

REHEARSING *ULYSSES*
A STRUCTURAL COMPARISON OF JOYCE'S *ULYSSES* WITH BEETHOVEN'S
HAMMERKLAVIER SONATA AND SCHOENBERG'S *VERKLÄRTE NACHT*

AYTAÇ DEMİRCİ
Student number: 108667013

İSTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
MA PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

Thesis Advisor: PROF. DR. MURAT BELGE

2010

Rehearsing *Ulysses*:
A Structural Comparison of Joyce's *Ulysses* with
Beethoven's *Hammerklavier* Sonata and Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht*

Ulysses'i Prova Etmek:
Joyce'un *Ulysses*'iyle Beethoven'in *Hammerklavier* Sonatı ve Schoenberg'in
Verklärte Nacht'ının Yapısal Bir Karşılaştırması

Aytaç Demirci
108667013

Prof. Dr. Murat Belge (thesis advisor):
[Department of Comparative Literature]

Prof. Dr. Nazan Aksoy:
[Department of Comparative Literature]

Asst. Prof. Dr. Tolga Tüzün:
[Department of Music]

Approval date: 17 August 2010

Total page number: 119

Anahtar Kelimeler

1. Estetik
2. Alienation
3. Negative Dialectics
4. Joyce'un *Ulysses*'i
5. Beethoven'in *Hammerklavier*'i
6. Schoenberg'in *Verklärte Nacht*'ı

Key words

1. Aesthetics
2. Yabancılaşma
3. Negatif Diyalektik
4. *Ulysses* by Joyce
5. *Hammerklavier* by Beethoven
6. *Verklärte Nacht* by Schoenberg

Abstract of the thesis by Aytaç Demirci, for the degree of Master of Arts in Comparative Literature to be taken in August 2010 from the Institute of Social Sciences.

Title: Rehearsing *Ulysses*:
A Structural Comparison of Joyce's *Ulysses* with
Beethoven's *Hammerklavier* Sonata and Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht*

In spite of the wide acceptance of Joyce's interest in music along with rich musical allusions in his texts, the relationship between Joyce's oeuvre and music remains a relatively less enticing field of study in comparison with the colossal field of Joyce studies as a whole. Although literary scholars frequently remind the musical background of Joyce, they generally content themselves with mere classifications of the allusions taken as accompaniments to the texts.

Notwithstanding the noteworthy endeavours of Joyceans who devote themselves to the study of the role music plays in Joyce's texts, the field has been cultivated exclusively to the extent of interpreting how these allusions are employed, at best. However plausible are the complications, a historical analysis on the correspondences between the literary techniques Joyce employed and those made use of in different artistic expressions is yet to come, for all Joyce's well documented influence on a wide range of modern works of art from painting to music.

The present study is intended to fill this gap by comparing Joyce's *Ulysses* with Beethoven's *Hammerklavier* Sonata and Arnold Schoenberg's Sextet *Verklärte Nacht*. Relying on the negative dialectics of Adorno I will try to reveal structural and socio-historical correspondences among the works. By doing so I hope to bring an insight into the field of Comparative Literature while extending its scope through a comparison of different artistic expressions with the devices negative dialectics provides.

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü'nde Karşılaştırmalı Edebiyat Yüksek Lisans derecesi için
Aytaç Demirci tarafından 2010 Ağustos'unda teslim edilen tezin özeti.

Başlık: *Ulysses*'i Prova Etmek:
Joyce'un *Ulysses*'iyle Beethoven'in *Hammerklavier* Sonatı ve
Schoenberg'in *Verklärte Nacht*'inin Yapısal Bir Karşılaştırması

Joyce'un müziğe olan ilgisinin aşıkârlığına ve eserlerindeki yoğun müzikal göndermelere karşın Joyce'un yapıtlarının müzikle olan münasebeti, bir kütüphaneyi rahatlıkla doldurabilecek zenginlikteki Joyce araştırmalarının bütünüyle kıyaslandığında, son derece cılız bir araştırma alanıdır. Akademisyenler her ne kadar Joyce'un müzik bilgisine atıfta bulunmaktan geri durmasalar da genellikle metne çeşni kabul edilen müzikal göndermeleri sınıflandırmakla yetinmektedirler.

Kendilerini Joyce'un eserlerinde müziğin oynadığı rolü araştırmaya adanmış olan Joyceçuların kıymetli çalışmalarına rağmen bu alanda şimdiye kadar yapılanlar söz konusu göndermelerin nasıl bir işleve sahip olduklarının incelenmesinin ötesine geçmiş değildir. Resimden müziğe pek geniş bir yelpazede modern sanat üzerindeki etkisi de göz önüne alındığında, Joyce'un kullandığı edebi tekniklerle farklı sanatsal ifadeler üretmek üzere başvurulan yöntemleri karşılaştıran tarihsel bir analizin yokluğu, böyle bir çalışmanın tüm gücüne rağmen, son derece şaşırtıcıdır.

Elinizdeki çalışma Joyce'un *Ulysses*'iyle Beethoven'in *Hammerklavier* Sonatı ve Schoenberg'in *Verklärte Nacht* Sextetini karşılaştırmak suretiyle bu açığı giderme gayretindedir. Adorno'nun negatif diyalektiğinden hareketle bu eserlerin yapısal ve sosyo-tarihsel bakımdan yakınlıklarını açığa çıkarmayı deneyeceğim. Böylece Karşılaştırmalı Edebiyat alanının sınırlarını negatif diyalektiğin sağladığı araçlarla farklı sanatsal ifade biçimlerini karşılaştıran analizleri de içerecek şekilde genişletmeyi umuyorum.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I:	
INTRODUCTION: The Lord's Altar Fawn Singing	1
On Method.....	3
An Outline	8
CHAPTER II:	
ADORN(O)ING <i>ULYSSES</i> : A Theologophilological Framework.....	12
The Problem of Alienation I.....	16
The Problem of Alienation II.....	18
Marxism as Deviation.....	24
The Heart of Darknes.....	27
Negative Dialectics.....	30
The Philosophy of Hibernian Metropolis.....	36
CHAPTER III:	
WORDS?: Speaking to Omphalos in Protean.....	45
A Telltale Word-Theme: "Forth I sail'd..."	58
"a competent keyless citizen"	64
O! The Climax of Sensual Experience.....	68
Rehearsing "Sweets of Sin"	71
CHAPTER IV:	
MUSIC?: Calm Sister of Language.....	77
"No: it's what's behind"	94
<i>Waiting at the Crux of SeeHearing</i>	101
_____:	
Endword	107
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	109

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: The Lord's Altar Fawn Singing

In spite of the wide acceptance of Joyce's interest in music along with rich musical allusions in his texts, the relationship between Joyce's oeuvre and music remains a relatively less enticing field of study in comparison with the colossal field of Joyce studies as a whole. The pioneering work, *Song in the Works of James Joyce* by Matthew J. C. Hodgart and Mabel Worthington, which is a catalogue of more than one thousand musical allusions in Joyce's works, dates back to 1959 (Bowen, *Musical Allusions* 3). Despite the past five decades, the literature on the subject has in no way significantly grown. Although Joyceans frequently remind the musical background of Joyce they hardly tend to analyze his use of music with musical approaches rather than reducing the task to a mere classification of the allusions taken as accompaniments to his texts.

The reason precluding scholars from scrutinizing even identified allusions, as Ruth Bauerle argues, might be the vast amount of music to be studied, if not only the variety of material from music hall songs to operas is difficult to be encompassed in a single study (Bauerle, "Introduction" 10f). However, the colossal amount of allusions to literary texts, both classical and contemporary, or to the historical events, never prevented scholars from detailed interpretations in the past. Thus the risk of overstatement, such as attributing key degrees to certain names (B flat for Bloom, D for Dedalus, etc.), or worse, the fear of falling outside the critical sphere through improper assertions not related to the text, such as "Joyce's favorite opera this and that," seems a more plausible reason for the ongoing neglect.

The subtitle of the present section, for instance, "The lord's altar fawn singing," is an anagram made out of a passage in the "Nausicaa" episode: "stars falling with

golden” (13.740). Although we will later discuss a more plausible use of the method, with due allowances for Saussurean *hypogrammes*, here I first mock the device to show to what extent Joyce’s texts can be *exploited*: Given the fact that the passage from which I pick out the sentence is one of the climaxes of the book, there is enough reason to attribute a thematic importance to our anagram: Since a fawn is a young deer, we may fairly suggest that Joyce places himself into this climactic moment, for it is well-known that the deer is the animal he used to identify himself with: An “altar fawn” is a modification of an altar boy: Thus it is obvious that Jesuit Joyce, here at this masturbation scene, satisfies his blasphemous desires: Moreover his singing is in tune with the overall musicality of *Ulysses*.

As Fritz Senn indicates, in “The Joyce of Impossibilities,” Joyce is “a godsend for the academy” (198). It is possible to approach his texts from a numerous points of view. Though it will be a painstaking endeavour, even an anagrammatical reading is possible for a diligent student with strong nerves. However, leave aside their plausibility, such approaches are dead ends of literary criticism. Neither do they serve a better understanding of the work, nor contribute to grounding it in its historical context. The fact that the text is like a curve bending upon itself does not oblige us to remain delving into it without comparing it with other works of art.

Notwithstanding the noteworthy endeavors of Joyceans who devote themselves to the study of the role music plays in Joyce’s texts, the field has been cultivated exclusively to the extent of interpreting how these allusions are employed, at best. However plausible are the complications, a historical analysis on the correspondences between the literary techniques Joyce employed and those made use of in different

artistic expressions is yet to come, for all Joyce's well documented influence on a wide range of modern works of art from painting to music.

On Method

Whack fol the dah now dance to yer partner
round the flure yer trotters shake
Bend an ear to the truth they tell ye,
we had lots of fun at Finnegans Wake!
Finnegan's Wake, an Irish ballad

Writing on *Ulysses*, students of literature usually underline how hard it is getting into the text at the first reading. The fact bolstering that belief up is that *Ulysses* requires of the reader to become part of it, if not only Joyceans highlighting the importance of being familiar with the allusions in the text.

In his remarkable study entitled *The Idea of Absolute Music* Carl Dahlhaus, while depicting the evolution of the concept of absolute music in relation to the romantic ideal *l'art pour l'art*, denotes the German esthete Karl Philipp Moritz's discrimination of what is beautiful or useful as an expression of disgust with modern bourgeois morality, which expects art to be "engaging the heart" as well as dealing with moral issues. Moritz, who had a significant impact on German Romanticism and influenced obviously his friend Goethe, rejects both Horatian *prodesse* and *delectare* and stands for that art requires recognition. In contrast to the useful object's not being perfect in itself, but rather "fulfilling its purpose through" the subject, suggests Moritz, the beautiful "constitutes a whole in itself, and gives me pleasure for the sake of itself, in that I do not so much impart to the beautiful object a relationship to myself, but rather impart to myself a relationship to it" (Dahlhaus 5). Notwithstanding his metaphysical discourse praising the beautiful object as a source of "pure and unselfish pleasure," which absorbs the receiver and makes him lose in "a kind of higher existence," Moritz's rejection of bourgeois

moral philosophy, as Dhalhaus implies, anticipates the new aesthetics that “proceeded from the concept of self-sufficient, autonomous work” (5). Moritz’s distinction is important on two grounds. As we will discuss later in detail, it reflects the inevitable autonomy of the individual through a separation from bourgeois morality, the ideological motives behind it notwithstanding. On the other hand, given the common opinions of *Ulysses* mentioned above, it provides the grounds to locate *Ulysses* in an aesthetical sphere insofar as it is a beautiful object requiring recognition while drawing attention exclusively to itself. The means Joyce makes use of to reach such a level of attention is not the vast amount of allusions deployed in the text, nor simply the subject matter, but of a technical kind. The quality correlating the text to this sphere is not only allusions. Notwithstanding that they foreground the structure, the quintessence of *Ulysses* giving the text its character is the method used in interrelating these parts to each other.

Insofar as the character of the text is determined by technique we may analyze *Ulysses* in relation to other artistic expressions of its contemporaries, music in our case, without being bewildered by sentimental value judgments. It does not amount to say that our approach will follow scientific farragoes under the guise of objectivism. Rather, treating *Ulysses* as a work of art produced at a certain moment in history, we will trace its correspondences between other works of art produced with comparable techniques, though they are perceived as that of a totally different kind.

In his *The Open Work*, Umberto Eco, considering modern instrumental music, indicates that modern pieces exhibit a common characteristic insofar as they require of the performer what Eco calls “an act of improvised creation” (1). That is, the performer does not only interpret the work but is also involved in its production by determining the

path it will follow: “They [modern pieces] appeal to the initiative of the individual performer, and hence they offer themselves not as finite works which prescribe specific repetition along given structural coordinates but as *open* works, which are brought to their conclusion by the performer at the same time as he experiences them on an aesthetical plane” (3). Suggesting that “every reception of a work of art is both an *interpretation* and a *performance* of it” (4), Eco later enhances the limits of his argument to the extent of containing any process of aesthetic contemplation. Although Eco distinguishes the active participation of a performer from the activity of an interpreter “in the sense of consumer,” he nevertheless considers both as different manifestations of the same attitude for the sake of “aesthetic analysis” (251).

In order to clarify the open character of a work of art Eco compares the “ordered cosmos” of medieval art, where the work is “a mirror of imperial and theocratic society” (6), with the dynamic Baroque form, which he acclaims as “the first clear manifestation of modern culture and sensitivity” (7). Quoting §7 of the *Epistola a Cangrande*, where Dante calls the sense of *Divine Comedy* “polysemantic”¹ and exemplifies the theory of allegory with four possible readings, namely in literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical meanings of Psalm 113.1-2² Eco proposes that the “multiplicity of meanings” provided for the medieval reader in no way amounts to a “complete freedom of reception” since the possibilities of form are finite and “never allow the reader to move outside the strict control of the author” (5f). However, argues Eco, through its “indeterminacy of effect” Baroque *spirituality* requires of the receiver some “corresponding creativity on his part,” which will eventually yield to an understanding of “pure poetry” embodied in Burke’s

¹ See, <http://www.english.udel.edu/dean/cangrand.html>.

² Which reads, “In exitu Israel de Aegypto, domus Iacob de populo barbaro, facta est Iudaea sanctificatio eius, Israel potestas eius” [When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a barbarous people, Judea was made his sanctuary, Israel his dominion].

“emotional power of words” and later to Novalis’s “pure evocative power of poetry as an art of blurred sense and vague outlines” (7f), insofar as what is at stake here is the active participation of the interpreter through a “complex play of the imagination.” In the case of “pure poetry” the *suggestiveness* of the work through ambiguousness inspires imagination, insofar as it is open to a wide variety of different interpretations. According to Eco in order to ascend an aesthetic effect from suggestiveness the proposed expression should allow the receiver to return to the initial point without ever exhausting the effectiveness the work provides: “Then I will be able to appreciate not just the indefinite reference but also the way in which this indefiniteness is produced, the very clear and calculated way in which it is suggested to me, the very precision of the mechanism that charms me with imprecision” (34). This will also let the emotion to reveal itself, rather than being bonded to precise definitions the writer insists. Such a character determined by technique shifts attention from the objective *essence* to “subjective perceptions” of the *appearance* as it is with *Ulysses*, which, by an analogy to the Einsteinian universe, Eco describes as “molded into a curve that bends back on itself” (10, 13). Since the means the artist makes use of is language, Eco asserts that language itself is an artifact, “like any other art form. No need, therefore, to identify art with language in order to pursue an analogy that would allow us to apply to one what we have said about the other” (28). However, given the fact that musical language obviously is of a quite different character, it deserves some closer attention.

In his *Critique of Taste*, Galvano Della Volpe stands for the relevance of semantic tools to musical language due to its *expressive* character. Taking the interval as the primary expressive unit of music, Della Volpe attributes to it a sense of *suggestiveness*. The basis of his argument is of a historical kind and derives from

different ways of appreciation of certain intervals. The diminished seventh chord, for instance, is regarded as “functional” in classical harmony but as “worn out” and “false” in modern music. “That is, musically it [the interval] can signify anything whatever depending on what musical system it is employed in or to what compositional use it is put” (217). Since the sound subsumed in the interval brings about the musical grammar, proposes Della Volpe, the relation between the “semantic instrument” and the “form” indicates the “expressed musical idea” (218). However “untranslatable” is it, that is *unspeakable* but not in the mystical sense, the musical idea represents an orderly expression through “a grammatical system of intervals.” Thus the sense of music, if identical with this *unspeakable Gedankenfülle*, is solved “only by whom who *plays it right in its totality*” (219). Since here the receiver will be deprived of the musical idea, attributing a sense of performance to the interpretive activity, as Eco does, might solve the problem while enhancing the analysis. However Della Volpe takes a different road and suggests separating music from “what it says” (219).

In his article “Music, Language, and Composition” Adorno, as well, explores the problem with a socio-historical approach and that the general symbols of musical form, in tonality, are relieved of abstractness and gain meaning in a specific context. Since their identity is related not to something they refer to but instead to their own existence, as the time goes by, these musical concepts are exhausted and turn out congealed formulae. As it is with language “musically, too, subjectivism and reification correspond to each other, but their correlation does not describe conclusively the similarity of music to language in general” (114). Comparing music to signifying language Adorno implies that music “aims at an intention-less language.” Although music cannot be thought without any signification, an absolute signification yields a retreat from the sphere of

music while passing into the false language. In the true language,³ however, the content reveals itself through intermittent intentions without succumbing to an overstatement. The tension between language and music is inevitable, if not only necessary. Through this tension determined by intention-less-ness the relation between musical content and form becomes tangible. In contrast to Della Volpe's separation of content from form, in Adorno, they are inextricable, as if the form is the *spiritual destiny* of musical idea: "Its [music's] similarity to language is fulfilled as it distances itself from language" (117).

As for literature, Adorno criticizes the musical languages of Swinburne and Rilke for imitating musical effects, although he praises Kafka since "he treated the meaningful contents of spoken, signifying language as if they were the meanings of music, broken-off parables" (115). Being musical, for Adorno, is *innervating the intentions*, not being possessed by the process. Hence comparing exclusively an act in signifying language with an act in music does not yield a comprehension but a mere transcription. Therefore, in the present study, we will look at how *Ulysses* gains musicality through intentionlessness with a special emphasis on the process of detachment from the *meaningful contents of signifying language* while approaching the *meanings of music*.

An Outline

Musicologist Donald Grout is said to have commented "one must study Joyce if one wishes to understand Schoenberg." Jack W. Weaver, in his *Joyce's Music and Noise*, reminding Grout's insight, underlines a correspondence between Joyce's fictional techniques and the devices employed both in Symbolist poetry and in Impressionist art.

³ Although these terms, false and true language, seem abstract for the time being, I believe they will become concrete with our discussion of Adornian philosophy, below.

Since, taking Grout's suggestion as a premise we will try to find out structural correspondences between *Ulysses* and Adorno's analysis of modern music, first we need to explore the dialectic behind the clockwork technique in question and the historical process, which gives birth to that technique.

Murray McArthur, in his article "Signs on a White Field" analyzes Joyce's use of semiotics in *Ulysses* by focusing on "Proteus." After a brief description of Saussure's assumptions on the principle of "the arbitrariness of the signifier" and reminding us how human speech differs from the nonhuman one in regard to "the principle of double articulation," McArthur maintains that "Joyce granted some level of communicative status to nonhuman sign systems" (636). According to Emile Benveniste human communication consists of two levels where meaningless units, phonemes and graphemes—the first level—are combined into morphemes, meaningful units—the second level. Whereas in "animate or inanimate sounds" such a combination does not present, even though in the representations of these sounds, in onomatopoeia, they do so. McArthur also grants that Saussure takes the national differences in onomatopoeic expressions as the final domination of arbitrariness. However, argues McArthur, Joyce's use of altered onomatopoeic figures—such as "Mrkgnao" for "Meow"—provides a rich iconicity with the lowest degree of national convention or "arbitrariness" (636). By doing so Joyce offers us a new way around the conventional barriers, a common ground derived from personal experience through the way we perceive the world around us. Not the way of our looking at the cat or the way of his looking at us, but the very crossroad of this encounter. If Vico is right, if "all nations began to speak by writing" and the language stemmed from onomatopoeic sounds, the whole system of signs has to be constructed through an accumulation of personal inventions. Relying on Adorno's

above-mentioned argument that the tension between language and music is inevitable, we will scrutinize certain personal inventions stemmed from this tension in the history of music in comparison with specific techniques Joyce deploys in *Ulysses*. But is it reliable?

In “Joyce, Semiosis and Semiotics” Umberto Eco indicates that when it comes to explain how we produce and understand texts there are two competing models: the dictionary model and encyclopedia model (28). The former treats language as “a series of items each explained by a concise definition,” whereas the latter is “based upon the assumption that every item of a language must be interpreted by any other possible linguistic item,” which requires a kind of cultural contiguity. Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*, claims Eco, consists of completely comprehensible metaphors since the entire work “furnishes the metonymic chains that justify it” (23). According to Eco Joyce creates puns out of metonymic chains “presupposed by the text as a form of background knowledge.” Eco further maintains that this corpus consists of “previously posited cultural contiguities or psychological associations” (23). In order to prove his hypothesis Eco takes the lexeme /meandertale/ as an example. Rather than revealing its constitutive structure Eco begins with the lexeme /Neanderthal/ in order to reveal the mechanism behind Joyce’s work. Through a schema of lexemes consisting of /Neanderthal/ and its phonetic associates Eco reaches three different lexemes: /meander/, /tal/ (“valley” in German), and /tale/ (24). Eco thus argues that “from a point outside Joyce’s linguistic universe we can enter into that universe” (23). The very basis of this process, namely cultural contiguities, can also be thought in parallel with literary limits and borders drawn by the difference between the I and the other. In lieu of reuniting the I and the other—which, as Adorno underlines, is impossible since the bourgeois revolution—we

shall reach a common ground by deepening the differences in every possible way until each constituent turns out a meaningful unit. Given the fact that Eco's case study on *Finnegans Wake* is also applicable to *Ulysses*, if not in all aspects, we may reveal the premises of Joyce's technique through a combination of deductive and inductive methods; that is by picking up an appropriate variable we will unfold the correspondences.

Since, as we will discuss in detail below, the congealed formulae, the very basis of the tension between music and language becomes tangible at the very moment of the collapse, or overthrow, of established technical devices, along with dramatic displacements in the social structure these devices stem from, we will analyze the unity and reconciliation in *Ulysses* in comparison with Beethoven's late style, with a special emphasis on the *Hammerklavier*. Since the technique Beethoven employed in that piece will later be developed by Schoenberg in *Verklärte Nacht* to the extent of giving way to the music of the twentieth century, through an analysis of these pieces along with an examination of theme and variation in *Ulysses*, we will try to reveal the moment music gets closer to language, and language to music. In the following chapter, thus, I will draw the theoretical framework of the present thesis. Starting with a passage of importance in regard to quintessential literary techniques employed in *Ulysses*, we will discuss first the problem of alienation and then the negative dialectics of Adorno. Delving into the poetics of *Ulysses* by means of structural and thematic analyses, the revealed *spirit* will lead us to the comparison of language and music.

CHAPTER II

ADORN(O)ING *ULYSSES*: A Theologicophilological Framework

It is twelve o'clock at noon and the episode "Aeolus" begins at Nelson's Pillar, the departure point for the trams of Dublin United Tramway Company, which follow "the most efficient and modern" (Gifford & Seidman, 128) route in Europe at the time from Blackrock to Palmerston Park. Before getting into the newspaper offices of the *Freeman's Journal* and the *Evening Telegraph*, where Bloom carries out his business, Joyce depicts central Dublin at its prime in a ceaseless movement: "Grossbooted draymen rolled barrels dullthudding out of Prince's stores and bumped them up on the brewery float. On the brewery float bumped dullthudding barrels rolled by grossbooted draymen out of Prince's stores" (7.21). The rhythm created through an altered repetition prepares us to "Hell of a racket" the printing presses give out inside the print shop, "The machines clanked in threefour time. Thump, thump, thump" (7.101). The triple Bloom hears complements the tumult of people working, moving hither and thither, or better living, in the streets of Dublin. Without doubt we are here among the people of the earth, not with the dead of the underworld, whom we have left behind in "Hades:" "Back to the world again. Enough of this place" (6.995). Joyce brings us back right into the life "In the Heart of the Hibernian Metropolis" with the bawls of the timekeeper passing all through the tram stations while the beer barrels are being bumped up on the brewery float as the shoeblacks polish the shoes of the passersby. The rhythms of the "workaday workers" both outside and inside the newspaper offices intersect at the entrance of William Brayden:

Mr Bloom turned and saw the liveried porter raise his lettered cap as a stately figure entered between the newsboards of the *Weekly Freeman* and *National*

Press and the *Freeman's Journal and National Press*. Dullthudding Guinness's barrels. It passed stately⁴ up the staircase, steered by an umbrella, a solemn beardframed face. The broadcloth back ascended each step: back. All his brains are in the nape of his neck, Simon Dedalus says. Welts of flesh behind on him. Fat folds of neck, fat, neck, fat, neck. (7.42)

Brayden's "stately" passing figure is crisscrossed with the thudding barrels and the rhythm surrounding the scene is enmeshed in Bloom's contemplation, who begins to *see* what he *hears* in the same rhythm of the environment: "The door of Rutledge's office whispered: ee: cree. They always build one door opposite another for the wind to. Way in. Way out" (7.50).

As if it is the sound that carries us from an atmosphere to the next, while the process is accompanied by a shift in the narrative mode from the third-person objective "The door [...] whispered" through the sound as Bloom hears it "ee: cree" right into the stream of consciousness "They always [...] the wind to." If we take this process of shift in the narrative mode as a thematic kernel we may identify that it is introduced three times in this passage of intersection. First the phrase "Mr Bloom turned and saw [...] *National Press*" (7.42-44) is followed by the sounds of the thudding barrels "Dullthudding Guinness's barrels" (7.44-45). Then an altered version of the kernel is introduced with the phrase "It passed [...] beardframed face" (7.45-46) followed by an image "The broadcloth back ascended each step: back" (7.46-47). These two thematic processes proceeded first through an auditory unit and then through a visual unit as they are received by the character, finally leads us to Bloom's stream of consciousness "All his brains are [...] Dedalus says" (7.47), which immediately reveals a rhythmic sound-

⁴ In the 2009 Dover republication of the original Shakespeare and Co. edition, the adverb reads "stately" (113). References to that edition will be cited as 1922 edition.

image intersection in “Fat folds of neck, fat, neck, fat, neck” (7.48). The third thematic kernel beginning with the phrase “The doors of Rutledge’s [...]” (7.50-51), which we have already looked at above, also ends up with a similar rhythmic expression “Way in. Way out” (7.51). Here the intersection, which begins with the sounds of “thudding barrels” and then proceeds to the image of an “ascending back,” is rounded off while being related to schematic theme, the winds of Aeolus.

Being absorbed by the rhythm of his surroundings Bloom already blends the auditory and visual units harmoniously with his memories. Embracing Red Murray’s remark of Brayden, which associates him with Our Saviour (7.49), Bloom coalesces the image of Jesus speaking “in the dusk” (7.52) to Mary and Martha of Bethany with the remembrance of tenor Giovanni Matteo Mario (7.53) singing the aria “M’appari” from Flotow’s opera *Martha*: “Jesusmario⁵ with rougy cheeks, doublet and spindle legs. Hand on his heart” (7.57).⁶ The rhythmic coalescence of the sensual elements, which stems from Bloom’s usual tendency to let the world around engross him, continues to accompany his thoughts till his exit from the building: “Thumping. Thumping” (7.72); “Thumping. Thump” (7.76); “Thump, thump, thump” (7.101); “Clank it. Clank it” (7.137). Besides allowing us to sense the workaday world of the print shop, these rhythmic units also feed the schematic theme of “Aeolus,” since, as Gifford and Seidman underline, their resemblance to the daily “royal feast” in Aeolus’s palace is

⁵ In the 1922 Edition it is not typed as one word. Rather it reads like two separate names “Jesus Mario” (113).

⁶ Harry Blamires, in *The New Bloomsday Book*, finds a lapse here. Asserting that the tenor Mario retired in 1867, Blamires concludes that Bloom, who was born in 1866, might hardly have any memory of Mario (46). However Gifford and Seidman specify the date of retirement as 1871, when Bloom was five years old (129). Given also that *The Romance of a Great Singer: A Memoir of Mario* by Mrs. Godfrey Pearse, the tenor’s daughter, gives no specific clue for a Dublin performance between ’66 and ’71, though she specifies 19 July 1871 *La Favorita* performance in London as Mario’s last stage appearance (284), Bloom probably knows Mario and his impressive gesture from another source, Molly for instance, or a book. Whatever is Bloom’s inspiration, according to *My Brother’s Keeper*, John Stanislaus Joyce, Joyce’s father, had heard Mario on October 28 1866 in Cork upon his father James Ausgustine Joyce’s request, who was on his deathbed (Ellmann 14).

obvious (Gifford & Seidman, 130): “Through a lane of *clanking drums* he made his way towards Nannetti’s reading closet [emphasis added]” (7.74).

Bloom is open to the sensuous world surrounding him, not only by means of being consumed by the objects but also through being bewitched by the relationships among these objects and people. However the more in harmony he is with the environment the less *rest* he finds in life, since he is ceaselessly excluded from the ethos of companionship among the Dubliners around him. While rushing out he bumps into Lenehan: “My fault, Mr Bloom said, suffering his grip. Are you hurt? I’m in a hurry” (7.419). In *The New Bloomsday Book*, Harry Blamires underlines “how remote and alien Bloom’s smooth politeness is from the virile intimacies of shared obscenity and blasphemy by which the Dubliners give voice to their mutual friendship” (49). While hurrying away towards Dillon’s in order to catch Keyes and to fix up his commission the remaining party make fun of his walking: “Both smiled over the crossblind at the file of capering newsboys in Mr Bloom’s wake, the last zigzagging white on the breeze a mocking kite, a tail of white bowknots” (7.444). If one of Bloom’s longings is happiness in marriage, or a return to Penelope, the other is being recognized by his fellow Dubliners, or in other words being part of the crew. In “Aeolus” we witness how Bloom is deprived of both *treasures*. Getting displeased of the reeking “heavy greasy smell there always is in those works” (7.223), Bloom dabs his nose with his handkerchief. Blended with the perfume of the forgotten soap its smell evokes Martha’s letter asking “What perfume does your wife use” (7.230). Through the stink of the print shop his thoughts fall upon Molly. He considers going home on the pretext of something he forgot, *just to see* Molly while she is dressing to greet Boylan. He immediately dismisses the thought, “No. Here. No” (7.231), for the sake of his business. In *The Odyssey* while

their ship lies off Ithaca Odysseus's companions open the bag in which Aeolus cooped up all the unfavorable winds. The winds blow them back to Aeolia, where Aeolus denies Odysseus a second chance. Not unlike Odysseus, Bloom is blown off twice. However remote and alien from the people around him, Bloom by means of being in tune with his environment, even if not always consciously, arrives at a plausible solution to the devastating consequences of alienation, notwithstanding the ceaseless distress he experiences.

The Problem of Alienation I

In *The Open Work* Umberto Eco compares two distinct kinds of approach to the problem of alienation; one is expressed in the novel *Cecilia* by Elemir Zolla, and the other is suggested by John Dewey. Zolla's fiction, depicting a semi-erotic relationship of its heroine Cecilia with her car, exposes the state of being possessed by an object as "the symptom of the general and irreversible impoverishment of modern society" (132). Whereas Dewey stands for the "integration of man and nature," where the individual experiences a harmonious fulfillment of the context, the action and the means he makes use of. Although Eco highlights the practicality of Dewey's approach, he also draws attention to the fact that some awareness of a probable failure in this adjustment is necessary in order there to be a sustainable interplay between the individual and the object.

The amalgamation of such diverse attitudes conceived here finds its theoretical ground in a rereading of Hegel's analysis of alienation through Marx:

According to Hegel, man alienates himself by objectivizing himself *in* the aim of his work or his actions. In other words, he alienates himself *in* the world of

things and of social relationships because he has constructed it according to the laws of subsistence and development that he himself must adjust to and respect. Marx, on the other hand, reproached Hegel for not making a clear distinction between objectification (*Entäußerung*) and alienation (*Entfremdung*). In the first case, man turns himself into a thing; he expresses himself in the world through his creations, thus constructing the world to which he then commits himself.

(Eco, *The Open Work* 124)

Moreover Marx's critique is based on the assumption that Hegel disregards the risk of being possessed by this very creation and treats the problem simply as a process of the mind, where objectification is considered alien to "man's nature" and thus cannot be transcended unless man recognizes himself in the created object. It goes without saying that such a process of self-consciousness executed by a "non-objective, spiritual being," which eliminates objectivity and alienation at one blow, eventually denies reality to the object man creates, which, on the contrary, "exists just as much as the reality of nature, technology, and society" (125). As Eco underlines, Marx distinguishes objectification from alienation as a "positive and indispensable process," and suggests a practical action to suppress alienation rather than a spiritual suppression of the object. Although solution to the subjugation at this point is but a modification of the system of relationships, Eco immediately reminds us that even a revolutionary shift in the system would not necessarily eliminate the alienation, since it is an integral part of any relationship we establish. Eco argues that the process of objectification in the work creates a tension insofar as it bears a twofold consequence; it is either a "domination of the object" or "total surrender to the object. This is a dialectic balance that is based on a constant struggle between the negation of what is asserted and the assertion of what is denied"

(126). Praising this integration of *loss* and *recovery*, Eco justifies Hegel's not making a clear distinction between objectification and alienation. The inevitability of the tension, proposes Eco, "is where Hegel contributes a greater understanding of the problem"

(127). However impossible is a permanent elimination of alienation, Eco stands for an "active and practical involvement," accompanied by a vigilant awareness, rather than holding the object in contempt as the womb of alienation. Before proceeding with the intention beneath this suggestion and the use we may make of it in our study of *Ulysses*, it is better to delve further into the problem of alienation.

The Problem of Alienation II

In Hegel the process of self-consciousness through the negation of the object necessarily suggests an equation between what is created and the idea imagined before the creation. Opposing Hegel by claiming that the final character of the yet-to-be-created object is determined by the process, Marx insists on the concreteness of the process as much as he stresses the reality of the object. He is quite certain of it as early as *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*.⁷ Throughout the analysis of estrangement, and alienation, he prefers "labour" (die Arbeit) as the subject of objectification, not the worker (der Arbeiter) who makes use of this labour, which denotes a clear emphasis on the process as such. According to Marx, it is the labour that creates the commodity along with the worker as a commodity while materializing itself in an object as the *objectification* of labour. Identifying the realization of labour as its objectification, Marx further explicates the process in its different but intertwined phases as they are present under the *existing* economic conditions: "Realization of labour appears as a loss of

⁷ Any reference to the writings of Marx in Marx, *Selected Writings*, Ed. David McLellan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

reality for the worker, objectification as a loss of the object or slavery to it, and appropriation as alienation, as externalization” (86). Grasped in their relationship to one another the aspects of the process are revealed as real entities, rather than matters of abstract thinking. Insofar as a loss of reality for the worker is an *actual* starvation, *objectification* is privation, and *appropriation* is slavery. Alienation, Marx concludes, “shows itself not only in the result, but also in the act of production, inside productive activity itself” (88).

In his *Reason and Revolution*, identifying the fundamental premise as the “negativity of totality” both in Hegel and in Marx, Herbert Marcuse distinguishes the Marxian theory from the Hegelian theory in terms of its distinct approach to the process of negativity. Grounded on the totality of reason, negativity takes a metaphysical route in Hegel’s closed ontological system. In contrast to this ontological dialectic, proposes Marcuse, Marx turns the negativity of reality into a “historical condition.” “In other words, it becomes a social condition, associated with a particular historical form of society. The totality that the Marxian dialectic gets to is the totality of class society, and the negativity that underlies its contradictions and shapes its every content is the negativity of class relations” (314). As Marcuse points out, for Marx, as well as for Hegel, facts are also negations and restrictions shackling the “real possibilities” (282). Thus, in Marxian dialectic, the negation of negation is the negation of alienated labour. According to Marcuse, in Hegel’s system, to be “real” is to be in a form “concordant with the standards of reason” (11). Although, not unlike Marx, Hegel considers the reality as a process of self-realization, it is but the process of reason, of “its being made real” (9). To be “real” you need to *know thyself*. To cite Marcuse: “Hegel’s philosophy is thus necessarily a system, subsuming all realms of being under the all-embracing idea of

reason” (24). Therefore “the truth” can only be reached through the fulfillment of objective potentialities in the unification of opposites, insofar as the subject already is the “process of becoming the predicate and of contradicting it” (26). An analysis of alienation is thus essential to comprehend Marx’s critique of Hegel. As we have already mentioned, alienation is overcome, in Hegel’s system, through the realization of reason. The subject, ascending the comprehension of itself, as well as the possession of the object, establishes a totality. Hence the truth is a whole. According to Marcuse, since this Hegelian totality is to collapse if any of its *material elements* or *facts* cannot be subsumed under the process of reason, Marx rejects the idea that the truth has already been realized: “The existence of the proletariat contradicts the alleged reality of reason, for it sets before us an entire class that gives proof of the very negation of reason” (261). Under the prevailing social conditions, as Marcuse posits, “the consciousness of man is completely made victim to the relationships of material production” (273).

Insofar as labour is exterior to the worker, as Marx postulates in *Manuscripts of 1844*, “that he does not belong to himself in his labour but to someone else,” the activity of the worker amounts to a loss of self (88f). Marx identifies such an activity as passivity, “for what is life except activity,” and labels it as self-alienation, which, needless to say, determines the entire human condition. Moreover, as to another insufficiency of Hegelian spiritual subject, posited as an abstract activity of a “mental labour” the process of self-consciousness is but illusory. In the absence of a real object existing externally, a being is non-objective. That it is a non-being, which, obviously, cannot have a consciousness of itself at all. As it is with the process of self-consciousness in Hegel, where the object is annulled in recognition, alienated labour no sooner tears from man his real objectivity than it robs him of the object he produces

(91). Condemned to non-objectivity, alienated man cannot establish any kind of human relationship.

Identifying money as the eminent possessor, the sole appropriator of all objects, Marx highlights its status as the mediator of any relationship between man and man. The power alienation enjoys through the domination of the object passes to money. It makes the ugly beautiful, or the stupid clever. It possesses the entire human condition. Its lack means a “decline” even for the “cleverest fellow,” as it is with J. J. O’Molloy: “Cleverest fellow at the junior bar he used to be. Decline, poor chap. That hectic flush spells finis for a man. Touch and go with him. What’s in the wind, I wonder. Money worry” (7.292). It is money that downs J. J. O’Molloy⁸ in *Ulysses*, and leads the companions of Odysseus to open the bag in *The Odyssey*.

Referring to Marx’s *Capital*, Marcuse points out that under the prevailing capitalist mode of production men are related to each other “through the commodities they exchange,” where the relationship between persons is of a material kind, whereas between things is of social (279f). Qualities are exchanged with certain amounts of quantity. Hence the process of reification conceals the real potentialities under the semblance of “a totality of objective relations,” which cannot be revealed unless it is exposed as “a specific historical form of existence that man has given himself” (280f). Intertwined with the entire human condition in all its appearances, the aspects of alienation cannot be isolated from one another. Otherwise, if we renounce the critical analysis Marx maintained, we will find ourselves dealing with mere semblances. Examining Marx’s analysis of labour process in *Capital*, Marcuse draws attention to the

⁸ Relying on Stanislaus’s *My Brother’s Keeper* Gifford and Seidman relate Molloy with Moonan of *Portrait* (134), who has been maltreated because of a homosexual affair. Thus a possible relationship between the incident and the ruin is worth analyzing.

twofold content of the analysis on which Marx's entire system is grounded: "All the Marxian concepts extend, as it were, in these two dimensions, the first of which is the complex of given social relationships, and the second, the complex of elements inherent in the social reality that make for its transformation into a free social order" (296). Eco's noteworthy suggestion of integration among distinct attitudes towards alienation can be elaborated through a rereading of Marx, rather than a rereading of Hegel. That, as Eco presupposes, "to learn how to acquire new autonomy, and how to devise new ways of being free" (136), to live with never-lasting alienation without enslaving by it, requires an awareness of the relationship between alienation and labour, as well.

Striving to give Mr Nannetti an exact description of the advertisement he wants to place in the paper, Bloom "glancing sideways up from the cross he had made, saw the foreman's sallow face, think he has a touch of jaundice, and beyond the obedient reels feeding in huge webs of paper. Clank it. Clank it. Miles of it unreeled. What becomes of it after? O, wrap up meat, parcels: various uses, thousand and one things" (7.134).⁹ As regards the externalization of the worker in the object produced, Marx, in *Manuscripts*, assumes an inverse proportion between the product and the worker: "So the greater this product the less he is himself" (87). The share due to the worker is misery, *jaundice*. Deprived of his physical welfare as well as mental strength the worker "falls under the domination of his product," ever more. Then what is it that possesses the worker to an increasing extent the more he strives for? "What becomes of it after?" Having already reduced the paper to the status of a mere medium for advertisement and entertainment, "It's the ads and side features sell a weekly, not the stale news in the official gazette"

⁹ Although soon-to-be lord mayor of Dublin J. P. Nannetti does not have the look of a conventional worker, the way Joyce depicts him seems sufficient to treat him so, if not only Nannetti's claim of being "not a professional politician but a workingman who pursued a political career on the side" (Gifford & Seidman, 130).

(7:89), Bloom claims that the paper will become anything but a medium of information. More than that it will become money along with “thousand and one things.”

What makes Bloom well aware of the relationship between labour and alienation, rather unconsciously, is his being in tune with his surroundings. Not unlike Eco, who prefers using the car as “a sort of sonic or rhythmic background” to his thoughts in order not to be totally absorbed by it (134), Bloom makes use of his senses to keep himself aware of the concrete violence around him: “Now if he got paralysed there and no-one knew how to stop them they’d clank on and on the same, print it over and over and up and back. Monkeydoodle the whole thing. Want a cool head” (7.102). In *Manuscripts of 1844* Marx exposes the non-objective being as “an unreal, non-sensuous being,” which is but “a being of abstraction.” According to Marx “to be sensuous, i.e. to be real, is to be an object of sense, a sensuous object, thus to have sensuous objects outside oneself, to have objects of sense perception. To be sentient is to suffer” (113). Passionate Bloom, who suffers a great deal from alienation, provides a model for coping with the situation.

So far we have been considering the problem of alienation in order to contribute a new perspective to Umberto Eco’s suggestion of integration regarding opposing attitudes towards the problem. We have tried to move the integration to the grounds of Marxian theory from its Hegelian origin through extending it to comprise the entwined modes of alienation—which, I believe, provides a more sustainable, but not an easier, solution when it comes to everyday experience. Throughout the analysis we have realized that our solution has already been materialized in Bloom. However, leave aside those Dubliners and their claims of having known Bloom in person¹⁰, Bloom is a fictional character. The remark is made by the author, though it is by no means dictated.

¹⁰ See Willmar Sauter, “Bloomsday: James Joyce’s *Ulysses* Celebrated as Theatrical Event,” *Culture Unbound*, Volume 1: 2009, 469–485.

Rather it is revealed through the form of the narrative. Therefore the response Bloom gives to alienation is presented as the unintentional message of the author. Before proceeding with a detailed analysis of the form, of the means the author deals with fundamental problems in and of the society, such as alienation, we need to clarify certain points left obscure. We have suggested a rereading of Marx, instead of Hegel, but we have not yet indicated the theoretical basis of it. Undertaken in such a way the problem will lead us to various, but intertwined, questions. To what extent *Ulysses*, which we have already praised as a beautiful work, can meet the theoretical premises of such an approach? How can the correspondences, between the approach and the text, be uncovered? Is it plausible to extend these correspondences to other artistic expressions?

Marxism as Deviation

Elaborating Eco's remark on the "dialectic balance" derived from the everlasting tension brought out in man's productive activity, we recalled Marx's critique of Hegel's alleged dialectic, which is denounced as one-sided and non-objective. In *Marxism and Hegel*, Lucio Colletti contributes a great deal of insight to this critique. Tracing Kantian influence in Marx's theory, Colletti first comes to grips with *Grundrisse*, especially the passage where Marx criticizes Hegel. Believing that the text Marx has in mind is Hegel's *Science of Logic*, where Hegel reproaches Kant, Colletti finds a junction of the three. Referring to Volume II of the *Science of Logic* Colletti points out that Hegel opposes the idea that the "natural principle" is absolutely unconditioned, although it comes first and determines the Notion "in the order of nature" (114f). Notwithstanding the acknowledged precedence of the stages of "intuitive perception," Colletti quotes from Hegel, "they are postulated as conditions for the coming-into-being of the

understanding (intellect) only in the sense that the Notion comes forth out of *their dialectic* and *nothingness*, as the ground of their being, and not in the sense that it (the Notion) is conditioned by their vitality” (115). Assessing the quotation Colletti highlights that the question at stake here is the duality between “the process of reality” and “the logical process.” To cite Colletti, “[t]he first gives us the situation as viewed by the ‘intellect’: empirical-sensate being is the *prius*, it places limiting conditions on thought. The second gives us the situation as depicted by ‘reason’: thought *cancels out*—by dialecticizing them—the limiting conditions or premisses in reality upon which it appeared to depend” (115). The latter, which is the “process of knowing,” transforms the former, which is the “progress towards knowing.” *Causa cognoscendi* absorbs and annuls *causa essendi*. According to Colletti, Hegel, not willing to forgo either deduction or induction, downgrades the “process according to nature into an *apparent* process,” whereas the “process according to the Notion is upgraded into a *real* process” (116). In other words *reason* becomes the eye in the sky looking upon its creation, not unlike Goethe’s nature, who created men to know itself. It goes without saying that the unification of the processes, within the *real* process, proceeds through the self-realization of reason, which transforms the cause into a consequence. In our analysis of the problem of alienation we have touched upon Marx’s rejection of Hegel’s assertion that it is the reason that realizes itself through its productive activity. There Marx opposed Hegel with that both labour and the process as such are exterior to the man who produces. Here we have another moment of fundamental divergence derived from the very same source. According to Colletti Marx, inheriting Kant’s “principle of real existence,” however obscure is the course of the mediation, rejects the idea that the

concept generates itself and “upholds the process of reality side-by-side with the logical process” (121f).

Departing from the principle of “non-contradiction,” which makes the old philosophy of Descartes and Leibniz inconsistent as well as transforming the infinite into a “finite infinite,” Hegel by means of a unity of deductive and inductive processes maintains the “condition of logical consistency,” where the “non-being” is annihilated and replaced with *true reality* (Colletti 8ff). “All of this is right,” Colletti quotes from the *Grundrisse*, “in so far as—and here again we have a tautology—the concrete totality, *qua* totality made up of thought and, is in fact a product of thinking and comprehending. In no sense, however, is this totality a product of a concept which generates itself and thinks outside of and above perception and representation; rather, it is a product of the elaboration of perception and representation into concepts” (120). Notwithstanding the real subject to which it is granted to proceed *side by side* with the logical process, the *whole*, the totality stands still. It is this totality that Colletti holds so fast to the extent of condemning Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of Enlightenment for defaming the entire process by identifying it with a “concentration camp” (174). Colletti asserts that “[t]ogether with Marcuse, they [Adorno and Horkheimer] are the most conspicuous example of the extreme confusion that can be reached by mistaking the romantic critique of intellect and science for a socio-historical critique of capitalism” (175). Adorno and Horkheimer’s severe criticism against the “science as a technical experience” along with the state apparatus to which Enlightenment provides the philosophical grounds by “identifying truth with the scientific system” is reviewed by Colletti in the following remark: “They simply will not stand for discipline” (174).

Colletti's firm attachment to the totality Marxian theory offers, despite Marx's intention to give a socio-historical basis to Hegelian unity of being and non-being, leads him to reject the integration of "the critique of the intellect" and "the analysis of reification" articulated in Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*, leave aside Lukács's self-criticism for a moment—for the sake of the *totality* of this thesis. Colletti does so even to the expense of contradicting his own premises. One need only recall that as it is underlined here and again how Marxian theory is derived from certain moments of deviation from Hegelian theory, which find their fundamental divergence in the analysis of alienation, namely the rejection of reason's self-realization and of its being concrete in itself. Such a theory as dependent on the moments of divergence as that of Marx, one need only think of his ardent study on "the declination of the atom" according to Democritus and Epicurus, should not be let to succumb to determinism of totality. The approach that does justice to this prerequisite is that of Adorno. But before proceeding with his contribution to the analysis we need to figure out how adhering to the whole yields a lapse, since it undermines whatever is adduced to contemplate a beautiful object on the grounds of its relation to *reality*. Such a totality denies aesthetic object of any meaning whatsoever. For the sake of totality *viewed by the intellect*, everything reason *depicts* is sacrificed.

The Heart of Darkness

What makes Colletti so furious at the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Horkheimer and Adorno is their criticism against science as a mere tool in which experience is degraded as a mere operation. According to these refugees from the Third Reich, enlightened reason finds its subjects in the bourgeois, the free entrepreneur, and the administrator.

Dealing with the inner contradictions of all-embracing, universal reason Horkheimer and Adorno posit its imperfection:

Reason as the transcendental, supraindividual self contains the idea of a free coexistence in which human beings organize themselves to form the universal subject and resolve the conflict between pure and empirical reason in the conscious solidarity of the whole. The whole represents the idea of true universality, utopia. At the same time, however, reason is the agency of calculating thought, which arranges the world for the purposes of self-preservation and recognizes no function other than that of working on the object as mere sense material in order to make it the material of subjugation. (65)

Since Enlightenment professes to be the utmost culmination of the entire history, patron of the free mind, guarantor of the prosperity of human beings, Horkheimer and Adorno trace its pure immanence from Homeric narratives to the cultural industry of consumer society. Stripped of its universal dictums Enlightenment ceases to be novel, or unique as it claims to be. The separation of the concept from the thing, dialectic principle of the “objectifying definition,” can be traced back to the ancient rites where the nonliving is equated with the living in contrast to “demythologization of enlightenment, which equates the living with the nonliving” (11). To root it out enlightened mind takes possession of the unknown. The “blank spaces on the earth” Marlow of *Heart of Darkness* remembers from his childhood, which used to arouse excitement in him whenever he looked through the maps, are beyond recall. There is no place for excitement. Any blank space out of enlightenment’s reach is the womb of fear, which is to be suppressed. To cite Horkheimer and Adorno “[e]nlightenment is mythical fear radicalized,” hence, “[n]othing is allowed to remain outside” (11). As we have touched

on above, for Hegel the finite gives itself up to the infinite on an impulse. Turned inside out enlightened reason seizes the finite:

Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to human beings. He knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them. The man of science knows things to the extent that he can make them. Their “in-itself” becomes “for him.” In their transformation the essence of things is revealed as always the same, a substrate of domination. (6)

Striving for unity, for being the embodiment of totality, not unlike the absolute of the process of negation in Hegel, enlightenment “draws a strict line between feelings, in the form of religion and art, and anything deserving the name of knowledge” (72).

According to Horkheimer and Adorno with this separation the division of labour extends to language:

For science the word is first of all a sign; it is then distributed among the various arts as sound, image, or word proper, but its unity can never be restored by the addition of these arts, by synaesthesia or total art. As sign, language must resign itself to being calculation and, to know nature, must renounce the claim to resemble it. As image it must resign itself to being a likeness and, to be entirely nature, must renounce the claim to know it. (13)

The totality praised over the particular, regardless of the intuition behind it, whether with the presumption that the union of being and non-being elevates to the knowledge of God, or with an aim at putting an end to this supernatural process by trusting it exclusively to the intellect, inevitably becomes totalitarian. To quote Horkheimer and Adorno “[t]hought is reified as an autonomous, automatic process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine” (19). Resolute to

fulfill their mastery over nature estranged individuals become slaves to “the objectification of mind.” Torn off its qualities the individual turns into something replaceable, if not only calculable units of mathematical formulae. Tearing Horkheimer and Adorno to shreds Colletti does little but invites a retreat into the totality of the whole, where the beauty is stripped of any meaning whatsoever for the sake of fulfillment; science is identified with progress no sooner than efficiency of the object takes the upper hand over its beauty. In the cold bare grove of scientificism works of art are deprived of any meaningful relationship to life, they turn into objects of mere contemplation. They belong to the category of feeling, hence have nothing to do with knowledge. To do justice to art, theory is to approach it rather than leaving it at a distance as science distances itself from the object. Letting the object, or work of art speak for itself is to become a work of art whether on the plane of philosophy or literary criticism.

Negative Dialectics

In *Negative Dialectics* Theodor W. Adorno depicts philosophical experience by an analogy like the one Schoenberg claimed for traditional musicology: “one really learns from it only how a movement begins and ends, nothing about the movement itself and its course” (33). Hence Adorno suggests composing philosophy, rather than reducing it to categories, where the “crux is what happens in it, not a thesis or a position.”

Designated not as a means to truth but as a measure of the narrowness of scientific truth, philosophy is kept distant both from *vérités de raison* and from *vérités de fait*: “Nothing it says will bow to tangible criteria of any ‘being the case’; its theses on conceptualities are no more subject to the criteria of a logical state of facts than its theses on factualities

are to the criteria of empirical science” (109). As Simon Jarvis cautions, in his *Adorno: A Critical Introduction*, Adorno by no means identifies philosophy with music. Instead by analogy he lays claim to an affinity found in the fact that neither music nor philosophy are expoundable: “Both philosophy and music have a constitutive internal organization, whose articulation is as essential to the meaning of a philosophical text or music composition as the individual prepositions or thematic elements without which there would be no composition at all” (Jarvis 129). Adorno describes philosophy as “a true sister of music” in the sense that it suspends the expression of inexpressibility, which is void: “where the expression carried, as in great music, its seal was evanescence and transitoriness, and it was attached to the process, not to an indicative ‘That’s it.’ Thoughts intended to think the inexpressible by abandoning thought falsify the inexpressible. They make of it what the thinker would least like it to be: the monstrosity of a flatly abstract object” (Adorno *ND*, 110). Adhered to the inexpressible, Heidegger in his mind, Adorno postulates, philosophy amounts to that which is “not even sure what it is dealing with”—though Nietzsche is exempted to an extent (110). What is at issue here as an approach is a collage of inductive and deductive methods, not a unity of them. The concept lying at the very core of the Adornian philosophy is contradiction:

The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy. Contradiction is not what Hegel’s absolute idealism was bound to transfigure it into: it is not of the essence in a Heraclitean sense. It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived. (4)

As regards the Kantian “thing-in-itself” Adorno approves of Hegel’s critique of Kant; “[t]o think is to identify” (4). Insofar as we think in a conceptual order, which as a matter of course implies conceptual totality, where the “semblance and the truth of thought entwine,” Adorno suggests breaking “immanently, in its own measure, through the appearance of total identity” (4). As Jarvis underlines, Adorno does credit to the object by means of “pushing subjectively mediated identifications to the point where they collapse” (184). To cite Adorno “[t]o use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity—this is what the author felt to be his task ever since he came to trust his own mental impulses” (*ND*, xx). He admits that the gap between concept and thing can no more be bridged. Nonetheless, undertaking the issue from a point of view where “idealistic and materialistic dialects touch” is still possible. That is reading “things in being” as texts of “their becoming” (52). However rude it is, if not only contrary to almost everything Adorno stands for, we can *summarize* the process as follows: Philosophy, the activity of critical thinking should not monopolize the object at issue but, rather, need get into it; when the thing is taken as a text speaking of its becoming then it can be read, interpreted:

Concepts alone can achieve what the concept prevents. Cognition is a *trôsas iasêta* (wounded heal)¹¹. The determinable flaw in every concept makes it necessary to cite others; this is the font of the only constellations which inherited some of the hope of the name. The language of philosophy approaches that name by denying it. (53)

What leaves cognition black and blue is that it is destined to fall *over a cliff that beetles o’er his base into the sea* whenever it attempts the concept. In *Late Marxism* Fredric

¹¹ Redmond’s translation. See Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. Dennis Redmond. At <http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/NDIntro.txt>.

Jameson ascribes the failure not to “the mind’s weakness,” but to the concept’s claim to “secure and perpetuate the feeling that it reunites subject and object, and reenacts their unity” (20f). Adorno denounces such an identity as ideology. As we have discussed above idealism transforms any relationship of subject with object into a pure, metaphysical process: the finite’s dissolution into the infinite. Adorno finds here a resemblance to bourgeois society: “To preserve itself, to remain the same, to ‘be,’ that society too must constantly expand, progress, advance its frontiers, not respect any limit, not remain the same” (ND 26). Jameson exposes this outrageous claim of identity as *neurosis*, which “is simply this boring imprisonment of the self in itself, crippled by its terror of the new and unexpected, carrying its sameness with it wherever it goes, so that it has the protection of feeling, whatever it might stretch out its hand to touch, that never meets anything but what it knows already” (16).¹² In other words cognition is tempted into unity, reconciliation. Adorno finds in this immanence the inevitability of contradiction insofar as “what we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant, negative” (ND 5). Contradiction is immanent inasmuch as we think with concepts, which always refer to nonconceptuality, “that as the abstract unit of the noumena subsumed thereunder it will depart from the noumenal” (12). Thus it is matter itself that brings about the dialectics. There is a tension between thinking and the object of thinking. However dialectics is not something supernatural nor does it exist in any place; it requires active thinking of the subject: “To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions, for the sake of the contradiction once experienced in the thing, and against that contradiction. A contradiction in reality, it is a contradiction against reality”

¹² Here the resemblance between Jameson’s approach to *neurosis* with Benedict Anderson’s description of the nation “as an imagined political-community” is obvious. Underlining this resemblance the point I would like to draw attention to is that the entire webs of relationship, from the most *individual* to the most *universal*, are in a sense destined to idealism, unless we arrive at a critique of it.

(144f). Negative dialectics then is not the denial of this process—one need only recall that dialectics even in Hegel was negative, it was negation—but, rather, turning the direction of conceptuality, which affirms itself through nonconceptuality, toward nonidentity (12). That is simply driving the contradiction through further contradiction. As Susan Buck-Morss cautions, in *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, “Adorno insisted that philosophy recognize not only natural objects as ‘matter’ but *geistige* phenomena as well [...] Like physical matter, the ‘material’ of ideas, theories, concepts, of novels and musical compositions, lived, grew old, and decayed” (78). Here we are at the edge of falling under the spell of Benjamin’s *aura*. To quote *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, “[i]f the tree is addressed no longer as simply a tree but as evidence of something else, a location of *mana*, language expresses the contradiction that it is at the same time itself and something other than itself, identical and not identical” (11). The emphasis is as striking as it is simple: Here we are, here we think! However it is quite different from *je pense donc je suis*. *Donc* does no more function as a conjunction, it is denounced as an *adverb*, as something the subject dictates. What brings us here is the thinking activity, which finally finds itself self-contradicting; thought realizes itself as finite, as concrete, which, as Buck-Morss highlights, does but increase “the nonidentity, the strangeness of the object,” *aura* as Benjamin called it (78). Labeling the experience of nonidentity as negativity, in the case of an open-ended “unreconciled condition,” Adorno attributes a sense of mobility to this experience: “Mobility is of the essence of consciousness; it is no accidental feature. It means a doubled mode of conduct: an inner one, the immanent process which is the properly dialectical one, and a free, unbound one like a stepping out of dialectics” (ND 31).

According to Buck-Morss, when it comes to the thinker or to the artist, Adorno relates this twofold process of consciousness to the intellectual activity: that one “needed to critically negate the (reified, bourgeois) material of his trade, which functioned ideologically yet contained in a mediated form the antagonisms of that society whose historical development had been the source of its production” (50). Evaluating the role praxis plays in Adorno’s train of thought, Buck-Morss further draws attention to the multidimensional and reciprocally determining traits of the concepts of nature and history, and underlines their “double character.” Insofar as it is the material product of labour nature is positive, hence it refers to “concrete, individual, existing being,” whereas it is negative inasmuch as it is beyond the reach of human control, referring to “the world not yet incorporated into history, not yet penetrated by reason” (54). History, in its turn, is positive insofar as it is “dialectical social praxis” from which always emerges something new, notwithstanding that it is destined to reproduce prevailing conditions and relations unless the social order is modified, which makes it negative. Adorno criticizes taking either of the concepts as “an ontological first principle,” as Hegel and Heidegger did, which immediately cancels out their double character. On the contrary Adorno stands for the utilization of this heterogeneity. As he claimed in a 1932 speech titled “The Idea of Natural History,” “to grasp historical being in its most extreme historical determinacy, there where it is most historical, as itself natural being, or ... to grasp nature there where it appears to harden most profoundly within itself, as historical being” (quoted in Buck-Morss 54f). Adorno’s clear preference on the side of heterogeneity of the concept is much like a sail through Benjamin’s constellations, ever changing, always in movement. Hence the course of the interpretation is revealed: undermining the moments of unity whenever the concept lays claim to identity,

whatever it reconciles with. It goes without saying that such an approach requires a ceaseless experimentation in form. Always addressing itself, *the text* reveals the kernels of its immanent relations without which there will be no *composition* at all.

The Philosophy of Hibernian Metropolis

Ulysses, always returning to itself, is the playground of such an experiment not only by virtue of its form but also of its content. If we return to our analysis of the “Aeolus” episode we may identify two moments of this articulation. On the one hand, the overall picture conveyed by the narrative consists in audio-visual elements entwined with the thoughts of Bloom insofar as he is willing to *be seduced* by the environment, to be part of it. On the other hand, although this formal structure does not determine the content, it makes the fundamental elements of social relations reveal themselves without ever judging them. These articulations we deduce from the text are in no way dictated by the narrator, instead are allowed to speak for themselves. Since the devices employed to establish the structure in question are grounded in a scrutiny of relations among distinct parts, the attention paid to microcosm is immediately reflected onto the whole as well as to its constituting concepts and themes.

In *Advertising and Commodity Culture in Joyce*, Garry Leonard, tracing the moments Joyce comes to grips in his works with yet-to-be-developed commodity culture of his time, sheds light on the relationship between the parts and the whole on a thematic level, and, as he admits, tries “to demonstrate how Joyce's fiction consistently asserts that what is disposable, insignificant, ephemeral, dead, or forgotten may nevertheless especially influence and shape our sense of reality and self more profoundly than those objects, texts, and images that have been designated as worthy representatives of eternal

truth” (34). Leonard first scrutinizes to what extent Stephen’s Thomistic theory of art in *Portrait*, which consists in the concepts of *integritas*, *consonantia*, *claritas*, and *quidditas*, corresponds to certain stages of commodity advertisement, from packing (*integritas*) and labeling a Brand Name (*consonantia*), which amount to an “exchange value” higher than the production cost (*claritas*), to the final phase of convincing the consumers of the *whatness* of the product—that is the commodity they consume is what it is and no other thing (*quidditas*) (2f). Leonard then links Stephen’s theory of contemplation with Bloom’s theory of quite practical sort aesthetics by figuring out the correspondences between the ad canvasser’s dream of ideal advertisement and the young artist’s aesthetic doctrines in *Ulysses*:

What were habitually his final meditations?

Of some one sole unique advertisement to cause passers to stop in wonder, a poster novelty [First we recognise that the object is one integral thing], with all extraneous accretions excluded [then we recognise that it is an organised composite structure], reduced to its simplest and most efficient terms [“the parts are adjusted to the special point”] not exceeding the span of casual vision [“Its soul . . . leaps to us”] and congruous with the velocity of modern life [“The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant”]. (*U* 17.1769; comments and quotations in brackets are in Leonard, 4)

As Stuart Gilbert emphasizes, in *James Joyce’s Ulysses*, such junctions or disjunctions of thoughts, feelings, and attitudes in the spiritual relationship of Stephen and Bloom constitute one of the *leitmotifs* of *Ulysses*. Pointing out that Stephen’s ever-changing thoughts on his stroll around Sandymount are symbolized by the “upswelling tide” Gilbert formulates “an integral part of the psychological background of *Ulysses*” out of

this early presentation, which will provide us with the key to the “intimate connexion with the personalities of Stephen and Mr Bloom” (4f). The connection between these two is rooted in and gives the grounds of the entire web of relationships that constitutes the work. Since the monadic threads of this web are inconspicuous and scattered throughout the work *Ulysses* requires of the reader drawing hypotheses to acquire meaningful discourses out of apparently unrelated fragments. To indicate this feature Gilbert quotes Herbert Spencer’s remark “[i]t is a truth perpetually that accumulated facts, lying in disorder, begin to assume some order when an hypothesis is thrown among them” (25). Revising the remark Gilbert asserts that such hypotheses are not thrown but concealed. Thus the one who needs to come up with hypotheses is the reader: “Moreover, again following Nature’s method, Joyce depicts only present time and place of the times and places that are passing, a rapid flux of images. [...] It is for the reader to assemble the fragments and join the images into band” (25). Not unlike Adorno’s keen assurance of the reciprocally determining traits of the concepts of nature and history, the method Joyce employs serves the multidimensionality and heterogeneity of concepts and themes.

However ephemeral and ahistorical are the thoughts, acts, and gestures of Joyce’s characters, Leonard attributes to them a kind of “nonhistoricized significance” (65). Underlining that the insignificance is always kept at a distance from the orbit of history, with a view to demonstrating that the moment of insignificance is grounded at the juncture of “timeless art” and “ephemeral marketplace” in *Ulysses*, Leonard argues that Joyce drew our attention to how powerful the insignificance actually is:

In *Ulysses*, the ephemeral and disposable a “throwaway” figure forth the apocalypse and provide a promise of closure to the painfully open-ended

experience of being human. Modern advertising's promise of completion, redemption, and the attainment of paradise is the equivalent of holy scripture for Joyce, the new (improved!) testament, promising completion and bliss if purchased, and warning of permanent gnomonic despair if spurned." (35)

Leonard further identifies the superficial disorders of Bloom's and Stephen's meditations as "chronicles of disorder," along with *other* neglected sources of history such as "newspapers, advertisements, and fashions." A chronicle of disorder, continues Leonard, "signifies, in a manner unfairly dismissed as "rubbish," a non-narrational history of the everyday as distinct from the narrative history" (66). In a letter to his patron Harriet Weaver, citing a number of pained remarks on the *Work in Progress*, Joyce cries "[w]hat the language will look like when I have finished I don't know. But having declared war I shall go on *jusqu'au bout*" (Ellmann, *James Joyce* 581). All in the wind, Joyce did not express a new, *ephemeral* vision of the world, but let what is prevalent reveal itself through a critical negation of his material.

In *The Open Work*, Eco explores the problem of alienation in the industrial society along with the question of how the avant-garde artist undergoes the problem as well as the prevailing conditions the industrial society confronts. One, among many, of Eco's points of departure is that contemporary art has but as its feature a novel formal structure corresponding to the "new vision of world," which is quite different from the "orderly cosmos" of the past. He rejects the idea that contemporary art deals more with formal experiments and abstractions than with man, which will eventually amount to say that to speak of man art needs to speak in a traditional form:

To speak of today's man, however, art has no choice but to break away from all established formal systems, since its main way of speaking is as *form*. In other

words—and this amounts to an aesthetic principle—the only meaningful way in which art can speak of man and his world is by organizing its forms in a particular way and not by making pronouncements with them. Form must not be a vehicle for thought; it must be a way of thinking. (142)

Hence an avant-garde artist, who is aware of the problems industrial society bears, tries to fulfill a double task: apart from creating his own style he develops tools necessary to understand and to explain this completely new situation while avoiding the authoritative dictations of a meta-language. Eco illustrates this *double burden* with Joyce's treatment of contemporary journalism in the "Aeolus" episode, where the entire chapter is constructed as a montage of newspaper clippings with headlines in different styles ranging "from the most traditional Victorian headline to the syntactically flawed vernacular of an evening scandal-rag." According to Eco, Joyce by means of turning "the situation into a formal structure and let it speak for itself (revealing itself for what it is)," first "alienates himself in the situation," for he in a sense adopts its expressions, and then manages to "elude the situation and control it. In other words, he avoids alienation by turning the situation in which he has alienated himself into a narrative structure" (148). Further in *The Aesthetics of Chaosmos*, Eco highlights that the arranged style does not convey a dictated judgment, "[r]ather it [the judgment] is represented solely by the form of the chapter, in which all the rhetorical figures are employed" (36). Describing the process as a transformation from "meaning as content of an expression" to "the form of the expression as meaning," Eco praises it as "the direct consequence of the refusal and destruction of the traditional world in *Ulysses*" (37).

In *Joysprick*, Anthony Burgess, who goes far to relate Joyce's interest in the media to his Jesuit background,¹³ considers the style applied to the episode on the grounds no less of the medium's (newspaper's) "power to shock a reader into attention" than of its symbolism—"god of the wind; editor; journalism; rhetoric; etc." According to Burgess "[t]he manner in which, on any page of a newspaper, we move from subject to subject without logical progression, finds a counterpart in the interior monologue, where the mind dips into its own private newspaper and comes up with topics at random" (25). Submitting that Joyce's formal experiments consist in his awareness of the virtues of visual and auditory shock, Burgess grounds his study on an analysis of "Joyce the manipulator of ordinary human language" (25). Not unlike Eco, Burgess considers Joyce's texts as formal experimentations where "the act of signalling" is brought to the fore instead of a narrative loaded down with message.

The formal structure is a web of relationships so beautifully woven that its threads, thematic kernels constituting it are closely entwined. A tiny little change in the atmosphere immediately affects the thoughts of the characters, for their objectivity is related to their subjectivity. No deed is needed as heroic as drinking the blood of Fafner to hear the inmost thoughts of Mime or to understand the songs of the birds. A shift in the narrative mode is related to the sensuous experiences of the character, which consist in particular themes and in the whole work as well. However, different techniques employed in the text in no way amount to a simple body of appropriate rigs gathered together to constitute a charming whole, which, by means of different points of view, will give the codes of subject-matter. Such assessments belong to the Lukács's school. As Adorno asserts in an article titled "Reconciliation under Duress," where he reviews

¹³ Apart from the long list of Joyce's engagements in the business, he is said to claim, "I must have talent for journalism." See Ellmann, *James Joyce*, 255.

Lukács's *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism* and tears his "class-justice" to pieces, "[the authentic works of modern literature] objectify themselves by immersing themselves totally, monadologically, in the laws of their own forms, laws which are aesthetically rooted in their own social content" (166). For Adorno the excitement these works arouse, which is far beyond the reach of any message confined in the narrative, is rooted in the fact that "[t]he voice of the age echoes through their monologues" (166). He defends the device interior monologue and its subjectivism against Lukács's accusations of solipsism:

"The *monologue intérieur*, the worldlessness of modern art which makes Lukács so indignant, is both the truth and the appearance of a free-floating subjectivity—it is truth, because in the universal atomistic state of the world, alienation rules over men, turning them into mere shadows of themselves—a point we may undoubtedly concede to Lukács. The free-floating subject is appearance, however inasmuch as, objectively, the social totality has precedence over the individual, a totality which is created and reproduces itself through alienation and through the contradictions of society." (160)

Adorno rebukes Lukács for disparaging the terms like "image" and "essence" made use of in aesthetics, notwithstanding the obvious idealistic connotations the terms have. In spite of this apparent idealism, these terms perform different functions in the realm of art in comparison with their philosophical use. The distinction gives way to the idea lying behind the inevitable objectivity of artistic subject: "Art exists in the real world and has a function in it, and the two are connected by a large number of mediating links" (159). The point is far beyond being significant: the dialectic of criticism and work of art. The artist distances himself from the object while the critic approaches his object. Since art

and world are already inextricably connected, and the artist and his work exist in the real world, the artist needs to expel himself from the real world to realize the “mediating links” between his imagination and the world he dwells in, whereas the critic has to approach this process, by means of both form and content, in order to grasp it completely. I believe therein lies the reason why great works of art require a Sisyphean effort in reaching a plausible analysis: they exert this dialectic of critique and work on their own bodies. No doubt, Joyce’s fictions belong to this class.

In *James Joyce’s Ulysses* Stuart Gilbert points out that the problems of aesthetics Joyce dealt with from *Stephen Hero* onwards give the grounds on which Joyce performs his trade. Gilbert further quotes from *Portrait* “[t]he artist, like the God of creation, remains within or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails” (Gilbert 21). Evaluating Stephen’s views by quoting the passage where the young artist denounces art as improper if it arouses “desire and loathing,” for the former urges us “to possess” whereas the latter “to abandon,” Gilbert concludes that *Ulysses* is the embodiment of the aesthetic theory Stephen sketched out in *Portrait*. Praising the “aesthetic emotion” as static, Gilbert finds in *Ulysses* “the ideal silent stasis of the artist nearly realized, his personality almost impersonalized” (22). Although lending colour to fundamental traits of *Ulysses* with a view to emphasizing its coherence, if at the expense of drawing biblical deductions, will not serve a full understanding of the work, Gilbert is beyond paying lip service when he infers “[t]he conflict of deliberate indifference (*stasis*) with the loathing of disgust (*kinesis*) is apparent throughout *Ulysses*” (23). What deserves to be labeled as “coherent” in *Ulysses* is having as its *spirit* such interminable contradictions. As Stephen, articulating his “theolologicophilolological” farragoes in the National Library, asserts “[w]here there is

a reconciliation, [...] there must have been first a sundering” (9.334), and again at the expense of repeating himself “[t]here can be no reconciliation, [...] if there has not been a sundering” (9.397). With an eye to considering fairly Stephen’s insistence, the present thesis is grounded in an analysis of this dialectic of “sundering” and “reconciliation” in *Ulysses* while comparing the techniques employed to reveal this dialectic with those that gave birth to modern music. However before proceeding we need to identify these techniques more clearly.

CHAPTER III

WORDS?: Speaking to Omphalos in Protean

In most novels, Stuart Gilbert points out in his study on *Ulysses*, the reader's attention is concentrated on dramatic situations deployed to lead the reader to a calculated meaning. According to Gilbert that *Ulysses* glosses over "the problems of conduct or character" does not strip it of meaning as "a mere photographic slice of life." Consequently, the meaning "is not to be sought in any analysis of the acts of the protagonist or the mental make-up of the characters; it is, rather, implicit in the technique of the various episodes, in nuances of language, in the thousand and one correspondences and allusions with which the book is studded" (8f).

In *James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word* Colin MacCabe, comparing Joyce's texts with the classic realist novels, extends the novelty Joyce introduced to literature as far back as *Dubliners*, where the discourse is almost entirely denied privilege: "This refusal forces the reader to experience the discourses of the characters as articulation rather than representation; in short, to experience language" (54). MacCabe measures this feature up through a twofold examination. Balzac's *Illusions perdues* in his mind, MacCabe points out that classic realism represses not only the reality of language but also of women. By analogy with Freud's grandson playing Fort / Da in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, MacCabe asserts that the symbolic relationship of presence and absence the boy invented to experience a separation from the mother corresponds to the neurotic relationship with pleasure that the realist narrative employs:

Classic realism disrupts the position of pleasure only to reassure us of its return, it is this gap which produces the heightened tension we experience as narrative.

Classic realism is thus caught in a constitutive contradiction between the

elaboration of non-disjunction and the denial of this elaboration, between the experience of difference and the denial of that experience. In classic realism, the elaboration of truth as struggle between text and performer (writer or reader) goes together with the desperate assertion that the text only exists in correspondence to a truth that is given in the world. The classic realist text starts from an incoherence between word and world but this incoherence will be resolved and, furthermore, it has always already been resolved in advance. (46)

Proceeding toward a determined truth, the classic realist text furnishes the reader with the possession of characters and their discourses. Although *Dubliners* surpasses this Fort / Da game by way of diminishing the gap between the discourses of narrative and of characters MacCabe discerns two moments of failure in the stories “The Boarding House” and “A Mother,” where women are not allowed to speak for themselves and are subdued in language. Uncovering a sense of fear towards the mother’s speech in *Stephen Hero*, which amounts to the production of a meta-language, MacCabe asserts that the lapse is also prevalent in this first version of Joyce’s autobiographical novel. Yet the opening passage of *Portrait*, following the path Joyce first introduced in “The Dead” and elaborated later in *Stephen Hero* by means of “an undetermined signifier,” expands on “the experience of language” through the eyes of *baby tuckoo* Stephen, juxtaposing the dominant look and narrative of the father with the mother, “who opens up language as sound and movement, appealing to the nose and the ear against the identifying eye” (56). To reinforce his argument MacCabe further explains the classic realist structure with Emile Benveniste’s distinction of discourse and narrative according to which the former derives from an interplay between the speaking subject (I) and the addressee (you) where the latter stands for an unscripted subject. Given “[t]he disjunction

between the 'it' of the narrative and 'I' of the central character provides a constant suspense in the classic realist text" MacCabe reproaches the process for relying on an "eventual identity of narrative and discourse at the end" (58). It goes without saying that this ontic identity is the sole adherent of the identity of things. Dwelling in an imaginary end it has the possession of every relationship among the objects. A meta-language, as MacCabe underlines, "regards its object discourses as material but itself as transparent. And this transparency allows the identity of things to shine through the window of words" (14). Once the meta-language is refused, the imaginary end of identities is disposed and the supposed identity of objects to object, or to concepts, is dispelled: "Without the possibility of an end a writer can only investigate the discourses of the day but this investigation can accomplish, in a radical investigation of our sense, a revolution: the revolution of the word" (63).

In his "Introduction" the editor of *James Joyce and the Difference of Language* Laurent Milesi approaches the revolution Joyce devoted himself through a different point of view, "in the etymological sense of coming round full circle" (2). Considering Joyce's oeuvre as a "discreet continuum" Milesi relates the circular character of Joyce's literary productions to the technical evolution Joyce manifested throughout his career, which, eventually gives colour to "an ongoing creative process" (1). Not unlike the structure of Joyce's texts and his "technical evolution," the focus of Joyce scholars and readers has been shifted throughout the history of Joyce criticism. According to Milesi the revision follows a course "from an earlier focus on the mimetic powers and programme of/in Joyce's fictional language [...] to an awareness of the assumptions underlying such a naïve belief in language's illusory mimetic and organic ability, including the ability to be the spearhead of fictional experimentation" (8f). By virtue of

“the inbuilt critical dimension” Joyce’s texts bring representation itself into question, which is then exposed “to a reflexion on representability and representativity alike” (9). Hence product (*signification, oeuvre*) is replaced by process (*signifiance, écriture*). Not surprisingly, when the first fragment of *Finnegans Wake* published in 1924 April issue of Ford Madox Ford’s *transatlantic review* under the title “Work in Progress” Joyce liked the term and used it till the publication of the book in 1939 (Ellmann 563). The title suits as well *Finnegans Wake* as Joyce’s entire oeuvre and career, a life in progress. However plausible it seems the question, whether it was a consciously chosen and well-planned course of life or determined by the shapes of things to come, still remains. In a speech given at University College Dublin, to celebrate the anniversary of Joyce’s graduation, Umberto Eco discusses the issue too. Out of passages from Joyce’s articles written around the year of 1900 Eco draws a unique idea prevailing the entire course of Joyce’s career covering his belief in “[e]ven the most commonplace, the deadest among the living, may play a part in a great drama,” his praise awarded to the artist “with perfect vision and an angelic dispassionateness, with the sight of one who may look on the sun with open eyes,” his attachment to beauty, “the splendour of truth,” and his dream of a language beyond all languages “the higher grades” of which, “style, syntax, poetry, oratory, rhetoric, are again the champions and exponents, in what way soever, of Truth.”¹⁴ To cite Eco, “not yet a bachelor, he knew exactly what he had to do, and he told it, even though informally and naively, on these college premises” (12).

¹⁴ The quotations are in Eco, “A Portrait of the Artist as a Bachelor,” ff 9, *covering* respectively a paper on “Drama and Life” presented before UC Literary and Historical Society on January 1900, and a revised version of the essay published later in *Fortnightly Review* in April 1900, a paper on Irish poet James Clarence Mangan read to the Society on February 1902, a paper titled “The Study of Languages” written in 1899. See also Ellmann 70ff, 74, 94.

Further in his lecture Eco searches for possible connections between Joyce's lifelong quest and the history of languages. First he begins with early Irish grammarians and their seventh century (AD) treatise *Auraicept na n-Éces* (*The Precepts of Poets*), where they try to adopt Latin grammatical model to Irish with an eye to the reconstruction of the first language, Gaelic (!), born after the babelic confusion. According to Eco these disciples of Fenius Farsaid were after a new and perfect language as homologous to the nature of things as the aboriginal one and wished it to contain "the substance of every language born after the babelic confusion" (21). The method they followed, proposes Eco, that through a comparison of different languages arriving at "the best of every idiom" and then combining the collected fragments, is quite reminiscent of Joyce's description of the supreme artist in *Stephen Hero*, who, picking out the latent soul of "defining circumstances," "re-embodies" his material in "artistic circumstances." The second moment Eco arrives at is the *Book of Kells* written in the fashion of Hisperic aesthetics, which, according to Eco, "is the kingdom of Proteus," where "[t]here are no points of precise reference, everything is mingled with everything else" (34). Eco's quest for remote sources of Joyce's attempt at a perfect language, starting from the middle ages and passing through the Hisperic revival, exposes the claims these *poets* had laid to pure language as dreams quite reminiscent of Joyce's own dream. For Eco, Dante, not like Joyce, underwent "the establishment of a perfect tongue" with an eye to "mankind's escape from the post-babelic labyrinth."

On the contrary, Joyce's project, as he progressively moved from his early Thomistic aesthetics to the world-vision expressed by *Finnegans Wake*, is really about overcoming the post-babelic confusion *by accepting and exploring it*. Joyce did not try to go before or beyond the Tower, but rather wanted to live

inside it. And allow me to wonder whether perchance the decision to start *Ulysses* from the top of a tower was an unconscious prefiguration of Joyce's final purpose of forging a *polygluttural* and *multilingual* instrument of communication as a melting pot representing and celebrating the triumph of the *confusio linguarum*. (20)

Highlighting the esoteric background of *Ulysses* Stuart Gilbert links the tower allusions to the navel motif prevalent throughout the work. Elaborating on Stephen's soliloquy "To ourselves ... new paganism ... *omphalos*" (1.176) Gilbert points out that the association between Martello tower and the rounded stone of Delphi Stephen just conjures up in the early morning of the day is also related to the island of Calypso, which Homer describes as *omphalos*, "a navel of the sea,"¹⁵ as well as to the umbilical telephone Stephen fancied of on the Sandymount Strand:

One of her sisterhood lugged me squealing into life. Creation from nothing.
What has she in the bag? A misbirth with a trailing navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool. The cords of all link back, strandentwining cable of all flesh. That is why mystic monks. Will you be as gods? Gaze in your omphalos. Hello! Kinch here.
Put me on to Edenville. Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one. (3.35)

Through the streams of consciousness of Bloom and Stephen the association between the tower and navel cord foregrounds the tapestry interweaving the constituent themes from the "swollen belly" of Mrs Mina Purefoy, who symbolically gives birth to English in the "Oxen of the Sun" episode, to the embryo-Stephen speaking to a "cable of all

¹⁵ Gilbert quotes the line, *Odyssey* I.50, from Victor Bérard's edition as "νήσω [ἔν] ἀμφιρύτῃ, ὅθι τ' ὀμφαλός ἐστι θαλάσσης" [by isle set in the waters, whence there rises a navel of the sea] (Gilbert 54), which omits the proposition ἐν (in), which is present in A. T. Murray's edition, where the translation reads "in a sea-girt isle, where is the navel of the sea." The latter seems more plausible, which places the *navel of the sea* in, or around, but somewhere close to, the island, rather than identifying it with the island. See Homer. *The Odyssey with an English Translation*. Ed. A.T. Murray. London: Harvard University Press, 1919. At <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/>.

flesh” while waiting to be lugged into life by his spiritual father Bloom, who, himself inhabiting (close to) the navel of the sea, is about to go down to Hades, probably at the very moment when Stephen is dialing Edenville. As Frank Budgen recorded in *James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses* Joyce explains the quintessence of the general structure on a wider thematic plane: “my book is the epic of human body,” and further “[i]n my book the body lives in and moves through space and is the home of a full human personality. The words I write are adapted to express first one of its functions then another” (21). In *James Joyce* Richard Ellmann, relying on Joyce’s autobiographical affinity to Stephen, deduces from the process of Stephen the young heretic’s coming into being that Joyce of *Portrait* is the mother of himself (288). Whereas in *Ulysses*, Ellmann continues to elaborate on the idea, Joyce becomes his own father by way of reconciling the spiritual son Stephen with the spiritual father Bloom, who is a reflection of mature Joyce (289). As Budgen indicates early episodes of *Ulysses* give out the main themes that will recur in variations throughout the following *movements* (47). Alluding to “the struggle with Proteus,” the “Proteus” episode well serves as the prelude of coming movements, giving out the quintessential themes, interweaving the father/mother author with the body/soul protagonist through an interplay of constituent parts of the human body. As Joyce disclosed to Budgen “[c]hange is the main theme. Everything changes—sea, sky, man, animals. The words change, too” (49). And later upon Budgen’s surprise at “almosting” (3.366): “That’s all in the Protean character of the thing. Everything changes: land, water, dog, time of day. Parts of speech change, too. Adverb becomes verb” (55).

In the episode, lazing around Sandymount Strand Stephen closes his eyes “to hear his boots crushes crackling wrack and shells” (3.10), he hears everything in

“progression,” he is “a stride at a time. [...] Five, six: the *Nacheinander*.” Though he is well aware of that if he falls, he would fall through “the *Nebeneinander* ineluctably” (3.15). Don Gifford and Robert Seidman, in *Ulysses Annotated*, remind us that in *Laocoon* Lessing distinguishes the poetry from painting in terms of how they perceive the subject matter. Though in both cases the action is visible, poetry requires a “progressive,” “one after the other” (*nacheinander*) perception, while painting “stationary,” “developing in co-existence” (*nebeneinander*) (45). Joyce seems to apply this subject matter distinction to the reception of the work of art. Not unlike Stephen’s fall, or his death, his perception by others as well is *nebeneinander*: “My two feet in his boots are at the ends of his legs, *nebeneinander*” (3.16). That is how others perceive him. Joyce, depicting *nebeneinander* on these terms, at first in death—for the living perceive death through the death of the dead—and then in perception, associates it with the relationship of the I to the other. Comparing Stephen’s prevailing thoughts and feelings with those in earlier episodes Budgen concludes that not surrounded by hostile *fiends* Stephen is no more hemmed in by “a defensive watchfulness, no longer performing wearily an uncongenial task, he is free, alone, essentially himself” (50). Compared with Stephen’s defensive manner, tendency to retreat into solitude, Bloom’s reaction to hostility is quite the reverse, the greater the hostility he receives the more he tries to behave himself. On his way out of the cemetery Bloom warns John Henry Menton of the “dinge in the side of his hat,” (6.1015) in return for which he receives a cold stare and a short “Thank you.” Although the incident makes him draw “behind a few paces,” “chapfallen,” he immediately dismisses the melancholic thoughts:

Oyster eyes. Never mind. Be sorry after perhaps when it dawns on him. Get the pull over him that way.

Thank you. How grand we are this morning! (6.1031)

Later in the “Circe” when the mob cry out “Lynch him! Roast him! He’s as bad as Parnell was. Mr Fox!” (15.1672) following Alexander J Dowie’s hateful speech, retreat is quite foreign to Bloom: “This is midsummer madness, some ghastly joke again. By heaven, I am guiltless as the unsunned snow! It was my brother Henry. He is my double” (15.1768). Notwithstanding the abundant determinism of the environment, neither Bloom nor Stephen is abandoned to chance. They are objective beings in all *senses*, constantly contradicting the subject material by virtue of their will.

As for the defense of alibi Bloom offers at the trial nightmare, Stephen takes a fancy to the idea of being beyond any ephemeral need or impulse: “On the night of the seventeenth of February 1904 the prisoner was seen by two witnesses. Other fellow did it: other me. Hat, tie, overcoat, nose. *Lui, c’est moi*. You seem to have enjoyed yourself” (3.181). In “Sings in a White Field” Murray McArthur reads the passage in terms of an interplay between Stephen’s body, which cannot be in two places at the same time, and his imagination, who “enjoys the spatial and temporal freedom of the Word” (641). Bloom’s pipe dream of graveyard gramophones in his mind, McArthur compares writing with speech claiming that the latter depends on ephemeral, “performative occasions” whereas the former has as its trait “a temporal stability and extension.” Given the experiment of *nacheinander* and *nebeneinander* Stephen conducts on his own body, McArthur draws our attention to the inextricability of the audible and the visible, not unlike their linguistic counterparts writing and speech. The relationship is exploited through visual and audible transformations. Compared to Saussure’s exaltation of speech over writing by virtue of the organic flux the former exhibits, McArthur analyzes the interaction of writing and speech in time Joyce employs both in Stephen and in Bloom.

In the “Nausicaa” episode Bloom tries to write in the sand a note to Gerty MacDowel, in vain, for “[h]opeless thing sand” (13.1266). Hence writing as well belongs to the ceaseless flux. However fragile is the writing material Bloom works with, using more secure grounds will not completely separate writing from speech. The poem Stephen writes on a piece of paper he tore from Mr Deasy’s letter has as its source at least four books. Given the fact that some of these sources themselves rely on numerous sources ranging from old chants to folk speeches, McArthur exposes the poem as an example *par excellence* of the interaction between writing and speech, as well as “a demonstration of the process of literary production” (648f). Relying on Abraham Moles theory that “the organized figure of sign [tone], whether graphic or phonic, can only be perceived by way of contrast with an unorganized ground [noise],” which is “the surface of inscription” in writing whereas in speech “the entire background of sounds,” McArthur maintains that both Stephen and Bloom “meditate on the omnipresent ground of noise” (638).

The transformation of the audible and the visible in streams of consciousness of the characters corroborate the inextricability of writing and speech *Ulysses* comes to grips with on a wider plane. Like a curve bending itself, such a process, yields a revelation of the relationships among the constituent parts, which eventually lays claim to a new language not through an attempt at purifying it but instead by exploiting the prevalent confusion in the language. On the same “ground of noises” Bloom and Stephen approach each other through their *senses*, both experiencing the language. By virtue of its social character, for the ground is founded upon the *heart of the Hibernian metropolis*, this movement takes a quite ambiguous course. Both Bloom and Stephen simultaneously extend to past and to future, through the memories of a late mother [“No,

mother! Let me be and let me live” (1.279)], a deceased father [“Granpapachi. But ...” (15.2318)], or a lost son [“No son. Rudy. Too late now. Or if not? If not? If still?” (11.1067)], as well as by means of yearning for reconciliation or freedom from usurpers. Hence turned into a “historical condition,” their experience of language becomes a leap in the dark towards reconciliation and sundering, simultaneously.

In an article titled “Cypherjugglers going the highroad” Benoit Tadié compares linguistic potentialities in Joyce’s texts with the contemporary linguistic preoccupations. Reproaching most of the theorist of the age for inventing fictional origins to justify their theories, Tadié postulates “Joyce’s fiction dramatizes the struggle between alienating structure of linguistic categories and their liberating displacement in literature” (51). According to Tadié such a visual transformation of a dog into a pard, which is later given out in a Protean speech as “Leopardstown,” or as “*Leo ferox*,” and finally gets the noun ‘leopard’ to transform into a verb, stands as proof against the notion of that “a part of speech is only *what it does*” (50). Compared to Peirce’s approach to language, “whose system also expounds signs as proliferating narrative structures,” Tadié praises Joyce’s fiction for it “implies (like Humpty Dumpty) that a form of power struggle overdetermines the rationalization of ambiguities in people’s use and understanding of signs in discourse” (47). Consequently Tadié maintains that by way of phonetic reconfigurations Joyce gives the ground of multiple interpretations, where signs “find their origin in previous discourse, rather than in *langue*’s abstract catalogue of words” (54). Moreover Joyce’s texts allow the reader opposite interpretations of phonetic sequences. Considering the “fourworded wavespeech” in the “Proteus” Tadié argues that along with “a Whitmanesque” interpretation of onomatopoeic qualities, “a Saussurean reading” of *hypogrammes* is also possible. Emphasizing that *hypogrammes*, unlike

onomatopoeic devices, function as “matrices and signs of other words,” which are “central to the subject matter of the passage itself,” Tadié distinguishes the “hrss” (3.457) sound in Stephen’s soliloquy as a related pattern for “rearing **horses**” (3.458). According to Tadié even the *hypogramme* ‘**sea**,’ though it is not present in the paragraph, can be figured out by virtue of its “overwhelming symbolic importance” as the matrix of “its **(s)p(ee)ch cea(s)e(s)**” (3.459) (Tadié 53).

In a presentation given under the title “Silences: Where Joyce’s Language Stops” Marilyn French highlights the growing interest over the concept “incertitude” among Joyce scholars at the time. In her speech she gives a brief historical account of Joyce’s entire oeuvre by focusing on the incertitude prevailing in the texts and compares them with works of other *hommes de lettres* of Joyce’s times. Although she admits the anarchical character of the structure Joyce made use of, French rejects the idea that the center of *Ulysses* is language as such: “Language points, is an indicator; it can be an end in itself only in a treaties” (46).

Most great satire, like most great theatre, emerges in periods of homogenous social thought, when a dominant class agrees about universal standards of good and evil—at least in literary representations. The twentieth century is not such a period. Joyce’s public stories are traditional satires contrasting the behaviour of the characters with a “true” morality; but that “true” morality is hard to define. (44)

French specifies two main devices Joyce employs to arouse a sense of incertitude, namely “focal shift” and “ellipsis.” While the former is related with changing points of view, which impede any possibility of a “dominant narrational consciousness,” the latter signifies “a pointed omission, a gap or silence” undermining any attempt of a given

sentence to a certain purpose. According to French, *Portrait* “contains few ellipses and no focal shift: it remains focused on a single dominant consciousness, Stephen’s” (44). However Stephen’s fluctuating states of mind give the grounds of an inner contradiction. She finds *Ulysses* unique because “it possesses a dominant figure—Leopold Bloom—but not a dominant point of view” (45). Given the fact that the book in no way amounts to a formless chaos despite the lack of dominance, French surmises that criticism should focus not on the incertitude, which she believes “is a quality of existence, not its purpose,” but on the purposes of Joyce’s work and style (41).

Colin MacCabe exposes such attitudes as the proof of literary criticism’s own inadequacy for “the active metamorphosis” and “the constant displacement in language” prevalent in Joyce’s texts, which “refuse to reproduce the relation between reader and text on which literary criticism is predicated” (3). According to MacCabe traditional approach devotes itself to a criticism centered on the subject, which foregrounds “a unity for the field of experience such that one could give an account of judgment between possibilities within that experience” (4). In order to interpret the text on these grounds the critic relies himself on meanings, or *purposes*, which are eventually derived from a separation of language from the world. Come to grips with Joyce’s fiction, which refuses the subject any dominant position, the traditional approach loses its grounds of judgment and cannot grasp the content, “for the texts investigate the very process which produce both content and form, object-languages and meta-languages” (14). Comparing the “Aeolus” episode with previous chapters in terms of character dominance, MacCabe argues that the centrality of Bloom’s or Stephen’s consciousness in the first six episodes “is no longer the case in the newspaper office” (114). Notwithstanding the apparent

impersonality of the narrator, especially at the absence of Bloom, the text itself retreats from any central position:

Pause. J. J. O'Molloy took out his cigarettcase.

False lull. Something quite ordinary.

Messenger took out his matchbox thoughtfully and lit his cigar.

I have often thought since on looking back over that strange time that it was that small act, trivial in itself, that striking of that match, that determined the whole aftercourse of both our lives. (7.760)

Emphasizing the “monotonous repetition of *that*,” MacCabe maintains “the impossibility of fixing a moment of presence outside language which would ground the text” (115).

For MacCabe Joyce’s texts constantly articulate “different ways of signifying the world” (93) without thrusting representations upon the reader as ineluctable identities.

Comparing Dante’s linguistic traits with those of Joyce, Eco argues that both derive from “an ensemble of denotative and connotative meanings fuses with an ensemble of physical linguistic properties to produce an organic form” (*The Open Work* 42). Although they both attempt to provoke “an ever richer enjoyment,” admits Eco, Joyce’s case is distinguished by virtue of “a plurivocal message” it has as its source of pleasure, in contrast to the “univocal message” in Dante, “not just in what it communicates but also in how it communicates it” (42).

A Telltale Word-Theme: “Forth I sail’d...”

Examining the influence the Continent had on Joyce, by means of either his travels or literary preferences, in a paper titled “Joyce’s Sentimental Journey through France and Italy” Harry Levin labels Joyce as a traditional writer insofar as the term “tradition” is

“defined as a living relationship with the dead” (131). A relationship Joyce projected through two distinct but parallel planes in the course of his life, insofar as “the theme” that “the dead do not stay buried” prevails in Joyce’s entire oeuvre, as Ellmann indicates. On the one hand Joyce carried over the thought into “The Dead,” which was a projection of his own jealousy of a late engagement of Nora Barnacle, and then into *Ulysses* where his deceased mother shadows Stephen. On the other hand, Ellmann pursues, “there was a disrupting parallel in the way that Dublin, buried behind him, was haunting his thoughts” (Ellmann 244). Levin considers Joyce’s dilemma, rooted deep in his native Dublin “he bore with him wherever he went,” in terms of his actual exile as he himself dramatized in *Exiles*: “whether to bring European culture to Ireland or to create Irish culture on the Continent” (Levin 1957, 132). Levin lays further stress on Joyce’s attitude toward the English language as the key to the “stylistic virtuosity” of the author, who problematized “the basic incongruity between his Celtic race and his Norman name” (132f). In order to come to terms with his awkward position in regard to a foreign language, as Stephen admits, Joyce, as we have discussed above, tried to exploit this awkwardness. To cite Levin, “[a]s linguist and pedagogue, Joyce had a professional grasp of what was not only his problem but finally his theme: the difficulty of communication in the modern world” (132). Considering Joyce’s apparent indifference to politics, MacCabe exposes his use of the term “race,” especially in the newspaper articles written during the Trieste period, as an apolitical concept standing against both “the official culture of the imperial master” and the “nationalist ideology of his contemporaries. Race becomes for Joyce a way of cutting across these competing attempts to reduce both the cultural and the sexual in order to open up a heterogen[e]ous and miscegenated area in which the political would cease to function as repression” (xv).

Further in his analysis MacCabe compares *Stephen Hero* with *Portrait* in terms of narrative-discourse relationship. Although the fact that discourse constantly disrupts narrative and prevents the story from being told is common to both novels, what amounts to “battles of identities, so many attempts to be recognized by a father” in the former, turns into a discourse indifferent to the narrative of the ruling class in the latter. Stephen’s discussion with the Dean of Studies in his mind—

The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words *home, Christ, ale, master*, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write those words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language. (in MacCabe 64)

—MacCabe suggests the “text can ignore the comfortable order of sentences and concentrate on individual words (*tundish*) and on sound” (64).

Meditating on the same passage in *Joysprick* Anthony Burgess draws attention to the diction Joyce employed to emphasize the phonic-differences between the ruling class and the ruled *peasants*: Compared to the diphthong in *home* or the patrician stress in *Christ* the Dean pronounces, Stephen has either a long open vowel or a diphthong respectively (28). As Ellmann recorded, when it comes to the appropriate expression of the age Joyce considers even the technique Ibsen employed inappropriate:

It’s all very fine and large, of course. If it had been written at the time of Moses, we’d now think it wonderful. But it has no importance at this age of the world. It is a remnant of heroics, too. Synge’s play, also! For me, youth and motherhood are these two beside us [indicating a drunken boy of about twenty—a labourer—

who had brought his mother into the trattoria...]. I would like to put on paper the thousand complexities in his mind... Absolute realism is impossible, of course. That we all know. But it's quite enough that Ibsen has omitted *all* questions of finance from his thirteen dramas. (266f)

Joyce's realism, with *the thousand complexities* in the minds of his characters, yields not a secure ground on which the reader enjoys ready-made judgments, but, as MacCabe indicates, "a fictional and linguistic space which stresses the provisionality and interdependency of all identities" (xxi).

In a scrupulously prepared article titled "Opus Posthumous" Sebastian D. G. Knowles traces the notion of *living burial* starting from a junction where composers Othmar Schoeck and Samuel Barber meet writers James Joyce and Gottfried Keller. The initial material of Knowles is a piece by Barber based on a translation of Keller's "Da hab' ich gar die Rose aufgegessen" ("Now Have I Fed and Eaten Up the Rose") by Joyce. According to Knowles Joyce first heard the poem as part of a song cycle called *Lebendig Begraben (Living Burial)* Schoeck set to music along with a group of poems by Keller under the same title. Keller's fourteen poems consist of epiphanies of a poet buried alive. The poem Joyce translated depicts the moment the starving poet eats the rose encoffined with him, the last stanza of which reads:

Only I wonder was it white or red
The flower that in this dark my food has been.
Give us, and if Thou give, thy daily bread,
Deliver us from evil, Lord. Amen. (109)

Knowles considers these epiphanies as the expression of "encoffined" poet's alienation from the world embodied in the contradiction between his imagining mind and

paralyzed body. Knowles delineates the pine tree the coffin is made out of as “the symbolic connection between the two worlds of present paralysis and past liberty” (117), and relates it to the navel cord connecting the dead to the living in *Ulysses* (125). Since the buried poet is in an awkward situation as he addresses his epiphanies but to “the pine boards of his coffin,” however transcendent are his thoughts, the pine tree is the very condition of his misfortune, “savagely” undercutting his epiphanies (119). Keller’s epiphanies undercut by grotesque parody, asserts Knowles, correspond to the moments of climax undercut by parodies in *Ulysses*. Run away from Citizen in “Cyclops,” “Bloom Elijah” ascends to heaven but the biblical augmentation is undercut by the burlesque description of his chaperones “Him even Him, ben Bloom Elijah, amid clouds of angels ascend to the glory of the brightness at an angle of fortyfive degrees over Donohoe’s in Little Green street like a shot off a shovel” (12.1916). According to Gifford and Seidman “the glory of the brightness” refers to the symbols of sanctity, namely *nimbus*, *aureoles*, and *gloria*, since *gloria* combines the first two which are related to head and body respectively (374). The highness of the glory is darkened by being placed “at an angle of fortyfive degrees.” John M. Greer, in *The New Encyclopedia of the Occult*, defines the position formed “by two planets at an angle of forty five degrees” as a minor aspect in astrology, which is called a *semisquare*: “It is among the strongest of the minor aspects, and has a somewhat unfavorable effect, representing sources of difficulty or tension” (428). The theme is parodied twice. First the biblical language is knocked down to the streets of Dublin “like a shot off a shovel,” then the embodiment of mind and body in *glory* is relinquished to a tension, to the struggle between Bloom and Citizen, which will later in “Nausicaa” be transformed into Bloom’s personal tension that is to be resolved by his masturbation. Moreover, the

closing negativity of the *semisquare* also completes the circle of the episode. For, as Budgen indicates, compared to one-eyed Citizen for whom the world consists of good Ireland and wicked England, “the Nameless” narrator, like Bloom, “can see the two sides of a question, only for him [unlike Bloom] both sides are equally rotten” (158). In the “Circe” episode Stephen-Siegfried crying “*Nothung!*” (15.4242) smashes the chandelier with his ashplant. His heroic cry is responded by the “Pwfungg!” (15.4247) “The Gasjet” gives out. Parodying its own climax the narrative ceases to be what it is supposed to be and dissolves into apparently indifferent but inextricably related parts. In *Portrait* Joyce transforms, without ever judging, his lifelong obsession, his native Dublin as the dead living in him, into a power relation between the Dean and young Stephen through the words *home*, *Christ*, *ale*, and *master*, not in terms of different meanings attributed to these *concepts* but by way of revealing the phonetic variations on the lips of each party. As to the mirror image of this theme, the notion of the dead among the living, or “the transubstantiation of the dead,” Knowles maintains that Joyce counterpoises the melancholy with “the images of renewal and return, of sexuality in the face of death,” as “garlic held before a vampire. Death has a kind of life; the only way of defeating death is to live again.” According to Knowles “[a]ll of *Ulysses* is an exhumation: of Irish politics and Irish music, of Homer and Shakespeare, of little Rudy and the beautiful May Goulding, of Bloom’s youth, of the past” (127).

As Ellmann recorded Joyce dreamed of “a language above all languages”: “I cannot express myself in English without enclosing myself in a tradition” (397). He transcends the enclosing tradition through an experience of language. Thematic counterparts of his puns are strongly interrelated as well as multidimensional, which

surpasses the tradition by undermining apparent connotations. If language has become a prison in this age as Jameson argued, there is no other way getting out of it than digging.

“a competent keyless citizen” (17.1019)

Ellmann reproaches critics who compare Joyce with Homer for being unjust yet the Homeric myth foregrounding *Ulysses* lends colour to the comparison. Nonetheless Joyce relentlessly alters the foregrounds for “he seems to come to things through words, instead of to words through things” (4). Ellmann quotes this suggestion from J. M. Cohen’s study on Rabelais. As our analysis shows Joyce’s achievement is quite beyond what “he seems” to do. Focusing on words and thematic units with an eye to exposing their relationships Joyce let the multidimensional thing inside the word reveal itself. He does not just approach *Christ*, he questions the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized by laying stress on the difference of the words on different lips. The process demolishes the acknowledged identity between the concept and the thing. Coming through things to words is the course of meta-narrative, the counterpart of idealist reason in literature, which annuls both the thing and the word through self-realization. Turning the process upside down Joyce brings the concealed alienation into light. Joyce’s discovery, postulates Ellmann, “so humanistic that he would have been embarrassed to disclose it out of context, was that the ordinary is the extraordinary” (5). He did not content himself with disclosing it in a context, he also brought the clumsiness of the context into question.

In a discussion with Budgen about complete all-round characters in literature Joyce rejects Budgen’s all suggestions unless the latter comes up with *Ulysses*, who is not only a son but also a father, a husband and a lover, not only a brave warrior and

companion but also “a war dodger” (16). When Budgen postulates the imperfection of all human bodies in contrast to a three-dimensional sculpture, Joyce defends his Ulysses by claiming “[h]e is both. I see him from all sides, and therefore he is all-round in the sense of your sculpture figure. But he is a complete man as well—a good man” (17f). Budgen recalls the idea for further elaboration while comparing the writer representing his own past with the painter before his self-portrait, who “is not only painting himself painting himself; he is also painting himself posing to himself” (62). He argues that the writer as well does a sort of posing to himself, but the means of pervasion is his memory instead of a reflection in the mirror. To cite Budgen “he is not looking *at* something but *into* something, like a mystic contemplating his navel” (64). Admitting that all self-portraits, written or painted, are more or less one sided, Budgen compares Stephen with Bloom and labels the former as “the portrait” whereas the latter as “the all-round man.” Rodin’s description of sculpture, “le dessin de tous les côtés,” in his mind Budgen praises Bloom as a sculpture (65). Collated with other characters, who “are all hemmed in in a niche of social architecture,” Bloom, as a carving “we can walk round,” is open to be viewed from numerous and diverse points of views in almost every act he performs: “The completeness with which Bloom is presented is at times bewildering. There are innumerable changes of key and scale. Sometimes he is a dark phantom in the middle distance and then he suddenly dominates the foreground plane” (66).

W. B. Stanford, in his scrupulous study *The Ulysses Theme*, where he traces the adaptations of Ulysses by post-Homeric writers, concentrates considerable attention on the tiny details illuminating almost every feature of Ulysses-Bloom, which “are interwoven, loop by loop, spiral by spiral [...] into a complex, variegated unity of design” (223). Given that Joyce remained faithful to the outlines of the myth, Stanford

compares *Ulysses* with the *Book of Kells*, “in which well-known words of the Gospels provided the basis for unwrought linear patterns of the highest possible complexity” (223). Joyce himself did great credit to the book; and as he disclosed to Arthur Power, he used to keep it close at hand wherever he went: “It is the most purely Irish thing we have, and some of the big initial letters which swing right across a page have the essential quality of a chapter of *Ulysses*. Indeed, you can compare much of my work to the intricate illuminations” (Ellmann 545). According to Stanford the characteristic style of the *Book of Kells*, that “a single word of the text may flower into almost as much detail as the façade of a Gothic cathedral,” lends colour to a comparison with *Ulysses* (224). For as physically narrow an area as the one Bloom is to perform in requires that the “adventures must arise mainly from the agility of his imagination and the subtlety of his senses” (224f). Stanford also draws attention to the tension between the author and his character stemming from this inward extension. Since Bloom is not aware of the *fact* that “he is a metempsychosis of *Ulysses*,” his imagination tends to invent Mosaic and Babylonian analogies for his everyday experiences, whereas Joyce, and the reader more so, project these experiences on a surface made out of Homeric details. Hence “the traditional exilic yearning of Ulysses is deepened by an inheritance of wandering and exile which goes back far beyond Homer’s Odysseus, to Abraham and even to Adam” (221).

In regard to Joyce’s relation with Dante, one of his favorite authors, Ellmann asserts that Joyce “put aside Dante’s heaven and hell, sin and punishment, preferring like Balzac to keep his comedy human, and he relished secular, disorderly lives which Dante would have punished or ignored” (4). However, as Stanford maintains, Dante’s reproduction of Ulysses, unlike Homer’s original, is not so much foreign to these

“secular and disorderly lives.” Yet, he finds quite ambiguous Dante’s attitude towards *the much-enduring goodly Odysseus* of Homer, now mourning “the trickery of the horse” in the flames of Inferno, compared to the Latin anti-Ulyssean tradition prevalent in his time. Relying on Croce’s opinion of Dante,¹⁶ Stanford derives Dante’s ambivalence from “a tendency to over-adventurous speculation and research in his own mind” (182). Nonetheless, when Ulysses has finished the account of his last voyage “his flame becomes ‘erect and still.’ Without groan, boast, or curse, he moves firmly away. His austere and majestic self-restraint [...] contrasts with the abject lamentations of the fraudulent counselor who comes next to Dante’s view” (181). Stanford exploits further and postulates more clearly the contrast with Homer’s Odysseus in *The Quest for Ulysses*:

Though he, too, was a man of *curiositas* he respects the will of the gods and he constantly strives to return home: he is homeward-bound, centripetal, dutiful, and pious. Dante’s doomed hero is outward-bound, centrifugal, impious; and he is romantic, too, in the sense that the romantic hero ever yearns for new experiences in faraway lands, while the classical spirit endeavours to make the best of normal and familiar life. (189)

As Stanford points out Joyce carries over this antinomy into *Ulysses*, where the father and son relationship turns out to be an encounter of opposing portraits of Ulysses:

Bloom, representing the centripetal pole, on the one hand, whereas Stephen, having the centrifugal as his trait, on the other. In this way, Stanford concludes, “Dedalus marks the negative pole of the Ulyssean character, Bloom, the positive. Between them they encompass the whole cosmos of the tradition” (Stanford 1968, 215).

¹⁶ “No one was more deeply moved than Dante by the passion to know all that is knowable, and nowhere else has he given expression to that noble passion as in the great figure of Ulysses” (Stanford 273/n7).

O! The Climax of Sensual Experience

Once having hailed *Ulysses* as “the epic of human body,” Joyce transposes the material he inherited from history into the book in the form of either Homer’s or Dante’s Ulysses, instead of picking out historical figures as identical, fixed sources. As Ellmann indicates “[t]o override the dichotomy of body and soul, to reveal their fundamental unity, he was displaying the mind’s imagery under the influence of particular physical functions” (436). What interweave the strands of *Ulysses* are recurrent thematic kernels given out in slight variations throughout the book. In the “Nausicaa” episode for instance, the unity of body and soul is given out in the pure amalgamation of senses. The tension created at the end of the “Cyclops,” leaving *gloria of nimbus* and *aureoles* in distress, is to be resolved here, for the sake of rebirth Nausicaa gave to Odysseus.

And then a rocket sprang and bang shot blind blank and O! then the Roman
candle burst and it was like a sigh of O! and everyone cried O! O! in raptures and
it gushed out of it a stream of rain gold hair threads and they shed and ah! They
were all greeny dewy stars falling with golden, O so lovely, O, soft, sweet, soft!
(13.736)

Crying children are no less merry than the *leaped, and shouted, and laugh’d* little ones in Blake’s “Nurse’s Song,” as if they are consecrating the communion of Bloom with Gerty, one need not forget that they only exchange their intimate feelings. Recurring shouts of cheerful children are blended with orgasmic sighs of “O.” A hypogrammic reading of the passage is plausible, if not having remarkable results for it forces the device to the limit, as well as useful for a better understanding of the following lines. Obviously the exclamation “O” functions as the matrix of “golden, **O** so lovely, **O**, soft, sweet, soft!” hence rounds the circle of communion and has the heavenly joy of having

sex connect with the yelling pilgrims. Consequently the matrix also conveys a remote theme into the communion, “A shout in the street” (2.386), and thus includes Stephen into this heavenly union, not surprisingly along with his God. Finally the passage allows us to figure out one of the main leitmotifs of *Ulysses* as the matrix, although it is not present, as it is supposed to be so, in undetached form in the passage: “Love’s Old Sweet Song.” The matrix can easily be picked out from “(g)olden, (O) so love(l)y, (O), (so)f(t), sweet, (s)of(t)!” which forms an almost perfect anagram.

In *Musical Allusions in the Works of James Joyce*, Zack Bowen cites eleven allusions to “Love’s Old Sweet Song,” each interrelates with all the others and functions as portals linking main characters to each other. Since Molly is to rehearse this song with Boylan for their Belfast concert, Bloom will be preoccupied with the song throughout the day. In one of the key passages the novelettish (*bourgeois!*) tension Gerty’s immoral desires cause is resolved by a motherly tenderness (*introibo!*) aroused in her towards the sorrow the song drove Bloom to:

Perhaps it was an old flame he was in mourning for from the days beyond recall. She thought she understood. She would try to understand him because men were so different. The old love was waiting, waiting with little white hands stretched out, with blue appealing eyes. Heart of mine! (13.666)

Bowen figures out two allusions to two different songs connecting Gerty with Molly as well as Bloom, namely “Love’s Old Sweet Song” and “Waiting.”¹⁷ Having related the first line of the “Love’s old Sweet Song,” “[o]nce in the dear, dead days beyond recall,” to the rising tenderness of Gerty, Bloom’s personal Virgin Mary, Bowen cites the phrase “[t]he old love was waiting” as a commingled allusion to both songs (230). The song

¹⁷ For complete texts of the songs see Gifford and Seidman, 77, 303.

“Waiting” is one of the most memorable of the collective memory of Molly and Bloom, for it was the song Molly was singing at their first meeting at Mat Dillon’s, “that romantic *soirée*,” as Gilbert calls it.¹⁸ According to Bowen in the “Penelope” episode Molly identifies herself as Siren through the songs “Waiting” and “In Old Madrid:” “wd give anything to be back in Gib and hear you sing Waiting and in old Madrid” (18.616). Insofar as “[b]oth are songs of a patient girl awaiting her lover's return, and both are pictures of fulfillment suspended until the return of the absent lover” (334).¹⁹ Bowen further argues that at the moments a special emphasis placed on the song “Waiting,” Molly’s “desires in life” is released from the clouds of her soliloquy: “waiting always waiting to guiiiide him toooo me waiting nor speeed his flying feet” (18.676). As Bowen points out, insofar as the song “Waiting” is already alluded to earlier in the episode, and also relates Gerty to Molly, the song reference lends credence to the communion of Gerty, Molly, and Bloom: “he who would woo and win Gerty MacDowell must be a man among men. But *waiting, always waiting* to be asked and it was leap year too and would soon be over” (13.206) [emphasis added]. Although Gerty wishes to play a more significant role, “to become, like Nausicaa, the means of salvation

¹⁸ For a *fancy* account of this event see Margot Norris, “Joyce’s Heliotrope,” where she maintains a “Shaunian” rather than a “Shemian” reading, with an eye for the pantomime instead of an ear for the speech (3f). By means of reconstruction Norris unearths the “Maytime garden party” at Dillon’s in 1887 as the place where Bloom, Molly and Stephen came across for the first time (18ff). The event links the “Nausicaa” to *Finnegans Wake* through a children’s game, “Lady on a Mountain,” Joyce transposed into “[a]s Rigagnolina to Mountagnone, what she meant he could not can. All she meant was goltien sylvup, all she meant was some Knight's ploung jamn” (*FW*, 225.15), which carries over the returnee, the “golden syrup” (13.32) which Cissy Caffrey promised his brother Tommy, along with the riddle “What’s your name? Butter and cream?” (13.65) right back into the *Wake*. The transposition connecting the texts is exploited even to a further extent as Norris maintains:

If beautiful Gerty MacDowell sitting on her rock on Sandymount strand were indeed an unattainable Lady on a Mountain to little Tommy Caffrey [“Gerty is Tommy’s sweetheart” (13.72)], she is no more than a girl on the rocks to Bloom, who has his own Lady on a Mountain: the beautiful Marion Tweedy of the Rock of Gibraltar, who many years ago, on another mountain, or hill, the Hill of Howth, answered his implicit proposal, “Madam, will you marry me?” with her breathless “Yes I will yes,” and his tacit “What’s for breakfast, love?” with a bit of seedcake from her kiss. (14) [Quotation in brackets added]

¹⁹ As we will discuss later Molly’s *waiting* is thematically much more significant and opposite in function.

for her lonely, saddened Ulysses” (Bowen 230), she remains a source of *inspiration* insofar as Bloom is so preoccupied with his real Lady on the Mountain.

Meditating further upon this moment of junction Bowen also concentrates some attention on another inspiring incident represented in the fourth chapter of *Portrait*: “As the strains of the mass chants drift onto the beach and the virgin-temptress-Gerty engages in vicarious intercourse with Bloom, the scene from *Portrait* is repeated, this time not in the fantasized, stream-of-consciousness-surrogate narration of Stephen but in the naturalistically developed thoughts of Gerty and Bloom” (228). Not surprisingly, since here Stephen’s existence is felt ineluctably, the related allusion is not to a song but instead to a chant: “and the choir began to sing the *Tantum ergo* and she just swung her foot in and out in time as the music rose and fell to the *Tantum ergo cramen tum*” (13.497).²⁰

Rehearsing “Sweets of Sin”

The dove with ivory thighs filling Stephen with “profane joy” in *Portrait* is transposed into Bloom’s Virgin Mary. Yet the transposition is carried over into a further variation, since in *Ulysses* Stephen is imbued with the muse again, after all these years, but this time his inspiration is a cockle picker gypsy in lieu of a dove-like girl with fair, girlish hair, “touched with the wonder of mortal beauty.” He imagines immortal death coming to her, “pale vampire, through storm his eyes, his bat sails bloodying the sea, mouth to her mouth’s kiss” (3.397). The bat will return to the scene nine hours later but this time in flesh. “Ba. What is that flying about? Swallow? Bat probably” (13.1117). Tired of the

²⁰ Bloom’s train of thought, which continues “[t]hree and eleven she paid for those stockings” (13.499), stands as to a further example of how church and custom are interchangeable for him, as we have discussed above.

affair Bloom, “Up like a rocket, down like a stick,” follows the sight of the bat with his train of thought accelerating unless it becomes impossible to tell who is chasing who. Thinking of birds flying over the ocean he arrives at sailors “Sometimes away for years at the ends of the earth somewhere” (13.1153). Though “No ends really because it’s round” (13.1154). Odysseus of Homer before Nausicaa becomes Ulysses of Dante seeking his past in vain:

Then you have a beautiful calm without a cloud, smooth sea, placid, crew and cargo smithereens, Davy Jones’ locker, moon looking down so peaceful. Not my fault, old cockalorum. (13.1163)

Hence Stephen’s experiences of *nebeneinander* and *nacheinander* given out at the beginning of the “Proteus” are coalesced at the end of the “Nausicaa.” On the strand the epic of the human body materializes, moving both in time and in space. If the body is *Ulysses*, it is the body of a drowned man floating in the tide. Paralyzed *Ulysses* of Dublin consecrates Stephen, Bloom, and Molly in their union. Stephen with his “cockle hat” is the lover as pilgrim;²¹ though centrifugal to his biological father he is centripetal to his spiritual father. Molly is the potential lover of Stephen, the dormant wife of Bloom, and the latent mother of those who stream toward their mother-sea in ebb and flow—the stream will be running in the opposite course in the *Wake* with Anna Livia Plurabella flowing down to her lover-father sea. Individual but intertwined themes of the work recur in variations and amount to a progression.

In *The Ulysses Theme* Stanford analyzes *Ulysses* in terms of the polysemous interpretation Dante proposes in *Epistola a Cangrande* and praises it as “a complex four-dimensional work” (214). Although literally it is set in Dublin in an extremely ordinary

²¹ “The cockle hat (with a scallop shell as a sign of pilgrimage) and the staff suggest the conventional metaphor of the lover as pilgrim” (Gifford & Seidman 65).

day, it can also be interpreted allegorically, Stanford maintains, as “a kind of *Pilgrim’s Progress*” similar to pre-modern attitudes towards *The Odyssey*. Although it is a story of a man all flesh in all his weakness, it never yields moralistically a conclusion praising faith. As for the fourth aspect, the analogical interpretation, Stanford postulates that Joyce’s hero is quite foreign to any spiritual dimension consistent with the sense Dante ascribes to his *Divine Comedy*: “In place of this spiritual dimension Joyce substitutes the heroic dimension. Bloom’s pattern and archetype is Ulysses, not Christ. His lost Eden is the heroic world (and, in another sense, the Promised Land of his Jewish ancestors), not Adam’s Paradise” (213). However, the heroism of the book has nothing to do with a ceaseless outward extension required of ancient heroes. In *James Joyce* Harry Levin stays aloof from such attitudes, which hold too fast to ancient sources of *Ulysses*:

Always evasive when confronted by action, Joyce shuns heroic. The relation of the *Odyssey* to *Ulysses* is that of parallels that never meet. The Homeric overtones do contribute their note of universality, their range of tradition, to what might well be a trivial and colorless tale. But in so doing, they convert a realistic novel into a mock-epic. The present is treated as a travesty of the past; richness furnishes an ironic comment on reality. (71)

As exclusively ordinary as Dublin, the modern *bourg* does not require of its inhabitants heroic deeds. Nor wishes the dwellers to get to grips with daunting tasks everyday. The troubles waiting to be solved are supposed to be as simple as “foot and mouth disease.” Though some perform valiant acts, such as saving a man from drowning, Stephen “is not a hero, however” (1.62). Nor is Bloom, “Drunken ranters what I said about his God made him wince. Mistake to hit back” (13.1216). He is in fact too tender to be a hero, “[p]erhaps not to hurt he meant” (13.1220). On the contrary Odysseus has no sympathy

for those not of his blood.²² Even his companions are but sacrifices offered in return of this “valiant warrior’s” safety. *Ulysses* is the starkest possible opposite of such a thematic ground. It depicts Everyman in his banality, his uniqueness notwithstanding. The only hero in the book, as Levin underlines, is the city of Dublin: “To amplify the subject of the city, as Balzac discovered, is to dwarf its inhabitants: he [Joyce] made the metropolis his actual hero, or rather villain” (1941, 70). According to Levin Joyce manages to get into “humble existences” in a manner quite different than that of Dickens or Dostoevsky, who underwent the task on the grounds of melodrama: “Joyce was somewhat susceptible to melodrama, but he managed to sublimate it—in the psychological crises of both Stephen and Bloom—to a highly subjective plane” (1941, 70).

The subjectivity of the characters is grounded in *noises* Dublin gives out, which foregrounds also their objectivity. Hence the book detaches itself from its own roots, as well as approaching them with a close contemplation, that is by way of interpreting its own interpretation. For all its splendor, compared to contemporary attitudes of modern *bourg* dwellers, in terms of their relationship with the heroic past, the course of the method is actually far from being unique: a retrospective attempt to grasp what is not there anymore. What drives the memory to retrospection is a simple question: “What’s that?” Not unlike the question the answer will be a representation, and can be stated either subjectively or objectively. The subjective course will take the surveyor to nostalgia, to the times of barter, where the subject will eventually be equated with the object, and both will be canceled out simultaneously. The opposite course will lead him

²² To the deviation from this Euripidean tradition condemning Ulysses for being “an artist in crime,” deceitful, and unscrupulous, Stanford cites Seneca’s *Troades*, which justifies Odysseus’s cruelty by emphasizing the necessity of killing Astyanax, Hector’s son, to prevent a future war of revenge (144f).

to the garden of unequivocalness where he will become *something* little more than a formula. Both attitudes, taken by themselves, respond to the question “What’s that?” with an arrogant “That’s it,” which annuls the question at the same instant. But there is *no end because it’s round*. Pretending to be totally subjective or objective is illusory. The question itself should be questioned by means of an integration of the attitudes. In *Ulysses* a word is not just a word. It does not denote an identity. Nor does it connote brand new meanings, as it does in Heidegger. Instead it is undermined, whenever it tends to lay claim to an identity. A potato might be a talisman Bloom inherited from his mother, a preservative “against Plague and Pestilence” (15.1952), as well as a symbol of poverty “Potatoes and marge, marge and potatoes” (8.42). Hence it becomes the measure of *potestas* Dubliners surrendered to Britons. For each connotation is contiguous to the colonial rule, what else might be the best substance of a relic when there is nothing but potatoes? The parallel between Dubliners and Israelites is parodied not only by thrusting Jew-Bloom into Ireland against the will of those who used to boast “she [Ireland] never let them [Jews] in” (2.442), but by means of revealing distinct functions a word may carry out in everyday life. A word is not just a word. It has a life of its own. Repeated use of a word in different contexts by way of contextual shifts may point to directions outside of itself. However it does not amount to any claim of firm statements or exaltation of purposes over the silly pun in-itself. Questioning the question as such is what makes *Ulysses* interpretable from different points of views. It exposes the *cliché* without succumbing to further *clichés* by proposing ready-made judgments, hence invites interpretation. Insofar as the language of *Ulysses* is distanced from the conventional use of words, and again by means of revealing every potential use of the words rather than inventing new meanings, by keeping in mind that altered signifiers

have nothing to do with inventing new signifieds, it approaches the language of music. The language, hence *Ulysses*, itself becomes the measure of the tension between subject and object. *Ulysses* responds to the question “What’s that?” with another question, or instead with a proposal for a new point of view: Since human consciousness is a kaleidoscopic stream able to change in accord with *noises* that give it its grounds, why does the form of work of art not follow its course?

CHAPTER IV

MUSIC?: Calm Sister of Language

My soul, calm sister, towards thy brow,
whereon scarce grieves...

Mallarmé, "Sigh"

In *Beethoven*, a posthumous collection of fragments of an unfinished work, Adorno praises the metaphysical substantiality of Beethoven's music as the Promethean element in him, which is achieved not through transcendence but by way of *manufacturing* the means of transcendence. Adorno labels the annihilation of the parts in the whole, that is the finite's giving itself up to the infinite, as "a representation of metaphysical transcendence, not as its 'image' but as its real enactment, which only partly succeeds—or is mastered?—because it is *performed* by human beings" (77f). Hence the transcendental aspects in Beethoven's music become the measure of artificial features, and reinforce the aesthetical formula of "nature as the appearance of the supernatural" (78). Adorno considers Beethoven as the counterpart of Hegelian philosophy in music. In terms of its form as a totality, Adorno argues, Beethoven's music "represents the social process," where individual moments of social production cannot be grasped unless taken in their relation to the whole: "Not only is the individual element insignificant, but the individual moments are estranged from each other," which "taken individually, seem to contradict each other" (13). In the fragments, the correspondence between Beethoven's music and Hegelian philosophy notwithstanding, the former is exalted as truer than that philosophy: "Logical identity as immanent to form—as an entity at the same time fabricated and aesthetic—is both constituted and criticized by Beethoven. Its seal of truth in Beethoven's music lies in its suspension: through transcending it, form takes on its true meaning. This formal transcendence in

Beethoven's music is a representation—not an expression—of hope” (14). Once the representation of *hope* is given out as formal transcendence, the artifact becomes the sole condition of *hope*. Its realization is bound to the process, the *manufacture* of transcendence. The form thus takes its shape through a negation of what is asserted.

Adorno labels the tendency to give up the self in experience as a foregrounding Romantic principle common to Schumann and Mahler, as well as Alban Berg: “The nobility in this has an un-ideological content: weariness with the privation implicit in the private. One senses exploitation extending even into the *principium individuationis* and turns away” (155). Interpreting the third movement of Schumann's *Fantasia in C Major*, by an analogy with “allowing oneself to be carried out to sea,” Adorno compares it with a similar gesture “of drowning, sinking, of ‘unbewusst, höchste Lust’ [void of thought/highest bliss²³] in Wagner. According to Adorno in their distinction “philosophical truth is contained. The difference between inwardness and sensual intoxication is too conventional to do justice to the distinction” (155).

The climactic moment of the *communion* in the “Nausicaa” can be treated as an outward extension as well, given out by an allusion to “Love's Old Sweet Song.” Accompanied by trilling ‘O's of effervescent children the moment is an awe-inspiring coalescence of senses experiencing life. What makes *Ulysses* comparable to the language of music is not only the vast amount of musical allusions employed, nor just the function of these allusions in different contexts, but also its diction, and the method Joyce accomplishes in utilizing the enunciation. The outward extension, “they were greeny dewy stars falling with golden, O so lovely, O, soft, sweet, soft!” resolves into a kind of inward extension: “Then all melted away dewily in the grey air: all was silent”

²³ Last lines of *Isolde* (See “Editor's Notes” in Adorno 1998, 235/n253).

(13.741). The resolution is no way all of a sudden. The ‘s’ sound given out at the peak of climax functions as a pre-dominant of the coming silence. In terms of verbal syntax a sort of *abab* pattern might be identified in this passage of transition:

a—“they were greeny dewy stars falling with”

b—“golden, O so lovely, O, soft, sweet, soft!”

a— “Then all melted away dewily in the grey air”

b—“all was silent”

In *Joyce’s Music and Noise* Jack W. Weaver asserts that the overall framework of *Ulysses* functions as a thematic parallel to the sonata form. Relying on Don Noel Smith’s analysis Weaver divides the book into five parts corresponding to “the exposition” (episodes 1-6), “the development” (episodes 7-15), “the transition” (episode 16), “the recapitulation” (episode 17), and “the coda” (episode 18) of a classical sonata (49f). According to this suggestion, looking for his “mythical father” and lamenting the usurpation Stephen stands for the first subject (chapters 1-3), whereas Bloom, “repeating the same themes, though in variation,” corresponds to the second subject of the exposition. Therefore chapters 7-15 are cited as the development of these subjects and themes. Unfortunately Weaver does not elaborate on in what way the remaining chapters correspond to the stated musical categories. It seems that something obliges Smith and Weaver to apply an extended structure instead of the basic three-part sonata form consisting of an exposition including transitions, a development section, which may contain a retransition, and a recapitulation containing the coda. The reason of the innovation might be that *the book* refuses to fit in with any conventional system. What such approaches lack in terms of literary criticism is that they simply overlook the fact that *Ulysses* is a literary work. Yet I reserve the question of why a writer whose personal

motto was “jusqu’au bout” should yield to what he declared war on in literature, all sorts of convention, when it simply comes to applying musical techniques in his texts. The music in *Ulysses* can be deduced from allusions to the texts of pieces as well as from corresponding techniques employed throughout the book. Instead of trying to thrust the book into conventional musical structures it is better worth uncovering the technical means employed in certain passages parallel to musical devices. *Ulysses* is not an *allusion to music*. That it denotes a shift in *literary paradigm* is not by virtue of musical allusions employed in it, or having its roots in a Homeric myth, but rather on the strength of verbal and thematic details tightly interwoven, which connects every part to each other as well as to the whole. Thus it reveals the relationships among them in lieu of attributing relationships to them. By virtue of this quality *Ulysses* distances itself from the authoritative rule of the language of meta-narrative, of the convention, and approaches the language of music. Insofar as being distant from the language of convention makes it closer to the language of everyday life, what it accomplishes thematically is inextricably entwined with its form.

In *The Classical Style* Charles Rosen labels Schumann’s *Fantasia in C Major*, composed in homage to Beethoven, as the commemoration of “the death of the classical style,” for all the references to and obvious quotations from Beethoven (451). Notwithstanding, referring to a private significance exterior to the work is itself unclassical, Rosen postulates, “Schumann’s *Fantasy* neither starts from a point of stability nor reaches one until the last possible moment” (452). Compared to the classical convention the “impulsive energy of the Romantic work is no longer a polarized dissonance and an articulated rhythm, but the familiar Baroque sequence, and the structures are no longer synthetic but additive. The music of Schumann in particular

comes in a series of waves, and the climax is generally reserved for the moment before exhaustion” (453). As for the border separating Romanticism from Beethoven, Adorno points out a sense of trust not “in the power of the existing order” but in theology, which it has as its main feature:

The work represented by Beethoven is the one which supports itself. In its totality resides the positivity of possession, which cancels the negativity of all individual aspects. The expressive seal of this is defiance—which yet has a quality of humanity. The human in Beethoven is linked to *tact*, as it is in the old Goethe. [...] Schumann is tactless; if he cannot reward, he gives himself instead. And still falls short of Beethoven by making things too easy between himself and the world. (155f)

Brought forth, *tact* is related to practicality. By laying stress on *tact* Adorno integrates the work with the process of production along with the form already entwined with its content. Hence the work becomes the center of the tension, and turns out a self-criticism.

For Adorno, the decisive trait in Beethoven’s music, which crystallizes in his late works, is the “relationship between conventions and subjectivity” as the formal law the content springs from (125). Of the Adagio of the *Hammerklavier* Sonata he writes:

The melody, judged by traditional notions, lacks plasticity; that is, it is not obvious, in much the same sense as church music precludes the ‘inventions’ of secular music. The reasons are: the disappearance of surface articulation (there are no pauses, no sharp rhythmical contrasts, no ‘motifs’ and, above all, the harmonic and tonal basis remains identical throughout the whole theme). (128)

In *The Classical Style*, Charles Rosen points out that the descending thirds, which prevail the entire movement and give the articulations a sense of *disappearance*, are

preceded by ascending thirds, as it is with the beginnings of other movements (424). The sequence of the triads, as Rosen underlines, especially when it is shifted from treble to bass in mm. 3-5, suspends the tension by way of balance. Rosen cites the ambiguity between B flat and B natural in the Allegro, along with the ceaseless tension between majors and minors throughout, as the expression of grief prevalent in the entire piece (426). In the first movement the opening B flat major arrives through descending thirds at B major at the end of development, which is carried over into the opposition of F sharp minor and G major in the Adagio (413). By way of altered repetitions the tension between the tonic and the flatted supertonic is brought forth. Affirmed tension of finites is driven to an annulment, and resolves in the whole. Highlighting the Hegelian parallel in Beethoven's music Adorno claims "[t]he Beethovenian form is an integral whole, in which each individual moment is determined by its function within that whole only to the extent that these individual moments contradict and cancel each other, yet are preserved on a higher level within the whole" (13). Hence the melody is stretched in time, and consequently, loses its *immediacy*:

[...] appearing from the first mediated, and, moreover, 'meaningful'. It is not itself but what it means. It can hardly be heard and understood as a 'melody' at all, but as a complex of meanings. Nor does it really move on, but remains, circles around itself, does not develop (only the consequent phrase character is distinct as such). One might say, F sharp minor is not fully worked out here, but idiosyncratic peculiarities of the key are insatiably presented. Instead of being realized, tonality is portrayed. (128)

In *Beethoven: The Last Decade* Martin Cooper analyzing the movement, praises “the whispered shift” from the dominant C sharp to “the remote Neapolitan world of G major” in mm. 13-14 (Figure 1) as a moment beyond compare:

This passage alone seems to demand that all talk of immense lamentations, ruined happiness and cold, immeasurable woe should be seriously qualified. We do not need to indulge the supremely profitless game of finding ‘meanings’ for such music to feel that, if the opening thirteen bars of this movement are indeed an expression of grief—or, rather, are grief made audible—these two bars are in some sense the voice of a consolation so absolute that, even if they never reappeared (as they do almost at once) and had no echo in the rest of the movement (as they in fact have) it would still be impossible to consider the Adagio a movement of anything approaching unqualified lamentation, let alone despair. (166)



Figure 1. Adagio of *Hammerklavier*, mm. 10-17.²⁴

The *whispered shift* Cooper indicates actually begins from V of F sharp minor in m. 9 (Figure 2) and is prolonged through inversions up to its resolution in m. 14 (Figure 1):

²⁴ Figures of the piece are from Breitkopf & Härtel edition.



Figure 2. Adagio mm. 5-9. V is preceded by a third inversion seventh chord vi of F sharp minor in m. 9.

Diminished seventh v of the key at the end of m. 13 *whispers* the shift to the six-four chord of diminished ii in m. 14 (Figure 1). In *Theory of Harmony* Arnold Schoenberg cites the relationship of Neapolitan sixth and V of *f* minor as a well-established practice: “But the typical use of the Neapolitan sixth is patterned after that of the IInd degree in the cadence. Hence, it was assumed to be a chromatic alteration of II. To be correct, however, we must call it a substitute for II” (234). Thus the phrase in mm. 14-15 can be read as a transition of Neapolitan chords: a Neapolitan six-four, a Neapolitan in root followed by a second inversion i, and finally a Neapolitan sixth, which resolves, as it is supposed to be, into a second inversion tonic in m. 16, passing through a solemn pianissimo (Figure 1). Although the Neapolitan sixth is supposed to be built on a lowered root Schoenberg refuses to treat the process in such terms, since the “roots are, in our conception, fixed points from which relationships are measured. The unity of all the measurements we have found are guaranteed by the immobility of these points. But then one may not move them!!” (234). Instead he assumes that “at the second place of the scale there are two roots,” in our case for instance, *g sharp* and *g natural*. What convinces Cooper of the whole movement’s being beyond any fixed meanings, or makes Adorno praise the Adagio as “a complex of meanings,” is the form of the piece, namely, breaking off the foregrounding grief by means of Neapolitan substitutions. Once considered in terms Schoenberg raises, the multidimensionality of the device confirms the diversity of expressions represented. Since the *Piano Sonata in B Flat* is not a textbook written in descriptive manner, what Schoenberg analyzes theoretically is

revealed by virtue of the relationship between the passage and the entire movement. To cite Adorno, “[d]evelopment is replaced by a self-transcendence of the tonal realm” (128). The form finds its spirit in praxis. For all the grief foregrounding the Adagio, the phrase built on Neapolitan transitions stands for the multidimensionality of any given context. In the Adagio of the *Hammerklavier* Sonata Adorno finds the epitome of late Beethoven: melody alienated from melody. Insofar as the “repeated notes, together with other elements, give rise to the peculiar *speaking* character of the theme” (128). In other words music gets closer to language by way of alienation from itself. Considering the moment Beethoven’s music approaches the language as a splitting into polyphony and monody Adorno determines the crux of it as “the withering of harmony”:

The thesis of the withering of harmony in late Beethoven must be conceived far more dialectically. There is, rather, a *polarization*. While harmony does wither here [...] at the same time it is nakedly visible, and the change in the melody pattern is precisely a function of this ‘nakedness’. That is, the melody line is now only the putting into effect of the pure, intrinsic essence of harmony and is thus *unreal*. To this extent the style of the late Beethoven is the opposite of polyphony, although, on the other hand, all polyphonous melodies, that is, those conceived in true relationships, have something of unreality. (129)

The decisive trait of the late Beethoven is the contradiction of harmony and melody, where the former functions as “a convention keeping things upright, but largely drained of substance” (156). Driven to its limits and presented in contradiction to harmony, melody yields revelation of the nakedness of harmony. It is the music of the representation of the contradiction between polyphony and monody. In order there to be, a sort of, self-revelation of the *unreality* of the melody, that is melody undermining not

only harmony but also itself, the contradiction is to be let reveal itself within the context. Since in the case of music the context is but the tonality itself, unearthed contradiction in Beethoven's music yields the affirmation of the whole. According to Adorno, "tonality became universally established. Everything is related to its function: it no longer needs to prove itself. The precondition becomes so substantial that thereby it loses its substantiality and becomes a discarded convention, alienated music in its concreteness" (157).

Nakedness of Stephen on the strand, the protean change in diction is the exact equivalent of the change in the melody: words alienated from words, which leave the harmony, the foreground of the book naked. However the moment when the whole is affirmed more profoundly can be found elsewhere in the book. In the "Scylla and Charybdis" episode, by means of exploitation of all the meanings of *love* a kind of recapitulation is thrust upon the apparent tension among contradictory connotations of the word. In the episode we find Stephen in a discussion on Shakespeare with a pair of librarians. One of them, "the quaker librarian" John Eglinton is an arrant Platonist, who is interested not in Shakespeare as a historical figure but in the words of his protagonists, Hamlet for instance. Per contra, Stephen, an arrant Aristotelian, tries to reveal the meaning latent in Hamlet by looking at Shakespeare's relations with his son Hamnet, his lovers, and even the street he walked from his house to the Globe Theatre. Throughout the episode Stephen sways to and fro between Scylla and Charybdis. What is the right move? Engaging only in intellectual studies, or engaging in worldly things: being *un homme de lettre*, or *un homme de terre*. Is there a middle way? Is there anything common between the two?

These are Stephen's life-long questions. While sailing into Shakespeare he discovers himself. Arguing that coming to grips with the creative process itself is as a theme so central in Joyce as to recur over and over again throughout the entire oeuvre, Ellmann quotes Stephen of *Portrait*:

The narrative is no longer personal. The personality of the artist passes into the narration itself, flowing round and round the persons and the action like a vital sea... The dramatic form is reached when the vitality which has flowed and eddied round each person fills every person with such vital force that he or she assumes a proper and intangible esthetic life... the mystery of esthetic like that of material creation is accomplished. (Ellmann 296)

By analogy with "a mother's love" Ellmann indicates that for Joyce the work of art is to be achieved over a struggle against its subject matter, but for all the obstacles the artist never gives up. For all his proven arrogance, attributing to Joyce a sense of artist-as-the-creator-God is hard to deduce from what we have discussed so far in the present analysis. However Ellmann has reason to praise the artistic merit Stephen strives for as being both a god and a goddess within whose "womb creatures come to life": "As Stephen explains in *Scylla and Charybdis*, the artist's brain-womb is violated by experience, a violation which in some sense it seeks. Outer and inner combine, like spermatozoon and ovum, to form a new creation, independent of its parents" (296).

In the library Stephen mournfully remembers Cranly whose friendship he sacrificed, although he states, "A man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery" (9.228). However, from such a hollow assertion he would shift to the need of being with a woman, or having an heir:

Marina, Stephen said, a child of storm, Miranda, a wonder, Perdita, that which was lost. What was lost is given back to him: his daughter's child. *My dearest wife*, Pericles says, *was like this maid*. Will any man love the daughter if he has not loved the mother? Will he not see reborn in her, with the memory of his own youth added, another image? (9.420)

What we have here is no less than a battle given by Stephen against himself. Probably because he has no one to fight with, except himself. These inner contradictions are also related to the environment. While speaking to the librarians he uses French phrases. When Buck Mulligan joins the party we begin to hear more quotations in Latin.

Beneath this chaotic nebula of contradictions we find Stephen sailing on his way: "Do you know what you are talking about? Love, yes. Word known to all men" (9.429). The ongoing struggle instantly reveals a point of reconciliation. Though he immediately shifts from that point back to the contradiction, he would later come to another point of reconciliation, paternal love, when Bloom, his spiritual father, joins the picture. Erotic, paternal, or intellectual love: the word is known to all men. It is the most earthly thing, and also the most transcendent. It is this feeling of being in-between that makes the reconciliation possible.

In one of the fragments Adorno explicates further the role *polarization* plays in late Beethoven as tonality "rendered indifferent" by virtue of the same recurring chords: Beethoven's stepping back from appearance, the withering of harmony in the widest sense, stems from resistance to subsumption by the unchanging. Instead of stating the unchanging in its aesthetic mediations—which are experienced as illusory since it is always the same thing—it must be expressed as such, unmediated, in its abstractness and thus its *truth*. The concreteness of the

aesthetic *Gestalt* itself is burst asunder as a mere façade, in face of the identical core of the language. (157)

In an article titled “Strange Words, Strange Music” Andreas Fischer compares the sequentiality of language with the co-sequentiality of music. Given the fact that music can be either monophonous, or homophonous, or polyphonous whereas language is hemmed in in monophony Fischer calls the former a sort of *nebeneinander*, but the latter a form of *nacheinander*. Analyzing the role onomatopoeic devices play in the “Sirens” episode Fischer asserts that by way of forcing the onomatopoeic forms to their limits Joyce maintains synthesis of *nebeneinander* and *nacheinander*: “Joycean onomatopoeia is not the natural union of meaning and form, of signified and signifier, but quite on the contrary it is the signifier freeing itself from the link with the signified and taking off all on its own” (258). Evaluating other musical means Joyce makes use of in the episode as well, such as furnishing the language with rhythm by virtue of intense use of punctuation, Fischer tries to *uncover* the musicality of the episode. Since language is believed to be consisting of “a conventional combination of a form with meaning,” whereas music is deprived of conventional meanings (247), Fischer suggests that breaking away from the conventions of language *Ulysses* reaches the pure form of music. The proof for the lack of universal meaning in music Fischer provides is that “nearly everyone is familiar with the beginning of Beethoven’s Symphony no. 5, but it is nevertheless not associated with a specific, conventional meaning” (247). However, an educated ear will determine the chords or pitches he hears, not unlike any educated person, who will understand the enunciated word when he hears the word “pickup.” Both in music and in language the meaning is determined by the context. When I am told “get a pickup, will you!” I decide whether I am supposed to find a vehicle or a

record player according to the state of affairs. A burglar who is not able to hear the lowered ‘n’ in his mate’s urging “get’n the pickup!” will probably have more time in jail to think of the Saussurean conventions of language than we have in our workaday idleness. Joyce’s texts do not simply approach the language of music. Instead they question the borders drawn by the conventions. The devices employed in these texts correspond to those made use of in music inasmuch as the latter exploits musical means to the extent of alienation from its own conventions.

Carrying on with his analysis of the Adagio of *Hammerklavier* Cooper recalls the phrase we have dealt with above. Labeling it as an “ineffably consoling voice” Cooper points out that the melody is repeated in mm. 45-47. Though it is given out in the bass, it will immediately be taken up in imitation by the treble (167). The sequence is actually repeated in mm. 49-51, which will be followed by the same little theme scattered throughout mm. 52-59 till its resolution from a prolonged III of D Major, given out in descending—in treble—and in ascending—in bass—octaves, into a pre-dominant IV, major counterpart of the prevailing diminished ii. Always returning to the pre-dominant the entire movement gives the impression of a sustained preparation, without ever giving a clue of what might it be we are preparing for. It goes without saying that this sustained preparation makes the ineluctable recapitulation even more expressive, in this case III’s dissolving into IV with a pianissimo, which will finally be resolved into the tonic with a diminished piano, forming a plagal cadence with a shift from submediant to dominant in the soprano.

Considering such features employed in late Beethoven’s music, Adorno postulates that recapitulation becomes “a kind of guarantee of the *idealism* informing his music,” and “the imprisonment of the bourgeois spirit” is turned into a *driving force*.

Comparing the recapitulation in Beethoven with the thesis of identity in Hegel, Adorno underlines a common shortcoming in both: “by a deep-seated paradox these elements are, in both, abstract and mechanical” (16f). Language of a time is the language of the prevalent ideology of that time. Its detachment from the convention gives the grounds of transcendence. Works of art transcend the ideology through self-criticism, since the means of their trade have already been forged by the conventions of the ruling ideology. *To forge the uncreated conscience* of an age is to forge the means of creation. Music and language get close to each other when they detach from the conventions of their trade. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment* Adorno and Horkheimer consider Odysseus’s encounter with the Sirens in terms of power relations, where his comrades have no idea of how magnificent is the sound of chanting Sirens, but “know only of the danger of the song.” Not unlike paid slaves of our time Odysseus’s companions are supposed to think of but the work they have to execute: “Between the cultural heritage and enforced work there is a precise correlation, and both are founded on the inescapable compulsion toward social control of nature” (27). To Odysseus, who is bound to the mast, the luring chant of the Sirens “is neutralized as a mere object of contemplation, as art,” whereas the crew, whose ears are waxed, “reproduce the life of the oppressor as a part of their own, while he cannot step outside his social role” (27). Once the social order built on the sovereignty over nature, art is dismissed from the immediacy of society. It becomes high art, for instance, for those who can afford a crew to sail the boat. A fragment of Adorno reads:

Schiller has something of the man risen from a lowly station who, embarrassed in good society, starts shouting to make himself heard. ‘Power and impudence’—the bragging of the petty-bourgeois, which may be a general bourgeois

characteristic of the brutal bourgeois craving for ostentation, as observed by Max Horkheimer. Included in this gesture is the self-incited, peeling, violent laughter and a certain tendency to ‘explode’. This lies at the source of the solemn tone, and underlies the whole of idealism—a certain nobility in the sense of grandeur, sovereignty over nature, compensates for the vulgar, inferior element. Behind the maxims lie the letters about woollen stockings exchanged with their mothers by pastors’ sons working as private tutors. This element must be defined as an objective aspect of bourgeois bombast. It is usually linked to the fiction of *strength*. In Schiller it is held in check by a strong intellect, but what remains of it is finally pure weakness. Beethoven is not immune to this—though his work is saved by the enormous density of its purely musical substance. (30)

In *Style and Idea* Schoenberg asserts that individual tones of a piece create a ceaseless tension. When a tone is added to another meanings of both tones become dubious: “In this manner there is produced a state of unrest, or imbalance which grows throughout most of the piece, and is enforced further by similar functions of the rhythm. The method by which balance is restored seems to me the real *idea* of the composition” (in Adorno 1998, 208). With due allowances for that Adorno states “[h]omoeostasis contains an (inseparable) moment of musical *conformism*—not excepting Schoenberg. Is an ‘allostatic’ music at all possible? (Adorno 18). The problem is not whether there is a resolution or not, for it is ineluctable, but rather that in what terms the resolution is dealt with. Is it dictated or left for the consideration of the receiver? An open-ended piece will leave the contemplator in a state of creativity, imagining possible resolutions, hence interpreting the work over and over again. An abrupt end at the climax of contradictions brings truth into the light: there is no such thing called resolution on earth unless one

interprets the contradicting parts. Mind's immediate response to that chaotic nebula is but attributing a totality comprised of identical entities. In art bourgeois bombast compensates this tendency, though by glossing over prevalent tension. By questioning that *convention* work of art may subvert it, without withdrawing from its underlying balance. In that case the conditions foregrounding the resolution will be built on a self-revelation of the everlasting contradictions.

Adorno, in an article titled "Presuppositions", underlines the need of linguistic expressions' being split from concepts, since "the definitions are themselves the result of a reification, a forgetting; they are never what they would so like to be" (100). Adorno draws our attention to the fact that the language itself excludes fixed meanings in virtue of its kinetic character. It is *the paper* Bloom reads while digesting and wipes himself, or *the newspaper* he hides his love letter in and lays under his knee while bending down to pray. Hence what is worth analyzing are the *associations*, the connections of concepts with each other and things. A work of art revealing these associations gives the concept a sense of *mobility*. As for Joyce, Adorno suggests that through inherent associations "an objective physiognomy of words is linked [...] with the rhythm of the whole" (101). Obviously the revealed unity is quite different from the reconciliation Hegelian dialectic suggests. As Adorno states in *Minima Moralia* "the point should not be to have absolutely correct, irrefutable, water-tight cognitions—for they inevitably boil down to tautologies, but insights which cause the question of their justness to judge itself" (71).

Joyce's *Ulysses*, in that sense, is an example *par excellence* of Adornian negative aesthetics. In *Ulysses* the main theme's foregrounding tendency to reconciliation is constantly undercut mostly by poetic and linguistic devices. As we have discussed in our analyses of the episodes "Aeolus" and "Nausicaa" the use of these methods is exploited

along with a fusion of senses. Hence ephemeral individual experiences are made transcend spatiotemporal restrictions. The transcendence is immensely related to the subversion of conventions. It brings forth the constellation of contingencies, and thus annuls the certainty of sovereignty over nature, which is comprised of identities. Nonetheless such a progression cannot be created *ex nihilo*, but be built on modifications since it requires a fusion of elements at hand.

“No: it’s what’s behind” (11.703)

Considering the twelve-tone technique and its liberating as well as limiting traits due to the rows binding it, Adorno, in *Philosophy of Modern Music*, emphasizes that the melodic form in modern music takes the upper hand. Though in traditional music one cannot employ such an upside down hierarchy, the method is obviously borrowed “from traditional music through the circumspection of harmony” (72). However the modification is remarkable. The traditional practice of achieving a sense of time through spatial intervals is abandoned: “No new material is introduced into the progression of intervals, and the omnipresence of the row makes it unfit in itself for the construction of temporal relationships, for this type of relationship is based upon differentiations and not simply upon identity” (75). Consequently melody is stripped of its conventional use (value!), and is integrated to ‘rhythmic configurations.’ Rhythmic configuration as the quintessence is what connects modern music to entire cultural heritage. Not by virtue of its identical value though, but instead insofar as it gives way to a critique of conventions. It is measured now by already-configured rows. Hence the age-long question of ‘which comes first,’ content or form? is annulled. They become interrelated entities staying aloof from each other. The subject becomes the content of the form it has created.

Emphasizing the historical development of the technique Adorno asserts “[i]f Beethoven developed a musical essence out of nothingness in order to be able to redefine it as a process of becoming, then Schoenberg in his later works destroys it as something completed” (77).

Taken in its historical context Schoenberg’s *Verklärte Nacht*, which is acknowledged as his first masterpiece, stands for the transformation of tradition into the modern. By virtue of its slightly modified sequences, its inconclusive pulse-stream the piece prepares the grounds of the new music of the twentieth century. The composition dates back to 1899 and is based on a poem by the German poet Richard Dehmel, “Verklärte Nacht” (Transfigured Nights).

The poem “Verklärte Nacht” consists of five stanzas and depicts a couple walking through a cold, bare grove under moonlight. In great anxiety, the woman confesses that she bears a child by another man she had never loved. But the man confidently consoles her:

May the child you conceived, / Be no burden to your soul; / Just see how brightly
the universe is gleaming! / There is a glow around everything; / You are floating
with me on a cold ocean, / But a special warmth flickers / From you into me,
from me into you. / It will transfigure the strange man’s child. / You will bear the
child for me, as if it were mine; / You have brought the glow into me, / You have
made me like a child myself.

He grasps her around her ample hips. / Their breath kisses in the breeze. / Two
people walk through the lofty, bright night.²⁵

²⁵ Translated by Stanley Appelbaum, in Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht*.

The poem is written in a clear symmetrical structure and its 1st, 3rd, and 5th stanzas are spoken by an implied narrator whereas the 2nd and the 4th by one of the two characters. In *The Early Works of Arnold Schoenberg* Walter Frisch states that the ABA'CA" pattern conceived some critics of the correspondence between five stanzas of the poem and five-movement musical form of the sextet. Considering actual unfolding of *Verklärte Nacht* quite complex than the rondo-like scheme Frisch suggests that “the different segments of *Verklärte Nacht* are closely related by motivic variation, and toward the end of the work earlier themes are recalled” (113). He further quotes Carl Dahlhaus: “The rondo ground-plan, which gives the work formal support, is as it were covered with a web of thematic and motivic relationships, a web which becomes tighter and thicker as the work proceeds” (113). Comparing *Verklärte Nacht* with Strauss’s *Don Juan* Frisch underlines that the former consists of a profusion of themes and exhibits more deviance than Strauss’s quite normative piece. It simply does not fit in with any classical sonata form: “*Verklärte Nacht* can more accurately be said to be shaped by thematic processes and large-scale harmonic procedures lying largely outside the sonata tradition. The thematic material in *Verklärte Nacht* is unfolded by continuous transformation that is more malleable and subtle than anything we have seen in Schoenberg's earlier works.” (116)



The first theme (1a) of the sextet is given out by the first cello in mm. 4-5 (Figure 3).

The following evaluation of the theme shows the foregrounding trait of the piece as well as revealing the music of the coming age. This brief stepwise descent from the $\hat{6}$ to the $\hat{1}$ of the D minor scale is first repeated in mm. 5-6, and then stretched throughout the following four measures. Themes 1b and 1c will be formed out of this brief thematic unit:



Figure 5. Theme 1b, mm. 10-11.



Figure 6. Theme 1c, mm. 21-22.

As Frisch indicates, like theme 1a, theme 1b, which is given out by the first violin and also shadowed by the second violin, as well “has an upbeat, followed by a quarter note on the downbeat, then a dotted rhythm, then a longer note value. Theme 1b also prominently features the first and sixth degrees, now heard in disjunct form rather than connected by a stepwise scale” (118). Theme 1c, which is given out by the first viola now transposed into G clef, is exactly in the same form but exhibits a diminution in the second beat, which is flashed out to four sixteenths, whereas the third beat is augmented.

The progression here is based on a simple theme and its slight variations, while the whole composition is forged with small intervals between the notes. According to Frisch, the classical-romantic thematic structure is based on brief thematic units, which are “first presented on the tonic, then on the dominant, and then ‘developed’ and ‘liquidated’ in a continuation.” However the “themes of *Verklärte Nacht* differ significantly from this model in that the repetition is normally not on the dominant, but at the original pitch level; harmonic motion takes place in the continuation” (118).

Keeping the repetition on the tonic Schoenberg prepares the grounds of a continuous flow mostly derived from the half-step manipulation and recurring descent from the $\hat{6}$ to the $\hat{1}$ of D minor. Thus we may fairly suggest that Schoenberg depicts the epic mood of the first stanza with old romantic tools slightly modified. With the sextet proceeds the modifications will give way to a transfiguration of the romantic mood along with the now worn out romantic apparatus.



Figure 7. Theme 2a, m. 29. Originally in alto clef.

The theme 2a, for instance, the passionate plaint of the woman is given out by the first viola and echoes the previous registration of B flat and D. However, as Frisch indicates, this time the “span and the dissonance level are increased by the addition of the leading tone, C sharp. The dotted rhythm is present on the second beat, as in the theme 1 complex, but now the first beat of the measure, as well as the preceding upbeat, are distinctly empty—it might be said that the upbeat has been compressed *within* the measure” (119).



Figure 8. Repetition of theme 2a, mm. 30-31. In the Dover edition.

In contrast to the romantic practice the theme 2a is repeated on the same pitch level, rather than on the dominant. However, the second repetition in m. 31 is altered. That is the D – C sharp appoggiatura of the preceding measures is placed up an 8ve. By doing so Schoenberg changes not only the preceding romantic mood of the composition but also the expressive use of sequence.

In his *In Search of Wagner*, Adorno underlines that Wagner, for instance, uses sequence “to unite inwardness and objectivity: With the aid of the sequence the scheme of abstract symmetrical relationships, with their panoramic architectonics, can be given a firm temporal structure” (26). According to Adorno in Wagner time is revoked in lieu of being filled or dominated, and thus at times the flow is interrupted by *expansive* pauses his music collapses like wave:

Sonata and symphony both make time their subject; through the substance they impart to it, they force it to manifest itself. If in the symphony the passage of time is converted into a moment, then by contrast, Wagner’s gesture is essentially immutable and atemporal. Impotently repeating itself, music abandons the struggle within the temporal framework it mastered in the symphony. (26f)

In *Theory of Harmony* Schoenberg asserts that a sequence of melody, “the transposed repetition of a segment,” accompanied by an unsequential harmony has more merits than mechanical sequence (283). Recurrent themes of *Verklärte Nacht* in no way function as regressions. Kept on the same pitch level, harmony’s tendency to reconcile is not disguised. Instead of referring to different regions of harmony, now melody serves as the fool who *intermittently* reminds the awkward position of harmony. Hence its sundering is unearthed. For all its claim to demolish the rule of gods, Wagner’s music remains hemmed in in the demythologization of enlightenment insofar as it glosses over the latent tension. According to Adorno “the firm temporal structure” is the basis of the sense of eternity in Wagner: “The eternity of Wagnerian music, like that of the poem of the *Ring*, is one which proclaims that nothing has happened; it is a state of immutability that refutes all history by confronting it with the silence of nature” (30). Repetition,

therefore, serves not a better understanding of concealed ideology but instead performs “a commodity-function, rather like that of an advertisement: anticipating the universal practice of mass culture later on, the music is designed to be remembered, it is intended for the forgetful” (21). As for Wagner’s claim of being able to harmonize “unrestraint sexuality” with “an ideal of asceticism” Adorno postulates the “harmony is achieved in the name of death. Pleasure and death become one” (4). Instead of being accompanied by a prospective hope, in Wagner retrospection succumbs into paralysis, and denotes preservation. It can be compared with the dramatic changes in the lives of the protagonists of classical narratives. The characters may change but the history, or faith, stands still. The good is praised, the evil is punished. Thematic kernels seem constantly changing but the nature is silenced. In *Verklärte Nacht*, on the contrary, with the aid of altered repetitions of short thematic units everything is changed through a neutral continuum. In *Schoenberg’s Musical Imagination* Michael Cherlin labels the recurrence of 6-5 voice leadings in the third movement of *Verklärte Nacht* as the expression of an altered sense of time and space. According to Cherlin this altered sense is conveyed through “figuration whose polyphony comprises a rhythmic steady state, an intricate clockwork suspended over an F sharp pedal” (182). Suggesting that the passage, especially mm. 251-254, echoes also the “uncanny voice leadings” of Wagnerian motives, Cherlin praises the motive as an *uncanny* time shard expressing a magical integration of time and space: “Once the magical space has been established, Schoenberg continues the passage by juxtaposing against this frame his lyrical themes from the first part of the work—symbolically, all that has transpired is seen in the new light of Verklärung” (182). With due allowances for Freud’s analysis of the uncanny Cherlin maintains that in Schoenberg the pulse-stream, the tonal foreground of his

music, “instead of being perceived as the underlying conveyor of musical thought, draws attention to itself as signifier; although the parallel is imperfect, it is as though the cadence of speech were to become that to which we attend, rather than its semantic content” (177). The uncanny, repressed *heimlich* events of the past, emerges in Schoenberg not only through repeated thematic units of the pieces but also by means of quotations from *moments* exterior to his composition. Thus his compositions turn out portals able to link remote moments of art history, if not the entire cultural heritage. The retrospection here does not succumb into nostalgia insofar as it has an eye to a better understanding of the present, a hope for the future. It is the silence and C sharp combination in *Verklärte Nacht* encircling the main thematic unit of the piece. The moonlight illuminating the cold, bare groves of our souls. Once uncovered the terror of the repressed feelings ceases, love and trust glimmer in the light. Otherwise retrospection is destined to paralysis.

Waiting at the Crux of SeeHearing

To bring forth the structural correspondences of *Ulysses* and *Verklärte Nacht* we may now suppose that “the transposed repetitions” in *Ulysses* function as *modified sequences* of *Verklärte Nacht*, which connect the thematic units of the book while giving it a sense of inconclusive rhythm. By picking out a thematic unit, first introduced at the very beginning of the book and then modified throughout, we may easily identify how the device is made use of. In the “Telemachus” episode Haines wishes to hear Stephen’s Shakespeare analysis but Mulligan refuses to open the discussion before having a drink:

—You couldn’t manage it under three pints, Kinch, could you?

—It has waited so long, Stephen said listlessly, it can wait longer.

—You pique my curiosity, Haines said amiably. Is it some paradox?

—Pooh! Buck Mulligan said. We have grown out of Wilde and paradoxes. It's quite simple. He proves by algebra that Hamlet's grandson is Shakespeare's grandfather and that he himself is the ghost of his own father. (1.551)

That brief passage informs us of not only the intensity of Stephen's intellectual state but also the structure-to-be of the rest of the book. Adverbial descriptions of characters anticipate words changing according to the states of mind of characters, while always-bombastic Mulligan discloses the main theme of the work. Listlessly insisting on *waiting longer* Stephen reveals *Ulysses's* connection with *Portrait*, and gives us a theme to deal with. If we take the verb *to wait* as our basic thematic unit, we may easily identify how this theme recurs in slight variations throughout the book. As it will be seen below, the expressive function of the sequences stems not only from the variations, but also from the mood surrounding these sequences. However slightly modulated are the sequences, as it is with *Verklärte Nacht*, the rhythm and dynamism provided by the protagonists, and sometimes by their counterpoints, along with the sense of continuation derived from nature, which is now in marvelous voice.

As we are quite familiar, since *Portrait*, Stephen always waits for something. A miracle sometimes, sometimes just the muse. Thus, for instance, when he is with never resting Mulligan, it is the latter who determines the color of the passage. As Jack Weaver indicates in *Joyce's Music and Noise*, in contrast to dominant passive adverbs related to Stephen, such as "wearily," "quietly," and "gloomily" Joyce uses more than twenty active -ly words in relation to Buck Mulligan. As Weaver cites some of them are as follows:

“stately” (1.1), “gently” (1.3), “coarsely” (1.7), “solemnly” (1.9), “gravely” (1.10) “sternly” (1.19), “briskly” (1.28), “nicely” (1.28), “gravely” (again, 1.30), “quietly” (1.33), “gaily” (1.34), “hastily” (1.65), “thickly” (1.66), “neatly” (1.71), “slightly” (1.76), “abruptly” (1.86), “evenly” (1.[99]), and “seriously” (1.99).²⁷ (54)

Although Weaver lists the adverbs in order of appearance, he skips “smartly” (1.19), “frankly” (1.51), and “warily” (1.56). Moreover the adverb “nicely” (1.28) does not denote any *quality* of Mulligan, instead Mulligan enunciates the word himself: “That will do nicely.” Mulligan is not simply assigned to dominate the scene; he claims it with his soul. In contrast to Stephen’s “displeased and sleepy” (1.13) figure, Mulligan “made rapid crosses in the air, gurgling in his throat and shaking his head” (1.12). Even his “white teeth” glisten (1.25), his whistles are “strong” (1.26), and his smile is “tolerant” (1.95). Yet early in the morning his restless exposure is in stark contrast not only to Stephen but also to Dublin:

[Mulligan:] *Thallata! Thallata!* She is our great sweet mother. Come and look.

Stephen stood up and went over to the parapet. Leaning on it he looked down on the water and on the mailboat clearing the harbourmouth of Kingstown. (1.80)

Still waiting, and still sleepy Stephen contemplates the awakening city in a pastel coalescence given out by “mailboat” and “harbourmouth.”

As for the Stephen’s relation to the thematic unit “waiting” we may cite:

“Stephen heled his upended valise to the table and sat down to wait” (1.329).

“He walked on, waiting to be spoken to, trailing his ashplant by his side” (1.627).

“I pull the wheezy bell of their shuttered cottage: and wait. They take me for a

²⁷ Pagination is modified in accordance with the *conventions* of the present thesis.

dun, peer out from a coign of vantage” (3.70).

“In long lassoes from the Cock lake the water flowed full, covering greengoldenly lagoons of sand, rising, flowing. My ashplant will float away. I shall wait. No, they will pass on, passing, chafing against the low rocks, swirling, passing. Better get this job over quick. Listen: a fourworded wavespeech: seesoo, hrss, rsseeiss, ooos” (3.453).

In all these examples the theme signifies a sort of suppression. That is Stephen always tries to stop the ever-changing reality. The last “listen,” in that sense, is also remarkable, insofar as it denotes an active participation on Stephen’s part, which also represents his constant swaying between the two poles, if only mentally and never physically.

Watching the tide his soliloquy reveals the essence of his *waiting*: “Saint Ambrose heard it, sigh of leaves and waves, waiting, awaiting the fullness of their times, *diebus ac noctibus iniurias patiens ingemiscit*²⁸” (3.465). Yet-to-be artist Stephen *waits* for the fullness of his time, in pains of creation: “Wait to be wooed and won. Ay, meacock. Who will woo you?” (9.937).

In contrast to Stephen’s physical restraints, the theme *waiting*, functions as a mental regression in Bloom. Since he is the wandering Jew, even a moment of physical break is out of the question. Thus he tries to make his thoughts, at least, wait a moment:

“Derby, smiling. Silly Milly’s birthday gift. Only five she was then. No, wait: four” (4.284).

“Skin breeds lice or vermin. A million pounds, wait a moment. Two pence a pint, fourpence a quart, eightpence a gallon of porter, no, one and fourpence a gallon of porter” (5.307).

²⁸ Latin: “day and night it [the Creation] groans over wrongs.” See Gifford and Seidman, 64.

“When was it I got it made up last? Wait. I changed a sovereign I remember”
(5.469).

“They wheeled lower. Looking for grub. Wait.

He threw down among them a crumpled paper ball. Elijah thirtytwo feet per sec
is com. Not a bit” (8.56).

“Wait. Those poor birds” (8.73).

“We were in Lombard street west. Wait: was in Thom’s” (8.157).

“Fag today. Send her a postal order two shillings, half a crown. Accept my little
present. Stationer’s just here too. Wait. Think over it” (8.1132).

“Pat is a waiter hard of his hearing. Pat is a waiter who waits while you wait. Hee
hee hee hee. He waits while you wait. Hee hee. A waiter is he. Hee hee hee hee.
He waits while you wait. While you wait if you wait he will wait while you wait.
Hee hee hee hee. Hoh. Wait while you wait” (11.915).

In the last passage, sitting at the Ormond’s restaurant, Bloom makes fun of the deaf and
clumsy waiter of the bar. His delight is quite ironic though. At the same time, Molly is
probably in the *jingling* bed with Blazes Boylan, while the cuckold Bloom, waiting,
away from the place of adultery, tries to dismiss the thought, projecting his *waiting* in
vain into Pat the waiter-waits-while-you-wait. The rest of the variations of the theme
serve as exclamations, cadences in the flow of his thoughts.

Since the spiritual father-and-son relationship of Bloom and Stephen has a
considerable part in the novel, one may expect that, in Molly’s case, the last
modification of the theme will play an important role and make the previous sequences
reveal themselves in a meaningful sphere. Yet it won’t be a great expectation:

“after I sang Gounods *Ave Maria* what are we waiting for O my heart kiss me

straight on the brow” (18.274).

“and my tongue between my lips up to him the savage brute Thursday Friday one Saturday two Sunday three O Lord I cant wait till Monday” (18.593).

“I was almost planning to run away mad out of it somewhere were never easy where we are father or aunt or marriage waiting always waiting to guiiiide him toooo me waiting” (18.676).

In contrast to the preceding sequences, which function as first physical and then mental regressions, here the theme negates both kinds of regression. By questioning itself, the theme unfolds its own structure as well as uniting the sequences it negates on a new and meaningful sphere. Obviously the meaning here is in no way dictated, but rather reveals itself. The “Penelope,” especially if compared to the preceding sections, is the sanest episode of the book. For all its chaotic appearance Molly’s inconclusive soliloquy follows a rational line. Each moment of her flow-like quasi-dream is interrelated with one another, exhibiting all the aspects of womanhood. The story of “all-round” man resolves into all-round woman, in “the way a body can understand” (18.567). Hence *Ulysses* ends in the integration of *real* and *logical* processes. If it is taken in its coming into being the book becomes integration of individual thematic units. However indifferent are they, each theme is quintessential in grasping the other. The whole, consequently, is not built in a predetermined meaning, but instead set forth to the contemplation of the receiver.

Endword

What makes Adorno better worth considering than most Marxist thinkers of his age is his receptivity not only to novelty but also to the approaches he considers false. Instead of completely dismissing idealism he stands for its exploitation by dialectics, by its own devices. Throughout the present study I have tried to shed light onto the correspondences among Joyce's *Ulysses*, Beethoven's *Hammerklavier*, and Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* by analyzing certain formal aspects of the works in light of Adorno's philosophy. Above all, I believe, on a wider plane, all are related in their receptivity.

The process of artistic creation is a process of objectification. Since under the prevailing social conditions alienation is ineluctable, forcing it to its limits seems a better worth practice to cope with it. Once the preconceived belief, that a revolution is the cannon of a cruiser turned on the Winter Palace, is denied, *tiny* modifications of conventional devices, modified sequences or recurrent themes in variations, become revolutionary moments of our cultural heritage, if not of entire history. Although Eco has every reason to suggest that the process of objectification creates a tension, the tension is obvious only for those who interpret it. Without interpretation, or the critique of the subject matter, it remains in the realm of alienation.

The work of art by way of alienating itself in the material of its trade provides the means of subverting reification, insofar as it achieves a critique of the subject matter it derives from the society. What makes modern art beyond compare, in that sense, is its persistent self-critique, which, ineluctably, amounts to a critique of society simultaneously. The subject of modern art is so sensuous as having sensuous objects outside itself. A ninth chord in *Verklärte Nacht*, in that sense, is no less revolutionary

than any acknowledged historical moment. Works we have analyzed here, having an eye to an objective hope for the future, tear prevailing objective ideal of identities to shreds by virtue of their subjectivity.

Once the experience becomes an experience of non-identity, consciousness achieves a sort of mobility, and steps out of dialectics. The apparent unity of subject and object is thus dissolved, which eventually undermines ideology. Stephen's passive resistance tears down Mulligan's adverbial dictatorship, by way of revealing its essence: bombast of adverbs. It is left as *stoned* as *le Penseur*. Once the structure is bound to rhythmic configurations, the ephemeral, the chronicle of insignificance, takes the upper hand. Hence any claim of coherence on the part of predetermined meta-narratives is annulled. A new language is created simultaneously, not by purifying but instead by exploiting the existing one. A language alien to *Odyssey's* Nobody, but not foreign to *Ulysses's* Everybody.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adorno, Theodor W. "Presuppositions". *Notes to Literature II*. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 95-108.
- . "Music, Language and Composition". *Essays on Music*. Ed. R. Leppert. Trans. S. H. Gillespie. Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 2002. 113-126.
- . "Reconciliation under Duress". Trans. Rodney Livingstone. *Aesthetics and Politics*. Adorno et al. London, New York: Verso, 2007. 151-176.
- . *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Oxford: Polity Press, 1998.
- . *In Search of Wagner*. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. London, New York: Verso, 2009.
- . *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*. Trans. E. F. N. Jephcott. London: NLB, 1974.
- . *Negative Dialectics*. Trans. E. B. Ashton. London, New York: Routledge, 1990. [*Negative Dialectics*. Trans. Dennis Redmond. At <http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/NDIntro.txt>]
- . *Philosophy of Modern Music*. Trans. Anne G. Mitchell & Wesley V. Blomster. New York, London: Continuum, 2004.
- & Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Ed. G. S. Noerr. Trans. E. Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

- Bauerle, Ruth H. "Introduction: Some Notes We Haven't Heard in Joyce's Music".
Picking Up Airs: Hearing the Music in Joyce's Text. Ed. Ruth H. Bauerle.
 Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993. 1-15.
- Beethoven, Ludwig van. *Piano Sonata No.29 in B Flat, Op. 106 (Hammerklavier)*.
Ludwig van Beethovens Werke. Serie 16: Sonaten für das Pianoforte, No.152
 Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1862-1890. Plate B.152.
- Blamires, Harry. *The New Bloomsday Book: A Guide through Ulysses*. London:
 Routledge, 1996.
- Bowen, Zack. *Musical Allusions in the Works of James Joyce*. Albany: State University
 of New York Press, 1974.
- Buck-Morss, Susan. *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*. New York: The Free Press,
 1979.
- Budgen, Frank. *James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses; and other Writings*. Oxford:
 Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Burgess, Anthony. *Joyceprick: An Introduction to the Language of James Joyce*.
 London: André Deutsch, 1973.
- Cherlin, Michael. *Schoenberg's Musical Imagination*. Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press, 2007.
- Colletti, Lucio. *Marxism and Hegel*. Trans. Lawrence Garner. London: NLB, 1973.
- Cooper, Martin. *Beethoven: The Last Decade, 1817-1827*. London: Oxford University
 Press, 1970.
- Dahlhaus, Carl. *The Idea of Absolute Music*. Trans. Roger Lustig. Chicago, London: The
 University of Chicago Press, 1989.

- Dante. *Epistle to Can Grande*. Trans. & Ed. James Marchand. At <http://www.english.udel.edu/dean/cangrand.html>.
- Della Volpe, Galvano. *Critique of Taste*. London, New York: Verso, 1991.
- Eco, Umberto. "Joyce, Semiosis and Semiotics". *The Languages of Joyce: Selected Papers from the 11th International James Joyce Symposium, Venice, 12-18 June 1988*. Eds. Bollettieri Bosinelli et al. Philadelphia, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1992. 19-38.
- . *The Aesthetics of Chaosmos*. Trans. Ellen Esrock. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- . *The Open Work*. Trans. Anna Concogni. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- . "A Portrait of the Artist as a Bachelor". *Talking of Joyce*. Umberto Eco, Liberato Santoro-Brienza. Ed. Liberato Santoro-Brienza. Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1998.
- Ellmann, Richard. *James Joyce*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Fischer, Andreas. "Strange Words, Strange Music: The Verbal Music of 'Sirens'". *Bronze by Gold: The Music of Joyce*. Ed. S. D. G. Knowles. New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1999. 245-262.
- Frisch, Walter. *The Early Works of Arnold Schoenberg, 1893-1908*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Gifford, Don & Robert J. Seidman. *Ulysses Annotated: Notes for James Joyce's Ulysses*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
- Gilbert, Stuart. *James Joyce's Ulysses*. New York: Vintage Books, 1955.

- Homer. *The Odyssey with an English Translation*. Ed. A.T. Murray. London: Harvard University Press, 1919. At <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/>.
- Jameson, Fredric. *Late Marxism*. London, New York: Verso, 2007.
- Jarvis, Simon. *Adorno: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 1998.
- John Michael Greer. *The New Encyclopedia of the Occult*. Minnesota: Llewellyn Worldwide, 2003.
- Joyce, James. *Ulysses*. London: The Bodley Head, 2008.
- . *Ulysses: An Unabridged Republication of the Original 1922 Edition*. New York: Dover Publications, 2009.
- Knowles, Sebastian D. G. “Opus Posthumous: James Joyce, Gottfried Keller, Othmar Schoeck, and Samuel Barber”. *Bronze by Gold: The Music of Joyce*. Ed. S. D. G. Knowles. New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1999. 107-149.
- Leonard, Garry Martin. *Advertising and Commodity Culture in Joyce*. Florida: University Press of Florida, 1998.
- Levin, Harry. “Joyce’s Sentimental Journey through France and Italy”. *Contexts of Criticism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. 131-139.
- . *James Joyce: A Critical Introduction*. New York: New Directions, 1941.
- MacCabe, Colin. *James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. London, New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Marilyn French. “Silences: Where Joyce’s Language Stops”. *The Languages of Joyce: Selected Papers from the 11th International James Joyce Symposium, Venice, 12-*

- 18 June 1988. Eds. Bollettieri Bosinelli et al. Philadelphia, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1992.
- Marx, Karl. *Selected Writings*. Ed. David McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- McArthur, Murray. "Signs on a White Field: Semiotics and Forgery in the Proteus Chapter of *Ulysses*". *ELH* 53.3 (Autumn, 1986): 633-652. Web. 2 Nov. 2009.
- Milesi, Laurent. "Introduction: language(s) with a difference". *James Joyce and the Difference of Language*. Ed. Laurent Milesi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 1-27.
- Norris, Margot. "Joyce's Heliotrope." *Coping with Joyce: essays from the Copenhagen Symposium*. Ed. Morris Beja & Shari Benstock. US: Ohio State University Press, 1989. 3-24.
- Pearse, Godfrey & Frank Hird. *The Romance of a Great Singer: A Memoir of Mario*. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1910.
- Rosen, Charles. *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven*. New York: Norton, 1972.
- Sauter, Willmar. "Bloomsday: James Joyce's *Ulysses* Celebrated as Theatrical Event". *Culture Unbound*. Volume 1. 2009. 469–485.
- Schoenberg, Arnold. *Theory of Harmony*. Trans. Roy E. Carter. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- . *Verklärte Nacht: Sextett für zwei Violinen, zwei Violen und zwei Violoncelli, Op. 4*. New York: Dover, 2005.
- Senn, Fritz. "The Joyce of Impossibilities". *Beckett, Joyce and the Art of the Negative*. Ed. Colleen Jaurretche. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2005. 197-211.

Stanford, W. B. *The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero*.

Oxford: Blackwell, 1968.

——— & J. V. Luce. *The Quest for Ulysses*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.

Tadié, Benoit. "Cypherjugglers going the highroad: Joyce and the contemporary

linguistic theories". *James Joyce and the Difference of Language*. Ed. Laurent

Milesi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 43-57.

Weaver, Jack W. *Joyce's Music and Noise: Theme and Variation in His Writings*.

Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1998.