. And I was not aware of anything. When we got to the car I asked what happened and why everybody said “get better soon!” My uncle’s name is David, “David was injured” they said. They said there was an explosion in the synagogue and pieces of glass got into his eyes and he was in surgery. I was a child and I started to cry. My relation with my uncle was really close. I started to cry without understanding why. I was just upset about the situation of my uncle without realizing that the other people were injured and died.<sup>170</sup>

She is no aware of the fact that the occasion that caused her uncle to get hurt, hurt a lot more people and some worse than her uncle. She does not fully recognize the impact of the situation; but she does not need to. The surrounding feelings of her mother, of her mother’s friends’ already communicate to her that it is a very sad moment that is the time to be concerned and sorry. That is how independent some feelings like alertness and uneasiness are from cognitive schemes. They are being felt even before the person in question fully recognizes the scope of the situation. Even before the cognitive scheme of the event, the coherent narrative of the situation, feelings may overwhelm the affective state.

My interviewees mentioned a range of issues that explained how fragile their sense of trust to their environment or their sense of security is. For instance, they felt tired and fed up with the environment or the reactions around them towards Jewishness, or they felt alert when they hear someone mention Jewishness or being a minority. Similarly, their perception of the society they lived in was sometimes seen as something against their identity, and even something that make them feel frightened. These went in

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<sup>170</sup> From personal interview with Ani: “7. Sınıf... Sanırım öyle bir şeydi. Ben döndüğüm günü hatırlıyorum; çünkü, tam onun akşamına denk gelmişti. Patlamanın akşamı biz Ankara’dan döndük, ben otobüsle döndüm. Tabi ben hiçbir şeyin farkında değilim ailemde bana hiçbir şey söylememişti o zaman. Yaşım gereği haberlerle pek hasır nesir değildim. O dönemde twittermiş facebookmuş pek kullanılmadığı içinde haberdar olmak o kadar kolay olmuyordu. Çocuk cep telefonum renksiz bir Nokia sadece ‘Alo, anne iyiyim.’ bunu söylemek içindi. Bunun dışında şeyi hatırlıyorum ;otobüsten indim annem bana sarıldı. Bir anda bütün arkadaşlarımın anneleri anneme geçmiş olsun herkes iyimi geçmiş olsun iyimi demeye, başladılar ve ben hiçbir şeyin farkında değildim. Sonra arabaya bindiğimde; ne oldu niye herkes geçmiş olsun, dedim. Eniştem, eniştemim adı David, David yaralandı; dediler. Nasıl, ne oldu; falan dedim. Sinagogda patlama oldu, gözüne cam parçaları girmiş ve işte ameliyatta işte hastane falan filan bunları söylediler. Ben çocuktum, bir an ağlamaya başladım. Eniştemle de aram gerçekten çok iyidir. Ağlamaya falan başladım o zaman nedenini niçinini çok fazla anlamadım .Sadece eniştemin durumuna üzüldüm. O anda baksa insanların hayatları kaybettiğini bile başka insanların. başka insanların başka yerlerini kaybettiğini farkında olmadan, sadece enişteme üzülmüştüm.”



line with their need for protection and feel safe. In this context, we also see how my interviewees explain their everyday practices of adapting to these circumstances.

In certain situations, spaces and times, people declare that they feel tired, weary and became inured to those feelings. One may call this phenomenon “spirit of *geniş toplum*(wider society)” as well. There are similarities and common characteristics of the state of minds of my respondents that are developed simultaneously with what they experience and what the encounter in the midst of *geniş toplum*. For instance, tiredness felt by Selen is caused by the constant felt necessity to explain herself. She says, “Worry... The idea of what is next, something like a bad expectation? And also there is tiredness: Tiredness about the effort for explaining. You need to explain tiredness and nonchalance about the obligation to defend yourself.”<sup>171</sup> Ser feels hopeless about the possibility of raising a child in such a setting. “The idea of living in Turkey is a challenging concept for me apart from being Jewish”.<sup>172</sup> Ser questions his present conditions and not only because he is a Jewish person, but because of what he despairs he feels within *geniş toplum* as a part of that it. Weariness is one of the results of such encounters. Rakel, for example, is weary of being the scapegoat of the country. She says, “I am dealing with these things all day long. I am not getting surprised and I am bored of it. It is challenging and tragic that officials from the government imply this discourse even though it is needed that the government should restrain in this country where hate against the Jewish people is high”<sup>173</sup>. Rakel, being an activist lawyer, she is constantly exposed to discriminatory encounters experienced by not only herself; but also her clients, too. She is both weary and desperate. Her account is significant in the sense that she not only delivers her experience as a Jewish individual; but also as the litigator whose day-to-day business involves such stories of others.

One common spontaneous affect that surrounds the respondents every once in a while was their alertness. Some of them declared that they are being vigilant within

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<sup>171</sup>From personal interview with Selen: “Endişe, şimdi ne gelecek düşüncesi... Ne derler ona... Kötü bir beklenti gibi... Ve biraz yorgunluk... Anlatmaya çalışmaktan anlatmaya üşenmekten yorulmak. Anlatmak zorunda olmak, kendini savunmak zorunda olmanın getirdiği boş vermişlik ve yorgunluk.”

<sup>172</sup> From personal interview with Ser: “Umutsuzum, burada çocuk yetiştirebilir miyim, diye düşünüyorum. Türkiye’de yaşamak benim kafamı sorgulayan bir şey, Yahudi olmamın dışında.”

<sup>173</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Günah Keçisi; bende bıkkınlık yaratıyor. Ben tüm gün bununla uğraşıyorum zaten. Şaşırmıyorum ve sıkılıyorum. Yahudi nefretinin bu kadar yoğun olduğu bir ülkede devlet tarafından engellenmesi ve önlenmesi için bir şeyler yapılması gerekirken aksine devlet yetkililerinin bu söylemlerde bulunması çok düşündürücü ve Türkiye için çok acı bir durum.”

geniş toplum or feeling vigilant and alert against the potentiality of what is to come. Yosi, in general, says even a simple introduction of himself as Jewish makes him feel vigilant. He says, “People should recognize you with reference to other things, not to Jewishness”<sup>174</sup>. Constant state of vigilance, therefore, may cause a state of ambivalence. One may not be able to feel rooted, as Yusuf explains. “We are constantly one step above the ground, I think. There is always a state of alertness.”<sup>175</sup> The word Jewish, itself is enough for some of the respondents to suddenly step out of their state and become alert for the following statement. Ser and Ani describe this reaction as follows; Ser says “It is depending on the context but you become alert when you hear the word *Jewish*. Your senses become more perceptive; you become more curious about what they are talking. You develop sensitivity for the word. I am getting startled about what they are saying. It is something about perceptual selectivity, I guess”.<sup>176</sup> And according to Ani; “The name Jewish, awakens a necessity to come to my senses and listen closely even when I am not listening. Every second, I am in such a state of mind that one can say something about me, my family, and my community. This is exhausting of course. I should care little less perhaps but I am not that kind of person. I do not abstain from talking with a level of education. If this person is the teacher, the biggest punishment would be that I do not pass the class. Because of that I know my rights; I can talk a long time. I can talk with a teacher or student. However, when a taxi driver starts to tell that Jews are doing these, I do not talk and I get alerted on what he is saying.”<sup>177</sup> They both put it so clearly that one can easily imagine their heightened sensitivity and how they become pulled out of their current states of mind and immediately become cautious and on the guard all of a sudden. One should imagine this happening repeatedly on a daily

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<sup>174</sup> From personal interview with Yosi: “Seni başka şeylerinle tanısınlar, Yahudiliğinle tanımasınlar. Yahudi’yim dediğimde tedirginlik oluyor.”

<sup>175</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Ayaklarımız yere basmıyor diye düşünüyorum. Her zaman tetikte olma durumu var.”

<sup>176</sup> From personal interview with Ser: “Yahudi kelimesi duyunca, kontekste göre değişiyor; ama, duyunca bir alert oluyorsun, duyuların açılıyor. Ne diyorlar, daha çok merak ediyorsun. Daha çok o kelimeye bir hassasiyetin oluyor. Ben hemen irkiliyorum acaba ne diyorlar, diye. Algıda seçicilik oluyor galiba.”

<sup>177</sup> From personal interview with Ani: Dinlemediğim bir anda bile alarm haline geçip dinleme şeyi gerekliliği uyandırıyor. Her an bana benim aileme dâhil, sinagogdaki insanlara, benim topluluğuma ait insanlara bir şey söylenebilecekmiş psikolojisindeyim. Derste hiç ilgim olmayan bir anda bile. Yahudi kelimesi kullanıldığı zaman bir dinlemeye başlayıp acaba ne söyleyecekler benimle ilgili şeyine giriyorum. O da biraz yorucu tabi. Yorucu derken? Benim açımdan belki biraz kulak arkası edebiliyor olmak gerekiyor ama ben çok edebilen bir insan değilim. Belli bir düzeyde eğitim düzeyinde olan insanla konuşmaktan çekinmem. Karşımdaki öğretmene bana verebileceği en büyük ceza, sınıfta bırakmak o dersi geçirmemek olduğunu ve benim bir hak iddia edeceğimi bildiğim için uzun süre konuşabilirim. Okulda bir öğrenci ve hocayla konuşabilirim. Ama bir taksiciyle, Museviler şunları yapıyorlar, dediklerinde; hayır yapmıyorlar, diye bir konuşmaya girmiyorum. Ama, bir alert oluyorum; ne diyor şeklinde.”

basis and how it may reflect on an individual's state of mind. One respondent says, although the context matters, she, too, is curious about the rest of the sentence when she hears the word Jewish.<sup>178</sup> It should also be noted that the mentioned respondent, Maya, unlike many other respondents, says that she was not made to feel like a minority, yet, in this society, she didn't feel like it<sup>179</sup>. Here, the word, *yet*, she uses may imply her expectation about the potentiality of such experience; so far she says she didn't feel like it. *Yet*, brings more than what it implies, too. The following sentence, for instance; "we cannot know how the circumstances would change".<sup>180</sup> One last reference to the alertness respondents adopt was made by Etel, who presents a more genuine articulation of her reasons. "It becomes more important and valuable than another word. You belong to it. If she/he mentions *Jewish*, she/he mentions *you*, as well."<sup>181</sup>

Naming certain places or situations as frightening is observed as a common practice. They say that the society at large, *geniş toplum*, is adopting a stance against them with a hostile behavior. These feelings mostly come to light whilst discussing their relations with the state or with other people. It would be a vital addition to the chapter to discuss in detail their articulation of their "fear".

Yusuf, for instance, thinks that the society is being egged against Jewish people and it is scary. His contention is that the public's hostility is being fed.<sup>182</sup> By which sources, he does not say; it is unimportant. Adopting a historical account on the gradual shift of her discomfort, Suzi displays a very troubled citizen image. "Until 1990's, this identity did not bother me. In these days, it does. They are seeing us as an enemy"<sup>183</sup>. By and large, she believes that what changed and caused a rapid downward movement in her sense of security is the AKP incumbency. The pressure she feels is so overcoming she states, "After the rise of AKP to incumbency, we've been hit in the

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<sup>178</sup>From personal interview with Maya: "Merak ediyorum cümlenin girişini; ama, hangi kontekste olduğu önemli tabi ki ama evet, merak ediyorum."

<sup>179</sup>From personal interview with Maya: "Ben azınlık hissettirilmedim bu toplumda henüz, hissetmedim de."

<sup>180</sup>From personal interview with Maya: "Bilemeyiz şartların nasıl değişeceğini."

<sup>181</sup>From personal interview with Etel: "En basitinden haberlerde bile bir Yahudi lafı geçtiğinde 'Ay ne diyorlar yine?' gibisinden.. Başka bir laftan daha değerli ve önemli geliyor. Ona aitsin. Yahudi'den bahsediyorsan senden de bahsediyordur."

<sup>182</sup>From personal interview with Yusuf: "Şu an buradaki toplumun dolduğunu hissediyorum ben Yahudilere karşı, biraz daha korkutucu."

<sup>183</sup>From personal interview with Suzi: "1990'a kadar bu kimlik beni hiç rahatsız etmedi. Bu günlerde ediyor. Düşman gibi bakıyorlar."

head by a sledgehammer every single day”.<sup>184</sup> Thus, it is clear that she feels more and more oppressed lately compared to her stance before 90s. She is frightened by her own identity and what it entails, she says. It is obvious especially for recent months but, she says she has been concerned about their safety for some time now.<sup>185</sup> Her position is worth taking a closer look at, since she has marked a turning point for her desperation and since then the pressure increases. The word sledgehammer is very striking even if one begins to imagine the daily impact. Another respondent shares Suzi’s concerns and her arguments about the degrading situation of tolerance. “I was born and raised in Turkey. I experienced several different kinds of periods. In recent 4-5 years, there is a serious differences of opinion. I am perceiving a big transformation in people. People are angry. People began not to understand each other maybe as a result of anger or financial difficulties. They have no patience, they learnt not to listen to each other. These kinds of images are bothering me. They do not understand”<sup>186</sup>. Thus, the impact of rapidly degrading situation as a direct consequence of domestic political context is a vivid concern for the respondents, not only as a potential target of aggression they fear to encounter, but also as a concerned citizen.

Some respondents, though share similar fears, adopts a sentimental patriotic approach to home and illustrate a heartbreaking story while describing their anxiety. Nino is the most remarkable respondent of that camp. He says, “If you are worried about the politics of this country, it means that you are from *here*. I am last person to turn off the lights”.<sup>187</sup> He is the last person to leave here, the last person to close the lights and shut the doors. Though it is moving, the reference to *here* worth further elaboration. The thought of leaving *here*, the potentiality of *here* not being an option to accommodate in is very much alive. It is not hidden somewhere deep in his conscious; it is vivid; it is right at the surface. It is perceived as a place very much close to his heart; but then again a place where one might one day choose to close down, turn down the lights and leave, and not be a part of anymore. This is the intricate nature of a very

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<sup>184</sup> From personal interview with Suzi: “AKP yönetiminden sonra kafamıza balyozla vuruluyor her gün.”

<sup>185</sup> From personal interview with Suzi: “Bugünlerde bu kimlik beni korkutmaya başladı. Son birkaç ay ayyuka çıktı ama son birkaç yılda da can güvenliğimiz hakkında düşünüyorum.”

<sup>186</sup> From personal interview with Vivet: “Türkiye de doğdum büyüdüm, çok değişik evreler yaşadım. Bu evrede son 4-5 yılda fikir ayrılıkları çok var. İnsanlarda büyük bir değişim algılıyorum. Öfke var insanların üzerinde. Herkes, belki geçim sıkıntısı, öfke, insanları birbirini anlamamaya başladı. Sabırları yok, birbirlerini dinlememeyi öğrendiler. Bu görüntüler beni rahatsız ediyor. Anlamıyorlar.”

<sup>187</sup> From personal interview with Nino: “Bu ülkenin politikası ile ilgili kaygı duyuyorsan buralıdır. Ben ışıkları kapatacak en son adamım.”

sentimental patriotic man's affective approach to *home*.

There are fluctuating responses and feelings being produced by an affective mind. One might say one thing at one time, and say another at others. But regardless of those ups and downs the look at home, the discussion of home may be suited across one single feeling. In the case of Ser; it is *ease*. "One may feel more threatened right now, however, I could not say that they have always been at ease... I could not declare that living in Turkey is a bad experience because I could say that I have not been experiencing hard times for 29 years. We live mostly at ease".<sup>188</sup> Feeling at ease at one moment, and not at another is a perfect example of how affect works, changes, flows through a person; changing one's moods/thoughts momentarily regardless of the context. He generally draws an image of not so frightened person compared to other respondents; however what he had said when discussed the practice of scapegoating suddenly erupts the atmosphere of the discussion as well as his disposition as a somewhat laid-back person. He states that he is disgusted by the habit of the government to manipulate the society and create a scapegoat out of minorities every time they had to cover up something or get the spotlight of some agenda. It is causing anxiety and it disrupts the sense of trust/security. It increases hostility and it causes to become the target.<sup>189</sup> He chose to use the word disgust, a word loaded with feelings.

Words' emotional experiences may vary from respondent to respondent. They are not necessarily cohesive when it comes to articulation of their fear. Dorin, for that matter, draws a somewhat mild image for what troubles for about scapegoating. She is in contention that during conflictual times with Israel, such as the Mavi Marmara incident, she declared her name "faintheartedly" instead of mentioning it casually. But "I didn't need to hide my name" adds Dorin,<sup>190</sup> focusing her attention to the anxiety rises at international crisis.

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<sup>188</sup> From personal interview with Ser: "Belki şu an daha tehdit altında hissedebilir ama hiçbir zaman tam olarak rahattı diyemeyeceğim. Türkiye'de yaşamak; kötü bir duygu diyemeyeceğim. Çünkü, 29 yıldır çok ciddi bir durum yaşadığımı söyleyemeyeceğim. Çok rahat yaşadık Yahudi olarak."

<sup>189</sup> From personal interview with Ser: "Günah keçisi, tikslenme duygusu yaratıyor. Gündemi değiştirmek, gerçekleri kapamak adına azınlıkları kullanmak endişe yaratıyor. Ve güven duygunu tamamen yerle bir ediyor. Düşmanlığı artırıyor, hedef gösteriyor."

<sup>190</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: "Gizleme ihtiyacı olduğum zaman olmadı ama çekinerek söylediğim zamanlar oldu yani. Mavi Marmara olayları ile İsrail'le ilgili gerginlikler olduğu zaman yeni tanıştığım birileri olduğunda ya da bir hastam mesela 'İsmimiz çok değişik.' vs. gibi sorular sorduğu zaman mesela, söylemekte tedirgin olduğum zamanlar oldu."

Rather than the affective impact of a word, in the case of Engin, it was the facial impression of a respondent of 68 years of age, that lasted in my mind when he told me the story of a memory from 40 years ago. When I asked him about his time in military service, and whether or not there was any problems he experienced because he was a Jew; first he said “Not much; but I knew it would cause issues, they knew it would”. Then he continued with the story of how some officers asked him, in a way interrogated him whether or not he is Jewish, if he was circumcised or not. At one point, in front of a large group his officers made him loose his pants and ‘check’ if he was actually circumcised. His face dropped down, looking at the floor and suddenly started to talk with a very low volume as if he was whispering. His facial impression changed in as he was describing something very unfortunate, something he experienced at that moment again as he spoke, and not as an old memory from 40 years ago. I listened to the recording 4 times later to be able to clearly hear what he said afterwards when I was transcribing.

Fear may even be considered as a natural feeling, too. Being frightened might come what Jewish Turkishness entails, as Yosef explains. “In the last analysis, here is a country carrying risks for a Jewish person to be dismissed. It is obvious how Muslims is seeing Jewish people. That’s why; Turkey is not a suitable country for Jews in the sense of security”.<sup>191</sup> Consequently, fearing for one’s life might be a natural repercussion of the regional power relations and regional political status quo. It might be embedded to one’s everyday life as well as his political reality. Though, a specific example, Maya’s thoughts on the religion box on identification cards presents how the fear of security embedded in her daily thinking. “There is a place for religion on my identity card, so it means that it would be used against me when it is needed. It may be a label against me.”<sup>192</sup>

The counter affect standing against fear, is the need for security, for protection. They co-exist as complementary feelings. “To what extent I could share who I am. You

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<sup>191</sup> From personal interview with Yosef: “Neticede burası bir Musevi için risk taşıyan bir ülke. Kovulmama ve istenmeyen bir ülke, çünkü % 99’u Müslüman bir ülke... Ortadoğu’nun durumu ortada. Dolayısıyla Müslümanların Musevilere bakış açısı ortada. Bu durumdan dolayı da çok güvenilir bir yer olarak Türkiye, Museviler için uygun değil.”

<sup>192</sup> From personal interview with Maya: “Benim nüfuz cüzdanımda din hanem var. Demek ki bu bana karşı kullanılacak, yeri geldiğinde. Belki de aleyhime işleyecek bir hanedir. Her zaman nüfus cüzdanımı çıkarttığımda bu fikir...”

have a wall as an instinct for protection”<sup>193</sup>. Walls are built instinctively. Ser similarly does not feel that there is a place protecting you even if something bad happens to you.<sup>194</sup> For example Suzi finds protection to a limited extent in the Jewish community. She says that though Cemaat is there as for a reason and that’s where she gets news on late migration; she acknowledges that the power of Cemaat is limited to serve any meaningful protection. “How would it protect us? Does it have a police force?”<sup>195</sup> asks her, rhetorically, not expecting an answer, pointing out Cemaat’s limited capabilities.

When walls are built, precautions are taken. All these defensive actions may as well be the way respondents survive in an atmosphere where they are being confronted. At some instances, there are drawbacks, says Can, to their Turkish identity. “One is always defending herself/himself. She/he presents himself/herself as different in order not to be exposed to discrimination” says Can describing the constant efforts put in on a daily basis.<sup>196</sup> He argues that identities, Jewishness and Turkishness, are undeniable but sometimes one draws Jewishness back for protection.

Drawing Jewishness back as a precaution is certainly a recurring theme. Jacques goes even one step further and argues it is worldwide practice for Jewish people. “Living as a Jew produces the same kind of feeling everywhere in the world; both a pride and a secret. You have to conceal yourself under protection. Therefore, there is a historical pattern to it as well. You couldn’t belong to anywhere, you are stateless, homeless”.<sup>197</sup>

Being exposed to a “minority psychology” (*azınlık psikolojisi*) is another concept employed as both the input and the repercussion of fear. Can argues that the

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<sup>193</sup>From personal interview with Yosi: “Kim olduğumu ne kadar paylaşabilirim? Duvarın var, korunma iç güdüsü.”

<sup>194</sup>From personal interview with Ser: “Yahudi olduğumu hissetme; güvenlik mesela kendi ibadetinin rahat yapamamak... Mavi Marmara’da hükümetin senin yanında olmadığını hissediyorsun. Ülkede başına bir şey gelse seni koruyacak bir yer varmış gibi hissetmiyorum.”

<sup>195</sup>From personal interview with Suzi: “Ben cemaatin dağınık olduğunu düşünüyorum. Göçler... Tabii ki cemaatten haberim oluyor bu olaylar karşısında ama Cemaat bizi ne koruyacak ki; polis gücü mü var cemaatin bizi koruyacak.”

<sup>196</sup>From personal interview with Can: “Bazı yerlerde çekince oluyor. O yüzden Türk kimliğine daha sarılmış oluyor. Ya ben Türk’üm zaten. İnsan hep korunuyor. Ayrımcılığa maruz kalmamak için kendini olduğundan farklı gösteriyor. Böyle bir potansiyelin olduğu yadsınamaz.”

<sup>197</sup>From personal interview with Jacques: “Yahudi olarak yaşamak; Yahudi olarak dünyanın her yerinde yaşamak aynı duygu, hem gurur hem saklı. Koruma altında tutmak durumdasın kendini. Dolayısıyla tarihsel bir durum da var ortada. Vatansız evsiz, bir yere ait olmadan.”

ultimate aim is to fight back extinction by saying that “The biggest concept what the minority psychology brings is the protection against extinction.”<sup>198</sup> Such psychology may also bring forward lack of trust to the protection provided by the state itself. Since fear for survival is embedded in everyday thought, it is not unexpected to observe mistrust to the state mechanism. Yosef denotes his stance by stating that “I do not feel trust because of that I do not approve this kind of trustworthiness. But I am living here so, I am trying to keep up with it.”<sup>199</sup>

Trying to survive in such an atmosphere, may, be exhausting, too. Not every action may meet a reactionary precaution. Some respondents may remain passive. It may be tiring both emotionally and mentally as was the case of Etel, when she was in high school. “Occasionally I participated into the religion lectures and sat in class. When there was an event about Israel, there was always a negative idea on Jewishness. I was neither emotionally strong nor knowledgeable enough to deal with. I had hard times. There were times I couldn’t defend myself. They were coming at me, asking ‘What *we*’ve done?’ because they were considering that every act of Israel is the act of Jews, as well. ‘Who is *you*, who is *me*?’ There is something to think about”.<sup>200</sup>

Fear for not only the safety of one’s own self but also the safety of her family, her children to be precise, creates a whole another level for concern. Suzi, vividly brings the issue to the interviews and tells in detail how she is not at ease currently. “Now, I do not feel at ease at all. The incidents, the attitude of people make me very frightened. I fear for my children, for how they would come back at home in the evenings. To be honest, I am trying to live”.<sup>201</sup>

Within the all feelings shared above, it is important to remind the declarations of

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<sup>198</sup> From personal interview with Can: “Azınlık psikolojisinin getirdiği en büyük kavram yok olma tehlikesine karşı korunmak.”

<sup>199</sup> From personal interview with Yosef: “Türkiye’nin durumu; güvenilirlikleri tasvip ettiğim şekilde olmadığı için güven duymuyorum. Ama burada yaşadığım için buna bir şekilde ayak uydurmaya çalışıyorum.”

<sup>200</sup> From personal interview with Etel: “Din derslerine giriyordum bazen onlarla birlikte. Tam ne zaman İsrail’le olay olsa mutlaka Yahudilikle ilgili kötü bir düşünce de çıkıyordu. Onunla savaşılabilecek bir bilgim ve duygusal gücüm de yoktu. Zorlandığım zamanlar oldu. Kendimi savunamadığım zamanlar oldu. Çünkü İsrail’in yaptığı her hareketi Yahudilerin yaptığını düşündükleri için direk bana geliyorlardı: ‘Siz niye böyle bir şey yaptınız?’ diye. Siz kim, ben kim? Bunları tabi düşünmek gerek.”

<sup>201</sup> From personal interview with Suzi: “Şu an hiç rahat değilim. Olaylar insanların tavırları beni çok korkutuyor. Akşam ne şekilde dönecekler korkusu. Yaşamaya çalışıyorum doğrusu.”



the respondents that Turkishness and Jewishness can cohabite within this community. They own both identities. Just like they declared –as discussed at length above- how hard it becomes sometimes. The reality of being a Turkish Jewish person becomes challenging at some contexts. It creates countless affects through everyday encounters. From fear to weariness, from tiredness to faintheartedness and uneasiness, there are numerous reflections of those affects on respondents. After having heard all the interviews and reviewing the responses countless times, one question got stuck in my head and kept disturbing me until I constructed my thesis on it: *In spite of all those troubling encounters and feelings on a daily basis, what still keeps these people here?*

People feel in harmony with Turkishness in one second, but then in another, he faces suddenly a distasteful encounter that shakes the grounds this belief is built upon. But he shakes it off and continues to feel that he belongs here and keeps living here as nothing happened until the next incident happens. What makes this constant regeneration of sense of belonging? What is the anchor that keeps them here?

At this specific juncture, I'd like to introduce a term which was first mentioned by a few respondents, that I believe lies at the heart of the possible explanation to the above given question; *bubble/fanus*. These words are used coincidentally as a substitutive in the interviews by different respondents right from their own vocabulary; it was not mentioned once in the questions. Let alone the words, even the concept of bubble/fanus was not existent in either the questions or in my contemplation before I heard it from the respondents themselves.

Thus, in the following section, I will focus on what's meant by bubble/fanus, the dynamics of bubble and its scope. I will reconsider the responses given to the question of "feeling at home" by the responses from the distinctive framework of bubble/fanus; and attempt to re-read them via affective goggles.

## 4.3 Bubble as an Affective Space

### 4.3.1 A Sociological Understanding of Bubble

Thinking about the individual expressions of a demarcated space which makes an individual secure, such as the *bubble/fanus*, it is vital to note the specific features of the historical period we are living today; that this ambivalent concept of the *bubble/fanus* appears in the period where/when communities and old ways of solidarity-forming dissolve and a change occurs in the way individual wellbeing is understood. In this case, this is a period when the Jewish community's old ways of solidarities, the *Cemaat* bond itself, and the *dernekler* which used to be the traditional ways of forming solidarities has weakened. Thus, it would be plausible to recall the points rose in the previous chapter concerning the transformation of the city as well as the transformation of the Jewish community via a historical approach, in order to better formulate the transformation of the bubbles as well.

The city appears frequently in respondents' interviews. A few of them, as mentioned in previous chapter, talks about a memory of a city when they knew everybody and everybody knew them when it was much smaller and predictable. Probably, the reason city lost its significance as a territory of belonging because it became unpredictable, unfamiliar and unknown. It was Kastoryano who drew attention to the transformation of Istanbul through the perspective of Jewish community by arguing that they tend to act cohesively with the national Muslim bourgeoisie who follow a similar pattern to modernization who use(s) West as their model for its cultural, economic, and political aspirations.<sup>202</sup> In the context of this cohesion, Leyla Neyzi adds a very crucial dimension and points out the language of Turkish: "Today Turkish Jews mainly speak Turkish as their first language, give their children Turkish names, and resemble secular middle –class Turks in many ways. Young, educated Turkish Jews increasingly distinguish between modern and conservative persons, whether of Jewish or Muslim origin".<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> See Kastoryano, 1992, p.259.

<sup>203</sup> See Neyzi, 2005, p. 173. She cites from the Master's thesis of Melin Levent Yuna , *Identity Construction: Self-Narration of Educated Turkish Jewish Young Adults*, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 1999.

Another argument raised was that the community's upward mobility in society marked their current social cohesion. Kastoryano's account denoted that the aspiration to modernity explain this movement towards the top to certain areas where national bourgeoisie resides; namely, Şişli, Nişantaşı and latter for those who can afford it, the Bosphorus. It was these mentioned local migratory movements, argued Kastoryano, which led to the dissolution of local Jewish communities. Leyla Neyzi assisted this view, as she explained in her interview how lower classes left for Israel and emptied ghettos. And when the remaining community got gradually assimilated to the public, and moving to areas middle class Muslims reside.<sup>204</sup> There would be important to keep the information shared by Neyzi in the mind to understand the mobility of Jewish people towards areas middle class Muslims: "After the 1950's, the profile of Turkish Jews changed. Anatolian Jewish communities had largely disappeared. Families living in the historic neighborhoods of Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara either immigrated to Israel or moved to newer mixed middle-class neighborhoods."<sup>205</sup>

Thus, I argued, that it is likely, in the 1960s and 1970s both in terms of the geographical territory and in terms of the population size, it was easier to get to know people. The transformation of the city and the transformation of the local communal groups turned Istanbul into a metropol that is unstable which is certainly not easy to call home, to feel as relaxed as they used to. Thus, it was concluded that the city remained as a nostalgic memory within the context of spatial belonging. Home, is the *known* city. It is where you are familiar with its inhabitants. It is where you are familiar with its objects, where you share a common memory. Thus, when the context of this familiarity is blurred, the sense of home is blurred.

Within the lights of the ethnographic data gathered in the interviews, as both scholars draw attention, it is plausible to argue traditional senses of bubbles are dissolved by the local movements and turned into individual imaginary spaces. The loss of neighborhoods and relations with the residents of a shared apartment building, all assist the construction of individual spaces...

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<sup>204</sup> See Gül&Kutluata, 2010, p.109-119.

<sup>205</sup> See Neyzi, 2005, p. 173.

#### 4.3.2 Imaginary Protective Shield of Bubble as the Perpetuation of Minority Status

At the beginning of the research for this thesis, the topic in my mind was feeling at home as an affect. Thanks to all the interviews, this topic led to others and opened new venues of considerations, such as the present one; bubble/fanus.

Feeling at home is a multifaceted topic that may very well be contemplated on within the framework of migration issue at an abstract level. But bubble/fanus is considerably fresh and actual issue that also spreads to the everyday reality of Jewish community in Istanbul. Thus, both concepts, feeling at home and bubble/fanus can be thought as two complementary concepts that assist and transform each other.

*In spite of all those troubling encounters and feelings on a daily basis, what still keeps these people here?*

This question was constantly repeated in my head. The responses given to the question of “feeling at home” fall short to justify respondents’ choices in staying despite all encounters. Various answers were given to the question had not been satisfying enough as the anchor that kept them here. There were cultural connotations in their responses such as the cuisine, kebabs or the esnafs themselves may come across as the reasons for a heartwarming argumentation for staying. Or sometimes it was a nostalgic approach such as the old golden days of their town and Istanbul. I kept searching for more substantial evidence.

The question was unraveled by the concept *bubble/fanus* introduced by the respondents themselves. The words *bubble* and *fanus* were used by a number of respondents to refer to specific affective spaces. These words appear especially while discussing where the respondents feel secure, safe, at peace or at home. Feeling at home may be thought from the perspective of feeling like a minority. And within that context bubble/fanus emerges as the brand new and fresh ethnographic tool that is embellished by affects.

There appears to be a need for some sort of created area for them as a prerequisite to even begin to think about feeling at home/secure. This leaves the rest of

the public as “others” or “general public/widened public”; revealing the dichotomous perspective. Thus, *bubble* or *fanus* may be referred to as an imaginary protective shield and the perpetuation of the minority status, as the lingering affect of the minority status, as its ghost. In this setting, a set of affects to be discussed in this chapter pertains to the personalized secure spaces imagined by the interviewees.

Firstly, some of my interviewees defined a bubble, a secure space, a bell jar, an environment where they felt safe and where they belonged. Selen is one respondent that introduced the word *fanus* when asked about segregationist attitudes from the society. She said that “My environment is very small *fanus*. I do not experience in my social environment but I feel a bit timid when I enter another social environment”.<sup>206</sup> She goes even forward explaining what her *fanus* functions as, what it works for: “I did not feel (discriminated against). In that sense, I was in the right places. I was under the protection of *fanus* to avoid experience discrimination. It is nice and comfortable to live in my environment.”<sup>207</sup> *Fanus* protects, it shelters. Sofi, coincidentally uses the word *bubble* for her *fanus*, describing a similar construction when explaining how hard it is to be a woman in Turkey. “I think certainly there is discrimination. Being a woman in Turkey... I am living in a small bubble. Being a woman in Turkey is uneasy”.<sup>208</sup> There’s something new. It is not only a space for minorities but also a space where one can harbor as a woman, too. *Bubble* is a safe harbor for all that is discriminated against, it is where one may avoid any displeasing affects; and simply be at peace.

Bubbles may be built as a reactionary space where one may retract to. Can, for instance, says he tries to avoid discrimination by moving away from the places which have a possibility of making you feel minority. He thus prefers to be in places where he knows discriminatory feelings will not be affecting him.<sup>209</sup> There are certain places he

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<sup>206</sup> From personal interview with Selen: “Kendi sosyal çevrem çok çok küçük *fanus*. Kendi sosyal çevremde görmüyorum. Ama, yine bir sosyal çevreye girdiğimde biraz bunun çekingenliğini hissediyorum.”

<sup>207</sup> From personal interview with Selen: “Ayrımcılık hissetmedim. O anlamda çok doğru yerlerde bulundum. *Fanus*un koruması altındayım ayrımcılığa uğramamak için. Benim bulunduğum yerde benim bulunduğum ortamda yaşamak çok güzel, konforlu.”

<sup>208</sup> From personal interview with Sofi: “Ayrımcılık olduğunu düşünüyorum kesinlikle. Türkiye’de de kadın olmak. Ben küçük bir *bubble* da yaşıyorum. Türkiye’de kadın olmak rahatsız.”

<sup>209</sup> From personal interview with Can: “Aslında biraz planlı bir şekilde Kendimi azınlık hissedebileceğim ortamlardan uzaklaştırarak bunu bir şekilde önlemeye çalışıyorsun.” – “Ne gibi?” – “Gezdiğin gittiğin sosyal hayatı yaşadığın yerler belli başlı yerler oluyor aslında. Örneklendirmek istersek Bebek, Nişantaşı, Tarabya, Etiler.... Eskiden mesela, Tophane’ye çok giderdik. Ondan sonra haberlerden gördüğümüz

goes, for example Bebek, Nişantaşı or Tarabya. He says he used to go to Tophane, too; but he quit going there socially as a consequence of the increasing conservatism in the area. He uses their aggressive reaction to the Gezi protestors towards as a sign of the mentality now harbors in Tophane that leaves him uncomfortable to even be there.

One may refer to it as freeing oneself from displeasing affects as Can does, but then again one may refer to it as “caging” herself to avoid those affects. It changes from which perspective and state of mind one sees it.

I am living in an environment which is embracing and does not have discrimination. I incarcerate myself in a cage; but I am sure... I never feel as minority because I have a family and an environment which I belong and I am not excluded. . With an utmost honesty I can say that until today I have not experienced an obvious act of discrimination; I have not even felt as an affect. Maybe because I am a person refusing discrimination, I have not felt because I have been in “sterilize” environments; I have gone to distinct universities... I have not been with ignorant - I shouldn't say ignorant but- prejudiced environments. I have not felt discriminated against maybe also because I have not been worn down in ignorant prejudiced situations.<sup>210</sup>

Voluntarily caging herself to be free is a reversed look to the construction of bubble/fanus. Some respondents may see it a liberating construction from oppressive affects whereas others, such as Maya may interpret this liberation as the incarceration of herself to a previously defined safe space.

Although other respondents did not explicitly refer to these phrases discussed above, their description of a space, an environment, where they felt at home interestingly coincided with the conceptualization of the bubble as an affective space.

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şekilde oranın muhafazakarlaşması söz konusu olduğundan açıkçası oraya gitmeye çekiniyorum.” –“ Ne zaman gidiyordun?” –“Ben Üniversite 3’e, 4’e kadar gidiyordum. 2005’te başladım 2008’e kadar gidiyordum diyebilirim. Sonra haberlerde gördüm. Orada sanat galerileri var. Onlara karşı bazı saldırılar oldu . Genel olarak Gezi olaylarında da gördük; orada yaşayan halkın ayaklanma bu sosyal harekete karşı çok sert bakışlarının olduğunu gördük. Ben artık oralarda kendimi huzurlu hissedebilir miyim pek zannetmiyorum. Çünkü, orada sizden sadece kimliğinizden ötürü hoşlaşmayacak insanlarım arasında olacaksınız.Bu da hoş bir durum değil.”

<sup>210</sup> From personal interview with Maya: “Daha kucak açıcı daha ayrımcılığın olmadığı bir çevrede yaşıyorum. Kendimi böyle bir kafesin içine hapsettim ama eminim. Ben kendimi son derece ait hissettiğim, dışlanmadığım ve bir şekilde mücadele ettiğim bir çevrem, ailem olduğu için hiçbir zaman azınlık hissetmedim. Çok samimi bir şekilde söylüyorum ki bu yaşıma kadar çok belirgin bir ayrımcılık birebir yaşamadım, hissiyat olarak da yaşamadım. Çünkü, belki ben ayrımcılığı reddeden bir insan olduğum için de. Tırnak içinde steril ortamlarda bulunduğum iyi üniversitelerde yetiştiğim, cahil insanlarla şey olmadığım için, cahil demeyeyim, ön yargılı insanlarla bulunmadığım için önyargılı cahil ortamlarda yıpratılmadığım içinde bu ayrımcılığı hissetmedim. Ama, kulaklarımıza bu arada nüfus cüzdanımdaki Musevi beni hep rahatsız etmiştir. Her zaman, çünkü, bir insanın din hanesi nüfus cüzdanında bulunmamalı.”

It may be a space where they can find affection, where they can find themselves, as Jojo contends. It is a place where one does not feel foreign, feels comfort, where one finds tolerance, understanding and can be heard, adds he while imaging his home.<sup>211</sup> He then adds the sense of trust to his imagination of home when he states that being an actor; he defines the stage as his home as well since it fosters trust. Dernek has provided a safe environment for him to actualize what he wants to do by assuring self-esteem. “That is the beauty about Dernek” says Jojo, “it creates people with high self-esteem”.<sup>212</sup>

Predictability may be a key concept for one when she imagines her home in addition to the feeling of affection and comfort as Selen denotes. “Being in a familiar place, knowing what you can expect and being comfortable and physically and emotionally at ease. Feeling that comfort and affection, being able to predict.”<sup>213</sup> In addition to comfort, one respondent draws attention to the necessity of intimacy which is also correlated to the need for trust and the predictable environment of home, too. For Rakel, feeling at home means feeling at ease. It is about the sense of privacy and the protection of this privacy. You feel at home when you can protect this sense of privacy because you feel safe. Home is something familiar, known and the estate you own.<sup>214</sup> The imagination of home, thus changes with every respondent according to their personal needs for comfort. Where one may seek affection, others may desire peace, or the state where one does not need auto-control at any instant; a state where one does not care for the thoughts of others, where the potentiality of being judged is non-existent.<sup>215</sup> Surely, it might be questioned whether or not such a *home* exists for any one or ever been existed for that matter. Since an ideal was asked to the respondents, it is plausible

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<sup>211</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “Evde hissetmek; kendimi bulabildiğim, sevgiyi bulabildiğim yer. ‘Yabancı’ hissetmediğim, rahatlık, tolare edebilme, anlayabilme dinleyebilme, bunların olduğu yer.”

<sup>212</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “Dernek için tiyatro yapıyorum, orta okuldan beri yapıyorum. Her gün.istediğim için yaptım .Tiyatro yapmak istediğim için orası bana ev oldu. Evde hissetmek dedin ya yapmak istediğim şeye alan açtı ve bana güven aşıladı. Bu güzel bir şey bence derneğin yaptığı şeylerden biri, bu daha kendine güvenen bireyler. Dostluk’ta da yaptım Liga’da da yaptım. Bu bir aidiyet, güzel bir his bu.”

<sup>213</sup> From personal interview with Selen: “Evde hissetmek; tanıdık bir yerde olmak, ne bekleyeceğini bilmek ve orda konforlu olmak. Rahat etmek, fiziksel ve duygusal olarak. O sevgiyi, konforu hissetmek ve ne bekleyeceğini bilmek.”

<sup>214</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Huzurlu hissetmek demek. Mahremiyet duygusu ile ilgi bir şey evde hissetmek ve o mahremiyet duygusunu koruyabilmek ile ilgili. O mahremiyet duygusunu koruyabildiğinde evde hissedersin; çünkü, güvende hissedersin. Ev tanıdık bildik ve senin olan, malik olduğun mülk...”

<sup>215</sup> From personal interview with Can: “Rahat davranır otokontrolün mümkün olduğunca azaldığı alan. Karşındaki düşüncelerine ve yargılayacağına önem vermeden davranabildiğin yer, bence evdir.”

that some responses were bordering such constructions which may never be fully experienced; may remain as mere abstractions.

Contemplation further on the idealized states of these definitions of home may lead to an argument that these definitions are imagined as a reactionary of what they have been exposed to, experienced. They might be the reflections of their frustrations. If one is frustrated by the immediate out casting he suffers, he might search for anonymity like Engin desires: “The sense of not being noticed/discriminated against the other as you are living in a country...”<sup>216</sup>

Thus bubble/fanus may be built upon what one needs and/or what one avoids. The creation may be imaginary or real; may reflect idealized desires and/or tangible needs. It is certain that bubble/fanus are personal spaces; they are ever changing according to the individual encounters and intrinsic filters they are processed through. But one may question the scope of bubble/fanus or how one may be in/out of the bubble. These questions may help to juggle our minds around the construction of bubble as a space and also as a living organism as such.

Additionally, my respondents’ descriptions of the bubble/fanus/bell jar and their understanding of home also included their relationships, such as with their friends, family, and the Jewish community as a whole. Bubbles are not places, locations but also people and their relationships as well.

Building social circles within the Jewish community is one thing; but also building mixed circles with non-Jewish people is another. Having mixed friendship circles (karma arkadaş grupları) is considered to be a new phenomenon that grew gradually in the last 10-15 years. It is certainly not frowned upon, on the contrary is considered to be possessed with “healing” powers. “Mixed friend groups are like tree planting in a landslide site”<sup>217</sup> said Yusuf pointing out the positive impact of socially opening up to the “general public” to undo the damages accrued or potential damages that might accrue in the future by landslides. If we read his account conversely, there is

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<sup>216</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “Evde hissetmek, o ülkede yaşarken başkaları tarafından ayırt edilmeyecek hissi...”

<sup>217</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Karma arkadaş grupları; heyelanlı bölgeye ağaç dikmek gibi...”



an indication of a strong potential for huge disaster. Again, the bubble is presented as a safe haven for a dangerous situation as it's embedded in his line of thought.

People matter. One's family and some certain friends may as well be one's very own bubble. Home might be your family.<sup>218</sup> "The state and the majority make me feel (like minority). But am I feeling it in everyday life? I have my own job, I am mostly with my Jewish friend, so I cannot say I am experiencing face to face. I do not feel because I am doing only certain things in only certain places"<sup>219</sup>, says Ser as he explains how people matter for his avoidance of the distasteful minority feeling. Aside from the avoidance of minority feeling, one's family may grant a sense of peace<sup>220</sup> as well that one seeks in his imagination of home. Friends may as well be a person's bubble. It only depends on the individual's perception of home and around what/who it is constructed. For Etel, it is exactly the case with the addition of the town factor.<sup>221</sup> It is the existence of her friends, and her friends being in Nişantaşı that makes her feel comfortable enough to freely wander around in and with people.

Further in her interview, she pointed out, very bluntly, that bubble is not necessarily a space that is free from class-specific segmentation. On the contrary, as Etel proves, people tend to feel more comfortable amongst those they're "similar" to in a class-specific sense.<sup>222</sup>

the place I feel (comfortable) is Nişantaşı and the places like Nişantaşı which well-educated people are living in. I only feel comfortable when I'm with people like myself. People that are like me; not necessarily that look like me but who are capable to speak the same language, have a similar education level maybe. Maybe not a similar education level but that has the same opinions, same vision. Adopted a similar look for future.

As a refreshing response to what she says, another respondent, Rejin said at one

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<sup>218</sup>From personal interview with Ser: "Eviniz ailenizdir. Cemaat belki evi koruyan bodyguard olabilir."

<sup>219</sup>From personal interview with Ser: "Devlet ve çoğunluk hissettiriyor. Bunu açıkladım zaten; ama, günlük hayatımda çok hissediyor muyum? Kendi işim var, Genelde Yahudi arkadaşlarımıyla, birebir çok hissettiğimi söyleyemem. Belirli yerlerde yaşayıp belirli şeyler yaptığım için hissetmiyorum."

<sup>220</sup>From personal interview with Nir: "Evde hissetmek, insan huzurlu olduğu mutlu olduğu para kazandığı ailesi ile birlikte sıkıntısız yaşadığı yer demektir."

<sup>221</sup>From personal interview with Etel: "Nişantaşı'nda oturuyorum. Genelde arkadaşlarım da buralarda oturuyor. O yüzden daha rahat görüşebiliyoruz."

<sup>222</sup>From personal interview with Etel: "Yer Nişantaşı tarafları... O tip insanların yaşadığı yerler. O tip derken daha kültürel seviyesi ve eğitim seviyesi yüksek yaşam yerleri farklı insanların yaşadığı yerler. Ancak, kendim gibi olan insanların yanında kendimi rahat hissettiğim için... Bana benzeyen görünüş açısından değil. Benimle aynı dili konuşabilecek insanlar. Aynı eğitim seviyesi belki. Eğitim olmasa da aynı görüşe sahip, aynı vizyona sahip, geleceğe aynı bakan..."

point in her interview, that she couldn't get along with Jewish people because she finds them "snob".<sup>223</sup> So, acknowledging a general phenomenon of class-related preferences for constructing one's own bubble, still one should question whether or not everyone's definition of "comfort" revolves around same type of people or places. For Rejin, whose most close friends are Muslims, the idea of a comfortable space is nothing similar to that of Etel, still abiding by the class-specific segmentation.

One might thus talk of certain similar characteristics of these individual bubbles, within the light of the ethnographic data. Being secular, belonging to upper middle class and speaking Turkish are the three pillars of all bubbles. It is safe to say that there's no individual bubble without or that challenges these characteristics. The above argued historical transformation supports this condition. It should also be mentioned that all three characteristics brings forward invisibility to the public eye. They assist to become a citizen of low profile, anybody within the general public. Again, the adaptation to all these three characteristics is a consensual act. It should be duly noted that secularization, Turkish becoming mother tongue and becoming upper middle class, are all gradual voluntary acts that occurred naturally. Thus, public invisibility and the concept of bubble go hand in hand whilst analyzing state of Jewish community.

Thus, this bubble is a constructed "space" that is supposedly liberated from unpleasant affects, such as uneasiness, fear, insecurity, and whose boundaries are continuously re-shaped, which makes it hard to grasp even by the respondent him/herself. It both changes from one person to another, but also is continuously rebuilt by the individual him/herself. It may be the case that the "space" where people are free from unpleasant affects coincide with one another, such as friendship, a certain neighborhood, family gathering etc.

Adopting a more sociological perspective to contemplate on, it is also probable to argue that bubble produces the minority discourse itself. In detail, state both legally and socially directs a limited space for the minorities to habituate in. It is a controlled space where the distinctions between the rest of the public is visible. State does not necessarily force minorities to exist only within the boundaries of these spaces but it is

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<sup>223</sup>From personal interview with Rejin: "Ben Yahudilerle galiba anlaşıyorum, daha snobbed oluyorlar."

also obvious that there's a highly strong implicit coercion for minorities to act that way. Within that very space, respondents build their own bubbles. It should not be mistaken though, it is consensual. Respondents willingly choose to stay there and imagine a space of their own within that demarcated area. A possible incentive for them to do so is the fact that, unlike their stance in general public, they have the prerogative to be the subject of that space. They are entitled. Hence, one can even argue a shift in the power relations for the subject that may be the reason for given consent.

On the other hand, just as the duality of majority and minority, the construction of bubbles perpetuates the feeling of being a minority, since it rests upon the existence of a greater space that includes the majority. Therefore; it can also be thought of as a limited space that is not only free from unpleasant affects, but also a limiting space that reminds one of its feelings on being a minority.

For instance, according to Can, Jewish people “surely” cannot experience and live to the fullest their own identity. He contends that they live in certain neighborhoods such as Nişantaşı, Bebek, Levent, Tarabya where economic welfare of the inhabitants are better than most. “They can't live outside of these places”<sup>224</sup> says Can as if they are fish out of water and their gills won't work anymore in a dry environment. He is referring to a capability of living as if it is bounded by certain circumstances that are provided in those towns he mentioned and not existent in others.

One last observation is the absence of other minority groups within anybody's bubbles. Not one single respondent mentioned being close to, friends with or even having acquaintances from other minority groups. It might be a conscious move or not, regardless; it is interesting not to see a minority community to be so exempt from other minority communities socially. Even when mixed friendship groups were being discussed; it was obvious that respondents meant Muslim friends in particular. A possible cause could be that Jewish community is the only minority group that possesses all three characteristics compared to others. No other group can be called secular, upper middle class and having Turkish as their mother tongue. That might have been the deal breaker which caused them to be left outside of individual bubbles.

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<sup>224</sup>From personal interview with Can: “İstanbul'da her semtte tabii ki kendi kimliğini yaşamıyor. Nişantaşı, Bebek, Levent, Tarabya, ekonomik durumu daha iyi olan yerlerde yaşıyor.”

A number of questions can be put forward with regard to what one understands from this concept of the bubble/fanus. Are bubbles some sort of coping mechanisms which assist the respondents to manage the discrimination they may face when they interact with the “general public”? Are bubbles stationary spaces, or rather simply fluid spaces that move with its inhabitants, or particularly move with the respondent him/herself? Or would a single person (e.g. a boyfriend/ girlfriend) consider a bubble? Are there specific characteristics that infringe on the secure space/the bubble/fanus?

### **4.3.3 When Bubble Blows Up...**

The integrity of the affective space is ambivalent. It is, as mentioned above, not rigid. In one moment it is being shaped and strengthened by feelings and in another it is torn, ruptured by affect of the reverses of feelings. In other words, whilst trust, comfort and affection is what determines the boundaries of bubble; distrust, discomfort and hostility works as the counter feelings that erupts that very bubble by constructing the non-bubble space; constructing what they prefer to call “general public”.

For instance, the instant reminder of one’s Jewishness by a friend who one might consider to be close (someone considered to be from the same bubble) might leave a greater impact with his words than a discriminatory state statement. And the respondents seem to remember such events more vividly than other sorts of encounters they experienced in general public. “There is no reason not to experience 6-7 September Events again, if even my friend which I went to his wedding sees/perceives the things in that manner. This kind of situations make you feel your Jewishness”<sup>225</sup>, explains Jojo the despair he felt when he heard some comments made by his friend on the Gaza Attacks happening during that time. He did not mention what he said, it didn’t matter; all that matter was the feeling it ignited in Jojo. The way he constructs his sentence hints us how he already lost hope for the rest of the public. He was astonished when his friend had a similar view with what he would expect from general public and not from a person of his bubble. Similarly, Dorin talks about the feeling of sudden uneasiness surrounded her when she faced with what her close friends acted on social media during heightened tension between Israel and Turkey. “The friends and

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<sup>225</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “Benim düğününe gittiğim arkadaşım bile böyle görüyorsa tek kıvılcımla 6-7 Eylül Olayları’nın yaşanmaması için bir neden yok. Bu oyunu yapmak isterse yapar. Böyle durumlar da Yahudi olduğunu hissettiriyor.”

environment are nice, they are not doing anything special because of your Jewishness but in recent Israel events, my friends from the university started sharing stuff on Jews, something about Hitler. My closer friends... I suddenly feel ill at ease. I have worries on whether I should always be cautious; I should meet people only from the community and not see anyone else socially”.<sup>226</sup>

It is certain then that the impact of an encounter is attached to the perpetrator, to the context, to the location, or in total to it being inside of outside of bubble. There is already a high expectancy of facing the specter of minority out of nowhere, or an instant alienation in “general public”. It is what they experience every day, they got used to it, it is usual. But bubble is another story. It is an alternative reality they carefully built for themselves. It is imaginary but perfectly real. In essence what makes it a desirable space is its potentiality of hope, the expectability of better days. In bubble, they know that they can look for a better future where things would be better whereas in “general public” it is safe to say that most respondents either foster no more hope or has very weak belief that things would change for a better course.

The expectancy of a better future is a very strong incentive to go on. Thus when it is for some reason is erupted, punctured and bursts; the repercussions are severe. The impact lasts longer, they cause a re-construction of the bubble, and they both change their affective space and themselves as well. It is no surprise that during the interviews, those anecdotes that are precisely the ones that shocked the grounds of their bubbles are the ones they feel the urge to tell, without being asked, out of context.

Age might be an important factor as well. When they're little they are more drawn to their protective spaces, bubbles; and as they grow older they realize that the universe is not what they perceive it to be. Selen walks the listener through her thought process, for instance, which helps to depict this realization: “Calling names, pointing fingers, saying “you're Jewish, you're wuss”, being outcasted in school, Capital Levy... Listening to all these, I used to think that I didn't go through what they (my elders) went

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<sup>226</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: “Arkadaşlar çevre güzel herkese sana Musevi'sin diye hiçbir şey yapmıyor ama son dönem İsrail olaylarında bir bakıyorum üniversiteden arkadaşlarım Musevilerle ilgili, Hitler ile ilgili bir şey paylaşıyor. Yakın arkadaşlarım... Bir an tedirgin oluyorum. Kaygılarım oluyor; acaba hep temkinli mi olmam gerekiyor, acaba cemaatten insanlarla mı görüşeyim başka kimse ile görüşmeyeyim.”

through. I used to think that there's no more such discrimination in public. But now, I see that there is something going on under-handed, it is just not explicitly going in our environment.<sup>227</sup> As she grew older she realized that she was in fact living in a bubble; but then again there were instances, apparently, that erupted the harmony of the bubble with something implicit; the specter of minority somehow creeps in.

Being young surely makes a person see things differently. One may not totally get the true intentions behind all acts taken against them at that age; but that does not mean one forgets. Rejin, an 88 years old respondent did not forget what happened to her when she was little<sup>228</sup>. One of her friends, on purpose, got offended by her in the week of her birthday in order not to invite her. Her friend's mother did not want Rejin at her daughter's birthday because she was Jewish. After her birthday, they became friends again. Rejin says she realized the reason much later, she could not understand it at that time. The memory so vivid to her but she later realized that it may have been the first instance where her bubble was blown away; she was shaken by the very person inside of her safe zone. It seems, her time at school continued to be a challenging experience for Rejin, as she makes it clear by sharing a confrontation moment with one of her friends from high school. After more than 70 years, her high school friend told Rejin that they (Rejin and another Jewish student at school) were the ones liked the most at school. It shocked and frustrated Rejin so much that she couldn't hold herself and snapped. Rejin told her off, "I said why you did not say this whereas we were loved that much".<sup>229</sup> She couldn't let it go; she got frustrated even when she retold the story. It was a strike that came within her secure space, her close friend, within her bubble; and that's what made all the difference.

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<sup>227</sup> From personal interview with Selen: "Lakap takma ,parmakla göstermek, Yahudi'sin korkaksın, tekerlemeler okuldayken dışlanmak, Varlık Vergisi, o zaman bunları dinlerken onların yaşadıklarını hiç yaşamadığımı düşünürdüm. Artık toplumda öyle bir ayrımcılık olmadığını düşünürdüm. Ama şimdi bakıyorum ki alttan alta var; sadece o kadar açık şekilde yapılmıyor belki bizim çevremizde."

<sup>228</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: "Çok sevdiğim bir arkadaşımın yaş günü vardı. O hafta benle darıldı, beni davet etmemek için. Annesi istememiş, Yahudi olduğum için. Sonra, bittikten sonra biz yine arkadaş olduk. Sonra farkına vardım niye olduğunu. O zaman anlamamıştım."

<sup>229</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: "Benim bir arkadaşım vardı Yahudi, okulda. Bize dediler ki, 'En çok siz seviliyordunuz.' Dedim ki 'Madem o kadar seviliyorduk neden o zaman söylemediniz?' diye yüzüne vurdum."

#### 4.4 Conclusion

The affective approach to belonging matters. I want to urge the reader to contemplate on the belonging of Jewish community including the previous chapter, Turkishness & Jewishness, via an affective channel. As the interviews are going deeper on the issue of belonging, many interviewees called for their feeling of belonging (*aidiyet hissiyatı*). It is how linguistically formulated in Turkish and lets the respondent to inevitably consider and dig in to their feelings about their belonging. Rather than a judicial or political line of thought, people naturally find themselves investigating their personal stories. Thus, while trying to convey people's told stories, I paid additional attention to focus on belonging within the context of feelings, as the data at hand clearly shows. Thus, it is not a voluntary choice of style or intellectual orientation; but a dictation of the data at hand.

My data was vigorous accounts of daily experiences and affects implemented on their everyday lives. That is precisely why I was drowned to affect in the first place. In order to understand and make sense of the bulk data that was not transmitted by not only words but with attitudes, body language and feelings. So basically I was led to this point by ethnographic data. I was brought face to face with a concept of "feeling minority" when I originally was dealing with "sense of belonging".

Consequently, my aim was to provide a wholesome analysis of the bond between all these phenomena how they interact with and transform each other. They affect and in turn get affected by each other. I started with the specter of minority and bubble because predominantly, all respondents talked of feeling minority and how it changes their lives. As for the bubble, it is a space where they change, feel secure, at ease and peaceful; but still they feel the presence of the specter even within the boundaries of that space. In fact, bubble is the answer to the question "what keeps these people here?" against all the uneasiness and anxiety they experience day to day.

As mentioned above, bubble provides us with a fresh tool. Respondents used bubble in very similar terms with feeling at home. But with a keen look, it provides the scholars with more. Bubble assists us a spatial understanding to imagine belonging

because it provides a collective space to analyze complex and dynamic relationalities in the encounters of life. Thus, it was extremely helpful for me to understand a large bulk of ethnographic data at hand.

Bubble is constantly present in people's lives; however, it is a frequently changing structure and at certain occasions, it erupts and then it is rebuilt into something new. At those moments of eruptions as the respondents say, the presence of "general public" is felt within the bubble territory very vividly.



## CHAPTER V - SILENCE AND MIGRATION AS CULTIVATED PROCESSES

Respondents who encounter the specter of being a minority in Turkey multiple times in a day may draw an affective space, her/ his bubble to avoid the bodily and emotional repercussions of those encounters. Within the light of those observations and resulting interpretations of those data, I come across two important mechanism/pattern which I call the case of *'silence'* and *'migration'*. While both mechanisms function within the bubbles, they have been historically cultivated. In the previous chapter, I discuss how respondents somehow chose a silent behavior, silent move or even chose not to move at all at some instances. This chapter will thus pay a closer look at silence, as a phenomenon which is learned and constantly repeated. And also migration silently moves in the lives of Jewish people. As an another both historical and recent phenomenon, migration will be analyzed as “an individual choice”, “a second plan “or “a possibility” in relation to specter of minority status, bubble and silence.

### 5.1 Silence

Silence is cultivated; it is learned from the past, from the memories of elders in the family, from friends, from past encounters. Silence is imbued; it cannot be abandoned consciously. The mechanism of silence is historical in the sense that it is a cumulative mechanism which grows by the practice of each new additional individual of the community. The practice does not end with the passing of an individual; it is inherited by new generations via family traditions, old habits and embedded behaviors. Thus the first section will be on how this transfer occurs. There are also ideas of silence that might have unknown roots, probably a result of affective transmission, one may not be aware of where these ideas came from but nevertheless are in play.

Bubble provided respondents a secure space to exist. But it is also noted that this space may also experience eruptions, it may blow away. Thus, even within the bubble the mechanism of silence prospers. The bubble itself assists the cultivation of silence as a mechanism.

### 5.1.1 Cultivated Silence

How does silence develop within a conversation? It is observed as the pattern of choosing not to talk of certain issues. Even though the respondent knows the issue, is aware of the situation, he/she prefers not to further the discussion with a response and interrupts the interview with an odd response. This practice of avoiding certain issues repetitively, or choosing to behave in a specific evasive way and securing a passive, inertial manner, is a cultivated act, inherited by historical events and/or family. These habits are not necessarily passed on as cautionary advices told by the elders, or warnings constantly repeated to the child until it is certain that he learned; but rather in a variety of channels such as cautions, as inside jokes, as written memories or as oral tales.

Being raised in a house where politics was not considered a hot topic was for instance a practice within the household of some respondents. Vivet was raised in a closed and isolated environment<sup>230</sup>, as she puts it, which she resents and says that she didn't raise her children in the same way. Jojo was raised in the same manner, and he feels guilty for that. He contends that, "my generation grew up in an apolitical period; it suited us; we took advantage of it I suppose. We became a bit more political with the Gezi Events. What is presented about Kurds would possibly be a lie..."<sup>231</sup> he stops in the middle of the sentence with sigh. The weight of the previous silent practice is easily sensed on his shoulders as he grew into a more politically susceptible adult.

Sometimes the respondents explain how they didn't know about certain tragic events in the history of Turkish Republic until they found out about them themselves. Their parents, on purpose, didn't pass on their historical experience to avoid any potential political discussion that would raise 'unwanted resentments'. Can explains how the events of 6<sup>th</sup> – 7<sup>th</sup> of September were not told by his parents, even though he experienced it firsthand. "I am going to ask now, when I go. Maybe they did not say

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<sup>230</sup> From personal interview with Vivet: "Biz daha kapalı ve izole yetiştirildik; ama, çocuklarımızı böyle yetiştiremedik."

<sup>231</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: "Biraz sorumlu ve suçlu hissediyorum. Epey bir dönem apolitik olarak büyümüş insanlarız, işimize gelmiş. Gezi ile birlikte biraz daha politik olduk. Kürtlerle ilgili yansıtılanların yalan olabileceği..."

intentionally, may be?”<sup>232</sup> asked him, not expecting an answer, wondering the possible responses he would get, imaging the causes of such discretion.

Maya explains the exact same pattern as the above two, in detail this time, mentioning also how her mother constantly warned her, nagging her that “they were not political; they had nothing to do with politics”<sup>233</sup> to avoid something bad happening to them. She, on the other hand, says does not have the fear that her mother has. She does not fear of being incarcerated unlike her mother does just because they are Jewish. Here, Maya declares that she resists adopting the practice of silence and denies inheriting her mother’s fears. She prefers to be political, “extremely political” as she puts it and cannot understand how one cannot be political in this country. Therefore, she criticizes Jewish people too. In particular, the habit of “not touching anything” pushes Maya away from the Jewish community as she explains how this practice of being silent politically irritates her and how she reacts to it. “Let’s not to touch and deal. This makes me annoyed. I thought that I was not a part of this community and I was resisting becoming a part of.”<sup>234</sup> She accused the Jewish community of being low profile for all her life. The term she uses, low profile, and is particularly definitive for the way *silence* works. Lately, she argues the community is trying to come out and become more visible.

Apparently, for her the popularity of figures like Soli Özel and Mario Levi or the opening of *Avlamos*<sup>235</sup>, are all signs of stepping out<sup>236</sup>, becoming active, the community becoming less frightened, which she finds a hopeful development.

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<sup>232</sup> From personal interview with Can: “6-7 Eylül annemin ve babamın birebir yaşadığı olaylar; ama, adını bile anmadılar. Şimdi gidip sorayım. Belki bilinçli olarak söylemediler”

<sup>233</sup> From personal interview with Maya: “Bu kadar politik değildim, ben apolitik yetiştirildim; her ne kadar her gün bizim eve gazete girse de...”, “Apolitik büyüdüm...”, “Apolitik yetiştirildik başımıza bir şey gelmesin, annem hala başımın etini yer hala. ‘Kızım biz politik değiliz kızım bizim politikayla bir ilgimiz yok. Bir de Yahudi’sin cezaevlerine girebiliriz’. Yani korkar. Annemin korkusu bende yok.”

<sup>234</sup> From personal interview with Maya: “Noktada olarak son derece politiğim bu ülkede politik nasıl olunmaz onu da anlamıyorum. Zaten Yahudileri de eleştiriyorum. Zaten açıkçası zaman zaman son derece ‘Aman dokunmayalım, aman şey etmeyelim tavırlarını.’ Bu tavırlar beni Yahudi cemaatinden hep çok uzaklaştırdı. Hayatın içinde ben hep Yahudi cemaatini bu ülkede low profile olmakla suçladım. Aman dokunmayalım aman ilişmeyelim... Bu, beni çok rahatsız eden bir şey. Bu toplumun bir parçası olmadığını düşündüm her zaman, parçası olamaya direndiğini düşündüm.”

<sup>235</sup> *Avlamos* means “to speak” in Judeo-Spanish. It is a web site that publishes articles on attitudes against antisemitism in Turkey. It is founded by some Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals.

<sup>236</sup> From personal interview with Maya: “Türkiye’deki Yahudiler o kadar low profile tuttular ki kendilerini... Daha dışarı açılmaya çalışıyor. Sonra Soli Özel geldi, Mario Levi kitap yazdı. Şimdi Avlamos kuruldu yani daha görünür oldu. Müze kurdu, Yahudi cemaati daha görünür oldu; daha az korkak oldu. Bir adım öne atabildi. Bu da çok mutluluk verici bir şey; çünkü, başka ülkelerde Yahudi toplulukları son derece aktif.”

Regardless of her examples being valid or not, her thought process both validates and rejects the transmission of silence. The habit is being transformed –or in this case is trying to be transformed- to the next generation by the family elders; but she refuses to acknowledge it as her norm denies it and reacts to the Jewish community pushing it onto them, adopting and practicing it.

Maya criticizes the preference to remain as a low profile citizen as a practice of silence. However it is a practice adopted by some as a remedy to stay on guard when one begins to be exposed to the tragic events experienced by Turkish Jews in the past as Yusuf contends. “What’s behind these practices; to prepare yourself for such occurrences. One of the main reasons why Turkish Jews are not grounded to Turkey with their both feet is those stories that happened to them”<sup>237</sup>. That is why he says they don’t buy property, it continued this way until the 1960s. According to him there are still some Jewish people who do have the money but still not choose to buy real estate.<sup>238</sup> So the act of preparing yourself for potential events that may or may not happen in the future, is a sort of general practice for the community at large, reckons Yusuf.

From the perspective of one those elders, who do not prefer to pass on the experience, Rejin explains why she does so. She simply does not want to bother her kids; she does not want to depress them with that<sup>239</sup> when she was talking about the migration of newer generations in Turkey to elsewhere. Their perspective is vital since they are the ones that change the path of the history. They experienced those memories first hand; consequently it was inescapable for them to live without that knowledge.

Vivet similarly, shares that in 1970’s and 1980’s there was a sense of abstention. They were preferring to stay at the background.<sup>240</sup> Her contention is that it is natural for

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<sup>237</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Bu tür şeyleri öğrenmeye başladığın zaman gard alma... Bunun arkasında ne var? Buna kendini hazırlamak... Türk Yahudilerinin genel olarak bir ayağının yere basmaması, bu ülkede... Ana nedenlerinden bir tanesi bu, başlarına gelen hikâyeler...”

<sup>238</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “O yüzden mal mülk almaz Yahudiler. Bu 60’lara kadar devam diyor. Hala parası olup da mülk almayanlar var. Gard alma hikayesi her zaman var. Kendini buna hazırlıyorsun, nasıl davranacağını düşünür hale geliyorsun.

<sup>239</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Göç? Evet, duyduğum kadar oluyor. Çocuklarımla bunu konuşmuyorum. Belki canları sıkılır. Kulaktan duyuyorum.”

<sup>240</sup> From personal interview with Vivet: “70’lerde 80’lerde azınlık olarak çekinme duygusu vardı. Her zaman geri planda kalmayı tercih ederlerdi. Gayrimüslimlere yapılan 6 Eylül var, Varlık Vergisi var. Bunları yaşayan bir insan bizi farklı yetiştirir. Bunları birebir yaşamış insanlar. Dibinde yatan bir korku

people who experienced first-hand the September Events and Capital Levy implementations to raise their kids differently. They have a foundational fear at their hearts which cause them to choose isolated. Accepting the legitimate cause for being raised in such a manner, she chose not to raise their kids that way, not with the culture of fear, thus they were the ones choosing silence in order not to pass silence on to their kids. And that is how silence is being cultivated by each generation, on purpose or not.

Not being exposed to the tragic events experienced in the past such as the 6-7 September Events at home, causes a startling shock to the respondents when they first come across with them. Their bubbles may have been shaken by the discovery of that information. For Rakel, it was the case. She says she was surprised when she read the books of Rıfat Bali and heard that these historical events were sequential. “I was born in 1984 so a lot of time passed after these events. And they are not mentioned in everyday life. But what the family discusses nowadays might be the hostility towards Jews.”<sup>241</sup> Rakel, too, contends that the reason for such discretion is to avoid people being frightened.<sup>242</sup> Not passing on the memories of historical events is an intentional act, Rakel argues. Apparently, being left in the dark is the better choice for being loaded with such tragic experience as far as the elders are concerned. Therefore, the new generations would either not learn about them at all<sup>243</sup> or, hear/read about them elsewhere, much later in life at which point they startle as Rakel did.

In his extensive study on the manifestations and social dynamics of multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity in the post-Ottoman space which focuses on non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and Muslim minorities in the Balkans, Christopher Giesel argues that cultivated silence is one of the vital factors that “shape the scope, intensity and structure of Jewish community’s cultural and religious activities”. According to Giesel (Giesel, 2015, p. 67) what I call the cultivated silence is:

...dependence on the state’s favor, past and present urges to demonstrate their loyalty to the

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var. Onun için izole yaşıyordu.”

<sup>241</sup>From personal interview with Rakel: “Tarihi olaylar: Bali’nın kitaplarını okuyup çok şaşırmıştım, o kadar arka arkaya olduğunu duyunca. 1984 doğumluyum dolayısıyla bahsettiğiniz olayların üzerinden bir zaman geçmişti, gündelik hayatta artık o olaylardan konuşulmuyordu. Ama, ailede bugün konuşulan şey Yahudi düşmanlığı olabilir.”

<sup>242</sup>From personal interview with Rakel: “Bilerek anlatmıyor, insanlar korkmasınlar.”

<sup>243</sup>From personal interview with Sofi: “Zamanla başımıza bir şeyler geldiğini unutuyoruz. Trakya olaylarını unutuyoruz. Yeni jenerasyon bilmiyor bunları.”

state, the fear of hostilities, discrimination and loss of economic status, the eagerness to stay out of the public eye and the corresponding reticence. Within this context, the desire to expand the publicly accessible, ethno-cultural activities is relatively low. This can be attributed to concrete social, political and psychological reasons, but also to the Jews' increasing assimilation into the Turkish mainstream and the emigration of Jewish intellectuals. Most members and official representatives of their community have therefore not taken full advantage of the opportunity to intensify their ethno-cultural and ethno-political activities.

The data gathered mostly verify a strong tendency to stay within the veil of silence. But for the purpose of this study, it is also vital to mention certain instances where the respondents break that pattern and do reach out and attempt. Two of those instances coincided in Gezi Events. It is no surprise that respondents' choice to act different than they usually would during Gezi; since Gezi itself, was a time of irregularity. Can denoted when he joined Gezi movement, he stepped outside of his regular space. What he realized was the true size of the population who felt like a minority<sup>244</sup>, which he couldn't foresee before. It was only through his new encounters during Gezi, he observed that.

Realization of the true nature of the web between different groups, communities and state became possible with Gezi. Especially for young adults, who were intentionally distant from political awareness by their parents. The impact of this realization led to a new understanding of what one is exposed to everyday by media. Jojo's honest account on his realization was striking and depressing<sup>245</sup>:

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<sup>244</sup>From personal interview with Can: "Azınlık hissedenden çok fazla grup olduğunu gösteriyor."

<sup>245</sup>From personal interview with Jojo: "Gezen insanları tanımayı seven biri olduğum için şu an görüyorum ki insanlar hep bir farklılıklar var; ama, birbirimizle bağımız kopuk. Bu bağın kopuk olması gücü ve iktidarı elinde bulunduran insanların işine geliyor. Şimdi yapılmaya çalışılan tekrar bu bağları iyice ayırmak, daha da mümkün olduğunca parçalamak ki daha rahat yönetebilsinler. O zaman nasıl hissediyorum? Hem sorumlu hem suçlu hissediyorum. Bunu yaratmış olarak epey bir dönem apolitik olarak büyümüş insanlarız ailemiz tarafından. Ve bu da işimize gelmiş tabii. Apolitik olunca çok da takmıyorsun kafayı. Daha 'ignorance is bliss' gibi yaşamışız ki öyle olmadığımızı düşünüyorduk. Ama medyanın ne kadar bize yalan söylediği ne kadar taraflı olduğu ve bunun ne kadar yandaş bir şey olduğu. Hiçbir farkı yok hiçbirinin diğerinden, bizim hoşumuza giden de taraflı oda bizi yönlendiriyor. Karşı tarafın tarafını tutan da taraflı, o da yönlendiriyor. Ve biz gerçeği bilmeden takım tutar gibi birbirimize giriyoruz aslında. Bu biraz rahatsız edici o yüzden sorumlu ve suçlu hissettiğim bir yer var. Üzülüyorum; bu topraklar çok renkli ve çok güzel insanlarla dolu, güzel potansiyel var. Ama, bu şeyler yüzünden herkes kapalı kutu kalmış kendi bölgelerinde. Gezi ile birlikte hani biraz daha politik olduk ya; az buçuk da olsa hani hepimiz biraz daha gördük. Yani şu an mesela ben Diyarbakır'da olan Kürtlerle ilgili yapılan bütün gelişmeler orada olanlar hep uzaktan uzaktan ve haberlerin bize yansıttığını görüyorum şimdi. Onların yalan olabileceğini oradaki insanların hedeflerinin ve oradaki farklı farklı insene grupları olduğunu kendi ajandaları olduğu ve kendi bakış açılarını duyurmaya ihtiyaçları olduğunu minimumda. Fazlası da yapmalılar. Ama bilmiyoruz, yani doğuda ne oluyor bilmiyoruz. Karadeniz'de ne oluyor; sadece Güneydoğu değil tamamını bilmiyoruz aslında."

I like to travel a lot and get to meet new people; thus I can easily argue that people are different but the connection between us is lost. This suits well the purpose of those possess the power and incumbency. Now they're trying to get rid of those connections for good in order to manage people more easily. I feel guilty and responsible for that. We've been raised by our parents as apolitical adults who indirectly created that situation. Being apolitical suited us; you don't really get bothered. We've been living (a life of) 'ignorance is bliss' which we thought we definitely did not. The extent of the lies media told us for years, the extent of its partisanship, its partiality... The one (media) that we like is also partial; they're all the same. They all mislead us. Without knowing the truth we're turning against each other like hooligans. That is disturbing. I feel responsible and guilty for that. I am sad for the fact that there are very beautiful people on this land, very good potential. But because of all these, people are drawn to their own corners. With Gezi, we were able to see the real picture relatively more than we used to. For instance, I am seeing all that's been delivered by the media about Diyarbakır, the Kurds in there and what's been going on. I now see that everything could be a lie and the true intention of those people could be the necessity to raise awareness as much as possible to their cause and their personal agendas. They should even do more. We don't know what's going on in the East, in the Black sea region; not only Southeast, we don't know anything.

The embeddedness of silence is, as Jojo contends, was cultivated by his parents which might be a common patterns for some respondents as mentioned previously. One can feel the despair he felt after Gezi when he realized that all the news delivered in the past regarding Diyarbakır and clashes with Kurdish people and the state may as well be a misleading and not cover the true nature of events at all. Gezi, of course plays a critical role in the realization as it did for Can as well.

The importance of Gezi as a turning point in most respondents lives, demands a closer look at the Events in order to try to understand in what ways it changed people's sense of belonging. According to Sherry B. Ortner, Gezi was the success of a resistance movement. She argues that "one can only appreciate the ways in which resistance can be more than opposition, can be truly creative and transformative" (Ortner, 1995, p.191). Michael Hardt takes a similar position and says in an interview that "One of the most important and inspiring aspects of the Gezi encampment was the way it opened the possibility for new political subjectivities and new articulations across the spectrum. Rigid social divisions that previously seemed unbreachable suddenly seemed to dissolve among these together in the square" (Hardt, 2014).

An unusual characteristic of Gezi was the fact that it was not led or headed by some institution or a person. The success of Taksim Dayanismasi –if there is one - was that it guided without managing. It neither undertook a "leadership" position, nor did it assume the responsibility of the masses (Tugal, 2013a & 2013b). Rather Taksim Dayanismasi helped the masses to stay headless but grounded and coherent by

preventing it to divert from the original purpose to specific group oriented ideals. It probably assisted to the multifaceted nature of Gezi and created an optimum environment for the engagement of much diversified groups with each other.

I wrote a paper on Gezi Events questioning how the absence of Jewish community as a collectivity made the individual Jewish participants feel right after the movement. I wanted to see how Jews situated their religious identities within the Gezi process and Turkey's political spectrum. In other words, I wanted to observe how Jewish participation in Gezi events affected the Jewish political subjectivities and Jews' political mobilization. The study revealed that most Jewish participants were not aware of other Jewish community members contribution to Gezi and were shocked when they found out that they were not the only ones in that Park. It was astonishing for them to see "seemingly politically inactive people" to come together and take a stand. There were signs that represent the Jewish community but there were no collective participation of the community. When I asked my interviewees on the relation between their support of and participation in Gezi protests and their Jewish identity they all found the question irrelevant. They all argued that the motivation of their participation was not about their ethno-religious background, their Jewishness but because their unrest with the current political atmosphere in Turkey. They also added that there was no need for collective Jewish participation and they all participated with their both Jewish and non-Jewish friends.

Taking another look at that work after a few years, within the context of the sense of belonging of Jewish community in mind, it could also be seen as a irregularity within the cultivated silence argument. Gezi participation is taking a step out of the shell, making a move towards the other, thus conflicts with their inherited silent nature. Within the perspective of this thesis, one may argue this break from silence could have been the first ignition point of such realization of silence. The protests helped people feel belonged to a collectivity. This warm sense of belonging led them to become more genuinely involved in daily politics by following news more often either through print media or other alternative media mediums.

Overall my study on Gezi showed that the Jewish identity was not a political identity as far as the Jewish people themselves are concerned. None of them considered



the movement as a statement of identity but as a statement of their sincere concern for the prosperity of liberty. Nevertheless, as long as my observations go, there was a massive active contribution from the community both personally resisting on the streets and supporting through social media coverage.

Thus resistance against what they believe in may be conducted individually and not be a choice as a member of a collectivity. A person may resist and take stand individually to protect and preserve his/her prosperity of liberties; although as a member of community he/she remains passive. Maya for instance, may not be an ideal communitarian activist, but she certainly makes a stand individually articulating her position against what she believes to be unfair, discriminative and racist. “I thought that it would be nice to stop prejudice and respond to the discrimination. I wanted to respond because I thought that it was not only about Jews, or about anti-Semitism but it was about racism against all” says Maya describing what she felt after being witness to a racist statement. “Being a righteous person, rather than being nice; being against injustice, standing shoulder to shoulder; struggling against all kinds of injustice and being on this path of justice; in spite of saying that you’re a democratic person and not advocating the rights of Kurdish people; it is not about advocating Artvin Cerrahtepe without advocating the rights of Kurdish people. It is about including everything and everybody as a whole”<sup>246</sup>. Her heroic and idealist stance, surely, is not common; she could be the only one preferring an openly egalitarian and activist account which makes her unique in that sense but still provides perspective of how would silence fail.

Snapshots of withdrawals all come to a point where one “withdraws himself/herself back to his/her shell and switch to a hold mode. You are intimidated to get into any kind of venture, to make an innovation, to be open to advancement of any sort”<sup>247</sup> as Jacques explains his account.

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<sup>246</sup> From personal interview with Maya: “Yani bu ön yargıya ve bu ayrımcılığa bir dur demek, bir cevap vermek, yani haddini bildirmek iyi olur diye düşündüm. Yani, bize karşı Yahudilere karşı yani bunu sadece Yahudilere yapılmış bir şey olarak değil, ırkçı bir tavır sadece antisemitizmden ırkçı bir tavırda olduğunu düşündüğüm için cevap vermek istedim. Doğru bir insan olmak, iyi bir insandan ziyade haksızlıklara karşı durmak, dayanışmak, omuz omuza vermek, her türlü haksızlığa karşı mücadele etmek, bu yolda ilerlemek, demokratım diye geçinip bir grubun haklarını savunup ama Kürtlerin haklarını savunmamak, Artvin'deki Cerrahtepe'yi savunup kürleri görememek değil bütünüyle almak her şeyi bütünüyle kapsamak...”

<sup>247</sup> From personal interview with Jacques: “Günah Keçisi. endişe yaratıyor. Kabuğuna çekilip beklemeye geçiyorsun. Herhangi bir şekilde atak yapmak, yenilik yapmak, gelişime açık olmaktan geri duruyorsun.”

Institution of Cemaat is another pillar that supports the cultivation of silence pattern. Jacques criticizes the way Cemaat behaves, precisely for that reason. He says “We are living in a region where we should act according to the power of majority. They taught us to get along with everyone... Chief Rabbi/community is not a whole with its institutions. Unfortunately, I learnt this later. They have their own budget and when it comes into the issue, there is a conflict of interest. When they adopt a policy, it is not disclosed with the Jewish community; they just enforce it and go with it. It is their tradition. Keep quiet and handle it.”<sup>248</sup> “Keep quiet and handle it” may be a very good statement for the way Cemaat behaves and interacts with the state as a tradition.

In the summer 2014, in late July, when the Israeli attacks on Gaza were increased, there was a confidential community meeting that was held by the Cemaat administrators where they informed the participants on how the institution is taking measures. Around 80 people participated to the meeting one of which was me. It was held a few times in the recent years where something irregular happened such as the Mavi Marmara case. In a conversation, the chairman of the Cemaat explained in detail how Cemaat would act in a moment of crisis. He told that they would immediately issue a very short and extremely clear public statement even before a question of “How would the Turkish Jewish Cemaat act, what would they think?” arises by the public. This statement would not be controversial; but rather inherit a very mainstream statement that would take the potential future heat off the community. And immediately they would withdraw themselves from the public eye, not giving any more public speeches or statements. Thus, they would successfully preempt the emergence of a public discussion on Jewish stance on the issue by issuing it beforehand. The chairman of Cemaat told us in detail that is how they used to do things, and how they were managing the process at that time, as well. This anecdote clearly shows how the institution of Cemaat cultivates silence by adopting it as an official behavior. They are not withdrawing themselves from the public eye totally; because that would only cause an increase of curiosity of the media. Thus, they feed the thirst of the media with a statement even before it is asked to them.

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<sup>248</sup>From personal interview with Jacques: “Çoğunluğun gücüne göre hareket etmek durumunda olan bir bölgede yaşıyoruz. Herkesle iyi geçinmeyi öğrettiler. Cemaat ya da Hahambaşılık kurumlarıyla bir bütün teşkil etmiyor. Maalesef, ben de bunu çok sonra öğrendim. Herbirinin bütçelemesi var, işin içinde, menfaat çatışmaları var. Bir politika belirlendiği zaman da bizlere anlatılmıyor. Sadece uygulanıyor. Çok geleneksel bir politika: Sessiz kal ve işi idare et.”

Community is a vital factor for the creation and sustainability of silence. They do not necessarily be explicit warning, as mentioned, silence is so imbued in the behavior of the community, it is being transferred in an implicit way through conversations of regular nature every day. For instance, when one respondent tries to hold an event of some sort of celebration, a wedding of sorts; Can says, you get told “not to hold it in certain place and rather do it elsewhere”. Such line of thought is being implemented to you, he says. You try to hold a wedding “within the community; people should not see it. The first wedding was done in 2014, I guess.”<sup>249</sup> What he means by “first wedding” is the first wedding whose religious ceremony was held in a private venue instead of a synagogue. So, the general idea is, he contends, that the instinct of hiding is embedded in the Jewish cultural memory.<sup>250</sup> The urge to hold even a celebration comes naturally. Selen argues that it is a racial instinct.<sup>251</sup> Maintaining a low profile, being closed and always blending in is a racial instinct says Selen, surely using the word racial in a very general sense.

Above quotes demonstrate the lack of willingness to be the ones to act. They do not wish to take a step further until they think they have to. Rakel questions such lack of willingness and arrives at an explanation. She contends that people doesn’t want to be the ones that pay the price for being the one who indeed take a step further. Thus lack of willingness to be an active is strongly correlated to the knowledge of the past events. Even a simple act of filing for a lawsuit can easily turn into a battle for civil rights for a Jewish person and people are sick and tired of being the ones struggling in it. The reluctance to be the one that pays the bill, surely, is not ungrounded. The tendency to avert is rooted the question they learned to ask themselves incessantly: “What if something happens? “It is not easy to sue someone because it means a struggle on human rights and our society does not want to pay the bill as they are right. We have already enough. What are things you would do at the cost of your life? They perceive this at this edge. Suzi says, she prays not to have a business with the state.<sup>252</sup> She feels

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<sup>249</sup> From personal interview with Can: “Örneğin bir etkinlik yapmak istiyorsun, orada yapmasan daha iyi olabilir, şöyle şöyle denebiliyor. Böyle bir düşünce yerleşiyor. Düğünü bile kendi içimizde yapalım, insanlar görmesin diye bir şey var. İlk defa 2014’te yapıldı sanırım.”

<sup>250</sup> From personal interview with Can: “Yahudi cemaatinin kültürel hafızasında böyle bir şey var, böyle bir içgüdü var.”

<sup>251</sup> From personal interview with Selen: “Göze batmayalım, kapalı kalalım, uyumlu olalım. Bize zarar gelmesin içgüdü var, ırk olarak.”

<sup>252</sup> From personal interview with Suzi: “Mecbur oluyorum cemaatimden insanlarla konuşmaya. Dua ediyorum ki devletle bir işimiz olmasın.”

she is compelled to talk to people from her own community for this very reason, for the fear of the cost of making new attempts. Suzi is certainly not the only one to wish so. Others<sup>253</sup>, too, try to get into contact with any kind of state institutions which could easily cause distress in case of a new encounter.

However, I think once in a while someone should challenge it. Someone is going to pay this bill. The bill we have already paid may be our silence, being intimidated.”<sup>254</sup> Being passive and choosing to staying that way is the portrayal of the cultivation of silence. The choice wasn’t made easily, for sure, but still Rakel contends that it shouldn’t be their fate. She is bothered by the fact that somehow it leads to a fate of constant settling down for a lesser future. Settling for intimidation is a future, as far as she’s concerned, should be denied. As a remedy of her occupation, she is constantly dealing with the issue of Jewishness, and “not hiding the identity has become a matter of honor for me” added Rakel. She strongly believes that they should struggle for their existence in Turkey. “Hiding would be contradicting me.”<sup>255</sup>

Aside from hiding one’s own identity in the public eye, the way an individual handles his day-to-day business amongst his close circle of friends and families may be affected under the weight of the silence as well. Acquaintances and the way one handles their regular interactions, such as the weekly visits to synagogues or family dinners, all assist to the construction of silence. They are the pillars that help cultivate this pattern. Knowingly or otherwise, it makes no different. Sofi mentions the security measure they run into every single time they visit a synagogue and how it makes Sofi feel. “I feel minority because one could not keep his religious beliefs and traditions at ease and safe. The meaning of being minority is living closed. You are exposed to high security checkpoints every time you are going to a synagogue. It is frightening. You have to do things confidentially when they are concerning community although they are not illegal.

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<sup>253</sup>From personal interview with Jacques: “Resmi dairede, karakolda çok bulaşmadığım sürece kimse sana sorun yaratmıyor.”

<sup>254</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Dava açmaya karar vermek hiç de kolay değil, Türkiye’de bir kimlikle beraber. Çünkü, bir insan hakları mücadelesi demek oluyor. Ve o bedeli ödemek istemiyor bizim toplumumuz, haklı olarak. Ödedik zaten yeteri kadar. Canınız pahasına yapabileceğiniz şeyler nelerdir mesela, öyle bir şey işte. Bunu bu kadar uç bir noktada olarak algılıyor. Ama arada bir denemesi gerektiğini de düşünüyorum. Bu bedeli birileri ödeyecek. Zaten ödediğimiz bedel suskunluk olabilir, sinmişlik olabilir.”

<sup>255</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Sürekli Yahudilik ile uğraştığım için, bunu gizlemem benim için neredeyse bir onur meselesi haline geldi. Yahudi olarak Türkiye’de var olma mücadelesi vermemiz gerektiğine inanıyorum. Gizlemek, kendimle çelişen bir şey olur.”

For example, when you ask for donations...<sup>256</sup> So in general, the idea is that when respondents are practicing their religion, they tend to do it confidentially or do it in a strictly secure fashion where no one outside of their bubble would have the access. It is, again, considered to be the norm, a scary one, but still, a norm of their community, something regular. That is exactly how silence is being cultivated every week, with their visits to the synagogue, with every wedding and/or funeral they attend.

Within the light of the affective context, the reluctance of the respondents to go or be in places where they may be discriminated against is already contemplated on. Those who say that they do break that reluctance and do try also explained how it is risky to encounter certain unpleasant feelings and face certain distasteful experiences. The possibility of other dynamics which are invisible could be questioned at this juncture then, for those who prefer not to take those risks and decide to remain silent. In spite of this silence, they still become a target of hostility, of discrimination. They are still haunted by the specter of being a minority. One other prominent question of this section is, then, why is it so: *Despite the silence, why is the Jewish community still at the point of hostility and discrimination?*

Etel describes one moment in the past when she was in Izmir with two of her friends looking for synagogue and asked for directions to a police officer. The police officer asked them what they will do with a synagogue and whether or not they were Jewish. She replied “Being three girls, we were sacred, and said we’re only curious. We’ve heard about that place and wanted to see”.<sup>257</sup> Why were they scared? Is being in a conversation with a policeman who asks whether or not they’re Jewish an instant of alert where coincidedly all three adopt a preemptive behavior and deny the truth? A remarkable collective but instinctive reaction of the cultivated silence that is at play both individually and collectively.

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<sup>256</sup> From personal interview with Sofi: “Azınlık olduğumu hissediyorum, çünkü kendi ibadetlerini, kendi inançlarını, kendi geleneklerini rahat ve güvenli şekilde idame ettiremiyorlar. Azınlık olmak, kapalı yaşamak demek. Sinagoga giderken bile aşırı güvenlikten geçiyorsun. korkutucu bir şey. Cemaat altında yaptığın şeyleri gizli yapmak zorundasın, illegal bir şey değil ama. Mesela bağış topladın.”

<sup>257</sup> From personal interview with Etel “Bir kere İzmir etkinliğine gitmiştik. Alef’in etkinliğine... Hepimiz belli başlı görevleri vardı. Bize bir tane sinagog ismi söylemişlerdi. Sora sora gidiyoruz üç kız. Bir karakolun oraya geldik. Havrayı biliyor musunuz, dedik. Ne yapacaksınız orayı dedi polis. Musevi misiniz?, dedi. Biz de üç kız olarak korktuk, merak ettik sadece burada öyle bir yer varmış diye. Ama, genelde pek tercih etmem sorulmadıkça söylemeyi. Benimle tanıştığınız zaman ilk başta ben Yahudi’yim demem. Gizlerim. Yani gizlerim derken bunu özellikle saklamam; ama, ifşa da etmem.”

Silence does not necessarily have to be a restrictive feeling; but rather preference for the purpose of peace of mind. For Yusuf, it is a voluntary option not to get involved. He rationalized this passivity by saying that “I like to see the world humorously. It is important to be a happy. I like to ridicule as long as they are not smothering me. What I want is to look at this disturbance in Turkey from a distance as laughing.”<sup>258</sup> Avoidance brings peace. But up to which point, that may differ from person to person. For Yusuf, it was up to the point of smothering; for Sandra it is up to the point of obliteration. According to her, the situation is not dramatic until it comes to the very last draw. “We may say, on the last day that we are devastated. However, I do not see it like that for now; there is time to experience this.”<sup>259</sup> She does not try to change the course of the situation; she does not have a belief for a better future and still does not have any new attempts to even try to make a difference in the course of things. She simply waits as a bystander, as an out stander. They refer to the rising authoritarianism of the state. They don’t want to do anything about it; they don’t urge others to do anything about it. Nevertheless they’re not happy about it either and know that unless something is done it is going to get much worse until the point of their annihilation. It all comes to a sense of peace with a termination date. Not talking about it doesn’t make it go away but certainly helps feel good.<sup>260</sup>

Having said that, one would probably not expect the following sentence would be this: “I cannot say I directly experienced discrimination but I did not force to be amongst circles/places where I might be exposed to discrimination.”<sup>261</sup> Avoiding such circumstances, sometimes may not be possible. Respondents were not always free to choose their circumstances, as in the case of Etel, recalling her anecdote in high school where she felt she needed to defend herself, though she lacked both the strength and knowledge to do so.<sup>262</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Ben olaylara mizahla bakmayı seven bir insanım. Mutlu biri olmak benim için çok önemli. Beni sıkıştırmadığı sürece olaylarla dalga geçmekten zevk alan, Türkiye’deki bu kargaşaya uzaktan bakıp gülebilen... Budur, benim isteğim.”

<sup>259</sup> From personal interview with Sandra: “Ben en en son noktaya gelene kadar çok dramatik görmüyorum bu durumu. En son gün belki diyeceğiz, biz mahvolduk; ama, şu an öyle görmüyorum. Onları yaşamak için daha çok vakit var

<sup>260</sup> From personal interview with Yosef: “Hiçbir şeyden bahsedilmemesi bir şekilde iyi olduğumuzu hissettiriyor bize.”

<sup>261</sup> From personal interview with Raket: “Doğrudan bir ayrımcılık yaşadığımı söyleyemem ama ayrımcılık yaşama ihtimalim olan ortamları zorlamadım.”

<sup>262</sup> From personal interview with Etel: “Onunla savaşıcak bir bilgim ve duygusal gücüm de yoktu.”

The ambivalence Rakel presents might be the nature of bubbles which nurtures silence. Could this thought process may cause the reproduction of silence while criticising it? Would every attempt to break it down, remind that person to stay silent?

During interview Nino shared a memory from his past which he does not wish to “scratch the surface of”. He said “for a period, there was a statement like ‘filthy Jew’... but I do not want to scratch this. This happened in my childhood. I live not to highlight my Jewish identity through all my life.”<sup>263</sup> It is a picture he does not wish to see again, feel the affects again. The next sentence he uses is, thus, about how he kept his identity under disguise. It reminded immediately of the veil he laid on him, that kept him out of new ventures.

Another instance would be the efforts of not showing one’s own true colors. In other words, respondents sometimes say that they intentionally behave in certain ways which would be impossible to argue for or against a certain view. Particularly, when they’re in a public situation and discussing Israel’s actions, they tend to present their stance as the middle man; they both run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.<sup>264</sup> An additional instance of taking such intentional ambiguous stance is Nir’s statements regarding Gezi Events. He was originally asked about his feelings regarding the scapegoating of Jewish community for both Gezi Events and Soma for that matter as most evident recent examples. He preferred to avoid the question and in return only said “they make us sad. I guess, it is a political discourse. It is not said with the intention to mean Jews living here.”<sup>265</sup> One may wonder who they could possibly mean when they accuse Jews of being behind Gezi or Soma tragedies, if not Jews living in Turkey. It seems he didn’t put much thought in it as well; he only successfully diverted the question from disclosing an honest account of his personal reflections for being scapegoat. This was a common theme throughout his interview; in fact, at one point he asked me to stop the recorder when discussing certain issues about the management of synagogues and continued to share them off the record. He was very determined not to make any statement that could be interpreted as critical of the state. Even though he

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<sup>263</sup> From personal interview with Nino: “Bir dönem pis Yahudi. Ama, onları çok kaşımak istemiyorum. Çocukluğumdaydı. Genelde Yahudi kimliğimi öne çıkarmama üzere yaşadım ömrüm boyunca.”

<sup>264</sup> From personal interview with Can: “O siyasi söylemlere gelindiğinde ne şiş yansın ne kebab...”

<sup>265</sup> From personal interview with Nir: “Bizi üzüyor. Ben zannediyorum ki bu politik bir söylemdir. Buradaki Yahudiler için söylenmiş bir şey değildir.”

responded numerous questions about the discriminative policies or scapegoating of Jewish community during the interview, he also said at one point “There is powerful politics in here. But they are not indulging in minorities. As far as I’m concerned, they’re good with minorities.”<sup>266</sup> He continued to use a mainstream tone through his interview, staying within the contours of the veil of silence until such moments of little bursts of.

## 5.2 Migration

The final section of this chapter focuses on migration as a historical as well as current phenomenon and its affective repercussions on the daily lives of respondents. Migration as a current and viable option for most Jewish community members is one of the important aspects of this issue. Precisely the reason why it is so common, demands closer attention.

The existence of the idea of migrating elsewhere digs the very ground that senses of belonging is constructed upon; but somehow for the respondents, it does not negate the other; it is not contradicting. Migration seems to be the elephant in the room; either talked of or not, it continues to affectual impact on the senses of belonging of those in the room. Contradicting or not; what sort of impact might migration as an option have on the senses of belonging? As a grand question, I only try to depict a glimpse on the possible answers of these questions by merely asking the question while acknowledging that an attempt to answer it may as well be a subject matter of another comprehensive analysis.

Migration is perceived as an individual matter and evaluated solely as a personal choice as far as the data is concerned. It is attention grabbing to see that regardless of the widely accepted status of migration as a legitimate life choice, it is still considered to be a personal matter rather than a public or communal matter. There is nearly no discussion on how migration would impact the socio-cultural dynamics of the community or what would it mean for the future of the Jewish community – if any

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<sup>266</sup> From personal interview with Nir: “Burada güçlü bir siyaset var, azınlıklara pek karışmıyorlar. Bildiğim kadarıyla azınlıklarla ilişkileri iyi.”



remains. How many people would remain in Turkey in the following years if the migratory moves continue is a critical question to be asked.

Considering migration as an individual choice can also be contemplated within the context of the bubble, one of the key arguments discussed during this study. People experience migration within the contours of their personal lives as they observe their friends, family members or acquaintances leave for good. It may bother him/her; but not to the point where he/she would carry this feeling to a public/community level and discuss it publicly.

It should be precisely noted that historical and sociological background of migration of Jewish community is certainly not within the scope of this thesis, since it is a profound subject to be studied elsewhere to its lengths. What is under inspection is migration as an affect and its impact on senses of belonging of respondents. As I conducted the interviews one after another, it became obvious that I couldn't oversee the impact of migration on daily live patterns and encounters of respondents as the feelings were so visible and current. As a result of which I decided to take a trip to Israel, and try to have a glimpse of what the perceptions of people who did migrated there from Turkey. Returning back to the question which is repeated continuously throughout the thesis, "what keeps these people here?", I believe migration would add an important layer to the contemplation of this question and it is worth taking a closer look at.

### **5.2.1 Migration as an Ongoing Process**

Although I argued that it is the idea of migration that is on the table, it is also the fact of migration that is a reality in Turkey. Therefore, it would be crucial to briefly look at the historical information on this issue. Since the 19th century, large numbers of Jewish people have migrated from Turkey and the number of Jewish people living in Turkey diminished to 20,000-25,000 people in 2003 (Toktaş, 2006a, p.506) from 130,000 in 1914 (Guttstadt, 2012, p.45). Though there are no data from population census between 1914 and 1927, half of the Jewish population in Turkey left for Palestine, European countries as well as USA, Canada and several Latin American countries as well due to economic, social and political repercussions of many years in wars (Balkan Wars, World War I and Independence War). When the migrant acceptance

regulations of USA became stricter during 1920s, the route of Turkish Jews for migration was diverted to France. Due to its liberal migrant acceptance regulations, it is estimated that around 20,000-30,000 Turkish Jews migrated to France mainly from Istanbul, Izmir and Edirne. Although different source indicate conflicting numbers, Cory Guttstadt maintains that if one considers the fact that 1935 census data says 78,000 Jewish people living in Turkey, the importance of the number of Turkish – Jewish migrants in Turkey can be better understood (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 54).

During the interwar period, under the rule of Republican Party, the migration to Palestine was a mere reflection of “escape from local problems” as Benbassa & Rodrigue explains though there were a small number of religiously conservative Jews who had Zionist pursuit. In the last analysis, out of 80,000 Turkish Jews living in Turkey in 1943, 5,000 left for Palestine. It should be noted that in 1948, Turkish state banned migration to Israel which caused a dramatic fall in the numbers of Jews who left. Some continued to take the risk and pursued illegal means to leave Turkey. With the lift of ban on migration in 1949, the real impact of the establishment of Israel as a sovereign state can be observed by the 30,000 people migrating to Israel in one year. They were mostly lower- middle class young Jews who had no or limited job opportunities in Turkey with no hope to move upwards socially (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2010, p.382-384). Thus, for the remaining Jewish community, Toktaş argues that Zionism as an ideology lost its significance, since they were mainly upper middle class ,financially stable business owners who were content with their state.

After 1949, up until 2001, it is estimated that another 27,000 people left for Israel with fluctuating waves in certain periods.<sup>267</sup> If one takes a closer look at the migration waves, it can be observed that those times that the numbers peaked coincides with certain political conflicts in Turkey. There are no current data on the last 15 years’ migration numbers in the literature. Thus, I contacted the Secretary of Türkiyeliler Derneği in Israel and asked for the data they gathered. As of today, the information I gathered from the Secretary of Türkiyeliler Derneği in Israel shows that 651 number of people migrated to Israel between 2008 – 2014. As Sara Ahmed mentions, these numbers are not merely statistical data but actually refer to human body movements.

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<sup>267</sup> Toktaş provides us with the following data: “A total of 6,871 emigrants arrived in Israel in 1952-1960, 4793 in 1961-64, 9,280 in 1965-71, 3,118 in 1972-79, 2,088 in 1980-89, 1,215 in 1990-2000 and 108 in 2001. The migration figures then decreased greatly.”

She contends that “ research on emotions should embrace the multiple ways emotions work ... this means working with a range of different materials, which we can describe in different ways ( as texts, data, information) (Ahmed, 2004, p.19) Therefore, I prefer to further think what these numbers ‘do’ how they work through and reflect a certain feeling or a certain affect.

### **5.2.2 Migration as a Current Idea**

Imagine moving permanently to a different country in which you would not use your mother tongue is an idea that you constantly encounter in your everyday life. Somebody you know, or even love, considers leaving Turkey for her/his goodness; in the process of leaving, or just left. Leaving or being left behind is a current reality of your life. How would it affect you? What would a life within the context of a migration idea be like? This section will attempt to shed some light on these questions by utilizing the data gathered in the interviews.

Leaving is depicted as a valid option first and foremost. As a current option, migration always being on the table, is an inherent fact for Turkish Jews. Considering to migrate to somewhere else is never observed as an odd option. The odd thing is though, even the ones that openly state their strong and wholehearted belonging to Turkey, come across migration as a daily phenomenon either as a thought going through their friends/acquaintances’ minds, or their own. How is it possible?

Some responses refer to migration as being an issue of class. Some even attempted to draw a class related argument to understand the current migration patterns in Jewish community. Is leaving an individual choice as mentioned above or on the contrary, is it a public matter? If that’s the case, if migration is in fact a public matter for the Jewish community, is it a phenomenon solely about being Jewish or is it a class related fact, more precisely an upper-middle class fact? These are vital questions to keep in mind throughout the section both to understand migration patterns and to see migration as an element inherent to bubble. If one’s bubble falls apart, if one loses social stance, is it possible to build up a whole new bubble or do they simply consider leaving?

First and foremost, the most commonly used causation for migration is leaving for educational purposes or for better work conditions. As a repercussion of globalization<sup>268</sup>, says Selen, all of her friends migrated to another part of the world. She does not mention it with a sigh, or a pause; that would even slightly indicate a weigh of the issue on her heart, because as far as she's concerned it is a rational choice to move towards the 'better'. This move towards the 'better' work/education standards and aspiring for them is naturally more concentrated in young adult members' choices rather than the elderly. One respondent for instance believes that Jewish people are happy with their lives but it is the young people that search for abroad opportunities for future.<sup>269</sup> And from those who go abroad for educational purposes, most prefer to stay in that country. According to Engin, those who choose to go to USA or Canada, mostly have a certain job and education level. And apparently there's a large community in Canada as well, as Engin notes.<sup>270</sup> When it is USA or England for instance, according to Etel, people tend to have financial security to sponsor an education there.<sup>271</sup> But Etel further explains that if one chooses to go to Israel for education it might be because they have relatives living there that would ease their adaptation process, or because the possibilities of financial support government provides, are more common.

In addition to education purposes, financial status is another correlated factor for leaving Turkey. Somehow building a new life in another country breaks certain social barriers that according to the accounts of some respondents, they may feel free to do

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<sup>268</sup> From personal interview with Selen: "Globalleşme, tüm arkadaşlarımı dünyanın farklı yerlerine dağıttı. O anlamda çok ait hissettiğim bir arkadaş grubu da bulamıyorum etrafta. Ailem de dünyanın birçok yerinde."

<sup>269</sup> From personal interview with Nir: "Burada yaşayan Museviler hayatlarından gayet memnun; fakat, gençler geleceğini düşündükleri için yurtdışı arayışları oluyor."

<sup>270</sup> From personal interview with Engin: Specific meslekleri olan insanlar, meslekleri vardır. Adam teklif alır ülkeden gider oraya; ama, genel olarak daha çok Kanada'yı tercih ediyorlar son zamanlarda." –"Göç motivasyonları farklı mı? İsrail'e gidenle Kanada'ya giden?" –"İsrail'e giden hiçbir özelliği olmayan kişi. Genellikle çocukları olup ekonomik olarak daha düşük düzeyde olanlar İsrail'i tercih ediyorlar. Eğitim düzeyi daha yüksek kişiler, daha spesifik meslekleri olan kişiler Kanada'ya gidiyorlar. Kanada yeni çok göç alıyor ama genellikle eğitim düzeyi üniversite mezunu kişileri alıyor, onları tercih ediyor. Kanada'da büyük bir Yahudi toplumu var, cemaati. Başka ülkelerden gidenlerde var Kanada'ya. Başka ülkelerden giden Yahudiler var mesela bir arkadaşımın çocuğu oraya Meksika'dan göç etti."

<sup>271</sup> From personal interview with Etel: "Belli başlı ülkelerde yapmak onlar için daha kolay geliyor veya bir tanıdığı oluyor onun yanına gidiyor. Bu daha çok İsrail oluyor. Onun dışında eş bulmak ve şu anda en fazla olan eğitim için gitmiş, insanların kendini daha iyi bir gelecek gördüğü için kalmaları."... "Görüyorum kendi çevremden eğitimsel olarak gidip kalanlar daha fazla. Tabi bence akrabalık önemli bir etken, İsrail'de akrabası olan fazla insan var. Daha Siyonist görüşe bağlı olup giden insanlarda olabiliyor, daha İsrail'e daha bağlı hissediyorlar Türk olmaktansa. Bütün motivasyonlar farklı tabi. ABD ve İngiltere'ye daha eğitim amaçlı gidiyorlar. Bence daha iyi eğitim, bu daha yüksek ekonomik olarak insanların gideceği ABD daha fazla. İsrail'de hem burs hem de yardım olanakları daha fazla."

certain jobs that they would not have done in Turkey.<sup>272</sup> Apparently, one can be a grocery owner in Israel which is not perceived as an option in Turkey since it conflicts with certain societal convictions Etel states regarding this issue, that, “migration becomes a rational choice, when the economic situation starts to degrade to a point of no return”.<sup>273</sup> Also Engin points out the same fact that people who go to Israel are of “lower economic situation who are not professionals” of a certain job.<sup>274</sup> Surely, what she means by ‘a point of no return’ is not that they become homeless, but their financial capabilities degrade to a point where they cannot afford their previous lifestyle. In conclusion, their bubble becomes unstable since they cannot continue sustaining the mechanisms of their bubble, which in this case is the socioeconomic circumstances pertaining to their bubble. Consequently, a new life plan becomes a necessity. My respondents’ stringent viewpoints on clinging onto the lifestyle of their socioeconomic class in Turkey are interestingly irrelevant for their perception of acceptable jobs and life styles in Israel. So, their bubble which supposedly provides them shelter from the greater society in a way also limits their belonging to this bubble. If they cannot meet certain socioeconomic standards, they posit that they can no longer belong to this bubble and even to Turkey. This explicates how the bubble is a key element of Jewish community’s belonging to Turkey. In this case, it is particularly the socioeconomic characteristics of the bubble that the respondents emphasize.

An interesting reason for leaving was mentioned by Etel. She reckons that the decreasing number of Jewish community causes young people to have difficulties to find each other; to get married.<sup>275</sup> For that reason people prefer to migrate to locations with strong Jewish communities be it either Israel or other countries such as the United States with a big Jewish population. It appears that matrimonial purposes may cause someone to leave Turkey as well. It also shows how meticulous people are being about marriage to a Jewish person and still cross-community marriages might be perceived as

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<sup>272</sup>From personal interview with Etel: “Yeni bir hayat kurmak için göçü tercih ediyorlar; çünkü, burada yapamayacakları işleri, İsrail’e daha çok ekonomik nedenlerle gidildiğini görüyorum ben ekonomisi burada bozulanlar çünkü. Sonuçta sen burada manav olmazsın; ama, orada olursun gibi bir şey var. Burada yapamayacağın işleri orada yapabilirsin.”

<sup>273</sup> From personal interview with Etel: “Göç nasıl rasyonel bir seçenek haline geliyor, ekonomik durum bozulduğunda toparlanamayacak bir dereceye geldiğinde insanlar.”

<sup>274</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “İsrail’e giden o kadar profesyonel değil. Ekonomik durumu iyi olmayan filan...”

<sup>275</sup> From personal interview with Etel: “Özellikle Yahudi eş beklentisi olan insanlar ‘Burada bulamıyorum, o yüzden gitmek istiyorum.’ Orada cemaatler daha fazla olduğu için belli yerlerde tercih ediyorlar, evet. . Onun dışında eş bulmak ve en fazla olan eğitim için gitmiş insanlar...”

marginal. As the rabbi<sup>276</sup> also mentioned they are troubled by the decreasing number of the community which might be the reason for their approach towards marrying someone of their own. Yet, again in this case migration is normalized; it may even be associated with a common rite of passage in the society, such as marriage.

Perceiving migration as a life changing act may also be challenging for some to process. Thus, certain people can handle the idea of migrating as simply “going” somewhere. Rather than using the words ‘migrating for leaving’ which indicates a permanent departure; people may approach to this phenomenon as ‘going’ as it still refers to a hope of coming back. I personally use the word ‘gone’, too, for my friends who migrated. I have been experiencing the same challenges to process emotionally the weight of my friends leaving for good to foreign countries. Etel’s account on the difference of perception of migration across different age groups is an example of such remedy to cope with the emotional weigh<sup>277</sup>:

“I believe there’s a difference of opinion regarding being a Turk. Those of more conservative nature ask ‘why are people gone?’. Elder community members have a specific point view. They argue that they have been living here for so many years and nothing happened. They ask ‘why did you go and leave?’. But other than that, generally my environment thinks positively regarding going. They say ‘it’s good they you’re going. We wish that we could go, too.’ These are young people of course. Seniors say ‘don’t go!’”

In the previous section, while I discussed construction of bubbles as personal imaginary spaces, I mentioned certain feelings like fear, anxiety, an uneasiness that people avoid as particularly important affects. Personal bubbles are being designed not to be exposed to those feelings. But lately, especially in the last few years, respondents argue, these negative feelings in a way creep into the bubbles which result in the public discussion of migration as a valid option. Lack of security causes constant fear<sup>278</sup> that cultivates the stance of migration as a current option. As a solution, they come up with a plan B<sup>279</sup>, a plan for a possible eviction out of Turkey. Some apply for foreign

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<sup>276</sup> Nir: “Göç, devamlı azalıyoruz.”

<sup>277</sup> From personal interview with Etel: “Bence bir görüş farklılığı var Türklüğe bağlı ve buradaki daha muhafazakar insanlar niye gitti diye bakıyor; yaşı daha ileride olan insanlar bunca yıl burada yaşadık bir şey olmuyor siz niye gittiniz niye bıraktınız gibi bakış açıları veya belli bir düzen kurmuş insanların gitme opsiyonları genel olarak... Onun dışında benim çevremde en azından kötü bakılmıyor, gittiniz iyi yaptınız. Keşke biz de gidebilsek, diyen çok fazla insan var benim çevremde. Genç olanlar tabi, yaşı daha büyük insanlar, gitmeyin, diyor.”

<sup>278</sup> From personal interview with Viki: “Gençlerin göçü; emniyette hissetmemeleri, devamlı korku...”

<sup>279</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “Biraz tedirginlik var. Herkes bir B planı yapıyor, gitmek mi

citizenship statutes especially to Portugal and Spain who recently issued legislation that offer citizenship to Jews who are the descendants of Jewish ancestors that were banished in 15<sup>th</sup> century (Şalom, 2015; Valansi, 2015). Surely, the reason to apply may as well be financial or work-related (one may seek to find occupation in Europe, too). But they may apply also because they wanted it as a precaution<sup>280</sup>, as is the case with Selen's aunt who applied for citizenship to Canada.

“In any case, one should not set goals and purposes. As I have said before, what would happen tomorrow is not clear” says Can<sup>281</sup>, with a pessimistic tone, indicating the ambiguous nature of their future in Turkey. They cannot make any long term plans. An extreme account of such uneasiness portrayed by Dorin is an anxiety of being expelled, of being forced to leave. She shares her worries of such possibilities lately and fears they may happen one day.<sup>282</sup> “What would we do?” asks she, without an answer she pauses with a sigh. Thus, it can easily be argued that leaving is not an abstract thought, a possibility amongst million others; but rather a very probable future that they began to contemplate on and discuss.

Leaving is now demonstrated as a viable option as perceived by the community. But how probable is it? To what extent respondents see leaving as something they personally would do when it came down to making a choice? For some, though the situation in Turkey is as ambiguous and disturbing as it is; one may still prefer to stay rather than leaving. Rakel sheds some light to this preference by presenting a cultural argument such that “When you ask a person who experienced big traumas about why he/she would not leave, the answer may be what she/he is going to do there. Language is also so important. The community in Turkey is not a society who knows Hebrew. It is

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gerek? Son 2,3 senedir bunlar konuşuluyor. Herkes B planını düşünmeye başladı. Çocuklarını göndermeye çalışıyor.”

<sup>280</sup> From personal interview with Selen: “Tezmem eniştem Türkiye'nin son zamanlarındaki durumlarından çok kıllandı. Birkaç yıl önce Kanada vatandaşlığına başvurmuştu. Neden kıllandı? Buradaki politik durum özellikle Yahudi Cemaati için iyiye gitmiyor. Ülkenin gidişatından, günlük hayatta da daha modern yaşamak hoşuna gider diye düşünmüştü, o kafada bir adamdır. Kanada vatandaşlığına başvurdu ve Kanada hükümeti onları davet edince gittiler, oraya yerleştiler. Şimdi vatandaşlık almak üzereler orada, bilmiyorum vatandaşlık aldıktan sonra Kanada'da yaşamaya devam ederler mi yoksa dönerler mi bilmiyorum. Ama, teyzemin ilk baştaki düşüncesi, Kanada vatandaşlığını alalım bir cebimize koyalım o pasaportu sonra buraya döneriz; düşüncesiydi.”

<sup>281</sup> From personal interview with Can: “Hiçbir zaman insanın zaten Türkiye gibi bir yerde amaçlar hedefler koymaması lazım. Dediğim gibi, yarın ne olacağı hiç belli olmuyor.”

<sup>282</sup> From personal interview with Dorin: “Son yaşanan dönemdeki olaylardan dolayı biraz kaygılar var. Buradan gitmek zorunda olmak gibi.. ‘Böyle bir şey yaşanır ne olur? Naparız?’ gibi kaygılarım var.”

challenging not to know the language of the country where you arrive. But because it is no easy to leave, it is generally a possibility to think but they stay.”<sup>283</sup> In the absence of a common tongue, one of the most imperative cultural glue of the society, one fails short of adopting his/her new home and not be accepted in return. This is exactly the reason why Dorin’s parents decided to migrate back to Turkey from Israel when her father couldn’t find a job to support his family without Hebrew knowledge. So, just as the idea of migration is on the table, so is the idea of belonging to Turkey on the basis of the Turkish language. As I have argued in my previous chapter, Turkish language is one of the critical aspects of my respondents’ belonging to Turkey and their analysis of Turkishness/Jewishness. Turkish language continues to be an important aspect of their identity in the case of contemplations on the option of migration, which is a critical part of being a Jewish minority in Turkey.

Aside from language, other cultural factors are at play, too according to Engin, such as the difference between Turkish and Israeli traditions. He contends that when people settle in Israel they try to sustain and preserve their cultural patterns but when they cannot get accustomed to the conditions in Israel they come back.<sup>284</sup> He argues that cultural integration is hard and most who come back, they do so out of cultural differences. So what he refers to is the strength of correlation of migration between cultural factors as well as financial ones.

Staying might also be presented as the less complicated option for those do not necessarily suffer from a decreasing financial stance. “I have not seen that someone

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<sup>283</sup> From personal interview with Rakel: “Büyük travmalar yaşamış birinin neden gitmediğini sorarsanız, alacağınız cevaplardan çoğu orda ne iş yapacağıma dayanıyor olabilir. Dil var bir de, çok önemli. İbranice bilen bir toplum değil, Türkiye’deki Yahudi cemaati. Bence düşündürücü bir şey, gittiğin ülkenin dilini bilmemek. Ama, gitmek kolay olmadığı için genelde düşünülür ve oturulur.”

<sup>284</sup> From personal interview with Engin: “Benim bir yakınım, şirkette çalışan bir çocuk vardı, ailesiyle beraber gitmişti. İki tane de çocuğu var. Okulla ilgili bir olay, yani okullara o ücreti ödeyemediler. Dolayısıyla o iki sene orada kaldı. İki senenin sonunda oradaki yaşama alışamadı. Mecburen geri dönüş yaptı. Şimdi burada tutunmaya uğraşiyor yeni bir iş yapıp tutunmaya uğraşiyor. Oradaki şeye alışamadı. Aynı Türk geleneklerine göre yaşama olayı var İsrail’de. İsrail’de binbir ülkeden insan geliyor. Kuzey Avrupa’dan tut, Güney Amerika’ya kadar değişik ülkeden insanlar geliyor ve bu insanlar kendi kültürlerini bir süre devam ettirmek istiyorlar. Oradaki toplumla kaynaşana kadar tek bir kültür oluşana kadar... Dolayısıyla, onlar kendi semtlerinde oturmak isterler, kendi şekillerine göre yaşamak isterler, Türk gibi yaşamak isterler; o şartları ortamı bulamayınca orada. O insan düşüncesi, yapısı, mantalitesi, oradaki şartlar daha ağırdır insanlar biraz daha egoisttirler. Kolay kolay hoşgörülü değiller. Türkiye’de burada alışığız, daha hoşgörülü, daha rahat bir hayat... İnsanlar daha merhametli. O adam o şartları göremeyince çok büyük zorluk çekti. 1, 2 sene dayandı, baktı ki yapacak gibi değil sağlığını kaybetmeye başladı. Geri dönüş yaptı, burada sıfırdan başladı. Ekonomikten ziyade daha çok kültürel...”



who has a job and money to leave. Migration is mentioned too much but there are few people migrating. It is still like that”<sup>285</sup> says Jacques with a critical tone. So leaving may be a more *realistic* option to those with limited financial capabilities. This account, again, reassures the argument of leaving being a very challenging decision to decide on and is relatively more favored by certain circles than others. For a respondent like Jojo, apparently migrating has never been a real option that he had to consider. He states he would only consider it in the case of “discrimination, bad behavior, or if it was a question of his life”.<sup>286</sup> But what is more important here, as it is also in the above examples, is how the respondents perceive talking about migration as a daily practice of the Jewish community’s life in Turkey. Interestingly, migration is talked about together with certain characteristics of their life in Turkey, such as their financial status, their language, their traditions, and opportunities such as education and work. My respondents’ account of migration not only reveals the permanence of this topic to their being, but also reveals what they find or what they believe other Jewish people find important in their life. In a way, once I scrutinize my respondents’ viewpoints on migration, I once again find out about the arguments I presented in my previous chapter on Turkishness/Jewishness and also my arguments on the affects associated with being a minority discussed above in this chapter. My respondents are aware of the traits of their bubble and the feelings associated with being a minority. When asked a simple question on migration, all of these points once again come up. Migration therefore becomes the magnet topic that gathers all of my arguments on Jewishness/Turkishness and on the affects about being a minority in Turkey.

One point raised in Jewishness/Turkishness chapter was against all odds, respondents’ attachment to their land, to Turkey. Considering everything they, in person, or as a community experienced, it was interesting to observe how passionate they were about living here. One aspect of it is explained by Rejin by pointing out to the difficulty of actually migrating elsewhere.<sup>287</sup> One might argue that the reason it is “too difficult” to move is the reflection of their sense of belonging. It might be so strong that

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<sup>285</sup>From personal interview with Jacques: “Burada işi gücü yerinde olan, para kazanan kimse yerinden sallandığını görmedim. Göç, çok konuşulur ama göç eden azdır. Bugün de böyle.”

<sup>286</sup> From personal interview with Jojo: “Kolay bir şey değil. Geçmişin burada, arkadaşların burada, kaçınılmaz olursa giderim. Ayrımcılık kötü davranış. Hayatım söz konusu ise arada göç etmeyi düşündüm, çok ciddi değil ama tiyatro için. Buradan kurtulmak için gitmeliyim diye çok düşünmedim.”

<sup>287</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Korkuyorlar, belli bir şey olduğu zaman. Yahudilere karşı bir şey olduğu zaman ‘Gidelim.’ diyorlar. Daha rahat edeceklerini zannediyorlar. Kolay mı yerinden çıkmak? Bazen mecburiyet oluyor.”

even though they left at one point, they may come back to Turkey like Maya did. She says, “Everyone is worried but I do not even think about it... But I returned. I want to be here, I preferred to be here. It is not an obligation. I am here because I want it. It is not about that I do not have another choice. Migration is not current as those days. Because of that I am not in contact with the Jewish community, I am not observing their worries. I would migrate if and only if my survival is in danger. We are not in the point for migration, I guess but I can guess that they are worried.”<sup>288</sup> She preferred not to stay in England after she completed her master’s studies unlike most other respondents’ accounts. Again, another account on waiting for the doomsday of Jewish community appears as the only justification for leaving Turkey. When such a day would come, or what signs would indicate of doomsday; one may not know since it would change individually. Even though there’s not much hope for a better future; or even a strong belief for a probable decay of conditions, it is still not an option: “I do not think that it would go better but I do not think to leave/go out of this country” as Sandra says, the decision to leave obviously prerequisites more than what she’s been telling throughout her interview.<sup>289</sup>

Parents’ decisions matter. If their parents didn’t leave at some point in their lives, that apparently is an indication for their children to stay as well. Or the fact that their parents weren’t bothered enough to leave; somehow eases the current difficulties they experience today. “My mother preferred to stay here. I do not also feel uncomfortable to stay here” says Yosef.<sup>290</sup> She feels exactly how her parents felt in the back, supposing what she experiences may be equal to what her parents did.

Parents may also be in contention to omit such topics on migration within

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<sup>288</sup>From personal interview with Maya: “Bu durumda herkes çok endişeli; ama, aklımın bir an ucundan bile geçirmiyorum. Ama geri geldim, burada olmak istiyorum, burada olmak istiyorum. Burada olmak seçimim, mecburiyetim değil başka çarem olmadığı için burada değilim istediğim için buradayım. O güne göre göç, çok güncel bir mesele değil. Ama, Yahudi cemaati ile iletişim içinde olmadığım için endişelerine, Yahudi cemaatinin endişelerine çok şey değilim, tanıklık etmiş değilim. Ben ancak hayati tehlike olduğunda, dayandığı zaman göç ederim. Kendim, ailem göç noktasına henüz gelmedik galiba; ama, endişelendiklerini tahmin edebiliyorum.”

<sup>289</sup>From personal interview with Sandra: “Çok iyi bir yere gideceğini düşünmüyorum; ama, bu ülkeden de pek gitmeyi düşünmüyorum.”

<sup>290</sup>From personal interview with Yosef: “Benim anneler burada kalmayı tercih etmiş. Ben de şu an burada kalmış olmamdan dolayı rahatsızlık hissetmiyorum.”

conversation with their children with the intention not to bother/annoy them<sup>291</sup>. The respondent mentioned this is a 88 year old woman. It should be noted that though she is an elderly woman who has little social ties with the community relative to a young adult; but still she is informed by her neighbors or other acquaintances about the migrating Jewish population out of Turkey. Thus she tries to secure her children who are over 60, from depressing news.

### 5.2.3 Migration as “Joke”

Trying to omit migration from conversations, not talking about is not enough to keep it out of daily language. It finds its way out. Because leaving the life one built through all her/his life is a serious matter. It should not be taken lightly. But the possibility of doing so, surprisingly comes up as a joke in conversations. It may not necessarily mean that respondents making joke about leaving, are taking migration lightly; but it surely mean something. Joking about it either makes the idea of leaving tolerable, an initial attempt to introduce it as an option; or it may reveal a tragic side of the affect that is transmitted to the respondent. The idea of leaving may creep into one’s thought process through the ease of a joke. It somehow decreases the burden of the reality of migration and makes it easier to quickly come and leave a conversation. It lifts up the gloomy veil of the matter. Joking about it may also be seen as an act of resistance their current reality. One may even go further and say that this expression, joking about migration may be fed by the irony that is fostered in cultural characteristic of this region. Multiple cultural and sociological explanations may be argued for the practice of humor, all of which could be in effect at this juncture.

Yusuf, for instance, offers a historical argument that says joking about migration is passed on to us by our grandfathers. “It is circulating around us as a humor; where are we going to go when something happens tomorrow? This is, what I have just said before, that little handicap, is right under everybody’s cerebellum. The thing that passed onto us from our grandfathers is warning us. This warning makes us come up with these kinds of jokes.”<sup>292</sup> Noting that I certainly don’t think these jokes are humors,

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<sup>291</sup> From personal interview with Rejin: “Göç? Evet, duyduğum kadar oluyor. Çocuklarımla bunu konuşmuyorum. Belki canları sıkılır. Kulaktan duyuyorum.”

<sup>292</sup> From personal interview with Yusuf: “Espri olarak bile aramızda geçer; yarın öbür gün bir şey olduğunda nereye gideceğiz? Bu bile herkesin beyniçğinin altında. Demin söylediğim o küçük

I, too perceive it as a defense mechanism. I have been witness to multiple occasions where my friends joked about becoming a babysitter or selling stuffed peppers, borekitas or boyikoz (pastry that is closely tied to Jewish cuisine culture) in Israel if they had to move there. Thus, Yusuf's account is on point as far as my experiences go, as well. Selen, for example mentioned the possibility of selling boreks if they migrated to Israel as a joke. She said that "it turned into a joke in the society. We also go soon, what are we going to do? We sell börek. It started to be an issue of joke. We may become tailor/dressmaker..."<sup>293</sup>

Although it appears to be ubiquitous as a discourse, migration without a doubt is not a joke when we look at the historical information and current statistics. Historically, the number of Jewish people in Turkey has diminished enormously particularly with the establishment of the sovereign state of Israel. Thus, I can easily argue that from a historical point of view, migration is entrenched in the identity of this community. The idea comes naturally; it is a reality of their heritage.

It is easily observable from each interview that either an friend or a family member of the respondents has left. If we consider the relationship of the community as a network, it is plausible to argue that a considerable amount of the nodes of this network is not in Turkey. Hence, it is a transnational network. Perceiving it as such, I decided to travel to Israel and get in touch with the "transnational" side of this community, get their stories on their migration choice and how their senses of belonging pre and post-migration got impacted by this life changing step.

#### **5.2.4 Migration via the Migrated**

When I travelled to Israel and get the accounts of those who chose to leave, on their senses of belonging, my aim was not to contemplate on the meaning of migration or the socioeconomic data on those who migrated. Instead, I will be focusing on the belonging perceptions of those who migrated both pre and post their decision to leave. I tried to understand how their lives were in Turkey and what 'leaving' meant for them.

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handikap... Dedelerimizden bize geçen durum bizi uyarıyor. Bu uyarı da sana böyle espriler yaptırıyor."  
<sup>293</sup> From personal interview with Selen: "Göç bir şakaya dönüştü artık toplumda. Biz de gideriz yakında, ne yaparız ? Börek satarız. Böyle bir espri konusu olmaya başladı biraz. Belki terzi oluruz."

Out of 7 people I interviewed, 2 of them spend at least 3 months of the year in Turkey (they migrated to Israel 30 years ago). Another two went to Israel for educational purposes; one has close business relations with Turkey which causes him to travel back and forth a lot. One respondent has left Turkey since he felt he did not belong here ideologically and religiously. In addition to those, I interviewed someone in close contact with those who migrates from Turkey and assists them with their first settlement affairs and has been living in Israel for 50 years. And the last one is someone in her early 60's who left Turkey in mid 1960s. My intention was to gather information on migration because I believe migration data itself tells us something. I believe this data could be particularly explanatory to better understand a community of 18,000.

Again, I should point out that migration is not the center point of this analysis; however, it is vital to understand a community's sense of belonging that lost 651 people between 2008-2014 to Israel, according to the information I gathered from the *Secretariat of Türkiyeliler Derneği* in Israel. If I remind what Sara Ahmed says about emotions decrypted by statistical data, within the context of this thesis, I believe statistical data on migration of Turkish Jewish community members offers a way to better understand how these people feel.

All of my findings regarding the existence of imaginary protective shield of bubbles and cultivation of silence as a habitual pattern were supported by the accounts provided by the interviews I conducted in Israel. Thus, their accounts assisted me to better contemplate on bubble and silence. They all mentioned how free and more secure they felt in Israel. I will get in detail about the bubbles they realized they were living in Turkey and about the newly found secure and enlarged public area they could exist in now.

It is also important to note their general disposition I observed during the interviews. All of them were noticeably more outspoken relative to those I interviewed in Turkey. This point will be discussed below at length as well. Unlike the predispositions of respondents in Turkey, they were more precise presenting their arguments. Even though I didn't ask any questions regarding my arguments on bubble, cultivated silence and specter of minority status, they started to talk of how contracted their lives were in Turkey as if they were living in a bubble. They also mentioned how

being minority followed them around every day and the felt necessity to hide their identities. These points assisted me to better understand the dispositions of those I interviewed in Turkey, too. Having an outside experience, assisted me to realize the withdrawal of language, of body and of speech I encountered in every interview conducted in Turkey.

Migration is an integral part of the identity at hand whether that person lives in Turkey or elsewhere. It became obvious with interviews I conducted both in Turkey and in Israel. The only difference between them was the latter ones were not mere abstract thoughts or jokes; they are actualized life decisions. Having left is a part of their history now.

Migration is embedded in the everyday lives of the Jewish community. It is a regular, a habitual part of their existence. Just as migration is a general trend when we look at the historical data, it is a “trendy” topic in daily conversations, too. When a respondent may open up about their thoughts about leaving, for instance, they may very well see that their friends are thinking about it as well. It accelerates the pace of thought process and makes it somehow a more tolerable thought, an easy transformation as in the case of Moni & İvet couple who left Turkey in 1979.<sup>294</sup> They were a married couple with a little baby when they left Turkey. They recall the time they left as “a few months later than Abdi İpekçi assassination”. Their motivation, according to Moni was the will not to raise a kid in that environment. When they realized that their friends also considered the same option, it validated their choice, it exacerbated it. Their family and friends were saddened by the news but still no one wanted to stop them. İvet tells their family’s position by saying that “they didn’t want to hold us. They thought we might have regrets if we stayed; they didn’t want to be the ones to cause such regrets thus they didn’t stop us from going”.<sup>295</sup> It is interesting to listen to İvet telling about their family’s opinions. Even at those troubled times –late 1970s-, they still considered leaving as an individual matter and not a step taken against political and sociological troubling events. Furthermore, it is an actual event for many, who have migrated and for many others

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<sup>294</sup> From personal interview with Moni: “Katalizör olan tanıdıklarımız arasında aynı şeyi düşünenler de vardı. Onların da bu kararı almış olmaları bizim de bu kararı almamızı kolaylaştırdı diyebilirim. Gideceğiz diye çok negatif bir tepki almadık. Bu kararı verdiğimizde bir daha dönmeyeceğiz diye de gitmedik.”

<sup>295</sup> From personal interview with İvet: “Yakın çevremiz çok üzüldü; ama, bize mani olmak istemediler. İleri de burada kalırlarsa pişman olurlar. Biz onlara engel olmayalım gibisinden”.

whose relatives and friends have migrated. When I spoke with the migrants in Israel, I once again encountered this phenomenon. Migration was not a surprising turn of events or an unusual aspect of their lives. Instead, my interviewees normalized their decision by referring to how they perceived migration when they were a child, or how it is perceived by their family and friends. On the other hand, it should be noted that migration is not a decision taken lightly. For Momo, a doctorate student, it was lifelong dream. He says that “I always dreamt about the realization of my childhood dreams and relaxation. I did it. I even felt empty when my dream became real. Then, I started to think about what I want to do next”.<sup>296</sup> Momo’s case may be an extreme one but, for a Turkish Jewish person living in Turkey; it still tells a lot about migrating out of Turkey. It is how further a citizen may feel detached from the society and foster the ideal of leaving in. It should be noted, however, that he discloses the fact that his brother also lived in Israel and that he was raised in an extremely “blue & white” household.<sup>297</sup> Momo felt at ease and content when he found out most of his friends he knew from Ada or school turned out to be in Israel.

The immigrants’ points of view on migration offer insights on the perception of migration via the Jewish community living in Turkey. In some cases, the decision to leave was met with positive reflections and was supported; and in a few, the decision to leave was handled less enthusiastically. The reflections İdil got from her circle of friends were positive when she pitched her idea of migrating to Israel. Her mother even supported her decision and said “You should go, of course”.<sup>298</sup> On the top of not receiving any negative response, she learnt that other people considered moving as well. For İdil, choosing to live in Israel is not out of the ordinary since she has been frequently visiting Israel when she was little. Thus, it is not a step taken to the unknown. She decided to leave after Gezi Events and applied for graduate studies in Israel. Only

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<sup>296</sup> From personal interview with Momo: “Çocukluk hayallerimin gerçekleşmesi, rahatlama... Hep bunu hayal ettim. Bunu yaptım. Hatta gelince bir boşluğa düştüm, bu hayalim olunca. Ben şimdi ne yapmak istiyorum diye düşünmeye başladım hatta sonra.”

<sup>297</sup> From personal interview with Momo: “Ağabeyim buradaydı zaten. Bizim evde de çok yoğun mavi beyaz bir ortamda büyüdük! Birçok eskiden tanıdığım arkadaşım bir baktı buradalar; adadan, okuldan eski kız arkadaşım.”

<sup>298</sup> From personal interview with İdil: “Tek bir sebebi yok aklımda, hep olan bir şeydi. Çünkü, buraya çok küçükken gelirdim. Kim gördüyse bunu yapmalısın. Negatif bir tepki hiç almadım. Sadece çoğundan ben de geliyorum duydum. Bir arkadaşım göç etmek istiyor Türkiye’den gitmek istiyor. Benim yanıma bakmaya gelecek. Benden 3,4 yaş büyük. Benzer tipleriz. Aileden gelen tepki annem ‘Git tabii ki de.’ Dedi. Kimse durdurmadı. Bir tek anne hala döneceğimi düşünüyor. Burası yada başka bir yer olmasıyla akası yok, oradan gitmiş olmamla alakası var.”

one person believes that she would come back, and that is her grandmother. She says “it’s not about living in Turkey or Israel; it is about leaving where I was.”

Parents tend to support children’s decisions to move to Israel with a motivation of prospects of a ‘better life’. Melisa, a 24 year old Izmir born Turkish Jew, went to Israel for undergraduate studies and decided to settle in Tel Aviv where both of her older sisters lived. Her parents supported her decision both when she went for educational purposes and when she decided to stay. Her father told her that “there was not much future left in Turkey to look forward to. You could always come back here but if you start a life elsewhere it would be good for you”<sup>299</sup>. As a last resort, Turkey is always an option. They tend to leave a small door open when they leave; but it would be a smart choice to build your life elsewhere.

The issue of support matters for the migrated. Melisa also explained that it was easier for her to adapt to Israel because her sisters were there. When asked about Sabbath dinners, she said that the first year she was there, she was alone. She got together with her friends on Friday nights. After 2 years, one of her sisters also settled in Israel. Then, when one more year passed, her other sister came. “We are doing Friday dinners with the family of my boyfriend. Having my sister here made me love here more”<sup>300</sup> said Melisa as she reveals how natural and ordinary it is that people are moving to Israel. She mentions about her sisters’ migrations and migrations of her boyfriends’ family as a mere detail. It astonished me how she didn’t tell more about their choices for migrating or she did not point out to the extraordinary nature of people leaving their homes for good to find a better one.

An account provided by Yoni, 70 years old man working for Turkish families to migrate to Israel as a member of Türkiyeliler Derneği, reveals the motivation of migrating to Israel was a very current idea. He mentioned this idea became a natural

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<sup>299</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: “Anne baba ve yakın çevrem hem okumaya giderken hem de yerleşmeye karar verdiğimde çok destek verdi. Annem ve babam Türkiye’de pek bir gelecek görmüyorlardı. Politik durumlar ve karışıklık. Buraya zaten gelebilirsin, dışarıda da bir hayat başlatırsan senin için çok güzel olur, diyorlardı hep. Çok desteklerlerdi.”

<sup>300</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: “Mesela ilk geldiğim sene ben yalnızdım. Cuma yemeklerini arkadaşlarımla yapardım. Baya beraber Şabat yemeği yapardık. 2 sene sonra 1, ondan 1 sene sonra öbür ablam geldi. Erkek arkadaşımın ailesiyle daha çok yapar olduk. Ablalarımın olması burayı sevmeme daha çok etkisi oldu kesinlikle.”



result of heightened Zionist activities implicitly conducted under the roof of Jewish youth foundation called “*Dernek*”.<sup>301</sup> Thus, although it is not mentioned frequently by respondents either in Turkey or Israel; Zionism may as well be a factor for migration, especially back in mid 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The idea of migration is one way or another, through varying contexts, embedded in the lives of Jewish community; either through ideological tendencies of the families or through the discourse of aspiring for a better future.

While they explained how their lives led to the decision to leave Turkey and settle in Israel; all conversations somehow led to their attachment to Turkishness, to its tongue, to its culture. For a respondent who has been in Israel for a few years now, Turkish still is very much comforting to speak in. “I am speaking Turkish because it is my mother tongue. I feel comfortable when speaking in daily”<sup>302</sup> says Melisa relative to the fact that she is speaking in other languages (English or Hebrew) on a daily basis now. She contends that though she is living in Israel, her future kids will be born here; she would still prefer them to speak Turkish. According to her, it is matter of sustenance of her identity, of her culture as a Turkish Jew.<sup>303</sup>

It is interesting to see even though there are things in Turkey that led them to the decision to leave and never come back again; they still are very much tied to their identity and heritage against all odds. The idea of being “assimilated” is frightening; the thought of extinction of Turkish Jews is not bearable.<sup>304</sup> When I listen to these words

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<sup>301</sup> From personal interview with Yoni: “Ben Türkiye’deyken İstanbul’dayken küçük yaşımdan beri gönüllü faaliyetlerde bulunurdum. Betar: gençlik grubu, Siyonist. Türkiye’de ayağı vardı bunu çocukları bilmez. Türkiye’de bulunan Yahudi cemaatinin büyük kısmı oraya aitti. Ben 15-16’yken onlar 20-21 yaşındaydılar. Betar, Yıldırım filan dedikleri, onun temeli Betar’dan. Asmalımscit’te bir lokal vardı, cemaate ait. Bizim verdiğimiz eğitim daha fazla Siyonist o yüzden bizi sevmeylerdi, oradaki cemaat. Başka türlü şeyler yapardık iyi çocuklar değildik; kötü çocuklardık. Bugün aramızda profesörler var kimler yok. Biz oradan çıktık 63 senesinde Osmanbey’de benzincinin karşısında bir apartman vardı, sonra Yıldız yıldırım sokak orayı lokal yaptı. Biz oraya geçtik. Ben Siyonistim. Ne Amerika ne Kanada... Babam da çok Siyonist’ti ben böyle bir yerde büyüdüm.”

<sup>302</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: “Türkçe konuşuyorum çünkü anadilim. Günlük konuşurken kendimi daha rahat hissediyorum.”

<sup>303</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: “Nereye gidersem gideyim konuştuğum şey Türkçeyse Türk kültürü ile büyümüş. Mesela onu düşünüyordum. İsrail’de yaşayacağım ama çocuklarımla Türkçe konuşmasını ister miyim? Kesinlikle isterim. Ama burada yaşıyor neden konuşsun dersiniz? Kültürümün devamı gibi. Sonuçta ben Türk Yahudi’yim.”

<sup>304</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: “Bu asimile olmaktan korkuyorum. Türk Yahudilerin tükenmesini istemem... Soyun tükenmesi yakın o zaman bunun olmasını istemem.”

from a Turkish Jew who left Turkey; it made me realize, once again, that leaving is certainly not an easy decision. It is not a matter of black and white; but rather is built upon ambiguous feelings; conflicting thoughts, a grey affective space. Migration is not to be taken lightly. Even for someone who desired to leave for so long, defined leaving as a “lifelong dream” there are still affective residues of ties to Turkishness that creep out to the sunlight. Momo, half-heartedly, says Turkish as his mother tongue mentioning though he does not feel particularly proud of that fact. His next sentence, though, is for his daughter to learn Turkish. “Her not being able to speak in Turkish would be misfortunate”.<sup>305</sup> He perceives Turkish as a material surplus for his daughter; a skill that she would use in the future; nothing more. So far in his interview, I didn’t observe or hear any reference or the slightest impression of his attachment to Turkishness or Turkey in general. His whole interview generally went in line with the idea of him accomplishing his greatest desire and being fully proud of himself. Turkey, in this scenario, as may be guessed, is not in the desired position. But in the final section of the interview, he defined himself with three words; Jewish, Israeli and a Fenerbahce fan.<sup>306</sup> What intrigued me was that Fenerbahce is the third word that comes to his mind thinking of himself. Thus, once again, I may argue that migration is not an easy decision even for those who believe it is as their lifelong dream. Even for those, there are still some notions, some memories or some ties lingers that they simply can’t or won’t get rid of.

Those who migrated no longer use Turkish on a daily basis. For some, it has been over 40 years whereas for some, it has been only a few. But most still continues to regard Turkish as their mother tongue.

Out of 6 people I interviewed, only one didn’t speak Turkish as such. But still he conversed me in Turkish, being very fluent only with a slight touch of accent which could be a remnant of over 50 years spent in Israel or could be a characteristic of being multilingual (Turkish – Ladino-Hebrew). He stated that he speaks Ladino when he’s at home; neither Spanish nor Turkish. “This is a tradition. This is the language that our

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<sup>305</sup> From personal interview with Momo: “Ladino konuşuyorum ama konuşmuyorum. Bu topraklarda Türkçe konuşmak bana özel bir haz vermiyor. Özel bir gurur duymuyorum. Kızımın bu dili bilmesini istiyorum çünkü bu evin içine doğdu. Bilmemesi yazık olur.”

<sup>306</sup> From personal interview with Momo: “Yahudi’yim, İsrailiyim, Fenerbahçeliyim.”

mother, father, grandmother spoke. I speak Ladino at home and in here.”<sup>307</sup> He then continued to tell me that they have been staging plays in Ladino at the Culture Club of the association established by the Turkish community in Israel. It is being performed every two weeks for so many years.<sup>308</sup> I was astonished to find out how Ladino still very vividly was used in Israel relative to its disappearance in Turkey. I never expected to see let alone theatre plays in Ladino, but even it is being spoken in households. Since most migrated Turkish Jews mentions the importance of learning Hebrew to belong in Israel, I would have expected to see a dominance of Hebrew rather than Ladino as the household language. He points out to the fact that Ladino is one of the two recognized cultural languages by the state of Israel; one is Ladino and the other is Yiddish.<sup>309</sup> At a later point in his interview he states that Ladino is not necessarily enough to “save the day”<sup>310</sup>. Without the language one cannot make a difference says Yoni, pointing out the vitality of Turkish in Turkey and Hebrew in Israel.

Speaking in another language other than your mother tongue on a daily basis, may overstrain that person. As İdil contends that one may not feel as the same person when she has to speak English whereas her mother tongue is Turkish. Thus according to her, it’s a matter of character. She says that only in time, those differing personalities of different tongues starts to settle down and become one again in one’s mind.<sup>311</sup> She has a somewhat romanticized approach to Turkishness; though with certain reservations. Taking what’s close to her identity from Turkish culture; and leaving the rest, is how she explains her stance towards Turkishness as a cultural heritage. It would be an

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<sup>307</sup>From personal interview with Yoni: “Ben evde İbranice konuşurum ne İspanyolca ne Türkçe. Ladino konuşurum. Gelenek bu. Anamızın, babamızın, büyükannemizin konuştuğu dil evde de konuşurum, burada da konuşurum.”

<sup>308</sup> From personal interview with Yoni: “Derneğin içinde Batyam Kültür Kulübü var. Her sene Ladino oyun sahneye konuluyor. Haftada iki gün bunu yapıyor, gönüllü olarak. aynı zamanda localarda faaliyet görüyor. Tiyatro da Ladino. Bu sene yaptığımız İsrail tiyatrosu. Anne babalar Ladino biliyor, çocuklar İbranice. Oyun iki dilli bu yıl.”

<sup>309</sup> From personal interview with Yoni: “Ladino bir Yahudi dilidir. İsrail’de de tanınmış iki kültür dili var; biri Yidiş, biri Ladino. Tanınmış bunlar.”

<sup>310</sup> From personal interview with Yoni: “İbranice, Ladino, Türkçe meselesi. İbranice bilmiyorlar Ladino günü kurtarmıyor. Dil bilmeden bir yere gelemesin. Toplumla kaynaşamazsın ister Türkiye’de Türkçe, ister İsrail’de İbranice. Dil çok kritik bir noktada.”

<sup>311</sup> From personal interview with İdil: “Bu bir karakter meselesi. 27 yaşındayım ve ilk defa İngilizceyi anadilim olarak konuşmak zorundayım. Türkçe konuşurken olduğum insan değilim İngilizce konuşurken. Türkçe konuşurken kendimim, İngilizce konuşurken başka biriyim. İbranicede bambaşka biriyim. Yavaş yavaş bu üçü oturmaya başlıyor benzemeye başlıyor. Kızdığım zaman filan verdiğim tepkiler hep Türkçe kafamda; ama, yavaş yavaş birleşmeye başladı.”

exaggeration to tell that she tries to sustain Turkish culture in her life but then again she would certainly enjoy preparing “rakı-meze” dinner for her friends.<sup>312</sup>

Carrying Turkish culture, Turkish language with you wherever you go, is thus a personal choice and to what extent one wants to foster that part of his/her identity varies across your willingness to preserve it. For someone who’s been living in Israel less than 10 years, Turkish may start to descend to a secondary position relative to Hebrew; but then again for a couple who left Turkey in 1979 and has been living in Israel ever since, the stance of Turkey as a mother tongue may never be lost. “Hebrew will never replace Turkish”<sup>313</sup> states Moni, explaining even though his primary language for business is Hebrew at work; Turkish will still be his mother tongue. Same goes for his wife, İvet, who states that although it’s been over 35 years living in Israel, she has the utmost love and respect for Istanbul and Turkish people. She has the most beautiful memories and Muslim friends they still are in touch with. She argues she lives Turkishness and Jewishness simultaneously.<sup>314</sup> She is more enthusiastic about being Turkish and her memories towards Turkey and their time in here. No wonder she states that she is still very interested in what happens in Turkey and follows the news. The extent of her affection towards Turkishness peaks when we talk about her sense of belonging<sup>315</sup>:

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<sup>312</sup> From personal interview with İdil: “İstedğim özellikleri alıyorum Türk kültüründen, istemediklerimi bırakıyorum. Beni ben yapan şeyler var mesela. Müzik kesinlikle. Yemek diyemem. Ben Türk kültürünü yaşatmak istiyorum gibi bir şey söyleyemem. Ama, yabancı arkadaşlarımı toplayıp bir rakı meze yapmak mesela...”

<sup>313</sup> From personal interview with Moni:” Türkçe benim için her zaman ana lisan. İbranice hiçbir zaman Türkçenin yerine gelemeyecek. Türkçe seviyesinde olamayacak. Aidiyeti dil bağlamında konuşursak Türkçe benim hala ana lisanım hep. İş hayatında da Türkçe kullandığım oldu. Türk kökenli çalışma arkadaşlarım oldu. Ama esas çalışma dili İbranice. Evde konuşmuyoruz. Çocuklarla hem Türkçe hem İbranice. Eşimle aramızda Türkçe konuşuyoruz ama arada İbranice kelimeler için içine giriyor.”

<sup>314</sup> From personal interview with İvet: “Tam 33 yıl mı? 36 yıl mı? Orada yaşamamıza rağmen çok yakın zamana kadar her şeyden evvel ben kendimi Türk olarak addediyorum . Türkiye’ de doğdum Türkiye’ de büyüdüm. Müslüman arkadaşlarım vardır çok seviştığımız, hala da görüştüğümüz. Ondan sonra tabi Musevi’yim. Türk ve Yahudiliği birlikte yaşarım. İstanbul aşığıyım. Ege’yi çok severim Türk insanları çok severim. Türk eğitimi gördüm Türkiye’ de büyüdüm. Korkunç iyi hatıralarım vardır. Hep iyi şeyler söyleyebilirim. Onun ötesinde bir şey söylememe imkan yok. İlk gittiğimiz senelerde hiçbir şekilde değişmedi,.halen de öyle. Türkiye’ de olan bitenlerle oldukça ilgiliyim. Türkiye beni çok entrese eder.

<sup>315</sup> From personal interview with İvet: “Tabi ki oldu tamamen yabancı olduğum bir yere göç etmek kolay değildir. Mantık farklıdır düşünceler farklıdır, eğitimi farklıdır, lisan çok farklıdır onu öğrenebilme. Aileden kopma sevdiklerinden kopma. Tabi ki endişelerin başında geliyordu. Fakat zamanla buna alışılıyor ama sevgim bitmiyor. Buraya olan sevgim hiçbir zaman bitmedi. Nitekim devamlı senede 2-3 kere buraya gelmeye çalışırız. Çünkü ben kendimi buraya ait gibi hissederim çünkü insanın geçmişi ona bir ait olma imkanı veriyor. Çünkü, bütün geçmişim burada 32 yaşına kadar tüm geçmişim burada geçti. Burada doğdum, burada büyüdüm, burada eğitildim. Burada evlendim, burada çocuğum oldu, burada arkadaşlarım, okulum... Oraya gittiğimizde oldukça büyük bir değişiklik hissettik. İnsanın doğduğu ve büyüdüğü yeri bırakması ve tamamen bilmediği bir yere yerleşmesi kolay bir şey değildir.”

Sure; it is not easy to migrate to somewhere completely foreign to you. Logic is different, thoughts are different, education is different, language is different. Learning the language, separating from your family and your loved ones were at top of my worries. Gradually you get used to it; but your love ( for them) does not go away. My love for here(Turkey) didn't cease to exist. As a matter of fact, we try to visit 2-3 times a year. Because I feel like I belong here, because a person's past gives him/her an opportunity to belong. Because all my past is here, I spent 32 years of my life here. I was born and raised here; got my education here. I got married here; had a child here; my friends are here.

All instances gathered here, clearly shows how Turkishness, independent from their affection towards Turkey, still succeeds to linger in their lives and identities, one way or another.

On an individual level, they foster it either through the practice of language and passing it onto next generation; or through the practice of cultural norms and habits. On a societal level, the Türkiyeliler Derneği is worth mentioning. It is remarkable how they get in touch with the newly migrated families and assist them on their settlement procedures. In addition to that, I was astonished by hearing about their cultural efforts to perpetuate Ladino as a living language and Turkishness as a culture in general. The contact from the Association basically defined the scope and purpose of the association as such: "The state of Israel already assists to the new-comers in finding a job. This association does not help in that area. We have cultural functions. We have Turkish Night gatherings, and have activities to prolong Turkish culture and get people of common Turkish roots together. To live and let Turkey be lived in a small ghetto".<sup>316</sup> It is intriguing how the effort to prolong the language Ladino is so vivid in Israel considering its stance in Turkey. One may thus think further on the affective value of possessions, language in this context; how it varies when one stays or leaves his/her home.

Keeping in mind the difference of quantity of respondents interviewed in Turkey and Israel; I nevertheless sensed a major distinction between two groups. Respondents in Israel, in general, were more comfortable using more precise statements and more outspoken about their reflections to questions. Unlike the silent attitude adopted by most respondents in Turkey I dragged attention to, respondents in Israel used clear and to the point political arguments, critical dispositions about current domestic politics and

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<sup>316</sup> From personal interview with Moni: "İsrail devleti zaten kendi yapıyor. Bu kurumun çok etkinliği yok o konuda. Kültürel faaliyetleri var. Türk gecesi tertiplemek, Türk kültürünü devam ettirmek, Türk kökenleri müşterek zevklerinden bir araya getirmek, Türkiye'yi küçük bir gettoda yaşamak ve yaşatmak..."

society at large. It would be important to note that even though I had different questions for them, they started talking about how they used to live in a bubble in Turkey and in Israel they now experience a larger public sphere that they can exist in. They mentioned that being minority was something they were constantly haunted by before they came to Israel; they felt the necessity to disguise themselves. I always reconciled the feeling of insecurity with the emotions that previously contemplated on previously in this chapter - discomfort, restlessness, fear, anxiety. The interviews I conducted in Israel even though it was a small sample, certainly solidified that thought further.

“In Turkey, you are always under threat. Nobody should know that you are Jewish. Here, you feel more secure”<sup>317</sup> says İdil, point blank, not avoiding any words, using a very strong language. She either had a heightened sensibility towards what’s been said and done in her surrounding environment regarding her identity, or she was more outspoken and precise about the fear she felt. Thus, she disguised her identity. “I heard that ‘you were the Jewish person I love most’. There is this kind of state of mind. There was not anything to me, personally because I did not open myself 100 percent. I was aware of this point of view because these people were always around me”<sup>318</sup> is how she continued her responses. It is obvious how deeply she felt insecure in Turkey. Imagine living always on guard and, imagine trying to be alert about possible threats to you and your identity on a daily basis. It may find you on the street walking, at a friend gathering, or any other daily practice. Even imagining it may exhaust the reader. That is how powerful she tells her emotions about her time in Turkey.

Being haunted by the specter of minority does not necessarily refer to something they experience in their adult lives. They have memories for way back when they were little. Melisa, for example, remembers a conflict in school bus between two students at 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> grade. One of them threw a water bottle to other saying “Filthy Jew”. It is a statement of hatred that no 3<sup>rd</sup> grader could come up with on their own, argues Melisa pointing out that it was a discourse cultivated within his home by his elders. This is a memory that she immediately remembered and started to tell me. It is still haunting her

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<sup>317</sup> From personal interview with İdil: “Türkiye’de sürekli tehdit altındasın; ‘Aman kimse bilmesin Yahudi olduğumu.’ Burada bir yanda daha secure hissediyorsun.

<sup>318</sup> From personal interview with İdil: “Sen benim en sevdiğim Yahudi’sin diye bir şey duydum. Böyle bir mantalite var . Bana karşı bireysel olarak bir şey olmadı; çünkü, benim yüzde yüz bir tarafım olmadı hep ortada. Ama böyle bir bakış açısının farkındaydım; çünkü, bu insanlar hep etrafımdıydı.”

just like a second memory from her time in high school when her classmates wondered whether or not she would donate money to a school wide aid program that aims to help kids in Gaza.<sup>319</sup> The only thing she had to say about that moment was that it was a disturbing one; and she changed the subject.

Aside from childhood memories of being alienated from the society by a word, a look or an attitude may be a daily experience where one may come up with alternative coping or evasive maneuvers –just like the respondents in Turkey did. As a repeating maneuver, Melisa, too, decided to come up with a short and simple explanation for her unusual surname to avoid further interrogation of strangers. “I was a minority in Turkey but when I said my name in public they were thinking that I was foreign because of my surname. Abuaf... ‘Why is it Abuaf?’, ‘Are you not Turkish?’ When you gave your credit cards, they were immediately asking... I said that it was coming from Arabic... I had not realized until now that I kept it as a secret. I did not tell to foreign people that I was Jewish.”<sup>320</sup>

Aside from verbal altercations, some more discrete offenses had been experiences, according to Momo’s account, which may assist to establish a pattern similar to what respondents’ in Turkey disclosed. He mentions a few examples from his circle of friends and family where he witnessed open and outright discrimination towards Jewish people only because they’re Jewish. One example is where a newly employed serviceman who is in charge of serving teas/coffees to the office (çaycı) stopped serving tea to one of his friends who has been working in the same firm for almost 20 years. Another instance is one of his very close friends had to close down his business because his name was fallen into dispute by his opponents in the sector as the person who secretly sends money to Israel. People started to boycott him and he went bankrupt apparently. “Rhetorically some occurrences happened that borderline anti-Semitism. Take Hüseyin Çelik’s statements on Judaism, atheism.. Red lights have

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<sup>319</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: “Bir de lisedeyken; eğitim bakanlığı Gazze deki çocuklara yardım kampanyası düzenlemişti. İsraili ve Yahudi olma farkı yok, olmadığını gördüm. Biz bütün sınıfta 2 Yahudiydik. Bütün sınıf dalga geçti; ‘Bakalım Yahudiler para verecek mi?’ filan diye. Sonra öğretmen konuyu dağıtmaya çalışmıştı şakayla karışık. Rahatsız edici bir durumdu.”

<sup>320</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: “Türkiye deyken azınlıktım ama toplum içinde söylendiğimde hemen soyadımdan dolayı yabancı olduğumu düşünüyorlardı. Abuaf, soyadın neden Abuaf, Türk değil misin? Kredi kartını veriyorsun, hemen soruyorlar. Milli güvelik dersinde oldu bu. Hemen sordular bende onlara Arapçadan geliyor derdim, hee tamam,deyip geçerlerdi. O zaman azınlık olmayla şu ana kadar fark etmemiştim ama gizleyerek bahsetmişim. Yabancılara hiç söylemezdim Yahudi olduğumu.”

started to light up in peoples' minds and Davos was a break point for them."<sup>321</sup> These stories, although not first-hand experiences of my respondent, is a secondary witness articulation of some serious snapshots of specter of minority.

Feeling secure is the key feeling that all respondents point out as the most obvious change in their lives. İdil contends that "A big change happened in the sense of safety. Sensation of being safe... The biggest and the most relaxing thing is being able to walk however you want, to wear whatever you want, to say whatever you want. I do not know if it is about being minority anywhere or being minority in a Muslim country"<sup>322</sup>. If one reads her statement from the opposite side, she felt that she was not free to do all those things in Turkey. It is important to note that, respondents do not necessarily say that they felt they were bounded by certain social restraints; rather they explain that they were the ones restraining themselves for the purpose of self-preservation.

Similarly Melisa realized that practice of silence, not disclosing her Jewishness to others was something she only practiced in Turkey and no longer continued in Israel.<sup>323</sup> If she had not left; she would have continued keeping silent and believing it to be the norm, not realizing that it was tied to living in Turkey as a Jew and her felt sense of insecurity.

According to Momo, keeping silent may seem nonreactive; but in fact it is actually a statement in itself. "One represents something both when he/she remains silent or not. You are not apolitical if you remain silent." He is onto something particularly important at this point as far as I'm concerned. One may believe it to be

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<sup>321</sup> From personal interview with Momo: "Türkiye'de 15-20 yıldır çalıştığı şirkette Yahudi bir kişiye 2 yıllık çaycı çay getirmemeye başladı. Bir adam Yahudi bir adama, sen borcumu silersin ben Gazze'deki çocuklara vereceğim, diye açıklama yapan insanlar var. Bunun yanında çok yakın olarak tanıdığım bir kişi işini kapatmak zorunda kaldı çünkü piyasada adı 'paraları İsrail'e kaçıran kişi' olarak çıktı ve insanlar onu boykot etmeye başladı. Tekstilde de yaşandı bunlar. Retorik olarak antisemitizme kaçan şeyler yaşandı. Hüseyin Çelik 'Ben Yahudiliği, ateizmi tasvip etmiyorum.' diye açıklamaları oldu. İnsanların kırmızı ışıkları yanmaya başladı, onun için Davos önemli bir kırılma oldu."

<sup>322</sup> From personal interview with İdil: "Güvenlikle ilgili acayip bir değişikliklik oldu. Güvenlik hissiyle... İstedğin gibi yürümenin, istediğini giymenin, istediğini söylememenin... Benim için en büyük şey. En rahatlatıcı şey... Ama bunun azınlıkla mı alakası var yoksa Müslüman bir ülkede azınlık olmakla mı alakası var bilemiyorum."

<sup>323</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: "Özellikle Türkiye'deyken böyle davranıyorum zannediyordum. İsrail'deyken Yahudi olmayan kişilere karşı çok rahatım, ne olduğumu söylüyorum. Galiba olduğum yerin buna etkisi var. Türkiye'de azınlık hissediyordum, azınlık olduğumu herkesin gözü önüne koymuyordum. Ama burada, azınlık değilim ve bilmiyorum belki bir etkisi vardır."



otherwise; that if he/she does not take a step forward and say something; he/she would be passive. But instead as Momo points out, it is actually a stance in and of itself. He argues that the mentality of “let’s keep our hands off it; let’s not temper with our comfort”<sup>324</sup> is a political stance as it is. Such mentality is what I argued before by saying that it is gained via a cultivated culture of silence.

Surely, perception of how one understands being free determines their sense of belonging, too. For İdil, one way or another, freedom would come down to being a matter of politics. Thus moving elsewhere is a decision of changing one’s lifestyle. The question on sense of belonging is always meets with a will of changing one’s lifestyle. In detail, they would say financial causes led them to migrate or the fact that they can’t find a job in Turkey. “As far as I’m concerned all these arguments come down to a choice for a different life. Like you’ve been reborn”<sup>325</sup> argues İdil, adopting a more abstract point of view whilst trying to understand how people legitimize their choice of migration. While the reasons for migration is not within the context of this thesis, her argument of freedom being a political matter may tell us her perception of security and her sense of being restrained while she lived in Turkey. Above, I adopted sociological goggles to observe the concept of bubble and argued that state discourses generated a sense of minority. Within the context of what İdil said, then it can be observed how socially she felt contracted within a bubble that she preferred to get out of.

At the section where I discussed sociological look at bubble, as Kastoryano and Neyzi put it, the Jewish community by and large contracted to certain parts of the city after the departure of lower classes in the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century ( Kastoryano, 1992, p. 359; Gül&Kutluata, 2010, p.112). Thus one may question whether this homogeneity of the Jewish community could be the reason why existing lower or lower-middle class Jewish population in Turkey could have difficulties sustaining a life within the community. Yoni has a similar observation of the situation: “They do not have any profession. Selling t-shirts, blouses, and athletes is not a profession. They are coming. Why? What

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<sup>324</sup> From personal interview with Momo: “Sustuğun zamanda Türkiye’ de bir şeyi temsil ediyorsun susmadığın zamanda. Yani konuşmadığında apolitik değilsin, daha çok ‘aman konuşmayalım, rahatımız bozulmasın.’ kafası var.”

<sup>325</sup> From personal interview with İdil: “Zaten özgürlük dediğin şey siyasala vuruyor bir noktada. Bana kalırsa hayat tarzı değişikliği. Ne kadar kendini buraya ait hissediyorsun vs. Bu tarz sorular hep bu geliş sebebi, ortak nokta ve sonra farklılıklar ortaya çıkıyor. İşte bazısı diyecek ki iş bulamıyorum.. bazısı başka bir şey söyleyecek. Ekonomikten de göç eden var. Bana kalırsa bunların hepsi başka hayat yaşıyor burada. Yeni doğmuş gibi. Yeni hayat tarzını da belirliyor.”

do they do? Being a worker... It is needed to do easy work. For Russians, it is different. Doctors come, Professors come. They do cleaning here. After she/he gets the certificate she/he works as doctor. Our people are not doing this. We should rather get these kinds of people, however; they should know that they would have difficulties.”<sup>326</sup>

The question “why don’t these people sell t-shirts on the streets, or works at a grocery store?” is vital at this point. When people decide to move to Israel, they embrace the possibility of having a lesser stance of socio-economic and cultural stance than they did in Turkey. As far as my observations go, the community in Istanbul does not foster an environment in which these people could choose a lesser socio-economic stance. Rather they choose to migrate to Israel. They may prefer to move because they cannot afford to send their kids to private schools in Turkey. Rather than the option of enrolling your kids to a public school; they prefer to leave. Surely, Israel may be seen as an attractive option, too; or simply the cost of sustaining a life in Turkey in line with the prerequisites of one’s socio-economic and cultural class may be too heavy to afford. Thus, the homogenization of the Jewish community is not a mere result of low birth rates but a gradual elimination of lower classes from the public scene as a consequence of their incapability to afford more costly life standards.

When the environment you’re given is left that homogenous, it is inevitable for the number of paths one could choose to follow becomes less. There’s only certain amount of schools one may go to that are already socially approved by the community, or a certain amount of cafés to hang around that would not be considered odd by others. When it is the case, it’s inevitable for a Jewish citizen to feel trapped. The feeling of being trapped was, in fact, a recurring theme in other interviews as well. Melisa mentioned the exact same thing when she described her time in Izmir. She says that she used to feel as if she was living in a framework. “In Izmir, everything was more inflexible. For example, one of these 3 schools was preferred. Then, one of these 3 universities... Specific places to go, specific things to do... When you go slightly out of

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<sup>326</sup> From personal interview with Yoni: “Bunların meslekleri yok. Kumaş, gömlek satmak, atlet satmak meslek değil. Buraya geliyorlar. Niçin? İşçi olmak. Basit iş yapmaları gerekiyor. Ruslarda farklı profesör gelir, doktor gelir, burada temizlik yapar, sertifikasını aldıktan sonra doktorluk yapar. Bizimkiler bunu yapmıyor. Böyle insanları da alacaksın. Ama, burada zorluk çekeceklerini bilecekler, zorluk çekenler bu kısım.”

this framework, all eyes come on you. I feel free in Israel in that sense.”<sup>327</sup> She didn’t accept this sort of previously designed options as possible given ways to choose from. She argues that it is a remedy of the “framework” they live in. Mentioned “framework” may also be considered as a territorial restricted space as may be the case when bubble is concerned. Momo’s concept of “preserved spaces”<sup>328</sup> is an example of such. Some neighborhoods or even streets may be safe havens for Jewish people where he felt himself home in Istanbul.

One instance that vividly shows in what sort of contracted framework she lived in Turkey was the part when she described a less fortunate memory of her first time in a bus in Israel. Apparently she didn’t see the yellow button that she was supposed to push before the stop. Bus driver passed the stop without stopping. When she asked the driver why he didn’t stop, he started yelling at her since she didn’t know that she was supposed to do that. He stopped in the middle of the highway and left her there. As she told me how stressful and frustrated she was when she walked on the side of the highway to the mall she was trying to go to; she mentioned that she wasn’t using public transportation in Turkey anyways. But she also added that Turkish bus drivers wouldn’t have acted this way.<sup>329</sup> One point would be that she assumes a different, a kinder approach from Turkish bus drivers, though she does not use public transportation. A button to push when one wants to get out in the next stop, is probably a conventional wisdom for the most part of the world. And not knowing it would actually be the odd thing, though she assumes otherwise. A second and more important point to be raised is the closeness of her environment in Izmir. As an upper class child, public transportation is not within her sociological bubble. The fact that certain general public venues are omitted in her life proves the contracted nature of her life, of her bubble.

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<sup>327</sup>From personal interview with Melisa: “Türkiye’ de kendimi çerçevenin içinde gibi hissediyordum. İzmir’de her şey daha kalıplaşmış. Mesela bu üç liseden birine gidilir. Sonra bu üç üniversiteden biri filan. Belirli gidilen yerler yapılan şeyler. O karenin dışına biraz çıkınca bütün gözler üstüne çevriliyor. İsrail’de kendimi bu açıdan özgür hissediyorum.”

<sup>328</sup> From personal interview with Momo: “Kurtuluş bölgeleri; okulum falan, Bağdat caddesi, Göztepe, bizim Yahudilerin takıldığı mekanlar.”

<sup>329</sup>From personal interview with Melisa: “Mesela bir kere otobüste sarı düğme var, basman lazım. Ben bilmiyordum. Baktım durakta durmadı Şoföre gittim, neden durmadın diye. Şoför bağırmaya başladı bana, düğmeye basmadın falan falan diye. Sonra durdu ve açtı kapıları otoyolun ortasında ve in o zaman, dedi . Ben de strese girdim indim, ağlamaya başladım. Annemi aradım bu ülkeden nefret ediyorum diye. Otobanda kaldırım bile yok üst geçit yok yürüyorum. Nasıl olduysa vardım avm’ ye bir şekilde. Çok travmatik bir durumdu. Zaten İzmir’de de pek toplu taşımaya binmezdim. Türkiye’ de asla böyle bir tepkiyle karşılaşmazdım. Direkt olarak durumun yüzüme söylenmesi durumuna alışmam aldı.”

Remembering what I've previously discussed as the three pillars of bubble; being secular, speaking Turkish as their native tongue, being amongst middle or upper social classes; the profiles of those migrated to Israel as indicated by Momo, easily supports that argument. According to Momo's observations, "Lately, for the last 7-8 years, what I've observed is people who come here are either considerably religious (*Allah'ın dibine vuruyordu*) or they were extremely secular (*laik*). I used to visit synagogue in Turkey since I was trying not to lose my sense of belonging and to be with the community. But in here, I am the part of the wider public (*geniş toplum*); synagogue lost its functionality. I pray at home, at the university. But there are some friends that used to pursue a secular life in Turkey; became extremely religious in here, not touching the other sex, who grew beard"<sup>330</sup>. After my interview with Momo, this point resonated in my mind, the limited nature of public space for Jewish community in Turkey. Even for a person who calls himself secular, may choose to include synagogues into his life on a regular basis, in order to get in touch with the community members and socialize.

The assumption of Melisa as an upper class child and being exposed to a life exclusive to that class is surely founded by her statements. What she calls standard for a life in Turkey are standards for a certain class. When she first considered Israel as a new place to live in, she honestly says that she looked down on it saying "Is that where I'll go?!", because as far as she was concerned those who decide to migrate to Israel were of lower classes, having financial difficulties supporting a life in Turkey. The most striking comment of her interview was when she mentioned that life standards in Turkey are already very high relative to Israel. "You have very high life standards in Turkey and already have a very good life. The service and other things... Maids and personal chauffeurs at home... In Israel, it doesn't matter how good your financial situation is; it is still very hard to afford a cleaning lady. It is very unusual here; it is standardized in Turkey."<sup>331</sup> Melisa is obviously have a very class-specific point of view;

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<sup>330</sup> From personal interview with Momo: "Gelen çok var son yıllarda, 7-8 yıldır. Son yıllarda gözlemediğim buraya giden ya Allah'ına dine vuruyordun ya da Allah'ına laik. Ben Türkiye'de aidiyetimi kaybetmemek için ve toplumla olabilmek için gidiyordum sinagoga. Geniş toplumun bir parçası olduğum için sinagog işlevini yitirdi. Kendim evde, üniversite'de dua ediyorum. Bazı arkadaşlar da var ki Türkiye'de seküler bir hayat yaşayıp burada karşı cinse dokunmayan, sakal bırakan."

<sup>331</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: "Açıkkçası İsrail'e ilk baktığımda 'Oraya mı gideceğim!' diye bakmıştım. Benim bildiğim Türkiye'den gelenler hep işi kötü gidip gelenler, sosyo-ekonomik seviyesi iyi olmayıp gelenler. Hiç kendi isteği ile daha iyi bir hayat için gelen yok. Çünkü, Türkiye'de de hayat standartları gayet yüksek ve rahat bir hayat yaşıyorsun. Servisi şeyi evde bakıcılar, şoförler. İsrail'de sosyoekonomik düzeyin ne kadar yüksek olursa olsun temizlikçi tutman çok zor çok pahalı. Burada alışılmışın dışında bu şeyler Türkiye'de çok standart."

but, she does have a point where she says that some people consider leaving Turkey for Israel is a step socially taken down. It is sort of a conventional belief amongst the Jewish population in Istanbul, as another respondent, as Momo explains. “The image in Turkey is that we would grovel if we go to Israel. They do not take it as a good example. If they manage the issue of language and education, there is no limit to what they could accomplish on this land (Israel).”<sup>332</sup> There are a lot of people who prefer to go to Israel because they’re bankrupt in Turkey and those people have no ideological motivation to migrate. So, it is a legit argument to state that financial struggles can and sometimes do let people migrate to Israel. An important detail is whether or not they do know Hebrew or not. As Momo puts it, those who prefer to go to Israel after a financial breakdown in Turkey, “Unfortunately, they do not live in that kind of wealth since they could not learn the language.”<sup>333</sup> Language becomes a key point for those who want to bond with their new home. It becomes a necessity if one wants to be considered a ‘regular’, someone who is adapted to Israel rather than a migrant from Turkey who does not understand.

Being reserved to one’s secrecy and adopting silence, again, is a common pattern for the ones that had left Turkey as well. Just like the respondents who still live in Turkey, those who migrated mentioned they preferred to keep their Jewishness secret or were reluctant to disclose it as new information to others. It was even disturbing for some, Melisa, for instance. She didn’t talk about her Jewishness because talking about it, as she puts it was “out of her comfort zone”. “I did not like it. I did not feel comfortable if they were not my close friend. I was hiding the big part of my identity. For example, there was Liga, like Yıldırım in Istanbul. When going there, there was always secrecy. I did not even go much. I did not go because I could not say where I went. Why? I did not feel comfortable. I do not know why, this place was always told in secret. ‘Do not say, do not tell anybody’. I did not like this feeling.”<sup>334</sup> Though she does not fancy the

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<sup>332</sup> From personal interview with Momo: “Türkiye’deki imaj İsrail’e gidersek sürünürüz. Çünkü, iyi bir örnek görmüyorlar. Eğitim konusunu açarlarsa dil konusunu açarlarsa bu topraklarda gelemeyecekleri yer yok.”

<sup>333</sup> From personal interview with Momo: “Düşüş ekonomik olarak var, herkes benim için ideolojik olarak gelmediği için batıp gelen çok insan var. Bu insanlar maalesef burada yüksek seviyede bir hayat yaşamıyorlar, dili de öğrenmedikleri içinde.”

<sup>334</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: “Çünkü, Türkiye deyken Yahudiliğim hakkında konuşmazdım. Comfort zone un dışında bir şeydi Yahudilik hakkında konuşmak bayramlarımızı anmak. Sevmezdim. Kendimi rahat hissetmiyordum, çok yakın arkadaşım değilse. Çok yakın arkadaşım değilse Yahudi olmayan kişilerle Yahudiliği konuşmak beni rahatsız ediyordu. Kimliğimin çok büyük bir kısmını saklıyordum. Mesela Liga vardı, İstanbul’da Yıldırım gibi. Oraya giderken hep bir gizlilik... Çok da

feeling of keeping where she's been secret, still she continues to practice it. It is a necessity. The interesting thing is that reason is not relevant here. The reason for hiding it is not important to investigate. She just follows the practice that has been there before her and passes it forward even though the secrecy bothers her. Looking at the legacy of secrecy from the other side, from the perspective of the one who moved, Momo says "Relaxation, taking of your mask, not bothering what would others think. I am in my own dump yard. I can say whatever I think. These are the kind of freedom I experienced when I moved here".<sup>335</sup> Apparently the lifting of burden of the practiced secrecy was freeing and relaxing and it actually made him feel incarcerated which he realized after he "freed" himself.

Though the practice of hiding visits to Liga may suggest silence is inherent in Melisa's actions as well; her following statements on the current political situation and women's stance in Turkey are anything but silent. She uses an extraverted clear language with specific points raised. She says she is sorry for the situation Turkey is in. She believes Erdoğan and AKP are on the path to dictatorship. She believes that the Erdoğan uses fraud to fix the election results. "Everything is done to cover up something else. Thus I do not believe anything they do. All the lies and games played before the elections..."<sup>336</sup> says she with a sigh. Melisa is utterly outspoken about her thoughts on the incumbent, unlike the profile she illustrated a few minutes earlier talking about reserved feelings.

I always had to consider myself as a secondary person. Men are on the spotlight. There are always fewer executive women and women entrepreneurs in conferences. Here (Israel) the percentage is not fifty-fifty but sill, ratio is much more favorable for women then it is in Turkey. In Turkey, I feel that it is more attention-grabbing to wear

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gitmezdim ve gitmememin büyük bir kısmı da buydu çünkü insanlara söyleyemiyordum nereye gittiğimi. Niye? Rahat hissetmiyordum. Nedense bize orası çok gizli anlatıldı, söylemeyin anlatmayın. O hissi de sevmiyordum."

<sup>335</sup> From personal interview with Momo: "Rahatlama, maskeyle dolaşmama, başkası ne düşünecek diye düşünmeme... Ben kendi çöplüğümdeyim. Ne düşünüyorsam söyleyebilirim. Bunun özgürlüğünü yasadım buraya gelince."

<sup>336</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: "Türkiye'nin durumuna üzülüyorum. Bir kere Erdoğan'ın ve Akp'nin diktatörlük yolunda ilerlediğini düşünüyorum. Bu seçimler filan yapıldı. Bazı insanlar umutlu burada ama ben hiçbir zaman bir şey değişebilir diye düşünmedim. Belki fazla karamsarım ama Erdoğan'ın her şey planlı yaptığını düşünüyorum. Bugün çıkan şeyler dün alınmış kararlar değil. Seçimlerde bile seçimleri göstermelik yaptığını düşünüyorum.. Kendisi ne isterse ne zaman isterse yapıyor. Türkiye' de olduğum zamanlarda da yaptığı seçimleri görüyordum 2000'lerin sonları. Seçimlerden önce yaptığı yalanlar oyunlar... İnsanların kayıt yerlerinin değiştirilmesi, sonuçlarla oynanması. Yapılan hiçbir şeye de inanmıyorum. Hepsinin başka bir şeyi kapatmak için olduğunu düşünüyorum."

something with a cleavage and wander around. Here I do not feel uncomfortable. It may be because of my career... Well, then again I've never worked in Turkey...<sup>337</sup>

As Melisa openly argues, women are considered to be secondary in Turkey. Even in academic circles, there are always a felt difference of stance between women and men; whereas in Israel she says she feels considerably different; considerably equal.

Probably the most outspoken respondent about his feelings towards Turkishness and his story of migration to Israel is Momo, a doctoral student in his early 30s. He begins his interview with an outright declaration of his sense of belonging: "I feel I belong to Israel. In addition, I know where I come from."<sup>338</sup> He is confident and at ease about his strong attachment to Israel and he prefers to be called an "Israeli scholar" rather than a "Turkish scholar from Israel". At some point in his life, he says he was taught that he was not Turkish by some unfortunate experiences he had in Turkey, though he used to consider himself Turkish<sup>339</sup>. He gives an example of a courier guy who asked whether or not he is Turkish, a recurring incident that I've encountered in other respondents' memories as well. The most striking statement of Momo that resonated with me long after our interview was his contention on being Turkish on Israel: "When we were in Turkey we were Jews. We came here and became Turks. But the difference is this: I can be a prime minister here. I am not seen as an extension of Turkey; I am perceived as one who carries Turkey's culture. But in Turkey I was perceived as an extension of Israel"<sup>340</sup>. The bottom line is, according to Momo, is the way people surrounded him, perceives him; as an outsider or as a member of than community.

Out of all the interviews I conducted in Israel, İdil's interview, particularly what

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<sup>337</sup> From personal interview with Melisa: "Kadın olduğum için her zaman ikinci planda olmam gerekli. Erkekler daha ön planda. Konferanslarda da her zaman daha az kadın yöneticiler, girişimciler burada yarıya değil; ama, oranlar çok daha fazla kadınların. Günlük hayatımda açık giyinerek gezmek Türkiye' de dikkat çeker bunu hissediyorum. Burada hiçbir zaman o konuda bir rahatsızlık hissetmedim. Belki kariyer şeyin de olabilir... Gerçi Türkiye de hiç çalışmadım ama."

<sup>338</sup> From personal interview with Momo: "Ben kendimi İsrail'e ait hissediyorum. Bunun yanında nerden geldiğimi de biliyorum."

<sup>339</sup> From personal interview with Momo: "bir akademik kongre olsa Türkiye'de İsraili Türk akademisyen yerine İsraili akademisyen denmesini tercih ediyorum. Türk pasaportum duruyor mu ? Evet, duruyor; ama, ben Türkiye'de kendimi her ne kadar Türk olarak görsem de çeşitli yaşadığım tecrübeler bana olmadığını öğretti. Örneğin; kredi kartı için kurye geldi. İşte bilgilerimi istedi kimliğimi verdim, kredi kartını teslim etti filan. Sonra bir soru sorabilir miyim, dedi kurye. 'Siz Türk müsünüz?' dedi. O da demin size vermiş olduğum kimlik ve zerindeki bilgiler size Türk olduğumu kanıtlıyor ama sanırım sizin sorunuz Müslüman olup olmadığım yönünde. O da evet, dedi. Ben de Yahudi olduğumu söyledim ve o da gitti."

<sup>340</sup> From personal interview with Momo: "Biz Türkiye'de Yahudi'ydik. Buraya geldik Türk olduk. Ama fark şu; ben burada başbakan olabilirim. Bana Türkiye'nin uzantısı gibi bakılmıyor, bana oranın kültürünü taşıyor olarak bakılıyor. Yani, Türkiye de bana İsrail uzantısı olarak bakılıyordu."

she said about her enlightenment after Gezi Events had a great impact on me. What she said in only 30, 40 seconds nearly summarized my arguments in this thesis:

After 2013 protests, I realized how much lonely we were, how many problems we had. Political problems have never been a primary concern for my generation. You want to touch that person while expressing yourself, but you cannot. Even though you are living side by side, the differences means different worlds. I realized, I felt at least, that it is exaggerated and putting you inside a very little bubble. I felt this after Gezi because that was the first time I have been a part of such a big crowd. To support something... -there is no to call it an idea, because there was no idea at all. I shared an enthusiasm for supporting freedom or anything for that matter. These two months were exciting, I was living in Taksim during this time. At some points, it was depressing but it made people move. It was depressing within the context of how it ended. The reasons of existence were saddening. The state of mind was saddening. When the pressure was softened, it is weird, from parks people when back to loneliness. People again started to find the other weird.<sup>341</sup>

She realized that Gezi was the time her imaginary bubble became visible to her. But sensing it so vividly, realizing how limited her life was, broke her heart. It became clear to her that she was in fact alone, both as an individual and as a community. Thus, that unusual two months of solidarity, of breaking ties and boundaries of old social segments and getting together felt exhilarating. She was finally able to touch the other, get in contact with the other and transmit her feelings and thoughts. When everything went back to the usual, she was truly saddened by losing what she realized she could have. So it was impossible for her, for most to get back to the way they were, since now that they knew what it was like to touch the other, not to be alone. That is what she argues was the turning point for her that started the whole adventure of moving to Israel. It was a very affective few months for not only her but most assuming many experienced similar emotions.

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<sup>341</sup> From personal interview with İdil: “O zaman tam bir yön vermiştim 2013 teki protestolardan sonra aslında biz ne kadar yalnız mıyız. Ne kadar çok sorunumuz varmış dedim. Politik sorunlar hiçbir zaman benim jenerasyonumun birincil problemi olmadı; ama, kendini ifade etmede karşındakine dokunmak istiyorsun ama dokunamıyorsun. Yan yana yaşasan da ayrı dünyalar bu farkların. Abartıldığını ve seni nasıl minicik bir bubble’ın içine koyduğunu bu tarz şeyler fark ettim böyle hissettim en azından. Bunu Gezi’den sonra hissettim; çünkü ilk defa böyle büyük bir kitlenin içinde bulundum. Belirli bir şeyi savunmak için fikir demeye gerek yok; çünkü orada hiç bir fikir yok aslında. O özgürlüklerin savunması herhangi bir şey için bu kadar aynı enthusiasm paylaştım. Çok heyecanlı iki ay oldu ben Taksim’de oturuyordum o sırada. Belli bir noktada üzücü bir şeydi ama insanı harekete geçiren bir şeydi. Sona ermesi bağlamında mı üzücüydü ? Var olmasına neden olan şeyler üzücüydü. Kafa yapısı her şey üzücüydü ama. Ne zaman o büyük baskı azaldı insanlar parklardan, garip tekrardan yalnızlığa dönüş. İnsanlar garip bir şekilde, ötekini yine garipsemeye başladılar.”



### 5.3 Conclusion

Here, at this point, I have revealed various reactions, moves and answers of the Jewish Turks to the existing conditions of what I have defined as bubble and affects circulating inside. I have begun with a passive stance to the situation as ‘silence’ as an overarching defense mechanism. Then, I have explored the migrated ones who might be counted as the ones who left the story. And, lastly, there have been and sometimes going to be the ones who stay and claim their rejections. However, this distinction is not boldly drawn because the same person can acquire all these three stances at the same time to the existing context.

This practice of avoiding certain issues repetitively, or choosing to behave in a specific evasive way and securing a passive, inertial manner, is a cultivated act, inherited by historical events and/or family. These habits are not necessarily passed on as cautionary advices told by the elders, or warnings constantly repeated to the child until it is certain that he learned; but rather in a variety of channels such as cautions, as inside jokes, as written memories or as oral tales.

The data gathered mostly verify a strong tendency to stay within the veil of silence. But for the purpose of this study, it was also vital to mention certain instances where the respondents break that pattern and do reach out and attempt. Even at those instances though, it is reminded them, again and again, the presence of silence and how intrinsic it is to their being.

One may argue that keeping silent successfully serves as a preemptive measure against being discriminated or being subject to hostility of any sort. But it would fall short of being true. Respondents, even those who pay the utmost attention to keep their heads down, are still haunted by the specter of being a minority. To ask the reason why, would be a worthy start to the thought process of understanding the rise in migration.

Following up that thought, I took a closer look at migration from both ends; via the ones that stayed and via the ones that left. The most important outcome was that the accounts of those who left, certainly confirmed all arguments raised in the previous chapter when I argued the haunting of the minority status and the imaginary space of bubbles; as well as the recent argument of cultivated silence as a historical and

sociological tool of mediation & survival. However, what startled me is that the intensity of the reactions respondents gave to those affects was nowhere near being similar and that made all the difference between staying and leaving.

For those who stayed, migration is not left aside or buried away as an unbearable thought. On the other hand, it is handled as daily-met information of their routine. At some instances, they talk about it, consider it as an option as a daily practice, or even joke about it, in a sarcastic way. Thus, as I said above, the idea of migrating elsewhere digs the very ground that senses of belonging is constructed upon; but somehow for the respondents, it does not negate the other; it is not contradicting.

By and large, they perceive migration as an individual matter and spend an extreme amount of effort not to accept it as a communal phenomenon. Thus, it is not conversed as a subject of socio-political concept but rather an individual choice. Interestingly, the ones that migrated adopts the opposite attitude towards migration.

Silence, again, is a domain where feeling minority is reproduced. Thus it is complimentary to the previous arguments presented in specter and bubble sections. It urges the reader to rethink those points raised. Migration section is intrinsic to the bubble argument which acts together with it. It is current and conventional which again makes it an imminent part of specter argument. It is vital to note at this point that I was only interested in migration in relation to sense of belonging and feeling minority rather than a recap of causes for migration. To what extent and via which channels migration is being conversed within are crucial questions which could be discussed around the feeling minority.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

The most fundamental matter this thesis concerned with is the sense of belonging of Turkish – Jewish citizens in Turkey. But it is a challenging endeavor to look and observe something so fluid, ever changing. Since sense of belonging cannot be set to some sorts of constant definitions, I followed closely the reflections of my respondents to understand what their perceptions are, or if existent, what are the challenges they experience.

As it appears, there is a coherence of Turkishness and Jewishness. To put it in more accurately, the interviews clearly showed that Jewish society in Turkey certainly do not have a problem with being both Turkish and Jewish. They all figured out an individual explanation of how natural it is for them to consider themselves for Turkish and Jewish. It was interesting to see such a common practice of acknowledging a harmony among both identities; since there is no explicit narrative circulating through the community. No one really talks about their sense of Turkishness or Jewishness; or why/why not they feel themselves so. But apparently, all have – at one point in their lives- individually figured a rationalization for such predicament.

One of the most frequently used justifications was to adopt a nationalist-legal framework to conceptualize their stance as both a Turkish and a Jewish citizen in Turkey. A justification of Turkishness via being born a citizen here, being a tax-payer, owning a Turkish identification card, apparently provides the respondents a very comforting sense of security, since the power of acclamation of their Turkishness is granted by the state and the constitution; not a consequence of their fictional rationalization.

Evidently, Turkishness and Jewishness may not conflict because they both refer to different dimensions of an individual; one being a nationality, and the other a belief system, a religion, for instance. Thus, it would be misleading to consider them as mutually exclusive phenomena. Additionally, cultural attributes of both are complimentary of each other, thus they are completing each other, not contradicting. One example and a very strong one, may I say, would be Turkish being considered as the mother tongue. It is remarkable how fast and irretrievably Ladino lost its significance as the primary language of that community and replaced by Turkish. Since they all speak Turkish and they enjoy similar habits that one could call cultural

characteristics of ‘Turkish society’, arguing for a perfect harmony of two identities, Turkishness and Jewishness, is easily plausible.

All arguments and perceptions regarding these two identities indicate that though justifications may be similar; there is no common narrative that is shared by the community, or even some part of it. Interestingly, even at times of instability between the rest of the society and Jewish community; a public discussion of the compatibility of these two identities has never been actualized. People do not share personal accounts on the issue with each other and create a somewhat common discourse/grand narrative to be freely used as a community-wide. Not being bound by such a collective approach undoubtedly helps peculiar narratives of Turkishness and Jewishness to be more effectively produced at a personal base. But, the mentioned coherence is so fragile that it is constantly broken, weakened and turned into something else.

Weakening and the breaking of that harmony happen every day. The realization of the image they portray at the beginning of the interview is being challenged by their encounters with the other or with the state. Thus, it renders their perceptions of Turkishness and Jewishness somewhat idealist approaches towards what they desire, rather than what they daily experience.

It is even more evident at instances when they described those instances where they felt like “the other one outside the many” rather than “the one amongst the many”. Something they experience in their daily routine makes the rationalizations mentioned above non-functional. They mostly argued that they have been reminded about the difference, the discrepancy of these identities. To exercise their religious ceremonies with the assistance of bodyguards or being warned by his superior officer not to disclose his Jewishness to even the highest ranking general are two instances that, without a doubt, establish a discontent feeling on behalf of the respondents. It is ever more challenging to try and keep one’s faith in their senses of belonging to Turkey when they are subject to such reminders.

Encounters with the state have also been a historical reminder of how and why their perception on the coherence of Turkishness & Jewishness doesn’t work as ideally as they wished. They are challenged by frequent reminders of how and why Turkish State doesn’t consider them to be a “full citizen” or the discrepancy caused by the difference of their religion. Though the Jewish community in Turkey has been mostly

cooperative with the concept of Turkishness; it is still startling for them to be directed questions that inquire their Turkishness. When that is the case, it is inevitable to observe the overwhelming presence of affective reactions of the community. Consequently, a discussion of sense of belonging turned into an analysis of affective approach to “feeling minority”. I am not concerned with the rights & responsibilities of citizens and thus their belonging via a legalistic view. The discussion has always been on the “emotional” aspect of belonging.

Feeling minority as an affect revealed that people’s sense of belonging is much largely dependent upon repetitive daily encounters. Constant repeat of certain encounters, thus, leads to the dominance of specific feelings, namely, fear, uneasiness, alertness, discomfort and feeling like other. What are those encounters? Some affective responses are triggered by the encounters with the state, as I mentioned above, but also sometimes their exchanges with the rest of the society, the “general public” if you will, set off these feelings of discomfort or distress.

Surely, one of the most predictable instances that cause distress is any occasion where the context is about Israel. The Jewish community frequently has been subject to inquiries of their ties to Israel or the direct assumption of it. The reason for being assumed in this way is the lack of adequate knowledge of the counter party. This thesis showed that the Jewish community is not of contention to be properly known by the rest of the society and in response, the society has no intention to get of the stereotypes about the community. Thus, the communication between them is based on misconceived judgments of socially constructed prejudices. During the discussion in Chapter IV, I asked if that’s the case why people still stay here. In other words, people feel in perfect tune with Turkishness at one moment, but then at another, s/he faces suddenly a discomforting encounter that shakes the grounds this belief is built upon. But s/he knows, s/he is taught how to shake it off and continue to feel that s/he belongs here and keep living here as nothing happened until the next incident happens. So, the question comes to mind: What makes this constant regeneration of sense of belonging? What is the anchor that keeps them here?

When that’s the case, it is not surprising for the Jewish individuals to desire a space of their own, inside of which they’re known, they’re familiar, a space where they’ll continue to desire to still be here. Bubble is the heart of the explanation why.

As traditional communalities such as neighborhoods, associations were dissolved by the migration and local change of neighborhoods of relatively low income Jewish groups; people are turned into individual imaginary spaces. The loss of neighborhoods and relations with the residents of a shared apartment building, all assist the construction of individual spaces.

The need for those spaces was about the “feeling at home” where no one should be this uncomfortable. Thus *bubble* is designed as an imaginary protective space which both provides a safe space to call their own, their home. The side effect of that safe place, is the remembrance of the minority status as a ghost haunting them. Bubble is highly suggestive in order to explain the reason why these people prefer to stay in this country despite the existence of intensely negative affects of being a minority as discussed above. There is a constant need for some sort of protected area for the individual as a prerequisite to even begin to think about feeling at home/ secure. This leaves the rest of the public in the outside, as the un-safe crowd. That is why bubbles are referred in this thesis as the imaginary protective shields that consequently prolong feeling minority.

Bubbles are personal spaces where each individual has the prerogative to decide who to avoid or to get in contact. Thus, bubbles are imaginary constructions of coping mechanisms that assist the respondents to manage the potential discrimination they may be subject to. But as the word already suggests, bubbles are fragile. Bubbles are sometimes shaken by an instant of affective feeling that it was supposed to keep out. That is how the individuals are startled when they hear a disturbing statement against Jews from a close friend at a casual conversation. The affective impact comes from an unexpected person at an unexpected moment. That individual’s bubble is now been blown up and will be renewed, reshaped with the new information s/he has. That is how fragile permeable and variant bubbles are.

Keeping in mind bubble is a recent and dynamic phenomenon; one should rethink and reconsider it with its correlation to the transformation of the city, to neoliberal politics and to Turkey’s recent political climate. Within this framework, the following questions might be visited while contemplating on bubble in the future studies: How would the transformation of bubble, as an affective space, be affected by the neoliberal transformation of the city? For those whose spatial lives are shaped by

neoliberal policies, how would bubble change itself? What kind of dynamics may appear within the bubble while conservatism is increasing and penetrating the public space as secularism is graying in recent socio-political context of Turkey? And thus, how would the repercussions of rising authoritarianism of state on people's everyday lives effect bubble?

In this thesis, I provided a descriptive analysis of belonging via the community's understanding of their Turkishness and Jewishness and via an affective tool of bubble, I contemplated on feeling minority. Then I asked what a Jewish subject's territory of mobility, his/her space of struggle that is bound by their capabilities could be. I asked what sorts of strategies they have. That is where silence and migration, as a last resort come into play.

Silence is a strategy used to sustain what bubble provides. It is a cultivated practice is a historical phenomenon which is still in use today. Jewish community prefers not to disclose information about them unless they're specifically asked about it. They rather keep private their characteristics that would signal their Jewishness, as a practice to avoid being subject to any sensation that would diminish their sense of belonging to Turkey or their devotion to Turkishness. In that sense, the practice of keeping silent is an integral part of the anthropological tool of bubble to sustain the serene environment within the territory of it.

As the last resort, migration becomes viable. It is certainly not a contemporary invention. The Jewish community has been migrating out of Turkey for almost a century now. But that is not within the scope of this thesis; the reason why they leave. What is related here is the impact of migration on the sense of belonging of the community. It appears migration is a very popularly evaluated option on a daily basis but still, somehow the community manages to spend their days not talking about it. Community's remarkable ability to avoid an issue that is deeply rooted to a community's past and present astonishes me. They know that an immense number of young adults are leaving the country; but because of the fact that they are individual cases and not mass migration. Thus, obviously at the heart of the migration lies a strong incentive of silence. It is another instance where the cultivation of silence is perfectly utilized.

One reason why migration is tangled up with silence in a perfect way might be that the idea of migration is ever present. It is never forgotten; outdated or a subject out of context. The possibility and the capability of migrating elsewhere is always on the table. Thus, recognizing it every second, realizing the challenge to belong every day with a contradiction in mind, may be overwhelming to a body. That might be the reason why community works so hard to acknowledge migration as mere individual life choices rather than a century old pattern of their community.

Silence and migration are exciting tools that came out of the interview data. From a structure focuses on belonging, these two phenomena rose as two strategies of being, belonging. Thus, the affective analysis of silence and migration are not within the scope of this thesis. Without a doubt, silence is an affective strategy and has very powerful affective impact on the community. But since the interviews were limited to a study of belonging, I do not have the data to analyze silence with affective goggles. I have rather preferred to handle the migration and silence phenomena as coping strategies of the self and the community. Further research on affective analysis of the practice of silence as well as of migration would be very valuable studies for the cultural anthropology literature as well as minority and migration studies. I am personally very interested in such an analysis and hope to have the chance to read one in the future or have the opportunity to be the scholar that analyzes it himself.

Consequently, this thesis' contribution to the literature on minorities in Turkey would be twofold. Firstly, the existing studies on Jewish communities built by biographical studies, memoirs and largely be historical works. There are very few studies though that focuses on belonging of minorities, even close to none if one seeks a study concerned primarily with Jewish community in Turkey. Therefore, this thesis is one of a kind considering it focuses on sense of belonging of Jewish community via affect theory. I hope it would be an explanatory example of anthropological work on affect theory that would assist to future young scholars who aim to work on the field with Jewish community, sense of belonging or via affect theory.



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## APPENDIX 1

### LIST OF RESPONDENTS

Record No. 19 – Yosi – He works as a consultant at an international law firm. We've met at a café in Kabataş. The interview lasted 48 minutes 55 seconds.

Record No.20 – Suzi – She is a housewife. I've met her at her home in Tarabya. The interview lasted 41 minutes 37 seconds.

Record No. 21 – Yusuf – He is both an actor and a director in theater. I've met him at his home in Gayrettepe. The interview lasted 71 minutes 31 seconds.

Record No 22 – Viki – She is a retired bank employee. I've met my parents' house in Tarabya. The interview lasted 49 minutes 38 seconds.

Record No. 23 – Jojo – He is also a theatre actor. I've met him at a café in Beşiktaş. The interview lasted 52 minutes 36 seconds.

Record No. 24 – Can – He works at his family company. I've met him at my home in Tarabya. The interview lasted 66 minutes 16 seconds.

Record No. 25 – Engin – He is in textile sector. I've met him at my home. The interview lasted 52 minutes 48 seconds.

Record No. 26 – Avi – He is an investment consultant at a bank. I've met him at my home. The interview lasted 45 minutes 33 seconds.

Record No.27- Dorin – She is a dental practice. I've met her at her office in Kadıköy. The interview lasted 49 minutes 34 seconds.

Record No. 28 – Vivet – She is a housewife. I've met her at her home in Tarabya. Throughout the whole interview, her husband was present in the room. It was interesting to feel that all her references to daily encounters were based on totally what she personally experienced or heard and shared by heart. The interview lasted 52 minutes.

Record No. 29 – Niso – He is a businessman in coffee sector. I've met him in at a café in a luxurious mall in Zincirlikuyu. His girlfriend was with him. The interview lasted 38 minutes 12 seconds.

Record No. 30 – Ser – He is an owner in a business of manufacture and export of buttons. I've met him at a coffeehouse in a mall in Etiler. The interview lasted 36 minutes 05 seconds.

Record No. 31 – Yosef – He owns his business in textile. I've met him at a coffeehouse in Ulus. He was very meticulous about time because he was going to meet his two years

old son that afternoon. He only gets to see him a few times during the week. The interview lasted 44 minutes 32 seconds.

Record No. 32 – Selen – She was a chemical engineer looking for job opportunities. I've met her at coffeehouse in a mall in Etiler. The interview lasted 62 minutes 30 seconds.

Record No. 33 – Sarah – She owns her business that manufactures zips. I've met her at a cafe in Osmanbey. The interview lasted 31 minutes 47 seconds.

Record No. 35 – Nino – He owns a meyhanes. I've met him at his meyhanes in Beyoğlu. His business partner was with us during a part of the interview. She also made a few comments during the interview. She is an Armenian Turkish. The interview lasted 82 minutes 39 seconds.

Record No. 36 – Sandra – She works in an advertising agency. I've met her in a coffeehouse at Akatlar. She requested to change tables for three times because someone sat at a table closer to us. The interview lasted 45 minutes 18 seconds.

Record No. 37 & 38 - Rakel – She is currently an attorney at law. She is handling the Cemaat's legal businesses. Also she is a writer at Güncel Hukuk magazine. We've met with her in her office in Dolapdere. The interview is made up out of two successive records. First one lasted 35 minutes and 39 seconds. The second one lasted 8 minutes 20 seconds.

Record No. 39 & 40 – Sofi – She is a clinical psychologist. I've met her in a coffeehouse in a mall in Akatlar. The interview is made up out of two successive records. First one lasted 43 minutes and 8 seconds. The second one lasted 6 minutes 21 seconds.

Record No. 41 - Tuna - She is 88 years old. I've met her at her daughter's house in Nişantaşı. She is living with her daughter. Her husband passed away. Her daughter was with us throughout the interview. She brushed her mother's hair for about 10 minutes before the interview. During interview, she occasionally used Ladino in her statements and she had a recognizable accent. She had trouble on the understanding the questions, because she is not familiar with the contemporary language. One thing was interesting that she used some phenomena with different meanings than we currently do. For instance what she meant by military service was actually time spent in Aşkale. And also, for instance, she did not get the question "How would you define yourself?". At such dead ends, her daughter translated from Turkish to Turkish into a sentence build with words her mother would understand. As the middle women, her daughter acted as a litmus, I could get hints on what her point of view actually was. So, her daughter was the person who accomplished some sort of communication between me and her mother. Then the doorbell rang. Her daughter went to get the door thus for a few minutes we couldn't continue, and sat in silence. The interview lasted 50 minutes 29 seconds.

Record No.42 & 43 & 44 – Rejin – She is also 88 years old. I’ve met her at her home in Esentepe. For a while, the help at home sat with us. She was not involved in the discussion; the conversation continued as if she was not there. The interview is made up out of three successive records. First one lasted 47 minutes and 58 seconds. The second one lasted 1 minute 10 seconds. The last one lasted 2 minutes.

Record No. 46 – Nir – He’s a rabbi .I’ve met him in a synagogue at the main praying hall which was empty at the time. The interview lasted 40 minutes 41 seconds.

Record No. 47 – Moni – He is retired of chemical engineering who used to do plastics trade. He lives in Tel Aviv but spend a few months of the year in Turkey. I’ve met him at the hotel he was staying in Mecidiyeköy. His wife İvet – the next respondent – was with us all the time. The interview lasted 30 minutes 14 seconds.

Record No. 48 – İvet –She is a housewife and married to Moni. We spoke all together. I’ve conducted the interview at the same hotel. One of her friends came at one point of the interview and she suddenly left the interview. The interview lasted 15 minutes 34 seconds.

Record No. 49 – Eti - I’ve met her at Moni & İvet’s home in Tel Aviv, because they are friends. They stayed with us during the interview. Occasionally, they intervened her “improper” comments during the interview. The interview lasted 41 minutes 15 seconds.

Record No. 50 – Yoni - He is a retired police officer. I’ve met him at an office of an association in Tel Aviv. Moni was with us during the interview. He has a very recognizable accent when he speaks Turkish probably because of Ladino. He migrated to Israel in early 60’s. The interview lasted 76 minutes 41 seconds.

Record No. 51 – Momo – He is a PhD candidate in a university in Israel. I’ve met him in his office at the university. The interview lasted 62 minutes 29 seconds.

Record no. 52 & 53 – İdil – She was searching for a job in Tel Aviv where she recieved her MBA degree. I’ve met her at a café in Tel Aviv. The interview is made up out of two successive records. First one lasted 71 minutes and 27 seconds. The second one lasted 4 minute 57 seconds.

Record No. 54 – Melisa – She works at an online advertisement agency in Tel Aviv. I’ve met her at a park in Tel Aviv. The interview lasted 100 minutes 14 seconds.

Record No. 55 – Ani – She is a psychology student in a university in Istanbul. I’ve met her at a coffeehouse in a mall in İstinye. The interview lasted 130 minutes 49 seconds.

Record No. 56 – Etel – She is sociology and business administration student in a university in Istanbul. I’ve met her in a café in Nişantaşı. The interview lasted 46 minutes 17 seconds.



Record No. 57 – Maya – She is a documentary director and a tour guide. She also writes in Avlaremos, a web site that publishes articles on attitudes against anti-Semitism in Turkey. I've met her at a patisserie in Teşvikiye. She occasionally used a more silent tone to talk because the tables were too close to each other. The interview lasted 50 minutes 32 seconds.

## APPENDIX 2

### SAMPLE INTERVIEW WITH A RESPONDENT

*-Interview with Sandra -*

Cem: Rica etsem biraz kendinden bahsedebilir misin? İsmi ne? Kaç yaşındasın, nerede oturuyorsun? Meseleğin ne? Günlük hayatta neler yapıyorsun?

Sandra: İsmim Sandra, reklam ajansında çalışıyorum. Bilgi Üniversitesi Sinema-Televizyon Bölümü'nden mezun oldum. Şu anda bir reklam ajansında çalışıyorum. Sosyal medya ajansı onun dışında. Günlük olarak yaptığım şeyler çok klasik aslında, işten eve dönmek. Onun dışında yaptığım çok değişik bir şey yok; herkesin yaptığı şeyler aslında yemek yemek, sinemaya gitmek, arkadaşlarımla buluşmak böyle... Çok özel yaptığım anlatabileceğim bir şey yok, belki sorular cevaplarım

Cem: Türkiye'nin bugünkü durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsun, hem sosyal, siyasal, ekonomik ve kültürel?

Sandra: Çok güzel iyi bir yere gideceğini düşünmüyorum; ama, bu ülkeden de gitmeyi pek düşünmüyorum. Çoğu insan gitmekten yana. Ben kendimi o kadar ait değilmişim gibi hissetmiyorum. Ama, gidin buradan denileceğini zannetmiyorum. Ama, bazıları için yakın bir zamanda gerçekleşecek. Ben kendimi hala buraya ait hissediyorum.

Cem: Yakın zamanda gidileceğini söylüyorlar derken, rica etsem onu biraz detaylandırabilir misin? Arkadaşlarından mı duyuyorsan, yakın çevrenden mi duyuyorsun ne diyor? Ne söylüyor insanlar bununla ilgili olarak?

Sandra: Herkes durumdan şikayet ediyor artık burada yaşanmaz, gittikçe daha kötü bir hal alıyor, daha da kötü hale gelecek, çocuklarımız burada yaşayamayacak... Ve kaçacağız hangi ülkeye gitsek, diye konuşuyor. Hangi ülkede yaşamak daha iyi Amerika mı, İsrail mi?

*(Millet bakıyor)*

Cem: Boş ver millet. Zaten yukarda (katta) oturduk. Tamam, kusura bakma. Türkiye'deki Museviler açısından en iyi dönem ve dönemler hangisiydi sence?

Sandra: Benim o konuda çok detaylı bir bilgim yok. Ama duyduğum şeylere göre annelerin gençlik zamanında daha rahat ve tarz kaygıları olmadan yaşıyorlardı.

Cem: Onların gençlik zamanı ne zamandı 1970ler, 1980ler mi?

Sandra: Aynen öyle 70ler. Sanki öyle daha rahat, veya kötü hatıralarını hatırlamayıp güzel şeylerini anlattıkları için o kadarını biliyor olabilirim ama şu geldiğimiz zaman en kötü zamanda olduğumuzu düşünüyorum. Ama dediğim gibi, benim için bir kaçış şeyi planım yok. İzliyeceğim daha ne kadar gidebilir diye.

Cem: Kendini nereye ait hissediyordun, nerede evde hissediyorsun? Bu bir ülke olabilir bir semt olabilir, bir sosyal çevre olabilir. Amerika mı?

Akatlar da mı oturuyorsun?

Sandra: Ulus'ta oturuyorum.

Cem: Amerika mı? İsrail mi? Türkiye mi? Ulus mu? İstanbul mu?

Sandra: Aidiyet olarak söylersem, gerçekten aidiyet evinden uzak bir yerde olunca İstanbul içinde bu çevrelere Akatlar, Ulus evimin çevresindeki yerlere geldiğim zaman tanıdık bir yere geldim, güvendeyim hissiyatı oluyor. Evimin çevresinde, benim için evde hissediyorum. Tüm Türkiye'yi evim gibi hissetmiyorum; ama, uzak bir yerden uzak ülkeden geldikten sonra Türkiye'ye gelince evet burası benim evim. Ama, uzun süre burada yaşadıkdan sonra daha da küçük bir yerin evim olduğunu hissediyorum. Yabancı bir yerden yurduşından geldiğim zaman Türkiye'yi özlemişim diyorum. Türkiye'deyken kendi alanımı özlemişim diyorum; o kendi alanım da bahsettiğim gibi ve daha aşına olduğum bir yer.

Cem: İstanbul'u böyle tanımlayabilir miyiz?

Sandra: İstanbul da böyle ama dediğim gibi insana biraz daha özelleştirmeyi sevdiği için Türkiye içinde İstanbul. İstanbul içinde evimin etrafı benim için.

Cem: Senin için evde hissetmek ne demek ? 5.42

Sandra: Güvende hissetmek yani yapabileceğim şeyleri çekinmeden yapacağın şeyleri çekinmeden yapmak. Evinde nasıl rahat edersin? Bende sokağa 12'de de çıkabilirim, 13'te de çıkabilirim; ben burada zarar görmeyeceğimi hissetmem gerekiyor. O benim için ev hissiyatını, güvende, ailemin yanında nasıl bir şey olmayacağını hissediyorsam. Etrafımdan da bana zarar gelmeyeceğini... Etrafımdaki insanların dost olduğunu düşündüğüm yer, benim evimdir.

Cem: Ailece Şabat yemekleri yapıyor musunuz? Eğer yapıyorsanız kim kim yapıyorsunuz?

Sandra: Yapıyoruz. Bizim ailemiz çok aşırı geniş değil, şabat yemekleri genellikle ailece yapıyoruz. Çekirdek ailece dört kişi abim, annem, babam her Cuma yapıyoruz. Her Cuma toplanıp dua ederiz, dışarı bayramlarda daha büyük bir aile şeyi olur. 6.40 Onda bile çok aşırı kalabalık değiliz ki daha çok kalabalık olmayı isterdim.

Cem: Daha çok kalabalık olmayı isterdim darken?

Sandra: Hani şey gibi; kendi alanımın genişlemesi güvendiğim insan sayısının artması çevremde olması bana huzur veriyor. Şu anda gerçekten benim iyiliğimi isteyen ve gerçekten benim için en iyiyi isteyen insanların ailem olduğunu düşünüyorum ve bu insanların artması benim için daha güvenilir bir şey hal alır. O yüzden her zaman kalabalık olmayı, samimi olmayı beni içten seven insanlarla olmayı tercih ediyorum. 7:24

Cem: Geri döneceğim Cuma şabat yemekleri sorusuna. Senin için bu yemeklerin önemi nedir? Veya bu yemeklerin hani bir an için olmadığını hayal edelim, o zaman nasıl olurdu?

7.40

Sandra: Bu yemeklerin beni haftada bir kere beni ailemle bir araya getirdiğini düşünüyorum. Dini şeyinden öte dini gerekliliğinden önce, çok fazla haftada karşılaşmıyoruz. Herkesin farklı hayatı var; eve gelemiyorum, abim eve gelemiyor. Yani, bu bir buluşma noktası gibi yemekte.

Cem: Abinle sen annenlerle oturuyorsunuz değil mi?

Sandra: Evet ailece oturuyoruz şu anda hala, o yüzden bunu bir toplanma anı olarak görüyorum. Her cumada o masada dördümüz oturabildiğimiz için mutlu oluyorum. Yani haftalar geçiyor, seneler geçiyor o cumalarda birlikte olmuş oluyorum o da hoşuma giden bir şey.

Cem: Peki olmasa nasıl olurdu bu? Olmadığını varsayalım? 8:16

Sandra: Olmasa eksikliğini hissederdim. Çünkü, bu yaşıma kadar bu şekilde büyüdüğüm için olmasa eksikliğini hissederdim olmasını isterim. Ailem olursa ileride böyle bir şeyin hayatımdaki varlığını, var olmasını isterim.

Cem: Pesah bayramlarında ne yapıyorsunuz? Kim kim toplanıyorsunuz?

Sandra: Pesah bayramlarımda annem ve dayım geliyor. Dayım evli olmadığı için aile genişlemiş durumda değil. Bu yaştan sonra sanmıyorum evleneceğini. Dedem geçen sene vefat etti; bir bir buçuk sene önce normalde o da olurdu. Ama bir kişi eksildi şimdi. Pesah'ta bütün kitabın gerekliliklerini, kitapta ne yazıyorsa... Bir saat boyunca tek tek o duayı ediyoruz. Şabattan ayrı olarak çok uzun sürüyor galiba o da hoşuma gider. Çünkü, senede bir kere yapılan bir şey. Ondan da keyif alıyorum.

Cevaplarım yeterli mi?

Cem: Çok iyi çok sağol nasıl rahatsa.

Cem: Sence azınlık olmak ne demek? Azınlık hissetmek ne demek? Yahudilik azınlık olmak mıdır ? 9:45

Sandra: Evet, Türkiye’de azınlık olmaktır. Azınlık olmak beni çok rahatsız etmiyor. Yani, çok aşırı muzdarip büyümedim açıkçası. Garip garip sorular oldu; evet. İsmim neden değişik? Soyadın neden böyle? Nerelisin sen? Nerelisin dediği zaman söyleyebileceğim bir cevabım yok, buralıyım aslında. Ama kökenlerim İsrail’e dayandığı için hemen öyle bir bağdaştırmaya gidiyor.

İsraili misin sen? Hayır; aslında değilim. Bir gün belki gitmem gereken yer orası olabilir; ama, oraya ait hissetmiyorum kendimi.

Cem: Türkiye’de kendini azınlık hissettiğin oldu mu? Gerçi bir iki örnek verdin sorulara dair ama.

Sandra: Olduğum zaman oldu. Mesela yapılan saldırılarda, özgürce istediğim yere gidememek. Sinagogun tehlikeli hal alması.

Cem: Yapılan saldırılar derken yapılan sinagog saldırılarını mı kastediyorsun?

Sandra: İşte bu tip çıkan haberlerden dolayı insanların galeyana gelmesi, başbakanın konuşmaları vs.'den... Bir kışkırtma gibi olduğu için bunun yüzünden hedef haline gelmiş oluyoruz ve normalde yapacağın şeyi, gitmesem mi acaba bir şey gelir mi başıma, gibi şeyleri düşünür oluyorsun. Bu noktada, özgürce hareket edemediğim için azınlık olduğumu fark ediyorum.

Cem: Sinangoga gitmek daha zor bir iş haline geliyor. 11.36

Sandra: Tabi, yani bu bir Örnek. Toplu bulunduğumuz hiç birine gitmememiz gerekiyor; çünkü, orası bir hedef olabilir; mesela okul...

Cem: Okul derken Musevi Lisesi'nden mi bahsediyorsun?

Sandra: Evet Musevi Lisesi'nden... Bir hedef haline gelebiliyor. İleride çocuğumu oraya verirsem bu gibi durumlarda, demin bahsettiğim durumlarda, tereddüt edeceğim; endişe edeceğim. Neden insan kendi evinde, şehrinde, yurdunda neden böyle bir şeyden endişe etsin ki çocuğu okula giderken.

Cem: Türk vatandaşı bir Kürt'e sorsak; siz Türk müsünüz diye, şey diyebilir: Yok ben Kürdüm. Aynı şekilde Türk vatandaşı bir Ermeni'ye sorsak: Siz Türk müsünüz diye, yok ben Türk değilim Ermeniyim diyebilir. Sence hem Musevilik için de durum böyle mi? Hem Yahudi hem Türk olunabilinir mi?

Sandra: Evet olunabilinir; ama, insanlar buna izin vermiyor işte. Çünkü, senin devamlı İsrail'e ait olduğun varsayımında oluyorlar. Bir noktadan sonra sen de bunu düşünmeye başlıyorsun? Halbuki, böyle bir şey yok. Bizim kökenimiz oraya dayanıyor olabilir; ama, ben burada doğduysam buradaki suyu içiyorsam ve yurtdışındaki su farklı geliyorsa; evet burası benim evimdir. Orası, yabancı olduğum yerdir. Böyle hissediyorum 13:10

Cem: Peki sen kendini Türk olarak görüyor musun?

Sandra: Görüyorum.

Cem: Türkiye'de Yahudi kelimesini duyduğunda ne hissediyorsun? Tabi ki bu kontekste göre değişecek, ortama göre değişecek, zamana göre değişecek ama genelde duyduğunda ne uyandırıyor sende? Hem genel bir algı olabilir bu, hem yaşadığım bir deneyim olabilir ?

Sandra: Sanki şey gibi; bu kelime birini parmakla işaret edersin ya bu, o gibi yani. O sanki bir sıfat; ama, güzel bir sıfat değilmiş gibi hissediyorum. Bana pozitif bir şey hissettirmiyor, belki yaşadığım şeylerden algım öyle yerleşti. Hani böyle nasıl bir işaret edersin. Baksana şuna, hissiyatı veriyor bana.

Cem: Biraz küçümseyici bir şey gibi mi? Ya da başka bir şey gibi mi ?

Sandra: Biraz öyle ama bu yaşadığım ülke sebebiyle, Yoksa küçümsenecek bir şey değil.

Cem: İlk Yahudi olduğumu ne zaman öğrendin ilk okulda mıydın daha mı küçüktün? Hatırlıyor musun?

Sandra: Hiç düşünmemiştim.

Cem: 5,6,7 yaşında mıydın ?

Sandra: 7,8 yaşındaydım herhalde. 7 yaşında olabilir. İlk şeyden kaynaklanıyor kafamda; oruç tutma. Kipur zamanındaki abimin oruç tuttuğunu benim tutmadığımı ve benim ona öyle şey yaptığımı hatırlıyorum. Onun önünde yemek yedim bilerek onu şey yapmak için canını çektirmek için, adilik yapmak için. 14:30

Cem: Öylemi, sen 7, 8 yaşındaydın o 12,13 yaşındaydı?

Sandra: Aynen, o tutuyordu; böyle şey yapılmaz diyordu. Neye göre yapılmaz? Kime göre yapılmaz? Ne oluyor'u ondan sonra idrak ettim. Öyle hatırlıyorum yani, öyle başladı gibi.

15:07 – Cem: Türkiye’de hani Musevi olduğun için kendini hiç ayrımcılığa uğramış hissettiğin oldu mu?

Sandra: Yok, olmadı. Yani şeyde hissettim. Okulda din derslerinde biz Üç kişi kütüphaneye giderdik aslında çok severdim, hani biz gidiyoruz tatil gibi ama aslında böyle bir farklılık...Farklılığı orada hissettim ama kötü bir şey olarak değil orada bir ayırım olduğunu hissediyorum. Din derslerinde mesela ortaokuldayken, lisedeyken. 15:38 Cem: Peki hiç Musevi kimliğini gizlemek zorunda olduğun zamanlar oldu mu? Olduysa ne zaman oldu, nasıl oldu ?

Sandra: Oldu. Mesela bir şeyde çok tereddüt ediyordum. Bir müşterimiz vardı.

Cem: Şirket mi yani?

Sandra: Bir şirket. Yani şey...

Cem: Mesleki şeye dair belki şeyi verebilirsin ?

16:07- Sandra: Yani şöyle, ben bir reklam ajasında çalıştığım için. Bir müşterimizin reklam işlerini almak istiyordum; ancak, onlar pek sıcak bakmadıkları için bizim dinimize.

Cem: Şirkette çalışan insanlar Musevi mi daha çok?

Sandra: Orada çalışanlar mı ?.

Cem: Hayır, sizin şirkette?

Sandra: Yok, değil ama ben sadece kendim tereddüt ettim. ki eğer söylersem bana tavırlı davranabilirler veya işi kaybedebiliriz diye. Çünkü, onlar biraz daha kendi dinleriyle birlikte hareket eden; yani onlara iş veren onları destekleyen tipler olduğu için Mesele orada ismimi söylemedim, ismimi mesela Sandra değil Melis. Daha fazla

rastlanan bir isim olduđu için mesela Melise çeviririm. Mesela, benim takma ismim soyadım vardır Melis Er diye.

Cem : Öyle mi?

Sandra: Gerçekten öyle. Mesela terziye giderim şey yaparım, hem ismimi anlamadıkları için zor olduđu için hem bir farklılık hissettmemek için. Direk Melis Er dediğim zaman kimse hiç bir şey sorgulamıyor. Böyle bir şey isim kullanma gerekliliği duyuyorum bazen. 17.15

Cem: Peki , şey...

Sandra: Mesela şu şeyi cevaplıyayım.

Cem: A evet evet. Onu da soracağım. Ondan önce şeye geleyim de.. Peki Musevi olmayan biriyle çıkmış mıydın hiç?

Sandra: Hayır.

Cem: Çıkmadım. Peki Musevilerin Musevi olmayan biriyle evlenmesi hakkında ne düşünüyorsun? Sence bu tip evliliklerde bir sorun çıkar mı? Eğer sorun çıkarsa ne gibi bir sorun çıkabilir?

Sandra: Eeee.. Ben..

Cem: Ya da çıkılmaz mı? Neyse artık...

Sandra: Ben şey değilim böyle, “Aa sakın” filan gibi bir düşüncem yok. Kendim tercih etmiyorum. Böyle de bir şeyi... Böyle.. Nasıl söyleyeyim. Kendim seçersem yolumu, kendi dinimden biriyle seçmeyi tercih ederim. Çünkü, farklılıklar olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Cem: Ne gibi?

Sandra: Yetiştirilme farklılıkları, gördükleri, bildikleri, her şey. Bence, evet günlük hayatta “Onu versene; onu alsana; mutfaktan şunu getirsene” de sorun çıkmayacak; ama, çok daha derinlerde çok büyük farklılıklar olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Cem: Ne gibi?

Sandra: Biz küçük bir toplum olduğumuz için, kendi aramızda bir konuşma tarzımız, şeklimiz, esprilerimiz... Bazı komik olan şeyler komik gelmeyebilir mesela o insana, ters gelebilir. Yani öyle bir şekilleniyoruz ki burda küçükken de, birlikte toplu toplu hareket ettiğimiz için, Kendi içimizdeki dil ve doğru olan bir şey kodluyoruz. Bu doğrudur diğeri terstir, bu böyledir. Hani böyle bir şey kodlandığı zaman, diğeri insana bu çevrede büyümediğinde ona çok garip gelebilir, ters gelebilir. Hareketler çok şey gelebilir. Hani ne bileyim ... Biz çok , şeylerimizi hareketlerimizi sertlikle dile getirmeyiz mesela. Böyle büyütülmedik, böyle yetiştirilmedik. Mesela kaba ve sert olarak çok sınırimız vardır. Ama diğeri türde bu ters. Yani nasıl söyleyeyim farklılık burda gözükebilir mesela. Çünkü yetiştirilme tarzı... Biraz daha kaba sert daha farklı

olabiliyor insanlar açısından. Çok da ayırım gibi konuşmak istemiyorum; ama, büyük farklılıklar olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Cem: Kaba sert darken ne kastediyorsun?

Sandra: Mesela sen bana bir şey söylersin, ben sana “Yapma” derim, bir daha dersin mesela beni rahatsız edecek bir şey; “Yapma” derim, bir daha söylersen oradan çeker giderim. Ama başka bir aile yetiştirilme tarzında sen bunu söylersin; başka dediğim yani Türkiye’de gördüğüm aile yapısından bahsediyorum hepsi için söylemiyorum; yapma dersin, bir şey söylersin, “Yapma” dersin, tekrar eder, “Yapma” dersin tekrar eder, “Yapma” dersin tekrar eder. Ondan sonra sen sert bir şey söylersin, karşısında sana vurabilir. Anlatabiliyor muyum?

Cem: Evet.

Sandra: Tahammül sınırları konusundan bahsediyorum. Yani bilmiyorum düzgün anlatabildim mi, yeterli anlatabildim mi de. Yani böyle kayıta olduğu için çok bir şey konuşamıyorum. Ama normalde böyle.

Cem: Yok rica ederim, sen nasıl şey sen, nasıl hissediyorsan.

Sandra: Yani farklılıklar bana böyle geliyor. Mesela bizi biraz daha tahammül ve daha böyle tatlı tatlı yavaşlıklarımız vardır mesela; her insan onu kaldıramaz. Anladın mı? Yani böyle sululuklar, bir şeyler. Nasıl söyleyeyim, ters gelebilir bir insana böyle. Mesela Ferit’i örnek vereyim.

Cem: Öyle mi?

Sandra: Hayır yani, nasıl Ferit’le bir insana espri yapsa onu algılayamayabilir. Ama, bize yapsa biz onu çok iyi algılayabiliyoruz; çünkü, bize bu normal geliyor. Ama, başkasına yapsa normal gelmeyip kırılabilir. Ama biz onu öyle kabul ediyoruz. Bizim alışkanlıklarımızda bu yönde birbirimize karşı. O yüzden farklı gelebilir başkasına hareketleri gibi düşünüyorum.

21.30- Cem: Anladım. Peki, jenerasyon.. Hani ben, bugün karma arkadaşlıkların hani arttığını gözlemliyorum; bilmiyorum sen de katılır mısın?

Sandra: Evet.. Evet.

Cem: Çok etnik gruplu, çok dinli...

Sandra: Benim çok yakın arkadaşlarım vardır.

Cem: Sen ne düşünüyorsun bu konuda?

Sandra: Yani bence çok güzel bir şey. Hatta o.... Bazen söylediklerim birbirleriyle çelişiyor olabilir; çünkü orada ben de çelişiyorum kendi içimde. Çünkü bir yandan yetiştirilmeyle ilgili bir yandan da hayatın getirdikleriyle ilgili karmaşıklıklar... Ben aslında ayırımı çok seven bir insan değilim. Keşke hiç farklılıklar olmasa... Arkadaşlıkta benim hiç böyle bir şeyim yoktur. Çok yakın arkadaşım var mesela. Hani.... Kendi



cemaatimden olmayan çok, yakın olmadığım kadar yakın arkadaşlarım var ve onlarla hiçbir farklılık bir şey hissetmiyorum. Ama durum bir aile kurmaya geldiği zaman biraz daha ince şeyler söz konusu olduğu için, orada biraz farklılıklar çıkıyor. Bu bahsettiğim şey arkadaşlıkta hiç takıldığım veya rahatsız eden veya farklılığı hissettiğim bir şey olmuyor. Arkadaşlarımla sanki gerçekten hiçbir farklılık yokmuş gibi; benimle yetişmiş bir insan gibi hissediyorum. Ama evlilik hani zor bir kurum olduğu için, burada su yüzüne çıkıyor bazı şeyler.

Cem: Peki şey, hmmm.., Okullarda, dini bayramlara katılıyormuy-.... şey hani milli – dini nerden çıktı – milli bayramlar özür dilerim. Milli bayramlara katılıyor muydun? Yani, 19 Mayıs, 23 Nisan gibi. Nasıl geçiyordu? Ne hissediyordun?

Sandra: Evet katılıyordum, hatta ben o kadar şey hissediyordum ki. Ben zaten o zaman, bu kadar fazla ayrılmışlık hissetmiyordum. Kendi içimde ben baya bayramlarda-

Cem: Orta okulda, lisede mi...

Sandra: Orta okuldayken mesela, orta bir belki beşinci sınıfta vs. Baya böyle kendi şeyim gibi görüyordum. Yani ağlıyordum bazen 10 Kasım'da filan ve bayrak taşıma törenlerinde filan ben taşıyordum. 23.29

Cem: Öyle mi?

Sandra: Yani çok saygı ve çok da mutlu olurduk. Ben çok fazla değer veren, milli marş çaldığında böyle ayağa kalkan-. Televizyonda çalardı ve ben küçükken de, daha tam televizyonda ayağa kalkınmayacağını bilmediğim yaşa kadar, milli marşlarda ayağa kalkardım yani. Ama, sonra farklılıkları hissettirttiler bana, büyüdükçe. Ve şuan sanki, evet, 100% o duyguyu hissedemiyorum maalesef. Halbuki, içimde vardı o duygu.

Cem: Peki, gerçi bundan biraz bahsettin de, bu din derslerinde çıkıyordun herhalde? Hani bir kaç arkadaşınla çıktığından bahsettin.

Sandra: Evet.

Cem: Çıktığında ne hissediyordun? Nasıl anlamlandırıyordun durumu?

Sandra: Benim için çok güzel bir vakitti. Çünkü böyle lay lay lom gibi; ama bazen de din derslerinde oturabilirsiniz dediği zaman da oturduğum zamanlar da oluyordu hani. Merak ettiğim için... Şey için değil hani. Merak ediyordum ne konuşuluyor, ne anlatıyorlar diye ve bazen kaldığım zamanlar da oluyordu. Derse katılmıyordum ama başka şeyler yapıyordum. Orada sadece bulunuyordum ama tabii ki kulağımda bu şeyler, neler konuşulduğu vs tabii hepsi farkındayım; nasıl işlendiğinin...

Cem: Öyle mi?

Sandra: Yani, beni rahatsız eden bir şey olmadı hiçbir zaman. O derste bulunmak çok olağan bir durum gibi geldi. Çünkü herkesin kendi şeyi var. Ama çok rahat kabullendim. Yani benim bu, istedikleri şeyi yapabilirler; ne konuşmalar komik geliyor, ne dalga geçilecek geliyor. Bence çok olağan ve normal bir durum. Aynı şeyi benim için de hissetmelerini isterdim. 25.09

25.15 -Cem: Cemaatin bir azınlık kimliği için koruyucu kapsayıcı olduğuna inanıyor musun? Gerekli olduğuna inanıyor musun?

Sandra: Evet aslında bunu yani %50 evet ise. Pardon %60 evet ise %40 hayır diye düşünüyorum. Yani oran aslında çok farklı bir uçurum değil, benim de kararsız kaldığım şeyler oluyor ama bir desteğinin olduğunu ve bunun bizi koruyacağına inanıyorum; ki ben Cemaat içinde yaşama algısı beni çok sıkan bir şey. Hep aynı insanlar... Gittiği yerler aynı, hep onları görmek zorundasın, hep insanlara hesap vermek zoundasın davranışlarıyla ilgili; çünkü senin her şeyini çok detaylı biliyorlar. Yarın öbür gün başıma bir şey geldiğinde böyle hemen yayılabilir. Başka çevrede olsam kimse kimseyi beni bir daha gördüğünde hatırlamaz. Ne yaptıysam, kötü bir şey yaptıysam o kötü yaptığım şey gizli kalabilir; anlatabiliyormuyum yani. Burada öyle bir mahremiyet yok. Her şeyi herkes biliyor; bu beni çok rahatsız ediyor. Ama dediğim gibi diğer bazı konularda da pozitif bir etkisi olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Cem: Sen Cemaat için bir şeyler yaptın mı bugüne kadar? Yapmayı planlarmısın ileride?

Sandra: Yaptım dediğim, evet yaptım. Bazı böyle destekleyici şeylere katıldım, nasıl söyleyeyim o genç partileri vs den ayrı. Yıldırım'dan ayrı olarak katıldığım şeyler oldu; semineler, seminerlerin insanları topladığı olaylar vs. ki hala da toplanıyor mesela.

Cem: Ne gibi seminerler?

27:00 - Sandra: Bir konuşmacı getiriyorlar mesela; iş geliştirme bilmem ne teknikleri falan fian gibi... Böyle şeyler olduğu zaman hala nasıl yayılabiliriz, nasıl duyurabilir, insanlar nasıl birlikte olur, bundan haberdar olur; bunun için var oluyorum bazı organizasyonlarda.

27.28 - Cem: Cemaati bir ev olarak görüyor musun?

Sandra: Görüyorum, ama çok fazla değil. Görüyorum, görüyorum diyelim..

Cem: Çok fazla değil derken veya görüyorum derken onu biraz açabilir misin?

27:40 Sandra: Yani görüyorum ki birlikteyiz. Şeyde görüyorum aslında, güzel şeylerde değil de kötü bir şey olduğunda haydi hep birlikte kaçalım. Sürü psikolojisi; yanında birileri var hissiyatı ,güzel bir şey. İyi bir şey olduğunda güzel. Benim cemaatimden biri güzel bir şey yaptığı zaman açıkçası bu hoşuma gidiyor. Ama inanılmaz da mutluluk şeyinde değilim; yani sadece kötü bir şeyde plan gibi birlikte yaparız, birlikte oluruz. Bunlar var, destekçim var gibi hissettim.

Cem: Son yıllarda Cemaat içinde gözlemlediğin bazı değişiklikler var mı ? Varsa neler?

Sandra: Var, insanlar artık bu Cemaat işinden çok uzaklaşıp kaçmaya başlıyor bence. Hatta, irite olduklarını düşünüyorum çoğu insanın. Bu toplu olma, bu şeyi yayma, Cemaat olayını yayma bunlar insanları irite ediyor ve bunlar daha çok yararından çok zararını gözterdiğini düşünüyorum. Bu sebeple insanlar bu konuya gıcık olmuş vaziyette yada konu şey oldu irite edici bir mevzuya döndü insanların; bazen de.

Cem: Niye böyle döndü mesela veya eskiden değilse böyle neden değildi?

Sandra: Bilmem belkide eskiden de öyleydi.

Cem: Öyle mi?

29:00 - Sandra : Çok şey değilim, benim gördüğüm yani bunu idrak edişimden itibaren söylüyorum. Eskiden çok daha fazla böyle Cemaat olayı vardı, bu toplanmalar, Cemaat içinden herkesi toplanmalar... Fazla ayırıştırıcı olması biraz rahatsız edici boyuta geliyor ve sana yaptırımları başkası söylediği zaman bunu bunu yapıp öyle yapmayın söylendiği zaman insanları rahatsız ediyor. Yani bir çocuğa nasıl yapma yapma, yapma dersin o da yapar. Sanli bu toplumda da bence öyle oldu.

29:38- Cem: Türkiye’de yaşamak nasıl bir duygu ? Türkiye’de Yahudi olarak yaşamak nasıl bir duygu gerçi paralel şeyler söyledik daha önce konuştuk ama yine de.. ?

29:57- Sandra: Güzel, hani zorlukları var; ama, kendimi biraz daha farklı hissediyorum. Farklı hissetmek de hoşuma gidiyor yani. Bu toplumda yaşayan daha farklı bir kesim olarak görüyorum. Farklılık derken ne bileyim aslında demin bahsettiğim şikayet ettiğim o Cemaat unsuru yeni herkesin anlatması, yayılması... Bunları ne kadar söylesem de bazı hoşuma giden yanları da oluyor. Ne bileyim, sen farklısın sana “Neden ismin böyle?” diye sorduklarında diğer arkadaşlarının yanında bunun sohbetini yapabiliyorsun?

Cem: Öyle mi?

30:36 - Sandra: Yani konuşabilirsin bunu sorduklarında çünkü onu da soruyorlar. Aynı şeyi paylaşmak hoşuna gidiyor insanın. Yani hem sormaları garip geliyor hem bazen de farklısın farklı olduğunu her şekilde hissediyorsun olumlu veya olumsuz farklı olmak güzel bana çok çok aşırı rahatsız edici gelmiyor.

Cem: Belli durumlarda günah keçisi ilan edilmek nasıl bir hissiyat yaratıyor? Mesela Gezi Olayları sırasında hükümet.

Sandra: Yo.

Cem: Gezi Olayları sırasında hükümet “arkasında Yahudi Lobisi var” dendi. Soma Faciası’nda işte...

Sandra: Sorunu anladım. Açıkçası bunları kaale almıyorum. Artık biraz komik vaziyete geldi. Belki söylediklerinde haklılık payı da olabilir ama boyutu saçma bir boyuta ulaştı. Böyle şeylerin söz konusu olamayacağı... Bazı olaylar var ki artık komik. Bazı şeylerin arkasında belki var şey yapmıyorum da. Artık “kuş uçtu sizin yüzünüzden” böyle bir raddeye gelince artık şey yapmıyorsun, çok ciddiye almıyorum.

Cem: Anladım, peki bu nasıl bir hissiyatı yaratıyor? Korku mu endişe mi? Yoksa durum o kadar da dramatik değil mi?

32:00 - Sandra: Benim en en son noktaya gelene kadar çok dramatik görmüyorum bu durumu. En son gün, evet, o gün konuştuğumuzda belki derim ki biz mahvolduk. Ama şu anda öyle görmüyorum sanki onları yaşamak için daha çok vakit varmış gibi.

Cem: Öyle mi?

32:10 - Sandra: Öyle hissediyorum, halbuki tam tersini herkes hissediyor.

Cem: Peki Türkiye'deki Musevi cemaatinde kadın olmak nasıl bir şey yani, nasıl bir?

Sandra: Güzel çünkü ben şeyleri severim geleneksel şeyleri sevdiğim için genellikle kadının görevidir bu olaylar.

32:39 - Cem: Ne gibi?

Sandra: Mesela bir Cuma akşamı bir şey yapmak. Masaya ekmeği koymak; mumları yakmak bunlar kadınları görevidir erkekler Sinagoga gitmekle yükümlüdür. Sen de bu şeyleri yapmakla yükümlüsün; bu düzenlemeleri aileyi bir araya getirmeyi, bilmem neyi yapmakla yükümlüsün. Bu benim hoşuma gidiyor yani güzel bir şey bence. Bir de şu güzel dinin annelikten geçiyor olması güzel bir duygu yani benim çocuğuma benim dinimin geçmesi ben kimle evlenirsem evleneyim, ben taşıyan kişi olduğum için onu hoşuma gidiyor.

33:35 - Cem: 6,7 Eylül, Varlık Vergisi, Trakya Olayları gibi olayları ilk nereden duydun, ilk ne zaman duydun ve bu olayları duyduğunda ne hissettin?

33:48 Sandra: Bu şeyle ilgili aslında; belgesel vardı, çok seneler evvel bunun bir filmini çekmişlerdi. İlk defa o zaman ben, "bu ne ya?" falan diye, bunun aslında bize yapıldığını farkettim.

Cem: Ne belgeseliydi?

Sandra: Belgeselin ismini hatırlamıyorum. Bu bir filmi. Belgesel ya da filmi; çok çok net hatırlamıyorum. Küçüktüm de. Bunu seyretmeye gitmiştik. Halbuki ben aslında çok haberdar değildim bu mevzunun bizim üzerimizden döndüğünü.

Cem: Kaç yaşındaydın?

Sandra: 14 belki filan yani, öyle bir şeydi. Ki böyle bir şey aslında, bir sebebi var hani. Bu filmi izliyoruz çünkü bizimle ilgili.

Cem: Bu filmi evde izliyorsunuz ama değil mi?

Sandra: Sinemada.

Cem: Ha sinemada izliyordunuz.

Sandra: Ve ben sinema izlemeye gitmiştim. Çok net bilmiyordum; öyle olur ya gidersin.

Cem: Film neydi ama hatırlamıyorsun. Neyle ilgiliydi? 6-7 Eylül'le mi ilgiliydi?

Sandra: Evet evet. İnsanlar kaçtığı zaman, kaçmak zorunda kaldıkları dönemlerle ilgili tekrar bir canlandırma yapmışlardı. İşte bu vergiler, vesaireler. İşte dükkanların

kırılması, yıkılması vesaireleri böyle çok net hatırlıyorum filmde. Ben öyle öğrenmişim mesela bu olayı.

Cem: Peki ne hissettirmişti o zaman? Nasıl olduğunu hatırlıyor musun?

Sandra: Yani aslında bu çok net bir şekilde ayrımcılığın aslında insana kodlandığı bir zaman. Ben bunu 14 yaşında izlediğim zaman, bunun niye bize yapıldığını sorguladığım zaman, orada işte farklı bir şeye dair... 35.23. O zaman bunu hissettirdi bana.

Cem: Peki başka yerlerden duydun mu? Ailenden, arkadaşlarından, ya da başka bir yerden öğrendin mi? Ya da ne bileyim bir gazeteden, kitaptan.

Sandra: Babamdan öğrendim. O anlatmıştı daha sonrasında biraz daha akliselim bir yaşa geldiğim zaman.

Cem: Daha yetişkinken öyle mi?

Sandra: Evet evet evet. Daha böyle neden neden diye ayrıntısıyla öğrenmişim.

Cem: Neyi? 6-7 Eylül'ü mü Trakya'yı mı hangisini?

Sandra: O vergiyi. Neden vergi alınmıyordu ne kadar vergi alınmıyordu, ne yaptılar vesaire.

*Respondent requested to change tables. Record was paused and we moved to another table. She was concerned people would hear us. Record continued again after changing seats.*

36.15 - Cem: A iyi burası daha iyi. Bu 6-7 Eylül, Trakya, Varlık Vergisi gibi nereden öğrendiğinden bahsediyorduk. Başka ekleyebileceğin bir şey var mı?

Sandra: Başka ekleyebileceğim şey, sonra ben bir filmde oynamıştım da bu aslında vergi meselesiyle-

Cem: A filmde mi oynamıştın?

Sandra: Bir tane bununla ilgili bir belgeselde oynamıştım. Belgeselin ismini soracaksan unuttum, ben sana sonra söylerim. Bu şey, ... pasaport hani... Türk. Bu olayında bir hikayesi var tabi ben şu anda... Pasaport veriyorlar ya hani Türk-

Cem: Almanya'dan...

Sandra: Evet kaçabilmek için. Türk pasaportu verilme, trenle kaçırıyorsun vesaire vesaire. Onun bir belgeselinde oynamıştım ve bence belgesel çok güzel bir belgeseldi.

Cem: Öyle mi?

Sandra: Evet. Sonra ismini söylerim; ismini unuttum. Mesela orada benim arkadaşlarım bunu yapıyordu, içinde dâhildi. Benim de oynamamı istediler. Ben de orada oynarken hani, "Hiç rol yapmıyorusun", gerçekten sanki olan bir şeyi canlan- yani çok böyle şey hissetmedim. Yani yine aynı kişiyim ama orada başka hareketler yapıyorum. Nasıl söyleyeyim çok yabancı gelmedi orada onlar çekerlerken ben sanki onları izliyordum,

bu olaylar oldu, başımızdan bu olaylar geçti gibi düşünüyordum içindeyken de. İnsanlara bazen farklı geliyor ya hani, ne bu olay filan diye onlar yabancı kalıyor.

37.50 - Cem: Peki okuldaki arkadaşların mıydı? Arkadaşlarım dedin ya.

Sandra: Üniversiteden. Sinema Televizyon okudum ya. Oradan arkadaşlarım, çalışıyordum prodüksiyon şirketinde. Ben şey bulma, insan bulma, kast kısmında arıyorlardı. Bana da dediler ki “sen oynar mısın zaten sen de tam uygunsun. Hani tipin de uygun”. Tipine ona göre bakıyorlardı, hani biraz Yahudi’ye benzesin diye bakıyorlardı. İşte orada oynamıştım mesela.

Cem: Ben bilmiyorum sen de katılır mısın, bu son zamanlarda yurtdışına göçlerde bir artış gözlemliyorum. Sence bu göçlerin nedeni nedir? Ya da göç nasıl rasyonel bir seçenek haline geliyor?

Sandra: Yani ben göçlerin sadece burada yaşanan yaşama zorluğundan dolayı olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Farklılık olarak farklılıktan kaynaklandığını düşünmüyorum. Mesela maddi olarak da insan gitmek zorunda kalıyor buradan. Ve gittiği yerler genelde şey oluyor.

Cem: Ne oluyor?

Sandra: Medina oluyor. Oraya gidiyorlar ama biz onu farklı algılıyoruz. Hani burada yaşanmazmış gibi algılıyoruz. Halbuki bazen maddi zorluklardan dolayı gidiliyor. Anladın mı?

Cem: Anladım. Mesela Amerika’ya, Kanada, İngiltere gibi yerlere göç ile İsrail’e göç arasında bir farklılık var mı? Farklı motivasyonları var mı bunun?

Sandra: Farklı motivasyonları var evet.

Cem: Ne gibi mesela?

Sandra: Biri daha dine dönüş gibi geliyor bana. Hani sanki oraya gidince, Amerika’ya gidince daha laylaylom ama oraya gidince biraz daha dini vazifelerini yapmak durumundaymışsın gibi geliyor. Aslında belki hiç alakası yok ama bana öyle geliyor.

Cem: Ama insanlar mesela...

Sandra: Mesela mesela her Cuma mesela, orada toplanıp yemek yersin gibi geliyor. Halbuki Amerika’da da belki yersin ama, belki de yemezsin. Zorunluluğun yok ama sanki oraya gidince böyle oraya uyum sağlarsın. Belki de orada bizim kadar dikkat etmiyorlardır. Cuma akşamları, onlar için çok önemli olmayan aileler vardır. Biz bunları bizim için daha şey kalıyor.

Cem: Göç eden... Oraya geçelim mi?

Sandra: (*laughs*) Zig zag yapıyoruz.

Cem: (*laughs*) Biz de baya göç ettik.

Sandra: Biz de göç ediyoruz.

Cem: Peki bir saniye, Özür diliyorum.

*40.43 - Respondent requested to change tables. Record was paused and we moved to another table. She was concerned people would hear us. Record continued again after changing seats.*

Cem: Peki göç edenler hani, kalan Cemaat içinde nasıl algılanıyor? Gittiler iyi mi yaptılar deniyor? Bireysel tercihleridir mi deniyor? Ya da bir sitem var mı? Senin bir gözlemin var mı? Ya da fikrin nedir?

Sandra: Bence bireysel olarak algılanıyor.

Cem: Öyle mi, ne gibi mesela?

Sandra: Evet. Toplu bir hareket gibi algılanmıyor. Böyle bir şeye karar verdiler ve artık orada yaşayacaklar, diye düşünüyorum ben. “A onlar da gittiler, bu şeyin bir parçası olmaya” diye düşünmüyorum. Sanki öyle karar verdiler ve artık orada yaşayacaklar.

Cem: Peki, göçün çok güncel can alıcı bir mesele olduğunu düşünüyor musun Cemaat açısından?

Sandra: Toplam, kişi sayısı azsa düşünmüyorum. Ama çok aşırı çoğalırsa, evet, hani bir anda ne oluyoruz, niye böyle bir şey var, acaba bir şey mi geliyor, bir şey mi yaklaşıyor endişesi gelebilir insana.

Cem: Hımm peki şu anda öyle mi hissediyorsun?

Sandra: Hayır... hayır.

Cem: Peki şu anda öyle hissetmiyorsun.

Cem: Peki son yıllarda hani cemaatte gözlemlediğin bazı ekonomik değişiklikler var mı?

Sandra: Var.

Cem: Ne gibi?

Sandra: Cemaate özgü değil bence genel bir değişiklik var.

Cem: Cemaate özgü değil mi?

Sandra: Değil.

Cem: Kendi sosyal çevrene özgü mü?

Sandra: Evet evet.

Cem: Ne mesela?

Sandra: Yaşam standartlarının düştüğünü düşünüyorum.

Cem: Öyle mi?

Sandra: Evet. Bizim anne babalarımızın zamanındaki yaşam ve para kazanma durumunun şu anda olmadığını düşünüyorum. Sanki para kazanmak çok daha zorlaştı, çok daha fazla emek harcaman gerekiyor gibi düşünüyorum şu anda.

Cem: Peki şey... Kendini hangi kimlikle tanımlarsın, işte ne bileyim Türk, Yahudi, kadın, ya da mesleki bir kimlik olabilir?

Sandra: Eeeee... Hımmm... (*takes a few seconds to think*) Kendimi nasıl tanımlarım? ... Bilmiyorum.. Yani hepsi. Özel bir şeyim yok. Hani bu yönüm daha ağır basar diye kafamda bir şeyim yok. Yani yönüm derken bu tarafım diye bir şey yok. Hepsinden biraz karışık.

Cem: Peki şey, bu kimliklerin hani gündelik rituellerini yerini getiriyor musun?

Sandra: Hayır. Getirmedığım zamanlar da oluyor, getirdiğim zamanlar da oluyor.

Cem: Mesela getirdiğin zamanlar neler yapıyorsun, ya da getirmedığın zamanlar neler yapmıyorsun?

Sandra: Mesela işle ilgili mi?

Cem: Hepsini dediğin için şimdi daha şey oldu...

Sandra: Evet hepsini çünkü yani hepsini getirebildiğin kadar. Bence yani zaten hepsinden oluşuyor yaşam. Hepsi her gün aynı şeyleri yapmıyorum hepsi için ama hepsi karışık olarak hayatımda dönem dönem yani onların daha baskın olduğu şeyler oluyor. Mesela iş hayatı! İş hayatında iş hayatı kısmım daha baskın oluyor. Yani o karakterim daha yüzeye çıkıyor. Diğer tarafısa... Yani dediğim gibi hepsi dönem dönem. Böyle bir çok sabit bir hepsi için spesifik yaptığım bir şey yok. Hiç biri için.

Cem: Hayattaki öncelikli amacın nedir? Ne bileyim iyi bir insan olmak, belli bir ekonomik refaha sahip olmak, iyi bir Yahudi olmak, iyi bir Vatandaş olmak?

Sandra: Öncelikli şeyim, anne olmak.

Cem: Öyle mi?

Sandra: Evet. Benim çok yüksek annelik içgüdü. O yüzden anne olmayı çok istiyorum. Ve iyi bir anne olmak istiyorum. Ve iyi bir insan olarak hayatıma devam etmek istiyorum. Yani karakterimi yaşam bozmasın istiyorum, kötüleşmeyeyim, gaddarlaşmayayım, sertleşmeyeyim istiyorum ama gitgide maalesef ki biraz bu şeylerim değişiyor.

Cem: Neden dolayı değişiyor sence?



Sandra: İnsanlardan dolayı. Evde o güvenli ortamında yaşadığım gibi olmuyor dışarıda ve g\*tünü kollaman gerekiyor. (*laughs*). Bunu da yazarsın.

Cem : (*laughs*) Evet sen, çok sađol teŖekkür ederim. Zaman ayırdığın için çok sađol.