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Emotions and Evaluative Judgments

Abstract

There has been an ongoing debate on whether emotions are evaluative judgments, and as such cognitive. Though philosophers, who commit themselves to the idea that emotions are constituted or structured by evaluative judgments, provide us with very rich accounts of the nature of emotions, they downplay its ethical dimension. In order to correct this we should focus on particular emotions. Here I focus on compassion and conclude that though there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and evaluative judgments this is not necessarily a one-sided one. Finally, I claim that any suspension of judgment (Arendt on Eichmann) can lead to a state of indifference, or an emotion-free state. And here I am interested in the ethical consequences of such a state, namely that with the suspension of judgment and accordingly of emotions, it is much easier for someone to avoid any moral action, and accordingly any sense of accountability.

Keywords: Emotions, Evaluative Judgments, Compassion, Ethics.

Duygular ve Değer Biçen Yargılar

Öz

Birçok çağdaş filozof duyguların değer biçen yargılar ile kurulduğunu ve bu sebeple de bilişsel olduklarını iddia etmektedir. Her ne kadar bu iddia duyguların doğası hakkında bize zengin tartışma alanları açıyor olsa da, böyle bir genelleştirmeye ulaşma kaygısı aynı zamanda duyguların etik boyutunu göz ardı etmektedir. Bunu engellemek adına spesifik duygulara odaklanmamız gerektiğini iddia ediyorum. Bu yazıda merhamet duygusunu inceleyerek, duygular ve değer koyan yargılar arasında içkin bir ilişki olduğunu ama bu ilişkinin her zaman tek taraflı olmayabileceğini, duyguların da yargılarımızı biçimlendirebileceğini savunuyorum. Son olarak, eğer duygular ve yargılar arasında içkin bir ilişki varsa, yargının askıya alınması durumunun (Arendt'in Eichmann analizi) aynı zamanda duygusal anlamda kayıtsızlık halini de beraberinde getireceğini ve *özellikle* bu kayıtsızlık ya da duyguların askıya alınması (*emotion-free state*) halinin kişinin ahlaki eylemden ve sorumluluk alma yetisinden uzaklaşmasını kolaylaştıracağını iddia ediyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Duygular, Değer Biçen Yargılar, Merhamet, Etik.

Introduction

What are emotions? What are the differences between emotions and sensations, feelings, moods etc.? What is the role that the body and the mind play in emotion formation? What is the role that society plays in emotion formation? These are just some of the questions that have occupied philosophers of emotions. The problem is that there is no agreed definition of the emotions, nor agreed answers to these questions. However, there is one proposition that at least many philosophers of emotions seem to agree with, that is, emotions involve cognitive judgments.

“Human beings are rational creatures, but we also have emotions”. Saying “but” already implies that our emotions are not rational. This is what Robert Solomon calls “the old prejudice” (Solomon 2008: 2) or what Richard Lazarus and Bernice Lazarus call a “myth” (Lazarus and Lazarus 2014: 3) according to which emotions, belonging to the irrational part of our *psyche* and being independent of thinking and reasoning, disrupt our lives, so much so that if we lead a life dictated by emotions we can never achieve virtue. In his tripartite structure of the *psyche* Plato, for instance, claims that in order to live a virtuous life our reason should rule over our passions and desires.

Today, there are many philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists who claim that emotions are not merely “unthinking forces” (Nussbaum 2001: 26), on the contrary, they involve evaluative judgments, and as are cognitive. Nor is this view completely new, as readers of Aristotle and the Stoics know. Or of Spinoza the Stoic,¹ and Nietzsche who, correcting “Descartes’s” error” (Damasio) about the separation of the mind and body, claim that the result of such a separation is “a divided individual split between the cognitive and the affective, the mental and the bodily, the rational and the instinctive, and a negative philosophy of the passions that leaves the individual in this torn state” (Ansell-Pearson 2013: 3). Similarly, in his *Descartes’ Error* the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio argues that the Cartesian myth of a disembodied *cogito*, according to which mind is processing sensory input and coordinating responses,

¹ Spinoza himself departs from Stoic idea of human flourishing can be achieved only by liberating ourselves from passions.

ignored the role of the body which provides a ground reference for the mind. The Cartesian myth implies the separation of rationality and emotions, claiming that reason is more effective when emotion is suppressed or kept under control (“the old prejudice”). Damasio, on the other hand, thanks to his clinical studies on patients with prefrontal lobe damage, comes to the following conclusion: patients with brain lesions cannot make healthy or “rational” decisions because their emotions are impaired. Damasio asks: what happens to someone who lost the feeling of shame, or compassion, or fear? He says: “certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality. At their best, feelings point us in the proper direction, take us to the appropriate place in a decision-making space, where we may put the instruments of logic to good use” (Damasio 1994: xiii). In his *Looking for Spinoza* (2003) Damasio has found a precedent (“the protobiologist”) for his ideas: Baruch de Spinoza (Damasio 2003: 14). In the 17th century Spinoza had already insisted on the relationship between emotions and cognition.

In the first part of my paper I investigate the relationship between emotions and evaluative judgments; and claim that emotions are intrinsically related to evaluative judgments. Moreover, I claim that if there is such a relationship between the two then any suspension of judgment can lead to a state of indifference, or an emotion-free state. And here I am interested in the ethical consequences of such a state, namely that with the suspension of judgment and accordingly of emotions, it is much easier for someone to avoid any moral action, and accordingly any sense of accountability. Finally, I will develop some of the points made through a focus on a particular emotion, compassion.

Emotions are judgments?

Though Aristotle is a philosopher whom we turn to about many philosophical discussions, he is somewhat neglected when it comes to the philosophy of emotions, despite the fact that he himself gives us an important insight into them. I think this neglect occurs because Aristotle does not give us a systematic theory of emotions.

Aristotle’s analysis of emotions (passions) begins with a distinction between *pathe* (passions) and *praxeis* (actions). Actions are things we do, whereas passions are things that we undergo, that happen to us (1106a4-5). In *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle furthermore identifies passions with feelings explicitly; indeed Scarantino calls him the founder of the “feeling tradition” (Scarantino 2016: 6) (as opposed to *motivational* and *evaluative* traditions). This legacy of Aristotelianism,² which can still be seen in many metaphors used such as “falling in love”, “consumed by envy”, “haunted by guilt”, (Scarantino 2016: 6) inspired early modern accounts of emotions.³ Later William James claims that our emotions are caused by our interpretation of bodily reactions, and thus emotions are the result of bodily changes, that the state of consciousness of, for instance, joy, anger etc. is nothing but the consciousness of physiological manifestations. He says: “the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (James 1884: 189-190). In other words, we do not cry because we feel upset, it is the other way around: we feel upset because we cry.⁴

² *Nicomachean Ethics* does not give us the complete picture of his account of emotions. In order to do this, we need to look elsewhere, namely, his *de Anima* and *Rhetoric*. In *de Anima*, “beliefs, bodily motions, and physiological changes are inseparable elements of emotion...similarly he avoids treating emotions as irrational, uncontrolled responses to situations” (Solomon 2003: 5). In *Rhetoric* Aristotle says: “passions [are] those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments and that are also attended by pain and pleasure” (1378a19-21). By saying this in fact he also adopts an evaluative attitude. Think of his definition of fear: “Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future” (1382a23); or shame, he says, “may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future which seem likely to involve us in discredit. . . If this definition be granted, it follows that we feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves or to those we care for” (1383b15-20). Though passions are feelings, as such things that they happen to us, Aristotle does not mean that we are not responsible for our passions, on the contrary, we are but for the responsibility talk in Aristotle we need to look at the relationship between passions and virtues in *Nicomachean Ethics*, for Aristotle himself says that “Now, neither the virtues nor the vices are feelings, because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our feelings, but we are so called on the ground of our virtues and vices; nor are we either praised or blamed for our feelings (a man is not praised for being frightened or angry, nor is he blamed just for being angry; it is for being angry in a particular way)” (1106a). What does he mean by “a particular way”? As Roberts puts it “a virtue is a disposition to have a certain emotion “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way” (Roberts 1989: 296).

³ For the relationship between language and emotions, see George Lakoff 2016: 269-273 and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 1980: 453-486.

⁴ Around the same time James was developing his theory on emotions, C. G. Lange, a Danish psychologist was working on similar ideas, and thus the theory is often referred to as James-Lange theory.

In his *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory* (1939), Sartre criticises James’ account for reducing emotions to a physical phenomenon. Sartre’s main idea is that emotional consciousness is first of all consciousness of the world, and that “emotion is a certain way of apprehending the world” (Sartre 1993: 52). For instance, when I say that “I am afraid”, I am always afraid of something. Thus, consciousness, and in this case emotional consciousness, is intentional, implying “directedness toward a world of objects” (Weberman 1996: 394). Saying this Sartre does not deny the physiological content of emotions (James), however, he sees this approach reductionist and his analysis of emotions in *The Emotions* is an investigation of the unity of consciousness and body that he will later fully develop in *Being and Nothingness* (1943). He says: “In short, in emotion it is the body which, directed by consciousness, changes its relations with the world in order that the world may change its qualities” (Sartre 1993: 61). What does he mean by this? Earlier in the book, Sartre refers to Pierre Janet who claims that an emotion is a setback-behaviour (Sartre 1993: 26). In order to explain this Janet gives us an example: there is a young girl who finds out that her father may have a paralysis and who upon this news rolls on the floor, displays a violent emotion because she cannot bear the idea of a life of a sick-nurse. According to Janet, this reaction is setback-behaviour, a “substitution for ‘sicknurse-behaviour-unable-to-be-endured’” (Sartre 1993: 26). Now, though Sartre does not completely disagree with Janet, he claims that this cannot be merely an automatic reaction or response towards an inner conflict, rather her behaviour is a strategic one designed to resolve or reduce a conflict.

With this we come to the functional role of emotions. Anger, for instance, is not an instinct, nor is it a habit (Sartre 1993: 36). It is an escape and yet rather than an automatic behaviour “it is we who put ourselves into a state of complete inferiority, because on this very low level, our needs are fewer” (Sartre 1993: 37). This is what Sartre means by describing emotion as “a transformation of the world” (Sartre 1993: 58). When we find ourselves in a difficult or unbearable situation, we realise that we

James and Lange published a book called *The Emotions* in 1885. John Dewey published his “The Theory of Emotions” in 1894 (See Robert C. Solomon 2003: 84).

can no longer live in such a difficult world, and yet we must act, we have to act, and in acting we change the world, “that is, to live as if the connections between things and their potentialities were not ruled by deterministic processes, but by magic” (Sartre 1993: 59). It is applying new connections and new exigences. We change the intention, the belief, accordingly the judgment about a particular object. Thus, for Sartre emotions are related to our desires, beliefs and judgments; emotions occur to resolve or reduce a conflict between belief or judgments and desires. And via changing our beliefs, judgments or perceptions of the world we resolve an inner conflict between desires and beliefs etc.

Yet Sartre’s account is limited; it is a functional account that draws us away from the question of what emotions are.

Now, I agree with Sartre that there should not be an identity principle between emotions and feelings, or bodily feelings, that there might be some bodily feelings attached to particular emotions such as pounding of the heart, muscular reactions and hormonal changes but these bodily changes are not enough for emotional experience,⁵ even more, as Goldie says, they may not even be necessary for emotional changes, because I may have some bodily changes without being conscious of it (Goldie 2002: 52). I also agree with Sartre that emotions are intentional, that they are directed at an object. For instance, I always get angry with someone, or with something, I can even get angry with an idea, be that idea one that is put forward by someone, or agreed upon by many people in a society. Or I may be afraid of something, be it a person or an animal or even an idea. However, the intentional character of emotions does not merely mean that they involve pointing at something. As Nussbaum says, “Their aboutness is more internal, and embodies a way of seeing” (Nussbaum 2001: 27). The intentionality

⁵ Schachter and Singer, distinguishing between the two components of emotions, namely the Jamesian physiological component and the “cognitive” component, conclude that emotions are a combination of both physiological and cognitive factors, that while the first component is easy to measure, the second one is more complex and to do with our labelling some physiological arousal as anger, or joy, or hatred etc. Based on experiments in which subjects were given different amounts of adrenalin and expected to describe what they feel and/or label their emotions, they argue that it can be one and the same physiological state of arousal that is fear, anger etc. but how we label them makes these particular emotions distinct from one another (See Stanley Schachter and Jerome E. Singer 1962: 379-399).

character of emotions also suggests that they involve evaluative judgments “in which appraising an external object as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness” (Nussbaum 2001: 19). Robert Solomon, for instance, claims that emotions are structured by judgments (Solomon 2008: 207).

The recent “Blink”-type emphasis on intuition and snap judgment is much more what I have in mind (Gladwell, 2005). Nor need the judgments that structure emotions even be articulate, that is, “spelled out” (either to ourselves or others). Nor are emotional judgments what some philosophers call “propositional attitudes,” that is fully conceptual depictions of the world in that...”-type clauses, taking as their objects propositions rather than concrete objects or people or relationships. I have sometimes compared emotional judgments to kinesthetic judgments, in that our awareness may be merely tacit and unspoken (even to oneself) (Solomon 2008: 207).

However, by saying emotions are structured by evaluative judgments, we imply that judgments, in whatever form they come, precede emotions, or as the Stoic view claims “behind your feelings (passions), there is a judgment”. This implies a one-way route, a cause-effect relationship between judgments and emotions: you have a certain judgment about something which gives way to a certain emotion. However, I argue that it is rather a reciprocal relationship, meaning that, experiencing a certain emotion may also have an effect to have a certain judgment or even to change your judgment about something. This, I think, what Aristotle means by saying that “passions [are] those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments and that are also attended by pain and pleasure” in *Rhetoric* (1378a19-21). Think of someone who is in love, who, precisely because of this, perceives things in a more positive or even completely new way than he/she would otherwise do. Nietzsche draws our attention to such a state: “imagine a man seized by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea: how different the world has become to him! Looking behind him he seems to himself as though blind, listening around him he hears only a dull, meaningless noise; whatever he does perceive, however, he perceives as he has never perceived before” (Nietzsche 1997: 64).

It is not easy to come up with a generalisation such as “emotions are always constituted or structured by judgments”. Thus, I avoid such big generalisations but claim that though there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and evaluative

judgments, rather than attempting to establish a central claim, we should focus on particular emotions in order to have a deeper understanding of the phenomena. In addition, I argue that the emphasis on the cognitive aspect of emotions downplays its ethical aspect. Thus, in the following section I concentrate on compassion, and investigate whether the presence or the absence of it may have ethical consequences.

Compassion

What is compassion? Etymologically it means “to suffer (*passion*) with, together (*com*)”. Or we simply can define it as “a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune” (Nussbaum 2001: 301). But how does it differ from sympathy and empathy? The Greek: *sympatheia*) means something quite similar (“together” (*syn*) + feeling, suffering (*pathos*))?

Empathy, by contrast, is “an imaginative reconstruction of another person’s experience, without any particular evaluation of that experience” (Nussbaum 2001: 302) and as such quite different from compassion and sympathy; an empathetic person may understand, or think that he/she understands the other’s suffering while not suffering with him/her.⁶ Compassion or sympathy, which has etymologically similar roots, which for this reason I use them interchangeably here, requires that we feel the pain of the other.⁷ Also they both “include a judgment that the other person’s distress is bad” (Nussbaum 2001: 302).

Can compassion or sympathy provide a ground for ethics? A number of philosophers claim that it does. Hume, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and later Schopenhauer claim that human beings are compassionate creatures and even more that ethics is all about compassion and sympathy. As Schopenhauer says compassion is “the great

⁶ The word *empathy* (derived from the Ancient Greek word *empathia*, meaning “Physical affection”) was coined by the British psychologist Edward P. Titchener in 1909 as a translation of the German *Einfühlungsvermögen*.

⁷ Nussbaum says: “if there is any difference between ‘sympathy’ and ‘compassion’ in contemporary usage, it is perhaps that compassion seems more intense and suggests a greater degree of suffering, both on the part of the afflicted person and on the part of the person having the emotion” (Nussbaum 2001: 302).

mystery of ethics” (Schopenhauer 1995: 144). This was in fact a reaction to some philosophers who claim that human beings are selfish by nature (Hobbes), that emotions cannot provide a ground for ethics, that we need to banish emotions from ethical realm and instead make reason the basis for ethics (Kant). This idea was partly the result of the “old prejudice” that we mentioned earlier, that there is a dichotomy between emotions and rationality. Not every anti-compassion philosopher had the same reason though. For instance, Nietzsche despises compassion (*Mitleid*) on the basis that it is an acknowledgment of weakness not only in the pitied but also in the pitier, and in that respect, it is not altruistic but rather egoistic. Moreover, for Nietzsche, there is both a conceptual and a causal relationship between compassion and anger. The pitier enjoys a kind of superiority over the pitied, while the pitied, who may accept the help if there is one involved, precisely because he/she is put in an inferior position feels anger towards the pitier (Nietzsche 1997: 133,137). Or think of Lester Hunt’s point about the relationship between compassion and anger: “the hatred we feel for the villains in reading a novel by that archpitier, Charles Dickens, is simply the underside of the compassion that we feel for his protagonists. The sorrier we feel for *Oliver Twist*, the more we hate Mr. Bumble, Noah Claypole, Fagin, and Monks” (Hunt 2006: 570).

Here I will not discuss whether the anti-compassion philosophers or the pro-compassion philosophers were right or wrong, or whether we are selfish by nature or not, but say simply that neither the former nor the latter position gives us a truthful insight into the relationship between emotions and cognition, and that any discussion of compassion and ethics needs to begin from this. And here once again I turn to Aristotle. In his *Rhetoric* Aristotle defines pity, or compassion as “a feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon” (1385b13-15). What are the cognitive elements involved in Aristotle’s account of compassion? First, the pitier believes that the pain that the pitied is suffering from is a serious one, caused by an evil; second the pitier believes that the pitied does not deserve such a pain; third the pitier believes that the same thing or something

similar that happened to the pitied may happen to the pitier as well (Nussbaum 2001: 306). Nussbaum claims that it is the *size* of the suffering, the *undeservingness* of it, which appeals to our sense of *justice* (Nussbaum 2001: 312) and an awareness of *similar possibilities* (Nussbaum 2001: 315) are necessary and sufficient reasons to have compassion towards someone. Thus, yes, we feel sorry for Oliver Twist, along with other orphans, who are treated cruelly. And Hunt might be right in claiming that we may hate the villains in Dickens' novels precisely because they are the cause of such sufferings. But anger also may result in moving us towards creative and productive actions. Perhaps Aristotle had something like this in his mind when he said in *Nicomachean Ethics*: "Any one can get angry—that is easy—or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy" (1109a.27). Or Nietzsche might be right in claiming that the pitier enjoys a kind of superiority over the pitied, and in return, the pitied feels anger towards the pitier, but, how can we generalise this? How can we claim that this is always the case with everyone and every case of compassion?⁸

Let us return to Nussbaum and her reference to the *size*, *undeservedness*, and *similar possibilities*. Think of Job, in the Old Testament. Why don't his friends feel any sort of compassion towards Job, the most righteous man, who was blessed with wealth and children and a happy marriage, but who lost everything (the wealth was taken away, his children died) precisely because God wanted to test his piety? Job does not know that this was the reason, he does not know why the evil happened to him, but his friends seem to know: they say: "you must have done some evil towards God, you must have sinned because God never punishes anyone who is innocent." No compassion comes from his friends: yes, it is a serious, a big suffering (*size*); but according to his friends Job must have deserved it (it is his *fault*); it would not happen to the friends themselves because obviously, they think, whatever Job must have done, what sin he must have

⁸ Here Nietzsche uses the word *Mitleid*, which is translated as compassion or pity and which has the similar etymological root as compassion (to suffer with). Thus, I ignore the distinction made by some philosophers (for instance Arendt) between compassion and pity.

committed cannot be and could not have been performed by these pitiless friends (*similar possibilities*).

With all these "wrong" evaluative judgments it was easy for Job's friends not to pity their once beloved friend. I turn now to a different case, one where what makes it easy not to feel compassion is where there is a suspension of judgment.

In Hannah Arendt's account of the Eichmann trial, Eichmann's inability to speak directly to the court, his tendency to "repeat word for word the same stock-phrases and self-invented clichés" (Arendt 1964: 49) was intrinsically connected with his inability to think, to think from the stand point of somebody who, as Kant says in "What is Enlightenment?" does not need the guidance of any authority: religion, the ruler, or the bureaucracy. This is quite explicit when Eichmann, thinking of May 8, 1945, the official date of Germany's defeat says that "I sensed I would have to live a leaderless and difficult individual life, I would receive no directives from anybody.... – in brief, a life never known before lay before me" (Arendt 1964: 32).

The thoughtlessness that Arendt occupies herself with in the Eichmann case involves the lack of reflection, which also means the lack of conscience. Thanks to the repeated clichés, coded language which in a sense has not been produced by the speaker himself, the individual is unable to enter a Socratic dialogue with himself, which may allow the person to put himself/herself in the position of others. In such a state, one can easily become completely indifferent to the fate of others. This whole apparatus also involves a particular language (*Sprachregelungen*). Arendt claims that Himmler's rhetoric, for instance, was quite effective when it came to make people detached from what they did, rather than saying "what horrible things I did to people!", the murderers would be able say "What horrible things I had to watch in the pursuance of my duties, how heavily the task weighed upon my shoulders!" (Arendt 1964: 106).

To make my point more clearly: if there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and evaluative judgments then Eichmann's suspension of judgment, especially when it comes to moral judgment, also leads to the suspension of his emotions, be they

compassion or sympathy or pity. More than that, the suspension of his emotions means not questioning his deeds and their consequences. After all, if he had not been that successful in the process, if the thinking itself, and correspondingly, moral judgment and/or evaluative judgment, had not been abandoned completely, there could have been some room for compassion and/or sympathy, and this, in turn, could have forced him to question his deeds, or non-deeds.⁹ In this case, and perhaps in some others too, compassion, the capacity to feel the pains of the others, would force the individual to be more sensitive towards the pains of others. In such a reciprocal relationship, we can talk about two phases:

- 1) The suspension of judgment along with the suspension of emotions can lead to a state of indifference.
- 2) However, if compassion is triggered somehow, if one regains the capacity to feel the pains of others, he/she can be forced to think, to reflect and accordingly to act.

Think of the scene in the *Schindler's List*: a Nazi official who kills Jews even for fun in his concentration camp, falls in love¹⁰ with a Jewish woman whom he chooses as his maid, and one night, approaching her, touching her, he says “is this the face of a rat?” At least for a moment there is hope that the answer will be “No!”, a sincere “No!” which requires a re-evaluation, even, transvaluation of judgments, beliefs about Jewish people, about the whole brutality happening during the Nazi Germany. But unfortunately the answer is “yes”: the Nazi official gives the answer by hitting and beating the woman.¹¹

Or alternatively, someone with a weak conviction or a belief, could be less immune to the enforcement of emotions. Emotions themselves may have the power to force us to reevaluate some beliefs, especially when they have not been held very strongly. Perhaps the most powerful one would be love, accompanied with the emotions

⁹ For the neural underpinnings of compassion see Mary Helen Immordino-Yang, Andrea McColl, Hanna Damasio, Antonio Damasio and Marcus E. Raichle 2009: 8021-8026.

¹⁰ Though love itself cannot be regarded as an emotion, it triggers various emotions.

¹¹ Though Nussbaum herself refers to this scene in her *Upheavals of Thought*, she still ignores the potential reciprocal relationship between emotions and judgments.

of happiness and joy, may even force someone with strong convictions to question himself/herself.

Conclusion

Today there are many philosophers and psychologists who claim that we need to question our “old prejudice” about the separation of emotions and cognition. These thinkers, however, attempt to come up with theories or generalisations about the nature of emotions such as “emotions are structured or constituted by evaluative judgments”. Though such an approach may give us a rich insight about some aspects of emotions and lead to rather fruitful discussions about how emotions can have an effect on our decisions, it may also conceal some features of them. I agree that there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and evaluative judgments, but this is not necessarily a cause-effect relationship, as Solomon and Nussbaum suggest. A certain emotion too can affect one’s judgments about someone, or an object or an idea, as Aristotle and Nietzsche claim. Thus, rather than attempting to establish a fundamental claim, I suggest that we should focus on particular emotions in order to have a deeper understanding of the phenomena. This is why in the final section I focus on compassion to investigate the idea that if there is such a relationship between emotions and evaluative judgments, then any suspension of judgment (or *vice versa*) can also lead to a suspension of emotions. Thus, in addition to Arendt’s analysis in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, I suggest that any suspension of emotions can be more influential when it comes to not questioning Eichmann’s evil deeds. If he had not been that successful in the process, there could have been some room for compassion and/or sympathy, and this, in turn, could have forced him to question himself. Emotions themselves may have the power to force us to reevaluate some beliefs and convictions. Being in love which requires a re-evaluation, even, transvaluation of judgments, beliefs can be a good example of this.

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