

ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE PROGRAMS
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THOUGHT MASTER'S DEGREE
PROGRAM

SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE:
INFINITE NATURE OF AFFECTIONS

Serdar ERDEM

119679003

Assoc. Prof. ZEYNEP TALAY TURNER

İSTANBUL

2022

Spinoza and Nietzsche: Infinite Nature of Affections
Spinoza ve Nietzsche: Duygulanımların Sonsuz Doğası

Serdar Erdem

119679003

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Zeynep Talay Turner

(İmza).....

İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

Jüri Üyesi: Doç. Dr. Ferda Keskin

(İmza).....

İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

Jüri Üyesi: Doç. Dr. Çiğdem Yazıcı

(İmza).....

Üsküdar Üniversitesi

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih: 17.10.2022

Toplam Sayfa Sayısı: 84

Anahtar Kelimeler (Türkçe)

Anahtar Kelimeler (İngilizce)

1) Güç istenci

1) The Will to Power

2) Conatus

2) Conatus

3) Duygulanımların Sonsuz Doğası

3) Infinite Nature of Affections

4) Beden

4) Body

5) Yaşam

5) Life

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I am very grateful to my esteemed thesis advisor, Assoc. Prof. Zeynep Talay Turner, for inspiring me to work on this thesis. Because it was she and her lessons that inspired me to engage more deeply with Nietzsche and Spinoza.

To my family who always supports me,

To my nephew who interrupts me all the time to play game on computer,

And lastly thank to Nietzsche and Spinoza I hope I didn't misunderstand them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
LIST OF DIAGRAMS.....	vi
ABSTRACT	vii
ÖZET.....	viii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1. INFINITE NATURE OF AFFECTIONS	5
2. SPINOZA.....	11
2.1. THE PHENOMENON OF CAUSALITY IN SPINOZA	12
2.2. ABSOLUTE SUBSTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SPINOZA’S PHILOSOPHY	14
2.3. ‘GOD’ AS THE ABSOLUTE SUBSTANCE.....	16
2.4. THE CONCEPT OF ATTRIBUTE IN CONNECTION WITH SUBSTANCE IN SPINOZA.....	20
2.5. MODE AS THE LIMITED EXISTENCE IN SPINOZA.....	23
2.6. UNDERSTANDING OF CONATUS IN THE CONTEXT OF SPINOZA’S PHILOSOPHY.....	30
2.7. AFFIRMATION OF LIFE IN SPINOZA.....	35
3. NIETZSCHE	37
3.1. GENEALOGY.....	41
3.2. CONSCIOUSNESS IN NIETZSCHE	48
3.3. BECOMING AND BEING IN NIETZSCHE.....	51
3.4. NIETZSCHE’S THEORY OF FORCES.....	55

3.5. BODY IN NIETZSCHE	57
3.6. THE WILL TO POWER, ETERNAL RETURN AND CONCEPT OF TIME IN NIETZSCHE	61
3.7. NIETZSCHE’S ETHICS.....	65
CONCLUSION.....	70
REFERENCES.....	74

LIST OF DIAGRAMS

Diagram 3.1.: Relation of concepts in Nietzsche's philosophy.....47

ABSTRACT

We find great differences between the philosophies of Spinoza and Nietzsche. On the one hand, it can be understood why there are such great differences between the philosophy of Spinoza, which builds almost all of his philosophy on the concept of God, and the philosophy of Nietzsche, whose most famous claim is “God is dead”. Or Spinoza’s choice of geometric method as the method of expressing his thoughts, and Nietzsche’s use of a literary and critical language deepens these differences. On the other hand, there is only an inherent orientation in the philosophy of both Spinoza and Nietzsche. And at this point, we begin to see that differences build themselves on similarities. Because the immanent philosophical perspectives of both philosophers overlap to a great extent. In particular, the explanation of the objective world established in the context of the infinite nature of affections and the capture of the finite from the infinite, stemming from the way these relations are established, have great similarities. Therefore, from this point of view, the concepts of ethics and freedom, feelings and experiences, the roles of consciousness and body in these relations, and even the concepts of conatus and the will to power, which are the founding impulses of their immanent philosophies, overlap to a great extent. Because, the fact that the infinite nature of affections plays an active role as a founding element in the philosophies of both philosophers and thus affirms life at the highest possible level, positions these two philosophers very close to each other in terms of interpretation and meaning. In summary, the aim of this thesis is to first focus on the meaning and importance of the infinite nature of affections in terms of affirming life, and then to examine how Spinoza and Nietzsche positioned this idea in their philosophy and in what respect they established a partnership.

Keywords: Infinite Nature of Affections, Life, Body, The Will to Power, Conatus

ÖZET

Spinoza ve Nietzsche felsefeleri arasında büyük farklılıklara rastlarız. Özellikle bir yandan neredeyse tüm felsefesini Tanrı kavramı üzerine inşa eden Spinoza felsefesi ile en meşhur iddiası “Tanrı öldü” olan Nietzsche felsefesinin neden bu kadar büyük farklılıklar barındırdığı sırf buradan hareketle anlaşılabilir. Ya da Spinoza’nın düşüncelerini ifade etme yöntemi olarak geometrik yöntemi seçmesi, Nietzsche’nin ise edebi ve eleştirel bir dil kullanması bu farkları derinleştirir. Öte yandan hem Spinoza hem de Nietzsche felsefesinde sadece içkin bir yönelim vardır. Ve tam da bu noktada farklılıkların kendilerini benzerlikler üzerinden kurduğunu görmeye başlarız. Çünkü iki filozofun da içkin felsefi bakış açıları çok büyük oranda örtüşmektedir. Özellikle duygulanımların sonsuz doğası bağlamında kurulan nesnel dünyanın izahı ve bu ilişkilerin kurulma biçimlerinden kaynaklı sonsuzdan sonlunun yakalanışı çok büyük benzerlikler barındırır. Dolayısıyla buradan da hareketle etik ve özgürlük anlayışları, duygu ve deneyimler, bilinç ve bedenin bu ilişkilerdeki rolleri, hatta içkin felsefelerinin kurucu itkileri olan conatus ve güç istenci kavramları bile çok büyük oranda örtüşmektedir. Çünkü iki filozofun da felsefelerinde duygulanımların sonsuz doğasının kurucu bir unsur olarak etkin rol oynaması ve bu sayede yaşamı olabilecek en üst seviyede olumlaması, bu iki filozofu yorumlama ve anlamlandırma bakımından düşünsel olarak birbirine çok yakın bir yere konumlandırır. Özetle bu tezin amacı öncelikle duygulanımların sonsuz doğasının yaşamı olumlaması açısından anlamı ve önemi üzerinde durmak daha sonrasında da Spinoza ve Nietzsche’nin bu fikri felsefelerinde nasıl konumlandıkları ve hangi açıdan ortaklık kurduklarını incelemektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Duygulanımların Sonsuz Doğası, Yaşam, Beden, Güç İstenci, Conatus

INTRODUCTION

The character Parmenides, whom we encounter in Plato's *Parmenides*, defines being as something that is not in becoming, indivisible, motionless. Zeno of Elea, who was Parmenides' student to support him, put forward some thought experiments to show the paradoxes that can occur if the being is divided indefinitely, still known today as the *Zeno Paradoxes*. These thought experiments were generally aimed at demonstrating the impossibility of motion or the relativity of motion. This thought experiment left a question mark because, theoretically, infinite division seemed possible. Later, some ancient Greek philosophers, especially Democritus, started the atomism movement, which was based on the idea that matter can be divided, but not indefinitely, but finitely. But when Archimedes theorized the idea of infinitesimals with the method of exhaustion in his book *Quadrature of the Parabola*, he also showed the applicability of the theoretical to the objects of experience. When it comes to Aristotle, he claimed that, with a similar method to Archimedes, against Zeno's paradox of the impossibility of motion, when we assume that we divide the distance theoretically, we should actually divide the time indefinitely. (Aristotle, 2021, p.1779). In this way, he showed that movement is possible by processing or interacting in certain ways with the time parameter, which can theoretically be divided into infinity in the same way. Afterwards, although there were different developments, the real rise of the idea of infinitesimals coincided with the 17th century: Newton and Leibniz became the pioneers of great developments in mathematics such as derivatives and integrals. Mathematical developments in this period paralleled the developments in philosophy and caused a paradigm shift intellectually. Particularly, Leibniz's relationship with Spinoza in philosophy and his troubles with Newton in mathematics are good examples of how these two fields affect each other.

Capturing finitude from the relations of these infinitesimals, which are called *Calculus* in mathematics, has a philosophical as well as a scientific aspect since it basically explains the relation between the theoretical idea of infinity and the idea of finitude in experience. Because it actually represents the meeting point of

metaphysics (infinity) and physics (finitude). As we will examine in details later; approaching the idea of infinitesimals from this perspective, Spinoza succeeds in explaining the relationship between 'God and his modus' in his philosophy. It is not accidental that he used the geometric method in his philosophy while doing this. Because the idea of infinitesimals is firstly related to geometry. On the other hand, the most important part of the idea of the infinitesimals is not the idea that the objects of experience consist of infinitely small parts, but that this infinity is in certain proportions relational. For it is this relational ratio that transforms a becoming into an object (being) of experience, that is, makes it finite. In Spinoza's philosophy, Deleuze explains this relational ratio as follows:

“What is this relation? According to what relation of infinitely minute elements can they be said to belong to something? And if I answer the question, here I truly have, I truly have the answer I was looking for. I mean, I will have shown how, under what condition, an infinite set can be said to belong to a finite individuality. According to what relation can infinitely minute things belong to a finite individuality?”

Well, if I respect the letter of Spinoza's texts, Spinoza's response is that this occurs according to a certain relation of movement and rest.” (Deleuze, *Spinoza: The Velocities of Thought* / 12, 1981).

Thus, the idea of the infinitesimals does not make sense on its own. In fact, when taken alone, that is, when we try to make sense of an infinite quality in the world of experience, we encounter paradoxes. Because our mind is only capable of perceiving the limited, or perhaps has a structure that establishes the limitation itself while perceiving it, as we shall see. Therefore, putting the idea of infinitesimals on an existential ground is only possible through relations, or in Spinoza's words, with certain relational ratios. On the other hand, in Nietzsche's philosophy, as we shall see, although we cannot see a structure as systematized as Spinoza's philosophy,

there are approaches that are similar or even the same in some points. Of course, there are deep differences in the philosophies of the two philosophers. Because, first of all, the philosophy of Nietzsche is a philosophy of criticism, even a philosophy of destruction. And he does so with the sensibility of a psychologist. In this sense, we can say that; Nietzsche is the psychologist of social and historical consciousness. And it would not be wrong to say that the hammer he uses while philosophizing with the hammer in *The Twilight of the Idols* is a point of view borrowed from Spinoza. Because as we shall see, according to Nietzsche the concepts of essence, self, morality, values, meanings, truth etc. or, in fact, Western metaphysics in general has been built on the misinterpretation and disregard of life throughout history. On the other hand, when Spinoza reveals the first serious philosophical method that affirms life, this method will turn into the most accurate tool in Nietzsche's hands for tearing the masks and destroying the so-called facts, namely the hammer. That is why Nietzsche expresses his excitement of meeting Spinoza in a letter to Overbeck as follows:

“I am absolutely astonished and quite enraptured! I have a *precursor*, and what a herald he is! I was practically ignorant of Spinoza. That I am now hankering after him was the result of “instinct.” Not only is his over-all objective like mine – to raise knowledge to the mightiest effect – but, in five of main points of his doctrine I find myself. The most abnormal and the loneliest of thinkers is closest to me especially in these things: He denies freedom of will, purposes, a moral world order, whatever is nonegoistic, and evil. Of course, the differences also are tremendous, but they lie more in the difference of age, culture and science. *In summa*: My solitude which, as on very high mountains, often, very often caused me to be short of breath and the oozing of blood, has at least for the time being become the isolation of two. – Strange!” (Nietzsche, *Unpublished Letters*, 2022, p. 121).

Therefore, one of our most important aims in this study is to analyze how the methodological partnership between these two philosophers, the intellectual solidarity, functions as the possibility of affirming life.

In the first part of this study, we will briefly touch on the idea of infinite nature of affections. In this way, in Spinoza and Nietzsche sections; while expressing certain points of view, we will be able to more easily examine at what level the established partnership was established and in what sense it turned into an immanent affirmation philosophy. Then, in the second part, we will deal with Spinoza's philosophy in the context of the infinite nature of affections in general. And doing so, we will mainly examine how this idea emerged in Spinoza's philosophy and how it grounded it. In this sense, we will examine how both God and modes are grounded in Spinoza, on which universal foundations the immanent philosophy is based and how its connection is established. First of all, we will make a start in the light of the concepts of God and causality, and investigate the metaphysical aspect of Spinoza's philosophy, and then move onto the physical aspect of it through the investigation of the concept of *modus*. We will also evaluate some auxiliary and connection concepts from the perspective of infinite relations, and finally we will dwell on the understanding of ethics and the affirmation of life. In the third part, we will evaluate Nietzsche's philosophy in general with the same attitudes and perspectives as in Spinoza. Our task in this section will be more difficult, for as opposed to Spinoza, Nietzsche's philosophy is not that systematic, precisely because he attempts to deconstruct systematic and traditional way of philosophising. Therefore, we will sometimes dwell on his partnership with Spinoza while some other times focus on his differences and see in what sense Nietzsche's philosophy affirms life with the relational coexistence philosophy. We will examine how he deals with concepts such as consciousness, body, meaning and interpretation. Finally, within the framework of this philosophical perspective, we will briefly touch on Nietzsche's understanding of ethics.

1. INFINITE NATURE OF AFFECTIONS

In this section, we will try to analyze the method of the immanent ontology, albeit briefly, before we touch upon how Nietzsche and Spinoza construct or ground their philosophies ontologically. Because, as we shall see, existence in the ontology of Nietzsche and Spinoza is always pluralistic, namely, there is always co-existence. The existent coexists with other existents in the world of existence and thus also turns into one of the constituent elements of the field of existence. On the other hand, only the awareness of this can go beyond the relative perception in the intellectual dimension and actually reach the competence of a much more important perception, namely the bodily relative perception. In this way, the way to affirm life at the highest level can be discovered. Because the level of bodily awareness can be an expression of a rhythm that overlaps with life. And this rhythm is only possible with bodily interactions.

My fundamental investigation in this thesis is the philosophical issue of the encounter and interaction of at least two bodies (affection), as we shall see while discussing Spinoza and latterly as well as Nietzsche in a similar perspective. In Spinoza, we will discover the establishment of a body on the plane of infinite relations, starting from the concept of God. In Nietzsche, on the other hand, we will explore the body, starting from the infinite relations of a specific theory of forces established on the basis of chance. Therefore, it is clear that the main subject of our thesis is eternal relations and bodily encounters. When we examine eternal relations as the existential condition of bodies, it will be seen that bodily interactions ground coexistence rather than being mechanical. Because the effect of at least two bodies on each other should be understood as a mixture of bodies (DELEUZE, 1978)., re-existence and even conditioning their existence, rather than simply leaving a trace. For this very reason, the endless relationships between bodies should be understood as 'affection' as concept of Spinoza with a very similar meaning for Nietzsche's philosophy. On the other hand, while emphasizing the body as both a part and a constituent element of life, it is necessary to evaluate the mind from a Nietzschean point of view, which has shaped our relationship with this world in almost all

understandings throughout history. We need to examine the relationship of the mind with the body, the partnership with life, how we affect and even transform this world as we comprehend it, together with important thinkers. Therefore, we will briefly examine Nietzsche; and Deleuze, who evaluated his philosophy; and Kant, whom they oppose.

Deleuze says; the real activity is not mental but bodily, since the mind itself is a part of body (Like Freud, Nietzsche thinks that consciousness is the region of the ego affected by the external world). (Deleuze, 2002, p. 39). In other words, the world is experienced with a bodily perception rather than a mental one. Because we mentally systematize our common perception of the world, but this effort only functions as a re-creating. (Nietzsche, 1968, p.291). In other words, the main reason for the common perception is because we are bodies in the same form at frequencies that will perceive each other. More precisely, the relative perception of experience of bodily co-existence is the reason of the common perception of this world.

On the other hand, bodily perception, which has an activity and competence far beyond intellectual perception, can reach full perception only if it has the awareness that its existence is conditioned by co-existence. Because the effect of coexistence-totalism in every single body or its relative effect in every body, feeling (affection) is also the explanation of the formational condition of all this coexistence. In other words, there is always a formational parallelism (as Deleuze named in Spinoza philosophy) between the thought and the extension, which requires and conditions each other. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, PROP. VII., p.131). On the other hand, we cannot speak of a complete parallelism between body and mind in Nietzsche. Because, according to Nietzsche, while mental activities function more as reconstructing the world, the body still appears as a bigger mystery. Therefore, if the essential one is the body, it is not just a human body, but all the bodies of coexistence in this world. Nietzsche expresses this understanding in *The Will to Power*:

“Put briefly: perhaps the entire evolution of the spirit is a question of the body; it is the history of the development of a higher body that emerges into our sensibility. The organic is rising to yet higher levels. Our lust for knowledge of nature is a means through which the body desires to perfect itself. Or rather: hundreds of thousands of experiments are made to change the nourishment, the mode of living and of dwelling of the body; consciousness and evaluations in the body, all kinds of pleasure and displeasure, are signs of these changes and experiments. In the long run, it is not a question of man at all: he is to be overcome.” (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 2017, 676., p.1053).

Therefore, Nietzsche criticizes Kant on the phenomenon of knowledge as one of the important mental activities, especially in terms of his claiming that the conditions for obtaining knowledge are a priori. Because according to Kant if conditions are a priori knowledge can not be drawn from experience. So Nietzsche criticizes Kant as follows:

“Kant believes in the fact of knowledge: what he wants is a piece of naivete: knowledge of knowledge! “Knowledge is judgment!” But judgment is a belief that something is thus and thus! And not knowledge!” (Nietzsche, 1968, p.287).

According to Kant's philosophy, our relationship with objects is not based on how we see them, but on how they appear to us. Since the first establishment of the subject-object dualism, the object is an entity that is perceived only by the subject and whose knowledge consists of the subject, while with Kant, the object is moved to a field of existence independent of the subject. Therefore, to the extent that each object appears to the subject, it allows the formation of its representation in the mind of the subject. Of course, this manifestation takes place under certain conditions through our sensibility. And the appearance of an object to us also corresponds to the extent to which our perceptual capacity is affected by an object. Each effect corresponds to an intuition. In this sense according to Kant, when intuition is compared to the imaginary representation of an object (thought) in the

mind -as a measure of influence- it expresses both the first mental activity of knowledge and a more continuous and fluid object representation. So it is not in the limited and particle format as it is in the conceptual dimension. This sensation is actually a presentation and is direct. So we can say that intuition, which is a priori, is a kind of consciousness level. And this level of consciousness is not the constitutive factor of the objects but of the conditions of sensation. As a matter of fact, an object does not take the source of its existence from the subject, but the source of the object representation in the subject is intuition. This is a very powerful paradigm. Because this is a concept that draws the boundaries of the entire field of existence. Therefore, it should be underlined that those that exist do not exist because of the subject. But all beings are real to the extent that they appear to the subject.

Kant actually intends to solve two fundamental philosophical problems by schematizing the possibilities of knowledge in this way. First, to show that natural sciences are universal and necessary sources of knowledge against empiricism; second, to free philosophy from dogmatic metaphysics. Therefore, Kant tries to make possible non-metaphysical but universal and necessary knowledge as a priori.

The claim that a priori forms and categories exist or that a priori-ness is a solution to two problems does not mean that this claim is true. This is exactly why Kant tries to prove why time and space are a priori by presenting two basic arguments. The first of these arguments is based on the idea that the forms of time (successive) and space (simultaneous) must be given in the mind because they cannot be drawn from experience. The second argument is on the idea that an object cannot be considered separately from the phenomenon of space, but the phenomenon of space can be thought of independently of any object. (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1998, p.179).

Although Kant's claim that the mind can reach knowledge with a priori conditions and that this process cannot be derived from experience seems incontrovertible, Nietzsche considers these as prejudice and this approach as a belief:

“Here moral ontology is the dominant prejudice.

The conclusion is therefore:

1. there are assertions that we consider universally valid and

necessary;

2. necessity and universal validity cannot be derived from

experience;

3. consequently they must be founded, not upon experience,

but upon something else, and derive from another source of

knowledge!

(Kant infers (1) there are assertions which are valid only

under a certain condition; (2) this condition is that they derive,

not from experience, but from pure reason.)

There are no isolated judgments!

An isolated judgment is never “true,” never knowledge; only in the connection and relation of many judgments is there any surety.” (Nietzsche, 1968, p.287).

Experience forms the basis of Nietzsche's philosophy. For to speak of any essence or substance beyond or out of experience means paving the way for Nietzsche to the devaluation of life. For this very reason, although Kant deprived metaphysics of his philosophy, he could not put forward the thought that would give the necessary value to life and affirm it, so he was exposed to Nietzsche's criticism.

Although intellectual history has constructed a process that leads to the alienation of human and life with metaphysics, getting rid of metaphysics does not mean affirming life. Especially if you try to get rid of metaphysics with the mentality of alienation and othering, which is one of the possible reasons for constructing metaphysical worlds in the beginning, what will emerge is definitely not affirmation of life.

If we are going to take something as the prerequisites of the mind, it should definitely be bodies and their relations. It should be affection as common perception (bodily perception) of coexistence, that is, the harmony of a body with this world. The perception of being in becoming beyond reason should be considered, not the awareness or competence of the mind. Thus, in this text, we will deal with the philosophers who capture life from this point or from angles that can be considered close to it, Spinoza and Nietzsche.

2. SPINOZA

The existence of a conventional concept of truth at the conscious level necessitates its understanding, and its understanding contributes to its existence. Therefore, self-requiring truth is actually established by the necessity of consciousness being conscious of itself. Therefore, consciousness has the potential to become a place where it is established, as well as being the first place where the truth – if any – starts to be sought. Seeing the danger of this situation from the mistakes made by other philosophers, Spinoza bases his philosophy of existence starting from the infinite. He tries to look for the possibility of the finite in the context of the infinite pattern of relations (affection) and necessary causality. In this sense, absolute substance is the cause of finite existences, in other words, modes, as Spinoza puts it, since it is the immanent and active, first and only cause of everything. On the other hand, the binding of this all-pervading necessary causality from absolute substance to mode is also through attributes. That is, under certain attributes, each mode acquires singularity and finitude accordingly. To summarize; it is the substance that reveals itself, or its essence through attributes. What substance reveals itself is mode, the existence forms of modes are attributes, the essence of mode is in substance. And these are all one and the same thing.

We can, then, conclude that Spinoza's philosophy is a philosophy of relationships. Even the concept of God, who is the absolute substance, will be understood in the context of this infinite relationality. Therefore, in this section, under these concepts, we will engage with Spinoza's philosophy, especially as a pattern of infinite relationships. And we will look at how these relations are established and examine the formational aspect of the way they are established. In order to do so, we should begin our investigation with the idea of causality in Spinoza.

2.1. THE PHENOMENON OF CAUSALITY IN SPINOZA

In order to examine the phenomenon of causality in Spinoza, first of all, it is necessary to make a critical distinction. We can do this by looking at exactly how causality is established. We need to look at whether the causal relationship is an interaction between at least two bodies or an interaction between parts of a body itself. In a complex system, the causal interactions between the parts that make up that system are at the existential level. As a matter of fact, any causal interaction that is articulated to a whole at an existential level and based on a relationality in this context, and the formal causal interaction of at least two separate bodies on each other has a very important place in Spinoza's philosophy. Because, according to Spinoza, while the interaction between any two bodies in nature can establish a relationship with a formal cause, this relationship is also an existential relationship within nature itself, which is a single substance. While this point of view leads us to the conclusion that the whole is not just the sum of the parts, it also helps us to conclude why nature is only a single substance that is the existential cause of itself. To explain this subject a little more, we should investigate how and when relations are established in the context of existential reason and formal reason.

In Spinoza's philosophy, there are two main centers that make possible the holistic and at the same time singular understanding of a coherent system. One of them is absolute substance and the other is necessary causality. If we consider the necessary causality, which plays a key role in the establishment of all connectivity, starting from the absolute substance to all individual objects and their relations and influences, it is clear that the basic study area of this philosophical system is existence. In this respect, his philosophy needs to be examined in an ontological subtext. The idea of God, which he sees as the absolute substance and at the same time as the source of all existence, is the starting and causal starting point of his entire philosophy. Necessary causality, which establishes the consistent integrity of Spinoza's philosophy and is based on the concept of God, has similar characteristics

between the functioning of the objects in nature (extension attribute) and the functioning of thought, idea, concept (thought attribute) in mental form. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, PROP. VII., p.131). Because there is always an object that corresponds to every idea and an idea that grasps every object. And this seemingly reciprocal connection is actually the grasping of the same substance under different conditions. Thus, the functioning of the system that we encounter on the way to knowledge and the structure of the order that determines and maintains the conditions for everything to come into existence should be evaluated in the context of the same pattern of relations. On the other hand, although Spinoza starts his philosophy with the idea of absolute substance and tries to establish his logic from there, it would not be wrong to argue that he is an empiricist like other philosophers (David Hume, John Locke) in his analysis of the concept of causality. Because causality itself is empirical. The concept of causality inevitably carries itself into a metaphysical field of existence in every intellectual system where it comes together with the concept of infinity, which is generally intuitive. Because the mind, while grasping anything, attributes an artificial attachment to the things it perceives, and when it does this in a limited area, it calls it science, and when it carries it to infinity, it calls it metaphysics throughout the entire history of philosophy. Although Spinoza's absolute substance is also subject to causality, it is metaphysical in this sense, in that it is infinite, even infinitely infinite. But this is where Spinoza is really consistent. Unlike other philosophers (Descartes, Platon), he does not include eternity in the field of existence and does not prefer reality to metaphysical truth. Rather, it raises empirical causality to the level of infinity and identifies metaphysical truth, namely God, with nature as absolute substance. In this way, reality and truth are melted in the same pot, and instead of a dualist perspective, a singular life itself is affirmed as nature. But what does Spinoza mean by absolute substance?

2.2. ABSOLUTE SUBSTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY

Contrary to Descartes, who starts his investigation with the human mind, Spinoza begins his philosophy by defining the nature of absolute substance, God, which is the most direct in terms of its conditions of existence and, in this context, the freest being. His intent in doing so is this: He thinks that the knowledge of the conditions of existence of singular objects, about which we think we have the most knowledge, is in fact the absolute substance, which can be the cause of its own existence, infinitely indirectly, rather than their own existence. Because Spinoza assumes two situations about the knowledge of the conditions of existence and starts with a presupposition by saying "Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else". (Spinoza B. d., 2007, AXIOMS I., p.17). Therefore, the reason for existence should be understood not from the conditioned one, but from what is in itself, so that the true nature of all existence can be grasped. Another remarkable point at this point is that this method starts with axioms. This is why Spinoza calls this method geometric. Because geometry also begins with axioms such as *point*, *line*, *infinity* whose existence cannot be proven and whose existence can only be grasped intuitively. And geometry, which is almost the entire field of science, is systematically and provably built on these axioms. Trying to shape his philosophy using a similar method, Spinoza also starts with presuppositional definitions and axioms. The first of these definitions states, "By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent." (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS I., p.14). The first point to be understood about this definition is that it acts as the first link of compulsory causality. It should be noted that the first definition does not begin with defining substance, God or nature. As he will state later, although God is the first existential cause of everything, he initiates the linear causality relation as cyclical (his own cause) in order to make the concept of necessary causality consistent in the context of causality. In this way, this point becomes the starting point of all existence and prevents the assumption of the existence of anything before it. In his

second definition, he says, “If something can be limited to something other than the same nature as itself, that thing is called finite in its own kind...” (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS II., p.14). and here too, linear causality operates. That is, the causal relationship is no longer existential because it is not its cause but rather circular as such; It is formal because existences limit each other, the relationship is always outward and linear as it is.¹ As can be seen, instead of attributing a first cause to everything, Spinoza prefers to establish the logic of the causal necessity of the first cause. In the third definition, that is, immediately after necessitating causality, he gives place to the properties of the first cause, not itself, and does so by using the concept of substance borrowed from Descartes. When we say the attribute of substance, its mode, we finally come to a definition of the concept of God. Another point that draws attention in the definitions so far is that although it is an effort to ground the concept of God, it is not dogmatic in any way. Because even though it is not provable, it is intuitively logical. As in geometry, it acts with presuppositions that are considered to be suitable for nature. This is exactly why Spinoza’s God is considered as nature itself, as the extreme point of perception (infinitely), perceptually suitable for nature, rather than the idea of a created or designed God.

Before defining God, Spinoza imagines God as a substance. Therefore, first of all, he will have been inspired by Descartes², because he defines substance as follows:

¹ Here we say that the causal relationship is not yet existential in terms of being external. But later on, together with Spinoza, we will discover that all relations established with external or internal patterns are existential. Our aim here to express it in this way is to follow Spinoza with the habits of thought we have and to understand his philosophy in the best way with these habits of thought. Otherwise, it would mean keeping the cyclical and linear causality together, to bring the external to the level of the internal without distinguishing between external and internal relations. But later, especially when we move on to the Nietzsche chapter, these distinctions will be important in terms of analyzing the linear causality as a presupposition in linking events (especially since it is assumed that the connection of each event is linear due to its in the context of time) and what kind of deadlocks it has led us to in the history of thought.

² “Thus there remains only the idea of God. I must consider whether there is anything in this idea that could not have originated from me. I understand by the name “God” a certain substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and that created me along with everything else that exists—if anything else exists. Indeed all these are such that, the more carefully I focus my attention on them, the less possible it seems they could have arisen from myself alone. Thus, from what has been said, I must conclude that God necessarily exists. For although the idea of substance is in me by virtue of the fact that I am a substance, that fact is not sufficient to explain

“By substance, I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception”. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS III., p.15). Considering this definition, although the concept of substance provides the knowledge of certain properties about God, as it will be understood later, for a substance to be God, it must also be absolute. Therefore, even if we fall into the idea that there may be non-absolute substances from this point of view, in fact, there is only one substance in terms of its properties, and that is absolute substance. Because it is only the absolute that can exist in itself. The possibility of self-manifestation, which is the sole condition for its apprehension and without the need for the mediation of anything else, cannot exist in an experienced being. Because for every experience presupposes at least one mediation. Considered in this context, substance cannot be an object of experience. Although nature itself can be thought of as a field of experience, nature as absolute substance must be considered holistically on the condition of infinity. And truth as substance cannot be captured in a limited area in this sense. It can only be grasped intuitively. In the light of this information, this is exactly why, according to Spinoza, a substance can only be grasped through itself. Comprehension of substance in an absolute sense leads us to the concept of God in Spinoza’s philosophy. That is, if the existence of a being is conceived from itself, substance must be understood, and if a substance is considered infinitely, God must be understood.

2.3. ‘GOD’ AS THE ABSOLUTE SUBSTANCE

We have already discussed that the way to be followed in terms of comprehending God in Spinoza’s philosophy is primarily through understanding the concepts of causality and substance. We have also mentioned that causality is necessary and substance is absolute. Spinoza defines God: “By God, I mean a being absolutely

my having the idea of an infinite substance, since I am finite, unless this idea proceeded from some substance which really was infinite.” (Descartes, 1998, p. 76).

infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.” (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS VI., p.15-16). And with these two definitions presents us two new concepts, namely: the essence of the substance and the attribute. He defines attribute as “By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.” (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS IV., p.15). These two definitions are a shortcut to the relationship between the existence of God and the human mind’s understanding of him. And in fact it is the epitome of Spinoza’s philosophy. But these insights are more about the essence of God than about himself. Here, Spinoza points to a fine distinction between God and his essence originating from definitions. Although the essence of something is understood as the self, as it will be noted in both definitions, the essence of God is more related to its comprehension. On the other hand, the essence of anything is already related to its comprehension. But with one difference, the essence of a thing in nature does not correspond to itself. More precisely, since the cause of the existence of a thing is not from itself, it is not the source of its essence. When it comes to God, since the cause of existence is himself, his essence is in himself, so his essence corresponds to himself and not to anything else and/or anything external. Spinoza reads this inference in reverse: He attributes his cause to be the reason that his essence necessitates its existence; that is, to something whose nature cannot be grasped if it does not exist. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, p. 15). If attention is paid, all definitions of the concept of God are at a level that can be understood from each other in their reflexive form. This is exactly why Spinoza claimed that the concept of God cannot be deduced from the concept of anything other than itself. Any concept that defines God intellectually as well as the reason for its existence spatially cannot be derived from any other concept. Therefore, God’s being a substance, having infinite attributes or being understood as nature are one and the same thing. At this point, a distinct difference between existences draws our attention. Anything exists either in itself or through something else. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, AXIOMS I., p.17). Essentially, every existence in a system that has grounded its existence with an infinite necessary causality must necessarily be understood in the context of one or

more existences. But the real question is, is an existence that has its own reason for existence subject to this necessary causality or is it something ontologically located outside of it? Of course, these questions may seem contradictory, as they are necessary implications of an insight subject to necessary causation. But if the already absolute substance were subject to necessary causality, it would not be absolute, or if it was located outside the necessary causality in terms of being the cause of itself, then it would be another substance outside itself, which would again contradict its absoluteness. From a similar point of view, it is possible to find a contradiction between God and his attributes: If the infinite number and infinite variety of attributes are concepts that can each express God himself, and God is also infinite, the attributes do not exceed God as the equivalent of an infinite variety of infinity (God). Or is it? What leads us to contradiction about this kind of conceptual confusion is not the lack of Spinoza's understanding of God. Absoluteness or eternity are not concepts that we have direct knowledge of. Such concepts can only be grasped intuitively. What is intuitively grasped is limited when it is conceptualized or imagined as an idea to be grounded in thought and thus transformed into the object of an idea. As a matter of fact, when something is understood, it is torn from its true nature and understood. Therefore, grasping something and the thing itself are not the same thing. Especially if it is absolute substance. Therefore, Spinoza says, "By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent." (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS I., p.14)., and he bases his definition on the comprehension of things rather than their own nature. This saves us from the contradictions that may arise from the limited understanding of the infinite.

Another point of contradiction that we may encounter in the concept of God is related to the fact that God is a substance. According to Spinoza, unlike Descartes³, we can talk about only one substance due to the nature of the substance. For, as it

³ Because, according to Descartes, we can talk about both infinite and finite substances. (Descartes, 1998, p. 55).

will be remembered, a substance could only be the cause of itself and could only be grasped through itself. In the case of at least two substances, if they have common points, they would limit each other, otherwise they would be deprived of their absoluteness in terms of containing things that each other did not contain. These, too, are contrary to the nature of the substance by definition. However, the existence of only one substance also necessitates the condition that the existence of that substance is not contained in anything else. This leads us to the conclusion that the existence of absolute substance and its being the cause (*causa sui*) of its own existence is by its very nature. In every system that starts with axioms and is established consistently, that is, at a demonstrable level, the axiomatic rules at the initial stage present themselves as a necessity. This is like the case assuming that two infinitely extending lines do not intersect at any point, they must necessarily be parallel. They are not falsifiable more than provable. Because they explain the aspect of nature that can be perceived intuitively and not logically established. It is not known whether the reason is because the mind proceeds with a logic that corresponds to nature, or whether nature opens itself to human experience only with the aspect that corresponds to the human mind, or if people reconstruct with their minds to comprehend nature while experiencing it, but Deleuze will later call this parallelism (between the attributes of thought and extension).

Another point that Spinoza draws our attention to in understanding the absolute substance is about the indivisibility of the infinite substance. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, PROP XII., p.40). This point is interesting. Because the indivisibility of something that is the whole (nature) of infinite multiplicity and diversity is inconceivable. Spinoza proves this proposition as follows; “For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided would either preserve the nature of the absolutely infinite substance or they would not. In the first case, there will be many substances of the same nature. In the second case, the absolutely infinite substance will cease to exist. Both cases are absurd.” (Spinoza B. d., 2007, PROP XIII. Proof, p.41). This proof of Spinoza is also that the concept of absolute substance is so by definition and

nature. In other words, this feature of God is a result reached by axiomatic necessity. Otherwise, the intuitive idea that anything can always be broken down into smaller pieces is more logical. The conclusion we need to reach from here is that any mathematical operation is essentially directed towards the finite. In other words, mathematics is the language of the comprehension of limited space, according to Spinoza's logic. Otherwise infinite substance would have to be divisible. Because the absolute substance is infinite, it cannot be subjected to mathematical operations. Thus, It cannot be measured to be understood; it cannot be put into a logical framework. Therefore, Spinoza introduces the concept of 'attributes', which enables the absolute substance as a way to be comprehended.

2.4. THE CONCEPT OF ATTRIBUTE IN CONNECTION WITH SUBSTANCE IN SPINOZA

In Spinoza's philosophy, the concepts of substance, essence of substance and attributes could easily be confused. Because they are different concepts describing the same thing. First of all, if we consider the understanding of the concept of essence in the nature, essence can be understood simply as what remains unchanged in its transcendent state, or as something that gives something a singularity, or something that makes its difference even if it changes. Precisely in this respect, the essence of a thing has always been thought of as that which transcends its limited existence. Because what is limited is temporary. But when the essence of the substance is considered, it cannot be thought of as the thing that remains constant in change, as it is not subject to time, or as the thing that makes its difference because the absolute substance is unique. Therefore, the entire existence of absolute substance is already its essence. Another important point about the essence is that the essence is always about the comprehension of something. That is, something does not reveal its essence, its own existence is a revelation anyway, but being grasped by another existence becomes the essence of that thing. In this respect, we can explain the basic difference between substance and essence as the intellectual

projection or comprehension of the essence in another existence. Now, in order to understand the relationship and difference between attribute and essence, it is necessary to examine the conditions of cognition. We mentioned earlier that in order for an existence to be grasped, an idea about it must first be visualized and for this idea to occur, the mind must first transform it into the object of this idea. Because every idea is necessarily directed towards an object. Of course, this whole process of understanding also meant re-arranging existences from their true nature. Because, in order to establish the intuitive perception of an infinite existence as an idea, this existence must be moved to the limited area of existence and reconstructed here as the idea of an intelligible object. This is exactly why Kant considered this field of infinite existences as noumenal, that is, unknowable. (Kant, 2022, p. 648). But unlike Kant, Spinoza was able to conduct an ontological philosophy between God and nature, as he saw necessary causality as a bridge between the finite field and the infinite field. In this respect, we can say that in order to grasp the eternal essence of a substance, it must be reconstructed in a limited space, and it is the attributes that determine the conditions of this limited space. But the attributes themselves are not limited. In fact, just as every attribute is infinite in itself, there are also an infinite number of attributes. The limitation is in the relative perception of the apprehension. Therefore, the perception and characterization of an infinity as limited space or limited existences is purely a relative understanding of understanding. This means that I cannot grasp anything by its very essence and nature as merely and only itself. In order for me to grasp something, I can grasp its existence in relation to other beings in a condition of coexistence, in its relativity. Spinoza explains the limitation of this limited understanding as follows: “A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature...”. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS II., p.14). Therefore, we can say this: It is attribute that determines the conditions for the understanding of the essence of the substance, what our mind understands as the thing that establishes the essence of the substance.

So far, we have examined the ontological relation between substance and essence, then essence and attribute, now we need to touch on substance and attribute so that we can conceive with what conceptual difference these three concepts are the same thing.⁴

Spinoza's definition that best explains the basic relationship between the substance-essence-attribute trinity is as follows: "By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality." (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS VI., p.15-16). As it can be understood from here, all of the infinite number of attributes express the absolute essence of the substance, and each attribute separately reveals the existence of the substance. Although each can be thought of as separate from the other, they are one and the same thing in terms of expressing God. It is contained in God, expresses God, and is what establishes God's essence. According to Spinoza, attributes that are to be understood in this context are naturally eternal, like God, and each must be understood on its own. But this understanding of attributes does not mean that they exhibit an existence independent of God. On the contrary, it is another proof that they are one and the same thing with God. They are not the cause of their own existence, though each in their own way is a means by which they establish the essence of God. Because while it is possible for them to be grasped on their own, they cannot be thought of as exhibiting a separate existence from God.

However, although attributes are infinite in number and variety, their positioning in a limited space is also limited. That is, the comprehension of attributes by beings with minds and bodies limited by relative perception is also limited. Because, again, we can talk about only two of these attributes, which are the basis of existence, namely 'thought and extension'. Note here that, attributes, which are perceived as the thing that establishes the essence of God, are also the plane of existence of the

⁴ Because essences and attributes do not have existence in themselves. We can only speak of them in the sense that they express God. On the other hand, they must be understood as the same thing as God in the sense that they express God.

limited things that perceive this essence. Therefore, it can be said that while limited existences experience themselves (as body and idea) through two attributes, they can grasp the source of their existence, namely God (as thought and extension), with these two attributes. Here, however, we should emphasise that, experience is a limited perception, while grasping God is an endless perception. From this point of view, attributes, which establish an ontological partnership between God and limited existences, are not themselves an existence. In terms of understanding God, quality should also be considered as form, as the field of existence of limited existences. As a result, only God and limited existences exist. Spinoza will call these limited existences ‘modes’.

2.5. MODE AS THE LIMITED EXISTENCE IN SPINOZA

In Spinoza’s ontology, we cannot talk about any existence other than absolute substance, which is eternal, infinite and the cause of its own existence, and mode whose existence is temporary, limited and determined by something else. The dynamism between these two diametrically opposed modes of existence is determined only by the two attributes, namely ‘extension’ and ‘thought’. Recall that each of the attributes was eternally a condition for realizing the essence of substance. Therefore, each attribute separately corresponds to each other in terms of being an expression of the same God. Likewise, from a different point of view, each mode corresponds to each other according to the form of the attribute with which it exists. That is, an idea that exists as a mode under the attribute of thought necessarily has an object that exists as a mode under the attribute of extension. As such, the mind and body are always in harmony. But this harmony does not involve a succession or a direct relation. It is rather a harmony, as the same thing is perceived from different points of view at the same time. The level of objective relationality is established in the same way in the intellectual dimension (Spinoza B. d., 2007, PROP. VII., p.131). by the necessity of compulsory causality. That is why mathematics has its counterpart in nature. Since the attributes of thought and

extension, as infinite forms, are grasped by finite existences, it has always been thought that there is no direct relationship between them. This is why dualist approaches separate body and mind from each other. For when attributes are considered as the conditions for God to be grasped, they must be grasped by themselves like God. Not through each other. However, attributes cannot limit or influence each other. As it is understood from Spinoza's ontology, there is no direct relationship between attributes. But every attribute is parallel as a condition for the apprehension of one and the same thing. Considering substance as the attribute that occupies extension (space), God is nature. When considered as an attribute of thought, it is the absolute mind. That's why God definitely has the idea of both his own essence and every being that necessarily arises from his own essence. So God knows infinitely, because under the infinite attribute he can have the idea of all of them. But when it comes to human, a human knows and knows she/he knows. This is where the act of knowing is interrupted. Because even though knowing is thought attribute, in 'knowing that you know' case, first 'knowing' is thought attribute, second 'knowing' is that is, yourself, that is, conscious self-knowledge, which is bodily, is extension attribute. Because an idea is always directed towards an object. An idea is primarily a thought. The idea of the idea now makes the first idea the object of the second idea and carries it to the extension dimension. In this way, a human thinks that she/he can think because she/he can only grasp with two attributes, and she/he stays there and cannot take it to infinity like God. For only God has infinite attribute.

On the other hand, Spinoza understands existence as an activity, a competence. The reality of a thing increases as it is brought into existence as a potential. In Spinoza's words, if being able to exist is a possibility, the more the reality of something's nature increases, the more its possibility of existence will increase. they become reality in proportion to their existence. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, PROP. XI., p.37). As a matter of fact, this realization process can actually be understood as the transfer of the absolute essence to a partially limited area of existence and experiencing itself in this area of existence. For example, when God is perceived with the

attribute of extension, it is understood as objective nature. When a human, who is a part of objective nature, experiences nature, nature (God) experiences him/herself through him/her. Therefore, the absolute experience of itself in a limited space is a reality. But note that there is no purpose here. In other words, God does not create the finite being or move into the finite being space to experience himself. They are all one and the same thing. Limited existence is just one of the infinite states of God's absolute existence. But not in terms of being limited, but in terms of existence. Reality is a transition to existence—an experience of limitation, to exist here in the world as one and the same thing with nature. Being here is not an exclusion or abandonment that is added to us later by our essence. Existence is coexistence. It is the transition from a possibility to the realm of reality with other existences, but this reality is the transition of the field itself to existence with this existence. Because finitude, according to Spinoza, is a state of coexistence. It is not a quality or something of its essence. Experiencing and influencing each other is a condition of relative existence, namely co-existence. Therefore, the finite existence called reality, that is, this coexistence in this world right now is God himself. God is nature itself. God is not located in such a metaphysical field and has not constructed this world from his own essence. To go even further, if the concept of God is removed from Spinoza's terminology and only the concept of nature is used instead, there would be no loss, and Spinoza's philosophy will be completely purified in terms of metaphysics. Therefore, it can be said that there is essentially no metaphysical aspect in Spinoza's philosophy. It is a philosophy that fully affirms this world and life. Exploring the infinite side of nature is not metaphysical. Metaphysics is to claim that nature is ordered with its limited, compulsory causality and that it has a purposeful structure determined in this respect, and to seek its essence outside this world. The situation is different with Spinoza. Necessary causation permeates both the infinite and the finite realm of nature because it is one and the same thing. Our experience of Nature (God) and Nature's experience of us is one and the same thing. The finite and the infinite are one and the same thing, this is this world. Finitude is the realization of possibilities in the sea of infinity.

Possibility is the infinite state of finitude. Reality is the relative self-perception of possibility. Relative perception is also the experience of reality.

In Spinoza's ontology, the order of God-attributes-mode is only an order of comprehension. There is no priority or later. Because time is also a part of the limited existence of the modes. Thus modes, which are essentially the explanation of all limited existences one by one, are the states of God independent of time. And they are finite in their relation to other beings of their own kind. Apart from that, they are infinitely diverse and numerous in terms of expressing the existence of God. To say, "A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature..." (Spinoza B. d., 2007, DEFINITIONS II., p.14). and what is meant by the same (genus) nature, actually means that the essence of substance is grasped under the same attribute, as we mentioned above. And this also means that modes express the existence of absolute substance, which they base on each mode's essence one by one. When we understand the modes one by one from this perspective, that is, in terms of expressing the essence of the substance, we comprehend the eternal existence of the mode. But when we understand the same mode in terms of their relation to other modes, which is the condition of their finiteness, then we grasp their temporary, temporal (duration) existence. Because this means taking something out of its real context, abstracting it and reconstructing it with certain limits. And this practical life creates contradictions and paradoxes when we try to comprehend God through habits of thought. The conclusion we can deduce from here is that finitude is not an absolute substance, but only an infinite relationship, experience, and its relative perception that mode establishes under the same attribute. Therefore, modes are also eternal and eternal in the sense that they express the essence of substance. For example, the axioms that Spinoza uses in definitions are infinite modes. Or 'movement and rest' (Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, 2005, p. 208)., 'necessary causality' are infinite modes. And they enable us to understand, for example, how finite existences conceived under the space attribute relate, as well as the dynamics of relationships. On the other hand, finite modes are essentially infinite. More precisely, while it is essentially

infinite, it gains finitude when it is grasped relatively under certain relations and conditions of other infinite modes (what we understand as order). That is why Spinoza understands singular things as manifestations-emotions of God or attitudes of attributes. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, p. 77).

Anything determined to finite or unlimited existence and action is necessarily determined by God. Because there is no other being except God and his affections (modes).

But it is not possible for a finite and finite existence to be finite and limited by the absolute nature of any attribute of God. Because the things that come out of God's absolute nature have to be eternal and eternal like God.

Recall that, there is only absolute substance, the essence of which required its existence and could be the cause of itself. On the other hand, the situation is different in mode. They are inherent in God as possibility, because God alone has the idea of everything that is or could be objective. The essence of everything is in God. But it means that finite existences, that is, mode, come true. The fact that the essences in God come into existence means that they establish certain relations with other finite existences and become actualized relatively. Therefore, the realization of finite existences is not by their essence, but by their formal and external relationship patterns. This also means that an unrealized essence does not acquire singularity. They only exist wholly in God. According to Spinoza, in order for a finite existence's essence to gain singularity, it must first pass into a co-existence in the field of finite existence. According to Spinoza, it is possible to gain a singularity at the same time, with a certain relation of movement and rest, while gaining reality in an endless pattern of relations in this area of existence. And finite existence, which gains singularity with this certain relation of movement and rest, now becomes the subject of its essence in God. So what is this relation of movement and rest?

First of all, each of the limited existence in nature is a whole. In other words, it is an integrated state of many separate existences. On the other hand, every holistic

limited existence is part of another whole. Therefore, every single thing in an endless pattern of relations is both a part externally and a whole within itself. At the same time, while all these limited existences do not make a difference due to their essence in God, they can reveal themselves under a singularity in the field of existence, that is, when they gain reality. It is precisely at this point that Spinoza claims that the singularity emerges as a certain relation of movement and rest. The fact that everything that happens is in movement and rest is not a new idea. What is new in Spinoza is that he treats ‘movement and rest’ as a ratio. And when it comes to the relation of movement and rest in an infinite pattern of relations (affection), it is necessary to consider the differential equations⁵ calculation introduced by Newton a few years before Spinoza’s *Ethics*. Because, in order to understand the nature of relations both scientifically and philosophically, finite realities are analyzed with the help of infinitely minute things. To examine the scientific aspect of this point of view:

When the relationship between two parameters (variables) is examined graphically, if this relationship is linear, it is easy to understand (calculate) the nature of this relationship. It will be the slope of this graph that will allow us to calculate the state of the relationship between two variables at any time. What is called slope is the proportional relationship between two variables. But until then, this proportional

⁵ “**Newton’s laws of motion**

Imagine a body moving along a line, whose distance from some chosen point is given by the function $x(t)$ at time t . (The symbol x is traditional here rather than the symbol f for a general function, but this is purely a notational convention.) The instantaneous velocity of the moving body is the rate of change of distance—that is, the derivative $x'(t)$ (Also $x'(t) = dx/dt$ where d ’s means (differ): The ratio of the change in x to the change in t . (At the same time, these changes are the expression of infinitely small changes.). Its instantaneous acceleration is the rate of change of Velocity—that is, the second derivative $x''(t)$. According to the most important of Newton’s law of motion, the acceleration experienced by a body of mass m is proportional to the force F applied, a principle that can be expressed by the equation $F = mx''$. (4)

Suppose that m and F (which may vary with time) are specified, and one wishes to calculate the motion of the body. Knowing its acceleration alone is not satisfactory; one wishes to know its position x at an arbitrary time t . In order to apply equation (4), one must solve for x , not for its second derivative x'' . Thus, one must solve an equation for the quantity x when that equation involves derivatives of x . Such equations are called differential equations, and their solution requires techniques that go well beyond the usual methods for solving algebraic equations.” (Ordinary differential equations, n.d.).

relationship could only be calculated if it was linear. In other words, if there was a change in the relations at the same rate, the calculation was possible. This calculation was also unable to analyze the complex structure of nature. But a method called differential computing would change that. Because he succeeded in breaking the finite structure of nature into infinitely small pieces and carrying it to a computable size, no matter how complex. More precisely, no matter how complex the relationship between two variables is, it could give its nature, namely its inclination, to explain its state at any given moment. Of course, what we are really interested in here is that besides helping us to understand the complex structure of nature at a certain level, we methodically see that finite things, which are the object of experience in nature, consist of infinitely small things. That is, everything that is finite contains infinity and finitude only appears as infinitely relational ratios. Therefore, we understand that everything that happens is in a sea of eternity (Nature-God), and what we experience as finite is only relationships, proportional or relative.

This understanding of nature emerges scientifically in Newton and Leibniz⁶ and philosophically in Spinoza ontology. In the section so far, we have understood that finitude in mode is established firstly by relations and secondly by the understanding of these relations as relative or proportional. But while Spinoza conceptualizes the factors that ground finitude, he additionally states that this infinite proportional relationship is specifically a relation of movement and rest. Scientifically, these relationships have been discussed in the context of variables. Spinoza, on the other hand, specifies change and considers it only as parameters of movement and rest. But the movement and rest here should not be thought of as a kind of energy flow or something else that provides the dynamism between finite existences. Because it is a relation of infinities rather than a relation of finitude. In

⁶ “So, what is an infinite analysis? So, we are hopeful: If Leibniz is one of the great creators of differential calculus or of infinitesimal analysis, undoubtedly this is in mathematics, and he always distinguished philosophical truths and mathematical truths, and so it's not a question for us of mixing up everything. But it's impossible to think that, when he discovers a certain idea of infinite analysis in metaphysics, that there aren't certain echoes in relation to a certain type of calculus that he himself invented, notably the calculus of infinitesimal analysis.” (Deleuze, *The Deleuze Seminars*, 1980).

fact, this movement and rest is the dynamic of the transfer of finite existences originating from the proportional relations of infinities from possibility to reality. But why movement and rest?

When Spinoza's philosophy is examined, it should not be overlooked that the main reason for each existence to come into existence within a certain relation of movement and rest is co-existence. Because every existence is necessarily in movement and rest. And this movement is made possible by the fact that stagnation gains a formational meaning by being in an endlessly continuous relationship with other existences. If we think that co-existence constitutes a field of existence with necessary-endless relationality; co-existence, as the holistic context of existence, brings into being every single existence in this totality in relation to itself. In this way, the movement and rest of every single existence gains meaning in relation to this totality and is carried into the field of existence in proportion to it. In this way, while each singular existence exists in a holistic manner, with an internal relation of movement and rest relative to it, it can also establish a relationship with other singularities at an external relation of movement and rest. The situation is similar to this: while the rest mass of an object is also an expression of energy; It can have kinetic energy when in motion and potential energy when at rest. And so every type of energy is actually an expression of mass.

So, while everything is brought into existence at a certain relation of movement and rest with a pattern of endless relations, and existences gain finitude in this context, how does the balance of this whole existence continue to exist?

2.6. UNDERSTANDING OF CONATUS IN THE CONTEXT OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY

"Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being." (Spinoza B. d., 2007, PROP. VI., p.271). Spinoza first lays the foundations of the concept of conatus with this proposition. The first thing to note in this proposal is

that each and every thing must first exist, and then it must be in an effort to continue its existence. Of course, we can think that this should already be the case. But with the same habit of thinking, we can also think that we need to find the efforts of existence in a metaphysical field (as it may be related to the essence). Therefore, according to Spinoza, the efforts of beings to continue their existence must be within the limits of the finite field of existence. Recall that, since the divine essences of modes are infinite, the source of what gives them finitude could not be absolute substance. And it also has to be external necessary relationality, not internal necessary causality, that allowed them to be perceived as singular objects. Therefore, according to Spinoza, it was possible for the infinite essence to acquire a finite form, in the sense that a possibility becomes reality, with a certain relation of movement and rest. From this point of view, we can say that since the reason for finite existence is not the essence of the substance grasped under certain attributes, but a certain relation of movement and rest, the efforts of these finite existences to maintain their existence must be possible not from the essence of absolute substance, but from another impulse in the field of existence of finite existences. And this impulse will be called Spinoza conatus. In this sense, conatus also belongs to the field of existence as an impulse, like the finiteness of mode, but essentially it belongs to the essence of absolute substance.

Before moving on to the concept of conatus, we must first assume and talk about an area of existence in order to comprehend the infinite relations that are the reason for the existence of finite existences and these relations at a certain relation of movement and rest. Because if every existence is a relational existence, there is necessarily a field in which these relations are established.

A mode should be understood to mean the same thing under two different perspectives. First, in the sense that absolute substance is part of the essence of substance under its respective attribute, and secondly, as finite singularities in God does not create the finite being or move into the finite being space to experience himself. that is the relevant attribute. Thus, space represents a field of being for finite singularities. More precisely, the field of existence as the field of the finitude

of the relative comprehension of infinite existence at a certain relation of movement and rest. In this context, we can say that, existence exists with its field of being. Therefore, everything that exists exists in accordance with the field of existence. At the same time, existing is one of the founding elements of the field of existence. The existent and the field of existence are conditions of co-existence that require each other. On the other hand, if we consider Spinoza's ontology, nothingness is not outside the field of existence. A potential is an infinity. Therefore, it is the one whose field of existence is limited, whose potential is realized, and which contains order.

To be in the realm of being is to exist completely relationally, relative and contextually. Spinoza explains this existence as follows:

“Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and the action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.” (Spinoza B. d., 2007, p. 76-77).

Therefore, there is a contextual coexistence in an endless pattern of relations. This is actual existence, not originating from the essence of the substance. Coexistence as an activity characterizes a field of existence in the relation of movement and rest. On the other hand, considering the coexistence as a field of existence also explains us the active and passive states of an existence. Spinoza writes: “Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.” (Spinoza B. d., 2007, PROP.I. p.254). The conclusion we can draw from this is: the stronger the relationship of an existence with other existences that

characterizes its existence during a co-existence, the more active it is in its relationship with them, and the weaker or more indirect it is, the more passive it is. Therefore, an existence is not only mental, which is parallel to the mind and body. According to Spinoza, the less indirect the level of relation is in the field of existence where its entire existence is conditioned, the more its existence is qualified, and the more indirect it is, the less it is characterized. On the other hand, this existence; Being finite, that is, being determined-qualified to be finite by other things, is a constant influence and being affected. This relationality can be both external and internal as we mentioned earlier. Sometimes both can be the same thing. Because when our relationship with other bodies is in the way of consuming them, assimilating them, and incorporating them into our own integrity, we are internally affected by that body. Or, on the contrary, we can be included in the integrity of other bodies. Another result from here is; While a body determines its integrity by external reasons, its extinction, that is, its inability to continue its existence in a singularity, must also be determined by another reason. Therefore, according to Spinoza, the reason for the existence of anything cannot be found in itself, and the reason for its disappearance cannot be found in itself. It can only be determined to perish by another existence. It cannot contain its own cause of extinction in its own nature. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, p. 459). Because the essence of a thing only qualifies or determines its nature in such a way as to affirm its existence. Therefore, the cause that eliminates one thing can only be an external cause as the reason for the existence of something else. Therefore, every existence that is surrounded and determined by eternal existence will necessarily be destroyed by other existences in their affirmation of their own existence. In this sense we can say that no finite existence can exist forever. In such a case, it cannot be finite. So every existence continues its existence in a struggle against other existences, by an effort against them. So it's all a question of resistance. Therefore, limitation by external influences is a condition that both affirms its existence and can cause its destruction. Spinoza calls the efforts of existences to resist external influences as 'conatus'. This effort is an effort to preserve the existence of a body. Because when something exists, it has to be in an effort to preserve its existence and keep it in

balance. Only from this point of view, Spinoza's concept of conatus can be thought of as an effort for self-preservation, passive and essentially an expression of inaction in all relational activity. But the situation is not at all as expected. It would certainly be easy to ascribe a state of inertia to Spinoza's concept of conatus by reasoning with habits of thought. However, as we mentioned above, every existence co-exists as an activity. Efficiency is the basis of existence. Passivity, on the other hand, is that the more indirect the relationality that an existence establishes while actively passing into existence in the context of infinite relationality, the less its effectiveness is, and thus Spinoza defines the weakened activity level as passivity. Since action and reaction are opposite attitudes that require each other, any resistance is also an active resistance. Because if there is a coexistence, no struggle is just resistance. Apart from this, in order to understand why an existence is actually an active existence, Spinoza previously explained the essential relationship between a finite existence and absolute substance: Every finite existence as a mode is a certain part of the absolute power of absolute substance. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, p. 431). So every struggle is a particular power struggle. And these power struggles characterize existence as formational. We can even go further and say that the conatus of a thing is itself as its genesis. Because every existence is the activity of its related conatus, since it is a certain part of the absolute power that it expresses and carries itself into existence to the extent of this power. In other words, this activity is the competence of a finite part of infinite power in the field of existence. It is the competence to relate, to exist at this level of relation, and even then as absolute substance's finite self-experience with this existence.

To summarize, an existence is effective in proportion to its power, and competent to the extent that it is active. In this way, it affirms its existence by establishing a passive relationship with other existences, on the other hand, it affirms other existences in the context of existence by establishing an active relationship on other existences at the same time. And the equivalent-expression of all this in Spinoza's philosophy is the concept of conatus.

2.7. AFFIRMATION OF LIFE IN SPINOZA

As we have seen in the previous section, life in Spinoza is based on an effort-infinite will (conatus) and thus, life is a flow in a pattern of endless relationships. This flow also means being in harmony with nature's own flow. In other words life is in harmony with nature in the conditions of co-existence of singular existence. As we have also seen according to Spinoza, God is not a transcendent being, but an immanent being. For God is to be understood as nature itself. Therefore, God is not an entity to be attained or understood, but an immanence that must be lived together. In this sense, we can say that God's commands do not present themselves as a necessity but as a unity in singular conditions of existence. Life itself becomes worthless when God is conceived in a metaphysical realm, as something that transcends everything. But life reaches its maximum value if life itself is already in an equated position with God. This is one of the insights that makes Spinoza's philosophy important. It is also thanks to the harmony between god and the world that Spinoza's God is to be conceived as an immanent being. Following this, we can conclude that every singular existence is actually a singular existence of God. That's why every existence is so important. Every effort is an effort to exist. And the more one lives in harmony with nature and life, the better one becomes. According to Spinoza, concepts such as perfection and imperfection are artificial comparisons produced entirely by thought. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, p. 419). Nature itself is never imperfect. It never has any flaws. Since what is good is in harmony, we can say that what is bad is only what hinders this harmony. (Spinoza B. d., 2007, Definitions II, p.423). Even in Spinoza's evil, there is no negativity. There is only the absence/privation of goodness. Considering all this point of view, in the philosophy of Spinoza, a body experiences its freest state by being in harmony in terms of affirmation of life, rather than the necessity of causality having a feature that prevents free will. Because the source of limitation is mind anyway. A consciousness that tries to understand life with comparisons becomes the main source of limitations during this process. However, life has the opportunity to experience the existence of unity endlessly, not at the level of thought, but in

harmony with the body. Therefore, the philosophy of Spinoza is far from an understanding that disables freedom. Because human beings design freedom mentally. This is like a bird that boasts about the size of its cage forgetting to fly. However, life should never be something spent to be understood. Life is just for to be lived.

On the other hand, when it comes to life, on the affirmation of life we have a similar approach in Nietzsche whom we will be discussing in the next chapter. This is not a random move, as Nietzsche himself is indebted to Spinoza, or at least to some of Spinoza's philosophy, in his understanding of ethics and of affirmation of life.

3. NIETZSCHE

Nietzsche fights his greatest battle against nihilism. Because he thinks that when God is dead, nothing will be left; in other words there would be no ground for value creation. The reason for this, is not that life itself is meaningless. We have placed meaning in a metaphysical field while constructing it from its own point of view. Now, while we wanted to get rid of the metaphysical field, we have been doomed to lose all meaning with it. Nietzsche touches upon this issue most prominently in *The Madman* section of *The Gay Science*. The parable *Madman* begins with an inquiry: “Haven't you heard of that madman who in the bright morning lit a lantern and ran around the marketplace crying incessantly, ‘I’m looking for God! I’m looking for God!’ Since many of those who did not believe in God were standing around together just then, he caused great laughter.” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 2017, p. 119). The main point that draws our attention in this questioning is that belief in God has already been lost. According to Nietzsche, although the idea that God is dead has grown in all minds, we do not yet know the reason for this situation, where it will lead us, or what consequences it will have. He says the following about this subject in the parable: “I'll tell you! We have killed him - you and I! We are all his murderers. But how did we do this?... Where is it moving to now? Where are we moving to?... Aren't we straying as though through an infinite nothing? Isn't empty space breathing at us?... Is the magnitude of this deed not too great for us? Do we not ourselves have to become gods merely to appear worthy of it?...” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 2017, p. 120). As a result, he suspects that the idea that ‘God is dead’ will lead us to nihilism. But this result emerges as a result of interpretation as an idea, that is, as a result of the genealogical examination of history. God's death is a symbol, as it represents the collapse of a mindset that negates life, that envisions a world beyond this world and seeks the full meaning of that life there. It is a picture of how a hierarchical, especially moral system, consumes and devalues itself.

Although Kant seems to very successfully eliminated metaphysics, as Deleuze writes, “One of the principal motifs of Nietzsche’s work is that Kant had not carried

out a true critique because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms of values.” (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p. 1). Although this problem of meaninglessness is seen by existentialists (Fyodor Dostoyevski, Albert Camus) as a deficiency of the world in itself, according to Nietzsche, it stems from the perspective of humanity, who sees the world in this way. Subjecting this point of view to a genealogical analysis, Nietzsche concludes that the reigning attitude in science and philosophy is a reactive attitude. What is meant by reactive here is a perspective that negates life, excludes power, singularizes everything in the name of causality, negates diversity and multiplicity, eliminates difference, and reduces all existences to order and awareness. Nietzsche puts the active one against this point of view. These are not a point of view, but on the contrary, they are the founding principles of all life and existence. Looking for ways to get rid of the reactive attitude that has spread to all minds throughout the historical process, Nietzsche finds the solution by developing a very comprehensive philosophy of criticism. Although this philosophy of criticism has been developed in terms of justification by being influenced by Kant and, especially by Spinoza, these philosophers themselves have also been exposed to this criticism in the end. The greatest contribution of Kant’s philosophy is the abolition of metaphysics, and Spinoza’s theory of infinity and relationality. At this point, it would be appropriate to examine some concepts, which are the cornerstones of the construction of Nietzsche’s philosophy, shaped by the contributions of these philosophers, through an analytic path.

In this section, I will try to analyze Nietzsche’s philosophy in the context of eternal relations (infinte affections) by following a analytic method. This method seems to be rather difficult, even almost impossible at some points. For while Nietzsche’s philosophy objects against the systematized philosophy, examining it with this analytic method leads us into a contradiction from the very beginning. When considered in the context of his philosophy of criticism and the language he used in almost all of his works, Nietzsche does not give us a systematized critique and also mostly does not directly refer to an idea or a conceptual explanation. He usually

explains his thoughts by emphasizing the falsity of what he problematizes in an indirect way and in doing so he does not directly offer us a solution.

“‘Nietzsche's work,’ Crane Brinton wrote in a passage that is characteristic of many, ‘contains a great variety of ideas, sometimes mutually contradictory, difficult if not impossible to reduce to a ‘system,’ made still more bewilderingly varied by the aphoristic form in which they are cast.’” (Nehamas, 1999, p.14).

In terms of ‘system’ we can say, although every action taken to be understood, every word spoken, exhibits an anti-systemic attitude, paradoxically, it cannot escape from being systematic. Because in the end, even when the mind is trying to overcome itself, it still appeals to itself. From this point of view, it may not be the meaning itself, but to be understood, interpreted means to be systematized. Precisely for this reason, no reality can be understood without involving the mind that grasps it into this reality.

“Kaufmann was nevertheless determined to show the Nietzsche’s aphorisms are ultimately unified, that behind them “there is a whole philosophy”. In order to accomplish this, he interprets the aphoristic style as an expression of Nietzsche's philosophically grounded objections to system building and of his preference for posing questions rather than for giving answers: “Nietzsche,” Koufmann writes, “is, like Plato, not a system-thinker, but a problem-thinker”” (Nehamas, 1999, p.15).

And Nietzsche's biggest problem is life and the meaning we have attached to it throughout history.

On the other hand when we understand Nietzsche’s main problem is life itself, it can be understand why the language he uses is literary. Because if a language is built on expressing any phenomenon, situation or directly life itself, it must be dynamic, organic and alive like life itself. It is the only way to take life as it is. Therefore, while the perceived life is being transferred, the means of transmission, especially language, should be expressed with the most appropriate to the rhythm

of life. And every time this transfer is experienced, it should be able to give very different experiences and ideas, just like in life itself. This should be the only reason why Nietzsche used the language of poetry. Otherwise, he would contradict himself. On the other hand, the language used in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is similar to that of a holy book. And Zarathustra in the book is in fact a religious figure. We may speculate on why Nietzsche chose such a figure. One answer would be this: Humanity has always followed a religion and belief came into play at the point where the mind could not make sense of the life. Therefore, throughout history, many events, phenomena or objects in human life have been considered as holy but never life itself. In this respect, a holy language should be used to explain that what should be blessed is life in terms of sense and value. Therefore, Zarathustra and his imperious-masterful language should be used. The aim is to direct the traditional belief culture to the unconventional thoughts, that is, to the ideas that affirm life itself, in a customary holy language. After all, human is a process and he/she is so embedded in experiences that he/she has lost all his/her innocence. This is what the metaphor of child in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is about. "The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying." (Nietzsche F., 2006, p.17).

After trying to analyze the language used by Nietzsche in his philosophy, we can now proceed to analyze his philosophy intellectually, conceptually and methodically. We will try to analyze some of the concepts or certain thought clues expressed by Nietzsche in his works, deductively and as much as possible. At some points, we will try to understand his philosophy by referring to its partnership with Spinoza, who has tried to prove his philosophy through geometry as a method, and by clarifying their differences when necessary. Although Nietzsche claims that he differs from Spinoza in terms of philosophical thought and method, we will see that their commonality is not to be underestimated.

I think that emphasizing their partnership with Spinoza while referring to Nietzsche's philosophy will make Nietzsche's philosophy more accessible and understandable for I believe that Nietzsche was influenced by Spinoza immensely,

more than he admits. However, Spinoza's language which cannot be detached from the method he chose in *Ethics* is completely different from Nietzsche's. Thus, in this section that is why, while making the conceptual analysis of Nietzsche's philosophy, we will try to benefit from Deleuze's book *Nietzsche and Philosophy* as much as possible. Deleuze will accompany us as a very good guide at this point. Because, as we have mentioned before, Nietzsche's philosophy is almost closed to analysis because it is not systematic. For this reason, we can say that Deleuze's analysis, interpretations and especially the way of bringing concepts together and the way of connecting concepts that play a key role in Nietzsche's philosophy are more systematic because they are methodologically unique to Deleuze. Since Deleuze uses this analysis method in a similar way while examining Spinoza's philosophy, it will enable us to better see the commonality or difference of Nietzsche and Spinoza philosophies. Once and for all to summarize, in this section, I will dwell on how the idea of a pattern of relations, or of relationality which he borrowed from Spinoza grounded Nietzsche's philosophy. Therefore, we should first mention Nietzsche's concept of Genealogy. Especially if we consider the habits of knowledge and thought, which have been wearing countless masks, especially on the stage of history, are far removed from their own reality. From this point of view we can say the reality of knowledge itself can not be considered as something that has a reality in itself. Searching for an essence, a first cause or a starting point means nothing but incorporating a nonexistent reality into the history of knowledge. Therefore, not only historical but also every process of life should be analyzed in its own conditions without being isolated and decontextualized. And if Nietzsche's genealogy is taken as a method, this seems possible.

3.1. GENEALOGY

Nietzsche says that there are only interpretations, not facts. (NIETZSCHE, 1968, p. 267). Since, in Spinoza, the existence of limited existence, that is, of facts, is already relative perception, in fact, all reality means that all beings come into existence

together in a way that conditions each other's existence. And this situation of relational-formational coexistence is actually formed by an interpretation. While every interpretation, every existence conditions each other in terms of each other and passes into existence together, they are actually existences that gain meaning in terms of each other. And there is always a plurality of meanings, not a singular one. Meaning is not an expression of the tension between the subject and the object or a quality that each subject and the object has in itself. Becoming is always in a state of becoming, and this is a dynamic process. Even all occurrences are within uncertainties and probabilities. The fact that gaining reality for an existence is the interpretation of becomings by other becomings. Therefore, while interpretation allows us to construct and create reality, it also leads us to the conclusion that we are the ones who attribute sense and value to this reality.

In his *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze touches on two important concepts in Nietzsche's genealogical analysis, sense and value which always affirm themselves through a distance and difference in order to save themselves from the clutches of nihilism. (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p.1). Because the field of existence, which is an endless pattern of relations, also points to an endlessly extending network of causality. Therefore, wherever causality exists, a higher consciousness imposes itself. We have seen this approach in Spinoza too. Infinite causality necessitated the existence of absolute-substance with its infinite intelligence. Kant, on the other hand, deprived of his philosophy of infinity. However, adopting a Spinozian and/or Nietzschean attitude, we could argue that the problem with Kant, just like in science, is to reduce everything to a mental activity in order to limit the infinite. (Kant, 2022, p. 130-141). Because, as it is known, the main purpose of Kant's philosophy is to give a new basis to epistemology and to purify universal knowledge from certain paradoxes or uncertainties of metaphysics. According to Kant's epistemology, the first condition of knowledge is sensation (*Empfindung*). The data that appear to the mind through sensation are processed by the understanding through a priori forms, time and space. (Kant, 1998, p. 21). Since this is to ground the phenomenon called

knowledge, hence the reality outside of experience, it means to seek the sense and value of life, elsewhere. Especially if we consider that Nietzsche rejects the idea of essence, the Noumenon (Ding an sich) as the existential essence in Kant's philosophy is unacceptable. In Nietzsche's philosophy, on the other hand, sense and value are established independently of human consciousness, based on the struggle of certain power impulses and certain types of relationships.

Nietzsche places force impulses as necessary and constitutive elements at the foundation of his philosophy. The endless relationships that these impulses establish with each other over *distance or difference*⁷ is the creative element. Everything that exists exists with the endless struggle and the unity of these impulses. We can conclude that an existence established in this way both gets rid of all levels of consciousness (causality) and preserves its eternity. It both eliminates metaphysics and affirms meaning in life.

When Nietzsche borrowed the idea of - infinite pattern of relations (affection)- from Spinoza, he reduced it to the struggle of these two fundamental and constitutive drives, the *active* and *reactive*⁸, and their domination over each other, instead of basing it on absolute substance as in Spinoza. The strong point here is that it is possible to take the multilayered relationship itself as the founding principle and as such the idea of the relationship or of relationality itself as a founding principle also means the cancellation of the idea of essence. Because if there is a certain series of relations at the base of everything, everything that exists exists indirectly. Because it is always a context that makes existence possible. In this sense, it is necessary to rethink existence as infinitely relational, so that we can understand the contextual

⁷ Science allows us to define relations between phenomena through concepts such as equality, similarity and equivalence. The question to be asked here is: Do these types of relationships originate from nature's own structure or do we define artificial types of relationships between phenomena while creating our own reality? Nietzsche thinks that this is a strictly second kind of relationship. (Nietzsche, 1968, p.279). Therefore, the difference between phenomena is not something that is added to their relations later, on the contrary, it is a qualitative feature of phenomena.

⁸ Active and reactive essentially exist through a relationship of difference and distance. Therefore, in Nietzsche's philosophy, the activeness and reactivity of a force from the relationship of forces depends on the differences and distances in the relationship of this force with other forces. In other words, they can be thought of as the same impulses for the active-reactive and difference-distance forces relationship.

manifold structure of each existence. At this point, the art of interpretation, which Nietzsche calls genealogy, becomes necessary. Deleuze summarises genealogy as the following:

“We see that the art of interpreting must also be an art of piercing masks, of discovering the one that masks himself, why he does it and the point of keeping up the mask while it is being reshaped. That is to say that genealogy does not appear on the first night and that we risk serious misunderstanding if we look for the child’s father at the birth. The difference *in* the origin does not appear *at* the origin.” (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p. 5).

The art of genealogical interpretation should always be the analysis at any point in a movement process that accompanies life itself. And this analysis should be neither fundamentalist nor trajectory. Otherwise, the analysis itself can only be in an attitude towards the solution it wants to find, not the truth.

When examining Nietzsche's understanding of genealogy, Michel Foucault expresses why the idea of origin, which is frequently encountered on the stage of history, and the effort to attribute an essence to event-facts are futile:

“Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin (Ursprung), at least on those occasions when he is truly a genealogist? First, because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession. This search is directed to "that which was already there," the image of a primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity. However, if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is “something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.” (Foucault, 2011. p. 232-233).

Historical analysis can be a correct analysis as long as it reveals values in life and does this with an attitude that reveals difference, diversity, randomness, deficiencies and mistakes.

The idea that a phenomenon is identical with its origin cannot be discovered by following a linear timeline and reducing it to a simple cause-effect relationship.

Because the origin never appears as a pure result that can be isolated. Just as a present phenomenon is a state of infinite relationality, so a historically analyzed origin is an origin that is eternally related to the other origins. Therefore, the origin demands to be analyzed continuously, to be interpreted in different contexts, to become heterogeneous.

In this context Deleuze frequently uses a concept he calls the differential element while analyzing the multi-layered, infinitely relational coexistence in Nietzsche's philosophy. While trying to schematize the formation process of a body and its consciousness in particular, he always tries to explain the relations he has established between Nietzschean terms through the concept of differential element.

Because differential emerges as a method that can explain, analyze, and evaluate bodies and their relations at a level that will ground their co-existence. Being in such a relationship always means passing into existence in an indirect relationship through a difference and distance. Because differential emerges as a method that can explain, analyze and evaluate bodies and their relations at a level that will ground their co-existence. Being in such a relationship always means passing into existence in an indirect relationship through a difference and distance. Deleuze borrows this differential logic from mathematics. It is clear that macro bodies cannot base themselves on difference. But in the relation of infinitesimal bodies, difference (differential) plays a very critical role. Because the fullness (mass) of bodies in space is a relative situation. The bodies, which are infinitely related, always establish their relations over a distance, and while establishing a difference between them, they establish a relative existence relationship. According to Deleuze, infinitely small bodies and their relations are the basis of Spinoza's

philosophy, while in Nietzsche they are infinitely small forces. From the relative relationship of these forces, bodies come into existence heterogeneously (actively and reactively).

It will be easier to understand why Deleuze uses the concept of differential element if we try to outline some of such relationship definitions by quoting from *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and if we create its diagram:

- “The will to power is the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation.” (Deleuze, 2002, p.65).
- “A plurality of forces acting and being affected at distance, distance being the differential element included in each force and by which each is related to others - this is the principle of Nietzsche's philosophy of nature.” (Deleuze, 2002, p.6).
- “Forces have quantity, but they also have the quality which corresponds to their difference in quantity: the qualities of force are called “active” and “reactive”.” (Deleuze, 2002, p.61).
- “Evaluation is defined as the differential element of corresponding values, an element which is both critical and creative.” (Deleuze, 2002, p.16).
- “What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body - whether it is chemical, biological, social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship.” (Deleuze, 2002, p.55).
- “The great activity is unconscious. Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces which dominate them. Consciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do not know what a body can do, or what activity it is capable of.” (Deleuze, 2002, p.56).
- “The concept “reality,” “being,” is taken from our feeling of the “subject.”” (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 1968, 488 p. 269).




Diagram 1: Relation of concepts in Nietzsche's philosophy

In the diagram, I tried to summarize Deleuze's philosophy of Nietzsche. Note that Deleuze often uses the concept of differential element (difference and distance) to express the network of relationships between concepts. And as it will be remembered, Deleuze defined a similar relationality for Spinoza, using the very

concept of differential. The main reason for this situation is that the philosophies of Nietzsche and Spinoza are established in a very similar way as an endless relationship pattern (affections). While there is a philosophy built on the basis of infinitesimals and their relation in Spinoza, forces take the place of infinitesimals in Nietzsche. Although the concepts are different, the main thing that bases the philosophy of both philosophers is relations. In Nietzsche, the body is reached through the relationship of forces, in Spinoza, bodies and their relations are reached from the relationship of the infinitesimals. Therefore, Deleuze uses the same concept of differential when analyzing the philosophies of the two philosophers, which are built on similar relationality.

We briefly analyzed some of the concepts that form the foundations of Nietzsche's philosophy with the help of Deleuze. We will examine some of these concepts in detail, especially those related to the body, in order to base the body. But first, we need to address the place of the concept of consciousness in Nietzsche's philosophy, especially why it was preferred to the body in Nietzsche's philosophy, while it was prioritized throughout the history of thought.

3.2. CONSCIOUSNESS IN NIETZSCHE

Nietzsche explains the state and relationship of the mental and bodily worlds best with these two sentences:

“There exists neither “spirit,” nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no use.” (NIETZSCHE, 1968, p. 266).

“Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, there is a mighty lord, an unknown sage it is called Self; it dwelleth in thy body, it is thy body.

There is more sagacity in thy body than in thy best wisdom. And who then knoweth why thy body requireth just thy best wisdom?" (Nietzsche F., 2006, p.33).

So consciousness does not mean anything more than being in communication with the outside world as a body. Consciousness is simply a method of relating of bodies. Since the relationship it establishes is a multi-layered and indirect relationship, its depth and structure are differentiable. The phenomenon called consciousness is essentially just a matter of difference, a differential element.

"Consciousness usually only appears when a whole wants to subordinate itself to a superior whole . . . Consciousness is born in relation to a being of which we could be a function". This is the servility of consciousness; it merely testifies to the "formation of a superior body." (Deleuze, 2002, p.39).

In other words, consciousness is the relational integration of states or objects of which it is conscious. In other words, it is the interpretation of both the contextual and phenomenal coexistence of those things under the conditions of mental projection, rather than the direct sum of the things they are dealing with. Therefore, the established relationship is both cumulative and multi-layered. At this very point, Deleuze uses the term differential element to explain this multi-layered relationship while making a genealogical analysis of Nietzsche's concepts. Because while the differential explains this multi-layered and contextual relationship, it makes it possible to explain any situation or result by the parameters that it coexists with. Therefore, anything can be comprehended by analyzing it without being taken out of its context. This is precisely the explanation of Nietzsche's genealogical analysis as we mentioned earlier. Because anything always establishes both a formational and interactional relationship with everything else with which it is related.

At this very point, it is necessary to analyze correctly that the real nature of the so-called 'sublime' phenomenon, which is called consciousness and which supposedly separates us from all other living things, is not the ability to comprehend everything. The competence of consciousness is not to grasp the thing as it is. Here, a very basic

relational necessity, which we can call ‘relative rightness’ (NIETZSCHE, 1968, p. 266)., is included in the ability to understand. Because there is no way of understanding that can perceive nature in its purest form without interfering.

On the other hand Descartes in his philosophy after suspending what he knew so far, began to seek what could be considered true. At this point, Descartes reached the proposition “Ergo Sum (as I think I am something.)” (Descartes, 1998, p.18). And by this proposition Descartes claims a subject as the cause of an object, not just imposing its own existence on the reality of the object while a subject perceives an object. Nietzsche objects to this:

““There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks” : this is the upshot of all Descartes’ argumentation. But that means positing as “true a priori” our belief in the concept of substance— that when there is thought there has to be something “that thinks” is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed. In short, this is not merely the substantiation of a fact but a logical-metaphysical postulate.” (NIETZSCHE, 1968, p. 268).

In this sense, it is possible to see the explanation of the annulment of the essence and the subject even from this point alone. Because the phenomenon called subject is an illusion (Nietzsche F. , 2006, p.26)., it imposes itself on the action itself, as in Descartes, in order to activate its own existence-existence process so that it can be included in the truth. Therefore, this classifying understanding that imposes a necessary existence on every possibility, on every potential, is also the founder of an attitude that excludes infinite possibility.

Because, first of all, according to Nietzsche, although the relational unity is placed on an artificial plane by consciousness, this artificiality also rearranges the situation between becoming and being. (NIETZSCHE, 1968, p. 330). Because consciousness has always been thought of as the condition of the states in which it is conditioned. Although the cause and effect relationship is thought to be established at the point of becoming conscious of a situation, it has often been misconstrued that there is a consciousness in itself in this relationship. While order

is the selectivity of the seeing eye in perception, the mind, which is not even conscious of its own consciousness, tries to attribute the whole order to a higher mind and carries the formation to a metaphysical field. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how becoming is grounded in Nietzsche's philosophy and how it is transferred from its relation with consciousness to the field of existence.

3.3. BECOMING AND BEING IN NIETZSCHE

According to Nietzsche, there is only becoming and there is no being.

“Becoming is not a merely apparent state; perhaps the world of beings is mere appearance. Consequently one must ask how the illusion of being could have arisen (was bound to arise); likewise: how all value judgments that rest on the hypothesis that there are beings are disvalued. But here one realizes that this hypothesis of beings is the source of all world-defamation (— the “better world,” the “true world,” the “world beyond,” the “thing-in-itself.”)” (NIETZSCHE, 1968, p. 378).

These so-called worlds have been produced-created throughout history by thought. Because thought cannot grasp becoming. When thought grasps becoming, it reduces it to being. In other words, being is the re-establishment of becoming by means of making sense of it (comprehending, practicing, processing). When becoming turns into an idea or knowledge, it is detached from its real context. Exactly at this point, the movement called life, which consists only of becoming, is limited and objectified. Since one's ability to comprehend and then intervene reduces everything from becoming to being, it falls into certainty (singularity) from probability. For the probability of becoming is always plural. So when we try to make sense of singularity of being we think we discover essence in it. And when if the singularity is a human, then the essence becomes the subject. That is why Descartes, who evaluates the subject in the context of causality (*cogito ergo sum*), constructs the whole reality through the subject.

“‘The subject’ : interpreted from within ourselves, so that the ego counts as a substance, as the cause of all deeds, as a doer.

Psychological derivation of our belief in reason.—The concept “reality,” “being,” is taken from our feeling of the “subject.”” (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 1968, 488 p. 269).

According to Nietzsche becoming is reconstructed at every moment, while grasping the becoming as the being constituted at the moment and as the moments are constrained by perception. But this reconstitution is thought of as a comeback, the return of the same (in the sense of becoming). On the other hand, it is not exactly the same. Because the condition of becoming is transformation. Therefore, it does not come back to the same. It exists in the moment of becoming. Being passes into becoming in order to exist again at the next moment. That's why being transforms to becoming. Rather, it returns to its own existence. But what comes back is not the same, the same being does not stay the same when it comes back. In this sense, re-establishment in time as a dynamic of becoming is always a return, according to Nietzsche's philosophy. (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 2017, 1066.- 1067. p.1579-1586). According to Deleuze, Heraclitus sees this dynamic of becoming as a game and reinterprets this idea for Nietzsche: “The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow - the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back.” (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p.25). The point to be noted is that all these inferences are built on the assumption that time consists of moments.

Rolling the dice once is an interpretation of chance. The combination they form while falling is the necessity. Chance, in Heraclitus is the possibility of becoming, in Spinoza it is eternal existence, Necessity represents being in Heraclitus and limited (relative) existence in Spinoza. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, chance⁹

⁹ “Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no accident (chance); for only against a world of purposes does the word ‘accident (chance)’ have a meaning. Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is only a form of what is dead, and a very rare

is chaos. Necessity is destiny. On the other hand, to look for clues of any purposefulness or causality with the dynamism between chance and destiny is essentially to roll the same dice many times and wait for the expected result, instead of affirming the plurality in one throw of the same dice. According to Nietzsche, this is the causality with which the mind builds its cobwebs. (Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, 2016, p. 448). As Deleuze writes: “To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity - these are all the operations of a bad player.” (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p. 27). This is exactly why Nietzsche sees consciousness as a place of delusion. He tries to establish the main activity on unconscious. As we have seen, according to Spinoza, causality is something that transcends existences, its essence is in substance (in nature). Therefore, necessity is not grounded in the relation of chaos to chance in the throw of the dice, as in Nietzsche, but as the condition of eternal existence. Here again, there is no purposefulness to be attributed to consciousness. And in Spinoza, consciousness is not a place of deception, but rather the condition of necessity, as Nietzsche puts it, out of coincidence. In fact, it can be said that in order for consciousness to be a place of deception, it must first be the source of necessity. Because only the causal one can be necessary. How else can necessity make itself necessary if becoming, where the dice falls, imposes itself as necessity, and while there is no purposefulness? Yes, necessity as self-affirmation of chance is necessary in Nietzsche's philosophy. But chance only destroys purpose, not causality. For causality presupposes a pattern of existential relations, not purposiveness. Therefore, causality is not an illusion of consciousness. That's why, just as Spinoza said; causality is necessary as the condition of limited existence, and therefore also as the condition of time and space. Because, as we have seen, according to Spinoza, causality plays an active role in the conditioning of the absolute substance's own

form.” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 2017, p. 110). Because chance is purposeless. This necessarily presupposes purpose. When we use the word ' chance ' in Nietzsche's philosophy, it should be understood not as accidental parts of the purposive world, but as the quality of chaotic life, devoid of any order or purpose.

existence. Therefore, the necessity of causality and the absoluteness of substance were existentially overlapping concepts. But in Nietzsche causality itself is seen as an illusion of the intellectual process.

At this point, we can define the main difference between Spinoza and Nietzsche as follows: While in Nietzsche, time appears as a phenomenon that traverses the infinite becoming beyond being, determines its path, and even sometimes attributes eternity to becoming; in Spinoza it is causality that performs this task. Since time is included in the field of existence, it is limited with it.¹⁰ It is causality that transcends everything. Therefore, the endless relationship pattern is established through time in Nietzsche and causality in Spinoza. The reason why Nietzsche could not attribute this task to causality is, as we mentioned before, causality presupposes a consciousness according to Nietzsche. That would mean contradicting himself. The interesting point is that while causality can easily explain an infinite pattern of relationships (affection), time can only attribute an infinity to this relationship. Because time does not become a constitutive element of a contextual relationship beyond this. At this point, Nietzsche tries to make up for this gap with a relationship of forces, their struggle or the formational affirmation of their difference. In this way, he finds a way to keep the world of becoming alive, to save it from nihilism with the endless cycle of time and to keep it alive. Therefore, it is necessary to examine Nietzsche's theory of forces in order to clarify the differences between the theory of forces and the scientific one and to explore its formational side.

¹⁰ "When we conceive quantity abstracted from substance, we can mark off quantities in any way we please; and when we separate duration from the way it flows from eternal things, we can mark off durations in any way we please; and so we come by time and measure—time to determine duration and measure to determine quantity—making both easier to imagine. When we separate the affections of substance from substance itself, and put them into classes so as to make them easier to imagine, we come by number, which we employ in counting them." (Spinoza B. , p. 16).

3.4. NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF FORCES

As we have seen the active and reactive impulses are defined as forces in Nietzsche. What does that mean? in order to understand the role of forces in Nietzsche, we should refer to Newton.

Newton assumed the existence of a force between two massive masses directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them to explain the action of the earth's rotation around the sun. However, the theoretical phenomenon called force is nothing but an indirect, reductionist and hypothetical mental representation of relational states based on results. It has no reality in itself. We often use the concept of force, to explain certain relations in our perception of the universe, which Spinoza describes as an endless pattern of relations, and which seems to be consistent only for the sake of operational convenience in practice, but also to explain other relation patterns. Although it is used as a much more basic interaction tool in Nietzsche, it is imperative to look at the scientific dimension of this theory of forces in terms of priority.

When an active object interacts with another object, it creates an effect in proportion to the size of the interaction. In response to this effect, a reaction occurs in the opposite object due to the desire of each object to preserve its state (inaction). It is assumed that the active and reactive forces are of the same magnitude but in opposite directions. In this respect, it is obvious that the source of the reaction force is inertia. The source of the active forces is active energy in transfer, it is dispersive and sometimes transformable (increasing entropy).

On the other hand, one of the scientific approaches that causes the greatest misunderstandings is the negligence we fall into when we try to understand or explain the interaction phenomenon, when we perceive the interaction as a contact or zero distance. Because we think of what we experience while holding a glass or touching a table in our daily life as a zero-distance interaction. However, what actually happens is that no object in this universe interacts with any other object at

zero distance, nor can it do so. Behind all this intertwinedness, many distances are actually hidden. From this point of view alone, it is possible to sense that there is already a paradigm shift in terms of interactions and coexistence. Because it is clear that all interactions require certain distances as a prerequisite, and it assumes spatial interaction, which we can characterize as an interaction area in the measure of distances through these distances. At this point, it would be appropriate to explain what we mean by the field of interaction scientifically.

We have mentioned that this rotation activity is a relational relation originating from the gravitational force as the earth revolves around the sun. Such an effort to understand is no different from imagining the existence of an invisible thread stretched between two masses. According to Einstein's *General Theory of Relativity*, instead of each object interacting directly with other objects and attracting each other through certain forces, each object creates an interaction field by creating certain curvatures in the four-dimensional space-time universe fabric in proportion to its own mass. (Einstein, 2021, p. 203-204-205-206). And it indirectly establishes its interaction with other objects through this field. If we want to clarify the differences between Newton's and Einstein's interaction theories from this perspective, we can explain the two most important differences as follows:

In Newton, the interaction is established directly. Since zero distance is assumed in action and reaction, there is a direct interaction. Distance, on the other hand, is conceived as a phenomenon that only reduces the amount of interaction inversely proportional to its square and is articulated to it from the outside.

In Einstein, on the other hand, interaction is indirect and distance is a founding principle of interaction. It is not thought of as something that is articulated afterwards, but as a prior and necessary phenomenon that makes interaction possible.

From this point of view, we have scientifically arrived at the two basic properties of nature designed by Einstein, without making any reductions, unlike Newton, in terms of interactions:

1) Distance is a necessary and constitutive principle.

2) Relations are never direct, but always indirect, as they require the existence of a field of interaction (distance).

Coming back to Nietzsche, we should emphasise that Nietzsche's theory of forces does not necessarily mean the same as Newtonian forces. Because forces and their relations add sense to existence, just as a formational activity characterizes the fact that it has not come into existence yet. From this point of view, we can say that the forces have no object, as in the Newtonian one. And these forces are the constitutive differential elements of active and reactive impulses that require only difference and distance, and as such they are only in direct relation with each other, which establish existence in a very indirect way.

I argue that trying to understand Nietzsche's concept of force in the sense of Einstein's physics rather than forces in Newton's physics will help us to understand it, at least in terms of establishment, although not directly. Therefore, it would be appropriate to examine how a becoming passes into existence as a body.

3.5. BODY IN NIETZSCHE

According to Nietzsche the mind is the instrument of the body. Human's greatest wisdom is his/her own body. (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 2017, 676., p.1053). Even the wisest mind itself cannot fully comprehend into its own body. Nor is the body a place of superiority or humiliation, for its competence is not superficial to be measured and weighed. For this reason alone, human, as a thinking animal, is not superior to other animals. Because thought is nothing but a tool that is affected by the relationship of the body with other bodies and works this influence. Therefore, the perception of the superiority of the soul over the body, which is the mistake of the mind, is again an indicator of the inadequacy of the mind in relation to the body. Because, according to Nietzsche, firstly the lives and then the bodies

in which the lives are singular can never be shallow enough to be an object of comparison. In any case, in order for something to turn into an object of comparison, it must first be reduced to a measurable level, that is, to a unitary being level by being cut off from its becoming context by the mind. Therefore, the awareness of our being in becoming in this life is essentially negligible. Because, according to Nietzsche, consciousness is only capable of perceiving being, not becoming. Thus, the physical singularization (being) and the relationship it establishes with the outside of itself is also a very superficial relationship. Therefore, for Nietzsche, just like for Spinoza, consciousness cannot be the condition of its existence. Because consciousness is only the part of the self that is affected by the outside world. The main effect, that is, the main action that characterizes the existence of the body, occurs with the forces and the relations of these forces. They exist as a force tension or a force's resistance to a force.

Modern science also produces theories that can be considered similar. For example, the so-called inert mass is considered to be a very high energy density. On the other hand, an object with a inert mass creates an effect in the field of existence, just like an object with a larger mass, in proportion to the free energy it has. The point to be noted here is that the phenomenon called mass essentially corresponds to an interaction rate. Because it doesn't matter whether the energy is in a free or concentrated form. What matters is always the type of interaction or rate of interactions that is meant to be expressed, whether expressed as mass, energy, or in some cases momentum or force. Concepts such as mass or energy are a measure of interaction. Albert Einstein proves with a thought experiment that action (movement) and inertia (inaction) are the same thing in terms of being in interaction with this world and that both situations create same mass effect in the field of existence. With his elevator experiment in space, Einstein claims that the inertial force due to accelerated motion is actually the same thing as gravity. In other words, he states that the effect of the stationary mass of an object and the effect of its accelerated motion are the same. This tells us that; something exists as much as the effect it creates in its environment, which means its own mass. Because the force

of inertia is the measure of the resistance that an object creates in itself as a result of producing an effect or reacting. In other words, inertia, as a unit of active (force) resistance, is actually the same as gravity, that is, the mass existence of an object, that is, the effect (collaption) it creates in the environment where it exists with a certain movement-vibration or rest ratio. So in fact, as it should be stated again that each mass is a measure of the effect ratio.

In Spinoza, very similarly, limited existences, that is, as an explanation of being in space, mass existences gain their limitations, that is, their masses, at a certain relation of movement and rest. This is the inert (rest) mass of an object. Let me dwell on this more.

An existence gains mass at a -certain relation of movement and rest- in the field of existence, that is, together with other limited existences and in relation to them. This is its mass nature . The relation of movement and rest is actually the mass gain of an active situation as a result of its reactive existence (being). This is where the confusion is. Conatus is essentially active. Beings at a certain relation of movement and rest seems reactive because they are the reaction of this activity (Conatus). Because according to Nietzsche being is reaktive in terms of being a part of consciousness.

Thus, I agree with Nietzsche: All limited beings, consciousness and their knowledge, namely science, is reactive.¹¹ But he is wrong about Spinoza's conatus. Because Nietzsche interprets Spinoza's *conatus* as inertia and understands it as an instinct for self-preservation in his book *The Gay Science*:

¹¹ "Nietzsche shows that science is part of the ascetic ideal and serves it in its own way (GM III 25). But we must also look for the instrument of nihilistic thought in science. The answer is that science, by inclination, understands phenomena in terms of reactive forces and interprets them from this standpoint. Physics is reactive in the same way as biology; things are always seen from the petty side, from the side of reactions. The instrument of nihilistic thought is the triumph of reactive forces." (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p. 44).

“To wish to preserve oneself is a sign of distress, of a limitation of the truly basic life-instinct, which aims at *the expansion of power* and in so doing often enough risks and sacrifices self-preservation. It is symptomatic that certain philosophers, such as the consumptive Spinoza, took and indeed had to take just the so-called self-preservation instinct to be decisive: - they were simply people in distress. That today's natural sciences have become so entangled with the Spinozistic dogma (most recently and crudely in Darwinism with its incredibly one-sided doctrine of ‘the struggle for existence’ -) is probably due to the descent of most natural scientists: in this regard they belong to ‘the people’, their ancestors were poor and lowly folks who knew all too intimately the difficulty of seraping by.” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 2017, p. 207-208).

But conatus is an expression of being active. It is perceived as reactive when it determines the external relations between objects as its effect in a limited space, that is, as a force of inertia. Because inertia is understood as a reaction to a stagnation or an external influence, if any. Therefore, inertia is a concept used in natural sciences, as Nietzsche writes, and is understood as an internal reaction that each body has in proportion to its mass. There is no activity, dynamic or mobility of this inner state. Because it is understood as consisting of an object forming a reaction upon the request to protect its state against any effect. As such, this reaction cannot be articulated as an impulse to existence as an explanation of passivity. More precisely, it cannot condition existence or determine its genesis. Spinoza's conatus is also considered to be reactive because it is confused with such an understanding of inertia. More precisely, since science misinterpreted inertia until a certain period, the idea of conatus was misunderstood accordingly. But Einstein, who was also a Spinoza admirer, offered an ‘active’ understanding of the concept of inertia, perhaps thanks to his correct understanding of Spinoza.¹²

¹² Meanwhile, in Spinoza's philosophy, the concept of time is considered as a feature of ‘limited being’ or ‘limited perception’. (Spinoza B. , p. 16). Similarly, according to Einstein, in *Relativity: The Special and The General Theory*; time is a genesis part of the structure of the universe, which is considered as the fabric of ‘space-time’.

As Einstein stated, an activity on an object gives it mass; in addition to its stationary mass. This means that an object's own activity, that is, the dynamics in the conditions in which it exists, can give it mass. In other words, the phenomenon called mass is actually always the expression of an activity in a field of existence. In other words, the mass of an object even when it is stationary is actually an expression of activity. Therefore, when Einstein says that inertia and gravity are the same things (Einstein, 2021, p. 125)., he actually means that active and reactive are the same things with Nietzsche's concepts, but only to the extent that the active necessitates the reactive.

From this point of view, Nietzsche thinks that the real places of activity of becomings are outside of non-scientific, unconsciously limited existences. As it will be remembered, the outside of the limited was infinite. This is thought to be the case in Nietzsche's philosophy as well. This is where the difference between Spinoza and Nietzsche emerges. Spinoza considers the infinite as nature, the absolute substance, Nietzsche, on the other hand, as will to power. However, I believe that the difference is not as big as Nietzsche claims; on the contrary, Spinoza's accounts of conatus and nature in their relation to the idea of infinity is similar to Nietzsche's account of the will to power and its relation to infinity. Will to power is the place of eternity, of chaos. Since existences are also limited, the establishment of the finite from infinity is possible through endless random repetition. Nietzsche will call this eternal return.

3.6. THE WILL TO POWER, ETERNAL RETURN AND CONCEPT OF TIME IN NIETZSCHE

It may be contextually inconvenient to examine separately the concepts of Eternal Return, Will to Power and Time, whose meanings we can at least reach directly in Nietzsche's philosophy, and which also play a very key role. Because each concept gains meaning together with other concepts. Therefore, in this section, we will try to understand how it conditions and requires one over the other without breaking

this unity. Nietzsche talks about the idea of eternal return, which he sees as the ‘greatest weight’ of necessity and which can be described as a thought experiment in his book *The Gay Science*:

“The heaviest weight. - What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence - even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!’ Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: ‘You are a God, and never have I heard anything more divine.’ If this thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing, ‘Do you want this again and innumerable times again?’ would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 2017, p. 194-195).

The idea of eternal return appears more as a thought experiment in Nietzsche's philosophy. But rather than the value of life, it is a thought experiment to impose itself as an extreme necessity. It's a thought experiment that tries to imagine an endless affirmation. Because if a life is lived in a limited way, its responsibility is not taken enough and this life comes as a trust to the person. Therefore, after a while, it loses its meaning and falls into the clutches of nihilism. But if this life is our only option, in which we will inevitably live again and again and again and

again, it will necessarily affirm itself to us. *Amor fati*¹³ becomes obligatory in this way. Necessity turns into love after a while. Because one begins to see, accepts, and the idea that it is better or worse than any other life, or any other life imagined or imposed as success, is abandoned. Every life is worth living. For better or worse, it's an illusion. Therefore, the idea of eternal return is a thought experiment to affirm the cycle of Nietzsche's concept of infinite time and to take this cycle and necessity away from causality and deliver it to the spontaneity of life. Because for Nietzsche, no repetition is a repetition of the same. A transformation is always essential. The repetition of the same mentioned above, the necessary repetition of the finite in infinite time, leads us to a contradiction. Nietzsche calls this the mechanistic interpretation of the world. (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 2001, p. 976-978). Because the mechanistic interpretation sees the becomings only as limited through consciousness. Therefore, it leaves the finite to nothingness on an endless path. In Nietzsche, time is the companion of the will to power and even the determinant of its path. So the *will* cannot ask to return. Time stipulates one-sidedness, to the path of the will to power. Because the return of the endless stretch of the one-way road is only possible with the eternal return.

In fact, time is the only point in Nietzsche's philosophy that we can describe as transcendent.¹⁴ And the idea of eternal return is the project of eliminating the contradiction of time. But in the name of misinterpretation of life.

Nietzsche asks: "Shouldn't everything that will happen in infinite time, or rather everything that is included in time, lived and happened at least once in this eternity?" (Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, 2016, p. 427). This is a valid inference. After all, if time is infinite and beings are limited, what happened must have happened at least once before. It is from this idea that Nietzsche puts forward the ideas of eternal return. The finite in eternity returns

¹³ Affirmation in all aspects of life, as harmoniously as possible.

¹⁴ For the eternal return is the only thing to which everything bows and must follow. And the eternity of eternal return is also a quality of time. In this sense, it can be said that time is Transcendent as something that transcends everything. But since there is no metaphysical aspect in Nietzsche, this eternity should be understood not as transcendence but as immanence.

endlessly. In addition, we can say that if the past or the future is infinite, the moment is also infinite. Because eternity is not a being. At best, it is to continue to be in the state of becoming. As such, the moments that make becoming eternally possible must also exist endlessly. On the other hand, moments that will exist forever in the future cannot be moments that have existed forever. For what has been must have ended in the present moment in order to at least have been. And to qualify as a past, one must have at least one lived beginning. From this point of view, Nietzsche concludes that time is cyclical, otherwise he cannot attribute eternity to the past. Failing that, he would have to assign a starting point to the past. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, both the past and the future consist of eternally existing moments. Since it is cyclical, the past establishes itself as the new future, and the future as the repetition of the last past (with a non-identical repetition).

If Nietzsche had approached the idea of eternal return from a mechanistic point of view, as we have mentioned before, he would have seen that endless repetition is the repetition of the same. But it is the will to power that saves the eternal return from this vortex. Because the traveler of the infinite time path is the will to power. The will to power is also infinite. And every becoming is the expression of being an existence that is swept away in a sea of power that changes and transforms in the struggle of power and returns to itself again. As such, infinity (power) that traverses eternity (time) never repeats itself.

The will to power is the condition for life to transcend itself. Life creates values and through this it constantly surpasses itself, obeying and commanding. His last obedience is death. The first commandment of life is to be in a relationship. It is subject to the spirit. Human is free and creative in the construction of the world that will imprison him/her. It is already a prisoner during grasping and creating. However, life is something that must constantly overcome itself. But life that overcomes itself permeates not only in singular existences, but in all time, especially by using singularities as a stepping stone. This also coincides with the historical idea of an organism that prevents nihilism from blooming in the human psyche. This is the idea of the whole in the whole. This idea makes itself felt in the

singularities of practical life as a lineage or an impulse to transcend time. But in fact, Nietzsche says, the source of the leaps in the act of transcending himself from life to life is the will to power. (Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, 2016, p. 321). Because my spirit will walk with someone else's feet. Because I am always someone else in eternal return. Because what comes back is never the same. That's why the only answer life can accept is 'yes'.

Then if everything is accidental, if there is no essence-subject, if the only way to live this life is to accompany, if there is no free will, if there is no right or wrong, how can we talk about an ethical life?

3.7. NIETZSCHE'S ETHICS

It is not possible to talk about free will in Nietzsche's philosophy, just as free will in Spinoza is annulled due to endless causal relations. According to Nietzsche, free will is nothing but an illusion. Free will is a means of concealing weakness in order to legitimize the morality of the herd people, who are at the level of consciousness where reactive forces rule, even to make them superior to the active ones. In fact, Nietzsche claims that there is never a subject or consciousness behind actions, wills or choices. Just because of this illusion of free will, imagining the existence of a subject who wants it behind every choice means adding a virtual constructor to existence. This is just a linguistic and intellectual mistake. (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 2016, p. 47-48-49). When describing the reactive force (inertia), for example, we say the desire to preserve the state it is in, which means assuming a consciousness that wants it. Or, when describing the active force (entropy), we say inclination towards infinite-maximum disorder. Again, we assume an inclining consciousness. We also imagine absolute consciousness when these supposed consciousnesses are too infinitely human to be specific.

So, how can an understanding of ethics be established if there is no subject, there is no willing consciousness, therefore there is no free will, and the concepts of good and bad are relative concepts?

Even if such an ethical understanding could be established, the objection most likely to falsify this view would probably be the following: It is a known fact that some, if not all, of her/his actions are pre-planned in her/his mind for certain purposes and then he acts. If this is not free will, what is?

As we mentioned above, concepts such as purpose and intention are misconceptions such as 'action requires a subject' resulting from the incorrect setup of the language. But what could it mean to at least be aware?

Right at this point, it is necessary to first touch upon the body from the endless pattern of relations, memory through the body, and finally consciousness through memory and body. So that we can see that mental activity is actually nothing but bodily interaction.

In Nietzsche's philosophy, all bodies, all relations, all thoughts, everything that happens exist in the relationship of the active and the reactive forces. While reactive forces are dominant in everything that contains order, active forces are competent in disorder. As it will be remembered, while making the scientific analysis of the active and the reactive, we explained that the active tends to maximum disorder, and the reactive tends to maintain the state of -inertia-order-. Therefore, when Nietzsche says, consciousness is basically reactive, (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p.41). it is clear that consciousness is in a structure to comprehend only the regular and limited, originating from the forms of time and space. It will be seen that all this structure is peculiar to the structure of the reactive that Nietzsche is talking about. In other words, Nietzsche does not falsify Kant, in fact, he shows once again how narrowly he looks at reality when Nietzsche says, the basic activity is the unconscious. (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p. 41).

So what could be the unconscious?

It seems that the unconscious must first be a cumulative field rather than a singular field like consciousness. It's exactly like a memory or a cumulative multiplicity of influences. Considering that time is the succession of singular moments and space is cumulative, it would be appropriate to argue that memory is spatial or bodily based solely on this.

Even if the mind has a manifold structure, it is necessary for the activity called memory to take place in the body due to its inability to be cumulative. Consider a person who is forced to do heavy labor. It is difficult at first, but over time, he begins to do the same things more comfortably. Because the body muscles are now developed. The body has become adaptable to the conditions for which it is not suitable. Or we can think about the body's immunity against diseases. In short, the body works like a record book. Although it is sufficient to contain the traces of all kinds of interactions or encounters cumulatively to explain the phenomenon called memory, this type of activity is mostly valid for inanimate beings. In addition to this kind of bodily memory in living things, there are many more complex memory activities that we can call emotional, intuitive and even hormonal. Therefore, when the body is exposed to an infinite pattern of relationships (affection), it registers certain changes on itself depending on the extent of being affected. Similarly, in the Ethics, when Spinoza talks about this kind of influence, he mentions about proportional influence between the human body and the cognition of the mind rather than an interaction between the bodies. (Spinoza, 2021, p.33). As it can be seen, in all things, there are interactions that occur outside of our perception, where, as Nietzsche says, active forces dominate and disorder prevails.

Therefore, the phenomenon called awareness refers to interactions in which reactive forces are active. That is, it describes the types of interactions where order is relatively higher. If I have an intuition or a feeling about the thing I am interacting with, it will be an orderly, limited, relatively definable type of interaction between me and that thing that I have probably experienced a similar example before. But if

I engage in an interaction directly on the conscious level, not on a purely intuitive or emotional level, it will be an interaction that can be defined, categorised, inclined to the highest order. So mental awareness is the explanation for such an interaction that increases at the rate of inclination towards order.

When Deleuze says, “Like Freud, Nietzsche thinks that consciousness is the region of the self that is affected by the outside world.” (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2002, p. 39). the consciousness he is referring to here is a consciousness that can only be aware of its actions, not as a phenomenon whose actions are shaped in line with certain purposes. That is why the conclusion that can be drawn from Nietzsche’s philosophy is that a person can only be responsible for his own actions. Not the goals or underlying intentions of the actions.

This radical perspective offers us a new understanding of ethics. This means that every existence interacts with the outside world within its own sphere of activity¹⁵ within the pattern of endless relations. This domain of activity is also a domain of competent existence as the founding principle of the existence of a body. Every entity is an entity as effectively as possible. Therefore, each entity is responsible for its actions as much as its level of interaction. Because as the level of interaction increases, awareness increases, and as it decreases, it decreases. In order to better explain the effect of responsibility and awareness on ethical behavior, an example would be more effective:

¹⁵ Sphere of activity is essentially about being local. Each existence is only as active as its own sphere of activity within the endless pattern of relations. And this state of being active characterizes the existence of existence. As it will be remembered, relationships were always built through distances. And these distances determine the competence level of being active as a founding element. This is what we call being local. That is, an existence operates in areas close to itself in space. And the greater the intimacy, the greater the competence to be effective. This also applies to the concept of time. No existence is in the same moment. Because being at the same time is actually the measure of how a relationship is direct. To illustrate: two people talking face-to-face means they're interacting almost simultaneously. Yet they are not at the same time. Because even when talking, there are delays in the transmission of sound waves due to the distance requirement of this process. Thus, the greater the distance (spatial or temporal) between the two bodies that come into contact, the greater the indirectness. For example, it takes about 8 minutes for the sun's rays to reach the earth. Therefore, the sun we see now is the sun 8 minutes ago.

While a man is one hundred percent responsible when he kills a woman, another man, who is the bearer and instigator of a patriarchal mentality, is still at least slightly responsible for any femicide that takes place all over the world due to this mentality, even if he does not commit murder himself.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, especially in the context of Nietzsche and Spinoza; the main subject of interest in the commonality and difference of these two philosophers is the discovery of the body as a founding element in this world, regardless of its cause-source, through infinite relational mediation. This was our main purpose in this thesis, to state that the essential thing is this world, without making any reference to any metaphysical field, and to seek a way of philosophy in which we can evaluate all existences within their own conditions of existence. Although Spinoza did not try to ground the ontological explanation of this world on the basis of the human mind, we saw that also he established his philosophy by referring to the concept of God, and therefore to metaphysical perspectives or thought structures. But ultimately, Spinoza tries to show that the meaning of the whole universe, including God, is one and the same, from a pantheistic point of view, instead of looking for the meaning of this world in other worlds. He does this with an infinite context of relationality and an infinite chain of necessary causation. In its basis, there are bodies and the relations of these bodies (affection).

On the other hand, claiming that bodies and the relations of these bodies are at the heart of Spinoza's philosophy does not mean limiting this philosophy or reducing it to some mechanistic ideas. Also this point of view simply does not have just a scientific subtext. Because, as will be remembered, Spinoza claims that we are not aware of the limits of the body. Similarly, Nietzsche claimed to see the body as a much more exciting and complex phenomenon than the soul. Therefore, the philosophy of the body, we can say makes possible a much deeper connection that can be established between the philosophy of Nietzsche and Spinoza.

Occasionally, we claimed that these two philosophers put forward similar ideas in terms such as Conatus-Will to Power, while Nietzsche saw causality as an illusion of the mind, Spinoza included it as the most fundamental phenomenon in his philosophy, and we saw that there are sharp distinctions between them. They differed on many points similar to these, and at many points they based their

philosophy on similar claims. But the body and the bodily infinite relations, as an immanent ontology that adds sense and value to this life at the highest level and makes an ethical existence possible, is the most important subject of this thesis as well as the most important partnership of Nietzsche and Spinoza in our opinion.

In this way, Nietzsche and Spinoza pave the way for a re-understanding of existence as co-existence. This is the point that needs to be understood in the context of the endless pattern of relationships in their philosophies; being in unity-unity in being. In this way, every being discovers the existence of meaning and the meaning of its existence in the relationality of unity. Existence is established in the common and contributes to understanding alongside its own meaning, at the level of a plural partnership. This commonality of meaning, which increases as we encounter with other bodies, builds the representation of a co-existence in diversity and contingency. Because the foundational condition of existence is always relations or the capacity of relationality. Life attains its true value only when it is understood as living together. Thus, for both philosophers, the source of meaning and value in life should not be sought in the intellectual field as consciousness alone, detached from its intrinsic relation to the body, is not capable of comprehending life.

In particular, a limited mind that sees the body as the prison of the mind, or rather a mind that is only capable of perceiving the limited, or a mind that attributes the limit to what it perceives simply because of its perception, tries to understand the unlimited through intellectual intuition has created many paradoxical situations. This point of view has opened a philosophical field called metaphysics, which cannot go beyond being speculative, from past to present.

For both Spinoza and Nietzsche, however, we should start from the body and the bodily relations for it is primarily the body that establishes our relationship with life in the most organic way. Because the level of bodily awareness is the expression of a rhythm that overlaps with life. But not in a relation of intellectual awareness or understanding, but by surrendering to life itself, affirming it, being with it; not reciprocally, but together in plurality, accompanying in creation. Therefore, when

we think in the name of life (nature), creating means giving birth. It's never about building. Building is to attribute meaning to life rather than finding life meaningful. Because when the mind tries to comprehend something, it makes sense of something instead of finding sense in it with the relationship of togetherness. So in this case finding is making (building-constructing)¹⁶. In other words, the human mind makes sense of everything based on itself. But the philosophy of discovering the real dynamics of life should start from a point of view that is not human at the center and with an existence as becoming in this world. Perhaps, ethically, the most human perspective will be discovered in a non-human-centered field. Because as we know very ironically and from a similar point of view, for thousands of years we thought that the center of the universe was the earth. And now we know that the earth is no different from a speck of dust in this universe. It seems that the mistake of the mind against the body contains a very similar error. Therefore, life should be understood in terms of bodies and their affections.

An ethical life seems possible precisely from such a point of view. Approaching life as something we are a part of, grasping it without marginalizing should be the only way to be ethical. As it will be remembered, according to both Nietzsche and Spinoza, there was neither good nor bad, neither freedom nor free will. It was just bodies, their encounters and relationships. Therefore, each body is active in its own area of existence, competent to the extent of its effectiveness, and is responsible for its own existence and actions to the extent of this competence, in an infinite relationship. Apart from this, subjecting events and facts to generally accepted evaluations, setting rules and trying to ground these rules in metaphysical fields, and articulating artificial understandings of freedom is nothing but a futile effort.

Because what is essentially good or bad is not the events or phenomena that occur within the functioning of nature's own dynamics, but the interpretation of them according to us. A thing can only perform comparative actions that we can define

¹⁶ But building is not 'forming' in the sense of producing meaning. Because when the meaning is considered in the context of Nietzsche, it should always be understood through relationships of forces. And forces, from Nietzsche's perspective, are always towards forces. Therefore, meaning should always be understood as the meaning of something, even if it is reproduced by human mind.

as good or bad within the limited scope of existence we assign to it. If existence is understood as an infinitely interactive relational becoming, the mind alone cannot evaluate this existence and so cannot make inferences such as good or bad since the mind is capable of comprehending the limited. This situation is similar to this: As we do not have any concrete data about how valuable a human life is, we cannot evaluate it and we can only express an opinion that it is sacred. But for example, when asked whether the life of one person or 10 people is more valuable, the general opinion is in favor of the lives of 10 people. Therefore, a real understanding of ethics should not be sought only through interpretations and inferences, but in the activity of each existence's own existence and co-existence with other existences. As a result, we saw in the philosophies of Spinoza and Nietzsche that the discovery of the finite from the infinite need not be metaphysically grounded. On the other hand, the limited need not be mechanized by the understanding of science. Thus, through the partnership of Nietzsche and Spinoza, we tried to discover the sanctity of life, based on life itself.

REFERENCES

- Aristotle. (2021). The Complete Works of Aristotle. Illustrated: Logic, Universal Physics, H. Strelbytskyy Multimedia Publishing.
- Deleuze, G. (1980, April 22). The Deleuze Seminars. Retrieved from Leibniz: Philosophy and the Creation of Concepts / 2: <https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/leibniz-philosophy-and-creation-concepts/lecture-02>
- Deleuze, G. (1981, March 10). Spinoza: The Velocites of Thought / 12. Retrieved from The Deleuze Seminars: <https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/spinoza-velocities-thought/lecture-12>
- Deleuze, G. (1978, January 24). Spinoza: The Velocites of Thought / 00. Retrieved from The Deleuze Seminars: <https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/spinoza-velocities-thought/lecture-00>
- Deleuze, G. (2002). Nietzsche and Philosophy. London, Newyork: Continuum.
- Deleuze, G. (2005). Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Brooklyn: Zone Books.
- Descartes, R. (1998). Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. Indianapolis /Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
- Einstein, A. (2021). Relativity: The Special and The General Theory . True Sign Publishing House.
- Foucault, M. (2011). Felsefe Sahnesi. Istanbul: AYRINTI YAYINLARI.

Kant, I. (2022). The Critique of Pure Reason. DigiCat.

Kant, I. (1998). The Critique of Pure Reason. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

Nehamas, A. (1999). Nietzsche, LIFE AS LITERATURE. Harvard University Press.

Nietzsche, F. W. (2001). The Will to Power. Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. W. (1968). The Will to Power. Random House, Inc.

Nietzsche, F. W. (2016). Beyond Good and Evil. anboco.

Nietzsche, F. W. (2016). Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. anboco.

Nietzsche, F. W. (2006). Thus spoke Zarathustra. New York: The Modern Library.

Nietzsche, F. W. (2006). On the Genealogy of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. W. (2017). The Gay Science. Delphi Classics.

Nietzsche, F. W. (2017). The Will to Power. Delphi Classics (Parts Edition).

Nietzsche, F. W. (2022). Unpublished Letters. Philosophical Library/Open Road.
Ordinary differential equations. (n.d.). Retrieved from Britannica:
<https://www.britannica.com/science/analysis-mathematics/Other-areas-of-analysis>

Spinoza, B. (2017) (n.d.). Correspondence, 12. letter, to Meyer. Jonathan Bennett.

Spinoza, B. d. (2007). THE ETHICS. Wilder Publications.