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**TRANSFORMATION OF GALLIPOLI COLLECTIVE MEMORY  
IN TURKEY IN 2000s**

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## Transformation of Gallipoli Collective Memory in Turkey in 2000s

### 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Gelibolu Kolektif Hafızasının Dönüşümü

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## ABSTRACT

It has been over a century since the Gallipoli Wars, yet Gallipoli has still an important place in the collective memory of Turkish society. However, the way we remember Gallipoli varies as our positions change. Since the formation of the Turkish Republic, the forms of Gallipoli remembrance have fluctuated due to the social, cultural, and political conditions of the time. In this context, it is possible to talk about two different types of Gallipoli narrative in Turkey; one is Republican period's secular-nationalist narrative; and the other is recent decades' Turkish-Islamist narrative. The main objective of this thesis is to explore the changes occurred in the Gallipoli collective memory in the last twenty years. Within this scope, Gallipoli narrative in the school coursebooks, curriculums, *Diyanet* Friday sermons, and *Diyanet Magazine* are examined in this thesis. In addition, Gallipoli Epic Promotion Center, which is designed as a war museum in Gallipoli peninsula, is studied as a memory site. This research is conducted mostly on the transformation of the collective memory about the Gallipoli Wars in recent decades.

**Keywords:** *Collective Memory, Memory Sites, Gallipoli Collective Memory, Diyanet Friday Sermons, Gallipoli Epic Promotion Center.*

## ÖZET

Çanakkale Savaşları, üzerinden bir asırdan fazla zaman geçmesine rağmen Türk toplumunun toplumsal hafızasında hala önemli bir yere sahiptir. Ancak, Gelibolu'yu hatırlama biçimimiz bugün durduğumuz yere göre değişmektedir. Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan bu yana Çanakkale'yi hatırlama ve anma biçimleri dönemin sosyal, kültürel ve politik koşullarına göre şekillenmiş ve çeşitlilik göstermiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'de iki farklı Çanakkale anlatısından söz etmek mümkündür. Bunlardan ilki Cumhuriyet dönemi eseri laik-milliyetçi anlatı iken, diğer anlatım biçimi ise Türk-İslamcı anlatıdır. Bu tezin temel amacı, Çanakkale Savaşları hakkındaki toplumsal hafızanın son yirmi yılda geçirmiş olduğu değişim ve dönüşümleri incelemektir. Bu çerçevede, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın hazırlamış olduğu okul ders kitapları, eğitim müfredatları, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın camilerde okuttuğu Cuma hutbeleri ve *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* Çanakkale anlatısı bağlamında incelenmiştir. Ayrıca, Gelibolu'da inşa edilen Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi bir hafıza mekanı olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu çalışma, Çanakkale Savaşları hakkındaki toplumsal hafızanın son dönemlerde geçirmiş olduğu değişim ve dönüşümleri incelemeye çalışmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Kolektif Hafıza, Hafıza Mekanları, Çanakkale Kolektif Hafızası, Diyanet Cuma Hutbeleri, Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi.*

## INTRODUCTION

Memory is really something amazing, it is always alive and dynamic, we have no complete control over it. If the details are gone, if you have black holes in your mind, the memory starts to fill in the gaps - the things never happened - until you remember the whole story.<sup>1</sup>

Ari Folman

The act of remembering or forgetting is generally considered as an individual ability. However, social circles, groups, or communities retain and recall the past as individuals do. At this point, we can talk about two types of memory; 'individual memory' and 'collective memory'. By definition, the remembering practices which are framed by social and cultural influences are called as 'collective/social memory'. There can be several memories since there is variety of social and cultural frameworks in the society. In this context, to remember or to forget an event, a person, or a memory from the past is not only a consequence of our individual experiences. Variety of social, cultural, and historical conditions determine what we remember or forget today. Furthermore, the individual memory is often intertwined with the collective memory in order to consolidate its remembrances and cover the gaps. That is, we as individuals are not the only creators of our thoughts, ideas, and feelings because it is possible to be affected by some of the external parameters such as the social and cultural factors. We remember as the members of social communities, we recollect our past collectively, and it makes us the partners of the social milieu. In addition, remembering activity is not the only part of the memory issue, there is the flip side of the coin, 'forgetting'. It is obvious that collective forgetting is as universal as collective remembering for our societies in the modern times. We do not know exactly what percent of our past we remember today and what percent we delete from our brains.

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<sup>1</sup> Ari Folman, *Beşir'le Vals*, trans. Sabri Gürses (İstanbul: Everest Çizgi, 2010), 19. This text has been translated by me.

In modern societies, memory issue is significant because they need to rewrite their past in order to achieve their present goals. Social, cultural, and historical parameters control and decisively affect the ‘memorable’ and ‘forgettable’ past according to the present’s needs. In this process, the action of distinguishing what, how, and when we remember or forget something belonged to the past is carried out by social and cultural conventions. The very impact of the present on the past cause reconstruction of the memory in many ways. For this reason, the structure and content of the memory might change as the conditions change.

Within the twentieth century, The Great War, The Second World War, The Holocaust, and their repercussions have been engraved in our memories forever. In this context, the interest on war remembrance and commemoration have increased in the field of memory studies since the twentieth century. Remembering and commemorating wars are mostly examined in terms of social, political, and ideological perspectives. However, especially after The Holocaust, cultural and psychological influences of the war have become more important. The destructive results of the war - both the physical destruction and psychological destruction – started to be emphasised more. In this sense, war remembrance and commemoration symbolize mourning, grief and suffer of the losses in the war. Besides, traumatic characteristics of the memory and the significance of witnesses are stressed in the collective remembrance of the war. In parallel with the major events of the twentieth century, many of nation states have appeared whole over the world since the collapse of the Monarchies and colonial order. Nations, as ‘imagined’ and ‘invented’, need common successes, losses, and objects somewhere in the past. National symbols, icons, values, rituals, myths enlighten the shared past. Moreover, a nation remembers and forgets the common things at the same time. For this reason, the main characteristics of the memory seem practical for the nation states to create and form a collective identity for further generations. In this manner, the formation of nation states, nationalist ideologies, and the establishment of national memory will be mentioned.

The initial motive of this study is to conduct a research on the remembrance of the Gallipoli Wars in Turkey and the transformation of the master Gallipoli narrative in the last twenty years. In order to understand the Gallipoli narrative and its transformation, it is necessary to mention about collective/social memory, war remembrance, and nationalism. Moreover, the social, cultural, and political reasons which cause a transformation in the Gallipoli narrative is examined in the study. Therefore, the development of Gallipoli narrative in Turkey since the establishment of Turkish Republic and its transformation in the last twenty years under the AKP rule are discussed in this study. For this purpose, the Gallipoli narrative presented in different fields such as education, religious institutions, and museums are examined.

Accordingly, the first chapter of this research comprises a literature review on collective memory, national memory, memory sites, and war remembrance. In this way, it is focused on social, cultural, and historical factors that shape the act of remembering and forgetting in a society. While discussing the main scholars worked on collective memory and remembering, the sociological studies of Maurice Halbwachs contribute to the chapter. In this light, social and cultural effects of the memory and remembering are emphasised. In addition, the works conducted by Barbara Misztal, Jan Assmann, Paul Connerton, and Paul Ricoeur comment on the reconstruction of the memory, present influence on the memory, the power of forgetting, and the complexity of the remembering. Through this chapter, the relation between nationalist discourse and collective memory will be argued with the help of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's *Invention of Tradition*<sup>2</sup> and Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*<sup>3</sup>. In this way, it is aimed to underline how the nationalist motivations shape today's memory and how we remember or forget some pieces from our past experiences. As a final analysis of this chapter, the significance of memory sites, war remembrance, and

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<sup>2</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).

commemoration is discussed. Pierre Nora's work on *lieux de mémoire* and Jay Winter's works on war remembrance and commemoration lay the ground for this study. It is expressed that memory sites always provide new meanings for our past experiences. Besides, since war remembrance and commemoration symbolize mourning, grief and suffer of the losses in the war, the cultural and psychological sides of the war remembrance will be mentioned in this chapter.

In the second chapter, this study seeks to make a modest contribution to the scholarly debates about the collective memory of Gallipoli Wars in Turkey. The aim of the chapter is to focus on whether there is a change in the Gallipoli master narrative in the last twenty years. For this, the founding image of Gallipoli, history of Gallipoli remembrance, and the development in the last twenty years will be discussed in the chapter. This chapter grounds mostly on the works given by Zeynep Suda Güler and Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu. In addition, Ayhan Aktar, Mesut Uyar, and Veysel Şimşek's articles about Gallipoli remembrance contribute to the discussion in this chapter. The main argument of the chapter is that Gallipoli campaign is regarded as one of the 'founding myth' of the Turkish Republic since its formation period. That is, the state ideology uses the Gallipoli as a national and historical theme in order to construct the national consciousness, unity, and solidarity. In this manner, the relationship between Gallipoli, Turkish nationalism, and Turkish Islamism will be examined in the chapter. In order to understand the master Gallipoli narrative in Turkey, I will summarize the Kemalist and Turkish-Islamist ideology and their interpretation of Gallipoli. Finally, I will analyse some cultural, political, and economic developments about Gallipoli remembrance in the last twenty years under the AKP rule. It will be demonstrated some transformations in the Gallipoli collective memory; and correspondingly, socio-cultural perspectives of these transformations will be discussed in the chapter.

The third chapter of this thesis examines the Gallipoli narrative presented in the educational institutions and materials in Turkey. In this sense, especially developments in education field for the last two decades and their effects on the Gallipoli narrative will be discussed. Benefiting from Louis Althusser's works, education is analysed as an 'ideological state apparatus' in the chapter and the role of educational institutions in the construction of Gallipoli narrative is evaluated. Moreover, I will demonstrate the Turkish national education ideology, its nationalist-statist structure, and Turkish-Islamist interpretation of this ideology in the last twenty years. In this context, some legal regulations made in the education field is shown in order to understand the role of education in the AKP ideology. For this reason, the works given by İsmail Kaplan and Elif Gençkal Eroler are significant since they set a framework to understand Turkish national education ideology and recent developments in the education field in Turkey. At last, I will examine the coursebooks and curriculums of the 5<sup>th</sup> – 12<sup>th</sup> grades and follow the Gallipoli narrative presented in the sources. It is possible to see the reflections of transformations occurred in the Gallipoli collective memory.

In the fourth chapter, the *Diyanet*'s<sup>4</sup> role in the construction of Gallipoli collective memory is discussed in terms of 'ideological state apparatus'. Initially, the structure of the *Diyanet* will be mentioned; then, the increasing effect of the *Diyanet* inside the state with the rising Turkish-Islamist ideology and AKP governments will be emphasised. Moreover, this chapter includes the debates about secularism and the place of the *Diyanet* in Turkey. In this context, the works given by İştâ B. Gözaydın, Ceren Kenar, and Ahmet E. Öztürk make significant contributions to the debates about secularism in Turkey, the *Diyanet*'s ideological role inside the state, and the recent developments about the *Diyanet*. However, the main purpose of this chapter is to reflect the role of the religion and religious institutions in the construction of Gallipoli narrative in Turkey. For this purpose, some of the *Diyanet* publications and the Friday sermons given to the public in the

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<sup>4</sup> The Presidency of Religious Affairs.

mosques will be examined in this chapter. It will be observed that these texts reflect the nationalist, statist, and Islamist perspectives of the Turkish Republic. Besides, it will be possible to see some changes in the reconstruction of Gallipoli memory in recent times.

The last chapter of this thesis will focus on Gallipoli Epic Promotion Center as a memory site. This centre is a museum located in Gallipoli peninsula. There are eleven simulation rooms and an exhibition hall inside the museum. In these simulation rooms, animations about the Gallipoli Wars are demonstrated with some audio-visual effects and 3-D projectors. In this chapter, I will touch briefly on the representation of war, war museums, and memory sites. In addition, Gallipoli peninsula will be evaluated as a memory site in the chapter. Most of the chapter grounds on the Gallipoli Epic Promotion Center and animation halls where the Gallipoli collective memory can easily be observed. Focusing on the Gallipoli narrative, the official resources and some of the publications about the centre are used in the chapter. In this way, the collective memory about Gallipoli Wars and the recent changes occurred in the narrative will be analysed. Besides, some of the visitors' experiences and feelings will be presented in the chapter. Therefore, the main themes of Turkish nationalism, Kemalism, and Turkish-Islamist ideology and their reflections on the Gallipoli collective memory will be argued in this chapter of the thesis.

To sum up, the purpose of this thesis is examining the collective memory about Gallipoli Wars and discussing changes occurred in the Gallipoli narrative in the last twenty years. By focusing on the Gallipoli collective memory and its transformation in recent times, I aim to show that there are various reflections of this transformation in the educational and religious institutions of the state, and even in a war museum. Through my examination in this study, representations of the collective memory are analysed in daily practice. These practices comprise of texts from the educational resources, religious expressions which are open to public every day, and a museum which you can visit anytime you want. At the

same time, this limited research tries to shed light on the Turkish nationalism, Kemalism, and Turkish-Islamism under the title of remembering Gallipoli by means of these daily practices. While doing this, the recent developments under the AKP governments' rule are discussed.

## CHAPTER 1: MEMORY STUDIES

### 1.1. MEMORY BOOM

Recalling or recollecting events and people from the past have been a significant issue in science, literature, and art for a long time. In modern times, scholarly debates on memory centred around Bergson's philosophy, Freud's psychoanalytic analysis, Durkheim's sociological inquiries, Proust's autobiographical literature, nation-states' political passions and many more. In the twentieth century, memory studies have covered in many disciplines such as psychological, sociological, and cultural perspectives. When we look at the scholarly works on memory and remembering, we will notice that Maurice Halbwachs' sociological comments, Eric Hobsbawm's and Benedict Anderson's political analysis, Pierre Nora and his circle's *Lieux de Memoire* (memory sites) and Jay Winter's psychological-cultural perspectives about remembrance and commemoration have important position in the scholarly literature. In this chapter, we will discuss which elements or factors shape the act of remembering and forgetting. How could we describe the memory? How does it work? Which factors influence social memory's functions? There are a lot of questions about the memory and its explanations which need to be discussed.

In the twentieth century, the whole world has experienced many catastrophic events. These terrible times and experiences have resulted with the 'memory boom' for the coming generations. The 'memory boom', which was coined by Jay Winter<sup>5</sup>, refers to the increasing weight of memory studies in academia and public debate.<sup>6</sup> The term 'memory' is a metaphor for searching in ruins or remnants of the past and finding some 'usable' and meaningful documents for today. The Great War, Second World War, and Holocaust are some of the catastrophic events of the blossoming of memory boom in European

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<sup>5</sup> Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (Pennsylvania: Yale University Press, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Silke Arnold-de Simine, *Mediating Memory in the Museum: Trauma, Empathy, Nostalgia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 14.

cultural atmosphere. After these unusual times, western democratic societies have increasingly been interested in past and memory. This obsession about remembering is focused especially on war and consequently victims of the war. According to Winter, in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “there occurred a rush toward memory in which at least three processes were of great importance”<sup>7</sup>. These are construction, adaptation, and circulation processes of memory<sup>8</sup>. The first process, construction, was emerged from arts, science, and academy. Marcel Proust and Sigmund Freud are some of the examples Winter utilizes in his argument.<sup>9</sup>

The second development, according to Winter, was generated by the debates around Maurice Halbwachs’ works in which social or collective memory was firstly discussed. In the third vector, circulation, “writers on memory reached a much wider audience than ever before”<sup>10</sup> as Winter states. Technological developments first in photography then in cinematography and the growth of print trade, art market, leisure industry, and press sector, created new channels for circulation of memory as texts, images, and narratives all around the world.<sup>11</sup> As Winter categorizes, these three significant processes are the first ‘generation of memory’ in the twentieth century, and the Great War (1914-1918) shapes this generation. After this period, the second ‘generation of memory’ begins in the 1970s and 1980s, but many of its sources originate in the Second World War and Holocaust. After “the victims of the Holocaust came out of the shadows, and a wide public was finally, belatedly prepared to see them, honour them, and hear what they had to say”<sup>12</sup>, the memory boom of the late twentieth century gained speed. Winter specifies this period as: “By the 1970s, new voices emerged with new memories. These were the new ‘remembrancers’, the new carriers of

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<sup>7</sup> Winter, *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

memory; they form a new singular collective which we term the witness”<sup>13</sup>. As we understand from Winter, the memory boom of the 1970s and 1980s is different from the first one: its focus is shifted towards the ‘victim’ and the Second World War cannot not be separated from the Holocaust and its victims. It is obvious that Holocaust survivors play a “liminal, mediating, semisacred”<sup>14</sup> role in the memory boom of 1970s and 1980s. In short, it was first the Great War which reveals the motives and sources of the memory boom; and then “the Second World War and the Holocaust drew upon and transformed the iconographic and programmatic character of remembrance in striking and enduring ways”<sup>15</sup>. It is a fact that the wars, losses, griefs and traces of the century had dominated remembrance forms in Europe and elsewhere.

## **1.2. COLLECTIVE MEMORY**

As a beginning, Halbwachs interrogates whether our own ideas and comments about something are original or not. This is very provocative question for the so-called free people. “How many people are critical enough to discern what they owe to others in their thinking and so acknowledge to themselves how small their own contribution usually is?”<sup>16</sup> We think that, in one way or another, knowledge must have been stayed in its original form in our mind. Those pieces of information in our memory should be purely personal because we are aware of them, so we have the control over our own memories. But that is not the case at all. As Halbwachs questions, we believe we are free in our thought and feelings, but what will be the social rules we have to obey?<sup>17</sup> It is obvious that we are not the sole originators of our thoughts and ideas, wishes and feelings, since we could always get influenced by television, media, books, or conversations with friends. At this point, Halbwachs talks about two types of memory. There is ‘individual memory’ and a ‘collective memory’. According to Halbwachs, “the individual

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>15</sup> Winter, *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>16</sup> Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 45.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

memory, in order to corroborate and make precise and even to cover the gaps in its remembrances, relies upon, relocates itself within, momentarily merges with, the collective memory”<sup>18</sup>. These comments mean that remembering is not just a personal act and the nature of remembering activity seems to be open to manipulations and external influences. Our main concern here, as Misztal states, is “the fact that memorizing is not free of social constraints and influences”<sup>19</sup>; that is, *collective* or *social* memory is the significant point of memory issue. Memory is social by itself, since the act of remembering is interactive and promoted by cultural structures and institutions.<sup>20</sup> Another comment about the non-individuality of the memory is presented by Schudson as cultural memory: “Cultural memory refers to people’s memories constructed from the cultural forms and to cultural forms available for use by people to construct their relations to the past”<sup>21</sup>. If it is called as either *collective / social memory* or *cultural memory*, the framework of the remembering is obvious: “Memory is social because remembering does not take place in a social vacuum”<sup>22</sup>. We remember as members of social groups, we recollect our moments collectively and this makes us partners of the social milieu and customs. We are not in a ‘social vacuum’. At this point, the argument Halbwachs put forward seems important. For Halbwachs, a person who was separated from the society completely wouldn’t have any memory, because “memory can only be fashioned during the process of socialization”<sup>23</sup>. In conclusion, remembering the past and having the memory of it involves individual, social and cultural forms of facts altogether. We do not have a memory which is independent from all the impacts around and we will never have it.

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 50-51.

<sup>19</sup> Barbara Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering* (Glasgow: Graw-Hill Education, 2003), 10.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Schudson, “Distortion in Collective Memory,” in *Memory Distortion*, ed. D.L. Schacter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 348.

<sup>22</sup> Misztal, *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>23</sup> Jan Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 22.

Since remembering is an operation inside the social frameworks, and as an individual inside the society, what should we remember and what should we forget? When will we do this operation? Who will decide this? These questions make explicit the variability of the argument. According to Misztal, it is society which determines what we remember, what we forget, when and how we remember or forget, since “the division of the past into ‘memorable’ and ‘forgettable’ is a social convention”<sup>24</sup>. Moreover, this memory problem shows us that remembering is not the only part of the memory issue, there is the flip side of the coin, ‘forgetting’. While Connerton interpreting the rise of focus on memory in recent times, he uses these sentences about forgetting:

There can be no doubt that the accumulated repercussions of the holocaustal events of the last century have played a vital role in these current preoccupations; but I want to argue that a crucial reason, if not indeed the fundamental explanation, is that modernity has a particular problem with *forgetting*.<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, this act of forgetting in modern societies does not seem so modern. “Different social formations prior to the onset of modernity exhibit characteristic forms of forgetting which are peculiar to themselves”<sup>26</sup>. Therefore, collective forgetting is as universal as collective remembering. Forgetting does not dominate the contemporary world “like an all-enveloping blanket”<sup>27</sup>, yet we still experience different forgetting forms which are specific to our cultural age. According to Assmann too, “modern societies suffer from amnesia”<sup>28</sup>, we do not know what percentage of our memoirs fact and what percentage is fabrication. We can forget at least as much as remembering we do. In order to discern how far we can go beyond in forgetting, Assmann presents us some estimated limits: “If persons – and societies – are only able to remember what can be reconstructed as a past within the referential framework of their own present, then they will forget things

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<sup>24</sup> Misztal, *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>25</sup> Paul Connerton, *How Modernity Forgets* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>28</sup> Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” *New German Critique* 65 (Summer 1995): 128.

that no longer have such a referential framework”<sup>29</sup>. To put it another way, what we remember today has a meaning for us. If there is no meaning, so there is no need to remember anything. As Halbwachs states below, all the remembrances we share with partners have the possibility of disappearing:

Désiré Roustan has written to me: If you content yourself to say that, when an individual thinks that he evokes the past, it is really ninety-nine percent reconstruction and one percent true evocation, that residue of one percent, which resists your explanation, suffices as a basis for the whole problem of the conservation of remembrances. Now, can you avoid that residual element?<sup>30</sup>

After such an expression and debate, we may experience some uneasiness to see that totally or partially – actually not partially, ninety-five per cent – pieces of our memory have been lost or deleted. At this point, we need to look the reconstruction – or recreation, reorganization – debates about memory.

### **1.3. RECONSTRUCTION**

At this point, we will focus on the change in the memory. As individuals or social groups, why do we need a change in our remembrances? And how such a transformation takes place in our memory? According to Schacter, our memories are not photographic, they don’t take snapshots of the past. Instead of this, “we recreate or reconstruct our experiences rather than retrieve copies of them”<sup>31</sup>. Reconstruction of old memories is a process, and we need new pieces of information to build this process. These new items can be feelings, beliefs, or knowledge we have experienced before. In other words, “we bias our memories of the past by attributing to them emotions or knowledge we acquired after the event”<sup>32</sup>. In this context, Winter’s view about memory as a product needs to be mentioned. Winter says that “memory is the product of a multitude of impulses,

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<sup>29</sup> Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 23.

<sup>30</sup> Halbwachs, *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>31</sup> Daniel L. Schacter, *The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), 9.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

drawn together in the form of a collage, or approximation of a past event”<sup>33</sup>. Therefore, our memories are not storing every original copy of our experiences and we should consider this when we reference to our remembrances.

However, we need to look at the driving forces behind such behaviours of our memories. The facts or events took place at past times must have crucial functions, so there is the change in the remembrances. But for whom crucial? There are two main reasons fundamentally: psychological and political/ideological reasons. The psychological reasons such as grief, trauma, stress, ravage, etc. will be studied in the second part of this chapter, so we are leaving this subject to be discussed later. To get back to the political or ideological reasons, the significant point is the present’s rule over the past. Having the memory of the past is not just a storing operation. From the very famous novel, George Orwell’s *1984*, we know that controlling the past is controlling the future: “Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the present, controls the past”<sup>34</sup>. As Orwell stresses, the usability of the past is the central doctrine of the present day’s interests. Therefore, today’s interests have crucial effects on remembering the past. These relations among past, present and future are mentioned in Orwell’s another masterpiece, *Animal Farm*: “So long as the animals cannot remember the past, they have no control over the present, and hence over the future”<sup>35</sup>. Thereby, these questions are of concern: Is the memory stable or is it changing according to the circumstances? Does the past effect the present or does the present effect the past? Milozs gives us an answer about this issue: “whatever takes place has meaning because it changes into memory”<sup>36</sup>. Memory plays a tricky role in this respect. Everything which happened in the past (even the things never took place) can be manipulated in the present.

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<sup>33</sup> Winter, *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>34</sup> George Orwell, *1984* (New York: Penguin, 1983), 221.

<sup>35</sup> Daniel Lea, *George Orwell* (New York: Macmillan, 2002), 111.

<sup>36</sup> Czeslaw Milosz, *New and Collected Poems* (New York: Penguin, 2001), 431.

In this context, social, cultural, political, and ideological factors should be regarded in order to understand the memory and its functions. According to Boyarin, memory is political on its own; remembering and forgetting practices are all political<sup>37</sup>. When we talk about the memory, we mention to a discourse which is political and related with the past. Personal moments and recollections are transformed into collective memory with political interventions, and this collective memory is formed by present ruling. As Halbwachs states, collective memory is ‘socially framed’ by itself because social groups decide what should be remembered and how it will be done: “The individual calls recollections to mind by relying on the frameworks of social memory. In other words, the various groups that compose society are capable at every moment of reconstructing their past”<sup>38</sup>. As we know then, present interests play crucial role in determining the ‘memorable’ facts, events, or knowledge from the past, and this is one side of the social memory. However, social memory does not reflect only the past, but it also “shapes present reality by providing people with understandings and symbolic frameworks that enable them to make sense of the world”<sup>39</sup>. Misztal emphasizes this issue in these sentences: “Present influences the past, it can be said that the reconstruction of the past always depends on present day identities and contexts”<sup>40</sup>. In addition to these, Schwartz adds: “Memory at once reflects, programs, and frames the present”<sup>41</sup>. In short, memory is not stable and strict; on the contrary, it is elastic, artificial, and reorganized again and again.

As we see, present interests are our main concern in this issue. These interests lead us to the recreation and reconstruction of the memory. There is the possibility of explicit manipulation in the reorganization process. In order to understand the situation, I want to present an example from Halbwachs’ argument

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<sup>37</sup> Jonathan Boyarin, “Space, Time and Politics of Memory,” in *Remapping Memory: Politics of Time and Space*, ed. Jonathan Boyarin (University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 2-24.

<sup>38</sup> Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 182.

<sup>39</sup> Misztal, *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>41</sup> Barry Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000), 18.

about remembering a past event or thing.<sup>42</sup> Although we are unable to remember anything about an event or thing, some people may be able to describe the facts or events that we have also experienced, and they can also narrate the entire sequence of our actions and words self-assuredly. Namely, the facts can be undeniable. It is obvious that this event happened, we were there, and actively participated. However, this entire story seems strange to us. We cannot remember such a story. We can face with such situations in daily life and witnesses cannot convince us. It is already accepted by Halbwachs, and we know that witnesses are not necessary to confirm an event or remember it, and even they would never be enough.<sup>43</sup> Now this is the question: In some way, we meet those people who were with us in that event, they are the witnesses, and they tell us a lot of materials about the event. How do we use the given information to fill the gaps in our memory? Is it possible to do this?

In this sense, I want to tell another example from the famous animation film *Waltz with Bashir*<sup>44</sup> in order to give an answer. While main character of the film having problems about remembering the war days in Lebanon, he consults his friend. His friend talks about a psychological experiment about remembering. A group of participants are shown their childhood photos. All the photos are real except one, a day in the amusement park. When the participants are asked whether they remember that amusement park and that day, eighty percent of the participant group said they were remembering that scene and that day, although the kid in the photo is not themselves. As to the other twenty percent, they also remember that scene after they think a little bit: “Yes, I remember the amusement park, we went there with my family, it was a really great day”. Memory is really something amazing, it is always alive and dynamic, we have no complete control over it. If

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<sup>42</sup> Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 24.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>44</sup> Folman, *Ibid.*, 16-19.

the details are gone, if you have black holes in your mind, the memory starts to fill in the gaps - the things never happened - until you remember the whole story.<sup>45</sup>

In this context, Güler makes an influential metaphor: “Archived documents and historical information are selected, constructed, and deceptive; in the same way, remembrances are not different in this respect”<sup>46</sup>. Reorganization of the memory can reach a point in which we cannot recognize even ourselves. Halbwachs describes this situation simply: “Thus, a very religious man, whose life was so exemplary that he was beatified after his death, might well be astonished were he to return to life and read the legends about himself”<sup>47</sup>. Many of those legends about him would not be recognized by himself for those events did not occur in real life. Those fabricated narratives were written, edited, recreated, and reorganized so that the saint would not identify himself. This situation is about a man’s life and the narrative is edited by other people. There can be a different situation too. A person can make the same process for his or her own past. For instance, Stendhal argues this issue in his autobiographical work, *Life of Henri Brulard*. Stendhal says that he and two friends, as children, shot a pistol at the Tree of Fraternity. The story is a couple of clear scenes. But his friend, R. Colomb, points out some errors about the story and details. According to Colomb, in Stendhal’s story “everything seemed believable, and the same light played across the whole surface. But the cracks were revealed when it was viewed from another angle”<sup>48</sup>.

There is no absolute emptiness in our memory, according to Halbwachs: “No area of our past is so emptied of memory that every image projected there will discover only pure and simple imagination or impersonal historical representation, without ever catching hold of any element of remembrance”<sup>49</sup>.

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>46</sup> E. Zeynep Güler, “Çanakkale’de Anılardan Tarihe Hafıza ve Mekan,” in *İşgale Direnen Çanakkale 100 Yıl Önce 100 Yıl Sonra*, ed. E. Zeynep Güler (İstanbul: Yazılama, 2015), 49.

<sup>47</sup> Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 28.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

Halbwachs improves these comments while examining Bergson's studies about memory. Indeed, we do not forget, we do something much more complex. As Halbwachs states:

Our past in its entirety remains in memory, and only certain obstacles, notably the behaviour of the brain, prevents our evoking any and every segment. In any case, the images of past events rest fully formed in the unconscious mind like so many printed pages of books that could be opened, even though they no longer are.<sup>50</sup>

Reconstruction and reorganization of the memory becomes important at this point. Certain parts of our past seem incomplete or ambiguous, moreover they seem completely gone from our memory. However, all the necessary information for recreation of our past can be found in society, and even in today's social institutions. As Halbwachs mentioned, "a remembrance is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past achieved with data borrowed from the present, a reconstruction prepared, furthermore, by reconstructions of earlier periods wherein past images had already been altered"<sup>51</sup>. Thanks to these operations, many remembrances that we have in our memory are still there (real or fake), otherwise they would have been forgotten partially or completely. As a conclusion, remembering or forgetting operations cannot be simply explained, they are too complex.

In order to grasp this complexity, we must pay attention to Assmann's comments about reconstruction. Memory functions by means of reconstruction; that is, "the past itself cannot be preserved by it, and thus it is continually subject to processes of reorganization according to the changes taking place in the frame of reference of each successive present"<sup>52</sup>. In addition to this, Assmann analyses the social institutions' adoption of new ideas and traditions in terms of reconstruction perspective. According to Assmann, the society does not make an exchange between the old and new; instead, it takes over the past from those who

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 69.

<sup>52</sup> Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 27.

successfully brought today and moves it to the future. In short, collective memory functions in two directions at the same time: ‘backward’ and ‘forward’. As Halbwachs says, “it not only reconstructs the past, but it also organizes the experience of the present and the future”<sup>53</sup>.

#### 1.4. NATIONAL MEMORY

The ‘nation’ has some basic descriptions and boundaries of itself which require remembering and forgetting at the same time so that the citizens of the nation could stay united. As one of the famous thinkers of ‘nation’ ideology, Benedict Anderson, describes the ‘nation’ as an ‘imagined political community’ which is “both inherently limited and sovereign”<sup>54</sup>. The ‘nation’ is *imagined*, since its so-called members and features are not real, they are some founded characteristics through remembering and forgetting processes. As Anderson states, “the members of a smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them”<sup>55</sup>. It is a fact that we have been living in a fictional environment by dreaming our nation’s valour and sovereignty for quite a long time. We worship at idols which we made with our own hands. In order to increase the plausibility of the subject, we always apply to past times and find some usable documents, or we are compelled to forget some details of our past. What we call as ‘national consciousness’ is arisen throughout these processes and just a significance group of people holding this belief is enough for the creation of this ‘national consciousness’. At this point, Seton-Watson’s sentences become more meaningful: “A nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole of the population should so feel or behave”<sup>56</sup>. As a result, national memory is shared by people who have never seen or heard one another, but who believe the same holy idols.

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>54</sup> Anderson, *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>56</sup> Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 5.

People consider themselves as a member of common elements such as national history or national unity, thus it is easy to achieve huge transformations and changes in the light of new nation. The main sources of these changes are remembering and forgetting operations. Primarily, becoming or creating a ‘nation’ can be called as a fundamental change on its own— as we know, some leaders calls this as a revolution too – and such a change brings new things along. After the creation of the national consciousness, following steps take the turn, collective remembering and collective forgetting. As Anderson emphasizes, “all profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such oblivions, in specific historical circumstances, spring narratives.” Although we do not whether remembering or forgetting is more influential over the ‘nation’, we may identify their characteristics. According to Ernest Renan, the essence of a nation is full of common objects and forgotten details of the past which are shared by all individuals of the nation.<sup>57</sup> If the national unity requires a harmony or a peace situation, and if there is a conflict between main figures of that nation in the depths of history which may harm the present unity, the conflict must have been forgotten absolutely and buried into the absence. As Renan states, two things hold together the ‘nation’ as a soul, one in the past, the other in the present. “One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the undivided heritage one has received”<sup>58</sup>. People, the members of the ‘nation’, want to repeat the past successes again, they try to do great things together as they did before, or they have to wipe out the failures of their ancestors, they choose to delete their recollections and crimes for the sake of nation’s unity and solidarity. Since the nineteenth century we have been experiencing this scenario repeatedly.

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<sup>57</sup> Ernest Renan, *What is a Nation? And Other Political Writings*, trans. M. F. N. Giglioli (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 251.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 261.

Furthermore, we know that there are variety of items in the process of recreation and reconstruction of 'the nation' and 'the memory'. For instance, the noted idea of Hobsbawm and Renger, *invention of tradition*, is one of these items. *Invented traditions* are identified as "set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past"<sup>59</sup>. The role of the nation state in this invention cannot be ignored. These invented traditions are invented, constructed and formally instituted under the ruling of nation states. "Standard national languages, to be learned in schools and written, let alone spoken, by more than a smallish elite"<sup>60</sup>, national flags, national anthems, national symbols, or national triumphs are mostly constructed by nation states in a very short time. Hobsbawm and Ranger present some general observations about *invented traditions* since the industrial revolution. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger, invented traditions have three interrelated types:

a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.<sup>61</sup>

All these descriptions and discussions show that invented tradition is a way of reconstruction of collective memory and has a very powerful relationship with the 'nation', and with its associated partners: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories, etc.

Memory issue is always possible to be as a troublemaker in our modern times, yet we cannot ignore the influence of powerful instruments which nation states hold. *Ideological apparatuses*<sup>62</sup> of the nation state such as education

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<sup>59</sup> Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>62</sup> Luis Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2014)

systems or religious institutions have the potential for organizing the required remembering and forgetting. An example for this is given in Halbwachs' work: "Past events read about in books and taught and learned in schools are selected, combined, and evaluated in accord with necessities and rules"<sup>63</sup>. Another example especially focusing on the forgetting feature of the history lessons is presented by Judt:

To judge from the virtual disappearance of narrative history from the curriculum in many school systems, including the American, the time may soon come when, for many citizens, large parts of their common past will constitute something more akin to realms of forgetting – or, rather, realms of ignorance, since there will have been little to forget.<sup>64</sup>

In short, the systems and mechanisms of the nation state play crucial role in remembering and forgetting processes. As we have discussed before, memory is not individual, it has many social relations. Memory does not work on its own, it has an easy access to very influential mechanisms thanks to nation state. Nation state provides the essential tools and memory takes the steps.

## 1.5. MEMORY SITES

Memory sites (*les lieux de mémoire*) are places where people engage in public activities in order to remember some past events or facts. Throughout this process, people express "a collective shared knowledge"<sup>65</sup> of the past and this provides awareness of unity and particularity. The term, *les lieux de mémoire*, was coined by Pierre Nora in a seven-volume study. His study has influenced many different texts, thinkers, fields, from legends to stories. With his own words, *lieu de mémoire* is "any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community"<sup>66</sup>. However, the term 'memory site'

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<sup>63</sup> Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 78.

<sup>64</sup> Tony Judt, *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 215-216.

<sup>65</sup> Assmann, "Collective Memory and Cultural Identity," 132.

<sup>66</sup> Pierre Nora, Preface to *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman and trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), XII.

is defined by Jay Winter a bit differently: “More narrowly to mean physical sites where commemorative acts take place. In the twentieth century, most such sites marked the loss of life in war”<sup>67</sup>. Winter focalizes his camera to the physical sites, especially the battlefields. In the same way, Paul Ricoeur, who approaches memory, history, and social memory from the point of phenomenology, stresses that our remembrances are connected to places in one way or another. Memory places, according to Ricoeur “function for the most part after the manner of reminders, offering in turn a support for failing memory, a struggle in the war against forgetting, even the silent plea of dead memory”<sup>68</sup>. Memory sites play the role of inscriptions, monuments, or potential documents for remembering. Ricoeur suggests that there happened a transition from ‘corporeal memory’ to the ‘memory of places’ and this transition is occurred by moving from place to place, by orienting yourself, and by inhabiting.<sup>69</sup> Namely, we remember ourselves travelling and visiting memorable sites around the world, and in this way, our remembrance is basically connected with places. All these comments show that there is one certain truth about memory on which we can all agree. “It is that no two people invoking the term memory seem to use it in the same way. And yet, its resonance and near ubiquity suggest that it discloses a quest we simply cannot do without”<sup>70</sup>. If we turn back to Nora’s *lieux de mémoire*, there is a huge crowd around the memory issue since the nineteenth and twentieth century. As Nora says: “We speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left”<sup>71</sup>. The living memory, which communicated face to face - still exists in rural Anatolia for instance – has to deal with the other forms of memory types such as official,

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<sup>67</sup> Jay Winter, "Sites of Memory," in *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 312.

<sup>68</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 41.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>70</sup> Winter, *Remembering War*, 20.

<sup>71</sup> Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” *Representations* 26 (1989): 7.

ideological, commercial, etc.<sup>72</sup> In other words, we cannot reach to the living and untainted pieces of our past, since there are lots of factors which are waiting for the manipulation. Nora's these sentences make the argument clearer: "There are *lieux de mémoire*, sites of memory, because there is no longer *milieu de mémoire*, real environments of memory"<sup>73</sup>. This condition and confusion between real and unreal memory leads Nora to make a differentiation between memory and history: "Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition"<sup>74</sup>. The memory here is "real memory - social and unviolated, exemplified in but also retained as the secret of so-called primitive or archaic societies"<sup>75</sup>. However, for Nora the history organizes the past with the help of our amnesic societies. In order to see the differentiation well, I want to share an important passage from Nora's work:

Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer.<sup>76</sup>

If we seek an answer for the question of what are *lieux de mémoire*, memory sites, the answer will tell us that *lieux de mémoire* are at first too complex. They are also "natural and artificial, simple and ambiguous, concrete and abstract, they are lieux - places, sites, causes - in three senses - material, symbolic and functional"<sup>77</sup>. Nora gives an example to make the definition comprehensible:

An archive is a purely material site that becomes a lieu de memoire only if imagination invests it with a symbolic aura. A textbook, will, or veterans' group is a purely functional object that becomes a *lieu de*

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<sup>72</sup> John R. Grills, "Memory and Identity: The History of A Relationship," in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Grills (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 7.

<sup>73</sup> Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire," 7.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>77</sup> Nora, *The Realms of Memory*, 14.

*memoire* only when it becomes part of a ritual. The observance of a commemorative minute of silence, which might seem to be a strictly symbolic act, disrupts time, thus concentrating memory. These three aspects of embodied memory - the material, the symbolic, and the functional - always coexist.<sup>78</sup>

Finally, *lieux de memoire* exist only for change, they always recall old experiences and gain new meanings, and we cannot discover these relations between old and new. The aim of *lieux de memoire* is to stop time, to limit forgetting act, to determine things, to immortalize the mortality, and to materialize the immaterial; thereby *lieux de memoire* are trying to “capture the maximum possible meaning with the fewest possible signs”<sup>79</sup>. Besides, “*lieux de memoire* has no referent in reality; or, rather, they are their own referent: pure, exclusively self-referential signs”<sup>80</sup>. Although most of historical or scientific approaches about memory are interested in reality, *lieux de memoire* does not seem so.

## 1.6. WAR MEMORY AND COMMEMORATION

Since the nineteenth and twentieth century, there has been an increase in the phenomena of war memory. Throughout the world, war memory and commemoration have been a matter of debate by several cultural and political perspectives. According to Ashplant this issue has been studied within the context of two main paradigms<sup>81</sup>. Firstly, remembering and commemorating wars have been important for cultural, political and ideological reasons. As we discussed before, memory is constituted and organized socially, and this collective memory is constantly related with symbols, rituals, or discourse which provide collective national identity and maintaining a national unity. As conclusion, social and political environments are significant for memory issue. The other paradigm is about psychological reasons, since war remembrance and commemoration

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<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>80</sup> Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” 23.

<sup>81</sup> Timothy G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, “The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: Contexts, Structures and Dynamics,” in *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, ed. Timothy G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper (New York: Routledge, 2000), 7.

symbolize mourning, grief and suffer of the losses in the war. For ages, people who have experienced the destructive results of the war – both the physical destruction and psychological destruction - have such types of feelings about the war. These two paradigms can be grouped as in this example: Maurice Halbwachs' *Collective Memory* or Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* represent one side of the remembering, social/political; and Jay Winter's work *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning* represents the other side, psychological and cultural. We will discuss these two perspectives in more detailed forms in our study.

If we focus on Jay Winter's work now, the significant points for him are not the political or ideological meanings of remembrance; on the contrary, Winter focuses on the 'existential', that is, psychological meanings of the war remembrance. Winter accepts that all remembering activities for commemoration symbolize national identity, unity, pride and inhold 'aesthetic' or 'political' message; however, he adds that these tools have another crucial meaning. That meaning is "as much existential as artistic or political, as much concerned with the facts of individual loss and bereavement as with art forms or with collective representations, national aspirations, and destinies"<sup>82</sup>. This focus, in Winter and Sivan's edited volume, can be seen clearly: "This book is intended as a contribution to the history of collective remembrance in the twentieth century. Its focus is on wars, soldiers, and victims of wars"<sup>83</sup>. In their theoretical introduction, it is obvious that they analyse collective remembrance "as the outcome of agency, as the product of individuals and groups who come together, not at the behest of the state or any of its subsidiary organizations, but because they have to speak out"<sup>84</sup>. While commenting on this situation, Ashplant states that "the endeavour to refocus attention on hitherto neglected dimensions of remembrance does not deny

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<sup>82</sup> Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 79.

<sup>83</sup> Jay Winter and Emanuel Sivan, "Setting the Framework," in *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jay Winter and Emanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

the importance of the state but downplays it; indeed, in practice, it pushes it out of the frame of consideration”<sup>85</sup>. Indeed, the reason of this chose by Winter and Sivan can be explained in this manner; they choose the families and civil society primarily because the state and its political/ideological instruments have been studied and documented for years. It is enough for the state, now the focus is on individuals. They prefer to focus on the individuals, and the psychological perspectives of remembering and memory issue. In this context, the first thing we may apply is traumatic conditions of war and about war. Nobody would object to the effect of The Great War, Second World War, and Holocaust on our cultural environment in recent two centuries, so the main issue here to be analysed would be linked to the wars of the century eventually. Therefore, “the victims of war and the ravages it causes is at the heart of the memory boom in contemporary cultural life”<sup>86</sup> and some questions become important such as: who remembers or forgets these pains, when do they remember or forget, and how do they remember or forget? “It is not just the injuries of war, but its drama, its earthquake-like character, which has fuelled the memory boom”<sup>87</sup>. In short, the interest about humans’ and individuals’ feelings, reactions, experiences, etc. have become much more important. Several resources such as televisions, internet, academy, biographies, war museums, etc. feed and narrate this interest. ‘The story of war’ have been travelling among our societies and forming new channels. It is a fact that the focal point of the story is changing. Winter mentions about this change in his study:

It is no longer the generals and admirals, or even soldiers and sailors, who dominate the story of war. It is the victims, more and more of whom have been civilians. If initially the memory boom focused on serving or fallen men, it no longer does.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Ashplant, *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>86</sup> Winter, *Remembering War*, 1.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

One of the main differences of Winter and the scholars following his footsteps is their focus on remembering and indeed memory's uses for the masses. Memory is defined as a way of recovery and reconciliation because the victims of the war need to find a kind of consolation, a way to live with their memories. Winter calls this group of people as 'therapeutic community' and this type of wounds is named also as 'traumatic memory', 'shell shock', 'combat fatigue', 'post-traumatic stress disorder' in the psychological field in different times. What we know about the situation is that the witnesses and victims of war would have to live with their memories for a long time. "First it was frontline troops under artillery bombardment, then it included anyone in combat; then it reached anyone afflicted by traumatic events of a life-threatening kind, whether or not they were soldiers"<sup>89</sup>. Some of these people are trapped in the past, repeat it under similar conditions, and buried in the wreckage of their memories. In this regard, the huge proliferation in the field of memory boom, should be thought also as an "act of defiance, an attempt to keep alive at least the names and the images of the millions whose lives have been truncated or disfigured by war"<sup>90</sup>. As Winter states again, "traditional modes of seeing the war, while at times less profound, provided a way of remembering which enabled the bereaved to live with their losses, and perhaps to leave them behind"<sup>91</sup>. By dealing with our remembrances in such a way, it provides us a cure for our wounds rather than creating anger, hatred, and despair. Unless it has such a powerful and therapeutic effect, there would be no reason to remember and commemorate those bad days again. Although we know the national memory, nation states' manipulation, and their ideological outcomes about our remembering habits, it also explains at least one of the main reasons why do we have deep obsessions with the past as modern societies. We need the remembering for we need the recovery.

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>91</sup> Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, 115.

## CHAPTER 2: REMEMBERING GALLIPOLI

### 2.1. THE BATTLE OF GALLIPOLI

In the Ottoman and Turkish history, Balkan Wars have very important place. These wars are psychological threshold in some ways for the Ottoman society. Ottoman Empire was defeated by Balkan countries and the war ended catastrophically for the Ottomans. Following the war, the great wave of immigration caused thousands of people to face poverty and misery. Furthermore, The Great War was approaching as a kind of death blow for the Ottoman society. Therefore, this process reduced the trust of the Ottoman people in themselves and their belief in the empire. As Kemal Taştan states, with the dramatic loss in the Balkan Wars, the Empire and the idea of Ottomanism started to be discussed, Turkish nationalism became the dominant discourse among the Ottoman elites, and a transition from the Empire's lands to the national homeland occurred.<sup>92</sup> Consequently, the nationalist-conservative structure of Turkish society and new established Republic, the search for internal and external enemies, and charging citizens with treason can be understood in this manner. According to Taştan, perhaps the most important argument that can be drawn from the results of the Balkan Wars is the decrease in the tolerance towards religious and ethnic identities of the Empire and the need to define the borders of the homeland.<sup>93</sup>

In the light of these reflections of the time, we need to ask these questions: Is Great War really a disaster for the Ottoman and Turkish society? Or is it possible to read the situation in a different manner? According to Feroz Ahmad, the Great War can be a disaster for the Ottomans, but it is not a disaster for the Turks.<sup>94</sup> It is known that nationalist regimes need some kind of pain and loss as well as heroism and success. Therefore, the narrative that Gallipoli is the heroic legend of the Turkish nation despite all the deficiencies and obstacles. The war

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<sup>92</sup> Kemal Taştan, *Balkan Savaşları ve Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu* (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2017).

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> Feroz Ahmad, "Çanakkale 1915: Ulus-Devlet Yolunda Gurur Momenti," interview by E. Zeynep Güler, in E. Zeynep Güler, *Ibid.*, 16.

opened the way in which new Turkish Republic could be established and proceed. Among all those fronts in the war, Gallipoli and Gallipoli battles have significant roles for Turkish Republic because the state ideology has tried to read Gallipoli as the ‘founding image’ of the Turkish nation since the establishment.

In this chapter, we will discuss the founding image of Gallipoli for Turkish Republic and Turkish society. While discussing this issue, we will focus on the nationalist characteristics of the new state and regime at first. Yet, the master narrative about Gallipoli campaign has been changing in recent decades. With the rise of Turkish-Islamic ideologies in 1990s, remembering practices have been centred on the religious and nationalist literature. Besides, some economic motivations related with the neoliberal economic perspectives have been in question. In the light of these perspectives, we will discuss the remembering and commemorating practices of the Gallipoli, and then analyse the transformation process in the Gallipoli master narratives in terms of the economic, political, and social changes. In many ways, the subject will be discussed and studied.

## **2.2. FOUNDING IMAGE OF THE REPUBLIC: GALLIPOLI**

In 1920s, the Turkish War of Independence successfully ended, Mustafa Kemal and his friends won the battle against Greek occupation forces, and The Treaty of Lausanne was signed in July 1923. In October 1923, Mustafa Kemal and Turkish parliament declared that Turkey was henceforth a republic. As Veysel Şimşek underlines, “Mustafa Kemal and his companions’ radical reform agenda then steered the country to become a full-fledged Turkish nation-state”<sup>95</sup>. With the establishment of the new state, the sultanate and the caliphate were abolished, and a new era started in Turkish history. New Turkish state leaders wanted to create a modern, secular, and national state for the future; furthermore, they wanted to remove the traces of old Empire. Therefore, they needed to create a new society, new nation and a new ideology.

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<sup>95</sup>Veysel Şimşek, “Backstabbing Arabs and Shirking Kurds: History, Nationalism and Turkish Memory of the First World War,” in *The Great War: From Memory to History*, ed. Jonathan Vance et al. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2015), 2.

In his scholarly works, Benedict Anderson describes the ‘nation’ as *imagined political community*, since its so-called members and features are not real, they are some founded characteristics.<sup>96</sup> Nationalist ideologies develop some kind of features and characteristics that are created and constructed in order to keep the masses in unity. Similarly, the new established Turkish Republic adopted nationalist perspectives to create a new society for the new state. According to the new state’s ideology, non-Muslim population of Ottoman period should have been eliminated, non-Turkish (but Muslim) subjects should have been counted as Turkish, Muslim subjects should have become secular citizens, and non-Sunni citizens should have been forced to behave as Sunni. To achieve these goals, the state tools such as constitutional ignorance or constitutional guarantee, forcing people to migration, crime and punishment mechanisms, and some types of violent actions were applied. It was obvious that Turkishness was the defining point of the new identity of the Republic; however, one had to be Muslim also in order to be regarded as a Turk.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, the Islam that the citizens will follow would come from the state itself, not from somewhere else. This ideology of the new state is defined by Barış Ünlü as ‘unwritten constitution’ of Turkish Republic.<sup>98</sup> This constitution has its basic rules, loyal citizens are expected to behave within its parameters, and the ones who are not obeying these rules would be punished in some way. In short, so-called ‘Turkish’ citizens had to adapt the new circumstances; they were Muslims (only Sunni and state-oriented Muslims), they were Turks, and they were secular citizens simultaneously. As Neyzi states, “Turkish Republic was established on the assumption that acknowledging the plural cultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire would threaten the creation of a singular national identity”<sup>99</sup>. Moreover, the new nation and state needed an ‘imagined’ national history and ‘invented traditions’<sup>100</sup>. Those tools were

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<sup>96</sup> Anderson, *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>97</sup> Hamit Bozarslan, *Türkiye’nin Modern Tarihi*, trans. Heval Bucak (İstanbul: Avesta, 2004), 56.

<sup>98</sup> Barış Ünlü, *Türklük Sözleşmesi* (Ankara: Dipnot, 2018).

<sup>99</sup> Leyla Neyzi, “Remembering to Forget: Sabbateanism, National Identity, and Subjectivity in Turkey,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, no. 1 (2002): 153.

<sup>100</sup> Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Ibid.*

necessary to create a new identity, found a new social group, provide the unity and solidarity, and establish the new ideas, values, behaviours, symbols, sacred, etc. Ernest Renan identifies the ‘nation’ in his famous conference in 1882, titled as *What is a Nation*; two things hold together the ‘nation’ as a soul, one in the past, the other in the present.<sup>101</sup> “One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the undivided heritage one has received”<sup>102</sup>. Similarly, new state’s leaders were aiming to hold the nation together, in unity and solidarity. That is, they needed to have common past and historical stories for the national unity and solidarity. In this regard, Gallipoli campaign and its narrative in Turkish society presented nationalist materials for the new state’s leaders.

Castoriadis mentions that the society consists of social imaginary significations which motivate the social institutions to be established and organized together.<sup>103</sup> It is a fact that a lived and experienced history will provide the feeling of collective identity and collective memory. For the new nation states, such symbols and representations are the founding elements. As a new established nation state, Turkish Republic, and its founding ideology (its founding leaders and elites) aims establishing the narratives, myths, symbols, and history to specify ‘founding images’ of the new state. Güler is one of the main scholars who studied about remembering and commemorating the Gallipoli and she expresses that Gallipoli peninsula and Gallipoli battles are accepted as a ‘founding image’<sup>104</sup> by the new established state’s elites. Although it has been transformed in some terms; today Gallipoli is still been used as a founding image by the rulers. Düzcan describes Gallipoli as ‘the heart of social body’ and states that the Gallipoli is one of the main social and historical images what makes ‘we’ and what makes

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<sup>101</sup> Renan, *Ibid.*, 251.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 251.

<sup>103</sup> Cornelius Castoriadis, *Dünyaya, İnsana ve Tabiata Dair*, trans. Hülya Tufan (İstanbul: İletişim, 1993), 14.

<sup>104</sup> Güler, “Çanakkale’de Anılardan Tarihe Hafıza ve Mekan.”

‘they’.<sup>105</sup> Indeed, any social group who connects itself to the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic try to state that they were too at the Gallipoli, they were fighting for the motherland, so they are also a part of the nation today.<sup>106</sup>

In this context, Turkish Republic’s understanding of itself will be significant. Throughout the Republic, the leaders of the state picture a Turkey which is always open to threats from both inside and outside. The country is imagined as ‘China plate’ that easily can be cracked, scattered, dispersed, or divided at any time, so you should be very careful to protect it and keep it stable.<sup>107</sup> This type of understanding has always been used by the politicians and ideological groups. In the founding process of the Republic, national ideas and images were thought as a kind of glue for the different parts of the society and Gallipoli was thought as one of the items of this holding together effect.<sup>108</sup>

Gallipoli is always seen as a defending mechanism of the nation, a war of national honour, and a line which specifies the motherland. Hence for years, variety of social and political perspectives can come together if the Gallipoli issue is in question. Gallipoli campaign serve the need for forgetting and overcoming the defeat in Balkan Wars, furthermore it is a way of gaining the old pride of the nation.<sup>109</sup> Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, a national memory about the Gallipoli has been constructed. This war and triumph would lead the rise of Turkish nation and form the base of the Republic.<sup>110</sup> After the war ended, all narratives and memoirs about the Gallipoli contributed to the ‘founding ideology’ of the nation state. Finally, a national founding myth has been constructed. Heroic stories, poverty of the nation, religious miracles at the war, Mustafa Kemal’s keen intelligence and leadership, and certainly many martyrs who had sacrificed their

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<sup>105</sup>Bekir Düzcan, “Çanakkale İçinde Kurdular Beni: Şehit(lik) İmgesi Üzerinden Toplumsal Bedenin İnşası,” in “*Öl Dediler Öldüm*” Türkiye’de Şehitlik Mitleri, ed. Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014), 121.

<sup>106</sup> Güler, “Çanakkale’de Anılardan Tarihe Hafıza ve Mekan,” 47.

<sup>107</sup> Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu, “Kamusal Alanın Çatışma Belleğine Dönüştürülmesi,” in Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu, *Ibid.*, 376.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 376.

<sup>109</sup> Güler, “Çanakkale’de Anılardan Tarihe Hafıza ve Mekan,” 57.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

lives for the country and nation were feeding the national myth of the state. In this way, Gallipoli peninsula and the area in general have become the historical image of the Turkish nationalism and Turkish Islamism, and it has been assumed as a memory site to commemorate the war and the losses. Moreover, Gallipoli issue plays an important role in modern Turkish history; “it is regarded not only as a magnificent victory, but also as signifying the birth of the new Turkish nation which emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire”<sup>111</sup>. Such an ideological practice during the Republican period of the Turkey is what Nora questioned in his famous work: How is the great and uniting narrative of the nation being constructed?<sup>112</sup> The defeats, massive losses, occupation and resistance, common and shared pains, legends of valour shape the national identity, social unity and solidarity. The society and the nation cannot think or remember something on its own; thereby, collective memory about the Gallipoli is developed by the state institutions and its ideological apparatuses such as education, media, museums, history, and literary works.

### **2.3. HISTORY OF GALLIPOLI REMEMBRANCE**

Until 1980s, Gallipoli was indeed a local affair, not a commemorative practice performed at national level. In this aspect, we need to examine the process how Gallipoli peninsula and commemoration practices of Gallipoli collective memory have become an important piece of Turkish nationhood and Turkish Republic. It is also known that there are empty and dark points in the narrative of Gallipoli campaign, so we need to be careful. In the aftermath of the war, we can see that there was an effort to publicize the Gallipoli campaign by Enver Pasha and Ottoman leaders.<sup>113</sup> The main idea of the collective memory of Gallipoli was “the heroism and vast sacrifice of Ottoman (or Anatolian) peasant soldiers under the command of young officers, defending not only the motherland

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<sup>111</sup> Mesut Uyar, “Remembering the Gallipoli Campaign: Turkish Official Military Historiography, War Memorials and Contested Ground,” *First World War Studies* 7, no. 2 (2016): 1.

<sup>112</sup> Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory*.

<sup>113</sup> Uyar, *Ibid.*, 3.

but also the realm of Islam”<sup>114</sup>. The Ottoman leadership thought that the war and its narrative would recreate the empire. The government selected and sent some novelists, poets, intellectuals and artists (*Heyet-i Edebiyye*) to the Gallipoli front between 11 and 22 July 1915, and wanted them to produce “lasting works of art and literature on the war in general and on Gallipoli in particular”<sup>115</sup>. In the following period, there occurred many commemorative structures and monuments in the peninsula to dignify and immortalize the sacrifice for the motherland. However, Ottoman units constructed only fences and barbed wire around the cemeteries of soldiers and left them with the nature alone. It is clear that “Ottoman military simply did not have a tradition of honouring its war dead with individual burial and care for gravesites”<sup>116</sup>. In short, Ottoman period’s remembering practices were not so efficient.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic with the ideology of a national and secular state which is quite different from the former Islamic and multi-cultural Empire’s characteristics, Gallipoli campaign became much more significant. Yet, it should have been used carefully because the Republican leaders under the rule of Mustafa Kemal were aiming to break their connections with the Ottoman heritage and construct a new paradigm for the new state. According to this ‘territorial strategy’<sup>117</sup>, Misak-ı Milli forms the borders of the state and secular-Muslim-Turkish citizens consist of the nation. In this strategy, Anatolia and Gallipoli should have been far from Ottoman era’s memories and colourfulness. Furthermore, “the history of the War of Independence was far more significant in terms of establishing the legitimacy, credibility and popularity of the new nationalist and republican regime”<sup>118</sup> for the Republican elites. Particularly in the Republican period, there was a focus on the ordinary Turks’ experiences of the war. In other words, “non-Turkish people have been erased from it, making their

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<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>117</sup> Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 47.

<sup>118</sup> Uyar, *Ibid.*, 5.

contributions to the war (whether voluntary or involuntary) invisible”<sup>119</sup>. The Republican elites must have thought that reading the war in such a way would shape the ordinary Turks’ sense of national identity. As we see today too, this master narrative never forgets the “treachery of Arabs and Armenians, the unavoidable fall of the Empire”<sup>120</sup> and it always is stressed that the establishment of the Turkish Republic was necessary after the war. Although Greek, Armenian, Jewish, and other non-Muslim Ottomans served in the fronts, unfortunately they would never be remembered as active players of the war effort in Turkish collective memory. As we have seen, the secular-nationalist narrative of the Republican period pictures Gallipoli as a defending point of the motherland against the ‘Great Powers’<sup>121</sup>. According to this narrative, “the British, French and Anzacs were the ‘enemy’, but not the ‘infidel’ or ‘Crusaders’. The German allies of the Ottomans were either airbrushed out of this narrative or disparaged as incapable officers with colonial ambitions”<sup>122</sup>.

As Halbwachs states, not only the material ruins, geography, or the lands are changing, but also the social framework of remembering and memory is changing. From the last days of the Ottoman Empire to the first days of the Turkish Republic, Gallipoli were formulated in terms of cultural and political perspectives. In this respect, “the newly emerged Republic shook off the garments and vestiges of the old empire”<sup>123</sup>, elites, leaders, and intellectuals emphasize “the importance of Turkish valour and sacrifice in such a way that it effectively negated the official message of multi-nationality”<sup>124</sup>. The focus of this narrative is Turkish nation’s sovereignty and Mustafa Kemal’s leadership and intelligence. In this manner, Mesut Uyar illustrates the Turkish understanding of commemoration:

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<sup>119</sup> Şimşek, *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>121</sup> Ayhan Aktar, “The Struggle Between Nationalist and Jihadist Narratives of Gallipoli,” *Forum for Modern Language Studies* 56, no. 2 (2020), 215.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 215.

<sup>123</sup> Uyar, *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

However, while Michael Howard has suggested that the Western European monuments are concerned with suffering, bereavement and loss of life, it is clear that these new Turkish memorials emphasize the glorification of military virtues, and portray death for a great cause as a triumph.<sup>125</sup>

During the late 1970s, there were civil violence and political conflict in Turkey. In this process, Gallipoli became much more important for the Turkish government. General Kenan Evren and his friends who made coup in 1980 were “eager to reinvigorate the official ideology with new symbols, myths and history in order to fight extremist ideologies including communism and Kurdish nationalism”<sup>126</sup>. Gallipoli was one of the most influential symbols as a traditional and Islamic cure for extremist ideologies. With the rise of political Islam ideology and ongoing Kurdish Question caused some modifications of the master narrative about Gallipoli: “All the Anatolian peoples, including the Kurds, made sacrifices — but in practice, the “all” appears to describe the Muslim people only”<sup>127</sup>. As we know, in the Republican establishment period, Gallipoli is organized as a discourse which is parallel with the state ideology: “The memory of Turkey’s wars of emergence now emphasizes how different Muslim peoples fought together and thus became “one nation,” thus avoiding the constitutional recognition of non-Sunni Muslims or non-Turkish ethno-cultural identities”<sup>128</sup>. In this manner, Turkish collective memory about Gallipoli is significant in terms of Republic’s emergence and development of Turkish identity and nationality. To understand the situation better, Aydemir’s biography of Enver Pasha can be used as an example. In his book, Aydemir mentions that the Kurdish and Arabic subjects did not contribute to the war: “If we name the war of the Ottoman Army as the ‘War of the Turkish Army’, it won’t be an exaggeration. The basic fact is the main burden [of conscription] was on the shoulders of Turkish-Ottomans”<sup>129</sup>. His analysis clearly reflects the state ideology of the time, and through this

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<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>129</sup> Şevket S. Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Paşa: 1914–1922* (Istanbul: Remzi, 1985), 3: 29.

perspective, collective memory about Gallipoli campaign were being shaped in time.

When it is come to 1990s, president Turgut Özal’s economic policies have affected the area because Gallipoli could be used for domestic tourism. For the first time, Turkish state perceived the Gallipoli battles in terms of economical parameters. We will mention about this issue at the end of the chapter, so we are leaving this subject to be discussed later. Since 1990s, Gallipoli battles and peninsula have also been under the control of hybrid ideology of Turkish-Islam. “The AKP government launched its own memorialization project shortly after coming to power, seeking to challenge some of the most cherished myths, official history and public discourse”<sup>130</sup>, and Gallipoli campaign has gained its new master narrative with some basic modifications. As we have passed the centenary of the Gallipoli, today there has been some changes in the discourse when it is compared to the Republican period. In the late 1990s, the Kurdish citizens were being omitted from the master narrative, and “broad terms such as “Ottoman” and “Turkish” were used liberally to denote the Kurds alongside other peoples of the Empire”<sup>131</sup>. Yet now, there has been a new reality especially with the rise of political Islamic ideology. For example, the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used these sentences during the 2011 parliamentary elections in Diyarbakır:

Aren’t Kurds, Turks, Lazes, Circassians, Arabs, and Roma lying next to each other at Gallipoli? Aren’t our martyrs lying together at Sarıkamış? Didn’t we — Turks, Kurds, Arabs — win the great victory altogether at Kut’ül-Amare? We fought the War of National Liberation together; we founded the Republic altogether.<sup>132</sup>

As we have seen, Islamic figures and Muslim population of the Ottoman period which are omitted from Gallipoli narrative in the Republican period have been

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<sup>130</sup> Uyar, *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>131</sup> Şimşek, *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>132</sup> “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Speech in Diyarbakır,” AKP Website, June 1, 2011, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/1-haziran-diyarbakir-mitingi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/8230>.

added to the new narrative. Some basic concepts such as internal and external enemies, East and West conflict, the power of belief, martyrdom for the motherland have been culminated. Gallipoli region's meaning of 'national geography' has been changed into 'ummah geography' under the rule of AKP government.<sup>133</sup> Indeed, such a transformation in the collective memory of Gallipoli is not so surprising. As Aktar states, "there has been an Islamist narrative operating as an undercurrent in opposition to secular-nationalist accounts of Gallipoli, mostly expressed in literary works and poetry"<sup>134</sup>. As one of the most important figures, Islamist poet Mehmet Akif published his well-known poem 'To the Martyrs of Çanakkale' in 1924. According to Aktar, in his canonical poem Mehmet Akif "portrays the Gallipoli campaign as a kind of 'Resistance of the Army of Muslims against the Infidel'"<sup>135</sup>. Shortly, Akif's poem in memory of the martyrs forms a synthesis in which Turkishness and Islam merge with each other. As Aktar emphasizes, "we observe all the major themes of Islamic nationalist narrative that were to be developed further in later years"<sup>136</sup>.

In this context, one of the transformations about Gallipoli is the removal of Atatürk's effect. As we know, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is the biggest figure in the master narrative of the Republican period. However, today's Turkish-Islamic interpretation of Gallipoli removes Atatürk from the Gallipoli narrative and puts the ordinary Muslim citizen soldiers (*Mehmetçik*) instead. Moreover, Gallipoli does not consist of today's master narrative only, there have been supporting new narratives too. Some other battles such as the siege of Kut al-Amara (Iraq) and other important military figures such as Enver Pasha or Halil (Kut) Pasha have been used by the Turkish-Islamic narrative to feed the new narrative.<sup>137</sup> According to this Islamist narrative, "Muslims come from all over the Islamic world to

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<sup>133</sup> Zeynep E. Suda, *Büyük Savaşın Hafıza Mekanları Çanakkale-Gelibolu ve Alsace Lorraine Cepheleeri* (İstanbul: Yazılama, 2017), 77.

<sup>134</sup> Aktar, *Ibid.*, 216.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 219.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 218.

<sup>137</sup> Uyar, *Ibid.*, 16.

defend the ‘House of Islam against the infidel’<sup>138</sup>, and rescue the ‘ummah geography’ from the crusaders by sacrificing their lives.

To conclude, Turkish collective memory about the Gallipoli campaign was shaped by the propaganda which aimed to establish a new nation and identity; that is, Gallipoli was a founding figure. Although the War of Independence “proved more powerful in shaping a national identity with its particular myths and legends, reducing Gallipoli to the status of a mere ‘first step’ for several decades”<sup>139</sup>, the practice in the field has not occurred in this way. Gallipoli has always been important in terms of Turkish nationality and Islamic perspective. In the 1980s, military governments changed the narrative into a Gallipoli which includes both Islamic figures and Kemalist perspectives at the same time. Moreover, the state ideology of the 1980s were emphasizing the Kemalist perspectives of the state to cover the rise of nationalist and Islamist movements in the country. In this way, it was possible to combine some Islamic and religious figures with the Kemalist ideology of the state to prevent the dangers of social and political movements, extremism, and Kurdish separatism. During the Republican period, ‘backstabbing Arabs’<sup>140</sup>, ‘shirking Kurds’<sup>141</sup>, and ‘betrayers’ non-Muslims (especially Armenians) were kept out of the Gallipoli narrative, and today Muslim population of the Empire gets back to the narrative thanks to political Islamic movement. Recent political and sociocultural developments under the rule of AKP government have shown us that Gallipoli symbolizes the Turkish-Islamic paradigm of the new era and it has the meaning of geographic ‘site of memory’ for the ummah. It is obvious that a great effort has been made to add some religious themes into the master narrative of Gallipoli by the current political elites.

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<sup>138</sup> Aktar, *Ibid.*, 215.

<sup>139</sup> Uyar, *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>140</sup> Şimşek, *Ibid.*

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

## 2.4. MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES

Gallipoli peninsula and Gallipoli campaign are one of the important memory sites and sacred places of Turkish nationalism and conservatism for years. Since the 1915 wars, the region has been shaped as a national memory site with the help of stories, legends, and variety of constructions such as martyrdom memorials and monuments. In the aftermath of the war, both in the Ottoman period and in the Republican establishment period, the leaders made some regulations about the peninsula and constructed some memorials in the peninsula in order to remember and commemorate the war and the martyr soldiers. Even though the Republican regime used Gallipoli campaign as a founding image for Turkish nation and for the Republic, physical attempts in the region were so less. War territory was left alone to its own fate. In the meantime, main narratives about the war, stories, legends, and nationalist figures were wandering around the Turkish society. In 1960s, Çanakkale Martyrs' Memorial was opened officially as a commemorative monument at the end of 15-20-year period of construction. Nevertheless, neither the society nor the governments were not interested in Gallipoli peninsula until 1990s. Despite some local interests about the region, great change was occurred with Turgut Özal government's initiatives. With the liberal economic perspectives, Özal government thought Gallipoli peninsula as an opportunity for tourism attractions and international pilgrimage tours. Since 1990s, there has been many projects and reconstruction works in cemeteries or monuments. With the rise of Turkish-Islam narrative and economical motives, Gallipoli peninsula as a memory site has been subjected to commercialization practices by the governments. Suda calls this attempt in her study as 'packaging Gallipoli as a memory site'.<sup>142</sup> Therefore, Turkish-Islam conservatism in Turkey accelerated the improvements about Gallipoli peninsula. Gallipoli campaign was not only a political or ideological campaign, but it was also a tourism attraction which moved the debate into the fields too.

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<sup>142</sup> Suda, *Ibid.*, 84.

Since the 1990s years, Gallipoli peninsula has been increasingly gaining more interest. One of the main factors of this increase is the AKP government and its municipalities. As a representative of Turkish-Islam conservatism, AKP governments have assigned Gallipoli an ideological meaning. After the establishment period of Turkish Republic, Gallipoli has been transformed into a new founding image in 2000s years. Collective memory about the Gallipoli battles has been changed into a more religious, more sacred figures; accordingly, the geography has changed its shape from the ‘national geography’ to ‘Islamic geography’.<sup>143</sup> It has been observed in Gallipoli Historic Area Presidency’s 2016-2020 strategic plan clearly:

Gallipoli victory is a place from where Bedr's heroes can only come out alive according to Mehmet Akif Ersoy; it is a place where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ordered to die not to fight; it is one of the greatest legends of *Mehmetçik* who come from far and wide in order to sacrifice their lives for the motherland.<sup>144</sup>

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism Gallipoli Historical Area Presidency of the Gallipoli battles was established in 2014 with the Law on the Establishment of Gallipoli Historical Area Presidency of the Gallipoli battles No. 6546 (entered into force on 19.06.2014).<sup>145</sup> On the official website of the Area Presidency, it is seen that the mission of the presidency is “transforming the area into an open-air museum by preserving and developing the spiritual, historical, cultural, and natural values of the Gallipoli Historical Site, together with the sense of responsibility for the future and universal thinking”<sup>146</sup>. Besides, Gallipoli battles and Gallipoli peninsula are portrayed as a symbol of national unity and solidarity in Turkey.

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<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>144</sup> “2016-2010 Stratejik Planı,” Çanakkale Savaşları Gelibolu Tarihi Alan Başkanlığı, accessed May 14, 2020, <https://catab.ktb.gov.tr/Eklenti/50049,2016-2020-stratejik-planpdf.pdf?0>. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>145</sup> “Çanakkale Savaşları Gelibolu Tarihi Alanı Hakkında Bazı Düzenlemeler Yapılmasına Dair Kanun,” Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, June 28, 2014, <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6546.pdf>.

<sup>146</sup> “Misionumuz Vizyonumuz”, Çanakkale Savaşları Gelibolu Tarihi Alan Başkanlığı, accessed May 14, 2020, <https://catab.ktb.gov.tr/TR-173376/misionumuz--vizyonumuz.html>. This text has been translated by me.

As we know, there has been an attempt of constructing a new narrative about Gallipoli memory. During AKP government, some republican practices such as April 23, May 19, or October 29 have been replaced by March 18, and Gallipoli commemorations gained much more attention.<sup>147</sup> The defence of Islamic army and martyrs of Muslim geography are at the centre of the new narrative. In this new narrative, new arising collective memory tends to see the war as an Ottoman war contrary to the Republican period. However, attempts of constructing a new master narrative about remembering Gallipoli haven't easily succeeded; the old master narrative has shown some resistance. Most especially, the emphasis of Atatürk's effect on Gallipoli battles has not been deleted by the new narrative. Atatürk's keen intelligence and success hold its place today by merging with the new master narrative. Therefore, we can say that collective memory about Gallipoli battles has been on its way with some basic changes required by the present ideological-political needs.

Değirmencioğlu identifies a new era about the interest on Gallipoli and calls this as 'new invention'.<sup>148</sup> Gallipoli peninsula has been transformed into an important tourism attraction of this new narrative. 18 March Gallipoli Victory and Martyrs' Day is organized as suitable for Turkish-Islam perspective and includes various religious figures as expected. Gallipoli tourism is not a cultural activity which occurred accidentally; on the contrary, it is an ideological tourism activity, a political motivated public relations work, and a martyr tourism attraction which constructed and shaped deliberately by state authorities and ideological motives.<sup>149</sup> In this transformation, AKP local governments played a crucial role. The local governments from all quarters of the country organize bus tours to the peninsula and cover the expenses with public funding. The trips to the field are organized as a pilgrimage in which people can commemorate the martyrs and feel

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<sup>147</sup> Şafak Aykaç, "Şehitlik ve Türkiye'de Militarizmin Yeniden Üretimi: 1990-1999" in *Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler*, ed. Nurseli Y. Sünbuloğlu (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 169.

<sup>148</sup> Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu, "Şehit Turizmi: Kitlelerin Çanakale Seferberliği," in Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu, *Ibid.*, 351-382.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 351-382.

the grief of the Islam geography.<sup>150</sup> Especially with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's selection as the Mayor of İstanbul in 1994, this interest have increased. A couple of municipalities under the rule of AKP have pioneered the Gallipoli tourism.

In his statistical work, Değirmencioğlu shows how the masses are directed to the peninsula by municipalities on the purpose of creating a national consciousness about Gallipoli victory and martyrs.<sup>151</sup> In this respect, Gallipoli has been shaped as a martyr tourism attraction and presented as a symbol of new Turkish-Islam master narrative. According to Değirmencioğlu, approximately seven million people have visited Gallipoli peninsula with the direction of municipalities between 2007-2013 years.<sup>152</sup> These numbers show that about ten per cent of the population is directed to Gallipoli martyr tourism, and Değirmencioğlu calls this attempt as 'mobilization of the masses'.<sup>153</sup> One of the originators of this practice, Zeytinburnu Municipality, and its mayor Murat Aydın started the bus tours to the war field. Aydın states that he gained this awareness in his visit to the Australian War Memorial (AWM) in Canberra. He talks about his experience at the memorial as here:

I went to Australia in 2000. I have seen there, how Australians and their state value Gallipoli. Thousands of kilometres far from here, I saw the Turkish flag and the diorama of Gallipoli. I noticed the importance Australians gave to Gallipoli. I have seen their effort and resolution to build a nation. I thought, "Australians are doing all this, but why are we not interested in Gallipoli?" So, I promised myself to keep 'Gallipoli spirit' close to Zeytinburnu. Therefore in 2000, Zeytinburnu's interest of Gallipoli started.<sup>154</sup>

In these tours, the amounts of expenses from capital budgets are remarkable. For instance, Fatih Municipality, as one of the pioneers of Gallipoli martyr tourism with Zeytinburnu Municipality, spent 3 million TL for these tours between 2009-

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<sup>150</sup> Suda, *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>151</sup> Değirmencioğlu, "Şehit Turizmi: Kitlelerin Çanakkale Seferberliği," 351-382.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 351-382.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 351-382.

<sup>154</sup> "Çanakkale Kısa Film Yarışması Ödülleri Sahiplerini Buldu," Zeytinburnu Belediyesi, accessed May 18, 2020, <http://www.zeytinburnu.istanbul/Haberler/Canakkale-Kisa-Film-Yarismasi-Odulleri-Sahiplerini-Buldu>.

This text has been translated by me.

2012 years.<sup>155</sup> Zeytinburnu Municipality, as one of the founders of Gallipoli martyr tourism, carried 150 thousand people to the peninsula between 2003-2008 years.<sup>156</sup> As it is seen, especially public institutions are customers of Gallipoli tourism and collective memory is shaped by these institutions.

Moreover, it is obvious that neither the old narrative nor the new one represents a peaceful interpretation of the war; to the contrary, these nationalist and religious narratives improve hostile and demonising language about Gallipoli battles and construct such a collective memory with their ideological tools. In addition to this, it is obvious that “the Islamist nationalist narrative glorifies death, martyrdom and sacrifice for the country”<sup>157</sup>. In this respect, a documentary film which was produced by Zeytinburnu Municipality in 2003 (*Son Kale: Çanakkale*) can be given as an example. In this film, the image of religious-nationalist understanding and the practice of marginalizing the enemy can be seen easily. Consequently, Gallipoli collective memory and Gallipoli remembering practices proceed on its way consonant with liberal economy, tourism mobility, nationalist and religious figures, and new arising political and ideological narratives.

## 2.5. MEMORY WARS

The geography of Dardanelles and Gallipoli peninsula are natural and beautiful when you look from outside. However, both the wars and memories of those wars gave the shape of Gallipoli peninsula since 1915.<sup>158</sup> Since then, Gallipoli has been open to ideological, political, and economic manipulations. As Nora states, memory sites are the places which “ferment the memory”; that is, the history relates to the events, the memory is then connected with the sites/places.<sup>159</sup> Gallipoli has been shaped as a memory site by all the ideological and political perspectives since the war ended. Variety of Gallipoli narratives have been

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<sup>155</sup> Değirmencioglu, “Şehit Turizmi: Kitlelerin Çanakkale Seferberliği,” 372.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, 367.

<sup>157</sup> Aktar, *Ibid.*, 219.

<sup>158</sup> Suda, *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>159</sup> Pierre Nora, *Hafıza Mekanları*, trans. Mehmet Emin Özcan (Ankara: Dost, 2006), 12-36.

wandering around the centre and periphery for years, manipulated by state ideology and political movements, glorified by ordinary people, national ideologies, or religious motives. At the same time, Gallipoli is itself shaping social and political discourse in the country such as the national history, national identity, and collective memory of the ordinary people. Having said that, we need to mention that memory sites does not remain stable, original, untouched; and certainly, Gallipoli did not too.<sup>160</sup> Memory sites are open to political, economic, ideological or social interference because they are the battlefields of these parameters. When we look at the developments in Gallipoli peninsula since the establishment of the Republic, we can see such examples.

If the memory sites are the subject, we can easily talk about the exaggerations. As we know, every war has basic results and numbers, but these statistics change very often according to some needs. The Turkish example, *Gallipoli*, has also interesting manipulations in this manner. One of the debatable issues is the numbers of the deaths in the war. Since the end of the war, the losses, *martyrs*, have been exaggerated in Turkish collective memory. According to Copeaux, these numbers were the cost of the following Turkish Republic's independence so they could be exaggerated.<sup>161</sup> The brave Turkish soldiers (Mehmetçik) have sacrificed their lives for the motherland and for the independence, the blood they sacrificed was the Republic's and the nation's price. Accordingly, the more the better. Copeaux have observed in his study which focuses on Turkish history textbooks that the stories about Gallipoli have been dramatized, and the war has been discussed to glorify self-sacrifice and independence.<sup>162</sup> In this sense, it is not only the figures there has been a huge field of glorification and exaggeration about Gallipoli battles. The narrative of poverty and weakness of Ottoman army according to European allies, and the legends of superhuman events results with the impossible triumph of the poor *mehmetçik*.

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<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>161</sup> Etienne Copeaux, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine*. trans. Ali Berktaş (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), 258.

<sup>162</sup> Suda, *Ibid.*, 59.

Even though the main narratives have been changed in time ideologically, Turkish collective memory about Gallipoli has always served for the nationalist ideology of the state. In this respect, in his study about the martyrdom and Gallipoli, Düzcan calls Gallipoli campaign as a “memory pill” which helps the foundation of collective identity.<sup>163</sup>

One more important thing is that there has been a “memory war”<sup>164</sup> on Gallipoli narrative between different ideological paradigms in Turkey. We can group the sides as Republican period’s secular-nationalist narrative and recent decades’ Turkish-Islamist narrative. These two master narratives maintain the war in Gallipoli as ‘memory war’. Main motives of these different interpretations of Gallipoli come from different political and ideological trends. In the Republican period, secular-nationalist narrative established a collective memory of Gallipoli. As Aktar remarks, “the dominant Turkish nationalist historiography ‘Turkified’ the victory of the Ottoman Imperial Army”<sup>165</sup>. According to Aktar, Mustafa Kemal in this narrative plays a bridge role “to attach the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 to the Turkish War of Independence”<sup>166</sup>. When it comes to 21<sup>st</sup> century, with the rise of AKP governments, Turkish-Islamist narrative has tried to rewrite the collective memory of Gallipoli. Aktar calls this narrative as ‘jihadist revision’<sup>167</sup> of the Gallipoli narrative. According to this new narrative, Gallipoli battles represent ‘Resistance of Islam against the Infidel’ and ‘Invasion of Crusaders into the House of Islam’.<sup>168</sup> In his analysis, Suavi Aydın also mentions about the struggle between Republican side and Turkish-Islamist side. Aydın stresses that these two sides of Gallipoli narrative aim only writing their own epics by using Gallipoli.<sup>169</sup> However, these two epics do not refer to facts and truths, they are justifying their ideological positions. In this way, these two different interpretations of Gallipoli

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<sup>163</sup> Düzcan, *Ibid.*, 120.

<sup>164</sup> Düzcan, *Ibid.*, 122.

<sup>165</sup> Aktar, *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>169</sup> Suavi Aydın, “Çanakkale Ruhu 2015,” *Birikim* 312 (Nisan 2015): 45-58.

help to understand the ideological and political divisions in Turkey.<sup>170</sup> In short, all these debates clearly mention that Gallipoli collective memory is “full of contrasting ideologies, politics, motivations and contradictions”<sup>171</sup>. As Macleod points out:

Tracing the memory of Gallipoli through Ottoman and then republican Turkish history, makes clear that the context in which Gallipoli is remembered here is by far the most complex and challenging for any of the belligerent nations. For Turkey, Gallipoli is a victory amidst a series of defeats.<sup>172</sup>

To conclude, there has been a ‘memory war’ between two different master narratives about remembering Gallipoli. On the one hand, some so-called authors or filmmakers publish books or films which Turkish-Islamist religious and mythical language shape collective memory of Gallipoli. On the other hand, again some so-called authors or filmmakers portrays Gallipoli as Turkish nation’s struggle and self-sacrifice against the colonizers in which Atatürk is at the centre of the narrative. In both narratives, nationalist perspective of the remembering Gallipoli does not change. Despite this tension between two master narratives, today there seems a silent agreement between these different political and ideological trends. Islamist narrative could not erase Atatürk figure in Gallipoli and secular narrative embraces some religious motives about Gallipoli. As it turns out that two major flow of Gallipoli remembrance will find a common way of commemorating Gallipoli. However, we know that there is a huge need for constructing a realistic, simpler, objective, and humanist collective memory about Gallipoli.

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<sup>170</sup> Suavi Aydın, “Çanakkale Savaşları,” Yakındoğu Yazıları, March 16, 2020, <https://yakindoguyazilari.com/suavi-aydin-yazi-canakkale-savaslari/>.

<sup>171</sup> Uyar, *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>172</sup> Jenny Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 154.

## **CHAPTER 3:**

### **GALLIPOLI NARRATIVE AND NATIONAL EDUCATION**

#### **3.1. EDUCATION, IDEOLOGY, STATE**

In recent decades, political, economic, and sociocultural developments under the rule of AKP governments have shown us that the new Gallipoli narrative manifests the Turkish-Islamic ideology of the AKP era. It is obvious that a great effort has been made to add some religious dimensions into the master narrative of Gallipoli by the ruling political elites. In this sense, we will follow the traces of the new master narrative in the national education sphere. This part of the study aims to reveal how the Gallipoli master narrative has been transformed in the AKP period in parallel with the changes of education system and educational contents. At first, the relations between education, ideology, and state will be discussed by utilizing dominant themes on this subject. Then, we will discuss the national education ideology of the Turkish Republic since its formative years by focusing on its transformations based on the current developments. Afterwards, we will concentrate on the educational initiatives of the AKP period. To analyse how the new Gallipoli narrative have been presented to the new generations with the help of education ideology, we will examine textbooks, school ceremonies, national holiday activities, educational applications, etc.

Modern education systems have the role of popularising the national identity of the state. Moreover, the school provides an opportunity for the reproduction of the nationalist discourse and national identities. Thereby, it becomes possible to create the standards of ‘acceptable’ or ‘ideal’ citizen and to establish the image of the ‘other’. In this respect, the relation between education and nationalism seems important. However, it requires more detailed analysis to explain the education’s role under the state rule. Are the schools providing public service or serving for the state projects? In order to understand nation states,

national identities, and nationalist discourse under the title of education, we need to look at the role of ideology, power, and state altogether.

If we come to the ideology or power issue, many prominent thinkers have discussed the relation between education and ideology or power. According to Örs, ideologies are road maps in the hands of people and societies. These maps show how social and political reality is established and what is the best route to follow.<sup>173</sup> In this way, people can follow the predetermined routes. As Şerif Mardin states, modern school systems function to protect society's symbolic repertoire and form a new channel for the ideological practices of nation states.<sup>174</sup> Nationalist discourse does not show up for no reason, but it is produced and imposed by state institutions.<sup>175</sup> In Marxist tradition, the state is identified as a repressive apparatus. To dominate the working class, repressive state has some tools and education is one of these crucial state institutions. In this context, Antonio Gramsci puts forward important ideas about the ideological function of the education and establishes a relationship between hegemony and ideology. Education is the tool that ideology of the ruling class or 'superstructure' needs to maintain its hegemony. For Gramsci, the real strength of the system is not the violence or oppression of the ruling class, but it is the oppressed class' acceptance of the ruler's view of the world.<sup>176</sup> Louis Althusser amplifies the discussion about ideology, state, and education.<sup>177</sup> According to Althusser, there are two types of state institutions: *Repressive State Apparatuses* and *Ideological State Apparatuses*. Repressive state has some tools such as government, courts, police, armed forces, prisons as *Repressive State Apparatuses*. Yet, Althusser enhances his thesis with the *Ideological State Apparatuses*. These institutions such as

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<sup>173</sup> H. Birsen Örs, "İdeoloji: Karmaşık Dünyayı Anlaşılır Kılmak," in *19. Yüzyıldan 20. Yüzyıla Modern Siyasal İdeolojiler*, ed. H. Birsen Örs (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013), 10.

<sup>174</sup> Şerif Mardin, *İdeoloji* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012), 164.

<sup>175</sup> Umut Özkırmı, *Milliyetçilik Üzerine Güncel Tartışmalar: Eleştirel Bir Müdahale* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 28-31.

<sup>176</sup> Giuseppe Fiori, *Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary* (London: New Left Books, 1970), 238.

<sup>177</sup> Althusser, *Ibid.*

school, church, religion, family, culture, media function by using ideology to save the survival of the state. According to Althusser, ideology is very significant for holding the control and governance of the state. In his study, he explains the benefit of the ideology and gives an example from the socialist Soviet regime:

To my knowledge, no class can hold state power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the Ideological State Apparatuses. I only need one example and proof of this: Lenin's anguished concern to revolutionize the educational Ideological State Apparatus (among others), simply to make it possible for the Soviet proletariat, who had seized state power, to secure the future of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to socialism.<sup>178</sup>

As the dominant *Ideological State Apparatus*, Althusser indicates the school or education systems.<sup>179</sup> The students learn many skills at the schools, but the system always provides this education by imposing the dominant ideology and its practices. This position of the state education institutions is inevitable for Althusser because any other Ideological State Apparatus “has a captive audience of all the children of the capitalist social formation at its beck and call for as many years as the schools do, eight hours a day, six days out of seven”<sup>180</sup>. According to Althusser, the School replaces the Church and becomes the dominant ideological apparatus of the state:

Behind the ‘theatre’ of the political struggles which the bourgeoisie has offered the popular masses as a spectacle, or imposed on them as an ordeal, what it has established as its number-one, that is, its *dominant*, Ideological State Apparatus is the *scholastic apparatus*, which has in fact replaced the previously dominant Ideological State Apparatus, the Church, in its functions. We may even say that the school-family dyad has replaced the Church-family dyad.<sup>181</sup>

With all its officials and supporters, the education system is helping to maintain and improve the scholastic apparatus of the state. Today, the school is seen “as 'natural' and useful-indispensable or even beneficial for our contemporaries as the

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<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, 245.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 143-147.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 146.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

Church was 'natural', indispensable and generous for our ancestors of a few centuries ago”<sup>182</sup>.

Another important thinker, Michel Foucault, defines the school as a small power unit.<sup>183</sup> In modern times, school functions as a normalizing process just like factories or barracks. In this context, education serves to adapt individuals to social normality and to eliminate personalities which are out of normality.<sup>184</sup> Therefore, education is an ideological and political apparatus of the power which aims to maintain controlling mechanism.<sup>185</sup> In another philosophical analysis, Pierre Bourdieu identifies the modern education systems. For Bourdieu, the school functions to legitimate and consolidate the power and privilege relations between social classes.<sup>186</sup> In short, education system is a type of symbolic violence and its primary role is to reproduce the dominant class culture.<sup>187</sup>

### 3.2. TURKISH NATIONAL EDUCATION

In order to understand national education policies in Turkey, we need to start with the establishment of Republic in 1923. National education ideology was formed by the Kemalist ideology which had nationalist, statist, and secular perspectives for education. As Althusser mentioned above, education was used as a tool to create a new Turkish identity, to design the new social architecture, to determine the new norms of the “acceptable citizen”<sup>188</sup> or the “other”. In this period, national education provided the legitimization and reinforcement of the new regime’s ideology.<sup>189</sup> The education model of the Kemalist state rejects both the religious education of the Ottoman period and the international education that

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<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>183</sup> Michel Foucault, *Hapishanenin Doğuşu* (Ankara: İmge, 2013), 208-209.

<sup>184</sup> İlknur Şentürk and Selahattin Turan, “Foucault’un İktidar Analizi Bağlamında Eğitim Yönetimine İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme,” *Kuram ve Uygulamada Eğitim Yönetimi* 18, no. 2 (2012): 243-272

<sup>185</sup> Foucault, *Ibid.*, 223.

<sup>186</sup> Elif Gençkal Eroler, “*Dindar Nesil Yetiştirmek*” *Türkiye’nin Eğitim Politikalarında Ulus ve Vatandaş İnşası* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2019), 44.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>188</sup> Füsün Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaş’ın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet’ten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2016)

<sup>189</sup> Gençkal Eroler, *Ibid.*, 46.

is claimed to be against our national characters.<sup>190</sup> In this context, it is obvious that Turkish national education ideology is nourished by the Kemalist ideology of the formative years. The narrative we focused in the Gallipoli remembrance is constructed within this educational ideology, so it is important for our study to analyse the education policies and practices throughout the Republic. The citizen figured by the state is limited by main characters such as Turkish, Muslim, Sunni, modern, and laic/secular. The emphasis of nationalist and militarist perspectives, using the education institutions for the regime's ideology, and training next generations of the Republic have been conceptualised by İsmail Kaplan's famous work, titled as 'The Ideology of National Education in Turkey'<sup>191</sup>. Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Kemalist ideology names the Turkish teachers as 'army of spiritual knowledge (irfan ordusu)'<sup>192</sup>. Resembling the teachers to soldiers and education to militaristic practices present the mentality behind the Turkish national education ideology clearly. Some of the educational themes of the period such as militarist expressions, national anthem, cult of leadership of the nation, unity of the motherland, labour of the nation, etc. show that Kemalist ideology had an obvious nationalist understanding of the education. In short, Turkish national education ideology was formulated to create a new Turkish nation that would be loyal to the state and its leaders. However, this formulation has been updated according to some developments since then.

As we have stated before, religious themes were removed from the Turkish education system because of the Kemalist ideology's secular preoccupations. The main tenet of the Kemalist education was Turkishness. However, in the following years, some Islamic or religious dimensions were integrated into Kemalist education system. As Gençkal states, there was an effort to highlight some religious contents as a component of Turkish national morality

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<sup>190</sup> İsmail Kaplan, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2019), 139.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup> "Kütayha'da Öğretmenlerle Konuşma," in *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1997), 167.

in order to reproduce the Kemalist hegemony.<sup>193</sup> At this point, secular or laic perspective of Kemalist ideology seems much more complicated. With the establishment of the Republic, religion was excluded from the social life and the state organizations pushed it to individual realm, but religious themes were exploited in forging Turkish national identity and unity.

As one of the most crucial parts of the Kemalist ideology, universities should be analysed especially. After the establishment of the Kemalist ideology and its national education, there was a huge need, transfer of the ideology to the next generations. In 1933, Istanbul Darülfünun was abrogated and Istanbul University was established instead. This was a symbolic change of the new regime's secular and national education perspective. Thus, universities would be the centre of the national and secular education of the regime and new elites of the regime would be trained in these centres. According to Kaplan, the reorganization of the university as an ideological apparatus to ensure nationalist socialization in the service of the state played a major role in the establishment of the Turkish national education ideology.<sup>194</sup> In the process of transition to a multi-party system, there was not huge differences and Turkish national education ideology proceeded on its way. As Kaplan mentions, the period between 1946-1960s was the era of reproduction and gaining continuity of the Kemalist ideology and Turkish national education.<sup>195</sup> After this period, three major events designated the journey of national education ideology in Turkey, 1960, 1971, and 1980 military coups and developments following the coups. In 1960, one of the major interferences of the state occurred in education field. In those years, there was an effort of the state elites to save the Kemalist ideology of the state with some additions based on current needs. In this context, 222 No. Primary Education Act was issued in 1961. The law regulates the basic level of educational services in Turkey. According to

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<sup>193</sup> Gençkal Eroler, *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>194</sup> Kaplan, *Ibid.*, 182.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 226.

the Law, “after basic training, non-compulsory preschool education in Turkey includes compulsory primary and secondary stages”<sup>196</sup>.

With regards to education, two major developments will be discussed in this part: The Basic Law on National Education in 1973 and The Higher Education Law in 1981. This period portrays the rise of democratic and socialist movements in the fields of politics and culture. Strengthening of unions and political organization, increasing of youth movements, emergence of the Kurdish political movement, mobilization of the public sphere is some of the developments in this dynamic period of Turkish history. On the contrary, the regime of the Kemalist state preferred to stay in a conservative position against those social, political, and cultural developments in the country. Therefore, it is important to analyse these developments in order to understand the history of Turkey. At first, the ‘National Education Basic Law’ determines the main principals of Turkish national education and it is the axis of Turkish education system and ideology. In the National Education Basic Law, Turkish Republic is pictured as a national, democratic, secular, and social state of law that respects human rights and the fundamental principles of the Constitution. One part of the aims of the National Education is as follows:

To educate citizens of the Republic of Turkey as those who know their duties and responsibilities and act accordingly in accordance with all policies and principles as expressed in the Constitution of Turkey, which is a secular and social law nation.<sup>197</sup>

In addition to this, the citizens of Turkish Republic are defined as committed to Atatürk’s Reforms and Turkish nationalism, adopting, protecting, and developing the national, moral, religious, and cultural values of the Turkish Nation. Turkish citizens always love and try to glorify their family, homeland, and nation. Moreover, they know their duties and responsibilities well towards the state and

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<sup>196</sup> “222 No. Issued Primary Education Act of 1961,” Eurydice, accessed August 18, 2020, <https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice>.

<sup>197</sup> “The 1739 numbered National Education Basic Law of 1973,” Eurydice, accessed August 18, 2020, <https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice>.

the nation as citizens. In addition, some of the economic, social, and educational perspectives of the time can be observed in the Law:

To prepare individuals for life by providing them with necessary information to develop capability and the ability, skills, attitudes and by giving them jobs that will make them happy and provide them with a job to contribute to the happiness of society; and to improve the welfare and happiness of Turkish citizens and Turkish society; on the other hand, national unity and economic integrity, social and cultural development and to accelerate the contemporary civilization, and finally to make Turkish nation a constructive, creative, and outstanding partner.<sup>198</sup>

In short, the essence of the articles is raising nationalist citizens and generations who are loyal to their country in harmony with the current and scientific developments of the time. National Education Basic Law shows that there would be monotype education and monotype citizen model. Turkish national education provides an ideology that can be instilled not only at schools, but also at home, at work, in social life, everywhere and every time.

If we come to Higher Education Law of 1981 and 1982 Constitution, recent decades' social and political developments and today's educational policies seem more comprehensible. With the 1982 Constitution, Kemalism and Turkish nationalism, which were already unofficially state ideologies, have become the official ideologies of the state. However, the most significant invention of the regime was Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the Kemalism. Against the rising social and political movements, the regime needed a kind of defence mechanism which combines some Islamic or religious figures with Kemalist ideology of the state. The military regime aimed at placing the Turkish education system in a Kemalist structure on the one hand, it aimed at using religion to strengthen the social unity and solidarity on the other hand. Ultimately, notions such as the understanding of the sacred state, the emphasis on the 'soldier-nation', Turkish nation as the guardian of Islam, the effort to protect Atatürk's principles have composed the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. For this reason, the school seemed one of the most influential tools to use the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the social life according to

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<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*

the state elites.<sup>199</sup> Ever since the alliance between Turkish Islamism and Kemalism, education ideology has undergone some basic transformations; that is, the emphasis of religious and nationalist themes merges with each other. According to Etienne Copeaux, the educational content in textbooks after the 1980s is significantly different from the 1930s years' samples.<sup>200</sup> The new ones include more Islamic discourse, but some figures of Kemalist ideology are used to mask the Islamic perspective of the new regime; that is, Islamic or religious elements have been added to the Turkish identity under the title of Kemalism.

In this manner, the university in Turkey gets its share from the oppressive and hard-core ideological education model of the state with the Higher Education Law in 1981. This type of education has long been practiced in primary and secondary education so the university has been reduced to primary and secondary school levels with this regulation.<sup>201</sup> Thus, universities in Turkey in general have been shaped away from free thought and scientific reality. Unlike being in advance of its time and providing critical perspectives for the various problems of the society, the university was forced to adopt a guardian position of the state ideology. As Abbas Güçlü revealed in 1993, universities were pictured as the state apparatus according to 'Psychological Operation Plans'.<sup>202</sup> In these plans, some advices such as controlling university libraries, loyalty to the state, prohibiting ideological and extremist groups' activities, applying disciplinary punishments, etc. have been given to the universities. This finding is enough to present the role or place of the university in Turkish education ideology.

### **3.3. EDUCATION IDEOLOGY OF THE AKP**

As we have seen in many new rising nation states, Turkish Republic has also experienced a process in which the state elites pondered about the state apparatuses in order to construct the new secular-Turkish citizens of the Republic.

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<sup>199</sup> Kaplan, *Ibid.*, 72.

<sup>200</sup> Copeaux, *Ibid.*, 240.

<sup>201</sup> Kaplan, *Ibid.*, 311.

<sup>202</sup> Abbas Güçlü, "Üniversitelere MGK Emri," *Milliyet*, April 13, 1993.

Turkish national education ideology was created in the era of one-party regime. Following the establishment period, national education ideology settled and developed in multi-party era. With the military interventions between 1960-1980s years, there has occurred a new type of paradigm. Depending on the formation of Turkish-Islamic synthesis in 1980s, state apparatuses have undergone some transformations. Since 2000s, with the AKP governments, we have been going through one more crucial period. With Erdoğan's leadership, the AKP governments have carried out many applications in terms of state ideology and presented many examples of its apparatuses.

According to Gençkal, AKP governments have determined the 2000s years' nation identity in Turkey.<sup>203</sup> As we have discussed in the former chapters, AKP governments and Erdoğan's leadership have developed the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and moved its applications further. In this part of the study, we will examine how this transformation of the state ideology has been experienced in the education area. When we look inside the AKP governments' education ideology, some terms such as neoliberal education policies, privatization of education, religious-nationalist education policies, compulsory religion lessons and Imam Hatip schools, 4+4+4 education model, etc. seem significant. One of the most important features of this period's education model is that the state has an economy-based education understanding. Another important point is the desire of the state elites (especially the leader of the state) to make some fundamental changes in the Turkish-Islamic ideology of the state. Within this scope, the education policies of the last twenty years have been shaped and applied. Particularly after 2011, the contents of some regulations made in the education area have shown that AKP governments started to pay more attention to the ideological function of education.<sup>204</sup> As we have discussed in the former chapters, there has been a conflict between the Kemalist ideology of the establishment period and Turkish-Islamist ideology of the AKP period in recent decades. In this

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<sup>203</sup> Gençkal Eroler, *Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

sense, it has been observed that in the education area AKP governments' education policies reflect an understanding of revenge or counter-ideological practices.<sup>205</sup> For İlker Aytürk, since the AKP came to power, post-Kemalist paradigm has become the state ideology rather than becoming an opposition movement to the Kemalist regime.<sup>206</sup> As a result, education policies in the AKP period and some regulations made in this period reveals that ideological motivations were taken into consideration rather than improving the quality of education and raising free, democratic, multi-cultural generations.

When we look at some regulations about education made during about AKP period, there are certain changes we need to mention. Primarily, there has been crucial regulations about the central organization structure of the Ministry of National Education during AKP era. One of these regulations was decree law about the Organisation and Duties of Ministry of National Education and issued on 14 September 2011. According to Gençkal, this regulation leaves an arbitrary impression contrary to the claims.<sup>207</sup> However, before a long time passed, a new regulation was issued on 14 March 2014 with the same purposes. This regulation had a broad repercussion in public sphere as "Closing Dershanes". Dershanes were the private educational institutions that prepared the students to the country-wide exams. Students were taking courses in Dershanes in addition to the state school lessons. According to the official sources, there were more than four thousand Dershanes in Turkey in 2011 and more than one million students were going to the Dershanes.<sup>208</sup> Meanwhile, the most advanced Dershane organization was in the hands of Gülen Movement (it would be named as FETÖ in 2015 by the Government of Turkey) and they were earning considerable income from the Dershanes. Therefore, this regulation has an ideological objective in the context of the AKP-Gülen Movement tension; that is the motivation of the regulation carried

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<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>206</sup> İlker Aytürk, "Post-post Kemalizm: Yeni Bir Paradigmayı Beklerken," *Birikim* 319 (Kasım 2015): 37-47.

<sup>207</sup> Gençkal Eroler, *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.

political reasons rather than educational interests. In this context, all the services carried by Dershanes have been stopped or transformed since 1 September 2015.

As one of the most important regulations of AKP governments, the new legislation on primary and secondary education usually known as ‘4+4+4 system’ went in effect on 11 April 2012. The radical changes that concern the whole society must be structured with social consensus and scientific data; yet, it has been implemented without the necessary research and in a short time.<sup>209</sup> The main purpose of the regulation is to transform the education system into religious and ideological manner. By doing this regulation, it would be possible to increase the number of Imam-Hatip schools and to edit the contents of the courses. In all its parts, 4+4+4 regulation carries political and ideological motives rather than educational interests. Another important issue is the determining the standards of the ‘acceptable’ teacher or school administrators. As Gençkal mentions, the merit-based assignments of the school administrators and interview method lead to unjust applications.<sup>210</sup> More recently, interview applications started to be used for the assignment of teachers after the 15 July military attempt. Teachers must enter both a written exam (KPSS) and an interview to work at the state schools. The questions asked in the interviews are far from the democratic, egalitarian, and educational perspectives; on the contrary, the interview applications show that the governments want to teachers who will obey every wishes of the state.<sup>211</sup> In addition to these developments, the basic condition for teacher assignments, candidate teachers' procedures, and administrator appointments is reduced to become a member of the partisan education union, Eğitim Bir-Sen.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>211</sup> “Sözleşmeli öğretmen mülakatları rezalete dönüştü,” *Birgün*, October 3, 2016.

<sup>212</sup> İlker Akçasoy, “AKP’nin Eğitim Bilançosu: ‘Oku, Düşün, Uygula, Neticelendir!’,” *Ayrıntı Dergi*, June 14, 2015.

### 3.4. NATIONAL EDUCATION AND GALLIPOLI NARRATIVE

In the twenty years of the AKP rule, it is noteworthy that the public sphere, in which schools play the leading role for the training of next generations, has been transformed into an area of conflict with a militarist, statist, nationalist and Islamist ideology. In other words, taken decisions about Turkish education system were ideological and political predominantly rather than educational or scientific. The new arising Gallipoli narrative has also been influenced by this trend. For instance, the concept of martyrdom has been manipulated in a way that has never been before in this period. Especially after the 15<sup>th</sup> of July 2016 attempted coup, many schools around the country have been renamed with the martyrs' names. Such a practice is an important indicator of how the militarist, nationalist, and Islamist language in the country has become stronger. It has been very important to reach children for the consciousness of Gallipoli that the state elites desire to create, and therefore schools have been included in this Gallipoli campaign.<sup>213</sup> As we know, lecturing is not the only way for the message that you want to give to the children. Visiting a memory site can be much more influential and pragmatic to get the right message. To understand the grandfathers who fought 'fearlessly' in Gallipoli and were 'gladly' gave their lives, people need to see the war field and 'breathe' their sacrifice. Within this framework, thousands of tours have been organized by state or private schools, universities, or various education foundations.<sup>214</sup> Millions of students have experienced the new master narrative of Gallipoli by means of these tours. The children are waving Turkish flags, singing anthems, saying Allahuekber loudly, carrying such posters in these tours: "My dear grandpa! I came for you". This poster has been organized as a regular activity to take students to Gallipoli and called as "My dear grandpa! I came for you" activity.<sup>215</sup> In addition to the education institutions' activities about the Gallipoli commemoration, there are also some other remarkable efforts too.

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<sup>213</sup> Değirmencioğlu, "Şehit Turizmi: Kitlelerin Çanakkale Seferberliği," 372.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, 373-374.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, 374.

For instance, Ministry of Youth and Sports have been organizing a project for the young citizens to commemorate Gallipoli battles. In its official website, the Ministry explains the objective and content of the activity. The explanations made by the organization itself represent the driving force behind the project:

Our Ministry carries out the project named "57th Regiment Loyalty Walk" on 24-25 April every year to commemorate Gallipoli martyrs and the 57th Infantry Regiment, which became legendary with their heroism in Gallipoli battles. "57th Regiment Loyalty Walk" aims to increase the personal and social development of young people and to contribute to their awareness of history. Young people between the ages of 18-29 can apply to the project. Our youths participating in the project are taken to Gallipoli through our General Directorate of Youth Services and Provincial Directorates. All the expenses are covered by our Provincial Directorates. Applications for the project are received by our Provincial Directorates in person or by phone.<sup>216</sup>

Organizing such tours for the students do not aim educational benefits, they carry some ideological motives on the contrary. By doing this, it is only possible to raise militarist, nationalist, hostile generations for the future. Consecrating death and blood, mythologizing wars, martyrs, losses, and always finding enemies inside or outside of the country are the main characters of the AKP era's understanding of Gallipoli. In short, the AKP regime's new Gallipoli narrative is injected into students with the help of state institutions, especially the educational institution.

Another important issue is performing ceremonies in national commemoration days. On 24.08.2003, the Regulation on the Ceremonies to be held on 18 March Martyrs' Day and 19 September Veterans Day was issued.<sup>217</sup> On 05.05.2012, the Regulation on National and Official Holidays, Local Liberation Days, Atatürk Days, Celebrations to be Held on Historical Days was issued.<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> "57. Alay Vefa Yürüyüşü 2016," TC Gençlik ve Spor Bakanlığı, accessed August 18, 2020, <http://www.gsb.gov.tr/Sayfalar/2611/2610/hakkinda.aspx>. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>217</sup> "18 Mart Şehitler Günü ve 19 Eylül Gaziler Gününde Yapılacak Törenler Hakkında Yönetmelik," Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, August 24, 2003, <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=5792&MevzuatTur=7&MevzuatTertip=5>.

<sup>218</sup> "Ulusal ve Resmi Bayramlar ile Mahalli Kurtuluş Günleri, Atatürk Günleri ve Tarihi Günlerde Yapılacak Tören ve Kutlamalar Yönetmeliği," Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, May 5, 2012, <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=20123073&MevzuatTur=3&MevzuatTertip=5>.

These two regulations determine the principles of the ceremonies made at the state schools and shape all the activities and their contents during the ceremonies. Every year and in every school without exception, teachers and students prepare commemoration boards for Gallipoli remembrances. Students write poems and letters to the martyrs, draw pictures of heroism, display flags around the school, narrate sacrifice or martyrdom stories in the ceremonies, etc. Moreover, many students from five to eighteen years take part in various plays or theatres about the Gallipoli commemoration ceremonies all over the country. In these plays, death, war, martyrdom is glorified, and nationalist ideology of the state is instilled to the students. For example, a ceremony organized by Avcılar District Directorate of National Education sets a good example for our discussion.<sup>219</sup> Young children play various roles in a commemorative theatre here. In one of the scenes, the ‘little’ commander, closes the eyes of the dead little soldiers with his little hands and shouts: “This is also a martyr. This is also a martyr”<sup>220</sup>. In the background, a tragic music plays and little soldier continues to shout: “My Mehmed said Allah Allah”<sup>221</sup>. Finally, the Turkish flag is laid on the dead soldiers. As another example, there is a famous story around the country about the martyrdom in Gallipoli battles, the soldier who hennaed his hair before coming to Gallipoli. According to the story, the commander asks the hennaed soldier the reason of it. The soldier explains the reason with his mother’s letter:

The love of the homeland is burning in us. You cannot stay away from your father, from your ancestors. Allah created us; the homeland raised, and fed. Tell your commander. We henna sacrificial lambs that way. You are the sacrifice of four brothers. You are Ismail. I hope you will be a martyr there. Just as the sacrificial lambs, I sent hennaed your hair so that you would be a sacrifice for the homeland.<sup>222</sup>

The children find themselves in an atmosphere of war, death, and blood in this process. According to Bülent Sezgin, it is unknown how many times the children

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<sup>219</sup> Muzaffer Özkurt, “Ana okulu mu acemi birliği mi?,” *Evrensel*, May 14, 2011.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.* This text has been translated by me.

at schools in Turkey stage scenes of martyrdom in a year.<sup>223</sup> As Sezgin states, it is also unknown how many children take part in these scenes in a year; furthermore, many children have to watch such scenes at their school.<sup>224</sup> As a result, such scenes are common in Turkey, and unfortunately almost every child throughout their education is faced with such scenes. Displaying themes such as war, death, martyrdom, conquest, or occupation to the children or using the children inside the display would cause several pedagogic problems in the long term. Above all, such an education understanding is far from democratic, peaceful, scientific perspectives, and would lead the next generations to militarist, nationalist, and hostile path on the contrary.

If we come to another important issue, the discourse of state education ideology of AKP period about the Gallipoli narrative shows itself on the boards that prepared in 18 March period at the schools. As we stated above, teachers and students prepare commemoration boards for Gallipoli remembrances. Students write poems and letters to the martyrs, draw pictures of heroism, display flags around the school, prepare various contents for the commemoration. As one of the most important figures of Gallipoli, Atatürk is referred in commemoration boards diversely. An example is from a poem named “He was Mustafa Kemal” by Suna Doğanay. A part of the poem was used in the commemoration boards as follows:

They said: No Army! He said: We will establish!

They said: No Money! He said: We will find it!

They said: Too many enemies!

He said: We will beat them!

He said. And he did what he said.

He was Atatürk!<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Bülent Sezgin, “Militarizm ve Ölüm Kıskaçında Törenler ve Drama Etkinlikleri: “Şehit Olacaksın İnşallah!”,” in Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu, *Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>225</sup> “18 Mart Çanakkale Zaferi,” Torul Atatürk Ortaokulu, accessed August 13, 2020, <http://torulataturkortaokulu.meb.k12.tr/>. This text has been translated by me.

Apart from Atatürk figure, the other elements of the Gallipoli narrative in the boards constitute the basic parts of the master narrative during the AKP period. The main emphasis is focused on the heroism, struggle, self-sacrifice of the Turkish nation and its faith, courage, and triumph. Besides, there is the dominance of the nationalist and statist language in the commemoration practices. For instance, one of the Imam Hatip schools in Konya has used the classical slogan of the Turkish-Islamist ideology in the commemoration boards.<sup>226</sup> The slogan is “One Nation, One Flag, One Homeland, One State”. Using such a nationalist and discriminatory language under the same roof of education does not give any positive message to anybody. Some of the examples from the boards are given as follows: “Gallipoli is impassable!”, “The homeland is grateful to you (martyrs)!” , “Gallipoli is an epic!”, “They (martyrs) didn’t die, they gave life to the future generations!”, “All that remains of them is these lands, this homeland!”, “Hey Turk! Don’t forget! Your national anthem starts with Don’t afraid!” Even further, a school principal from Trabzon likens Gallipoli battles to current conflicts in Syria and states these sentences about Gallipoli: “Gallipoli spirit is still alive in our nation. Zeytindalı Operation and the epic of our Mehmetçik in Afrin shows that they have the same spirit as Gallipoli”<sup>227</sup>. Justifying Turkey’s interventions into the warfare by comparing Gallipoli battles with the Syrian civil war displays the reflections of new Gallipoli narratives.

Finally, a very important news on Gallipoli subject has recently appeared. The Ministry of National Education Directorate General of Support Services has signed a collaboration protocol with Gallipoli Historic Area Presidency.<sup>228</sup> The

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<sup>226</sup> “18 Mart Çanakkale Şehitlerini Anma,” Karatay Mesleki ve Teknik Anadolu Lisesi, accessed August 13, 2020, [http://karatayticaretlisesi.meb.k12.tr/icerikler/18-mart-canakkale-sehitlerini-anma\\_6841295.html](http://karatayticaretlisesi.meb.k12.tr/icerikler/18-mart-canakkale-sehitlerini-anma_6841295.html).

<sup>227</sup> “18 Mart Çanakkale Zaferi Etkinliği,” Şalpazarı Ayten Yılmaz Mesleki ve Teknik Anadolu Lisesi, accessed August 13, 2020, [http://salpazariaymtal.meb.k12.tr/icerikler/18-mart-canakkale-zaferi-etkinligi\\_6866394.html](http://salpazariaymtal.meb.k12.tr/icerikler/18-mart-canakkale-zaferi-etkinligi_6866394.html).

<sup>228</sup> “Çanakkale Kahramanlarını Öyküleştirme Protokolü,” MEB Destek Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, September 29, 2020, <http://dhgm.meb.gov.tr/www/genel-mudurlugumuz-ile-canakkale-savaslar-gelibolu-tarih-alan-baskanligi-arasinda-28092020-tarihinde-canakkale-kahramanlarini-oykulestirme-protokoluimzalandi/icerik/543>

name of the project is “Narrating the Heroes of Gallipoli” and its aim is handing Gallipoli spirit down from generation to generation.<sup>229</sup> Moreover, the project aims to convey historical, cultural, and spiritual values of Gallipoli peninsula on the one hand; it aims to carry natural texture and geography of the peninsula to future generations on the other hand.<sup>230</sup> To conclude, there has been an increase of the religious/Islamic emphasis, marginalising interpretation, nationalist and militarist language, and glorification of death and martyrdom in the Gallipoli narrative within the boundaries of schools.

### **3.5. COURSEBOOKS, CURRICULUMS, GALLIPOLI NARRATIVE**

In Turkey, collective memory and its manipulation has played an important role in terms of construction and reproduction of national identity and state ideology. In this context, this part of our study will focus on the transformation of Gallipoli narrative in textbooks used in educational institutions. Especially, we will analyse the efforts of AKP governments to reconstruct the Gallipoli master narrative. For this, we will mention about some studies about the education ideology’s role in Gallipoli remembrance. Then, we will present examples from the textbooks, curriculums, and some educational changes during AKP period. The contents are obtained from the sections related to the Gallipoli battles in the textbooks and curriculums used in primary and secondary education. As we have discussed before, educational institutions are one of the most important elements that shape the collective memory of a nation. According to Ali Gençoğlu, textbooks are “memory carriers of a nation”<sup>231</sup> so textbooks and curriculums should be examined carefully. In his study, Gençoğlu has examined the Gallipoli narrative in textbooks and developed some conclusions. At first, there is an effort to support the Ottoman Empire’s entrance to the war. As Gençoğlu examines in textbooks, the war was inevitable for the Turks at that time:

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<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> Ali Gençoğlu, “Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Kurucu Bir Ögesi Olarak Kolektif Bellek: Okul Ders Kitaplarında Çanakkale Savaşı Anlatıları,” *İletişim Kuram ve Araştırma Dergisi* 41 (2015): 332.

When it came to 1914, there was no other way out for the Ottoman Empire rather than entering the war. It seemed impossible to remain neutral against the war. Allies had done everything to leave the Turks alone and helpless. They wanted to hide the deep and vital relation of the war with the Turks.<sup>232</sup>

In the same textbook, the condition of Turkish military and Turkish soldiers have been pictured as much weaker than the Allies' military supplies.<sup>233</sup> Despite the weakness of economy and military, the Turkish army won a victory against the enemies with the help Allah and Turkish nation's heroism. In addition to this, the figure of Atatürk in Gallipoli has been emphasised in the textbooks. According to Gençoğlu, Mustafa Kemal has become prominent as a different personality since his childhood and some of his superhuman abilities were understood years ago.<sup>234</sup> Another issue that was examined by Gençoğlu, the self-sacrifice of Turkish nation and the love of martyrdom or death. In the master narrative, Turkish soldiers are identified as people who especially wanted to be martyred for the defence of the homeland and the nation.<sup>235</sup> These people sacrificed their lives without blinking their eyes for a second.

Another remarkable study has focused on the cognitive perception of university students about the Gallipoli battles. In his study, Abdülvahid Sezen has conducted a survey among university students to collect the data. Some of the findings have shed light on the transformation of Gallipoli master narrative in recent times. For instance, while the participants have emphasized the role of unity and solidarity of the Turkish nation in Gallipoli victory, they have also stated that this war has a national, spiritual and religious dimensions.<sup>236</sup> Another important finding is about the most effective elements in the war. As the three most important elements, the participants stated about the religious mission and motivation, the unity and solidarity of the Turkish nation, and finally military

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<sup>232</sup> *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi-I* (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi AÖF Yayını, 2012), 102. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, 107-108.

<sup>234</sup> Gençoğlu, *Ibid.*, 342.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, 343.

<sup>236</sup> Abdülvahid Sezen, "Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Çanakkale Savaşlarıyla İlgili Bilişsel Algı ve Yorumlama Biçimleri," *Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi* 10, no. 2 (2010): 186.

genius and skills of the commanders.<sup>237</sup> If we come to the martyrdom issue, Sezen has indicated that the participants value the concept of martyrdom and this situation is parallel with the general understanding in the society.<sup>238</sup> As one of the impressive findings, 80 percent of the participants believe in extraordinary stories about the martyrs, and 90 percent believe in extraordinary events related to the Gallipoli battles.<sup>239</sup> In this research, the religious emphasis of Turkish-Islamic understanding and the effort of glorifying religious figures can be observed easily.

As another impressive work, Gençkal examines the militarist and nationalist discourse school coursebooks that are produced in AKP governments' era. According to Gençkal, school textbooks are full of descriptions of 'military-nation' and always narrate the history as a range of wars.<sup>240</sup> As Üstel indicates, the 'acceptable citizen' that state elites desire to create in the society is not a civilian citizen but it is a 'militant citizen'.<sup>241</sup> One of the observed cases in the study that there is an attempt to naturalise the war, death, and blood under the title of heroism, braveness, and martyrdom. For instance, some figures such as enemy, occupation, or conquest are shown to the young children at Social Science coursebook of 1<sup>st</sup> grades together with national holidays, national heroes such as Atatürk, and martyrs.<sup>242</sup> In addition to this, there are such descriptions in the coursebooks that there are always internal and external enemies, Anatolia is the homeland of Turks, seas around the country are the Turkish territory, Turks have enemies every time, etc.<sup>243</sup> In her research, Gençkal remarks that there has been an increase in the admiration of Ottoman era and tendency to the neo-Ottomanist perspectives in the AKP period in terms of educational context.<sup>244</sup> Moreover, we can easily see the transformation of education system from a much more Turkish-

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<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*, 191.

<sup>240</sup> Gençkal Eroler, *Ibid.*, 214.

<sup>241</sup> Üstel, *Ibid.*, 325.

<sup>242</sup> Mehmet Ülger, İnci Türker, and Seçil Kinik, *İlkokul Hayat Bilgisi Ders Kitabı 1* (Ankara: MEB, 2016), 163-165.

<sup>243</sup> Gençkal Eroler, *Ibid.*, 225.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, 233.

nationalist position to a Turkish-Islamic place. These findings about the contents of the coursebooks and educational discourse of the AKP governments show absolute parallelism between education ideology of the state and transformation of Gallipoli master narrative. This situation tells us that the AKP administration is attempting to transform the state ideology within its own interest in all field of the society.

Among the academic research, the most extensive work has been done by Fatma Eylem Çoban. In her MA study, Çoban aims to find out how Gallipoli battles are taught to the students, to measure the knowledge of students about Gallipoli, and to analyse the attitudes and thoughts of the students related to the subject.<sup>245</sup> Çoban has applied her scanning model to the high school students from Ankara, Van, Batman, Rize, Denizli, Isparta, Kırklareli, and Çanakkale. Therefore, we will refer to some findings of the study in order to comprehend the role of education institutions in the reconstruction of Gallipoli narrative. Primarily, before starting to the subject of Gallipoli battles, we need to mention about the aims of history teaching in Turkish education ideology. According to Çoban, history teaching is necessary because Turkish nation should know its history in order to respond to the false accusations, to learn about the nation's glorious past, and to defend it properly in every field.<sup>246</sup> Furthermore, as the inheritors of these lands that have been watered with martyrs' blood, young people need to learn their history so that they know their duties and responsibilities, and deserve this homeland as a legacy from their ancestors.<sup>247</sup> At this point, we will look at the findings of the study with these preliminary information. In textbooks that Çoban examined for her study, before starting to the subject of Gallipoli battles, a preliminary information is given to the students about why the Ottoman Empire had to enter the war.<sup>248</sup> It is insistently emphasized that there is no other

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<sup>245</sup> Fatma Eylem Çoban, "Ortaöğretim Öğrencilerinin Çanakkale Savaşları ve Öğretimine İlişkin Biliş ve Algılama Düzeyleri" (MA Thesis, Çanakkale 18 Mart Üniversitesi, 2011).

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

choice but to enter the war. Another important finding is the stress of Atatürk figure and his supernatural effect to the Gallipoli victory. A quotation from a coursebook about Atatürk's success as follows: "The battles he won against superior enemy forces in Anafartalar, Arıburnu, and Conkbayırı prevented Gallipoli from falling into the hands of enemies"<sup>249</sup>. Besides, a reading passage exists in the coursebook about Atatürk's contribution to the war with the title of "I order you to die"<sup>250</sup>. As a remarkable finding of the study, majority of the students who attended the research think that supernatural and religious factors have crucial role in Gallipoli victory:

It is very common idea in Turkish society that the Gallipoli victory occurred by supernatural forces rather than military success. The question of "Religious factors have a great effect on our extraordinary Gallipoli victory." was directed to the students to find out whether this idea had a place in history lessons. As a result, many of the students agreed with this sentence.<sup>251</sup>

What is more interesting about the subject is that Çoban states that the students from Imam Hatip schools could have affected this result of the study.<sup>252</sup> In other words, some of the education policies such as increasing the number of Imam Hatip schools during the AKP period have influenced the young people's view of Gallipoli. From this point of view, despite the objections of certain segments of the society, the main purpose of some changes in the field of education during AKP period becomes clear. Turkish-Islamic synthesis and the rule of AKP has been transforming some parts of the Gallipoli master narrative. The stress of Islamic and religious perspectives in Gallipoli narrative is one of those transformations that aimed by the Turkish-Islamist elites and Imam Hatip schools undoubtedly make the necessary effort in this regard.

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<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, 26. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, 96. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

### 3.6. CURRENT VERSIONS OF THE COURSEBOOKS

In the new curriculum of 2017, the Presidency of the Board of Education prepared the history course teaching programs again. Beginning from the 2018-2019 academic year, the renewed history course curricula will be implemented at all grades of the schools. Therefore, we have looked inside the curriculum programs and history coursebooks that published by National Education. According to our findings, the Gallipoli issue is placed in the 8<sup>th</sup> grade of the primary education and 12<sup>th</sup> grade of the secondary education. The name of the lesson is “History of Revolution and Kemalism”. The other grades (5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> grades) of the education system and their history lessons don’t refer to the Gallipoli battles.

If we come to the findings from the curriculum and coursebooks, there are both the common points with the other research we mentioned above and some different points too. Before coursebooks, we want to present the explanations of the learning outcomes in the curriculums. In the 8<sup>th</sup> grade History of Revolution and Kemalism Course Curriculum, the aim of the subject is determined as giving information about the Gallipoli battles and its importance for the First World War. In addition, it is clearly stated that the Victory of Kut’ül Amare and Sarıkamış Operation should be taught to the students.<sup>253</sup> One more important issue mentioned in the curriculum is that the contributions and leadership of Mustafa Kemal in the Gallipoli front should be emphasised in the lessons and textbooks.<sup>254</sup> When we look at the 12<sup>th</sup> grade History of Revolution and Kemalism Course Curriculum, there are similar explanations with the 8<sup>th</sup> grade except a couple of sentences. For instance, the importance of Gallipoli, the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the Victory of Kut’ül Amare, and Sarıkamış Operation are repeated. However, there is a remarkable addition to the subject: “The Army of Islam and

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<sup>253</sup> T.C. History of Revolution and Kemalism Course 8<sup>th</sup> Grade Curriculum (Ankara: MEB, 2018), 11.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

the defence of Medina”<sup>255</sup>. As we discussed in the former chapters and in the education part of the study, there has been a great effort to add religious and Islamic figures into the Gallipoli master narrative since the 1980s’ Turkish-Islamic synthesis. As a matter of fact, the AKP period and some of the educational regulations has achieved the transformation of Gallipoli remembrance in terms of Islamic figures.

In addition to the curriculums, we have also examined the history coursebooks of the 8<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grades. In the Gallipoli part of the books, the war is summarised in general; then, the martyrs and the victory are glorified. Yet, there is also a trend in both coursebooks. Some of the individual memoirs from the war field have been used in the subject to create a spiritual or lyrical environment for the students. It is not important either those stories are real or fabrication. As an example, a scene from the frontline is presented with these sentences:

Tempers are tense, lips are praying to Allah, reciting Shahadah. Time is getting longer. The commander calls out to the soldiers. My boys! My lions! After a while, we will come into the presence of Allah. Let's not go without ablution.<sup>256</sup>

As another example from the coursebooks, one of the stories narrate the self-sacrifice of the Muslim soldiers, their braveness, heroism, and magnanimity. At the point of death, a soldier named Lapsekili Halil tries to ask for his friend’s blessing due to the debt he took from him. Additionally, the understanding of ummah is pictured by this story in the book. A part of the story is as follows:

It was one of the bloodiest scenes of the Gallipoli battles. There were many wounded people, some from Urfa, some from Bosnia, some from

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<sup>255</sup> T.C. History of Revolution and Kemalism Course 12<sup>th</sup> Grade Curriculum (Ankara: MEB, 2018), 22.

<sup>256</sup> Ökkeş Kurt, T.C. *History of Revolution and Kemalism 8<sup>th</sup> Grade Coursebook* (Ankara: Nev Kitap, 2019), 42.

This text has been translated by me.

Sivas, some from Aleppo, some from Antep, some from Muş. One of the wounded heroes was Halil from the Beybaş Village of Lapseki.<sup>257</sup>

As the coursebook of 12<sup>th</sup> grades, there is another version of the book. Indeed, majority of the contents is same, but the publishing house is different. In this coursebook, the leadership of Atatürk is glorified via Churchill's sentences:

After his successful operation in Anafartalar on August 9, Mustafa Kemal destroyed one thousand British soldiers with a raid attack he himself led. The Turks surpassed Conkbayırı and remained there until the end of the victory. This success is the event that closes the curtain.<sup>258</sup>

In the same coursebook, it is stated that Mustafa Kemal was called as "the commander who saved the capital"<sup>259</sup> after the Gallipoli victory. As in many other matters in short, Atatürk figure has also been placed into the coursebooks.

As a conclusion, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, we have observed various cases related with state ideology and *Ideological State Apparatuses*. The dominant ideological perspectives who came to power have tried to stereotype the state and the society; in return, both the state and the society have adapted itself to the conditions. In this manner, education ideology has been abused effectively in Turkey as a practical state tool. Like its formers, the AKP governments have reorganized the educational institution of the state and its ideology within the scope of its own political, economic, and ideological purposes. It is obvious that the period of AKP governments and the rise of Turkish-Islamic movements has transformed the Gallipoli master narrative by adding especially religious and Islamic figures into the narrative. Nonetheless, the old figures of Gallipoli narrative such as Atatürk, nationalist discourse, and statist view has held their place. In this context, education ideology of the state and practices applied in education institutions has given remarkable support for the transformation of the Gallipoli narrative. During the commemoration week of 18

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<sup>257</sup> Akif Çevik, Gül Koç, and Koray Şerbetçi, *T.C. History of Revolution and Kemalism 12<sup>th</sup> Grade Coursebook* (Ankara: Devlet Kitapları, 2019), 39. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>258</sup> Bahattin Demirtaş, *T.C. History of Revolution and Kemalism 12<sup>th</sup> Grade Coursebook* (Ankara: Mevsim, 2019), 34. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

March, war, death, blood, martyrdom, self-sacrifice is being glorified, hostile and nationalist discourse are instilled to the students, and the significance of state, nation, motherland is stressed persistently. In addition, interference to the curriculums and contents of the coursebooks have influenced the transformation of the Gallipoli narrative. Finally, it should be known that such an understanding of history education is remote from the educational, pedagogical, humanistic approaches, and does not evoke good feelings for the next generations.

## CHAPTER 4: GALLIPOLI NARRATIVE AND DIYANET

### 4.1. DIYANET AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY

The *Diyanet*<sup>260</sup> was established as a laic/secular organisation in the Turkish Republic in 1924. Modernisation project of republican elites needed an institution “to execute services regarding Islamic faith and practices, to enlighten society about religion, and to carry out the management of places of worship”<sup>261</sup>. Indeed, the republican/Kemalist ideology thought laicism as a tool for removing religion from the social milieu and reduce it to the level of individual faith and practice. The idea of freedom of religion during the Republican period solely aimed ‘individualized religion’, and furthermore, “the purpose of the new leadership in this period was to secularize and modernize not only the state and the political, but to transform society into a modern entity”<sup>262</sup> with the help of religious establishment. In this context, the *Diyanet* was considered as a state apparatus to ‘regulate’ Islam by the new leadership. ‘Regulation of Islam’ meant for the Republican elites to “put orthodox Islam under the state control”<sup>263</sup> and to merge it with Turkish nationalism for the national unity and solidarity, in parallel with secular education and legal systems, minimising the significance of the *Ulema* (Islamic scholars) in the social environment, and “outlawing the use of religious speech, propaganda or organization for political purposes”<sup>264</sup>. One of the prominent scholars who studied on religion in Turkey, Şerif Mardin, identifies the secularisation project of the Turkish Republic and its elites as ‘positivist-nationalist generation’, and according to Mardin, this generation constitutes a specific social class in the country.<sup>265</sup> The debate of relation between laicism and Islamic lifestyle has always been complicated in Turkey. Another famous

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<sup>260</sup> Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA).

<sup>261</sup> İştâ B. Gözaydın, "Diyanet and Politics," *The Muslim World* 98, no. 2-3 (2008): 216.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.

<sup>263</sup> Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," in *Religion and Politics in Turkey*, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (New York: Routledge, 2006), 27.

<sup>264</sup> Gözaydın, *Ibid.*, 217.

<sup>265</sup> Şerif Mardin, "The Just and the Unjust," *Daedalus* 120, no. 3 (1991): 125-127.

sociologist who studied on secularism in Turkey, Niyazi Berkes, expresses the Kemalist phenomenon as follows:

They now claimed that provisions restricting the political power of religion were incompatible with secularism, which implied non-interference in the affairs of religion; therefore, Kemalist secularism was not true secularism, but shoddy legitimization for the persecution of Islam. A modern secular state, said the secularist jurists on the other hand, should let religion follow its own course if the state did not intend to liquidate religion altogether. The inference was that, if Kemalist secularism did not fit one shoe, it should, perforce, fit into the other.<sup>266</sup>

Although the *Diyanet* has been the religious authority and the primary institution for Islamic policies of the Turkish Republic, Ceren Lord states that “scholars have minimised the *Diyanet*’s role, characterising it as a passive and marginal actor and primarily an instrument of the Kemalist/secular state for controlling religion”<sup>267</sup>. In this manner, the *Diyanet* represents the body of secular/modern/national religion of the state and aims to carry out the religious affairs, to manage the religious places such as mosques and local units, and to transform the public religious trend into the statist understanding, that is, secular/modern/national Islamic interpretation of the Republic.<sup>268</sup> In an article discussing the process of Turkish modernization project and the similar one in Japan, R. L. Chambers mentions that the establishment of the *Diyanet* in Turkey aimed at monopolising the religious authority, and abrogating its function in society and civil bureaucracy of the time.<sup>269</sup>

Yet, the situation has undergone huge changes until now. Especially with the rise of Islamic movements in 1980s and with the rule of AKP<sup>270</sup> governments in 2000s, the role of *Diyanet* has gained new dimensions according to the political conditions of the day. As we have discussed in earlier chapters, Gallipoli

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<sup>266</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 480.

<sup>267</sup> Ceren Lord, *Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 79.

<sup>268</sup> İsmail Kara, "Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Devletle Müslümanlar Arasında Bir Kurum," in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004): 6.

<sup>269</sup> R. L. Chambers, *The Civil Bureaucracy, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (New Jersey: Princeton, 1964), 107.

<sup>270</sup> Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development Party

remembrance practices have been transformed and shaped by the Turkish-Islamist ideology in recent decades. Like many other state institutions, the *Diyanet* also has played a significant role in creating such a new master narrative about Gallipoli remembrance. In order to analyse the *Diyanet's* role in Gallipoli issue, we need to examine the process which the *Diyanet* as a state administrative unit has experienced some basic turns from the secular/modern environment of the republican establishment period until today's Turkish-Islamist climate. Now, we will examine the *Diyanet's* Friday sermons, *Diyanet Dergi*, and some *Diyanet* publications to discuss the role of the *Diyanet* in the transformation of Gallipoli master narrative. In this way, we will compare the rise of Turkish-Islamic ideology under the rule of AKP governments, transformation of the *Diyanet*, and formation of the new master narrative in the Gallipoli remembrance.

#### 4.2. JURIDICAL STATUS OF THE DIYANET

After the establishment of the Republic, the Kemalist ideology and its defenders started to pass laws to “secure secularism”<sup>271</sup>. In 1924, the Act no. 429 on the Abolishment of The Ministries of Seriiyye and Evkaf<sup>272</sup> was adopted. The first article of Act no. 429 as follows:

In the Republic of Turkey, the Parliament and the Cabinet are responsible for the legislation and execution of the provisions concerning the affairs of the society; and the Diyanet was formed as part of the Republic for the implementation of all provisions concerning faith and worship aspects of the religion of Islam, and the administration of religious institutions.<sup>273</sup>

This regulation was important due to reducing the *Diyanet's* power to an administrative unit. The first organizational legislation of the *Diyanet* was adopted on 14<sup>th</sup> June 1935 and published in Resmi Gazete on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1935 (Act no. 2800 on The Organization and Duties of Religious Affairs). Then, Act no. 5634 was enacted on the 29<sup>th</sup> April 1950 by changing the organization of religious affairs considerably. Despite some legislative changes about the Presidency of

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<sup>271</sup> İřtar B. Gözaydın, “A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism: The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,” *Marburg Journal of Religion* 11, no. 1 (2006).

<sup>272</sup> Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations.

<sup>273</sup> Gözaydın, “Diyanet and Politics,” 218.

Religious Affairs (PRA hereafter), another important change has been made in 1965. Act no. 633 on the Organization and Duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs was adopted on 22 June 1965 and published in the Official Gazette on 2 July 1965. According to this legislation, *Diyanet* was gaining more importance within the administrative structure of the Turkish Republic. The mission of the *Diyanet* was described as “to carry out affairs related to the beliefs, worship and moral foundations of Islam, to enlighten Turkish society about religion and to manage places of worship”<sup>274</sup>. In one respect, this legislative regulation of the 1960s made official what was already being experienced in the country, the Republic is defined as laic, but state authorities interfere in the religious issues constantly.<sup>275</sup> Hereafter, the *Diyanet* could take part in social, religious, and moral issues officially. On 30 April 1979, the Act no. 1982 was enacted by amending the Act no. 633 on the Establishment and Duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and by providing the organisation of the *Diyanet* abroad. However, the Constitutional Court rescinded the law by asserting that it was incompatible with the Constitution.

In this context, Halil Arslan states that the *Diyanet* in Turkey has been treated as an institution “without organisation laws”<sup>276</sup> until 2010s because it has been in a bizarre situation legally. It was one of the very powerful administrative units in Turkey, but it did not have legal basis technically. In the research conducted by Ruşen Çakır and İrfan Bozan on the organizational structure of *Diyanet* and the search for a civil-democratic *Diyanet*, it is seen that *Diyanet* has more than seventy-five thousand employees since 1992.<sup>277</sup> According to the official figures of PRA Directorate of Strategy Development, the staff numbers

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<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, 220.

<sup>275</sup> Lord, *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>276</sup> Halil Arslan, “*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’nın Din Algısı: 1972 ve 2011 Yılları Cuma Hutbeleri Örneği*” (MA Thesis, Harran University, 2015), 8.

<sup>277</sup> Ruşen Çakır and İrfan Bozan, *Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün Mü?* (İstanbul: TESEV, 2005), 74.

were more than one hundred thousand on 31 December 2019.<sup>278</sup> These statistics are contradictory when we look at the legal position of the *Diyanet* in the country. *Diyanet*, as a state agency does not have the basic statutory power, but it has thousands of people to work.

It seems that the Act no. 6002 adopted in the Turkish Parliament on 1 July 2010 has fixed the organizational structure of the Presidency “in line with the requirements of the age”<sup>279</sup>. Since 1965, the Act no. 633 has been in force with some changes and today the same regulations are running. In a word, the mission of the *Diyanet* and its complicated position in the Turkish Republic can be understood from the one hundred thirty sixth article of the Constitution:

The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.<sup>280</sup>

The Constitution states that the *Diyanet* is both a religious administrative unit of the secular Turkish Republic and also it helps to maintaining national unity and solidarity. It is defined in the constitution as “removed from all political views and ideas” and “aiming at national solidarity and integrity”. This is something impossible in practice. Ceren Kenar summarises this issue as four main functions of the *Diyanet* in her study. Firstly, the *Diyanet* is responsible for “services relating to worship, including the administration of places of worship and the organization of pilgrimages to Mecca”<sup>281</sup>. Secondly, the *Diyanet* is charged with religious education and Quran courses for the citizens in coordination with Ministry of Education. Thirdly, as the most debated mission of the *Diyanet*, “enlightening the public on religious matters, which includes providing answers to religious questions, preaching, offering guidance, conducting conferences, and

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<sup>278</sup> “İstatistikler,” DİB Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı, June 1, 2020, <https://stratejigelistirme.diyamet.gov.tr/sayfa/57/istatistikler>.

<sup>279</sup> Arslan, *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>280</sup> Ceren Kenar, “Bargaining between Islam and Kemalism: An Investigation of Official Islam through Friday Sermons” (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2011), 33.

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

publishing religious texts with an aim to inculcate true knowledge to people”<sup>282</sup>. Fourthly, the *Diyanet* manages religious services for Turkish citizens abroad to “strengthen their commitment to religious and national principles”<sup>283</sup>. While *Diyanet* is carrying out these missions, the religious issues are merged with the nationalist and statist issues frequently. Therefore, whether the *Diyanet* is a state apparatus or a free secular state institution is a controversial issue. In this manner, we have discussed the legislative issues about the *Diyanet*; however, its political and ideological status is more important for our study rather than its legal condition in Turkey.

After the September 1980 military coup, there has been the rise of Islamist movements in Turkey with the assistance of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis ideology. Besides, Turkish Republic welcomed these movements and made room for them in order to stand against the Left-wing movements, the Kurdish political/separatist movement, and extremist ideologies. As for the Turkish-Islamist movements, the *Diyanet* has also taken advantage of this period and enhanced its organisation and influence inside the state. According to Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, the period after the coup shows us “the transformation of the *Diyanet* from a functional ideological state apparatus to a very pliable and an imposer one, which regulates and steers Turkey’s society according to the political decision-makers’ ideology and daily political strategies”<sup>284</sup>. Indeed, military coups in Turkey has played crucial role in *Diyanet*’s transformation within the state, while it has always been asserted that the military represents a secularist/laic perspective and shows no tolerance to religious structures.<sup>285</sup> As an example, in the process of 27 May 1960 military coup in Turkey, *Diyanet muftis* and *imams* told in their sermons to the public about the “great meaning of the 27 May reforms”<sup>286</sup> by using religious apothegms. As in the 27 May, this situation has been experienced

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<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>284</sup> Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, “Turkey’s *Diyanet* Under AKP Rule: From Protector to Imposer of State Ideology?,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16, no. 4 (2016): 3.

<sup>285</sup> Lord, *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

in 1980 military coup, and in the AKP governments' rule because according to our leaders supporting our governments is a 'sacred duty' and "our religion orders us to be united and disapproves of any dissention and factionalism"<sup>287</sup>.

In this context, we will focus on the critical era, the *Diyanet* under the AKP rule because the religious authority of the state has been reshaped ideologically and politically by the AKP and personally by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Our sacred duty as a citizen has been reached its top level in the AKP period and Islamic basis of this situation has been organized especially by the *Diyanet*. It is stated by many scholars that "the AKP has used its dominant political position to direct state resources to underwrite the political success of its leading cadres"<sup>288</sup>. Similarly, the *Diyanet* has undergone a process in which the administrative unit of the state has been transformed into one of the most crucial foundations of the AKP governments. In recent decades, it has been observed that the *Diyanet* determines its policies about religious issues and even about the socio-political subjects in synchronisation with the AKP governments' practices and discourses. In the end, Turkish-Islamic synthesis had found the embodied version of its ideas, the AKP rule with the *Diyanet*'s contributions, so it wouldn't have missed the chance.

With the AKP rule in the country, especially after the legislative reforms in 2010, the *Diyanet* has improved its organization, bureaucratic significance, and administrative capacity inside the state. According to Lord, the *Diyanet* has been experiencing its golden era under the AKP rule since 2002.<sup>289</sup> For instance, the *Diyanet* started the Family Guidance Bureaus in 2003. Another example is *Diyanet TV* which was launched in 2009 in order to broadcast religious contents for enlightening the Turkish-Muslim society. In 2010, legislative regulations were carried out with the Act no. 6002. In 2011, some religious leaders from Kurdish region were appointed for the struggle against Kurdish separatism and encouraged

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<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>288</sup> Öztürk, *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>289</sup> Lord, *Ibid.*, 99.

for the use of Kurdish language. After this time, many measures have been carried out; the raise of Presidency's position in state protocol from fifty-first to tenth place, its administrative linkage to The Prime Minister, new education system (4+4+4 years of education), civil marriages regulation, dealing with halal certificates for foods, *fatwa* services by a telephone call.

In the meantime, the *Diyanet*'s economic status has been debated by the Turkish public in recent years. Some statistical data will be helpful for our discussion about the *Diyanet*'s economic role and its relationship with the AKP governments in this period. At first, Lord states that the *Diyanet*'s budget amount have been growing considerably since its establishment in 1924 despite some temporal declines from time to time.<sup>290</sup> However, the period after 2003 has shown that the *Diyanet* has been increasing its budget day by day. Since 2003, the *Diyanet* budget has been multiplied up more than ten times. In 2005 Central Government Budget, the *Diyanet*'s budget was averaged about 1,12 billion TL.<sup>291</sup> In 2020 Central Government Budget, the *Diyanet* was averaged about 11,5 billion TL.<sup>292</sup> The 2020 budget of the *Diyanet* has also surpassed eight different ministries such as Ministry of the Interior or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Öztürk, the *Diyanet* employs about 120.000 personnel which makes it one of the Turkey's largest state agencies.<sup>293</sup> As Lord states, in between 2002 and 2016 years, the *Diyanet*'s personnel have increased by 52 per cent, the number of mosques by 15 per cent, and the Qur'an courses astonishingly by 392 per cent.<sup>294</sup> However, that is not all, there is one more financial resource of the *Diyanet*, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı<sup>295</sup>. This foundation was established in 1975 by the *Diyanet* and it has been controlled by the *Diyanet* not officially but indirectly. It aims to support the religious activities in the society as a 'civilian foundation'.

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<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>291</sup> Çakır and Bozan, *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>292</sup> "Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Bütçesi," Veri Kaynağı, accessed July 12, 2020, <https://www.verikaynagi.com/grafik/yillara-gore-diyamet-isleri-baskanligi-butcesi/>.

<sup>293</sup> Öztürk, *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>294</sup> Lord, *Ibid.*, 115.

<sup>295</sup> Turkish Religious Foundation.

The foundation organises charity campaigns and receive financial support from the society for the purpose of religious services such as constructing Quran courses. Moreover, the foundation provides some scholarships to the university students.

### 4.3. GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN IN FRIDAY SERMONS

A sermon or preach is a religious speech given in the mosques. Friday sermons are read by the *imams* to the people in every Friday prayer. In Turkey, general preaches and Friday sermons are prepared by the *Diyanet* according to the Act 633 on 1965. A circular letter (no 357) about the preparation of sermons and preaches was issued on 24 October 2002 by the *Diyanet*, and an amendment was made about this circular under the title of Services of Presidency in 2007. Since then, all the sermons and preaches have been organized in care of the *Diyanet*. As per article 10/a: “In the Friday sermons, preaches, and conferences, the emphasis will be given to issues that will strengthen religious integrity, national unity and solidarity. Necessary measures will be taken against destructive, separatist propaganda and harmful movements.”<sup>296</sup> In addition to this, the article 10/b states as follows:

In the sermons and preaches, improving the knowledge and culture of the society on religious, scientific and moral issues will be targeted. The evil of *fitna*, disagreement and separatism will be explained. Issues that will strengthen our national unity and solidarity will be included.<sup>297</sup>

As understood from the articles, the *Diyanet* provides itself a specific role about enlightening the society, maintaining religious integrity, and protecting national unity and solidarity. Even these sentences only give the impression that the *Diyanet* is an ideological state apparatus of the Turkish Republic. However, there is confusion about this practice inside the *Diyanet*. As per article 10/ç, “it should be avoided from politics and personal issues, and internal or external political

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<sup>296</sup> “2007 Genelgesi,” DİB Hukuk Müşavirliği, May 24, 2007, <https://hukukmusavirligi.diyamet.gov.tr/Detay/155/2007-genelgesi>. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.* This text has been translated by me.

issues shouldn't be mentioned in the sermons"<sup>298</sup>. To the contrary, the article 8/ğ states the following: "when faced with current affairs and emergencies, an unplanned sermon can be prepared"<sup>299</sup>. Through this, we can estimate that these emergency situations can also be social or political issues. In some cases, such as terrorist attacks or the Syrian civil war, we know that the *Diyanet* takes initiative and makes some political statements in preaches and sermons in the mosques. Thereby, an objective *Diyanet* in terms of political issues have not been organized yet in Turkey.

In the preparation of the sermons and preaches, there has been different applications since the establishment of the Presidency. In 1924-1965, the sermons were left to the choice of *imams* and an advisory 'sermon book' was prepared in 1927-1936. In 1965-1980, the Committee of Religious Affairs was charged with determining the principles of sermons and preaches, but the *imams* were preparing their own sermons still. When it came to 1980, the centralisation of the sermons started. The preparation of the sermons was carried out by the Presidency until 2006, and the imams were controlled in the light of "sunnah, Quran, and Atatürk's principles"<sup>300</sup>. Since 2006, the sermons have been prepared by the local offices of the *Diyanet* (*Muftiate*); however, the *Diyanet* has also been publishing a central Friday sermon in its website every week. If we look at the topics of the sermons, they are similar to each other most of the time. For instance, if the date is close to 18 March<sup>301</sup>, then the contents are prepared about Gallipoli all over the country. This condition has continued until 15 July military coup attempt. On 15 July 2016, a circular letter was issued rapidly. In the article 5/1 of this circular, "On Friday sermons, the sermons sent from the Presidency will be read meticulously and no additions or subtractions will be made in the sermon text"<sup>302</sup>. In the article

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<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.* This text has been translated by me.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.* This text has been translated by me.

<sup>300</sup> *Diyanet Gazetesi*, "Çanakkale Zaferi," February 15, 1981, no. 255, 14.

<sup>301</sup> 18 March is the date of the Gallipoli Victory and Martyrs' Day.

<sup>302</sup> "Genelge," DİB Hukuk Müşavirliği, July 15, 2016,

<https://hukukmusavirligi.diyenet.gov.tr/Documents/15%20Temmuz%202016%20Genelgesi.pdf>.

This text has been translated by me.

5, it is also stated that strengthening national unity and solidarity will be emphasised during sermons. It is insistently stressed that necessary measures should be taken against destructive, separatist, and harmful movements such as ‘Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organisation’ (FETÖ hereafter).<sup>303</sup> Thus, the centralisation of the Friday sermons has returned with the 15 July issue. By giving such a reaction right after the 15 July military attempt, the *Diyanet* shows how it serves the ideological needs of the state just at the right time.

As we have discussed in previous chapters, the collective memory about the Gallipoli has also been influenced and shaped by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Particularly with the AKP rule since 2002, it has been occurred a transformation in the remembering practices of Gallipoli. In this period, there has been a trial to rewrite the Gallipoli and create a new master narrative about the Gallipoli campaign. In this manner, we will examine the role of the *Diyanet* in this transformation of Gallipoli remembrance. For this, we will analyse the Friday sermons of the *Diyanet* between 2008-2020 and refer to some scientific works about them. The sermons we have examined are the ones which were read in March of each year.<sup>304</sup> Now, we will look at some studies on the Friday sermons, then we will focus on the examination of the sermons.

The Friday sermons are significant in order to understand the *Diyanet*’s role inside the state and its ideological position. Sermons aim at providing religious knowledge and showing the right way to the people; moreover, they include political, social, and cultural subjects according to the daily needs. Gürpınar and Kenar states that “religion was associated with a morality obliging the individual with certain social responsibilities”<sup>305</sup> in the sermons. The *Diyanet* has adapted itself to the social and political order of the day throughout the Turkish Republic history so as to maintain this morality issue. According to

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<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.* This text has been translated by me.

<sup>304</sup> The sermons are selected according to the closest Friday to 18 March Gallipoli Martyrs' Day.

<sup>305</sup> Doğan Gürpınar and Ceren Kenar, “The Nation and Its Sermons: Islam, Kemalism and the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no. 1 (2015): 15.

Gürpınar and Kenar, “obedience to the community/society is requested as a moral and religious obligation”<sup>306</sup> in the sermons. Even further, becoming the citizen of the state is equated with this obedience which makes “the concepts of morality, nation, community and the state indistinguishable from each other”<sup>307</sup>. By the sermons, the *Diyanet* takes the role of “synchronization of individual morality and integrity with the national mores and obedience to the state”<sup>308</sup>. According to Halise Kader Zengin, the Friday sermons of the *Diyanet* portrays the ‘adequate Muslim citizen’ of the Turkish state.<sup>309</sup> In order to be an adequate Muslim citizen, there are some responsibilities under the title of faith, praying, morals, and social responsibilities. Moreover, sermons should serve the survival of the state, national unity and solidarity, peace and tranquillity of the society. Since the establishment of the *Diyanet*, all these principles have been regarded as the necessity for the good Turkish and Muslim citizens. Caner Taslaman, on the other hand, states that the Friday sermons prepared by the *Diyanet* frequently use concepts such as ‘love of homeland, nation, Turkishness’.<sup>310</sup> It shows us the importance of the *Diyanet* in carrying the basic principles of the state to the public as an ideological apparatus. To see the argument in practice, the following example from a sermon is clear:

Our prophet orders us to obey the legitimate state authority which is endowed with the responsibility to govern society. He foresees that some Muslims will rebel against state authority, and he orders Muslims to remain patient and silent, avoid strife and fighting, and prevent the spread of *fitna* at these troubled times... In times of *fitna*, every Muslim is obliged to side with the legitimate state authority and help the security forces. Every Muslim who dies in the service of state authority would achieve the status of martyrdom... Muslims are shrewd people. We have to be on alert and ready for the orders coming from our legitimate state authority.<sup>311</sup>

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<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>309</sup> Halise Kader Zengin, “Son Dönem Cumhuriyet Hutbelerinin İçerik Analizi (2003-2011),” in *Yaygın Din Eğitimi Sempozyumu* (Ankara: DİB Yayınları, 2013).

<sup>310</sup> Caner Taslaman, *Küresellesme Sürecinde Türkiye’de İslam* (İstanbul: İstanbul Yayınevi, 2011), 301.

<sup>311</sup> *Diyanet Gazetesi*, “Fitneden Sakınınız,” March 1, 1980, no 232, in Gürpınar and Kenar, *Ibid.*, 12.

When we look inside the Friday sermons, significant historical events are consistently commemorated on their anniversaries such as the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, the Gallipoli battles in 1915, 30 August victory in the Turkish Independence War in 1922, and many more. As Gürpınar and Kenar mention, these sermons present “an unmistakable continuum between the major military triumphs of Turks throughout centuries”<sup>312</sup>. In these sermons, Turks are represented as “peace-loving nation and never mistreat innocents in a war”<sup>313</sup>; furthermore, Turkish communities in the past fought “not to destroy other nations and pursue worldly ambitions, but to defend homeland, religion and dignity and to elevate the glory of God”<sup>314</sup>. From the Seljuks to the Ottoman Empire, from the secular and modern Republican period to the Turkish-Islamist ‘New Turkey’, all the historical processes include the narrative of “timeless organic community”<sup>315</sup>. In this imagination, some historical events are linked with each other such as the Battle of Malazgirt (1071), Gallipoli battles (1915), Turkish War of Independence (1919-22), Korean War (1952), Cyprus Operation (1974), or 15 July 2016 military coup attempt. All parts of the history are pictured as a “semi-divinely ordained mission”<sup>316</sup> for the Turkish Republic and Turkish nation. There are also national icons of this thread such as Osman Gazi, Fatih Sultan Mehmed, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and recently Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. These leaders are the heroes who engrave the name of Turks in the world history.

In this study, we have examined the *Diyanet* Friday sermons in terms of propagating new narrative of Gallipoli collective memory. Primarily, the Gallipoli issue has recurred in every March of each year. Besides, it can be said that there are repetitive themes in the sermons, some basic points underlining the Gallipoli master narrative. Firstly, the soul of unity and solidarity of Turkish-Muslim society is constantly repeated. Besides, the martyrdom of *Mehmetçik* and their

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<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

courage, self-sacrifice, valour, and love of homeland form the centre of the narrative. In addition to this, the poverty and weakness of Turkish military against the Western allies, the power of faith and Allah's favour, self-sacrifice of the women and mothers, Turks' heroism are some other themes emphasised in the Gallipoli narrative. In the 2019 Friday sermon, these sentences summarise our argument:

Our ancestors have protected these lands on which we live for centuries with their faith in Allah, their love for their homeland, their courage and sacrifice. They fought for every inch of the homeland with the idea of 'I shall be a martyr if I die, or invalid if I survive', and they did not leave the sacred homeland to the enemies at any cost.<sup>317</sup>

As we have discussed in this chapter before, especially with the rise of Turkish-Islamist movements in Turkey, the emphasis on the *ummah* and Muslim society has been increased. Moreover, Turkish history links the historical events with each other to form a linear integrity. In this manner, not only the Gallipoli but also some other historical figures that Turkish-Islamic ideology gave importance has been observed in the sermons. Some of these are Turkish Independence War, Cyprus Operation, Korean War, Kosovo and Bosnia, Jerusalem, 15 July. In his way, the focus of *ummah* in the new master narrative of Gallipoli has been easily placed. One of the examples is as follows: "There are many glorious victories that have changed the course of history. Gallipoli victory is one of them. With an unshakable faith and love of homeland, *Mehmetçik* has shielded himself against a shameless invasion"<sup>318</sup>. Another example of this narrative is as follows: "Gallipoli is one of the best manifestations of coming together above common ideals and having the consciousness of being nation and *ummah*"<sup>319</sup>. In this regard, the attacks coming from the Infidel and foreign forces strengthen the narrative of nation and *ummah*. As we have mentioned in previous

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<sup>317</sup> "Çanakkale Zaferi ve Birlik Ruhu," Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB) Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, March 15, 2019. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>318</sup> "Milletimizin Varoluş Mücadelesi: Çanakkale Zaferi," DİB Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, March 16, 2018. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>319</sup> "Şehadetin Destanlaştığı Yer: Çanakkale," DİB Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, March 17, 2017.

This text has been translated by me.

chapters, Turkey is imagined as a ‘China plate’ that could be cracked, destroyed, dispersed, or divided at any time.<sup>320</sup> According to this narrative, Turkish nation has been under attack throughout the history. In such conditions, the nation defends itself with national unity and solidarity, with a pure faith in Allah, with courage and valour, and with keen intelligence of its leaders. About this defence mechanism, the following sentences will be clear: “Nations that have disappeared from the history scene have disappeared not because their enemies are strong, but because they have lost their national and religious values”.<sup>321</sup> For this narrative, the unnecessary conflicts and internal divisions which lead to the erosion of people's trust each other have weakened the people and the countries.<sup>322</sup> The condition of dealing with attacks is portrayed in 2016 sermon, too:

Today, as a nation and the geography we live in, we are going through a heavy test again. Our country is trying to be drawn into a circle of fire by those who want to weaken us and slide into chaos. Regardless of sect, race, colour and geography, our brotherhood, unity and solidarity are being threatened.<sup>323</sup>

According to this narrative, despite the poverty and weakness, Turkish nation has always struggled with these threats and become successful. In Gallipoli for instance, “the Great Powers of West (*Yedi Düvele Karşı*) that are superior in terms of weapons and soldiers were defeated with the sacrifice and martyrdom of *Mehmetçik*”<sup>324</sup>.

As one of the main figures of the Gallipoli, Atatürk is stressed in the sermons with some titles as ‘Ghazi, commander in chief, Field-Marshal’. However, there is an interesting finding in the study of sermons. Since 2011, the title of ‘Atatürk’ has not been used in the sermons insistently; instead, the other titles of Atatürk have been selected. This choice of the *Diyanet* shows the

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<sup>320</sup> Değirmencioglu, “Kamusal Alanın Çatışma Belleğine Dönüştürülmesi,” 376.

<sup>321</sup> “Vatan Sevgisi,” DİB Ankara Müftülüğü, March 26, 2010. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>323</sup> “Çanakkale ve Birlik Ruhu,” DİB Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, March 18, 2016. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>324</sup> “Çanakkale ve Şehitlerimiz,” DİB Ankara Müftülüğü, March 14, 2014. This text has been translated by me.

reflection of Turkish-Islamic ideology about Atatürk figure. In the beginning of the new Turkish-Islamist Gallipoli narrative, there was a trial of removing Atatürk figure from the master narrative, but this attempt has not been successful. Atatürk, as the victorious leader of the Gallipoli front and the father of the Turkish nation, has been holding its position in the Gallipoli narrative. Consequently, the *Diyanet*, as the ideological apparatus of the state, stresses the role of Atatürk in Gallipoli. There are many examples of this in the sermons we have examined, the following one is from 2009:

Today, as a nation, we should explain the Gallipoli Victory to our youth. The founder of our Republic says: “Gentlemen! First and foremost, we need to teach our children and young people to fight with the elements which are hostile to Turkey's independence, Turks' own self, and their national traditions.” In this manner, we should take lessons from Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the hero of Anafarta.<sup>325</sup>

To conclude, it seems that there occurred a synthesis of Kemalist perspective and Turkish-Islamist narrative somewhere in between in terms of Atatürk's significance in Gallipoli narrative despite some tensions experienced. In addition, main themes of the Friday sermons have focused on the nationalist, statist, and Islamist perspectives of the new master narrative of Gallipoli. Nevertheless, some Republican figures such as Atatürk have found place for themselves. Icons such as martyrs, national flags, the azan, the blood have been emphasised in the narrative frequently. On the other hand, it has been shown that the changes made on the writing, reading, and supervision processes of the sermons do not play a random role; to the contrary, these changes are crucial role for transforming the religious understanding of the citizens with the help of *Diyanet*. Since the formation of Turkish Republic period, sometimes control and supervision has been tightened, sometimes kind of partial freedom has been granted. Perhaps the only element that does not change is that *Diyanet* as a religious institution of the state is a very easy means of reaching people and, when

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<sup>325</sup> “Çanakkale Zaferi,” DİB Ankara Müftülüğü, March 13, 2009. This text has been translated by me.

necessary, sermons are used effectively in delivering the state messages.<sup>326</sup> The remarkable point in the *Diyanet* issue is the permanence of Turkish nationalism since the establishment of the Republic, it has never lost its power. It is so much so that Turkish nationalism has been organized as the ‘substitute of religion’ for years; furthermore, it is something like ‘modern religion’ of our modern times.<sup>327</sup> In their study, Gürpınar and Kenar state that “the Islamic identity was constitutive of the allegedly secular Turkish national identity”<sup>328</sup> of Turkish Republic. When we come to recent times with the AKP governments and Erdoğan image, the practice of Islamic identity in the field has been increased noticeably. Both in terms of nationalism and religious perspectives, both in the establishment period and under the Turkish-Islamist rule, the PRA has been ‘the ideological apparatus’ of the Turkish Republic. An astonishing example is presented by Kenar in her MA thesis about the *Diyanet*’s Friday sermons, Islam, and Kemalism:

During my first visit to the PRA, I had an opportunity to interview an official who was responsible for the preparation and monitoring of the sermons. When I informed him about the topic of my thesis and my affiliation with Boğaziçi University, his immediate reaction was remarkable. Admonishing me that foreign researchers in particular fail to grasp the function and status of the PRA fully, he noted that “the PRA is not an ideological apparatus of the state.” This was an unexpected reaction for me, since I had already decided to base my thesis on the assumption that the PRA was simply part of the state apparatus, whose sole function was to reproduce and disseminate the official ideology by instrumentalizing religion. Thus, the remark of the official did not mean much to me apart from giving a clue on the self-perception of the PRA.<sup>329</sup>

Though the *Diyanet* is expected to keep away from the political and ideological cases of the society; to the contrary, it is occupying a place at the centre of political and ideological conditions. One of the former heads of the *Diyanet*, Ali Bardakoğlu, states that the primary aim of the *Diyanet* is “preventing religion from being used for political purposes. We should pave the way for individual

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<sup>326</sup> Halise Kader Zengin, *Ibid.*, 146.

<sup>327</sup> Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

<sup>328</sup> Gürpınar and Kenar, *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>329</sup> Kenar, “Bargaining between Islam and Kemalism,” 199.

religiosity instead”<sup>330</sup>. However, as Kenar mentions, “the official ideology of the Turkish state, Kemalism, dictates that maintaining and protecting the national solidarity and integrity of the Turkish state is the primary function of all citizens and institutions”<sup>331</sup>. If the issue is maintaining national solidarity and integrity in Turkey, it is unfortunately impossible to keep the religion out of politics. Consequently, encouraging ‘individual religiosity’ has never been experienced since the establishment of the Republic; furthermore, the religiosity of people has been exploited for the political and ideological benefits of the Turkish state. All the time, the state comes first, the others follow. Instead of dealing with the religious education of people, the *Diyanet* focuses on the “guardianship of the regime”<sup>332</sup>. With the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and AKP governments’ rule, this role of the *Diyanet* has increasing day by day. In this manner, the Friday sermons play the role of propagating the state or the official discourse of the regime.

#### **4.4. GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN IN DIYANET PUBLICATIONS**

In addition to the Friday sermons, we have examined some *Diyanet* publications about the Gallipoli campaign, too. Among these, there are edited books, periodicals, newspapers, and magazines. We have reviewed the March issues of *Diyanet Dergi* between 2003-2020 and a collective prepared book by Diyanet Publications<sup>333</sup> in commemoration of the centenary of Gallipoli. As we have discussed above, there is a severe Turkish-Islamist emphasis about the Gallipoli campaign in the examined pieces. If we compare with the Friday sermons, these publications include much more Islamist-statist figures and portrays an *ummah* centred Gallipoli. In general, the contents inside these works have been prepared by the Turkish-Islamist authors or by the *Diyanet* officials. When we look inside the writings, it seems that main themes and figures are similar to the ones in Friday sermons. Gallipoli is pictured as the victory of faith

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<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>333</sup> *Bir Millet'in Yeniden Dirilişi: Çanakkale* (Ankara: DİB Yayınları, 2015).

and martyrdom, valour of Turkish nation and *Mehmetçik*, resistance of Muslims to the Infidel and to the imperialists, defence of Turkish flag and homeland, sacrifice of our mothers and Turkish women. In the monthly magazines, it is observed that March is the name of the glorious victory that Turks won against the Infidel and imperialists in Gallipoli.<sup>334</sup> Therefore, there is at least one article or essay about the remembrance of Gallipoli in every March issue of the *Diyanet Dergi*. There are many instances of Turkish-Islamic narrative about Gallipoli in the magazines, we will show some of them in this part of the study.

If we come to the findings in the publications, there is a common example from both the *Diyanet Dergi* and centenary commemoration book. The writer, referencing to the Islamist poet Mehmet Akif, glorifies the death in the war as follows: “Martyrdom is not the death of the hero, it is the heroism of the death”<sup>335</sup>. Afterwards, he adds that “enthusiasm for martyrdom and education of martyrdom are the guarantee of freedom, independence, honour and dignity of future generations and nations”<sup>336</sup>. Talking about the necessity of the enthusiasm for being martyr seems so interesting, it obviously presents the understanding of glorifying death in the Turkish-Islamist narrative. In another example, the martyrdom and the death are praised with these sentences: “Gallipoli is an epic. Our martyrs wrote this epic with their blood. The whole world remembers Gallipoli with respect”<sup>337</sup>. This ‘death praising narrative’ reaches such a level that martyrs in the war speaks from their graves in some stories. One of the famous authors of the Turkish-Islamic ideology, Hayati İnanç, analyses the lyric poem *Gazel-i Hümayûn*, written by Sultan Mehmed Reşad about Gallipoli battles, in his essay and stresses the martyr’s sentences as follows: “Martyr says that; I became a martyr with delight, and I see from my grave that our army is victorious, thank

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<sup>334</sup> Fatih Kurt, “Takdim,” *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* 351 (Mart 2020).

<sup>335</sup> İsmail L. Çakan, “Kahraman Ölüm,” in *Bir Millet’in Yeniden Dirilişi*, *Ibid.*, 63.

All the quotations given hereafter have been translated by me.

<sup>336</sup> İsmail L. Çakan, “Akif ve Kahraman Ölüm,” *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* 267 (Mart 2013): 57.

<sup>337</sup> Mustafa Özçelik, “Çanakkale Şiiri Nasıl Yazıldı?,” *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* 219 (Mart 2009): 52.

God”<sup>338</sup>. Furthermore, İnanç talks about the conversation between the martyrs and the Prophet as follows: “This time, it is not a martyr, but the army of the martyrs heralds our blessed Prophet, the Beloved of Allah: “O Messenger of Allah! We came into your presence. We didn't let the Infidel pass”<sup>339</sup>.

In these publications, the interpretation of Gallipoli as the struggle of *ummah* is clearly observed. Many authors refer to the contribution of Arabs, African Muslims, Balkan Muslims, and much less to the Kurds. Gallipoli is represented as the honour of Muslim geography. For instance, Ahmet Taşgetiren counts Gallipoli among the symbolic cities of Muslim geography:

I wonder where is the last castle of Islam? Is it Sarajevo? Is Skopje? Is it Şumnu? Is it Edirne? Gallipoli? Is it Istanbul? Is it Ankara? Is it Jerusalem? Is it Cairo or Tripoli? Is it Baghdad? Is it Kabul? Is it Mecca or Medina? If what happens, Islam falls down?<sup>340</sup>

In another essay in the same book, Turks are portrayed as the guardian of the oppressed people and the House of Islam. According to the writer, grandchildren of the Osman Bey “sailed to India, sometimes to Marseille, sometimes to Sudan to stop the persecution of Christian imperialists”<sup>341</sup>. Besides, the belief of Allah and Allah’s aid have a remarkable place in the new master narrative of Gallipoli campaign. Indeed, it is known that there are many myths about some events in the Gallipoli fronts in traditional narrative. In the *Diyanet* publications also, this type of understanding can be found easily. Following sentences present the asserted relation between belief and victory in Gallipoli:

Gallipoli proved once again that the greatest power of a nation is not its tanks, rifles, or weapons, but its faithful children. Gallipoli is a war in which Allah's help is clearly seen in the struggle of a faithful community. The greatest wealth of this geography is its faithful youth.<sup>342</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> Hayati İnanç, “Tahmis-i Gazel-i Hümâyûn,” in *Bir Millet'in Yeniden Dirilişi*, *Ibid.*, 124.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>340</sup> Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Çanakkale: Son Kale Hassasiyeti,” in *Bir Millet'in Yeniden Dirilişi*, *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>341</sup> Talha Uğurluel, “Tarihin Yaşlı Şahidi: Çanakkale Boğazı,” in *Bir Millet'in Yeniden Dirilişi*, *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>342</sup> Mustafa Irmaklı, “Çanakkale Zaferi'nin Hatırlattıkları,” in *Bir Millet'in Yeniden Dirilişi*, *Ibid.*, 163.

One of the common themes about Gallipoli, both in the sermons and other publications, is the attack coming from foreign forces and Turks' quite naive defence against these attacks. According to Mehmet Görmez, former president of PRA, "Gallipoli is the struggle of a Muslim nation to protect its honour and homeland against the relentless attacks on its values"<sup>343</sup>. The theme of fighting with the evil can be found in various types throughout Turkish history. It has been adapted to the collective memory about Gallipoli, too. Mehmet Akif, national poet of Turkish society, narrates such a story in his noted poem *Çanakkale Şehitlerine*<sup>344</sup>. This poem is seen as the "second national anthem" of the nation in the commemoration book of the *Diyanet*.<sup>345</sup> According to the writer, known as *Çanakkale Şehitlerine*, this poem is as precious as Turkish National Anthem. Thus, it clearly shows us the significance of Gallipoli and its founding image for the Turkish-Islamist narrative. If we come to the issue of Turks' kindness, according to the master narrative, Turkish nation never crosses the line in terms of conscience and human rights during the war. Gallipoli is one of the many examples of this kindness. According to the former president of PRA, Mehmet Görmez, Turkish nation and Turkish army displays a model behaviour in Gallipoli battles.

If the war aims to winning people's heart before conquering lands; if not for hatred, revenge and booty, but for peace, tranquillity and justice; if it serves to eliminate all forms of discrimination, oppression, and evil; if it ensures the establishment of freedom, solidarity, morality, and law, then the war becomes humane. Then its name is Çanakkale!<sup>346</sup>

In parallel with this sentence, there are many examples in the monthly magazines, too. As one of them, the following sentences present the Turks' opinion about their own behaviours in the war process:

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<sup>343</sup> Mehmet Görmez, "Sunuş," in *Bir Millet'in Yeniden Dirilişi*, *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>344</sup> To the Martyrs of Gallipoli, Mehmet Akif Ersoy.

<sup>345</sup> Mehmet Doğan, "Çanakkale'nin Şehitleri ve Şairi," in *Bir Millet'in Yeniden Dirilişi*, *Ibid.*, 90.

<sup>346</sup> Görmez, *Ibid.*, 11.

When we look at our adventure over history, our nation has struggled for a honourable life. In addition to the victories that we gained with war tactics and courage, the nations of the world have always esteemed our heroism, our treatment to the captives, and our fairness during the war.<sup>347</sup>

Another important theme of the Turkish-Islamist narrative of Gallipoli is the poverty and weakness of the Turkish society and Turkish army during the Gallipoli battles. The main theme of this narrative is as follows: ‘We’ were so poor, our army was lacking the munitions and technology, our soldiers were starving in the front lines, but somehow ‘we’ won a victory against the rich, powerful, technologically highly equipped armies. In this regard, this type of narrative can be seen in the monthly magazines and commemoration book. For instance, one of the authors stresses the glorious victory despite the weakness of the Turkish army; furthermore, he gives so-called statistics of the military ammunition in detail about the ‘Sick Man’, a label used for the last years of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>348</sup> In his writing, Yavuz Bahadırođlu mentions that “the world's most tired nation won a victory against the world's best armies, and this requires a detailed analysis. It also provides a great hope for our future”<sup>349</sup>. For the writer, there was a struggle between disproportional powers and Gallipoli symbolises achieving a glorious triumph out of poverty. In order to understand the emphasis of the weakness of Turkish society, their self-sacrifice, and their heroism in the war, there is a memoir of a Turcologist in the *Diyanet Dergi*.<sup>350</sup> This story is told by a chairman of a local branch of *Diyanet*, but he does not give any valid reference. In the story, the Turcologist experiences a conversation with three children in Gallipoli after the war. This is the story in short:

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<sup>347</sup> Nermin Taylan, “İşgal İçin Geldiler: İnsanlık Dersi Alıp Gittiler,” *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* 351 (Mart 2020): 65.

<sup>348</sup> Yavuz Bahadırođlu, “Hasta Adam’ın Diriliş Cehdi: Çanakkale,” *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* 291 (Mart 2015): 13.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>350</sup> Mustafa Önder, “Çanakkale Geçilmez,” *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* 147 (Mart 2003): 30.

The man asks one of the children: “What is your father’s job?” The child answers: “My father is dead.” The man asks: “How did it happen?” The child says: “In Gallipoli.” The man asks one more: “Why did he go to the war?” The child answers: “For our religion and homeland.” The man astonishes and asks: “How do you know that?” The child says: “Our neighbourhood’s *imam* told me.”<sup>351</sup>

The names of these children are Gazanfer (brave, courageous), Muzaffer (conqueror, victorious), and Mücahit (combatant, fighter). Finally, the Turcologist utters these sentences amazedly when he learnt the names of the children: “Gazanfer! Muzaffer! Mücahit! The nation who put these names on their children in their darkest days will never disappear, even if you bury them into the ground”<sup>352</sup>. This example clearly presents the understanding of Turkish-Islamist narrative about Gallipoli. The same author’s another comment about Gallipoli reveals the relation between Turkish nationalism and Islam: “Every Turkish citizen should know and understand the Gallipoli well. People who don’t know Gallipoli can understand neither Turks nor Islam”<sup>353</sup>.

There is one more important issue of Turkish-Islamist ideology. Atatürk figure in Gallipoli should be analysed carefully. As we have discussed in previous chapters, there has been a tension between secularist-republican Gallipoli narrative and Turkish-Islamist Gallipoli narrative about Atatürk figure in Gallipoli. However, this tension has ended with the Atatürk’s inclusion to the new master narrative of Gallipoli. While analysing the Friday sermons, we have seen several examples of this. Here, in the commemoration book, there is an interesting finding. There are places in which Atatürk and his role in the process of Gallipoli battles is told, but he is mentioned with ‘Ghazi, Pasha, Colonel or Lieutenant-Colonel’ titles. The authors have insistently avoided using ‘Atatürk’ title of Mustafa Kemal. This is the typical reflection of Turkish-Islamist ideology to Atatürk issue. As a final finding, we have mentioned above that the new master narrative is trying to link the historical events with each other to form a linear

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<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

integrity. Significant historical events such as Gallipoli, Independence War, Korean War, etc. represent the Turks' greatness and valour. Now, there is one more historical epic of Turkish society to link, '15 July resistance'. In the periodicals after 2016, we have observed the emphasis of 15 July inside the Gallipoli commemoration. Scenes from the Gallipoli battles are resembled with 15 July and 'the soul of 15 July' is repeated often.<sup>354</sup> It is clear that the new master narrative of the Gallipoli remembrance gives much importance to the 15 July issue. As in many subjects, the *Diyanet* behaves in parallel with the political regime about the issue of 15 July.

In conclusion, it is observed that the *Diyanet* has been served to the Turkish Republic's needs as an ideological apparatus since its establishment. With the rise of Turkish-Islamic movements and with the AKP governments, *Diyanet* has transformed itself according to the new discourse. As we have discussed in previous chapters, the collective memory about Gallipoli remembrance has also experienced such a transformation in this period. By examining the Friday sermons, *Diyanet Dergi*, and other publications of the *Diyanet*, we have observed the discourse change about Gallipoli in the *Diyanet* publications. It shows that the *Diyanet* cannot keep away from the ideological and political issues; even worse, it undertakes the role of guardianship of the state regime. In short, since the Republic's establishment, *Diyanet* has adapted itself to the time's conditions and discourse, it has been the ideological apparatus of the Turkish Republic instead of providing religious education for the citizens. This feature of the *Diyanet* is presented in this study with the help of discussing the transformation in Gallipoli collective memory.

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<sup>354</sup> Mustafa Uçurum, "Ömer Seyfettin Hikayesinde Millet Ruhu," *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* 315 (Mart 2017): 61.

## CHAPTER 5:

### GALLIPOLI EPIC PROMOTION CENTER AS A MEMORY SITE

#### 5.1. WAR MUSEUMS

Since the nineteenth century, there has been a huge debate about remembering, forgetting, commemoration, individual and social memory. If the issue relates to war, places or physical sites seem more important in terms of memory. As Paul Ricoeur mentions, remembrance is related to places in one way or another.<sup>355</sup> When we look at the war remembrance practices, it is obvious that war museums have an important place in contemporary history. According to Jay Winter, museums which are interested in contemporary history attract notable populations.<sup>356</sup> Some major events such as World Wars and Holocaust have influenced the increase of number of war museums in many countries. At first, the focus was the military conflict between the parties. However, especially with the Holocaust experience, the narratives of the war museums turned to the ‘witness’ of the war. The other side of the military war - *suffering and loss* - became more important since the Holocaust effect. As Winter mentions, “by the end of the twentieth century, the shadow of the Holocaust was indirectly evident in new representations of the First World War”<sup>357</sup>. Undoubtedly, the emphasis of suffering and loss has been useful for the nationalist perspectives and states to keep the masses in unity and solidarity with each other. In addition to these developments, new technologies have presented some features such as dioramas, audio-visual effects, virtual reality shows to remember the war in recent times.

One of the major debates about war remembrance is whether war museums are close to memory or history. For Winter, history and memory cannot be combined; therefore, the construction of a historical place to represent the war is something complicated.<sup>358</sup> There are various aspects of constructing a war

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<sup>355</sup> Ricoeur, *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>356</sup> Winter, *Remembering War*, 222.

<sup>357</sup> Jay Winter, "Museums and the Representation of War," *Museum and Society* 10, no. 3 (2012): 158.

<sup>358</sup> Winter, *Remembering War*, 222.

museum. As Winter states, “war museums are capital projects, and thus inevitably enter the realm of urban, regional and national politics on the one hand, and business, on the other”<sup>359</sup>. In the remembering and commemoration process, there are economic, political, ideological, cultural, and social motivations of the states. Especially neoliberal economic perspectives see the war museums as money-spinner tourist attractions. Moreover, nationalist and militarist narratives have important place in war remembrance through war museums. Besides, one of the most interesting debates about war museums is the impossibility of representing the war in a museum. As one of the most famous scholars about war museums, Winter explains the situation as follows:

And yet, one fundamental conclusion anyone who has ever worked in a war museum knows in his entrails; it is that all war museums fail to represent ‘the war’, because there was then and is now no consensus as to what constituted the war, *wie es eigentlich gewesen war* – as it actually was. In this sense, war museums are like cloud chambers in particle physics; they represent the traces and trajectories of collisions that happened a long time ago. They never describe war; they only tell us about its footprints on the map of our lives.<sup>360</sup>

The difficulty of representing the war has been discussed under the title of war remembrance issue. However, the pragmatic applications of nation states are far from these debates. They are focused on the nationalist-militarist reading of the wars and interpreting the historical events for the sake of today’s political or ideological purposes. They aim to increase the income of war museums by exploiting the nationalist and religious beliefs of the masses.

## **5.2. GALLIPOLI AS A MEMORY SITE**

In recent years, Gallipoli peninsula has been one of the important memory sites of Turkish society and Turkish nationalism. Until the 1990s, however, there was little interest in the Gallipoli battlefield. On April 25, 1990, the 75th anniversary of the Anzac troops’ landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula during the Gallipoli battles was celebrated at an international level with commemorative

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<sup>359</sup> Winter, "Museums and the Representation of War," 151.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.

ceremonies. The ceremonies were attended by senior figures such as Turkish President Turgut Özal, Turkish Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulat, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, and New Zealand Governor General Sir Paul Reeves.<sup>361</sup> At the end of the ceremonies, Turkish President Turgut Özal and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher held a bilateral meeting about various topics.<sup>362</sup> With the effect of this visit too, Özal government's liberal economy perspectives have opened way to huge changes in the Gallipoli battlefield. There have been great projects and reconstruction trials in the peninsula in order to open the field to the touristic activities. The rise of Turkish-Islamic synthesis and neoliberal economy policies have set eyes on Gallipoli peninsula as a memory site. Zeynep Suda calls this attempt in her study as 'packaging Gallipoli as a memory site'.<sup>363</sup>

Since 2002, the policies of AKP governments have attached Gallipoli a huge meaning because Gallipoli is seen as a representation of Turkish-Islam symbolism. During AKP period, there has been an attempt of constructing a new narrative about Gallipoli memory and reorganizing the peninsula in order to construct an 'ummah geography'<sup>364</sup>. In parallel with Turkish-Islam understanding, Gallipoli battlefields have been transformed into an important tourism attraction. '18 March Gallipoli Victory and Martyrs' Day' is organized as suitable for Turkish-Islam perspective. Gallipoli tourism is not a cultural activity which occurred accidentally; on the contrary, it is an ideologically motivated domestic tourism activity, a political motivated public relations work, and a martyr tourism attraction which constructed and shaped deliberately by state authorities and ideological motives.<sup>365</sup> Serdar Değirmencioğlu names this new era as 'new invention'<sup>366</sup> of the Gallipoli campaign.

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<sup>361</sup> "Gelibolu'da Anzak Günü," *Cumhuriyet*, April 26, 1990.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>363</sup> Suda, *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>365</sup> Değirmencioğlu, "Şehit Turizmi: Kitlelerin Çanakkale Seferberliği," 351-382.

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid.*, 351-382.

However, the ideological interference of AKP governments have encountered with the resistance of Republican ideology. Bekir Düzcan describes this clash between two different Gallipoli narrative as ‘memory war’<sup>367</sup>. On the one side, the Republican period’s secular-nationalist narrative, on the other side, Turkish-Islamist narrative of recent decades. These different interpretations of Gallipoli originate from different political and ideological motives. As Ayhan Aktar mentions, “the dominant Turkish nationalist historiography ‘Turkified’ the victory of the Ottoman Imperial Army”<sup>368</sup>. In this narrative, Mustafa Kemal plays a bridge role “to attach the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 to the Turkish War of Independence”<sup>369</sup>. The other version of the Gallipoli campaign, Turkish-Islamist narrative, is called by Aktar as ‘jihadist revision’<sup>370</sup> of the Gallipoli narrative. In this new attempt, Gallipoli battles pictures ‘Resistance of Islam against the Infidel’ and ‘Invasion of Crusaders into the House of Islam’.<sup>371</sup> Consequently, there has been a ‘memory war’ between two different master narratives about Gallipoli campaign since 1990s.

### 5.3. GALLIPOLI EPIC PROMOTION CENTER

To project this memory struggle, we will focus on a war museum constructed in Gallipoli peninsula in 2012. At first, in 2009, Gallipoli Peninsula Historical National Park Kabatepe Promotion Center Idea Project Contest was organized by Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs General Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks.<sup>372</sup> In the official website of the Promotion Centre, the opening of the center is cited as follows:

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<sup>367</sup> Düzcan, *Ibid.*, 122.

<sup>368</sup> Aktar, *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>372</sup> “Kabatepe Tanıtım Merkezi Fikir Projesi Yarışması,” Meteoroloji Genel Müdürlüğü, July 27, 2009, <https://www.mgm.gov.tr/kurumsal/haberler.aspx?y=2009&f=gelibolu>.

Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre was opened on 7 June 2012 by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to remember Gallipoli battles, to convey the spirit of Gallipoli to the next generations and to contribute to the development of Gallipoli spirit.<sup>373</sup>

Afterwards, the Promotion Centre is attached to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism Gallipoli Historical Area Presidency of the Gallipoli battles. This presidency was established in 2014 with the Law on the Establishment of Gallipoli Historical Area Presidency of the Gallipoli battles No. 6546 (entered into force on 19.06.2014).<sup>374</sup>



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In the Promotion Centre, there are eleven separate animation rooms with advanced simulation techniques. In these rooms, important sections of the Gallipoli battles are explained to the visitors with three-dimensional displays,

<sup>373</sup> “Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi,” Çanakkale Savaşları Gelibolu Tarihi Alan Başkanlığı, accessed September 20, 2020, <https://catab.ktb.gov.tr/TR-121090/canakkale-destani-tanitim-merkezi.html>.

This text has been translated by me.

<sup>374</sup> “Çanakkale Savaşları Gelibolu Tarihi Alanı Hakkında Bazı Düzenlemeler Yapılmasına Dair Kanun,” Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, June 28, 2014, <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6546.pdf>.

<sup>375</sup> “Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi,” Çanakkale Travel, February 27, 2019, <https://www.canakkaletravel.com/haber/canakkale-destani-tanitim-merkezini-gunde-2-bin-kisi-ziyaret-ediyor.html>.

moving platforms, visual and sound effects, holograms, etc. In addition, there are expressions in seven different languages for our foreign visitors. In the centre, there is a two-floor exhibition hall where materials and dioramas used in the Gallipoli battles are exhibited, a library where the works published about the Gallipoli battles are collected, and a two-floor conference hall.<sup>376</sup> Oruçoğlu Holding won the tendering process of Promotion Centre's completion. The Oruçoğlu Family, whose history dates back to the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, carries out its activities in many fields from transportation to food, from construction to tourism under the roof of Oruçoğlu Holding.<sup>377</sup> In 2015, an encyclopaedia series were published with the contributions of Oruçoğlu Holding. First Volume of the series narrates the Promotion Centre's construction, design process, the animation and exhibition halls, and their contents.<sup>378</sup> Throughout the volume, decision making procedure with the support and contribution of Celalettin Oruç who is the chairman of the Oruçoğlu Holding has been narrated by Altan Erkekli and Ertan Özyiğit. Furthermore, the eleven animation rooms have been explained in this volume with various narratives, legends, stories, etc. Another remarkable content is the part of "Mehmet's Letters"<sup>379</sup>. Every chapter of the book includes some fictional stories from a fictional character, Mehmet. He cites some scenes and memories of war with fictional stories. In addition to this encyclopaedia volume, the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs General Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks published a book<sup>380</sup> which mentions The Historical Gallipoli Peninsula National Park and Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre in 2012. Consequently, this part of the study will examine the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre with the data obtained from the encyclopaedia, the book

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<sup>376</sup> catab.ktb.gov.tr., *Ibid.*

<sup>377</sup> Oruçoğlu Holding, September 20, 2020, <http://www.orucoglusistem.com.tr/orucoglu-holding/>.

<sup>378</sup> Altan Erkekli, Ertan Özyiğit, and Murat Gunem, *Gel Tarihe Geçelim Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi* (İstanbul: Wizart, 2015): 1.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>380</sup> *Gallipoli Peninsula Historical National Park Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli* (Ankara: General Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks, 2012).

published by the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, and official resources. We will focus on the Gallipoli narrative in animation rooms and exhibitions.

At first, it is observed that the state authority gives much importance to the Promotion Centre. The importance of the Promotion Centre and the necessity of its construction is cited with these sentences at the Ministry book:

The battle of Dardanelles has great importance as it is one of the turning points of our history. For this reason, Turkish people need to know about The Battles of Dardanelles very well, they must take lesson from it, and direct their policies and works towards the future.<sup>381</sup>

By using new technologies, the representation of the war in the Promotion Centre would influence the visitors in a way that they “would learn the importance of the Battles of Dardanelles and know about the sacrifice and perseverance that our soldiers showed”<sup>382</sup> and this experience “will never be slipped away from their mind”<sup>383</sup>.

As a war museum, Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre reflects some basic themes of Turkish-Islamist narrative and the recent interpretations of AKP period. While examining the animation rooms, we will use contents from every room one by one without destroying the integrity. The first hall is named as “Entrance to the War”. In this hall, the situation of the Ottoman Empire before the war in 1914, the reasons of the war in terms of the Allies and the Ottomans, the beginning of the war and the first attacks, the process of preparing the military logistic forces of the Ottoman Empire are explained to the visitors in chronological details.<sup>384</sup> In the commemoration book, there is an attempt of justifying the Ottomans’ entrance to the war. It is claimed that the Ottoman Empire tried to avoid the war; however, it was impossible keeping away from the inevitable war:

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<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>384</sup> [catab.ktb.gov.tr](http://catab.ktb.gov.tr), *Ibid.*

According to reports, after the challenging Balkan War, the world divided into two. Only wish is not to be a party. Due to the reason that Enver Pasha is clearly on the German side, British, Russian and French troops are going to hit us.<sup>385</sup>



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According to the narrative in the first part of the commemoration book in which the first hall of the Promotion Centre is mentioned here, there is a sorrowful tune about the war. One of the “Mehmet’s Letters” present this tune clearly:

Today I set out to go to Dardanelles after having good prays of my mum. Despite the pain of my father couldn’t returned from the Balkan War, she is not showing her suffer. My country is fighting with the black clouds now it is time to serve for my country.<sup>387</sup>

Herein, we can see both the melancholic manner of the society after the Balkan Wars and the hostile point of view to the allied enemies. Another sample about the Balkan War is from the Ministry book. According to this, “when the Ottoman State was defeated in the Balkan War, our national honor was offended and our soldiers felt humiliated”<sup>388</sup>. At this part of the book, the psychology of the Turkish

<sup>385</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>386</sup> catab.ktb.gov.tr., *Ibid.*

<sup>387</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>388</sup> *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli, Ibid.*, 11.

soldiers is mentioned. As stated in the book, the soldiers “wanted to remove the black spot of humiliation smeared on their faces in the Balkan wars and they considered this new front an opportunity to improve their morale”<sup>389</sup>.

In addition to the negative mood in the narrative, there is also an emphasis of heroism and braveness of the Turkish soldier. As mentioned in the volume, the visitors experience emotional atmosphere at this hall while watching the animations.<sup>390</sup>

My mother is preparing an elaborate table for it is unknown clearly that I'll eat next time. Enemies are making cruel plans at their table far away from here. However, those who see us weak forget that they can plan a battle at the table, but it can be won only at the front line.<sup>391</sup>

At the end of each chapter of the commemoration book, some remarks/comments of the visitors have been shown to the readers. A child visitor's sentences are remarkable to see the feelings of the visitors:

It was the first time I saw my father crying. I wiped his tears and told him not to cry. "The Turkish soldier fought for us and won", I said. "We should protect our country as they did." He wiped his tears and kissed me. Then I cried too, but I hope my father didn't see it.<sup>392</sup>

The second animation room is named as “*Nusret*”. In this part of the museum, *Nusret* minelayer's operations have been presented to the visitors. Furthermore, it is emphasised in the chamber that *Nusret* minelayer “played a great role in the victory of the Battle of Dardanelles”<sup>393</sup>. In order to give the sense of the Dardanelles sea to the visitors, sound effects, visual effects, wave effects have been used in the hall.<sup>394</sup> Besides, the importance of *Nusret* minelayer in the Gallipoli Naval Wars has been mentioned in the second chapter of the volume.<sup>395</sup> As we have seen in earlier chapters, the master Gallipoli narrative contains the glorification of death and underestimating Turkish forces against the Allied

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<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid.*, 67. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>393</sup> *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli, Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>394</sup> *catab.ktb.gov.tr., Ibid.*

<sup>395</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 77.

forces. A sample of this language has been used in the “*Nusret*” chapter of the commemoration book:

It seemed like a wild dog waiting to attack and mines lined along the strait were the only obstacle between us. Ocean was waiting for the small British ships to clean the mines. For our demoralized troops, our commanders, never lose faith in, were doing their best to boost them. We were like dwarfs who were getting prepared to fight against giants. Even if we die, we knew it would be heroic.<sup>396</sup>



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When we come to the third hall of the animation demonstrations, we see the chapter of “Allies’ War Plans”. In this part, the naval attacks of the Allied forces are narrated with 3D projectors, the model of the Ocean ship, and specially designed mechanical systems.<sup>398</sup> The main theme of this section of the animation is the superiority of the European powers and the resistance of the Turkish soldiers with faith, prays, patience, valour, and braveness. Following citations from the commemoration book presents the understanding of the Turkish-Islamic interpretation of the Gallipoli: “Huge armoured ships were floating in the water like a leaf and in my ears my father’s words sounded like a prayer. We were tiny

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<sup>396</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

<sup>397</sup> *catab.ktb.gov.tr., Ibid.*

<sup>398</sup> *Ibid.*

against them, but we would resist with our patience, knowledge, and our heart.”<sup>399</sup> In addition to this sample, these sentences also stresses the superiority of the Allied forces: “Finding a way on hill to pass to the Marmara Sea, they besieged such a small land with how many a navy?”<sup>400</sup> Furthermore, some type of legendary and supernatural figures has also been used in “Mehmet’s Letters” as follows:

No, gentleman, no! The land you want to pass if it is empty it stands up; the sea it throws up its anger. What about these folks! Wouldn’t they rain over you as bullets? Ocean come, come. See the fate waiting for you.<sup>401</sup>

At the end of the chapter, there is again a letter from an unknown visitor about the museum. In this letter, we can see the understanding that links the existence of the country today to the heroism and courage of the martyred soldiers:

Which war leaves so many heroes behind. Today, I witnessed once again how every soldier and every citizen who sacrificed his/her life to defend the homeland fought bravely. The tears in my eyes are neither from pain nor pity. I feel the pride of being the grandchild of every hero I see here, and I cry for that. This homeland came into existence with your heroism.<sup>402</sup>

Every great victory needs great heroes in the nationalist narratives. Corporal Seyit is one of the great symbols in the Gallipoli battles. It reflects Turkish soldiers’ valour and miraculous events, and God’s blessing. This astonishing event is narrated in the fourth hall of the museum under the name of “Rumeli Mecidiye Battery”. The Ocean battleship was hit by a cannonball and a mine while making a return manoeuvre and then sank. Therewith, the Allied Navy decided to withdraw from the Bosphorus at the end of March 18. These scenes from the battlefield has been told in the hall and main hero of the victory is presented as Corporal Seyit.<sup>403</sup> If we look inside the texts, the faith and commitment of the soldiers can be seen clearly. One of the soldiers’ words from the frontline portrays the condition:

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<sup>399</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>400</sup> *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli, Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>401</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid.*, 119. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>403</sup> *catab.ktb.gov.tr., Ibid.*

I have got my father's rosary in my hands, praying for the silence of the balls continuing from the tilted Ocean. Whenever I wish my late father to be with me, I take this rosary in my hands. ... We could call the death, so bastions let them shoot.<sup>404</sup>

Another example from the "Mehmet's Letters" is as follows: "Oh Lord, please work a miracle and help us to give a final blow to Ocean"<sup>405</sup>. As we see here, there is a huge need for the mystical developments in order to win the battle. Therefore, there is a great emphasis on the Corporal Seyit figure in the Turkish-Islamist Gallipoli narrative. This chapter of the volume has also taken its share from this narrative. Some of the examples are as follows:

Around the artillery battery was total a wreckage, working of it was even a miracle. While we were waiting enthusiastically, the second shot fell just to the bottom of the Ocean thus it shook like a leaf in the sea. Ocean was shot at the end! ... But who had fired the cannon? Forced to believe, who had shouldered the mere two hundred and fifty kilos of bullet to the barrel alone, took and fired twice was no one but Corporal Seyit.<sup>406</sup>



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<sup>404</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>407</sup> [catab.ktb.gov.tr](http://catab.ktb.gov.tr), *Ibid.*

Another sample about the Corporal Seyit is from the Ministry book as follows:

Seyit looks at the cannon. The lifting device of the cannon has been damaged. His eyes meet the bullet lying on the ground. With a great anger and ambition, he walks to the 180-kilogram-bullet. He kneels down, grabs the bullet firmly, lifts it up all of a sudden and places it on his back. With short and shaky steps, he walks towards the cannon and places the bullet into the barrel of the cannon and pushes it. With great ambition he aims at the target and fires the cannon.<sup>408</sup>

At the end of the chapter, one of the visitors mentions about the technological applications and modern design of the museum along with the Turkish soldiers' braveness: "However, once again I understand. Without the Heroic Turkish soldiers and commanders, neither I nor any young people like me would have looked at their future with confident and hopeful eyes"<sup>409</sup>.

In the fifth animation room of the centre, the preparation process on the battlefield before landings and trench warfare is explained. The name of the hall is determined as "Preparation for the Ground Wars". According to the narrative, Allied Forces were defeated in the sea and they were planning to land troops in order to stop the cannon batteries on the coasts; thus, they would cross the Dardanelles and reach the Sea of Marmara.<sup>410</sup> While the soldier Mehmet is talking about the Liman Pasha's precautions in his letters, he stresses the mistakes of the Pasha strikingly. The German Field Marshall Liman von Sanders (Liman Pasha) was the CO (Commanding Officer) of the Gallipoli front; however, his contributions to the war haven't been stressed enough and his figure has been tried to be belittled in the Gallipoli battles. It must be originated from the fact that a German and non-Muslim commander cannot have a place in a Kemalist-Anti-imperialist narrative of Gallipoli or its Turkish-Islamic interpretation. For this reason, following sentences from "Mehmet's Letters" seem important:


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<sup>408</sup> *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli, Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>409</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 143. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>410</sup> *catab.ktb.gov.tr., Ibid.*

On the invasion day, Liman Pasha assumed the strongest attack was going to be the north of the peninsula, so he placed the largest units there. For the sake of our generals' predictions, he left little units. I wish Liman Pasha were here to see the multitude of troops coming upon us. For all day long he sat in the bushes and did something in the North part. It is seen throughout the history that not believing in their own human intelligence and knowledge always put them into trouble the country because of their foreign fascination.<sup>411</sup>



As we have discussed in former chapters, Gallipoli campaign is the founding image of the Turkish Republic. As to Mustafa Kemal figure in Gallipoli, it is one of the founding figures of the Gallipoli master narrative in Turkish history. Despite the attempt of degrading role of Mustafa Kemal in the Gallipoli narrative, there has occurred a social resistance against this attempt and Turkish-Islamist narrative had to merge with the Atatürk figure in the new master Gallipoli narrative. Consequently, Mustafa Kemal figure and his contributions find place in the animations to some extent. In this sense, the hall number six, “The Milestone in the Development of War” and the hall number seven, “Trench Warfare” are the places where we can especially see the Mustafa Kemal figure in the museum. In

<sup>411</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>412</sup> *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli, Ibid.*, 20.

these parts of the animation, the landing at Anzac Cove, the combats on Chunuk Bair and Arıburnu Battle, the legend of 57th Regiment, Mustafa Kemal's keen intelligence in the battlefield, trench battles, and some of the individual heroic remembrances are narrated by using hologram and 3D technologies. One of the narrated stories is the story of Laz Ziya as follows:

Sooner they climbed over Chunuk Bair, they only remained fifteen soldiers. While Anzac soldiers were chasing up them, the colonel they met changed the tide of the battle with his keen intelligence. I learned later that the colonel's name was Mustafa Kemal. He ordered Laz Ziya and his friends, who didn't have even a bullet in their hands, to lie down. He managed to stick firstly Anzac pioneers, then seeing them rearguard troops.<sup>413</sup>

For this historic scene, Mustafa Kemal's remarkable words have been shown in the Ministry book as follows: "You cannot run away from the enemy. If you have run out of ammunition, you have bayonets. Attach your bayonets, lie down."<sup>414</sup> Besides, this event has been named as "a very moment of war"<sup>415</sup>. In the following of the chapter, the famous words of Mustafa Kemal to the fifty-seventh regiment are presented:

Anzac is strong in number, tense nerves, the eyes were on Mustafa Kemal. After describing the situation to the soldiers, he gave the order that requires courage. "I am not commanding you to attack. I'm ordering you to die. The time that until we die, other forces and commanders may replace us". To stop the progress of the enemy without hesitation they walked onto Anzac. They even managed to beat back the enemy to deploy. But almost all of fifty-seventh regiment were vanished.<sup>416</sup>

The narrative in the seventh room's animation has some complications. In this hall, the screening starts with Aynalı Çarşı folk song and narrates Mustafa Kemal's conversation with a soldier at the front, the painful aspects of the war and the losses reasoned by it.<sup>417</sup> Furthermore, the friendship between Turkish and

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<sup>413</sup> *Ibid.*, 170.

<sup>414</sup> *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli, Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>415</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>416</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>417</sup> *catab.ktb.gov.tr., Ibid.*

Anzac soldiers is portrayed in a peaceful manner as if both sides were not killing each other at the battlefield. As an example, the following text is clear:

Cihan, who grew in this land, fulfils the trenches with his affecting voice just after the gun reports end. Cihan not only in our trenches, famous enemy side. At night when it is time for ballads, he puts Anzac trenches in the same spirit. Yet more Anzacs who want Cihan to sing ballads, started to throw tins and chocolate bars. Not like two enemy sides but we were as if two brother folks separated by a Wall.<sup>418</sup>

In order to give the sense of reality, visitors are shown various sections of the long-lasting land battles and terrifying scenes of the war through the trenches formed in Z-shape; therefore, visitors watch the war from the trenches.<sup>419</sup> In this way, it is aimed that the visitors deeply feel the examples of heroism experienced in the war inside the trenches. The film screenings show that the devastating sides of the war has been narrated with an understanding of valour, braveness, martyrdom, and patriotism. In the Ministry book, the heroism of the Turkish soldiers has been portrayed as follows:

They were all heroes and Sergeant Yahya.

They fought heartily against three regiments here.

The enemy thought each of these marvellous soldiers as a division

They desired Allah and reached Him in the evening.<sup>420</sup>



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<sup>418</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 184.

<sup>419</sup> [catab.ktb.gov.tr](http://catab.ktb.gov.tr), *Ibid.*

<sup>420</sup> *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli, Ibid.*, 21.

One final significant point is highlighting the history knowledge for the enlightenment of next generations. One of the visitor letters reveals the importance given to the history knowledge: “Nations that do not know their history are doomed to perish.”<sup>422</sup>

When we come to the eighth animation room, “Gallipoli from the Firmament”, we see a dome that has been created to allow the visitors to watch the war from the sky at an angle of 360 degrees with a specially prepared mechanism; thus, the visitors can experience the feeling of rising into the sky.<sup>423</sup> The film screening reflects the activities of Allied reconnaissance planes and the situation of military hospitals. At this part of the narrative, the holiness of being a ghazi or a martyrdom has been emphasized. In addition, the nurses that came from the several regions of Anatolia has been shown to stress the desire of Turkish woman to save the homeland.



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Another important discussion in this hall is that the Allied warplanes committed a war crime by winding operations and bombing the field hospitals.<sup>425</sup> The following example reveals the discussion well enough:

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<sup>421</sup> catab.ktb.gov.tr., *Ibid.*

<sup>422</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 203.

<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*

I cannot imagine the reason of attacking to wounded and helpless people. While we are giving chance to them to get their injured ones, what kind of response is this. We have shown that even attacking the enemy has a nobility.<sup>426</sup>

Manifesting itself as noble even on the battlefield is one of the traditional slogans of Turkish-Islamic ideology. It should be the way of self-justification against the condition of being in a war and killing each other. It is a search of innocence; trying to state that “we didn’t do something wrong, just defended our country”.

In the tenth hall of the museum, “Gallipoli Impassable”, the loss of Allied Forces in land battles and their evacuation has been narrated with some exaggerated claims. According to the narrative at this animation room, the Allied Forces fell back their troops and escaped hiddenly; furthermore, they applied some interesting methods to trick Turkish soldiers such as placing puppet soldiers and establishing rifle mechanism by water drops.<sup>427</sup> In addition to this, there is also the narrative of Turkish nation’s miraculous victory against the superior tyrants and imperialists. The themes mentioned in the narrative are the power of faith and God’s help, the self-sacrifice of Anatolia and Muslim geography, the courage and valour of thousands of Turkish-Muslim soldiers, and their blood and martyrdom for the liberation of the homeland. This quotation from “Mehmet’s Letters” shows the language of self-sacrifice and pride clearly:

Although we are full of joy, we have not forgotten what we lost. As we were fighting in the battle, they will always remember us that we do not compromise of honesty even if we win, not seeing our counterpart different from us, as a nation protecting our customs and traditions. We’ve given a single message to all over the World. No matter what the conditions are this country will hold to its people’s intelligence and courage. There is only one reality who came for a wicked purpose; “Gallipoli is impassable”.<sup>428</sup>

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<sup>425</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*, 232-235.

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.*, 233.

In order to understand the visitors' feelings and experiences after watching this animation, the following letter that was written by a visitor presents some materials:

When I came here and saw the traces of the struggle for the existence of the nation, I felt more secure. I felt freer, more hopeful for the future, more fearless and more Turk because I know we are the grandchildren of heroes and brave people.<sup>429</sup>

It is obvious that the master narrative of Gallipoli and its Turkish-Islamist interpretation makes people experience nationalist and militarist feelings. We have seen this type of narrative in the tenth hall of the museum, "Memories". In this hall, various types of war memories and experiences, military letters from the front, and letters sent from the families to the soldiers have been used in order to show the self-sacrifice and heroism of the Turkish soldiers.<sup>430</sup> Moreover, the brutal side of the war and inevitable deaths have been mentioned at this part of the museum. For instance, martyr Lieutenant Zahit's letter which was written to his wife is narrated by prominent actor Altan Erkekli, one of the authors of the volume, as follows:

Today we'll go over the more important battles. Do not be sad if I die. I have two wills. First, do not cry for me. Secondly, the list of my goods is attached. Sell them and get the necessary things for yourself. With the rest of it make a religious ceremony for me. If I cannot pay my debt to you, give your blessing.<sup>431</sup>

One of the Anzac soldiers' letter that praising Turkish soldiers and refusing the war is given in the volume, too. The Anzac soldier questions the war with these sentences: "I refuse to die in this war. This is not my war"<sup>432</sup>. A piece of this soldier's letter is as follows:

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<sup>429</sup> *Ibid.*, 245. This text has been translated by me.

<sup>430</sup> *catab.ktb.gov.tr.*, *Ibid.*

<sup>431</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 255.


<sup>432</sup> *Ibid.*, 255.

I again hide, shoot, kill the enemy and rarely sleep. I am just an Anzac soldier. I neither have a favourite song, nor a dish. I am just a number who dies “heroic for the sake of the homeland”. Turks are the real heroes. Here is their homeland and they die heroically defending their homeland.<sup>433</sup>

In addition, the psychology of the soldiers after the end of war have been represented in “Mehmet’s Letters” as follows:

Dozens of soldiers we are all waiting for going back home. After all this time we’ve forgotten where our home is. I can’t wait to see my mum; she will touch my face tenderly. But what about those who cannot return home?<sup>434</sup>

As we have discussed before, Gallipoli is a figure of unity and solidarity in Turkish Republic. Since the establishment of Republic, both the Kemalist ideology and Turkish-Islamic movement have benefited from Gallipoli in this respect. This uniting feature of Gallipoli for the Turkish nation and society have been presented in the animation. One example from “Mehmet’s Letters” is as follows: “They call Epic of Gallipoli in Anatolia that we had experienced. We have delivered a message to everyone. We have created a direct sense Everyone found himself inside of it”<sup>435</sup>.



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<sup>433</sup> *Ibid.*, 255.

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*, 251.

<sup>435</sup> *Ibid.*, 251.

<sup>436</sup> *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli, Ibid.*, 24.

The eleven numbered animation room is the last hall of the museum that film screenings are done. However, this hall is not about the Gallipoli battles. The name of the hall is “From 1915 to Present” and talks about some developments in Turkey since 1915 such as health, industry, trade, agriculture, transportation, energy, military, politics. The aim of this chamber is explained as follows:

The Republic of Turkey, founded just after the end of the Independence war, has advanced fast in the way to become a global power by making h a great progress. In this chamber, the process that developing and improving Turkey has gone through is presented with specially prepared motions.<sup>437</sup>

The importance given to this issue can be understood easily from Celalettin Oruç’s own notes while working in the construction of the museum: “The distance that developing and strengthening Turkey has got over should be presented with special scenes”<sup>438</sup>. At this part of the museum, the traces of Turkish-Islamic ideology can be followed easily. Inside the film screenings, some figures of Turkish-Islamist narrative such as Siege of Kut Al Amara at Mesopotamian front of 1916, Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Korean War of 1952-55, and finally 15 July 2016 Military Attempt have been displayed in sequence. It is known that there is an attempt of linking historical events, successes, and leaders with each other to create a national history line. Thereby, Turkish-Islamist narrative links Gallipoli with other symbolic historical events and adds President Erdoğan’s leadership among other important figures. Besides, the economic power and growth of Turkey, bad intentions of internal and external powers, the upright of the Turkish nation, national unity and sovereignty are some of the subjects mentioned in the animation.

In addition to eleven animation rooms, there is also a two-floor exhibition hall where objects such as weapons, tools, equipment, personal belongings, letters used in the Gallipoli battles and relief maps depicting war scenes are displayed.<sup>439</sup>

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<sup>437</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>438</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*, 267.

<sup>439</sup> [catab.ktb.gov.tr.](http://catab.ktb.gov.tr), *Ibid.*

At this hall, we can see some themes of Turkish-Islamic ideology's reflection. Firstly, the justification of entrance to the war and objectives of Ottoman Empire have been presented in this exhibition hall. Especially the stress of industrial revolution and colonization of European allies can be observed easily. According to the narrative, the Ottoman Empire was obliged to enter the war to protect the country from the colonization. Another important point handled in the exhibits, the poverty and weakness of the Ottoman people against the Allied side. Despite this deficiencies, Turkish nation mobilized with its women, students, teachers, olds, and children to protect the homeland from the occupation. According to the narrative, to understand the victory of the Turkish nation, their courage, honour, fidelity, and self-sacrifice should be understood primarily. It is a story of bravery that engraved Turkish nation's name. In addition to these themes stressed in the exhibits, some individual memories, official documents, basic historical information about the war and its progress, knowledge about the military sides of the war, the scenes in and behind the battlefield are demonstrated to the visitors.

In conclusion, Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre has been constructed to represent the Turkish-Islamic interpretation of Gallipoli narrative. As in many war museums, economic, political, and ideological purposes are more prevalent than remembrance of the war in Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre. The representation of the Gallipoli battles in the museum focuses on the valour and martyrdom of Turkish-Muslim soldiers, self-sacrifice of Turkish society altogether, and people's faith and God's help against the superior Allied powers. According to the narrative, the European forces were unfair and unjust, they were coming for colonization; to the contrary, the Muslim geography was innocent, they didn't do something wrong. German military's participation into the war is ignored intentionally not to damage the Turkish-Islamic narrative of the war. Similarly, non-Turkish elements of the war is reduced to some of the Balkan, Arabic, and Kurdish soldiers' contributions under the title of "Muslim geography". The role of Turkish society and Turkish soldiers' heroism are portrayed much more loudly. One more important detail that is emphasized persistently is the technological

characteristic of the museum. As it is stated on the website and commemoration book, film screenings, projectors, holograms, 3D technology, visual and sound effects show the modernness and innovative side of the museum.

As a memory site, Gallipoli battlefields have undergone some transformations since the establishment of Turkish Republic. Especially with the rise of Turkish-Islamic ideology and neoliberal economic perspectives of 1990s, state authorities intervened in the developments occurred in peninsula both for economic reasons and with ideological purposes. The peak point of these interventions is the AKP period. Many state applications about the peninsula such as legal regulations, construction projects, restoration works, and road buildings have been carried out under the AKP governments' rule. Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre is one of those projects intended to be designed as a memory site. The main themes and figures of Turkish-Islamic ideology has been observed in the Gallipoli narrative that presented to the museum visitors inside the animations and exhibition halls. We have used the commemoration book named "Gel Tarihe Geçelim: Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi"<sup>440</sup> and the official website of the museum while collecting data.

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<sup>440</sup> Erkekli, Özyiğit and Gunem, *Ibid.*

## CONCLUSION

With the formation of the Turkish Republic, creating a modern, secular, and nation-state was the purpose of state elites. In this manner, the Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished, and a new epoch started in Turkish history. A new society, a new nation, and a new ideology would shape the next generations. Thereby, there was a huge need for a shared past, common losses and victories. Remembering and forgetting the common things at the same time would provide the national unity and solidarity.

During the formative years of republic, the main focus of the state ideology was to highlight War of Independence and Mustafa Kemal's leadership in this war. However, Gallipoli collective memory is also one of the 'founding ideologies' of the Republic. This founding image of the Gallipoli would contribute to the great and uniting narrative of the nation. As might be expected, the main themes of the Gallipoli narrative are Turkish nation's martyrdom, heroism, and valour against the imperialist occupants. In this narrative, non-Turkish and non-Muslim populations of the Ottoman period were erased and ignored as a result of nationalist and Kemalist ideology. Besides, the influence of Mustafa Kemal's keen intelligence and leadership in the victory is emphasised insistently in the Republican narrative. In this regard, Gallipoli Wars were seen by the Republican elites as a preliminary preparation for the Turkish War of Independence. Thus, main themes of the state ideology such as national independence, unity, solidarity, heroism, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice are located both in the Gallipoli narrative and War of Independence narrative.

Some of the social, cultural, and political developments in 1960s, 1980s, and 2000s have shown that Gallipoli collective memory has been reconstructed and transformed by the state elites according to the changing times and sensitivities. Especially after the 1980 military coup, some Islamic and religious figures were merged with the Kemalist state ideology in order to prevent some of the social and political movements; for instance, Left-wing movements, the

Kurdish political/separatist movement, and extremist ideologies. In this process, the state ideology was re-defined as Turkish-Islam synthesis. At the same time, the neo-liberal economic developments both in the world and in Turkey influenced Gallipoli peninsula and increased its importance in the Turkish public opinion. Gallipoli peninsula became a profitable commodity and source of income for the state as a tourism attraction centre. Reconstruction projects, road constructions, and several investments on the peninsula have been operated in recent decades.

In 2000s, rising political Islam and the AKP governments have shaped the Gallipoli collective memory severely. As in the formative years of republic, Gallipoli is being used as one of the 'founding images' of the state ideology. In this context, AKP governments' both nationalist and Islamist language are conveyed through Gallipoli. This time, the main focus of the narrative is more religious and Islamic than the republican period, coloured with Muslim population of the Ottoman period, but still ignoring non-Muslim population. The war is described as a 'resistance of Muslim peoples against the invading Crusaders'. By contrast with the republican narrative, Muslim participants of the war such as Arab, Kurdish, and Balkan people are mentioned in the Turkish-Islamist narrative of Gallipoli. However, non-Muslim participants of the war such as German side, Greek and Armenian soldiers of the Ottoman Empire are ignored in the narrative. Besides, this new Gallipoli narrative carries less emphasis to the Mustafa Kemal effect in the war when it is compared to the republican narrative. A hostile and unfriendly language, the need of the martyrdom or death in a victory, and supernatural incidents are observed much more in this new narrative. In short, the new Gallipoli collective memory began to reshape in 1980s and took its final state under the AKP rule in the last twenty years. The main figures of the new narrative consist of a heavy version of Turkish nationalism and Islamic themes.

In this context, Gallipoli peninsula and the area in general have become the symbol of the Turkish nationalism and Turkish Islamism, and it has been assumed as a memory site to commemorate the war and the losses. However, there have been some tensions especially between two master narratives while constructing the Gallipoli collective memory; one is Republican period's secular-nationalist narrative; and the other is recent decades' Turkish-Islamist narrative. They have been struggling with each other and fighting in a 'memory war'. Main themes of these different interpretations of Gallipoli Wars stem from different political and ideological trends. The secular-nationalist narrative establishes a collective memory of Gallipoli that emphasises Turkishness, secularism, and Mustafa Kemal. Turkish-Islamist narrative rewrites the collective memory of Gallipoli with a nationalist, religious, and jihadist understanding. Moreover, the role of Mustafa Kemal is intended to be replaced by the standard soldier *mehmetçik*. Yet, it is observed that the attempt of replacing the role of Atatürk has not succeeded. The Republican and Turkish-Islamist narratives have had to agree on the Atatürk figure in the Gallipoli collective memory.

In the previous chapters, it is mentioned that some of the political, economic, and sociocultural developments under the rule of AKP governments have transformed the Gallipoli narrative and added the Turkish-Islamic dimension of the AKP era into the narrative. In order to understand this process and change, some of the state authorities and their implemented policies have been studied. Initially, the ideological roles of the state institutions such as education, religious authorities, or war museums have been argued with the help of Louis Althusser's work, *Ideological State Apparatuses*.

In this sense, the examination of educational developments during the AKP period and the examination of coursebooks and curriculums reveals that the Turkish-Islamist narrative of the Gallipoli Wars have been presented in the educational resources. The emphasis of martyrdom, death, heroism, supernatural incidents, Turkish nationalism, and Atatürk effect exist in the historical texts and

books of Ministry of National Education. The other chapter in which we examined the *Diyanet*'s Friday sermons and some publications put also some conclusions. The texts, sermons, and magazines prepared by *Diyanet* officials carry the main themes of the Turkish-Islamist narrative of Gallipoli. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that there are more powerful and severe stress to the Islamist and jihadist figures in the *Diyanet* chapter. In order to argue Gallipoli issue under the title of memory sites, focusing on a war museum would be more functional. Therefore, examining the Gallipoli Epic Promotion Centre provide a meaningful framework. The structure of the museum and the animations displayed in the halls pictures the Turkish-Islamist narrative about the Gallipoli collective memory. Moreover, it is significant that the materials we used in our study are mostly constructed from official resources. In addition to those materials, some of the scholarly works and articles have been used in order to strengthen the framework of the study.

To conclude, this study tries to identify the contours of collective memories about the Gallipoli Wars in Turkey. Besides, it examines some of the developments and transformations in the Gallipoli narrative in the last twenty years. Social, cultural, ideological, political, and economic reasons are argued in the study. It is seen that especially with the rise of Turkish-Islam synthesis and the AKP governments rule, the collective memory of Gallipoli Wars has been transformed into the nationalist, Islamist, and jihadist version. The state authorities have carried out this change with their practical apparatuses.

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