

CAUGHT BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION:
THE NATIONALIST AND PRO-GLOBAL DISCOURSES OF
MULTINATIONAL PROFESSIONALS

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ABSTRACT

In post 1980s Turkey, the introduction of neoliberal policies of unregulated financial transactions and the imposition of a free market mentality increased foreign direct investment and number of multinational corporations which thereby contributed to the formation of a newly rich class whose members are affiliated with the globalized world.

On the other hand, the nationalist discourses under the convenient political label of anti-westernism, anti-imperialism and state-centered nationalism constitute the backbone of the resistance to the introduction of so-called global trends in regional and social terms. In this sense, the multinational professionals can be thought as ‘caught between globalization and nationalism’ since on the one hand, they are prone to globalizing trends and on the other hand, as being members of the nation, they are not independent from nationalist discourses. The subjectivity construction of multinational professionals with respect to pro-global and nationalistic discourses was questioned during this thesis study in order to understand the relationship between nationalism and globalization in micro level. By answering this question, the secondary layer of the research which questions whether nationalistic discourse loose power in the globalized age and if this is the case, in which aspects it is losing power is discussed.

By using the method of in-depth interviewing and quantitative research technique at the same time, this study examines the narratives of Turkish multinational professionals on globalization and nationalism with covering several issues from everyday work life preferences regarding to global versus local dilemma to dimensions of national identity.

This study argues that nationalistic discourse is very dominant to evaluate both national and global issues with respect to subjects of the study since nationalism is not just a political doctrine but a way of thinking and interpreting the world. On the other hand, nationalistic discourse is found to loose power while evaluating ‘personal’ and economic choices which are based on concrete and experienced facts not on imagined concepts like ‘national interest’ or ‘national integrity’ since nation itself is an imagined notion. This study contributes to the literature by arguing that the nationalistic discourse of elite members of Turkish society is strongly effected by secularism. While the degree of nationalistic discourses differ for each issue, secularism constitute the unchangeable political and social key to interpret the world.

ÖZET

1980 sonrası Türkiye’de finansal ticaretin deregüle edilmesi ve serbest piyasa mentalitesinin empoze edilmesini içeren neoliberal politikalar, yabancı yatırımın ve çok uluslu şirketlerin sayısının artmasına yol açarak küresel dünyaya entegre olan yeni zengin bir sınıfın ortaya çıkmasına uygun zemini oluşturmuştur.

Öte yandan Batı karşıtlığı, anti-emperyalizm ve devlet merkezli milliyetçilik gibi uygun politik etiketlere sahip milliyetçi söylemler, bu süreçte yeni oluşan küresel trendlere karşı bölgesel ve sosyal açıdan güçlü bir direnç oluşturmuştur. Bu anlamda, çok uluslu şirket çalışanları, küresel trendlere yakın olmaları ve ulusun üyeleri olarak milliyetçi söylemden bağımsız olmamaları sebebiyle ‘küreselleşme ve milliyetçilik arasında sıkışmış’ olarak tanımlanabilir. Mikro düzeyde milliyetçilik ve küreselleşme arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamak amacıyla bu tez çalışmasında çok uluslu şirket çalışanlarının küreselleşme yanlısı ve milliyetçi söylemler karşısında oluşturdukları öznellikleri araştırılmıştır. Bu soruya verilen yanıt çerçevesinde araştırmanın ikinci katmanını oluşturan küreselleşme sürecinde milliyetçi söylemin güç kaybedip kaybetmediği, kaybettiyse hangi alanlarda kaybettiği de sorgulanmıştır.

Derinlemesine görüşme metoduyla kantitatif metodu birlikte kullanan bu araştırma, Türk çok uluslu şirket çalışanlarının küreselleşme ve milliyetçilik anlatıları üzerinden küresel ve yerel ikilem çerçevesinde günlük iş yaşantısı tercihlerinden ulusal kimlik boyutlarına kadar pek çok konuyu kapsamıştır.

Bu araştırma, milliyetçiliği bir politik doktrin olmanın ötesinde bir düşünme ve dünyayı yorumlama biçimi olarak ele almış ve araştırmanın öznelere çerçevesinde milliyetçi söylemin hem ulusal hem de küresel sorunları yorumlarken çok egemen olduğunu tartışmıştır. Öte yandan milliyetçi söylemin ‘milli çıkar’ ya da ‘ulusal bütünlük’ gibi hayali kavramlarda olmasa bile somut ve deneyimlenen olgulara dayanan ‘bireysel’ ve ekonomik tercihler konusunda güç kaybettiği tartışılmıştır. Bu çalışma, Türk toplumunun seçkin üyelerinin milliyetçi söyleminin sekülerleşmeden güçlü bir şekilde etkilendiğini savunarak literatüre katkı sunmaktadır. Milliyetçi söylemin dozu her konuda farklılık gösterirken, araştırmanın öznelere çerçevesinde sekülerizm dünyayı yorumlamada değişmeyen bir politik ve sosyal anahtar rolünü üstlenmiştir.

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INTRODUCTION

The motivation for writing this thesis and for conducting the relevant research was born out of personal curiosity to understand the relationship between nationalism and globalization in a micro-level within the case of multinational professionals who are thought to be most prone to globalizing trends. This group is comprised of Turkish business professionals employed by multinational and foreign corporations with branches or regional headquarters located in Istanbul.

Since, I was working for a multinational company a short time ago, I am not distant to the 'multinational style' of living and thinking. While working as an employee, one of my responsibilities was developing success stories from Turkey branch of the corporation to be published in global intranet. Although I sent a relevant picture together with the story, most of the time the editors preferred to use mosque pictures which made my "secular and modernist " colleagues crazy. Even though, they feel some kind of "national proud" with the exposure which made them to be heard and seen by the "West", their proud is left half since they preferred to be represented more modern and secular than the reality itself. These kind of experiences and anecdotes enabled me to think over the impact of globalization and nationalist way of thinking on the multinational professionals' identity and discourses. Indeed, academic literature helped me to find a more balanced way of evaluating the issue.

In post 1980s Turkey, the introduction of neoliberal policies of unregulated financial transactions, fictitious exports and the imposition of a free market mentality increased foreign direct investment and number of multinational corporations which thereby contributed to the formation of a newly rich class whose members are affiliated with the globalized world. In

addition, integration to European and global trends was not a new issue for Turkey since the westernization policies of Republic of Turkey together with numerous developments in education, broadcasting, arts and urban restructuring have already been place since the establishment of the young republic.

On the other hand, there has been a strong resistance to the introduction of so-called global trends in regional and social terms. The nationalist discourses under the convenient political label of anti-westernism, anti-imperialism and state-centered nationalism constitute the backbone of the resistance which mobilize people on a platform to protect ‘the territorial and national integrity of the Turkish Republic’. In this sense, the multinational professionals can be thought as ‘caught between globalization and nationalism’ since on the one hand, they are prone to globalizing trends and on the other hand, as being members of the nation, they are not independent from nationalist discourses. Therefore, it is interesting to understand what types of identities and dispositions these multinational professionals produce, taking into consideration the “given” nationalist discourses and intensifying transnationalism in their everyday lives. Furthermore, it is worth to observe and analyze the “tactics” of the multinational professionals which are developed to cope with the power of “strategies”.

Academic literature suggests that the nation-state system has not been contrary to globalization since the very first day of nation-states, but linked to a global capitalist system. In addition, points out that historically, the nation-state and modern globalization grew up together. On the other hand, some scholars argue that due to globalization, undermining of national borders is inevitable and the sovereignty of states is declining. However, it is important to note that, nation-state and nationalism are two different notions. Although the nation-states, to a large extent through its schools, educational system and ‘constructed

national histories' shapes the forms of perception, categorization, interpretation and memory that serve to determine the constitutive basis for a kind of national common sense, nationalism has other kind of tools which enables to make it 'natural' and more than a doctrine in the eyes of the members of nations.

While globalization provides individuals with a wider range of opportunities, at the same time, it increases the sense of insecurity. As a result of this insecurity, nationalism is reproduced with different contents by adopting the discourse of "reunification" on the level of identity. As we seek in our everyday life to adjust to these new horizons and organizations, the nation and nation-state continue to be our primary political and cultural reference points. In this sense, nationalist discourse which is not reducible to only state-formation is being argued to be deeper than just a doctrine since it is being reproduced each and every day within the habits of language, thought, and symbolism.

This study, by using the method of in-depth interviewing and quantitative research technique at the same time, examines the narratives of Turkish multinational professionals on globalization and nationalism with covering several issues from everyday work life preferences regarding to global versus local dilemma to acculturation to the global consumer culture, from dimensions of national identity to national symbols.

Organization of the Thesis

The next sections of this thesis are as follows: Chapter One consists of a theoretical framework that aims at understanding globalization with focusing on different dimensions of globalization. Before discussing various aspects of globalization, the history of globalization concept will be analyzed in order to give a complete picture. In addition to this, the chapter presents a contextual framework of Turkey case under neoliberal policies which enabled the rise of multinational companies and foreign direct investment that produced a new 'hybrid' bourgeois class structure. Chapter Two focuses on nationalism and globalization relationship and discusses nationalism and nationalist discourses in reference to relevant literature. In this regard, this chapter also presents a current picture of nationalist discourses in Turkey. Chapter Three outlines the methodology used for this study. Chapter Four consists of both globalization discourse analysis of multi-national professionals and a presentation of the quantitative study conducted to measure acculturation to the global consumer culture of the informants with five dimensions. Chapter Five consists of a nationalist discourse analysis of the informants and presents an evaluation of the findings from the fieldwork in regards to the research question and discussions in previous chapters.

CHAPTER ONE: GLOBALIZATION

1.1 Globalization: A Novel Issue?

As George Modelski (1972) argues the term globalization has only become commonplace in the last two decades after the academic scholars employed the term as late as the 1970s. Long before the introduction of the term globalization into recent popular and scholarly debate, the emergence of new high-speed forms of social activity generated extensive commentary about the compression of space. The spread of high-speed technologies is probably the main source of the numerous references in intellectual life since 1950 to the annihilation of distance.

On the other hand, the historical origins of globalization are the subject of on-going debate. While some scholars situate the origins of globalization in the modern era, others regard it as a phenomenon with a long history. For instance, for O'Rourke and Williamson (1999), globalization is not a new phenomenon. The authors argue that trade, migration and international capital flows in the Atlantic economy has roots dating back to prior to 1914—the first great globalization boom. For McNeill (1963) the origins of globalism lay in fifteenth-century Europe which was criticised by Hutchinson (2004) since he argues that globalization is not a modern revolutionary development but a recurring and evolutionary process, with roots, according to some estimates, as far back as the second millennium B.C.

1.2 Globalization in Contemporary Social Theory

Moghadam defines globalization as “a complex economic, political, cultural, and geographic process in which the mobility of capital, organizations, ideas, discourses, and peoples has taken on an increasingly global or transnational form” (1999: 367). The study of globalization in sociology revolves primarily around two main classes of phenomena which have become

increasingly significant in the last few decades. These are the emergence of a globalized economy based on new systems of production, finance and consumption; and the idea of 'global culture'. While not all globalization researchers entirely accept the existence of a global economy or a global culture, most accept that local, national and regional economies are undergoing important changes as a result of processes of globalization even where there are limits to globalization (see, for example, Scott, ed. 1997).

While some authors (see Chase-Dunn, 1999) distinguish five different dimensions of globalization, for the discourse analysis conducted in the next chapters, this study will focus on three main dimensions of globalization which are cultural globalization, economic globalization and political globalization.

Political globalization has a long history in the emergence of international organizations over the last 200 years. Political globalization refers in part to an increasing trend toward multilateralism, in which the United Nations plays a key role, national non-governmental organizations act as watchdogs over governments, and international NGOs increase their activities and influence. Political scientists and sociologists have considered the prospects of the nation-state and national sovereignty in a context of regionalization and globalization in which international financial institutions have increasing power over national economies and state decision-making.

Since the early nineteenth century the European interstate system has been developing both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interaction. This phenomenon has been termed "global governance" by Craig Murphy (1994) and others. Some political scientists are also studying

the trends toward democratic consolidation in terms of a global process of democratization. Political scientists Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that international organizations (IOs) are active in world politics, play an autonomous role, suffer from 'mission creep', and even create new system-wide rules. In this sense, IOs demonstrate authority, autonomy, and power—just like states.

Cultural globalization refers to worldwide cultural standardization—as in “Coca Colonization” and “McDonaldization”—but also to postcolonial culture, cultural pluralism, and “hybridization”. As Pietersee (1995) notes, cultural experiences have not been simply moving in the direction of cultural uniformity and standardization. Such a conception overlooks the impact non-Western cultures have been making on the West. It fails to see the influence non-Western cultures have been exercising on one another. It has no room for crossover culture. Globalization does not simply mean the spread of multinational, and usually American-, British-, or Japanese-run corporations, around the globe. Globally, the culture scene is now witnessing two opposing, yet simultaneously occurring and reinforcing movements: the homogenization and heterogenization of cultures.

Ger (1999) argues that capitalism, global transport, communications, marketing and advertising are interacting to dissolve the boundaries across national cultures and economies and thereby accelerating the emergence of a homogeneous global consumer culture. On the other hand, the “differentiating impact of globalization strengthens or reactivates national, ethnic, and communal identities; and the pattern of interrelationships fuels a hybridization of social life” (ibid. : 65). Rather than suppressing differences, this new global cultural system may actively promote them.

A profound definition is proposed by Robertson (1995) who notes that in opposition to widespread tendency, the local should not be seen as a counterpoint to the global. Instead it should be regarded, subject to some qualifications, as an 'aspect' of globalization. Thus Robertson coins the term 'glocalization' to emphasize that globalization has involved the simultaneity and the interpenetration of what are conventionally called the global and the local, or - in more abstract vein - the universal and the particular (ibid. : 30). Robertson remains implacably opposed to the view that globalization implies a homogenization of local cultures. First, there is virtually overwhelming evidence that cultural messages emanating from 'the USA' are differentially received and interpreted; that local groups absorb communication from the 'center' in a great variety of ways. Second, the major alleged producers of 'global culture' increasingly tailor their products to a differentiated global market they partly construct. Third, seemingly 'national' symbolic resources are in fact increasingly available for differentiated global interpretation and consumption. And fourth, there is a substantial flow of ideas and practices from the so-called Third World to the seemingly dominant societies and regions of the world (ibid.: 38-9). In short, Robertson concludes, it makes no sense to define the global as if the global excludes the local.

Economic globalization refers to deeper integration and more rapid interaction of economies through production, trade, and financial transactions by banks and multinational corporations, with an increased role for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as the World Trade Organization. Although the capitalist system has always been globalizing and there have been various waves of globalization, it is said that the trade, capital flows, and technological advances and transfers since the 1970s are more intensive and extensive than in earlier periods. Intercontinental economic integration has been a long-term trend since the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century, but this trend also reveals a cycle in the

rise and fall of the proportion of all economic exchange that crosses state boundaries (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000).

According to Chase-Dunn (1999), the discourse about globalization has transformed (within the last decade or two) with the changes occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market became the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups.

1.3 Neoliberalism: Economic Globalization

Scholte (2005) argues that neoliberal doctrine regards globalization as being basically an economic process—a question of the production, exchange and consumption of resources. Neoliberal policy making therefore rests on economic analysis above all other understandings of globalization. Therefore, for Scholte, neoliberalism tends to treat economics in isolation from other dimensions of social relations.

Neoliberalism focuses not just on economics, but also on economics of a particular kind, namely laissez-faire market economics. As Harvey (2005) argues neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework

appropriate to such practices and once the markets are created to keep its intervention at minimum level.

There has everywhere been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s. The main features of the policy implications of neoliberal ideology that are imposed on governments all over the world are; privatization, deregulation, open markets, balanced budgets, deflationary austerity, and the dismantling of the welfare state. Proponents of neoliberalism, perhaps most notably the Reagan and Thatcher governments of the 1980s, thus pushed for more liberalized trade and investment, tax cuts and concurrent cuts in public spending on social services, deregulation and the privatization of state-owned industries or services.

During the 1970s stronger backed corporations have started to build factories and buy manufactured products in low-wage countries of the third world, and this process has been continuing with growing intensity. As Brecher et al. (2000: 2) rightly indicate this tendency converted the world into a “global assembly line”, in which the components of an ordinary trouser or a car may be made and assembled in a number of different countries. Moreover, corporations started to see the world as a global market where they can produce, buy and sell goods as well as services and labor.

While corporations have always operated on an international level, during the 1980s they have started to restructure in order to adapt to the operations in a global economy. They started to develop new corporate forms by strategic alliances, global outsourcing, captive suppliers, supplier chains, and increasingly transnational mergers.

1.4 The Inevitable Rise of Multinational Companies

According to Arthurs (2006) the importance of the role of multinational companies (hereinafter referred to as MNCs) in shaping the global economy has increased in the 20th century. Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Market Countries Report of IMF (2003) suggests that MNCs have had reciprocal relationship with globalization; in which globalization has led to higher foreign direct investment(FDI) flows to countries while the opportunity of receiving a greater share of global FDI flows has motivated a number of countries to undertake further liberalization.

Amirahmadi and Wu (1994: 170) argue that the proliferation of MNCs began 200 years ago, but they were making only a part of the foreign investment in different countries in the form of portfolio rather than long term greenfield or joint venture investments. They continue by claiming that with the increase of globalization, which is both the cause and the effect of internationalization of world trade, MNCs have become dominant players in the global economy (1994: 176). The end of the Cold War which led to the liberalization of the developing markets and opening of their economies with the removal of foreign investment barriers, privatization of the state economic enterprises and development of FDI attractive policies, has increased the investment of MNCs, especially in the developing countries.

As the importance of their role in the global economy increases, MNCs are both criticized and appreciated. Particularly their growing shares in developing countries' economies and impact of their decisions in overall economic conditions of the host countries have increased the attention paid to MNCs. For Amirahmadi and Wu (1994:185), the main reason of these criticisms is disappearance of domestic players as a result of popular brand names, superior technology, marketing and management skills, control of a large section of world markets,

and economies of scale of MNCs which domestic companies find hard to compete with. In addition to this, their positioning in the market as a profit seeker in the periods of economic growth may turn into disinvestment in economic downturns.

MNCs have also faced the criticism of controlling the domestic economic policies and taking actions that are contrary to a developing country's national interests or independence. As a consequence of nationalism, residents of a particular nation-state see themselves as a "we" group and other nations as a "they" group. These other nations may be perceived as a threat (Terpstra, 1978). Hence, MNCs, because of their foreign origins, may also be considered as a threat.

Contrary to these criticisms, Amirahmadi and Wu (1994) argue that MNCs are not only supported just for their impact on the economic growth but also for their substantial impact on productivity growth, industrial development that is induced by FDI, opening of technological and managerial assets of foreign investors' to developing countries, employment with a better-trained labour force, a higher national income, more innovations, and enhanced competitiveness in addition to foreign market outlets for a developing country's exports.

1.5 Turkey Case

For Turkey, it would be better to analyze the increase of foreign direct investment in parallel with neoliberal policies of the 1980s. Before coming to a period of crucial policy changes, the 1970s witnessed several economic and political instabilities in both Turkey and in the world. In developing countries, the easy stage of the import substituting industrialization (ISI) came to an end and the foreign exchange crisis and increasing dependency of imports led them to shift towards export promotion. Plus, most of the developed and developing countries were

negatively affected by the 1974 oil crisis. The foreign exchange crisis that took place in the second half of the 1970s had a great impact on the MNCs operating in Turkey. They had trouble getting the foreign exchange to transfer to their corporate headquarters. In addition to the foreign exchange crisis, the bargaining policies of the governments, and the economic and political instability in the country obstructed higher levels of FDI flow into Turkey.

After 1980, the attitude of the government toward FDI issue changed dramatically. In order to attract foreign firms, the government revised the regulations concerning FDI. Before, there had been a lack of a strong and efficient organization dealing with the FDI application process. In the 1980s, all restrictive regulations about FDI implemented in the 1970s were eliminated. Since 1980 there has been a great interest of the public in the FDI issue. In order to inform the public about issues regarding FDI, a foreign investors association (YASED) was established. YASED held conferences in order to change the suspicious attitude in the public towards FDI.

Turkey has joined neoliberal globalization by means of government policies and the structural adjustment programs prepared by the IMF and World Bank. On the September, 12, 1980 the Turkish military took over political power in Turkey. As Keyder (2004) argues the military regime provided a suitable environment in order to implement a radical restructuring of the economy with minimum resistance. Under military rule, ISI was replaced with an export-oriented industrialization model. Rutz and Balkan (2009: 18) summarize the main elements of the package of economic and social policies that had been introduced on January, 24, 1980 as the gradual removal of trade restrictions towards full commodity trade liberalization, the liberalization of the interest rates and the exchange rate regime, the privatization of industries and public services such as education, and the elimination of price controls and subsidies.

On the other hand, Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Market Countries Report of IMF (2003) states that due to its candidacy status of EU membership, its geographical location between Asia and Europe and domestic market of 72 million, Turkey has been perceived as having significant potential for market-seeking FDI, but the potential is unlikely to be translated into concrete outcomes until 2000s. Cizre and Yeldan (2005:338) argue, while the economic reforms of the 1980s can be defined as Turkey's first-generation economic liberalization, the period starting in 2000 can be termed second-generation marketization reforms. According to the authors both rounds of reforms aim at the establishment of free market capitalism. But in the second-generation of market policies transnational mobility of capital and global production networks were far more pronounced than before (2005:339.). Sayek (2007:130) argues that the major reforms and the political momentum after 2002, the increase in improved economic conditions, GDP per capita, legal reforms and candidacy of the country to EU membership increased FDI inflows to Turkey.

1.6 Rise of a new class with Neoliberal Globalization

The rise of this globalized system, an "Empire" (Negri and Hardt, 2001), together with the emergence of cyberspace, has had profound impact on governance, the polity, culture, various realms of subjectivity, and identity. Since the mid 1980s, the rise of consumption culture, introduction of information technologies and the encouragement of a business-oriented lifestyle have altered social and political values in the country. Introduction of neoliberal policies of unregulated financial transactions, fictitious exports and the imposition of a free market mentality since the 1980s produced a 'hybrid' bourgeois class structure.

In addition, Helvacioğlu (2000:333) argues that “since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, under the rubric of westernization there have been numerous developments in education, broadcasting, arts and urban restructuring which have created a stratum of society that is fully integrated with European and global trends”. As Helvacioğlu (2000) states the group of professionals and new business people has been most adaptive to globalizing trends. Although this group is the most visible indication of globalization, it remains a minority in relation to the overall national, social and political formations in Turkey. On the other hand, the working class and low-level state functionaries have been adversely affected by neoliberal policies.

In regional and social terms there has been a strong resistance to the introduction of so-called global trends. This resistance has been captured by political Islamic groups and nationalist discourses which, under the convenient political label of anti-westernism, anti-imperialism and state-centered nationalism mobilize people on a platform to protect ‘traditional Islamic values’ and ‘the territorial and national integrity of the Turkish Republic’.

CHAPTER TWO: NATIONALISM

2.1 Globalization and Nationalism

Nationalism is a profoundly international ideology, founded upon and driven by inter-national as much as national factors. Early waves of modern globalization were driven by missionary zeal and empire-building, and found their response in a wave of anti-colonial nationalisms. Under imperialist globalization, societies without a national state were simply unable to exercise autonomy, and instead were colonized or otherwise dominated. On the other hand, today's globalization is increasingly driven by private corporations and is associated with a dramatic internationalization of state-orientations (Held et al. 1999).

Historically, the nation-state system has not been based on only economic sovereignty, but also on its linkage to a global capitalist system. Significantly, markets for capital, raw materials, manufactured products and labour have always over-reached the scope of the national state. From the beginning, these markets have been global. As Scholte (2000) reminds, the interconnections between countries have intensified at various junctures during the 500-year history of the modern states-system. Indeed, so-called national economies have historically relied on their continued access to such global markets, be they for silver or rubber. In this regard, it can be said that the capitalist era has been concerned with the making of a global space (Said 1993; Habib 1995). The making of this global space has been very much depended on the formation of nation-states since it was often the nation-states that provided the monetary and military means by which such markets could expand globally. The nation-states ought to be recognized as one of the first regulatory institutions of globalization.

Globalization and nation formation are not objectively contradictory or essentially opposed formations(Nairn and James, 2005). The period of the rise of the nation-state and the ideology of modern nationalism- the nineteenth century- saw the simultaneous consolidation of ideologies of modern cosmopolitanism as well as those of the alternative globalizing solidarity movements such as international labourism and socialist and communist internationalism. In short, the nation-state and modern globalization grew up together.

Ironically, contemporary corporate globalism sharpens conflicts defined in national terms, while simultaneously weakening the role of national states in resolving conflicts among states. Despite losing significant elements of legitimacy, national states remain important 'arenas for democratic struggles' and the category of nation remains a 'mediation between the local and the global' (Calhoun,1993).

On the other hand, Beck (2000: 79) argues that undermining of national borders is inevitable and positive and that the sovereignty of states is declining or that the 'nation-state' is withering away. In contrast, proponents of historical continuity argue that a wave of globalization was followed by a wave of deglobalization by taking into account of capitalism's powerful and countervailing globalizing tendencies from the start (Chase Dunn and Gills, 2003).

Globalization provides individuals with a wider range of opportunities, while at the same time, it increases the sense of insecurity. As a result of this insecurity, nationalism is reproduced with different contents by adopting the discourse of "reunification" on the level of identity. In order to adjust to these new horizons and organizations, the nation and nation-state continue to be the primary political and cultural reference points.

In trying to reconcile the paradox of nationalistic resurgence at a time of global economic and technological interdependence, Smith (1995: 24) argued that nation-states remain the primary object of loyalty in the modern world because a nation's "memory is central to identity." Indeed, the quest for a sovereign identity is driving much of the nationalistic sentiments today: as insecurities about globalization grow, loyalty to the nation-state increases. This helps explain why, at an economic level, the rise of globalization has failed to weaken economic nationalism (Nayar, 1997). Nationalism is a concept that has been linked to both collective behaviors and governmental policies and to individual behaviors.

Moreover, capitalists are the real globalizers, not workers or citizens. Capital is increasingly mobile across borders; labour is not. Labour, as a political actor, is demobilized by global flows and is replaced by the network society (Castells, 1996: 475-6). Most people do not want to emigrate and most who do, are forced out by repression or poor economic opportunities (Stalker, 1994). Borders have been stiffened since September 11, 2001. The global market is the arena for multinationals, business professionals and the rich, where power rests on unequal command of property.

2.2 Nationalism

Much energy has been expended in the search for more precise definitions and classifications of core concepts such as 'nation', 'national identity', and 'ethnicity' (Hall 1993; Connor 1994; Smith 1998). While this quest for analytical clarity has created various schools of analysis, there are serious doubts whether any unitary theory of nationalism or ethnicity has succeeded in capturing the complex and ambiguous phenomenon of nationalism (Young 1993: 21-3). Craig Calhoun argues that nationalism and its corollary terms 'have proved

notoriously hard concepts to define', because nationalisms are variable and 'any definition will legitimate some claims and delegitimize others' (1993: 215-16).

Since many differences between scholars arise out of competing definitions of the nation, Liah Greenfeld (1992) began her study of early nationalism with a conceptual genealogy of the word "nation," and she finds that the origins of national identity lie in the experience of outsiders rather than that of the citizen/insider. "Natio" is Latin for "something born" and was originally applied to foreign-born individuals who constituted a social stratum beneath Roman citizens (1992:4). The term gradually shifts in meaning from something "derogatory" to "the community of opinion and purpose" (1992:4).

Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries the idea of the nation came home, in the sense of applying to people in their place of origin rather than outside of it. But this was a decidedly secondary development, and even then it indicated the political elite of a country and not its general population. The eventual transformation into a form of nationhood that included all "the people" emerged first in early sixteenth century England, Greenfeld claims (1992: 16). As the political history of England unfolded, this example of political sovereignty had a kind of viral effect on neighbouring countries. The effect was such that "the emergence of new national identities was no longer a result of original creation, but rather of the importation of an originally existing idea" (1992: 14). Indeed she suggests the importation and imitation involved tended to breed a kind of reactionary "ressentiment" towards the original source.

Although he approaches nationalism differently, Benedict Anderson (1983) shares Greenfeld's analyses when it comes to the roots of nationalism in supra-national encounters. On the other hand, Anderson focuses on large-scale shifts in collective consciousness and

argues that changes in dominant communication practices (like the use of vernaculars in administration and the spread of newspapers and novels) constructed a new “imagined community”. Members of even the smallest nations do not know the majority of their fellow-citizens, do not meet, do not hear from one another. And yet they are convinced that they belong to a unique national community not only because they follow the same media of the nation but also nations are perceived as limited by boundaries and thereby cut off from the surrounding nations since no nation identifies itself with entire humanity.

Ernest Gellner (1983) had a different perspective and explanation which is opposed to the general idea of seeing nation or nation-state as the source of the development. As he put it: “it’s nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way around” (1983: 55). Gellner attributes the rise of nationalism to the imperatives of a new social order organized around industrial production and its requirements for an educated and socially mobile workforce which was criticized to be “West oriented” later on by some scholars.

Anthony Smith defines the nations as entities based on conceptions of popular sovereignty and common citizenship, a consolidated territory and economy, are generally post-eighteenth-century formations (2001: 19). But as Smith observes, nations are also communities of sentiment that in large part rest on ethnic cultures which predate the modern period. These provide the nation with a collective name, myths of unique origins, a sense of belonging to a homeland, of shared history and culture, and common political fate. It is the sense of belonging to an ancient ‘timeless’ community that gives the ideology of nationalism such power in the modern world. Nationalism is able to bind individuals into a society through which they can overcome contingency and death, achieving immortality by adding their story to that of an eternal unit (Smith 1999: 88).

2.3 Nationalism as a Discourse

Nationalist discourse is one of the most important elements of the global cultural flow, and it has both transformed ethnicity and cultural patterns and shaped the process of state-formation itself. Craig Calhoun (1997), who proposes to analyze nationalism as a discourse rather than a political ideology, argues the best way since “this conceptualization reveals that nationalism is more than a political and cultural doctrine, that is, a more basic way of thinking that shapes the world view of members of the nations”(Özkırmılı, 2005: 32). Even though these analysis may be casespecific and may have a hard time explaining how nationalism shapes the world in general, it may still be helpful in finding the dynamics of nationalism and struggles in its reproduction for the purpose of this study.

For the discourse analysis, Billig’s (1995) concept of ‘banal nationalism’ is particularly useful to consider since he argued that the construct of nation is often accepted and reproduced mindlessly and carried out through mundane habits of language, thought, and symbolism. For example, when the term we is used to refer to a specific national collectivity, the speaker and the audience are reconstructing the nation unconsciously. De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999) examined topics, discursive strategies and linguistic devices that, on one hand, are employed to construct national sameness and uniqueness, and on the other hand distinctions and differences from other national collectives. De Cillia et al. (1999: 153) argued that national identities are “discursively, by means of language and other semiotic systems, produced, reproduced, transformed and destructed”. In this sense, “the discourse of nationalism divides the world into 'us' and 'them' while positing a homogeneous and fixed identity on either side” (Özkırmılı, 2005: 32).

In addition, nationalist discourse which is not reducible to only state-formation is being argued to be deeper than a political and cultural doctrine. People respond to nationalist messages from flags and ceremonies for reasons deeper than doctrine.

Furthermore, 'banal nationalism' notion of Billig (1995) elucidates how the discourse of nationalism naturalizes itself since the construct of nation is often reproduced mindlessly and carried out through mundane habits of language, thought, and symbolism. As Herzfeld (1997: 42) argues 'nationalism treats national identity as a system of absolute values, in which the relativism of ethnic shifters has been transformed into a set of reified eternal verities'. In this sense, national values are no longer seen as social values and they become taken for granted, common sense and hegemonic.

The construction of national identity builds on the emphasis on a common history, and history has always to do with remembrance and memory. Maurice Halbwachs's (1985) notion of 'collective memory' maintains historical continuity by recalling specific elements from the archive of 'historical memory'. Halbwachs's concept is of particular interest for an analytical approach to the subjective discursive construction of national identity, especially regarding the question of which 'national history' is told by a nation's citizens, what and how they recollect, and between which 'events' they make a connection in their subjective 'national narrative'.

While Halbwachs focuses on the concept of memory, Stuart Hall (1992) emphasizes the role culture plays in the construction of nations and national identities. Hall describes nations not only as political constructs, but also as 'systems of cultural representations' (1992: 200) by

means of which an imagined community may be interpreted. People are not only citizens by law, they also participate in forming the idea of the nation as it is represented in their national culture. A nation is a symbolic community constructed discursively. National cultures construct identities by creating meanings of 'the nation', with which is identified as: these are contained in stories that are told about the nation, in memories which link its present to its past and in the perceptions of it that are constructed (Hall, 1992: 201).

Similarly, Clifford Geertz (1975), claims that 'nationality is a narrative, a story which people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world'. On the other hand, national narratives do not emerge from nowhere and do not operate in a vacuum. They are, rather, produced, reproduced and spread by actors in concrete (institutionalized) contexts. The designers of national identities and national cultures aim at 'linking membership within the political nation state and identification with national culture' (Hall, 1992: 205) so that culture and state become identical. In this sense, it can be argued that the discourse of nationalism operates through institutions and national identity as internalized through socialization. As Bourdieu (1994) argues it is to a large extent through its schools and educational system that the state shapes those forms of perception, categorization, interpretation and memory that serve to determine the orchestration of the habitus which in turn are the constitutive basis for a kind of national common sense.

As a result, the discourse of nationalism hegemonizes like other discourses. As Özkırmı (2005: 32) argues the nationalist discourse is about power and domination which legitimates and produces hierarchies among actors. On the other hand, while authorizing particular formulations of the nation against others, nationalism also conceals the divisions and differences of opinion within the nation. As some researches in the area indicate there is not

one kind of nationalism since nationalism is not a homogenous discourse, but as a series of discourses (Bora, 2003).

2.4 Turkish Nationalism: A brief history

Turkey's last century has been shaped by the ideology and the social, cultural and economic policies of an aggressive and at times racist/ ethnicist nationalism. Giving an account of the history of nationalism in Turkey would certainly break the confines of this thesis. Therefore, the main aspects of Turkish nationalism will be discussed in this section with focusing on the brief history.

Up to the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s, Turkish historiography and studies on Turkey had been largely coherent with the “founding myths” of the Turkish Republic. According to this official paradigm, the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, meant a complete break with Turkish/Islamic history and opened a blank page for a new nation, aspiring to reach the “level of contemporary civilization”. Modernizing reforms such as the introduction of a secular and republican form of government, European legal codes, the emancipation of women, the abolition of the fez and of the Arabic script, were looked upon favorably. In the case of the rigorous language reform and the activities of the History Foundation (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*), famous for its Turkish history thesis, according to which all civilizations emanated from central Asia (Özdoğan, 2001), criticism was sympathetic and apologized for by the revolutionary fervor in their implementation (Lewis, 1999).

With the end of the cold war era, internal and external changes opened the way for a re-consideration of the frozen official historiography of contemporary Turkey. After 1980 coup

d'état, the 1990's were characterized by the emergence of a plethora of writers and researchers questioning nationalist interpretations of history. Zürcher's "Turkey: A modern history" (1993), was the most influential among a number of books, which opened Pandora's Box in re-placing the Turkish national project as re-presented by its iconized leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk into the history of Turkish Modernization and Nationalism since the mid-19th century. Zürcher argues that the central rupture in Turkish history was not the foundation of the Republic, as it took over the officials as well as the mindset of the Ottoman State, but if at all, the turn to multi-party politics in 1947.

Since the mid-1990s, despite the heterogeneity in their theoretical approaches and the variety of their subjects, in most of these critical works, the history of Turkish nationalism is seen as a project of modernization. It is understood as a process of gradual transformation of the attempt to save the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire under the flag of a liberal, multi-religious state to an exclusionist and ethno-secular nationalism (Dündar, 2001; Özdoğan, 2001). Dündar argues that the ethnic and religious reshaping of Turkey dates back to the years between 1913 and 1918 under the Committee of Union and Progress, and this transformation took place in three stages, which were heavily influenced by external developments.

Firstly, the modernizing edict of 1839, the Tanzimat, sought to re-unite the people of the Empire through a universal citizenship of a modernizing state. Secondly, the restorative reign of Abdülhamid II turned towards a Pan-Islamist stance, as the secession of Bulgaria and Greece left the country with a Muslim majority. Finally, after the Balkan Wars in 1912/1913, which resulted in a next to complete loss of the Empire's European possessions, and therefore the loss of birthplaces of its leading elite, the Committee of Union and Progress, the leaders of the Modernist paradigm turned towards an ethnically based Turkish nationalism.

Turkish nationalism developed along the lines of Herder's concept of organic nationalism, which formed the intellectual basis of aggressive German nationalism (Kedourie, 1993), as opposed to the more inclusive territorial nationalism of French or British origin. Turkish identity, the normative reference of Islam and the multi-religious reality of the Ottoman Empire were regarded as the constituents of this modernist movement (Turkishness, Islamism and Ottomanism). Before the Balkan wars, there was still some space for the 'other' in the nationalist imagination. After the Balkan wars, Ziya Gökalp, arguably the most influential ideologue of the later Turkish Republic, made clear that the nation of the future would not be Ottoman anymore, but Turkish (Gökalp, 1968). It was in this intellectual climate and the political constellations of World War I that the Committee of Union and Progress issued, in 1915, the Deportation Law with the aim to expel 'unreliable' Christian communities from endangered border regions. While the following Armenian massacres certainly meant a serious rupture in the history of contemporary Turkey, the ideology and practice of Turkish nationalism was not deeply affected.

The foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the canonization of Turkish Nationalism as Kemalism (after the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) continued along these lines and declared conservatively religious Turks, non-Turkish speaking Muslims and Non-Muslim as its internal 'other' (Aktar, 2000). As Dündar (2001) asserts, Kemalist Nationalism defined the nation as an ethnic group (Turks), denying the existence of ethnic differences within the newly established Turkish Republic. The driving forces of the Kemalist national integration process were ethnically based policies such as assimilation and deportation.

2.5 Current Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

Tanıl Bora (2003) explores this reconfiguration in his recent work on Turkish nationalisms in the 1990s, identifying four main nationalist discourses. Besides Atatürk nationalism, these discourses are radical Turkist nationalism; Kemalism; and neonationalism (or liberal nationalism) while leaving aside the less articulate Islamist nationalism. Bora thinks that these four discourses are all dialects deriving from the root-language of official Turkish Nationalism which depends on the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state, its symbols, rituals and its glory with its ideological ambiguity. However, that neoliberal nationalism deviates significantly from the others, criticizing and positioning itself against all types of state-developmental and protectionist nationalisms.

Among these four discourses, radical Turkist nationalism stands out for its emphasis on race before all else. Distinctively essentialist and aspiringly fascist from its inception, radical Turkist nationalism reclaims the entire territory inhabited by people of Turkic descent as “the Turkish homeland”. During the post-1980s period, however, radical Turkist nationalism “modernized” itself. Forming links with Atatürk nationalism and occasionally allying with Kemalism, it softened its extremist aspects, drew closer to the political center, and became “normalized” (Bora 2003: 446). This normalization, in fact, paved the way for the 1999 electoral success of the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi- MHP) that in turn represented Turkist views in the coalition government. Although “normalized” to a certain extent, radical Turkish nationalism is still widely seen as a reactionary, well capable of retreating to protectionist views of the nation-state and thus denounced in pro-globalization circles.

Kemalism (Kemalizm / ulusçuluk) distinguishes itself from the other discourses by claiming to be a “left-wing” nationalism. There are variously nuanced versions of Kemalism; but today it is most clearly represented by the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi-CHP) and the newspaper Cumhuriyet. The Kemalist nationalistic discourse construes nationalism as the advocate of the process of secularization and modernization. Therefore, the term ‘ulusçuluk’ is preferred to milliyetçilik in order to prevent from religious connotations where ‘millet’ designates the religious community in the Ottoman language. In order to propagate a secular national culture on equal terms with the modern West, Kemalism draws on the Republican ideal of “attaining the rank of contemporary civilization” (Bora 2003).

In the socio-economic milieu of the 1990s, however, Kemalism went through a process of generating new distinctions and thereby splits within itself. Some Kemalists who prioritized anti-imperialism over Occidentalism came to terms with radical Turkist nationalism. This rapprochement found expression in the alliances established on occasions that required taking sides about Turkey’s EU membership. Other Kemalists who gave precedence to Occidentalism converged with neoliberal positions such as that of TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) and tended to favor a market-based economy and a pro-globalization approach to the making of national culture.

A noticeably new development in Turkish nationalism stems from a proglobalization point of view, that of neoliberalism, gaining currency in contemporary Turkey (Bora 2003).

Notwithstanding its oxymoronic quality, neoliberal nationalism seems to be eclipsing other forms of nationalism in Turkey today; or, at least, it presents itself as the form most capable of encompassing competing discourses within the promises of a globalized economy. Neoliberal nationalism points to the failures of state-developmentalism, promoting instead the goal of

free market globalization and believes that the nation's best interest lies in merging with the globalization process and in harmonizing with civilization. It is important to note that the proponents of neoliberal nationalism are from the rising segments of the new urban middle class whose discourses will be analyzed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Methodology

Both quantitative and qualitative methods, in other words mixed method, were conducted for the research since the quantitative and qualitative elements of the research complement each other for our research question. In addition, Rauscher and Greenfield (2009) argue that this research strategy opens possibilities for researchers to uncover a more profound understanding of a research problem since mixed method combines investigation and interpretation. As noted by Sechrest and Sidana (1995), growth in the mixed methods movement has the potential to reduce some of the problems associated with singular methods. By utilizing quantitative and qualitative techniques within the same framework, mixed methods research can incorporate the strengths of both methodologies.

Measures:

- 1) Quantitative study:** In order to analyze how informants acquire the knowledge, skills and behaviors that are characteristic of a deterritorialized global consumer culture, the five dimensions of acculturation to the global consumer culture have been measured.

In this sense, the elements of acculturation to the global consumer culture (hereafter AGCC) evaluated relevant for this study are: cosmopolitanism, exposure to English language and global mass media, social interactions with foreigners (primarily travel),

openness to and desire to emulate global consumer culture and self-identification with global consumer culture. The close-ended questions with a seven point likert scale have been used in order to analyse the levels of the five dimensions of AGCC. The scales that Cleveland and Laroche (2007) have developed to evaluate AGCC were adapted for this section. The 2-page questionnaire consisted of five parts which contained a battery of 33 measures designed to capture various values, attitudes, opinions, and interests (serving as surrogate measures for several components of AGCC) was used in the survey.

While cosmopolitanism dimension was measured by 10 items (reliability coefficient of 0,863) , exposure to English language and global media dimension was measured by 10 items (reliability coefficient of 0,861), social interaction(primarily travel) with 4 items (reliability coefficient of 0,888), openness to and desire to emulate global consumer culture dimension with 4 items (reliability coefficient of 0,557), and self identification to global consumer culture with 5 items (reliability coefficient of 0,702). Since the sample is limited with 30 informants, the realtively low reliability coefficient of openness to and desire to emulate global consumer culture dimension was disregarded.

All answers to 32 questions were expressed on seven-point Likert scales (anchored by 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Only 1 question (number of the foreign countires visited) was open-ended.

2) Qualitative study: The ethnographic method of in-depth interviewing was employed in order to examine the narratives of Turkish multinational professionals on globalization and nationalism with covering several issues.

Although the interviewees were business people, the interviews did not aim to acquire information regarding their occupational or institutional operations in detail. The kind of information which was intended to be acquired can be listed as the following:

In the first section, a chronological summary of work life, work experiences with foreign colleagues, preferences about working abroad, preferences of whom to work with (foreigner or local, if local any ethnic bias or not), where to work (multinational or local) were asked.

In the second section questions regarding nationalist perceptions and discourses were asked by focusing on perception of “others”, namely non-moslem citizens of Turkey, Kurds, other ethnic originated people, Western people, European Union, Moslem countries, Turkic Republics and non-secular citizens of Turkey. The questions which aim to explore national identity construction process such as thoughts about being a Turk, Turkey, symbols of Turkish nationalism (flag, Atatürk, The Turkish National Anthem) and media preferences were also included in this section.

For the interviews, a list of open and closed-ended questions that has been prepared beforehand was used to guide the conversations. Each interview generally lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, and were conducted in a semistructured fashion. In the final form, there were 52 questions for qualitative section of the research.

Although the interviews were designed in a structured way, the interviewees mostly were allowed to speak without interruption, hence making improvised and unstructured dialogues possible, and they were interrupted only when they seemed to be diverting from the information intended by the question. They were also interrupted when it seemed that the question was not clear. Some interviewees gave long answers, which could easily cover a couple of questions from the list. So when giving such answers the interviewees were allowed to speak without interruption. The interviews were dominantly monologues in which the interviewees exploited the chance to speak; however, there were many times in which follow-up questions or probes were used to acquire information that was more detailed or to disclose intimated answers.

The interviews were conducted face to face, and all were tape-recorded with the permission of the participants. I have transcribed each recording in order to include the non-verbal reactions of the participants. The interviews were made in various places, in the personal offices of the interviewees, in their homes or in cafés outside.

3.2 Sample

In the fieldwork which was conducted for this thesis, 30 people were interviewed who currently live and work in Istanbul where Turkey branches of major multi-national companies are located. Interviewees were selected according to convenience sampling, as in this study we do not aim to represent Turkish multinational professionals as a complete population. Rather, we try to understand how some of the members of this broad population experience with globalization and nationalism. However, in order to reduce the selection bias, the selection criteria regarding to industry and company where the multinational professionals

work, has been applied to the sample. In this regard, the informants were selected from 17 major companies which operate in 7 main industries.

Table 1

SAMPLE			
	Industry	number of interviewees	origin of MNC
	1) Energy, oil&chemicals industry		
1	Company A	2	European
2	Company B	4	European
	2) Automotive industry		
3	Company C	2	American
4	Company D	2	Japanese
	3) Communication, technology &electronics industry		
5	Company E	1	European
6	Company F	2	European
7	Company G	2	American
8	Company H	1	American
	4) Pharmaceutical industry		
9	Company J	1	American
10	Company K	2	European
	5) Finance/Banking industry		
11	Company L	2	European
12	Company M	2	European
13	Company N	1	American
	6) Retail/FMCG industry		
14	Company P	2	American
15	Company R	2	European
16	Company S	1	European
	7) Consulting industry		
17	Company T	1	American
	Total	30	

As seen from the table above, mostly the informants work for European and American multinational companies which have more decentralized and individualistic patterns comparing to Turkish business culture. In addition to the selection criteria of the workplaces of the informants, another selection criteria has been applied. The criteria were as follows:

People who,

1. Have been working in multinational corporations more than 4 years AND
Have spent their careers mostly in multinational corporations

2. Have interacted with foreigners for business purposes
3. Speak English
4. Travel abroad and interact with foreigners

The criteria above were set to ensure global exposure and culture. Multinational companies come to occupy “global” cultural space through the physical and organizational layout of the workplaces as well as the omnipresence of what interviewees called a “global work culture”.

This culture is characterized by a standardization of work practices across locations.

Furthermore, a mixture of heterogeneous and snowball sampling methods was chosen.

Snowball sampling accompanied this method and it proved to be the most feasible way to reach adequate interviewees, as the adequacy of interviewees is hard to predict and as it is hard to contact them (due to occupational positions and busy agendas) without the reference of a prior adequate interviewee.

The informants were between 26-65 years of age, with the average age of 34. Besides, the interviewees were highly educated. While 13 people hold a master’s degree, 16 of them were graduated from university. Only one informant has a high school degree. The marital status, gender and monthly income levels of the informants were quite well balanced (see table 2, 3 and 4 below).

Table 2

Gender			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Male	18	60
	Female	12	40
	Total	30	100

Table 3

Marital status			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Married	16	53,33
	Single	14	46,67
	Total	30	100

Table 4

	Monthly Income		
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	2001-3500 tl	5	16,67
	3501-5000 tl	6	20
	5001-6500tl	6	20
	6501-8000 tl	2	6,67
	8001-9500 tl	3	10
	9501-11000 tl	4	13,33
	above 11000 tl	4	13,33
	Total	30	100

The participants usually reside in middle and upper middle class districts of Istanbul such as Etiler, Bebek, Beşiktaş, Erenköy, Kanlıca and Zekeriyaköy where they have a social “habitus”. The professions of the informants range from upper management positions like communication director, marketing manager, procurement manager, legal director to lower positions like software developer, finance analyst, product specialist and executive assistant. In total, 25 different professions have been counted in the sample.

Regarding foreign languages spoken, nearly all female informants speak second foreign language besides English, while only 11 male respondents speak second foreign language. Unsurprisingly, almost all second languages except Kurdish, which is in fact a mother tongue language for informants rather than a foreign language, are Western languages which is compatible with Westernized policies of Republic of Turkey.

Table 5

gender * second language spoken Crosstabulation										
Count										
		second language spoken								
		Kurdish	French	German	Italian	Spanish	Dutch	non-exist	Total	
Gender	Male	1	3	4	0	2	1	7	18	
	Female	1	5	4	1	0	0	1	12	
	Total	2	8	8	1	2	1	8	30	

CHAPTER FOUR: DISCOURSES OF GLOBALIZATION

4.1 Economic Globalization

4.1.1 Increase in Foreign Direct Investment

Rationalistic Discourse: Within this discursive frame, the increase in foreign direct investment was set as a part of economic restructuring and internationalization (globalization). In brief, three arguments dominated the discussions:

- the need for economic growth of Turkey including creation of new employment opportunities,
- the problems related to State ownership,
- the know-how acquired by FDI

As an example of this kind of discourse, Mert (28) claims that:

“Privatization and increase of FDI are positive processes that have to be maintained in order to gain economic growth. It does not matter whether the investment is local or global, we are not in middle age. We have to change the perception of foreigners in our minds. The state has to stop doing business but it may control the business”.

Similar to Mert, Melih (28) argues:

“ I support the increase of FDI since it is good for Turkish economy. Besides, I work for this purpose as a financial consultant for merger and acquisitions. Foreign investment has other advantages as well, such as know-how, growth of national economy regardless of local conditions”.

This kind of discourse asserts that the works of several civic organizations like YASED in order to change the suspicious attitude in the public towards FDI have influenced the public

opinion in favour of FDI. On the other hand, there is still way to go since few respondents claimed their anxieties regarding increase of foreign direct investment.

Nationalistic Discourse: Within this discursive frame, the increase in foreign direct investment was evaluated with doubts regarding to anti-imperialism and state-centered nationalism. In brief, three arguments dominated the discussions:

- Turkey may loose control, sovereignty and depend on foreigners (statist economy and some restrictions were argued as a solution)
- Some restrictions (regarding to industry, management of the multinational company, share structure and transfer of the cash) have to be applied
- The first beneficiaries of a country's resources are the people of that country rather than other foreign investors

While majority of the multinational professional informants welcome foreign direct investment, few of them resist FDI investment due to nationalist discourses. Also some of the informants welcome FDI only within some restrictions. For Şirin (28), the restriction depends on the industry which FDI is imposed:

“I support but I do not think it is hundred percent positive. It is not good for the security of Turkey that global companies own and run energy and communications industries.

Me: What do you think about local companies investing in foreign countries? Do you think there has to be any restrictions on that?

Şirin: For sure, they have to invest. I think it is positive and there is no need for any restrictions”.

As seen from the above dialogue, Şirin advocates one way restriction on FDI which is not rationalistic in terms of interstate commercial agreements. From a different point of view, her

discourse reminds us the increased reaction to globalization because of economic inequality between nations (Mackay, 2000). She implies that since there is not an equality of economic conditions between nation-states, why there has to be an equality on restrictions? On the other hand, for Emrah (37) the restriction is needed in order to control the country:

“Foreign direct investment is good but it has to be restricted. Some protection policies have to be in place. Foreign direct investment means the management and control of the country, this may lead to loose the control. Therefore it has to be restricted within limits. And statist economy policy has to implemented to some extent.”

Like Emrah, Ceyda (33) supports statist economy policy as well because of her anxiety about loosing national sovereignty and being dependent to foreign countries:

“Foreign investment, for sure I support its increase, but I am against to the disposal of Turkish companies. I am definitely against to the privatization of some companies such as Ereğli Demir Çelik and Türk Telekom. The state has to run some business as well. Otherwise, agriculture and livestock breeding in here dies, you start to import meat and wheat which *we* have in our country. These make *us* dependent to foreign countries. God forbid, if something happens, you have to develop by yourself. If you import everything from abroad, then what will you do?”(italics by author).

As noticed, Ceyda’s view is bounded with nation-state and she seperates the nation-state from other countries by using the words like “we” and “us”. Following Billig’s (1995) argument on ‘banal nationalism’, we may note the continued use of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ to refer to the nation’s identity, landscapes or achievements.

On the other hand, Çetin (27) referred to the ‘economic nationalism’ (Chomsky, 1999) operated on the heretical principle that the first beneficiaries of a country’s resources are the people of that country rather than other foreign investors. Çetin not only defends economic nationalism but also closed economy as well:

“ Foreign direct investment is not that much advantageous. We know that most of the income and capital generated here by using our resources are transferred to their country of origin by multi-national companies. They are beneficial for know-how, however we know that they are not coming to train us but to earn money. I wish some kind of embargo was imposed and we had to produce all required materials from automotive to needle by ourselves”.

Similarly Nesrin (28) claims that:

“ I am nationalist about this subject. The global investors should have Turkish partners if they invest. They may bring know-how and capital but the management of the corporation has to be run by Turkish citizens and money gained should not be transferred”.

Following Nesrin’s claims, the informants who are “nationalist” about this subject were not that much “nationalist” when it comes to select where to work, namely multinational company or local company which will be discussed in following sections. In order to conclude, although only few informants used nationalistic approaches in their replies, it is worth to note since the multinational professionals have been thought to be the most adaptive group to globalizing trends which is in this sense increase of FDI.

4.1.2 Selling real estate to foreigners

Within this discursive frame, selling real estate to foreigners in Turkey was evaluated with a more nationalistic approach. In brief, four arguments dominated the discussions:

- Anxiety about territorial integrity (fear of foreigners capturing the territory of Turkey, especially Southern Eastern area)
- Some restrictions (regarding to type and size of real estate- whether it is land or just an apartment) have to be applied

- there has to be bilateral agreements among nation-states [“if a German buys an apartment from Alanya, then a Turkish citizen could buy an apartment from Berlin, vice versa”, Yavuz (43)].
- economical equality [economic conditions and value of the ‘national’ currencies are not the same in world scale, “while an English taxi-driver may buy an apartment in Kuşadası, it takes for an entire life of work for a Turkish taxi-driver to buy a shanty ” (Orhan, 28), offers that priority must be given to Turkish citizens].

Orhan’s approach reminds us capturing the properties of non-moslem citizens of Turkey during 6-7 September Uprisings. Remembering that the nationalist discourse is about power and domination, we see the same “hegemonic” language in Yasin’s (26) response:

“I am totally opposed to that. Even if I work entire of my life, I can not able to buy a house nearby Bosphorus. On the other hand, some British people can buy. The priority has to be given to Turkish citizens. I do not support the selling of lands, territories to foreigners as well”.

While majority of the multinational professional informants welcome foreign direct investment, only few of them welcome selling of real estates to foreigners due to nationalist discourses. Furthermore, most of the informants are against selling “Turkish” lands to foreigners. As Mehmet(43) puts it:

“It is risky. Imagine that they buy Eastern Anatolia by this way. It is the thing that Israel did. It has to be determined by bilateral agreements among states. If they buy real estate from Turkey, I may be able to buy from their country as well. And the policy has to be designed within restrictions in order to protect the benefits of Turkey”.

4.1.3 Multi-national or Local: The preferences of where to work

The respondents were asked whether there exists a difference between multinational companies and local companies and afterwards asked which one they prefer to work. Most of the respondents claim that there are many differences which affect their preference in favour of multinational companies. Since this question is more concrete compared to foreign direct investment and something that the respondents think and go through in their everyday lives, the rationalistic discourse was dominant. In brief, three rationales dominated the discussions:

- Regarding to the organizational structure: Multinationals are more effective, organized, fast, professional, decentralized, participatory, standardized, fair, transparent, dynamic, corporate and less hierarchical comparing to local companies. On the other hand, multinationals do not take risks that much comparing to local firms, the strategy of a multinational firm is determined by global board which makes a local branch just an executor and in this sense, local firms are more flexible. Moreover, some big, corporate local firms are as much competitive, corporate and professional as MNCs.
- Regarding to the benefits: Multi-cultural environment (different point of views), multinationals pay higher comparing to local firms, employees have the opportunity to travel or work abroad and speak foreign languages regularly, training opportunities are higher in multinationals, MNCs respect to employee rights more than local firms.
- Regarding to the work: Job definitions are more clear at multinationals, international experience, know-how, make use of global network, awards according to performance criteria not personal relationships, rational decision making (while local firms are more emotional) and compatible with law when hiring and firing.

For instance Hale (32), a legal counsellor of a big energy company who is an expert in legal issues such as dismissals and employee rights, claims that:

“ Indeed, I prefer to work for a multinational company which enables me to learn different issues and meet different people. For example, you are not just supposed to look Turkish law but you have the opportunity to analyse foreign law structures as well. We are taking agreements from global head office and then adapting them here with taking into account of Turkish law system. While doing that, you are learning foreign laws as well. Furthermore, in local companies, the boss says the final word, but this is not the case in MNCs. Each employee works within business targets here in order to increase the profitability not to please the boss. And as being a lawyer, I may say that firing, contracting and dismissal policies are compatible with law in MNCs. For instance in order to fire an employee, several steps have to be maintained such as warnings, reportings, human resources (HR) interference and legal control in multinationals. However, you can be fired without getting your legal amendments in a local company just because the boss does not like your clothing style! In MNCs procedures are being practiced. Maybe they do not like it at all but they are trying to be compatible with legislation and law”.

For Hale job security, freedom and independence (especially from an authority of a boss) and learning new things are the selection criteria which reminds us the research conducted by Wasti (1994). Wasti argues that Turkish employees’ expectations from their jobs ranking from 1 to 8 are: Learn new things, Job security, Good pay and fringe benefits, Be creative, Freedom and independence, Status and prestige, Belong to a group and Get to know others. Since, Turkish economy has gone through many crisis in recent years, job security and good pay are important for employees. For Eda, the main selection criteria is financial benefits:

“For sure, I prefer to work for a multinational. First of all, MNCs offer good pay and financial benefits. I remember that when I was working for a multinational tobacco company few years ago, we were paid in dollar currency and we received bonus and

premium payments 6 times in a year. Can you imagine that! Secondly, they are more professional. In a local company, employees behave in an unconventional and informal manner which irritates me. The boundaries are clearly set in MNCs”.

According to Jain et al. (1998), many MNCs prefer, in developing countries, to pay very high wages by local market standards in order to attract the best employees and, perhaps, minimize the need for extensive training.

As discussed above, while 60% of the informants work for European multinationals, 33% of them work for American multinationals. Since, the informants compare Western-American working culture with Turkish substitute, we benefit from HRM (Human Resources Management) and Business literature. According to Ferner (1997), MNCs of different national origins behave in significantly different ways and there are also grounds for anticipating the persistence of national differences in MNC HR behaviour, since the characteristics of the national systems in which they are based reflect long historical processes of cultural and economic development.

On the other hand, Fiona Moore (2005) argues that, MNCs and businesspeople are best considered, not in isolation as individuals and corporations with a particular "culture," but as a part of a wider transnational capitalist society incorporating many cultures with diverse. Similarly, Turkish business culture is not a static one and keeps changing regarding to the changing environment and conditions. Wasti (1994) reports that the vast majority of the Turkish employees agree that it is better to have all the people concerned participating in decision making rather than the boss making decisions on his own which is contradictory to Turkey having a high power distance index which means power is distributed unequally among members of an organization (Hofstede, 2001).

Furthermore, another research suggests that participatory management styles and professional management are increasingly becoming popular in Turkish organizations (Aşçıgil, 1994). As Atakan (39) puts it:

“Comparing to 1980s and 1990s, Turkish corporations are different now. There are professionals who worked for corporate companies for their entire lives now, a generation has turned. Therefore, as far as I observe, there are not any significant differences between MNCs and local firms. Turkish companies are corporate and professional in this respect. What makes sense now is, how much the company is profitable, big and integrated to the world economy rather than the origin of the it. For instance Kordsa Global is as much professional as a multinational company. When you look at the corporate governance scores, you may find at least 20-30 Turkish companies in the big 100 companies of Turkey which is an indicator of the professionalism levels of Turkish companies. In this sense, Turkish companies are more advanced than Eastern Europe companies which were integrated to capitalist economy later on”.

In order to conclude, selecting where to work is not based solely an economic conditions but also has cultural aspects. Therefore, some other preferences regarding to work life will be discussed in detail in cultural globalization section.

4.2 POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION

4.2.1 Representation of Turkey in the global arena

Within this discursive frame, representation of Turkey in the global arena was evaluated with different four approaches, nationalistic, occidental, economic and secularist/elitist. Some of the informants used all four approaches in their responses. Furthermore, some respondents

evaluate this question regarding to their attitude towards current government, namely AKP, Justice and Development Party In brief, four arguments dominated the discussions:

- secularist approach: The opponents of AKP state their anxiety and fear about Turkey becoming an Islamic state with the recent politics of approaching Middle Eastern countries (most claim that AKP has a hidden agenda) , and they are annoyed while being represented with veiled (türbanlı) spouses of government officials. Regardless of being pro-AKP or vice versa, most of the informants, especially female respondents, state their discomfort about “veiled” representation.
- anti-imperialistic and nationalistic approach: Turkey does not have a consistent and clear policy and is represented as a servant of the United States and European Union. Turkey seems to be closer to Europe, then we see it is flirting with Middle East. It becomes to difficult to distinguish who are *our* enemies and who are *our* comrades (italics by author).
- economic approach: Since Turkey became economically stronger in the recent few years, Turkey started to be an important player in the global arena.
- occidental approach: They do not know us, they still think that we are travelling by camels and think that all women are veiled in Turkey. They even do not know that we are using Latin alphabet and gregorian calender. This approach combines secularist, elitist and occidental frames.

Furthermore, as a part of an elitist approach, most of the respondents think that Turkey is being represented horrible in Western countries where many Turkish immigrant workers live.

For instance, Sedat (27) claims that:

“The representation of Turkey varies by region. It is represented very well in the United States. It is all about the profile of the people that immigrates. On the other hand, it is represented awful in France and Germany. Because *Turks* are uneducated,

ignorant and rude. As I said, the representation changes with respect to the profile of the people. 98 percent of *Turks* is very different, I wish only 1-2 percent represents Turkey. In my daily life, I prefer to have minimum contact with *those 98 percent* as well”(italics by author).

His usage of the word ‘Turks’ is noteworthy here. He does not say ‘other Turks’, but ‘Turks’. It gives an impression that he does not regard himself as a Turk. As a result of the privileges that he has, he considers himself in a different position (probably within that 2 percent) than the other Turks who are in 98 percent of the population, and cause him to call the others as Turks. When I ask about the perception of Turkey in the eyes of Westerns, Sedat argues:

“ They think that Turkey is in the same category with Syria and Arabia. Turkey is the source of money for them, a developing country. However, in terms of people, Turkey is not that much different from Arabs, undeveloped and rude. They see that we are not in the same category with Westerners”.

Sedat evaluates Turkey from a Western gaze with frustration. His orientalist point of view defines Middle East especially Arabs as “others” (undeveloped, rude) whom he does not want to associate with at all. On the other hand, Mehmet (43) based his hostility towards Arabs with a reference to official history:

“Turkey is being represented very bad. It has populist policies which are against the benefits of the country. For instance, we have common benefits with Israel in terms of politic, economic and military agreements. Israel provides the military resources and trainings of Turkey. Israel is not our enemy but our comrade. Our enemies are Arabs. This country did not gain any benefit from Arabs at all. Let them fight with each other, and let us take care of *our* advantages. In order to please the followers of AKP, Turkey carries out an anti-Israel policy”.

The nationalistic discourse of Mehmet divides the world into 'us' and 'them' while positing a homogeneous and fixed identity on the Arab side by claiming that they were enemies some time ago and this will not change forever.

4.2.2 Who represents Turkey successfully in the global arena?

In order to complete the discussions presented in the previous section, the respondents were asked whom they think represent Turkey successfully in the world. While the answers varies from politicians to sports people, in brief, we can analyze them in main four categories:

- Historical figures: Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, Mimar Sinan.
- Artists (authors, movie directors) and scientists: Orhan Pamuk, Nuri Bilge Ceylan, Fatih Akın, Fazıl Say, Yaşar Kemal, Elif Şafak, Cahit Arf (mathematician)
- Popular figures (pop music singers, sports people and business people): Mehmet Öz, Muhtar Kent, Sertap Erener and Manga with their success in popular Eurovision music competitions, Emre Aydın with his MTV award, Tarkan, Hidayet Türkoğlu, Galatasaray, TÜSİAD.
- Politicians: Şükrü Elekdağ(former the US Consulate of Turkey), İsmail Cem, Erdal İnönü, Tayyip Erdoğan, Tansu Çiller, Egemen Bağış, Turgut Özal, Ali Babacan, Abdullah Gül, Ahmet Davutoğlu.

Unsurprisingly, the younger respondents mention popular figures more than older ones. When it comes to politicians, the informants make their choice regarding to their political stand. For Ceyda(33) who argues veiling as a political symbol, claims that:

“ Who represents? The first figure comes to my mind is Atatürk. Maybe Özal is also good. As I am not much interested in politics, well, I do not know really. But at the end of the day, I am a child of Özal’s period. Çiller was also successful as being a very modern woman”.

While the majority of the respondents denote Atatürk by default and then count more other names, their opinions split into two when it comes to discuss Orhan Pamuk, the first Nobel prize winning author of Turkey. For instance Kamil (28) claims that:

“ İsmail Cem was good at foreign affairs. I am not a fan of İnönü, but I appreciate his fight at Lausanne, so I may add İsmet İnönü as well. For sure, Atatürk as being a legendary leader who was appreciated even by the former enemies of Turkey.

Me: What do you think about Orhan Pamuk?

I do not take him into consideration. Orhan Pamuk has played under the terms of the day just like Ertuğrul Özkök, they are both spineless. I did not see such a wise person in my life. He made the announcement just on time, then won the Nobel prize. I do not think it is a coincidence. No offence but I think the hands of no one is cleaner than ours. I also do not believe any sort of Nobel prizes”.

As many people would remember, Orhan Pamuk was consequently subjected to a hate campaign that forced him to flee the country after he stated "Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians have been killed in Turkey" in his interview with the Swiss publication Das Magazin in 2005. Since the mainstream media covered this within a nationalistic frame even some used hate speech, many Turkish people believe that his being awarded the Nobel Prize was politically motivated. Even some Turkish officials did not praise Pamuk - a sign perhaps of how divisive a figure he is here and how sensitive the Armenian issue in particular remains. As Arda (33) puts it:

“ Orhan Pamuk... I think he is more appreciated by the world than Turkey, which is sad”.

4.2.3 Accession to European Union

According to Özkırıklı (2008), Turkey-European Union relations are dominated by fears of nationalism which are fed by both sides. These fears divide the world into 'us' and 'them' while positing a homogeneous and fixed identity on the other side. This kind of essentialist view degrades the “other” to a one and only one feature (Turkey is a muslim country with a life-style which is different from Europeans, Europe is a christian club, Europe is trying to divide us). In addition, the popular nationalist narrative present in newspapers, public debates and on the streets codes Europe as the space which always excludes the Turks, supported the PKK and opposes Turkey’s EU membership.

For Çağaptay (2011), the governing party, AKP has changed its attitude towards the accession to EU recently, while it has created the idea of a liberal society appeared within reach when the membership talks started in 2005. Çağaptay argues that the recent anti-European sentiments of AKP has resulted in a decline in Turkish public’s support for EU membership.

Within this discursive frame, accession of Turkey to the European Union was evaluated with different four approaches where the respondents use some of these approaches together in their replies. In brief, four arguments dominated the discussions:

- Nationalistic: Europe will ask for compromises and will interfere our internal issues. Europe will not want a muslim country in the union. If we are admitted, the neighbours of EU will be Iran, Syria which they will not like at all. Turkey is very big in terms of population. Turkey will have third largest number of chairs in the parliament of EU which is not in favour of EU. Accession to EU will not solve our issues. Turkey will decrease the welfare level of EU. EU does not want Turkey in the union, just playing with Turkey. Our cultural values will be degenerated.

- Rationalistic: European Union has internal issues and they are confused. Accession to EU has to be still aimed at, but it is not the one and only true way as well. Social, legal and democratic structural changes in line with European standards will improve Turkey.
- Individual: Individually, I wish to be a part of EU since I may travel without visas, I may work in European countries.
- Economic: Europeans do not like working so much, therefore they will see our work force as a threat, unemployment will increase there. The prices of the goods with change of currency will increase, Turkey is not ready for this yet. Economic standards of EU is not good, take Greece as an example. OR: European Union will provide financial funds which is in favour of Turkey. EU will provide new commercial agreements to Turkey.

Most of the respondents reply within nationalistic, individual and economic frames whereas only a few of them evaluate the issue with a rationalistic perspective. For instance, Yavuz (43) uses both nationalistic and economic approach:

“Turkey should not access to EU since we do not need their money. In the recent financial crisis, we overcome financial troubles by ourselves while some European countries did not. Even they were not able to gain financial aid from EU. We proved that we do not need neither EU nor IMF and World Bank. I think EU will accept our membership whenever they do not need us. We are fighting for almost 30 years, does it matter if they accept Turkey after 30 years from now on? In the meantime, we became stronger in terms of economy. There is no need to consume our energy and motivation in order to access a union which does not like us. We do not need to access to any other unions such as moslem union as well. We can overcome difficulties by ourselves”.

On the other hand, Itr (65) evaluates the issue with a nationalistic and individual frame while referring to “Sick man of Europe”, nickname given to Ottoman Empire in the decline period:

“I do not support this. Europe, itself is not in a good state. We would become a stepchild and they would expect too much things from us. As far as I remember, either Atatürk or İnönü have already refused our membership. They would ask for amnesty, Armenian issue and etc. They would make Turkey a sick man. But one thing would be great, we would get rid of visa, passport problems. I would want it just for this”.

We witness the conflict of “individual” and “national” benefits in Itr’s words. Even if she sees the individual benefits side of accession to EU, before claiming that, she explains her concerns about “national” consequences. Following de Certeau’s theory (1984), she first examines the power of “strategies” which are institutions and structures of power, and then she determines her “tactics” according to the strategy.

4.2.4 Accession to Moslem Union

As to be discussed in detail later on in Chapter 6, most of the respondents are secularist and elitist. Therefore, their responses regarding to a possible accession of Turkey to a union consisting of moslem countries were quite negative and similar in their negativity.

However, we can still count different four approaches where the respondents use some of these approaches together in their replies. In brief, four arguments dominated the discussions:

- occidentalist/elitist approach: Moslem countries are less developed than us, we can not benefit from them, in fact they will be a burden to us. They are governed by dictators and underdeveloped. Turkey has already gone through these steps, no need to go backwards. Moslem countries are uncivilized, I do not want to be in the same union

with Afghanistan. They are not developed in terms of science and technology, have problems regarding to human and women rights. Moslem countries seem warlike.

- secularist approach: Religious enforcement may increase in Turkey. Turkey should not be in a religiously defined union. Religion is a private issue, everyone may practice her religion by herself. Turkey will not gain anything if it is remembered with the religion. This will increase concerns regarding to secular structure of Turkey. I am closer to Western life style.

- economic approach: The US and big international players will not like this, they may impose economic embargo to Turkey. If the union is defined only in economic terms, I will support but if it will have a supranational (political) structure, I will not. In economic terms, this is not realistic. EU accession will bring more economic benefits to Turkey. Turkey should access to a union composed of BRIC countries which are Brazil, Russia, India and China.

- individual/nationalistic approach: I do not like Arabs and Middle Eastern countries. It depends on the attitude of EU, if they do not approve the membership of Turkey, we will look for other opportunities, but Turkey should be in leader position. They only have petrol and people are lazy in Muslim countries.

4.2.5 Accession to a Union composed of Turkic Republics

The attitudes of the informants about a possible accession of Turkey to a union including Turkic republics were more positive comparing to the former issue. Although, some respondents treated the issue same as Moslem Union possibility, while constructing the discourses, nationalistic/economic approach dominated over occidental/elitist approach:

- nationalistic/economic approach: Turkey should be in good relations with these countries since they have rich natural resources. If the union is defined in economic

terms, I will support. I support if and only if Turkey is in the leader position. Turkey has a language and culture unity with these countries. If it will be economically beneficial, I will support. Unions are good, I wish my country would act as an arbeiter in the unions. They were not together with us through the history, for them when compared to Russia, Turkey would rank in the second place.

- occidentalist/elitist approach: They are undeveloped countries. They are not superior to Turkey. Russia is still a strong player in the region and they are not more developed than us. I believe these countries will want it more than us, but Turkey should access to a union composed of BRIC countries which are Brazil, Russia, India and China.

- cultural approach: Since they have a different commercial culture, it is hard to make economic agreements with those countries. They have ethical problems and corruption is high in these countries.

Since the Turkic Republics are rich in terms of petrol and natural gas resources, most of the respondents underlined the potential economic benefits of this union. Interestingly, only few of the respondents claim a unity of language and culture with those countries since they refer to the recent history of Turkey especially after 1923 in their general discourses. Kadir (27), proposes a “national” tactic for economic purposes:

“It is a drawback that this kind of union have not been constituted yet. At the end of the day, these countries evaluate Turkey as an important power in the world. On the other hand, we behaved them as a stepchild. Now, foreign countries are even closer than us to these countries and they have more trading agreements in petrol and natural gas. Turkey could have used ‘Turkishness’ in order to make profitable deals with these countries and we might have been paying less to natural gas”.

4.3 CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION

4.3.1 Foreigner or local: Preferences of whom to work with

As discussed earlier, most of the respondents claimed that there are many differences between national and multinational companies which affect their preference in favour of MNCs.

Following this discussion, the informants were asked whether they prefer to work with foreign or local superiors, colleagues and subordinates. While answering, the informants compared the work culture of local and foreign employees as well which will be discussed in this section. While few respondents claim that they are indifferent about working with foreign or local people, the rest indicated their preference which was mostly in favour of foreigners. We have to note that few of them stated that they would prefer to work with local people in order to communicate easily. The preference was evaluated regarding to three different approaches:

- cultural approach: Foreigners are more professional while we are more emotional. For them work is just a work and ends at work, for us this is not just that simple. We have problems of separating work and private life. Because of cultural difference, they have a different point of view which adds value to work. They are more open to new and innovative ideas. Foreigners are more willing to share their knowledge whereas Turkish people prefer working individually. Foreigners are more align to business rules, objective, and do not decide regarding to politics while Turkish managers support adulators and usually give political decisions. Foreigners are more disciplined while local people are more flexible. Foreigners are neutral to every employee whereas local employees do care more about hierarchy, title, degree and status. Foreigners work more effective and KPI(key performance indicator) oriented than us while business is executed through relationships for Turks. Turkish employees are less

extrovert in terms of business which is the same as any nation member who have no international experience. Turkish managers are very detailed and share every details of work with their staff whereas even they believe the need, they are not willing to improve the rights of the employees which may be increase in the salary, laptop, company car etc. Foreigners are more democratic and more open to criticism.

- individual approach: In order to have a business network, I will prefer to work with foreigners.
- ‘for the sake of the business’ approach: While most of the respondents prefer to work with foreign superiors or colleagues, when it comes to subordinates, they prefer to work with local people since they claim that they need local subordinates who know the local market.

According to Hu (1992,117) even where the home base does not account for the bulk of sales, operations and employment, the home nation is almost always the primary locus of ownership and control. Board and senior management positions are staffed disproportionately - often overwhelmingly - by home country nationals, strategic decisions tend to be made in the home nation, and innovative activities (research and development) are also disproportionately located there. Therefore, there is a hidden hegemonic relationship between local and foreign employees especially home country nationals and this hidden relationship explains why local people prefer to work with foreign superiors or colleagues but prefer to work with local subordinates.

Since, major differences arise from different work cultures, mainly Turkish business culture and Western-American work culture, we will refer to HRM and business literature.

Kashima and Callan (1994) argue that Turkish managers are autocratic and in favour of top-down approaches. In addition, Turkish collectivism is more family oriented than corporate

oriented. As members of a high power distance culture, Turkish employees will feel more comfortable with clear vertical roles and tall hierarchies that are typical of Japanese companies as opposed to the decentralized structures which is characteristic of Western American organizations. However, from the replies of the respondents, we witness that this attribute of working culture has changed probably with the interaction of Western business culture. As discussed previously, Turkish business culture is not a static one and keeps changing regarding to the changing environment and conditions. Cultures are neither pure nor timeless; rather cultures constantly evolve due to either internal dynamics or external forces (Venkatesh, 1995). Across different times and places, some cultures change more quickly than others, and some cultures are more open or resistant to change.

On the other hand, the research of Wasti(1994) where she found that the majority of Turkish employees would prefer a democratic boss, was more useful to comprehend the change in culture. In addition, this change is not one way around, as Emrah (37) claims:

“There is a difference between a local and a foreign employee. On the other hand, there is a difference between the foreign employee who work in Turkey and the one who work in abroad. For instance, foreigners are thought to care about work and life balance. However, when you look at the foreigners working in Turkey, you see that they adapt to the conditions of Turkey and start to work overtime as we do. In this sense, there is no difference between local and foreign employees. They are sensitive to annual leaves in abroad, however again we can not use our annual leaves even in a global company. About culture, it depends on the country, if he/she comes from Greece, then this person is closer to our culture, you can not evaluate all foreigners in one category”.

Emrah touches upon a good point since the entire foreigners can not be considered as identical. Why have been they evaluated so? For my opinion, the foreigner was “imagined” as a category not a living person who symbolizes the dominant culture of the company and who is exactly the reverse of the local since one can identify oneself looking at the imagined “other”.

4.3.2 Preferences about working abroad

While few informants claim that they would not prefer to work abroad in order not to change their settled patterns in Istanbul. In addition, some of these informants argue that they would not catch the same living standards which they already have in Turkey in abroad. On the other hand, most of the informants are open to new opportunities of working overseas ranging from just few months to the entire life time. The preferences about which country/region to work are discussed within mainly three approaches:

- cultural/ life standard approach: We are closer to culture of South Europe, that is why I would like to work in Spain or in Italy. I would like to work in a country where I would like to see as well. Therefore, I would prefer the UK, France or Italy. I prefer cosmopolitan cities such as London, New York or San Francisco in order to enjoy cultural activities. I would prefer to work in South Africa, New Zeland, Australia where the life standard is very high. I can work any country in Europe because of high life standards and cultural opportunities. I won't prefer Eastern countries where the life standard is even lower than us.
- business approach: Europe is more conservative in terms of business approach, therefore I would like to work in the US or Australia. I would like to work in stable markets such as Hungary, Switzerland, Canada. Because of language, I would prefer to work in Britain. I can work in Japan where our headquarter resides. I believe working in the US or Britain will bring new business opportunities for me. I can work

anywhere else, I especially prefer Gulf countries such as Dubai, Bahrain or Qatar, I can also work in Hong Kong, Changai where you are paid well.

- orientalist/elitist approach: Since you have an elitist life style seperated from public in eastern countries, I would prefer to work in countries like Pakistan, Iran as well. Because of my father's appointment, we lived in Pakistan when I was a child. We stayed in 5 star hotels where we had 4 servants.

Since, the informants are mostly consist of secularist and elitist individuals, their preferences should be analyzed not only in economic terms but also in ideological terms. Considering that Kemalism always has regarded the West as the center of civilization, actuality of being peripheral in terms of current levels of economic development and political influence in Europe despite the country's historical centrality, which is a source of emotional disturbance have effected the preference of working in Western countries. On the other hand, since some respondents prefer Eastern countries, it is observed that such rhetoric reflects an important shift in perceptions of being peripheral. In other words, they feel that they are already 'European' and 'civilized', therefore they can live and work in East as well since they have an elitist life style which is seperated from public like some Western executives have in Istanbul.

4.3.3 Acculturation to the global consumer culture

J.W. Powell coined the word "acculturation," first using it in an 1880 report by the US Bureau of American Ethnography. Powell (1883) defined "acculturation" to be the psychological changes induced by cross-cultural imitation. Acculturation is thus the exchange of cultural features resulting from a continuous contact between different cultural groups. The term, however, needs to be differentiated from the term enculturation, which is applied when infants or very young children are born in a new culture, and simply learn that culture as their own.

Such enculturation can also be called socialization, while acculturation is a kind of second socialization.

While first acculturation studies focused on immigrants, with the introduction of the global consumer culture, recent studies especially in marketing focus on acculturation to the global consumer culture. Global consumer culture is a “cultural entity not associated with a single country, but rather a larger group generally recognized as international and transcending individual national cultures” (Alden et al., 1999: 80). Global consumer segments (Dawar et al., 1996; Hassan and Katsanis, 1991) are those segments that “...associate similar meanings with certain places, people and things” (Alden et al., 1999: 75).

Simply stated, acculturation to global consumer culture considers how individuals acquire the knowledge, skills and behaviors that are characteristic of a nascent and deterritorialized global consumer culture since cultures constantly evolve due to either internal dynamics or external forces (Venkatesh, 1995). An exhaustive review of the relevant social sciences literatures delineated several distinct dimensions of AGCC. The five dimensions of AGCC which are cosmopolitanism, exposure to English language and global mass media, social interactions with foreigners (primarily travel), openness to and desire to emulate global consumer culture, self-identification with global consumer culture have been evaluated relevant dimensions for this study. The close-ended questions with a 7 likert scale have been used in order to analyse the levels of the five dimensions of AGCC. The scales that Cleveland and Laroche (2007) have developed to evaluate acculturation to the global consumer culture, were adapted for this section. Before discussing the findings of the research, the dimensions of AGCC will be discussed in detail in the following section.

Cosmopolitanism: The word ‘cosmopolitan’, which derives from the Greek word *kosmopolitês* (‘citizen of the world’), has been used to describe a wide variety of important

views in moral and socio-political philosophy. Although cosmopolitanism has political, economic, moral and cultural aspects, for this study we will focus on cultural aspect of cosmopolitanism which is defined as “a world culture that is created through the increasing interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as through the development of cultures without a clear anchorage in any one territory” by Hannerz (1990: 237).

Hannerz argues that the perspective of the cosmopolitan subject must entail relationships with a plurality of cultures and he must have a specific stance towards diversity (1990: 239).

Interpreted this way, cosmopolitanism “...is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity” (1990: 239). Finally, Hannerz (1992) claims that cosmopolitanism is more a matter of degree and situational in nature rather than constituting an absolute trait, and due to the culture-shaping power of the media, a person can be cosmopolitan without ever having left his/her country of origin (Hannerz, 1990).

Cosmopolitanism dimension of this study refers to a specific set of qualities held by certain individuals, including a willingness to engage with the other (i.e., different cultures), and a level of competence towards alien culture(s).

Exposure to English language and global mass media: This dimension reflects the extent of a person's exposure to and use of the English language for various communications and exposure to global media in which English is the main language used. Language (spoken and/or written) serves as a fundamental form of communication, and language is an indispensable component of all cultures. Since English is the new lingua franca for communication in multinational business, diplomacy, international institutions, tourism, international mass media and internet, exposure to english language and global mass media by default constitutes a dimension of AGCC. Besides, Hirschman (1988: 345) has stated that

“television is a particularly fertile source of texts pertinent to the ideology of consumption”.

World wide access to television and other forms of mass media has helped to create a global culture of consumption.

Social interactions (primarily travel): This dimension involves the individual's degree of exposure to global culture via travelling abroad. Because of increasing access to low-cost and speedy transport, travelling abroad is a hallmark of today's world, resulting in increasing numbers of direct and indirect contacts with peoples of different cultures. According to tourism statistics of Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2010) over 11 million Turkish citizens traveled overseas while over 28 million foreigners visited Turkey within 2010. While global media provide passive exposure to brands, increasing international travel and movement customers across national boundaries provides active exposure to brands in different countries. Appadurai (1996) refers to the fact that there are three types of cross cultural interactions: (1) traveling to outside cultures; (2) having social contacts with relatives, friends, etc.; (3) having social contacts with foreigners. In addition, it was argued that foreign country travel and interactions with foreigners in one's own country are to facilitate globalization process (Wilk, 1995; Belk, 2000).

Openness to and desire to emulate global consumer culture and self identification to global consumer culture: According to cultural globalization theory, globalization leads to the creation of a “global consumer culture” (Ozsomer and Simonin, 2004). Large number of people around the world are substituting globally diffused consumer images, symbols and preferences that flow primarily from the West (Zhou and Belk, 2004) for those from their traditional, local cultures (Holton, 2000). However, some scholars have argued that local cultures has a very powerful influence (Ural, 2008; Turner, 2003). The other group of scholars argue that together global and local cultural influences are shaping consumer's consumption behavior (Alden et al., 2006). Appadurai (1990) believes that global cultural forces tend to

become localized in one way or another. Some researchers posit that individuals who admire the lifestyles to other countries are likely to desire ownership of consumption symbols from other countries. For example, Wee (1999: 369) concludes in his study that “each generation now has its own global culture shaped by the familiar Western themes and values brought through the mass media and sold alongside the lifestyle urged upon the young consumers as a part of the process of selling goods and services”.

Method: As discussed in the methodology section in detail adapting from the scales of Cleveland and Laroche (2007), five dimensions were identified as antecedents of AGCC. Firstly, extreme care was taken to assure an accurate and meaningful translation of measurement items from English to Turkish (doubleback translation).

Secondly, the sample is described in detail in the methodology section of the thesis which is consist of 30 multi-national professionals. Since the sample size is not qualified to run regression test, descriptive statistics, ANOVA test and correlations will be discussed in the findings section.

Findings:

As seen from the table 6 below, the means of cosmopolitanism, social interactions (primarily travel) and English& global media exposure dimensions were measured over scale 4 which signifies the ‘neutral’. Evoking the nature of the bidirectional models of culture change articulated, and in line with selective and contextual notions of cultural maintenance and adaptation, Yoon et al., (1996) assert that individuals can be cosmopolitan (global) in one domain, but local in another. This means that the respondents were prone to global consumer culture to some extent. However, Table 7 shows that female respondents are more inclined to global consumer culture with a significant F value of 0,05 in self-identification to global

consumer culture dimension.

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Cosmopolitanism	30	3,6	7	5,58	0,85
English and global media exposure	30	2,18	6,18	4,14	1,04
social interactions(travel)	30	1,33	7	4,73	1,55
Openness to emulate	30	2	6,5	3,88	1,07
self identification global consumer culture	30	1,2	6	3,91	1,25

Table 7

		ANOVA				
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Cosmopolitanism	Between Groups	0,057	1	0,0569	0,0770	0,7835
	Within Groups	20,691	28	0,7390		
	Total	20,748	29			
English and global media exposure	Between Groups	1,948	1	1,9484	1,8451	0,1852
	Within Groups	29,567	28	1,0560		
	Total	31,515	29			
social interactions (travel)	Between Groups	2,450	1	2,4500	1,0142	0,3225
	Within Groups	67,639	28	2,4157		
	Total	70,089	29			
openness to emulate	Between Groups	0,501	1	0,5014	0,4291	0,5178
	Within Groups	32,715	28	1,1684		
	Total	33,217	29			
global consumer culture	Between Groups	5,904	1	5,9042	4,1669	0,0507
	Within Groups	39,674	28	1,4169		
	Total	45,579	29			

Table 8

		ANOVA				
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Cosmopolitanism	Between Groups	0,536	2	0,268	0,358	0,702
	Within Groups	20,211	27	0,749		
	Total	20,748	29			
English and global media exposure	Between Groups	4,427	2	2,214	2,206	0,130
	Within Groups	27,088	27	1,003		
	Total	31,515	29			
social interactions (travel)	Between Groups	14,407	2	7,204	3,493	0,045
	Within Groups	55,681	27	2,062		
	Total	70,088	29			
openness to emulate	Between Groups	4,734	2	2,367	2,244	0,125
	Within Groups	28,481	27	1,055		
	Total	33,216	29			
global consumer culture	Between Groups	9,768	2	4,884	3,683	0,039
	Within Groups	35,809	27	1,326		
	Total	45,578	29			

On the other hand, Table 8 indicates that the respondents having a higher education level are more prone to global consumer culture in self-identification to global consumer culture dimension with a significant F value of 0,039 and in social interactions (primarily travel) dimension with a significant F value of 0,045. Interestingly, the age factor was not found to be significant in terms of dimensions of AGCC. Regarding to the relationship between different dimensions of AGCC, several correlation tests were run which imply that there exists a positive correlation between most of the dimensions of AGCC except cosmopolitanism (see Table 9). It is important to note that while self identification to global consumer culture is positively correlated with three other dimensions except cosmopolitanism, openness to and desire to emulate global consumer culture is positively correlated with exposure to English language and global media dimension. On the other hand, number of foreign languages spoken is positively correlated with exposure to English language and global media and social interactions (primarily travel) dimensions (see Table 10).

Table 9

Correlations

		Cosmo- politanism	English and global media exposure	Social interactions (travel)	Openness to emulate	Global consumer culture
Cosmopolitanism	Pearson Correlation	1,000	,293	,276	,295	,156
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,116	,139	,113	,410
	N	30,000	30	30	30	30
English and global media exposure	Pearson Correlation	,293	1,000	,226	,641**	,411*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,116		,230	,000	,024
	N	30	30,000	30	30	30
Social interactions (Travel)	Pearson Correlation	,276	,226	1,000	,312	,383*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,139	,230		,093	,037
	N	30	30	30,000	30	30
Openness to emulate	Pearson Correlation	,295	,641**	,312	1,000	,475**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,113	,000	,093		,008
	N	30	30	30	30,000	30
Global consumer culture	Pearson Correlation	,156	,411*	,383*	,475**	1,000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,410	,024	,037	,008	
	N	30	30	30	30	30,000

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 10

Correlations

		English and global media exposure	Social int. (travel)	Number of foreign languages
English and global media exposure	Pearson Correlation	1,000	,226	,505**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,230	,004
	N	30,000	30	30

Social int. (travel)	Pearson Correlation	,226	1,000	,365*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,230		,047
	N	30	30,000	30
Number of foreign languages	Pearson Correlation	,505**	,365*	1,000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,004	,047	
	N	30	30	30,000

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Furthermore, as Table 11 indicates number of foreign countries visited is positively correlated with number of foreign languages spoken and monthly income level.

Table 11

Correlations				
		Monthly income	Number of foreign languages	Number of foreign countries visited
Monthly income	Pearson Correlation	1,000	,238	,833**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,206	,000
	N	30,000	30	30
Number of foreign languages	Pearson Correlation	,238	1,000	,399*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,206		,029
	N	30	30,000	30
Number of foreign countries visited	Pearson Correlation	,833**	,399*	1,000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,029	
	N	30	30	30,000

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Conclusion: Findings assert that female respondents and highly educated respondents are more akin to global consumer culture while the age factor is not significantly determinant in this respect. Another important finding is the moderate level of acculturation to the global consumer culture almost for every dimensions of the AGCC which implies that the multinational professionals who are thought to be most adaptive to globalizing trends (global consumer culture in this sense), are not that much close to global consumer culture.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCOURSES OF NATIONALISM

5.1 Construction of national identity

In this section, the elements which enable the construction of a nationalistic identity will be discussed in parallel with the discourses and approaches of the informants. For this purpose, media preferences, discourses of social identity, approaches about Turkey and being a “Turk”, ideas about national symbols, rituals and taboos such as National Anthem, Atatürk, Turkish flag, 10th of November (day of remembrance of Atatürk) and Armenian issue will be analyzed with the claims of the informants. In addition, as mentioned before, in parallel with Hall’s argument, approaches regarding to “the others” such as Kurds, non-secular citizens of Turkey, non-moslem citizens and different ethnic identities will be portrayed and analyzed in order to give a complete picture of the construction of the national identity.

5.1.1 Media preferences:

Zygmunt Bauman points out that identities pursued are hardly ever invented by those pursuing them (2002). More often than not they are fostered and portrayed as attractive choice by the authoritative persuasion of ‘trustworthy’ sources. In addition, popular acceptance makes an identity even more appealing. In what Bauman calls postmodern stage of modernity, media plays a prominent role in disseminating these pre-packaged models to those in search of identity. Furthermore, the mainstream media covering the news mostly within a nationalistic frame plays an important role in the attitudes of the readers to ‘ the others’ in Turkey.

For the purpose of the research, the informants were asked about their media preferences including daily newspapers, usually followed columnists, television programs, internet and

social media. Since the informants are consisted of highly educated middle and upper middle class people, they usually followed daily newspapers from internet instead of paper-based newspapers. Some argue that they do not have time to read from papers and since they are on line most of time during work hours, they prefer to read online. On the other hand, most of the informants do not follow news portals, blogs or alternative media. Few of them asked me how to use blogs which is interesting when we think about the internet literacy levels of the respondents. Only two people follow news portals (one is ntvmsnbc- online version of NTV news channel, the other is gazeteport) rather than newspaper web sites. This brings us to assume that although they are followed on line, newspapers are still ‘trustworthy’ sources of news for our respondents in terms of content.

Coming to the most followed newspapers, Hürriyet, the nationalist mainstream newspaper, was announced by the majority in the first place. Milliyet (secularist nationalist), Habertürk (secularist nationalist), Cumhuriyet (secularist Kemalist), Sabah (pro-government nationalist), Radikal (liberal), Akşam, Fanatik (sports newspaper), Birgün (left-wing), Sözcü (secularist Kemalist) and Dünya (daily economy newspaper) followed Hürriyet. Since the informants are consist of secular individuals, they do not follow Islamic newspapers such as Yeni Şafak and Akit or even moderate Islamic papers such as Zaman. This shows that they only follow the papers which are closer to their world view and approach. Only two people claimed that they sometimes read other newspapers to hear the voices of the “opposite site”. As Kamil (28) puts it:

“ I read Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet daily. From time to time I read Radikal, Taraf and Zaman in order to see how the opposite site interpreted the news”.

As seen from Kamil’s claims, apart from his political approach, all other different approaches including liberal, antimilitarist and moderate Islamic views constitute the ‘opposite site’. This

kind of perception which separates the world into “we” and “they” remind us the nationalistic approach which has little room for grey tones.

Regarding to most followed columnists, Yılmaz Özdil from Hürriyet was announced by the majority of the respondents in the first place. Yılmaz Özdil has a secularist, nationalist approach and from time to time he has been criticized of being racist. As an example, when the co-chair of BDP (Peace and Democracy Party, a pro-Kurdish political party), Ahmet Türk was attacked by a person, Özdil interpreted this violent act as ‘a reaction of citizens to Kurdish initiative’ which aimed to legitimize this violence against Kurdish citizens. In addition to Yılmaz Özdil, the informants counted some more columnists ranging from secularist and Kemalist writers such as Emin Çölaşan, Oktay Ekşi, Mustafa Balbay, Hikmet Çetinkaya to liberal and left-wing writers like Yıldırım Türker, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Ece Temelkuran, life style columnists such as Ayşe Arman and sports writers like Uğur Meleke, Bülent Timurlenk and Banu Yelkovan.

Based on the claims of informants, they watch television less than (most of them watch 1 hour a day) average Turkish audience. Some of them even watch television less than half an hour in a day due to their over time working hours. Their watching habits are based on entertainment not information since they prefer watching Turkish or foreign television series, sports programs, football games instead of news programmes and discussion programmes. While the respondents follow mostly Turkish newspapers, this trend changes when it comes to television channels and programs since most of the informants watch foreign documentary channels and foreign TV series. Based on this, it may be assumed that the informants follow news from national channels which are usually dailies and watch television mostly for hobbies or entertainment.

As mentioned before, the respondents usually read daily newspapers via internet. In addition to this, they use internet for shopping (travel, holiday, electronics, cosmetics, books etc), banking transactions, controlling e-mails, researching, listening to music, watching videos and connecting people (social media). Regarding to social media, they are more keen on to facebook than twitter, interestingly some claimed that they do not know how to use twitter, and most of them prefer to use professional network sites such as linkedn. As noted earlier, most of the informants do not follow blogs and news portals, and they are usually on line one hour a day for private purposes listed above.

5.1.2 Evaluating social identity

Before discussing the role of ethnicity and religion in constructing the identity, the respondents were asked how they describe and define their social identity. The first response of the informants was astonishment. Therefore, I had to explain and clarify what I mean by social identity almost to each interviewee. Although the question seems a very easy one, the answers given may tell about the confusion of the respondents.

While some of the informants describe their social identity according to their social status such as being a lawyer, being an independent woman who earns her own money, being a middle class individual [“White Turk” in her own words, Şirin(28)] or being an engineer, some preferred to describe themselves according to their favorite football team.

“I live in Turkey. I am a Turkish moslem who cares about human rights and who does not discriminate people regarding to ethnic differences. But for me being a Galatasaray fan is one step ahead of being a Turk”(Mert, 28).

What is interesting in Mert's words is his need of explaining himself with some additional adjectives, like caring about human rights or being against of discrimination. He thinks that being a Turk or Moslem is not enough to define his social identity. Besides, it may be assumed that in his idea being a Turk or Moslem has some negative meanings, therefore he is in need of additional explanations to neutralize the meaning. In his final words, we understand that the state of belonging which he has chosen himself (Galatasaray fan) is more important than a given (by default) state of belonging (Turk or moslem). Similar to Mert, Emrah (39) describes his social identity again with some additional explanations:

“I can only say that I am Turk. But by saying Turk, I do not refer to ethnicity, I mean anyone who feels Turk is a Turk. I do not define myself according to ethnicity or religion. I am nationalist and social democrat”.

Like many people Emrah perceives ethnicity just the same as race, therefore in order not be misunderstood, he uses his definition of Turk which is based on acceptance and therefore inexplicit.

On the other hand, the respondents whose ancestors migrated to Turkey recently or who has a different ethnic origin, have replied the question more easily. This situation implies that these respondents have thought about their social identity more than the other group.

“In fact we are Tatars from Kazan region. My mother was born in Japan and my father was born in China. Then they immigrated to Turkey where I was born. I was raised according to Turkish culture and values. I feel myself Turk. Coming to religion, I am not that much attached to my religion. For me, god is the authority that I need in hard times such as during flights. We are Sunni, but I feel myself closer to the Alaouite sect which interpreted the religion in a more modern way. For instance men and women can pray together in the Alaouite sect” (Yeşim, 39).

Like Yeşim, Hale (32) is very clear and defines her social identity in one simple sentence: “ I am a Kurdish origin citizen of Republic of Turkey”.

Furthermore, few respondents identify themselves as citizens of world or occidental in order to differentiate from ‘common’ Turks. For instance Rezzan (36) claims:

“ I may say that I am a citizen of world who lives in Turkey with a Turkish origin. I believe in god but I am not a follower of any religion.

Me: Do you feel any kind of belonging to Turkey?

Rezzan: Sure, I do. Especially whenever I watch a historical movie, my nationalistic emotions increase. If the conditions will require, I can join the army and fight. At the end of the day, we all know how our ancestors fought to achieve these lands. I feel strong sense of belonging to my country but this sense does not increase day after day.

Me: What is the reason for that?

Rezzan: Because I think that good things which I may be proud of are not being done. These lands which are achieved through the bloods of our ancestors are not open to discussion. In addition, my strong nation does not deserve to be treated as miserable and in need of others. This bothers me a lot. We are not even defending the integrity of our lands as strong as possible”.

Rezzan claims that she is a citizen of world, on the other hand her further ideas imply that she thinks within the boundaries of the nation-state and sharply separates the world into ‘us’ and ‘others. This reminds us Smith’s (1995: 24) argument which states that the nation-states remain the primary object of loyalty in the modern world because a nation's "memory is central to identity." Rezzan refers to this national memory by underlining the War of Independence. Similarly, Kamil (28) refers to recent history as a part of national memory:

“ Ethnic origin and religion do not mean anything for me. For sure I know my roots and I have no problem with them, but lots of things in terms of values and respect to the ancestors have changed so far.

Me: Which period of history do you mean by ancestors?

Kamil: I mean the period of early republic, namely 1920s. I mean Republic of Turkey which was established by Atatürk, for sure I do not mean Ottoman”.

While the object of belonging varies from favorite football team to ethnicity, majority of the informants agree on where the religion stands as an element of social identity. For most of them religion does not have an important role on their social identities since they are not strong believers. Furthermore, as being secularists they do not associate themselves with Islam. As Kadir (27) puts it:

“I define myself as Turk. Whenever I visit foreign countries I introduce myself as Turk not Moslem”.

On the other hand, most of the respondents think that Islam stands as an important element of social identity for common Turkish citizens apart from themselves. Kamil (28) summarizes:

“Since, we became moslem 1000 years ago, for sure Islam affected our culture. For me, the impact of religion in my identity is just 5 percent. *Unfortunately* this is more than 80 percent for general public”(italic by author).

His usage of the word ‘unfortunately’ is noteworthy here. It gives an impression that he is not happy with this situation. As being secularist, he considers himself in a different position than the general public which makes him feel threatened by religious citizens.

5.1.3 What does it mean to be ‘Turk’?

“Ethnicity is like family or marriage: everybody knows what it means but nobody can define it.”

RT Smith(118,1)

Similar to social identity, the respondents were confused while defining Turkishness. While Kemalism centered on the cult of personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey was based on modernist values predicated on a rejection of tradition, Turkishness continued to be defined vis-à-vis Sunni Muslim heritage identified with an imagined Turkish ethnicity. In this sense, Turkish national identity is both inclusive and exclusionary. It is inclusive insofar as it is defined in terms of a commitment to secular modernist values on the part of citizens of Turkey. It is exclusionary insofar as it is defined vis-à-vis a single language and a single imagined ethnicity associated with a particular religious heritage. Respectively, while some respondents define Turkishness regarding to commitment to modernist and Kemalist values, some defined regarding to ethnicity. For instance Hale (32), a Kurdish origin citizen (in her words), summarizes the inclusive and exclusive character of Turkishness:

“Being Turk or Kurdish, this does not mean something special. In any case you are part of a history and a nation. Maybe Turks are the voice of the majority in Turkey. I think the majority of people living in Turkey is not Turk but the voice of the majority is Turk”.

On the other hand, some informants underlined some cultural characteristics while defining Turkishness such as coming from a nomad culture, being less civilized comparing to Europeans. As Kadir (27) puts it:

“ I did not think it before. Being Turk, I guess means being different from other people. In terms of family values, traditions we are different from Europeans for instance. In addition, we, Turks are nervous or how can I say it, insensible and less civilized. For example, people in America wait when the traffic light turns red and people think that if they would move as soon as the light turns to green, the traffic in the crossroad will cause a traffic jam. Therefore, they think further steps and wait even the light turns to green. This shows the cultural difference”.

What is interesting in Kadir’s words is the Europeans or Americans as being the reference point for comparison, probably symbolizing ‘the other’ as the one whom he wanted to be replaced with. It may be assumed that the interviewees evaluate Western identities (European, American) superior to Turkish identity, whereas see Eastern identities especially the ones with Islamic connotations inferior to Turkish identity. In fact, this is a result of the official ideology which inspires the West and disparages Arabs since the first years of Turkish Republic and spreads this ideology via education system, official history thesis, media and literature.

Taner Akçam (1992) argues that Turkish national identity was constructed later than European nations which caused an aggression in order to fill this time gap. In addition, he argues that Turkish national identity is shaped by a reaction to decadence and humiliation and derived from the feelings of loneliness and anxiety of misunderstanding which is caused by being stuck between a glorious past and fragile national identity. Itr (65) summarizes this situation:

“Being Turk is difficult. You have to prove yourself all the time. I have been to abroad for many years, I have worked for global companies for more than 20 years. You always feel that you are being observed in detail by Westerners. Therefore, you have to behave in a more careful and responsible manner. Europeans do not love us, that is it. There is a bad reputation coming from the past and it is impossible to remove the

past. Think about the great empire of Ottomans, and now look at us. Whenever I see the big map of Ottoman territory in Topkapı Palace, I feel sorry. I mean we were strong and respected by other nations. I wish we were also strong in terms of culture. We were not successful in presenting and promoting ourselves to Europe. Think about the workers migrated to Europe. They failed to represent us in terms of manners and appearance. While I was living in Switzerland, the Westerns were complaining to me about Turkish workers because they did not integrate to Western culture in terms of clothing etc. I went to high school in Paris and when I introduced myself, my class mates failed to believe that I am Turk. What they have told me was I do not look like a Turk. I got angry and asked them to show Turkey in the map, they could not find it. I have gone through all these, but things have changed during years. Now, young people go for studying, get married with foreigners and Turkey is being represented more modern.

The interesting point in the claims of the respondents is the decrease in referring to “national character” which was defined by Atatürk as being characteristic features that differentiate a nation from other nations. The national character is itself being constructed subjectively in order to explain history and reflect the fantasies of national proud. In this sense, some features, especially positive ones such as hospitality, heroism, generosity, modesty, courtesy and compassion have been attributed to Turkish national character. Among 30 people, only Serkan (39) referred to national character:

“Being a Turk, means privilege. Turks are different in sense of being hardworking and determined.

Me: What is the difference, do you mean that other nations are not hardworking or determined like a Turk?

Serkan: Compared to us, no, they are not. I mean, Turks really work hard. If they aim something, they do. But this is different for Americans or British people. Working is not in the center of their life, they care about fun more than work. On the other hand, Turks have gone through difficult times so in order not to be humiliated, they work a lot. We have plenty of way to go”.

Serkan combines the national character phenomenon with the reaction to decadence and humiliation which is caused by being stuck between a glorious past and fragile national identity. In addition, his usage of the words ‘Americans’ and ‘British people’ is noteworthy here. He does not mention other nations but ‘Westerners’. It gives an impression that his “other” in this sense, is Westerners. And this also reminds us “the ultimate aim of reaching to the level of contemporary civilizations” put by Atatürk.

5.1.4 Reactions to anti-Turkishness

In order to see how the respondents differentiate or identify their personal identities with Turkish national identity, the interviewees were asked about their opinions regarding to discourses which are against Turkishness. While the approaches were not homogenic, most of the respondents claimed that they would not take it with pleasure and would react. While some claimed that their reactions would be rigid, some told that their reaction would depend on the content and style of the discourse. For Rezzan (36), the speaker determines her reaction:

“Indeed, I do not like those kind of discourses. I become sentimental and get angry. I can criticize of Turks but I will not let anyone to do so. For myself, it is a kind of self-criticism and again we may criticize with other Turks. This changes when it comes to foreigners. I never let them speak of against Turkishness. If they do, I will think about even violent acts”.

The statement of Rezzan who described her identity as a citizen of world when asked about her social identity, shows that individuals may speak of a globalized world in idealistic level, but their political and cultural reference points are usually bounded by their nation and nation-state. Similarly, Itr identifies her personal character with Turkishness in a more intimate level:

“ This resembles that someone is speaking of the faults and wrongdoings of your child. I would react immediately. I would not defend the faults but I would try to show good parts in order to state that everyone has whites and blacks at the same time”.

On the other hand, Kerem (32) claims that his reaction will change regarding to the country it is told:

“ I would like to learn the reason for that. I would not get angry, but I would wonder and would like to discuss about that. I would not evaluate with bias and I would agree or disagree with the person at the end of the discussion. But the situation changes depending on where you are. For instance if you are living abroad and you hear this kind of discourses, you can be more reactive. If I face this situation in Belgium, I may be more defensive while I may react more calm in Turkey”.

5.2 National symbols

5.2.1 Turkish flag

Nationalism claims to be homogenic and the obstacles of homogeneity are positioned as threats to uniformity. Nationalism constructs its hegemony over the fears of loosing integrity and uniformity. The national flag is one of the symbols which refers to national history and prices paid during history and protects national uniformity and integrity by this means. The national

flag symbolizes homeland, nation, divinity, history, integrity, uniformity and plenty of other concepts which evokes nationalism.

Like other ideologies, nationalism is perceived with positive connotations by the people who are surrounded by nationalism itself. In other words, nationalism has been made 'natural'. As Copeaux (2008) argues nationalism and the symbols of nationalism are perceived effortlessly by the people as if they express natural virtues. However, in 'The Invention of Tradition', Hobsbawm (1995) argues that new symbols and devices came into existence as part of national movements and states, such as the national anthem and the national flag.

Most of the informants agree that Turkish flag is an important symbol for Turkey which represents freedom, independence, integrity, the blood of ancestors, history, honour, respect, struggle, Turkish Republic, territory of Turkey, home, loyalty and makes them feel proud.

“ I consider the flag as a part of me. Whenever I see Turkish flag, my heart starts to beat. I feel proud. Especially, while I am in abroad and witness that some hotels hang Turkish flags when they have Turkish customers, I even take a picture of the flag. I like to see waving big flags everywhere” (Itr, 65).

Similar to Itr, Kamil (28) perceives the symbols of nationalism and nationalism itself effortlessly as a natural thing:

“Turkish flag symbolizes respect and honour for me. I respect the flag as being a Kemalist nationalist not like racist nationalists. I hang my flag on the anniversaries of establishment of Turkish Republic. We prefer to hang the flag which has the portrait of Atatürk as well”.

As seen from Kamil's comments, while differentiating his 'nationalism' from other versions, he affirms and legitimates his 'Kemalist nationalism'. Furthermore, he indicates his side

through the flag which has portrait of Atatürk. As the research of Kentel, Ahıska and Genç (2007) points, nationalism splits Turkish people rather than unifying them since Turkish nationalism is not a homogenous discourse, but as a series of discourses as Bora (2003) argues. On the other hand, only two respondents evaluate Turkish flag from a different perspective.

“Since the crescent figure on the flag represents Islam, I do not like it. The form of the flag is not beautiful but its colour is nice”(Nesrin, 28).

While Nesrin judges the flag in terms of its aesthetic appearance and its reference to Islamic motives, Eda (55) considers it just a flag without ascribing any side meanings:

“This is the flag of the country. It does not associate me further meanings. At the end of the day, each country has its own flag and the flag of Turkey is this one, that is it. I do not see any reason to die for it”.

5.2.2 National anthem

Like Turkish national flag, national anthem is one of the important symbols of Turkish nationalism. In addition to singing on Monday mornings and Friday evenings in primary and secondary schools, lately, the anthem is started to be sung in football games and non-official ceremonies. It is very similar to religious rituals where the blessed march is sang before starting to work. While singing the anthem, the people are expected to stand at attention and to look at the national flag. The norms to be followed while singing the anthem are very similar to the norms of religious practices such as reading Qoran. The people who are not following these norms and not respecting to the national anthem are condemned by the society and if they are working for the state institutions, legal action is initiated against them.

Regarding to interpretations of the respondents, on one hand some of them consider the national anthem with full respect and even with condemnation to people who do not ‘respect’, on the other hand the rest claim that the anthem has lost its importance as they grow up and they do not feel the same ‘sublime’ sentiments anymore.

“ I love the national anthem and whenever I sing or hear, I am touched and whenever I sing, I sing it loudly with fervour and enthusiasm. I get angry when some football players do not sing or just pretend to be singing before football games” (Yeşim, 39).

As seen from Yeşim’s statements, she interpretes the national anthem as a sacred value of the nation which has to be respected where respect means ‘singing the anthem loudly with fervour’. On the other hand, there are few different approaches.

“The lyrics is nice whereas the melody is terrible. As far as I know, the melody has been composed precipitately” (Kerem, 32).

5.3 Taboos

The use of *taboo* in English dates back to 1777 when English explorer, Captain James Cook, visited Tonga. Describing the cultural practices of the Tongans, he wrote: “Not one of them would sit down, or eat a bit of any thing...On expressing my surprise at this, they were all taboo, as they said; which word has a very comprehensive meaning; but, in general, signifies that a thing is forbidden”.

A taboo is a strong social prohibition (or ban) relating to any area of human activity or social custom that is sacred and forbidden based on moral judgment and sometimes even religious beliefs. According to Frazer and Freud, non-religious sacredness forms the basis of the ‘taboo’ concept. Taboo objects and people are attributed with a supernatural power and similar to ‘sacred’, members of the society are expected to accept this power without

questioning. There are certain rituals to follow in order to approach and touch the ‘sacred’ one. Breaking the taboo is usually considered objectionable or abhorrent by society.

5.3.1 Atatürk

Being represented as a national sovereignty symbol, the image of Atatürk personifies the national father figure. The pictures, portraits, pins, statues and posters of Atatürk are used to symbolize secularism in public and private spaces. In the period of transition from empire to nation-state, the political gap was filled by one person by sanctifying him and with attributing rescuer and genius image to him.

While the respondents were asked their opinions about Atatürk, the first reaction of some respondents was to get excited and sentimental, even they thought a bit to find the right words to describe him.

“Melih (28): How can I explain... He is very important for me. He deserves respect and unfounded statements should not be made about him. His work, achievements are being misinterpreted. I think, he acted under the conditions of that period. Therefore, this should be evaluated with respect to this period.

Me: What kind of actions are being misinterpreted?

Melih: Some say that he exiled some people, but for me he acted regarding to the conditions of those times. He ensured the integrity of the people under one state. He is a very important person.

Me: Is it possible for you to befriend with someone who doesn't like Atatürk?

Melih: No, it is not possible. If we are talking about someone Turkish, he or she should not talk against Atatürk. Because if he did not struggle and strive, we would not

be living in this current conditions. If we are talking about a foreigner, I do not like as well, but I do not take him or her seriously”.

As seen from Melih’s statements, Atatürk is positioned as a sacred figure whose actions are not allowed to be questioned since ‘we owe our lives to him’.

Similarly, Rezzan (36) says that:

“Atatürk is a visionary, great leader and statesman. In addition he lead during the independence war as well. He was a dictator, but since what he dictated suits my life style, I think that fortunately he lived and dictated, so that we are in this situation now”.

On the other few respondents evaluate Atatürk without attributing sacredness to him.

“He is a successful leader and achieved many things. At the same time, he is a dictator. After the establishment of Republic, he purged his former fellow soldiers like Kazım Karabekir. Maybe it is correct under those circumstances, but he is not as perfect as they have taught us. After all, he is a human being and nobody is perfect”(Kerem, 32).

5.3.2 10th of November: Day of Remembrance of Atatürk

The death of Atatürk at 9.05 on the morning of 10th November 1938 is recognised throughout Turkey, marked by 5 minutes' silence. Since then, every year on 10th of November, official ceremonies are being organized, people stand at attention at 9.05 on the morning to show their respect to Atatürk. According to Yashin (2002), this ritual is thought to symbolize the mourning of an orphan nation who lost its father. For Yavuz (43), Day of Remembrance of Atatürk is more than a symbol:

“On that day, the sentiments become more intense. It is the day we lost the person who holds us together. I wish every day was 10th of November and the sentiments became

as intense as on that day. For a short time, we find ourselves and then again on 11th of November, we go back to business as usual”.

Most of the respondents claim that they grieve on 10th of November and they agree that this remembrance ritual should continue. Similar to national anthem, the people are expected to follow the norms regarding to remembrance ritual, if they do not, they are condemned by the society.

5.3.4 “Armenian Genocide”

The construction of national identity includes both national collective memory and national ‘*amnesia*’ at the same time. Therefore, the history of nations are constructed with selecting specific events, forgetting and erasing others.

Akcam and Cooper (2005) argue that decades of silence, limited access to historical material, and more recently, active propaganda campaigns have persuaded much of the Turkish public of the truth of the official view regarding to Armenian killings. The government’s ability to frame the opposing campaign as an attack by foreign enemies on Turkish honor and national existence has given its interpretation broad popular resonance. Since, the historical dimension is removed from the national education system, the public follows the discussion from media which discusses the issue in a nationalistic frame. Erkan (27) evaluates the issue in parallel with official view:

“ Ottoman Empire exiled Armenians due to uprisings. There might happen killings during deportation. However, it is wrong to call this as genocide. Ottoman Empire just did what it had to do while there are uprisings which threatened integrity. Now, some countries like the US and Europe use this issue as leverage in order to enforce Turkey

to accept some other things. Armenians declare that they want to see Kars as the capital of Armenia, we see that the real aim is to break our territorial integrity”.

Most of the respondents are sensitive to the word of “genocide”. Therefore, their first reaction was to oppose genocide. According to Akcam and Cooper (2005), the killings of Armenians also meet the definition of crimes against humanity, which include various types of government-sponsored or tolerated killings, torture, and discriminatory action. However, the charge of "genocide" has proven most controversial, perhaps because it calls up memories of the HoloCaust, which has become the standard of extreme evil, and because genocide is considered the worst of international crimes.

On the other hand, almost half of the informants are open to discuss what happened in the history and they do not treat the issue as a taboo. However, they react to the economic claims that might be made upon it if Turkish government was to acknowledge the Armenian genocide, and the experience of other countries indicates that its worries may be justified: it might be called upon to seriously consider the issue of reparations and compensation.

“I think *this* might have been happened in the past. On the other hand, it is not fair that the future generations are being blamed for *this*. The government can apologize but I do not think this will solve the problems or bring the past back. I mean what was done, was done. European Court of Human Rights is just dealing with the issue for compensation. However, *this* is not a kind of heritage that has to be left for future generations. Besides, not only Armenians faced with this kind of problem, but also Turks were killed throughout the history” (*italics by author*, Hale, 32).

As observed, Hale refrains from using the word ‘genocide’, instead she uses the pronoun ‘this’. As defined in a United Nations convention, "genocide" connotes an intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part. It does not presuppose the

murder of an entire people, nor even murder; the operative language refers to the intentional attempt to destroy a collective identity. On the other hand, the term "genocide" was coined in 1944 and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission confirmed that the Genocide Convention of 1948 did not apply retroactively to the Armenian genocide and could not form the basis for any legal claims.

In addition, Hale is opposed to the economic claims which makes her more defensive to argue that not only Armenians are victims in this sense. Similar to Hale, İdil (30) argues:

“ I think people evaluate the issue biased. I do not claim that Turks did not do such a thing but everyone did so bad things. Therefore, raising this issue everywhere makes me upset. On the other hand, while thinking about the genocide that was committed by Nazis, it is difficult to call this as a genocide. By the way, if it was done, for sure this is wrong. I wish it was not done. Regarding to compensation, if each and every country will pay for its past mistakes, then Turkey can”.

5.4 Relation with the “Others”

As mentioned in the former sections, nationalism is characterized by a sense of national consciousness. As a consequence of nationalism, residents of a particular nation-state see themselves as a "we" group and other nations as a "they" group. Furthermore, the members of so called “we” group is not as homogeneous as the nationalism ideology seeks for. Therefore, dominant ethnic culture hegemonizes “the others” in nation building process. Political and social organization assigned by the “ we” and “other” categories, determines the content of the different sets of policies towards “the different” groups. While positing a homogeneous and fixed identity on the “others”, the discourse of nationalism legitimates and produces hierarchies among actors.

In this sense, one can define national identity only by highlighting its inner and outer boundaries or its others. As Stuart Hall (1996: 4) states, ‘it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside, that the “positive” meaning of any term—and thus its identity—can be constructed.’ In the Turkish case, different nationalistic discourses compete with each other in this process of boundary marking. As Schlesinger (1991: 172) argues: ‘National cultures are not simple repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions take place ... It may also reproduce distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ at the intra-national level, in line with the internal structure of social divisions and relations of power and domination’.

Turkish national identity has been constructed through a deep social conflict among various social groups, classes, and ideologies that are in competition with each other to make their own perceptions of identity boundaries properties of the national identity. As Fuat Dündar (2002: 893) argues, different from other nationalisms which focus on single external enemy, Turkish nationalism constitutes its discourses against “internal others”. In the process of building Turkish nation, “the others” were non-Turk moslem citizens and non-moslem citizens.

Since majority of the informants identify themselves Turk and moslem (see Table 12 and Table 13), their positioning of “the other” regarding to ethnicity and religion will be discussed in following sections. Furthermore, since all informants regard themselves secularist, their views on non-secular citizens will be discussed as well.

Table 13

Table 12

				Ethnicity			
Religion						Frequency	Percent
		Frequency	Percent	Valid			
Valid	muslim	21	70		Turkish	24	80
	no religion	5	17		Kurdish	2	7
	atheist	3	10		Turkish but mixed origin	1	3
	shafi	1	3		Laz origin Turkish	1	3
	Total	30	100		citizen of Turkey	1	3
					BelgoTurkish	1	3
					Total	30	100

5.4.1 Turks vs different ethnic identities living in Turkey: Preferences of whom to work with

In this section, the informants were asked about their preferences of whom to work with among different ethnic identities living in Turkey in different levels of hegemony such as superiors, colleagues and subordinates. It is observed that most of the respondents prefer to work with Turk superiors, colleagues and subordinates, while they have negative prejudgements about Arabs and Kurds:

“ I am a little bit sensitive to Arabs. I do not like to share the same environment with them. I had the opportunity to observe them a few times. I think they are dirty.

Regarding to Kurds, I have many Kurd friends whom I like very much. However, since the society has troubles with Kurdish issue, we may argue about this problem and there may occur unrest in the workplace. Therefore, if I have a chance to select, I do not like to work with Kurds”(Yasin, 26).

As seen from Yasin’s comments, secular nationalism, while positioning itself pure, elitist and superior, excludes the others, Arabs in this case, who are positioned as different, backward and inferior by the official ideology. By the same token, the prejudgements about “the others”

turn into judgements immediately bypassing the recognition stage since secular nationalism not only evaluates “the other” as different but also inferior. On the other hand, as discussed in in previous sections, while asked about the preferences of working with foreign or local people, the majority of the respondents including Yasin, indicated their preference which was in favour of foreigners. This shows that evaluating oneself superior to society, especially to “the others” does not suppress the feeling of inferiority in relation to West.

Another interesting point in Yasin’s claim was the willingness to refrain from discussing the issues of the society with people who may have different opinions because of their ethnic identities. It can be deducted that Yasin frames his opinions about social issues in parallel with his ethnicity and nationality since otherwise seems impossible for him. While Yasin rates people according to his general prejudgements on ethnicities, Itır (65) rates them according to her personal experiences, in other words her specific prejudgements:

“I do not have any idea about a Kazakh originated person. Therefore, I do not want to work. Arab, no I do not want. Because I worked with an Arab colleague once.

Regarding to Kurds, they are loyal to their beloved ones, therefore I am indifferent to them. Zaza and Bulgar origin, I do not know them, I want to give 1 out of 7”.

While Itır rates lower points to the ethnic originated people which she is not familiar with, some respondents claim that they are indifferent to unfamiliar ethnicities since they do not have any prejudgements.

For Mert (28), the ethnic attributes are deterministic in hegemony levels as well. While he prefers to work with Arab superiors and colleagues since ‘they are loose and easygoing’, he does not prefer Arab subordinates because he can not manage them since ‘they are loose’.

Sedat (27) with a deep feeling of inferiority in relation to West, prefers to work with comparatively Western originated people such as Rum (Greeks who hold Turkish citizenship) and Bulgar rather than Turks, Kurds and others. On the other hand, Hale (32) who identifies herself as a Kurdish originated citizen of Turkey Republic, is indifferent with working Kurds and interestingly prefers to work with Turk superior due to compilance.

Ceyda with a view of closer to radical nationalism prefers to work with Turkic originated people such as Kazakh, Azeri, Circassian, Turkmen while she does not prefer to work with Western people and in this case, Rum people. However, her idea about Arabs was similar to most of the respondents. The prejudgement towards Arabs was in common for the majority of the informants, while few claim that they are indifferent to any ethnic identities.

5.4.2 Kurdish question

In Turkey, this issue was entitled with different names such as ‘South Eastern question’, ‘Terror question’ and ‘Kurdish question’ which shows the perspective the issue is evaluated. In addition, depending on the different namings the causes and proposed solutions of the question is being differentiated. While ‘South Eastern question’ addresses the economic aspects of the problem, ‘Kurdish question’ refers to the social and political dimensions of the question besides its economic aspects. During the periods of freedom and social self-confidence the issue is considered as the Kurdish issue, on the other hand, during the escalation of military casualties, the issue is called as ‘South Eastern question’ or ‘Terror question’.

The perspectives of the respondents indicate that there are two different approaches regarding to the causes and origins of the Kurdish question. While nearly half of the informants state

that discrimination, state policies, and social and economic problems are the main causes whereas other half assert that in addition to social and economic problems, foreign intervention and the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and terrorism are the main causes of the Kurdish question. Therefore, while asked about the opinions on Kurdish question, some informants stated that there does not exist such a problem and continued to define and entitle the problem from their perspective.

“I do not define the issue as Kurdish question. For sure, there is a terror and security problem. On the other hand, I do not know whether the involving actors to terrorist attacks are Turks or Kurds. I do not have enough information about the issue.

Therefore, I am noncommittal, but I can not call it Kurdish issue directly” (İdil, 30).

Like İdil, some other respondents claim that they are not well-informed about the issue. On the other hand, the misinformation given by media, institutions and government lead to evaluate the issue as a one-dimensioned problem by the respondents.

“Kurdish question is in parallel with Armenian issue. The actual and real demand is independence and territory. I mean, a Kurd citizen holds the same legal rights with me. The governments had mistakes in South Eastern region which lead to economic problems in the area. On the other hand, it is easier to brainwash the uneducated and unemployed people. Foreign powers such as the US and England exploit the issue. Regarding to democratic right demands of Kurds, I support the equality of opportunity and rights for every citizen. I wish this equality had been provided for everyone. Then, Kurds would accept Turkish identity besides Kurdish identity. The state policies are another main cause of the issue. Education in Kurdish, I am fine with this, but is it the real demand? I do not think so, this is just a mask. The aim is to establish a separate state” (Kamil, 28).

Kamil degrades the issue to ‘hidden agendas of Kurds’ and because of his fears regarding territorial and national integrity, he approaches the question aggressively. Like Kamil, majority of respondents believe that Kurds want their own independent state, which leads to the emergence of strong feelings of fear that the country will be divided along ethnic lines. Because of this fear and concerns, there is a visible resistance on the issue of constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, liberalization of policies on the Kurdish language and the introduction of a more liberal constitution that will address the objections of the Kurds. On the other hand, few respondents including Kurdish originated people evaluate the issue from a multi-dimensioned angle. This conclusion is coherent with the findings of Public Perception of the Kurdish Question report of SETA (2009) which argues that in contrast to Turkish respondents, Kurdish respondents do not see the separation as the ultimate goal of the Kurdish political demands.

“For sure, there exists a Kurdish question which is may be the biggest problem of Turkey. People who identify themselves Kurdish are having troubles in the country. Therefore, the Kurdish question is obvious. For the sake of formality every citizen seems equal, but we see that they are not equal actually. People live in discomfort. One more thing, people living in the Western regions of Turkey only see Eastern part on the map, they say that this is part of our country. On the other hand, they are not willing to visit, see, work and live in Eastern region. I mean this is not only Kurdish problem but also Turkish problem. There exists a kind of disunity in the country. For sure people ask for cultural rights and we started to understand better their demands recently since the issue is being discussed more. But before, there was only violence. Economy is just a part of the issue. I do not think that only economic investment and development will solve the problem. We witness that the willpower of acquiring a political power emerges recently. Regarding to autonomy, if the problem would be

solved through consensus and political autonomy would be evaluated as a solution, I would not oppose. In my opinion, all feasible alternatives should be discussed without any prejudgements in order to solve the issue” (Arda, 33).

5.4.3 Non-moslem citizens

According to Aktar (2000), although all citizens of modern Turkey were Turkish by law, some Turks were more equal than others. After the war between Greece and Turkey following the invasion of Ottoman territories by the European powers in 1919, the Greek Orthodox population of Anatolia was exchanged with the Muslim population of Greece (Ari 1995). Under the Republic, Christians and Jews remained as small minorities whose rights as officially acknowledged minorities were guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Despite their support for the Kemalist project, though, Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin remained potential outsiders in Republican Turkey, experiencing discrimination and encouraged (if not forced) to emigrate (Bali 1999).

Regarding to the opinions of the respondents about non-moslem citizens of Turkey, while most of the informants consider them like themselves and claim that they do not have any negative opinions about them and evaluate non-moslems as different cultural motives of Turkey which enriches cultural climate, only very few respondents have some prejudgements and negative opinions about non-moslem citizens regardless of religious differences.

“ They live in more democratic conditions than a muslim living abroad. I do not think that their home countries would provide the same opportunities to muslim people. They are integrated to social life in Turkey, however they are more introverted in business life. They prefer to do business with their environment” (Rezzan, 36).

As observed in Rezzan's claims, some people in Turkey still see Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin as outsiders who are claimed to have 'home countries' rather than Turkey.

Similar to Rezzan, Birol (33) argues that:

“Although they are minorities in Turkey, they live in better social and economic conditions since their rights are acknowledged by Ottoman Empire and then Turkish Republic. Besides we, Turks behave them in a better manner than we behave Turks in order not to upset and hurt them. In general, we have this kind of attitude because of admiration to West”.

As to be realized, both Rezzan and Birol discuss their opinions in political rather than religious frames. Since they are both secularists and impartial to religious differences, they consider political and social side. In addition, like Kurdish question, this issue has been politicized as well because of the on-going policies of the state towards Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin. Interestingly, none of the respondents mentioned about the assassination of Hrant Dink during interviews.

5.4.4 Non-secular citizens

Islam was regarded as contradictory to Westernization and modernity, both by Westerners and Turkish nationalists who aspired to be Westernized. Simultaneously, laicism became the dominant ideology, which came to be almost synonymous with modern nationalism. 'The Republican regime justified a tremendous amount of symbolic violence in the lives of the Muslim population, in changing dress styles, religious rituals, and cultural practice, as a necessity for Turkey to become a modern nation' (Aydın, 2006: 452), and there has been an Islamic opposition from the very first days of the Republic.

However, Islam was not altogether crushed or abandoned in the dominant ideology; on the contrary, the so-called modern nationalists positioned it as the implicit and repressed reference of Turkishness. It was utilised as the ultimate reference for shaping national policies, such as discriminatory policies and practices against non-Muslim citizens in Turkey, as evident in many traumatic examples in national history. Thus, the situation with regard to Islam has been more complex than the reigning division between laicists and Islamists in Turkey. According to Cemil Aydın (2006), not only the Islamic opposition in Turkey, but also the conflicts among Islamists and pro-Western and laique nationalists have been legitimised by references to the West.

Since nationalism excludes other, then Islamic movements for instance, occupy the same position in nationalist discourse. As Göle (1996) argues the often authoritarian-secular, anti-Islamic movements for national consciousness in Turkey are an excellent example of the dark side of nationalisms, especially in their explicit exclusion of such religious identities.

Regarding to the opinions of the respondents about non-secular citizens (Islamists) of Turkey, most of the informants have negative views about them which was one of the fewest issues they all agree on. While some argue that the religion should be practiced in private, but they are not against the different life styles of other people unless they interfere their life styles, some see these citizens as a threat to secularist state. In addition, few consider the situation within the current political climate of Turkey with referring to Justice and Development Party (AKP). For instance Şirin (28) argues:

“I think they are on the wrong way, they should be secularist. I mean, the belief and religion should not interfere in other areas of social life. Now these people are holding the majority. Some of them pretend to act like non-secularists or Islamists for their

own benefit not for their belief since you are treated well when you are a supporter of the government(yandaş) under these political circumstances”.

Başak (31) admits that she has much more prejudgements about non-secular people since her father is a soldier and she was grown in a neighbourhood where veiled women are not allowed to enter. On the other hand, being aware of the prejudice does not change her negative idea about non-secular people. Similar to Başak, Kadir (27) evaluates veiled women as non-secularists:

“Secularism is one of the principles of Kemalism and Atatürk. In this sense, I think these people disregard the principle of Atatürk. However, the state will continue to be secular regardless of those people. They only deceive themselves. I feel uncomfortable when I see lots of veiled people around who share this view. There were not that much veiled people in universities 8 years ago. It is not because I bother about veiling but if they wear like these, then others have the right to wear shorts, bikinis while going to university”.

CONCLUSION

Both theoretically and empirically, this thesis presented a multilayered study. Thus, it is possible to conclude it by “peeling off” the layers that have been put on top of each other. In this sense, Turkish multinational business professionals who are positioned as ‘caught between globalization and nationalism’ constitute the main subjects of this study in order to identify the ongoing and dynamic relationship between nationalism and globalization in micro level.

The aim of this study is to answer the question of how multinational professionals who are thought to be most adaptive to globalizing trends construct their subjectivities with respect to pro-global and nationalistic discourses. By answering this question, the secondary layer of the research which questions whether nationalistic discourse loose power in the globalized age and if this is the case, in which aspects it is losing power is discussed. Furthermore, this question takes us to think about whether globalization effect nationalistic discourse positively or negatively.

By using the method of in-depth interviewing and quantitative research technique at the same time, this study examines the narratives of Turkish multinational professionals on globalization and nationalism with covering several issues from everyday work life preferences regarding to global versus local dilemma to acculturation to the global consumer culture, from dimensions of national identity to national symbols. While quantitative technique enabled to investigate acculturation to global consumer culture level of interviewees, the qualitative method enabled to interpret the result as a part of big picture, in other words the research question.

In order to accomplish primary aims of this study, the theoretical framework of globalization has been discussed in the first chapter. In this section, as being one of the academic buzzwords of recent two decades, globalization was evaluated referring to its history which varies from second millennium B.C to 15th century according to different scholars who agree on the globalization phenomenon not being a novel issue.

Furthermore, contemporary social theory for the notion of globalization was discussed with focusing on different dimensions and aspects of the issue. In this sense, three main

dimensions of globalization which are cultural globalization, economic globalization and political globalization were discussed in detail which constitute the necessary basis used for the analysis of discourses of globalization.

In addition to this, first chapter presents a contextual framework of Turkey case under neoliberal policies which enabled the rise of multinational companies and foreign direct investment that produced a newly rich, bourgeois class structure. Besides post 1980s economic and political policy changes which boosted the class of multinational professionals, the westernization policies of Turkey which dates back to the establishment Republic of Turkey was included in order to present a complete picture of multinational professionals. Thereby, those professionals were argued as being the most adaptive to globalizing trends and the most visible indication of globalization.

Chapter Two focuses on nationalism and globalization relationship and discusses nationalism and nationalist discourses in reference to relevant literature. In this regard, it has been argued that while the nation-state and modern globalization are not contradictory terms at all, contemporary globalism weakens the role of nation states and on the other hand maintains the nation-state still as the primary reference point for political, cultural and economic issues since globalization increases the sense of insecurity and ‘national’ memory is central to identity.

In addition, chapter two analyses the ‘nationalism’ literature with referring to the definitions and arguments of various scholars and touches upon the geneology of the word ‘nation’ in order to underline the “constructed” and “imagined” feature of nation and nationalism. Following Craig Calhoun’s conceptualization of “nationalism as a discourse”, the various

attributes of the discourse were analyzed. Moreover, based on the study of Tanıl Bora, the current nationalist discourses in Turkey was discussed briefly which enables to evaluate the discourse analysis of this study with a more down-to earth perspective. In addition, the history of Turkish nationalism was discussed briefly in order to clarify the roots of current nationalist discourses.

After literature review and methodology sections, the findings of the research are discussed in chapter 4 and 5. The globalization discourse analysis part mainly involve three sections which are economic globalization, political globalization and cultural globalization in order to conceptualize the arguments and evaluations of the discourses in a more structured frame.

The assessments with respect to this section indicate that the level and intension of nationalist discourse used varies from topic by topic. While the issue is more concrete and experienced by the informants which make them to think over the subject such as preferences of where to work (multinational or local), the rationalistic discourse is more dominant. On the other hand, while the issue is supposed as a 'national' issue such as increase of foreign direct investment, more nationalistic voices find room to be heard.

Regarding to political globalization topics, the nationalistic discourse of the respondents are found to be more dominant which position a homogeneous and fixed identity on the external "others" who are 'Europeans', 'Arabs', 'Middle East countries' and 'uncivilized Muslim countries'. Secularism together with elitism and occidentalism constitute the necessary basis of 'nationalistic approach' to evaluate external 'others' in this sense. Furthermore, these discourses are mostly coherent with Turkish official politics and ideology with respect to European Union, Moslem countries and Turkic Republics.

While evaluating cultural globalization topics, the informants were found to be less prone to global consumer culture than it was expected. On the other hand, female respondents and highly educated respondents are more akin to global consumer culture while the age factor is found to be insignificant in this respect. While evaluating the foreign employees, it was observed that the informants suppose all foreigners as identical which implies that the foreigner is “imagined” as a category not a living person who symbolizes the dominant culture of the company and who is exactly the reverse of the local since one can identify oneself looking at the imagined “other”.

In order to summarize the findings of globalization discourses chapter, it can be argued that nationalistic discourse is very dominant to evaluate both national and global issues since nationalism is not just a political doctrine but a way of thinking and interpreting the world. On the other hand, nationalistic discourse is found to lose power while evaluating ‘personal’ and economic choices which are based on concrete and experienced facts not on imagined concepts like ‘national interest’ or ‘national integrity’ since nation itself is an imagined notion. However, it is important to note that, these personal and economic preferences are not independent from ‘national’ economic policies since almost all political parties in Turkey, regardless of their ideological orientation, now have similar economic programs which admit the unavoidability of the process of globalization. In this sense, it can be argued that the personal approaches are constructed in negotiating with national and global policies. However, this does not mean that subjects are victims of the superstructures since they have rooms to evaluate the issues with different approaches if they do not bound their thinking within limits of nation-state and nationalism.

In order to understand how the informants construct their ‘national’ or/and pro-global identities which enable them to evaluate global, personal and national issues, media preferences, national symbols, national taboos and attitude towards internal ‘others’ are discussed in Chapter 5.

Media preferences are discussed as an important tool to shape ‘national identities’ since the informants follow news from national channels which are usually daily national (mainstream) newspapers and watch television mostly for hobbies or entertainment not for information.

Furthermore, secularism is an important element for the informants to shape and construct their identities since they follow secular newspapers and columnists. While the tone and intensity of the nationalistic discourse differs for each informant, secularism is the common ground for them to evaluate issues. Since secularism is dominant in the arguments of the informants, it is observed that multinational professionals suppose Islam as an important element of social identity for common Turkish citizens apart from themselves. In this sense, Islamic opposition from the very first days of the Republic and Islam being regarded as contradictory to Westernization and modernity, both by Westerners and Turkish nationalists is argued to affect the attitudes of modern and secular citizens of Turkey.

Coherent with official ideology and strongly effected by secularism, the respondents evaluate Western identities (European, American) superior to Turkish identity, whereas see Eastern identities especially the ones with Islamic connotations inferior to Turkish identity.

In the national symbols section, Turkish flag and the national anthem are evaluated in order to indicate how nationalism is perceived with positive connotations by the people who are surrounded by nationalism itself.

From the discourses of the informants, it is assumed that contrary to the general thought, “Armenian genocide” is not being treated as a taboo by almost half of the respondents. On the other hand, Atatürk and day of Remembrance of Atatürk continue to be stronger taboos in the views of the business professionals. This indicates that, the people are not nationalist by default but they embrace nationalistic discourses if the issue is not open to discussion. Since “Armenian genocide” is being discussed in internal and external politics for almost 20 years, people have found the opportunity to listen to different voices on the issue which made them to question the ‘national history’ and ‘Armenian genocide’. On the other hand, secularism can be thought as more dominant in their identities and discourses of these secular and elitist professionals since Atatürk is still not open to discussion and perceived as a taboo.

Regarding to internal ‘others’, nationalistic discourse and official ideology is still very dominant in the discourses of the informants. Besides, collective memory can be argued as not that much collective and varies by political stand since some people refer to Ottoman Empire as ‘our history’ while some refer to only establishment of Republic of Turkey as the beginning of the history. Again secularism is dominant to describe the common others of the all informants as non-secular citizens of Turkey.

To sum up, regarding to the relationship between globalization and nationalism, the multinational professionals can be thought as ‘caught between globalization and nationalism’ since on the one hand, they are prone to globalizing trends in terms cultural and economic

practices and on the other hand, as being members of the nation, they are not independent from nationalist discourses and it has been observed that they are more prone to nationalist discourses while referring to political issues. As discussed in the narratives of the multinational professionals, nationalistic discourse does not lose power in the globalized age but nation continues to be the reference point for interpreting the world since it is more than a political doctrine. While the level and intensity of nationalist discourse used varies from topic to topic, it is still dominant for the subjects of this study.

On the one hand, the superstructures of the nation-state such as official ideology and history, education and media are powerful tools to determine the nationalistic and proglobal discourses of the members of the nation, on the other hand if the related issue is open to discussion and independent from secularist reactions such as “Armenian genocide”, the intensity and strength of nationalist discourse decrease since the people are not nationalist by default. In this sense secularism is more dominant and common than nationalism in the discourses of the subjects of this study. Tanıl Bora (2009) analyzes this issue as being beyond nationalistic endoktrinasyon but closely related to anxiety of losing economic and social status of educated, secular middle class since education is not a powerful tool to discriminate those people from common people in terms of economic privileges effected by recent neoliberal policies. In this sense economic globalization, in other words, neoliberal policies enabled to increase the feeling of insecurity for those professionals who have concerns to lose their privileged status in the society different from lower classes who have little to lose in this respect (Bora, 2009). Therefore, globalization effects the increase of nationalistic discourse positively in this sense.

Since nationalism is shaped and used with different interpretations under each different political ideology, this study contributes to the literature by arguing that the nationalistic discourse of elite members of Turkish society is strongly affected by secularism. While the degree of nationalistic discourses differ for each issue, secularism constitutes the unchangeable political and social key to interpret the world. Therefore, in order to understand the national identity construction of Turkish middle class, future researchers should focus on secularist discourse and secularism in detail.

Unfortunately, this study with focusing on discourses of multinational professionals misses other members of the Turkish middle class who may or may not be positioned as 'caught between nationalism and globalization' depending on their attitudes and discourses. Future studies which will focus on effects of nationalism and globalization may be based on the discourses of other relevant groups of the middle class. Furthermore, since the sample size is limited to 30 multinational professionals, this study failed to combine the findings of quantitative research with qualitative research but used some findings in order to conceptualize the discourses of cultural globalization. Future studies may use sufficient sample sizes both to combine each finding within the bigger picture and to generate further tests to measure the effects of each dimension.

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Appendix 1- Questionnaire of Quantitative Research

1- (COS) Cosmopolitanism (Cronbach's Alpha: 0,863)

I am interested in learning more about people who live in other countries.
I like to learn about other ways of life.
I enjoy being with people from other countries to learn about their unique views and approaches.
I like to try restaurants that offer food that is different from that in my own culture.
I enjoy exchanging ideas with people from other cultures or countries.
I like to observe people of other cultures, to see what I can learn from them.
I find people from other cultures stimulating.
When travelling, I like to immerse myself in the culture of the people I am visiting.
Coming into contact with people of other cultures has greatly benefited me.
When it comes to trying new things, I am very open.

2- English language and global media exposure (Cronbach's Alpha: 0,861)

I feel very comfortable speaking in English.
I often speak English at work.
I often write in English at work.
Many of my favorite shows on TV are in English.
I communicate in English with my family.
Many of the books and business reports that I read are in English.
The songs I listen to are almost all in English.
I have foreign friends with whom I regularly meet.
In general, I follow global or foreign news channels, magazines and newspapers.
Some of my favourite actors/actresses are from Europe or Hollywood.

3- Social interactions (primarily travel)-(Cronbach's Alpha: 0,888)

While vacationing, I would prefer to stay in my home country rather than visit another country. (reversed)
I prefer spending my vacations outside of the country that I live in.
I often think about going to different countries and doing some traveling.
I have visited..... foreign countries up to date.(open-ended question)

4- Openness to and desire to emulate GCC (Cronbach's Alpha: 0,557)

I think that my lifestyle is almost the same as that of people of my age-group in other countries.
I think my lifestyle is almost the same as that of people of my social class in other countries.
I would rather live like people do in Western countries.
When travelling abroad, I appreciate being able to find Western products and restaurants.

5- Self-identification with global consumer culture (Cronbach's Alpha: 0,702)

When shopping, usually foreign or global brands draws my attention.
The way that I dress is influenced by the advertising activities of foreign or global companies.
I like reading magazines about the fashion, décor, and trends in other countries.
I find myself close to global brands.
I find myself close to local brands.(reversed)