

CHP'S DISCOURSE ON THE KURDISH QUESTION:
CONTINUITIES OR RUPTURES?

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Continuities or Ruptures?


CHP Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu:
Süreklilik mi Kopuş mu?

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ABSTRACT

Turkey's Kurdish unrests firstly occurred as a reaction against centralization policies, which took place in the Ottoman past. However, the issue peaked after the foundation of a secular-nation state. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, numerous Kurdish rebellions emerged. These rebellions often brought the nationalist and Islamic characters together. These rebellions were quelled by the Kemalist regime, and this period referred to as the early acquaintance era of the CHP and the Kurds.

In 1989, SHP, as a successor of the CHP tried to become a social democrat party as European one. Moreover, the values of the new world order were spreading all over the world, including human rights and democracy. The biggest outcome of these values for Turkey has been the increasing politicization of the Kurdish question and emergence of Kurdish movement at national and international levels. These two developments led to a short-lived alliance between legal representatives of the Kurdish movement and the social democratic SHP. Another remarkable point of this period is the SHP's Kurdish report of 1989, which tried to describe the Kurdish question from a social democrat perspective. This report is the starting point of numerous reports of the CHP tradition on the Kurdish question. These reports usually emphasized on underdevelopment, lack of democratization and lack of cultural rights in the Kurdish-populated regions. This period can be referred to as second acquaintance of the Kurds and the CHP tradition.

This thesis scrutinizes the relation between the Kurds and the CHP in Turkey. In the second chapter of thesis, historical dynamics of Turkey's Kurdish question are summarized. In the third chapter, the CHP and the SHP's Kurdish question reports are issued, which show in accordance with the ruptures and continuities in the CHP's discourse. In the fourth chapter, specific data, are collected from semi-

structured interview with the CHP's political elites, elaborated on continue to show the breaking points in the CHP's discourse on the Kurdish question.

ÖZET

Türkiyeli Kürtlerin huzursuzluklarının ilk ortaya çıkış nedeni, Osmanlı merkezileşmesine karşı olmakla beraber, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin bir seküler ulus-devlet olarak ortaya çıkışından sonra doruk noktasına ulaşmış ve bir çok isyana sebep olmuştur. Bu isyanlarda dini ve milli karakterlerin varlığından, hatta iç içeliğinden söz edilebilir. Bu dönemde yaşanan isyanlar Kemalist rejimin empoze ettiği değerlere gösterilen bir reaksiyon olarak okunabilir. Aynı zamanda bu dönem CHP ve Kürtlerin erken tanışma dönemi olarak da anılabilir.

Aynı dönemde -1980 ikinci yarısı- CHP geleneğinin temsilcisi olan SHP, kendisini Avrupalı anlamda bir sosyal demokrat parti yapmak için mesai harcıyordu. Diğer bir taraftan, yeni dünya düzeni vasıtasıyla tüm dünyaya yayılmaya başlayan demokrasi ve insan hakları gibi değerlerin Türkiye açısından Kürt hareketini toplumsallaştırması ve siyasallaştırması gibi bir sonucu ortaya çıkmıştı. Bu gelişmeler Kürt hareketi ve Türkiye sosyal demokrat hareketi arasında çok kısa süren bir işbirliği ile sonuçlandı. Bu dönemle ilgili ilgi çekici bir diğer gelişme, SHP'nin Kürt sorununu sosyal demokrat bir vizyon ile ele aldığı 198 raporunu (Kürt Raporu) yayımlamasıdır. Bu rapor sonrasında CHP tarafından yazılan sayısız raporun ilk adımıdır. CHP'nin raporlarında geri kalmışlık, demokrasi ve kültürel hakların eksikliği üzerine yapılan vurgular gibi ortak noktalar bulmak mümkündür. Bu süreç CHP ve Kürtlerin ikinci buluşma dönemi olarak adlandırılabilir.

Bu tez CHP ve Kürtler arasındaki ilişkiyi irdeleyecektir. Tezin ikinci kısmında, Türkiye'nin Kürt sorunu tarihsel olarak incelenecektir. Üçüncü bölümün ise ana odak noktası SHP ve CHP'nin Kürt sorunu hakkında yazdıkları raporlar olacaktır. Buradaki amaç CHP'nin Kürt sorunu söylemindeki süreklilik ve kopuşları göstermektir. Tezin dördüncü bölümünde CHP'nin siyasi elitlerinin Kürt sorunu ile ilgili görüşleri kendileri ile yapılan yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine mülakatlardan toplanan veriler ışığında paylaşılacak ve CHP söylemindeki süreklilik ve kopuşlar irdelenmeye devam edilecektir.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP - Motherland Party, Anavatan Partisi

AKP – Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

AP - Justice Party, Adalet Partisi

BDP – Peace and Democracy Party, Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi

CHP - Republican People's Party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi

DEP - Democracy Party, Demokrasi Partisi

DDKO - Revolutionary Cultural Hearth of the East, Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları

DDKD – Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Association

DGM – State Security Court, Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi

DP - Democrat Party, Demokrat Parti

DTK – Democratic Society Congress, Demokratik Toplum Kongresi

DTP – Democratic Society Party, Demokratik Toplum Partisi

DYP - True Path Party, Doğru Yol Partisi

FP - Virtue Party, Fazilet Partisi

GAP – Southeastern Anatolia Project, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi

HADEP - People's Democracy Party, Halkın Demokrasi Partisi

HDP – Peoples' Democratic Party, Halkların Demokratik Partisi

HEP - People's Labor Party, Halkın Emek Partisi

HP – Populist Party, Halkçı Parti

HÜDA PAR - Free Cause Party, Hür Dava Partisi

JİTEM – Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization, Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele

MDD – National Democratic Revolution, Milli Demokratik Devrim

MDP – Nationalist Democracy Party, Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi

MGK - National Security Council, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu

MHP - Nationalist Action Party, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi

MNP - National Order Party, Milli Nizam Partisi

MSP - National Salvation Party, Milli Selamet Partisi

OHAL – State of Emergency, Olağanüstü Hal

PKK - Kurdistan Workers Party, Kürdistan İşçi Partisi

RP - Welfare Party, Refah Partisi

SHP- Social Democratic Populist Party, Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti

SODEP – Social Democracy Party, Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi

TİP – Turkish Labor Party, Türkiye İşçi Partisi

TKDP – Kurdistan Democrat Party of Turkey, Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi

YTP – New Turkey Party, Yeni Türkiye Partisi

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Kurdish question of Turkey is historically rooted in its Ottoman past. The problem continues more than a century later. The problem became an agenda for the state after the revolts which began in the late Ottoman time. The establishment of the Republic of Turkey is an essential breaking point on the Kurdish problem because the Kemalist regime tried to create a monoculturalist nation-state as seen in many nation-state formation processes in different geographies of the world. The new Republic implemented security politics in the Kurdish-populated regions to 'discipline' the Kurds. This is self-explanatory as it demonstrates the tensions between the Kemalist authority and the Kurds between 1920 and 1938; there were seventeen Kurdish rebellions against the projections executed by the single party regime (Heper, 2010, p.13). The second armed, and bloody struggle between the Turkish state and the Kurds under the name of PKK has started in 1984. The Kurdish question is still the most significant issue of Turkish republic which could not be resolved since the foundation of the Republic. Nowadays, scholars generally agree on the fact that the solution of the Kurdish question is important to develop the standards of the Turkish democracy.

The CHP was the only actor, which either was in power or was/is a witness in these processes as the party was founded by Mustafa Kemal and still survived. In the mid-1960s, the CHP had a new outlook which was left-of-center (*ortanın solu*) under the leadership of then general secretary and later the leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit. In the meanwhile, the TİP was interested in the Kurdish question during the mid-1960s and explaining it with socialist concepts. During the 1970s, representatives of the Kurdish left tried to establish their own socialist movement instead of remaining under the Turkish left. After the 1980 military coup, the CHP (under the name of the SHP) became a monopoly on the left. The party had some key actors from the Kurdish politics as MPs during the 1991 election. The SHP-

CHP declared numerous reports about the resolution of the Kurdish question from 1989 to 2015 which reveals that the CHP usually tries to demonstrate its perspective on the Kurdish question. As seen above, the CHP is a must when the Kurdish question is explained, because there are intimacies and disagreements between Kurds/Kurdish politics and the CHP. In addition, as noted above, the CHP was a ruling party, and it even has a single party era which enabled it to determine politics and policies of the state on every single issue. Therefore, the CHP is still remembered with the concepts of state-minded, party state and single party because of its history of its single party period. Especially after 1989, it is very important for the relations because of two reasons; one of them is about international environment, the other is about domestic politics. First, between 1989 and 1991, a sudden and fast disintegration occurred in the Eastern Bloc namely the end of the Cold War. The disintegration led to improving human rights and democracy and globalized these values as necessities of the contemporary politics. Meanwhile, the Kurdish question has become so popular. In many Kurdish populated provinces there was a popular discontent about the state policies based on securitist and exclusionary-discriminative logic and the Kurds began to use all domestic and international channels to mobilize these disfavours. It is possible to say that the Kurdish people socialized their opposition in the 1990s and it was one of the projections of the newly emerging world's rhetoric such as democracy and human rights in Turkey. Second, the other reason is the domestic one from the SHP (the successor of the CHP in that time) which published a report consisting of suggestions for the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question. The reason why it is important that during this period, the SHP tried to have a social democratic outlook, including democratization, equality and libertarianism on the European meaning, and following reports of the party were inspired by the 1989 report until the Kılıçdaroğlu period.

Although the 1990s is very important for explaining the relations between Turkey's Kurds and the CHP, there is a remarkable gap in academic literature about these relations which have changed due to new dynamics of the aftermath of the Cold War. There are many studies about the relations between the CHP and Kurds in the

single party era (Perinçek, 2010), as well as the ones focusing on the rise of the Kurdish identity (Kutlay, 2012). There are also numerous studies about the Kurdish movement, states' assimilations towards Kurds. However, there is a limited number of studies for the existence of the studies about the relation between the CHP and Kurds after 1989 and the following years. Contemporary literature explaining the relations between the CHP and Kurds after 1989 is limited because their sole focus is on what the CHP said in the reports or how they tried to explain these relations historically. Even more, the main focal point of these studies is limited with 1989 and some following reports. However, in this research, it focuses on what the CHP's rhetoric for the resolution of the Kurdish Question, and of course reports are investigated thematically and all written reports and bulletins are summarized to show ruptures or continuous themes. In addition, internal and external factors and actors, which affected the CHP's approach on the Kurdish question will be discussed here, too. For example, the Turkish army and MGK were important actors –especially about the Kurdish question- for the policy-making process until the 2010s. Moreover, the 1990s is known as the period of the debates and claims on the existence and practices of the deep state activities. In a different context, positioning of the party leaders vis-a-vis on the Kurdish question may become an indicator factor about the CHP's approach on the Kurdish question. Therefore, while the shifts within the CHP's approach on the Kurdish question is discussed, effects of peculiar dynamics of the decades is discussed as well. It should be also noted that the CHP's discourse and agenda on the Kurdish question is important owing to its promise for the sole representative of the social democracy, as well as being the only member of the Socialist International from Turkey. As another important fact and maybe an opportunity for the party to meet the party and Kurdish demands, the party has a leader from one of the Alevi-Kurdish populated provinces of Turkey, Dersim. In addition, it might be observed that the CHP sometimes attempts to have a dialogue with the Kurdish legal political party, the HDP however, it still posits a distance from the HDP because of pressure from its Kemalist grassroots and as well from its electoral base having concerns on territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

In this research, the main purpose will be to explain the CHP's approach on the Kurdish question with reference to the official reports of the party in various years and to the results of the field study based on a qualitative study, in-depth interviews with the political actors of the party having responsibility in the preparations of these documents. Additionally, an analysis of domestic political dynamics will be given with their repercussions on the preparation and announcement process of these reports, in order to show how the political environment affected the CHP's attitude on the Kurdish question. The main objective of this thesis is to ask the 'why' and 'how' questions to understand the reasons of the CHP's approaches on the Kurdish question. This thesis tries to answer following issues: the processes of Kurdish movement's politicization, ruptures and continuities of the CHP's discourse on the Kurdish question, the external and internal factors having repercussions on the CHP's position on the Kurdish question.

Additionally, the main contribution of this study to the literature is that it particularly focuses on 1989 period of the SHP tradition as a particular moment in secularist-republican tradition represented later by the CHP, when majority of the studies merely deal with a critique of the single party period of the CHP. Secondly, this study opposes reductionism, which analyzes the political parties' views on different issue as static or in adversary terms, namely Yes or No. In other words, this study attempts to demonstrate different and sometimes antagonistic views of the party elites on the Kurdish question, rather than looking into it in a holistic bias.

1.1 Methodology

When a researcher focuses on only a single party, the qualitative research provides opportunity for an extensive research via its methods like discourse analysis, interviews, literature survey and other methods like these. For example, if a researcher tries to understand a party's ideology, speeches of the party leader and his/her people, news from newspapers' archives, TV programs and other sources like these must be examined (Babbie, 2007, pp. 286-293). In this thesis, the CHP's

approaches to the Kurdish question from the 1989 report to 2015 will be examined. To understand a problem, looking at its historical dynamics or roots is considered as a necessary condition. Therefore, the first part of the thesis will be about the dynamics of the Kurdish Question with the use of the relevant literature survey method. In the second part, the SHP-CHP's report from 1989 to 2015 –there are 10 different reports- will be discussed and also some of the non-governmental organization's report, which were written at the similar time with CHP's report, will be analyzed as a requirement of literature survey to understand the factor having an impact on the party's positioning *vis a vis* the Kurdish question. In the last part, results of the qualitative study, in-depth interviews will be given. Selection criteria for the interviewees are their particular roles played in the direction of the CHP's politics on the Kurdish question.

1.2 Chapter Organization of the Thesis

After an introductory chapter I, Chapter II focuses on the historical context, the origins of the Kurdish problem from the foundation of the republic for Kurds first. Secondly, *raison d'être* on the Kurdish question will be unfolded. Thirdly, the reasons why the Kurds shifted to a left-wing political view and their relations with different political/ideological groups will be argued. Four main periods will be explained in this chapter; a single party period, a multi-party era, the politicization process of Turkey's Kurds after 1970s and changing parameters and the peace process of the Kurdish question. In other words, in the first chapter, the historical dynamics of the Kurdish question will be summarized from the single party period to the recent past. The purpose is both to understand the reasons of the Kurdish question and the CHP's historical and current roles on the Kurdish question.

The third chapter will start with the changing environment in the world politics by 1989, with the dissolution process of the Eastern Bloc which affected the fate of the Kurdish mobilization in Turkey. Thirdly, how the CHP-SHP's approach changed with the new world order towards the Kurdish question, will be shown via the CHP's reports. In addition, the CHP's contradictory attitude on the Kurdish

question will be revealed via party reports, and published news in credible newspapers will sometimes be shared to explain domestic politics of this period. In this chapter, developments on the side of the Kurdish movement will also be detailed to understand the public opinion whenever the CHP published these reports. Besides, the developments in internal and external politics, which shaped up and affected the CHP's Kurdish question approach, will be uncovered. In other words, the main purpose, in that part, is to understand the relations between the Kurds and the CHP under the effect of the new world order and also to understand how the external and internal factors affected the CHP's approach on the Kurdish question.

In the fourth chapter, results of the field study conducted as in-depth interviews with the key names who were/are effective in determining the CHP's approach on the Kurdish question. In other words, some data will be used, which were obtained by in-depth interviews with current politicians of the CHP and witnesses of mentioned periods. Additionally, the CHP's youth and women branches' understanding of the Kurdish question will be shown by data from one interview with one member per branch. In this chapter, the external and internal factors, which affected the CHP's Kurdish question will be discussed, the CHP's current outlook on the Kurdish question will be shared, the CHP's understanding of the Kurdish question will be summarized with some themes via the results of in-depth interviews. Finally, the last chapter will be the conclusion. In that part, findings of the previous chapters will be summarized and prospects for further research will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY

The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the historical dynamics of Turkey's longest-standing question, the Kurdish question. An analysis of the historical dynamics is significant because historically rooted problems on the Kurdish question cannot be understood comprehensively. Therefore, in this chapter, the single party period, which created some traumatic memories for the relation among the state and the Kurds, will be discussed. This part of the chapter will be very crucial to consider the interplay between the state, the the Kemalist regime that was in power as a single party from 1923 to 1950, and the Kurdish question at large with a different perspective. In other words, this part will help to understand how the established Kemalist values guiding the CHP's approach on the Kurdish question. Secondly, the multi-party era will be reviewed until the 2000s, which represent changing dynamics for the state's rationale on the Kurdish question. The third focal point of this chapter will be an analysis of the practices in the 2000s and more importantly, the fate of the peace process is considered. This part will have crucial significance when the CHP's reports—which are written during these years—will be questioned in a critical perspective.

2.1 The Single Party Period and the Kurds

According to Zürcher, Turkey's form of governance was “an authoritarian single party government and obviously it was a dictatorship” after the announcement of Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun*) in 1925 (Zürcher, 2006, p. 257). Yayman called the years between 1918 and 1925 as “tolerating” of Kurdish demands. He explains the second period (1925-1950) “the years of ignorance and assimilation of the Kurdish identity”. In his opinion, this second period was the time

to determine the state's official approach towards the Kurdish question. He says, "the word of assimilation was clearly used in the Kurdish reports of Fevzi Çakmak and Abidin Özmen" (Yayman, 2016, p. 40). Reports have an essential role in order to understand the state's approach on the Kurdish question. In these years the word of the East (*Şark*) was used to describe the problem because the East (*Şark*) has meant 'underdeveloped'. The attitude is seen as part of an orientalist point of view. There are over 20 reports which were written in the first 20 years of the Republic. The purposes of the reports were determining how Kurds would be assimilated. The biggest commonality in the most of reports, Dersim was seen as a 'source of trouble' (Akçura, 2011, p. 51). According to Heper, the leaders of the republic had not rejected empiric fact but rather they only ignored it. The aim here was avoiding the transformation of a secondary identity into primary identity (Heper, 2010, p. 99). Yeğen classified the outlook of Kemalists towards Kurdish identity in three terms. Firstly, during the years of national struggle, the Kurds were seen as "a different nation which has political and legal rights" by the Kemalists. The second term started with the 1924 Constitution. In this period, although presence of the Kurds was accepted, political and legal rights of them were not recognized. In the third term, which began at the end of 1920s, the Kurds' presence was rejected. Yeğen's idea for the third term is contrary to Heper's idea because according to the former, after the last years of 1920s, Kemalists had rejected empiric fact as well (Yeğen, 1999, p. 128).

In addition, Kurdishness and Islam are complementary phenomena during that time due to the fact that the abolishment of the caliphate also created a basis for the emergence of the revolts. Bruinessen says that "the most important symbol of brotherhood between Turks and Kurds disappeared with the removing of the caliphate. Blaming the government with anti-religious implementation became possible (...) this argument was the most effective argument for the extremely conservative Kurds (Bruinessen, 1993, p. 281)". Perinçek as another view, describes the Kemalist revolution as a "revolution for peasants". According to him, the implications which took place after Sheikh Said Rebellion was "liquidation of feudal relations in Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia" and he continues: "Leaders

and ideologists of the revolution emphasized the relations between separatism and feudal aghas, and they also emphasized the necessity of getting rid of aghas and sheikhs.” According to him, the driving force behind the rebellions were the “aghas and sheiks who were against the revolutionarily rising republican values” (Perinçek, 2010, pp. 40-41).

Akçura explains the reason for the first Kurdish rebellion (Sheikh Said) as “breaking of the given promises by Kemalists” and she explains the reasons of other Kurdish rebellions as a “result of violence for assimilation and government pressure in the region” which occurred after the Sheikh Said rebellion (Akçura, 2011, p. 53). Bozarslan talks about an additional factor as to why Kurds resisted against state and says, “Kurds were afraid to have the same fate as the Armenians”. Ankara’s response was extremely harsh to the rebels and also to the local community. The law on the maintenance of order was introduced and implemented while the rebellion was going on (Bozarslan, 2014, pp. 109-111).

Following this law, Abdülhalik Renda, Cemil Ubaydın and the presidency of the general staff wrote three reports. All of these reports created a general framework for the Eastern Reform Plan (*Şark Islahat Planı*) (Yeğen, 2014, pp. 57-59). In his report, Renda talked about the developing (Kurdish) nationalism amongst the Kurds in his report. He said that the “developing nationalism can cause a rebellion which includes only nationalist characters.” The main focal points in both the report of the presidency of the general staff and the report of Cemil Ubaydın was the outline of assimilation policies through ‘demographic engineering’. According to the Eastern Reform Plan, 500.000 Turks planned to settle to the region. However, the practice of the plan was unsuccessful. The practice was even criticized by Avni Doğan’s report, written in 1940. He said “25% of 8020 Balkan immigrants who settled in the region died because of epidemics and starving” (Al Jazeera Türk, 2013)¹, he criticized the policy because it failed to help to these people continuously. In addition, and according to the plan, people who spoke any other language than Turkish in the school, the municipality, the downtown and the bazaar would be

¹ Al Jazeera Türk, Cumhuriyet tarihi Kürt raporları, 2013

punished in Kurdish populated provinces. No foreign person or institution could enter in to the region without government permission, the report also argued (Akçura, 2011, p. 77). According to Tan, after the Sheikh Said rebellion, in addition to executions, arrests, the exiles of blameless people, pressure on the Kurdish identity, culture and language made the Kurds about their lives and futures. The state had tried to convince the Kurds that 'they are originally Turk' (Tan, 2015, p. 243) but failed due to the perspective which it viewed the Kurdish question, as well as the heavy-handed implementation of these policies.

Besides these, inspectors-general, a holdover from the Ottoman times, started to be implemented again. According to the inspectors-general law of 1927, the first inspectors-general had founded in Sheik Said rebellion's sphere of influence. This law implemented for 20 years as de facto and 25 years officially. Koçak criticizes the inspectorship, "the region was cut off from the outside world and instead of solving the problem, the problem deepfrozen with the inspectors by the state (Koçak, 2003). He says this idea (deepfreezing) is the base of the Kurdish question, which continues today. The inspectors understood every single issue under the framework of 'security'. Furthermore, every single inspector wrote a report about 'how Kurds should be assimilated' (Yeğen, 2014, p. 63). The second biggest Kurdish rebellion of the republican period (Ağrı) took place in 1930 and then it quelled. As a result, the Kemalist administration, had taken a variety of precautions. Under May 1932 law, 4 regions were created in Turkey and 3 of these 4 were in Kurdistan. One of these regions was evacuated because of 'medical, cultural, political, economic and strategic' reasons. Tribes lost their legal personality, meaning that they lost their privileges and rights coming from the Ottoman past. In addition, properties of the tribes were confiscated by the state (Jwaideh, 2016, pp. 416-417).

Later on, the Resettlement Law of 1934 was approved in the parliament and the law affected all Kurds. Tan explains the law with the following statement: "11/A and 13/3 articles of the law was about Kurdish assimilation through resettling them into the Turkish populated regions. The law also did not permit to the Kurds to create a

Kurdish populated village or community in the resettled places” (Tan, 2015, p. 255). Yeğen (2014, pp. 66-67) agrees with these arguments, but according to him, the law could not be implemented as it was targeted and an additional law in 1947 (with the multiparty democracy) states that people who resettled, as a result of the law of 1934, could go back their hometown. Yeğen (2014, pp. 66-68) continues to support his perspective, as the settlement policies were not the only way to assimilate Kurds. He says “madrasahs which closed down with the establishment of the republic and they were crucial in reproducing Kurdish culture. Education in any other language different than Turkish was forbidden (Lausanne rights reserved), and it is still forbidden.” In addition, as noted above, speaking in Kurdish was forbidden in the East Reform Plan. Surnames, place names (village, town, and province) were Turkified (Yeğen, 2014, p. 67). According to Perinçek, who claims that republican revolution was a revolution for peasants, the law “reflected the view of Kemalism towards feudalism” and he elaborates on his idea: “Especially, there were radical views against chieftains. Kemalists planned to distribute land to the poor and landless peasants in order to get their support” (Perinçek, 2010, p. 107).

As it was noted above, Dersim was seen as a source of trouble. Therefore, a lot of reports were written about this area in addition to the implementation of some special laws regarding the Dersim area, etc. Though Dersim did not take part of the Sheik Said rebellion, the reason why Dersim was seen as a ‘source of trouble’ was that Dersim had reacted to the centralization policies of Ottoman Empire and also the republic at large. In Hamdi Bey’s report (1926), he describes Dersim as a ‘source of trouble’ and the people who lived in Dersim as ‘smart, trickier and crafty’ (Bulut, 2011, p. 479). In the same year, a different report came from Ali Cemal Bey, governor of Dersim, who demanded to increase measures of safety. However, a different report came from Cemil Bardakçı, governor of Elazığ in 1927 who said, “if violence is not used and the state can approach the people logically, Dersim will be a loyal friend of the republic” (Bulut, 2011, pp. 487-489). Yayman says that “Bardakçı did not see the Alevi as an enemy, he thought Alevi as a community which had been oppressed for a long time” (Yayman, 2016, p. 105). His understanding attitude towards the people led to have good contact between him

and the people. However, the general attitude between the Kemalist elites favored a military solution to control Dersim. In other words, according to them, the only way for the solution was via a military operation in Dersim. Another 'hawk' of the period was Fevzi Çakmak who wrote two reports about Dersim in 1930-1931, and these reports were "the base of Resettlement Law of 1934" (Yayman, 2016, pp. 117-118). Çakmak supported "colonizing Dersim" as a solution of problems in Dersim in his report. Besides, according to him, the only way for keeping order is military intervention (Bulut, 2011, pp. 515-517). All of these approaches show the general perception of Kemalist administration to Dersim.

In the meanwhile, the general condition was negative in Dersim. State wanted to abolish tribes through Resettlement Law of 1934, one of the forbidden zones was Dersim according to the law. Later on, the Tunceli province (vilayet) was established by the law of Tunceli in December, 1935. The law of 1937, which aimed to integrate the Kurds in Turkish population, outraged the Kurds. This anger resulted in a rebellion, which continued for 2 years and negatively affected many people's lives from both sides, rebels and soldiers. Turkish government intervened in Dersim in order to quell the rebellion with military means, using all the modern weaponry of the time, even planes. Therefore, the new Republic was able to quell the rebellion (Jwaideh, 2016, p. 20). Aygün, who was the former MP of the CHP for Dersim, shows an official document, which demonstrates that the Dersim operation had been planned in 1932, but was postponed because of a lack of budget. The name of the planned operation was "MA operation" (Aygün, 2016, p. 16). The reports about Dersim corroborate these ideas. Right after the Sheik Said rebellion, the Kemalist regime set their eyes on Dersim.

On one hand, the rebellions continued but on the other hand, some reports were prepared by Kemalist regime to solve and understand the problem since the first years of republic. Some of the reports were about Dersim specifically, as noted above while the others were about the Kurdish question at large. However, it is possible to say that these two 'problems' were never understood as different from each other by the Kemalist regime. Perinçek explains the interest of the Kemalist

regime towards the Kurdish question; “2 different reports were prepared by the last two prime ministers (İnönü and Bayar) of Atatürk’s period by the demand of Atatürk in his last two years in life” (Perinçek, 2010, p. 53).

İnönü was the founder and mentor of the eastern politics of the state. Inspector-generals were appointed from people who were close to İnönü. İnönü has been accepted as the head of the hawks on the solution of Kurdish question, he supported the hawks’ idea that the Kurdish question had to be solved via settlement policy, assimilation and Turkification. (Akçura, 2011, pp. 89-92). İnönü had a suggestion for every single province in his report and he described the provinces like “an Arabic province which is seen as avid for Turkishness” or “a province, which is fully populated by Kurds.” Then he detailed how the provinces could be Turkified. İnönü supported the inspectors-general in his report as “Inspector-general will be the main polity of Eastern provinces.” İnönü described the army as the biggest guarantee of the republic in his report. Tunceli province (vilayet) and inspector-generals were established as a result of İnönü’s suggestions in this report (Akçura, 2011, pp. 92-95).

A second report came from Celal Bayar and his visit to Dersim. Some of the opinions of Bayar contradicted what İnönü said. Bayar emphasized that the implemented politics to create a national consciousness resulted in contrary to what was aimed with these politics. Bayar also observed that although 13 years had passed, republican regime still could not control the region. Nonetheless, for his idea, after the Sheikh Said and Ağrı rebellions, he supported the punishments against the rebels. However, having a grudge against the community of the region was wrong, according to Bayar’s report (Bayar, 2006). Bayar talked about the crucial role of an educational campaign, which meant ‘opening schools and libraries in order to integrate the Kurds into the republican system as opposed to İnönü’s idea of providing a road system in order to quell a possible rebellion easier (Yayman, 2016, pp. 159-160; Akçura, 2011, pp. 115-117).

Atatürk discharged İnönü shortly before his death and appointed Bayar as prime minister. After Atatürk’s passing in 1938, İnönü was elected as 2nd President of

Turkish republic. In İnönü's period, there was not any visible change in governance methods of the single party. Though, the visible changes started after WWII when İnönü was still in the office of presidency. In other words, İnönü decided to continue Atatürk's main policies. He legitimized his leadership position in the CHP's congress, which took place in December 1938. In the congress, the charter of the CHP had changed and Atatürk was declared as eternal chief of the party and İnönü declared as unchanged chair of the CHP" (Lewis, 2015, pp. 393-396; Zürcher, 2006, pp. 269-270). In other words, İnönü had become 'national chief'. The monist politics of the single party and how the system created a national chief were defined by Naci Kutlay as follow: creating 'a monoculture' idea was the main motto of the republic. 'Monocultural nationalism' created 'monopolitical nationalism'. Kemalist regime which was oppressive and assimilationist and wanted to create a monolingual, monocultural and mononational state continued with a national chief and a single party governance. Thus, Kurdish culture was ignored too and tried to be abolished" (Kutlay, 2014, p. 107). As a result, Minister of Justice, Mahmut Esad Bozkut's one of the speeches (in 1930) was like a supporter argument of Kutlay's explanation: "I think, Turks are owners of Turkey. People who are not originally Turk have only one right in Turkey that is becoming servant or slave" (Tan, 2015, p. 266).

2.2 Kurdish question after the WWII and the Multi-Party Era

Turkey did not take side in WWII, but its cost was very serious for Turkey both in terms of domestic politics and also in foreign policy. Within domestic politics, unrest against CHP increased for numerous reasons, not least of which was the inflation rate. In foreign policy, Turkey had to get close to United States because of the USSR's threats. In the meanwhile, United States understood Turkey's importance in relation to the established communist regimes in Eastern Europe by the enforcement of the USSR. Turkey considered benefiting from the United States' Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine, thus it needed to change its statist economy model and political system. After these developments, the transition to multi-party

democracy started in Turkey. (Unat, 2016, pp. 260-263; Keyder, 2013, pp. 78-84; (Sander, 2013, pp. 252-260).

After the election of 1946—the transparency of this election is still discussed— and in the election of 1950, the DP came to power with a great victory against the CHP. The DP won 408 seats when the CHP could win only 69 (Lewis, 2015, p. 417). In this election, it is not possible to say Kurds voted to the DP collectively because majority of MPs from Kurdish populated cities were elected from the CHP's lists. According to Uçar, Kurds who voted for the DP were landowners as a result of the Redistribution of Land Law blocked by the founders of the DP (Uçar, 2016, p. 178). According to Tan (2015, p. 316), the biggest success of the DP for Kurds that “the DP brought children who come from opposite families to the regime into the parliament.” The DP promised to end gendarme pressure in the eastern parts of Anatolia, but did not. Tan (2015, p. 316-317) explains the situation as follows: “in years, it was understood that there is not any difference about the nationalist paradigm between the CHP and the DP.” By this point, the Kurds had realized the importance of education from seeing the results of socio-economic developments, social mobilization and industrialization in agriculture since the 1950s. This means that these factors, which caused migration from Kurdish populated regions to the western provinces of the state and alongside this migration, also resulted in the Kurdish bourgeoisie starting to send their children to universities. This development caused the emergence of an educated Kurdish class. The silence—which had started after the destruction of Dersim—ended by the time of the emergence of this class in the 1960s.

In addition, it was the first signals of a replacement among enlightened Kurds and feudal chiefs or Sheiks, meaning that the representatives of Kurdish demands would now be enlightened Kurds instead of feudal chieftains and Sheiks (Uçar, 2016, p. 181). In the 1954 elections, the DP gained a great victory due to numerous factors, most notable of which was economic development. However, in the next 3 years, the economy became static and the DP's authoritarian tendencies caused a serious loss of votes in the suburbs and Kurdish populated regions as well. Therefore, the

CHP was seen as the leader of democratic defense and some groups of the Kurds started to vote for the CHP again (Zürcher, 2006, pp. 344-345; Uçar, 2016, p.188).

As noted above, many prohibited Kurdish feudal people were elected as MP from the list of the DP. Tan explains this situation and the aftermath of the elected period: “In this period (1950-54) Kurds who were elected MP kept step with Ankara’s system. Only a very limited number of Kurdish deputies which were elected from Kurdish provinces were interested in Kurdish question and the other problems of the region. However, they got weak due to insensitivity of other Kurdish deputies. Later on, Kurdish deputies who were interested in Kurdish question were liquidated from the DP” (Tan, 2015, p. 318). Another important development of the DP years was that a commercial bourgeoisie emerged. Kurds also benefited from a less restrictive and less authoritarian state in terms of trade. However, Kurdish investors did not invest to Kurdish populated provinces, they chose to invest in economically developed regions, which were often times less populated by Kurdish people. This made the gap between underdeveloped eastern cities and industrializing western cities seen easier (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 14-15).

The gap and difference between the east and west could be why many Kurds shifted towards left wing politics in the 1960s and the following years (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 15). In the last years of the DP government, there was another factor, which caused a remarkable distance between the Kurds and the DP. Turkey’s Kurds sympathized with the Barzani Movement in Iraq and became an alternative center of attraction for the repressed Kurdish movement (Jwaideh, 2016, pp. 534-538). This new situation was a dilemma for the official ideology of the state, which was implemented by the DP in that time.² Another important point to show the state’s approach to the Kurds during the DP years witnessed in the conflict period in Iraq at the second half of 1950s. Some conflicts occurred between Turkmens and Kurds in Iraq, which started in 1958. Turkey was influenced from the conflicts too. The main fear of Turkey was that “Mustafa Barzani’s—who came back to Iraq with

² About nationalism, it is noted above that there were no any differences between the DP and CHP in the understanding of nationalism.

1958 coup—movement could affect the Kurds who lived in Turkey and they could demand the same or similar rights what he obtained in Iraq. Therefore, Ankara organized a meeting in presidency office under Celal Bayar's leadership" (Tan, 2015, pp. 328-331). The decision made in the meeting was "50 Kurds who were seen as a threat to the state in accordance with the intelligence report will be arrested." The decision was implemented and a majority of the arrested Kurds were well educated or students. The arrest of these people has been referred to as the Event of 49s (Tan, 2015, pp. 332). According to Alış, 49s' event was an important step for Kurdish movement because although there were a few people who came from feudal families, the majority of them came from the newly developed middle-class (Alış, 2012, pp. 64-66). In other words, this situation helped along the emergence of a politicization process of educated-middle class Kurds in different political views.

The DP's authoritarian tendencies and pressure on the Kemalist status quo resulted in a military coup, which took place on May 27, 1960, the Republic of Turkey woke up to the first military coup of its history. All of the ministers and deputies of the DP, included President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes were arrested. Then, Menderes and two ministers were executed (Unat, 2016, pp. 273-275).

Right after 1960 military coup, coup makers wanted to create a constitution and the constitution-makers were a group of academicians. Therefore, the Turkish constitution of 1961 was a liberal constitution, which allowed for the existence of labor unions and student organizations. Although it was a liberal constitution, pressure on the Kurdish identity continued as a result of the policies executed by the coup-makers (Akkaya, 2015, p. 27). Moreover, they tried to implement assimilationist policies, but they could not stop the Kurdish movement because the constitution gave an advantage to the Kurdish group too in order to organize and come together. The first place for the mobilization of the Kurds was TİP (Bruinessen, 1993, p. 341).

In the meanwhile, some remarkable changes started to take place both in Turkish politics and in the CHP. The TİP was positively welcomed by a few possible voter

groups of the CHP like the Kurds. The CHP understood the sympathy to the TİP, so the chair of the CHP, İnönü determined the new political outlook of the party as left of center (Kabasakal, 2013, pp. 109-112). This was the first step of social democratization of the CHP. In other words, among 1961-1965, İnönü's CHP was in power. Although a decline was observed on the CHP's progressive attitude for the freedoms (when the party in power among 1961-65), the CHP came to realization that it had to re-determine its policies in order to distinguish itself from the AP which was the successor of the DP—as well as the socialist TİP. This re-determination was a necessity for the CHP because of loss of votes in the 1963 municipal elections, and the 1964 partial election for senate. Therefore, the CHP re-determined its position between the AP and the TİP as left-of-centre (*Ortanın Solu*) (Altunoğlu, 2014, pp. 27-30). İnönü's left-of-center meant little change; therefore, the new outlook was not a deviation from Kemalist Principles, rather, only a social justice component was added to the Principles in order to keep up with the time (Altunoğlu, 2014, p. 32). In the 1965 election, the AP collected amount 53 percent of total votes under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, and he and his people dominated the politics for amount 5 years (Zürcher, 2006, pp. 364-365). The YTP, which was founded by former DP members, was another actor of post-coup period (Şur, 2016, p. 40).

The majority of the Kurdish leftists gathered under the same roof of TİP in 1960s. TİP was founded by unionists in 1961 and socialist intellectuals joined the party in 1962. Later on, the party seriously developed. The party became the center of attraction for the Kurds who wanted to be interested in politics too (Gunes & Zeydanlıoğlu, 2014, p. 3). The situation can be seen as a discrepancy because of the Barzani movement, which struggled for a regional autonomy of Kurds. However, the TİP was a socialist party, which described the Kurdish question in class politics, in one page and under the name of “development of East” in its program. Even the party did not use the word “Kurd” in its program (Aydinoğlu, 2014, p. 20). The party only supported according to its program of 1964 “positive discrimination” for people who speak in Kurdish and Arabic and also people who belonged to the Alevi

sect because they were excluded and discriminated. According to Yeğen (2014, p. 164), this sentence was important to show the TİP's interest in the Kurdish question.

Yeğen (2014, pp. 164-165) also described the Kurds who joined the TİP as one of the third components of the TİP (others unionists and intellectuals). This bilateral relation between Kurds and TİP became more specific day by day and peaked in Eastern demonstrations which started in 1967. According to researchers as Yeğen (2014, p. 165) and Bruniessen (1993, p. 343-344) Eastern demonstrations were a turning point for Kurdish resistance and Turkey's future politics. TİP's interest to the Kurdish question increasingly continued and in 1970, the congress of the party, the word "Kurds" was used and the Kurds were seen as "a public that had been oppressed by dominating classes and fascist governments" and the party still emphasized "underdevelopment of the region" (White, 2016, p. 29). Despite this decision, the Kurds (or easterners, as they were referred to in the party) were alienated from the party because Aybar's group defeated the group of Behice Boran and Sadun Aren who were "scientific socialists".

Later on, when the constitutional court closed down TİP in 1971, the justification of the decision was the taken decision in the 1970 congress about Kurds (Yeğen, 2014, p. 167). After TİP won 15 deputies in the 1965 elections, it became the dominating actor of Turkey's left (Aydinoğlu, 2016, pp. 23). Kurds who were in the TİP left from the party because they gave up their hope to solve the Kurdish question with Turkish socialists in the aftermath of the Eastern rallies (Tan, 2015, pp. 351-352). Of course in the 1960s, there were some Kurdish intellectuals like Said Elçi and Fait Budak, who tried to create an independent channel for Kurdish movement. For example, these intellectuals founded TKDP. However, it was a very limited movement when it is compared with the Kurds who were active in TİP. According to Bozarslan, the leaders of TKDP was chieftains; sheikhs and their followers, Said Elçi and Fait Bucak were the representatives of this tendency, but there was a leftist oriented group too in TKDP, led by Sait Kırmızıtoprak (Bozarslan, 2003, pp. 853-855). The ending years of 1960s and the first years of 1970s, the Turkish left divided into many groups. Kurds could not be indifferent to

this division. “Kurdish leftists tried to far away the group which supported the MDD, and then, they started to organize under the name of the DDKO, formed in 1969 (Yeğen, 2014, p. 173; Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 15).

At the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, political violence increased between left-oriented groups and extreme-nationalist “Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*)” (Zürcher 2006, p. 375). In the meanwhile, Demirel’s government was fragile; he was not able to make much of an effort towards stopping violence, which took place in universities and public spheres. Then, in March 1971, the army declared a memorandum which requested a “strong will which will be able to stop anarchy with a Kemalist view”. Right after the memorandum, Demirel resigned and the Nihat Erim government founded (Keyder, 2013, pp. 103-105). After the military intervention of 1971 took place in Turkey, leaders of two different -noted above- TKDP were killed by unidentified murder.³ After the March 1971 memorandum, the MGK declared a state of emergency for 12 of 67 provinces. Later on, the DDKO, which was the first platform to express Kurdish demands, was closed down as many other political organizations and parties and its leaders were arrested (Şur, 2016, pp. 60-61). After the coup, TİP closed down too because of the reason noted above. After TKDP’s leader died, TİP was closed down and DDKO’s leaders were arrested, Kurdish movement slowed down (Bruinessen, 1993, p. 334). However, White (2016, p. 30) believes that “even though the army explained its motivation for the pressures against Kurds to stop a possible Kurdish rebellion, the pressures helped the radicalizing Kurdish movement in order to collect more supporters.

Nonetheless, in the coalition period, in 1974, the government declared a general amnesty and arrested Kurds too got out of prison with the amnesty. After they got out of prison, they started to reorganize (Tan, 2015, p. 335). The closed DDKO reopened under the name of the DDKD. The DDKD tried to collect all of the Kurdish progressive movements under a single organization, but could not and, as a result, the DDKD was divided. The first group was the DHKD, founded by Kurds

³ Bruinessen claims that “Şivan could kill Sait Elçi and Şivan could be killed by Barzani because of provocations of Turkey’s intelligence service” (1993, p. 344)

who mostly came from the TİP. The DHKD was their legal platform and they had a magazine called the Freedom Path (*Özgürlük Yolu*), and they were remembered under this name. They thought that the best strategy would be founding an alliance between the Kurdish oppressed classes and Turkish workers. Another group was Rızgari, the group did not trust the Turkish left and were different than the Freedom Path and they criticized the decision for supporting CHP in the 1977 election. According to them, the Kemalists never gave a favor for the Kurds and that the Kurds should be interested in their future, meaning a socialist revolution in Kurdistan. The last remarkable Kurdish organization was Kawa, founded by people who came from DDKO and DDKD. The organization supported armed struggle against the state and its members were Maoist and pro-China. All of these organizations divided in the last years of 1970s because of factionalism (Tan, 2015, pp. 335-337; Bruinessen, 1993, pp. 348-349).

In the meanwhile, (second half of 1970s), the coalition government that was under the prime ministry of Süleyman Demirel (*Nationalist Front Government, Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti*) worked up the conflict between the right and left wing. All of these developments increased the reputation of Bülent Ecevit and led to highest reaching votes of the CHP of all time (Kabasakal, 2013, pp. 115-118). Tan explains the voting behavior of Kurds in 1970s like that: “Kurds voted for two main parties that were Ecevit’s CHP and Erbakan’s MSP. According to him, Kurds mostly voted for Ecevit’s CHP in the 1973 election because of Ecevit’s populist slogans. Tan claims that MSP collected votes from Kurds who were both conservative and member of middle class. There was a breaking point for the relation between leftist Kurds and Ecevit’s CHP, Tan explains the event as follows: “Left oriented Kurds stopped to vote CHP after 1975 because in Diyarbakır meeting of CHP, Kurds shouted slogans like ‘freedom to the nations’ and Ecevit answered the slogan like ‘there is no any nation in Turkey different from Turks’” (Tan, 2015, p. 365) In Bruinessen’s words, the Kurds questioned these intentions, “what can Turkish politics give us, when Ecevit too let us down” and after that the shift towards nationalist (Kurdish) organizations increased significantly (1993, p. 346) .

In the 1977 election, both Ecevit and Erbakan vetoed the Kurdish candidates in their respective parties who were interested in the Kurdish question. After this exclusion, the Kurdish movement participated in the elections with independent candidates. In the 1977 parliamentary election, two independent candidates of the Kurdish movement were elected—Nurettin Yılmaz was elected from Mardin and Abdülkerim Zilan was elected from Siirt (Tan, 2015, p. 138). The Kurdish movement used the same strategy in the local election of 1977. Due to this strategy, Mehdi Zana was elected the mayor of Diyarbakır municipality and Edip Solmaz was elected the mayor of Batman. However, these experiences were short-lived because Solmaz was killed in 1979 and Zana was arrested in 1980. According to Şur (2016, pp. 67-69), their victories in the elections were crucial because Kurdish politicians who directly took stand on the Kurdish movement and supported Kurdish demands were elected for the first time. In addition, the local people supported the Kurdish fate for the first time.

On the other hand, the PKK was founded in 1978. However, the PKK started its bloody attacks after 1980, especially after 1984. Aydınoglu (2014, pp. 30-31) explains how the PKK collected many Kurds' support because other Kurdish organizations, which had been founded even before the PKK, solely wanted to gain the independence of Kurdistan. PKK's main difference from the Turkish and Kurdish left was to start armed struggle against the Turkish state, which started in 1984. After the 1980 coup, the Kurds suffered from states' extreme violence in Diyarbakır prison and this situation gave a great opportunity to PKK to get Kurds' supports, Aydınoglu argues. After the 1980 coup, the 1960 constitution's libertarian articles changed with 1971 intervention and it was completely abolished with the 1980 military coup. 1982 constitution, which was more authoritarian and limited the individual's freedom was put into force. Şur (2016, 69) says "it was not possible to found a leftist or Kurdish political party in Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 coup". With the 1980 coup, all political parties and trade unions were closed down and politicians and leaders banned from practicing politics (Zürcher, 2006, pp. 405-407). Therefore, after the coup makers allowed democratic elections, new actors emerged.

Kurds tried to be included in Turkish politics aftermath of 1980 coup. The 1983 election was held under the control of military junta. Although the junta supported the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), Turgut Özal's Motherland Party was the winner of the election as single party government. Later on, 1970s' actors of Turkish politics started to appear again as a result of 1987 referendum. CHP separated two different parties, Ecevit founded the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and became the leader of it, although most of the CHP's leading people came together in Social Democrat People's Party (SHP). The AP, Süleyman Demirel had continued with the DYP and Erbakan's MSP continued under the name of the RP. In 1987 referendum, prohibited politicians were allowed to come back to the politics by the voters (Somer, 2015, p. 188).

Even though the majority of Kurdish people voted for right of center parties, the importance of SHP is that the party brought some members of the Kurdish political movement to the parliament as MPs. However, the elected Kurdish politicians were expelled from SHP in 1989 because they participated in a Kurdish conference in Paris. The expelled members of SHP founded the HEP. Although they announced that "there is a Kurdish question in Turkey and assimilation policies are implemented to the Kurds by Turkish state" (Şur, 2016, pp. 82-83), the party was not a purely single-issue party. According to HEP's charter, the party was "the party of workers, unemployed people, peasants, teachers, democrats, social democrats, socialists and all other masses who suffer from pressure and exploitation" as Güneş cited from HEP's charter (Güneş, 2013, p. 292).

Given the upsurge in PKK's armed activities, the importance of the alliance between the state and the chieftains grew because synchronously the state wanted to control the region with the help of the chieftains and chieftains wanted to maintain their privileged situation in the region by struggling with PKK under a new developed system, Village Guard System (*Köy Koruculuğu Sistemi*) (Aktan, 2012, pp. 74-75). There is a very common perception in Kurdish society that if PKK did not develop, the Kurdish question would not be discussed at all. However, Somer disagrees and notes "the conflict between state and PKK slowed Turkish

democracy down” and stopped the steps for democratization of Turkey which appeared in the second half of the 1980s as noted above (Somer, 2015, pp. 187-188).

In addition to Turkey’s democratization in the second half of the 1980s, the sudden transformation in international politics affected the Kurdish movement, even the sudden change affected the Kurdish movement more than Turkey’s democratization in the second half of the 1980s. The abrupt dissolution of Eastern Bloc made values such as democracy and human rights more powerful all over the world and globalized these values. The Gulf crisis was the breaking point for demonstrating the outcomes of ‘new world order’. In the Gulf War, there was no longer any state to balance the United States, so the system in the Middle East started to be reshaped by the United State according to the ‘new world order’. After the collapsing of the Eastern Bloc and Gulf Crisis had two main outcomes; first of which was the globalization of the values like human rights and democracy as noted above, secondly, immobility of the nation states which was because of the bi-polar structure of the cold war has changed. Therefore, new regimes, allies, conflicts and borders emerged all around the world. After the Gulf War, Iraq’s Kurds became had a de facto autonomy after Gulf War and it is seen as a model for Turkey’s Kurds. According to Yeğen,” Kurdish question after the Eastern bloc collapsed was more de-nationalist instead of becoming a nationalist movement because they believe that nation states are not dominator actors of the world in the post-cold war era (...) Today, Kurdish opposition is more about ‘human-collective rights” (Yeğen, 2014, pp. 35-41).

In the meanwhile, the conflict between PKK and state increasingly continued. However, Kurdish identity was no longer a taboo in Turkey in 1990s. Until 1990s, Kurds were ignored by the Turkish state. Moreover, using ‘Kurds’ as a term and identity was not acceptable until this period (Somer, 2015, p. 202). First of all, what politicians said about the Kurdish question will be discussed. Turgut Özal—who was prime minister in that time—told “Disciplining perception towards Kurds was wrong after national struggle (...) we will solve this issue with political ways instead of disciplining methods” as Cemal quoted in his book. (Cemal, 2015, p.

101). This is a typical example in order to show politicians perception towards 1990s about Kurdish question. Their perceptions will be examined below. The SHP was the most social democratic experience of Turkey, human rights and leftist organizations were destroyed by the military government and even the establishment of socialist parties were forbidden, therefore leftist movements united under the flag of the SHP (Emre, 2013, pp. 42-43).

The year 1984 marked a new point for the issue because the PKK started its armed attacks against Turkey; the state has tried to preserve its territorial integrity (Beriker, 1997, p. 439). Thus, putting a democratic vision instead of an armed challenge was both successful and risky action for the SHP. The 'SHP's Perspective and its solution offers take on the East and Southeast Problem' (*SHP'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sorunlarına Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri*) was prepared by the SHP in 1989. This report was a big risk because using word "Kurdish" was forbidden, and seen dangerous in that time. Celep argues that "This document denounced the prohibition on the use of Kurdish as the mother tongue of the Kurdish people, and regarded the prohibition as an embarrassment for Turkey's legal system" (Celep, 2010, p. p. 7). The party had three different ideological groups, which were called as Baykal backers, Reformists and İnönü backers. Baykalist vision was re-organizing the SHP with Kemalist principles and appealing to all groups of the society, not only marginalized groups of the society as Kurds, Alevis and working class (Kömürcü, 2011, p. 16). Otherwise, priorities of the reformists were social democratization of the party with international values of the ideology, a clear ideological definition, especially appealing to disadvantageous groups of the society, intra-party democracy as a necessity of social democracy and promoting human rights to solve Kurdish question. İnönü and his backers were trying to create a synthesis between Baykal and his backers and Leftist groups of the party that means adopting both the CHP's tradition and Western social democratic values (Kömürcü, 2009, p. 17).

A big crisis took place after participating of SHP's seven Kurdish members of parliament who were interested in Kurdish question to a Kurdish conference in

Paris. These all MPs were expelled from the party because of their activities in order to 'separate the state'. Twelve deputies resigned from the party in order to protest Kurdish deputies' expulsion. These developments resulted in the establishment of first legal Kurdish Party, HEP (Şur, 2016, pp. 79-80). SHP's report was important because after PKK's attacks started in 1984, it was the most significant development which caused a series of discussions in politics, society and press. The report also was the starting point of a period of reports for different political parties and also SHP/CHP. This report was judged in state security court because of its radical suggestions (Akçura, 2011, pp. 57-58). SHP and CHP - the CHP was re-opened by Deniz Baykal in 1992 and united with SHP in 1995- announced few reports, but none of them could be sensational as the 1989 report. SHP's and CHP's report will be main objective of next chapter, so written arguments above in order to summarize the general approach of the party on the Kurdish question seen enough.

Few remarkable changes occurred in the coalition government (1999-2002) under the leadership of DSP due to European Union process. In the coalition period Turkey applied to European Union for fully membership. Therefore, the obstacles of education in Kurdish and broadcasting in Kurdish were removed with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd EU Harmonization packages. Nonetheless, six Kurdish populated provinces were ruling by state of emergency when the coalition government came to power in 1999. State of emergency abolished in four of the six provinces during the coalition period (Somer, 2016, p. 17). These left of center parties tried to solve Kurdish question with both a more liberal constitution and expanded "human rights" (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 110).

As it is noted above, although SHP expelled the Kurdish movement from the party, it could be allied with HEP in the 1991 election. HEP was an important actor and represented a new starting in Turkish politics because of several reasons that HEP's program was the first program which took Kurdish question into its agenda after 1980 military coup and although the party's program included the Kurdish question as one of the priorities in accordance with its agenda, HEP made an effort to catch

all democratic groups of the society. Moreover, the party's first chair was Fehim Işıklar who was a Turkish socialist (Şur, 2016, pp. 81-83). Even, Aydınoglu says "HEP was designed as party of Turkey, as HDP has been designed later" (Aydınoglu, 2014, p. 84). HEP was founded by former expelled deputies of the SHP and former members who resigned because of the deputies' expulsion. HEP was not able to run in the 1991 parliamentary election because the party's congress could not be organized on time –according to the election law, there must be 6 months between the party congress and election-.

Later on, 27 members of the HEP rejoined the SHP in order to be listed in the election and 22 of them were elected. SHP collected amount 20 percent of national votes and formed a coalition government with Demirel's DYP (Şur, 2016, pp. 85-86). In Aydınoglu's words "Kurdish deputies of SHP who came from HEP represented a significant situation with the coalition government that these deputies who aimed to discuss Kurdish question in the parliament became the deputies of ruling party" (2014, p. 85). New coalition was a hope for the solution of Kurdish question and Demirel recognized the "Kurdish reality" right after he became prime minister. Demirel said to Hasan Cemal "In our country, doing anything which is not welcomed by the army is difficult" in their visit to Diyarbakır with Erdal İnönü (Cemal, 2015, pp. 56-57). İnönü told to Cemal "it can be our last chance to solve the Kurdish question" in Diyarbakır visit (Cemal, 2015, p. 59). However, they could not solve the issue because of the reasons noted below. Actually Demirel mentioned about a new constitution, which would be based on international human rights and freedom, but Demirel could not continue his liberal speeches because of two reasons, pressure from the army and unrest among nationalist deputies of his party (Cemal, 2015, pp. 60-61).

On the other hand, one of the breaking points between the Turkish reformist left and the Kurdish movement took place during the oath taking ceremony, two of SHP's deputies which came from HEP, Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle took their oaths different than other deputies. Leyla Zana had a headband with Kurdish national colors, used by the PKK too, as soon as she came to rostrum, a number of deputies

started to protest them by beating their desktops although Zana dedicated her oath to the “Brotherhood of Turks and Kurds” and at the end of her oath, she repeated her argument in Kurdish. On the other hand, Dicle prefaced his oath by declaring he is taking the oath because he must (Şur, 2016, pp. 87). These attitudes of the deputies were not welcomed by SHP too and caused serious crises in the party as shown by the ideas and experiences of witnesses of this period in the next chapter.

After the emergency state and bloody Newroz celebrations, the majority of SHP’s deputies which came from HEP resigned from SHP in order to rejoin HEP in 1992. About a year later, PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire and Öcalan said to Cemal that “we are ready to a political solution if mass-arrests, evacuation of villages and unsolved murder events are stopped” (Cemal, 2015, p. 52). However, ceasefire finished with PKK’s Bingöl attack. The ceasefire created a hope for peace in the politics, even army. Güreş –chief of general staff- told to Cemal after his retirement “I was hopeful, I asked myself ‘can we solve the problem.’ However, I had disappointment with Bingöl massacre” (Cemal, 2015, p. 65).

In the meanwhile, the Kurdish movement founded the Democracy Party (DEP) in order to have an alternative in case of the possibility of HEP’s closure by constitutional court. These parties were excluded by the Turkish politics. In 1993, two moderate actors of the politics disappeared, Özal died and Erdal İnönü retired from the politics. After these developments, Demirel was elected as president of Turkish Republic and Tansu Çiller became the leader of DYP and prime minister of Turkey. Aftermath of Özal’s death represented a transition period, army finished the dilemma of the government between struggling with terror and solving the problem with democratic ways, in Cemal’s words “struggling with terror was their priority” (Cemal, 2015, p. 75). Of course DEP had its share of this military pressured period. DEP’s deputies’ legislative immunity was lifted and majority of them suffered from penal servitude, many members of the party was tortured or attacked and finally DEP was closed down (Aydınoglu, 2014, p. 86).

CHP was re-opened by Deniz Baykal in 1992. Soon after the CHP and the SHP were united under the name of the CHP in 1995, social democratic alternative

period that started with the SODEP has come to an end (Kömürcü, 2009, p. 4). Baykal began to adopt the heritage of single party period, as evidence of what Maurice Duverger said, Kabasakal quoted “Political parties are always under the influence of their own historical origins” (Kabasakal, 2013, p. 92). Actually, Baykal’s CHP declared a Tunceli report which argued the recognition of the Kurdish identity and language as a solution of the Kurdish question; however, Baykal did not act in accordance with the report during 2000s (Celep, 2010, p. 7). Therefore, the CHP could not pull votes from the Eastern and Southeastern areas of Turkey, Kurdish-populated provinces. In Somer’s words, “it was the collapsing of alliance between moderate actors” (Somer, 2015, p. 227). After these developments, CHP was acting as a party of state and Kurdish movement has become more pro-PKK. The HADEP was founded in 1994, in the closure process of DEP and the party was longest-lived Kurdish legal party which was active until it closed down by constitutional court in 2003. On the other hand, HADEP was the first Kurdish party that ran with its own lists in the elections, but they could never pass the threshold (Aydinoğlu, 2014, pp. 87-88).

Another remarkable claim was deep state in 1990s because extreme violence was implemented to eastern and southeastern Anatolia especially among 1994-1998. Strategy of the state was ‘total war’ in that period and “every single Kurd was accepted as a potential supporter of the PKK” as Somer (2015, p. 229) says. Deep state activities and actions of the JITEM caused great trauma for Kurds in the region during 1990s. Altan Tan summarizes the strategy of the state as “creating armed conflicts between Kurds”. According to him, Hezbollah was the appeared example of this strategy (2015, pp. 486-487).

During the 2000s, Ecevit’s DSP formed a minority government until the soon election, but just before the election, Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK’s leader captured. This caused increasing of nationalist feelings in the society that explain the electoral successes of the DSP and the MHP. As a necessity of the election result, the ANAP, the DSP and the MHP had formed a coalition government under the Prime Ministry of Bülent Ecevit (Unat, 2016, pp. 281-282). Öcalan’s discourses changed after his

capture in 1999. He was supporting that the armed struggle between Turkish state and the PKK must end and he started to support a permanent ceasefire between state and the PKK. He also started to support a democratic autonomy rather than independence of Kurdistan. After Öcalan's changing attitude and some efforts to send the PKK out of Turkey's borders, deputy secretary of National Intelligence Service, Emre Taner met with Öcalan on 8 July 1999. Yet, state and government authorities wanted to arrest the PKK members instead of their leaving of Turkey's borders. Of course it was not logical for Öcalan who takes his authority from the PKK and its members (Aydinoğlu, 2014, pp. 110-112). Therefore, this very short-term negotiation was unsuccessful at the end of the 1990s.

2.3 Changing Parameters on the Kurdish Question

At the beginning of the millennium, three considerable developments had significant results in Turkey. First of all, 2001 crisis occurred, accepted as the most serious crisis of the Republic. Although the coalition government could not survive until the ordinary election, the government was successful on foreign policy, especially relations with the European Union under the Foreign Affairs Ministry of İsmail Cem. At the Helsinki Summit, Turkey was accepted as a candidate to full membership state which had required it to implement Copenhagen Criteria about economy and democratization. The coalition government in a short time implemented a series of reform packages. The path-breaking package was issued on August 2002 which argues that Turkey abolished the death penalty, accepted broadcasting of different language than Turkish and recognized the property rights of the foundations of the non-Muslim minorities (Ulusoy, 2010, pp. 71-72). Abolishing of the death penalty, barred Öcalan's punishment with death penalty. Among 1998-2002, there was a remarkable decreasing in the number of people who see as the biggest threat of the state is terrorism –decreased to 5.5 % from 39.3- (Somer, 2015, pp. 253). The most important reason for this remarkable decrease was PKK's ceasefire and non-aggression of it to the Turkish state. In the meanwhile, three important path-breaking package which has allowed Kurdish

broadcasting and education in Kurdish, abolished death penalty and prohibitions for using different languages and demilitarized the state more were signed in the coalition government as noted above too. However, before the policies were implemented as a whole, the coalition government collapsed.

In the early elections which took place on November 2002, none of the parties could pass the threshold different than CHP and new founded AKP. AKP's victory is the second important reason for changed paradigms in the Kurdish Question. The AKP formed a single party government and the party has been the winner of following all local, general elections and also referendums. This situation gave a chance for the AKP in order to get rid of the military status quo in the state system (Somer, 2015, pp. 253-254). AKP was a party that supports democratic values, human rights, EU membership and its imposed values in its first ruling period between 2002 and 2007. Therefore, people who believe a peaceful solution in the Kurdish question were very hopeful (Bayır, 2014, p. 21). However, in the AKP's first period, the party did not effort to solve Kurdish question contrary to expectations different than infrastructural investments, implementing social policies or abolishing state of emergency in all Kurdish populated regions. In this period, there was also an external factor which clipped AKP's wings in the Kurdish question that United States' occupation of Iraq. This occupation caused a dilemma for Turkey because of two reasons. First Iraq's Kurds became the most loyal and biggest ally of United States, so Turkey was doubtful that if they took new status, Turkey's Kurds can want to get the same rights. Secondly, 1st March memorandum which would allow to United States to benefit from Turkish ports and airports was not approved by the national assembly of Turkey although government supported the approval of it. This development was not welcomed by United States and had caused a series of crises between Turkey and United States. Moreover, relations between these states came to stopping point. In the meanwhile, Iraqi Kurdistan which represented by KDP and PUK became a de facto state day by day (Somer, 2015, pp. 258-260).

However, the 2007 election was a turning point for AKP in Turkish politics because in first ruling period of AKP, the party developed its ties with international actors like EU and United States. AKP tried to get rid of the military status quo by the help of EU democratization packages in this period. In other words, AKP continued to the implementation of EU's criteria, the normalization of Turkish foreign relations and implementation of economic reforms which are imposed by IMF (Ulusoy, 2010: p. 82). With the seventh reform package, the AKP has started to re-organize civil-military balance; the influence of National Security Council has limited on decision making process (Milliyet, 2003).

First significant attempt of the AKP government to organize a dialogue with the PKK aftermath of the 29 March 2009 local election. In Aydınöğlu's words, "Importance of this meeting was requesting for meeting came from the AKP, contrary to 10 years ago" (2014, p. 184). In Somer's words "AKP lost a considerable vote to the DTP in the 2009 election, so it was understood as a message which given by Kurdish voters to the AKP (2015, p. 258). AKP tried to solve the Kurdish question three times which are the democratic opening, the process of Oslo and the peace process, these attempts led to increasing of Erdoğan's reputation among Turkey's Kurds. In the processes, the AKP took considerable steps like founding a Kurdish broadcasting TV channel (*TRT ŞEŞ*), removing Kurdish prohibition in the jails, etc (Al Jazeera Türkiye, 2015). However, In Bayır's words "While the AKP has maintained some positive developments as de facto practices, it has failed to convert them into de jure guarantees" (Bayır, 2014, p. 21-22).

In the meanwhile, two important negative development took place. First of all, DTP⁴ was closed down by the constitutional court because of its separatist activities and deputies of the party joined the BDP. Moreover, in the 2009 election, BDP won amount 99 municipalities and many elected mayors and members of municipal boards were arrested because of their relations with Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) at the same year (Şur, 2016, p. 105). According to Aydınöğlu (2014, p. 185),

⁴ DTP was founded in 2005 and ran in the 2007 general elections with independent candidates. The party allied with some left and democracy oriented groups and 22 of its candidates became MP in the election. (Şur, 2016, p. 102)

“KCK arrestments show that this process is not a process of negotiation or peace process. It is the process of AKP’s power testing against Kurdish movement.” At the same year, Habur crises occurred that 34 PKK members came from Qandil and Mahmure Camp of the PKK to Habur Border Gate of Turkey. These people greeted the people who came for welcoming them and they were judged by attorneys in the courts which founded the meeting place in order to judge them, which is called as ‘tent court’. This event caused an indignant in the Turkish society (Sabah, 2009). After this stopping point, Erdoğan tried to collect Turkish nationalist votes in the 2011 election and he said “if I were the prime minister in 1999, I would order to implement Öcalan’s death penalty” as Cemal reminds (Cemal, 2011, p. 266). Nonetheless, in the meanwhile Erdoğan said in his one another speech that “There is no Kurdish question anymore, my Kurdish brothers and sisters have some problems” (Akşam, 2011).

After the June 2011 election, AKP consolidated its single-party government and BDP’s 36 independent candidates were elected. Three of the deputies of Hakkari were elected from BDP’s list and some of its candidates elected from non-Kurdish provinces too like Adana and Mersin (Aktan, 2011, pp. 83-84). In the meanwhile, undersecretary of national intelligence service, Hakan Fidan and his staff started to meet Öcalan again. Öcalan wanted to extend the ceasefire process until 15th of July, 2011. However, one day later a conflict took place between Turkish army and PKK and 13 soldiers died in the conflict. After this time the conflict continued until 2012 between the parties (Başaran, 2015, p. 39). In addition, one of the most sensational event happened on 28 December, 2011 in Uludere which is called as Roboski massacre. Turkish air forces bombed the Uludere and 34 Kurdish people, villagers died (Diken, 2015). Although these all conflicts, a more official form of peace process started in 2013 with Öcalan’s message was read in Newroz celebration (Şur, 2016, p. 110).

Newroz 2013 can be called as the most important step of peace process because Öcalan’s message was read by BDP’s MPs in Kurdish and Turkish as well as peace process started to transform a more formal structure. Başaran explains the

celebration area of Diyarbakır like “There were some banners which mentioned that we are ready either war or peace and when Öcalan is not free, peace is not true” (2015, p. 157). Öcalan emphasized “armed struggle finishes right now, after this, our struggle will be based on ideology and legal politics” (Euronews, 2013). After this message, KCK arrestees started to be evacuated (Cemal, 2014, p. 72). After the ceasefire, the DTK called to the international organizations which listed the PKK as a terrorist organization and United State in order to delist the PKK. On 25 April 2013, Murat Karayılan declared that “PKK’s leaving process of Turkish borders will start on 8th of May” as a first step of Öcalan’s road map (Cemal, 2014, p. 113). He added that “second step is the constitutional recognition of Kurdish rights, it is the business of government, and we kept our side of bargain” (Başaran, 2015, p. 113).

Although Karayılan’s warning to Turkish state about second step, Turkey did not take necessary steps and Karayılan said that “KCK evacuations are not enough, but state does not take necessary steps. Anti-terror law could be changed, but it did not or the election threshold could be decreased, but it did not” (Cemal, 2014, pp. 175-176). Later on, on August 2013, Cemil Bayık declared that “If government did not take necessary steps until 1st of October, we will stop leaving Turkey’s borders” (Haber24, 2013). On September 9, KCK’s executive board shared a declaration which mentioned the leaving from Turkey’s borders stopped. However, Cemil Bayık said that “We keep the ceasefire until Turkey organizes an operation against us. If Turkey attacks against our guerillas, we will respond them as self-defense” (BBCTürkçe, 2013). “When these developments asked to Erdoğan, he told that “I do not believe in that there will be any problem for the peace process” (Başaran, 2015, 226). In the meanwhile, BDP’s group continued to meet with Öcalan in the İmralı prison. Pervin Buldan who was one of the members of the group told that “Öcalan told that there was no any different way than stopping to leave Turkey’s borders” (Başaran, 2015, 230).

2014 was one of the most crucial period for both peace process and Kurdish movement. Peace process created an opportunity for legal political activity to

Kurdish movement. In the 2014 local election, BDP gained more than 100 municipalities. BDP repealed itself aftermath of the election and BDP's deputies joined the HDP (Şur, 2016, p. 110). HDP has been re-trying of Turkey's party instead of becoming a Kurdish party (Aydinoğlu, 2014, pp. 192-193). In the summer of 2014, there was a presidential election and Kurdish movement participated the election under the candidacy of Selahattin Demirtaş. The winner of this election was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by popular votes and he became the 12th president of Turkey (BBC Türkçe, 2014).

After the election an external dilemma for Turkey occurred in North Syria. PYD is a party that has accepted Öcalan's concepts of democratic confederation and democratic autonomy. The party has been controlling Cezire, Kobane and Efrin cantons since 2011 and implements Öcalan's concepts in these cantons (Jongerden & Şimşek, 2015, pp. 239-240). Rojava is a de facto autonomy in north Syria which includes these cantons. After the Islamic State attacks to the Kobane, Erdoğan said "Kobane will be lost soon" (Habertürk, 2014). In Başaran's words "It was understood as expression of pleasure by Kurds and they started to think that government supports the ISIS" (2015, p. 237). However, when Kurdish YPG resisted against ISIS, they tried to get international support in order to get rid of ISIS at the same time (Jongenden & Şimşek, 2015, p. 251).

In the meanwhile, HDP invited people to the streets in order to protest the ISIS attack against Syrian Kurds (Sabah, 2014). In the protests, some conflicts occurred between jihadist (Hezbollah's legal political Party) HÜDA PAR and PKK's youth branch and 52 people died (Başaran, 2015, p. 247). The tension ended after Öcalan's call. At the end of the September, a police and a soldier were killed, PKK did not accept the attacks, but government did not believe them. In the meanwhile, although KCK declared that they cannot disarmed in this conjuncture, Öcalan represented a road map in order to disarm the PKK (Başaran, 2015, p. 238). Later on, on 28 February 2015, HDP's committee which was represented by Sırrı Süreyya Önder, İdris Baluken and Pervin Buldan and government's committee which was represented by vice prime minister Yalçın Akdoğan, Minister of Internal Affairs

Efkan Ala and AKP's group deputy chair Mahir Ünal came together in prime ministry office of İstanbul. In this meeting, Önder declared Öcalan's message and the message was that "When we finish our war for 30 years, our main and permanent purpose is reaching a democratic solution. If the minimum common democratic demands are provided, I call out the PKK to organize the congress in order to disarm." Democratic demands of Öcalan summarized under 10 titles (Al Jazeera, 2015). According to Cengiz Çandar, the crucial demand was founding an 'investigation commission'. In Çandar's words, "Erdoğan understood that as a demand for satisfying Öcalan" (Çandar, 2015) because according to Erdoğan the process should be performed by intelligence service instead of an investigation commission (BBC Türkçe, 2015).

After these all developments, on 20 March 2015, Öcalan's third Newroz message was read. Başaran says "Enthusiasm of the message was lower than last two years because of two reasons: first there was no good developments to show the people, secondly target group of the message was different (...) the target group of the message was the state" (Başaran, 2015, pp. 291-292). Later on, a conflict occurred between army and PKK members. Aftermath of the conflict, HDP and government made different claims (BBCTürkçe, 2015). Erdoğan also tried to marginalize the HDP before the 2015 election and on 28 April, he said "Saying there is a Kurdish question is not a discrimination anymore. There is no problem of the Kurds. HDP performed with illegal methods and made our peace process difficult. There is no a table to share with HDP" (Başaran, 2015, p. 299). During the election campaign, many local branches of HDP suffered from bombed attacks and in its Diyarbakır meeting 5 people died because of bombed attack. After that, member of KCK's executive board, Mustafa Karasu told that "This attack is the result of AKP's ISIS mentality" and blamed AKP (T24, 2015). As it is seen above, the relations between the Kurdish movement and the AKP started to collapse before the election. According to the result of the 7 June election, the AKP could not gain enough deputies in order to form a single party government. In the meanwhile, HDP collected more than 13% of national votes and gained 81 of 550 deputies (Hürriyet, 2015).

CHAPTER 3

CHP'S DISCOURSE ON THE KURDISH QUESTION

In the second chapter, the main purposes were to show politicization process of Kurds and changing parameters in the CHP tradition towards Kurdish question since the beginning of the Republic. The SHP was the most social democratic experience of Turkey and acted as an umbrella to come together for leftists after the 1980 as noted in the second chapter. In Tan's words "Kurds were the biggest victim of the 1980 coup. In Diyarbakır prison, Kurds were tortured and pressured as infrequently experienced in the world. Therefore, 1980 coup was the most important breaking point of the Kurdish Question" (2015, p. 380). Turkish left was repressed following the 1980 coup by the Turkish state, meanwhile Kurdish left was repressed by an additional actor with state, by the PKK. The PKK has been the hegemonic power in Turkey's Kurdistan since the second half of 1980s (Yeğen, 2014, p. 189). Under these circumstances, as argued in the second chapter, SHP gave an opportunity to people who came from the Kurdish movement in the 1987 election. Although this alliance was very short-lived as explicated in the second chapter, SHP's role to provide an alternative solution to armed struggle cannot be ignored. In 1992, CHP was re-opened by Deniz Baykal and later on SHP and CHP united. Baykal maintained his chairmanship until 2010 discounting two short cuts. In 2010, Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as the chair of the party and his period has witnessed some radical changes, including the Kurdish question.

This chapter delineates the shifts of the CHP in the Kurdish Question, how domestic and international politics affected CHP's Kurdish question approach, and differences and similarities of CHP's approach with the state in the Kurdish question. CHP's discourse is important because of two main reasons: firstly, the party is the founder of the modern republic and still remembered with state-minded or single party period. And secondly, CHP describes itself as a social democratic party, dominates the Turkish center left too. Therefore, CHP's discourse on the

Kurdish question is significant to understand how Turkey's social democratic movement approaches to the Kurdish question.

Some reports and bulletins of CHP and SHP will be the issue of this chapter for demonstrating this tradition's continuities and ruptures on the Kurdish question.

The list of the reports and bulletins are as follows:

Table 1: CHP and SHP's Report list, which will be used in this chapter.

Report Name in English	Report Name in Turkish	Party and Publish Year
SHP's Perspective and Its Solution Offers Take on the East and Southeast Problem	<i>SHP'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sorununa Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri</i>	(SHP, 1989)
Newroz Report of SHP	<i>SHP Newroz Raporu</i>	(SHP, 1992)
Now is the time for peace	<i>Şimdi Barış Zamanı</i>	(SHP, 1994)
General Meeting for Union of CHP and CHP: Bulletin of Main Principles and Targets	<i>CHP-SHP Bütünleşme Genel Kurulu Ana İlkeler ve Temel Hedefler Bildirgesi</i>	(CHP, 1995)
Election Bulletin of 1995: We will bring Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations	<i>1995 Seçim Bildirgesi: Türkiye'yi Çağdaş Dünyaya Biz Taşıyacağız</i>	(CHP, 1995)
The Report of the Commission for investigating of the developments with the Kidnapping of Necip Baskın for Ransom in Yüksekova	<i>Necip Baskın'ın Yüksekova'da Kaçılarak Fidyeye İstenmesi Olayı Üzerine Gelişen Olayları İncelemek Üzere</i>	(CHP, 1996)

	<i>Görevlendirilen Komisyonun Raporu</i>	
Tunceli Report	<i>Tunceli Raporu</i>	(CHP, 1996)
Being a Women in the Southeast	Güneydoğu'da Kadın Olmak	(CHP's women branch, 1998)
East and South East	<i>Doğu ve Güneydoğu, 1999</i>	(CHP, 1999)
Democratization and main politics for the development of Southeast and East	<i>Demokratikleşme ve Doğu-Güneydoğu Anadolu Kalkınması Temel Politikaları</i>	(CHP, 2000)
Solution with the Society III: For Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Malatya, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli, Van	<i>Halkla Birlikte Çözüm III: Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Malatya, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli, Van</i>	(CHP, 2001)
Bulletin of CHP's Left Wing Congress	<i>CHP Sol Kanat Kurultay Bildirgesi</i>	(CHP, 2000)
Bulletin of CHP's 30 th Ordinary Congress: Main Problems and Main Solutions	<i>CHP 30. Olağan Kurultayı: Temel Sorunlar ve Temel Çözümler Bildirgesi</i>	(CHP, 2003)
AKP's Opening Fiasco	<i>AKP'nin Açılım Fiyaskosu</i>	(CHP, 2010)
CHP and Turkey's EU Membership process		(CHP, 2010)
We promise Turkey for 41 Subjects	<i>Türkiye'ye 41 Söz Veriyoruz</i>	(CHP, 2011)

Economic Development and Strategic Targets for East and Southeast	<i>Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu: Ekonomik Kalkınma ve Stratejik Hedefler</i>	(CHP, 2011)
Democracy, equal citizenship and free society	<i>Demokrasi Eşit Yurttaş Özgür Toplum</i>	(CHP, 2011)
CHP's offers for real democracy, real justice and human rights	<i>Gerçek Adalet, Gerçek Demokrasi ve İnsan Hakları için CHP'nin Çözüm Önerileri</i>	(CHP, 2013)
Report of Turkey	<i>Türkiye Raporu, 2014</i>	(CHP, 2014)
22 Question 22 Answer CHP's view to Turkey's Kurdish question and solution framework	<i>CHP'nin Kürt Sorununa Bakışı, Çözüm Çerçevesi</i>	(CHP, 2015)

In the following section, an analysis of these reports will be presented to portray the CHP's approach to the Kurdish question, by tracing continuities and ruptures.

3.1 Kurdish question Approach of CHP: 89 Report under Erdal İnönü Era

As noted in the second chapter, 1989 report's content was considered very radical for this period. This report was announced to the public on the 15 July, 1990. This report led to many political discussions, as DYP's deputy chair Kırathoğlu said: "This report is unrealistic and Erdal İnönü contradicts with his father." (Milliyet, 1990) At this time, the ruling party was ANAP and its leader Turgut Özal was the president. As noted above, Özal had a different perspective than the official state discourse on the Kurdish question. However, he did not hesitate to blame the SHP

by saying that 'acting as vote-hunter' (Sabah, 2009). In addition, Prime Minister Akbulut blamed the SHP of 'promoting separatism' (Milliyet, 1990). When Birand addressed this report in his column, he talked about the courage emphases of the report as follows "This report conflicts with the laws on the issue. This report can be judged and convicted for hundreds of years because of its some views" (Birand, 1990) . Furthermore, this report was judged by the DGM. Another importance of this report was that it is still accepted as CHP's official approach to the Kurdish question and still maintains its importance as CHP's main point of views on the Kurdish question.

This report was prepared by a committee of SHP's deputies under the presidency of Deniz Baykal who was the secretary general of the party at that time. In the introduction of the report, Baykal notes:

"Kurdish question, which must be solved to reach the ideal of a more democratic Turkey, is taking place in a possible ruling party's written document (...) It must be understood that this question cannot be solved by assimilationist policies and ignoring an ethnicity" (SHP, 1989, pp. 5-6).

In the preface of the report, Turkey's biggest problems were described as:

"Institutionalization of Turkey's democracy by removing the constitutional obstacles for democratization; development via rapid industrialization; abolishing of social injustice by a more even distribution of the national wealth among people and regions of Turkey" (SHP, 1989, p. 7).

Then the committee described the Kurdish populated cities as their priority as follows:

"Problems of the East and Southeast are our priority. The problems can be summarized as human rights violations, terrorism and violence, economic underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, feeling of insecurity and an identity crisis" (SHP, 1989, p. 7).

This statement is important to understand how SHP understood and described the sources of Kurdish question. The report continues with explaining current situation of the region in that time as:

“Citizens who live in these regions are alienated because of extraordinary living conditions and long standing implementation of OHAL (...) Citizens started to react against the official authorities because of mass arrestments, mass investigations and impassable inequality” (SHP, 1989, p. 10)

Later on the report determines the problems and after criticizing the 12 September ‘authoritarian’ policies and ANAP government, it talks about the wrong implementation of the 12 September regime’ and ANAP government’ that East and Southeastern region of Turkey suffered. First of all, the report criticizes the prohibition of the mother tongue, then the law of state of emergency which came into operation in 1983 and more importantly the implementation of state of emergency. In this part the wrong implementations of the state of emergency in the East and South East of Turkey were summarized as “swamping the personality principle of the crime (...) acting the local people as potential criminals” (SHP, 1989, p. 18).

The most important point of the report is about the Village Guard System. According to the report this system is not acceptable because of two main reasons: firstly, it divided people into two parts like pro-state and counter-state and secondly the system strengthened the clans ‘as the allies of state’ and deepened the problem (SHP, 1989, p. 19). Aktan explains the results of Village Guard System as follows, “After clans started to fight against PKK, landlords’ relations with the state increased and they started to take role in the unsolved murders” (2012, p. 75). According to the SHP’s report, this system will be removed (in the future SHP government) (SHP, 1989, p. 47). According to the report, Turkish state should implement the legal policies, and local people should be protected by the state instead of increasing unlawful and anti-democratic implementations because the report states that this is the only way to get local people’s support to defeat the terror (SHP, 1989, p. 42). The report supports a new understanding of citizenship which does not give any privileges to any ethnic groups in the society (SHP, 1989, p. 30). Another statement of the report is that “democratization of Turkey and solution of the Kurdish question depend on each other” (SHP, 1989, p. 30)

This report supports every kind of constitutional obstacles on mother tongue would be removed (in the future SHP government). In other words, broadcasting in any mother tongue, speaking, writing, teaching and organizing any kind of organizations in any mother tongue would be possible (SHP, 1989, p. 45). A year later, SHP started to an initiative for legislation to the national assembly which allows using different languages from Turkish in accordance with its 1989 report (SHP, 1991). The report adds that Turkish will be only official language and will be taught to all citizens (SHP, 1989, p. 45). Furthermore, SHP's report emphasized that national integrity and unitary state as their *sine quo none* (SHP, 1989, p. 27). In addition, "governorship of the state of emergency of region would be abolished (in the future SHP government) and security authorities would be re-shaped with democratic values" (SHP, 1989, 42-43).

SHP's report includes some economy policies for the Kurdish populated regions. SHP's economic plan is called as "regional development plan" in this report. This development will be through the execution the etatist principles. The purpose of this plan is to develop the economic and social structure of the regions. The report also underlines that employment will be increased by the industrialization of the region. The development plan will be implemented coordinately with the GAP. In the meanwhile, a land reform will be implemented which will start from GAP region because it is one of the most serious obstacles of democratization of the region according to the report (SHP, 1989, pp. 33-37).

There are three different points about this report. Firstly, the SHP understood the Kurds' demands for more democracy and recognizing their cultural rights when the Eastern Bloc was collapsing. Secondly, the SHP realized the state security policies' and forces' responsibility on the increased unrests in the Kurdish-populated regions. Thirdly, CHP tradition' long-lived perception to explain the Kurdish question with underdevelopment continued in this report as a part of SHP's determinations for defining the Kurdish question.

Approximately seven months before this report was announced, SHP expelled their Kurdish deputies owing to their participation to a Kurdish conference in Paris.

However, HEP and SHP allied for the 1991 election and Kurdish deputies rejoined to SHP as explicated in the second chapter. Soon after the 1991 election, DYP and SHP formed a coalition government. Although these promises were never remembered by the SHP when it was in the power (Yayman 2016, 235), SHP's efforts can be seen for democratic solution of Kurdish question as well as Turkey's democratization. Furthermore, SHP's suggestions for the peaceful and democratic solution of Kurdish question appeared in the coalition protocol under the titles of 'South East and Democratization' (Yılmaz & Neziroğlu, 2015, pp. 1644-1661). These efforts can be exemplified with making the law of criminal procedure. People's right of defense was guaranteed by this law (Saybaşı, 1995, p. 53). This legal regulation was firstly issued in the SHP's 1989 report. In these years, the MGK was the most influential actor of the Turkish politics as mentioned in the second chapter. Therefore, civil politics could not implement radical changes especially on the Kurdish question.

In the Newroz of 1992, a dramatic event took place. Actually after the DYP-SHP coalition government formed, Kurdish-populated regions were hopeful for a democratic solution. The coalition partners declared that they recognized the Kurdish reality. Before the 1992 Newroz, the PM Demirel allowed to the Newroz celebration in his meeting with HEP deputies (BBC Türkçe, 2015). However, security forces -notably in Cizre and Şırnak- intervened the Newroz celebration by using extreme violence. This violence cost approximately 100 people's lives (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p. 162). After this development, SHP sent a committee to the region for investigating the background of these events. PKK tried to create a collective rebellion at this time, so the state acted as an aggressive actor. However, her aggression was not limited to struggling with PKK; in other words, the state repressed the local people who were also under pressure of PKK by mass arrestments and torture (Somer, 2015, pp. 225-228). This situation was criticized in SHP's Newroz report of 1992 (*Newroz Raporu, 1992*) which was prepared by its committee (Yayman, 2016, p. 255). The committee's statements can be considered as radical for this period, as were in 1989, too. According to the United Nations Newroz report, civil areas were raked through for 20 hours by the security forces

of the state after Newroz events (BBC Türkçe, 2015). According to SHP's report this raking fire continued for 22 hours (Yaymam, 2016, p. 255). SHP's committee met to the mayors of municipalities, chairmen of different parties' local branches and numerous of non-governmental organizations. According to the report, people argued that the dramatic event was started by state forces and continued as a single-sided conflict (Yayman, 2016, pp. 253-254). On the other hand, according to the report, civil bureaucrats like governors believed these events were started by PKK members because "they lost their authority against security forces" (Yayman, 2016, p. 255).

Another remarkable determination of the report (Newroz, 1992) is that "PKK has strengthened owing to 12 September regime's oppressive attitude" (Yayman, 2016, p. 255). In the report, PKK is accepted as a terrorist organization, but state officials in the region were also criticized for legitimizing the PKK in the eyes of society by using wrong methods against local people like torturing them, condemning them to unemployment and poverty (Yayman, 2016, p. 255). According to report, the local people's demands are very clear: "equality, democracy and peace"⁵ (Al Jazeera Türk, 2013). This report also notes about lack of coordination between state institutions on how they should approach to the local people. The report argues that "Kurdish question can only be resolved with democratic ways" and the committee claims the only way to solve the Kurdish question is "new policies which consider the ethnic and cultural identities" (Yayman, 2016, pp. 256-257) This report's other suggestions about economy, politics and ethno-cultural rights were the repetitions of the party's 1989 report's suggestions. However, this plans could not be implemented during the SHP-DYP coalition period. Erdal İnönü explained the reason for this failure as follows:

"Our commitment could not take place on time because of rising tide of the terror (...) right after we get rid of the terror, we will implement our commitments" (Yayman 2016, p. 256).

⁵ Al Jazeera Türk, 2013, Cumhuriyet tarihi Kürt raporları.

According to Somer, there were two sensitive groups, which have hindered the peaceful and democratic solutions of the Kurdish question: Martyrs' families who could not accept the democratic solution for the Kurdish question and Kurdish people who were killed by the state's extreme violence radicalized (Somer 2015, 189).

It can be said that 1992 was an important year for SHP for two reasons. First, HEP MPs resigned from the SHP and came back to the HEP due to SHP's support to protract state of emergency and SHP's incapability to stop extreme violence of the state during the Newroz celebrations (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p. 162). Secondly CHP was re-opened by Deniz Baykal in the same year as noted above. The oath crisis commenced by the Kurdish deputies in the SHP created the dynamics for this separation. The intraparty opposition movement was driven by Deniz Baykal under the name of 'reformist left' (Akçura 2011, p. 230). This new vision was explained by Deniz Baykal in his press conference on 8 September 1994. In Baykal's speech secularism and nation building emphases were main concentrations. He explained his social democrat vision as follows:

"Separating the leftist movement in Turkey is very dangerous and wrong (...) our vision is to catch up the level of contemporary civilization, even coming up them (...) CHP is the representative of both national and international views" (*New Targets New Turkey, Yeni Hedefler Yeni Türkiye, 1994*) (CHP, 1994, p. 14).

After Özal's death, big changes occurred in Turkish politics. PKK restarted its attacks against security forces, Demirel became the 9th president of Turkey and İnönü decided to leave chairmanship of his party. After Demirel became president, Tansu Çiller became both the chair of the DYP and PM of Turkey. She formed her first coalition government with Erdal İnönü before he left the chairmanship of his party in June 1993 (Neziroğlu & Yılmaz, 2015, p. 1815). 3 months later, a leader change took place in SHP, Murat Karayalçın became the chair of the party. He was the vice PM of Turkey and foreign minister of Turkey between 1994 and 1995. His vision on the Kurdish question was not different than that of Erdal İnönü. He supported a peaceful and democratic solution on the Kurdish question. Although he

suggested accepting SHP's 1989 report as a road map to the new government headed by Çiller, this suggestion was rejected. Actually Çiller welcomed these ideas, but she could not accept them as governmental policy because of four main reasons. First, there was a strong opposition against giving ethno-cultural rights to the Kurds inside the DYP. Second, she was not as experienced in politics as she was in the field of economics. Thirdly, Demirel's attitude to the Kurdish question changed negatively after he was elected as the President of Turkey finally, Çiller would not be able to challenge the army's opposition (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, 163). Towards the end of the 1993, Çiller began to act as a hawk and she blamed the DEP's MPs to become PKK's supporters. Then, DEP's MPs legislative immunities were abolished by the parliament and they were arrested in March 1994 although SHP voted out (Saybaşı, 1995, p. 83-84).

1994 witnessed two important developments: firstly, CHP added the Kurdish question to its party programme and secondly, SHP announced an election bulletin, called as "now is the time for peace" (*Şimdi Barış Zamanı*, 1994) for by-election to elect new MPs for vacant seats in the parliament in December 1994. In this bulletin, SHP answered the criticisms for nonperforming commitments about democratization by emphasizing its limited seats (49 of 450) in the parliament although it was a coalition partner. This bulletin's main focal point is ways to solve Kurdish question. According to SHP's bulletin, solving the Kurdish question is the precondition to develop the region economically, to develop the trust with the community in the region in order to develop their life and economic standards and to become modernized (SHP, 1994, p. 2). This report argues that dealing with terror by means of armed struggle cannot solve the Kurdish question alone, the Republic of Turkey should recognize the Kurds' cultural rights as a necessity of the new world order (SHP, 1994, pp. 2-3), explained in detail in the second chapter. some of the emphases of the 1989 report were repeated like broadcasting in mother tongue in private TVs were repeated. Moreover, this report suggests that citizens of Turkey should have right to speak in their mother tongue (SHP, 1994, p. 3). Then SHP reminds what it did for the democratization of Turkey during its coalition

period. The most remarkable commitment of this report is seen as education in mother tongue in the private schools (SHP, 1994, p. 3).

In the 1994 local election, DYP became the first ranked party, but lost remarkable votes in Kurdish-populated regions. Erbakan's RP was very successful in these regions with his party's emphases for 'just order'. SHP weakened more in this election because of two reasons that firstly separation in left parties and second, arrests of the deputies of DEP (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p.164-165). In 1995, CHP and SHP decided to unite under the name of CHP in order to "make the Turkey's left stronger" as stated in their bulletin of union congress (General Meeting for Union of CHP and SHP: The Bulletin of Main Principles and Targets, CHP-SHP, 1995). In this bulletin, the added solution different than other written arguments for the democratic and peaceful solution of the Kurdish question was adopting the principle of decentralization (principle of local administration). This principle was also planned for all regions of Turkey. This principle was planned for all regions of Turkey by CHP. This principle noted under the title of "Solution to Kurdish question with democracy, equality and national integrity" (CHP, 1995, pp. 14-15). In this congress, Hikmet Çetin was elected as the new chair of the re-united party.

In the 1995 election, the mainstream parties' election campaigns focused on a criticism of 'threat of radical Islam and Kurdish separatism' (Balcı, 2007, p. 94). Therefore, discussing democratic solutions to the Kurdish question was not a priority of the parties during the election campaign. Right before this election (on 9 September 1995) Baykal was re-elected by the delegates of the CHP as the chair of the party again. CHP prepared an election bulletin for the December 1995 election (*Election Bulletin of 1995: We will bring Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations*) and mentioned about the Kurdish question under the two main arguments that "Kurdish question will be solved by us and we will abolish the inequality between regions" (CHP, 1995, p. 16). First of all, it should be said that nationalist discourses had dominated political spectrum during this election. Moreover, CHP was blamed of supporting terrorists in order to ally with the Kurdish legal movement for the election and its efforts to find democratic and

peaceful solutions to the Kurdish question by the main actors of the politics (president, and leader of mainstream parties). Therefore, increasing populism and accusations to the CHP affected CHP's election bulletin. Although CHP repeated its economic and social commitments for the democratic solution of Kurdish question (CHP, 1995, p. 36-37), its emphases down toned, its cover of on national integrity increased and principle of decentralization which took place in the congress of union's bulletin was not mentioned in the bulletin of the 1995 election. In the 1995 election, five parties could pass the 10% threshold including CHP, but CHP continued to lose votes both in the eastern and western parts of Turkey. After CHP's relation with the Kurdish movement, their votes seriously decreased in the Kurdish populated regions. In this election, CHP could only get one seat for both of the provinces, Adıyaman and Tunceli (Akçura 2011, 169). In this election, DEP's successor HADEP and Turkish nationalist MHP could not pass the threshold. However, HADEP collected the Kurdish votes significantly, became the first party in 5 of the Kurdish populated provinces.

After the coalition negotiations, ANAP-DYP coalition government was formed under the prime ministry of Mesut Yılmaz. This very short-lived government chose to commit economic development to the region instead of being interested in the Kurdish ethno-cultural rights. MHP, DSP and DYP were supporting to the military struggle with terror and they were not talking about giving any ethno-cultural rights to the Kurds. Ecevit's understanding of the Kurdish question was not different from CHP's understanding before the 1980 coup as mentioned in the second chapter. In other words, he could not keep up with the new world order. DYP's attitude suddenly changed to the Kurdish question because of reasons noted above, so it is resulted in losing votes in the Kurdish-populated regions. At the same time, ANAP shifted from Özal's vision on the Kurdish question adopted that of the MHP, the DSP and the DYP. The CHP continued to keep the democratization for the solution of the Kurdish question on the assembly's agenda after its union with SHP. Moreover, the CHP took considerable steps for democratization in spite of its minority in the assembly. Yet, CHP's broken ties with the Kurdish movement and its failure to fulfil its 1989 report's commitments led to losing votes in Kurdish-

populated provinces. CHP's loss of votes was the biggest, when compared with other political parties in so much that it got behind Turkish nationalist MHP which was supported by some of the village guard chieftains by a narrow margin in the Kurdish populated regions. Erbakan's RP was the biggest winner of this election in the Kurdish-populated regions with its anti-status quo appearance (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p. 165-171).

Although the CHP lost remarkable votes, it continued to be interested in every single problem of Kurdish question in accordance with its own 'reformist left' vision which explained above. In 1996 two important reports were announced by the CHP. One of them (*The Report of the Commission for investigating of the developments with the Kidnapping of Necip Baskın for Ransom in Yüksekova*) was about the kidnapping of Necip Baskın by a gang which included 3 police officers of the Special Team (*Özel Kuvvetler*), 4 village guards and 1 former PKK member in Yüksekova, Hakkari. The kidnappers were wearing the PKK members' clothes. However, this plan was collapsed by the gendarme. This report is called as CHP's Yüksekova report in the press. CHP is listing its suggestions under the four titles starting from this event to re-gain local people's confidence. First of all, the writers of the report thank to security forces for solving this dark event. The first suggestion of the report is that if security forces can continue to solve this dark ties and gangs which include members of state's security forces, it will be helpful to re-gain local people's trust to the state. The second step should be the solution of unsolved murder events to re-gain their trust. Thirdly, the report suggested abolishing the Special Forces and Village Guard System as a necessity of local people's peace and lastly, it claims that struggling with terror cannot be a reason to legitimize human right violations (CHP, 1996).

The Second report of this year was written under the name of Tunceli Report. Tunceli governorship decided to implement a 'food embargo', so a CHP committee consisted of its deputies went to Tunceli in order to see the effects of this implementation on site. This implementation was called as 'shame of humanity' (1996, p. 9). According to the report this implementation reminds 'scarcity years in

the 1940s, when there was food rationing (1996, pp. 9-10). This sentence is important because it was the time when the CHP was the single party ruling Turkey under the leadership of İsmet İnönü. This report is more than a single issue report because after food embargo was criticized, it started to blame the 12 September regime of becoming repressiveness and authoritarianism and its constitution for the escalation of the unrest with the Kurdish question (1996, pp. 3-4). Then the report continues with its suggestions which are like those of 1989 report. The remarkable suggestion is that the principle of plural decentralization re-added to this report different than the 1995 election bulletin (1996, p. 25). Moreover, this report described the PKK's members as 'our jerked people' (1996, p. 2).

In 1998, CHP's women's branch organized a woman congress in Siirt. After the congress, the bulletin of the congress published by CHP (*Being a Women in the Southeast*). This bulletin focuses on the women who live in the underdeveloped and conflicting Kurdish provinces. First of all, the main reasons of the migration were explained under 4 main titles: "terror; state's repressions; poverty, unemployment and landlessness; and evacuation of villages" (1998, p. 12). According to this report, migration of the Kurds from their hometown to the metropolises of Turkey like Mersin, İstanbul, Adana affects women negatively because they cannot adapt to social life and cannot continue their agricultural production in these provinces (1998, pp. 13-14). Kurdish women's problems are explained under 4 main titles: marriage and family life, lack of education, health problems and problems of working life. Firstly, under the marriage and family life title, problems such as early marriage, child mothers, polygamy, kin marriages and honor killings are summarized (1998, pp. 22-25). Solution proposals of CHP can be summarized as replacing feudal relations with modern relations, enforcing women to be organized by non-governmental organizations, providing opportunity for socialization of women by local administrations, teaching women their legal rights and strengthening them by democratizing family relations (1998, pp. 34-36). Secondly, the reasons for women's lack of education explained with closed schools due to terror, limited number of teachers and schools and linguistic problems (1998, pp. 42-47).

Solution proposals of CHP for increasing the education level of women in the region were creating an education system which informs women about their legal and civil rights, increasing the number of schools, enforcing women's education, implementing exchange programs with western cities and creating an education system which responds to the regional needs (1998, pp. 48-52). Thirdly, under the health problems title, this report notes about both women's health problem and general epidemics of this region (1998, pp. 58-63). CHP suggests improving health services in the region (1998, pp. 72-75). Fourthly, after women's problem of unemployment was explained, CHP offers a land reform, unemployment insurance, a coming back project to their villages which had been evacuated and so on (1998, pp. 76-78).

Right before the 1999 election, CHP announced another report about Kurdish question under the name of "East and South East". This report was prepared by several deputies of the party and mayors of the municipalities of these regions who were the members of CHP. The President of the committee was Algan Hacaloğlu. According to this report, the main sources which make terror much stronger are "inequality, unemployment, unlawfulness and irregularity" (1999, p. 4). This inequality is shown by the help of GDP statistics of Turkey's region (1998, pp. 6-8). Then, the report describes the economic sectors of the region, and it marks the economic sectors are limited with agriculture and animal husbandry (1998, p. 9). The report underlines that although GAP has a key role to solve the Kurdish question, it is neglected by the state (1998, p. 9). For this report, migration and feudal structure are the other key reasons for the Kurdish question (1998, pp. 11-13) because feudal structure causes an increase in inequality and in addition to this, evacuations of villages and migration lead to several main problems like property and unemployment problems of people who are forced to migration (1998, pp. 11-14). This report summarizes its main solutions with democratization and socio-economic development (1999, p. 20). The best way to keep up these solutions is social democracy according to this report (1999, p. 20). When the report emphasizes the indivisible integrity of Turkey, a new concept is offered that "democratic solution to the ethnic differences" (1999, p. 21).

The Report argues that CHP has two “mega projects” for the democratic solution of Kurdish question: first, a democratization and principle of decentralization (local administration) project and regional and second, a regional socio-economic development project (1999, p. 22). The Regional socio-economic development project includes some special solutions for the region like new investments to the region and additional employment areas (1999, pp. 23-26). In addition, land and agricultural reforms are seen as a part of the regional development to get rid of the feudal structure in the region (1999, p. 26). CHP’s project of decentralization should be understood as autonomy because according to CHP’s understanding of decentralization, the authorities which are on social state like providing education and health services better by the strengthening of local administrations. Report also repeats the determinations of 1989 report like abolishing the Village Guard System and the project of coming back to village.

3.2 CHP and Kurdish Question: The Altan Öymen Period

Right after this report was announced, two important developments occurred in Turkey. First, Öcalan was captured and second, a DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government was formed after the 1999 election. In this election, CHP could not pass the election threshold for the first time in its history. After this failure, Baykal resigned from chairmanship of the CHP. In the extraordinary congress of the party Altan Öymen was elected as the 6th chair of the party. Although he could only stay for 15 months in the seat, this period was crucial for CHP because a serious shift could be observed on party’s offers for the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question. Moreover, CHP’s discourses were under investigation by the legal authorities in this period (Akçura 2011, p. 177-179). In addition, the priorities of the party were determined as Kurdish question and democratization of Turkey by Öymen’s administration on 11 January 2000 (Evrensel, 2009).

Right before CHP announced the Kurdish question and democratization as its priority, Algan Hacaloğlu prepared an intra-party discussion text for the solution of

the Kurdish question by benefiting from the party's previous reports. The title of the report is "Democratization and main politics for the development of Southeast and East". This report emphasizes the brotherhood between security forces and 'jerked young people' and both groups are described as 'our children' (2000, p. 10). Then, forced evacuations of villages are criticized as they lead to violation of human rights as noted in the previous reports (2000, p. 10). In the report, social democratic values were emphasized. It marks that "our purpose is to create an equal, a solidarist and a libertarian society" (2000, pp. 11-12). Other priorities of CHP are described as a pluralist democracy which are based on human rights in the report (2000, pp. 11-14). Although Kurdish society has already organized and has had solidarity, the report does not mention about that because neither social democracy nor Marxism is concerned about what society wants. According to their point of view, people are not able to plan the best future for themselves if they are not directed and motivated by an authority. Therefore, CHP's social democrat vision is based on social engineering rather than minding their demands. The report describes the state as "blind to ethnicities" (2000, p. 12). This can be understood as neutralizing the identity definition of the state. For the report, neutralizing the identity means keeping the nation-state structure of the state. A new constitution is offered in this report to keep up the pluralist democracy (2000, pp. 12-13). the Principle of decentralization (local administration) is noted under the title of democratization even though it was noted under the title of Kurdish question in some reports and the 1995 union bulletin (2000, p. 15). There is a special title named "Kurdish question" to describe and offer solutions for the democratic solution of the Kurdish question. According to the report, Kurdish question cannot be solved by the bases of "racism, militarism and zealotry" (2000, pp. 15-16). It also summarizes the previous reports' offers for peace such as democratization and regional development plan. While this report emphasizes that mother tongues are the part of cultural area, it also emphasizes an official language in public areas (2000, p. 17). The report repeats the CHP's proposals on cultural rights like education in mother tongue in private schools under the control of Ministry of National Education, benefiting from every kind of broadcasting, publication and so on and even more

founding institutes to develop and research their cultures in the universities (2000, p. 18). After that, the report offers three different ways for domestic peace: abolishing the Village Guard System, offering a limited amnesty for all prisoners who have been arrested because of thought crime and who are under 18 years old (2000, p. 19) and getting rid of the feudal structure by implementing land reform as part of the regional development plan (2000, p. 20).

In this period, CHP also organized some meetings with local people of every single region of Turkey to develop its strategies according to what people want. The third of the meetings was organized in Diyarbakır between 8 and 9 April 2000. After this meeting, a report consisted of 200 pages was prepared by the CHP's chairmen of the local branches. In this report, firstly, the chairmen determine their provinces' main problems and then sort their ways for solution. CHP's committee filed a report to the party's administration by benefiting from the report's determinations (Solution with the Society 3: For Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Malatya, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli, Van; Halkla Birlikte Çözüm III: Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Malatya, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli, Van, 2001). However, they could not share the report with Öymen's administration because of the re-election of Baykal, so they shared the report with Baykal's administration. In the filed report, PKK is described as a 'result' of Kurdish question instead of describing it as the only source of the Kurdish question. According to the report, the place which should solve the Kurdish question is the parliament. Therefore, the parliament should be activated for the discussing the solutions as well as non-governmental organizations.

As noted in the second chapter, after Öcalan's capture, PKK stopped its attacks until 2004. Therefore, for the report, there is no reason for the continuity of the state of emergency and the Village Guard System, so both of them should be abolished. The report supports the democratization as the best solution way of Kurdish question by implementing Copenhagen criteria of the EU. Education in the mother tongue is another suggestion of this report. In that time, there were no institutions to educate the Kurds in their mother tongue. It can be understood that the

opportunity to educate the Kurds in mother tongue can be provided in state schools. This report also supports a general amnesty for all prisoners. After this report, general staff started to investigate the CHP's efforts on the Kurdish question and the general staff prepared a report. In general staff's report CHP was blamed of cooperating with the PKK to re-gain its previous voters in the region (Akçura 2011, 178-179).

3.3 CHP and Kurdish Question Reloaded: Baykal's 3rd Period

Right after the general staff's report was written, Deniz Baykal was re-elected as the chair of the party on the 'left wing congress' (*Sol Kanat Kurultayı*) of CHP on 30 September 2000. In the short bulletin (*Bulletin of CHP's Left Wing Congress*) of the congress, CHP's approaches on the Kurdish question are summarized: abolishing of Village Guard System and state of emergency (2000, p. 5). There are two remarkable points in this bulletin. First, there is no emphasis on CHP's ideas to give some ethno-cultural rights to Kurds although they were emphasized in both previous congress bulletins and party reports. Secondly, nation-building is emphasizing with citizenship as necessarily imposed values. This reminds the single-party era argument to create a homogenous state (Yeğen 2014, 124-125).

This period was the third period of Baykal as the chair of the party. In this period, social democrats started to be expelled from the party and neo-nationalist became the hegemonic power in the party administration. This nationalism is not the same with MHP's nationalism. In current charter of the CHP, CHP's nationalism described as follows:

"CHP follows Atatürk nationalism: Republic of Turkey founded based on political conscious and unity on ideal instead religion, language, race, and ethnicity. Nationalism is passing over the discrimination owing to race, ethnicity, religion, sect, regionalism and ethnocentrism at the national level. Turkey has never been a state, which governs based on race, color and racism, and will never be. We try to solve the problems of the state with reference to citizenship, not race (...)" (CHP, 2016, p. 13).

CHP still brings some effects of social democracy and neo-nationalism together in its charter and program. The first difference between CHP and MHP's understanding of nationalism originates (comes?) from from this combination. Majority of the neo-nationalists support some values of social democracy, especially in the area of economy such as re-distribution and welfare state. However, MHP's understanding of nationalism does not emphasize a left-wing perspective on the economy, also owing to its anti-Communist past during the Cold War years. Secondly, Islamic values are not a component of CHP's neo-nationalism, whereas Turkish-Islamic synthesis is a sine quo none of the MHP and the idealist (lkc) movement. In other words, CHP's nationalism is based on secular values, while MHP's nationalism is blended with an Islamic edge. Thirdly, CHP's nationalism points Westernization is the only way to catch up with the contemporary civilizations and social welfare. This is, in fact, a neo-nationalist's utopia. On the opposite side, the biggest ideal of the MHP is reaching the Turkish Union, namely Turanism (zdağ, 2011).⁶

Additionally, Atatrk nationalism identified as more cultural based in CHP's program to avoid any discrimination and conflict with regard to ethnic, religious and cultural differences. In the MHP's charter, nationalism is defined rather ethnic-based, where 'being a Turk' has some self-given character. The charter states:

"Our nationalism aims to develop the conscious of belonging to Turkishness, and taking the distinguishing features of Turkishness as main reference in interpreting process of the current affairs" (MHP, 2009, p. 17).

MHP's nationalism is seen as close description to the single party period' understanding of Turkish nationalism. As noted in the second chapter, as an example from the early Republican period of the CHP, Esat Bozkurt described the non-Turkish ethnic identities who live in Turkey as servant or slave. This early Republican discourse of the CHP has similarities with the MHP in the 1990s and 2000s. A clear proof the CHP's vocal and outright nationalist discourses during the Kurdish Opening process initiated by the AKP.

⁶ mit zdağ, Milliyetilik ve Ulusalılık Arasındaki Farklar, Yeniağ Gazetesi, 2011.

In Bora's perspective, two significant developments led to increasing Turkish nationalism during the 1990s in Turkey. First of all, he believes that the most important breaking point was the new formation of Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, which triggered the Sèvres syndrome once again in the Turkish society. In his opinion, the second important development was growing momentum of the Kurdish movement in Turkey, which triggered the rise of Turkish nationalism (Bora, 2003, pp. 1-5). He calls the neo-nationalism of the CHP as neo-Kemalism. In his view, the main axis of this nationalism was secularism as a reaction to rising Islamism. This nationalism continued to be embraced by the left-wingers. In Bora's perspective, the left-wing cause of Kemalist nationalism was anti-imperialism and the emphasis on independence in foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s. However, these emphases gave way to secular emphases during the 1990s. This nationalism determines its position as 'universalist and humanistic type of Turkish nationalism', based on universal citizenship, according to Bora. Bora underlines that at the beginning of the 2000s, independence and anti-imperialism were both emphasized again as an extension of anti-globalist discourses (Bora, 2003, 5-6).

In the 2002 early election, AKP came to power. In this election, only two parties could pass the election threshold, AKP and CHP. Therefore, the conflict between secular and conservative elites increased after this period (Somer, 2015, pp. 267-268). In this conflict, CHP's emphasis on the secular and Kemalist values increased during Baykal's period. This can be seen in the party documents. For example, on 24 October 2003, the CHP organized its 30th ordinary party congress. In the bulletin of this congress (Bulletin of CHP's 30th Ordinary Congress: Main Problems and Main Solutions), Kemalist and secular emphases are intensively seen. In this bulletin, Kemalism is described and national sovereignty is emphasized because of distrust against the conservative elites. The second emphasis of this bulletin is on social democracy. The CHP believed in bringing social democracy and Kemalism together in Baykal's period (2003, pp. 6-7). Later on, EU process is supported to have a more democratic constitution. In this bulletin, the number of references to the democratic solution of the Kurdish question remarkably declines. The solution offers of the party are discussed in a page, and it repeats democratic solution to

ethnic differences and some ethno-cultural rights, social policies and regional development plan for the region (2003, pp. 13-15). In this bulletin, the most important point is that when the education in mother tongue is supported, there is not any provision to allow them only in private schools (2003, p. 14).

However, due to the such neo-nationalist and pro-status quo attitudes, distance between the Kurds and the party increased. In 2005, Erdoğan told that “Kurdish question is my question” as also noted in the second chapter. This speech of Erdoğan was criticized by Baykal. When Erdoğan and press reminded the CHP’s report which talks about the Kurdish question, Baykal supported that there is no Kurdish question anymore because the Kurds can speak their mother tongue in their lives, they can write in their language and state of emergency had been abolished, so on. Moreover, he blamed Erdoğan to consider the PKK’s demands (Birgün , 2005). From the 2002 to the 2007 election, CHP developed its relations with secular elites. It means that CHP’s relations with civil and military status quo peaked in this period. Therefore, ‘state party’ image of CHP re-remembered in the people’s mind. During this period, CHP’s main opposition mechanism to stop the AKP’s activities was the application to the Constitutional Court. Many of the AKP’s activities were stopped by this mechanism. The most critical crisis occurred in the 2007 presidential election. There are two reasons for this crisis. First, the army put an assertion on its website which is called as e-memorandum. Second, AKP could not reach a 2 of 3 majority in the assembly and the CHP brought the election to the constitutional court. This argument was accepted by the constitutional court (Haber10, 2015). Although Baykal criticized the army’s memorandum, his apply to the constitutional court and cancellation of the presidential election led to increase on people’s perception which blamed the CHP to act together with bureaucratic tutelage.

After this crisis, AKP government decided to hold an early election on July. In this election, AKP collected 47 per cent of the votes and Abdullah Gül was elected as the 11th president of Turkey by the parliament after the election. In this election, AKP collected the majority of Kurdish votes and on the other hand, CHP could win

only 63 seats. In the 2002 election, CHP won 14 seats from the Kurdish populated regions, but it was because of Turkey's election system, not owing to CHP's success in the region. CHP's defeat in the region can be explained under with four main reasons. the First effect was Baykal's changed and negative attitude for the solution of the Kurdish question. the Second reason was CHP's proximity to the bureaucratic status quo. The third reason was Baykal's extreme support for the military operation to Northern Iraq and the last reason was the Kurdish movement's decision to participate in the election with independent candidates. In this period of Baykal, CHP's discourse on the Kurdish question was over-nationalistic for a social democrat party as also noted in the second chapter. In fact, according to one of the former CHP's deputies from Tunceli, Sinan Yerlikaya, CHP did not have any differences from MHP in the eyes of the local people of Kurdistan (Akçura 2011, 170). CHP's this shift can be understood as transforming the party to a nationalist one for collecting nationalists' votes in order to come to power as Ecevit did (Cemal, 2005). Although CHP tried to collect nationalist votes, it was not successful and Turkish nationalist MHP passed the threshold.

After AKP's victory in the 2007 election, AKP started to act some seriously actions to get rid of military status quo by the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases. This demilitarizing process made a democratic solution process on the Kurdish question possible. Although CHP lost its influence and grassroots in the region, it continued its over-nationalistic discourses and analysis on the Kurdish question. At the end of the 2008, CHP revised its party approach on the Kurdish question. This revision was added to CHP's party program and became the party's new official approach on the Kurdish question. This program starts with a sentence that kind of an answer to Erdoğan and his party's solution on the Kurdish question. In this sentence, CHP says "CHP is against creating new minorities", so it is possible to say that AKP's approach was understood as "a process which creates a new minority" by the CHP. For CHP, the state should treat all citizens equally regardless of their ethnic origins. However, a few sentences later, eclectic arguments were visible because, in the following sentence, it is noted that "coming from different ethnic origin is not obstructing national building". More clearly, the emphasis on 'national building'

increased and identification of citizenship changed in this program. Actually after 1989 report, CHP's understanding of citizenship was rallying all citizens under the umbrella of the Republic of Turkey although they all come from different ethnic origins.

After 1989 report, CHP tried to replicate this idea about citizenship in following reports and speeches during the 1990s with a shy expression because of the military tutelage. In this new program, when the emphases on cultural rights and demands decreased significantly, emphasis on national building increased. Even more, this emphasis can be understood as one of the main objectives of CHP's new vision in the solution of Kurdish question with regional development. Although this program claims that "CHP supports integration not assimilation", its solution for national unity is to unite all people or ethnicities under the umbrella of Turkishness instead of citizens of Republic of Turkey. However, this solution of the CHP can cause assimilationist policies as it caused in the single party period. CHP offered private education in the mother tongue for the democratic solution of the Kurdish question in its previous report, but in this program, CHP offers private courses --not schools-- for learning and maintaining their language. In other words, CHP was the first party to mention the importance of private education in the mother tongue for the democratic solution of Kurdish question, but in this new program, it is not mentioned. Even though this important title was removed, private broadcasting in mother tongue was still mentioned and was seen as an important step for the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights. After these rights were emphasized, the development plans of the CHP are repeated: regional development plan and the immediate completion of GAP. Moreover, the principle of decentralization for the democratic solution of the Kurdish question did not take place in this program. In short, Baykal administration reduced the emphases on ethno-cultural rights while it increased the emphases on development policy to the east and southeast of Turkey for the democratic solution of Kurdish question. This can be understood as a remarkable shift from social democratic vision of the party which was the dominant view of the party during the 1990s to classic Kemalist view on the solution of the Kurdish question. In other words, the Kurdish question was associated with

underdevelopment of the region in Baykal's third period as how Kemalist view understood the question during single party period.

Later on, AKP started the democratic opening process in 2009 as explicated in the second chapter. On February 2010, CHP published a brochure to criticize the process under the name of "AKP's Opening Fiasco". This brochure is very typical to show CHP's approach on the Kurdish question during the Baykal's third period. In this brochure, there are 29 main titles criticizing the AKP's democratic opening and Erdoğan's discourses about the Kurdish question. First of all, the suggestions of this brochure are less social democratic and more Kemalist than the previous reports of the party. This shows how CHP moved away from its social democratic vision to neo-nationalist vision in Baykal period. After the new vision on the Kurdish question was accepted in the 2008 congress of the party, this brochure represents the peak point for party's shifting to Kemalist-neo-nationalist outlook. Although the CHP supported neutralization of definition of citizenship in its some pervious reports, CHP criticizes the AKP's idea to remove Turkishness from the constitution and replacing it with a wider definition like citizenship of Republic of Turkey under the two titles of this brochure. Moreover, CHP blames the AKP to support the same idea with Öcalan on the new definition idea of the citizenship (2010, pp. 5-7). The CHP supported a new and neutralized definition of the citizenship to have a more integrative one in 1989 and following reports. Between 3th and 5th titles, CHP criticizes the AKP's democratic opening process for following Öcalan's road map in this brochure (2010, pp. 11-19). CHP's accusations are not only limited with that, but also claims that AKP tried to organize several closed sessions to hide the content of the democratic opening process from the people because, according to the CHP's brochure, this process would lead to separation of the country. This democratic opening process called as "project of the AKP and the PKK" at the end of the 5th title (2010, p. 19). Although the SHP was the first party which brought Kurdish movement to the parliament, Erdoğan's meeting with DTP's deputies is also criticized in this brochure (2010, pp. 23-25). Even more, after CHP re-founded by Deniz Baykal, the party voted out when parliamentary immunities of deputies of DEP was abolished by the parliament as

noted in the second chapter. However, CHP claimed that this process enforced by the United States (2010, pp. 27-29)⁷. This reminds one of Yeğen's concepts to explain the Kurdish question understanding of Kemalist state, which is 'provocation of foreigners'.

One of the reasons for CHP's disappearance in the Kurdish populated region of Turkey is that its discourses on Northern Iraq –noted above- still continued in this brochure (2000, pp. 31-41). Moreover, the CHP claims the once stopped terror re-started because of the AKP government, which did not organize any military operations to Northern Iraq, but the CHP was not considering on PKK's internal crisis –explained above- when AKP came to power (2000 p. 32). Right after CHP emphasized some shifts of Erdoğan on the Kurdish question, it claimed that Erdoğan had a secret agenda in this brochure (2000, pp. 39-41). Between 17th and 21st titles of this brochure, the Habur crisis is emphasized and criticized (2000, pp. 55-67). The CHP criticizes the claims of the members of PKK, who came to Habur that they had never participated to the terrorist activities; the CHP says that there is not any information on the database of intelligence service, which can verify this claim (2000, pp. 55-57). In other words, the CHP claims that state approves of the PKK's discourse about these people. Even the CHP uses a very populist discourse in a part of the brochure and says that "Martyr families could not be respected like terrorists could" (2000, p. 63). One of the most paradoxical parts of this brochure for the CHP was the 24th article. Under this article, the CHP criticizes the AKP's outlook for the education in mother tongue and establishment of living languages institute in Artuklu University because according to the CHP, the purpose for founding this institute is providing a substructure for training in Kurdish (2000, pp. 74-75). This is very paradoxical for the CHP because it emphasized foundation of this sort of institutes to maintain and develop the languages and culture and also supported the private education in mother tongue in the party's all previous reports as seen above. Moreover, the CHP supported the foundation of Kurdology institutes

⁷ According to the brochure, this 'solution package' imposed and enforced by David Philips who is explained as an expert of Atlantic Council by this brochure (pp. 27-29).

in its some reports. Actually, the CHP removed its idea to found this kind of institutes to maintain the languages and cultures in its new Kurdish question approach which was announced in 2008 congress as noted above.

Another criticism of the CHP is about GAP that according to this brochure, the AKP did not invest to complete the GAP or had never attempted to decrease unemployment in the region by founding factories and so on. Moreover, this report says that the existing ones were closed down in this period. After these all criticisms, the CHP mentions its offers for the solution of Kurdish question. According to the CHP, the biggest problem of the region is unsolved underdevelopment. Therefore, Yeğen's another concept to explain Kemalist outlook to the Kurdish question is seen by this determination that 'backwardness'. Although CHP was the party, which determines the PKK as a result of Kurdish question instead of describing it as the problem itself and also claims the Kurdish question cannot be solved by only security policies, at this time, the CHP interprets the Kurdish question as a result of AKP's democratic opening project. According to the CHP, "Ethnic polarization has increased following the opening process". In the following pages, the CHP contradicted this brochure's previous pages because the CHP supports that state should be ethnically blind, but in the previous pages, the CHP criticizes the AKP's idea to widen the definition of citizenship as noted above. However, CHP's this attitude is meaningless because the 1982 constitution's definition of citizenship is ethnic based instead of ethnically blind⁸. Right before Baykal resigned from the chairmanship, CHP published a very short brochure in English under the title of "CHP and Turkey's EU Membership process". This brochure is limited with seven titles and one of the titles is "Kurdish question". CHP repeats its offers which took place in the party program like private language education, private broadcasting and more investment to the region (2010, p. 3).

⁸ Article 66 of Turkish Constitution argues "Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk" Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. Available from: https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf . [04 June 2017].

3.4 Kılıçdaroğlu's vision: New CHP and Changing Vision on the Kurdish question

2010 represents an important turning point for CHP because Baykal resigned from chairmanship of the party and Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as the new chair of the party. Kılıçdaroğlu's election was considered as a new hope for the social democratization of the CHP. Indeed, CHP's discourses on the different subjects started to change including Kurdish question after his election. On the other hand, Erdoğan who achieved his aim to get rid of military tutelage by Ergenekon and Balyoz cases gained a chance to replace secular elites with conservative elites in judicial power. After this victory of the AKP, Erdoğan and AKP started to do social engineering and tried to reshape the society with their Islamic vision. Another importance of this referendum was the first electoral experience for Kılıçdaroğlu as the chair of the CHP. In this referendum, Kurdish movement steered its grassroots to boycott the referendum by not voting. The second electoral experience for Kılıçdaroğlu took place after 9 months later than the referendum.

Three sources published by the party for this election directly or indirectly show the CHP's vision on the Kurdish question. First of all, the bulletin published under the name of "We promise Turkey for 41 Subjects", talks about the issues related with Kurdish question under its 6 titles. In the 6th and 7th titles, CHP noted its commitments to bring the state to a pluralist democracy, but Kurdish movement would be the biggest beneficiary of this kind of a democracy. According to the 6th title, if CHP came to power, the election threshold would be decreased; it would be maximum 5%. According to the CHP, 10% threshold challenges the "justice in representation" principle of democracy as a product of 12 September regime. The importance of this title for the Kurdish political movement was that the Kurdish political movement still participated to the general elections with independent candidates by making some alliances with a variety of small left-oriented groups because the Kurdish political movement believed that they could not pass the national threshold. the 7th title is recommending a 'commission of truth' (*Hakikat Komisyonu*) to solve the unsolved murders and reveal the gangs inside the state.

This is important for both the Kurdish movement and Kurdish people because the biggest sufferers of this kind of gangs and unsolved murders are Kurdish movement and Kurdish people as noted in the second chapter. The titles which are directly related with the Kurdish question noted between the titles 14 and 17. These titles are about a sudden development of the region by completing the GAP as soon as possible, incentive for the investors to invest to the region and public investment to the region. In this report, CHP has an alternative way for giving land to landless people by deactivating the land mines in the different lands of the region. There is not any commitment to redistribute the lands by forcibly taking them from feudal landownerships as seen in some of the former reports.

The Second publication was a report that directly written for putting a new perspective on development of the region and determining situation of regional economy. In other words, it was an updating of outdated solutions of the 1989 reports on economy and development. While the report puts some new perspective on the development of Kurdish populated regions, lots of offers of the 1989 report are also repeated in this report. This report was published under the name of "Economic Development and Strategic Targets for East and Southeast". According to the report, the regions' human and natural sources cannot be effectively used (2011, p. 3). These regions' underdevelopment hinders the modernization of the state Plus, migration from these regions to developed provinces leads to many problems on health services, property, and education and so on in developed provinces too (2011, p. 6). This report argues that although the export has increased to the geographically close states to the East and South East regions of Turkey, the companies which export to these countries are located in Marmara region of Turkey, therefore their costs increase. In this sense, the CHP plans to make the region a center of agriculture, industry and service, which exports to geographically close countries (2011, pp. 12-13).

It is also noted within the report that public investments will increase and private investments will increase owing to both internal dynamics of the region and new needs which occurred due to states' investment to the region (2011, pp. 15-26).

After that, report shows that how CHP's planned investment model will solve the unemployment problem and how many people will be employed as a result of this model by statistics and numbers until 2023. Under the title of "CHP's strategic targets", first, CHP repeats its idea on completing the GAP urgently as mentioned in its previous reports (2000, p. 29). After that, CHP starts to mention its other proposals. The CHP plans to develop the region by developing husbandry, increasing public investment, intensive for the private investments, investing to the rail way towards freight shipment, increasing the mining investments (CHP noted all copper, zinc, chrome, magnesite and steel deposits in these regions), developing the industry based on petro chemistry, developing solar industry to increase the regions' capacity of technology production and contributing the regions' economies. The last offer is increasing the sugar beet industry for producing chocolate, sugar and so on to export them potential consumers in Iraq, Iran and Syria (2000, pp. 30-44). This report is also essential to show that CHP's tradition continued to see the underdevelopment as one of the main reasons of the Kurdish question at this time. However, Kılıçdaroğlu was still working with Baykal's backers in this period. He created his own administrative staff after two main issues: first, after Önder Sav⁹ and his backers were liquidated, and then, new parliamentary group was elected in the 2011 election. After Kılıçdaroğlu created his staff, CHP's vision on the Kurdish question began to change. The most concrete version of the CHP's new vision came into existence before 2011. CHP issued a report about Kurdish question and firstly, this report is more about cultural and human rights and democracy. There is no a title about regional underdevelopment. Secondly, CHP shows that Kılıçdaroğlu's administration believes the only way is social reconciliation to build the social peace.

The third report of the party before 2011 was published on May, 2011. This report was published under the name of "Democracy, equal citizenship and free society". Although this report is not directly about the Kurdish question approach of CHP, it

⁹ He was the secretary general of the party during Baykal's third period (2000-2010) and his control on the parliamentary group and on the local branches of the party were very strong.

is important to show CHP's approach to the Kurdish ethno-cultural rights because CHP planned the better recognition of minority groups and Kurds as a result of democratization of Turkey. This report starts with showing how AKP destroys democracy and violations of law during AKP period and so on. Later on, 5 main principles of CHP's libertarian democracy as a social democrat party are explained in the report in respect to human rights, a stable and institutionalized democracy, superiority of law and state of law, respect to minority rights and plurality in the society and politics. In this report, CHP's changing politics are emphasized and the axis of this new politics is explained as freedom and respect and support to the human rights. Another important point is about "stone-throwing children". CHP claims that AKP government arrested under-age children who threw stones at the police. Therefore, one of the priorities of CHP will be changing the anti-terror law to make it right.

All these discourses are more progressive when compared to Baykal's period, but the most progressive discourses take place under the title of pluralist democracy. In this part, when the CHP's main targets are explained as providing pluralist democracy and increasing representation by decreasing the election threshold to five percent and decreasing high application fee of independent candidacy. Even though these are not directly related with the Kurdish movement, both of them were important for them because at this time representatives of Kurdish movement struggled to survive in the legal politics by independent candidates. In addition, after Baykal's terrorizing attitude towards the Kurdish movement considered, meaning of supporting these theses can be better understood. CHP supports a wider definition of citizenship which is rallying all people around the citizenship of Republic of Turkey instead of referencing to a single ethnicity for the report.

According to report, CHP has understood that people are not only demanding fair distribution of wealth, but they also want to be recognized with their ethno-cultural rights. Therefore, CHP promises to accept these kinds of rights as a social democrat party. CHP explains its solution for the Kurdish question to recognize their pluralistic demands as all other religious or ethnic groups' right will by

democratization in this report. CHP describes its position for the solution of Kurdish question as “the third way”. the Third way is explained as neither ignoring the Kurdish question nor ethnic-based Kurdish politics, the third way is an integrative alternative method, which believes that there are very different solution steps for the democratic solution of the Kurdish question in the areas of economy, culture, and politics and so on. After this description, CHP repeats its economic policies which took place in the last report about the development of Kurdish populated regions. In the 2011 election, AKP collected 50% of votes and maintained its single party government. In this election, the CHP increased its vote by 4 percent.

In March 2013, CHP prepared a brochure under the name of “CHP’s offers for real democracy, real justice and human rights” to show its activities in the parliament to bring Turkey a better functioned democracy. In other words, CHP tried to show its given bills of law for the democratization. Some of these bills could solve some unrests of the Kurdish people. First of all, a bill was offered by CHP to shorten the detention on remand to hinder the violation of human rights (2013, p. 15). At the same time, imprisonment of Ergenekon and Balyoz cases’ sufferers continued on the Kemalist side. On the other hand, KCK imprisonment continued against the representatives of the Kurdish movement, so this could be beneficial for the Kurdish movement if accepted by the parliament.

Secondly, CHP gave a bill of law to relieve the victims of 12 September regime by providing them an opportunity to sue for both mental anguish and material compensation against the state (2013, pp. 39-43). This is crucial for Kurds because Kurds were the biggest sufferers of 12 September regime as underlined in the second chapter. Moreover, tortures which were implemented in Diyarbakır prison has been accepted as the one of the main reasons for PKK’s strengthening. Therefore, this sort of a law could be helpful for changing the Kurds’ understanding of Turkish state by increasing accountability of itself.

the Third important bill of law argued the removing time-out rule for the unsolved murders, which could change the image of Turkish state in the eyes of the Kurds

(2013, p. 43). As stated in the second chapter, and also seen in Yüksekova report of CHP, Kurds have suffered from gangs of deep state's murders and many of cases were dismissed because of time-out rule. CHP also offered a bill of law to decrease election threshold from 10% to 5% as argued in the previous reports which were written during Kılıçdaroğlu's period (2013, p. 47). The importance of this situation for the Kurdish movement has been explained above. The fifth important bill of law was to hinder the police brutality when they intervene the social events, and coordinately CHP tried to extend the right to congregate and demonstrate by a different bill of law (2013, p. 59). These laws could be beneficial for the Kurds as the most politicized society who always demonstrates against the state's some activities and as a result, suffers from extreme violence. All these bills of law can be understood as progressive steps for CHP, but none of them was accepted in the parliament because of AKP's domination.

In May, 2014, CHP announced a "Report of Turkey" (Türkiye Raporu), but the Kurdish question could not take place in this report. This is understandable because at the end of the 2013, some of the AKP's ministers were blamed of corruption. Later on, the municipality election was organized in March, 2014 and AKP was the winner of this election again. CHP emphasized the corruption claims during its election campaign and this propaganda continued after the election. On the other hand, AKP increased the censorship over the press and started to ban the social media whenever it wanted. Therefore, this report emphasizes corruptions, democracy, freedom of press and social media, judicial independence and so on instead of emphasizing the Kurdish question or indirectly related issues.

Currently, the CHP believes that the solution should be in the parliament. The CHP has suggested establishing a social reconciliation commission (Toplumsal Uzlaşma Komisyonu) in the parliament in order to solve Kurdish problem. The CHP published a report which is called as suggestions and priorities of the CHP for social peace in 2013. The report was revised before the election and published as a manifesto of the CHP in order to solve Kurdish question. However, the report is not so different than the SHP's report that was published in 1989. In the 1990s,

suggestions of the SHP were both courageous and useful in order to solve the problems of the Kurdish people like finishing assimilation policies against Kurds, removing the Village Guard System and removing the obstacles to speak in mother tongue. However, the CHP still efforts to solve Kurdish question with democratization and enlargement of individual freedom like the SHP. Today, Kurdish demands and problems are not just about democratization and individual rights and freedoms. Instead, the demands are collective rights like being autonomous now. The last report is more about individual rights and freedom as removing gag laws, strengthening protest rights and supporting freedom of expression. The sameness of the CHP's Report with the report of the SHP is contrary to continuous progression principle of social democracy. Besides, the European social democratic parties accepted minority rights a long time ago and started to be interested in the subject, but the CHP chose identity politics like Turkish nationalism against the Kurdish identity whenever there was a chance to transform itself into the social democracy in Baykal's period (Emre, 2015, p. 393).

In 2015 report, CHP has some new perspectives and progressive methods, but these are not still seen enough to solve the Kurdish question. This report of CHP was prepared right before the June 7, 2015 elections under the name of "22 Question 22 Answer CHP's view to Turkey's Kurdish question and solution framework". (In this report, CHP mentions that the Kurdish question is problem, which continues because of lack of democratization in Turkey. In addition, CHP argues that this problem cannot be solved by using security methods. Later on, CHP explains its idea on AKP's solution method of the Kurdish question and notes that although ending armed struggle and elimination of new martyrs are important, this process is not sustainable (2015, p. 3). Since, this process is not institutionalized because of insincerity of the AKP government to solve the Kurdish question. CHP's argument to testify the insincerity of the AKP in this process is rejection of given bills of law by CHP to democratize the state and to socialize the peace by the AKP's deputies' votes (2015, pp. 3-4). CHP also mentions that 27 bills of law were given to socialize the peace by CHP during the period (2015, p. 4). According to CHP, "AKP's aim

is not peace settlement; AKP captures the hope for peace to serve its political purposes.”

After that CHP starts to talk about its solution methods and states that CHP’s peace model has 4 main dynamics. First of the dynamics is providing equal citizenship and an advanced democracy. Secondly, establishing a Social Agreement Commission (*Toplumsal Mutabakat Komisyonu*), which will be a platform that includes all represented political parties in the parliament to have a better consensus (2015, pp. 4-5). the Third suggestion is the establishment of a Common Sense Committee (*Ortak Akıl Heyeti*) to be advised by non-represented groups in the parliament like NGOs, labor unions and trade associations. Moreover, this committee will take a role to investigate when the PKK is disarmed (2015, p. 5). There is a difference between this committee and AKP’s wise men because while AKP’s wise men were responsible for explaining AKP’s model to the people, CHP’s committee will advise to the commission, and they will also have other key roles during the democratization process (2015, p. 11). The last of the main dynamics is establishment of a Reality Research Commission (*Gerçekleri Araştırma Komisyonu*). CHP emphasizes the importance of this sort of commissions by considering different peace processes around the world (2015, p. 5). The purpose of this commission is predicted as revealing the lawlessness and realities which have caused this continuous alienation of the Kurds (2015, p. 9). This will be one of the key steps for the social and permanent peace according to CHP. Later on, CHP continues to state the significance of a new and as inclusive as possible constitution for the permanent peace.

Another part of the report is about the mother tongue and CHP declares its idea about the using the mother tongue as a necessity of respect to human rights. Then when CHP says that it is not biased to the education in mother tongue, also supports that this road map should be drawn by pedagogues, not by politicians (2015, p.8). After that, CHP interprets the İmralı meetings and believes that these meetings are not acceptable for a peace process because the rights and freedom cannot be matters of negotiations (2015, pp. 11-12). Therefore, the Kurdish question must be

negotiated in the parliament with legal actors according to CHP's report. Nevertheless, CHP explains how PKK will be disarmed and supports that the legal regulations must be resettled to include the members of PKK into society life. This disarmament process will be investigated by Common Sense Committee according to the report. As noted in the previous paragraph, although CHP's new vision has some differences than previous reports, it still concerns about individual rights or democratization. However, after over 30 years politization process of Kurds because of extreme violence of state and some other reasons, Kurds' demands have become collective instead of becoming individual based.

In Turkey, the system of political parties does not allow intra-party democracy. Party leaders are not open to criticism. Leaders have tried to determine party politics, and discourses with their inner circles only. Local branches of the parties and members cannot be involved in the decision-making processes of the parties. This situation leads to limitation on the discourses of the parties. In other words, leaders' strong authority in the political parties hinders the emergence of new and original policies, and new solution models for the problems because this strong authority of leaders does not allow different views in the party (Yanık, 2007); (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008).

CHP's repetition of proposals on the Kurdish issue rooted in the strong authority of the leaders. As seen above, subchapters named leader based, since the effect of the leaders in policy-making process has been the most essential actor. For example, during Baykal's period, the CHP repeated the 1989 report's proposals as its solution proposal of the Kurdish issue because in this period, Baykal controlled the party with his very limited number of administrative staff. Intra-party democracy was destroyed in this period. In Sağlar's words:

"SHP had to prepare 1989 report because in the party, grassroot could be involved in the decision-making process as a result of intra-party democracy. This report was prepared as an outcome of the pressure of

SHP's grassroots in the Kurdish-populated provinces. However, this intra-party democracy did not continue after CHP re-opened.”¹⁰

After Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as the leader of the party, he took some of the important names of Kurdish movement in the party like Sezgin Tanrikulu, and then, the CHP re-started to offer its new solution model as a result of dialogue with different groups of the society.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that CHP's traditional discourse on the Kurdish question is based on leaders' attitude on the Kurdish question. Therefore, CHP's traditional discourse on the Kurdish can be summarized under 4 main periods. First of all, during SHP periods, this tradition tried to be interested in Kurdish question by putting some progressive visions to the agenda. Two of the leaders of SHP, Erdal İnönü and later Murat Karayalçın never gave up their efforts to create visions on the Kurdish question. Secondly, after the union of CHP and SHP, especially after Deniz Baykal became the chair of the party, the emphasis on national integrity increased and emphases on giving cultural or linguistic rights and principle of local administration gradually decreased in the second part of the 1990s, if not counting very short Altan Öymen's administration. Thirdly, in Baykal's third period, emphases on concepts of modernization like secularism and nationalism peaked owing to both increased nationalism due to increased separatist activities and strengthening radical Islam. After AKP came to power, these emphases remarkably increased and CHP started to reject its previous commitments on the Kurdish question even more like establishment of a Kurdology institute or changing the definition of citizenship when AKP offered them during the democratic opening process. Lastly, the last change on the CHP's discourse about the Kurdish question has been seen following period of Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as the leader of the party and still decreasingly continues. CHP tries to create a third way, means different than Kurdish movement or AKP, on the Kurdish question. CHP's main methods for a possible

¹⁰ Fikri Sağlar, May 3, 2017, TBMM

peace process can be summarized as democratization, social reconciliation and transparency in the peace process.

CHAPTER 4

CHP AND THE KURDISH QUESTION OF TURKEY: MAPPING VIEWS OF PARTY ELITES

In the second chapter, the historical politicization process of Kurdish movement is summarized from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey on. In the third chapter, CHP's written documents are summarized to show both ruptures of the CHP on the Kurdish question and to show continuous arguments of the CHP on the Kurdish question. The importance of this chapter is both it is based on field work it gives chance to analyze the party discourse better by the help of qualitative research based on in-depth interviews with CHP's party elites. The main aim of this chapter is sharing the data of in-depth interviews. These in-depth interviews were made with the political elites of the CHP and its predecessor, the SHP, including former Chair of the Party, former ministers of Turkey and current MPs. In this thesis, some of the planned interviewees were changed because some of the CHP elites do not prefer to talk about the Kurdish question. It is easy to understand why they avoid talking about this issue: in a continuous political career, talking about the Kurdish question can cause an undesirable archive for a politician. Hence, the researcher could meet with 10 out of 15 most prominent names in the list. In this chapter, the name of one of the interviewees will be encoded since he did not want to announce his name and the code of him will be "CHP1"¹¹ in the text.

In this chapter, first of all, an overview of CHP's different attitudes was shaped are explained. Then the collected data are summarized under different titles of some themes. These themes will be the Kurdish question as the source of democratization and human rights problems, the Kurdish question as an outcome of plans of the imperial powers in our region, the Kurdish question as a result of continued feudalism and the Kurdish question in the form of ignoring cultural rights. These are all the themes that will be explained under the subchapters.

¹¹ CHP1 is from Urfa and he is of Kurdish descent. Currently, he is CHP's MP from İstanbul.

As noted above, opinions of CHP's elites on the Kurdish issue will be the issue of this chapter for demonstrating different perspective of them on the Kurdish issue.

The table of interviewees is below:

Table 2: List of interviewees.

Name	Position	Reason for Selection
Ali Tirali	Member of the executive board of the SODEV, and delegate of CHP's Youth Branch for Kadıköy.	He is active both in Turkey's social democratic movement and also in CHP's youth branch.
Durmuş Fikri Sağlar	CHP's MP from Mersin. He was secretary general of the SHP.	He has been one of the witnesses of the whole period since 1989, and one of the key actors on the SHP's approach on the Kurdish question.
Dursun Çiçek	CHP's MP from İstanbul.	His former position at the army and his strong Kemalist outlook.
Hilal Dokuzcan	Former General Chair Women of the CHP's Women Branch, and Current Deputy Chair Women of the Socialist	Her ideas are important to understand both how CHP's women define the Kurdish question and what is the role of

	International Women (SIW).	women branch in a possible peace process, which implemented by the CHP.
Kadir Gökmen Ögüt	He was CHP's MP for İstanbul in 24 th Legislative Session, now, he is member of Party Assembly.	He obtained his BA degree from Dicle University, Diyarbakır, and he observed the regional dynamics on site.
Mehmet Tüm	CHP's MP from Balıkesir, former general secretary of the SODEV.	He is one of the representative of CHP's social democratic wing.
Muharrem İnce	CHP's MP from Yalova.	He is the leader of opposition movement in the party, and can be considered as a potential future leader of the party.
Murat Karayalçın	He was the last general chair of the SHP.	He was one of the key actors in SHP's decision making process as the last chair of the party and was also deputy Prime Minister of Turkey.

Mustafa Sezgin Tanrıkulu	Former president of Diyarbakır Bar, and now CHP's MP from İstanbul.	He determines CHP's approach to the Kurdish question since 2011 as he said. He is the most prominent actor on CHP's new approach to the Kurdish question.
CHP1	He is from Urfa and he is of Kurdish descent. Currently, he is CHP's MP.	His ideas are important because he has both an identity of the CHP and Kurdish descent.

Based on the positions held by the party elites during the interviews, results are given via a Qualitative Chart as below:

Table 3: Qualitative Chart on views about the Kurdish question

Name	Equal citizenship	Education in the mother tongue	Implementation of Principle of Local Administration	Kurdish issue as imperialist plans	Regional Underdevelopment as one of the reasons of the Kurdish issue
Ali Tiralı	+	#	+	-	-

Durmuş Fikri Sağlar	+	+	+	-	-
Dursun Çiçek	+	-	+	+	+
Hilal Dokuzcan	+	?	+	+	+
Kadir Gökmen Öğüt	+	?	+	+	+
Mehmet Tüm	+	+	+	-	-
Muharrem İnce	-	#	?	+	+
Murat Karayalçın	+	#	+	-	+
Mustafa Sezgin Tanrıkulu	+	+	+	-	-
CHP1	+	-	+	+	+

+: Agree

?: Unstated

-: Disagree

#: It should be discussed

4.1 A Short History of CHP's Evolving Approaches to the Kurdish question

In the third chapter, CHP's approaches to the Kurdish question in different periods since 1989 is explained via summarizing party documents. Although these documents were helpful to demonstrate how the CHP tradition reflected on the Kurdish question in different periods, they are not sufficient to show what happened in practice. In this section, CHP's elites' answers to these two main questions will be shared: the reasons why CHP changed its Kurdish question approach over time and the actors and factors in the determining process of CHP's Kurdish question approach.

In the CHP's history, the most progressive period on the Kurdish question was SHP's period, more specifically, the 1989 report as Mehmet Tüm¹² notes. Tüm also argues that SHP's vision was not only limited with this report, the SHP also tried to exert itself on the Kurdish question in practice like its efforts to investigate the unsolved murders. Mustafa Sezgin Tanrıkulu¹³ underlines that this report was very progressive and tried to solve the Kurdish question with a perspective which is based on human rights. According to him, the progressivism of the report caused some crises in the military and civil bureaucracy. Moreover, this report was discussed in the National Security Council (MGK) and was judged in State Security Court (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi, DGM), Tanrıkulu says. This report summarized in the previous chapter like all other reports of the CHP and it is possible to note that all other reports until Kılıçdaroğlu's period were a revised copy of the 1989 report. Therefore, the report survived as a party program for the CHP. This report can be accepted as the most influential document of the CHP's history on the Kurdish question because of its listed features above. Thus, the actors and factors that took role in the pathway to the report are important and there is a considerable gap in the literature on this subject.

¹²He was the former Secretary General of the Foundation of Social Democracy (Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı, SODEV) and now CHP's MP from Balıkesir.

¹³He was the former chair of Diyarbakır Bar and now he is CHP's MP from İstanbul

In the interviews, three different and mutually complementary actors or factors existed. First of all, there is a consensus among interviewees on Erdal İnönü's role and leadership in both the preparation process of this report and changed attitude of SHP on the Kurdish question. Kadir Gökmen Ögüt¹⁴ claims that Erdal İnönü could put a new perspective on the Kurdish question different than other leaders of the CHP/CHP tradition because he was the son of the founder of Turkish Republic. It means that he had an advantage of being able to talk freely than all other leaders, since people could not have doubt about him or could not blame him with separatism. As seen above, the first effect was actors based.

Secondly, Murat Karayalçın¹⁵ claims that SHP depended on two identities, social democracy and republicanism. The importance of the Kurdish question on the Republican side was because of the definition of citizenship. In other words, with the very beginning of 1990s, Republican parties had to re-define citizenship all over Europe because of the newly emerged values of new world order. As a result of its Republicanism, SHP adapted itself to this trend of re-describing the definitions which was common among the European Republican Parties at that time. In this regard, SHP accepted that people can have an ethnic identity alongside with their republican identity (citizenship) in its new program which was accepted on December, 1988.

On the other hand, SHP recognized some ethno-cultural rights of Kurdish origin citizens as a necessity of its social democratic identity according to Karayalçın. Third effect is factor based too like second one and comes from Durmuş Fikri Sağlar¹⁶. Sağlar talks about three important factors when he explains how the SHP's 1989 was prepared. First of all, in the by-election of June 1986, SHP could win only one of 12 seats, then in 1987 amount 29 MPs who were not pleased with the union of HP SODEP, joined DSP. Sağlar says these two events enforced the party for a

¹⁴He graduated from Dicle University, was the MP from İstanbul during 24th Legislative session and now member of Party Assembly.

¹⁵He was the last chair of SHP and former Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey

¹⁶He was the Secretary General of the SHP and former Minister of Culture of Turkey. Currently, he is CHP's MP from Mersin.

new formation. After that, people who came from leftist organizations before 1980 coup d'état joined the party and SHP tried to adapt itself to a Western type of Social Democratic Party. Secondly, the 1989 local election were important for the on-site monitoring of Kurds' problems. Thirdly, SHP's organizational form was very different than today's CHP because in the SHP's organizational form, every single member can be included in the decision making process, in other words, SHP's organizational form was bottom-up when the CHP's organizational form is top-down today. Therefore, southeastern grassroots of SHP were very influential in the pathway and preparation process of the 1989 report.

Second breaking point for the SHP was expelling the Kurdish origin MPs -who went to a Kurdish conference in Paris- from the party. There is a widely accepted idea that they expelled because of their participation to the Kurdish conference were seen as unacceptable by the SHP administration. However, witnesses do not agree with this idea. According to Karayalçın, this process was done in a hurry and he says Erdal İnönü was not supporting the expulsion of the MPs. He believes that the most important effect for the expelling was public pressure. Sağlar argues that majority of MPs saw this action as a strategic mistake and Fikri Sağlar –from SHP-, Ahmet Türk –from HEP- agreed on the electoral alliance for the 1991 election. After this alliance, an oath crisis occurred as noted in the previous pictures, according to interviewees, this crisis was because of public pressure too. In Ögüt's words:

“We (SHP) wanted to integrate Kurdish political movement into the legal political system and increase their representation. However, after the oath crisis, SHP was seen as the party that brought the ‘terrorists’ into the Parliament by the public.”¹⁷

The general attitude of the CHP (SHP)'s MPs do not support their expulsion from the party, however, majority of them blame them to act irresponsibly after joining to the parliament. Actually, Mahmut Alınak also underlines the same thing with different words:

¹⁷Kadir Gökmen Ögüt, His DentalClinic in Kadıköy, İstanbul, May 12, 2017

“We had to resign from SHP and had to rejoin to HEP aftermath of the 1991 election because of both our isolation after some external and internal attacks and our political inexperience which was interpreted wrongly by the society” (Alınak, 1996, pp. 20-21).

4.2 The Kurdish question in the form of Democratization, Human Rights and Cultural Rights Problems

CHP tries to become a social democratic party since 1970s. These attempts peaked in the aftermath of the collapse of Eastern Bloc. CHP’s social democratic vision never become independent than Kemalist values because these values can be accepted as the *raison d’etre* of the CHP. As noted above, emphasis on Kemalist values remarkably increased during Baykal periods. Today –Kılıçdaroğlu Period- some development occurred for the social democratization, and additionally, CHP’s Kurdish vision re-determined in this period. However, there is no common understanding of CHP’s proposal for the solution of the Kurdish question between CHP elites. In this section, different understanding of CHP’s elites regarding CHP’s solution proposals such as principle of local administration, recognizing the cultural rights of the Kurds, and democratization of Turkey will be discussed.

As noted above, CHP tradition tried to describe Kurdish question more than one reason as a necessity to explain a sociological fact. Democratization, human and cultural rights problems have been one of the parts of CHP’s vision to describe Kurdish question since 1989 report. CHP still believes that one of the reasons of Kurdish question in Turkey is the lack of democracy and violation of human rights. Sağlar says that in 1990s, if parliament could be more resistant despite the military and civil bureaucracy and increased terror, the Kurdish question could be solved by democratization. He argues that DYP-SHP coalition government period was the period of Turkey’s democratic transformation despite America’s controlling project in the Middle East. In other words, although United States of America tried to protect Israel from Arab world and Iran by controlling the Middle East (his new world order definition), Turkey tried to democratize herself by the coalition government. According to him, in this period, Turkey was in a significant point,

although Turkey became combined task force and new establishing Kurdish region in Northern Iraq.

Sağlar gives an example:

“Demirel who was one of the most important representatives of ignoring policy for differences said ‘we recognize Kurdish reality’ in Diyarbakır by the enforcement of SHP’s 1989 report and successful election result in the Southeast.”¹⁸

Öğüt mentions that in this period, number of martyrs increased, PKK’s rebellion call and oath crisis went the SHP all to pieces, so its interest in Kurdish question started to decrease. Karayalçın’s idea supports Öğüt’s speech, in his words:

“In this period, PKK and Kurdish question started to be seen the same in the eyes of society, even more telling ‘Kurd’ to describe a group was not possible. This political environment affected SHP the same way it affected all other political actors.”¹⁹

However, Tanrıkulu claims that the reason for changing attitude of the SHP and in wider perspective the coalition government was because of the expulsion of Kurdish politicians from the SHP. These expulsions caused many resignations in the Southeastern Region. In Tanrıkulu’s words “This situation transformed the coalition government into a truck without brakes on the human rights.”²⁰

All of the interviewees agree on that if 89 report’s suggestions could be implemented, Kurdish question would quite likely be solved. On the other hand, when some of them believe that SHP’s solution proposals are outdated, some of them believe these solution proposals are still surviving their validity. This conflict can be seen under every single proposal which will be examined in next subchapters. For democratization –this subchapter- the main conflict can be seen under the principle of local administration and equal citizenship understandings of CHP’s political elites.

¹⁸Durmuş Fikri Sağlar, Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM), May 2, 2017

¹⁹Murat Karayalçın, Historical Building of İş Bank in Ulus, Ankara, May 5, 2017

²⁰Mustafa Sezgin Tanrıkulu, Passage Hazzo Pulu in Beyoğlu, İstanbul, May 20, 2017

The principle of local administration has emphasized since 1989 report of the SHP as a solution proposal by the CHP tradition, but the political elites' understanding of this principle are different than each other. Actually, they agree on European Charter of Local Self Government, but they do not agree on its content. According to Karayalçın, there are two types of autonomy: administrative autonomy and political autonomy. According to him, political autonomy is not possible because it could threat indivisible unity of the country, but administrative autonomy should be implemented. He summarizes his understanding of administrative autonomy like decision makers should only come from elected people and freedom to create and use their budget in their region. He also supports the implementation of European Charter of Local Self Government. Dursun Çiçek²¹ says that security, health services and education cannot be given to local administrations. For him, this local administration should be implemented in all regions and provinces of Turkey not to cause a different law and regional government in Turkey like Iraq. He argues that European standards should be the guide for Turkey when she determines her sort of local administration. Sağlar defends that education, health services and local security –not national security- should be given to local administrations too. However, he believes that there must be a standard for education and if the local administrations cannot reach this standard, central government should intervene to improve these services.

Another conflict is seen in the terminology of 'equal citizenship' which is seen in 2015 report of the CHP as noted in the previous chapter. The general understanding of CHP's political elites can be explained as removing all discriminations originating from identity, belief and life style and democratizing the state to reach this idea. However some of the MPs do not accept this terminology like Muharrem İnce²². He opposes this terminology and asks "are we not equal now?"²³ He continues to explain the life standards of Kurds who live in Yalova, in his words:

²¹He is a retired colonel and now, CHP's MP from İstanbul.

²²He is CHP's MP from Yalova

²³Muharrem İnce, Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM), May 3, 2017

“They are employer in thoroughfares. In Diyarbakır, how many Turks could you see as employer? I accept the poverty in Kurdish-populated regions, but poverty does not only occur in Southeast, villages of Çanakkale or İzmir also suffer from poverty.”

Another agreed idea is separating terror problem and the Kurdish question for the solution of the Kurdish question. These problems are not the same as each other set aside not even related according to general understanding of CHP’s political elites. Actually, this idea is coming from the 1989 report of the SHP. According to them, Kurdish question cannot be solved by security strategies. They believe that when Turkey continues her struggle with terror, she should democratize the country coordinately to solve Kurdish question.

All interviewees understand the Baykal’s period as a rupture for the relations with Kurdish question, but their reasons are different to explain this situation. Tüm says that in this period CHP ignored the Kurds when he shares his opinion about Baykal’s period. CHP1 supports this argument with his own experience, in his words:

“I was the candidate in the 2002 election and Önder Sav asked me ‘are you Kurdish?’ as first question. Therefore, I could not be elected. Baykal’s period is very questionable for me.”²⁴

Karayalçın clarifies the reason for the changed attitude of CHP in Baykal’s period with the timely conjuncture. According to him, the conjuncture which affected the DSP, affected the CHP too. This conjuncture included increasing nationalist feeling in the society and DSP came to power with its nationalist discourses. According to CHP1, this changed attitude can be because of the strengthening Kurdish political movement. In other words, Baykal’s administration could believe that when these parties occurred, it is not possible to get vote from Kurdish voters, he says. In Sağlar’s words:

“After Turkey joined NATO alliance, two of six principles of Kemalism changed by the enforcement of United States: secularism and nationalism to mobilize Turkish people against USSR. With the 1980 coup this changed nationalism principle became more assimilationist and reformed with an

²⁴CHP1, Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM), May 2, 2017

ignoring policy of differences. CHP adapted itself NATO's understanding of nationalism rather than Atatürk's vision of nationalism."²⁵

Tanrıkulu explains this period as a period that makes CHP an unreliable party in the eyes of Kurds. For CHP1, CHP started to be seen as a very close party with the MHP on the Kurdish question. According to all interviewees, this period caused a permanent disengagement with the Kurdish political movement and the CHP. They believe that this disengagement became very costly for both CHP's political challenge to become ruling party and democratization of Turkey to solve Kurdish question.

One of the most important points is CHP's actions in the democratic opening process. In this process, CHP should be investigated under two periods, first Baykal's period and second Kılıçdaroğlu's period because there is a huge difference between these two periods towards Kurdish question. In Baykal's period, CHP understood this process as unacceptable and the process of Turkey's separation as shown in the previous chapter. According to Tanrıkulu, Baykal's administrations' position in this process increased the distance between the CHP and the Kurds moreover created hatred against the CHP. He defends that especially CHP's role in Habur crisis created this distance because CHP pumped the fear of separation to the society. He continues with following words:

"If CHP could take a proactive role in this process; its reconciliation with Kurds could be possible. I am not telling that AKP was sincere during the process, but If CHP could be proactive, it could demonstrate the AKP's insincerity to the society."

On the other hand, for Öğüt's perspective, the difficulty of Baykal's period was continuing terrorism in that time. He supports that Baykal cannot support this process as a leader of founder party when terrorism was going on. He believes that the biggest advantage of Kılıçdaroğlu is peaceful environment to support the process. The most different claim comes from Çiçek and he says that there is no any difference between these two periods because according to his perspective:

²⁵According to him, in Atatürk nationalism, all differences are equal with each other under the umbrella of citizenship.

“CHP’s solution proposal is always clear: ignoring terrorism, solution in the parliament and no concession from nation-state and unitary state.”²⁶

In Kılıçdaroğlu’s period, all interviewees believe that the CHP supports a peaceful solution, but it does not support the method because of its non-transparency. Kılıçdaroğlu’s period should be detailed because it still continues and CHP’s political elites’ stories are very different than general perception towards the CHP during the peace process in Kılıçdaroğlu’s period. In Tanrıkulu’s²⁷ words:

“We try to create a consensus between political parties during peace process. In 2012, we try to find a commission in the parliament and visit the AKP to share our idea, but they ignored our project. In this period, ceasefire was cancelled and conflicts re-started. Although they rejected our suggestion and we did not support the method of AKP’s solution strategy, Kılıçdaroğlu said that ‘we give you a blank check for the solution of Kurdish question’. Erdoğan said ‘You are not the person who can give us a blank check.’”

He also claims that today, MPs of the HDP accepted that CHP was right to oppose to the method of the peace process.

As noted in the third chapter, in the CHP’s new proposals for the solution of Kurdish question -2015 Report- there are 4 main strategies. Tanrıkulu explains them briefly as a producer of the report. He explains the differences between Committee of Common Sense (*OrtakAkılHeyeti*) and AKP’s committee of Wiseman (*AkilAdamlar*):

“AKP used the committee as its tool of propaganda, in other words, AKP made its PR via this committee rather than solving Kurdish question via their helps. In our model, we will create a committee with the offered names by all political parties. This committee will be authorized to meet every critical actors of the process under the controlling of the parliament. It must be under control of the parliament because the process should be transparent.”

In addition, he notes that Öcalan could be one of the parts of this committee’s meetings to negotiate, if it will be under control of the parliament. Another sine quo none of the report was founding a commission to face unsolved murders and more

²⁶Dursun Çiçek, Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM), April 20, 2017

²⁷He is the key person to determine CHP’s Kurdish issue approach since 2011, as he says.

openly enlightening of darkness which created bad memories for the Kurds. He says that CHP is ready to do its share about the past. Karayalçın and HilalDokuzcan²⁸ mention that none of the political parties in Turkey, including HDP have a brief vision on the Kurdish question as CHP has. However, he believes that the strategies on the Kurdish question should not be prepared by a group of academicians or a group of MPs, the strategies on the Kurdish question should be prepared after discussing the issue in the Kurdish-populated regions to regain Kurds' trust.

This section thirdly focuses on the problems on cultural rights. Actually during the peace process, some developments occurred in this area. Therefore, there are some different visions between CHP's political elites about problems on cultural rights are going on or not for Kurds. As will be noted below, interviewees are not opposing to discuss the education in mother tongue as a cultural and democratic right. Even more, Tanrıkulu and Sağlar see this right as a necessity of human rights because they believe that mother tongue is a natural right. Sağlar believes that giving Kurdish cultural rights is important, but it should not be ethnic based. He states that CHP, as a social democrat party must determine its policy based on its ideology and shares his ideas by benefiting his own experiences:

“When Baykal was expelling us in 2002, said that ‘2 biggest successes of me is kicking Alevi and Kurds out of the party. Today, Kılıçdaroğlu administration does the exact opposite of this strategy. For me, both of them are wrong, both of them have ethnic tendencies.”

He believes that Kurdish question is the biggest barrier to reach advanced democracy for Turkey. However, the solution should not be based on ethnicity. The best solution way is equal citizenship in his mind and he explains his equal citizenship definition like that there should not be any discrimination between citizens because of their language, ethnic origin, belief, religion, gender and sexual preferences. CHP mentions that how Turkey enforces to recognize Turkmen's rights in Syria or Iraq, she should do the same thing for Turkey's Kurds in Turkey. The only way to make the Kurds feel secure is guaranteeing their rights with law

²⁸Former General Chair women of CHP's women branch, and now vice-president of Socialist International Women (SIW).

and constitution. He does not agree the AKP government recognized the Kurdish rights because there no constitutional guarantee. In his words:

“AKP found TRT6, but there is no law means there is no guarantee. AKP’s purpose is not solving the Kurdish question, their purpose is collecting the Kurdish votes. In addition, Kurdology strategy of the AKP collapsed in practice. They found Kurdology in Mardin, but there is no lecturer in this department.”

Karayalçın opposes the CHP’s opinions, in his perspective, conditions changed. He believes that radio and TV broadcastings are so essential as a part of giving cultural right to the Kurds in order to integrate them to the state. In his words:

“We (SHP-CHP) never said that the Kurdish broadcastings will be in the state channel. These channels strengthen their loyalty to Turkey.”

On the other hand, Tanrikulu believes that cultural right or any other solutions will not be enough for Kurds today because their demands have become socialized. According to his point of view, Kurds want to have a self-governance, but not leaving from Turkey. In other words, autonomy can be true concept about what he wants to underline and more specifically what Kurds demand according to him. In his perspective, the first step to solve Kurdish question is accepting Kurds’ socialized demands or demand of self-governance and other dimensions of the solution can be accepted as recognizing their cultural and human rights in international standards. However, this thought is unacceptable in Çiçek’s perspective because he believes that accepting the Kurdish rights are socialized means giving autonomy to them. Giving autonomy to Kurds will exactly make Turkey like Iraq and Syria. According to him, a model like United States is not possible. In his words:

“United States is united from different parts, but if we try to implement this model, especially in this region, it certainly will become like Syria and Iraq. It is inevitable.”

As a result, as seen above, although CHP published some reports to show CHP’s understanding of Kurdish issue, CHP’s elites understanding of both; the approach to the Kurdish issue and the understanding of CHP’s solution suggestions are different from each other. This is because CHP’s grassroots consist of Kemalist and

social democrats. Moreover, these groups are not totally different than each other, these two concepts interlocked in the CHP's grassroots. The differences between the grassroots appeared on the Kurdish issue. While some of the members of CHP still perceive the Kurdish issue the same way as the fathers of the Republic of Turkey did; in the form of underdevelopment and imperialist plans, another group tries to describe the issue under social democratic vision through democratization and recognizing Kurds' cultural rights. Therefore, the different understandings among CHP's political elites can be accepted as a reflection of this difference in the grassroots of the CHP.

4.3 The Kurdish Issue in the Form of Regional Underdevelopment and Feudalism

During the early Republican period, the Kurdish issue was described under the concepts of underdevelopment and feudalism. Actually this is not only the method of description by Kemalist regime; Turkish Left has used the same concepts to describe the Kurdish issue in Turkey (Ünlü, 2013, p. 23). Therefore, struggling with underdevelopment and feudalism took a remarkable part in most of CHP's social democratic period's reports –SHP's period- as well. These concepts maintained its importance in the party reports until Kılıçdaroğlu's term. In Kılıçdaroğlu's term, CHP formed a new vision to describe its understanding of Kurdish issue, but the majority of CHP's elites describe their understanding of Kurdish issue different than both party reports and each other. In this section, CHP's elites understanding on these two concepts –regional underdevelopment and feudalism- will be discussed.

First of all, all of the interviewees agree on the multi-dimensional structure of Kurdish issue. They accept that there is not only one reason to describe the Kurdish issue. On the other hand, there is not a single unified idea about issues of this subchapter among the interviewees. Emphasis on underdevelopment and feudalism were so strong as solution suggestions of CHP tradition in the 1989 and following

reports until CHP formed a new Kurdish issue vision with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. According to Karayalçın, feudal system lost its importance in the region when compared 1990s due to migration to western provinces. According to him, it should be possible with the implementation of GAP in the region. In his words:

“Turkey could bring water to the villagers who are waiting for water to irrigate their lands. Then we need to organize the producers and coming together this organization with public. As a result, we could create a public peoples’ partnership to solve this feudal structure.”

Tanrikulu also agrees with this idea and adds that if village guard system abolishes, the feudal structure will fully collapse. Çiçek does not agree with this idea because according to him, one of the best ways to struggle with PKK terror is village guard system. He believes that this system shows that PKK is not representing local people. On the other side, CHP1 believes that feudal system continues in the southeast region. He says that people still can make trade by using the power of their surname. Dokuzcan argues that the feudal system has never collapsed for women. This situation causes high rate of incest relationships and child marriage. Actually, this structure is not only problem for women, man also cannot realize their rights and freedoms. Ali Tirali²⁹ believes that feudal structure does not continue in the Southeast Anatolia. Its effect is less limited compared to the past. He believes that the reasons why the feudal structure lost its effect in the Southeast Anatolia are market relations and continuity of the conflict. He supports that the conflict between state and the PKK, on the one hand, made the feudal structure weak because of its conflict with feudal people who do not support the PKK and on the other hand, made strong some of the members of feudal structure in the region indirectly like families who became a part of village guard system. As a result, in his words “Feudal structure has become less important for the region since 1970s.”³⁰

²⁹He is the member of executive board of Social Democracy Foundation of Turkey (*Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı, SODEV*) and Delegate of CHP’s Youth Branch for Kadıköy. In addition, He is PhD candidate at History Department of Boğaziçi University.

³⁰Ali Tirali, SODEV in Beyoğlu, July, 2, 2017.

CHP1 claims that if SHP could be successful in its vision on economic investment, land reform and industrialization, the problem would be solved. He strongly emphasizes the underdevelopment in the region. According to him, the biggest problem of the region is unemployment because there is no job opportunity for the local people like factories. Therefore, local people only talk about police, soldiers, dead bodies and funerals, he mentions. According to him, the priority of the state should be solving the underdevelopment of the region by investments. According to Ögüt, the unemployment which was knowingly created in the region. In other words, he understands why the factories like Sümerbank or Tekel were closed. It was to enforce people to migrate to the Western provinces and provide cheap labor. Dokuzcan also talks about economic dimension and in her perspective if CHP could increase development, production and women's role in the society when it comes to power, the problem can be solved. In her words:

“Actually, this model is used all around the world to end the conflicts, wars and to build the peace. Main projects of this model are creating cooperatives, economic development, women unions and so on.”³¹

According to İnce, underdevelopment is a serious problem for the region, but it is not the only reason. Actually all other political elites agree on that. He says this problem has different dimensions on law, culture and underdevelopment. CHP1 also emphasizes the education problem as one of the major problems of the region. He underlines that it is always problematic, but with new education system (4+4+4), it became worse. According to his perspective, children who come from poor families can get education in district schools, but the AKP government removed the district school with this new education system. He believes that AKP tries to create an uneducated generation in the southeast region of Turkey to exclude them from the system even more. Çiçek says that PKK cannot be accepted as representative of local people, in his view, PKK is one of the examples of the large number of terrorist organizations in the region. He accepts that state implemented wrong

³¹Hilal Dokuzcan, Kadıköy local branch of CHP, May 9, 2017

strategies and caused traumas in the region, but proposed a different item for the agenda:

“I think the biggest problem of the region is underdevelopment, but it does not show that state did not invest in the region. When I was battalion commander in Şırnak in 1990s, Turkish state tried to invest to this region like providing electricity to the smallest villages and so on. The purpose of Turkey was hindering the depressed feelings in the region. Even in this period, there was no electricity in the majority of villages of Black Sea. However, these electric lines were cut by the members of PKK to hinder their integration to the state.”

He also argues that actually it is the plan of Israel and the United States because they do not want to see Turks and Kurds as one body. For his view, after June 7 process reminds him 1990s because he believes that PKK did not want to a strengthening legal Kurdish movement as a representative of Kurds. Therefore, HDP should keep distance with PKK and integrate itself to the democratic politics to be the key actor for the democratic solution of the Kurdish question. Dokuzcan mentions that CHP paid the biggest price for the mistakes of representatives of Kurdish politics during 1990s like not passing the threshold. Therefore, the solution is only possible in a future CHP government. Tirali believes that there is a relation between underdevelopment of the region and Kurdish nationalism because the poverty and ethnic differences interlocked in Turkey. In other words, he defends that east of the Euphrates suffered from poverty more and they are also ethnically different. He explains his argument with the slogans of Eastern rallies which took place in the final years of 1960s. In his words, “Main slogans emphasized on the underdevelopment, poverty, illiteracy, difference of language and Kurdishness.” As a result, according to his perspective, underdevelopment is one of the most important components of Kurdish nationalism. However, he mentions that today, a development movement is neither realistic nor logical because Turkey stopped its development movements after Özal, hence it is not realistic. On the other hand, it is not logical or meaningful for the region and for the social peace is developed Kurdish nationalism. In his words:

“If Turkey could develop the region in 1940s or 1950s, it could slow the Kurdish nationalism down. In my opinion, the development means

connecting this region to Çukurova, Mersin or İskenderun with capitalist relations or productions.”

In other words, he believes that regional development is not logical to take place in a possible new vision of the CHP when the Kurdish nationalism occurred and even peaked.

As a result, when some of the elites believe that these feudalism and regional underdevelopment maintain their key roles for the solution of Turkey’s Kurdish issue, others believe that parameters changed, and these concepts are not enough to describe the Kurdish issue today. In addition, CHP’s women and young branches’ approach tried to show above.

4.4 CHP’s Perception Towards Kurds in the Middle East

CHP as a state founder party had a tradition to explain all unrests which come from Kurds with imperialist plans and it is possible to see that it still continues between some of the elites of the CHP. When some of them maintain this perception to explain both the Middle Eastern crises and Turkey’s Kurdish question, others believe that Turkey’s Kurdish question is not about imperialist plans. In this context, this subchapter’s main objectives will be Kurds in the context of imperialist plans in the Middle East; CHP’s solution offers to solve continuous crises in the Middle East and Euphrates Shield Operation in the context of Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish question.

First Kurds in the context of imperialist plans in the Middle East will be examined in this subchapter. Although there are pros and cons about this issue, the majority of interviewees believe that the crisis, including Kurds in the Middle East, and even (generally) Kurdish issue in Turkey are not independent from imperialist plans to control the Middle East. Ögüt says that a Kurdish state already is founded in the Middle East with the support of two big imperialist powers: The United States and Russia. According to him, an ideological togetherness was shaped among Kurds, including Turkey’s Kurds with this imperialist support. Çiçek supports this

argument and mentions that Western states and Israel want to found a Kurdish state in the Middle East to control the energy sources in the region. In his words "This plan is planned to be implemented in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria." In İnce's perspective, a Kurdish state which could be founded between Syria and Iraq cannot be acceptable for Turkey because he believes that it will result in Great Kurdistan. In other words, he thinks that it will cause the separation of Turkey at the end. CHP1 interprets Turkey's mistakes on the Kurdish question as follows:

"We can put the human rights and democratic values away in the southeastern region of Turkey because it is enforced to Turkey by the imperialist powers. They know that if Turkey solves its Kurdish question, they will lose their biggest advantage to use against Turkey."

Dokuzcan's claims also support the arguments of CHP1. She claims that Turkey's Kurdish question gives advantage to Western powers to control Turkey in her relations between Iraq, Iran and Syria. However as noted above there are some counterarguments to these perceptions. Although Sağlar agrees that there are imperialist plans to reshape the Middle East, he focuses on Turkey's Kurdish question in a different perspective. He believes that the reason why the Middle Eastern crisis affected Turkey's Kurds is intervening the Middle Eastern crisis and choosing a part in the conflicts. He also criticizes Turkey to send weapons to the conflicting region and to act against the Kurds who live in Middle East as an enemy. According to him, these are the reasons why Turkey's Kurds affected from Middle Eastern crisis. Tanrikulu believes that Kurdish issue is no longer only related with Turkey's Kurds. According to him, currently Kurdish issue is not independent from Iraq, Iran and Syria. He claims that Turkey's Kurds want to see Turkey as a protector of Middle Eastern Kurds instead of seeing Turkey as a part of different alliances in the Middle East. He gives an example to clarify his claim with Kobane protests in Turkey:

"Kurds ensured that Turkish politics blind to the Kurdish mothers' tear because of the governments' actions and discourses during the Kobane crisis."

Tirali mentions that PKK is not a project designed by imperialist powers. According to his perspective, PKK is the result of both Turkey's unsolved Kurdish question

and increased Kurdish nationalism. He continues to explain the relations between PKK and imperialist powers as follows:

“Imperialist powers have relations with all guerilla movements, after PKK developed, they started to contact with imperialist powers.”

Tirali also thinks the same thing for Middle Eastern Kurds (Syria’s and Iraq’s Kurds). He mentions that Kurds as a nation who suffered from Halabja massacre can normally want to take imperialist powers’ support to protect themselves.

Second issue of this section will be Middle East and Euphrates Shield Operation in the context of Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish question. In this issue there is no consensus between interviewees too. Some of them support the operations when others strongly see the operations unacceptable. Ögüt believes that these operations deepen the Kurdish issue and make a possible solution more difficult. He also defends that a Kurdish corridor in the borders of Turkey is not acceptable, but he does not support this kind of operations neither. He believes that Turkey should not have intervened the Middle Eastern conflicts since the beginning. He explains the current situation of the Middle East as a result of imperialist plans. He supports Atatürk’s idea to not intervene the Middle Eastern conflicts, in his words “If your home built with glass, you cannot throw stone to your neighbor’s home.” On his point of view, Turkey should have supported the Assed regime since the beginning as a legitimate authority instead of supporting some illegal groups. He further claims that as an imperialist plan the imperialist powers try to create four different and fundamentalist parties; a party only represents Alevis, a party only represents Sunni Muslims, a party only represents Turkish nationalist and a party only represents Kurds. Sağlar firstly criticizes the CHP’s support when the government took authorization from the parliament to the cross-border operations. He says that Turkey interferes in Syria’s internal affairs and it is not acceptable. In his words:

“We are the neighbors and we, as a nation that never forgets what Arabs did in the WWI to us should not interfere our neighbors in their internal affairs because they will not forget Turkey’s responsibility after this situation comes to an end.”

For Dokuzcan, main motto of Turkey should become again Atatürk's "peace at home, peace in the world" perspective to survive in the region and Turkey should not separate its citizens depending on their ethnicity. She believes that Turkish citizens cannot reflect as a nation in this crisis because government took a specific part in the Middle Eastern crisis. This causes a separation between citizens, they start to support the groups from their ethnic origin. CHP's arguments are very similar what Dokuzcan underlines, he only added a claim to her perspective that Turkey intervened to the region to help Barzani. According to Karayalçın, Turkey and CHP must have two musts: peace in the region and territorial integrity in the region. In his words:

"Turkey should not oppose any new model in the Middle East like Northern Iraq as long as territorial integrity of the regional states is protected and Turkey is not threatened by any menace or enemy. In addition, Turkey should not allow an administration of PKK in the region because this kind of administration can cause desperate results for Turkey like separation."

Tüm summarizes his ideas about these operations and Middle Eastern Kurds as follow; Turkey should not intervene in these conflicts that relates to the decision of whether they will live together with Syria and Iraq or not. It is not Turkey's business. The biggest supporter of AKP's Euphrates Shield Operation is Çiçek and even he says that Turkey got late to intervene the region. According to him, this operation was necessary because of three reasons: to control the regions that attack to Kilis and Hatay with missiles, to stop the migration from Syria by creating a security zone and to hinder a possible Kurdish corridor that is enforced by imperial states to cut Turkey's communication with the Middle East. Tirali's perspective for the Euphrates Shield Operation is very different than majority of the interviewees. He believes that AKP uses these operations as a tool to increase its hegemony in the domestic politics by increasing nationalist feelings. On the other hand, according to his perspective, AKP's idea to not allow a Kurdish corridor in the Turkey's borders is not welcomed by Turkey's Kurds. He believes however that AKP could not be as successful as they planned in these operations. Therefore, this operation did not affect Kurds as Kobane process, he argues.

The third and last focal point of this section is about what CHP suggests to solve the Middle Eastern conflicts. The suggestions of the interviewees are generally parallel with each other. Çiçek says that Turkey should effort to end the conflict and enforce the democratic elections in the region to re-establish the peaceful environment in the region. In his perspective, CHP opposes every fundamentalist movement in Turkey and in the region. He claims that the only solution to re-establish the peaceful environment in the region is equal citizenship and democratization. He mentions that fundamentalist solutions like ethnic based states will not serve the peace and stability of the region, including Kurds. He believes that the most important signal of imperialist plans which planned by instigating the Kurds in the region is the alliance of Russia and United States about the future of Middle Eastern Kurds. İnce notes that if Turkey does not want to be like Syria or Iraq, she should improve its standards on public services to demonstrate the Kurds that their standards would not be better than in Turkey in a possible Kurdistan. He mentions that if Turkey could do this, it can be model for other states of the region in the future peace talks.

Tirali criticizes CHP to not have a specific policy towards Middle Eastern Kurds. He says that there are some members of CHP who support the state tradition and have prejudice against Middle Eastern Kurds. According to his perspective, these people support the AKP's efforts to hinder an independence or autonomous Kurdistan in the west of Euphrates because of this prejudice. In his perspective, the source of their prejudice is Turkey's opposition against a Kurdish state in its borders since 1980s. For him, CHP should see the changing parameters of Kurdish issue. Changing parameters mean Kurdish issue became an issue of Middle East, instead of becoming Turkey's domestic politics according to his point view. Even more, the issue transformed into an international issue for his outlook. In other words, CHP should not oppose to a possible Kurdish state in the Middle East categorically in his perspective. In other words, CHP should not oppose it when it does not damage Turkey's national interest and even more, CHP should decide what it prefers in Turkey's border, a Kurdish state or ISIS, Tirali believes. In his words:

“CHP should accept that a nation like Kurds who are the largest non-state and homogenous society in their region will gain their independence at the end. If CHP could do this, it could help to build peace between Turkey’s Kurds and CHP in the long term.”

In this section, CHP’s understanding of the development, which occurred in the Middle East demonstrated by showing their ideas on Kurds in the Middle East and Turkey’s military operations towards Middle East. The first discussion was on the elites of CHP’s idea of imperialist plans in the Middle East. The second was to show their understanding of current situation of Kurds in the Middle East and the last one was about their opinions for Turkey’s cross-border operations.

4.5 Future Prospects of Interviewees on the Kurdish question

As seen in the previous sections, CHP’s elites have many different proposals on the solution of Kurdish issue. This makes a future prospects section necessary to share both their different ideas for a possible solution of Kurdish issue and to share their idea for a possible peace process under the leadership of the CHP. In this regard, there are different views on CHP’s needed new vision between the interviewees. It will be demonstrated under this title first and secondly, HDP’s role in their solution models will be examined.

Karayağın believes that Kurdish issue is a problem of Turkey rather than the only problem of Turkey’s Kurds. It is the problem about Turkey’s brotherhood, democracy, human rights and national integrity. According to him and İnce, Turkey should discuss the education in mother tongue, but Karayağın believes that Turkey must protect its unitary structure because for his perspective, it is the only way to survive in this region. Therefore, Turkey should discuss the education in mother tongue with this precondition. İnce underlines that CHP’s first step to solve the Kurdish issue must be principled. According to him, voted ‘yes’ in the voting for abolishing parliamentary immunities is not acceptable for a party that tries to build peace with Kurds. On his perspective, the only solution is possible in the parliament, “not in Kandil, Dolmabahçe or with committee of Wiseman.” He

believes that CHP needs to persuade the people who live in Western provinces or Black Sea region for the peace and when this process is going on, struggle with terror should continue. He summarizes his perspective as follows:

“It should be solved under the umbrella of TBMM and via elected representatives, there will be justice in the representation, election threshold will be decreased, the process will be transparent and taking plunge is possible, but with transparency.”

According to CHP1, lifting the immunities were not wrong because CHP only defends the chair immunity and promised to lift the immunities before the election. In his words “CHP did the necessity of its party program.” He does not agree that lifting parliamentary immunity about Kurdish political movement in practice. He argues that it was about all summary of proceedings and support his parties’ decision to notes he also has 8 proceedings. He says that in his view, first step should be not focusing on Kurdish issue in accordance with the conjuncture because in Turkish politics, politicians have focused on this issue cyclical. His musts for a possible new vision of CHP can be summarized democratization, freedom and guarantee of state of law. Sağlar’s vision has two crucial points that creating equality between citizens and makes the CHP joint of this equality and improving communication with Kurds. He defends that CHP cannot make its policies ethnic based as a social democrat party; it should determine its policies for common good of people. Tanrikulu claims that CHP is interested in every single problem of Kurds now and it became a party that can be voted in the eyes of Kurds, but still not a party that can get Kurdish votes. There is a consensus between interviewees that the partnership for ‘no’ campaign in April 16 referendum will help the peace between Kurds and the CHP. In Tanrikulu’s words:

“Kurds and CHP will come together because of Islamic fascism as secular groups of the society.”

Dokuzcan has a very different perspective than all others. According to her, the first needs of the region are love and kindness because people who live in this region suffer from many traumas. She observes that CHP has forgotten the region for a long time, so it is not seen in the field. This situation caused to the ceased relations

between Kurds and CHP. In her perspective, CHP could not reach the local dynamics because of this situation. She defines women's role under the umbrella of motherhood. In her words:

“Women's role is very important because the problem in southeast affects the mothers who live in western provinces because their children must join the army. Therefore, mothers should be one of the elements of a possible new vision of CHP.”

She offers the CHP what they did in the central executive board of women branch that there must be members in the party assembly from the provinces which CHP does not have MPs. Another advice from her is regional meetings; she believes that these meeting are strengthening the relations between local people and the CHP because of her observations when she was general chair in the women branch of the CHP.

Another different vision comes from Ali Tirali as a member of CHP's youth branch. On the one hand, he shares his idea how CHP's youths approach to the Kurds and Kurdish issue and on the other hand, he sorts his solution proposals to build a peace between Kurds and CHP. Firstly, for his point of view, CHP's youths are less prejudiced and more open-minded on the Kurdish issue in comparison with CHP's middle aged members. However, their number is still not enough, he believes. According to him, majority of members of CHP youth branch is Turkish –if not counting Alevi-Kurds. Therefore, he supports that there is no dialogue platform between young Kurdish people and CHP's youths. He proposes to organize some platforms like seminars, panels, workshops for CHP's youth branch to work together with Kurdish-leftist young people. These kinds of events can be helpful to break down the prejudices between the parties. He argues that “although CHP can make peace with Kurds, there is no a formula to make CHP strong in the region again.” He says that he is hopeful about future alliances between CHP and Kurdish political movement owing to new system (presidential system). According to his perspective, new system will enforce both parties to pragmatic alliances under the title of “democrat powers of the society”. Another proposal from him is the continuous appearance of CHP in the region and he believes that this is only

possible with a strong and dynamic women and youth branches. He believes that this strategy should not be about electoral concerns, CHP needs to get in contact with Turkey's Kurds as a social democratic party.

Lastly, in CHP's new solution model, as noted in the previous chapter and this chapter, TBMM is the only place for the solution of Kurdish issue. Therefore, political parties are the main actors in that kind of a solution model. Some of the interviewees give a special role to HDP different than all other political parties when some of them are not. However, their priorities are the same that HDP must keep distance with PKK terrorism. Ögüt notes that CHP should come to power strongly to take steps courageously in the Kurdish issue. He believes that the establishment of a Secular-Kurdish party is a result of a planned project. In his perspective, the HEP was more leftist, and even a party that had a Turkish socialist chair. However, PKK did not allow that and Kurdish political movement became radicalized day by day.

According to CHP1, HDP can be a special actor in the CHP's peace model, but the majority of HDP MPs are the part of feudal system which is seen in the southeastern region. Therefore, HDP should solve this structure which is one of the dilemmas of Kurdish issue first, for his perspective. Sağlar criticizes the CHP's current situation, he believes that CHP lost its social democratic vision day by day after its re-opening by Baykal in 1992. Thus, according to him, CHP should social democratize itself again to re-ally with Kurdish movement. Dokuzcan's perspective is similar to Sağlar's vision, she says that our partnership during the referendum is meaningful. She believes that there is no difference between grassroots of CHP and HDP on democracy and secularism. Therefore, CHP should emphasize its democratic, secular and social democratic program instead of emphasizing nationalist values. According to her, CHP should re-ally with Kurds for both to come to power and to solve the Kurdish issue because she argues that Kurds are the most politicized part of the society and they can act collectively on a social event.

On the other hand, Çiçek says that CHP is doing its best to re-ally Kurdish movement, but HDP is not. He notes that HDP can be accepted as the most

important actor as a legitimate party which is represented in the parliament, however it should do two things to re-ally with Turkish social democratic movement. First, they should take lessons from alliance which occurred in 1990s because their irresponsible actions caused losing grassroots for the SHP/CHP, especially from its social democratic and Kemalist grassroots. Second, they should keep distance with PKK terrorism and they can do some symbolic actions to show that they do not want to separate the state like joining a martyr funeral. Tanrıkulu states that HDP cannot be excluded as a party that has secular and democratic grassroots, if Turkey attempts to re-establish its democracy and secular system. He claims that CHP's neo-nationalist grassroots will neither be a handicap nor the solution of Kurdish issue and to re-ally Kurds to re-establish democracy. From the July 7, 2015 election on, especially during the April 16 referendum, CHP and HDP's grassroots started to breakdown the prejudices against each other.

Ince notes that the first step for the CHP should be not to be afraid to associate with HDP because according to his perspective, CHP did some big mistakes because of this fear like voting of lifting parliamentary immunities as noted above. Tirali says that Öcalan cannot be an official part of CHP's solution model, but HDP should continue its contact with Öcalan in a possible solution opportunity of CHP and HDP. According to him, HDP will be the main part of CHP's solution model as the legal representative of Kurds. However, HDP and CHP should mutually break down the prejudices against each other's grassroots, in his perspective. He has some proposals for both parties to succeed in this. According to him, HDP should respect the CHP's symbols like Atatürk or the values of the Republic. In his words:

“For example, HDP MPs can visit Anıtkabir to demonstrate that they respect to CHP's symbols. On the other hand, CHP should show to Kurdish people that the process will result in a more democratic state and Kurdish cultural rights will be legally recognized.”

As a result, as it is seen above, on the Kurdish issue, there is no consensus between the CHP's elites neither to describe the Kurdish issue nor offering solution ways, as it has been demonstrated above, they are in different positions in different concepts. Moreover, some traditions of Kemalist period continues among some of

the elites like trying to explain Kurdish issue with feudal relations, underdevelopment or imperialist plans. It is possible to see that they also offer some social democratic visions to solve the Kurdish question like democratization, equality (equal citizenship) or recognizing their cultural rights. The only consensus between CHP's political elites occurs around the idea that the only actor that can solve the Kurdish issue is CHP.

The CHP's solution model is not seen easily implemented if it comes to power because of mismatching opinions between its elites on the Kurdish issue. Moreover, their opinions are sometimes contrary to each other's proposals. Moreover, the CHP's grassroots' approaches also are different than each other, and the CHP brings together social democrats and Kemalists in its grassroots. In addition, the CHP changed its party approach towards Kurdish issue in order not to lose its traditional grassroots during Baykal period as noted above. Therefore, CHP's new vision is also not easy to implement in practice. Even if CHP could implement these proposals, it is not easy to get the Kurdish votes, when a strong Kurdish party participates to the elections. In summary, the only way can be pragmatist alliance owing to new election system and the new regime of Turkey as some of the interviewees stated above. The grassroots of the HDP and CHP can come together under the idea to support and defend the democracy and secularism.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The CHP is the only coeval party of the Republic of Turkey and the only party, which has a had a single-party period in Turkey. This single-party era called as Kemalist regime as well. The Kemalist regime tried to create a secular-nation state; the Kurds were the biggest reactionaries of the new regime. Their reactions came into existence as rebellions. These rebellions were quelled by the Kemalist regime via extreme military forces including air strike. After the Dersim rebellion was quelled by the Kemalist regime, the Kurdish question was covered by the state until the establishment of the PKK.

After this period, a great silence started in the Kurdish-populated provinces. Other breaking points started to emerge from the aftermath of transition to a multi-party system, in the DP years. During this period there are two important developments, which directly or indirectly are related to Turkey's Kurds. One development, directly related to the Kurds, is the increased level of Kurdish migration to more economically developed areas. This migration resulted in a soaring education level and is accepted as the emergence of the Kurdish middle class. On the other hand, the indirect one is the emergence of a commercial bourgeoisie in the DP years because Kurds benefited from this periods' relative liberalism. These two developments directly or indirectly helped a secularization among Kurds.

In the 1960s, those secularized Kurds tried to take place in Turkey's leftist movements, especially in the Turkish Labor Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP). In the aftermath of the Eastern rallies, Kurdish leftist movements exited from Turkey's leftist movements as a whole and tried to organize their own strong movements. However, it was not possible due to factionalism until the PKK occurred. The PKK

was successful in becoming a hegemonic power in the Kurdish movement, especially after the second half of the 1980s. Meanwhile, the SHP tried to social-democratize itself. This process resulted in a progressive Kurdish report. This report was an essential step for a party, which determines the states' ignoring policy of Kurds during its single party period.

In the second chapter of this thesis, the main focal point is the historical context and dynamics of the Kurdish question in Turkey from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. In this chapter, the relations between Kurds and state during the single party era are discussed; first, to show both the dynamics of the problematic relation between the state and Kurds, and then to show the CHP's ideological bases, which limit the undertaking of social democratic plunges. This section was also helpful to show the CHP/SHP's failure on the democratic solution of the Kurdish question in practice.

The second purpose of this chapter was to show the politicization process of the Kurds, especially after the 1960s and which peaked in the 1990s. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Eastern bloc collapsed and some values began spreading all around the world like democratization, human rights, and so on. As a result of these spreading values, the Kurdish movement transformed into a more socialized structure and also transformed a collective movement in the Kurdish-populated provinces. This collective movement and some calls of the PKK for a collective behavior caused an increased effect of military service over democratic politics.

The third objective of the chapter was to demonstrate the changing parameters in the 2000s on the Kurdish question. In this period, two important development occurred in Turkey. First, at the end of 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s, Turkey's effort to become a member of the European Union increased. This increased effort led to some changes in the Kurdish question understanding of the state in practice like abolishing martial law, which was implemented in Kurdish populated regions for a long time. Secondly, AKP came to power in Turkey as a result of two factors; the 2001 economic crises in practice and increased presence of Islam in Turkey. During the first period of this Islamic party (2002-2007), the

military status quo strongly continued, so the party tried to get rid of the status quo by the help of the reform packages. This period is seen as a period to increase international support for the AKP. In their second period (2007-2011), they tried to increase their alliances in Turkey, and the 2009 local election was a serious breaking point for the starting of democratic opening process of the Kurdish question, because the AKP lost a remarkable number of votes and number of municipalities in the Kurdish-populated regions. Therefore, a democratic opening/peace process started in 2009 and continued until 2015, although some crises between the government and the PKK.

In the third chapter, the main objective was to explain CHP's shifts –ruptures or continuities- on the Kurdish question based on the published reports by the SHP and CHP. In this chapter, the general political environment is demonstrated in order to understand its effects over the CHP's shifts. In addition, during the first half of 1990s, the CHP/SHP was in power as a coalition partner, but the party could not be successful in implementing its offers, which took place in the party reports about the Kurdish question. This situation is also explained with the help of understanding the general political environment. On the other hand, the effect of the Kurdish question understanding of the single party period like underdevelopment, imperialist plans and feudalism on the CHP's Kurdish question reports, written after 1989 evaluated.

Another important actor, which determines CHP's Kurdish question perception is its leader. Therefore, this chapter focuses on 4 periods: first, the Erdal İnönü period under the 1989 report, the Deniz Baykal period under published numerous reports, the very short Altan Öymen period and the Kılıçdaroğlu period.

During the Erdal İnönü period, although some effects of single party's perception seen in the party reports, the reports were very progressive in relation to its political environment. The reason for this progressive discourse was the new outlook of the SHP to create a more social democratic party. However, SHP could not be successful in implementing its offers on the Kurdish question when it was in power because of increased terror and simultaneously decreased effect of civil politics.

Secondly, Baykal re-opened the CHP and his period was the longest period after 1990 in the CHP. His period was important because he changed the CHP's discourse in the Kurdish question, his discourses were close to the single-party period. Even more, during the Baykal period, the CHP rejected its own offers, which took place in its previous reports for the democratic solution of Kurdish question when AKP offered them during the peace process.

Thirdly, although the Altan Öymen period was very short, it was a very progressive period for the CHP history. In this period, CHP announced that the only way for democratizing Turkey is through solving the Kurdish question. Moreover, the solution of the Kurdish question entered to CHP's agenda as a first priority of the party in Öymen period.

Fourthly, Kılıçdaroğlu period issued in this chapter because there are remarkable changes in CHP's Kurdish question approach in this period. Firstly, some people, who were interested in the Kurdish question, like Sezgin Tanrıkulu, became CHP's MP in this period. Secondly, the CHP changed its Kurdish question vision and revised its offers for the solution of the issue. Before this period, the CHP used the 1989 report as party politics on the Kurdish question by revising it. In this period, the CHP had determined a new vision and published it as a report before the 2015 election. In this report, there is no emphases on feudalism and underdevelopment. The CHP's main strategies seen as democratization, increasing and implementing human rights, creating a transparent peace process, and recognizing Kurds' cultural rights legally in this new vision.

In the fourth chapter, the applied methodology was semi-structured in-depth interviews with key actors of the CHP, who took place in the determining process of Kurdish question approach, and who are interested in the Kurdish question. In the first section of this chapter, a short history of how the CHP determined its Kurdish question approach after 1989 explained via collected data from the interviews first. Then, the CHP's understanding of Kurdish question questioned under three main subtitles and 6 main themes: the role of Kurds in the Middle East in CHP's solution model; Kurdish question as democratization, human and cultural

rights; the Kurdish question as feudalism and underdevelopment. Lastly, political elites of CHP's offer for a possible solution model of the CHP discussed under the future prospects on the solution of the Kurdish question.

In first half of 1990s for the SHP, two important development occurred for the SHP, which published 1989 report and expelled Kurdish MPs. The road map of 1989 report explained under 3 main actors and factors by the interviewees. First, there is a consensus on Erdal İnönü's social democrat view as an effect between the interviewees. Secondly, some of the interviewees explain this process as a result of new world order because according to their perspective, SHP tried to re-determine its social democrat and republican identities. This situation resulted in ethnic identity alongside with republican identity (citizenship). Thirdly, SHP's organizational form, which gave opportunity to every single member to join the decision making process accepted as one of the factor of the publication of 1989 report. In addition, Democratic Left Party's (Demokratik Sol Party, DSP) emergence in the parliament enforced the SHP to the new alliances according to some interviewees. Therefore, emergence of DSP in the parliament accepted as external factor in the publication process of 1989 report.

The second important breaking point for the SHP and Turkey's social democratic movement was expelling the Kurdish MPs from the SHP. None of the interviewees support their expelling today, but majority of them blamed the Kurdish MPs because of their "irresponsible actions" after they elected. According to witnesses, the crises which occurred because of this irresponsible actions led to increased public pressure over the SHP. The interviewees believe that the only reason was public pressure to expel them from the SHP.

The second subsection of this chapter was about democratization, human and cultural rights. First, the principle of the local administration was emphasized since the 1989 report, as discussed in this subsection. There is no a consensus about the content of this principle. While some of them support that education, health services and regional security should be under responsibility of the local administrations, others believe that these areas cannot be given to local administrations because it

can cause a political autonomy and it is not acceptable for CHP. Although there is no consensus on the understanding of local administration, there is a consensus between interviewees on the necessity to implement the European Charter of Local Self Government in Turkey as a part of solution of Kurdish question.

Another part of CHP's new vision (2015 report) has been 'equal citizenship' and it is another conflict area between the interviewees. According to some of the interviewees, this terminology is not acceptable, because all Turkish citizens are already equal since the foundation of the Republic in their perspective. On the other hand, others believe that equal citizenship is one of the musts of the solution of the Kurdish question, because some implementation of the state and some of the law of the constitution lead to discrimination between citizens in their perspective.

In this subsection, the CHP's distance during the peace process is also critically examined. First of all, all of the interviewees accepted the Baykal period as a rupture for CHP's Kurdish question approach, however their reasons to think that it is a rupture are different. Some of them believe that this rupture occurred as a result of timely conjuncture (increasing nationalist feelings in the society); some believe that a strong Kurdish movement existed and the CHP tried to protect its traditional grassroots. An additional claim came from Fikri Sağlar, according to his perspective; the CHP adapted itself to a new kind of nationalism, which was constructed by NATO. All of the interviewees believe that a noticeable change occurred after Kılıçdaroğlu elected as the general chair of the party. There is a consensus why the distance continued to the peace process. The interviewees say that the CHP had a distance to the process because of two reasons; its non-transparency and staying out of parliament control. In addition, the interviewees make note that Kılıçdaroğlu gave a blank check to the government for the solution of the issue, but they rejected his offer.

CHP's elites view on the Kurdish cultural rights also questioned in this subsection. According to a group of elite, most of the Kurds' cultural rights were given during the peace process, but other group believes that there is not any legal guarantee for these rights. According to them, the CHP should state that Kurdish rights will be

recognized legally. Another questioned area was over whether the Kurdish demands are socialized or not and two tendencies took place between CHP elites on this question. One of the group believe that Kurdish demands are socialized and they want to administrate themselves, but not want to separate the state. Other group believes that acceptance of socialized Kurdish demands cannot be acceptable because this will be resulted in division of the state.

Feudalism and regional underdevelopment perceptions of Kemalist regime were also issued in this chapter as a subsection. Two tendencies seen about the concept of feudalism as a reason for unsolved Kurdish question. One group believes that this problem had already been solved owing to migration and the PKK's hegemony increased. Some of these people believe that if village guard system abolished, the problem of feudalism totally solved in the region. On the other hand, the other group believe that feudalism still continues in the region and even they still elected as MP by the help of the power of their surnames. A different interviewee believes that the village guard system is the most effective way to struggle with PKK terrorism.

Another focal point of this section was underdevelopment. The general perception about regional underdevelopment and lack of education that is the one of the most significant reasons of the Kurdish question, and should take a part in the possible new solution model of the CHP. However, a few interviewees believe that it is too late to solve the Kurdish question by solving the regional underdevelopment. It could be possible to solve Kurdish question via developing the region in 1940s and 1950s, according to their opinion.

In the third subsection of this chapter, CHP's view about Kurds in the Middle East and the current situation of the Middle East addressed to understand what CHP elites think about the relation of Turkey's Kurdish question and Kurds in the Middle East. Firstly, Kurdish question is an imperialist plan or not in the eyes of interviewees questioned in this subsection. Majority of the interviewees believe that this issue a part of imperialist plan in the Middle East and Turkey. Even more, they believe that it is the biggest winning tool of the imperialist powers against Turkey. On the other hand, minority of the interviewees believes that the Kurdish question

is not a plan of imperialist powers. The issue occurred as a result of unsolved unrests of the Kurds since the establishment of the republic.

Another issue of this subsection was about the Kurds in the Middle East and Turkey's Euphrates Shield Operation. There is no consensus between the CHP's elites in this issue too. Some of the interviewees believe that this kind of operations are necessary for Turkey's border security and even according to them, this operation should start earlier. On the other hand, according to some others, this kind of operations can deepen the Kurdish question if a conflict occurred between Kurdish forces in the Middle East and Turkish army. According to them, Turkey should avoid to take a part in the Middle Eastern conflicts, unless its national security is not threatening. There are different ideas about these two common ideas. According to one of these ideas, Turkey should see the Kurds in the Middle East as a nation to have dialogue in the near future. Another idea is that there can be a model like Northern Iraq for Kurds. In this perspective, Turkey should not oppose this kind of a model, unless this administration controlled by the PKK.

Lastly, the CHP's offers to solve Middle Eastern conflicts and what the CHP offers for Middle Eastern Kurds issued in this chapter. According to all interviewees, Kurds in the Middle East should take place in the CHP's new vision because in their perspective, solution of Turkey's Kurdish question is no longer independent than Kurds in the Middle East. Interviewees believe that Turkey should improve both Turkey's Kurds' life standards and Turkey's democracy to be a model for the Middle Eastern countries. Then, Turkey should enforce democratic regime and free elections to the Middle Eastern countries. The CHP's model should support the territorial integrity in the Middle East, but with democratic regimes and equal citizenship for majority of the interviewees.

In the last section of this chapter, future prospects of the CHP's elites demonstrated. In this section, firstly different ideas for a new solution model of the CHP summarized and secondly HDP's role discussed in this possible solution model. Although there are many unique offers, there is a consensus between interviewees about democratization, implementing human rights and recognizing Kurds' cultural

rights legally. Another consensus area between interviewees is that the peace process should be under control of the parliament. Majority of the interviewees believe that Öcalan cannot be a part of peace process, but two different ideas also occurred. According to one of this idea, CHP's Committee of Common Sense can meet with everyone to solve this issue, including Öcalan. According to other additional idea, Öcalan cannot be CHP's and state's official negotiant, but the HDP should continue its talks and meetings with Öcalan in a possible peace process, which implemented by the CHP.

A group of people support that the CHP needs strengthen its presence in the region. According to them, it is the only way to break down the prejudices. This argument strongly supported by the representatives of women and youth branches and in their perspectives, the best way to reach the people who live in Kurdish –populated region is to have a dynamic and pro-peace women and youth branches. In majority of the interviewees, after Kılıçdaroğlu, the CHP broke down the Kurds' prejudices more. Majority of the interviewees believe that April 16 referendum was the first step to come together to defend the democracy together for Kurds and the CHP. According to some of the interviewees, in Turkey's new regime, this kind of pragmatist alliances will be must.

To sum up, the CHP offers the democratization and maximum consensus in the society for the solution of the Kurdish question. Their methods to do this are to create a consensus via a commission, which includes its members from different NGOs, political parties, academy and so on. Another method of the CHP is to create a Committee of Common Sense, which includes members from different groups of the society. Their must is parliamentary control during the peace process to make the process more transparent. In the AKP's peace process, one of the biggest problem was non-transparency of the process. A possible peace process should be based on institutions instead of based on leaders like Erdoğan and Öcalan. CHP's solution offer is seen more possible to build peace because it tries to democratize the country simultaneously the peace process of the Kurdish question.

CHP's elites believe that the new electoral system will enforce the parties, which support democracy and secularism to pragmatic alliances, but it is difficult to create a long-standing alliance between the Kurdish movement and the CHP. As underlined in the previous chapters, there is no consensus between CHP's party elites on the Kurdish question and moreover, the HDP's role in the Turkish politics. Moreover, some of the demands of the HDP, including democratic autonomy, cannot be acceptable for the CHP as a state-founder party. Therefore, even if this pragmatic alliance can be formed in the future elections, it will probably collapse in a short time.

The Kurdish question is the longest-standing problem of Turkey as noted above and there are many studies about this issue as well. However, there are limited studies about the party discourses regarding the Kurdish question. This study can be useful for a possible party discourse study in the future. In addition, when the researcher continues this research, some of the other possible studies, which can be studied as a future study attracted his attention: the differences between democracy and Kurdish question understanding of Turkey's political elites, when the Kurdish question became apparent in 1990s how political parties reacted, changing discourse and attitude of the AKP in accordance with the conjuncture during the peace process of the Kurdish question and how conjuncture and public pressure affects Turkish politics.

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