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Representing Enlarging European Union: Hegemony, Change and the Visegrad Perspectives

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Representing Enlarging European Union: Hegemony, Change and the Visegrad Perspectives

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REPRESENTING ENLARGING EUROPEAN UNION: HEGEMONY, CHANGE, AND THE VISEGRAD PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract

Representing Enlarging European Union: Hegemony, Change and the Visegrad Perspectives

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This study focuses on the European Union's (EU) discursive construction, and representation in the process of its enlargement. It problematizes the presently common tendency of doing so in ways which portray EU expansion as an expansion of Europe. At issue are thus practices conflating and equating the EU and Europe which pervade much of related academic, political and public debates and discourses, and so structure how we know of and imagine enlarging EU. Embracing post-structuralist and discourse-theoretical analytical and interpretative framework, this work points to the political character of representing the EU in this and, for that matter, any other fashion. Pursuit of this assertion necessitates a 'step back' from, and critical consideration of mainstream political and scholarly presuppositions concerning the Union and its enlargement in their arbitrariness. The very problematization of practices equating the EU and Europe, or of their allied 'Europe-building' concept of 'European identity', is conceivable and 'meaningful' only once we admit that these are not politically innocent components of an 'objective' grasp on 'present' or 'emergent' social realities in Europe and the EU but instead 'merely' value-laden interpretative possibilities biased in favour of the EU-official federalist integration project. Anticipating a divergence in conceptions and portrayals of the Union by senior EU members, elite and institutions on the one hand, and the new post-communist Member States on the other, this study examines national discursive spaces in the so-called Visegrad countries. On the basis of this extensive empirical enquiry, it reports rather distinctive understandings of the EU/European integration therein, affirming thus the suspected dissonance from the EU mainstream. They are attributed to several factors, considerations and concerns which are posited to be very likely shared more widely among post-communist member countries. The Visegrad societies' conceptions of the EU and of its relation to Europe converge on a number of crucial points. These can be seen and interpreted as combining into a latent alternative European integration project which envisions persisting primacy of national identifications and maintenance of the current social and political organization of European space. The EU is conceived of as enlarging common political superstructure of Europe of nations and their states rather than a certain culture-bound, 'thicker' community of 'post-national' subjects of a 'pan-European' federal entity with centre in Brussels. The study challenges in this context the prevalent political and scholarly tendency to reduce debates on and contention over the character and future of European integration to a binary conflict between the so-called 'Euroenthusiasts' vs. 'Eurosceptics'. Building on insights of Lacanian psychoanalysis as deployed by discourse theorists, it suggests that it may be precisely the suppressed democratic conflict of competing visions and projects of European integration which greatly contributes to the lacking popular identification with the process and the EU, and prompts some 'obscene' or more 'excessive' expressions of discontent with it.

Keywords: post-structuralism, discourse theory, Europe, European integration, European Union, European identity, enlargement, Visegrad countries, Turkey.

Özet

Genişleyen Avrupa Birliği'ni Temsil Etmek: Hegemonya, Değişim ve Visegrad Yaklaşımları

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya
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Bu çalışma Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) genişleme sürecindeki söylemsel oluşumu ve temsiline odaklanmaktadır. Bugünlerde AB'nin genişlemesini Avrupa'nın genişlemesi olarak gören yaygın eğilimi sorgulayan çalışma, ilgili akademik, siyasi ve kamusal tartışmalarda AB ile Avrupa'yı özdeş gösteren temsil pratiklerini inceliyor. Post-yapısalcı ve söylem-kuramsal analitik bakış açısıyla, AB temsillerin siyasi niteliğine dikkat çekiyor. Bu önermenin irdelenmesi, AB ve AB'nin genişlemesi hakkındaki ana akım siyasi ve bilimsel önyargılardan "geri adım atarak" eleştirel bir bakış açısının benimsenmesini gerektiriyor. AB ile Avrupa'yı özdeş olarak kurgulayan eylemlerin ve tekil bir "Avrupalı kimliğinin" aracı olduğu "Avrupa'yı inşa" fikrinin sorunsallaştırılmasının makul ve "anlamlı" görülebilmesi, ancak ve ancak bunların Avrupa ve AB'de "halihazırda" ya da "oluşma evresindeki" toplumsal gerçeklikleri "nesnel" bir biçimde anlamaya olanak sağlayan, siyaseten masum araçlardan "ibaret" olmadıklarını kabul etmemizden geçiyor. Aksine, bu bakış açısının, resmi AB ideolojisinin federalist entegrasyon projesini destekleyen, değer yüklü ve öznel değerlendirmelerden yalnızca bir tanesi olduğunu idrak etmemiz gerekiyor. Önde gelen AB üyeleri, üst düzey siyasileri ve kurumları ile AB üyeliği yeni elde eden eski sosyalist ülkelerin Avrupa ve AB algılarında görüş ayrılıkları olduğunu öngören bu çalışma "Visegrad" olarak tanımlanan ülkelerin ulusal söylemsel alanlarına odaklanıyor. Bu coğrafya üzerine gerçekleştirilen yoğun ve ampirik inceleme, AB/Avrupa entegrasyonuna dair özgün anlayışların varlığına işaret ederek AB'nin ana akım temsillerinden farklılıkları gözler önüne seriyor. Bu ülkelerdeki AB ve entegrasyon algısını belirleyen çeşitli endişe ve kaygıların AB'ne üye olmuş eski komünist ülkeler tarafından da paylaşıldığı vurgulanıyor. Visegrad toplumlarında AB ve AB'nin Avrupa kavramı ile ilişkisine dair mevcut algılar birkaç temel nokta üzerinde yoğunlaşıyor. Bunlar, hep birlikte alternatif bir Avrupa entegrasyonu fikrini öne çıkartırken ulusal kimliklerin öncelikli konumu ve Avrupa kıtasının mevcut siyasi ve toplumsal düzenini muhafaza edecek bir projeye işaret ediyor. Bu anlayışa göre AB, merkezi Brüksel'de olan ve "post-ulusal" öznelerin bir araya geldiği federal yapılı, "derin", kapsayıcı bir kültürel birlikteliği değil, ulus devletlerin bir araya gelerek teşkil ettiği bir Avrupa'nın ortak siyasi üstyapısını ifade ediyor. Dolayısıyla, çalışma bu açıdan Avrupa entegrasyonunun mahiyet ve geleceğini "AB yanlıları" ve "AB karşıtları" arasındaki çatışmaya indirgeyen yaygın siyasi ve bilimsel refleksi sorguluyor. Kuramsal altyapısını söylem kuramcılarının uyguladığı Lacancı psikanaliz yöntemine dayandıran çalışma, tam da Avrupa entegrasyonuna dair demokratik bir düzlemde birbirleriyle çatışan proje ve tahayyüllerin bastırılmışlıklarının, halkın süreç ve AB ile özdeşleşmesini engellemiş ve meydana gelen "yakışıksız" ve dahası "ölçüsüz" protesto gösterilerini tetiklemiş olabileceğini savunuyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: post-yapısalcılık, söylem kuramı, Avrupa, Avrupa entegrasyonu, Avrupa Birliği, Avrupalı kimliği, genişleme, Visegrad ülkeleri, Türkiye.

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List of Abbreviations

ALDE	Alliace of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CECs	Central European countries
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs	Central and Eastern European countries
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Area
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
Comecon	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSU	Christian Social Union
ČSSD	Czech Social Democratic Party
DHA	Discourse-historical Approach
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EIS	European integration studies
ELDR	European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party
EP	European Parliament
EPP(-ED)	European People's Party (– European Democrats)
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
Fidesz(-MPP)	Alliance of Young Democrats (– Hungarian Civic Party)
KDH	Christian Democratic Movement
KSČ	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
KSČM	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
(Ľ'S-)HZDS	(People's Party –) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
MDF	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MEP	member of European Parliament

MSZMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party
ODS	Civic Democratic Party
OF	Civic Forum
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party
PES	Party of European Socialists
PiS	Law and Justice
PO	Civic Platform
PSL	Polish People's Party
QMV	qualified majority voting
SDK	Slovak Democratic Coalition
SDKÚ(-DS)	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (– Democratic Party)
SDĽ	Democratic Left Party
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance
SMER(-SD)	Direction (– Social Democracy)
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
SPÖ	Social Democratic Party of Austria
SZDSZ(-MLP)	Alliance of Free Democrats (– Hungarian Liberal Party)
UD	Democratic Union
UMP	Union for a Popular Movement
VPN	Public Against Violence
WEU	Western European Union

Introduction

European integration is a pioneer process with no pre-destined finality. By the turn of the 2000s, the debate on its future manifested new urgency in the face of several recent and anticipated events and developments. Within the European Union (EU), it was tied to the parallel process of 'constitutionalization', institutionalized in the 'Convention on the Future of the European Union'. Crucially, in reflection of the increasingly common tendency to equate and represent the EU as Europe, this EU-bound and EU-extensive debate was recast and come to be known as the so-called 'future of Europe debate'. It appears that this tendency was further consolidated by the Union's 2004/2007 eastern enlargement, by means of which it extended itself over a greater part of what is conventionally understood to be Europe.

One of the debate's most prominent 'outputs' in the 2000s was the sense of widespread acceptance or acknowledgement that European integration's future evolution, and especially further territorial expansion, somehow depend on or are determined by how this emergent EUrope 'answers' the question as to what constitutes Europe and what is its identity. Indeed, the question of 'European identity', supposed to pertain to the EU, Europe, or both, was one of the key controversies in the Union's 'constitutional moment'. Most notable was the contention over whether the EU/Europe's foundations are secular or religious (Christian). With respect to EU enlargement, 'European identity' (or 'Europeanness') was projected to matter as certain 'yardstick' of a country's eligibility to accede. It was widely taken to represent a measure of mutual compatibility between the EU and membership candidates, a 'threshold' of what EU members are like.

If this account of the debate is accurate, it has become a common impression that 'European identity' is crucial for the EU's further development and expansion. Meanwhile, the EU and Europe have come to be commonly discussed as largely equivalent, mutually interchangeable entities: the two terms apparently designating the same 'thing'. Consequently, the search for the meaning and content of 'European identity' has become a search for an identity of Europe, justified on the basis of its importance or even indispensability for European integration. But, *what is 'European identity'?*

Analyzing or examining 'European identity' (or 'Europeanness'), its possibility, significance, 'content', or compatibility with other (most notably national) identities, has

become a trendy research interest in recent decades. A greater part of such analyses tend to conceive of it as commonality in terms of culture, religion or 'civilization' in a space called Europe; and/or with reference to the EU and its founding (putatively universal) values, such as liberal democracy, human rights, the rule of law, (social) market economy, etc. Particularly the former kind of conceptions frequently point to some essential or uniquely European characteristics. This study identifies with the (wider) constructivist ontological position and rejects to conceptualize identity in essentialist or primordial terms. Identity is from this perspective not rigid, immutable or built on an essence but rather an endless process of becoming, re/constructed and re/negotiated in social interaction. Crucially, also the collectivities to which identity constructs are to pertain (e.g. nations or Europe) are treated in the same manner – as socially constructed, 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991).

In international relations (IR) theory, two constructivist strands of thought and analysis focus on identity problematique. The first is the so-called 'conventional', 'middle-ground' constructivism. The latter is 'non-conventional' strand, set apart from the former by diverging epistemology and encompassing varieties of critical theory and post-structuralism. From among their points of divergence, 'non-conventional' constructivists attribute 'formative' role to difference in identity construction, whereas the conventional ones deny, downplay or otherwise bypass this contention. The former's critique of the latter also often revolves around the argument that they somehow 'restrain' the scope of construction.

Both strands developed interest in European integration and the 'European identity' question and entered thus the field of European integration studies (EIS). Conventional constructivists have researched the emergence of 'European identity'; what it is (constructed to be); what are its effects on multiplicity of actors at various levels; how does it relate to other identity constructs; or what role it has played or may assume in European integration. Non-conventional constructivists focused on other kind of questions: how has 'European identity' come about, or what makes or allows us to speak of it? Compared to IR, it is rather difficult in EIS to distinguish the two strands on the basis of their conception and treatment of identity. This is because the field's mainstream 'blend constructivism' sought to respond to 'non-conventional' constructivists' critique and embraced in the process much of their thinking, enlarging thus the scope of the projected 'middle ground'. It owes much to sociological institutionalism but poses not only the first cluster of questions concerning 'European identity'. Constructivist students thereof also seek to investigate how it came about, and in difference from what. The line of division was thus shifted somewhat further

apart from rationalist theories and approaches. Divergence between EIS 'blend constructivism' and critical and post-structuralist approaches concerns the problematization of the very object of enquiry: why do we speak of and study 'European identity'?

The latter analysts alert us that through these practices we ourselves take part in its very construction and reification, and criticize (conventional) constructivists for obscuring this fact despite analyzing construction. This critique is equally applicable to non-problematization and uncritical replication of the seemingly 'socially emergent', increasingly normalized and common-sense practice (in public, political and scholarly debates) to equate, conflate or otherwise interchange the EU and Europe. Non-conventional constructivists entertain the anti-foundationalist premise that 'it is a condition of all knowledge that it is just one representation of the world among many other possible representations'. They consequently assume that each researcher 'always takes a position in relation to the field of study', and that this position 'plays a part in the determination of what he or she can see and can present as results' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 22). From this perspective, it simply matters how one conceives of and treats the objects of enquiry, and the very practice of studying them.

To be sure, the Union's equation with Europe, and its gradual 'emergence', were attended to by a number of scholars. Their primary concern were either why and how has the EU increasingly come to fill the concept of Europe with meaning, or what consequences this has or may have for continent Europe and the states, nations and peoples therein. The problem identified by this work is not only this equation's progressive naturalization and depoliticization but also that it seems to hold sway in political and academic debates on EU enlargement, most clearly to Turkey. It thus seeks to problematize the equation from the reverse side: how does it affect our ways of knowing of, and conceptions of the EU and its enlargement?

This study posits, in simplest terms, that the basic implication of seeing EU enlargement through the prism of this equation is to represent it as an enlargement of Europe. The discursive struggle over the meaning and content of Europe is consequently *enabled* to bear on the process, and 'European identity/Europeanness' projected as playing a decisive role. Yet, once we admit that there is not just one way of conceiving of the relation between the EU and Europe, the following question arises: *should 'European identity' pertain to the*

EU or Europe? Precisely this dilemma, it appears, stands at the centre of the controversy over Turkey's EU accession.

Chairing the Union's constitutional Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaign famously declared in 2002 that Turkey was 'not a European country', that its accession 'would be the end of Europe', and denounced its promoters 'the adversaries of the European Union'.[1] In 2004, the EU's future first full-time President (of the European Council), Herman van Rompuy made a similar point. Declaring that 'Turkey is not a part of Europe and will never be part of Europe', he deemed that its inclusion in the EU would be unlike previous expansions. As he saw it: 'The universal [*sic!*] values which are in force in Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey' (as quoted by Phillips 2009).

On the other hand, that same year the Czech President Václav Klaus dismissed this kind of debate on Turkey as 'ridiculous' and 'insincere', especially since its participants failed to 'emphatically and thoroughly distinguish between Europe and the European Union'. Describing it as a 'geographically rather imprecisely delimited territory … only and solely a spiritual, cultural and civilizational phenomenon', Klaus insisted that 'no one can appropriate Europe for themselves, and that no one can speak on its behalf'. Consequently, he deemed it 'absolutely absurd to want to accept someone to Europe or to exclude them from it'. On his view, the only relevant question was

> whether to admit Turkey into one specific, as a deliberate project man-made, right-now-existing organization called the European Union. It must have nothing to do with the debate on Europe. That debate takes place elsewhere and is about something else.[2]

As Klaus explained one year later,

> *Turkey will be in the future entering the EU, not Europe*. Turkey will – I hope – get a chance to enter *the man-made, time-determined institution,* called the European Union. *There is no membership in a* – for centuries spontaneously evolving, geographically delineated – *European continent* (as quoted by Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 122, emphases added).

These are clearly two conflicting positions on the matter. Their conflict, however, is not so much about Turkey or its 'Europeanness'. It is rather a conflict of worldviews, of different conceptions of the EU, Europe, and of their relation. From the perspective of this study, the key question is not whether one side is simply right or wrong. It is instead: *what are the*

[1] *BBC News*, 8 November 2002.
[2] Klaus, Václav (2004) 'Turecko, Evropa a Evropská unie [Turkey, Europe and European Union]', *Právo*, 30 September 2004. Available from http://www.klaus.cz/clanky/1864.

conditions of possibility for such competing representations? Both the views were presented publicly, and were as such meant and expected to be publicly comprehensible. Did the two EU representatives and the Czech President in fact speak on behalf of and address different constituencies with their statements?

These are the questions of interest to this study. And so is the question of where do these divergent understandings come from. Was Klaus accurate in his 2004 assessment (*op.cit.*) that '[t]he dispute over Turkey is not a dispute about Turkey' but 'over the character, shape and the very substance of the European Union'? Did he grasp the crux of the dilemma when describing it as contest between federal and intergovernmental conceptions and visions of the EU? The argument advanced in this study is that Klaus made a valid point in this respect, but also that the presented conflict of worldviews is not reducible to the long-standing conflict of federal/supranational vs. intergovernmental integration projects alone.

A preliminary literature and empirical material survey indicated that there are indeed notable differences between how is the EU/European integration conceived of by the new post-communist and the majority of so-called 'old' EU members. Relatedly, the former also seem to manifest markedly greater support for further enlargement. Should these anticipated differences prove to be the case, it is pertinent to wonder whether EU expansion in membership can have an effect on how it is represented and, in turn, the prospects of further enlargement. This study's main research question reads: *has the EU's eastern enlargement challenged its hegemonic self-representation as Europe?*

This question is relevant not only with respect to the most obvious and controversial case of Turkey's possible EU membership, but also in relation to other potential candidates whose 'Europeanness' is or can become challenged on grounds of cultural difference or religion (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, etc). The question is in itself a compound question and the present endeavour to propose answers to it must take the form of posing and answering a set of more specific component sub-questions. These are identified together with the Scope of the Study.

Research Design, Rationale and Methodology

The research question is also entrenched in, and premised on, the particular perspective from which it is posed and attended to. Its very 'meaningfulness' depends on manifold presuppositions derived on the basis of this study's theoretical and analytical framework.

This framework is post-structuralist. It is built by combining general post-structuralist thought in linguistics and social theory with its analytical deployment in two disciplines of social-scientific research: post-structuralist IR theory and especially post-structuralist discourse theory.

Neither IR post-structuralism nor discourse theory, however, propose a certain theory validity of which should be empirically tested; or prescribe a certain method of enquiry apart from a set of general guidelines emanating from the post-structuralist ontological and epistemological premises (e.g. deconstruction). They both provide only a specific interpretative perspective, on grounds of which the particular presuppositions underlying this study are derived. Chapters 1-3 do so through critical reading of relevant primary documents, or review of (theoretically often incongruent) scholarly debates on, and research into, the theoretical and empirical issues at hand, such as the 'nature' of the EU, the conception of its identity, or of EU enlargement. The precise foci and procedure of this critical reading, as well as the particular objects of enquiry, are detailed at the end of the ensuing chapter (1.4.2), once the theoretical and analytical framework is established.

A set of presuppositions concerns, for instance, how 'European identity' and an equivalence between the EU and Europe are to be treated. Should they be problematized, neither can assume any privileged or independent (extra-discursive) status throughout the study. This in effect amounts to 'downgrading' them to the status of mere value-laden, if pervasive, interpretative possibilities. As such, neither can hold a 'sovereign' position in 'causal' chains; which are themselves nothing more than highly contextualized interpretative schemes, or 'chains of enablement'. Only after having laid out such presuppositions, and having conceptualized on their basis the context and objects of investigation, can the interpretative framework, scope, and precise foci and method of the analysis of empirical material be specified in detail. In other words, it is necessary first to establish what is meant by notions such as 'hegemonic representation' or the 'EUasEurope' equivalence; whether they allow for or rather defy a working definition; and, above all, why the empirical research revolves around these and not other notions.

Post-structuralist discourse theory problematizes identified problems or social phenomena – in our case 'EUasEurope' equivalence (and by extension the question of 'European identity'), and its bearing on EU enlargement – through an account of their genealogy. It examines structural and historical conditions standing beyond their generation.

An interrogation of particular phenomena, at the same time, 'seeks to challenge existing accounts and the theoretical frameworks that engender them … [I]t begins with and challenges the political circumstances within which such theories emerge and operate' (Howarth 2005, 319). This study's problematization of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence can be understood as one attempt at its re-politicization by means of both deconstructing and juxtaposing this hegemonic construct to the seemingly alternative conceptions of the relation between the EU and Europe, such as that of Václav Klaus.

The key notions in the context of this work are the EU, Europe, their equivalence, and EU enlargement. All ought to be cast in the language and on the terms of discourse theory. This study's Chapter 2 addresses the first three notions. It conceives of the EU identity construction as 'performed' through practices of its symbolic representation, and addresses the question of what and how has been represented as the EU. It focuses on how have 'EUasEurope' equivalence, and relatedly 'European identity', been articulated by the 'official' integration discourse, as developed and disseminated by the EU elite and institutions. It examines the equation's origins, transformation and recontextualization, and how it came to assume a hegemonic position in organizing meaning. It also ponders 'EUasEurope' from a discourse theoretical perspective influenced by Jacques Lacan's psychoanalysis.

At this point the study departs from its hitherto prevalent focus on the official and other hegemonic discourses and constructs which made for the production of the complex 'EUasEurope' equivalence. Based on a number of reported indications, it is hypothesized that the EU's 2004/2007 post-communist entrants may have harboured understandings of European integration, the EU, and of its relation to Europe, that diverge from those prevalent in the former 'Western-European' EU-15. This work undertakes to investigate the validity of this preliminary hypothesis. It examines the new members' conceptions thereof and juxtaposes them in the course of empirical analysis to the radiating 'central' discourses disseminated by EU institutions and some 'old' Western-European Member States. It concentrates in particular on *whether and how they have re-/articulated the hegemonic construct of equivalence between the EU and Europe*.

The empirical analysis covers four 2004 'Central European' EU entrants: the so-called 'Visegrad Group', comprised of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. It seeks to identify and interpret dominant national understandings of the EU, Europe, and

of their relation, to partially 'map' the select national discursive spaces. Due to a variety of constraints, it must limit itself only to an (ideally well-balanced) coverage of dominant, most pervasive and influential discourses. Their identification is performed by a proxy: initial identification of several *main political forces* (most often organized as parties) competing in post-communist, 'democratic' national elections to the lower chambers of parliaments between 1990 and 2010 (1991 and 2011 in Poland).[3] The investigated 19 Visegrad political subjects are selected on the basis of a 'two top-ranking parties in any national election' rule. As regards the corpus of analysed textual data, the select subjects' programmatic documents represent its by far largest part, most commonly taking the form of national elections manifestos and 'euromanifestos'.

The purpose of this endeavour is to determine whether the Visegrad political elite understandings of the EU, Europe, and of their relationship, concur with or contest an 'EUasEurope' equivalence; to assess the extent of appropriation and the standing of this hegemonic identity construct in the post-communist national discursive arenas. Have their respective constructs of the EU and Europe been dissident enough to challenge this discursive equation? What is the nature of the relationship they construe between the two? Have they built and equivalence or difference between them? How? The empirical investigation's latter goal is to ascertain how do such subject and national understandings relate to respective subject and national projections of further EU enlargement.[4]

The guiding aims of the reading and interpretation of the textual data are first to assemble particles of the 'images' (symbolic representations) of the EU and Europe construed by particular political subjects; and then to aggregate these individual images into larger, collective and more or less representative, national 'images' thereof. The objective is to establish whether, how, and what 'particles' co-producing 'EUasEurope' equivalence were appropriated, possibly recontextualized, and included in particular subject and national discourses and representations. This work's Conclusions unit then puts together 'common' Visegrad mosaic 'images' of the EU and Europe. It draws conclusions with respect to the standing of 'EUasEurope' in the four countries, and to its implications for national views of

[3] Coverage of a relatively extensive period of time allows for accounting for possible changes in the examined subjects, and of their conceptions and understandings, due to factors such as the post-communist members' complex 'Europeanization' and exposure to socializing pressures in the EU.

[4] To account for the possibility that select national subjects represented their countries's accession differently than further enlargement, and that their support thereof may be selective, the question of Turkey's EU accession serves as a 'test case', allowing for discernment of such conceivable inconsistencies.

EU enlargement, some of which may be applicable to post-communist EU members more generally.[5]

The rationale underlying the main research question in this study derives from its conceptualization of EU enlargement as a relatively sedimented procedure of border change – of inclusion and incorporation of 'Other'. The EC/EU changes as it expands. Every newly acceding country altered its realities and character to some extent, and influenced its future development. One can therefore suppose that, as a process of inclusion of the hitherto 'foreign', enlargement may work to challenge and destabilize the said equivalence, should the newcomers entertain dissonant or even entirely distinct understandings of the relation between the EU and Europe. Each expansion may be thought of as one prominent 'event' with the potential either to further consolidate hegemonic discourses and constructs, should new members appropriate and adopt them, or to challenge and destabilize them by means of dissenting (or even competing) re-/articulations, or altogether novel constructs. In discourse theoretical terms, novel articulations may prompt re-politicization of sedimented discourses and symbolic representations. Just like any other, eastern enlargement could thus precipitate alteration in the Union's Self-representation to membership candidates.

The findings in the Visegrad countries suggest that post-communist CEE societies' understandings of the EU are indeed at odds with the 'EUasEurope' equivalence constructed in their absence. Hence, they seem rather out of sync with the mainstream thinking across the EU institutions, elite, and some senior members. Due to their isolation from Western-European developments till the 1990s, and eventual accession only in the mid-2000s, the ten CEECs were not directly exposed to and so largely escaped the EC/EU community- and consciousness-building practices. Their diverging conceptions of the EU seem to be manifested in their comparatively higher declared support for further enlargement, or in their related general conceptions of the purposes of European integration, often approaching, in more than few respects, the positions of the northern members. Their visions of the EU's future as 'united Europe' are marked by intense concern for the maintenance of their relatively newly re/gained national independence and sovereignty; desire to protect and nurture national identities and cultures; and preoccupation with equal treatment of the

[5] The findings and interpretations arrived at in the course of empirical analysis are strictly based on the chosen and identified data sources which vary in extent, content and quality across time, countries and political subjects. It is therefore desirable to cross-check and complement them with findings and insights of other existent studies into the matters of interest.

respective nation/state by others. These are rooted in some deep-seated sentiments, relating to perceptions of historical injustice incurred on these societies post-WW2, and of powerful neighbours deciding about their future. Their caution vis-à-vis Western Europeans and the integration process have sprung from such sentiments, as much as their foreign political pragmatism or 'realism' has. These combined with experience of inferiority in the EU accession process and subsequent sense of relative weakness as members to co-produce the Visegrad societies' so-called 'Euroscepticism'. The examined political subjects show rather strong resistance to projects for constructing a European 'superstate'; EU-bound culture- and identity-building efforts; as well as to further transfers of some competences to Brussels, dismissively designated by some of the more radical opponents 'the new Moscow'.

Scope of the Study

In organizational terms, in order to attend to the main research question it is first necessary to establish this work's theoretical and analytical standpoint, the research framework within which it is posed, and the grounds on which the answers are sought. This is the objective of Chapter 1 which locates this research project (theoretically and analytically) within two domains of social scientific research. Inspired by Jacques Derrida's assertion that everything depends for its identity on its 'constitutive outside', the excluded, the chapter establishes this study's theoretical and analytical framework by way of contrasting two proximate approaches within each domain, and opting for the one which provides best opportunities for addressing the present questions of interest. In the discipline of IR, the study is distinguished – with regard to the conceptualization and treatment of 'identity' and 'reality' – from (conventional) constructivism, and embraces post-structuralist theoretical premises. Post-structuralist ontology of discursive (linguistic) construction postulates that we have no direct or unmediated access to the world: there are only representations of the world and of the 'real', an infinite number of representations. Identity of the EU, Europe, and the conception of their relation, are therefore constituted discursively, by means of their representation.

There are, to be sure, discourses (i.e. systems of representing the world, or, 'accounts of reality') which pervade our thinking to the point of disciplining it. In such cases it is difficult, or it may seem odd or 'unreasonable' to think outside such sedimented systems of meaning. This is the very subject matter of the evolving theory (and analysis) of discourse, the second social scientific domain in which this study ought to be positioned. In this domain,

a contrast is drawn – with respect to the conception of discourse and the presuppositions underlying its analysis – between Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the opted-for post-Marxist and post-structuralist discourse theory, associated most prominently with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.1). The latter is selected as the most appropriate theoretical and analytical framework for this study, since it is arguably the 'purest' and most advanced attempt to apply post-structuralism to the analysis of discourse and society, while furnishing it with a coherent conceptual and analytical apparatus. Crucially, grounding this research project in post-structuralist discourse theory (presented in subchapter 1.3) necessitates that its merits be re-considered, and the context and objects of investigation be recast and detailed in discourse theoretical terms (1.4.2).

Chapter 2 opens by discussing discourse theory's application to international relations and argues, following post-structuralist works in the discipline, that identity of the subjects of international politics is construed performatively, in and through their symbolic representation. Subchapter 2.2 concentrates on what exactly has been represented as the EU, in order to lay the ground for addressing the first two component sub-questions: *where does the equivalence between the EU and Europe come from, how was it discursively constructed?* And subsequently, *how did this equivalence come to play a role in EU enlargement?*

The first part of Chapter 3 then conceptualizes EU enlargement in post-structuralist discourse theoretical terms: as an incorporation of 'Other' through a relatively sedimented procedure which hierarchically organizes the parties concerned in a specific fashion. It ponders the question of the EU's representation in the process in general terms so as to address the third component sub-question: *what are the implications of* 'grafting' the 'EUasEurope' equivalence onto the enlargement procedure, and *representing* thus *EU enlargement as an enlargement of Europe?* The final section of this part (3.1.4) argues that EU enlargement, as a process of inclusion of 'Other', can present a certain challenge to the established ways of projecting and representing the EU and its further enlargement. It proposes, more specifically, that the eastern enlargement could have challenged and destabilized the hegemonic interpretative constellation organized by the said equivalence, should it be the case that the new members brought with themselves 'inside-EU' competing or altogether distinct understandings of European integration, the EU and Europe, and of their relation. It then suggests and substantiates a focus in this regard on the post-communist 2004/2007 entrants.

Subchapter 3.2 selects from among them the so-called 'Visegrad Group' as the four country-cases to be covered in the empirical analysis concentrating on the final component sub-question: *what are the post-communist entrants' understandings of the EU, Europe, and of their relation?* The four country analyses are carried out in full consideration of the findings and conclusions arrived at in Chapter 2, in an effort to scrutinize *whether and how their understandings of the above concur with or rather differ from the hegemonic 'EUasEurope' equivalence.* This subchapter also establishes the general interpretative framework of the thusly oriented investigation. Follows subchapter 3.3, concluding the design of the intended discourse analysis by detailing the organization, foci and methodology of the empirical investigation undertaken in Chapters 4-7.

The objective of the final Conclusions unit is to return to the main research question and propose answers to it on the basis of the findings reported, and interpretations thereof proposed in Chapters 2-7. It draws several conclusions with respect to the standing of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence in the Visegrad countries; and with regard to the implications of their national understandings of the EU/European integration, and its relation to Europe, for their positions on further EU enlargement. It suggests that there is a reason to believe that similar conceptions may be shared more widely among the post-communist EU members. This unit also evaluates the practice of addressing the questions and objects under scrutiny from the post-structuralist and discourse theoretical perspective, and proposes few further possible research questions which presented themselves in the course of this work and merit further attention.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework and the Present Research Project

This chapter develops this study's theoretical framework in order to conclude, on its basis, with an outline of the organization of the research process undertaken in the ensuing chapters. It first turns to the two problems (identified in Introduction) which mainstream constructivist analysis poses with respect to the research interests of this work (1.1). It proceeds by suggesting that post-structuralist theory provides a more appropriate perspective for seeking answers to the research questions posed. Subchapter 1.2 concentrates on the development of post-structuralism, and its ontology of discursive (linguistic) construction, in both linguistic and social theory. After outlining in general terms the post-structuralist conception of identity construction and change, it introduces post-structuralist discourse theory as the most elaborate attempt at application of post-structuralism to the analysis of discourse and society. The ensuing subchapter 1.3 presents discourse theory in its complexity, both as it was initially formulated by Laclau and Mouffe in the 1980s and further developed since then. The final subchapter clarifies what 'discourse analysis' denotes in discourse theory (and does not), and addresses the question of method in discourse theoretical research. The chapter concludes with an outline of the research steps carried on in order to provide answers to the questions posed with respect to the 'EUasEurope' equivalence and EU enlargement.

1.1 Conception of Identity and Reality: From Divided Constructivism to Post-Structuralism

This subchapter opens with a discussion of the epistemological divide running across constructivist IR theory (widely defined). It proposes a distinction on the basis of this divide between 'conventional' and 'non-conventional' (or 'critical') constructivisms and concentrates on how they conceive of identity formation, and treat identity constructs. The ensuing section ponders the character of constructivist work in EIS with a view to the above epistemological divide. Then it turns to a brief survey of constructivist research into (the question of) 'European identity'. Section 1.1.3 critiques 'conventional' and much of EIS constructivism from a post-structuralist perspective. It suggests that their defining focus on 'social reality' or 'the intersubjective' obscures the political character of the social world; and effectively precludes asking certain questions (despite analyzing construction) and the

problematization of the very objects of (conventional) constructivist enquiry. After focusing this critique on the constructs of 'European identity' and the 'EUasEurope' equivalence, section 1.1.4 concludes with the proposition that it is the post-structuralist ontology of discursive construction which allows for the problematization of the 'constructedness' and political character of these two constructs themselves.

1.1.1 Conventional and 'Non-Conventional' Constructivist Treatment of Identity

Constructivism is a contested label in IR. Some associate it almost exclusively with the works of Alexander Wendt. For others, it designates a cluster of similarly oriented and closely related 'middle ground' approaches. Perhaps most frequently, 'any non-mainstream and hence non-rationalist approach' is considered constructivist (Zehfuss 2004, 6-7). For the purposes of this discussion, constructivism will be conceived of as a wide array of theoretical approaches subscribing to the (intersubjective) ontology of social construction. What differentiates them from the 'mainstream' positivist/rationalist approaches is the shared assumption of 'the deeply social nature of the world around us' (Checkel 2006, 8). In other words, rather than being given, the reality of international politics is nothing else but a 'social reality' which 'exists' only by virtue of intersubjective knowledge and understandings. It has been a lasting dilemma as to whether and how should be constructivism differentiated from the other, post-positivist/reflectivist meta-theoretical pole in the discipline. The most common proposed solution has been to bracket this very question and to focus instead on the epistemological divide running across constructivism, and to identify at least two different kinds of constructivism in these terms.[6] For the purposes of the present discussion, a distinction will be simplistically drawn between 'conventional' and 'non-conventional' constructivisms, divided not only epistemologically, but also in terms of their treatment of identity (discussed below), and of 'social reality' (discussed in sections 1.1.3 and 1.1.4).[7]

Conventional constructivism is premised on claiming a bridging, 'middle ground' position between rationalist and postmodernist theoretical orientations (Katzenstein,

[6] For instance, Ted Hopf (2000) differentiated between conventional and critical constructivisms; Jeffrey T. Checkel (2006) between conventional, interpretative and critical/radical ones; while Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit (2000) spoke of modernist and postmodernist variants of constructivism.

[7] This distinction is aligned with Hopf's classification, revolving around the critical nature of constructivist works. As he explained: 'To the degree that constructivism creates theoretical and epistemological distance between itself and its origins in critical theory, it becomes "conventional" constructivism'. Critical analysts acknowledge 'their own participation in the reproduction, constitution, and fixing of the social entities they observe'. A conventional constructivist, on the other hand, claims to remain 'analytically neutral', and thus 'never becomes a subject of the same self-reflective critical inquiry' (Hopf 2000, 1763-1764).

Keohane and Krasner 1998, 678), on its juxtaposition to both so as to 'justify its claim to the middle ground' (Adler 1997, 321). The challenge, formative of the 'middle', was not so much targeted at the latter as it was against, and in engagement of, the two mainstream positivist theories. The emergent middle-ground, conventional constructivist position was characterized by combining positivism with (wider constructivist) intersubjective ontology.[8] The latter is characterized by two key ontological premises. Constructivists are, as Emanuel Adler put it, 'ontological realists' positing an independent existence of the material world which interacts with the social world and is resistant when acted upon.[9] The latter premise is the belief in the 'ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge' (2005, 90). Following John Searle, constructivists posit that, unlike material reality, social reality, 'the objective facts of world politics', exist only by virtue of human agreement (Ibid, 112). Social reality, the social world is intersubjective in nature and as such potentially changeable. Yet, it can be resilient and persistent as well.[10] Intersubjective meanings have structural attributes which not just constrain or empower actors but, at the same time, 'define their social reality' (Ibid, 94), and create social order (Kratochwil 2001, 19).[11]

Jeffrey T. Checkel (2006, 10) traced the theoretical and meta-theoretical inspiration of 'virtually all conventional constructivists' to Wendt. Not only as regards his claims that change is possible, that agents and structures are mutually co-constituted but, more

[8] Constructivists, largely adopting the language of neorealism and neoliberalism, challenged their fundamental assumptions concerning both agency and structure. The defining constructivist social ontology is that 'human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings' (Risse 2009a, 145). In international politics, then, the identity and thus also the behaviour and interests of actors are constituted and re-constituted in a social environment. They are endogenous to actors' interactions therein. Concurrently, the social environment is constituted and given meaning through processes of social construction. It is an 'intersubjective structure' which contributes to the 'creation of norms governing behavior and the boundaries of the possible' (Rosamond 2001, 164, paraphrasing Wendt). It is continuously re/produced by the practices of culturally embedded actors. Hence, (social) structures and actors are seen as continuously co-constituting each other, and the 'reality' of global politics as socially constructed, a product of interaction (Wendt 1987, 1992, 1999; Adler 1997, 324-325).

[9] Adler (1997a, 322) characterized constructivism as 'the view that *the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world*'. As suggested by Wendt (1995, 73): 'material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded'.

[10] Adler sought to address the social construction of reality, the 'constructivist dynamics', through his theory of cognitive evolution. He tackled the questions of the acquisition by certain ideas and concepts of an epistemic, discursive and institutional authority, and why certain ideas become reified and taken for granted. Refer to Adler 2005, 103-109 for his elaboration of cognitive evolution and of the role of epistemic communities therein.

[11] Adler demonstrates this point on Karl Deutsch's concept of 'pluralistic security communities' and Benedict Anderson's description of nations as 'imagined communities'. While both are intersubjectively created and preserved, '[f]rom the perspective of the members of the community, as well as for the physical world, they are real' (Adler 2005, 94).

importantly, that the real issues to be addressed are ontological rather than epistemological.[12] The conventional constructivist treatment of identity is no exception. Wendt's crucial move, distinguishing, and at the same time forming the constructivist position, concerned the concepts of identity and intersubjectivity (Zehfuss 2004, 38-39). He postulated that both the identities of agents, and the intersubjective structures they are embedded in, may change. His treatment of identity is marked by close engagement with neorealist (Walzian) theory, and the concomitant endeavour to develop 'systemic constructivism'. Committed to systemic theory, Wendt bracketed the domestic realm, the genesis of the subject (Ibid, 220) and focused exclusively on international social interaction as the sole constituent of state identity (Price and Reus-Smit 2000, 1792).

On the one hand, it is precisely the influence of Wendt's works, and through them of symbolic interactionism, which 'made the relationality of identity a fundamental premise' (Morozov and Rumelili 2012, 30). It is, on the other hand, precisely the influence of symbolic interactionism which differentiates the conventional constructivist conception and treatment of identity from those characterizing 'critical' or 'non-conventional' constructivism, approaching this relationality in post-structuralist terms (Rumelili 2004, 30). The divide between them revolves around the process of identity formation, and the importance attributed to difference in this process of social construction.

Most of mainstream constructivists depart from Wendt's systemic focus on the relationality of identity. Instead, they study 'how social structures of shared norms and meaning constitute identities, i.e. constitution of self by social' (Morozov and Rumelili 2012, 30). They all, nevertheless, replicate Wendt's essentialization of identity, stemming from 'a conflation of "identity" and "essences", in line with a classic superimposition of the category of "having" over "being"', according to Epstein (2011, 7).[13] They take the existence of identities as given, aim to 'discover' them, and the social practices reproducing them, in order to 'offer an account of how those identities imply certain actions'. (Hopf 2000, 1764-1765). With the mainstream constructivist focal shift to norms 'identity seems to have acquired a further "given-ness"' (Epstein 2011, 7). With this 'fixed, essentialized

[12] This is well exemplified in the following statement by constructivists around Nicholas Onuf: 'Constructivism effectively leaves epistemology to the philosophers, and takes the linguistic turn back to ontology' (Kubalkova, Onuf and Kowert 1998, 19).

[13] Charlotte Epstein (2011, 7) pointed in this regard to Wendt's appraisal of analysing identity as 'the search for the set of core attributes that "make a thing what it is"', hence 'the quest for its essence'. Refer to her article for a novel critique of the (Wendtian) conventional constructivist treatment of the identity category inspired by Jacques Lacan.

understanding of identity' (Ibid, 8), conventional (liberal) constructivists 'understate and downplay the role of difference in identity formation' (Rumelili 2004, 33).[14] Hence, '[c]onsistent with its symbolic interactionist roots, liberal constructivism has focused on processes of state socialisation' (Ibid, 30).

Under post-structuralist influence, in contrast, 'non-conventional' (self-labelled 'critical') constructivists 'underscore the discursive necessities that make identity dependent on difference' (Rumelili 2004, 33). Identities are construed through their performance, their differentiation (alternatively 'othering') from certain 'counter-identities' (Ibid, 31). Hence, if conventional constructivists focus on social interaction and the processes of socialization, 'non-conventional' constructivists inquire into the very process of identity construction.

1.1.2 Blend EIS Constructivism

If such a distinction on the basis of conception and treatment of identity can be more or less comfortably drawn with respect to the IR discipline, this is not the case with much of what can be in this respect called 'blend constructivism' in European integration studies. In 1999, constructivism was 'introduced' to EIS under clear 'middle ground' premises of conventional constructivism which, however, claimed incorporation the 'non-conventional' strand as well.[15] Since then, this blend 'middle ground' scholarship, aspiring to represent a certain 'bridge' among the most prominent theories and approaches in the field (Wiener and Diez 2009a, 12), largely succeeded in appropriating the EIS constructivist label.

Much of EIS constructivism demonstrates the conventional constructivist interest in individual and collective identity transformation as a result of socialization in the EU (e.g. Hermann, Brewer and Risse 2005); or the EU's effects on its constituent elements through the workings of its institutions, rules and norms (e.g. Checkel 2001, 2003, 2007).[16] This concern with the transformative impact of the integration/Europeanization process on social

[14] In symbolic interactionism, in which conventional constructivism is grounded, 'identity formation is depicted as a process of socialization through which an individual comes to see herself in the way that others do'. 'Other', then, 'does not denote the bearer of constitutive difference'. 'Other' merely 'represents other individuals, who constitute self's identity by naming, recognising, and validating, but not by embodying the alternative and different identity' (Rumelili 2004, 30).

[15] Epistemologically divergent works, sharing a 'crucial focus on ontology' and preferring it to epistemology, were located on a semi-circle rising above the axis between 'two incommensurable poles of rationalist and reflectivist approaches' (Christansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001, 9-10).

[16] This research builds on the assertion that social norms and institutions at once regulate actors' interaction and constitute their identity as members of a social community (Onuf 1989; Kratochwil 1989). Their socialization and embeddedness in a social institution like the EU makes for their gradual internalization of its rules (Risse 2009a, 146-148). EU membership is thus presumed to affect states' perceptions of own interests and identities, as well as those of other states.

identities, as well as national polities, politics and policies, was later accompanied by studies of the professed Europeanization of Member States' national public spheres and/or the emergence of a transnational 'European public sphere' (e.g. Risse 2009b, 2010; Risse and Van de Steeg 2008; or Fossum and Schlesinger 2007).

Whereas there are a number of volumes which saw 'European identity' as something to 'have' or 'acquire' as a result of 'Europeanization'/socialization in the EU[17], for much of EIS constructivism the question of 'European identity' has been a more complex matter. Many 'blend constructivists' recognize that 'a sense of collective European identity is always accompanied by the need to differentiate "Europeans" from "others"' (Risse 2009a, 152). In other words, that the construction of Europe as a community 'has depended on the parallel construction of "others" (variously located in the East, South, West, or in Europe's past) against which a separate identity is seen as being constructed, created or invented' (Christansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001, 14). Consequently, many constructivist studies emerged of a variety of Self/Other relationships in the construction of 'European identity'[18]. In order to assess the 'blend constructivist' study and approach to 'European identity', the following section discusses one prominent survey of constructivist enquiry into the matter.

A Survey of Constructivist 'European Identity' Research

A second edition of the high-profile volume *European Integration Theory* included a presentation of EIS constructivism by Thomas Risse. His reflections on constructivist findings on 'European identity' were set within a 'multiple identities' interpretative framework, and based on a recognition of (emergent) equivalence between the EU and Europe. As for the perceived equivalence, Risse described the EU as 'an active identity builder' which 'has successfully achieved hegemony in terms of increasingly defining what it means to belong to "Europe"'. Elaborating on this, he stated: 'EU membership has significant constitutive effects on European state identities. States in Europe are increasingly defined as EU members, non-members, or would-be members' (2009a, 154). Hence:

> If Europe and the EU are used interchangeably, it means that the latter has successfully occupied the social space of what it means to be European. One could then not be a "real" European without

[17] An example is the volume introduced by Richard Robyn (2005, 1), which focused on 'questions about the ability of people voluntarily to acquire new forms of identity with new political institutions'. For a similar collection of works, emphasizing the external dimension of the 'construction' of 'European identity' – 'external sources of European identity formation', see Cederman 2001.

[18] Their findings, as well as those presented by post-structuralist works, are discussed in section 2.1.1, after a fuller elaboration of discursive construction of identity in international politics from discourse theoretical (post-structuralist) perspective (subchapter 2.1).

> being an EU member. The EU increasingly fills the meaning space of Europe with a specific content' (Ibid).[19]

His account of 'European identity' was interwoven with a perceived equivalence between the EU and Europe in a complex manner. Having asked '[w]hat does it mean in substantive terms to identify with Europe and the EU?'; his proposed answer was that '[a] most important corollary of the marble cake concept [of multiple identities] concerns the content of what it means to identify with Europe'. On the one hand, he recognized that '[d]ifferent groups might fill it [the concept of Europe] with different content'. On the other hand, he continued by stating:

> Yet elite discourses on Europe and the EU appear to converge on a vision of European identity that encompasses the values of modernity and enlightenment. "Unity in diversity", as well as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and social market economy (as opposed to laissez-faire capitalism) are constructed as what is special about the EU' (Ibid, 153).

Drawing on a number of elite and public opinion studies, Risse pointed to '[t]he increasing contestation and politicization of European identity with competing visions of modern Europe versus fortress Europe' (Ibid, 156), two dominant and competing constructs pertaining to the EU and/or Europe. The first construct was that of a '*modern and post-national European identity*', a 'post-national civic identity in the Habermasian sense'.[20] It has been deliberately sought by European institutions and elite, and 'seems to resonate with mass public opinion'. Referring to studies of public opinion, Risse pointed out that education, income, and leftist ideology, were correlated with peoples' attachment to 'Europe'. This self-identification was further correlated with less xenophobic and more positive attitudes towards the EU's eastern enlargement. Furthermore, '[t]he "inclusive nationalists" who show some degree of identification with Europe also share the modern values'. Therefore, Risse concluded, 'post-national values have become constitutive for the EU, as you cannot become a member without subscribing to them' (Ibid, 154).

'Fortress Europe' was the second image or vision of 'European identity' which Risse identified as having been equally emergent and competing with 'the modern image of Europe that the EU wants to convey'. This construct has stressed 'Europe's cultural heritage, a common history, and a grounding in a Christian-Judean culture'. 'In this context', he

[19] 'In this sense, the EU has achieved identity hegemony in Europe', suggested Risse, and substantiated this observation by referring to the desire of the Central and Eastern European countries to '"return to Europe", as if they were currently outside the continent'; and to the slogan 'entering Europe', employed during Italy's preparations for entering the Eurozone, 'as if Italy … had ever left it' (2009a, 154).

[20] Habermas spoke in the EU context of a post-national 'constitutional patriotism' (see for instance 2001, ch. 4). Similarly, Jo Shaw (2001) proposed the concept of 'postnational constitutionalism'.

observed, ‘Europe and the EU are constructed as exclusionary entities that are only open to white Christians while hostile to foreigners, immigrants, and – particularly to Islam’. As promoters of this ‘counter-vision of Europe as an exclusionary construct’ were identified Eurosceptic and right-wing populist parties, increasingly successful across the EU. This construct accorded with ‘exclusive nationalist’ attitudes discerned in the public which also ‘correlate strongly with hostility towards immigrants and foreigners’. This construct of ‘European identity’ gained salience particularly in two at least implicitly related debates. The first one has revolved around ‘a European-wide concern about immigration and the influx of extra-EU foreigners’. The second has been the debate on Turkey’s possible EU accession (Ibid, 154-155).

Having thusly identified and characterized what appeared to be the intersubjective ‘reality’ in the contemporary EU/Europe, Risse proceeded in his survey by pondering the possible causal effects of the two competing identity constructs on Turkey’s EU accession prospects. According to him, ‘the vision of modern Europe would, of course, open the doors to Turkish accession, as long as Turkey complies with the Copenhagen criteria of democracy, human and minority rights and the rule of law’. As for the second construct, Risse deemed that ‘“exclusive Europe” cannot accept Turkey into the EU, because it is predominantly a Muslim country’. ‘Europe’s cultural identity is constructed in essentialist terms in the anti-Turkish discourse’. It is as such akin to ‘primordial identity constructions’, resembling ‘ethno-nationalist identities in the sense that they cannot be changed’. Hence, ‘the door to Turkish EU membership would remain closed for good’ (Ibid, 155).

In recognition of the inescapability of differentiation in ‘European identity’ construction, Risse suggested that an alternative path to making inferences about ‘the substance of European identity’ was to consider and ‘know more about European “others”’. Deploying this strategy in view of the two dominant constructs, he drew the following conclusions. ‘Fortress Europe’ had rather easily identifiable ‘Others’: Islam and non-white foreigners. The EU-driven construct of ‘modern, enlightened and post-national Europe’, on the other hand, ‘cannot rely on clear cultural and/or geographical borders’. Its ‘fuzzy boundaries’ render identification of its ‘Others’ more complex, for it is context-dependent. ‘This does not mean’, he closed, ‘that anything goes but it warns us not to reify the concept of European identity and to fix it once and for all’ (Ibid).

1.1.3 Uncritical and Normalizing EIS Constructivist Analysis

The above fragments of the survey of constructivist enquiries into 'European identity' present a number of crucial points which need to be addressed in order to clarify why conventional and blend EIS constructivism would provide an altogether detrimental theoretical and analytical framework for addressing the research questions of this study. Posing them from this perspective would be nonsensical and seeking answers to them made impossible due to the founding premises of conventional constructivism, 'critical nature' of which is at best limited.

Constitutive of the 'middle ground' conventional constructivist enterprise in IR was the proposition of an alternative ontology: that of an *intersubjective or social reality of international politics*. In the ontological and epistemological debate on the relationship between material and 'social' reality, conventional constructivism takes a 'mediative' stand (for explication, see Adler 2005, 91-92). Its adherents recognize the 'presence' of both and study their interaction but stress, at the same time, that the 'facts' of international politics do not reflect an objective material reality but instead an *intersubjective, social reality* (Onuf 1989). The problematic 'critical nature' of conventional constructivism arises from an inherent dissonance between its underlying research purpose and the way in which approaches and treats 'social reality'. This paradox was well grasped by Adler. The purpose of constructivism was, according to him, an 'emancipation from oppressing discourses, power structures, ideologies, and theories (critical theory) and the unmasking of "the way power is used in all of society's sites" (post-modernism/post-structuralism)'. Nonetheless, the 'constructivist "mediative" epistemology … is interested neither in emancipation *per se*, nor exclusively in uncovering the power structures that affect the marginalized in history'. Conventional constructivism aims instead to provide '*better explanations of social reality*': '*once institutions and practices are reified, it takes the world as it finds it … as the given framework for action*' (2005, 100, emphases added).

It is precisely this 'mediative stand and the shared quest to identify and to contemplate the effects of 'social reality' which set conventional constructivism apart from the 'non-conventional' strand and particularly from post-structuralism. This is the crux of Maya Zehfuss's powerful Derrida-inspired post-structuralist critique of conventional constructivism, applicable to most of EIS constructivism. It ascribes 'reality to the material world' (Adler and Barnett 1998, 12), a 'phenomenal world' which is itself 'external to

thought' (Guzzini 2000, 159). In line with its 'mediative' position, it posits a duality of the social and the material, where the material realm exists independently of representations (Zehfuss 2004, 251), that is, the realm of social construction. Consequently, conventional constructivism promotes a concept of 'limited construction' and relates it to some kind of independently existing 'reality' which is taken as given (Ibid, 10).[21] Taking it as their starting point, conventional constructivists fail to problematize the very existence and character of 'some given, intersubjectively accessible "reality"' (Ibid, 261). Yet, drawing a line between an objective material realm (material reality) and the realm of social construction ('social reality') is far from analytically impartial and politically innocent: 'the limit of reality is itself a construction' (Ibid, 238). As Zehfuss put it: '[P]ortraying something as real, and indeed the assertion of knowledge about what reality is, has immense political power' (Ibid, 255). Endeavouring to simply 'take reality into account', while accepting it as a limit, conventional constructivists obscure not only the political character of social construction, but also 'the politics already involved in representing reality' (Ibid, 248 and 250) and their own involvement in its making (Ibid, 255).

Conventional constructivism depoliticizes construction, the making of 'something common, shared, intersubjective'. Its representation of the construction of intersubjective (social) reality disregards power and the political in are not acknowledged. Consequently, also the role of conventional constructivists in the very process of construction which they study remains for the most part unaccounted for. Yet, as Zehfuss maintained, 'both the act of construction, and the representation of it in constructivism – which is always already implicated in the act of construction itself – is political, more political than is admitted' (Ibid, 261). Enabled by the belief that one can distinguish between the real and the represented, the material and the 'social', conventional constructivists present the practice of taking reality as the starting point as 'apolitical, or rather non-political'. Yet, '[i]t is this separation of the represented and the real which makes possible for constructivism to exclude political questions despite analysing construction' (Ibid, 262).

A related and presently equally important problem with conventional constructivist analysis is its very preoccupation with 'social reality' and its re/construction through intersubjectively shared understandings, meanings and ideas. The latter form an

[21] Zehfuss developed her critique by focusing on the works of Wendt, Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil and concluded (2004, 197) that they all 'posit "reality" as a significant point of reference': 'the "reality" of international politics' (Wendt), '"reality" as raw material' (Onuf), and 'everyday reality' (Kratochwil).

intersubjective structure. Since conventional constructivists seek to map the intersubjective, 'social reality' within a certain entity, they are prone or even motivated to study dominant or hegemonic ideas, constructs and discourses. Neglecting marginalized competitors thereof, they themselves contribute to naturalization and reification of the subjects of their inquiry.

The above critical remarks seem to apply to the majority of research into 'European identity'. Conventional constructivism deprives identities of essence. This does not, however, amount to the denial of their 'reality'. Without much ado, many students of 'European identity' approach it as something emergent or 'present', something already 'out there', a 'real' part to 'social reality'. What conventional constructivists treat as 'European identity' is very much the kind of intersubjective structure they seek to identify; investigate the emergence and the re/construction of; ponder the relation to or effects of on other identity constructs; and even include in accounts of causality. While recognizing the contestedness of its substance, as different groups and discourses seek to attribute to it different and at times mutually incompatible meanings, the concept as a form to be filled apparently stays. It itself is supposed to be 'real', 'out there'. Consequently, despite frequently recognizing that what 'European identity' is to mean is a matter of discursive construction, conventional constructivist works fail to address the discursive origins of the very idea of 'European identity'. From a strictly post-structuralist perspective (see the next subchapter) the very concept and idea of a pan-EU and/or pan-European 'identity' or 'commonality' is nothing else but a discursive construct, at once a hypothesis and political programme (as discussed in subchapter 2.2). Hence, speaking of and studying 'European identity' already involves, often an unconscious, political choice.

The conception of 'European identity' as a socially emergent or 'real' form to be filled with meaning is discernible in Risse's contention that it is 'a specific construct in time and space whose *content* actually changes depending on the social and political context in which it is enacted' (2009a, 156, emphasis added). Conceiving of it as such allowed him to point to '[t]he increasing contestation and politicization of European identity with competing visions of modern Europe versus fortress Europe' (Ibid). Having identified two dominant discourses filling the form with meaning, he distinguished two dominant 'European identity' constructs. Yet, while recognizing that as constructs they are prone to change in time, space and context, Risse apparently accepted them as the current 'social reality' when he spoke of them 'as they were' in the context of Turkey's EU accession. Treating them as 'out there'

allowed him to ponder in rough terms the two constructs' contents or 'substance', among other ways by studying their respective 'Others', and consider their possible effects.

Crucially, however, treating 'European identity' itself as some kind of pre-discursive 'occurrence' directs the very analysis of its construction. While the identification of 'European identity' constructs suggests an understanding of 'construction' as an endless process, in the application of the findings in conceivable causal accounts 'construction' largely becomes a noun: a construct. This is because the very 'being' of 'European identity', or of that which it is supposed to designate, are already taken as given.

Without denying the transformative impact of the integration process, be it on Europe, states, elite, politicians and other groups and individuals, the presumption that it should lead to community-building or a shared commonality and identity in any singular sense is unwarranted. Yet, for many constructivists, the idea of Europeans sharing in some features or having alike perceptions of their commonality, as opposed to outsiders or some (threatening) insiders, becomes a further unproblematized 'reality'. This affects the way in which even some of those studies more or less comfortably blending conventional constructivist analysis with the post-structuralist focus on identity/difference nexus represent construction. Treating 'European identity', regardless of what it should designate and pertain to, as something singular enables some of these works to put forth claims on its behalf despite analysing only one or few Self/Other relationships. Speaking of 'the *emergence* of', or about how particular 'Others' '*contributed* to the construction of European identity' (Morozov and Rumelili 2012, 34-35, emphases added) makes for the impression that 'European identity' is conceived of as a certain singular edifice onto which each Self/Other relationship imprints or sticks a particular increment.

Any such conception is inconceivable from a strictly post-structuralist perspective. Once we presume that identity constructs are contingent, relation- and context-bound, and changing in time and perspective; and, furthermore, that context is boundless and relations and perspectives potentially infinite; the idea of any singularity of 'European identity' is undermined and denied. From the post-structuralist point of view, 'construction' of 'European identity' denotes exclusively endless, diffuse, and most often disconnected processes rather than their product(s) in the sense of singular construct(s). Therefore, it also becomes impossible to characterize (both positively and negatively) any identity construct in a more general and non-arbitrary fashion. It is the argument of Laclau and Mouffe 'if any

identity, and by extension society, is no longer a given and immutable datum, if its character cannot be determined in a naturalistic fashion, then it can no longer be individuated on the grounds of positively attributed characteristics (Norval 2000, 220). Furthermore, while an investigation of an Other may one discern what the Self was constructed as *not-being* within a particular relationship, it does not in itself provide grounds for conclusions as to the Self's *what-being.* The latter needs to be arbitrarily attributed by the analyst, simply because there are potentially infinite 'Others'.

The main problem from the perspective of this study's research interests is the impossibility to address the question of equivalence between the EU and Europe on conventional constructivist premises. As will be suggested in subchapter 2.2 the EU institutions' discursive construction of this equivalence has not only coincided but has been closely entangled with the construction of 'European identity' which has, under the pretension of singularity, appealed to both the EU and Europe. To the degree of the equivalence's naturalization attests the fact that it has largely evaded scholarly attention as a discursive and political construct in its own right.

As intersubjectively emergent or 'real', or at least shared among 'those who matter', conventional constructivists may study and contemplate the possible consequences of this equivalence. However, due to their uncritical acceptance thereof, which may take the form of simply interchanging the EU and Europe, they fail to account for the equivalence's profoundly political character. Hence, they are themselves implicated in the very construction and replication of this hegemonic construct and interpretative framework. By uncritically reflecting it in their research, conventional constructivists themselves further disseminate, normalize and naturalize this equivalence.

1.1.4 Concluding Remarks: From Social to Discursive Construction

Much of constructivist work in EIS, despite recognizing the contingency and arbitrariness of social construction, cannot be of assistance in pondering the very constructs the re/production and implications of which it studies. Conventional constructivists are concerned with 'social reality' and study it as they find it. They seek to identify intersubjective ideas, understandings and structures and then propose accounts of their contents, substance or causality. They find what they look for without, however, paying due attention to their self-implication in the very construction and naturalization of the objects

of their enquiry.[22] They obscure the political character of intersubjective ideas as well as the politics already involved in their construction, of which they are part. The conventional constructivist research enterprise is as such particularly prone, perhaps even programmed to replicate hegemonic discourses and constructs disseminated by the EU elite, institutions and bureaucracy (refer to subchapter 2.4 for further discussion of their inter-implication). It also obscures that the very identification of the intersubjectively shared is in itself an arbitrary (and thus political) act in the construction of that 'social reality'. This is to say that both the preoccupation with 'European identity' and an uncritical (if unconscious) acceptance of an emergent or 'present' equivalence between the EU and Europe are in themselves political choices and political interventions.

The epistemological divide running across constructivism (widely defined) revolves around the question of the availability of 'an empirically identifiable reality to be identified and studied'. The conventional strand posit 'an identifiable reality … out there' which 'can be accessed through empirical research'. The 'non-conventional' (or 'critical') constructivist epistemology dictates in contrast that 'we can never know for sure if what we observe really exists independently of our observation'. Hence, 'no true reality exists for empirical research to find' (Barkin 2003, 336-337). As such, the latter cannot escape the acknowledgement of political or 'interested' nature of academic research.

Moreover, the difference between IR conventional constructivism (and much of EIS 'blend constructivism') and post-structuralism also concerns ontology, more precisely the scope of social construction. While all constructivism subscribes to the (general) ontology of social construction, the former take a 'mediative' stand on the relationship between social and (non-discursive) material realms and restrain the scope of construction only to the social. Post-structuralism, on its part, denies the possibility of knowledge of the material apart from representations, that is, discursive construction. Denying thus a non-discursive quality to the material realm, it proposes a more specific, all-encompassing ontology of linguistic or *discursive construction*, positing that the social field is in its entirety a product of discourse.

Detailed in the following subchapter, discursive construction of intersubjective knowledge, and thus of social reality, the process rather than its outcomes, and the role of

[22] In the present context, this implication is perhaps most blatant in the case of those constructivist studies which seek to discern the content or substance of a shared 'European identity' or 'Europeanness'. The bulk of such work is reminiscent of what Wæver (2009, 174-175) called 'traditional approaches': those which 'typically ask what European identity is and thus … end up talking identity talk themselves'.

power therein, are the foci of post-structuralist (discourse) analysis. In these accounts, the 'emergence' of intersubjective social reality is not a simple and 'positive' creative process. There are always winners and losers involved therein. Inherent to social construction, *discursive construction* in their terms, of both social reality and of knowledge about it are power and politics. Social construction takes place in discourse and is inescapably a political act. Hence, what appears to be 'social reality' in contemporary Europe is the product of discursive and political struggle.

1.2 Post-Structuralism: Discourse, Identity, and Change

The post-structuralist ontology of discursive construction is premised on the underlying assumption that it is only through language that people can access the world. Since language is itself of human making, this amounts to the claim that we cannot access the world but through its representations, themselves arbitrary fixations of meaning, that is, discourses. Hence, whereas language is the necessary mediator of our access to the world, it is not itself a neutral or 'transparent tool which communicates the reality of the object to the subject'. Language and linguistic practices 'produce meaning and value in the sense that they constitute what the object means to the subject' (Huysmans 1997, 363). At the same time, as meaning and value can be attributed from countless perspectives in countless contexts, each representation is bound to be incomplete and partial. Therefore, the arbitrariness of meaning production makes any representation of an object or reality a political act and intervention.

This subchapter opens with a presentation of the post-structuralist ontology of discursive construction (section 1.2.1). The ensuing section discusses its origins in structuralist and post-structuralist thinking in linguistics and social theory, and presents a number of key tenets on the basis of which a post-structuralist discourse analysis operates. Section 1.2.3 briefly summarizes the key post-structuralist arguments with respect to the two key notions in this study: identity and change. The concluding section, then, introduces post-structuralist discourse theory as arguably the most advanced attempt to develop a comprehensive theoretical and analytical framework applying post-structuralist theory to the analysis of discourse and society.

1.2.1 Reality as Political, Discursive Construct

Post-structuralist theory and discourse analysis build on structuralist and (to varying extent) post-structuralist linguistic theory, shared claim of which is that 'our access to reality is

always through language' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 8). 'Reality' does not stand apart from discourse (or vice versa) and thus 'cannot be known outside discourse' (Diez 2001, 89). Discourse is 'the layer of reality where meaning is produced and distributed'. Hence, the conception of any meaningful account of reality needs to take place in discourse (Wæver 2009, 165). Crucially, this contention is not a denial of the existence of a reality external to language, only of the proposition that 'real objects have a *meaning* independently of the discourses in which they are constituted as objects' (Howarth 2000a, 112).[23] While matter exists, and natural occurrences are 'real' events, their construction as objects of our knowledge takes place in and through language and discourse. Only through their representation (construction) in language '"things" – objects, subjects, states, living beings, and material structures – are given meaning and endowed with a particular identity' (Hansen 2006, 16). As soon as an event, or a 'thing', is ascribed meaning, 'it is no longer outside discourse' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 9).

At the same time, language is not a neutral mirror reflecting 'things', events, behaviour or facts, a 'transparent tool functioning as a medium for the registration of data as (implicitly) assumed by positivist, empiricist science'. It is instead 'a field of social and political practice' (Hansen 2006, 16). Social world and the identities and relations it comprises are generated in and through language (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 9) by specific discourses. Yet as there is no objective or 'true meaning' beyond linguistic representation (Hansen 2006, 16), each and every account of 'reality' is nothing more than just one specific discursive construction thereof (Diez 2001, 90). Each discourse is an arbitrary and thus political manner of representing the world. As such, each is necessarily involved in the struggle over the change or reproduction of 'social reality' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 9).

From the post-structuralist perspective, it is impossible to have a pre-discursive (and thus value-neutral) access to 'reality'. Therefore, claims to such an 'objective' standpoint, to the veracity of a particular account of 'reality', as much as those to truth, are political acts.

[23] Post-structuralists and discourse theorists do not deny that 'matter exists independently of our consciousness, thoughts, and language' but assert that '[m]atter does not carry the means of its own representation'. As explained by Jacob Torfing: 'the social forms that render matter intelligible are neither passive reflections of an immanent essence of the experienced objects nor are they constituted by the omnipotence of the experiencing subject that reduces the object to a thought object'. They are 'constructed in and through different discourses'. He provided the following illustrative example: 'a particular piece of land can be constructed as habitat for an endangered species by a group of biologists, a recreational facility by the urban population, fertile farm land by the local farmers, or a business opportunity by urban developers (2005, 18). As a matter of fact, post-structuralists 'affirm the material character of every discursive structure. To argue the opposite is to accept the very classical dichotomy between an objective field constituted outside of any discursive intervention, and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 108).

They too promote certain representations and interpretations of the 'real' while silencing and delegitimizing others. Michel Foucault's famous statement on this point reads:

> We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favor. We must conceive discourse as a violence we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them (1984, 127).

Epistemologically speaking, the post-structuralist point is that, whether we acknowledge it or not, our representations of reality and the world around us are arbitrary, and have thus a political character.

1.2.2 Structuralism and Post-Structuralism: Linguistics and Beyond

This section discusses several key 'episodes' in the development of the post-structuralist conception of discourse, in both linguistic and social theory. It concludes with few remarks on how that conception bears on discourse analysis.

Saussurian Linguistics: Differential Origin of Meaning and Structural Determinism

The original assertion of the 'contingency of the articulation of meaning' is attributed to Ferdinand de Saussure, Swiss structural linguist (Mole 2007b, 15). De Saussure (1960) conceived of language as a system of related signs, one 'which is not determined by the reality to which it refers'. He posited that every sign consists of a *signifiant*, that is 'the signifier' in the sense of a 'form' or 'sound-image'; and a *signifié*, that is 'the signified' in the sense of 'content' or 'concept' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 9-10; Mole 2007b, 16). Fundamentally, he asserted that the relation between the two components of a sign is wholly arbitrary (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 10), that 'there was no *a priori* relationship between the signifier and the signified': 'the meaning of a concept is … not determined by the word used to name it'. So the ascription of 'sound-image' to a concept must be arbitrary (Mole 2007b, 16). Accordingly, '[t]he meaning we attach to words is not inherent in them but a result of social conventions whereby we connect certain meanings with certain sounds'. Hence, 'the relationship between language and reality … is arbitrary' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 10). The crucial point that de Saussure made with this conceptualization of language as a system of signs was that *the meaning of signs is determined by their differential relations with other signs*. A sign, then, 'gains its specific value from being different from other signs'. A certain word is thus seen as 'part of a network or *structure* of other words from which it differs; and it is precisely from everything that it is not that … [it] gets its meaning' (Ibid).

What characterized Saussurian structural linguistics was de Saussure's distinction between two levels of language and an analytical prioritization of just one of them. The first level was that of *langue*: the structure or network of signs whose interrelations determine the meaning of each, a meaning which is fixed and unchangeable. The latter level of language he termed *parole*: 'situated language use, the signs actually used by people in specific situations'. '*Parole* must always draw on *langue*, for it is the structure of language that makes specific statements possible' and where meaning resides. On this ground, the Saussurian structuralist school largely disregarded the former as a research object and focused instead on *langue* as 'the fixed, underlying structure' (Ibid). Still, it needs to be stressed that de Saussure conceived of the structure of language (a system of interrelated signs) as a social institution, which could as such change over time. Furthermore, his structuralist theory of language in no way denied that the signifier or the form of a sign differs across languages, or that the content of a sign may vary across applications in particular situations (Ibid).

Foucault: Discourse as Regulatory Structure

De Saussure's structuralist theory made a profound impression on the theory of discourse of Foucault, the pioneer of applying discourse analysis to the study of society (Mole 2007b, 16). He pointed to the structural property of language when describing 'discursive formation' as 'a *system* of dispersion [whenever] between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices' which constitute 'a *regularity* (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations' (as quoted by Hansen 2006, 17). In his earlier work, Foucault conceived of discourses as 'autonomous systems of rules that constitute objects, concepts, subjects and strategies' (Howarth 2000a, 48-49). As a system of rules, discourse mandates 'how particular statements are formed and distributed to constitute a given object'. Crucially, since it imposes a boundary between what is included and excluded, discourse constructs objects in an arbitrary, and thus political fashion (Ifversen 2007, 171-172). Throughout his works, Foucault sought to demonstrate the workings of discourses as regulators in the devising of statements, in disciplining thought, and as arbiters of what is (and is not) true, rational, or legitimate. He also stressed that due to their pervasion of our thinking, discourses may often remain unnoticed (Mole 2007b, 16).

Derrida's Critique of Logocentrism: Hierarchically Organized Differential Relations

Jacques Derrida (1976, 1978) also conceived of language as 'a system of differential signs' whereby the determination of meaning 'is established not by the essence of a thing itself but

through a series of juxtapositions' (as paraphrased by Hansen 2006, 17). Derrida's crucial point was that such meaning-producing juxtapositions were hierarchically ordered dichotomies rather than pairs of equal signs. Each coupling between signs valorizes and prioritizes one over the other, its supposed opposite. This structuration of language was, according to Derrida, due to what he termed 'logocentrism' of Western thought, something like its 'programming interface'.

Western thought is, according to Derrida, structured by 'dichotomies or polarities such as good/evil, presence/absence, truth/error, identity/difference'. These oppositional binaries are 'neither equal in value nor independent of each other'. They are hierarchically organized: one term is always negatively connoted as compared to the other 'temporally and qualitatively prior' term (Zehfuss 2004, 197). Derrida attributed this structuration of language to 'logocentrism' (logocentric discourse) of Western culture, its 'belief in the self-presentation of meaning'. Logocentrism directs all our thinking to valorizing presence, and inclines us to support the value of our ideas or statements by showing 'that they are in accordance with presence' (Ibid, 198). Oppositional pairs of concepts, then, privilege one which governs the other. The former 'supposedly signifies a presence, propriety, or identity which the other lacks' (Devetak 2000, 1742). Hierarchical binaries 'privilege unity, identity, immediacy, and temporal and spatial *presentness* over distance, difference, dissimulation and deferment'. Western philosophy has thus 'conceptualized being or the "real" as presence. That which is seen to be immediately present, temporally and spatially, is thus valued over the other removed' (Zehfuss 2004, 197-198).[24]

The key point of Derrida's critique of the logocentric 'metaphysics of presence', (that 'representation is always already inferior to the "real" and present'), was that it mandated an impossibility. Logocentrism and its conceptualization of being as presence presupposed the possibility of making 'clear distinctions between presence and absence, identity and difference, and entity and supplement'. This idea was flawed, according to him, because neither of the terms can 'work without elements of its presumed opposite' (Zehfuss 2004, 198). As he put it: 'Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences' (Derrida 1982, 11). This contention invalidates any 'search for origins or essences', since '[a]ll we can find are non-originary origins' (Zehfuss 2004, 200).

[24] For a more detailed explication of the 'operation' of logocentrism, refer to Ashley 1989, 261-262.

Hence, all the oppositional binaries omnipresent in political theory and science, such as structure/superstructure, core/periphery, continuity/change, nature/culture, individual/collective, real/ideological, domestic/international, or man/woman are not only hierarchical, but the signs they comprise are mutually dependent on one another for their meaning. Identity/difference is no exception: '[a]lthough identity is an effect of differences, identity is the valued term' (Zehfuss 2004, 218). The recognition of the indispensability of differentiation in identity construction, and of an inescapable hierarchy between juxtaposed identity constructs, is one of the defining characteristics of post-structuralist analysis of subject formation in international politics (discussed in subchapter 2.1).

Post-Structuralism: Critique of Structural Determinism and the Possibility of Change

Saussurian structural theory of language came under criticism for proposing a relatively rigid conception of language system and 'too simplistic' view of meaning-formation. To reiterate, de Saussure held that the meaning of a sign is determined by its difference from other signs. Marianne Jørgensen and Louise J. Phillips likened his conception of language structure to a fishing net, and a sign to one of its knots: 'When the net is stretched out, the knot is fixed in position by its distance from the other knots in the net, just as the sign is defined by its distance from the other signs'. Hence, 'signs are locked in particular relationships with one another: every sign has a particular location in the net and its meaning is fixed'. Later structuralists and post-structuralists denied the fixity of a sign's position in the structure of language, and thus also any simplified view of how its meaning is determined (2002, 11).

Post-structuralists, on their part, built on but significantly modified the Saussurian theory. On the one hand, they embraced the claim that the meaning of signs is unrelated to 'reality', that it depends solely on their relations with other signs within certain network thereof. On the other, they rejected the conception of language structure as totalizing, stable, and thus virtually unchangeable; and sought to dissolve the Saussurian sharp distinction between *langue* and *parole* (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 10). They posited that the set of signs from which a certain sign differs, and thus acquires its meaning, can change depending on the context in which that particular sign is employed (Laclau 1993a, 433). Hence, signs' meaning cannot be stable and fixed once and for good. It depends on the context of their usage. The image of fishing net becomes inappropriate, 'since it cannot be ultimately determined where in the net the signs should be placed in relation to one another'. Jørgensen and Phillips likened the linkages between signs in the post-structuralist conception of

language to ‘internet’: ‘all links are connected with one another, but links can be removed and new ones constantly emerge and alter the structure’. Post-structuralists thus opened up the possibility of change, virtually missing in structuralism. Structures exist, but always ‘in a temporary and not necessarily consistent state’. Structures can change, and the meanings of signs ‘can shift in relation to one another’ (2002, 11).

Post-structuralist theorization of change revolved around context. It prompted them to undermine the structuralist distinction between *langue* and *parole*. Whereas structuralists disregarded *parole* (situated language use) as ‘too arbitrary’, post-structuralists asserted that it was precisely ‘in concrete language use that the structure is created, reproduced and changed’. To be sure, people’s utterances need to draw on the structure to be intelligible. Yet, ‘they may also challenge the structure by introducing alternative ideas for how to fix the meaning of signs’ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 11-12).

Derrida: Boundless Context and the Impossibility of Pure Presence

The final ‘episode’ in the development of post-structuralist thought concerns Derrida’s propositions regarding signification and the context-dependency of meaning. As for the latter, he asserted that meaning can never be definite or exhaustive because ‘context cannot be circumscribed’: ‘no context is absolutely saturable or saturating … [and thus] can determine meaning to the point of exhaustiveness’ (quoted by Zehfuss 2004, 200-201). Briefly put, ‘meaning depends on context but context is boundless’ (Ibid, 224). Moreover, ‘[b]ecause of the potential multiplicity of contexts, meaning is also the product of a process of “grafting”, of different texts and contexts being superimposed on each other and working together in a signifying chain’ (Ibid, 201). From this springs the preoccupation with context, intertextuality and interdiscursivity of post-structuralist discourse analysis.

The final point to address concerns signification, the reason why post-structuralists insist that there is nothing outside language, that is, the realm of discursive construction. Derrida rejected the possibility of ‘the representation of an absent presence’, of *something*, ‘because there never is an absolute presence which could thus be represented, prior to signification itself’. A presence (something) can only be signified through deferral, by its supplement. Supplements are thus an inevitable part of signification. A supplement has the character of what Derrida called an ‘undecidable’: it works paradoxically both to complement and to replace the signified (Ibid). Hence, a *sign is a supplement of the signified* (the thing itself). As such, it takes over the place of the signified in both ways the verb

'supplement' suggests: 'it stands for it in its absence but at the same time already replaces it'. Zehfuss put Derrida's argument as follows:

> The supplement is not an essentially superfluous addition. Rather the "presence" which it is thought to be added on to is derived from the supplement. Therefore, the supplement endangers the possibility of pure presence. As the sign is a supplement, the logic of the supplement is fundamental to Derrida's claim that there is "*nothing outside of the text*" […], that the real is an effect of representation, that it is "constituted by the logic of supplementarity" (Ibid, 202).

Post-structuralist discourse analysis can thus conceive also of the material as text: language cannot convey to people anything but its representations. Furthermore, no representation can ever be complete, exhaustive or pure. A representation can never fully grasp the represented. The two can never be the same, fully congruent. Each representation is a supplement and as such excessive or partial in one way or another. Finally, no representation is an ahistorical, context-free standalone. It is always an effect of other representations.

1.2.3 Post-Structuralism: Discursive Construction of Identity, Endless Change

This study enquires into the discursive construction of the EU vis-à-vis Europe, and into whether and how enlargement may affect this process. Hence, this general discussion of post-structuralism should conclude by laying out how it conceives of both identity construction and change. These two themes will be revisited in more detail in the ensuing subchapter, focusing on Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory as arguably the most advanced unified attempt to apply post-structuralism to analysis of society and discourse.

Applying post-structuralist thought to the concept of identity means not just to deny it an essence or origin. It is to point to its inherent and inevitable dependence on difference, incompleteness, context-boundedness, non-exhaustiveness, instability and political character. No settled identities can exist from this perspective, for 'the subject never achieves the completion or wholeness towards which it strives. It remains haunted by that which has to be excluded for subjectivity to be constituted in the first place' (Zehfuss 2004, 220).

The post-structuralist take on meaning-production as accomplished 'through the discursive juxtaposition between a privileged sign … and a devalued one', makes for a *two-dimensional relational conception of identity construction*. Operationalizing Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory for empirical analysis of identity construction in and through discourse, Lene Hansen identified two concurrent processes – *linking* and *differentiation* – which put together a series of juxtaposed signs (2006, 17). Owing to its ontology and epistemology, post-structuralist analysis of discursive construction of subject identity

conceives of it as its representation and performance. How this bears on post-structuralist analysis of subjects of international politics is discussed separately in subchapter 2.1, as this is an application thereof to a specific domain. Suffice it to say at this point that the way in which we represent the EU is the way in which we construct the 'thing itself' (Diez 2001).

As regards change, and by extension the interplay between structure and agency, post-structuralism proposes a clear but necessarily open-ended answer. The Derridean post-structuralist conceptualization of language not as a singular, fixed and rigid structure of signs but rather as a 'series of open-ended chains' implies not only that change is possible but constant: 'With each articulation [of meaning], there is at least a potential of adding new oppositions to the already existing chain, and thereby of altering it' (Diez 2001, 94). These 'open-ended chains' are precisely what post-structuralists understand discourses to be: the arbitrary organizations of signs. Hence, each articulation is 'in itself a constitutive part of discourse and as such also a political act and intervention in a discursive space (Ibid, 98).

Yet, precisely because the notion of language as a stable structure is denied and overcome, agency is limited. From the Derridean perspective, Zehfuss asserted, 'neither analysts nor actors can just (re)make the world according to their wishes. Precisely because context is boundless … it cannot be dominated at will' (2004, 255). Myriad discourses constitute a discursive space, a 'web surrounding each articulation that makes the latter possible', meaningful and intelligible. On the other hand, a discursive space and discourses that make it up are dependent for their reproduction through these articulations (Diez 2001, 90). Hence, while discourses are structures constraining agents' possibilities of articulation, '[n]o discourse can be protected from contestation and contamination as their boundaries are continuously breached and redrawn (Torfing 2005, 18-19). Discourses 'are *continuously transformed* through the addition and combination of new articulations' (Diez 2001, 98, emphasis added). Novel articulations of meaning may both 'largely reproduce the prevailing rationalities' or 'combine linguistic elements in novel ways', and thus contribute to discursive change (Ibid). From this perspective, then, 'change and continuity always go hand in hand'. This is not to deny, however, that while 'each addition to a linguistic chain seems to be minor at first', it may be 'part of a major transformation, the importance of which becomes clear only in the long run' (Ibid, 94).

1.2.4 Concluding Remarks: Discourse Theory as Applied Post-Structuralism

Having concluded the presentation of post-structuralism in general terms, the remainder of this chapter focuses on discourse theory as developed by Laclau and Mouffe and their followers, arguably the 'purest' and most comprehensive application of post-structuralism to the analysis of society and discourse. It is grounded in Derrida's propositions concerning the 'impossibility of closure [of meaning] and [people's] constant longing for the fixity and security of any such ultimate basis'. As Ole Wæver aptly described it, discourse theory revolves around the presupposition that '[p]artial fixations of political meaning are constantly attempted and make up much of the dynamics of politics, but any such attempt always has a loose end, an opening for a possible re-articulation' (2009, 166). As a specific and highly coherent post-structuralist theoretical and analytical framework, discourse theory proposes a unified conceptual apparatus for conducting discourse analysis (subchapter 1.3). Equally importantly, it also establishes detailed premises thereof by outlining and elaborating on what analytical possibilities are opened and foreclosed once one adopts the post-structuralist (discourse) theoretical and analytical standpoint (subchapter 1.4).

1.3 Discourse Theory

This subchapter discusses the development of the theory and analysis of discourse, and points out what distinguishes the post-structuralist from other approaches to discourse analysis (1.3.1). It then turns to the 'genealogy' of post-structuralist discourse theory as developed by Laclau and Mouffe and their followers (1.3.2). The ensuing sections proceed with a presentation of the theory itself, its ontological and epistemological premises, and key theoretical and analytical categories. In particular, its conceptions of 'the discursive' and discourse (1.3.3); understanding of 'the social' and its structuration (1.3.4); initial and later enhanced theorization of identity formation (1.3.5); take on the structuration of social spaces (1.3.6); and finally its understanding of change and continuity (1.3.7).

1.3.1 Three Generations of Discourse Theory

Discourse theory (widely defined) originated in the late 1970s debates over the merits of mainstream theory; the critique of structuralist theories of language, culture and society; and Marxism's intellectual crisis, revealed by the ascendancy of neoliberal and neoconservative hegemony. It emerged as a novel cross-disciplinary attempt to fashion a new analytical perspective through the integration of key insights of linguistics and hermeneutics with core

ideas resident in social and political theory. Generally focused on 'the rules and meanings that condition the construction of social, political, and cultural identity', the new theories of discourse have an 'open, contingent, and theoretically polyvalent character'. They differ among themselves in terms of their understanding of discourse, and the coincidence of language and political power struggles (Torfing 2005, 1 and 5). Their understandings evolved hand in hand with the evolution of discourse theory itself. Jacob Torfing's identification of its three generations sheds light on the diversity of theoretical insights on which Laclau and Mouffe's theory draws, as well as those it dismisses.

The first generation conceive of discourse in narrow linguistic terms, as 'a textual unit that is larger than a sentence', and concentrate on the semantic aspects of a text (spoken or written) in individual speakers' actual linguistic utterances. Neither *socio-linguistics*, *content analysis*, nor *conversation analysis* seek to extend discourse analysis to an analysis of politics and power struggles. While the pre-occupation of *discourse psychology* with speakers' strategies, and that of *critical linguistics* with ideological distortion allow for the analysis of 'the repressive effects of different forms of discourse', they are both 'trapped in a purely linguistic analysis of the semantic aspects of discourse, and the notions of ideology and power remain undertheorized' (Torfing 2005, 6).

The second generation's conception of discourse is extended beyond written and spoken language to include a broader set of social practices. *Critical discourse analysis* (CDA), as developed by Norman Fairclough, partly builds on and partly departs from the insights of Foucault, whom Torfing subsumes under the second generation as well. CDA concurs with Foucault on that discursive practices constitute subjects and objects but denies his 'quasi-transcendental' conception of discourse (see e.g. Fairclough 1992, 38-39). In CDA, social practices are discursive so long as they involve a semiotic element. Discourse then refers to 'all kinds of linguistically mediated practices in terms of speech, writing, images, and gestures that social actors draw upon in their production and interpretation of meaning'. CDA focuses itself on the 'power effects of discourse'. It sees as ideological those discursive practices which 'contribute to the naturalization of contingently constructed meanings' in order to preserve or counter the hegemonic power of particular social classes or ethnic groups. CDA posits a certain 'relation between discourse and its non-discursive contexts', and tends to reduce discourse to 'a linguistic mediation of the events that are produced by the causal powers and mechanisms embedded in the independently existing structure of society' (Torfing 2005, 6-7).

Foucault himself did not study 'the actual form and content of linguistic statements and semiotic practices' but rather the rules which regulate their production, their 'discursive conditions of possibility'. He was concerned with the 'rules of formation', regulating 'what can be said, how it can be said, who can speak and in which name, and what kind of strategies … can be realized at the level of discourse'. He held that all practices are 'shaped by the discursive rules of formation' (varying in time and space), and are as such discursive. His *archaeological* writings manifested Marxist influence, as they upheld the idea that discursive rules of formation are 'conditioned by non-discursive relations'. Operation of this conditioning, and how should one distinguish 'the discursive real from the nondiscursive' remained unclear. Foucault's concern with this distinction subsided in his later, *genealogical* work, focusing on 'the power struggles that shape and reshape particular discursive formations' rather than on discourse *per se*. In this phase, he put forth a new notion of discursive power, stressing *power's productive aspect* (Torfing 2005, 7). In his words, power 'traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body' (1980, 119). *Power* so *produces the social*. It denotes 'the ways in which discourse regulates actions' by shaping social actors' 'identities, capacities, and relations of subordination' (Torfing 2005, 8). This was an assertion of mutual co-constitution of power and discourse: discourse is both 'an instrument as well as an effect of power' (Foucault 1998, 101).

Building on but departing from Foucault, the third generation post-structuralist discourse theorists posited that discourse encompasses the entire social realm. All social phenomena are discursive since 'their meaning depends upon a decentred system of contingently constructed rules and differences'. Hence, rather than extending merely to the part of the social with semiotic aspect, the discursive is 'coterminous with the social'. The third generation understood *discourse* as a 'relational system of signifying practices that is produced through historical and ultimately political interventions and provides a contingent horizon for the construction of any meaningful object'. It is important to reiterate that post-structuralists discarded the structuralist idea that the system of meaning comprises only one discourse, one 'centre'. Their conception of discourse follows Derrida's 'deconstruction of the traditional concept of structure as a closed and centred totality'. As Torfing put it, paraphrasing Derrida (1978), 'the consequence of giving up the metaphysical idea of a transcendental centre that structures the entire structure while itself escaping structuration is that everything becomes discourse' Social identities can no longer be 'fixed once and for all

with reference to a determining centre'. Instead, 'the play of meaning extends infinitely, and an endless displacement of limited and provisional centres begins' (Torfing 2005, 8).

Laclau and Mouffe sought to develop a 'synthetic, post-Marxist, post-structuralist, and postmodern political theory' by putting together and 'translating' several third generation discourse theories into a coherent analytical framework. Theirs is a 'synthetic third generation theory which is both a development of and a departure from the second generation'. They endorsed Foucault's idea of mutual co-constitution of power and discourse and saw the latter in 'quasi-transcendental terms' as 'historically variable conditions of possibility of what we say, think, imagine, and do'. As opposed to the second generation, they dismissed a distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive as unsustainable. They held that even 'the seemingly non-discursive phenomena like technology, institutions, and economic processes are ultimately constructed in and through discursive systems of difference'. On their view, then, discourse is 'co-extensive with the social' (Ibid, 8-9). It should be stressed, once again, that this does not amount to a repudiation of 'the material', since for Laclau and Mouffe discourses are material (1985, 108). Their point of departure from historical materialism was rather that 'there is no dialectical interaction between discourse and something else: discourse itself is fully constitutive of our world' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 19). This was also one of the key grounds of their critique of Fairclough's CDA, upholding 'the idea that discourse is somehow determined by extra-discursive powers at the level of the economy or the state'. Their latter reservation concerned Fairclough's emphasis on 'the actions and reflexivity of human agents in reproducing and transforming the social world', inspired by Anthony Giddens's theory of structuration' (Torfing 2005, 9).

Laclau and Mouffe's work (1982, 1985, 1987) thus represents a certain unifying element of the third generation *post-structuralist (or post-Marxist) discourse theory*, a crucial reference point for discourse-oriented post-structuralist analyses. Post-structuralist discourse theory, nonetheless, is an evolving, 'open, and unfinished research programme' (Torfing 2005, 3). While it takes Laclau and Mouffe's 1980s' works as the theoretical and analytical starting point, its arguments and concepts have been further elaborated since then, not only by Laclau and Mouffe but also by others seeking to apply and 'calibrate' it in concrete empirical analyses.[25]

[25] The term 'discourse theory' will hereafter refer solely to the third generation post-structuralist (post-Marxist) variant anchored in the works of Laclau and Mouffe.

Laclau and Mouffe worked out their theory through deconstruction of other theories, in particular by combining and, at the same time, substantially modifying the Marxist and structuralist theoretical traditions (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 25). Their interrogation of manifold theories was guided by the 'central substantive aim' to elaborate a 'theory of hegemony as the main framework of political analysis'. It involved a 'thorough deconstruction of the Marxist tradition' (in Laclau and Mouffe 1985), 'which made it possible to understand the radically innovative potential of the Gramscian turn', according to Laclau (2000a, x). Discourse theory's presentation is thus inseparable from its genealogy.

1.3.2 Genealogy of Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory

Laclau and Mouffe concurred with the post-structuralist critique of Saussurian structural linguistics: signs acquire meaning by their relations of difference from other signs but these relations are not fixed once and for all. Structures of meaning are (partially) fixed and challenged in social contexts by situated language use: signs acquire new meanings as people position them in novel relations and let the old ones subside. As a social practice, meaning production operates '*as if* a Saussurian structure existed'. 'Speakers' ceaselessly attempt to fix the meaning of signs by specifically relating them to other signs. Yet, the building of a structure of meaning is 'ultimately impossible', since each concrete fixation of signs (and their meaning) is *contingent*: 'possible but not necessary' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 25).

For Laclau and Mouffe, these discursive processes characterize not only systems of signification but the entire social. The understanding of discourse as coterminous with the social was distantly inspired by Immanuel Kant's classical transcendental philosophy (see Laclau 1993a), maintaining that 'perception and experience of empirical phenomena are made possible by some pregiven categories in the human mind'. Post-structuralist discourse theory endorsed the idea that 'we should focus on the conditions of possibility of our perceptions, utterances, and actions, rather than on the factual immediacy or hidden meaning of the social world'. Contrary to the Kantian classical transcendentalism, however, it adopted a 'quasi-transcendental view of the conditions of possibility'. It posited that these are not invariable and ahistorical but rather 'subject to political struggles and historical transformation'; and that they are not 'an inherent feature of human mind' but rather 'a structural feature of contingently constructed discourses' (Torfing 2005, 9-10).

Laclau and Mouffe developed their theory of the social through a critique of classical Marxism, chiefly its economic determinism and class reductionism (see Laclau and Mouffe

1985, ch. 1 and 2; Laclau 1990; Mouffe 1993). As for its economic determinism, historical materialism conceived of society as comprised of *the base* (material conditions and the economy) and *superstructure* (the political realm, i.e. the state, its apparatus, and 'the entire production of meaning that goes on in society'). The base determined the superstructure, and thus what people could say and think. Social change could then be only due to causal changes in the economy. As for class reductionism, classical Marxism proposed that the ownership of the means of production at the level of the economy determined the division of society into two 'objective' antagonistic classes: the capitalists and workers, the former exploiting and ruling the latter. Workers withstood their exploitation because their consciousness was formed by the superstructure, producing and enacting an ideology legitimizing the capitalist system. This ideology blinded workers from their 'true interests' and instilled in them 'false consciousness'. In order for the proletariat to overcome their predicament through revolution, they had to 'see beyond' ideology and recognize their true interests (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 30-31). The crucial problem with classical Marxism was: how could transformation of consciousness come about if the base determined everything.

The problems of economic determinism and class reductionism were shared also by the Athusserian structuralist re-fashioning of classical Marxism (Torfing 2005, 10), another key theoretical resource for Laclau and Mouffe (see section 1.3.5). In overcoming the historical materialist idea that the economy (the base), that is 'the non-discursive' or 'the material', determines everything, they relied on Antonio *Gramsci's theory of hegemony* (1985, ch. 2). Gramsci refused to 'identify the subjects of political actions with social classes that are organized around a paradigmatic set of interests that are determined by their structural position at the level of production' (Torfing 2005, 10). He proposed the notion of hegemony in order to account for the processes taking place in the superstructure which impact the formation of people's consciousness (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 32).

Hegemony designated '*the organisation of consent* – the processes through which subordinated forms of consciousness are constructed without recourse to violence or coercion' (Barrett 1991, 54). Existing societal relations were thus stabilized and naturalized through the production of meaning. Crucially, on Gramsci's understanding, hegemonic processes took place in the superstructure, the political. Their effects thus could not be reduced to the economy alone. Hence, he posited that consciousness was determined by superstructural processes which were not themselves necessarily determined by economic conditions (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 32).

Gramsci thus 'introduced' politics into the Marxist thought, while rejecting that 'the state and the political class struggles that are fought out at the level of the political and ideological superstructure' were 'determined by the inner movements of the economic infrastructure'. As a result, while Marxism foresaw that politics would eventually disappear, on Gramsci's account politics were a 'constitutive force of society' (Torfing 2005, 10-11). In modern societies, according to him, politics took the form of

> struggle for hegemony in terms of the establishment of a political and moral-intellectual leadership. The highest moment in the struggle for hegemony is when the hegemonic force becomes a state, in Gramsci's integral sense of the term defined as political society plus civil society. As such, the institutionalization of a hegemonic project in an organic coupling of state and civil society is more important than taking control with the means of production (Torfing 2005, 11).

Gramsci thus anticipated, according to Torfing, Laclau and Mouffe's assertion of the primacy of politics. Rather than 'determined by non-political socio-economic infrastructures', politics is 'a constitutive force that constructs the intra-societal forms and relations of state, economy, and civil society in a context of social strife and antagonisms'. From here, as he put it, 'it only takes a deconstruction of Gramsci's essentialist assumption that only the fundamental classes can exercise hegemony to arrive at the notion of discourse advanced by Laclau and Mouffe' (Torfing 2005, 11).

They radicalized both Gramsci's and Luis Athusser's (see section 1.3.5) elaborations and departures from the classical Marxist understandings of politics and ideology. Informed by post-structuralist linguistics, their discourse theory 'deconstructs the Marxist ontology in which all identity is reduced to a class essence, and introduces a relational conception of discourse'. Consequently, society is conceived of as 'a symbolic order in which social antagonisms and structural crises can not be reduced to essential class cores determined by economic processes and relations'. The implication of this view is that 'all ideological elements in a discursive field are contingent, rather than fixed by a class essence, and that there is no fundamental social agency or political project that determines processes of historical change in an a priori fashion (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 5-6).

In more concrete terms, Laclau and Mouffe abolished the remainder of 'objectivism' in Gramsci's theory by suggesting that 'there are no objective laws that divide society into particular groups; the groups that exist are always created in political, discursive processes'. Furthermore, their assertion that politics has primacy (see e.g. Laclau 1990, 33) does not amount to a mere elevation of the status of the superstructure, since they abrogated the

base/superstructure model by fusing the two into 'one field produced by the same discursive processes'. On these grounds, then, they concluded that 'how we act and think and thereby how we create society' is contingent and determined discursively, in and through political articulations (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 33-34).

Another key source for Laclau and Mouffe was the aforementioned deconstruction of the logocentric bias of the Western 'metaphysics of presence' by Derrida (1978, 1981, 1982). It reaffirmed the primacy of politics and omnipresence of power in the discursive construction and structuration of the social. Derrida's deconstruction of binary hierarchies revealed an 'ultimate undecidability':

> The social world is founded upon an undecidable oscillation between different poles that cannot be arrested by rational calculation or any other totalizing gesture, but requires an ethico-political decision, which inscribes a contingent decidability that privileges some options, meanings, or identities over others (Torfing 2005, 12).

The construction of oppositional hierarchies is the matter of politics and the exercise of power: since 'politics takes place in an undecidable terrain of non-totalizable openness it will always involve both inclusion and exclusion of meanings and identities' (Ibid).

The third generation discourse theory also drew on the idea of postmodernity, albeit in a peculiar and critical fashion.[26] For Laclau and Mouffe, postmodernity denoted

> an expression of an increasing awareness of the limits of modernity … a recognition of the flaws and limits of the modernist belief in the reconciling force of reason, the nomadic account of the individual, the quest for self-determined meanings and identities, and the emancipation from power through a rational reorganization of the social order' (as presented by Torfing 2005, 12).

On this reading, then, discourse theory sought to develop a postmodern social and political theory in the sense of exploring the new possibilities opened up by the subsiding of modernist ontology and epistemology (Ibid).

In summary, the three key sources informing the third generation post-structuralist discourse theory are post-Marxism, post-structuralism and postmodernity. The body of work it subsumes, however, often also draw on other theoretical sources, such as postpositivism, rhetorics, neopragmatism (Richard Rorty) or postanalytical philosophy (Ludwig Wittgenstein). From among them, perhaps the most prominent is the incorporation into

[26] Laclau (1989) identified two problems inherent in the notion of a new, postmodern era. The idea relied on a 'modern account of history as consisting of a progressive series of clearly defined epochs'. Secondly, he suggested that 'the conception of postmodernity as a negation of modernity' tended to imply the affirmation of 'the possibility of the full presence of all these things of modernity that are supposed to be abandoned or turned upside down' (Torfing 2005, 12).

discourse theory of the insights of Freudian and particularly Lacanian psychoanalysis, as well as the reinterpretation and further elaboration thereof by Slavoj Žižek. Discussed in detail in section 1.3.5, Laclau and Mouffe relied in their later (post-mid-1980s) works on Lacanian psychoanalysis so as to 'go beyond the post-structuralist conception of the subject as a relatively unified ensemble of discursively constructed identities (see Laclau, 1990). This was still a 'quasi-structuralist understanding of subjectivity as a dispersion of subject positions', which as such failed to account for the stimuli and mechanisms directing the process of subjects' identification ('subjectivation'), that is, for people's desire for a 'fully achieved identity'. Lacanian psychoanalysis proposed that this desire emanated from 'the ultimate failure of the subject to constitute itself as a locus of a positively defined identity' (Torfing 2005, 12-13).

1.3.3 The Discursive, Discourse, and Basic Analytical Categories

In discourse theory, *the discursive* refers to 'a theoretical horizon within which the being of objects is constituted'. Since the meaning of objects 'depends upon a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences', they are all 'objects of discourse'. Hence, the discursive designates 'a horizon of meaningful practices and significant differences' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 3).[27] *Discourse*, then, designates a certain 'totality in which each sign is fixed as a moment through its relations to other signs'. It is an 'attempt to stop the sliding of the signs in relation to one another', to establish a 'unified system of meaning'. Discourse does so by means of '*exclusion* of all other possible meanings that the signs could have had' if organized otherwise. Discourse is, simply put, 'a reduction of possibilities' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 26-27). Laclau and Mouffe designated all the meaning possibilities excluded by a discourse as *the field of discursivity*. A discourse 'is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre' (1985, 111-112). It is a contingent system of meaning premised on and formed by its relation to the excluded, since it cannot itself 'completely exhaust a field of meaning' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 3).[28]

[27] Underlying this understanding is the conviction that 'we are always internal to a world of signifying practices and objects', which forecloses and judges 'as logically self-contradictory all attempts to escape and conceptualize this world from an extra-discursive perspective' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 3). As Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 108) pointed out, this is not a denial of 'a world external to thought'. 'What is denied is not that … objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence'.

[28] Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 27) pointed to unclarity surrounding the concept of the field of discursivity: whether it 'is a comparatively unstructured mass of all possible constructions of meaning' or 'is itself structured

Transposing this onto the social, discourse is a system of meaningful practices forming the identities of subjects and objects. It establishes 'a system of relations between different objects and practices, while providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify'.[29] The formation of discourses as 'concrete systems of social relations and practices' is 'intrinsically political'. It is an 'act of radical institution', involving 'the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between "insiders" and "outsiders"'.[30] It always involves an 'exercise of power', since the construction of discourses is premised on 'the exclusion of certain possibilities and a consequent structuring of the relations between different social agents' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 3-4).

Fundamentally, since discourses are constituted by means of exclusion, and depend thus on the excluded, they are 'contingent and historical constructions': 'always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their control' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 4; see also Laclau 1990, 31-36). On the other hand, as Laclau and Mouffe had it, '[t]he impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial fixations - otherwise, the very flow of differences would be impossible. Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning' (1985, 112). Hence, they held that 'partial fixations of meaning are both possible and necessary' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 7).

Basic Analytical Categories

Discourses, and thus all identity, are constituted and reconstituted in and through *articulation* of signifying elements (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 7): 'any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice'. Discourse, it follows, is then '[t]he structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105). Articulation eliminates a sign's polysemy by fixing its 'position' within a system of meaning (signification) which it establishes and organizes. All the signs that a discourse comprises (articulates) are called

by the given competing discourses'. That is, if it refers, in relation to a certain discourse, to all other discourses, or only to those which in some sense and to some extent 'inhabit the same terrain' as that particular discourse.

[29] The corollary of discourse theory's assumption that all social practices and objects are discursive is the rejection not only of an 'ontological separation between different types of social practice, whether understood as ideological, sociological, economic or political' but also of 'the idea that ideological practices simply constitute one area or "region" of social relations'. Distinction between such practices can be merely 'pragmatic and analytical, and strictly internal to the category of discourse' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 4).

[30] Stuart Hall (1988), for instance, analysed the 'Thatcherist discourse' as articulating a set of 'disparate ideological elements' which were 'linked together by establishing a clear set of political frontiers' both within and outside the Conservative Party (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 4).

moments: 'the knots in the fishing-net', meaning of which is fixed by differentition from other signs (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 26). In Laclau and Mouffe's words, they are the 'differential positions' which 'appear articulated within a discourse'. *Elements*, then, are such differences which are 'not discursively articulated' (1985, 105): the excluded signs whose meaning is not fixed, remaining as such polysemous.

A discursive articulation can never be final and is always contingent. By transforming polysemous elements into fixed moments it produces a *closure*. But this closure of the system of signification is never total or finite: 'the transition from "elements" to "moments" is never complete', never 'entirely fulfilled' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 110 and 113). It can be only *partial and temporary*. A discourse depends on its 'constitutive outside', the field of discursivity, and the meaning possibilities which it displaced therein always threaten to destabilize it. Looked from apart a particular discourse, its moments remain potentially polysemous. They are 'always potentially elements'. 'There are always other meaning potentials which, when actualised in specific articulations, may challenge and transform the structure' of a discourse. By organizing meaning (of signs) in particular ways, articulations reproduce or challenge existing discourses. Crucially, each articulation is an 'innovation' to some extent: while drawing on earlier fixations of meaning, it is 'never merely a repetition of something already established'. Articulations are then, in Laclau and Mouffe's terms, 'contingent interventions in an undecidable terrain', endlessly shaping and reshaping the structures of meaning. Discourses are thus 'incomplete structures in the same undecidable terrain' which 'never quite become completely structured'. Hence, inherent to meaning-production (the social) are (discursive) struggles over how should the system of meaning be organized, the ascription of meaning to individual signs (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 29).

In order to account for the very possibility of 'any identity or social formation', of 'the structuration of elements into a meaningful system of moments', Laclau and Mouffe proposed the concept of discursive *nodal points*. These are 'privileged signifiers or reference points' in a discourse, binding together a particular 'chain of signification' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 8). A discursive articulation partially fixes meaning around one or more nodal point(s) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 112), by organizing other signs in relation to it/them.[31] Importantly, despite their key structural position and organizing properties, nodal

[31] Drawing on Žižek, Howarth and Stavrakakis demonstrated the organizational property of the nodal point 'communism' as follows: 'In communist ideology … a number of pre-existing and available signifiers ("democracy", "state", "freedom", and so forth) acquire a new meaning by being articulated around the

points are in themselves empty: they too are polysemous elements unless discursively articulated (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 28). In discourse theory, such elements which are 'particularly open to different ascriptions of meaning' are called *floating signifiers* (Laclau 1990, 28; 1993b, 287). They are the signs that different discourses strive to fill with meaning in their own specific fashion. *Nodal points are floating signifiers*. The difference between the two concepts concerns the structural level at hand. A nodal point is a 'point of crystallisation' within a given discourse, whereas the term floating signifier more generally denotes those privileged signs meaning of which is the subject of struggle between different discourses (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 28).[32]

1.3.4 Discourse Theory of the Social: Key Concepts

One of the oft-cited contentions of discourse theory is that society is impossible. This assertion relies on Derrida's deconstruction: society cannot be an objective entity because it can never be complete and enclosed (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 111), a 'full presence':

> The limit of the social must be given within the social itself as something subverting it, destroying its ambition to constitute a full presence. Society never manages fully to be society, because everything in it is penetrated by its limits, which prevent it from constituting itself as an objective reality (Ibid, 127).

'If the social does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of society', it only exists 'as an effort to construct that impossible object' (Ibid, 112).

Hence, whereas Marxism presumed the existence of an objective society and social structure, discourse theory dismissed both. Laclau and Mouffe extended the logic of discursive structuration to the entire social realm: all social phenomena are 'organized according to the same principle as language' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 35). Just like the structure of language is only a contingent and partial fixation of meaning, society's structuration too can be only partial and contingent. Any fixation thereof is thus political: possible but not necessary. Therefore, also social relations are characterized by contingency, historicity, power and the primacy of politics (Laclau 1990, 31-36). All social practices are conceived of as articulations, since they too either reproduce or alter ascriptions of meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 113).

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signifier "communism", which occupies the structural position of the nodal point'. These elements are 'transformed into internal moments of communist discourse' due to the 'intervention' of the nodal point: their meaning is partially fixed in reference to it (2000, 8).

[32] For instance, 'equality' or 'the market' are specific nodal points (moments) of neo-liberal discourse, and floating signifiers with respect to the struggle between the neo-liberal and socialist discourses.

Even if society, 'the full closure of the social', is impossible, 'the idea of closure and fullness still functions as an (impossible) ideal'. Societies are in fact centred and organized around such ideals (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 8). As Laclau (1996, 53) put it: '[A]lthough the fullness and universality of society is unachievable, its need does not disappear: it will always show itself through the presence of its absence'. He called a sign signifying an absence *empty signifier*: 'any term which, in a certain political context becomes the signifier of the lack'. Politics is itself possible 'because the constitutive impossibility of society can only represent itself through the production of empty signifiers (Ibid, 44).[33] Discursive articulations (political practices) 'attempt to "fill" this lack of closure'. Political discourses revolve around empty signifiers, which in particular articulations structurally operate as nodal points (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 8-9).

Another important concept introduced by Laclau is that of *myth*: a floating signifier denoting a certain totality. Myths signify constructs of society as a totality. When speaking of 'the people' or 'the country', Europe or the EU, 'we seek to demarcate a totality by ascribing it an objective content'. While such myths are the conditions of possibility of social formations, they are still floating signifiers, 'invested with a different content by different articulations' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 39).

Since each empty signifier and myth are floating signifiers, all attempts to articulate their meaning (both reproducing and challenging older understandings) are inescapably political acts. Discourse theory understands *politics* in broad terms, as 'the manner in which we constantly constitute the social in ways that exclude other ways. Our actions are contingent articulations … in an undecidable terrain which reproduce or change the existing discourses and thereby the organisation of society' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 36). As each discursive articulation 'always involves both inclusion and exclusion of identity', discourse is 'intrinsically linked' with power. Discourse theory conceives of *power* 'in terms of the political acts of inclusion and exclusion that shape social meanings and identities and condition the construction of social antagonisms and political frontiers' (Torfing 2005, 23). Underlying Laclau and Mouffe's assertion of the primacy of politics is the notion that '[d]iscourses and the identities produced through them are inherently political entities that

[33] Laclau demonstrated how empty signifiers operate in discursive structuration on the example of the Hobbesian state of nature: '[I]n a situation of radical disorder "order" is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of this absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function' (1996, 44).

involve the construction of antagonisms and the exercise of power'. Crucially, as 'social systems have a fundamentally political character, they are always vulnerable to those forces that are excluded in the process of political formation' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 9).

Just as a discourse depends on and is threatened by the excluded (the field of discursivity), so a particular articulation of society and its structure is 'always in conflict with other discourses that define reality differently and set other guidelines for social action'. While some discourses may seem natural at some points in time and contexts, this is nothing but a semblance. They can never become 'definitively established'. Their moments can be destabilized and so become elements once again: 'objects for new articulations'. Hence, the social is pervaded by antagonistic conflicts and struggles (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 47).

Social antagonisms disclose, in Lacanian terms, 'the lack at the heart of all social identity and objectivity'. Essentially, discourse theory works under the assumption that social antagonisms 'cannot be reduced to the pre-constituted interests and identities of social agents'. They are instead 'formative of social objectivity itself': 'the construction of antagonisms and the institution of political frontiers between agents are partly constitutive of identities and of social objectivity'. And, furthermore, underlying the very possibility of social antagonisms is social agents' inability to 'attain fully their identity' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 10). Laclau and Mouffe described antagonism as a situation when 'the presence of [an] "Other" prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution' (1985, 125). As they explained:

> Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. But nor is the force that antagonises me such a presence: its objective being is a symbol of my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meanings which prevent it being fixed as full positivity (Ibid).

On all these grounds, how does then discourse theory conceive of identity construction?

1.3.5 Construction of Identity (the Subject)

In discourse theory, the organization of both individual and collective identity operates on the basis of the same processes of discursive structuration. Theorization of the subject and identity formation belongs among those parts of the theory which saw greatest development post-mid-1980s, particularly under the influence of Lacanian psychoanalysis.

As discussed earlier, in formulating discourse theory, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) sought to overcome the pitfalls of classical Marxism's economic determinism and class reductionism. The point of departure for their conception of *the subject* was Althusser's own

structuralist departure from classical Marxism. According to Althusser, subjects are formed through 'interpellation' or 'hailing' by ideological practices. Individuals 'acquire an identity of who they are and their role in society by being positioned in certain ways by a whole series of unconscious practices, rituals, customs and beliefs, with which they come to identify' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 12-13; see Althusser 1971, 127-186). He saw these practices, rituals, customs and beliefs as *ideology*: 'a system of representations that masks our true relations to one another in society by constructing imaginary relations between people and between them and the social formation'. On his view, ideology was a distortion of 'real social relations', one which controlled 'all aspects of the social'. The process of subject *interpellation* denoted the linguistic (discursive) construction of a 'social position for the individual', hailing and marking this individual as 'an ideological subject' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 15). Through interpellation or hailing, ideology '"recruits" subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or "transforms" the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)' (Althusser 1971, 174).[34] Althusser's theory of the subject was deterministic. He presumed that individuals always 'accept' the subject positions they are interpellated into and become thus the 'subjects of ideology', that there was 'no chance of resistance' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 15).

Laclau and Mouffe discarded Althusser's economic determinism and with it the implication that there are 'objective' or 'real' social relations (determined by the economy) that ideology works to disguise. There was consequently no need for the concept of ideology, which was itself rather undesirable, as most conceptualizations thereof in one way or another suggested the accessibility of 'truth' or 'objectivity'.[35] They replaced the concept of ideology with discourse and argued that there can never be just one, since no discourse can ever structure the entire social field. Hence, Althusser's argument that individuals are 'interpellated or placed in certain positions by particular ways of talking' translated into discourse theory's assertion that 'the subjects become positions in discourses' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 40-41).

[34] Althusser provided an example of an individual on the street who may be in the most commonplace manner addressed by the police. Once the individual turns around in response to this call, 'he becomes a *subject*'.
[35] In discourse theory, ideology can still be understood as a 'distorted representation': not of 'how things really are', but rather of the inescapable contingency of the entire social realm and 'the undecidability of all social identity'. As explicated by Torfing, ideology as such 'constructs reality as a part of a totalizing horizon of meaning that denies the contingent, precarious, and paradoxical character of social identity. The construction of naturalizing and universalizing myths and imaginaries is a central part of the hegemonic drive towards ideological totalization' (2005, 15).

Theorizing the subject, Laclau and Mouffe followed Althusser in denying it autonomy and sovereignty. They followed Foucault in replacing Althusser's notion of ideology with discourse; and in arguing that the subject is 'de-centred', always outside of itself, because it is formed as a subject position within a discursive structure (1985, 115). But they departed from both when proposing in the Derridean post-structuralist fashion that 'the subject is also *fragmented:* it is not positioned in only one way and by only one discourse, but, rather, is ascribed many different positions by different discourses'. The subject is thus *overdetermined*: interpellated into a multiplicity of subject positions.[36] Social antagonism arises when identity constructs get into conflict and mutually exclude one another.[37] Those subject positions which do not seem to be in conflict with other ones result from 'hegemonic processes … whereby alternative possibilities have been excluded and a particular discourse has been naturalised' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 41 and 47).

The second key point on which Laclau and Mouffe diverged from Althusser concerned the scope of social agents' autonomy. They sought to overcome Althusser's structural reductionism and determinism (that agents were 'mere effects of pre-existing social structures') by proposing a distinction between subject position and political subjectivity. While *subject position* still refers to 'the positioning of subjects within a discursive structure' and accounts for 'the multiple forms by which agents are produced as social actors'; *political subjectivity* is to 'account for the agency of subjects'. Overcoming 'the privileging of the structure over the agent in structuralism without recourse to a voluntaristic privileging of the agent', Laclau suggested that subjects' actions are due to 'the contingency of those discursive structures through which a subject obtains its identity' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 12-13).

[36] The assumption of 'dispersion of subject positions' does not mean that they are completely separate from one another. Howarth and Stavrakakis remarked that 'various subjectivities can, and are, articulated together into discourses which hold different positions together in a contingent unity. A socialist, populist or nationalist discourse may try, for example, to weld various subjectivities together into an overdetermined subject position, thus modifying the meaning of its component parts' (2000, note 57 on pg. 13).

[37] Jørgensen and Phillips pointed in this respect to the famous example of collective identity formation prior to the First World War as analyzed by Eric Hobsbawm (1990, 122-130). In these years, two discourses came into an antagonistic conflict. One was the increasingly naturalized nationalist (or nation-state) discourse, and the latter was the socialist (or class-based) discourse for which national borders were either inconsequential or a mere transitory phenomenon. The same person was concurrently interpellated into two subject positions (as a national and as a class-member). This was not a problem until these two distinct understandings of the world and of its organization came into conflict prior to the war when antagonism between them arose: 'Advocates of people as nations competed for the people's favour with advocates representing people as classes, and finally, the national articulation prevailed' (2002, 46).

Enhanced Conception of the Subject: Lacanian Psychoanalysis

In terms of its conception of the subject, post-structuralism 'has retained a rather structuralist view that threatens to reduce the subject to an objective location ["an ensemble of subject positions"] within the discursive structure', to a 'mere bearer of the structure'. Laclau developed the concept of the subject further in his later works, drawing particularly on Jacques Lacan and the reading thereof by Žižek. He posited that the discursive system faces recurrent dislocations and therefore that 'the subject cannot be conceived in terms of a collection of structurally given positions'. Dislocations disrupt the discursive structure which then cannot fully determine the subject's identity. The subject thus has a 'failed structural identity' (see e.g. Laclau 1990): it is 'internal to the structure, but … has neither a complete structural identity nor a complete lack of structural identity'. Due to dislocations of the discursive structure, 'the subject always emerges as a *split subject* that might attempt to reconstruct a full identity through acts of identification' (Torfing 2005, 16-17).

Laclau drew on Lacan in explaining why people let themselves be interpellated by discourses. Lacan conceived of the subject in a way similar to how Laclau and Mouffe conceived of structure and society: 'a perpetually incomplete structure which constantly strives to become a whole'. His theory begins with the infant, unaware of itself 'as a delimited subject' and living 'in symbiosis with the mother and the world around it'. In time, the infant starts to gradually detach itself from the mother. Preserving 'the memory of a feeling of completeness', it begins to face the social:

> Through socialisation, the child is presented with discursive images of "who it is" and what identity it has. The subject comes to know itself as an individual by identifying with *something* outside itself, that is, with the images presented to it. The images are internalised, but the child (and, later on, the adult) constantly feels that he or she does not quite fit the images. So the images are, at one and the same time, the basis of identification and of alienation. The images which come from the outside and are internalised are continuously compared to the infant's feeling of wholeness, but they never quite match it. Therefore, the subject is fundamentally *split*' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 42).

Generally speaking, then, 'the condition of the subject is the perpetual striving to become whole again', while the feeling of wholeness incessantly 'fails to emerge'. Discourses structure the subject only partly and never totally. The sought after 'wholeness' is imaginary but, at the same time, also 'a necessary horizon within which both the self and the social are created' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 42). The force driving the subject's identification thus becomes its perpetual longing to sense its wholeness again. It seeks 'to "find itself" through investing in discourses', through identification with various subject positions. Lacan termed the primary points of identification *master signifiers*, which could be dubbed in Laclau and

Mouffe's terms 'nodal points of identity' (e.g. 'man' or 'woman'). As these are too floating signifiers, their meaning is established through various discursive articulations of their linkages to other signs through *chains of equivalence* which construct identity in relational terms (i.e. the inseparable *chains of difference*). Hence, '[i]t is by being *represented* in this way by a cluster of signifiers with a nodal point at its centre that one acquires an identity' (Ibid, 42-43).

The Affective Side of Identification: Working Conception of 'Culture'

Lacan took issue with the 'dry' reading of his theory as it was introduced to discourse theory. In response, a number of discourse theorists sought to adopt his insights in their greater complexity. Yannis Stavrakakis (2005) did so also in consideration of Freudian psychoanalysis (an important source of inspiration for Lacan's analysis), and that in order to focus the empirical part of his piece on the problematique of 'European identity'. Only the outline of his theoretical argument will find its place in this section. His application thereof on the question of 'European identity' will be discussed later, in section 2.4.1.

Stavrakakis endeavoured to ascertain what belies the appeal of and makes people collectively identify with particular identity constructs. Building on Laclau and Mouffe, he enhanced the discourse theoretical account of identification by including in it the long-disregarded 'obscene' dimension of identification theorized by Lacan and Sigmund Freud. Reflecting on the psychoanalytic 'problematic of enjoyment' he proposed a conceptualization of identification as 'encompassing not only … formal/discursive but also … substantive/affective conditions of possibility' (2005, 69-70).

Laclau and Mouffe came to appreciate that '[i]dentity, at both the personal and political levels, is only the name of what we *desire* but can *never fully* attain'. People seek to 'identify with something', a political ideology or a group for instance, 'because there is an originary and insurmountable lack of identity', as Laclau (1994, 3) had it. 'The ultimate impossibility of identity' makes for the centrality of the psychoanalytic category of *identification*: '*political subjectivity* (both at the individual and the collective levels) depends on identification but identification never results in the production of full identity'. It is in fact precisely 'because it proves unable to cover over lack and dissimulate social antagonism that identification remains the horizon of political subjectivity. Its ultimate failure is its biggest success' (Stavrakakis 2005, 70-71).

Freud held that a key and constitutive dimension of identification is that of 'passion, of affective attachment, and libidinal investment'. On his view, collective identity has to do with 'affective libidinal bonds'. He also pointed out that 'every *passionate* affective investment also entails a more sinister dimension, that of hatred and aggressiveness'. According to Stavrakakis, Lacan's work can be seen as an attempt to 'redirect this Freudian focus on the affective side of identification processes onto the *obscene* paths of enjoyment (*jouissance*)'. His concept of *jouissance*, designating 'a satisfaction so excessive and charged that it becomes painful', appears to assume a place in his work 'overlapping with what is associated with libido [sexual energy] in Freud'. Freud differentiated between 'representation' and 'affect', and thus between 'the subject of representation' and 'the subject of affect'. Lacan, on his part, distinguished between *the symbolic*, in the sense of 'the discursive', 'the social', 'the symbolic order'; and *the real*: jouissance, or enjoyment of the body. On this basis, he drew a distinction between *the subject of desire* (or *desiring subject*), i.e. the subject striving for its lost 'wholeness', interpellated by discourses; and *the subject of jouissance*, of the enjoyment or satisfaction of its pre-symbolic/pre-discursive 'wholeness'. Following Lacan, then, identification operates 'on both of these distinct but interpenetrating fields: discursive structuration/representation and *jouissance*' (Ibid, 71-72).

Once we, following Lacan, recognize that the 'support for particular identifications' depends not only on 'symbolic coherence and discursive closure' but is also 'partially rooted in the *jouissance* of the body', it becomes possible to account for discourse theory's assumption of the omnipresence of social antagonism. It becomes possible to substantiate this assumption also on other but post-structuralist grounds. Jouissance (enjoyment) animates human desire, people's longing for identity/identification (Ibid, 72):

> The emergence of desire is primarily related to the process of symbolic castration: desire presupposes the sacrifice of a pre-symbolic *jouissance qua* fullness, which is prohibited upon entering the social world of linguistic representation. It is only by sacrificing her/his pre-symbolic enjoyment that the social subject can develop her/his desire (including the desire to identify with particular political projects, ideologies, and discourses) (Ibid, 72-73).

In other words, 'it is the imaginary promise of recapturing our lost/impossible enjoyment which provides the fantasy support for many of our political projects and choices'. The argument does not end here, because, beyond the above 'promise of fantasy', there are at least two further dimensions to the sustenance of the desire to identify. These are 'our ability to go through limit-experiences related to a *jouissance* of the body, and the fact that desiring itself entails a *jouissance* of its own – an enjoyment beyond the anticipation of fantasmatic

fullness'. In consideration of all the three dimensions, one can account for the subject's longing for identity as follows: 'desire – and social life as we know it – presupposes the impossibility of fully recapturing our lost *jouissance*; at the same time its appeal depends on the possibility of partial *jouissance* (encountered in momentary limit experiences and in desiring itself)' (Ibid, 73).

Crucially, the affective side of identification is driving both the desire for identity but also the antagonistic relations the latter involves. This 'obscene' dimension 'constructs the scene in which the *jouissance* we are deprived of is concentrated in the Other who stole it from us' (Žižek 1998, 209); while it is, at the same time, 'instrumental in perpetuating human desire and reproducing the centrality of identification' (Stavrakakis 2005, 73). Its success on both counts depends on the suggestion of the 'theft of enjoyment', that somebody else (an Other) stole it from us:

> It preserves our faith in the existence and the possibility of recapturing our lost enjoyment – a faith enhanced by the partial enjoyment we get from our experience – but projects its full realization onto the future, when we will manage to get it back from the Other who has stolen it from us. This way enjoyment is kept at a "healthy" distance, not too far but not too close either; close enough to support the appeal of an object of identification but far enough from letting us entertain the vision of full satisfaction as an imminent possibility, something that would kill desire and put identification in danger. Nevertheless, there is an important by-product in this balancing act: the exclusion/demonisation of a particular social group' (Ibid, 73-74).

In Lacan, then, jouissance concerns concurrently, and not in a mutually exclusive fashion, both libido and the death drive or aggression (Ibid, 74).

Building on Lacanian psychoanalysis, it becomes possible to develop in discourse theory a non-essentialist[38] account of identification, incorporating into 'the same theoretical/analytical logic discourse and *jouissance*, desire and aggressivity' (Ibid, 75).[39] The core of Stavrakakis's theoretical argument was that this Lacan-enhanced, but still discourse theoretical, conception of identification allows for accounting for the reasons why people manifest diverging levels of attachment to identity constructs. He applied this perspective exactly to the two constructs around which, as the ensuing chapter reveals, the problematized 'EUasEurope' equivalence revolves: national and 'European identity'. Let us

[38] Lacan's theory does not invoke some kind of 'biological essentialism' in the sense that 'the somatic acquires the character of a positive essence'. It is as such congruent with the discourse theoretical ontological premises (Stavrakakis 2005, 74).

[39] In her more recent works, Mouffe (2000, 95; or 2001, 11) laid emphasis on 'passions and affects'. She posited that they are essential for adherence to political projects, one of the drivers of political action, making for 'collective forms of identification' (Stavrakakis 2005, 75).

now focus on how Stavrakakis developed his argument with regard to national identification, and return to how he applied it to 'European identity' in the following chapter (2.4.1).

The 'persistence and hegemonic success' of national identification is due to 'affective bonds' supporting it. The formation of national collectivity, as any collectivity, relies on both 'the mobilization of symbolic resources' and an 'affective investment grounded in the body'. The appeal and 'strength' of national (and all other) identity 'is not wholly attributable to the structural position of the nation [or other sign for a collectivity] as a nodal point (or of other signifiers and discursive elements)'. Hence, the 'glue' holding together a certain community cannot be merely a 'symbolic [discursive] identification' (Ibid, 76). Following Lacan, Žižek posited that the 'bond linking together' members of a (national) collectivity 'always implies a shared relationship toward … Enjoyment incarnated', one connected with the hatred of Others, structured in fantasies. He asserted: 'A nation exists only insofar as its specific [communal organization of partial] enjoyment continues to be materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through national myths that structure these practices' (1993, 201-202). This is pertinent to efforts seeking to account for the persistence of certain identifications, national or otherwise. Once we recognize that 'the mechanism most effective in structuring subjectivity in relation to discourse may not be exclusively or primarily discursive, but linked to the *extimate* real of enjoyment', the postmodern ideas of 'multiple' or 'fluid' identities become challenged and undermined (see section 2.4.1). Furthermore, 'due to the fact that enjoyment is a knot between libido and the death drive … every identification is bound to produce its obscene Other', that is, social antagonism. The Other is an object of our hatred because we fantasize it as 'stealing our lost enjoyment' 'This is what accounts for', according to Stavrakakis, 'the ever-present potential for violence, aggressiveness, and hatred marking national identification' (2005, 77).

Stavrakakis's final theoretical point concerned the consequences of suppressing the dimension of passion in construing national (and other) collectivities. He pointed out that

> Enlightenment philosophy and political theory – as well as politics itself – have largely seen their role as drawing a sharp distinction between the discursive/symbolic dimension of identification and its affective/obscene support. In the age of reason and rational administration there was no room for "irrational" forces and libidinal bonds; the aim was either to control or, even better, to eliminate passion, affect, and enthusiasm, to drain from political practice and political theory the *jouissance* of the body' (Ibid, 77-78).

Following Mouffe (2000, 130), Stavrakakis suggested that basing politics on 'reason and nature', the Enlightenment put forth 'an optimistic view of human sociability, seeing

violence as an archaic phenomenon that does not really belong to human nature'. The progress of human civilization was to gradually displace both passion and enthusiasm (2005, 78). This suppression of passion and affect underlies the frequent distinction made between 'good' and 'bad' forms of nationalism; the former often called 'patriotism', and the latter being 'the *malignant* nationalism of hatred and affective cathesis'. From the Lacanian perspective, however, it becomes rather impossible 'to sustain a strict separation between affect and reason, to disengage the symbolic aspect of discursive organization and identification from libidinal investment and enjoyment'. Such a 'moralistic dichotomy' seeks to 'exorcize the obscene dimension of national identification'. It is premised, however, on neglecting that 'the frontiers between a supposedly benevolent nationalism and an ugly hypernationalism are never clear-cut and certainly do not preclude the transformation of one into the other' (Ibid).

The problem with the strategy of suppressing passion, with 'political projects almost devoid of affective "substance"' is that '[t]he repression of signifiers cathected with libidinal and affective value does not repress affect itself'. This repression detaches affect from thought. Yet, whereas 'representation is directed to the unconscious, affect remains and gets attached onto another substitute representation'. Consequently, Stavrakakis concluded, 'the more we repress the affective dimension of political subjectivity and identification, the signifiers associated or invested with political passion within a certain socio-political configuration, the more this dimension will seek expression through substitute political formations' (Ibid, 79).[40]

The general conclusion that Stavrakakis arrived at was that political projects, and the identities they discursively construe for the subjects (of desire), ought to involve an 'affective content' so as to be able to 'mobilize popular support on a large scale and form the basis of pervasive identifications (as has been the case with national identification)'. This implies that the idea, espoused by Habermas and others, of a (purely) civic, i.e. 'uncultural' with respect to the ways and organization of collective enjoyment, forms of identification become unreachable ideals, unsustainable in practice (Ibid).

[40] Mouffe adopted such a view in her analysis of the growth of right-wing populism in countries marked by Third Way politics (1998). Right-wing populist parties are sometimes the only parties which 'try to mobilize passions and to construct collective forms of identification'. A reigning 'refusal to recognize the political in its antagonistic dimension' (Stavrakakis 2005, 80); and 'the concomitant incapacity to grasp the central role of passions in the constitution of collective identities' (Mouffe 2002, 2), stand beyond the rise of these neo-populist parties.

On the basis of Stavrakakis's enhanced theorization of identification, it is possible to differentiate for the purposes of this study between two dimensions (or components) of (collective) identity constructs: the political and the 'cultural'. The *political dimension* pertains to the discursive construction of identities (subject positions), their symbolic representation. The *'cultural' dimension*, on the other hand, pertains to the 'affective content' of identity constructs, to the social antagonism, exclusions, and threatening otherness they invoke. This distinction will prove useful in pondering the equivalence 'EUasEurope' in subchapter 2.4.

1.3.6 Group Formation: Political Frontiers, Logics of Equivalence and Difference

Group formation (collective identification) operates in discourse theory on the basis of the same logic of discursive structuration as the construction of subjectivity. Just like subject positions, collective identity constructs are articulated discursively by reducing the possibilities of meaning, and thus of identification, through exclusion and closure. They are formed through articulation of equivalential chains of signs, premised on a parallel articulation of chains of difference. Collective identity constructs not only depend on the excluded (their 'constitutive outside'), they also suppress in-group diversity. Needless to say, they are contingent, and thus arbitrary and political (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 44).

Articulation of chains of equivalence and difference in discursive construction of identities is also articulation and symbolic representation of *political frontiers*, and thus of social antagonism. Political frontiers symbolize the constitutive opposition of social groups (or entire societies) to something else, 'the constitutive outside', 'an Other'. '[T]here is only politics where there are frontiers' (Laclau 1990, 160); and it is through their constitution and consolidation or dissolution that 'discursive formations in general, and social and political identities more specifically, are constructed or fragmented' (Norval 2000, 220).

Laclau and Mouffe proposed to account for how discourses organize social space (by erecting political frontiers) in reliance on two political logics: of equivalence, and of difference (1985, 127-145). Delineation of clear-cut political frontiers, and a 'proliferation and deepening … of antagonistic relations' are due to the operation of *the logic of equivalence* (Norval 2000, 220). It condenses meaning around antagonistic poles (Howarth 2000a, 107), 'by splitting a system of differences and instituting a political frontier between two opposed camps' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 11). It forges an 'image of … unity'

(Norval 2000, 222) of each such group, while de-emphasizing or 'erasing' intra-group difference.[41] *The logic of difference* operates conversely. It diffuses opposition between antagonistic poles by reintroducing intra-group diversity and melting political frontiers. It expands 'a given system of differences by dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated elements into an expanding order' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 11).[42] It is the logic of difference which belies attempts at construction of hegemonic discourses and social formations. It corresponds with *the logic of hegemony* and is akin to Gramsci's (1980, 58-59) notion of 'transformism', a '"bastard" form of hegemony' in his terms. It is a

> process that involves a gradual but continuous absorption and domestication of "the active elements produced by allied groups - and even of those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile" (as paraphrased and cited by Norval 2000, 220).

A 'transformist project' seeks to 'to expand the systems of difference defining a dominant bloc'. If successful, it results in a reduction of 'the antagonistic potential of the remaining excluded elements and a broadening of the hegemonic bloc' (Norval 2000, 220). In other words, hegemony seeks to domesticate and so contain conflict and social antagonism. Therefore, while a project deploying the logic equivalence 'seeks to divide social space by condensing meanings around two antagonistic poles', a project guided by the logic of difference 'attempts to weaken and displace a sharp antagonistic polarity, endeavouring to relegate that division to the margins of society' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 11).

'[J]ust as there is a play between identity and difference, and universality and particularity', there is always a 'complex interaction' between the two political logics (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 12). According to Aletta Norval, since 'neither the conditions of total equivalence nor … of total difference … ever fully obtain', the two logics stand in a hierarchical 'relation of reciprocal delimitation to one another'. Whichever

[41] Stuart Hall's (1991) study of the post-WW2 formation of the 'black' identity in the United Kingdom provides a fine example of the operation of the logic of equivalence. As Jørgensen and Phillips summarized it, 'all non-white people gradually were identified as black: the specificity of all the different colours and origins was subsumed in the one category "black", and "black" was defined in opposition to what it was not, that is, as "non-white". Thus the social space collapsed into a polar opposition according to which the only identities available were "black" and "white"' (2002, 44-45).

[42] Howarth's (2000b) study of late-1970s' and early-1980s' transformation of the South African 'Black Consciousness' discourse into a 'non-racial democratic' one presents an illustrative example of the logic of difference at work. The apartheid South African state endeavoured to expand 'bases of consent' through incorporating other and/or more specific groups into the dominant order. It thus sought 'to disarticulate the growing political alliances between these groups, thus weakening the anti-apartheid opposition' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 11-12). Another example was the Romanian post-1989 transformation of revisionist socialism into social democratism though the appropriation and modification of signs characteristic of the neoliberal transition discourse (see Adamson 2000).

predominates impacts the structuring of the social space. Situations where the logic of equivalence takes the lead are prone to dichotomization, a 'paratactical division of the social into two opposing camps'. Where the logic of difference takes precedence, 'a more complex articulation of elements, militating against such dichotomisation, is facilitated' (2000, 220-221). Hence, in some cases 'paratactical frontier formations may predominate', while in other, 'complexifying formations' can. Still, both are indispensable for political identity formation (Ibid, 222).[43] With respect to the construction of difference in articulations of identity, Laclau and Mouffe posited a 'coincidence between the presence of frontiers and the construction of "an enemy"'. In situations where 'clear-cut relations of equivalence' prevail, the construction of antagonistic groups tends to articulate them on the basis of a friend/enemy binary. In cases where the logic of difference predominates, 'the multiplicity of articulations between subject positions makes it more difficult to construct such "an enemy"' (Ibid, 221).

It remains to point out that the symbolic (including practical political) *representation* of a group is the very process of its construction as a discursive formation. Constitution of a group thus necessitates that one speaks about or on behalf of it (see Laclau 1993b, 289ff). Crucially, '[w]henever a group is represented, a whole understanding of society follows with it', as it can be construed only 'in contrast to other groups' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 45). As Laclau put it: 'I cannot assert a differential identity without distinguishing it from a context, and, in the process of making the distinction, I am asserting the context at the same time' (1996, 27).

1.3.7 Dislocation and Hegemony, Change and Continuity

Dislocations of discursive structures are the condition of possibility for the articulation of novel political projects, discourses, and identity constructs. They are bound to occur, because, despite a fair flexibility of many discourses to expand their systems of meaning, they can never be total. They are all 'finite and … will eventually confront events that they fail to integrate'. Even an established hegemonic discourse 'becomes *dislocated* when it is confronted by new events that it cannot explain, represent, or in other ways domesticate'. A discursive system thus becomes disrupted (Torfing 2005, 16). Laclau described *dislocation* as a revelation of the contingency of and 'decentring' of discursive structures (1990, 39ff). Their decentring 'through social processes such as the extension of capitalist relations to

[43] For a more detailed outline of the discourse theoretical approach to the structuring of social spaces, political identities, and the processes of hegemonic construction, see Howarth 2000a, 101-125; or Torfing 1999, 81-131.

new spheres of social life shatters already existing identities and literally induces an identity crisis for the subject' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 13). With regard to discursive structuration, '[d]islocation shows itself through a structural, or organic, crisis in which there is a *proliferation of floating signifiers*' (Torfing 2005, 16, emphasis added).

Dislocations are not only disruptive but also productive: 'they are the foundation on which new identities are constituted' (Laclau 1990, 39). They 'create a lack at the level of meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the dislocated structure' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 13). New articulations of meaning will come to occupy such a newly opened 'terrain for hegemonic struggles about how to heal the rift in the social order'. They will 'aim to fix the floating signifiers by articulating them with a new set of nodal points'.[44] Eventually, these political struggles 'lead to the articulation of a new hegemonic discourse, which is sustained through the construction of a new set of political frontiers' (Torfing 2005, 16).[45]

The concept and the logic of *hegemony* are indeed central in discourse theory. A (novel) hegemonic project, enabled by the 'presence of floating signifiers and … mobility of frontiers' (Norval 2000, 225), 'will attempt to weave together different strands of discourse in an effort to dominate or organise a field of meaning so as to fix the identities of objects and practices in a particular way' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 3). It will strive 'to construct and stabilise the nodal points that form the basis of concrete social orders by articulating as many available elements - floating signifiers - as possible' (Ibid, 15).[46] A hegemonic articulation will seek to 'reconstitute unambiguity'. Hegemony, nevertheless, cannot resolve the undecidability of meaning, as it is itself merely a naturalized, contingent, and always only partial an articulation thereof (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 48).

Discursive closure is impossible. No discourse can 'completely hegemonize' a field of discursivity, and eliminate thus 'the experience of dislocation and the construction of antagonisms'. The degree of success of a discourse in achieving hegemonic position was

[44] Stavrakakis (2000) posited, for instance, that Green ideology emerged as response to the late-1960s' dislocation of leftist radical discourses, as a successful rearticulation of the radical tradition around the nodal point of 'nature'.

[45] Structural failure is also a failure of subject positions discursively articulated. It thus '"compels" the subject to act, to assert anew its subjectivity' through identification with some political projects (and discourses articulated by them) which 'seem capable of suturing the rift in a symbolic order' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 13-14).

[46] *Hegemonic formation* is the product of a hegemonic project: 'a social and political space relatively unified by the institution of nodal points and the constitution of tendentially relational identities'(Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 136).

captured by Laclau's concepts of 'myth' and 'social imaginary' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 15). In the condition of structural dislocation, *myth* refers to a certain 'principle of reading of a given situation' which produces 'a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated elements' (Laclau 1990, 61). Myths 'construct new spaces of representation that attempt to suture the dislocated space in question'. They are particular attempts at totalization and closure, 'effectiveness' of which is 'essentially hegemonic' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 15). 'From their emergence until their dissolution, myths can function as a surface of inscription for a variety of social demands and dislocations'. If and when some myth proves 'successful in neutralising social dislocations and incorporating a great number of social demands', it has been made into an imaginary (Ibid). Upon the turning of a myth into *social imaginary*, it becomes 'a horizon' or an 'absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility'; the Christian Millennium, the Enlightenment, or the positivist conception of progress being Laclau's examples (1990, 64).

Laclau described those discourses which are so profoundly naturalized and established that their contingent nature gets beyond recognition and forgotten *objective* discourses (1990, 34). They can also be conceived of as 'sedimented discourses'. The term *objectivity* designates in discourse theory something which seems 'given and unchangeable'; something that 'seemingly does not derive its meaning from its difference from something else'. Discourse theory thus equates objectivity with ideology: 'it is objectivity that masks contingency and, in so doing, hides the alternative possibilities that otherwise could have presented themselves' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 36-37).

From the perspective of mutual co-constitution of discourse and power, objectivity can be seen, following Laclau (1990, 66) as 'sedimented power where the traces of power have become effaced, where it has been forgotten that the world is politically constructed' (as paraphrased by Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 38). It is 'the world we take for granted, a world which we have "forgotten" is always constituted by power and politics'. In any case, however, '[t]he boundary between objectivity and the political … what seems natural and what is contested, is … fluid and historical'. Objective or sedimented discourses 'can, at any time, enter the play of politics and be problematised in new articulations'. Discursive change is thus presumed to operate in two ways. Just as one perspective can be naturalized and effect (apparent) consensus, so 'the objective' can 'become political again'. On a schematic image of the 'development from political conflict to objectivity', 'hegemony' stands between 'the political', the clearly contingent, and 'objectivity', the disguised/forgotten contingency of an

articulation. Hence, a certain hegemonic project suppresses alternative articulations of meaning, and enables thus 'naturalisation of one single perspective' (Ibid, 36-38).

Discourse theory accounts on these grounds for both change and continuity. It does so with the notions of contingency and partial structuration. All discourses and thus all the social are contingent. Yet at the same time the social is always partly and partially structured: 'there is at all times a vast area of objectivity which it is hard to think beyond'; a 'long series of social arrangements that we take for granted and therefore do not question or try to change'; i.e. 'an objective field of sedimented discourse' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 38 and 55). *Novel articulations may* destabilize and challenge, and thus *re-politicize sedimented discourses and symbolic representations*. But they are still contained by the scope of agency of their producers, which is already determined by 'the objective' discursive structure of meaning (as subject positions). Agents' possibilities 'for reshaping the structures are set by earlier structures'. Put differently, our cognition 'can never transcend all existing structures, for, in giving meaning to the world, we always imply some or other structure' (Ibid, 38).

1.4 Analysis Grounded in Discourse Theory: Research Outline

This subchapter endeavours to establish the basic conditions of applying discourse theory in concrete research and empirical data analysis, first in general terms (1.4.1) and then with respect to this research project (1.4.2). The latter, concluding section outlines the design of the research process aimed at answering the questions posed with respect to 'EUasEurope' equivalence (and by extension the question of 'European identity') and EU enlargement.

Before proceeding in this direction, it is desirable first to review some of the key premises and concepts of discourse theory so as to clarify what discourse analytical possibilities this framework opens and forecloses. The ensuing paragraphs do so by way of contrasting discourse theory with the 'second generation' CDA, and more specifically the discourse-historical approach (DHA) in CDA. Such a comparison is pertinent also for another reason. It was precisely from within the CDA/DHA that a large majority of discourse analytical studies of 'European identity/identities' construction and, occasionally, of the relation between the EU and Europe, were conducted. Some of these works provide valuable insights and findings on which this study builds to the extent of their congruence with the discourse theoretical approach to the objects under investigation.

CDA is a cluster of diverse approaches or 'traditions' with varied (multi)disciplinary origins which, nevertheless, 'build on a similar philosophical background', such as: the Frankfurt School Critical Theory; classical Marxist and Althusserian 'ideas on ideology in society'; and Foucault's conception of discourse as formative of knowledge and 'reality'. Approaches falling within the CDA umbrella are also characterized by a 'shared "critical" stance on the role of discourse in society' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 68-69). The key difference between discourse theory and CDA concerns the conception of discourse and of its 'scope'. This difference underlies their diverging, although not entirely distinct, research purposes and analytical foci. Discourse theory upholds a quasi-transcendental conception of discourse as encompassing all the social: all social phenomena are discursive and their analysis is thus in a sense always a 'discourse analysis'. CDA, on the other hand, does not understand discourse or 'the discursive' as all-encompassing, but rather as just one, (semiotic) aspect of the social. It posits, in other words, that the social consists of both the discursive and non-discursive. Consequently, whereas discarded in discourse theory (since everything is discursively constructed), CDA follows more traditional Marxism in postulating a certain dialectical relationship between discourse and something else:

> Critical Discourse Analysis sees discourse – language use in speech and writing as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but also shapes them (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 55).[47]
>
> [...] That is discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status-quo and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it (Ibid, 258).

Discourse is then, on a more specifically DHA reading, both 'socially constituted and socially constitutive'. It is a 'cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action' (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 89).

Looked at from another perspective, CDA/DHA conceives of discourse, and thus of the role of language in social construction, as one among a number of social practices, all of which are interrelated. Discourses are mapped through their enactment in particular context-dependent language use in social interaction. Discourse analysis under CDA/DHA thus becomes more or less agency-centred. Agents' language use and meaning-production (semiosis) are structured, enabled and constrained, by their 'temporary attachments' to

[47] As Ruth Wodak (1996, 18) put it elsewehere: 'discourse constitutes society and culture as well as being constituted by them'.

subject positions created by particular discourses (Krzyżanowski 2010, 32). Still, agents are seen as mediators among discourses and non-discursive social contexts of their enactment.

Tied with the conception of the non-discursive is the notion of ideology with its frequent underlying implication that there are some 'true' or 'objective' ways of organizing society which ideology seeks to misrepresent. CDA builds on this Marxist view of ideology. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe discard such a notion and equate ideology with 'objectivity' (and as such indispensable for any society); CDA defines ideology 'in such a way that it can be used to identify and criticise unjust power relations'. It is thus interested in investigating the 'ideological effects of discursive practices' with a focus on power and patterns of domination (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 18 and 37). A discourse analyst, then, 'enters the picture with the mission of extorting the falsity of representations and revealing the "true" intentions of … actors'. He or she is 'expected to be able to produce 'non-ideological' interpretations of … texts' (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 66). Endorsing 'Marxian theories of social structure and social class', CDA derives from them its analytical focus on 'the linguistic aspects of power and inequality in contemporary societies' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 67).

This is the fount of CDA's 'emancipatory' mission, aimed at 'radical social change geared towards empowering oppressed groups'. Its 'emancipatory critique' often 'involves the comparison of various representations with an implicit version of the way things really are' (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 65). In discourse theory, in contrast, a 'non-ideological' position is inconceivable for the analyst or anyone else: a privileged position outside discursive structure is impossible. CDA's preoccupation with ideology, premised on a distinction between the discursive and non-discursive, resembles in a sense the conventional constructivist idea of limited construction. They both assume that there are phenomena beyond discursive construction, and compare discourses or particular textual utterances with something presumably 'out there', something '(socially) real' which itself escapes problematization. This is not possible from the discourse theoretical perspective, according to which such persistent or taken-for-granted phenomena are 'objectivity', i.e. sedimented discourses whose contingent and political character was only 'forgotten'.

Consequently, it can be argued in general terms that whereas discourse theory focuses its analysis on discourses and discursive structuration, CDA tends to focus more specifically on their enactment or change in 'specific instances of language use in social interaction' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 7). Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer characterized CDA in

this regard as interested in 'demystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and *retroductable* investigation of semiotic data'; in 'analysing opaque as well as transparent relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language'; in other words, as aiming to 'investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized … by language use (or in discourse)' (2009, 3, 7 and 10). More precisely, CDA analyses are primarily focused on the text(s) under investigation: its character; how it relates to the interaction between its producer and addressee and; finally, how that interaction relates to a certain social context (Fairclough 1989, 109). A particular analysis, then, 'traditionally caters for micro-macro mediation … by connecting micro-linguistic analyses with macro, social, political and economic contextualisation of the material analysed (thus relating it, in most cases, to the larger processes of socio-political change)' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 47).

Finally, there is also a marked difference in how discourse theory and CDA/DHA approach identity formation. Discourse theory refashions identity formation as a complex process of identification. It is thus prompted to investigate particular discourses and how they structure the social space. CDA/DHA's theoretical premises, and focus on agency and (multi-level) context, direct it to an investigation of identity formation at individual or otherwise less aggregate levels. As such, it concentrates on how actors enact, perform or re-construct a particular discourse rather than on the very articulation of that discourse, and the construction of subject positions for these actors to assume. Furthermore, is should also be noted that CDA/DHA studies of discursive construction of 'European identity/identities' endorse a 'multiple identities' interpretative framework (see e.g. Krzyżanowski 2010, 63). This framework for interpreting identity construction is, from the discourse theoretical perspective, only one possible (and certainly not 'neutral') way of doing so. It is, moreover, rather problematic from the Lacan-inspired point of view (see section 2.4.1).

1.4.1 A Discourse Theoretical Analytical Framework

Discourse theory upholds that 'theory cannot be separated wholly and objectively from the reality it seeks to explain, as theoretical practices are themselves partly constitutive of (and shaped by) the social worlds in which the subjects and objects of research find themselves'. Discourse analyst is thus understood as 'always located in a particular historical and political context with no neutral Archimedean point from which to describe, argue and evaluate' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 6-7). In order to elucidate the application of discourse

theory in concrete research, let us turn to Howarth's explication of the difference between 'discourse analysis' and 'discourse theory'.

The former 'consists of a range of techniques to analyse "talk and text in context", while the latter provides the underlying assumptions for their appropriate employment'. Putting it in Heideggerian terms, Howarth argued that 'discourse theory corresponds to the ontological level, where the concept of discourse specifies the necessary presuppositions of *any* inquiry into the nature of objects and social relations, while discourse analysis operates at the ontical level, and is concerned to analyse the particular objects specified by one's ontological presuppositions'. More specifically

> discourse in the first usage is an ontological category that specifies the interweaving of words and actions into practices, the contingency of all identity, the primacy of politics, and so forth, whereas in the second usage it is understood more narrowly as a set of symbolic representations and practices embodied in a range of texts, speeches and signifying sequences of all sorts (Howarth 2005, 336).

Discourse analysis itself thus in a sense becomes a subordinate to discourse theory where '[a]t most … the various tools of discourse analysis constitute one particular set of techniques that can help us to understand and explain empirical phenomena which have already been constituted as meaningful objects of analysis' (Ibid, 318).

Method, in discourse theory, 'is not synonymous with a free-standing and neutral set of rules and techniques that can be applied mechanically to all empirical objects'. Methodological questions are instead 'always understood within a wider set of ontological and epistemological postulates, and in relation to particular problems' (Ibid, 317). Howarth described discourse theory as 'a version of "*problem-driven*" [but not problem-solving in the Coxian sense] rather than "method-" or "theory-driven" *research*'. Its approach is as such 'akin to Foucault's technique of problematization in that it *begins with a set of pressing political and ethical problems in the present, before seeking to analyse the historical and structural conditions which gave rise to them, while furnishing the means for their critique and transgression*' (Ibid, 318, emphasis added). Howarth detailed this as follows:

> In short, *problem-driven discourse theory* not only *constitutes new objects of inquiry through interrogating particular phenomena, in which it seeks to challenge existing accounts and the theoretical frameworks that engender them, but, most importantly, it begins with and challenges the political circumstances within which such theories emerge and operate*. Finally, while the focus of research is the interrogation of a specific problematized phenomenon, it is important to stress that *these problems are not specified in a completely independent and atheoretical fashion*. On the contrary, as against empiricism or rationalism, *the emergence and constitution of research problems always presupposes the ontological assumptions and categories of discourse theory for their initial discernment and description* (Ibid, 319, emphases added).

Furthermore, '[t]he way such problems are constructed and analysed is constrained by the overall *purposes* of discourse theory and the epistemological *ideals* such purposes harbour'. Post-structuralist and post-Marxist discourse theory 'locates itself within the hermeneutical branch of the social sciences: its 'key objective' is 'to elucidate carefully problematized objects of study by seeking their description, understanding, and interpretation' (Ibid). Hence, discourse theorists' main goal is not 'merely to provide novel descriptions or facts about specific objects of investigation, but to produce new *interpretations* either by rendering visible phenomena previously undetected by dominant theoretical approaches, or by problematizing existing accounts and articulating alternative interpretations'. These ought to be '*translated into the language of discourse theory*' in the sense that 'facts have to be situated within wider fields of social meaning or discourses, that their *interpretation relies upon the theoretical concepts and logics furnished by its social ontology,* and that *the resulting interpretations are contingent and contestable*'. The latter conditions highlight the presupposed 'contingency of all ontological platforms but also the contestability of particular interpretations, which represent only one possible way of ordering the facts and descriptions' (Ibid, 320-321, emphases added).

Deployment of discourse theory in specific empirical research, then, revolves around the 'problem of application'. Discourse theorists maintain that a theoretical approach cannot be separated from the objects of its investigation, that there is no 'relation of exteriority' between them (Ibid, 321). 'As against empiricism', they hold that 'there can be no unmediated access to the real-concrete', since 'the very idea of "accessing" the real-concrete presupposes a gulf between the subject and object of knowledge, which objective knowledge somehow bridges'. Instead, they subscribe to Heidegger's critique of 'classical epistemology' and 'conceive of the subject as "always already" within a world of meaningful objects and practices, and … of the norms of that world as providing the criteria for subjects to identify objects in the first place'. So as to 'counter the problems of logical derivation or theoretical subsumption', in discourse theory 'the employment of abstract tools to explain concrete objects requires a work of theoretical elaboration that *articulates* concepts and logics which are, initially at least, located at different levels of abstraction, focused on different levels of analysis, and drawn from a variety of theoretical problematics (Ibid, 322).

Howarth generally conceptualized the 'solution' to the problem of discourse theory's application, short of 'the difficulties surrounding the mechanical application of "formal-abstract" theory to "real-concrete" events and processes', as a '*method of articulatory*

practice'. It 'involves a logic of explanation that brings together and transforms a plurality of formal social logics, together with the political logics that constitute and contest the latter, in order to elucidate a carefully problematized instance of research' (Ibid, 316).

On his reading, 'the basic unit of explanation' is 'the notion of a logic'. An articulatory practice 'combines different logics together in any given explanation. (Ibid, 322). Paraphrasing Laclau (2000b, 282-283), Howarth characterized 'a logic' as referring 'first, to the rules governing a practice, institution or system of relations between objects', i.e. a certain social logic; and, 'secondly, to the kinds of entities (and their relations) presupposed by the operation of such rules', i.e. a certain political logic.[48] On the one hand, *social logics*, such as 'the logic of the market', 'the logic of bureaucracy' or 'the logic of apartheid' are 'conditional and historically specific systems of sedimented practice'. *Political logics*, on the other, designate 'special kinds of practice that *constitute* and *contest* these social logics', through conditioning 'the emergence and character of the rules governing any particular social logic'. Howarth demonstrated this as follows:

> Thus, for example, the (social) logic of apartheid was formed, instituted and later challenged by precise political logics. In other words, the 'system of differences' through which particular ethnic and national groups were allocated separate and formally equal institutions and territorial spaces wherein they could exercise their legitimate 'demands' for political and cultural self-determination was a product of the intersecting logics of equivalence and difference that divided and structured social space in South Africa, as different political forces competed for hegemony (Ibid, 323).

Simply put, whereas political logics concern the discursive structuration of a social space and the formation of subjects and collectivities, social logics concern the organization of their mutual relations and interaction.

It is possible to claim, on these grounds, that discourse theory supplies a particular research not with a pre-conceived theory to be applied to empirical objects, but 'merely' (and literally) a *highly mouldable theoretical and analytical framework.* The concepts and logics it furnishes are 'open' and flexible. They are 'adapted, deformed and transformed in the process of application', and discourse theorists articulate and tailor them 'in each particular enactment of concrete research' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 5). In explaining how an articulatory practice functions, with respect to the construction of a research design,

[48] Howarth proposed the following illustrative example: '"the logic of the market" comprises a particular set of rules governing the arrangements bringing together buyers and sellers of commodities. Importantly, the organization of such interactions via the price mechanism presupposes a set of entities that make possible the operation of such rules. Hence the logic of the market presupposes a particular set of subjects (buyers, sellers), objects (commodities, means of exchange) and a system of relations between subjects and objects (exchange)'.

Howarth followed Laclau and Mouffe's characterization thereof (see section 1.3.3) and postulated:

> [T]he application of various theoretical and social logics to account for a particular problem involves *a mutual modification of the logics and concepts articulated together in the process of explaining each particular instance of research*. This is because different concepts have to be rendered compatible with one another, and with the underlying ontological assumptions of discourse theory, and both modifications only take place within the particular context of understanding and explaining the particular object investigated. Without such modification, the separations between different logics and concepts, and between those logics and the empirical problems investigated, would remain in place (2005, 326-327).

The 'conditions of possibility for an articulatory practice of this sort' were specified by Howarth in the following manner. 'First, the *theoretical* logics and concepts employed in any putative explanans must be consistent and compatible with the underlying ontological assumptions of discourse theory'. Secondly, the same applies to 'the more concrete *social* logics that are constructed to explain particular conjunctures and events'. These too must be 'compatible' with discourse theory's underlying assumptions (e.g. short of essentialism and determinism). Thirdly, discourse theory lays special emphasis on political logics. Despite the fact that they 'are substantively empty in that they do not determine in an a priori fashion the *content* of particular social logics or formations, they are at the root "cause" of all social practices given that the latter are ultimately the product of the operation of the former'. All in all, 'discourse theoretical explanations give primacy to the role of political practices – understood via the logic of hegemony – in the concrete explanation of social practices, though such explanations must draw upon and articulate a variety of theoretical and social logics in order to constitute satisfactory accounts (Ibid, 327-328).

1.4.2 Research Project Outline

The application and thus the 'doing' of discourse theory begins with the identification (and so articulation) of the problem under scrutiny. This study aims to investigate the equivalence constructed discursively between the EU and Europe, and how it bears on EU enlargement. Hence, the EU, Europe, their equivalence, and EU enlargement are the key notions in the context of this work. Approaching them from the discourse theoretical perspective requires something of a *reset* of all the presuppositions and insights hitherto entertained and casting them in the language and on the terms of discourse theory.

This study addresses the first three notions in the ensuing Chapter 2. The EU and Europe are discursive formations designating a certain space or entity. They are as such, in discourse theoretical terms, either myths or social imaginaries. Since their meaning has never

been more than partly and partially 'stabilized' or 'sedimented', but rather a matter of often overt struggles about how to fill these two spaces/entities with content and meaning, they should be seen, at least for the present purposes, as *myths*. The 'European Union' and 'Europe' are themselves *empty signifiers*: they often play the key organizational role of nodal points in particular discourses, but have no 'given' meaning on their own unless organized by a discourse. From the perspective of the discursive (and thus political) struggle over how to fill them with meaning (at national, EU/European or still other levels), the EU and Europe operate as *floating signifiers*: each discourse articulating them can do so differently.

Having conceived of the EU and Europe as floating signifiers, the question arises as to how should 'discursive struggles over their meaning' be schematically conceptualized. It was earlier remarked that Laclau and Mouffe distinguished, with respect to a particular discourse, between that discourse (articulation of a system of signs) and its field of discursivity (the excluded meaning potential). This is somewhat insufficient once we desire to grasp 'discursive struggle' from apart or from 'above' that discourse. This study endorses the idea of Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) to insert, at this level of abstraction, between 'discourse' and 'the field of discursivity' the concept of 'order of discourse', borrowed from Norman Fairclough's CDA and modified. They pointed to the non-clarity as to whether 'the field of discursivity' should refer to 'any meaning whatsoever outside the specific discourse, or if it more narrowly refers only to *potentially competing* systems and fragments of meaning' (2002, 56). They proposed an analytical separation between 'the field of discursivity', i.e. 'all possible, excluded constructions of meaning', and an *order of discourse*: 'a group of discourses that operate in the same social terrain – both in conflict and in concordance with one another' (Ibid, 27 and 57). The latter thus schematically stands 'in-between' discourse and 'the field of discursivity'. It designates 'a social space in which different discourses partly cover the same terrain which they compete to fill with meaning each in their own particular way'. Each such discourse 'strives to establish itself in the same domain'. With the 'insertion' of the concept of 'order of discourse' it becomes analytically possible to locate the categories such as 'antagonism' and 'hegemony' in this supposed space of discursive conflict: '"antagonism" is open conflict between the different discourses in a particular order of discourse, and "hegemony" is the dissolution of the conflict through a displacement of the boundaries between the discourses' (Ibid, 56).

On these grounds, since there is no *a priori* reason why should the signs 'European Union' and 'Europe' be equated with one another, i.e. pertain to the same 'order of

discourse', let us suppose that there are two: each pertaining to the construction of one discursive formation or object. Discourses which strive to 'form' the EU do not necessarily have to occupy the same terrain as those constructing Europe. The problematized equivalence between them is itself a manifestation, nevertheless, of that the two orders of discourse can, and often indeed seem to, overlap. In other words, the EU and Europe are frequently articulated in parallel, in a certain relation to one another, be it within the same chain of equivalence or in opposing chains.

As any other, the present problematization of the hegemonic 'EUasEurope' equivalence is in discourse theoretical terms a political intervention. Risse's account of the 'politicization' of 'European identity' with two competing discourses presents something of a parallel to the merits of discourse analysis of the said equation. He implied that the EU-official 'post-national' construct of the EU and its identity used to be for long beyond contestation – its discursive articulation sedimented – hence, an 'objectivity'. This construct has been challenged and destabilized by a competing discourse seeking to construe the EU and Europe as exclusive entities. In resemblance, the problematization of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence in this study can be understood as one attempt at its re-politicization by means of both deconstructing and juxtaposing this hegemonic construct to the seemingly alternative conceptions of the relation between the EU and Europe, such as that of Václav Klaus. The equation's deconstruction is, in a sense, an attempt at its 'dissolution'. Laclau (1993b, 281f) followed Derrida when suggesting that 'the dissolution of hegemonic discourses is also a fitting description of the practice of discourse analysis itself'. He described deconstruction and hegemony as 'the two sides of a single operation': '[h]egemony is the contingent articulation of elements in an undecidable terrain and deconstruction is the operation that shows that a hegemonic intervention is contingent – that the elements could have been combined differently'. Deconstruction thus 'reveals the undecidability, while the hegemonic intervention naturalises a particular articulation' (as cited and interpreted by Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 48).

The ensuing chapters, and their respective aims, can be briefly outlined as follows. Chapter 2 opens with a discussion of discourse theory's application to 'the international'. Relying on post-structuralist (IR) insights and arguments, it clarifies how is the EU conceived of from this perspective, and conceptualizes its identity construction as 'performed' through practices of its symbolic representation. The first subchapter concludes with a survey of existing scholarly findings with respect to the EU' discursive construction

and differentiation. Subchapter 2.2 addresses the question of what and how has been represented as the EU. Its section 2.2.1 focuses on the articulations of 'EUasEurope' equivalence (and relatedly of 'European identity') by the 'official' integration discourse, as developed and disseminated by the EU elite and institutions. It examines the equation's origins, transformation and recontextualization, and how it came to assume a hegemonic position in organizing meaning. Subchapter 2.3 discusses the failure of the official 'Europe-building' discourse to serve the purpose of its formation; accompanied by its concurrent 'success' in inscribing 'European identity' and 'EUasEurope' equivalence in mainstream political debates on both the EU and Europe. Subchapter 2.4 concentrates on the equation's apparent 'strength', resilience, operation and possible implications. Contemplating it from Lacan-enhanced discourse theoretical perspective, it concludes with several reflections on the role 'EUasEurope' equivalence has come to play in EU enlargement.

Chapter 3 restricts and focuses this discussion on the specific context of EU enlargement. It conceptualizes EU enlargement in post-structuralist and discourse-theoretical terms as a relatively sedimented procedure operating according to what can be called 'the logic of EU enlargement'. Consequently, it posits that there is a certain political logic at work in the process which constructs the parties involved ('the EU side' and membership candidates) as hierarchically organized subjects. EU enlargement's social logic then concerns the organization of relations and interaction between these subjects. Section 3.1.3 ponders the potential implications for further enlargement of the 'grafting' of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence onto the enlargement procedure. Section 3.1.4 then presents the argument that enlargement, as a process of inclusion and incorporation of an 'Other' may work to challenge and destabilize the said equivalence, should the newcomers entertain dissonant or even entirely distinct understandings of the relation between the EU and Europe. It proposes that the ensuing empirical analysis focuses on the 2004/2007 post-communist EU entrants, and seeks to substantiate such a choice in general terms. Subchapter 3.2 restricts the scope of empirical analysis to four 2004 'Central European' EU entrants: the so-called 'Visegrad Group' comprised of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. It also puts forth the general framework of the investigation undertaken. The last subchapter 3.3 then concludes the designing of the intended discourse analysis by detailing its precise organization and methodology.

On the thusly established and specified grounds, Chapters 4-7 seek to identify and interpret dominant national understandings of the EU, Europe, and of their relation, in each

of the four select countries. The ultimate Conclusions unit, then, puts together the findings arrived at in each country-case study. It draws conclusions with respect to the standing of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence in the Visegrad countries, and its implications for the national views of EU enlargement. It suggests that some of these conclusions may be of a more general validity, extensible perhaps to all the post-communist EU members. It also assesses the employment of discourse theory in addressing the questions under investigation, and suggests a number of other questions which may be attended to in a similar fashion.

Chapter 2

EU and Europe, 'EUasEurope' and 'European Identity'

As aforementioned, subchapter 2.1 ponders the application of post-structuralist discourse theory to international politics. In particular, how its anti-essentialist linguistic ontology, and anti-foundationalist discursive epistemology bear on the conception and treatment of state identity, as well as that of the EU. Subchapter 2.2 opens by addressing the questions of the 'nature' of the EU, its relationship with the Member States, and of its contested legitimacy. Section 2.2.1 proceeds by focusing on the origins of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence, and relatedly the concept of 'European identity', in the official discourse as enacted and progressively developed by the EU elite and institutions. It monitors their sequential articulations and recontextualizations since the 1970s by scrutinizing a number of high-profile official texts; as well as their dissemination through the 'Europe-building' EC/EU cultural and identity action; to jointly become established as a hegemonic, yet transforming, way of organizing meaning. Section 2.2.2 summarizes the findings of this extensive analysis.

Subchapter 2.3 then turns to the apparent failure of top-down efforts to make member citizens into 'Europeans' by inculcating in them 'European consciousness'; accompanied by the paradoxical entrenchment of its key signs – 'European identity' and 'EUasEurope' – as increasingly naturalized terms of imagining, speaking and knowing of the enlarging EU. The last subchapter 2.4 concentrates on the said equivalence *per se*, as it developed till the end of the 2000s. It reflects on the equation from the Lacanian discourse theoretical perspective, finally to propose several arguments with respect to the possible implications of constructing the EU in this fashion, and the role this has come to play in EU enlargement.

2.1 Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory and International Relations: Identity as Performance

Discourse theoretical works (strictly speaking) only scarcely addressed literally 'international problems'. This can be partly due to the 'youth' of discourse theory; or its theoretical origins and grounding in the theory of language, which may be conducive to a tendentious focus on the level of (and the relations within) a particular society, community or state. The question thus arises: to what extent is discourse theory applicable to relations among societies, communities and states? With respect to 'the international', this question

boils down to a more concrete and prior one: how should (nation-) states be dealt with? Should the principle of state sovereignty, constitutive of them and the system of their relations, be exempted from discursive ontology and taken as the determining principle, or should it be treated as just one discursive articulation naturalized into objectivity and social imaginary? Seeing discourse as all-encompassing, discourse theory must opt for the latter answer. Within this framework, state sovereignty does not assume a 'sovereign' position. It is nothing more (and less) than a sedimented organization of meaning (and of the social). Despite manifold challenges, the discourse of sovereign (territorial) state largely retained its (centuries-built) status of objectivity; its privileges in structuring collectivities, as well as our understandings of, and attributions of meaning to the structuration of the world around us. Still, (nation-) states cannot be conceived of otherwise but as discursively-formed collectivities (e.g. 'imagined communities').

If states and/or 'nations' (in the foreign political sense) are to be treated under the (generic) category of social groups, what does then their 'impossible society', the playfield of politics and discursive construction, look like beyond being structured through the political logic of state sovereignty? Since discourse is coterminous with the social, the language-determined principles of the discursive structuration of social relations fully apply to the 'reality' of the realm of relations and politics among states. So does, therefore, the post-structuralist assertion that '[t]here is no "extra-discursive" materiality that sets itself forward independently of its discursive representation' (Hansen 2006, 22) must also apply to the 'reality' of relations and politics among states. Discourse theory, though itself 'richer' and more extensive (theory-wise), is with respect to international politics fully congruent with post-structuralist IR theory.

Post-structuralist IR theory puts at the 'ontological and epistemological center' of its analysis the question of (state) identity (Hansen 2006, 33). It entertains, in this regard, the counter-Wendtian supposition that it 'is not something that states, or other collectivities, *have* independently of the discursive practices mobilized in presenting and implementing foreign policy' (Ibid, 1, emphasis added). The view of language as 'relationally structured and ontologically productive' makes for both a *discursive and relational conception of identity formation.*[49] Hence, state identities are at once 'produced through and constitutive

[49] This is at odds with the Wendtian concept of essentialized, 'pre-social intrinsic state identity' (see Hansen 2006, 15), and the conventional constructivist 'take on the process of identification' (Neumann 1999, 208). Conventional (or liberal) constructivists 'downplay the role of difference in identity formation', often by

of foreign policy' (Ibid, 33). Post-structuralists thusly posit an ontological inter-linkage between (foreign) policy and (state) identity: identity is constituted and reproduced solely through 'performances' (Butler 1990, 25), 'the discursive enactment of foreign policy' (Hansen 2006, 19). No state identity can thus exist 'prior to and independently of [its] foreign policy'. Under this 'performative understanding of identity' (Ibid, 23), foreign policy becomes 'not the representation of the nation to others as a pre-given object, but a construction of the nation in the very moment of representation' (Diez 2005, 627). This has at least two immediate consequences, one epistemological and one ontological.

Epistemologically, the notion of the performativity of identity representations, and of their discursive inter-linkage (co-constitution) with foreign policy, disables propositions concerning causal relations between them (Hansen 2006, 25). There can be no relation of causality, since the former are 'simultaneously the precondition for and (re)produced through articulations of policy' (Ibid, 9). The latter, ontological consequence, concerns the relationality of all identity. To reiterate, post-structuralist discursive ontology mandates that language is 'an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference' (Ibid, 15). State identity must thus be 'always given through reference to something it is not' (Ibid, 6). Put otherwise, states have no ontological status: to 'be', they need constantly to re/constitute themselves through foreign political (identity) discourses with respect to the inside/outside (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 505-506).

The arbiter of inside/outside is the principle of state sovereignty which finds its manifestation in the erection of frontiers: it 'organizes authority, space, time, and identity by separating the domestic sphere … from the international realm'. Rather than as two distinct spheres, 'the national' and 'the international' are 'constructed as each other's opposites, as each other's constitutive Other' (Hansen 2006, 30).[50] By drawing a set of borders between 'inside' and 'outside', 'us' and 'them', '[t]he principle of the sovereign state makes a distinction between inside and outside possible' (Hansen 1997, 343; see also Ashley 1987,

positing a distinction between pre-social self-organizing corporate identities and processual (social) identities of states, whereby the former are independent of difference or 'Otherness' (Rumelili 2004, 31). This extends also to their theorization of international socialization (Epstein 2011, 7-8).

[50] State sovereignty and national security discourses link the 'constitutive division between national and international space' to a temporal aspect by positioning 'the possibility of progress … inside the boundaries of the state, whereas international relations always revert to conflict and war, to a temporality of repetition' (Hansen 2006, 43).

1989; and Walker 1990, 1993).[51] Boundary-inscription is a political act, 'marking the point of articulation between the inside and outside'. It delimits and thus forges the identity (Devetak 2000, 1748); and the striven-for 'unity' of political units: 'exclusion is a necessary ingredient of integration' (Neumann 1998, 413). Foreign policy is, then, regarded as one 'specific sort of boundary-producing political performance' (Ashley 1987, 51). It forms the identity and secures the very 'being' of a state (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 48). Identities are 'performatively constituted' through differentiation from what they are not: counter-identities (Campbell 1992, 85), or their 'constitutive outside' more generally. Furthermore, the 'inside' is not a 'neutral spatial concept'. Construed with 'logocentric bias', it 'demarcates "outside" ("difference" and "other") as threatening' (Hansen 1997, 344).

David Campbell's oft-quoted study of the United States' security policy (1992) raised (aside from critique of his selective reading thereof) several widely appreciated insights. Among them is the claim that a state's very existence depends on 'the international', 'radical difference' or a 'radically threatening Other'. As Hansen put it:

> [S]ecurity is an ontological necessity for the state, not because the state [actually] needs to be protected from external threats but because its identity depends on them. Threats and insecurities … constitute the state: the state only knows who and what it is through its juxtaposition against the radical, threatening Other (2006, 30).

Campbell remarked in this respect: '*for a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations*; stasis would be death' (1992, 11, emphasis added). To construct itself and its identity, a state needs to represent and thus articulate threats and radical 'Others'. There is thus 'a drive within the ontology of national identity for turning constructions of difference into [undesired] Otherness' (Hansen 2006, 34). In the words of William E. Connolly: 'Identity requires difference to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty' (2002, 64).[52]

The most common forms of othering (i.e. operation of the logic of equivalence) in world politics concern geographical representations, due to the modern state's indispensable territoriality (Diez 2004, 325; see also Neumann 1996a, 1998 and 1999). Still, 'Other' can

[51] As Hansen (1997, 343-344), explicating Robert J. B. Walker's (1993) point, put it: 'There is … a long list of binary oppositions which follows and constitutes the distinction between inside the state and outside the state, so that identity, self, inclusion, unity and universality are to be found on the inside, and the other halves of the pairs on the outside. The oppositions are connected to one another in a long chain of equivalence'.

[52] For the same assertion – the dependence of Self on (generalized) Other, namely the 'social or symbolic order' – developed explicitly on the basis of Lacanian analysis, refer to Epstein 2011.

be cast through temporal[53] and manifold other representations (e.g. civilizations, religions, political ideologies, nations or other collectivities) short of clear-cut geographic reference. Crucially, identity construction is not 'accomplished solely through the designation of one particular sign for the Other or the Self but rather through the location of this sign within a larger system' (Hansen 2006, 37). Following Laclau and Mouffe, the discursive construction of identity can be approached theoretically as comprising two simultaneous processes: *linking* and *differentiation* (Ibid, 10-11). Articulated in parallel are at once 'a series of signs that are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness', differentiated from 'another series of juxtaposed signs' (Ibid, 37).[54] This conception allows for the possibility of internal dissonance or even contradiction of identity constructs.[55]

Moving (with post-structuralists) beyond a fixed and rigid conception of structure (of language), it also follows that there is more than one 'Other'. There may potentially be infinite Others, counter-distinction from which can (co-)articulate the identity of Self. As context is unbound, discourses multiple, and relations among signs unstable and context-dependent, the subject is not only *fragmented* (situated across subject positions), but its identity formation involves 'not a single Self-Other dichotomy but a series of related yet slightly different juxtapositions' (Hansen 2006, 33). Even if a certain 'radical Other' (in Campbell's terms) is articulated and represented, 'it is [still] an Other constructed through and stabilized by a simultaneous articulation of a number [or 'web'] of other identities of a less radical and more ambiguous character' (Ibid, 36). Hence, 'identities are constituted, at any given time, in relation to multiple others, including internal and external others as well as the generalized Other' (Morozov and Rumelili 2012, 30).[56] Consequently, 'a certain

[53] Examples of temporal differentiation are the colonial-orientalist, developmental, modernization, or Westernization discourses, constructing 'a temporal distance between those who have developed and those who have not … a distance that can be bridged, if not always eradicated, through the developing Other's adoption of Western policies and advice' (Hansen 2006, 36). The Other's temporal progression towards the (Western) Self is equally a feature of democratization and human rights discourses (Ibid, 43).

[54] For instance, a conception of 'Europe' as different from 'the Balkans' is in itself rather meaningless and empty unless 'situated within a discourse that links and differentiates these signs' and organizes them in hierarchical binaries. 'One discursive possibility is to link "the Balkans" to the violent, irrational, underdeveloped, barbarian, backward, tribal, primitive, and savage and differentiate it against a controlled, rational, developed, civilized, organized, national, orderly, and mature "European" identity' (Hansen 2006, 37, example from Todorova 1997).

[55] This may happen, taking the same example, 'if a discourse constructs "Balkan identity" as barbaric and violent and "European identity" as civilized and peaceful, while at the same time arguing that there is no boundary differentiating "the Balkans" and "Europe" (Hansen 2006, 26).

[56] Examples are 'Central Europe' (see section 3.2.2); the 'Baltics', represented as 'different from Western Europe and the Soviet Union but integrating elements from both'; or what can be more generally termed 'bridge identities'. Examples of the latter kind are (often three-party) constructs of Turkey (as between the West/Europe and the Middle East or Central Asia); or those of Slovenia that articulated 'a rather sharp difference between

collective identity cannot be unequivocally privileged, because self and other are not only mutually constitutive entities but also … necessarily unbounded' (Neumann 1999, 36).

Post-structuralists' other key point concerns multiplicity of modalities of Self/Other relations. They follow Derrida in breaking with structuralist 'semiotic analyses of decoding meaning and identity into binary oppositions' (Huysmans 1997, 363, paraphrasing James Der Derian). Derrida posited that signs' meaning rests with the context of their organization. This implies, as Iver B. Neumann put it, that identity constructs are 'fluid not only across time and space, but even as they pertain to the same subjects at the same point in space and time'. In other words, 'the same speakers may activate very different representations of the same others when the context changes' (1998, 400). National identity constructions usually manifest the logic of equivalence at work: the political frontiers erected in the process tend to be 'paratactical in nature', i.e. drawing 'relatively clear-cut' divisions between Self and Other ('us' and 'them'). But this does not inevitably mean that such frontiers are 'the result of simple, non-complex forms of identity constitution' (Norval 2000, 226-227).

Self and Other(s) may be construed 'along multiple dimensions'. Difference may vary in positive or negative connotation, even in relation to 'Other's' different identity traits. (Morozov and Rumelili 2012, 31). 'Other' 'may be idealised or completely denigrated, affirmed or negated, or even eroticised and exoticised' (Rumelili 2004, 36). It can be projected as superior, equal or inferior; as a threatening enemy ('radical Other'), 'an ally, a [merely different] stranger, or an underdeveloped subject in need of help' (Hansen 2006, 68; see also 1997, 345; Walker 1988, 166; or, for a constructivist perspective Wendt 1994, 386; Ruggie 1993; Rumelili 2004, 34-36, and 2007; Berenskoetter 2007; or Roe 2008).[57]

Most important in the present context is 'the possibility that identity need not be constructed through radical Otherness', that it can 'assume degrees of Otherness' (Hansen 2006, 33-34).[58] Although never really disregarded or discounted, (since both the

"Europe" and "the Balkans"', construed Slovenia as part of the former, but also as 'being sufficiently familiar with the Balkans that it could function as a "bridge" between the two' (Hansen 2006, 35; see also 1996).

[57] Various modes of representing Self/Other(s) differentiation may run along leader/partner (Milliken 1999b) or guardian/children lines (Doty 1996). 'Other' can be projected as superior, to be emulated – the Russian construction of Europe (Neumann 1996b); as 'both superior to the self and as identical to it' – the prevalent post-communist Central European portrayal of Europe or the wider 'West' (Hansen 2006, 35); or as 'colonial Other' – both different, exotic and attractive to the West (Said 1978). For a theorization and classification of the like discursive strategies in articulations of 'normative power Europe', refer to Diez 2005, 628-629.

[58] If Connolly's ideas on *Identity\Difference* are transposable from (democratic) state to international relations, his notion of 'agonistic relations of adversarial respect' (2002, x) can be one avenue of approaching therein identity formation short of 'radical Otherness'. He saw agonistic respect as '*a reciprocal virtue appropriate to a world in which partisans find themselves in intensive relations of political interdependence*' (Ibid, xxvi).

equivalential and differential political logics were posited), this point has come to be stressed by Laclau and Mouffe and discourse theorists more generally.[59]

Neumann (1998) proposed a distinction in this regard between 'digital' and 'analog' modes of differentiation, of organizing the boundary amid 'Self' and 'Other(s)'. Under the digital mode, they are contrasted as opposites; there is a clear-cut border, and nothing in-between. This mode, prompting exclusive identity constructs, characterizes the modern, territory-bound state-system (Hülsse 2006, 399-400). Under the latter, analogue mode of differentiation, political frontiers become ambiguous, more fluid and multifaceted. Rather than a matter of binary opposition, differentiation is multifarious, more nuanced and gradual (Wæver 2009, 175): a difference in degree rather than in kind (Manners and Whitman 2003, 386). In the frontier zone, the 'Self' and 'Other' overlap in myriad ways (Hülsse 2006, 400). It is a zone of hybrids which are neither clearly 'inside' nor 'outside' (Rumelili 2004, 289). Viatcheslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili designated those hybrids, occupying 'partly-self/partly-Other' positions, 'liminal Others'. They posited that such 'positions of liminality and hybridity enable the subversion of the identities on whose margins they are located', and sought to account for the possible agency of 'liminals'. Liminality, according to them, may be practised and enacted 'in ways that are more or less subversive or non-subversive at all, including indifference, self-assimilation, negotiation and resistance' (2012, 29-30).[60]

Focusing on 'European identity', Rumelili distinguished inclusive and exclusive identity constructs. The former (e.g. 'liberal' or 'democratic') 'embody a conception of difference based on acquired characteristics'; the latter ('geographical Europe' or 'Islamic identity') 'are defined around some inherent characteristics'. She explicated her distinction with a view to the (possibility of) agency of EU membership candidates as follows:

[59] Norval pointed to, and sought to surpass, the prevalent tendency in discourse theory (as originally developed) to theoretically 'privilege the moment of negativity, of frontier construction and of the development of antagonisms' at the expense of 'differential dimensions of identity'. This privileging of antagonistic over differential dimension of identity was later qualified by both Mouffe, who distinguished between 'enemies' and 'strangers' or 'adversaries', and Laclau (1990). In their later works, they made a distinction between 'the individuation of identity and the construction of antagonistic relations' (Norval 2000, 223). Furthermore, at least two of the major influences on discourse theory – Derrida's deconstruction of hierarchical binaries and Lacanian psychoanalysis – 'offer detailed treatments of "inside/outside" relations that may be deployed to come to a more adequate understanding of the complexities of relations between self and other' (Ibid, 224). Hence, a space opens up in discourse theory for bi-directional transformations between enemy and adversary, antagonism and agonism (Ibid, 230). Refer in this respect also to Howarth 1996.

[60] Morozov and Rumelili studied as 'liminal Others' in relation to 'European identity' Russia and Turkey. As for Russia's position vis-à-vis Europe, Neumann made a similar argument when he characterized the perception of Russia not so much as 'non-European' but rather as an 'irregularity' (1998, 412; see also 1996b).

> If difference is constructed to be deriving from inherent characteristics (the other as non-self), then the possibilities for change in the "other" are by definition nonexistent, and the other is placed in a position of permanent difference. If, on the other hand, difference is constructed to be deriving from acquired characteristics (the other as less self), then, by definition, there is the possibility that the other will become like self one day, so the other is only in a position of temporary difference (2004, 37).[61]

Rumelili's distinction is analytically valuable as it allows for a rough categorization of exclusive and inclusive identity constructs (and the modes of differentiation they invoke) on the basis of whether difference is projected as due to 'inherent' or 'acquirable' traits. In discourse theory, nevertheless, the two categories cannot be but analytical only: neither can designate some extra-discursive, 'real' difference. Recast in discourse theoretical terms, the purported 'inherent' character of some traits denotes their naturalization or sedimentation as 'objectivity'. Characteristics represented as 'acquirable', on the other hand, are those whose contingency and political nature is not 'forgotten' and less distorted.

The final point to address is particularly pertinent to discursive constructions of the EU and/or Europe. Ole Wæver (1996, 1998) and many others after him (e.g. Risse 2001; or Diez 2004) suggested that the EU/European integration has been perhaps most prominently constructed in counter-distinction from (and thus as overcoming) Europe's (or certain EU member's) violent, war-prone (nationalist) past. This relatively frequent finding in the literature deserves few remarks. Rumelili (2004, 46) aptly suggested that any such 'temporal-internal differentiation' is always tied to some spatial reference, as it presupposes that a given community is 'unequivocally bounded' (compare Hansen 2006, 44). What qualifies findings of the above sort is that the EU is not a singular and territory-wise set, but rather a 'composite' and expanding entity. It appears reasonable to assume that '[t]he number and magnitude of … re-articulations … increase when the Self is not a national one but a regional or civilizational one' (Hansen 2006, 69).[62] Hence, one should stay alert to the possibility that what could be dominant narrative among the post-WW2 'founding Six' may not inevitably have the same meaning across the EU of 27. If for no other reason, the memories of the past may be narrated and 'tinted' differently in various settings. Let us turn to this finding in greater detail in the ensuing section, focusing on how has the Union been (found to be) discursively constructed.

[61] It should be noted that Rumelili suggested two further dimensions of identity interactions, namely 'response of other' and 'social distance' between Self and Other (2004, 36-39).
[62] Hansen pointed in this respect to how 'the West' in the 'Western debate on Bosnia' was articulated differently in Europe and in the USA, and by pro- and anti-interventionist groups (2006, 69).

2.1.1 The EU and Its Others

From among the manifold constructions and differentiations of the EU studied and discerned, the above discussed temporal one has been among the most frequent and persistent. In his insightful article focused on the mode(s) of differentiating the EU, Thomas Diez supported but also qualified the validity of this finding. On his view, for most of the period since the WW2 'the most important other in the construction of a European identity' has indeed been 'Europe's own past'. Identity formation along these lines allowed for 'less antagonistic and exclusionary practices than was common in the modern international society'. This changed about two decades ago. Since then, 'geographic and cultural otherings' have been on increase. This marked, read Diez's argument, 'a return of geopolitics in European identity constructions'. The introvert-temporal othering has thus come to be accompanied by a 'traditional' (digital and modern) mode of differentiation, undermining in effect 'the notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation-states' (2004, 319). The change, he asserted, came about with the Maastricht Treaty and the post-Cold War discussion on the EU's enlargement to the east (Ibid, 326). Diez proposed the following explanation with respect to the latter:

> The representation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after the end of the Cold War remained within the discursive logic of past as other, but added a geographical notion. Central and Eastern Europe now became the incarnation of Europe's past, a past that the West had overcome, and a zone of war and nationalism that was stuck in history (Ibid).
>
> The end of the Cold War and the expansion of both NATO and the EU have raised questions of what it means to be European that had been less urgent before … In other words, these developments have led to the explication and politicisation of the hitherto much less problematic ambiguity of the notion of "Europe" (Ibid, 331).

The discourse theoretical category of dislocation seems pertinent for an attempt to interpret these early-1990s developments. The collapse of the communist bloc, the Soviet Union, and of the notion of the Cold War upset and revealed the contingency of the hitherto largely 'stabilized' global political order. The sudden 'lack' freed a number of locked-in signifiers and let them float. This dislocation thus enabled and invited the forging of new discursive articulations (such as the 'New World Order'); and prompted dislocated subjects to 'remake' themselves and identify anew (e.g. the question of the post-Cold-War NATO's purpose). The dilemmas faced by the EC/EU in the 1990s, with respect to both the 'deepening' and 'widening' of European integration, as well as the 'return' to the 'traditional' geopolitical form of its differentiation, can be at least partly accounted for in this way. The EC's territoriality was till then fairly fixed and constrained to 'Western Europe'. The events of the

late-1980s and early-1990s set the signs pertaining to its geography afloat as elements to be fixed anew into moments in new articulations and political projects.

Studies of othering practices in constructing the EU/Europe identified among the geographically distinguishable 'Others' the 'East' (Hay 1957; Delanty 1995; or Neumann 1999);[63] particularly the 'liminal' Russia[64] and Turkey (Neumann 1996b, 1998, 1999; Morozov and Rumelili 2012; Rumelili 2004; Neumann and Welsh 1991; or Aydın Düzgit 2008). The EU's differentiation from Islam most often revolved around the membership aspiration of Turkey (Diez 2004, 328), and perhaps shortly that of Morocco (Rumelili 2004).[65] The Union was also found to have been construed in relation to the Mediterranean (Pace 2002); the United States and Japan in the context of either the 'European social model' or security policy (Rosamond 2001; Stråth 2002; Diez 2004, 2005; Sjursen 2006a; or Joenniemi 2010); or 'almost European Others', such as the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) (Rytkønen 2002), the Balkans (Hansen 2006); the 'stranger in Europe' United Kingdom (Wall 2008), or migrants within Europe (Huymans 2000).

As regards the EU's differentiation, both the digital ('modern') and analogue ('postmodern') modes were reported to be at work. Arguments focused on its territorial and organizational structure generally discern preponderance of the latter mode, pointing out that it has in fact a multiplicity of purpose-bound boundaries. These pertain to the Eurozone of some members; the 'Schengenland' excluding some members and including non-members; the clusters of countries who are current and potential entry candidates, have a customs union with the EU, are parties to the European Economic Area, or fall within the scope of European Neighbourhood Policy, Union for the Mediterranean, or its development aid schemes. This 'system of concentric circles and buffer zones' (Busch and Krzyżanowski 2007, 109), 'layered frontier zones' (Buzan and Diez 1999, 49), or the EU's 'variable geometry' favour 'multiple differentiations' rather than 'a "digital" logic of total contrast' (Wæver 2009, 175).

On the other hand, representations of the EU vis-à-vis membership aspirants and candidates were found to be more ambiguous. Whereas in the case of the CEECs they were

[63] Neumann asserted that the 'Eastern absence' has generally been a 'defining trait of "European" identities': all-European, regional and national (1999, 207).
[64] Diez (2004, 329) noted that '[d]uring the Cold War, the then Soviet Union came perhaps closest to being an other for the then European Community', having, however, played this role for 'the West' as a whole.
[65] The Other of Islam, according to Diez, 'played at worst a secondary and at best a silent background role' in the times of the preponderance of the introverted temporal differentiation, one reason for which was arguably that 'the Europeanness of the then EU members had not been challenged' (2004, 328-329).

observed to be rather blurry and less antagonistic, the cases of Turkey or Morocco 'have supported claims of a modern mode of differentiation' (Rumelili (2004, 28). In her Turkey-focused study, Aydın Düzgit (2008, 526) reported construction thereof both within parent/child dichotomy, as a child in need of guidance; and as a 'clear threat and danger' in connection with the securitization of the EU's 'Southern neighbourhood' and the fear of potential Turkish immigration.[66] Even if at lower intensity, the discourses surrounding the eastern enlargement followed a similar pattern: both the parent/child roles and the anxiety, if not concern and fear, across the EU-15 over the 'influx' of labour force from the EU-10/12 were observable.[67] Such findings appear somewhat puzzling, provided that it is precisely enlargement that most clearly undermines the equivalential logic in constructing the EU. Whereas it has clear-cut 'modern' borders encircling its members (the basic tier), enlargement is exactly about changing them.

Taking on Wæver's (2009, 175) challenge 'of sorting out contradictory findings that sometimes claim strong Othering, sometimes its striking absence', this work advances the claim that these may be due to the unaccounted for tendency of many studies to approach the objects of investigation through a prism equating the EU and Europe. The conflicted findings, in other words, may have more to do with how one looks at the EU rather than its outward relations. Moreover, the ambiguous cases of former or current candidates, involving (in one way or another) both the analogue and digital modes of differentiation, suggest that EU enlargement may be the best-suited issue-area to focus on in seeking to understand and exemplify both the operation and the ramifications of this equivalence. Before doing so in Chapter 3, the 'sorting out' should begin with a genealogy and deconstruction of the equation. This is the task of this chapter's remainder, focusing on the grounds on which and how it was constructed, naturalized, and eventually 'grafted' onto EU enlargement.

2.2 The EU's Discursive Construction, the Member States, and the Question of Legitimacy

The basic dilemma and point of contention among the 'doers' and theorists of European integration concerns the nature of the EU's relationship with its component (Member) States. This question is as old as the integration project, and the answers proposed have almost

[66] Refer to Rumelili (2004, 44) for a like finding on the basis of her distinction between inherent and acquired characteristics; as well as to Morozov and Rumelili (2012, 29), concluding that 'the cases of Russia and Turkey attest to Othering being often a hybridizing practice involving both positive and negative representations'.
[67] On the British 'threatening migration discourse' with respect to the Poles, see Galasińska 2009.

always been ideologically and normatively laden. There are, on the one hand, federalist answers, and neofunctionalist ones approximating them. They posit a certain unfolding process which is eventually to culminate in the establishment of some kind of federal arrangement among the members, backed by supranational institutions.[68] Opposing answers are put forth by 'intergovernmentalists' and other groups, often referred to by their self-proclaimed 'Euroenthusiast' opponents as 'Eurosceptics'. Their answers revolve around the conception of the EU as a kind of specific and enhanced international organization, an arrangement contingent on the converging interests of its constituent members.

Somewhere in between are found more ambiguous projections of the EU as a certain 'polity in the making', marked by its continued, yet evolving, dual character as a mixture of both intergovernmental and supranational elements. On this account, it is located somewhere between the two supposed poles as a 'non-state', 'unfinished project' or a 'hybrid' (Wiener 1997). Lacking on its own the traditional attributes of nation-state sovereignty, the EU only 'pools' it with its members (Schmidt 2004, 979). Such views are not necessarily opposed to either of the two polar characterizations and visions. They only recognize that in its present form, the EU is (still) literally constituted by its Member States: its viability and evolution depend on the support of member governments, parliaments and increasingly citizens.

Despite the successive steps taken through treaty revisions, the EU formally remains a 'treaty-based international organization controlled by sovereign states … empowered by them to pursue a limited number of mutually agreed goals'. Furthermore, 'though EU decisions have a direct impact on individual citizens, it has no real coercive power of its own – it relies on the active cooperation of member state institutions to implement its policies' (Bellamy and Attuci 2009, 205).[69] On the other hand, '[w]hile the EU is a non-state, it does evolve around and works on the basis of core constitutional norms, principles, and procedures akin to the central constitutional reference frame of national states such as the rule of law, fundamental and citizenship rights, and the principle of democracy' (Wiener and

[68] Rey Koslowski (2001, 33) for instance asserted that the Maastricht Treaty presented an important move in that direction. Through it, the Member States 'entered into a type of political relationship that is neither domestic nor international, as conventionally defined. A classic way of understanding … [such a relationship] is to think of it in federal terms', i.e. to see the EU as a 'federal polity'.

[69] Corroborating with this view of the EU have been the number of challenges brought to member constitutional courts, pondering 'whether an EU decision, even if backed by an ECJ [European Court of Justice] ruling, could be disallowed on the grounds that it undermined domestic arrangements for promoting justice'. Prominent among them was the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court, later challenged by the ECJ, on the legitimacy of the Maastricht Treaty. The former ruled that 'since the EU was not a sovereign state, the Court retained the right to decide if any EU decision or policy exceeded the justifiable competence of the EU in conflicting with the domestic constitutional (as paraphrased by Bellamy and Attuci 2009, 205).

Diez 2009b, 249). In many instances, domestic institutions are obliged to comply with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings, and the European Parliament (EP) formally provides EU citizens with 'partial direct input into EU decision-making'. Hence, 'the EU has certain state-like characteristics, producing pressures for it to acquire a degree of democratic legitimacy and some obligations to promote socioeconomic justice' (Bellamy and Attuci 2009, 205).

The rise of the legitimacy question into prominence was prompted by the perceived shattering of the long-reigning neofunctionalist assumption of citizens' 'permissive consensus' concerning the elite-drive integration process. It has been commonly attributed to the challenges faced in the course of the Maastricht Treaty ratification process (Beetham and Lord 1998; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Weale 2006). With the EU's competences entering domains where democratic legitimation is 'standardly required … within states', the normative dimension of European integration became increasingly salient (Bellamy and Attuci 2009, 198 and 217). The question of the EU's (missing) normative legitimacy surrounded the drafting and adoption of all the EU treaties henceforth. It gave rise to a lively academic exchange[70], and to efforts promoting greater 'engagement of mass publics in the future direction of the EU'. The latter translated into the mounting tendency to use referenda 'to obtain political legitimacy for new treaty arrangements' (Burgess 2009, 42).

It should be stressed that the criticism of the EU's 'democratic deficit' often derives from the EU supranational institutions' grounding of their credibility and authority in the 'claim to represent the "European interest" over and above that of the individual member states'. The problem with this self-projection, recognized also by these institutions, is that it 'presupposes' a transnational 'European public' or '*demos*'. The latter, nevertheless, 'barely exists as a recognisable category, and hardly at all as a subjective or *self-recognising* body' (Shore 2000, 19). The 'essential ingredient' that the EU lacks is, in other words, 'political identification of the peoples of Europe' (Ibid, 20).

[70] See for example Dahl 1994; Majone 1996 and 1998; Moravcsik 1993, 1998 and 2002, Norris 1997; Føllesdal 1998 and 2006; Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Scharpf 1999; Tsakatika 2007; or Bellamy 2006a,b). Some suggested that the concerns of both politicians and scholars over the EU's legitimacy are quite misplaced. Arguing that it has been and should remain focused primarily on the regulation of the single market, they held that it should steer clear of areas calling for normative legitimation. Others countered, maintaining that even the policies enacted for the sake of enhancing the efficiency and functioning of the single market are more or less directly linked to areas (e.g. social policy) where public consent and normative legitimacy are conventionally sought in national settings. They also asserted that the accountability of EU institutions has become more problematic, as their co-/operation has gradually slided beyond the control of member state governments (see Bellamy and Attuci 2009, 199-217 for an overview of the debate).

A cluster of suggestions on how to resolve the issue of lacking identification revolve around the theory and proposals of Jürgen Habermas and his sympathizers to base it on a kind of post-national 'constitutional patriotism'. Those challenging this idea often do so by denying that the EU is, or may ever become, a coherent or unified intersubjective space, a pervasive and solid 'imagined community'. The EU is indeed characterized by considerable linguistic diversity, and the resultant shortage of shared communicative spaces and other common media of 'imagining' a community (e.g. education). Some critics pack such considerations and the like into a more general argument that the Habermasian visions are precluded by the missing common identity rooted in shared national consciousness (Miller 1998, 2000; Offe 2000, 2003; Scharpf 1999; Grimm 1997). According to Cris Shore, the so-called 'democratic deficit' is in fact 'symptomatic of a deeper "cultural deficit"' (2000, 3). The EU, according to others, misses 'a wider cultural or affective meaning' for Europeans (Pagden 2002, 33); it 'offers little that can inspire collective enthusiasm' (Chebel d'Appolonia 2002, 190).

Arguments of this sort measure the EU against the model of the nation-state. Some suggested that the EU lacks 'a transcendent common culture and identity analogous to the national cultures and national identities of its component states' (Schlesinger 2001, 99). There is, in other words, 'no "European consciousness" to rival that of the nation-state'. At the same time, precisely 'those cultural elements which give unity and coherence to existing national identities (such as shared language, history, memory, religion) tend to divide rather than unite fellow Europeans' (Shore 2000, 18; see also Smith 1992, 8).

What at least partly underlies such comparisons between the EU and the nation-state, and so the 'democratic deficit' charge, is the fact that the EU has actually been for decades deliberately constructed along the nation-state lines. EU elite and institutions, particularly the European Commission (henceforth 'the Commission') engaged themselves in 'attempts to appeal to common European values and shared history … to provide the EU with the symbolic trappings of a nation state' (Bellamy and Attuci 2009, 214). At least since the early 1970s, there has been a mounting concern among the EU elite with 'integration as a cultural process, and "culture" as a political instrument for furthering that construction process' (Shore 2000, 1). From about that time, 'the construction of European identity was officially recognized as a crucial policy issue in the process of strengthening the profile and safeguarding the future prospects of the European Community' (Stavrakakis 2005, 68).

The following sections focus on how the supranational institutions and elite, particularly the Commission, sought to secure their very 'being' – and by extension that of the EC/EU – through multifaceted cultural and identity action. It will be suggested that these efforts heralded only a limited, if any, discernible success, and sparked a national backlash instead. Still, despite their non-success in disseminating 'European consciousness' along the nation-state-building lines, they succeeded in inscribing in the debates on the EU the empty concept (sign) of 'European identity'; while forging an equivalence between the EU and Europe in the process. Both the concept and equation, moreover, underwent transformation since the turn of the 2000s.

2.2.1 Attempted Hegemonic Project: 'Europe-Building, 'European Identity' and 'EUasEurope'

As discursive formation or 'imagined community', the EU is in constant 'need of articulation of its "meaning"' (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 51). To secure its own 'being', it needs its purpose articulated; and to perform its very 'presence' by catering to that purpose. In his outstanding study of precisely these practices, Shore called the 'moments' of the EU construct 'agents of European consciousness': 'those forces and objects through which knowledge of the European Union is embodied and communicated'. They range from 'the abstract and intangible to the concrete and mundane': from the founding treaties, EU institutions, elite and officials, the single market and the euro; through EU symbols, 'traditions', law, regulation, harmonization, and activities; to EU statistics, historiography, studies and literature. All these, 'singularly or collectively, help to engender awareness and promote acceptance of the "European idea"'. They lay the 'conceptual and symbolic foundations' that 'make it possible to *imagine*' the EU (2000, 26). They communicate or, as Michael Billig (1995) put it, 'flag' the EU's purpose and 'being'.

Agents of European consciousness, in other words, produce and reproduce the EU. Yet, not all of them have equal opportunities for doing so. From among them, the institutions and actors at the 'centre stage' of EU affairs 'rank among the most important' (Shore 2000, 26). Particularly aware of the need to 'perform' the EU has been the Commission, projecting itself self-consciously 'as "custodian of the European idea" and "conscience of Europe"' (Ibid, 5). From among the EU elite, it has indeed been the Commission which most explicitly engaged in endeavours 'to tackle the problem of Europe's fragmented polity and absent demos by instilling a sense of shared European history and identity' (Ibid, 40).

It should be pointed out at the outset that these endeavours, as much as the European integration project, have always been closely intertwined with the (often normative) theory of (regional) integration. The latter has provided guidance and the basis for evaluation and justification of the steps undertaken, while itself undergoing transformation in reflection of the 'realities' of European integration at a time. The integration project has its roots in the federalist theory of regional integration.[71] Its proponents exerted an extraordinary influence on the post-WW2 developments in Western Europe and, in fact, ever since, most notably within the supranational institutions.[72] The federalist theory drew on pre-WW2 early federalism, embodied in the pan-European movement promoting the overcoming of state sovereignty through organizing politically at a supra-state level (e.g. von Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926). In line with this idea, the ultimate aim since the turn of the 1950s has been 'to bind Europe's nation-states into a federal political system' (Shore 2000, 16).

Accordingly, intrinsic to EU historiography are 'a series of political and cultural assumptions about the causes of war and the future of European societies'. On the Commission view, 'the antithesis of peace and the major obstacle to European integration is the continuing presence of the nation-state and its allied ideology of nationalism' (Ibid). The EU and its predecessors were to 'lay foundations for a new kind of social and political order in Europe, one that would "go beyond" the existing order based on competitive nation-states' (Ibid, 2). EU officials and federalists have thus seen European integration as 'a "community-building" enterprise involving a "rapprochement" among the peoples of Europe' (Ibid, 25). This aim was formulated as 'ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe' by the 1957 Rome Treaty and all treaties henceforth. On closer inspection, the objective has been

> to forge a new sense of "Europeanness": a collective identity that can transcend exclusively parochial and nationalistic loyalties and lay the foundations for a higher level of consciousness based on allegiance to European, rather than national, institutions and ideals (Ibid, 21).

The EU elite have perceived themselves as key agents in 'the construction of Europe'. As such, they, and particularly the Commission, have in due time actively 'attempted to further the integration process by forging and diffusing their vision of "European consciousness"

[71] Rather than an explanatory theory, federalism has been a normative programme, conceiving of European integration as of progress towards a (certain form of) pre-destined federal finality of united Europe. Refer to John Pinder's (1986) call for a new federal Europe; Preston King and Andrea Bosco's (1991) ideas on a federal constitution for Europe; and to Burgess 1996; or Elazar 1995 for overviews of federalist thought.

[72] Far beyond their activity at the time of the project's inception, federalists have retained considerable influence on the 'doing' of European integration ever since. Jean Monnet, Jacques Delors (Ross 1995), and other EU figures such as Joschka Fischer, Pat Cox, or Guy Verhofstadt have been closely associated with federalist ideas.

and "European culture"' (Ibid, 1). The goal of inducing or boosting popular identification with the integration project 'has been a recurring theme in official thinking' since the end of the 1960s (Laffan 1996, 96). It rests on the belief that 'the construction of Europe' requires 'the creation of "Europeans" … as a category of *subjectivity*'; that for the project's long-term success, 'transformation of identity and consciousness' is needed (Shore 2000, 30).

For the 'top-down' EU identity and cultural action, and later cultural policy (see Pantel 1999; or Delgado Moreira 2000), to be designed, 'a fundamental shift in thinking' needed to take place through which 'culture' became 'the idiom through which elites try to galvanise and mould public opinion' (Shore 2000, 42 and 222). The shift concerned, more precisely, a departure of the official EU discourse from the elite-centrism of the neofunctionalist integration theory. Neofunctionalism was the guiding theory in the 1950s and 1960s, premised on the belief that economic, 'technical' and legal integration is to engender social and political integration too.[73] This presumption started to be severely challenged since the mid-1960s Community crisis, associated most prominently with the French President Charles de Gaulle, and the reassertion of Member States and their governments.[74] Yet, the neofunctionalist preoccupation with elite rather than popular attitudes and loyalty to supranational institutions was so deeply entrenched in the official thinking that it persisted for many years to come. Neofunctionalism largely bracketed the question of popular identification with the integration process by assuming its spontaneous rise 'as each successive step towards political union demonstrated the economic benefits to be gained by further integration'. This 'instrumental loyalty' was to 'provide sufficient "permissive consensus" to enable the subsequent step towards ever-closer union to be implemented' (Ibid, 18). The assumption was, in other words, that change in popular attitudes and consciousness would (almost automatically) follow suit with, and in turn legitimize, the progress in integration.

[73] Neofunctionalism, developed in two original versions by Ersnt B. Haas (1958) and Leon Lindberg (1963), had strong links to both earlier functionalism (Mitrany 1943) and federalism. European integration was treated as an evolving process driven by interrelated 'spillovers'. Conceiving of national and supranational elite as the initiators and primary drivers of integration, neofunctionalists posited a 'political spillover' (shift in loyalties and self-perception) to accompany the process of 'functional spillover' earlier elaborated by functionalists. Together, the two spillovers were to bring about the emergence of a new supranational (regional) political entity (Pollack 2005, 359-360). The theory underwent several reformulations since the 1960s in reflection of the then current developments (see e.g. Haas, 1970, 2001; Schmitter 1969, 1970, 2004; or Niemann 1998, 2006). For an overview, refer for instance to Niemann and Schmitter 2009.

[74] These prompted the development of another key (and politically opposed) strand of integration theory – intergovernmentalism – associated in its classical form most closely with Stanley Hoffmann (1966, 1982, 1995).

The conception of European integration as a matter of transformation of elite rather than public allegiances pervaded the EU elite thinking approximately till the late 1970s, when it became apparent that the prediction of mounting popular support and identification failed to materialize. Only then did the EU elite come to appreciate 'culture' as 'an integrative mechanism and possible solution to the riddle of European unification' (Shore 2000, 42). It was in the 1980s when the Commission undertook to transform the hitherto '"technocrats" Europe into a popular "people's Europe"' (Ibid, 19). Until made into an emergent official policy in the early 1990s, the EC cultural action took the form of 'various initiatives in the field of media and information policy to promote integration in the sphere of culture by enhancing what [the EC] saw as "the European identity"' (Ibid, 44).

The sequential genesis of the concept of 'European identity' as we have come to know it reaches back to the 1970s. In his oft-cited account, Bo Stråth attributed its 'launching' to a series of early-1970s crises: the breakdown of the post-WW2 (Bretton Woods) global economic and financial system; and the concurrent crises of the Keynesian model of political economy, the EC's cohesion, and of the legitimacy and general confidence in the European integration project (see 2000a, b, 2002, 2006; or Malmborg and Stråth 2002b). 'European identity' was 'launched' in 1973 by what soon became the European Council as a concept whose purpose was to 're-establish' the place of the EC in the redesigned global order (Stråth 2000b, 385), and 'to infuse new confidence in the project of unification' (Stråth 2006, 430).

1973 Declaration on the European Identity[75]

Meeting in Copenhagen in December 1973, the heads of the then nine Member States produced what they called the 'Declaration on the European Identity'. For the Commission, according to Shore, the document was 'the first significant step towards defining a cultural basis for European unification' (2000, 44). Much of academic literature in fact see it as the basis for, if not the commencement, of the EC identity action, since it coined the term 'the European Identity' (note the definite article and capitalization). Yet, on closer inspection, this reading is more due to retrospective projection of meaning invested in the later notion – 'European identity' – rather than to the 1973 text which explicitly concerned foreign policy. Apart from the Nine's resolution to seek a 'unified' or *'common' stance in* their *external relations*, and allusions to the federal plan of 'the construction of United Europe', the

[75] *Bulletin of the European Communities*, no. 12 (December 1973): 118-122.

Declaration did not suggest their intention to rely on supranational institutions in boosting a sense of community and collective consciousness beyond the remit of foreign policy.

This becomes apparent once the 1973 historical context is complemented with few further considerations. Prevalent at the time was the Cold War interpretation of world politics as revolving around the bipolar confrontation between 'the West', led by the USA, and the Soviet-led communist bloc. Furthermore, the waned or inverted drive for further integration was not only due to the aforementioned crises. This perception was further enhanced by the very recent enlargement to relatively more trans-Atlantically-oriented and integration-wise less enthusiastic countries (the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark). Finally, most of the Nine had historical and political ties to territories and/or later independent (at least of them) political entities towards which they assumed a degree of involvement and responsibility.

Against this background, the Nine decided 'to draw up a document on the European Identity' which 'will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs'. They undertook '*to define the European Identity* with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind', with 'the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe' (opening section, emphasis added). This 'definition' was to set the ground for the pursuit of 'the determination of the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity' (II.14). As postulated in this regard:

> Although in the past … [they] were individually able to play a major rôle on the international scene, present international problems are difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe [later specified as "the Europe of the Nine"] must unite and speak increasingly with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper rôle in the world (I.6).

'The European Identity' was defined in three parts, each tending to a particular dimension of doing so. The first part addressed 'The Unity of the Nine Member Countries of the Community'. It opened with the proclamation that whereas they

> might have been pushed towards disunity by their history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests ... they have overcome their past enmities and have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common' (I.1).

The notion of a common stance was invoked in the following statement:

> The Nine have the political will to succeed in the construction of a united Europe … they have created a common market … and have established institutions, common policies and machinery

> for co-operation. All these are an essential part of the European Identity. The Nine are determined to safeguard the elements which make up the unity they have achieved so far…
>
> … the Nine Governments have established a system of political co-operation with a view to determining common attitudes and, where possible and desirable, common action. They propose to develop this further (I.2).

The latter two stated components of 'the European Identity' are essentially the two concepts raised by the present EU motto 'Unity in diversity'. As the Declaration put it:

> The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice … and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity (I.1).
>
> The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism (I.3).

Part two concerned the definition of 'The European Identity in Relation to the World'. Elaborated first in general terms, it was stated that '[t]he Europe of the Nine is aware that, as it unites, it takes on new international obligations'. In pursuit of objectives aligned with 'the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter' the Nine 'should progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy' (II.9):

> As the Community progresses towards a common policy in relation to third countries, it will act in accordance with the following principles:
>
> (a) The Nine, acting as a single entity, will strive to promote harmonious and constructive relations with these countries …
>
> (b) In future when the Nine negotiate collectively with other countries, the institutions and procedures chosen should enable the distinct character of the European entity to be respected.
>
> (c) In bilateral contacts with other countries, the Member States of the Community will increasingly act on the basis of agreed common positions (II.10).

Ensued a list of groups of or individual countries, ranked by the perceived importance of common stance towards and/or the already existing links (II.11-II.19). The text's last part pointed to the open-endedness of defining 'the European Identity', due to 'The Dynamic Nature of the Construction of a United Europe':

> *The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe*. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity [common stance] in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. They are convinced that building up this policy will help them to tackle with confidence and realism further stages in the construction of a United Europe thus making easier the proposed transformation of the whole complex of their relations into a European Union (III.22, emphasis added).

To briefly summarize, the Declaration was a statement of the Nine's intent to respond to the challenges of the time through progressively taking common stance towards the outside world; building and performing thus 'the European Identity'. The text faithfully reproduced but rearticulated the original meaning of the 'EUasEurope' equation woven by the federalist integration discourse. Sign 'Europe' referred to those nations undertaking 'the construction of a United Europe' (see paragraph I.4). 'Europe' was thus a short-hand term for the nations involved; the integration project; as well as the project's pre-conceived federal finality. At the same time, the Declaration is possibly the first highest-level Community text explicitly linking the EC's appropriation of the notion 'Europe' with what would later be rearticulated and re-contextualized (beyond foreign policy) as 'European identity'.

1975 Tindemans Report[76]

In 1974, the newly established European Council mandated its member Leo Tindemans with drafting a report aimed 'to define what was meant by the term "European Union"' (5). To clarify, 'European Union' was by then decided to be the next (but not final) stage of 'the construction of Europe'. As explained by Tindemans in a laudatory federalist fashion: faithful to '[t]he basic choice made by the Founding Fathers of Europe and embodied in the Treaties of Rome and Paris ... to bring about an ever closer union between our peoples',

> [t]he 1972 and 1974 Paris Conferences decided that European Union was the best means of doing this at the present stage of the construction of Europe (13).
>
> The establishment of the Community was the first stage of this historic undertaking. The European Union which will extend our joint action to new sectors and reveal more clearly the concept of society that it implies is the stage that follows (35).

Paradoxically, while it was decided that 'European Union' was the stage to 'prolong and extend to new areas the efforts' hitherto undertaken (29), its 'aims and nature' were not 'clearly understood'. Hence, the goal of Tindemans's *Report on European Union*, submitted in December 1975, was to assess 'the qualitative change which is European Union' (13). It sought 'to give an overall picture of the European Union and of the means of achieving it' (34), so as to help the European Council decide 'in which general perspective the joint endeavour will be pursued during the Union phase' (13).

The Report's unmistakably federalist pedigree is discernible in Tindemans's allusion to 'the final phase of European development' (6). He made it explicit in his stated personal

[76] *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76: 1-36.

conviction that 'Europe will only fulfil its destiny if it espouses federalism' (5). The text is in fact a 'manifesto' of the federalist/neofunctionalist elite-centrism; and the peculiarly self-involved top-down, 'dirigiste' attitude to the public. While the strategies of 'communicating' the 'federal plan Europe' to citizens were elaborated and partly altered over time, even in the 2000s the crux of the disseminated message, and the logic underlying it, remained faithful to this landmark text. The 'rhetorical magic' deployed is well-grasped by ensuing excerpts. To begin with, Tindemans addressed the apparent lack of popular enthusiasm and support for the integration project: 'We must listen to our people. What do Europeans want? What do they expect from a united Europe?' (11). Yet, 'what Europeans want' was not so much about Europeans as the elite engaged in the project and acting on the former's behalf. This was due to the self-justificatory interpretative framework, according to which, somehow, '[t]he construction of Europe … derives spontaneously from the will of our peoples as embodied in the work of the Founding Fathers of Europe' (35). Accordingly, Tindemans attributed the loss of much force and initial impetus of the 'European concept' to that

> *the European public has lost a guiding light*, namely the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking this joint task and the characteristics with which we wish to endow it. We must first of all restore this common vision if we wish to have European Union (11, emphasis added).

It was precisely his Report and its proposals which 'state the objectives and the methods whereby Europe can be invested with a new vitality and current obstacles can be overcome (6). To come full circle, the Report's adoption was to reinstate the said 'guiding light':

> The will of our States, expressed in this way [the European Council's adoption of the general framework proposed by the Report], is based on the deep-seated motivations of public opinion and can convey to it the guiding light of our common action (13).

In order to improve the image and solidify the legitimacy of the integration project in the eyes of citizens, and enable thus the transition to the 'European Union' stage, a concerted and multifaceted action was needed. Tindemans's Report indicated the spheres of, general guidelines, and particular measures to be taken. First it focused on the aims and steps of EC action in the realms of economic and social policy (III.), and especially the social and regional policies (III. C). Particularly the Report's fourth part outlined the programme for 'A Citizen's Europe', designed to engender popular interest and consent. The rationale beyond the programme was explained as follows:

> The construction of Europe is not just a form of collaboration between States. It is a *rapprochement* of peoples who wish to go forward together ... In democratic countries the will of governments alone is not sufficient for such an undertaking. The need for it, its advantages and its gradual

> achievement must be perceived by everyone so that effort and sacrifices are freely accepted. Europe must be close to its citizens (26).
>
> No one wants to see a technocratic Europe. European Union must be experienced by the citizen in his daily life. It must make itself felt in education and culture, news and communications, it must be manifest in the youth of our countries, and in leisure time activities. It must protect the rights of the individual and strengthen democracy through a set of institutions which have legitimacy conferred upon them by the will of our peoples (12).
>
> If this extensive will for *rapprochement* is to take on a political dimension vital to ensure that action is taken, Europe must find its place again among the major concerns of public opinion thus ensuring that it will be the focal point of the political discussions of tomorrow (11).

Aside from the steps in connection with EU social policy, Tindemans identified two further spheres of action in this regard. The first pertained to the protection of Europeans' fundamental, consumer and environmental rights (IV.A). The latter, then, concerned *performance of the EU's presence*: 'concrete manifestation of European solidarity by means of *external signs* discernible in everyday life' (IV.B). The first cluster of propositions in the latter regard related to the movement of persons (e.g. 'passport union' or frontier controls) and intra-Union transport and communication (27-28). Another course of action was to encourage greater integration in educational matters by promoting student exchanges:

> The aim is to give Europeans of tomorrow a personal and concrete impression of the European reality and a detailed knowledge of our languages and cultures since these constitute the common heritage which the European Union aims specifically to protect (28).[77]

Next, in anticipation of the first direct EP elections, expected to 'provoke throughout Europe an electoral campaign on European themes', Tindemans suggested a concerted promotion of collaboration in the audio-visual sector in order to '*encourage the spread of information and better knowledge of each other*'. Finally, EC institutions and governments were to better the manner in which their 'common activity is presented to public opinion', namely through the creation of the 'European Foundation'. Its tasks would be to promote '*either directly or by assisting existing bodies, anything which could help towards greater understanding among our peoples'*, and '*presenting abroad the image of a United Europe*' (Ibid).

Many of Tindemans's proposals were indeed implemented. Yet the transition to EU stage turned out to be only incremental and greatly protracted: it took on an institutionalized form only in 1993. With respect to the genesis of the 'European identity' concept, the text brought no notable departure from the 1973 Declaration. Its second part spoke of 'the European identity' solely in relation to EU members' common/unified external policy:

[77] The concept of *common heritage*, hereby referring to *the EC/EU's diversity of languages and cultures*, would later become one of the pivotal notions across many official culture- or identity- related texts.

> The European identity will not be accepted by the outside world so long as the European States appear sometimes united, sometimes disunited (15).

In contrast, the above citations suggest that the Report went much further in appropriating 'Europe' for the EC/EU. This was achieved, *inter alia*, through its stated goal of addressing 'the fragile nature of Europe' due to the Community's present unbalanced state (11); or in relation to foreign policy and putative desires of 'Europeans' in statements such as:

> 'Our peoples expect the European Union to be, where and when appropriate, the voice of Europe'.
>
> 'Europe ... must build a type of society which is ours alone and which reflects the values which are the heritage and the common creation of our peoples' (12).

These effectively advanced the construction of equivalence between the EU and 'Europe', while 'Europe' was still differentiated from Europe as geographic space (18).

1980s' Cultural Action: Instilling European Consciousness

Tindemans identified the need to engage 'Europeans' in 'the construction of Europe'. Their sense of mutual solidarity and of the EC/EU's presence were to be performed and enhanced through fostering mutual contacts, exchange, and information about one another. His ideas and propositions were still based on neofunctionalist elite-centred and instrumental thinking with respect to popular support and legitimacy. Citizens' meagre interest in EP elections demonstrated the deficiency of this outlook.

It was in the early 1980s that the 'vanguard' EU elite recognized that the EU's credibility 'hinges on the development of a more tangible and coherent sense of shared identity among the peoples of Europe whose interests the Union claims to serve'. This was deemed key for popular mobilization, consent-building, and 'creating "social cohesion" and feelings of belonging'. These were to 'underpin the legal, economic and monetary aspects of the integration process' and the EU institutions' democratic legitimacy (Shore 2000, 222). This stress on 'consciousness-raising as a strategy for bringing Europe "closer to the citizens" and creating "Europeans" … signalled a new departure in EU approaches to the neglected domain of culture' (Ibid, 45). It was the beginning of the progressive appropriation of 'culture' as a 'political instrument for the construction of Europe', and of 'resolving' the perception of the project's missing legitimacy (Ibid, 3-4). This incipient enterprise 'to invent the EU as an imagined community', make it 'visible and appealing' to 'Europeans', has since been at the centre of 'the cultural politics of European integration'. It was hoped that in the process 'a fully-fledged European public sphere' would form (Ibid, 221).

It was not till mid-1980s that deliberate efforts were undertaken to instil in and among 'Europeans' a sense of community and belonging. By then, reaching a high-point in the 1990s, 'identity-formation' and 'culture-building' became 'explicit political objectives' (Shore 2000, 26). As part of the mounting endeavour to build a community among 'Europeans' (member citizens) by inculcating in them awareness of what they share in common, the EC/EU cultural action rearticulated and recontextualized 'European identity'. This was in the situation when the EC's discursive appropriation of 'Europe', establishing an equation between the two 'imagined communities', became an interpretative tendency. Progressively naturalized, it served as an instrument of the EC's Self-justification in the process.

One key 'outcome' of the process was successive 'transfer' of the meaning of what used to be EC members' common foreign policy stance ('the European Identity') onto 'Europe' (the 'presence', project and finality of European integration). In the context expanded to include social and cultural domains, it became a 'European identity'. Flash forward: 'At the end of the road, the "Europe as an identity" project took on essential proportions' (Stråth 2006, 439).

To substantiate this account, a closer scrutiny of the above complex process should be presented. Most prominent among the initial steps in the 1980s' turn of attention to culture was the European Council's 1983 *Solemn Declaration on European Union*[78]. In its preamble, highest representatives of 10 Member States' confirmed their resolve 'to continue the work begun on the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome and to create a united Europe'; expressed the conviction that the EC 'must strengthen its cohesion, regain its dynamism and intensify its action in areas hitherto insufficiently explored'; and reaffirmed 'their will to transform the whole complex of relations between their States into a European Union'. The first among the objectives thereby adopted linked 'the European identity' with a commitment to progress in 'the construction of Europe':

> The Heads of State or Government, on the basis of an awareness of a common destiny and the wish to affirm *the European identity*, confirm their *commitment to progress towards an ever closer union among the peoples and Member States of the European Community* (1.1, emphases added).

Crucially, among the courses of action aimed to 'consolidate the progress already made towards European Union' (1.4) was

[78] *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6/1983: 24-29.

> to promote, to the extent that these activities cannot be carried out within the framework of the Treaties ... *closer co-operation on cultural matters*, in order *to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity* (1.4.3, emphases added).

The particular activities to be undertaken with regard to cultural cooperation were reserved a separate section. It opened by stating:

> With a view to complementing Community action and stressing that, in consideration of the membership of their States of the Council of Europe, they maintain their firm support for an involvement in its cultural activities, the Heads of State or Government agree to promote, encourage or facilitate the following, taking account of respective constitutional provisions ...

The points listed relate to cooperation and activities in education, among others the 'development of the teaching of the languages of the Member States'; as well as

> improving the level of knowledge about other Member States of the Community and of information on Europe's history and culture so as to promote a European awareness;
>
> examination of the advisability of undertaking joint action to protect, promote and safeguard the cultural heritage;
>
> examination of the possibility of promoting joint activities in the dissemination of culture, in particular as regards audio-visual methods... (3.3).

Several points deserve attention with respect to the 1983 Declaration. It did, albeit scarcely, reproduce the EC's claim to the label 'Europe' (e.g. section 3.1.5 or 3.2). Next, in the context of its usage (1.1, 1.4.3), 'the European identity' referred once again to EC members' common foreign political stance. Yet this time 'the awareness of a common cultural heritage' was clearly designated 'an element in the European identity' (1.4.3). The notion thus still denoted common stance, which an awareness of common cultural heritage was to enhance but not replace.

The provisions concerning cultural cooperation were in fact very carefully worded, as it was recognized that cultural activities stood, in most respects covered (1.4.3), outside the framework of the Treaties. This was acknowledged in section 3.3 which linked cultural cooperation with the EC members' Council of Europe membership and 'their firm support for an involvement in its activities'. Moreover, aside from insisting that cultural activities must take into account the 'respective [national] constitutional provisions'; the Declaration *called not for action but only examination* of both the 'advisability of undertaking joint action to protect, promote and safeguard the cultural heritage', and the 'possibility of promoting joint activities in the dissemination of culture' in the audio-visual sector. Finally, the text's greatest 'advancement' with respect to cultural action and promotion of 'European awareness' was that the earlier-set effort to improve peoples' knowledge of other Member States was to be complemented by 'information on Europe's history and culture'.

1985 'Adonnino Report'[79]

The Commission reportedly interpreted the 1983 Declaration 'as giving a green light to pursue cultural initiatives' (Shore 2000, 45). Key for its cultural and identity action was the second of two 1985 reports produced by the '*ad hoc* Committee on a People's Europe', comprising high-profile member delegates and chaired by Pietro Adonnino. It was summoned by the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council, which considered it

> essential that the Community should respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by *adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world* … (5, emphasis added).

The Committee was mandated to 'prepare and coordinate this action' (Ibid). Aside from legitimizing the EC and normalizing its claim to 'Europe' (when speaking of the need to tend to the 'expectations of the people of Europe'), the mandate also suggests a crucial 'move' with respect to 'European identity'. Departing from earlier texts, the EC identity and image were now to be promoted both outside ('the rest of the world') and inside (member citizens). Whereas making the EC popularly 'felt' was an already established concern, deliberate consciousness- or identity-building was not. Directed inwardly (towards citizens), 'identity' no longer denoted a foreign political 'common stance'. It could have a much more ambiguous cluster of possible meanings: from the most general statement of its 'being and presence' to the more normatively loaded notions of unity, community, solidarity, or even multifaceted convergence.

The second 'Adonnino report', entitled 'A People's Europe', focused primarily on the inward dimension of the EC identity action.[80] Allowing for 'the right of initiative of the Commission in conformity with the Treaties' (19), it put forth a set of proposals, long-term goal of which was to 'deal with important aspects of special rights of citizens, of education, culture and communication, exchanges, and the image and identity of the Community'. These were deemed 'meaningful to the citizen in various aspects of his daily life' and as such 'a substantial contribution to the realization of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' (18). They were approved by the 1985 Milan European Council which 'instructed the Commission and the Member States, acting within their respective powers, to take the necessary implementing measures' (31). As in the course of implementation (discussed later) some proposals were omitted, some enhanced, and yet others added, the rest of this section

[79] *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 7/85: 1-33.
[80] The Committee's first report was 'essentially confined to … problems connected with the abolition of border checks on individuals and their goods' and a university diploma equivalence recognition system (7).

centres on this text's contribution to the weaving of the 'European identity' concept and 'EUasEurope' equation rather than the 1985 proposals in their entirety.

EC action was to focus, first, on *culture and communication*, areas 'essential to European identity and the Community's image in the minds of its people' in which 'support for the advancement of Europe can and must be sought' (3.1). Apart from validating the EC's 'presence' by alluding to 'the people of the Community', the Report developed further in this context the notion of 'the European cultural heritage', while differentiating between the EC and Europe. The goal of engraining popular support for the EC through dissemination of awareness of (common) cultural heritage was grounded in the belief that

> [t]he languages spoken in the Community form an essential part of its cultural heritage and contribute to its richness and diversity. In order that people may get on together across frontiers, they must first of all understand one another. A practical knowledge of the languages, cultures and living conditions of the other Member States consequently takes on special importance and should be encouraged from an early age (5.2).

It was, nevertheless, stressed that common cultural heritage in the sense of linguistic and cultural diversity could not be reduced to the EC alone:

> The European cultural heritage is not however confined to the territories of the Member States of the Community, nor, for that matter, to the frontiers of the States of the Council of Europe. We must therefore avoid any exclusivity in this area and seek cooperation with other European countries (3.1).[81]

Among the proposed measures were the encouragement of audio-visual co-productions (3.5); the foundation of a 'European Academy of Science, Technology and Art' (3.10); or the creation of 'Euro-lottery' (3.11).

Having identified the problem that 'the people of Europe do not receive satisfactory information about the construction of Europe', the Adonnino Committee outlined the key premises of a joint EC and Member States' information action:

> Information about the Community should aim to *explain* [read "disseminate"] *the fundamental themes which underly the crucial importance of the Community for the Member States* - the historical events which led to the construction of the Community and which inspire its further development in freedom, peace and security and its achievements and potential in the economic and social field. Member States can *show how national action is reinforced by Community action*. It is also necessary to point out to people *what the costs would be if the Community did not exist* (4.1, emphases added).

[81] Culture-wise, countries deemed 'European' were thus not only the then 10 EC and the remaining Council of Europe members, i.e. including Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Iceland, Austria, Cyprus, Switzerland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Liechteinstein. Whereas greatest attention today deserves the inclusion of (or lack of ambivalence concerning) Turkey, 'other European countries' was a reference to further unspecified states beyond the Iron Curtain, and Finland.

This statement exhibits the self-justificatory and self-preserving properties of the earlier discussed national security discourses, general goal of which is to ground and legitimize the very being of a state. Representing itself as 'Europe' with increasing confidence, the EC/EU's Self-construction was in fact devised to deploy the 'proven' nation-state building technologies. In this spirit, the ensuing statement maintained that, additionally, 'need is felt for greater factual information about the specific policies and actions of the Community and to disseminate information on their significance for the citizen in his daily life' (4.2).

The Report deemed it 'essential to involve and interest young people in the further development of Europe' (5.). To that end, it suggested that action be taken in the spheres of youth, education, exchanges and sport. Particular attention deserve proposals in three areas which are rather characteristic of nation-building projects. Section 5.5 focused on '[t]he European image in education', stressing that '[t]he past achievements and the future potential of Europe are an integral part of education in the Member States and in many other countries'. Measures to 'give new impetus to a *European dimension in education*' should include, *inter alia*, 'the preparation and availability of appropriate school books and teaching materials'; 'confirming 9 May of each year as Europe Day with a view to *creating awareness and giving information* in schools in particular as well as on television and in other media'; or 'the setting-up of a Centre *displaying European achievements and the common heritage*' (5.5, emphases added). Additional steps were to be taken to encourage intra-EC youth exchanges, since these help '*promote the identity of Europe for young Europeans*' (5.8, emphasis added). Exchanges were to manifest 'a European direction and focus' and 'distinct European dimension'. A new 'Europe Exchange' scheme was to be developed with a '*clear Community identity*' (5.8.1, emphasis added). Finally, in the realm of sport, *EC events* were to be organized in certain sports and '*Community teams*' created 'to compete against joint teams from geographical groupings with which the Community has special links'. Sporting teams were also to be invited 'to wear *the Community emblem in addition to their national colours* at major sporting events of regional and worldwide interest' (5.9, emphases added).

The Report's final cluster of proposals (9.), focused on boosting the EC's image and identity, are most explicitly attuned to nation-state-building strategies. To use Billig's term, the Committee saw a clear need for 'flagging' the Community

> for both practical and symbolic reasons, for a flag and an emblem to be used at national and international events, exhibitions and other occasions where the existence of the Community needs to be brought to public attention (9.1).

Next symbol, Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy', 'recognized by the Council of Europe as being representative of the European idea', was to become the EC's official anthem (9.2). Lastly, postal stamps could also be 'appropriate vehicles for drawing attention to ideas and events in the Community'. National postal organizations could issue 'certain stamps … bearing identical designs of subjects which highlight the Community or its underlying values, or which commemorate particularly important events in Community history' (9.3).

In her general assessment of the Adonnino Report, Brigid Laffan (1996, 96) incisively concluded that the proposed policy package's overall aim was 'gradually to change people's consciousness of political realities and the political domain to which they belong'. It sketched 'a deliberate process of manufacturing and legitimizing a European identity from the "top down"'. The goal was to 'construct [the EC as] Europe as "an imagined community"' along three policy lines 'designed to show that "Europe exists for the people"': 1) move from consumer to citizen; 2) politics of identity and symbols; and 3) creation of non-economic cross-national networks.

Cultural Action: Implementation and Nation-State Lines of EC/EU Self-Construction

Until the Maastricht Treaty, 'culture' stood outside the EC treaty framework. It thus lacked both legal competence and funds for cultural programmes. Still, partly in implementing the Adonnino Committee proposals and partly from its own initiative, the Commission came to operate 'a *de facto* cultural policy' before 1993. It took the form of 'a number of ad hoc "cultural actions" based on resolutions from the European Parliament and Ministers of Culture'. Justifying cultural action beyond competences legally granted to it, EC officials and politicians sought to invoke 'economic reasons for achieving cultural ends' (Shore 2000, 45-46). Jacques Delors spelt out this strategy in his 1985 speech to the EP:

> [T]he culture industry will tomorrow be one of the biggest industries … Under the terms of the Treaty we do not have the resource to implement a cultural policy; but *we are going to try to tackle it along economic lines* … We have to build a powerful European culture industry that will *enable us to be in control of both the medium and its content*, maintaining our standards of civilization [an implicit reference to the "shallowness" of American cultural industry], and encouraging the creative people amongst us (quoted in Shore 2000, 45-46, emphases added).

In 1988, one of the Commission's documents recorded the development of this economic justification for cultural action as follows:

> The world of culture clearly cannot remain outside the process of completion of the big European internal market: that process demands the formation of a true European cultural area (quoted in Shore 2000, 15).

The Commission's 1988 communication on 'People's Europe' further added that it was precisely 'in anticipation of the creation of a European cultural area' that action was 'needed in the cultural sector to *make people more aware of their European identity*' (as quoted by Shore 2000, 25). In fact, a very blunt statement on the instrumentality of dispersing the idea of European cultural identity in 'building' Europeans' approval for the integration project was found already in its 1984 Green Paper on 'Television Without Frontiers' initiative:

> Information is a decisive, perhaps the most decisive, factor in European unification … *European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it*. *Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as European identity*. *A European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed*. *At present, information via the mass media is controlled at national level* (quoted in Shore 2000, 45, emphasis added).

Two points deserve special attention in view of the above statements. First, they suggest that in the 1980s the meaning of 'European identity' underwent significant change in the official discourse. Far beyond signifying the EC's unity in foreign policy, it was transformed into an image and programme with increasingly essential *cultural and nation-like proportions.* It was to serve as *key instrument in both unifying 'Europe' and creating its subjects*. Secondly, the 1984 text stated rather bluntly that the citizens of the 'Europe-to-emerge' do not desire it yet; and that the way of installing in them such a desire is to interpellate them through and into the 'European identity' discourse. Crucially, this interpellation required unrestrained flow of information disseminating this discourse. This effectively amounted to stating that 'the national' stood in the way of European unification, as it exercised control over the media of diffusing information. National control was to be overcome or bypassed through EC action in the audio-visual sector. The aim was to establish mechanisms and relays of the EC's direct contact with citizens so as to forge their culture-infused 'European identity'.

The relationship between national identities and what has the EC projected as 'European identity' raised scholarly interest. Some replicated the official 'multiple identities' doctrine and argued that perceptions of conflict or tension between them are misplaced since the latter does, or is meant only to, complement the former. Others opposed and held that under construction has been a national-like 'European identity', designed to compete with and eventually largely to replace national identities whose appeal was expected to wane. It appears that neither side was wrong. 'European identity's' construction and representation has run along both the culturalized nation-state and the 'multiple identities' lines. Yet it was especially the former framework which marked the official construction thereof in the 1980s and well into the 1990s.

The formatting of 'European identity' as a 'nationalist discourse', projecting practices 'deemed to have "worked" as vessels of national identities onto the European Union', is traceable to the Adonnino Committee at the latest (Neumann 1998, 409-410). Its proposed 'populist, nation-building measures were designed to enhance European consciousness and "Europeanize" the cultural sector' (Shore 2000, 46). The EC as 'Europe' has been since construed 'on much the same symbolic terrain as the old nation-states'; with 'icons for evoking the presence of the emergent state, only instead of "national sovereignty" it is the EU institutions and ideals that are emphasized and endorsed' (Ibid, 50). In any case, 'the structure of national identity' has been '"projected" onto the European identity' (Stråth 2000a, 13). In this context, the EC's 'Other' has been most prominently represented as 'the national'; with reference either to conflict-prone nationalist past or to the persistent if not mounting resistance of some Member States to further progress in European unification.

Since the 1980s, the EC has been 'flagged' and 'performed' most plainly through nation-like symbols: from emblem, flag, passport, driving licence or sporting events to later additions such as harmonized car number plates, national ID cards, or common currency. Among the more subtle means of its symbolic representation belong various public awareness campaigns; new bodies and events in the sphere of 'high culture'; or numerous awards with 'supranational identity' such as 'European Literature Prize', 'Women of Europe Award', as well as 'Jean Monnet Awards' aimed at development and promotion of EIS and the 'Europeanization' of university teaching. Last but not least, symbolic steps were taken 'to re-structure the ritual calendar by creating new celebratory calendrical markers', such as 'European Weeks'; 'European Culture Months'; 'European city of culture' initiative; themed 'European Years'; or EC/EU-wide public holidays such as the 9 May 'Europe Day'. All the symbols are to help 'reconfigure the symbolic ordering of time, space, information, education and the media in order to reflect the "European dimension" and the presence of European Community institutions' (Shore 2000, 48-50). According to one Commission 1988 document, for this endeavour to be successful, symbols alone were not enough. Whereas they surely played a 'key role in consciousness-raising', i.e. *hailing*, there was also a need

> *to make the European citizen aware of the different elements that go to make up his European identity, of our cultural unity with all its diversity of expression*, and of the historical ties which link the nations of Europe (as quoted in Shore 2000, 47, emphasis added).

Despite the fact that the remit of 'culture' has never been officially defined (Shore 2000, 52-53), 'European culture' or 'common cultural heritage' have come to assume the role of empty signifiers in the official 'construction of Europe' discourse. Shore drew attention to

the seemingly contradictory, yet in national security discourse rather conventional, manner of representing 'Europe's cultural heritage':

> Typically, this is portrayed as a well-established and static "object": an organic phenomenon arising naturally from Europe's rich diversity and centuries of shared history (and hence, as something strong, proud, distinctive and unambiguous). At the same time, European culture is portrayed as fragile and vulnerable; something that needs to [be] nurtured and protected from dangerous, even "contaminating" foreign influences, most notably Japanese technology and American cultural imperialism (Ibid, 52).[82]

The resemblance of the working of the official discourse on European cultural identity to national security discourse is uncanny. The 'survival' of 'European cultural heritage' and the diversity of its manifestations have been represented as dependent on the EC's very 'being' and action in the cultural sphere. The official message has been that

> European culture and identity already exist in the "collective conscience of its peoples", but bureaucratic intervention is nevertheless needed to "defend" it from assault [and contaminating influences] and to make Europeans "more aware" of their cultural identity [i.e. sameness at a deeper and transnational level] … [T]he "environmental approach" to culture (culture conceived as a kind of "endangered" species) justifies further intervention into the cultural sector by EU officials, experts and managers (Ibid, 52).

Finally, Euro-statistics have been a latent but no less efficient nation-like mechanism in 'the construction of Europe' and its subjects. They have served not only to make Community citizens into a 'European public', and thus to 'create' a 'European public opinion', but also opened up new avenues of both moulding and interpreting the latter. They have also been instrumental in constructing and mobilizing 'new "European" meta-concepts and categories' (Ibid, 31). As Shore explained,

> these new *Eurobarometer* and *Eurostat* statistics are not only powerful political instruments for creating a knowable, quantifiable and hence more tangible and governable "European population" and "European space": rather, they are also powerful moulders of consciousness that furnish the meta-classifications within which identities and subjectivities are formed (Ibid).

Euro-statistics and their official interpretations have certainly played a notable role in the EC/EU's Self-representation, its appropriation of 'Europe', and the diffusion and solidification of the hailing 'European identity' and 'European culture' official message. The present scholarly over-reliance on Euro-statistics makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that also they have formed part of the EC/EU identity and cultural action. They too contributed to 'transforming the peoples of Europe into European subjects … who not only recognise

[82] Justifying action in the audio-visual industry was the perception that its competitiveness and '[t]he survival of so-called European cultural identity' were at stake in the face of 'the industrial and cultural supremacy of the United States and Japan', e.g. the domination of American movie exports in the EU market (Llobera 2003, 169). Fear of 'Americanization' has been a 'recurring motif in Commission discourse', resonating in myriad EU documents and reports (Shore 2000, 52).

themselves as "European citizens" but who also accept the EU's supranational institutions as a legitimate political authority' (Ibid).

The Maastricht Treaty and the 1990s

Marking institutionalization and legal entrenchment of the 'European Union' stage in the federalist 'construction of Europe', the Maastricht Treaty introduced the category of EU citizenship, hitherto 'the exclusive constitutional prerogative of the Member States'. Shore related this move, and the Treaty's larger advancement of the project, to 'a new stage in the ambitions of EU leaders and their goal of transforming the peoples of Europe into an amalgamated "European people"', driven by 'more confident and aggressive' Commission led by federalist Jacques Delors (Shore 2000, 67). EU citizenship, ultimate peacetime democratic technology of hailing masses, is a discourse interpellating citizen-subjects. Once again devised to salvage the EU's legitimacy, it was to 'generate a new category of European subjectivity'. It has served not only to make the EU more visible to its subjects but also as 'a conceptual tool for legitimising a supposedly supranational form of statehood' (Ibid, 83).

It is since the Maastricht Treaty[83] that one can speak of a constrained but coherent EU 'cultural policy'. Article 128 thereof granted the EU competence in the cultural sphere, establishing thus the legal ground for its intervention:

> 1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
>
> 2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:
>
> improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples; conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance; non-commercial cultural exchanges; artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.
>
> […] 4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty.

Considering the 'national' mode of 'European culture' and 'European identity' construction, the EU's dual objective of both contributing to the 'flowering of the cultures of the Member States' in their diversity and 'bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore' appears somewhat contradictory. This was not the case according to the responsible Commission officials. Reporting on their view, Shore asserted: 'If national diversity is celebrated, it is always within a context that emphasises the way these national specificities fit into the

[83] *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. C 191 (29 July 1992).

overall European picture'. Through a *departicularization* strategy, '[n]ational cultural icons are … appropriated, re-interpreted and then offered up as indices of a unitary "European" history'. 'European culture' (or 'civilization' in the rhetoric of many officials and French historians) was seen as 'an over-arching, encapsulating and transcendent composite of national cultures; a whole greater than the sum of its discordant parts' (2000, 54).

The EU's new formal cultural objectives were as daring as they were at odds with the situation 'in the field'. The Danes rejected to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in the first referendum and the votes for the French 'oui' were barely gathered. In view of this dire atmosphere for legitimation and further pursuit of 'the construction of Europe', the Commission decided to intensify and enhance the EU communication strategy by deploying 'more sophisticated marketing techniques for "selling" Europe to the public' (Shore 2000, 62). Delors summoned a so-called 'committee of wise men' to examine and suggest improvements to the strategy and the EU's 'flagging image' (Ibid, 55). The Committee produced what has come to be known as the 1993 De Clercq Report.[84] On key points still adhered to, it was a strikingly overt testament to the Commission's (and the EU elite) unabating federalist drive; its view of citizen-subjects; and the unmasked propagandistic nature of 'communicating Europe' to them.

The Report's preface diagnosed the 'state of affairs' as the disappearance of the hitherto supposed 'permissive consensus':

> During 1992, and since then, the debate provoked by the construction of Europe has revealed a growing perplexity amongst citizens. This perplexity seems to highlight, for the first time, a break in the traditional support of European citizens for the cause of European integration. For the first time, it would appear that the worthiness of the "good project" – in other words, European construction and integration – is being questioned. It is no longer a subject of unanimity, nor is it perceived as something normal or obvious, or even as being imperative.

Detailing this diagnosis, section 1.1 reported that 'the building of Europe' was 'in a state of crisis' in terms of 'confidence, credibility, desirability, ... public approval and public support; there was an 'estrangement between the European authorities and the public'; and that 'the concept [of European Community] was based far more on the will of statesmen than on the will of the people', leaving many citizens with the impression that it was imposed on them 'top-down' by Brussels. Section 1.2 assessed that much of the public expressed 'ignorance and indifference' to the project, the EU and its institutions; there was no 'European public

[84] De Clercq, Willy (1993) *Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the European Community* (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities). Available from http://aei.pitt.edu/29870/1/DE_CLERCQ_REPORT_INFO._COMM._POLICY.pdf.

opinion', substantial 'feeling of belonging to Europe', nor has 'European identity' yet been 'engrained in peoples' minds'. Marking the next shuffle in the official discursive deployment of 'European identity', the Report saw an opportunity in the 'fact' that '[t]here are … a number of values commonly shared by Europeans … [which] could form the basis of a European identity'.[85]

The malaise was, on the Committee's view, due to that '[t]he construction of Europe is not being communicated in a relevant and persuasive way to the citizens of Europe' (1.3). In its PR language, it suggested that the EU/'Europe' be presented, 'sold' and 'marketed' via relevant message 'transmitters' as a brand 'good product' to its citizens ('receivers') (see e.g. section 4.5). The strategic communication goal was to 'build public *awareness* and *approval*' of the EU and of 'the rôle and function of the European Institutions': 'The building of European Union must be made intelligible to all and relevant to each so that everyone appreciates its importance *for me* (3.1). The appeal of 'Europe' and 'the Institutions responsible for its construction' was to be enhanced through an implicit evocation of '*the maternal, nurturing care of "Europa" for all her children* (3.3, emphasis added).[86] Furthermore, it was held that '[t]he European message must concern Europeans both in their professional dimension … [and] their historical and cultural dimension, in terms of values, outlook and a commonly shared identity' (3.7).

Whereas the general aim was that 'all European citizens should be convinced that European Union and the work of the European Institutions is for the common good', the Report singled out several key 'specific groups who must be convinced':

> Within the general public, those who are *undecided/indifferent or need reassurance*. Priority targets within this group must be those inclined to have favourable attitudes (more likely to be receptive and to respond positively).[87]
>
> Within the specialized public, those who are particularly *relevant multipliers*:

[85] Listed were the following: the rejection of war; the fight against poverty and unemployment; protection of the environment; Human Rights, freedom and democracy; the wealth and diversity of European culture.
[86] It is worth pointing in this context to the research conducted within the *Identities and Modernities in Europe* (IME) project which presented a number of insights with respect to the mid-2000s EU communication strategy and its enactment in Hungary. They not only indicate that not much has changed in the ways the EU represented itself since the 1993 De Clercq Report, but also that the key disseminated message apparently underwent only a minor, if any, adaptation in the new-member-Hungarian context (see IME 2011b, 5-7). As before, the discourse emanating from the EU documents was one of self-justification. They articulated 'the need for an overarching institution and administrative body – the European Union and its elites – that are able to protect "Us, Europeans" from outside threats', especially those to 'prosperity, solidarity and security' brought by globalization (Ibid, 6).
[87] These were identified as *women*, who 'form a major (and perhaps the most receptive) "constituency" in Europe'; and the *youth*, 'a primary target for persuasion and conviction'.

> *Journalists, editors and programme directors*: All those who have decisive influence in their media via news, editorials and programmes ... *[T]he media must be persuaded to present the achievements, the benefits, the opportunities in a positive, optimistic way, and not delight in criticism and failure*. As far as possible, *"Europe" should be integrated into the information, entertainment, advertising and didactic functions of media*, not isolated in special sections (3.7, emphases added).

Among the 'relevant multipliers', including also businesspeople, politicians and officials (3.7), the Report paid further attention to 'newscasters and reporters' who

> must *themselves* be targeted, they must *themselves* be persuaded about European Union. It is crucial to change *their* opinions first, so that they subsequently become enthusiastic supporters of the cause (5.10).

So as to tackle the problem of weak coordination among EU institutions, and between them and Member States' institutions, the Committee urged the creation of a 'central *Office of Communications*. Similar to bodies in Japan, the USA and the Member States, it was to be 'responsible for the general communications' strategy' and ensure that the Community 'speaks with one voice' (7.0).

Discussing symbols and mottoes, the Report also made a rather conclusive statement on the 'presence' and purportedly essential traits of (this time an altogether culturalized) 'European identity':

> The USA's solution, "*out of many one*" [E pluribus unum] cannot be Europe's solution, since *we have been one ever since Greeks, Romans, Celts, Norsemen, Teutons, Slavs and other Europeans realized long ago that they shared a common heritage* [emphasis added].
>
> We are Europeans, and are proud of it. What is happening is that *we are realizing our identity* [emphasis added]. In asserting our position in the world, we assert the richness of our culture, which is diverse and deep, a rich mosaic rather than an artificial "*-ism*". European Union has deep, diverse and powerful roots. We are many in one: *In uno plures*, and we want to keep and nurture our diverse cultures that together make us the envied focus of culture, civilization, intellectual life and savoir-vivre in the world (5.9).[88]

Finally, the Committee saw the need to extend the communication strategy to the realm of education, where is stressed the importance of the 'reviewing of history':

> *The communication of "Europe" must be a continuous process of education, culture and formation*, starting at secondary school stage. *School books should be reviewed*, not in order to rewrite history, but *to ensure that a European dimension is given to our past*, and that the events leading up to European Union are explained to, and understood by school children. The European dimension should be emphasized particularly in subjects such as geography, history, economics and civics (5.4, emphases added).

The goal of such a 'refashioning of history' was to write it from a 'European perspective' or 'inject' it with a 'European dimension' so as to 'challenge the nationalist bias of traditional

[88] It should be noted that the current EU official motto 'Unity in diversity' was adopted only in the early 2000s.

teaching and learning' (Shore 2000, 56). The point was that history taught from national angle laid emphasis on the divisions, conflicts and enmities among European nations rather than the desired message of their 'common cultural heritage'. In his critique of EU historiography, Shore characterized it as weaving 'an essential European cultural community: a "core Europe" whose common bonds lie in its shared heritage, moral ascendancy and cultural continuity' (Ibid, 57). 'Most attempts to define Europe "from a cultural perspective"' were, according to him, 'laden with ethnocentric and elitist assumptions about what constitutes Europe's "cultural heritage". In this construction of 'European identity', they belittled or erased the contribution of 'non-Europeans' (Ibid, 63). Perhaps most importantly, this new 'European perspective' invested in history was to 'combat the hegemony of nationalist ideology … the primary obstacle to European union'. Such a construction process, to be sure, inescapably invokes differentiation: 'if Europe symbolises peace and prosperity, the nation-state … is constructed as an agent of conflict and war' (Ibid, 58-59).

2.2.2 20th Century Transformations of 'European Identity' and 'EUasEurope'

Originally developed in the early 1970s to signify the EC members' common stance towards the outside world, 'European identity' underwent transformation and recontextualization within the EC/EU common identity- and culture-forming action since the mid-1980s. Recast as hailing instrument of this community-building enterprise, its meaning was expanded to include the category of culture ('common cultural heritage') and later a culture-infused list of common values. This endeavour to 'Europeanize "Europe"' was designed and implemented in replication of 'proven', elite-driven nation-state-building strategies:

> [J]ust as the nation-state was forged by intellectuals and elites whose goal was to inject nationalist consciousness into the masses … so European consciousness is being developed and diffused from above by a vanguard of EU politicians, bureaucrats and marketing professionals' (Shore 2000, 64).

Confident that 'European identity' and 'European culture' are satisfactorily dispersed and entrenched, the EU elite, spearheaded by the Commission, focused its attention in the 1990s on filling them with meaning. The Commission 'expended considerable time and energy in financing seminars, workshops and symposia aimed at outlining the features of what European identity and culture might consist of' (Shore 2000, 40). This was the next step in naturalizing these signs. Efforts aimed at discerning their meaning and content work not only to establish them as nodal points in related concurrent and future articulations, but also to affirm the very 'presence' of what they are to signify.

'European identity' was since its 1973 'launching' tied to 'EUasEurope' equivalence. Developed within federalist integration discourse, 'Europe' in this equation was originally a shorthand designation for the nations undertaking 'the construction of a United Europe', the integration/unification project *per se*, as well as its projected federal finality. The gradual dissolution of quotation marks around Europe, running in parallel with the culturalization of 'European identity', indicated the *metamorphosis in the official discourse of 'Europe' as project into Europe as community with common identity.* Either way, the naturalization of the equation as such seems to have been finalized on paper by the early 1990s. In its section 4.2, 'Avoiding Confusion', the De Clercq Report bluntly prescribed the following:

> Confusion between "Europe" and the European Institutions [of the present "third stage" European Union] must be avoided. The organizations and institutions are not Europe. They are simply means to an end, and must not be confused in their purpose. Bureaucrats are a "necessary evil". Their existence must not be confused with Europe. *People are far more interested in the food that comes to the table than they are in the workings of the kitchen*.

The prescription was not to 'sell' (i.e. engrain and instil popular consent towards) the EU, its institutions and evolutionary steps, but rather the '*destination Europe*', the progress towards which the EU represented.

This was a solid basis for the upcoming iteration of 'EUasEurope' equivalence, signifying a culture-infused community and 'shaking off' its roots in the federalist project. While it is quite impossible to clearly establish when exactly has this new equation assumed a structurally hegemonic position of nodal point across both EU- and Europe-related discourses, its ascendancy can be traced to the 1990s and at least a part of the 2000s. It still took several complex developments, however, before the culturalized 'EUasEurope' interpretative scheme claimed hegemony in the context of EU enlargement to Turkey.

2.3 Relative Failure of 'Europe-Building', Its Transfer onto 'European Identity' and 'EUasEurope'

Most official texts covered in the latter part of the previous subchapter admitted that, despite their growing sophistication, the EC/EU efforts aimed at 'inculcating a more popular sense of European consciousness' (Shore 2000, 222) yielded little if any success. This appears to be the case in the early 2010s as it was in the 1990s. To be sure, the achievements of this community-forming enterprise in structuring discourses on the EU are hard to deny. Yet, its very purpose was to engage European peoples and 'win' their consent with the integration project. On this count, the endeavour succeeded in certain elite circles but, as regards the

citizenry, it has been at best a non-success. The 'European identity' project remains an elite affair, largely disconnected from 'Europeans' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 53). Lacking 'the political socialisation of the nation state projects', it has had 'limited social meaning' for them (Edwards 2003, 8). The sought-after 'European people' never appeared (Stråth 2006, 434). Despite replicating the national ones, the new symbols of 'togetherness' and unity have largely 'failed to win for the EU the title deeds upon which national loyalties and allegiances are claimed'. Most citizens 'remain stubbornly wedded to their national identities, against which the notion of "European identity" pails into insignificance' (Shore 2000, 222 and 224).

It appears that several main factors behind this non-success have to do with the formatting of 'Europe-building' along the nation-state-building lines, and the inability of both the EC/EU and its 'message' to approximate the popular appeal of the nation-state and national (and other) identity constructs. That the cultural, identity and communication action replicated nation-state-building has not been seen as an issue by the involved EU elite and officials. They have relied on the 'multiple identities' theoretical and interpretative framework, adopted and further elaborated by (especially the constructivist) students of European integration. The presumption, discernible across EC documents since the 1980s or even the 1970s, that neither 'European identity' nor its symbolic construction incur antagonism but are instead compatible with national identities, was reportedly widespread among the Commission officials in the 1990s (Shore 2000, 50). On their view, people had 'multiple identities' which tended to be 'complementary and segmentary, connecting different orders of ascending "levels" of belonging'. Forming 'an over-arching "European identity"' was then 'simply a matter of grafting a higher collective identity on to and above existing regional and national identities'. One of the 'architects' of the 'People's Europe' project explained that its aim was 'to create some sort of supra-nationality', a 'double sense of belonging': being at once national and European. Explaining the Commission's take on the relation between the two identifications, he drew three bounded 'concentric circles' (region, nation-state and the Community), delineating 'harmoniously integrated and hierarchical levels of authority and identity'. Crucially, the presumption that 'existing identities can be successfully encapsulated within a wider European identity' excludes the possibility of their conflict. It rests as such on an apolitical conception of identity (Ibid 51-52).

From the post-structuralist discourse theoretical perspective, problematic is not the idea of multiple identifications but rather the assumption of their mutual harmony or even

complementarity which underlies the 'multiple identities' doctrine. Post-structuralists insist that no identity can be construed apart from 'constitutive outside'. Hence, the formation of regional and national identities must have depended on their counter-distinction from something outside, the excluded. As it appears counter-intuitive that their differentiation has been merely 'horizontal' – other regions and nations, respectively – the construction of both has in all likelihood involved a certain differentiation at several levels: regional, national and 'supranational' (wider politico-geographic areas, Europe, and more recently the EU). Although differentiation does not automatically imply antagonism, it certainly undermines the *a priori* assumption of harmoniousness or complementarity of 'multiple identities'. The theoretical expulsion of differentiation, and thus of 'the political' from identity construction in fact endangers the very idea of multiple identities. If in harmony, why would they and their corresponding collectives ever be constructed in the first place?

The point of this critique is perhaps best exemplified on 'culture', the primary target of the EC/EU community-building. Many within the Commission in the 1990s reportedly deemed that the creation of an 'overarching "European identity"', 'a new pan-national tier of identity and solidarity', simply was a matter of 'stimulating awareness' of European peoples' shared cultural heritage (Shore 2000, 225). The key problem with this belief, as many have stressed, is that Europeans are most divided precisely by 'those cultural elements from which existing national [and for that matter also regional] identities are constructed (including language, history, religion, myth, memory, folklore and tradition) (Ibid; see also Stråth 2002).[89] Looked at from this angle, it is hard to deny the profoundly political nature of the 'Unity in diversity' ideal, or the idea that 'European culture' is 'a whole greater than the sum of its parts – and therefore "naturally" transcendent' (Shore 2000, 225). Desirable or not, these notions merely distort what seems to be the predicament of any full-fledged supranational community-building in Europe.

Furthermore, while the EC/EU's 'Europe-building' was meant to forge a post-national community, in practice it has largely replicated nation-state construction. Fundamentally, the project to form 'European identity' and create 'European people' in virtually the same terrain and 'by means of the same symbols in competition with national ones invited competition, with nation states being the home team' (Neumann 2006, 9). Meddling in domains where nation-states have hitherto claimed their prerogatives could

[89] For further critique of the idea of a European cultural heritage *qua* identity transcending national societies see Malmborg and Stråth 2002b, 5-6; Delanty 1995, or 2000, 226-227.

have in fact been 'counter-productive': conducive to the reassertion of nation-based difference, and thus to antagonism between the EU/'European' and national identifications.[90]

There is at least one more key factor which has marred a top-down 'construction of Europe'. As one Commission expert on public opinion research disclosed:

> *[T]he reason there is no "European public" is because there is no common language* … Because there is no common language, there is no common media [and] no public for the democratic debate over European issues (quoted in Shore 2000, 223, emphasis added).

No common language is a particularly immobilizing 'obstacle' to 'the construction of Europe' from the post-structuralist perspective. Its linguistic ontology implicitly presupposes that discursively constructed collectives should be, at least to some minimal extent, 'linguistic communities'. To be sure, the EC/EU has always stressed the importance of executing its actions, communicating its message, and disseminating its objectives and ideals in national languages. It has also attributed great importance to the promotion of knowledge among EU citizens of other Member States' languages. Yet, the 'language problem' facing 'Europe-building' runs much deeper than this.

Diverse languages are diverse systems of expressing and representing various identities (Duszak 2002a). Still, language is not only the system but also the very means and object of forging communities. 'Language politics' did and still play vital role in their construction.[91] Regulating group boundaries, language policies and planning are identity-formation tools (Krzyżanowski 2010, 42). Differentiation often takes the form of 'delineating different linguistic communities' and 'showing that "*they* (*Others*) are those who can*not* speak *our* language"' (Duszak 2002b, 1).[92]

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[90] In a similar vein, commenting on the weakness of the EU's identity-building endeavour, one observer asserted that the EU efforts 'are just about strong enough to generate a considerable amount of Euro-sceptic reaction in member states and prospective member states alike. Instead of an effective policy instrument, the nation-building ventures of the EU provide cores that foment Euro-sceptic discontent' (Spiering 2007, 182).

[91] The vital importance of common language has been appreciated by virtually all nation/-state builders. Particularly in Europe, the perceived need to codify a national language in order to enable and aid nation-building has been often painfully demonstrated and enacted.

[92] For instance, DHA analysts demonstrated how 'the post-war Austrian "Second Republic" reinvented its identity to one of a modern nation state by means of, inter alia, the country's often controversial language policies'. These attempt to control linguistic diversity and 'to regulate Austrian official state language (German vs. Austrian German)'. The aim is to stress 'the specifically Austrian character of the country's official language (i.e. German)', arguably in response to the National Socialist 'attempts to create "*großdeutsche Kulturnation*"' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 43-44). Neumann provided another example of how has Austria made linguistic difference a matter of its own political identity. Its EU accession protocol listed 23 items which EU documents must refer to by both German and Austrian-German terms. Each time a text containing one of these

Many believe that linguistic diversity and the lack of common language present possibly the most insuperable barrier to furthering 'the construction of Europe' (Smith 1992; Schlesinger 1994, Ifversen 2002; or Shore 2000, 83). There are at least two key problems suggesting this to be the case. Both have to do with the Member States remaining distinct and sovereign linguistic communities. The first problem emanates from the EU's highly constrained legal competence in the cultural domain. The Maastricht Treaty Article 128 ruled out any 'top-down' cultural policy by assigning responsibility for cultural cooperation to the Member States. The Community was merely to encourage, support and supplement their action. It also postulated that the achievement of the listed objectives *excluded* 'any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States'. Culture remains a domain of Member States and the subsidiary EU action is chiefly to be at their service.[93] After all, according to the Treaty, it was first of all 'to contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity'.[94]

Read in this context, the EU's 2000 'United in diversity' motto above all implies that Member States' cultural identities can be in no way challenged or threatened. This is epitomized by the EU language policy: linguistic assimilation, harmonization or integration has been out of question ever since 1951 (see de Witte 1993). The official regime of the ECSC/EEC/EC/EU operation has been a Member State-centred multilingualism. It was formalized by the Council Regulation 1/1958, stipulating that the EEC shall have four absolutely equal official and working languages, and taken over by the EU through Article A of the Maastricht Treaty.[95] With the exceptions of Irish (Gaelic) and Luxembourgish, the common practice has become that either the national language of a new Member State, or, in cases there are more, the language nominated by it becomes the new EU official and

word pairs is published, it confirms that 'the German language is connected to two different political identities' (1999, 7).

[93] Discussing a report on the 1982 first informal meeting of the Ministers of Culture, where Member States and some (especially German) regions resisted a full-fledged EC cultural action, Enrique Banús commented: 'Member States' concern with cultural issues and their obsession with diversity combined to produce an acceptance, however unwilling, of a new partner [the Community] to share the responsibility for the promotion of national culture', though it 'might have the secondary effect of fomenting the common heritage' (2002, 162).

[94] The Amsterdam Treaty amended the Article 128 only by extending the original statement in the fourth paragraph that '[t]he Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty' with the phrase '…, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures'.

[95] With the ECSC, parallelism was established between the (then four) so-called 'official' and 'working' languages. Their formal distinction turned out to be very useful with successive enlargements. While the category of 'working languages' allowed for restricting the number of languages in communication with, within, and between EU institutions; with the category of 'official languages' were tied a number of obligations which have remained in place until present. Since EU legislation affects national law, it must be published in all the official languages, and EU institutions and bodies should be able to communicate in all of them as well (Caviedes 2003, 252).

working language (Liddicoat 2002, 36). The Member States hold an unchallenged sovereign position in the EU's linguistic setup. Its multilingualism, just as the standing of all (including regional and minority) languages and their speakers in the EU, are fully determined by national laws. Paradoxically, then, the EU's cherished linguistic pluralism in practice merely replicates the Member States' language plans at the Community level.

The closely related second key problem is that Member State interpretative frameworks and debates on the EU are not only linguistically differentiated but also heavily nationally biased. Varying national interpretation patterns were identified by several studies.[96] One synchronic analysis of national media debates and discourses (Oberhuber *et al*. 2005) concluded that the diverging 'national-discursive patterns of interpreting EU-related events differ to a degree which prevents the construction of a European Public Sphere or any related construction of a transnational European identity'. 'Europeanization' of EU-related debates is hindered by pervasive '*national filters of perceiving Europe*' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 59, emphasis added)[97]:

> The result of such a "filter" is that, whenever debated, Europe is never discussed in the national media from a perspective other than that of national interests, and thus always remains a strictly national rather than a supranational construct. Even if described positively … Europe, and in particular the EU, tends to be viewed strictly nationally, which, in turn, poses a major obstacle to developing transnational ideas of Europe and non-nationally-specific ideas on the meaning and purpose of the European project (Ibid, 133).

As 'similar pan-European patterns of interpretation' are missing, 'European Public Sphere' is 'an international rather than a transnational construct' (Ibid, 60).

2.3.1 Turn of Century and the 2000s: From 'Unity in Identity' to Divergence-in-Diversity

The 1990s are commonly held to be a decade of nationalism reawakened with the Cold War's end, manifested violently on the European continent. The demise of polarized 'binary discursive system' (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 102) was a major dislocatory event for the international order, the continent, and so the EC. Some posited that the decade saw a major shift in the official EU discourse: from forging 'European identity' towards promoting national and local diversity. On the basis of the texts heretofore analysed, it is hard to affirm this 'major shift' thesis. Although formalized only by the Maastricht Treaty, the objective to

[96] Among others, see Bärenreuter *et al.* 2006; De Vreese and Boomgarden 2006; De Vreese *et al.*2006; Downey and Koenig 2006; Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Risse and Van de Steeg 2008; or Statham and Gray 2005.
[97] See also Krzyżanowski 2009a; Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2006; or Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2009a and 2009b).

preserve and promote the diversity of Member State national and regional cultures and identities has accompanied 'Europe-building' ever since the 1970s. If there was a certain 1990s shift in that direction, it was greater emphasis on sub-state diversity, aligned with the newly adopted subsidiarity principle. The 1990s were a period of mounting preoccupation with intra-EU diversity, but from quite a different perspective. Diversity in this regard concerns not so much cultural and identity matters as socio-economic conditions and visions of the future of the EU and European integration; hence the contention over the desirability and feasibility of the federalist project. Of crucial importance in this context were the planned eastern enlargement to post-communist Europe and the gradual reassertion of the Member States at the expense of the Commission.

Since the latter half of the 1990s, there has been a clear trend in the EU 'towards a looser kind of intergovernmental cooperation and coordination', according to Stråth:

> European political practice as it developed meant *a migration of power from the centralised level of the Commission to the member state governments* assembled in the Council … The European summits in Luxembourg 1997 and Lisbon 2000 outlined this *transformation from the image of a Europe beyond the nations to a Europe of the nations*. High politics in Europe had to recognise that *the nation had returned on the European scene* and to find political responses to this fact (2006, 434, emphases added).

The 2000 Humboldt University appeal for a federal Europe by the German Foreign Affairs Minister Joschka Fischer should be seen in the context of the turn-of-century ambiguity over the federalist project. Seeing it as 'bureaucratic affair run by a faceless, soulless Eurocracy in Brussels', many called 'the construction of Europe' into question (Ibid, 440). By then,

> the migration of power from the Commission to the Council was fully visible as the transformation of the *acquis communautaire* to the open method of coordination as the motor of decision-making. This was a development towards the EU of the Member States, De Gaulle's *l'Europe des patries* (Ibid, 439-440).

It was arguably at the 2000 Nice European Council where the image of 'the European Identity' in its original sense of Member States' unity and 'togetherness', guided from above by supranational institutions, collapsed. The summit scheduled and provided for the eastern enlargement. 'The agenda of the unification of Europe in quite a new sense, the whole of Europe, was proclaimed'. But this '*grande geste*' swiftly slid into bickering of member representatives over institutional issues and the distribution of decision-making power. 'Media described how the leaders of Europe tried to see and dark the cards of one another like in a big European poker game' (Ibid, 435).

One corollary of these developments was the toning down of the official 'European identity' discourse. Although almost entirely cut off of its original meaning, the notion in its later articulated, culture- and values-connoted sense was there to stay. The hitherto 'Europe-building' efforts seeking to inculcate it in public consciousness succeeded in establishing it as a widely shared solid nodal point of many localized and specialized discourses on the EU, in political and scholarly debates, and beyond. The construction of culturalized 'European identity' was partly de-coupled from the official discourse. As the control of EU elite and institutions diminished, this empty signifier was set afloat. This *politicization of 'European identity'*, and the *decentralization and 'democratization' of its construction*, prompted multiplication of diffuse (national and other) attempts to articulate its meaning and content. These marked the so-called 'future of Europe' debate of the early 2000s.

According to Stråth, the 'loss of orientation, confidence and political legitimacy' was by 2000 'as massive as in the 1970s' (2006, 434-435). It was in this dislocatory situation that the process of the EU's 'constitutionalization' was initiated.[98] The deliberations of the constitutional Convention stood at the centre of the debate about the nature, future and possible finality of the integration project. Crucially, this EU 'soul-searching' was itself cast in terms of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence. Not only have we come to know of it as the 'future of Europe' debate. One of its key topics was *the question of Europe's identity.*

Both the culturalization of 'European identity' and progressed discursive sedimentation of enhanced 'EUasEurope' equivalence, where the meaning of Europe extends beyond the original 'Europe-the-project', marked the Concluding Remarks of the 'Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe'.[99] Comprised of politicians and scholars from both old and new member countries, it was summoned by the Commission President Romano Prodi at the time when the constitutional treaty's drafting finalized. Its mission was to consider in the context of eastern enlargement, and the rise in diversity it brings about, 'the relevance' of 'the intellectual and cultural dimension' to 'the cohesion of the expanded and redefined Union' (5). The 2004 enlargement was portrayed as challenge, bringing inside-EU

> people who are often much poorer and culturally vastly different from the majority of the citizens in the older member states. The vast majority of these new EU citizens, many of whom endured

[98] It began with the EU's 2000 installation of the (first) Convention which drafted the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*.
[99] Biedenkopf, Kurt, Bronisław Geremek, and Krzysztof Michalski (2004) *The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe* (Vienna/Brussels: Institute for Human Sciences/European Commission).

> decades of subjugation to Communist regimes, hold thoughts and values indelibly marked by experiences unfamiliar to long-time EU citizens. As a result, economic and cultural differences within the Union have, at a stroke, become much greater and more intense (5).

The key questions addressed by the Reflection Group read as follows:

> Faced with *growing diversity* and the rigours of establishing a *more demanding kind of unity*, what forces can hold the expanded, redefined European Union together? What moral concepts, which traditions, what goals are capable of bringing together the Union's diverse inhabitants in a democratic structure, and so underpin and anchor the European constitution? (5).

As the belief that political unity would be a 'consequence' of economic integration proved 'illusory', it held that 'Europe's political union demands *political cohesion*, a politically grounded community bound by the ties of solidarity' (6-7). Judging that 'the older forces that animated European unification [desire for peace, external threats, and economic growth] are no longer sufficiently powerful to provide genuine political cohesion', it suggested that '*new sources of energy*', unity and cohesion '*must be looked for and found* [sic!] *in Europe's common culture*' (7-8). For this to happen, it stressed, '*the meaning of European culture needs to be better understood and made politically effective*' (emphasis added):

> A mere list of common European values is not enough to serve as the basis of European unity … This is so because every attempt to codify "European values" is inevitably confronted by a *variety of diverging national, regional, ethnic, sectarian, and social understandings.* This *diversity of interpretation* cannot be eliminated by a constitutional treaty … (8, emphases added).

The following paragraph not only pinpointed that it is precisely 'common European culture' which stands beyond citizens' and peoples' capability of political unity, it also affirmed that 'despite … difficulties of definition, *there can be no doubt that there exists a common European cultural space*' (emphasis added):

> [A] *variety of traditions, ideals, and aspirations*, often intertwined and at the same time in tension with one another. These traditions, ideals, and aspirations *bring us together in a shared context and make us "Europeans"*: *citizens and peoples capable of a political unity and a constitution that we all recognise and experience as "European"* (8, emphases added).

'The common European cultural space' cannot be, however, 'firmly defined and delimited, deemed the Reflection Group. Its borders are principally and 'necessarily open': 'European culture, indeed Europe itself, is not a "fact". *It is a task and a process*'. Questions as to what is 'European culture' or Europe 'must be constantly posed anew' (8). In equation of 'European culture' with 'European identity', this point was elaborated as follows:

> So long as Europe is of the present, and not simply the past, they can never be conclusively answered. *Europe's identity is something that must be negotiated by its peoples and institutions*. Europeans can and must adapt themselves and their institutions, so that European values, traditions, and conceptions of life can live on and be effective. At the same time, the Union and its citizens must make their values endure as a basis of a common identity through ever-changing conditions (8, emphasis added).

Arguably in response to some observable tendencies accompanying its decentred discursive constructions, the Reflection Group stressed that 'the common *European cultural space cannot* be defined *in opposition to national cultures*' nor '*in opposition to a particular religion* (such as Islam)' (9). The document's penultimate paragraph declared: '*There is no essence of Europe, no fixed list of European values. There is no "finality" to the process of European integration*' (12, emphasis added).

Crucially, one contriving statement in particular articulated the *'EUasEurope' equivalence* in an overtly *culture-bound* sense. It was 'European culture' which, in the end, defined Europe and the EU's limits:

> If Europe is not a fact, but a task, neither can there be any fixed, once and for all defined European boundaries, be they internal or external. Europe's boundaries too must always be renegotiated. It is not geographical or national borders, then, that define the European cultural space – it is rather the latter which defines the European geographical space, a space that is in principle open (9).

Returning to its main argument on the future instrumentality of 'common European culture' in 'Europe-building', the Reflection Group stated:

> European culture, that open space which must be forever redefined, does not, of itself, establish European unity. That unity also requires a political dimension and the decisions that it engenders. But *the common European culture is what gives politics the opportunity to make Europe into a unified political entity* (9, emphasis added).

The Reflection Group articulated 'European culture' *qua* 'Europe's identity' as myth and empty signifier: something that aspires to but can never become a closed totality. It was a matter of endless re/construction, of discursive struggle with no final resolution. In discourse theoretical terms, it saw 'common European culture' as contingent and therefore political. Its meaning and content were after all a political question, dependent on constant negotiation between Europe (the nation-states and their peoples) and its institutions (the EU). As they were too principally open, the boundaries of 'EUasEurope' were equally contingent on politics. One can interpret this as a recognition of not only that the construction of 'European culture' no longer is or can be directed from above, but also that investing it with meaning is very much a matter of political decision. 'What constitutes the content of "European culture"', so one sentence went, was not a philosophical or 'merely a historical question' but one that 'calls for political decisions which attempt to demonstrate the significance of tradition [undefined] in the face of future tasks that Europe's Union must address' (9).

Despite evoking the next big step in 'the construction of Europe', and new hopes and expectations 'to conjure up a "community"' (Stråth 2006, 436), the EU constitutionalization

process ‘practically affirmed the shift of power and initiative to the Member States and their peoples. The Convention on the Future of the European Union met between 2002 and 2003 and drafted the constitutional treaty ‘through the collaboration of EU (mainly EP) and national (government and parliamentary) politicians’ from both member and candidate states (Turkey included) (Krzyżanowski 2010, 21). After several revisions, it was signed in the latter half of 2004, to be ratified by the Member States as the *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*. Quite far from symbolizing a foundational moment, the Treaty, even in its initial 2004 form, remained ‘in crucial respects … an intergovernmental agreement’, evaluated as it was ‘by the European peoples (in plural) nation per nation [through national parliaments and referenda], not a European people as the constitutive entity’. The hopes and expectations faded as early as the spring of 2005, when the ratification process was halted by the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands (Stråth 2006, 436).

Starting with the 2004 enlargement and culminating with the constitution’s sudden death, a period of disenchantment set across the EU, a ‘pause for reflection’. At issue were the direction of the unification project and the future of further integration and enlargement – ‘deepening’ vs. ‘widening’: both, one, or none? Krzyżanowski observed in these years ‘*a rather abrupt disappearance of questions about European identity from both media and political discourses, and from both national and supranational settings*’ (2010, 11, emphasis added). The concept as such ‘receded from its previous leading role in the EU-based debates’ (Ibid, 92). ‘[L]osing its democratic and political confidence, *the EU gradually stops projecting supranational ideas of European identity and asking questions about the future of Europe*’. This has been reflected at the national level where ‘such questions become less prevalent, with insecurities other than those of “who we are” now seemingly bothering Europeans’ (Ibid, 11, emphasis added). Overall, there was a general ‘apparent recess of earlier (often normative) ideas of European identity and unity’ (Ibid, 205).

The constitutional project was resuscitated, and the text partly modified and renamed to be since its signing in 2007 widely known as the Treaty of Lisbon. Despite vigorous EU effort to ‘communicate’ itself and the new treaty, not much has changed since the ‘pause for reflection’, as manifested by the June 2008 Irish referendum rejecting it. Although it is for future historians to assess its extensiveness and impact, the Treaty’s proponents managed to mount a strong-enough backing resolved to push it through: as once before, the second Irish referendum, late in 2009, was successful. How far the initial grand constitutional community spirit degraded, and how fragile a project ‘the construction of Europe’ became, was

epitomized at the end of the Treaty's ratification process when individual Member States, individual politicians in fact, manifested their capability to protract the next big step.[100] Krzyżanowski described the turn of the 2010s as 'a time when ideas of an inclusive, multicultural and ever-closer Union of Europe [were] increasingly criticised in, inter alia, the wake of populism and the rebirth of provincial nationalism across the continent' (2010, 11-12). We are set to see how will these, combined with the persisting fragmentation of EU public into myriad nationally (and otherwise) framed, restricted, and dominated communicative spaces, come to affect the status and prospects of the integration project.

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From among the few certain things, the 'EUasEurope' equation was not only sustained but further normalized. Underpinned by the eastern expansion, and the new role it has come to play in debates on further enlargement, its hegemony has been partly depoliticized. This interpretative complex has thus moved one step ahead towards 'objectivity', to becoming a new social imaginary. Before turning to the discussion of the equivalence *per se*, a brief recapitulation of its construction, transformation and gradual ascent among the ways of talking about and imagining the EU is in place.

The 'EUasEurope' equivalence originates in federalist articulation of the integration project. In its initial sense, 'Europe' denoted the project itself, its envisaged finality, and the nations undertaking 'the construction of Europe'. In the 1970s, it was as such incorporated in the discursive construction of 'European identity', originally developed in the context of foreign policy to signify the Member States' unity and 'togetherness'. It was this empty sign, a nodal point of the official 'Europe-building' discourse, which both enabled and channelled the transformation, recontextualization and extension of the equation's meaning. As part of the EC/EU cultural and identity action, 'European identity' was recontextualized and its primary meaning shifted. By the 1990s, it was remade into more encompassing and elusive concept, tightly coupled with other empty signifiers: 'common European culture' and 'common European values'. As a result of their discursive inter-linkage, also 'EUasEurope' underwent culturalization and expansion. Recontextualized so that the meaning of Europe has come to extend beyond the immediate reference to the integration project, this enhanced

[100] The last two countries to deposit their ratification instruments were Poland and the Czech Republic. Their Presidents, united in disapproval of the Treaty, made their assent to its ratification contingent upon the outcome of the second Irish referendum rather than the decision of national parliaments. Admittedly, at least in the second case the President made the Treaty hostage to his personal convictions regarding European integration, with the rest of the EU awaiting his signature.

equivalence saw a rather quick discursive sedimentation. After all, it was meaningful for the high-profile EU Reflection Group to pose in the 2004 enlargement context questions as to the content of 'European culture' *qua* 'Europe's identity'.

Despite the relative non-success of the EC/EU's top-down 'Europe-building', the recontextualized and culture-infused 'European identity' and 'EUasEurope' succeeded in pervading debates and discourses on the EU and European integration at multiple levels. With a shift in power and initiative from the supranational to the national around the turn of century, the top-down 'Europe-building', endeavouring to engrain in European peoples a consciousness of common identity and cultural heritage, has been since the early 2000s on retreat. Still, both 'European identity' and 'EUasEurope' in their culture- and Europe-bound sense were there to stay. With their discursive construction markedly decentralized and 'democratized', the quest to fill 'European culture' and 'European identity' with meaning was to take the form of endless negotiation among the EU institutions, Member States and peoples, as the Reflection Group had it. Though not necessarily in democratic spirit, the diffuse efforts to invest them with meaning and content became the turf of a new and levelled 'Europe-building-in-diversity'.

How should one, then, make sense of the observed general and multilevel waning of preoccupation with 'European identity' since about the mid-2000s? It is this author's contention that the discursive struggle over the meaning and content of 'European identity/culture', mounting with the question's re-politicization, has been *gradually displaced from inside-EU and externalized beyond its borders*. The Reflection Group's concluding remarks indicated this transfer as follows:

> Europe and its cultural identity … depend on a constant confrontation with the new, the different, the foreign. Hence the question of European identity will be answered in part by its immigration laws, and in part by the negotiated accession terms of new members (op. cit., 8).

Hence, it appears that *immigration and EU enlargement have become the new venues for competing decentralized articulations of 'European identity' and* the now tightly linked *'European culture'.* Importantly, both empty signifiers have been since their coupling in the 1980s inward-oriented. In the context of their relocation 'outside-EU', they *have taken on an outward-oriented form through the notions of 'Europeanness' and 'being European'*. Before examining in Chapter 3 some implications of the externalization of the discursive struggle over the meaning of 'European identity/culture', and the resulting 'grafting' in the

process of culture-infused 'EUasEurope' equivalence onto the procedure of EU enlargement, the very equation should be pondered from the discourse theoretical perspective.

2.4 Culturalized 'EUasEurope'

'EUasEurope' equivalence has been culturalized as 'European identity' has been coupled or even construed as coterminous with 'European culture'. Its operation in structuring discourses is intricate. Re-contextualized, both 'EUasEurope' and 'European identity' were largely cut off from their initial meanings and primary reference to the integration project. In their culture-infused sense, they have come to revolve chiefly around the elusive concept of Europe. On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, the EU has itself become a prominent part of and contender in investing the notion of Europe with meaning. Should its claim on Europe consolidate, the equation can come full circle: the EU would underpin its legitimacy by claiming to represent Europe which it would be able to define in terms coextensive with itself. Still, this is merely an unlikely future possibility. An EU-wide construction of Europe is precluded by the fragmentation of the Union's discursive space. Moreover, many of these diffuse and often enclosed (national and other) discursive sites have recently seen a flare of articulations inimical to the integration project as such.

Europe-as-identity is 'so diluted that it means anything and nothing' (Stråth 2000a, 13). It is 'inscribed in a long history of philosophical and political reflection on the concept of Europe' (Stråth 2002, 387). '[T]here is a rich reservoir of ideas linked to Europe', and all its 'past identifications', with their respective subtexts, 'still have a contemporary relevance'. But 'there is no stable core, no fixed identity, no final answer' (Wilson 1995, 11; see also Seton-Watson 1985). Europe has been re/invented ever since its inception in antiquity, with manifold – geographical (e.g. Leontidou 2004), political, normative, religious, cultural, civilizational and still other – connotations (see e.g. Goddard *et al*. 1994).[101] Its construction can be thought of as 'an amalgam of discontinuities, ruptures and transformations' (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 529). Far from static, its meaning 'has taken various shapes in history' so as to 'fit certain projects of "unity" which were almost always disguised bids for hegemony' (Ibid, 99). Synchronically and diachronically, Europe has been 'charged with various meanings'

[101] Many conceived of it as 'distinctive cultural entity united by shared values, culture and identity', often presenting the 'heritage of classical Graeco-Roman civilization, Christianity, and the ideas of the Enlightenment, Science, Reason, Progress and Democracy as the core elements of this claimed European legacy' (Stråth 2002, 388).

and, as projects of unity, its conceptions have invoked myriad differentiations and alter-castings (Stråth 2000b, 420).[102]

As it forged the initial 'EUasEurope' equation and incrementally materialized, the federalist integration project became another contender in investing Europe with meaning. As integration deepened and enlarged, the EC has come to represent itself not only as 'Europe-the-project' but increasingly as Europe-a-community. It was via the said equation that the EC/EU's bid to define Europe as such was cast. Its success brought EU officials and politicians in the 1990s to pondering the question of how to 'do Europe' (Wodak 2007). Still, although Europe's association with the EU seems to 'take up the scene … to a point where they are used synonymously' (Ifversen 2002, 4), it does not engender erasure of previous articulations. Europe has 'kept its general-philosophical, geographical and other multiple connotations which were never tied to any concepts branding the institutions of European integration' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 91).

Crucially, apart from being the guiding notion of various projects of unity, Europe has also been constructed as 'Other', not just from outside but also 'from within … what [outside] others consider to be Europe'.[103] It has thus served 'both as a pluridirectional demarcation between Us and the Others, and as an incorporated element in different projects of community construction' (Stråth 2000a, 15-16). With respect to the latter, Europe has been both an 'active element' of national and other identifications – 'the nation [or other collective] as part of Europe' – '*and*, at the same time, something different and separate' from them (Stråth 2002, 390-391). There has been, in fact, an intimate entanglement between the construction of Europe and the nations purportedly encompassed by it:

> Meanings of the nations are inscribed in the meanings of Europe and meanings of Europe are inscribed in meanings of the nations. The intertwining means that various and contentious patterns of mutual support and reinforcement in some cases, and opposition and demarcation in others, emerge. This figure becomes even more complex when the regional level is considered (Malmborg and Stråth 2002b, 9).

Fundamentally, 'although one specific discourse on Europe might be predominating in a country or across countries at a certain point of time … national views on Europe vary not only between nations but also within nations'. There have been, in fact, 'not one but several contested views of Europe in the various nations and at various times' (Stråth 2002, 391).

[102] For detailed overviews of historical constructs of the concept/idea of Europe see among others Delanty 1995; Pagden 2002; Aydın Düzgit 2008, pp. 83-118; Stråth 2000a, b, 2002; or Malmborg and Stråth 2002b.
[103] Within the latter, 'internal demarcation', Europe has been for instance portrayed in the UK or parts of Scandinavia as 'the Continent' (Stråth 2000a, 15).

Hence, 'full of political content in each national setting', the meaning of Europe 'varies and is contested within – as much as among nations (Malmborg and Stråth 2002b, 4). Thus, '[w]hether "Europe" is defined as big or small, on cultural, geographical or political criteria, depends much on national [and still other] vantage-point' (Ibid, 11).[104]

Europe is a myth and floating empty signifier whose articulations aspire to but can never make it into a singular, bounded totality. It is a key concept in multifarious discursive struggles taking place in supranational, national and otherwise fragmented discursive sites. With lesser or greater hegemonic appeal, each articulation seeks to fix its meaning as a nodal point, to transform it from an element into a moment of this or that discourse. The key implication of the *culturalization of 'EUasEurope'* is that Europe's discursive construction has become part of constructing the EU itself. In a complex fashion, *the equation has* thus *reversed its operation*. This manner of constructing the EU has recently been most prominent with respect to the outside: in the context of its enlargement and 'non-European' immigration. Before restricting this study's focus solely to enlargement, there are several considerations left to address.

2.4.1 'EUasEurope': From a Bid for Post-National Hegemony to the Passionate National

The remarkable penetration of mainstream debates and discourses at multiple levels by 'EUasEurope', 'European identity', 'European culture' and the 'multiple identities' purview, attests to their efficacious dissemination. Although scarcely discussed in this regard, particularly effective in spreading these moments of the official 'Europe-building' discourse have been EC/EU activities in the realm of education. That academic students of the EU/European integration themselves take part in its construction as an object of knowledge is hardly a controversial assertion from a critical perspective. Yet, far beyond this, they have also been, if often unconsciously, key agents and accomplices of raising 'European consciousness' in a particular fashion. Investigating and imagining the EU/'Europe', they have often replicated, dispersed and naturalized the official discourse and its components.

[104] From among studies of the variety and peculiarities of national and local constructions of Europe, considering their potential conflicts and the influence of the notion's appropriation by the EU, see the contributions to Stråth 2000, Malmborg and Stråth 2002a, Stråth and Triandafyllidou 2003, Mole 2007a, or the *Identities and Modernities in Europe* project reports; but also Wæver 2005; Weiss 2002; Abélès 2000; Larsen 1997; or Marcussen *et al.* 2001.

There has been, in fact, a very close inter-linkage between the 'doers' and students of 'Europe'/European integration. The contribution of the EU and its personnel to the 'invention' of EIS is hard to overestimate. The 'Jean Monnet Project', launched in 1990, was instrumental in its establishment and institutionalization, while the Commission staff and employees 'have also played a prominent role in shaping the content and agenda of this emergent field of study' (Shore 2000, 28). Above all, EU officials and supporters have been 'the key contributors':

> An extraordinarily high number of EU officials are themselves prominent writers, academics, pundits and experts within this newly institutionalised domain of knowledge. Equally striking is the large number of publications that have been produced by writers who are connected to the EU institutions either as recipients of EU funding or as current or former employees (Ibid).

As Shore aptly pointed out, given that so much of EIS is written by people 'connected to' EU institutions, networks, relays and money, there are reasons to believe that it is not 'as critical of the EU as might otherwise be the case' (2000, 28-29). Gerard Delanty raised this point already in mid-1990s, judging that much of EIS 'tend to be of uncritical and even laudatory nature' (1995, x). Most importantly, EIS remains largely unreflective of its inter-implication with the EU/integration project. In relation to the construction of 'European identity', Stavrakakis refused to distinguish the academia from (EU) politics, arguing that

> [t]reating academic discourse as a privileged – more or less reliable – discursive source would obscure the – often unconscious – *"complicity" between mainstream (European) politics and academia, two discursive domains* which, in a typically modernist fashion, are *interimplicated in the formulation and reproduction of a particular standpoint vis-à-vis European identity* (2005, 81, emphases added).

At present, it appears that spearheading the dissemination of the components of the official 'Europe-building' discourse is the new mainstream of academic enquiry into European integration: EIS constructivism. If Risse's earlier discussed account of constructivist work on 'European identity' (section 1.1.2) was accurate, this strand of research has come to embrace them all: 'EUasEurope', the concepts of 'European identity' and 'European culture', as well as the 'multiple identities' perspective. Explicitly developing his account from that perspective, Risse pointed out that research has shown that '"country first, but Europe, too" is the dominant outlook in most EU member states'. Hence, that

> the real cleavage in mass public opinion is between those who exclusively identify with their nation (exclusive nationalists), on the one hand, and those perceiving themselves as attached to both their nation and Europe (inclusive nationalists), on the other hand (2009a, 152).

It was on this basis that he then pointed to the often reported intersubjective 'presence' or 'emergence' of two dominant constructs of 'European identity': the competing visions of 'modern Europe' vs. 'fortress Europe', one inclusive, one exclusive.

This study argues that the discernment of two such antagonistic constructs is bound with a particular analytical prism and should as such be qualified. *The supposed coherence of the 'fortress Europe' vision, as well as its purported peer conflict with the EU elite vision, are attributable to and meaningful only within the framework of culturalized 'EUasEurope' equivalence*. Stavrakakis's Lacan-inspired enquiry into the pathologies and apparent failure of 'Europe-building' presents a pertinent starting point for this argument, developed in the ensuing section. He attributed the failure of top-down efforts to construe and 'communicate' 'European identity' as an appealing object of identification with and across the EU to their chiefly 'contrived and shallow' nature. '[L]imited to big words and a dry institutional jargon' they have articulated a 'dry, institutional, symbolic conception of identity' (2005, 81-82):

> It is a common conclusion that what is really missing here is, so to speak, the substance behind the projected image of Europe. From our point of view, this lack of substance can clearly be associated with the libidinal/affective dimension of identification. When this is lacking, identifications cannot acquire any salience or deep hegemonic appeal (Ibid, 82-83).

Judging as unlikely that such a 'European identity, with the EU as its political foundation, will generate the sorts of passions and loyalty that people feel towards their nations' (Ibid, 83), he pointed to the latter result of the disregard of the dual nature of identification – at once 'discursive and affective, symbolic and libidinal'. It is exactly the exclusion of affect, enjoyment and passion, 'dimensions crucial in the reproduction of social and political identification', to which the observed undesired 'vicissitudes of a construction of European identity' are due (Ibid, 89). The academia replicated this repression, and so the 'dry and symbolic' character of representing 'European identity':

> Faced with the normative/formal/institutional and mostly top-down attempts of European institutions to foster a strong popular identification with Europe and their poor results, most academics were led to recognize the existence of the two crucial dimensions of identity formation, the procedural and the substantive, the *drier* and the *stickier* (Ibid, 83).

Some strictly differentiated between 'a positive (*benign*) and a negative, exclusionary (*malignant*) form of identification, implying that it is possible to cultivate the former [symbolic] and abolish the latter ["darker" and affective]'. This move characterized the so-called 'post-national agenda' (Ibid, 83):

> [A]n impossible strategy which, due to the inherent paradox of identification, is unable to produce any sustainable results. It is impossible to fight or displace processes of social or political cathexis

> and exclusion with a theoretical or analytical exclusion or *repression* (of the 'obscene' side of identification) (Ibid, 84).

Others have alternatively adopted a 'multiple identities' or 'dual identity' framework. These are 'more alert to the irreducibility of the two dimensions involved in identification', but, failing 'to understand their close interconnection' try to keep them 'present but separate'. '"Multiple identity" or "multi-identification" is typically predicated upon a model of peaceful coexistence between different but equally valid subject-positions'. Yet, from the perspective of the psychoanalytic theory, multiple identities cannot be of equal import:

> [T]here is always a *fantasy scenario* which organizes and supports the apparent multiplicity of identity and determines the "rules of engagement" between its different levels, a *mapping* which prioritizes particular modes of enjoyment, particular libidinally invested components and nodal points (*points de capiton*) and not others, which remain structurally and emotionally peripheral (Ibid, 84).

Short of 'the intervention of these nodal points, subjective structure can easily disintegrate into a psychotic state'. This also arguably explained 'why, when a conflict of loyalties arises, certain components or levels are always assigned higher priority than others, the process that has sustained most nationalist identifications so far'. When different identities claimed peoples' loyalties, the national almost always prevailed (Ibid, 85).

Finally, the 'dual identity' model invoked by EU citizenship involves two 'national' loyalties. Building on and quoting Wæver (1995, 208), Stavrakakis explained it as follows:

> [E]very European citizen would be *split* between a political state identity (along the lines of the so-called "French" model) and a cultural identity (along the lines of the so-called "German" model) … [W]hat is introduced is "a dualism, with Europe as the civic nation-state and our old nation-states as organic people-nations" (2005, 85).

Crucially, this 'split is also one of the premises of certain versions of the "postnational" agenda' which deconstruct 'the link implied by nationalism between cultural integration (the ethnic, substantive aspect of nationalism) and political integration (the formal, procedural aspect) (Ibid). It was very difficult to imagine, he maintained,

> how it would be possible to de-link politics from identity, discourse from enjoyment. Furthermore, even if it would be possible to separate them, what would be the "rules of engagement" between them? A conflictual scenario, that of a spill-over of affect/aggressivity from the national to the European sphere, seems probable – even more probable than a peaceful one … Furthermore, if such a contamination would be unavoidable, then another question becomes crucial: which of the two dimensions would dominate the other? *Given the deficiencies of a dry conception of "European identity" or "Europe",* once more prospects look a bit gloomy. Engaged in such an unequal "battle" *it is difficult to see European identity ever acquiring a salient role in the lives of European citizens* (Ibid, 85-86, emphases added).

Strong identification with the EU 'beyond traditional statist and nationalist models

> … cannot materialize and will never succeed without dealing with the affective dimension of identification in a non-repressive way. *If theory and political analysis continue to repress or disavow this dimension "Europe"* will, of course, develop in various directions but *will never become a really salient identification*, winning the hearts rather than merely the pockets of European citizens (Ibid, 86, emphases added).

As intimated, the second part of Stavrakakis's argument concerned the displacement rather than disappearance of cathectic energy due to its repression by constructing the EU/'Europe' in a dry, symbolic and non-affectionate fashion:

> [R]epressing the dimension of enjoyment does not only affect the future prospects of European unification, it also produces a series of indirect results of major political importance … [T]he repression of signifiers cathected with libidinal and affective value never leads to the disappearance, but merely to the displacement, of psychical energy and to *the "return of the repressed" through the emergence of symptomatic formations* (Ibid, emphasis added).

Positing the same logic deployed in explaining the rise of right-wing populism across Europe, Stavrakakis postulated that it indeed seems

> that the neglect of the affective side of identification leads to a displacement of *cathectic energy* which is *now invested in anti-European political and ideological discourses*. In fact, a whole separate level of charged debate is erected, in which *dry European identity, its institutional arrangements and big words are seen as agents of castration, not only indifferent but also hostile to the structures of enjoyment operating in the various nationalisms and engaged in a process of standardization which has to be resisted* (Ibid, 87, emphases added).

Such 'discourses of resistance' diverge from 'the standard euro-jargon' both in content and style. They appeal precisely because 'they are aggressive, visceral, and funny, ranging from the obscene to the violent, often via the grotesque' (Ibid). Focusing on British popular press 'Euroscepticism' as discourse of resistance to 'Europe', he noted:

> Its most salient feature seems to be the depiction of *the European Union* as an alien regulating agency which somehow *intervenes in the particular way we have organized our lives*, in the particular way we have *structured our enjoyment*. In other words, *the EU is primarily represented as an agent of castration* … [S]uch grotesque stories seem to provide the obscene support to a resistance against a Europe that has failed to inspire and function as an object of identification, a Europe that has failed to engage with the visceral, obscene dimension of identification, which is increasingly seen as devoid of substance and appeal (Ibid, 87-88, emphases added).

In conclusion, by 'focusing exclusively on institutional arrangements and symbolic ideals', and neglecting thus 'the crucial role of affect and passion … political and academic debates on 'European identity' and Europeanization often reproduce the problematic strategies of repression and disavowal'. In doing so, they in turn 'force the expression of passionate attachment through a variety of anti-European discourses'. Hence, these ways of 'Europe-building' are not just 'ineffective' but 'actually harm the prospects of constructing a strong European identification (Ibid, 80-81).

2.4.2 'EUasEurope': Platform for Reunion of the Symbolic and the Affective

It would be misleading to suppose, under Stavrakakis's powerful argument, that the designing of the EC/EU 'Europe-building' was devoid of awareness of the substantive shallowness, if not emptiness, of the 'European message', and of its lacking affective appeal. This has in fact been a long-term consideration and concern. The Community symbols were devised as part of a general strategy seeking to replicate nation-state-building under the impression that similar affective attachment would present itself. In any case, as many analysts pointed out and the 2004 Reflection Group report implicitly admitted, this top-down strategy was not just ineffective but eventually counter-productive, as it invited competition with national identities.

In a piece attached to the Reflection Group report, Bronisław Geremek proposed an incisive analysis of the EU 'state of affairs' and specified a new direction of 'Europe-building' to evoke popular appeal of and affective attachment to the unification project:

> Europe finds itself at a paradoxical turning point. While legal harmonization and constitution-making attest to deepening integration, Europe's institutions have failed to generate what every political community needs in order to survive and thrive: a feeling of belonging. As long as this is true, integration cannot succeed. Quite simply, *if the European Union is to overcome national parochialism and embrace a shared and binding purpose, it must abandon the rhetoric of accountants and speak in a language that comprehends what is good and bad, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong*. This won't happen automatically or overnight. *Communal values and bonds evolve from a long accumulation of experience, with mythological and historical understandings that give this experience the appearance of having evolved organically*. There is nothing comparable in EU integration, which seems far more like a deliberate choice by an imperial few. So it is difficult to see how this path could lead to the collective and individual identity that European unification requires (2004, 25, emphases added).

Considered in parallel with the Reflection Group conclusions, suggesting a shift in locus, decentralization and 'democratization' of 'European identity' construction (to be constantly re/negotiated 'bottom-up'), the new direction of forging 'Europeans' is '*Europe-building-from-below*'. This study contends that from the perspective of discursive structuration, intentionally or not, *the cognitive scheme of culturalized and Europe-channelled 'EUasEurope' equivalence* substituted the elite discourse and *assumed* a *pivotal organizing role in this initiated process*. Fusing the EU (the political and symbolic) with Europe (the cultural and affective), it appears to be a (purpose-wise) perfect replacement of the partly discredited dry elite-driven strategy. *Europe supplements the EU with the hitherto missing affective cultural dimensions of enjoyment*. Culturalized 'EUasEurope' is thus in theory a *potentially 'winning' combination with clear hegemonic appeal*. It *joins together both*

dimensions crucial for identification: *the symbolic (subject position) and the affective/cultural (enjoyment).*

Yet, this new 'Europe-building' outlook, as fragile as decentralized, has faced the very same predicament as the earlier top-down strategy: the primacy of national (and other) identifications. Even when revolving around the EU, as Anthony Smith had it, 'the idea of Europe' is incapable of truly competing with national identities' (1992, 74). The latter still

> possess distinct advantages over the idea of a unified European identity. They are vivid, accessible, well established, long popularised and still widely believed in broad outline at least. In each of these respects, "Europe" is deficient both as an idea and as a process. Above all, it lacks a pre-modern past – a pre-history which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth (Ibid, 62).

Moreover, far from collectively 'imagined community' with shared ways of enjoyment, Europe's discursive construction has always been highly fragmented and perspectival, and so have been the ideas of Europe-as-identity/-community. Europe has been, above all, primarily a national construct, at once significant 'Self' and 'Other', and as such always nationally appropriated and moulded so as to accord with national narratives, imaginations, and interpretative schemes. Whereas national conceptions of Europe were at times at least partly directed or structured by certain hegemonic discourses inducing their greater convergence (e.g. 'Christian', 'Enlightened', or 'Orientalist Europe'), these have never been, so to say, 'pan-European' but only more or less pervasive projections of more localized constructs onto the continent.[105]

Europe, as the cultural/affective component of 'EUasEurope', is at best a very weak and highly fragmented 'imagined community'. One may hope but should not *a priori* suppose that decentralized and 'democratized' 'Europe-building-from-below' will underpin rather than undermine the integration project's guiding premises and popular standing. The opposite seems to have been the case so far. A *fair share of recent diffuse and varied attempts to articulate Europe-as-community have projected the EU as irrelevant, undesirable or even harmful*. These are symptomatic of the new wave of mostly right-wing populism across Europe, resulting from the dissipation of traditional political frontiers and antagonisms attending the spread of neoliberal 'Third Way politics' (Giddens 1994, 2000). In most cases,

[105] The potential hegemonic appeal of culturalized 'EUasEurope' is also thwarted by the equation's reciprocal operation. In the unlikely case that the EU comes to hold the keys to defining Europe, the equation's affective charge would dissipate. The question of Europe as such would be re-centralized and 'Europe-building' revert to the dry, non-affective EU-official Self-performing discourse of presently globally-desirable values and rights.

national political landscapes have seen the erosion or downgrading in importance of the ordinarily conflict-prone socio-economic cleavage, usually linked to the division liberal vs. conservative, the political 'left' and 'right'. One could observe

> … a peculiar reversal in the traditional discourses of the mainstream left and right political groups with the once social-democratic parties now voicing neoliberal and mainly market-oriented concerns, and the conservative parties populistically arguing for almost socialist conceptions (Krzyżanowski 2010, 20).

Major political parties 'now debate very similar sets of issues (most notably the economy, immigration, relationships with EU-rope, etc.) and only provide different conceptions of how those issues should be governed or regulated'. They tend to furnish merely 'different forms of more-or-less localised responses' to transnational political and global economic trends, such as transnational labour migration (Ibid).

The rise of right-wing populism and new racist and xenophobic expressions are, according to discourse theorists, the result of the attendant repression of 'the affective dimension of political subjectivity and identification' (Stavrakakis 2005, 79):

> *Unclear dividing lines block the creation of democratic political identities* and fuel the disenchantment with traditional political parties. Thus *they prepare the ground for various forms of populist and antiliberal movements that target nationalist, religious and ethnic divides*. When the agonistic dynamism of the pluralist system is unable to unfold because of a shortage of democratic identities with which one can identify, *there is a risk that this will multiply confrontations over essentialist identities and non-negotiable moral values* (Mouffe 1994, 109, emphases added).

Mouffe's key point was that it is paradoxically the upkeep of traditional democratic political frontiers and conflicts which forecloses 'the possibility that other identities may be inscribed with paramount political meaning and thus may be made the defining foci of essentialist identity politics' (as interpreted by Neumann 1999, 211). The dissipation of traditional political antagonisms, clearly discernible in the 2000s, suppressed neither the longing for enjoyment in identification nor its 'obscene' excesses. These were only redirected from the mainstream to new politics of populism and anxiety, of passion and affect directed against 'Others' (most notably immigrants from both EU/Europe and outside). The latter have been represented as the 'thieves' of enjoyment of communities usually construed on essential grounds.

It is in this context that the reported constructivist findings of two dominant competing 'European identity' constructs – 'post-national Europe' vs. 'fortress Europe' – should be revisited. It was already suggested that the semblance of their antagonism is meaningful only within the interpretative framework of the culture-enhanced 'EUasEurope'

equivalence. This perspective enables a harsh analytical reduction of multifaceted social phenomena under a single label of 'fortress Europe', but also a favourable representation of the EU-elite post-national vision as its peer contender. As the constructs radiate from different locales and sources, the only obvious conflict they seem engaged in pertains to the envisioned role of the nation-state and the concomitant prospects of the federalist integration project.[106]

While 'post-national Europe' is the elite construct of EU-official Self-performing discourse, the originators of 'fortress Europe' are much harder to identify, arguably because they are chiefly of national provenance. 'Fortress Europe' appears to be nothing else but an assemblage of divergent dissenting national (and other) visions, distilled in constructivist accounts into an over-arching label or concept that provides them with appearance of certain singularity. Hence, if one can conceive of 'post-national Europe' as something singular (as it has, at least, radiated from one discourse-forming centre), 'fortress Europe', with its connotation of culture and passion, is inherently fragmented. It is a biased, artificial analytical assemblage and distillate of disparate and often dissonant national (and otherwise more particular) discourses. It crudely reduces opposition to the EU elite vision and project to the manifestations of the new nationalist, culturalist, and on some versions civilizationalist antagonistic identity politics thriving on popular fears and anxiety. These have usually projected the EU as a mounting power-hungry menace to national sovereignty, or marginalized it into a rather efficient barrier vis-à-vis the outside-EU-foreign.

It is possible, on these grounds, to address Wæver's challenge to 'sort out' contradictory findings of the EU's sometimes 'digital' and at other times 'analogue' mode of differentiation. These are due to the prevalent analytical tendency to merge the EU's discursive construction with the often nationally (and otherwise) premised and biased diffuse constructions of Europe as cultural space. Hence, the answer is, once again, a culturalized 'EUasEurope' equivalence. Once deconstructed, there emerges an image of the EU with shallow, if any, identification appeal: founded on and advancing a set of purportedly universal values and rights. Conjoined to it is Europe as, on some constructs enclosed and on others essentially open, cultural space where national (and other but pan-European) identifications hold sway, a domain with persevering libidinal and affective appeal. Conceptions of this space as such are geared towards antagonism and negative alter-casting,

[106] This dichotomy is not just misleading. It is a reduction heavily biased in favour of the EU elite construct. After all, many may oppose the integration project without being exclusive nationalists, racists or xenophobes.

the inescapable company of lost enjoyment driving the passions of identification (see section 1.3.5). Put otherwise, on one side of the equation stands the EU founded upon universal, and thus at least formally acquirable, values and properties, its identity so construed as principally inclusive. On the other stands Europe-as-culture, frequent exclusivist constructs of which have been based on certain (putatively 'inherent') aspects of culture, religion or philosophical outlook as the grounds for negative differentiation from 'threatening' outsiders.

2.5 Culturalized 'EUasEurope' and Prospects of the Integration Project

As of early 2010s, culturalized 'EUasEurope' equivalence is the hegemonic way of imagining and knowing of the EU, structuring related debates and discourses. Compared to the equation's original sense, where 'Europe' signified the federalist integration project and its bid to reorganize relations in Western Europe, the meaning-wise expanded *culture-infused 'EUasEurope'* in a way *reversed its operation*. The EU's discursive construction has become channelled by that of Europe as cultural space. Articulations of Europe-as-community are thusly enabled to lay claim on defining the meaning (and purpose) of the EU. With respect to the goal of transforming member citizens into 'Europeans', by instilling in them 'European consciousness' and a sense of 'European identity', the top-down elite 'Europe-building' was gradually overshadowed in the 2000s by 'Europe-building-from-below'. Lacking common language makes for the absence of an EU-wide communicative space, and so the decentralized and 'democratized' discursive construction of culture-enhanced 'EUasEurope' is not just diffuse but also unpredictable. Rather than a collectively 'imagined community', Europe has always been, due to its formative role as both Self and Other in the construction of national and other more particular collectivities, an extraordinarily fragmented, and often incoherent and dissonant, 'pan-European' construct.

Since the mid-2000s, one could observe notable disappearance of the EU-internal quest for 'European identity'. Discursive construction of the now central Europe-as-community was displaced and externalized. Recontextualized to revolve particularly around the questions of immigration and EU enlargement, 'European identity' took on the form of 'Europeanness'. Others of the culture-bound 'EUasEurope' have so come to be cast as 'non-European'. Crucially, as Europe is a variously connoted and highly fragmented construct, the diffuse, nationally and otherwise premised and biased, constructs of 'EUasEurope' have come to depend on particularistic bases of differentiation, some attributing certain culture-

European traits an essential quality. With a wave of mostly right-wing populism across Europe, the EU's culturalization has been most saliently played out from a 'fortress' perspective, against the internally and externally 'undesired'. In the enlargement context especially against Turkey.

It is a matter for speculation how these developments can affect the standing and prospects of the integration project. Its future has certainly become more fragile. If the purpose of top-down 'Europe-building' was to engender consent and legitimize it, it is at best doubtful that this will be served by decentralized 'Europe-building-from-below'. The latter may as well foment opposition to European integration. So far, it appears that rather than a key symbolic representation of the bright future envisaged by the project's 'architects' and ardent supporters, 'EUasEurope' has become an easy tool for build-up of populism and right-wing extremism, at disposal of principally anyone interested in its exploitation. Aside from the potentially dire implications this may have for the integration project's future, especially its territorial expansion, its very guiding premise – overcoming old parochialisms, division and exclusion in favour of unity and inclusion – is called in question. 'Europe-building-from-below', centred on culturalized 'EUasEurope', invited passion and affect but with them also displays of populism and politics of fear and anxiety. This is as such a new, unforeseen stage of the integration process. The federalist project has been shattered and the Member States reasserted their primacy. One can interpret the initiation of 'Europe-building-from-below' as vanished drive for further expansion. It suggests that enlargement is to halt or become a slow, incremental, optional process.

Yet the views of the former Czech President Klaus, the strongly pro-enlargement national foreign political priorities, and both elite and public opinion in the new post-communist EU Member States speak another language. They seem to indicate other ways of imagining and knowing of the EU/European integration. Krzyżanowski reported an altogether different conception of 'European identity' in the CEECs, one marginalizing the EU into an instrument at the service of states and nations of Europe. This alternative, 'bottom up' understanding emerged with the fall of the Iron Curtain:

> When many of the once-communist CEE countries quickly started to assert their aspirations to become EC (and later EU) members, that process caused many of the *CEE leaders* to *accommodate the concept of European identity within their discourses* and to *argue that the identity of Europe was not so much the problem of a certain international organisation as one of rebuilding the unity of Europe previously broken by the post-war divisions* (Krzyżanowski 2010, 92, emphases added).

Far from representing the bond of 'Europeans' with the EU, this alternative conception might have at least contributed, on his view, to the recession of the 'European identity' question from the EU-official and other mainstream debates:

> [W]hile the two ways of understanding European identity came to be frequently merged (primarily at the EU-level, while also being tied to other, multiple ways of perceiving European identity created at the time …), one may assume that *the thus created, polysemous conceptual conglomerate acting under one heading of European identity was too heavily burdened to remain politically and otherwise active* (Ibid, emphasis added).

This study's empirical analysis (Chapters 4-7) undertakes to investigate national understandings of the EU/European integration in four select post-communist Member States. On the basis of the heretofore analysis, it is expected that should these be at odds with the hegemonic ways of constructing the EU, this would be in some way reflected on the standing and understandings of the 'EUasEurope' equation and the notion of 'European identity'. The ensuing Chapter 3 lays out the broad context of this enquiry. It ponders EU enlargement as both a procedure of the EU's transformation, through an inclusion of 'Other', and one of two key sites where the discursive construction of 'European identity' ('Europeanness') has been externalized. It sketches the possible implications of 'grafting' culturalized 'EUasEurope' equivalence onto the process in order then to embark upon the investigation of its relevance and meaning in new post-communist EU countries with a view to their stand on further enlargement.

Chapter 3

EU Enlargement, and the Framework, Scope and Method of Empirical Analysis

This study is concerned with the symbolic representation of the EU in its enlargement, that is, vis-à-vis current and potential membership candidates. At issue are the now hegemonic way of constructing the EU through the prism of culturalized 'EUasEurope' equivalence, and the role it has come to play in the Union's expansion. The equation's 'grafting' onto the process enabled the nationally and otherwise fragmented discursive struggle over the meaning of Europe to bear upon and channel the EU's representation in its course. Subchapter 3.1 explores what possible implications this may have for further expansion. It opens by conceptualizing EU enlargement as process of its transformation through an inclusion of 'Other', and points to the crucial importance of how the Union is constructed. Section 3.1.1 posits a crude three-model categorization of its myriad representations and relates them to certain schemes of interpreting and justifying expansion. Section 3.1.2 conceives of enlargement in discourse theoretical terms so as to lay the ground for section 3.1.3 to ponder potential consequences of the procedure's culturalization through reversely-operating 'EUasEurope' equivalence. Elaborating on the conception of enlargement as incorporation of 'Other', section 3.1.4 argues that inclusion of members with alternative understandings of the EU/European integration may work to challenge the established ways of representing it. Hypothesizing that these are likely to be found in the post-communist Member States, it proposes and substantiates an inquiry mapping national discursive spaces therein, with particular focus on the presence and 'standing' of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence. Subchapter 3.2 restricts the scope of this empirical analysis to four select country-cases (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary), and specifies its general interpretative framework. Subchapter 3.3 then details this investigation's organization, and the specific foci and methodology of textual analysis.

3.1 EU Enlargement and Its Culturalization

Non-conventional constructivist and post-structuralist works have most commonly theorized enlargement as a specific foreign political matter, concerning relations between 'Self' and

'Other', the EU and the state/s in question.[107] This study resist this conception for two reasons. To begin with, it is unclear how 'Self' should be understood in this specific context. It may at once denote EU institutions, officials, and politicians; an aggregation of EU Member States and of their relations with particular candidates; or alternatively merge them all together. Secondly, two understandings of enlargement are often conflated in the literature. In the first, foreign political sense, at issue is a country's membership eligibility, i.e. the prospect that it may once enter the EU. In the latter sense, enlargement is a procedure leading to accession, starting with the recognition of eligibility or at latest when the EU grants candidate status to a state.

The determination of eligibility can indeed be seen in foreign political terms. It is what Ashley called 'boundary-producing political performance' (1987, 51), revolving, among other political considerations, around the stipulation that '[a]ny European State may *apply* to become a member' (Rome Treaty Article 237, emphasis added). The application and above all the 'desirability' of an interested state are evaluated by EU institutions and Member States. Neither of the successive treaties ever clarified the term 'European state'. The Lisbon Treaty (Article 49) only tied it with a set of values on which the EU is founded (Article 2). The eligibility question's ambiguity renders any such evaluation a matter of convenience, a political decision without much disguise. 'Where decisions are taken to exclude states from membership (even if not permanently) their relations with the Union remain by definition at the level of foreign policy' (Hill 2002, 95). It is on its latter understanding – as procedure leading to accession – that EU enlargement loses its foreign political character.[108] In this sense, it designates 'a highly complex policy process through which the external becomes internal' (Bretherton 2002, 15). Rather than identity performance through boundary-drawing, it concerns alteration of the EU and its borders. Both 'inside-EU' and 'outside-EU' are bound to change.

This study conceives of EU enlargement in the latter sense – a procedure aimed at accession, an inclusion of 'Other' – and restricts thus its analytical scope only to past, present

[107] The EU's foreign policy is premised on clear demarcation of its borders, an authoritative distinction between 'inside-EU' and 'outside-EU'. Building upon and approximating in many respects the functions of state borders, EU borders are the referents of inclusion/exclusion. EU enlargement's specificity as foreign policy rests with the exclusivity of this relation only to states, and its preoccupation with the determination of their eligibility to accede. Moreover, this special outward relation will be around only so long as there are countries aspiring for membership and the EU remains willing to accommodate this aspiration.

[108] This does not necessarily mean that a state's accession/membership ceases to be a foreign political issue either for this or any other member country.

and potential membership candidates. While the EU's differentiation from candidates is no longer a foreign-political boundary-drawing, it is far from absent in the process. It just takes another, non-antagonistic form along the discussed parent/child dichotomy. It can vary both in content and extent across candidates. Yet, the scope of the EU's possible differentiation is restricted by virtue of their candidacy, grounded on the perspective of eventual accession, i.e. that difference will be satisfactorily overcome. The EU is differentiated in terms of the conditions required from a candidate to satisfy, its pre-accession 'Europeanization', by the *terms of accession* in other words. Differentiation diminishes if and as accession process advances, with candidate's change in specific direction. Satisfaction of the accession terms brings it to the point of entry. Through accession this state becomes a new member, and so part and parcel of the enlarged EU's new 'Self'. Precisely because enlargement becomes at some point a process of incorporation of an outsider, and so of reconstituting the EU, foreign policy framework alone is insufficient for its analysis.

The terms of accession and their meaning depend on how is the EU, *identity of an EU member* to be more precise, represented in the process. It is to representations thereof, particularly in the enlargement context, that the following section turns.

3.1.1 Three Models of Representing the EU

Facing difficulty in naming it according to established taxonomies, theoreticians and students of the EU have devised a variety of its characterizations. These hinge upon, to be sure, the theoretical outlooks, and implicitly also the (normative) convictions regarding the EU/European integration, harboured by their authors. Jacques Delors called it a *sui generis* 'unidentified political object' (Schmitter, 1996). Others spoke of its as 'confederatio', 'consortio' or 'condomio' (Ibid); 'less than a federation, more than a regime' (Wallace 1983); 'the first truly postmodern political form' or 'multiperspectival polity' (Ruggie, 1993); a 'regional' (Schmidt 2004), 'regulatory' or 'postmodern' state (Caporaso 1996); a postmodern entity (see Van Ham 2001); a system of 'multi-level governance' (Marks 1993); or a 'network of networks' (Leonard 1998). Still others described it as 'civilian power' (Duchêne 1972) or 'normative power' (Manners 2002); or, drawing on Karl Deutsch (*et al.* 1957) as 'the most advanced community-region so far' (Adler 2005, 181), a 'tightly coupled' (Ibid, 183) or 'amalgamated security community' (Rogers 2009). Diverse academic representations of the EU point to their potential infinity in nationally (and otherwise) fragmented and structured elite and public debates and discourses. There the EU has been

constructed, often in appropriation of EU-official discourses, for instance as 'community', 'single market', enhanced international organization, emergent nation-state or federation, 'zone of democratic peace', post-national or post-modern political entity, a 'system of multilevel governance'; or, in more particular fashion as 'Christian club', 'fortress Europe', even as certain 'guardian' against national transgressions.

It is impossible to evade the violence of interpretative reduction and do justice to all possible EU constructs in the effort to organize them in a simplistic fashion. For the present purposes, focused on 'EUasEurope' equivalence, it appears that distinction between three schematic, rough 'ideal models' of representing the EU should suffice. The goal is to establish, in crude terms, three most commonly invoked projections of the arrangement of relations between the EU and its component Member States, and how they bear on EU enlargement. The EU has been constructed either as certain 1) *means and instrument* of the Member States; or in two senses invoking a community: 2) *based on Western (political) values* (such as those listed in Lisbon Treaty Article 2), or 3) *based on common (cultural) identity* in the sense of reversed 'EUasEurope' (the EU defined as Europe is).[109] It is crucial to note that apart from the EU's implied relation with the Member States and/or Europe, the models are in no way mutually exhaustive. Just as Model 2 can in some way add a layer onto Model 1 constructs, so Model 3 may enhance representations along Model 1 and (especially) Model 2. Each model roughly corresponds to a certain 'dimension' of constructing the EU: the economic and, to some extent, foreign-/security-political; the political; and the affective cultural. Only Models 2 and 3 invoke certain community, and so a certain exclusion. Their respective exclusions are best illustrated on the controversy over Turkey's possible EU entry.

Some identity-focused literature tends to marginalize Model 1 representations of the EU as a *means and instrument* at the service of Member States. This is because if these project any notion of community, it is not EU-bound but tied with the idea of Europe of nations/nation-states. This manner of construction, most distant from any sense of EU-related 'European identity', is undertaken primarily on national premises, and is as such

[109] Very similarly, in a deliberation-focused constructivist volume analysing justifications for eastern enlargement, Helene Sjursen distinguished between three ideal types 'which depict the EU according to integrationist modes – economic, cultural and political' (2006a, 2; see also LaGro and Jørgensen 2007, 2). These were conceptions of the EU as 'a problem-solving entity whose main purpose would be to promote and protect the interests of the member states; a value-based community where a common identity would be sought through the revitalization of the traditions, mores and memories of whatever common European values and affiliations there are; or a rights-based post-national union resting on universal rights and democratic procedures' (Sjursen 2006d, 203).

accordingly fragmented. Along this model, the EU may be constructed as a (single) 'market, securing the free movement of goods and capital' (Sjursen 2006c, 1) or a 'problem-solving entity whose principal purpose is to promote the [members'] material interests' (Ibid, 10). Rather than as 'autonomous entities', EU institutions are seen as Member States' instruments meant to reduce 'cooperation costs'. Cooperation is primarily of economic and, if beneficial, also of foreign and security character (Ibid, 2).

In her extensive Turkey-focused enquiry, Aydın Düzgit reported two common Model 1 EU constructs. Primarily in national spheres it was represented as a 'valid economic space': as 'social Europe' (by the German and French left) or a 'neo-liberal economic space' (by the British Labour Party representatives) (2008, 520). Some members of the EP's EPP-ED fraction, of the French UMP, and the two main British political parties also represented the EU as a 'political project of nation-states'. She observed that underlying this construct was an image of Europe as 'culturally/historically/geographically bounded space'. This image was not reflected onto the EU, perceived as a 'loose gathering of member-states where the political core lies with the nation-state'. Such constructs seem to evoke 'clear distinction between a mythic Europe based on a common culture, history, a (rather flexible) geography and a Europe as a political project of nation-states which come together to promote their self-interest' (Ibid, 519 and 524).

Model 1 conceptions have been usually associated with so-called 'traditionally Eurosceptic' countries, such as the UK and Denmark. The linkage between a projection of the EU and that of its expansion is well illustrated by the common argument which attributes the general pro-enlargement position of the British to their opposition to further 'deepening'. Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen's study of the Danes' stand on eastern expansion demonstrated that their prevalent conception of the EU as a 'problem-solving' entity (2006, 81-82) was not antithetical to a solidarity-based 'sense of a particular duty to enlarge' (Ibid, 97).[110] The Danish example suggests that support for enlargement on the basis of solidarity with non-members can be short of invocations of an EU-bound community and emanate instead from images of what can be called 'European society' of nations/states. One can also comprehend in this sense the relatively frequent CEE projections of eastern enlargement as

[110] They quoted a 1994 speech on behalf of the Danish government, comprising statements such as that the CEECs are 'natural members of the European family', that the government promoted their integration into 'European cooperation-structures', or that '[t]he historic task of our generation will be to extend the existing zone of stability to the rest of Europe' (Riddervold and Sjursen 2006, 97).

a remedy for past injustice incurred upon the CEECs by some Western European states: notwithstanding the obvious German case, their 'about us, without us' negotiated submission to Nazi Germany (the 'Munich Agreement') or to the hands of the Soviet Union (the so-called 'Yalta' or 'Percentage Agreement'). Germany allegedly promoted expansion to some CEECs partly due to the perceived need 'to pursue a multilateral, European route to achieve reconciliation with its Eastern neighbours' (Zaborowski 2006, 118).

Model 2 representations of the EU as community *based on Western (political) values* are best characterized by the articulation of the official enlargement discourse at least since the second-wave expansion to Greece. Till the early 1960s, when the notion of a 'democratic criterion for membership' was introduced at the EEC stage, 'the explicit normative reference had been to "peace"' (Sjursen 2006d, 214). It was in the 1970s debate on Greece's entry where the consideration of candidate's respect for democratic principles and human rights turned salient (Ibid, 210). Importance of these values raised with the ensuing third enlargement to Spain and Portugal (Ibid, 214). Just like the NATO and the Council of Europe, the EC was construed as a principally open community in 'the West', exclusive, though, to applicants with market economies and observing Western political values:

> Each of these institutions embedded different aspects of the loose and overlapping concepts of "Europe" and "the West", as these had come to be defined by West European elites and their transatlantic allies during the Cold War: resistance to communist expansion; commitment to open societies, civil liberties and parliamentary democracy; acceptance of market economics and (relatively) free trade (Wallace 2002, 80).

This cluster of values has been updated and expanded over time, most notably by the so-called 1993 'Copenhagen criteria'. Stipulated in anticipation of entry applications by post-communist CEECs, the criteria were to be the threshold of their transformation and democratic consolidation, of congruence with the EU's Western political values.

Commonly referred to as 'rights-based', Model 2 constructs have often been predicated 'post-national' or 'post-modern'. Risse described the EU elite vision as '*modern and post-national European identity*', a 'post-national civic identity in the Habermasian sense' (2009a, 154). Sjursen spoke of 'rights-based post-national union with a set of legally entrenched rights and democratic procedures'. As opposed to Model 1, Model 2 conceptions tend to project EU institutions as 'autonomous', deriving legitimacy not via the Member States but 'directly from a European demos' (2006c, 10). Unlike identity-based Model 3, resting 'on a feeling of cultural cohesion and common traditions', Model 2 constructs embrace cultural pluralism: their exclusivity concerns 'universal rights and democratic

procedures' (Ibid, 3). Hence, cultural and other 'essential' characteristics are excluded from portrayals of the EU-as-community on this model. Some branded such a 'post-modern and post-national' EU 'de-culturalized' (Ifversen 2007, 182-183; see also Van Ham 2001).

Model 2 representations 'cannot rely on clear cultural and/or geographical borders' (Risse 2009a, 155). Membership applicants can be distinguished on no other grounds but their respect for the established set of political values (Sjursen 2006d, 209), 'regardless of religion or historical background' (Lundgren 2006, 121). This has reportedly been the British position on Turkey's prospective accession.[111] Similarly, official EU documents relating to it reveal 'no predominant cultural content', 'no cultural encounter' between Turkey and the EU. Issues addressed by them have chiefly to do with the Copenhagen political criteria and the *acquis communautaire* (Jørgensen 2007, 13). Aydın Düzgit reported that this position, on which Turkey's accession depends on its 'compliance with given political, economic and *acquis*-related criteria' was shared among left/liberal EP groups, and some in the Commission and national parliaments in Germany, France and the UK (2008, 510).

On Model 2, solidarity with candidates can be thought of in terms suggested by Frank Schimmelfennig. The EU is seen as a liberal community of states embracing values of human rights, rule of law, democracy and social market economy. Its members feel normative obligation to 'states that share the collective identity of an international community and adhere to its constitutive values and norms' (2001a, 58-59, see also 2001b, 2003a, b; or Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). In the case of eastern enlargement, this made for the candidates' entitlement to enter the Union. EU members' cost-benefit strategic calculations were overshadowed by their commitment to community values (Risse 2009a, 157).[112]

Model 3 representations of the EU as a community *based on common (cultural) identity* are characterized by their correspondence to reversely operating 'EUasEurope' equivalence: discursive construction of Europe as cultural space is equated, through the culture-infused concept of 'European identity', with that of the EU. The following statement by Lionel Jospin is a paradigmatic example:

[111] Agnes I. Schneeberger reported that the British media debate on Turkey portrayed the EU as 'a political and not a cultural or geographic entity', membership to which depended on respecting and upholding the values of democracy and human rights. 'Sources of difference that establish permanent difference and exclusion, such as Turkey's geographic location or culture' were 'given only minor consideration (2009, 98-99).

[112] Among other studies entertaining this or similar argument belong those included in Sjursen 2006b; or Sedelmeier 2005. A similar point was also made from the 'speech act' perspective in Fierke and Wiener 2001.

> Let us remember that Europe is a civilization, that is at one and the same time a territory, a shared history, a unified economy, a human society and a variety of cultures which together form one culture).[113]

On Model 3, a 'thick' sense of commonality, 'common identity', a 'we-feeling' is portrayed as a 'basis for integration'. The EU is projected as exclusive, a principally 'geographically delimited entity seeking to revitalize traditions, mores and memories of whatever common European values and affiliations there are' (Sjursen 2006c, 2). The demarcation/openness of this community depends on whether its identity is construed on the basis of essential or non-essential traits.[114] Still, Model 3 representations are most commonly premised on certain putatively 'essential' or 'inherent' aspects of 'European identity/culture'. Their articulations so imply some kind of cultural encounter with 'non-European' difference.[115]

What has been called 'fortress Europe' clearly falls under Model 3. Stressing 'Europe's cultural heritage, a common history, and a grounding in a Christian-Judean culture', it is premised on a solid demarcation of borders and differentiation from 'outsiders'. Europe and the EU are projected as 'exclusionary entities that are only open to white Christians while hostile to foreigners, immigrants, and – particularly to Islam', as Risse put it (2009a, 154; compare Checkel and Katzenstein 2009 or Armstrong and Anderson 2007). 'Fortress Europe' 'cannot accept Turkey into the EU, because it is predominantly a Muslim country' (Risse 2009a, 155). Regardless of compliance with the accession criteria, membership of Turkey with 'dominant Muslim cultural identity' would compromise the maintenance of 'Cultural Europe whose identity, borders and boundaries are historically, religiously and geographically fixed and coherent' (Keyman and Aydın Düzgit 2004, 3). At issue is 'European identity' or 'Europeanness', and Turkey's implied lack thereof is projected as a possible threat to cohesion of the EU-as-community 'founded on a set of shared cultural values of a "thick" and non-universal quality' (Lundgren 2006, 121). Such constructs of the EU/Europe as an 'exclusive and bounded entity, unified by essentialist

[113] Jospin, Lionel (2001) 'The Future of the Enlarged Europe', *Bulletin Quotidien Europe*, 30 May.

[114] Constructs along non-essential traits, frequently coming from the EU-official, liberal and leftist circles, usually invoke a certain 'post-modern' or 'post-national' vision of the EU/Europe. Though they do refer to culture as key aspect of common identity, their overriding commitment to diversity and pluralism, and a prevalently cosmopolitan conception of culture as such, virtually eliminate cultural difference as the basis of differentiation. Thus, with respect to exclusion, these representations in most cases fall under Model 2 category.

[115] As noted earlier, Model 3 is not principally opposed to or excluding Models 1 or 2. Articulations along this model may only add onto the latter ones certain common-identity/-culture layer. Constructs of the EU as an 'upholder of democratic values' can be for example based on a conception of 'democracy' as 'cultural/historic value' embodied in 'Europe' or 'the West', where 'democracy and human rights are construed as culturally/historically dependent traits' (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 516). As witnessed by the ensuing empirical analysis, there are also peculiar blends of Models 1 and 3. However, these are not in fact constructs of the EU but of a culturally-defined Europe of nation-states.

components', to which Turkey 'does not and can not belong' were identified among right-wing and extreme right-wing EP factions, and national right-wing groups in France, Germany, and (partly) in Britain (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 510). The general tendency appears to be that exclusive Model 3 articulations come from conservative and not progressive circles. Illustrative are in this regard the 1990s and 2000s model-shifts of the German (government's) position on enlargement.[116]

3.1.2 EU Enlargement as Discursive Structure: Political and Social Logics

The importance of how is the EU represented, and the possible implications of doing so along the discussed Models, can be fully appreciated once the 'operation' of the enlargement procedure is laid out. This section 'translates' it to discourse theoretical terms: as a specific discourse or discursive structure articulating political logics which constitute specific subject positions, and a social logic organizing their relations. The enlargement procedure has been officially built on a Model 2 conception of the EU. At least since the 2004 eastern enlargement, however, it has seen substantive change. The reversely-operating equivalence 'EUasEurope' has established itself as a hegemonic way of understanding EU enlargement (section 3.1.3). Model 3 EU constructs abound. Through the culture-infused concept of 'European identity', *EU enlargement started to be represented as an enlargement of Europe*.

From the discourse theoretical perspective, EU enlargement procedure is a mostly naturalized discursive structure determined by the EU-official enlargement discourse. With semblance of 'objectivity', its contestation has been scarce, and the subject position it created taken for granted, unchallenged by dissenting articulations. As a discursive structure, EU enlargement articulates, through its specific political logic of equivalence, two general subject positions. On the one side, the EU institutions and Member States, as representatives of the subject to enlarge (the EU); and, on the other, a group of states desiring that this subject

[116] Under the Chancellorship of Helmut Kohl and primacy of his conservative CDU, a limited enlargement to some (i.e. neighbouring) CEEC's was promoted with an emphasis on 'normative considerations, stressing the notion of cultural closeness as apparent in the shared experience of Western Christianity, Renaissance and Enlightenment'. Hence, apart from a sense of responsibility for, and the search for a 'Europe-framed' reconciliation with, its neighbours, also a sense of cultural kinship underlay Germany's position under Kohl. Short of such kinship ties, this support for enlargement did not extend to the Balkans and Turkey. For Kohl, the EU was a 'Christian project' with no place for Turkey. Similarly, Romania and Bulgaria were reportedly considered by the CDU/CSU 'culturally alien countries to whom Germany owed nothing and where its interests were less significant' (Zaborowski 2006, 118; compare Gowan 2002, 32). With the rule of the SPD-Greens coalition came a shift to 'more universal rights-based and political considerations', and the earlier 'sense of historical responsibility and cultural kinship' was de-emphasized. The Schröder government supported a more extensive, 'big bang' eastern enlargement, and in principle also Turkey's accession (Zaborowski 2006, 118). In the 2000s, under the Chancellorship of Angela Merkel the German position on enlargement largely switched back to Model 3.

enlarges to them. With respect to the logic of difference, these general subject positions are subdivided. On the EU side, the parties exercising power/direct influence are: respective EU institutions, Member States acting as whole; and each of the internally diversely-organized Member States. On the side of the states desiring membership, one can distinguish between countries to whose membership the EU officially expressed a commitment; which were granted by it the status of membership candidate; which commenced their accession negotiations; and finally, those that have signed with the EU their Treaty of Accession.[117] The latter group will be hereafter referred to simply as current or potential 'candidates'. With respect to its social logic, the procedure imposes a highly hierarchical relationship between the two general subjects party to it. As the categorization of the more particular subject positions among membership aspirants suggests, these are strictly separated, and a state's transition between them in each and every case depends on a decision taken by the EU side. The procedure's grounding 'objective' is candidate's accession, and so it also regulates how the two general parties may or should act.

'EU membership' is the nodal point organizing the political logic establishing the two general subject positions. On one side stand the current members whose subject position is articulated through the linking of signs in chains of equivalence (what EU members are like). On the other stand candidates from which EU members are differentiated through articulations of the former's respective deficiencies. In other words, candidates are juxtaposed to EU members as 'lacking' with respect to some particular characteristics: e.g. hierarchical binaries such as having/not having adopted the *acquis*, or deemed to respect/not respect human rights.

Accession criteria are the signs linked together to articulate the identity of an EU member. 'Discursive encounters inevitably evolve around constructions of inferiority and superiority and hence a particular distribution of discursive and political power'. In our case, the EU side is the subject to articulate this chain of equivalence and constitute thus one discursive structure to which candidates must respond (Hansen 2006, 68).[118] The EU side's

[117] Should one take into consideration the wider sense of EU enlargement, including also the question of a state's eligibility to become a member, one can also distinguish countries which expressed their desire to accede; those whose such desire was recognized by the EU, while a treaty-stipulated appropriate action was taken from its side; and in view of the question of eligibility itself, also between states whose eligibility is beyond question (e.g. Norway or Switzerland) and those whose is often disputed (e.g. Ukraine or Russia, Armenia or Georgia).

[118] Aydın Düzgit (2008, 531) pointed to the linkage of the construction of the EU side's subject position to the 19th century constructs of Europe a 'bearer of standards of civilisation and thus modernity'. She referred to a study by Hartmut Behr (2007, 250 and 254), who asserted that the EU 'perceives the political and economic

prerogative to define in this parent/child relation what an EU member is like, that is to project the experience and achievement of its current members 'as the organising terms of membership', can be considered 'an act of "political power"', deemed Aydın Düzgit. With relations between the two parties thusly constituted, difference from 'the "European" model … comes to be interpreted as a "lack"' (2008, 534, paraphrasing Chakrabarty 2000, 8).

The Member States, acting both together and on their own, wield ultimate power over enlargement. It arises from the requirement of members' unanimity in making decisions pertaining to it: granting candidacy after having determined sufficient satisfaction of the so-called 'Copenhagen political criteria'; starting and controlling progress in accession negotiations; or formulating the terms of accession, and eventually accepting their final negotiated formulation. Above all, the ratification of accession treaties runs separately in each Member State, and that according to its specific constitutional provisions. Crucially, each member has in principle 'the power to block any of these crucial stages of the decisional process' (Piedrafita 2006, 44).[119]

Given that the relationship between the EU side and candidates is highly asymmetrical and 'shaped by pre-determined and non-negotiable formal rules' (Engert *et al.* 2001, 2), it comes as no surprise that during accession negotiations there is actually 'little to negotiate about, apart from the length and quantity of transition periods and the budget' (Verheugen, 2000, 442). Candidates have to adapt and 'comply with the EU system 95 per cent of which is untouchable (Schrijvers 2007, 32-33, referring to findings in Grabbe 2004, 2). The accession process is thus 'a process of mostly one-sided adaptation to the EU by a state accepting the EU's demands for accession (Jørgensen 2007, 14), paraphrasing Kramer 2004, 7). This process of candidates' unilateral change/adaptation in the direction established by the terms of accession was earlier referred to as their 'Europeanization'.[120] Short of

accomplishments of its member states as universal norms for every system of rule', on the basis of which 'a history of modernisation is constructed which would rescue the applicant states from backwardness'.

[119] There are a number of historical examples, ranging from de Gaulle's famous 1963 and 1967 vetoes of the UK's entry, through myriad threats to block, to actually blocking an accession process in its course. Among these belong the early 1980s blockage of Spain's accession negotiations by France and the UK; Spain's 1994 threat to veto the negotiated accession terms with Norway (Piedrafita 2006, 45); or the trade-off demanded by Austria asking for the start of Croatia's accession negotiations in exchange for its consent to the negotiating framework with Turkey (Grigoriadis 2006, 154-155).

[120] It must be stressed that academic literature has attributed the notion a variety of meanings, and so it may refer to basically anything denoting a certain EU/Europe-centred 'motion towards convergence'. Specific disciplinary interpretative frameworks commonly invest the notion of 'Europeanization' with a more specific content. For example, political scientists have often studied it 'from the point of view of diverse (national) policy fields which underwent a substantial change in the process of their adjustment to the respective areas of EU policies' (Krzyżanowski 2009b, 95). Alternatively, CDA scholars focused on the 'adjustment or alignment

further connotations, this study comprehends 'Europeanization' as the process of candidate's EU-mandated multifaceted transformation so as to qualify for membership, i.e. to eliminate its difference from, and ensure congruence with the projected image of an EU member. On this conception, 'Europeanization' is not limited just to the transformation spelled out by the formal accession criteria. It also concerns that transformation which is latently implied by the EU side's interpretation of the criteria in determining whether they were satisfactorily met (e.g. political culture); as well as the socialization and adaptation of candidates and later members, their institutions and representatives, (in)to the EU structures.

The official enlargement discourse formally articulates the identity of an EU member, and so the threshold of candidates' requisite transformation, only with respect to what Rumelili called 'acquired' characteristics. What were called candidates' 'inherent' traits (culture, religion or geography) are thus presumed to be accommodated by the EU side as part of their incorporation as new members. The formal accession criteria, i.e. the equivalential chain of signs articulating what EU members are like, are formulated in most condensed form through the general provisions for membership application and by the more specific cluster of membership conditions comprising the so-called 'Copenhagen criteria' and later additions to them. Lisbon Treaty Article 49 spelled out the former as a state's respect for and commitment to promoting the Union's founding values (Article 2):

> The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

As regards the more specific formal accession conditions, the 'Copenhagen criteria' as originally formulated and the subsequent additions to them, one should keep in mind their historical situatedness and context-dependency. The 'Copenhagen criteria' were laid out in 1993 in anticipation of entry applications from the post-communist CEECs.[121] Novel were

of discourses at the national level to the extra-national (or European) ones' with repercussions for 'the diverse forms of discursive construction of identities' (Ibid, 96-97), i.e. the 'Europeanisation of national discourses' as a 'macro-discursive change' (Krzyżanowski and Galasińska 2009, 12, see this volume for an analysis of post-communist political discourses in Poland and other CEECs). Neumann presented two examples of a 'Europenization' of national political discourses: the Polish debate of civil-military relations; and an Estonian debate on minorities that saw a racist discourse denigrating Russian women as contaminated by 'an Asiatic gene pool' abate (1998, 410-411).

[121] In 1991, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland signed with the EC the so-called 'Europe Agreements'. These already comprised a clause, advocated by Germany and the UK, formally recognizing these countries' interest in membership. Particularly active in promoting their accession as an official EU policy was Germany. It endorsed the recommendation coming from the Commission 'that a set of criteria be established that would precondition starting actual membership negotiations with the former Soviet-bloc countries', and actively supported their determination at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council summit. The EU thus gave a green

not so much the particular conditions but rather that 'the EU for the first time formalized the accession procedure' and so 'a kind of common EU enlargement policy, based on strictly objective criteria'. Compared to previous expansions, these criteria 'set out a new basis for stricter accession conditionality towards the CEECs' (Schrijvers 2007, 31). Presented as 'objective standards' for assessing candidates (Zaborowski 2006, 106), the criteria set the threshold for their EU-member-congruent democratic consolidation, and economic, political and social transformation. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council 'Presidency Conclusions' defined them as follows:

> Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union [i.e. acceptance of the Community *acquis*] (7.A.iii).[122]

Additionally, the 1995 Madrid European Council 'Presidency Conclusions' laid emphasis on candidates' 'development of the market economy, the adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a stable economic and monetary environment' (III.A). The political criteria were later extended to further require candidates' engagement in and openness to intra-regional cooperation or 'good neighbourliness' (Tatham 2009, 218-224).

It must be stressed that the formal accession criteria articulate what an EU member is like in a rather minimalist and notably vague fashion.[123] While the EU-official discourse represents them as an 'objective' and largely 'technical' yardstick, their 'exact' meaning and the benchmarks in their satisfaction are situationally determined by the EU side. To be sure, presenting them as such is nothing but one of 'political technologies' in the Foucauldian sense: depoliticizing 'essentially *political*' questions through 'recasting them in the neutral language of science or technology so that they appear as technical/managerial problems to be solved (or rather managed) by technical experts' (Shore 2000, 90).[124] Practically

light to the CEE accession aspirants most of which filed their applications within the next few years (Zaborowski 2006, 106-107).

[122] At the same place, it was further stated that '[t]he Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries'.

[123] The accession criteria represent a set of points on which all EU members do or 'learned' to converge. So long as they need to be compatible with the ideas of all the members about what the EU and its members are like, they are rather general and vague, the commonly agreeable minimum.

[124] An obvious case in point was the (later discussed) instrumental dusting off of the notion of the EU's 'absorption capacity' by some EU members experiencing the so-called 'enlargement fatigue' in the aftermath of the 2004 expansion and in the face of commencing accession negotiations with Turkey. They called for an expert analysis of the EU's capacity to absorb new members in spite of the fact that its 'extension' has always depended solely on their political will to do so. See Emerson *et al.* 2006 for a detailed analysis of the notion.

speaking, the accession criteria are due to their ambiguity and vagueness 'prone to abuse and manipulation', and the procedure of monitoring candidates' progress in meeting them, claimed Jan Zielonka, 'anything but predictable and objective' (2002, 8).

The power asymmetry between the EU and candidates is thus manifested by *the EU side's prerogative not only to formulate but also to interpret the accession criteria*. In principle, the identity of an EU member, articulated through them by linking a set of traits, should have the same meaning 'inside-EU' as it does when represented 'outwards'. Yet, the latter prerogative enables the 'insiders' to discriminate between these two sites with respect to the strictness and urgency of how the criteria are 'politically applied'. 'Inside-EU', they define what an existing member *should* be like, whereas outwards they determine what candidates *must* become like to be admitted as members. Put otherwise, as the accession criteria are represented 'outside-EU', the 'should' for existing members becomes a 'must' for candidates. This was the crux of the criticism by several analysts and CEEC's representatives accusing the EU of imposing a 'double standard' when requiring more from the future than the existing members. This was found to be the case with the new 1993 (Copenhagen) political criterion of 'respect for and protection of minorities'.[125]

3.1.3 Culturalization of EU Enlargement: 'EUasEurope' Reversed

Having outlined the 'operation' of the enlargement procedure as a discursive structure where specific political and social logics establish and hierarchically organize the subject positions of the parties to it, this section discusses how has the reversed 'EUasEurope' equivalence been 'grafted' onto it. In view of the power asymmetry among the parties involved, it also ponders the possible implications in this context of the resulting prevalent tendency to represent the EU not along Model 2, as the official enlargement discourse has so far, but through Europe-bound Model 3 constructs.

Due to the abstractness and complexity of the matter at hand, any account of how and when has culturalized 'EUasEurope' come to play a hegemonic role in structuring

[125] It was suggested that it was once again Germany which, 'deeply concerned with the developments in the former Yugoslavia, was determined that the conditions set out by the EU should aim to foster stability in its Eastern neighbourhood'. It pushed for the inclusion of human and minority rights among the political criteria in order to 'discourage the candidates from pursuing nationalistic policies' (Zaborowski 2006, 106). Until then, the EU had no special minority rights provisions, and thus no common internal standard (de Witte 2002) apart from the principle of non-discrimination. Thus, demanding from candidates 'group-specific measures to protect minorities' was an addition to the internal practice. Far from establishing a new EU-wide standard, however, 'the EU applied differentiated pressure across applicants, dependent on whether minority protection was regarded as problematic and security relevant in the particular case' (Schwellnus 2006, 186-187; or 2005a, b).

debates and discourses on EU expansion can only be a perspectival approximation.[126] Chapter 2 developed the argument that its conditions of possibility arose with the 'externalization' of the discursive construction of Europe-bound, culturalized 'European identity'. Recontextualized 'outside-EU' as the question of 'Europeanness', the decentralized, 'democratized' and nationally and otherwise fragmented quest to invest Europe with meaning has centred on the issues of immigration and further enlargement. It is a question for another research to try determine what or who precisely stood beyond this externalization. Suffice it to point out at this time that with the EU elite and institutions' diminished capability to moderate this debate, and a multifaceted immense increase in internal diversity brought by the 2004 inclusion of 10 new members, having this debate take place 'inside-EU' turned out to be rather 'counter-productive'.

Amidst all this uncertainty, it is still possible to identify at least some of the parties and practices prominently involved in the culturalization of EU enlargement. This study contends that it was in fact a deliberate, and the most 'successful' of several largely overlapping short-of-veto strategies deployed by countries and groups opposed either to any post-2004/2007 enlargement or to Turkey's entry in particular.

Turkey's commencing accession process already played an important part in the early-2000s 'future of Europe' debate. The salience of and controversy over this question mounted with the EU's approaching self-imposed December 2004 deadline to make a decision with respect to opening the country's accession negotiations. This was also the time when some 'old' members 'found' themselves experiencing the so-called 'enlargement fatigue', prompted by the experience with the 2004 expansion. Despite growing opposition and ambivalence, the EU-25 took the decision at the long-awaited European Council summit to start accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.[127] Enthusiasts were quickly sobered by the fact that the summit also laid out new provisions pertaining to future accession negotiations frameworks. Apart from abolishing the previous group approach to enlargement,[128] these introduced much stricter conditionality and further enhanced the EU

[126] One possible general answer is that the 2004 expansion 'brought the EU closer to a congruity between the space its member states occupy and what many EU citizens see as the "natural" boundaries of Europe' (Diez 2006, 246).
[127] *Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 16-17 December 2004*, 16238/1/04 (Brussels).
[128] It is worth noting that the initially unplanned 'big bang' mode of eastern enlargement was a strategy meant to put pressure on candidates and expedite their compliance with the accession criteria. Germany's later strong promotion thereof was allegedly due to its desire to have Poland, which began to 'lag behind' by 2000, in the first wave (Schrijvers 2007, 35). One way of interpreting the 2004 reinstatement of the principle of differentiation among candidates is to see it as a sign that the EU side's overall resolve and will to expand have

side's power, superiority and prerogatives in the process, e.g. by giving it the right qualitatively to alter the nature of future entrants' membership in terms of its content and extent. Although not Turkey-specific *per se*, all the new provisions, including those pertaining to the possibility of curtailing a country's membership – derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses with respect to the freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture, found their place in the framework for negotiations with Turkey. Crucially, while long transitional periods to the benefit of the EU side were introduced in these fields already with respect to the 2004 entrants, such inordinate measures can now potentially be of permanent nature.

Once again not Turkey-specific but fully pertinent precisely to its accession process was the 'dusting off', by some enlargement-fatigued 'old' members, of the consideration of the EU's 'absorption capacity', originally raised aside the 1993 'Copenhagen criteria'. In the aftermath of the failed French and Dutch referenda on the constitutional treaty, the December 2005 European Council summit saw a revival of the long-standing discussion over the merits of a simultaneous pursuit of the EU's 'deepening' and 'widening'. The debate on its capacity to 'absorb' new members peaked at the June 2006 summit where Austria, Germany, Netherlands, and especially France proposed that the consideration be indicated as an additional criterion of candidates' accession. With this idea firmly rejected by the UK, Italy, Spain and the new members, the European Council decided to revisit the matter at its December summit on the basis of a special report by the Commission (Emerson *et al.* 2006, 2). The Commission (2006, 15) effectively buried the proposal by deconstructing 'absorption capacity' as the need to reform and adapt the EU's functioning in view of further enlargement, and that strict accession criteria are satisfied by candidates.

Clearly Turkey-specific was the closely related strategy of advancing an alternative arrangement with the country, short of full membership. The most prominent proposal in this respect, the so-called 'privileged partnership' (see e.g. Hakura 2005 for its critique) was put forth in 2004 by the German conservative CDU/CSU. In 2005, it became a stated policy option for the new grand (CDU/CSU-SPD) German government coalition (Emerson *et al.* 2006, 3). It garnered support of other opponents of Turkey's entry, most notably of Christian-

either faded or were already largely sated. Accession negotiations were to be thereafter based on candidate-specific negotiation frameworks tailored to 'the specific situations and characteristics of each candidate State' (6).

democratic and other conservative political forces, France and Austria.[129] Precisely these two countries came up with another strategy with much greater potency to block Turkey's accession: to hold national referenda on the issue. The French[130] and Austrian[131] executives declared such intention in 2008.[132]

By far the most 'successful' has been the opponents' deliberate discursive strategy of culturalizing EU enlargement through representing Turkey as 'non-European', and so voiding the recognition of/decision on its eligibility to accede.[133] German Christian Democrats represented the EU in relation to Turkey as a culture- or civilization-exclusive project, and managed to promote this conception among other Christian-democratic parties, already in the 1990s.[134] This manner of projecting the EU and its enlargement took on greater

[129] In October 2005, Austria reportedly insisted on including a 'privileged partnership' clause in the framework for negotiations with Turkey, eventually to withdraw this demand in exchange for the start of Croatia's accession negotiations (Grigoriadis 2006, 154-155).

[130] In the French case, it was already under the relatively pro-Turkey-oriented presidency of Jacques Chirac that a constitutional amendment was passed requiring that a national referendum be held on any future EU accession of a state whose population exceeds 5% of that of the EU. This was arguably due to the weakening of Chirac's presidency as a result of the failed referendum on the constitutional treaty, political and public debate on which was pervaded by the issue of Turkey's prospective entry. The treaty's opponents reportedly 'used Turkey as one of their campaign issues, identifying that country's possible accession as one example of the false path that European enlargement had taken' (Grigoriadis 2006, 154). The constitutional requirement was revoked in 2008 under the new President Nicholas Sarkozy. Yet, Sarkozy made Turkey himself a major issue of his presidential campaign during which he declared that it should never become an EU member (*International Herald Tribune*, 11 September 2006). Moreover, just one day after his government announced its intention to cancel the constitutional requirement, Sarkozy promoted the idea that the decision to hold a referendum should depend on the discretion of the French President, in view of which he declared that if Turkey's membership were a serious issue while he was still in office, he would call the referendum anyway (*Hürriyet*, 25 April 2008). The question was eventually settled by a compromise, under which a decision in national referendum should be called for only if both chambers of the French parliament fail to produce a 60% majority in support or against the motion (Bürgin 2010, 44).

[131] Already in 2006, Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) reportedly argued that such a referendum would be a 'test' of the EU's absorption capacity. The intention to hold a referendum on the issue was upheld by Schüssel's two successors Alfred Gusenbauer and Werner Fayman (SPÖ) (Bürgin 2010, 42-43).

[132] This would certainly be a substantial qualitative modification of the enlargement procedure which has customarily relied on the Member States' parliamentary fashion of ratifying candidates' accession treaties. With the exception of the 1972 French referendum on the first expansion, no enlargement has so far been subject to decision in national referendum in any other country but the acceding one(s). A precedent would be set where decisions on enlargement would be made 'hostage to the veto of one member state or (part of) its population' (Diez 2007, 420). Should this become widely perceived as a viable option, any EU member would in fact be able to block an imminent enlargement regardless of the state of, or conclusion of accession talks.

[133] To be sure, albeit not predominant, culturalized EU constructs were far from absent prior to the early-2000s headway in Turkey's accession process. During the Cold War, Turkey's 'Europeanness' was rather a non-issue, as the question of Europe was itself bracketed by its subsumption under the wider 'West' (Delanty 1995, 115-125). The political logic of the Cold War security discourse counter-posed the (equivalentially articulated and only partly differentiated) democratic, capitalist and free 'West' to the totalitarian 'communist East' subjugated to the USSR. The question of Europe could itself be re-opened only in the wake of this tight discursive structure's dislocation. Cultural factors then played part in the prioritization of certain candidates by Germany under Kohl.

[134] In 1994, the head of the CDU/CSU club in the German parliament Wolfgang Schäuble declared that 'Turkey was not part of the Christian-occidental tradition and therefore could not be a member of the EU'. In 1997, 'the heads of European Christian Democrats, after a meeting of the European People's Party in Luxembourg, made

currency in the first half of the 2000s. Of particular resonance across the EU was found to be the view of Turkey and the EU expressed in 2002 by Valéry Giscard d'Estaign chairing the second, constitutional Convention (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 527). He declared that Turkey was 'not a European country', since the absolute majority of its population lived, and its capital was located, outside Europe. He insisted that its accession 'would be the end of Europe' and designated its advocates 'the adversaries of the European Union' (*BBC News*, 8 November 2002). While Giscard d'Estaign avoided cultural references, these were latent in his implied equation between the EU and Europe. Another oft-quoted, and explicitly culturalist statement was that of the Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkenstein. Few months before the 2004 decision on Turkey's accession negotiations was to be made, he reportedly spoke of the country's entry in connection with Europe's 'Islamization' due to demographic and migration changes. Should it take place, he stated, 'the liberation of Vienna [from the Turks] in 1683 would have been in vain' (as paraphrased and quoted in *The Financial Times*, 8 September 2004). That same year, five years prior to becoming the EU's first full-time 'President', Herman van Rompuy was quoted saying:

> Turkey is not a part of Europe and will never be part of Europe ... An expansion of the EU to include Turkey cannot be considered as just another expansion as in the past. The universal values which are in force in Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey (quoted in Phillips 2009).

What all these statements have in common is their structuration by the reversed 'EUasEurope' equivalence. More important than the fact that such voices could not eventually prevent the start of accession negotiations is that such utterances of several prominent EU figures were reported in the first place. This suggests that at latest by the mid-2000s their conditions of possibility in the enlargement context already arose.

To conclude, the culturalization of EU enlargement, resulting in the 'outward' discursive construction of the EU-as-Europe, dates back to the 1990s discourse of the German Christian Democrats. Its rise into prominence in the first half of the 2000s at least remarkably corresponded with advancements in Turkey's accession process and the efforts of some political forces and countries to prevent the country's full membership. According to Knud Erik Jørgensen, it was in the wake of the 2002 Copenhagen summit, where the European Council committed itself to decide on the start of accession negotiations with Turkey in two years, that the question of its membership 'has been heavily politicized' and

their infamous statement to the same effect' (Diez 2004, 329). This was restated the same year by Kohl who cast the EU as a 'civilisational' project where 'Turkey has no place' (*The Guardian*, 7 March 1997).

culturalized (2007, 12). [O]n the one hand, we have more than a dozen previous accessions that were "culture-free", but on the other, in the case of Turkey's potential accession, the "cultural factor" has been introduced as a key nodal point in public and political discourse (Ibid, 11). By the mid-2000s, '"Europeanness" as equated with EU membership' constituted 'a key tenet of the discourse on EU enlargement to Turkey' (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 510).

The apparent paradox of there being a diversity of understandings of Europe 'inside-EU' and, at the same time, a politically operative linkage of EU membership with 'Europeanness' projected 'outside-EU' (as if there was a consensus), can be explained once the hierarchical nature of the relationship between the EU side and candidates is taken into account. The insiders' prerogative to establish meaning of the EU to be projected outwards has in this particular respect similar effects as it does with the interpretation of the accession criteria. 'Inside-EU', the construction of Europe has depended on particular, national and other discursive settings. Yet, outwards the EU-as-Europe has been portrayed as a coherent entity. Hence, what are Europes inside is 'translated' and represented across EU borders to candidates simply as Europe.

In discourse theoretical terms, 'EUasEurope' equivalence merges two orders of discourse – one pertaining to the discursive construction of the EU and the other to that of Europe. Europe, as a geographical, political and cultural space, has always been a myth (signifying a totality) and 'floating signifier': its construction always overtly political but also so fragmented that no one particular construct could claim hegemony across this 'imagined' space. The EU's case is different. For decades, the EU elite and institutions held the keys to constructing and 'imagining' European integration, 'ideal Europe' at its end, and the EU as the present stage of that construction process. This changed with the 2000s decentralization and 'democratization' of the construction of the now Europe-bound EU-as-community. This process revealed the contingency of the hitherto EU-official federalist integration project, and politicized European integration as such. And so also the EU has increasingly become a 'floating signifier' that various discourses seek to invest with meaning. As the said equation between the EU and Europe merged the orders of discourse pertaining to their respective constructions, each has assumed a key structural role in organizing the construction of the other. Just as the EU/European integration claimed a central place in the imagining of Europe, so Europe took on this role in the discursive construction of the EU once the notion of 'European identity' underwent culturalization.

The latter is consequential, and may have crucial implications for further enlargement. The equation's 'grafting' onto the procedure enabled the discursive struggle over how the myth of 'Europe' should be filled with meaning to bear on it. It made it possible that EU enlargement be represented as if it were an enlargement of Europe. The account of the hitherto expansions (scattered through this chapter heretofore) suggests that how the EU is represented in the process has consequences for the availability/permissibility of certain instruments at the disposal of the Member States and other interested parties either to push forth, influence, protract or even to halt enlargement to some candidates.

The fundamental problem, in this context, with representing the EU-as-Europe is that this is a *potentially all-inclusive* representation which is indeterminate, malleable, and hardly contestable. Given that each Member State formally wields the power to block candidates' entry practically at any time until their actual accession, the 'EUasEurope' makes it possible to ground such a step on a peculiar construct of Europe which somehow casts the candidate in question as 'non-European', and so as not eligible to accede, or even 'undesirable'. This becomes apparent once the consequences of representing the EU along Models 2 and 3 are considered with a view to the EU side's prerogative to establish meaning. In the Model 2 accession criteria case, the investment of meaning into the 'elements' they comprise is constrained by virtue of their relative sedimentation as nodal points of multiple global discourses. This does not, however, apply to Model 3 EU-as-Europe constructs, as in their case the discursive imposition of meaning can be practically boundless and potentially all-inclusive. The construction of the EU is thus opened to insiders' manipulation at convenience. Those striving to coin and disseminate the meaning of the EU-as-Europe are enabled by the hegemonic equivalence to project their own culturalist and essentialist (or otherwise exclusivist) ideas about what Europe is or should be (e.g. 'fortress Europe') onto the EU/European integration in order to deny and/or delegitimize the call for inclusion of the respective 'undesired'. At the same time, whatever the EU construct, the resulting representation is virtually incontestable from 'outside-EU' by candidates.

Another implication of 'grafting' the now hegemonic reversed 'EUasEurope' onto EU enlargement is that it allows for attempts at altering the hitherto sedimented nature of the procedure by enabling the re-opening of the essentially political question of a country's eligibility to accede practically at any time in the course of its accession process. We assumed that the basis of the EU's differentiation from candidates may vary but that it is at the same time restricted in scope by the virtue of candidacy. Representing the EU-as-Europe,

however, due to the equation's heightened revealed contingency, makes it possible to revisit the question of a state's eligibility to enter. It enables re-articulation of the EU, and so of its differentiation from candidates to the effect of rejecting, or modifying the terms of, its membership at any time along its accession path. It appears that such a re-opening of the eligibility question, in the sense of blurring the limits to the scope within which the EU may be differentiated from an existing candidate, has been attempted in the case of Turkey, a candidate since 1999.[135]

Whereas under the formal procedure – Model 2: the *EU-as-community based on Western (political) values* – the room for manipulation and interest politics of EU members and other interested parties is limited to establishing and interpreting the accession criteria (acquired traits), under the EU-as-Europe it is practically boundless. The equivalence thus becomes an instrument for interested abuse. It may serve as framework for externally unchallengeable justifications for exclusion, or a fertile terrain for populist entrepreneurs. Finally, it may and does give credence to such absurd circular statements such as that 'by becoming an EU member, a state becomes European': the EU is defined by Europe which it itself increasingly defines.

It is this author's opinion that having 'EUasEurope' equivalence structure how we imagine the EU/European integration and Europe is not only unnecessary but also highly undesirable. Should the practice of equating them be further naturalized, this may adversely impact on both the EU's outward Self-projection and the very premises and objectives underlying the European integration project. Its presently hegemonic reversed operation further empowers the discourse-wise already powerful in projecting their particular interests in novel and potentially infinite guises onto the integration project and its further enlargement. What emerges is very much a realist picture of the EU, where discourse-wise hegemonic powers are enabled to speak not only for the EU but for Europe at large. This is a situation when non-members considering themselves European may legitimately ask: are we not welcome in the EU-as-Europe which claims to speak on our behalf?

This study's main objective is to enquire into whether the dire picture just painted is what we should foresee the EU's future to be like, or whether there are prospects for the way it has been represented to alter. The following section elaborates on the conception of

[135] Prior to and even during its accession negotiations, opponents of Turkey's entry justified their stance by referring to its excessive difference from existent EU members in terms of culture, religion, or civilization.

enlargement as inclusion of 'Other'. Guided by the observed dissonance between the 'old' and 'new' Member States with respect to the understandings of the 'EUasEurope' and/or of the EU/European integration as such, it proposes empirical investigation thereof in the post-communist member countries.

3.1.4 Appropriations of Hegemonic Discourses and Constructs: Enlargement as Inclusion of Other

Based on their analytical focus, stemming from underlying ontological and epistemological premises, identity-focused studies of EU enlargement can be crudely categorized in two strands. Works (more or less) based on post-structuralist theory revolve around the necessity of differentiation in identity construction, and as such focus on boundary-drawing. They tend to approach EU enlargement from the perspective of foreign policy, and study most frequently the Self, less frequently the 'Other', and only rarely both at once.[136] Theoretical foundations of the latter (and much larger) cluster of works range across the variety of constructivisms. Rather than focusing primarily on differentiation and boundary-drawing, they have been mainly interested in (emerging) social realities, i.e. what appears to be instersubjectively shared; and/or have preoccupied themselves with change, focusing most often on the acceding countries, less so on the EU, and scarcely on both sides at once.

As outlined at this chapter's outset, this study conceptualizes EU enlargement as a process of border change – of inclusion and incorporation of 'Other'. As such, it should pay attention to both 'Self' and 'Other', both sides involved in the enlargement procedure. This is not to suggest that such a dual focus is missing in either of the two above research strands. If not explicit, it has frequently been latent. The point is rather that should both the EU 'Self' and acceding 'Other' be the primary analytical foci, neither can be reduced or prioritized.[137] Hence a study of enlargement as an inclusion of 'Other' must conceive of two subjects whose Selfhood is altered/reconstructed in the process. There are thus *two reconstructions of Self* taking place which may, and often do, temporarily partly overlap. The first, most commonly studied change takes place 'outside-EU'. It concerns *candidate's 'Europeanization'*, earlier described as a unilateral, unidirectional and multifaceted process of Self-transformation, aimed at that country's congruence with the image of an EU member projected by the EU

[136] The last category of works focus on both Self and Other and their identity-forming encounters. See for instance Rumelili 2008, or Morozov and Rumelili 2012, who did so from a constructivist perspective, blended with post-structuralist insights as regards the self/other nexus.
[137] It must be recognized that speaking schematically in the above context of the EU or a candidate country as one 'Self' is in itself already a rather 'violent' reduction thereof.

side through the criteria and other terms of accession. The latter, partly concurrent and partly subsequent reconstruction takes place 'inside-EU'. It concerns the *incorporation of the hitherto 'Other'* – the soon-to-be and later actual member – into the *enlarged EU's new 'Self'*. These two Self-transformations should be analytically separated, since neither can reach completion. Just as no new member can ever entirely match the projected (and continuously morphing) image of an EU member, so the EU side will always have to incorporate something hitherto foreign and different. Treating the two as one and the same process would amount to a reduction of both.

A number of persistent and significant limits to candidates' 'Europeanization' were suggested in the discussion of the difficulties and obstacles faced by the EC/EU culture- and identity-building action (subchapter 2.3). It pointed to the essential importance of a shared language, the foundation of national (and other) communities of communication. Various languages co-determine national (and other) discursive contexts and constellations. These co-constitute particular collective interpretative filters, which intervene in and tint collective understandings, such as those of the EU, or the EU-member image projected outwards to candidates. This is particularly important with regard to national (and still other) appropriations of EU-side discourses and their constructs, hegemonic or marginal. To be sure, constructivists and others make a valid point when presuming that EU accession and membership are conducive to new entrants' socialization into the hegemonic ways of constructing the EU, spearheaded by EU institutions and/or some 'older' members; and also that a country's membership duration may correspond to its apprehension thereof. Yet, this apprehension is structured by specific national (and other) interpretative frameworks and filters which bear upon particular perceptions and constructs of the EU. Their plurality is of course not only due to different languages (each being a discrete system of signs), but also to discrete collective histories and experiences (not just of EU accession), articulated through these languages. Moreover, these histories and experiences structure and are structured by the constructs of collective Selves. Wæver observed in this respect that the 'concepts of nation/state are peculiarly stable, because they were hammered into each country at a specific formative moment'. They have constituted interpretative frameworks and changed 'only incrementally in an evolutionary mode, on the basis of their own internal components' (2005, note 11 on pg. 43).

Consideration of changes to the EU's Self, both as an evolving constellation of constituent institutions, offices, Member States and individuals, and a multifarious

economic, political and social programme, prompted by inclusion of new members, has been often tacitly present in scholarly works. Yet, this reconstruction has been only rarely explicitly addressed from an identity perspective. This may be due to a perception that the hitherto enlargement rounds or the acceding members have never been 'influential' enough to bring about a notable change, or that the 'Europeanization' of candidates and later new members is profound enough to prevent or marginalize the potential for such a change. Despite this initial and apparently prevalent impression, the question of the EU's change brought by each expansion has not fully evaded scholarly interest. Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford described enlargement as a 'graduated and highly indeterminate process of social construction' and 'self-creation', pointing out that it 'is not just about getting bigger but is about transformation, since the EU is changing as it expands' (2005, 49). Every newly acceding country altered the Community/Union's realities and character to some extent, and influenced its future development. '[S]uccessive waves of enlargement are changing the EU itself', argued Kenneth Dyson in his enquiry into the matter, '[d]espite the asymmetry of power and conditionality involved in accession negotiations'. Each wave brought a reflection on 'the nature of the EU's identity', with questions asked anew as to '"whose EU is it?" and "What kind of EU?"'. Every enlargement prompted the EU to 'reinvent what it does', and re-opened the issues of how it sees and presents itself, and how '"older" member states relate to it' (2007, 51 and 61). Ever since its first 1973 round, enlargement has presented 'a problem of painful adaptation' for the existing members, raising 'often divisive questions' about the EU's character and its '"deepening" in institutional and policy terms' (Ibid, 51-52). Some enlargement waves have been more conducive to these kinds of questions than others, especially if they involved countries with conceptions of the purpose of the integration process (and the means to its achieving it) other than those of the Six founding members ('ever closer union' with federal features). The UK and other countries of northern Europe have persistently demonstrated more ambivalent or altogether rather minimalist views thereof. They seem to have been joined by most of the latest entrants.

One of the most prominent questions has certainly been that of changing power constellation within the enlarging EU. On the one hand, '[t]he basic institutional structures, policy beliefs and rules of the EU were established by its six founder members, the "north-west" core', with France and Germany acting as the '"engine'' of European integration'

(Dyson 2007, 62). Each expansion added to the EU members' diversity[138], and reopened the question of whether this core's power is diminishing:

> Alongside the north-west core, there are Mediterranean, Nordic and now Baltic and east central European member states (with the three Baltic States being different from the four "Visegrad" states – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – and Slovenia different again from the others). Each has different experiences of both European integration and Europeanization, not least in the geo-strategic and historical contexts, and timing of accession. There are also awkward outliers such as the UK (Ibid).

With successive enlargements, '[t]he days in which [the] relationship of north-west core and EU could be characterized as simply a combination of coexistence and mutual adaptation are disappearing. This phenomenon of a "shrinking" core is accentuated by its declining "soft" power' (Ibid).

With respect to the EC/EU foreign and security policy, 'the debate between 1961 and 1973 regarding the UK's entry precipitated an internal debate between Gaullist and Atlanticist conceptions of the EU' (Dyson 2007, 52). The 1973 'Declaration on the European Identity' was a statement on the conclusions of this debate. The 2003 division across the EU with respect to the intervention in Iraq was another example of different conceptions among the Member States. This impasse raised the well-known discussion about 'old Europe' (especially the founding members) opposing the intervention, and a pro-Atlantic 'new Europe' (most pronouncedly the 2004 entrants) endorsing it. The distinguished intervention in the debate by Habermas and Derrida (2003), speaking of 'old Europe' as 'core Europe', was paradoxically perhaps the best testament to the acknowledgement of growing diversity of views and traditions of thinking across the EU, and to the realization that this has consequences. The 2004 entrants proved their assertiveness in seeking expansion of the scope of the CFSP. They took on 'a new proactive role in pushing an EU agenda of spreading freedom and democracy through the prospect of EU membership'. Their pro-enlargement

[138] One should not underestimate the linguistic dimension of the EU's expanding internal diversity. One of its paradoxical consequences, within the EU's formally multilingual setup but practically largely '*laissez-faire*' linguistic operation, has been the rise of English as the unofficial EU *lingua franca*, to the detriment of French. This is not just a matter of language but, as Dyson suggests, of cultural power: 'French was the traditional lingua franca language of the EU across its institutions. French models also shaped the way that EU administrative organization and culture evolved'. Yet, with English becoming the most preferred working language, after the 1995 enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden, 'came the Anglo-Saxon terminology of management and economic organization. This development further accentuated the sense that the traditional north-west core was eroding' (Dyson 2007, 63). Another dimension of the rising EU diversity concerns the construction of its social model, facing at once Anglo-Saxon, Mediterranean, Nordic and Rhineland 'models of capitalism'. There has been an 'uncertainty about the relative importance of market competition and social solidarity in the EU's basic values. This issue ranges France against the UK and many east European states' (Ibid, 61).

drive has sprung from 'own historical memories as post-communist societies of isolation and suppression, and … geo-strategic interests in stabilizing their borders' (Dyson 2007, 63).

The 2004/2007 accession states have indeed proven to harbour understandings of the EU, and of its purposes, which may not be quite like those of the founding members. From the perspective of this study, focusing on EU enlargement as an inclusion of 'Other' which may precipitate alteration in the Union's Self-representation to candidates, the CEECs present a particularly pertinent case. Until the late 1980s, they were effectively isolated from Western European developments. As a matter of fact, all but two of the dozen 2004/2007 entrants stood on the 'opposite side' during Europe's bipolar Cold War division. Hence, their accession was an incorporation into the EU of components of its former 'Eastern European Other', in one way or another an important element in the hitherto construction of 'united Europe'. These countries also had the most recent and immediate experience with the present enlargement procedure. Above all, they too added to the diversity in the EU of the pool of national (and other) historical legacies, narratives and concepts, all of which have structured understandings of the EU by a given collectivity. As such, and as any other, the eastern enlargement prompted the EU's reconstruction. It can be conceived of as one prominent 'event' with the potential either to further consolidate hegemonic discourses and constructs, should new members appropriate and adopt them, or to challenge and destabilize them by means of their dissenting (or even competing) re-articulations, or altogether novel constructs.

Due to their isolation from the Western-European developments till the turn of the 1990s, and their eventual accession only about one and a half decade later, the ten CEECs were not directly exposed to, and thus largely escaped the EC/EU community- and consciousness-building practices. Aside from participating in the drafting and eventual adoption of the constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, they were not involved in any of the evolutionary steps taken in the gradual construction of what is currently the EU. Furthermore, of all the EU-27 members, they had to undergo the most comprehensive and profound transformation prior to accession. Hence, it appears not merely conceivable but quite likely that their perceptions and views may be unlike those prevalent among especially the 'old' 'Western European' members. There are several indications (discussed in the next subchapter) and thus reasons to believe that the CEECs' understandings of the EU may be at odds with, or alternatively significantly refashioning, the 'EUasEurope' equivalence constructed in their absence. They seem to be manifested in these members' comparatively higher declared support for further enlargement, or in their related general conceptions of

the purposes of European integration, often approaching, in more than few respects, the positions of the northern members.

The preceding and the present Chapters outlined and critically evaluated the potentially undesirable implications of grafting a reversely-operating, culture-infused equivalence 'EUasEurope' onto the EU's representation in the enlargement process. The primary aim of the analytical part of this study is to assess the extent of appropriation and the standing of this hegemonic identity construct in the post-communist entrants' national discursive arenas. The goal is to discern whether this equivalence has been present therein and, if so, to identify how it has been understood. The analysis must account for the post-communist members' 'Europeanization' and exposure to socializing discursive pressures in the EU, both of which may have suppressed or marginalized alternative understandings. Finally, it also ought to take into consideration that these countries may have represented their own accession differently than they have further enlargement, and that their support for the latter may be selective.

Has the EU's 2004/2007 incorporation of a large portion of its former post-/communist 'European Other' had the potential to affect its Self-representation in further enlargement? How have the post-communist CEECs understood the EU and its relation to Europe? Have they reproduced, and thus further consolidated, the hegemonic 'EUasEurope' equivalence? Have their national appropriations or re-articulations thereof attributed a novel meaning to this equivalence? Or, instead, have their respective constructs of the EU and Europe been dissident enough to challenge this discursive equation? Are there changes discernible in the manner in which they have constructed the two over time? And finally, how have they projected their conceptions of the EU, Europe, and of the integration process into their respective positions on further EU enlargement?

In order to propose answers to the above questions in the chapters to follow, the rest of this chapter will identify the scope, and develop a concrete framework and methodology of analysis, on the basis of which an examination will be undertaken in Chapters 4-7 of *the post-communist entrants' understandings of the EU, and of its relation to Europe.* The empirical analysis will focus particularly on *whether and how they have re-/articulated the hegemonic construct of equivalence between the EU and Europe.* In order to account for possible changes in their understandings thereof, the analysis will cover a relatively extensive period of time. And finally, so as to account, furthermore, for the possibility that

they have represented their own accession differently than further enlargement, and that their support thereof may be selective, the respective country analyses will include one additional step. Here, the question of the membership of Turkey, as the candidate whose 'Europeanness' has been contested the most, will be cast as a 'test case', allowing for the discernment of such conceivable inconsistencies.

3.2 Scope and Interpretative Framework of Empirical Analysis

3.2.1 Cases selection

As outlined at the end of Chapter 1, an analysis based on post-structuralist discourse theory is itself a problem-driven 'articulatory practice' in which a 'strong separation of theoretical discourse and empirical objects' diminishes (Howarth 2005, 329). This has been conducive to the tendency among discourse theorists to undertake case-based research. Another common research strategy has been to combine case studies with a method of comparison. Yet, just like the case study method, 'the practice of comparison' in discourse theory 'needs to be related to the practice of interpreting problematized phenomena' (Ibid, 332). Comparison in discourse theory must, according to Howarth, satisfy two conditions. First, as it is 'always relative to the specific problems addressed and tackled … it is necessary to specify the problems and questions to be addressed'. Secondly, 'comparative research in discourse theory cannot short-circuit its focus on historical context and concrete specificity. The basis for comparison must comprise thick descriptive interpretations of particular empirical phenomena' (Ibid).

The preceding 'orientation' section (3.1.4) reiterated that the problem identified and addressed in this study is the discursively forged hegemonic equivalence 'EUasEurope', and its possible undesirable implications for EU enlargement. It also suggested that there are reasons to believe that the EU's 2004/2007 post-communist new members may have harboured understandings of the EU, and of its relation to Europe, diverging from those prevalent in the former 'Western-European' EU-15. This study undertakes to investigate the validity of this preliminary hypothesis. It will examine the new members' conceptions of the EU, Europe, and of the integration process, and juxtapose them in the course of empirical analysis to those disseminated by EU institutions and prevalent in 'older' Western-European Member States. As such, this work will engage in a specific practice of comparison, aimed to '*desediment* and *defamiliarize* our normal understandings' of the EU 'by drawing attention to their contingent peculiarity' (Howarth 2005, 333).

So far the discussion largely focused on the official and other hegemonic discourses and constructs which made for the production of the complex 'EUasEurope' equivalence. From this point onwards, to put it in Wæver's (2009, 175) terms, it will deliberately abandon the mainstream preoccupation with 'the normality at the centre', and thus also their 'focus on the core of Europe with the assumption that it is the most influential and therefore most important'. Section 3.1.4 suggested in general terms why the CEE members present an especially interesting group in the EU with respect to the radiating 'central' discourses, and thus also the hegemonic equivalence they co-produced. Until recently, the CEECs were either entirely (till the turn of the 1990s) or partly (since then) isolated from the integration project and related wider Western-European developments. Europe's post-WW2 ideological and geopolitical division into 'Western Europe' and 'Eastern Europe' replicated the Enlightenment modernization discourse, which constructed Western Europe as 'the seat of civilization'. 'Eastern Europe', on the other hand, was assigned an ambiguous place, at once included and excluded: 'Europe, but, at the same time, not Europe'. It was Western Europe's 'complementary other half', marked by 'backwardness on a relative scale of development' (Stråth 2002, 393). During the Cold War, this manner of constructing difference between the 'two Europes' was not only revisited but reinforced by geopolitics and the structurally determinant antagonism between two competing political (ideological) programmes. In other words, their geopolitical demarcation 'converged with the ideological and economic border dividing the continent into Western-capitalist and Eastern-Communist zones (Busch and Krzyżanowski 2007, 108). With the EEC/EC at its aspiring discourse-forming centre,

> Western Europe became 'Europe', and 'Europe' was firmly part of 'the West': two overlapping concepts, easily elided. Across the Iron Curtain lay Eastern Europe: unfree Europe, Eurasian Europe, excluded by Soviet domination from 'Western' institutions. These Western institutions – the European Community and NATO, the Council of Europe and the WEU – in turn formed part of the broader 'Atlantic Community', the 'free world'. Ideology and institutional membership went together; concepts of community served as the rhetorical underpinning for both the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Communities (Wallace 2002, 78).

William Wallace's characterization of how difference was constructed between the separated Western and Eastern Europes in the Cold War years also aptly grasped the then determinant discursive structure and its guiding concepts and notions. As the following discussion, and presumably also the ensuing empirical analysis, will demonstrate, these were the key concepts and notions structuring the early 1990s post-communist CEE debates and discourses. At that time, nevertheless, they would also take on the character of floating signifiers. Their established meaning was unsettled by the speedy dislocation of the Cold War discursive structure and the disappearance of the line diving Europe in two.

From the Western-European perspective, the fall of the Iron Curtain also upset the hitherto situated social imaginary re/produced by the EC's official discourse: the EC simply being 'Europe'. There was now another part of Europe, recognized as such by the 'EC-insiders', which was simply outside the EC and affiliated Western European institutions. The 'Eastern European Other' disappeared as it dissolved. In the process of its disintegration and the symbolic emergence of a fragmented and more or less transforming CEE region headed to 'the West', 'new national states inscribed themselves on the European map'. Out of isolation, and regaining/building national independence, for the CEECs the question of 'nearness/distance from Western Europe' was a crucial consideration. According to Brigitta Busch and Michał Krzyżanowski, each state/nation has seen itself as an 'integral part of Europe, its western borders with the rest of Europe being quasi-nonexistent', while, at the same time, constructing its eastern borders as 'culturally determined' (2007, 108).

The distinction between 'two Europes' along the old and the recently past East/West dichotomy has been reproduced since the 1990s on a number of occasions. Most prominently in the 'old Europe' vs. 'new Europe' debate, sparked by the controversy across the EU over the 2003 intervention in Iraq. Interestingly, while also a number of Western European countries stood by the USA, as much as most of the CEECs did, only the latter came to be referred to as the 'new Europe'. This label has persisted since then, whereas that of 'old Europe' largely disappeared from public debates 'once the intra-European divisions' over Iraq subsided (Krzyżanowski and Galasińska 2009, 1). Yet it is essential to recognize that despite the still

> extremely strong tendency in public discourse to group or collate CEE countries into one, more or less uniform entity … that geographical region does in fact consist of a set of politically, socially, economically, linguistically and religiously very diverse countries. In each of them, sometimes very radically diverse forms of context-specific intra-national changes and transformations have taken place' (Ibid, 1-2).

With a view to the diversity of the grouping commonly referred to as the CEECs, even if limited merely to the ten post-communist 2004/2007 entrants, this work cannot aspire to cover them all in the ensuing empirical analysis. Taking into account also the time, space, and linguistic constraints, it will restrict the scope of this analysis to four countries – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary – forming together for over two decades the so-called *Visegrad Group.* There are several reasons for choosing these four countries over the remaining six, as well as opportunities this choice offers. To begin with, it is important to cover not only the years of EU candidacy but also those in the aftermath of the fall of the

communist rule. It was in these critical years when the countries' emergent political elite and politically liberated populations sought and established the key tenets of their future foreign political course. In view of this, while all the post-communist states were in need of undergoing a multifaceted transformation within their respective transitions from communism, it was least complex in the Visegrad countries which were not, as the remaining six, burdened by further dimensions of change.

The transformation processes were not in the early-1990s' Visegrad four complicated by further foreign-politically consequential issues.[139] In their case, the rearrangement of state-society relations, change of economic model, and the re/building of political and party systems along liberal-democratic lines were not requiring or even preconditioned by nation- and/or state-building (as in Slovenia and the Baltics), or substantially delayed (as in Bulgaria and Romania).[140] The Visegrad four's wider history, yet particularly the pre-1989 one of Soviet satellites located 'right beyond' or 'quite near' the boundaries of Western Europe, predisposed them to heightened sensitivity to issues of identity and belonging vis-à-vis the latter and the wider 'democratic West'. To this attest their 'successful identity-politics strategy' of rediscovering and re-establishing the concept of 'Central Europe', and 'forging themselves' into it (Neumann 1998, 401).

With regard to the intended analysis of their respective understandings of the EU, Europe, and its integration, the Visegrad countries' specificities, and their sharing of many attributes (in terms of history, security environment, politics, economy or culture) in common, are opportune. While their similarity would be a weakness from the conventional comparative perspective, it is rather desirable here, as it will decrease the complexity of pondering them together after treating each case separately first. Moreover, their specificities allow for the analysis to be better focused on the issue at hand. Considerations of their

[139] That this is a very important consideration will become clear in the (Czecho/)Slovak case, where even the relatively mitigated 'stateness' problem turned out to be of crucial significance in the 1990s.

[140] While somewhat problematic in the Slovak case, the post-1989 Visegrad countries, as opposed to Slovenia and the Baltics, did not have to undergo the foreign politically consequential processes of building anew their nation and/or state as independent of a greater political entity (Yugoslavia, the USSR/Russia) they had been hitherto part of. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia is another case. It was a quite unexpected consequence of the transformation process rather than a precondition to its taking place. The Visegrad four also share in common a relatively quick and clear break with the past communist rule (unlike Bulgaria), without, furthermore, having to first come to terms with the strong legacy of a 'sultanist' (see Linz and Stepan 1996) communist regime (like Romania). Simplifying matters, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary initiated their respective 'rapid social realignment' programmes already at the very beginning of the 1990s. The Bulgarian and Romanian governments resulting from the 1990 elections were formed not by (new) pro-transformation political forces but once again those intimately tied with the previous regime. These governments 'prioritised economic revival over social system change', as well as 'economic links with the USSR' (Gowan 2002, 31).

countries' foreign political situation and future priorities should be less preoccupied with more urgent tasks of building the state and/or nation. Their guiding 'national' conceptions of the EC/EU, Europe, and of European integration, can thus be expected to have been solidly articulated relatively early in the 1990s, if not earlier.

Lastly, the choice of these four countries facilitates the additional, control step in the intended analysis, taking as the test case the potential EU enlargement to Turkey. Since none of the Visegrad four has an important link with Turkey (in terms of immigration, trade, culture, history, and negative or positive sentiments), nor any significant direct stake in its accession, a number of potentially disruptive factors will thus be eliminated.

3.2.2 Central Europe, 'Return to Europe', and Long-Desired National Independence

The analysis undertaken in Chapters 4-7 and the interpretation of empirical data ought to be preceded, yet not determined, by a discussion at this point of two interrelated powerful Europe-bound discursive formations and of one important consideration, all of which pervaded national debates in the Visegrad countries. All three entered the debates prior to the fall of communism. All three became omnipresent in its aftermath, guiding national imaginations and the search for a new programme and future. While their heyday subsided in the course of several ensuing years, they have left a profound mark on the debates and discourses of national elites and publics, in which their larger or smaller residues are still discernible.

Of the two dispersed but overlapping discursive formations, the most consensual was the currently largely 'forgotten' concerted re/imagination of region 'Central Europe'. That its discursive construction was both highly successful and pervasive beyond this projected region is affirmed by the presently widespread social imaginary that Central Europe simply 'is' a region at the heart of the continent, although its precise contours are perspectival. The forging of Central Europe was a long and gradual process to which the present discussion cannot do justice within its constrained space. It will thus limit itself only to a number of key points which help situate many of the early 1990s foreign political and more general reflections and proposals to be found in the Visegrad countries. The 'story' of Central Europe is also crucial for better understanding of the sense of common historical predicament of the region's component states and nations, their pro-Western drive, and of their shared belief in the desirability of mutual cooperation. It also helps shed light on their ambivalent relation to

Western Europe(ans), attachment to the rest of the CEE region, and their at best bitter-sweet and at worse hostile sentiments with respect to the USSR and later Russia.

Building on the much older, with German presence intimately tied, concept of *Mittelleuropa*, the projection of 'Central Europe' took place since the late 1950s in the writings of Polish, Czech and somewhat later also Hungarian artisan and intellectual elite (Neumann 1998, 402). Rather than precisely delineated areas, both the concepts designated 'conglomerates of loosely similar imagined communities' (Neumann 1999, 147). The intellectual debate which produced Central Europe took on a new and decisive dynamic in the 1980s. In one way or another, its participants, such as Milan Kundera, Czesław Miłosz, Eugène Ionesco, Danilo Kiš, or György Konrád, argued for 'the existence of a shared Central-European culture and mentality' (IME 2009, 13) which was, just like the region thusly constructed, above all an indispensable part of 'the West'. Hence, as such, Central Europe was not and could not be an integral part of 'the East'. As Kundera put it in 1980:

> As a concept of cultural history, Eastern Europe is Russia, with its quite specific history anchored in the Byzantine world. Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, just like Austria, have never been part of Eastern Europe. From the very beginning they have taken part in the great adventure of Western civilization, with its Gothic, its Renaissance, its Reformation—a movement which has its cradle precisely in this region. It was here, in Central Europe, that modern culture found its greatest impulse ... The postwar annexation of Central Europe (or at least its major part) by Russian civilization caused Western culture to lose its vital center of gravity (quoted in Neumann 1999, 149-150).

Kundera's (1984) essay 'The Tragedy of Central Europe', addressed to 'the West', made very much the same point. Europe's post-WW2 division tore apart from the West one of its founding centres, and submitted its populations to the Soviet empire and, by implication, also to cultural and overall degradation by communism-in-practice. His essay was a call for attention to the fate of Central Europeans, and a claim for recognition, and eventually restoration, of their place in 'the West'. Western Europe was, as noted by Neumann (1999, 150) constructed 'as being … outside of itself as long as Central Europe remained in the custody of the Soviet Union'.

If culture was one prominent thread from which Central Europe was woven, then modernization and geopolitics were another and closely related ones. Since the early 1970s, a strand of Hungarian historiography started entertaining the idea that the Western part of Eastern Europe (particularly Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) was in fact at a comparatively more advanced level of development than the rest, and as such relatively more similar to Western Europe. In 1981, Hungarian historian Jenő Szűcs was the first to expressly

divide Europe in three parts: Western, Eastern, and the in-between 'Central-Eastern-Europe', each marked by a specific developmental path (IME 2009, 13). Hence, European history was a history of three regions, the Eastern one now associated primarily with Russia (Neumann 1998, 403). György Konrád, Hungarian writer, stressed the geopolitical dimension when he stated in 1988 that 'Central Europeans are all who are disturbed by the division of our continent … With the geopolitical reality of Eastern and Western Europe, Central Europe exists only as a cultural and political antithesis … Being Central European does not depend on citizenship, it depends on one's world view' (as quoted in IME 2009, 20).

It should come as no surprise that rather than on what Central Europe was, there was a greater accord among the participants in its construction as to what it was not. That it was not part of Eastern Europe was widely agreed upon. It was at the same time also clearly differentiated from Western Europe, albeit with differing degrees of intensity and underlying sentiments. While some held that culture-wise 'this part of continent basically belonged to the West', some others differentiated Central Europe on the basis of its cultural traits from both 'the East' and 'the West' (IME 2009, 20). Discourse(s) on Central Europe differentiated it from, and thus produced, two external 'Others'. One was 'the East'/'Eastern Europe', represented particularly by the USSR and, for Kundera, more profoundly by the 'totalitarian Russian civilization', the 'radical negation of the modern West'. Western Europe was construed at once as both 'Self' and 'Other' (Neumann 1999, 151). While stressing its belonging to 'the West', the Central Europe 'project' was also a moral criticism of *Western Europe*, 'reproaching it for *usurping the marker "Europe"* and arguing that it cannot do so without losing a vital (or even "organic") part of itself (Ibid, 149, emphasis added).

Central Europe was, above all, a political, developmental and cultural programme. György Schöpflin, Hungarian political scientist, deemed in 1989 that 'this identity' offered 'a way out of Soviet-type homogenization in emphasizing the European qualities of the local cultures, including above all those of pluralism and democracy'. According to him, 'despite all the major and minor variations that differentiate Central Europe from the West, the central Europe project is potentially a viable way of re-Europeanizing the area, of recovering some of the values, ideals, aspirations, solutions and practices that were eliminated by Soviet-type systems' (quoted in Neumann 1999, 147). It needs to be emphasized that the Central European programme did not always project the region's speedy 'return to the West' by means of its participation in the Western European, especially military, 'integration structures'. As a matter of fact, at the very beginning of the 1990s, with the Soviet/Russian

breath still felt from behind, a considerable if not predominant part of the emerging political elite called for the establishment of an 'in-between', 'relatively independent and free Central-European space' (IME 2009, 20).

In a 1990 speech addressed to the Polish MPs, the former prominent dissident and just newly elected Czechoslovak President Václav Havel sought the 'realization' of the idea of Central Europe through its building and transformation into a proud and equal partner of both the USSR and Western Europe:

> [T]here is before us the real historic chance to fill with something meaningful the great political vacuum that appeared in Central Europe after the break-up of the Habsburg Empire. We have the chance to transfer Central Europe from a phenomenon that has so far been historical and spiritual into a political phenomenon. We have the chance to take a string of European countries that until recently were colonised by the Soviets and that today are attempting the kind of friendship with the nations of the Soviet Union which would be founded on equal rights, and transform them into a definite special body, which would approach Western Europe not as a poor dissident or a helpless, searching amnestied prisoner, but as someone who has something to offer (quoted in Neumann 1999, 155).

That the intended formation of such a regional grouping failed to take off in the end did not mean that the construction of Central Europe failed as well. According to Neumann (1999, 156), '[i]n terms of identity politics, the project's reality was actually unimpaired by the failure of political structures to emerge; its dynamics had from its very inception lain on the interface between the imagined region and its external others, Russia and Western Europe, and continued to do so'. As a Cold War moral 'appeal and reproach' addressed to Western Europe and the wider West, 'born of frustration with the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe' (Ibid, 156 and 158), it was not only widely received by the addressees but also in fact immensely successful.

With the fall of the satellite communist regimes in the region, and eventually of the Soviet empire as such, the far-reaching impact of the Central Europe construct was clearly discernible. Upon the arrival of new post-communist governments (formed in the Visegrad countries by former dissidents), 'the arguments of the discourse on Central Europe have become part of the armory of official foreign policy'. Central Europe provided a 'framework within which appeals to Western Europe for assistance and inclusion could be made (Neumann 1999, 158). Eventually, it anchored itself as part and parcel of Western European mainstream debates and discourses on the enlargement of the EC/EU and the NATO (Ibid, 144). Since 1992 it was widely accepted that with respect to the expansion of the two organizations, there was 'the need to privilege a region now referred to as Central Europe'. Hence, Central Europe 'has not only become firmly entrenched as a term, but it has also

contributed to propelling the states that ostensibly make it up to the forefront of the queue of EU applicant states' (Ibid, 143).

The second and closely related influential discursive formation, not only in the Visegrad countries but across the CEE region, was the late-1980s and early-1990s shared narrative of 'return to Europe'. Some have taken this slogan as the affirmation of the EC/EU's formative influence on the continent, a testament to the emerging equivalence between the two. This is, however, at best a harsh simplification and at worst a selective misreading of the slogan, due to an overestimation of the EC's importance for the just-independent post-communist countries. At least in the Visegrad countries, 'return to Europe' denoted a long-term and multi-step comprehensive programme of transformation and foreign political realignment. As such, the programme itself, yet especially the particular steps it comprised, turned out to be the primary objects of confrontation among the re/emerging political forces. Hence, while it is possible to claim that 'return to Europe' framed political debates and discourses of the early 1990s, it would be unfounded to claim that there was a wide consensus on the composition, and sometimes even the desirability, of its attendant programme. In view of this, and in order not to prejudge the following empirical analysis, the present discussion ought to remain rather superficial.

It must be stressed that if not all the CEE then certainly the Visegrad national elite and publics had no doubt about their place in Europe as historical, cultural, and/or geographic space. More than that, as suggested in the discussion on Central Europe, they accused and reproached Western Europeans for 'usurping' Europe for themselves. 'Return to Europe' was in essence about re/uniting Europe, about overcoming its post-WW2 'artificial' or 'unnatural' division.[141] For Visegrad societies, taking part in the process of European integration was certainly the most prominent way towards achieving this goal but it did not, at least in the initial post-communist years, necessarily include EC membership. It took some time till there emerged (prevalent) consensus on that EU entry was a crucial if not (at least for them) the final step in that direction.

Fundamentally, in the early 1990s, when this narrative was omnipresent in the Visegrad countries, 'return to Europe' most immediately designated a larger 'return to the West'. It symbolized their exit from the Soviet/Russian sphere, and the renewal of their

[141] Reflecting its general understanding in the Visegrad countries, in 1996, Felipe González, the Spanish Prime Minister till that year, spoke of enlargement to the CEECs as of 'great reunification' through which 'Europe will be reconciled with her own history' (as quoted by Piedrafita 2006, 56).

alignment and tying of their futures with the 'democratic West'. This in practice meant turning to the other side – Western Europe and the more distant United States – and entering the existing 'European and Euro-Atlantic structures', among which the NATO and the EU were considered most prominent. Wallace pointed to the other version of this slogan – to 'rejoin the West' which, according to him, 'implied *both* to recover their links with Western culture and "civilization" *and* to negotiate full membership of Western institutions' (2002, 78). Hence, it appears fairly plausible that the understanding of the EU in these countries may have been far from or even quite at odds with perceiving it *as* Europe. While it is not possible to dismiss the idea that some of those identifying with this programme may have understood 'return to Europe' as their countries' 'entering Europe', that 'Europe' was not the EU itself but rather the Western European politico-socio-economic model.

Finally, the one shared, highly influential and persistent consideration pervading the Visegrad countries', if not all the CEECs', foreign political reflections has been an intense concern for the maintenance of their relatively newly re/gained national independence and sovereignty. This directly relates to their (intensity-wise variable) desire to protect and nurture national identities and cultures. This preoccupation with independence, but also the position and equal treatment of the respective nation/state by others, has its roots in some deep-seated sentiments still to be found in (at least) the Visegrad countries. Large segments of local populations and of political elite narrate their national histories as those in the shadow of powerful neighbours deciding about their future. They have perceived the post-WW2 division of Europe as historical injustice, perpetrated against their will, and resulting in their subjugation to the Soviet empire, the primary reason for their relative backwardness. It is from these sentiments, and the resulting foreign political pragmatism, if not 'realism', that their caution vis-à-vis Western Europeans and the integration process have sprung. These combined with an experience of inferiority in the EU accession process, and a subsequent sense of relative weakness as members, to make for the so-called 'Euroscepticism' of these countries. It is perhaps more pertinent to speak in this regard of their ambivalence with respect to the desired character of the EU. The countries have manifested a comparatively high resistance to the EU-bound culture- and identity-building efforts, as well as to further transfers of competences to Brussels, dismissively designated by some of the more radical opponents 'the new Moscow'.

3.2.3 National Constructions of Convergence/Divergence between the EU and Europe

Recognizing that there are, in fact, multiplicity of territorially and otherwise more specific discursive spaces that co-constitute national understandings of the EU, and of its relation to Europe, the following analysis will focus only on the most aggregate, national discursive spaces. These are the most relevant from the perspective of this work, due to the organization of decision-making in the EU. Key decisions with respect to its character, internal arrangement and further enlargement require Member States' unanimity. At least in the case of the four countries under scrutiny, the crucial debates on the positions they have taken as candidates vis-à-vis the EU, and as Member States on such EU matters, have principally been the national in scope. The mapping of national discursive spaces is, nonetheless, in itself an immense task, accomplishment of which can only be more or less partial. With regard to this complexity, the level of abstraction, but also the space and time constraints of this study, the analysis undertaken in Chapters 4-7 must limit itself only to an (ideally well-balanced) coverage of dominant, most widespread, and thus the most influential discourses pervading the national discursive spaces in the Visegrad countries (see section 3.3.1 for explication of the manner of their identification).

These will be investigated in their capacity as articulations of meaning which they invest in *the EU* as a myth and floating signifier (by linking and differentiating signs). The key objective of the analysis will be to discern the nature of the relationship constructed by these national discourses between the EU and *Europe*, itself also a myth and floating signifier. The goal is, more precisely, to identify whether and how they have built and equivalence or difference between the two.

This practice of interpretation will most likely face and thus have to tackle one particular difficulty. As the orders of discourse pertaining to the construction of the EU and of Europe often overlap, it is predictable that their respective representations may be co-articulated, interdependent, or otherwise inter-fused and tied together. In other words, Europe may be a crucial organizing point in the construction of the EU, and vice versa. Consequently, whereas the primary analytical foci are national representations of the EU, these may be in some fashion tied to, but not inevitably equated with, constructs of Europe. Additionally, tied together, the two constructs are also likely to be hierarchically organized as superior/inferior to one another.

Hence, the question presents itself as to how should this potential difficulty arising from the structuration of national discourses be addressed: how to analytically separate the EU and Europe constructs should they be articulated in parallel, or should, at the same time, either of them be deemphasized or somehow bracketed in particular (clusters of) texts. Since each discourse and, above all, each text is unique, it is impossible to provide an answer to this problem which would be generally applicable. In contrast, there is a reason to believe that a general answer would be in fact detrimental. Interpretation is necessarily an arbitrary exercise. It may be therefore desirable to limit it to each particular text rather than to seek to formulate a general rule which would only add to the degree of arbitrariness by partly pre-determining how all the texts should be read. Still, it is both possible and appropriate at this point to specify certain interpretative schemes which would allow for a greater consistency of analysis and interpretation across the empirical material. Particularly valuable are in this respect the findings and insights of one already existing study of the constructions of convergence and divergence between the EU and Europe.

Structuration of discourses along an EU-Europe convergence/divergence axis was the main focus of Krzyżanowski's DHA analysis of semi-private interviews among the participants at the second, constitutional Convention. Conducted on the basis of a CDA/DHA theoretical and analytical framework, it focused on the convergent/divergent visions/conceptions of the EU/Europe presented by individual actors, situated in a particular context, and especially on their argumentation schemes (*topoi*) and strategies. As neither the elaborately structured textual analysis nor agents' argumentation schemes and strategies bear upon the research interests of this study, the ensuing discussion will only summarize the author's most general and 'abstract' findings. In order to do so, however, it should be stressed that, in line with the research programme to which it subscribed, Krzyżanowski's analysis was based on (at least partly) pre-conceived analytical categories. The presentation of its findings must thus begin by laying out how it conceived of the EU, Europe, and of the convergence and divergence constructed between them by the conventioneers.

In the analysis, the EU was understood as a 'set of institutions and as a political organisation', and Europe broadly as a 'European space … designated by non-institutional and non-strictly-political features' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 100). Construing their *convergence* (partial equalization), speakers linked 'the current state and the future development of the entire European space to the progress and correct functioning of the institutions of the

European Union'. Hence, the EU appeared to be 'the key for the future development of the whole of Europe'. Through their rhetorical strategies, speakers would

> aim to attach the positively-connotated signifier "Europe" to their description of the political project of the EU … to create a certain *balance* in claiming that both Europe and the EU are politically-meaningful concepts, with one of them (the EU) remaining politically-operational, and the other (Europe) being endowed with some broader and far-reaching historical-political (and other) meaning(s). Hence, the speakers are emphasising the actual political meaning already possessed by the EU, which can be further broadened by linking it with Europe as a further, positive connotation of the (politically-efficient) EU (Ibid).

In contrast, constructing *divergence* ('partially *contradicting and juxtaposing Europe and the EU*') were those conceptions/visions which 'although clearly recognising the importance of the Union, [saw] it as a political and organisational superstructure of the already existing European space'. The EU was seen as 'facilitating and enhancing contacts between European nation-states (whose role is clearly emphasised) while clearly perceiving Europe as predominantly constitutive of (and definable through) its traditions, culture, geography, religion and other features' (Ibid, 101). A difference was articulated between the two:

> [T]he speakers construct an "imbalance" which creates a vision that either Europe or the EU is a politically meaningful concept. Thus, the speakers (implicitly and explicitly) argue that the constructed divergence proves that one (or both) of the concepts is actually devoid of any deeper political meaning: in some cases the EU would be deprived of such meaning while Europe would be portrayed as a forceful and polysemous concept, while in other (far fewer) instances, it would be claimed that Europe is a meaningless place which is thus divergent from the more evocative EU' (Ibid, 102).

Summarizing his findings on the visions constructing convergence, Krzyżanowski concluded that they were 'mainly based on arguments which allow mixing of the features of Europe and the EU, and which plead for the fact that the EU constitutes a unique mirror of the European space'. '[T]he unity of Europe' could be achieved only within the EU. The two were frequently nominally mixed and/or exchanged. The 'main force' od this 'convergent EU-rope' resided in 'the Union's force in organising Europe by facilitating co-operation between its elements and in constructing the EU's future form' (Ibid, 129). The divergence visions were, in contrast,

> almost entirely based on reiterating the unique role of the nation state as a locus of Europe's identity …, as a basic unit of the future construction of Europe …, and as a basic unit of Europe perceived as a conglomerate of states located within Europe's common and clearly outlined geography (Ibid).

They clearly identified Europe as a 'space composed of culture, heritage, religion and identity', while perceiving the EU 'in some strictly organisational aspects, i.e. as a facilitator of cooperation between European nation-states or as a problem-solving task force'. Moreover, many of these speakers denied the building of a 'EU-ropean super-state', being

'very cautious or realist in their projections for the immediate form and content of any finality of the EU-ropean project' (Ibid).

Both the convergence and divergence visions conceptually differentiated between Europe and the EU, the latter being 'a certain form of political organisation of the former'. Yet, in divergence constructs, that 'political organisation' was 'mainly embodied by the nation state [i.e. "the key element of Europe"]', whereas the EU was 'only a superstructure facilitating inter-state co-operation on a pan-European scale', its role being 'limited to solving a set of clearly functional problems'. The convergence group, in contrast, saw Europe's political organization as 'embodied by the EU', itself constructing or articulating Europe politically as a 'unitary collective', while describing nation-states as 'part of that EU'. They saw Europe, 'allowing for all its inherent polysemy and meaningfulness', as a 'larger entity whose features can easily be linked to the EU, yet not solely through the bridge of the nation-state level' (Ibid, 129-130).

Krzyżanowski's study indeed provides several useful directions or schemes which may enhance coherence and consistency of the ensuing analysis and interpretation of empirical data. The former, nonetheless, should not guide the latter. Perhaps most important is the finding that while the convergence/equivalence conceptions of the EU and Europe are likely to project them both as 'politically meaningful', the ones of divergence/difference are likely to deny this quality to one of them, primarily the EU. The latter may be interpreted throughout the analysis as *discursive prioritization*, a projection of (political or other) precedence and superiority of one construct to which the latter is in some way subordinated.

Other useful point is that the EU is likely to be generally perceived as 'a certain form of political organization' of Europe. Yet, on the one hand, the constructions of equivalence between them would be prone to conceiving of the EU as a 'key for the future development of the whole of Europe', and to nominally and features-wise intermixing or interchanging the two under the perception that 'the EU constitutes a unique mirror of the European space'. On the other, representations building difference between the EU and Europe are likely to lay emphasis on ('discursively prioritize') the variably woven constructs of Europe inhabited by nation-states. Such articulations would tend to stress the nation/-state as a 'locus of Europe's identity', a basic component unit of Europe and of 'the future construction of Europe'. While recognizing the EU's importance, they are likely to project more (if not altogether) intergovernmental visions thereof. As such, they can be expected to 'reduce' it

to ‘a political and organisational superstructure of the existing European space’; facilitating and enhancing contacts, cooperation and joint problem-solving among member nation-states; and ‘limited to solving a set of clearly functional problems’. Politically, the nation-state, ‘the key element of Europe’, would be the key organizing unit of the EU. Such conceptions of the EU exhibit clear traits of the suggested analytical Model 1 category constructions thereof (detailed in section 3.1.1).

One more expectation which can be derived from Krzyżanowski’s work is that particular (clusters of) texts are likely to construct a temporal difference between continent Europe and the EU: the former’s conceptions being ‘presence’ or ‘the present’, while the latter’s being future-oriented. From this springs the final useful insight. In the texts under scrutiny, the EU constructs/conceptions may take the form of certain future-bound ‘visions’. Nevertheless, in cases of ‘discursive prioritization’ of Europe, to which the EU constructs would be subordinated, these visions might be in fact articulated as ‘visions Europe’.

3.3 Organization and Methodology of Discourse Analysis

3.3.1 Mapping National Discursive Spaces by Proxy: Political Party Elite

The general goal of discourse analysis in Chapters 4-7 is *not* a text-oriented ‘retroduction’ – identification or reconstruction – of a series of already pre-conceived and characterized (template) discourses on the basis of their manifestation in textual data. It is rather a partial mapping of national discursive spaces through identification of main discourses pertaining to dominant national representations of the EU and of its relation to Europe. This task will be performed by a proxy: initial identification of several prominent subjects in the national discursive spaces, and an ensuing examination of their respective representations of the above. In a sense, it will be these subjects who identify which discourses and understandings are nationally prevalent. The desired ‘end product’ of this interpretation practice is the aggregation of such representations across texts produced by each subject under scrutiny into their particular, more or less coherent projected ‘images’ of the EU and Europe. This is, put differently, an exercise in at least partially identifying their respective EU/Europe-bound discourses (orderings of elements and their fixations as moments). These may (but also may not) exhibit larger or lesser fragments of national appropriations of EU- or Europe-wide discourses, some of which were discussed in Chapter 2. This is, in the end, the core question addressed by this work, answered in its Conclusions: whether and how do main national discourses in the Visegrad countries articulate a ‘EUasEurope’ equivalence, and with what

implications for their respective conceptions and projections of further EU enlargement. Chapters 4-7 will first assemble the 'images' of the EU and Europe produced by given chosen subjects, and then *aggregate but not 'distil'* (so as not to excessively distort) these individual images into larger, national ones. It will be only the final Conclusions unit which will seek to put together the 'common' Visegrad countries' mosaic 'images' of the two.

The prominent national subjects will be selected from among the political elite in each country. Acknowledging that political elite are not the only group which can be studied in the present context, this choice is made under the assumption that these subjects' representations already are more or less representative aggregates of individual and group 'images', produced within more specific collectivities and constituencies. Political elite discourses are 'intertwined' with the public ones, 'both feeding into each other' (Aydın Düzgit 2008, 56). On the one hand, political elite, especially through media, wield significant and often formative influence on the opinions and perceptions of national publics. At the same time, as suggested by Aydın Düzgit, 'they also react to the shifting discourses among different social groups in the public' (Ibid, 70). Hansen (2006, 6-7) aptly remarked in this respect: 'It would … be extremely unlikely – and politically unsavvy – for politicians to articulate foreign policy without any concern for the representations found within the wider public sphere as they attempt to present their policies as legitimate to their constituencies'. Moreover, national political elite represent a certain 'meeting point' between the discourses and representations circulating in each country and those emanating from the EU side. As members of governments, parliaments and yet other national institutions they have been directly involved with the EU and its institutions, both during their countries' accession process and ensuing membership. They have thus been most directly exposed to on-going EU-wide debates and political struggles over the EU's 'presence' and 'future', as well as to learning and social pressures (discursive and yet other) radiating from and within the EU.

The chosen national subjects will be the *main political forces* (most often organized as parties) competing in post-communist, 'democratic' national elections to the lower chambers of parliaments between 1990 and 2010 (1991 and 2011 in Poland).[142] Their selection is, of course, an arbitrary practice, which in itself already partly pre-determines the findings arrived at. It will be guided for the present purposes by an impartial, yet still arbitrary, *ad hoc* selection rule: as 'main' will be considered the *two top-ranking political*

[142] For a consideration of the need to cover this entensive period of two decades, refer to the next section (3.3.2).

subjects in any of the seven (six in Hungary) *national elections throughout the above specified period* of time, while *excluding one-time electoral coalitions of subjects other than them*. The application of this rule produces a total number of 19 political subjects.[143]

Two particular reasons, specific to the Visegrad countries, make the choice of main political parties the most appropriate. Aiming to cover in the analysis also the 'formative years', early-to-mid 1990s, one faces the difficulty of identifying reliable primary sources from this period which could be deemed relevant also in the aftermath of democratic transition and consolidation, and of EU accession. Choosing main political parties (or their likes) as the sources of empirical information appears to be the most pertinent 'solution' in this situation. Not only because (relative) continuity may be reasonably expected in both their existence and general attitudes, but also because of the unique position and role which the re/emergent parties (or the like political formations) assumed in the early-to-mid 1990s.[144] Many of them having originated in anti-communist pro-transition and pro-democracy umbrella movements of newly emerging political forces, they became the main drivers of the multidimensional transformation processes. Furthermore, in the post-revolutionary absence of personally more or less stable diplomatic corps, and of other more 'professional' and established agencies, consensual long-term goals of which only started being sought and formulated, these political subjects played a similarly significant role in the transformation of the countries' foreign policies.

[143] Not all of them were active throughout the entire period. Anti-communist pro-transition umbrellas won the Czech and Slovak 1990 elections but soon fragmented, as new ideologically profiled political parties started forming within them to eventually break free and secede. After having served their most immediate purpose – the removal of communists from power – they were, so to speak, 'overcome' by their more or less partial successors. Furthermore, the party systems in Poland and Slovakia demonstrated a rather high degree of instability. In both countries, two new parties emerged around the turn of the 2000s which significantly affected (if not dominated) party competition and the making of domestic and foreign policies till the decade's end. The analysis will specifically cover four parties/party-equivalent-subjects in the *Czech Republic*: the Civic Forum and the Czechoslovak Communist Party/Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (since 1990), and the Civic Democratic Party and the Czech Social Democratic Party (since 1992); six in *Slovakia*: the Public Against Violence, the Democratic Left Party, and the Christian Democratic Movement (since 1990), the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (since 1992), the Direction/-Third Way/-Social Democracy (since 1999), and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union/-Democratic Party (since 2000); five in *Poland*: the Democratic Union, the Polish People's Party, and the Democratic Left Alliance (at latest since 1991), as well as the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform (since 2001); and finally four parties in *Hungary*: the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Alliance of Young Democrats/-Hungarian Civic Party, the Alliance of Free Democrats/-Hungarian Liberal Party, and finally the Hungarian Socialist Party (all at latest since 1990).

[144] Due to the nature of the post-totalitarian communist state-society relations, there were, with the exceptions of larger or smaller dissident groups, embryonic civil societies, or 'second cultures', virtually no alternative political and foreign political actors (non-affiliated with the previous regime) to be found in these countries (Linz and Stepan 1996). In this vacuum, the re/emergent parties (or politically equivalent subjects) and their prominent figures assumed the most important and formative functions.

Before turning (in the next section) to the question of what corpus of empirical data is examined, two more important points should be addressed. It is first necessary to clarify the 'depth' or 'orientation' of the ensuing discourse analysis: its treatment of political subjects and their discourses. To reiterate, the textual analysis aims to 'summon' and aggregate fragments of the said 'images' of the EU and Europe as constructed, first, by a given political subject, and then, nationally. Its guiding objective thus diverges from the most common discourse analytical goal of in-depth examination of the construction of subjects and/or their discourses *themselves*: in their historicity, and in full consideration of their respective linkages to earlier and concurrent discourses and texts, as produced by other subjects in various contexts. This is not to say that this focus is missing from the analytical chapters. The point is rather that the investigation of intertextualities and interdiscursivities is not comprehensive but rather limited to the extent necessary for this study to address its research problem. More precisely, to the extent needed for it to establish whether, how, and what 'particles' co-producing 'EUasEurope' equivalence (identified in Chapter 2) were appropriated, possibly recontextualized, and included in particular subject and national discourses and representations. This interpretative endeavour will be aided by a reflection of the already discussed widespread and pervasive 'Central Europe' and 'return to Europe' discursive constellations, and the Visegrad countries' common preoccupation with national independence and sovereignty (section 3.2.2); as well as the deployment, where appropriate, of the partly pre-conceived interpretative schemes (3.2.3).

The last matter to address at this point is the restrained contextual and historical framing of this enquiry. Beyond a summary timeline of the development of relations between the Visegrad four and the EU (at the end of this section), and brief national 'introductions' opening Chapters 4-7, no further accounts of historical and other national background information are proposed prior to the empirical analysis itself. The key reason for proceeding in this way is to prevent what can otherwise be anticipated: such accounts would guide, pre-judge and (at least partly) pre-determine how the textual data would be read and interpreted. This would be highly detrimental and thus undesirable from the perspective of this study's research interests. The aim is instead, to use a common cliché, to 'let the political subjects speak'. That is, it should not be the analyst but rather the subjects under scrutiny themselves who identify, through the texts they produced, what historical and other 'background' information is relevant for their respective conceptions of the EU, Europe, and of their relationship. The intervention (or the 'violence' committed) by the analyst ought to remain

restricted to the more or less arbitrary (and empirical-data-driven) practice of interpretation of texts, discourses and representations.

Still, it is desirable to both complement and compare the findings arrived at in the course of the empirical analysis, reported in final subchapter of each national study, with relevant additional information, and findings and insights provided by other available studies. Their presentation and discussion is attached as supplementary second part of that final subchapter. Their inclusion enriches the mapping of national discursive spaces, and of the understandings of the EU and Europe found therein. Hence, their additional input allows the Conclusions unit to draw more solid and better-balanced conclusions when putting the national findings together.

It now remains to temporarily situate this investigation by presenting a brief timeline of the unfolding relationship between the Visegrad countries and the EU. Hungary and Poland established formal contacts with the EC already in the last years of communist rule. Just like in the Czechoslovak case, however, their relations could take on an unrestrained character only after the fall of communism and the countries' gradual extrication from external (Soviet) interference in domestic and foreign policy-making. In 1991, the four countries signed the so-called Visegrad Declaration, establishing a framework for mutual cooperation and coordination of foreign policies. Its primary aims were to facilitate transformation and to accelerate the countries' incorporation in the 'Euro-Atlantic structures'. Ever since then, the only exception being Slovakia's delayed accession process, the four countries' relations with the EC/EU followed very much the same timeline. Their association, 'Europe Agreements' with the EC were signed at the end of that year.[145] After the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia, two new, separate agreements were signed with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Hungary and Poland applied for full EU membership in 1994, Slovakia in 1995, and the Czech Republic in 1996. In 1997, the EU excluded Slovakia (failing to satisfy the political Copenhagen Criteria) from among the (so-called 'Luxembourg') group of states to commence accession negotiations in 1998. It was eventually included in the 1999 second (so-called 'Helsinki') group, accession talks with which began in 2000. Accession negotiations were formally concluded at the 2002 Copenhagen European Council summit, and the Treaty of Accession was signed in April

[145] For an account of the Visegrad countries' disenchantment with the terms of association proposed by the EC, refer for instance to Gowan 2002, 34-36.

2003. That same year, successful national referenda were held on the Treaty's ratification[146], allowing the countries to accede the EU in May 2004. It should also be noted that the Czech Republic assumed the rotating (EU Council) Presidency in the first half of 2009, and Hungary and Poland in the first and second half of 2011 respectively.

3.3.2 Corpus of Select Textual Data

With its all-inclusive conception of discourse, discourse theory allows discourse analysis to 'treat *all data as text*', be they of linguistic or non-linguistic (e.g. social practices, images, buildings, etc.) character (Howarth 2005, 335-336). All empirical data are conceived of as 'sets of signifying practices that constitute a "discourse" and its "reality"'. They are analysed as 'discursive forms' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 4). For the present research purposes, nevertheless, the corpus of analysed texts remains more 'conventional', as it comprises solely linguistic data. The absolute majority of the texts covered in the analysis are programmatic documents of the select political subjects (parties and their likes). Making for their key importance for this enquiry is their intimate bond with the very parties that produce them. They are produced, in other words, only so long as the subjects intend to compete in elections, and thus to remain politically relevant.

It is most prominently through their programmatic documents that parties represent (and thus construct) themselves as specific collective political subjects to national publics. They provide parties with the greatest space to locate themselves in national politics; to differentiate themselves from other political subjects by identifying points of mutual contention, and thus of the antagonism driving party competition. Moreover, party programmes are in themselves outcomes of intra-party negotiations, and their adoption conventionally requires approval by relevant party representative organs. They are, as such, products of a larger or lesser intra-party consensus, aggregating (and to some extent also harmonizing) elements of individual and group discourses – ideologies, worldviews, ideas, understandings, positions, etc. – all of which profile parties as this or that political subject.

Since they all serve the same purpose, a primary (although not exclusive) focus on party programmatic documents provides the ensuing empirical analysis with the greatest opportunity to address all (or almost all) of the points of interest to this study. Above all, this focus allows it to work with the same kind of texts, equivalent in form, across political

[146] This step was supported by 83% Hungarians, 92% Slovaks, and 77% of both Poles and Czechs.

subjects and countries and, most significantly with respect to possible changes in discourse and/or perspective, across time.

Party programmatic documents represent a peculiar genre of texts, with specific content and style, as well as a particular 'rationale' shaping 'the schematic structure' of the discourse they put forth (Hansen 2006, 57). They exhibit a number of traits making them the most pertinent texts to be covered for the present purposes. To begin with, they are perhaps the most prominent means for the parties to communicate themselves and their positions on myriad national (and other) topics and issues. They are designed to attract votes by 'hailing' potential or existing supporters.[147] As such, they are written, in the majority of cases, in a relatively accessible language. This is especially valuable with respect to the feasibility of the established analytical objective of assembling the select subjects' respective 'images' or 'visions' of the EU and Europe. Most importantly in this regard, party programmes are doubtless the richest sources to feed the examination of their discourses, and the symbolic representations they articulate.

Fundamentally, parties regularly update their programmes. So as to keep serving their main purpose – hailing voters – they ought to reflect on (and ideally propose responses to) past and anticipated events, developments, problems and challenges of national relevance. Their longitudinal coverage will therefore allow the empirical chapters to identify and investigate possible changes in the subjects' own character and political profiles, and most importantly, to account for the possible changes in their discourses and representations, if and as they evolved over time.

If party programmatic documents are equivalent in their purpose and form, they significantly diverge content- and quality-wise. For various reasons, such as the parties' communication styles, or characteristics of the target groups addressed by them, some texts are very long, detailed and elaborate, while others are relatively brief and often reduced in their expressiveness to presentations of short 'bullet-point' statements and positions.

The investigated dataset comprises four types of programmatic documents produced by the select 19 political subjects. Three of them recur and are regularly updated. By far the largest portion of the textual corpus is formed either by national elections manifestos, or, if

[147] In and through their programmes, political subjects tend to 'tap into' public sentiments, debates and discourses. They often need to reflect on and refer to them in their efforts to propose, and to provide publicly accessible and understandable justification of, their programmes and choices in a variety of policy areas.

available, long-term comprehensive programmes. Hypothetically the most valuable for the present purposes are the most EU-specific regular documents - the EP elections manifestos (hereafter referred to simply as 'euromanifestos'). Indeed, many of the 19 subjects presented their understandings of, and positions vis-à-vis the EU and the debates on its present and future character, most elaborately precisely in these texts. For some, on the other hand, 'euromanifestos' were just another opportunity for attending to essentially national conflicts and controversies. Some other parties, still, basically reproduced the manifestos of the respective EP fraction they were part of, with little if any input of their own. The latter tendency was observed especially among the intensely cooperating socialist and social-democratic parties, and to a lesser extent among those affiliated with the programmatically and ideologically less coherent largest EP fraction of center-right conservative, often Christian democratic, parties. Finally, the most desirable, yet irregular and rarely available, fourth kind of documents are specialized texts, focused either generally on foreign policy matters, or more narrowly on the EU/European integration.

The corpus of analyzed texts was formed in two steps, the first being the collection of all available programmatic documents made public by the subjects.[148] In the latter step, some texts were eliminated from consideration, either due to the very general and/or limited (and thus inconsequential) information they provided, or because their relevant statements merely replicated those of earlier texts. Duplicity was rather frequent, especially among consecutive texts produced within few years. The analytical chapters approach it as follows: in the case that consecutive documents are content-wise identical or very similar, presented is the content of the earlier document, and only important additions by later documents are accounted for.[149]

I was earlier hypothesized that national understandings of the EU could change over time. So could the political subjects themselves and, in the process, also their discourses, and the symbolic representations or 'visions' of the EU and Europe they constructed. In

[148] This turned out to be a very difficult process, particularly with respect to the early-1990s texts. Some of the subjects active at that time no longer exist. A number of parties also restrict the collection of documents available from their websites only to the most recent ones. Fortunately, most of the unavailable documents could be accessed either from the databases of the Manifesto Project, the Euromanifestos Project, or some other on-line archives or alternative sources.

[149] It is worth noting that almost all the political subjects produced one or two key documents with respect to their representations of the EU and Europe (either 'euromanifestos' or national programmes prior to the elections preceding EU accession). Another interesting observation is that EU-matters were discussed predominantly in the foreign policy sections. It was only in the years preceding EU accession, and particularly in those in its aftermath, that 'the EU' started pervading the texts in their entirety.

order to account for and investigate such changes, the ensuing analytical chapters cover texts from an extensive period of two decades of 'democratic' elections (1990/1991-2010/2011).[150] This longitudinal coverage allows them to examine national discursive spaces throughout the entire process of the transformation of the Visegrad countries' relationship with the EC/EU: form the fall of communism and the very early-1990s' 'formative years'; through the periods of their association and potential candidacy, actual candidacy and accession negotiations; to their eventual accession. The countries' accession brought a crucial qualitative change in their position vis-à-vis the EU, shifting their status from 'outsider' candidates to 'insider' members. It is therefore presumable that the period of time surrounding and following this alteration of the mutual relationship was particularly ripe for further elaboration or modification of political subjects' discourses on and conceptions of the EU. This is one of the two main reasons why it is imperative that the analysis covers also the years of the countries' membership (2004-2010/2011).

As for the second key reason, it was also hypothesized that the select political subjects could represent the eastern enlargement, that is, their own countries' EU accession, differently that they did further enlargement to other countries once 'inside-EU'. In other words, they could compose one 'image' of the EU, applicable to their countries, but diverge from this 'image' when conceiving of enlargement to other states. To control for this possibility, the individual analyses of subjects active after 2004 include one additional step, focused, for the reasons already stated, on the 'test case' of Turkey's potential EU membership. The inclusion of this step is necessary for this study to establish in its conclusions whether such plausible changes in the chosen subjects' understandings of the EU, of its relation to Europe; and in their attendant conceptions of enlargement; manifested approximation to, or appropriation of the EU institutions' and 'older' members' hegemonic ways of representing them. This will allow the Conclusions unit to substantiate and solidify its assessment of the standing of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence in the Visegrad countries, and to draw conclusions which may hold also for some other new CEE members.

Since the question of Turkey's EU accession has (with few exceptions) largely evaded national debates and party competition in the Visegrad countries, statements on it were missing from the programmatic documents of many political subjects. For this reason,

[150] The temporal coverage of empirical material is further extended in the case of all the chosen Hungarian, but also some of Polish, political parties/party-equivalents which were already active few years prior to the first fully competitive 'democratic' elections of 1990/1991.

the last, 'Turkey sections' of the analyses of parties active after 2004 have to seek additional party-relatable sources of empirical information. If available, these sections cover declarations and other official statements delivered either by the parties themselves or their prominent figures (on the parties' behalf). In those cases where the information obtained is still inadequate, they further include public speeches of or interviews with individual party representatives. These are in themselves genres of texts with traits and conventions different from party programmatic documents. This is, nevertheless, not of significant consequence for the present analysis. For one thing, the additional textual data are covered only in its comparatively minor part and in relation to one particular issue. And, above all, the difference in genre affects neither the focus of the analysis on symbolic representations nor its reading and interpretation of texts (detailed in the ensuing section).

A potentially much greater problem arises, in contrast, from the fact that many of the available statements on Turkey were uttered by party representatives occupying executive posts (Prime Ministers, ministers, or Presidents). In such cases, the extent to which these utterances represented the view of a given party needs to be qualified and assessed. This evaluation is always party-specific, and performed on the basis of the findings arrived at in the analysis of programmatic documents, and in consideration of the composition of governmental coalitions at the time.

Finally, there are also very few parties which proposed no statement on Turkey at all. In these rare cases, the analysis covers available statements of those party members which did express a position on the matter (most commonly the MEPs). Taking their views as fully representative of party positions would be unwarranted. On the other hand, the silence of parties is, in a sense, also a statement in itself.

3.3.3 Detailed Analytical Focus and the Reading of Texts: Symbolic Representations

It remains to specify how Chapters 4-7 approach texts and the statements they comprise. To reiterate, the primary goal of their reading and interpretation is first to assemble the 'images' (symbolic representations) of the EU and of Europe construed by particular political subjects, and then to aggregate these individual images into collective, more or less representative, national 'images' thereof.

It is important to stress that whereas it is impossible to isolate political subjects' intentions and motives from their discourses, texts and statements, the former are in

themselves not of concern to the ensuing discourse analysis. Discussing construction of subjectivity 'in and through texts', Howarth drew on Lacan and Roland Barthes and proposed a heuristic distinction between 'the statement (*énoncé*) and the act of saying or the enunciation (*énonciation*)' (2005, 343). This is a distinction between two discourse analytical foci, and between two corresponding ways of treating the speaking subject. Many discourse analyses, perhaps most characteristically those written within the CDA framework, focus on the '*act* of enunciating', that is, 'the acts of saying or writing, in which the subject is constituted or subverted by the act itself'. These are analyses of what are commonly termed 'speech' or 'illocutionary' acts. They focus on the 'pragmatic dimension of language – what a subject is doing when saying something', and as such often 'centre on the *intentions* of those making or uttering statements'. This kind of investigation 'requires an analysis of the historical contexts within which such illocutionary acts take place, so as to reconstruct the background conventions and conditions against which the utterances can be interpreted' (Ibid, 343-344).

The ensuing discourse analysis focuses, in contrast, on statements rather than their authors, on what was written and said rather than on why. It seeks to assemble into larger abstract 'images' the particles of select political subjects' symbolic representations of the EU and Europe. As such, it treats 'the subject of the enunciation' as 'a finished product through which language speaks' (Howarth 2005, 343); and disregards its motives, argumentation schemes and strategies.[151]

The analytical chapters focus on subject and national symbolic representations of the EU and Europe. In discourse theoretical terms, the two are *myths* (organizations of social space) and *floating signifiers*. As all key signifiers, both of them are, above all, *empty signs*: 'they mean almost nothing by themselves until, through chains of equivalence, they are combined with other signs that fill them with meaning' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 50). It is through linkages with and differentiations from other signs that their representations are construed by particular subject discourses. Such an analysis of discursive construction of the EU and Europe, and of their relationship, is located, methodologically speaking, 'at the level of explicit articulations', of 'the enunciation of signs' (Hansen 2006, 37). Hence, the assembling of their respective 'images' must be based solely on the texts under scrutiny.

[151] For an example of a novel synthesis of a post-structuralist theoretical framework with some of the DHA methods of textual analysis, refer to Aydın Düzgit 2008.

Their respective discursive constructions are conceived of as accomplished through 'processes of linking and differentiation' (Hansen 2006, 40). Procedurally speaking, the textual analysis focuses on how particular texts invest meaning in the empty signifiers 'European Union' and 'Europe' through articulating chains of equivalence among sets of signs. The building of chains of equivalence inescapably involves the construction of chains of difference. Linking necessitates juxtaposition, that is, the articulation of parallel chains of opposed signs ('the Other', generally speaking).[152] In order to establish how the select political subjects conceived, through their texts, of the relationship between their respective EU and Europe constructs, the chains of equivalence and difference pertaining to each are compared. The objective is to identify whether and how an equivalence or difference between them was articulated.

The examination of articulations of chains of equivalence and difference can be characterized in crude terms with reference to two widespread, 'neutral', and thus generally applicable, discourse analytical foci of textual analysis: referencing/nomination and, relatedly, predication. Focus on *referencing/nomination* is a focus on the 'naming and labelling of social actors' (Krzyżanowski 2010, 88), on how they are located discursively as subject positions. This often involves an even narrower focus on *deixis*, which may take on personal or spatial character. Personal deictics may take the form of 'we', 'us' or 'our'; as juxtaposed to 'they', 'them' or 'their'. They allow the analysis to 'discover' the non-/allegiance of the speaking subject to other subjects of which it speaks. Spatial deictics ('here' or 'there'), on their part, assist the identification of 'differing ideas on the spatial division of discursively-created reality' (Ibid). *Predication* is directly linked to referencing/nomination. It is a focus on the ascription of characteristics 'to all those previously named and labelled' (Ibid), that is, on the said linking of signs into chains. Subjects, the EU and Europe in the present case, are constructed through 'the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns'. Predicates 'construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities' (Milliken 1999a, 232). Predicates are thus the signs which make the empty signifiers 'European Union' and 'Europe' into what they become in their symbolic representations across the texts of the select political subjects.

[152] Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 50) demonstrate this on the example of the construction of the myth of 'the West' which 'typically links a geographical part of the world to, for instance, "civilisation", "white people", "the Christian church" and "liberal democratic institutions"'. 'The West' is articulated relationally, in juxtaposition to what it is not. It 'stands in opposition to the rest of the world which is not automatically accepted as civilised and democratic, but rather defined as "barbaric" and "coloured"'.

Chapter 4

Czech Republic

Compared to Poland and Hungary, the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia was rather abrupt. November 1989 student demonstrations brought a quick 'Velvet Revolution', a non-violent gradual removal of Communists from public offices. The demonstrations produced the Civic Forum, an open platform uniting opposition forces. The Civic Forum, and its (independent) Slovak counterpart – the Public Against Violence – won the respective 1990 Czechoslovak elections. A period ensued in the Czech Republic which saw the platform's gradual fragmentation into new political subjects. The most prominent among them was the Civic Democratic Party led by Václav Klaus. Klaus became the face of the 'shock-therapy' neo-liberal economic transformation programme, implementation of which was inititated.

The (very) early 1990s were also a period when the emerging Czech political elite, just like political elite in the remaining Visegrad countries (see next chapters), intensely contemplated European integration/unification. Yet, and fundamentally, most of them did not foresee that the then EC would be the, or even the primary, platform on which this altogether (geo)political process would be grounded. The '*new Europe*' they envisioned would be 'all-inclusive, transcending the East/West division and including all the countries taking part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)'. On the 1990 understanding of the then Czechoslovak President Václav Havel, the two most important 'forums of European integration' were the CSCE and the Council of Europe (as interpreted by Drulák 2006, 177). Similarly, the then Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jiří Dienstbier, believed in 1990 that particularly the Council of Europe was to play the role of what he called a 'truly general institution of European integration'. On its basis, Dienstbier projected the construction of a European confederation that would unite Europe short of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO (Ibid). Dissolution of both was widely expected.

Historically speaking, the Czechoslovak elections of June 1992 were the key turning point in a number of crucial respects. To begin with, they initiated the Czechoslovak 'divorce proceedings' by producing Czech and Slovak governments with mutually quite incompatible transformation programmes (see next chapter). The elections represented also a significant step in the gradual (but indeed long-lasting) displacement of the dissident elite around Havel from the emerging new, party-centred political landscape. In both republics, the elections

brought the ‘rise of pragmatic and nation-oriented political forces’: the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, and Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party (Drulák 2006, 177). Interestingly enough, the Czechoslovak divorce, widely held as orchestrated by these two governing subjects, was neither generally expected nor desired. Majority of political forces and of the Czech and Slovak populations demanded referendum on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Their demands were ignored and Czechoslovakia dissolved with the coming of 1993. This was the beginning of a new era also in terms of foreign policy. The political elite had to take account of that the initial expectations with respect to European integration failed to materialize. As Drulák put it, ‘the so far exclusively Western clubs such as NATO and the EC proved to be more persistent than the dissidents originally expected, while the plans for a European confederation based on the CSCE or Council of Europe failed to take off (Ibid).

By that time, the successor of the oldest party in the Czech lands, the Czech Social Democratic Party, would intensify its ‘comeback’ on the centre stage of Czech politics, affirmed by the 1996 elections in which it ranked second. Since then, Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party and the Social Democrats dominated Czech politics and party competition. To be sure, national elections always produced parliamentary representation of other, smaller (and most often short-lived) parties as well. In the two decades under scrutiny, the most influential and persistent among them was another historical party: the Christian and Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People’s Party. The Christian democrats will be, nevertheless, excluded from the below analysis. They never ranked first or second in elections to the Czech parliament’s lower chamber. Moreover, the party’s (governmental) influence was not so much due to its Christian profile but rather one oddity of Czech politics, constraining formation of governmental coalitions. This oddity is the persistence of the formally ‘post-communist’ yet largely ‘unreformed’ Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, ranking either second (in 1990 and 1992, as the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) or third in all national elections till those of 2010. The self-imposed restriction of other parties not to negotiate with the Communists on the formation of governments effectively isolated the latter’s parliamentary seats from the efforts aimed at forming majority (coalition) cabinets. This predicament was furthered by the tendency of Czech national elections to produce an almost equal representation in the lower chamber of subjects which would form either a ‘right-centre’ or ‘left-centre’ government. In effect, then, with the Communist MPs excluded by default, it proved to be almost impossible to form a government in the Czech Republic with a comfortable majority in the lower chamber.

All Czech governments since 1992 were formed either by the Civic Democratic Party or the Social Democrats as the leading coalition partner. Their respective 'right-centre' and 'left-centre' governments alternated throughout the two decades. Crucially, since the early 1990s, party competition, and the differentiation within the Czech party spectrum at large, remained largely unidimensional. The socio-economic cleavage was determinant, with Civic Democrats representing the political 'right', and Social Democrats the 'pro-establishment left'.[153] This divide also determined the crux of the political elite debate on and conceptions of the EU/integration process. With the Communists effectively refusing to contemplate the EU in its present (neo-liberal) capitalist form, the political elite debate was largely reduced to that between the Social and Civic Democrats. In this rather elaborate antagonistic debate, the former envisioned continental unification on the basis of federal and social EU. The latter sought the EU's partial 'demontage' into a free-market, intergovernmental structure.

4.1 Civic Forum

Občanské fórum (OF) emerged spontaneously in the first days of the 'Velvet Revolution' as an essentially non-partisan and open Czech civic platform opposed to the communist regime. As such it initially comprised a wide spectrum of political orientations. It entered the 1990 elections as such. Soon afterwards, a fragmentation of the movement commenced with a rising party-political profiling of its members. By the end of 1991, the OF effectively dissolved. The Civic Democratic Party was the most prominent of successors to the increasingly centre-right late OF, not just with respect to the leader of both – Václav Klaus.

In their 1989 declaration 'What do we want'[154], the OF stated that they strove for Czechoslovakia to 'once again assume a dignified place in Europe and the world'. They declared that the country was 'part of Central Europe', and that they 'count on [its] incorporation into European integration'. The 'idea of European house' was to guide its policy towards the Warsaw Pact and Comecon partners (3). The 1990 OF election manifesto[155] reiterated the belonging of Czechoslovakia to Europe in a historical narrative which described the country pre-WW2 as one of the 'developed European countries' and

[153] In view of the consolidation and stability of the two main subjects of Czech politics, it is worth noting that the circulation at prominent party posts was often due to various types of scandals; intraparty politicking; 'political retirements' to the EU and other institutions, or to more ceremonial national public offices; but also, on occasion, to the intervention of the public.
[154] Available from http://www.svedomi.cz/dokdoby/of_1989.htm.
[155] Available from http://miloshlavka.wordpress.com/2011/11/19/volebni-program-obcanskeho-fora-z-roku-1990/.

‘the only democratic country in Central and Eastern Europe’ with ‘profound cultural and political traditions’. Moreover, the ‘common house’ metaphor was deployed here to describe the Czechoslovak federation as well (I).

The OF’s fundamental goal was ‘return to Europe’, described as ‘the re-claiming of Czechoslovakia’s place among developed European countries’. ‘Belonging to Europe’ was described as not merely belonging among states with high productivity and life standard but also ‘belonging to a community sharing the same cultural and political values’. The ‘basic European cultural values’ were posited to be diversity and democracy. Czechoslovakia had been ‘artificially separated’ from this ‘European community’ under the pretence of its ‘belonging to a different world’. Finally, it was stated: ‘Our house has always stood on European soil and its sad isolation is becoming the past’ (II).

To overcome isolation, due to its artificial dissociation from other European states that integrated to develop an internally differentiated economic, political and cultural unit, Czechoslovakia ‘must take part in this process as soon as possible’. It was stressed that the distance from developed European countries is enormous, mainly because ‘people in these countries are living in circumstances unknown to us’: environment of political democracy, market economy, developed culture and technology. ‘For fourty years we were taught not to behave normally and we thus cannot expect that our adoption of the new rules of behaviour will be quick and painless’. In the process, the country should capitalize on its historical tradition in the sense of belonging to the club of developed countries (II).

Czechoslovakia’s return to the ‘European community’ must be based not only on that which ‘developed countries share in common – political democracy and market economy – but also on that which can be specific to Czechoslovakia’ (II.). Foreign policy is to ‘primarily contribute to our return to Europe through the intense development of contacts with European countries’. The OF endorsed the then idea of an agreement among the parties to the Helsinki Conference which would ‘end the division of Europe, confirm the validity of borders, and establish conditions for the creation of an all-European security system’ (III).

Overall, to the OF, Czechoslovakia’s ‘return to Europe’ was a *return to normalcy*. It was confident that the country’s had always belonged to Europe, a ‘community’ of developed states based on political democracy and market economy, whose basic cultural values are diversity and democracy. The EC was at no place explicitly named. Its members were described primarily as the ‘developed European countries’. It thus appears reasonable

to conclude that the OF understood Europe as an artificially divided space. It sought the end of this division, and the natural return of Czechoslovakia among the 'Western', developed states therein, characterized by political democracy and market economy.

4.2 Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia

Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM) has remained until present only a partly reformed direct Czech successor to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), the party which had ruled the country for four decades. Despite its formal subscription to the post-1989 political system and its persistent significant electoral successes between 1990 and 2010, the party has never managed to shed the image of an anti-system party which is often ostracized by other parties and whose coalition potential oscillates between 'non-existent' to 'possible'. Despite this outsider position in Czech politics, the party has throughout the two decades, due to its strong presence in the parliament, managed to play a decisive role with respect to the stability of governments and the formation of *ad hoc* legislative coalitions, etc. The KSČM and its positions on all matters and policies are guided by its persistent and only minimally 'updated' communist or alternatively 'democratic socialist' ideology.

It competed in the 1990 elections as the Czech part to the federal KSČ. In its manifesto[156], it pointed to its apology for past 'errors, mistakes, and injustices' committed by the party. Stressing its 'definitive break-up with the past', the programme was described as one of a 'new' KSČ, a 'party of labour and democratic socialism' (8). Its novel goal was described as 'democratic, humanist, materially and spiritually productive socialism' (1). The party stressed that Czechoslovakia must be a sovereign country, about the present and future of which 'must not decide no one else but its sovereign people and its properly elected representatives' (1). Its main foreign political priorities were global disarmament and peace. They supported the 'country's opening to the world' but 'NOT at the expense of its sovereignty, security and political or economic independence' (7). The party proposed the 'dissolution of the Warsaw Agreement and NATO military groupings, yet NOT at the expense of violating the equilibrium of forces in Europe and in the world' (8).

In its 1992 elections manifesto[157], the KSČM reiterated its rejection of the direction of the country's transformation towards the 'already overcome capitalism of yesterday', that

[156] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[157] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

is neo-liberal capitalism, their strategic goal being 'modern-age socialism' (6). The country must not return to its 'capitalist past'. This evasion would lead to its 'place in Europe' desired by the party, when the 'path to Europe' must not involve disruption of the economy or the submission to foreign interests (7). Parts of the text discussing foreign policy were pervaded with geopolitical and security considerations. These considerations embedded the party's understanding of Europe. The country must not accept a position of an 'inferior, second-class country, eagerly gathering the remains from the table of our richer neighbours'. It must be built as an 'autonomous, independent state, economically prosperous and culturally developed, aspiring for an honoured place on the world front of political and social progress' (6). The country, as entire Central Europe, has been the 'crossroads of interests of great powers': 'Just as we got out of one power-bloc, we rush to the embrace of another'. According to the party, the country must not participate in military blocs and must preserve its independence, as well as sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state (11). Czechoslovakia must become an 'equal partner in united Europe', 'economically, politically and culturally independent country'. The Republic must not 'once again become a colony or satellite of any of its powerful members' (2), such as Germany (11). It must find its place in uniting Europe as an equal partner of other economically, politically and culturally developed countries. This entails avoidance of military blocs, as well as of 'unilateral economic and political dependence' (6). It should participate in 'all-European cooperation' (11). 'Coming to Europe' cannot undermine 'our state and national identity', since national cultures 'develop and strengthen national self-consciousness'. This should not be understood as 'nationalism' but rather as the 'consciousness of self-worth'. The party would fight Czechoslovakia's 'submission to foreign states, the danger of cultural uniformity, Americanization and Germanification (11). The EC, itself not named in the text, was understood as one of the 'existing Western European institutions', Czechoslovakia's participation in which, as an active partner with 'own political, economic and cultural interests', should 'enrich' them (11). This was a theme recurring across the rest of the party texts – the country's participation in them opens up its ability to promote a particular *vision of Europe*. The KSČM persistently subjected EU membership to the struggle for the vision of Europe desired by leftist forces in the EU and the rest of Europe.

KSČM's 1996 manifesto[158] expressed concern with the Czech Republic's growing dependence on 'transnational capital and Western powers' and possible governmental

[158] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

concessions to the German efforts to 'rule over our country and to revise the outcomes of the Second World War' (2). It perceived the country's growing dependence on Germany and the USA. In view of this, the 'fundaments of our state sovereignty and national existence' must be strengthened through a balanced foreign policy, part of which is 'cooperation with the closest neighbours' in CEE (7). To this related the party's proposed foreign policy of 'active neutrality' of the country and its 'non-participation in blocs and military adventures'. This also entailed the rejection of the NATO accession and the promotion of its dissolution. It was to be replaced with an 'all-European system of collective security' under the OSCE (7). This foreign political outlook was projected onto the question of European integration, based on equity of parties and democracy. Rejected were to be all 'forms of integration which would mean the submission to the interests of transnational capital and great powers, loss of national sovereignty and the citizens' social sacrifices' (7).

The 1998 elections manifesto[159] repeated the points made earlier with respect to security. The Czech Republic must be built as a 'sovereign, militarily non-aligned state'. The KSČM undertook to continue its campaign against the NATO, which is a Cold War anachronism exploited 'especially in the interest of the USA and Germany in Europe'. The NATO is as such a military pact submitted to great powers' interests. The party promoted a wider collective security system which does not limit the country's sovereignty, and sought 'good relations with countries both west off and east off our borders'. The OSCE was once again identified as the route to 'collective European security' (13).

Novel in the manifesto was the party incipient articulation of a *'vision Europe' as the outcome of European integration*. The terms of EU accession were not to situate the country as a 'colony, seen by stronger countries merely as a market open to their excess production and as a source of cheap labour'. The party undertook to 'strive for a democratic European integration on equal terms, allowing for the development of all states of Europe'. Its 'vision Europe' was articulated through its demand for 'Europe of social security, culture and educational attainment, unity and national sovereignty, democracy and human rights, peace, security and cooperation' (14). The EU itself was minimized to one important link in the 'vision Europe' for which the integration process rather than the EU was crucial. So as to 'develop the fundaments of our state sovereignty and national existence against the increasing unilateral dependence' of the country, the KSČM supported the 'unification of

[159] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

Europe also within the framework of all-European economic space', and the 'integration processes also outside the EU framework', while admitting that the Czech Republic may remain solely associated with the EU. It was in this context that it called for a '*character change of European integration*': a 'socially just and environmentally bearable European integration process' that is not submitted to the 'interests of transnational capital and great powers' and preserves national sovereignty (14, emphasis added).

The emphasis on security pervaded also the 2002 elections manifesto[160]: the country was to leave the NATO military structures; the long term goal being the NATO's dissolution and replacement with 'collective security structures'. In this respect, the party called for the resurrection of the initial purpose of the OSCE, comprising all European states, to be a 'universal European security organization'. Globalization and European integration posed a challenge to the vital interests of the citizens of the Czech Republic. Rather than submit itself to the interests of transnational capital, it should, as a sovereign state, 'participate actively in the creation of conditions for collective security, cooperation and solidarity of nations and states' (15). The EU was itself discussed only in the context of the need to alter the accession terms in order to prevent a second-class membership for a number of years (16).

In its manifesto for the 2004 EP elections[161], the KSČM detailed its 'vision Europe' which it shared with other leftist forces in the EU and Europe at large. The objective of the radical and democratic European Left was the 'system transformation of capitalist Europe into a socially just society' (5). The EU was characterized as 'integrative grouping' (2) and 'unified institutional platform' (5). EP elections were presented as an opportunity to have a say in the EU's future. The European integration process had become more dynamic but at the same time increasingly contradictory in the face of globalization. Europe approached a crossroads with respect to its further development. Its entry to the 21st century was marked by economic stagnation, retreat of democratic principles and asocial policies that were due to the 'prevalent neo-liberal approach' and adverse European population demographic trends in (1). The 'orientation' of the integration process and the EU was to undergo radical change. Particularly after the accession of new members in 2004, the EU needed 'a novel strategic choice' as a result of 'direct exchange of experiences between the citizens of Eastern and Western Europe' which brought a new dimension to the 'social struggle in defence of the interests of the working class and democracy'. The party aimed to strengthen the influence

[160] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[161] All 'euromanifestos' are available from the database of the Euromanifestos Project.

of the Left in both Europe and internationally, and to contribute to the unification of its programme and its articulation of the 'vision of new social and political circumstances' (6).

The 'vision Europe' that the KSČM undertook to fight for was 'Europe of social rights, equality and solidarity'; a democratic Europe open to the world, to peace and cooperation; a Europe independent of and equal to other great powers, which economically prospers on the basis of sustainable development and protection of the environment (1). This Europe was built on common institutions programmatically based on 'the advantages of national peculiarities', and creating a 'multicultural reality of Europe'. Such Europe would 'respect the equality of EU Member States and of other European countries, their territorial integrity including the inviolability of their borders (2). This Europe would be a 'continent of social justice', short of discrimination and political, racial, religious and other hatreds, where national cultures are the basis of a pan-European culture (5). To this end, the hitherto EU institutions (including the EP) were to be democratized and the gap between the EU administrative centres and the citizens and parliaments of the Member States overcome. Moreover, 'political integration must overcome the supremacy of great powers through a new quality of European unification' (2). Meanwhile, the forces managing the EU were not to be allowed to 'exterminate the democratic and social achievements existing in Western European countries'. That would negatively affect the situation of new EU members and the European states outside the EU (2). To the contrary 'the political space of the EU' must be utilized as a site for promotion of the 'restoration and further development of the elements of welfare state and for the overcoming of capitalist relations' (3).

In terms of security, 'vision Europe' was not to build a new 'Iron Curtain' in the East (3) but develop instead an all-European collective and non-military security architecture (5). In the meantime, militarization of Europe was to be prevented. European military structures wete to be be freed from the NATO influence and fully transformed into instruments of 'defence and security, not aggression'. The party further promoted the NATO's dissolution and the removal of US military bases from Europe (4), and the EU's greater independence of the USA in foreign policy, security and common defence. Finally, in relation to the 'eastern part of Europe' that is not part of the EU, namely Russia, 'new conditions should be sought which would enhance closer cooperation and peace on the whole continent' (5).

In its 2006 elections manifesto[162], the KSČM saw the path to future European security in the reconstruction of the OSCE, since 'all European states, including the EU and NATO non-members, belong to the European security structures' on its understanding (18). It declared that it 'respected' the Czech Republic's EU membership with 'critical objections'. 'Vision Europe' was here expressed in the 'concept of democratization and socialization of Europe, which is not limited to current EU Member States', in the promotion of which the European Left had assumed an important role (16).

Finally, in its 2009 'euromanifesto', the party reiterated its 'vision Europe' as a 'continent without any discrimination' (1); a 'place of democratic dialogue'; and a 'union based on true equality among the citizens and states of Europe' (2). That is why it rejected in the current EU the 'discriminatory conditions' for new Member States; superiority of some states and nations in decision-making; pressures of great powers on other states; as well as the 'continuation of the EU's neoliberal policy … expelling social questions from the process of the deepening of European integration' (3).

To conclude, the KSČM understanding of the EU, Europe, and of European integration was extraordinarily consistent throughout the two decades, without discernible changes. The party scarcely discussed the Union and its character. When it did, it was with respect to the EU's traits which the party perceived to be at odds with its 'vision Europe', itself one part of the desired democratic and just global order. The present EU and its undesirable features – neoliberal policies and the inequity of its members – were eventually to be overcome through the 'building of Europe' as a continent of equal citizens and sovereign nations/states, whose identities and cultures must be preserved and allowed to flourish for the sake of Europe itself. This Europe seemed to include Russia as well. The party saw the EU as currently the most efficient means and platform for the achievement of its 'vision Europe', of which it could be, appropriately altered, an important element.

The KSČM at no point suggested anything resembling a 'EUasEurope' equivalence. Europe was on its portrayal a continent of culturally diverse nations/states and peoples. If it attributed any significance to the EU, it was that of an as-yet-unaltered vehicle for the continent's unification, and for a desirable transformation of social relations therein. This construction of the EU's relation with Europe appears to be a peculiar 'historical-materialist' re-articulation of the official integration discourse, pervading for instance the De Clercq

[162] Available from http://www.kscm.cz/politika-kscm/volebni-program.

Report. It also laid emphasis on 'united Europe' as the end product of a construction process of which the EU was a temporary stage. Finally, to the extent that this exercise is meaningful in the party's case, its representation of the EU best approximated a Model 1 construction.

The KSČM's programmatic documents refrained from making statements on EU enlargement. Still, nothing in its representations of Europe or the EU suggested it should see cultural/religious difference as the ground for exclusion. Theoretically speaking, this would contradict some of the key premises of the ideology it espoused. With respect to Turkey, the party's MEPs voted in 2004 in favour of opening the accession negotiations (Král 2006, 68). Jiří Dolejš, a prominent member of the KSČM, reportedly declared that he saw no reason why 'we should prevent Turkey from its path to the EU'. Another party member, Zuzka Rujbrová converged on this point but hesitated whether or not there should be a referendum held (as quoted and interpreted by Šaradín 2010, 134).[163] If the party had concerns over Turkey's EU accession, they primarily related to the question of EU funds and their distribution (cohesion policy), and the European social standards (Beneš 2008, 57).

4.3 Czech Social Democratic Party

Česká strana sociálně demokratická (ČSSD) is the main left-off-centre Czech political party with swinging but relatively stable electoral support throughout the two decades. It claims to be the direct successor of the social democratic parties active prior to and after the Czechoslovak independence in 1918. The party survived in exile during the communist period. Its activity on the Czech territory was re-activated in 1990. For both decades under scrutiny, it remained the largest among 'Euro-enthusiast' parties in the Czech Republic.

The party based its 1990 electoral manifesto[164] on the founding assumption of 'Czechoslovakia's key position in Europe, not just in terms of geography but also especially in terms of the belonging of our nations to European culture and traditions'. As primary goal was designated the provision of the country's security and independence, the long-term goal being 'neutrality of the entire Central European space'. This related particularly to the agreements with the countries of the former Soviet bloc, especially the USSR, which were to be remodelled so as to reflect the principles of equality of parties, mutual convenience and national sovereignty; as well as to the continued presence of the Soviet armies in Central

[163] It should be noted that the KSČM has been especially vigorous in demanding referenda on many occassions.
[164] Available from http://www.cssd.cz/ke-stazeni/volebni-programy/program-ceskoslovenske-socialni-demokracie-1990.

Europe. With respect to the future of the continent, around which many programmatic documents in the following two decades revolved, the key proto-tenet of the future foreign political course was support for 'gradual establishment of an *all-European confederation*'. Discussing the 'logical historical process' of German unification, the party held that 'it must take place in the framework of the unification of Europe' (3). Underlying this goal was the narrative of the 'artificial division of the continent' which was eventually to be overcome.

In its 1991 programme *Objectives and Principles*[165], the ČSSD identified with the idea of social democracy and its ideal of social relations which have been 'best approximated by the social market economy of European countries' (3). The underlying narrative of 'return to Europe' was suggested by the consideration that social market economy and social democratic thought presuppose a 'solid and widely anchored democracy'. Czechoslovakia should learn from the 'experience of economically successful, socially and environmentally responsible European countries'. Europe was understood in terms of democracy and social democratic thought, as 'countries of the free world'. The party's goal in this respect was 'as quick and painless as possible overcoming of everything which divided us from Europe and the free world': 'the path to freedom and prosperity' (3). 'Entering Europe', understood as the 'free world', the country must take into account the need for 'as large a support as possible to those countries marked by communist dictatorship, whose democratic future is most threatened'. Czechoslovakia must resolve its problems and deficiencies in order to be able to 'contribute to the creation of stable, tranquil Europe' which represented a hope for peoples living in more 'hardly tried' areas (4). Czechoslovakia did and will belong to the 'community of free states' and as such had to 'defend freedom all over the world, since freedom was and is indivisible'. The country's position in the 'community of freedom' had to be further solidified. Support for NATO accession was justified by the argument that 'truly strong social democratic and modern Western socialist parties could operate and govern only in countries protected by the NATO, and not those guarded by the Warsaw Pact tanks' (15).

'Return to Europe' was understood as '*return to normalcy*', to the 'normal world of freedom and democracy': 'For too long we were systematically isolated from the normal world of freedom, democracy and true economic progress, for too long we were kept in the so-called socialist camp full of lies and illusions'. For too long was the country 'too deeply and too inconveniently' economically tied to the USSR and Comecon countries. For too long

[165] Available from http://www.cssd.cz/ke-stazeni/volebni-programy/cile-a-zasady-ceskoslovenske-socialni-demokracie-1991.

were ‘our national and state pride’ undermined. Now, the party held, ‘we cannot afford to hesitate about our opening to the world of free states, particularly states of Europe’ (17). To this end, ‘all must be done for the association of Czechoslovakia to the European communities’: free ‘Europe has formed a set of integrative institutions and state groupings which keep overcoming their borders and their differences’. It was fortunate that strong democratic and socialist parties operated in or governed ‘developed European countries’, and that they had great influence on the working of ‘European integrative institutions’. Important was also close cooperation with the EFTA and ‘other European groupings’ (18). The party sought to ‘closely cooperate with social democratic parties of Europe’ for the sake of ‘*development and humanization of European communities*’: ‘their full democratization and especially their humane and generous approach’ towards the CEECs during their rapprochement with the ‘demanding European market economy’ (18, emphasis added). Czechoslovakia should coordinate it policies with ‘other countries of the free world’ with respect to other CEECs and the ‘stabilization of the economic, social and political situation of particularly our neighbours’. Relations with Germany should be fully settled so as to allow for a ‘natural development of relations between the citizens of both the states within integrated Europe’ (19). The 1992 elections manifesto[166] further stated that the party, ‘just like social democratic governments of the majority of Western European countries’, would direct the country’s foreign policy towards ‘future unification of Europe for the sake of welfare, solidarity, shared responsibility, social peace and healthy environment for all’ (7).

Aside from the thereafter common reiteration of the party’s endorsement and resolve to promote the ‘European social model’ principles, and the ideal of ‘socially and environmentally oriented market economy’ (1); it also stressed a ‘thorough respect for human rights’ as one of the key principles of global and European social democratic thought (22). In the process of the country’ incorporation to the ‘ever-more integrating European structures’, Czech foreign policy was primarily to ‘defend the vital interests’ of citizens. (22). The ČSSD desired the country’s NATO entry with a specific status enjoyed by Norway and Denmark – ‘short of the deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign military units on their territory’. It also endorsed the membership to the WEU and the strengthening of the OSCE as a platform for seeking ‘optimal forms of collective security’ (23).

[166] Available from http://www.cssd.cz/ke-stazeni/volebni-programy/volebni-program-cssd-pro-volby-1992.

The Czech Republic had to avoid 'negativist approaches' to the EU: 'In the foreseeable future, security, stability and prosperity of a smaller state in Central Europe can be provided only through an effective and goal-oriented foreign policy which is able to merge its interests with those of democratic Europe' (23). The EU was characterized 'not merely as a free trade zone but also as a *multidimensional European community* united by common social, environmental, agricultural, transport, as well as foreign and security policies' (22, emphasis added). Accession to 'European structures' (16), or 'European institutions', with their 'social, environmental, economic and moral standards' would allow for the Czech Republic's incorporation into 'the mainstream of European thinking' (2). 'Gradual European integration' was not to be feared: 'our participation in this process allows for the equalization of living standards of the citizens of all countries in the union and provides for their collective security, as well as access to education and job opportunities on the territory of all European Union states' (22). The party stressed the principles of solidarity and comprehensive cooperation with Central European states which would 'strengthen our security, stability and democratic progress of the whole region, and increase as well our chances of being accepted into the European Union' (23). Finally, as member of the European Social Democratic Party, the ČSSD would participate in the 'formation of Europe of peace and human rights, social justice, employment and environmental renewal' (23). This last point was an anticipation of the party's own '*vision Europe*', which was articulated in great detail in the documents from the first half of the 2000s.

The 1998 electoral manifesto[167] pointed to the incremental crystallization of this vision, and its distinction from the EU of the present and foreseeable future. In other words, with only scarce exceptions across all the documents till 2010, when Europe was discussed it was with respect to the future of the continent. When EU-related matters were discussed, the referent entity was exclusively the EU or its shorthand designations (i.e. the Union) among which 'Europe' did not belong. The manifesto reiterated that the party's main foreign political priorities remained the country's 'incorporation into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures', particularly the EU and NATO; and 'good and stable relations with neighbouring states' (24). The ČSSD embraced the '*idea of integration of the states of the European continent*'. It understood 'European integration process' as 'desirable and convenient' for both the Czech Republic and EU members, since 'integration' would enrich member countries – solidify and multiply material and spiritual values – '*without wiping off*

[167] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

their national identities' (12, emphases added). EU membership, spoken of as the country's 'incorporation into European structures' (12), would help the party in promoting a 'social policy directed towards the achievement of European standards' (23); enable the country to actively participate in discussions on the Union's reform (13); and to promote its priorities: 'quicker integration into the EU of countries striving for membership' (23) and especially the support for Slovakia's efforts aimed at 'incorporation into European structures including the EU' (23). Finally, EU membership would allow for the Czech Republic's participation in the policy-making of 'one of the largest groupings in the world. It would thus contribute to the 'forming of the *21st century European Union*'. Hence, the party's 'vision Europe'was a 'vision of united, democratic, prosperous and peaceful Europe short of tensions and conflicts, Europe of free citizens and cooperating regions, *Europe of solidarity in which distinctive identities of individual Member States flourish*' (25, emphases added).

The ČSSD's 2003 long-term programme elaborated the party's understanding of European integration and developed its 'vision Europe', to the achievement of which the integration process and the EU were the means. The 'simple idea of our "return to Europe" no longer suffices', according to the party, and the Czech society needed to be 'offered a trustworthy project', a distinctive and purposeful 'vision of its future' in the changing world (11). EU membership was in the 'strategic interest' of the country not only economically but also by allowing it to 'participate in the policy-making of this important grouping' (23). 'In the face of accelerating globalization processes', the country's interests would be best served in the EU (23). Particularly 'regional integrative groupings of states', such as the EU, actively confronted globalization challenges. The EU progressed farthest in this direction by developing programmes allowing for the reaping of benefits of globalization (20). It demonstrated that it had found after the WW2 'forms and methods' of supplanting political confrontation of European states with peaceful cooperation. It 'created a space for economic development and a European form of involvement in the worldwide globalization process'. Until present, it attained significant progress in the effort to create a 'united, democratic, socially just, prosperous and peaceful continent of free citizens and cooperating regions' (23). The EU was an *unfinished project.* The adoption of 'European constitution' presented another step towards a 'stronger and more united Europe'. The debate on the EU's future would contribute to the strengthening of 'all the positive elements in its hitherto evolution'. The EU, that is 'uniting Europe', was to assume in the globalizing world 'a role corresponding to its economic might' (24).

European integration was characterized as 'unique process' of 'voluntary, democratic and peaceful creation of a community of European states' (9). The EU was not an end in itself but rather a 'contemporary form' the project took. Crucially, the 2004 enlargement represented a 'step of historical importance in overcoming the legacy of the Cold War, which divided Europe into western and eastern parts' (23). The enlarged EU had to further 'develop and consolidate the functioning model of relations between large, medium-sized and small states based on the development the community method'. The party saw the 'deepening of economic and political integration in Europe, while strengthening federative elements in its evolution', as the EU's desirable long-term path (24). Fundamentally, so long as the ČSSD subjected the Union's development to its 'vision Europe', that is the 21st century 'perspective of Europe as a continent of peace, security, democracy and prosperity', it did not foresee an early end to its expansion. It supported enlargement to '*other European states which share the common values and satisfy the Union accession criteria*, while *respecting the national and cultural identities of individual states, nations and regions*' (24, emphases added).

The ČSSD 2004 'euromanifesto' stressed that with accession the Czech Republic would sit at the 'European table', 'apply its own sovereignty' and have the 'chance to influence European matters' (1). EU membership was a 'challenge and unique opportunity', and EP elections were an 'opportunity for Czech citizens to have a say with respect to what kind of European Union they want' (1). To this end the party proposed its 'vision Europe', of the 21st century EU (2). Its elements were 'making Europe into a continent of peace and security'; developing the European social model, since the EU is 'not just an economic but also a social community' where an 'important part of European unification is the rapprochement of Member States' economies', (2) including those of their regions (3); developing solidarity and social justice (3); nurturing of culture as a precious investment to the 'rapprochement and mutual knowledge of nations and states in the uniting Europe' (3); or the 'creation of an European area of freedom, security and the rule of law' (3).

It was particularly the ČSSD 2005 long-term programme[168] which went to greatest detail with respect to its 'vision Europe' and its understanding of the EU, both of which were explicitly linked to the emerging global situation and the party's 'global vision'. The central challenge faced by humankind was the ever-growing interdependence of nation-states who at the same time lose their sovereignty. Consequently, 'individual societies gradually lose

[168] Available from http://www.cssd.cz/ke-stazeni/volebni-programy/dlouhodoby-program-cssd-2005.

their ability to autonomously determine the conditions of reproduction of their own life' (23). ČSSD's 'vision Europe' was that of a 'project of formation of European justice by means of incremental European unification within the European Union framework'. Regulation of the economy was insufficient, since the 'economic aspect of *continentalization* is ahead of other dimensions of *continental unification*' (29, emphases added). This state of affairs worked to the detriment of the 'institution of democratic social state' which had since the WW2 developed in the framework of the nation-state' (29). The 'welfare state' model could no longer be preserved in the 'narrow national framework'. This situation presented an opportunity for its 'restoration and adaptation' through 'mutual recognition of citizens and states within the entire European Union' (29). This complex process required 'not only a deeper political and social integration on the EU basis, but also a multicultural, environmental, security and economic integration' (29). Hence, '*reconstruction of welfare state at the EU* level required a multifaceted integration process in this common space', all aspects of which should be as synchronized as possible (29, emphasis added).

The EU was an 'adequate answer' to globalization challenges. Accession to it was thus in the national interest of the Czech Republic as a whole, and this would hold also with respect to the future stages of the integration process, of 'European unification' (29). For the Czech Republic, it was extremely important that the position of small and medium-sized states is enhanced in EU institutions at the expense of large states (30). 'Diverse cultural traditions of European nation-states' required the 'project of united European Union to be anchored in a legal framework', and that it be characterized by 'democratic arrangement' (35). The party promoted 'tighter cooperation, greater sharing of sovereignty and federal elements' in the EU, as this was a 'more efficient and more appropriate' way of solving problems facing 'Europe of the 21st century' than intergovernmental cooperation (36). Mechanisms of 'democratic opinion- and will-formation' needed to be to some extent 'transposed from the national to supranational level' where the welfare state model was to be reproduced (35). The 'political unification of Europe' (37), and the 'sovereignty of the people' within a 'regional or continental multicultural democratic entity' (36), were deemed feasible once an 'all-European people' is conceived of as a 'civil' as opposed to 'ethnic nation' (35). This would entail and require an 'all-European civil society': an 'all-European public' where 'political opinion- and will-formation would take place within national public spaces, but would be at the same time common as it would transgress them' (36). All of these would be anchored in the already 'common European political culture', germs of which are

already to be found in Europe: religious and nationalist conflicts are not resolved through violence but 'ritualized' and 'made into a "source of social innovation"' (36).

This empowered, novel 'European arrangement' would become a global actor 'able to pursue its "legitimate interests" in international institutions'. It would be stronger in the face of global competition. Fundamentally, however, '*the creation of united Europe*, able to act globally, is *acceptable only then when this first step would be followed by a second step*': 'United Europe should play an active role in the *gradual transition to a world system based on multicultural order, observance of human rights, and on global legitimacy*'. This would be a system of harmonious relations between its individual planes: local, national, regional (or continental) and global. (37, emphases added). The ČSSD 'vision Europe' was therefore just one part of its 'global vision', of the 'transition from the present supranational arrangement to global justice' (10), 'global governance and multicultural order' (23).

The points spelled out by the 2005 long-term programme underlay the rest of the party's programmatic documents till 2010. The latter only made some additions to them. The 2006 elections manifesto[169] maintained that the 'European unification process' had no alternative' and that the Czech Republic, as full EU member, should contribute to its advancement (75). Its specific contribution to the common enterprise was to involve efforts aimed at 'strengthening the Union's role in the Balkans' and the development of an 'eastern dimension' of the European Neighbourhood Policy' (75). Its 2009 'euromanifesto' insisted that the Czech Republic must 'not only be heard in Europe' but also 'truly participate in the positive formation of the European Union'. Only thus 'we would not lose our national identity and ability to pursue our national interests' (1). This was related to the argument that 'freedom is something we must deserve'. 'Europe is today one of the most free places in the world, and the centre of this freedom is precisely the European Union'. The party promised to 'defend in Europe our common freedom, as well as national interest and identity' (2-3). Finally, its 2010 elections programme[170] stressed the importance of 'cohabitation of diverse cultures and philosophies': 'No one can impose their culture on others and at the same time one cannot export rules there where they fundamentally alter and restrict peoples' behaviour' (32). In the programme's 'Orange Book' on foreign policy[171], the ČSSD reiterated its earlier

[169] Available from http://www.cssd.cz/ke-stazeni/volebni-programy/volebni-program-cssd-pro-volby-2006.
[170] Available from http://www.cssd.cz/ke-stazeni/volebni-programy/velky-volebni-program-cssd-pro-volby-2010.
[171] Available from http://www.cssd.cz/ke-stazeni/volebni-programy/oranzove-knihy-cssd-pro-volby-2010/zahranicni-politika

and novel key points: strategic cooperation between the EU and USA; support for the incorporation of the Balkans into the EU and further enlargement ('support for Turkey's EU accession'); the building of 'Eastern Partnership'; and finally a 'common EU energy policy'.

To conclude, the ČSSD subordinated its EU construct to its discursively prior understanding and vision of Europe. Far from being an end in itself, the EU was an 'adequate response' to the challenges posed by (neoliberal) globalization processes, and the most suitable platform for furthering the party's 'vision Europe' and 'vision of global justice', deemed to be shared by other like-minded parties across Europe. If there were changes discernible across its documents over time, they did not pertain to the EU, understanding of which was fairly constant and marginalized, but rather to Europe itself. The party never questioned Czech Republic's place in Europe. Its 'return to Europe' was understood as 'return to normalcy', the 'normal world of freedom and democracy'. Europe was in this sense understood as 'free Europe', in terms of democracy and social democratic thought, i.e. as 'countries of the free world'. This conception was shortly accompanied, but for most of the two decades supplanted, by a second and prioritized future-oriented projection of Europe. Ever since 1990, the party concerned itself primarily with the future of the continent, and endorsed the idea of its federalization/European confederation. It consistently spoke of the goal of future unification of Europe, often referred to as 'the continent', and of overcoming its historical division and disunity, i.e. of 'continentalization' or 'continental unification'. The Czech Republic's membership to the EU, the integration process, and the EU itself were instrumental to this goal. Ever since the early 1990s, the party found it necessary to modify and further develop the integration process, as well as the EU (one of 'European structures') as its key framework. The EU as 'uniting Europe', the current form of European unification, was almost always spoken of with respect to present and foreseeable developments. Europe, on the other hand, designated the party's 'vision Europe', a '21st century EU'.

The party's understanding of the EU/European integration, and of its ultimate goal of 'united Europe', appear to be a specific rearticulation of the classical, official federalist integration discourse. The ČSSD's 'vision Europe' was intimately tied to, and dependent on, its 'vision of global justice' in the face of ever-advancing globalization. The unification of Europe was not to endanger but rather to respect (and possibly promote) the diversity of distinct 'national and cultural identities of individual states, nations and regions'. Since it saw the EU/European integration as an 'unfinished project', the ČSSD did not discuss its territorial limits. It supported EU enlargement to all European states (Turkey included) that

share its common political (and social democratic) values, and comply with the accession criteria. It stressed the importance of cohabitation of diverse cultures and philosophies. Europe's political unification was to make it into a 'regional or continental multicultural democratic entity'.

Overall, the ČSSD's understanding of the EU, as well as its position on further enlargement, were fully subordinate to its 'vision Europe' and the ultimate goal of Europe's unification/continentalization. Its discourse appears to be a situated rearticulation of the classical federalist/neofunctionalist integration/unification discourse. It is in this sense that a link between the EU and Europe was articulated, the former being a current stage or form that the unfinished project has taken. In contrast to the Western-Europe-centred forms of this discourse, the party clearly distinguished Europe and the EU. It represented Europe as a continent with past and future, territory of which was not delineated; and the EU as the framework for the project of its unification. The notion of 'European identity' was never discussed. 'United Europe' was to be a community based on common values. Yet, the party did not seem to include among them those pertaining to 'culture' (as understood in this work). To the contrary, its consistent emphasis on national and cultural identities of states, nations and regions, as well as its stress on the multiculturalism of 'continentalization', suggest its dismissal or at least non-acceptance of 'top-down' efforts at forging a European culture and identity. This reading is corroborated by the party's 'global vision', to which the project of uniting Europe had to correspond. European integration was thus not about drawing boundaries and new exclusions. To conclude, the party proposed a 'typical' construction of the EU/integration process along Model 2, as an essentially open community based on certain political (democratic and social) values.

The ČSSD's representation of the EU/'united Europe' as a Model 2 culture-free community was reflected in its projection of further enlargement, including its position on Turkey's EU accession. According to David Král, the party's position has been aligned with, or even determined by that of fellow social democrats in the EU, especially the German SPD. The embrace of Turkey would ensure democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights in the country. Common was also the projection of Turkey as a possible 'bridge' to the Middle East and the Islamic world (2006, 58). The first party prominent to officially support its EU accession was Vladimír Špidla in his capacity as the Czech Prime Minister. Visiting Turkey in 2003, Špidla linked the support for the opening of accession negotiations with a concern over the country's possible 'orientalization'. Should they not be opened, there

was ‘a risk that the country might turn towards radical Islamism and leave the pro-European course’ initiated by Mustafa Kemal in the 1920s (as interpreted by Král 2006, 59). At a 2004 meeting of ambassadors in Prague, Špidla’s successor Stanislav Gross repeatedly emphasized ‘the necessity for recognizing the “European future” of Turkey’. It was in the interest of the Czech Republic. Gross reportedly wished for ‘more interconnection or perhaps anchoring of Turkey in Europe’ (as quoted and interpreted by Král 2006, 59). That this was the position of the ČSSD, and not just the Czech government, was confirmed in 2007, during the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister in Prague. The then party leader Jiří Paroubek issued a *communiqué* in which he declared that the ‘Czech Social Democratic Party has supported Turkey’s accession to the EU in the past and that position persists’ (as quoted by Šaradín 2010, 133-134). One year earlier, prior to national elections, Paroubek stated:

> I am generally for accession, but it depends on how Turkey develops. If their economy improves, if they move closer to the legislative structure of the EU, if they meet the human rights standards, then *it will be good to have such a populous Muslim country on our side* (as quoted by Šaradín 2010, 134, emphasis added).

Noteworthy is Paroubek’s acknowledgement of Turkey’s cultural/religious difference, and of the desirability of having it ‘on our side’, in the EU. The ČSSD’s position in support of Turkey’s EU entry remained constant. It was reiterated not only by the party chairmen but also other prominent representatives. A dissenting voice from within the party was that of Richard Falbr who, in his 2004 EP elections campaign, opposed Turkey’s accession because ‘Turkey does not belong in Europe’. The peculiarity of Falbr’s position, one of the leading representatives of Czech trade unions, was his argumentation, and thus construction of Europe. Falbr apparently saw as the demonstration of Turkey’s ‘non-Europeanness’ his observation that, in the country, trade unions ‘meet, choose their leadership, and the Turkish police immediately take them to prison’ (as quoted by Šaradín 2010, 134).

4.4 Civic Democratic Party

Občanská demokratická strana (ODS), designating itself liberal-conservative, is the main right-off-centre Czech political party. All party-based Czech governments in the 1990s and 2000s were dominated either by the ODS or ČSSD. Just like the ČSSD, also the Civic Democrats maintained a solid and consistent ideological profile throughout the two decades with respect to both domestic and foreign political matters. Not just through its president, Václav Klaus, the ODS became the successor to the late, increasingly centre-right OF. During his party presidency, Klaus remained the most prominent face of the ODS, and is

reputed to have maintained a significant influence on it even after his resignation from the post and ensuing election as the second President of the Czech Republic in 2003.

The party's 1992 elections manifesto[172] opened with Klaus's letter in which he represented the upcoming elections as 'our decision' on 'whether our country would once again and definitely become part of the West, where it used to belong for centuries, or whether we would remain for the next long years part of the East'. It was a decision between a 'free democratic society', prosperity and modern market economy on the one hand, and 'non-freedom of life in an authoritarian state' and 'desperate inefficiency of state-planned economy' on the other (1). Czechoslovakia's 'return to Europe' was thus conceived of as '*return to the West*': The 'task we face', asserted Klaus,

> is made easier by the fact that our path is actually a return. We return from the backward borderline between Europe and Asia back to the West, to which we belonged for a millennium. The [Czech] path to Europe is at the same time a path home, to ourselves, to our democratic traditions which materialized at their fullest during the twenty-year existence of the first Czechoslovak Republic [1918-1938] (2).

The manifesto spelled out the party ideology/political identity as *conservative*, that is, 'grounded on the traditional values of European civilization'. Among these were primarily Christian traditions and values: 'respect for truth and love of fellows'. The ODS stressed, nonetheless, that '*it is not a party declaring itself Christian, and even less so confessional*'. It understood Christianity 'as part of the spiritual heritage of the past and stresse[d] that which it brought about to the practical, political realm'. These were ideas such as sovereignty and responsibility of the individual, division and balance of power in society, and respect for diverse opinions. Freedom, equality and solidarity were the three 'fundamental social values' derived from the Christian tradition to which the ODS claimed allegiance (5).

Discussing foreign policy, the party dismissed ideas of Czechoslovakia as a 'buffer country' or a 'bridge between the East and West'; or the 'hypothesis of its being a "stabilizing factor"' in the CEE. From such ideas emanated the 'utopian dream' that the 'space of Central Europe could become an institutional basis of a pan-European security system' (16). All these were distracting the country from what was to the party a clear and unquestionable goal: 'activities directly and unequivocally directed towards a political, defence, military and economic integration with Western Europe' (16). The ODS main foreign political priority was to '*incorporate Czechoslovakia to the Western World*,

[172] Available from http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/program_1992.pdf.

especially to Western Europe as its integral part'. That was the only way of 'acquiring long-term international-political guarantees of our freedom and sovereignty, as well as the space needed for economic prosperity' (17, emphasis added). The country's integration into the 'European communities' was the 'immediate and most important' goal, 'the only way of stabilizing our general political, economic and security situation' (17). Attending to the task of a 'comprehensive and quickest integration of Czechoslovakia into Europe' (18), the party stressed, must not be at the expense of Hungary and Poland with which 'we share historical ties, and the present common efforts to make up for the damages perpetrated by communism and to find a path to Europe' (17). Finally, key for the ODS were the relations with the USA, without the active participation of which 'it cannot conceive of the creation of a new post-communist order in Europe and the world' (17). The country had to seek a quick and closest possible association with the NATO which still had a 'decisive importance for the preservation of peace and the protection of Western civilization'. Moreover, 'especially its transatlantic dimension' created 'a needed balance in uniting Europe' (17).

The ODS 1996 elections manifesto addressed, *inter alia*, its neoliberal, unrestrained free-market programme (10), and several new points with respect to foreign policy. As quick as possible accession to the EU and NATO (both designated 'organizations'), aimed at the 'definite anchoring of the Czech Republic in the Western European political, economic and cultural space', was 'a vital necessity' (6). The country was closely tied with the 'Euro-Atlantic space' through 'common political, economic and security interests' and 'common values and civilizational heritage'. The Czech Republic should assume its part in 'promoting and defending the values and heritage of European civilization' (9). EU membership was designated the party's main foreign political goal. European integration was characterized as a 'promising process' providing peace, stability, security, freedom and economic prosperity to the citizens of EU Member States. The ODS expressed support for enlargement and openness of the EU to the world; deepening of political *cooperation*; and the creation of single market. At the same time, it stressed that European integration '*should not artificially suppress the diversity of states, nations and cultures* which is one of the European civilizational values'. Also in the future 'individual states will be the cornerstones' of the EU, and its sovereignty and competence will 'derive from the sovereignty and competence of individual states' (9).

The 1998 ODS elections manifesto[173] reiterated the narrative of 'return to Europe', a 'society of developed democratic states' (2). Reflecting on the departure from the party of 'many left-leaning and [ideologically] ambivalent politicians', it felt it could thereafter 'much more vigorously defend conservative social values as well as the policy of economic liberalism' (5). It presented itself as a 'right-wing, liberal-conservative party', economically and politically inspired by the ideas of classical liberalism and conservatism. Ideology-wise, the ODS opposed and strictly differentiated itself from 'socialist policy, in both its overt and covert forms', represented especially by some aspects of the welfare state model (6). With regard to foreign policy, it stressed its reverence for the centuries-old tradition of 'Czech statehood', profoundly embedded in European civilization. Czech national culture was an important part of European culture. Therefore, admittedly in response to the visions of its primary contender, the ČSSD, it declared: 'The present form of Czech statehood is for the ODS a confirmation of our legitimate place at the heart of Europe, we thus see no need to seek for our state some abstract, higher idea' (15). 'Defence of Czech national interests' was the party's important priority. To these belonged the '*preservation of a clearly defined [/demarcated] Czech national identity*'; or the provision of territorial integrity, political sovereignty and independence of the country (15, emphasis added). The US presence in Europe through the NATO was seen as 'a guarantee of the defence of the general interests of the Euro-Atlantic civilization' (15).[174] The ODS expressed support for the country's participation in the European integration process. Yet, conceiving of it in 'realistic' rather than 'naïve' terms, its goal, its own 'vision Europe', was '*Europe of nations*, based on free market, partnership, free competition, and the protection of stability and prosperity' (16, emphasis added). Aside from 'uncritically copying' problematic arrangements, such as the 'expensive and inflexible model of the so-called welfare state'; the party refused to '*let our state dissolve either in supranational structures or in a "Europe of regions"*', and a 'Europe closed to the world' (16). While appreciating and promoting 'mutual enrichment of different cultures', the party did not share 'the theories or visions of an emergence of global society or the gradual termination of nation-states'. It was 'convinced that the sovereign nation-state – of course open, tolerant and cooperating – and healthy patriotism will remain the fundamental pillars' of citizens' relation with the world society. It further exhorted: 'We say yes to integration processes, but we refuse to get lost or dissolved in them' (16).

[173] Available from http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/program_1998.pdf.
[174] As opposed to the previous documents, the discussion of NATO preceded that of European integration.

The ODS 2001 *Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism*[175] became the key document with respect to its understanding of the EU and the integration process for the rest of the 2000s. Despite having returned to 'freedom and national sovereignty' only in 1989, the manifesto read, 'our ambitions cannot be other than to fully participate in the decision-making process that is shaping the present and future democratic Europe, an integral part of the natural Euro-American civilization' (3). It was

> no longer possible to understand our accession to the Union only superficially, as a symbolic and final line separating us from our past within the socialist empire or our present within the transitory post-communist area. We have to realize on what conditions we will join the EU, what is the current state and the likely future development of the EU, which potential forms of the Union would bring the most advantages to us and which would be less convenient, and which model of the EU we will support after our country becomes a full-fledged member (3).

To that end, the party declared its 'sincere wish' that the EU be '*a community of equal democratic states of Europe*'; a friend and ally of the USA, 'the most important democracy with close ties to Europe and a country which, traditionally, has helped Europe overcome her internal conflicts' (3, emphasis added).

The EU was a '*tiltyard of interests*': 'European integration was, is, and will be principally about *confrontation of various political, economic and power interests*' on several planes (4). Many problems currently faced by European states were due to the 'constructivist elements of European integration itself'. These 'ideological-political residues of European past', such as costly 'redistribution and bureaucratic processes', welfare state, or 'collective rights' claims, were projected as 'specific European values'. These 'phenomena', however, had an adverse impact on economic growth and the global competitiveness of European economies. The single market was overregulated, largely as a result of lobbyist and corporatist pressures, where this regulation served mainly for protecting the European market from outside competition (4). European institutions suffered from 'democratic deficit', evaded full-fledged parliamentary control of European citizens, and were hence a 'constitutional anomaly' (4). Unsettling were also tendencies in the conception of the CFSP suggesting an 'implicit anti-Americanism' or the 'efforts at restoration of lost great power positions' (4-5).

Ensued an outline of two 'historically distinct conceptions of European integration': intergovernmental vs. federalist/supranational. The latter, 'advocating a unified European

[175] Available from www.ods.cz/docs/dokumenty/zahradil-manifest.pdf; in English from http://www.zahradil.eu/ assets/files/publikace/JanZahradil_aj_manifest.pdf.

state with strong supranational institutions', dominated the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, the whole 'federalization process' slowed down due to a partial change of French positions and the traditionally tepid stance of the 'northern wing' (the UK, Scandinavia). This became apparent at the Nice summit. In response, federalist-oriented countries, particularly Germany, acknowledging that it would be increasingly difficult to push through further changes consensually, managed to modify the planned reform of voting mechanisms to their advantage and strengthened their weight. This related to the resurrection of another German concept of the so-called flexible/multi-speed EU. On the basis of such ideas, some Member States would form an EU 'vanguard' or a 'gravitation nucleus' of closer integration (5). Followed a similar realist analysis of the EU's 'eastern enlargement' project, pointing out, among other things, that its point was not candidates' quick accession but rather 'the exploitation of the accession process to the benefit the then members', e.g. through asymmetric economic exchange at the EU's convenience (6). The EU's skilful negotiation tactic made enlargement into a 'competition among individual candidates', involving a unilateral imposition of the *acquis*, which was primarily an 'antidumping' measure which was to quickly 'eliminate the rest of comparative advantages' the CEE economies had in comparison to the EU (6). Evaluation of the *acquis* adoption was 'fully in hands of European bureaucrats' and became thus another instrument in negotiations open to manipulation at will (7). Since the EU was 'at once both the referee and a player' in enlargement, it had'no reason to change the current arrangement' (7). Decisions on enlargement were arbitrary, a matter of political will (7).[176]

Turning to the ODS view of Czech EU membership, the Union and the future of European integration, 'the Czech statehood concept' as the source of national identity and state sovereignty was, on its reading, inclined to 'the liberal democratic form of government and administration of public affairs, markedly close especially to the Anglo-Saxon traditions of liberal conservatism'. Congruent with it was thus a '*democratic European unity of loosely connected cooperating states, originating from below*', defended by the ODS. In contrast, it was in conflict with 'the earlier extreme fascist or Marxist visions of violent European unification', as well as 'the present-day European social democracy with its central re-distributive processes' and 'the politically centrist Catholicism of the Christian democratic parties'. In view of this danger, the party stressed that on their way to the EU Czechs must

[176] In view of this, the document laid out possible alternatives to EU membership, should the accession process not proceed as foreseen.

not lose sight of Czech national interests: their country's 'territorial integrity, political sovereignty, independence, stability and security', and the mutual opening and integration of markets accompanied by dismantling of unneeded barriers' (8, emphasis added).

In consideration of the above, the ODS advocated the *intergovernmental model of European integration*, which '*must come from below*, from European nations and citizens of Member States represented by their parliaments and governments, not from the office desks of the European political and bureaucratic elite'. It opposed 'further unnatural deepening of European integration towards federation'. Efforts aiming at 'supranational federation' stemmed from theories predicting the 'extinction' or 'dismantling' of the nation-state in the face of economic globalization. These theories disregarded 'such fundamental prerequisites of a stable state' as the indispensability of common language, shared historical experience, or the need of 'a jointly created model of democracy and political culture'. Furthermore, this line of thinking '*reduce[d] national identity to merely a negligible cultural-folklore element*', while ignoring its political and constitutional aspect, i.e. 'the political concept of a nation as the source of state sovereignty and constitutional legitimacy'. Advocates of 'supranational federation' proposed '"European" identity or "European" political nation as a substitute'. In the opinion of the party, however, nothing like that existed and 'should it ever come into being, it would be the result of a long-term social evolution process, not a few decades of the integration process'. Based on these considerations, the party raised a warning that 'the reduction of nations to mere ethnic groups, divested of the possibility of political self-identification, may result in a frustrated counter-reaction in the form of destructive wave of ethno-nationalism' (8, emphases added). For similar reasons, the ODS also opposed a downward 'dissolution of nation-states through their "regionalization"' (9).

Hence, the party advanced intergovernmentalism: maintenance of Member States' equality regardless of their size; the ability of each to block changes in key areas; and so the effective prevention of 'a potential dictate of great powers' (9). It opposed 'all successive steps towards a federal state', such as increased competences of the Commission and the EP; further restrictions to national veto rights and the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV); 'European constitution' (9); or fiscal union; while pondering an opt-out from the monetary union (10). It supported the idea of a flexible/multispeed EU, but in the form of national opt-outs, i.e. '*integration à la carte*', where all speeds are equally legitimate. This, however, was not to not lead to the emergence of 'first-rate' and 'second-rate' Europes, i.e. 'an enclave of "more equal" among equals', implied by the 'gravitation nucleus' proposal:

> those states which would not be included in it would be indirectly forced to adopt its standards without having the opportunity to influence them … This interpretation of the flexibility concept as the formation of some kind of an EU vanguard again leads to inequality in the status of individual states and must therefore be rejected (9).

The party undertook to seek allies in the EU to form interest-based coalitions with: those taking a similar stand on the Union's internal arrangement (the 'northern wing' – the UK and Scandinavia) plus those 'Atlantically-oriented' (e.g. also the Netherlands and Portugal). These alliances of shared interests needed to balance the political influence of Germany, 'the chief architect of federalist conceptions of European integration' (10). The document closed with the ODS vision of the future: '*a broad Euro-Atlantic area*', held together by security, economic and political links, rather than 'fortress Europe' differentiating itself from the USA and other world centres, and rejecting reforms which proved themselves elsewhere (13).

The ODS 2002 elections manifesto[177], as the rest of its programmatic documents issued till 2010, derived from the 'eurorealist' manifesto. The party stated that the EU was at an important crossroads in its development. The contention over its future concerned the ratio between intergovernentalism and supranationalism, of which the EU always was a blend. With membership, the Czechs would get their chance to cease being mere 'spectators' and have a say on the issue (4). The 'Eurofederalist' goal of a 'unified supranational state entity', a 'superstate', would not bring a 'harmonious cohabitation of European nations, but result instead in a new wave of national antipathies'. It was undesirable, held the ODS, since 'the nation-state is not a needless anachronism, but rather an altogether natural product of social evolution' (4). Civic Democrats also denounced the depoliticization of the domestic debate on the EU's future, resulting from its structuration and reduction by their national contenders to one between 'imported eurofederalism' (especially the ČSSD) and what they portrayed as mere and shallow 'anti-Europeanism' or 'Euroscepticism' of the ODS (5). The party opposed European integration's future as one of an 'artificial levelling off of all European states into a single legal, political, economic and institutional framework regardless of diverse national traditions'. It did *not* see '*the EU's present form as the final point of European development, an end in itself*'. The Union was instead a '*means for the realization of our goals, our national interests*'. As opposed to 'fortress Europe'conceptions, the EU was merely an '*opportunity to build an area of freedom, openness and liberal order*', a '*Euro-Atlantic area* as the core of the world democratic civilization' (5, emphases added).

[177] Available from http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/program_2002.pdf.

The party's 2004 'euromanifesto' substantiated its positions on the EU with reference to the need for flexibility in the face of economic globalization, i.e. 'integration à la carte'. It further expressed the conviction that 'far from heading towards a form of supranational state entity … *we are witnessing under the guise of the supposed "federalization" of Europe a re-nationalization of policies of some (particularly large) EU Member States*'. It led 'even to their effort *to ensure their dominant position in the EU's future architecture*'. Hence, the Czech Republic had to pursue 'such an institutional arrangement of the EU and such decision-making procedures which will ensure as large as possible *equality of all the EU Member States, regardless of their size and population figures*' (1). The 2004 'euromanifesto' was accompanied by a special foreign policy document entitled *Realism without Illusions*[178] which listed the party's (/country's) potential allies, sharing with it common interests and positions with respect to European integration, the 'trans-Atlantic link' and the freedom of international trade: the 'northern wing' (the UK, the Baltics and the Nordic countries); and the countries of the same 'weight category' as the Czech Republic such as Portugal and others (14). With respect to enlargement, the document stated:

> *The EU must remain an open structure with a flexible form* in the future, *able to offer various forms of partnership, including full membership, to those of its neighbours which express their desire for and satisfy the necessary conditions* for such a partnership or membership (10, emphases added).

The country's priority interest had to be the 'stabilization and democratization' of Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus) and of the Balkans, as well as the incorporation of these countries into 'European structures'. Furthermore,

> after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, possibly Croatia, *we must prospectively support the membership of those other countries which express their desire for it, and satisfy the accession criteria, including Turkey* (14, emphasis added).

In its 2009 'euromanifesto', the ODS reiterated its understanding of the EU/European integration as *not an end in itself but rather a means to the ends of its participants*. The EU was '*an expression of the will and willingness of its Member States and European nations to manage together matters in their common interest*', 'a space of cooperation' (7, emphases added). Having acknowledged that with a growing number and diversity of members, the Union's 'discipline' and 'unification potential' were undermined, especially the 'strong Member States' started to realize once again the need of the EU's internal re-arrangement. Pushing through the constitutional/Lisbon Treaty would serve the '*large Member States'*

[178] Available from www.ods.cz/docs/publikace/modra_sance-zahranici.pdf.

tendencies to monopolize European integration to the benefit of their national interests'. The ODS opposed the drive towards building a 'closed-off power-regional bloc', characterized by maximal legal, political and economic unity – 'some "state Europe"'. It opted instead for a '*flexible, economically open, and further enlarging entity*', based on the concept of flexible or variable integration (9, emphases added). This was the reason for its departure from the EPP-ED EP fraction. It undertook to cooperate with other like-minded parties, such as the British Conservatives, and establish a new EP 'conservative' fraction: a new platform proposing an '*alternative vision of European integration opposed to the hitherto prevalent Eurofederalism*' (30).[179] With respect to EU enlargement, the party expressed its desire that

> the *EU remains open to further enlargement* to those interested [countries] which satisfy the *criteria of full membership*. We consider *raising additional arbitrary conditions [/hurdles] on their way unacceptable* (33, emphasis added).

In 2010, the ODS published a long-term programmatic document *Vision 2020*[180], foreign policy section of which symbolically opened with a full-page picture of the British, US, Czech and Norwegian flags. Here, the party reiterated its economy-oriented EU construct: a '*path to economic prosperity and a platform for defining the common interests of European democratic states*'. Its alternative vision to the presently dominant 'Eurofederalism' reduced the EU to a 'barrier-free unified market space', based on free movement of people, goods and services, and intergovernmental cooperation (21, emphasis added). In the enlargement context, this construct was enriched with a concern for political values:

> The ODS strives for further enlargement of the *European Union as a space of stability and economic prosperity, based on democratic principles, and respect for human rights and free competition* (22, emphasis added).

It prioritized EU accession of the formerly Yugoslav countries, allowing for 'stabilization, democratization and economic development' of the historically conflict-prone Western Balkans. Based on similar considerations, it supported expansion to Turkey, on proviso that it 'satisfies the same conditions that are and were put down for other candidates' (22).

Finally, the publication of the 'Vision 2020' party conference[181] contributions included a special section on enlargement, authored by Tomáš Chalupa. He portrayed expansion as beneficial for the EU, because it brought in 'new states with distinct character'. New entrants brought with themselves the Union's 'refreshment' and 'a new dynamic in its

[179] This fraction was indeed established under the name 'European Conservatives and Reformists Group'.
[180] Available from http://www.vize2020.cz/docs/vize2020final.pdf.
[181] Available from www.vize2020.cz/docs/sbornik-cr-evropa-svet.pdf.

development', based less 'on regulation and etatism promoted by the "old" Member States' and more on '*a greater space for freedom, market and a healthy competition*':

> Further enlargement must … not only serve the stabilization of the European continent but also make Europe into a strong and predictable actor in economic and political sense, which would as such aid the maintenance of stability in the world (11, emphasis added).

In conclusion, key tenets of the ODS position on both domestic and foreign policy matters remained highly constant throughout the two decades. So did its representations of the EU and Europe, both of which were subordinated to the party's vision of a 'Euro-Atlantic space', the hallmark of democratic civilization. It was in this light that it narrated the Czech(oslovak) 'return to Europe'. It was a return to normalcy, a return 'home', to the early-20th-century Czechoslovak experience with liberal democracy. It was a return to the West, to freedom, democracy and free (and unrestrained) market economy. It was a return to the values and heritage of European/Western civilization, owing its origins to Christianity. The ODS refused to label itself a Christian or confessional party, and interpreted this Christian legacy in terms of practical political values and principles. Ever since its 1992 manifesto, it advocated the country's integration to 'Europe', on its construction largely equivalent with Western Europe and more generally the 'Western World'. NATO membership and the 'trans-Atlantic link' with the USA were attributed equal and occasionally greater importance than European integration. The party's equation of 'Europe' with Western Europe must be therefore understood more widely, as an equation with the West and its political values.

With respect to European integration, the party persistently stressed its appreciation of the diversity of states, nations and cultures. The departure of a relatively large part of its members in the second half of the 1990s allowed the ODS to toughen its anti-socialist profile, built on the (Anglo-Saxon) classical liberal and conservative thought. It concerned itself with the preservation of what it projected to be Czech national identity and interests, emanating from what it saw as 'the Czech statehood concept'. As this concept was (of course) best congruent precisely with the positions of the ODS, the party presented itself as (naturally) its best defender in the face of European social democracy and the centrist Catholicism of Christian democratic parties. It was thus the ODS whose views of the EU, European integration, and of their future, best represented 'the national interest'. On these grounds, it fiercely opposed 'Eurofederalism', and the ideas of 'Europe of regions', European superstate, 'European identity', and of a European 'political nation'. These purportedly stemmed from misguided or anachronic theories reducing and marginalizing the politically non-expendable nation-state and national identity. European integration was not to dissolve

sovereign nation-states. It was not an end in itself, but rather a means to the realization and achievement of its participants' interests. The ODS desired the EU to be a free-market-oriented 'Europe of nations', a 'community of equal democratic states in Europe'. Hence, it pioneered an intergovernmental model of integration, driven from below by European nations/states; as well as the concept of flexible/multispeed EU, 'integration à la carte', on proviso of preserved equality of all the members. Faithful to its declared 'Eurorealism', the party understood the EU/European integration as being principally about confrontation of various interests. It attributed much of the undesired in the EU, (from the purview of Czech national interests), to power and interest politics of large members, particularly of Germany, the chief source of federalist ideas. It undertook to build with like-minded political forces a novel platform promoting an alternative vision of the EU and the integration process, opposed to the prevalent 'Eurofederalism'. On this alternative, the EU was to be a 'flexible, economically open and further enlarging entity', based on flexible or variable integration. Aside from being a 'platform for defining the common interests of European democratic states', the ODS also often constructed the EU in predominantly economic terms, e.g. as a 'barrier-free unified market place'.

Still, this did not mean that it renounced its reverence for Western political values. These were merely deemphasized when discussing the EU itself, and resurfaced in the party position on EU enlargement, remarkably similar to that of the Commission. The EU was to remain open to further enlargement to all countries which desire accession and satisfy the criteria of full membership. Meanwhile, any additional and arbitrarily imposed conditions, aside from the resolution of disputes with neighbours, were unacceptable. In line with the Commission, the ODS saw EU expansion as a means of 'stabilization, democratization and economic development'. Expansion was desirable: each accession of a new member brings inside something distinct, but, especially the weakening of the federalist 'old' members.

The ODS elaborate views of the EU and the integration process should not, however, overshadow its primary vision of a closely-interlinked Euro-Atlantic 'area of freedom, openness and liberal order', the hallmark of (the Western-style) world democratic civilization. With respect to the equivalence 'EU as Europe', the ODS did indeed very often conflate the two. This conflation, nevertheless, sprang from the party's clear-cut discursive prioritization of Europe (itself often a shorthand for Euro-Atlantic civilization), and the attendant relative marginalization of the EU as such. The EU was an instrument and platform to serve the interests of its constituent democratic nation-states, home of which was Europe.

The ODS expressly opposed the concepts of 'European identity' and 'European (political) people'. On its view, culture and identity were intimately tied with nation-states, and their dissolution or harmonization/unification from above had to be strictly rejected.

Overall, the ODS constructed the EU *per se* along Model 1, while Model 2 (Western political values) was latently presupposed. It surfaced in its Commission-like stance on EU enlargement. It was to continue for the sake of democratization, stability and economic development; and steer clear of cultural considerations, and of novel, arbitrarily imposed conditions on candidates. One should keep in mind that, for the ODS, the (Model 2) community was not primarily the enlarging EU, but rather the 'Euro-Atlantic area'. The Union was just one, albeit very important, link thereof.

Promoting its conception of the EU, the ODS consistently advocated its (territory-wise rather unrestrained) enlargement. It declared support for Turkey's membership already in the 2004 'euromanifesto'. Its 2010 long-term programme represented EU enlargement as that of a 'space of stability and economic prosperity, based on democratic principles, and respect for human rights and free competition'. Hence, enlargement was a matter of stabilization, democratization and economic development of all the countries desiring accession. Whereas the party's priority region in this respect were the former Yugoslav countries, this general line on enlargement did not discriminate among current and potential candidates, and explicitly excluded cultural considerations. Therefore, Turkey was to accede once it satisfied 'the same conditions that are and were put down for other candidates' (22).

Characterizing Turkey as a long-term 'reliable NATO member and the largest Muslim partner of the Western states', the ODS insisted that it 'must not be pushed away to the periphery'. Preventing its EU entry 'would certainly prompt [its] leaning towards more radical Muslim countries, which could lead to a radicalization of Turkey itself and, consequently, a reduction of the EU's security' (Ibid). This position drew on a text on EU expansion presented at an earlier ODS 'ideas conference'. This piece recognized Turkey's cultural/religious difference but refrained from making it a valid, relevant consideration. The ODS reflections on Turkey were altogether of geopolitical, security and economic nature:

> Turkey's full membership in the European Union could bring about the stabilization of the area and keep Turkey on its path to greater democracy. It would prevent the danger of a fundamentalist regime being formed and, above all, demonstrate the ability of the European Union to absorb in the process of enlargement the first country which is closer to the Union in terms of its liberal-market economic environment rather than Christian traditions. Consequently, it [Turkey] could play the much needed role of a stabilizing factor in the given area (11).

It was further added that important energy supply lines were to go through Turkey; that its entry would make the EU a direct neighbour of the Middle Eastern 'crisis countries'; or that populous Turkey would assume a strong position within the EU institutional architecture, bringing thus 'certain changes' to the European decision-making process. From the perspective of Czech national interests, a much easier access to the 80-milion Turkish market would be 'certainly interesting' (11). The ODS should

> support closest possible cooperation with Turkey on the European project, at each phase of its accession negotiations, because there is … a real concern that a delay in negotiations would lead … to a falling interest in membership in Turkey itself, and its efforts to seek partnership elsewhere. In the end, such a process could result in a negative development … primarily from a security perspective. It is not possible to ignore in this regard our traditional and firm alliance with the state Israel, and [our] interest in its secure existence in this very "tectonic" area' (11).

The party preoccupied itself with equal treatment of Turkey by the EU. Its representatives were strongly critical of any proposed 'specialties' in the Turkish case. In 2005, its then chairman Mirek Topolánek issued a resolution declaring that all the Balkan states, Turkey and Ukraine had a 'full right to apply' for EU membership (as quoted by Šaradín 2010, 135). In 2008, this time also in his capacity as the Czech Prime Minister, Topolánek on one occasion 'categorically refused any alternatives offered to Turkey such as privileged partnership, semi-membership, etc.'; and on another insisted that 'every country which fulfilled the membership criteria had the right to aspire for full membership' (as reported by Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 115).

Jan Zahradil, the party expert on foreign policy, and especially on EU matters, has been one of the most outspoken advocates of Turkey's accession, and of its 'due accession process'. In 2006, Zahradil stated that 'Turkey sometimes serves as a scapegoat and as a way [for the EU] to escape its own problems' (as quoted by Šaradín 2010, 135). That year, the ODS MEPs refused to support the Progress the Report on Turkey, declaring jointly that

> [t]he formulations and suggestions included in this report are in many respects outside … the general framework of requirements common during … EU accession negotiations and are not related to the current political and economic situation in Turkey (as quoted by Šaradín 2010, 135).

Addressing EU activism on the issue of Armenian genocide, they could not

> accept the manipulation with long past historical events and its use as a political tool in the contemporary context (in relation to the Turkish question of the so-called Armenian genocide during World War I). The Czech Republic has its own very negative experience with attempts to retroactively misuse the past (as quoted by Šaradín 2010, 135).

Finally, in a 2005 article[182], speaking of concerns over Turkey's predominant religion, Zahradil asserted that it was 'impossible' to think of European culture and civilization without the influence of Islam, or to deny its importance in Europe's history. This would amount to a 'denial of a part of Europe's past and present', since 'European history is to a large extent a history of very vivid meeting and clashing with Islam'. Zahradil's stance reflected the ODS refusal to think of the EU as a 'Christian club', striving instead for its 'greater engagement in the Muslim world as a natural neighbourhood for Europe', and seeing Turkey's accession as the first step on that way, according to David Král (2006, 66).

4.5 Country Findings

The template for the story told of Czech(oslovak) Republic and Europe, its integration and the EU, was the country's 'return to Europe', its natural and rightful claim. What the parties under scrutiny differed on in filling this narrative with a storyline and meaning were their respective understandings of Europe. For all four parties, it was a return to statehood independent of great powers: in matters of foreign policy, and of the nation-state's 'presence' and Selfhood. This is where the Communists' story ended. The OF, ODS and the ČSSD proceeded further. For them, it was a *return to normalcy*, to 'the West'(ern civilization), its values of democracy and market economy, from which the country and its neighbours were (artificially) separated short of their own discretion on the matter. It was more immediately a return to Western Europe, which was 'the West'. The two were virtually equated by the ODS which built a chain of equivalence pertaining to the West as such. The ČSSD and the KSČM differentiated Europe in the West, and particularly from the USA. They represented Europe as a further unspecified space or continent, the future of which was to be set out by common efforts. They saw the EU as the most appropriate (if still inadequate) means and platform for the attainment of their respective 'visions Europe'. Their envisioned future Europe was to become an active agent in the rearrangement of global social relations.

The Social Democrats' 'vision Europe' projected a further stage in the process of 'continentalization'/'European unification', and that as part of a larger process of building a just global order. For them, the hitherto achievements of fellow advocates of federalism, and of EU institutions, were a desirable starting point. The KSČM largely distanced itself from the EU, doubting that it was, in its present shape, the most appropriate vehicle to carry

[182] Zahradil, Jan (2005) 'Stýkání a potýkání [Meeting and Clashing]', *Euro*, 7 March 2005. Available from http://www.zahradil.eu/media/627.

Europe to the desired European and global destination. It deemed the EU compromised, tainted by transnational capital and neoliberal economic programme. The party's vision of 'united Europe' and of a global order stemmed overtly from historical-materialist thought. Yet, in terms of geopolitics and the reorganization of social relations, the KSČM's 'return' story ended with national independence and sovereignty. Thereafter the country remained stuck between the East and West, possibly waiting for changes to take place in a desirable direction. Such change would be an appropriate alteration of the EU. Then it could serve as possibly the most efficient means and platform for the unification of the continent, (inhabited by diverse nations/states and peoples), and the transformation of social relations therein.

The ODS also presented a sequel to its 'return to Europe' story. It envisioned an EU reduced to a free-market entity, and open to further enlargement to all states that so desire. It would be a natural component of the Western-democratic world, subscribing as such to the values of this community, primary defenders of which were the countries of the 'Euro-Atlantic area'. This vision determined the party's programme for the future of the EU/integration process. It proposed a pro-Atlantic, free-market- and nation-state-centred alternative to the hegemonic (socialist and Christian democratic) 'Eurofederalist' project; and its comprehensive programme of dissolving the nation-state into ideas of 'European identity', 'European political nation/people' or 'Europe of regions'. The EU was to be a free-market-oriented 'Europe of democratic nations', a means for the pursuit of their national and shared interests.

All three parties subordinated their respective EU constructs to those of a 'Europe of nations', and neither doubted the Czech(oslovak) Republic's belonging therein. Their respective sequels to the 'return to Europe' story took place in the context of (economic) globalization. All three concerned a further undifferentiated Europe and its future. Rather than an end in itself, all three projected the EU as a means to be adjusted, so as to become the appropriate platform for the re/unification of Europe, and of transforming or setting it on the desired path. All three parties stressed the importance of the diversity of European cultures and national and other identities, as well as of national independence and sovereignty. The latter were merely deemphasized in the discourse of the 'Eurofederalist' ČSSD. No party demonstrated adherence to the concept of 'European identity'. The KSČM disregarded the question. The Socialists appeared hesitant and somewhat torn between their culture-free (official) EU construct, and the more pro-active federalist currents in their discourse. The ODS, on its part, expressly dismissed the 'European identity' concept and

programme as misguided, interested and political. With regard to the place of culture in the parties' respective EU constructs, the KSČM's geopolitical and geo-economic discourse largely expelled this question. Persistently stressing the diversity of cultures and worldviews, and the multicultural nature of the future just global order, the ČSSD seems to have eventually opted for a plurality of culturally distinct collectivities (most probably national) rather that the idea of an 'over-arching European identity'. If it construed anything of this kind, the chain of equivalence did not seem to involve 'culture' as understood in this work.

All in all, it may be concluded that the Czech political elite subordinated their EU constructs to their respective representations of Europe as an undifferentiated space/continent of nations and states. With respect to the three Models outlined in Chapter 3, the KSČM's conception of the EU remained blurry, largely due to its dismissal of the Union in its current form which must first be overcome. Still, since the party's EU construction revolved around historical-materialist geo-economic and geopolitical considerations, with an emphasis on the nation-state, it admittedly most closely approximated the Model 1. The ODS also predominantly constructed the EU along Model 1. It represented its enlargement, nevertheless, as that of a Model 2 culture-free community of (Western) political values. That community was not EU- or Europe-specific. It encompassed the wider West, that is, the 'Euro-Atlantic' area. Finally, the ČSSD engaged in a 'typical', mainstream and left-leaning Model 2 construction of the EU-as-community based on (Western) political and (European) social-democratic values. Meanwhile, its stress on the plurality and diversity of cultures and identities, as well as its localized re-articulation of federalist ideas, demonstrated inclination to the nation-state-centred Model 1 rather than the Model 3 culture-infused 'EUasEurope' equivalence, and the notions of a shared (and thus exclusive) 'European identity' and 'European culture'.

The last observation is attributable to the above identified discursive prioritization by the Czech political elite of a Europe of nation-states and peoples. That Europe was there before European integration. The EU, the current form the process took, was understood as the most appropriate, but for differing reasons still not quite the rightly-set-up, project/vehicle to bring about the final re/unification of the still disunited continent Europe.

When it comes to Turkey's EU membership, the KSČM, itself scarcely commenting on enlargement, saw no reason why it should be prevented. The ČSSD and the ODS acknowledged its cultural/religious difference. Fairly often, their statements implied that

they located Turkey outside, yet just 'next to' Europe, although neither party provided a further specification thereof. They both evaluated Turkey's EU accession on the basis of their very similar (Model 2 culture-free) general positions on enlargement, and esteemed possible consequences of having a Muslim country in. It should be added, nonetheless, that the two parties had differing primary motives for their advocacy of Turkey's membership, each depending on their envisioned future character of the EU/'united Europe'. The ODS was more vocal in its advocacy, insisting at the same time that the EU must treat Turkey as any other candidate.

The findings of the above analysis with respect to the Czech(oslovak) 'return to Europe', and the understandings of the EU, Europe, and of the integration process by the Czech political elite, were corroborated by the findings of the EURONAT project. Especially in the early 1990s, the 'return to Europe' narrative overshadowed and structured other considerations. This narrative was set within a hierarchic East-West binary with an underlying developmental current. The Czechs built a chain of equivalence between this slogan (or its 'Back to Europe' alternative), and thus the goal of ending Europe's division, with the end of communism, post-communist transformation and European integration (EURONAT 2006, 88). The desire for EU membership derived from the aspiration to overcome the perceived 'West-East' hierarchy (Ibid, 32). Indicating a differentiation between Europe and the EU, it was further reported that the Czechs had no doubt about their country's belonging to Europe; while the discussion on 'the question of EU membership' revolved primarily around 'the benefits of such a step': the prospective 'economic (dis) advantages' (Ibid, 17). This economy-centred perspective characterized also the KSČM's view of the EU, albeit from a radically different standpoint. The party saw the present EU as 'a capitalist project, serving as a channel through which the globalisation forces will eventually "swallow up" Europe' (as interpreted by Král 2006, 50).

Turning to the Czech political elite stand on further EU enlargement, a general consensus has been reported (Král 2006, 49). The Czech Republic was described as 'the engine behind' the so-called pro-enlargement 'Tallinn Group' of EU members (Bartovic and Král 2010, 40).[183] As a matter of fact, the Czech political elite scarcely converge on foreign political and EU matters, enlargement thus being one of the few points of common

[183] This like-minded informal group was formed by most of the new 2004/2007 members, the UK, Italy, Spain and Portugal. It has focused on the Balkan countries and Turkey, and (other) topical enlargement-related matters (e.g. visa liberalization) (Bartovic and Král 2010, 40-41).

agreement. Even though often from different perspectives, and with diverging motives, all political forces concurred on that further enlargement was in the Czech Republic's interest (Beneš 2008, 49 and 52). By 2010, all parliamentary parties, including the KSČM, strongly favoured it (Bartovic and Král 2010, 39). Král suggested a number of possible factors making for the relatively sturdy Czech pro-enlargement stand. One had to do with the fact that the county was a novice in the EU and as such in no position to deny membership to 'others who want to come in'. This related to the (earlier identified finding of a) generally shared understanding that '*the driving force behind the EU integration project is European reunification, starting with the Franco-German reconciliation after WWII but continuing after the end of the Cold War with bringing the former Communist countries into the EU*' (Král 2006, 49, emphasis added). Another factor was a widespread 'feeling of solidarity with countries outside the EU aspiring to join the club, who should be given the right to prosperity and well-being as well'. This related to the perception of EU membership perspective as a powerful instrument in the efforts aimed at securing a stable neighbourhood, and the country's own experience with a complex and difficult transformation. The goal of EU membership prompted the implementation of necessary reforms quicker than would otherwise be the case. Hence, the EU's '"carrot and stick" soft power' was seen as 'an extremely powerful tool for creating a friendly neighbourhood … and changing the countries to be more like the members of the club' (Ibid, 49-50). The ODS, nevertheless, spared no criticism of the actual execution of the enlargement procedure, both with respect to the Czech Republic and generally. It accused the EU of 'dominating and treating candidate countries unequally, over-regulating, [or] trying to impose red "socialist" tape on countries that are striving to develop in a more liberal direction' (Ibid, 50).

According to Král, the two dominant parties (ČSSD and ODS) indeed harboured very unalike motives for supporting EU enlargement, since they projected 'the EU and its "*finalité politique*" through completely different optics' (Král 2006, 52). The Social Democrats linked further enlargement to the goal of European reunification, 'spreading stability and prosperity across the continent, and thus creating a safe home for everyone' (Ibid, 50-51). On their view, it was at the same time 'difficult to delineate the boundaries of Europe in geographic terms'. The debate on the EU's future should thus not seek to produce a 'definite "map of Europe" but … [rather] focus on the question of political culture'. Still, the party perceived a certain tension between the EU's 'widening' and 'deepening'. It deemed that the two ought

to be appropriately balanced, so that the EU's cohesion, operation, and ability to pursue its objectives and further political integration, are not compromised (Beneš 2008, 56).

Many observers believed that the primary motive of the ODS's support for further enlargement derived from its intended partial 'demontage' of the EU. More precisely, from the presumption (characterizing admittedly also the stance of the British Conservatives) that the greater the number of EU members, the less likely further 'deepening' of the integration process. Even more so, further enlargement, especially to 'large and relatively poor countries such as Turkey or Ukraine', was expected to 'dilute' the political aspect of European integration, strengthen the EU's intergovernmental features, bring more flexibility[184] (Král 2006, 51) and greater focus on free-market economic integration. The ODS thus saw enlargement as 'insurance against further political integration, as an inhibitor of federalist and communitarian deepening of the integration process'. Still, according to Vít Beneš, and in line with the findings of the above analysis, the ODS also represented it (together with the Commission) as a precious opportunity to bring the neighbouring countries closer to 'European standards, democracy, stability and prosperity' (2008, 53).

Compared to Eastern Europe, and especially the Western Balkans, Turkey has never been a Czech foreign policy priority. Almost all relevant Czech political parties, nevertheless, expressed their support for its EU accession[185]; adhering strongly to the '*pacta sund servanda*' principle; and demanding that no additional criteria be formulated; and that the progress in accession negotiations must not be held hostage to bilateral disputes with some EU members, i.e. with the Republic of Cyprus (Bartovic and Král 2010, 49 and 51). The positions of the main political forces – the ČSSD and the ODS – were determined by their respective wider conceptions of the future of the EU/'united Europe', and especially their stance on the further deepening of integration. They were found to be aligned with the positions of like-minded parties abroad (Král 2006, 95).[186] The ČSSD saw Turkey's potential membership as 'endorsement of the idea of open, inclusive Europe, bridge to the Middle East and the Muslim world in general', a possible showcase of Islam's 'compatibility' with

[184] Zahradil reportedly stated that 'enlargement brings in certain flexibility' and weakens 'the unification template, i.e. the desire to squeeze all the European countries into one format' (as quoted by Král 2006, 65).
[185] Dissenting voices could be identified among some small parties. Most important in this respect has been the rejection of Turkey's EU membership on grounds of cultural/religious difference by the formerly politically influential Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party.
[186] The Social Democrats' position largely resembled that of German SPD. The ODS often replicated arguments of British Conservatives. The minor Christian Democrats followed the position taken by their German counterpart.

democracy. The ODS, on its part, viewed it as a step to diluting the integration process and to the revision and reduction of some financially demanding (e.g. agricultural or cohesion) redistribution policies (Bartovic and Král 2010, 39). Král identified yet another ODS incentive to support Turkey's entry: its own strong pro-Atlanticism, combined with the lasting US advocacy of the country's accession, and the party's hope that Turkey would join and thus empower the pro-Atlantic group in the EU (2006, 66).

Insights from the Czech Republic ought to include a discussion of the positions of Václav Klaus, taken either in his capacity as the ODS's long-term (presently honorary) very influential chairman, or that of the Czech President between 2003 and 2013. Regardless of the office from which he uttered them, Klaus's views, inspired by the British Conservatives and perhaps most significantly by Margaret Thatcher, have been very constant in their harsh criticism of the EU and the efforts aimed at deeper integration. His positions have been remarkable for their theoretical sophistication and a clear, liberal-conservative ideological profile. In a 2004 newspaper article[187], Klaus critically addressed the very problem identified by this study – a hegemonic equivalence built between Europe and the EU – and its implications for enlargement to Turkey. He dismissed the then debate on the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey as 'ridiculous' and 'insincere', particularly because its participants failed to '*emphatically and thoroughly distinguish between Europe and the European Union*' (emphasis added). Klaus insisted that

> *no one can appropriate Europe for themselves, and that no one can speak on its behalf*. *Europe,* as a *geographically rather imprecisely delimited territory* (or delimited only customarily), *is only and solely a spiritual, cultural and civilizational phenomenon*, and even this statement is merely a generalization, abstraction, a hypothesis. Moreover, it is *in permanent motion*. *Its heterogeneity is so large that speaking of homogeneity, unity, or common past would be very courageous*. For all these reasons, *it is absolutely absurd to want to accept someone to Europe or to exclude them from it* (even by means of legislative acts) (emphases added).

Klaus found it disturbing that many European politicians did exactly that at the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul, despite the fact that they 'did not and could not have any [such] mandate'. He held that the only and sole (relevant) consideration was

> *whether to admit Turkey into one specific, as a deliberate project man-made, right-now-existing organization called the European Union*. It must have *nothing to do with the debate on Europe*. That debate *takes place elsewhere and is about something else* (emphases added).

Once the question is posed in this way, it is quite easy, according to Klaus, to structure the problem on the basis of the arguments of some of the participants in the 'Turkish debate':

[187] Klaus, Václav (2004) *op. cit*.

'The dispute over Turkey is not a dispute about Turkey. It is a dispute over the character, shape and the very substance of the European Union' between two alternative conceptions thereof. Those desiring a 'Delorsean-Maastricht-ambitious … "ever closer union"' with a constitution logically said 'NO' to Turkey, as it was 'evidently incompatible' with their (desired) Union. Those who (like Klaus) desired the EU to be a 'conglomerate of friendly, maximally cooperating and close states' equally logically said 'YES' to Turkey, because 'they do not see the tiniest reason why and how to defend introversion and exclusivity of this European club against those who want to be friendly, maximally cooperating, close states, joining forces in many respects'.

This is the crux of Klaus's position on both the EU and Turkey, repeated on many occasions. In a piece from 2005, he developed this argument a little further. Expressly dismissing an equation between Europe and the EU, Klaus recognized Turkish influence on the culture and civilization of continent Europe. At the same time he stressed that

> *Turkey will be in the future entering the EU, not Europe*. Turkey will – I hope – get a chance to enter *the man-made, time-determined institution*, called the European Union. *There is no membership in a* – for centuries spontaneously evolving, geographically delineated – *European continent* (as quoted by Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 122, emphases added).

Accordingly, in yet another, 2006 piece, Klaus appreciated the diversity that EU accession of a populous and culturally different country would bring about.[188] He held that accession of *a candidate must not be assessed on the basis of its culture, religion, or history*, but rather strictly according to the principle that 'any country, willing to participate in the European integration process, should have a chance to do it, on the condition of fulfilling the agreed-upon political, economic and social criteria' (as quoted and interpreted by Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 122).

[188] In a 2005 speech in Istanbul, Klaus reportedly declared that should Turkey not be accepted into the EU, it would amount to the failure of European multiculturalism (as interpreted by Šaradín 2010, 133).

Chapter 5

Slovakia

If making choices on how to manage the post-1989 regained independence was prolonged in any of the Visegrad countries, it was in Slovakia. The post-Soviet-empire independence brought Slovaks to demanding a re-arrangement of the Czechoslovak federation (more national and less federal competences). Interpretations of the Czechoslovak divorce may diverge on many points but converge on that it was a rather uneforeseen development, desired only by few. The general expectation on both the Czech and Slovak sides was that some sort of federative arrangement would be maintained between the two republics. There is also a wide agreement on that the divorce began with the June 1992 elections, more precisely with the Czech and Slovak governments their results produced. The diverging programmes of these two governments reflected a growing schism between the two republics regarding the transformation road to be taken. At the root of this schism was the economy, in particular the neo-liberal free-market 'shock-therapy' programme associated primarily with Václav Klaus and his rising ODS. In contrast, the main Slovak governing party at the time – Movement for Democratic Slovakia – promoted an alternative, social market economy programme. Asserting Slovak claim for sovereignty, this party managed to tie the question of economic transformation with that of the future of the Czechoslovak federation.

If the 1992 elections can be retrospectively described as those which brought a decision on Slovakia's full independence (as of 1993), then the 1994 elections should be seen as those which brought up the question of how to manage this independence not only in theory but also in practice. Slovakia's heading to Europe and the West, towards integration with 'Euro-Atlantic' structures, was arrested and put in question in the ensuing 1994-1998 period of government led by Vladimír Mečiar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Despite having repeatedly declared that this was the course the country should take, the domestic actions of this government, and its conduct of foreign policy, markedly diverged from that stated intent. This period was one of a bitter realization that despite being a fully sovereign and independent country, Slovakia's options were limited. They were largely reduced to a choice between taking the same 'Western' course as other Visegrad countries, or, alternatively, facing a possible nationalist and Eastern/Slavic-oriented isolation. The 1994-1998 government proved to be ambivalent on this point. Its widely registered

undemocratic practices became the target of criticism by Western institutions. Slovakia's isolation came about anyway, when what Mečiar earlier called a 'disaster scenario' materialized (Drulák 2006, 181). In 1997, both the NATO and EU decided to exclude Slovakia from their respective first enlargement waves to CEE. The bottom-line for the EU was that Slovakia failed to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. The Slovaks came to realize that the hitherto government's conduct and ambivalent foreign policy effectively disconnected their country from the Visegrad Group 'train' headed to the West, the NATO and EU memberships. The obvious conclusion for many was that Mečiar and his party must be removed from office by the 1998 elections, and that all efforts must be invested in Slovakia's catching of 'the European train' (Kopeček and Šedo 2003, 8). Implementation of 'radical domestic reforms' was to quickly bring the country back onto its Visegrad neighbours' NATO and EU accession track (Drulák 2006, 181).

This is how the NATO, yet especially the EU entry came to dominate party competition prior to the 1998 and 2002 Slovak elections. Although Mečiar's party formally won in 1998, the actual victor was a wide coalition held together by the shared objective of getting back onto the 'European train', and thus of ousting that party from government. A number of these forces formed together a heterogeneous governmental coalition which made the above objective, and thus the return to the pre-1994 Slovak foreign political course, its top priority (Drulák 2006, 181).[189] The glue of common objective, however, failed to hold the governmental coalition together till the end of its term in 2002. Its gradual erosion and fragmentation brought a number of dissatisfied secessions and new party formations. Mikuláš Dzurinda, the then Prime Minister and head of the strongest subject in government, founded a new formation called Slovak Democratic and Christian Union. From the 1998 anti-Mečiar coalition, it was only this new subject and the Christian Democratic Movement which managed to enter the Slovak parliament in 2002 and co-create the next government.

In the 1998-2002 period, the Slovak debate and differentiation of party positions on the EU/European integration were arrested by the urgency of 'catching up the European train'. Parties largely restricted their positions to declarations of support for the EU entry (Kopeček and Šedo 2003, 8). Efforts in that direction bore fruit when Slovakia was included in the second, Helsinki group of candidates which started negotiating accession in 2000.

[189] Paradoxically including Mečiar's party as well, there was now a consensus in the 1998-2002 Slovak parliament on the matter of timely EU accession (Kopeček and Šedo 2003, 6).

Prior to the 2002 elections, Dzurinda's new party presented itself as a guarantee of EU accession, capitalizing on what can be seen as EU-side intervention in Slovak party competition. Several EU and individual member representatives signalled that Slovak chances of admission would be compromised should Mečiar's party participate in the future government. On their view, it was Dzurinda's Prime Ministership which would be 'an assurance of Slovakia's smooth EU [and even more so NATO] accession'. This intervention did not prevent a repeated victory of Mečiar's party. Yet it did effectively disqualify it from government coalition talks, eventually led by Dzurinda's second-ranking Slovak Democratic and Christian Union. Mečiar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia thus remained in isolation despite having eliminated from its leadership a 'traditional-nationalist' wing, and efforts aimed to repair its pro-Western, i.e. pro-EU and pro-NATO image (Kopeček and Šedo 2003, 6-7). The resulting second (and more coherent) Dzurinda government, remained faithful to the key NATO and EU entry objective. All its component subjects demonstrated a consistently 'pro-European orientation', but also a growing differentiation with respect to their conceptions of the EU's desired future character (Kopeček and Šedo 2003, 5 and 7).

The restructuring of the Slovak political scene continued post-EU accession as well. The 2006 elections were the last to produce parliamentary representation of Mečiar's party, as well as its presence in government. This time, however, the party was demoted into one of two minor coalition partners of the victorious Direction – Social Democracy. This party, a partial successor of the post-communist Democratic Left Party, came to dominate Slovak politics till the 2010 elections, which it won with (in democratic Slovakia unprecedented) 35% share of the votes. Its pro-EU stance was formed in opposition to Dzurinda's governments and their perceived submissiveness during accession talks. In this context, the party laid emphasis on national identity and interests, thusly differentiating itself from the 'pro-establishment Left' in neighbouring Visegrad countries (Kopeček and Šedo 2003, 7).

5.1 Public Against Violence

Verejnosť proti násiliu (VPN) developed in the late 1989 as a distinctly Slovak popular movement, a Slovak 'twin' to the Czech OF. Just like it, the VPN emerged as an anti-regime pro-transition umbrella of multiple political forces which would eventually secede from it. Just like the OF in the Czech lands, it was the main force in government in the post-revolutionary years, which would fragment and dissolve in 1992. The VPN's most important

successor was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, foundation and departure from the VPN of which took place in 1991.

The VPN 1990 elections manifesto[190] was preoccupied with the rearrangement of relations within the Czechoslovak federation and the position of both the federation and of Slovakia in international relations. Together with the OF, as its Czech counterpart, it promoted the 'shift of power from a federal centre … to the governments, regions and communities of the two constituent Republics' (2). With new federal, Slovak and Czech constitutions Czechoslovakia was to become a 'modern federal state' based on partnership, friendship and cooperation, with federal jurisdiction preserved only in essential matters, such as foreign defence and financial policies (3). Slovak government would 'conduct independent foreign relations'. Slovakia would be represented in federal representative bodies, as well as in international bodies and organizations on equal footing (4-5). It opposed calls for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, since the Slovak Republic already was a state on its own, 'in the process of gaining full equality' within the federation: 'Our relations will be based on the democratic principles typical of our society as a whole and of Europe in its process of integration. Ours is to be a federation of equal partners' (24).

Foreign policy-wise, the VPN saw (Czecho)Slovakia's future in 'an integrated, open Europe, founded on the equality and cooperation of all its nations' (4). Slovakia's belonging to Europe was accompanied in the VPN discourse with an emphasis on Slovak national distinctiveness. It described itself as

> linked equally with the traditional national values and national culture, and with the traditions of European humanism. This is only natural because Slovakia used to be and is once again becoming a crossroads of spiritual currents, both domestic and European (23).

Aside from cooperation with neighbouring states and contacts with international institutions and organizations, the movement advocated the then widespread idea of 'demilitarization of Europe and the world' (5); 'scaling down and gradual abolition of military-political blocs in their present form and their replacement by new forms of cooperation, guaranteed by bilateral and multilateral treaties' (4). This involved 'all moves leading to a Europe free of military groupings'; 'a basic re-assessment of the functioning of the Warsaw Treaty until such time when the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO are disbanded'; and the making of Central Europe into a 'nuclear-free zone' (5).

[190] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

Overall, the VPN located Czechoslovakia firmly in Europe, of which, it was implied, it has always been part. It saw the country's future in an open and integrated, further non-delineated Europe, founded on the equality and cooperation of all its nations. Europe denoted in the document a space of nations, comprising (at least a part) of the membership of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty pacts. This suggests the movements' narrative of the time as one of the overcoming of the post-Yalta division of Europe by means of its integration.

5.2 (People's party –) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia

(Ľudová strana -) Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (ĽS-HZDS) was founded in 1991 after a sizeable part of the VPN seceded from it. It was the main party in Slovak governments between 1991 and 1998 and, on the basis of electoral results, the strongest party in the Slovak system in the two decades. Together with its long-term president Vladimír Mečiar, the HZDS is often blamed for Slovakia's delayed NATO and potentially threatened EU accession. The party profiled itself as a blend of at least three orientations: social democratic, Christian/popular, and national(ist). In the course of the two decades, its emphasis on these orientations varied. This is somewhat problematic for the analysis of its construction of the EU: it seems to have articulated a distinct blend of social- and Christian-democratic pro-integrationism, a stress on Slovak national identity and culture and, for some time, also Slavic collectiveness.

Already its 1992 elections manifesto[191] represented the party as a blend of all the three orientations. At this time of intense debate about the future of the Czechoslovak federation, however, it emphasized particularly its national orientation. It characterized the 1992 elections as a decision on the 'destiny of Slovakia', since the

> [b]odies which will result from the elections will decide about a position of the Slovak Republic in Europe and in the world, and about a form of co-existence with the Czech Republic. The state will have to be given a new constitutional framework (1)

The party's primary goal in 1992 was the 'accomplishment' of Slovakia's democratic emancipation by taking steps through which it would obtain 'international legal subjectivity' (1), such as the declaration of its sovereignty, new constitution, and a referendum held on 'a new arrangement of relations with the Czech Republic' (26). The party did not suggest how the relations between the two Republics should look like but it appears that they were not to be based on the existing federal arrangement. Security and defence policies were to be

[191] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

subject to the new arrangement, whereas 'the internal content of Slovak statehood' was 'the building of a socially just state', based on the rule of law, political pluralism, civic engagement, and self-administration principles' (25). The party advocated enactment 'of the usage of Slovak as a state language on the whole territory of Slovakia' (26).[192]

What many analysts later identified as key factor beyond Czechoslovakia's dissolution was the tying by the HZDS, the party to dominate the future government, of the question of rearrangement of Slovakia's relation with the Czech Republic with its social market economy programme (as opposed to the overwhelmingly neoliberal Czech programme). At the heyday of Klaus's comprehensive 'Thatcherite' agenda of economic overhaul, the HZDS articulated an equivalence between Slovakia's national sovereignty and international subjectivity on the one hand, and its own social market programme of economic transformation on the other. It advocated the continuation of 'economic transformation according to a new strategy' with a social, environmental and anti-monopoly dimension (26).

With respect to foreign policy, the HZDS declared primary goal was a 'direct incorporation of the Slovak Republic to European integration processes', perceived as a chance for the 'satisfaction' of Slovakia's economic and political interests. It would seek greater cooperation among Central European countries with respect to European integration (19). Considering participation in European integration processes, 'namely the EC', and European security structures (60), the HZDS apparently preferred Slovakia's own way, while allowing for the option that the federation would be preserved: 'We will support a parity or parallel representation of the Slovak Republic in foreign relations and international organizations' (25).

The HZDS 1994 elections manifesto[193] called for continuity in Slovakia's foreign-political orientation under Mečiar: 'participation in European and trans-Atlantic political, security and economic structures [the EU, NATO and WEU], *while respecting the national independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty*' of Slovakia (152, emphasis added). Furthermore, the party maintained, in promoting the country's culture abroad, stress should be laid not only on the Slovak but also *Slavic collectiveness* (143).

[192] The HZDS called for the 'renaissance of Slovak society' through the 'restoration of our original spiritual and cultural principles'. These were Cyril-Methodian (Old Church Slavic) traditions, 'springing from the moral principles of Christianity' and the civilizational values of European culture (24).
[193] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

Similarly brief and general on the matter of EU was the party manifesto of 1998[194], at the time when its government was discredited from abroad, as both the EU and NATO postponed Slovakia's accession track; and a heterogeneous coalition was formed whose main goal was to remove the HZDS from government and to 'catch up' with both the EU and NATO accession 'trains'. Aside from its 'dignified' integration into the EU as an 'equal and accepted partner' (21), the HZDS stressed that Slovakia's accession to 'European and trans-Atlantic structures' must not lose sight of 'the defence of the state's geopolitical interests'. This apparently related to the party vision of the OSCE, the 'sole all-European structure of a security character', as the backbone for 'building a security model for Europe of the 21st century': an 'all-European security architecture'. This implies an understanding of Europe as comprising also those states whose membership to either the NATO or the EU was not under consideration, as well as the party's persisting Slavic orientation. In a somewhat puzzling statement, it also advocated the 'strengthening of the legal and moral basis of the European political space', where 'the development of cultural-civilizational specificities … would support and enrich European universalism' (22).

The 2002 elections manifesto at least partly clarified what was meant by the last statement.[195] It emphasized the party's Christian (Cyril-Methodic) democratic orientation with respect to individual responsibility, life, family, society and social justice; while also declaring its openness to 'all people regardless of religion' (1). It characterized both the EU and NATO as 'standard security and social structures' (4), and Slovakia's accession to them as a 'fundamental and critical interest' of the nation-state and its future development (21). It espoused EU enlargement and the deepening of cooperation within the Union (2):

> We are Europeans; that is why we support the integration, cooperation, peace and security of our continent. Our culture and values are our contribution to Europe. We are ready to take part in the enlargement of the European Union and the creation of new guarantees of [a] security system, and to take part in this system' (1).

Still, the HZDS subordinated the EU to, rather than equated it with 'continent Europe':

> We will be active in the formation of democratic European policies in the EU bodies and in the Council of Europe. *Europe should remain a continent of nation-states* with full-fledged parliamentary democracies' (21, emphasis added).

The party 2004 'euromanifesto' is unavailable, most probably because it was not produced. Available are interviews with its two MEP candidates. The first candidate[196] suggested that

[194] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[195] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[196] Available at http://www.infovolby.sk/index.php?base=data/euro/2004/kandidati/interview/1086464627.txt.

in view of the cultural, religious and national diversity of Europe, 'it is very hard to speak of federation or confederation' with respect to European integration. She preferred to speak of a 'union'. The latter candidate[197] asserted that 'the EU cannot be unequivocally considered either an international organization or a state, and even a federation or confederation'. It involved elements of all these structures. 'The EU is in reality not an institution. It should be thought of as a continuously developing system'.

It was only in its 2009 'euromanifesto' that the HZDS elaborated on the EU and European integration in greater detail. The EU was characterized as '*not merely an economic and political association, but also a community of values and solidarity*'. As such, on the party reading, it strove for a 'sustainable development of Europe', social market economy, and the quality and protection of environment. At the same time, it 'respects its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and provides for the preservation and enhancement of European cultural heritage' (1). The party pointed to its 2000 declaration of allegiance to 'the values and principles promoted by people's and other non-collectivist parties of Europe'; and the necessity to promote and develop the '*tightest possible cooperation of all states of Europe*', while respecting '*the right of each nation to protect its own identity and vital interests*' (1, emphases added). It seems that the HZDS discourse stressed select facets of the EU/European integration, and attributed to it goals congruent with the party priority concern with the future of the Slovak nation and of 'continent Europe':

> Freedom, peace, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, security, economic development and the protection of environment can be secured only by a *united Europe* … The ĽS-HZDS thus supports a *balanced deepening of integration processes in the framework of the European Union as a manifestation of nation-state interest* and the highest priority of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy' … *The goal of European Union is to promote peace, its values and the welfare of its nations* (1, emphases added) … *In accordance with the Union's goals, the ĽS-HZDS supports integration, cooperation, peace and security of our continent*' (2, emphasis added).

This specific reading of European integration is discernible also in the party's reflection on Slovakia's part in the process: 'Slovakia brings a cultural and value contribution to Europe. It participates in the enlargement of the European Union, and the establishment of new guarantees of its security system' (2). This was instantly followed by the party call for 'the elimination of discrimination' against the 2004 EU entrants; and the expression of its support for 'the process of enlargement of the European Union to other countries which will satisfy the accession criteria' (2). The EU's concern with social justice was 'an important aspect' of, and contribution to 'the European way of life in a globalized world' (2). The party further

[197] Available at http://www.infovolby.sk/index.php?base=data/euro/2004/kandidati/interview/1086770919.txt.

stressed that the EU must not transgress the scope of competence delegated to it by the Member States, *equality and national identities of which must be respected* (4). With respect to EU enlargement, it declared support for accession of countries 'close to us culturally', such as Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Ukraine. Interesting in this statement is that all these are Christian Slavic countries, while for instance Bosnia and Herzegovina or Albania were left out or subsumed under the more general sign 'Western Balkans'. It thus comes as no surprise that full membership of Turkey, a 'country with radically different culture' in comparison with EU Member States, was rejected (17).

Finally, the 2010 elections manifesto[198] characterized the party as 'influenced by the political philosophy of the *new centre*', and recalled that it was, ever since its emergence, based on three pillars: Christian, social and national (2). It declared a more inclusive support for 'the inevitability of integration of the Western Balkans into European and Euro-Atlantic structures' as 'the only alternative for the stable development of the entire region' (17).

To conclude, the HZDS remained for the two decades a rather uneasy blend of Christian and social democratic, as well as national orientations. Particular texts stressed all or only some of them. The party construction of the EU combined all: it stressed social market economy, respect for the diversity of cultural and national identities, and the development of apparently both Slovak and European Christian 'cultural-civilizational' specificities. The party spoke of the EU as 'one of European integration processes', or one of 'European and trans-Atlantic structures' in the context of 'the defence of the state's geopolitical interests'. It sought the rebuilding of the OSCE into, or the building on its basis of an 'all-European security architecture'. Europe, which seemed to have a distinct European Christian dimension, stretched well beyond the NATO and EU members. The HZDS manifestos consistently stressed that European integration had to preserve the equality of all nations, and respect the right of each to protect its identity and vital interests. This stress on national identity was linked to Slovakia's distinct value and cultural contribution to Europe.

Ascertaining in line with which Model the HZDS constructed the EU is rather difficult due to only brief and variegated statements. With respect to the EU's internal arrangement, it seems it put forth a Model 1 construct when insisting on the independence, sovereignty, national identity and interests of nation-states. Yet, it also constructed the EU in political and economic terms as a 'community of values and solidarity', enlargement of

[198] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

which depended on candidates' satisfaction of the accession criteria (Model 2). In the end, however, the party representation of EU enlargement was structurally determined by a Model 3 reversed 'EUasEurope' equivalence. Nevertheless, in contrast to the hegemonic 'EUasEurope', and in line with the examined Czech parties, the HZDS subordinated its EU construct to that of 'Europe of nation-states'. It stressed the latter's Christian character, to which Slovak culture and values brought a contribution. The outcome of combining both was a *reversion of the equivalence into 'Europe-as-EU'*: what the party projected to be Christian European culture (including Slavic) was to determine EU membership. Thus, 'Europe should remain a continent of nation-states', with Christian character, and EU enlargement should continue to unite it. The 2009 text saw as steps in this direction the enlargement to Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and Ukraine, Slavic countries 'close to us [Slovaks] culturally', while the 2010 text spoke only of 'the Western Balkans'. Accession of Turkey was rejected on grounds of its 'radically different culture'. As such, the HZDS projection of EU enlargement presents one example of how an arbitrarily construed cultural identity of Europe, one which was (of course) also Slovak identity, may be, through a reversion of the 'EUasEurope' equivalence, projected as the limit to EU enlargement.

The HZDS articulated its position on Turkey in its 2009 'euromanifesto', stressing cultural closeness as the chief determinant of its support for particular candidates. 'Realizing' that Turkey was a 'country with radically different culture in comparison with other states of the European Union', the party rejected its EU membership. Appreciating the efforts of the Turkish government and the reforms implemented which aimed at Turkey's '*integration into Europe*', it chose to join 'other states, such as Germany and France' in promoting a 'privileged partnership' with the country (17, emphasis added).

5.3 Christian Democratic Movement

Although its votes scarcely reached over 10%, Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie (KDH) can be considered an important political subject in the relatively fragmented and unstable Slovak party system. Its is a party whose popular support and political profile have been fairly constant, and which has often been part of government coalitions. The KDH was founded in 1990 and has profiled itself ever since as a right-wing, conservative Christian-democratic party which is, at the same time, fairly strongly nationally oriented.

In its 1990 elections manifesto[199], the KDH declared itself a popular movement whose aim was the 'renaissance and flourishing of Slovakia on the basis of Christian values'. That is, 'the creation of a spiritually healthy society, fulfilled with love and justice, a prospering society living in a healthy environment' (1). It sought a declaration of Slovak sovereignty and a re-ordering and weakening of the then Czechoslovak federation – the transfer of key, hitherto federal competences (foreign, defence and monetary policies) onto the organs of the Czech and Slovak Republics, which would co-decide on these matters (1). In terms of foreign policy, it advocated 'thorough disarmament and the gradual elimination of military blocs' (4). Speaking of the 'opening of windows to the world', it deployed a '*European home*' metaphor when stressing that through its established and strengthening cooperation with Christian and democratic parties in Europe, it had 'already prepared conditions for accession to the European Community' (4). Yet, the image of a 'European home' extended well beyond the then EC. The party foresaw as the future the 'Slovak nation's full-fledged participation in a *future all-European community*' (1).

The KDH 1992 elections manifesto[200] called for '[t]he equal setting out of relations with the Czech Republic'. The common state was to be based on a treaty between the two republics that would guarantee their equity and partnership (2). The party stressed again its reverence for Christian spiritual principles, which were, in matters political, the Christian democratic principles of liberty, fairness and solidarity (1). It put forth in this text a portrayal of 'present-day Europe' which was characterized by 'two different tendencies':

> On the one hand, it is the tendency to integration that follows from the necessity of nations to work together in economics, culture and politics. On the other hand, it is the tendency toward the emancipation of nations which are trying mainly, after the destroying influence of Lenin's nationality policy, to reach their own national and state identity (1).

Implied was an image of Europe until recently divided in two: the integrating (Western) part, and the (Eastern) post-communist part, which was at the time in the process of national reawakening and emancipation. Western Christian democrats stood at the birth of European integration and looked after its realization ever since (1-2). On the other hand, '[i]n the post-totalitarian countries we see the revival of the idea of nation. Involuntarily created multinational states are splitting' (2). 'Slovakia is in the margin of these two developing tendencies', both of which the party saw as 'extremely important'. In view of both, it strove

[199] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[200] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

for an '*equal position of* a democratic and stabilized *Slovakia in the family of European nations*' (2, emphasis added).

It was in the party 1998 elections manifesto[201], amidst the NATO- and EU-integration foreign political debacle of the HZDS-led government, that the KDH elaborated Slovakia's accession to both in greater detail. Five years of coalition government under Mečiar 'almost entirely liquidated' the prospect of Slovakia's entry into the NATO and the EU together with other Visegrad countries. The NATO 1997 Madrid summit saw the Slovak internal-political situation as incompatible with its membership requirements. 'Similarly crashed also the second priority foreign political goal of [Slovakia] – integration into the European Union'. With respect to both, the party deemed, 'one can unequivocally speak of a *foreign-political self-disqualification* due to domestic political factors' (78, emphasis added). Furthermore, Slovakia's political representation also demonstrated an 'obvious leaning … to Russia', and the promotion of its positions and interests internationally (78). Hence, 'the restoration of trust in the "European maturity" of the Slovak political representation is the precondition for any positive change in the position of the NATO and the EU towards Slovakia' (78).

Economically, Slovakia's exclusion from the first EU enlargement wave was a catastrophe. The government coalition's 'illusions about the possibility of "turning to the East", or of an "effective development outside the EU framework"' were 'only dangerous and incompetent distractions' (5). The KDH desired that Slovakia's 'natural political allies be the states of Western Europe and America associated in the NATO and the EU'. This made for its 'integration priorities' – as quick as possible accession to both (79). Slovakia's EU integration was 'the basis for its future political and economic stability and prosperity and, above all, for the participation of its citizens in the free movement, life and work in the entire space' of the Union' (79-80). Recovery of close and friendly relations with Slovakia's neighbours was deemed 'an inevitable step in the restoration of the foreign-political position of the Slovak Republic' (80). Finally, with a certain sense of servility, the party undertook to revisit and review Slovakia's international treaties and agreements, especially those with Russia, 'so as to satisfy all preconditions for the accession to the NATO and the EU' (80).

The KDH view of the EU went into some detail in its 2002 elections manifesto[202] in which the party identified the primary problem it had with the Union, one that would later

[201] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[202] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

serve as the basis for its own, Christian 'vision Europe'. The KDH pointed to its long-term vision of 'effectuating a democratic perspective of Slovakia in united Europe'. EU accession was part of this project (2): European integration had 'no alternative' and Slovakia had to be ready to accede, while its foreign policy was to be a natural and reliable 'manifestation of [its] nation-state interests'. Hence, '[o]ur programme reflects the strength of the European idea and our understanding of national interests' (2). The KDH saw the EU as a '*specific community of Member States which combines communitarian and intergovernmental forms of cooperation*'. It supported reforms of the EU, particularly those 'convenient for the states with our demographic and economic potential'. They were to be based on the principles of '*subsidiarity and proportionality in community action*'. Crucially, the party also insisted on 'the preservation of the *sovereignty of the member countries in cultural-ethical matters*' (2, emphases added). It supported the development of the EU's CFSP – the Union would engage there where the NATO would not; and the NATO's 'robust enlargement' to 'all the countries satisfying [membership] criteria, regardless of historical or geographical obstacles'. In these 'common Euro-Atlantic structures we want to strengthen the proven values of freedom, protection of human dignity, solidarity and the rule of law' (3).

It was in its 2004 'euromanifesto' where the KDH began to articulate its own 'vision Europe'. The party declared that it 'feels to be the bearer of [Robert] Schuman's vision of Europe's development, and subscribes to '*peaceful cooperation of European nations*'. 'Peace, observation of human rights, respect for freedom, economic development, common security policy, and social justice and solidarity are the main attributes which must be furthered by the *uniting Europe and Slovakia as its part*' (1). Distinguishing between the EU and Europe, and subordinating the former to the latter, the party professed that it

> supports further *integration process on the whole territory of Europe* and will promote *openness of the European Union with respect to the accession of other countries on the basis of common values and the satisfaction of the Copenhagen Criteria* (1, emphasis added).

On its 'vision Europe', to the attainment of which the EU seemingly was the means, 'Europe will be strong if its member countries will be strong, if the principle of common good is applied, the principle of subsidiarity and justice'. The KDH swore to 'protect and promote' Slovak interests in the EU, and to pursue such measures that would secure the *preservation of Slovakia's cultural identity*'. Like the HDZS, it believed that 'with its human potential, economy and culture, Slovakia enriches Europe and makes it stronger' (1). Its concern with respect to the EU, and therefore also its 'vision Europe', sprang from its (apparently primary) goal of 'protecting traditional values', particularly through the 'support of the family':

> Contemporary world and Europe suffer from a *devaluation of cultural values and traditions*. These changes manifest themselves most apparently on the family. The family – an institution based on the unique relationship of a man and a woman – deserves a special and concrete protection by the society … *Family and social policies should remain in the competence of nation-states* (2, emphasis added).

Hence, the KDH 'vision Europe' was based on cultural values and traditions. It was conservative and Christian. It was in many respects a Christian-/tradition-based alternative to the liberal/social-democratic progressivist and federalist 'vision Europe'. The party insisted that '*decision-making in cultural-ethical matters must remain at the member-states level*'. It undertook to seek cooperation with like-minded countries on this issue (2).

Furthermore, the party supported cooperation within the CFSP based on unanimity in decision-making, where the ESDP operates 'within the conditions and structures of the NATO; a common neighbourhood policy, 'namely towards Ukraine'; and EU enlargement to countries which satisfy accession criteria, 'namely the Western Balkans' (3). Finally, to the party's distinction between the EU and Europe of nation-states attested its position on the constitutional treaty. That opened with the insistence that the treaty must be called '*Constitutional Treaty of the European Union*'. Its preamble 'should mention *Europe's Christian roots* and the *responsibility in the face of the highest authority of God*'. The KDH did not consider it 'right' in many cases to base decision-making on the QMV as opposed to the unanimity principle, especially with respect to matters of asylum and migration, culture, social security, foreign and security policy, etc. (3).

In its 2006 elections manifesto[203], the KDH deployed a strongly national rhetoric. It declared itself a 'conservative party' faithful to the 'Slovak national tradition', which 'believes neither in the creation of a new man nor of the world on a new basis' (3). Slovak foreign policy was to protect and serve the national and economic interests of the state, and preserve *Slovakia's sovereignty and national identity*. It was to help 'others on their way to freedom and democracy' and 'thoroughly pursue proven values'. The KDH characterized what it called '*the space of the European Union*' as '*culturally, historically, geographically, politically, legally and economically delimited*'. It did *not* see the EU's future 'in the *transferring of competences from the Member States to the EU organs*', but rather in the more effective operation of EU institutions, and of the instruments which are already at its disposal, as well as the gradual deepening of mutual trust'. Exclaiming that 'the *European Union is an agreement between states*', the KDH *rejected the draft constitutional treaty.* It

[203] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

saw it as 'a *fundamental step towards the creation of a European state*, and a *principal transformation of European integration into such a form which endangers the national and economic interests of Slovakia*'. It opposed 'any form of political centralization in the EU' and called for the 'preservation of the principles of subsidiarity and Member States' sovereignty', including their veto rights in the spheres of national interest (10, emphases added). Moreover, it aimed to initiate in the EU the guarantee that community funds would not be supporting or financing 'practices violating human dignity', such as the destruction of embryos for research purposes, cloning or euthanasia, which are outlawed in at least one member country (10-11). With respect to EU enlargement, the KDH declared:

> The KDH supports *EU enlargement to those states which are sharing common European values*. That is why we will support the Union's enlargement to the Balkan countries, but *will not support enlargement of the Union outside the borders of Europe*. In the case of Turkey, we consider the so-called privileged partnership the best solution (11).

Finally, it stressed that the 'NATO is the most important pillar in the security of the trans-Atlantic area'. It saw the CFSP 'concept' as complementary to the tasks assumed by the NATO. Since the USA was a country 'with which we share many common values … 'steps need to be taken to eliminate the alienation between Europe and the United States' (11).

The KDH 2009 'euromanifesto' built on the points raised earlier but with greater 'security discourse' emphases with respect to both Russia and Christian civilization. Thusly it furthered its construction of Christian 'vision Europe'. Having reminded the addressee of the manifesto that it was precisely the KDH which was the party to advocate Slovakia's EU entry, it declared that 'the EU means for Slovakia: freedom and democracy, economic prosperity, and political security and stability'. Pointing arguably to the 2009 'gas crisis' with Russia, it further stated: 'Precisely because we are in the European Union and the NATO, we do not face an occupation by "Soviet" armies as we remember it from 1968' (1).

Yet, 'the KDH is concerned with the *future of the European Union*, what will be *its content*'. It wanted that the Slovaks/the party co-decide on the 'rules of co-habitation among individual member countries'. On the party's vision, '*the EU should be built on the proven, two-millennia-old Christian fundaments*' where 'the *traditional family based on a bond between a man and a woman is the cornerstone of the European community*' (1). 'Since the new rules of the EU's operation … called the Lisbon Treaty, did not satisfactorily guarantee the above', the party did not support it (1-2). Stressing that 'the protection of family and the preservation of traditional values in society' always were the key elements of its politics (2), the party was concerned with the moral degradation, or even corruption, in the EU. Aside

from opposing abortions and euthanasia, it undertook to point to the efforts in the EU which 'disparage traditional values, relativize the institution of family based on the bond between a man and a woman, put on par with it registered partnerships, or introduce adoption of children by homosexual couples' (2). In view of these, it wanted to push for a *guarantee of the protection of family and traditional values in the EU*, and of '*respect for the cultural and ethical traditions of the Union's Member States*' (2, emphasis added). The KDH considered the '*cultural-ethical matters as a realm in which decisions should be made exclusively by the Union Member States*'. The same applied to all related practical policy spheres (e.g. health, upbringing and education) where it was needed that the principle of Member State sovereignty be preserved (3, emphasis added). The KDH constructed the EU as a '*community of sovereign states*', and rejected the Lisbon Treaty as not respecting the Member States' sovereignty enough. The party saw the EU's future in 'an adequately effective utilization of the Union institutions' legitimate competences, and the *deepening of the common Christian orientation on which the Western civilization was built*' (7, emphases added). Discussing migration, the KDH identified the 'need to *defend the uniqueness of European culture and values, based on Christian foundations, against outside influences*' (3, emphasis added).

This civilizational and security discourse pervaded many of the party's foreign policy preferences. The EU had to closely cooperate with the NATO, and strengthen its geopolitical position and influence, since 'there are countries which can become a real military threat to the European Union in the future' (3). The USA was to remain the EU's 'strategic geopolitical partner', as 'they belong with respect to values and culture to the [same] *civilization based on Christian-Judean roots*' (3). Finally, in view of the 2009 'gas crisis', the KDH, as virtually all the Visegrad Four parties, advocated a common EU policy in energy security. As the party put it, 'Slovakia's almost full dependence on Russia' makes it into a 'tool' in the hands of Russia in its 'power and economic games' (5).

The KDH 2010 elections manifesto[204] merely reiterated the earlier points. It emphasized the need for a 'balance between the preservation of national identity and sovereignty and the necessary adaptation to globalization trends', and the importance of strengthening the trans-Atlantic cooperation between the EU and the USA (60). With respect to the EU, it called for '*the protection of [Christian] values which are the foundation of European unity*', since 'unity is not based only on the market and geography but also on the

[204] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

respect for the dignity of each human being' (61). It advocated patriotism and the 'consciousness of European commonality' short of nationalism, totalitarian ideologies, and of ethical relativism which weakens the respect for values' (61).

In conclusion, the KDH programmatic documents depicted it as a party with a legible and highly constant conservative Christian and national political profile. Consistent was also its mission to protect and promote traditional Christian values, primarily in Slovakia where it projected them as a crucial part of national and cultural identity, but in Europe at large as well. 'Return to Europe' was not explicitly discussed in the texts under scrutiny, but it appears the party held a view similar to the parties hitherto covered. Its 1992 manifesto spoke of two, until recently separated, parts of Europe: one integrating, the other in the process of national emancipation. It thus replicated the image of Europe's East-West division which was eventually to be overcome in the 'future all-European community', the 'family of European nations'. With a continued concern over Russia and its geopolitics, the KDH clearly sided with Slovakia's integration to the 'Euro-Atlantic' structures, namely the NATO and the EU, members of which were the country's 'natural allies'. Slovakia's 'return to Europe' can thus be considered as constructed by the party as a 'return to the West'.

The KDH very often construed the EU in terms of economy, political stability and security. It saw European integration as a process with no alternative and denied the possibility of an effective development of Slovakia outside the EU. Crucially, as was the case with all the preceding parties, the KDH construction of the EU was subordinate to its construction of Europe. The point of European integration was 'uniting Europe'. It expressed support for the 'integration process on the whole territory of Europe'. The process took the form of EU enlargement which should be open to all (European) countries sharing values common in the EU/Europe and satisfying accession criteria. The KDH opposed the establishment in the future of a 'European state', further centralization and further transfers of competences onto the EU. It constantly stressed the need to preserve the sovereignty and national and cultural identities of the component Member States. In line with the subordination of the EU to 'Europe of nation-states', the party construed the Union as a treaty-based 'community of sovereign states'. With this construction of the EU was consistently linked the KDH concern with ethical relativism and even moral decay in the EU, particularly with regard to the traditional family and the respect for human life. Constructing such developments in the EU as a (potential or actual) danger, it undertook to defend and promote traditional Christian values in Europe as 'the foundation of European

unity'. In the interim, it repeatedly insisted, the EU had to respect the ethical and cultural traditions of its members, while decisions on cultural-ethical matters had to remain in the hands of nation-states. Throughout its programmes, the KDH articulated its own nation-state-based, conservative Christian 'vision Europe' as an alternative to the socialist and/or liberal federalist and progressivist vision(s). This Christian 'vision Europe' primarily concerned Europe defined by Christianity. As such, however, it also bore on the KDH construction of the integration process, and thus also the EU and its future, all of which were to be congruent with that vision. Hence, the EU was to be built on the proven Christian foundations, among which the traditional family was consistently emphasized. The KDH cast the Christian foundations of the Western civilization in security terms, particularly in its 2009 'euromanifesto' where it called for the defence of the 'uniqueness of European culture and values', founded on Christianity, 'against outside influences'.

The KDH constructed the EU itself along Model 1, discursively clearly prioritizing 'Europe of nation-states', to which its EU construct – a community of/agreement between nation-states – was subordinated. Notwithstanding its preferred internal arrangement thereof, structurally determinant was the party's Model 3 conception of the EU. Just like the HZDS, it articulated a 'EUasEurope' equivalence and, by prioritizing Europe in its discourse, reversed it. Hence, on its view, how Europe was constructed culture-wise determined how the EU was, and how its future was to look like. Consequently, the KDH call for the EU to remain open to the accession of all states sharing common European (and thus Christian) values was accompanied by the rejection of EU enlargement 'outside the borders of Europe'. Therefore, the project of Europe's unification was open to all countries located within the borders of Europe which were, however, Christian-civilizational borders.

In 2004, in line with the above Model 3 portrayal of EU enlargement, limits of which were culture-bound, the KDH opposed (in an official statement) the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey on grounds of its difference from 'European cultural and religious traditions' (Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 122). In its 2006 text, the party implied that Turkey was located 'outside the borders' of what it saw to be Europe. Consequently, it considered its 'privileged partnership' to be the 'best solution' (11). It advocated this alternative also in its 2009 'euromanifesto'. While considering Turkey 'an important political, economic and military partner', it expressed its belief that 'our [Slovak/European and Turkish] cultures are however significantly different' (3). It is noteworthy that in its 2010 text the KDH articulated a different, 'culture-free' justification for Turkey's privileged partnership. Stating that it

closely followed the accession talks, it appreciated 'the improvements achieved by Turkey in the past years'. Nonetheless, '[w]ith a view to persisting problems, it considers it adequate that Turkey be offered a specific relationship in the form of privileged partnership (62).

5.4 Democratic Left Party

Strana demokratickej ľavice (SDĽ) emerged in 1990 as a result of the transformation of the ex-regime Communist Party of Slovakia by its pro-reformist wing. Between 1990 and 1992 it was part of the federal Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The latter was eventually dissolved due to mounting differences between the Czech KSČM and the SDĽ with respect to party transformation and its guiding ideology. The SDĽ operated as an independent party till its 2004 merger with the SMER-Third Way, a new party formed by a group of people who had left the SDĽ from 1999 onwards. Since the merger, the new party has been called SMER-Social Democracy. This name change in itself suggests that the SDĽ profiled itself politically as a social democratic party, with close ties with other like-minded parties abroad.

The SDĽ 1990 elections programme[205] was identical with that of the federal KSČ. It stressed the party's break with its own past, and espoused 'democratic socialism'. It advocated global peace; disarmament and dissolution of both the Warsaw Treaty and NATO military blocs; as well as the country's opening to the world, without compromising its sovereignty, security, and political and economic independence. Increasingly diverging, party-transformation-wise, from the Czech KSČM within the KSČ, the SDĽ entered the 1992 elections campaign with its own manifesto.[206] It sought the transformation of the hitherto federation into two 'sovereign republics in a joint state' (11). The manifesto declared that the party,

> proceeding from the inalienable right of each nation to self-determination and in connection with the European and the world processes of *emancipation of nations*, supports the *sovereignty of Slovakia* (12, emphases added).

It called for a better entrenchment of Slovakia's own statehood among the citizens of Slovak Republic, and of their 'natural and inalienable right to decide on all the basic issues of the economic, political and cultural life' (12). The party saw 'the constitutional accomplishment of the Slovak statehood … in the approval of our [Slovak] own constitution' (12). Convinced that most Slovaks desired 'to live in a joint state, together with the Czech Republic', the SDĽ

[205] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[206] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

maintained that it had to be a 'voluntary union of strong national states with equal rights', of two republics with own constitutions which must 'have enough authority /competences/ to be able to administer their affairs themselves' (12). Moreover, this joint state was to 'enforce the interests of both Republics in the same way', and 'become the foundation that would be ensuring stability of the Central European space' (13). The SDĽ expressed its support for the development of Slovakia's

> relations with *the West European integration configurations*, as well as approximation of our *accession to the European Communities*, in accordance with the signed Association Agreement, and to develop friendly relations with all countries of the world, based on the principles of equality and sovereignty (13, emphasis added).

The following statement implied the party's East-West-division understanding of Europe, and laid out its all-European and global objectives:

> We are for our purpose-oriented adaptation to the high economic, legal as well as social and cultural standards of *Europe that is undergoing unification*, for the *consequential aiming at and pursuit of the European and the world humanist ideals, eliminating any form of discrimination* (13).

In this context, the party deemed it necessary to 'overcome the hitherto very narrow [Slovak] economic approaches to integration into the European Community' (13).

The SDĽ entered the 1994 elections as the main subject of the 'Common Choice' coalition of leftist and environment-cautious parties. Their joint manifesto[207] declared that the grouping's foreign policy would be based on a 'solid orientation on European political and economic structures and balanced relations with neighbours'. Slovakia's 'nation-state security' would be enhanced with its 'accession to international security structures', such as the NATO, on the accession to which the citizens would decide (1).

Just like the rest of the party 1998 elections manifesto[208], its section on foreign and security policy and European integration was preoccupied with the 'damage' caused by the coalition government led by Mečiar and his HZDS. It attributed Slovakia's exclusion from the group of NATO membership candidates, and the first group of countries to negotiate EU accession, to 'deficiencies in the operation democracy in Slovakia' and the 'pharisaic approach of the governing political parties to the government's programme'. The coalition's non-adherence to democratic rules, restrictions on the role of the opposition, tendency towards authoritarian rule etc., caused 'the loss of trust of [Slovakia's] foreign partners in

[207] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[208] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

the present representation of the state and worsened the image of Slovakia abroad'. As a result, Slovakia found itself at the 'margin of integration processes' (69). The coalition gradually and covertly altered Slovakia security and defence strategy: 'from the strategy of collective security to the strategy of isolation'. Slovakia was the only country associated with the EU which did not satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria. Consequently, as the party saw it, 'we face the danger that we will not become part of *a common economic space of prosperity and progress in Europe*' (69, emphasis added), i.e. the EU. In the face of the fallout of the present government, the SDĽ sought to use its relations with fellow socialists abroad to mitigate the negative consequences for Slovakia (70).

The SDĽ's primary goal was for Slovakia to gain such an international position that provides 'long-term guarantees of its security and undisturbed democratic development':

> We do not want to be an isolated island in the midst of a community of stable, democratic and prosperous countries. We want to be an active participant in the *formation of new Europe*. That is why we need quickly to remove the obstacles to Slovakia's *integration into the Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security structures*, the guarantees of long-term economic prosperity and national security (70, emphases added).

Quick removal of obstacles was to allow for the earliest possible opening of accession negotiations. The underlying aim was Slovakia's 'catching-up' with, and eventual accession together with the other three Visegrad countries. Aside from the more conventional arguments in support of EU membership, the party also put forth a 'globalization' argument:

> The SDĽ realizes that a country like the Slovak Republic can deal with the demands of the third millennium and the continuing globalization process, while *preserving its economic, national and cultural identity*, only as a part of a larger unit (71, emphasis added).

Still, the prioritization of European integration 'does not mean that we forget the possibilities for an all-around advantageous cooperation of [Slovakia] with [its] traditional partners in the space east of our borders, namely with Russia and other CIS countries' (70). Furthermore, the SDĽ demanded that Slovakia switches 'back to its original collective security strategy', resting in the effort to be 'accepted as a member' of the NATO (70). Discussing the benefits of collective security and the NATO, the party was aware that 'the democratic Europe [i.e. "the West"] expects also our contribution to the collective defence community' (71).

It was in its 2002 elections manifesto[209] where the party constructed the EU in greater detail, as well as its social-democratic 'vision Europe'. In this document, the party spoke of Slovakia's EU accession as of its 'incorporation and entry to the common Europe'. Yet, this

[209] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

was not a construction of an 'EUasEurope' equivalence. As other hitherto covered parties, the SDĽ conceived of the EU as the path to the unification of Europe, extending beyond the Union. It was in this sense that the party equated EU membership with Slovaks' 'taking part in the building of Europe' (2). Thusly the SDĽ constructed its 'vision Europe':

> [W]e are aware that a modern and prospering Slovakia cannot be outside a *united, socially just and solidary Europe*. *Such a Europe we want and will build*. *Europe is no longer there*. *Europe is here* (8, emphases added).

Having declared the 'integration of Slovakia into the EU … the main nation-state interest of our country', the party portrayed it as 'European community of the values of freedom and human, civic, social, cultural and economic rights'. The ensuing paragraph clarified that this was what the party desired the EU to become in accordance with its own 'vision Europe':

> The European Union must not be merely an economic grouping. The *European Union must become a true political, social, solidary and environmental community of European citizens* who adhere to peace and humanism (8).

The above interpretation of the SDĽ understanding of the EU, and its subordination to the party 'vision Europe', is corroborated with statements from its 2004 'euromanifesto'. Here it described the 2004 EU enlargement and the first elections to the EP in the CEECs as a '*historical opportunity leading to the re-unification of Europe*'. In the following sentence, the EU was described as a '*project* which was built for long decades, *fruits of which are the provision of peace, stability, prosperity, solidarity and social justice on the European continent*' (1, emphases added). EP elections were an opportunity for Slovaks to have their say on the 'forming of *the future shape of the European Union*'. They could thus co-decide on 'whether Europe will be formed merely as a community of nations adhering to free market, or whether it would proceed in the direction of *providing welfare and social justice for all European citizens*' (1, emphases added). What emerged was thus a construction of the EU as the potential vehicle to the party's vision of re-united Europe.

The SDĽ explicitly aligned its goals with those of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in the EP, which understood the EU as a 'community based on the principles of *socially-oriented market economy*'. The party declared its support for '*further deepening of the economic and political integration of Europe, while respecting the national and cultural identity of states, nations and regions*'. On its understanding, '*strong and united Europe does not mean a centralized superstate, but rather an effective association attending to the expectations of its citizens*' (1). In its foreign affairs, the EU had to speak with a single voice. The goal of the CFSP, reliable and strengthened, was to be the EU's worldwide promotion

of democracy and human rights, multilateralism, as well as the 'enlargement of the zone of peace, security and stability all over the world' (3).

It was only in the 2004 'euromanifesto' where the SDĽ, albeit merely in general terms, expressed support for further EU enlargement. It declared:

> After this enlargement round, the *European Union must not close itself*. Its interest must still remain a *further enlargement of the zone of peace, stability and economic prosperity to the south and to the east*. The SDĽ will therefore support a further round of EU enlargement, and that *on grounds of the same conditions and criteria that were applied in the case of [Slovakia's] EU accession*' (4).

To conclude, the SDĽ was a party whose political orientation had transformed hand in hand with its own transition from post-communism towards social democracy. In its course, the party developed fairly constant and consistent understandings of Europe and of the EU. Though a 'return to Europe' narrative was missing[210], it could be discerned by putting together a number of party statements scattered across its programmatic documents. The party spoke of the 2004 EU enlargement as a 'historical opportunity leading to the re-unification of Europe'. Already in its earlier documents it constructed Europe as a further non-delineated continent/space that was divided into Western and Eastern parts. And it was to 'the West' that Slovakia had to find its way as part of the wider process of European re-unification. Already in 1992, it constructed the 'European communities' as part of 'West European integration configurations', Slovakia's participation in which, including the NATO, was the highest priority. It was in this context that the party equated the EU with Europe, the EU being part of the West and the path to the SDĽ vision of re-united Europe. It was in this sense that the party called for Slovakia's 'purpose-oriented adaptation' to the high standards of that part of 'Europe that is undergoing unification'. This effort was tied to the 'consequential aiming at and pursuit of the European and the world humanist ideals'. Similarly, the party's criticism of the failures of the Mečiar government till 1998 raised the warning that Slovakia EU membership was endangered, and with it the country's place in 'common economic space of prosperity and progress in Europe'. Slovakia' possible exclusion from the Western and social market 'community of stable, democratic and prosperous countries' would also prevent its participation in the 'formation of new Europe'.

[210] This was common to all the Slovak parties so far covered. It may be attributed to the possible omnipresence of this narrative in the early 1990s which were its heyday, or the immediate prioritization in discourse of the closely related issue of the reorganization of the Czechoslovak federation, or a combination of both.

The party's construction of the EU was subordinate to its construct of Europe, its 'vision Europe', as well as global considerations. 'Only as part of a larger unit' could Slovakia preserve its 'economic, national and cultural identity', while effectively facing new challenges and globalization. The party's concern with the relatively harsh economic reforms enacted in the post-1998 years on the accession track affirmed its pronounced reverence for the 'European social model', and the equation thereof with the EU/(Western) Europe. The SDĽ 'vision Europe' – 'united, socially just and solidary Europe – had thus far been best approximated in the EU which should further develop in that direction. Although rarely explicitly, the party supported further deepening of integration, on proviso of respect for 'national and cultural identity of states, nations and regions'. While not strictly adhering to the nation-state paradigm, and prioritizing 'the citizens' in envisioning the EU's future, the party rejected the idea of a 'strong and united Europe' as a 'centralized superstate', and opted instead for seeing it as an 'effective association attending to the expectations of its citizens'. On its view, the EU was the current stage of European integration/unification, a 'project' aimed at the 'provision of peace, stability, prosperity, solidarity and social justice on the European continent'. By putting forth its 'vision Europe', of the future and enlarging EU, the SDĽ entered the EU-wide contest over the future of the 'European social model'.[211] In sum, the party construed the EU/European integration as the most appropriate potential vehicle/project for Europe's re-unification, provided it remained faithful to its hitherto advanced social market economy model and its underlying principles.

While foreign-politically oriented primarily on 'Western democracies', the party repeatedly laid emphasis on cooperation with countries to the east, including Russia and the CIS, and was concerned with their future. It advocated the EU's further southward and eastward expansion as an 'enlargement of the zone of peace, stability and economic prosperity', on the basis of the same conditions and criteria that were applied to Slovakia. Overall, the SDĽ representation of the EU and of its enlargement was a 'typical' Model 2 construction, endorsing the EU-official enlargement discourse and the enlargement procedure in its current form. As in the previous cases, however, the construction of the EU was subordinated to that of Europe, at once a continent divided in Eastern and Western parts and a social-democratic 'vision Europe' as the preferred character of the future united continent.

[211] This was observed to be the crux of the debate between the two largest Czech political parties – the ODS and the ČSSD.

5.5 Direction – Social Democracy

The party was originally founded in 1999 as SMER (Direction). In 2003, inspired by the British New Labour, it renamed itself to SMER – tretia cesta (Direction – Third Way). After its 2004 merger with the SDĽ, it started to call itself SMER – sociálna demokracia (SMER-SD, Direction – Social Democracy). There has been disagreement as to its political profile beyond a social democratic programme. While some observers see it as populist, the party tends to characterize itself as pragmatic. As long as the SMER/-SD is in many respects at least a partial successor to, and at most the latest materialization of the SDĽ's transformation, there is a great overlap between two parties' understandings of the EU and European integration. Yet, characteristic of the SMER/-SD is its espoused 'Eurorealism', and an economic stress in its construction of the EU, both similar to the Czech ODS.

In its 2002 elections manifesto[212], the SMER-Third Way declared its ambition 'to make Slovakia into a European welfare state' (1). Criticising the hitherto government coalition's subservience especially to Brussels, it held that the new government coming out of the elections had to 'do everything' to ensure Slovakia's invitation to the NATO and the EU, while 'preserving [its] dignity and strategic national interests' (2). This reproach targeted at the negotiators of Slovakia's EU accession found its way into the party's 2004 'euromanifesto' entitled 'Stronger Slovakia in Social Europe', possibly the party's most detailed statement on the EU and European integration. The document portrayed the EP elections as a '*vote on our European future*': a vote on '*social Europe*', thorough defence of the interests of the Slovak people; a vote on 'Europe as a chance', Europe as a strong global player; thus a vote on '*Europe of tomorrow – also our Europe*'. While considering Slovakia's EU accession a 'historical milestone and success', EU membership was, according to the party, '*nothing more and nothing less than a chance and opportunity*': 'No one will give us anything in the EU and it will depend only on us how we will use the chance offered to us' (1, emphases added). Unfortunately, Slovakia's accession negotiations were focused on their pace at the expense of the quality of the terms of accession. That is why 'Slovakia enters the EU today significantly weakened'. This was a problem because *the EU is about conflicting interests of countries*. As the party put it:

> EU accession is an *accession to a space of competition where everyone*, while respecting the fundamental common principles and objectives of Europe – freedom, peace, stability, tolerance,

[212] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

> human rights, prosperity and social justice, *pursue their own needs and interests* … The trial to succeed in this space of competition will not be at all easy (1).

The EP elections presented an opportunity for the Slovaks to co-decide, through the MEPs they choose, about the 'future direction and organization of the EU', about 'what Europe in the future will be like'. They were an opportunity to take part in deciding about 'what Europe we will live in', 'our European future' (1). The SMER's proposed 'vision Europe' was '*Social Europe*', based on social market economy. With an implication of undercurrent East-West dichotomy, the party maintained that it was this model of society which 'provided the inhabitants of Western Europe with stability' and welfare. It further stated:

> Europe is a unique and successful society precisely because it managed very successfully to combine the social market economy model of economic competition with the principle of social justice – solidarity and equality of opportunity in the society (2).

On the SMER view, there was no reason why this model of society, which proved itself successful in Western Europe, should not be applied and realized in Slovakia as well (2).

The European model of society needed to be reformed. This was a crucial point in making decisions about the 'future of Europe'. For the SMER and the centre-left forces associated in the PES, it was key 'that it be reformed in such a manner which would *preserve the principles of social justice, balance and equality of opportunities in the society*'. Only thus 'will Europe preserve its characteristic dimension' (2, emphases added). This was the party 'vision Europe'. Just like the PES, it therefore clearly rejected 'Europe of [advocated by] right-wing political forces', for which it was a 'purely economic community', reduced to the 'creation of the fundamental framework for the operation of market forces' (3). It was in Slovakia's interest that 'Europe be able to take its part in the global competition as one strong player', since 'only such Europe will be able to defend the interests of its citizens, Europeans' (6). The priority of both the SMER and the PES was for Europe to act on the world stage as a '*political force of peace, stability and security*', which 'does not participate in military adventures' without a UN mandate, in violation of international law, or with adverse consequences for the security of people in the world, Europe and Slovakia (6).

The SMER constructed the *EU as the integration process*, very much like the federalist/neofunctionalist EU-official discourse, and subordinated it to its proposed vision of (uniting/united) Europe: 'Europe of tomorrow – also our Europe'. Europe, as the party portrayed it, was 'a *unique political project* with unbelievable internal dynamic' which, despite setbacks and problems, 'provides the citizens of Europe with life in a *community of*

freedom, democracy, stability, prosperity and relative welfare'. Doubtless, 'also the EU has its problems and deficits'. It had to become more transparent and efficient. But, the party stressed, opposing the EU's portrayal by its opponents, '*Europe is not a huge bureaucratic monster, a superstate, imposing its wrong decisions onto the states and citizens of Europe*'. It was the MEPs' task to help ensure that 'Europe does not work just for itself, its institutions, just for the strong and chosen, but that it works for all Europeans' (6, emphases added).

The 2006 manifesto of the post-merger SMER-SD[213] focused on the national struggle for the welfare state, which it anchored in 'Eurorealist' considerations. It maintained that only the welfare state model could allow for Slovaks' catching up with the 'developed countries' of the EU in terms of life standards:

> Never before were the welfare state principles as enfeebled as they are at present. Never before Slovakia needed so urgently to return to basic social security and to introduce the European social model as it does today. This is about a return to human dignity (1).

It was in terms of human dignity, on this reading, that the SMER-SD constructed 'European identity': '*European identity is based* precisely *on the value of human dignity*', and solidarity is 'one of the values on which the European Union is founded' (1, emphasis added). The party undertook to promote the 'European model of mixed economy' (2) as the only way 'how Slovakia can compete', how it could approach 'the living standard in the developed Europe' (15). In the manifesto's foreign policy section, the party called for Slovakia's '*active participation in European political and economic, as well as trans-Atlantic structures, because Slovakia is an inseparable part of Europe*'. This was part of its criticism of the perceived 'stagnation' and 'loss of motivation' of the then government after the NATO and EU accessions. This, according to the party, seriously undermined the promotion of the country's foreign political goals. Having stated that 'foreign policy cannot be a mere instrument for building [abroad] the government's political prestige', the SMER-SD declared that since 'the world has four sides' also its foreign policy 'would be oriented to the east, north and south as much as to the west' (29, emphases added).

The party 2009 'euromanifesto' restated the earlier points and reminded the voters that the 'struggle for the welfare state' took place also in the EP. Reflecting on the unfolding global economic crisis, as the cause of which it identified 'the blind faith in an all-powerful

[213] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

market which resolves everything', it called for a 'functional European social model', a '*new social Europe*' (1). Finally, the party 2010 elections manifesto[214] constructed the EU as a

> *community based on the values of respect to human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of people belonging to minorities*. The member states share these values in *a society where pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equity prevail* (35, emphases added).

Aside from stressing again the need for a social market economy, and for a 'sustainable development of Europe', the party declared that the 'main warrantor of the security of the EU and of the whole Euro-Atlantic space remains the NATO as a defence community adhering to these identical values' (35). Furthermore, the party stated that Slovakia would continue its active participation in the Visegrad Four group which should, together with other new EU members, such as Romania and Bulgaria, jointly pursue their 'common themes and interests' in the EU framework (38). It was only in this document where the SMER-SD made a statement on EU enlargement, albeit a very brief one: 'Slovakia will continue its assistance to the Western Balkan countries aspiring for EU membership in their integration efforts' (38). In view of the brevity of this statement and the fact that the party led the then Slovak government, it should be interpreted as a position on enlargement beyond the then candidates. Yet, the validity of this interpretation must be confirmed by the findings of the section on the party position on Turkey's possible EU accession.

In conclusion, just like in the SDĽ case, the SMER/-SD construction of the EU/European integration was subordinated to its construction of Europe, both as a historically and development-wise divided continent, and the vision of a 'new social Europe', the model of society for the uniting/re-united Europe. With an undercurrent of East-West dichotomy, the party identified with the Western model of democracy and values system. The SMER/-SD's lesser emphasis on the trans-Atlantic link, the 'Euro-Atlantic area', derived from its admiration of and desire to emulate in Slovakia the Western European model of society: European welfare state. In this sense, the party articulated equivalence between the EU and 'welfare-state Europe'. This was largely in response to the relatively harsh neoliberal reforms enacted in Slovakia in the course of EU accession. Seeking to locate Slovakia firmly in the EU/'welfare-state Europe', the party linked the domestic struggle for the welfare state with that over its reform in the EU. This related to its 'Eurorealist' interpretation of the EU as a 'space of competition' where everyone, while respecting

[214] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

common political and social objectives and values, pursue 'their own needs and interests'. For Slovakia to be 'strong in Europe' and able to 'compete' therein, the party held, it had to adopt and implement the European social model. That was the only way to catch up with the 'developed' EU countries in terms of life standards. It built a chain of equivalence between the European social model – human dignity and solidarity – and 'European identity'.

As compared to the SDĽ's mainly citizens-oriented discourse, the SMER/-SD's was more state-centred. This may be attributed to its 'Eurorealism'. In the face of what it saw as an inferior/weakened position of Slovakia after EU accession, it laid emphasis on the preservation of national dignity and interests. Many Slovak interests were perceived to overlap with those of a number of other new members, particularly the Visegrad Four. The party called for their cooperation and joint pursuit of common interests in the EU.

It appears that the SMER/-SD supported both further deepening and enlargement of the integration project/EU (equating these two). Its construction thereof replicated the federalist/neofunctional EU-official discourse: a 'unique political project' providing the 'citizens of Europe with life in a community of freedom, democracy, stability and prosperity and relative welfare'. At the same time, however, this construction revolved around the preferred societal model for *future Europe*. Thus, just like the SDĽ, also the SMER/-SD subordinated its EU construct to its vision 'new social Europe'.

Overall, while the SMER/-SD's understanding of the EU as a space of competing (member) interests suggests an element of a Model 1 conception thereof, the party explicitly rejected to reduce the EU to a framework for an unrestrained operation of market forces. Its constructs of the EU, and of 'vision Europe' to which the former was subordinated, projected a Model 2 'culture-free' community, based on Western liberal-democratic political values and, at the same time, those social values and principles on which the European social model is founded. Though nothing suggests that its position on EU enlargement should differ from the SDĽ's – support for further enlargement to unite a further undifferentiated Europe on the basis of the desired 'vision Europe' – a conclusion on this point cannot be drawn on the basis of its election programmes.

The SMER-SD's position on Turkey not only suggested that its general line on EU enlargement was the same as the SDĽ's, but also demonstrated its opposition to the country's 'disqualification' on grounds of cultural/religious difference. In December 2006, the party leader Robert Fico, in his capacity as the Slovak Prime Minister, declared in a statement

addressed to the Slovak MPs that Turkey's EU accession would 'benefit both the Union and Turkey, and that from an economic, political and strategic perspective'. He reportedly further added that Muslim Turkey could not be disqualified from the accession process only because the religion which prevails therein is different from that which prevails in the EU (Bilčík and Világi 2007, 36). That Fico's official statement, repeated on several occasions later on (Šaradín 2010, 142), was a reflection of his party's position rather than a governmental compromise, is suggested by the fact that the then Slovak government was not united on the matter.[215] Furthermore, in a 2007 interview, the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš (nominated by the SMER-SD) stated that the SMER-SD-led government believed that with the opening of accession negotiations the EU also committed itself to their conclusion. While they would take a long time, the Slovak government desired that their conclusion be successful, resulting in Turkey's accession (as full member). Kubiš himself considered this outcome desirable from the perspective of (global) stability, and the EU and Turkey's strategic interests. Strategically, 'it would be immensely important and beneficial' also for the EU (for full quotation, refer to Recska 2007, 63).

5.6 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party

Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia (SDKÚ) was founded in 2000 as a successor to the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK, a purpose-oriented coalition of parties (including the KDH) aiming in 1998 at electoral victory over Mečiar and his HZDS. Campaigning for 'change', the SDK's main goals were the initiation of reforms, the rule of law, 'to bring the country back onto the European integration track and to affirm Slovakia's pro-Western and pro-Atlantic orientation'[216] The SDKÚ emerged within the SDK when a number of its representatives (such as the then Slovak Prime Minister and the party's future president Mikuláš Dzurinda) sought to transform the five-party SDK into a single political party. This eventually took place only partly, as some allies in the SDK (such as the KDH) did not join the new party. Thusly the SDKÚ emerged as an assemblage of Christian-democratic, liberal, as well as conservative political strands. In 2006, the SDKÚ, 'in an effort to unite the right-wing political forces'[217] merged with the Democratic Party (DS) to become the SDKÚ-DS.

[215] A prominent member of one of the SMER-SD's coalition partners, for example, declared Turkey's EU accession 'unacceptable', among other reasons because Turkey represented a threat of the EU's 'Islamization' (as quoted and interpreted by Bilčík and Világi 2007, 37).
[216] This is the party's official account. Available from http://www.sdku-ds.sk/content/historia-sdku-ds.
[217] Ibid.

The SDKÚ 2002 elections manifesto[218] was framed as a call for Slovakia's *'return to Europe', to 'the West'* to be more precise. It criticized those political forces in Slovakia which only declared but did not genuinely pursue '*Slovakia's course to the family of free states of the West*', as well as democracy and its institutions (1, emphasis added). What Slovakia needed, held the party, was an 'internal societal change', a democratic content to its democratic institutions. The democratic state needed people who accept the rules of free society and behave accordingly. The party saw in Slovakia a 'silent, hardly visible but fierce struggle' over this question, where many parties were ambivalent, comprising 'people of the East as well as people of the West'. Unlike them, the party was clear on this point:

> The SDKÚ stands in this fight clearly and unequivocally on the side of *genuine Western democracy*. Only through the victory of forces that will give democratic institutions also a democratic content the *democratic revolution* which started in 1989 will be *completed*. *It is a struggle for a free, open society* (2, emphases added).

With the slogan '*Never Yalta again*', the party portrayed the 2002 elections as a 'fundamental historical decision for an entire generation':

> The question is whether our generation will manage to assume its *place in the family of democratic nations of Europe and the world*. That what happened in Yalta in 1944 without our participation had become a tragic trauma for the entire following generation. We are facing a similar decision today. With one substantial difference: this time is it primarily up to us. More precisely up to the *upcoming elections*. Their result will *determine whether we will [be able to] accede the NATO and the European Union*. That is not only a foreign political theme. The result of this decision will influence our lives for decades in all spheres of social relations (3, emphases added).

This decision, the party implied, was about the return of Slovakia back where it belongs:

> *Historically and culturally, Slovakia naturally belongs to the Western civilization*. *It shares the same values and principles* of personal freedom, respect for human rights, sense of justice and responsibility, democracy, the rule of law, and the free market. *Their concrete expression is today the community of developed democratic countries associated in the European Union, and the protection of these values in the NATO* (3, emphases added).

The SDKÚ saw the NATO not just as a military defence organization but also the protector of the Western civilization's values, the 'most important pillar of European security, and an assurance of economic stability. The party advocated, and *projected itself as the guarantee of* Slovakia's *speedy accession to both the EU and the NATO*, both of which '*represent an opportunity to accelerate the country's modernization*' (3, emphases added). It further endorsed 'deepening of the European integration process', and the 'gradual strengthening of European institutions' competences, while strictly adhering to the principle of subsidiarity' (4). All in all, it construed *Slovakia's NATO and EU entry as its return to the West*.

[218] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

Having depicted the period after 1998 as 'Slovakia's return to the integration processes', and Slovakia's accession to both the EU and the NATO as its highest 2002 priority (1), the SDKÚ 2004 'euromanifesto' presented its own 'vision Europe'. Symbolically entitled 'SDKÚ Manifesto for New Europe', the document detailed the party's *vision of the future of the EU/European integration*. It opened with the following statement:

> The democratic revolution in 1989 brought down communism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The citizens of these countries, living hitherto in non-freedom, gained the *opportunity to build democracy and market economy, and to take part in the processes of Europe's unification*' (1, emphasis added).

In the future EU, '*each country should be able to freely decide about its destiny*'. This freedom involved a responsibility: 'our common responsibility in *the new enlarged Europe* is its prosperous and secure future'. Taking part in the '*greatest unification of the European continent in history*', i.e. the 2004 enlargement wave, Slovakia and its citizens got the chance to be more than a mere 'passive spectator of the decisive processes in European politics'. Their representatives in EU institutions got, for the first time in history, 'the *opportunity to actively influence and co-create the future of the old continent. Its future, the future of Europe and of the European Union* is thereafter also of our making and responsibility'. Slovakia was to actively participate in the 'forming of this future' (2, emphases added). The party thus envisioned *continental unification on the basis of the EU platform*.

The party desired a '*European Union of equal states*', not divided between the small and the big, old and new, the rich and the poor (1, emphasis added). 'All the members share an equal responsibility for the future of the European Union and are obliged to participate in its decisions'. The EU institutional reform must ensure equality of all the members, since only 'equal states will be able to responsibly attend to their tasks in *the new united Europe of 25 Member States*'. The preservation and further deepening of one of the Union's founding principles – 'subsidiarity system' – was both substantial and needed: '*Member State competences must be respected*' so as to prevent '*the risks of empowering bureaucracy at the expense of us all*' (2, emphases added).

The SDKÚ desired a '*European Union of equal citizens. Not of citizens of two categories'*. Each Member State citizen is also an EU citizen. Hence, 'the citizens of all the member countries should have equal rights. Europe is here for the citizens'. The reform of EU institutions must primarily serve the interests of the citizens, and these 'cannot give in to excessive bureaucracy'. Civil society was 'the foundation of Europe'. It was thus 'our responsibility to protect the citizen's right to develop freely'. On these grounds, the party

rejected 'attempts to link these freedoms with the thesis of collective rights': 'Yes to individual rights, no to collective rights' (3, emphasis added).

The party desired a '*Europe of values*', a '*European Union firmly standing on shared values*' (1, emphasis added). Together with the centre-right parties associated in the EPP it shared the vision of 'the founding fathers of united Europe', the '*vision of united Europe as a continent of peace and prosperity*'. The cornerstones of European values were, on the party's view, *the freedom and natural rights of the individual, democracy, the rule of law, equality before the law and market economy*. Furthermore, the values for the 21st century were also *equality of opportunities, of men and women*, '*of all citizens* regardless of race, nationality, skin colour, language, faith, religion, gender, origin, political and other views and positions'. Therefore, *in the 'new united Europe' no one could be discriminated*, negatively or positively. The SDKÚ undertook to closely cooperate with like-minded political forces in Europe (EPP) in the face of challenges posed in front of '*united Europe after its historically largest enlargement*' (3-4, emphases added).

The party desired a 'secure European Union', one 'which speaks with a single voice' in matters in which common stance is more effective. The (Western) values shared in the EU were shared by the USA as well (1). Thus, the EU's security and defence policy could operate only in close cooperation with the USA and the NATO, the latter 'being the most efficient alliance of those protecting the heritage of the Western civilization' (4).

The SDKÚ sought a '*European Union of diversity*' (1, emphasis added), so a '*Europe of diversity*'. It was the '*diversity of individual national, regional and local cultures*':

> It is needed that the diversity and national specificities of individual member countries are preserved, because they are the result of centuries-long development which defined Europe. We want to find the unity of Europe in a Europe of diversity. We want an EU enriched by the creativity and experiences of its member countries. We see the future in [such a] *Europe which is a legitimate and well-disposed space for true patriots who are, at the same time, devoted to the ideas of common Europe*' (5, emphasis added).

The party's goal was also a '*solidary European Union*', since 'we will all get stronger as the weakest get stronger' (6, emphasis added). Finally, it wanted a Europe/'*European Union which belongs to all*' (1, emphasis added). EU enlargement 'cannot end with the last one' in 2004. The SDKÚ undertook to 'support *further enlargement of the European Union to the countries of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkan which adhere to the same values, build democracy and market economy, and await further enlargement of the E*U' (3, emphasis added).

The 2004 'euromanifesto' laid out the main points of the party understanding of the EU/integration process. It was the means and platform, based on Western political values, for the re/unification of continent Europe. These main tenets of the party construction thereof were retained across its programmatic documents till 2010. Its 2006 elections manifesto[219] stressed the importance of Slovakia's constructive cooperation with partners in the CEE space. It sought good neighbourly relations with Ukraine and undertook to 'assist it in the satisfaction of its pro-European and pro-Atlantic ambitions' (42).

The SDKÚ-DS 2009 'euromanifesto' called for the elimination of barriers to free movement (four freedoms of the single market) in the EU which the new members still faced. This was its call for '*full equality of all states and citizens of the EU*' (3, emphasis added). At the same time, Member State competences in the sphere of social security had to be respected. The members also had to retain their right to their own labour market model (4), as well as their competences with respect to taxing (9). The party called for a strict adherence to the principle of subsidiarity, supporting 'coordination of EU policies where it is inevitable to speak with one voice' (8-9). In this context, the party declared that should the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty be successful, it would support a debate 'on *returning some [EU] competences back to the levels of regions and municipalities*', as well as proposals on '*decentralization within the EU* so that municipalities, regions and states have both the competence and means for solving problems there where they emerge' (9, emphases added).

Having, in response to the 2009 gas crisis with Russia, called for not just a talk about but the actual implementation of a common energy policy (14-15), the party turned to its 'future of Europe' vision: 'For a strong Slovakia in the EU, and a strong EU in the world'. Just like the official EU discourse communications, the SDKÚ-DS *equated the EU with the integration process, while differentiating between the EU and Europe*:

> *The European Union is the largest peace project in modern history*. It is a *space of democracy, security and stability* for almost 500 million inhabitants of 27 EU member countries. *Other countries of Europe strive for EU membership* (16, emphases added).

Slovakia reaped various benefits arising from EU membership, 'but this does not mean it forgets the space which surrounds it, and that outside the EU borders'. Being a country guarding the EU's external border, *it was in Slovakia's interest that 'this space of security, freedom and democracy, human rights and civil liberties enlarges'*. To that end, it would support democratization and integration efforts of its largest neighbour Ukraine, including

[219] Available from http://www.sdku-ds.sk/data/MediaLibrary/145/Volebny_program_2006.doc.

the possibility of 'alternatives to its full EU membership in the foreseeable future'[220]; a principled policy towards Belarus; *accession of and 'exchange of experience with accession' with the countries of South-Eastern Europe*; or, 'not just a declarative, but actual' support for Croatia's integration efforts (17). Despite the problems, such as the financial crisis, that the EU faced, and the declarations of a number of large EU states that enlargement beyond Croatia was unlikely in the foreseeable future, the SDKÚ-DS believed that

> *European integration must continue and also other European countries must be offered a chance to participate in the European project, provided they satisfy the inevitable conditions*. Especially the border regions such as *Ukraine and the countries of South-Eastern Europe* must be incorporated into the integration process – through participation in the projects of the European Union, through investments to their infrastructure and support of political stability (17, emphases added).

Finally, the party 2010 elections manifesto[221] declared support for all measures 'accelerating the creation and liberalization' of the single market, while rejecting the 'growth of European regulation and bureaucracy'. It insisted on 'the preservation of the member countries' sovereignty in the sphere of economic and social policy in all respects where it does not contradict the needs of the common European market'. It endorsed the EU and Commission policies contributing to long-term sustainability of public finances and responsible economic policies of individual EU members (e.g. the Stability and Growth Pact) (8). Having supported the '*integration of Ukraine into the European Union*', as all the changes in the country this entails were in Slovakia's interest, as its neighbour, the SDKÚ-DS promised to '*support the completion of the integration of the South-Eastern Europe into the European Union*', and to assist them in satisfying the membership conditions' (41, emphases added).

In conclusion, the SDKÚ/-DS produced in its programmatic documents the most elaborate account on the theme of 'return to Europe'. Holding to an East-West dichotomy, it constructed Europe as a further unspecified continent inhabited by nations and states, whose boundaries were somewhat tied to the adherence to the Western liberal-democratic values. Despite the party's proclaimed close ties with the Christian-democratic parties in Europe, it did not speak of Christianity or culture when describing either Europe or the EU. It was to 'the West', 'the family of free states', where Slovakia had been returning until its NATO and EU accession. Slovakia was constructed by the party as always naturally belonging to the Western civilization, historically and culturally, as sharing the Western

[220] It should be noted that this was not an expression of support for a permanent 'privileged partnership' or the likes of it for Ukraine, but merely of a temporary arrangement for the years to come.
[221] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

values. Slovakia's return and democratic revolution were protracted, according to the party, by political forces in the pre-1998 Slovak leadership, ambivalent with respect to where Slovakia should be heading. On that point the SDKÚ/-DS was clear: to 'the West' and across the Atlantic, towards a genuine Western democracy with a free and open society. The country's accession to the EU and the NATO was to be the guarantee that Slovakia would thereafter be the maker of its own destiny as a member of the 'family of democratic nations of Europe and the world'. Entering both was to complete the democratic revolution and Slovakia's return to 'the West', where it belonged. The concrete expression of the Western values was 'the community of developed democratic countries associated in the European Union', and its protector was the NATO. The stress on 'the West', and the NATO/USA as the EU's natural company, was persistent across the party texts.

The SDKÚ/-DS construction of the EU/European integration was unequivocally subordinate to the prior construction of Europe: as a continent formerly divided in two; and as the outcome ('united continent') of, as well as 'the project of European unification', with which the EU/European integration was equated.[222] The party was remarkably consistent and clear on this point: the EU/integration process, and its institutions and bureaucracy, were not ends in themselves. They were merely, and should not be allowed to become more than facilitators – the means and platform – of the re-/unification of continent Europe on the basis of Western values. Apparently strongly leaning towards the intergovernmental model of the EU, the party persistently stressed the need for a strict adherence in the EU to the principle of subsidiarity. Not only it identified particular spheres of policy-making where competences should stay with the Member States, it also proposed steps in the direction of decentralization within the EU and the return of competences back to nation-states, regions and municipalities. Prioritizing discursively 'Europe of nations and states' over the EU, the party consistently strove for the equality of nations and states in Europe to be reflected also in the EU where all members had to remain equal.

These were the key tenets of the party 'vision Europe', a vision of the future of the EU and the integration process, of 'the future of the old continent'. It was the vision of 'the founding fathers of united Europe', a non-socialist 'vision of united Europe as a continent of peace and prosperity'. The EU was constructed both as the largest modern 'peace project' and a 'space of democracy, security and stability'. The SDKÚ/-DS desired that the future

[222] This is to stress that, on the party's understanding, enlargement was an indispensable part of European integration, as it itself was a project to unite the European continent.

EU be a 'Europe of diversity' of individual national, regional and local cultures, a space for 'true patriots' who espouse the 'ideas of common Europe'. Its understanding of *the EU as the integration process*, replicating, and extending to what it portrayed to be Europe, the early official integration discourse, determined its view of EU enlargement. On its projection, *EU enlargement was the integration process* as *that process was about the unification of Europe*. The EU 'belongs to all' and its expansion had to continue to all countries which adhere to the Western values, build democracy and market economy, and satisfy the membership conditions. Aside from Croatia and Ukraine, the party spoke in this respect of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkan. Short of differentiating between them, it foresaw EU enlargement to the countries of South-Eastern Europe. While allowing for arrangements that would temporarily substitute full membership, these would be largely intended to facilitate the countries' eventual accession to the EU as the enlarging 'space of security, freedom and democracy, human rights and civil liberties'.

Through an East-West-division prism, and in line with the non-socialist version of the original official integration discourse, the SDKÚ/-DS conceived of the EU/European integration as a project aimed at the unification of Europe. It represented the EU as a Model 2 community, based on Western political values. In 'the West', Europe was differentiated by the diversity of cultures at various levels and across its primary units – states and nations. The party's conception of the EU/integration project, derived from its priority constructs of 'Europe of states and citizens' and 'vision Europe', bore on its projection of EU enlargement, which had to continue. It symbolically represented the 2004 expansion as the historically largest 'enlargement of united Europe'. Accordingly, it spoke of 'the new enlarged Europe' as 'the new united Europe of 25 Member States'. This apparent equivalence articulated between the EU and Europe is merely illusory, since the party consistently subordinated the EU to Europe in its discourse. Therefore, enlargement was not about the EU *per se* but about bringing the project of uniting Europe to its conclusion once the Union encompasses all of continent Europe, and anchors it in the values of Western civilization.

When it comes to Turkey's EU membership, however, it appears that the SDKÚ/-DS did not take any official position (at least till 2010). This above all means that it did not feel the need to oppose it. The few available statements, attributable to the party, suggest its strong detachment from and at best tepid acceptance of accession negotiations with Turkey. In October 2004, after the publication of the Commission recommendation, the SDKÚ/-DS entered in discussions with other parties in an effort to find a consensual official Slovak

position on the commencement of accession talks. The party chairman, and then also the Slovak Prime Minister Dzurinda located Turkey outside Europe when he reportedly stated that 'for Slovakia and Europe, it would be more beneficial if communication with Turkey takes place'. He demanded that the process be strictly monitored, that Turkey complies with all conditions, and emphasized that the negotiations should be open-ended and should not bring about any EU commitment to Turkey.[223] In 2005, Dzurinda welcomed the compromise decision on opening accession talks with both Turkey and Croatia, and stressed the security aspect of that decision: 'Europe will be much more secure' if Turkey, the Western Balkans, and the former Yugoslav countries '(well) develop'. Another party member, the then Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan, expected that the negotiations would be 'very difficult, very long, and very complex, which follows from the state's character' (as quoted in Bilčík and Világi 2007, 34-35). With respect to further expansion, Slovakia was to focus on Croatia, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, according to Dzurinda. Unlike Turkey, these were the priority countries of Slovak foreign policy (Ibid, 35).

5.7 Country Findings

The Slovak political elite, represented here by six diverse parties, developed over the two decades divergent understandings of the EU and its enlargement. All of them did, however, converge on a number of organizing points which may be thought of as structuring the Slovak interpretative framework. The shared starting point was that Slovakia always was part of Europe. The 'return to Europe' narrative, at least in the form identified among the Czech political parties, was virtually missing. This is either because of its omnipresence and/or relative marginalization by the more immediate question of the reorganization of the Czechoslovak federation, topical precisely at the same time. The narrative of 'return', however, was either explicitly articulated or latent in the accounts of four parties, albeit each time with a somewhat different content. All four accounts were cast within the image of a continent divided (since Yalta) in two halves – Eastern and Western. The 'return' theme remained for the VPN limited to the overcoming of this division in an open, integrated, and unspecified Europe. In the accounts of the KDH, SDĽ and the SDKÚ/-DS, Slovakia's 'return' was a 'return to the West' and its liberal-democratic values, a return to the family of free and democratic nations. While all three parties saw Slovakia's accession to 'Euro-

[223] 'Turecko spojilo SDKÚ a HZDS', *EurActiv.sk*, 21 October 2004. Available from http://www.euractiv.sk/rozsirovanie/clanok/turecko-spojilo-sdku-a-hzds.

Atlantic structures', particularly the EU and the NATO, as the inevitable final step of that 'return', the trans-Atlantic understanding of 'the West' was deemphasized by the SDĽ, for which the 'European social model' and thus the 'welfare-state' Western Europe were primary. The SMER/-SD, arguably because of having emerged later, did not deploy a 'return' narrative. Just like the SDĽ, it has called for Western democracy and values, but more specifically the form they took in the Western European welfare state model of society. The party equated this model with the EU.

All parties constructed Europe as discursively prior to both the EU and the integration project. For all of them, Europe designated a continent, a space inhabited by equal nations and states, and citizens on the reading of the SDĽ and the SMER/-SD. The HZDS effectively marginalized the EU into one of the processes aimed at the integration of Europe (stretching beyond EU and NATO members). It remained open to alternatives, such as an 'all-European security architecture' built on the basis of the OSCE. The remaining four parties, rather than conceiving of the EU as an end in itself, saw it as (present stage of) the integration process. At the same time, they equated the integration process with the project for the unification of the (still) divided continent Europe. As a result, EU enlargement was far from complete, on their view. Hence, the EU was constructed merely as the platform for re-/uniting a 'Europe of nations, states and citizens'. All the parties, including the VPN and the HZDS, converged on that in the 'future united Europe', nations/nation-states would remain the (more or less sovereign) primary organizing units, and that the diversity of (national and other) identities and cultures must be preserved. Most explicit on this point was the KDH. In the face of what it perceived as moral relativism or even decay in the EU, it sought EU guarantees of the Member States' exclusive competence in cultural-ethical matters.

The parties' conceptions of the EU/integration process, and its enlargement, were thus structured by their own ideas of what Europe was and/or should be like in the future. For the HZDS, Europe is and thus the EU should be marked by cultural-civilizational specificities and social market economy. The remaining four parties articulated more elaborate 'visions Europe' – of the future of the EU as the unifying/united continent. The KDH's was a nation-state-based, conservative Christian vision of Europe, an alternative to the progressivist and federalist/supranationalist visions. That Europe would be built on 'proven' Christian foundations. The unique (and Christian) European culture and values are to be protected against outside influences. The SDKÚ/-DS proposed a vision of Europe's future which rearticulated the non-collectivist version of the official integration discourse.

That Europe would be a unified yet decentralized 'old continent', a community primarily of states and nations. It would be based on Western political values, and would respect and promote the diversity of cultures at various levels. The 'visions Europe' advocated by the SDĽ and the SMER/-SD were largely identical. Both centred on the crucial importance of, and the need to preserve and further develop, the unique 'European social model'. SDĽ's was a vision of 'united, socially just and solidary Europe'. It saw the EU as its best approximation and the platform for its achievement. The welfare-state model of society was eventually to encompass the entire continent Europe through the expansion of social and just EU. The future EU would be an 'effective association' attending to citizens' needs and expectations, aimed at providing 'peace, stability, prosperity, solidarity and social justice on the European continent'. The SMER/-SD proposed a nearly identical vision, 'new social Europe', as the model of society for the uniting/re-united continent. It was the only party to explicitly engage in articulating 'European identity' when it linked it with human dignity and solidarity and these two, in turn, to with the 'European social model'.

The parties' constructs of Europe, and their visions of its future, determined their representations of the EU and its enlargement. They all concurred that enlargement must continue, since the primary goal of the EU/integration process is nothing less than the re-/unification of the space/continent Europe. Hence, what ultimately determined their projections of EU enlargement was how they constructed Europe. The SDĽ and the SMER/-SD represented EU enlargement along Model 2, as one of a culture-free community, based on Western liberal-democratic values and the European social model. The SDĽ advocated enlargement to the south and to the east on the basis of the same criteria as applied to Slovakia. The SDKÚ/-DS proposed a non-socialist, 'official' Model 2 construction of the EU. The EU 'belongs to all' and so its expansion must continue until it encompasses the entire (unspecified) continent Europe. Having explicitly mentioned Ukraine/Eastern Europe and the countries of South-Eastern Europe, the party apparently held that all countries adhering to Western values, and building democracy and market economy, have their place in the EU/united Europe. Overall, all the respective 'vision Europe' constructs to which these three parties subordinated EU enlargement were articulated in culture-free, principally non-exclusivist terms. Yet, this is not the case with the HZDS and the KDH. While demonstrating elements of Model 1 (both) or Model 2 (HZDS) when conceiving of the EU, both the parties represented its enlargement as that of a Model 3 culture-bound community, where the EU and Europe are equated. Since their Europe constructs determined both the enlargement of

the EU and its future, the two parties have articulated a reversed equivalence 'EUasEurope'. Consequently, while the EU should keep enlarging to encompass and unite all Europe, Europe *per se* is culturally distinguished as Christian. In effect, then, on the representations by the HZDS and the KDH, the limits to EU enlargement are set by what they arbitrarily construct to be Europe's cultural, that is, Christian identity.

All the four parties which issued a statement on Turkey's EU membership (HZDS, KDH, SMER-DS and the SDKÚ/-DS) took a position corresponding to their respective representations of EU enlargement. The HZDS and (more distinctly so) the KDH, opposed Turkey's EU accession on grounds of cultural/religious difference. Europe and thus the EU were a culture-bound community, exclusive to Christian nations/nation-states. Both the parties located Turkey outside Europe and opted for its 'privileged partnership'. The SMER-SD, on its part, remained faithful to its Model 2 culture-free community construct. Even more so, it explicitly opposed Turkey's 'disqualification' from the accession process on grounds of cultural/religious difference. It believed that since the EU opened accession negotiations with Turkey, it committed itself to their conclusion, preferably a successful one resulting in Turkey's (full) membership. Only the SDKÚ/-DS was ambiguous on the matter and most probably did not, in the period covered, articulate neither a supportive nor opposing position. It practically only accepted the start of accession talks with Turkey, on the basis of the Commission recommendation, and without much enthusiasm and expectation demanded that they should remain open-ended and should not lead the EU to making any commitment to Turkey. Apparently, it believed that the negotiations would be a long-term affair which would, however, aid Turkey's development. Two possible reasons were suggested for the party's cool on the issue: that Turkey was not the SDKÚ/-DS's/Slovak foreign policy priority, and possibly also that it was located outside of what it perceived to be Europe.

Of the four Visegrad countries, research on Slovakia has been the most limited with respect to the issues of interest to this study. Nonetheless, insights of few works can still aid interpretation of the Slovak conceptions of and attitudes to the EU/European integration. To begin with, the Slovaks had no doubt about their belonging to Europe.[224] At least in much of the 1990s, there was a pervasive East-West element, a duality, in the portrayals of

[224] Chairing the Slovak Parliament, Ivan Gašparovič declared in 1993 at the Council of Europe that Slovakia was a successor of the Great Moravia, (a 9th century state entity encompassing much of what has been recently referred to as Central Europe), and that already since then it has been part of European civilization. That same year, Slovak Prime Minister Mečiar spoke of a 'natural European identity of Slovakia' (Drulák 2006, 180).

Slovakia/Slovak nation on the map of Europe, where 'the East' referred primarily to Slavdom. As Petr Drulák suggested, the construction of the Slovak state/nation involved both Western and Slavic ingredients, 'making it possible to see Europe both as a natural home and as a rejected other, depending on the political situation'. Crucially, this was a (national) community construction blending tradition, and stress on ties with Slavic Europe, with modernity, in the sense of representing Slovaks as a 'Western nation'. They were portrayed as 'Danubian nation attracted by the West, where it would like to find economic and cultural impulses, but which is also naturally connected with the East and the South' (2006, 180).

Even Mečiar, whose government would soon find itself 'navigating' between the 'the West' and 'the East', was certain in 1993 that Slovak interest dictated 'an irreversible path to European structures' (Drulák 2006, 180-181). For the Slovaks, the 'return to Europe' narrative denoted Slovakia's 'return to the West': 'to its legitimate place on the world geostrategical map, and a return to where (Czecho-) Slovakia certainly would have been before had a communist totalitarian government not been established', according to Andrej Nosko. It was identified with the country's 'Euro-Atlantic' integration: the 'integration into European structures' and to the NATO were perceived as 'an organic whole'. This was commonly seen as 'natural development, Slovakia's return to its legitimate historical place from which it had unfortunately been separated' (Nosko 2008, 19-20). The consensus on 'heading to the West' was accompanied by Prime Minister Mečiar's belief that the social-democratic 'Slovak way' of economic transformation was in fact much closer to the 'European mainstream' than the Thatcherite Czech one (Drulák 2006, 180).

This consensus was shattered by Slovakia's 1997 demotion by the NATO and the EU, both excluding it from the list of CEECs earliest to accede. This was a time of general Slovak 'awakening' to the fact that the government's Western drive was at best shallow or empty and at worst contradicted by its domestic and foreign political conduct, and a deteriorating internal political situation.[225] The denial of Slovakia's bid for speedy NATO and EU accession (in the company of fellow Visegrad countries) put in question the country's Western drive and, for more than few, the desirability of this orientation. The

[225] Mečiar's 1994-1998 government was widely faulted for 'marked deficits and disregard for law and democratic principles'. The EU, on its part, expressed concern over the situation of human rights and democracy. This was also a period of strained relations with Hungary and with ethnic minorities in the country (Nosko 2008, 20).

period of growing tension between the then government and the increasingly critical Western institutions saw mounting 'Slovak dissatisfaction, often resulting in the quest for alternatives, and sometimes in the rejection of the Western European option' (Drulák 2006, 181).[226] In 1998, Mečiar harshly criticized the EU and likened it to the Soviet bloc. He raised the warning that 'Slovaks had already been members of a union created forever with a unified culture'. Projecting himself as serving Slovakia's desire to preserve its national identity, he pointed out that 'integration prefers a universal culture suppressing national cultures' (as quoted by Drulák 2006, 181). Having asserted that Slovakia 'should not bow to everything coming from abroad', Mečiar stressed the importance of cooperation with Russia and Slavic nations in the spheres of economy and culture (Ibid).

The 1998 elections were, in turn, about Slovakia's return on the Western track, about catching the 'express Visegrad train' to the EU (and possibly the NATO). The ensuing 1998-2002 period of Dzurinda's first coalition government was marked by a largely arrested or even self-censored debate on the EU and Slovakia's accession. Expressions of doubts and criticism became a 'general social taboo'. One observer described the situation by 2000 as follows:

> [I]n Slovakia the nonstandard political system prohibits even the tiniest bit of critical discussion of the touchy theme "Europe". Supporters of the EU glorify Brussels and engage in self-censorship to the point of political correctness while … extreme "Euroskeptics" … try to stir up fears (as quoted by Nosko 2008, 21).

The criticism came only from the (then already) discredited former governing parties.

It was only with the initiation of the early 2000s 'future of Europe' debate that a larger Slovak political elite EU-debate emerged. In 2001, it was institutionalized into the 'National Convention on the European Future of Slovakia'. Yet, beyond consensus on EU accession, also this national discussion failed to bring about greater differentiation among Slovak political parties with respect to the EU's upcoming reform, and its future more generally (Bilčík and Világi 2007, 8 and 17). At this early stage, the Slovak debate remained rather underdeveloped in comparison with other candidates. Especially more elaborate critical positions failed to crystallize. This was due to the fact that the Slovak top priority was to first of all make up for the delay in 'Euro-Atlantic integration'. It was also due,

[226] Then ruling political elite believed in the 'extraordinary position', and foresaw 'an illusory alternative future for Slovakia as a bridge between European-Atlantic institutions and [the rest of] Europe'. Mečiar allegedly stated: 'if they don't want us in the West, then we'll turn to the East'. This proposed 'alternative, equal path for Slovakia', was endorsed by those dissatisfied with the transformation process and/or its outcomes (Nosko 2008, 21).

according to Bilčík and Világi, to the political parties' limited foreign policy expertise, their ambiguous ideological differentiation, and the general instability of the Slovak party system (Ibid, 16-17). Among the few Slovak contributions to the 'future of Europe' debate, Prime Minister Dzurinda's 2002 speech at the Humboldt University, two years after that of Joschka Fischer, deserves attention. On Dzurinda's articulation, 'Europeanness' designated first and foremost a 'cultural and civilizational model', based on the common values of liberal democracy, civil society, and individual rights'. He further declared that the EU and its institutions' competences should concern 'exclusively those questions, solution of which is sensible and effective at this level'. 'The form must not prevail over the content', added Dzurinda (as quoted by Bilčík and Világi 2007, 12-13).

Another, more specifically Slovak contribution were the efforts of Dzurinda's government, backed by the parliament in 2003, to re-name the constitutional document to 'Constitutional Treaty of the EU', to include in its preamble a reference to Christianity, and to pursue several further changes in Slovak interest. The proposed change of the document's title was, of course, highly symbolically charged. According to the government, it better represented the document's contractual character. More precisely, that the founders of the EU are its Member States (rather than a European people/peoples), which entrust the EU with its competences and decide on its internal arrangement (Bilčík and Világi 2007, 20 and 22). This was the consensual Slovak position. One may also add that this symbolic 'struggle' which the Slovak political elite entered into suggests that they apparently also differentiated between Europe and the EU, the former being a space inhabited by nation-states, and the latter its territory-wise expanding, increasingly common, but dependent political 'superstructure'.

The 2006 elections brought the arrival of the SMER-SD and, when it formed government in coalition with Mečiar's HZDS and yet another participant in the infamous 1994-1998 government (Slovak National Party), also a harsh criticism coming from domestic opposition and the EU. In response to the latter party's participation in government, European socialists suspended SMER-SD's membership. A new wave of concern was discernible abroad about the possible outcomes of this governmental formation, particularly after a number of controversial statements coming from its ranks (Nosko 2008, 24). The image that SMER-SD built for itself until then did not bring much hope either. The party profiled itself as an outspoken critic of the accession terms negotiated by Dzurinda's

governments,[227] projected itself as a defender of national interests, and sought victory by pointing out the (temporary) disadvantages of EU membership (Ibid, 22).

Aside from the widely shared, but intensity-wise differentiated preoccupation of the Slovak political elite with the nation and its interests, the most critical position came from the KDH, demanding that European Christian traditions and values be preserved in the EU (Nosko 2008, 24). Within the Visegrad group, Slovakia is indeed a rather strongly Catholic country, but probably less so than Poland. This was reflected in the fate of the KDH's proposed declaration on the sovereignty of member and candidate countries in cultural-ethical matters. While rejected by Dzurinda's cabinet, the Slovak parliament endorsed it in 2002 (Bilčík and Világi 2007, 14).

Finally, with respect to EU enlargement, Ivan Gašparovič (HZDS), the Slovak President since 2004, reportedly 'acknowledged that accession of any country, geographically located on the European continent, should be subject only to compliance with [the] Copenhagen criteria'. He favoured further enlargement, once candidates meet all the accession criteria. Still, when expressing Slovak support for Turkey's accession process, Gašparovič seems to have located it outside Europe, since he added: 'full compliance does not necessarily result in the EU's obligation to accept Turkey as a member' (as interpreted by Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 117).

[227] It is worth noting that one of the SMER-SD billboards commented on the state of Slovak economy at the time of EU accession by depicting 'several bare bottoms' (Nosko 2008, 22).

Chapter 6

Poland

Aside from its geographic location, Poland stands out among the Visegrad countries in a number of respects. To begin with, population- and territory-wise it is much larger than the other three. Poland is one of the greater states in Europe, and the Polish political elite have been in agreement on that this fact must be acknowledged, and reflected in the country's foreign policy and objectives. Poland is also a strongly Catholic country, more than Slovakia. The Catholic Church has exercised a significant influence not only on Polish society at large but also on the Polish state, most of political parties, and labour unions. As a matter of fact, it was Catholicism which characterized and empowered the Solidarity labour unionist movement. And it was the foundation of Solidarity in 1980 that initiated a process which, despite resistance, gradually undermined the communist regime throughout the 1980s. For the Solidarity, whose influence incrementally mounted, a timely EC membership was an agreed-upon goal. The communist downfall began already in 1988. The 1989 'round-table' negotiations between the then government and the Solidarity led to 'semi-free' elections in June of the same year.[228] After the outright victory of Solidarity, the communists agreed to a compromise, on the basis of which Solidarity's Tadeusz Mazowiecki became the Prime Minister of a government whose majority was no longer communist. 1989 thus was not a year of an abrupt change in Poland, neither domestically nor with respect to foreign policy. The goal was, as Mazowiecki stated at a January 1990 Council of Europe meeting, Poland's 'return to Europe'.[229]

Perhaps the most important Polish peculiarity, from the perspective of the present analysis, has been the comparatively very fluid and highly unstable political party system. Until the elections of 1991, the Solidarity fragmented into many, variously profiled (both right- and left-wing) political subjects. This fragmentation, or rather 'atomization' of the Polish party system was reflected in the composition of the lower chamber (Sejm) after these elections. Under proportional representation, and with no electoral threshold, the 1991 elections resulted in the entry into Sejm of 29 political subjects (many of which were

[228] In these elections, about two thirds of the lower chamber seats were excluded from electoral competition.
[229] Refer to Mazowiecki's essay *The Mutual Return to Europe*, available from http://www.visegradgroup.eu/the-visegrad-book/mazowiecki-tadeusz-the.

themselves coalitions). Ensued two years of attempts by post-Solidarity subjects to form a government backed by a majority in the Sejm. Their failure brought the early 1993 elections, and with them the rise to government of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish People's Party, both often labelled 'post-communist'. Thus was formed possibly the most important division on the Polish political scene: between the so-called 'post-Solidarity' and 'post-communist' political subjects, and their respective ideas on the state-Church relation.

The post-1993 rule of 'post-communists' prompted the formation, prior to the 1997 elections, of the Solidarity Electoral Action by mostly right-wing, conservative post-Solidarity forces. This wide coalition, profiled on anti-communism and a Christian and national orientation, won the 1997 elections and ruled Poland till the 2001 elections (till 2000 in coalition with the Freedom Union). The 2000 and 2001 were marked, however, by the fragmentation of the Solidarity Electoral Action and an overall re-grouping on the right of the political spectrum. Two new 'post-Solidarity' parties – Civic Platform and Law and Justice – emerged in 2001. They lost in the 2001 elections to the Democratic Left Alliance, which once again formed a government in coalition with the Polish People's Party. These two new parties would, nevertheless, dominate Polish politics in the aftermath of the mid-2000s' fall into disrepute of the Democratic Left Alliance due to a number of scandals.

Even this very brief overview of the unstable and highly fragmented character of the Polish political scene in the two decades under scrutiny suggests that the choice of a relatively small number of main political subjects to be covered in the present analysis has to be arbitrary. The application of the two-top-ranking-parties-in-elections rule in their selection does, however, still produce a relatively balanced picture of the Polish political elite. The parties/alliances included in the following analysis belong to both the 'post-communist' and 'post-Solidarity' poles, whereas each pole is represented by at least two political subjects. The main problem arises from the fact that, except the Polish People's Party, these subjects were not, until the 2000s, relatively consolidated parties but rather morphing party coalitions/alliances. Even the Democratic Left Alliance, the main subject of the rather integrated Polish political left, became a political party only in 1999. This problem is at least partly alleviated with the observation, confirmed in the below analysis, that despite their organizational instability, Polish political subjects/parties demonstrate a high degree of continuity in their respective political programmes (Kubát 2005, 93-111).

6.1 Democratic Union

Unia Demokratyczna (UD) was a party founded in 1990 from the initiative of the then Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki as a merger of two important post-Solidarity political groupings. Before it merged with another post-Solidarity party in 1994 to form the Freedom Union, the UD profiled itself politically as a liberal, social-market-economy-oriented party influenced by Christian democratism. With slightly over 12% of votes, the UD won the 1991 general elections, and with about 10.5% ranked third in the 1993 early elections. Even so, it was the most successful among the diversity of post-Solidarity parties and party alliances in the early 1990s. Although it is hard to speak of any political party dominating the multitude of Polish governments in the 1991-1993 period, the UD may be considered as one of the most influential within the then atomized Polish political scene, not least due to a number of prominent politicians it comprised.

Its 1991 elections manifesto[230] described Poland as an economically 'underdeveloped country' in comparison with the West/Western Europe, the result of an 'irrational economic system' upheld for four decades. The path chosen for the 'restoration' of Polish economy – a radical neo-liberal reform programme (i.e. the so-called 'shock therapy') – was already underway and to be continued (10). Consequently, not just politically but also economically, 'Poland should be a country which is widely open to Europe and to the world'. The UD advocated liberal trade policies as well as all other steps to improve the competitiveness of national economy in international markets. Poland's 'opening' involved, according to the party, its *association with and later a full membership in the EEC* (19).

Polish foreign policy's key goals were to 'safeguard the independence of the state', and to use the opportunities arising from relations with other nations for the sake of Poland's 'material, cultural and spiritual progress' and strengthened international position (24). The UD located Poland in the CEE region but spoke more immediately and urgently of the

> problem of *our position between Russia and Germany* [which] has been dominating Polish politics for a long time and it has re-asserted itself again in the moment when Poland is regaining its independence and rebuilding its democracy (24, emphasis added).

If not explicitly in terms of a 'return to Europe', the party understood Poland's future foreign political course as *turning away from the sphere of the Soviet/Russian 'empire' and heading to the West/Europe*. A treaty negotiated with ('democratic') Germany on the settlement of

[230] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

the Polish-German border was to become the basis for 'new relations' between the two countries. These were to become 'a vehicle' for Poland's economic development, and of its '*integration with the European institutions*'. With respect to the Soviets, the party declared:

> The Polish interest demands that, once East Germany ceased to exist, *Poland must not remain the Western forefront of the political presence of the Soviet empire*. Such a development would delay *our integration with the democratic Europe*. This is why the prompt withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Poland remains a necessity. At the same time *the remnants of the imperial structures – the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON – must be liquidated* (24).

Poland's choice was clear to the UD: integration with the democratic Europe. This suggests that on its construction *Europe was a continent divided in two parts, one of which was the integrating and democratic (Western) Europe. The latter part (the CEE) was just regaining independence by leaving the embrace of the undemocratic Soviet empire*. The UD believed that, irrespective of the outcome of the processes of change in Russia, it 'will remain an important factor of international politics and one of the states co-determining the future of our region'. Poland was 'bound with Russia with real interests', e.g. in terms of security and economic cooperation. It thus should 'not do anything that might alienate or humiliate this country'. The aim was not to push it away from Europe but to 'encourage their cooperation, the chances of which will increase if Russia gets rid of her imperial burden' (24).

With respect to ensuring Poland's independence and security, the UD deemed the time was not yet ripe for a clear answer. It depended on the future events both in Europe and especially the USSR. It dismissed the idea of Polish neutrality as a dangerous illusion which would only make it into 'an object of the competition of major powers for the spheres of influence'. In general terms, the party opted for a new multilateral system of relations which should allow for Poland's security being equal to that of 'West European democracies'. The preferred option was a 'new order of European security' on the basis of the CSCE (i.e. with the participation of both the USA and the USSR). Should this intention not come to fruition in the foreseeable future, the UD declared, 'it will be necessary for Poland to seek closer links with the [post-war] system of security of European democracies' (25). Both in terms of security and economic revival, the USA were seen by the party as an important partner: their 'contribution to maintaining balance in Europe … is and will remain essential' (26).

The UD conceived of all 'Central-Eastern Europe, which like us is looking for its *way to full independence and democracy*', as Poland's 'natural and important ally':

> We share with the countries of this region our democratic aspirations, the dramatic problems of the way out of communism as well as *our position between the East and the West and the specific*

> *security problems which it entails*. Together with these countries, and in particular with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, *we should put forward the propositions concerning the way Western countries could assist us in order to overcome the economic, social and political division of Europe*. Together we should maintain the stability in the region to *prevent the situation where powerful neighbours could dictate their conditions to Central-Eastern Europe* (25, emphases added).

What emerges from the above paragraph is the UD's location of Poland among other CEECs, inhabiting a region in-between 'the East' and 'the West'. These countries, sharing in common the historical fate of being deprived of full independence by their powerful neighbours, should join their forces and seek the ways, on equal footing with the Western countries, of how to *overcome the division of Europe* (their rightful claim). This was, indeed, the main objective for the future. The Poles were to do all they could to accelerate the process of Poland's 'transition to the highly developed West European countries, to enter in close economic, diplomatic, political and cultural links with Europe, as well as *to create pan-European institutions*'. The *ultimate purpose* was '*united Europe*':

> The membership in the Council of Europe, active participation in the process of the Conference for European Security and Cooperation and even the association with the European Community and close cooperation with the West European Union *are but the first steps on this way* (24, emphasis added).

The UD 1993 elections manifesto[231] was preoccupied with largely the same themes. Poland's economic development was to provide a solid basis for its integration with the EC market and for its position in the world (11). Pursuing liberal trading policy, it should fully implement its association with the EC to eventually accede to it, and seek free trade with the Visegrad Group, the EFTA and other important partners (19).

The document proposed a narrative of the past years and of the party's (and Poland's) choice for the EC and (this time also) the NATO. On the UD reading, it was in Poland where the process was initiated at the turn of the 1980s which would culminate in the '*autumn of nations*'. States which found themselves in the 'communist sphere of influence' were 'liberated'. The collapse of the post-war bipolar world order, which divided it into 'the East' and 'the West', meant '*the end of that form of totalitarianism which made world politics into an instrument for the enslavement of entire nations*' (34). Poland's opportunities for development and security were to be found primarily in the EC and the NATO:

> For many years of the post-war history, the *Western European integration structures* were decisive for *the security and economic stability of the Western part of our continent*. They were able to consolidate democratic values, allow for their members' dynamic economic and civilizational

[231] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

> development, preserve peace, and to *lay the foundations for stabilization in the perspective wider than the Western European one* (34, emphases added).

Poland's association agreement with the EEC was 'the logical consequence of our *choice to belong with the world of democracy, peace and economic progress*'. It was a choice to embrace '*the values which lay at the foundations of European spiritual culture*' (34). Hence, for the UD, it was the choice of 'the West'. The party realized that many tasks awaited Poland on this way. It expected the *understanding of* Poland's '*Western partners*' of the '*necessity to harmonize the EC's gradual economic and political institutionalization with the needs emanating from our long-lasting limited sovereignty and national sentiment*' (35, emphases added). The UD expressed support for a variety of *supranational integration processes*, enriching the communities involved and solidifying peace among nations, and that *without endangering national identities* (37, emphasis added).

The UD saw the NATO as the 'political and military complement of the European democratic structures'. It called for Poland's membership therein as well as in the WEU. It saw the NATO membership of the USA, and their presence in Europe, as the guarantee of the continent's political and military security; and bilateral relations with the USA as one of Polish foreign policy's main priorities (35). It hoped that Poland's burdened relations with Germany would be overcome along the lines of Franco-German reconciliation. It sought the creation of a promising trilateral French-German-Polish cooperation: 'These three countries can and should find common interest in the prospective move of the Community's borders to the east'. This cooperation would 'contribute to balanced relations on the continent and help overcome the traditional enmity among European countries' (35). The party then called for Poland's good relations with, and support for democratization and development of all of its southern and eastern neighbours (35-36). The Visegrad Group were the most stable and dynamic states in the region, intensely engaged in the process of European integration. They should coordinate their actions with respect to their shared goal of full EC membership. Their cooperation would strengthen their voice in the 'Western European arena' (36).

The UD saw Europe as a divided continent, countries/nations in the Central and Eastern part of which were subjugated to, and deprived of their independence, by the Soviet empire. The party narrated 'return to Europe' as a 'choice for' integration with the democratic Europe. It was a choice to belong once again to the peaceful, democratic and stable 'West'. It was a return to national independence and thus to making choices on one's own. This choice/return took the form, in Europe, of participation in Western 'European

integration structures', and thus in Poland's accession to the EC, the NATO and other organizations. It was for the sake of its independence, security and overall development. The ultimate purpose of the integration process started in Western Europe was to overcome the division of Europe, that is, by implication, its enlargement to include all the CEECs: their rightful claim. The goal was, in short, 'united Europe'. It was a promise that the countries and nations of Europe could live in democracy, peace and stability; overcome their historical animosities just like Germany and France did; and at the same time preserve their national identities. The party was, on the other hand, cautions. It advocated close cooperation of the CEECs and particularly of the Visegrad Group. This cooperation and common actions were to ensure that their choice was, this time, independent of the dictate of powerful neighbours.

6.2 Polish People's Party

Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) is a party whose historical roots reach back to the Austro-Hungarian Polish agrarianism and influential agrarian party/parties of the post-WW1 Second Polish Republic. Having returned from exile post-WW2 with a hope to oppose the communists, the party was eventually 'purified' and forced to become the United People's Party (ZSL), a satellite of the communist state-party. In the late 1980s, the ZSL's successor merged with other political subjects identifying themselves with the historical PSL. United, this new subject co-formed the first non-communist government with the Solidarity movement, and adopted its present name in 1990. With a view to its forced incorporation into the communist regime, the party is often referred to as 'post-communist'. It is considered to have gradually moved from the left towards the centre in the Polish party system during the two decades. Yet, its programmatic documents suggest that such a move concerned its greater emphasis on the Polish nation/-state and its traditions rather a preferred socio-economic model. The party's political profile has been first and foremost (neo)agrarian and as such focused on the needs of peasants and the Polish countryside. Its programmes have blended elements of social- and Christian-democratism, concern with the environment, and a persistent emphasis on the preservation of national and Catholic values and traditions, as well as of Polish national and cultural identity. It has been concerned with the situation of Poles living abroad and advocated the strengthening of their ties with the home country.

With votes reaching over 15%, the PSL ranked second in the 1993 elections, but in all other elections its support oscillated between 7 and 9%. Despite its relative 'smallness', it was the most stable of all Polish political parties between 1991 and 2011. Its influence on

Polish politics derived from its 1993-1997 and 2001-2003 coalition governments with the Democratic Left Alliance (subchapter 6.3), as well as that with the Civic Platform (6.5) since 2007. The matter of Poland's EU membership figured prominently in the PSL programmes, not least because it sought to strike a balance between its own principal support for European integration (but not the negotiated conditions of Polish accession, the reason of its 2003 departure from government), and the prevalent resistance of its supporters.

The PSL 1991 elections manifesto[232] called for social market economy and a secular, yet not anti-religious, Polish state (38). It saw cooperation with other states as the best way of securing Poland's independent existence and security. Yet it insisted that it must be a cooperation among peers with equal rights and opportunities for development. It dismissed all forms of relations with other states involving overt or covert aggression, exploitation, or the pursuit of interests of some states at the expense of others. Hence, the fundaments of its idea of the co-existence of states and of Poland's foreign policy were the recognition of each state's sovereignty, its right to exist and develop; as well as the mutually beneficial character of cooperation and international exchange (37). It saw '*the well-being of the nation, its freedom, independence, and political and cultural sovereignty as superordinate to any pan-European interests*' (37, emphasis added). This statement was uttered by the PSL not in denial but rather in recognition of the need to seek a new arrangement of relations in Europe:

> In 1989, Poland became the pioneer of changes in Central and Eastern Europe. The success or failure of the changes in Poland will have a great impact on the situation in entire Europe. In fact, *a new era has opened which brought* [Europe] *the opportunity to form altogether new rules of cooperation and to prevent the catastrophe of war* (39, emphasis added).

Against this background, the PSL advocated Poland's active participation in the formation of an 'atmosphere of mutual confidence among nations'. Its objective was a '*political integration of Europe, while maintaining full sovereignty of states, and an economic integration on equal terms*' (39, emphasis added). Accordingly, it undertook to contribute to Poland's friendly relations and cooperation with other, especially neighbouring states. It promised to maintain the 'traditional interest of the popular movement in close cooperation with the countries of the North', beneficial not only in economic terms. The northern countries' economic and social model could also serve as source of inspiration for Poland. The country's dynamic development, especially in agriculture, also demanded, according to the party, the recovery of Polish presence in the 'eastern market' (39).

[232] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

The PSL 1993 elections manifesto[233] went into greater detail on many of the above points. After the end of the Yalta arrangement and the fall of the Soviet empire, humankind found itself facing the task of introducing a 'new world order'. The position that Poland would gain for itself in the new system would determine the fate of future Polish generations. In these circumstances, the most important challenge for Poland was to '*reach … the civilizational level of the developed European states*' (18-19, emphasis added). After the fall of the USSR and its communist ideology, new rules and forms of cooperation could be developed which could lead to the elimination of the 'disaster of war', and support a 'harmonious development of all states – large, medium-sized and small' (19).

The PSL listed among its foreign political priorities Poland's gradual *incorporation into the 'cooperation and integration structures, European and north-Atlantic, on equal terms'*; development of comprehensive and mutually beneficial cooperation with all neighbours; maintenance of regional associations, especially the Visegrad Group and the Council of the Baltic Sea States; co-creation of a collective security system in Europe; or the enhancement of US-Polish cooperation (19). Regarding European integration, it stated:

> With respect to the [the character of] economic and political integration of Europe, we will observe the *necessity to maintain balance between the competences of Community institutions and its members' governments* for the sake of *preservation of the fundamental scope of state and national sovereignty of the Member States (Homeland Europe)*, and the preservation of conditions [allowing] for economic development also of weaker and delayed partners (19, emphases added).

The party was not satisfied with the terms of Poland's association with the EC and deemed it not only possible but also necessary to renegotiate some of its, for Poland inconvenient, provisions. That was in the interest of peasants and the national economy as a whole. It expressed its confidence that the new regional cooperation could and should contribute to *the stabilization of the entire Central-Eastern European region*, and thus effectively support a *pan-European integration process* (20).

Largely identical points were reiterated in the 1997 elections manifesto.[234] The party 2001 elections manifesto stressed the need to further modernize and develop the Polish (preferably social market) economy, so as to allow it to reap the benefits of globalization rather than become marginalized by it (3). Having conceived of Poland's 'integration with the European Union' as both a great opportunity and challenge (3), the PSL blamed the then government (of post-Solidarity parties) for letting a marked *asymmetry develop between the*

[233] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[234] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

EU countries and Poland to the latter's detriment. The government allowed foreign companies to take control over strategic sectors of Polish economy, and let develop a huge trading deficit and a strong foreign interests lobby in Poland. It stressed that Poland should be a strong state and assume an appropriate position in the '*family of European nations*' (5, emphasis added). National security was to be built on Poland's 'active participation in the NATO structures', and political, economic and cultural cooperation with all neighbours (8). The PSL goal was the country's *EU membership based on terms of equal partnership*, which would secure 'the *protection of our basic national interests*, including the incorporation of [Polish] agriculture into the common agricultural policy' (9). In was in this text where it also articulated the key tenet of its vision of the future character of the EU, i.e. its 'vision Europe'. As a party with patriotic and pro-state stand, as it described itself, it supported

> a *Europe of nation-states which would retain their national and cultural identities*. The PSL does not sell itself out to foreign powers and organizations – it never did, does not, and in the future will not travel [abroad] for instructions (15, emphasis added).

The party 2004 'euromanifesto' opened in a similar spirit. It declared that the PSL cared for Poland, the '*Polish nation, its faith, language and culture*'. Hence it wanted a '*Europe of homelands* [nations/nation-states], *preserving national values*'. It cared for the Polish state, 'its sovereignty and strength'. Thus, it wanted a '*Europe preserving the distinct character of Member States* and *not a European superstate*' (1, emphases added). In all its doings, the party always cared for the Polish nation and state. Poland's EU membership would require special efforts of the public, the state and the institutions of local government aimed at the '*strengthening of national identity*' and '*comprehensive and sustainable development*'. It promised to actively pursue these goals in consideration of all the opportunities and threats posed by the European integration process (1). The party representatives in the EP would aim to secure a comprehensive development of Poland and its dignified place in Europe. In particular, they would ensure that Poland fully utilizes all the rights and possibilities arising from its Treaty of Accession; the EU's fundamental principles; and the objectives of the European Communities, such as '*harmonious, balanced and durable development, cohesion, solidarity, subsidiarity and the respect for diversity*' (1-2, emphasis added).

It promised to make all possible efforts to ensure that Poland and the Poles are treated equally, just like other Member States and EU citizens, and that the Community's basic objectives fully apply to all – old and new – Member States and their citizens (2). In the shaping of the EU, the PSL sought to defend the '*respect for the sovereign rights of all the Member States and the nations inhabiting them*', and for *their cultural and national*

identities. Its support for the strengthening of the EU's global position, the improvement of the Community's functioning and decision-making mechanisms, would be accompanied by a consistent concern for the *preservation of the unanimity principle in matters of the Member States' vital interest* (3, emphases added). It matched its values and goals with those of the European Christian-democratic movement, represented in the EP by the EPP. As such, it endorsed Christian values, a moral social life, the rights and freedoms of people and citizens, or a social market economy. The PSL and the EPP-ED were represented as the warrantors of *the respect in the EU for the 'diversity of traditions and cultures of the Member States'* (3, emphasis added). The party promised that its representatives

> will be guided in their actions by their *attachment to traditional values*, appreciate *Christianity as the source of European civilization, strengthen the position of nation-states within the framework of a Europe of homelands* [/nations/nation-states]; and will *strengthen Polish culture and national traditions*, including the *care for the Polish language and the native land* (3, emphases added).

Its 2005 elections manifesto[235] raised similar points. Poland was to assume a decent place in the international arena. Its foreign policy had to respect the Polish raison d'état and national interests, ensure its sovereignty and external security. It was to create conditions for Poland's long-term development by linking its international ties and cooperation with the realization of the potential of the state and the nation. EU membership was to serve *the building of Poland's international position*, and the *equalization of differences in development in all Community areas* (11). The PSL advocated a better education of the Polish youth with respect to European integration (2). It conceived of culture as the 'fundament of national identity' and, in the context of EU membership, emphasized the need to provide special protection to the Polish language as the 'greatest good of the national cultural heritage' (10).

The PSL 2007 programmatic document[236], outlining its national priorities, remained faithful to the previous texts. It undertook to implement in Poland the 'European social model', and 'to develop Polish culture, deepen patriotism, national consciousness and identity' in order to strengthen national bonds and the general will to form a common future of the nation. On the basis of Poland's strong position in the EU, the PSL intended to enhance the relations with the USA. Reiterating its 'vision Europe', it promised to promote the building of a '*Europe of homelands*' for the sake of the '*preservation of sovereignty and national identity of European states*' (12, emphases added).

[235] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[236] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

The party 2008 programmatic document[237] concluded that even after almost two decades since the fall of communism, 'the international order is still in transitional phase'. Political, economic and financial crises demonstrated its fragility and vulnerability, new threats emerged to international security, and the processes of globalization and deregulation had been changing the world (28). Articulating difference between the EU and Europe, the party asserted that in the vital interest of Poland, as a '*European state and a member of the European Union*', should be to '*increase the role of Europe in the international arena*'. It considered '*the process of European integration* as *the most appropriate route to that end*' (28). The strength and development of Poland were ever more dependent on the *strength of Europe in its entirety*. For that reason it was in favour of a strong EU, 'able to create conditions for economic growth in all countries', and for the development of Polish agriculture and countryside. It saw opportunities for Poland primarily in the strong position of '*the whole of Europe*' as an equal partner of the USA (18, emphasis added).

On the PSL understanding, *Poland's EU membership* provided it with great benefits but at a price. It *provided new impulses* and was an *opportunity for Poland's civilizational/developmental advancement* but, at the same time, *constrained its actions*. In a referendum, the Poles, fully informed of both the benefits and costs of membership, accepted such conditions. That did not mean, however, that Poland 'finally freed itself from *the dilemma of reconciling national interests, including national sovereignty, with the fulfilment of its duties arising from integration, character of which is more and more frequently transnational*'. This remained to be a central problem for the EU, answer to which would determine the direction of its development and future (28, emphasis added). The PSL had pursued the conception of 'Europe of homelands' (of nations/nation-states). At the time, it could conclude that the EU managed to find a solution to *the dilemma of whether to be a 'Europe of homelands' or a supranational superstate*. Over the years, it had developed a '*functional integration model*' *combining features of both*. The question however remained of 'how to preserve Poland's national identity and subjectivity and … protect national interests' in the situation when the ongoing process of communitarization of EU policies, especially the economic ones, was accompanied by a significant and rising number of decisions taken in Brussels and not in Warsaw. This was symbolized by the economic and monetary union and the euro: it would bring Poland certain advantages but at the same time

[237] Available from http://www.psl.org.pl/upload/pdf/dokumenty/Dokumenty_X_Kongres_PSL/Dokumenty_Programowe_X_Kongresu_PSL_.pdf.

'deprive the country of an important element of identity', and a macroeconomic policy instrument (28).

The PSL believed that the response to that question lay in the continuously updated and modified national integration strategy. One of the most important goals was to win for Poland the position of '*one of the six major EU countries*', and to keep it through effective participation in the EU decision-making mechanisms. It saw the need for greater public consultation with the aim of developing a Polish vision of the EU's further development. *Poland could not be seen as a country claiming EU funds but at the same time trying to block bolder integration initiatives*. That also applied to the matter of EU enlargement:

> The *Polish position must not take into account only geopolitical aspects*, as [it has] in the case of Ukraine, *but* must *also* take into account *historical and civilizational-cultural, as well as economic, aspects which concern the particular case of Turkey* (29, emphases added).

It appears that the *PSL did not see enlargement to countries other than Turkey and Ukraine as a matter of controversy in Poland*. With a view to the immediate co-text, it seems that it conceived of the possible EU membership of the two countries as belonging among the 'bolder integration initiatives', and took a stand on neither. The following paragraph expressed the party's belief that it was in Poland's interest to promote those Union policies which, on the one hand, empower the EU and its subjectivity on the international stage and in the world economy and, on the other, those which allow – through the principles of solidarity, cohesion and catching up – countries like Poland to raise their level of economic and civilizational development. Consequently, it supported the formation of a 'genuine' CFSP. Furthermore, having stressed that the NATO was essential for Poland's national security, it held that its traditional functions as a *defence alliance* should be restored. The NATO's further enlargement, especially to Ukraine and Georgia, would enlarge the '*zone of stability and security in Europe*'. The party saw the relations with the USA as vitally important for the security of Poland (29). The document closed with a declaration that Poland, as a 'European country and an EU member', was interested in tackling the dangers arising from demographic processes, uncontrolled immigration and the rise of organized crime and terrorism. It saw the answer in the development of European integration and an increasingly important role of the EU. However, *European leaders needed to work out a clear vision for the Union in the 21st century*. It declared:

> As Europeans, we are open to the development of friendly cooperation with all democratic and responsible countries, especially those which believe that global problems can be solved only together, with the goodwill of all (30).

Finally, the PSL 2009 'euromanifesto' recognized the desirability of Poland's integration with EU countries. The party sought to ensure the preservation and strengthening of Poland's identity as well as its strongest possible position in the EU; and that all the opportunities for is development are utilized so as to raise people's living standard. Under the heading 'Europe of homelands' it held that beyond chances for comprehensive socio-economic development, through policies aimed at equalization of differences across all members, EU membership was also conducive to the acquisition and implementation in Poland of the positive '*European values and standards*'. These concerned *the organization of economic and social life, and the country's political system*. The EU economic and social cohesion policies provided opportunities and funds for regional and rural development, and investments in the infrastructure and protection of environment. The goal was to improve social welfare and to let the European developmental standard spread to all the EU countries and territories (11).

The PSL strove for the broadest possible application and consolidation of the '*core European values*' in Poland and all the EU countries. It described them as the

> *respect for the principles of peaceful development, and human and civil rights – freedom, democracy, solidarity, justice and human dignity – rooted in the Christian tradition and ethics of Europe* (11, emphasis added).

These values had to be preserved under the Lisbon Treaty, 'so that European democracy can flourish and support *the development of all European nations*' (12, emphasis added). The PSL sought further development in Europe, and implementation in Poland, of the '*positive European standards and ethical norms*': the *principles of social market economy*, the '*European social model*', and the *principles of solidarity and subsidiarity* in actions of executive institutions and in public life in both Poland and Europe (13). Faithful to its earlier position and the Polish 'raison d'état', the PSL insisted on *the need to cultivate* '*sovereignty and identity of the nation, national culture and consciousness*', and to maintain Poland's position in the EU and among the nations of the world. It strove to preserve and strengthen the stability and development of the nation 'in conditions of freedom and independence' for the sake of its 'material and spiritual development' on its own territory, while preserving its language and culture and reinforcing the awareness of common opportunities and common future (15). In view of these national objectives, the PSL rearticulated its 'vision Europe'. It called for the preservation and '*strengthening of the common Europe of Homelands*', created '*on the basis of Christian values and the principles of European culture*'; the maintenance and further development of the '*Social Europe'* model on the basis of social market economy; a partnership for the development of all the EU countries on the basis of the

renewed Lisbon Strategy; and finally the implementation of the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity in the operation of the EU institutions and authorities (15, emphases added).

To conclude, short of an explicit 'return to Europe' narrative, the PSL conceived of the early 1990s as a post-Yalta and post-Soviet-empire time in which the countries of Europe (and the world) were given the opportunity to build a new arrangement of their relations. For the entire two decades, it consistently and clearly prioritized in its discourse a territorially non-delineated 'Europe of homelands/nations/nation-states'. Consequently, ever since its 1991 manifesto, it conceived of the EU as the present form that the integration process takes. The purpose of the process was to unite Europe. On several occasions, especially with respect to global relations, it explicitly spoke of the whole/entire Europe. Hence, it constructed the integration process in its discourse as 'pan-European' by default. For the process to proceed, Poland and all the CEECs needed to stabilize, modernize and develop.

The party projected its envisioned and desired arrangement in Europe into all of its considerations with respect to the EU and Poland's membership therein. It was persistently preoccupied with the nation-state-Poland's independence, sovereignty, security, national identity, culture, language, traditions, faith, and interests, neither of which was to be endangered by Poland's 'integration with EU countries'. To the contrary, in the context of EU membership all of them were to be strengthened and further cultivated. The party maintained its emphasis on the vital importance of the NATO and the USA. Since the early 1990s, it also continuously stressed that Poland's cooperation with any subject must be a mutually beneficial cooperation among equal partners. Accordingly, Poland's incorporation into the 'cooperation and integration structures, European and north-Atlantic', and the entire integration process of Europe, were acceptable to the PSL only on equal terms. The party insisted that Poland must win and preserve for itself a dignified and strong position among the nations/nation-states in Europe/the EU and the world. Hence, on one occasion it called for the renegotiation of the unfavourable conditions of Poland's association with the EC; on others it criticized the power asymmetry between Poland and the EU countries in the accession process, and later the inequity of the old and new members and citizens. The PSL often spoke of the EU and a membership to it cost-benefit terms. Its conception of EU membership was primarily instrumental: the opportunities it provided through the principles of solidarity, cohesion and convergence. It allowed for Poland's complex socio-economic and 'civilizational' development through the replication of the 'European social model' ('European values and standards'), and the building of the country's international position.

Having informed its supporters that Poland's strength and development depended on those of 'entire Europe', the PSL insisted that Europe's global political and economic role had to be reinforced, and that European integration was the most suitable means (or 'route') to that end. Despite its recognition of tendencies directed at the EU's supranationalization, the PSL repeatedly articulated a diverging 'vision Europe': *a common social* '*Europe of homelands/nations/nation-states*', which would maintain their independence, sovereignty, distinctness and diverse character. They would preserve and strengthen their national identities, cultures, traditions and values. That Europe would be a community based on what the PSL called 'core European values': 'respect for the principles of peaceful development, and human and civil rights – freedom, democracy, solidarity, justice and human dignity – rooted in the Christian tradition and ethics of Europe'. It would also observe the principles of social market economy, subsidiarity, and the 'European social model'.

All in all, the PSL constructed the EU *per se* primarily as a Model 1 equal partnership arrangement among nations/nation-states, aimed at their complex development, elimination of conflicts and wars. It persistently prioritized in its discourse a 'Europe of nations/nation-states', a construct to which it subjected its conception of the EU and its future. The EU was the integration process, objective of which was to encompass all of Europe. Its envisioned EU/'united Europe' was a Model 2 social and solidary community of nations/nation-states, adhering to Western democratic values and caring for comprehensive development of all its members. This is how the party represented EU enlargement: as that of a culture-free Model 2 community preserving the diversity of members, their national identities and cultures. It is noteworthy that despite stressing its own attachment to Christianity, and reverence for the Christian roots of European values, it did not articulate a chain of equivalence in which its construct of Europe would be linked with Christian identity. While it recognized that Turkey was a candidate whose potential EU membership involved historical and civilizational-cultural considerations, it did not oppose it either on grounds of history, culture or religion.

The PSL position on Turkey's accession has been 'essentially positive' but detached. Its representatives reportedly presumed that it 'would be difficult' and, just like that of Ukraine, bring about internal (institutional) reorganization of power (Šaradín 2010, 141). Its MEPs abstained in the 2004 EP vote on the start of accession talks (Szymański 2009, 175). This lukewarm 'Yes' is discernible from the party's answer in the Polskie Radio survey:

> After the last enlargement, the EU has covered bigger part of European continent. For further broadening, it is necessary to define not only the political and economical criteria of accepting

> new nations, but also taking into account capabilities of continuation the enlargement process. Turkey can be accepted to the EU, when [it] will satisfy required criteria and also, when the EU will be ready for its acceptance.[238]

6.3 Democratic Left Alliance

Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) was formed prior to the 1991 elections as a coalition of several centre-left parties. This coalition won the 1993 elections and, together with the PSL (which ranked second), governed Poland until the 1997 elections which brought the victory of the right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action. In opposition, the SLD was formally made into a single political party in 1999, losing some of the previous coalition partners. Most of its 1999 founding members came from the two main successors to the previous communist regime-party (Polish United Workers' Party). In coalition with the Labour Union, the SLD decidedly won the 2001 Polish general elections. It formed once again a governmental coalition with the PSL which lasted until 2003. The party's support markedly dropped by 2004, partly as a result of its fall in disrepute due to a number of scandals related to its prominent members. In 2004, a high-profile secession from the party took place to establish a new party (Social Democratic Party of Poland). Faithful to his earlier promise, Leszek Miller, until recently also the SLD president, resigned from the post of Polish Prime Minister the day after Poland's EU accession. Since then, the party's electoral results, in electoral coalition or not, gradually declined. In the 2011 elections it ranked the fifth with slightly over 8% of the total votes cast. Despite its organizational and membership instability, the SLD maintained throughout the two decades a rather stable political profile of an anti-Catholic, pro-secular and economically reform-minded centre-left social-democratic coalition/party. It was particularly in the aftermath of the PSL 2003 departure from the SLD-led government, and the successful referendum on Poland's EU accession, when the SLD articulated a strongly pro-integration stand (with reservations), and explicitly linked it with the 'European' programme of the PES in the EP.

The SLD 1991 elections manifesto[239] opened with an attribution of responsibility for Poland's economic decline, '[u]nprecedented in today's Europe', to the two Solidarity-camp governments' 'wrong economic policy underlain by the liberal doctrine':

[238] Polskie Radio conducted a survey among all the main Polish parties standing in the 2009 EP elections, asking them in English about a number of policy positions, one of which concerned Turkey's EU membership. The parties'non-edited answers are available at http://www2.polskieradio.pl/eo/dokument.aspx?iid=109498.
[239] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

> Poland pays an enormous price for illusions of the ruling elite who assumed that the "invisible hand of the free market" and a monetary policy will ensure economic stability and development. Now we suffer the consequences of the fact that two subsequent governments, both from the Solidarity camp, have succumbed to the terms dictated by the International Monetary Fund (1).

Most of this ruling elite acted on 'the premise that the Third Polish Republic can be raised only on the rubble of the Polish People's Republic', and sought thus the destruction rather than improvement of the former system's positive legacy. The results of their doing were mounting societal disintegration, 'the collapse of all authorities', loss of public confidence, and a further decline of Poland's international prestige (1). The SLD proposed an alternative in the form of social market economy and, more comprehensively, a 'socio-economic and socio-political' programme of implementing in Poland the 'European social model', developed by social democrats in Western Europe (2). It also insisted on the Polish state's secular character, in line with the standard accepted 'in the democratic Europe and countries of the world': 'the separation of the Roman-Catholic Church and other denominations from the state and the state's neutral attitude towards its citizens' religious beliefs' (4-5).

Polish foreign policy's general goal were 'partner-like relations' with all states. Of utmost importance was the normalization of relations and reconciliation with the country's neighbours: the USSR, the 'new states that have emerged along our eastern border', and Germany (13). The SLD advocated Poland's participation in the construction of a 'European security system, in keeping with the CSCE principles'; as well as in the 'shaping of a new political order in Central and Eastern Europe', where 'new regional strategic ties' were to be established to replace the dissolved Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. It also called for Poland's participation in 'the *all-European process of integration covering the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals without limiting it solely to the EC countries*' (13). It stressed that the Poles were to be provided with opportunities for broad contacts and exchanges with foreign partners, 'so important if *we are to shape the future of Europe*' (14, emphasis added).

What emerges is the SLD understanding of Europe as a continent extending between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals, divided historically and geopolitically into the integrating Western and the dislocated and transforming Central and Eastern parts. An integration process was not to remain limited solely to the EC but rather incorporate all of Europe.

The SLD 1993 elections manifesto[240] called for the strengthening of Poland's ties with the NATO, the EU and its Eastern neighbours. It deemed that the country would be able

[240] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

to accede the NATO only after its reform: 'this pact would need to change its character as it was created in the times of political confrontation between East and West' (6). These three foreign policy priority areas were rearticulated in the SLD's 1997 elections manifesto[241] (6), which linked the strengthening of Poland's security with its 'integration with Europe and NATO structures' (1). This security-centred understanding of the integration process, later accompanied with a more explicit developmental focus, characterized the party discourse till 2011. In the 1997 document, the SLD laid emphasis on education which was to facilitate the Polish youth's understanding of, and increase their competitiveness vis-à-vis their peers in '*united Europe*' (9, emphasis added). It undertook to fight the EU's dumping practices with respect to subsidized goods. At the same time, it laid out the steps necessary for Poland to accede the NATO and 'to prepare its economy for *the process of integration with the European Union*'. In this context, it constructed the EU as Poland's '*European family*' (15). As it put it, the accession to '*the European "homeland of homelands" will provide the Poles with the opportunity of living a better and more secure life*' (15-16, emphases added).

The SLD 2001 elections manifesto (in coalition with the Labour Union)[242] declared its desire for Poland to be a country of democracy, equal opportunities and neutrality with respect to worldviews. It was to *favourably integrate* with the EU ('united Europe') and the world, and have a strong position therein (1). For this to happen, Poland had to prepare itself adequately. Having stressed education and science as the most effective ways of allowing the Polish society to 'truly compete in Europe' (2), the party advocated, *inter alia*, the incorporation of the 'elements of European education' (including 'European studies') into the educational system (20). It saw *Poland's integration with the EU* as '*not an end in itself*':

> Among other reasons, we want to be part of the European Union to be able to realize our basic goals: faster economic growth, modernization of the agriculture, improvement of infrastructure, and the provision of equal opportunities (19).

A national referendum was to decide on Poland's EU accession. Taking the decision in this fashion would allow for a closure on this matter (19). In consideration of EU accession, the SLD saw the need to improve Poland's political and economic relations with eastern neighbours. Poland's eastern border would become the EU (and later the Schengen) border with all the steps and responsibilities that involved. Its obligations arising from EU membership were not to harm the relations with neighbours to the east. With a view to its

[241] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[242] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

location, 'Slavic pedigree' and past experience, Poland was deemed fit to play *a constructive ('bridging') role between its eastern neighbours and EU Member States* (20).

It was in its 2004 'European Manifesto' that the SLD elaborated on the EU/European integration in much greater detail. The document presented the 2004 eastern enlargement to ten CEECs as a historical milestone in the EU's history. This

> *historical expansion will finally close the post-war division of the continent*, opening new political and economic opportunities for the 25 Member States. Our common goal will be to secure Europe's development and security both inside and in its external relations (1, emphasis added).

The SLD presented its 'vision Europe' and tied it with global responsibilities. It endorsed the adoption of a new 'European Constitution' as the foundation for a '*strong and democratic Europe*'. It applauded the fruitful efforts of the PES to incorporate into the document new social goals, as well as those provisions which made for the *preservation of the 'European model of social justice'*, and for *its promotion on a global scale* (1, emphases added). The party saw *European integration as the opportunity to realize social-democratic values: solidarity, equality, freedom, justice and democracy*. It articulated what it explicitly referred to as '*our vision of united Europe*' as follows:

> *Social Europe – a Europe based on the principles of solidarity and social justice which is not only a structure of the common market and currency but constitutes an area of common social standards and policies of sustainable development* (1).

That was a '*Europe of global responsibility*', an active actor in world politics supporting multilateralism, and defending international law and the position of the UN as the pillars of a peaceful and consensual coexistence of nations (1). The SLD believed that the EU was becoming '*one of the strongest economic-political organisms*' in the world, whose operation was guided by its founding 'universal values and goals' aimed at peace, human rights and democracy. As a result of both its expansion and the adoption of the new constitution, the Union's responsibility for the security and peace 'beyond the boundaries of our continent' would grow. Its efforst were to focus on the root causes of conflicts (2, emphasis added). Rather than a 'fortress', this Europe, on the SLD vision, was also an '*open Europe*' which is solidary with developing countries, and does not close its borders to people seeking refuge from poverty or political repression. In this context, the party conceived of globalization as a process which the modern European economies could not and should not avoid. The objective was to shape globalization in such a way which would ensure a fairer global income distribution and sustainable development. Polish policies were not to be oriented at the interests of the international capital and profit but rather the needs of people (2).

'Vision Europe' would also be '*federal Europe*': *integrated not only economically but above all politically*. It would be based on the principles of the *widest possible democracy and participation of citizens in decision making*. Responsibilities would be divided between the EU and the Member States on the basis of the *principles of subsidiarity and solidarity*. The fundamental principle of democracy was to be fully realized at the European level as well (2). The SLD undertook to pursue this vision of future Europe/EU in cooperation with other social democratic parties, believing that it would 'ensure *a dignified life for all the inhabitants(/citizens) of the old continent*' (3, emphasis added).

The party 2005 elections manifesto[243] reminded the voters that it was the SLD which, during the last four years in government, saved the state from financial bankruptcy and negotiated the best conditions of Poland's presence in the EU. In response to the tendencies of several (right-wing) political forces to challenge the established socio-political order in the country, it insisted that 'Poland in Europe' must be a modern, civil state, based on the respect for people and their rights. To that end, it undertook to defend the Constitution of the Republic as the 'guarantor of democracy and the idea of a self-governing and civil society' (1). The SLD built its *vision for Poland on the grounds of what European states already achieved*. It supported three EU objectives: s*ecurity, welfare and the creation of conditions for everyone's development*. It sought the enactment in Poland of the constitutional principle of *social market economy*, which served well the development of EU states and provided their citizens with welfare and social security (2). Hence, its national programme sought more democracy, citizens' rights, 'more European democratic and social standards'; and a tolerant and secular state, neutral with respect to people's worldviews (4). Under the heading 'More Europe in Poland, more Poland in Europe', it spoke of the opportunity and challenge to raise the living standard in the country to the level of EU countries, and of Poland's strong and growing position in the Union (5). In response and opposition to the nationalist rhetoric, and what it described as isolationist tendencies, of the right-wing parties, the SLD called for the strengthening of the EU; its common foreign and security policy; Poland's good neighbourly relations; and a place in Europe it deserved. It strove for such a Poland which would, together with the EU, 'give globalization processes a progressive character'. It desired a 'strong Poland in a strong Union'. That was, on its construction, the 'truly patriotic task', and the reason to adopt the constitution for Europe (5).

[243] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

The SLD 2007 elections manifesto[244] raised the same points but with special stress, as regards European integration, on the difference between itself and the Polish 'right and liberals, the populists and fundamentalists'. Both were resisting and unwilling to 'cooperate in *the making of a modern social Union*'. Hence, practically only the left 'wants to *deepen the political integration of Europe*' (5, emphases added). The party undertook to struggle for a '*social Europe*', and envisioned the EU as a '*social and solidary community*', caring for the development and prosperity of all its Member States. 'The measure of the EU's success should be the socio-economic condition of its poorest countries and regions' (10). It called for a modern, that is, 'a fully European' ('respecting social and democratic standards') Poland, able to create, together with other countries and societies, a 'united Europe' (11).

The SLD 2009 'euromanifesto' (in coalition with the Labour Union) identified with the manifesto of the PES, and their vision of a '*more just, secure and ecological Europe*' (5, emphasis added). Amidst global financial crisis, Europeans faced in these elections a 'choice between political parties with very different ideas for the future of the European Union', a

> *choice between our vision of a progressive Europe* in which citizens, Member States and institutions work together to address the issues of greatest concern to the people of Europe; *or a conservative Europe* in which the future of our countries and people is left in the hands of the market (7, emphasis added).

In the era of globalization, the EU, an active cooperation in Europe, presented the framework needed for strong common action by countries facing together the global financial crisis and other global problems (7-8). Among the six key goals of the PES (and the SLD) belonged the envisioned '*new social Europe*'; transforming Europe into the leading global force against climate change; creation of a true European immigration policy; or the enhancement of Europe's role as a partner for peace, security and development (8, emphasis added).

The PES/SLD believed that 'the future of the Western Balkans lies inside the EU', and that stability will bring that region prosperity and security. They welcomed the start of accession negotiations with Croatia, and endorsed their commencement with all other Western Balkans countries upon their satisfaction of the required criteria. They held that '*the EU should* respect the fundamental rights of all peoples', and *support* '*the multicultural and multi-religious nature of European societies*' (57, emphases added). Crucially, while the SLD manifesto was nearly identical with that of the PES, the former *reformulated the*

[244] Available from http://archive.sldpodkarpacie.pl/files/konstytucja2_3_06_2007.pdf.

statement on, and omitted the phrase 'open-ended', when speaking of Turkey's accession negotiations:

> *We support the process of negotiations with Turkey on the basis of transparent criteria, but we want that the EU, as well as Turkey, fulfil all the relevant commitments associated with it* (57, emphasis added).[245]

That the reformulation of the statement on Turkey was not just a matter of translation is suggested by the ensuing and yet again nearly identical statements in support of the strengthening of the EU's neighbourhood partnerships. The parties proposed 'the creation of a Black Sea Union and an Eastern Partnership to strengthen cooperation with our Eastern neighbours', and saw the need for a structured/'thought-through' dialogue with Russia (57).

Finally, the SLD 2011 elections manifesto[246] presented the party as the warrantor of a 'stable, predictable and pragmatic foreign policy', based on democratic values, and free of historical resentments and prejudices (76). This was its response to what it saw as destructive foreign policies of the right-wing parties' governments. In a section entitled 'Diagnosis', the SLD held that since the 2005 government of the conservative right, the foreign policy of Poland degenerated and fell prey to the xenophobic and pseudo-imperial aspirations of a part of political elite. The Law and Justice Party (see subchapter 6.4) sought to mobilize the electorate by instilling social anxieties. The right claimed uncompromisingly to have a 'monopoly on patriotism', and negated the oppositions' right to having its own understanding of the raison d'état. This brought the end of consensual foreign policy, and a foreign political turn of Poland (particularly with respect to the east). Foreign policy stopped serving the country's development. Poland's international position was weakened. It turned away from playing a positive and creative role in the EU (as it used to during the SLD governments). The relations with Poland's neighbours and the USA worsened. The Polish right could make Poland again into a 'sick man of Europe', preoccupied with controversies and conflicts, and at the same time isolated and ridiculed in the international arena (77-78).

As before, the SLD foreign political goals were based on three pillars: 1) a European policy; 2) relations with neighbours and all other CEECs; and finally 3) Euro-Atlantic relations (76). The party vision of the EU was encompassed in a wider vision of international

[245] The English version of the 2009 PES manifesto read: 'We support an open-ended process of negotiations with Turkey towards EU accession, based on clear criteria, and that both Turkey and the EU should fulfill their respective commitments'. This version is available from http://www.pes.org/system/files/images/ManifestoBook_EN_Online.pdf.
[246] Available from http://www.sld.org.pl/public/ckfinder/userfiles/files/program_sld.pdf.

order based on a sense of responsibility and global solidarity, thinking in terms of entire humanity. A harmonious development of the EU required the 'strengthening of European solidarity', since the sharing of prosperity was in the interest of both Europe and the world at large. In the best interest of Poland was the '*deepening and widening of integration in the framework of the European Union*'. The SLD undertook to 'harmonize effectively the Polish national interests with the interests of the EU as a whole' (79, emphasis added). Poland was to actively participate in the debate on the future of European integration, with the aim of strengthening the EU and the deepening of its integration (80). The party saw as disconcerting not only the problems facing the common currency; but also tendencies aimed at the loosening of the integration achieved; the 'building of a "two-speed" Europe; the weakening of European cohesion; as well as a notable rise of national egoisms, and of divisions across the EU with respect to foreign policy (80). The SLD expressed support for the deepening of European integration; mitigation of the EU's democratic deficit through the empowerment of both the EP and national parliaments in adopting EU law; a common EU fiscal policy, as well as further development of the CFSP (81). In the field of defence, the EU was to closely cooperate with the NATO. Among Poland's vital interests were also the continuation of comprehensive cooperation with the USA, and the strengthening of the NATO 'as – next to the EU – the warrantor of national and European security' (84).

It maintained that Poland was to promote new initiatives and instruments in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership programme, to bring the countries closer to the EU. It advocated liberalization of the EU visa regimes towards the citizens of Eastern European countries, 'Europeans from the east, close to us culturally and civilizationally' (80-81). For the sake of its own security and development, Poland was to actively support all processes contributing to the '*modernization of the European east*'. The Polish 'eastern policy' was to remain committed to the '*enlargement of the area of stability and integration to the east of our borders*', so that there is a '*West in the West, and West in the East*' (83, emphases added). The party also believed that 'Poland can strengthen its position … by *promoting an intercultural and intercivilizational dialogue*' (84, emphasis added).

The first conclusion to draw is that the SLD programmatic documents did not narrate a story of Poland's 'return to Europe'. Poland doubtless belonged to Europe, portrayed as (geo-)politically, developmentally and historically divided continent, extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. Western Europe was integrating 'democratic Europe', a part of 'the West'. The CEE region was dislocated, transforming itself, and heading to 'the West'.

Ever since its 1991 elections manifesto, the SLD constantly thought of European integration as an all-European endeavour, that is, not limited to the EC/EU members. The party tended to interchange Europe with the EU. Yet, when it did so, it was in the sense of speaking of the EU as (the hitherto) 'united Europe'. As already observed among other social-democratic parties, the SLD conceived of the EU and its Western European members as the bearers of a specific Western-type political, social and economic model – 'European social model' with its 'European social and democratic standards' – that Poland and preferably all the CEECs were to replicate and adopt. It was on the basis of this model, i.e. by means of enlargement of the EU as the suitable platform, that the re/unification of the continent was to proceed.

Since the early 1990s, the three key 'pillars' of the SLD foreign political programme remained constant: relations with and later within the EU; relations with neighbours and the rest of the CEECs; and the trans-Atlantic/Euro-Atlantic relations (the USA and the NATO). Remarkable is the party's persistent stress, in speaking of the EU/ integration process (and the NATO as well), on security and development, and that with respect to both Poland and the CEECs. It was with this emphasis that it conceived of Poland's EU accession as 'not an end itself' but rather an enablement to achieve developmental/modernization goals. The SLD consistently advocated the deepening and enlargement of the European integration process on the basis of the EU framework. Crucially, also the SLD fully subordinated its construction of the EU to its construct of a further undifferentiated continent Europe. Its vision of the EU's future was thus a '*vision of united Europe*': *a strong, open, solidary, democratic, federal and social Europe with a strong global responsibility*. The EU/'vision Europe' was to promote globally not only its founding 'universal values and goals' but also the 'European model of social justice' and solidarity. That Europe was the best answer to the globalization processes and, at the same time, the best means of taming and giving them a 'progressive character'. That Europe would be federal, integrated not only economically but above all politically: 'a homeland of homelands'. It would be based on a transparent division of competences between the EU (institutions) and the Member States, and strictly adhering to the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. It would be a 'social and solidary community', caring for the development and prosperity of all its constituent members. Finally, it would enjoy the widest possible degree of democracy and popular participation.

The SLD was persistently invested in the democracy, development, security, stability, as well as the 'united-European' future of its neighbours and the entire CEE region (from which it excluded Turkey). From among them, it perceived that Poland had a special

responsibility for the stability and integration of its (and thus the EU's) neighbours to the east. It deemed that the country could play a certain 'bridging' role between them and the EU members. It also believed that Poland could contribute to a dialogue between cultures and civilizations, and conditioned candidates' (including Turkey's) EU membership by their satisfaction of the criteria of accession. All in all, the SLD constructed the EU, and represented its enlargement as that of a Model 2 culture-free community (of Member States and citizens), based on universal (Western) values and, more specifically, the form they took in the progressive 'European social model'.

Closely aligned with fellow social democrats in the EP, the SLD, both in government and in opposition, supported Turkish EU membership bid. It demanded that both sides to the accession negotiations (on the basis of clear criteria) fulfil their respective obligations. By the end of 2004, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a long-term foreign minister of the SLD-led governments, *linked and declared support for the membership of non-European Turkey and European Ukraine* by stating:

> We support Turkish accession for several reasons which relate to economic development, international security, and cooperation with the Islamic world. We are aware that together with the accession of Turkey we will overstep a certain borderline included in the title of European Community. With Turkey, we will move further. If we are prepared for this, then there can be no doubt that the European states on the European continent have the right to join the EU. These are arguments in favour of Ukraine, which also needs to be supportive of them in order to utilize them (as quoted by Šaradín 2010, 140).

In a 2008-2009 survey conducted among the Polish MEP's, some of the SLD representatives expressed a number of concerns, but jointly opposed 'the emotional discussion and "cultural" arguments against the Turkish accession' (Szymański 2009, 174). Accordingly, the SLD's answer in the Polskie Radio survey read:

> The EU has a natural potential to expand its borders and integrate new states, nations and economies on the basis of common ideas. So far the acceptance of new states in the EU has turned out to be beneficial for both parties. So it will be in the case of Turkey, which has been historically connected to Europe since the 14th century and has had a great impact on the continent. Turkey's accession in the EU should be combined with peaceful regulation of relations with the Kurdish minority in Turkey.[247]

What emerges from the above statements is the SLD's location of Turkey outside Europe, accompanied by a recognition of its close historical ties with and influence on the continent. That seems to be enough for the country to become an EU member.

[247] Available from http://www2.polskieradio.pl/eo/dokument.aspx?iid=109498.

6.4 Law and Justice

Since its formation in 2001, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), has been closely associated with the twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, and through them with the dissolved post-Solidarity Centre Agreement party (presided by the latter brother) which entered the 1997 elections within the Solidarity Electoral Action coalition. Lech Kaczyński, who tragically deceased in a 2010 plane crash together with other party representatives, raised his popularity especially between 2000 and 2001 as a Minister of Justice. As the party name itself suggests, the main issue on which the PiS initially profiled itself was a 'clean up' of the Polish state, its institutions and administration. Its programmes focused on the fight against corruption; law enforcement and public order; extensive 'decommunization' of Polish public but also private institutions[248]; or the modernization of Polish military forces. In the ensuing decade, the PiS profiled itself, aside from what many consider unmasked populism, as a right-wing national(ist) and Catholic conservative party, leaning towards social market economy. It has been an ardent defender of a strong (and unitary) Polish state, traditions and traditional family, Catholic faith, and of national pride and interests.

Since the mid-2000s, the PiS has been one of the two dominant parties in Polish politics (the Civic Platform being the other one). In 2005, it won general elections and Lech Kaczyński was elected the Polish President. Initially ruling on its own, the party formed an infamous coalition government with two other, more radically nationalist, conservative or Catholic right-wing parties in 2006. Whereas always overshadowed by strong Atlanticism, the party's programmatic documents paid significant attention to European integration/the EU. Having toned down its rhetoric by the end of the 2000s, the party has remained harshly critical of the course that European integration has taken. It has combined strong anti-federalism with national pride, and the conviction that the Western civilization, Europe, and the EU/European integration are indebted to Christianity, a debt that must be acknowledged.

The PiS 2001 elections manifesto[249] declared that the Polish foreign policy, at the time preoccupied with the EU accession process, was to seek a strong position for Poland within the CEE region, and through it a strong position in Europe as a whole. It insisted that foreign policy was to reflect the 'obvious fact' that the Poles are a large European nation and

[248] Also referred to as 'lustration', 'decommunization' denotes a screening practice aimed at preventing people who collaborated with the communist regime's security service from entering public offices. The PiS advocated the extension of this screening to 'public functions' in the private sector as well.
[249] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

that their state must thus have a corresponding place in Europe (7). Its central goal was *the defence of the Polish national interest* (16). The party's first and crucial foreign political priority was an active NATO membership, and through it the closest possible relations with the USA. Poland was to modernize and revitalize its armed forces, to be able to fully attend to the obligations arising from NATO membership, and become one of the states formulating its policies. These would aid the realization of Poland's potential to become a 'local leader' (17). The second priority area was Poland's EU accession process. The PiS insisted that the terms (or 'quality') rather than the timing of EU membership were the most crucial: Poland was to assume in the EU a position worthy of a large European nation, while defending decisively its interests. The key condition of Poland's 'presence in *integrated Europe*' was the '*preservation of the nation-state*'. A strong, unitary state would allow for the pursuit of the interests of the nation, and ensure its existence and development. The nation-state was also the prerequisite of the functioning of democracy. The third priority area concerned the CEE. The party deemed that Poland's position in both the NATO and the EU would to a large extent depend on the role it assumes in this region. It called for the country's active participation in all regional initiatives, such as the Visegrad Group, Council of the Baltic Sea States, or the CEFTA. Poland was also to actively promote the European and NATO orientation of its eastern neighbours: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus (17).

The party 2004 'euromanifesto' went into greater detail with respect to its view of the EU/European integration, and the role and place of Poland therein. The document opened with the PiS 'Krakow Declaration', where it committed itself to safeguard in the EU Polish national interests and '*the Christian identity of our continent*' (1, emphasis added). It summarized its 'vision Europe' as follows:

> We want a *solidary Europe*, we want the *European Union as a strong association of sovereign national states*, we want a *Europe of homelands* [nations/nation-states] (1, emphases added).

It promised to represent Poland in all circumstances in ways which would bring it '*pride and due recognition in the family of European nations*'. Under the heading 'We want a solidary Europe', the PiS explained that Poland's strong position in the EU, accorded to it by the Nice Treaty, gave it a chance to revise economically unfavourable conditions of EU entry, and to reach a 'good outcome' in the negotiations on the EU's future budget. That was the first task of the entire Polish EP delegation. Furthermore, in Polish and European interest was the

> quickest possible *liquidation of the economic gap on the continent*. This divide is *the result of the Yalta division of Europe*. So *we have a moral right, in the name of European solidarity, to demand a robust support* [by the other side] *for* [our] *development* (1, emphases added).

This moral right applied, according to the PiS, to '*all the countries in our region that have found themselves in a similar situation*' (1, emphasis added). Under the heading 'We must defend the historical truth', the party demanded 'respect for *the Christian foundations of the Western civilization*, as well as *the spiritual-moral dimension of the unity of Europe*' (1, emphasis added). It also promised to take energic steps to protect the 'historical truth' and to remind, possibly the fellow Europeans, of '*the role of our nation in the history of Europe*'. The truth was, on the party's construction, that Poland contributed to the war for freedom against Nazism and Communism. Hence, it decidedly opposed attempts to relativize the responsibility for causing the WW2 and the actions of some German circles aiming to challenge Poland's claim on its western territories (1 emphasis added).

Turning to the issue of European constitution, the PiS refused to 'capitulate' but stand instead firmly behind its minimum conditions for accepting the treaty. It demanded that the country's position must remain the same as under the Nice Treaty; '*acknowledgment of the Christian character of European culture and civilization*' in the treaty's preamble; the *deletion of provisions granting EU law a position superior to the Polish Constitution*; maintenance of the unanimity principle in relation to changes to EU treaties; '*inviolability of the sovereignty of the Republic in foreign policy*'; the treatment of the NATO as 'the primary institution guaranteeing the security of Europe'; 'preservation of *the independence* – within the common market – *of Polish economic policy* and its indispensable attributes'; the removal of privileges accorded, in conflict with the principle of solidarity, to the former 'East Germany', or their extension to '*all the countries liberated from communism*'; and finally, the preservation of the principle of financial solidarity in the EU regional policy, which would *not* effect an *excessive expansion of regional autonomy* (1-2, emphases added).

The PiS 2005 elections programme[250] was equally expressive on foreign policy. Its main objectives were the protection of national interest and security (including the energy sector), and Poland's real influence in global economic and political processes, worthy of a large European nation. The goal was thus a 'strong Poland in Europe' (38-39). The hierarchy of the three highest priority areas of foreign policy remained the same. Leading the list was the 'trans-Atlantic dimension' of Poland's security. The PiS sought 'strengthening of the strong Polish-American relations', since the USA were the key ally and the main guarantor of Poland's security, and cooperation with them enhanced its position in the EU. Poland and

[250] Available from http://www.pis.org.pl/download.php?g=mmedia&f=program_2005.pdf.

the USA shared common interests. Poland could play an important role in the shaping of international order, take steps directed at Europe's shared responsibility for global security, and contribute to the Union's good relations with the USA (40). The party was in favour of incorporation into the NATO, 'the only effective and reliable alliance', of new European members, especially Ukraine. European states were to harmoniously cooperate rather than compete with America with respect to global security (41).

Europe was a 'challenge', deemed the PiS, and dismissed the proposed Constitution for Europe as 'harmful both for Poland and the European integration process'. This was so because it transferred more competences onto EU institutions; introduced a decision-making mechanism which gave a premium to the largest EU states (weakening thus Poland); and especially because it would superimpose EU law to national law (limiting thus Poland's ability to protect its sovereignty). Equally importantly, the proposed Treaty

> *negated the role of Christianity in shaping the moral and cultural face of our continent*. It was used [as a means] to reject the obviously truthful claims and thus *introduced into the European constitutional practice a kind of anti-Christian censorship* (42, emphases added).

The party undertook to be active in the debate on Europe's future. Speaking of the *inequality of the new members in the EU*, and its *future enlargement*, it believed that *the Union policy*

> has been *dominated by myopically understood economic interests of the "old" Member States*. The Union has moved away from the values which guided the founding fathers of European integration. *The Union has no vision, it faces a crisis of cultural identity* (42, emphases added).

Recalling the Pope John Paul II.'s opinion that Poland could bring an invigorating breath to Europe, the PiS felt bound by the duty of fidelity to that mission: '*the duty to revive Europe through the spirit of Christian solidarity*', expressed in the rights of people, of family, and of nations (42, emphasis added). That is why the party sought to '*restore the dimension of solidarity in the Union policy*', not only by opposing 'the *hegemonic aspirations of the strongest EU states* which want to build their prosperity at the expense of the rights of other members', but also by promoting EU *enlargement to* '*new countries in our [eastern] part of Europe*'. Hence, the PiS effectively based the EU's duty to enlarge, and the demand that all members are treated equally, on what it constructed to be 'Christian solidarity'. On the same grounds, it opposed the concept of a 'multi-speed' Europe, which could 'push economically weaker countries to the margins of integration processes'. For still the same reasons, the party believed that '*a culturally rich Europe can only be a Europe of nations*'. In defence of the principle the sovereignty of nations, it had to *reject the supremacy of European law*, and insist that the latter *should not regulate questions pertaining to customs and morality*.

Competences in these matters had to remain exclusively with the Member States (43, emphases added). The PiS saw as dangerous 'strong centralizing trends' in the EU,

> binding hopes for the future of our continent with building a superstate, and the creation of a new "pan-European" identity at the expense of nation-states and the identity of European nations. In social practice, *the project of construction of a new "European" consciousness must* [necessarily] *bring about an imposition onto weaker nations of the identity of the strongest nations* (9, emphasis added).

Having declared that the EU's development must arise from 'harmonious cooperation among sovereign Member States' (43), the party articulated a counter-vision to a federal (and 'regionalized') structure of a European superstate as a substitute for (preferably unitary) sovereign nation-states. The PiS's 'vision Europe' was a '*Europe of solidary nations*':

> *The Union should be a strong and solidary association of national states*. The primary source and carriers of these values [strength and solidarity] are, and will remain, the Member States, and *all EU competences* [should] *arise from the decisions of sovereign countries* (44, emphases added).

The PiS thus constructed the EU (and its future) as an '*association of sovereign nations, retaining their cultural identity and legal individuality*' (53, emphasis added). It reiterated that the CEECs had the right, in the name of European solidarity, to demand robust support from fellow (western) Europeans for the sake of eliminating economic inequality in Europe (44-45). Another key priority for the party, both with respect to Polish foreign policy and the EU's CFSP, concerned 'peaceful stabilization' in Eastern Europe. The objective was to develop an 'eastern dimension' policy of both the NATO and the EU. Ukraine, its tying with the 'Euro-Atlantic bloc' and speedy accession to both the organizations, was the top priority. Followed efforts aimed at the democratization of Belarus; and partnership with Russia, which should stop seeing Poland as its sphere of influence. The Union's 'eastern dimension' was to be one of the pillars of Poland's engagement in EU policies. The animation of the EU's strategic partnership with *Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova*, and the creation of their *EU membership perspective*, were in Polish interest (46-47). Important allies in the EU for the pursuit of these goals were the countries of Central Europe (among which the PiS included Lithuania), with which Poland was to actively and comprehensively cooperate (48).

The PiS clearly superimposed 'Europe of nations/nation-states' to the EU construct in its discourse. How it construed Europe, and differentiated it from the instrumental EU, the platform for Europe's (sectoral) integration/unification, was clarified in its 2005 document entitled 'Catholic Poland in Christian Europe'.[251] Here, the PiS declared that it attached great

[251] Available from http://www.pis.org.pl/download.php?g=mmedia&f=broszura_katolicka.pdf.

importance to what the '*future united Europe*' would be like. It believed that *the EU would keep its sense only on condition that its own identity is determined.* That is why the party insisted that such a fundamental document as a European constitution had to include a '*reference to God and the Christian heritage of Europe*' (40). It quoted a 1997 declaration, co-signed by some PiS members, which demanded such a reference. The declaration stated, among other things, that for *the foundation of the integration process* – '*the spiritual and historical unity of Europe*' – 'the essential constitutive fact was and is Christianity'. It was Christianity which formed the basis of European culture, and of the sense of a mutual bond among the nations of Europe. Faith and Christianity were constitutive in the construction of European unity on the basis of democracy and human rights. They played a clear role in the resistance against communist oppression, and the preservation of a sense of unity in the continent divided by the Iron Curtain. Yet, Christianity was not only the historical foundation of European civilization, it was a living faith of millions of Europeans. Forgetting about this 'reality' in defining the meaning of European cooperation would mutilate Europe spiritually and socially. Expanding Europe needed a clear sense of identity, it was a condition of success of the common endeavour. The declaration quoted John Paul II., stating that the history of Europe was a 'great river', with many inflows and streams, and that the diversity of traditions and cultures therein was a great treasure. The frame of European identity, he held, was built on Christianity. On the basis of the above text, the PiS declared that

> *Europe is a historically formed area* [/region]. *It is not possible to belong to Europe on the basis of some arbitrary political agreements* [/arrangements]. It is also important to emphasize that *Europeanness of a country is not determined by the level of its economic development* (41, emphases added).

Ensued a quotation of the following 2004 statement by Marcin Libicki in the EP:

> *If we want to build European identity as a common security area, as a common economic area, we have to tell ourselves what are the limits of the Union's enlargement. If the accession of Turkey is proposed, perhaps someone will soon propose the accession of Morocco, while Ukraine is omitted. It is not possible to speak of European identity if it will not be identity also in this regard* (41, emphases added).

It seems that through the above statements the PiS conceived of 'European identity' as an underlying bond, defined by the scope of cooperation in the EU, and determining the limits to its enlargement. The party was deeply suspicious of an EU-bound 'European identity', arguably because 'true European identity' had to do with the historical construct of Europe, and was Christian. To this perceived tension in the party discourse attests the immediately following paragraph, stating that the rejection of the appeal to God in the constitutional treaty was a sign of *the EU's civilizational orientation*. The EU, according to the PiS, partly ignored

and partly turned against the established social order: '*We are dealing with the rejection of the normative character of Christian morality*'. No substitute was proposed. In essence, held the party, it was a '*construction of society without religion, without traditions, without common ethics and culture*' (42, emphases added). It is noteworthy that at no place in this discussion the party opposed Turkey's EU membership on Christian grounds.

The PiS feared in its 2007 elections manifesto[252] that the strongest, most populous and economically most powerful states would dominate the Union. Stressing that its concern did not originate from an antipathy towards those countries, it held that *the domination and the particularism of the interests of the largest EU states impacted negatively on the 'realization of the idea of European solidarity'*. In this context, it advocated the creation of timely and reliable *prospects of membership in the 'Euro-Atlantic structures'* (i.e. the EU and the NATO) especially for *Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia*, and in the future also for 'other partners in the region': *Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus* (52). This suggests that the PiS did not construct a qualitatively crucial difference between the two organizations.

The last examined document is the party 2009 comprehensive programme.[253] Here, it restated its vision of Poland and the EU/Europe: '*Strong Poland in a Europe of homelands* [nations/nation-states]'. Having once again argued for the supremacy of national constitution over the EU law (175, emphasis added), it called for the maintenance of the condition where the *EU's functioning is based on the voluntary transfer by the Member States of part of their sovereign competences* onto 'the *EU as an international organization*, also known as – not strictly in accordance with its nature – supranational'. The transfer of power onto the EU was *justified* '*insofar and only insofar as the common realization of certain tasks provides everyone with greater benefits*'. Since 'there is not and will not be a European nation', transparency and democratic legitimacy of decisions made in EU institutions were to be ensured by new mechanisms providing for greater influence of all citizens, and that through mechanisms operating at the nation-state level. The party criticized excessive EU regulation. It called for *deregulation in some areas*, and the *return of competences back to nation-states in others*. It endorsed *further integration only in the spheres of defence* (including a common EU army) *and military and energy security* (176). Opposing federalist tendencies and 'the unacceptable vision of a European superstate', the PiS rearticulated its own 'vision Europe':

[252] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[253] Available from http://www.pis.org.pl/download.php?g=mmedia&f=program_pis_2009.pdf.

> We firmly stand for *the maintenance of the EU as an international organization, associating sovereign Member States – a Europe of nation-states* ("*Europe of Homelands*" that Charles de Gaulle talked about) (177, emphases added).

Having returned to its earlier concern over the hegemony of the largest states, the PiS insisted that *the EU* was to be a '*genuine community of freedom and democracy*', *respecting* the '*sovereignty and distinctness of individual states*'; and *based on the principle that 'the subjects of the sovereign will are all the nations forming the Member States of the Union'*. These provisions excluded all forms of imposition onto any nation in Europe of the will of a state or a group of states, justified by a reference to the number of their citizens (177-178, emphases added). Furthermore, the EU '*can in no way interfere in matters related to public morality, family law, and the respect for human physical and moral integrity*'. This was not to be the responsibility of *this organization*, although the temptations of *some left and liberal circles* to use it as '*an instrument of de-Christianization of Europe*' were very strong. In government, the PiS undertook to vigorously *oppose all such attempts* '*to discredit the idea of European integration*', and to protect Polish safeguards in this area. The party also strove for the freedom of proclamation in the EU (arena) of the views in accordance with the Christian system of values and the teachings of the Catholic Church, since it perceived there to be a serious imbalance in favour of views incompatible with the Christian vision of man. Whereas such views seemed to be supported by *EU institutions*, these institutions not only did *not support the propagation of Christian views* but *tended* instead *towards their stigmatization and censorship*. This discriminatory situation and 'unilateral restriction of freedom is unnatural and must be changed', exclaimed the party (178-179, emphases added).

The PiS remained faithful to its earlier views on other issues as well. Poland was to retain its strong position in the EU and possibly further strengthen it, for instance by improving its good relations with the five largest EU members (180). The country was to actively participate in, and seek to strengthen, regional cooperation initiatives (the Visegrad Group, the Baltic Sea region). All the CEE members of the NATO and the EU, facing similar challenges and keeping in mind their shared historical experience, were to show solidarity with one another and act in accord; for instance with respect to the EU's cohesion and rural development policies, or an 'open doors' policy of both the organizations towards the Union's eastern neighbours (180). With respect to EU enlargement, the PiS strongly advocated, and sought to establish as a principle, *the expansion of the Union (without delay) to all its eastern neighbours and the Balkan countries which* 'will wish to participate in our community and *meet the relevant criteria, tailored to their specific situation*'. It stressed that

programmes such as '*partnership*', '*eastern dimension* of the European Neighbourhood Policy', and their likes, '*may only supplement – but not replace – a clear prospect of full membership of these states in the Union*' (179, emphases added). The party laid particular emphasis on the EU's eastern neighbours, and among them especially Ukraine. As it stated:

> *The enlargement of the NATO and the European Union, not only to Ukraine but also to Georgia and Moldova, and later to other states of the South Caucasus*, is one of the most important tasks in the region, in which Poland should actively participate (181, emphasis added).

To conclude, the PiS conceptions of Europe, European integration/the EU, and of Poland's desired role therein, were fairly constant during the decade covered in the analysis. Short of a 'return to Europe' narrative, the party clearly and consistently differentiated Europe and the EU. It construed Europe as a historically constituted continent/area, inhabited by nation-states, and divided at Yalta in two parts. This continent, its culture and unity, as well as the Western civilization at large, owed their existence, character and values to Christianity and Christian faith. The EU, on the other hand, was on the party construction an international organization, associating, and providing a common roof for the cooperation among, European nation-states. It was also the platform for the re/unification of Europe on the basis of European solidarity, springing from the Christian tradition and its contribution to European unity. The party saw the Yalta arrangement as unjust, and held fellow (western) Europeans at least partly responsible for the CEE region's fate (of undevelopment). Hence, the CEE nations (and their states) had a moral right to demand solidarity from Western Europe in the form of robust support for their development, and of 'open doors' of both the EU and the NATO to their accession.

The party's foreign policy line revolved around several core themes: the nation, security, Europe and Christianity, and cooperation and solidarity with the fellow CEECs, particularly Poland's eastern neighbours (and among them especially Ukraine). On all occasions, the PiS stressed the need for Poland to assume in the CEE, Europe, the EU and the NATO a strong position worthy of a large European nation. Only thus it could effectively pursue national interests. The party's foreign policy discourse was structured by security and geopolitical considerations, and as such it projected the NATO and the Polish-American relations as the highest priority. The NATO was to remain the primary guarantor of security on the continent, and the EU was to harmoniously cooperate rather than compete with it. Still, in 2009, possibly under the influence of the Russian gas and Georgia crises, the party called for a stronger CFSP, including a gradual formation of an EU army.

The party construction of the EU/European integration was determined by that of Europe, character of which the Union was merely to replicate. Hence, it envisioned the future EU/'integrated Europe' as a '*strong and solidary association of sovereign national states*', a '*Europe of homelands*' in which nations/states retain their cultural identity and legal individuality. In 2009, the PiS represented the EU as a textbook 'international organization' (Model 1), the transfer of nation-state competences onto which was justified only insofar as the common realization of certain tasks provided all the parties with greater benefits. On the basis of this conception of the EU, it advocated the return of some competences back to the nation-states; deregulation in other areas, so as to minimize the EU's independent input; and the strengthening of integration/cooperation efforts only in the spheres of defence, and military and energy security. Accordingly, the party opposed all centralizing and federalist tendencies aimed at the building of a 'European superstate'. Furthermore, with a concern over the position of Poland in the EU/Europe, and on the basis of what it constructed to be the duty of European solidarity, the strongly 'eurorealist' PiS persistently opposed the domination of the EU, including its solidarity and enlargement agenda, by the strongest and most populous EU members. This was because these 'old' members put their particularistic and myopically understood economic interests ahead of their duty of solidarity with the CEECs, and sought to impose their will onto the weaker nations in Europe.

This situation sprang, according to the PiS, from the fact that the EU lost a vision and cultural identity, which it used to derive from the Christian idea of European solidarity. Christianity shaped the moral and cultural face of the continent, and the repulsion of the acknowledgement of this 'truth' from the constitutional treaty amounted to a sort of anti-Christian censorship. This was part of the party's more complex critique of the course the EU/European integration had taken. It alleged some left-wing and liberal circles in the EU of trying to use the EU and its institutions as an instrument of Europe's 'de-Christianization', of construction of a society without religion, traditions, common ethics and culture. Opposing this decidedly, the PiS insisted that the EU could not interfere in matters of public morality and other ethical-cultural matters. On its view, all the attempts at belittling the importance of Christianity for Europe discredited European unity, and the very ideas underlying the integration process. The party believed that Poland had a certain duty to defend the Christianity of Europe, and to revive it with the spirit of Christian solidarity (equality among nation-states and further EU enlargement). This relates to the tension in its discourse with respect to the concept of 'European identity'. On the PiS understanding, the

'true' identity of Europe, of its culture, and of the bond among European nations ('the spiritual and historical unity of Europe') was Christian. Christianity and Christian faith were the fount of democracy and human rights; and played an important role in the resistance to communist oppression, and the preservation of a sense of unity on the continent divided by the Iron Curtain. This was the preferred identity for the EU to adopt to be meaningful. Yet, the construction of the EU, and of a 'European identity' underlying this organization, were headed in an opposite direction instead. In view of this, it appears, the party chose to dismiss altogether all efforts aimed at the creation of a new 'pan-European' identity/consciousness, together with the building of a European superstate. These would not only undermine the existence of nation-states and the identity of European nations but, even more importantly, necessarily involve an imposition onto weaker nations of the identity of the strongest ones.

The PiS fully subordinated its construction of the EU to its construct of 'Europe of nation-states'. In its overwhelmingly security- and geopolitics-bound 'eurorealist' discourse, it constructed the EU as an almost entirely Model 1 international organization, qualitatively not quite unlike the NATO. This is not to suggest, however, that it did not represent EU enlargement as that of a Model 2 community based on Western democratic values, accession to which was conditioned by the satisfaction by the candidates of the required membership criteria. This sense of the EU-as-community was nevertheless relatively diluted by security and geopolitical considerations, and very often reduced to the duty of solidarity among European nations. With respect to EU enlargement, the PiS strove for the EU's principal commitment to enlarge, without delay, to all the countries in the Balkans and in the EU's eastern neighbourhood (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus).

The PiS stance on Turkey's EU entry evolved from prevalent opposition on Christian grounds (a Model 3 reversed equivalence 'EUasEurope'); towards a more 'torn' position, recognizing cultural/religious difference between Turkey and Europe, but not presenting it as a reason to reject the country. This is largely attributable to the party's reduction of the EU to an international organization, and the attendant security and geopolitical considerations. Adam Szymański reported that some party figures, including the Kaczyński brothers, opposed Turkey's accession on cultural grounds. On the other hand, the PiS-led government (2005-2007) declared that 'it was "not against the Turkish accession", but avoided using an explicitly affirmative form'. By 2009, the stress on cultural and religious difference appeared to be counterbalanced by geopolitical considerations, when a number of PiS members and MEPs demanded the prioritization of accession of other countries,

especially Ukraine, over that of Turkey (2009, 176-177). This was corroborated by the party's answer to the 2009 survey conducted by the Polskie Radio. The PiS declared:

> *The EU should focus on countries like Ukraine, Georgia, or the Balkan States when it comes to enlargement. Turkey is not the priority. It should become a member of the EU in the future, as soon as it is ready in the terms of democratic reforms and respecting human rights* (emphasis added).[254]

The above statement suggests the party's representation of EU enlargement to Turkey as that of a Model 2 community of democratic countries respecting human rights. Yet, with a view to the manner in which the PiS constructed the EU and Europe in its discourse, it is hard to consider this representation structurally determinant. This is because the relevant entity of the PiS integration discourse was 'Europe of nation-states' rather than the EU. That Europe was, and ought to remain Christian on the party's construction, and so should the EU. At the same time, however, the PiS perceived that the EU headed in a rather opposite direction. In view of this, and on the basis of 'eurorealist' considerations, it envisioned the EU as a Model 1 international organization, explicitly prevented from having a say in matters of morality, culture and religion. On this construction, Turkey's non-Christian religion was not to be a matter of concern, and geopolitical considerations, in contrast, at their prime. One PiS MP (Zbigniew Girzyński) reportedly stated in 2008 that Turkey's EU accession offered an opportunity for Poland to find a partner in counter-balancing Germany, and thus changing the power distribution in the EU (Šaradín 2010, 141).

That the recognition of cultural/religious difference did not inevitably mean the PiS principled opposition to Turkey's EU membership was suggested in two 2007 statements by Lech Kaczyński in his capacity as the Polish President. Despite being uttered in this office, they both built on the key nodal points of the PiS discourse: Europe as a historical construct, and Christianity. On the matter of Turkey's questioned Europeanness, Kaczyński stated:

> *Turkey is the link between the East and the West, between Asia and Europe*. *For ages the history of European nations and Turkey were intertwined*. I am profoundly convinced about the significant role of Turkey in the intercultural, religious and civilizational dialog (as quoted in Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 123, emphasis added).

In the latter statement, Kaczyński expressed his opinion that Islam and Christianity did not have to be incompatible:

> [W]e deeply believe that, *on the basis of these two religions – provided that one does not adopt a fundamentalist approach – one can find a junction, a link that will allow us to live together within one close-knit union of states* (as quoted in Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 123, emphasis added).

[254] Available from http://www2.polskieradio.pl/eo/dokument.aspx?iid=109498.

That seemed to be the crux of the concern over religious difference. In 2007, a PiS MEP worried about the possible consequences for the EU of a potentially increased influence of 'Islamic forces' in the process of Turkey's democratization (Šaradín 2010, 140). In 2009, Michał Kamiński (a PiS member to chair the EP ECR fraction between 2009 and 2011) put this concern even more bluntly:

> I still have great doubts about the European aspirations of Turkey. I am concerned primarily about the growing infiltration of Turkish politics with radical Islamist elements (as quoted in Šaradín 2010, 141).

6.5 Civic Platform

Platforma Obywatelska (PO) was founded prior to the 2001 elections as a merger of secessionists from the fragmenting Solidarity Electoral Action coalition with the Freedom Union. The Freedom Union's former chairman, Donald Tusk, took over the PO leadership in 2003. The party ranked second in the 2001 and 2005 elections, becoming the main opposition subject to the governments led by the SLD and the PiS respectively. Since the mid-2000s, the PO-PiS competition has dominated the Polish political scene. The PO won the 2007 elections, and strengthened its position further by the end of the 2000s, to win the 2011 elections as well. Between 2001 and 2011, the PO maintained a stable profile of a centre-right party, combining (social-)liberal (ordoliberal) economic programme with social, moral and national conservatism. It advocated Poland's EU membership on proviso of the preservation of its national and cultural identity. As an active member of the EP's EPP, it endorsed the EU's further federalization.

The PO 2001 elections manifesto[255] focused almost entirely on the comprehensive modernization of Poland; and the elimination of state interventionism in the economy – a freeing-up of the market which was to result in economic development. Its goal was to free the Polish potential for the sake of building a '*modern country*, a *full and respected member of the family of European nations*' (32, emphases added). In its 2004 'euromanifesto', the PO described the EU as a 'hope and challenge':

> A *hope for lasting peace, stability and the development of civil society*. Yet *the challenge is to care for a continuous and harmonious development of European integration to the benefit of all its participants, for our own contribution to, and the marking of our identity in united Europe* (1, emphases added).

It represented the Union as an *institutional superstructure of a 'Europe of nations'*:

[255] Available from http://www.bemowo.platforma.org/dokumenty/program_po.doc.

> *The European Union provides the institutional framework for the joint efforts of many nations* [striving] *for peace, stability and prosperity*. [Our] membership to it does not deprive us of sovereignty, on the contrary – it *allows for a fuller realization of the sovereignty and freedom of Poland and the Poles*. It *ends the period of humiliating separation of Poland from Europe by the Iron Curtain*. It *complements the efforts of Solidarity aimed at a dignified place and sovereignty of the nation*. It *creates the best conditions for the realization of the Polish raison d'état* (1, emphases added).

Rather than an end in and of itself, the EU was a means to the achievement of greater goals. It was, according to the party, '*a project in progress*': to develop democracy and prosperity, it needed to constantly improve its institutions and policies; to ensure security and stability, it needed to constantly adapt itself to external challenges; and '*to unite the continent, it must keep enlarging*' (1, emphases added). The EU was an '*opportunity and a way*' for Poland/the Polish nation '*to recover the place in Europe which belonged to it*'. The extent to which it would be able to utilize this opportunity would depend primarily on the quality of the Polish state, and the effectiveness of the domestic and foreign policies (1, emphases added).

The PO summarized its 'vision Europe', its desired character of the EU as the platform for the re/unification of continent Europe, as follows: 'The Civic Platform is in favour of a *cohesive and sustainable, solidary, strong, democratic and economically efficient Union. Such a Union will best serve Poland and Europe*' (1, emphases added). The rest of the document detailed its vision. It desired the EU to be a '*community of, and not just an agreement among states*'. *Only thus would the revival of nationalist ambitions and interests in Europe, and the return of the horrors of the 1930s and 1940s, be prevented*. To that end, it supported the strengthening and enhancement of EU institutions (the Commission and the EP), and the extension of majority decision-making. At the same time, it insisted on the *strict observance of the principle of subsidiarity* in extending integration to further areas of public life. It desired a '*Union without a hegemon, directorates, or two-speeds for the more and less advanced – a Union which connects rather than divides*'. On this basis, it sought the preservation of Poland's position in the EU, accorded to it by the Nice Treaty. The Nice (voting) power distribution most fully ensured 'the realization of *the principle of equality of all the states and citizens of united Europe*'. The PO also deemed that *the constitutional treaty's preamble ought to include a reference to Christianity* (1, emphases added).

The party desired a '*Union which protects the identity of the nations of Europe*'. It was to *protect* '*the diversity of historical memories, traditions and customs of Europe*', and *could not* in any event '*constitute norms undermining the basic values and customs which had proven themselves in Europe for centuries*'. In this regard, the PO strove for 'an

exclusively national character of norms relating to the particularly sensitive worldview questions', especially with respect to *human life, family and education*. It pledged to seek to ensure that EU institutions, particularly the EP, do not create norms and recommendations undermining in these areas the traditional, Christian and European values and customs. Relatedly, it *opposed tendencies* in the EU *directed at* '*Europeanization and harmonization of the directions of cultural policy*'. In this regard, it expressly appreciated the '*distinctness and cultural diversity of European nations and regions*' (2, emphases added).

The PO sought a '*Union which is solidary*'. It believed that '*there is no community without solidarity*', that '*European solidarity is the foundation of integration*'. It perceived as alarming the decreasing solidarity in the EU, and called for new projects which would revive it. In this context, the party exclaimed that *solidarity of the well-off with those in need of support was an* '*element and a condition of the integration contract, not a sign of charity*'. Hence, it stood for a consistent EU cohesion policy, and opposed its 're-nationalization'. It also wanted a '*Union, which is close to citizens*', whose operation they could comprehend, and the decisions of which they could influence. Only then would the EU win citizens' support and identification (2, emphases added). The PO desired a '*Union which speaks with one voice*', and assumes greater responsibility for the security of Europe and the world by enhancing the CFSP and ESDP cooperation and coordination. Still, no common project in this area could weaken the trans-Atlantic partnership (3, emphases added).

This was also a '*Union which unites Europe*', since '*Europe does not end at the Bug*', i.e. at Poland's eastern border. The 2004 enlargement would raise the interest of *Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans, and the nations of the former Yugoslavia*, in making a '*choice for Europe*': for 'the West', and the democratic Europe uniting in the EU. The PO pointed out that the Union had at its disposal political and economic measures which could support changes in these countries in the direction of democracy and market economy, and thus their ability to enter the EU. To that end, the party sought the establishment of an '*eastern dimension*' of the EU's external policy (3, emphases added).

In its 2007 elections manifesto[256], the PO combined its critique of the last two years of the PiS government with a stress on the desirability of EU membership. The party chairman Donald Tusk recalled the Poles' 1989 choice for freedom. He applauded them for voting for EU accession in the national referendum, a step through which they ensured 'a

[256] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

place for Poland among the most developed countries in the world'. He described the choice that the Poles faced in the 2007 elections as one between a '*Western European standard of living, efficient organization and democratic standards*' (the PO), and '*bickering, mess, and an Eastern European model of "democracy"*'. Those elections were, according to him, simply about *prosperity*, and the PO was a guarantee of building '*a normal European country*' (4-5, emphases added). The party's then vice-president Bronisław Komorowski further added that the Poles managed to build an '*independent and democratic free-market state*', a state *that shook off the post-Yalta bonds of dependence*, '*a state integrating with the West, with Europe*'. The PO sought to repair rather than to destroy the state; to strengthen rather than to weaken democracy and the free market; to accelerate Poland's '*march towards Western standards of living and development*'. The great national objective was to '*catch up with the peloton of the states of the so-called Old European Union*' (6, emphasis added), to decrease the 'civilizational gap' between Poland and the Western EU countries (23).

A shared 'dream of a united Europe' stood at the birth of the PO. It believed that *Poland's presence in the process of building the EU* was a demand arising from the Polish raison d'état and national interest. It would open up *new opportunities for the modernization of the state*; improvement of the quality of people's lives; and the '*deepening of national identity and of a shared responsibility for the fate of Europe*'. In 2004, Poland acceded, on equal footing, into 'the *emerging union of European nations*' (9, emphasis added).

The party sought a new doctrine of state sovereignty, defining and allowing for an effective pursuit of Polish national interests in new circumstances, marked by globalization processes, technological development, 'information civilization', and EU membership (10). Having regained its independence, Poland acceded the NATO and the EU. So it gained the greatest opportunity in centuries to ensure the sovereignty and security of the Republic; to create favourable conditions for economic and civilizational development; and to reinforce its international position. Poland's strong position in Europe and the world could be ensured only through a sophisticated and effectively conducted foreign and security policy. Its objective would be *the strengthening of Poland's position in* the '*structures of the West*': *the NATO and the EU*. The *focal point of the Republic's foreign policy* was to be '*Europe, and in particular the European Union*' (74, emphases added). Here, Poland should not only regain its lost image of 'the leader of changes in our part of Europe', but also progress much father: to become, through its activity in the integration process, '*one of the Union leaders*' (75, emphasis added).

The PO then reiterated its earlier points on the character of the EU it desired. It demanded a 'solidary Europe': 'that *the principle of solidarity remains the basis of the Union's internal cohesion*'. The enlarged EU needed solidarity, both economic and political: the *support provided to poorer regions and countries* was a '*non-negotiable condition of the integration contract*' rather than charity. The PO would strive for the upkeep and further development of the mechanisms of this support; and also to win the backing in the EU for the 'eastern policy', which was of vital interest to the post-communist members (75, emphases added). It also restated that

> *the goal of European integration cannot be uniformity of values, traditions, or customs, but unity in diversity*. The European Union should *protect the diversity of its constituent cultures and nations* (75, emphases added).

With respect to EU policies, the PO sought the creation of a common energy policy, and the deepening of the CFSP. A strong EU and Poland were to be in strategic partnership with the USA. Poland's vital interest was to preserve the US presence in Europe. The EU and the NATO held responsibility for global peace, security and stability of the international order (76 and 78). The party sought deepening and strengthening of the ESDP, so that it would in time become the second, with the NATO equivalent, pillar of national security (83). Furthermore, a vital Polish interest was the development and enhancement of good relations with EU states, especially with Union neighbours: the Germans, Czechs, Slovaks and the Lithuanians. Poland's strategic and good relations with the Germans were not only in these two nations' interest. They were also important in the trans-Atlantic context, and for the EU relations with Russia and Ukraine. Of similar importance were the Polish-French relations. On grounds of historical and geopolitical considerations, the party sought the continuation of the dialogue and cooperation within the 'Weimar Triangle' (Poland, Germany and France). Ukraine was a great and important partner of Poland in its 'part of Europe'. The PO undertook consistently to support its democratization and '*desire to integrate with the West*'; to remain an ally of Ukraine in its rapprochement with the NATO and the EU, even if the process takes longer than initially expected (78-79, emphasis added).

Finally, the PO 2011 elections programme[257] declared that after having reached the most important post-1989 strategic goal, the NATO and EU membership, Poland had to invest its efforts into building a '*strong position within these two organizations*' (84, emphasis added). Most of Polish foreign political activities were implemented through the

[257] Available from http://platforma.org/media/dokumenty/Program_PO_100dpi.pdf.

EU. Polish national interests could thus be carried out most effectively though their skilful projection into larger, European interests. Both in the wider international environment and the EU, the building of effective (interest) coalitions was needed. The PO knew how to do that, how to persuade partners (88). The party worked out the best relations with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The Visegrad Group coordinated their positions in the EU, and provided a clear signal to the Eastern Partnership states that 'regional cooperation may lead to Union membership' (92). The party also called for a common EU Russia policy (94).

The PO undertook to advocate *EU enlargement* – '*above all to the countries of the Balkan Peninsula, and in longer-term perspective also to other European countries which meet all the necessary accession requirements*' (98, emphasis added). All Polish political forces converged on that an important national interest was '*the rapprochement and gradual integration of the neighbouring states (countries of Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus) with the EU*' (89, emphasis added). Poland would remain the leader in the promotion and implementation of the Eastern Partnership programme, bringing the countries aspiring for the rank of democracies closer to the EU. It would keep encouraging the 'European ambitions' of countries like Ukraine, Moldova and the states of Southern Caucasus (98).

To conclude, the PO did not speak of Poland's 'return to' but rather a 'choice for Europe'. Europe in this narrative denoted 'the West', and more immediately national independence and democracy. It was a choice to belong, as an equal partner, with the (Western) European 'family' of developed and democratic nations. It was a 'return', in a sense, because Poland, on the PO reading, always had a place in this Europe. The party's goal in 2007 was to make Poland into a modern and prospering 'normal European country': with a 'Western European standard of living, efficient organization and [Western] democratic standards'. The key tenet of the party programmes was Poland's modernization, its economic and 'civilizational' development. That was the way for the country to recover its due strong place in Europe and the world; together with its integration with, and the building of a strong position in, the 'structures of the West': the EU and the NATO. On the party understanding, Poland's EU and NATO memberships were not restricting national sovereignty, but rather allowing for its full realization; an effective pursuit of Polish national interests; and the deepening of national identity. Poland's EU accession was the final closure of the 'period of humiliating separation of Poland from Europe by the Iron Curtain'.

The PO consistently differentiated between the EU and 'Europe of nations' in its discourse, and reduced the former into an institutional superstructure of the latter, a platform for the re/unification of the nations of the continent. Rearticulating the original official integration discourse, the PO constructed the EU as a framework for joint efforts by nations striving for peace, stability and prosperity, and equated it with the integration project in progress. The EU was the 'emerging union of European nations'. This union ('united Europe') would not be complete until it encompasses all of Europe ,which comprised, on the party portrayal, also the countries of Southern Caucasus. It was against this background that the PO articulated its 'vision Europe'/of the future EU: 'a cohesive and sustainable, solidary, strong, democratic and economically efficient Union'. It was to be a community, preventing the revival of nationalist ambitions and interests in Europe. Therefore, the strengthening of supranational institutions and features/federalization was desirable, on proviso of the strict observance of the principle of subsidiarity in extending the scope of integration further. This envisioned community was first and foremost a 'solidary Europe' – without a hegemon, directorates, or two speeds for the more and the less advanced; where all the states and citizens are equal. The PO believed that European solidarity was the foundation of the integration project, and that the support provided by the better-off to the poorer nations was a 'non-negotiable condition of the integration contract'. It insisted that 'the goal of European integration cannot be uniformity of values, traditions, or customs, but unity in diversity'. The EU was to protect the diversity of its constituent cultures, and of nations with their identities. The PO stressed that the Union must steer clear of efforts aimed at 'Europeanization' or harmonization of cultural policy. In defence of what it saw as traditional, Christian and European values and customs, it expressly sought to prevent EU institutions from creating norms incongruent with them; and thus their interference with the exclusively national character of norms relating to human life, family and education. The envisioned Union was also to be close to its citizens; speak with one voice; and assume responsibility, in strategic trans-Atlantic partnership with the USA, for the peace, security and stability in Europe and the world.

The PO constructed the EU as the integration project, and represented its enlargement as that of a culture-free Model 2 community, based on western democratic values; whose distinctly European features were solidarity and the diversity of cultures and identities of its constituent nations and regions. It undertook to advocate EU expansion to the Balkan countries and, in longer perspective, to all other European countries (of Eastern Europe and

Southern Caucasus) that 'meet all the necessary accession requirements'. It promised to keep supporting the 'European choice' of Eastern Europeans (especially Ukraine); and their NATO and EU accession.

The PO did not become an advocate of Turkey's EU accession. It merely applied on it its general position – the insistence that all candidates must satisfy all the accession criteria. The party's answer in the Polskie Radio survey read: 'Turkey should enter the EU as soon as it meets all of the necessary accession criteria'.[258] In 2004, the PO supported the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey; but some of its members tended to link it to the accession (prospects) of Ukraine, which was, unlike Turkish membership, the priority of Polish foreign policy. The position 'Yes to Turkey, but yes to Ukraine as well' was voiced by the PO's EP prominent Jacek Saryusz-Wolski in 2004 (Kaźmierkiewicz 2006b, 139-140) and also the ensuing years (Szymański 2009, 173).

6.6 Country Findings

The Polish political elite understandings of the EU, Europe, the integration process/project, and of Poland's role therein, converged on a number of structurally determinant points. Poland and the Polish nation indisputably belonged to and with Europe. The *leitmotif* of the story of post-1989 Poland, told by the five parties covered in the above analysis, was not a 'return to Europe' but rather the recovery of national independence. Only as independent could the Polish nation make choices about its future on its own, democratically. The UD and the PO narrated the early 1990s as the Polish 'choice of Europe'. It was a choice of 'the West', of (once again) belonging to, and integration (as an equal partner) with the peaceful, prosperous, developed and democratic nations of (Western) Europe. All five parties understood Europe as a continent inhabited by nations and their states, until recently divided geopolitically, economically and developmentally in two parts: the developed, prospering and 'democratic Europe' in the process of unification, and the 'dislocated' CEE region. The CEE was torn apart from 'the West' and 'democratic Europe' at Yalta, and forced to become part of 'the East'. The CEECs' economic and 'civilizational' development was arrested by their subjugation to the embrace of the communist Soviet empire.

The post-Yalta and post-Soviet-empire period was represented by the PSL as an opportunity for countries in Europe (and the world) to build a novel international order. For

[258] Available from http://www2.polskieradio.pl/eo/dokument.aspx?iid=109498.

the UD, SLD and the PO, it was a time of Poland's (and all the CEECs') heading (back) to 'the West' for the sake of national independence, stability, security, democracy, as well as modernization and comprehensive development. The aim was, in brief, to rise to the 'normal' standards of living in 'democratic Europe'. This motion took the form, in Europe, of participation in the Western/'European integration structures', most importantly in the EC/EU and the NATO. All parties concurred that the goal of Poland's transformation, democratization and complex development, and the implementation of the 'European social model' according to the SLD (and at least partly the PSL), was for it to assume its due strong position in Europe and the world. Only as such could Poland ensure its independence, sovereignty and security. Only so it could cultivate national identity and effectively pursue national interests. All the parties agreed that Poland's EU membership was conducive to that goal, but also that Poland, on the way to its attainment, needed to be treated by others as an equal partner. Concerned with the possibility that strong European countries could seek to dictate and manipulate the CEECs' future to their advantage, and treat them as less-than-equals in the process of European integration, all the parties stressed that the CEECs', especially the Visegrad Group, needed to cooperate and coordinate their actions vis-à-vis the EU/Western Europeans.

All the five parties prioritized in their discourse their respective constructs of 'Europe of nations/nation-states', and subordinated to them their conception of the EU, its future and enlargement. Conceiving of the EU as the form it presently took, they equated it with the integration process, goal of which was to overcome the division of continent Europe, territorially defined only by the SLD as extending between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals. With some explicitly referring to the ('template') German-French reconciliation, they saw European integration as the route to Europe's re/unification, construction of 'united Europe' in which nations/countries overcome their historical animosities and live in peace, stability and democracy. One way or another, they all believed that the CEECs had a rightful claim to demand inclusion into the prosperous and developed 'democratic Europe', that is, the EU at the time. The PiS and the PO were more explicit on this point. The PO pointed out that it was European solidarity which was the fount of European integration, its non-negotiable condition, and that this solidarity must by definition apply to all of Europe. Making a similar point, the PiS went further and suggested that Western Europeans were at least partly responsible for the CEEC's 'eastern predicament'. Hence, the CEECs had a moral right to demand solidarity and support from Western Europe/the EU. Their provision by the latter,

and the NATO and EU's 'open doors' policy, were a moral duty arising from the Christian idea of European solidarity.

Each party constructed the EU as the platform for the integration of entire Europe, for cooperation of all European countries/nations. Yet, they diverged with respect to the extent and depth of this platform when envisioning the EU's (desired) future character. How they projected the latter was determined by their respective 'visions of united Europe'. According to the UD, national identities were to be preserved in 'united Europe'. On the view of the PiS, the EU's character was merely to replicate that of 'Europe of nation-states'. The fount of Western civilization, democracy and human rights, and of Europe's culture, ethics and unity was Christianity. It formed the bond uniting European nations and, as such, underlay the integration process. Rather than a means of domination and imposition of the will of the most powerful and populous, European integration was about European solidarity: the principle of all nation-states' equality and the commitment to further enlargement. Europe was Christian, according to the PiS, and so should the EU. As the integration process seemed to have taken an opposite course, however, the PiS chose partly to de-construct and reduce its envisioned 'united Europe' into an 'international organization', a strong and solidary association of cooperating sovereign nation-states which retain their national and cultural identities. This organization must not interfere in the solely national domains of culture and morality, and must deny attempts at Europe's de-Christianization. It was in this context that the PiS dismissed and ardently opposed efforts aimed at building a European superstate, and a 'pan-European' identity and consciousness underlying the EU. It feared that it would mean nothing else but the imposition of the will and identity of the strongest EU members onto the weaker ones.

The PSL also stressed the need for European solidarity, particularly in view of power asymmetry and inequality between the 'old' and 'new' EU members and citizens. It envisioned a common social Europe of nations/nation-states, which preserve and cultivate their independence, sovereignty, and the diverse national identities, cultures, traditions and values. United Europe would be a community based on what the PSL projected to be 'core European values': respect for the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity, of peaceful development and human and civil rights (rooted in Christian tradition and ethics of Europe), and the 'European social model'. The PSL's 'vision Europe' was to play a global political and economic role.

The PO envisioned a 'union of European nations' which was cohesive and sustainable, solidary, strong, democratic and economically efficient. It would be a progressively federalized community, strictly adhering to the subsidiarity principle. This community, preventing the revival of nationalist ambitions and interests in Europe, would be first of all solidary – without a hegemon, directorates or multiple speeds. European solidarity was a condition of 'integration contract' and demanded equality of all states and citizens. The EU would be an 'institutional superstructure' of 'Europe of nations', a framework for joint efforts by nation-states striving for peace, stability and prosperity. The EU/integration process must not harmonize but rather ensure respect for the diversity of cultures, national identities, values, traditions and customs. Preferably, it should remain faithful to the traditional Christian and European values and customs. At the least, it must not prescribe or interfere in national cultural policies, and in the exclusively national prerogatives with respect to matters of human life, family and education.

In line with its fellow social democratic parties, the SLD envisioned a federal 'united Europe', integrated not only economically but above all politically. It would strictly observe the principle of subsidiarity, and the competences of Member States and of EU institutions would be clearly defined. That Europe would not only be federal, but also social, solidary, strong, open, and as widely as possible democratic in making decisions. It would adhere to the 'European social model' and care for the development of all the members. It would assume global responsibility for giving globalization processes a progressive character, and promoting globally its founding values and goals, including the European model of justice and solidarity.

All five parties submitted their projection of the EU's future and enlargement to what they portrayed as 'Europe of nation-states'. Despite their disagreement on the EU's desirable internal arrangement (either Model 1 or 2), all of them, including the PiS (initially leaning to Model 3), converged on representing its enlargement as that of a Model 2 culture-free solidary community of nation-states (and citizens, for the SLD). That community was based on Western democratic values, cared for the well-being of all, and preserved the diversity of national (and more local) identities and cultures. All the parties held that EU enlargement must continue until it encompasses the entire CEE region. It should thus enlarge not only to the Balkan Peninsula, but also to Eastern Europe, including, on the PiS and PO construction, also the countries of Southern Caucasus. All the candidates were to satisfy all the accession

criteria. The Polish political elite felt that Poland's greatest interest and responsibility lay in a European/Western future of Eastern European countries, particularly of Ukraine.

All four parties active in the 2000s linked, in one way or another, the question of Turkey's EU entry with that of Ukraine. They all accepted Turkey's accession process but none became its resolved advocate. A lukewarm and detached 'Yes to Turkey, but yes to Ukraine as well' characterizes the position of the Polish political elite. This is despite the fact that even the most progressive SLD located Turkey outside its imagined Europe. Having dismissed emotional and cultural arguments against the country's membership, the SLD saw its close historical ties with and influence on the continent as reasons good enough for having it in the EU. Despite their strong, yet varied, levels of attachment to Christianity (except the SLD), the parties' recognition of cultural/religious difference of Turkey did not lead them to reject its possible EU membership. The position of the PiS was, nonetheless, somewhat torn. It desired that the EU replicates the character of Europe (a historical construct), which was Christian. On the other hand, it located Turkey on the margins of Europe and admitted that both Christianity and Islam could conceivably coexist within a 'closely-knit union of states'.

Several earlier studies corroborate these findings and provide further complementary insights for interpreting the Polish take on Europe, the EU and its enlargement. This study's key finding – that Europe was differentiated from the EU – was earlier reported by the EURONAT project. It observed that the mainstream Polish media represented Europe as 'historical, cultural and geographical entity', whereas the EU as an 'economic and political edifice' (2006, 112). Interviews conducted within that project revealed a similar construction of Europe in geographic and cultural terms, and the respondents' conviction that Poland belonged therein. In another, narrower sense, Europe denoted 'developed Europe', a 'technological (civilisational) entity to which Poland still aspires (and integration with the EU is aimed at speeding up this process)' (Ibid, 108). It is in this latter sense that the Poles built a certain equivalence between 'developed Europe' and the EU. Yet, while this equation underlay the strong Polish developmental discourse, it was the first construct of 'Europe of nations/nation-states' which structurally determined the Polish conception of the EU. The EURONAT reported the respondents' construction of the EU in mainly economic terms, as 'an organization of countries aiming at creating a counterbalance to US economic power', and their desire for it to be 'Europe of motherlands' which 'allows all member states to maintain their identity, peculiarity, and independence'. They believed that the EU promoted the 'interests of its powerful member states', and also that 'neither thinking in universalistic

terms nor the common market, economic policy, or currency will conquer the pursuit of national interests by any of the member states' (Ibid, 110).

The same study concluded that the Poles' conviction of their belonging to Europe was aptly grasped by the statement included in the Polish government's 1997 *National Integration Strategy,* which read:

> For over a thousand years Poland has belonged to Europe in a geopolitical, cultural and economic sense and has shared its basic values, which Poland has co-created and defended (as quoted in EURONAT 2006, 112).

This does not mean that the Polish discourse on Europe was unproblematic or lacking elements of mutual differentiation (see especially Törnquist-Plewa 2002), nor that there was agreement on its meaning. The Polish political elite still converged on representing Europe in historical and geopolitical terms. Most of them projected it as a 'political emanation of the democratic West, perceived as the 'First World'. Europe's construction was thus cast against a background East-West binary, with Yalta being the milestone which 'split Europe into East and West' (EURONAT 2006, 107-108).

This was the context of Poland's 'return to Europe', declared by Mazowiecki at the turn of the 1990s, a slogan which became 'extremely popular'. 'Return to Europe' denoted, on the reading of Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (2002, 237), 'a process that was launched, a project that was to be implemented in several areas'. Politically, it meant 'the return of Poland to the European arena of independent and democratic states'; economically, the adoption of market economy and economic modernization; and, culturally, it designated coming to terms with the 'mental and social heritage of communism', as well as a 'broad opening towards the West' in respects such as cultural contacts or educational models. Hence, the slogan was linked with complex transformation. The enthusiasm it initially provided started waning with the difficulties in the process and its adverse consequences. Also the idealized image of Europe/'the West' started turning more 'realistic'. The intensification of exchange with the West brought many Poles to the painful realization of 'their economic backwardness and provincialism'. It also made them aware that Western Europeans, with their 'contempt for "illegal Eastern labour" and the fear of the Eastern European "Mafia"', were lukewarm rather than cheerful in welcoming Eastern Europeans 'knocking on their door'. Törnquist-Plewa suggested that these perceptions led the Poles to a 'feeling of being Europe's "unwanted child", and to the deepening of the latent Polish inferiority complex' (Ibid). On the way to EU accession, 'Euro-enthusiasts' linked their

desire for EU membership to a critique of Polish society, accusing it of 'being conservative, limited, fanatically religious, nationalistic, burdened with the heritage of the past and immature'. Polish 'Euro-sceptics' feared, on their part, that 'Poland will be "degraded" in the EU and completely controlled both politically and economically by Western powers'. Some of them also feared the loss in the EU of 'values traditionally associated with Polish national identity, e.g. the cult of national history and tradition, Catholic piousness, etc'. The 'Euro-sceptics' thusly re-deployed the historical dilemma of whether Western-model modernization threatened 'Polish originality', something they projected as Poland's valuable contribution to Europe. Some of them believed that Poland had a (cultural) mission to accomplish therein. A third, smaller and moderate group, called 'Euro-rationalists' by Törnquist-Plewa, saw the EU/Europe as a model to be appropriated 'in a creative way … that fits Polish society', and advocated EU accession for the sake of saving the country from marginalization and of speeding up its modernization (Ibid, 237-239).

Turning now to the matter of further enlargement, Poland has been an active member of the so-called 'Tallinn Group' of EU members jointly promoting it. Adam Balcer reported a 'broad consensus' across the Polish political elite on that enlargement must proceed, and that this support applied principally to all the countries aspiring to enter the EU. They believed that 'all European countries which meet the Copenhagen criteria and adopt the acquis communautaire should be allowed to join the EU'. Menwhile, they were 'opposed to drawing a clear borderline of who should and should not be considered European' (2010, 8-9). This thinking underlay the key Polish argument justifying EU expansion to South-Eastern Europe, and especially to Turkey: a reference to 'the principle of adhering to agreements and promises made beforehand'. This stress on fulfilling EU commitments to candidates, and all the former Yugoslav states, was voiced *inter alia* by both the leftist President Alexander Kwaśniewski and his conservative successor Lech Kaczyński. It derived from the conviction that '"it is not appropriate" that Poland and other new Member States that just acceded should deny accession to other states'. The Polish diplomacy also held that 'the EU side ought to guarantee a "fair starting point" and should be willing to present each candidate state with prospects of eventually becoming a member' (Kaźmierkiewicz 2006b, 120). This stand was also taken by both the PiS- and PO-led cabinets. Their official position derived from 'solidarity with other candidates who are said to have the same right to become members of the Union as the [CEECs] had' (Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 116).

Accordingly, there has been consensus among Polish foreign policy-makers that 'Poland will not block further enlargement'. They were also in agreement, however, on that Poland is not to assume 'a leading role as Turkey's advocate' (Kaźmierkiewicz 2006b, 118). This had to do with Poland's relative non-interest in the issue. Affirming this study's findings, Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz reported that the eastern vector of Polish foreign policy has clearly taken a precedence over the southern or south-eastern ones. Hence it tended not only to link but to prioritize the accession of Ukraine over that of Turkey (Ibid).[259] That Turkey's accession was not a Polish priority, however, did not mean that Poland's representatives would not oppose any 'special treatment' of the country by the EU. At a 'Weimar Triangle' meeting in 2006, the then Polish President Lech Kaczyński rejected the imposition of stricter measures on Turkey in response to its non-compliance with the obligations arising from the EU-Turkey customs union. Similarly, the Polish Prime Minister Tusk dismissed in 2009 any additional criteria for Turkey; holding that 'there should be no obstacle on the Turkish way to the EU after the fulfilment of the universal membership criteria' (Szymański 2009, 171-172).

The final point regarding the Polish position on EU expansion concerns the (seemingly paradoxical) element of Christianity. The Poles' rather strong conservative attachment to traditional (Christian and Catholic) values, demonstrated by insistence on a reference to Christianity in the constitutional treaty's preamble, and discerned by the above analysis among all 'post-Solidarity' parties, 'has not played a major part in the discussions on the individual candidates' profiles', according to Kaźmierkiewicz (2006b, 129). This may have to do with the position of Catholic Church which has wielded a notable influence in the debate on Turkey's EU entry. While some of the debate's most critical participants, 'the hierarchs of the Catholic Church in Poland have never officially opposed Turkey's accession' on cultural grounds (Balcer 2010, 12).

[259] There has been a national consensus, upheld by consecutive Presidents and governments of Poland, on the objective of opening the 'European perspective' to (particularly) Ukraine and Belarus as an 'incentive and eventually an anchor for economic and political reforms'. This was a Polish national interest, a matter of national security and regional geopolitics vis-à-vis 'the spectre of Russia's influence in the area'. The rapprochement between the EU and the two countries was to provide an 'ultimate solution to the security dilemma of the countries between the EU and Russia' (Kaźmierkiewicz 2006b, 119).

Chapter 7

Hungary

To the extent that one can meaningfully distinguish the Soviet satellite communist regimes with respect to their harshness and rigidity, the Hungarian was, for decades, relatively more moderate in comparison with those in Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic Republic. The communist Hungary initiated its 'opening to the West' already in the early 1980s.[260] Moreover, it was still under the communist rule that Hungary, in the late 1980s, established contacts with the European Parliament; applied for the Council of Europe membership; and concluded a trade and cooperation agreement with the EC (1988).[261] Hungary was in this respect ahead of all the other CEECs, not least because it had already implemented 'the most radical reform programme of the Communist East' (Batory 2002, 2).

Hungary also stands out within the Visegrad Group with respect to the very early formation of a (post-communist) party system, and its subsequent endurance in the following two decades. Anti-communist opposition, gaining in strength since the mid-1980s, comprised two main strands. The national and Christian-conservative would be represented, since 1987, by the Hungarian Democratic Forum; and the liberal-democratic opposition by the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Alliance of Young Democrats since 1988. All three subjects would transform themselves into political parties in the years to come. The ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party entered in 'round table' negotiations with the opposition in June 1989. Till the year's end, this state-party was dissolved and replaced by its (at least partial) successor – the Hungarian Socialist Party. The formation and (at least the initial) ideological profiling of the future four main Hungarian parties was thus concluded before the (first democratic) March 1990 elections. Hence, their contenders were already differentiated, 'democratic' political subjects. These four parties would maintain their parliamentary presence until 2010.[262] The political profiles of the minor, and in time less and less successful, Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats remained largely consistent over the two decades. Those of the two increasingly dominant parties –

[260] The country was admitted to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1982.
[261] This had to be preceded, of course, by the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the Comecon and the EC one week earlier.
[262] To be sure, the party system was not rigid but evolved throughout the two decades. Most of national elections produced parliamentary representation of other, smaller parties as well.

the Alliance of Young Democrats and the Hungarian Socialist Party – underwent gradual change in the course of their respective efforts aimed at extending support bases on the right and the left sides of the political spectrum. The Young Democrats progressively shifted from liberalism to national and conservative orientation. The Socialists built a social-democratic profile but, striving for a catch-all managerial appeal, gradually de-emphasized ideology.

Compared to other Visegrad countries, the Hungarian peculiarity is that the primary axis of party system structuration, and of formation of governmental coalitions, has been neither a 'former communists vs. anti-communists', nor a socio-economic divide. The labels of political 'right' and 'left' have a distinct meaning in Hungary, as the socio-economic cleavage has been only secondary. It has been overshadowed by the core 'cultural' divide between the liberal, secular and cosmopolitan 'left' (the Socialists and the Free Democrats), on the one hand, and the conservative national and Christian 'right-wing' (the Young Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum), on the other. The key aspect of this 'cultural' divide, the root of the Hungarian party system's bi-polarism, are competing conceptions of Hungarian nation, and projections of its future. This question has been a long-lasting dilemma, ever since the 1920 Trianon Treaty, which mandated the creation of a Hungarian state incongruent with the territory inhabited by Hungarians. Consequently, there has been a very sizeable Hungarian minority living in the neighbouring countries, particularly in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.

The question of 'divided Hungarian nation', and by extension the 'cultural' divide running across the political spectrum, have played a prominent part in Hungarian foreign policy; and the debate and party positions on EU accession and European integration more generally. At the same time, the differences among the four main parties on the above issues have been more a matter of degree and emphasis rather than of conflict. Hungary's new independence, gained with the end of the Warsaw Pact, the Comecon and the USSR, allowed the government of the first post-communist Prime Minister József Antall to formulate these early-1990s foreign policy objectives: 'Euro-Atlantic integration'; good relations with other CEECs; and representation of the interests of (ethnic) Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. With variations in emphasis and proposed 'solutions', these three foreign political objectives were shared by all consecutive government coalitions (Batory 2002, 2). In the course of Hungary's EU accession process, each national elections (1994, 1998, 2002) brought an alteration of governing parties, so that at one period it was either the 'left' or the 'right' pole that ruled. These changes did not notably affect Hungary's resolve and accession

drive. After all, it was the government of the less enthusiastic 'right'-pole which negotiated accession, and kept Hungary among the leading applicants in the process (Ibid, 3).

It was only after the EU entry that more significant changes on the Hungarian political scene started taking place. One of the accession outcomes was a trend of 'growing Euro-skepticism in a significant part of the population'. This trend was soon accompanied by the discreditation of the governing 'left'-wing coalition of the Socialist Party and the Free Democrats, in the aftermath of the former's 2006 post-election scandal. Ensued a period of increased internal instability. The Free Democrats left the coalition in 2008. In 2009, the Socialists handed rule over to an interim government (with their backing), which brought the country to the next regular elections of 2010. These elections saw a landslide victory of the 'right'-wing coalition headed by the Young Democrats; a drastic fall of the Socialists; the elimination of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Free Democrats from the parliament; and the entrance therein of two new parties: the radical-right Jobbik, and the leftist-green Politics Can Be Different (IME 2011a, 3).

7.1 Hungarian Democratic Forum

Magyar Demokrata Forum (MDF) emerged in 1987 as an open formation and later a movement opposed to the communist regime. Having transformed itself into a political party in 1989, it won the 1990 elections, and led the resulting coalition government. It was the main Hungarian right-off-centre party till about the mid-1990s, when its dominant role was taken over by the Fidesz (next subchapter). Several secessions took place from the party. Although it was active until 2010, and took part in the 1998-2002 government, its votes in elections decreased below 10% already in 1998, and never recovered. The MDF profiled itself as a Christian democratic, strongly nationally-oriented conservative party.

The MDF 1989 programme statement[263] described it as an 'independent intellectual-political movement' which, '[r]eflecting the varied character of Hungarian society … is not committed to any ideology' (159). It aimed at 'relieving the people from the remnants of Stalinist tyranny and letting the *rebirth of the nation* happen without a disaster'. This in practical terms meant for it to 'establish a *free and democratic Hungary*, based on the *moral, spiritual, and political values of our nation and Europe*' (159, emphases added). Although

[263] Published in English as 'Program of the Hungarian Democratic Forum', *World Affairs*, vol. 151, no. 4: 159-164.

not explicitly, the party presented a narrative of the time in terms of East-West dichotomy, and of Hungary's belonging to Europe:

> We are at a crossroads. We shall either succeed in stopping moral, cultural and economic rot, or our country will soon be separated from *a united Europe* by a wide gap, and our nation lose contact with *the family of the European peoples* (159, emphases added).

Hungary was in crisis, according to the MDF, and its 'social renewal' was needed. 'Any sacrifice will only be sensible if it contributes towards a soundly functioning market economy and democratic political system' (159). Having pointed to the fact that 'one-third of Hungarian speaking people live outside' Hungary, it stressed the importance of changes to be made in the spheres of culture and education, the two being the 'determinant factors of the future of every society and nation' (161).

In consideration of the changing post-WW2 international order, the party located Hungary, and the region to which it belonged on the continent, as follows:

> We have been linked to our neighbours and to the small and medium-size nations of *the region* in general, through a more or less common history and fate for many centuries. In *this part of the continent*, state borders seldom coincided with national ones. Multi-lingual co-existence subsisted with national oppression and selfishness, as well as with the persecution of minorities. *Hungary is searching for her place between a Western Europe about to be unified and an Eastern Europe about to disintegrate*. We must not give up *our intention to establish … our national existence and European linkage*, whatever the circumstances. Our *final objective* is a *Europe free of military blocs*, and we regard all democratic movements and organizations as our European allies in this endeavour (163, emphases added).

To that end, among the MDF foreign policy objectives were 'developing relations with the neighbouring nations'; and 'making the common interests of small nations the fundament of a more organic regional cooperation and of a voluntary alliance of a higher level'. The party desired that *Hungarians living abroad* 'be given the right of becoming part of the nation and be entitled to citizenship if so wished. They shall share all the advantages of normal citizenship, and suffer no disabilities as a result of *their adverse fate of having been thrown far from the motherland by the waves of history*'. The party stated that Hungary's '*ultimate aim*' was to be '*a neutral state*' (163, emphases added). Finally, it urged 'the establishing of relations with world organizations active in Europe and on other continents' (164).

The MDF 1990 elections manifesto[264] described its beginnings as those of 'a rallying organization for those who espoused ideas ranging from democratic populism to liberalism and Christian democracy, and from environmentalism to local devolution' (1). It made itself since then into a '*democratic, centrist party, committed to Hungarian traditions*'. Stressing

[264] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

that is was 'not an ideological or class party', it rejected ideologies aimed at 'the building of socialism', and 'the collectivism that these imply'; nationalism and chauvinism; 'along with all ideas and philosophies which promote myths and undermine human dignity' (1). It affiliated itself with 'political groupings [which] combine Christian democratic values with social and political centrism, together with the demands of human solidarity and European traditions'. Representing itself by implication as 'Western' (European), the MDF described itself as incorporating the 'Christian-Democratic ideas of the French and West German type', while 'its middle-class liberal values put it close to both parties of the USA' (5).

The party insisted that '*Hungarian foreign policy must be based on national interests, and should be centred on Europe. It must respect the universal norms and values of civilization*'. Emphasizing that '*neutrality is a realistic aim for the future*', it suggested that a '*neutral Hungary can maintain a stable, partner-like, relationship with the Soviet Union*'. Finally, 'Hungary must accept responsibility for the situation of the Hungarian minorities living beyond its borders, and a consistent concern for these nationalities must be part of the overall national strategy' (5, emphases added).

The MDF 1998 manifesto[265] included a section entitled 'Creation of a new Europe'. It discussed the country's 'Euro-Atlantic integration', i.e. accession to the NATO and the EU; and the security, stability and convergence it would bring about. It was an opportunity for the pursuit of national interests, including the improvement of ties with Hungarians living abroad. Hungary was to be well prepared, and not lose sight in accession negotiations of its long-term national interests, and national and cultural identity (13). In the face of nearby conflicts, the MDF eventually opted for Hungary's NATO membership instead of neutrality. It advocated the country's full participation in the European integration process, since most of Hungarian exports were already directed to the EU and its 'associated countries in Europe'. The party undertook to make all efforts necessary to ensure as smooth and speedy an accession process as possible. Only thus would it not be delayed; and a 'dilution' of full, or a 'second-class membership', with lengthy transition periods, prevented (13). According to the party, Hungarian *foreign policy had to be independent, and primarily protect national interests, including those of Hungarians living abroad*. The country's *small size and economic openness* called for a strong diplomacy in the competitive world (IV.26). The country was to further its relations with the CEECs, including the Baltics and the Balkans,

[265] Available from http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/Biztons%C3%A1got-a-mindennapoknak-1998.pdf.

with which it had historically much in common, with the aim of supporting the region's development. With the NATO accession approaching, the future government's main tasks would centre on the EU entry. The MDF criticized the then government for its internationalism/cosmopolitanism, which immediately gave in to EU demands. Hungary's foreign policy, 'however small and open it is', had to be an instrument for the pursuit of national interests (IV.26). While it was a mistake to ignore the powers in its environment,

> it is also a *mistake if one does not utilize one's opportunities and simply yields to external forces*. The *real government of the nation has to assume the representation of the common interests against external negotiating parties, and has to, above all, represent the interests of the whole nation* (IV.26, emphases added).

Despite all the difficulties involved, joining the EU was about the country's future, a historic opportunity for Hungary to take part in the progress in Europe. The Union's 'structural transformation' did not present 'a clear picture yet'. 'For this reason, instead of setting the date for accession, the main emphasis of the efforts is on getting to know the conditions and the adaptability of the country' (IV.26). The MDF saw 'collaboration and joint action of the invited and candidate countries to join the NATO and the EU' as a means of effective support for their accession: 'It is also in *the countries' interest that the neighbouring countries will also be part of the integration* – even if with a delay' (IV.26, emphasis added). This directly related to the question of Hungarians living abroad, where the MDF objective was to

> take the European political power relations and situation into consideration, and *integrate the cross-border Hungarian communities and their territories in the uniting Europe*; and maintain and secure the ethnic structure of the Hungarian-inhabited territories, so that the Hungarian communities and their members will be able to find happiness while staying at home. They will be free to maintain their relationships with each other and the Republic of Hungary (IV.27, emphasis added).

The MDF 2002 programme theses[266] stressed its 'value-based', Christian conservative, patriotic and democratic politics (I.02); and that *both European and Hungarian culture were inseparably based on the Christian culture* (XIII.146, emphasis added). Hungary needed a 'prudent *foreign policy that is in harmony with the Hungarian and European traditions*'. Pointing to the necessity of Hungary's concern with Hungarians living abroad, it held: '*This policy shall always serve the interests of the whole nation of Hungary*' (XVI.179). Such a policy was established by the MDF-led government since 1990, and had three key tenets:

> *József Antall and his government* made the matter of *Hungarian communities living in foreign countries* an unmovable foundation stone of foreign policy; he started Hungary's *Euro-Atlantic* policy, and the negotiations on joining the NATO and the EU; and he *extended a hand of friendship*

[266] 'Az MDF programjának tézisei a 2002. évi választásokra', available from http://www.datanet.hu/mdf/.

> *to our Central-European neighbours*, and thus called the Visegrad Group to life. In the next cycle, the MDF will continue to work on achieving these three political objectives (XVI.180).

The NATO membership provided a solid ground for Hungarian nation-building, deemed the party, and supported its enlargement to the CEE. Every country had a place there, which adhered to democratic values and respected human and minority rights. It was in this text where the MDF started developing its own 'vision Europe'. The following passage explicates the logic which led to the vision's nation-centred articulation in 2004:

> It cannot be precisely predicted how the EU will operate in 15 years, but it is highly probable that a new country will form in the form of Europe, where decision making will regroup from the national parliaments and governments to the different institutions of the European Union, and to regional and local governments. *The role of nation-states will decrease, but the nations' role will not* – if they are present, if national identity is strong, and if citizens do not turn to a cosmopolitan direction, which will likely have a strong backwind. From the purview of the state of the nation, it is important that the politicians who participate in the accession negotiations think in terms of the nation. *National interests cannot be harmed during the accession negotiations!* (XVI.185).

It was in its 2004 'euromanifesto' where the MDF laid out its 'vision Europe', of the future EU, which it aimed to promote with like-minded centre-right Christian conservative parties (1). It was '*Europe, Union of Values*'. The EU was to be in the future effective, democratic and close to its citizens. It was to be '*not only an economic area*' but '*primarily a political community of nations and citizens*'. The values connecting EU Member States 'with each other and their partners across the world' were 'universal human rights, freedom, democracy, constitutionality, solidarity, justice, equality before the law – between men and women too'. The MDF sought in that Europe '*equality in diversity*'. To that end, it advocated the '*strengthening [of] national, regional, and local cultures* developed in the past centuries'. While this diversity of the Union could make problem-solving more difficult, good decisions would be facilitated by 'democratic and civilized negotiations (1, emphases added).

The MDF's was a vision of '*Europe of nations'*: 'Hungary's thousand-year-old history, unique culture and traditions are values that we are obliged to cherish and introduce to the "Nations Europe"' (5). The elimination of internal borders in the EU made the *old dream of the detached parts of the nation for a peaceful reunification*, in terms of economy, culture, etc., into reality. Yet, they still fell under the jurisdiction of other states. It was thus particularly important that in the future the rights of national minorities are guaranteed at the European level. In the '21st century Europe', discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, cultural origins, religion, or national origin, was unacceptable (5). Exclaiming '*Everybody to Europe!*', the MDF stated:

> By trying to cooperate with both the new members and the old ones, we hope that *the largest political undertaking of the new millennium, the European Union*, will not only be an economic and political partnership, but *a community which guarantees peace, security, well-being, culture, and a valuable life* (5).

The party 2006 elections manifesto sought to keep 'the political heritage of József Antall alive'. He wanted a 'Christian Hungary, because only this will have a future'. The 'Christian values disseminated by the historical churches' aided Hungarians (and their moral life) both in re-building the country after communism, and on its 'difficult and exhausting road to join the Union' (40). The MDF endorsed the ideas of Robert Schuman, and pledged to 'collaborate with the Christian churches and Christian political powers in the 21st century'. That was one of its most important missions (40). Also its three key foreign political goals remained faithful to Antall: EU membership, good neighbourly relations, and Hungarians living abroad. With respect to Hungarians abroad, the members of the 'Hungarian cultural nation' (42), the future government was to work vigorously to further enhance their autonomy on the basis of subsidiarity, self-governance, and the EU's regional policies (41).

Arguably in reflection of the responses by the neighbouring countries with respect to the above goals concerning Hungarians abroad, the party declared: 'We do not think of any state as our enemy, and we will also do everything so that no other state will think of us as its enemy'. The MDF expressed its hope 'that *more neighbouring countries will become members of the European and Atlantic organisations*' (43, emphasis added). Speaking of the NATO, it supported its enlargement to all the states in Hungary's neighbourhood, and the region (undefined), who are committed to democracy, human and minority rights (41).

Finally, the MDF 2009 'euromanifesto' called for a Europe free of unnecessary rules, and denounced the 'illusion of an all-powerful state'. It regretted that '[u]nfortunately many populist and anti-market forces' will enter the EP that 'will interfere with *the real objective of the European Community: the common and free market*' (15, emphasis added). This suggests a change in the MDF stress in construing the EU. Its one elected MEP left Christian Democrats in the EP, and joined instead the fraction of conservatives and reformists.

To conclude, the MDF did not explicitly narrate Hungary's 'return to Europe'. Most probably with the idea of Central Europe in mind, it located Hungary and the region on the continent it inhabits, 'between a Western Europe about to be unified and an Eastern Europe about to disintegrate'. In the early MDF texts, Europe designated a continent divided in three parts (Western – Central/in-between – Eastern), but was, at the same time, a shorthand sign for Western Europe. It was in the latter sense that the party insisted that Hungary's foreign

policy should be ‘centred on Europe’. On this understanding, (Western) Europe was part of ‘the West’, characterized by ‘its universal norms and values of civilization’; freedom; democratic political system; a ‘soundly functioning market economy’; as well as the principle of national independence. At the same time, (Western) Europe meant a ‘united Europe’, a ‘family of the European peoples’. It was on the basis of combining these two meanings of Western Europe that the party equated Hungary’s ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’ with the ‘creation of a new Europe’: the unification project, started in Western Europe, was to unite the continent into a new ‘all-Europe’, based on Western values and principles.

Omnipresent in the party texts was its persistent emphasis on the Hungarian (cultural) nation, one third of which lived outside Hungary, in the neighbouring countries. In 1989, it spoke of the ‘rebirth of the nation’. Elsewhere it saw NATO membership as a ‘solid basis’ for Hungarian nation-building. Almost all the party statements on foreign policy were directly related to the pursuit of national interests (including those of Hungarians abroad), and the protection and promotion of Hungarian national and cultural identity. It denounced the internationalism/cosmopolitanism of its ruling governmental opponents for failing in this regard, and succumbing to external pressures in negotiating EU accession. Still, the party’s concern with the nation did not translate into its opposition to the EU/integration project. To the contrary, it saw in it a means to ‘integrate the cross-border Hungarian communities and their territories in the uniting Europe’. The elimination of internal borders was to peacefully reunite the divided nation. The EU also provided the framework for autonomy of Hungarian minorities abroad. The same considerations led the party to stressing not only good friendly relations with Hungary’s neighbours, but also its desire that they also become members of the ‘European and Atlantic organizations’. That would guarantee their compliance with the requirements of these organizations in terms of democracy, human and minority rights. The party deemed that it was in Hungary’s interest, as of any country in the region, that its neighbouring countries ‘will also be part of the integration – even with a delay’. On the other hand, it was more explicit on the expansion of the NATO, where every CEEC had a place.

The MDF devoted very little space to the construction of the EU as such, and when it did, it was with respect to the economy. It refused socialist and collectivist projects, anything that distorts the real objective of the European Community: ‘*the common and free market*’. In all other respects, the EU was subordinated by the party to its construction of Europe. Hence, its ‘vision Europe’ determined how it envisioned the EU’s future. It foresaw a development on the continent where, on the basis of the current EU, ‘a new country will

form in the form of Europe', where nation-states would be weakened but nations would not. That was the fundamental reason why Hungarians were to keep defending and promoting their strong national identity and culture. Thus, it appears, the Hungarian nation would not just be reunited and preserved, but even strengthened, provided it would not turn in 'a cosmopolitan direction'. The MDF 'vision Europe' was '*Europe of nations*', a '*union of values*'. It would be not only an economic area, but '*primarily a political community of nations and citizens*'. That community would share the values of universal human rights, freedom, democracy, constitutionality, solidarity, justice, equality before the law and of men and women. It would be a Europe of 'equality in diversity', where national, regional and local cultures are cherished and flourish; where the rights of national minorities are guaranteed at the European level; and which is, economy-wise, free of unnecessary rules.

In a peculiar blend of Models 1 and 2, the MDF constructed the EU *qua* European integration/unification as 'the largest political undertaking of the new millennium'. It was the formation and expansion of a '*Europe of nations*' *with new common political superstructure*, a '*community* which guarantees peace, security, well-being, culture and valuable life'. This was the 'new Europe' to encompass all of Europe, as the exclamation 'Everybody to Europe!' suggested. The MDF vision of the future of the EU/integration project was thus a vision of the future of Europe: what it projected to be Europe was to determine the EU's expansion. Yet, it was precisely here where it drew the limits of Europe and of the envisioned community: Europe was Christian, and so the future community of nations would have to be as well. What emerges, in the end, from the party representation of the EU and its enlargement, is once again *a Model 3 reversed equivalence 'EUasEurope'*: *what it constructed to be (Christian) Europe determined the limits of EU enlargement*.

Accordingly, the MDF articulated a strong and principled opposition to Turkey's membership already in 2004. In a formal statement, the party presidium aligned its position with that of other Christian Democrats, and opted for Turkey's possible 'special status', promoted by the German CDU (Batory 2006, 108). The party expressed doubts over Turkey's secularism, which was, on its view, enforced by non-democratic means; and produced 'nothing more than a thin veil of modernity on a society that is still governed by Islamic laws and values, including the subordinate situation of women'. Relatedly, it also pointed out that the Turkish government was led by an 'Islamic party organised on religious grounds'. It appears that the MDF ascribed much of the cultural difference between Turkey and Europe to Islam. Its 2004 statement referred to the former Pope Joseph Ratzinger's

'alert' to that Turkey's 'whole existence contradicts Europe'; and that the country's tying with 'a community based on common Christian roots and cultural heritage in Europe – would be a grave mistake' (as quoted and interpreted by Batory 2006, 109-110).

7.2 Alliance of Young Democrats (– Hungarian Civic Party)

Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Fidesz) was formed in 1988 by students and young intellectuals as a liberal and anti-communist movement. In contrast to the MDF, its demands for Hungary's democratization were more radical. It joined the Liberal International in 1992, and transformed itself into a political party in 1993. Having elected Viktor Orbán its president in 1993, and in the face of its 1994 electoral non-success, the Fidesz commenced its 'conservative turn'. Supplanting its initial liberal and cosmopolitan orientation, it gradually made itself into a centre (economy-wise) – right (culture-wise), Christian and nationally-oriented conservative party. As part of its gradual turn to conservatism and the nation, the party extended its name to Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt (Hungarian Civic Party) in 1995; and in 2000 changed its EP affiliation from the ALDE to the EPP. Since about the mid-1990s, the Fidesz has been the dominant right-off-centre Hungarian party, and the primary opponent of Socialists (and Liberals) who ruled the country for most of the two decades. After governing Hungary between 1998 and 2002, the Fidesz remained in opposition till 2010, and furthered its conservative and national orientation.

The Fidesz programmatic documents were particularly rich with respect to Hungary's place in, and 'return' to Europe. Already its 1988 programme statement[267] included passages on this point. Hungary's 'return to Europe' was articulated as its 'return to the West', to which the CECs historically and culturally belonged:

> *Hungary was a European country*, and we were *an integral part of the history and culture of the continent*. Europe continues to exists, but *Yalta tore the Central-European countries, and us, away from the Western civilization*. In spite of our political situation, *our history and culture tie us here*. *We believe that we belong here*: neither armies nor tanks can oblige us to give up this belief. To *re-establish our Europeanness*, we think it is necessary to eliminate the military blocs and to *restore the cultural and political unity of the European civilization*.
>
> Because of our geographic situation and history we are classified as an *East-Central European* country. We have to assume our culture and politics' progressive traditions, and *solidarity with other countries in the region*. We deem *we have to unite and step up as one* to attain the social changes we want. *Our historical experience proves that this is our only chance to reclaim our European status* (1, emphases added).

[267] Available from http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/Politikai-programnyilatkozat-1988.pdf.

Having introduced itself as a liberal party in its 1990 elections manifesto[268], the Fidesz turned to the 'nationality-minority question'. It deemed that till its resolution it would 'raise obstacles to Hungarians in *joining the European nations*' (13). The next Hungarian government, on the basis of national self-determination and minority defence principles, had to do 'everything in favour of the defence of Hungarian minorities living outside the country' (16). 'Return to Europe' was to be the 'particular aim' of Hungary's foreign policy. With a certain reproach aimed at fellow (Western) Europeans, the Fidesz stated:

> The Russian occupation in 1945 and then the *territory distribution decided by the superpowers not only split Europe in two but its Eastern part – including Hungary – had been plunged into an Asian despotic reign*. But after the total failure of this bolshevik system, a historic task has opened ahead of us again: *join Europe* (15, emphases added).

The Fidesz also spelled out an important dimension of that 'return', if not pronounced, then latent in the accounts of many of the hitherto analysed parties: *the reassertion of national sovereignty and independence* in the '*Europe of nations*': 'It has to be one of the main goals of our foreign policy to *regain our sovereignty to* that extent which makes it possible for us to *be equal members of the community of European nations*' (15, emphases added). Important was also the strengthening of friendly relations with those CE nations 'which have the same historical fate'. Hungary's ties with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact were to be reviewed. Soviet troops had to withdraw from Hungary as soon as possible. The country was preferably to leave the Warsaw Pact and declare neutrality (15).

The party 1994 elections manifesto[269] was even more explicit on the 'return to the West' as a 'cultural community'. The 'return' was linked with the EU and NATO accession:

> *Hungary has been part of western civilization for a thousand years*. Under the communists, there was an attempt to tear the country away from this background. With the change of regime, Hungary decided to *return to this cultural community*. Our historical traditions and our present national interests oblige us to strengthen the *western orientation of the country* and to *enhance European and Atlantic cooperation* (4, emphases added).
>
> Our freedom and security is primarily guaranteed, both directly and indirectly, by our joining the European political, economic and military systems … For this reason, the most important foreign policy aim of FIDESZ is *to integrate Hungary with the European Union and NATO as soon as possible* (4).

That was in the interest also of Hungarians living abroad, since 'it is through this step that Hungary can give them her best support to preserve their national identity and to obtain and practise their individual and minority rights' (5).

[268] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[269] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

The Fidesz-MPP 1998 elections manifesto[270] indeed manifested change in emphasis in representing the EU. Its construction comprised 'eurorealist' elements, attributable to the party's own conservative and national turn, and/or the more tangible 'realities' of the accession process. Characteristically, it declared: '*We are citizens of Europe. The citizens of Hungary are European citizens. We have been at home in Europe for a thousand years*'. The EU accession raised an important question: will we be able to reap the opportunities presented by the Union, or will our country be 'marginalized and vulnerable'? The accession negotiations had a 'serious impact' on the society and economy of Hungary, and the lives of its citizens. 'It is expected with good reason from the Hungarian government to *steadily and firmly represent national interests*'. Joining the EU, according to the party, was 'not only a matter of diplomacy, but *primarily about the economy catching up*':

> By joining the NATO, Hungary became a member in the community of the developed Western countries. So *the main aim of the EU negotiations is to put our economic interests into the focus ...* We can *hold our ground in the European competition* only as a thriving community of citizens. *Our goal is not only to join but to catch up with the developed countries* (n.p., emphases added).

In 2002, the Fidesz-MPP produced a specifically EU-focused document entitled 'Europe is our future, Hungary is our home: essay on the European reunification'.[271] This rather lengthy text couched the party reflections on and advocacy of EU accession in terms of globalization, the economy, the nation and culture; while projecting the EU/Europe as an intervening factor. On the basis of these reflections, the party presented its 'vision Europe'. Pervading the text was an underlying discursive prioritization of 'Europe of nations' (as part of the West), and the question of the division of the Hungarian nation. The whole account was, however, in fact made more complex by the concurrent global and economic considerations.

According to the Fidesz-MPP, the EU 'opened itself to Central Europe' partly because it 'recognized its *historical responsibility*'. Its member countries and the USA 'let Central Europe and Hungary be engulfed into the Soviet sphere, and disconnected it from Europe for four decades'. However,

> *Europe often forgot about this responsibility*, partly because of practical and partly because of economic reasons. But the EU was not alone, *the rest of the Western world forgot about it too*. On many occasions we are reproached for lagging behind. However, *we are behind because we were forced to be absent from the community of the European democracies* (15, emphases added).

'Hungary's *accession to the Union is not an arrival. It is a return home to Europe*', since '*the Hungarian nation, Hungarian culture and Hungarian history have always been part of*

[270] See: www.gondola.hu/cikkek/6328-1998__A_Fidesz_-_Magyar_Polgari_Part_valasztasi_programja.html.
[271] Available from http://static.fidesz-eu.dream.hu/media/1/9/3/3/1933.pdf.

Europe' (58, emphases added). The party believed that '*Europe is our future, and Hungary is our home*', and that questions pertaining to the Hungarian nation's future were particularly pertinent at the 'threshold' of EU accession. *Nations whose unity and cohesion are strong* '*will be even stronger after joining the European Union*', wherein they will be able to find 'new, added values' in joint interests and common values (3, emphasis added). 'The force binding the Hungarian nation became prominent' in the aftermath of the two world wars, 'when our borders were redrawn'. In the 20th century, 'both foreign and domestic political powers and authorities' not only did not accept 'the existence of this binding force', they sought to 'dissolve or destroy it with firm hands'. Hence, '*reunification of Europe means [at once] the source and the recognition of the force binding our nation*' (4, emphasis added).

Hungary entered the 'globalized 21st century'. '*Hungary as a nation will develop*' and join the EU in the 21st century. The party 'vision of the future', and of the country's position, revolved around the question of '*how the national, European and global life are connected to or face each other*'. The regime change meant the restoration of civil law; of 'our relationship with Western Europe'; and 'our participation in the Euro-Atlantic integration' (5, emphases added). Acceding the EU was the main aim: 'The central issue of Hungarian foreign policy and – for a time – the economic policy was clearly to join as soon as possible, and its consequences for the objectives of the nation were only secondary' (6). This course was taken in the face of the challenges brought by globalization:

> [T]he *European Union's economic and social structure and values continuously satisfy the expectations of globalisation*, while at the same time *more and more firmly and steadily emphasise the importance of the European and national identity*. The Member States of the EU realised: *without their national identity not only their nations, but the European Union too, will dissolve with globalization* (6, emphases added).

The logic informing this thinking was that 'we will be able to strengthen our national interests, values, and sovereignty, only if we find our place and assume an appropriate position in the system of international powers'. That applied to 'the global world, the EU, and the Euro-Atlantic region, where our role and place is ensured by our NATO membership'. The NATO accession 'provided Hungary with a new and more advantageous position'. Its security guarantees 'provided us … with a chance to elaborate and implement our national plan' (6-7). Although the 1990s 'EU-phoria' might have made us forget about the 'global world', or at least not to feel its presence, the opposite was the case:

> [The] opening to the European Union meant a general and comprehensive political and economic opening, which enabled the global world to conquer and occupy the positions in Hungary it had already occupied in other parts of the world (7).

‘The globalized world’, led by the USA, ‘gained its power not by crossing borders but by conquering – with the help of transnational companies – countries’ domestic economies’. In this sense, ‘we stepped from the 20th century “world-of-countries” era into the 21st century “world-of-companies” era’ (16). In this situation, the EU/Europe offered a promise:

> *Europe’s economic and political development is primarily ensured by strengthening its member countries, and including new countries in the European cooperation*. This is the so-called “world-of countries” thinking, which is *supported by the force that cements nations* (16, emphases added).
>
> Critically speaking: at the beginning of the 21st century, national development is not the tool which helps us join the EU and establish our competitiveness in the world economy; on the contrary: *joining the EU can give us an edge, which can promote the national development* … [T]he *European Union* recognizes the legitimacy of national development, and *knows that it can grow stronger by acknowledging the national identity of its member states* (17, emphases added).

In the face of ‘*Europe’s reunification*’, according to the Fidesz-MPP, Hungarians needed to clearly define their goals; to identify points common with ‘European interests and values’ and, ‘if necessary, to isolate them from common European goals’. Crucially, for Hungarians, *European re/unification was about national reunification*:

> We can conclude that *Hungary is interested in a European unification that ensures the economic and political openness of the Union*, because *this openness creates the opportunity for Hungary to reunite the nation across the borders, and strengthen its coherence in the 21st century* (18, emphases added).
>
> [A]t the beginning of the 21st century, our national goals are not in contrast with the European goals; in fact, they are mostly in harmony. *Our national goals cannot be achieved without the European force of cohesion and the institutional union* [/joint institutions]. Moreover, *this seems like to be the most effective way to strengthen the Hungarian nation* (19, emphases added).

Based on these reflections, the party, with an implied perception of Hungary’s smallness, concluded that as EU member it was to represent Hungarian national interests: ‘we do not have to surrender our national interests, and we do not need to. The nations who protect their interests are valued and appreciated’ in the EU (23). ‘*The nation’s sovereignty is one and indivisible*’, it held; and rejected the ‘*euro-servile* interpretation’ (by its political opponents) of the amendment of the country’s constitution, that would effectively subject it to a superior EU law. On its view, EU accession did not involve a ‘surrender [of] our sovereignty in any extent; we will exercise certain elements of it with the other member states of the EU. With regard to their own sovereignty, they will do the same with us’. The Fidesz-MPP desired the strengthening of both the European and national unification. It took steps aimed at bringing the Hungarians living in neighbouring countries closer to home. Such steps were ‘also part of the “*European integration*”, and … can be built into *the process that we can confidently call the reunification of Europe*’ (23, emphases added). Representing Hungarian interests, ‘*we will … shape the future of Europe with all the other members*’ (18, emphasis added).

The party attributed the idea underlying the EU to Christian-democratic statesmen. Their work was now continued by the EPP, of which the Fidesz-MPP had been a part since 2000 (58). The EU, on its construction,

> is *neither a traditional confederation nor an international organisation*. It is *a community whose citizens* did not simply make one big decision, but after decades of economic, political and other agreements, contracts and decisions, they *became members, creators and beneficiaries of a large economic, then political organisation*. The *Union slowly became the economic, political, social and cultural community* that we will soon be a member of (58, emphases added).

It is noteworthy that, similarly to the MDF, the Fidesz-MPP did not invoke states in its construction, but rather citizens (and, in the above context, nations). It also found it 'indispensable that European citizens have their voice heard and cooperate in the setting of European objectives and making decisions'. In order to ensure the EU's successful and efficient operation, its *federal and intergovernmental elements were to be appropriately balanced*, and the *principle of subsidiarity consistently adhered to* (59). Putting it in the classical Marxist terms, it appears that the Fidesz-MPP (similarly to the MDF) conceived of Europe as a 'base', and of the EU as its 'superstructure'. *The community that the party spoke of with respect to the EU resided in Europe*, a '*Europe of common values*':

> The knowledge and experience of two millennia are condensed in this part of the world. The spiritual heritage of the "old continent" defines our history, our everyday [life], and lays the foundation of our future. *Europe is primarily not a geographical concept, but common values and a strong community of interests. The standards and treaties of the Union are built on these basic European values* (60, emphases added).

The party vision of the EU's future was thus its 'vision Europe': a 'Europe of nations and regions':

> We want to live in a *Europe where the diversity of peoples, cultures and traditions is guaranteed*. We want to live in a *Europe of nations and regions*. In this Europe we will be able to preserve our thousand-years-old nationality, secure our national existence and growth, and unite our nation across the borders (60, emphases added).

The Fidesz-MPP's objective was thus 'the preservation of *a culturally diverse, rich and productive Europe*', since *'[o]nly this kind of Europe will be able to withstand the forces of globalisation destroying cultures*' (60, emphases added).

The Fidesz-MPP 2004 'euromanifesto' was aligned with the programme of the EPP-ED. It declared that *EU enlargement was in Hungarian national interest*. The goal of *peaceful reunification of Hungarians across borders* required that more and more of Hungary's neighbours become EU Member States as soon as possible. It discussed Romania and Bulgaria. Calling for the decoupling of their accession dates, it pointed to the need (especially of Romania where Hungarians reside) that they resolve problems concerning

national minorities. It expressed support for Croatia's accession process to begin as soon as the remaining problems are overcome, and discussed also Turkey (see the last section) (36).

The party 2008 document on foreign policy strategy[272] called for an 'economically strong, competitive and united Europe … able to overcome the challenges of our age'. Representing the interests of the nation, Hungary collaborated with other Member States in the effort to 'establish a Union which strengthens the Member States' cooperation, increases cohesion, and deepens integration' (6). In connection with Hungary's future EU presidency, and the need to form in the EU issue-oriented alliances, the party called for and presented a 'political vision of Europe'; and listed what it saw as national priorities. Their pursuit in the EU would be facilitated through cooperation with like-minded members on particular issues, such as the Visegrad Group. Among these priorities were the *actual* implementation of the principle of the Member States' equality (i.e. the elimination of differences between the 'old' and 'new' members); the maintenance and increased efficiency of the EU cohesion policy (the solidarity principle); a reasonable reform of the common agricultural policy; an enhanced and extended CFSP; or common energy and climate policies (7-9).

The relations of Hungary and the EU with the USA were based on the shared values of freedom, democracy and human rights. Further expansion of 'Euro-Atlantic integration', endorsed by the USA, was of significant importance for the (CEE) region (13). Concern with this region was one of the pillars of Hungarian foreign policy: to maintain and, where necessary, create stability (14). Hungary's EU accession brought a new situation to the CEE. As its neighbours strove for EU membership, *Hungary became a 'bridgehead' to the EU's eastern and southern neighbourhood*. Hungary was also to actively participate in the EU's policy towards the Mediterranean (15). With respect to EU enlargement, the party declared:

> Our aim is to *overcome the division of Europe*. A way to attain this is *our region's* [CEE] *successful and complete integration into the European Union and the NATO*. *This applies to our eastern and southern neighbours*. The accession of these states to the European and Atlantic organisations is an important step towards the stability and stronger democracy in the region (15-16, emphases added).

Ensued a discussion of Croatia and Turkey's (see below) entry prospects, as well as of other CEECs' (16-18). Moreover, in a section on culture, with special emphasis on Hungarians living abroad, the party called for diversity and dialogue 'with regard to the future of the continent and the issues of different religious and ethnic groups living together' (36).

[272] Available from http://static.fidesz.hu/download/210/FideszSzpF1_belivek_148x210.pdf.

Virtually the same points were reiterated in the party 2009 'Europe can do more!' document[273], specifically focused on the EU's CFSP. It stated that while the world changed since the inception of European integration, 'the citizens living *on the continent* have the right to expect from their nations and the EU institutions a solidary cooperation and the protection of the well-being and freedom of Europeans (5, emphasis added). The Fidesz-MPP's aim was a '*more unified and stronger Europe*' in the world. Europe needed to strengthen its economic influence (on the world markets); a clear security strategy; 'a uniform international representation'; suitable institutions; military and civil capacities; and adequate resources. Only as such it would 'preserve its role and influence in the changing world', and avoid its dependence with respect to energy resources and raw materials. 'This is the only way to attain the original objectives of European integration: to ensure citizens' freedom, security and well-being (15, emphasis added).

The party sought the EU's active engagement in the developments in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, a priority shared with other CECs. These countries were in accord also on other priorities: a common energy policy, a single EU policy towards Russia, and the strengthening of the trans-Atlantic partnership (18). The latter was to be a CFSP priority, since the NATO was militarily 'the main security guarantee for the citizens of Europe'. That is why 'an essential interest of the citizens of Europe and Hungary is to maintain the North Atlantic Alliance, and a reasonable extent of American presence in Europe' (24). Trans-Atlantic relations were the first priority area listed in the document. The second was the Western Balkans, the integration of which into the 'Euro-Atlantic community' the party strongly supported (27-31). Turkey and its accession prospects were the third priority area, followed by sections on EU policies towards the East, the South, and the rest of the world.

In conclusion, the Fidesz was particularly articulate on the 'return to Europe' narrative. On its construction, it was a 'return to the West', not only of Hungary but all the CECs who always (historically and culturally) belonged to European/Western civilization. They were torn apart from their home (Europe/'the West') at Yalta, by the decision of others (superpowers). Re-/joining Europe was the party's primary aim since 1988. This 'return' concerned initially the reassertion of national sovereignty and independence in 'Europe of nations' as part of 'the West'. Since 1994, Hungary's return to 'the West' was linked with its membership in the 'Euro-Atlantic community', i.e. 'participation in the Euro-Atlantic

[273] Available from http://static.fidesz.hu/download/es!/Europa_tobbre_kepes!.pdf.

integration' through both the EU and NATO accession. In 1998, the party saw Hungary's NATO membership as the threshold of its belonging to the 'community of developed Western countries'; and projected EU accession as primarily about an economic catch-up with 'developed countries', so as to withstand 'European competition'. The EU opened itself to the CECs, according to the party, partly because it finally acknowledged the historical responsibility for the submission of the region to the Soviets; and so its disconnection from European trends; and the resulting belated development.

Return to Europe/'the West' was constantly linked to the party's increasingly overriding concern with the fate of the nation. This was a crucial element of its discourse: references to Hungarian nation, its identity, culture, interests and objectives persistently suppressed the sign 'state', as the former denoted a collectivity one third of which lived outside Hungary-the-nation-state. The question of the reunification of Hungarians as a cultural nation structured the party's narrative of return to Europe/'the West'. It was the ultimate and overriding objective of Hungary' EU and NATO accession, and of Europe's re/unification. It was the key consideration in the party's advocacy of EU accession. On the Fidesz reading, the EU/future Europe was the best answer to the question of the future of the Hungarian nation, and of its culture, in the face of globalization forces uprooting domestic economies and dissolving nations and their cultures. It offered a promise not only for the preservation of national identity, but for its strengthening and further development.

This was so because the EU/European integration was, on the Fidesz understanding, subordinate to, and thus replicating, the character of the 'Europe of nations'. Joining the EU was about promoting national development. Even there, national sovereignty remained one and indivisible. Its parts were merely shared with fellow Member States. The party at least marginalized, and at most discarded, any independent 'being' of the EU. On its portrayal, the Union was a 'large economic' and then 'political organization'; but primarily an economic, political, social and cultural community of citizens (and nations). Its federal and intergovernmental features were to be appropriately balanced. It was to consistently adhere to the principle of subsidiarity. The EU was constructed as a common institutional 'superstructure' of 'Europe of nations' (the 'base'). The community that the party identified with the EU resided in Europe, the 'old continent'. It saw Europe as 'not primarily a geographical concept' but rather as 'common values and a strong community of interests'. The common values, among which Christianity was not explicitly listed (despite the party's affiliation with Christian-democratic and conservative parties), provided the basis on which

the EU was built. Consequently, the party vision of the EU's future was its 'vision Europe': '*Europe of nations and regions*', where 'the diversity of peoples, cultures and traditions is guaranteed'. Such a Europe would be united, economically strong and competitive, and able to cope with global challenges.

Hungary's EU accession and the continuation of the integration process, that is the project of European re/unification, were the means to reuniting and strengthening the Hungarian nation. Hence, the Union was to remain open to close cooperation with, and an eventual (but preferably timely) enlargement to, its southern and eastern neighbourhood. EU enlargement was thus a Hungarian *national* interest, a means and platform for the peaceful reunification of Hungarians across borders. Consequently, the Fidesz-MPP persistently advocated the enlargement of 'Euro-Atlantic integration', i.e. of the EU and the NATO (and by extension of Western democracy, values and principles, and thus of stability), to the entire CEE region. This was indispensable for the achievement of the ultimate aim: to '*overcome the division of Europe*'. To conclude, the Fidesz-MPP represented EU enlargement as the re/unification of 'Europe of nations'. *Rather than the EU itself, it constructed that Europe to be united as a Model 2 community* based on Western values; and characterized by the endeavour to preserve and foster nations and their identities, as well as the diversity of national, regional (and yet other) cultures on the 'old continent'.

On the other hand, the Fidesz-MPP progressively aligned itself in the EP with Christian democrats. Christianity also played a role in its conception of Europe and the integration project. Neither of the above, however, prompted it to take a solid stand on Turkey's EU membership. Its position remained ambivalent, and that, according to the scattered statements on the matter, for reasons other but cultural/religious difference.

As opposed to its fervent support for enlargement to the Western Balkans, the party largely detached itself from the 'Turkish question'. Its 2004 'euromanifesto' discussed Turkey's possible accession as a 'decades-old question', a 'dilemma' faced by EU politicians. Reflecting debates in Western Europe, and referring to one of the general concerns common among the new EU members, it stated:

> An explicit refusal can hinder the democratic development of Turkey and strengthen Muslim fundamentalism. However, accepting this country with 65 million inhabitants can be a serious economic burden, [and] *can lead to a significant wave of migration, which can have a disadvantageous impact on the historical-cultural identity of the European Union*. Turkey's accession would also mean that the Union's western core and eastern edge would get farther from one another. It would [thus] increase the chance of the emergemence of a "two-speed Europe", a "core-Europe" and a "peripheral-Europe" (37, emphasis added).

Similar ambivalence and detachment emerged from the statements uttered by the party MEPs in 2005. The head of its EP delegation, Pál Schmitt, deemed that Turkey's membership would bring 'enormous, almost insurmountable problems' for the EU. The party thus preferred a special partnership instead. Still, it accepted the decision to commence accession negotiations with Turkey, with a 'hope' that they would take a long time, according to Batory. Another MEP from its ranks, political scientist György Schöpflin, expressed concern over whether Turkey's political system was democratic enough to qualify for EU membership. He referred in this respect to the country's human rights record, position of women, the Kurdish question, or the excessive influence of the military. He believed that the EU's influence might not be enough for sorting out these problems and 'keeping the Turkish government in line' (as quoted and interpreted by Batory 2006, 107-109).

In the party 2009 document on the EU's CFSP, its detachment from the 'Turkish membership question' took the form of an implied spatial *deixis*. Having pointed to (ally) Turkey's importance for Euro-Atlantic security, and its future significance for the EU's energy security (31-32), it declared:

> Hungary strives to have a close relationship with Turkey, and we welcome the reforms undertaken by Ankara. In the EU accession process, we support open-ended negotiations, accepted by [both] Brussels and Ankara. The Union has to support Ankara in fully complying with the accession conditions (32).

So the party virtually distanced itself (and Hungary) from Turkey's accession process as something taking place between Ankara and Brussels. It did so without prejudice, or expressed preference, as to the outcome of the ongoing 'open-ended' accession talks. A certain distant sense of solidarity with Turkey's efforts in the process was also discernible.

7.3 Hungarian Socialist Party

Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) was founded in 1989, on the very same day when the former state-party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP), was dissolved. The MSZP comprised the latter's pro-reformists, and can be thus seen as its (at least partial) successor. Particularly in the 1990s, the MSZP underwent a thorough transformation into a largely 'catch-all' social-democratic party, with relatively pro-market-economy oriented policies. With respect to the main cleavage in the Hungarian party system – the nation and its culture – the MSZP, as the clearly predominant 'left'-of-centre subject throughout the two decades, profiled itself as an opponent of right-wing nationalism. Instead, while not dismissing the national question, it has tended towards liberal and cosmopolitan ideas, and argued for its

resolution through European integration. Together with what became its 'traditional' coalition partner – the Hungarian liberals (SZDSZ), the MSZP governed Hungary for most of the two decades (1994-1998 and 2002-2009/2010). Significant was the party's profound discreditation in the aftermath of the 2006 elections (which it won), when a statement of Ferenc Gyurcsány, its president and the Hungarian Prime Minister, became public in which he admitted that he lied to the voters about the state of the country's economy.

The MSZP programmatic documents were, in comparison with the other three parties covered, rather limited with respect to all the points of interest in this analysis. The simplest explanation of this observation is that the party understanding of the EU/integration process was well-known, and underwent no important change throughout the two decades. It was suggested that the MSZP position on European integration was largely a continuation of the already 'pro-European' and pro-Western/Atlantic course taken by the MSZMP in the late 1980s.[274] Furthermore, since the party was in government for most of the two decades under scrutiny, its positions could be already manifested in its conduct of foreign policy on behalf of the country to such an extent that it saw it dispensable to articulate them in programmatic documents. A further reason seems to have to do with the peculiar structuration of the Hungarian party system, which was strongly polarized and divided into a Fidesz-MPP-dominated national-conservative camp, on the one hand, and a liberal-cosmopolitan one, dominated by the MSZP. In this context, 'an unlikely alliance' developed between the MSZP and the liberal SZDSZ, two opposing parties prior to regime change, for which 'a common European outlook is an important integrating force' (Batory 2002, 5). Agnes Batory suggested that the MSZP's 'pro-European' orientation was reinforced by its coalition with the SZDSZ, the most pro-integrationist Hungarian party. This 'SZDSZ-factor' might have thus contributed to the MSZP pro-federalist positions (Ibid, 6-7). This influence could be important precisely because the MSZP transformation made it more into a pragmatic and technocratic catch-all party, rather than a clearly profiled social-democratic one.[275] Since 1994, it committed itself to the country's modernization and 'catch-up' with the developed Western European countries (Ibid, 6). Finally, some found the MSZP rather content with the

[274] The MSZMP concluded a cooperation agreement with the EC already in September 1988, applied for Hungary's membership to the Council of Europe, and established relations with the EP and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Benda 2000, 43).

[275] Batory in this respect pointed to the dilemma the party faced in 1994, when it 'found itself trapped' between its desired leftist profile and the inability to take steps in the welfare state direction at the time of the country's economic restructuralization. The party eventually chose to 'tone down ideology altogether and rely, instead, on a claim to expertise and managerial competence' (2002, 6).

EU/European integration as it did and would develop. The EU managed to find, it deemed, a model allowing for the preservation of linguistic, national, cultural and religious identities (Benda 2000, 44). At the same time, its reflections on European integration were often cast in cost-benefit terms: the EU and its actions were to be as much as possible congruent with the interests of Hungary, and of other small states more generally (Benda 2002, 231).

The MSZP 1989 programme statement[276] offered a vision of 'democratic socialism' for Hungary, as the developmental path to bring it to the level of modern civilization (II.8). Rather than return to capitalism, Hungary was to seek market economy based on democratic socialism (IV.37). Its 'democratic transition to socialism' (II.11) would involve participatory democracy and other elements of progression to the 'completion' of human freedom (II.9). Calling for the creation of a just international economic order, the party found it necessary to reassess and restructure Hungary's economic relations (and to reform the Comecon), in order for it to be able to catch up with the developed countries (IV.38). To that end, and not to become 'the unskilled workers and poor relatives of the developed Europe, or be squeezed to the periphery as victims of an odd industrial civilization', Hungary was to open itself to the world and modernize (IV.39). The party called for Hungary's independence and ability to represent its interests internationally (IV.40). That involved a balanced relationship with the USSR (IV.41); or the rapprochement of the (reformed) Warsaw Pact and the NATO, for the sake of détente in Europe; but preferably their elimination till the century's end (IV.42). Crucial for the continent's future was that all foreign troops withdraw from European states.

> We wish to contribute to *the reunification of Europe*. *Hungary' development depends primarily on the future of Europe*. The safety of our continent cannot depend on weapons; it should depend on political, economic, and cultural cooperation, and the direct connections and trust between people (IV.44, emphases added).

The MSZP undertook to collaborate with all (but especially left-wing and other proggressivist) democratic forces, 'who have a sense of responsibility for the future of Europe' (IV.46). It also sought the improvement of the situation of Hungarians living beyond state borders, and of their links with their homeland (IV.45).

In 1992, the MSZP presented a programme statement[277] which introduced it as a modern, centre-left social-democratic party (II). Denouncing the then MDF-led government for its authoritarian and dictatorial ambitions, it pointed to the dissatisfaction of many parts

[276] Available from http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/Programnyilatkozat-1989.pdf.
[277] Available from http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/Politikai-Nyilatkozat-1992.pdf.

of Hungarian society with its economic and other policies (I), the lack of social peace and progress; and presented itself as the only alternative (II.) It expressed support for *cooperation among, and political and economic integration of the peoples of Europe*. At the same time, Hungarian foreign policy was to protect and promote national interests and objectives, crucial among which was the reunification of Hungarians (I). Still, unlike its opponents, the party sought such a resolution of the Hungarian minority question that would result from growing cooperation rather than antagonism between Hungary and its neighbours. While the MSZP also found the results of the two world wars unfair to Hungarians, it demanded a declaration by the government renouncing any intention to revise the country's borders. It was instead patiently to contribute to, but if necessary take a strong stance on, the improvement of the rights of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries (III.1).

The party 1994 manifesto[278] was a call for electoral victory, presenting the MSZP as a 'European' alternative to the hitherto MDF-led coalition. It 'has not become the government of freedom', since it 'consistently attacked the institutions of freedom'. 'It has not become the government of the nation, because instead of unity it has led the nation towards ominous division'. '*It has not become a European government, because its policies conjure up ideas which have been antiquated on the larger part of our continent for half a century'*. Finally, '[i]t has not become the government of economic reform but rather that of missed opportunities' (1-2, emphasis added). The MSZP, as a 'good (Western) European', sought to offer the neighbouring countries a 'historical compromise and reconciliation':

> In our foreign policy there is no place for the memories of past grievances, missionary zeal, or ideological considerations. We are ready to participate in discussions and fresh initiatives to establish neighbourly relations. We want to trade, not litigate.
>
> The security and stability of Central and Eastern Europe could be strengthened by the legal international confirmation of national borders and the assertion of ethnic minority rights. It is essential to establish mutual trust, to develop bilateral relations and regional co-operation … We want to promote the full realization of the rights of Hungarian ethnic minorities outside the borders with a firm, calm policy, and have their endeavours for autonomy accepted, in accordance with European norms (20).

The party found it necessary to extend foreign markets for Hungarian products. While stressing the need to restore 'some Eastern European markets that have been lost' (3), it concluded that '[t]he *external sources and markets indispensable to the development of the Hungarian economy can only be guaranteed by Hungary obtaining full membership in the European Union*' (20-21). At the same time, it advocated as necessary 'the building of the

[278] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

relationship between Hungary and NATO', while stating that 'NATO membership is not the only possible guarantee of national security' (21).

The party presented a similarly pragmatic, largely economic and technical account of Hungary's integration efforts in its 1998 elections manifesto.[279] It stated:

> The objective of our national program is for Hungary to start *catching up with the developed countries, to join Europe and the political and economic organisations fundamentally influencing the future of the world*. The difficulty of our task is indicated by the fact that currently the economic performance of Hungary is only one-third of the EU member states' average. There is no magic wand that can help us to quickly catch up. Only thoughtful and consistent work leads to results (10, emphasis added).

The phrase 'to join Europe' suggests a construction of equivalence by the MSZP between the EU and Europe. The party's earlier statements, however, indicated that Europe denoted it its discourse both a continent, which was divided, and, at the same time, the developed countries of Western Europe, with which Hungary was to catch up. This was a construction similar to that of other social-democratic parties already covered, which saw the EU/Western European societal model as the model on whose basis the re/unification of Europe should proceed. The pertinence of this interpretation is solidified by the following paragraph which points to the party's underlying, but not elaborately articulated, 'vision Europe':

> It is the conviction of the Hungarian Socialist Party that we can *enter the Europe of the new millennium while preserving our Hungarian identity and national values. Our national culture, our historical experience, and the talent and intelligence of our citizens, enrich the continent* (11, emphases added).

In the above quotation, the MSZP constructed the 'Europe of the new millennium' as one comprised of nations, which are to retain their identities. This once again calls for the interpretation of its discourse as privileging 'Europe of nations' to the EU.

This reading of the party EU construction is corroborated by the statements from its 2004 'euromanifesto'. The text celebratorily declared that what Hungarians strove for a long time finally happened: 'Hungary is now a member of the *European Union, the community of developed countries*' (1, emphasis added). On the same page, a statement of the then socialist Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy from 1 May 2004 was quoted, stating: '*Hungary has returned to Europe, and has returned to the values it believes to own for a thousand years*' (1). It appears then, that Hungary's EU accession was conceived of by the MSZP as the finalization of its 'return to Europe', the (Western) community of developed countries.

[279] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

Contrasting itself to 'the other parties', the MSZP declared that its representatives 'sincerely believe that *the destiny and future of our country is connected to the destiny and future of Europe*'. Its representatives also 'do not think of the *Union as an organization* which will limit our power', but rather see in it '*an opportunity to have a better and wealthier life*' (2). Not only did the MSZP conceive of the *EU as an organization*, depriving it thus of any independent supranational personality; it spoke of it in terms of the opportunities it provided for Hungary. Its pragmatic concern for the well-being and international standing of the country was strongly emphasized in the following statement from the document, which not only suggests that the party's underlying discourse was that of modernization, but also that its *vision* always was that of a '*borderless and unified Europe*':

> The MSZP has been in favour of *borderless and unified Europe* since the beginning. The socialists, whether as a governing party or in opposition, *disregarding the interests of their own party*, have always served Hungary's accession to the EU. With hard work and resolution, *Hungary managed* in a short time *to get from the political periphery of the EU to the centre of European life*. In 1997 it was the government of the MSZP who brought Hungary to a place where the security of our country is guaranteed, the NATO, and now again it is the MSZP that makes *Hungary a member of the family of modern European nations*. (3)[280]

Hence, the MSZP constructed the EU as a '*family of modern European nations*'. It is thus reasonable to suppose that also on its construction 'Europe of nations' was prioritized.

Having stated that 'Unified Europe facilitates a quick catch-up'; the MSZP claimed to had established '*the conditions for European welfare* by implementing the largest development programme in our history' that secured a 'quick and permanent' improvement of Hungarian economy (11, emphasis added). Representing the *EU as* an '*alliance for the people*', it declared: 'We joined the EU so that all people living in Hungary are able to have a better life'. A 'rich and developing' Hungary, and a 'diverse Europe providing many opportunities and welfare will be a welcoming home!' (13). The MSZP portrayed EU membership as a guarantee of 'our common future'. It presented itself as the most efficient proponent of the interests of Hungary, hence, as the guarantee of its prosperity (15).

The party 2006 elections manifesto[281] set its development programme, and Hungary's EU accession, against the background of globalization. By increasing its competitiveness, Hungary was to 'benefit from the power of globalization':

[280] The following page listing the last-minute successes of the MSZP in accession negotiations showed a picture of the Visegrad Four Prime Ministers joining hands, subtitled 'Back again in the Visegrad Group'.
[281] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

> the time and opportunity have finally come for *Hungarian citizens to join the everyday Europe: European prosperity*. *Thus our nation will be a Western country in terms of the quality of life too*. Hungary is free today. (12-13, emphases added).

Accelerated progress and catch-up, a better performance 'to hold our ground in competition', were to establish Hungary's 'new regional role'. The MSZP sought to 'make Hungary the strongest economy in this region of Europe' (26), its 'economic, logistical and innovation centre' (37). EU enlargement to the CEE region was to enhance the position of Hungarian minorities abroad (26), the main ambition being a '*peaceful reunion of our nation in the frame of the European Union*'. The MSZP's idea of the EU's future basically expressed its satisfaction with its current nature:

> It is our conviction that *the future of European integration should be built on harmonising the interests of the Community and the nations, and on equal chances*. We support the preservation of the successes of the European Community, maintenance of the well-functioning policies, and will also support the indispensable and extensive reforms (37, emphasis added).

The only point on which it expressed any specific position was that '*more Europe does not mean less America*'. Strengthening of the alliance with the USA was a foreign political, security, as well as modernization interest of the country. Hungary's security depended on both the European and trans-Atlantic commitments. Finally, the party declared: 'instead of isolationism and national politics of defiance, we will strive to have a good relationship with all our neighbours and nearby non-EU countries' (38, emphasis added).

The MSZP 2009 'euromanifesto' was largely reduced to a call for immediate measures in order to manage the global economic crisis, and to mitigate its consequences. That was also the key theme of its 2010 elections manifesto.[282] Here, the party presented its account of the last two decades as an 'era of change', during which Hungary has 'come a long way to catch up with the developed countries of Europe' (3):

> Hungary has come a long way. Now we are a sovereign and independent republic. We are a member of the NATO and the EU. We can grasp the opportunities of membership and assert our national interests even in relation to the Hungarians living across the borders. Our borders are opening one by one, which gives us the opportunity to establish cooperation with other regions, and to rebuild the friendships and family connections that once were separated by a border (3).

The time had come, deemed the party, 'to determine the position and role of Hungary in the post-crisis world'. Reiterating its persistent modernization rhetoric, it declared:

> Now again we have a chance to quickly and with even larger steps *get closer to the developed half of Europe*. We can again be in the forefront among the countries of our region. This is the objective of the national modernisation programme, and this is the interest of us all (4, emphasis added).

[282] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

With an underlying sense of Hungary's smallness (and insecurity), the party saw the nation's comprehensive modernization as indispensable for its standing in the developed world as a 'free, open and self-confident country' (4). Hungary's modernization and convergence with the developed countries was to increase its international prestige and shape its positive image abroad (40). Endorsing the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the 'acceleration of European integration' (40), the MSZP conceived of *the EU* as a '*frame for the representation of Hungarian interests*', and a '*means for the reunification of Hungary*'. It further stated: 'Our goal is *to represent European interests in Hungary, and to represent Hungarian interests in Europe*' (39, emphases added). With respect to the EU, the party hoped for a greater accentuation of solidarity among the Member States; and declared that '*in terms of the Union's economic and political integration*' it was '*in favour of both [its] deepening and broadening*'. Its objective was for Hungarians 'to utilize all the opportunities offered by the unified market', and '*to join the inner circle of integration in all areas as soon as possible*' (40, emphases added). It pointed to the need to establish various issue-based alliances in the EU for the pursuit of common interests (40-41). Once again, in relation to the question of Hungarians living abroad, the party stressed the need for good neighbourly relations. Finally, having pointed to Hungary's 'active role in the Union's expansion', it designated '*the stability of the regions east and south of us*' an '*essential national interest*'. Therefore, the MSZP supported '*the catching up and Euro-Atlantic integration of our southern and eastern neighbours*'. The document explicitly mentioned an early accession of Croatia, and of the Western Balkans, upon their satisfaction of membership conditions (40, emphases added).

All in all, in neither of the analysed programmatic documents did the MSZP present an elaborate account on the EU, Europe, or a vision of its future. The following conclusions are thus drawn by putting together the scattered fragments of its conception of both Europe and the EU/integration process. It seems that Europe, inhabited by nations and peoples, was for the party a discursively prior, organizing construct. It was a continent divided in two halves: a modern and developed Western Europe, united in the EU, and the (by implication non-modern and non-developed) post-communist CEE region on its way to join the former. Hungary's 'return to Europe' was, on the party construction, a return to 'the West': the modern civilization, the place of developed countries. On the continent, 'the West' was represented by the Western European countries ('developed Europe') in the process of integration. That was their modern solution to contentions among states and nations. The MSZP saw it as the future solution to Hungarian disputes with neighbouring countries, and

of the issue of Hungarian minorities living abroad. Following the course already set by its party-state predecessor, the party's channelling discourse was that of modernization, of catch-up with the developed (Western) European countries. It seems that it involved a sense of Hungary's backwardness, 'smallness', and a fragile and insecure international position. The modernization paradigm structured all the party texts which were, since the mid-1990s, reduced to an overly pragmatic, technical and economy-focused programme. The party preferences were construed as national interests. Key among them were Hungary's well-being, sovereignty, independence and good international standing: from being the strongest economy in and the new centre of the CEE region, to joining the 'inner circle of integration' in the EU. These were the prerequisites for the pursuit of other national interests.

Joining the EU and (after some hesitation) the NATO was presented as the finalization of Hungary's return to 'the West' and the developed countries in Western Europe. The party spoke of 'joining Europe' as the 'community of developed countries', a 'family of modern European nations'. That was a prospering Europe, integration into which would allow for Hungary's accelerated 'catch-up' and achievement of the level of 'European welfare'. The MSZP constructed EU membership predominantly in economic terms, as a guarantee of Hungarians' future and prosperity. Rather than as organization to limit its power, the EU was portrayed as the framework for Hungary's growth, and the pursuit of national interests; and also the 'means' for a peaceful reunification of Hungarians. The party did not express discontent with the character of the EU/integration process (as it understood it), and the direction in which it evolved. It called for the harmonization of interests of the Community and of the nations, and a reciprocal representation of 'European interests in Hungary' and of 'Hungarian interests in Europe'. It supported both the 'deepening and broadening' of the Union's economic and political integration.

The EU/Western Europe managed to find a model of unification which preserved nations with their cultures and identities. This model was therefore the one on whose basis the MSZP's envisioned modernization and reunification of Europe (and of the Hungarian nation) was to proceed, to eventually become a 'borderless and unified Europe'. In this 'vision Europe' of the new millennium, national identities, cultures, values and historical experience were to be preserved. Albeit never explicitly suggested, the MSZP prioritized in its construction of the EU/European integration an undifferentiated (and preferably modern) 'Europe of nations', which was to be united. The statements related to EU enlargement, found in the analysed texts, were uttered through the prism of national interests. Essential

among them were the reunification of Hungarians, and the stability of neighbouring regions. Hence, the party strongly supported 'the catching up and *Euro-Atlantic integration of our southern and eastern neighbours*'. Noteworthy is the tying of both the NATO and EU memberships together. Overall, the MSZP constructed the EU to keep enlarging as a Model 2 community based on Western values, a family of developed European countries/nations; while stressing that this arrangement allowed for the maintenance of national identities and cultures of its members. The party's pragmatism and an overwhelming economic reading of European integration, as well as its conception of the EU as a framework for the pursuit of national interests, also suggest some Model 1 aspects or its representation of the EU.

In one fashion or another, the MSZP led the rule over Hungary for most of the 2000s. Its position on Turkey's EU accession coincided with that of Hungarian government. On the one hand, '[b]oth coalition partners have been strong supporters of EU accession and a policy of extending the benefits of European integration to countries of political significance to Hungary' (Batory 2006, 102). On the other, until the December 2004 decision on the start of accession talks with Turkey, the government's 'approach' had been rather 'reactive', according to Batory. Hungary had no specific official position on the matter prior to the Commission's October 2004 recommendation. It merely relied on 'a general policy that no country that meets the Copenhagen criteria can be denied membership'. Subsequently, Batory observed, 'the government endorsed EU-level decisions giving Turkey a green light without any apparent reservation, or in fact without any sign that the issue would (or could) be controversial for Hungary'. Prime Minister Gyurcsány reaffirmed Hungary's support during the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister the next year (Ibid, 103-104).

Overall, largely silent on the matter, the Socialists took a 'lacklustre pro-Turkey position'. In December 2004, two party MEPs presented their more differentiated positions. Gyula Hegyi opted for a 'special partnership' with Turkey, presuming that as a member it would become a large competitor for EU funds, and raised a warning that its membership would set 'a dangerous precedent which would then make it difficult to put a stop to further enlargement to Ukraine or even Russia'. Another MEP saw the MSZP support for Turkey's membership as 'conditional on granting territorial autonomy for the Kurds' (as interpreted by Batory 2006, 107). Neither MEP raised a concern relating to Turkey's cultural difference.

7.4 Alliance of Free Democrats – (Hungarian Liberal Party)

With origins in the illegal Democratic Opposition, Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ) emerged in 1988 as a movement of liberals. It gradually transformed itself into a political party radically opposed to the then regime. Having closely lost in the 1990 elections, the SZDSZ was the leading opposition subject to the MDF-led government till 1994. In 1994, it entered into a 'strategic alliance' with, and till 2008 co-formed all the governments led by the MSZP. In the second half of the 1990s, the party's electoral support declined. It oscillated since then between 6-7%.[283] In the 2010 elections, it failed to gather enough support to enter the parliament. Despite its relative electoral weakness, the party had a rather significant influence on government policies. Its political profile was extraordinarily stable throughout the two decades: blending liberal values with the principles of social solidarity. The SZDSZ has been the most vocal subject of the liberal/cosmopolitan pole of the Hungarian party system; located therein, to the extent such a schematization is applicable, on the 'centre-left'. It has been constantly the strongest advocate of European integration; the 'broad notion of Europe' being in its discourse a synonym of modernization (Batory 2002, 6).

The SZDSZ laid out the key tenets and objectives of its programmes already in its 1989 'Transition Programme'.[284] This document's opening statement summarized the party's ultimate objective for Hungary as follows:

> *We want to be part of [that] Europe which in the last two hundred years advanced more than humanity in all its history*. *We want an independent, democratic welfare state* (6, emphases added).

The party declared to 'fight for *Hungary to stay part of Europe – together with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe*' (8, emphasis added). It narrated Hungary's 'return to Europe' as '*the choice of Europe*'. Yet, what 'Europe' in this sense meant was something more specific than the divided continent. 'Europe' was 'the West'. Locating Hungary in the eastern part of a divided Central Europe, it explained:

> *In Central Europe and its eastern half, Europe has always meant Western Europe*. The great historical moments of our region came at those times when catching up with Europe was the political aim. Central Europe has never been united culturally, on the basis of traditions, or politically; and only its certain parts were united economically. *In the past decades, one half of Central Europe entered into a political and economic community with Western Europe, the other half was forced to take a road that avoids Europe*. *Today, Central Europe is the victim of unmanageable political conflicts and bipolar relations*. *These nations will be able to gain their independence only if the military, political, and economic border which divides Europe is dissolved*. As part of this process, we will be able to solve our national and international conflicts.

[283] In 2002, the SZDSZ added to its name the extention '– a Magyar Liberális Párt' (Hungarian Liberal Party).
[284] Available from http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/A-Rendszerv%C3%A1lt%C3%A1s-programja-1989.pdf.

> *Our destiny is common, but our future should be in a spacious and democratic Europe. We can be Europeans only as free citizens* (10, emphases added).[285]

Hence, Europe denoted, on the one hand, a continent comprised of three parts (Western, Central and Eastern), and divided after the WW2 in two halves, with the division line running through Central Europe. 'Europe' was in the party discourse also a sign for Western Europe, and its political, societal and economic model. The goal of 'return to Europe'/'the West' translated into clear transition objectives for Hungary: '*to advance those social processes by which our culture and institutions can be integrated into the culture and institutions of Europe … to change the country into a European country*; and to replace the former principles with a new economy and a policy built on new principles (10, emphases added).

The SZDSZ dismissed all other ('third way', 'Hungarian way', or 'reformed communism') political and economic transition options; as well as illusions of Hungary's mission. Its choice was (Western) Europe, modernization and development:

> Paths that bypass Europe lead to right-wing dictatorships or left-wing totalitarianism. Instead of assuming the European values, an illusion may be born that Hungary has a special mission or that another kind of socialism – different from that in the East – can be realised in the centre of Europe. We reject such attempts which see an aesthetical value in being underdeveloped or attribute to this a unique value. There is no middle way between being developed and underdeveloped (10-11).

Hungarians were a divided nation, held together by language, national culture and history. While concerned with the nation's future, the SZDSZ held that the idea of a pure Hungarian nation was an illusion, just like that of a purely Hungarian Hungary. '*Our Hungarian identity is inclusive*', stated the party and added: 'our national culture and traditions were strong in the past and will always be strong in the future', on par with and open to those of other nations. This inclusive Hungarian identity was to be especially open to '*our home, Europe – modern values of science, art, political structure and technical knowledge*'. A healthy national consciousness was the one, according to the SZDSZ, which is grounded on the 'universal human rights of freedom' (11, emphases added).

The party conceived of the Hungarian nation as one of European peoples, and insisted that none of Hungarian national interests was opposed to 'the Western world'. Hence the main task of Hungarian foreign policy was to *bring the country closer to the developed Western countries*. Hungary's Warsaw Pact membership was the main obstacle to overcome:

[285] Later in the document, the party undertook to promote the dissemination of the idea of democracy in Eastern Europe (59).

> Hungary's belonging to a military and economic union that opposes the West is currently our greatest obstacle in *catching up with Europe*. Hungary did not enter the Warsaw Pact because our citizens wanted to, but because of external pressures (12, emphasis added).

The SZDSZ advocated a negotiated withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. The ultimate objectives were *the independence and neutrality of Hungary* (12), which was to '*step back on the road of European development*' (14).

Economy-wise, there was 'hardly any doubt' that, in order to 'rebuild' its traditional economic links with Europe, Hungary needed 'to *join the Western European integration*', particularly the EEC. That was not seen as a detriment but rather a precondition to building intensive economic links with other dynamically developing regions of the world (31-32, emphasis added). Taking part in the Western European integration processes and acceding the EEC were to allow Hungarian citizens and companies *to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the large European market*. Meanwhile, the party drew attention to the costs and challenges that this would involve, such as: exposure to competition, structural changes, or demanding environmental standards. Likening European integration to globalization, it pointed out that one of the side effects of international integration was the withering of national cultures. Despite these potential setbacks, the party saw now other way of how the country could catch up with the developed 'West', and avoid thus drifting to the 'Third World' – 'the periphery of the international division of labour' (32).

These points were reiterated by the SZDSZ in its 1990 elections manifesto.[286] Here, it outlined its social-liberal outlook, presenting itself as a 'party of freedom and solidarity':

> Following the traditions of European and Hungarian liberalism, we fight for the freedom of the individual, for human and civil rights, for the restriction of state power and for a modern market economy. We also connect ourselves to the traditions of social democracy. We fight for the right of the workers to form independent organizations to defend their interests, and for a society which seeks to secure a dignified life for every individual (1).

This was the path for the country's comprehensive transformation, and for '*Hungary to join with Europe completely*'. There was no other real alternative for Hungary to overcome its backwardness ('by Western standards'): '*progress in Hungary is possible only by rising to Western standards*' (1, emphases added). A free society could only be a society of free individuals; and it was the guiding principle of the freedom of the individual which set the SZDSZ 'apart from socialist or communist collectivism to the left … and national-Christian-conservative collectivism to the right' (2).

[286] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.

The party expressed 'strong solidarity with Hungarians outside Hungary's borders', but, as opposed to national conservatives, rejected 'the dangerous illusion that those borders can be revised'. It saw the solution in taking steps towards such a future where there would be no borders to separate Hungarians; and where 'minority Hungarians abroad' would enjoy their individual and collective rights, including those allowing them to 'cultivate freely their language, culture and historical traditions' (2).

The SZDSZ desired an '*independent and neutral Hungary*'. It called for its multilaterally negotiated withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact 'before the *two military blocs* are actually *dissolved*'and the Soviet troops withdrawn. It sought to develop 'correct relations' with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. The party's real allies were the democratic movements in the region (4, emphases added).

In its 1998 programmatic documents, the SZDSZ maintained its discourse on 'Europe' and Hungary's path therein largely unchanged. Its elections manifesto was characteristically entitled 'For a modern, European Hungary'. Elsewhere, presenting its 'basic principles', it desired a Hungary 'where freedom and solidarity are the most fundamental values, and which is an equal member of *the community of free and democratic European states*'. In yet another document from that year, it conceived of the EU as a '*guarantee of maintaining … the democratic order and the rule of law, deepening market economy, and increasing living standards*' (as quoted in Batory 2001, 20, emphases added).

For the purposes of the present analysis, possibly the most important document produced by the SZDSZ was its 2003 long-term comprehensive programme entitled 'Think Europe'.[287] This was a major programme update, and a reflection on how Hungary can be better prepared 'to successfully join' the EU:

> […] in which ways we can *increase Hungary's competitiveness to stand our ground in joining the EU and facing its challenges*. We recommend considering *what will clearly differentiate us from the other European countries besides the preservation of our traditions and values in the future*. In other words: we should think about *what the modern and European Hungary will be like* (2-3, emphases added).

The programme's two core objectives were '*Europeanness and modernization'*. What 'Europe' stood for and 'Europeanness' denoted was clarified as follows: 'The SZDSZ's commitment to European values and norms means that our aim – and the aim of our programme – is to represent liberal principles and modernisation ideas' (1.4). Hence, what

[287] Available at http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/Gondolkozz-Eur%C3%B3p%C3%A1ban-2003.pdf.

'Europe' stood for, in the party discourse, were Western *liberal (democratic) principles and modernization*. This was explicated in section 1.4.1, entitled simply 'Europeanness':

> The regime change was the promise of Western democracy and civilian world. The process of embourgeoisement in Hungary can be accomplished by joining the EU and introducing a new institutional system. Thus, today it is not the establishment of democracy which is in the centre [of attention], but [instead] the development of a civilization of freedom, and stepping up against the vulnerability of citizens, intolerance, and violations of laws and norms.
>
> *The aim of the regime change* [party] *programme was to break away from an empire*; *the aim of this programme is to enter a federation with free will*. *With the first aim we wanted to establish democracy; with the second we seek to protect it, put it in operation, and to expand it for the sake of improving the prospects of the country in the Union* (1.4.1, emphases added).

Hence, while the objective of transition was Hungary's independence of the Russian/Soviet 'empire', its EU accession was about Hungarians' free choice to become part of a *federation into which the EU would develop*. Yet, as the latter was a free choice of an independent country, *commitment to European values was not to be 'unconditional'*: their domestication 'should lead to better prospects for the country'. The adoption of European law was not to be a 'servile adoption of "foreign regulations"', but rather take such a form 'which *best promotes the competitiveness of the country*' (1.4.1). It appears that the party's endorsement of both the country's 'Europeanization', and of the EU's federal future, was conditioned by their accruing benefits, and desirability for Hungary's European and international standing. The SZDSZ pointed out that in the aftermath of accession there will be people who will not benefit from the advantages of EU membership 'in the first few years'. Still, it deemed that '*the only way for Hungary is to join*'. That was not chiefly because Hungary 'cut a good deal', but rather because it was an integration with a place 'where the roots of our culture can be found'. This 'culture' comprised, on the party construction, 'the traditions that we inherited from the 19th century Hungarian liberalism … and from the 20th century liberal Hungarian progression' (1.4.1). 'Today', it declared, '*Europeanness means modernization*' (1.4.2, emphasis added). The SZDSZ represented itself as that party whose 'value system' is closest to the one 'considered to be standard in most of EU countries' (6.2).

A long and elaborate account of why should Hungary accede the EU, and what was needed for it to be/come an economically competitive and liberal-democratic Western (European) country, was structured by an underlying East-West dichotomy. As stated:

> *The modern history of Hungary is the history of drifting between the West and the East*. It was shaped by powers thinking in terms of Europe and powers withdrawing from Europe. In those years when Hungary was open to accepting European culture, our country was politically and economically stable, and Hungarian culture was richer and more diverse (8., emphasis added).

The SZDSZ demanded a radical regime change because it desired to see 'the political, economic and cultural patterns present in Western democracies' also in Hungary. The ensuing years demonstrated the fragility of democracy and of its institutions in the country; and that was the reason why '*our only way*' *is to join the EU*: '*the community of values*':

> We think that *with this step we will at last drop anchor on the Western side, on the side of freedom, well-being, and tolerance*. That is why we think that it is unworthy to narrowmindedly weigh the momentary advantages and disadvantages of accession: *we want to belong to Europe because we would like to transform Hungary into a European country in every aspect*.
>
> It appears that only the Free Democrats keep in mind that after accession *also we will be shaping Europe*. So, it does matter what we bring with ourselves into this community. We would like to leave behind intolerance, discrimination and carelessness about the nature … they have no place in Europe and thus they have no place in Hungary (8).

This is the manner in which the SZDSZ constructed an equivalence between what it projected to be 'Europe' – the Western liberal-democratic values – and the EU – a community based on and upholding these values. At the same time, it stressed the need to 'prepare our country's citizens to stand their ground' in the EU competition, so that they have an equal chance to reap the benefits of EU membership (8).

EU accession was thus for Hungary not only 'a political and economic act'. It also had 'important cultural consequences' – it was about Hungarians' more comprehensive identification with the 'European'/EU 'norms and ideals'. It was a 'chance to significantly improve society, and with this – besides increasing the financial and political security – the life and culture of the citizens' (9.2.1). Dismissing the accusations of political opponents that the SZDSZ did not care about Hungarian traditions, and merely followed 'foreign ideals and style', the party warned against the strife of the right-wing parties 'to identify Hungarian traditions with national conservatism' (9.2.3). It pointed to the division among political parties (and by extension in Hungarian society) with respect to 'symbolic cultural issues'. The right-wing related to the nation, religion, Christianity, national tradition and racism. The other side embraced multiculturalism, globalization, non-discrimination and tolerance. Not only did the SZDSZ project itself as the 'least ethnocentric', and thus 'culturally the most open' party; and the pioneer of the latter side; it also represented this division as one between 'the East' and 'the West'. On this scheme, the SZDSZ, as the most ardent proponent of the European/EU/Western values, 'has always had a defining role', and was thus itself the most 'western'. On the other hand, the Fidesz-MPP and the MSZP, despite 'significant differences between these parties', represented 'a more "eastern" view', with respect to the importance they attributed to the pace of the 'spreading [in Hungary] of European cultural norms', but

also on many other points. While the MSZP did not in principle question 'either the need to join or the values of the Union', the Fidesz-MPP questioned both and, in an effort to appeal to extreme-right voters, tended 'towards authoritarian ideals rather than the norms of moderate conservative parties'. The SZDSZ and the MSZP diverged on the economy, but on cultural matters their difference was smaller (11.2.3).

The SZDSZ did not worry about Hungarian culture in the EU, that it would 'melt into and disappear in the culture of EU nations'. To the contrary, '[i]t will get stronger – as it always had when our nation chose openness instead of isolation' (9.2.3.1). This was because 'Hungarian culture', posited the party, was an 'alloy' of diverse cultural influences:

> *The European features of Hungarian culture manifest themselves, among other ways, as diverse influences: Turkish, Slavic, German, Romanian, Roma, Jewish, Christian, etc*. Free movement and knowledge of other cultures in the EU will further and accomplish this alloying process (9.2.3.2, emphasis added).

Furthermore, in the EU the 'homogenizing effects' of the unification process were accompanied with the strengthening of regions (9.5.1). The SZDSZ expressed support for further 'regionalization' in the EU, 'irrespective of national borders' where appropriate. Economically strong regions were the key to the EU's competitiveness (9.5.1.1). The party also called for the strengthening of local communities in the EU (9.5.1.2). They were the guarantee of the preservation of the diversity of cultures:

> Since the "national features" and culture have always been shaped and passed on by real human groups and not by an abstract "nation", we should not fear the disappearance of [our] culture. To the contrary, the stronger the small communities maintaining a culture are, the less we have to fear this (9.5.1.3).

The SZDSZ 2004 'euromanifesto' was the Hungarian version of the manifesto of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR). The ELDR 'vision Europe' was one 'based on the fundamental liberal principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, tolerance and solidarity'. Theirs was also a vision of 'a fair, free and open society which harnesses the abilities of each and every one of its citizens to participate fully in society, presenting them with the opportunities to fulfil their potential, free from poverty, ignorance, and discrimination' (1). The ELDR endorsed 'a constitutional settlement for Europe', 'a strong constitution as the basis of democracy' (1). It supported the proposed Constitutional Treaty. It fulfilled the party long-standing objectives 'by clarifying the values, principles, and objectives of the Union, by rationalising its instruments and decision-making procedures, by delimiting its competences and by strengthening its institutions' (3). The ELDR stressed the need for a 'more transparent, democratic and accountable Europe, taking

decisions only on those matters which require European solutions'. It therefore laid emphasis on the strict adherence to the EU's principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (1).

The ELDR 'vision Europe' was that of a '*a united continent based on the principles of liberty, democracy, peace, stability, equality between women and men, market economy, free movement, and the rule of law*'. With respect to enlargement, the EU 'must change and adapt to the challenges' it brings about. '*All European countries that fulfil the Copenhagen criteria should be welcome to join the European Union*'; while '[s]afeguard clauses are a necessary but temporary mechanism to facilitate the integration of new Members in the Union, while maintaining the proper functioning of the Union as a whole' (16, emphases added). The party stressed that

> although the fundamental criteria for joining the EU are non-negotiable, once these have been fulfilled, *there can only be one type of EU membership - namely, full membership*. For this reason, we are in favour of *minimising transitional arrangements upon the accession of new countries* as far as practically possible. ELDR is determined that *new countries should not be treated as second class members of the EU*. At the same time, ELDR defends fully the principle of flexibility … which allows some Member States to proceed with deeper integration (16, emphases added).

Furthermore, the EU was to 'elaborate mechanisms to ensure that old and new member countries alike fulfil their obligations in the area of human rights', since there was a room for improvement for all EU members, old and new (16).

The SZDSZ 2006 elections manifesto[288] expressed views consistent with the preceding documents, including the ELDR manifesto. 'More SZDSZ – more European Hungary', read its motto (178). 'Hungary cannot be successful if the European Union is unsuccessful', deemed the party and concluded: 'so it is our EU policy to harmonize our interests and reach intelligent compromises'. The 'most efficient way' of representing 'our national interests' was making Hungary 'an esteemed member' of the EU. *The EU was to become more federal, Brussels stronger*, and yet '*more subsidiarity and comprehensive deregulation*!'. '*Our goal is once again united Europe*' (181), declared the SZDSZ. It further stressed that the USA was and would remain 'the main guarantor of European security'. Hungary sought excellent bilateral relations with the USA, and promoted thus the strengthening of trans-Atlantic relations.

Finally, the SZDSZ 2010 elections manifesto[289] located the party, and its fellow liberal party-family members in the EP, between the conservative and social-democratic

[288] Available from the database of the Manifesto Project.
[289] Available from http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/%C3%9Ajratervez%C3%A9s-2010.pdf.

party-families therein. The Liberals sought for decades a middle way between the Right and the Left (9). The SZDSZ foreign policy was value-based. Its global vision was an international community based on liberal values. Among them belonged democracy; the rule of law; security; tolerance; and human rights, including the right to self-determination of minorities anywhere in the world; as well as environmental awareness and sustainable development (10). The SZDSZ 'vision Europe' was that of an expanding '*European federal state*'. Supporting thus consistently the deepening of European integration (10), the party expressed its desire that a greater part of Hungarian society become 'committed to the development of *our larger home: Europe*'; and that a '*European attachment*' *finds its* '*room near the national and local elements in Hungarian citizens' identity*' (11, emphases added).

The traditional 19th century nation-state model was no longer able to effectively deal with problems. The solution was to be found in *economic unification and political integration*: the creation of *a secular 'European federal state, a federal Europe'*. This would involve the strengthening of citizen participation in decision-making, and the creation of a European political space (11, emphases added). At the same time, it was not necessary that the community level be strengthened in areas such as common defence policy, immigration policy and a uniform tax policy (12). With respect to EU enlargement, the SZDSZ expressed the following belief, once again articulating a chain of equivalence between the EU and 'Europe', understood as the location and materialization of liberal-democratic Western values: '*The borders of Europe are not set in stone: the European Union has to stay open to enlargement to the countries which satisfy the conditions for accession*' (11, emphasis added). It is worthy to point out the implied subordination of the EU to Europe, the latter of which, as opposed to the SZDSZ's national and conservative opponents, was constructed by the party as Western liberal-democratic values.

To conclude, at the background of the SZDSZ discourse lay continent Europe, divided historically and development-wise (and in terms of what it conceived of as 'cultural values') into a Western, Central and Eastern parts. Post-WW2, this continent was divided (by a multifaceted line running through Central Europe) into the developed and modern Western Europe and the backward region of East-Central and Eastern Europe, submitted to and embraced by the Soviet/Russian empire. The SZDSZ articulated a narrative of 'return to Europe'. It was, in general terms, a return to 'the West'; but designated more immediately a return to Hungary's independence; and on its 'Europeanization'/'Westernization' path. In the party's almost wholly normative discourse, 'Europe' (and 'Europeanness'), on the term's

second and prevalent usage, denoted Western liberal-democratic values and the welfare state societal model. For the entire two decades, the SZDSZ programme was one of Hungary's modernization; development; and 'Europeanization' in the sense of dissemination and adoption of the said 'European cultural values'. 'Europe' was understood, in this sense, as the Western European political, economic, social and 'cultural' model to be emulated. Hungary, together with other CEE nations, was to become part of this Western, modern and developed 'Europe'. Hence, the party's primary long-term objective was to make Hungary into a modern and fully 'European country'. Only thus it could 'step back on the road of European development'. 'Europeanness' meant modernization.

EU entry and membership was the (final) guarantee of the maintenance in Hungary of a democratic order, the rule of law, deepening market economy, and of rising living standards. The party perceived serious deficiencies of Hungarian democracy, and of its institutions; and conceived of Hungary's accession to the EU, 'a community of [Western/European] values', as the finalization of its path to 'the West'. The 'Western side' was the side of freedom, well-being and tolerance. EU membership was thus not just an 'economic and political' act, but involved as well a very significant 'cultural dimension'. It was about Hungarians' comprehensive identification with 'European'/EU norms and ideas. EU membership was an opportunity for Hungary, albeit not free of challenges and potential losses, to accelerate its own development and reap the opportunities provided by the large market; all in order to catch up with the developed Western countries. For that to happen it needed to prepare itself and the citizens for EU competition. The adoption of 'European' values and laws was not to be a servile adoption of foreign rules, but an endeavour aimed at the improvement of Hungary's competitiveness and future prospects.

By acceding the EU, on the party understanding, Hungarians freely decided to become part of a federation into which the EU would develop. Its global vision was one of a liberal international community. Its 'vision Europe' was based on the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, solidarity and tolerance. It was a vision of an *expanding and secular 'European federal state'*. This 'federal Europe' would be a 'minimal state', regulating and taking decisions only there where European solutions are needed. It would be more transparent, democratic and accountable, and strictly adhere to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. It would involve a European political space and a greater citizen participation.

The party was aware that the homogenizing pressures brought about by integration/unification would pose a challenge for the preservation of cultures and their diversity. It did not fear, however, that Hungarian culture would melt and disappear in the EU. To the contrary, it would become stronger and richer for, on the SZDSZ construction, Hungarian culture, just as Hungary, never was exclusively 'Hungarian'. Equally, the idea of a pure Hungarian nation was an illusion. Instead, Hungarian identity was inclusive, and Hungarian culture an alloy of diverse cultural influences. The shapers and bearers of cultures always were small communities rather than an abstract 'nation'. Hence, in a strongly regionalized 'federal Europe', cultures would be maintained by culturally autonomous small communities. Obsolescence of borders, regionalization and cultural autonomy were also to be the solution to the question of the divided Hungarian nation.

With respect to EU enlargement, but also the envisioned 'federal Europe', the SZDSZ goal was a '*once again united Europe*'. *All European countries that satisfied the accession criteria were to be welcome in the EU,* and that on equal terms. While endorsing the model of flexible integration, the SZDSZ and ALDE insisted that there was just one possible type of membership – full membership – and thus that all exceptions had to be of transitory character so as to prevent anything like an inferior second-class membership.

The SZDSZ representation of the EU and of its enlargement was the 'purest' construction of a culture-free (and secular) Model 2 community, based on Western liberal-democratic values, from among all the 19 parties covered. While it also discursively prioritized 'Europe'; to which it subordinated the future of EU enlargement; its construction of 'Europe' was not that of a 'Europe of nations/nation-states', but rather of a set of Western liberal-democratic values, a part of 'the West'. Meanwhile, it built an equivalence between this 'Europe' and the EU, of which it conceived as a community based on and upholding these values. Thus it could declare that '[*t*]*he borders of Europe are not set in stone: the European Union has to stay open to enlargement to the countries which satisfy the conditions for accession*'.

Accordingly, departing from the MSZP 'lacklustre pro-Turkey position' taken by the Hungarian government, the SZDSZ expressly and strongly supported Turkey's EU accession. One of its greatest proponents, the party MEP István Szent-Iványi, argued in December 2004 that the EU had an 'indispensable need' for Turkey (as quoted by Batory 2006, 108). On another occasion, he reportedly posited that 'irrespective of Turkey, the EU

is evolving into a "community of common political objectives" and has already ceased to be exclusively defined by a common past, cultural or religious traditions'. According to him, 'the EU is (or should be) an "open political and economic community that rests on common ideals and objectives, and not a closed club organised along cultural or religious roots' (as quoted and paraphrased by Batory 2006, 110 and 116).

7.5 Country Findings

Despite diverse perspectives and focal points, the Hungarian political elite, represented here by four main political parties, manifested a rather coherent understanding of the EU, its enlargement, and of Hungary's location on the European map. With the MDF and the SZDSZ explicitly locating the country in Central Europe, all parties converged on its belonging to Europe and, more specifically, to that part/region thereof which was backward and in need to either 'return' to (Fidesz-MPP, MSZP and SZDSZ), or to re-connect (MDF) with Western Europe. Hence, the content of their 'return to Europe' narratives was largely similar: it was about Hungary's independence and return to 'the West', finalized with its accession to and membership in the EU and (after some initial hesitation) the NATO. Belonging with uniting Western Europe offered a promise for Hungary and for a peaceful reunification of the divided Hungarian nation. For the MDF and the Fidesz-MPP, this promise rested primarily in the model that Western Europeans developed for the resolution of inter-state conflicts and a peaceful coexistence of and cooperation among nations. While in agreement on this point, for the MSZP and the SZDSZ, discourses of which did not prioritize the cultural Hungarian nation at the expense of Hungary-the-country, the key promise of the West/Western Europe, and of the integration processes therein, was Hungary's comprehensive modernization and development, a catch-up with the developed Western (European) countries. This is not to suggest that the same point was not to be found in the MDF and the Fidesz-MPP discourses. The difference rested in primary emphasis. Significantly, the Hungarian political elite discourses on the EU/integration process, Europe, and their future, are remarkable for their structurally determinant Hungaro-centrism. Each party expressed at some point a certain perception of Hungary's smallness, backwardness, and insecurity. In the face of globalization pressures, and European competition, they were all concerned with Hungary's/Hungarians' international (and European) standing, well-being, national identity and culture. The endeavour to pursue Hungarian national interests was omnipresent in the texts of all the parties except the SZDSZ.

All four parties, with the MSZP in the background and the SZDSZ by implication, superimposed in their discourse constructs of Europe to those of the EU. The MDF, Fidesz-MPP and the SZDSZ understood Europe in highly normative terms. And how they saw Europe was determined by how they conceived of Hungarian nation and its future. This has been the crux of the Hungarian party system's polarization. For the conservative and nationally-oriented MDF and Fidesz-MPP, Hungarians were a nation with unique culture, to be reunified as a result of Europe's re/unification. The MSZP, and most strongly and explicitly the SZDSZ, also conceived of Hungarian nation in terms of culture, but at the same time de-emphasised (MSZP) or expressly rejected (SZDSZ) its essential and unique character. The conservative parties prioritized in their discourse the nation at the expense of the country. Hungary was, on the other hand, the main reference point for the programmes of the principally liberal-cosmopolitan SZDSZ. The MSZP stood somewhere in between, speaking in terms of both Hungary and the nation residing also outside its borders.

All the parties converged on the point that the EU/integration process was about the re/unification of Europe. Hence, that EU (but also NATO) expansion was far from over. The EU was to encompass all of what the parties projected to be Europe. The MDF and the Fidesz-MPP constructed and envisioned the future of Europe as that of 'Europe of nations' and 'Europe of nations and regions' respectively. Depriving it of any independent significance or being, they saw the EU not as an end in itself but rather a means and platform for the pursuit of national goals and interests. They conceived of it as a common institutional 'superstructure', and a certain 'shield' against globalization challenges, which allows for the preservation of national independence, and even the strengthening of national identity and culture. European integration was also the template for the reunification of the Hungarian nation. The MDF saw the EU itself in largely economic terms. On its 'vision Europe', a 'new country in the form of Europe' would emerge in which nation-states but not nations would be weakened. This 'Europe of nations' would be 'primarily a political community of nations and citizens'. It would be a 'union of [Western] values' based on solidarity and equality, committed to the preservation and flourishing of diverse cultures and the rights of national minorities. The Fidesz-MPP went even further in marginalizing the EU into an economic and political organization, a community of citizens and nations which should maintain the balance between its federal and intergovernmental features. This community, however, resided in Europe which was defined in terms of Western political values. The EU's future

corresponded to its 'vision Europe': a united 'Europe of nations and regions' guaranteeing the diversity of peoples, cultures and traditions.

The MSZP has been largely content with the EU's current character and progressive federalization, and supported further deepening of economic and political integration. Yet the EU was in the end about nations and their interests. In its predominantly pragmatic and modernization-centred discourse, it saw the EU, thusly developing, as the means and framework for Hungarians' peaceful reunification, development and prosperity. The ultimate objective of the EU/integration process was to re/unite (an undifferentiated) 'Europe of nations', and the Hungarian nation in the process. It was an appropriate model for reaching the party's envisioned 'borderless and unified Europe' where national identities, cultures and values are preserved.

The SZDSZ's Europe construct was most distinct. Europe was modernization, progress and development. It was the Western European political, economic, social and, most importantly, 'cultural' (i.e. liberal) model to be emulated. The party conceived of the EU as a solidary community based on liberal-democratic values. It envisioned a Europe united on the basis of the Western European values that the EU represents. Its 'vision Europe' was one of an expanding and secular 'European federal state'. It would be minimal, strongly decentralized, and submitted to citizens' democratic control. Cultures in their diversity would be carried over by culturally autonomous local communities.

As aforementioned, the parties' respective understandings of Europe and their visions of its future determined their general position on EU enlargement. Equating, along the lines of the classical official discourse, the EU/European integration with the project of unification of what they constructed to be Europe, the real question for them was not whether or not to enlarge further, but rather when. Answering the latter question with a view to the interests of Hungary/Hungarian nation, they laid greatest emphasis on the speedy accession to both the EU and the NATO of the country's immediate neighbours, and the wider regions to the east and south of Hungary. Regardless of this prioritization, the EU was still to encompass all that they conceived of as Europe. Despite differences in how they envisioned the EU's internal arrangement, the SZDSZ, the MSZP and the Fidesz-MPP represented its enlargement as that of a principally open and culture-free Model 2 community based on Western (liberal-) democratic values. For the MDF, in contrast, Europe was Christian.

Hence, its projection of EU expansion accorded with Model 3 reversed 'EUasEurope': EU enlargement should end there where Christian Europe does.

Among the four parties covered, the minor MDF and SZDSZ developed their respective positions on Turkey's EU membership, congruent with the above indicated Model-constructions, relatively early. Each of them did so with reference to a construct of Europe imposed onto the EU. The MDF construed Europe as Christian and rejected Turkey's entry on grounds of its cultural difference, much of which seemed to emanate from Islam. The SZDSZ, in contrast, representing Europe as a set of acquirable Western liberal-democratic values, expressed strong support for Turkey's EU accession. It explicitly excluded from its conception of the EU and its enlargement any boundary-drawing on the basis of culture and religion.

In contrast, the two main political contenders throughout the two decades under scrutiny, the Fidesz-MPP and the MSZP, failed respectively to present a clear or a somehow justified stance on Turkey's EU membership. Despite having pointed to the role of Christianity for Europe and the integration process, the former party's position on Turkey remained ambiguous. Just like many of its affiliate Christian democratic parties, it preferred a special partnership alternative for Turkey. Its expressed doubts, nonetheless, did not revolve around cultural or religious difference. More importantly, it largely detached itself (and Hungary) from the 'Turkish membership question' and accession process, representing the latter as a business conducted (primarily) between Brussels and Ankara. In the end, the second line – respecting the EU's key decisions – seems to have prevailed. Finally, the MSZP also seems to have subordinated its official position on Turkey to decisions taken at the EU level, maintaining at the same time its general line that 'no country that meets the Copenhagen criteria can be denied membership'. Hence, it took a further unexplained pro-Turkish-membership stance.

Once again, the key finding of the above analysis – that Hungarian political elite differentiated between the EU and Europe – is affirmed and complemented by insights of similarly focused (and broader) national studies. A study conducted within the IME project turned to this issue when discussing the dissemination of 'EUasEurope' equivalence through EU communication strategy documents from the 2000s. Drawing together findings from a number of qualitative and quantitative EU-commissioned studies, it concluded that Hungarians distinguished between an 'almost always' positively perceived Europe, 'a

geographical-cultural-historical entity', and the ambivalently or even negatively perceived EU, 'a political-economic-administrative body' (IME 2011b, 5). The EURONAT also reported that interviewees construed the EU primarily as 'an economic community based on exchange processes and a system of norms that regulate (public) behaviour'. In many respects, the EU was a 'reference group for Hungarians', frequently perceived as 'restricted, prestigious club' into which the country strove to be admitted (2006, 98).

The EURONAT further concluded that the location of the country and of Hungarians on the map of Europe derived from 'the historical processes of nation-formation'. The 20th century constructions of Hungarian national identity shared in common a number of aspects. The first one was a sense of 'being in the centre of Europe (in the geographical sense) but on the edge of Eastern and Western European cultures'. The other common aspects were the perceptions that Hungarians were a 'small nation', considerable part of which resided in neighbouring countries; that Hungary/Hungarian nation fell 'repeatedly into the shadow of great empires, thus forming and preserving national identity in a minority position'; and finally a relatively diminished self-esteem when compared to the nations in the West (2006, 93). The manner in which Hungarians located themselves and Hungary on the European map has been structured by an underlying, hierarchical and culture-connoted East-West binary. They held a positive view of 'the Western part of the continent' and differentiated 'Western Europe from the countries lying east of them'. They located themselves between 'the East' and 'the West', and desired to 'catch up with Western European development', while holding diverging views on the desirable road to achieving this aim. The EURONAT also confirmed the observation of lasting consensus on three main post-communist foreign policy priorities: 'Euro-Atlantic integration', good relations with neighbouring countries, and concern with the situation of Hungarian minorities living in some of them (Ibid, 94).

The 'return to Europe' narrative denoted in Hungary a more general 'return to the West'. In the early 1990s, the 'general expectation' was that 'following the abolishment of the coercive conditions – after the collapse of the Iron Curtain – the country would quickly join the European integration and, consequently, the deficits of modernization would be promptly liquidated'. These steps 'would enable Hungary to become a fully accepted member of the community of the Western democracies' (IME 2011b, 2). Its NATO and EU memberships, i.e. 'Euro-Atlantic integration', was seen as reinforcement of 'the nation's belonging to the West' (EURONAT 2006, 96). The Hungarian public's initial hesitation over NATO membership was overcome by the latter's linkage, forged in mainstream public

integration discourse, to the 'planned and widely expected' EU accession. The underlying presumption was that the NATO entry 'would help legally and symbolically to reconstruct the once existing ties between Hungary and the West', and aid thus EU accession. It was thus 'most often presented as an initial phase in a well-planned series of actions: the first step in Hungary's "return to the West" (Heller and Rényi 2007, 179).[290] Hungarians converged on that 'Euro-Atlantic integration' provided an opportunity for the empowerment and fuller realization of the sovereignty of their 'small nation'. Crucially, this integration was 'not based on sheer geopolitical dominance but rather on the nations' free choice and interest' (EURONAT 2006, 96). It was an expression of independence, and of their ability to choose their own future.

What differentiated Europe in the West (and from the USA) was, from the Hungarian viewpoint, its 'greater cultural and national diversity' (EURONAT 2006, 96). European integration was seen as 'peaceful transformation', mitigating conflicts among nations (Ibid, 95). The EU could help European nations 'overcome some dangerous components of nationalism … while keeping national identity as an important form of social identification' (Ibid, 18). European integration was also projected as a 'new geo-political arrangement', allowing for the resolution of the 'divided Hungarian nation' problem. It was presumed that 'once frontiers disappeared, interaction between kin states and minority populations would become easier, and, [that] the EU would serve as a legal framework for collective rights protection' (IME 2009, 25).

The textual analysis discerned that this linkage between EU membership and a resolution of the 'divided Hungarian nation' problem was probably most prominent in the Fidesz-MPP's integration discourse. It stands out among the four parties covered not only because of its impressive ideological transformation from the initial (radical) youth movement, through a 'social-liberal' party, into a centre-right catch-all party characterized by national and cultural conservatism (Batory 2002, 4). It also gradually made itself into the prime defender of the Hungarian (cultural) nation's interests, and managed to represent Hungary's EU accession as an opportunity for their pursuit and further advancement. On its view, enlarging EU/European integration would allow for Hungarians' peaceful reunification and thus the strengthening of their national and cultural identity. This idea sprang from the party's largely instrumental understanding and vision of the EU as common

[290] The Hungarian elite saw the NATO and EU as based on '[g]eneral human and democratic values'. It equated 'Euro-Atlantic integration' with adopting the 'international community' standards (EURONAT 2006, 164).

(and primarily intergovernmental) superstructure of a 'Europe of nation-states' (Ibid, 5). In 1998, one of its prominent members suggested that Hungary's EU membership was its 'natural claim to harmonize … [the country's] position on the cultural map of Europe with … [its] position in the European economy' (as quoted by Batory 2002, 4-5). His statement suggested not only a difference between the EU and Europe, but also a highly reduced construction of the former.

Finally, Hungarians perceived their country in the EU as 'medium-sized or even small', with a corresponding limited influence when compared with 'the "big players" … expected, and accepted, to take the lead'. Under this perception, Hungary largely abstained from 'strong governmental ambitions to leave a mark on the Union's political agenda'. Outstanding was thus in this respect its assertiveness in promoting Croatia's accession and Ukraine's 'European aspirations', according to Batory (2006, 102-103). Hungary's 'follower stand' characterized also its official position in support of Turkey's EU accession process. Accordingly, at the time of the 2005 commencement of accession negotiations with Turkey, the Hungarian foreign ministry's official declaration on the matter, reflecting rather general EU-level debating points, quite dryly and unimaginatively stated:

> The beginning of the talks is an important political message to the Turkish society, and will reinforce the position of the forces, which are committed to the European perspective. It is in our interest for the largest possible part of the Turkish society to support the efforts of the Turkish government for the furthering of profound democratic reforms, and for the taking over and the practical implementation of the *acquis*. We find it important that the negotiating framework emphasizes the necessity to take into consideration the absorption capacity of the EU (as quoted in Çakır and Gergelová 2010, 117).

Noteworthy is the statement's direct reference to the notion of the EU's 'absorption capacity', otherwise virtually missing from the Visegrad national debates and discourses.

Conclusions

On Enlarging the Enlarged EU

Post-structuralist problematization of what this work schematized as 'EUasEurope' equivalence – a specific yet mouldable interpretative complex or constellation merging the EU's discursive construction with that of Europe – takes the form of its deconstruction through an account of its genealogy. *Where does the equivalence between the EU and Europe come from, how was it discursively constructed?* Chapter 2 identified its origins in the federalist articulation of the integration project, where 'Europe' initially signified the project itself, its envisaged finality, and the nations undertaking 'the construction of Europe'. Analysing high-profile EU-official texts, it discerned that the equivalence was incorporated in the 1970s into the official discursive construction of 'European identity', a notion originally developed in foreign policy context to signify the Member States' unity and 'togetherness'. It was this nodal point of the official 'Europe-building' discourse which both enabled and channelled the transformation, recontextualization and extension of the equation's meaning. As part of the EC/EU cultural action since the 1980s, 'European identity' was recontextualized and its primary meaning shifted, to be remade by the 1990s into a more encompassing and elusive concept, tightly coupled or construed as coterminous with 'common European culture'. Due to their discursive inter-linkage, also 'EUasEurope' underwent recontextualization, culturalization, and expansion in meaning. So it was largely cut off from its original immediate reference to the integration project: 'Europe-the-project' was transformed in the equation into Europe-as-community. With culturalized 'European identity' as its organizing sign, this enhanced 'EUasEurope' merges the EU's discursive construction with that of Europe. Culturalized, 'EUasEurope' in fact reversed its operation. The EU's construction has come to be channelled by that of Europe as cultural space, enabling articulations of Europe-as-community to claim to define the meaning of the Union.

How did this equivalence come to play a role in EU enlargement? The conditions of possibility for the reversed, Europe-bound 'EUasEurope' playing an increasingly prominent role in the process arose with externalization, in the first half of 2000s, of the mounting, largely decentralized and 'democratized' discursive struggle over the meaning and content of the re-politicized 'European identity/culture' concept. Recontextualized 'outside-EU' to revolve around the issues of immigration and further enlargement, 'European identity' took

on the form of 'Europeanness'. Articulations thereof cast 'Others' of culture-bound 'EUasEurope' as 'non-European'. Culturalizing EU enlargement was in fact the most 'successful' of several interrelated strategies deployed by opponents of Turkey's EU entry, voiding its eligibility to accede. This case thus best illustrates *what are the implications of representing EU enlargement as an enlargement of Europe.* Enlargement is a relatively sedimented procedure organizing relations between the EU side and candidates in highly hierarchical fashion. 'Grafting' reversed 'EUasEurope' onto it allowed for presenting 'Europeanness' as a decisive measure of mutual compatibility between candidates and what EU members are like. The equivalence enabled the nationally and otherwise fragmented struggle over the meaning of Europe to bear on the process. EU expansion and membership aspirants can thus become hostage to particularistic conceptions of what Europe is or should be like; and the 'EUasEurope' in turn an instrument for interested abuse, not least by right-wing extremists and populist entrepreneurs.

Having conceptualized enlargement as an inclusion of 'Other' to be incorporated into the Union's new, expanded and transformed 'Self', Chapter 3 hypothesized that it may work to undermine the established ways of projecting the EU and further expansion. Several factors indicated that the hegemonic way of representing the EU/European integration and its relation to Europe – the 'EUasEurope' interpretative complex – may not be shared by post-communist EU members. Entertaining this possibility, the chapter proposed that should it be the case that these new members brought with themselves 'inside-EU' competing or altogether distinct conceptions thereof, the Union's eastern enlargement may have challenged and destabilized the said hegemonic interpretative constellation. The empirical enquiry into *what are the post-communist entrants' understandings of the EU, Europe, and of their relation* covered four Visegrad country-cases between 1990 and 2010. It sought to 'map' the select national discursive spaces, in each case represented by several main political subjects, in order to establish whether the conceptions of the EU/European integration and its relation to Europe found therein concurred with or contested the hegemonic 'EUasEUrope' interpretative complex. Its latter goal was to ascertain how given subject and national understandings related to respective projections of further enlargement.[291]

[291] Admitting the possibility that these conceptions could change in time, e.g. through alignment process referred to as 'Europeanization'; that select political subjects could represent the EU differently in the context of their countries' accession and that of other states'; or that their support for further enlargement could be selective; the question of Turkey's entry served as a 'test case' allowing for identification of such potential discrepancies.

Despite marked disparity of national political elite debates and conflicts over the EU/European integration, Visegrad national conceptions thereof, and of its relation to Europe, were extraordinarily alike, consistent over the entire period under scrutiny. The key empirical finding is the virtual absence in the four national discursive spaces of the ways of knowing of and imagining the EU structured by any sense of 'EUasEurope' equivalence. A positively connoted Europe was differentiated from the more ambivalently or even negatively perceived EU. The two signified different 'things'.[292] All political subjects construed 'Europe of nations/states' as discursively prior to the EU. Their varied conceptions of the former were superimposed to and determined those of the EU, and the projections of its future and enlargement. Rather than as independent entity or imagined community, the EU was portrayed as equivalent with the process of European integration, understood as joint undertaking of European nations and states whose legitimacy derived from its guiding purpose: to re/unify the still divided Europe. The crucial difference between the Visegrad and the hegemonic way of representing the EU was that the former saw its very purpose in advancing and concluding Europe's re/unification rather than in building a community of post-national 'Europeans' with supranational institutions at its centre.[293] The Visegrad political elite saw European integration as the route to 'united Europe' in which nations/countries overcome their historical animosities and prejudices and live together in peace, prosperity, stability and democracy. The EU was thus not meant to be an independent entity or an end in itself. It was seen as the so far most (yet not fully) appropriate means and platform for integration and cooperation of all European nations/countries, still in need of adjustment to reflect the desired arrangement of their mutual relations. Except pro-transition umbrellas, all political subjects articulated a more or less elaborate set of ideas pertaining to re/organization of relations among the nations/states involved, or to jointly setting them on some desired path: 'visions' of uniting/united Europe.

Most content with the Union's internal arrangement, further political integration and progressive federalization were social-democratic/liberal parties except the more nationalist

[292] In all but few cases explicitly referring to Christianity, the Visegrad political elite represented Europe as rather undifferentiated historical, geographical and cultural space/continent inhabited by equal nations, states and, on some (particularly leftist) conceptions, citizens. That Europe was there prior to, and is and will be there independent of the EU/European integration. The EU was, in contrast, largely denied a political meaning independent of Europe of nations and states. It was generally represented as the latter's dependent, geopolitically desirable and economy- and security-oriented, expanding (and so increasingly 'common') political and institutional 'superstructure' in the classical Marxist sense.

[293] Although European peoples' sense of community and mutual solidarity was the ideal and desired goal, this was not the business of EU institutions and their top-down 'Europe-building'. It was a matter of spontaneous, long-term bottom-up process in uniting Europe where nations and national identifications retain primacy.

Slovak SMER-SD.[294] Yet even those Social Democrats favouring progressive federalization sought certain guarantees that it would not aggravate the stark power imbalance in the EU. Neither questioned the importance of national independence, sovereignty, and the diversity of national identities and cultures in the EU. These considerations were the key tenets of centrist and conservative 'visions Europe'. A certain progressive federalization was foreseen and not opposed by the Slovak SDKÚ/-DS, Polish PO and both Hungarian MDF and Fidesz-MPP. Their acceptance of further federalization was nonetheless only partial and 'shallow', as they conditioned it by the maintenance of balance between the EU's federal and intergovernmental features. Crucially, all the examined Visegrad centrist and conservative parties, and in fact all Slovak and Polish political subjects, envisioned that nations and nation-states remain the (more or less sovereign) primary organizing units in 'united Europe' (Slovakia); that it be a 'Europe of motherlands' allowing all members to maintain their identity, specificity and independence (Poland).[295] It may be concluded that except the Hungarian SZDSZ, and to some extent the Czech and Polish Social Democrats, the Visegrad political elite opposed the programme of popular loyalty transfer, of de-nationalization in favour of European 'supranationalization'. Even those political subjects admitting for the nation-state's diminished organizational primacy in 'united Europe' insisted that *European integration must not constrain national independence, or reduce or somehow threaten the diversity of national and other identities, cultures, values and traditions*.

The roots of this *shared strong adherence to the nation and opposition to top-down 'Europe-building'* are best discernible in the shared 'return to Europe' narrative. For the Visegrad societies, it was actually about return to 'the democratic West' after four decades of subjugation to the communist Soviet empire. 'Return to Europe' signified the overcoming of Europe's post-WW2 'artificial' or 'unnatural' division. It was the CEE nations' 'return' to their legitimate place on Europe's geopolitical map. It symbolized their exit from the Soviet/Russian domain and rejoinder/re-connection with the 'family' of free, equal and

[294] The Czech Communists dismissed the EU in its present shape as tainted by transnational capital and neoliberal economic programme. To become the proper platform for reuniting and transforming social relations on the continent, its capitalist nature had to be altered first.

[295] The Hungarian MDF and Fidesz-MPP, and the Polish PO, could at the same time not oppose further federalization because on their 'visions Europe' the EU would merely be an economic and political organization: a common shield against globalization challenges and institutional 'superstructure' of 'Europe of nations (and regions)'. Farthest in reducing the EU's independent political significance went the Slovak KDH, Polish PiS and PSL, and especially the economically neo-liberal Czech ODS.The ODS was the only Visegrad centrist or conservative party to engage in proposing not a nationally but an EU-framed alternative to what it saw as hegemonic socialist and Christian-democratic 'Eurofederalist' project: the EU's partial 'demontage' into a pro-Atlantic, free-market- and nation-state-centred entity open to enlargement to all states that so desire.

democratic nations in 'the West'. Most crucial was in this regard the *recovery of national independence and sovereign statehood*, the *CEE nations' liberation from the dominion of great powers*. It was thus a recovery of their ability to restore and cultivate national identities, to pursue national interests, and to make their own choices, democratically. A vital concern for the Visegrad political elite was that their countries (and all the CEECs) be treated fairly by other European states, as equal partners. 'Return to Europe' was their natural and rightful claim, justifying their demand for Western Europeans' solidarity.[296] They converged on that the EU/European integration was about re/uniting Europe, solidarity with those still left out, and equal treatment and independence of all. So long as Europe's re/unification was far from over, they did not really see a stop to EU expansion as political option. Their support for further enlargement was rather unequivocal. Drawing on their recent (often bitter) experience with complex transformation and inferiority in the accession process, they stressed that all candidates must be treated equally, and presented with fair starting point and unquestioned prospect of eventual membership. From this sprang their principled opposition to setting altogether new conditions for further EU expansion. European integration was, after all, about re/uniting all of Europe, and this had to remain a feasible, attainable goal.

It was on the question of what is Europe that the Visegrad political subjects disagreed. While most constructed it in inclusive fashion, as largely unspecified continent/geopolitical space or a part of 'democratic West' in civilizational and political terms; several conservative parties diverged and distinguished it as Christian. That Europe was somehow grounded in Christianity was an idea shared by the Slovak KDH, HZDS, SDKÚ/-DS; Polish PiS, PSL, PO; and the Hungarian MDF and Fidesz-MPP. Yet only the KDH, HZDS and MDF represented EU enlargement along reversed 'EUasEurope', as that of a Model 3 culturally exclusive community. Hence, while the EU was to keep enlarging to encompass and unite all of Europe, Europe *per se* was culturally differentiated as Christian. Arbitrary constructs of Europe's cultural identity thus determined EU enlargement. However they envisioned future 'united Europe', the rest of the Visegrad political elite converged on representing EU enlargement as that of a principally open, culture-free Model 2 community based on Western political values, and in some cases the values underlying 'European social model'.[297] As

[296] The Polish PiS explicitly stated what many Visegrad political subjects insinuated: that Western Europeans were at least partly responsible for the CEEC's 'eastern predicament'. The latter had thus the moral right to demand solidarity and support from them/the EU.

[297] Ascertaining along which model was enlarging EU represented by the Czech Communists is perplexed by their rather blurry conception of the EU *per se*. As it revolved around geo-economic and geo-political concerns, the nation-state, power distribution and economic redistribution, it most closely approximated Model 1.

regards Turkey, the political elite perceived it as historically and otherwise attached to but not part of what they saw as Europe, as culturally/religiously different. No political subject made Turkey an exceptional case. They all represented EU expansion to it in correspondence with their general Model 2 or 3 representations. Hence, the HZDS and especially KDH and MDF stuck to Model 3 and opposed Turkey's accession as it was not part of Christian Europe. The no-exception-for-Turkey approach is all the more interesting with respect to the conservative Slovak SDKÚ/-DS and Hungarian Fidesz-MPP. Both acknowledged Europe's Christian dimension but neither opposed Turkey's entry on grounds of cultural/religious difference. Remaining political parties expressed support for Turkey's accession regardless of cultural/religious difference, subject to the same conditions applied to other candidates.

EU as Enlarging Political Superstructure of Europe of Nations and their States: An Incipient Alternative Project?

The hegemonic interpretative complex, designated 'EUasEurope' equivalence in this study, was nearly absent in the Visegrad national discursive spaces, in both its initial and culturalized (reversed) sense.[298] Rather than equating Europe and the EU as two 'present', politically significant entities, the Visegrad political elite constructed *a hierarchical relation of correspondence* between them. Their conceptions of Europe, which was discursively prioritized, and its future as 'united Europe', were superimposed to and determined their EU constructs and projections of further enlargement. The EU was more or less explicitly reduced to a political, institutional and regulatory 'superstructure' at service to its component parts. It was denied 'presence' and political significance independent of the Member States. It was in this sense marginalized into an arrangement of their mutual relations and a platform for their mutual cooperation and pursuit of common interests and goals.

What made for such divergent conceptions? To begin with, the Visegrad countries, as all formerly communist CEECs, were until the latter half of the 1980s entirely isolated

Perhaps the most important finding in this context is that also those parties envisioning the EU chiefly as a Model 1 economic, and foreign and security policy-oriented, association of Member States projected its enlargement as that of a Model 2 community. So eventually did the Polish PiS which initially desired the EU to replicate Europe's Christian character but later distinguished them and reduced the former into a Model 1 solidary association of sovereign nation-states. This apparent inconsistency seems to be due to that the referent community for these parties was larger 'democratic West' rather than a European community tied with the EU.

[298] The same applies to the allied 'Europe-building' notion of 'European identity' in its culturalized, community sense. Direct references to it were rather scarce, most commonly by the critics of the concept and programme. Except the Slovak HZDS, KDH and Hungarian MDF equating it with Christianity, the Visegrad political elite equated 'Europeanness' with 'Westernness' construed in developmental, civilizational, (geo)political, security and economic terms. In any case, however, 'European identity/Europeanness' was not meant to represent the bond of 'Europeans' with the EU, as the EU-official 'Europe-building' discourse has had it.

from Western European developments, standing as they did on the opposite side of the Cold War divide. Having acceded the EU only about one and a half decade later, they were not directly exposed to and so largely escaped the EC/EU community- and consciousness-building practices, standing beyond gradual articulation and dissemination of the components of culturalized 'EUasEurope' equivalence. By the time of their accession, top-down 'Europe-building' was already on retreat. The presently hegemonic 'EUasEurope' was thus woven and actively dispersed across EU-related debates and discourses largely in their absence. With respect to their complex 'Europeanization' and exposure to socializing pressures, no significant changes in these conceptions may be reported.[299]

European integration was, on the shared Visegrad view, about a voluntary, peaceful re-ordering of relations among European nations, overcoming past traumas and resentments. Crucially, it was not to overthrow Europe's 'modern' form of political and social organization. Nations and their states were to preserve their primacy, peculiarity, independence and sovereignty in key matters. Diversity of sub-European, particularly national identifications was to be conserved rather than put in jeopardy by top-down 'Europe-building'. Visegrad (if not all CEE) societies manifested a central, intense concern for the maintenance of their only rather recently re/gained national independence and sovereign statehood. The Visegrad political elite preoccupation with them, directly relating to their unabating (though intensity-wise variable) desire to protect and nurture national identities and cultures, arises from certain persisting, deep-seated sentiments.[300] It is from these sentiments, and the resulting foreign political pragmatism if not 'realism', that their ambivalence and caution vis-à-vis Western Europeans and the integration process have sprung. There was widespread concern among the Visegrad political elite, made particularly urgent by 'Eurosceptic' or nationally-oriented forces, that their countries (and the CEECs at large) could be submitted to economic and political control of European powers. This

[299] Most notable changes in political elite discourses took place only after the EU entry. Three parties followed the lead of German Christian Democrats and represented enlarging EU as an exclusive Model 3, Europe- and culture-bound community. Yet in most cases the change was rather in the direction of greater divergence. The period between late accession negotiations and 2010 saw mounting (and not just conservative) criticism of new members' inequity and unfair treatment in the EU; insistence that such discriminatory practices must end; or determination of several parties altogether to 'reduce' the EU's political influence and competences.

[300] Large segments of local political elite and populations narrate their national histories as those in the shadow of powerful neighbours deciding about their future. They perceive Europe's post-WW2 division as historical injustice perpetrated against their will, resulting in their subjugation to the Soviet empire, the key reason of their cultural degradation and overall backwardness. As compared to Western European efforts to shed the burden of nationalism, these societies strove for decades not to overcome but rather to preserve and prevent degradation of their national identities and cultures in the face of practices levelling them (including culture-wise) to the 'model' Soviet communist society.

concern underlay their insistence on the preservation of national independence and equal and fair treatment: 'return to Europe' was for these societies first and foremost about once again making their own choices and no longer being decided about. It combined with perceptions of inferiority in the accession process and of relative weakness as members to make up for the Visegrad societies' so-called 'Euroscepticism': *ambivalence as to the EU's desired character*, and *discontent with the political practice of rather than disapproval of European integration* as such. The Visegrad political elite manifested rather strong resistance to top-down 'Europe-building', an EU-bound cultural and identity action. Even those political subjects which endorsed or accepted further federalization did not envision, or expressly rejected, a community-building tied with the EU. There already was a requisite community either in Europe or the trans-Atlantic 'democratic West', where nations and states held their primacy, and which, on their view, was not co-extensive with or 'owned' by the EU.[301]

The Visegrad political elite understood the EU/European integration to be there for Europe and its peoples, nations and states, and that Europe's re/unification was the very purpose and driving force of the process/project. What started with Franco-German reconciliation was to proceed, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, with inclusion of the CEE. Only thus could be Europe's Yalta division, 'unresolved issues', and the WW2 legacy as such, finally overcome. Hence their shared belief that all the CEECs are entitled to join the EU, and that its current members owe them solidarity. The Visegrad countries' sense of attachment to, and of peer responsibility and care for the CEECs derives from the perception of common CEE historical fate and predicament, and historical, political, social, cultural or ethnic (e.g. Slavic) ties.[302] Absence of such factors in relation to Turkey's possible membership significantly contributed to the question's low priority and salience in the Visegrad countries. National debates on it remained rather detached and domestically 'un-owned'. The countries' expressed support for Turkey's entry derived from their general position on enlargement: the EU must stand to its earlier commitments and obligations and

[301] Some of the more radical opponents of top-down 'Europe-building' feared that building a European superstate, and 'pan-European' identity and consciousness to underpin the EU, would in practice mean nothing else but imposition of the will and identity of the stronger onto the weaker EU members (PiS); or cultivated anxiousness that Brussels may become the new Moscow of the past. For instance in 1998, Mečiar, Slovak Prime Minister till that year, likened the EU to the Soviet bloc. Pointing out that 'Slovaks had already been members of a union created forever with a unified culture', he held that the EU/European integration also preferred a 'universal culture', and so also suppressed national cultures.

[302] This shared idea of CEE 'togetherness' translated into the Visegrad desire for and commitment to regional cooperation, and avoidance of new inalterable and impermeable dividing lines. It made for the countries' activism on behalf of their post-communist fellows' democratization, stability, close relations with and eventually incorporation into 'Euro-Atlantic' structures.

treat all candidates equally. Although virtually all the Visegrad political elite represented Turkey as (historically, (geo)politically or culturally) closely attached to but outside of their imagined Europe, and recognized its cultural/religious difference, these were not the reasons for all but three parties to exclude it from the EU. This study contends that, albeit hardly vigorous, the Visegrad support for Turkey's inclusion, despite the rather strong attachment to traditional (Christian and Catholic) values in countries like Poland or Slovakia, is due to the shared distinction drawn between Europe and the EU, and the attendant conviction that the latter is not to be built, and so differentiated, as a community based on some 'inherent' cultural traits. Diverging thus, except the three Catholic parties, from the hegemonic representation of EU enlargement through the prism of culturalized 'EUasEurope' equivalence, they do not see culture-connoted 'Europeanness' as the qualifier for EU membership. Klaus's argument on the absurdity of representing EU enlargement as if it were an enlargement of Europe characterizes the prevalent understanding of the Visegrad political elite. The EU is European integration whose very purpose is to re/unite Europe. They deny the EU an independent 'presence' and political significance, and consequently resist an EU-bound community-building. Whatever community there did or will emerge with European integration, it is a *community in Europe*, a space of nations and states, *rather than of the EU*. Only in future 'united Europe' can the two possibly become spatially co-extensive.

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The heretofore discussed factors, considerations or concerns underlying the almost consensual Visegrad general conception of the EU/European integration are not specific to Visegrad or Central European societies only. There is thus a reason to suppose that similar understandings and visions thereof are very likely to be shared among post-communist EU members more widely. That they all stand by the pro-enlargement camp in the EU is just one indication. *Has the EU's eastern enlargement,* then, *challenged its hegemonic self-representation as Europe?* Having established that this manner of portraying the EU is structured by the interpretative complex of culturalized 'EUasEurope' equivalence, premised on attributing 'presence' and political significance to both the EU and Europe, and tied since its articulation with the project and programme of building the EU-as-community, the answer is *yes*. Post-communist members, represented in this study by the Visegrad group, brought with themselves 'inside-EU' alternative understandings of the EU/European integration, and visions of its future and ongoing expansion. They conceived of it as a purposeful undertaking of European nations and their states, whose objective is to end

Europe's division. They denied the EU an independent 'presence' and political significance, and so also the claim to speak on behalf of Europe until integration encompasses all of it.[303]

An explanation of the divergence of worldviews of senior EU members, institutions and elite on the one hand, and the post-communist new members on the other, should not be reduced to the lasting conflict over European integration's federal vs. intergovernmental form alone. The so-called 'Euroscepticism' of large (and not just conservative) segments of Visegrad political elite, which has mounted in the aftermath of EU accession, is not an opposition to European integration, and in some cases not even the EU's progressive federalization. It is rather a resistance to the old federalist project's objective to transform European peoples into largely post-national 'Europeans' as subjects of a European federal entity. It is thus an opposition to undermining national independence, identities and cultures which such a 'Europe-building' endeavour inescapably calls for. That this was expected to be the case was implied by what several examined political subjects explicitly stated and the rest in some way insinuated: building a 'thicker', culture-bound community, underpinned by so connoted 'common Europeanness', could be yet another opportunity for the already powerful to further their hegemony in the EU by imposing onto such 'European identity' their own conceptions of what Europe and its culture are or should be like.

This political position should not be simplified and pushed over to one side of the 'Euroenthusiast' vs. 'Eurosceptic' binary conflict, itself biased in favour of the EU-official, federalist integration project. *The EU/European integration* as we have come to know of it *is first and foremost a political project*. Recognizing it as such does not make it any less valuable or desirable but should allow for an open reflection on how has the process in practice unfolded and with what practical objectives in sight. Designating, often with deprecating undertone, all dissident and non-conformist positions, visions and projects simply as 'Eurosceptic' leads to discursive dismissal not only of (the most often exclusivist) populist, hyper-nationalist and hyper-clerical, xenophobic and racist voices, but also of those seeking substantial modification of the process in good faith that it would then not only continue but also better serve its underlying purposes and ideals. Simplifying disapproval of the federalist project in such a fashion thus works to suppress democratic opposition and

[303] Still, it is a question for another research to establish and predict whether their views have been or will be influential enough to effect more substantial change in how the EU and its enlargement are represented to membership aspirants. That this is not as inconceivable as might appear at first sight is suggested by the close correspondence between the 2004 eastern expansion and the retreat, 'inside-EU', of top-down 'Europe-building' efforts aimed at forging 'European identity' and consciousness to underpin the integration project.

prompts some excessive manifestations of 'obscene' discontent. It marginalizes alternative projects by lumping them together with resistance to European integration as such. One such project appears to latently pervade much of the Visegrad political elite conceptions and visions of 'united Europe': the *EU as enlarging political 'superstructure' of Europe of nations and their states*. From the Lacan-enhanced discourse-theoretical perspective, ending appeasement or rather suppression of democratic conflict between different projects of European integration could possibly finally animate popular interest, and evoke more passionate identification with at least some of them. This may indeed be a key step in tackling the Union's persistently lacking democratic legitimacy.

This study sought to shed some light on the political aspect of representing and studying the EU/European integration and its enlargement. Although some of its conclusions on the Visegrad national understandings thereof may be generalizable to all post-communist EU members, it is a matter for further enquiry in other countries to confirm or disprove this expectation, and the interpretation imposed on them by this work. It would also be worthwhile to investigate national conceptions of the EU/European integration in other parts of the EU outside the said 'core Europe': in the so-called 'neutral'; southern; or northern European countries stretching from Ireland (or even Iceland) to Finland. Finally, one could also attempt a more coherent comparison between the disparate conservative and the rather similar liberal/socialist visions of the EU/Europe; particularly with a view to the rather recent discernible conservative turn to hesitation, at the least, over the Union's desired character.

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