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THE PROCESSES OF MYSTIFICATION AND DEMYSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN TURKEY

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TÜRKİYE'DEKİ POLİTİK SÖYLEMDE MİSTİFİKASYON VE DIMISTIFIKASYON SÜREÇLERİ

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ABSTRACT

THE PROCESSES OF MYSTIFICATION AND DEMYSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN TURKEY

This thesis examines the processes of mystification and demystification in Turkish political discourse with a social constructionist approach. Within the context of Kemalist one party regime and the AKP single party government, this research portrays how the dichotomy of Old/New Turkey was discursively constructed and deconstructed by Kemalist and the AKP power and how mystification and demystification processes take place by means of four binary opposition categories: 'New/Old Turkey', 'Ottoman as a revival (resurrection) process/Ottoman as a degeneration process', 'unveiled woman/veiled woman', Kemalist youth/ the AKP (Asım) youth.The samples that are collected through newspapers archives of Beyazıt State Library and Atatürk Library and the archives of the AK Party, Presidency of Turkish Republic and Grand National Assembly websites consist of political speeches, newspaper articles in *Cumhuriyet, Ulus, Yeni Şafak* and *Sabah* newspapers and Assembly minutes between 1934 and 1938 for Kemalist discourse and between 2012 and 2016 for the AKP discourse. The comparative discourse analysis of Kemalist and the AKP data provided an in- depth understanding of the processes of mystification and demystification.

Keywords: discourse analysis, mystification, demystification, political discourse, power and ideology

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'DEKİ POLİTİK SÖYLEMDE MİSTİFİKASYON VE DİMİSTİFİKASYON SÜREÇLERİ

Bu çalışma Türkiye'de politik söylemlerde yer alan mistifikasyon ve dimistifkasyon süreçlerini/yöntemlerini sosyal inşacı bir yaklaşımla incelemektedir. Kemalist tek parti yönetimi ve AKP tek parti hükümeti bağlamında bu çalışma Yeni/Eski Türkiye'ye dair farklılıkların Kemalist ve AKP iktidarları tarafından söylemsel olarak nasıl yapılandırıldığını ve yapıbozuma uğratıldığını ve aynı zamanda sözü edilen mistifikasyon ve dimistifikasyon süreçlerinin 'Yeni/Eski Türkiye','bir yozlaşma süreci olarak Osmanlı/bir diriliş süreci olarak Osmanlı', 'örtülü kadın/örtüsüz kadın', 'Kemalist gençlik/AKP (Asım) gençliği' olarak belirlenen dört ikili karşıtlık kategorisi üzerinden nasıl meydana geldiğini ortaya koyuyor. Beyazıt ve Atatürk Kütüphanesi gazete arşivlerinden, AK Parti, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi websitesi arşivlerinden elde edilen örneklem Kemalist söylem için 1934 ile 1938 yılları arası ve AKP söylemi için 2012 ile 2016 yılları arasındaki politik konuşmalardan, *Cumhuriyet*, *Ulus*, *Yeni Şafak* ve *Sabah* gazetelerindeki haber ve yazılarından ve meclis tutanaklarından oluşmaktadır. Kemalist ve AKP verilerinin karşılaştırmalı söylem analizi, siyasal söylemde mistifikasyon ve dimistifikasyon süreçlerinin derinlemesine incelenmesine ve anlaşılmasına olanak sağlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:söylem analizi, mistifikasyon, dimistifikasyon, politik söylem, iktidar ve ideoloji

1 INTRODUCTION

On November 10, 2016, Erdoğan gave one of his effective speeches on the commemoration day of the founder of the modern secular 'New Turkey'; Atatürk. His speech was highly significant not only because it was an apperant manifestation of the (re)construction of 'New Turkey' in which the cult of Atatürk was an instrumental tool for legitimizing the AKP's 'new' but also because it encompassed symbolic elements regarding this 'new'. Throughout his speech, for instance, the religious and pro-Ottoman First Assembly slide that centered the stage and read the words of Atatürk; "Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation" in Ottoman language is of symbolic importance in terms of demonstrating the 'real' cultural and historical values of 'New Turkey'. It represents, in fact, an outcry against the Kemalist 'Old Turkey' that caused a rupture in every realm of the society and a rejection of the reformist and exclusionary Second Assembly that embodies the Kemalist rule and mentality and stirs up the 'painful' days in AKP's cultural memory due its authoritarian rule.

What was more striking in Erdoğan's speech was his word preference as Ghazi (which is an Islamic term and a title given to a Muslim warrior fighting for Islam); the title given by the religious First Assembly in 1921, instead of Atatürk which the reformist Second Assembly granted him as a surname when he referred to the founder of Turkey and his statements on -the (re)construction of- 'New Turkey' as a new phase of Turkey in which "they would fulfil Ghazi's wishes in spite of the ones who resist change in the name of Atatürkism/Kemalism since unlike the AKP, the CHP could not grasp the 'real' messages of Ghazi"[1]. It was remarkable in the sense that how the AKP creates an 'imaginary' discursive link in terms of marking a continuity and similarity between the 'intentions' and the 'ideals' of the founder of 'New Turkey' in 1920s and the founder(s) of the 'New Turkey' in 2010s.

Apart from labelling and emphasizing Ghazi as an Ottoman soldier who was designated to save the Ottoman Empire, the historical line of the Turkish Republic was (re)constructed by selectively interweaving particular historical events with reference to1071 (the Battle of Manzikert), 1299 (the foundation of the Ottoman Empire), 1453 (the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottoman), 1919 (the Independence War), 1920 (the foundation of the First Assembly), and 1923 (the foundation of Turkish Republic). In addition to this, the marking of 2023 as an

[1] TCBB, "10 Kasım Gazi Mustafa Kemal'i Anma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma" November 10, 2016, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61155/10-kasim-gazi-mustafa-kemali-anma-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma.html

‘ideal’ future also perfectly illustrates the AKP’s adoption of its modernist discourse in its ongoing last phase in the sense that the change of the present, the defamation of the past and longing for a better future with a constant progress takes place. The selective word used to express this progress in terms of reaching beyond the level of contemporary civilization is (through) the ‘revitalization’ of ‘our country’. Accordingly, the very speech of Erdoğan serves as a perfect example to demonstrate how the signification(s) of ‘New Turkey’ is discursively constructed (along with his ideological selections of lexicon) and varies according to different ideologies within different political, historical and cultural contexts.

New Turkey is indeed a key concept in Turkey’s political lexicon. Erdoğan also emphasizes the significance of this ‘new’ with reference to Atatürk’s recurrent use of the very concept in Speech (*Nutuk*). This leads one to ask questions about how ‘New Turkey’ was constructed on a discursive level in Kemalist discourse, thereby, how it is being reconstructed discursively in the AKP discourse and several other questions such as if these ‘new’ and ‘old’ are different ideological constructions, then how the clash between these two constructions can be revealed by means of leitmotifs; ‘Ottoman’, ‘woman’ and ‘youth’ and thus by means of binary opposition categories over these leitmotifs in political speeches or newspapers in terms of mystification and demystification processes.

This study is thus a case study of two contending ideological movements, namely Kemalism and the AKP, in contemporary Turkey. Hence, it is based on a comparative discourse analysis which examines the texts of two ideologically confronting powers. The political speeches of the representatives of the Kemalist ideology along with the articles published in *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* newspapers between 1934 and 1938 and paralel to this, the political speeches of the representatives of the confronting groups; the AKP and the articles published in *Yeni Şafak* and *Sabah* newspapers in addition to the Assembly minutes constitute the texts for the comparative analysis in this study. The newspapers have been assumed to function as Althusserian sense of “ideological apparatuses”. The main aim of this study is to delienate the processes of mystification and demystification within two discourses, to reveal the clash(es) between the two distinct constructions by means of binary opposition categories, to discuss the construction and the deconstruction of narratives in terms of the representations of ‘New and Old’, ‘Ottoman’, ‘woman’ and ‘youth’ within two different political, historical and cultural contexts and to discuss their contribution to mystification and demystification processes by means of binary opposition categories.

In terms of political discourse, the processes of mystification and demystification are indeed ideological. Broadly speaking, mystification process refers to eulogy of a particular ideology or person(s) that can reach to the level of sacralization of 'us' or 'our' ideology in order to realize the ideological intentions of power groups while the demystification process refers to defamation of the 'other' that can result in the de-sacralization and the de-legitimization of 'them' or 'their' ideology. Both processes neccesiate the ideologically based (de)construction of narratives and the creation of (new) myths. Since there has been a clash between the two ideological movements, namely Kemalism and the AKP in Turkey precisely over the discursive (re)construction of 'New Turkey' that inevitably results in mystification and demystification processes on an ideological basis, this study sought to analyze the very processes in both discourses with a comprative anaysis.

The years between 1934 and 1938 and the years from 2012 to 2016 are selected and analyzed comparatively in order to demonstrate the discursive clash(es) of two contending discourses within the consolidation periods of Kemalist one party regime and the AKP single party government. These time spans are significant since the 1930s is a mark of the absolute consolidation period of Kemalist power due to the completion of Republican reforms.

The years between 1934 and 1938 can be regarded as a complete domination of political, social and cultural realm by the Kemalist one party rule by means of strict laws such as the Press Laws in 1934 and 1938, the Physical Education Law in 1938, the declaration of the Kemalist six principles as the official ideology in the CHP program in 1935 and the mobilization of all institutions to disseminate and instill Kemalist ideology. In addition, these years manifest the establishment of the Kemalist principles as a "regime of truth"[2] in the construction of 'New' Turkey.

The 2010s, similar to the 1930s, indicate the thorough consolidation of the AKP rule as a consequence of consecutive election victories. Starting with 2010, the concept of 'new' has been mentioned with an increasing emphasis on the construction of 'New Turkey'. Up until 2012, the AKP gradually neutralized the elements of the secular regime, succeded in several confrontations on legislative, military, and Presidential basis and roughly complemented its 'democratization and transformation reforms'. By 2012, the reforms that have been implemented under the AKP rule have been termed as 'The Silent Revolution' and published

[2] Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, (New York Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 131.

in 2013 by the AKP. The reforms in question have been interpreted as "counter-revolution" by foreign and local media and intellectuals.The post-2012 period can be regarded as a period in which the concepts of 'restoration', 'revitalization', 'revival' and '(re)construction'[3] have become central in addition to the concept of 'new' in the AKP discourse. Within the years between 2012 and 2016, the AKP not only reached its peak in terms of political power with the successive elections that resulted in 'majoritarion power' but also strengthened its position in the centre.Thereby, the more 'majoritarian power' it gained, the more authoritarian (oppressive and exclusionary) it has become as that of Kemalist power; gradually realizing its own social engineering project in the (re)construction of 'New Turkey'.

Throughout the comparative discourse analysis of political speeches and newspapers, all the binary categories are regarded as cultural concepts and signifying practices. That is, "the meaning is thought to be produced – constructed - rather than simply found (…) consequently what has come to be called as social constructionist approach". [4] With the assumption that meaning is never fixed and stable, this study analyzes the discursive formations and practices of two ideologies, traces the changes within these discursive formations and reveals how they function not only to produce different meanings but also to mystify 'itself' and to demystify the 'other'. What is meant by 'discourse analysis' is articulated by Hall as in two approaches;

> One important difference is that *semiotic* approach is concerned with the*how* of representation, with how language produces meaning –what has been called its 'poetics'; whereas the *discursive* approach is more concerned with *effects and consequences of the representation* –its 'politics'(…) It examines not only how language and representation produce meaning, but how the knowledge which a particular discourse produces connects with power (…) The emphasis in *discursive* approach is always on the historical specificity of a particular form or 'regime' of representation: (…) on specific languages and meanings, and how they are deployed at particular time, in particular places.[5]

The leitmotifs of 'New/Old' Turkey along with the other sub-motifs such as 'Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' are approached as two mythic constructions. Deriving from Benedict Anderson and the concept coined by him for the nation-states as "Imagined Communities"[6], the two different discursive constructions of 'New Turkey' are approached as two different

[3] The mentioned concepts, for instance, were used by the former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in the First Extraordinary Congress of the AKP after he was designated as the Prime Minister and were incorporated into the 62nd government of the AKP in 2015.
[4]Stuart Hall, "Introduction" in *REPRESENTATION Cultural Representations and Signifying practices*, ed. Stuart Hall, (Sage Publications: London), 1997, p.5.
[5]Ibid., p.6
[6]Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London: Verso: NLB, 1983).*

imaginary communities. In this sense, New/Old Turkey is referred as two discursive mental, namely cultural constructions. The binary opposition categories are also employed to interrogate the desire of two powers to construct their 'ideal' Turkey by creating hierarchial positions through mystification and demystification processes.

Considering these aspects of this study, the reader should be cognizant of the aim of this study which does not attempt to portray Kemalist and the AKP rule which is explicated in context part in order to provide the contextual background for the analysis but is rather interested in the discourses of both powers in terms of their 'ideal construction(s)' and how these two opposing 'ideal' is (re)produced, (de)legitimized and (de)constructed.

The primary source research of this study was through the archiveal research of newspaper archives in Beyazıt State Library and Atatürk Library and also through digital research of the political speeches in the AK Party, Presidency of Turkish Republic and The Grand National Assembly websites. The texts for the comparative analysis were collected according to the pre-determined keys words regarding the binary opposition categories, translated and categorized into four titles in line with the aims of the research topic.

The contemporary trends in cultural studies favor the study of culture through language since language and culture are inextricably interrelated. AsBaker and Galasińskiargues "an understanding of culture centered on signifying systems, cultural texts and the 'systems of relations' of language marks the shift in cultural studies." [7] Accordingly, this research contributes to the cultural studies or media studies that seek to understand political culturein Turkey by means of the discourse analysis of two distinct cultural forms in terms of 'New Turkey'. The main contribution of this thesis is that there is no previous academic work that has focused on the processes of mystification and demystification with a comparative discourse analysis of Kemalist and the AKP discourse in terms of political discourse.

With its modernist ideology and positivist attitude, the Republican regime in its half totalitarian but authoritarian structure attempted to define and create 'culture';which is a means of defining oneself, along with a civilizational shift from Islamic to Western, and tried to impose its own 'truths' on society. The Kemalist project whose aim was to 'reach the level of contemporary civilizations', namely Western civilizations, thus positioned the West(ern)

[7]Baker and Galasiński, Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity, (London: Sage), 2001, p. 4.

(civilization) as superior and the Eastern civilization inferior while demonizing the Ottoman period and rejecting the Ottoman civilizational heritage since its pre-Islamic cultural heritage was deteriorated by the adoption of 'eastern' culture and Islam in the Ottoman period. With the implemention of the reforms, the (re)adoption of this 'authentic' culture was aimed. In this sense, the First Assembly slide in Ottoman in Erdoğan's speech on the commeration day in November 2016 is in fact the epitome of the rejection of the one who was 'sentenced to forget' his 'authentic' Ottoman-Islamic cultural heritage. Paradoxically, however, the very slide of the religious First Assembly represents the attempt of a civilizational (re)shift and with the claim of the adoption of the same intentions of Atatürk aim at manipulating cultural and historical memory and thereby forgetting the civilizational adoption of Kemalism and its cultural preferences.

At this point, the matter of 'culture' in fact becomes the matter of 'civilization'. The 'conflict of civilizations', hence, becomes the central subject matter in terms of mystifcation and demystification process in this study. The leitmotfis 'New/Old','Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' serve to present this clash in terms of mystification and demystification processes. In addition, it primarily focuses on the historical/cultural aspects of the (re)constructions of 'New Turkey' in both political discourses. As a final note, this research also discusses the ideological depictions and claims of the 'authentic' woman and 'authentic' youth in both discourses.

The following part, Chapter Two, provides a theoretical framework of modernity and the asscociation between modernity and Kemalism and thereby, the discussions about the modernization process in Kemalist period. In addition, it contains the framework of post modernity and the AKP's adoption of post modernist discourse in its first phase along with the discussions in terms of similarities between post-modernity and Islamist literature and its intersection with the AKP's neo-Ottomanist discourse. Finally, it argues the AKP's adaption of modernist discourse in its ongoing last phase. Accordingly, the approach of this study is thus based on the AKP's shift from a post-modernist discourse to modernist discourse that resulted in the striking resemblance between two powers.

Chapter Three contains the contextual background for the research. As this research consists of the study of two ideological powers, it provides two seperate parts in terms of context. By doing this, the historical events that shaped the political conditions within two contexts are portrayed chronologically. First part allocated to Kemalism discusses the historical periods of

Tanzimat and Second Constitutonal Period in terms of modernization process. This section is followed by the emergence of one party period in which special emphasis was given to the political struggle between the Kemalist and the opposition group(s) along with the Republican reforms in the construction of New Turkey in order to depict the harshness of the one party regime.The final section regarding Kemalist context is discussed at length as a period with reference to the creation of myths, the regime's totalitarian tendencies for creating 'a new man' in line with the principles of Kemalist ideology and the mobilization of all institutions to contribute to this process is emphasized in this consolidation period of one party regime.

The AKP context constitutes the second part of this chapter. The political stance of the former parties such as Democrat Party and the National Outlook Movement are explicated in order to demonstrate the ideological similarites and continiuties with the AKP along with the clashes between Kemalism and these parties. Apart from this, the context regarding Cold War and post-cold War period is especially touched upon to discuss the rise of political Islam in global world. The phases of the AKP is also divided in three sections. The political events including the reforms that are congruent with the AKP's post modernist discourse are eloborated in its first phase with reference to party programs and bylaws. The clashes between the two ideological groups in terms of military, judiciary and the constitution are provided in its second phase. Finally, the third phase as the consolidation period of the AKP rule is explicated as the period of the (re)construction of New Turkey with the monopolization of power and as a shift from its post modernist discourse to modernist one in order to depict the social engineering project of AKP as that of Kemalism.

Chapter Four explicates at length the research methodology used for this study. It offers information on the aim of the research, the association between language, discourse analysis and cultural studies, the primary sources for the sample, the categorization of the sample according to binary opposition categories for the comparative analysis, the selection of time periods and the sample and the rationale for the discourse analysis method.

In Chapter Five, the leitmotifs, namely the representations of 'New Turkey', the 'Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' that appear in political speeches, newspapers and Assembly minutes are examined under the titles of binary opposition categories. An in-depth discourse analysis is conducted in order to eloborate the mystification and demystification processes with regard to the dichotomies within two opposing ideologies. By doing so, the clashes and the continuities in terms of similarities are also discussed. The findings and discussion section within this part

also discusses the construction of ‘we’ and ‘them’ dichotomy in details and the implications of this very dichotomy as a further analysis regarding mystification and demystification processes and how two different imaginations of New Turkey manipulate memory by the selective dimension of narratives that aim at forgetting.

Chapter Six, the conclusion part provides an opportunity to revisit the study, thus, summarizes the research findings with a brief overview in line with the contextual and theoretical framework in addition to the limitations of this study and recommendations for future studies.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Modernity and Modernization in Turkey

2.1.1 Modernity

In order to understand the modernization process in Turkey, it is benignant to delineate the characteristics and inevitable outcomes of modernization that originated in the West. In fact, the shift from the imperial (old) order in which religion was a regulatory and dominant factor in every aspect of life to nation-states (new order) in which the concept of citizenship flourished along with the dominance of positivism, that is to say, rational thinking was the denouement of modernization in the West and was a gradual process. This gradual process was initiated in Europe, namely, by Renaissance, Scientific Revolution and finally by Enlightenment, which prioritized science and scientific knowledge in the explanation of relations regarding humanity and society.

The defining characteristic of modernity would be a constant 'change' or 'progress' with a positivist approach and the implementation of reforms. It is a change from agricultural to industrial social formations, an evolution of modern culture that privileged science and technology. It is a project that aimed to cleanse the society of traditions, customs and weaken the hold of religious influence or beliefs (secularism) replacing them with reason, scientific knowledge and technology. Hence, it embodies a break with the past in which the past and the past values are devalued whereas the present is always doomed to change and the future is always a longing for this change to take place. The characterization of modern societies is therefore a "constant, rapid and permanent change". [8]

Modernity is, thus, to be considered as a discontinuity or a rupture with preceding conditions that entails a restructuring of traditional societies and social relations with modern institutions that are organized on different principles. In addition, modernity is a term that encompasses all social, political, cultural and economic aspects of life with a reference to nation, nationalism, national culture, a project, a discourse, capitalism, industrialization, democracy or secularism.

Modernity is inextricably associated with change which becomes the norm and with secularism which is constitutive of modern society. It marks the end of the systems and views

[8]Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Identity in Question" in *Modernity An Introduction to Modern Societies* (Blackwell Publishers, 1995), edited by Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thompson, p. 599.

offered by the religious authority replacing them with new social, political and cultural structures and institutions. All of these changes are legitimized by the development of knowledge and science. Within these changes, the past is devalued as "old-fashioned, traditional, obscure"[9] whereas the future is idealized as "a horizon of possibility and of improvement"[10]. Spencer explicates modernity with reference to Lyotard as such;

> Modernity is, for Lyotard, to be grasped as metanarrative. (…) To be modern, according to Lyotard, is to seek legitimation in one or other form of metanarrative suggested by that sense of future. Change and innovation are legitimated by being seen as part of the broader evolution or development of human knowledge (…)[11]

For the transition to a 'new' 'modern' Turkey that had been constructed on the remnants of the Ottoman Empire required legimization(s) for the radical changes, and thus it had to construct its own metanarrative. In other words,it required the construction of narrative(s), new myths, and stories that provide 'new' patterns or structures for people's beliefs or lifesyles and shape them accordingly.In this study, the emphasis is on Turkey as a nation-state in the consolidation periods of Kemalism and the AKP and the metanarratives of Kemalist and the AKP ideology.Since nation-states is an inevitable consequence of modernity, this study focuses on the narratives that serve to legitimize the 'creation of a new man', namely the creation of a homogenous identity through the project 'social engineering' and the 'creation of a new history and culture' that are in harmony with the ideology or the principles of the new regime in Kemalist period and challenges to it by the AKP, who formerly started to produce a post-modernist discourse against the modernist discourse of Kemalism as a grand narrative however finally ended up in a modernist discourse by constructing its own grand narrative.

Narratives serve as a vehicle to impose ideologies, cultures and traditions. As Anderson argued since nations are "imagined communities", then national cultures are narrative constructions imbued with symbols and representations. He also posits that "differences between nations lie in the different ways in which they are imagined".[12] According to Hall, there are five elements by which the narrative of national culture is told; "(1) national

[9] Lloyd Spencer, "Modern, Modernity" in *The Lyotard Dictionary*, ed. Stuart Sim, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 2011, p.143.
[10]Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12]Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Identity in Question" in *Modernity An Introduction to Modern Societies* (Blackwell Publishers, 1995), edited by Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thompson, p.612.

histories, literatures, the media and popular culture which provide a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and rituals which stand for and represent the nation, (2) an emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness (3) 'Invented tradition' (4) a foundational myth (5) the idea of a pure, original people or 'folk'" .[13] As such, this research seeks to understand the two different imaginations or narratives of Turkey in the name of the 'old' and the 'new' in two contending ideologies, namely Kemalism and the AKP regarding the time and bodies. While the time refers to different imaginations or narrative constructions of history regarding the 'New' and 'Ottoman', the bodies refer to 'woman' and the 'youth'. If modernity is regarded as a project, a constant change and progress in which the past is defamed and the present is depicted as a disease and the future as an ideal, then each ideology seeks the transform the society that is congruent with their 'true' values. The inevitable aspect of change that is intrinsic to modernity not only legitimizes these transformations within these ideologies but also enables to reveal the clash of two different narratives constructed within these ideologies. The relation between these two ideologies regarding modernity is explicated by Çınar as such;

> In the midst of such alternative projects, modernity can be thought of as a ruling metanarrative or a larger discursive field wherein contending ideologies challenge and seek to overpower each other, ultimately serving to reaffirm modern discourse. [14]

Also, Connolly furthers this argument as; "the interactions between such contending views or ideologies "establish a loosely bounded field upon which modern discourse proceeds" and where "adversaries sustain each other" ".[15] Thus, this study compares and contrasts the two periods within this depiction of modernity in Turkey: the consolidation years of Kemalism and the discursive strategies and formations in the construction of the 'new','Ottoman' 'woman', and 'youth' with the help of its main components, particularly republicanism, secularism, nationalism, reformism and that of the AKP, which entails an Islamist and (neo)Ottomanist discourse (the essential components of the traditional (old) society of which Kemalism was not advocate) and attempts to demystify Kemalism with the employment of the very same tools. Since the common desire is to transform the society toward an ideal future, they both tend to demystify the 'other' in order to impose their 'truths' regarding the

[13]Ibid., pp. 613-615.
[14]Alev Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: bodies, places, and time,* (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p.7.
[15]Connolly cited inAlev Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: bodies, places, and time,* (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p.7.

society. Indeed, for Kemalism the 'other' was the (old) Ottoman (regime) and all the meanings attributed to it, whereas for the AKP it is Kemalism (Kemalist old Turkey).

2.1.2 Modernity and Kemalism

In terms of comparison, the evolutionary change that took place in Europe marks the difference between the Europe and the non-European countries in which the preceding steps to modernity were non-existent. Turkey, in which the path to modernity was realized with instant reforms in the Republican period with a sense of a 'belatedness', serves to be a case of this example. In fact, the modernization process was initiated by the 'partial' reforms in the Ottoman period. The idea was simply to catch up with the West in terms of science and technology in order to reinforce the military and to preserve power of the Ottoman that was on the edge of collapse. However, it is noteworthy to acknowledge that Islam was still a dominant factor in the Ottoman society in every aspect of life, from judiciary to education, family life and societal relations. This state-led modernization was inevitably followed by partial reforms in judiciary, education and societal reforms. For instance, while in the 16th and 17th centuries women were ostracized by the Ottoman statesmen in the public sphere, the ignorance of women were regarded as a cause of backwardness by the western intellectuals in Tanzimat period and first reforms regarding the education of women were initiated. Marriage gained a legal status along with the right of a woman to demand divorce and the delimitation of polygamy by women's consent in the II. Constitutional period, yet, the ruling effects of Islam prevailed in social and family life.[16]

The outcome of the reforms was on one hand, an educated 'cadre' of which Mustafa Kemal was a part; a group of dissenters, 'Young Turks', who were infused with Western education and ideals to implement these reforms and on the other hand was a group of religious dissenters who were against these very reforms in the name of religion. The stance of religious dissenters towards change or modernization formed concepts like 'ignorant' and 'bigoted' which constituted the main part of a recurring conflict in the Republican Period[17], namely the chasm between the Ottoman and Kemalism. In other words, the Kemalist discourse of modernity is predicated upon this binary between reformists and Islamic reaction of which 'bigotry and ignorance' are constitutive parts and thereby is depicted as internal enemy of the regime. Since the ultimate aim of the Ottoman state elite was to preserve the

[16]Şirin Tekeli, "Kadın" in *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi,* (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul), vol.5, pp. 1191-1192
[17]Murat Belge, "Kültür" in *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi,* (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul), vol.5, p. 1291.

traditions and the Islamic character of the Empire, it repudiated the western ideals other than technology and science. However, modernization is not a partial but a full package. In other words, it comes with a full package, thus the idea of a controlled modernization; namely, picking what would suit their interests (technology) and discarding the other Western aspects (ethic and morals) initiated East and West conflict. [18] Belge explicates this partial modernization in the Ottoman period as such;

> When every basis of modernization is taken into consideration, it can be argued that decision on the change towards a Western direction was in fact for the sake of not to change in origin. To preserve the familiar structure of the state was dependent on the preservation of its power. (…) While heading towards the West, the Ottoman statesman neglected the concepts such as equality, freedom of thought, social justice and the practices that correspond to these concepts. The things they saw were a strong state apparatus, a modern and effective military, technological power and wealth. (…) They aimed to reach the very same level by acting like a western; however they did not want to discard the repressive features of an Eastern state.[19]

In the early years of the Republic, the modernization, so to say, westernization debate revolved around the question whether to inherit the aspects of the Western civilization as a whole or partially. The traditionalists, who were fond of partial inheritance, namely technology, privileged the Ottoman civilization and Islamic values with an exclusion of Western morals and morale. In contrast, the novelists were in favor of a total transformation with the belief that the exposure to Western civilization would create a synthesis. With the proclamation of Turkish Republic, a new state in 1923, a series of reforms were implemented with a secularist ethos in all avenues of life which meant the repudiation of the religious authority, i.e. Islam, a dominant factor in social and political and cultural realms in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Gellner emphasizes the *sui generis* nature of Turkey within the Muslim world in terms of modernity as such;

> I am about to discuss (…) the fascinating uniqueness of Turkey, or the multiple uniqueness of Turkey, and the interconnectedness of the various unique aspects of the Turkish political and social experience. The uniqueness is found in at least four fields: in religion, in state formation, in the pattern of nationalism, and in the diverse styles of modernity. These four things overlap, of course, are interconnected. [20]

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[18]Ibid., p. 1293.
[19]Ibid., p.1294.
[20]Ernest Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective" in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 233.

In his comparison of Turkey to Europe, Gellner argues that Turkey is a distinct example of modernity since in the secularization theses of sociology under the conditions of modernity and secularization, secularization does not apply to Muslim world in which the authority of Islam is in hold and hence Turkey is an exception.[21] In this exceptional case of Turkey, he also argues the presence of the Turkish state elite referring to the Ottoman period in which modernization was initiated. Among the Western principles that Turkey adopted is nationalism which "consisted of the worship of a differentiated high culture without the religious doctrine once linked to it".[22]

In regard to Turkish modernity, in which a transition took place from an empire to nation-state by the state elite who served to diminish the hold of religion in political, cultural and social sphere, regulated those with the institutionalization of modernity. Consequently, this created a binary opposition with regard to secularism and Islam within secular Kemalist ideology/discourse. Çınar puts it as such;

> Under the modernizing interventions of the state, the institutionalization of modernity (…) was predicated upon the preservation of binary oppositions that sustained secularism as the center and Islam as the periphery. The secular gaze has marked Islam as the traditional, the uneducated, the backward, the lower class. Therefore, within secularist discourse, Islam and secularism, Islam and modernity, and Islam and Westernism cannot go together. The presence of Islam is predicated on the absence of the other. Secularism is public, Islam is private; secularism is knowledge, Islam is belief; secularism is modern, Islam is traditional; secularism is urban, Islam is rural; secularism is progress, Islam is reactionary *(irtica)*; secularism is universal, Islam is particular.[23]

From modernization perspectives, the transition in the Turkish case was seen as a social engineering project which was realized by the political elites with top-down reforms as Kasaba explicates, "The political elites saw themselves as the most important force for change in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. To them, Ottoman-Turkish society was a project, and the people who lived in Turkey could at most be objects of their experiments."[24] The modern and

[21]Ibid.
[22]Ibid, p. 241.
[23] Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: bodies, places, and time*, (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p.47.
[24]Reşat Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambuguities" in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp.23-24.

western visage of the new state in every aspect of life "was portrayed as testimony to the viability of the project of modernity even in an overwhelmingly Muslim country."[25]

The desire to create a new man, a new history and culture in order to create a homogenous society was twofold. First, it presented the desire to cut the ties with the past, to repudiate Ottoman heritage and adopt Western tenets such as secularism, nationalism and positivism. This homogenous structure was indeed antagonistic to the heterogeneous structure of the Empire which was composed of different ethnic and religious population. The very structure was regarded as the main culprit of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; the subjects were thus interpellated into citizens in Kemalist ideology in order to impose a monolithic culture (through education, law, social life, clothing, music, architecture) which eliminated cultural diversity.

With reference to Foucault, if the state is the most outstanding form of power relations[26] and if truth is not outside of power then it is possible to argue that Kemalist ideology creates its own 'regime of truth' as a discourse based on Kemalist principles, Western or modern values and norms through which it imposes not only a 'true' or 'normal' cultural decorum on its fabricated citizens but also compels its subjects to define themselves accordingly by constructing the knowledge about 'us' and 'them'.

2.1.3 The AKP and Postmodernity vs. Modernity

The two types of narratives, namely Kemalist and the AKP, as the conflicting narratives dominate the political field in Turkey. The Kemalist narrative "which has achieved the stature of a 'master narrative' "[27] repressed and marginalized Islamic actors along with Alevis and Kurds in the society with authoritarian policies. The discourse of the former was thus "heavily reliant on a clear distinction (…) a rupture between the state and the society or between the center and the periphery and a narration of (…) a struggle between the values of a secular Kemalist elite and a traditional Muslim society"[28] while the discourse of the latter is reliant on the discourses that are compatible with post-modern period particularly in its first phase. Thus, this study argues that the AKP first appeared in the political field with a post-modernist

[25]Sibel Bozdogan and Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p.4.
[26] Deniz Erdoğan, "Foucault ve Beden" , (Ankara:Hacettepe Üniversitesi), p. 11, Accessed June 11, 2016, https://www.academia.edu/7300087/Toplumsal_Cinsiyet_ve_Beden-_Foucault_ve_Beden
[27]Deniz Kandiyoti, "The travails of the secular: puzzle and paradox in Turkey" in *Economy and Society*, no. 41 vol.4, 2012, p.515.
[28] Ibid.

discourse in order to represent and include the 'others' in the societal and political sphere that were formerly excluded and repressed in Kemalist discourse.

Postmodernity is cultural diversity, multiculturalism, deconstruction, "incredulity towards metanarratives"[29], a rejection of totality and universal truth, heterogeneity, a critique of knowledge and power (relations). In his book, Lyotard argues that the existing situation –the postmodern situation– of the societies cannot be understood with meta-narratives and as such they lost their significance since "in the post-era, the 'truth value' of all knowledge has been provincialized, unable to transcend social, institutional or human limitations." [30] The homogenous modern culture of meta-narratives is now replaced with "the relativism of a heterogeneous patchwork culture of 'little narratives' " [31] which in turn leads to the appreciation of cultural diversity. In other words, since meta-narratives are modern discourses which legitimize itself through science, reason and progress and claim to be the universal truth, they suppress all 'other(s)', namely alternative identities. Toit explicates this in terms of power relations with regard to Lyotard as such;

> The opposition to universal truths as put forward by Lyotard and the other is depicted in the term, the differend, and represents the condition which arises from a dispute between two discourses operating under different set of rules. Traditionally, one discourse will set its power and come to dominate the other, thereby producing a 'solution' to the dispute resulting in the suppression of the other.[32]

As such, the differend represents the 'other' whose viewpoints are excluded and repressed. One of the means of this repression is what Lyotard contests "narratives of emancipation" which rise from the Enlightenment movement and became a characteristic of modernity. He calls those as "narratives calling for liberation from the various evils besetting humanity"[33]. The evils indeed would be tradition, superstition(s) of religion. Hence, with totalizing and universalizing intentions, such narratives tend to speak on behalf of the 'other' which leads to the disacknowledgment and the abuse of the 'other' in social and political sphere. In addition, Gülalp argues that postmodernity is defined on cultural and political basis thus postmodernist period should be construed on the basis of postmodernist culture. As such, he explicates that

[29]Lyotard, Jean Francis, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, (University of Minnesota Press:1984), p.xxiv.
[30] Richard G. Smith, "Postmodern, Postmodernity" in *TheLyotard Dictionary*, (Edinburg University Press: 2011) ed. Stuart Sim, p.185.
[31]Ibid., p.185.
[32] Angelique du Toit, "Power" in *TheLyotard Dictionary*, p. 194.
[33]Stuart Sim, "Narrative of Emancipation" in *The* Lyotard Dictionary" p. 152.

postmodern period can be depicted as the espousal of 'authenticity' and the revival of cultural resources what is known as 'traditional' for the purposes of pluralism instead of the identities and cultures that were propounded by modernity.[34]

When the features of postmodernity are taken into consideration, it can be argued that the AKP appeared in the political scene with a claim that it represents "the return of the repressed"[35]. In other words, in opposition to the secularist and nationalist understanding of Kemalism which was inclined to create a homogenous society and culture with an attempt to erase ethnic, religious and class differences, the AKP postmodern discourse was based on the appreciation of cultural diversities regarding those as cultural richness. Hence, the AKP gained the status of a party which represented and embraced multiculturalism. As such, its assertion was to be voice of the "unrepresented", "repressed", "marginalized" or the "silenced other" in Kemalist discourse. The AKP, therefore, acquired a postmodernist discourse which was in favor of a heterogeneous society contrary to the homogenous society of which Kemalists were an advocate. This postmodernist discourse of the AKP was depicted in its 2002 election declaration entitled "Everything is for Turkey" as such;

> Democracy is a regime of tolerance and is a political contest in order to serve the people (*millet*). In a democratic regime, no one is superior to the other in terms of rights and privileges. OUR PARTY, which appreciates different cultures and beliefs as richness for our country, regards the people of different language, religion, ancestry and social status to live freely under the equal protection of laws and participate in politics as necessary. (…) Our understanding of law and justice is to ensure that the state treats the society and the individuals with justice and without discrimination based on reasons such as language, race, color, sex, different political stance or philosophical belief, religion or religious sect. (…)Depending on the political thought "Let the people live so the state endures", our party put the human in the center of its all policies. The ultimate aim of the democracy is to secure the freedom of thought, religion, education and organization along with the civil and political freedom and to provide a life without fear and apprehension.[36]

When it came to power in 2002, with such a political stance the AKP gained the stature of not only unifying the center and the periphery but also representing the deviant groups who were denied, dismissed, assimilated by the Kemalist elites. Similar to postmodernity which specifies the continuity with the past as significant; the AKP recapitulates and chastises the

[34]Haldun Gülalp, "Modernizm, Postmodernizm ve İslamcılık" in *Kimlikler Siyaseti Türkiyede Siyasal İslamın Temelleri*, (Metis Yayınları: İstanbul), 2003, p.116.
[35]Bennett, David, "May '68, ÉVÈNEMENTS" in *Lyotard Dictionary*, p. 140.
[36]AK Parti, 2002 Seçim Beyannamesi, pp. 22, 29 and 42, accessed November 26, 2016, https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!/ak-parti-hukumet-programlari

rupture with the past through the state apparatuses, discursive practices in one party period. The AKP, therefore, persistently marks the Kemalist period under the single party rule of the CHP as 'the years of tyranny' which is now a bygone age.

Despite the AKP's denial of Islamic heritage of the National Outlook Movement, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party in its first phase, the AKP is defined as an Islamist party. Çınar, for instance, argues that "even though the party is trying to dissociate itself from political Islam, it still maintains the same Islamist discourse (…) In other words, Islamism is still the intellectual foundation of the AK Party's ideology."[37] Deriving from Çınar's argument that defines the AKP as an altered version of political Islam, it becomes possible to construe the reasons of this appeal of postmodernity for the AKP since they are both critical of modernity. Armağan explicates this appeal for Islamists as such;

> Postmodernity shows the inadequacies and dilemmas of modernity. It is perceived as an opportunity to bring forward Islam in the search for alternatives to modernism. The rejection of the secular totalitarian feature of modernity paves the way for the utilization of traditions and Islamic elements. The declaration of the end of the metanarratives bolster the Islamist intellectuals' attacks on 'isms' of modernity such as socialism, positivism and Darwinism. [38]

Even though these two literatures differ in some significant ways, Gülenç draws similarities between post-modernist and Islamist literature. First of all, the criticism of 'progress' and the emphasis on culture seem to overlap in both literatures. Yet, while post-modernity merely emphasize cultural diversity and maintains an equal distance to pluralism that arise from cultural diversity, Islam points out tradition, culture and spirituality in pre-modern period and is critical of materialism and moral corruption. In addition, the labeling of the West in modernity as superior to East which marks the East backward and the other as advanced is strongly denied. What is last but not the least is the criticism of the modern-state. Similar to Foucault's analysis of the power techniques of the modern state to regulate the subjects, Islam is also critical of the nationalist feature of the modern state not only in its failure to provide a free, equal and peaceful life but also its desire to create a homogenous society by melting the

[37]Çınar,p. 21.
[38]Armağan cited in Haldun Gülalp, "İslamcı Toplumsal Kurumlarda Postmodernism" in *Kimlikler Siyaseti Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri*, (Metis Yayınları: İstanbul), 2003, p.116.

differences in the same pot for a harmonious culture.[39] That is, according to Bulaç, the ideology of imagining a nation.[40]

Apart from religion, i.e. Islam, the postmodernist discourse of the AKP also intersects with neo-Ottomanist discourse. The old regime, namely the Ottoman period, was regarded as a disharmony in terms of heterogeneity in the new Kemalist regime. The heterogeneous social structure, in other words, the cultural and religious diversity was perceived as a threat for the modernity project of the Kemalist elites. Based on the Kemalist understanding of nationalism and secularism that revolved around the idea of eliminating diversity and repressing the other, the AKP, on one hand, besmirches or denounces the Kemalist period not only because it effectuated a cultural and historical break with the Ottoman past but also because it induced tyranny in the name of its social engineering project, on the other hand, mystifies the Ottoman period as a tolerant social system that embraced the diversities. According to Onar, neo-Ottomanist discourse praises the "Ottoman pluralism (…) as a rare example in the world of a state that was multi- cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious."[41] This view also serves to conflate neo-Ottomanism (or neo-Ottomanist discourse) and Islamist recovery of Medina Document (Islamist discourse) into a postmodernist discourse which serves to put forward the 'new' Turkey as an alternative pluralistic neo-Ottomanist model. This is explicated by Onar as such;

> The neo-Ottoman model provides for the cohabitation of distinct groups each of which lives according to its own percepts and does not interfere with practices of others. This vision was most cogently articulated by Ali Bulaç during the 1990s in his Medina Contact (*Medine Vesikası*), a proposal for a new social contract based on *millet* system in which religiously defined communities coexist within a framework of legal pluralism. It received accolades (…) for representing a possible formula for the reconciliation of an alternative, non-western, (post-) modernity and Islamic lifestyles.[42]

From the postmodernist discursive motivation of the AKP that embraced and praised tolerance towards diversity as that of the Ottoman (period), the identification of the AKP with

[39]Kurtul Gülenç, "Küreselleşme, Postmodernizm ve Siyasal İslam" in *Kaygı Dergisi,* vol.17, 2011, pp.129-132.
[40] Bulaç cited in Ibid, p.112.
[41]Nora Fisher Onar, "Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today's Turkey" in *Middle Eastern Studies*, (Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group), vol.2, no.2, 2009, p.236.
[42]Ibid., p.236.

the Ottoman (period) can be ascertained in the explicit words of Erdoğan as; "Our ancestor has never tyrannized"[43].

In brief, the postmodernist discourse of the AKP, by which the scheme of "the mixing of images, the juxtaposition of different people, interlocking of cultures"[44] were implemented particularly in its first phase in party programs and the speeches of party representatives, managed to subvert the traditional images of the Kemalist understanding of politics, culture and society. The ultimate result is the recurring electoral victories along with hegemonic power that has been obtained gradually.

2.1.4 The AKP and the Shift to Modernity

While the AKP is consistently critical of Kemalist modernity project mainly for its social engineering to impose "institutions, beliefs, and behavior consonant with their understanding of the modernity on the chosen object: the people of Turkey"[45], it simply leads the very same path in its ongoing last phase by constructing its own metanarrative which indicates an adverse shift from a postmodernist discourse to modernist one. Aronowitz articulates the interrelation between postmodernist discourse and modernity which in fact overlaps with the discursive strategies of the AKP in the construction of 'New Turkey' as such; "while the postmodernist discourse tends to demolish the myths of modernity, it does not touch *modernity* which is the best environment to flourish and also promote its various and eclectic activities."[46]

When the claim to construct the 'new Turkey' in both Kemalist and the AKP discourse is taken into consideration, then what makes these two contending ideologies similar in terms of modernity is that they both sought to transform the society whereas "the difference between these projects lies in their specific ideological positions which dictate different visions of future and also a different sense of "society" ".[47] In other words, the imagination of the 'New'

[43]Diken, "Erdoğan: Anadolu'da tahrik edilen Ermeniler katliam yapınca Osmanlı tedbir aldı", April 23, 2015, accessed Novenber 27, 2016, http://www.diken.com.tr/erdogandan-soykirima-yeni-bir-soluk-ermeniler-katliam-yapinca-osmanli-cesitli-tedbirler-aldi/

[44]Akbar S. Ahmed, *Postmodernism and Islam*, (Routledge: London and New York), 1992, p.26.
[45] Çağla Keyder, "Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s" in*Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p.39.
[46]Aronowitz cited in Haldun Gülalp, "İslamcı Toplumsal Kurumlarda Postmodernism" in *Kimlikler Siyaseti Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri*, (Metis Yayınları: İstanbul), 2003, p.152.
[47]Çınar, p. 7.

Turkey and the narrative constructions has different notions regarding the bodies and the time. As such, while the Kemalist social engineering project prioritized Western civilization and culture as Turkey's 'true culture' with a target to constitute 'civilized', 'emancipated' and 'modern' subjects with "appeals to a golden, mythic Turkic past in Central Asia"[48] for legitimacy, the AKP embodies "the rise of conservative-Islamic social engineering"[49] which prioritizes Ottoman-Islamic civilization and thus revitalizes the 'old' with its neo- Ottomanist discourse with a target to constitute a new society, culture and subjects in accordance with its conservative, Islamic moral values. This tendency is explicated by Çınar as such;

> It takes Islam not as a religion but as a culture deeply rooted in the Ottoman past, and promotes the idea of an Ottoman-Islamic civilization as Turkey's "true national culture" and as an alternative to the country's official, secular, West-oriented, and ethnic-based identity. This is not a return to the golden age of Islam, but rather is the restoration of what is believed to be Turkey's "true culture" and its potential as a "glorious civilization".[50]

According to Açıkel, what is ironic here is that this new conservatism, namely the AKP, once equipped with postmodernist arguments in order to reject radicalism of modernity, adopted its technological apparatuses. As such, he explicates that the AKP managed to exclude the universalizing rationality and the 'regime of truth' of modernity (in other words the unitary and totalizing truth(s) of Kemalist modernity project) on one hand, and, incorporated social technologies and apparatuses into its structure for its social engineering project on the other hand.[51] This indeed involves the production of its "regime of truth" through discursive (and non-discursive) practices which negates all other possible narratives contrary to its first phase postmodernist stance. The establishment of the "regime of truth" implies the production of 'true' discourses which legitimates the regulations of power regarding bodies and time. In other words, the AKP produces its truth(s) as the ultimate truth, namely its own metanarrative. At this point, the AKP is not different from Kemalist ideology to impose their ideals, norms and values on people in order to transform the society. Hence, it is not a desertion of a modernist discourse but instead a shift from postmodernist to modernist discourse. In addition, if all constructions are power related and if two ideologies struggle over the status of truth, then the de-mystifiers and de-constructionists of the Kemalist period and discourse are

[48] Yeşim Arat, "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey" , in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 99.
[49]Fethi Açıkel, "Muhafazakâr sosyal mühendisliğin yükselişi: 'Yeni Türkiye'nin eski siyaseti' ", in *Birikim Dergisi*, no:216, April 2012, p.15.
[50]Çınar, p.12.
[51]Açıkel, p. 15.

exposed to de-mystification and de-construction by the AKP ideology through its Islamist and Neo-Ottomanist discourse regarding the 'new', 'Ottoman', 'woman', and 'youth'.

The narrative of the AKP, namely its metanarrative, is a mixture of Islamist and Neo-Ottomanist discourse. The Islamist discourse of the AKP is opposed to or negates its postmodernist stance since "Islam is a total doctrine in itself and requires believing in an ultimate truth"[52]. The imposition of this ultimate truth is discernible in the remarks of the AKP in the hot debates regarding 'woman' and 'youth' such as pregnancy, abortion, motherhood, the behaviors of women and the alcohol ban. The remarks of Erdoğan regarding 'youth' and the alcohol law in 2013 serves as a perfect example as such;

> There are those who are discontent only because we do not desire a drunken generation (…) Why is a law that is legislated by two drunkards valid to you but not a truth which is ordered by religion becomes an event that has to be denied?[53]

The demystification of the 'old' through the description of the law makers of the Kemalist period as drunkards and the mystification of the 'new' through the assertion of religion as an ultimate truth in Erdoğan's remarks serves to portray not only the clash between secularism and religion as a binary opposition that prevails in these two contending ideologies but also the desire to replace the 'Kemalist (Atatürk) youth' with 'the AKP (Asım) youth' that is in harmony with Islamic values.

The promotion of Ottoman-Islamic civilization as the 'true national culture' of Turkey reveals the association between Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism in the AKP discourse. This association "is seen as an antidote to the excesses of Kemalism, with its militant secularism, nationalism, and 'Westernization' "[54] since the discourse of the AKP is based on the "desire for a great restoration of lost, ancient values."[55] As such, the construction of 'New Turkey' as an alternative modernity project that is grounded on Islamist and neo-Ottomanist discourse becomes a narrative of legitimation for the transformation that the AKP seeks to achieve. The

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[52]Haldun Gülalp, "İslamcı Toplumsal Kurumlarda Postmodernizm" in *Kimlikler Siyaseti Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri*, (Metis Yatınları: İstanbul), 2003, p.141.

[53] AK Parti, Başbakan Erdoğan'n 28 Mayıs tarihli TBMM Grup Toplantısı konuşmasının tam metni, https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-28-mayis-tarihli-tbmm-grup-toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam-m/45231#1, accessed December 10, 2016.

[54] Agnes Czajka and Edward Wastnidge, "'The Centre of World Politics?' Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic Politics", p. 3.http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/GSCIS%20Singapore%202015/Archive/a1b05e35-80f6-40ae-9c56-b5708c5c321e.pdf

[55] Ibid., p. 8

idealization of the 'new' with reference to Islamism and modernity project of Kemalism is explicated by Dağı as such;

> The inheritance of Islamism in the AK Party is the still prevailing belief that 'a new society' is possible, a new society constructed by the state apparatus according to a set of "imagined values". This is not any different from the social engineering Kemalism implemented in Turkey.[56]

The AKP narrative is predicated upon the revival of the glorious Islamic-Ottoman past whereas Kemalist narrative is grounded on the denial of Ottoman civilization heritage. Hence, the AKP is in pursuit of alternative narratives and *invented traditions* through the celebration of the conquest of Istanbul (or *Fetih*) or the Holy Birth (*Kutlu Doğum*). Invented tradition not only serves for the practices of modernity as transformational processes but also "means a set of practices, (…) of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values or norms of behaviors by repetition which automatically implies continuity with a suitable historical past".[57] As such, it becomes not only a means to impose certain ideology and culture and but also a corrective to Kemalist narrative of the "inauthentic and oppressive state elites who (…) superficially borrowed Western culture."[58]

All in all, if modernity is understood as a project of social, cultural and political transformation, then the AKP offers an alternative modernity project legitimized by its own metanarrative, namely through its Islamist and neo-Ottomanist discourse, in the construction of 'New Turkey'. This 'new' is a different "imagined community" with an 'imagined history, culture, values and norms' which is opposed to Kemalist imagination of 'old' Turkey. The 'new' is constructed by the implementation of a social engineering project. By doing so, the AKP has completely become what it has been critical of in the Kemalist period which indicates a shift from its postmodernist discourse to modernist one.

[56] İhsan Dağı, "Imagining an AK Party society", December 23, 2012, accessed December 10, 2016, http://en.haberler.com/imagining-an-ak-party-society-248672/

[57] Hobsbawn cited in Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Identity in Question" in *Modernity An Introduction to Modern Socieities* (Blackwell Publishers, 1995), edited by Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thompson, p.614.

[58] Onar, "Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today's Turkey" in *Middle Eastern Studies*, (Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group), vol.2, no.2, 2009, p.235.

3 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE KEMALIST AND THE AKP RULE

3.1 The Kemalist Period, 1923-1938

The Turkish elite are
like a man running West
on the deck of a ship
heading East

Sakallı Celal (1886-1964)[59]

Turkey's transition form an empire to a modern nation state and the adaptation of the Western values did not come about abruptly but took place as aprocess as it is articulated in both Turkish and world literature. In this regard, when the historical context of modernization and westernization is taken into consideration, the Turkish modernization project is not revolutionary but instead an evolutionary process starting from the Tanzimat period and reaching its peak after the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923, and particularly in the authoritarian one-party regime period. Yet, each period namely Tanzimat, the Second Constitutional and Kemalist period has its own peculiar and distinct characteristics.

The period from 1839 to 1876 with the reign of Abdülmecit is known as the period of Tanzimat (reforms). The significance of this period is that with the establishment of "Supreme Juridical Regulations (Meclis-i Vala-i Ahkam-ı Adliye) the center of power now shifted from the palace, the ruler and the ruling elite to the bureaucracy". [60] Apart from the legal reforms, the army, the provincial administration, education and communication were other areas that were also subject to change.[61] As Zürcher posits Tanzimat reforms that were imposed on the society and aimed at secularizing law and modernizing the institutions of the empire never gained a wide support from the Ottoman society for two possible reasons: either because they stemmed from the leading bureaucracy or from the great powers.[62]

With the Tanzimat reforms that initiated the modernization project, the 'west' that had already been transformed with the ideas of Enlightment and industrialization was put in a superior position which in turn put the 'eastern' societies, including the Ottoman Empire, in a

[59]Gareth Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey Running West, Heading East?*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
[60]Erik J. Zürcher,*Turkey- A Modern History*, (London, New York: IB Tauris, 1997), Third Edition. p. 48.
[61]Ibid., p. 57.
[62]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

powerless position and, therefore enforced them to reposition themselves according to the western model by borrowing institutions, ideas and manners from the West. Yet, as Parla posits that since the Islamic values and culture were still dominant, the Tanzimat period did not lead to a dilemma between Western and Eastern norms but was a project with concrete and restrictive boundaries. [63] As Göle also puts it,

> The myth of the Golden Age of Islam (*Asr-ı Saadet*), referring to the idea that (. . /.) every novelty to be adapted from the west can be detected within the sources of Islam, exercised a profound influence upon the Westernists of the period. The Westernist movement thus pursued the sources of legitimacy with Islam.[64]

With the appearance of the political opposition known as the Young Ottomans, who was the first to articulate their discontentment with the economy policies of the empire that brought the empire to the edge of bankruptcy, the regime was forced to adopt a constitution in 1876. The adoption of constitution indicated a significant change in the regime which later would be regarded as a "manifestation of the power of either 'rising classes' or a 'national bourgeoisie' ". [65] This national bourgeoisie as the continuation of the Young Ottomans named as Committee of Union and Progress – CUP – (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) initiated the Second Constitutional Period *(II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi / 1908-1919)*.

As CUP consolidated its power in 1913, it sustained a series of political and social reforms within the Second Constitutional Period. Besides the administrative reform regarding army, the wave of reforms signaled "further secularization" in judicial and educational areas. [66] For instance, the religious courts (*the şeri*) and the religious schools (*medrese*) were now secularized by the control of Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Education. Although the family law persisted to be religious (*şeriat law*), the women that gained more rights in their marital and educational life were more visible in both educational and social areas.[67] The Second Constitutional Period is significant as it differs from Tanzimat since its main focus was on the cultural life and also in the way it is regarded as a pre-step to Kemalist reforms.The Kemalist period signifies a complete secularization of cultural, social and political life which, in fact, had its roots back in Second Constitutional Period. As Göle states,

[63]Nilüfer Göle, *Modern Mahrem*, (İstanbul: Metis, 2011), p. 45,55.
[64]Göle, The Forbidden Modern, (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), p. 22.
[65] Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 28.
[66]Zürcher,*Turkey- A Modern History*, (London, New York: IB Tauris, 1997), Third Edition. p. 121.
[67]Ibid., p. 122.

> The intellectual outlooks that originated crystallized during this period underlay the succeeding Kemalist reforms (. . /.) Contrary to the Tanzimat, modernists of the Constitutional Period defended the essence of civilization with reference to the cultural structure rather than to the technological gains of the society.[68]

Despite the efforts of the intellectual elites to prevent the collapse of the empire, by the late nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire experienced two insurmountable defeats. One is the Balkan Wars in 1911-1912 that led to a huge territory loss in the Balkans, the other is World War I in 1918. As in Lewis's metaphorical description which is also extensively mentioned in Kemalist discourse "at the end of the 1918 it seemed that the Sick Man of Europe was about to die at last." [69]The utmost result of the defeats was an upsurge in Turkish nationalism and the proclamation of The Turkish Republic in 1923.

From the modernization and Westernization standpoint, Turkey's modernization project is regarded as one of the intellectual driven social engineering. Köker explicates that the interference of the intellectuals is mandatory from a modernist perspective within the period of transition from a traditional to modern society since they have a command of features of the modern state and until the transition period is complete, authoritarian regime prevails[70]. Indeed, this interfering characteristic of the authoritarian regimes signifies the foundation of tutelage one party regime, the Republican People's Party (RPP/*CHP*) which assumed the mission of transforming the society from its traditional roots to the level of contemporary civilization. In addition, the authoritarian Kemalist regime had its very source of legitimization in regard to the reforms with the modernist perspective along with "the Independence War" that served to approve the accomplishment and savior/founder image of Mustafa Kemal[71] and his followers. The last source of legitimation would be the charismatic leadership of Atatürk.

In the rest of this one party context, first the emergence of the one party-state along with the first-wave of reforms, dissidents and insurrections will be examined, and then the consolidation of one-party period will be discussed.

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[68]Göle, *The Forbidden Modern,* p. 23, p. 25.
[69]Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), Second Edition, p. 239.
[70] Levent Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007) p. 14.
[71]Taha Parla, *Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u*, ed. Taha Parşa, 4 vols., vol 1, Türkiye'de Siyasi Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), p. 71.

3.1.1 The Emergence of the One Party Period, 1923-1930

With the War of Independence, the Grand National Assembly along with the High Treason Law in 1920 and the creation of a new party, Mustafa Kemal began to consolidate his political position. Although the emergence of the new Turkish state did not gain its determinate shape yet, the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate in 1922 signified the official end the Ottoman Empire. The 'Sick man of Europe' was now a bygone age. Yet, in order to eradicate the remnants of the Empire and to break ties with the past, a wave of reforms had to be implemented. The caliphate, a prominent figure in both Ottoman Empire and Muslim world in terms of his jurisdiction, was one of things to be expunged in the purges. The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 therefore indicated another detachment from the undesirable past.

The way The Turkish Republic was proclaimed-without the knowledge of the some contributors of the Independence War- brought along some dissidents who later became the founding members of the first opposition party, Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*). Apart from its loyalty to "secular and nationalist policies", it was a *de facto*resistance movement to the "radical, centralist, and authoritarian tendencies" with a wide support from the conservative east demanding "decentralization, separation of powers and evolutionary change rather than revolutionary".[72] The closing of the party in 1925 was its inevitable end due to both its oppositional stand to the center and Sheikh Sait rebellion.

The leader of rebellion in 1925, Sheikh Sait was an "influential member of the Nakşibendi order"[73] which was one of the religious orders serving as an instrument to unify people after the rupture from their Islamic past. According to Tunçay, although in theory this Kurdish insurrection is still considered as a "counter-revolution" to the existing regime or "Islamic reaction (*irtica*)", he considers it as a "national insurrection with a religious disguise."[74] The proclamation of Law on the Maintenance of Order by the one-party state in 1925 which was an outcome of the Kemalist view of the rebellion, as explicated by Tunçay above, created thepolitical environment to legitimize any reaction taken by the one party to the potential forthcoming rebellions. The law, which was enforced until 1929 by the virtue of the insecurity

[72]Zürcher,*Turkey- A Modern History*, (London, New York: IB Tauris, 1997), Third Edition. p. 168.
[73]Ibid., p. 170.
[74]Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931*, (Ankara: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005), p. 136.

of the regime, also authorized the government to control the political scene tightly and clean up, if needed, any opposing organization and publication that would ruin the law and order. [75]

When the one-party regime prevailed over any opposition in the political scene, a series of reforms were soon to be implemented. The reforms meant not only to assure the survival of the regime but also to instill modern and secular values into the minds of people who were to be constructed accordingly. The consecutive reforms such as the closure of the religious shrines (*türbes*) and dervish convents (*tekkes*) in 1925, the prohibition of traditional headgear (*fez*) replaced with hat, the adoption of European calendar, the family law which banned polygamy, the new Turkish script, and the removal of the statement which indicates the official religion of the state as Islam from the constitution[76], signified a radical detachment from the Ottoman-Islamic past and an intention to construct a new secular, modern and pro-western state and people in a perfect harmony with the new regime also with a related past. As Lewis puts it in the example of fez from Atatürk's speech in 1927,

> Gentleman, it was necessary to abolish fez, which sat on the heads of our nation as an emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism and hatred of progress and civilization, to accept in its place the hat, the headgear used by the whole civilized world, and in this way to demonstrate that the Turkish nation, in its mentality as in other respects, in no way diverges from the civilized social life.[77]

Moreover, the harshness of the regime, to which extends this utmost harshness can reach and the tragicomedy it involves in order to civilize the society can be portrayed by two vivid examples: a woman called Şalcı Bacı who was hung in 1926 as she was mistakenly perceived as a man by the officials. [78]The regime was totally intolerant to the ones who did not fit in culturally, blind enough to differentiate between a man and a woman and had a tendency to exclude anyone unable to meet the requirements, namely the hat law of the new regime. After the hat law, the issue was not how to get a hat or not how expensive the hat was, particularly for the people in the eastern part, anymore but to save and keep the head in its right place to wear a hat. This tragicomedy is portrayed by Paneth: "İstanbul lived as if it was in a permanent carnival. Men with paper hats or even with ladies' hats on their heads were in

[75]Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu,https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc003/kanuntbmmc003/kanuntbmmc00300578.pdf
[76]Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), Second Edition, p. 236-257.
[77]Ibid., p. 268.
[78] Bülent Somay, *The Psychopolitics of the Oriental Father*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan), 2014, p.157.

sight."[79] These examples not only present the state power on people but also the effort to create culturally homogenous people that are in perfect harmony with the new regime.

In 1927, the delivery of the Speech (*Nutuk*) indicated the consolidation of the one party-regime and the empowerment of Mustafa Kemal as he wrote and presented the official history from his perspective. [80] This attempt is significant in the way that "Mustafa Kemal's speech determined the historical vision of the genesis of the new Turkish state for generations"[81]; therefore one can argue that the dominance of this one-sided delivery of history made us neglect other perspectives in history.

3.1.2 The Kemalist Government, 1930-1938

In 1930, Mustafa Kemal's control tours around the country were an outcome of the discontentment with the new regime. 18 insurrections took place in the country in the period of 1923-1938. 17 of them occurred up until 1930 with an exception of one that did not took place in the eastern part of the state.[82] The time list of the events shows that only one incident occurred in the consolidation years of the one party regime. The fact that there was only one insurrection in the periods of 1931-38 can be interpreted as such; 1930s are the beginning of consolidation of the regime and reached its peak in the mid-1930s. In 1931, the CHP encapsulated the principles/reformsas a representative of Kemalism, in its six principles (*Altı Ok*); republicanism, laicism (secularism), nationalism, populism, statism and reformism which were determined in the party program and later incorporated into the constitution in 1937. With the declaration of Kemalism *("Kamalizm")* as the official ideology of the state in the CHP party program in 1935, it determined the official political agenda of the state.

Laicism derived from the word French (*Laïcisme)* and translated into English as secularism, is a term over which controversies seem to persist in Turkey. The perception of the term is twofold in literature; on one hand, it was defined as the separation of the state and religion and the establishment of state control over religious institutions and on the other hand, it served as a tool to create a new nation; a new nation (*millet*) with a Turkish identity which is

[79] Paneth cited in Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931*, (Ankara: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005), p. 156.
[80]Taha Parla, "Atatürk'ün Nutku", vol.1, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları*, (İstanbul; İletişim, 1991), p.20.
[81]Zürcher, p. 175
[82]Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931*, (Ankara: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005), p. 134.

devoid of its religious element which is an inheritance of the old Ottoman identity. [83] Reformism (*İnkilapçılık*), as a continuous change and support for the Kemalist reforms until the nation reaches up to level of contemporary civilization, goes hand in hand with secularism as it is the removal of or the minimization of the reference to religion from social and cultural life in order to create a civilized, modern nation state.

Nationalism, with the creation of national myths, served as a perfect tool to construct a new national identity and as such aspired to replace religion. In order to comprehend the context of one party period, the inter war context should also be taken into consideration. Krüger emphasizes the significance of creating myths and the role of myths not only in Turkey but also in Europe in the 1930s as such;

> The resort to myths was an important aid in the struggle for state and nation in Europe after World War I. A myth could justify the whole challenging enterprise, mobilize the adherents, and win the people for a specific way to that aim of a founding state and even of preparing the basis of a new nation. (. . / .) Myths could back persistently the efforts made to justify a new state and government and to mobilize the people in favor of it.[84]

Within this context, Turkish Historical Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*) in 1932 and Sun-Language Theory (*Güneş-Dil Teorisi*) in 1935 should be considered accordingly. The positivist approach to history (as in Europe at that time) in line with the archeological and anthropological researches[85] in order to prove the ancient historical background of Turks in Anatolia and that the Turks were descendants of white (Aryan) inhabitants of Central Asia indicated the mystification of Turkishness in the statements such as "Turks had created the world's great civilizations" and "Turkish was the closest of all languages to the primeval origin and that all languages had developed from the primeval language through Turkish." [86] Both theories were indoctrinated by institutions (as ideological state apparatuses) such as

[83]Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007) p. 161-162 and Nur Betül Çelik, "Kemalizm: Hegomonik bir söylem" cited in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* vol.2 Kemalism (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p. 85-86.
[84] Krüger cited in Esra Bilgiç, "The Role of the Mainstream Newspapers in the Consolidation of Turkish National Identity: 1934-1937", Boğaziçi University, 2015, p. 101.
[85] Büşra Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih -Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937),* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), p. 39
[86]Zürcher, pp.188-189.

media and schools[87] and contributed to the regime's intention of constructing of a new identity through discursive production of "myths".

It is also possible to detect the echoes of the totalitarian regimes of the period on the newspaper articles and the speeches of some of the party representatives such as Falih Rıfkı Atay and Selim Sırrı Tercan who praise the totalitarian regimes of the period. In his book, titled and published in 1931 as 'New Russia', Falih Rıfkı states;

> I put forward a lesson from Russia. This lesson is to organize the Turkish revolution, to raise the new youth and the methods to discipline (*terbiye*) the Turkish society with a few steps (. . / .) and to make the construction and economic plan of Turkey and to construct the Reformist Party (the CHP) by taking communist and fascist parties as an example that went through a transformation of an old order to a new one. [88]

And in Cumhuriyet in 1932;

> Children belong to the state. Individuals do not want to understand this but the state is obliged to ignore this individuals' will as children, mothers and fathers belong to the state too. (. . / .) Children belong to the state. One has to believe in this. The upbringing of the child since its birth should be left to the state's care and control.[89]

The similarity between the totalitarian regimes of the period and one party regime can be drawn in terms of the aim to construct a new identity as the advocates of the regime, conduct the conduct of the new 'man', create a homogenous culture and reshape the masses. However, although the party was in search for a new model to renew and adapt itself to after the Menemen incident, Mustafa Kemal was not in favor of such totalitarian models but also was against any fascist, communist and Nazi like models[90] although the regime displayed authoritarian features in line with the conditions of the period.

In 1930, Mustafa Kemal approached his friend Fethi Okyar to found a party that is loyal to the ideals of the regime. The Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) suffered the same destiny with the former opposition party and was closed down by virtue of insecurity of the regime that stemmed from the support the FRP gained from local elections. Within the same year, in this instable atmosphere of the politics, a religious group demanding Sharia

[87]Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus" in *On the Production of Capitalism* (London: New York; Presses Universitaries de France), p. 242-243.
[88] Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi 1930-1945*, (Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1983), pp. 34-35
[89]Ibid., pp. 39-40.
[90]Ibid., p. 40-41.

(*şeriat)*killed a young Turkish officer in Menemen. The disappointment that all the insurrections and the ongoing resistance to the regimehad created since the foundation of the Republic can be detected from İnönü's words;

> Let us consider all those accomplishments within a period of eight years. A secular republic, Ankara, becoming the capital city, the changing of the hat and letters, the civic law…the eastern uprising, all those men who were exiled… It was now obvious that we were unbelievably optimistic in assuming that all these had fallen into oblivion [91]

The event, which resulted in martial law and a series of executions, was one of the significant incidents in Turkish history in the way that it reinforced the insecurity of the regime and therefore compelled the government to take stern actions to consolidate the regime. The Press Law in 1931 brought serious sanctions and penalties. The law stipulated owners to have a permission to start a newspaper or journal, to have a clean record, for instance not to serve enemies through publications during the national struggle and to take the charge of the news in publication. Publications that were in favor of monarchy, caliphate, communism, or anarchism were prohibited and would result in imprisonment from six months to three years if the law was violated. [92] In addition, the Press Law in 1934 demanded publications that are appropriate to state ideology and reform principles along with any external and internal propaganda that served the principles of the regime.[93] Although, Mustafa Kemal stated the importance of freedom in press throughout one party period, he emphasized this freedom is limited to the law and laws would apply if the regime is not supported[94]. The regime did not limit the freedom of speech directly but oversaw the media. Yet, it indeed blocked the path for divergent views to appear and used the press to serve as a tool for Kemalist propaganda.[95] Accordingly, it would be argued that both laws not only consolidated the regime but also rendered the press an instrument to promote Kemalist ideals.

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[91]İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar* (İstanbul, Bilgi, 1992), p. 229 cited in Bilgiç, p. 82. "Sekiz sene zarfında 1923'ten 1930'a kadar yapılan işleri düşünelim. Laik cumhuriyet, Ankara'nın başkent olması, ondan sonar şapka, harf değişikliği, Medeni Kanun. bütün bunlar. Şark isyanı, birçok adamın yerlerinden sürülmesi, bütün bunların üç beş sene bir rahatlık içinde tamamıyla unutulup geçmiş olduğunu zannetmekle, inanılmaz bir iyimserlik havasına düşmüş olduğumuz anlaşıldı"

[92] "Matbuat Kanunu", 25.7.1931, p. 365-366, 372, available at https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc010/kanuntbmmc010/kanuntbmmc01001881.pdf

[93]Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü Teşkilatına ve Vazifelerine Dair Kanun, 26. 5. 1934, p. 310-311, available at https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc013/kanuntbmmc013/kanuntbmmc01302444.pdf

[94] Taha Parla, "Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri", ed. Taha Parla, vol. 2, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997) pp. 152-160.

[95]Bilgiç, , "The Role of the Mainstream Newspapers in the Consolidation of Turkish National Identity: 1934-1937", Boğaziçi University, 2015, p. 92.

The abolition of Turkish Hearth Movement (*Türk Ocakları)* that were replaced with People's Homes (*Halkevleri*) in 1931 in addition to Masonic Association and the Turkish Women's Association –as it was considered unnecessary with the granting of the vote to women to be a mayor in 1930 and a deputy in1934- signaled the centralization of power in one party's hands. After "both the press and the educational institutions were mobilized to spread the Kemalist message"[96], Recep Peker finally uttered the unification of the party, nation and the state in the party congress in 1935,

> The prominent feature of the new program is the convergence of the state and the CHP even more that had already been working together with the state since the beginning in New Turkey. [97]

This identification of nation, party and state indicates that the state is the entity that gathers all its citizens around one specific cause (*dava*): to reach the level of contemporary civilizations, therefore all citizens should contribute in the realization of this 'dream'. Obviously, women and the youth constituted the "backbone of the Kemalist 'revolution' "[98]; the former as the educators of the new generation and the representatives of the new regime with their modern images and the latter as the holders and guardians of the new regime and reforms whereas the religious groups and institutions such as dervishes, mystical orders*(tarikat)medreses*/religious colleges, *tekkes and turbes* formed the backbone of traditional Islamic/Ottoman past. Therefore, this study focuses on the clash between Kemalism and the other/others[99] over the Ottoman, women and youth on a discursive level seeking for myths, metaphors, symbols that would help to reveal mystification and demystification processes.

The issue of religion in Kemalist discourse seems to be paradoxical. Although religion, i.e. Islam, was employed as an instrument to mobilize the people in the Independence War period[100], the aim of the reforms was later to remove the dominance of Islam in political, cultural and social areas in one party period. Also, the transition from *ümmet* to *millet*[101] in the

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[96] Zürcher, p. 181

[97]Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi 1930-1945*, (Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1983), p. 128.

[98] Zürcher, p. 194.

[99] The other or others will be discussed in the rest of this chapter.

[100] Taha Parla, Taha Parla, "Atatürk'ün Nutku", *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları*, p. 108.

[101] Murat Belge, *Osmanlı'da Kurumlar ve Kültür*,(İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversity Press, 2005) pp. 254-255. In the Ottoman society, which consisted of many different communities, there was a *millet* system. According to this system, *millet* referred to different religious groups such Christian *millet* and Jews *millet* whereas Turks, Arabs, Circassians, Albanians constituted Islamic *millet*. However, in Kemalist discourse, *millet*, a term used as nation, referred to Turkish *millet* (a homogenous identity)which excluded such religious description and rather served to unite people with different religions under one umbrella. An Islamic understanding of *ümmet* referred

construction of a modern state excluded the religious factor to define a nation. In fact, Mustafa Kemal stated that "he was not against Islam and defended Islam as it is the most rational and natural one among all religions."[102] The same tendency is also observed in Ziya Gökalp's view,

> Distinguishing between "pure Islam" and "degenerated Islam", he (. . /.) defended Islam. To him, the negative influences of degenerated Islam were the main cause of backwardness and reliance on the old Turkish traditions.[103]

On one hand, Islam was defended due to its 'pure origin' but was regarded as an obstacle of progress due to its degenerated mindset, on the other hand. Moreover, since it was a symbol of old Ottoman regime, it had to be eliminated from political, social and cultural life and squeezed into the individuals' conscience *(vicdan*).

Ottoman and its Islam heritage constitute another part of this study in order to present the clash between Kemalist and the other/others in terms of binary oppositions. In order to explicate the role of religion in the narration of Kemalism, Bilgiç puts it as,

> So, the narration (. . /.) has come to be told upon the binary opposition between "Islam" and "the new secular Turkey". In such a narration, Islam represents the 'other' i.e. the Ottoman past, the old regime, the ruining factor and the enemy of the new regime. The new secular Turkey represents progress, the luminous future and the cure for all social, political and economic illnesses.[104]

Thus, this period should be considered with the following concepts; Tanzimat, the Second Constitutional Period, the Ottoman- Islamic past, the interwar period, the impact of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the rise of nationalist movements/ nation states, modernization and westernization, the period of myths, the insurrections and the opposing views and parties, the consolidation of the new regime. The data collected for Kemalist discourse will be analyzed on a discursive level according to this contextual framework with regard to the aforementioned concepts which will help to determine not only the (dis)continuities in the Kemalist period but also the clash(es) between Kemalism and the

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to Sunni Muslims which were considered as the main parts of this Islamic community and had management positions in the Ottoman society. Cevdet Küçük, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda "Millet sistemi" ve "Tanzimat" (Ankara: Phonex Yayınevi, 2006), pp. 375-386.

[102] Erik Jan Zürcher. "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları" cited in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* vol.2 Kemalism (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p. 46.

[103] Nilüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern*, p. 46.

[104] Bilgiç, p. 120.

other/the others and as such will eventually reveal mystification and demystification processes with the help of predetermined binary oppositions.

3.2 The AKP Period, 2002-2016

3.2.1 The Path to the AKP

With the transition to multi-party democracy period in 1945, the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti/ DP*) acceded to power in 1950 which indicated a brand-new phase in Turkish history in the way that it meant to be an alternative to one party regime and as such signified the end of the authoritarian regime and the beginning of a transformation period. Another noteworthy point is AKP's claim as to be the inheritors of this party. This claim is uttered metaphorically by Erdoğan indicating the execution of Menderes due to his implementations regarded as exploitation of religion, therefore a threat to secularism in the period: "We set off this road with our shroud on."[105] The end of the DP period resulted in the beginning of a recurring military coup phase -respectively 1960, 1980 and 1997[106] - and this repetitive military interference in politics is termed as tutelage regime in contemporary Turkey.

DP's main argument was "the evolution and transformation of democracy"[107] in order to "strengthen democracy and improve fundamental rights freedoms".[108] These encompassed the restriction of state's intervention on religion and the attempts in the freedom of belief/religion (such as call for prayer in Arabic again or compulsory religion lessons again in schools)[109]. Therefore, 'religion' i.e. Islam which was conceived as a source of a threat to the new regime and put under the full tutelage of one party regime, became the only medium between the Democrat Party and the people. Islam was associated with tradition and vice versa, hence, for the people of the old generation whose identity were closely related to and distinguished with Islam and tradition, DP's coming to power in 1950 with a wide public support can be interpreted as people's reaction to the westernization project of the one- party regime which not only aimed to re(construct) their identity, culture and social life but also to remove any

[105] "Biz bu yola kefenimizle çıktık.", AK Parti 4. Olağan Büyük Kongresi 30.9.2012, https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-ak-parti-4.-olagan-buyuk-kongresi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/31771#1

[106] Here, the e-memorandum given by the military is referred. This e-memorandum is termed as a 'post-modern coup' in the literarture.

[107] Yusuf Ziya Keskin, "Demokrat Parti İktidarı ve Günümüze Yansımaları", (DergiPark Ulakbilim, 2012). p.107.

[108] Ibid, p. 108

[109] Zerrin Kurtoğlu, "Türkiye'de İslmcılık Düşüncesi ve Siyaset" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* vol.6 İslamcılık (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), Second Edition, p. 212.

symbolic reminders of the past[110] in order to ensure the continuity of the regime. DP's political moves not only replaced religion in the center political scene but also made Islam more apparent in social and cultural life.[111] According to Mert, the DP as a rightist conservative party with a liberal and pro-freedom approach was loyal to secularism of Kemalism, however, defined religion as an inevitable character of national *(milli)* identity.[112] Hence, the DP was the precursor of the other divergent rightist conservative parties that would flourish in the forthcoming days in Turkey.

The denial of National Outlook Movement (*Milli Görüş*) heritage, on the other hand, was uttered this time metaphorically in Erdoğan's words, "This is AK Party. We have already taken off the National Movement shirt but some people want us forcibly to wear the very same shirt."[113] The basis of this movement was once religious dissidents of Kemalist regime; *Nakşibendi*.[114] The ultimate party founded by this tradition was the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi/RP*), which had been through a postmodern coup in 1997, and was finally closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998 due to its anti-secular implementations. This clash between National Outlook Movement and Kemalist regime is portrayed by Akın as such; "National Outlook Movement identified long-lasting one party period as years of animosity towards Islam and secularity as tyranny for Muslims in Turkey." [115]Although the founder cadre of the AKP originated from Erbakan's pro-Islamic Welfare Party, this denial stemmed from various reasons; RP's anti-secular and anti-western policies that wiped it off the political scene.[116]

Aside from the various trends in Turkey that resulted in AKP's power, we shall also consider some global trends about Islam related to Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Hence, it is noteworthy to mention the significant effects of Cold War for the (re)emergence of political Islam (against communism) in the Middle East in general and as well as in Turkey in

[110]Ibid., pp. 210-212.
[111]Ibid., p.212.
[112] Nuray Mert, "Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Laiklik ve Karşı Laikliğin Düşünsel Boyutu" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* vol.2 Kemalism, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p.208.
[113] Erdoğan cited in Sabah, "*Erdoğan'ın gömleği*" , 4.1.2006, http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/safak/2006/01/04/erdogan_in_gomlegi
[114] M. Hakan Yavuz, "Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhalif ve Modernist Gelenek" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* vol.6 İslamcılık (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), Second Edition, p. 591.
[115] Rıdvan Akın, "TBMM'nin XXII. Döneminde AKP İktidarı (2002-2007) in *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi XXII.ve XXIII. Döneminde Yasama Yürütme İlişkileri*, no. 9 Galatasaray University, p. 4.
[116] "The west was 'the mother of evils' and the European Union was 'a Christian club', as such the west was a degenarating element of Islam. A union of Islamic countries was an alternative to EU." cited in İhsan Dağı, "The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics and Discourse of Human Rights in the Search for Security and Legitimacy", in *The Emergence of a New Turkey* ,(Salt Lake City: Utah Universty Press, 2006) pp.100-101.

particular since 1970s which eventually led to the AKP period in Turkey. Since Islamic groups gained power during this period, they tended to assume power through either democratic or non-democratic means in their respective regions during the aftermath of post-cold war period. Some of these Islamic groups support radical Islam hence propagate anti-western sentiments and commit or support terrorist activities whereas other Islamic groups champion moderate Islam which is also backed by the US as an alternative to radical Islam (e.g. greater Middle East initiative). As such, either in the form of radical Islamic groups or in the form of moderate Islam, political Islam has gained an important ground for several decades in many parts of the world and the promotion of moderate Islam (that encompasses the discourse of democracy in itself) can be interpreted as some of the global tendencies which gave birth to the AKP in Turkey.

Within this context, the AKP periods will be analyzed in three terms, referring to Erdoğan's remarks labeling the AKP periods as the apprenticeship period (2002-2007), the journeymanship period (2007- 2011) and finally the 'ongoing' mastership period (2011-2016)[117] which also help to determine the divergences from its initial stance within these years.

3.2.2 The AKP's First Term (2002-2007)

With the lessons learnt from the past[118], the AKP has adopted a 'conservative democrat identity' as a reflection of its legitimization search in the dominant secular political scene. Dağı explicates this preference and strategic motivation behind it as such;

> The JDP (*the AKP* my italics) emerged at a time when two previous political parties of the founding leaders of the JDP had been closed down by the Constitutional Court in the last three years; when the leader of the movement, Tayyip Erdogan, had been imprisoned and banned from active politics; and when the Kemalist/Secularist center represented by the military and the judiciary had displayed its determination to eliminate any Islamic- popular opposition as well as its social and economic networks. Under these circumstances the JDP has developed a three-layered strategy; first, adopt a

[117] Hürriyet, "Başbakan: '2011'de ustalık dönemi başlayacak' ", April 3, 2011, accessed September 24, 2016 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/basbakan-2011de-ustalik-donemi-baslayacak-17450622

[118] "We will indeed remember the past and will draw lessons from the past but we will be nourished with the lessons from the past and will gaze into the future and the horizon and continue to work for the future as always" Erdoğan cited in T.B.M.M Meclis Haber. These lessons indeed refer to the DP, National Outlook Movement, and the RP years and Kemalist one party period.
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=126410 "Elbette dünü hatırlayacak, dünden ibret alacak, geçmişten dersler çıkaracağız. Ancak dünün bize verdiği tecrübeyi, kendimize azık edecek, her zaman olduğu gibi gözümüzü istikbale, geleceğe, ufuklara dikecek, gelecek için çalışmaya devam edeceğiz.

> language of human rights and democracy as a discursive shield; second, mobilize popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy; and third, build a liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors that recognize the JDP as a legitimate political actor.[119]

With this 'conservative democrat' identity the AKP retreated into the discursive level of democratic rights, and European human rights standards as a protection from persistent 'repressive and dominant' secular state in its first phase. For instance, the AKP's 2002 and 2007 programs emphasize universal values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, limited government, freedom of thought, beliefs and education, tolerance towards pluralism and respect for diversity. It is also stated in its programs that the AKP follows the principle of a prominent Ottoman statesman Şeyh Edebali: "Let people live, so that the state endures". [120]Here, this emphasis of unification proposes the coexistence of the two sides. The state cannot exist despite *millet.* For the AKP, the state (unlike the CHP) should follow this principle to conserve *millet's* rights, provide justice and let freedom prevail. It also indicates its service-based politics with regard to the welfare of the society. In addition, the AKP Constitution states that 'national will is the only determinant power'. [121] Also, the party declares that it embraces reason, science, and experience, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms as its main reference of its conception of rule.[122] It is also emphasized that the freedom of expression and the right to live according to one's beliefs is guaranteed by secularism; one of the principles in the Constitution. [123]

In Akdoğan's book, he explicates that for the AKP, conservatism is not against change but in favor of an evolutionary change rather than a revolutionary one. This evolutionary change posits a gradual and a natural transformation of the society. The preservation of traditional values against any authoritarian or totalitarian understandings is a stance against social engineering that aims a homogenous society. AKP's modern conservatism is not pro-*status quo* but it emphasizes the adaptation of change without losing essential values that are

[119]İhsan Dağı, , "The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics and Discourse of Human Rights in the Search for Security and Legitimacy", in *The Emergence of a New Turkey* ,(Salt Lake City: Utah Universty Press, 2006) pp.88-89.
[120]AK Parti 58. Hükümet Programı/2002 https://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/.../58inci-hukumet-programi.pdf pp.4-7.
[121]AK Parti Tüzüğü 2002 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/ pp.19-21.
[122]AK Parti Tüzüğü 2002 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/ and AK Parti 60. Hükümet Programı/2007 https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/60-hukumet-programi/6181#1
[123]Ibid., pp. 19-21.

peculiar to the society. [124] Due to the principles of conservatism stated above, this understanding of transformation or change is explicitly against Kemalist authoritarian modernization project. While Kemalist social engineering project advocates a revolutionary change with a priority given to tutelage and strong state tradition excluding any diversities/oppositions ; this AKP manifesto, on one hand repeatedly emphasizes limited government, the rule of law, strong civil society, universal human rights, the richness of cultural diversity, tolerance for solidarity and the centrality of the individual, and devalues unilateral acts of the state/government as a source of polarization and 'otherization' on the other hand.[125]

Family is referred both in the AKP constitution and manifesto as an important means of the preservation of traditional values with an opposing posture against abortion for religious justifications. For the AKP, family is "a bridge between the past and the future and an indispensable social institution that conveys *milli* (national) values, customs or traditions to the future generations."[126] On the basis of the AKP Constitution there is a portrayal of an 'imaginary' youth that "is free on every level, attached to its moral values, equipped with scientific tools and scientific *(ilmi)* data"[127][128]

In his speech at the First Congress of the AKP in 2003, Erdoğan portrays democratic conservatism not as a detachment from one of the core values of Republic which is secularism but instead "as a means to bridge the gap between state and society, to unite the center and periphery."[129] These two terms are derived from Mardin and used by many other scholars to explicate the split(s) whose roots go back to Ottoman times in Turkish politics. In brief, while

[124]Yalçın Akdoğan, *Muhafazakar Demokrasi*, (Ankara: AK Parti, 2003), pp. 6-12. and William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey-The case of the AKP*, (Routledge: London and New York, 2010). pp.20 and 24.
[125]Akdoğan, *Muhafazakar Demokrasi* and Hale and Özbudun, , *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey-The case of the AKP*.
[126]AK Parti Tüzüğü 2002 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/ p. 21.And Akdoğan, *Muhafazakar Demokrasi* p. 11.
[127] The debates over what science *(bilim) and (ilim)* (approximately it stands for knowledge) in the literature are noteworthy. Since the AKP refers to the latter so often it is important to comprehend the difference between these two words. According to Ateş, "*ilim* is an Arabic word whereas *bilim* is Turkish. *Bilim* with an English equivalence of science is based on experimentation and observation; data gathering based on analysis and is an effort to exceed the present limits of information whereas *ilim* comes from theology and is an effort to reach information based on divine power. Since every information and meaning is in Quran, *ilim* is an effort both to understand and learn Quran." Kenan Ateş cited in Evrensel, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/93327/gazaliden-iside-ilim-ve-bilim accessed February 25, 2016. In this research, whenever *ilim* is translated into English, it will be referred as science but *ilim* will also be given in parenthesis.
[128]AK Parti Tüzüğü 2002, p. 22.
[129]Hale and Özbudun, , *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey-The case of the AKP*, p. 25 and p.33.

the bureaucratic elites and the military as the defenders of secular values represent the center, the excluded and the marginalized groups in the regime represent the periphery.[130] Hence, the AKP claims to be the representative of the peripheral groups with an assertion to integrate them into the system which implies the end of the cleavage between the secularist and peripheral forces. From Erdoğan's perspective, while republican and democratic values are in harmony and the former is their "firmest foundation", "religious, ethnic and regional nationalism" is unacceptable. [131]

The AKP's first term witnessed a variety of democratization reforms in constitutional and legislative realms which in turn curtailed the military force and the harsh recurrent confrontations between the AKP and the representatives of the secular regime. The most important aspects of these reforms that were implemented in the AKP's first phase is that its implications both on itself and the hard core secularist center. While "the total abolition of death penalty, the priority of the international agreements over domestic laws in the case of a conflict, the abolition of controversial State Security Courts in 2004"[132] served to realize the Turkey's candidate membership of the EU along with the harmonization packages that included amendments for the expansion of freedom of expression, press, association, assembly, religion and advocated the protection of human rights on an international basis[133], the reforms regarding the structure and National Security Council, namely the military served to regulate the civil-military relations on one hand, subdued the military on the other hand. The reduction in the frequency of the meetings of the National Security Council, the repositioning of the Secretary General with civilian officials, the financial control over the properties of the armed forces by Courts of Accounts[134] are illustrative in this case. Therefore, the legal-institutional reforms in the AKP's first term for the Europeanization process provided the opportunity to delimit the influence of the army which was a strong representative of the secular regime in terms of its loyalty to republican, modernist and secular regime. This commitment had rendered the army the guardian of the regime and as

[130]Şerif Mardin. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Understand Turkish Politics?", in *Daedalus*. Vol. 102. No:1. (The Mit Press, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 1973) pp. 169-190.
[131]Hale and Özbudun, p.25
[132]Ibid., pp.55-57.
[133]Ibid., pp.57-60.
[134]Ibid., p.61

such led it to "check and balance the AKP government due to its Islamist background."[135]This will be explicated in the second phase of the AKP regarding the Presidential election in 2007.

In its first term in power, the AKP's preference was not to bring up the headscarf issue. However, the wives of the AKP deputies wore headscarves. Even if they claimed to have detached themselves from Islamist agenda, they nevertheless sustained the Islamic identity. The visibility or the representation of this Islamic identity by the headscarves led to a crisis in 2003 on a Presidential level. President Sezer refused to include the headscarved wives in the official reception.[136] The PresidentSezer vetoed several laws in 2004 that involved the regulations about *Imam Hatip (*religious) Schools. His justification was that the right to given to *Imam Hatip* schools for the university exam is "against the 1925 Unity of Education Law and therefore it was inconsistent with a concept of education based on democratic, secular, egalitarian, just functional and scientific foundations."[137] Apart from Sezer, in 2004 the military also emphasized their natural intervention in the national education system as another guardian of the secular system declaring that *Imam Hatip* graduates "should take jobs only in religious services"[138] The AKP chose not to react against the Presidential veto, and as such it can be interpreted that the party did not want to trigger any coup as a survival strategy in its first phase.

With the adoption of conservative democratic identity and the democratization reforms in line with the Europeanization process, the AKP seemed to display a shift from an Islamist agenda. This pro-western and pro-European stance in its first phase indicated that "Integration to the west and maintaining Islamic identity are no longer seen as mutually exclusive choices."[139] However, the value attributed to democracy and the emphasis to it on a discursive level may prove that democracy functioned as a tool for its political legitimization which seems to overlap Erdoğan's remarks; "democracy is not an aim but a means".[140]

The last point to be discussed in this part is the AKP's social and electoral base in 2002 and 2007 elections. In 2002 elections, the AKP managed to have a wide range of votes from

[135]E. Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşçü, *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, (New York:Palgrave Macmillian, 2014), p. 45
[136]Hale and Özbudun, p.85.
[137]Hale and Özbudun, p. 70.
[138]Ibid., p.86
[139]Dağı, , "The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics and Discourse of Human Rights in the Search for Security and Legitimacy", in *The Emergence of a New Turkey*. p. 92.
[140]Hürriyet, "Erdoğan: "Demokrasi amaç değil araçtır" March 6, 2011, accessed October 1, 2016 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-demokrasi-amac-degil-aractir-17197745

"center-right, moderate Islamists, moderate nationalists and even the former center left"[141] and came into power with 45 percent of the votes and also with an increase to 46.58 percent in 2007. Yet, relying on the pre-election and post- election surveys Hale and Özbudun state that "the AKP voters are more religious, more rural, less educated and poorer than the CHP voters." [142] This inference may allude to the desired profile of the voters or the construction of desired members of the new *millet* (nation) in the remarks of vice rector of Sabahattin Zaim University in 2016;

> I rely more on the perception of the uneducated and ignorant people. Those ignorant people who do not have a university degree or even primary education are the ones to keep up Turkey standing. (…) The educated bring this country into fire as the Young Turks did. The educated people of Turkey with a range from the professors to the university graduates are the most dangerous ones. The primary school graduates are the ones who read incidents the most easily because their minds are clear. However, university graduates cannot read the incidents since their minds are blurred. [143]

Ironically, the vice rector of a university who is supposed to be the defender of education, conversely devalues education for the sake of Turkey's so-called benevolence. It is also crystal clear that he discursively excludes and marginalizes the educated as the inheritors of the Young Turks. This may be interpreted in the sense that the 'secular educated class with modern values' is perceived as a threat to this new agenda.

3.2.3 The AKP's Second Term (2007-2011)

With the adoption of a conservative democrat identity, the AKP managed to detach itself from Islamic ideology. However, the AKP's conservative understanding has religious traces of its Islamist inheritance. These discursive traces can be illustrated in the utterances of the AKP representatives respectively in Burhan Kuzu's remark in 2011, in Hüseyin Şahin's in 2011 and in İsmail Hakkı Eser's remark in 2010; "One who does not vote yes for the Constitution will be punished by God (Allah çarpar), "To me, even touching our Prime Minister is service to God" and "Erdoğan is like a second prophet". [144] In fact, these statements blatantly contradict the Article 24 which prohibits "the abuse of religion or religious feelings or things

[141]Hale and Özbudun, p.37.
[142]Ibid., p.41.
[143]Cumhuriyet, "Yeni Türkiye'nin Rektörü: Türkiye'nin geleceği için daha çok cahil nesil yetişmesi lazım" accessed October 1, 2016 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/501980/Yeni_Turkiye_nin_rektoru__Turkiye_nin_gelecegi_icin_daha_cok_cahil_nesil_lazim.html
[144]Vedat Koçal, *AK Parti'nin Siyasal Sosyolojisi* Yeni Sağ, Küreselleşme ve Türkiye, Türkiyenin AK Parti Yılları, eds. Nafiz Tok, Mehmet Özel, Vedat Koçal (Ankara: Orian Kitabevi, 2014), p.29.

held sacred by religion in any matter whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence".[145] The parties can be closed by the Constitutional Court in case of a violation of this rule as the AKP nearly experienced but nevertheless survived in 2008.

Presidential election crisis in 2007 accompanied by several protests of the CHP, the secular media and the e-memorandum by the armed forces declaring their desire for a President who is loyal to republican and secular values not in words but wholeheartedly[146], resulted in the electoral victory of the AKP which signaled not only the "the fall of the last citadel of the secular republic"[147] but also the end of "Old Turkey". The Presidency as an impartial office was now assigned to the 'other' implying the beginning of "New Turkey" and the forthcoming conflicts and frictions within the system.

This defeating of the secular system by electoral means paved the way for the lifting the headscarf ban in 2008. After Erdogan stated in Madrid during an international visit that "even if the headscarf is a political symbol, the ban should be lifted and it is so easy to do so with one sentence"[148], the Constructional Court and the judiciary representative of the secular state, annulled the amendments regarding the ban on the headscarf. Supposedly, once more, the check and balances of the secular system repelled the attempts of the 'other'.

Within this heated context, the closure case of the AKP in 2008 was the last serious attempt of the secularists to eliminate it from the system. The verdict was in favor of the AKP as it escaped being banned due to the lack of majority votes and was only deprived of the state's funding despite the Constitutional Court's conclusion of the AKP's violation of the constitutional principles. The decision set an important precedent for the banning of political parties in a democratic system. For the first time, a party that is alleged to have an Islamist agenda and to be the 'enemy' of the secular state managed to survive from the perennial exclusion of the system. Yet, it was another defeat of the secularists but this time in the constitutional battle.

In 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey pursued a different foreign policy. His suggestions of a more active policy based on his book 'Strategic Depth' states that "rather than acting as a bridge between the west and the Muslim world (…) Turkey

[145]Hale and Özbudun, p.xvi-xvii.
[146] Ibid.,p.91.
[147]Ibid.,p.156.
[148] Sabah, "Türbanın çözümü için bir cümle yeter"
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/01/17/haber,3D8662251F5C425199A3E3BD9CBDC044.html

should act as a 'central country', (…) becoming a 'problem solver' contributing to 'global and regional peace'.[149]This approach and its implication with a reference to Ottomanism will be discussed further in the AKP's third term as it becomes more apparent with the ceremonies of the AKP government.

The prominent incident in 2009 was Erdoğan's trending 'one minute' outburst reaction in Davos Summit. Erdoğan's criticism over Israel's policies of the Palestinians not only added to Erdoğan's charismatic leadership but also reinforced the AKP's image which in turn had a reflection in 2011 elections.

The constitutional reform package in 2010 signified the neutralization of the Supreme Council of the Military along with the "Ergenekon and Balyoz (sledgehammer)" cases. The alleged organized coup to oust the selected and the legitimate government was employed by the AKP to denounce the military due to its attempt overthrow the AKP government in power that was the result of the national will. As a result of the constitutional referendum, "the AKP managed to undermine the dominance of secular Kemalist judiciary through the election of a new *HSYK* (the Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors) and new members to the higher courts"[150]

The aberrant shift in the role of *Diyanet* (Directorate of Religious Affairs) is also worth to mention. In Kemalist Period, the establishment of this institution, which was attached to the Prime Minister, aimed at sustaining state control over religion. Paradoxically, however, in 2010 Diyanet was authorized to shut down websites which were religiously inappropriate and thereby has become a control mechanism of the state.[151]The role of Diyanet in other issues like education and youth will be discussed in the AKP's third phase.

The consequent victories over the clashes between the military, the judiciary and the former President Sezer are inextricably associated with the gradual consolidation of the AKP power. In 2011 elections, having almost 50 percent of the votes (49.95) the AKP consolidated its electoral hegemony and political dominance. The winning of three elections in a row signify the grip of power, namely what Keyman and Gümüşçü call as "power fusion" or "monopolization of power" and explicate the term as such;

[149]Hale and Özbudun, p.120.
[150]Keyman and Gümüşçü, *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, (New York:Palgrave Macmillian, 2014), p. 48.
[151] Milliyet, Yeni site kapatma yetkilisi: Diyanet, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yeni-site-kapatma-yetkilisi-diyanet/gundem/gundemdetay/13.07.2010/1263032/default.htm

> What we mean by power fusion is the presence of strong executive that rules with a majoritarian impulse and relies extensively on electoral understanding of democracy, rather than a pluralist and participatory understanding, with serious repercussions for minority and women's rights.[152]

With the monopolization of power, the AKP rule not only trimmed the efficiency of the judiciary and the state bureaucracy and the opposing parties/voices and got free to implement whatever in its agenda (in this case the making/construction of "New Turkey") but also has obtained the power to enforce the society to adapt to its agenda. The AKP's consolidation and its implications in tandem with the related incidents are to be discussed in its third phase.

3.2.4 The AKP's Third Term (2011-2016)

There is growing evidence of a 'cultural fight' between the secular state and the AKP along arising from the AKP's majoritarian ruling in Turkey during the AKP's latest phase. Apart from this significant contrast with its early reformist phase of the AKP period, namely its strong emphasis on the Europeanization and Westernization, human rights and loyalty to republican values in its first phase, the construction of a 'New Turkey' at the expense of the polarization of the society is intensively uttered by numerous party representatives. The remarks of Aziz Babuşçu, the former provincial chairman of the AKP indicate both AKP's growing self-confidence due to 'power fusion' together with a split in its former alliance partnerships and most importantly its divergence between its first and last phase as such;

> Those who were partners with us in one way or another during our ten year period of government will not be partners with us during the next ten years. The future is a period of construction. The construction period will not be to their liking. Therefore, those partners will not be with us. Those who walked with us yesterday in one way or the other, tomorrow will be partner with the forces against us. Because the future that will be constructed and the Turkey that will be built will not be a future and a period which they will accept.[153]

The statements above are also self-evident to present the further clashes between the secularists and the AKP regarding the construction of the 'New' with an aim to eradicate the reflections of the 'Old' in social, political and particularly cultural realms. The construction of the 'New' necessitated changes in the system despite the opposing views. In 2012, the AKP launched reforms replacing the eight year compulsory education with the compulsory education with four years in each stage (the 4+4+4 system). While the former system blocked

[152]Keyman and Gümüşçü. p. 5.
[153] Babuşçu cited in Ergun Özbudun, "AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift" in South European Society and Politics, Vol: 19, No.2, Routledge, 2014, p. 158.

the entrance of the *Imam Hatip* graduates in the university and thus dissuaded the students from choosing those religious schools, the latter, on the contrary, enables the children to receive a religious education at an earlier age starting from the secondary school. According to a research by Eğitim-Sen, the notable increase in the number of Imam Hatip schools is from 71.000 in 2002 to 417.000 in 2014 along with the transformation of 730 primary schools and 1477 high schools into *Imam Hatip* schools. [154]

This increase of religious schools is also concomitant with Erdoğan's repetitive remarks of raising modern but "pious and vengeful generations", and with his reference to Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's address to the youth, Erdogan furthers his imaginary youth description: "I am speaking of a youth who is demandant of their religion, language, intellect, science (*ilminin*), chastity, home, enmity/hatred, heart."[155] Apparently, Erdoğan refers to the indoctrination, tyrannies and the social engineering project of Kemalist one party period. However, the same social engineering project applies to the youth who is supposed to embody moral and religious values imposed by the AKP rule this time with a justification of having a conservative democrat identity which ostensibly makes it natural to raise pious generations.

Erdoğan's admiration and frequent reciting of Kısakürek's poems in his speeches are noteworthy since "understanding Kısakürek is a precondition to understand the great "cause" *(dava)* that the AKP represents." [156]In his party congress, Erdoğan posit that the AKP is the continuation of a big/grand cause (*büyük dava)* whose roots leads back to a mythical background, namely from Adam to Seljuk and Ottoman Empire. This 'blessed cause', which persists for ages, originates from Adam's struggle of 'good' and 'bad' (*hak and batıl*).[157] There is a correspondence between the AKP's 'blessed cause" imbued with religious attribution, i.e. Islamic feeling and the ideological discourse of National Outlook Movement that posits "a fundamental conflict between Western civilization and Islamic civilization. The former is 'false' (*batıl*) in the sense of resting upon force, while the latter is based on righteousness (*hak*)."[158] This explicitly shared vision between the AKP and National Outlook Movement is a critical one and deserves to be noted. As discussed above, Erdoğan states that

[154]T24, "İmam Hatip liselerinin öğrenci sayısı 11 yılda 7 kat arttı", accessed October 8 2016, http://t24.com.tr/haber/imam-hatip-liselerinin-ogrenci-sayisi-11-yilda-7-kat-artti,279493
[155] Erdoğan's speech for the Youth congress, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OeqPpyYSg8s
[156] Toni Alaranta, "The AKP and Turkey's Long Tradition of Islamo-Fascism", in Turkey Analyst, Vol:8, No.3, 2015.
[157]AK Parti, AK Parti 1. Olağanüstü Büyük Kurultayı, August 27, 2014, https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-ak-parti-1.-olaganustu-buyuk-kurultayinda-yaptigi-konusm/66343#1
[158]Hale and Özbudun, p.6.

they had already abandoned the ideologies of National Outlook Movement and should not be seen as a political continuum of them. However, the belief and practices of this so called blessed cause is not just some random link between the two parties, and in fact it serves as an important categorical denominator which we cannot overlook as this grand scheme of understanding of history and of contemporary civilizations [159]is likely to result in an amalgam of similar policies. As such, this overlaying similarity is a strong link and acts as a contradiction to the tenet that the AKP is not related to National Outlook Movement.

In his articles published in Great East(*Büyük Doğu*) Kısakürek advocated the banning of the *CHP* as the source of all tyranny, banditry and depravity, and democracy and thus the CHP as the source of all illnesses was anathema to Kısakürek.[160] Also, "Kısakürek's prose works combined Islamic revivalism with Ottoman nostalgia (…) and in Great East his system of thought sought to create an Islamic state based on a return to the uncorrupted ideals of"[161] the Golden Age of Islam (*Asr-ı Saadet)*.Thus, Kısakürek imagines a new Islam society with a counter Islamic revolution in opposition to the new society that was constructed with secular laws or reforms by Kemalism. In terms of comparison with Kemalism, the similar hero-dependent understanding of history in Kısakürek and Kemalist narration leads to sacralization of Abdul Hamid II as the 'great Emperor' in the former and Atatürk as the 'great leader' in the latter.Thus, the historical 'good' and 'bad' stereotypes resemble the Kemalist mindset of history.[162] However, Alaranta states that Kısakürek "propagated for a totalitarian Islamist-fascist regime in Turkey (Kemalism is also criticized for its totalitarian tendencies), to be ruled by an Islamic version of a Führer"[163].

Turkey has not been transformed into an Islamist regime; nevertheless there is a proliferated inclusion of Islamic references centered on Sunni Islam in the AKP's political discourse which also generates 'us versus them' based politics. At this point, the empowerment of the

[159] This understanding of history and of contemporary civilizations has its reflections in the AKP's internal and external policies. For instance, Erdoğan's 'one-minute' outburst in Davos signifies that the AKP positions Israel as bad 'batıl' whereas Philistine as good 'hak'. In addition, Erdoğan's promotion of Turkish version of Constitution, Presidential System and Women's rights in the AKP's last phase signifies the negative view for the imitation of Western civilization which was also regarded as the main cause of the collapse of the once glorious Ottoman Empire by the National Movement ideology.

[160]Taner Timur,"Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, "İslam İnkılabı" ve AKP",2013, http://www.muhalefet.org/yazi-necip-fazil-kisakurek-%E2%80%9Cislam-inkilabi%E2%80%9D-ve-akp-taner-timur-26-4588.aspx

[161]Gareth Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey Running West, Heading East?*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.201.

[162]Rasim Özdenören, "Necip Fazıl Kısakürek" *in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*.vol.6 İslamcılık (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), pp.141-142.

[163]Toni Alaranta, "The AKP and Turkey's Long Tradition of Islamo-Fascism", in Turkey Analyst, Vol:8, No.3, 2015

Directorate of Religious Affairs *(Diyanet)* is noteworthy. Apart from the extensive state budget directed to *Diyanet* which outdistanced the other eleven ministries in 2013, the role of the *Diyanet* expanded with the new structural parts regarding "families, religious guidance, social and cultural religious services".[164] In other words, the efficiency of the *Diyanet* expanded beyond mosques into the "different venues of everyday life" [165] as in the example of Erdoğan's direction to legislators to suggest *Diyanet* before deciding how to regulate headscarf issue.[166] Besides, the role of the *Diyanet* in the construction of the desired 'new citizens' in accordance with Sunni Islam is explicitly stated by the Director of *Diyanet,* Mehmet Görmez as such;

> We should not be concerned with the construction of the new mosques in the cities; we should also be concerned with the construction of believers and a new moral society that will be filled with these believers.[167]

Reforming the education system to raise pious generations along with the attempt to cut the umbilical ties with the 'old Kemalist Turkey' and the aim to create its own citizens that are compatible with its moral, religious, conservative values led to intensive reactions in the society. For instance, the prohibitions of 'student oath' and '10th year march'[168] along with additional selective religion lessons in the education system, the end of the ban to teach children Quran under 12 years old, the implementation of 'project schools' which targets to change the teachers and management cadre of the most successful 155 secular schools[169] are

[164]Keyman and Gümüşçü. p.137.
[165]Ibid., p. 137.
[166]Hürriyet Daily News, "Further completing Erdoğan's media metaphor", http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/further-completing-erdogans-media-metaphor.aspx?pageID=438&n=further-completing-erdogan8217s-media-metaphor-2010-09-28
[167] Görmez cited in Keyman and Gümüşçü. p.137.
[168]Hürriyet, "Bolu Milli eğitim Müdürü 10.yıl Marşını yasakladı" accessed October 12, 2016 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bolu-milli-egitim-muduru-10-yil-marsini-yasakladi-40118793 and Milliyet, "Erdoğan 'andımız'ın neden kaldırıldığını açıkladı, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-dan-partililere-gonderme/siyaset/detay/1774517/default.htm The justifications of these prohibitions in the remarks of Erdoğan and Bolu Director of National Education are repectively as such; "You cannot become a Turk with a declaration of being a Turk every day" , "10th year march' is now bygone. We will write a new 100th march in 2023."

[169] The intended change was regulated by the 2014 law regarding the courses in Turkey. However, the implementation of the law led to a series of protest by the students and parents of these 'project schools'. The protests were accompanied by consecutive manifestos stating the arbitrary cadre changes and the alleged pressures in schools in order to 'regulate' the students. Resmi Gazete, MİLLÎ EĞİTİM TEMEL KANUNU İLE BAZI KANUN VE KANUN HÜKMÜNDE KARARNAMELERDE DEĞİŞİKLİK YAPILMASINA DAİR KANUNhttp://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/03/20140314-1.htm, HaberTurk, "Proje Okulların'da neden protesto var", http://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/pervin-kaplan/1249658-proje-okullarda-neden-protesto-var Diken, "Galatasaray Liseliler de 'iş ilanı verdi' Padişaha kölelik yapmamış müdür aranıyor", http://www.diken.com.tr/galatasaray-liseliler-de-ilani-verdi-hicbir-padisaha-kolelik-yapmamis-mudur-araniyor/

the possible indicators of the cultural fight between the 'old Kemalist Turkey' where the secular maintained their dominance and the 'new Turkey' which is claimed to be in process of construction.

Apart from the education, another tool to realize cultural transformation would be the ceremonies. According to Özbudun, "the ceremonies are turned into the tools of hegemonic construction in the hands of power holders (…) and the ceremonies are not only realms of exposition and legitimation of power relations but also (…) tools to express the geopolitical longings and intentions"[170] At this point, the overshadowing of the 23th April and 19thMay celebrations which are in fact the rituals of the 'old' secular regime, by the 'Holy Birth Week' and splendent 'The Ottoman Conquest of Istanbul"[171] ceremonies can be illustrations of AKP's hegemonic power and ideological intentions. In doing so, it can be argued that the AKP reveals its desire to change the 'secular' identity of the 'old' Turkey into a 'new' 'Ottoman-Islamist' identity which would also play an active role in the international arena.[172] This desired role is also articulated in the '2023 New Turkey contract' published in 2015 with regard to the glorious Ottoman heritage as the "the pursuit of a foreign policy that would be by the side and the guardian of the honor of downtrodden people or nations."[173] It is also remarkable in the sense that it is an apparent manifesto for the construction of 'New Turkey'; "While heading towards the 100th year of our Republic, New Turkey will be the creation of an inclusionary renewal and a continuous reconstruction process that duly appeals to people, time and space".[174]

The AKP's majoritarian understanding of democracy, namely being the embodiment of the 'national will' through the ballot box, led to 'power fusion' and as suchto societal polarization, marginalization and the exclusion of the other(s) as it failed to represent the other parts of the society. This is significant as it reveals the inconsistencies between its first and last phase on a discursive level. For instance, the AKP's claim to expand to religious

[170]Sibel Özbudun, "Osmanlı'yı "İhya" Etmek: AKP'nin Törenleri" in *Marka Takva Tuğra AKP Döneminde Kültür ve Politika*,(İstanbul: Evrensel, 2015), p. 222.
[171]Hürriyet Daily News, "Istanbul marks 1453 Ottoman conquest of Istanbul with grandiose ceremony" May 29, 2016 accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/istanbul-marks-1453-ottoman-conquest-of-istanbul-with-grandiose-ceremony.aspx?PageID=238&NID=99825&NewsCatID=341
[172]Sibel Özbudun, p. 231.
[173]AK Parti, Yeni Türkiye Sözleşmesi/2023, Article 84, accessed May 1, 2016, "dış politikamızdaher zaman mazlumların ve mazlummilletlerin yanında yer alarak insanonurunu koruyan değer odaklı biryaklaşım benimsenecektir." , "https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/yeni-turkiye-sozlesmesi-2023/73285#1
[174]Ibid., Article 2, accessed May 1, 2016, "Yeni Türkiye, Cumhuriyetimizin 100.yılına yürürken insana, zamana vemekâna hakkıyla hitap eden kapsayıcıbir yenilenmenin ve süreklilik içindeyeniden inşa sürecinin eseri olacaktır."

freedom which in fact only favored Sunni Islam and excluded Alevis, and to create a secular and pluralistic democratic environment which ostensibly embraced all parts of the society in its first phase seems to fail. Erdoğan's remarks regarding Alevis and Armenians are illustrative as such; "Cemevis are places of cultural activity not worship."[175]and "They have also said a lot of things about me. One of them came and said I was a Georgian. Then another came up and, I beg your pardon, called me uglier things, saying I was Armenian."[176] In fact, the former instantiates the AKP's authoritarian manner to define what counts as religion and Islam while defining the cemevis as not equivalent to mosques whereas the latter belittles the non-Muslim parts of the society.

The AKP's transition from its reformist democratic standpoint to authoritarian retreat in its last phase indicates continuity with the Kemalist past. In other words, the more the AKP consolidated the more authoritarian it became as in that of Kemalism in order to realize the transformations it seeks. The authoritarian tendencies within the AKP are also shown in Erdoğan's and the party representatives' remarks by telling people what and what not to do such as telling 'woman' not to laugh in public, not to display their pregnancy but to have at least three children, not to have abortions or C-sections, telling 'youth' not to drink, not to smoke, telling university girls and boys not to stay in the same homes, to be "religious and obedient" [177] As such, "the AKP replaced the "strong-state tradition" with the "strong-government tradition"[178], which now seeks to impose its own religious i.e. Sunni Islamic and moral values to the society in order to create its desired citizens, thereby has neglected the divergent parts of the society with an intolerant attitude in opposition to its pluralistic, participatory and democratic agenda in its first phase. The resemblance between the AKP and Kemalism is that both parties pursue a top-down transformation to create their "ideal citizens" that are compatible with their own 'acceptable' values to be instilled by using the state apparatuses. This resembling authoritarian aspect of the AKP is labelled as "post-modern authoritarianism" by Ihsan Dağı and explicated as such;

> (…) the majority legislates a particular way of life and uses the state apparatus to impose its choice of morality, lifestyle and value system (…) In public states

[175] Radikal, "Erdoğan: Alevilik din değil; Ali ile alakaları yok", accessed October 15, 2016, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan-alevilik-din-degil-ali-ile-alakalari-yok-1122494/
[176]Hürriyet Daily News, "PM Erdoğan complains of being called 'even uglier things, Armenian' ", accessed October 15, 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-erdogan-complains-of-being-called-even-uglier-things-armenian.aspx?PageID=238&NID=70043&NewsCatID=338
[177]Somay, *The Psychopolitics of the Oriental Father*, p.xiii.
[178]Keyman and Gümüşçü. p.53.

> and justification of social and cultural policies, the party leader is increasingly relying on "values". He refers to them as "our national values", "historical values", "our civilization" and "values that our nation represents". [179]

What is striking is that the AKP has been critical of the Kemalist project which it formerly denounced as 'the tutelary regime/democracy' as it sought to create a 'new' homogenous society imbued with modern, Western values with a special emphasis on 'woman' and 'youth'.

The Gezi uprising in 2013, which started as a small protest for the protection of a small park turned into a massive protest involving people from different ethnic, class, cultural, political and religious backgrounds. The attraction of such an unprecedented mixture of protestors despite the brutal police force evidently arose from the accretion of the AKP's 'otherization' and 'polarization' based politics particularly in its last phase. The spontaneous Gezi protest -which was a resistance in search of a democratic, pluralistic order arising from mutual respect towards differences-, was in fact an 'AKP resistance', namely that of Erdoğan's authoritarian manners. Apart from this, it also reflected the discontentment of the seculars educated with a Western mindset opposing the social and political engineering of the AKP. Thereby, the Gezi Park became a platform in which "the important segment of Turkish society express their fears (…), grievances and their will to practice their own-preferred life styles which were being increasingly taken away from them"[180]. Furthermore, the polarization within the society was even furthered and fueled by the pro-government media in line with Erdoğan's remarks[181] since the Gezi was portrayed as "an attempt by the secular minority to regain their stronghold in Turkish politics and remove the gains by the religious-conservative minority in terms of political rights as well as economic standing."[182]

On the positive side, the ongoing amendments related to socio-economic realm that would improve the infrastructure services such as health and transportation issues and the municipal services indeed reflects the AKP's serviced-based politics that resulted in the distinct increase in votes in each election. Other significant improvements regarding the last phase are the new law on the Presidential elections which enabled the direct election of the President for the first

[179]Dağı cited in Ergün Özbudun, "AKP at the crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift", p.162.
[180]Ziya Öniş, "Monopolizing the Centre: The AKP and the Uncertain Path of Turkish Democracy" ,2014, p.9 accessed September 20,2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2499213
[181]Erdoğan attempted to fuel the polarization as a powerful source of his electoral victories as such; "We hardly contain the other 50 percent at their homes" cited in Milliyet, "Erdoğan Türkiye'nin yüzde 50'sini zor tutuyoruz" " , accessed October 15, 2016, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/basbakan-4-gun-yok/siyaset/detay/1717873/default.htm
[182]Öniş, p.11.

time in 2014 and enhanced the participatory democracy –Erdoğan was elected with 51.79 percent of the votes-, the ceasefire with the PKK in 2013 (the armed organization of the Kurdish movement), the abolition of the headscarf ban in the public institutions which contributed to the freedom of religion and the removal of the 10 percent threshold for the parties to join the parliament.[183] In addition, the third and fourth 'judicial reform packages' aimed some improvements as the European Commission's 2012 Progress Report puts it as; "The third judicial reform package prohibits the seizure of written work before publication (…) thousands of titles were removed from the list of banned publications."[184]and 2013 Progress Report puts it as;

> The 3rd Judicial Reform Package, adopted in July, started to produce results, in particular as regards detention (including its length). The 4th Judicial Reform Package provides judicial remedies for a number of issues on which Turkey had been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights. It narrowed the scope of terror-related crimes by removing the link between the imparting of ideas through publications, statements, speeches, etc., and the use or threat of use of coercion or violence. If implemented in line with European standards, these changes should have a positive impact on freedom of expression.[185]

Paradoxically, however, the reports of Freedom House between 2012 and 2014 signal the severe decline in the freedoms of expression, assembly, information. The financial and other pressures on media owners to fire the journalists who were critical of the AKP and Erdoğan, the jailing or the detention of the journalists, the marginalization of dissent voices, the censorships on the internet, and the violation of the rule of law are emphasized.[186] Therefore, it can be argued that the judiciary reforms were inadequate in terms of a significant improvement regarding freedom of expression.

The democratization package in 2013 paved the way for the unprecedented rights for the non-Turkish communities such as Kurds. The package that made a progress on cultural rights precipitated the broadcast, education and political activities in languages other than Turkish.[187] The peace process that was launched in 2012 in order to solve the Kurdish problem, however, resulted in not only highly polarized political and societal atmosphere but

[183]AK Parti, 2002-2014 Sessiz Devrim Türkiye'nin Demokratik Değişim ve Dönüşüm Envanteri, http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!/parti-dokumanlari
[184]European Commission, Turkey 2012 Progress Report, p.21, ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/.../tr_rapport_2012_en.pdf
[185]European Commission, Turkey 2013 Progress Report, p.12, ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/.../turkey_2013.pdf
[186]Özbudun, "AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift", p.161 and pp.164-165.
[187]European Commission, Turkey 2013 Progress Report, p.6, ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/.../turkey_2013.pdf

also the incarcerations and the surveillances of the academicians who signed a petition denouncing the military operations in the south-east and calling for peace due to their severe impact on civilians.

Having gained the President seat in 2014, Erdoğan pursues of a highly active and interventionist Presidential leadership despite the legislative condition to be impartial and to end his ties with his former party. This ostensibly emanates from his will to control and interfere in the policies of his former party (the AKP) and to shape the Turkish politics and foreign policy.[188] The striking point is that the growing concentration and monopolization of power at the 'new' center[189], particularly in the hands of Erdoğan led to controversies within the founding cadre of the AKP such as Cemil Çiçek and Bülent Arınç in 2016. While the remarks of Çelik displays the Islamic character of the AKP with an emphasis on the tradition of consultation/*shura(iştişâre)*[190] within the party and the 'Golden Age of Islam' (*Asr-ı Saadet)* as a resemblance of Republican system, they also emphasize the lack of consultation and criticism as a prerequisite of any democratic system.[191] He furthers his criticism indicating the unconditional oath to Erdoğan within the party and thereby, the authoritarian manner of Erdoğan as such; "Now it is the time when people mostly preferred to express the things only which their leader would like"[192] Arınç's remarks[193] succinctly puts forward that the AKP replaced the CHP in terms of repressiveness and authoritarianism with the grip of power. His remarks also reveal not only the close monitoring of the universities through the Council of Higher Education *(YÖK)* and pro-government appointments of the university rectors but also the AKP's transition to an authoritarian and repressive stance to silence any voices of dissent as such;

> Formerly these repressionists, the ones who curtail freedom of speech were the hangmen of the prime minister. It was that mentality. They had the illusion of

[188]This interventionist manner of Erdoğan brought the heated Presidential system debates. As such, the AKP claims that despite the oppositions there has been *de facto* Presidential system which has to be turned into *de jure* system.
[189]Öniş, p.19.
[190] In the tradition of shura which prevailed in the the Golden Age of Islam "Muslim leader was supposed to consult leaders of community before taking decisions" cited in Hale and Özbudun, p.xiv.

[191] Cemil Çiçek, "İştişâre,Eleştiri ve Linç" , accessed September 1, 2016, http://huseyincelik.net/arsivler/3289
[192] Ibid.
[193]After his several confrontations with Erdoğan, some of the conferences of Arınç to be held in universities, the former Deputy Prime Minister, were supposedly cancelled by the university authorities without any relevant reason. Upon these cancellations, Arınç disclosed his ideas about the AKP ruling with a long explanation on his Twitter account.

> assuming devastating power and asserted "if you criticize me, you will perish". We did not perish, we gave away our youth, our lives but not quailed. (…) If the people with whom we fought shoulder to shoulder against many prohibitions such as the headscarf ban up until yesterday change their sides and play 'the banning game' as intoxicated with power, we will, in that case, count the interference in freedom as a reason to struggle for freedom and sort out this problem.[194]

All in all, the narration of AKP has come to be told upon the dual discourse of the 'Islamic Golden Age' along with the 'glorious Ottoman past'. Thus, the narration is also based on the binary opposition between the 'old Kemalist Turkey' and the 'new Turkey' in which the Kemalist principles are redefined. In such a narration, the 'old' represents 'the other', i.e, the enemy of the intrinsic values, the ruining factor of the Ottoman heritage, an imitator of the West whereas the 'new' represents a new civilization and the cure for all cultural, social, political and economic tyrannies.

Within this context, the phases of the AKP period should be considered with the following concepts; the National Outlook Movement, the conservative democracy, the Islamic tendency, the revival of the Ottoman, the transition from reformism to authoritarianism, the democracy erosion, the period of 'new' myths, the construction of the 'new' and the deconstruction of the 'old'. The data collected for the AKP discourse will be analyzed on a discursive level according to this contextual framework which will help to determine how the 'new' is constructed/mystified while the 'old' is deconstructed/demystified regarding the 'Ottoman', 'woman' , and the 'youth'.

[194]Nokta, "Arınç'tan AKP'ye çok sert sözler: Bu baskıcılar, güç sarhoşluğuyla yasakçılık oynuyor", accessed 20 September, 2016, this website is blocked at the time being of this writing.

4 AIM AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Aim and Objectives

The main aim of this research is to demonstrate the mystification and demystification processes through selected binary oppositions with a special emphasis on 'New and Old Turkey'. This research hence seeks to explore the meanings, actually the clash of meanings over the following binary oppositions; Ottoman as a revival (resurrection) process/Ottoman as a degeneration process, the unveiled/ the veiled woman,Kemalist/the AKP (Asım) youth,in Kemalist and AKP discourse and how these are discursively constructed within specific periods in Turkish culture and history.

Generalizability is a central debate in social sciences. One can say that the positions taken in this debate depend on discipline, school of thought and individual researchers. The most common approach in anthropology and cultural studies, particularly from a constructivist stance, is the tendency to disregard this problem of generalization on the ground that "Our insight can only be a reconstruction of subjective perspectives of people in specific situations. So the aim of inquiry can only be the development of an ideographic (sic) body of knowledge"[195]. Within this framework, neither the generalization nor the representativeness of the sample is the main concern in this research.

4.2 Research Question

"How is Kemalism demystified with the tools of Kemalism in the AKP discourse?" Since this is a dual process the sub-question would be "How does the AKP mystify itself"?

4.3 Cultural Studies, Language and Discourse Analysis

"The ways in which we commonly understand the world, the categories and concepts we use, are historically and culturally specific".[196] All ways of our understanding are inextricably associated with a particular culture and periods of history. In other words, the things in the way we perceive them or attribute meaning to, are the products of culture and history within that given time; therefore all our perceptions of the world are dependent upon images, concepts, categories and symbols that are lodged in our minds. Language is not a neutral

[195] Philipp Mayring, "On Generalization in Qualitative Oriented Research" , Vol.8, No:3, 2007, accessed October 29, 2016, http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/291/641#g3
[196]Vivien Burr, *Social Constructionism.* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p.3.

medium by which we understand the culture, and language determines the limits or boundaries of the ways we make sense of the world. At this point, there is indeed a strong emphasis given to language within culture and cultural studies. That is, the things that constitute culture can be said to be social and discursive constructs through language. This connection between cultural studies and language is also stated by Barker and Galasiński as such; "It is a core case of cultural studies is that language does not mirror an independent object world but constructs and constitutes it." [197] They also posit that an understanding of culture is to "explore how meaning is produced symbolically through signifying practices of language."[198] Hall, another prominent figure in cultural studies, argues that the cultural studies is centered on culture "as the signifying practices of representation." [199]As cultural studies features language to explore culture with an emphasis on discourse, this research focuses on how 'New','Ottoman', 'woman', and 'youth'are represented and discursively (de)constructed in Kemalist and AKP discourse within cultural framework.

Since an understanding of culture is centered on language, namely signifying systems, cultural studies is influenced by structuralism, post structuralism and semiotics which are concerned with meaning and representation.[200] Accordingly, this research aims to make the clash of the meanings in two different discourses intelligible to us in terms that these approaches provide.

For Saussure, sign is constituted by signifier and signified, and there is an arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified. This arbitrary relationship implies that meaning is not fixed but rather culturally and historically specific. If meaning varies in relation to every society, historical period, context, and if this change occurs with respect to systems of social consensus, then all meanings are constructed in history and culture. These meanings cannot be stabilized; therefore there is always a change from one period and context to another. In addition to this, Levi Strauss posits that meaning is constructed over binary oppositions. [201]

[197]Baker and Galasiński, Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity. (London:Sage). 2001. p. 1.
[198]Ibid., p. 4.
[199]Ibid., p. 4.
[200]Esra Bilgiç. The Role of the Mainstream Newspapers in the Consolidation of Turkish National Identity: 1934-1937, Boğaziçi University, 2015, p. 31.
[201]Durna, Tezcan and Kubilay, Çağla, "Söylem Kuramları ve Eleştirel Söylem Çözümlemeleri" in *Medyadan Söylemler*, Libra Yayıncılık, 2010.

Binary oppositions are multiple and new ones are continuously being created or the old ones are being revisited as political discourse is unfolding and new/old social phenomena are appearing in the agenda of the society. However, still some of these binary oppositions by their content and nature are likely to occur and reshape discourse in general and political discourse in particular more frequently than some others and as well as catch our attention more due to our selective perception and reasoning as individuals, interest groups or society as a whole. This shortlist of binary oppositions to be analyzed in this research was not easy to pinpoint, however after due study of the current literature of the research topic combined with my personal interest the following list is my core binary opposition categories under the New/Old Turkey title (the regime of tutelage *(vesayetçi rejim)*/national will *(milli irade)*): Ottoman as a degeneration process/Ottoman as a revival (resurrection) process, the unviled woman/the veiled woman,Kemalist youth/the AKP (Asım) youth. These binary opposition categories encompass a fairly big part of the discussions of New/Old Turkey title, and it will help us understand and show contemporary situation in Turkey in terms of power and power issues.

This research examines the aforementioned binary opposition categories through discourse analysis. "The main function of binary oppositions is to create hierarchical positions within a narrative by creating myths through mystification and demystification".[202] My aim, therefore, is also to interrogate the representation of the construction and deconstruction of narratives (or discourse in a broader sense) within the processes of the AKP and Kemalism or in other words the relations between "the system of present statements and those of the past".[203]

Thus, from a Foucauldian perspective, we may assert that each power constructs its own discourse which is peculiar to that given period within a particular society. In other words, any ideology or political standpoint that each power represents may be detected from a particular discourse. By the formation and transformation of statements each power, on one hand, reconstructs, reproduces, legitimizes its own discourse and on other hand, represses, weakens or attempts to eradicate the other existent predominant discourse(s). The present discourse becomes in many ways so natural that we do not question the symbolic meanings

[202]Esra Ercan Bilgiç. " 'Kötü/Eski' 'İyi/Yeni' Retoriğinde İkili Karşıtlıklar" in *Marka Takva Tuğra AKP döneminde Kültür ve Politika*. (İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın), 2015.
[203]Barry Smart. *Michel Foucault*. (New York: Routledge). Revised Edition. 2002.

attached to that particular discourse. At the end of the day, it becomes the ultimate social reality.

For Foucault, "discourse is one of the systems through which power circulates and discursive formations produce 'a regime of truth' " and if "Truth isn't outside of power"[204] then one can argue that all constructions are power related on a discursive level. Thus, the representation and (de)construction of 'New', 'Ottoman', 'woman', and 'youth' in Kemalist and the AKP discourse is the (re)production and the transformation of these two different powers/power relations. That is, through discourse "there exists a struggle concerning the status of truth."[205] Regarding this, each discourse, namely Kemalist and the AKP discourse not only claims to be the regime of truth in itself but also "involves the construction of knowledge about us vs. the other"[206] and therefore, "knowledge" is never a neutral or objective phenomenon but rather a tool employed by "power" for the construction of that specific truth or discourse. In that sense, power is not only repressive but "is most effective when it is productive, when it produces knowledge."[207]

"Discourses are (…) signifying social practices (…) which are shaped by social context and therefore linked to the meanings that are manufactured within context"[208]. In other words, the discourse analysis cannot be independent of the historical and social context in which it is constructed and (re)produced. As far as ideological standpoint of the AKP and Kemalist discourse is concerned, each considers itself to be discontinuity of the other which leads to a rupture in the historical continuity. These ruptures or breaking ties with the past are significant in the way to present the clash between these two prevailing discourses in Turkey in terms of my list of binary oppositions. This does not only result in us versus them dichotomy but also leads to exploration of the inclusion and exclusion of specific images, meanings, symbols attributed to 'Ottoman', 'woman', and 'youth' in that specific historical and cultural context. Moreover, this discontinuity also enables us to see the mythical constructions of two different powers in each discourse that serve to mystify itself while

[204] Esra Bilgiç. The Role of the Mainstream Newspapers in the Consolidation of Turkish National Identity: 1934-1937. Boğaziçi University. 2015. p. 32.
[205]Smart, *Michel Foucault*, p.62.
[206]Bilgiç, The Role of the Mainstream Newspapers in the Consolidation of Turkish National Identity: 1934-1937, p. 32.
[207]Chris Baker and Dariusz Galasiński. " Language, Culture, Discourse" in *Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity*. (London: Sage). 2001. p.69.
[208] Bilgiç, The Role of the Mainstream Newspapers in the Consolidation of Turkish National Identity: 1934-1937, p. 32.

demystifying the other. Arguably, it is also possible to track continuities (in this case I refer to AKP discourse) if there are any in order to mystify itself or consolidate its power.

Cillia, Resisgl and Wodak states that Anderson's main assumption for the nation is that it is "to be understood as mental constructs, as 'imagined political communities' " and secondly, they argue that "national identities – conceived as specific forms of social identities – are *discursively*, by means of language and other semiotic systems, *produced, reproduced, transformed and destructed*".[209] Deriving from these assumptions one can argue that as nations are imaginary entities, the concept of 'New', 'Ottoman', 'woman', and 'youth' are also mental constructs. In other words, the images and the representations of a specific Turkish 'woman' and 'youth' and the representation of the 'New' and the 'Ottoman' in the AKP and Kemalist discourse "becomes reality in the realm of convictions and beliefs through reifying, figurative discourses continually launched by politicians, intellectuals and media people".[210]

Hence, the aim of the reproduction of a specific given discursive construction- the AKP and Kemalist discourse- is to transform the perceptions of the past and of the present. It changes, for instance, the organization of the ideas or images of 'New', 'Ottoman' 'woman', and 'youth' and creates new ones; therefore it alters culture by emphasizing certain traits and distorts the pre-existing meanings through discursive construction. In a sense, these narratives (discourses in a broader sense) are new interpretations in order to modify the symbols and meanings once assigned to 'New', 'Ottoman' 'woman',and 'youth'. Moreover, the meanings they entail are ideologically and politically (re) produced and transformed or skewed.

If any ideology or political standpoint that each power represents may be detected from a particular discourse, Van Dijk suggests a strategic basis for this detection of ideology in a discourse as "the positive self-representation" of the dominant group to undermine the 'other' which is "negative other representation".[211] Referring to the clash between different groups (discourses), he states that "each group will select from the general cultural repertoire of social norms and values those that optimally realize its goals and interests and will use these

[209] R. De Cillia, M. Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discursive Construction of National Identities" in *Discourse and Society* 10. no. 2. (1999). p. 153.
[210]Ibid., p.153.
[211] Teun A. Van Dijk, "Ideological Discourse Analysis". University of Amsterdam, p. 144. http://discourses.org/OldArticles/Ideological%20discourse%20analysis.pdf, retrieved May, 10, 2016.

values as building blocks for its group ideologies". [212] This signals power/power groups is/are selective in the discursive construction process, therefore it may be possible not only to track how they (de)construct and also to determine what each power ideologically includes and excludes in the (re)production of 'New', 'Ottoman' 'woman', and 'youth' in Kemalist and the AKP discourse.

The overall strategy Van Dijk posits is as follows;

Ingroup	*Outgroup*
Emphasis	De-emphasis
Assertion	Denial
Hyperbole	Understatement
Topicalization	De-topicalization
-sentential (micro)	
-textual (macro)	
High-prominent position	Low, non-prominent position
Headlining, summarizing	Marginalization
Detailed description	Vague, overall description
Attribution to personality	Attribution to context
Explicit	Implicit
Direct	Indirect
Narrative illustration	No story telling
Argumentative support	No argumentative support
Impression management	No impression management

Van Dijk asserts that the above principles derive from social psychology and posits that they "also apply to discursive strategies".[213] Thus, one can argue that the principles on the left column can be some of the tools that are used by any power/power groups that result in mystification whereas the principles on the right can be the other tools that end in the demystification process.

All in all, in this research, 'New/Old Turkey', 'Ottoman' 'woman', and 'youth' are considered as discursive constructs within particular historical and political contexts. Therefore, each binary opposition will be examined in order to reveal mystification and demystification process.

[212]Ibid., p. 143.
[213]Ibid., p. 144.

4.4 Selected Time Periods and Information On the Data To Be Used

For Kemalism, the analysis focuses on the periods from 1934 to 1938 as those selected years are significant for the consolidation of Kemalism. In the first years of Republican period, the aim was to construct a new model of people and a society that are compatible with the new regime with fast and radical attempts. However, in the 1930s, one-party regime was regarded as inadequate in terms of the inculcation of the reforms. Hence, in the 1930s, the regime was believed to be in danger. In addition to the precautions to be taken as a necessity to consolidate the new regime, the propaganda activities proliferated to inculcate the reforms into the people.[214] Apart from the tendency to reinforce party and state unification that led to consolidation of the one-party government, they tightened their hold on the country by a complete control of "all the country's cultural and intellectual life, suppressing those independent social and cultural organizations."[215] Moreover, the task of the newspapers and educational institutions was to inspire people with the Kemalist ideas or ideals.[216] Although the primary focus is on the given periods above, the other significant incidents are also addressed in case of a need to contextualize Kemalism within the 1930s.

The data construction for Kemalism period is through the selection of periods of 1934-1938 as Kemalism sustained to be the dominant ideology within these years. These selected years are prominent in many ways. For instance, The Press Law in 1934 obliged the newspapers in the country to publish news in line with the government policies otherwise the government had the power to close down any newspapers publishing any opposing news.[217] In 1935, compared to 1931, the number of seats for independent members in the assembly dropped more than fifty percent, namely from 30 to 13.[218] In addition, the Turkish Women's Union was closed down in May 1935. The government regarded this organization 'unnecessary' as the women now had the rights to vote.[219] Moreover, "at the 1936 congress İsmet (İnönü) declared the congruency between the state apparatus and party organization to be official policy".[220] In addition to the Dersim insurrection by virtue of the discontent with the

[214] Hakan Uzun, "Tek Parti Döneminde Yapılan Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Kongreleri Temelinde Değişmez Genel Başkanlık, Kemalizm ve Milli Şef Kavramları" in *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*. Vol.9, 2010, p. 239.
[215] Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey A modern History*, (I.B. Tauris), Third Edition. 2004. p. 180.
[216] Ibid., p. 181.
[217] See Press Law in 1934, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc013/kanuntbmmc013/kanuntbmmc01302444.pdf
[218] Zürcher, p. 180.
[219] Ibid., p. 180.
[220] Ibid., p. 177.

government policies in 1937-38 that resulted in the severe resettlement of a plethora of Kurds, the six principles *(Altı Ok)* were officially in the Turkish constitution in 1937. Kemalist ideology is formed of these six principles and schools, media and the army were all subjected to the inculcation of these principles. The regulations about the journals to be published in schools in 1938 and Press Union Law in 1938[221], the Law of Physical Training in 1938[222] by which the focus was centered around the youth and children to be the defenders and guardians of the regime are quintessential along with the above incidents in terms of the consolidation of Kemalist regime between 1934 and 1938. Having assured the total grip of power and freed the political scene from any opposing parties or dissent voices indicates the complete domination of political, social and cultural realms within these years. The selected time span delineates the postulation of the Kemalist tenets for the construction of 'New Turkey'. Accordingly, the institutions were regulated in order to contribute to the goals modernization and 'Westernization' by the enforcement of laws along with the help of discursive construction of myths regarding the creation of a national identity grounded in a national culture that is compatible with modern and Western values. Thus, the time span was determined as the periods of 1934-1938.

Similarly, the chosen 2012-2016 time periods - which does not encompass the period after the resignation of the former Prime Minister Davutoğlu on May 5th in 2016 - to analyze the AKP discourse is significant as there has been an explicit emphasis on New/Old Turkey dichotomy in both Party programs and the speeches of party representatives. Thereby, the declarations to construct 'New Turkey' are noteworthy in order to determine the selected periods. Moreover, I think the given periods will be more effective to give us a frame of what they exactly mean by 'New Turkey', how they demystify/deconstruct 'Old Turkey' and also to observe what confident and decisive steps are taken to mystify/construct 'New Turkey'. With the election of Erdoğan as the President of Turkey in 2014 by the public for the first time in Turkish history and the former recurring electoral victories, not only the party reached its peak in terms of political power but also their political agenda has become much more explicit in terms of "conducting a social engineering by amending the educational system to ensure the creation of "pious younger generations" and reshaping the public space in accordance with

[221]Server İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat Rejimleri* (İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası, 1939). p.810-813, 820-822.
[222]See Physical Education Law, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc018/kanuntbmmc018/kanuntbmmc01803530.pdf

conservative values"[223]. Another noteworthy gauge of their assumed power is that the party has reached as far as negotiating and planning the rewriting of the constitution. These years, consequently, are significant as they ensured that they embody the national will, therefore have the very right supposedly to 'normalize'the society (or Turkey), in other words, take the society back to its roots. Another significant point is that during the mentioned years above, having gained more political stability and therefore power, the AKP, particularly Erdogan, has started to act exactly the same as the Kemalist government/Atatürk by employing the tools of Kemalism in the way that once "he liquidated the self-appointed 'guardianship' of the military and the Kemalist bureaucratic elite, something he constantly promised in his election campaigns, the more of a guardian he himself became; one by one he started to take on the attributes of the Kemalist father"[224]. The only contrast is that the values that are asserted to be the core values of the society differ in both parties but the guardianship to preserve these values seems to overlap. It shall be noted that in a broader sense, both periods are consolidation periods of the juxtaposed ideologies and as well as the periods of further advances of their respective cultural and ideological discourses.

The chosen data within the given years is determined in line with the selected binary opposition categories. That is, the corpus is correspondingly constructed through the key words as follows; New and old Turkey, woman, girl, lady, mother(hood), family, woman rights, equality, child, youth, the young, generation, sports and physical training, education, future, Ottoman, history, sick man, ancestor (*ecdad*), conquest (*fetih*), backwardness, reactionary, modern, revolution, tutelage regime, national will, Kemalism, Kemalist regime, one party regime, the CHP, Atatürk, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, religion, Republican regime, ideology, and the AKP. Since the discourse analysis is based upon a comparison between Kemalist and the AKP discourse, the same key words are employed for the corpus construction regarding both Kemalist and the AKP discourse.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey*(Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*) minutes, the speeches Mustafa Kemal and the party representatives and *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers articles constitute the parts of the data to be analyzed for Kemalism. While, the minutes were selected from the official website of the National Assembly of Turkey namely, through a digital search

[223]Gareth Jenkins. "Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Kemalism, AKP and Turkey at 90s". 2013. http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/69-revolution-and-counter-revolution-kemalism-the-akp-and-turkey-at-90.html.
[224]Bülent Somay.*The Psychopolitics of the Oriental Father*.(UK: Palgrave Macmillan).2014.p. 187.

using the Ctrl+F keys for the aforementioned key words, the newspaper articles were selected by seeking out the same pre-determined key words within the newspaper articles and the titles through an archival research of the newspapers in Beyazıt and Atatürk Library. Similarly, the latter method is employed for the selection of speeches of Mustafa Kemal and party representatives in the Kemalist texts.

One of the constituent of the data regarding Kemalism is The Grand National Assembly of Turkey minutes.The assembly has a significant position not only for the production of discourse but also for the decisions to be taken for the regulations that have a major impact on the society and culture as well. Indeed, the congress minutes of the one party-state government specifically 1931 and 1935 explicates the six principles of the party in details and the party declares these as Kemalist principles in 1935. In addition, the speeches of Mustafa Kemal is also analyzed for two reasons; as he is the founder of the Republic and the most important figure for the implementation of the social and revolutionary reforms to modernize and secularize Turkey but stifle any opposition with an authoritarian hand. The speeches of party representatives also consists another important part of the corpus since they are the vigorous advocates of the Kemalist regime and its ideals.

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers are other resources that are used in this study. *Ulus* newspaper formerly as *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* was named as *Ulus* in 1934, and became the mouthpiece one-party state government. It was published under the control of Falih Rıfkı Atay who was a deputy in the assembly between 1923 and 1950. In order to express the strict control of the state over the journalists and newspapers, he states that "the destiny of the journalists is bound to a one telephone coup".[225][226] The fact that newspapers systematically controlled or led to a certain extent by the ruling elite, we may posit that media in general mirror the state ideology as the 'ideological apparatuses'. This is one of the important reasons why using newspapers in Turkey in this study becomes significant. *Cumhuriyet* newspaper is also significant. As Köktener argues due to dissidents who were not content with the new

[225] Hıfzı Topuz, II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003). p. 162,164.
[226] In 2004, the telephone calls between R.T. Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, Fatih Saraç, Habertürk Board Member and Fatih Altaylı, Habertürk Chief Editor were released to the media. According to the allegations, Erdoğan scolds Saraç for making news regarding the health issues of the government. At the end, three journalists that were responsible for making the news were fired and this was proudly informed to Yalçın Akdoğan. This alleged incident is ironic not only in the way to exemplify the continuous constraints on the journalists and media but also how his assessment made about media in 1938 is still noteworthy in contemporary times. http://t24.com.tr/haber/basbakan-telefon-etti-haberturkten-uc-kisi-atildi,250642

regime, *Cumhuriyet* had a mission of defending the regime against these dissidents and helped with the inculcation of the reforms and the spread of this new concept 'Republic'. [227]

The chosen data for the AKP discourse include Party and government programs, the speeches and declarations of the party representatives mainly former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and the speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who was then Prime Minister now the President of Turkey. The conditions to break off his ties with his former party and to be impartial in order to be the President don't seem to apply to Erdoğan. In fact, in one of party group meetings, he declared that he would not be an impartial President but as there are two sides, namely, the state and millet, he would be on the side of *millet*.[228] In addition to his partial stance, he also retains his attitude to be a party representative more or less in his every speech in the way that praising and supporting the actions of his former party; the AKP while belittling the CHP, the Kemalist party as the inheritors of the tutelage regime.

Sabah and *Yeni Şafak* newspapers are also other resources for corpus construction since they are also assumed as 'ideological apparatuses'. These newspapers, as explicated in Arsan's article, were delivered to the people close to the AKP government due to bankruptcies, and became dependent on the government because of economic reasons. This dependency brought not only some privileges related to advertising incomes but at the same time an unconditional submission to the government, and therefore led to a formation of partisan media.[229] Besides, other pro-government newspapers or any other (visual) materials to support and enhance any relative argument are also used and analyzed if necessary.

The selected party and government programs and the speeches of Erdoğan and other party representatives have all been acquired from the official website of the AK Party, Prime Ministry and Presidency website through a digital search for the very key words within the title and the text by using Ctrl+F keys. For the data gathering of *Yeni Şafak* and *Sabah* newspaper articles, exactly the same method has been employed as that of Kemalism newspaper data. Besides, no digital data analysis software has been used either for Kemalist or the AKP data.

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[227] Aysun Köktener, Bir Gazetenin Tarihi Cumhuriyet. (İstanbul; Yapı Kredi Yayınları ,2002). p. 13-14.
[228]Esra Ercan, " 'Kötü/Eski' 'İyi/Yeni' Retoriğinde İkili Karşıtlıklar" in *Marka Takva Tuğra AKP döneminde Kültür ve Politika*, (Evrensel Basım yayın), 2015.
[229]Esra Arsan. " 'Yeni Türkiye'nin Sistematik Yalan Üretim Merkezi: Havuz Medyası". in*Marka Takva Tuğra AKP döneminde Kültür ve Politika.*2015. Evrensel Basım yayın.

4.5 Selection of Study Data

The target data of this study was all the newspapers and speeches that encompassed the keywords woman, girl, lady, mother(hood), family, woman rights, equality, youth, the young, generation, sports and physical training, education, future, Ottoman, history, sick man, ancestor (*ecdad*), conquest (*fetih*), backwardness, reactionary *(gerici)*, modern, revolution, tutelage regime, national will, Kemalizm, one party regime, CHP, new and old regarding the selected binary oppositions. Within the selected years, 50 speeches for the AKP discourse and 25 speeches for Kemalist discourse are collected. The selected speeches entails the major mentioning of the target key words either in the title or in the content, and thus possess a significant level of coherence and relevancy with the research topic and selected binary opposition categories.

Since there is no particular list of all speeches within the given years and for the fact that it is difficult for practical reasons to access some of the speeches (for example, non-recorded or semi-private speeches), priority has been given to those of speeches that are delivered on some significant dates (for example, commemoration of Atatürk Youth and Sport Day (May 19), Republican Day (October 29) commemoration of Atatürk (November 10), general assemblies of AKP and CHP and some other dates that are important for AKP's political agenda such as Holy Birth week (*Kutlu Doğum Haftası* – April 14-20), the anniversary of Kut'ül Amare (April 29) and speeches that received general public attention through media, literature or political discussions (such as speeches delivered about abortion, youth, Ottoman, Ottoman language, women and gender equality). In addition to this, a snowball technique has been applied to the already selected speeches to reach additional significant speeches both to enrich the content and increase the number of data to be analyzed.

As the snowball technique(s) is used to conduct a qualitative research, some specific dates or events mentioned in one speech leads the researcher to the investigation of other speeches, which in turn leads to the others that had "bonds and links"[230] with the former selected speeches. Although this snowball technique may be advantageous in order not to miss some significant speeches relevant to the topic, as Atkinson and Flint argues because the speeches are yet "subjective choices, most snowball samples are biased, however larger sample sizes

[230] Roseland Atkinson and John Flint, "Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research Strategies" (London: University of Surrey, 2001) p.2.

may reduce bias". [231] Accordingly, a large selection of data that consists of speeches, National Assembly minutes and newspaper articles are selected to overcome the problem of bias.

For the media data, within the selected years –1934-1938 and 2012-2016–the sample includes every month of the corresponding years from January to December. However, the year 2016 regarding Y*eni Şafak* and *Sabah* newspapers were partially existent in the archives of the libraries during the research process of this thesis. To overcome this problem, the official websites and the archives of the aforementioned press have been intensively followed by the beginning of 2016 closely and as a matter of fact some additional news sources such as foreign and local news to keep up with the current events in general.

For the newspapers, no sampling method is used but instead all the newspapers were thoroughly scanned according to the key words. Therefore, there is a chance of appearance of each news on the corpus so any possible systematic bias has been eliminated from the corpus. For the construction of final corpus, the articles were filtered both by pre-determined categories and relevancy. Thus, the newspaper corpus was separated into four corpora (as 'New/Old Turkey', 'Ottoman', 'youth' and 'woman') to be used in data analysis.

Table 1. The newspaper corpus for *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* articles

	Ulus	Cumhuriyet	Total
New/Old Turkey	22	15	37
Ottoman	22	5	27
Youth	8	30	38
Woman	4	39	43
			145

[231] Ibid., p.4.

Table 2. The newspaper corpus for *Yeni Şafak* and *Sabah* articles

	Yeni Şafak	Sabah	Total
New/Old Turkey	34	4	38
Ottoman	29	6	35
Youth	24	2	26
Woman	19	2	21
			120

Table 3. Final corpus for the paragraph unit of analysis

	The AKP data	The Kemalist data	Total
Speeches	20	20	40
Newspaper articles	30	30	60
			100

For newspapers, discourse analysis is not based on the corpus in Table 1 and Table 2. It is based on the reduced corpus as the final corpus shown in Table 3 in line with the binary oppositions and selected topics for discourse analysis. The unit of analysis in this research is paragraph and the total number of paragraphs regarding the speeches and the newspaper articles to be analyzed is shown in Table 3. In this research, 'subjective interpretation' is employed for the data selection and the reduction of the collected data to construct the final corpus, namely for the selection of the most significant 100 paragraphs. In subjective interpretation approach, the data is collected according to the researchers' perceptions of a particular phenomenon or phenomena since "it necessitates a researcher to count himself as one of the measuring instruments"[232] in data collection. Since there is no single version of reality, the researcher brings his individual perceptions of the world while conducting a research and therefore "all the research is essentially biased by the researcher's individual perceptions"[233]. Thus, validity is not a central issue in objective sense. Accordingly, any significant paragraphs in the articles were selected for the data construction to be analyzed. In

[232]Hubpages, "The Difference Between Objective and Subjective Data", 2013, accessed October 29, 2016, http://hubpages.com/education/The-Difference-Between-Objective-and-Subjective-Data
[233]William M.K. Trochim "The Qualitative Debate", 2016, accessed October 29, 2016, http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qualdeb.php

this way, the mystification and demystification processes in the AKP and Kemalist discourse are revealed through discourse analysis.

4.6 Rationale For the Method(s) Used

As a method, this study employs a qualitative discourse analysis for the comparison of Kemalism and AKP discourse. The differences, namely the binary oppositions,facilitate the process that leads to revelation of mystification and demystification processes. Since it is a dual process, the demystification of Kemalism also discloses the mystification of Kemalism and the AKP.

Deriving from Saussure, structuralism and its extension of Barthes, Baker and Galasińskistate that "the relations between signifier and signified are organized (…) into cultural codes. Signs become naturalized codes".[234] For Barthes, as of two signifying systems; denotation and connotation, "connotations which have become naturalized as hegemonic, that is, accepted as 'normal' and 'neutral' are described as myths (…) and myth has the task of giving historical intention a natural justification".[235] Thereby, the meanings and representations or any knowledge that are embedded in our minds should not be taken for granted - for social constructionists knowledge is not a direct perception of reality - but rather taken as constructs and be questioned about how they serve for any justification of power/power groups or ideologies in a specific political and historical context. Thus, the researcher should also seek and reveal these mythical constructions while employing discourse analysis and semiotic analysis. Within this framework, this study is based upon social constructionist approach which methodically embraces in itself discourse and semiotic analysis.

Discourse analysis which is considered as one of the qualitative research methods is an interpretative data analysis method. Qualitative researches seek to find out how phenomena, concepts, and social reality are perceived by the people. Parallel to this, discourse analysis investigates how facts, social realities, values, thoughts, and power come into existence, how they perpetuate, clash, and how they are assessed.[236] Moreover, "the theoretical basis of discourse analysis is social constructionist approach, which assumes that meaning is

[234] Baker and Galasiński, " Language, Culture, Discourse" in *Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity*, (London: Sage), 2001, p.5.
[235]Ibid., p. 5.
[236] Tahir Gür. "Discourse Analysis as a Postmodern Research Method. Zeitschrifft für die Welt der Türken. Vol.5. No.1. 2013.

constructed in and through language"[237]. Since discourse analysis views language as constructed and constructive[238], any analysis can be independent neither of historical, political context nor of ideology and power issues.

In this research, discourse analysis is considered to be one of the best methods to demonstrate the interrelation – in terms of continuity and discontinuity if there is any- between Kemalism and the AKP, and in what specific ways Kemalism is demystified in the AKP discourse. Moreover, this study can also be effective to specify the current polarization in Turkish society that stems from the clash of one particular discourse with another, that is to say Kemalist discourse with that of the AKP discourse.

Discourse analysis is a relatively new method; therefore there is no rigid system regarding the method. However, since its usage is flexible, it can be employed in various fields, and it may produce significant results where other methods might be inadequate. Yet, one should not take discourse analysis as a magic bullet which can be used very effectively in all cases since discourse analysis itself may be difficult to employ for the fact that there are not clear cut guidelines how to use it, and in addition to this, the research topic itself might have certain intricacies that applying discourse analysis will cause further problems. For example, Kemalism spans over a long period of time and an exact choice of period within Kemalism may prove to be difficult. Nevertheless, for practical reasons – the more the period is extended, the more number of documents must be analyzed- one must limit the time period of the study even for a particular topic, and in this case discourse analysis may miss some important aspects of the topic due to this limitation. However, with the prudent selection of the periods for Kemalist and the AKP discourse, the potential problem will be tried to be overcome.

All in all, based upon social constructionist approach, this research is not in pursuit of objective 'truth' regarding 'New' Turkey, 'Ottoman', 'woman', and 'youth' and but in pursuit of two distinct ideological versions of 'truth' that is constructed within culture and society.

[237]Bilgiç, The Role of the Mainstream Newspapers in the Consolidation of Turkish National Identity: 1934-1937, p. 45.
[238]Rosalind Gill. "Discourse Analysis" in *Qualitative Researching with Text Image and Sound*, eds. Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell (London; Sage, 2000), p. 174.

5 THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF KEMALISM AND THE AKP

In this chapter, the recurring dichotomies are analyzed within the consolidation periods of Kemalizm and the AKP, namely the single party regime in the mid 1930s and the last and ongoing phase of the AKP rule between 2012 and 2016 with reference to social constructionist approach and the construction of a 'new' Turkey. In fact, this recurrent theme of creating a 'new' Turkey encompasses other recurring sub-dichotomies; 'Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' that serve as other significant parts in two contending narratives in terms of mystification and demystification processes. Accordingly, this study attempts to apply the given items in Van Dijk's categorization of in-groups (for mystification) and out-groups (for demystification) to the selected corpora for discourse analysis and seek those given items in each selected paragraph including symbols, metaphors, metonyms and myths/mythic constructions to reveal mystification and demystification processes. As such, the following samples demonstrates not only the clash between the two ideologies on a discursive level but also how each ideology establish its new 'regime of truth' regarding the binary opposition categories.

In some of the selected samples below, both the mystification and the demystification processes coexist. Hence, although the main purpose of the study is to demonstrate these processes under two separate titles as mystification and demystification, the selected paragraphs for the corpora are sometimes analyzed under either mystification or demystification title in order to keep the cohesion and the unity of the paragraphs in terms of the meaning. Yet, the paragraphs are put under either title according to the intensification of the process. In other words, if the sample is predominantly related to mystification, it is put under mystification title and vice versa. However, regardless of under which title these paragraphs are put, both processes are analyzed if necessary. Besides, during the analysis, it is ascertained that some of items given for mystification and demystification processes can be employed interchangeably as a discursive strategy. For instance, the given items for mystification process can also be employed for the demystification process which means that the items for these processes can be reversed. In other words, it is not always possible to determine clear-cut guidelines for these processes. Hence, the sample paragraphs are analyzed by taking all these into consideration.

5.1 Binary Opposition 1: New/Old Turkey

5.1.1 Kemalist Discourse

The dichotomy of the 'old' and the 'new' Turkey revolve around the discussion between the Republican (new) regime and the Ottoman (old) regime in the Kemalist discourse. First of all, the speeches of the party representatives such as Recep Peker and Falih Rıfkı Atay the founder of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk, mystify the 'new' Turkey and depict it positively with reference to the Republican regime, Turkish revolution and reforms whereas the old regime is demystified and depicted negatively with reference to religion. Along with the speeches, the newspaper articles also contribute to this process by emphasizing the rightfulness of the change and progress in the Kemalist modernization project. Accordingly, for the survival of the 'sick' man and for the sake of the 'new' Turkey, the requirement for radical change and constant progress are legitimized. In this regard, the mystified concepts are 'Republican regime', 'Turkish revolution', the 'new', 'Kemalism', 'Atatürk', the 'CHP' and 'secularism' in Kemalist discourse.

5.1.1.1 Mystification

5.1.1.1.1 High-prominent Position

It is the claim to position oneself in a superior position. This positioning can function as not only mystification but also legitimization for the utterances and the actions taken.

> The Republican regime ensured the best way for peace and repose and in our motherland. The citizens and the residents in this country benefit from the opportunities of freedom, welfare and happiness under the equal conditions of the Republican laws at the highest level. (*161. The Opening Speech of the 5th Period of Assembly in the 3rd Legislative Year*, Open Session, 1 October 1937, see Appendix 1)

> The Turkish revolution is not a story of single consecutive events or cases but a story of a big events or cases which expresses the high heroism, honor and power of a noble nation. This nation has not lost but seemed to lose his political personality, social structure and noble existence by the influence of glorious (but) incompetent management and hypnotic superstitions. The revolution is to eradicate the evil, the obsolete, the backwardness and the harmful and to put the good, the true/the just, the right and the useful instead. It is to strengthen the just and the useful principles and sustain those in the social fabric of the nation. The revolution/reform generally happens by means of force. (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 March 1937, see Appendix 2)

In this sample, the Kemalist project and revolution is predicated upon the binary opposition between the 'Republican' regime which is depicted as the 'best' and 'ideal' regime for the 'noble' Turkish nation as a means of betterment in economic, social, legal conditions, namely, in all aspects of life and the 'Ottoman' regime which is depicted as all sources of backwardness, belatedness, dilapidation, illnesses and ignorance. Accordingly, the newspapers along with the political speeches in the era serve for the purpose of distinguishing between the two regimes by contrasting these dichotomies and for framing the Republican regime as superior and putting it a high-prominent position whereas framing the 'other' regime inferior and placing it in a low, non-prominent position. Besides, the Turkish nation was the verge of losing its 'modern' essence which had no relation with the Ottoman identity or 'Ottomanness' that defined Turks as 'others' in the Ottoman period. As such, the radical reforms that were implemented 'for the people despite the people' and the use of force in the period of change were legitimized since they served to regain the 'true' essence of the Turkish nation or 'Turkishness'.

The newspapers of the Kemalist period also contribute to the process and to the Kemalist narrative by not only by framing positive and negative images regarding the new and old regime but also mystifying Kemalism as the state ideology. Kemalism became the official state ideology in 1935. Parallel to this, in the newspapers the new regime is also strongly identified with Kemalism which is established as the 'new regime of truth'. Besides, another discursive practice that can be observed is that in order to reinforce the image of the Republican regime and to stain the image of the old regime, a special credence is given to the articles of the foreign newspapers. Since the main motivation was to 'reach the level of contemporary civilizations', namely the western civilization, and modernize the society accordingly, foreign articles (as a foreign gaze to modern 'new' Turkey to reaffirm and consolidate the image of the new Republican regime) used as references not only to reaffirm the success of the Republican regime but also to increase the credibility of the local news. By doing so, they reflect the ideology in power.[239] The following sample published in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper is an example of the articles that are frequently quoted from the European newspapers in the period.

[239]Esra Arsan and Süheyla Tolunay Şimşek, "Haber Metinlerinde Biyoiktidarın Kurulumu: Kadın Bedeni ve Kızlı-Erkekli Öğrenci Evi Tartışmaları", p. 168, https://www.academia.edu/30454195/HABER_MET%C4%B0NLER%C4%B0NDE_B%C4%B0YO%C4%B0KT%C4%B0DARIN_KURULUMU_KADIN_BEDEN%C4%B0_VE_KIZLI-ERKEKL%C4%B0_%C3%96%C4%9ERENC%C4%B0_EV%C4%B0_TARTI%C5%9EMALARI, accessed January 8, 2017.

5.1.1.1.2 Impression Management:

It is to make a positive image or impression as a discursive strategy. It can be either through creating a new impression/image or making the existent image/impression congruent with the message that is to be conveyed. It can be through metaphors, symbols, mythic constructions or positive self attribution.

> "The sick man of Europe" which was assumed to have caught a fatal disease for two centuries now has healed and appeared as "the strong man" of the Anatolia who was actually imposed to division by the rival aspirants twenty years ago. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 July 1934, see Appendix 3)

An explicit comparison between the 'Old' and the 'New' Turkey is employed by the means of metaphors as a discursive practice. Within the Kemalist revolution, the 'New Turkey' is likened to a 'strong man' whereas the 'Old' Ottoman regime is likened to 'the sick man of Europe'. The complete change and progress in terms of mentality, culture, society and politics, namely the 'New', is mystified by the creating the image of a 'strong and healthy man' who has managed to heal by the Kemalist revolution. On the contrary, the image of the 'Old' is tarnished by the metaphor of a 'sick man' who was deemed to die because of a fatal disease. The fatal disease would indeed refer to the adverse effects of religion. By doing so, the former is employed to create a positive impression for 'New' Turkey whereas the latter is employed to create a negative impression for 'Old' Turkey.

5.1.1.1.3 Assertion

It is the claim that something that is expressed, done or implemented is certainly true. By assertion, it is claimed that all the other divergent views or standpoints are false. As such, it establishes the 'truth' it presents as the only 'truth'.

> Kemalism has determined the most correct viewpoint and the truth and has been on the path of implementation. (…) Kemalism is the expression of history and life and of the best and the most correct viewpoint. In this respect, it refuses one-sided or deficient viewpoints in the society, accepted this unity of life and coalescence of life and regulated its activities according to this main principle. Similar to the formerly existent regimes, being against to dogmas in Kemalism is not a means to assert that its own 'dogmas' are timeless/eternal. On the contrary, it expresses explicitly and fearlessly via its leader that it can easily sacrifice its principles, by which it is dominated, to life and it takes the biggest courage from this explicit truth. It can be easily understood that an ideology which is nourished by such a lively resource will be a dynamic, lively, and a great force. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1937, see Appendix 4)

> While the creation of a homogenous and self-contained Turkey by Atatürk is a big event that would go down in history, what is more meaningful is that the same chef who instilled a new soul into the Turkish nation. (…) Kemalism which is the basis of New Turkey is not only a social, political system and a philosophy of life. It is more than that. Kemalism means that Turkey is open to modern information and progress, new industry and new education. It is the replacement of fatalism and dark thoughts by rationalism. Kemalism gives work, fate, position that has to be taken by someone in this universe of a person a new direction. *(Ulus*, 12 November 1938, see Appendix 5)

The Kemalist modernization project which aimed to create a modern, westernized nation state is mystified through the assertion that the principles of Kemalism are directly the life itself. Paradoxically, even if Kemalism is depicted as an ideology that is against dogmas, i.e. religious, it actually creates its own dogmas by turning a deaf ear to any opposing views which are depicted as 'one sided' or 'deficient'. In the new regime, the principles of Kemalism represent the only 'truth' and therefore have to be accepted by every single person. It is asserted as if with the implementation of the Kemalist principles, the new regime, namely, the 'new' Turkey will become powerful since it opens the 'true' path to everything; the path to everything modern, secularor civilized such as the modern information, modern attire, modern education. As such, it is asserted as the key to be a 'modern' and 'civilized' country or citizens, or simply the key to modern life.

Contrary to its claim to sacrifice its principles, every single law or reform that was in fact made in the Kemalist period in order to strengthen and consolidate the new regime. Hence, the new regime does not take its power from this claim of 'truth' but from the Kemalist principles as 'the new regime of truth'. Besides, rationalism, science and progress is privileged and replaced the 'fatalism' and 'dark thoughts' related to religion. Thus, the positivist approach of Kemalism related to modernity which excludes religious thought and the establishment of 'a new regime of truth' is also explicitly contributed, appreciated, and reaffirmed by *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus.* The narration is completed by asserting that it was Atatürk who created a homogenous culture and society to realize the modernization project.

5.1.1.1.4 Argumentative Support and Attribution to Personality

The former is a discursive strategy which functions to strengthen and mystify the given viewpoint by providing argument(s) either separately or in combination according to the purpose. The latter is the strategy to glorify and appreciate a person or the actions taken by

that specific person within a particular period. It can, therefore, become a tool to glorify a specific period as well.

> This dynamic force, (the force that arise from our national existence), a lush waterfall, had been wasted and exhausted like a river that flows in vain. It is the big leader Atatürk who dominated the societal life and changed the destiny of *millet* by discovering this dynamic force. Life is going on; there is nothing that stops or stays the same. The one who stops is trampled. We will progress each day. (…) It could be only dogmas, the primitive minds that undermine the ideas and actions, would embank the progress of the society. The religious dogmas had prevented the progress of Turkish and Islamic world. For this reason, Turkish revolution struggled with this at first. We cannot create religion again. Whatever life desires will happen, but we will also dominate by not leaving it to its own. This is the most significant characteristic of Kemalism! (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1937, see Appendix 6)

In the narrative above, the depiction of new and old regime is predicated upon the dichotomy between progress and underdevelopment. The 'new' is mystified with reference to progress whereas the 'old' is demystified with reference to religious dogmas. As congruent with Kemalism, the religious dogmas are presented as the main obstacles for the progress in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper. Similar to the characteristics of modernity, Kemalist modernization project prioritizes and requires a constant change and progress for an ideal future. Hence, any break in the progress is depicted as 'being trampled'. Accordingly, in the 'old' regime it was the bigotry and ignorance that stemmed from the religious superstitions and dogmas prevented the progress of the Turkish nation. As such, the Turkish revolution and the reforms that are implemented in order to eradicate the traces of religion in the cultural, social and political life are legitimized. Besides, Atatürk is also mystified as the leader who reversed this course of events and created a turn of events. Most important of all, the constant intervention in all aspects of life by Kemalism as a requirement for progress is simply confessed in this narrative.

Another prominent discursive practice is the creation of the mythic figure of Atatürk, who is mystified by attributing him innate and transcendent powers. According to Ünder, "this identification with transcendental power equates Atatürk with powers regarding God or any Gods".[240] As such, he becomes a 'godly figure' who 'instilled a new soul into the Turkish nation'. As Ünder states, "it is believed that the mystified person is believed to have absolute power and knowledge and have characteristics such asimmortality, and impeccability or to set

[240] Hasan Ünder, "Atatürk İmgesinin Siyasal Yaşamdaki Rolü," in *Modern Tüekiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm*, ed. Murat Gültekingil Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim), 2001, p. 139.

up rules and laws, and to take revenge from the evils." [241]*Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* newspapers seem to reaffirm and appreciate these features in many articles and contribute to this creation of the cult of Atatürk by asserting that it is this extraordinary hero who created a miracle; a new country out of nothing and saved this nation. Accordingly, the image of Atatürk is discursively constructed as the big leader for whom this nation longed for ages.

The center and the periphery dichotomy is another binary opposition that arises from the failure of the new regime. In the new regime, the center represents the modernized, the educated, westernized elites and the civilized urban part of the society while the periphery represents the uneducated Anatolian people, the traditional rural parts of the society. Even though one party regime, the CHP, aimed a total or nationwide modernization and westernization in all aspects of life, namely educational, economical, societal transformation, the outcome of the Kemalist project was not as expected due to the conditions of the period. As such, the single one party regime prioritized the urban in terms of city development, theaters, operas and universities whereas the changes that were made by People's House in the rural were indeed inadequate for the total transformation of the society. Hence, the modernization and westernization gap- still persists in current Turkey and the AKP is claimed to represent the periphery; the discriminated part of the society (in the Kemalist period) - widened between the urban and the rural. As the consolidation period of the Kemalist regime consists of one party regime, the meaning(s) attributed to the CHP below by its *de facto* leader, Atatürk, is significant.

5.1.1.1.5 Emphasis

It is the strategy to emphasize the specific characteristics or features of a person or a thing that is mentioned.

> Our main program for the government is the CHP's main program. The principles in this program are those that enlighten us in management and politics. Yet, these principles should not be identified with the dogmas of the books that dropped out of the sky. We have not been inspired by the sky or the invisible world but directly by life itself. The thing that guides us is the Turkish nation of whom we are the descendants and also the inferences/conclusions we have drawn from the history of nations that is full of pain, sorrow and distress. The soul of this program prevents us from dealing with particular citizens. We are the servants of the whole Turkish nation. With the unification of the state and the party, we have indicated that we are against any kind of discrimination

[241]Ibid., p. 139.

between the citizens. (*161. The Opening Speech of the 5th Period of Assembly in the 3rd Legislative Year*, Open Session, 1 October 1937, see Appendix 7)

The principles and the regulation of the CHP are not only mystified but also legitimized by Atatürk with the emphasis that those principles were not the dogmas or the religious books; i.e. Quran (here the demystification through the implicit reference to the Ottoman period in which Quran was the dominant tool of guidance in all spheres is also discernible with the use of words such as 'sky' and 'invisible world') but were the requirements of the historical lessons. These historical lessons are apparently derived from the other nation states that had been formerly through this modernization process. Since the main motivation of the Kemalist one party regime is to 'reach the level of contemporary civilizations', it becomes normal to take the other western and modern states as an example. The principles of the CHP, namely Kemalism, are the tools to reach this ideal. It is also emphasized that the program of the CHP that aimed to realize this ideal aims to reach each member of the society as a total project in order to avoid the discrimination between the urban and the rural parts of the society. However, the result was an unintentional discrimination which ended in a gap between the urban and the rural and thus created the ongoing center and the periphery dichotomy in contemporary Turkey.

Another significant dichotomy regarding the new and old regime is that constructing the binary opposition between secularism and religion. In this construction, the statues have symbolic value. The new capital of the new regime which is Ankara, (the previous capital İstanbul that is of symbolic importance for the Ottoman and therefore for the AKP in terms of the conquest implies another radical change in the construction of the 'new') is highlighted for its modern facet with reference to modern art. The present, namely the secular new Turkey is mystified with its new appearance while the past, the old religious regime with its old Islamic architecture is demystified.

5.1.1.1.6 Argumentative Support

It is the way to justify and mystify the given viewpoint with an argument. The standpoint or the argument can be supported by providing different examples.

> Modern Ankara attracts attention not only with its buildings but also with its monuments and art works of the sculptures. These art works which were regarded as sin did not exist in the old Turkish cities. Even though it has been only 15 years since the sultans left Turkey, a statue is seen in every corner of Ankara; in the new state center. (…) There are also statues in every Turkish city. These statues are rather/more of the symbols of the methods of Atatürk. (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 September 1937, see Appendix 8)
>
> There were cogent grounds for Atatürk's thoughts which supported the idea that New Turkey could not be managed from the capital city that was full of old palaces and sanctuaries. İstanbul which was full of fabulous old Islamic art would never become sufficiently modern. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1937, see Appendix 9)

In this sample, the modern appearance of the cities serves as an example for the radical changes that the new regime brought. The argument is that since the old regime had religious characteristics, it influenced every aspect of life including the architecture in the cities and had to be changed. As Bozdoğan argues, the desire of the 'new' was to "replace the preceding "architecture of historical styles" with "a new culture of building"[242] so that "it wouldbe, by definition, an architecture appropriate to its cultural and national context"[243].With the new secular regime, the religious effects of the old regime have been erased and the cities have now returned to semblance of 'normality' or more precisely of modernity which had been the 'true' cultural essence of Turkey. Therefore, the statues as the symbols of modernity and progress are also indicators which demonstrate that 'new' Turkey is now a 'developed' country. Here, the mystification of Atatürk reappears as it is explicitly seen that the reforms that led the way to modern new Turkey are attributed to the founder of Turkish Republic, Atatürk. Ünder explicitly states that "according to the created image of Atatürk, it is only him who gathered the Assembly, created the army, proclaimed the Republic and made the revolution in order to create a modern, western nation"[244]. Accordingly, the image of Atatürk as a 'saviour', 'protector', 'founder', 'one man' and 'leading figure' is also constructed by *Cumhuriyet*.In addition, the palaces and sanctuaries are depicted as the symbols of the 'old' in which modern art was excluded due to backward mindset of religion whereas the statues are depicted as the symbols of Atatürk's reforms and Atatürk's new, modern and secular Turkey.

[242]Sibel Bozdoğan, "The Predicament of Modernism in TurkishArchitectural Culture: An Overview" in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 134.
[243]Ibid., p. 134.
[244]Ünder, p. 138.

5.1.1.2 Demystification

The following sample from *Cumhuriyet* taken from a foreign newspaper to demystify 'old' Turkey demonstrates the discursive practice with reference to binary opposition between religion, i.e. Islam and secularism in a detailed and descriptive way. Under the modernist gaze of the secular state, the old Islamist regime connotes the traditional, the uneducated, the backward, the underdeveloped, the corruption and the lower class while the new secular regime connotes the modern, the educated, the developed, the progress, the change and the upper class. Therefore, Islam and Westernism exclude each other in Kemalist narrative. As a final note, the sample below is an example of the use of 'narrative illustration' item is employed interchangeably, that is to say, not for mystification but for demystification. In this context, the demystified concepts are 'the Ottoman regime' and 'Islam' in Kemalist discourse.

5.1.1.2.1 Narrative Illustration:

It is the strategy to frame a positive picture (here in a negative way for demystification) and to make a story of the message to be conveyed by narration.

> The visitors formerly went to Turkey in order to see these: the veiled women, men in long robe *(entari)*, (…) the dervishs who twirled and shriked (…) the big-bellied translators with and in strange clothes. The visitors tried to assume that they had Muslim soul in order to visit the tombs *(türbe),* the tombs of Muslim saints *(evliya)* and countless prayer halls. (…) Yes, the old Turkey in the past was really a brilliant Turkey. (…) Everything seemed to be serious, but nothing was taken serious even death and rebellions. There was no hurry in that Turkey except the burial of the dead. (…) The biggest skill and knowledge was not to taint the other part of the rose jam when you spooned up it from the Turkish toffee tray. The education given in Arabic was incomprehensible and was not working. They confused their minds with Western *(alafranga)* and Ottoman *(alaturka)* clocks and they became completely Orientalist by accepting the hegira as the beginning of history instead of the birth of Jesus. The old Turkey in the past! The government is a nuisance and the police is a tyrant… But bribery and tip are a means of compromise to straighten everything out. (…) Now Turk dress, eat, have fun like us. They implement our nature and traditions enthusiastically. *Harem* does not exist anymore! (…) The people from the upper class travelled a lot. (…) The backwardness of Turkish life disgusted them and made them angry. (…) The women who wanted freedom knew that they would be stoned if they uncovered their veils. The bad/evil beliefs mixed with religious bigotry were the watchmen of these old traditions. (…) Yet, Turkey has not died but changed not to mention its radical and entire change. Beliefs, traditions and order have been demolished. (…) Turkey has changed its soul. (*Cumhuriyet,* 23 October 1934, see Appendix 10)

The sample provides the story of the 'old' regime by narrating the old streets of Turkey. The narrator is a French journalist who demystifies the 'old' by means of irony; the 'brilliant old' and futhers the depiction by demonstrating various aspects of that 'brilliant old'. By providing a foreign gaze, the transformation into a secular modern regime is approved by a representative of the western culture. The figures to be seen in those streets are demystified for their religious appearances; 'the veiled women and the men in robes'. However, the figures in the 'new' regime are mystified since they are in modern attires like 'them', namely like the western people. Another discursive strategy is the construction of the binary opposition by the narrator between the Orient and the Occident. The use of Arabic alphabet, Ottoman (*alaturka*) clocks, and the hegira as the beginning of history meant that the old regime represented the Oriental. On the contrary, the new regime with its modern facet represents the Occidental. With reference to the new alphabet, the modern attire and the clock, the reforms are also mystified since they serve as a tool for adopting the western culture and lifestyle. Besides, they symbolize a mentality and a soul change since the new secular regime eradicated the beliefs, traditions and superstitions, namely the traces of the old Islamist regime which are regarded as evil obstacles for progress and change, by the means of reforms.

5.1.1.2.2 Attribution to Context

It is the strategy to de-glorify a period by making references to specific events or characteristics of that period.

> Today religion is not in question. Turkish state has no relations with religion. It is secular. Secularism does not mean irreligion. In fact, religion cannot be of concern for a state. There is not such a person called Mr. State so that it could fast and give zakat *(zekat)*. Therefore, Turkey does not have a religion. The state is not interested in religious issues. It means that the state does not have the authority, as it had in the past, to tell the people to choose this or that religion. When the religion had the power over the fate of the state, it caused the decline of the state. This is my opinion. By having the power over the fate of state, religion became a tool of tyranny in the hands of sultans. The Turk desires a secular state so that no one can interfere in the conscience of the people. Who is that sultan that interferes in the sacred conscience of the people? Turkish Republic did not abolish religion. Everybody is free to choose their religion. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1934, see Appendix 11)

Here is another sample in which mystification of the 'new' and demystification of the 'old' are inextricably intertwined. In the second part, religion is referred in the period of old Islamic-Ottoman state as means of tyranny for the people. Contrary to the religious 'old' that did not provide freedom of belief, the 'new' is mystified and depicted as irreligious since it

enabled this freedom of choice for its people. Thus, in the Kemalist discourse, it is advocated and promoted that the only way to be free and to reach the level of contemporary civilization to break the ties with Islamic tradition. The newspaper, accordingly, promotes this rupture with Islam in terms of political and social life and portrays the new regime as emancipation from religious tyrannies. While the old Ottoman sultanic system is demystified with reference to the arbitrary management reliant on religious principles and interventions of the sultans on their *kuls*, the secular new is mystified as the government of the people and by the people since it does not interfere in people's freedom of choice but instead provides freedom of conscience.

5.1.2 AKP Discourse

The most salient myth in the AKP discourse as in that of Kemalist discourse is predicated upon the binary opposition; the 'Old and New' Turkey. Similar to Kemalist discourse, this myth serves to justify and naturalize the intentions of both power(s) in terms of (re)construction on a discursive level with strategies of mystification and demystification. In this respect, the concepts that are mystified and identified with 'new' Turkey are the 'new', 'AK Party, 'silent reforms', 'nation'/*millet* with reference to national will', 'pluralism with reference to the Ottoman period and religion', 'evolutionary change', and ' the First Assembly'. According to the new/old myth, the 'new' is presented as the 'good'; the 'savior' of the nation that has freed them from tyrannies of the 'old' and has 'normalized' the society with silent reforms. Hence, this 'new' and 'old' inevitably exclude each other and the 'old' is naturally marginalized bythe reconstructed 'new'.

First of all, even if the concept of 'new' Turkey has been uttered by the AKP since 2010[245], the presidency of Erdoğan is depicted in *Yeni Şafak* as the end of 'old' Turkey; a new era in Turkey with the (re)construction of 'new' Turkey whose basis rely on the continuation of ideologies of Necip Fazıl, Sezai Karakoç and National Outlook Movement. The following sample, thus, reveals the AKP's Islamist ideology of its conservative social engineering project in the construction of 'new' Turkey. It is articulated as such;

> The Presidency of Erdoğan signifies the absolute ending of old Turkey and absolute establishment of new Turkey. (…) The presidency of Erdoğan is a move to an upper level concerning Revival, being the Big East, the Enlightenment (Risale-i Nur), and standing up with our national existence and

[245] Tanıl Bora, "Yeni Türkiye" in *Birikim Dergisi* , June 7, 2016, http://www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/7718/yeni-turkiye#.WHoFOPmLTIU

> the attempts of National Outlook Movement. It is the establishment of a New Republic that is established after Seljuks and the Ottoman. (*Yeni Şafak*, 13 June 2014, see Appendix 12)

Not only the Presidency of Erdoğan is depicted as a giant step in this gradual process of (re)construction of New Turkey but also the concepts (Revival, Big East) that are associated with AKP's New Turkey reveal its ideological standpoint. What is also remarkable in this sample is that the denial of National Outlook Movement heritage has left its place to an explicit confession or declaration of the very heritage particularly after the Presidential seat was acquired by Erdoğan and the Kemalist regime was neutralized.

5.1.2.1 Mystification

5.1.2.1.1 Argumentative Support

> In fact, New Turkey is Turkey which grasped the essence and the soul of April 20th 1920 and put the freedom, colorfulness and pluralism into practice again. (…)New Turkey is a constructive and guiding concept that contains the continuity in itself and provides us the opportunity build bridges between past, present and future. (…)While New Turkey indicates/refers to a commitment to our civilizational roots and continuity in terms of making peace with our historical geography, it also corresponds to a rupture in terms of the views on society and politics. (…)The ones who have been marginalized in this society for ages, are now included in the democratic political processes and can convey their demands to the ones in politics. (…)The thing that is regarded as polarization by some of the people, in fact is nothing more than the pluralistic expression of identities. (…) New Turkey is a pluralist Turkey and politicians are responsible for the representation of this pluralistic structure. (…)As I have mentioned before, there is not any discrimination between the *persona grata* and *persona non grata* in New Turkey; instead all the citizens are equal. (*Presidency of Turkish Republic*, 1 October 2014, see Appendix 13)

> Whatever we have done and whatever step we have taken, we have done for Turkey, for the 76 million and for the normalization of Turkey. The reforms we have done are not the ones that provide privileges for a specific part of the society but on the contrary are the ones that take away the privileges from a specific part of the society and normalize the society. (…)Every reform we have made, every step we have taken has returned Turkey to the essence. Every reform has made Turkey closer to the foundational philosophy from which Turkey had been estranged. (…)The thing that we do is to normalize Turkey, to cure the deep wounds/gashes, to take away the deep pains. (*AK Party,* 8 October 2013, see Appendix 14)

> Today we apprehend a blessed Fatiha, a blessed opening. Today we closed the doors of a period and we are taking a step to a new period. (…) Today the state and the *millet* embraced one another with affection. The state's understanding of looking down on its people (*millet*) has ended. The state and the nation

> (*millet)* do not have two distinct directions. The state and thenation(*millet)*work on the same direction. Now, both the right to speech and decision belongs to the nation (*millet)*. (*Yeni Şafak*, 11 August 2014, see Appendix 15)

In the first sample, contrary to 'new' in the Kemalist period that is homogenous, and a country facing the west, the soul and the essence of the 'new' is identified with 1920; the religious First Assembly, and the pluralistic and heterogeneous Ottoman state. Thus, unlike the 'old', 'new' Turkey does not deny its past but rather signifies continuity with the past instead of a rupture. This selective identification with the past, namely taking a particular segment of the Republican history; the period of First Assembly in 1920, as its 'real' soul and essence while excluding and marginalizing the other segments of history as in that of Kemalist period, also encompasses the period of Independence War. This selective identification is articulated by Erdoğan as such; "The soul of May 19th was the most important riches and wealth of this nation. The soul that constitutes the steel nucleus of New Turkey is that soul. To claim to the soul of May 19th is to claim the goals of 2023 and the vision of 2053 and 2071." [246] Here it is important to note that each date Erdoğan refers to has a common historical significance: 1923; the foundation of the republic after the Independence War, 1453; the conquest of Istanbul and finally 1071; the Battle of Manzikert represent a struggle and a victory of Muslims over Christians. Thereby, Islam is presented as the foundational basis of 'New Turkey'. Here, the adoption of modernist discourse by the AKP is also evident since modernity is associated with constant progress, change and an 'ideal' future. Each symbolic date is regarded as a milestone in the (re)construction of 'New Turkey' in which an 'evolutionary' change will take place for a complete transformation that is congruent with AKP's ideology.

In the narrative, a binary opposition is also constructed regarding the 'westernizing reforms' under the CHP rule and 'normalizing reforms' under the AKP rule. The former reforms are demystified as they not only led to historical and cultural rupture but also excluded and 'othered' the people who were against the change whereas the latter reforms are mystified as they serve to normalize Turkey in terms of religious rights, rebuild the foundational philosophy (here is another binary regarding the foundational philosophy of 'new' Turkey; it is presented as if it is not the westernization philosophy of the Second Assembly in 1923 but the pro-Ottoman and Islamist philosophy of the First Assembly in 1920), the historical and

[246]Presidency of the Turkish Republic, Milletler tarihlerinden aldıkları güçle yaşarlar, May 19, 2015, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/32149/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-81-ilden-gelen-gencleri-cumhurbaskanligi-sarayinda-kabul-etti.html

cultural bridges between the past and the present, embrace the *millet* and provide equality. Accordingly, while the 'old' is demystified as a period of 'discrimination', 'pressures' and 'privileges' given to the people who are the advocates of the Kemalist ideology under the CHP rule, the' new' is mystified as a period which has normalized the society and has prioritized equality under the AKP rule. Hence, the periphery (as the nation represents the 'repressed' periphery in AKP narrative) who was pressurized to have a western and modern lifestyle has been freed by the AKP in 'new' Turkey. Finally, in this 'new' Turkey, the nation (*millet)*, namely the periphery, is mystified as the real decision- makers of 'new' Turkey as opposed to the CHP elites in the 'old' Turkey. The Islamist discourse of the AKP reappears here since the Presidency of Erdoğan, marked as the beginning of 'New Turkey' is depicted as a 'blessed' day; the end of the elitist Kemalist rule, with a reference to a Al-Fatiha surah in Quran.

The AKP, the main actor in the construction of 'new' Turkey, in the sample below is mysitified due to its historical significance. The historical tie that is discursively constructed with the mythic past is what makes the AKP a glorious party.

5.1.2.1.2 Hyperbole

It is the strategy to praise a person or a thing by the use of descriptions in order to make that person or thing seem more important or better than they really are.

> We are the future whose roots are in the past. We are not a party or a movement which has broken its ties with the past and does not have roots or a soul. In this movement, there is the wisdom of Abdulhamid Han, the valor of Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the foresight of Osman ghazi, (…) the faith of Sultan Alparslan and the horizon, vision and dreams of Mustafa Kemal. This party is a movement guided by the words of Allah, his prophet who was sent to earth as the merciful to all living beings and which (the Quran) was sent down to in Mecca 14 centuries ago (…) We did not take this path 13 years ago or we did not take this path 100 years ago. We are a movement which proceeds in a straightforward direction throughout the human history and inherited the struggle of religion and righteousness. (…) Billions of names faded away. However, the struggle between the good and the evil which started with Hz. Adam prevailed throughout the human history; the struggle between 'righteousness' and 'false' ('*hak' and 'batıl'*). The names are fleeting but it is the cause that is permanent. In the past, others were the flag bearers and strugglers of this big cause, today it is us who are bearing this flag with pride and honor. (*AK Party*, Erdoğan's speech in the First Extraordinary Congress, 27 August 2014, see Appendix 16)

> AK Party is in fact the (very) epitome of this nation and this geography. AKParty is a giant roof under which each of our citizens makes themselves at home and finds a place for themselves, for their dreams and goals. There is no exploitation, no lies, no trickery, no discrimination, no otherization or no unfairness under this roof. Under this roof, there is only service, peace, welfare and brotherhood (…) In fact; a revolution of mentality took place. (…) An understanding which established/ built up trust and stability by praising national will has come into power. For several decades, the elitist, the tutelary and pro-coup mindset which loomed over Turkish politics like a nightmare has left and an understanding which believed in advanced democracy and freedom has come into being instead. The ones who patronized people have left and the servants of the people have come into being instead. The ones who despised the *millet* and exploiters of the Republic went away, the real Republicans who enfolded/take the *millet* in his arms/bosom /embraced the millet has come into being. (*AK Party*, Erdoğan's speech, 3 October 2012, see Appendix 17)

With historical ties attributed to the AKP by Erdoğan, the AKP is mystified and depicted as not a new party but a party that has deep roots with the past. Unlike the CHP, which had broken its ties with its Ottoman and Islamic past, the AKP is represented as the inheritor and thus the continuation of this glorious past. With reference to 'righteousness' and 'false', Erdoğan in fact discloses the AKP's identification with National Outlook Movement since the National Outlook Movement discourse was predicated on the very same dichotomy of conflict between the Western (false) and Islamic (righteousness) civilization[247]. On a deeper level, Erdoğan'sdepictionthis struggle between the good/righteousness and evil/falsein fact refers to a mythical story of Cabel and Abel (the sons of Adam) in the AKP discourse. In this narrative, Cabil connotes Western civilization in a broader sense and the Kemalist one party rule in a narrow sense. The similarity between them is they both depend on 'force'. Thus, while Kemalism and the West as 'they' represent tyranny and 'false' like Cabel, the AKP, as 'we', represents 'justice' and 'righteousness' as Abel. As such, the AKP constructs itself a mythic historical line starting from two mythical figures, Abel and Cabil, involving Prophet Mohammed and his faith of monotheism, Seljuks and the Ottoman and reaching up to Turkish Republic. The mystification of the AKP is furthered by Davutoğlu as such; "Today, the fate of the AK Party is not only the fate of AK Party but Turkey's fate. The AK Party determines not only its path but also Turkey's fate."[248] Accordingly, apart from its mission to 'nationalize' the 'old' by 'authentic' values within the national limits, the AKP is also mystified with a greater mission that goes beyond the national borders; "Our third principle is our characteristic of being not only Turkey's political movement but also the political

[247]Hale and Özbudun, *Islamism, Liberalism and Democracy in Turkey*, p.6.
[248]AK Party, Başbakan Davutoğlu'nun AKSEM'in ilk dersinde yaptığı konuşmanın tam metni, April 10, 2016.

movement of all the oppressed nations. (…) Hence, we state that the AK Party movement is both a national movement (*milli hareket*) and the current voice of oppressed nations and the geography within our hearts."[249]Deriving from the speeches of Davutoğlu and Erdoğan (for instance, in his 3rd balcony speech in June 2011) in which they greeted other parts of the world such as Baghdad, Damascus, Lebanon, Cairo, Tunisia, Serbia Bosnia, Skopje, 'the geography within our hearts' imply the old territories of the Ottoman Empirein the Balkans like Macedonia and in the Arab world like Iraq, Iran, Eygptin the late eighteenth century[250]. The common point is that apart from the other territories of the Ottoman Empire that are excluded in this greeting, these places are all Islamic (Muslim) territories.

Accordingly, the AKP represents the struggle for readopting Islamic-Ottoman civilization against the 'old' Turkey which had adopted western civilization, culture and lifestyle and transformed the society with secularizing reforms. It also implicitly designates the one party regime as the underlying evil cause of this struggle. As such, the struggle of the AKP is mystified depicting its rule not only as a fight against this change 'resting upon force' with secular reforms implemented by the CHP but also as the continuation of a mythical background regarding Hz. Adam. Hence, the AKP as a party guided by God and Islam, it is 'naturally' sacralized as a party that has a 'blessed' cause. Besides, the AKP is metaphorically likened to a 'family' or a 'home' under which all citizens would be embraced by the family members and would live together without 'otherization', 'exploitation' or 'discrimination'.

The samples below analyze the AKP's underlying desire on discursive level that seeks to establish a 'new regime of truth' within the context of this ancient struggle. In this blessed cause with reference to religion, not only the Islamic principles are established as the only 'truth' but also the Islamic-Ottoman civilization is depicted the 'true' essence of Turkey.

The coexistence of mystification and demystification processes is also discernible in Erdoğan's speech. In the narrative, AKP's coming to power as the 'real Republicans' revolutionize the old state mentality and as such downplays the CHP as the 'fake' Republicans. Besides, by the means of the metaphors the elitist one party regime, namely the CHP rule is demystified and likened to a nightmare that the nation had every single day. With a positive self attribution as a discursive strategy, the AKP is depicted as the 'real' Republicans and the 'real' servants that freed the nation.

[249]Ibid.
[250]Erik Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p.9.

5.1.2.1.3 Assertion

> We know that different colors and languages are a sign of the existence and the uniqueness of God *(Allah)* and our richness. (…)This package is a mentality change. It has changed the mentality of the Turkish state that identified or determined its people as subjects that had to be shepherded into a state mentality which intends to provide nation *(millet)* - state unity. (*Yeni Şafak*, 3 October 2013, see Appendix 18)

> The problem of "coexistence", which emerged with the killing of Abel by Cain *(Habil and Kabil)* and with his denial, has been and will also continue to be in the center of our lives. (…) For example, we stabilized the conditions of coexistence along with mistakes and deficiencies in the period of the Ottoman Empire. In the period of Mehmed the Conquer *(Fatih Sultan Mehmet)* the thing that was of the utmost important in the state mentality was the justice-centered ruling mentality. The padishahs, even though they were not bound by Sharia, subjected themselves to it but at the same time did not ignore any other superior moral limits or boundaries. (…) However, the Ottoman padishahs had the perception that the condition to hold a pluralistic Empire together was to constitute a minimum standard of justice in that period. (…) Even if we seemingly founded a country, we were in fact mandated. With Westernization, the (social) engineering first spread to bureaucracy and then to other parts of society with a partial success. (…) The Ottoman was a reality that shaped the world. Our collective memory calls us to the place where the accident happened. The killer is also there. We once came across; we can no longer go back. (*Yeni Şafak*, 7 June 2015, see Appendix 19)

The 'pluralist' mentality of the AKP is mystified by Numan Kurtulmuş, the Deputy leader of the AKP in *Yeni Şafak* regarding the democratization package and this pluralism – contrary to the monotypic CHP rule which aimed to create a homogenous culture and society – is asserted and appreciated with reference to religion/God. By the means of the metaphor, the nation is likened to sheep that was 'shepherded' in the 'old' Turkey while demystifying the tutelary regime in 'old' Turkey but now the nation is depicted as 'real' citizens that united with its state in 'New' Turkey.

The second paragraph by Turkish Armenian Markar Esayan, who was the former AKP member of the parliament, is also noteworthy since the Ottoman rule is approved and mystified by one of the representatives of different *millet* in that period. In this narrative, the problem of coexistence is depicted by the mythical story of two mythical figures; Abel and Cain. According to this story, Cain is the first killer (the killer of his brother; Abel) in history.[251] In this narrative, there is a historical transition from this mythic killer to the 'killer'

[251]For more details of this mythical story see Yeni Şafak, *İlk kurban Habil'in koçuydu*, October 8, 2012, http://www.yenisafak.com/yenisafakpazar/ilk-kurban-habilin-kocuydu-418737

of the Ottoman. This killer is rather ambiguous or vague since it does not provide any explicit names. However, it may refer to Atatürk or the CHP since it demystifies the CHP rule regarding its intolerance for the coexistence of people with diverse identities and the social engineering and westernization project of the one party regime in the previous lines. The word 'accident' represents the undesired 'new', the foundation of the Republican regime and marks the represantatives of the 'old' Turkey as a 'killer(s)' that terminated the desired 'old', the Ottoman regime. On the other hand, the tolerance of the Ottoman regime and the sultans towards pluralism is mystified with reference to justice. At this point, the name of the AKP as *Justice and Development Party* cannot be a coincidence. It explicitly reveals that it is the inheritor of the Ottoman-Islamic civilization. The struggle for justice (that has its roots in the Ottoman rule) is a blessed cause of which the AKP is the 'flag bearer'. It is uttered by Erdoğan as such; "When we founded AK Party, we were determined to put up a struggle for two contentions. The first one was the struggle for justice against the attempts to alter, corrode, and damage our cause that has persisted for ages".[252]

Erdoğan's utterances regarding the foundation of 'new' Turkey with reference to Kemalist period is rather erratic. This inconsistency arises from the ambiguous date taken by Erdoğan for the foundation of 'new' Turkey. For instance, in one of his speeches he takes 1923 as the beginning of 'new' Turkey while 1920 is asserted and mystified in his other speeches. However, in fact 1920 Assembly is the assembly that is predominantly designated by Erdoğan as the beginning of 'new' Turkey since it symbolizes and evokes the Islamic-Ottoman past whereas the 1923 Assembly (which is in fact the official year of the foundation of the Republic) signifies the transition to one party regime and hegemony of the Kemalist regime. The latter is the place in which all the elitist CHP representatives came together and all modernization and westernization project was initiated and the religious Ottoman past eradicated with reforms and laws. Erdoğan's eulogy for the First Assembly can be understood by the profile of the First Assembly articulated by Tekeli as such; "The First Assembly, which led the Independence War, was composed of a conservative majority that adhered strictly to the Islamic values and was in favor of the maintenance of the Ottoman societal structure, supported Mustafa Kemal and his supporters in the struggle for independence but were the

[252]AK Parti, Başbakan Erdoğan 1. Olağanüstü Kurultayında yaptığı konuşma, August 27, 2014."AK Parti'yi kurduğumuz iki büyük mücadeleyi vermeye azmetmiştik kuruluşunda.Birincisi; asırlardır yürüyüşüne devam eden davamızı değiştirmeye, örselemeye, yıpratmaya yönelik girişimlere karşı verdiğimiz mücadeleydi. Biz buna adalet mücadelesi dedik."

dissidents of the new societal structure that was to be founded after the independence."[253] Accordingly, it can be argued that the First Assembly is predominantly used as a discursive theme in the AKP discourse to serve the ideological intentions of the AKP rule in the sense that it represents the 'real' essence of not only 'old' but also its 'new' Turkey. The samples below are related to this recurrent theme in the AKP discourse.

5.1.2.1.4 Narrative Illustration

On April 23rd 1920, before the Great National Assembly was opened in Ankara, with the very orders of Mustafa Kemal the whole Quran and *Mevlid-i Şerif* were read in all the cities. April 23rd was deliberately coincided with a Friday. Prayers were said, animals were sacrificed in front of the Assembly building and the Assembly was opened in this manner. Did you know which divine order was put in the hall of General Assembly behind the dais? The 38th verse of *Şura (*sura) which meant; "They do their work with *shura (consultation)*." The meaning attribution of the First Congress was the exact view of Turkey. Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Bosnian, Sunnis and Alevis were there. Here is the yeast of Turkish Republic[254]. The foundation of Turkish Republic was laid in that very first Assembly. (*AK Party*, Erdoğan's speech in the First Extraordinary Congress, 27 August 2014, see Appendix 20)

> 29 October 1923 is the continuation the Ottoman State founded in 1299. 1923 is the continuation of 1453(…) The emphasis of New Turkey was mentioned repeatedly first by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal in the 'Speech'. By New Turkey, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal implied Turkey whose foundations were laid in April 23rd 1920 just as we meant/indicated. Our longing for New Turkey is Turkey of 1920, is that spirit, ferment and custom just the same as Ghazi Mustafa Kemal intended. (*Yeni Şafak*, 11 November, 2014, see Appendix 21)

The first paragraph is an example of another narrative illustration in the AKP narrative which demonstrates that the First Assembly predominantly constituted of religious, i.e. Islamic elements. The reference to *shura*, which is an Islamic traditionadopted by the AKP and declared as one its principles, reflects the Islamic character of the AKP. The use of Islam, particularly the use of verses of Quran, which can be considered as another discursive strategy for mystification, is encountered recurrently in Erdoğan's speeches. For instance, in one of his speeches, Erdoğan mystifies the conquest (*fetih*) with reference to the verse of *Fetih*.[255]On the

[253]Şirin Tekeli, "Kadın" in *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi* (İletişim Yayınları), vol.5 p. 1193.
[254] The foundation of the Republic is meant.
[255]Presidency of Turkish Republic, İstanbul'un Fethi'nin 562. Yıl Dönümü Kutlamalarında Yaptıkları Konuşma, May 30 2015, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32584/istanbulun-fethinin-562-yil-donumu-kutlamalarinda-yaptiklari-konusma.html

other hand, the reason Erdogan mystifies the First Assembly is that it symbolizes continuation of the 'Ottoman assembly' and rather than the modern, westernized 'new' Turkey. It also reflects heterogeneous characteristic of the Ottoman rule rather than the homogenous one party rule. Yet, this heterogeneous structure of the First Assembly in terms of pluralism is rather problematic in the sense that it encompasses only different ethnic groups but not different religious groups which is in fact a discriminatory factor. In addition, Erdoğan mystifies the First Assembly and justifies its actions with reference to Mustafa Kemal. As such, he identifies 'new' Turkey that is to be (re)constructed by the AKP ideology with 'new' Turkey in the Kemalist period just as if they are 'identical twins'. Yet, once the struggle for independence was over, the assembly was refined by excluding the religious elements in order to realize the modernization and the westernization project that Atatürk had envisaged since the very beginning. 'New' Turkey that is to be constructed thus in fact indicates two contrary views within these two ideologies.

5.1.2.2 Demystification

The 'old' Turkey is marginalized and demystified by the following concepts: 'the old', 'the CHP', 'the revolution', 'elites', 'the tutelary regime' and 'Atatürk'. Within the transformation of the 'old' and the creation of the 'new' society - that is congruent with its Ottoman-Islamist ideology- by the AKP rule in order to construct the New Turkey, the change is articulated as 'evolutionary change' through 'silent reforms' but not as 'revolutionary change' which is depicted to be devastating for the Anatolian people/ the periphery. The evolutionary change is in fact the basis of the AKP narrative in terms of the justification of the transformation in the (re)construction of 'New Turkey' under its rule.

In modernity in which rationality is prioritized, the change is realized with reforms in order to create a monistic, homogenous society. In the specific case of Turkey, this change was realized by radical and top-down reforms for a full transformation. In the following sample, it is this aspect of Kemalist period which is demystified.

5.1.2.2.1 De-emphasis

It is the strategy to de-emphasize a person or a thing that is formerly prominent. As such, it also becomes possible to emphasize any person or concept that suits one's interest.

> In the Republican period, the Anatolian people were exposed to change which did not emanate from the will of the people but rather from the pressure of the

> government. This change, which led to big traumas in Turkey, was realized not with evolution but with revolution. For this reason, the ravages in Anatolian's people's cultural world were enormous and doleful. (…)Turkey could not manage to change without changing. The Anatolia was changed in such a way with all its districts that, nothing remained the same. The revolution with guns changed the unchangeable values of the Anatolian people. Yet, the changes are made to preserve the unchangeable values. Change is something permanent and continuous. In the world, the more a country changes, the more it stays the same. However, the changes should be made with votes not with power. (*Yeni Şafak*, 14 May 2013, see Appendix 22)

In this narrative, 'the revolutionary change' is depicted as 'violent', 'enforcing' and 'devastating'. As such, the revolution is demystified as it is 'destructive' to 'authentic' identity and values. It implies that it demolished all the Ottoman-Islamic values that should have been preserved in the construction of the 'new'. On the other hand, the 'evolutionary change' is mystified since it is 'constructive' and 'protective' of the 'authentic' identity and values. This argument of *Yeni Şafak* is congruous with the conservative ideology of the AKP and the Ottoman reform mentality which are in favor of 'change without changing'. That is, the change is presented as 'ideal' only when it serves as a means of continuation but not as a means of rupture.

5.1.2.2.2 No Impression Management:

It a discursive strategy to tarnish the existing image of someone or something in order to put that person or thing in an inferior position.

> "The CHP is a 'revolutionary party estranged from its people' since the ideology and the ideals of the CHP is contrary to the ideology and the ideals of the people and it failed to ensure the welfare of the people". (…)The administrators of the CHP invariably boast about how the CHP established the state and proclaimed the Republic. In my perspective, this is not true. It was the *millet* (nation) who won the War of Independence and established their own state. The CHP was founded after the victory of the War of Independence. It is not the 'founder of the state' but it is the party which 'monopolized' or 'usurped' the state from 1923 to 1945, precisely for 22 years, under the name of 'One party period or regime'. The CHP established one party regime by closing down the opposition parties, Progressive Republican Party and Free Republican Party which were 'the requirements of Republic and democracy'. Their proclamation was not a 'Republic' in a real sense. (*Yeni Şafak,* 3 October 2014, see Appendix 23)

As s discursive strategy, failure of the CHP is reaffirmed by a historian who had published a book about the CHP history in order to demystify the CHP as a revolutionary party which is blameworthy for that 'devastating' transformation. Accordingly, it is emphasized that unlike

the AKP, the CHP failed to unite with the nation. Therefore, it is not a part of the nation and estranged itself from its people. In addition, with reference to Independence War, the nation is mystified as the 'real' founder of the state whereas the CHP elites are demystified as the founders of the one party regime which is depicted a 'counterfeit' Republic. As such, the superior image of the CHP is demystified by replacing their image of the 'real' representatives of the nation with the inferior image of the representatives of a 'dictatorship'.

The following sample is another example of demystification of the CHP as one party regime by Erdoğan with reference to a bill which was proposed by the member the parliament Ali Şükrü and accepted as a law in the First Assembly.

5.1.2.2.3 No Argumentative Support and Narrative Illustration:

The former is the discursive strategy to demystify by demonstrating that something that is void of valid supports, reasons or arguments either in the narrative of the demystifier or in the narrative of the demystified.

> Because of the imposing, jacobenist, modernist mentality of the one party rule, the law in question was completely repealed. Alcohol consumption was tempted with a mentality of imitation in order to be modern, contemporary, civilized and European. In the period of one party rule, the incentives for the alcohol were turned into such an exaggerated propaganda that banners were hung on the restaurants to explicate howbeneficial alcohol is. (*Yeni Şafak*, 27 April 2013, see Appendix 24)

> I want to tell a few anecdotes regarding the years of one party CHP and the conception/understanding of Republic. One of the old Minister of Education, Tahsin Banguoğlu, goes up to the rostrum in one party period on the Republic Day in order to make a speech to the ones who gathered around the ceremony area. After greeting the people, he started his speech; "Republic is such a thing that …" but he cannot complete his sentence because it is not easy for the one party rule to find and express an achievement of the Republic that the nation can adopt. The deceased Banguoğlu, is obliged to finish his sentence in this way; "Republic is such a thing that it is so delicious". (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 29 October 2015, see Appendix 25)

> The practice National Oath started in 1933. The writer of the text that is known as our National Oath was a controversial name called Dr. Reşit Galip. Raşit Galip was one of the sources of the tyranny of Turkish *ezan* and its Turkish text. The same Reşit Galip was a so-called scientist who measured the skulls of humans and classified humans according to this skull measurement. The practice of National Oath had nothing to do with our Republic, the bases of our Republic. (…) Do you know what this leads to? In the 1930s and 1940s, there were such practices in the periods of dictators

such as Stalin and Hitler in order to 'format' people. (*AK Party*, 8 October, 2013, see Appendix 26)

All samples above serve as examples to reaffirm the argument that the westernization and modernization ideal and practices of the CHP are incongruous with the religious values of the nation. In the AKP narrative, contrary to the First Assembly; the 'real' representatives of the nation, namely the CHP signifies the 'false resting upon force'. In the second sample, the Republican regime is ridiculed by storytelling. The falseness or defectiveness of the Republic founded by the CHP is consolidated by the inadequate argumentative support of the CHP representative for the merits of the Republican regime in Erdoğan's story. Besides, Erdoğan demystifies the 'old' Turkey, thereby,Kemalism with one of its other tool, Republicanism that aimed at replacing the Ottoman rule that rested upon sultan and his entourage with a system of Republic under which people hold sovereignity but ended up as a 'so-called' Republic due to the tutelary system of one party-rule. The third sample demonstrates not only the demystification of the fascist characteristics of the CHP rule but also the refusal of positivism (here specifically refers to of archeology and anthropology which were highly used in order to mystify the Turks as the founders of the civilization) adopted by the Kemalist regime. In addition, the selected word 'format' by Erdoğan signifies the top- down social engineering of the CHP rule; the creation of a 'new man' and as such it is identified with the fascist regimes in Europe in order to demystify the CHP.

5.1.2.2.4 Argumentative Support

The tutelary system turned a blind eye to the people and neglected societal demands almost completely. The desire was to formalize the state not according to the people but the people according to the state. With a dream to constitute "an unprivileged and a classless" society, they suppressed/repressed all the other identities which were out of their imagination. They ordered the society as such; "You will abandon all types of identities that you brought along with history and tradition except the ones that I envisaged for you. You will forget not only all the things you know but also who you are".

The tutelary standpoint put the persistent fear of being divided and the apprehension of the continuity of state into action in order to legitimize itself and to convince the society that the taken path is the true way. As such, the last remaining landscape was sacralized as an all-out "the National Pact geography" (*Misak-ı Milli*) and the state and the administrators acquired an otherworldly persona. Instead of renewing the ruling mentality of the Ottomans, who ruled with the spirit of conquest (*fetih*) and a firm self-assurance in the viability of the co-existence of different languages, ethnicities, beliefs which they implemented in a fair and skillful way, they reversed the path that was previously taken. For them, the people *(millet)* were not

> composed of a community whose needs, demands and identities were based on a specific history and tradition or of a community who were free adults. They were, rather, a mass of children who were in need of care and to be protected from dangers such "communism", "reactionarism" and "divisiveness". (*Yeni Şafak,* 24 May 2015, see Appendix 27)

Here is another leitmotif of the Kemalist period; the tutelary regime. In this narrative, it is argued that unlike the AKP, which treats the nation as the 'decision makers', 'real' owners of the Republic, the 'westernized' elites of the tutelary regime not only imposed people the 'best', 'ideal' and the 'true' lifestyle, education, family life, cultural codes but also forced them forget their 'real' essence. The social engineering project of the regime in order to create hogomeonous society that is in harmony with regime and its ideology is demystified since it neglected the pluralism. The 'constructed' fear of division, as the nourisher the nationalism/ nationalist identity in the Kemalist regime, is also demystified with reference to inner enemies; reactionarism.

5.1.2.2.5 Attribution to Context

> It is transpired that Mehmet Akif Ersoy, our poet of Independence, was blacklisted and tracked with the name of 'Reactionary 906' code in the one party period. In the book 'Code name: Reactionary 906', prepared by the journalist Muharrem Çoşkun, it was explained how Mehmet Akif, who took part in the War of Independence, served as deputy in the first Assembly and toured the cities to quell the riots in Anatolia, was designated as a 'threat', 'refugee' or as 'subversive element' in his own country. (*Yeni Şafak*, 19 February 2015, see Appendix 28)

This sample demystifies the 'old' Turkey of Kemalist regime by means of one of the most prominent figures in Turkish history; the writer of the Turkish national anthem, Mehmet Akif who was one of the most important represantatives of the Islamism movement (whose roots were in the Ottoman period) in Turkey. He was an advocate of the Ottoman-Islamic civilization as superior than the West except the technology and was against the positivists of the period such as Tevfik Fikret [256]and therefore was a dissident of the westernization project. Thus, Akif is one of the symbolic figures used by the AKP in order to demystify the old regime. Accordingly, in this narrative, the 'old' is demystified and designated as 'merciless' since it 'othered' and excluded Akif due to his religious stance.

[256]Fatma Bostan Ünsal, "Mehmet Akif Ersoy" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce,* vol.6, ed. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekingil ,(İstanbul: İletişim), Second Edition, 2005, pp. 72.77.

5.1.2.2.6 Denial and Marginalization

> Ali Şükrü was the first deputy of Trazbon in the Assembly. He was there to represent Trabzon on April 23rd in the Assembly. He was not only a gallant but also one of the most valiant deputies of the First Assembly. He was opposing any kind of injustice and he could not stand any cowardice, servitude or any stepping back. He was going up to the rostrum of the assembly, telling everything his heart desired and crying out justice. Do you know what they did to him? They martyrized this gallant man from Trabzon precisely on March 27th in Ankara 91 years ago. The slay(ing) of Ali Şükrü has a prominent meaning. When the killers were assassinating Ali Şükrü, they were intending to give the message that "if you do not behave yourselves or mind your steps, you will end up in Ali Şükrü's position. (*AK Party*, 25 March 2014, see Appendix 29)

> Ali Şükrü, the deputy of Trabzon, was known for his bitter/strong/heavy criticisms. (…) Was the order given to Topal Osman to kill Ali Şükrü from Çankaya? Who is the 'Master' of the killers? According to the opposition, the name of the killer was Mustafa Kemal. It was not the people from Trabzon who made this claim. It can be right or wrong but in the memoirs of Faik Mehmet Barutçu, he tells that İnönü himself told him that it was Mustafa Kemal who gave the very order. When we consider the consequences of the murder, all the opposition was thrown out along with the killing of Ali Şükrü. (*Sabah*, 2 September 2014, see Appendix 30)

> For instance, we lived/experienced one party period. After ghazi Mustafa Kemal passed away, we experienced severe tyrannies. Their lives are full of tyrannies. Quran was banned in this country. Teaching Quran and learning Quran was banned. They shut down our mosques and turned them into barns, storerooms and museums. They intervened in people's attire. They interfered in people's beard, moustache and even headscarf. They limited freedom and banned books. They banned languages and words. It was the CHP which massacred people in Dersim. Discrimination, cabal, hypocrisy/deception for religious purposes are intrinsic parts of the CHP. (*AK Party*, 24 March 2014, see Appendix 31)

> Let's look up the definition of dictatorship in Turkish Language Institution dictionary: 1. The person who has all the political authorization in his own hands 2. A tyrant (…) The characteristics above fits in with the years when Mustafa Kemal was ruling the state. (…) Mustafa Kemal was the 'only man/leader' in that period. (…) It is evident that Mustafa Kemal was in the very center of the political organization in the period since he is the eponym of our official ideology; he never held a referendum on his rulership throughout his life and he terrorized in the Assembly as, "Some heads will be cut off if necessary" along with the entitlement of 'Atatürk revolutions'. (*Yeni Şafak*, 16 April 2012, see Appendix 32)

In the narrative of the AKP, one of the most important binary opposition is constructed regarding the founder of Turkey. The binary in question consists of the dichotomy between

Ghazi Mustafa Kemal and Atatürk with reference to New/Old Turkey. As it is widely discerned, the word choice of Erdoğan for the founder of Turkey in most of his speeches is overwhelmingly in favor of Mustafa Kemal along with the 'ghazi' title which has a religious attribution. In his narrative, on one hand, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal represents/signifies the 'old' Turkey in the Kemalist period while Atatürk represents the 'new' in Kemalist period and Ghazi M. Kemal represents the 'new' in the AKP period on the other hand. To be more precise, in the Ottoman-Islamic mentality of the AKP, Ghazi who mobilized and saved the nation in the name of Islam in the Independence War and founded the religious First Assembly, is appreciated, affirmed and mystified while Atatürk who abolished the caliphate, adopted Western civilization, pursued westernization politics and implemented the radical reforms ending in rupture is rejected and demystified. That Atatürk is the 'killer' of the Ottoman- Islamic civilization that the AKP desires to (re)construct within the 'new' Turkey. In other words, Atatürk is the 'bad' 'other' of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal. This 'bad' other, namely Atatürk, is implicitly 'otherized' by Erdoğan in his speeches with reference to the CHP rule and is explicitly demystified by *Yeni Şafak* and *Sabah* newspapers. They, in fact, become the spokesmen of Erdoğan or the AKP ideology for the statements that he/they cannot make. As such, *Yeni Şafak* and *Sabah*newspapers serve to complement the AKP narration as ideological apparatuses.

The samples above are organized in an order to reveal the so-called contradictionbut in fact the complement between the narratives by Erdoğan, *Yeni Şafak* and *Sabah*. The first two samples tell a story of the killing of Ali Şükrü, a representative of the First religious Assembly. In the first story narrated by Erdoğan, the desire and the intention to clear the assembly by discarding the religious elements with the killing of Ali Şükrü is explicitly revealed. However, the killer is left rather ambiguous, that is, to the imagination of the receiver of the message. Still, by the plural use of the word 'killers', it somehow refers to the representatives of the CHP. On the other hand, in second sample this gap of the story is completed by *Sabah* newspaper by giving an exact name to the 'killer', that is Atatürk. As such, the founder of Turkey, Atatürk is marginalized and depicted as a figure that 'kills' or 'silences' a representative of the nation who resists the ideology of the 'old' Kemalist regime or has opposing views, namely the 'periphery' that the AKP rule now represents.

In the third sample, the discursive strategy of Erdoğan is to demystify the Kemalist rule with reference to the CHP without citing Atatürk. That is, only the CHP is held responsible for the

tyrannies of the one party period. It is potrayed as if the tyrannies happened after Atatürk's death or without his initative in the period. However, all the tyrannies Erdoğan states regarding the clothes reform, the bans on the attire and Quran all took place in the 1920s and 1930s when Atatürk was alive and in fact with the very orders of Atatürk. Thus, the narrative is again completed this time by *Yeni Şafak* by not only designating Atatürk as a dictator with reference to a dictionary meaning of dictatorship but also reminding and affirming that all the tyrannies, namely reforms that were implemented in accordance to his orders. Finally, Atatürk connotes the 'false' in AKP's narrative since he is the very cause of the end of Ottoman period and a religious rule along with the sultanate and caliphate, the initiator of the modernization reforms that 'rest upon force', tipped the destiny of the 'new' towards Westernization and Europenization and thereforeis the 'undesired'.

All in all, the myth of 'new' and 'old' is constructed upon distinct discourses in two contending ideologies. In Kemalist discourse, while the nationalist discourse (stories about ancient Turks) is harmonized with the myth of 'modern Europe' and designating the religious segments as the society as 'others' of the Kemalist 'new' or internal enemies, in the AKP discourse nationalist religious discourse is harmonized with the neo-Ottomanist discourse (myth of revival) by constructing the Kemalist elites of the 'old' the enemies of not only nation but national values in the (re)construction of the 'new'. In this sense, the different claims of 'authentic' civilization, namely the clash of Western and Eastern (Islamic) civilization which also constitutes the basis of other sub-dichomoties in this chapter is at work in order to mystify itself and demystify the other.

The following section analyzes 'the Ottoman' which is another leitmotif in two contending narratives regarding the mystification of the 'new' and the demystification of the 'old'. In the construction of the 'new', the Ottoman is indeed depicted negatively in Kemalist discourse whereas it is depicted positively in the AKP discourse. The comparative analysis therefore seeks to depict and reveal the clash under 'the Ottoman' binary opposition category below.

5.2 Binary Opposition 2: The Ottoman As A Degeneration Process/The Ottoman As A Revival Process

From the state to society and to individuals, that is to say, every realm became the interest of the Kemalist power to be changed for the sake of the construction of the 'new'. While the transformation of the society was in a reverse direction; namely from Eastern to Western, and the change was in process, an 'other' had to be constructed and vilified in order to legitimize

itself. In other words, the modern values and the positivist and secularist basis on which the 'new' was grounded, matched the 'old' in no sense. On a discursive level, this inevitably leads to contradistinguish the Ottoman period and the New Turkey along with mystification and demystification processes. 'The Ottoman', which is a recurring motif both in Kemalist and the AKP discourse, is analyzed as a separate category in this research in order to provide a more detailed frame of the processes. The newspapers of the period contribute to this process as they (re)produce, (re)construct positive image of the Kemalist rule. Accordingly, the mystified concepts in the Kemalist discourse are 'Turkish civilization', 'Turkish(ness)', 'language reform' and 'secularism'.

The mystification category below starts with the 'assertion' of the mythic golden past of the Turks in order to deconstruct the 'glorious' impression of the Ottoman.

5.2.1 Kemalist Discourse

5.2.1.1 Mystification

5.2.1.1.1 Assertion

> Woleyin Sümer, who was making a research regarding history in Mesopotamia on behalf of the English government, concluded that the Roman, ancient Greek and Egyptian civilizations seemed like yesterday's children next to the Sumerian civilization, and he said: "Today's European civilization should know that they are in debt to this Turkish civilization." In addition, a Turk named Hüsamettin Bey who now works in Evkaf as either a clerk or examiner said in his work History of Amasya that "What all the Roman and Greek civilizations whose fame reach the skies, have been able to do is to change the names Turkish civilization has given to cities in little Asia" and as such he proved that the Turkish civilization in Little Asia was 7-8 thousand years old, and he added that the Englishman Woley also confirmed this observation. (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 April 1934, see Appendix 33)

> "Khanate is peculiar to the descendants of the male sons of Cengiz. However, khanate does not pass from khan to khan as simple inheritance. The congess selects the khan." The greatest value of this article for us is that it clearly shows the Republican regime is accepted as the national regime by the Turkish nation. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 January 1934, see Appendix 34)

Both samples illustrate the mythic golden past of the Turks in terms of civilization and Republic. Turks are depicted as the 'creators' of the European civilization which was adopted in the construction of the 'new' and as the inheritors of the Republican regime. As such, not only Turks, Republic and Western civilization are mystified and hiearchially positioned on the

top but also the transformation is depicted as ‘normal’ since they were the ‘real essence’ of the Turks.

The second category illustrates the mystification of the language reform that emphazises the necessity of the reform and favors Turkish language since the ‘other’, namely the Ottoman language, created a gap between the society and the state due its structure that is devoid of Turkish elements.

5.2.1.1.2 High-prominent Position and Low, Non-prominent Position

> With such a large revolution our “Renaissance” shall begin. (…) The essential thing in language is that the meaning of words should be bright but not dark. Yet, a language in which the majority of the words consist of foreign words will reflect not the reality of the way things are but the superstitions loaned from foreign languages because the meanings of those foreign words will be contrary to national consciousness. Thus, the meaning will be dark rather than being light. Between the individuals who speak a language expressing such dark meanings, the events called “understanding” and “acquaintance” cannot take place. The deep chasm between the “Ottoman language” used by the Ottoman class in the Ottoman period and “Turkish” arose from this, and this chasm persisted for centuries, and prevented the national entity from any sort of progress. (…) The language revolution will cut the connection with the old, backward Ottomanness that is still insidiously alive, will nationalize all social institutions, will create our essence and self that we have lost; and as such we will have gained our actual “humanity” with this “national identity” that was actually ours. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 August 1936, see Appendix 36)

The language reform, which was another crucial step for the creation of unity within the new state and the Kemalist nationalism, is likened to ‘Renissance’. As such, Turkish is mystified as a bright, national language- appropriate to the ‘real essence’- that conveys the ‘reality’ whereas the Ottoman language is demystified as ‘backward’, ‘dark’ that conveys superstitions, and as an obstacle for progress. The language reform was a significant step since it would not only cause a rupture with the undesired ‘old’; the Ottomanness but also contribute to the Kemalist nationalism by nourishing the ‘Turkishness’.

In the following category, the Turks are put in a high prominent position due to their ancient adoption of secularism. In addition, religion becomes a matter of discussion and another element for the mystification of Turks.

5.2.1.1.3 High-prominent Position

> İhsan Arif analyzed the matter of religion after explaining the stages of the matter of religion that it has been through in history and the struggle between this institution and supporters of secularism. He explicated that it was based upon the principle of freedom of conscience in the early times of this religion, but these principles dissolved in the hands of preachers after the period of the Prophet and the religion was adulterated with certain fabricated superstitions and traditions. While he was mentioning Turks' existing traditions and principles about secularism, he added: Turks had been secular since the old ages. We hear that the word "laik" (secular) is being pronounced as to be worthy of (*lâyık*) in our folk language. In my opinion, this is a nice discovery because there is no other worthy adjective than to be secular (*lâyık)* for Turks. Because Turks live free and want to die free. As a result of a great intellectual evolution, Turks have separated the affairs of religion and state. The Ottoman Empire, which did not do so, suffered the punishment for this error very painfully. (…) Atatürk, by giving the Turkish nation secularism which is the most natural trait and quality, has won the greatest humanistic victory of world history. The Turkish nation, thus, has been able to possess the means of development, the freedom of conscience, the freedom of thought, and all its inner/spiritual freedoms and rights with a single word. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 March 1937, see Appendix 36)

In the narration above, religion is not entirely excluded from the Turkish past; however, another dichotomy is created with the discussion of 'real Islam' and 'corrupted Islam'. According to the Kemalist discourse, the 'pure Islam' was grounded on the freedom of consciousness. This stance of religion not only enables to draw a parallelism between secularism and religion but also legitimizes the secular stance of the 'new' in the various areas. Thus, it is the 'degenarated Islam' that is incompatible with secularism. In addition, the Ottoman, as the representative of the latter version of Islam that is convicted of degenaration is demystified since it failed to separate the religion and state issues whereas Turks are mystified as they are the implementers of its 'true' version as the 'freedom of conscience' and they possess this merit of secularism as a heritage of their golden mythic past which is conveyed by a language game of 'lâyık' as another discursive practice. Hence, what is evident in this sample is that secularism is set as a keystone for the Republican regime and it has connotations of civilization, progress and freedom and thereby, it is mystified.

The last category below illustrates argumentative support of the positivist approach of the Kemalist ideology in line with humanism.

5.2.1.1.4 Argumentative Support

> Turkish reform follows the ideal of humanity. Human society is the most valuable, powerful entity in the universe. (…) The purpose of the Turkish reform is to perpetuate the Turkish nation, and let it live as an elevated society in the great human family. The Turkish reform counts it its mission to serve the happiness of the great human family. (…) The Turkish reform's interpretation of life is modest. It is also based on the laws of nature. Life is something to love, protect and live. (*İsmet İnönü*, 20 March 1934, see Appendix 37)[257]

Here it is important to note that the Kemalist discourse depicts itself as 'humanistic'. This humanist approach is also used as another tool to legitimize and mystify the reforms that were implemented for the 'sake' of human life. As such, the human is placed in the centre. The same tendency is also discernible in the AKP discouse but with reference to Islam (which will be analyzed later) rather than humanism, positivism or natural sciences which are congruent with the Kemalist ideology.

5.2.1.2 Demystification

The espousal of the 'new' which replaced the 'old' of 600 years sultanate required a dual ideological effort; on one hand to legitimatize itself and to delegitimize the 'other' on the other hand. Accordingly, the Kemalist discourse depicted the Ottoman rule as a 'degenareted period'. In this context, the demystified concepts are 'caliphate', 'sultan', 'vizier', 'Arabs, 'Orientalism', 'madrasah', 'the Ottoman language', 'heterogenity', 'Ottoman state structure'.

First of all, the Islamic feature of the Ottoman rule is demystified with reference to the caliphate. The high-powered caliphate duty and the image of the Ottoman are tarnished due to its inadequate religious leadership.

5.2.1.2.1 Vague, Overall description and No Impression Management

> Half of the empire's population was Turks. The Sultan was the caliph of the Muslims. In fact, he should have been the genuine leader of Muslims, but this was forgotten, and he was the leader only by name. The laws and systems were and are based on 1300-year-old foundations due to the empire's dependence on sharia. One of the main weaknesses was that this dependence on sharia was limited to appearances. The capitulations were ruining the state's reputation (…) It was believed the caliphate was a power. However, all Muslims outside the empire were captive. (…) No benefit but clearly damage was sustainedfrom

[257]İsmet İnönü Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşiler 1933-1938, TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları No:98, Ankara, 2003

> the caliphate. In Europe, as the underdeveloped states quickly progressed, an awful coincidence enthroned a very bad man, Abdulhamid II., to the Ottoman throne. (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 February 1935, see Appendix 38)

In this sample, there is a rather ambigious depiction of the caliphate. First of all, the caliphate is demystified since it failed to protect all Muslims. Here, by emphasizing the weakness of the Empire as a caliphate which was in fact a matter of power, the successive impression of the Ottoman caliphate is effaced. The ambigiuity is related to the sharia rules. Even though it is not very clear whether the narrative aims at emphasizing the failure of the implementation of religious rules (sharia) in the Ottoman period or the ostensible caliphate position, the caliphate is demystified as a detrimental effect.

The signifance of the depiction of vizier and particularly the sultans is that it is another element of comparison and clash within the two contending narratives. The construction of different truth(s) is discernible by the representation of the 'sultans'. The caliphate feature of the sultan is reduced to a position of a 'so-called Muslim'.

5.2.1.2.2 No Impression Management

> The old sultans considered themselves God, and the old viziers saw in themselves the might of a little sultan. (…) These lines have been written by a messenger. They depict a sultan; "His face is red, how ugly this beautiful color looks on this stern face. With his great height, he is like a walking death. Such a death that knows no father, knows no mother, knows no compassion for children, and does not distinguish between friend and foe. It only tramples, topples, destroys. Here is the new sultan!" (…) An old vizier prays in his home. Prayer?... How can it be possible for these statesmen to pray when their hands are never out of the people's pockets, when their knives are always on the people's necks?... Prayer is the door to eternity of those souls who believe in truth and eternal justice. How can a hand washed in the blood of the oppressed reach out to the skirts of eternity? (…) This is not worship, this is hypocrisy. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 April 1935, see Appendix 39)

> For many years, the Ottoman sultans could not get around killing their siblings and even their own sons with this passion. The greed for reign in the Ottomans started back in the first periods and continued until the end. If there is one person that is clean of this greed in the first periods, they are Orhan and Murad Beys. After the victory of Kovsa, Yıldırım had his brother Yakup Çelebi assassinated. (…) Immediately after replacing his father, Fatih had the young prince Ahmed assassinated. (…) Fatih not only did this, but he legalized the murder of siblings. (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 February 1936, see Appendix 40)

The use of religion as a discursive element in these two narratives are meaningful since religion was a delicate issue in the Ottoman period and in the early Republican period the

religious dissidents were regarded as the ‘bane of the new’ to be constructed. Thus, every element associated with religion becomes a tool of demystification.Accordingly, the sultan that represents the Muslims with his ‘caliphate’ title is likened to ‘death’, contrary to his perceived positive image of a ‘protector and savior’ of people who experienced subjugation. In this narrative, such a merciless ‘killer’ sultan and such a despicable ‘tyrant’ vizier could not be ‘real’ Muslims as they are the represantatives of the ‘corrupted Islam’. The disparaging depictions regarding the highest ranks of the Ottoman rule such as the sultan and the vizier serve to efface the impression of the Ottoman in a broad sense.

Similar to the ‘New’ and ‘Old’ discourse, the very binary category which reappears under the title of the Ottoman is the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ dichotomy. For the demystification of the ‘other’, it is another tool on a discursive level in the construction of the ‘new’ for the Kemalist ideology that is fervid to desert the Eastern codes and replace them with the Western ones. In this respect, Islam is depicted as an element that makes the people lathergic due to its fatalism. In addition, it also seen that ‘Orientalism’ frequently alternates with the ‘Ottoman(ism)’ in the Kemalist discourse.

5.2.1.2.3 Low-prominent Position

> One of the most lively and notable marks of Orientalism is doubtlessly lightheartedness. (…) For centuries, the mission of the turbaned Turk has been this: The collar of your destiny is on your neck. Don’t think of your path, and walk. Flee again. In the almighty inertness, live like a frog that is busy with mentioning God. The fly which is named as fortune comes to your mouth and swallows. We closed the madrasah. But the Istanbul radio has taken the spirit that we want to shake off under its protection. These voices tie Turkishness to Orientalism every day with invisible networks.The voice of hafız has found a fortress to hide itself in and do whatever it wants, to numb merry hearts: the Istanbul radio. (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 August 1934, see Appendix 41)

The ‘East’ and ‘West’ dichotomy is discernible in this sample regarding Orientalism and Occidentalism. In this narrative, Orient connotes the ‘old’ Ottoman Empire, and with the myth of the Orient, the ‘old’ is denigrated as a non-western culture, as backward, uncivilized and lacking progressive thinking whereas Occident connotes ‘new’ Turkey and it is praised as modern, secular, rational, progressive and civilized with its western adopted values. Hence, as all the negative connotations of the Orient suggest, the desire to disassociate the ‘new’ with the Orient on a discursive level is explicit. In this sense, the Ottoman is demystified by ascribing it a negative meaning such as Orientalism. Since Occidentalism denotes Westernism, it is apparent that the ‘new’, adopting a Western face, is hearhically positioned as

superiorwhereas the 'old' is positioned as inferior with its 'light-heartedness' and Oriental facet. The turbaned Turk and the voice of hafız are associated with Orientalism and the latter is likened to a drug which stupefies people. The cultural signifiers of Orientalism such as the madrasah, the turbaned Turk and the voice of hafiz are depicted as the 'undesired' and regarded as obstacles for the desired modern, secular and 'Occidental' new. This binary opposition is also articulated by Ahıska as such; "If the Occidentalism of the West means the making and the representation of the West, then the constitutive alterity to this definition would be the East as the Other."[258]

The sample below analyzes 'the language' theme in the demystification of the Ottoman with several argumentative supports. The artificial quality and the disharmony of the Ottoman language with the Turkish essence are emphasized also for the vindication of the purges of the language reform.

5.2.1.2.4 Argumentative Support

Ottoman writers created a literary language resembling a bundle that was made of pieces. It was so fragmented that the original make of the language was almost lost among these pieces. The language that these created was composed of Arabic and Persian, complicated, vulgar, and it had a broken system. (…) Commander Mustafa Kemal's new literary nationalism represents a rebellion against this permeation/penetration and these effects that paralyze language that we have described above. (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 August 1934, see Appendix 42)

> Ottoman itself was also exceedingly deficient both in terms of words and grammar. In Şemseddin Sami's French to Ottoman dictionary, more than half of the French words and terms have a sentence equivalent. (…) Recently, a Turkish father was saying: "I'm tired of being an interpreter to my son." Today's children are incapable of understanding words in the simplest books because these words do not exist in their mother tongue. And knead these words with the grammar of the languages they are taken from: you can imagine how the young brains are writhing in agony. (*Ulus*, 26 Mart 1935, see Appendix 43)

Since one of the main aims of the Kemalist project was to imbue people with deep feelings of Kemalist nationalism, the samples above mainly compares the Ottoman language with Turkish and particularly French which is another significant language in the period. By doing so, the Ottoman language is depicted as complicated, invalid, tainted and inadequate.

[258]Meltem Ahıska, *Occidentalism in Turkey*,(London: New York), I.B. Tauris Publications, 2010. p.6.

Although the *millet* spoke various languages in the Empire, a Turkish father is given as an example in order to show the disharmony particularly between the Turkish and the Ottoman language and to show how impractical it would be to use it in 'New Turkey' since it creates a distance between the nation and the state. The Ottoman language is also ridiculed by likening it to a 'bundle'. With the depictions and the reasons provided, the Turkish language is presented as the 'ideal' for the 'new' Turkey.

In the sample below, by attributing to the period of the Ottoman Empire, the 'old' is demystified for the lack of a unity in its structure which the 'new' succeeded to achieve.

5.2.1.2.5 Attribution to Context

> In the Imperial period, every sect was left to its own particular life, and everyone was committed to their particular life. Even external influences contributed to this lifestyle by encouraging particular lifestyles. In this respect, the Ottoman Empire resembled a patched bundle with some colorful parts that were conspicious. After the dissolution of the empire, we now stand before the rubble of that patched bundle. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1936, see Appendix 44)

In the sample above, the 'bundle' metaphor is employed once again as a discursive practice in order to demystify the cultural heterogeneity of the Ottoman rule. The disagreement between the pluralist structure of the Ottoman rule and the monolithic structure of the 'new' for the unification of the community under the roof of 'Turkishness' accentuates the converse characterstics of the 'old' and the 'new'. As such, the lack of national consciousness is presented as a lacking feature of the Empire.

The below sample is another illustration of the newspapers of the period which promulgate the negative impression of the Ottoman rule. Religion was the main factor that tamed the Ottoman rule and the freedom of Turks was at stake. Thus, action had to be taken fortwith against this clumsiness.

5.2.1.2.6 No Impression Management

> Have the Ottoman sultans been rarely seen to turn things into defeats on the table with their inability and incompetence? (…) Despite all the flamboyance of its name, the "The Sublime Ottoman State" was a semi independent state that acted according to the commands of the great powers. (…) The Ottoman sultanate had signed many treaties both as victor and loser, but in none of these had been able to detach and throw away the fetters it had allowed the Europeans to put on its neck. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 July 1935, see Appendix 45)

> Of their successors, Yavuz Selim became the conqueror of Egypt. In 1517, he gave the title of caliph to his ancestors' imperial legacy. This event made the Ottoman Empire a theocratic state and the political heads of state were compelled theoretically to depend on the unchanging texts of the holy book. In the beginning of the 19th century, religion was a political tool, the army was undisciplined, unaware of new strategies and dominant over politics, without finances, and it was a formation of the middle ages in terms of dishonorable central administration. (…)Yet, history records some reforms (*ıslahat*) in this century. However, these were always made with the foreign pressure and were never thought as a response to the true needs of the people. The men of Tanzimat did not follow up their actions with energy because they did many parts of the reforms unwillingly and with foreign compulsion. Ali Paşa views the reformation in a report he gave to the emperor as a necessity like a form of a captain throwing weight off his ship to save it in stormy weather. The men of Tanzimat were devoid of the courage to forcefully apply precautions to save a state, to advance a nation. (…)The words; nation and freedom were the most disliked and least understood concepts. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 September 1937, see Appendix 46)

In the first sample, the inadequacy of the Ottoman rule with reference to the Ottoman sultans particularly in the desk jobs regarding treaties is also stated in order to tarnish the glorious 'conquest' image of the Ottoman Empire. Compared to this glourious name, it is depicted as the 'puppet' of the foreign powers. This impression is furthered in the excerpt of Afet İnan's thesis in the second sample. Since the reforms in Tanzimat period were implemented with the pressures of the foreign powers, they were not only inadequate but also incompatible with the needs of the era. Hence, unlike the 'new', the 'old' was against changes and progress due to its theocratical state structure and unlike the 'new', the 'old' never favored the demands or the freedom of the people/nation.

In the 'new' the real owners of the state are the people (the sovereignty of the people) unlike in the old'. Within the context of the end of monarchial period, this political move is articulated by Belge as such; "The political leaders, against the monarchies who consider themselves as the power holders since they have 'blue-blood', articulated that the *millet* is the 'real power-holders'. The reason these leaders put forward is that they are the 'represantatives' or the 'spokesmen' of the people in order to legitimize their position."[259]Naturally, the similar discursive strategy- which is employed by the CHP elites against the Ottoman Empire in the Kemalist period- seems to be employed by the AKP ideology as well by the recurring emphasis of the 'national will' but this time against the elites of the Kemalist period.

[259]Murat Belge, "Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşüncenin Ana Çizgileri" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, vol.9, (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları), 2009, p. 49.

All in all, while the mythic golden past as a discursive practice was given credence in order to mystify 'secularism', 'Turkish civilization', 'the Turkish(ness)' and 'the language reform' for the construction and the legitimization of the 'new', the pluralist and heterogenous Ottoman rule with its religious elements such as the 'caliphate', the 'madrasah' and the 'sultan' is demystified with an effort to efface the memory of the Ottoman that is associated with 'Orientalism' in Kemalist discourse.

5.2.2 The AKP Discourse

5.2.2.1 Mystification

Parallel to the non-discursive practices such as the grandiose celebtations for the commomeration of the conquest of Istanbul and Kut'ul Amara and the insertion of the Ottoman language as an elective lesson in the curriculum, what is discernible on a discursive level is that the AKP not only shows similarities with the 'Ottomanist' thought but also promotes Ottoman culture. Contrary to the Kemalist discourse that tends to disregard and vilify the 'Ottoman' in political and cultural realms, the AKP discourse indeed mystifies the Ottoman in every aspect. Apart form Erdoğan, *Yeni Şafak* and *Sabah* newspapersalso contribute to this process by commending the Ottoman and its sub-elements. Particularly, the articles of some columnists are remarkable. In this sense, it can be asserted that they contribute to this mystification process by functioning like ideologists who promote, re(affirm), (re)produce the Ottoman discourse. Accordingly, the mystified concepts are as follows; 'Ottoman civilization', 'Neo-Ottomanism', 'Ottoman model/rule', 'Ottoman sultans', 'madrasahs/lodges/zawiyas', 'Islamism', 'Ottoman projects and the conquest'.

In the first sample below, it can be observed that Yusuf Kaplan, the columnist of the *Yeni Şafak* newspaper functions as the promoter of the Ottoman civilization, so to speak, as an ideologist. His articles promote not only Neo-Ottomanism as an advocate of (re)applying the Ottoman model in every aspect, i.e politics and education; particularly in cultural and political realms but also the Islam culture. In this sense, the hyperbol category below seeks to present the exaggerated meanings attributed to the Ottoman. The first lines of his article imply that he is one of those Muslims that was not fooled by the ideological constructions of the Kemalism. In the following lines, he shows the reader the 'true' path with his Neo-Ottomanist stance as such, "The people trapped in the Anatolian continent were made to take the bait that the

Ottomans "weren't so great" but the Muslim children, peoples, people on the street, even elites of the Islamic geographies did not rise to this bait." [260]

5.2.2.1.1 Detailed Description and Hyperbole

> In my visits from Yemen to inner Africa, from Indonesia to Crimea, and to the remotest corners of the Balkans, I not only saw but also felt in my bones how the Ottoman consciousness was a high ummah (*ümmet*) consciousness, how it was such a perfect brotherly consciousness that it could regather the Muslims, and how it was a hope of civilization. The question here is: Why do all roads lead to the Ottoman? We can shortly answer this question as such: The codes of the answers to all these existential, political, cultural, ethnic problems the world is facing today are hidden in the Ottoman civilization experience.And what are these codes? Above all, the Ottomans were grounded in all the major civilization experiences in the history of humanity. In a time period when the Europeans were colonizing all continents, raiding all cultures, not even allowing the right of life to differences within Europe, and were therefore unaware of what sort of experience it was to live with differences, the Ottomans were the only experience of humanity that managed to establish an Ottoman Order (Pax Ottomana) based on peace and mutual trust rather than such orders based on "war, armed power of tyranny" (Braudel) like Pax Americana or Pax Romana in the world's most complicated, formidable, chaotic areas.
>
> Secondly, the Ottoman means justice; it means virtue; it means principle/to be principled because the Ottoman is not the name or address of an ethnic experience, a nation experience, an exploitation experience; it is the name and address in which the ideals of the revelation (*vahiy*) turned into a consciousness and it is the name and address of the "human brotherhood" experience in which consciousness turns reality into poetry. Thirdly, Ottoman means resisting capitalism at the cost of disappearing and not losing its claim to be the last island of humanity because the most distinctive quality of the Ottoman and its formative, existential, sustaining, life-giving and soul-giving secret, its foundation and its source were hidden in the realization of idea of the perfection of man (*Insan-ı Kâmil*) [261]. (*Yeni Şafak*, 16 July 2012, see Appendix 47)

In this article of the columnist Yusuf Kaplan in *Yeni Şafak*, the Ottoman rule and the civilization is promoted and mystified due to its Pan-Islamism and Pan-Ottomanism politics in its decline period. Contrary to the imperialist West, the successive Ottoman rule created an

[260]Yeni Şafak, Büyün yollar Osmanlı'ya çıkar, July 16, 2012, http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/yusufkaplan/butun-yollar-osmanl%C4%B1ya-c%C4%B1kar-33237

[261] "The teaching of Insan-ı Kâmil is a total understanding of man through systematical and conceptual approach in Islamic thought which was accumulated through philosophy to Kalam, Fiqh to tasawwuf. Insan-ı Kamil not only has ontological and epistemological roots but also it is an experience through religious and ethical experience. Insan-ı kâmil aims to reach personal purification and perfection of man. In this respect, Insan-ı kâmil is a perfect man who wants to reach perfect ethical experience.", Necdet Durak, "İslam düşüncesinde etik bir ideal olarak "insan-ı kâmil anlayışı" "in *Uluslararası İnsan Bilimleri Dergisi*, Vol.7, No.2, 2010, https://www.j-humansciences.com/ojs/index.php/IJHS/article/view/966/574

order in which peace and happiness prevailed. It is even eulogized and put forward as an 'ideal model' against all the entire systems in terms of a solution for the various problems of the present era. However, Belge articulates that Pan-Ottomanism was merely a strategy in order to maintain the commitment of the non-Muslim communities to the state in the period. Similarly, Pan-Islamism was not preferred just because it was a 'good' thing but rather because it was a pragmatic choice that is congruent with the conditions of the period.[262] In the second reason given, the Islamic tendencies are apperant. The Ottoman is mystified since it was the period in which the ruling was according to Islamic principles. With reference to revelation (*vahiy*), it establishes Quran as the only and absolute 'truth'.As such, the only 'ideal' rule becomes the one according to Islamic principles as in that of the Ottoman period. The use of Islamic principles as the only truth in every aspect of the 'new' implies the establishment of a new regime of truth. In other words, it seeks to establish a new regime of truth. The third reason illustrates the sacralization; mystification of the Ottoman rule by attributing it 'godly' features like 'life-giving' and 'soul-giving'. Besides, the Ottoman rule is commended by asserting the idea of the perfection of man (*Insan-ı Kâmil*) which is another Islamic reference is appareant regarding this mythical purification and perfection of the man is claimed to be achieved in the Ottoman period.

The next sample illustrates another ideologist in *Yeni Şafak* newspaper that contributes to the AKP's Ottomanist discourse in terms of politics. The Ottoman politics is once more promoted and affirmed as the 'true' path.

5.2.2.1.2 Hyperbole

> The Ottoman was the most important politics in the area and history. They had the closest politics to our century. When the nation state's contrived fictional politics and fictional societies dissolve one by one, we come upon the importance of the Ottoman once more because the Ottoman is the common entity of all these societies. (…)This is a dynamism that reaches visibility, but also carries the potential to offer the possibility to rise above historicity. Why shouldn't we take advantage of this to give meaning to today? Isn't this a more "advanced politics" than the present situation that is fragmented, isolated from each other with walls and taking positions of fear with alienation, fragmented with dozens of nation states, always creating dictatorships, battles and ideologies? (*Yeni Şafak*, 27 January 2013, see Appendix 48)

[262]Murat Belge, "Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşüncenin Ana Çizgileri" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, vol.9, (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları), 2009, p. 40.

In this article by the columnist Ergun Yıldırım entitled as "Neo-Ottomanism and Ottomanphobia" in *Yeni Şafak*, the Ottoman politics is depicted as the most appropriate, highly developedand progressive system for the current period. With reference to the mythical past, the Ottoman is mystified as a long standing system beyond history that would not contain any otherization, ideology or fear contrary to the nation-states such as Kemalist New Turkey. As such, Neo-Ottomanism as politics-wise is promoted.

Regarding the two samples above, it becomes possible to argue that; "neo-ottomanism is in fact a façade for a more robust Islamism."[263] In other words, even if neo-Ottomanism and Islamism are intertwined on a discursive level in the AKP discourse, neo-Ottomanism serves as a cover layer for the promotion of Islamism on a deeper level. As Czajka and Wastnidge argues, the Ottoman is depicted in three ways; "1. the image of the Ottoman Empire as the cradle or apex of civilization; 2. the image of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic Empire; and 3. the image of the Ottoman Empire as a liberal, multicultural empire."[264]

As an illustration for the association between (neo)Ottomanism and Islamism, the conquest of Istanbul is mystified by Erdoğanin his speech for the commomeration of the conquest with a reference to verse in Quran in the following sample.

5.2.2.1.3 Topicalization:

It is the strategy to make a topic to be the topic of a discourse typically by highlighting it.

> (İnna Fetahna Leke Fethan Mübina… Ve Yensurakellahü Nasran Aziza…) The truth is we grant you a conquest and God helps you with a glorious victory. And the dearest of the dear…(Letüftehanne'l Kostantıniyye. Ve Le Ni'mel Emrü Zalike'l Emr Ve Le Ni'mel Ceyşü Zalike'l Ceyş) Constantine shall be conquered one day. Such a great commander that conquers it, such a great army that conquers it. (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 30 May 2015, see Appendix 49)

> History is a graveyard of states that occupied wide areas with cruelty, blood, war, but were extinguished like straw flame because cruelty is not enduring. This is the real difference that separates us from the other states, other civilizations in history. Our difference is revitalization not occupation, conquering not plundering. Our difference is the grace to even set up nests for

[263] Agnes Czajka and Edward Wastnidge, "The Centre of World Politics? Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic politics", 2014, p.3.
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/GSCIS%20Singapore%202015/Archive/a1b05e35-80f6-40ae-9c56-b5708c5c321e.pdf
[264] Ibid., p.2.

> migratory birds, to put charity stones on street corners as not to insult the poor. (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 25 December 2015, see Appendix 50)

In the first sample, another Islamic reference is provided in order to mystify not only the Ottoman sultan, the conquerer Fatih but also the conquest itself. In addition, it is also implied that the Ottoman civilization/state still persists within the AKP's 'New Turkey' since that civilization is predicated upon 'revitalization and conquering'. In terms of the association between Neo-Ottomanism and Islam, the first sample may prove that the ideology of conquest that has been revitalized in AKP's 'New Turkey' is employed as a tool of promoting Islam. Onar articulates this 'ideology of conquest' as such; "For as heirs to ghazi frontier warrior tradition, the Ottomans saw themselves as the vanguard of *dar-Islam* (world of Islam) which would one day engulf the *dar-al harb* (word of unbelievers)".[265] In fact, Erdogan's speech in AKP's 4th Provincial Congress in June 2012 not only reveals the AKP's Neo-Ottomanist ambitions but also seems to affirm Onar's insight of the conquest; "Our ancestors dominated the world for 600 years; if Allah will let us, we will realize that cognation again on the remains of the highest state of the Ottoman Empire."[266]In the second sample, the Ottoman Empire is mystified since it is associated with 'righteousness' since it, according to the AKP, symbolizes the 'good' for its tolerance and compassion whereas the 'western' nation states are associated with 'false' since they symbolize the 'evil' for their brutal imperialist mentality.

Moreover, in the 562th anniversary of the conquest, Erdogan establishes a mythical historical line to mystify the conquest that resembles the one that is being established now- New Turkey- for the mystification of the AKPregarding 'righteousness' and 'false'. This mythical line starts from the Muslims coming to Mecca and reaches up to the War of Independence which is the most preferred, affirmed and praised period of the Turkish history by the AKP; "What is conquest? Conquest is the Hegira; it is being a companion to the leader of two worlds with the loyalty ofhis holinessEbu Bekir.Conquest is Mecca, it is cleansing God's home on Earth, the Kaaba, of all idols. (…) Conquest is our War of Independence; it is managing to establish a new state from the ashes of a world empire while in poverty and famine."[267] In this respect, the conquest can also connote neo- Ottomanist and Islamist

[265]Nora Fisher Onar, "Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today's Turkey", p. 230.
[266]Esra Arsan and Yasemin Yıldırım, "Reflections of neo-Ottomanist discourse in Turkish news media: the case of Magnificient Century" in *Journal of Applied Journalism and Media Studies*, Vol:3, No:3, 2014, p.217.
[267]Presidency of the Turkish Republic, "İstanbul'un Fethi'nin 562.Yıldönümü kutlamalarında yaptıkları konuşma", May 30,2015."Fetih nedir?Fetih, hicrettir, iki cihan Serverine, Hazreti Ebubekir sadakatiyle yoldaşlık etmektir.Fetih, Mekke'dir, Allah'ın yeryüzündeki evi olan Kabe'yi tüm putlardan temizlemektir. (…)Fetih,

AKPcoming into power and the (re)construction of 'New Turkey' as it is implied to be the continuation of this mythic historical line; "Thank God we have ended along with our nation's support this period of degradation that made Fatih turn in his grave, tormented the dear memory of our martyrs, and threatened the spirit of conquest."[268] As stated in Erdoğan's speech, the AKP has brought an end to the period; the Kemalist 'old' that presented the Ottoman as a degenerated period. As such, the Ottoman is revitalized in the AKP discourse to the contrary.

The same Ottoman motif and the continuation is also articulated by Erdoğan along with the mystificiation (purification) of the Ottoman in his another speech as such; "There has never been marginalization, disdain, discrimination, rejection, denial, assimilation in our culture, our civilization, our state tradition. (…)We are the grandchildren of such ancestors, and we must succeed in making this mentality of the Ottomans prevail also in the Republic of Turkey of now." [269] Unlike the ones who "got caught up in the winds of European fascism"[270] – the CHP –, the 'new' to be constructed will lean on the mythic perfection of the Ottoman heritage.

Contrary to Kemalist discourse that associates the madrasah with Islam and backwardness, the AKP discourse commends the madrasah and highlights its importance as a cultural transmitter. The sample below is an excerpt from an article of Yusuf Kaplan in *Yeni Şafak* newspaper which promotes an Islamic model of education with reference to madrasah.

5.2.2.1.4 Argumentative Support

> The madrasah subject is one of the subjects that have been understood distortedly in Turkey, especially by the mentally deficient intelligensia. The madrasah is the name of the educational institution that has laid the foundation for Islamic civilization for about a thousand years or so. And it is an authentic educational model the Islamic civilization has developed, which encourages civilization, germinates it, makes it reach the skies, and appropriates all cumulation of humanity. (…) This is why Muslim madrasahs have also been a source for Western universities, have ensured the accumulation of the world could reach the West. (…)The collapse of the madrasah shook the foundations of civilization and resulted in its collapse. The ulema went, and it was over: Our civilizational vault of heaven crashed down,

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Kurtuluş Savaşımızdır, yokluk içinde, kıtlık içinde cihan imparatorluğunun küllerinden yeni bir devlet kurabilmektir."

[268]Ibid.

[269]AK Party, Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Sakarya İl Kongresi konuşmasının tam metni, June 15, 2012.

[270]Ibid.

> and tumbled on us: The "head" and "body" were separated. Our Muslim way of hearing, thinking, enjoyment and liking styles were destroyed. We were condemned to the desert… (*Yeni Şafak*, 8 January 2016, see Appendix 51)

> As it is known, the establishment of lodges reaches up to the 8th century. They have also been named dervish convents during the Ottoman era. (…) As it is known, the Ahi order and masters of the religious order/shrines (*tarikats*) were influential in the establishment of the Ottoman state. In this respect, the Ottoman padishahs gave importance to masters of the religious order and led the establishment of these foundations necessary in the opening of lodges. Zawiyas (*zaviye*) are also places with similar functions. They helped poor people with clothing and food here too. In fact, in time, it is known that small settlements sprung up around these zawiyas. The lodges, which opened their doors to everyone no matter their thoughts, race, religion, or sect were, have thus been influential in spreading love, tranquility, and peace to the society. (*Yeni Şafak,* 4 March 2013, see Appendix 52)

In the first sample, another component that associates the Ottoman with Islam civilization is apparent; the madrasah. The madrasahs are not only depicted as the backbone of the Ottoman-Islamic civilization but also as the guide of knowledge for the Western universities. As such, the madrasahs (and the East) are hierarchically positioned on the top regarding the West and Western universities. As Şengül states, the ulemas in the madrasahs are not the only producers of the religious knowledge but also the ones who direct the people about how to maintain their daily lives according to religious truth(s). Hence, due to the central position of the ulemas and madrashahs, the political authorities desired to regulate this production of knowledge[271] as that of the Kemalist period by closing down the madrashas. Accordingly, the CHP elites and implicitly Atatürk is demystified by the very phrase, "mentally deficient intelligentsia" since they were incapable of grasping the importance of the madrasah. By the use of the metaphor as a discursive practice, the end of the madrasah is likened to living in the desert. Other metaphorical usages such as the separation of the head and the body resemble 'death' and articulate the agony caused by the annihilation of the madrasahs which meant to be to the end of Islamic dominance in the period. Similarly, the lodges and zawiyas are mystified due to their roles in the foundation of the Ottoman state and embracing the people regardless of their religious, ethnic statues.

The Ottoman language is another theme that is mystified in the AKP discourse. As it is seen in the sample, the need to learn the Ottoman language can be functionally reduced to reading

[271]Serdar Şengül, "Medreseden Okula Osmanlı-Cumhuriyet Modernleşmesi" in in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, vol.9, (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları), 2009, p.637.

gravestones but it is in fact stated a requirement in order to learn the reality and the richness of the Ottoman culture.

5.2.2.1.5 Assertion

> Schick adds "It is torture not to know Ottoman in Istanbul" and continues his speech: "The problem is not just reading books or gravestones, either. I have learned many languages and I have seen that learning a language also means to grasp its mode of thought and to understand the culture up to the hilt. This is why the Ottoman classes should be mandatory, not optional." When it is so, a great step will have been taken to understand the Ottoman soul and culture. (…) The academic, who emphasizes the richness of Ottoman text, reminds us that it is not reactionarism but a cultural necessity. (*Yeni Şafak*, 11 December 2014, see Appendix 53)

With the view of an academician in the sample above, the Ottoman language is depicted as a requirement giving the message to the addressee that it is possible to 'think' and 'act' like an Ottoman if one learns the Ottoman language. The most striking point is that news coincides with the new regulation regarding the Ottoman in the curriculum that is published in *Sabah* newspaper.[272] Accordingly, the addresser affirms this change in question by stating that it shoud be 'mandatory' and regarded as a 'requirement' but not 'reactionarism' as in the mentality of the Kemalist period due to its importance of knowing the Ottoman civilization heritage.

5.2.2.2 Demystification

Parallel to the ideological efforts of the Kemalist rule mentioned in the demystification part of this section, the mission of the AKP rule/discourse is to reveal the 'distorted truth(s)' of the Kemalist period in order to legitimize its own rule and deligitimize the 'other'. In this respect, the demystified concepts are 'Kemalism ', 'Kemalist history', 'Kemalist nationalism', 'one party laws', and 'secularism'.

First of all, the sample below highlights the invalidity of the Kemalism in the current period as it is depicted as an obsolete ideology.

5.2.2.2.1 Attribution to Context

> In the context of Turkey, we witness that the local branch of positivist modernism, Kemalist enlightenment, was subjected to the same fate earlier. Kemalism that was imposed on the society with violence, totalitarian

[272]Sabah, Osmanlıca zorunlu ders oluyor, December 4, 2014.

> secularism, and its appropriate single lifestyle dictatorship has been eroded. As a result of its totalitarian mentality –the exposition of the error in the main mentality that made a thing that thing – a loss in morality was unavoidable. Kemalism was not a mentality born from the deepening of many ideologies like modernism –liberalism, socialism etc.-, but a way of using power that consisted of imitation. Therefore, its collapse was earlier. The announcement of the collapse was just waiting for a certain conjuncture. (*Yeni Şafak*, 26 Mart 2014, see Appendix 54)

With comparison to other ideologies in the narrative above, Kemalist ideology is demystified due to its Jacobenist (for the people despite the people) mentality which became more apperant in one party laws that imposed an ideological lifestyle on the people. In addition, the word 'enlightenment' imples that Kemalism is rather a 'fake' enlightenment only by appereance since it was predicated upon force. As such, it is was nothing but a dictatorship, a 'copycat' of the Western mentality which was devoid of grasping the soul of its own people thus was naturally doomed to fail.

The next sample demystifies the selective dimension of the Kemalist narrative as the distortion of historical truth(s) by the Kemalist history which excludes the Ottoman history in the foundation of the 'new'.

5.2.2.2.2 Marginalization

> "In the 1400 years of Islam history, particularly in its last 1000 years, it is almost impossible to encounter any large battle which we did not participate in as a nation. The great agglomeration is the reason behind our capablity of having been able to keep the apple of all civilizations', all nations' eyes, Anatolia, as our homeland. In Western civilization, Turk is not the name of a certain tribe, but a name that represents all Muslims. (…) But in the historical narration of textbooks, there is an effort to the exact opposite, let alone deficiencies. I reject the understanding of history that starts our nation, our civilization's history of thousand years almost from 1919. It should be known that whoever alienates our last 200, even our last 600 years with its victories and losses, and jumps from old Turkish history to the Republic, that person is an enemy of our nation and state. (*Presidency of Turkish Republic*, 29 April 2016, see Appendix 55)

> This is always so. Because this is the only way they can cut your main artery. And the moment they cut it, you're finished, you're wasted. We have some people who don't realize which historical ground they stand on, even those who reject their heritage, and as you know such people also endanger the country's future. (*Presidency of Turkish Republic*, 19 May 2015, see Appendix 56)

The first sample illustrates the demystification of Kemalist nationalism regarding the Kemalist perception of history. In the narrative, Erdoğan clearly attributes to Turkish History Thesis that serves to mystify the Turk(ishness) while excluding the Islamic and Ottoman heritage in order to create a monolithic body in the name of nationalism. This standpoint is also articulated by Zurcher as such; "What is completely missing in Kemalist nationalism is that the idea of Islam as an element of a national identity and unity."[273] Erdoğan furthers his criticism with reference to history books of the period that (re)produce and (re)affirm the Kemalist nationalism. Erdoğan labels, and thus marginalizes the CHP elites and indeed implicitly the founder of Turkish Republic, Atatürk, as the 'enemies' since they constructed a 'New Turkey' which is devoid of its Ottoman and Islamic historical heritage. Moreover, the history is likened to main artery. The connection lost with the history in question means metaphorically to kill the inheritors of that very civilization. The mission of the AKP to the contrary is depicted by Erdoğan as such; "Our struggle of 12 years is the struggle of reforming our link with our roots, with our ancient values. It is the struggle of understanding and explaining our trivialized, ignored, affronted history in a correct way."[274]

In the construction of the 'new', Kut al Amara would be a remarkable example for different perspectives of history in two contending narratives with reference to different names in Arab community. For instance, in Kemalist narrative, the Arabs are demystified due to their betrayal to the *Turks* regarding the war in question as such;

> Mecca Sharif Hüseyin made this offer to the English in 1915: "I am ready to help you in any way if you recognize the sovereignty and independence of all Arabs of Asia under my rule." Sharif Hüseyin wanted to include such cities as Adana, Urfa, Mersin, Mardin into the Asian Arabia. He also wanted a tight blockade of the Hejaz peoples, so as to make the Arab populace understand the evils of allying with the Turks and make them join into his state. (…) Meanwhile, the carelessness of the Ottoman Empire was so great that they kept sending money to Sharif Hüseyin so that he would send forces. (*Cumhuriyet,* 10 Ferbruary 1935, see Appendix 57)

On the contrary, the Arabs in question are mystified due to their help to the *Ottomans* in Kut al Amara war in 1915. Within two narratives, two different truth(s) are provided.The historical event is depicted by Erdoğan as such;

[273]Erik Jan Zurcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Kemalism*, vol.2, (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları), 2010, p. 50.
[274]TCBB, "Milletler, tarihlerinden aldıkları güçle yaşarlar", May 19, 2015.

> President Erdoğan, who gave the information that a member of a well-established Arab family, Uceymi Pasha, saved an Ottoman unit sieged by the English by splitting the siege along with his men, made these statements: "As in Anatolia, in that area of course there were those who were fooled by the bribes, promises, games of the English and other forces. But this situation can never justify accusing all our Arab brothers in those areas, just like how what happened in Anatolia does not bind all Anatolians." (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic,* 29 April 2016, see Appendix 58)

The Kemalist understanding of secularism is demystified in the sample below since it became an instrument of tyranny and oppression for the devout. As the sample implies, rather than functioning as a tool to free the people from the imposition of religion by government or religious practices upon its people, it has become a tool for the imposition of the Kemalist ideology upon its people.

5.2.2.2.3 De-emphasis

> While secularism is supposed to be the guarantee that the devout can live their religion as they want, and that atheists can openly declare their atheism (…) It is painful that secularism has been used as a stick to beat the devout in Turkey for many years. (…) What we are doing is not to yield, not to obey. We would like to draw attention to the fact that even though there has been a hat law for men for many years, it is not abided. (*Yeni Şafak*, 23 April 2013, see Appendix 59)

Here, the AKP demystifies the Kemalist secularism which reduces Islam to the people's consciousness and restricts it into private sphere without allowing any space for representation of religion in societal sphere of which the AKP is the advocate. These two distinct approaches to secularism is termed under binary opposition category as "assertive secularism" for Kemalist understanding of secularism and a "passive secularism" in AKP's perception of secularism by Keyman and Gümüşçü.The distinct approaches to secularism is depicted as such; "The AKP replaced the assertive secularism of the Kemalist regime that imposed religious privatization on its citizens with "passive secularism" which is said to be neutral toward citizens' diverse religious identities in the public sphere."[275] In the sample above, AKP's tendency of passive secularism is discernible. Moreover, in order to emphasize the pressures of the period, secularism is likened to a stick that is used by a parent that would beat its child when it breaks the rules or becomes rebellious. The CHP is also demystified as the one who would spoil its own laws with a particular example on hat law. This would also imply that the CHP secularism is merely by appearance.

[275]Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşçü, *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey Hegemony through Transformation,* (London :Palgrave Macmillan), 2014, pp.6.-7.

The last sampe illustrates another sub-element of the Ottoman rule, madrasah, which was obliterated by the Kemalist rule and was regarded as inconvienient due to religious concerns.

5.2.2.2.4 Attribution to Context

> The Law on the Prevention of Lodges and Monasteries and Shrines and the Prohibition and Abolition of Tomb Keepers and Certain Titles that came into effect in 1925, is another law which should be evaluated in this context. At the same time, this is a heavy blow to multiculturalism and pluralism. As is known, the "dominant ideology" of nation state systems is the most important tool of staying in power. From this aspect, it has one religion, one school, one language, one sect and one common feeling. And with the laws they introduce, they predict they will cleanse society of all its colors and standardize it. (…)By closing the lodges and monasteries in this period, which had an important position in Islamic cultural and social life, a centuries-old cultural, educational, mystic, literary, musical and historical inheritance was abolished because lodges were a carrier of music, literature, history, and culture. (*Yeni Şafak*, 4 March 2013, see Appendix 60)

> Either the ones who did the alphabet change either innocently said that 'This Arabic alphabet can't convey Turkish properly, it creates problems, it decreases our learning speed. Let's convert to the Latin alphabet, and enter a common cultural pool with the West. We can transfer these texts anyway.' or at least some of them said 'This alphabet reform is just the start; let's sever our mental links from the past entirely. Let's start a brand new world from scratch." (*Yeni Şafak*, 19 Eylül 2013, see Appendix 61)

The dominant ideology of the period which indeed refers to Kemalism is demystified with regard to laws that authorized the annihilate lodges and zawiyas. Kemalist monolithic stance in order to create a homeogenous society is also demystified since the institutions in question were obliterated. As they connote the Ottoman and Islamic civilization, the Kemalist ideology in power caused a rupture with the very past. With reference to alphabet law in the second sample, Kemalism is demystified due to turning its face to the West, cutting off the ties with its 'own' past, conveying Western knowledge and imbuing the people with the Western mentality.

All in all, as a counter-discourse, the mystification of the Ottoman period with the discursive sub-motifs of the Ottoman serve to create other discursive practices such as the myth of a golden past and the myth of resurrection. In addition, while the attributing positive images in order to retrieve the glorious image of the Ottoman which was depicted negatively as a degeneration process in Kemalist discourse, Kemalism as an ideology is demystified with the

tools of Kemalism; particularly nationalism and secularism with reference to Kemalist history and one party laws.

5.3 Binary Opposition 3: The Unveiled Woman/The Veiled Woman

5.3.1 Kemalist Discourse

In the construction of the 'new', women have a significant role in both Kemalist and the AKP discourse. Unlike the dominant discourse which presupposes that the women were granted their rights from above, feminist intellectuals propose a counter argument which articulates the foundation of the several associations in the Constitutional Period with the intention of altering women's status with reference to first feminist movement.[276] According to Saktember, this presumption regarding the woman's rights not only "rendered them into a passive position"[277] but also "functioned as an ideological element that impeded/hindered them to become active political members."[278]

Besides, according to Kandiyoti, "the main legitimizing discourse for the woman question in Turkey has been that of Turkish nationalism."[279] She argues that this legitimizing discourse stems from Gökalp's view of "national-cultural rather than Islamic sources of morality"[280] which emphasize the mythical golden pre-Islamic Turkish history and culture. As the Kemalist modernization project aimed at secularization and Westernization, the woman was a highly significant part of this project. Since veil is regarded as a sign of religious affiliation in Kemalist discourse, the 'unveiled' woman, women's rights, political and social equality of the sexes are the recurring motifs of the 'new' in Kemalist discourse. In this context, contrary to the Islamic Ottoman past, the mystified concepts regarding women within the modern, secular 'new' are 'Turkish civilization', 'equality', 'visibility', 'Republican regime','Atatürk', 'Republican women' and 'Turkish family life' in Kemalist discourse.

[276]Şirin Tekeli, "Kadın" in *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, p. 1192.
[277] Ayşe Saktanber, "Kemalist Kadın Hakları Söylemi" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm* ed. Murat Gültekingil Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p.325.
[278] Ibid.
[279]Deniz Kandiyoti, "Women and the Turkish state: Political Actors or Symbolic Pawns?" in *Woman-Nation-State*, ed. Nira Yuval-Davis, Palgrave Macmilllan UK, 1989, p.139.
[280]Ibid., p. 140.

5.3.1.1 Mystification

5.3.1.1.1 High-prominent Position

> As the single people that make up society consist of women and men both, world history shows us how societies fall into such a terrible backwardness, such a deadly poverty that if they remove the equality between women and men, whohave no difference in terms of personal life. In this respect, Turkish history seems like a shining era by itself in the history of all nations. Truly, we will see that a complete union exists between woman and man if we look at Turkish history. (…) not only these livelihood jobs but also in the highest, most complicated state jobs women were beside men and did manual work with men in every century. They could take the position of members in the Congress. The wives completed the national head role of the hakans otherwise many state businesses would be left unachieved, just like that.*(Cumhuriyet*, 5 January 1935, see Appendix 62)

> In many of the old societies, the woman was a "taboo" compared to the man. However, for the Turks, the woman was not "taboo", she was auspicious. Auspicious is the opposite of taboo. (…) And this is where the division of labor between men and women came from. (…) Men and women worked together in every job. They were each other's helpers, complements, and partners. The two genders were not separated at home, in war, in political and social areas. In the ancient Turks, the religion also protected women. Back then, like religion, magic was also sacred. They were equal in value. (…) Religion gave magic to the man sitting on the right, and value to the woman sitting on the left. Thus, the man and woman were deemed equal in value. (…) In these ancient Turkish societies where the woman was not seen as "taboo", no duty was realized without women. If the emperor started commands merely as "the khan orders that," it had no value. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 February 1935, see Appendix 63)

One of the dichotomies in the Kemalist discourse is the equality/inequality between men and women. In the first sample, the mythic golden past of the Turks, thus the Turkish civilization, is mystified since the equality between the women and the men is regarded as an ingrained tradition in the secular Turkish culture. As a discursive practice, the lack of women equality is likened to poverty and regarded as a sign of 'backwardness'. In the second sample, the equality and division of labor are (re)emphasized with reference to Shamanism as traditional religion of Turks which espouses the equality of men and women in political, social realm along with family life.

This particular favor for the gender equality in pre-Islamic golden past of the Turks is also related to Kemalist nationalism which seeks to create an authentic national culture. The nationalist tendency to associate the 'new' with the mythic past with reference to Gökalp's view of national-cultural is articulated by Kandiyoti as such; "Shamnistic religion and rituals

were based on the sacred power vested in women.This made men and women ritualistically equal, an equality which has seen to permeate every sphere of life."[281] Accordingly, the two samples above (re)affirm and (re)produce the Kemalist nationalism which eugolizes the secular past of the Turks in terms of the equality of women.

The sample below is also related to the equality of women. It mystifies the 'new' Republican regime for conceding the right to vote for women and equalizing them with men.

5.3.1.1.2 Emphasis

> When it comes to the Turkish woman, only a time of fifteen years was needed to be equal to men under the law. The republic opened all the doors to the Turkish woman one by one with a great trust and openheartedness. (…) And in fact there is no one else who achieved success in this path as easily and quickly as the Turkish woman in history. (…) In summary, today the Turkish woman has entirely attained the laws that women of other regions yearned for for centuries. The Republic has supplied this blessing to the Turkish woman. No doubt, the Turkish woman will maintain a deep gratitude, thankfulness, and sense of commitment to the republic in return. (*Cumhuriyet,* 25 June 1934, see Appendix 64)

The right to vote for women is a significant issue in Kemalist discourse as it is an important signifier of the equality of women. As Göle argues, "the leading indicator of the principle of secularism was the importance attributed to the women's rights in a Muslim country." [282] Accordingly, this sample mystifies the 'new' secular Republican regime that granted Turkish women the right to vote 'without her effort or demand'. With the acquisition of the very rights, the Turkish women are depicted and positioned above the other 'western' women in hierarchial sense. As she is indebted to the regime for this 'equal' positioning, she wouldbe grateful to the 'new' regime and pay her debt and perform her national duties by being the breeders and educators of the future generations.

These national duties that are assigned to the women are willingly accepted, affirmed and diffused by the Republican women of the period with relish. The speech given to the women by Cemile Şevket Süreyya illustrates this acceptance; "You are the one who creates life! You are again the one who will protect it! You are for your children, for your land, for the existence of the world…(…)Turkish woman! When the ideal fades away or when a country dies, there is no end or measure to self-sacrifice. We will create the excitement of the future,

[281]Ibid., p. 141.
[282]Nülüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern*, (America: The University of Michigan Press), 1996, p.64.

the will to live and we will bring strength and warmth to the country. (…) How can a man of a nation fight if the women of that nation are coward and unfeeling? There always lies a woman inside a man as the force that raised him".[283]

Another binary opposition category is the visibility/invisibility dichotomy in Kemalist discourse. As the next sample illustarates, with the 'new' Republican regime, the women become visible in every realms of society in addition to the creation of a 'real' family life that is congruent with the 'real Turkish essence'.

5.3.1.1.3 Assertion

> I think the best, most useful revolution the Turks made is the way of family life that is experienced by the Turkish women today. Turkish men now go out on the streets with their families. For this to happen in a Muslim country, maybe the Europeans can't comprehend.(…) Atatürk has created the family in Turkey, has established it. A woman and her husband, a man and his sister can go out on the streets together, can go anywhere they want. A mother and father can participate in their children's fun and can enjoy it. This had never been seen in Turkey before. (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 May 1935, see Appendix 65)

> January is the month in which people pay visits most. Generally, tea parties, bridge meetings, social events – like engagements, weddings, concerts – take place in this month. It is a requirement for a woman who is fond of social life, is outgoing in society, to dress with grace, caution and care when they go to such places. (…) The woman of the twentieth century who knows how to make anything she wears look good on her, will give her opinion on the next season's fashion in advance between two cups of tea without sugar or two notrumps while going from one parlor/ballroom to another parlor/ballroom, and will prove that it is she herself is the eternal ruler of what is called the most perfect taste. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 January 1935, see Appendix 66)

The first sample presents the view of a French journalist about the position of women in the Reublican Turkey. Accordingly, it is affirmed by a 'western' gaze that the Republican women; the women of the 'new' modern, secular regime, resemble the Western women rather than the Eastern women in terms of visibility and take their place next to men in public realm. It also implies that with the Turkish revolution Turks regained their family morality - which was lost in the Islamic Ottoman period- as in that of their pre-Islamic past.The second sample also mystifies Republican woman that is visible in societal realms. As Göle states, all these

[283]Cumhuriyet, Kadınlarımız dün çoşkulu bir miting yaptılar,14 July 1935, "Hayatı yaratan sensin! Onu koruyacak gene sensin! Çocukların için, yurdun için dünyanın varlığı için sensin…(…) Türk kadını! Ülkü yurd ölünce fedakârlığın sonu ve ölçüsü yoktur.İstikbal heyecanını, yaşama ihtirasını biz yapacağız, ülkeye kuvvet ve sıcaklığı biz getireceğiz. (…) Kadını korkak duygusuz bir ulusun erkeği nasıl savaşır?Erkeğin içinde onu yetiştiren kuvvet olarak daima kadın vardır.

behavioral patterns such as going to a parlor/ballroom in modern attires, going to concerts and weddings "defined progressive, civilized and ideal Republican individual" [284] or more precisely, ideal Republican woman.

Last but not the least, the veiled/the unveiled dichtomoy as another binary opposition category is discernible. Although there is no certain law regarding the attire of the woman in the period, the woman of the new secular regime is indeed depicted and mystified as the 'unveiled' woman that has thrown away her veil or chador whereas the Ottoman period in which the woman is 'veiled' is depicted as a period of backwardness and remissness. The significance of the veil is argued by Bishop as such; "the veil has become the icon, the symbol of the clash of cultures, and it runs much deeper than a piece of cloth."[285] The next sample illustrates this clash and incompatibility between the Eastern culture in the 'old' and the adopted Western culture in the 'new' with regard to the unveiled/veiled dichotomy and the depiction of the 'unveiled' in the 'new'.

5.3.1.1.4 Detailed Description

> Turkish woman, feel joy and pride! Because ten years ago the chador hid your stature, the cage hid your identity; the harem hid your existence from the world like it was a shameful thing. In that time, the French woman lived freely with the freedom given by many centuries. In ten years, you left the harem, broke the cage, threw away the chador, and ripped the veil. In the days of war, the sultanate saw you only worthy enough to sweep streets and count stamps at the post boxes. But the Republic regime let you sit next to the man –let me say this if it won't offend you- and elevated you next to the man. (…) And therefore, in ten years you surpassed the French woman. (…) Turkish woman, feel joy and pride because in ten years Kemal Atatürk elevated you to a position higher than the French girls who are the mother of liberty. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 February 1935, see Appendix 67)

In this sample, the concepts of 'equality', 'visibility' and the 'unveiled' are intertwined in the construction of the image of the Republican woman in the 'new' regime. The comparison of Turkish woman to the French woman implies that France is regarded as touchstone of the civilization that 'New' Turkey aims to reach.Unlike the sultan who has been remiss to women and imprisoned them into harem which is depicted by the cage metaphor, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, with the image of the savior, not only freed them from religious traditions and pressures but also equalized women and men. In addition, the Republican regime that aimed at "the liberation of women from the oppression of religion encouraged not only social but

[284]Nülüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern*, (America: The University of Michigan Press), 1996, p.60.
[285]Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press), 2010, p.4.

also the physical visibility of the women."[286]Thus, the portrayed image of the 'unveiled' and civilized women in modern attire in this and previous samples related to equality and visibility not only mystify these concepts but also highlight the symbolic significance of the woman as an indicator of the modern and secular 'new'. Moreover, the discourse that revolves around the emancipation of women serves to re-adapt golden secular past identity of Turks in terms of re-secularisation and to prove the compatibility of the 'new' with the Western civilization.

5.3.1.2 Demystification

Since the discourse on women is also predicated upon the Ottoman/Republican regime and secular/religious dichotomy, the demystified concepts are congruent with these binary categories; 'the Ottoman (civilization)', 'invisibility'/'the veiled', and 'Islam'. The other demystified sub-element 'harem' was mentioned in the mystification part of this section.

The first sample demystifies the Ottoman and Arabicness of the Ottoman culture which is presented as the main reason for the backwardness.

5.3.1.2.1 Attribution to Context

> While Turkish tradition had been so, and found half of its national existence with completing the womens' life, the contrarian, hostile stance taken by the later-created Ottomanness which did not suit the Turkish spirit caused our tribe to regress for centuries and centuries in our national existence, deprecated itself in this universe of festivity, and seemingly dressed it in a crippled fashion, devoid of identity. Because Arabicness, which was an upper layer of Ottomanness, thought little of women, treated them like toys, and saw the existence of personality as too much for them. Can any favor be expected of such a nation, which buries its girls alive in the dirt, for women? The nation (…) and its culture were backwards and darklike itself. (*Cumhuriyet,*12January 1935, see Appendix 68)

> Later, with the misinterpretation of Islam and as the result of the monopoly of some conceited feelings, the woman was trapped under a cage, between four walls, and left deprived even of sun and air. (…) The woman was then left to an inner death. The woman had then lost her existance and feelings and become a machine living according to the desires of men; knew men as masters; and this lifestyle started to feel natural after many years of habitude. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 January 1935, see Appendix 69)

[286]Ibid, p.71.

What is appereant in the first sample is that the Ottoman(ness) is rejected to be the intrinsic part of the Turkish(ness) as it is labeled as 'later createdness'. The Ottoman is presented as the main culprit for the backwardness and an obstacle for the progress. The Arab motif which appeared with reference to the First World War in the Kemalist discourse that designated them as traitors-in the Ottoman analysis part- reappears here and is represented as another part of the Ottoman identity. This association between the Arabs and the Ottoman is employed to strengthen the negative image of the Ottoman that entrapped the women in harem and private sphere. The theme of 'corrupted Islam' that reappeares in the second sample also re-emphasizes the inqeality between men and women and the negligence in the Ottoman period regarding the women's rights and position in social and familial sphere.

The women in modern attire, the societal and physical visibilities of women are considered as other indicators of secularisation, modernization, Westernization and Europenization in Kemalist discourse. Regarding the physical invisibility, the last sample illustrates the 'undesired' 'veiled' women and intolerance to the 'veiled' in the 'new' regime and how she is depicted as the 'other' particularly in the urban areas of the 'new' Republican Turkey.

5.3.1.2.2 Marginalization

> Lock on the door, cage on the window, veil on the face… Let alone a human, even an animal could not stand this much pressure. (…)We do see veiled women sporadically in Istanbul. Pay attention. These are mostly corner women with faded face, dirtied clothes, crooked heels, and ripped socks (…)These bats that are afraid of the light are probably the female sort of the males who wear their hats reversed not to look like Europeans. (…)This facial cover of the Orient does not resemble the thin voile that European women use to look more beautiful. (…) As we proceed to the Orient, the veil thickens. It takes the shape of a thick torture woven from horse hairs in Iran. (…)The woman just becomes used to enduring this suffocating misery as a religious, traditional custom of this country. Those among us who have lived in the period of autocracy will remember well that after such disasters like war, illness, earthquakes took place, these evils were shown to be a sort of divine disciplining that stemmed from women going around indecently. (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 August 1935, see Appendix 70)

Here, it is seen that the Occident/Orient dichotomy reappears with the veiled/the unveiled sub-dichotomy. For the 'new' that faces now the Occident, the veil, as a sign of belonging to the Orient is regarded unaccaptable. Accordingly, the veil is likened to a cage and the veiled woman is likened to a bat and marginalized as the 'other' who resist change and progress. With reference to the autocratic rule of Abdulhamit II, the Ottoman rule, that is associated

with the Orient, is demystified since it obligated this invsibility in the name of religion. Finally, it can be interpreted that the 'new' regime is intolerable to the 'veiled' woman since it signifies not only the committent to the 'old' regime but also the failure of the Kemalist modernisation and Westernization project and the civilizational change. The 'veiled' woman is regarded as a resistance to change and theferore is undesired.Yet, the rights to be professionalized, the right to unveil and be visible and political rights for women are the factors that reinforce the Kemalist ideology and reforms.

To summarize, the Turkish woman that is used as a discursive sub-theme under the dichotomy of the New/Old, function to mystify the secular 'new' with the recurring discursive practices such as the myth of resurrection, the Republican/the Ottoman dichotomy along with the modernization, Westernization and Europenization trilogy. In addition, other discursive practices such as the equality/inequality, visibility/invisibility and the veiled/unveiled dichotomies function to demystify the 'old' along with the Orient, religion and the Ottoman trilogy.

5.3.2 The AKP Discourse

5.3.2.1 Mystification

The woman issue is a political instrument for the power holders. As in that of Kemalist period, the women question is predominantly discernible in the AKP discourse. In other words, while the women who serve as a sign of modernization, Westernization and Europenization, it is again the women who "serve as the emblem of politicized Islam".[287] If the promotion of Ottoman-Islamic civilization by the AKP is taken into consideration, then it is possible the state that the 'veiled', 'invisible' pious women is utilized as a counter-discourse (i.e. headscarf ban) for the mystification of the Ottoman-Islamic 'new' and the demystification of the Kemalist 'old' in which the women are represented as the 'unveiled', 'visible' and modern. Thus, the woman question as a discursive sub-theme also portrays the adopted civilizational difference in the (re)construction of the 'new' in two contending discourses. The (unveiled) 'old' and the (veiled) 'new' is a discursive element to apprehend the clash in two different constructions. Accordingly, the mystified concepts regarding the women are 'the Ottoman'and 'Islam' and 'devout girls'.

[287]Göle, *Forbidden Modern*, p.83.

First of all, the speech given by Emine Erdoğan on the Women's Day regarding sultan mothers (*valide sultans*) in the Ottoman period not only mystify the Ottoman civilization but also the harem as a sub-element of this civilization. The latter that was depicted in Kemalist discourse as a kind of a prison by the cage metaphor is mystified and likened to a school in which women learn about life and work for the sake of the community.

5.3.2.1.1 Assertion

> In reality, the harem is more of a school for members of the Ottoman dynasty. It is a house of education where women prepare for life, where they organize activities of charity. The sultan mothers head this house. (…)History is a mirror for all of us. These pleasant traits we see in the mirror of the Otttoman women should also be a compass in our lived. These lofty souls who gave a helping hand to those in need, who looked after the orphans and outcasts, should also give direction to our lives.(…) The sultan mothers were examples to our mothers, and thus open-hearted, generous generations were raised. (…) Those women in our history performed such important services of foundations shows that they could have possessions and save it freely. This is an indication of how women's rights are deeply rooted in our civilization. (*Predisency of Republican Turkey,* 9 March 2016, see Appendix 71)

Contrary to the Kemalist discourse as the advocate of women's rights with reference to the golden pre-Islamic past, this narratives mystifies the Ottoman-Islamic civilization in which 'women's right are deeply rooted' with the implication of the economical freedom of the sultan mothers that enabled them to take part in charity issues and the construction of several buildings in the period. Moreover, the sultan mothers are depicted as the 'role models' for the women, more precisely for the mothers in the 'new' due to their lofty souls that helped the people in need.

It is also important to note that 'motherhood' is also mystified on a deeper level by highlighting the high-prominent position and the privileges of the sultan mothers: There was one only person whose salary was more than the sultan's; the mother of the reigning sultan (…) They had a remarkable status not only because they were the mothers of the padishah but also because they ruled the country as a proxy on behalf of the sultan.[288]

In fact, 'marriage' and 'motherhood' are also praised in both discourses but with different references. For instance, the eulogy of motherhood is heavily predicated upon the preservance

[288]Yeni Şafak, Anneleri sultan eden cihana hükmeder, May 13, 2012
"Osmanlı'da pâdişahtan daha fazla maaş alan tek bir kişi vardı; Vâlide Sultan.(…) Sadece pâdişah annesi olduğu için değil, aynı zamanda sultan nâibi olarak devleti yönettiği için de bu olağanüstü yüksek statüye sâhip olmuşlardı."

of the nation by designating mothers as the breeders and the educators of the modern secular future generations for the progress of the nation without any trace of religious attributions; the following excerpts from *Cumhuriyet* newspaper illustrates this stance as such; "Marriage is considered useful and necessary for the community not only to increase descendants, but at the same time from the respect of eliminating social misery"[289] and the Assembly minutes illustrate the view of the 'motherhood' as such;

> "If Turkish children have won great honors in history and have raised up their heads among other nations, be sure that this is due to the upbringing they received at their mother's bosom. If Turkish children are fit and healthy, strong and powerful, then be sure that this is because of the strength of their upbringing"[290]

Yet, in the AKP discourse 'motherhood', 'mothers' and 'marriage' are predominantly mystified with religious attributions which is congruent with its ideology. Erdoğan's speech illustrates this view as such; "And the real owner of the generation is the mother. Because she is a mother, heaven is under the feet of mothers, not the feet of fathers. This is why we kiss under the feet of mothers. The scent of heaven is there, heaven is there"[291]and the marriage is mystified as such; "Just as there isn't boundless freedom in anything in life, the gatherings of women and men are not boundless and ruleless. The Holy Creator, who put the feelings of love, interest in the other sex and the inability to live alone in the human nature, crowned this truth with marriage."[292]

The next sample is another illustration of mystification of pious women educated with the 'truth(s)', that is to say, the values of revelation and the mythic golden age of Islam (*Asr-ı Saadet*) as the period that advocates the women's rights. As such, the golden age of Islam and the religious education are put against the pre-Islamic golden age of Turks and Western education of the modern secular Kemalist 'old'.

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[289]Cumhuriyet, Niçin evlenmiyoruz?, April 28, 1938, "Evlenme yalnız neslin çoğalması itibari ile değil, aynı zamanda içtimai sefaleti gidermesi bakımından da cemiyet için faydalı ve lüzumlu telakki edilmiştir"

[290] TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 4.Devre, C.16, s. 48, "Eğer Türk çocukları tarihte büyük şerefler kazanmışlarsa ve diğer milletlerarasında şerefraz olmuşlarsa emin olun ki bu, ana kucağında aldığı terbiye sayesinde olmuştur. Eğer Türk çocuğu zinde ve sıhhatli ise, güçlü ve kuvvetli ise emin olunuz ki bu terbiyesinin sağlamlığındandır".

[291]TCBB, May 30, 2016,"Ve neslin asıl sahibi, annedir. Anne olduğu için, cennet annelerin ayakları altındadır, babaların ayakları altında değil. Onun için annelerin ayaklarının altı öpülür.Orada cennetin kokusu var, orada cennet var."

[292]Yeni Şafak, Kürtaj cinayet midir?, May 31, 2012, "Hayatta hiçbir şeyde sınırsız özgürlük olmadığı gibi erkek ve kadının bir araya gelebilmesi de sınırsız ve kuralsız değil. İnsanın fıtratına sevgiyi, karşı cinse ilgiyi ve yalnız yaşayamama duygusunu koyan Yüce Yaratan, bu hakikatı nikâhla taçlandırmış."

5.3.2.1.2 Detailed Description

> As the women were educated with the values of revelation (*vahyi değerler*), they carried several cases to our prophet. They could not have succeeded in doing this without being educated with the values of revelation. One evening, a group of about 70 women gathered around the house of Muhammad. As long as Omar has heard about this, he ran to the house of Muhammad and his nerves was on edge because of the actions of the women. He said to Muhammad, "You should order their husbands to beat them once more for this reason." Our prophet called his companions *(sahabe)* ve told them; "You, the servants of *Allah*, donot ever beat the lady servants of *Allah*." In order to start a rebellion like this in such a society, they had to be educated with the values of revelation, had to realize that such a condition was against the values of revelation and had to find the person who would listen to them. (*Yeni Şafak*, 30 May 2012, see Appendix 72)

In this sample, with reference to an incident in the myhic golden past, it is implied that in the 'essence' of Islam, women's rights are not only protected but also the equal rights are recognized. The incident above in which Muhammed was involved portraits another contradiction between the two contending ideologies. In the AKP discourse, Muhammed is taken as an exampler and his life is taken as a guide along with the Islamic values and rules in Quran contrary to Kemalist period which takes Atatürk, his life and thoughts as an exampler along with Western values. Thus, regarding the women in question and women's right's, one one hand Islamic values are promoted and (re)produced since women's right are favoured by Islamin the AKP discourse and Western and modern values such as equality are depicted as the 'essence' of Turkish society in the Kemalist discourse on the other hand. Accordingly, the mystified periods and concepts vary in both discourses.

Here are other samples that show the recurrent mystification of the Ottoman-Islamic civilizational background of the 'new' with reference to 'humanist view' of Islam and the Ottoman regarding women.

5.3.2.1.3 Argumentative Support

> In our civilization, in our belief, in our culture, people are not referred to with their genders but with their attributes, because for us the human is a noble creature, so it is the most honorable of all creation. (…) What matters is that women are accepted as "nisa", which means they are accepted with a human attribute. So what did our book the Holy Koran dedicate a surah to? To women. The Nisa Surah… Then we will see that we have started to debate justice, not equality. (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 7 March 2016, see Appendix 73)

> Sheikh Edebali advises the founder of the Ottoman Empire Osman Gazi, and says: Let the human live so the state can live… This is the core principle of our civilization in our understanding of state and nation. Letting the human live is possible with justice. (…)Likewise, when we manage to look at the human from the point of view of justice, removing discrimination between men and women will happen in a fairer, humane and moral fashion. (…) Equality is forcibly elevating the victim to the level of the victimizer, or vice versa. What the women need is not equality, but equivalency, that is, justice. (*KADEM*, 24 November 2014, see Appendix 74)

In his speeches above, one held for Women's Day and the other for the International Women and Justice Summit organized by Women and Democracy Association (*KADEM*), Erdoğan points out that they do not discriminate men and women in terms of gender. As such, the 'human equality' signifies the Ottoman and Islam civilization in the AKP discourse. Erdoğan replaces the western 'equality' concept of the 'old' with the Ottoman 'justice' concept in the 'new' and mystifies the Ottoman rule and religion which are both claimed to regard women as 'human'; an understanding which thusnot only attempts to negate the 'equality' principle of the Kemalist Westernization and modernization project but also denies the men-women equality with a basis of religious thought. He asserts the Ottoman and Islamic view of 'justice' is the intrinsic value of the 'new'. As such, he demystifies the Kemalist 'old' which adopted Western values since "the injection of the equality principle into the prevailing relations between the sexes (…) is indeed the reflection of the civilizational change upon the social imagination".[293] Bedises, he particularly demystifies the concept of 'gender equality' since it not only signifies the West, the progress and Kemalist secularisation but also labels the position of woman as a 'victim' to be saved and freed. Both speeches are instrumental and functional approaches to women's rights (as in that of Kemalist discourse with the dictates of modernization and westernization values that redefined the physical appearance, the rights and the roles of women) that assume what is ideal for the women regarding their rights. In addition, in both discourses women are employed as instruments in order to promote secularism and nationalism in Kemalist discourse and to promote Neo-Ottomanism and Islam in the AKP discourse.

In the same speech, the refusal of the 'gender equality' of the West is articulated by Erdoğan as such; "You cannot bring the man and woman to the same position. Their dispositions are different, their natures are different, and their constitutions are different". [294] Hence, while in

[293]Göle, *Forbidden Modern*, p.77.

[294]"Kadın ile erkeği eşit konuma getiremezsiniz. Çünkü fıtratları farklıdır, tabiatları farklıdır, bünyeleri farklıdır." quoted in Kadem 24 Kasim 2014 Uluslararasi Kadin ve Adalet Zirvesi Türkiyecumhurbaşkanı Recep

Kemalist thought "equality was conceived of as irreconcilable with difference"[295], the Islamist AKP discourse is predicated upon the the differentiation between men and women.

The veiled/unveiled binary category represents another clash in two contending discourses. Since woman is regarded as the symbol of modernization and secularization, in other words an indicator of the transition from traditional and religious society to modern one, the veiling of woman is undesired and thus vilified in Kemalist discourse. In this discourse, the categories of tradition/modern and religion, i.e. Islam/secular exclude each other. The 'veiled' woman can not be associated with progressive, educated and civilized woman in Kemalist discourse but associated with reactionary and ignorant woman since it symbolizes the commitment to Ottoman-Islamic past. On the contrary, in the AKP discourse the 'veiled' woman is an indicator that signifies that the AKP is not the imitator of the West and do not abandon their traditional and religious values in the name of modernization. As Göle articulates, "the veiling symbolized both the rejection of Western cultural model and the expression of Islamic identity".[296] As such, woman is also instrumental in the AKP discourse not only to express its Islamic stance but also to justify the reverse transition of the society and the construction of the new with Ottoman-Islamic values. In this sense, Erdoğan' speech regarding this transition and the promotion of the appereance of the 'veiled' woman in societal sphere is remarkable;

> The abolition of the headscarf ban that was maintained unintelligibly for decades did not cause indignation as it was asserted but ensured the normalization of the society. The abolition of headscarf ban in public administrations, universities and now in secondary schools paved the way for freedom and routed Turkey in its normal and natural path.[297](*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 1 October 2014, see Appendix 75).

The abolition of the headscarf ban in the 'new' signifies not only the re-appearance of the 'veiled' woman, who was otherized by the Kemalist ideology, in the societal sphere but also

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Tayyip Erdoğan'in Açiliş Konuşmasi Http://Kadem.Org.Tr/Turkiye-Cumhurbaskani-Sayin-Recep-Tayyip-Erdoganin Acilis-Konusmasi-Tr/

[295]Yeşim Arat, "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey" in *Rethinking Modernity*, ed. Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan, (Seattle and London: Univserty of Washington Press), 1997, p. 102.

[296] Göle, p. 95.

[297] TCBB, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 24'üncü Dönem 5'inci Yasama Yılı Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma , 01.10.2014, "On yıllardır, son derece manasız bir şekilde sürdürülen başörtüsü yasağının kalkması, öyle iddia edildiği gibi toplumda infiale yol açmamış, toplumun normalleşmesini sağlamıştır. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde, kamu iş yerlerinde, üniversitelerde, şimdi de ortaöğretim kurumlarında başörtüsünün serbest bırakılması, özgürlüklerin önünü açmış, Türkiye'yi normal ve tabii mecrasına sevk etmiştir."

the return to the civilizational essence, namely, the 'true path' or route which was changed in the Kemalist period in the name of Wesrernization, modernization and secularization. Hence, the intended change of the civilization (which is in progress in present time) is depicted as 'normalization' by the AKP ideology.

5.3.2.2 Demystification

In line with the mystification process of the AKP, the woman in question is also used as instrument to demystify the 'old' Kemalist Turkey. Accordingly, the demystified concepts are; 'Kemalism', 'Kemalist modernisation', 'modernity' and 'Kemalist equality'.

5.3.2.2.1 De-emphasis

> There are some expressions about women that have been stuck in our minds together with modernity: Women's employment, man-woman equality, working women, women's freedom. (…) the man-woman equality of modernism is based on great myths and empty dreams. It is a venture that defines the woman by isolating her from her home and family. (…)It serves to make the woman construct her own self by marginalizing the home and family. It serves to eliminate motherhood; it invites them to compete with husbands or men. As an ideality, this "gender equality" takes people to interesting conclusions. Equality is offered to the woman as a freedom theory; it is assumed that the woman's problems such as exclusion, violence, unemployment, loneliness will be solved with it. (*Yeni Şafak*, 7 November 2014, see Appendix 76)

The newspaper article above by Ergun Yıldırım in *Yeni Şafak* demystifies the equality concept of modernity and the visibility of the woman in societal sphere. Kemalism approved, promotedand legitimizated both the social and physical visibility of the woman. In this sense, the image of the educated working woman (although this working woman had the mission to serve the nation) of the Kemalist ideology, which put the woman next to man in public realm, and the equality of men-women in terms of profession are demystified. So, not only the modernization project of the Kemalist ideology is demystified but also the professionalized working woman is depicted as a threat to motherhood and the preservation of the family life.Accordingly, it can be interpreted that even if the AKP discourse seems to promote social visibility of the 'veiled' and the equality of the woman, it is defined by the conservative and Islamic values.

5.3.2.2.2 Low, Non-prominent Position

> One of the deceptions of the old system was "modernism and the emancipation of the woman". This was a form of freedom expressed only in appearance.Particularly, the village women were exposed to oppression. The women to whom the regime showed respect were the ones who were a part of the ballrooms and the celebrations but not the women who resisted because they did not deserve the women's rights. They were exposed to oppression and they were forced to uncover their heads. (*Yeni Şafak*, 3 March 2013, see Appendix 77)

> I find it malevolent that some people insist on ignoring the women of their own country and idealize the Western woman's experiences only. Some people are stubbornly trying to equate the religions and the traditions of Eastern societies solely with oppression, marginalization, despotism, and tyranny. For these people, family and religion are the two major obstacles to the emancipation of women. Notice that Islam is not something that exalts, highly respects, values women, but rather an element that sucks out their personality in the eyes of these people. The owners of these claims have tyrannized this country's women for years in the name of "emancipation and modernization." (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 8 March 2016, see Appendix 78)

The first sample demystifies the Kemalist regime that only recognizes the 'unveiled' woman in modern attire in the celebrations and in the ballrooms as the woman of the 'new' regime while otherizing the 'velied' woman. Besides, it also demystifies the modernist mentality of the regime that presumed the unveiling as liberation. What is regarded as 'emancipation' in terms of unveiling in Kemalist discourse is perceived as 'oppression' in the other discourse. In this discourse, the emancipatory Kemalist regime regarding woman is depicted as rather alienatory and exclusionist. It also criticizes the Kemalist period that prioriotized the urban, 'unveiled' woman, for instance, in terms of education and profession or the members of the parliament since the appearance of 'veiled' woman in the societal sphere meant the failure of the Kemalist modernization project. According to the AKP discourse, the emancipation of the Kemalist regime was not 'real' but deceptive since the 'veiled' woman was devoid of the rights that the regime provided for the 'unveiled' as the representatives of the new regime, disrespected and pressurized by discursive and non-discursive practices. Thus, Kemalist regime is depicted as a 'dark' mentality which attempted to alienate woman from traditional and religious values in the name of modernization and secularization by promoting an 'alien' woman figure that was incompatible with essential values of the society.

In the second sample, Erdoğan refers to 'old' Turkey in which Kemalist modernization project is mystified due to emancipation of the woman since she was freed from the veiling

pressures and the isolation caused by religion. However, he demystifies the Kemalist 'old' by employing the very same discursive tools and concepts. For the AKP, the 'old' in fact did not emancipate the woman. On the contrary, the 'veiled' woman was not only persecuted for her religious and traditional Eastern values but also was isolated from the society.

Last but not the least, 'girls and boys together' (*kızlı erkekli*) debate exemplifies another point of clash in two contending ideologies. The debate in question revolved around the co-existance of the boys and girls -two sexes- in the state dormitories;

> As a conservative democrat party in power, having the conservative democrat identity, (…) we did not, do not and will not let the boys and girls stay in the state dormitories together. (…) And we certainly intervened in this situtaiton and we keep on our efforts to segregate girls from boys in dormitories. (*AK Party*, 5 November 2013, see Appendix 79)

It is important note that the speech of Erdoğan above led to long-lasting discussions and dispute in the public opinion. In fact, the dispute is twofold. As it is aforementioned in this section, women are instrumental in ideologies. First of all, the conservatism of the AKP and the modernization of Kemalism are defined by the woman. In this debate, it is discernible that woman is the symbol of Islamic values, morals and chastity for the conservative AKP. Accordingly, the veil of the woman draws the line between the men and women. However, Kemalism contended that the possible way to achieve modernization and Westernization is to free the woman from religious (Islamic) traditions. Hence, in Kemalism the unveiled woman is the symbol of modernization and the unveiling removes the borders between men and women. To the contrary, it becomes abnormal, unacceptable and immoral for a veiled, pious or even unveiled girl to stay with boys in a dormitory in conservative ideology. Secondly, both powers define the relationships between the sexes. Deriving from Göle, the co-existance of both sexes in the state dormitories can be defined as the 'encounter' between sexes.[298] Göle articulates that "Islamic social organization is based on the limitation and prohibition of social encounters between sexes. In this context, Kemalist reforms aimed at subverting the social system based upon the segregation of the sexes."[299] If this encounter between the sexes implies the "conversion of civilization"[300] in the Kemalist 'old', then the dispute above is the indicator of attempt of the Ottoman-Islamic 'new' to reverse this conversion by discursive and non-discurive practices in the construction of the 'new'.

[298]Göle, p. 73.
[299]Ibid.
[300]Ibid.

All in all, the representation of women in both discourses reveals the ideological differences of two powers. The discursive practices such as the veiled/unveiled, visible/invisible, equal/inequal has a function of not only representing the clashes within two contending discourses but also the construction and favour of the 'ideal' woman figure of two different powers. Hence, one on hand, woman is a discursive tool of re-secularisation in Kemalist discourse whereas she is a discursive means of re-Islamization in the AKP discourse.

5.4 Binary Opposition 4: Kemalist Youth/the AKP Youth

5.4.1 Kemalist Discourse

Youth is a prominent symbolic indicator and representative of the Kemalist 'new' as well as woman. As Barker articulates, "Youth is not a universal category of biology. Rather, it is a changing social and cultural construct that appeared at a particular moment of time under definite conditions. (…) Youth is a discursive construct."[301] In addition, Lüküslü states that the youth category has two dimensions in the foundation of nation states: it is constructed by the nation states and is regarded as the constructor of the new, as the foundation of Turkish Republic is an illustrative case.[302] In the case of Turkey, the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) whose education was based upon the Western education model, had the mission to save the Empire from collapse became instead the generation that founded the 'new' nation-state on the contrary.

Deriving from Foucault, Lüküslü and Dinçşahin argue that from the 19th century onwards, the West aimed at disciplining not only the mind of the youth but also its body with education and the reflections of this discipline are also discernible in the Kemalist ideology in terms of national education and physical education policies.[303] Accordingly, the mystified concepts regarding youth in Kemalist discourse are 'Kemalist youth', 'physical education', 'Kemalist education' and 'the new regime'.

[301]Chris Baker, *Cultural Studies Theory and Practice*, (London: Sage Publications), 2005, pp. 375-376.
[302]Demet Lüküslü, "Türkiye'de "Gençlik Miti" 1980 Sonrası Türkiye Gençliği", (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 2009, p. 20.
[303]Demet Lüküslü and Şakir Dinçşahin, "Shaping Bodies Shaping Minds: Selim Sırrı tercan and the Origins of Modern Physical Education in Turkey" in *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol.30, No. 3, 2013, p. 196.

5.4.1.1 Mystification

5.4.1.1.1 High-prominent Position

> From students to army, every Turkish child of all ages that passes form Atatürk stadium represented an example of gloriousness and perfection and filled our hearts with pride and joy. (…) The new generations of Atatürk period have become the members before whom this new nation would bow and they continuously pursue this path. The future generations constitute the phases of this nation that will rise strongly each day. (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 November 1937, see Appendix 80)

In this article, the youth is imagined both as monolithic and a homogenous group of mostly male members. Since the youth is mentally and physically disciplined or shaped according to the principles of the Kemalist ideology, it is held responsible for the progress of the nation and it is elevated to the highest position. This new generation is also regarded as 'Atatürk's generation'; which naturally renders the youth into the loyal individuals of the new regime.

The elites of the regime in the period tended to define the youth by drawing limits to what the Kemalist youth meant to be. For instance, Şükrü Kaya's speech illustrates the production of discourse in the Great National Assembly regarding their imagination of Kemalist youth. Indeed, 'Atatürk's generation' is discursively constructed by defining the clear-cut features of the ideal youth of the 'new' along with the purpose of physical education:

> The man of Atatürk regime, Kemalist revolution has a beautiful body, solid ideas and is brave, solemn, cheerful and serious. He defends rights and ideas everywhere. The purpose of physical education is the discipline of ideas, character and morals. This is the type of man that our regime requires. (*Great National Assembly*, 29 June 1938, see Appendix 81)

The purpose of the physical education, which was made compulsory for the citizens of certain ages of the entire nation with Physical Education Law in 1938, was to build powerful bodies, raise mentally and physically strong particularly male individuals. The mission of the physical education as that of the European totalitarian regimes in the period such as the Fascist Italy and the Nazi Germany by which the Kemalist ideology influenced was "to create the "new man" defined as masculine, belligerent and brave."[304] With the physical education, new healthy and strong members of the nation are raised in order to serve the nation as potential soldiers that maintain the persistence of the state. Arguably, physical education is even

[304]Ahmet Kuyaş cited in Bilgiç, in *The Role of Mainstream Newpapers in the Consolidation the Turkish National Identitiy*: 1934-1937, p. 181.

prioritized over national education. The legimitate reason was that it was a common practice in all the civilized; in fact, all the totalitarian regimes, of the period.

5.4.1.1.2 Assertion

> In all civilized countries, physical education has an important place as well as mental education because physical education is an issue that is related to a nation's existance. Its main goal is to reform the bodies thereby improving the individuals. In this sense, physical education is a means of protection; a way of protection against every kind of natural and political enemies by increasing the resistance/endurance and strength of the individuals… A nation that consists of sturdy, vigorous, healthy and strong people works better and more, endures the climatic effects and becomes less ill. (…) That nation lives longer, becomes more brave, defends his country more strongly and also do not surrender easily. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 November 1935, see Appendix 82)

The excerpt above from Cumhuriyet is only one of the several articles that refer to physical education in the period. The physical education is mystified since the youth; potential soldiers and workers of the nation are equipped with the necessary physical conditions in case of an emergency situation such as war. As such, the nation will be indestructible and permenant. Physical education is also a requirement of the period since it is depicted as a means of nurturing strong moral character of the youth; "One of the aims of the physical education is the high moral and character. (…) It accustoms people to self- sacrifice"[305] As such, the 'new' regime imagines the future generations as the strong and substitutable soldiers of the 'new' regime that can sacrifice their lives without hesitation for the endurance of the state.

Hence, the importance of youth is twofold: the youth were imagined to be the future generations that ensure the permenance of the nation or the state. Youth is also symbolically important as it is not only the representative or the image of the new regime but also the sign of the endurance of the Kemalist principles as it was exhibited, for instance, in the parades of the period that took place in the stadiums. In this sense, it is a part of the Kemalist political project as Foucault argues;

> The body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs.[306]

[305]Cumhuriyet, 27 March 1936, "Beden terbiyesinin güttüğü gayelerden biri de ahlak ve karakterin yükselmesidir.(…) Feragate, fedakarlığa alıştırır"
[306]Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan. (New York: Pantheon Books), 1977, p.25.

The newspapers of the period also (re)produces and promotes the sports and physical education policies of the Kemalist ideology by also addressing the youth directly;

> Advice to the youth: You should love your health, country, work and nature.Sport is the magical spell for eternal youth. It is a schame not to keep the body fit. It is necessary to preserve health until the old ages. A young head can sit only on strong shoulders and good posture. (…) Sit straight, speak honestly. (…) Your biggest treasure is your body. Healthy body- healthy mind –a beautiful human (…) The body of a sportsman is the most beautiful work of nature. Try to be perfect. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 83)

Also, the future generations are imagined to be the constructors of a stronger Turkey as in Falih Rıfkı Atay's speech;

> We want to raise Kemalism youth in terms of spirit, body and mind that can succeed in the construction of a strong Turkey.The aim is this: a healthy physique, a noble soul, zealous/enthusiastic Turkish youth who knows to love, act with solidarity and achieve a goal like a whole body.Everybody and every instituition; schools and clubs must aim to raise such a youth.(*Ulus*, 31 July 1937, see Appendix 84)

In order to achieve this goal, every institution should be mobilized such as the educational institutions. The law of Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*) was significant in terms of not only adopting a Western and secular education but also imbuing the youth with Kemalist national values. In the sample below, this new Western model of education is mystified with reference to the 'new' curriculum of the public schools.

5.4.1.1.3 Emphasis

> Kemalism is also a reform of mind, that is to say a cultural and educational reform. We have to regenerate all the books, methods and even the teachers. (…) We should reject a fairy tale in the first place. The education and schools in our time were never any better than the ones today. The following are the lessons taught in the last grade: Quran, the Ottoman language, the Arabic language the Persian language, history of prophets, geography, reading, punctuation, calliagraphy. Let us have a look at the program today: civics, history, geography, calculus/calculation, geometry, life science, natural history, reading, handicrafts, music, and physical education. This is the program difference! (*Ulus*, 4 December 1937, see Appendix 85)

First of all, Kemalism is once again mystified since it was an irrefutable ideology. The new curriculum is depicted as the embodiment of this *truth* in this sample. By comparing the new curriculum with the old in the Ottoman period, it is asserted that the education is revolutionized and disentralled from religious influence of the Ottoman 'old' regime. In

addition, it meant the replacement of the Ottoman culture and values that were imposed by education with national education that favored national, secular and Western values. As such, the education of the 'new' is positioned as superior to the education of the 'old'.

In the Speech (*Nutuk*) and his 'Address to the Youth' (*Gençliğe Hitabe*), the youth was entrusted with the mission of protecting the 'new' regime by Atatürk. In the sample below, a short time after Atatürk's death, this image of the youth and thus its mission are (re)produced by *Cumhuriyet* newspaper by means of the speech of youth in the period. As such, the future generations are imagined to be the guardians of the 'new' regime.

5.4.1.1.4 Narrative Illustaration

> Again, a glorious pledge spilt out from thousands of mouths and it spread the high reality within it like burning lava: Us, the Turkish youth, in front of the supreme memorial, in the name of our honor, youth, virtue, and Turkishness promise and make a pledge to be loyal to the heritage of Atatürk, to His Republic, His reforms, His mighty and strong regime and to fight to death for His land, and to die for His liberty. (…)Isn't keeping the wonders He has created, ever so beautiful, ever so perfect, flowing on in to the future forever, tied to the fire of our youth? (…) There is this fire in Turkish youth and he takes it upon himself to be the dauntless guardian of Atatürk reforms. (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 November 1938, see Appendix 86)

The youth is mystified not only because they internalized the Kemalist principles and the very eternal mission to be guardians of the regime but also because they would sacrifice their lives – as the 'new' ordered, shaped and educated them to do – for the endurance of the nation or the state. Also, the pledge is likened to burning lava that would burn out everything that takes a stand against the regime. The use of capital letters even in possessive adjectives that refer to Atatürk in the sample is also an example of the mystification of the leader of the regime. It is evident that every aspect related to the 'new' is associated with Atatürk since it is his land, his regime, his liberty.

Finally, the youth that was nominated for the guardianship of the new regime; its revolutionary principles is advised to take his 'father' (*Ata*) as a role model in order to fulfil his promise;

> The youth army of New Turkey is a group of divine light and consciousness that follow in Atatürk's footsteps. (…)The Turkish youth has to follow all the characteristics of Atatürk as an exemplar, Our Greatest Leader who went to Samsun and created the miracle of Independence struggle and the reforms/revolution.(*Cumhuriyet,* 19 May 1937, see Appendix 87)

So, by the elites of the new regime and with the contributions of the newspapers of the period, the features of the youth and the future generations in Kemalist discourse that are mystified as the members of the nation who are healthy, strong, vigorous, well-built, progressive, mentally and physically disciplined, self-sacrificing, enlightened, patriotic, committed to their 'father', 'new' regime and its principles and have strong moral and national values. In addition, the pursuit of the 'father' meant to efface their minds and hearts of any other ideology except Kemalism. This is the ideal Turkish youth in Kemalist discourse.

5.4.1.2 Demystification

In the 'new' regime, since the youth is disciplined in terms of mind and body, it has to be protected from bad habits and ideologies. Accordingly, the demystified concepts are 'alcohol' and 'religion'.

Alcohol issue was and still is a hot- debate as a matter of religious-secular stance in Turkish history. In the early years of the Republic, it was a matter of discussion and dispute in the Great National Assembly between the pro-religious and pro-secular members of the Assembly. Deriving on the minutes of Assembly in the 1920s, Emine O. Evered and Kyle T. Evered argue that "At the parliamentary level, while proto-Kemalists acquiesced to prohibition in an early Great National Assembly to ensure conservative support during the initial years of turmoilda prohibition that many (including Mustafa Kemal) simply ignored in practice."[307] Even though there were no strict regulations relating to alcohol in the period, it is regarded as an unfavorable habit in the sense of a healthy youth.

5.4.1.2.1 De-emphasis

> The young as the alcohol haters will have a tour to Heybeliada on July 21st in honour of the graduates that finish their school this year (…) The young aim to show how the entertainment without alcohol is a source of pleasure and to straighten out/unravel the doubts of those regarding alcohol. (…) Besides, banners on which there will be maxims have been prepared. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 July 1935, see Appendix 88)

Here is another feature of the youth in the Republican regime. Besides physical education, alcohol is another example of intervention on the body of the youth in the 'new'. Taking into consideration the interwar period and the rise of the fasicist regimes in the period, it can be argued that the 'new' intented to secure itself against any potential war, thus aimed at

[307] Emine O. Evered and Kyle T. Evered, "A geopolitics of drinking: Debating the place of alcohol in early republican Turkey in *Political Geography*, No. 50, 2015, p.58.

educating the youth both mentally and physically so that they would be committed to the regime and become strong and healthy soldiers that would meet the needs of the army in case of a war. Indeed, this required a body that was purified in terms of alcohol. Thus, in the sample above alcohol usage of youth is demystified and even the youthis mobilized to demystify alcohol.

The sample below encompasses a quote from Tevfik Fikret's poem, Ancient History (*Tarih-i Kadim*). According to Sertel, in his poem, Tevfik Fikret emphasizes the materialist and positivist thoughts that the ulama strongly opposed. For her, Tevfik Fikret proclaims and explicates the counter-revolutionary and backward stance of the reactionarism (*irtica*) and the ulama.[308] Arıkan argues that Tevfik Fikret opposed the idea of an Islamic state rather than religion. Parallel to this, in Ancient History, the concept of history includes war, violence and massacres. For Tevfik Fikret, religion, beliefs and traditions are determinative factors in this bloody and violent adventure of humanity. Besides, he emphasizes the influence of Tevfik Fikret on Atatürk; on his ideas of revolution.[309] Both Arıkan and Sertel note that the poem was the source of the struggle between the 'humanist' Tevfik Fikret and the 'Islamist' Mehmet Akif Ersoy due to Fikret's anti-religious and anti-sultanate thoughts. In Sertel's words; "the ideological content of this struggle is related to this philosophical stance of Tevfik Fikret and the mystic and metaphysical stance of Akif."[310]

5.4.1.2.2 Low-prominent Position

> Tevfik Fikret said; "Religion desires martyr, the sky desires sacrifice – Everywhere is blood, blood, blood". We know that the fights for religion and sect had been stained with the bloods of millions of people. (…) Religion was once an ideology. The ones that became bigoted in the name of ideology gladdened their hearts only by shedding blood (…)We do not burn the eternal works of art of the humanity or prevent the entrance of those works to our country if they do not fit our ideology. We have provided the freedom of conscience in a country in which the nation was deprived of for ages due to religious bigotry. (…) Why are the religious books and the major books of fascism, racism and communism translated into Turkish? But we do not let these ideologies to be used as a tool for division. This is a disciplined freedom of conscience. (…) We will try to raise our children according to these principles (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 April 1938, see Appendix 89)

[308]Sabiha Sertel, *Tevfik Fikret İdeolojisi ve Felsefesi*, (İstanbul: Yurt ve Dünya Yayınları), 1946, p.43.
[309]Zeki Arıkan, "Türkiye'nin Çağdaşlaşmasında Tevfik Fikret ve Atatürk", Ankara dergiler, 1998, pp. 127-129.
[310]Sertel, p.46.

The quote from Tevfik Fikret in this excerpt from *Cumhuriyet* newspaper is significant and purposeful in terms of the dichotomy of the 'old' and 'new' regarding youth. It aims at not only demystifying religion with reference to Tevfik Fikret's positivist and materialist philosophy and but also demystifying the 'old' in which religion held every aspect of life under its control. Unlike the 'old', the 'new' desires a youth whose "conscience is free". Here, it becomes once possible to argue that the newspaper is an ideological apparatus in the sense that it dissmeniates the ideas of the new regime and particularly Atatürk who ordered the educaters of the new regime to raise new generations or youth whose "thoughts are free, conscience is free and wisdom is free." Arıkan also notes the interrelationship between Atatürk and Tevfik Fikret in terms of their philosophy and imagination of the 'youth' by showing the similarity between the lines of Fikret,who emphasizes the trilogy of freedom in hispoem, The Broken Lute (*Rübab-ı Şikeste*) and the words of Atatürk who addresses the educators.[311] Thus, it can be argued that Tevfik Fikret,with his philosophy, is of symbolic importance of the 'new' in which religion was regarded as a matter of conscience. As that of Tevfik Fikret, the new regime desired "enlightened" members that adopted a Western way of thinking that is freed from religious pressures and dogmas.

All in all, youth is a subdiscursive theme under the title of new/old dichotomy. It was also instrumental as that of other subdiscursive themes for the demystification of the 'old' and mystification of the 'new'. The newspapers of the period (re)produced and promoted the ideals of the 'new' regime regarding its imagination of the youth. Within the interwar context of the 1930s, the duty to preserve the present and the future existence of the new regime, the revolutionary principles and the state was attributed to the youth.

As a final note, the struggle between Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Tevfik Fikret regarding the two contending ideologies is noteworthy. In other words, these two important figures serve to reveal discursive clash in terms of civilization which also revolves around the concept of 'youth' apart from the 'Ottoman' and 'woman'. This discursive clash is discussed in the following part.

[311]Arıkan, p. 134.

5.4.2 The AKP Discourse

5.4.2.1 Mystification

Since youth is a discursive construct, it is an erratic concept as it is discernible in two contending ideologies. The youth that is imagined in these two contending ideologies encompasses so distinct features that in fact show the adoption of two different civilizations; namely the East and the West. More precisely, the AKP youth is the antipode to Kemalist youth. For instance, Lüküslü argues that "the myth of modern and national youth (…) reinforced by the Kemalist Republic is being replaced by an Islamic one, or in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's words; an ideal young person carrying a computer in one hand and a Quran in the other."[312] In terms of social engineering project, she also emphasizes the continuity between Kemalizm and the AKP; their common desires of creating an ideal youth that is compatible with their ideologies.[313]Thereby, it can also be argued that the AKP is in pursuit of re-creating its 'new man'.

Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Sezai Karakoç are three noteworthy figures to whom Erdoğan refers in his speeches, particularly while addressing the youth. What is common in these figures is the discursive construction of East and West dichotomy. For these Islamist figures, the Western civilization with its materalist and positivist philosophy is positioned as the other of the Islamic civilization with its metaphysical stance that is indeed associated with the East. Besides, they are not only the advocates of the revival of an Islamic civilization; namely a religious-cultural restoration (as in that of Kısakürek's ideal of Big East, in Karakoç's doctrine of revival) but also the strong critics of the Kemalist ideology that, in their terms, sacrified religion in the name of Westernization. Thus, in the construction of the new/old dichotomy, the youth is also instrumentalized by the AKP discourse in order to mystify the 'new' that is to be constructed and to demystify the 'old'. The youth, that the AKP imagines, represents a blend of these Islamist figures. Accordingly, the mystified concepts regarding youth are 'Islamic education', 'Necip Fazıl generation', 'Asım generation' and 'Karakoç's man of revival'.

[312]Demet Lüküslü, "Creating a pious generation: youth and education policies of the AKP in Turkey*"* in *Southeast Europrean and Blacksea Studies*, (Routledge; Taylor and Francis group), Vol. 16, No. 4, 2016,pp. 637-638.
[313]Ibid., p. 639.

The sample below is an article of Yusuf Kaplan from *Yeni Şafak*newspaper. Paralel to his previous columns that promoted an Islamic-Ottoman civilization as an intrinsic part of the 'new' advocates Islamic education.

5.4.2.1.1 Assertion

> The foundational source of our civilization is Quran. The primary source of our education, thoughts, art and daily lives are also Quran. The result of every attempt that disregards Quran is disappointment. (…) What makes our civilizational experience possible is the madrasah and lodges system that is based on Quran and Sunna. If we do not restructure our education system within the frame of Quran and Sunnah, the only thing we do best with this education system that colonizes itself is to raise "volunteer slaves" who would be the volunteer agency of the Western culture as we have done until today. (*Yeni Şafak*, 13 March 2015, see Appendix 90)

Since education is significant in terms of homogenizing the youth, for creating a pious generation that is imbued with the ideal values of the 'new', Islamic education is represented as an inescapable component in the construction of the 'new' Turkey in which Quran is the main guideline. In his view, the 'old' that attempted to disregard Quran represents a failure. Unlike the 'old' regime that aimed at raising 'volunteer slaves' of the Western civilization, Islamic education is mystified since it aims at raising a pious generation who is committed to and internalized the historical and civilizational values of the 'new'. Indeed, contrary to the 'old', it implies the East in terms of civilization.

5.4.2.1.2 Topicalization

> I believe you are the youth that Mehmet Akif calls as Asım generation; a youth of revival that he longed for/yearned for. What does Akif say; I was telling Asım's generation and it was a real generation,it did not allow its honor to be run over. (*AK Party*, 5 July 2013, see Appendix 91)

> The youth Mehmet Akif imagined was not a youth that looks at the nation (*millet*) from Fatih mosque before he goes to Paris and looks at the nation from Eiffel Tower when he comes back, that is to say, a youth that become estranged from himself and his values. Akif was in pursuit of a youth that adopts/follows his own history, civilization, culture and equips and strengthens himself with the technique, knowledge and science of the West. (…)In his own terms, he imagined a youth with a delicate and sharp consciousness so that he would not give up on/dispose of the old because it was old or adopt the new because it was new. (…) For him, Asım generation will maintain the independence struggle of this nation with knowledge, science (*ilim*) and wisdom and it is the youth that will crown Gallipoli Epic with real victory. That generation is you! (*Presidency of The Turkish Republic*, 26 December 2015, see Appendix 92)

In this sample, Erdogan associates the AKP youth, in other words, 'the youth of revival', with 'Asım youth' that fought in the Battle of Gallipoli. Asım, one of the characters in Mehmet Akif's book called *Safahat*, is the name of Mehmet Akif's ideal youth. He is a prominent figure in the AKP discourse since "after the Battle of Gallipoli, Asım stood against the tyrants, injustice, unfairness and everything subverted the system."[314] Thus, Mehmet Akif's Asım is another symbol of the AKP. If their discourse on justice, tyranny and normalization of the society is taken into consideration (as it is aforementioned in the previous parts of this chapter), then it can be argued that the AKP identifies itself with Mehmet Akif's Asım in the sense of a similar struggle against the Kemalist 'old'. In addition, 'Asım' semiotically functions as the metonym of the AKP youth. 'Asım' the symbol of the AKP's imaginary youth and is therefore mystified not only for his brave and self sacrificing character in the battles of Gallipoli and Independence War but also his rebel against the Kemalist ideology that aimed a civilizational change, a shift in traditions and beliefs of the society. Furthermore, 'Asım' youth is mystified by attributing a positive self image, as a discursive strategy, that is, the AKP youth is depicted as the follow-up generation of their ancestors who fought to save the Ottoman Empire in the Battle of Gallpoli, the Independence War and the authoritarian Kemalist 'old'. Thus, the 'real victory' implies the mission assigned to the AKP youth to construct the 'new'. It will be a 'real' victory because the 'new' will be (re)constructed upon the 'authentic' values, namely Islamic, rather than the 'imitative' values of the West.

In addition to Erdoğan's parallelism between the AKP youth and 'Asım youth', it is also significant to apprehend the philosophy of Karakoç that would enable to analyze what the AKP youth embodies/represents in greater depth. Gürcan argues that the concept of " 'a man of revival'; a figure who both grasps the essence of the East and is aware of the insidious aspects of the West" [315]in his poem is peculiar to Sezai Karakoç. Gürcan emphasizes the recurring motifs of 'East' and 'West' in his poems, namely, Karakoç's juxtaposition of the former as 'white (ideal) civilization' and the latter as 'black civilization'. The ideal civilization is associated with Islamic civilization, particulary with the golden age of Islam, as a representative of Eastern metaphysics. Moreover, he argues that, in Karakoç's thinking, Seljuk Civilization and Ottoman Civilization are depicted as the phases of Islamic civilization. Ottoman civilization, as the last castle of Islamic civilization, was the continuation of this

[314]AK Party, Hakul'un Nesli ve Asım'ın Nesli… İki Modelleme, September 16, 2014.http://www.akparti.org.tr/tbmm/haberler/halukun-nesli-ve-asimin-nesli-iki-modelleme/66850
[315]Metin Gürcan, "Seventh Son of the East: Sezai Karakoç and His Doctrine of Revival", in *Turkies Studies*, (Routledge; Taylor and Francis Group), 2015, pp.6-14.

ideal civilization. [316] For Karakoç, "revival is reviving of human with Islam (…) the 'revival soldiers' who are warriers for uplifting the name of *Allah* will use every way to achieve this aim."[317]

Accordingly, it can be argued that the AKP youth, as a 'revival generation' has the duty of (re)revival of an Islamic civilization in the construction of the 'new'and this imaginary youth is sacralized or mystified by the AKP discourse as an 'Islam warrior' who fights against not only the tyrannies of the 'old' Turkey that adopted Western civilization but also the tyrannies of the West in the region of Muslim communities. Davutoğlu's guidance below in the AK Party 4th Youth Congress, illustrates the mission of this imaginary youth that in fact to become the constructers of 'new' Turkey and to become militant vanguards of the Muslim societies in the world in which there is an existential struggle between Christendom and Islam. This very mission evokes the discursive clash between 'righteousness' (Islamic civilization) and 'false' (Western civilization) in the AKP discourse;

> You are the builders of a future whose roots are in the past. (…) New Turkey is the name of the dream of future we see for you. We always stood against injustice. (…) You will also stand against injustice, will not overlook and submit to injustice. You will construct New Turkey. Do not forget that you are the hope for not only Turkey but all the oppressed. (…) Take our Prophet as an exampler. (…) A new era of conquest lies ahead of you. You will conquer the hearts. You will plant our flag of justice, freedom and peace. (*Yeni Şafak,* 21 December 2015, see Appendix 93)

It is important to note that two distinct models of imaginary youth have the similar missions in the sense that they have the role to preserve the power and the ideologies of the two parties. In other words, they have the mission to gurantee the maintanence of the 'new' and prevent any occasions in which the 'old' would haunt. For this 'sacred' mission, the exampler is Atatürk for the Kemalist youth in Kemalist discourse whereas the guiding figure is Prophet Muhammed for the AKP youth in the AKP discourse. In addition, AKP's Neo-Ottomanist discourse reappears in this sample with reference to the 'ideology of conquest'. By attributing the youth a role of Islam warrior, this ideal youth is entrusted with the task of 'conquering' or revitalizing the Ottoman(ness).'Conquering the hearts' does not merely imply the people in the national borders but also the people in the old territories of the Ottoman Empire. The conquest, however, does not refer to a territorial one but rather a cultural conquest in the old region of the Ottoman Empire for the sake of creating an Islamic union in terms of politics

[316]Ibid.
[317]Ibid, p.12.

and culture. This mentality is also congruent with Davutoğlu's Neo-Ottomanist vision which desires to make the 'new' Turkey a pivotal state in the region and in the world with the help of its Ottoman heritage.

In order to construct 'new' Turkey, in his speech in Global Education Summit in 2016, Erdoğan emphazies raising a generation with a high self-esteem that internalizes his historical and civilizational values along with the need of an appropriate curriculum that would teach the 'authentic' values of 'our civilization'.[318] For him, building this self confidence is closely related to religious belief contrary to the Kemalist discourse in which being a 'Turk' (which in fact attributes one a national identity that is isolated from the Ottoman identity or from being the descandants of the Ottomans) is designated as a source of self-confidence. Thus, the pious generation, as 'the grandchildren of the Ottomans' and strong believers of Islam, is hiearhically positioned above as such;

> The religion that our Prophet notified orders everyone to be self condifent. In order to achieve this, Muslims do not need to isolate themselves and head towards a distinct life which is completely different form others. In Quran, it says; "If you believe, you are superior." This superiority is indeed related to our belief, heart, mind and conscience. (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 12 April 2015, see Appendix 94)

One example of a discursive clash regarding youth would be related to moral education which reveals the polarization in two contending ideologies or discourses. While physical education is promoted to build a strong moral character in youth along with commitment to the regime in Kemalist discourse, the importance of religious education and religious service are emphasized to build a disciplined body and a strong moral character in *Yeni Şafak* newspaper by highlighting the words of Duralı, a professor of philosophy, as such;

> Educating the youth is necessary. Religious education is extremely important. One should have a religious education to be a moral person (...) the path to be a moral person is through religious education because it teaches order. (…)Religious service teaches me to dominate my body. It disciplines the people. (…) Being a moral person requires discipline. (*Yeni Şafak*, 6 February 2012, see Appendix 95)

As an illustration of another discursive clash, the AKP's imagination of "a youth who is demandant of his religion, language, intellect, science (*ilminin*), chastity, home, enmity/hatred and heart" embodies a counter- discourse of Kemalist imagination of "a youth whose

[318]TCBB, "Global Eğitim Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma", March 26, 2016. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/41326/global-egitim-zirvesinde-yaptiklari-konusma.html

thoughts, conscience and wisdom free". It represents, in fact, two opposing figures to whom the two leaders; Atatürk and Erdoğan refer in their address to youth; Necip Fazıl Kısakürek; a representative of metaphysic, Islamic thought and Tevfik Fikret; a representative of positivist thought. On one hand, the AKP youth is represented as a defender of Islam, 'authentic' values so that they would rebel against the rulers with 'hatred' in case of a deviation from 'authentic' values, Kemalist youth whose mind and conscience is free of religious pressures, dogmas and superstitions is represented as the defender of the regime and revolutionary principles in case of deviation from Republican values, on the other hand.

So, the signifiers 'Asım youth', 'the revival youth' and 'Necip Fazıl youth' have the same referent; 'the AKP youth' that is pious and thus moral, self confident, cognizant of his ancestors, original history, 'authentic' culture and civilization. It is this generation that is mystified as the standard- bearer of the 'blessed cause' in the AKP discourse.

5.4.2.2 Demystification

The attempt to replace the Kemalist youth with the AKP youth, more precisely with 'Asım youth', signals two distinct youth projects and a rupture in two contending discourses as implied in the previous section. The construction of this pious AKP generation as an 'ideal youth' has a discursive function of the 'otherization' of the Kemalist youth, thus also the marginalization of the values it represents in addition to the discursive clash of civilizations regarding the 'old' and the 'new'. Accordingly, the demystified concepts are 'Kemalist education', 'May 19th' and 'Kemalist youth'.

Within the context of the change in the curriculum in 2012-2013 school year that lead the way for the opening of the Imam Hatip secondary schools, - the ones that were prevented by the Kemalist ideology of 8 year of compulsory education- the following newspaper articles function not only to legitimizate the changes of the AKP power in the education system but also to demystify the education system in the Kemalist period.

5.4.2.2.1 De-topicilization

> From cradle to grave, this system tries to make the citizens believe in and to be committed to Kemalism and desires the citizens to consider every ideology, belief and thought as detrimental and destructive except Kemalism by education. Intead of an curriculum in which all cultural values unite on the basis of human rights and freedom, the curriculum that is grounded on the commitment to the state and idelology persists since the foundation of the

> Republic. As one of the former Minister of Education, Erkan Mumcu said about the present curriculum; "this system can only raise ideological mutants". (*Yeni Şafak,* 30 January 2012, see Appendix 96)
>
> In that period in the schools the idea that true Turks are the ones who support national forces movement, believe in the new Turkey and would do every sacrifice for the emancipation of the nation and the homeland and non-true Turks were pro-caliphate people who were directed to prevent national movement by the padishah and the government. (*Yeni Şafak,* 11 March 2012, see Appendix 97)

The samples above demystify the top down social enginnering project of the Kemalist ideology that attempted to raise a homogenous population that is compatible with its own principles. The youth to be raised by the Kemalist ideology is likened to 'ideological mutants'. The use of the very metaphor implies its desire to create 'a new man'. This 'new man' is downgraded and marginalized since it, in fact, has 'mutated' from an Ottoman-Islamic identity into a Western-Turkish identity. On the other hand, the Islamic-Ottoman approach to education by the AKP that 'values human' and 'centers human' in the cirruculum is mystified. In addition, the Kemalist education is demystified for its construction of the pro-caliphate or pro-sultanate members as the 'others', namely the inner enemies of the Kemalist 'new'.

The sample below also demystifies the Kemalist ideology over the commemoration of May 19th, an invented tradition of the Kemalist 'new', which has a symbolic meaning in Kemalist discourse in the sense that it is the beginning of the national struggle.Thus, both as a discursive and non-discursive practice, it functions not only to mystify Ghazi Mustafa Kemal; the leader of the national struggle – *not Atatürk*- and but also the youth, the inheritors of this struggle.

5.4.2.2.2 De-emphasis

> May 19 represents Turkey's hope and gratitude *(şükür)*. It expresses the happiness of replacement of the youth that became martry in First World War and Independence War. (…) For us, extolling the young or the youth is not an aesthetic or cosmetic phenomenon. It is a benediction, a search for consolation of a nation whose children became martrys. Well, we understood the 'youth' part but why 'sports" day? This part of the issue seems to be all related to the mentality of fascism in the Europe of 1930s. The ones who reflect the racial feautures in the best way? Athletic youth excited and filled particularly Hitler with pride. The sports were done to achieve a racial form rather than a healthy life. The matchings such as strong mind – strong body was about exaggerated

> and destructive meaning that was attributed to body. (*Yeni Şafak*, 17 May 2013, see Appendix 98)

The sample above implicitly encompasses us vs. them dichotomy. In the AKP discourse, the Kemalist ideology is demystified since May 19 is an 'aesthetic or cosmetic phenomenon" for 'them'. The conceptualization of May 19 an 'aesthetic phenomenon' is twofold. Firstly, it implies the visibility of the Republic girls in modern 'aesthetic' attire that functions to confirm the merits of the Republican 'new' and secondly, the display of the physically strong Republican boys that functions to affirm the creation of a 'new man' in the 'new'. Besides, Kemalism is downgraded for its fascist tendency of making an association between healthy minds and bodies. Yet, as it is articulated by the use of 'us' in the AKP discourse above, the youth or May 19 is not a means of exhibiting the adaptation of Western values but rather a commomeration of the martryswho fought in the War of Independence. Contrary to the Kemalist discourse, the youth is mystified by attributing it an Islamic value; martyrdom. Thus, May 19 is another illustration of the revelation of discursive of clash in terms of the adaptation two different civilizations and therefore two distinct value systems.

Finally, the third category of demystification is related to the dichotomy of the AKP and Kemalist youth in the AKP discourse.

5.4.2.2.3 Marginalization

> The doom of Tevfik Fikret's son, Haluk who had been considered to be the light that could diminish darkness is exemplary for us. Against Haluk, there is Asım generation for which Mehmet Akif prayed, longed and dreamed. These two conflicted and opposing characters are the keystone of our last 200 years of history. While there is Asım who has become a legend in Çanakkale war as the valiant warriors in the Battle of Badr[319], you cannot see Haluk in either Battle of Gallipoli or Independence War.On one hand, there is Asım who tires to perceive the West without turning his back on the East, suffered for this cause in terms of ideas, prioritizes his homeland and nation, there is Haluk who first goes to Scotland and then America and gives his last breath as a priest in a church,on the other hand. (…) Today, we also come across the symbols of Asım and Haluk. The unhealthy relationships that these characters built with the West and their morbid fascination with the West still persist. These characters are also an outcome of two different education models. Haluk and Asım give a hint of how a society that is on the edge of change can manage the

[319] Here there is reference to the Battle of Badr, a war that took place between the Muslims and Quraysh tribe in Badr; somewhere between Mecca and Medina. It is regarded as amilestone in Islam history for the Muslims since the war was won against the cruel leaders of Mecca.http://www.islamiarastirmalar.com/upload/pdf/5b3942fd84c70df.pdf?sid=500d472dd7d91cde31c98da27e79c654

> very process for its benefit or to the detriment of itself. (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 26 March 2016, see Appendix 99)
>
> Mehmet Akif's Asım is the opposite of the alienated, the ruptured soul of young intellectual type. Our political, cultural and art life of 200 years is in fact the history of the struggle between Tevfik Fikret's Haluk and Mehmet Akif's Asım.(…) On one side, there are the ones who serve this nation and there are the ones who insult and humiliate the nation, on the other side. On one hand, there are the ones who say; "Sovereignty belongs to the nation", there are the members of the tutelary regime who are righteous (judicious), on the other hand. On one side, there are the ones sacrifice their lives as a shield for the future of the young, there are the ones who sacrifice the young for their blind ideology. (*Presidency of the Turkish Republic*, 26 December 2015, see Appendix 100)

Here in these samples, the juxtaposition of two models of youth, namely and 'Asım' and 'Haluk' is evident. In fact, Tevfik Fikret's son Haluk is the metonym for the Kemalist youth. This metonym, as a discursive function, functions not only to demystify the Kemalist ideology for its abandonment of the 'authentic' self but also to 'otherize' the Kemalist youth by attributing it negative self images. In other words, there is this discursive construction of a dichotomy between the 'original'or 'authentic' self and the 'derived' or 'distorted' self.[320] As articulated by Erdoğan, these two distinct selves, in other words, two models of youth reveals the clash between these two ideologies since this 'authentic self' contains the represantations of an Ottoman-Islamic identity in itself whereas the 'derived' self, as a result of imitation, holds the represantations of a Western identity in itself. Hence, these two models of 'ideal youth' are uncompromisable.

In addition, the comparison of two distinct forms of 'ideal youth' serves to mystify the AKP youth by attributing it positive self images and demystify the Kemalist youth by attribitung negative self images. For instance, the AKP youth is depicted as martrys of the Gallipoli and Indepedance War. Thereby, the sacralization of the Asım youth as a discursive practice is at work here. Moreover, the Asım youth is hierarchically positioned above due its mere adoption of technology and the science of the West. Therefore, this generation has preserved its 'authentic' identity. On the other hand, the Kemalist youth is demystified by the illustration of Haluk who has become a 'westernized' character and ended up as a priest; a 'derived' figure that has lost his 'authentic' identity. Deriving from Ahmed Hamid Tanrıpınar's concept of 'cultural denial' with regard to the transformation of the self, Erdoğan futhers this concept by

[320]Nurdan Gürbilek, "Dandies and Originals: Authenticity, Belatedness, and the Turkish novel" in *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 102, No.2/3, 2003, p. 605.

calling it a 'cultural suicide'[321] which implies the estranged self from the traditional Ottoman-Islamic self/identity in the name of secularization, modernization and Westernization.

Last but not least, the discursive construction of a mythic historical line reappears with regard to generation. Erdoğan associates the Republican tutelary elites with the Westernized Haluk generation in the sense that they humiliated the nation and rejected its 'authentic' values, and the AKP representative with the Asım generation who fought in Bedir War as Islam warriors, served and glorified his nation in the Gallipoli and Independence War to save the last remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, 'we' as a discursive practice are depicted as the ones who are the bearers of the 'true' civilization, values and identity whereas 'they' are depicted as the ones that are the imitators of an 'other' civilization.

All in all, youth is another sub-discursive element to construct the 'other'. In other words, it functions not only as a discursive tool of 'otherization' of the Kemalist youth, thereby, Kemalist ideology but also the exclusion of the Kemalist 'old' in the construction of the 'new'. In this 'new', 'Asım youth' becomes the symbol of an 'authentic' culture and civilization whereas 'Haluk youth' becomes the symbol of an 'adulterated' culture and civilization. Both youth models indeed reveal the clash of civilizations; the East and the West in two contending discourses. Since, the discourse on youth is inevitably shaped by two distinct ideologies that have divergent mentalities and therefore aims, the roles that are discursively constructed for these imaginary youth is for the former to (re)revive the Islamic civilization and for the latter is to guarantee the maintenance of secular, modern regime along with the different representations of youth in two contending discourses.

5.5 Findings and Discussion

In his article *Ideology and discourse analysis*, Van Dijk argues that "if ideologies are acquired, expressed, enacted and reproduced by discourse, this must happen through a number of several discursive structures and strategies." [322] He states that *We/They* divide as one of the discursive strategies reveals the ideological polarization between two groups with the emphasis on "our good things" and "their bad things".[323] In this regard, the narrative selection of the two groups from their own cultural repertorie of norms and values, (for instance, the

[321] TCBB, Global Eğtim Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma, 26 March 2016
[322]Teun Van Dijk, "Ideology and discourse analysis" in *Journal of Political Ideologies*, No.11, Vol.2, 2006, p.124.
[323]Ibid.

modernist discourse of Kemalist ideology that involves modern and Western values and the religious and neo-Ottomanist discourse of the AKP ideology that emphasizes Islamic and Ottoman values) which also generates us/them dichotomy, provides the opportunity to demonstate the clash between them in terms of mystification and demystification processes regarding the binary opposition categories of this study. It also helps to determine or to grasp the other discursive strategies (such as the use of negative and positive lexicon, emphasis/de-emphasis or hyperbole within the us/them dichotomy) by which the 'new', 'old', 'Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' were represented according to the basis of values and norms of two different powers.

If political discourses are meanings that inevitably involve ideologies, values and norms, then it is possible to track the discursive practices or themes that WE or THEY find right, good, moral, acceptable in terms of mystification or bad, wrong, immoral, unacceptable in terms of demystification. One example would be the statements on 'abortion' regarding woman and on raising 'atheist generations' regarding youth in the AKP discourse. By these discursive themes, not only abortion and atheisim is ideologically depicted as wrong but also the violation of OUR (religious) values and (social) norms by THEM is emphasized. The same strategy also applies to the Kemalist discourse. For instance, the 'veiled' woman, 'harem' and education in 'madrasah' is not only ideologically marked as wrong or backward but also regarded as the dismissal of the secular and modern Turkish past by THEM. With the emphasis on the negative aspects of the 'old' in both discourses, the 'Other' is typically represented with negative terms as intolerant, inefficient and inauthentic.

The dichotomy of us and them in terms of self prasing "us" and downgrading or even demonizing "them" is a mode of polarization, marginalization or otherization. Typical example would be AKP's discoursive strategy of labeling itself as 'real Republicans' which naturally serves to mark the "other" as 'fake Republicans' who did not serve the nation but instead tyrannized them. This topicilization by means of us/them divide enables associating "us" with novelty, tolerance, freedom, and the "other" with intolerance, cruelty and segregation.

In addition, even if the discursive theme of "normalization" is employed by the AKP discourse, it is in fact expressed by the Kemalist discourse as well. The similar claim to "put" the society or the state in its normal route with the construction of the 'new' Turkey paradoxically results in repressive discourses of both ideologies particularly in their

consolidation years. Both powers tend to define the limits of what is ‘normal’ on a discursive level or more precisely what is ‘ideal’ for the society that inevitably creates not a united but on the contrary a fragmented society.

The different representations of the ‘real essence’ of the Turkish nation; namely the reference to the cultural roots of the pre-Islamic Turks in the Kemalist discourse and to the cultural roots of the Islamic-Ottoman in the AKP discourse not only demonstrates two distinct ideological preferences of the ‘real essence’ in the construction of the ‘new’ Turkey but also contributes to we/they dichotomy since ‘we’ and ‘they’ refer to the different espousal of self-essence in this sense. Moreover, during the analysis it is possible to observe that the promotion of the (re)adoption of the Western civilization in Kemalist discourse and Eastern-Islamic civilization in the AKP discourse creates the binary opposition of the representations of We and They as such; ‘we know the truth/ideal versus they are misguided’. It is thus possible to observe that when the uses of ‘we’ and ‘they’ have civilizational references, they contribute to positive self representation of ‘us’ by (re)adoption of ‘our ideal’ civilization and to negative other representation of ‘them’ by diverging from the ‘ideal’ civilization.

Another implication of us versus them divide is the mythic construction of “inner enemies”. Both powers pit the mythical characteristics of the “inner enemy” according to their ideologies. In the Kemalist discourse, it is observed that the “inner enemies” are those who are degenerate, weak, treacherous, descipable since they are pro-caliphate, pro-sultanate and in favour of the Islamic- Ottoman rule. In the AKP discouse, on the other hand, the “inner enemies” are the ones who are the imitators of the West, in favor of a Kemalist tutelary regime. What is striking is that they are both depicted as the obstacles to progress and threat to ‘New Turkey’ along with the inclusion and exclusion of the members of the society that are (in)congruent with their ideologies.

Most importantly, these are only ideologically constructed stereotypes of both ideologies that aims at categorizing the ‘other’ by discursive practices and strategies. As expected, the ‘other(s)’ are the enemies of the ‘new’. By the creation of us versus them divide; both ideologies not only naturalize their claim of ‘normalization’ but also have the opportunity to justify and legitimize their own mythic construction(s) regarding ‘New Turkey’. Defaming the past, the use of ‘old’ contributes to the discursive strategy of ‘normalization’ in the sense that it naturalizes the actions of both powers for change.

It can also be argued that on a deeper level, both powers have ideologically based doomsday scenarios. In Kemalist discourse, for instance, it is the 'haunting' of the Ottoman-Islamic 'old' in which 'they' as the ignorant, superstitious ones would make 'us' (the civilized) move backwards and lose 'our' regained image of secular and modern identity. Similarly, in the AKP discourse, it is also the 'haunting' of the Kemalist 'old' in which 'they' as the 'so-called secularists, Republicans, modernists' would make 'us' (the pious) lose 'our' regained image of Ottoman-Islamic identity and 'our' rights that are recognized in the 'new'. In fact, these bilateral discursively constructed doomsday scenarios serve to maintain and secure not only their maintenance of power but also their myhic constructions of the 'new'.

Another striking point is the creation of a new historical and cultural memory by two different powers in terms of remembering and forgetting within the construction of the 'new'. In this sense, the historical and cultural memory is shaped and controlled ideologically with discursive practices as well as non-discursive ones. The commomeration of the Conquest and the Holy Birth, May 19, April 23 are brief examples of non-discursive practices of creating a different memory in the 'New Turkey' of the AKP and Kemalism. By shaping the memory, each power gains a status of legitimacy regarding the past and their new mythic constructions and a status of eternity regarding the future and draws the limits of what to remember and forget.

Here it is important to note that these powers have two different imaginations of a Turkish nation with a different common past and future that also marks the ruptures within these two narratives. For instance, the association of the Turkish past with the pre-Islamic Turks but not with the Ottoman is a rupture in Kemalist discourse in terms of culture and history. On the other hand, the association of the Turkish past with the Islamic-Ottoman civilization reaching back to Abel and Cabil in the AKP discourse manifests a rupture with Kemalist discourse. Throughout the analysis, these historical and cultural ruptures also helped to ascertain the different imaginations of the 'Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' and the clashes within these narratives.

The emphasis and de-emphasis of different turning points in history also demonstrates the ruptures and the continuities with the 'old' in terms of memory. For the Kemalist discourse, The Speech (*Nutuk*) delivered by Atatürk in 1927 not only reconstructed Turkish history but also shaped the historical and cultural memory with the reinterpretation of the Ottoman past, namely highlighting different turning points in the Ottoman past to frame it degenerate, weak

and inefficient. For the AKP discourse, for instance, the emphasis of the religious First Assembly in 1920 (that naturally de-emphasizes 1923 Assembly) as the founding moment of 'new' Turkey manifests not only the construction of a new memory but also a rupture with the Kemalist discourse in which the 'secularized' Second Assembly in 1923 marks the foundation of 'new' Turkey. By highlighting different incidents of the Kemalist period, particularly the ones that would remind the negative aspects of Kemalist ideology such as the killing of Ali Şükrü, the ban on Quran, the AKP also attemps to create a different memory regarding Kemalist period.Accordingly, it can be argued that forming an alternative link with the past aims at alternating the current links with the past and creating new ones. Riceour defines this manipulation of the memory by the means of narratives through ideology as "forgetting":

> The narrative necessarily contains a selective dimension. (…) the ideologizing of memory is made possible by the work of configuration. The strategies of forgetting are directly grafted upon this work of configuration: one can always recount differently, by eliminating, by shifting the emphasis, by recasting the protagonists of the action in a different light along with the outlines of the action. For anyone who has crossed through all the layers configuration and of narrative configuration from the constitution of personal identity up to that of identities of the communities that structure out ties of belonging, the prime danger, at the end of this path, lies in the handling of authorized, imposed, celebrated, commemorated history – of official history. The source of narrative then becomes the trap, when high powers take over this employment and impose a canonical narrative by means of intimidation or seduction, fear or flattery. A devious form of forgetting is at work here.[324]

Accordingly, the AKP ideology that accuses of the Kemalist ideology for forgetting 'their' history and culture with the metaphor of the 'main artery, manifests itself the very same intentions. For instance, the use of photos of Atatürk in a qalpaq (*kalpak*) but not in a western hat in the commomeration speeches of Atatürk by the AKP has symbolic importance in the sense that it frames the founder of the 'new' modern Turkey as an 'Ottoman' officer who fought in the Independence War to save the 'Ottoman Empire' and found the First Assembly as the continuation of the 'Ottoman Assembly'. Moreover, in the commeration speeches, the narrative selection of the events that particularly refers to the period of before 1923, namely emphasizing the 'saviour' and 'founder' image of Atatürk but eliminating the 'reformist' and 'Westernist' image of Atatürk aims at shifting the emphasis from Atatürk's pro-Western character to 'so-called' pro-Ottoman/Islamic character before 1923. As such, Erdoğan 'recasts

[324] Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*,(Chicago:The University of Chicago Press), 2004,p.448.

the pratogonist of the action' by picking specific events in history. More importantly, Erdoğan instrumentalizes this 'preferred' image of Atatürk for their conservative social engineering project by claiming that this very construction of 'new' was directly what Atatürk had desired.

All in all, we/them divide as a discursive strategy not only functioned to mystify 'us' and demystify 'them' but also functioned to create an 'other'. The 'other' signifies the one who is not congruent with the ideology of the ones in power thus inevitably is marginalized. In addition, shaping the historical and cultural memory with the ideologically controlled narratives aims at forgetting the contested past of the 'old' and revitalizing a 'preferred' common past and therefore imagining a common future within the mythic construction of the 'new' of two powers on a discursive level. The newspapers also contributed to this process by reproducing the 'preferred' images and narratives of these ideologies.

6 CONCLUSION

This study analyzed the mystification and demystification processes of two discourses that consisted of newspaper articles, Assembly minutes and political speeches in the given periods. The comparative analysis of Kemalist and the AKP discourse enabled to demonstrate the counter discursive themes of both powers and to disclose how the mystification of "us" and the demystification of "them" or "the other" are performed on a discursive level for the realization of two different imaginations of New Turkey.

In terms of political discourse, the process of mystification can be regarded as aggrandizement or praising of the 'self' or more precisely 'us' that even can reach to an extent of sacralization with an aim of creating a sense of credulity in return whereas the process of demystification can be interpreted as downgrading, vilification of the 'other' or more precisely 'them' with an aim creating a sense of incredulity that results in the loss of legitimacy and de-sacralization of the 'other' and thus facilitates marginalization through the ideological (de)construction of narratives or creation of (new) myths. The examination of the mystification and demystificiation processes through binary opposition categories also helps to demonstrate the ideologically created hierarchial positions in two contending narratives. Hence, the comparative analysis of Kemalist and the AKP data demonstrated the mystification and demystification processes based on their ideological positionings.

Accordingly, this study is a case study of political discourse in Turkey that consists of Kemalist and the AKP narratives. It sought to analyze the discursive formations and practices of both ideologically contested power group(s) regarding their discursive (re)constructions of 'new' through the leitmotifs; 'Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' and how these discursive formations related to this 'new' were (re)produced, (de)constructed, (de)legitimized by means of binary opposition categories through mystification and demystification processes.

The role of the political speeches, Assembly minutes and the newspapers in the mystification and demystifications processes was thus threefold: The newspapers functioned as Althusserian sense of"ideological apparatuses" of the Kemalist and the AKP power for the reinforcement and the dissemination of their political propaganda in their explicit content. They also contributed to the discursive reproduction of the nationalist 'myths' and to the mystification and demystification processes through discursive practices and strategies.

Finally, they produced knowledge about “us” and “others” to be accepted as “true” by the members of the nation state.

In Kemalist discourse, the comparative analysis demonstrated that the mystification process was related to eulogization of the merits of the ‘new’ Republican regime in line with the Kemalist principles whereas demystification process took place by downgrading of the ‘old’ Ottoman regime. In the AKP discourse, however, the mystification process was related to the (re)construction of ‘new’ as a ‘normalization’ process in which the authentic values have been re-revived that signaled the return to the ‘real’ essence whereas the demystification process took place by emphasizing the failure of the Kemalist ‘new’, its radical reforms and the tutelary regime of the CHP. The binary opposition categories over ‘Ottoman’, ‘woman’ and ‘youth’ also helped to demonstrate how they functioned as tools of mystification and demystification processes along with the ‘naturalization’ and justification of the desires of the two ideologies in their imaginations of ‘New’ Turkey.

The main argument in this study was that the AKP rule first appeared in the political scene with a postmodernist discourse which was against the metanarratives of the Kemalist modernist discourse. However, the AKP established its own metanarrative -thereby its own ‘regime of truth’- which is a blend of Islamist and neo-Ottomanist discourse, to legitimize its own conservative social engineering project for the re-creation of its ‘new’ man. The analysis of the samples demonstrated that in its last phase the AKP reheld the modernist posture of Kemalist state that arised from the policy of undermining difference in order to create a homogenious society and culture – which has resulted in both polarization and marginalization as in that of Kemalizm-contrary to its multicultural and pluralistic postmodernist stance in its first phase. Apart from their similar desires to transform the society with a continuous change and their defame of the present and past and for longing for a better future in terms of modernist discourse, the difference lies in their distinctive imaginations of ‘new/old’, ‘Ottoman’, ‘woman’ and ‘youth’. Accordingly, their distinctive imaginations marked their ideological positions and more importantly helped to pursue the mystification and demystification processes regarding the given binary opposition categories.

Influenced by the totalitarian atmosphere of Europe, the authoritarian Kemalist regime not only aimed at creating ‘a new man’ but also implementing Kemalist reforms with a complete control of every realm of the society along with 1931 Press Law, 1934 Press Law for the Organization of the General Directorate of the Press and 1938 Press Union Law that made the

newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet and Ulus* function as Althusserian sense of ideological apparatuses of the state and contributed to the (re)production of the Kemalist discourse. The majoritarian power attained by the elections provided an opportunity for the AKP not only to naturalize the discourses on transformation and intervention on bodies (woman and youth) and time (history) but also to oppress any dissidents as in that of Kemalist regime in the interwar context with regard to the construction of 'New Turkey'. Likewise, *Yeni Şafak and Sabah* newspapers that had close ties with the AKP also became loyal to the AKP rule and similar to the Kemalist period they functioned as Althuserrian sense of ideological apparatuses and have (re)produced the dominant discourse and contributed to the imagination of the 'new' by (re)generating the discursive themes and practices and deconstructing the 'other' as in that of Kemalist discourse.

When the consolidation periods of two ideologies are taken into consideration; 1934-1938 and 2012-2016, the shared feature was that both are cases of a social engineering project in terms of political, social and cultural transformations for the construction of the 'new'. This is what makes both discourses pro-change and pro-creation of a 'new man'. However, the emphasis on change differs as Kemalist discourse necessitates 'revolutionary' change for a full transformation in order to break with the Ottoman-Islamic past as a rejection and thus replacement of the Ottoman identity with ethnic Turkish identity and the AKP discourse regards 'evolutionary' change as necessary in order to preserve the 'authentic' values with a promotion of Ottoman-Islamic identity in the construction of the 'new'. Since the two imaginations of the nation are grounded in different historical and cultural basis, the meanings attached to 'Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' differ widely within the discursive theme of 'New Turkey'. Thereby, the main difference is the de-emphasis and exclusion of Islam in Kemalist discourse *vis-à-vis* the emphasis and inclusion of Islam in the AKP discourse as the former regards it as an obstacle to both progress and a modern, secular 'new' while the latter designates it as a main principle in its 'new'.

Since the two ideologies share authoritarian tendencies in terms of their intervention(s) on body and time through discursive and non-discursive practices in addition to telling people what to do and not to do, both political projects aim at creating its 'new man'-with a special emphasis on youth- that is obedient to its ideology. While the Kemalist project was oriented towards a 'new man' with the Kemalist principles ingrained in his mind and apperant on his body and thus every institution such as family, school and media was intented for this creation

of ‘new man’, AKP’s political project similarly relies on the re-creation of a ‘new man’ that is congruent with Ottoman-Islamic values and principles. It entails the ‘purification’ or ‘normalization’ of the Kemalist production of ‘new man’. It is, thereby, the creation of a faithful, obedient man to its ideology as in that of Kemalist regime.In the AKP discourse, however, this is termed as the (re)revival of ‘Asım youth’. Returning to the Ottoman-Islamic, ‘authentic’ values will thus enable the ‘normalization’ of the national community in the (re)construction of the ‘new’.

Another argument throughout the study was that there are two different constructions of the ‘ideal new’. Accordingly, it was also argued that not only the Kemalist principles determined the context but also shaped the discursive act and discursive themes in Kemalist discourse while the Ottoman-Islamic principles or values determined the context and the discursive themes of the AKP discourse. Within these two constructions, the newspapers, the speeches in the Assembly and the speeches of the politicians were constitutive of the meaning and the representations of the ‘New’, ‘Ottoman’, ‘woman’ and ‘youth’ in line with the Kemalist principles and the Ottoman-Islamic principles or values.

The analysis of newspaper articles, Assembly speeches and other speeches of the representatives of both parties also demonstrated the establishment of Foucauldian sense of “regime of truth” in both discourses but as different versions of ‘true’ national identity, ‘true’ history, ‘true’ culture or ‘true’ essence regarding ‘New Turkey’. In fact, the mystification and the demystification processes take place over this struggle for this ‘regime of truth’ since the discursive practices in these narratives produce and advocate different assumptions of ‘truth’ with an attempt to replace the previous norms, ideals and values of the ‘old Turkey’.

As mentioned above, the newspapers’ role were important in terms of functioning as ideological apparatuses in order to disseminate the messages and contribute to the (re)construction of the images of the ‘new’ that are congruent to the ideologies of two powers. Accordingly, it was also observed that *Cumhuriyet and Yeni Şafak* newspapers predominantly contributed to the reproduction of the official discourses regarding both the discursive theme ‘New/Old’ Turkey and sub-discursive themes. This inference, in fact, does not have a content analysis basis but rather stems from the discursive intensity of the relevant articles in the pre-mentioned newspapers that are collected during the data collection process and employed for the discourse analysis. In this sense, it was observed that *Cumhuriyet and Yeni Şafak* newspapers articles and opinion columns provided comparatively more intense range of

discursive themes regarding the binary opposition categories. Yet, *Sabah and Ulus* newspapers were also significant in terms of the (re)production of the discursive themes related to two contending discourses. Another significant point is that while the discursive themes and practices were mostly evident in news articles, other discursive practices related to the mystification and demystification of particularly "Kemalism", "Islamism" and "neo-Ottomanism" with regard to 'New/Old' Turkey was most apparent in opinion columns.

This research provided an opportunity to discuss how 'New Turkey' and 'Old Turkey' were represented in the discourses of the one-party period and the last phase of the AKP and how both are mystified and demystified with other binary opposition categories. In two different imaginations of the 'new', thereby, appeared two dimensions; historical and cultural dimensions along with two different national identities.

The historical dimension was formed on the basis of two contending discourses that helped to imagine the 'new' within different course of history. In this sense, discourses with a reference to past, present and future have different implications. For instance, representation of the 'new Turkey' in Kemalist discourse as a continuation of a secular modern mythic past of pre-Islamic Turks is significant since it indicates a rupture form the Ottoman past. On the other hand, the representation of the 'new' Turkey as a continuation of mythic golden Islamic past and the Ottoman past is an illustration of another rupture from Kemalist history. In terms of present, references to 'putting' the society to its 'normal' route lead to imagine the 'new' that regained its 'true essence'. As such, references to future indicate the persistence of two different 'true essence' in this 'imagined new'.

The cultural dimension that was formed by the discourses demonstrated in fact a conceptual difference representing different civilizations in terms of cultural norms and values and thus helped to imagine a 'new' with different civilizational backgrounds. Discourses, on one hand, are at large based on West-oriented, secular nationalist culture in Kemalist narrative and on the other hand, East-oriented, Islamic nationalist culture is the main basis of the AKP narrative. In addition, the Turkish national identity was represented with an emphasis on ethnic Turkism, thus, excluded particularly the Ottoman identity in the former whereas it is represented as authentically Ottoman and Islamic with regard to 'New Turkey'. In this sense, the discursive practices function as a re-establishment of the ethnic and secular Turkish identity with an Islamic one. In addition, it was also observed that how secularism is regarded as an essential part of Turkish national identity and a norm of private and public life in

Kemalist discourse and how Islamism is regarded as a national ideology in the (re)formulation of an alternative identity with alternative constitutive norms and principles in the AKP discourse.

Apart from the similar claim to restore 'our own authentic value system' in both discourses, it was also demonstrated that the emphasis on civilizational difference with regard to 'Old and New Turkey' reappeared in all sub-discursive themes. That is, each binary category regarding 'Ottoman', 'woman' and 'youth' was represented, (de)constructed and also mystified or demystified with reference to (pre-Islamic Turkish) Western civilization and (Ottoman) Islamic civilization, thereby, they were recurrent discursive practices in terms of 'conflict of civilizations' in both narratives.

The comparative analysis of the discourses regarding 'New/Old Turkey' revealed the characteristics of two mythical constructions within the context of Kemalist one-party period in 1930s and the AKP in single-party rule in 2010s. Hence, the mid 1930s should be considered as the consolidation years of Kemalism since six principles were incorporated into the CHP party program in 1935 and into the Turkish constitution in 1937. Apart from the party- state-leader unification in the period, all the institutions such as schools, families, media and army were forced to disseminate Kemalist ideology and its principles. In addition, the creation of a 'new man' in this period was the main issue in the political agenda of Kemalism as that of the totalitarian systems in Germany, Soviet Russia and Italy. The periods between 2012 and 2016 should also be considered as the consolidation years during which the AKP intensively employed the tools of Kemalism as it gradually became the one that it has been critical of while its alternative conservative social engineering project became explicit as a consequence of complete grip of power stemming from the recurring electoral victories that was 'crowned' by the Presidential elections in 2014.

The analysis of the similar main discursive theme and other sub-discursive themes demonstrated that the discourses by which this new/old dichotomy was reconstructed not only functioned as constructing knowledge about the rightfulness of the 'new' but also served to praise and legitimize the 'new' by mystification process and to emphasize the 'fallacies' of the 'old' and de-legitimize it by demystification process. Accordingly, it was also demonstrated that how the negative comparison within both discourses in relation to the (re)construction of the 'new' through the discursive practices functioned to mystify 'us' as good, morally, politically, historically and culturally right or 'ideal' whereas to demystify the

‘other’ or ‘them’ as bad, morally, politically, historically and culturally wrong or ‘defective’. The mutual intense use of negative lexicalization in both discourses, for instance, particularly served for this purpose.

New/Old dichotomy, thus, serves as an element for constructing knowledge about the merits of the ‘new’ regime and the inferiorities of the ‘old’ regime in both discourses. This knowledge is presented as ‘truth’ with an assumption that the members of the nation would accept is as ‘true’. One of the other discursive themes, the Ottoman, was represented as a degeneration process and thus was ‘othered’ and discursively excluded in Kemalist discourse regarding ‘New Turkey’ whereas it was depicted as the ‘real’ essence and the ‘real’ ancestors of the ‘New Turkey as a revival process in the AKP discourse.

‘Woman’ and ‘youth’ as other sub-discursive themes functioned as ideological representations of the New/Old Turkey. Apart from being assigned national duties by the two ideologies, it was observed that they were instrumental in terms of presenting the successes and failures of the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ which also served to mystify and demystify the mythical constructions of two ideologies.

Since one term of the binary opposition is always dominant (veiled woman over unveiled woman or Asım youth over Kemalist youth), it was also possible to demonstrate how the image of ‘woman’ and ‘youth’ were (re)constructed, (re)produced in each discourse in order to represent the ‘new’, how the other terms of the binary opposition categories that do not fit their ideological representations were ‘othered’ or marginalized and thus how these mystification and demystification processes took place within each of these binary opposition categories.

It was also argued that Kemalism was demystified with the tools of Kemalism, that is, it was downgraded, vilified, de-legitimized and deconstructed with the foundational principles of Kemalism. Within the AKP discourse, these principles became the discursive practices for not only demystifying the ‘old’ and creating it as the ‘other’ but also mystifying its own ‘new’.

The analysis and the findings confirmed that the selected newspapers, political speeches and the Assembly minutes within the consolidation periods of the two powers can be regarded as sources to explore mystification and demystification processes by means of discursive practices and themes under the title of New/Old Turkey.

What determines the limitations of this study is that it discusses or interprets the mystification and demystification processes mainly in specific newspapers and political speeches in a given time and within a specific context. Hence, all other constituents of political discourse with regard to the construction of New/Old Turkey and the mystification and demystification processes concerning Kemalism and the AKP are potential areas of research for future studies.

Finally, my personal journey throughout this study is also worth to mention. The following lines serve to express self transformation toward the end of this studythat refers to relatively having been liberated from the ideological constructions.In the very beginning of this study, my main motivation was the desire to fully comprehend the reasons of the growing dispute between two powers over the issue of New Turkey particularly in the last phase of the AKP that also led to ever increasing tension in the society; mostly evident on one hand in the harsh brawls among the ordinary people over the very issue in daily life and in the ideological polemics regarding, for instance, women and youth that dominated the political agenda on the other hand. Most importantly, the polarization and the dissensus have reached such an unprecended level that news has appeared in media each day as proofs of increasing intolerance towards diversity. Thus, on a deeper level I wanted to 'explore' the 'faulty part' for this division in the society. Yet, finding the 'faulty' or 'more faulty' part is not the issue. What is really significant is the fact that one becomes the tool, or more precisely the 'puppet' of power (without any awareness of the case) both on a discursive and non-discursive level for the realization of its intentions in addition to its (de)construction and (de)legitimization processes.

During this study, however, I have been through several processes of realization. First realization was that I had a blurred vision due to the fact that I myself am a product of a particular ideology. In other words,every individual is, in fact, a product of an ideological construction thus one has to deconstruct himself in order to reach an awareness; namely, the awareness of the influence of power both on his mind and body. Secondly, the so-called 'ideal' that has been disseminated by the media, inculcated by the official ideology was in fact not only imperfect and deficient in many ways but also destructive and intolerant. Thirdly, the 'oppressed', that manifest itself in the form of rebellion against tyrannies, can take the form of the one of which had been critical once it holds the complete grip of power, thereby causing the very same rebellions or tyrannies and thus in fact creating a vicious circle in return.

Simply put, I had to deconstruct myself in order to conduct this research. It was a painful, deconstructive but more importantly a re-constructive process. Yet, it seems that more awareness does not bring bliss, but rather brings a relief that makes you both stand out from the crowd and yet feel alienated in return.

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8 APPENDIX

ORIGINAL PARTS OF THE CORPUS (OF NEWSPAPERS, SPEECHES AND ASSEMBLY MINUTES) FOR THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

1. Cumhuriyet rejimi, yurdumuzda huzur ve dinginliğin iyi şekilde yerleşmesini sağlamış bulunuyor. Vatandaşlar ve bu yurtta oturanlar, Cumhuriyet kanunlarının eşit şartları altında, kendileri için hazırlanan hürriyet, refah ve mutluluk olanaklarından en üst düzeyde yararlanmaktır. (*161. T.B.M. Meclisi'nin 5. Dönem 3. Yasama Yılını Açış Nutku*,1 Kasım 1937-Birleşim: 1-Açık Celse)

2. Türk inkılabı biribiri ardından gelen tek tek bir takım vak'aların, hadiselerin hikayesi değil, asil bir milletin, bünyesindeki yüksek kahramanlık, şeref ve kudreti aynı zamanda ifade den büyük vak'aların ve hadiselerin hikayesidir. Bu millet, asırlarca en şani idaresizlikler ve en uyutucu hurafelerin tesiri altında siyasi benliğini, içtimai bünyesini, dünyadaki asil mevcudiyetini, kaybetmiş değil, kaybetmiş görünür bir hale gelmişti.Inkilap; fenayı, köhneyi, geriyi ve zararlıyı birden kökünden söküp onun yerine, iyiyi, doğruyu, haklıyı ve faydalıyı koymak, haklı ve faydalı esasları perçinleyip milletin içtimai bünyesinde yaşatmaktır. İnkılap ekseriya zorlu vasıtalarla vaki olur (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 Mart 1937)
3. İki asırdan beri öldürücü bir hastalığa tutulduğu zannedilen "Avrupanın hasta adamı" iyileşmiş ve yirmi sene evvel rakib talibler arasında bilfiil taksime uğramış bulunan Anadolunun "kuvvetli adamı" olarak karşımıza çıkmıştır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 Temmuz 1934)
4. Kemalizm tarihin ve hayatın en iyi ve doğru görüşün ifadesidir. Bu itibarla cemiyet telakkilerindeki bu eksik ve bir taraflı görüşleri redderek, hayatın bu bütünlüğünü ve beraberliğini kabul etmiş ve icraatini bu ana prensibe göre ayarlamıştır. (…) Kemalizmin kendinden evvel yaşamış rejimler gibi dogmatizmin aleyhinde olması, kendi "dogma" larının ebediliğini iddiaya vesile olmak için yapılmamıştır. Bilâkis kendisine bugün hakim olan umdelerin dahi hayata tâbi olduğunu, icab ederse onları hayata kolaylıkla feda edebileceğini açıkça ve liderinin ağzından korkmadan ifade eder ve en büyük kuvveti de bu açık hakikatten alır. İdeolojisi bu kadar canlı bir kaynaktan beslenen bir rejimin ne derece dinamik, haraketli ve müthiş bir kuvvet olacağı kolaylıkla anlaşılabilir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Kasım 1937)

5. Atatürk'ün müstakil ve homojen bir türkiye yaratması tarihe geçecek büyük bir hadise olmakla beraber, ondan daha manalı olan bir taraf da gene aynı şefin türk milletine yeni bir ruh aşılamakta bulunmasıdır.(…)Yeni Türkiyenin temeli olan Kemalizm yalnız politik ve sosyal bir system, bir hayat felsefesi değildir. Bunlardan daha fazla bir şeydir. Kemalizm, türkiyenin modern bilgiye ve terakkiye açılması, fatalism ve fikri karanlık yerine rasyonalizmin ikamesi, yeni endüstri ve yeni talim ve terbiye demektir. Bununla beraber Kemalizm, işe, mukadderata, etrafındaki kainat içinde bir kimsenin alması gelen vaziyete de yeni bir veçhe vermektedir. (*Ulus*, 12 Kasım 1938)

6. (…) Bu dinamik kuvvet (milli varlığımızdan çıkan kuvvet), asırlarca gür bir çağlayan, boşuna akıp giden nehir gibi israf edilmiş, gitmişti. Bu büyük dinamik kuvveti, keşfederek milletin mukadderatını değiştiren ve cemiyet hayatını hükmüne alan Büyük Önder Atatürk olmuştur. Hayat yürüyor, duran birşey yoktur, duran çiğnenir;

hergün ileri gideceğiz (…) Cemiyetin bu ileri gidişine ancak dogmalar, fikri ve hareketi baltalayan iptidaî kafakar sed çekebilirdi. Din dogması, asırlarca Türk ve İslâm âleminin inkişafına mâni olmuştu. Türk inkilâbı onun için evvalâ bununla mücadele etti. Artık yeniden din yaratamayız. Hayat ne isterse o olacak; fakat hayatı da boş bırakmayarak hükmümüze alacağız. İşte Kemalizmin en büyük vasfı. (*Cumhuriyet,* 7 Kasım 1937)

7. Bizim Devlet yönetimimizdeki ana programımız, Cumhuriyet Halk partisi ana programıdır. Bunun kapsadığı ilkeler, idare ve siyasette bizi aydınlatan ana çizgilerdir. Fakat bu ilkeleri, gökten indiği sanılan kitapların dogmalarıyla asla bir tutulmalıdır. Biz, gökten ve gaipten değil, doğrudan doğruya hayattan esinlenmiş durumdayız. Bizim yolumuzu çizen, içinde yaşadığımız yurt, bağrından çıktığımız Türk millet ve bir de milletler tarihinin bin bir acılı olay, sıkıntı ve üzüntü dolu yapraklarından çıkardığımız sonuçlardır. Elinizdeki programın ruhu, bizim yanlız bir bölüm vatandaşlarla ilgilenmemizi önler. Biz bütün Türk milletinin hizmetçisiyiz. Geçen yıl içinde, parti ile Hükümet kuruluşunu birleştirmekte vatandaşlar arasında ayrılık tanımadığımızı uygulamayla göstermiş olduk. (*161. T.B.M. Meclisi'nin 5. Dönem 3. Yasama Yılını Açış Nutku*,1 Kasım 1937-Birleşim: 1-Açık Celse)

8. Modern Ankara yanlız binaları ile değil aynı zamanda abideleri ve heykeltraş eserleri ile dahi nazarı dikkate çarpıyor. Eski Türk şehirlerinde son derece günah sayılan böyle eserler mefkud idi. Sultanların Türkiyeden ayrıldıkları ancak on beş sene olduğu halde yeni devlet merkezi Ankaranın her köşesinde bir heykel görünmektedir. (…) Diğer her Türk şehrinde dahi heykeller vardır. Bu heykeller daha ziyade Atatürkün metodlarının remzini ifade etmektedir. (*Cumhuriyet,* 2 Eylül 1937)

9. Atatürkün yeni Cumhuriyetin eski saraylar ve mabedlerle dolu kadim payitahttan lâyıkıile idare edilemeyeceğini düşünmesinde haklı sebepler vardı. Eski İslam san'atının muhteşem eserleri ile dolu bir yer olan İstanbul hiçbir zaman kâfi derecede asrileşemeyecekti. (*Cumhuriyet,* 7 November 1937)
10. Evvelce Türkiye'ye şunları görmek için giderlerdi. Peçeli kadınlar, entarili erkekler (…) fırıl fırıl dönen ve feryat eden dervişler (…) tuhaf kıyafetli ve göbekli dervişler. Ziyaretçiler türbeleri, evliya mezarlarını, ibadet yerlerini gezmek için Müslaman ruhu taşımaya çalışırlardı. (…) Evet bu mazideki ihtiyar Türkiye hakikaten enfes bir memleketti. (…) Herşey ciddi gibi görünür, fakat hiç birşey hatta ölüm hatta isyanlar mühüm telakki edimezdi. (…) En büyük marifet ve bilgi yuvarlak macun tepsisinden gül reçeni kaşıklarken etraftakileri bozmamaktı. Arap harfleri ile yapılan tedrisat sökülmez ve yürümez bir halde idi. Alafranga ve alaturka saatlerle zihinlerini karıştırırlar, tarih başı olarak İsanın doğumu yerine hicreti saymakla büsbütün Şarklılaşırlardı. (…) mazideki ihtiyar Türkiye! Hükümet bir bela, polis bir zorba.. Fakat bahşiş ve rüşvet herşeyi yoluna koyan bir uzlaşma vasıtası. (…) Şimdi Türkler bizim gibi giyiniyorlar, Türkler bizim gibi yiyorlar, Türkler bizim gibi eğleniyorlar, Türkler bizim tabiat ve adetlerimizi tehalükle uyguluyorlar. Artık harem yok! Yüksek sınıflara mensup olanlar birçok seyahetler yapmıştı (…) Türk hayatının bu geriliği onları kızdırıyor ve iğrendiriyordu. (…) Hürriyet isteyen kadınlar sokakta peçelerini açşalar taşa tutulacaklarını biliyorlardı. Dini taasupla karışık kötü itikatlar bu eski adetlerin bekçiliğini yapıyordu. Halbuki Türkiye ölmedi, değişti. Hem de kökünden

ve baştan aşağı değşti. İtikatlar, adetler, usuller tamamen değişti. (…) Türkiye ruhunu değitirmişti. (*Cumhuriyet,* 23 Ekim 1934)

11. Bugün din mevzubahis değildir. Türkiye'de Türk devletinin dinle alakası yoktur.Laiktir. Laiklik dinsizlik değildir. Esasen bir devlet için din mevzuu bahsolamaz. Devlet efendi diye bir şahış mutasavver değildir ki o oruç tutsun, zekat versin! Binaenaleyh Türkiyenin dini yoktur. Devlet din meselerile meşgul değildir demek eskiden olduğu gibi şu dini kabul edeceksin, demek salahiyetini haiz değildir demektir. Din Türk devletinin mukadderatında hakim olduğu zamanlarda Türk milletinin bellibaşlı intihatına sebep olmuştur, ben buna kaniim. Çünkü din devletin mukadderat nazımı olmakla bilhassa sultanlarının elinde bir tahakküm vasıtası oluyordu. Türk laik devleti istiyor ki insanın en aziz vicadanına şunun bunun eli değmesin. Kim oluyor o sultan ki insanın en kutsi vicdanına el değdirecek? Türk Cumhuriyeti dini kaldırmadı. Herkes kendi dinini intihapta hürdür. (*Cumhuriyet,* 17 Mayıs 1934)
12. Erdoğan cumhur reisliğinin eski Türkiye"nin mutlak sona erişi ve yeni Türkiye"nin mutlak kuruluşu anlamına geldiğini anlatıyor. (…)Dirilişin, Büyük Doğu olmanın, aydınlanmanın(Risale-i Nur), milli varlıkla ayağa kalkmanın(Milli Görüş) girişimlerinin bir üst aşamaya ulaşmasıdır. Selçuklular ve Osmanlılar sonrasında kurulan cumhuriyetin yeni cumhuriyete ermesidir. (*Yeni Şafak,* 13 Haziran 2014)
13. Esasen Yeni Türkiye, 23 Nisan 1920'nin özünü ve ruhunu yeniden kavramış, o ilk Meclis'te oluşan özgürlüğü, renkliliği ve çeşitliliği yeniden hayata geçirmiş bir Türkiye'dir. (…)Yeni Türkiye, sürekliliği içinde barındıran; geçmiş, bugün ve gelecek arasında sağlam köprüler kurmamıza imkân veren, inşacı, yön gösterici bir kavramdır.(…) Yeni Türkiye, medeniyet köklerimize bağlılık ve tarihsel coğrafyamızla barışma anlamında bir sürekliliğe işaret ederken, topluma ve siyasete bakış anlamında bir kopuşa tekabül etmektedir. (…)Yıllardır bu toplumda "öteki"leştirilenler, demokratik siyasî süreçlere dahil olmakta, kendi taleplerini siyasete iletebilmektedirler. (…)Bugün bazılarının kutuplaşma olarak gördüğü şey, aslında kimliklerin çoğulcu ifadesinden başka bir şey değildir. (…)Yeni Türkiye, çoğulcu bir Türkiye'dir ve siyaset bu çoğulcu toplumsal yapının temsiliyle mükelleftir. (*TCCB,* 10 Ekim 2014)
14. Bugüne ne kadar her ne yaptıysak Türkiye için yaptık, 76 milyonun tamamı için yaptık, hangi adımı attıysak Türkiye'nin normalleşmesi için attık. Yaptığımız reformlar belli kesimlere imtiyaz sağlayan değil, tam tersine belli kesimlerdeki imtiyazları alan, 76 milyonu birleştiren, Türkiye'yi normalleştiren reformlardır. (…)11 yıldır attığımız her adım, yaptığımız her reform, özünden uzaklaşan Türkiye'yi özüne döndürmüştür. Yaptığımız her reform, kuruluş felsefesinden uzaklaştırılan Türkiye'yi yeniden kuruluş felsefesine yaklaştırmıştır.(…) Bizim yaptığımız Türkeye'yi normalleştirmektir, bizim yaptığımız derin yaraları tedavi etmektir. (*AK Parti,* 8 Ekim 2013)
15. Bugün kutlu bir Fatiha'yı, kutlu bir açılışı idrak ediyoruz.
    Bugün bir dönemin kapılarını kapatık, yeni bir döneme adım atıyoruz.(…) Bugün devletle milletin muhabbetle kucaklaştığı gün. Milletine tepeden bakan devlet anlayışı sona erdi.Devletin ve milletin iki ayrı istikameti bulunmuyor.Devlet ile millet aynı

istikamette çalışıyor Şimdi söz de karar da milletin oldu. (*Yeni Şafak*, 11 Ağustos 2014)

16. Biz, kökü mazide olan atiyiz. Biz, kökü olmayan, ruhu olmayan, geçmişiyle irtibatlarını koparmış bir parti, böyle bir hareket asla değiliz. Bu harekette Abdülhamid Han'ın dirayeti, Fatih Sultan Mehmet'in kahramanlığı, Osman Gazi'nin basireti, Nureddin Zengi'nin cesareti, Sultan Alparslan'ın imanı vardır. Bu harekette Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in ufku, vizyonu, hayalleri vardır. (…) Bu hareket, 14 asır önce Mekke'nin yalçın dağlarına inzal olmuş, Allah kelamını, onun alemlere rahmet olarak gönderilmiş Nebisini kendisine rehber edinmiş bir harekettir. Bu hareket, Ahmet Yesevi'den Mevlana'ya, Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli'den Hacı Bayram-ı Veli'ye, Yunus Emre'den Fuzuli'ye, Ahmedi Hani'den Melaye Ciziri'ye, Nazım Hikmet'ten Necip Fazıl'a, Mehmet Akif'ten Sezai Karakoç'a kadar o tatlı pınarlardan kana kana içmiş, o bereketli pınarlardan beslenmiş bir harekettir.(…) Biz bu yola 13 yıl önce çıkmadık, biz bu yola 100 yıl önce çıkmadık, biz insanlık tarihi boyunca dosdoğru bir istikamette ilerleyen, dinin ve doğrunun mücadelesini tevarüs etmiş bir hareketiz (…) Milyarlarca isim kayboldu ve gitti, ancak Hazreti Adem'le başlayan iyinin ve kötünün mücadelesi insanlık tarihi boyunca devam etti, hak ile batıl mücadelesi. İsimleri fanidir, baki olan davadır. Dün bu büyük davanın sancaktarlığını başkaları yapıyor, mücadelesini başkaları veriyordu, bugün o sancağı biz gururla ve şerefle taşıyoruz.(*AK Parti*, Erdoğan 1. Olağanüstü Büyük Kurultayı'ında yaptığı konuşma, 27 Ağustos 2014)
17. AK Parti bizatihi bu milletin ta kendisidir, AK Parti bu coğrafyanın ta kendisidir. AK Parti bu ülkede her bir vatandaşımızın içinde kendi hayallerini, hedeflerini bulduğu, kendine yer bulabildiği, kendini evinde hissettiği dev bir çatıdır. Bu çatının altında asla istismarı bulamazsınız, yalanı, kandırmacayı bulamazsınız, ayrımcılığı ötekileştirmeyi, haksızlığı göremezsiniz. Bu çatının altında sadece hizmet, huzur, refah var, kardeşlik var. (…)Esasında büyük bir zihniyet devrimi gerçekleşti. Milletin iradesini yücelterek güven ve istikrarı tesis eden anlayış yönetime geldi. Onlarca yıldır Türk siyaseti üzerine karabasan gibi çöken darbeci, vesayetçi, elitist zihniyet gitti, ileri demokrasiye hak ve özgürlüklere inanan bir anlayış geldi. Millete efendilik taslayanlar gitti, millete hizmetkar olanlar geldi. Cumhuru hor gören, cumhuriyet istismarcıları gitti, cumhuru kucaklayan, onu bağrına basan gerçek cumhuriyetçiler geldi. (*AK Parti,* 3 Ekim 2012)
18. Çünkü biz renklerin ve dillerin farklı olmasını Allah'ın varlığının ve briliğinin bir işareti olduğunu biliyoruz. (…) Bu paket bir zihniyet değişimidir. Türkiye artık tanımlayan, belirleyen halkını tebaa olarak, güdülmesi gereken bir kitle olarak gören devlet anlayışından millet-devlet bütünleşmesini sağlamaya niyet etmiş olan bir devlet anlayışına dönüşmüştür. (*Yeni Şafak*, 3 October 2013)

19. Kabil'in kardeşi Habil'i haset yüzünden öldürmesi ve bunu şiddetle reddetmesi ile açığa çıkan "birlikte yaşama" sorunu hayatımızın merkezinde oldu ve olmaya da devam edecek.(…) Mesela bizler Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminde birlikte yaşamanın şartlarını, eksikleri, hataları ile birlikte bir istikrara oturtmuştuk. Fatih Sultan Mehmet'te devlet aklının zirvesine oturan şey, adalet merkezli bir yönetim

anlayışıydı. Padişahlar, zorunlu olmadıkları halde, kendilerini Şeriat'a bağımlı kıldılar ve ahlaki bir üst ufku (sınır/had) yok saymadılar. Güçlü bir padişahın kendi yoluna gitmesini önleyecek bir zorunluluk yoktu. Ama Osmanlı padişahları, o dönemin şartlarında çoğulcu bir imparatorluğu bir arada tutmanın asgari adalet standardını oluşturmaktan geçtiğini bilecek ferasete sahiptiler. (…)Görünürde bir ülke kurmuş olsak da, aslında ortaya bir tür manda çıktı. Batıcılaşma ile önce bürokrasiye, sonra topluma sirayet eden mühendislik kısmen başarılı oldu. (…)Osmanlı bir gerçeklikti ve dünyayı biçimlendirdi. Toplumsal hafızamız, kazanın olduğu yere çağırıyor bizi. Katil de orada. Karşılaştık, artık geriye dönülemez. (*Yeni Şafak*, 7 Haziran 2015)

20. 23 Nisan 1920'de Ankara'da Büyük Millet Meclisi açılmadan önce, bizzat Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in talimatıyla bütün vilayetlerde hatimler indirilmiş, Mevlidi Şerifler okunmuştu. 23 Nisan günü özellikle bir Cuma gününe denk getirilmişti, Cuma günü Ankara'da Hacı Bayram Camii'nde Cuma Namazı kılınmış, hatim duası yapılmış, Buhari Şerifler hatmedilmişti, Ulus'taki Meclis binasının önüne gelinmişti, Ulus'taki Meclis binasının önünde yine dualar edilmiş, kurbanlar kesilmiş, Büyük Millet Meclisi bu şekilde açılmıştı; çok anlamlı değil mi, çok manidar (…)Meclis kürsünün arkasına hangi emri ilahi konmuştu biliyor musunuz? Onlar işlerini istişareyle yaparlar mealindeki Şura Suresi'nin 38'inci ayeti yazılmıştı. İlk Meclisteki muhteva tam anlamıyla bir Türkiye manzarasıydı, orada Türkler vardı, Kürtler vardı, Araplar vardı, Çerkezler vardı, Gürcüler vardı, Arnavut vardı, Boşnak vardı, Roman vardı, orada Sünniler vardı, Aleviler de vardı, milletin bütün unsurları işgali sona erdirmek, Kurtuluş Savaşını sevk ve idare etmek, zafer kazanmak için gönül birliği yapmışlardı. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin mayası işte orada, o ilk Mecliste atılmıştı.(*AK Parti*, Erdoğan 1. Olağanüstü Büyük Kurultayında Yaptığı Konuşma, 27 Ağustos 2014)

21. 29 Ekim 1923, 1299'da kurulan Osmanlı Cihan Devleti'nin bir uzantısıdır. 1923, 1453'ün bir devamıdır (…) Yeni Türkiye devletinin yapısı, ruhu milli egemenliktir' diyen yine Gazi Mustafa Kemal'dir. Yeni Türkiye vurgusu ilk kez Gazi Mustafa Kemal tarafından Nutuk'ta defalarca zikredilmişti. Gazi Mustafa Kemal, tam da bizim addettiğimiz gibi yeni Türkiye ile 23 Nisan 1920'de temelleri atılan Türkiye'yi kastetmiştir. Bizim yeni Türkiye özlemimiz tıpkı Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in kast ettiği gibi 23 Nisan 1920 Türkiye'si, o ruh, o heyecan ve o örftür." (*Yeni Şafak*, 11 Kasım 2014)
22. Anadolu insanı, Cumhuriyet döneminde milletten gelen bir istekten daha çok, devletten gelen bir baskıyla, büyük bir değişim yaşadı. Türkiye'de büyük sarsıntılara yol açan değişim, evrimle değil, devrimle gerçekleştirildi. Bu yüzden, Anadolu insanın kültürel dünyasındaki yıkımları, çok büyük ve çok acılı oldu. (…)Türkiye değişmeden değişmesini başaramadı. Bütün kesimleriyle Anadolu, öylesine değiştirildi ki, hiçbir şey aynı kalmadı. Silahla yapılan devrimler, Anadolu insanının değişmeyen değerlerini de değiştirdi. Oysa değişimler değişmeyen değerleri korumak için yapılır. Değişim sürekli ve kesintisizdir. Dünyada bir ülke, ne kadar değişirse, o kadar aynı kalır. Ancak değişimler, güçle değil oyla yapılmadır. (*Yeni Şafak*, 14 Mayıs, 2013)
23. "CHP ideolojisi ve idaelleri halkın ideoloji ve ideallerine zıt, halkın ekonomik refahını sağlayamamış ihtilalci bir partidir. (…)CHP yöneticileri hep, "Biz devlet

kurmuş ve cumhuriyeti ilan etmiş bir partiyiz" diye övünürler. Kanaatimce bu doğru değildir. İstiklal Savaşı'nı millet kazanmış ve devletini millet kurmuştur. CHP İstiklal Savaşı kazanıldıktan sonar kurulmuş, "devlet kurucu" değil, devleti "Tek Partili dönem veya Yönetim" adı altında 1923'ten 1945'e kadar tam 22 yıl devleti "tekel"ine alan veya "gasp" eden bir parti olmuştur. Karşısına "cumhuriyetin ve demokrasinin bir gereği" denilerek çıkan muhalefet partileri Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası ve Serbest Cumhuriyet fırkasını kapatarak tek partili yönetimini kurmuştur. İlan ettikleri de gerçek anlamda "cumhuriyet" değildir. (*Yeni Şafak*, 3 Ekim 2014)

24. "Tek parti iktidarının tepeden inmeci, dayatmacı, çağdaşlaşma zihniyeti yüzünden söz konusu kanun, tümüyle yürürlükten kaldırıldı. Çağdaşlaşacağız, modernleşeceğiz, uygarlaşacağız, alafrangalaşacağız denilerek taklitçi bir anlayışla alkol tüketimi özendirilmeye başlandı. 'Bedeli ne olursa olsun' dediler, 'ölenler öldü kalan sağlar bizimdir' dediler. Tek parti iktidarı döneminde, alkol teşviki o kadar abartılı bir propagandaya dönüştürülmüştür ki, lokantalara afişler asılmış, alkolün ne kadar faydalı olduğu anlatılmıştır." (*Yeni Şafak*, 27 Nisan 2013)
25. "Tek parti CHP'si yıllarına, o dönemdeki Cumhuriyet anlayışına ilişkin birkaç anekdot anlatmak istiyorum. Eski Milli Eğitim Bakanlarından rahmetli Tahsin Banguoğlu tek parti döneminde bir Cumhuriyet Bayramı'nda tören alanında toplananlara konuşma yapmak amacıyla kürsüye çıkar. Selamlamadan sonra konuşmaya, 'Cumhuriyet öyle bir şeydir ki' diye başlar, fakat devamını getiremez. Çünkü o dönemdeki tek parti iktidarının, milletin sahipleneceği bir Cumhuriyet kazanımı bulup, ifade etmek kolay değildir. Rahmetli Banguoğlu, sözünün devamını şu şekilde getirmek zorunda kalır; 'Cumhuriyet öyle bir şeydir ki tadından yenmez.' (*TCCB,* 29 Ekim 2015)
26. İlk ve ortaokullarda ant uygulaması 1933 yılında başladı. Andımız olarak bilinen metnin yazarı son derece tartışmalı bir isim olan Doktor Reşit Galip'ti. Milletimin şunu da özellikle bilmesini isterim: Andımızın yazarı olan Reşit Galip, Türkçe ezan zulmünün mimarlarından, Türkçe ezan metninin yazarlarındandı. Aynı Reşit Galip, insan kafataslarını ölçen, insanları kafataslarına göre sınıflandıran anlayışı destekleyen sözüm ona bir bilim insanıydı. Geçen yıl burada biliyorsunuz arşivlerden bazı görüntüleri burada sizlere göstermiştim bir tane de oydu. Ant uygulamasının cumhuriyetimizle, cumhuriyetimizin temelleriyle uzaktan yakından ilgisi yoktu. (…)Bu nereye dönüyor biliyor musunuz? 1930'larda ve 40'lardaki Hitler ve Stalin gibi diktatörler zamanında toplumu formatlamak için bu tür uygulamalar yapılıyordu. (*AK Parti,* 8 Ekim 2013)
27. Vesayet sistemi, toplumu yok sayıyor, toplumsal talepleri neredeyse tamamen göz ardı ediyordu. Devlet topluma göre değil, toplum devlete göre şekillendirilmek isteniyordu. "İmtiyazsız, sınıfsız" bir toplum yaratma hayaliyle kendi tahayyüllerinin dışında kalan tüm kimlikleri acımasızca bastırma yoluna gidiyorlardı. Topluma "Benim senin adına öngördüğüm kimlik dışında, tarihten ve gelenekten getirdiğin tüm kimlik yapılarını terk edecek, sadece bildiklerini değil, kim olduğunu da unutacaksın" diye emrolunuyordu.

    Vesayetçi bakış, kendisini meşrulaştırmak, toplumu gidilen yolun doğruluğuna ikna edebilmek için sürekli olarak bölünme korkusu ve beka kaygısını devreye soktu.Bu

sayede elde kalan son toprak parçası "milli misak coğrafyası" olarak alabildiğine kutsallaştırılırken, devlete ve yöneticilere de uhrevi bir nitelik yüklendi.Osmanlı'nın çok büyük bir coğrafyada birçok dili, etnisiteyi, inancı, adilane ve ustalıkla bir arada yaşatan, kendine sarsılmaz bir güven ve fetih ruhuyla yönetme biçiminin mirasını yaratıcı biçimde yenilemek yerine tam tersi bir rotaya girildi. Onlar için millet, istek ve ihtiyaçları, belirli bir tarihe ve geleneğe yaslanan kimlikleri olan hür insanlardan müteşekkil ergin bir topluluk değil, "komünizm", "bölücülük", "irtica" gibi tehlikelerden korunması gereken, bakıma muhtaç bir çocuk kitlesiydi. (*Yeni Şafak,* 24 Mayıs 2015)

28. Tek partili yıllarda İstiklal Şairimiz Mehmet Akif Ersoy'un resmi kayıtlarda 'İrtica 906' kod adıyla fişlendiği ve takip edildiği ortaya çıktı. Gazeteci Muharrem Coşkun tarafından hazırlanan 'Kod Adı: İrtica 906' isimli kitapta Kurtuluş Savaşı'nı veren, ilk Meclis'te milletvekilliği yapan, Anadolu'da isyanları bastırmak için il il gezerek halkı İstiklal Savaşı'na çağıran Mehmet Akif'in, kendi ülkesinde 'sakıncalı', 'mürteci' 'tehdit' durumuna nasıl düşürüldüğü anlatılıyor. (*Yeni Şafak*, 19 Şubat 2015)

29. Ali Şükrü Bey Trabzon'un Meclisteki ilk mebusuydu, 23 Nisan 1920'de Meclis açılırken Trabzon'u temsil etmek üzere oradaydı. Ali Şükrü Bey Osmanlı'nın kahraman bir subayı olduğu kadar, ilk Meclisin de en yürekli vekillerinden biriydi, her türlü haksızlığa karşı çıkıyordu, esarete, korkaklığa, geri adım atmaya asla tahammülü yoktu. Meclis kürsüsüne çıkıyor, kalbinde olana neyse onu söylüyor, hakkı haykırıyordu. Ne yaptılar biliyor musunuz? Bu kahraman Trabzonluyu bir gece tam 91 yıl önce 27 Mart gecesi Ankara'da alçakça şehit ettiler. Ali Şükrü Beyin katledilmesinin çok önemli bir manası vardı. Katiller Ali Şükrü Beye suikast düzenlerken, aslında Meclisteki her vekile korku salıyor, eğer doğru durmazsanız, ayağınızı denk almazsanız sonunuz Ali Şükrü Bey gibi olur diyorlardı. (*AK Parti,* 25 Mart 2014)

30. Trabzon Mebusu Ali Şükrü Bey 1. TBMM'de Mustafa Kemal'e yaptığı sert eleştirilerle tanınmıştı. (…)Topal Osman'ın Ali Şükrü'yü öldürmesi Çankaya'nın emri miydi? Katillerin "Efendisi" kimdir? Muhalefete göre bu isim Mustafa Kemal'di. Bu savı ortaya atan yalnızca Trabzonlular da değildi. Doğru ya da yanlış ama Faik Ahmet Barutçu anılarında İnönü'nün emri verenin Mustafa Kemal olduğunu bizzat kendisine anlattığını söylemektedir. Cinayetin sonuçlarına baktığımızda Ali Şükrü Bey'in öldürülmesiyle bütün muhalefet Meclis dışına atıldı. (*Sabah*, 2 Eylül 2014)

31. Örneğin tek parti CHP dönemini yaşadık. Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in vefatının ardından millete yapılan çok ağır zulümleri yaşadık. Ah bu CHP var ya, bu CHP, ah kardeşlerim, bunun gidecek yeri yok ya. Bunların ömrü zulümle geçti, zulümle. Kur'an-ı Kerim yasaklandı bu ülkede. Kur'an'ın öğretilmesi yasaklandı, öğrenilmesi yasaklandı. Camilerimizi kapattılar, yıktılar, ahıra, depoya, müzeye çevirdiler. İnsanların kılık kıyafetlerine müdahale ettiler. Sakala, bıyığa, başörtüsüne bile karıştılar. Özgürlükleri kısıtladılar, kitapları yasakladılar. Dilleri, kelimeleri yasakladılar. (…)ben buradan Dersim'e de sesleniyorum; ey Dersim, Dersim'in katliamını da işte bu CHP yaptı, bu CHP yaptı. Ayrımcılık bunlarda, yalan bunlarda, fitne bunlarda, kardeşlerim takiye bunlarda. (*AK Parti,* 24 Mart 2014)

32. Mustafa Kemâl"in nasıl bir siyasî lider olduğunu tanımlamanın yargılama konusu olabildiği bir ülkede yaşıyoruz. (…) Önce Türk Dil Kurumu"nun Büyük Sözlüğü"nden "diktatör"ün anlamına bakalım: 1. Bütün siyasi yetkileri kendinde toplamış bulunan kimse.2. Zorba. (…)Yukarıdaki özellikler, Mustafa Kemâl"in devleti yönettiği yıllara bire bir uymaktadır (…) Mustafa Kemâl de o dönemki "tek adam"dır (…) Mustafa Kemâl"in resmî ideolojimiz olan Kemalizm"in (veya Kamalizm"in) isim babası olduğunu, hayatı boyunca iktidarını halk onayına sunmadığını, Meclis"te "gerekirse bazı başlar kesilecektir" diyerek terör estirdiğini, vb. bir yana "Atatürk devrimleri" isimlendirmesi bile kendisinin tüm siyasî teşkilatlanmanın merkezinde yer aldığını sarih biçimde ortaya koyuyor. (*Yeni Şafak*, 16 Nisan 2012)
33. İngiliz hükümeti hesabına Mezopotamyada tarih tetkikatı yapan Woleyin Sümer, medeniyeti yanında Roma, eski Yunan ve Mısır medeniyetlerinin dünkü çocuklar gibi kaldığı neticesine vararak : "Bugünkü Avrupa medeniyeti, kendisini bu Türk medeniyetine borçlu bilmeli" dediğini söyledi. Amasya Tarihi isimli eserinde, şimdi Evkafta katip, ya müyeyyiz olan Hüsameetin Bey isminde bir Türkün de:" Şöhreti, afakı tutan kadim Roma ve Yunan medeniyetinin küçük Asyadaki Türk medeniyetinin şehirlere verdiği isimleri değiştirmekten ibaret kalmıştır" diyerek Küçük Asyadaki Türk medeniyetinin 7,8 bin senelik olduğunu isbat ettiğini, İngiliz Woleyin de bu mutalaları teyit ettiğini teyit etmiş olduğunu ilave etti. (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 Nisan 1934)
34. "Hakanlık, Cengizin erkek oğullarının nesline mahsustur. Fakat hakanlık, sade miras olarak hakandan hakana geçemez. Hakanları kurultay intihap eder." Bu maddenin bizim için en büyük kıymeti, Türk milletinde milli rejim olarak Cumhuriyetin kabul edildiğini apaçık göstermesidir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 Ocak 1934)
35. İşte büyük bir devrimledir ki bizim "Rönesansımız" başlayacaktır. (…) Dilde asıl olan şey, kelimelerin manasının aydınlık olması, karanlık olmamasıdır. Halbuki teşekkül ettiği kelimelerin en çoğu yabancı olan bir dilin o yabancı kelimelerin ifade ettiği manalar ulusal şuura aykırı, yad illere aid vakıaları, olmakta olan realiteyi değil, yad dillerden alınmış hurafeleri ifade edeceğine göre aydınlıktan ziyade karanlık olur. Böyle karanlık manaları ifade eden dille konuşan fertler arasında "anlaşma" ve "tanışma" denilen hâdiseler de husul bulmaz. İşte Osmanlılık zamanındaki Osmanlı tabakasının kullandığı "Lisanı Osmanî" ile "Türkçe" arasındaki derin uçurum bundan ileri geliyordu ve bu ayrılık asırlarca devam etmiş, ulusal varlığı her türlü ilerlemeden alıkoymuştur. (…) İşte dil devrimi henüz sinsi sinsi yaşamakta olan bu eski, geri Osmanlılıkla olan bağı kökünden keserek bütün sosyal müesseseleri uluslaştıracak, ve bizde kaybetmiş olduğumuz benliğimizi, kendi öz varlığımızı yaratacaktır, biz de asıl kendimizin olan bu "ulusal varlığımız" la asıl "insanlık"ımızı edinmiş olacağız. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 Ağustos 1936)
36. İhsan Arif, tarihte din meselesinin geçirdiği safhaları ve bu müessese ile lâiklik taraftarları arasında geçen mücadeleyi anlattıktan sonra islâmlık ve laicisme meselesini tahlil etmiş ve bu dinin ilk kurulduğu zaman hürriyeti vicdan esasına istinad etmiş iken, Peygamberden sonra hocaların elinde bu prensiplerin tamamen inhilâle uğradığını ve dinin uydurma bir takım hurafat ve an'anelerle tağşiş edildiğini

anlatmış ve Türklerde lâiklik hakkında mevcud âdet ve prensiplerden bahsederken şöyle demiştir: Türkler, ta eski devirlerden itibaren lâik idiler. Lâik kelimesinin bizde halk dilinde lâyık şeklinde telaffuz edildiğini işitiyoruz. Bu bence hoş bir buluştur. Çünkü, Türke lâyıklık kadar lâyık olan bir sıfat bulunamaz. Çünkü Türk hür yaşamak, hür ölmek ister. Türkler büyük fikrî bir tekâmül eseri din ve devlet işlerini birbirinden ayırmışlardır. Bunu böyle yapmayan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu bu hatasının cezasını çok acı bir şekilde çekti. (…) Atatürk, Türk milletine, en tabiî haslet ve vasıf olan lâikliği vermekle dünya tarihinde insanî zaferlerin en büyüğünü kazanmıştır. Türk milleti, bu sayededir ki terakkî imkânlarına, vicdan hürriyetine, tefekkür serbestisine, bir kelime ile bütün manevî hürriyet ve haklarına sahib olmuştur. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Mart 1937)

37. Türk inkılabı, insaniyet ülküsünü takipeder. İnsan cemiyeti, kâinatın en kıymetli, en kudretli varlığıdır. (…)Türk milleti var olmak ve büyük insan ailesinde yüksek bir cemiyet olarak yaşamak Türk inkılabının gayesidir. Türk inkılabı, büyük insan ailesinin saadetine hizmet etmeği vazifesi sayar.(…) Türk inkılabının hayat telakkisi sadedir. Ve tabiat kanunlarına müstenittir. Hayat, sevilecek, korunacak ve yaşanacak bir şeydir. (*İsmet İnönü*, 20 Mart 1937)
38. İmparatorluk nüfusunun yarısı Türktü. Padişahı da Müslümanların halifesiydi. Aslına bakılırsa Müslümanların sahihten başı olmak lazım gelirdi, halbuki bu unutulmuştu, ismen başı idi. İmparatorluğun şeriata bağlı kalması, kanun ve nizamlarını 1300 sene evvel kurulmuş esaslara uydurmuş ve yahud uyduruyor. Görünüş olması, başlıca zaaflarından biriydi. Devletin haysiyetini berbad eden kapitülasyonlar atlamıyordu. (…) Halifeliğin bir kuvvet olduğu zannediliyordu. Halbuki imparatorluk haricindeki müslümanların hepsi esirdi. (…) Halifelikten fayda değil, sarih surette zarar görülüyordu. Avrupada geri kalmış memleketlerin en çabuk terakki ettikleri, fena tesadüf, Osmanlı tahtına çok kötü bir adamı, İkinci Abdülhamiti getirmişti. (…) (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 Şubat 1935)
39. Eski padişahlar, kendilerini birer Allak sayarlardı, eski vezirler de nefislerinde küçük birer padişah kudreti görürlerdi. (…) Şu satırlar, bir elçi kaleminden çıkmıştır. Bir hünkarı tasvir etmektedir; "Yüzü kırmızı, bu güzel renk şu sert çehrede nekadar çirkin görünüyor?. O uzun buyile yürüyen ölüm gibidir. Öyle bir ölüm ki baba tanımaz, ana bilmez, evlad şefkati tanımaz, dost düşman ayırt etmez. Yalnız çiyner, devirir ve mahveder. İşte yeni padişah!." (…) eski vezirlerden biri evinde namaz kılıyordu. Namaz?... Parmakları halkın kesesinden, bıçakları halkın ensesinden ayrılmayan bu devletlilerin namaz kılmaları nasıl mümkün olur?... Namaz hakikate ve ezeli adalete inanan yüreklerin ebediyete açılması demektir. Mazlum kanı ile bulaşık bir el, ebediyetin eteğine nasıl uzanır? (…) Bu ibadet değil, riyadır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 Nisan 1935)
40. Osmanlı padişahları uzun yıllar bu ihtirasla kardeşlerini ve hatta kendi oğullarını öldürmekten baş alamadılar. Saltanat hırsı Osmanoğullarında daha ilk devirlerde başladı ve sonuna kadar sürdü. İlk devirlerde bu hırstan münezzeh tek bir şahsiyet varsa, o da Orhan ve Murad Beylerdir. Yıldırım, Kovsa zaferini müteakıb kardeşi Yakup Çelebiyi öldürttü. (…) Fatih babasının yerine geçer geçmez küçük şehzade Ahmedi öldürttü. (…) Fatih bununla da kalmadı; kardeş öldürtmesini kanun altına aldı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 Şubat 1936)

41. Şarklılığın en diri ve göze çarpan çizgilerinden biri, hiç şüphesiz kaygısızlıktır. (…) Asırlardan beri Türk sarıklısının vazifesi şu olmuştur: Mukadderatının tasması boynundadır. Yolunu düşünme ve yürü.Yeniden kaç. Ulu durgunluğun içinde, tanrının zikrile meşgul kurbağa gibi yaşa. Kısmet denilen sinek ağzına gelir, yutar. (…) Medreseyi kapadık. Fakat İstanbul radyosu, silkinmek istediğimiz ruhun üzerine kanatlarını germiştir. Bu sesler Türklüğü görünmez ağlarla her gün şarklılığa bağlıyor. Hafız sesi, kendisine saklanacak ve oradan istediğini yapacak, şen gönü uyuşatacak bir kale bulmuştur: İstanbul radyosu. (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Ağustos 1934)
42. Osmanlı yazıcıları parçalardan yapılmış bir bohçaya benzeyen bir edebi lisanı vücuda getirmişlerdir. Öyle parçalı ki lisanın asıl kumaşı bu parçalar arasında hemen hemen kaybolmuştur. Bunların yarattığı dil arabî ve farasiden mürekkep ve karışık kaba ve kaidesi bozuk bir dildir.(…) Başbuğ Mustafa Kemal Hazretlerinin bulunduğu yeni edebî milliyetperverlik, yukarıda tarif ettiğimiz, lisanı felce uğratan nüfuz ve tesirlere karşı bir isyan teşkil ediyor. (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Ağustos 1934)
43. Eskiden iyi Osmanlıca bilmek için, üç dili iyi bilmek gerekti: son zamanlarda, üstelik, Fransızca ve almanca bilmiyenler için bir bilim ve fen yazısını okumak zorlaştı. Çünkü Osmanlıcanın kendisi de hem söz, hem de gramer şekilleri bakımından son derece eksikti. Şemseddin Sami'nin Fransızcadan Osmanlıcaya lügatinde yarıdan artık Fransız kelime ve terimlerin karşılığı, birer *cümle*'dir. (…) Geçenlerde bir türk babası: "Oğluma dilmaçlık etmekten bıktım." diyordu. Bugünün çocukları, en basit kitablardaki sözleri anlamaktan eksindirler. Çünkü bu kelimeler anadillerinde yoktur. Bir de bu kelimeleri, alınmış oldukları dillerin grameri ile yoğurunuz: genç beyinlerin nasıl bir ezit içinde yıprandığını tasarlayabilirsiniz. (*Ulus*, 26 Mart 1935)
44. İmparatorluk devrinde her cemaat kendi hususî hayatına terkolunmuştu, ve herkes bu hususî hayatına bağlıydı. Hatta haricî tesirlerle hususî hayata daha ziyade benlik verdirici gayretler de eksik değildi. Böylece Osmanlı İmparatorluğu bazı parçalarının rengi göze çarpan yamalı bir bohça gibiydi. İmparatorluğun tasfiyesinden sonra şimdi o yamalı bohçanın enkazı karşısında duruyoruz. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Kasım 1936)
45. Osmanlı padişahlarının aciz ve meskenetleri ile masabaşında hezimete çevirdikleri az mı görülmüştür? (…) Adının bütün parlaklığına rağmen "Devleti Aliyeyi Osmaniye" büyük devletlerin emri ile oturup kalkan bir yarı erkin (müstakil) bir devletti. (…) Osmanlı saltanatı, galib ve mağlub birçok andlaşma imzalamış, fakat bunların hiçbirinde, Avrupalıların boynuna takmasına müsaade ettiği bukağıyı bir türlü söküp atamamıştı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 Temmuz 1934)
46. Haleflerinden Yavuz Selim Mısırın fatihi oldu. (1517) de ecdadının İmparatorluk mirasına Halife lakabını taktı. Bu hâdise Osmanlı İmparatorluğunu teokratik bir devlet yaptı ve siyasi devlet şefleri din kitabının değişmez metinlerile nazarî olarak bağlı kalmaya mecbur oldular. XIX yüzyıl başı Din siyasete âlet, ordu disiplinsiz, yeni sevkulceyşten habersiz ve siyasete hakim, maliyesiz, merkezi idarede haysiyetsiz bir orta çağ teşekkülü halindedir. (…)Vakıa bu asırda bazı ıslahat hareketleri tarih kaydeder. Fakat bunlar daima harici tesir altında ve asla milletin hakiki ihtiyacının karşılığı olarak düşülmemiştir. Tanzimat adamları ıslahatın birçok kısımlarını ecnebilerin zorile ve gönülsüz yaptıkları için icraata enerji ve fikri takib göstermemişlerdir. Ali Paşa, ıslahat hakkında hükümdara verdiği bir lâhiyada ıslahatı,

bir fırtınalı havada gemisini kurtarmak isteyen kaptanın safra atması kalbinden bir zaruret olarak telâkki etmektedir. Tanzimat adamları bir devleti kurtaracak, bir milleti yükseltecek tedbirleri kuvvetle tatbik etmek cesaretinden mahrumdular. (*Cumhuriyet,* 24 Eylül 1937)

47. Yemen"den Afrika"nın içlerine, Endonezya"dan Kırım"a ve Balkanların en ücra köşelerine kadar yaptığım ziyaretlerde, Osmanlı şuurunun ne kadar yüksek bir ümmet şuuru, Müslümanları yeniden toparlayabilecek mükemmel bir kardeşlik şuuru, medeniyet umudu olduğunu yalnızca görmekle kalmadım, iliklerime kadar yaşadım ben.Soru şu burada: Neden bütün yollar, Osmanlı"ya çıkıyor acaba?Bu sorunun cevabını kısaca şöyle verebiliriz: Bugün dünyanın karşı karşıya kaldığı bütün varoluşsal, siyasî, kültürel, etnik sorunların çözümlerinin şifreleri Osmanlı medeniyet tecrübesinde gizli.Bu şifreler neler peki?Her şeyden önce, Osmanlı, insanlık tarihindeki belli başlı bütün medeniyet tecrübelerinin üzerine oturmuştur. Avrupalıların bütün kıtaları sömürgeleştirdikleri, bütün kültürleri yağmaladıkları, Avrupa içinde bile farklılıklara hayat hakkı tanımadıkları, dolayısıyla farklılıklarla yaşama tecrübesinin nasıl bir şey olduğundan habersiz yaşadıkları bir zaman diliminde, Osmanlı, dünyanın en karmaşık, en zorlu, en kaotik bölgelerinde Pax Americana ya da Pax Romana gibi "savaşa, silahlı zorbalık gücüne" (Braudel) değil, sulhe, barışa, karşılıklı güvene dayalı evrensel bir Osmanlı Düzeni (Pax Ottomana) kurmayı başarmış tek insanlık tecrübesidir. Bu açıdan, Osmanlı tecrübesi aşılamamıştır; aşılamadığı da anlaşılamamıştır. İkincisi, Osmanlı, adalet demektir; erdem demektir; ilke/lilik demektir. Çünkü Osmanlı, bir etnik tecrübenin, bir ulus tecrübesinin, bir sömürü tecrübesinin adı ve adresi değildir; vahyin şiarlarının şuura dönüştüğü, şuurun hakikati şiire durdurduğu "insanlık kardeşliği" tecrübesinin adı ve adresidir.Üçüncüsü, Osmanlı, yok olmak pahasına kapitalizme direnmek ve insanlığın son adası olma iddiasını yitirmemek demektir. Çünkü Osmanlı"nın en belirgin özelliği, kurucu, varedici, yaşatıcı, herkese hayat bahşedici ve ruh üfleyici sırrı, dayanağı, kaynağı, insan-ı kâmil fikrini hayata geçirmesinde gizlidir. (*Yeni Şafak,* 16 Temmuz 2012)
48. Osmanlı, tarih içinde bölge ile en önemli siyasetti. Yüzyılımıza en yakın olan siyaset buydu. (…) Osmanlı sadece belli bir hanedan ve monarşiye ait bir gerçeklik değildir. Belli bir coğrafyaya, tarihselliğe ve siyaset etme biçimine atıftır. Bu siyaset biçiminde Anadolu"nun, Ön Asya"nın, Afrika Asya"sının, Orta Asya"nın ve Avrupa Asya"sının içinde ortaklaşa var olduğu bir üst siyasal birlik var. Bu tarihsellikle görünüme ulaşan, ancak tarihselliğin de üstüne çıkma imkanlarını sunma potansiyeli taşıyan bir dinamizmdir. Bugünü anlamlandırmak için bundan neden yararlanmayalım? Bugünün parçalı, duvarlarla birbirinden yalıtık ve ötekileştirmelerle korku pozisyonları alan, onlarca ulus devletle parçalanan, sürekli bir biçimde diktatörlükler, çatışmalar ve ideolojiler üreten mevcut durumdan daha "ileri bir siyaset" değil mi? (*Yeni Şafak,* 27 Ocak 2013)
49. (İnna Fetahna Leke Fethan Mübina… Ve Yensurakellahü Nasran Aziza…) Doğrusu biz sana apaçık bir fetih ihsan ettik ve sana Allah şanlı bir zaferle yardım eder. Ve sevgililer sevgilisi... (Letüftehanne'l Kostantıniyye. Ve Le Ni'mel Emrü Zalike'l Emr Ve Le Ni'mel Ceyşü Zalike'l Ceyş) Kostantiniye bir gün fetih olunacaktır, onu fetheden komutan ne güzel komutan, onu fetheden ordu ne güzel ordu. (*TCCB,* 30 Mayıs 2015)
50. Tarih, belli bir dönem zulümle, kanla, savaşla geniş topraklar işgal etmiş, ancak kısa zaman sonra saman alevi gibi sönmüş bir devletler kabristanıdır. Çünkü zulüm payidar olmaz"Bizi, tarihteki diğer devletlerden, diğer medeniyetlerden ayıran asıl

fark işte budur. Bizim farkımız işgal değil ihya, yağma değil fetihtir. Bizim farkımız, göçmen kuşlara dahi sığınacak bir yuva kuran inceliktir; fakirleri incitmemek için sokağın köşesine sadaka taşını yerleştiren zarafettir. (*TCCB*, 25 Aralık 2015)

51. Türkiye'deki -özellikle zihin-özürlü entelijansiya tarafından- çarpık anlaşılan konulardan biri medrese konusu.
Medrese, yaklaşık bin küsur yıl İslâm medeniyetinin temellerini atan maarif kurumunun adı. Ve İslâm medeniyetinin geliştirdiği, medeniyeti yeşerten, filizlendiren, yeni ufuklara eriştiren, bütün insanlık birikimini kendine maleden özgün bir eğitim modeli. (…)İşte bu nedenledir ki, Müslüman medreseleri, Batı üniversitelerine de kaynaklık etmiş, dünyanın birikiminin Batı'ya ulaşmasını sağlamıştır. (…)Medresenin çökmesi, medeniyetin temellerini sarstı ve çökmesiyle sonuçlandı.Ulema gitti, "film koptu": Medeniyet gökkubbemiz çöktü, üzerimize yıkıldı: "Baş"la "gövde" birbirinden ayrıldı. Müslümanca biliş, duyuş, düşünüş, zevk ve beğeni biçimlerimiz yokoldu. Çöl'e mahkûm olduk... (*Yeni Şafak*, 8 Ocak 2016)
52. Bilindiği gibi tekkelerin kuruluşu 8. yüzyıla kadar uzanır. Osmanlı döneminde dergâh olarak da adlandırılmışlardır. (…)Bilindiği gibi Osmanlı devletinin kuruluşunda ahiliğin ve tarikat erbabının etkili olduğu bilinir. Bu bakımdan Osmanlı padişahları/paşaları tarikat ehline önem vermişler ve tekkelerin açılması noktasında gerekli vakıfların kurulmasında da öncülük etmişlerdir. Zaviyeler de benzer fonksiyonlara sahip mekânlardır. Buralarda da yoksul insanlara giyim ve yemek yardımı yapılıyordu. Hatta zamanla zaviye çevresinde küçük yerleşim birimlerin oluştuğunu bilinmektedir. Düşüncesi, ırkı, dini ve mezhebi ne olursa olsun herkese kapısını açan tekkeler bu yolla toplumdaki sevgi, huzur ve barışın yaygınlaşmasında da etkili olmuşlardır. (*Yeni Şafak*, 4 Mart 2013)
53. Schick, "İstanbul'da Osmanlıca bilmemek bir azap" diye ekleyerek konuşmaya devam ediyor: "Mesele sadece kitabe ya da mezar taşı okumak da değil. Ben epey bir dil öğrendim ve gördüm ki dil öğrenmek aynı zamanda düşünce tarzına vakıf olmak demek. Bir kültürü tam manasıyla anlamak demek. Bu yüzden Osmanlıca dersi seçmeli değil zorunlu olmalı." Böyle olunca Osmanlı ruhunu ve kültürünü öğrenmeye yönelik büyük bir adım atılmış olacak. (…)Osmanlıca'nın yazı zenginliğine de vurgu yapan akademisyen, bunun irtica değil bir kültürel gereklilik olduğunu da hatırlatıyor. (*Yeni Şafak*, 11 Aralık 2014)
54. Türkiye bağlamında ise, pozitivist modernizmin yerli şubesi olan Kemalist aydınlanmacılığın aynı kadere daha erken maruz kaldığını görürüz. Topluma şiddet eşliğinde dayatılan Kemalizm, totaliter laiklik ve buna münasip tek yaşam biçimi diktatörlüğü erozyona uğradı. Totaliter mantığı itibarıyla –şeyi o şey yapan ana mantıktaki arızanın çıplak hale gelmesi– ahlak yitimi kaçınılmazdı. Kemalizm, modernizm gibi birçok ideolojinin –liberalizm, sosyalizm vd– derinleşmesinden neşet eden bir zihniyet değil, taklitten ibaret bir iktidar kullanma biçimiydi. Bu nedenle çöküşü daha erken oluyordu. Çöküşün ilanı sadece belli bir konjonktürü beklemekteydi. (*Yeni Şafak*, 26 Mart 2014)
55. In the 1400 years of Islam history, particularly in its last 1000 years, it is almost impossible to encounter any large battle which we did not participate in as a nation. The great agglomeration is the reason behind our capablity of having been able to keep the apple of all civilizations', all nations' eyes, Anatolia, as our homeland. In Western civilization, Turk is not the name of a certain tribe, but a name that represents all Muslims. (…) But in the historical narration of textbooks, there is an effort to the exact opposite, let alone deficiencies. I reject the understanding of history that starts our nation, our civilization's history of thousand years almost from 1919. It should be known that whoever alienates our last 200, even our last 600 years with its

victories and losses, and jumps from old Turkish history to the Republic, that person is an enemy of our nation and state. (*TCCB,* 29 Nisan 2016)

56. Bu hep böyledir. Çünkü sizin şah damarınızı ancak böyle keserler. Bunu kestikleri anda da bitersiniz tükenirsiniz. Hangi tarihi zemine ayak bastığını fark etmeyenler hatta reddi miras edenler bizde var böyleleri biliyorsunuz ülkenin geleceğini de tehlikeye atar.(*TCCB*, 19 Mayıs 2015)
57. Şerif Hüseyin 1915 te İngilizlere şu teklifte bulundu: "Eğer bütün Asya Arablarının benim idarem altında istiklal ve hakimiyetini kabul ederseniz size her türlü yardıma hazırım." Şerif Hüseyin bu Asya Arabistanına Adana, Urfa, Mersin, Mardin gibi şehirleri de ithal ediyor ve bunları da istiyordu. Şerif Hüseyin, Hicaz halkının sıkı surette ablokasını da istedi, bundaki maksadı, Arab halkının Türklerle birlik olmanın fenalığını anlayarak, kendine iltihak etmesi içindi.(…) Bu sıralarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu gafleti o derece idi ki, Şerif Hüseyine kuvvet göndermesi için para yollayıp duruyordu. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Şubat 1935)
58. Köklü bir Arap ailesinin mensubu olan Uceymi Paşa'nın, Kut Savaşı'nda İngilizlerin kuşatması altında kalan bir Osmanlı birliğini yanındaki adamlarıyla birlikte, kuşatmayı yararak kurtardığı bilgisini veren Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan şu açıklamaları yaptı: "Anadolu'da olduğu gibi, o bölgede de elbette İngilizlerin ve diğer güçlerin rüşvetlerine, vaatlerine, oyunlarına kananlar vardı. Ama bu durum asla, nasıl Anadolu'da yaşananlar tüm Anadolu insanını ilzam etmezse, o bölgede de tüm Arap kardeşlerimizin itham altında bırakılmasını haklı göstermez.(*TCCB*, 19 Mayıs 2015)

59. Laikliğin, dindarların dinini istediği gibi yaşamasının, ateistlerin ise ateistliğini açıkça ifade edebilmesinin garantisi olması gerekirken (…)Türkiye"de laikliğin uzun yıllardır dindarları dövmenin sopası olarak kullanılması acı vericidir. (…)Bizim yaptığımız baş eğmemek, boyun eğmemektir. Onlarca yıldır erkekler için bir şapka kanunu var olduğu halde buna uyulmuyor olmasına dikkat çekmek isteriz. (*Yeni Şafak*, 23 Nisan 2013)
60. Tekke ve Zaviyeler ile Türbelerin Seddine ve Türbedarlar ile Bazı Unvanların Men ve İlgasına Dair Kanun da bu kapsamda değerlendirilmesi gereken bir başka kanundur. Bu aynı zamanda çok kültürlüğe ve çoğulculuğa vurulan ağır bir darbedir. Bilindiği gibi ulus devletçi sistemlerin "hâkim ideolojisi" iktidarı elde tutmanın en önemli aracıdır. Bu bakımdan tek bir dini, tek bir okulu, tek bir dili, tek bir mezhebi ve ortak duygusu olur. Çıkardıkları kanunlarla da toplum tüm renklerinden arındırılarak tek-tipleştirilmesi ön görülmüştür. (…) İslam kültür ve sosyal hayatından önemli bir yere sahip olan tekke ve zaviyeler de bu dönemde kapatılarak bu yüzyıllık kültür, eğitim, tasavvuf, edebiyat, musiki ve tarih mirası ortadan kaldırılmıştır. Çünkü tekkeler bir taraftan da musiki, edebiyat, tarih ve kültür taşıyıcılarıydılar. (*Yeni Şafak,* 4 Mart 2013)
61. Alfabe değişikliğini yapanlar ya masumane bir şekilde 'Bu Arap alfabesi Türkçeyi tam taşıyamıyor, sıkıntılar yaratıyor, öğrenme hızımızı düşürüyor. Latin harflerine geçelim, Batı dünyasıyla ortak kültür havzasına girelim. Nasıl olsa o metinleri de aktarırız' dediler. Yahut da en azından bir kısmı 'Bu harf inkılabı başlangıçtır, biz zihniyet dünyamızı bütünüyle geçmişten koparalım. Yepyeni bir dünyaya sıfırdan başlayalım' dediler. (*Yeni Şafak*, 29 Eylül 2013)
62. Topluluğu yapan tekler kadınla erkekten karışık olduğu için bu türe işte kişilik diriminde hiçbir ayırd olmıyan erkekle kadın arasında birliği kaldıran ulusların ne yaman bir gerilik, ne öldürücü bir yokluk içine düştüğünü acun tarihi bize gösteriyor. Türk tarihi ise bize bu yönden bütün uluslar tarihinde başlı başına

yaltırıklı(ışıklı,parlak) bir çağ olarak kalır. Gerçek, Türk tarihine bakarsak orada kadınla erkek arasında eksiksiz bir birlik bulunduğunu görürüz. (…) değil böyle dirim işlerinde en yüksek, en karışık il işlerinde bile kadın her kurun erkeğin yanında bulunur, erkekle birlikte el işlerini yürütür. Kurultayda üyelik örününü alırdı. Hakanın yanında, hatan onun ulus başkanlığı rolünü bütünlerdi, yoksa bir nice el işleri hatun olmayınca başarılmaz öylece kalırdı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Ocak 1935)

63. Eski cemiyetlerin birçoğunda kadın, erkeğe karşı "tabu" idi, Lakin Türklerde kadın "tabu" değil; tekin idi. Tekin tabunun zıddıdır. (…) Kadınla erkek işbölümü işte bundan doğmuştur.(…) Kadın, erkek her işte beraber çalışırdı. İkisi birbirinin yardımcısı, tamamlayıcısı, eşi idi. Evde, savaşta, siyasal, sosyal alanlarda iki cins birbirinden ayrılmazdı. Eski Türklerde din de kadını koruyordu. O zaman din gibi sihir de kutlu idi. Değerce birbirine eşti. (…)Din, sağda oturan erkeğe; sihir, solda oturan kadına değer verirdi. Bunun için erkekle kadın değerce bir sayılırdı. (…) Kadının "tabu" sayılmadığı bu eski Türk cemiyetlerinde kadınsız hiçbir iş görülemezdi. Hükümdar buyruklara yalnız "hakan buyurur ki" diye başlarsa değeri olmazdı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 Şubat 1935)
64. Türk kadınına gelince, erkekle hukukta müsavi olmak için yalnız on beş senelik bir zaman lazım geldi. Cumhuriyet büyük bit itimad ve genişkalbililkle bütün kapıları birer birer Türk kadınına açtı.(…) Ve filhakika Türk kadını kadar bu yolda kolaylıkla ve süratle muvaffak olmuş başka birisine tarihte tesadüf olmaz. (…) Hulasa başka muhitler kadınların asırlarca hasret çektikleri hukuka bugün Türk kadını tamamile nail olmuştur. Bu nimeti Türk kadınına Cumhuriyet temin eylemiştir. Hiç şüphe yoktur ki buna mükabil de Türk kadını cumhuriyete karşı derin bir şükran minnet ve bağlılık hissi besleyecektir. (*Cumhuriyet,* 25 Haizran 1934)
65. Bence Türklerin yaptıkları inkılapların en güzeli, en faydalısı, bugün Türk kadının yaşadığı aile hayatı tarzıdır. Türk erkeği şimdi sokağa ailesile çıkıyor. Bu hadisenin, bir Müslüman memleketindeki ehemmiyetini belki Avrupalılar kavrayamazlar.(…) Atatürk, Türkiyede, aileyi yaratmış, aile hayatını tesis etmiştir. Kadın, kocasile; erkek kız kardeşi ile sokağa çıkabiliyor, istediği yere gidiyor. Ana baba, çocuklarının eğlencesine iştirak ediyor, ondan zevk alabiliyor. Bu, Türkiyede, hiçbir zaman görülmüş şey değildi". (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 Mayıs 1935)
66. Kânunusani, misafirliğe en çok gidilen aydır. Ekseriya çaylar, briç toplantıları, içtimai hadiseler – nişan, nikâh, konser gibi- bu ayın içerisinde olur. Sosyal hayata düşkün, cemiyet girgin bir kadın için bu kabil yerlere giderken zarafetle, dikkat ve itina ile giyinmek şarttır. (…) Yirminci asrın, her giydiğini kendisine yakıştırmasını bilen kadını, böyle zarif kıyafeti ile bu ayda salondan salona dolaşarak, iki fincan şekersiz çay, yahud iki sanzatu arasında, gelecek mevsimin modasını şimdiden reyini verecek, zevki selim denilen şeyin ezeli hakimi bizzat kendisi olduğunu ispat edecektir. (*Cumhuriyet,*18 Ocak 1935)
67. Türk kadını sevinç ve kıvanç duy! Çünkü on sene evvel çarşaf endamını, kafes benliğini, haremvarlığını bir ayıp gibi dünyadan gizliyordu. O zaman Fransız kadını nice yüz yılların verdiği hürriyetle serbest yaşıyordu. On sene içinde, sen haremden çıktın, kafesi kırdın, çarşafı attın, peçeyi yırttın. Savaş günlerinde, erkek kalmadığı için saltanat seni yalnız sokak süpürücülüğüne ve posta gişesinde pul saymaya layık

görmüştü. Cumhuriyet rejimi ise, sen, erkeğin yanına oturttu- gücüne gitmezse diyeyim ki- erkeğin yanına yükseltti. (…) Ve böylece on sene içinde Fransız kadınını geçtin. (…) Türk kadını sevinç ve kıvanç duyki Kamal Atatürk seni, on sene içinde, hürriyetin anası olan Fransız kızlarından daha yükseklere çıkardı. (*Cumhuriyet,* 7 Şubat 1935)

68. Türk türesi böyle olmuş, ulus varlığının yarısını kadın dirimi bütünlemekle bulunmuşken sonradan yapma Osmanlılığın kadına karşı aldığı Türk özle ile hiçte uymıyan aykırı, yağı duruş ulus diriminde yüz yıllarca ve yüz yıllarca budunumuzu geriletmiş, şenlik acununda kendini hor etmiş, sanki kişilik diriminden bütün bütün yoksul, kötürüm bir kılığa sokmuştu. Çünkü Osmanlılığın üstbölümü olan Arablık kadını hiçe sayar, kadını oyuncak yerine kor, ona kişilik dirimini çok görürdü. Kız çocuklarını diri diri toprağa gömen bir ulustan kadın için hiçbir iyilik beklenir mi?Bu kadar(…)geri, şenlikle hiçbir alışverişi olmayan bir topluluğun kültürü de kendi gibi geri, kendi gibi karanlıktı. (*Cumhuriyet,* 12Ocak 1935)
69. Sonraları, İslam dininin yanlış anlaşılması ve bazı hodgamlık duygularının inhisarcılığın sonu olarak kadın kafes altına, dört duvar arasına hapsedilmiş, güneşten havadan bile mahrum edilmiştir.(…) Kadın artık manevi bir ölüme atılmıştır. Kadın artık varlığını duygularını kaybederek erkeğin isteğine göre yaşar bir makine haline gelmiş; erkeği efendi bilmiş; uzun alışkanlıklardan sonra bu yaşayış kendisine tabii gelmeye başlamıştır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 Şubat 1935)

70. Kapıya kilit, pencereye kafes, çehreye örtü… Bu tazyika insan değil, hayvan bile dayanmaz. (…)İstanbulda tektük çarşaflı kadınlar görmüyor değiliz. Dikkat ediniz. Bunlar ekseriyetle soluk, kirlice kıyafetli, çarpık ökçeli, yıtrık çorabli kenar bayanlarıdır. (…)Aydınlıktan ürken bu yarasalar, Avrupalıya benzememek için kasketlerini ters giyen erkeklerin dişileri olsa gerekir. (…)Şarkın bu yüz örtüsü, Avrupalı kadınların daha güzelleşmek için kullandıkları, incecik (voile) vuvale benzemez. (…) Şarka doğru ilerledikçe peçe sıklaşır. İranda at kılından örülme kapkalın bir işkence şeklini alır. Kadın nefes daraltan bu ıstırabı memleketin dini, an'anevi bir âdeti olarak çekmeye katlanır gider. Bizde istibdat yıllarını yaşamış olanlar pekala hatırlarlar ki memlekette harb, hastalık yer depreşmesi ve saire kabilinden afetler zuhurunda hep bu fenalıklar kadınların açık saçık gezmeleri neticesi bir nevi ilahi tedib suretinde gösterilirdi. (*Cumhuriyet,* 2 Ağustus 1935)
71. Oysa harem, Osmanlı hanedan üyeleri için daha çok bir okuldur. Kadınların hayata hazırlandıkları, hayır faaliyetlerini örgütledikleri bir eğitim yuvasıdır. Bu yuvanın başında da, valide sultanlar yer alır. (…)Tarih, hepimiz için bir aynadır. Osmanlı kadınlarının aynasında gördüğümüz bu güzel hasletler, bizlerin hayatında da pusula olmalıdır. Muhtaçlara yardım eli uzatan, yetim ve kimsesizlere sahip çıkan bu yüce ruhlar, bizim hayatımıza da yön vermelidir.Valide sultanlar, analarımıza örnek olmuş, böylece gönlü geniş, eli açık nesiller yetişmiştir. (...) Tarihimizde kadınların bu kadar önemli vakıf hizmetlerinde bulunmaları, onların mülk edinebildiklerini ve bunu özgürce tasarruf edebildiklerini gösteriyor. Bu, kadın haklarının medeniyetimizde ne kadar köklü biçimde yerleşik olduğuna işarettir. (*TCCB,* 9 Mart 2016)
72. Kadınlar vahyi değerlerle eğitildikçe Peygamber Efendimize davalar taşıyorlar. Mesela koca dayağına karşı isyan başlattılar. Vahyi değerlerle eğitilmeden bunu başaramazlardı. Bir akşam, yatsı arası 70 kadar kadın Hz. Muhammedin evi etrafında toplandılar. Hz. Ömer bunu haber alır almaz Peygamberimizin yanına koştu ve kadınların eylemlerine karşı son derece asabileşti. Peygamberimize, "Kocalarına

buyurun da bir de bunun için dövsünler" dedi. Peygamberimiz ertesi gün sahabeyi topladı ve anlattı ve "Ey Allah'ın kulları. Allah'ın bu hanım kullarını asla dövmeyin" dedi. Böyle bir toplumda böyle bir isyan başlatabilmek için vahyi değerlerle eğitilmiş olması, durumun vahyi değerlerin tersine olduğunu fark etmeleri ve kendilerini dinleyecek birini bulmaları gerekiyordu. Ondan önce böyle bir şeyi akıllarına dahi getiremezlerdi. (*Yeni Şafak,* 30 Mayıs 2012)

73. Bizim medeniyetimizde, bizim inancımızda, bizim kültürümüzde kişiler cinsiyetleriyle değil, insan sıfatıyla muhatap alınır, çünkü bizde insan eşrefi mahlûkattır, yani yaratılmışların en şereflisidir. (...) Asıl olan, kadının nisa, yani insan sıfatıyla kabul edilmesidir. İşte kitabımız Kur'an-ı Kerim bir sureyi nereye ayırmış? Kadına. Nisa Suresi… İşte o zaman eşitliği değil, adaleti tartışmaya başladığımızı göreceğiz. (*TCCB,* 7 Mart 2016)
74. Şeyh Edebali nasihat ediyor ve diyor ki, İNSANI YAŞAT Kİ, DEVLET YAŞASIN…Bizim medeniyetimizde, bizim devlet ve millet anlayışımızda, işte bu temel ilke vardır. İNSANIN YAŞAMASI, adaletle mümkün olur. (…)Aynı şekilde, insana adalet nazarıyla bakabildiğimizde, kadın ve erkek arasındaki ayrımcılığın da çok daha adil, çok daha insani ve vicdani şekilde ortadan kalkması mümkün olur. (...) Eşitlik, mağdur olanın, zorla, mağdur eden seviyesine çıkarılmasıdır, ya da tersidir. Kadınların ihtiyacı olan eşitlik değil, EŞDEĞER olabilmektir, yani ADALETTİR. (*Kadem*, 24 Kasım 2014)
75. "On yıllardır, son derece manasız bir şekilde sürdürülen başörtüsü yasağının kalkması, öyle iddia edildiği gibi toplumda infiale yol açmamış, toplumun normalleşmesini sağlamıştır. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde, kamu iş yerlerinde, üniversitelerde, şimdi de ortaöğretim kurumlarında başörtüsünün serbest bırakılması, özgürlüklerin önünü açmış, Türkiye'yi normal ve tabii mecrasına sevk etmiştir." (*TCCB,* 1 Ekim 2014)
76. Moderniteyle beraber kadın konusundazihinlerimize pelesenk olan ifadeler var: Kadın istihdamı, kadın erkek eşitliği, kadının çalışması, kadının eğitimi, kadının özgürlüğü. (…)Modernliğin kadın erkek eşitliği, büyük efsanelere ve boş hayallere dayanıyor çünkü. Kadını ev ve aile içinden soyutlayarak tanımlayan bir girişimdir. (…) Kadının benliğini, ev ve aileyi ötekileştirerek kurmasına yarıyor. Anneliği tasfiyeye yarıyor, rekabeti kocayla ya da erkekle yapmaya davetiye çıkarıyor. Bir idealite olarak bu "cinsiyet eşitliği", ilginç sonuçlara götürüyor insanları. Eşitlik kadına bir kurtuluş teolojisi olarak sunuluyor ve kadının dışlama, şiddet, işsizlik, yalnızlık vb. sorunlarının bununla aşılacağı varsayılıyor. (*Yeni Şafak*, 7 Kasım 2014)
77. Eski sistemin aldatmacalarından biri de "modernlik ve kadının özgürleşmesi" idi. Çoğunlukla bu, şekilde kalan bir özgürlüktü. Özellikle köylü kadın baskıya maruz kalıyordu. Rejimin saygı gösterdiği kadın salonların ve kutlamaların parçası olan kadındı, direnen kadın değildi. Çünkü onlar kadın haklarını hak etmiyordu, baskıya maruz kalıyorlar ve başörtüleri çıkarttırılıyordu. (*Yeni Şafak,* 3 Mart 2013)
78. Birilerinin ısrarla kendi ülkesinin kadınlarını yok sayıp, sadece Batılı kadının serencamını idealize etmesini art niyetli buluyorum. Birileri inatla Doğu toplumlarını geleneği, hatta dini sadece ezilmekle, ötekileştirme, despotizmle, zulümle özdeş hale getirmeye çalışıyor. Bunlar için aile ve din kadının özgürleşmesinin önündeki en büyük iki engeldir. Dikkat ediniz, bu kesimlerin gözünde İslam kadını yücelten, baş tacı eden, ona değer veren değil, bilakis kişiliksiz hale getiren bir unsundur. Bu iddiaların sahipleri yıllarca kadını 'özgürleştirme ve medenileştirme' adına bu ülkenin milyonlarca kadınına zulmetmiştir. (*TCCB,* 8 Mart 2016)

79. “Biz sorumluluk makamında, mevkiinde olan muhafazakâr bir demokrat parti olarak, muhafazakâr demokrat bir kimliğe sahip olarak, (...) kızların, erkeklerin devletin yurtlarında karışık kalmasına müsaade etmedik, müsaade etmiyoruz, müsaade etmiyoruz. (...) Ve biz burada kesinlikle müdahil olduk ve şu anda yurtlarımızda bu şekilde kızlarımızın erkek öğrencilerle bir defa ayrıştırması çalışmalarını hızla devam ettiriyoruz.” (*AK Party*, 5 Kasım 2013)
80. Ankara stadında Atatürkün önünden geçen mektepliden orduya kadar her yaştaki Türk çocukları bu yıl her zamandan ileri bir şanlılık ve mükemmellik nümunesi verdiler ve kalblerimizi gurur ve iftihar duygularile doldurup taşırdılar. (…)Atatürk devrinin yeni nesilleri yepyeni bir milletin önlerinde hürmetle ve muhabbetle eğilecek elemanları olmuşlardır ve mütemadiyen bu yolda tekâmül ediyorlar. Bu nesillerin mabadı hergün daha kuvvetle yükselecek bir milletin safhalarını teşkil edeceklerdir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 kasım 1937)
81. “Bizim Atatürk rejiminin, Kemalist inkilâbının rejiminin adamı güzel vücudlu, sağlam düşünceli, cesur, vakur, hakkını ve fikrini heryerde müdafaa eder, neşeli ve ciddi olmaktan ibarettir. Bizim aradığımız budur. Bu beden terbiyesinden maksad, fikrî, seciyevî ve ahlakî terbiyedir. Bizim rejimin istilzam ettiği tip budur.” (*Şükrü Kaya, TBMM*, 5. Dönem 4. Yasama Yılı, 83. Birleşim, s. 487, 29.06.1938.)
82. Beden terbiyesi bütün medeni, memleketlerde kafa terbiyesi kadar önemli bir yer tutmuştur. Çünkü, beden terbiyesi, bir milletin varlığı ile alakadar bir iştir. Hedefi, ferdleri gürbüzleştirmek suretile halkı ıslah etmektir. Bu bakımdan, beden terbiyesi bir milletin korunma vasıtalarından biridir, ferdlerin mukavemet ve kuvvetini arttırarak tabii ve siyasi her türlü düşmanlara karşı koyan bir korunma vasıtası… Gürbüz, dinç, sağlam ve kuvvetli insanlardan mürekkeb bir millet daha iyi, daha çok çalışır, iklim tesirlerine daha fazla dayanır, daha az hasta olur. (…) Daha çok yaşar, daha cesur olur. Tabii afetler karşısında kolayca yılmaz, yurdunu daha kuvvetle müdafaa eder. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 kasım 1935)

83. Sıhhatini seveceksin, vatanını seveceksin, işini seveceksin ve tabiatı seveceksin. Spor edebî gençliğin tılsımıdır. Vücudu güzel tutmamak ayıp işlemektir. Gençlikten ihtiyarlığa sağlık saklamalıdır. Genç bir baş ancak dik omuzlar üzerinde durabilir. (…) Dik otur, doğru konuş. (…) En büyük servetiniz vücudunuzdur. Sağlam vücud – sağlam kafa – güzel insan. (…) Sportmen bedeni tabiatın en mükemmel eseridir. Mükemmel olmıya çalış. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)
84. Biz vücud, ruh ve kafaca, çetin ve güç Türkiye inşasını başarabilecek Kemalizm gençliğini yetiştirmek istiyoruz. Bünyece sıhhatli, ruhça asil ve şevkli, hepsi sevmeği, dayanışmağı, bir gayeye doğru tek bir ferd gibi koşmayı bilen türk gençliği gayedir: herkes, istad, mekteb, kulüp, bütün müesseseler yalnız böyle bir gençlik elde etmeği hedef edineceklerdir.(*Ulus,* 31 July 1937)
85. Kemalizm, aynı zamanda, bir kafa, yani terbiye ve kültür inkılabıdır. Bütün kitabları, usulleri ve hocaları dahi ıslah etmek lazımdır. (…)En başta bir masal’ı red edelim. Bizim zamanımızdaki mektebler ve tahsil, bugünkünden asla daha iyi olmamıştı. Bugünkü ilk mektebin son senesi demek olan sınıfta okuduğumuz dersler şunlardır: Kuranıkerim, tecvid, ulumu diniye, lisan-i Osmani, lisani arabi, lisani farisi, tarihi enbiya, coğrafya, kıraat, imla, hüsnühat. Bir de bugünün programına bakınız: yurd bilgisi, tarih, coğrafya, hesab, hendese, hayat bilgisi, tabiat bilgisi, okuma, el işleri, musiki, beden terbiyesi. Bu program farkı! (*Ulus*, 4 aralık 1937)

86. Gene binlerce ve binlerce ağızdan büyük, muhteşem bir yemin çıktı ve içindeki yüksek hakikati, yakıcı bir lâv gibi ortalığa yaydı: Biz, Türk gençliği, Atasının bıraktığı mirasa, Onun Cumhuriyetine, Onun inkilablarına, Onun kudretli ve kuvvetli rejimime daima sadık; toprağına kanımızı, istiklaline canımızı vermeye şerefimiz, gençliğimiz, namusumuz ve Türklüğümüz namına yüce abidenin önünde söz verip and içiyoruz. (…) Onun yarattığı harikaların yarınlardan yarınlara akarak, daima daha güzel, daima daha mükemmel bir halde sonsuzluğa ilerleyebilmesi, gençliğimiz ateşine bağlı değil midir? (…) Türk gençliğinde bu ateş vardır ve o, Atatürk inkılâblarının yılmaz bir bekçisi olmayı kendine ilk vazife bilmektedir. (*Cumhuriyet,* 14 Kasım 1938)
87. Yeni Türkiye'nin gençlik ordusu Atatürkün izinde yürüyen bir nur ve şuur kafilesidir. (…)Türk genci en dar bir zamanda ve en felaketli günler içinde İstanbuldan Samsuna atlıyarak Anadoluda Kurtuluş Cidali harikasını yaratan ve inkılâbları yaşatan En Büyüğümüzün bütün karakterlerini kendisine misal ittihaz etmek mecburiyetindedir. (*Cumhuriyet,* 19 May 1937)
88. İçki düşmanı gençler bu yıl okullarını bitiren üyeleri şerefine 21 Temmuz Pazar günü Heybeliadaya bir gezinti yapacaklardır. (…) Gençler bu, ve ileride yapacakları gezmelerle içkisiz eğlencenin nasıl bir kıvanç kaynağı olduğunu göstermek ve bu yönde yanlış düşünenlerin şeklerini silmek amacındadır. (…)(…) Ayrıca içki düşmanlığı yolundaki özlü söz ve görüşleri toplayan afişler yapılmaktadır. (*Cumhuriyet,* 13 Temmuz 1935)
89. Tevfik Fikret "Din şehid ister, asuman kurban – Daima her tarafta kan, kan, kan!" demişti. Din ve mezhep kavgalarının kaç milyonlarca insan kanıile lekelenmiş olduğunu biliyoruz. Din, zamanına göre, bir ideoloji idi. İdeolojide taassuba varanlar, ancak kan akıtmakla yüreklerini serinletirlerdi.(…) Biz, beşeriyetin muhalled eserlerini, ideolojimize uymuyor diye yakmıyoruz; memlekete girmelerine engel olmuyoruz. Bir yanlı ideoloji için asırlarca vicdan hürriyetinden mahrum yaşamış bir memlekette vicdan hürriyetini tesis etmiş bulunuyoruz. Niye din kitapları yazıp basılıyor, faşizmin, rasizmin, komünizmin ana eserleri Türkçeye çevriliyor; fakat bütün bu ideolojileri, halk arasında birer parçalama vasıtası olarak kullanmağa müsaade etmiyoruz. Bu, disiplinli bir vicdan hürriyetidir.(…) . Bu esaslara göre çocuklarımızı disiplinli bir hürriyetle yetiştirmeğe çalışacağız. (*Cumhuriyet,* 11 Nisan 1938)

90. Bu yazılarda, kalkış noktam şu olacak: Bizim medeniyetimizin kurucu kaynağı, Kur'ân'dır. Eğitimimizin de, düşünce, sanat ve gündelik hayatımızın da ana kaynağı, kurucu-kaynağı Kur'ân'dır. Kur'ân'ı yoksayan her girişimin sonu hüsrandır. (…)Bizim ortaya koyduğumuz bu zengin medeniyet tecrübemizi mümkün kılan şey, Kur'ân'a ve Sünnet'e dayanan medrese ve tekke sistemidir.Eğitim sistemimizi Kur'ân ve Sünnet ekseninde yeniden yapılandıramadığımız sürece, bu kendi-kendini sömürgeleştirici eğitim sistemiyle en iyi yapabileceğimiz şey, Batı kültürünün gönüllü acenteliğini üstlenen "gönüllü köleler" yetiştirmek olabilir yalnızca -şimdiye kadar yapa geldiğimiz üzere. (*Yeni Şafak,* 13 Mart 2015)
91. Bir diriliş nesli özleyen ve adına Asım'ın nesli diyen Merhum Mehmet Akif'in özlediği nesil. İnanıyorum ki sizlersiniz. Ne diyor Akif:"Asım'ın nesli diyordum ya

nesilmiş gerçek İşte çiğnetmedi namusunu çiğnetmeyecek" (*AK Parti*, 5 temmuz 2013)

92. Onun hayal ettiği gençlik, Paris'e gitmeden önce millete Fatih Camii'nin minaresinden, gelince de Eyfel Kulesinden bakan, yani kendine, değerlerine yabancılaşan bir gençlik değildi. Burada özellikle tarihine, medeniyetine, kültürüne sahip çıkan, bu birikimi batının fenniyle, bilgisiyle, tekniğiyle teçhiz eden, tahkim eden bir gençlik peşindeydi Akif.(...) Yine kendi ifadesiyle 'eskiyi eski olduğu için atmayacak, yeniyi de yeni olduğu için almayacak incelikte, böyle bir keskin şuura sahip bir nesil' hayal ediyordu Akif.(...) Onun gözünde Asım'ın Nesli bu milletin bağımsızlık mücadelesini bilgiyle, ilimle, irfanla sürdürecek, Çanakkale Destanı'nı gerçek zaferle taçlandıracak bir nesildir, sizsiniz.(*TCCB*, 26 aralık 2015)
93. Sizler, kökü mazide olan bir geleceğin mimarlarısınız. (…)Yeni Türkiye, bizim sizler için gördüğümüz gelecek rüyasının adıdır.Haksızlık karşısında dimdik durduk. (…)Siz de aynı şekilde dik duracak, göz yummayacak, boyun eğmeyeceksiniz. Yeni Türkiye'yi siz inşa edeceksiniz. Unutmayın, sadece Türkiye'nin değil, dünyanın bütün mazlumlarının umudusunuz. (…)Efendimiz'in (s.a.s) hayata bakışını örnek alın. (…)Önünüzde yeni bir fetihler çağı bulunuyor. Sizler, gönüller fethedeceksiniz. Adaletin, özgürlüğün, barışın sancağını burçlara dikeceksiniz. (*Yeni Şafak*, 21 Aralık 2015)
94. Hazreti Peygamberin tebliğ ettiği din, tüm mensuplarına özgüven sahibi olmalarını emreder. Bunun için Müslümanların tecrit olmalarına, diğer inanç sahiplerinden tamamen ayrı bir toplumsal hayata yönelmelerine gerek yoktur. Kur'an'da, "İnanıyorsanız üstünsünüz" buyruluyor. Hiç şüphesiz bu üstünlük, inancımızla, kalbimizle, aklımızla, vicdanımızla ilgili bir üstünlüktür. (*TCCB*, 12 Nisan 2015)
95. Onları eğitmek gerekiyor. Din eğitimi son derece önemlidir. Ahlaklı bir insan olmak için din eğitiminden geçmeli.(…) ahlaklı olmanın yolu oradan geçiyor. Disiplin altına alıyor insanları. (…) Ahlak disiplin isteyen bir şeydir. (*Yeni Şafak*, 6 Şubat 2012)
96. Bu sistem beşikten mezara kadar Kemalizm'e iman edip, bağlanmaları, resmi ideolojinin dışındaki tüm ideoloji, inanç ve düşünceleri zararlı ve yıkıcı akımlar olarak görmeleri tüm yurttaşların bu inanç içinde olmaları eğitim yoluyla sağlanmaya çalışılmaktadır. İnsan hakları, özgürlükler temelinde kültürel değerlerinin bütünleştiği, kaynaştığı bir eğitim müfredatı ye-rine, devlete, ideolojisine mutlak bağlılığı esas alan müfredat Cumhuriyet'in kuruluşundan beri sürdürülmektedir. Mevcut müfredat hakkında eski Milli Eğitim Bakanlarından Erkan Mumcu'nun dediği gibi "bu eğitim sistemi ancak ideolojik mutandlar yetiştirir" tespiti oldukça yerindedir. (*Yeni Şafak*, 30 January 2012)
97. O dönem okullarda; öz Türklerin kuvai milliye hareketine destek veren, yeni Türk devletine inanan, vatan ve milletin kurtuluşu için her türlü fedakarlığı yapan insanlar olduğu, öz olmayan Türklerin ise; halifelik ve saltanat yanlısı, padişah ve hükümetin yönlendirilmesiyle milli mücadeleyi engellemeye çalışan ötekiler olduğu işleniyor. (*Yeni Şafak*, 11 Mart 2012)

98. 19 Mayıs, Türkiye"nin umudunu ve şükrünü ifade eder. Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Kurtuluş Savaşı"nda şehit düşen gençlerin yerine yenilerinin gelmesinden doğan

sevinci anlatır. (…)Gençleri, gençliği yüceltmek; bizim için kozmetik, estetik bir olgu değildir.Evlatlarını şehit vermiş bir milletin teselli arayışı, hayır duasıdır. Peki, "gençlik" kısmını anladık.Neden "spor" bayramı? İşin bu tarafı tamamiyle 1930"lar Avrupa"sındaki faşist telakkiyle ilgili görünüyor. Irksal özelliklerini en iyi yansıtan[?] atletik gençler bilhassa Hitler"i heyecanlandırıyor, gururlandırıyordu. Sağlıklı bir yaşamdan ziyade, ırksal bir forma kavuşma motivasyonuyla spor yapılıyordu." Sağlam kafa – sağlam vücut" gibi eşleştirmeler de açıkçası bedene yüklenen abartılı ve yıkıcı anlamla ilintiliydi. (*Yeni Şafak,* 17 mayıs 2013)

99. Tevfik Fikret'in karanlığı boğacak ışık olarak gördüğü öz oğlu Haluk'un serencamı da bizim için bu açıdan ibretlik bir hikâyedir. Haluk'un karşısında ise, rahmetli Mehmet Akif'in hayalini kurduğu, özlemini çektiği, duasını ettiği Asım vardır, Asım'ın Nesli vardır. Çatışan, birbirine zıt olan bu iki karakter, aslında bizim son 200 yılımızı anlamamız için bize anahtar sunarlar. Bedrin Aslanları gibi Çanakkale'de destanlaşan bir Asım varken, Haluk'u ne Çanakkale Harbinde, ne de Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda görebilirsiniz. Bir yanda Doğuya sırtını dönmeden Batıyı anlamaya çalışan, bu uğurda fikir çilesi çeken, önce vatan, önce millet diyen bir Asım vardır; diğer tarafta ise önce İskoçya'ya, ardından Amerika'ya giden, son nefesini kilisede rahip olarak veren bir Haluk vardır.(…)Bugün de Asım'ın ve Haluk'un canlı sembolleriyle günlük hayatımızda karşılaşıyoruz. Bu karakterlerin Batıya, Batı kültürüne bakış açısı, Batılı değerlerle kurduğu hastalıklı ilişki, bugün de aynı şekilde devam ediyor. Bu karakterler aynı zamanda iki farklı eğitim modelinin de ürünleridir. Haluk ve Asım, değişmek zorunda olan bir toplumun bu süreci nasıl kendi faydasına veya zararına yönetebileceğinin işaretlerini verir. (*TCCB,* 26 Mart 2016)

100. Mehmet Akif'in Asım'ı; yabancılaşmış, ruh kökünden kopmuş genç aydın tipinin zıddıdır. (…)Bizim son 200 yıllık siyaset, kültür ve sanat hayatımız, aslında Tevfik Fikret'in Haluk'u ile Mehmet Akif'in Asım'ının mücadelesinin tarihidir.(…) Bir tarafta 'Hakimiyet milletindir' diyenler, diğer tarafta milleti mümeyyiz görmeyen vesayetçiler vardır. Bir tarafta bu ülkenin gençlerinin geleceği için canını siper edenler, diğer tarafta gençleri kör ideolojilerine kurban edenler vardır. (*TCCB*, 26 Aralık 2015)