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RECONCILIATION OF MODERN DICHOTOMIES: LOGOS AND EROS

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Modern Dikotomilerin Uzlařtırılması: Logos ve Eros

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ABSTRACT

This thesis gets its fundamental idea from Herbert Marcuse's critique of modern society. His analysis concerning the petrification of modern dichotomies is our starting point. We especially focus on the modern dichotomy of Logos and Eros, in more general terms, reason and desire. According to Marcuse's analysis, petrification of dichotomies causes us to form a relation of domination and repression between our stated faculties. And this hampers modern individuals to use their capacities in their fullest sense. As a consequence of not being able to use our capacities freely, our powers to criticize and create are degraded. After covering this analysis, as a way out from this condition of domination, we are looking Marcuse's idea of reconciling the opposite faculties. Through his account of reconciliation, we try to discuss his accounts of aesthetics. And then we try to look at the political and social projections of his account of aesthetics. To be able to better understand Marcuse and find the starting point of his critique of modern dichotomies, we look at Friedrich Schiller in our second chapter. First off, we discuss his critique of modernity which is mainly based on modern dichotomies. After that, we try to discuss his account of aesthetics. We see that his account of Beauty and Freedom are closely related to each other and we see that those two terms stand at the center when it comes to reconciling modern dichotomies. And then, we try to understand how Schiller's account of aesthetics is associated with his ethics and politics. On that, we see that aesthetic action gives us a better understanding of the relation between ethics, politics and aesthetics. Lastly, as a way to reconcile the opposite faculties, we look at our capacities to negate and create that are used in a creative action.

Key Words: Marcuse, Schiller, Dichotomy, Reconciliation, Aesthetics

ÖZET

Bu tez, temel fikrini Herbert Marcuse'nin modern toplum eleştirisinden alıyor. Modern dikotomilerin taşlamasına ilişkin analizi bu çalışmanın başlangıç noktasıdır. Biz özellikle Logos ve Eros modern dikotomileri üzerine odaklanıyoruz, daha genel terimler ile, akıl ve arzu. Marcuse'nin analizine göre, dikotomilerin taşlaşması bu bahsettiğimiz melekelerimizin arasında baskılama ve tahakküm ilişkisi kurmamıza sebebiyet veriyor. Bu da modern bireylerin kendi kapasitelerini tam anlamıyla kullanmalarını engelliyor. Yeteneklerimizi özgürce kullanamamızın sonucu olarak eleştirel ve yaratıcı güçlerimiz azalıyor. Marcuse'nin analizini ele aldıktan sonra, bu tahakküm koşulundan bir çıkış yolu olarak, Marcuse'nin zıt melekelerimizi uzlaştırma fikrine bakıyoruz. Onun uzlaşma fikri aracılığıyla, onun estetik fikirlerini tartışmayı deniyoruz. Ve daha sonra onun estetik fikirlerinin politik ve toplumsal yansımalarına bakmayı deniyoruz. Marcuse'yi daha iyi anlayabilmek için ve modern dikotomilere yönelik eleştirisinin başlangıç noktasını bulabilmek için, ikinci bölümümüzde Friedrich Schiller'e bakıyoruz. İlk olarak, onun genel hatlarıyla modern dikotomilere dayanan modernite eleştirisini tartışıyoruz. Ondan sonra onun estetik fikirlerini tartışmaya çalışıyoruz. Görüyoruz ki Güzellik ve Özgürlük anlayışları birbiriyle yakından ilişkilidir ve modern dikotomileri uzlaştırmak söz konusu olduğunda bu iki terim merkezde durmaktadırlar. Ve daha sonra, Schiller'in estetik fikirlerinin nasıl onun etik ve politik fikirleriyle ilişkili olduğunu anlatmaya çalışıyoruz. Bununla ilgili olarak, estetik edimin bize etik, politika ve estetiğin arasındaki ilişkiye dair daha iyi bir anlayış sağladığını görüyoruz. Son olarak, zıt melekelerimizi uzlaştırmanın bir yolu olarak, yaratıcı edimde kullanılan reddetme ve yaratma kapasitelerimize bakıyoruz.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Marcuse, Schiller, Dikotomi, Uzlaştırma, Estetik

INTRODUCTION

In the history of philosophy, thinking in terms of oppositions is one of the common ways to think for various philosophers. Although each of them did it in a different framework, one thing remains common, which is the presence of oppositions. There are ancient philosophers who argue about opposite capacities of human beings, such as rational and irrational parts as we see in Aristotle. And within the Ancient Greek philosophy, we can also see the debate between the opposing forces of reason and desire. There are also modern philosophers who establish their concepts and terms within the framework of opposite forces. One of them is Freud. Although he does not consider himself a philosopher, there are his famous concepts which he is inspired from the ancient Greek mythology, Eros and Thanatos. The former refers to life, and the latter to death. Freud and following him Marcuse, talk about these forces sometimes as instincts, other times as principles. But we must know that for them, these forces stay in the center of our existence, meaning that they are formed and are still being formed by the responses and reflexes given by the individual to the different social and historical conditions. They form habits that we are constructing through-out the history. No one knows the true nature of those instincts because they lie behind the curtain of our consciousness, a set of highly complex dialectic and reciprocal relations which we are not able to determine fully.

Around 1790's in Germany where great philosophical systems are being built, Schiller also thinks about these opposite forces, in his terminology, drives. He argues that despite the advancement in sciences and in rational thinking, there is something wrong going on with our opposite faculties and we must understand what is happening.

This urge to know leads him to search for the consequences of the separation of dichotomies. He sees that in modern age, our faculties that are supposed to be used harmoniously are separated from each other in a way in which they cannot be used freely. This was so important for Schiller because he thinks that separation into dichotomies limits us. It limits our capacities to negate and create. Schiller acknowledges that there are of course bodily and physical limitations. But our consciousness and the faculty of reason and our ability to create don't have to be limited.

Schiller is also aware that impediments which stem from the separation of dichotomies diminishes the possibilities of a harmonious society. In Schiller's mind, harmonious society refers to a free society. And this free society can be achieved by educating individuals in aesthetics. What does he refer to when he says aesthetic education? He refers to strengthening the play impulse by learning to harmoniously use the two opposite faculties which are in Schiller's terms material and formal impulse. He believes that we are fully free when we are playing and, by playing we can create what is beautiful. ¹

Schiller thinks that split between our faculties also diminishes our relations with the whole. ²Establishing separations on the modern account of the self does blind us to the fact that our self is a whole. As a result, we forget that we must not develop one part of ourselves only to let other side stay underdeveloped. However, if we know that our faculties have their dialectic relations between themselves, and they function not as separate parts, but as a complex whole, we would have a chance to care every different part equally. Why is it important to develop our capacities in a balanced way? Because

¹ Full account of Schiller's ideas are discussed in the second chapter.

² We must note that for Schiller, existence of the different faculties is not the problem. What causes the problem is taking those different faculties as opposites. Meaning that taking different faculties as if they are against each other in a way in which one establishes a relation of domination and hierarchy between them which would impede one's free usage of her faculties. As an example, we can think of the enlightened reason as opposed to desire and emotions.

if one gets ahead of the other, relations between faculties become hierarchical and repressive. This eventually impede us from using those faculties freely.

Although there are different articulations and interpretations of dichotomies, this study will cover the modern ones. One of the philosophers who emphasized this topic is Hegel. In his text *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* he says something which emphasizes the importance of modern dichotomies in philosophy:

“Dichotomy is the source of the need of philosophy; and as the culture of the era, it is the unfree and given aspect of the whole configuration.”³

Here, we can see that culture of the modern era is what makes dichotomies petrified. By petrified, I mean stabilized and rigidified. They are no longer able to move dialectically and reciprocally; instead, they are fixed within the framework of modern culture. For Hegel, and also for Schiller and Marcuse, this is the real problem which philosophy must deal with. Because for them, it is one of the aspects which makes modern individuals unfree by establishing dominative relations within their consciousnesses. Other than the petrification of dichotomies, within the modern society, we produce new dichotomies which make modern individuals more unable, meaning that every new dichotomy that is rigidified degrades our capacities to act. They impede our free usage of our faculties. This kind of a reality where people cannot exercise their faculties freely because of the constraints that are put in their consciousnesses is in Marcuse's terms, the reality of domination. This production of petrified dichotomies is camouflaged under the name of truth. That is why we are easily believe in their existence. It becomes a social norm in

³ Hegel (1977), *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (Harris and Cerf, Trans.). New York: State University of New York Press, p. 89. And for the full account of Hegel's views of dichotomy also see here.

the reality of domination that reason is superior than desires and, the latter must be tamed.

In that sense, dichotomies in modern age gain a manipulative and ideological function. But Marcuse insistently reminds us that these newly produced dichotomies and dichotomies that are petrified are the results of human decisions and actions. He tries to emphasize that they aren't unchangeable. He is aware of the fact that we have produced them, so it follows that we can also change them. This realization is one of the biggest motives behind this study. Depicting the possibility of a world where oppositions are harmonized, and limits are not constraining.

We must note here that Schiller, Hegel, and Marcuse are not alone as critiques of the enlightenment's notion of reason. There is a long debate in the history of philosophy when it comes to the dichotomy of Logos and Eros. Although this debate starts from the Ancient Greek, we can place this study in the modern times of this debate starting from Descartes. Separation which comes with the cartesian dualism is the first place in the history of modern philosophy which we see this debate. Dichotomy of body and soul paves way for other dichotomies such as Logos and Eros. This separation excludes what is aesthetic from what is rational. And both functions of the two faculties, namely reason and desire are determined within this conceptualization. This determination simply results in the exclusion of what is sensual because only reason can be trusted to obtain knowledge. After Descartes, there are few philosophers who supported his dualistic conception of human being. One of these philosophers is Immanuel Kant. His philosophy is based on limitation, separation, and thus on fixed oppositions on several levels.

However, there are also philosophers who argue against the split way of thinking. Many of these philosophers are referred as romantics. They argued that human beings is a whole. Rather than being distinct, every part and faculty of human beings constitute a whole which we call a human being. And Friedrich Schiller in dialogue both with Kant and Romantics argues for neither of them, and puts his very unique account of aesthetics as a way to reconcile modern dichotomies. Inspired from Schiller, Marcuse also establishes his aesthetics in order to reconcile modern dichotomies within the advanced industrial society.

What will be our route to demonstrate this possibility? We will first take a close look in Marcuse's views on the topic. We will discuss how these dichotomies are produced. And also, we will try to understand how petrified modern dichotomies constrain our capacities to negate and create. Then, we will look into political and ethical outcomes of these dichotomies. And lastly, we will discuss Marcuse's account of aesthetics which aims to reconcile modern dichotomies.

In the second chapter of our study, we will go back in time and look for the roots of the criticism of Marcuse's modern dichotomies in 18th century: German poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller. Marcuse explicitly cites Schiller in his books and takes his account of both aesthetic and criticism from him. In that sense, we believe that it is important to understand Schiller both in order to better understand Marcuse, and modern dichotomies. In the chapter devoted to Schiller, we will see how Schiller treats the topic at hand. And also, we will discuss his account of aesthetics associated with ethics and politics.

Aesthetics has an important role in reconciling modern dichotomies for both philosophers. Because for them, if we can create an aesthetic existence, the rein of modern instrumental rationality will be gone, and freeing instincts of human beings, i.e., Eros according to Marcuse, play drive according to Schiller, can be empowered. The utmost aim of this study is to understand the two philosophers who tried to think freedom with an aesthetic ethos. Both philosophers hope that an aesthetic ethos would revive the capacity to spontaneously create. And as we will see, the road to spontaneous free creation starts with critical thinking and ends with an aesthetic existence where modern dichotomies are reconciled.

SECTION 1

HERBERT MARCUSE ON MODERN DICHOTOMIES

1.1 Marcuse and his Terminological Background

The study of individuals and society are generally attributed to different disciplines in academy. Investigation of the first is called psychology and studies on latter is sociology. Critical philosophers who try to understand human condition to change them into better, generally argues in one discipline or in the other. As a philosopher who is concerned about not only one but different aspects of humanity, and is aware of the wholeness of those aspects, Marcuse wishes to understand advanced capitalist society from both perspectives. To establish an interdisciplinary theory, he goes on to study Freud's instinct theory. He thinks that great explanatory potential lies in psychological studies and hence, he argues that it is a must for us to study consciousness of individuals since the target of repressions and domination is not only society, but also consciousness, subconscious and unconscious.⁴ He thinks that Freud's theory of instincts is one of the best articulations to explain what happens in advanced industrial society.⁵ So, the main reason behind Marcuse's studies of psychology from philosophical perspective is to understand advanced industrial society and its influence on individuals. In other words, he has a political aim in mind while studying Freud's

⁴ Philosophy Overdose (2018), *The Frankfurt School with Herbert Marcuse* [<https://youtu.be/O7B2q1Fszhc>]. Retrieved from url, minute. 13.20 to 13.26.

⁵ *Ibid*, minute. 17.10 to 17.20.

concepts, he even argues that “the psychoanalytic categories do not have to be "related" to social and political conditions-they are themselves social and political categories.”⁶

Marcuse investigates Freud’s instinct theory to shed light on dichotomic structure of human beings and to understand how advanced industrial society represses and dominates one part with the other which eventually, hampers free exercise and development of human faculties. What is Freud instinct theory then? Freud simply argues that proper functioning of civilization requires repression over human instincts. The two fundamental instincts are Eros the life, and Thanatos the death instinct. ⁷ Eros, i.e., pleasure or life principle, is repressed by the death instinct to be able to survive in civilization with others. In other words, Eros becomes socially useful. Freud sees this as a natural consequence of civilization and only lays out how repression is actualized in individuals. On the other hand, as a critical philosopher, Marcuse conceives it as restriction and compulsion on individual’s freedom. He argues that in this type of repressive civilization, there can only be compulsory freedom. In one of his lectures, he says:

“The individual reproduces instinctively the cultural negation of the pleasure principle, renunciation, the pathos of labor: in the repressively modified instincts social legislation becomes the individual's own legislation; the necessary unfreedom appears as an act of his autonomy and thus as freedom. If the Freudian theory of the instincts had stopped here, it would be little more than the psychological grounding of the idealist concept of freedom, which in turn had given a philosophical foundation to the facts of cultural domination. This philosophical concept defines freedom in opposition to pleasure, so

⁶ Marcuse (1970), *Five Lectures Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia*. (Shapiro and M.Weber Trans.), Boston: Beacon Press, p. 44.

⁷ For full discussion see Freud (1930), *Civilization and its discontents* (Strachey, Trans) New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

that the control, even the suppression of instinctual sensuous aims appears to be a condition of the possibility of freedom.”⁸

Here, Marcuse warns us against the illusory sense of freedom that is constructed in the repressive civilization. By modifying human instincts into socially useful forms, society’s rules and norms are internalized. This internalization represses our very pleasure principle and thus, freedom in civilization is recognized as opposed to gratification and pleasure. Paradoxically, control and suppression of instincts becomes the preconditions for freedom. To liberate the repressed instincts and put together again freedom and pleasure, Marcuse sets out to analyze advanced industrial society by the re-examination of Freud’s instinct theory to see how human instincts are repressed and therefore possibilities of freedom is blocked. The idea behind the great research of Marcuse is simple, he thinks that constitution of civilization by domination is a *choice* rather than a natural consequence. He believes that civilization can be organized un-repressively and this would let our instinct to be free. In other words, he states that institutional unfreedom is not preconditions of civilization. Only today’s civilization is based on domination. ⁹

One might ask here, why does civilization repress human instincts? According to Marcuse, Eros, i.e., life and pleasure instinct, contains the necessary libidinal energy to negate the status quo. It is the critical and creative power of humanity. According to organization of today’s civilization, those freeing faculties of individuals must be suppressed for the sake and sustenance of dominative civilization. But for Marcuse, it could be otherwise: “society could afford a high degree of instinctual liberation without losing what it has accomplished or putting a stop to its progress.”¹⁰ To achieve the ideal

⁸ Marcuse (1970), *Five Lectures Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia*. (Shapiro and M.Weber Trans.), Boston: Beacon Press, p. 10.

⁹ Ibid, p. 20.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 4.

of free and progressive civilization, he makes a critique of today's dominative civilization. So, in the next section, we will see how Marcuse widens the scope of Freud's terms and with those terms problematize the dichotomic structure of modern individuals. He carefully detects repressions that are made on our freeing instincts and, lays out various consequences of repressed instincts.

1.2 Domination and Freedom

Prior to see Marcuse's analysis, two fundamental terms of Marcuse must be described. Domination and freedom. The term of domination is very important for this study since Marcuse builds his arguments based on the mechanics of domination. Domination is inevitable if we are to live together. Togetherness necessarily brings external and internal influence on oneself from the other members of the group. So, domination is inescapable, therefore, Marcuse argues that we need to pursue its minimization.¹¹ But what kind of a domination does Marcuse talk about? He defines it as:

“Domination is in effect whenever the individual's goals and purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed to him and performed by him as something prescribed. Domination can be exercised by men, by nature, by things-it can also be internal, exercised by the individual on himself, and appear in the form of autonomy.”¹²

He specifies the domination that is exercised on individuals since he investigates dominated instincts of individuals. Whether the domination is from inside or outside, its supreme effect is prescription. It determines and compels one to act in a pre-established manner. This pre-establishment generally refers to benefit of the one who dominates.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 2.

¹² Ibid, p. 1.

Hence, dominated individuals seem to exercise their faculties freely however, they are actually being conditioned. In this form, mechanisms of domination target individual's instincts because in that way, it can manipulate one's decisions, goals and, purposes. That is why Marcuse strives for a study of repressed instincts, to unveil the domination that prevents freedom to show itself in human capabilities.

Another thing that Marcuse is careful about is the way in which domination works. He says that it can be exercised by men, nature, internal or external effects. In other words, it can be done in many ways. It is not an one-sided relation where one dominates the other. There are numerous variations of domination. There is a complete domination where one literally controls the other. There is also a situation of reduction where the domineering part qualitatively reduces the other part but does not control it directly. There might be a relation of subordination. The dominated part becomes subjugated to the other in a way that it preserves itself but serves the domineering part. The key point here is that there is also a dialectic within the relations of domination. Every instance of domination may differ and, may has its own unique relations. It is not a black and white situation, there are always gray areas within the mechanisms of domination and repression. What we need to keep in mind is that one way or the other, there are set of relations which restricts one's freedom within the modern civilization.¹³ And this is what Marcuse is concerned about.

How domination prevents freedom will be described below through the Marcuse's analysis of instincts. But to understand both the analysis and the motivation behind his project, we must know Marcuse's concept of freedom. He describes it as:

¹³ By modern civilization Marcuse may mean intentional structuring or governmentality of modern state. Marcuse is aware of the dialectic relationality which mechanisms of domination and repression has. But he does not specifically argue about those relations. Rather, he focuses on how we can break the mechanisms of domination which we will cover below.

“And in fact freedom can be defined only within the framework of domination, if previous history is to provide a guide to the definition of freedom. Freedom is a form of domination: the one in which the means provided satisfy the needs of the individual with a minimum of displeasure and renunciation. In this sense freedom is completely historical, and the degree of freedom can be determined only historically; capacities and needs as well as the minimum of renunciation differ depending on the level of cultural development and are subject to objective conditions.”¹⁴

Here, he says that historically freedom has been a form of domination. He may mean that as we minimize the domination on our freeing instincts, we will be freer in a sense that displeasure from life will be decreased, and we would not have to renunciate ourselves, i.e., our Eros, which refers to both pleasure and freeing capacities of human beings. By defining freedom in a form of domination, he also emphasizes on the historicity and sociality of freedom. He clearly asserts that the level of domination in civilization can be minimized or maximized depending on cultural development and material conditions.

It is important to see the connection between freedom and domination. As one increases, the other naturally decreases. For Marcuse, today’s civilization is based on domination and it must be changed. That is why he tries to expose civilization’s domination on instincts and thus, he seeks possible solutions to this historical situation. But why does he pick individual instincts to analyze? Because he sees great potentials of freedom in Eros. Following paragraphs will explain why he picks instincts as a topic of investigation and what are the natural results of domination on our very own instincts.

¹⁴ See note 12.

1.3 Problematization of Modern Dichotomies and Its Consequences

There is a problem with modern civilization according to Marcuse. The problem is the impeded power of modern individuals. Although Marcuse does not give it a specific name, we can infer from his studies and call it *The Modern Dichotomies: Logos and Eros*.¹⁵ Not the existence of the dichotomies, but the repressed and unbalanced usage of the dichotomic faculties cause obstacles which decrease the capability of critical and creative action. In other words, it blocks the dialectic and harmonic function that individuals are supposed to have within their different faculties.¹⁶ The discrepancy that stems from the unbalanced activity of our faculties eventually results in the decrease of the possibility of free development of our capacities, i.e., freedom. What is problematized as dichotomic is also called by Marcuse, using Freud's terms; *Pleasure and Reality principle*. Pleasure principle refers to instincts and emotions. The libidinal energy which must provide us the emotive motivation to create. The energy to live freely. He calls it simply Eros. Reality principle is retaken as reason and logic, namely logos. Our power of putting forward arguments and critical thought which may help us to lose the chains that we are both consciously and unconsciously are bound to. One may be shocked seeing Marcuse arguing about very individualist matters. However, Marcuse thinks that individual's instincts have their projections on the political life. He says that: "Today the fight for life, the fight for Eros, is the political fight."¹⁷ Hence, in one his interviews, he asserts that overall "philosophy has always been to great extent social and

¹⁵ We should keep in mind throughout this study what we call a dichotomy is actually not a dichotomy, that is constructed to be a one. A fake opposition is being put between reason and imagination as if they are separate faculties.

¹⁶ Not separated but different. Difference protects the mutual relation between two things while emphasizing their dissimilar sides.

¹⁷ See Marcuse (1955), *Eros and Civilization: Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, Boston: Beacon Press, political preface.

political philosophy ever since Plato.”¹⁸ Broader discussion on the political effects of the modern dichotomies will be given below paragraphs. Simply, he argues about the repressive exercise of our modern dichotomic faculties that are *reason and pleasure*. His utmost argument that we will see at the end of this article is that those instincts, if not used repressively and unbalanced, contains great possibilities of freedom. Throughout the paragraphs, we add the emphasis on critical and creative thinking and their freeing potentialities related with the conflicting faculties.

In his remarkable book *Eros and Civilization: Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, he argues that pleasure principle, i.e., instinctive part, is repressed. It is repressed through the domination of the other part, that is reality principle. Repression of the Eros for the proper functioning of the established reality, i.e., repressive civilization, results in numerous problems both in individuals and society. Firstly, it degrades, meaning that it changes the qualities of both faculties. By the suppression of Eros, it is de-sexualized. To understand what he means by de-sexualized Eros, we need to first understand what exactly he means by Eros. Eros is in its most pure form energy. Instinctual energy to act. Acting through the usage of this energy must give us pleasure. Meaning that we are supposed to be gratified by our actions in life. That is why he calls it *the pleasure principle*. Far from being a hedonistic conception, this pleasure principle refers to general gratification and satisfaction that we supposed to take from our life. However, under the authority of logos, pleasure principle is repressed, and we end up with displeasure, malaise and as a result exhaustion. In other words, it decreases our activity and power to act. Although we lack the energy to act, we still need to move in order to survive and this results in *reaction* rather than action. Re-action is different from action in the sense that it is not *self-motivated*. It is generally under the rule of a power and finds its cause on the dominative force which imposes rules on the person. That is what he means by de-sexualization of Eros. We still use the energy that we take from it,

¹⁸ See note 4.

however, rather than gratifying and satisfying us, it makes us suffer and hate from what we do because it is not *self-created and self-motivated*. Why does Marcuse emphasize on self-creation that much? There are various reasons for it. One reason is that he is concerned about the individual autonomy. When everything is pre-existed for you in your life, whether it is in politics, social life or work life, you can only have an illusionary autonomy. But in the process of creation, what is used is actually your freedom to move. Your freedom to exercise your faculties un-repressively. In other words, modern individual perpetually loses her autonomy if she lives a pre-existed, i.e., not self-created, life. Why the loss of autonomy is crucial for Marcuse? Because he argues that the loss of autonomy pave way for an external authority, i.e., the father to rule and dominate.

“These changes reduce the "living space" and the autonomy of the ego and prepare the ground for the formation of masses. - The analysis of the ego turns into political analysis where individuals combine in masses, and where the ego ideal, conscience, and responsibility have been "projected," removed from the realm of the individual psyche and embodied in an external agent. This agent, which thus assumes some of the most important functions of the ego (and superego), is the leader.”¹⁹

Individuals don't have to participate, decide or act, they only need to listen, follow and react according to leader's orders. This may happen both within the individual and also out of the individual. On the inside, reality principle dominates the Eros and with it, the very possibilities of self-creation. On the outside, individuals give their consent to the leader like they give their autonomy to the reality principle within themselves. In other words, both internal and external loss of autonomy through domination and repression dialectically support each other.²⁰ Repression on the inside constructs a free

¹⁹ See Note 6, p. 47.

²⁰ Internal loss of autonomy refers to repression of the life instinct, Eros. External loss of autonomy refers to loss of individuality.

space to be dominated from outside because when Eros is repressed, individual cannot decide or take a move by himself. On the other hand, domination from outside helps to sustain the repression on the inside.

The other reason stems from the very structure of Eros. It only gratifies us when it is encountered with an action that it creates, i.e., genuine action, because it is an instinct that urges us to create when it is not dominated. Also, in the non-repressive form, it is the libidinal force of life, the capacity to negate, to improvise, to be able to think alternatives, to create shatter zones that would exclude imposed authorities, to wonder out to indeterminacy, to be able to phantasy and urge to create utopias. Eros represents *critical* and *creative* power of humanity, i.e., *the life*. There is also another possible route of Eros when it is repressed, the way of the hedonist. When it is dominated and repressed, it could not give any genuine gratification to the person, and one seeks it wildly where he can find it with a repressed Eros such as alcohol, drugs or intellectually worthless entertainment. In that sense, hedonism can be defined as excessive and misuse of Eros. Additionally, this gives a person a reason to forget that he is exploited within the established reality because the tools of selfish joy numb one's consciousness.

When we look at the domineering part, logos, it is also corrupted. It turns into a tool of domination and operation. It must dominate the Eros to make it socially useful and it must function as a calculator to operate in the status quo. Operating mind must stick to the rules that is given him from the established reality, and it can only function when it is *shown* to it. Meaning that it is desperately dependent an external authority to act. Reason is emptied in a sense that it requires an order, force, or instruction to follow.

It can only follow, but not create its own route.²¹ Emptied and shallowed reason must be filled with purpose which it is disabled to find. It is filled with the idea of domination by the fake exercise of power toward to Eros and thus, became the logic of domination. Since it is extremely powerful, it is a great tool to use. To be able to turn Reason into a tool of repression, it must be detached from its liberating possibilities, i.e., from its Eros. After this point, reason only seeks to find out the better ways of domination. Shallow logos-centric mind has no concern in his mind rather than to dominate and transform everything a tool that would help to sustain the prevailing system. In other words, it is not allowed to act freely. It excludes any sort of critical and creative act, i.e., the free Eros. This type of rationality is famously called by the members of Frankfurt School the *instrumental rationality*. When one sees everything as something that should be taken advantage of, meaning that as an instrument to achieve a pre-determined goal, neither satisfaction nor critical thinking can be actualized.

We might experience different outcomes of the instrumental rationality in today's modern world. One of them is immense effort put into *operations*. An Operation is radically different from a creative act. Operation is pre-established for a pre-determined goal. Its rules, time and process are all already established. The reason behind the pre-determination is the purpose behind operation; sustenance of the dominative organization of civilization. It is construed to fulfill a function. It becomes impossible to identify yourself with the process of operation since you have no choice or say in it. Neither the result nor process includes you, you cannot contribute to it, you can only *function for it*. It sounds natural for people who are living with the repressed instincts because one does not feel an urge to negate and then create from what you negate because Eros is already repressed. The true reason, i.e., non-repressed, cannot participate

²¹ If the force of creation is bestowed again to reason, it immediately became a threat to the established reality of domination. Creation and critique are the most fearful powers for the civilization of repression.

in the action of operation. Only detached and distorted reason can be fit to the system of operations. In other words, “in the stabilized life there is no room for Reason.”²² Whitehead argues that “the methodology has sunk from a method of novelty into a method of repetition.”²³ Operation as a function of reason only repeats what is given to it. However, it has greater potentials than just operating. Freed reason can only participate in an action if it is creative. It has an urge to speculate and bring novelties when it is reconciled with Eros. It is not even reason, but a distorted rationality that is functioning in the process of operation. Marcuse calls free reason the *critical rationality*.²⁴ For Marcuse, *critical rationality in the most accentuated form, is the prerequisite for its liberating function*.²⁵ However, as it is discussed above dominative and repressive organization of the modern civilization make us unaware of the liberating function of the mind.

1.4 Reconciliation of Modern Dichotomies

Dominative and hierarchal relationship with oneself corrupts both parts while giving a fake authority to the one side. And this results generally in the loss of genuine action that finds its source in the critical and creative potentials. But Marcuse argues that we also need to vivify both critical and creative powers to overcome the problematic condition of modern dichotomy. We need first our critical power to analyze and realize that we are repressed and exploited, and second, we need our creative power to establish a new reality within the dust of the old one. So, focus for Marcuse is to demonstrate how

²² Whitehead (1929), *The Function of Reason*, Boston: Beacon Press, p. 20.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Marcuse (1941), Some social implications of modern technology. *Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences*, 9(3), p. 414-439.

²⁵ Ibid.

to reconcile and overcome the “opposition between imagination and reason.”²⁶ He puts the general agenda of his:

“The philosophical effort to mediate, in the aesthetic dimension, between sensuousness and reason thus appears as an attempt to reconcile the two spheres of the human existence which were torn asunder by a repressive reality principle. The mediating function is performed by the aesthetic faculty, which is akin to sensuousness, pertaining to the senses. Consequently, the aesthetic reconciliation implies strengthening sensuousness as against the tyranny of reason and, ultimately, even calls for the liberation of sensuousness from the repressive domination of reason.”²⁷²⁸

Those two spheres of human existence must be reconciled if we are to have a free exercise of our faculties. For Marcuse, this reconciliation can be made in the aesthetic dimension. Within the aesthetic dimension, opposing forces of modern individuals will not be simply reconciled, they are going to be *aesthetically reconciled*. He naturally argues that sensibility must be freed from logic of domination because his criticism is for the advanced industrial society. That is why he argues that reconciliation must first strengthen the sensuous part, it is the part that has been under repression. Aesthetic reconciliation is not only about strengthening the sensibility, but also being aware of the wholeness and structure of the human existence. We must be aware that Marcuse does not favor the sensuous part, but he favors what has been repressed in the modern society. In other words, aesthetic nature of the reconciliation does not specifically refer to empowerment of the sensuous part, it refers to freedom; de-repression of human

²⁶ See Marcuse (1969), *An Essay on Liberation*, p. 24.

²⁷ See Note 13, p. 180.

²⁸ The effort to reconcile two opposing parts of human beings goes back to second half of the 18th century according to Marcuse. Relations of Marcuse’s idea of reconciliation with the 18th century will be discussed in the next chapter.

faculties, harmonic movement between two opposing forces, and balance between different faculties of human beings.

Reconciliation in Marcuse's views does not refer to a fusion where two forces become one and where it would clear off the differences between forces. In other words, it is not an absorbing reconciliation. Rather, it is a *dialectic reconciliation*. Yes, two forces must work like one, but not become one. Becoming one would wipe out the dialectic dynamism between two forces. So, two spheres must preserve their specific features. While preserving themselves, they must push each other in a harmonic fashion to move. The kind of reconciliation that Marcuse has in mind and the dialectic relation between two opposing forces is best defined by Hegel:

“At the same time, there are two forces present, and the concept of both is, to be sure, the same; however, the concept has gone out from its unity and entered into duality. Instead of the opposition remaining entirely and essentially for just a moment, it seems to have withdrawn from the unity's dominion over it through its estrangement into entirely self-sufficient forces. What is at stake in this self-sufficiency needs to be viewed more precisely. First of all, the second force emerges as the soliciting force, in fact according to its content, as a universal medium, as facing off with what is determined to be the solicited force. However, while the former, the second force, is essentially the flux of both moments and is itself force, it is in fact likewise only the universal medium as a result of its being solicited to that end and likewise is also a negative unity, or it solicits the recession of force as a result of its being solicited. This difference, which came to pass between both forces such that one of them was supposed to be the soliciting and the other the solicited force, is thereby transformed into the same reciprocal exchange of determinatenesses.”²⁹

²⁹ Hegel (2012), *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Pinkard, Trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 84. passage 138.

There are two forces, yet they are the same. They are different and same at the same time. Different in terms of their own specific qualities, same in terms of the dialectic relation with each other. Two forces create a duality, but it is an unified duality. Because as negative and positive forces, they are the existence conditions of one another. In other words, they are self-sufficient only if the two exist. There is a co-operative sufficiency. How do they ontologically construe each other? Within the two forces, one force acts upon the other force. Thus, we have acting and acted forces. Then, the acted force also acts upon the acting force. And what was once an acting force become an acted force. That is what Hegel means by unified duality, the two forces are both actor and acted, they are at the same time both influencer and influenced. We should also know that in order one force to act on the other, they must be different, they must be opposites so that they need each other, and they need each other because they are opposite. This oppositeness is what creates the movement. This is called the movement that drives from contradictory two opposing forces.³⁰ It creates a circular endless motion.

Now, we can think of these two forces as Eros and Reason. Reality principle and pleasure principle. This is what *dialectic reconciliation* is for Marcuse. Both forces, Eros and Reason must be unified but yet, they must be in duality. Both need each other to exist, and they can only create a force by soliciting the other. Instead of moving harmoniously, Reason restricts the movement of the Eros in the dominative civilization according to Marcuse. Rather than pushing each other to move, one represses the other and the critical and creative power that are supposed to be driven from the dialectic movement of opposing forces cannot be produced. Only compulsory energy that comes from the hierarchal relation between two forces serve the domineering part, thus monopolization occurs. This is the core of the problem in the modern dichotomies for Marcuse.

³⁰ Marcuse defines human faculties as two opposing forces and trusts the movement of the contradiction to free us from the monopolized and one-way understanding of movement.

We understand what kind of a reconciliation Marcuse tries to put, but there is a still poking question; how this dialectic reconciliation will be actualized? As we remember from above, this reconciliation must be in the aesthetic dimension. So, Marcuse's account of aesthetics will provide us to answer to poking question. To see in which aim Marcuse recalls the aesthetic dimension of humanity, his own words are best place to start:

“We shall attempt to undo this repression theoretically by recalling the original meaning and function of aesthetic. This task involves the demonstration of the inner connection between pleasure, sensuousness, beauty, truth, art, and freedom -- a connection revealed in the philosophical history of the term aesthetic. There the term aims at a realm which preserves the truth of the senses and reconciles, in the reality of freedom, the "lower" and the "higher" faculties of man, sensuousness and intellect, pleasure and reason.”³¹

Aesthetic faculty helps us to see the inner connections within ourselves. The very inner connections that are distorted or teared apart by the rationality of domination. Aesthetic dimension reminds us that we are, in fact, a whole. It reminds us that if we are to act freely, we must be complete. Meaning that we must engage all faculties when we act. By pointing out the free and harmonious possibilities of our capacities, aesthetics reveals our chance of free existence. At the top of the list of dichotomies which must be reconciled in the aesthetic dimension, there lies sensuousness and intellect or pleasure and reason. Our life force, he sometimes calls libido, must transform to *libidinal rationality*. It refers to co-operation of Eros and Logos. But for libidinal rationality to exist, at first, libido must be released from the repression of reason because in the advanced industrial societies, domination is being made through reason.

³¹ See note 13, p. 173.

He also warns us that we should not confuse the libidinal release with the *explosion* of libido. He argues that release of libido from the logic of domination is not about genital supremacy or the libido for the pursuit of hedonist satisfactions. He says that true release of libido would bring happiness that is not mere feeling of satisfaction but freedom and satisfaction.³² This is the reason why Marcuse imperatively links reconciliation of two opposing forces with our aesthetic faculty. But how are we going to recall the aesthetic dimension? How does it help us to realize and create a new reality? Although Marcuse does not give the exact answers to those questions, he elaborates on the aesthetically created reality, that is the *reality of freedom*.

1.5 In the Aesthetic Realm

Marcuse sees great potentials in aesthetic dimension of human beings. Hence, he argues that most of the philosophers who tries to change the world for the better neglected the potential which aesthetics has.³³ Although he does not theoretically argue on aesthetics, he elaborates on the aesthetic state and tries to give examples of what kind of a life we would have if reality of freedom would be established and if individuals would realize their aesthetic dimension. It must be noted that Marcuse adopts many ideas from Schiller and develops his own ideas on aesthetic to implement them to advanced industrial society.³⁴ I will try to put Marcuse's ideas on aesthetics without going into Schiller's in this writing although they have great similarities.³⁵

³² See Marcuse 1955: *Eros and Civilization: Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p. 105.

³³ For the full discussion see note 39.

³⁴ See *Ibid*, p. 175.

³⁵ The next chapter of this study is devoted to Schiller's ideas on the modern dichotomies.

1.5.1 Work and Action

One of the discourses that he takes on his books and articles is on work. He argues that work is toil and burdensome in the established reality. It is imposed upon us, meaning that it is compulsory rather than voluntary. It is not *self-created* but *pre-established*. It is subjected to strict rules and must achieve some specific goals that are set by the massive work organizations to finally, accumulate capital. Because it is compulsory and imposed, it does not gratify our Eros. As Marcuse puts it:

“The normal kind of work (socially useful occupational activity) in the prevailing division of labor is such that the individual, in working, does not satisfy his own impulses, needs, and faculties but performs a pre-established function.”³⁶

Because it is pre-established and not self-created, it has no potential to satisfy and gratify the pleasure principle. The manipulated understanding of work does not only hamper ones' gratification but also alters the very meaning of the *action*. Within the framework of the distorted rationality, i.e., instrumental rationality, the very meaning of activity is changed. It is reduced to benefit. It does only worth to do something if it brings benefit. It is rational only if it refreshes one to work for the other day. Even taking a walk for the sake of taking a walk or to have a sincere and deep conversation with beloved ones is unnecessary and thus, irrational. In other words, in the repressive civilization, activity and work are reduced to benefit.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 221.

What is the genuine work then? It is *play* for Marcuse. Play refers to create with our both sensibility and reason. It has the potential to gratify us. It is a work which has some sort of indeterminacy in it. This indeterminant structure of play opens us different possibilities which eventually lead us to new creations. On the other hand, non-libidinal work can only make us suffer and hate, thus makes us idle, tired and, sluggish. Any concentrated and creative activity makes us more awake and energetic, but every unconcentrated and standardized work makes us sleepy. While a genuine action makes us more aware of both our and other's situation, standardized understanding of action makes us more indifferent and, lack of concern is followed with passivity. However, aesthetic work, when there is aesthetic reconciliation of opposing forces, turns to *play*. Erotic instincts start to co-operate with reason in the process of work. Work eventually becomes creation at its highest sense. Creative work is completely different from the standardized work. Erich Fromm, one of the members of Frankfurt School explains creative work in his spectacular words:

“In any kind of creative work the creating person unites himself with his material, which represents the world outside of himself. In all types of creative work the worker and his object become one, man unites himself with the world in the process creation. This, however, holds true only for the productive work, for work in which I plan, produce, see the result of my work.”³⁷

The work that includes libido is creative and this work makes us realize that we constitute a whole with outer world. And also, it makes us realize that we are also a whole in ourselves. Being aware of the wholeness of ourselves will lead us to aesthetic reconciliation of opposing faculties. Because we would understand that real work must include every faculties without excluding each other. In other words, in the aesthetic

³⁷ Fromm 1957: The Art of Loving, p. 14.

dimension, work transforms into a creative play where we can use our whole faculties freely. And becoming aware of one's situation is related with working. Being aware of one's situation is to realize one's potentialities and capacities. In genuine work, we realize our unfulfilled skills and talents. Hence, we may create new skills during the act of work. But of course, this realization can be actualized only while we are playing. To put it another way, work is a way to realization, if it is harmonized with the urge to freedom, i.e., Eros. This is what Fromm may mean when he says object, world and the subject unite in the process of creative work. One realizes herself, and his relationality with surrounding objects and environment. One also realizes his wholeness in herself. In that way, work is transformed into a free activity which Marcuse calls play.

1.5.2 Sociality and Politics

Another discussion he builds is on the social relations. He firstly talks about the distinction between Agape³⁸ and Eros in the reality of domination. He argues that relationship that we establish with others in a repressed Eros turns into conditional and selfish libidinal relationships. We seek our self-satisfaction in a hedonistic fashion when we form new relations. Naturally, those distorted and instrumental relations would not gratify us, and we lost our sense of trust, respect, and hope.³⁹ Because for Marcuse, there is a difference between blind satisfaction and pleasure. Blind satisfaction is a state where sensibility rules over reason and move the person only the sensual satisfaction without considering the consequences. In other words, one seeks *absolute* gratification of one part and let the other part serve to it in that matter. But in the aesthetic dimension, one may refuse the immediate blind satisfaction and seek out intensified fulfillment. This act of aesthetic refusal paves way to non-repressive relations with others. That is where

³⁸ Agape is an ancient Greek term that refers to unconditional love.

³⁹ See note 17, p. 197-222.

Agape is united with Eros. Eros is freed from dominance of sensibility and with the help of reason, can become love, care, trust, and respect for others. But Marcuse is careful that Eros must not turn to Agape, but that Agape must join to Eros.⁴⁰ He does not explain the reason of this remark, but I conceive this statement to not to turn Eros into a transcendental and abstract force of divine love. Agape's potential of unconditional love makes it open to manipulation. A type of manipulation that would pacify Eros as we generally encounter in the interpretations of the monotheist religions. It also probably would decrease the libidinal force of Eros and wipe its creative and critical energy from this world and place it up in the heavens. However, if we take Marcuse's advice as he suggests, meaning that make Agape join into Eros, its unconditional potential of love would help us to create respectful, trusting, and altruistic relations with both others and with our own self.

The relationship we establish with our self is important for the ethical realm. In the aesthetic dimension, although there might sometimes be tension, there must not be a contradiction between what I desire and what is good, because freed Eros can be satisfied by good deeds. Think about the modern dichotomy of morality and pleasure. Morality requires reason to establish its laws and needs to rule over sensibility to make one stick to the rules. However, aesthetically reconciled pleasure and reality principle would lead us also unification of ethics and aesthetics. Meaning that one can take pleasure by abiding the rules of morality. This would not be a blind obedience, but an *aesthetic conformity* to the moral laws. To conform to the laws aesthetically, there is a condition. Those must not be imposed, and not be instrumental to achieve a goal, they must be free. As Marcuse puts it:

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 211.

“This double order is in conformity with laws, but laws that are themselves free: they are not superimposed and they do not enforce the attainment of specific ends and purposes; they are the pure form of existence itself. The aesthetic "conformity to law" links Nature and Freedom, Pleasure and Morality.”⁴¹

The aesthetic conformity is not only about ethics, but it also has an ontological aspect. Firstly, it unites Nature and Freedom, meaning that necessity and pleasure. If the laws of nature are not imposed upon us and not to be manipulated for selfish aims like in the industrial production process, we might turn necessity of our existence into various pleasures. In other words, we might discover aesthetic ways to satisfy our necessities. In fact, we are already doing it even in a repressed context. Think of the existence of culinary arts and various kinds of delicious foods. In the face of diverse recipes, I must ask; why we have created numerous foods? Why don't we survive only with plain, undressed, and dry foods? Every possible explanation of those questions will inevitably include aesthetic side of human beings. Better questions must be put then, why one just eat raw foods when there is a possibility of make it more delicious? Why does humanity not live an aesthetic life? Why should we not turn our necessities into pleasures?

Secondly, in an ontological perspective, investigations that are made into nature to understand it can also become aesthetic. Instead of wondering the laws of nature to have a better control and manipulation over it like we have been doing in the modern society for at least 150 years, we may pursue a better understanding of nature to discover its forces which are very dynamic and dialectic. Those harmonious and dialectic forces of nature are actually aesthetic, if we really think how Marcuse defines the aesthetic dimension. They freely float all around the world harmoniously and there are very contradicting forces in nature. By understanding the forces of nature, we may have an

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 179.

idea of the harmonious interplay of forces. And the harmonious and free motion is itself *aesthetic*. The *beauty* of the aesthetic state of contradictory natural forces might put us in an awe. The sense of awe would follow with the better understanding of aesthetic within the nature and thus, influence our very own character in a good way. In the aesthetic dimension, we have a chance to learn to live a good life, i.e., ethics, by observing nature and being impressed from its beauty.⁴²

Aesthetically created relations with others at first seem to be only about ethics, but also, they let us think about politics with aesthetics. If we take our aesthetic faculty as a socially productive force, we can understand how non-repressive Eros can cooperate with reason and Agape to build an aesthetic politics. Instead of profit-focused and un-ethical politics, aesthetic politics is about rebelling against the repressive and dominative political trends such as fascism. One thing needs to be mentioned here that may create a misunderstanding. Another member of the Frankfurt School Walter Benjamin argues that relation between aesthetics and politics in the modern ages ideologically supports fascism.⁴³ He claims that growing processes of mechanical reproduction pave way to alienation of the aesthetics. He constructs an argument around the contrast of painting and film. According to Benjamin, the advance in the reproduction of artworks degrades their aura, authenticity and their perceivability. Degradation in aura refers to detachment of an artwork with its original, i.e., created, environment and culture. This is also related with perceivability of the artwork because when an artwork is detached from its context, the chance of understanding and therefore contemplating on it decreases. How does an artwork is separated from itself? For Benjamin, it is made by the techniques of fast reproduction. While the process of

⁴² This realization is a result of readings of Pythagoras and its implementation of his perspective to the Marcuse's.

⁴³ Benjamin (2012), *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, New York: Prim's Key Press, epilogue.

alienation is developing slowly, advances in the film industry gives it a great acceleration. From now on, not the old works of art are reproduced, but the new fastened and perceivably mediated artworks appear. He talks about the mediation of lens and camera but it is not going to be elaborated.⁴⁴ To sum up, he claims that alterations in the understanding of art makes aesthetics open to manipulation. It becomes a tool that places masses' mind specific emptied symbols which support the fascist politics. He gives example of the gratification that is taken from war technologies and its industry.⁴⁵ Destructive war machines became an aesthetic symbol and thus, empowers the fascist political regimes. In his famous words:

“Fiat arts – pereat mundus”, says Fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. This is evidently the consummation of “l’art pour l’art.” Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics rendering aesthetics. Communism responds by politicizing art.”⁴⁶

Fascism offers mere gratification of the aesthetic pleasures in an alienated fashion. In this form of aesthetics, its critical and creative features are excluded. It changed into something affirmative and being used in order to bind society with the major trends of fascism. Eros is politically manipulated and channeled to affirmative type of aesthetics. And this let fascism to exploit emotive content in art and use it to create volunteer

⁴⁴ For the full discussion see Ibid, chapter VIII to XV.

⁴⁵ Ibid, epilogue.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

affirmations of what it imposes by industrial entertainment. And this is the political manipulation of Eros. It is the instrumentalization of aesthetics.

Instrumental aesthetics includes beauty, but it recognizes it only as a symbol. Beauty is transformed into an idea and has no place within the daily life. It is useful as a symbol, not as a representation of freedom. Anything that would remind us the freedom is condemned in fascism. So, beauty can only be part of the industrial culture where it only functions as a symbol. Within this context, we learn and teach that beauty is about sensual pleasures. We build a relation with beauty that is limited. This hampers us to see freeing potentialities of beauty in every aspect of our daily life. We do not seek beauty in ethics and politics, we only seek it in entertainment. Thus, beauty is reduced to mere tool of joy which fascist regimes would use against society. Apart from his criticism of aesthetics, Benjamin differentiates politicizing art and aesthetic politics. While latter refers to manipulation and alienation of aesthetic values, by the first Benjamin means the same thing with Marcuse. If aesthetics is not corrupted by the fascist political forces, it has a great liberating potential both for the society and individual. In other words, Benjamin's criticism of aesthetic politics targets the alienated aesthetics by the forces of mechanical reproduction, not the aesthetic that Marcuse talks about. With that being said, we can now go on to elaborate on Marcuse's aesthetic views on politics.

Marcuse associates political liberation with the aesthetic dimension of human beings. He builds a bridge between art and politics. Political action as an art excludes all manipulation, repression, and domination. In this sense, politics must not only be related with efficient policies, monopolization of power, and the benefit of state. Rather, it must cover an emancipatory transformation of the society. To understand the conception of aesthetic politics better, we must dive into what Marcuse understands from art and, how it is related with politics.

In the beginning of his short book *The Aesthetic Dimension*, he argues that political emancipatory function and potential must be ascribed to art. He states that “I see the political potential of art in art itself, in the aesthetic form as such”⁴⁷ He criticizes orthodox Marxism for not considering the political potential of art.⁴⁸ Why Marcuse sees such an emancipatory political potential in art? Because art, for Marcuse, is a realm of free play. It is the cosmos of hope. Artist is nonconformist, she is rebellious to the social context in which she grew up. She wishes to reconcile all dichotomies including utopia and reality. Artist necessarily negates and creates his own ways to produce the artwork. It necessarily includes first critical and then creative practices. The most important political potential of art is revealed when we understand that *art stands under* “the law of the given while transgressing this law.”⁴⁹ Art can reveal its potentials even under domination and repression because it creates a distinct cosmos. While standing under necessities and forces of history and society, it has the potential to negate them. This potential is seen in the great work of arts, but not every artwork has these features. A work of art is revolutionary if, “by virtue of the aesthetic transformation, it represents, in the exemplary fate of individuals, the prevailing unfreedom and the rebelling forces, thus breaking through the mystified (and petrified) social reality, and opening the horizon of change (liberation).”⁵⁰ What is liberating in art is that it breaks through the established reality and create new emancipatory potentialities.

⁴⁷ Marcuse (1978), *The Aesthetic Dimension Towards A Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (Marcuse and Sherover, Trans.), Boston: Beacon Press, preface.

⁴⁸ Ibid, preface.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 11.

⁵⁰ Ibid, preface.

Now, we understood the importance of art in politics, but one may ask; how and why one must act like an artist? Here, Marcuse introduces *the Beautiful*. He argues that beauty calls us. It represents the Eros and rebels against the reality of domination.⁵¹ Beauty in a work of art can only result from the free play of our imagination and reason. Its existence is a proof of freedom. When we are encountered with a beautiful work of art, its freedom in the process of creation would fill us with hope. In the purest sense, Beauty is the material representation of freedom. In that sense, a work of art is beautiful, i.e., free, “to the degree to which it opposes its own order to that of reality.”⁵² So, an aesthetic politics contains the qualities of art. It must be filled with hope, it must be beautiful, i.e., critical, and creative. Like an artist, we must be able to go beyond the given, and create free spaces for ourselves, while doing it, we must stay within the reality to be able to touch and thus, change it. Of course, those can only happen if we reconcile imagination and reason. Only if Eros is freed and can move towards to Beauty. A repressed Eros cannot answer the invocation of Beauty. That is the utmost reason why Marcuse focuses on the dichotomies of modern individual, because it hampers the free play of our faculties. Any domination or hierarchy between our faculties would bring the same result, exploitation, and suffering. Every aspect of our lives, ethics, politics, individual and social relations, our understanding of ontology must become aesthetic again and show how life can be beautiful. And after that, “only one thing remains: an infinite beauty, which passes from one form to another.”⁵³

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 6.

⁵² Ibid, p. 64.

⁵³ Buchner (1974), as cited in note 47, p. 65.

SECTION 2

FRIEDRICH SCHILLER ON MODERN DICHOTOMIES

2.1 Introduction

18th century Germany without a doubt represents one of the most rich and complex years of culture in the history of philosophy and art. Friedrich Schiller who lived between 1759-1805 is one of the well-known contributors to that highly vivid era. Although he had marks of his era all around him, he also succeeded to distance himself from major ideas of his time. He not only distanced himself, but also, he criticized the major trends of his time. In other words, he managed to develop and maintain a critical distance to his time. As he says:

“Live with your century, but do not be its creature; render to your contemporaries what they need, not what they praise.”⁵⁴

Both transcending and remaining within his time, Schiller paved the way to great realizations in the history of ideas. What kind of new horizons he established will be the main theme of this section. We must note that what makes Schiller the perfect fit for this study is that his main topics of his philosophical texts carry the same purpose and problematizations with what Marcuse does.

⁵⁴ Schiller (1954), *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Snell, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 63.

We said that what distinguishes Schiller from his contemporaries is his critical perspective to his time. What are those criticisms that make Schiller so special for this study? Those are his critique of Enlightenment and its notion of reason. According to Schiller, the project of enlightenment has put too much importance on reason. By doing it, it caused fragmentations in the notion of humanity. Especially Kant and his followers emphasized reason as an uppermost faculty of modern individual. They claimed that everything can be accomplished only with reason.⁵⁵ This glorification of reason disturbed Schiller because from his first years of education, he defended not only reason, but the wholeness of human beings.⁵⁶ What he means by wholeness is the entirety of a person in himself. All her faculties, emotions and instincts. Of course, behind the idea of wholeness, there is an antique influence on Schiller like his contemporaries. As he put it:

“Why was the individual Greek qualified to be the representative of his time, and why may the individual modern not dare to be so? Because it was all-uniting Nature that bestowed upon the former, and all-dividing intellect that bestowed upon the latter, their respective forms.”⁵⁷

He compares the citizens of the ancient Greek polis with the modern individuals and argues that moderns lost their wholeness. Wholeness is extremely crucial for us to understand Schiller’s critique and the rest of his aesthetic ideas because the wholeness of human beings lies at the heart of Schiller’s philosophical ideas. Moreover, we may say that other arguments and ideas of Schiller stem from the fundamental notion of wholeness.

⁵⁵ For the full discussion see Beiser (2005), *Schiller as Philosopher*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵⁶ Beiser (2005), *Schiller as Philosopher*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 13-41.

⁵⁷ Schiller (1954), *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Snell, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 38.

Schiller argues that modern civilization started to divide human beings and at the top of those divisions, there lies the dichotomy between reason and sensibility. As I borrowed from Marcuse and put it in the title of this study, Logos and Eros.⁵⁸ For Schiller, the most harmful separation is the separation between reason and sensibility because it precludes the total development of the human capacities. Creative and critical thinking are lost because we have created an inner conflict within the conception of modern individual. By overemphasizing only reason and handing over the authority to it, we nullified and degraded the other part, i.e., the sensual. Schiller detects the problem by pointing out the modern culture:

“It was culture itself that inflicted this wound upon modern humanity. As soon as enlarged experience and more precise speculation made necessary a sharper division of the sciences on the one hand, and so on the other, the more intricate machinery of States made necessary a more rigorous dissociation of ranks and occupations, the essential bond of human nature was torn apart, and a ruinous conflict set its harmonious powers at variance.”⁵⁹

Since this is an introduction, it is not the right place to elaborate on his critique of modernity. But in order to understand his critique, we need to know the terms and conceptions that he established within his philosophical essays. The harmony between human faculties and powers are what he is concerned about because loss of those powers also means loss of the possibility to act, i.e., freedom. Human freedom lies at the wholeness of human beings, all his faculties and harmonious usage of them. Only then, critical and creative powers are on. Because for Schiller if we desire to be autonomous, we must realize that our faculties form a whole in themselves. Naturally, not being able

⁵⁸ This dichotomy is named by many philosophers and by different names. Title of this study is borrowed from Herbert Marcuse’s terminology since his works inspired me to write this study.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

to use all our faculties in a harmonic fashion means that we are not autonomous. In other words, the possibility of free action lies in the harmony between our faculties.

“How are we to go beyond the authority of reason and re-establish the lost wholeness of human beings?” is the main question that Schiller had in mind. His answer is aesthetics: Not as the discipline of philosophy of art, but as a way of existence. We said that for Schiller, on the top of the modern dichotomies there is the dichotomy of rational and sensuous faculties. As opposed to overemphasized thus degenerated reason, he argues that the balance between the two main faculties of human beings must be restored if we are to act freely.⁶⁰ That is why he points aesthetics to resolve the problem of fragmented conceptualization of modern individuals. He also talks about the reciprocal relation between the two impulses. Personality will keep material impulse from going to excess, and sensibility must limit the formal impulse. In other words, the two impulse must soothe each other in order to create and maintain the harmony between conflicting faculties. He also names reason as formal impulse, and sense as material impulse. In a word:

“The material impulse must be kept by the personality, and the formal impulse by the sensibility, or Nature, each within its proper bounds.”⁶¹

This conceptualization tells us something deeper about Schiller. He widens his perspective when he is encountered with divisions and broads the concept of dichotomy into all branches of philosophy. He detects the dichotomies that we have in our ontological status and epistemological theories. Generally, he includes every aspect of

⁶⁰ When reason is over-emphasized it loses its harmonic relation with the other faculties, i.e., with the whole. Therefore, we are not able to use its full capacity because it is in conflict with other parts.

⁶¹ Ibid, p.66.

human beings in his critique.⁶² He finds the traces of modern dichotomies in both how we perceive the world and what we create in it. This also includes our ethics and politics. And for Schiller, without reconciling those dichotomies, there is no chance of freedom. We said that aesthetics is the solution to petrified oppositions of modern civilization.⁶³ Against the over-praised reason, we are to empower senses to balance our faculties. Those faculties which let us negate and create.

What kind of an aesthetics does Schiller has in mind to unite our separated parts? It is certain that he does not aim for a theory of aesthetics like his contemporaries. He is not concerned about the theory of art, rather he creates an aesthetic which is associated with ethics and politics. Since his main problem is how we can gain our wholeness, and thus freedom, he takes aesthetics as a way to freedom and wholeness. The sensuous part will be empowered and harmony is to be established between our different faculties. That is the entire purpose behind his most famous philosophical text *On The Aesthetic Education of Man*.

⁶² We must note that this kind of an approach stems from the general perspective of Schiller. We can conclude from his philosophical essays that he considers his subject within the universe. Meaning that he takes them within their relationality with other aspects of that subject.

⁶³ Petrification of opposing forces refer to situation where those contradictory forces gone to extremes and does not create a dialectical movement anymore. As in the modern separation between Logos and Eros.

2.2 Schiller's Critique of Modern Civilization

Schiller had lived his life among some of the founding fathers of modern culture. Philosophically, some fundamental notions of modern thought were established at those times. Schiller as a critique, saw some problems which potentially can hamper the possibility of freedom. We can say that behind the critiques of Schiller there is only one motivation which is freedom. So, every problematization he puts is related to freedom.

He starts his critique by arguing about modern culture. Culture (Bildung) is a very important concept for German thought. It refers to social and historical context in which people are educated, learned, shaped, and behaved. So, what we have in our culture is intimately connected to civilization that we strive to build. Schiller was aware of the fact that his time was important in the sense that first, massive amount of critique has been made against the prevailing ideas of the time, and secondly, upon those critiques philosophers tried to establish systems to offer their own ideas instead of the former ones. Living in this intellectually rich era, Schiller understood that they were building a culture and for him, it must be as free as possible. He also believes in the influence of culture because he thinks that the one way out from a restrictive and repressive culture is first to negate the established one and second, to build a new one that is based on freedom⁶⁴. So, in his philosophical essays, Schiller first tries to detect the errors of modern culture. Secondly, he argues for a new culture of freedom under the name of aesthetics. However, before going into his aesthetic ideas, we must look his critique of modern civilization.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p.104. He attributes a twofold business to culture. One is the cultivation of sensibility, and the other is the cultivation of reason. Culture, probably with education must secure both sides of human beings. If one side is overly cultivated, we end up with suppression, and therefore excesses in every aspect of life.

Petrification of divisions is the prime problem of modern civilization according to Schiller. He becomes aware of the dividedness of modern times by reflecting on the ancient Greek society. The ancient Greek society was a great example for Schiller as well as his contemporaries. He asks himself: How did we lost the wholeness we had in ancient Greek polis? And the answer is modern civilization:

“That zoophyte character of the Greek States, where every individual enjoyed an independent life and, when need arose, could become a whole in himself, now gave place to an ingenious piece of machinery, in which out of the botching together of a vast number of lifeless parts a collective mechanical life results. State and Church, law and customs, were now torn asunder; enjoyment was separated from labour, means from ends, effort from reward. Eternally chained to only one single little fragment of the whole, Man himself grew to be only a fragment; with the monotonous noise of the wheel he drives everlastingly in his ears, he never develops the harmony of his being, and instead of imprinting humanity upon his nature he becomes merely the imprint of his occupation, of his science.”⁶⁵

As opposed to ancient times, we are fragmented in every aspect of life. The dividedness is not exclusive to labor, it covers every part of our life. Even to think that it is only about labor is a result of the separate way of thinking. Since Schiller takes a human being as whole in himself, division in any part naturally affects the other parts.⁶⁶ It influences our politics, labor, and our rationality which eventually ends up restricting our possibilities of freedom.

Although he touches upon different aspects of modern divisions, he specifically gives long arguments on the modern dichotomy of reason and sensibility. In his most famous philosophical text *On The Aesthetic Education of Man*, he devotes most chapters of the book on this division. Why is the dichotomy of reason and sensation so important for Schiller? Because he believes that other divisions that plague modern individuals

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.38.

⁶⁶ Taking as whole here refers to relationality and connectedness of every part to the other. In a word, they are entangled in a way that everything is connected to each other.

stem from the separation between reason and sensation and if we can reconcile them, other divisions will slowly perish. In other words, he takes it as the core problem. We face with the dichotomic problems because in modern civilization, reason is overly praised. That is what makes us fragmented, unhappy, and shallow for Schiller. That is why we lost the varieties of life and reduced life to only functions and utility. As he puts it:

“Today Necessity is master, and bends a degraded humanity beneath its tyrannous yoke. Utility is the great idol of the age, to which all powers must do service and all talent swear allegiance.”⁶⁷

The uppermost importance is given to necessities of life because we overemphasized reason. ⁶⁸Since life is defined as the satisfaction of necessities, function becomes the measure of man. Other members of the community exist through their functions only. Schiller calls this the “*devoured humanity*.”⁶⁹ When reason is positioned as the tyrant of the self, it also loses its other capacities because it is confined to a specific task which is to hold the strings of human feelings. Because we recognized the monarchy of reason in ourselves, monopolization becomes the true way of conducting one’s affairs. In the self, reason is the authority that controls the other parts of the individual and in the outer world, all powers and talents must serve to necessities of life. In other words, both in and out of human beings the differences of life are sacrificed in order to meet the demands of necessities. And then, all the other capacities of human beings are melted into the shape of necessity. That which is not necessary is not important for the civilization therefore, they must be eliminated. That is where the suppression of the other part comes onto the scene in Schiller’s line of thought.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.24.

⁶⁸ We can also state that because reason is over emphasized, we devalued the life. And also because we are shallowed, we even give more importance to necessities. Then, because we give more importance to necessities, we are being shallowed. So, there is a circular chain of reaction here.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p.39.

Schiller talks about two main faculties of human beings which are sensible and rational faculties. He also calls them, respectively, sensation and thought, feelings and intellect, physical and mental, material and ideal. What he tries to tell us by giving different terms to refer the same separation is to show the importance of it. He argues that it is not only about our drives or faculties, but it is also about our ontological views and our criteria of what is rational, i.e., rationality. Despite the fact that we as modern individuals, think everything in binary terms, he tries to show how entangled everything is with each other. Now, we said that the rational part established a hierarchal relationship with the sensual drive of human beings and excluded it out of the life. There is one point which is very important to understand Schiller's criticisms. What Schiller is concerned about is not specifically the reason, but it is the situation of excesses. Because the situation of excess causes suppression. It does not matter which part suppresses the other, what matters is the suppression itself because it disturbs the wholeness of human beings. When wholeness is lost, freedom is lost as well. For the suppression of one or the other he says:

“Here barbarity, there enervation: the two extremes of human degeneracy, and both of them united in a single period of time!”⁷⁰

He defines two extreme situations for modern individuals and defines one of them as barbarity and the other as savagery. Barbarian is the one who relies on his reason and gives away every other part of him to it. Most of his criticism covers this type of extreme because in his social and historical context, this was the main problem for him. On the other hand, there is the savage man who is a slave to his sensations and feelings. In his own words:

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.34.

“Man can be at odds with himself in a double fashion: either as savage if his feelings rule his principles, or as barbarian if his principles destroy his feelings.”⁷¹

The opposition he sets between principles and feelings can be best understood if we know that he is in dialogue with Kant here. Immanuel Kant is a very important philosopher for Schiller, and he writes most of his philosophical essay while or after his careful readings of Kant.⁷² According to Schiller, Kant supports and creates some of the modern divisions. His notion of reason excludes feelings and that is the problem. For example, according to Kant’s moral theory, we need only reason to establish moral rules and abide them even if it means to suffer and going against our feelings. Schiller criticizes Kant for confining morality in suffering and unhappiness. Because Schiller believes that we can reconcile both inclinations and necessities in a moral life. In that sense, the savage acts only to please his senses and does not care about the consequences. On the other hand, the barbarian makes himself suffer and free himself from his feelings. We must keep in mind that two of these extremes are opposite forms of slavery. One is slave to reason, and the other to his feelings. In a word, “he is a slave so long as he obeys only one of the impulses”.⁷³ What this means is that both of them lack the autonomy that is needed for free action. Schiller also is aware that being a slave to one part is an open invitation to an external authority. One of the contemporary American Schiller scholar Lydia Moland argues by quoting Schiller: “By placing morality and the good or the potential to do good in an external authority whether it is reason or God, he “forfeits his humanity by seeking a Godhead” outside of himself.”⁷⁴ The reason why Schiller is critical about external authorities is because it destroys one’s autonomy.

⁷¹ Ibid, p.32.

⁷² See Beiser (2005), *Schiller as Philosopher*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 169-189.

⁷³ Schiller (1954), *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Snell, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 15.

⁷⁴ Moland (2018), *Conjectural Truths: Kant and Schiller on Educating Humanity* In Dahlstorm (Eds), *Kant and his German Contemporaries Volume II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 104.

The discussion of autonomy is significant for Schiller since he seeks the impediments of freedom in modern individuals. As Beiser puts in his remarkable book *Schiller as Philosopher* the ultimate goal for Schiller is “the greatest fullness of existence with the highest autonomy and freedom”⁷⁵ Schiller argues that we cannot have the true autonomy if we maintain the enslavement of one part over the other. Or if we seek the autonomy only in subject or object. We must reconcile both sides to achieve the highest autonomy. As opposed to autonomy, there is heteronomy which refers to externally determined prescriptions to follow. Schiller wants to unite them and argues that both external and inner determinations are important if we are to be truly autonomous. In other words, he does not include or exclude any phenomena of life, he wishes to harmoniously unite them.

Schiller asks a very critical question to those who claim to be modern: “why is it that we still remain barbarians?”⁷⁶ The Question arises out of the internal contradiction which Schiller saw in modern individuals. If they claim to be modern and developed, why are they still killing, stealing, and cause suffering for both to ourselves and others? The natural answer to this question would be accepting that what modern civilization advocates is not sufficient to advance human freedom. Not accepting this situation, modern culture aims for functioning which rely on suppression of human capabilities. Realizing this, Schiller argues that “the enemy which only is overturned can rise up again, but the enemy reconciled is truly vanquished.”⁷⁷ He suggests that in order to be free, we must stop creating enemies by furnishing divisions, instead we must strive to reconcile existing enemies by aesthetics.⁷⁸ Another answer that Schiller gives to this question is the tightening bonds of the selfishness. By suppressing the sensual part,

⁷⁵ See Beiser (2005), *Schiller as Philosopher*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.140.

⁷⁶ Schiller (1954), *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Snell, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 47.

⁷⁷ Schiller (2006): On Grace and Dignity, *In Aesthetical and Philosophical Essays* (Riikonen, Widger, Trans.). Salt Lake City: The Project Gutenberg.

⁷⁸ Schiller’s account of aesthetics is covered below.

modern character overindulges on physical necessities dictated by the shallowed reason. He argues that modern individuals become blind to other possibilities and differences of life because they are enslaved by necessities. Necessities that are overindulged make one strive for more matter and let one exclude all form from his life. As Schiller puts it:

“The bonds of the physical (by the selfish character of Man) are tightened ever more alarmingly, so that the fear of loss stifles even the burning impulses towards improvement, and the maxim of passive overindulgence passes for the supreme wisdom of life.”⁷⁹

Here, he warns us against the enslaving effect of the suppression. It creates a vicious cycle of necessities and in every movement one takes, he adds another layer to his barbarity.

As opposed to suppression, Schiller offers reconciliation because he believes that it is the freer way to live. In other words, rather than suffering, he suggests that we can both satisfy our necessities by using reason and, take pleasure from them with our sensibility if we can reconcile them. How are we going to reconcile modern dichotomies to set free our critical and creative capacities is the topic of next pages.

⁷⁹ Schiller (1954), *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Snell, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 36.

2.3 Aesthetics as a Possibility of Freedom

In the previous chapter we have tried to show what problems Schiller sees in modernity. It is nothing other than the petrified dividedness. He thinks that one-sided way of thinking is blocking our way to wholeness and freedom. Surrounded by the fragmented world, Schiller searches for reconciliation. His main concern is to achieve the wholeness that we lost 2500 years ago. Schiller finds the solution in aesthetics and in the beauty itself. It is not a kind of aesthetics that we can talk about in theory, it is about living aesthetically. He tries to establish an aesthetics that would free us from both barbarity and savagery. He asks to himself: “Can it fetter Nature in the savage and set her free in the barbarian?”⁸⁰ He wishes to soften the excessive parts of the two sides in order to reconcile them. He is sort of looking for a mediating force that would establish a harmony between two poles. By asking questions as such, he actually tries to build his account of aesthetics as a possibility of freedom. The following question would naturally be “how?” How does an account of aesthetics can establish harmony between modern dichotomies? Although Schiller does not give an exact answer to it, he opens new horizons to negate the fragmented reality and create new ones in an aesthetic state.

Firstly, I want to discuss how are we supposed to negate the authority of reason when we are surrounded by it. Or put it another way, how does aesthetics show us another possibility? The artist is necessarily a critique of his time. Because an artist is mastered in transformation. It is nothing other than the transformation of necessities into joy. In other words, artist is a master of qualitative transformation of life. He knows how to both use form and matter in a free fashion. Necessities are not obstacles to overcome for him, rather they are the exact limitations to provide a fair ground for creation. While transforming both himself and his environment, he both stays in it and at the same time

⁸⁰ Ibid, p.53.

goes beyond it. He stays in it in a sense that he can't literally ignore the physical world, and he is transcending it in a sense that he transforms necessities into pleasures, therefore physicality is not a limit for him anymore. It is where form and matter unite in an artwork. We must notice that artist naturally has its distance from the established reality. Critical distance that he keeps between himself and the world makes possible him to open new possibilities while living in it. In other words, he is both in it and out of it. That is how aesthetics can open new possibilities. An artist:

“does not rest satisfied with what Nature has made of him, but possesses the capacity of retracing again, with his reason, the steps which she anticipated with him, of remodelling the work of need into a work of his free choice, and of elevating physical into moral necessity.”⁸¹

To be able to transform necessity into joy, i.e., in order to be free, one needs to be in harmony. There must not lie an inner conflict between his very own faculties. He is supposed to use them freely. Therefore, he needs to reconcile what has been suppressed. But what kind of a reciprocity can aesthetics bring? Philip Kain argues by quoting Schiller:

“Schiller wants a "reciprocal action between the two drives . . . of such a kind that the activity of each both gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and in which each achieves its highest manifestation precisely by the other being active.”⁸²

⁸¹ Ibid, p.27.

⁸² Kain (1943), *Schiller, Hegel, and Marx: State, Society, and The Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece*, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, p. 16.

The reciprocity which Schiller visions excludes all suppression and hierarchy and aims for the harmony. Because being a whole in oneself requires using every capacity in its fullest and freest sense. It is important that one side can only reach its full potential if the other is active. Dialectically, activity of the one side means the activity of the other. Each one support the other by being active. And at the same time, each one must set limit to the other in order to preserve the dialectical movement. Because differences between faculties must be preserved, and those differences must not dominate the other's differences. In other words, they must feed and limit each other to reach the harmony between our conflicting faculties. We can infer from here that Schiller does not want to make them one. If they would be one, it would reduce one's authentic characteristic to the other. That is why Schiller insists on harmony. Because the harmonic play of the human faculties can only both protect them and at the same time let them move as whole. In other words, antagonisms must be preserved because they are the source of the harmonic movement in the first place. Again, Kain argues by quoting Schiller:

“An antagonism between faculties was necessary, according to Schiller, for progress in the development of man's capacities to come about.”⁸³

This is a kind of reconciliation which Schiller has in mind: harmonic movement that comes from the free activities of antagonistic faculties of human beings.

How are we to actualize the reconciliation then? Schiller finds the answer in the beauty itself. Now, to be able to answer this fundamental question, we must know Schiller's account of beauty. For Schiller “*beauty is freedom in appearance.*”⁸⁴ How one can see freedom in form then? Schiller describes freedom in form with voluntariness and self-determination. An artistic creation must not look in a way that it

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Schiller (1992), *Kallias, or on the Beautiful* (William F.Wertz, Jr, Trans.), In *Fidelio* Vol I, No. 4.

is forced to be in that way. Rather, it must look natural in a sense that it is volunteer to be like it. It must look pure in a sense that it is determined by itself and not forcefully determined by the external effects. Of course, it does not mean that something has no limits. But the key point for Schiller is that those limits are free if they are set by itself. On the other hand, if limits are imposed on it from outside, it loses its freedom and thus, it's beauty. He further argues that "nature loves no jump."⁸⁵ Because radical jumps within a form represents external force for him. Instead, he argues that softer transactions in an artistic creation looks more beautiful because it looks as if it voluntarily got the shape of the specific form. He gives an example of a vessel:

"A vessel is beautiful, when it, without contradicting its concept, looks like a free play of nature. The handle to a vessel is merely there due to the use, therefore through a concept; however, should the vessel be beautiful, then this handle must spring forth therefrom so unforced and voluntarily, that one forgets its determination."⁸⁶

The reason of handle is to be able to hold the vessel. Mere usage of handle is transformed to something beautiful by the artist. She designed it in a way that handle is naturally is a part of the vessel. Not added or enhanced, but as if it was there all the time. And this beautiful creation makes us forget the determination of the handle when we look at the overall design of a vessel. That is how we observe beauty as a freedom.

In the human sphere, Schiller argues that beauty is the sensual result of the harmonious free activity of human faculties. When we are encountered with something beautiful whether it is an artwork, behavior or an idea, we are amazed by its beauty because it represents us freedom. An aesthetic eye can deduce the harmonic free activities from a beautiful phenomenon. In that sense, seeing beautiful things can make

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

us understand how beauty is created. Once we see and start to understand how beauty is actualized, we may learn from it. Eventually, beauty will lead us to aesthetic way of living. And it is nothing other than being a free autonomous person. In that sense, we can say that beauty is not only about sensual pleasure, it can also be found in a person's activity and character. But still, there is a poking question: How? How does a person move aesthetically? There Schiller introduces the famous notion of play.

For people who are living today play is not something to think about. You only play to spend some time in your very restricted free time. It is very simple and, its only function is to satisfy the players. However, Schiller relates play with aesthetics and beauty. For Schiller, the notion of play is the representation of the free movement. Because it means that we established harmony between our conflicting faculties and, we are able to use them freely. During the act of play, we are set free from the struggle between sensibility and reason because now they act in harmony. It is where human beings can demonstrate their full potential even their historical and social contexts restrict them. It gives you the chance to freely use your capacities and faculties, your imagination without any fetter. One can use his creative power freely in games. In other words, one can realize himself in play. As Schiller puts it: "He is only wholly Man when he is playing"⁸⁷ What he is going to play is nothing other than the beauty. In play, we synthesize opposite forces such as reason and sensibility, unity and multiplicity, universality and individuality. In that sense, play refers to all kind of activity which establishes a harmony between opposites and where one goes beyond every constraint while playing in those constraints. And since we are no longer under any restrictive force in the act of play, we act freely. This freedom in action represents beautiful as it represents freedom in appearance in an artwork. We can say that play is freedom in action, and this is why exactly it is beautiful.

⁸⁷ Schiller (1954), *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Snell, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 73.

As it can be understood, being whole means being able to use whole of your capacities, skills and talents in a free environment. That is why he is concerned with wholeness, and that is why he argues that there is such a thing as *play impulse*. According to Schiller, play impulse is the mediating force between dichotomy of reason and sensibility. The impulse to play means the impulse to use one's capacities freely. So, with the act of playing, two conflicting faculties are reconciled. We can state that if there is something beautiful, it is created with reconciled reason and sensibility, i.e., by playing. One might ask then, where do we see the traces of play in our life? Schiller argues that we can see them:

“In the lawless leap of joy becomes a dance, the shapless gesture a graceful and harmonious miming speech; the confused noises of perception unfold themselves, begin to obey a rhythm and weld themselves into song.”⁸⁸

Play is in our daily life. Whenever we turn a necessity into joy, we play with both world and our faculties. We taste the freedom everyday when we speak, listen, read and create. Play is such a powerful force that even “in the midst of the awful realm of powers, and of the sacred realm of laws, the aesthetic creative impulse is building unawares a third joyous realm of play and of appearance, in which it releases mankind from all the shackles of circumstance and frees him from everything that may be called constraint, whether physical or moral.”⁸⁹ The aesthetic creative impulse is what Schiller tries to empower in modern individualities. It is what weakened by the suppression of sensuality. It has a potential to go beyond every limit. Because first, negation of the authority of reason, and second free creation out of its dusk is the aesthetic creation itself. We can think of

⁸⁸ Ibid, p.122.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p.124.

every artwork in this way. Every painting, statue or music is a manifestation and proof of freedom. Because they are all created by the harmonious interplay of the human faculties, i.e., while playing.

2.4 Ethical and Political Projections of Aesthetics

We said that aesthetics of Schiller is not only about sensual pleasure, but it is also about freedom. So, Schiller tries to bring together ethics and theory of society with aesthetics. His concern is to create new domains of freedom within the individual and collective spheres. Although he is mostly known with his ideas on aesthetics, for some other philosophers like Herbert Marcuse, he actually writes them in order to reconcile modern petrified dichotomies for the sake of freedom. We can understand it from his account of beauty as freedom. In this section, I will first discuss the link between ethics and aesthetics, and then try to point out the possibilities of free politics with the help of aesthetics. The main question is how aesthetics can help us to create freer ethics and politics?

Before going into the discussion, I would like to mention one thing which concerns Schiller very much and that I think is important for our discussion. It is the emphasis on the humankind's power to act. At the beginning of his essay *Grace and Dignity* he points out the difference between other organisms and human beings. Schiller argues that in plants and animals, nature prescribes both means and ends. All their accomplishments are pre-destined and determined by Nature. However, in human beings although Nature gives specific limitations, humans are to determine their own destinies. Humankind is able to determine their own conditions because they have a power to create and change. Schiller calls this "the privilege to break the chain of necessity."⁹⁰ As

⁹⁰ See note 71

opposed to other organisms, human beings can create their life, change it according to their wills. This point is important because without acknowledging the power to create, we cannot be free. Meaning that it would be pointless to discuss on ethical and political freedom if one does not acknowledge the power to act. Freedom, as Schiller argues in his account of aesthetics, requires genuine action as play. And he concludes that “the act by which he thus determines himself is properly that which we call an action, and the things that result from this sort of action are what we exclusively name his acts. Thus, man can only show his personality by his own acts.”⁹¹

2.4.1 Ethics

In *Grace and Dignity* Schiller lays out his ideas on morality. He tries to find out how we can act morally, and at the same time freely. He tries to coincide morality and freedom and, this search leads him to aesthetics. On the one hand, he places moral principles determined by reason as necessary, on the other hand we have inclinations determined by feelings. We can see that the dichotomy of thought and feelings shows itself in the form of principles and inclinations. Schiller has a keen eye for detecting the dichotomies in many spheres of life. This kind of a realization makes Schiller to reconcile the dichotomy as he suggests in his account of aesthetics. He generally sees human faculties as a whole in which reason determines the principles of morality and feelings provide us the necessary motivation to do good.

Of course, he didn't just come up with the idea. His account of free morality stems from the critique of Kant's. For Kant, moral act must be unconditional if it is to be obliged universally. And to abide it universally, we must ground it in an absolute way. This can only be done in the transcendental realm, i.e., in the realm of a priori. In this realm, only reason can function, detached from all experience. Because for Kant, if

⁹¹ Ibid.

experiences are involved in the business of building a morality, inclinations and selfish interests would disrupt the job. Meaning that, they would hinder us to establish the ultimate rule of morality. Kant thinks that to ground morality, we need an ultimate rule which would establish a universal morality for all rational beings. Only reason, with its a priori concepts and categories, can furnish that type of law, distinct from all that is conditioned, i.e., the posteriori realm. In other words, we need an unconditional and ultimate ground for morality and, this can only be achieved by reason because it is the only faculty that can reach what is absolute. In Kant's words:

“Every one must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be valid morally – valid, that is, as a ground of obligation.....that here consequently the ground of obligation must be looked for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstance of the world in which he is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason.”⁹²

On the other hand, Schiller argues that this is not the only way of acting morally, it is even a very poor one. He criticizes Kant that his moral theory is restrictive rather than a free one.⁹³ It restricts our one side for the sake of the other. Also, Schiller argues that the vice person is also in the same situation. His reason or feelings are suppressed, and the outcome of this suppression is the vile action. We will remember that this is the core problem of modern dichotomies. Suppression of one part by the other. Now, one can ask what does Schiller suggest instead? Following his philosophical aesthetics, he suggests that inclinations can follow principles and only then true ethical freedom is achieved. He calls this *Grace*. In his own words:

⁹² Kant (2002), *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (Allen W. Wood, Trans.), New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 5.

⁹³ See note 66.

“The true harmony between reason and sense, between inclination and duty, and grace is the expression of this harmony in the sensuous world.”⁹⁴

Grace is the beautiful picture that we see if there is a harmony between inclination and duty in one’s actions. Aesthetic movement manifests itself in the graceful action as beautiful to our senses. He argues that there is a sensuous expression of assent of inclination to morality. All movements of someone who is graceful “are easy, sweet, and yet animated.”⁹⁵ There is no sign of constraint or involuntariness in her movements. And not his particular action, but his entirety and his character are graceful. In a word, she gathers his wholeness in herself together. Schiller likens graceful one to a kind of painting which all the harsh lines are softened and in harmony. She is in harmony with her body and movements in a way that she looks gracious. In other words, his movements are beautiful. Schiller calls her: “the beautiful soul.”⁹⁶ We must also note that grace does not refer to ascetic conception of life where taming of instincts is suggested. Instead, it refers to accepting and being aware of your wholeness and building a harmony between your faculties.

For some people grace is not always a possible choice. Because not everyone is capable of acting with grace. So, they are closer to suppress their feelings in order to do the right thing. Schiller is also aware of this situation. Often misunderstood, Schiller does not suggest that everyone can be graceful. We must ask then: what one must do if she is confronted with a situation in which inclinations are extremely powerful? There comes the notion of *Dignity*. According to Schiller, dignity refers to executing a moral act when Grace is not possible. It gives us a kind of independence. This independence is earned when moral force rule over instincts. Thus, mind is set free and one is able to

⁹⁴ See note 71.

⁹⁵ See note 76.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

act against one's instincts⁹⁷. We all encounter such cases that we must go beyond our existing conditions in order to do what is right. In Schiller's words:

“In general, the law which prevails here is, that man ought to accomplish with grace all the acts that he can execute in the sphere of human nature; and with dignity all those for the accomplishment of which he is obliged to go beyond his nature.”⁹⁸

By Nature, Schiller means here one's current capacity to be graceful. The capacity to harmonize inclinations with principles. If that does not work for the specific case, we are to go beyond it and act with Dignity in order to be good.

We said that Grace looks beautiful, how does Dignity look like then? Schiller argues that Dignity represents the sublime. Because in situations where Dignity is in play, we try to overcome a hardship. We are struggling to see behind the first impressions and envision the consequences of our actions if we act on our instincts only. So, we do the right thing even if it hurts. And this honorable behavior reminds us the sublime. Despite the fact that Grace and Dignity looks like opposites, they actually form a whole. Schiller argues:

“Although dignity and grace have each their proper domain in which they are manifest, they do not exclude each other. They can be met with in the same person, and even in the same state of that person. Further, it is grace alone which guarantees and accredits dignity, and dignity alone can give value to grace.”⁹⁹

As it is in our conflicting faculties, grace and dignity complete each other. Schiller establishes the same dialectic and harmonious relationship between grace and dignity.

⁹⁷ We can understand from here that not all instincts are good. Only the ones which reconciled with reason are good. And also, not all rules of mind are good. Only the ones which are reconciled with inclinations are good.

⁹⁸ See note 71.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

So, the answer is not this or that, it is always a harmonious both in Schiller's mind. Having only Dignity or only Grace would create their own problems. Only Dignity oriented person might not develop his sensibility and would create a moral life which is full of suffering and struggle. On the other hand, Grace oriented person would lack the necessary decidedness in hard circumstances. However, on the path which Schiller opens, we can argue that even in a very hard situation where one must act with Dignity, one does not have to necessarily suffer. If one cares the good as the prime concern, even acting with Dignity may become joyous but not immediately. Because it is a hard decision to make, during the action it may come as struggle and suffering, but a conscious mind will know that it is for the good and may take joy after it. Maybe, this is the point where Grace and Dignity touch each other in a sense that the two phenomena do exist for the human goodness.

Now, we can see what kind of a relation Schiller builds between ethics and aesthetics. A beautiful soul may awe us, with the beauty of his graceful movements, we may realize that freedom is possible even in this harsh world. It may give us hope that being good does not exclude being happy. If we first believe the power to act, and then see beauty in the freedom since beauty is nothing other than the freedom in appearance, we can strive for it. We must keep in mind that not the aesthetics or beauty itself, but the human beings who consider and act can accomplish what is good. It is not a beautiful painting or music that is good, but the actions and creative process behind it. In that sense, both grace and dignity must be created by human activities, only then it is beautiful and thus, good. As Schiller puts it: "Grace is a beauty not given by nature, but produced by the subject itself."¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

2.4.2 Politics

For Schiller, any kind of dividedness that precludes freedom is on a target for criticism. He also depicts dichotomies that he thinks as a problem in the politics. Schiller is criticized by his contemporaries for not discussing political issues. However, he is concerned about politics in his own unique way. He thinks that “If we are to solve that political problem in practice, follow the path of aesthetics, since it is through Beauty that we arrive at Freedom.”¹⁰¹ In this section, we will discuss how political freedom can be empowered by aesthetics. Another note is that it is impossible for him not to talk about it since he thinks that everything is connected, and within the whole, everything matters. So, even if he talks about ethics or aesthetics, he necessarily talks about politics.

Which dichotomies does Schiller see in politics? First off, he starts with state and person. We can understand this dichotomy by likening it to the core dichotomy of reason and sensibility. State represents the reason, meaning that it is the one who puts principles, laws and rules. In other words, the one who cares for necessities. Person, on the other hand represents the sensibility. The one which speculates. According to Schiller, the problem with modern states is that they divide state and person into two poles and again, give importance to state part only. Therefore, the person becomes something to be tamed and controlled by the modern state. In that sense, Schiller argues that:

¹⁰¹ Schiller (1954), *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Snell, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 26.

“The state should respect not merely the objective and generic, but also the subjective and specific character of its individuals, and in extending the invisible realm of morals it must not depopulate the realm of phenomena.”¹⁰²

Here, he argues that state over-emphasizes the objective sides and forgets the specific character of individuals. Since individualities provides what is subjective and speculative, it is as important as sensibility within human faculties for Schiller. It is the part which give the sufficient motivation for free spontaneous participation of individuals into the political realm. The form of the whole must be determined by the individuals, not by the state. In a word, individuals must not be separated but stick together as a participating social force. In the modern state, individuals are dominated and excluded from the determination and decisions of the whole. So, behind the aesthetics in politics there lies the depiction of the wholeness of individuals and state.

Every individual is unique to him/herself like a work of art. Modern state standardizes individuals by imposing ideals to individuals. Therefore, what is unique is reduced to standard. That is what corrupts the person in the political sphere. One loses his critical and creative forces, his desire to participate in politics, and eventually, his very force of life. Schiller thinks that state must respect its individuals.¹⁰³ Meaning that it must preserve their subjective parts. Because it is what will give them motivation to act. Individualities must be respected because only in that way, state and person can be reconciled. Not by the suppression, but by respect from state towards to person. Divided one would not have the reason to participate in the political life since he sees it as something separate from himself. He is detached from the community which he lives. So, what must be done to reconcile state and person? Schiller’s answer is that the political freedom must be first actualized in the individual, i.e., in the ethical realm. This stems from the wholistic approach of Schiller because he sees nearly no difference between ethics and politics. He argues that

¹⁰² Ibid, p.32.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.33.

“If the principles I have laid down are correct, and the experience confirms my description of the present time, we must continue to regard every attempt at reform as inopportune, and every hope based upon it as chimerical, until the division of the inner Man has been done away with, and his nature has developed with sufficient completeness to be itself the artificer, and to guarantee reality to the political creation of Reason.”¹⁰⁴

He may refer to French revolution when he says present time. Because for Schiller, French revolution is a complete failure. It was a temporary and savage attempt of reform because all the killings, violence and savagery could not represent the freedom. It was the doing of bunch of savages. Because Schiller thinks that reform must be first done in the inner person. Until we reconcile every modern division in ourselves, every attempt to reform is futile. He further argues that one has right to political freedom if only, one demonstrates an inner freedom, i.e., ethical freedom. We must reconcile reason and sensibility, moral principles and inclination, objective and subjective and only then, we can reconcile state and person.

In the last letter of the *Aesthetic Education of Man* Schiller gives his short but strong political thoughts. There he talks about three different types of states. First, he calls *the dynamic state of rights*. In this state human beings perceive others as a limiting force. It is the primal version of any human community. Second, he calls the *ethical state*. In the ethical state, individuals meet with others as a moral necessity. We respect others not because we want to, but because we are obliged by the moral codes. The last state he names is the *aesthetic state*. In this state of freedom, we face others as free players. Meaning that we respect other’s individualities and skills because we want to. And we perceive them as people who try to reconcile their inner dichotomies. He

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p.45.

concludes for the aesthetic state: “To grant freedom by means of freedom is the fundamental law of this kingdom.”¹⁰⁵ Freedom is not granted to others by compulsory moral principles or from necessity, but by pleasure. Meaning that the dividedness of individuals is gone away so they find freedom in joy. That is the reason why Schiller’s approach of reformation is bottom to top. He argues that individual inner harmony must be established if we are to have a harmony within the society.

Now, we can ask: what will be the social force that would bind everyone in the aesthetic state? Schiller wonderfully put it:

“Though need may drive Man into society, and Reason implant social principles in him Beauty alone can confer on him a social character. Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it establishes harmony in the individual. All other forms of perception divide a man because they are exclusively based either on the sensuous or on the intellectual part of his being; only the perception of the Beautiful makes something whole of him, because both his natures must accord with it. Only the communication of the Beautiful unites society, because it relates to what is common to them all.”¹⁰⁶

Neither necessity nor principles but only beauty can be the cornerstone of the aesthetic state. Everything that would focus on one side or the other will divide human beings, only beauty can preserve individualities but also provide common freedom. Here, etymology of the word of individual would reveal us the effect of the beauty, meaning that it does not divide the individual, but sees its “in-dividuality”.¹⁰⁷ It cares for the wholeness of human beings since it can only be created with the harmonious play of faculties. In other words, it can only be achieved while playing.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p.122.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ The individual in the sense of individual, meaning that which cannot be divided.

2.5 Classical Music Performance as “freedom in appearance”

To understand Schiller’s aesthetic arguments, I would like to give an example. The reason behind this example is to depict what we might understand if we look at an artistic performance with Schiller’s ideas. What possibilities and new horizons does it show us? In other words, which possibilities of freedom does it create? This idea came to me when I was watching a recorded live performance of one of Beethoven’s quartet with Schiller in mind. We must note that although I take the example of music, what I will try to argue is valid for every type of art. Now, let me continue with the example itself.

What strikes me first in any live music performance is that all the players are in harmony. When they are playing, they all do their own performances while co-playing with other players. This reminds me the link between ethics and politics. If we become ethical beings as Schiller suggests, it creates a free political environment. Meaning that if we can reconcile rational and sensible faculties, naturally we will contribute to a free political environment. We can see this also in a musical performance: in a quartet, all four players do their parts within the state of reconciled faculties and it immediately reflects to the political scene as the representation of freedom because it is beautiful. The intimate relation that is constructed with the act of playing represents itself on the facial expressions of every ethical player.¹⁰⁸ They all show different expressions according to their different plays, but they construe a whole which we call the quartet. In fact, their differences do not bother each other when they are playing, because varieties they have construe the free whole. Meaning that they know that a beautiful

¹⁰⁸ I call them ethical players because being able to use one’s faculties harmoniously in personal and social life - as musicians do in their performance - would make us ethical.

quartet performance can only be actualized by seeing other players as free subjects who are playing. In other words, they start to perceive each other not as a limiting force, but free partners of play. Because they are aware that only in this way, beauty can be created. In the parts that they play reciprocally, they enjoy the existence of the other and realize their own plays by the mediation of the other.

Another important thing is the act of creation in play. During and in the process of practice before play, artists create. First, they create a ground which they can freely play. It is nothing other than the field of music. In other words, a free space is created which they can play as they wish. Secondly, the music they play is re-created each time they play. Because each time, they interpret what is already written. Say that there is a live performance of Beethoven string quartet Op. 132. Although Beethoven wrote it many years ago, every group play it in their own unique way. Meaning that they re-create what is already created, and every new interpretation is not better or worse than the other, because they are all unique. It is not a matter of perfection as commonly misunderstood, but it is about uniqueness of the interpretation which makes it beautiful.

¹⁰⁹ Another face of this creation is the qualitative transformation we saw earlier in this study. Players transform necessities into something joyful and beautiful. Even the instrument itself is a proof of the transformative power of humanity from necessity into pleasure. Not only instrument, but also the playing itself is also a manifestation of the creative power. Physical necessities regarding sound are being used in the process of the play and are transformed into joyous sounds. Now if we wanted to project this into the political realm, we could say that it can be also achieved as a society. Economical necessities can be met with joy and freedom if we can create like an artist. To put it another way, necessities are sublimated and transformed into something beautiful. Meaning that necessities are negated but at the same time preserved as fact, and from

¹⁰⁹ This idea of creation as an interpretation is developed during the conversations that I had with my professor Ömer Behiç Albayrak. He let me realize the fact that the act of interpretation is also a kind of creation.

the free space that is left by the act of negation, novelty is created by the creating subject.¹¹⁰ We can say that creating subject open new possibilities and new realms. She points out that there are always different ways to perceive the world, hence she creates them. When we try to place this way of thinking and doing into the society, we would have a very different politics. A political environment where individuals can always create newer possibilities by negating what is established. Knowing that there is always another possibility, they can deny what is exploitative and unfree. They would not have to subjugate themselves to the repressive organization of society, they would less have to reproduce and organize the necessity, but they would have the courage to create freer one. In that sense, importance of philosophy and art within a society can be acknowledged. Art can enliven our sensualities which might result in empowered critical and creative way of living, while philosophy can give us the ground which we can think and create what we saw as a possibility in the aesthetic realm. What it is tried to be emphasized is that what we see in the scene as a free activity can be done in the society too. Every artwork reminds us that freer and better life is always possible and no one other than we – as a society of free individuals – can turn these possibilities into reality.

We must note that in the end, the musical performance is beautiful. Group creates the beautiful in every second of their play. Their dichotomic faculties are in harmonious interplay just as Schiller describes. They are using reason to practice and learn and, get their motivation and excitement from their feelings. Not suppressing, but using them freely, they create. Schiller said that “beautiful is freedom in appearance.”¹¹¹ With that idea in mind, we can say that the created beautiful in the scene by the four classical music players represents us the freedom. It shows us how beauty is created through

¹¹⁰ Negation of the physical necessities also shows us something political. Negation in itself, when applied in the social scale, refers to be able to criticize and negate the status quo. Because status quo is the necessary form of reality in most of our unconsciousness. What negation does here is to negate the constructed mental and physical limitations in order to build a free one. Being aware of this faculty causes us to realize our critical and creative powers.

¹¹¹ See note 78.

freedom and, it proves that freedom is possible. While pleasing our senses, it carries great hopes with it. *In that sense, playing itself is political and ethical.* This is how aesthetics, ethics and politics are reconciled. It is what Schiller tries to show us with his account of aesthetics.

CONCLUSION

After reading Schiller's and Marcuse's views on modern dichotomies, one may notice that the two philosophers aim at the same thing which is freedom. A freedom which would let us use our capacities in their fullest sense. Although their aim is one, they have also some different views due to their historical and societal contexts. When Schiller was writing his philosophical essays, he was mainly concerned with aesthetics' freeing potentialities. While he was rejecting existing ideas on aesthetics and ethics, he was trying to establish his own which would make aesthetics more alive and practical. Meaning that for Schiller, aesthetic education must lead us to the harmony between our diverse faculties. And this is supposed to pave the way to a more harmonious and freer life.

As we have seen in previous chapters, Schiller mainly writes on modern dichotomies, and how petrification of those cause problems in both society and individual. Then he goes on to argue about aesthetics because he finds the solution in there. Naturally, he lays down what problems would aesthetic education solve, and what possibilities it would create. However, he does not touch upon very much on the sources of modern dichotomies which may be economic, psychological, and political. In other words, he defines the problem and presents his solution, but he does not go deep as Marcuse when it comes to searching for the causes of modern dichotomies. Marcuse also sees this gap in Schiller's thought. And he decides to re-examine Schiller from his own perspective. He sets out to find the existence conditions of the modern dichotomies which may be found in different fields other than the philosophy.

Coming from the school of critical theory, he uses the concepts of Marxism and Freudianism. Bringing Marxist conceptions into his analyses, he tries to determine economic and political causes of modern dichotomies. He analyzes in which economic

and political conditions modern dichotomies are constructed. He searches for why and how critical and creative powers of modern individuals are degraded. He tries to find the answer by asking “how does advanced industrial society create new dichotomies which preclude our critical and creative capacities?” Because those very dichotomies are the reason of an understanding of life based on instrumental rationality.

In his later works, Marcuse shifts his gaze to the psychological influences of modern dichotomies. To be able to find answers, he reads Freud and uses his concepts to find possible resolutions to his questions concerning the modern dichotomies. To put it another way, Marcuse re-examines Schiller with the help of critical theory, Marx, and Freud. When it comes to the solution of the problem at hand, we can say that Marcuse and Schiller are on the same page. They both claim that we can resolve the dividedness of modern individuals by focusing on aesthetics. Maybe that is why Marcuse nearly does not add anything on Schiller’s aesthetics. He only re-iterates Schiller’s ideas in order to seek solution to our topic. In a word, both philosophers take aesthetics as a way to freedom in action, because an account of aesthetics as such would harmonize the dogmatized modern dichotomies.

Marcuse realizes that to be able to analyze rationality of domination in advanced industrial society, one requires concepts and themes which would give us the necessary intellectual width. He finds the perfect concepts in Marx and Freud to make his analysis concerning the modern dichotomies and then, combines it with Schiller’s ideas to discover emancipatory potential of aesthetics. With the power of aesthetics that Schiller and Marcuse point out, petrified dichotomies can be resolved. And repressed creative and critical capacities can be empowered thus, we would have a chance to emancipate ourselves from the rationality of domination in an aesthetic way.

1.1 Modern Dichotomies and Reconciliation

Modern dichotomies as described by Marcuse and Schiller may not be new. Meaning that their first articulation may go back to the ancient times, but they show themselves under different representations. In the Ancient Greek mythology, there are traces of the two opposite forces which has the potential to create but, at the same time in conflict with each other. One example of it is the opposition of the Gaia as the feminine force and Uranus as the masculine force. These oppositional forces generate a kind of a creative energy which results in the creation of the universe. Another is the opposite forces of Dionysus and Apollo. First refers to emotive capacities and latter refers to reason and wisdom. For us, these dichotomic articulations which we find in the ancient Greek mythology may represent the two faculties of human beings which are desire and reason. As Schiller argues, these forces were in harmony in ancient Greek society. In the modern society, not only these two forces are petrified, but also new ones are constructed as an extension of the existing ones.

When we turn to the modern age, we see that Schiller and Marcuse as philosophers who lived in modern age gave importance to topic at hand. As they argued, modern culture creates petrified dichotomies which limit and binds people within their consciousnesses. In the modern society, dichotomies become something limiting. They limit the development and free usage of our inner faculties and cause discrepancies in our mind. Those discrepancies result in the degradation of creative and critical capacities.

Petrified modern dichotomies works almost like an ideology. As modern individuals we believe that the dogmatic dichotomies are inherent to human nature.

¹¹²Modern account of self is constructed as if there are one rational and irrational part of human beings. As Marcuse has demonstrated, the functioning of this repressive modern establishment is organized and created out of individuals who believe that they are naturally torn apart within themselves. We attribute petrification to modern dichotomies because as we saw earlier, dichotomies are not necessarily constraining. They are the sources of dialectic movement, the source for the movement of life so to speak. However, in the establishment of the prevailing ideology, dichotomies detached from each other to their furthest point in order to sustain status quo's functioning in a repressive fashion. As a result, modern individuals cannot use their capacities freely.

We must ask then, what does one lose primarily in the face of rigidified dichotomies? One loses one's sense of wholeness. This is a very important point because as an extension of this loss we encounter with many more problems which make modern individuals repressed and constrained. If it has great importance for our study, we must know what wholeness means. Preservation of wholeness is very important in Schiller's thought. What does it refer to then? We can state that wholeness is firstly about ontology. Meaning that a perspective which is whole starts with a holistic approach to ontology. As beings who exist in the universe, we necessarily share the same ground of existence. We must know that we are part of a whole, meaning that every living and non-living existence contribute to the universe which we share. There can be no hierarchy, no layer, nothing that could cause domination when we think in the level of existence. However, modern civilization dictates the opposite. It divides, categorizes and thus creates hierarchy in our understanding of ontology. As a consequence, we become atoms which are distinct from each other in society. We become owners of other beings, because to be able to own, there must be a hierarchy which justifies the ownership. In that way, we justify great horrors, destructions, and injustice. We cannot

¹¹² Here dogmatic refers to stabilized. Dichotomies are taken to their extremes and dogmatized there. As a result, they cannot be used in a free fashion.

even see ourselves as a whole.¹¹³ As Schiller and Marcuse demonstrated, we create dichotomies within ourselves because we can't perceive our consciousness as a whole in itself. Instead, we establish a hierarchy in our account of self and believe that some part of our consciousness must serve to the other.

Not only to ourselves or universe, but also, we approach to life in a separative fashion. As an example, think about the concept of labor in modern societies. As Marcuse has shown to us, we separate leisure and labor. Labor becomes toilsome and a mere necessity. And only ones who have the chance to access to enough time and money can have leisure time. What Schiller and Marcuse suggest here is that leisure and labor must be reconciled and 'working' as we know today must become play. In other words, necessities of life must turn into pleasures. Mere biological survival must not be a problem but, we must search for how to live like play.

Another dichotomic approach to life is the dichotomy of determinacy and indeterminacy. In modern framework, it is thought that life and beings in it are subject to strict determination. With this way of thinking, it is easier to establish a system of control. Meaning that in a more determinate universe, it is easier to monitor and control individuals' actions and decisions. Naturally in this view, what may cause any indeterminacy must be eliminated. Such as capacity to spontaneously create. As one might guess, when indeterminacies of life are eliminated, we end up with a standardized and mechanistic existence.

¹¹³ Emphasis on holistic approach to ontology and to ourselves is made by Schiller implicitly. It is elaborated explicitly in this study. See Schiller (1954), *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Snell, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press, letter IV.

What is also lost in this atomistic way of thinking is one's sense of self. Since one cannot look herself in a holistic way, one naturally takes oneself as distinct from conditions, rules, norms and others. When that happens, one may lose one's self-awareness of oneself. One may not know oneself, and one become unable to set and follow purposes. After this process of alienation is actualized, one becomes a person who is indifferent to everything that surrounds them. This indifference has crucial political and ethical outcomes. She who is indifferent would not want to participate in social life. Also, this person naturally would not care about others therefore, she would not think about the consequences of her actions. This person would not only be indifferent to herself, but also to others. Since she does not have a holistic perspective to herself, she may feel isolated, passive and helpless. Hence, she may take things as detached from their relations, i.e., from the whole. She may lose relationality and connectedness of things and beings. Naturally, her interactions with other things and beings will be distorted. In that kind of a separated state of mind, there will be no hope and drive to move. It is impossible for anyone who is in that state to have an aesthetic life in the Schillerian sense.

As we have seen in previous chapters, the way out of this situation is to reconcile ourselves both with ourselves and others. We must have a holistic sense of ourselves. We must know that how and why I am who I am. How I am furnished in this specific society so that I like and dislike such things. In other words, I must at least try to know how I am formed in this whole and what kinds of relations I established with both myself and others. Being aware of this would let us gain a more responsible perspective in life. And also, it would help us to gain a critical distance to our society since we know our position in it. If we know that we are part of the whole, we may have the necessary motivation to be active in our ethical and political life. It may make us participants in society rather than mere passive elements. But we must also know that reconciliation is an endless process. It is not a task to be completed, rather one must always can create

new ways and stages of reconciliation.¹¹⁴ In other words, instead of resigning from both others and ourselves, we must choose to reconcile.¹¹⁵

One important remark needs to be made here. The emphasis that is put on the wholeness of human beings may result in a completely opposed way to that proposed by Schiller and Marcuse. First problem it can create is the focus on the self. As Schiller argues, one must realize one's wholeness, his full capacities and potentialities. But too much emphasis on oneself may open a way to ignoring others. In order to achieve one's wholeness, one may ignore and harm others. However, we must know that wholeness also refers to the others. As it is discussed above, others and the self are parts of the whole which we call community.¹¹⁶ So, ignoring others would impede one from realizing the wholeness of life.

The other thing that needs to be mentioned is the going too extreme when one tries to reconcile oneself or a community. Because the harmonious reciprocal relation that we must have from a reconciled phenomenon is destroyed when dichotomies are too close to each other. If relation of reconciliation goes too extreme and become a relation of fusion, that would bring what Schiller and Marcuse criticize, namely hierarchy and constraint. When dichotomies are a fusion, they become a single entity. And this singularity diminishes the dialectic and reciprocal relation which would block the contradictory movement between dichotomies that we must have in a relation of reciprocity. When fusion to a single entity is actualized in social scale, we are confronted with fascism. All individuals become a single entity which generally represented with a

¹¹⁴ Hedrick (2019), *Reconciliation and Reification: Freedom's Semblance and Actuality from Hegel to Contemporary Critical Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ See page 57-65.

constructed identity. Within that identity, one leader is determined to rule, because all members are united under a one ruler. And this ruler is not interested in the members but is interested to the specified common point where all individuals are lost. This loss causes their uniqueness to turn into standardizations which constructed identity requires. When this ruler tries to merge every dichotomy that may lead to freedom, he may use aesthetics in a manipulative fashion.¹¹⁷

1.2 Critique, Creation and Freedom

What is a free act? According to Schiller, an act which is not pre-determined is a free act. It does not refer to an objectless action, it refers to an action which its object is determined by the actor herself, i.e., self-determined. Schiller thinks that an external object that is forcefully put in an action limits it. An external determination of an act limits the actor because it closes the other possibilities by depicting a necessary goal.

Behind the pre-determination of an action, there lies the aim of estimation of what will happen, and desire to know the possible outcomes of the action. However, an act without an external object makes that action free because it gives the actor the freedom to spontaneously create. Schiller gives an example of a horse running all around the forest without an imposed aim contrast to a carriage horse. There is nothing which obliges it to do certain movements, or no external aim which narrows its possibilities thus, it is free, and thus, beautiful.

¹¹⁷ This discussion of manipulated aesthetics is discussed above. See pages 29-31.

With that being said, we must seek the ways of reconciliation to be able to act freely. However, action is fixed in modern culture. It cannot move freely. It must become dynamic again in order to make an action free. To be able to do that, we must establish a relation of difference rather than a relation of separation with the world. Meaning that we must not create separations in our consciousnesses and with others, rather we must acknowledge that we are different in kind, not in degree. That is basically what reconciliation is supposed to do. Reconciliation also would help us to realize our autonomy in the sense that it lets us use our faculties freely which would strengthen creative and critical thinking. We must see here that these faculties are fundamental for us to act freely. Because critical thinking would help us to realize that we are unfree in our actions. And also, it may drive us to analyze the conditions in which we are constrained. Secondly, to be able to wonder out to indeterminacy of life, we need our creative faculty. To establish our own way after getting rid of our chains. And with that, an actor might have a chance to determine its actions. Rather than being dictated by the rationality of domination.

What will happen when action become free? It will become play as Schiller and Marcuse argues. But what it takes to transform an unfree action to play is *creative action*. We already know from previous chapters that to be able to ‘play’, petrified modern dichotomies must be reconciled. And also, we know that to reconcile we must have a holistic perspective to ourselves, our life and to our society. What it also would bring to have a holistic approach is *critical thinking*. Because being aware of the whole would let us gain a holistic perspective in which we know our conditions and also, our position in the universe. So, it would help us to see what is restricting us or to see the other possibilities of freedom.

The capacity to think critically is so important because it is the precondition of a free action as play. Why? Because in order to create, we must first negate what is given to us, what is already repressing our creative capabilities. Only then, we can find the

ground in which we can freely create. In other words, without critically evaluating our existing state, it is impossible for us to create another state where we can act freely.

We said that dichotomies are not limiting when they are not taken as petrified. Meaning that when they move dialectically, they make possible for us to act spontaneously. And with the free action as play, we have a chance to actualize the two forces in a dialectical way so that they do not annul each other but amplify each other. We can only do that while we are playing. Other than that, if we consider life within the concept of modern dichotomies, we can ask the following questions: are we going to subjugate ourselves to the tension between dichotomies? Or are we to reconcile dichotomies in life? If one chooses to reconcile antagonistic forces of life, one opens oneself up to the infinite possibilities of creation. There are infinite ways of creation for a person who is trying to reconcile her conflicting faculties. That person can deal with any situation with utmost creativity, and the necessities of life can be transformed into pleasures. And if critical and creative capacities are empowered as such, our hope for freedom in modern society will rise.

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