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**JEAN MONNET CENTRE  
OF EXCELLENCE**

# BİLGİ EUROPEAN INSTITUTE NEWSLETTER

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Dear Friends,

We would like to welcome you all to the 10<sup>th</sup> newsletter of the European Institute of İstanbul Bilgi University. We are very honoured and excited to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the European Institute, which has so far organized many scientific and public conferences, seminars, exhibitions, conducted many research activities within the framework of Horizon 2020, Marie Curie Fellowships, TÜBİTAK Fellowships, and Jean Monnet Programs, established a Double Degree MA Program, continued the activities of an already existing European Studies MA Program, published many books and articles, generated several Jean Monnet Modules, established a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, formed two Jean Monnet Chairs, hosted many researchers and interns, invited several world-wide renowned scholars and decision makers, produced online material for secondary school students and teachers, continuously supported capacity building projects within the framework of the European integration process, and last but not least, established very fruitful international collaborations with higher education institutions, the European Parliament, European Commission, German Academic Exchange Program (DAAD), Viadrina University, Sciences Po-Paris, European University Institute and several others. Inside the newsletter you will see more written by Gülperi Vural, the Administrative Coordinator of the European Institute.

This issue contains information on the activities, publications, conferences, workshops, graduate programs, research activities, social outreach projects and opinions of our students. The newsletter starts with the depiction of three ongoing Horizon 2020 projects on the Critical Heritages in Europe, the future of Turkey-EU Relations, and the multilevel governance of mass migration in Europe. These research activities are followed by other research activities such as Marie Curie projects, TÜBİTAK Projects and Jean Monnet Projects. You will also find in the newsletter news from our DAAD Fellow, Dr. Malte Fuhrmann, and Aziz Nesin Chair, Dr. İnan Rüma.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Newsletter includes also a scientific contribution driven from ongoing research activities: "The Rise of Populism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity" written by Ayhan Kaya, the leader of the Work Package 2 within the framework of Horizon 2020 Research Project called CoHERE: Critical Heritages in Europe. The newsletter continues with a detailed depiction of conferences, roundtable meetings and workshops held last year by the European Institute. Some news from our students, graduates, interns, and publications will follow.

On this occasion we would like to express our appreciation to the Rectorate and the Board of Trustees of İstanbul Bilgi University which have always supported our activities. But most importantly, we would like to express our gratefulness to you all for your continuous support to the European Institute. We wish you all a pleasant New Year...



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# HORIZON 2020 Projects

## HORIZON 2020 Cultural Heritage Project (CoHERE)



### Critical Heritages: Performing and Representing Identities in Europe

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 693289.

### What does the CoHERE Project Investigate?

Funded by the European Union, and coordinated by Newcastle University (UK); the cross-cutting study involves 12 partners across nine European countries. The consortium comprised of several research team looks at heritage and identity across diverse European territories to see how different aspects of cultural heritage influences contemporary identities in Europe. In doing so, the project explores both national identities and European identity through an investigation of heritage and memory.

### What is the CoHERE Critical Archive (CCA)?

One of the most interesting aspects of this project is the CoHERE Critical Archive (CCA, available at: <http://cohere-ca.ncl.ac.uk/#/grid>). CCA is a dynamic digital repository and linking mechanism for content produced through or in relation to the CoHERE project. It includes critical essays, articles, reports and literature reviews, films and audio recordings, data files, case studies and profiles of practice-based research. The CCA intend to show the diverse links among the various issues tackled through the CoHERE project.

### What is CoHERE Work Package 2 (WP2)? What are the Objectives of WP2?

In the spirit of cultural diversity and the diverse nature of heritages, the CoHERE project has various research areas. These are groups under Work Packages (WP), which investigate specific questions or areas. Istanbul Bilgi University's European Institute is the lead research Institute for Work Package 2 (WP2) titled 'the Use of Past in Political Discourse and the Representation of Islam in European Museums'. WP2 is led by Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, with Chiara De Cesari (University of Amsterdam), Wayne Modest (Research Centre for Material Culture at the National Museum of World Cultures) and Chris Whitehead (Newcastle University).

WP2 investigates the use of past in political discourse and the representation of Islam in European museums. It deconstructs public/popular discourses and dominant understandings of a homogeneous "European heritage" and the exclusion of groups such as minorities. The WP focuses on the position of "Others" within or outwith European heritages and identities, attending particularly to the place in contemporary European societies. Objectives of WP2 are to critically review and theorize key concepts, such as "European heritages", "European identity" and "collective memory" in relation to academic literature, museum and heritage practice, value cultures, politics and policy and EU structures and agendas.



## The Research So Far...

Director of the European Institute Professor Ayhan Kaya prepared a report reviewing the literature on cultural/religious/civilizational reification, globalization and populist politics in Greece, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The report shed light on the need for empirical research in these countries in order to investigate the factors leading to the political radicalization of individuals responding to the detrimental effects of the ongoing change resulting in fear against the unknown (for instance, Islam, migrants, and refugees).

Furthermore, the research team conducted the field research in six countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Turkey). The fieldwork was comprised of in-depth interviews with 20 private individuals who identify with populist parties or movements, namely France's The Front National, Germany's Alternative für Deutschland, Greece's LAOS, Golden Dawn and SYRIZA, Italy's Five Star Movement, The Netherlands' Party for Freedom, and Turkey's Justice and Development Party. The interviews explored the strategies that populist movements and political parties deploy in their communications with private citizens. The fieldwork also explored individuals' opinions on multiculturalism, immigration, globalization and the European Union.



## The Preliminary Findings From the Fieldwork

Preliminary findings indicate that social, economic and financial difficulties lead to the escalation of fear and prejudice vis-a-vis the others who are ethno-culturally and religiously different. While there are various approaches to understanding the rise of populist movements and parties across Europe and elsewhere, leaders often use common strategies to communicate with their supporters. These include opposing present institutional arrangements, opposing a mandated political establishment and the political elite, taking on marginal positions, as well as polarizing and personalizing politics. As such, populist leaders emphasize a homogeneous national identity, and nativism, thereby producing a political discourse that attempts to isolate the others. The fieldwork study aimed at exploring the effects of such discourse on private individuals who support populist movements or parties. The data from the fieldwork will shed light on the types of communication strategies that attract these individuals, while also exploring how platforms, such as social media, are utilized in reaching out to the public. Our next report will also investigate how citizens see the relations between national cultural heritage and values, and those of Europe.

**COHERE Home Page:** <http://research.ncl.ac.uk/cohere/>

**CoHERE Home Page at BİLGİ:** <http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr/en/programs/ufuk-2020-kulturel-miras-projesi-cohere/>

# FEUTURE

THE FUTURE OF EU-TURKEY RELATIONS:  
MAPPING DYNAMICS AND TESTING SCENARIOS



Horizon 2020  
European Union Funding  
for Research & Innovation

## Horizon 2020 Future of EU-Turkey Relations (FEUTURE) [www.feuture.eu](http://www.feuture.eu)

*This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976.*

FEUTURE (Future of EU-Turkey Relations) **reveals the narratives and drivers of the EU-Turkey relationship, the likely scenario(s) for the future, and the implications these may have on the EU and Turkey, as well as the neighbourhood and the global scene.** In forward-looking terms, FEUTURE contributes to the knowledge base of the external environment the EU operates in, providing a strong, evidence-based foundation from which the future trajectory of EU-Turkey relations may be drawn.

The project identifies six prevalent thematic dimensions of EU-Turkey relations that structure our research across four levels of analysis: The EU, Turkey, the neighbourhood and the global scene.

**The political dimension** is most closely related with the overall pace of EU-Turkey relations. Research takes into consideration that progress in Turkey's political performance has often been related to and has justified progress in Turkey's European integration and vice versa. At the same time, setbacks in Turkey's democratization has been linked to stagnation in its European integration path.

**The economics dimension** focuses on the economic ties between Turkey and the EU, and the way these are conditioned both by the economic performances of the two sides and by relations with the neighbourhood and global markets.

### Security dimension:

**In the security dimension**, Turkey's membership of NATO (as the second largest armed force in the Alliance) critically shapes EU-Turkey relations (as well as EU-NATO relations). Likewise, Turkish ambitions to become an independent regional power affect security ties with the EU. At the same time, Turkey's relations with the EU condition both the EU and Turkey's relations with the neighbourhood as well as with key global actors such as Russia and the United States.

In the light of Turkey's growing importance for the EU's quest for energy security through the diversification of energy sources and routes, **the energy dimension** will focus on whether Turkey will end up representing an energy hub, for Europe at the heart of the Southern Corridor and thus contribute to the EU's energy security.

Concerning the **migration dimension**, the research analyses the flows of skilled migrants between Turkey and the EU, the transit of irregular migrants from Turkey into the EU, and the evolution of Turkish and EU asylum policies, and the way these have affected the broader scope of the EU-Turkey relationship. **The identity dimension** focuses on the diverse perception of identity of both Turkey and Europe by Turkish and EU actors.

**The consortium** includes 15 partner institutions including IAI in Italy; University of Cologne in Germany (coordinator); CIDOB in Spain; ELIAMEP in Greece; Middle East Technical University (METU), Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), Koç University, İstanbul Bilgi University European Institute and Sabancı University from Turkey; Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), DIIS in Denmark; The American University in Cairo in Egypt, CIFE in France, Caucasus Resource Center CRRC in Georgia and MERI from Erbil, Northern Iraq.

Istanbul Bilgi University's main tasks within FEUTURE  
**Contribution to:**

### WP1 "Conceptual and Analytical Toolkit":

WP 1 which aims at providing an analytical toolkit for the project encompassing two steps: (1) Historical analysis in light of narratives which have shaped the debate and political action both in Turkey and in the EU, thereby informing the scenario building and the thematic analysis in WP 2-7; (2) Conceptualising three forward-looking ideal-type scenarios for EU-Turkey relations: conflict, cooperation and convergence. The purpose of the scenariobuilding is to stylise what conditions would need to be met in the EU and in Turkey, and what would be the facilitating or constraining conditional factors at the neighbourhood and global levels, for the realisation of these scenarios.

### WP6 "Migration Drivers":

WP6 aims at identifying key direct and indirect migration-related drivers since 1999 at four levels of analysis (Turkey, EU, neighbourhood, global) that are likely to lead to the realisation of one of the three envisaged ideal-type scenarios: Conflict, cooperation or convergence in EU-Turkey relations. The WP analyses three focal issues: Skilled migration, irregular (transit) migration, and asylum, since these three areas are currently the focus in the development of the European Agenda on Migration but also of importance to Turkey. Two main questions will be addressed: (1) What migration drivers are relevant and what constellation of them exist? (2) What are the most prominent drivers both within each focal issue and across them? Lastly, on the basis of the research results, the WP will be able to offer a projected most likely scenario regarding the future EU-Turkey relation in the area of migration.

### WP8 "Synthesis of Research Findings and Policy Recommendations":

WP 8 "Synthesis of Research Findings and Policy Recommendations" which has a threefold goal: (1) rank the drivers across the thematic WPs and synthesise the likely scenario across all thematic dimensions (2) assess the consequences of the three ideal type scenarios, and in particular of the empirically most likely scenario of EU-Turkey relations for the EU, Turkey, as well as for their relations with the neighbourhood (including on protracted regional conflicts, migratory patterns, trade and investment flows, energy dynamics and identity politics) and with global powers (US, Russia and emerging countries); (3) extrapolate evidence-based policy recommendations for the EU and for Turkey aimed at preventing a plausible worst-case scenario and realising a plausible best-case scenario for the EUTurkey relationship, with an eye to the strategic interests of both parties.

### WP9 "Dissemination and Outreach":

WP 9 whose primary objective is to raise the awareness and knowledge about the drivers and implications of future scenarios of EU-Turkey relations as developed in WP1 to 8 and disseminate the findings of the project.



**Joint Workshop of WP 6 & 7 in Athens  
On September 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2016 the First Workshop of the  
WP6 'Migration Drivers' and WP7 'Identity and Culture**

Drivers' was held in Athens, Greece. Hosted by ELIAMEP, in cooperation with Koç University, the workshop sought to identify commonalities and shared issues of research between the two work packages. Partners participating discussed their respective tasks and methodological approach, enabling also an exchange of information and ideas between the two teams. The workshop concluded that particularly on contemporary events, there is an overlap between the work packages as regards drivers (for example visa liberalization) and that the teams will maintain an exchange of resources and information, where needed, to incorporate each other's findings in the respective material produced.

BİLGİ's European Institute, as a partner of the WP6, focuses on the state of the mobility of highly-skilled European citizens towards Turkey since 1999, and the impact of irregular migration on Turkey since the early 2000s. In this regards, Professor Ayhan Kaya conducted a field research in Ankara and İstanbul where he interviewed various state actors, international institutions, highly-skilled European citizens, and some relevant NGOs.

# Horizon2020 RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond



With the goal of enhancing the governance capacity and policy coherence of the EU, its member states and neighbors, RESPOND is a comprehensive study of migration governance in the wake of the 2015 Refugee Crisis. Bringing together 14 partners from 7 disciplines, the project probes policy-making processes and policy (in) coherence through comparative research in source, transit and destination countries. RESPOND analyzes migration governance across macro (transnational, national), meso

(sub-national/local) and microlevels (refugees/migrants) by applying an innovative research methodology utilizing legal and policy analysis, comparative historical analysis, political claims analysis, socio-economic and cultural analysis, longitudinal survey analysis, interview based analysis, and photovoice techniques. It focuses in-depth on: (1) Border management and security, (2) International refugee protection, (3) Reception policies, (4) Integration policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanization and externalization. We use these themes to examine multi-level governance while tackling the troubling question of the role of forced migration in precipitating increasing disorder in Europe. In contrast to much research undertaken on governance processes at a single level of analysis, RESPOND's multilevel, multi-method approach shows the co-constitutive relationship between policy and practice among actors at all three levels; it highlights the understudied role of meso-level officials; and it shines a light on the activities of non-governmental actors in the face of policy vacuums. Ultimately, RESPOND will show which migration governance policies really work and how migrants and officials are making-do in the two frequent absence of coherent policies. Adhering to a refugee-centered approach throughout, RESPOND will bring insights to citizenship, gender and integration studies, ensure direct benefit to refugee communities and provide a basis for more effective policy development.

**Partners:**

- 1 UPPSALA UNIVERSITET Sweden
- 2 THE GLASGOW CALEDONIAN UNIVERSITY United Kingdom
- 3 GEORG-AUGUST-UNIVERSITÄT GÖTTINGENSTIFTUNG OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS Germany
- 4 THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE United Kingdom
- 5 İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ Turkey
- 6 Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul Sweden
- 7 ÖZYEĞİN ÜNİVERSİTESİ Turkey
- 8 UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI FIRENZE Italy
- 9 PANEPISTIMIO AIGAIU Greece
- 10 OESTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN Austria
- 11 UNIWERSYTET WARSZAWSKI Poland
- 12 KOBENHAVNS UNIVERSITET Denmark
- 13 Lebanon Support Lebanon
- 14 The Hammurabi Human Rights Organization

**Starts. December 2017**

**Ends December 2020**



## Marie Curie Projects



### **The Europeanisation of the Organised Civil Society in Turkey: The Case of the Youth Organisations in the Prospect of the European Integration (EUROCS) - Cristiano Bee**

#### **Active Citizenship in Europe. Practices and Demands in the EU, Italy, Turkey and in the UK.**

The focus of EUROCS was the analysis of civic and political participation in Turkey. The project came in a crucial moment for the analysis of active citizenship in the Turkish context. It started in the aftermath of occupy gezi and ended few months after the attempted military coup of July 2016. As such, it offered a number of important insights for understanding the opportunities that civil society activists have to participate, but also the constraints put on them and that hinder their participatory behaviours.

The project has produced a relevant amount of outputs, some are underway and will be published across 2018. Part of the qualitative data has been useful for me to complete my recently published research monograph titled 'Active Citizenship in Europe. Practices and Demands in the EU, Italy, Turkey and the UK' (Palgrave, 2017). The book provides an overview of key issues in the debate concerning the emergence of active citizenship. The specific focus of enquiry is the promotion of patterns of civic and political engagement, and civic and political participation by the EU and the relative responses drawn by organizations of the civil society operating at the supranational level and in three different countries (Italy, Turkey and the UK). More specifically, it addresses key debates on the engagement and participation of organized civil society across the permanent state of euro-crisis, considering the production of policy discourses along the continuum that characterized three subsequent and interrelated emergency situations (democratic, financial and migration crises) that hit Europe since 2005. As such, it sheds light on the reframing of key policy priorities by institutional and non-state actors in regard to civic and political engagement and civic and political participation along this period.

The monograph greatly benefitted from the methodological and theoretical framework that I developed during the first year of the Marie Curie project. The period of time that I spent at the European Institute of Istanbul Bilgi University helped me to build deeper knowledge of the Turkish case study and provided me with extremely important data for the comparison with the other socio-political contexts that I have been studying since my GARNET visiting fellowship at the Institute of European Studies of the Free University of Brussels in 2008. My contribution in the field of active citizenship is based on data collected with groups that are part of the organized civil society and with members of the European Commission. Hence it deals with one but yet very important side of the debate regarding engagement and participation and the mechanisms that stimulate active behaviours of civic and a political nature. At the EU level and in all the three countries that I investigated, to different degrees, networks of interests have generated in order to fulfil the task to be part of wider deliberative and participatory systems that are crucial in order to overcome the limitations of representative democracy.

The comparison highlighted some characteristics of the territorial contexts of interest. The key aspects are the differences that derive from different models of state formation and the influence these have in determining contrasting configurations of civic and political engagement and civic and political participation. The data analysis presented in the book aims at discussing further these differences, by outlining critical dimensions, similar patterns but also peculiar characteristics of each context.

As it results from the analysis, Italy, Turkey and the UK hold similar characteristics. All of them have engaged in a process of profound reform in their state organization, that implied a reconfiguration of public administration -and consequently of public policy- that follows principles of New Public Management. In all cases this implied a renegotiation of the boundaries of the public space by enhancing principles of governance. Processes of decentralization and devolution are central in this sense, as well as the strong emphasis on the promotion of active citizenship as a practice. At the basis of the attempt to stimulate participatory behaviors there is the policy need to develop citizen-centered models of policy-making. In terms of developments and principles that orient this strategy, the prominence given to civic and political engagement is considered essential. In other words, the three countries have -at least on paper- committed to stimulate processes that enhance participatory behaviors through civic and political participation. There are however substantial variations in terms of development, and impact.

In Italy, the lack of trust toward institutional matters and the constant process of reform of the public administration make the principles of active citizenship as a practice blurred and somewhat inconsistent. At the same time, this matches with the presence of different forms of civic activism, generated through volunteering, social activity, etc. that are bottom-up and well representative of the presence of various experiences and demands for active citizenship. These are shaped outside channels of representative democracy, as a structural element of the Italian context. At the same time, however, it is important to note the persistent fragmentation between the Italian North and the Italian South, and the consequent heterogeneity existing in developing social solidarity between different Italian regions. This led into a connotation that I defined as contested active citizenship, because of the different voices -institutional and non- and processes - top-down and bottom-up - that compete in the Italian scenario.

In Turkey, active citizenship as a practice has been promoted more recently and particularly as a consequence of the impact of the process of top-down Europeanization on both governmental structures and non-state actors. This has been key in stimulating the process of democratization of the country and in influencing the pattern of reform that Turkish public institutions have been following under the AKP rule. Governance and management reform have been promoted in order to challenge the traditional state centric structure of the Turkish Republic, following an attempt to promote a citizen-centered approach. However, research on the impact of the EU civil society policy on Turkey, as well as the analysis of the governmental initiatives for promoting active citizenship –in example city councils- shows that this approach still suffers from many limitations, with the main shortcomings being the lack of activation of processes favoring engagement and political participation in public policy processes. Turkey, more than Italy and the UK, is a country with different experiences regarding the emergence of active citizenship as a demand. Processes of bottom-up mobilization however are volatile and appear to gain importance only in key moments, when windows of opportunities to initiate processes of social change open up and put into question the legitimacy of the political system to act in matters of public concern. Overall, I defined the connotation taken in the Turkish context as volatile active citizenship, because of the persistent impossibility for non-state actors to act as critical actors in public policy processes.

The British context is one that has favored the development of active citizenship in different stages and under different political conditions that have appeared in the last 30 years and even more. It has been on the top of the agenda of the New Right (under Thatcher and Major), of the New Labour (under Blair and Brown), of the Coalition Government (composed by Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) and more recently by the Conservative government led by David Cameron until June 2016 when the Tory leader resigned as a consequence of the Brexit vote. Across this period of time, it has been associated to different social and political needs and has been strongly affected by different connotations promoted under Neo Liberal, Third Way and Big Society approaches. At the same time and this is a crucial issue- active citizenship as a practice has intertwined with active citizenship as a demand in the context of the emergence of various social problems that put into crisis the British society in the last 15 years. The second category-expressed through volunteerism and the development of bottom-up demands for a better integration between ethnic communities in Britain- has corresponded with the first category –expressed through a policy reflection that has put the need to develop community engagement as key priority. Britain, more than Italy and Turkey, is therefore characterized by assuming a connotation that I defined as institutionalized active citizenship, due to the wide set of measures developed in order to favor the expression of civic and political participation in public policy.

These three configurations of active citizenship clearly affect the process through which each country has reacted to the force of Europeanization. The data collected through interviews of civil society activists and analysis of policy documents reveal in fact three different scenarios. In Italy, activists appear to be ambivalent in respect to the evaluation of the European project and more precisely in regard to its impact for enhancing bases for engagement and participation. The lack of a political union and of a social Europe is what makes, in the views of the activists, the EU as a top-down process without a soul, which becomes even more evident with the intensification of the financial and migration crises. These bring about different appeals for an alternative Europe and calls for mobilization that I classified as demands of active citizenship. In a nutshell,

in a context where the institutionalization of practices of active citizenship is limited and spaces of contestation are expressed through different means of non-conventional political participation, Italian activists radically question the current status quo and claim alternative views and social constructions of Europe.

In Turkey, the Europeanization process is seen by activists in the light of the positive effects this had for the democratization of the country. In a context where active citizenship is a volatile instrument because of a lack of clear set of measures enabling the establishment of practices to express participatory behaviors, the EU civil society policy has favored the emergence of critical voices in the society. Europeanization is thus seen as a key process, because it has brought to the fore the relevance of fundamental and human rights and enhanced the need to protect basic freedoms. At the same time, it has offered financial opportunities to civil society organizations to join partnerships and become full actors in conjunction with other international organizations. This is surely an important aspect that should not be underestimated. At the same time, as a consequence of the Turkey/EU agreement on refugees stipulated in 2015, activists criticize both supranational and domestic institutions. This brings to the surface the questioning of those positive values embodied by the EU and, as in the Italian and British cases, the perception of a crisis in European values and solidarity.

In the UK, the Europeanization process had gone hand by hand with the processes of institutionalization of active citizenship promoted by different governments in the last 30 years. In this context, British organizations have been fully cooperative and compliant with EU principles, recognizing the importance of participating in supranational umbrella organizations and integrating their activities in wide scale processes of civic participation. Even if critical of the excessive technicalities existing in accessing EU funding, I can argue that they have been proactive actors across the years and key to stimulate wide reflections on the improvement of processes of engagement and participation at the EU level. The scenarios opened by the financial and migration crises, bring about similarities in respect to the Italian and Turkish contexts. However, British organizations produce a clearer discourse directed at blaming the inefficiencies of the former Coalition and Conservative governments in producing adequate policy responses. This happens in a context where the recent promotion of active citizenship as a practice as part of the Big Society agenda is highly contested, because it is seen as undermining the autonomy of civil society organizations as well as the capacities of smaller organizations to survive. The foreseeable lack of EU funding that might be consequent to the Brexit, as a consequence of triggering art. 50, is likely to undermine capacities and capabilities of such organizations to guarantee adequate interventions and answers to growing social problems that dramatically affect disadvantaged groups.

I would like to thank all the colleagues and friends I worked with at the European Institute of İstanbul Bilgi University for their help and support during the period of the Marie Curie. It has been a significant period of time that has greatly inspired the writing of my monograph and the development of new research ideas.

Further information on EUROCS can be found at: [www.actineurope.com](http://www.actineurope.com)



## TÜBİTAK Projects

**TÜBİTAK - Living with indeterminacy: Not deported but abandoned, being an undocumented migrant in İstanbul - Meltem Sancak Finke**



This Tübitak and European Union Co-funded project focuses on migrants from the former Soviet Union, mainly from the five republics of Central Asia. Although for many years they are employed and in many cases sharing private and public spaces in Turkey, not very much is known about them and their origins. Interestingly, as migrants they did not get attention from scholars, locals as well as the bureaucratic state apparatus, so that they remain a rather unrecognised and unnoticed group in comparison to other migrants, especially those from Syria. For the last group, there are good reasons not only in Turkey but also in the world that they make it into the headlines. Syrians are numerous and they are more visible and public in many respects. Although there is more shared space and close relationship with Central Asian migrants to be expected, as they are kin from Turkic-speaking countries, how “other” and “different” they are, is still surprising for many of us.

“Living with indeterminacy: Not deported but abandoned, being undocumented in İstanbul” is chosen as project title because it refers to migrants’ precarious situation in Turkey. Their real numbers are difficult to figure out and visa free travel possibilities makes it easy for them to come and stay legally up to three months, while all that goes beyond this becomes years living in illegality. Excluding Persian-speaking Tajikistan, the number of migrants with residence and work permission from Central Asia in 2016 was around sixty thousand. However, only the number of Uzbek citizens who entered Turkey is more than three hundred thousand.

The project focuses on a number of aspects of migrants’ lives in both sending and receiving countries. One aspect is who they are and why they are leaving their homes for Turkey. Gender and marital status are highly visible variables regarding who is coming to Turkey because the available jobs in the domestic sector, in particular care work, push and pull primarily female migrants, and often widowed or divorced women, towards Turkey. Until recent years, Central Asian men preferred to go to Russia either for seasonal or

long-term employment opportunities. Not only the fall of ruble but also increasing homophobic attacks on Central Asian and Caucasian migrants in Russia led them to come and seek work opportunities in Turkey.

Life perspectives of those migrants in Turkey is also very dynamic and continuously in change, which includes not only the choice between return or stay for themselves but also, in spite of the illegality, to bring other family members (spouses, parents or children) and establish a new life for the whole nuclear or extended family.

Part of the research also is the decision making process of the actors, under which conditions, how they decide and why they come to this decision. In that regard, for instance the economic and the political realities of the sending countries play a significant role and differentiate the migrants between the Central Asian Republics. For example, the Soviet legacy of exit permissions is still valid in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have more liberal rules regarding the freedom of movement of their citizens. At the same time, recently introduced travel restrictions preclude young central Asian men from traveling to Russia or causes deportations for any reason like unpaid mobile bills. One reason is also the alleged threat of Islamist involvements. This also caused to route changes of men towards Turkey although the job facilities are clearly less than in Russia, not least because of cheap Syrian labour force.

Although many of the migrants were born after the demise of the Soviet Union, they still consider their upbringing and education, irrespectively where they are from, superior to the Turkish one. Especially in the domestic sphere, the employing Turkish side and the Central Asian employee -both typically female- often confront and clash due to differences in expectations and attitudes. This aspect is also intensely discussed and advice is sought in social media especially in Facebook among migrant groups. Social media groups and discussion platforms are rich with subjects like advice for residence (work permission, job opportunities, deportation rules and fines) as well as return possibilities after deportation, marriage-divorce consultation (mostly Central Asian women asking advice before they marry Turkish men), on coping strategies with Turkish husband’s jealousy and problems with mother in laws, or to warn others for uncertain situations or persons with empty promises. Problems and even confidential documents are shared with all details and discussed in the groups. Networks are also used for organizing joint celebrations, social meetings, announcing the creation of schools for children migrants, cultural and educational activities both at home and in Turkey. There are commonly shared platforms that are used by all Russian speaking migrants like “Emmigranty v Turcii” but also distinct Kyrgyz, Uzbek or Kazak social media platform addressing migration relevant issues.



Information exchange and comments on these platforms reflect the self-perceived situation in Turkey as well as relationships between migrants and locals. Especially potential migrants, who are sitting in their hometown and waiting because either they could not yet decide to come or do not have enough money for the airplane ticket, are also members of these sites and warned about capricious Turkish women, jealous Turkish men and hardships of migration in general. At the same time, contrary to political discourses of kinship and brotherhood among the Turkic peoples, the superiority of the migrants own and the Russian culture are presented and also in difficult times used as pillar and relief against hardships. These media also create emotional support of compatriots and expressions of ethnic solidarity. This virtual support is diverse; it can be expressed in the form of an appeal to nostalgic memories of the native land, the assertion of national exclusivity or superiority in the situation of an unfriendly environment and even opposing oneself to others. The leading content discourses include religious, national and traditional Soviet types of content-discourse. The formation and reproduction of solidarity in migration and between migrants in these social media is well organised and anonymity is taking new forms. The use of social networks and creation of virtual groups by migrants can be seen as tools for maintaining identity in the host country and making marginalisation manageable.

Migration touches many facets of life, from economic to eth(n)ic. This project, situated in a metropolitan context and with an unnoticed growing number of migrants, aims to reach as many of them while catching small details of everyday life, decision making and struggling that is the strength of anthropology.

## JEAN MONNET PROJECTS



### FlipEU

The first blended course on the EU that utilizes the flipped classroom approach that promotes innovation in teaching. This system allows the students to learn in their own time and the instructors to deploy an instructional strategy and resources that places a higher order cognitive demand on the students, since it engages the students with more creative, evaluative and analytical exercises. The course was awarded the title of Jean Monnet Module by the European Commission and is offered by Assistant Professors Özge Onursal Beşgül and Mehmet Ali Tuğtan in both fall and spring semesters. The proposed course is offered within the framework of general education (GE) course elective list at BİLGİ. The course aims to examine the history of the European integration process; to analyse the institutions of the European integration; and to introduce students to different theoretical outlooks of the European integration.

### Coffee Talk on Blended Education Experience, 29 September 2017.



The second year of the Jean Monnet module was launched with a coffee talk. A round table debate on the experience of blended EU teaching was held, the event was open to BİLGİ faculty and public. Students from the previous course also participated in the debate and shared their experiences of the module.

## DAAD FELLOWSHIP



Europeanization (or depending on your point of view, Westernization or modernization) of the Ottoman Empire is perhaps the most well studied subject among historians of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, my research project at the European Institute wishes to give the whole question a new twist. In general, one could divide the preexisting recent literature on nineteenth century Europeanization into three camps. They all agree on that fact that older writings that presupposed a standard trajectory of modernization based on Weberian or Marxist assumptions are no longer viable and that more unbiased attention must be paid to local constellations. However, their approaches vary. Some have followed the classic perspective of political history, studying a few remarkable political actresses and actors and thinkers in order to trace their impact on processes of change around the year 1900. The main detriment to such a perspective is that it says little about the social breadth of the views they embrace. Other researchers, mainly utilizing the Ottoman archive, have brought forth what is best described as reform studies, focusing on the Ottoman state's efforts to reinvent itself. This approach however, emphasizes very much the state and especially its bureaucracy, often reifying their perspective and belief that they are actually the ones in control of and initiating social change. It is therefore often ignorant or distortive of processes beyond the state's immediate control. Another perspective on nineteenth century has been that of the world system theory, describing processes of change in Ottoman society based on its dependency on global trade flows. While contributing greatly to our understanding of the region's interaction with other parts of the world, the world system theory has as a rule been used too rigidly and often inspired by preconceived ideas of how certain constellations should look like rather than through close study of local conditions.

In my study, I hope to balance out some of the discrepancies of earlier research based on recent developments in urban history, cultural studies, and global history. By taking the urban space of İstanbul, İzmir, and Salonica as the center of my focus, I wish to arrive at a perspective at “street level”, so to speak, investigating the highly diverse urban population as a whole and not simply certain ethnically or politically defined sections. Urban history has the advantage of including the voices of political actresses and actors and the state as well as many different agents considered inconsequential on a national level. These acclaimedly marginal characters often prove to be of importance for processes of transnational cultural change. In my study, I investigate how the perception by urban residents of their cities changed through a more intensive interaction with a real and imagined Europe and as a consequence, what changes they demanded of the built environment; how leisure practises changed, as people started frequenting the opera, going out for beer, and participating in balls, and what these changes say about the residents’ ambition to be part of a wider European community of taste. I also investigate nineteenth century constructions of the individual as part of European-wide phenomenon of cultural anxiety about as well as celebration of an ambivalent and complex quest for identity. The study also touches on the final disillusionment about Europeanization and subsequent anti-European practises. By approaching the nineteenth century in such a broad perspective, it is possible to draw comparisons to recent waves of Europhilia and anti-Europeanism in today’s Greece and Turkey.

This study has been made possible as I hold the position of DAAD lecturer (or visiting professor) at BİLGİ’s European Institute. This position for exchange scholars from Germany, which is co-funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the university, allows me to both serve as an instructor and to contribute to the institute’s wider research agenda. It has helped me to utilize for my project not only the university’s resources, but the rich collections of literature, published sources, and archival sources available within İstanbul. It is also a great opportunity to engage with scholars working on related agendas either resident in İstanbul or visiting.

## Aziz Nesin Professorship



### Aziz Nesin Visiting Professorship for Diversity Studies at European University Viadrina was granted to Assoc. Prof. İnan Rüma from International Relations Department

The time I had as a visiting professor in Viadrina European University in Frankfurt-Oder was excellent, many thanks to all those who made it possible. Going there from İstanbul Bilgi University does not change much: Similar contemporary good universities with high quality education and research. Universities are universal as their name suggests.

Considering the differences in teaching in Viadrina and in BİLGİ, there is not much difference: They have much fewer students there and the town is much smaller, so both professors and students have more time. The students are more talkative in the class in Viadrina, they are better informed about world affairs and their country, and they express themselves better. **santral**istanbul Campus is more physically defined with outer fence and large inner square, which provides more cohabitation to students in the university. Additionally, to be in another country, so being out of one’s own country’s bubble is often to increase motivation and performance anyway.

Following this visit to Viadrina, I have felt positively regenerated in many senses. The positive, productive and friendly mood in the department including its corridor as the physical manifestation of this mood and in the one of the International Office; productive and cheerful time I had with the students both in classes and out; the quiet town with more trees than human beings, are the experiences I carry with me.

The town Frankfurt-Oder is generally labeled as a decaying and boring one. It is one of typical post-communist deindustrialization and depopulation examples. It is quite close to an outstanding international town Berlin (80 km. 70 min. with train), thus many professors, employees and even students of the university prefer to live there instead of quiet Frankfurt-Oder. I preferred to stay there exactly because of these reasons in fact: A quiet, green, depopulated medieval town with a good university looks like a heaven compared to İstanbul.

During my stay, I have learnt a lot about Germany, thanks to my colleagues and students. It is much less monolithic and unflappable than it looks. All in all, they are aware of their problems and they know how to manage them however big those are. For instance, the regional disparities between West and East is practically observable in Berlin and Frankfurt-Oder although one would consider from outside that East German problems are solved long ago (in addition to rather well-known North-South difference).

Moreover, German politics is rather in a stalemate since Conservatives adopt and successfully implement policies from Social Democrats and Greens, such as social security, same sex marriage and renewable energy. It is observable in daily life: Despite the existence of a well-functioning production (as they are always in world export champions list) and social security; the wages are actually not high and public service is not always impressive.

For example, there was a huge problem with mosquitos in Frankfurt-Oder due to river and lake, but the municipality did not have budget to fight against although the state budget recorded surplus. It is because of tight monetary policies including budget discipline, but also because of

shortcomings of federalism: Brandenburg region does not produce much, so their budget is rather limited and federal budget is not interested in these municipal issues. It may look trivial but to suffer from mosquitos at the level of impossibility to sit outside due to low municipal budget in a town near the capital of Europe's first and world's fourth biggest economy looks ridiculously strange.

Finally, as our double degree program has practically demonstrated for years, Turkish-EU relations can be improved for mutual benefit by focusing more on the concrete issues of integration and/or cooperation (the EU seems to be interested in rather cooperation than integration as well as the nationalist and/or conservative Turkish elite), rather than being stuck at the full membership discussions including bigger interstate questions.

## SPECIAL SUBJECT



### **Critical Heritages (CoHERE): Performing and Representing Identities in Europe**

#### **Work Package 2: Work in Progress**

#### **The Rise of Populism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity** **Ayhan Kaya**

A larger version of this paper was previously published in the webstie of the Horizon 2020 Project "CoHERE: Critical Heritages. Performing and Representing Identities in Europe". See <http://cohere-ca.ncl.ac.uk/#/grid/141>

#### **The Rise of Populism in Europe:**

#### **Lost in Diversity and Unity**

#### **Introduction**

This essay reveals the social, political and economic sources of the populist zeitgeist in the European Union. The essay starts with an analysis of the current state of populist extremism in Europe. Subsequently, it elaborates different aspects of the current political framework in which populist political rhetoric is becoming strongly rooted in a time characterized with globalism, multiculturalism bashing, financial crisis, refugee crisis, Islamophobia, terror, Euroscepticism, and nativism. This essay is the initial stage of an ongoing work (WP2 in the CoHERE Project) to offer social, economic, political and cultural sources of the current populist movements in five EU countries (Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands) as well as in Turkey. The essay will start with the elaboration of the contemporary acts of populism. This work in progress aims to display the social-economic basis of the populist rhetoric without falling into the trap of culturalizing what is social, political and economic in origin.

#### **Current State of Populist Extremism in Europe**

Extremist populist parties and movements constitute a force in several EU member states. At the very heart of the story about the rise of both radical right and right-wing violent

extremism is a disconnect between politicians and their electorates. Right-wing populist parties in particular have gained greater public support in the last decade. Some of these parties are as follows: The Jobbik Party in Hungary, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, Danish People's Party in Denmark, Swedish Democrats in Sweden, *the Front National* and *Bloc Identitaire* in France, *Vlaams Belang* in Belgium, *True Finns* in Finland, *Lega Nord* and *Casa Pound* in Italy, *the Freedom Party* in Austria, *Die Freiheit* in Germany, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the English Defence League, the British National Party, UKIP in the UK, the Five Star Movement in Italy, and Golden Dawn in Greece.

Recent research suggests that these parties and movements are now a durable force in Europe. For instance, in Austria, the extreme-right Freedom Party is the most popular movement among 18-25 year olds; and support for the leader of the French Front National, Marine Le Pen, is found to be stronger among the younger voters. This suggests that these parties and movements may have a bigger potential to become influential political actors in the long-term. The Party for Freedom in the Netherlands won 15.5 per cent of the votes in the 2010 general elections and became the third largest party in the Dutch Parliament with 24 seats. The Freedom Party in Austria won 17.5 per cent of the votes in the 2008 general elections, and it is currently reported to be on a par with the SPÖ (Social-Democratic Party) and ÖVP (People's Party) as a major contender in the next parliamentary elections. It has also to be noted that the recent electoral failure and consequent political disintegration of the British National Party (BNP) seems to be one of the causes of a rise in racial violence, according to a recent survey of more than 2000 affiliates of the BNP and UKIP (UK Independence Party). There is evidence that those on the far-right feel betrayed by the political system and are prepared, hypothetically at least, to take the law into their own hands to defend what they see as 'the British way of life' against an onslaught by non-whites and, particularly, Muslims (The Spectator, 2012).

It seems that extremist populist movements are recently investing in the North-South divide in Europe, leading to both extreme right-wing, and left-wing populist parties capitalizing on different discourses and tools. Tensions between wealthy countries in the North contributing most to the bailouts, and the ailing debtor nations in the Southern periphery, threaten to destroy the monetary union within the European Union. The electoral successes of right-wing populist parties could indeed worsen the Eurozone crisis. As of August 2016, in the European Parliament (EP), far-right populist political parties have their own political group, namely the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), which is the seventh largest political group in the EP with 46 MEPs. The other right-wing populist group in the European Parliament is the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF) with 36 MEPs, presided by Marine Le Pen. On the other hand, the left-wing populist MEPs form the Confederal Group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) with 52 MEPs.

*1Die Freiheit (Bürgerrechtspartei für mehr Freiheit und Demokratie) was established in Bavaria in 2011. In September 2013, the party lost 2/3 of their former members to the AfD. Soon after it was founded, it started to shrink and lose its members to the AfD. The founder of the party, Rene Stadtkewitz, supported the members of the Party to be affiliated with the AfD. In early 2016, the party had less than 500 members.*

## The Power of Social Media

The rise in popularity of extremist populist political movements goes hand-in-hand with the intensification of online social media in politics. The online social media following for many of these parties dwarfs formal membership, consisting of tens of thousands of sympathisers and supporters. This mix of virtual and real political activity is the way millions of people, especially young people, relate to politics in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Barlett et al, 2011). The changing role of the media, especially social media, has certainly emancipated citizens in a way that has led to the demystification of the political office and political parties. More and more people tend to believe that they have a good understanding of what politicians do, and think that they can do better (Mudde, 2004: 556). Almost all the populist parties and movements exploit the new social media to communicate their statements and messages to large segments of the society, who no longer seem to rely on the mainstream media. These political groups are known to oppose immigration, heterogeneity, multiculturalism, and ethno-cultural and religious diversity. They are also known for their 'anti-establishment' views and their concern for protecting a homogeneous national culture and heritage. Their popularity springs from various factors in the current globalised economies, leading to a growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty. Beppe Grillo, the leader of Five Star Movement in Italy is a very good example of a party leader managing to mobilize millions of people by Twitter, Facebook and his personal blog ([beppegrillo.it](http://beppegrillo.it)) (Moffitt, 2016: 88). Geert Wilders (@geertwilderspvv) is also very successful in exploiting the internet to mobilize masses. In 2012, the Party for Freedom, which he leads, organized a website to invite the Dutch citizens to express their complaints about the migrants coming from central and Eastern Europe. Digital populism has become a spectre roaming around Europe for all the mainstream political parties.

Social media has unquestionably contributed to the development of deliberative democracy or participative democracy. Earlier forms of this kind of democracy were successfully generated by the populist demands of the New Left, the New Social Movements, and the Greens back in the 1960s, 1970s and even today in the Tahrir Square, Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, Gezi Park, and Maidan movements. The populism of the New Left, as eloquently summarized by Cas Mudde (2004: 557), refers to an active, self-confident, well-educated, progressive people. Contrastingly, the people of right-wing populism are the hard-working, conservative, reactionary, and nationalist citizens who see their world being distorted by progressives, elites, institutions, criminals, aliens and refugees. The kind of democracy pursued by right-wing populists also greatly differs from the kind that left-wing populist supporters pursue. Contrary to common belief, right-wing populist voters do not strongly favour any form of participatory democracy, be it deliberative or plebiscitary. Populists are not interested in expanding participative democratic processes; rather, they support referendums as an instrument to overcome the power of the elite. What they want is the problems of the ordinary wo/man to be solved by a remarkable leader in accordance with their own values. In other words, as Taggart (2000: 1) put it very well, 'populism requires the most extra-ordinary individuals to lead the most ordinary people.'

## The Culturalization of What is Social, Political and Economic

Some of these factors are related to the rise of unemployment, poverty, inequality, injustice, the growing gap between citizens and politics and the current climate of political disenchantment. For instance, in the spring of 2014, youth unemployment in Greece was 62.5 per cent, in Spain 56.4 per cent, in Portugal 42.5 per cent, and in Italy 40.5 per cent. As for the Central and Eastern European countries, we should recall that the collapse of the USSR has allowed long-suppressed national aspirations to find their outlet in ethno-nationalist extreme right-wing political parties

and movements. The JOBBIK Party in Hungary, built upon such ethno-nationalist inspirations, is a good example (Dettke, 2014). From the 1980s onwards, the introduction of neo-liberal policies has contributed to social and economic insecurity (Mudde, 2007). These policies implied that individuals were expected to take care of themselves within the framework of existing free market conditions. This led to the fragmentation of society into a multitude of cultural, religious and ethnic communities in which individuals sought refuge. In turn, ruling elites, which include vote-seeking political parties, exploited these basic needs for protection by adopting discriminatory discourses and stigmatizing the 'others'.

The rhetoric of a 'clash of civilizations' also seems to be legitimising populist extremist politicians, who claim the impossibility of a peaceful coexistence between ethno-culturally and religiously different groups (Kaya, 2012a). Populist extremist movements are also shaped by the ideology of consumerism. A consumerist culture, which widens the gap between the wealthy and the dispossessed, contributes to people's fears and insecurities. A study conducted in the UK reveals that the recent riots in London and other large cities in the UK and Europe reflect a deeply inadequate economic and social ethos, imbalanced consumption, the breakdown of accountability, distrust in institutions, and severe government failings over more than two decades (The Guardian, 22 August 2011).

What is mainly a social and political problem is often being reduced to a cultural and religious clash in a way that disrupts peace and social cohesion (Brown, 2006; Kaya, 2012a). The growing popularity of this type of rhetoric has deepened existing ethno-cultural and religious barriers between groups. As a result, the universal nature of human rights is being replaced by alternative views, which use culture, ethnicity, religion and civilisation as markers to define and stigmatise those with a different background.

*2* See the official website of the European Parliament for a detailed map of the political groups represented in the Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/hemicycle.html> accessed on 30 August 2016.

*3* Dutch website causes stir in Central Europe, Euractiv, 10 February 2012, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/dutch-website-causes-stir-in-central-europe/>

*4* See <http://www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/>. One should be informed about the fact that by September 2016 there was a significant improvement in the unemployment rates of these countries: Greece 50.4 per cent, Spain 43.9 per cent, Italy 36.9 per cent, and Portugal 28.6 per cent.

## The Backlash Against Multiculturalism: Lost in Diversity

Extremist populist parties and movements often exploit the issue of migration and portray it as a threat against the welfare and the social, cultural and even ethnic features of a nation. Populist leaders also tend to blame a soft approach to migration for some of the major problems in society such as unemployment, violence, crime, insecurity, drug trafficking and human trafficking. This tendency is reinforced by the use of a racist, xenophobic and demeaning rhetoric. The use of words like 'influx', 'invasion', 'flood' and 'intrusion' are just a few examples. Public figures like Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria and others have spoken of a 'foreign infiltration' of immigrants, especially Muslims, in their countries. Geert Wilders even predicted the coming of *Eurabia*, a mythological future continent that will replace modern Europe (Wossen, 2010), where children from Norway to Naples will learn to recite the Koran at school, while their mothers stay at home wearing *burqas*.

It is also true that much public attention has recently been focused on Eastern Europeans. Consider the recent controversy around the 'website for complaints about Middle and Eastern Europeans', created by the Dutch Freedom Party in the Netherlands, which asked people to provide information about the 'nuisance' associated with migrant workers or how they had lost jobs to them. On 22 February 2012, in a letter to Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal, Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland asked the Dutch government to clarify its position regarding this website, and expressed the hope that the Dutch government would publicly distance itself from its content.<sup>5</sup>

The Dutch parliament voted in March 2012 to denounce the Freedom Party's website, but the Dutch government, whose majority in the 150-seat lower house required support from the PVV's 23 lawmakers, has declined to condemn it.<sup>6</sup> This is only one among several events that are transforming the image of the Netherlands as a tolerant and immigrant-friendly country. On 10 April 2012, Vlaams Belang, a Belgian far-right party, launched a website that invites people to report crimes committed by illegal immigrants, mirroring a similar site in the Netherlands set up by the far-right Freedom Party. The website invites people to file anonymous tip-offs about social security fraud, black-market work more serious crimes. *Vlaams Belang* was previously known as *Vlaams Blok*, but the political force had to change its name in 2004 after Belgium's Court of Cassation found it in violation of the law against racism. Filip Dewinter, the *Vlaams Belang* leader, defended the website because of the presence of 'tens of thousands of illegal immigrants' in Belgian cities and the problems stemming from them. This type of thinking and political discourse have attracted public support *vis-à-vis* an 'enemy within' who is created through the actual politics of fear.

A remarkable part of the European public perceive diversity as a key threat to the social, cultural, religious and economic security of the European nations. There is an apparent growing resentment against the discourse of diversity, which is often promoted by the European Commission, the Council of Europe, many scholars, politicians and NGOs. The stigmatisation of migration has brought about a political discourse, which is known as 'the end of multiculturalism and diversity.' This is built upon the assumption that the homogeneity of the nation is at stake and has to be restored by alienating those who are not part of an apparently autochthonous group that is ethno-culturally and religiously homogenous. After the relative prominence of multiculturalism both in political and scholarly debates, today we can witness a dangerous tendency to find new ways to accommodate ethno-cultural and religious diversity. Evidence of a diminishing belief in the possibility of a flourishing multicultural society has changed the nature of the debate about the successful integration of migrants in host societies.

Initially, the idea of multiculturalism involved conciliation, tolerance, respect, interdependence, universalism, and it was expected to bring about an 'inter-cultural community'. Over time, it began to be perceived as a way of institutionalising difference through autonomous cultural discourses. The debate on the end of multiculturalism has existed in Europe for a long time. It seems that the declaration of the 'failure of multiculturalism' has become a catchphrase not only of extreme-right wing parties but also of centrist political parties all across the continent (Kaya, 2010). In 2010 and 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy heavily bashed multiculturalism for the wrong reasons

(Kaya, 2012a). Geert Wilders, leader of the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, made no apologies for arguing that '[we, Christians] should be proud that our culture is better than Islamic culture' (Der Spiegel, 11 September 2011). Populism blames multiculturalism for denationalizing one's own nation, and disunifying one's own people. Anton Pelinka (2013: 8) explains very well how populism simplifies the complex realities of a globalized world by looking for a scapegoat:

*-As the enemy - the foreigner, the foreign culture- has already succeeded in breaking into the fortress of the nation state, someone must be responsible. The elites are the secondary 'defining others', responsible for the liberal democratic policies of accepting cultural diversity. The populist answer to the complexities of a more and more pluralistic society is not multiculturalism... Right-wing populism sees multiculturalism as a recipe to denationalize one's nation, to deconstruct one's people.*

For the right-wing populist crowds, the answer must be easy. They need to have some scapegoats to blame. The scapegoat should be the others: Foreigners, Jews, Roma, Muslims, sometimes the Eurocrats, sometimes the non-governmental organizations. Populist rhetoric certainly pays off for those politicians who engage in it. For instance, Thilo Sarrazin was perceived in Germany as a folk hero (Volksheld) on several right-wing populist websites that strongly refer to his ideas and statements after his polemical book *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen (Germany Does Away with Itself: How We Gambled with Our Country)*, which was published in 2010. The newly-founded political party Die Freiheit even tried to involve Sarrazin in their election campaign in Berlin and stated *Wählen gehen für Thilos Thesen (Go and vote for Thilo's statements)* using a crossed-out mosque as a logo<sup>7</sup>. Neo-fascist groups like the right-wing extremist National Democratic Party (NPD) have also celebrated the author. They stated that Sarrazin's ideas about immigration were in line with the NPD's programme and that he made their ideas even stronger and more popular, as he belonged to an established social democratic party.

A recent survey conducted in Spring 2016 by the PEW Research Centre shows that many Europeans are uncomfortable with the growing diversity of society. When asked whether having an increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities makes their country a better or worse place to live, relatively few said it makes their country better. In Greece and Italy, at least more than half said increasing diversity harms their country, while in the Netherlands, Germany and France, less than half complained about ethno-cultural diversity (PEW, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Press release 22 February 2012.

<sup>6</sup> *Euractiv*, Belgian far-right emulates the Dutch xenophobic website, 11 April 2012.

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.morgenpost.de/politik/inland/article105070241/Pro-Deutschland-ueberklebt-Sarrazin-Plakate.html>

### Islamophobia as a New Ideology

These populist outbreaks contribute to the securitisation and stigmatisation of migration in general, and Islam in particular. In the meantime, they deflect attention from constructive solutions and policies widely thought to promote integration, including language-learning and increased labour market access, which are already suffering due to austerity measures across Council of Europe member states. Islamophobic discourse has recently become the mainstream in the west (Kaya, 2011; and Kaya, 2015b). It seems that social groups belonging to the majority nation in a given territory are more

inclined to express their distress resulting from insecurity and social-economic deprivation through the language of Islamophobia; even in those cases that are not related to the actual threat of Islam. Several decades ago it was Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) who stated that social-political discontent of people is likely to lead them to anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, regionalism, supranationalism, fascism and anti-cosmopolitanism. If Lipset's timely intervention in the 1950s is transposed to the contemporary age, then one could argue that Islamophobia has also become one of the paths taken by those who are in a state of social-economic and political dismay. Islamophobic discourse has certainly resonated very much in the last decade, and its users have been heard by both local and international communities, although their distress has not resulted from really anything related to Muslims in general. In other words, Muslims have become the most popular scapegoats in many parts of the world to blame for any troubled situation. For almost more than a decade, Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants are primarily seen by European societies as a financial burden, and virtually never as an opportunity for the country. They tend to be associated with illegality, crime, violence, drug abuse, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflict, and in many other respects are represented in negative ways (Kaya, 2015b).

The construction of a contemporary European identity is built in part on anti-Muslim racism, just as other forms of racist ideology played a role in constructing European identity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Use of the term 'Islamophobia' assumes that fear of Islam is natural and can be taken for granted, whereas use of the term 'Islamophobia' presumes that this fear has been fabricated by those with a vested interest in producing and reproducing such a state of fear, or phobia. By describing Islamophobia as a form of ideology, I argue that Islamophobia operates as a form of cultural racism in Europe which has become apparent along with the process of securitizing and stigmatizing migration and migrants in the age of neoliberalism (Kaya, 2015b). One could thus argue that Islamophobia as an ideology is being constructed by ruling political groups to foster a kind of false consciousness, or delusion, within the majority society, as a way of covering up their own failure to manage social, political, economic, and legal forces and consequently the rise of inequality, injustice, poverty, unemployment, insecurity, and alienation. In other words, Islamophobia turns out to be a practical instrument of social control used by the conservative political elite to ensure compliance and subordination in this age of neoliberalism, essentializing ethnocultural and religious boundaries. Muslims have become global 'scapegoats', blamed for all negative social phenomena. One could also argue that Muslims are now being perceived by some individuals and communities in the West as having greater social power. There is a growing fear in the United States, Europe, and even in Russia and the post-Soviet countries that Muslims will eventually take over demographically.

A PEW survey held in 2006 indicated that opinions of Muslims in almost all of the Western European countries are quite negative. While one in four in the USA and the UK displayed Islamophobic sentiments, more than half of Spaniards and half of Germans said that they disliked Muslims; and the figures for Poland and France for those holding unfavourable opinions of Muslims were 46 per cent and 38 per cent. The survey revealed that prejudice was mainly marked among older generations and appeared to be class-based. People over 50 and of low education were more likely to be prejudiced.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, the Gallup Organization Survey of Population Perceptions and Attitudes undertaken for the World Economic Forum in 2007 indicated that three in four US residents believe that the Muslim world is not committed to improving relations with the West. The same survey finds out that half of respondents in Italy (58 per cent),

Denmark (52 per cent), and Spain (50 per cent) agree with this view. Israelis, on the other hand, represent a remarkable exception with almost two-thirds (64 per cent) believing that the Muslim world is committed to improving relations. The image on the other side of the coin is not very different. Among the majority-Muslim nations surveyed, it was found that majorities in every Middle Eastern country believe that the West is not committed to bettering relations with the Muslim World, while respondents in majority-Muslim Asian countries are about evenly split (WEF, 2008: 21).

In the Netherlands, the hardening of political discourse, stimulated by dramatic events such as 9/11, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004, and the rise of populist and extremist parties with anti-immigrant agendas, have resulted in an increasingly polarised debate on Islam and on cultural diversity (Carr, 2006). Similarly, in Switzerland, a country where relations between the host society and Muslims remain very limited, the negative perception of Muslims was explicitly articulated by the majority society through the debate on minarets in December 2009. The requests by the Muslim community to erect mosques and minarets aroused significant public opposition in various cities. The Swiss majority vote in the 2009 referendum to ban the building of minarets is unfortunately not an isolated example of this trend (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2009). What was striking in the Swiss Referendum on minarets is that those Swiss citizens who did not have any interaction with the Muslim community in their everyday life were more inclined to oppose the erection of new minarets. On the other hand, those who interacted with them on a regular basis did not go to the poll and remained indifferent to the issue. It is my opinion that the reaction of the majority of the Swiss citizens was driven by fear, probably due to the global financial crisis, aggravated by the increasing immigration of highly skilled Germans as well as other domestic political and economic problems (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2009).

*8 For the data set of the surveys on Islamophobia see <http://pewresearch.org/>; <http://people-press.org/>; and for an elaborate analysis of these findings see <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/18/islam.religion>. One could also visit the website of the Islamophobia Watch to follow the record of racist incidences in each country: <http://www.islamophobia-watch.com/islamophobia-watch/category/anti-muslim-violence> (entry date 16 August 2016).*

### **Eurosceptic Populism: Lost in Unity**

In addition to the growing popular resentment against multiculturalism and diversity, there is also a growing resentment among populist segments of the European public against the discourse of unity, which is also promoted by European institutions as well as by scholars, politicians, local administrators and NGOs. Right-wing populist leaders have always tried to capitalise on anti-EU sentiment. Most recently, the perception that European leaders are failing to tackle a developing economic crisis is fuelling further hostility towards the European Union, both right and left. As will be shown shortly, for instance, the Lega Nord is a vocal opposition of Mario Monti's technocratic government in Italy, disparaging his ties with the European elite. Marine Le Pen is stoking up fear of the EU as part of her campaign for the French presidency. The Dutch Freedom Party has called for a return to the national currency, becoming the first political movement in the Eurozone with a large popular base to opt for withdrawal from the single currency. What is more dangerous is that a larger group of people, fearing the consequences of the economic crisis, may be sympathetic to Eurosceptic populism without being committed supporters: The risk is that their grievances could be hijacked by populist movements.<sup>9</sup> The 2016 Spring Global Attitudes Survey of the Pew Research Centre shows that many European citizens have lost faith in the European Union. In a number of member states, ratings for the EU are significantly lower than they

were before the onset of financial crisis (PEW, 2016).

Populist parties in many member states of the EU are known for their Eurosceptic positions, especially extreme right-wing parties. Their Euroscepticism has become even stronger after the global financial crisis, which has afflicted the EU since 2008. Accordingly, in their edited volume, Kriesi and Pappas (2015) reveal that the recession led to a growing public support for the populist parties. Comparing the election results before and after the financial crisis they found that populism in Europe increased notably by 4.1 per cent. However, the support for populist parties shows remarkable differences from region to region. The populist surge has been very strong in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe with a rather anti-systemic content. Nordic populism is also on the rise, but it has a rather systemic nature, and populist parties including Sweden's Democrats and True Finns Party are even supportive of their competitors' policies. In Western Europe too populism was bolstered by the financial crisis. With a very strong Eurosceptic content, France and the UK experienced a sharp increase in public support for right-wing populism (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015: 323). In Germany, however, extreme right-wing populism also increased, but the main reason for this increase is the refugee crisis.

### **Geographical Mobility of Europeans in Times of Global Financial Crisis**

Global financial crisis has brought about various demographic changes in the EU leading to the migration of skilled or unskilled young populations from the South to the North and from the East to the West. Germany, the UK, Sweden are certainly the net winners of the current demographic change. However, the changes in the demographic structure of the EU do not only create problems for the migrant-sending EU countries, but also for the receiving countries. For instance, high-skilled German citizens cannot compete with the cheap skilled labour recruited from Spain, Italy, or Greece. Hence, they also find the solution of migrating to another country such as Switzerland, Austria, the USA and Great Britain (Verwiebe et al., 2010). On the other hand, relatively poorer countries of the East and South such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland cannot compete with the rich West to retain their skills and young generations, the loss of which causes societal discomfort. The increase in migration flows in the EU has been accompanied by an increase in the migrants' education level.<sup>10</sup> According to a recent study, the percentage of intra-EMU migrants that were highly educated rose from 34 to 41 between 2005 and 2012 (Jauer et al., 2014). Emigrants from the southern periphery in particular show higher educational achievement and skill levels.<sup>11</sup> Highly educated migrants from the GIPS (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) moving to other euro member countries went from 24 per cent of the total in 2005 to 41 per cent in 2012. Among the total of these migrants who found employment, the percentage of highly skilled rose from 27 to 49. Regarding east-west migration, the same research found that the average emigrant from the EU-2 (Bulgaria and Romania) has tended to be less educated than his or her European counterparts – although being highly educated from these two countries increases the likelihood of emigration compared to those that are not. Highly educated emigrants from these two countries who moved between 2011 and 2012 accounted for 24 per cent of the total emigrants. Accordingly, the countries of destination have experienced an increase in the immigration of skills. Germany is the leading country in the EU attracting most of the highly-skilled labour from the rest of the EU. In Germany, 29 per cent of all immigrants aged 20 to 65 who arrived in the last decade or so (2001 to 2011) held a graduate degree, while among the total population the respective figure was only 19 per cent in 2011. Among the immigrants, more than 10 per cent had a degree in science, IT, mathematics or engineering, compared to 6 per cent

among the rest of the population aged 25 to 65.

The changes in the magnitude and direction of migration flows reflect the changes in macroeconomic conditions in the EU. Emigrants often prefer to choose pre-existing paths where fellow country(wo)men have already settled down.<sup>12</sup> Due to such network effects migration often increases only slowly at first and then intensifies when it has reached a critical figure. Language also influences emigrants' choice of a destination country. This factor is important for skilled workers searching for an adequate job abroad. Thus, language skills might have gained in importance. In contrast, geographic proximity has lost relevance. The temporary restrictions on labour migration within the EU have also led to distortions. Most major forces, namely immigration rules, language and network effects have benefited the UK in the past decade. According to a study for the European Commission, about 90 per cent of inward migration from the EU-8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) to the UK in the years 2004 to 2009 is due to the EU enlargement, while in Germany only 10 per cent of total immigration during this period can be attributed to this event (Holland et al., 2011).

In the past few years, however, intra-EU migration and intra-eurozone migration have largely been driven by the economy. In the GIIPS (GIPS + Italy), decreasing immigration and surging emigration are clearly related to the deterioration in the labour markets there. It is also not a coincidence that Germany has become the leading destination country in the EU. Given the ongoing expansion in employment and the low unemployment rate-as of May 2014 it was 5.1 per cent-Germany has become more and more attractive for jobseekers from the GIIPS. As crisis-triggered migration was initially clearly dominated by EU-8 and EU-2 nationals, doubts have emerged about the willingness to migration of citizens from the old member countries. However, it is hardly surprising that foreign workers are more mobile and more prepared to leave their host country again when they become unemployed due to a labour market shock. Furthermore, the crisis in the GIIPS has especially hit sectors like construction, retail, and the hotel and restaurant industry, which used to employ many migrants from eastern EU and non-EU countries. In the past two years more and more nationals have joined the line away from the GIIPS. It is obvious that the economic situation has markedly influenced and altered migration patterns in the eurozone. Recently, young skilled Italians are heading towards Germany while their Spanish fellows are becoming less likely to leave their homeland.

*9 See the post by Marley Morris: "European leaders must be wary of rising Eurosceptic populism from both the right and the left" on the blog "Euopp" - European politics and policy, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 26 March 2012.*

*10 The average population with a tertiary education rose from 19.5 per cent in 2004 to 24.7 per cent in 2013. Among the peripheral countries, Portugal has seen the largest increase in the number of graduates, rising 59 per cent in the last decade, followed by Ireland and Italy at 44 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively.*

*11 Deutsche Bank Research, 'The Dynamics of Migration in the Euro area,' [https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR\\_INTERNET\\_EN-PROD/PROD000000000338137/](https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD000000000338137/)*

*12 For a detailed discussion on the Network Theory in migration studies see Thomas and Znaniecki (1918), Castells and Cardoso (2005), and King (2012). The+dynamics+of+migration+in+the+euro+area.PDF*

*12 For a detailed discussion on the Network Theory in migration studies see Thomas and Znaniecki (1918), Castells and Cardoso (2005), and King (2012).*

### Colonial Legacy: From Racism to Nativism

Colonialism was based on the systematic exclusion of the colonized. Hence, the notion of the people in colonial contexts was exclusionary. Colonial projects tend to legitimize and institutionalize relations of exploitation through the construction of racial hierarchies of difference, which justify and maintain the colonial agenda even in the post-colonial settings (Filc, 2015). To this effect, racism became an inherent element of colonialism to establish and perpetuate economic, cultural and social inequalities. Research shows that the regimes of truth established by the European colonialists in their colonies are likely to be reproduced and perpetuated in Europe as some of the colonized subjects had to move to Europe in the aftermath of the World War II as migrant labour. In this study, one of the premises is that European populism has some elements originating from the colonial past. This is why European populism differs from the Latin American form of populism. According to Dani Filc (2015), European populism is exclusionary, while the Latin American populism is inclusive. This difference between the two is based on the fact that the former was the colonizer while the latter was the colonized. It seems that the legacy of being the colonizer and being the colonized is still effective in moulding the content of populism in both settings.

In the last three decades or so, it is likely that western European experience of migration has been very productive in terms of creating both cohesive societies and exclusionary ones. In times of economic crisis, exclusionary acts of the states and majority societies often become more visible. Racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia have been very common topics of discussion as far as migration, diversity and refugees were concerned. Now nativism has become a very popular kind of exclusionary discourse, promoted by populist politicians. Western Europe started to host many Muslim-origin immigrants following the World War II, who mostly originate from their former colonies such as the Maghrebian countries, India, and Pakistan. The increasing visibility of Muslim-origin immigrants in the public sphere after the mid-1970s has also carried the politics of racism, previously hidden in institutional and administrative levels, into the public domain. Then, those immigrants who were being blocked out of and refused an identity and identification within the majority nation, be it British, German, French, Belgian and Dutch, 'had to find some other roots on which to stand' (Hall, 1991: 52). Thus, being blocked out of any access to a British, German, French, Belgian or Dutch civic identity, immigrants and their children had to try to discover who they were (Hall, 1991: 52). In the aftermath of the transmission of the politics of racism into the public realm, they were forced to discover where they came from, their lost languages, histories and cultures. As their histories were not in any books, they had to recover their roots with imagination. Hence, the young generations, or the grandsons of immigrants, as Ernest Gellner once said in relation to the American context, busied themselves trying to remember what the elder generations had tried to forget:

*The famous Three generations law governing the behaviour of immigrants into America - the grandson tries to remember what the son tried to forget - now operates in many parts of the world on populations that have not migrated at all: the son, who arduously acquires a new idiom at school, has no desire to play at being a tribesman, but his son in turn, securely urbanised, may do so (Gellner, 1964: 164).*

Here, it is evident that the newly constructed ethnicities and religiosities are highly different from the previous form of ethno-cultural and religious identities, which were basically built upon kinship, culture, tradition and folklore. New ethnicities and religiosities are, on the contrary, constructed in a dialogical and dialectical process identified by the form of interaction between receiving society and immigrants. To put it differently, the escalation of new ethnicities, new religiosities and new racisms is intertwined, and they are all the symptoms of the unresolved encounter between the majority societies and ethno-cultural and religious minorities in the public sphere.

There is no doubt that institutional racism and the societal reaction to the flow of immigration in the well-established European nation-states constitute the major landmarks of new racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. Racial discrimination in the modern European states was left to market forces. It seems that immigrant-origin workers with low qualifications, who were recruited by the European states as the source of cheap labour in the 1960s, are no longer needed. Thus, states have recently tended to apply strict anti-immigrant laws that could be underlined as the prime evidence of the institutional racism (Sivanandan, 1990). Beside institutional racism, which appears in the administration, mass media, education, and judicial decision-making, some of the European states' governments

have also put into force strict legal provisions to restrict the entry of immigrants and asylum seekers - a set of provisions that have been revisited during the Syrian refugee crisis.

The implementation of those exclusionary legal provisions towards immigrants and asylum seekers, and the provocative political discourse of the governments at the expense of foreigners, also give momentum to the rise of xenophobic sentiments, such as the German Asylum Law (July 1, 1993) terminating economic asylum right and restricting the right of political asylum. The public speeches of politicians accusing the foreigners of unemployment and social depression are some of those acts, which legitimise xenophobia and racism in Germany, UK, France and elsewhere. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl always explicitly rejected the fact that Germany was a country of immigration, even in the aftermath of tragic events of Mölln (1992) and Solingen (1993) leading to the murder of eight Turkish origin residents.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, in one of her public speeches in the *Daily Mail* (January 31, 1978), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher complained about the massive immigration of the New Commonwealth or Pakistani people to Britain, and explained her concerns about the 'occupation of England' by a different culture (Barker, 1981: 15). And, one of the former French Prime Ministers, Edith Cresson, once complained that 'of every ten immigrants found to be here [in France] illegally, only three are expelled' (Cited in Bhavnani, 1993). The common denominator of those speeches given by the high level politicians is the extensive usage of the terms like 'our people', 'our citizens' symbolising the 'victims', and 'immigrants' referring to the 'criminals' - a discourse which is the replicate of the former colonial discourse that had created a Manichean world view for the colonialist powers.

It is evident that there is a positive correlation between the exclusionary discourses of mainstream political elite and the rise of xenophobic climate, a correlation that has also prepared the ground of populist rhetoric in Europe. For instance, the climate of xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism in the former East Germany became arduous after the CDU-CSU came back to power in Germany in 2005. The former spokesperson of the defeated Social Democratic Party and Green coalition government (1998-2005), Uwe-Karsten Heye, shortly before the 2006 World Cup in Germany, declared that there were small and mid-size cities in Brandenburg and elsewhere where he would advise anybody of a different skin colour not to visit (Weinthal, 2006). A 37-year-old Black German was beaten into a coma on a street in Potsdam in the spring of 2006 by two men affiliated with the right-wing scene. The perpetrators blasted the victim as a 'pig' and a 'nigger'. The commissioner responsible for internal security in Potsdam, Jörg Schönbohm (CDU), refused to designate the attack as a race-based hate crime. Schönbohm's CDU colleague, Wolfgang Schäuble, the Interior Minister, commented that blond and blue-eyed people were also victims of acts of violence - an unfortunate discourse far from discouraging racist attacks (Mühe, 2007).

In this context, the question to be asked is about the nature of the current racism. Racism may be defined as a doctrine that divides the world into racial castes locked in an endless struggle for domination, in which the allegedly physically superior are destined to rule the allegedly inferior and form a racial elite. Racism is also defined as an ideology of the colonial period and of the period in which class struggles deepened. Racism, as an ideology, has been a form of manipulation formulated by state actors in order to be able to assist the creation of a 'collective spirit' against the 'others'; or it is a system of thoughts, which creates an underclass<sup>14</sup> composed of the members of the other 'race'. Etienne Balibar (1991) conceives racism as an ideological apparatus of the state employed to provide national unity. Thus, 'racism is never simply a "relationship to the other" based upon a perversion of cultural and/or sociological difference; it is a relationship to the other mediated by the intervention of the state' (Balibar, 1991: 15).

<sup>13</sup> See <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/04/world/thousands-of-germans-rally-for-the-slain-turks.html> accessed on 19 December 2016.

<sup>14</sup> The term 'under-class' originally comes from a nineteenth-century Swedish word for lower class, *underclass*. Gunnar Myrdal (1963), a Swedish economist, was the first scholar who used the term to describe the victims of deindustrialization in a small book written for the American public. Myrdal defined the term as 'an unprivileged class of unemployed, unemployables and underemployed who are more and more hopelessly set apart from the nation at large and do not share in its life, its ambitions and its achievements (1963: 10). In his book, he foresaw that changes in the economy regarding the unemployed people forced out of the labor market. For a detailed analysis of the term 'underclass' see Gans (1995).

In other words, racism, as Jacques Barzun (1965: xi) once argued, could be found in each theory or social project which aims to justify any kind of collective enmity. Because of the ideological manipulation of the state, society comes to terms with the clear-cut separation of 'we' versus 'foreigner' leading to a sort of Manichean nationalist imagination. This dualist representation of humanity effectively reduces what belongs to individuals to what belongs to groups, and naturalises all discrimination. Similarly, Pierre-Andre Taguieff (1988) defines two kinds of racism: 'Discriminatory Racism' and 'Differential Racism'. The former is 'normal' racism found in the discriminatory ideology of colonialism and modern slavery, as in Britain and France. It can be boiled down to two axioms: Inequality (we are better) and universality (we are humanity). This implies two correlated attributes: The quality of universality for those who represent the 'we' and the racial quality (particularity) for those who stand for the 'others'. Those who define themselves as the representatives of the universal culture, blame others for belonging to an uncivilised race in denial of universality. In other words, discriminatory racism refers to oppression and exploitation applied by the bearers of the allegedly universal civilisation over indigenous peoples of colonies: Inclusionary racism (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991: 39). The second type of racism implies the negation of the universal. While 'normal' racism results in colonialism and exploitation, both of which are legitimized by postulating the intellectual inferiority of those exploited, the second type is embodied in Nazism - an ideology predicated on the pre-eminence of difference and the elimination of the other, whose physical differences are sufficiently vague to generate suspicion and fear of mixing. The goal of the differential racism is thus to annihilate the other by regarding him/her as the absolute enemy: Exclusionary racism (Taguieff, 1988).

The main constituent of differential racism is the encounter of cultural differences and traditions, which have become manifest in the aftermath of the World War II. The increasing intersection of various cultures in the last decades has simultaneously brought about the rise of ethno-cultural and religious contradictions. The rise of the population of Pakistanis and Indians in the UK, Algerians in France, Turks in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, and Moroccans in Belgium is conceived by the Europeans as a major threat against the Judeo-Christian European civilisation. This is what we call 'new-racism'. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (1991: 21), in this context, define new-racism in a way that emphasises cultural differentiations:

*The new racism is a racism of the era of 'decolonization', of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space. Ideologically, current racism, which in Germany centers upon the immigration complex, fits into a framework of 'racism without races' which is already widely developed in other countries, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon ones. It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but only the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions; in short, it is what P.A. Taguieff has rightly called a differentialist racism.*

Thus, 'new racism', regardless that of the ex-colonial states or of the non-colonial states, no more resembles the racism of the era of colonisation which carried an inclusionary discourse under the framework of 'strong' and 'weak' cultures. Rather, it has an exclusionary nature of a cultural differentialism as in the contemporary mode of 'differentialist racism', a 'racism-without-races'. The 'new cultural racism', or in other words 'differentialist racism' is formed by the state in order to exclude what is threatening the existence of the nation-state. To sum up, the ideology of racism is often constructed as a tool for governmentality to exclude the threats directed against the nation-state; the threats could be either class struggle, or ethno-cultural and religious cleavages, as they are perceived now. Such forms of governmentality deployed by modern states conceal the structural sources of social and political inequality, and prompt individuals to become preoccupied with an ethno-cultural and religious discourse in raising their political claims. One needs to realise that such forms of ethno-culturalist discourse become popular along with the crisis of the welfare state, thus with the rise of neo-liberal understanding of prudentialism, making things harder for marginalized migrant origin communities.

It seems that contemporary Populism has made another term very popular: nativism. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, nativism is prejudice in favour of natives against strangers. Today, nativism means a policy that will protect and promote the interests of indigenous, or established inhabitants over those of immigrants. This usage has recently found favour among Brexiters, Trumpists, Le Penists and other right-wing populist groups, who seem to be anxious to distance themselves from accusations of racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. Nativism sounds more neutral, and conceals all the negative connotations of race, racism, Islamophobia and immigration (Jack, 2016). Hence, the nativist European populism is now claiming to set the true, organic, rooted and local people against the cosmopolitan, globalizing elites denouncing the political system's betrayal of ethno-cultural and territorial identities (Filc, 2015: 274). Now in what follows, a detailed analysis of the six countries under scrutiny will be made in relation to their experiences with the populist movements and political parties from both right and left of the political spectrum.

## Conclusion

The purpose of this essay was to reveal the social-economic drivers of the contemporary forms of populist movements in Europe. It is often presumed that the affiliates of such populist movements and parties are political protestors, single-issue voters, 'losers of globalization', or ethno-nationalists. However, the picture seems to be more complex. Populist party voters are dissatisfied with, and distrustful of, mainstream elites, and most importantly they are hostile to immigration and rising ethno-cultural and religious diversity, which are perceived to be the symptoms of globalization. While these citizens are feeling themselves economically insecure, their hostility springs mainly from their belief that immigrants and minority groups are threatening their national culture, social security, community and way of life. They are perceived by the followers of the populist parties as a security challenge threatening social, political, cultural and economic unity and homogeneity of their nation. The main concern of these citizens is not just the ongoing immigration and the refugee crisis; they are also profoundly anxious about a minority group that is already settled: Muslims. Anti-Muslim sentiment has become an important driver of support for populist extremists. This means that appealing only to concerns over immigration such as calling for immigration numbers to be reduced or border controls to be tightened, is not enough. The resentment against the symptoms of globalization seems to be one of the two essential drivers of populism leading to the feelings of getting lost in diversity among the followers of such political parties.

A second constituent of the contemporary forms of populist rhetoric is the growing resentment against the European Union, which is perceived by the affiliates of populism as one of the sources of the current political and economic crisis. In such a period of structural, political and economic crisis triggered by the ongoing refugee crisis and escalating waves of terrorism, a growing number of European citizens, mostly lower-educated, male in 30-50 age-bracket, rural, and unemployed segments of the European public, are likely to become more affiliated with nationalism, localism, and Euroscepticism. The transnational character of the European Union has recently become one of the main focal points of criticism for the populist political leaders, who happen to invest in the capitalization of the feelings of getting lost in unity.

It was also argued that populist political style has become very widespread together with the rise of neo-liberal forms of governmentality capitalizing on what is cultural, ethnic, religious and civilizational. The supremacy of cultural-religious discourse in the West is likely to frame many of the social, political, and economic conflicts within the range of societies' religious differences. Many of the ills faced by migrants and their descendants, such as poverty, exclusion, unemployment, illiteracy, lack of political participation, and unwillingness to integrate, are attributed to their Islamic background, believed stereotypically to clash with Western secular norms and values. Accordingly, this essay has just argued that 'Islamophobia' is a key ideological form in which social and political contradictions of the neoliberal age are dealt with, and that this form of culturalization is embedded in migration-related inequalities as well as geopolitical orders. Culturalization of political, social, and economic conflicts has become a popular sport in a way that reduces all sorts of structural problems to cultural and religious factors - a simple way of knowing what is going on in the world for the individuals appealed to by populist rhetoric.

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# Conferences, Roundtables & Workshops

## Conference on EU-Turkey Relations 22 September 2017



İstanbul Bilgi University's European Institute, in collaboration with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Turkish Social and Economic Research Foundation (TÜSES), Social Democracy Foundation (SODEV), KÜYEREL think tank and the Science Academy Foundation organised a one-day conference on EU-Turkey Relations on 22<sup>th</sup> September 2017 at BILGi's **santral**İstanbul Campus.

The conference which was held at a crucial time for both EU and Turkey, attracted a large number of participants from academia, civil society and press. The aim of the conference was to analyse the situation of the relations between EU and Turkey at the present moment and look at the perspectives taking into account the recent economic, political and securitarian developments.

Following the opening speeches by İstanbul Bilgi University's acting Rector Prof. Dr. Ege Yazgan and the Deputy Representative of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Daniela Kuzu, the first session of the conference focusing on the economic aspects of EU-Turkey Relations was launched.

Moderated by Prof. Dr. Cem Başlevent (İstanbul Bilgi University), the economic session started with an overview of EU and Turkey's economic development by Prof. Dr. Şevket Pamuk (Boğaziçi University). Prof. Refet Gürkaynak (Bilkent University) described the role of EU as an anchor in Turkey's economic policy making and gave examples from today's global economy. The last speaker of the economics session, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Lars Nilsson (European Commission) gave an expose on extending and deepening EU Trade Relations where he described the setting of the EU in World trade (extra-EU trade), the current EU trade negotiation agenda, as well as the challenges facing EU such as non-tariff barriers, services and value chains. On EU-Turkey trade relations Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nilsson spoke in depth about the EU-Turkey Bilateral Preferential Trade Framework (BPTF), it's architecture, it's ex-post and ex-ante impacts.

The second session of the conference focused on the political aspects of EU-Turkey relations and was moderated by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emre Erdoğan (İstanbul Bilgi University). The first speaker Prof. Dr. İltur Turan (İstanbul Bilgi University) described parliamentary democracy and governance in the very diversified EU of today and in Turkey, emphasizing the differences of the systems. Then Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya (İstanbul Bilgi University) presented "Populism, Migration and Islam in the EU" and focused on the findings of research carried out within the framework of the Horizon 2020 COHERE (Critical Heritages) Project where fieldwork analysed motivations of populism in UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Greece. The last speaker of the political session of the conference was Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nicolas Monceau (Bordeaux University) who shared his vision on "Euroscepticism in the EU" and distinguished between three distinct types of Euroscepticism: Popular Euroscepticism, Political Euroscepticism and Institutional Euroscepticism.

The last aspect of the EU-Turkey Relations to be examined at the conference concerned "security" and was chaired by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erhan Doğan (Marmara University, TÜSES). In this last session Prof. Dr. Gencer Özcan (İstanbul Bilgi University) analysed the current challenges of "EU, Turkey and the Middle East", followed by the presentation of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Somer (Koç University) on "EU, Turkey and the Kurdish Question". Assoc. Prof. Dr. Raffaele Marchetti (LUISS University) presented the "Transnational risks and Opportunities in the EU - Turkey Relationship" using different models used in transnational politics.

The conference, which was attended by over 200 participants, also set the scene for lively question & answer sessions, which were held after each panel.



## Program

10.30 – 10.45 **Opening Speeches**

**Prof. Dr. Ege Yazgan**, Acting Rector, İstanbul Bilgi University

**Daniela Kuzu**, Deputy Representative, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

10.45 – 12.15 **Economics Session**

**Session Chair: Prof. Dr. Cem Başlevent**

**Prof. Dr. Şevket Pamuk**: EU and Turkey's Economic Development

**Prof. Dr. Refet Gürkaynak**: EU as a Carrot and Anchor for Economic Policymaking in Turkey

**Assoc. Prof. Dr. Lars Nilsson**: Extending and Deepening EU Trade Relations: An Overview of Current Issues and Future Challenges

12.15 – 13.30 Lunch

13.30 – 15.00 **Politics Session**

**Session Chair: Assoc. Prof. Emre Erdoğan**

**Prof. Dr. İlter Turan**: Parliamentary Democracy and Governance in the EU

**Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya**: Populism, Migration and Islam in the EU

**Assoc. Prof. Nicolas Monceau**: Democratic Responsiveness of the EU

15.00 – 15.30 **Break**

15.30 – 17.00 **Security Session**

**Session Chair: Assoc. Prof. Erhan Doğan**

**Prof. Dr. Gencer Özcan**: EU, Turkey and the Middle East

**Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Somer**: EU, Turkey and the Kurdish Question

**Assoc. Prof. Dr. Raffaele Marchetti**: Transnational Risks and Opportunities in the EU-Turkey Relationship

17.00 – 17.15 **Closing Remarks**

## “The Future of the EU, Rise of Populism and BREXIT”, 21 June 2017



European Institute of İstanbul Bilgi University in cooperation with Economic Development Foundation organized a panel entitled **The Future of the EU, Rise of Populism and BREXIT on June 21, 2017 at santralistanbul** Campus.

Opening speeches were made by Professor Yeşim Atamer, Director of the European Institute and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Çiğdem Nas, Secretary General of Economic Development Foundation. The panel was moderated by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pinar Uyan-Semerçi, Department of International Relations, and Director of the Migration Center of İstanbul Bilgi University.

The panel was held in order to discuss the effects of the rise of populism and Euroscepticism on European countries, and the affects of the transformation on the global system, and of corporate governance on their social structure, as well as Brexit, the future of the EU and where Turkey will be positioned in all these developments. Professor Ayhan Kaya, Professor Hakan Yılmaz and Assoc. Dr. Çiğdem Nas discussed the current and critical issues about the European Union.

**Professor Hakan Yılmaz** discussed the history of populism in Europe dating back to early 20th century. He argued that Europe has a tradition of populism thus it's recent rise was to be expected. Yılmaz highlighted the centrality of fears for safety and security, the economic crisis, and a seeking an escape from the truth have initiated the rise of the populist movements. He suggested that the only way to address issues stemming from populism is to increase the institutional competency of the EU.

**Professor Ayhan Kaya** discussed the initial finding from the CoHere project's field work. He argued that there are various populist political parties and movements across Europe. He also discussed the nature of populist movements in Turkey, Italy, Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, and France through examples obtained from the CoHere WP2 fieldwork. Kaya noted that populism is a strategy, an instrument, that can be deployed by any ideological configuration.

**Associate Professor Çiğdem Nas** discussed the importance of identity in the legitimacy of the EU along with the principles of transparency, accountability and legitimacy. She argued that along with populism, nation states have also been on the rise partly causing the legitimacy crisis of the EU. Therefore, deferring authority to the EU has become problematic for member states. Nas also suggested that the recent political crisis in European countries can be addressed by increasing the authority of the EU over nation-states.

**OPEN LECTURE: “People Matter, Not the Land” Syrians in Between a Lost Home and Building a Future, 12 May 2017**



**SYRIANS IN BETWEEN A LOST HOME AND BUILDING A FUTURE**

**Speakers:**

**MAISA ALHAFEZ**, Istanbul Mosaic Oriental Choir, Istanbul  
**MOHAMAD DIWANA**, Tomorrow is Better Project, Amsterdam  
**Moderator: Malte Fuhrmann**, Istanbul Bilgi University

The Open Lecture on “‘People Matter, Not The Land’ Syrians in between a Lost Home and Building a Future” was organized on 12 May 2017 with the participation of Maisa Alhafez with the Istanbul Mosaic Oriental Choir by the European Institute and the Center for Migration Research of Istanbul Bilgi University. After the brief introduction by Dr. Malte Fuhrmann, DAAD lecturer at European Institute, videos from the blog Welcome to Turkey, including a video on Maisa Alhafez, were screened, which have been developed by Sinetopya and UtopicturesCollective to contribute to daily representations of Syrian refugees with a variety of cultural and social values they have (<http://welcometoturkey.info>). After the screening, Maisa Alhafez introduced her journey leading from Syria to Turkey, where she engaged in social and cultural activities for refugee children and in the formation of the Istanbul Mosaic Oriental Choir. The seminar concluded with questions from the participants. The open lecture was organized as part of IR 472 course “Europe and Migration”.

**BİLGİ’s European Institute: over ten years of European Studies at BİLGİ**

**2017 was a special year for both BİLGİ’s European Institute and our Newsletter. In this tenth anniversary issue the European Institute Team wanted retrace our footsteps and share a short history of the last decade with our readers...**

**Background**

Since its foundation in 1996, Istanbul Bilgi University has always been a firm believer of the European Union perspective, as clearly stated in the BİLGİ mission statement. Thus, BİLGİ became a pioneer in developing and supporting academic study programs, research and political and social debates on the European Union in Turkey.

BİLGİ’s European journey continued with the establishment of a “European Union Center for Practice and Research” in April 2005. The center was established for the purpose of undertaking academic research and studies on EU politics, economics, law, and the expansion of Turkey-EU relations. In addition to academic discussions in these areas, the Center created a platform for international researchers by organizing meetings and conferences in which EU institutions and policies and Turkey’s EU accession perspectives were presented. These activities later paved the way for a more diversified platform on EU Research: a European Institute. This Center functioned as a core group of academics paving the way for today’s European Institute. An important step in BİLGİ’s European journey was the establishment of the second “European Institute” in Turkey in 2007.

**European Institute: First Steps...**

Decided by İstanbul Bilgi University’s management in 2006, the application to establish a European Institute was submitted to YOK (Turkey’s Higher Education Council) and YOK’s positive recommendation was then confirmed by the Council of Ministers during the same year on 06 May 2006.

The institute was established in 2007 with three main pillars: EU politics, EU economics and EU law. The Institute aspires to provide substantial support to the already existing EU-oriented academic programs offered at BİLGİ, notably the BA program in European Union Studies, the MA Program in European Studies, two Certificate Programs within the framework of Life-Long Learning programmes.

The Institute management was then in place: Ayhan Kaya as Director, Gülperi Vural as Administrative Coordinator, Refika Saldere as Administrative Assistant were the first persons on board. The composition of the first European Institute Executive Board reflected the multidisciplinary approach and counted academics from different Faculties of BİLGİ such as Prof. Dr. Alan Duben (anthropologist from the Faculty of Political, Social and Economics), Prof. Dr. Yonca Aslanbay (Faculty of Communication), Prof. Dr. Yeşim Atamer (Faculty of Law), Prof. Dr. Nihal İncioğlu (International Relations from the Faculty of Political, Social Sciences and Economics) and Prof. Dr. Durmuş Özdemir (Economist from the Faculty of Political, Social Sciences and Economics).

By then, a very successful European Studies Certificate Programme destined to professionals and civil society was launched. Another certificate programme focusing on Management of EU Funded Projects was also launched and reached out to the public sector as well as NGOs covering the needs in İstanbul but also of many distant locations such as Van, Diyarbakır, Afyonkarahisar and Antalya. The institute’s certificate programmes enabled us to reach over 1500 adults within the spirit of Lifelong Education.



**DAAD Berlin Study Trip, 2010**



**Certificate on EU, 2010**

## European Institute: Support to Academic Programmes

Academics affiliated with the Institute gave considerable support both in teaching and management of EU-oriented academic programs offered at BİLGİ, notably the BA program in European Union Studies, the MA Program in European Studies, two Certificate Programs within the framework of Life-Long Learning; Assoc. Prof. Dr. Senem Aydın –Düzgıt, Assis. Prof. Dr. Özge Onursal-Beşgöl, Emre Gönen, Prof. Dr. Durmuş Özdemir, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alper Akyüz, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Artıran, Prof. Dr. Nihal İnciođlu, Dr. Ayşe Tecmen are, among many others, only a few of the names from BİLGİ academics who have contributed to the success and sustainability of EU oriented programmes.

## European Institute to Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence - internationalisation of European Studies and Research at BİLGİ... So many projects...



International Mother Language Day, 21 February 2012



Study Trip, Patriarchate 2013



International Mother Language Day, 21 February 2011

The past ten years were marked by a large number of programmes and projects which gave us the opportunity to support teaching EU: Research activities, publication of books, papers, book chapters and academic articles as well as the organisation of many seminars, workshops, conferences and book launches at BİLGİ were due to the work of the Institute.

The cooperation with European University Viadrina provided the opportunity to fund exchanges of MA students between BİLGİ and Viadrina. Also Viadrina University established the "Aziz Nesin Chair" in order to be able to invite fellows from BİLGİ to Viadrina for a month for teaching and

seminars. Prof. Alan Duben, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serhan Ada, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bertan Tokuzlu, Assoc. Prof. Esra Arsan and Assist. Prof. Dr. İnan Ruma were the fellows of this ongoing fellowship.

The collaboration agreement signed with CIFE (Centre International de Formation Europeenne) in Nice which is one of the top five academic institutions funded by the European Commission allowed us to organise yearly MA in European Studies Programmes and many Summer Schools and Seminars for distinguished universities from the USA, Japan and Chile and to receive students from many countries all over the world at BİLGİ. Thus, BİLGİ hosted over 600 international students with this programme.

Another very important support came from DAAD (the German Academic Exchange Organisation) which funded a full time Lecturer (Fachlektor) at BİLGİ who carries out teaching, research and dissemination activities. As a landmark, Dr. Peter Widmann focused on a research on Turkey-EU relations from the mediatic angle, lectured at BİLGİ's International Relations Department, organised many visits of German Academics to BİLGİ and accomplished a 5 year DAAD fellowship. He was followed by Dr. Malte Fuhrmann who focuses on 19<sup>th</sup> century historical changes in Eastern Mediterranean while lecturing for the International Relations Department of BİLGİ.

This being said, the area in which the Institute really excelled was EU funded projects which include: INTERACT (INTERACT - EU, France, Turkey: Universities Dialogue) in collaboration with Sciences Po-Paris and IFEA; three Jean Monnet Module Projects; a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence "EU Values at School EUeducate" Project; partnerships in FP7 Projects focusing on political and social diversity such as "Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME)" and "Tolerance in the EU (ACCEPT PLURALISM)"; three Marie Curie Fellowships e.g. Dr. Alper Kaliber on EU and the Kurdish Question, Dr. Claire Visier on European Funded Projects in Turkey: From design to implementation", and Dr. Cristiano Bee on social movements in the Turkish and European context in the "Active citizenship and young people in Turkey: Organised and non-organised forms of participation" Project.

A very important development in the European Institute's history was being awarded the "**Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence**" title with the "European Values at School - Euducate Project". Within the framework of this Project the European Institute Team in collaboration with the Ministry of Education's İstanbul branch, ORAV (Teachers Academy NGO) and the İstanbul Beyođlu and Şişli Municipalities reached out to over 200 high school teachers for week long interactive seminars on "European Values" while in parallel continuing the social responsibility "EU Boat" project in the framework of the European Values at School project reaching over 5000 high school students in five years with the contribution of BİLGİ and institute academicians. The academicians held seminars on different subjects involving European Values and Europeanness at the high schools within Beyođlu and Şişli Municipalities.

Other outcomes of the "European Values at School" Jean Monnet Project were an academic workshop on the "Perception and teaching of EU in Primary, Secondary and Vocational Schools in Turkey" where academicians, education experts from the İstanbul Directorate General of National Education, ÖRAV, Post Doc and PhD students from BİLGİ but also other Universities working on the same subject discussed and prepared the final academic book "Educating on European Values: Diversity and participation in Education" published in Turkish in 2016.

The Institute was also awarded two Jean Monnet Chairs: Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya in 2011 and Assoc. Prof. Senem Aydın-Düzgit in 2013.

At the present the Institute is participating in two Horizon 2020 projects:

COHERE (Critical Heritages) which seeks to identify, understand and valorize European heritages, engaging with their socio-political and cultural significance and their potential for developing communitarian identities. CoHERE addresses an intensifying EU Crisis through a study of relations between identities and representations and performances of history. In COHERE, BİLGİ is focusing specially on research on the rising populism in Europe.

FEUTURE “The Future of Turkey - EU Relations: Mapping Scenarios and Testing Dynamics” Project where BİLGİ is responsible of the Migration work package.

The Institute also will shortly start collaborating in a new Horizon 2020 Project: RESPOND “Multilevel Governance of Refugees in Europe and the Middle East”.

Finally, at present, Dr. Meltem Sancak-Finke has joined the institute for three years as a TÜBİTAK Fellow and is working on the “Living with Indeterminacy: not deported but abandoned-undocumented in İstanbul” which focuses on undocumented foreign labor in İstanbul.

### European Institute: Many High-Level Guests



**Award Ceremony on Honorary Doctorate in Political Science for Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, 29 May 2012.**



**Conference on Woman and Politics: Best Practices, 28-29 March 2011**



**Conference on Contemporary Turkish Studies at a Glance - Topics, Institutions and Future Perspectives 13-14 October 2012**

During the past decade BİLGİ's European Institute hosted many national and international high-level guests for conferences, speeches and events.... Among the Turkish personalities who honoured the institute with their presence we can cite İsmail Cem (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Mehmet Ali Birand (Journalist, TV Anchorman, author), Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and many Members of Parliament and leading Academics.

From the EU we remember fondly the visits and events with Margot Wallström (Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs and former EU Commissioner), José-Manuel Barroso (Former President of the European Commission), Martin Schulz (President of SPD and Former President of the European Parliament), George Papandreou (Former Prime Minister of Greece), Yves Leterme (Former Prime Minister of Belgium) and many members of European Parliament and important academics.

### European Institute: Conferences, Workshops, Seminars, Book launches

It is very difficult to describe and write up all the workshops, seminars, conferences, book launches and events which the European Institute organised at BİLGİ during the last ten years. Every year, we organised over ten events since the establishment of the institute at BİLGİ and our academics participated at also many events outside BİLGİ, be it abroad or in Turkey.

**It is essential to point out that our organisations could not have been carried out without the permanent support of BİLGİ's Board of Trustees, Rectorate, Management, Academic and Administrative teams to whom we owe gratitude.**

### European Institute publications: newsletters, working papers, books, e-book, web site and social media

The European Institute also produces a large number of publications the yearly newsletter has reached its tenth edition in 2017, the various Institute Working Papers cover subjects as diverse as “Rediscovery of the Balkans”, “Gender in International Migration Studies”, “The perception of the Armenian in Turkey”, “The European Financial Assistance in Turkey”, “Free Speech in Multicultural Europe”, “Globalisation and Recession” and many others. The ninth Working Paper to be published in 2018 will focus on “Nation Branding in Turkey: Seeking cultural recognition”.

The very productive academic and project teams at the institute also share the credentials -as teams but also individually- of many book publications for example: As a team the Institute published the first university text book on European Union in Turkish (2011). The editors of this book were Ayhan Kaya, Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Yaprak Gürsoy and Özge Onursal Beşgül. Senem Aydın Düzgit published “Constructions of European Identity: Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU” (Palgrave, 2012) and “Turkey EU Relations - with Natalie Tocci (Palgrave 2015), Ayhan Kaya “Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey” (Palgrave 2013) and “Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization” (Palgrave 2012).

The institute also published the very first e-Book on “Digital European Union: a Handbook for Turkish Students” in Turkish (2015) with its companion “Guidebook for Teachers” within the framework of Jean Monnet projects in collaboration with the İstanbul National Education Directorate General and ORAV, the Teachers Academy Foundation, a highly renowned NGO (see <http://dijitalavruba.bilgi.edu.tr>).

The Institute published “Educating on European Values: Diversity and Participation in Education” in Turkish in 2016 within the above mentioned “EU-Ducate” Jean Monnet Project. And finally, as all academic platforms, the European Institute has its website (<http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr>), and social media accounts on Facebook (BİLGİ.EuropeanInstitute) and Twitter (BİLGİ\_European) which are followed by a mailing list of stakeholders of over 6000 persons both in Turkey and abroad to whom our gratitude goes.

## EU Student Club

BİLGİ Students are also very active and many student Clubs exist within the university. The European institute has collaborated and had the support of the very active EU Students Club during these past years. The members of the EU Club supported our events, workshops, conferences as well as the EU Values Seminars but also organized many events in their capacity as a Student Club.

## And Finally: The European Institute as a Group of Persons Working as a Team



Institute Staff 2011



Celebration Ayhan Kaya's Professorship, 2009



Wedding of Aslı Aydın, in Charge of Education Programs, 2017



Kuzey&Rüzgar, 2017. Children of Refika Saldere. Former Secretary of the Institute

It is very difficult to describe in a few sentences the days, months, years we all spent together in order to achieve our common objective of contributing to strengthen academic work, research and dissemination activities on European Studies and, Universal and European common values in Turkey.

Behind all this effort and considerable work there was a group of highly motivated, very focused and well-functioning multinational integrated team. **Some names to be recalled within this context are: Suna Gökçe, Peter Widmann, Refika Saldere, Aslı Aydın, Cristiano Bee, Alper Kaliber, Claire Visier, Gülperi Vural, Malte Fuhrmann, Özge Onursal-Beşgül, Meltem Sancak-Finke, Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Mareike Rump, Alper Baysan, Elvin Çetin, Kevin Smets, John Mc Manus, Thomas Schad** and many others...

Outside work, we also shared highlights of our lives in the past ten years: Four marriages (Suna Gökçe, Refika Saldere, Aslı Aydın and Malte Fuhrmann), many babies (Ayhan Kaya, Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Özge Onursal Beşgül, Refika Saldere, Suna Gökçe, Cristiano Bee) and many happy and some less happy events in our personal lives that bound us together with strong personal ties, even though many of us are not at the Institute anymore.

**It is with gratitude and thanks to all those at İstanbul Bilgi University Board of Trustees, Rectorate, Management, General Secretariat, Academic and Administrative Staff- and outside who supported the European Institute to reach this landmark that we end this short history of the past decade.**

The European Institute Team

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# Programmes on European Studies



## BİLGİ MA in European Studies

The MA Program, launched in 2000 and run by the Social Sciences Institute, is designed to provide a thorough knowledge of the European Union, its historic development, its institutions, systems and policies. Turkey's longstanding EU integration process, which started in 1963, continued with the Customs Union (1996) that made Turkey part of the European Single Market. Within the framework of the program, Turkey's EU accession period is analyzed and researched with a focus on recent developments. The program, concentrating on themes such as enlargement and the societal transformations it brings to the countries involved (peace, stability, democratization, regional cooperation, human rights, rule of law, etc.) and European Neighborhood Policy, also offers a wider perspective of European Studies with emphasis on issues such as migration, environmental issues and intercultural dialogue.

**For further information please visit:** <http://eustudies.bilgi.edu.tr/>



EUROPA-  
UNIVERSITÄT  
VIADRINA  
FRANKFURT  
(ODER)

## Viadrina Double Degree MA Program

As one of the core countries of European integration since the early days of the European Coal and Steel Community, Germany with its political, social and economic structure deserves special attention in studies regarding the European Union. To this end, the European Institute of İstanbul Bilgi University has developed close relations with many universities and institutes in Germany. The academic cooperation with the European University Viadrina is an exemplary relationship, which started as a two-way exchange of students and academics, leading finally to an enhanced collaboration agreement between the two universities funded by the German Foreign Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Graduates not only gain an insight into life in two very different European cities, but also prepare themselves for a rapidly changing world of work across the European continent. The program is run by the Social Sciences Institute. With 30% of foreign students from over 70 countries and an extensive network of partner universities, European University Viadrina is one of the most international universities worldwide. The study courses and university degrees are internationally acknowledged. Its atmosphere is personal and warm, and with excellent student support and guidance European University Viadrina is able to offer outstanding study conditions. Viadrina is located at the German-Polish

border, only one hour by train from Germany's capital, Berlin. The University's proximity to Poland and to Eastern Europe is clearly a distinctive feature of the degree program. Students are able to both learn about the expansion of Europe to the east whilst actively experiencing life on both sides of the German-Polish border. In addition, extensive supervision is offered, along with small seminar groups and outstanding technical facilities. Should Frankfurt be too small, then there is always Berlin, only an hour away by train. **For further information please visit:** <http://maesdd.bilgi.edu.tr/>

### Master in Advanced European and International Studies - MAEIS



Applications for the "Master in Advanced European and International Studies" (MAEIS) at CIFE's Institut européen-European Institute (IE·EI) (Nice/France) in cooperation with İstanbul Bilgi University's European Institute are open. The Master's programme offers the unique opportunity to learn about the challenges and chances of Europe and develop perspectives for its future by learning and living in different European countries over the year. The MAEIS is a one-year-programme that takes place in three different study locations. The programme includes semesters in different countries, complemented by a study trip to the European and international organisations in Strasbourg, Brussels and Geneva.

**For further information please visit:** [www.ie-ei.eu](http://www.ie-ei.eu)  
[http://www.ie-ei.eu/en/3/description\\_21-1](http://www.ie-ei.eu/en/3/description_21-1)

From the beginning of my studies I felt the warm, welcoming and international atmosphere of the İstanbul Bilgi University as well as interest and support of its professors.

In addition to these aspects I feel myself very happy and lucky to be able to organize my courses in a flexible way so I could attend and finish a highly appreciated 6 months internship programme at the same time. I had the opportunity to gain additional skills at the Regional Office of United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which focuses on projects from gender equality, reproductive health, decrease violence against women to fulfill a potential of youth, undergo safe pregnancy and childbirth.

Moreover, another valuable opportunity that İstanbul Bilgi University provided is studying as exchange student in Europe under the Erasmus Plus Program. Under Erasmus Plus Program I studied one semester at the Masaryk University, Czech Republic. During this program at the Masaryk University, I attended master degree courses and some optional open courses were also provided by Social Studies Department like History of European State Building and Politics, Migration and Transnationalism, International Relations Theories, Startup nation-Israel (open course) German Foreign Policy (open course), US foreign Policy (open course). This opportunity helped me to develop and follow new areas of interest thanks to the exchange program of Erasmus.

Furthermore, after my study abroad semester I have started to work in a project on Migration to Turkey that is hosted at İstanbul Bilgi University and funded by TÜBİTAK and European Union. This opportunity is also another valuable gain for my career and international networks.

Briefly and sincerely I can say that, Master Program in İstanbul Bilgi University has significantly contributed and still supporting my career building plans and gaining knowledge as well as skills in my main interest in European studies and other subjects.

## FROM OUR STUDENTS

### AZAMAT MURZALIEV



After graduating my Bachelor Degree in International Relations in my home country Kyrgyzstan, I have decided to continue my studies abroad in order to attain the Master's Degree and selected İstanbul Bilgi University due to its well-known program in European Studies.

### JOSEFINE WEINHOLD



Throughout my time at İstanbul Bilgi University I could gain an insight into why the academic institution is rated as one of the best in Turkey: Every course I took was characterized by high-quality education with excellent and highly motivated lecturers. The scope of work is demanding and the three hour courses require compulsory attendance. The advantage is, that it leads to a rapid learning progress and a close relationship between lecturers and students. The director of the European Institute is Ayhan Kaya, who regularly offers courses for Graduates and Undergraduates. Every student should definitely take at least one course with him since he is both a luminary and a first-class lecturer, who is able to change the way of thinking for everyone who gets the chance to listen to him.

Even Santral, the European Studies Department's Campus contributes to the learning experience of it's students and depicts interesting discrepancies. First, the gap between rich and poor: The modern private university financed by high study fees is in contrast located in a rather low-income urban area. Second, the interaction between nature and urbanization is ubiquitous: The campus is characterized by extensive green areas where students relax and sunbathe with İstanbul's city panorama in the background. Last, the new and the old: At Santral a vacant power plant was rebuilt for both student's classes and a museum. Nowadays, various new buildings and student art projects are surrounding the entire campus.

Once you get to to know the campus and the lecturers as well as the staff working at BİLGİ, you will never want to leave from here.

## EU Student Club

İstanbul Bilgi Universty European Union Club is a student club, which established in 2013. Our student club focuses on European Union and international issues. We are organizing seminars, conferences, competitions to understand the European Union and its current issues. When we look at Turkey as a Candidate Member, and examine its educational, political and social situation, we found that raising awareness is the key to understanding European standards that can affect Turkey's potential membership.

We also aim to promote youth activities in culture art and education. Another important goal of our group is to get our members to have a broader understanding of European citizenship and encourage them to participate in multinational activities so that they can learn more about other cultures and introduce our culture to other countries.

All members of our club are getting into this act as students studying European Union Studies and International Relations departments in undergraduate level (1-2-3-4 years) . Therefore, our staff/personnel has advanced knowledge about European Union, politics, global Issues, human rights, active citizenship etc.

- Weekly Regular Club Meetings
- Ankara Politic and Diplomatic Visitations II
- Ankara Politic and Diplomatic Visitations I
- European Union Project Management Training
- Intermeeting New Era in Eu-Tr Relations
- Plans for the Future
- Next Generation Meetings
- Turkey Transformed? Power, History, Culture
- Children of Our Neighbors grow with BİLGİ
- Media Freedom in Digital Age
- Climate Changing and Turkey
- Mobilizations and Revolts in Global World
- European Values in Schools
- Turkey's European Union Scoreboard

Some of the activities of the EU Club in 2016/17:



Meeting with Kani Torun, Member of Parliament, Bursa



Meeting with Fatma Betül Kaya, Minister of Family and Social Policies



Meeting with Selin Sayek Böke, Spokeswoman Republican People's Party (CHP)



2017 Promotional Activity Days

# SHORT NEWS

## Prof. Ayhan Kaya Back from Sabbatical Leave

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya took a one-year sabbatical leave to join the European University Institute-EUI (Florence –Italy) as a Jean Monnet Fellow at Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies in August 2016. Prof. Dr. Yeşim M. Atamer served as the director at the European Institute in his absence. Herewith it is announced that Prof. Kaya is back in charge as the director of European Institute as of September 2017.



## santralistanbul - Annex Building

The **santralistanbul** - Annex Building, which is in close proximity to the **santralistanbul** Campus, with totally over 5000m<sup>2</sup> land and capacity of approximately 3000 students is inaugurated for the use of our university. The preparations for the Annex Building where many different sections, ranging from the conference hall to the classrooms, from study areas to administrative offices, are situated, was operational from the beginning of the 2017-2018 Academic year.

Address: **santralistanbul**-Annex Building, Premier Kampüs Ofis, Gürsel Mahallesi, İmrahor Caddesi, No: 29, 34400 Kağıthane - İstanbul

# İSTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY

Founded in 1996 with the motto 'We learn for life, not for school', İstanbul Bilgi University is a city university intertwined with İstanbul's vibrant cultural life and in close connection with the business world. BİLGİ is renowned for qualified international education and career opportunities as the only member of Laureate International Universities in Turkey. Since its founding, BİLGİ has attempted to establish a cultural and scientific community that promotes tolerance and respect for a diversity of individuals with different lifestyles, beliefs and ways of thinking within the framework of contemporary universal values, while at the same time maintaining strong ties with all segments of society. The BİLGİ community includes more than students: It also includes faculty, alumni, families, employers and neighboring communities where BİLGİ is located. Today BİLGİ represents a sound and distinct

attitude in the academic and intellectual life in Turkey with its more than 30,000 graduates, more than 25,000 students and nearly 1,000 academic staff.

Functioning under the aegis of the Turkish Council of Higher Education, BİLGİ is an individual full member of the European University Association (EUA) and a member of the International Association of Universities (IAU). With nearly 350 exchange agreements in Europe, BİLGİ is also an active participant in the Erasmus exchange network and has strong academic affiliations with numerous universities abroad. In 2006, BİLGİ joined the Laureate International Universities network, which provides quality higher education on an international scale with more than 60 accredited campus-based and online universities throughout North America, Latin America, Europe, Northern Africa, Asia and the Middle East. With this collaboration, BİLGİ students are able to be a part of an educational network which includes the University of Liverpool in the UK; Kendall College, Santa Fe University of Art and Design, San Diego New School of Architecture and Design and Walden University in the USA; Ecole Supérieure du Commerce Extérieur in France; Business, Information and Technology School in Germany; Universidad del Valle de México in Mexico; Universidad Europea de Madrid in Spain.

BİLGİ seeks to educate freethinking, creative, intellectually curious and enterprising individuals who will contribute to a world in which knowledge is the primary driving force in society, where knowledge is accessible to all and, indeed, in which access to it has come to be seen as a fundamental human right. BİLGİ holds a primary responsibility for providing, maintaining and further developing an academic environment in which both students and faculty members are able to engage in learning and the production of knowledge at the highest level. BİLGİ offers more than 200 programs in its six faculties, five institutes, five schools and three vocational schools that provide education to its associate, undergraduate and graduate students. The medium of instruction at BİLGİ is English. Before being admitted to their degree programs, students must demonstrate their proficiency in English. Students whose level of English is not sufficient to begin undergraduate study will have to enroll in the English Preparatory Program.

BİLGİ has three innovative campuses on the European side of İstanbul, the 2010 European Capital of Culture. Located in central neighborhoods, the three BİLGİ campuses - **santralistanbul**, Kuştepe and Dolapdere - offer easy access to social and cultural activities in İstanbul. Kuştepe Campus is located in Şişli, the center of İstanbul's business life, and Dolapdere Campus, an award-winning campus for its architectural design, is only ten minutes away from Taksim, the heart of the art scene, social activities and city life. **santralistanbul** Campus is an arts and culture complex located along the Golden Horn, hosting more than 700 conferences, festivals and other scientific and social events a year and includes the Energy Museum, Main Gallery, as well as educational buildings.

# ACADEMIC PROGRAMMES

## Faculties

### Faculty of Architecture

Architecture  
Industrial Design  
Interior Design

### Faculty of Business

Business Administration  
Business Administration (BİLGİ-University of Liverpool / Dual Degree) \*  
Business Informatics  
Business-Economics  
Business-Economics (BİLGİ-University of Liverpool / Dual Degree) \*  
Economics  
Economics and Finance (Honors)  
Economics and Management (Honors)  
International Finance  
International Trade and Business  
Marketing  
Political Economy and Social Philosophy \*

### Faculty of Communication

Advertising  
Arts and Cultural Management  
Communication Design and Management  
Cultural Management\*  
Digital Game Design  
Film and Television  
Management of Performing Arts  
Media and Communication Systems  
Media and Communication Systems (BİLGİ-University of Liverpool / Dual Degree) \*  
Photography and Video \*  
Public Relations  
Television Reporting and Programming  
Visual Communication Design

### Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences

Civil Engineering  
Computer Engineering  
Computer Engineering (BİLGİ-University of Liverpool / Dual Degree) \*  
Computer Sciences \*  
Electrical and Electronics Engineering  
Electrical and Electronics Engineering (BİLGİ-University of Liverpool / Dual Degree) \*  
Energy Systems Engineering  
Financial Mathematics \*  
Genetics and Bioengineering  
Industrial Engineering  
Mathematics  
Mechanical Engineering  
Mechatronics Engineering

### Faculty of Law

Law

### Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

Comparative Literature  
English Language Teacher Education  
European Union Studies  
History  
International Relations

Music  
Political Science  
Political Science (BİLGİ-University of Liverpool / Dual Degree) \*  
Psychology  
Psychology (BİLGİ-University of Liverpool / Dual Degree) \*  
Sociology

## Schools

### School of Applied Sciences

Banking and Finance  
Digital Game Design  
Fashion Design  
International Logistics and Transportation  
International Retail Management \*

### School of Aviation

Aviation Management

### School of Sports Sciences and Technology

Sports Management

### School of Tourism and Hotel Management

Gastronomy and Culinary Arts  
Tourism and Hotel Management

## Associate Degree Programs

School of Advanced Vocational Studies  
Accounting and Tax Applications  
Accounting and Tax Applications (Evening Education)  
Aircraft Technology  
Aircraft Technology (Evening Education)  
Architectural Restoration  
Architectural Restoration (Evening Education)  
Banking and Insurance (English) \*  
Banking and Insurance (Evening Education)  
Banking and Insurance (Turkish)  
Business Administration (Distance Learning) \*  
Business Administration \*  
Civil Air Transportation Management  
Civil Air Transportation Management (Evening Education)  
Civil Aviation Cabin Services  
Civil Aviation Cabin Services ((Evening Education)  
Computer Programming  
Construction Inspection \*  
Construction Technology  
Construction Technology (Evening Education)  
Cooking  
Cooking (Evening Education)  
Cyber Security  
Fashion Design  
Fashion Design (Evening Education)  
Finance \*  
Graphic Design  
Graphic Design (Evening Education)  
Health Services Management \*  
Human Resource Management \*  
Interior Space Design  
International Trade  
Logistics \*  
Marina and Yacht Management  
Maritime Transportation and Management  
Maritime Transportation and Management (Evening Education)  
Photography and Videography \*  
Printing and Publishing Technologies  
Public Relations and Advertising  
Radio and Television Programming \*  
Sports Management \*

### **Vocational School of Health Services**

Anesthesia  
Anesthesia (Evening Education)  
Audiometry  
Audiometry (Evening Education)  
Child Development  
Child Development (Evening Education)  
Dental Prosthetics Technology  
Dental Prosthetics Technology (Evening Education)  
Dialysis  
Dialysis (Evening Education)  
Electroneurophysiology  
Electroneurophysiology (Evening Education)  
Emergency and Disaster Management  
First and Emergency Aid  
First and Emergency Aid (Evening Education)  
Medical Imaging Techniques  
Medical Imaging Techniques (Evening Education)  
Medical Laboratory Techniques  
Medical Laboratory Techniques (Evening Education)  
Occupational Health and Safety  
Occupational Health and Safety (Evening Education)  
Operating Room Services  
Operating Room Services (Evening Education)  
Opticianry  
Opticianry (Evening Education)  
Oral and Dental Health  
Oral and Dental Health (Evening Education)  
Pathology Laboratory Techniques  
Pathology Laboratory Techniques (Evening Education)  
Perfusion Techniques \*  
Physiotherapy  
Physiotherapy (Evening Education)  
Radiotherapy  
Radiotherapy (Evening Education)  
Social Services

### **Vocational School of Justice**

Justice

### **Master Programs**

#### **Graduate School of Sciences Programs**

Double Degree MA in European Studies (İstanbul Bilgi University and Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt-Oder)  
e-MBA English  
e-MBA Turkish  
Joint LL.M in Turkish-German Business Law (İstanbul Bilgi University-Cologne University)  
LL.M / MA in Information and Technology Law  
LL.M / MA in Law (Business Law/Human Rights Law)  
MA in Banking and Finance  
MA in Banking and Finance Online  
MA in Clinical Psychology  
MA in Comparative Literature  
MA in Cultural Management  
MA in Cultural Studies  
MA in European Studies  
MA in Film and Television  
MA in History  
MA in Human Resource Management  
MA in Human Resource Management Online  
MA in International Political Economy  
MA in International Relations  
MA in Management Information Systems  
MA in Management Information Systems Online  
MA in Marketing  
MA in Marketing / Next Academy  
MA in Marketing Communication

MA in Media and Communication Systems  
MA in Organizational Psychology  
MA in Philosophy and Social Thought  
MA in Sociology  
MA in Public Relations and Corporate Communication  
MBA  
MFA in Visual Communication Design  
MSc in Accounting and Auditing  
MSc in Economics  
MSc in Energy Systems Engineering  
MSc in Financial Economics  
MSc in International Finance

#### **Institute of Health Sciences Programs**

MSc in Dietary  
MSc in Health Services Management  
MSc in Health Services Management Online  
MSc in Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation

#### **Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences Programs**

MArch in Architectural Design  
MArch in History, Theory and Criticism in Architecture  
MSc in Energy Systems Engineering  
MSc. in Construction Management  
MSc. in Electrical - Electronics Engineering  
MSc. in Intelligent Systems Engineering  
MSc. in Mathematics

#### **Doctoral Programs**

#### **Graduate School of Sciences Programs**

PhD in Economics  
PhD in Communication  
PhD in Business Administration  
PhD in Public Law  
Private Law  
PhD in Political Science

#### **Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences Programs**

PhD in Mathematics

\* No new students will be accepted.







Yılda  
1 değil,  
yılda  
**1000**  
etkinlik!

Dance Festivali

DOMINO DERSLER

DOMINO DERSLER

DOMINO DERSLER



**İstanbul  
Bilgi University**

**LAUREATE** INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITIES