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THE PROBLEMATIC OF THE IMAGE  
AND THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION

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AND THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION  
İMGE SORUNSALI VE TEMSİL KURAMLARI

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses the “problematic of image” and the act of “representation”. We will investigate various critical approaches to images and signs, and we will study the “act of seeing” and its relation to imagination with the help of the works on perception and seeing (visible/invisible) by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty who is one of the most influential figures of existential phenomenology and on the discourses on semiotics (a—signifying semiotics) by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze who is one of the foremost representatives of post—structuralism. The purpose of this study is to reveal the traces of representability/non—representability of a new way of thinking Deleuze intended to bring into ontology. We intend to pose a number of questions about the perception of consciously/unconsciously non—represented “things” while reflecting on the value of representation. We will problematize the “invisible” through the “visible” and explain the relationship between the artist and the spectator in the process of signification and the intertwined state of the visible and the invisible through Ponty’s examination of the “personal experience”, “mind” and “body”.

**Key words:** Seeing, visible—invisible, image, representation, semiosis, time, movement, semiotics, signs, cinema, fiction, Gilles Deleuze, M. Merleau-Ponty.

## ÖZET

Bu tez çalışmasının konusu “imge sorunsalı” ve “temsil” eylemidir. İmge ve işaretler üzerine çeşitli eleştirel yaklaşımların araştırılması yapılarak; varoluşçu fenomenolojinin önde gelen isimlerinden Fransız filozof Maurice Merleau-Ponty’ın algı ve görme araştırmaları (visible/invisible) ile post yapısalcılığın en önemli temsilcilerinden Fransız filozof Gilles Deleuze’ün (a—signifying semiotics) semiotik göstergelere ilişkin söylemlerinin yardımıyla “görme eylemi”nin (seeing) imgelem ile ilişkisinin okuması yapılacaktır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, imgelem üzerine Deleuze’ün oluş felsefesinde açmak istediği yeni bir düşünme şeklinin varlığının temsil edilebilirliği/edilemezliği üzerindeki izlerini açığa çıkarmaktır. Temsilin kendi değeri üzerine düşünmeye çalışırken bilinçli/bilinçsiz olarak temsil edilmeyen “şeyler”in varlık algısı üzerine birtakım sorular oluşturmak istenmektedir. Görünür (visible) olan “şey”ler üzerinden “görünmeyen” (invisible) olan sorunsallaştırılacak; “anlamlandırma” sürecinde sanatçı ve seyirci ile görünür ve görünmez iç içeliği Ponty’ın görme üzerine oluşturduğu “kişisel deneyimleme”, “zihin” ve “beden” araştırmasından faydalanılarak açıklanacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Görmek, görünür—görünmez, imge, temsil, semiosis, zaman, hareket, göstergebilim, işaretler, sinema, kurgu, Gilles Deleuze, M. Merleau—Ponty.

## INTRODUCTION

Art, as a practice of *representation*, has such a significance that it has been argued and debated heavily for its nature of expressing what is in the “image” for years. We see the influences of this significance born out of the relationship between art and the image in many art movements including the art practices in the “modern era”. In this sense, we can say that *art* and its *representational value* have contemporary significance and have had a place as a problematic in every period of history.

Art shows us ways to an eminently complex mental mobility with its ageless power of *representation* and the limits/unlimitedness of the *subject-object* relationship which has been argued both internally and externally. At the same time, art is in such a position that it has the potential to create its own dynamics with its pioneering power. This position of art shows us that its efforts are so meaningful that it may stir up a fierce debate about its ability or inability to represent what is, and even what is not, in the image. Art hits our minds/bodies with such an affect through its efforts and becomes meaningful and valuable for “me” as the *subject*, and for “us” as the *society*.

We come across several critical questions while dealing with the “problematic of image” together with the “practices of representation” which constitute our second problematic and to which we will refer later on to see its value and meaning in question. These are the questions that help us plumb the depths of the world of thought and perception, such as: “what is an image?”, “how is an image formed?”, “can the image be represented?”, and “what is the non-representable field?”. We also think about, see and hear other questions that will or may guide us in the light of these concepts. We have laid the foundation for this thesis in view of the need to understand of our “perception of the world” (whole) and to do a reading in order to comprehend the limits/unlimitedness of “subjectivity” (part) through these questions.

I, as a designer who investigated this subject field and wrote this thesis, will try to

analyze *things* that are in the *image* and thought in the process of artistic creation, believing that the world (sector/fields of work) in which we produce is detached from philosophy. The conceptual structure of this text is centered around the “image” and “representation” because of the need to discuss the problems arising from the ways in which “design” practices, that have a critical relationship with art’s power of transforming and pioneering, are considered merely in terms of their “material value” and “final product” particularly in the modern era. I criticize this fast way of producing for other reasons as well; such as the creative process lacking any traces of “thought”, the system of design practices being rapid and result-oriented, and seeing that we started to create products/works in a context where the form and aesthetics are not properly discussed.

An artist/designer/director should be able to find new ways of expression with the possibilities provided by the modern era. This expression should have a potential to involve “thinking practices”. In this respect, we will start to examine the journey of the “image” which constantly stands before us (although it stands before us as a problematic, it may stand by us, in our minds only when we think about it with a method of understanding) while investigating how to establish such practices.

We will cite Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s works on perception and seeing (visible/invisible) and Charles Sanders Peirce’s different approaches on the sign and Gilles Deleuze’s *a-signifying semiotics* during our research on the image and signs. We will try to enrich our discussion by comparing various perspectives concerning the perception of the image which would be corresponding to its birth, its development and even its absence during this process. We will start a *thought journey* with Ponty, analyzing the thought and learning how to read the phrases that deal with the “body” and “soul” in conjunction with the “mind” and “time” (the change in thought, as a thinking practice), especially in the modern era, and we will examine the domains and systems of the mind through Deleuze’s reading of Bergson.

In this respect, what we will try to clarify in the concept of “seeing” that is valuable and meaningful will be to understand what it is, where it comes from and how it can be defined. Thus we will start to reconsider our position as observers and seers. We will analyze the concept of representation through the endless production of the image and Deleuze’s *ontology* and we will try to read the “non–represented” together with the “represented”. Because this process penetrates us through the perception of what we see and what we cannot see, we will look for questions as to how to read the signs at this point. Ponty’s philosophy, which problematizes the “invisible” through *visible “things”* and which is the starting point of this very investigation, constitutes the basis for the efforts to examine the subject matter comparatively. This is because reading various accounts and seeing their evolutions in the process of “signification” is basically being “on the road” which we try to explain throughout this text. It is being on the “road to thought”. It is a flow, it is mobile. In our approach what is obtained on this road is what makes our journey meaningful and valuable. We will try to explain this approach, starting with an inquiry into the “*personal experience*”, “*mind*”, and “*body*” and continuing with the mind, memory, memorizing, forgetting, signs, and finally the expression of all of these in representation.

The signs in the mind together with what correspond to them in the image will inspire us to ask the question “Is another kind of perception possible?”. Here, Deleuze’s “time” will provide us with helpful tools. We will discuss Deleuze’s radical and challenging treatment of time in detail in the *time–image* part. His “time” has the power to reverse, play with and challenge perception. Because this power will keep us in a state of flow and also tire us, we will conclude this thesis with a discussion on how “representation” should be in order to see the aforementioned value and meaning. In this representation, the power of art/design to influence and motivate should be the driving force that make the audience/spectator think.

## PART 1

### SEEING

#### 1.1. "SEEING" AS A MENTAL ACT

In addition to its definition as "to perceive with the eyes; discern visually", the verb to see<sup>1</sup> is also frequently used for its other meanings such as "understand" and "comprehend". Also, another definition of the word is "to experience or witness (an event or situation)". In this sense, seeing, besides being a physical act, has been the most important human sense for centuries for it gives meaning to the "thing" between thought and object. Therefore, when we look at the conceptual value of "seeing", we can say that it is like a bridge from yesterday to tomorrow for the "body", the physical entity, and the "mind", the world of thought, that also explains and gives meaning to them. In this study we will try to analyze the importance of the "act of seeing" and its dynamics, examining them in philosophical approaches which will turn it into an effective problematic of art; art as philosophy that will lead us to the "meaning".

One of the major problems of philosophy is to try to understand the journey of the sight that touches/hits the body of a person and from there travels to the mind where

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<sup>1</sup> The Oxford Dictionaries website:

1. Perceive with the eyes; discern visually.
2. Discern or deduce mentally after reflection or from information; understand.
3. Experience or witness (an event or situation)

it has a meaning. In this respect, philosophy has questioned the “*visible*” and the “*invisible*” in art as it has done in other disciplines it turned to in the pursuit of meaning while also trying to explain what it is. When we examine the history of this questioning, we find discussions where the mind and the body are treated separately or together in efforts to explain them by means of rational, empirical and metaphysical reflections.

In this sense, when we speak of an act of seeing, we should refer to the mind’s interpretation of “visibilities” that are heard, experienced, thought of and that touch/penetrate the body in some way, rather than merely what the “eye” see physically. This reference is a thinking practice which has its roots in various ways of seeing and which will pass through the *value* of the visible’s journey to find its meaning in the mind. Seeing is not merely looking but feeling the affect of a point where one’s gaze is directed at; thus one is exposed to that feeling’s corresponding words over and over and seeing proceeds to a “repetition” and then to an “experience”. Sometimes it is instantaneous and “unique” with its inherent quality of being one and only. In other words, *seeing* is perceiving what is concrete, such as recognizing/identifying a tree we see before us because we already have knowledge of it after seeing it over and over again, or an embodiment of “sadness” in our minds when we see a plane tree with yellow–red leaves in autumn, beyond the physical sight of the tree. All themes evoked by the structural form of what is in sight are “things” that are highly influenced by the past, present and future and that are dynamic, in motion and never able to be stable and that hit one’s eyes, namely the *body*, and find a place in one’s mind, namely the *soul*. All these *things* should not be considered separately from the *affect*. Here, at this point, the discussion of the artistic and philosophical dimensions of the *things* that “affect” the artist and the spectator who is in the position of the observer is included in Maurice Merleau–Ponty’s philosophy as well as those of many other philosophers.

Analyzing the structure of Ponty's relevant works would help anyone, who wants to do research in the fields dealing with the "image", "representation" and "seer", to understand reading materials related to this field, as this field covers the basic dynamics of every work whose key issue is "*representation*". We will frequently cite Ponty who created a new thought practice with his work on the relationship between the body and the soul and became a source for Deleuze who worked on the same subject later. His work will help us understand Deleuze's work in which he also created new thought practices through his reading of Bergson, thereby we will have a chance to understand the world of imagination and the specifics of this field better. We will question the groundless and fluxing nature of treatments of the *body* and the *soul* again, referring to Deleuze's approach and his notes on Bergson in order to examine different reflections on the mentioned details within the scope of representation comparatively. This questioning will incline us to look at the *visible* from various points of view and help us see what corresponds to Ponty's *visible/invisible* in Deleuze and how it develops. Therefore, we will start to analyze the act of seeing with Ponty's philosophy:

#### **1.1.1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Approach**

*"Man is a being who sees the world with his own eyes. A being who lives and sees with his own eyes and understands."*—Maurice Merleau-Ponty

The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), one of the founders of existential phenomenology, is also one of the philosophers who problematized the "mind" and the "body". Ponty focused on the concepts of perception, being, existence, other, body, writing, and ethics, being influenced by philosophers such as Bergson, Heidegger, Husser, Lévi-Strauss, Nietzsche, and Sartre. His articulations in

this field influenced philosophers such as Deleuze, Foucault, Lacan, Lefort, Lévi–Strauss, and Virilio. Ponty discussed the relations between internal consciousness and the world; he was influenced by Edmund Husserl’s conception of “intentionality”<sup>2</sup> while forming his own phenomenology and later transformed this concept in his work. According to Ponty, our perception does not only consist of sensations but every impression we have by means of our sensations consists of “things” together with spaces. The basic viewpoint of Merleau–Ponty’s argument is not searching for a precise information. Rather, he wants to reach a certain clarity. The clarity refers to is not an abstract or formulated numeric data, rather, it is the “thing” in our experiences, namely the experiences belonging to “me who thinks”. At this point, we see Ponty’s “intended act of consciousness” and his account of “experience”.

Ponty criticizes the ways modern science affects the world of perception and daily life while developing his phenomenology. He says that it is easier and more convenient to have knowledge of the world of perception we are in by simply opening our eyes. Because there is no need for means or calculations to access it, it is enough to go with the flow of life to be present in this world. Nevertheless, trying to reach “clarity” within the world of concepts/images, namely the “world of perception”, is a mentally exhausting process. He elucidates his argument as follows:

The World of perception is, to a great extent, unknown territory as long as we remain in the practical or utilitarian attitude. I shall suggest

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<sup>2</sup> Phenomenology is a philosophical movement founded by Edmund Husserl. According to the common expression, phenomenology studies “essences”. However, it should be understood that phenomenology is not the study of “essences” but the study of “consciousness” which sees the “essences”. According to the phenomenological perspective, there is no such thing as the reality itself because reality is what is known by a consciousness that is concerned with it. In other words, it is something that the concerned consciousness sees, perceives and comprehends. Then, our whole experience of the world, from tangible perceptions to abstract mathematics, is created by consciousness. For this reason, phenomenology aims at systematically examining consciousness. It avoids the idea of taking epistemology as its starting point.

that much time and effort, as well as culture, have been needed in order to lay this World bare and that one of the great achievements of modern art and philosophy (that is, the art and philosophy of the last fifty to seventy years) has been to allow us to rediscover the World in which we live, yet which we are always prone to forget. (Ponty, 2004, p. 39)

In the following passage where Ponty discusses the world of perception and the scientific world, he explains that “things” are not only “perceived” with the eyes through their properties such as mass, volume, weight, smell, texture or chemistry, but also they are conceived in the “*mind*” where they find “meaning”.

If I want to know what light is, surely I should ask a physicist. Is light, as was once thought, a stream of burning projectiles, or, as others have argued, vibrations in the ether? Or is it, as a more recent theory maintains, a phenomenon that can be classed alongside other forms of electromagnetic radiation? Is he not the physicist who can tell me what light really is? What good would it do to consult our senses on this matter? Why should we linger over what our perception tells us about colors, reflections and the objects which bear such properties? For it seems that these are almost certainly no more than appearances. Only the methodical investigations of a scientist—his measurements and experiments—can set us free from the delusions of our senses and allow us to gain access to things as they really are. Surely the advancement of knowledge has consisted precisely in our forgetting what our senses tell us when we consult them naïvely. Surely there is no place for such data in a picture of the World as it really is, except insofar as they indicate peculiarities of our human make-up, ones which physiology will, one day, take account of, just as it has already managed to explain the illusions of long- and short-sightedness. The real World is not this World of light and colour; it is not the fleshy spectacle which passes before my eyes. It consists, rather, of the waves and particles which science tells us lie behind these sensory illusions. (Ponty, 2004, pp. 40—41)

Ponty goes into detail with an example of seeing a piece of “wax”, asking, “What exactly is this wax?” Then, he discusses the answer together with the question of

whether the wax will cease to exist when it loses its physical properties. Its *visible* properties are its whitish color, its floral scent, its softness to one's touch, and the dull thud which it makes when it is dropped. Yet none of these physical characteristics is descriptive of the wax because it can lose one or all of them without ceasing to exist. In other words, will it be the same wax if we melt it so it changes into a colorless liquid which has no discernible scent? Ponty, with this example, creates the problematic of how the wax should be treated after this change of state and comes up with relevant questions. In order to understand this problematic, he reflects on its *visibility* in its different states together with the space it occupies and examines it without regarding constitutive limits. According to him, the reality of the wax is not revealed to our senses alone, because if this were the case and if it were enough, then our senses would perceive this changeable matter with the same size, weight, or shape each time. He articulates his argument as follows:

When I assume I am seeing the wax, all I am really doing is thinking back from the properties which appear before my senses to the wax in its naked reality, the wax which, though it lacks properties in itself, is nonetheless the source of all the properties which manifest themselves to me. Thus for Descartes – and this idea has long held sway in the French philosophical tradition – perception is no more than the confused beginnings of scientific knowledge. The relationship between perception and scientific knowledge is one of appearance to reality. It befits our human dignity to entrust ourselves to the intellect, which alone can reveal to us the reality of the World. (Ponty, 2004, p. 42)

The expression “...entrust ourselves to the intellect” in this passage helps us understand his philosophical perspective better. In fact, his reflection suggests a method we should adapt to reach the clarity of the world of concepts/images as in his discussion of the “World of Perception”. There is a process which requires much effort, time and culture within this intentionality. We can consider this process as the practices of “seeing”, “experiencing”, “questioning” and even “signification” of the mind. We can say that the wax, the object he questioned with the help of Descartes’

quote “*I think, therefore I am (Cogito ergo sum)*”, actually exists in the mind, and the act of seeing finds a meaning when “I think...” about what is in my mind.

Ponty explains the act of thinking through his criticism of classic science as well. He emphasizes that his standpoint is by no means anti-science as it does not reject science. According to him, science plays with things (manipulates them) and regards every being as an “object” which is a *thing* that does not have a corresponding meaning in our minds. In his criticism of classical science, we see an emphasis on how the definitions made by scientists are shallow, mechanical and monotonous.

But classical science clung to a feeling for the opaqueness of the World, and it expected through its constructions to get back into the World. For this reason, it felt obliged to seek a transcendent or transcendental foundation for its operations. Today we find—not in science but in a widely prevalent philosophy of the sciences—an entirely new approach. Constructive scientific activities see themselves and represent themselves to be autonomous, and their thinking deliberately reduces itself to a set of data-collecting techniques which it has invented. To think is thus to test out, to operate, to transform—the only restriction being that this activity is regulated by an experimental control that admits only the most “worked-up” phenomena, more likely produced by the apparatus than recorded by it. (Ponty, 1964, p. 159—160)<sup>3</sup>

Ponty criticizes scientists’ effort to identify/call something as an “x object” with their nominal definitions of the world and define its borders to reach the absolute knowledge. According to him, this effort is a result of perceiving everything that has happened and is about to happen soon as if they only exist so as to go into a laboratory. Processing a thought as if it were data is a kind of absolute structuralism. Moreover, this approach reflects the idea of human-machine systems as in cybernetic ideology, and if the human being and life are treated according to this thought system, all known/unknown concepts and history would be in danger of losing their reality.

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<sup>3</sup> Eye and Mind: Translated by Carleton Dallery.

Ponty exemplifies the problem here as follows:

If this kind of thinking were to extend its dominion over humanity and history; and if, ignoring what we know of them through contact and our own situations, it were to set out to construct them on the basis of a few abstract indices (as a decadent psychoanalysis and culturalism have done in the United States)—then, since the human being truly becomes the *manipulandum* he thinks he is, we enter into a cultural regimen in which there is neither truth nor falsehood concerning humanity and history, into a sleep, or nightmare from which there is no awakening. (Ponty, 1964, p. 160)

Here he says that overcoming the mentioned problem could be possible with the discovery of experiencing. He explains that science should leave its supercilious “notion of object” and concern itself with what already “exists”. Because, according to him, only a body that is not perceived as a machine and that exists in itself can come alive in the perceivable world. Furthermore, scientists started to regard their laws and theories as researches on nature’s events in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, rather than regarding them as perfect pictures of Nature. That is to say, they were inclined to regard those as scientific researches which must be continuously corrected and which are smaller compared to nature’s events, only trying to get closer to them. At this point, we can say that “experience” and “observation” constitute an endless path, the kind in which a painter would constantly pursue secret information. It is just as Van Gogh asking what the dimension he wants to dive “further” into actually is. Ponty explains this new conception as follows:

Science subjects the data of our experience to a form of analysis that we can never expect will be completed since there are no intrinsic limits to the process of observation: we could always envisage that it might be more thorough or more exact than it is at any given moment. (Ponty, 2004, p. 44)

Based on this passage, once again we can say that “observation”, and thus the “act of

seeing”, is an endless experience. Treating observation in association with a specific moment and a specific location is actually related to what extent it is necessary to be aware of its dependency on “time and space”. At this point, Ponty says that unlike the classical scientist, today’s scientist does not fall under the illusion that things come down to her/him and quantum physics now accepts that an absolute objectivity and certainty are merely fantasies. He explains that every observation confirms the constant “motion” of observation, being tightly bound to the observer’s position and leaving the notion of an absolute observer aside. Ponty, saying that we cannot speak of a transcendental approach and an absolute object and also that only God can see at this point, rejects the dogmatic science that considers itself absolute, without underestimating the importance of scientific researches. “We are simply doing justice to each of the variety of elements in the human experience and, in particular, to sensory perception.” (Ponty, 2004, p. 45)

Ponty explains the necessity of treating the whole experience of observation with this new notion of the body which does not separate it from the soul and includes others, rejecting many classical views, as follows:

Further, *associated bodies* must be revived along with my body—“others,” not merely as my congeners, as the zoologist says, but others who haunt me and whom I haunt; “others” along *with* whom I haunt a single, present, and actual Being as no animal ever haunted those of his own species, territory, or habitat. In this primordial historicity, science’s agile and improvisatory thought will learn to ground itself upon things themselves and upon itself, and will once more become philosophy... (Ponty, 1964, p. 161)

When we treat the mind’s act of seeing together with the body, this way of thinking that does not separate the mind from the body will allow us to understand and develop an awareness of how the other bodies that have and will come together perform the act of “seeing”. This awareness brings along the problems of observation

and observer. However, it must be known that these new problems allow us to find the answers that will increase the value and enhance the experience of the “path to knowledge” and allow us to see the contradictions of the notion of an ultimate result. Thus the *problem of the observer* will extend to an endless observation with the *act/s* of the *other/s*.

## 1.2. THE VISIBLE, THE SEER AND THE PROBLEM OF OBSERVER

*"Rather than a mind and a body, man is a mind with a body"*

—Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Ponty, 2004, p. 56)

### 1.2.1. On the Visible and the Seer

According to Ponty, the *body* is united to the *soul*. They are visible in unison, they are seen in unison and in this unity, they are present in the world; they are part of the world. He extends Paul Valéry’s statement that the painter “takes his body with him”, trying to explain how the painter turns any image of the world that hits him into a painting with his/her body. The body he refers to is not one that is part of the space, existing only with its physical functions, but one with activities of “seeing” and functioning. In this way, we can make sense of transformations of substances. That is to say, the painter can paint her/his world with a body. His following statement supports this view:

I have only to see something to know how to reach it and deal with it, even if I do not know how this happens in the nervous system. My moving body makes a difference in the visible World, being a part of it; that is why I can steer it through the visible. (Ponty, 1964, p. 162)

We see the importance of his approach at the core of perception, regarding the mind united to the experiencing body in his following words he used to describe the human being: “Rather than a mind *and* a body, man is a mind *with* a body”. (Ponty, 2004, p. 56) This sentence makes more sense with his elucidation of the concept of *body* with the subject–object dualism. Ponty does not deal with the *body* in terms of its physical and biological aspects but he puts it at the core of his philosophy together with the *soul*. The existence of the body and the bodies (*the others*) is a fact that gives rise to thoughts, but also challenges the singular objective thought. He tries to extend this fact that challenges the thought by treating the conception of the *body* and the *flesh*, which is related to experience in terms of its philosophical aspect rather than its biological aspect. While doing this, he increases the importance of perception in all cases. Ponty, with his articulation of bodies, points out that the bodies are both subjects and objects. “*The body of the other person is not just any object but a cultural object for me*”, he says, “...just as my body is for the other”. At this point, he expects us to take the *body* as an important concept and give meaning to it.

...we can only gain access to them through our body. Clothed in human qualities, they too are a combination of mind and body. (Ponty, 2004, p. 56)

While explaining that the body is a part of the world, Ponty says that anything contains accessible information at the point it stands in a known/unknown space, namely the world, and it hits the *body/mind*, in other words, it is seen. That is to say, in principle, every visible thing remains in a place where it can be reached; it “exists” at the point where one’s gaze can reach. The *sight* at the point where the gaze can reach does not absolutely exist in the space, rather, it can be approached through the gaze and it is the natural continuation, journey and maturation of the first sight. This journey prevents the comprehension of a representation of the world/image, e.g. a painting of it, standing before one’s eyes on both immanent and transcendental levels. The body moves itself and that movement can keep it open to new possibilities to

reach clarity. The “*seer as a visible*” cannot capture “what s/he sees” in the state of visibility in a world of a mobile design. The *seer* approaches what s/he sees through her/his gaze and opens up to the world. Here, Ponty says that the *seer* is not a matter of the world of which s/he is a part. Thus the *seer* is considered as a natural continuation of a sight.

He says that the *Body*, being visible and mobile, is one of the *things*. The interaction and association between the body and the things are important. Ponty explains that our relationship with objects is a fairly close one and every object affects our bodies and lives by calling us, stating “Humanity is invested in the things of the world and these are invested in it” in his “*World of Perception*”. (Ponty, 2004, p. 63) Objects may have human qualities attributed to them as if they symbolize behaviours we love or hate. Ponty, with this approach, indicates that the things are “chaos”. He explains how the things may stand for a particular manner of behaving as follows:

The things of the World are not simply neutral objects which stand before us for our contemplation. Each one of them symbolizes or recalls a particular way of behaving, provoking in us reactions which are either favorable or unfavorable. (Ponty, 2004, p. 63)

We can say that the relationship between the human and things is an ambiguous one and there is a tendency to see things in this way in this argument. According to Ponty, there is a rather ambiguous relationship between a sovereign mind and a thing. He emphasizes that there is no such distant dominant/submissive relationship between the mind and the thing as in Descartes’s wax argument.

In other words, the body, being visible and mobile, is part of the world’s fabric as well as being one of the *things*. It is inside. The body is the one which sees and moves. In this way, it is among the *things* and the *things* are among the body. The

body's attachment to the fabric of the world signifies a cohesive, intertwined, flesh to flesh unity. When Ponty says, "The world is made of the very stuff of the body", he makes us think of the inseparable union of the *body* and the *mind* and the fabric of the body (with the mind) together with the things. We read his argument in the following statement in his *Eye and Mind*:

The enigma derives from the fact that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. That which looks at all things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the "other side" of its power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; it is visible and sensitive for itself. It is a self, not by transparency, like thought, which never thinks anything except by assimilating it, constituting it, transforming it into thought—but a self by confusion, narcissism, inherence of the see-er in the seen, the toucher in the touched, the feeler in the felt—a self, then, that is caught up in things, having a front and a back, a past and a future...

This initial paradox cannot but produce others. Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is one of them. It is caught in the fabric of the World, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around [*ces renversements*] itself. Things are an annex or prolongation of itself; they are incrustated in its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the World is made of the very stuff of the body. These reversals, these antinomies, are different ways of saying that vision is caught or comes to be in things—in that place where something visible undertakes to see, becomes visible to itself and in the sight of all things, in that place where there persists, like the original solution still present within crystal, the undividedness [*l'indivision*] of the sensing and the sensed. (Ponty, 1964, pp. 162—163)

This is the very concurrence of the *seer* and the *visible* and the intertwined state of the *visible* and the *invisible*. Ponty says that the human body is here. It is where it is and its vitality is not due to its parts or organs being held together.

There is a human body when, between the seeing and the seen, between touching and the touched, between one eye and the other, between hand and hand, a blending of some sort takes place—when the spark is lit between sensing and sensible, lighting the fire that will

not stop burning until some accident of the body will undo what no accident would have sufficed to do... (Ponty, 1964, pp. 163—164)

If, Ponty says, the *things* and the *body* are made of the same fabric, then the body's *seeing* must happen in the *things*. It is as if they transmit their visibilities to one another. Again, we can say that Ponty defines the *body* as an object of experience and describes the acts of seeing and signifying as the embodiments of our perception and experiences. He points out that Cezanne's work, who says that "Nature is on the inside" (Ponty, 1964, p. 164), denotes the *body's* seeing or being seen. According to Ponty, the *body* is plural to the extent that it is singular. Therefore, the spectator who looks at an artwork in which the artist's experiences become visible also looks for those belong to his/her own *body*. For this reason, both the artist's acts of seeing and representing and the spectator's efforts to perceive, alternating between the artwork and her/his personal experiences, are meaningful insofar as they force each other into a new mental state. Ponty further explains the argument as follows:

I would be at great pains to say *where* is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do at a thing; I do not fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it. (Ponty, 1964, p. 164)

Ponty says that we can look for the philosophical aspect of the figuration of what is seen by the painter when we look at paintings. He says that the digestion of empty interiors by the "round eye of the mirror" in many Dutch paintings is not coincidental. It is the painter's symbolization of what is comprehended abstractly. The specular image is the sight of things with the use of light and dark and reflections. And it is explained by Ponty as follows:

Every technique is a "technique of the body." A technique outlines and amplifies the metaphysical structure of our flesh. The mirror appears because I am seeing-visible [*voyant-visible*], because there is a

reflexivity of the sensible; the mirror translates and reproduces that reflexivity. My outside completes itself in and through the sensible. Everything I have that is most secret goes into this *visage*, this face, this flat and closed entity about which my reflection in the water has already made me puzzle. (Ponty, 1964, p. 168)

Artists very well exemplify the relational state of the *things* and the *bodies* they affect. What does a painter want from a *thing*? A mountain's features that are before the artist's eyes, namely its lights, shades, reflections and color, with which it makes itself visible to the artist, are not real; the mountain is merely a visual being with these. Ponty says that the way the artist sees its features questions how it affects what s/he does to show us the existence and visibility of the mountain. This questioning further complicates the ambiguous relation between the painter and the visible. They might switch roles in time, in fact, many painters said that the *things* look at them. Andre Marchand says, "In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the forest. Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, were speaking to me... I was there, listening... I think that the painter must be penetrated by the universe and not want to penetrate it... I expect to be inwardly submerged, buried. Perhaps I paint to break out". (Ponty, 1964, p. 167) At this point, Ponty says that "Entity" really does inhale and exhale. Moreover, the entity penetrates to the body of the *seer* and the *visible* to the extent that one cannot tell who sees and who is seen, or who paints and who is painted due to this intertwined state. He explains that this obscurity is like an ongoing birth in the painter's sight. We can further understand his point with the help of his remarks on learning how to see the world:

...from classical to modern was marked by what might be thought of as a reawakening of the world of perception. We are once more learning to see the world around us, the same world which we had turned away from in the conviction that our senses had nothing worthwhile to tell us, sure as we were that only strictly objective knowledge was worth holding onto. We are rediscovering our interest in the space in which we are situated. Though we see it only from a limited perspective – our perspective – this space is nevertheless where we reside and we relate

to it through our bodies. We are rediscovering in every object a certain style of being that makes it a mirror of human modes of behaviour. So the way we relate to the things of the world is no longer as a pure intellect trying to master an object or space that stands before it. Rather, this relationship is an ambiguous one, between beings who are both embodied and limited and an enigmatic world of which we catch a glimpse (indeed which we haunt incessantly) but only ever from points of view that hide as much as they reveal, a world in which every object displays the human face it acquires in a human gaze. (Ponty, 2004, pp. 69—70)

Although seeing the world vaguely, one constantly haunts it, seeing it from one's own perspective. So, what does a human look like from the outside then? Ponty, with this question and his statements above, discusses how the human/the other is perceived by "the other". If one sees the visible with one's body in all circumstances (e.g. time, space, movement, motion) at the point one stands, then, how is one seen by the "visible"? The idea that one is both seeing and being seen leads to the conception of the human and thus questioning the *other*. The question here reminds us of the examinations of human existence done for centuries. Such as Descartes's reflections on the *soul* and the *body*. Ponty exemplifies Descartes's conception of the *soul* which asserts that it can have its own distinctive nature and which overcame the notion of the *soul* as something evanescent like a breath. Ponty says, "...for smoke and breath are, in their way, things – even if very subtle ones – whereas spirit is not a thing at all, does not occupy space, is not spread over a certain extension as all things are, but on the contrary is entirely compact and indivisible – a being – the essence of which is none other than to commune with, collect and know itself." (Ponty, 2004, p. 82) This way of treatment of the *soul* is surely just the beginning of the journey of understanding the human's relations with the others. Therefore, Ponty goes on to say:

....Yet it is clear that I can only find and, so to speak, touch this absolutely pure spirit in myself. Other human beings are never pure spirit for me: I only know them through their glances, their gestures,

their speech – in other words, through their bodies. (Ponty, 2004, p. 82)

In order to define a person, we need his/her *body* that has many of his/her characteristics within itself. In this sense, it is obviously difficult to distinguish another person by means of their voice, accent or silhouette. For this reason, he points out that the information learned through experience cannot be equivalent to the information learned from others in terms of defining a person. According to him, seeing another person even just for a minute can be enough to conceive and define that person. This shows us that another person is also a *body* with a *soul* in our eyes. It is their appearance before us with all the possibilities (the soul has) within their body. In this respect, we need to think carefully of the difference between the *soul* and the *body* when we talk about seeing others. Ponty explains this approach by a truly detailed example:

Imagine that I am in the presence of someone who, for one reason or another, is extremely annoyed with me. My interlocutor gets angry and I notice that he is expressing his anger by speaking aggressively, by gesticulating and shouting. But where is this anger? People will say that it is in the mind of my interlocutor. What this means is not entirely clear. For I could not imagine the malice and cruelty which I discern in my opponent's looks separated from his gestures, speech and body. None of this takes place in some other Worldly realm, in some shrine located beyond the body of the angry man. (Ponty, 2004, p. 83)

If the thing we call anger is a thought after all, this thought would not be found in any matter, just as other thoughts. In this sense, even though we say that anger comes from the *soul*, this is not enough to indicate whether it is inside or outside the body. This is because a person who feels angry would not say that anger is outside her/his body despite thinking that it is not in any matter. That is to say that one who feels the anger feels it within her/his body. Resolving this complexity and ambiguity, namely drawing definite lines between the *mind* and the *body* is difficult, but it is not

impossible, it can be done. Ponty says that although the *mind* and *body* seem to be united, we can consider this complexity as “a *mind attached to the system of the body in some way*” and that this thought would harm neither the structure of the *body* nor the transparency of the *mind*.

What we have discussed thus far was an introduction to the perception and positioning of the “*visible*” with the help of Ponty’s reflections on the *mind* and the *body*. In the next part, we will refer to Ponty again, trying to analyze a thinking practice on how we should perceive the *mind/body* relationship and taking a detailed look at the *observer* who participates in and is exposed to the *act of seeing* and who is the subject of the act of seeing. The structure of Ponty’s discussions will facilitate a transition to Deleuze’s approach. Thus we will analyze the problematic of representation through the *observer*, reading how the *mind* and the *body* are interpreted in philosophical thought in different ways in the process of “signification” we started with the help of Ponty’s philosophy and proceed with the journey of the image.

### **1.2.2. The Problem of Observer**

The physical appearance of a person is certainly not a matter of one person. The matter here is the discussion of the two different roles of the *body/mind* which both performs and is exposed to the act of observation. In this activity of at least two people, the two parties, namely the “*observer* and *observed*” are equally active because every *observer* is the *observed* and every *observed* is the *observer*.

The definition of the *observer* is “a person who watches or notices something.”<sup>4</sup> Whereas it is difficult to deduce whether the observer is effected by the act of observation from this general definition, we can find a deeper meaning when we think of the act of observation in a philosophical context. Here the process will start as a way of thinking and become intertwined with the representation and art, and it will proceed with the *interpretation* and *expression* of the *things* in various forms of articulation. Then, every detail that give meaning to the *thing* will not be able to be regarded independent from its constituent elements but will exist together with each of its parts.

To elaborate further, Ponty’s act of *observation* is based on the union of the *mind* and the *body* with a possibility in which many *observers* can be subjects simultaneously. The union of the soul and the body in terms of thinking and their infinite mobility should be free. Ponty’s thinking practice as to seeing and problematic of the representation is one that opens up and even goes beyond itself. Here, it will be helpful to refer to Jonathan Crary to understand Ponty’s observer better. Crary’s treatment of act of observation and his explanations in his essay *Camera Obscura*, in which he says that the observer gains his/her freedom/individuality for the first time, involve the very conceptuality Ponty criticizes. His statement “experiencing freedom for the first time” means “limitation to freedom” in Ponty’s philosophy. At this point, these two discussions will provide alternative perspectives for comparison in order to know in what aspects we can examine the function and potential of the body as to the problematic of observation, thus helping us understand how to consider and how not to treat Ponty’s observer.

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<sup>4</sup> The Oxford Dictionaries website.

Jonathan Crary (1951) is an art critic known for his works on photography and art as well as being a professor of art history and an editor. In his book *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century* (1990), he discusses models of vision and modernity in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and introduces a new type of observer. He wrote on many issues ranging from measurability of vision to the invention of optical instruments and approaches to the body and knowledge, focusing on the change in representation practices and the concept of the observer which he considers problematic.

Crary, constructing the act of observation within *Camera Obscura*, regards it as a process that exists upon the observer's experience with the outsider/other. According to him, the act of observation takes place in *Camera Obscura* in its purest and insulated form and the "process of thinking" that requires a mental clarity is also experienced there. *Camera Obscura* is the only place where seeing can be comprehended and represented purely. The one in the position of the *observer* gains subjectivity and importance in terms of understanding and even defining the relationship between oneself and the world. The importance in question here stems from fact that this the first steps of individuation process. The person who is the observer is alone with the world outside before his/her eyes, being away from the surrounding crowd in a place isolated from the dynamics of the outer world for the first time. This privacy will make the *observer* think more. The observer in the *Camera Obscura* is free, while at the same time, s/he is the symbol of a subject taken away from the external world and put in an enclosed space. Crary explains this saying "At the same time, another related and equally decisive function of the camera was to sunder the act of seeing from the physical body of the observer, to decorporealize vision." (Crary, 1992, p. 39) He discusses the observer's physical (*body*) and sensory (*mind*) experiences—for which Ponty used the words *body* and *mind*—, namely the relations between a mechanical apparatus (*Camera Obscura*) and a pre-given objective reality (external world) through an eye and a plane and, he explains how, at the same time, the

observer becomes problematic as part of the representation in accordance with his/her position (where her/his body stands).

When we start reading *Camera Obscura* through Ponty's philosophy, beginning with the statement above, the concepts of observations/observers come to an impasse. The argument that multiple *observers* can simultaneously be subjects and possible acts of seeing can take place at any time becomes meaningless. As opposed to Ponty's account of the body involving the intertwined state of seeing and being seen namely the painter and the painted penetrating each other, the relation is between the insider and the outsider in Crary's *observer*, thus Ponty's mutual interaction does not take place in it. The insider can see the outsider but the outsider cannot see the insider. Moreover, the insider's act of seeing the outsider is limited by *Camera Obscura*. The *body* which constantly effects and is effected by the "things" in Ponty's account can no longer effect or be effected by the "things" here due to the *Camera Obscura* that connects and blocks. Crary holds that sundering the act of seeing from the body and decorporealizing it affects the thinking process and ascribes this to experiencing. However, this thought does not fit in with Ponty's approach that "While seeing what is physical, one tries to comprehend the visibility in "thought" in his comparison of the "I" and the "other". This is because, according to Ponty, one becomes the observer by means of "experiencing" and actively being at the "heart of the experience". Ponty places importance on art while explaining this experiencing. According to him, art is a privileged and significant way of learning on the path to clarity and it is the reality of existence in this sense. Ponty's observer does not only see *things* but also is seen by them and thinks about them during all her/his mobile and changeable acts of observation. Yet the *body* in *Camera Obscura* is exposed to a limited number of sights for its sight is restricted to available angles depending on the place and form. Crary's idea of an objective sight that is free from all kinds of influences through a "pinhole" provided by the camera and a fixed position is

considered rather restrictive in Ponty's argument of a mobile and influenced perception of the motions and actions of the outer world/other observers. In fact, these two thinking practices oppose each other in terms of their approaches to the observer.

To go into more detail; while seeing what is physical, one tries to comprehend the visibility in “thought” as in Ponty’s comparison of the “I” and the “other”. Ponty’s conceiving of the *body* as a being in a way that does not leave the *mind* alone makes us think about the act of seeing itself, bringing the idea of a new kind of intentionality that helps us understand and even challenge the traces/particles of things in the image and the limits of the representation in sight. The way we position the *things* which penetrate/touch us and which we feel/see through an artwork by way of the new thinking practices and ideas and the *things* such as words, sentences, concepts, and dialogs that we are exposed to and interact with through sights in everyday life find their places in an unlimited fluid form in mind together with our position as an observer. We will refer to Deleuze again, who opened the problem of representation up for discussion in a way that does not limit the fluid form of thinking, being influenced by Ponty, and later dealt with the image through the *body* with his approach to affect in his work on Bergson. Thus we will elaborate further on our analysis to understand the image and we will make a meaningful transition to other analyses on semiotics in order to discuss a new kind of visible/invisible through signs again. This is because we will need to comparatively examine many transitive and tangential concepts and have knowledge of what could possibly underlie the new ways of thinking Deleuze intended to bring into ontology so that we can read the relations between “*seeing*” and imagination. Therefore, we will establish a meaningful connection while transiting to the problematic of “representation/s of image/s”, expanding on the discussion of the body from a Deleuzian perspective in the next part of the text.

### 1.2.3. Gilles Deleuze's Approach

The “body” discussion is involved in Deleuze’s philosophy as well. Most of the philosophical approaches to the mind and the body used to regard what is transcendental (intellect, consciousness, mind, soul) as “valuable/noble” while not regarding the body (matter, flesh) as equally noble, particularly in the discussion of transcendence–immanence. Deleuze explained this with the concept of “representation”. The Spinozan, Nietzschean and Deleuzian approaches pointing out the necessity of a new way of thinking about the body to understand the transcendental rehandle the “body” through a powerful conception and awareness within its own context. Their approaches regard the uniqueness and desire of the transcendental as a deceptive idea and focus on the body within the frame of on the plane of immanence.

Deleuze was influenced by Merleau–Ponty’s philosophy, namely his works “on seeing”. We can explain Deleuze’s and Ponty’s approaches as follows:

He uses the concept of nature similar to Ponty, who extends it, and tries to elicit the sources of normative criticism. Ponty handles the body as an organic entity. Eventually, by leaving the idea that it is linked to an absolute result in organic thought, the world is perceived as ambiguous in even its irreducibly most readable form and as a dynamic and living flesh which not only includes organic connections but also inorganic connections. Deleuze overcomes the nature as a world of separate objects by going in the opposite direction which is machinic. He establishes an identity relationship between the terms: nature, industry, and culture. He aims to eliminate the difference between poesis which comes from Ancient Greece and located in nature and poesis which means manufacturing something. Thus, there is no longer a nature apart from the artificial one. The reason of this approach is that the distinction between the natural and artificial is not a useful distinction. With this move of his, he can be accepted to reject Western Philosophy tradition. Of course in this tradition, there are Cartesian philosophers who consider that distinguishing the body from

the mind is more important than distinguishing it from the artificial things. These philosophers developed a mechanical body comprehension. However, Deleuze is against their separation of mind/body and he does not separate the mind from the machinic one. (Direk, 2013)

It will be useful to cite the following passage at this point in order to extend Deleuze's account of representation dealing with the unity of the artificial and the natural as well as the machinery as a preface to the practice of representation we will address in subsequent parts:

While representation is always a social and psychic repression of desiring–production, it should be borne in mind that this repression is exercised in very diverse ways, according to the social formation considered. The system of representation comprises three elements that vary in depth: the repressed representative, the repressing representation, and the displaced represented. But the agents (*les instances*) that come to carry them into effect are themselves variable; there are migrations in the system. We see no reason for believing in the universality of one and the same apparatus of sociocultural repression (*refoulement*). (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 184)<sup>5</sup>

Deleuze focuses on the concept of the rhizome as well in his collaborative work with Félix Guattari (1930—1992). The aim is to understand the thought's and the body's relations with other thoughts and bodies. That is to say that certain points of rhizomes may be connected to each other despite not being in a fixed order. Any point of a rhizome can be interrupted, also, there is no such thing as a fixed rhizome. The plane of context/relation, to which we try to give meaning using the rhizome metaphor, is actually the very self of the events, the occurrences. The rhizome is a network that enables things to connect with one another. It is a thought power that mobilizes the bodies between the bodies. To go into more detail on the subject with the help of

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<sup>5</sup> Chapter: "Territorial Representation"

Adrian Parr:

Rhizome describes the connections that occur between the most disparate and the most similar of objects, places and people; the strange chains of events that link people: the feeling of “six degrees of separation”, the sense of having been here before and assemblages of bodies. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “rhizome” draws from its etymological meaning, where “rhizo” means combining form and the biological term “rhizome” describes a form of plant that can extend itself through its underground horizontal tuber-like root system and develop new plants. In Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term, the rhizome is a concept that maps a process of networked, relational and transversal thought, and a way of being without “tracing” the construction of that map as a fixed identity. (D&G, 1987: 12) Ordered lineages of bodies and ideas that trace their ordinary and individual basis are considered as forms of “aborescent” thought, and this metaphor of a tree-like structure that orders epistemologies and forms historical frames an homogeneous schemata, is invoked by Deleuze and Guattari to describe everything that rhizomatic thought is not. In addition, Deleuze and Guattari describe the rhizome as an action of many abstract entities in the world, including music, mathematics, economics, politics, science, art, the ecology and the cosmos. The rhizome conceives how everything and everybody– all aspects of concrete and abstract and virtual entities and activities– can be seen as multiple in their interrelational movements with other things and bodies. The nature of the rhizome is that of a moving matrix, composed of organic and non-organic parts forming symbiotic and apperellel connections, according to transitory and as yet undetermined roots. (D & G, 1987: 10). Such a reconceptualization constitutes a revolutionary philosophy for the reassessment of any form of hierarchical thought, history or activity. (What is the Rizom? — Felicity J. Colman, 2014)<sup>6</sup>

One needs to think about the mobility in the intricate process within the spiral structure of the rhizome to understand the passage above. The unity of the organic and the inorganic, namely the Deleuzian view of nature together with the machinery,

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<sup>6</sup> This text was translated into Turkish by Oğuz Karayemiş from The Deleuze Dictionary prepared by Adrian Parr.

and Ponty's treatment of the body together with its connection to the other take us to the past of the "sight". Thus we keep searching for the "zero point" when we travel back to the birth of the thought that is in constant motion. However, the important thing here is not to define or identify that point but to be conscious of the value of the thought itself and even its image and not to fall into contradiction. That's the reason why the *image* will no longer correspond only to the *signs* as it is not merely a *sight* before one's eyes. The *image* is the outermost or perhaps the innermost set of the connections between the components of the *eye* and the *mind* that are explored here. Yet this general set or special set will constantly rotate on its axis, travel in space and hit the *seer*. In this sense, the *image* now shows its new systems that will repair damage caused by its use in lieu of many things anywhere as if it were the common denominator of many different meanings. The image no longer exists on a plane of mere visibility but it is conceptualized as an issue in itself by virtue of a new kind of classification. For this reason, we will examine the image in more detail in the next part of the text.

### 1.3. THE IMAGE AS A PROBLEMATIC

*"Every thought is a sign."* —Charles Sanders Peirce

The practice of painting, being frequently referred to in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, through which we try to understand the world of perception that is all around and above the world of thought/sight, which makes up space and is inherent in the unity of the knowledge and the human being, may position us against the material world. This is because, says Ponty:

In the work of Cézanne, Juan Gris, Braque and Picasso, in different ways, we encounter objects – lemons, mandolins, bunches of grapes,

pouches of tobacco – that do not pass quickly before our eyes in the guise of objects we “know well” but, on the contrary, hold our gaze, ask questions of it, convey to it in a bizarre fashion the very secret of their substance, the very mode of their material existence and which, so to speak, stand “bleeding” before us. This was how painting led us back to a vision of things themselves. (Ponty, 2004, p. 93)

That’s the reason why the philosophy of perception which wants to see the world anew penetrates painting. This is the point where the painting recalls the “*image*” it depicts to the seer’s mind, going beyond its concrete existence and volume while we hear the image’s footsteps gradually getting louder. In this sense, this is the most important benefit of studying the philosophy of perception:

We have discovered that it is impossible, in this world, to separate things from their way of appearing. Of course, when I give a dictionary definition of a table – a horizontal flat surface supported by three or four legs, which can be used for eating off, reading a book on, and so forth – I may feel that I have got, as it were, to the essence of the table; I withdraw my interest from all the accidental properties which may accompany that essence, such as the shape of the feet, the style of the molding and so on. In this example, however, I am not perceiving but rather defining. (Ponty, 2004, p. 94)

The moment that a table is perceived beyond its definition, it is no longer possible to be indifferent to its function. Accessing its information means being aware of its capacity with all of its properties and all variations it is able to be. This awareness is beyond accessing information about what any table is able to do, and what distinguishes a table from *another* is its own properties, namely its capacity. When we look at a table’s properties, none of the details we see are pointless or too much — the wood being new/old, the color, or the marks left on it. The table, with all the details, is the embodiment of the immediate existence of the word “table” in terms of its meaning and that body is composed of “details”. Therefore, when someone says “the table” in a place where there is more than one table, we can find out what the

word “table” refers to at that instant by asking the question “Which table?”. When comparing “something” with “the other” in the world of things, the answers for the question “which” are found in the details of things. In this respect, every detail, every piece helps us understand both the thing itself and its relation to the other. The answer to “Which table?” can be “old, brown, wooden table” or “old, brown, round, wooden table”. All the details mentioned depend on the sight of other things around the table. The description of the table in question varies according to the properties of the others nearby. That is to say, if there is nothing new around it or all the tables are round, then giving such information would be pointless due to lack of any distinguishing details; hence, other details should be indicated. Therefore, we can say that things are related to the others around them and their images are affected by their surroundings.

It is of great importance that perception has such an intricate presence in space and things. A mind that follows perception is prepared to give meaning to things. This is the matter of signification, which we come across while looking at an artwork. For instance, we comprehend that a painting —the artwork—, by its nature, is meant to be seen and heard as well as objects of perception, things, and others, when we understand that the meaning of a painting —as a whole with its flesh— does not wander freely in space, rather, it exists with all its details and the traces of all signs. And the most valuable form of comprehension is the one that is experienced, in other words, the one we are directly involved in. In this sense, defining the word image<sup>7</sup>, which we frequently refer to in order to understand things, and limiting the scope of the perception of the image are rather difficult and complex tasks. Ponty explains this

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<sup>7</sup> OED: 1. A representation of the external form of a person or thing in art.  
1.5. A mental representation or idea.  
2. The general impression that a person, organization, or product presents to the public.  
3. A simile or metaphor.

complexity as follows:

The word "image" is in bad repute because we have thoughtlessly believed that a drawing was a tracing, a copy, a second thing, and that the mental image was such a drawing, belonging among our private bric-a-brac. But if in fact it is nothing of the kind, then neither the drawing nor the painting belongs to the in-itself any more than the image does. They are the inside of the outside and the outside of the inside, which the duplicity of feeling [*le sentir*] makes possible and without which we would never understand the quasi presence and imminent visibility which make up the whole problem of the imaginary. (Ponty, 1964, p. 164)

On the other hand, seeing things from our perspective, we only say that “the image exists” when we start to get to know the “things” and think about their meanings. This is because things do not take shape merely by means of their existence. The image of a thing is formed in the mind. This perspective, inherited from Descartes, is where the signs of seeing are in the mind. Although it seems like we understand an image by means of the “outward” we see, the outward/surface/appearance becomes a thing only when its image is familiar or connected with. Ponty says,

For the imaginary is much nearer to, and much farther away from, the actual that is, what is resemblance for me: something which makes me discover more of the world. (Ponty, 1964, pp. 164—165)

The specular image is not a thing per se.

On the other hand, if we continue handling the problematic of image through a Deleuzian approach, we find that he refers to the American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839—1914) who is one of the founders of semiotics that has both the most general and the most specific approach to *images* and *signs*. A *sign*, above all, is a form of representation, according to Peirce who famously stated “To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves.” Peirce uses the term

*representamen*, one of the key concepts in his theory, as a synonym for “sign”. We can read his reflections on representation and sign in the following passage:

Peirce: CP 2.228 Cross-Ref:

A sign, or *representamen*, is something *which* stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man's idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the interval a new idea. (Peirce, 1931—1935, p. 1218)

We see his approach to the term “sign” in his statement where he defines it using the concepts of *sign*, *interpretant*, and *object*. According to Peirce, who says that the most important thing that determines the meaning of a sign is its effect on the interpreter of it, a sign is a law, namely a rule. The rule can be the sign itself and the thing called rule is made up by people. Peirce's concepts and his approach to them in terms of human experiences, however, give rise to contradictions and gaps. Peirce differentiates between three types of signs: legisigns, qualisigns, and sinsigns. He explains the latter two concepts as follows: A qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It concerns an object's characteristics. A sinsign is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. This expression indicates that he was not able to differentiate between sinsign and qualisign properly and clearly. To quote from his writings in full:

Peirce: CP 2.244 Cross-Ref: A *Qualisign* is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign.

Peirce: CP 2.245 Cross-Ref: A *Sinsign* (where the syllable *sin* is taken as meaning "being only once," as in *single*, *simple*, Latin *semel*, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.

Peirce: CP 2.246 Cross-Ref: A *Legisign* is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by men. Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not conversely]. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a *Replica* of it. Thus, the word "the" will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a *Replica*. The *Replica* is a *Sinsign*. Thus, every *Legisign* requires *Sinsigns*. But these are not ordinary *Sinsigns*, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant. Nor would the *Replica* be significant if it were not for the law which renders it so. (Peirce, 1931—1935, p. 1563)

According to Peirce, a sign can be anything that substitutes for something. The sign of a *thing*, within its own context, can be anything that substitutes for that *thing*. One can receive signs by the use of any of the senses and can be exposed to them. His theory also involves some ambiguities for it is based on human experiences and effects. This is because we can only concretely comprehend signs by the use of the senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. We shall refer to the following statement by Peirce, who says that the most important thing that determines the meaning of a sign is its effect on the interpreter of it, to better understand him:

Peirce: CP 8.177 Cross-Ref: [My definition of a sign is:] A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e., specialized, *bestimmt*,) by something *other than itself*, called its Object, while, on

the other hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by the Object. (Peirce, 1931—1935, p. 4856) (Peirce, 1931—1935)

Peirce has walked on the edges of the image and the representation with his statements on signs. Therefore, mentioning Peirce’s semiotic process graph will be useful in this part of the text and help us better understand what mainly influenced Deleuze in his writings.




Figure 1.1

Semiotic process consists of the relations between the “representamen” (oneness), the “object” (twoness) and the “interprétant” (threeness). Peirce says that the conceptual relationship, as shown in the graph, is composed of three elements. The *signifier* is a sign, because Peirce considers each of these three concepts, which constitute the *sign*, as a sign in itself. In other words, “signifier” is a “thing” that shows another “thing”, according to him. *Signifier* is an entity itself even before it comes to the person who interprets the sign of the object and it is the first one as indicated in the definition.

And *object* is the *thing* the sign shows. Sign/representamen shows an object but does not define it. If an object is priorly known by its interpreter, then, some thoughts concerning the object arise in his/her mind. In that case, the signifying thing gives rise to the details that will make up the thought depending on the familiarity and depth of the signified thing. The signified object is called a “direct object” if the interpreter does not priorly have its information, and it is called a “mobile object” if the interpreter already has its information and s/he can define the meaning of the sign. *Concept* (interprétant) refers to an interpreter’s producing a concept by interpreting a sign. The concept in question here acts as an explainer of an object, and also, it can be the sign of another interprétant that explains the same concept. A concept will be explained by another concept as and when needed and it will be the sign of the object it expresses when needed. We can refer to the following graph to exemplify this:




Figure 1.2

Images touch the mind, take form and find meaning, following a process in which they are presented by *expressions in the mind* (concept/interprétant) by means of *written/verbal/vocal* signifiers (signifier/representamen) to become *information objects* (object) in the interpreter’s (the person who perceives them) mind. In the

representation, they find different meanings in different conditions depending on whether they have a history and information or not. To elaborate further:



**Figure 1.3:** This Is Not A Pipe, René Magritte, 1928—1929. “The treachery of images”  
(French: La trahison des images)

The sign itself is not the thing it signifies, it is another thing that evokes the thing. The most appropriate example for this argument could be Magritte’s painting which reads “This is not a pipe” (*Ceci n’est pas une pipe*). The painting that is hung on the wall and that signifies and depicts a pipe is not an actual pipe. However, what it evokes, namely an image of a pipe, in the seer’s mind is nearly equivalent to the sight of an actual pipe. The painting on the wall can represent a typical pipe or all other kinds of pipes (with different colors, sizes, materials, etc.) in the seer’s eyes. Yet this

sight is an expression and also the representation of the signified object's image in the artist's mind. For a person/interpreter who does not have the information of a pipe or a history with a pipe, this painting with the writing on it will not be a representation; therefore, what we call signification will hang in the air and the painting will not evoke any feelings in the spectator's mind due to an unrealized or uncompleted sequence of sign/reading. (This takes us to Deleuze's essential argument based on the *representability* and *non—representability* of the image, the argument which he advanced with the help of Bergson's writings on *memory*. Of course, at this point, it is necessary to discover ways to access the information of the mind and *things* in thought that *belong to the mind*, rather than the body and *things that belong to the body*. Thus we understand the nature of the information of things in the mind; that is, they constantly divide, change and even have the potential to break. Here we see that this potential is dynamic and changeable and critically important because of these characteristics. From another aspect, we also think about the image's movement, examining in detail the critical presence of *things* in the mind together with the image discussion under the topic of "time—image". And this way of thinking provides us with a deeper perspective.

We can cite the following passage to read the conceptual complexity we frequently come across in the definition of image and the question "What is an image really?" through Bergson:

We will assume for the moment that we know nothing of theories of matter and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to the reality or ideality of the external world. Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the word, images perceived when my senses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed. All these images act and react upon one another in all their elementary parts according to constant laws which I call laws of nature, and, as a perfect knowledge of these laws would probably allow us to calculate and to

foresee what will happen in each of these images, the future of the images must be contained in their present and will add to them nothing new. Yet there is one of them which is distinct from all the others, in that I do not know it only from without by perceptions, but from within by affections: it is my body. (Bergson, 2005, p. 17)<sup>8</sup>

...  
Let us hold to the appearances; I will formulate purely and simply what I feel and what I see: *All seems to take place as if, in this aggregate of images which I call the universe, nothing really new could happen except through the medium of certain particular images, the type of which is furnished me by my body.* (Bergson, 2005, p. 18)

Deleuze's thoughts on the problem of imagination and "movement" was influenced by Bergson's writings. Here, we need to briefly refer to Bergson to explain Deleuze's approach. According to Bergson, *movement* is the matter itself. It is a flow without a stagnation point. It is an endless process. If this flow is interrupted at any point for any reason, what arises is nothing other than "perception". This nature of perception can be considered as a whole including our reactions for it acts as both the receiver and the giver. This whole is the definition of consciousness given by Bergson. The following sentence from the preface in Bergson's *Matter and Memory* helps us understand his approach to the image:

...For common sense, then, the object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image. (Bergson, 2005, p. 10)

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<sup>8</sup> The second sentence of *Matter and Memory* reads "Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the word, images perceived when my senses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed." Bergson's *image* is not limited to the plane of visibility. In this sense it is not only an *image*. Later, Bergson uses the expression "...in this aggregate of images which I call the universe...". He states that "the brain is an image". Bergson separates the "external images" from the "internal images". He considers what he calls the "cerebral concussion" an image. My own "body" is an image itself and the image in question here is not the image of my body at all! Although he does not define it as such, the *image* in Bergson is an ontological base. It is a wholist ontological base including the perceived and the unperceived, and the visible and the invisible. (Deleuze, 2014, p. 9. Translator's note to the Turkish edition)

Bergson says that the body is composed of images that exist within movements and affects and is affected by other bodies. He speaks of a mobility of constant input–output where images are received from and given back to the outside, stating that the body is a *mobile image* just as other images moving in the aggregate of the material world. However, he points out a difference here and explains it as follows:

My body is, then, in the aggregate of the material world, an image which acts like other images, receiving and giving back movement, with, perhaps, this difference only, that my body appears to choose, within certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives. But how could my body in general, and my nervous system in particular, beget the whole or a part of my representation of the universe? You may say that my body is matter, or that it is an image: the word is of no importance. If it is matter, it is a part of the material world; and the material world, consequently, exists around it and without it. If it is an image, that image can give but what has been put into it, and since it is, by hypothesis, the image of my body only, it would be absurd to expect to get from it that of the whole universe. *My body, an object destined to move other objects, is, then, a centre of action; it cannot give birth to a representation.*

But if my body is an object capable of exercising a genuine and therefore a *new* action upon the surrounding objects, it must occupy a privileged position in regard to them. As a rule, any image influences other images in a manner which is determined, and even calculable, through what are called the laws of nature. (Bergson, 2005, pp. 19-20)

According to Deleuze, however, in consciousness there are only images and in space there are only movements. Movements are extended in consciousness, while images do not have extension in space. He explains the relation between these two concepts through the philosophical context of cinema. According to Deleuze, who reads this context through Bergson again, cinema is a form of art which has the potential to produce its own evidence of a movement–image. The image in thought exists by means of intuitions and observations, whereas the image in cinema is comprehended directly by virtue of its auditory and visual presentation. Just as in Bergson’s concept

of duration. He introduced the notion of temporality of the living in a direct way as opposed to modern science's indirect and linear conception of time. Thus, indirectness provided by cinema, just as duration, intersects with the image in movement. Cinema is a practice of representation. It is alive and has an obscure effect in which invisible becomes visible. Cinema shows us the image through the representer's mind, namely her/his thought. It is a high-capacity form of art in which the representer/director makes us feel the images of things and conveys them to us, sometimes through concepts or indirect narration without showing them, and sometimes by showing them as they are.

In order to exemplify this, we can continue with cinema, referring to two directors' works in terms of their handling with the concepts that enter the frame and those do not. Claude Lanzmann's "*Shoah*" and László Nemes's "*Son of Saul*" are two significant films that make us think deeply about their way of representing. Their cinematic language has a striking effect on the audience. This effect is in accordance with how the directors narrate the images in their minds, in other words, how they are reflected in the practice of representation. In the subsequent parts of this text, we will try to understand in detail how the image in thought finds its place in the practice of cinema on the basis of Deleuze's cinema approach that invites us to a mental process. From this point of view, we will try to examine in detail how the image in thought finds its place in the practice of cinema in the subsequent parts of this text. For this reason, we will start to get to know the two significant films in general terms and elucidate what cinema's vitality means through a close reading of the practices of representation in the following parts.

Shoah (1985) is a Franco–British documentary film directed by Claude Lanzmann; it is about the Holocaust and runs for 9.5 hours<sup>9</sup>. The film features highly striking scenes and Simon Srebnik (1930 – 2006) and Mordechai Podchlebnik (1907—1985) as witnesses. The “*Chełmno extermination camp*”, one of the topics in the film, is in Poland.



**Figure 1.4:** Chełmno extermination camp. Wall at the spot where Jews were buried after they were killed in the forest (Photo Credit: Alan Collins)

Shoah (1985) is a Franco–British documentary film directed by Claude Lanzmann; it is about the Holocaust and runs for 9.5 hours<sup>10</sup>. The film features highly striking scenes and Simon Srebnik (1930 – 2006) and Mordechai Podchlebnik (1907—1985) as witnesses. The “*Chełmno extermination camp*”, one of the topics in the film, is in Poland. Even the title, "Shoah", meaning “calamity” in Hebrew, has a representation that suggests the weight carried by the film. Telling the story of the Holocaust, the

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<sup>9</sup> France: 613 minutes, United States: 503 minutes, United Kingdom: 566 minutes, Sweden: 544 minutes

<sup>10</sup> France: 613 minutes, United States: 503 minutes, United Kingdom: 566 minutes, Sweden: 544 minutes

documentary maintains a significant stance with its stillness (!) and the way it uses “sound”. This is because what is seen within the frame, which hits our minds, are vocalized with the help of recollection and narration of witnesses. We can say that the level and affect of the sound surely participates in the film with a hair-raising literalness and engages us, the audience, in. The simplicity of what we see throughout the film, in an untouched manner, penetrates the spectator’s feelings/memory through a minimalist narration. In the film, the silence of the “sound” hangs in the air and constantly implies a potential affect, “as if” it is coming up in the next second. Here, we see a representation that represents itself in silence, despite creating an expectation that there will be screaming anytime. This way of representation makes us listen to the “non-representable” sufferings and happenings that permeated the place. The film provides the spectator with a watching experience in which it is watched while listening and listened while watching. At this point, we can say that watching has the power to effect all of the senses. The presence of this power supports the saying we emphasize repeatedly: “The image in thought exists by means of intuitions and observations, whereas the image in cinema is comprehended directly by virtue of its auditory and visual presentation”. We see, hear and feel the nature of cinema, deeply and indirectly penetrating our concepts, in Shoah in an uninterrupted manner. Possible interruptions in the film would be due to the spectator’s emotional load, state of immanence, or mental ambivalence.

Shoah does not give a sense of safety. The narrative of the film does not intend to develop the sense of safety the spectator wants. The control of the film is given to the spectator (controlling idea) in this sense. Thus the spectator remains in a state of flow and is on shaky ground under the influence of the frame. Lanzmann knows that the spectator will feel the power and affect of the “sight” in this way. Scenes with their simplicity give rise to meaningful questions in the spectator’s mind as the “sound” traumatizes the spectator. Our thoughts about the place that we try to enter through

Srebnik's and Podchlebnik's accounts collide with what we see. Lanzmann, while providing an objective narrative, hinders us from relating to the characters. This hindering in fact shows that there is another way of "understanding". This is the kind of narrative that leaves the spectators alone with what they watch in a way that it disturbs them and invites them to think. In other words, the distance between the spectator and the film is also an ideational closeness between them. Perhaps, rather than being in the film, the greatest collision concerning the film is between the spectator and the director! László Nemes, just as Lanzmann, wants to wipe away the established ordinariness in spectators' minds and invites his spectators to give meaning to what they see by means of another kind of practice. We see Nemes's effort clearly in *Son of Saul*. The narratives of the two directors, despite their different ways of representation, intersect in terms of the functions they attribute or do not attribute to cinema and what they expect from it, that is to be an activity that "leads to thinking".

*Son of Saul*<sup>11</sup> is the first feature-length film of the Hungarian director László Nemes. It features *Géza Röhrig* as the leading actor, playing the role of Saul Ausländer/Sonderkommando. Saul puzzles the spectator with his dull expression in every scene he is in. This is surely because of the place and the job Saul has to do impassively. Saul is a Hungarian-Jewish prisoner and member of Sonderkommando<sup>12</sup>, whose job is to burn the dead in the Auschwitz concentration camp in 1944. Especially in the first scenes of the film, we see him as a man who

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<sup>11</sup> *Son of Saul*, set in the Auschwitz concentration camp in 1944, tells the story of what Saul Ausländer (played by Géza Röhrig), a Hungarian member of the Sonderkommando, goes through after he comes upon the body of a boy whom he believes is his son.

<sup>12</sup> Sonderkommandos were work units made up of German Nazi death camp prisoners. They were composed of prisoners, usually Jews, who were forced, on threat of their own deaths, to aid with the disposal of gas chamber victims during the Holocaust. They were killed after a few months of working.

moves fast and silently with a dull impression and has gone through the same steps over and over again and got used to any kind of scene in the place and is highly capable of doing the job.



**Figure 1.5:** Son of Saul (Hungarian: Saul fia) is a 2015 Hungarian drama film directed by László Nemes and co-written by Nemes and Clara Royer

However, we also feel the presence of a deep and intense emotion (images) beneath what is seen (representation). This feeling disturbs us as in Shoah. We see an unreliable narration that does not make us feel safe again in this film. Nemes does not want to make the spectator feel safe just as Lanzmann, though they prefer different types of narration in terms of what they represent and what they do not. Throughout the film, Saul has a purpose which we find out about when he comes upon the body of a boy whom he believes is his son. He wants to keep the body from burning and secretly give it a proper Jewish burial, for which he needs a rabbi. We watch what risks Saul takes and what he goes through for this purpose through a constantly moving camera. While he tries to find a rabbi for his son's burial, he finds himself in the middle of a rebellion that is about to begin in the camp and the film continues in a dynamic manner.

Nemes, starting from the first scene, creates a sense of vagueness whereby the complexity of what is seen could have a meaningful effect on the spectator. The film starts with a blurry scene with a green area in the background. There is a figure

walking toward the camera and the picture gradually becomes clearer and then we see Saul's face. The camera (the spectator) is either opposite, beside or right behind Saul throughout the film. Therefore, the positioning and movement of the camera makes the spectator feel unsafe, constantly moving along with Saul. While the spectators feel Saul's steps physically, they have to think of the overwhelming effect of the place mentally. In the film which is shot from only a few different angles with constant camera movement, we mostly see Saul through the camera following behind him. Nemes, who used 400mm lens in the film, wants to deviate from the usual narration of the Holocaust, putting the setting into the background, in contrast to other Holocaust films. Thus the spectator, being right beside Saul, becomes a part of the camp along with him. The director's priority is what Saul goes through, his behaviour and his despairing acceptance. Thus the setting with the traces of the genocide is out-of-focus in the background. Yet what we see in the background, namely deaths and piles of dead bodies, has an effect on what we see in the foreground, thus having a great affect on the spectator. In the narration Nemes chose, the spectator tries to understand Saul now and then. However, there is also a fine line here. The spectator does not identify with him because they never feel safe. The identification is continuously interrupted and their connection gets damaged. Because the spectator keeps wondering what Saul's purpose is and cannot find a proper answer, an signification cannot start purely or continue uninterrupted throughout the film. After the film ends, the spectator's being alone with the film and the place and the events in which Saul takes part with his steps and gaze gain more meaning. At this point, we can say that the director's representation is not limited to what he shows, on the contrary, he makes the spectator feel the importance and the affect of what is not shown. Rather than Röhrig's acting or the chaos of the place that we see, what really makes the spectators think and connects them to the film is what we do not see. Saul's purpose, as an object of desire, shows us how human emotions are effected by place and time. The need for a purpose and/or a meaningful stance has the power to occupy the human mind in various ways. Saul's pursuit may seem like a

meaningless effort to the spectator due to the conditions in the film. However, Nemes's script and narration do the exact opposite of what we are used to seeing in Holocaust films, themes of which are hope, miracle, reunion, and freedom. The death of Saul's son after surviving miraculously is the reality itself, and we confront the reality once more. At that point, the spectator understands that there is no hope. In fact, they see and hear that Saul's strong pursuit of meaning cannot have a place in this world through a forceful conception of reality and a narration that goes beyond representation. At that point, if the spectators can make correct connections through Saul's discovery, they can read the film effectively, thus the transforming power of cinema can be effective. In this film, we see the real mission Deleuze wants to see in directors and the potential of cinema.



Figure 1.6: Son of Saul and Shoah Movie Posters

Nemes and Lanzmann have fulfilled the mission. They managed to show the human tyranny and malignity on the screen through different ways of narration and fictionalizing with the power of radical scripts. And while doing that, they managed to actively draw the spectator into their films, thus won a powerful and valuable place among Holocaust films in terms of narration.

## PART 2

### PRACTICES OF REPRESENTATION: PHOTOGRAPHY AND CINEMA

*“Cinematography, the art, with images, of representing nothing.” —Robert Bresson*

The problems of reality and representation date back to the invention of photography. Humans have always had a desire to “record the images” along with their desire to imitate and depict nature throughout history. This desire has rapidly developed in the course of time and revealed itself in representation in different ways. Reality has always been imitated as a copy of the relevant time and space as in the period between the invention of photography and the creation of the first film by Lumière brothers. This progress from one movement to multiple movements has changed the perception and expectation of the spectator, thus changing their world of image. In this regard, we shall refer to the famous German philosopher, literary critic, and cultural historian Walter Benjamin’s reflections on photography and “Camera Obscura” and his approach to the subject.

According to Walter Benjamin, the “curtain of mystery” surrounding photography at the time it emerged was not as intense as that of printing when it emerged. This is because the general perception at the time of the invention of photography was suitable to understand this new method of recording images. Many people needed such an invention at the time and they were trying to capture images with “Camera Obscura”.

..to capture the images in the camera obscura, which had been known at least since Leonardo's time. When, after about five years of effort, both Niepce and Daguerre simultaneously succeeded in doing this, the state, aided by the patenting difficulties encountered by the inventors, assumed control of the enterprise and made it public, with compensation to the pioneers. This paved the way for a rapid ongoing development which long precluded any backward glance. Thus it is

that the historical or, if you like, philosophical questions suggested by the rise and fall of photography have gone unheeded for decades. (Benjamin, 2005, p. 507)

Benjamin points out that photography started to be used widely ten years after its invention, developing with the help of the fast industrialization and new techniques. He says that he considers photography an industrialized material/medium with an awareness of its *inherent* nature of being open for improvement, while at the same time, he considers it an independent practice in the domain of *art* without positioning it in industry. However, despite being in the representation domain of art, photography is always used in connection with the capitalist industry for its photographic methods.

In this respect, we can say that photography's power of representation constantly increases and this power finds its place in both contemporary art and capitalist industry with different dynamics and provides basis for many types of production. We can further explain this with some examples of pop art, in which mass production and objects of mass production are frequently used as in the works of Andy Warhol, who is a leading figure in pop art, with regard to how an art form finds its place in capitalist economy.

Warhol was initially known for his illustrations and paintings in the 20<sup>th</sup>—century art scene. Later, he mostly painted portraits, using the photographs he took with a polaroid camera, employing various techniques including serigraphy. He iconized some images of popular culture and created mass-produced artworks in music, cinema, advertisement, and design; thus he created an influence that reached today. He describes painting, which he gave up in his later years, as work and filmmaking as fun. Warhol's work is still a matter of debate in terms of its representational value,

though he says that his works do not have any meaning. His works are dominated by the belief that there is no need to ponder upon the image. They suggest the question of what makes an artwork valuable and what qualifies it as high art, thus make the spectator/audience think. This question is after all the one thing he wants to make his spectator think about. He sees the pressure of consumer society on the individual, who is an inseparable part of it, and gets inspired by it. He seeks to represent the uniformity of lives and people gradually becoming identical in virtue of consumer necessities in his works by creating them in a factory-made manner. In this way, he shows that works of art can be created with the use of everyday objects and that they can be unaffected by the artist's personality. The idea of an artwork that is not affected by the artist's personality expresses the viewpoint that the artist is an ordinary person and the *supremacy* attributed to her/him is taken away from her/him. However, even the presence of this purpose makes it possible to argue that there is a purposeful stance in the representation and that the idea is ironically contradictory even when the opposite circumstances are considered. Warhol's stance at this point is distinct from the philosophy which holds that the value of the problematics of image and representation, which we explained in the previous parts of this text, comes from what is in *thought*.

On the other hand, it is not quite realistic to consider an artwork unaffected by its artist even when it can be considered apart from and independent of its artist. The artist leaves her/his mark in her/his artwork with any act s/he performs consciously or unconsciously. Regardless of whether Warhol regards his works as artworks or not, or whether he wants to give them a definition or not, the fact that he is a leading figure in an art movement, which is called *pop art* in modern art today, brings about contradiction. Does he want art to become banal, or the banal to enter into art? Under which circumstances representation does not take place? Warhol's works are distinctive for they have their own reality and display the representation of the period

they are produced and his own style. The artwork he created for the album *The Velvet Underground & Nico* in 1967, a Warhol print of banana with the invitation to “Peel Slowly and See”, was more than what it represents in terms of what is attributed to a mundane consumption object bought from the market. In this sense, Warhol used mundane things as material in his art and reflected his admiration for plastic things on his works. His idea of producing works that are independent of the artist, that is himself, is disputable.



**Figure 2.1:** Debbie Harry, model of Andy Warhol’s paintings. Photo © Chris Stein.

Warhol managed to develop a mass production system with the use of serigraphy whereby he reproduced his works. Thus he eliminated the idea that an artwork is one and only and produced similar artworks. Could something that is mundane and reproducible as a factory-made product be an artwork? There are several answers to this question in his works. Warhol’s works have a radical stance against the works that are pointed out as artworks and “highly valued” and the conception of “art” in this context. He could paint consumption objects such as soup cans. For instance, it is thought that *Campbell’s Soup Cans* has the most powerful expression that could be achieved with such a simple image. This is because in this work, Andy Warhol paints

a soup can which is known by everyone, reproducible, deprived of its uniqueness, and accessible and reproduces it using serigraph printing and not including its details. Warhol uses photography and his digital camera in many different ways; in this work however he prefers to paint the soup can instead of photographing and thus presenting it as it is. A photograph would display all of the details of the can, but Warhol does not want to include details that would show the reality of the can. He includes neither the part of the label reading the contents nor any other text reading details in the picture. The visual should symbolize the American consumer culture and become a temporary icon. In this way, it does not have the responsibility to take an artistic stance. Warhol chooses an image which is easily discerned among fast-moving consumer goods and easily accessible and disposable at the same time. What he wants to create is an “easily defined”, iconic image as in his portraits. This painting of a can, created with symbols that would evoke many things in people, is like the American flag; or it is an expression of western culture. *Campbell's Soup Cans* is not a work of art to be admired aesthetically. Neither the colors used nor the *thing* it represents evoke admiration in the spectator/viewer. This work which has many copies and prints does not have the kind of effect other works of art have on the spectator. The most significant difference between them is that other works of art are unique and non-reproducible.

Warhol sees himself as a machine and even calls his studio “The Factory”. The effects of mechanization and the changes it brought in the food industry (Campbell soups being produced untouched by human hands), as well as other industries, find its place in Warhol's representation. In this connection, we can speak of a production and a reproduction which do not involve the image and the kind of art in which machines replace human hands.

The changes mechanization brought in the 20<sup>th</sup> century found their place in the food industry. Campbell's soups being prepared untouched

by human hands is actually the same mechanization found in Warhol paintings. Warhol wished to be like the machine that produced Campbell's soups, eliminating human hands from his art and printing and reproducing his images. The images are related to real subjects in pop-art. The created forms are representations of what exists. –All forms of representation (including reality) can only be codes that refer to themselves. (Özdemir & Koca, 2012)<sup>13</sup>



**Figure 2.2:** Andy Warhol —Campbell's Tomato Soup

“When you see a gruesome picture over and over again, it doesn't really have any effect.” —Andy Warhol, ARTnews 1963 (Race Riot (Warhol), 2017)

Ordinary *things* are subjects in Andy Warhol's representation. We can say that the artworks he created with the use of mechanized production compose a “consumable art” and that they are products in sight but do not have to be in the mind.

On the other hand, photography theoreticians, who tried to stand up against adverse developments in their period and the conception of art that is basically against

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<sup>13</sup> Foster, Hal. The Return of the Real. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Publications, 2009.

technology, could not have a result nearly for a century in the face of criticisms against the idea that photography can be a form of art in an industrialized environment. According to Benjamin:

For they undertook nothing less than to legitimize the photographer before the very tribunal he was in the process of overturning. Far different is the tone of the address which the physicist Arago, speaking on behalf of Daguerre's invention, gave in the Chamber of Deputies on July 3, 1839. The beautiful thing about this speech is the connections it makes with all aspects of human activity. The panorama it sketches is broad enough not only to make the dubious project of authenticating photography in terms of painting—which it does anyway—seem beside the point; more important, it offers an insight into the real scope of the invention. “When inventors of a new instrument,” says Arago, “apply it to the observation of nature, what they expect of it always turns out to be a trifle compared with the succession of subsequent discoveries of which the instrument was the origin.” In a great arc Arago's speech spans the field of new technologies, from astrophysics to philology: alongside the prospects for photographing the stars and planets we find the idea of establishing a photographic record of the Egyptian hieroglyphs. (Benjamin, 2005, p. 508)

The reality and representation of nature that is recorded on the photographer's camera should be discussed apart from the painter's painting in which s/he depicts the affect of the image in his/her mind using canvas and dyes to record the image of a river s/he observed.

No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his subject, the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long-forgotten moment the future nests so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it. For it is another nature which speaks to the camera rather than to the eye: “other” above all in the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious. Whereas it is a commonplace that, for example, we have some idea what is involved in the act of walking (if only in general terms), we have no idea at all what happens during the fraction of a

second when a person actually takes a step. Photography, with its devices of slow motion and enlargement, reveals the secret. It is through photography that we first discover the existence of this optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis. (Benjamin, 2005, pp. 510-512)

Photography is an art form which allows the expression of the physical appearances of matters and their world as images. A photograph is together, even in unison, with the camera which created it. The photograph can create a private, hidden, and valuable space for itself in a meaningful and secret way through his union, though we are conscious of it. While discussing Benjamin's belief that the awareness of visual subconscious can be developed only by means of photography, we should refer to an effect that goes beyond the objective world of photographs. Photography is an art form which can present the objective/physical appearance of matter to the spectator. In this respect, an effective photograph has an affect that goes beyond the photographer's skill. To elaborate more on the subject, we can exemplify with a well-known photograph we kept seeing for years: *Afghan Girl*<sup>14</sup> by Steve McCurry.

The photograph has been very famous around the world, although its story was not entirely known during the period between 1984, the year it was shot, and 2002. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, millions of Afghans lost their lives and millions of them fled the war zone, taking shelter in refugee camps in neighbouring countries. McCurry wanted to photograph students in a school in one of the refugee camps in Pakistan. After getting necessary permissions, while walking around the school, he saw the Afghan girl. He could read the tragedy she went through during the war from her uneasy posture and he was affected by her gaze. He took the famous photograph which clearly captured her red scarf and the sad look on her big green

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<sup>14</sup> The portrait of Pashtun-Afghan Sharbat Gula (born ca.1972).

eyes. After photofinishing, the photograph was chosen by the picture editor Bill Garrett and published in the June 1985 issue of National Geographic with the title “Afghan Girl”. The photograph became widely known, although nothing was known about the Afghan girl except that she was a refugee, and it was acclaimed as the best photographic portrait in history. Everybody was curious about the girl in the photograph and tried to reach Steve McCurry. The eyes of an Afghan girl, whose name is not known, fled the war and traveled around the world, recounting the war.



**Figure 2.3:** Afghan Girl: Sharbat Gula, National Geographic 1985

**Figure 2.4:** Afghan Girl: Sharbat Gula, 2002 (Newman, 2002)

Why has the Afghan Girl become the most famous photograph in the world of publishing? The reason why the copies of the photograph is seen in various cities/places is certainly not just the sharp contrast between her big green eyes and her red scarf. It is also the traces of war seen in her messy and dirty hair evoking mixed

feelings in the spectator of the photograph. The Afghan girl with her piercing gaze has become the symbol of the war in Afghanistan in the Eighties. In the same way it happens with the photographs of refugees fleeing from the same problem in different countries today. Such a photograph leaves a meaningful effect on the spectator with its intense expression of reality with the help of its pictorial and graphic qualities; so much so that it asserts itself with such a power that even the photographer cannot leave it behind. After the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001, Steve McCurry started to make attempts to find the Afghan girl because all his attempts had been unsuccessful until 2002. A National Geographic team traveled to Afghanistan in 2002 and found her 17 years after the photograph was taken. They visited the camp where the Afghan girl had stayed before and met a resident who knew Gula's brother. The team located her in a remote region of Afghanistan, she had returned to her native country from the refugee camp in 1992. Her identity was confirmed using iris recognition and her name was Sharbat Gula. Gula had never had her photograph taken before or after 1984 until that time, and she remembered the year she was photographed for the first time. However, she said that she had never seen a photograph of herself. Gula's story was published in the April 2002 issue of National Geographic, thus the world learned the Afghan girl's name and story. The spectators' comments on social media showed that there were people who were happy that the mystery was resolved as well as people who were unhappy about it. The criticism was that this way it lost its quality of being a news photograph that represents the war in Afghanistan as it was at the time it was taken; it turned its objectivity into a *desire* through *curiosity* by entering the territory of popularity. The number of people who thought that the mystery about the photograph should have been preserved instead of being resolved is as much as the number of people who wanted to learn the story behind it as soon as possible. There is no doubt that Steve McCurry, as the artist, was among those who wanted to learn the story behind the 17-year-old photograph.

The photograph represents the blood red image of war through an anxious and uneasy gaze. The powerful representation of the photograph is still seen, over and over again, in the photographs of Syrian refugees who suffer from the ongoing conflict and who have become homeless. There are no conscious efforts to create expressions in those images. In fact there are profoundly real and spontaneous facial expressions. We come upon the same suffering Sharbat Gula had gone through in the 80s in the photographs of different persons with different names and ages today, as in the two photographs below: little Aylan from Kobane who had to flee the war and lost his life and Omran from Syria who was rescued from the rubble of a house.



**Figure 2.5:** Little Aylan (3 years old), son of a Kobanian refugee family who tried to go from Bodrum, Turkey to Greece.



**Figure 2.6:** Omran Daqneesh (5 years old), who was rescued from the rubble of a house in Haleppo where the conflict is still ongoing.


Perhaps these photographs will last with their powerful representations as well, representing death and fear through children's faces/bodies in different places, at

different times. It is the same suffering that war inflicts on children, who do not understand it, with its intense darkness and futility regardless of where in the world it takes place. The reality is seen without any effects, filters, or editing. The photographs represent what they have with a power that enables them to pass censorship and that could be open to manipulation (!). The reality stands before us as it is in the photographs which try to represent the war itself through the bodies of two little children. These two powerful photographs try to represent the *non-representable area* through the ideational disturbance of seeing the sheer reality as in the film Shoah. We still face the problems of immigration and immigrants as part of wars which have never stopped in the course of time. We, as the spectators who did not go through those sufferings, are exposed to the most concrete expression of pain and despair in these untouched photographs of refugees and the films that try to show the non-representable. In the same way we see the anxiety in the eyes of a worried mother with her baby on her lap and her other children huddled around her, facing away from camera. The photograph of the Migrant Mother<sup>15</sup> who is the representation of anxiety was taken by Dorothea Lange. The woman seen in the photograph with her children is Florence Thompson, a 32-year-old mother of seven children (1903—1983). Florence, who is a typical worker with her dirty, old clothes, and her tired, weary, and wrinkled face, looks like she is waiting for help from the point her gaze is directed at as she placed her hand under her chin probably reflexively. The despair is read from the waiting-expression on her face. She sits desperate and worried with her

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<sup>15</sup> The 1930s are the years of drought and poverty in America, called the “Great Depression”. Many people lived on the starvation line and suicide rates increased at the time. The people who suffered the most were migrants and agriculture workers who collected products in the farms they came across. In 1936, the newly elected President Roosevelt asked Columbia University to conduct a research in order to improve the situation. As part of the project, photographer Dorothea Lange (1895—1965) hit the road to document the poverty. After shooting for one month in February, while on her way back to California / Nipomo she decided to return to a pea farm 20 minutes after passing by it. She took six photographs of a woman and her kids whom she met there, at first from a distance and then from a closer angle with the woman’s permission. After gathering some information she left the camp. (Held, 2013)

baby on her lap. The other children face away from the camera and the tired mother is too shy to look at the camera directly as well. This photograph, too, does not need any other objects or narratives to represent the destitute and all the difficulties they went through just to survive. It leaves a powerful effect on the spectator with its reality just as the photographs of immigrants. It also makes spectators understand what the other people, who struggled to survive like the Migrant Mother and her children, had to go through during the period of the “Great Depression”<sup>4</sup> in America.



**Figure 2.7:** The most famous photograph by Dorothea Lange: Migrant Mother, 1936

These photographs were published in San Francisco News, in March 1936, for the first time with little exaggerated information collected by Lange. Shortly after, food aid was delivered to the camp and no one died of starvation. The government also built new camps for the migrant farm workers. Although Thomson and her family had already left the camp and were on their way to another camp by the time the

food arrived, they started to live in better conditions after that day. Although not very noticeable, the photograph was retouched. The thumb of a woman seen in the bottom right corner of the frame was removed to improve the photographic composition. This photograph, known as the “Migrant mother”, of Florence Owens Thompson whose identity was not known until the 1970s is considered one of the best documentary photographs in the world. (Held, 2013)

A photograph can have different effects on different people, namely the photographer, editor, and reader/spectator, depending on their intents and the images in their minds. While the time and place that a photograph is taken have their own reality, the photograph can represent the reality in the photographer’s mind at the same time. The photograph can be a powerful and effective weapon of representation just as cinema by means of a touch, camera angle, or post-processing. In this respect, it can be a means for manipulation or advertisement. What makes a photograph valuable and unique is surely the power of its affect on the spectator. In this context, the touchability or untouchability of the reality of a photograph depend on where and how we come upon it as much as what it represents.

The effect of cinema finds its place through the awareness of visual subconscious and transcends the objective world of photography. Cinema has carried further the basics of representation it took from photography and as a signifier steered the *representation problem of image* with its own dynamics. While discussing cinema, we will be addressing its uniqueness for it has technical competence and powerful ideational foundations; also, we can see painting, music, literature, and graphic arts in it. This is because cinema has a rather extensive and aggregate structure in which graphic frames are used insensely and effectively with a hierarchical balance; many pictures and images are used together with literary texts, poetry, musical notes and sound/silence; and reality and virtuality interpenetrate each other during the post-production process. In this sense we can say that the signifier and the signified in

cinema are thoughtful with plenty of ideas and have a rich representation.



**Figure 2.8:** Shoah is a 1985 Franco—British documentary film, directed by Claude Lanzmann, about the Holocaust

In this respect, we can elucidate the dynamic relationship between the photographic frame and the cinematic frame through the film Shoah again. Shoah is very valuable in terms of its practice of representation which goes beyond other documentaries and historical or fictional films that narrate the stories of painful events of the century such as the Holocaust. We do not see the war itself or any fictional scene made up of its representable images throughout the film. It shows us the *present* (1985) in contrast to other films which try to reconstruct the images of the relevant time and depict its objective reality with the shades of grey, brown, and red. We see the current image of the “Chel̨mno Extermination Camp” throughout the film. The person, who is seen as a small figure in the large, green area in the frame shown below, is a graphical element which was pondered upon. It is eminently affective to see a human body

which looks very small in comparison to the largeness and effect of the place, lonely, and desperate with an unsettling feeling caused by the weight the place bears even today. The place has an overwhelming weight by virtue of its memory.

We see the life in the area where green grass has grown and is surrounded by trees while we hear bird sounds. This life simultaneously combined with narratives stands in front of us with a striking effect. The narrator relives the experience while telling the story and this can be read in her/his face, expression, posture, voice, and words; thus the image of the green area saying “*everything is fine*” is turned upside down by the second image which is “*suffering and death*”. The image and silence of the green shatter and the image of suffering fills in the cracks. However, this newly developed image does not stand still where it started throughout the film. Lanzmann manages to represent the relationship between the past and the present of the place in the scenes in an incredibly powerful way.



**Figure 2.9:** Mordechai Podchlebnik  
Subtitle in English: “It’s the place”

The details revealed by the narrator in a still manner are important. Here, the relationship between the memory and the present cannot be considered independent of the narrator. Suffering is in the narrator's mind and it is an image there. The spectator pulls the suffering out of the narrator's mind. The film, with this effect, paves the way for narration through such a representation that transcends bodies. The scene is there in its simplicity as if the narratives were not actual events —suffering, deaths, and losses— that took place a while ago. The past and present state of the place are dramatically in contrast with each other. The pieces that found their place in this representation are included in the world of the film.

Shoah, with its documentary value, tells the story of the Holocaust directly through its traces disappeared from the sight, its reflection on the faces with no makeup, and voices. The representation is fed by a powerful memory and has a strong affect on the spectator through all its channels in the film. The image in the mind of the spectator as the subject divides in two: the one s/he had before and the one s/he has after watching the film.

The green, still frames of Shoah are replaced by a dark setting in Son of Saul, another film in which photographic and cinematic frames were used so effectively. In the film, in which continuous movement is used in a dark setting, we occasionally see light cast upon Saul's face dramatically. In the scenes we directly see his face, we make eye contact with Saul and feel disconnected as opposed to the scenes we relate to him while following him from behind, moving along with him. The spectator keeps making an effort to identify with him and feeling disconnected from him throughout the film.



**Figure 2.10:** Son of Saul, Saul Ausländer/Sonderkommando (played by Géza Röhrig)

A perception was created where the spectator is on a shaky ground; s/he constantly moves, enters the place and sees what happens the next moment at the same time as Saul. A powerful narrative language, in which representation is not/cannot be embodied, is created with this new perception. In this way, the *signified thing* keeps flowing with the questions which arise in our minds (the spectator's mind) and exists with us (the spectator) throughout the film. The images hit us, but only the "why" questions we ask enter into our minds as concepts and accumulate there. They are in an evanescent dimension. In this sense, the image is formed but it subsists without having a meaning as in Deleuze's concept of crystal-image, as we will see later on thought hangs in the air. We can neither get inside the story of Saul's purpose completely nor find the strength in ourselves to get out of it throughout the film. We keep following the representation that is presented to us, looking for "what/whom it

represents” with the effort of signification within the flow and affect. While we are feeling Saul’s efforts and what he goes through in the pursuit of his purpose through his body movements, the camera presents us the perception of the “place” Saul sees. This representation is eminently realistic and heartbreaking. We actively see the war, death, and fear; however, these images are not in the foreground. Following the moment Saul sees the body of a boy whom he wants to think is his son and feels the “desire” to bury him, we start to see the place in the background. This is also a desire and purpose to find a rabbi. While moving constantly, Saul’s efforts involving highly risky steps keep hitting our minds in an unsettling way. The director does not impose a controlling idea nor does he want to give a powerful feeling of catharsis.

The film chooses a way of narration completely different from Shoah with its scenes, yet they have the same effect and power in terms of what they give us on the path to representation. The sights from the two films, which contrast with each other in terms of the cinematic techniques they use, starkly make us feel the war “in thought”. Their representational values and methods are eminently powerful within their own contexts and they make up the “present” which brings us to the inquiry, the past, and the future of the image. We will elaborate the effects of the image on the signifier, examine the power of representation in detail and plumb the depths of this field in the next part, referring to cinema as a practice of representation again due to the reasons mentioned above.

## 2.1. THE UNREPRESENTED

*“The cinema is not just present images, it surrounds them with a world. This is why, very early on, it looked for bigger and bigger circuits which would unite an actual image with recollection-images, dream-images and world-images.”*

— Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2, The Time-Image* (Deleuze, 1997, p. 68)

When we read contemporary continental philosophers, we see that they reflect heavily on the relation between “seeing” and cinema. What had been experienced socially and subjectively during the transition process where the photograph turned into motion picture have greatly influenced them. The mobility and dynamism of the time have touched, processed, and transformed the projection of the image and thus the conveyance of expression. In this sense, the image is not considered to have a fixed and certain nature, rather, it is considered to go beyond its potential and extend freely. If this area of freedom is an eternal line, then, we see the image’s existability in this manner in cinema in terms of the possibilities it has. Ponty, as Deleuze who advanced arguments on the subject after him, put the human being at the center of his discussion where he tried to understand “things” and the plane of existence of “things” and discussed the matter through his film criticism and his other works in which he tried to understand cinema.

In his lecture *Le Cinéma et la Nouvelle Psychologie* (1945) which he wrote in the first half of the twentieth century, Maurice Merleau-Ponty appreciates the capacity of cinema to represent our “dealing with things and other people” described by phenomenology and modern psychology. The cinema spectator lets his/her thoughts and feelings out as behavioural patterns by means of the film just as “someone who watches the world”. Seeing is not merely being the “owner of the gaze” but also being effected by images, according to Ponty. One exists in the world when one

becomes both the “seer” actively and the “seen” passively. There is a primordial spatiality beneath the objective space and this spatiality is the body itself, according to Ponty. He plumbs the depths of the concepts of body/flesh, sight/seer/visible, space/spatiality, and dimension/dimensionality in depth through painting. We can see his approach in the following words:

To be a body, is to be tied to a certain world, as we have seen; our body is not primarily in space: it is of it. (Ponty, 2005, p. 171)

For Descartes it is unarguably evident that one can paint only existing things, that their existence consists in being extended, and that design, or line drawing, alone makes painting possible by making the representation of extension possible. Thus painting is only an artifice which presents to our eyes a projection similar to that which the things themselves in ordinary perception would and do inscribe in our eyes. A painting makes us see in the same way in which we actually see the thing itself, even though the thing is absent. Especially it makes us see a space where there is none. (Ponty, 1964, p. 172)

Deleuze reinterprets Bergson’s philosophy while dealing with the cinema in detail in his books *Cinema I: The Movement–Image* (*Cinéma I: L’image mouvement, 1983*) and *Cinema II: The Time–Image* (*Cinéma II: L’image–temps, 1985*) in which he frequently refers to Sanders Peirce. While making this interpretation, he tries to rethink the semiotics of cinema with the help of Sanders Peirce’s extra–linguistic semiotics.

Accordingly, he advances an argument about the possibilities of “signs in themselves” and “a–signifying pure semiotics” apart from the *signifier–signified* discussion of structuralism. The belief that cinema produces images, movements, and thoughts is at the center of Deleuze’s philosophy. For this reason, he explains the images belonging to the cinema with philosophical approaches in his books where he discusses the Time–Image. Deleuze rediscusses the concepts of image, truth, and

narrative/narration through cinematographic representations in the chapter “The Powers of the False” in his second book *Cinema II: The Time-Image*.

It is in this way that the Notion of age, ages of the World and ages of memory, is profoundly justified in Resnais’ cinema: events do not just succeed each other or simply follow a chronological course; they are constantly being rearranged according to whether they belong to a particular sheet of a particular continuum of time. All of which coexist. Did X know A or not? Did Riddier kill Catrine, or was it an accident, in *Je t’aime je t’aime*? Was the letter in *Muriel* sent and not received, and who wrote it? These are undecidable alternatives between sheets of past, because their transformations are strictly probabilistic from the point of view of the coexistence of ages. Everything depends on which sheet you are located on. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 120)

Deleuze examines the thoughts created by the image under two separate titles: the movement and the time. He says that the perception and representation of the world has been changed by the images after the World War II. He defines the image in the pre-war period as the movement-image and the image in the post-war period as the time-image because the unity in action fell apart following the war. In other words, thought is created by means of fiction and camera in the image itself in the movement-image, whereas it is described as a form of thought in the time-image. That is, in the time-image, thought is created by breaking it away from the signifiers that represent it.

What distinguishes Deleuze, with his deep analyses of the relations between “seeing” and cinema, from other thinkers of the subject is that he considers cinema a philosophic creation and that he is the first one to be called a philosopher of cinema. Deleuze does not see cinema as merely an art form, he discusses its power to create and its effective area together with “thought”. In this respect, cinema is a domain that creates concepts on the path of thinking and it has the potential to mobilize itself,

according to him. He ascribes this relationship between philosophy and cinema to the distinct way of presenting/spectating in cinema in comparison to other art forms. Cinema has a mechanism that contains the “images of movement and time” in itself. Deleuze regards cinema as something that activates thought, paves the way for thinking and requires spectators to be in a creative flow rather than merely involving in the act of watching. He discusses the “image” of cinema within “thought” through the relationship between these two concepts. He frequently mentions the “immanent”, “signs”, and the “language” in the world of images in this discussion. Because he developed a philosophical reflection in his approach to cinema, which he tried to elaborate through language and signs, he turned to the concepts of “movement” and being/not being “stable” in his problematizations concerning “entity”. Deleuze wants to demolish the theories that are based on the subjective–objective relations. This is where we start to see a brand new way of thinking with the philosophy of “becoming”, “event”. Deleuze uses cinema–graphic to the fullest in comparison with other art forms for he sees cinema as a unique artistic activity and a creative means for philosophizing and producing ideas. In this context, he begins intellectual journeys through the “value” and “sense” of the sight using details such as the image, movement and moment, setting and shot, frame and decoupage, and editing and camera movements. This is the reason why Deleuze breaks apart each one of the dynamics of the cinema that looks for the sense. The following statement by him explains the intertwined state of cinema and philosophy:

The great directors of the cinema may be compared, in our view, not merely with painters, architects and musicians, but also with thinkers. They think with movement images and time–images instead of concepts. (Deleuze, 1986, p. Preface to the French edition)

The director’s journey to what is philosophical as a thinker is one which goes beyond her/his own immanent individuality —we may call it the union of the body and the mind— and which is clear because it is tied to the past and the future, seeing and

hearing all the frequency of the “other” and getting involved with the other, but will become obscure as s/he goes deeper. For the director, this state of “being on a journey” with the elements provided by cinema is as much important as, even more important than (for it contains movement and time), other art forms. Of course, not every film is a good example of what cinema wants to tell. There are hollow productions, qualities of which cannot be compared to their financial and industrial results, in cinema as much as in other art forms. However, despite being an incredible industrial product, cinema has continued to represent what is philosophical and what is achieved through thinking with the help of its long and deep past and the persistent attempts by the directors who would have been frustrated if they were hindered. In this sense, cinema has had its irreplaceable “authentic styles” thanks to the directors who reflected on and produced them.

Deleuze’s argument here is based on his putting the thought itself at the center on the journey of cinema and his approach to cinema includes a criticism of the modern person, as the seer and the visible. It is inevitable to look at the world of perception that is created or caused by the changing world, causes, and effects.

The modern scientific revolution has consisted in relating movement not to privileged instants, but to any–instant–whatever. Although movement was still recomposed, it was no longer recomposed from *formal transcendental elements (poses)*, but from *immanent material elements (sections)*. (Deleuze, 1986, p. 4)

It can be possible to create a power of thought, which leads to the perception of what is becoming visible at the moment or yesterday/tomorrow, in cinema for its inherent nature is full of discoveries. Cinema can be considered a means of expression with graphics, photographs, and its own movement just as a means of transport such as a train, plain, or car. In the statement “Cinema seems to be the last descendant of this lineage which Bergson traced. One might conceive of a series of means of translation

(train, car aeroplane...) and, in parallel, a series of means of expression (diagram, photo, cinema). The camera would then appear as an exchanger or, rather, as a generalised equivalent of the movements of translation.”, (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 4—5) cinema is conceived in a way that it is equivalent to movement, intervening and taking part in it. Its ability to intervene and change within an infinite discovery and visuality is the mobility of what is or what will be in the mind that will “transform” into an image. Cinema can exist at any moment by virtue of this very mobility. In other words, the movement of cinema is a system that gives the potential to recreate over and over again a recreation by choosing or editing sequential snapshots and moments separated by equal intervals of time to create the impression of continuity. It is of course a question of debate who has the power, who will make *things* dance; it is an extensive inquiry that requires another elaboration. At this point we see the attitudes of the directors who are the thinkers of cinema.

Robert Bresson refers to the visual and mental philosophy of how things dance in his statement "Not beautiful photography, not beautiful images, but necessary images, and photography" (Bresson, 1950—1958, p. 45). We can think about technique and style together with the question “why” to elaborate further on the subject. For instance, based on Ponty’s *World of Perception*, we can say that a painter’s intent while working with real objects is not to show an object itself, but to create a new image on canvas so that it becomes itself. According to Ponty, it is needless to make a distinction between the theme of a painting and the artist’s technique, style, and mental approach; because there is an “aesthetic” stance here and it is formed by experience. The primary concern here is that how a grape or a pipe is given form on the canvas by the painter. Ponty explains, “Does this mean that, in art, form alone matters and not what is said? Not in the slightest. I mean that form and content — what is said and the way in which it is said — cannot exist separately from one another.” (Ponty, 2004, pp. 96—97) In this sense, his statement and the answers to

the question of “how” a painting is created will give us a viewpoint that enables us to think about deeper meanings in “...a situation in which words have (at least) two different meanings and things do not allow themselves to be named by a single word.” (Ponty, 2004, p. 109) much beyond a viewpoint that systematically categorizes things.

The observer/spectator should get out of passivity, mobilize intellectually and make an immanent exploration with a new kind of subjectivity in accordance with how actively the *artidit* walks the way in this challenging and difficult process. Thus, the spectator can be a timeless self-explorer. Apart from all the definitions made by the classical film theories, what Deleuze points out is that what that leads to thinking is in fact the realization of the strong magnetic connection —like radio waves— between what we see with the eyes (the body) and what corresponds it in our minds (the image).

Apart from what the representation, image, and text convey, a reconstruction so as to think about how all these are formed will decipher the relational codes of the representer and the represented. Deleuze’s conception of cinema is the presentation of thought itself as an eminently subjective act in a film that thinks through images. He argues that cinema should be an activity where the spectator thinks philosophically in the “moment”, rather than merely presenting information, entertaining, and *signifying* something through the camera by means of a technologic system. That activity is the reading of the film. While reading a film, one should try to understand what is represented in the film — including the theme, storyline, style, and even shooting — while keeping the *artist* at the center of it. Every chosen detail leads us to a mental practice of thinking about why it was chosen and thus helps us understand what is in the sight. Cinema literacy is surely an interactive discussion, agreement, or

disagreement on what is in the mind (the spectator's and the director's mind). At this point, seeing the how and why of the discussion concerns our approach to the problem of representation and even how the subjective expressions/meanings of images correspond to it.

To exemplify this with *Son of Saul*, we can explain the reasons why László Nemes, as a director and signifier, wants to draw his spectator into an unsafe area with the narration style he chose for his film. Nemes's approach stems from his intent to involve the spectator in active thinking on a disquieting journey by creating a sense of obscurity. There is an authentic narration style in the camera movements, close-ups, long shots, and details that he chose. The director, who transcends the safe area, brings Saul's wish into the foreground while treating the spine-chilling place as an ordinary place in the background. Thus, Nemes creates a narration by not representing an obvious thing at the center, that is Saul's subjectivity, while representing the reality of a concentration camp using multiple layers, as his way of handling his story within the problem of representation. While thinking about the director's intent, as a viewer/spectator, we start a deconstruction process where we think not about what the representation/image presents to the spectator but why it does so.

In a similar context, we can exemplify our point with the film *The Act of Killing*<sup>16</sup>. The film directed by Joshua Oppenheimer in 2012 reveals the mass-killings and tortures by the vigilantes emerged following a coup attempt in Indonesia in the 1960s. In the film, we watch the gang started by Anwar and his friends turn into a far-right group and kill people whom they accuse of being comunists with rage following the

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<sup>16</sup> The Act of Killing (Indonesian: Jagal, meaning "Butcher") is a 2012 documentary film about the individuals who participated in the Indonesian killings of 1965—66.

coup attempt in 1965. The far-right gang tortures and kills hundreds of intellectuals who were blacklisted by them as communists.



**Figure 2.11:** The Act Of Killing: The film is directed by Joshua Oppenheimer and co-directed by Christine Cynn and an anonymous Indonesian.

Anwar and his friends continue their lives without any regrets or worries about mass-killing minorities and their own citizens with the support of the coupists, regarding the crimes they committed as sacred acts rather than “crimes”. These gangsters who have not been convicted after the events continue their daily routines in a quiet and peaceful (!) manner that chills the spectator to the bone. Joshua Oppenheimer gets surprised when he he travels to the region and meets the gangsters to make a documentary years after the events. Anwar and his friends cold-bloodedly tell him everything they did at the places where the events took place without any hesitations even 45 years after the massacres. The proud manner and the lack of regret in their narrations of events prevent the director from looking for actors to hire, instead he shoots the film with the actual killers. He creates the language and technique of his documentary about the significant historical event accordingly. At this point, it is

rather difficult to try and understand the psychological states of the perpetrators or discuss their sacred values and what is right and wrong. However, it is obvious that killing is an ordinary act for Anwar and that he can kill without blinking an eye for the sake of what he believes to be “right”. His regarding killing as an ordinary act forces the spectator to think about the relation between this ordinariness and being human. This *cold-blooded narration* becomes the film’s own representation.

The Indonesian massacre could have been told in many other ways and the representation of this tragedy could have been presented with many different narration styles. Yet Oppenheimer’s method in this documentary film is again one that eliminates fiction. If we are to speak of a reality that can be real, the narration in *The Act of Killing* is the closest one to be the “reality that is real” because the director abandons all the tried methods and turns his camera toward the killers in this documentary. Thus, the actual problem of representation starts at this point. This is because there is no such script or acting that was used before in other representation practices and that can convey the massacre and the *cold-blooded* manners of the perpetrators showing *no regrets* the way this documentary did.

Cinema has such a basis, on which we settle what is immanent together with what is external in practice to see the signs in life and even understand “life” and also to think about cinema as it is an art form that is aware of its potential. The point where it differs from other art forms is the very mobility and dynamism of cinema. The past and future of its representation are not stable and they can be broken into many pieces. The reality and representation have a completely different platform in cinema. Technical possibilities and ideas have brought this world of photographs which emerged with the imitation of nature to a whole another point today. The most important thing that will perhaps not change in cinema is its capability to “change”

and “divide”. Cinema transforms life just as other art forms, however, it is more closely related to philosophy as an ideational act and in terms of its conception in thought. Art and philosophy have a distinct place compared to science in terms of what they present and reveal to us in the world of thought. Acts of thinking and furthering the thinking itself on the path to thought find their place and value in Deleuze’s philosophy where thought is also analyzed in terms of its relation to cinema. Cinema takes part in art’s contribution to the possibility transformation of life as Claire Colebrook, who works on Deleuze’s philosophy, explains as follows:

Each act of art, science or philosophy is itself an event and transfiguration of life. And each transformation changes life in its own specific or singular way. (Colebrook, 2002, p. 12)

The philosophical ability to think this concept will help us to live our lives in a more joyful and affirmative manner. Because philosophy allows the transformation of life, it is a power, not an academic discipline. Similarly, but in its own different way, art also encounters difference: not by producing a concept of difference but by presenting and creating differences (such as all the different characters in a novel or different sounds in a symphony). If we want to know what something (such as art, science or philosophy) is, then we can ask how it serves life. (Colebrook, 2002, p. 13)

Colebrook, while explaining the transformative power of philosophy through Deleuze’s time–image, tells us about how we, as film spectators, mentally engage concepts and images or how cinema engages us. This interaction is an outcome of the experience and has the power to make us see cinema from a different perspective; it even effects the way we experience the world by enabling many transformations when it takes place. Colebrook puts the point in the following way:

Philosophy forms concepts for our time that transform time. Art pulls experience apart to create percepts and affects that are not yet synthesised within a line of time. Deleuze’s concept of the cinematic time–image is an act of philosophy in response to a particular event of

art. The concept allows us to see cinema differently; we can go to the cinema and more than follow the narrative and identify with the characters. We can allow cinema to engage us and transform us. The time–image, which will impose an incongruous sound over a discordant visual image and will then cut from image to image and voice to voice, undoes the single horizon of time from which “we” view the world. (Colebrook, 2002, p. 69—70)

We shall refer to Ponty’s account and criticism of cinema at this point where we discuss the power of cinema that is ascribed to the experiment.

Cinema has yet to provide us with many films that are works of art from start to finish: its infatuation with stars, the sensationalism of the zoom, the twists and turns of plot and the intrusion of pretty pictures and witty dialogue, are all tempting pitfalls for films which chase success and, in so doing, eschew properly cinematic means of expression. While these reasons do explain why, hitherto, there have scarcely been any films that are entirely filmic, we can nevertheless get a glimpse of how such a work would look. We shall see that, like all works of art, such a film would also be something that one would perceive. Beauty, when it manifests itself in cinematography, lies not in the story itself, which could quite easily be recounted in prose and still less in the ideas which this story may evoke; nor indeed does it lie in the tics, mannerisms and devices that serve to identify a director, for their influence is no more decisive than that of a writer’s favourite words. What matters is the selection of episodes to be represented and, in each one, the choice of shots that will be featured in the film, the length of time allotted to these elements, the order in which they are to be presented, the sound or words with which they are or are not to be accompanied. Taken together, all these factors contribute to form a particular overall cinematographical rhythm. When cinema has become a longer–established facet of our experience, we will be able to devise a sort of logic, grammar, or stylistics, of the cinema which will tell us — on the basis of our knowledge of existing works — the precise weight to accord to each element in a typical structural grouping, in order that it can take its place there harmoniously. (Ponty, 2004, p. 97—98)

Ponty’s statement here tells us that there should be more “thinking” in the area where

cinema directs its power towards and we, who are effected by this power, should enhance our experience and choices accordingly. This is a conscient cinema literacy. He says that we have the chance to experience the standpoint of art in the world of images in cinema in the most active and intense way possible. There, we, the spectators and the directors, should see, handle, and feel the “narration” deeply. What he refers to as the knowledge of style is the sum of all the qualitative and quantitative values of “form”. The represented things will be examined piece by piece through the forms and ways they are represented, namely the sounds, colors, sights, and frames; thus they will enrich themselves with new methods of narration. They will pass through experienced paths, which lead to thought and refer to a new kind of perception, and allow us to conceive “what” is represented or what will not be represented. In this context, it would not be wrong to speak of a representation that develops outside of the classical methods, clichés, and profit-oriented filmmaking.

Also, we can suggest that a deeper reading is possible now with the knowledge of what is subjective combined with the power and effect of the image. In our reading, we have discussed the human being as the bearer and perceiver of the image along with its physical and mental activity while explaining our points thus far. In the next part, we will look at the “time-image” for which the previous discussions formed a basis and which will bring a new kind of comprehension. Thus, we will also explore the non-representable areas of Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema and see how he treats *time* with his idea of “being the thought itself” which is perhaps the only constant in his discourses.

## 2.2. THE TIME-IMAGE

We have addressed Deleuze's philosophical approach to cinema and his discussions where he accounts it as a practice of producing thoughts and concepts in the preceding parts. Now, we will try to elaborate the image which comes into existence in the course of time under the title of the *time-image*. This part will reveal the position of the human being, as the subject, spectator, and in *representation*. Thus we will have a chance to do a closer reading of the basic arguments of the representation approaches in "*Shoah*" (Claude Lanzmann), *Son of Saul* (László Nemes), and *The Act of Killing* (Joshua Oppenheimer). We have examined these films with the questions such as "how should the image be constructed when the subject is a director?" and "how has it been?" and "how should the image be considered when the subject is a spectator?". Now we will try to acquaint ourselves with Deleuze's new subject with the awareness we have gained through these powerful films. For this reason, we will refer to his reflections on the image which he handles as the "movement-image" and the "time-image".

Deleuze handles the thoughts that are given rise by the image in terms of movement and time. In this sense, he emphasizes the concept of time-image in his second book on cinema, *Cinema II: The Time-Image* (*Cinéma II: L'image-temps*, 1985). In this book, he indicates that the perception and representation of the world have had different effects on images before and after the World War II and the images have changed in this sense. Whereas images were perceived as the *movement-image* before the war, following the war the *time-image* period began and their activity ended. That is to say, the image used to be formed by means of thought, fiction, and camera movements as the *movement-image* before and now it is a form of thought as the *time image*. Thought has been torn from the signs that represent it and it can be

formed in a fluid form (in constant motion) now.

In other words, the thought/what is in thought is broken away from all the representations and signs that would express it in Deleuze's "time-image". According to him, the already torn connection between the world and the human being finds its place in modern cinema with new dynamics. These new dynamics are; the human being providing reasons that are necessary to reconstruct her/his belief in the world and thus filming the reasons s/he needs to believe. The thought that needs to find its place in modern cinema is *the one that goes beyond itself*. The one that leads to the figure has broken its connection with the figurative.

In short, the forger cannot be reduced to a simple copier, nor to a liar, because what is false is not simply a copy, but already the model. Should we not say, then, that the artist, even Vermeer, even Picasso, is a forger, since he makes a model with appearances, even if the next artist gives the model back to appearances in order to make a new model? Where does the "bad" relation of Elmer the forger of Picasso end and the "good" relation of Picasso and Velázquez begin? From the truthful man to the artist, the chain of forgers is long. This is obviously why it is so difficult to define "the" forger, because we do not take into account his multiplicity, his ubiquity, and because we are content to refer to a historical and ultimately chronological time. But everything is changed in the perspective of time as becoming. What we can criticize in the forgers, as well as in the truthful man, is their exaggerated taste for *form*: they have neither the sense nor the power of metamorphosis; they reveal an impoverishment of the vital force [*élan vital*], of an already exhausted life. The difference between the forger, the expert and Vermeer is that the first two barely know how to change. Only the creative artist takes the power of the false to a degree which is realized, not in form, but in transformation. There is no longer either truth or appearance. There is no longer either invariable form or variable point of view on to a form. There is a point of view which belongs so much to the thing that the thing is constantly being transformed in a becoming identical to point of view. Metamorphosis of the true. What the artist is, is *creator of truth*, because truth is not to be achieved, formed, or reproduced; it has to be created. There is no other truth than the creation of the New: creativity, emergence, what

Melville called “shape” in contrast to “form”. Art is the continual production of *shapes*, reliefs and projections. The truthful man and the forger form part of the same chain, but, in the end, it is not they who are projected, elevated, or excavated; it is the artist, creator of the true, in the very place where the false attains its final power: goodness, generosity. (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 146—147)

It should give up metaphoric expression and center the information, wandering around it and pushing its limits. Modern cinema has abandoned the representation in the world of images. The “whole” is no longer sufficient or important by itself and the signs that the figurative had in classic cinema are abandoned; the new dynamic of modern cinema is “subjective” and subjective “things” are political. The novelties and new approaches arising from the potential of cinema are not independent of the world/reality, yet they have to create their own reality that is influenced by it. This new reality that is inherent/should be inherent has provided/should provide a more powerful form of expression for cinema every passing year. When we think of a powerful form of expression, what is important is that it creates a free space/platform/work of art with a different expression and narration of thought. The freedom here should involve a narration in which what is expressed has new types of signs. Of course, these new signs should be based on thought.

Thus the cinema can call itself *cinéma-vérité*, all the more because it will have destroyed every model of the true so as to become creator and producer of truth: this will not be a cinema of truth but the truth of cinema. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 151)

The practice of sense/concept that has found its place in the *time-image* especially in the post-World War II period will need new types of signs. This is because movement remains in the background in the *time-image* and a new concept of time is suggested; one that proceeds with thought. According to this, the image is interpenetrated with the thought which belongs to/concerns it and it is dependent on

the *ability* of a thought to *fantasize* and *think*. That is to say, it is what constantly proceeds towards thought, what is present in thought. What is essentially important here is what/who is the “unthinkable” in thought. Here, we can argue a method that brings us to the problem of how the image, which is perhaps made of pieces of thought that can transcend themselves, divide, and multiply, finds a place between the part (the human) and the whole (the world) (the possibility of discussing the whole’s effect on the part or the part’s intervening in the whole together). We can refer to kind of a cinema that will not consist of movements any more by means of this method. Cinema has a mobility which disregards the center of movement in montage and editing practices, transcends what is standard, includes the plural in the singular and is intertwined. The “time” and the “subject” which are engaged in this movement play a major part together with thought in this mobility.

To elaborate further, the “image” in the *time-image* is a form of thought because it takes the time from the movement and attaches it to the thought. Consequently, it is the image of what thought acquires/will acquire on its way to be *thinking*. It is the image thought gains on the path of thinking. Also, it is the world of image–body in which an effect constantly flowing and multiplying in layers hits the body and proceeds in an intense and occasionally contradictory manner (with its potential to produce questions) and finds its place. In this respect, it is impossible to point out a definite line between the before and after of the passing time within the pieces thought is able to divide into. Time has penetrated into thought and the pieces of thought. Deleuze explains the intertwined state of thought and time with the concept of “crystal–image” which we can think of as a flowing and evanescent type of perception. He argues the crystallization of time and the image’s constantly being on the “way” as if it is on a journey in this chapter. This makes us think about the image’s not having a representation or, in other words, its *state of becoming* which cannot get into form or have a representation. At this point, we need to understand

“representation” and the difference between its affect on its spectator’s mind and its affect on the others’ minds (other spectators) and discuss its subjectivity. In this respect, we can link up this part with the next part, the “crystal image”, in which the flowing image and the personalization of the subject will be explained in detail, with the following statement by Deleuze:

Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual. The actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective: it was initially the affect, that which we experience in time; then time itself, pure virtuality which divides i’tself in two as affector and affected, the affection of self~by self as definition of time. (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 82—83)

### **2.2.1. A–Image Reading of Cinema: Recollection, Recapitulation and the Crystal–Image**

*“Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal. The crystal–image was not time, but we see time in the crystal. We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, nonchronological time, Cronos and not Chronos.”*

—Gilles Deleuze’s (Deleuze, 1997, p. 81)

Deleuze thinks that what is philosophical befits cinema and he includes thought, thus the act of thinking itself in it. Similar to philosophy, cinema plays with concepts and produces images and movements. While explaining the concept of *time–image*, he demolishes the conception of time as being dependent on movement, as the past, present, and future; and detaches time from the cause and effect relationship, considering it to be in itself.

The movement–image has an inherent power and the spectator perceives the change in the movement of *what is universal*. There is a certain duration in the image of this perception. To explain this through Bergson, the transcendent form of time is “duration” and this duration flows continuously without interruption. Cutting sections and pieces, Deleuze sees a cartographical activity (that draws mind maps) in the relationship between the nonchronological outer duration and cinema. Thus, he thinks that there are cinematographic images that map the *movement–image* and the *time–image*. The reason why the time–image has a more important position is that time can be intuited. We can exemplify the cartographical expression with the following statement by Deleuze:

As a result of this functionalism, cartography is essentially mental, cerebral, and Resnais has always said that what interested him was the brain, the brain as world, as memory, as “memory of the world”. It is in the most concrete way that Resnais attains a cinema, creates a cinema which has only one single character, Thought. Each map is in this sense a mental continuum, that is, a sheet of past which makes a distribution of functions correspond to a distribution of objects. The cartographical method and coexistence of maps in Resnais may be distinguished from the photographic method in Robbe–Grillet, and his simultaneity of snapshots, even when the two methods result in a common product. (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 121—122)

According to Deleuze, what makes Alain Resnais’s documentary *Night and Fog*<sup>17</sup> highly influential is the organization of mental functions that are almost impossible to understand. There is no doubt that the scenes and objects used in the film have an important effect on the narration. Above all, these objects are functional. The functions Resnais attributes to these objects are not concerned with the common use of them, but with what we can refer to as *mental functions* or *levels of thought*. Deleuze says:

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<sup>17</sup> *Night and Fog* (*French: Nuit et brouillard*) is a 1956 French documentary short film. Directed by Alain Resnais, it was made ten years after the liberation of Nazi concentration camps.

Resnais conceives of cinema not as an instrument for representing reality but as the best way of approaching the way the mind functions. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 121)

Resnais regards the cinematic language he uses in the filmmaking process as a way/method to get closer to what is mental; he is not concerned with representing reality. We can say that this is the most effective and/or cartographical way he uses the things in his mind in representation together with the images that make him think about those things. In this sense, rather than presenting how the camp functions, *Night and Fog* represents what is cold and evil. The spectators are not only exposed to a portrayal of a Nazi concentration camp, they also fulfil their mental functions (with their own subjectivity). In other words, the elements and levels of a massive memory composed of neuronics messengers, which represent the revolution in the image, are formed in the representation the spectators are exposed to. This formation is an eminently active and layered aggregation of memories.



**Figure 2.12:** *Night and Fog* 1956, French documentary short film. Directed by Alain Resnais  
Scene: “I am not responsible”

It will be useful to cite the following passage in which Bergson’s notion of *duration* is discussed through the time–image to elaborate how time affects *perception*:

As we saw before, the movement–image is a power and this power presents perceptions of the change in the universal movement to the

spectator. This image presents a small fraction of duration in Bergsonian terms. The reason why this image is not the highest one of the cinematographic movements is that it cannot acquire the “unthinkable in thought”. This is because the power of the movement image is a perception that is acquired through the universal change, rather than the spectator per se. However, the time–image is a type of cinematographic image that breaks free of sensory mobilization and retains thought purely. This type of image, as Rodowick indicated as well, points out to the distinction found in Bergson’s statement “We perceive in space but we think in time.” As we mentioned before, the perception in space follows the movement–image and this image gains identity according to a given matter’s various encounters in space. Furthermore, Deleuze treats the movement–image as part of Bergson’s “intermediate image” (moyenne image). And by means of this image, cinema emerged as an art form that integrated movement and consciousness. Bergson defines this image as follows:

“This is such an image that it is almost a matter because it allows itself to be seen; and it is almost the mind because it no longer allows itself to be touched.” (Sütçü, 2015, p. 133—134)

Deleuze’s time–image and movement–image parallel the two sides of Bergson’s concept of “central image”. The first description of the central image indicates that the image is equivalent to matter, and this is concerned with the movement–image which is the first cinematographic image defined; the second description the central image indicates that the image is inside the mind, and this is concerned with the time–image. (Sütçü, 2015) While trying to understand the “time–image” in Deleuze’s film philosophy, we need to discuss the how time was conceived before Kant and the conception of time that emerged with the first major “reversal” in *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

The first philosophical foundation of explanation of time through a succession subject to movement is the ancient philosophy. Movement is explained as “momentary” subsequent translocations based on “change” itself in the ancient philosophy. The explanation about the

concept of “time” is predicated on things and their movements in the most general sense.

In general terms, time can be considered as a whole consisting of three pieces; one that existed before but does not any more, one does not exist yet but will exist and the “resent” between these two parts. If time is considered a dividable object, then we can speak of the pieces of time. However, time cannot be considered an object, thus its pieces cannot exist. This is because one of the them is done, it went past; and the other will be, it does not exist yet. And the “present” cannot exist without the other parts. It can only exist together with “befor” and “after”; because the “present” gains meaning as a thing that did not exist before and will be gone after a while. In other words, just as it is not possible for a “moment” to disappear in itself, it is also not possible for it to disappear in a past or future moment. Therefore, we can say that it is impossible for “moments” to be attached to one another. (Sütçü, 2015, p. 125—126)

The *movement–image*, which is conceived in accordance with the conception of time in antiquity, is perceived through its differentiation from the principles of the universe; whereas the *time–image*, which is conceived in accordance with the Kantian time, is perceived without any relation to matter. In a perception, from which matter is extracted, the image’s meaning and structure will stem from movement and the source of the movement will be the “mind”. The mind does not have to be exposed to the expressions/signs composed of movements that are seen, heard, and thus comprehended one after another any more, or, it is no longer in a system that demands this. Now that time has replaced movement, the effect that the *things*, that hit the mind, has on the image is concerned with time.

The time–image is more valuable in terms of cinematography, because it has the potential to direct thought and movements of thought unlike the movement–image. In the time–image, the *image* is not conceived merely as something that hits the mind, appears, or stands by itself somewhere; it also plays with, changes, and produces

concepts as a driving force in thought because it is in motion. This effort of producing ideas takes the image's cinematographic movement from the object world and opens doors to new kinds of perception with its own dynamics in this new world formed in the mind.

At this point, cinema gives us a recapitulation of images and signs. This is not merely a pause between the movement-image and another kind of image; it is also what gives us a chance to deal with the most urgent problem within the relations between cinema and language. In this respect, the possibility of a semiology (Fr: sémiotique) of cinema depends on the state of the relationship between cinema and language. Deleuze handles with this problem of language in his essay "*Recapitulation of Images and Signs*". He makes us think about how the cinematic narration should be in the essay where he uses the following questions by Christian Metz, who tried to understand and interpret the relations between semiotics and cinema:

Instead of asking "In what way is the cinema a language (the famous universal language of humanity)?" he poses the question "Under what conditions should cinema be considered as a language?" And his reply is a double one, since it points first to a fact, and then to an approximation. The historical fact is that cinema was constituted as such by becoming narrative, by presenting a story, and by rejecting its other possible directions. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 25)

Could cinema be the universal language of humanity with its narration and power? Under what conditions should cinema be considered as a language? In fact, Deleuze's cinema-language criticism starts here. His intellectual and practical discourse on cinema-language elucidates the fragmentization of the image in the time-image that replaced the pre-war images and signs related to the sensory-motor schema in the post-war period. His discourse and approach give us the pure time which exists in the inner life, namely subjectivity. He reflects on the past and present through the

sound, reading, and conceptual ways of thinking that are involved in the time–image. Deleuze thinks about the place of the “body” in cinema in a non–linear manner. His inquiry starts with the body and continues with the “mind” and he goes on to inquire into “meaning/meaninglessness”. Saussure’s<sup>18</sup> influence can be seen in his criticism of the use of the “body” in the movement–image of the pre–war period and the use of the “mind” in the time–image of the post–war period. The cinematic image wants to give a more realistic narration through the inner world of the human by means of movement or the body or time–images. However, we understand that the point of cinema is not to represent the real but to create new worlds and new forms of existence with the powers of the false.

There is a Nietzscheanism in Welles, as if Welles were retracing the main points of Nietzsche’s critique of truth: the “true world” does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, and, if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 137)

In his investigation of the “Powers of the False”, Deleuze says, “Everything is a recapitulation of what has already been done before, but liberated from the need for truth.” The body has strived to get rid of its sensory—motor schema and engaged in the conceptuality of its time–image during the transition from the movement–image to the time–image. If there are traces of a narration/expression or a sign in the time–image, then this is due to a subjectivity which involves “*thinking*” (cogito) and meaning. Cinema should start a valuable working process as well to achieve these dynamics of the time–image. Cinema should adopt a subject–object viewpoint that goes beyond and surpasses subjectivity. It should have the power to transcend and

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<sup>18</sup> Ferdinand Mongin de Saussure (1857—1913) was a Swiss linguist and semiotician. His ideas laid a foundation for many significant developments in both linguistics and semiology in the 20th century. (Source: wikipedia.org)

remove the limits of the human.

But at the very point that the image is replaced by an utterance, the image is given a false appearance, and its most authentically visible characteristic, movement, is taken away from it. For the movement–image is not analogical in the sense of resemblance: it does not resemble an object that it would represent. This is what Bergson showed from the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*: if movement is taken from the moving body, there is no longer any distinction between image and object, because the distinction is valid only through immobilization of the object. The movementimage is the object; the thing itself caught in movement as continuous function. The movement–image is the modulation of the object itself. We encounter “analogical” again here, but in a sense which now has nothing to do with resemblance, and which indicates modulation, as in so–called analogical machines. It may be objected that modulation in turn refers on the one hand to resemblance, even if only to evaluate degrees in a continuum, and on the other hand to a code which is able to “digitalize” analogy. But, here again, this is true only if movement is immobilized. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 27)

According to Deleuze, the movement–image has two sides. One in relation to objects whose relative position it varies, the other in relation to a *whole* — of which it expresses an absolute change. The movement–dependent cinema has certain laws and it functions in accordance with these laws. Space–time, presentations, and contemporary connections with definite structures in the movement–image cinema gain identity and structural integrity by means of the actions that are conceived through causal and logical relations.

On the other hand, every image can turn into another image and divide, multiply, persist, and even vanish in the crystal–image which is the regime of the cinema that depends on the time–image. Their potential, namely this state of disconnectedness, comes into existence in a constantly changing setting. This of course shows that the cinema that depends on the time–image cannot be treated in the context of cause and

effect. It will be useful to cite Deleuze's own words to elaborate this:

The movement–image has two sides, one in relation to objects whose relative position it varies, the other in relation to a whole — of which it expresses an absolute change. The positions are in space, but the whole that changes is in time. If the movementimage is assimilated to the shot, we call framing the first facet of the shot turned towards objects, and montage the other facet turned towards the whole. Hence a first thesis: it is montage itself which constitutes the whole, and thus gives us the image *of* time. It is therefore the principal act of cinema. Time is necessarily an indirect representation, because it flows from the montage which links one movement–image to another. This is why the connection cannot be a simple juxtaposition: the whole is no more an addition than time is a succession of presents. As Eisenstein said over and over again, montage must proceed by alterations, conflicts, resolutions, and resonances, in short an activity of selection and coordination, in order to give time its real dimension, and the whole its consistency. This position of principle implies that movement–image is itself in the present, and nothing else. That the present is the sole direct time of the cinematographic image seems to be almost a truism. Pasolini will again rely on it to maintain a very classical notion of montage: precisely because it selects and co–ordinates “significant moments”, montage has the property of making the present past’, of transforming our unstable and uncertain present into “a clear, stable and desirable past”, in short of achieving time. It is useless for him to add that this is the operation of death, not a death that is over and done with, but a death in life or a being for death (“death achieves a dazzling montage of our life”). This black note reinforces the classic, grandiose concept of the montage king: time as indirect representation that flows from the synthesis of images. (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 34—35)

Cinematographic narration breaks the patterns of “thinking” as in its general sense by means of both its narrative potentials and its power generating from the possibility that it can be a philosophical thinking practice, as Deleuze points out, and it transcends what is rational with the help of the basic language that is inherent in the concept of *time–image*. In this way, it tries to surpass thinking by *thinking* again, abandoning the idea that the beginning and end are/should be exactly/absolutely definite. It paves the way for what could not have been thought by looking for

*thought* in thought; thus, it even goes back to the moment preceding the birth of the thought and looks for *thought* by *thinking* inside that moment. The outcome of this effort is what is thought and thus what is *seen*. At this point, what is seen is a product of the mobility that involves “fantasy” and “memory” in the mind, namely the union of the *past*, *present*, and *future*. In his essay “Peaks of Present and Sheets of Past”, Deleuze says:

We must go back to the Bergsonian distinction between the “pure recollection”, which is always virtual, and “the recollection— Peaks of present and sheets of past image”, which makes it actual only in relation to a present. In a crucial passage, Bergson says that pure recollection should definitely not be confused with the recollection—image which derives from it; it remains a “magnetizer” behind the hallucinations which it prompts. On each occasion, pure recollection is in a sheet or continuum which is preserved in time. (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 122—123)

The time—image which functions in the mind finds its place with the discoveries of thought, differently from the moment—image which connects with and refers to the discoveries of the experimental world. The image and time work actively; time takes the image from its place and then starts to look for it. The image, as if it sets off to explore, produces inside what is new and this production ensures its mobility. The time—image, which is fed by its mobility and has a new power, detaches from the image and heads toward the essence of thought. This turn of the image, this state of transcending limits is an achievement whereby it will break away from the influence of the movement—image.

The time—image cannot do *things* with movements as in the movement—image; it can enter into the mind, produce questions, find answers to those questions, produce theories, or oppose. Thus it can take part in an experience. When the image starts to function within a time dynamic that goes beyond itself, what we see is a “pure”

cinema coming into existence. At this point, the time–image is no longer related to the outer world any more, because the subject is abstracted from the possibilities of the outer world and thus the image draws apart from the outer world. In this way, the image and the subject change in two directions as they are getting away from the outer world. The first one is that thought, as a point that has never existed before, detaches from the outer world and comes into existence. The second one is that thought, again as a point that has never existed before, is left alone with an *unthinkability* in the process of a meaningful and deep thinking in its inner world. We can say that this detachment from the outside combined with the inner discovery is the point where the thought is confronted “purely”. Eventually, the subject of the time–image will encounter the externality of thought and confront the thought outside itself and it will encounter the unthinkable in itself and confront its own internality.

In cinema, it was by means of the time–image that the movement—image which takes place through rational connections to the outer world has lost its independency and that thoughts have derived from the mind through irrational connections. The emergence of the time–image in cinema required a transformation. Italian Neo–Realism pioneered this transformation and Andre Bazin defined it. The point that should be stressed in the definition is that Italian Neo–Realism managed to transcend reality by presenting reality. What happened here is that reality has gained a cinematic autonomy. In this context, all the forms of reality that create the image should not be conceived as “the reality the spectator confronts in life”. This is because the reality of the image in cinema does not exactly correspond to the actual reality. Cinema had to create its own reality in the face of the actual one. This artificial creation has become an independent cinematic reality in the course of time. According to Andre Basin, this cinematic reality:

“should be conceived as a ‘real’ quality by its nature. The same event or the same object can be represented in different ways. Each one of these ways leaves and saves a couple of qualities that allow us to recognize the object; each one of these ways, for educational or aesthetic purposes, brings about abstractions that are more or less erosive and that do not allow the actual object to stay as it is. As a

result of this inevitable and compulsory chemistry, an illusion of reality made up of the actual reality and the limitations (e.g. rules of editing) replaces the first reality in an abstraction complex (black and white, flat surface).” (Sütçü, 2015, pp. 135—136)

Bazin says that the “real” should not be treated as a quantity because he doubts the existence of one truth concerning the reality of the object. He thinks that cinema has the power to go beyond the real by virtue of its ability to produce new types of narration at the point where the image transforms into representation. According to him, the image has transcended the real, furthermore, it started to represent the time–image. When considered in its own time and independent of other connections, the image can represent itself in different forms provided by thought and change, develop, and even break into pieces. The time–image clears the way for an endless change and this is not a cycle; this is nothing other than the movement of thought toward eternity. This is the mobility of the image.

The real was no longer represented or reproduced but “aimed at”. Instead of representing an already deciphered real, neo–realism aimed at an always ambiguous, to be deciphered, real; this is why the sequence shot tended to replace the montage of representations. Neo–realism therefore invented a new type of image, which Bazin suggested calling “fact–image”. This thesis of Bazin’s was infinitely richer than the one that he was challenging, and showed that neo–realism did not limit itself to the content of its earliest examples. But what the two theses had in common was the posing of the problem at the level of reality: neo–realism produced a formal or material “additional reality”. However, we are not sure that the problem arises at the level of the real, whether in relation to form or content. It is not rather at the level of the “mental”, in terms of thought? If all the movement–images, perceptions, action and affects underwent such an upheaval, was this not first of all because a new element burst on to the scene which was to prevent perception being extended into action in order to put it in contact with thought, and, gradually, was to subordinate the image to the demands of new sign which would take it beyond movement? (Deleuze, 1997, p. 1)

Therefore, while time is not considered independent of change, it is not the change itself. The feeling that time is not passing, as we feel when there is no sense of change in our daily lives, is due to the effect of “perception” and “movement/immobility” on the subject. The fact that movement creates time does not mean that these two concepts are equivalent. In order to understand how movement and time correspond or penetrate to the subject, we can cite the following passage where Aristotele’s account of time as before and after and its effect on the subject are explained:

According to Aristotles, when a mobile object moves from one thing to another, this process takes place with a succession of “before–after”. This requires the existence of before and after proportionally to "magnitudes" in movement. On the other hand, because every "magnitude" is continuous, movement follows a magnitude. And because every magnitude maintains continuity in itself and movement is continous, time follows a continous line. Consequently, we can say that time passes as much as movement takes place. In that case, “befor” and “after” gain meaning according to change and magnitude is formed according to both of them. (Sütçü, 2015, p. 127)

However, this notion of before and after is turned upside down in the time–image. The time–image with its dominant effect on cinema has changed many dynamics, overturning the “organic regime” and replacing it with the “crystalline regime” as the image in the crystalline regime is in constant motion. The movement is taken from the object and given to what is mental. This “birth of image” in the mind does not have to have an effect on the subject or result in an act. The image is a being in itself and the *things* we refer to as acts (action–reaction) keep flowing to be postponed (this may be an endless postponement as a result of this dynamic) to say the least. In the classical cinema, montage is related to the *organic regime* and movement is directly related to the objects. In modern cinema, the relationship established between the *image* and *representation* is one in a constant flow with open senses as if anything can happen anytime, keeping the mind on alert. Under these conditions, the subject strives greatly and transcends the limits of the usual. This new kind of image

movement which involves a tiring, inconvenient, and challenging intellectual activity is a worthy, meaningful, and valuable effort.

According to Deleuze, the image takes on its form as the sight and sound with three types of signs. These are referred to as: “narration” (lectosign), “time” (chronosign), and “formation” (genesign). Time connects with what is in thought through these concepts. Deleuze thinks that these concepts bring innovation to cinematic narration. Modern cinema has observably grown different from classical cinema by means of the narration sign in terms of perception; so much so that this change has permeated the perception that cinema has presented/will present. What is perceptual goes beyond itself and turns to what is in the image, thinks about and follows it. The narration sign strays away from the perceptuality and reality of the expressed in the object–image relationship, namely the representation (e.g. form, structure, method) in classical cinema. Sound gains importance as much as visual elements owing to this deviation, it comes into play and turns into an immanent perception. At this point, not only seeing but also reading of the image, which is born/which touches the subject, is the case. Here we can speak of a development that involves reading because seeing is not sufficient by itself, because the object of classical cinema ceases to be a representation element and takes roots in the mind in modern cinema. This is the beginning of the image’s path to being free of outer elements, acquiring inner elements and becoming what cannot be objective. Pure visual and auditory elements start to become effective in the image and the distance/difference between the subject and the object gradually diminishes/vanishes. Thus the “narration sign” (lectosign) finds itself independent of the object and free of its influence.

As for the other sign, cronosign we can say that it clears the way for the flow. At the same time it is where the dissociation that allows the image to exist *purely* takes

place. The concept of *time* in the movement–image presents the image chronologically. In the *movement–image* however the past, present, and future are not “perceived” as independent, definite, and precisely distinguished units. There is no such linear succession in which they proceed one after another. Deleuze connects before and after of the “*present*” in a way that he wants us to see the importance of our perception of the “present”. This is because the *present* in question exists together with the past and this union gets involved in its relationship with the future and eliminates the distinction between them. In the time–image approach, time is directly the image. This image cannot be explained with a succession. In the conception that involves time in the image, the “movement” in question is the very act of “forming/formation”; it is different from the “movement” which was involved in cinema in the early stages. In other words, it is the information of a movement that will keep forming (genesis) continuously and has the potential. We cannot consider this movement distinct from the past, present, and future or this trio independent from each other. Here we see an approach that eliminates the idea of the succession of time in a sense and describes a constantly moving “present”. We exist simultaneously with a constantly passing present, a preserved *past*, and an uncertain *future* with no information simultaneously.

To elaborate further: The “past” is established simultaneously with the “present”, not before it. Yet time, by its very nature, splits itself in two at the currently passing moment, namely *today/present*. It separates a “*moment*” inside the moment, and it is arguable exactly when or at which point it divides. The *past* and the *future* are the distinctions that will split the “present” in two. These two *dissymmetrical* lines of time (Deleuze, 1997, p. 78) collect the past of the present and allows the present to flow toward the future with the collection. Deleuze explains this as follows:

The crystal–image may well have many distinct elements, but its irreducibility consists in the indivisible unity of an actual image and


“its” virtual image. But what is this virtual image in coalescence with the actual one? What is a mutual image? Bergson constantly posed the question and sought the reply in time’s abyss. What is actual is always a present. But then, precisely, the present changes or passes. We can always say that it becomes past when it no longer is, when a new present replaces it. But this is meaningless. It is clearly necessary for it to pass on for the new present to arrive, and it is clearly necessary for it to pass at the same time as it is present, at the moment that it is the present. Thus the image has to be present and past, still present and already past, at once and at the same time. If it was not already past at the same time as present, the present would never pass on. The past does not follow the present that it is no longer, it coexists with the present it was. The present is the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the virtual image, the image in a mirror. According to Bergson, “paramnesia” (the illusion of *déjà-vu* or already having been there) simply makes this obvious point perceptible: there is a recollection of the present, contemporaneous with the present itself, as closely coupled as a role to an actor. “Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image. Every moment of our life presents the two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception on the one side and recollection on the other... Whoever becomes conscious of the continual duplicating of his present into perception and recollection... will compare himself to an actor playing his part automatically, listening to himself and beholding himself playing.” (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 78—79)

Deleuze examines the *movement* and *time* images that are represented in cinema through two regimes: crystalline regime and organic regime. The organic regime is what depicts the image and it is examined through movement-image. These are the images that emerged from the movements/actions that took place yesterday or today. Here we need to speak of an outer reality; the thought of this outer reality can be influenced by itself and outside. On the other hand, when we mention the crystalline regime, we think about the image’s own reality. Here, the image creates its own reality with its own dynamics.

The crystalline regime exists as a thought that is much beyond a previously created reality which remains in the past as a unit of thought. This means that the crystalline regime is neither a representation nor a presentation of anything. It is what can exist by itself and create its own reality by carrying it in a time-based manner. On the other hand, the organic regime has limited relations, connections, and inputs-outputs due to being in the movement-image. And conversely, the relations of the time-image in the crystalline regime are not limited; the images can be independent of one another and not every image exists only as an input-output but also interacts in different ways. To explain in further detail, the crystalline regime and the forming image in the time-image have such potential that every image can transform into another as well as it can dissolve itself. This is because the image of the crystalline regime and its movement are not dependent on the cause and effect relationship.

Deleuze's *crystal image* gives us a different viewpoint on how time functions. The crystal Image is the affect of a flow that Deleuze sees/wants to see in cinema and that hits us while proceeding toward climax. Deleuze was influenced by Bergson in his explaining of the crystal image and the potential motion of the image within the context of the crystal image. Bergson separates the concept of time from the movement paradox and thinks about how time can divide into parts from end to end and move through these parts. These divisions can be comprehended as long as we comprehend our subjectivity because Bergson considers the subject (human) together with its potential to break the linear perception of time and divide it into pieces. This approach involves a conception of time which can reoccur/change at any moment inside the "moment". In contrast to the classical chronological perception of yesterday (past), today (present), and tomorrow (future) that movement gives rise to, Deleuze describes cinema as sections, parts, and a way of thinking that consists of what are obtained from these in the new form of perception he established through his interpretation of Kant and Bergson. This way of thinking involves the state of being

*perpetual* and a motion that refers to a moment while being in another moment. According to Bergson, movement and subjectivity should be considered together in order to understand how we move at the present moment (duration). Here it will be helpful to cite Bergson's diagram of the cone SAB and his comments on it:



**Figure 2.13:** The cone SAB

Itself an image, the body cannot store up images, since it forms a part of the images, and this is why it is a chimerical enterprise to seek to localize past or even present perceptions in the brain: they are not in it; it is the brain that is in them. But this special image which persists in the midst of the others, and which I call my body, constitutes at every moment, as we have said, a section of the universal becoming. It is then the *place of passage* of the movements received and thrown back, a hyphen, a connecting link between the things which act upon me and the things upon which I act— the seat, in a word, of the sensorimotor phenomena. If I represent by a cone SAB, the totality of the recollections accumulated in my memory, the base AB, situated in the past, remains motionless, while the summit S, which indicates at all times my present, moves forward unceasingly, and unceasingly also touches the moving plane P of my actual representation of the universe. At S, the image of the body is concentrated, and, since it belongs to the plane P, this image does but receive and restore actions

emanating from all the images of which the plane is composed.  
(Bergson, 2005, pp. 151—152)

According to Bergson, recollection is made up of perceptions that gradually thinned out. The perception in the mind is detached from the physical and the act and it lost the physical mobility, namely the activity, of thought. It is rather a state of thinking deeply and quietly. In this sense, the concept he refers to as *pure recollection* does not correspond to the physical nor does it occur at the present, yet it takes place in the mind. Pure recollection is distinct from recollection and perception — though it takes place in the mind as well — when it is considered with the said dynamics. Recollection is fed by externality because perception is active; it acts as an agent. Meanwhile, there is no such relation concerning pure recollection; it is self-sufficient and therefore it is fed by itself. Whereas the recollection image is in *what concerns the present*, the pure recollection image is in the pure recollection and dependent on subjectivity.

In conclusion, to summarize the time-image part; the movement-image forms the empirical form of time during the course of time. A subsequent present involves an outer before/after and the future of the present. Moreover, the movement-image leaves the present with an empirical progress, passes over it and flows toward the time-image: in this case, time is no longer measured by movement, it is the number or measurement of movement (metaphysical representation). The movement-image is basically connected to an indirect representation of time and does not give us a direct presentation. The presentation is direct in music alone. Here we can digress to cite Deleuze's own words where he refers to Kant:

But in modern cinema, by contrast, the time-image is no longer empirical, nor metaphysical; it is “transcendental” in the sense that Kant gives this word: time is out of joint and presents itself in the pure state. The time-image does not imply the absence of movement (even

though it often includes its increased scarcity) but it implies the reversal of the subordination; it is no longer time which is subordinate to movement; it is movement which subordinates itself to time. It is no longer time which derives from movement, from its norm and its corrected aberrations; it is movement as *false movement*, as aberrant movement which now depends on time. The time–image has become direct, just as time has discovered new aspects, as movement has become aberrant in essence and not by accident, as montage has taken on a new sense, and as a so–called modern cinema has been constituted post–war. However close its relations with classical cinema, modern cinema asks the question: what are the new forces at work in the image, and the new signs invading the screen? (Deleuze, 1997, p. 271)

Based on this passage, we can say that the questions of modern cinema which is parted from classical cinema are the questions that form the basis of Deleuze's philosophy of cinema. To what extent does the new power of the image find its place in representation? The image should not settle for drawing its power from its signifying objects, according to him. *Thought* should be the greatest power in the new forms of narration. The image can have plenty of new powers; it can continue producing new dynamics and each of these can appear before us as highly important connections.

However, we need to look at what is in thought, namely what is intellectual, and even what looks for what has not been thought yet in order to see, hear, and watch all of these. And modern cinema should not present us ordinary sights of ordinary objects, situations, or subjects within a structure composed of introduction, body and conclusion (before/after) with a *representability*. Its purpose is to take the spectator, who is in the position of the seer, on a journey and this journey should take place in the mind. It should present the images and all other dynamics within a representation/non–representation which tires and interrupts the mind and breaks its perception.

## CONCLUSION

In this text, we have tried to discuss the image and the representation through the concepts of mind/body, thought/thinking, observation/observer, matter/memory, and visible/invisible with the help of Ponty, Peirce, and Bergson and through what they correspond to in Deleuze's philosophy including time/movement images. Ponty's overcoming of the need to reach the *clarity* and *transparency* of the world of concepts/images that also includes thought through thinking, as he describes with the expression "entrust ourselves to the intellect", has its place in Deleuze's philosophy as well, though with differences in theorizations. Both of the two thinkers articulate the idea of a mental inquiry which tires the mind and requires much time and effort. We see a similarity in terms of "mental" concepts between the two: Ponty's criticism of classic science and his inquiry into the existence of objects with the help of Descartes's "I think, therefore I am (*Cogito, ergo sum*)" whereby objects find meaning in the mind with "...I think!" and Deleuze's criticism of classical cinema and the world of images he cleared the way for by referring to the time-image in modern cinema. Both of the two thinkers problematized the "body" through remarkable articulations and advanced arguments revolving around the body/flesh while constructing their philosophies. However, this similarity comes to an end at the point where Ponty puts the "body" itself in thought and holds that the world can be conceived through the union of the mind and the body. Deleuze connects what concerns the mind to the mind and considers it separate from the body with his conception of the body without organs (production). According to Deleuze, bodies and events exist at the moment (the present). They are pieces of continuously forming and becoming acts in infinity. According to him, the *body* has a critical ontological information which requires a reconsideration of its relationship with the world, beyond its biological conception...

In Merleau-Ponty, nature-culture continuum is a mobile, living tissue, a flesh; whereas in Deleuze, it is an articulation that constantly makes up new machines by joining one machine to another. Even though they are different in terms of their conception of the body, these two thoughts allow us to imagine the gender difference as a multiplying thing on the basis a new conception of nature. (Direk, 2013)

On the other hand, the two thinkers have an important common approach: rather than the purpose, the path that leads to the purpose is important in both their conceptualizations of the image and their treatments of the path to representation. That is, the purpose is not “looking for precise information”; it is the effort exerted on the path to looking for information and the experience acquired with the subject who is inside the experience and in the pursuit of the mobile thought.

As we see in the reflections of the thinkers we refer to, thinking stands before us with a clarity and it will gain meaning/value through the comprehension of the information or the image of what belongs to the world (the whole), namely the object, in the mind. Therefore, in order to represent and see thinking actively in a representation practice, we should know our freedom in this area, push the limits and increase awareness. In this sense a director should penetrate into the channels of the image and open new ways for the formation of new images for his/her film, which is her/his practice of representation (with all the basic elements such as the storyline, frame, sight, sound, and montage) to have a meaningful affect on the spectator. This should be the main concern in art and design productions. Thus, the “seer” who is in the position of the spectator will give or do not give meaning to the sight by means of the movement the images give rise to in his/her mind in a flow and s/he will find a chance to make new kinds of discoveries as to his/her subjectivity. The point that connects an artwork with its spectator/receiver is the power of its effect on him/her, that is the state of the aggregation of images in his/her memory.

As for the spectator, s/he should refer to thought in order to establish a meaningful connection with the artwork s/he directs her/his gaze at; this will give the information and feeling of being able to see what is behind the area/painting/scene that is presented to her/him. This is being able to see the non-represented or the non-representable in what is represented. This is an intellectual vision through which we can enter into an expression, piercing through its flesh, and read it in different ways when its information is not provided (or with hints). In this sense, the importance of the crystal image that has established its place in modern cinema is that it turns all the information upside down and clears the path that leads to the reality (!) that remains pending somewhere.

In his two books where he discusses the *movement-image* and the *time-image*, Deleuze says that if we hold that cinema is a way for one to see oneself, then, the *time-image* and modern cinema can be parts of what is in our thought. At this point, we can say that modern cinema is a result of culture. It is the expression of the *things* that are acquired through culture as signs. We start to see and know ourselves better through these signs, namely what cinema represents. Thus cinema is a power that represents us to us, according to this viewpoint. Cinema, which we consider together with what it has in the modern era, presents the perception of “time” and “space” to us through its own construction of reality. We see this reality in the powerful inquiries which try to settle cinema on thought. For instance, a director who thinks about cinema as a philosopher can convey the refractions and signs of time in cinema into form and express them in a steady manner. On the other hand, Deleuze had to give up aesthetics and semiotics to discuss the visual integrity of cinema within this newly acquired reality or this effort of cinema to make the spectator think what is in thought. This is one of the challenges of the new and difficult ideational cinema. Nevertheless, the ideationality that a film has or should have is much more important than the necessity of treating it as a work of art. In this respect, Deleuze says that a

film cannot always be discussed in the context of the time–image or the movement–image, and this does not mean that such a film does not signify a thought within its own context. He emphasizes that if indeed it does not, if a film is not associated with a thought or concept, then it is meaningless.

A film should have a value with the dynamics it represents itself. It should involve a concept and leave an ideational effect on the spectator. Rather than a structure that brings to a conclusion with a narration signifying a specified point, a film should have a presentation which is open to debate and in which various narrations can be discussed through the image on the screen. Modern cinema should play with concepts. It should open new thinking channels in the modern era and stand before us as a creative effort. Modern cinema, which should give thought new dimensions in many aspects, is ideational in terms of “image” production within the cinematographical context. In this context, Deleuze considers Jean–Luc Godard to be the first director to include thought in cinema among the valuable figures in the history of cinema. Deleuze admires Godard’s work and creativity, the way he reformed the film language. If finding *a new form of expression* is the most important function of creativity and it is what we should see not only in cinema but in all art forms, then Godard achieved it greatly and formed his style. In Godard’s works, the spectator wanders in his language like a nomad. He constructed his own form with which he influenced many subsequent directors. So much so that it is termed as the Godard construct. Godard’s cinema which involves time jumps and refractions does not impose its own image on the spectator; it does not interfere in his/her perception. The spectator’s perception is subjective and within the context of what s/he is effected by. In this respect, there is a narration style that does not direct the spectator and that allows the rise of images that will develop in themselves, rather than interfering directly. This is exactly what Deleuze wants to see. The spectators do more than merely watching the representation presented to them; they start to talk

about what they saw after leaving the film theater. These conversations are their ideational journey. They try to find what is in thought or the “other” thought through the sights presented to them or try to find the meaning through their own memories. And perhaps they discover what is not in their memory, what has not affected them. This effort is the value and meaning of a work of art in representation. This is because the spectator is active and s/he does not directly receive a ready representation presented to him/her. S/he has a filter and a method to evaluate. S/he sees, hears, and feels the representation in her/his mind.

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