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PRONATALISM AND PROFAMILISM
IN RELATION TO BIOPOWER IN TURKISH CONSERVATISM

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PRONATALISM AND PROFAMILISM IN RELATION TO BIOPOWER IN TURKISH
CONSERVATISM


TÜRK MUHAFAZAKARLIĞINDA BİYOİKTİDAR BAĞLAMINDA PRONATALİZM
VE AİLECİLİK

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to evaluate political arguments increasingly targeting women's bodies in Turkey through an examination of power relations and forms. Hence I tried to reveal the inextricable relationship between the modern "bio-power" in the Foucauldian sense and the above-mentioned arguments by first recompiling what Foucault said on power and then by comparing two population based politics, late Ottoman and contemporary Turkish, at the beginning of 20th century. What I wanted to achieve with this study was to decipher the subjectification processes of neoliberal bio-politics especially concerning women's bodies and unveil the differences they have from the early pro-natalist discourse driven by disciplinary power mechanisms.

Keywords: biopower, biopolitics, neoliberalism, pronatalism, profamilism

ÖZET

Bu çalışma ile amaçlanan, Türkiye'de özellikle son yıllarda artan kadın bedenine dair politik tartışmaları iktidar ilişkileri ve biçimleri üzerinden yeniden tartışmaya açmaktır. Çalışmada, Foucault'nun "biyo-iktidar" olarak adlandırdığı modern iktidar formunun bahsi geçen tartışmayla olan girift ilişkisini, öncelikle Foucault'nun iktidara dair söylediklerinin bir derlemesini yaparak, akabinde ise geçtiğimiz yüzyılın başında ve yaşadığımız günde güdülmekte olan nüfus yanlısı politikaların bir karşılaştırmasını çıkararak ortaya koymaya çalıştık. Çalışmayla başarılmak istenen, neoliberal biyo-politikanın özellikle kadın bedeni üzerinden özneyi inşa etme sürecini deşifre

etmek ve disiplinci yöntemlerle yönlendirilmiş eski pro-natalist söylemden farkını ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: biyo-iktidar, biyo-siyaset, neoliberalizm, pronatalizm, ailecilik

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INTRODUCTION

It's no news that the idea of womanhood was abused in order to align women with a specific kind of conceptualization, and that womanhood itself has been dictated by regulations, practices and even legal codes with a specific form of normativity created by ruling classes and other instances of power almost everywhere and for a long period of time. Womanhood is subjected to power practices that aim to regulate population in every respect. From one and until her death a woman is fixed and reduced to motherhood as the only conveyor of her gender and function in societies around the world. Even not bearing a child, be it by choice or due to health conditions, is seen and interpreted within the context of motherhood. In the same vein, there recently has been a debate in Turkey, fevered by president Erdogan's statement that "Women choosing career over child are half persons,"¹ and this was only one of many similar debates during the ruling of his party since 2002. Erdogan's speech was not surprising for many who already know of his position on gender equality. On the other hand, many people in Turkey may perceive this discourse on womanhood, as exemplified in Erdogan's words, as conservative/non-secular/ Islamist etc. From a different standpoint, but reaching a similar conclusion, mainstream feminists often interpret this attitude as part of the patriarchal mind setting which is a natural corollary to conservatism.

Evaluations of this controversy in the context of conservatism or in the framework of patriarchic hegemony do not personally convince me as an answer to the problem, since neither hypothesis, no matter how accurate it is,

¹ <https://www.rt.com/news/345548-erdogan-women-career-children/> (Accessed in September 2016)

does sufficiently answer the question as to why the AKP government is so obsessed with bodies, especially those of women. Initially, my basic research aim was to lay bare the long-standing patriarchal control over women's bodies in Turkey as well as to portray religion/culture based codes hidden therein. However, reading Foucault made me to rethink the subject in a wider scope. Equipped with Foucauldian "tools", as he coined the term, my refocus on power relations revealed a completely new picture, and the issue became more multifaceted than an issue of mere gender or norms. In the end, the debate grew deeper in my mind and gender gained importance only as *one* part of the big picture of *power relations*.

There are different kinds of phenomena playing roles in power relations as it always was the case. One of them is the hold of power on the body, which not only made it possible to rule, but also raised an awareness of the body as a practice of the self. Hence, reminding Riefenstahl's film *Olympia*², tens of different practices such as gymnastics, training, body building, nudeness, praising the beauty of body, etc. aim to arouse an appetite that would make youth and soldiers (who were the youth of WW2 in *Olympia*) wish to have such flesh and bones with the help of a determinate, meticulous mission applied on and for healthy bodies.

According to Foucault, the power, which focuses on the body or basically on biological life itself, has evolved into two different forms since the 17th century rising over the shoulders of sovereignty. These two different formations of power form two poles of growth which are in a mutual relationship rather than excluding each other. Together, they establish a new

² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNnDBAdF2sI>

kind of power, which Foucault names “bio-power”³ in *The History of Sexuality*⁴. The first formation of bio-power focuses on the body as a machine, and it is concentrated on discipline, on the optimization of body’s abilities and on distilling its forces in order to increase its usefulness. These practices have been provided by methods in the name of an *anatomo-politics*.⁵ Somewhat later, the second formation of power focused on the body as a species. In other words, body as an object of power gained importance because of reproduction, birth, death, health conditions and life expectancies. Practices pertaining to these aspects emphasize the body as a species, and these practices became possible with the help of a set of regulatory interventions and controls in the name of a *bio-politics*⁶. Both disciplinary practices over the body and regulations of the population (body as a species) are appearances of an organization of power focusing on biological life.⁷

The intention and motivation behind this thesis is to understand what is behind the current pro-familist perception in conservative Turkey by using the Foucauldian literature on bio-power. To do so, it is important to dig a little

³ In the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault explains this term by relating it to the practice of modern nation states and their regulation of their subjects through “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations.” M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality: V. 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p.140.

⁴ M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p.140

⁵ A social orthopedics that forms the individual via its own strategies and practices in factory or at school, etc. Cf. J. Revel, *Foucault Sözlüğü*. İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2012, pp. 23-24

⁶ Used first by Rudolf Kjellen in 1920s, (Roberto Esposito (2008). *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, University of Minnesota Press. p.16), *bio-politics* is explained in detail by Foucault in January 1978, in one of his Lectures at College de France as “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power.” M. Foucault, *Security Territory Population*, p.16. Although here he uses the term *bio-power*, this confusion of terms ends later in his lectures based on “*The Birth of Biopolitics*” in 1979.

⁷ M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction*, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 139-140

deeper and reach the roots of current *governmentality*⁸ mechanisms. Both in the late Ottoman era and in the early Republican Turkey, traces of bio-power can be seen in many practices, especially those held by state authorities. Thus, in the first part, I will review two formations of bio-power, i.e. anatomo-politics and bio-politics to get an insight into the roots of the current practices of bio-power. Both formations of power will be explained in Foucauldian terminology. In the second part of the thesis, I will try to detect traces of anatomo-politics in the footsteps of the late Ottoman Era pro-natalism, and I will try reveal a unity between current bio-politics and current neo-Ottoman pro-familism.

The marriage of neoliberal and conservative politics in the AKP era created for the government a new perspective on citizenship. The pro-family perspective which created fields of intervention into private life, has also taken hold by regulating women's bodies. These practices, in turn, became one of the main pillars of the AKP mentality, and the brought about a mind setting different from the early pro-natalist discourse of the late Ottoman and Early Republican Turkey.⁹ As Foucault argues, liberalism and neoliberalism are neither simply political ideologies nor economic models, but arts of governing people with special characteristics.¹⁰ Liberal and neoliberal strategies, which aim to govern freedom rather than narrowing it down, proceed not only by economic and political arrangements but also through techniques of subjectification.

⁸ The *governmentality* is frequently defined as the “*art of government*” or governing. It includes the practices of government and their effects on the people who are governed. The term will be explained in detail in further pages.

⁹ E. Öztan, “Türkiye’de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi,” *Toplum ve Bilim*. n. 130, 2014. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014, p.177

¹⁰ T. Lemke, *Biopolitics*. New York: NYU Press, 2011, p.45

Foucault described the general focus of his work as an historical analysis of practices of subjectification¹¹. Especially in the courses he gave in Collège de France under the headlines of *Security, Territory and Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics* Foucault argued that liberal and neoliberal strategies proceed via economic and political regulations at the macro level while they proceed via techniques of subjectification of individuals at the micro level. At the macro level, there are totalizing political technologies directed at the population. At the micro level, techniques become individualizing.¹² These techniques aim to establish a system in which people include themselves voluntarily. And the whole process of voluntarily being a part of the system of government is subjectification.¹³ An invention of late capitalism, subjectification is an important manipulation technique,¹⁴ and governmentality needs new technologies of power in order to be able to practice this manipulation. Furthermore, these technologies of power are not limited to personal manipulations methods. Freedom is essential to the practice of liberalism, which can only function if a number of freedoms such as freedom of the market, freedom of discussion and freedom of expression literally exist.¹⁵ Freedom is inevitable for the AKP government too, although this may look odd because of the oppressive disciplinary moves it has made for the last few years.

¹¹ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), p.22

¹² Ibid, p.7-8. The terms “macro” and “micro” are Keskin’s rather than Foucault’s.

¹³ F. Keskin, “Hükümranlıktan Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm,” *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.7

¹⁴ Ibid, p.15

¹⁵ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.63

Going back in time, it seems obvious that although pro-natalist politics were practiced in the late Ottoman era too beginning with the reign of Mahmud II (approximately in the first half of the 19th century), the techniques of liberalism mentioned above had not yet developed enough to perceive the human body as problem pertaining to population. Hence the immediate and easier solution was discipline.¹⁶ In the second chapter of this dissertation, I will try to compare two forms of ideological approach which are both related to population: pro-familism and pro-natalism under Turkish conservative rules. At a first glance, these two ideological approaches might look consistent with each other in terms of their perception of the body as part of population. However, they differ in terms of their practical applications and political as well as economic goals. Indeed, these two approaches differ to a great extent given their intervention into daily life. Pro-natalist politics differ from pro-familism since it does not take into consideration identity or individuality in demanding people to procreate. As Foucault remarks, however, modern bio-power “applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him.”¹⁷

The pro-familist perspective of conservative neoliberal governments expect their citizens not only to partake in particular kinds of practices (following the law or paying taxes), but also to devote their bodies to their government as a

¹⁶ F. Keskin, “Önsöz”, *Öznenin Yorumbilgisi Collège de France Dersleri 1981-82*, trans. F. Keskin. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015, p.xii, xiii

¹⁷ M. Foucault, “Subject and Power,” in H. L. Dreyfus and P Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982, p.212

natural duty from being a member of a grand nation. By contrast, the early pro-natalist perspective remains relatively naïve. The latter may ask for more children to be born to give them “*talim ve terbiye*”¹⁸ but it does not intervene in the identity within the public space. However, bearing children is not sufficient for being a good citizen in the eyes of the pro-familist neoliberal perspective, and “choosing children over career” and giving an identity-driven decision is what is asked for. Thus, the pro-familist perspective sets a law of truth, a truth that creates a *persona grata* or a *persona non grata* by stepping into daily lives. Whether a formation of power imposes a law of truth in everyday life or not here makes a significant difference. This difference made me to rethink pro-natalist and pro-familist approaches in a new perspective. Foucault, who extensively discussed the characteristics of homo-economicus in neoliberalism, emphasizes the entrepreneurial spirit of the individual who is above all an entrepreneur of himself/ herself.¹⁹ And this is what we can trace in pro-familism. The homo-economicus of the pro-natalist ideology, by contrast, could make the individual at most a part, i.e. a partner, in a process of exchange. In the conclusion of this thesis, I intend to show that although both pro-natalism and pro-familism have their roots in forms of power focused on the body, they used obviously different techniques evolved throughout the history of capitalism towards a new world order especially with respect to the individual’s identity.

¹⁸ This term refers to the original name of Turkish National Education System. But the lexical meaning of these two words ironically lead to “*discipline and punish*,” thus literally reminding Foucault’s terminology.

¹⁹ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–79*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.226

This study, may hopefully arise curiosity and interest in the non-ideological codes behind the subjugation of the body, especially women's body, which may lead to further forms of struggle against this subjugation. As seen in the example of Turkish conservatism, considering the general attempt to subjugate women's bodies to be a matter of force exercised by religion or ideology does not answer the "*why?*" question thoroughly. From this perspective, my purpose is to evaluate the situation in terms of the two forms of "bio-power" together. This eclectic approach may make us consider the problem from a different angle. Hence this thesis will be a thematic literature review of the Foucauldian notion of bio-power together with an application of its conceptual framework to Turkish conservative life affecting women's bodies.

Methodologically, I will refer to the primary sources by Foucault and sometimes to secondary sources of interpretations of his work to support my hypothesis in the first part of the study. In the second part, I will mostly use secondary sources summing up late Ottoman period practices to complete my inquiry. Due to my lack of formal education in history, secondary sources especially gathered from various articles helped me picture pro-natalism in the Ottoman era.

A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BIOPOWER

A.1. Discipline

*"kill a man and you're a murderer,
kill thousands and you're a conqueror,
kill them all and you're a god"*²⁰

A.1.1. What is BioPower?

Foucault begins the last part of *The Will to Know, History of Sexuality, Vol. I* by discussing forms of power. Sovereign power as one of the premodern forms has, according to this discussion, the privilege to decide upon life and death. According to the formulations of power made by classical theoreticians, the sovereign has a direct power, a god-like position, over the life and death of its subjects especially when this power was questioned or threatened.²¹ Hence power was positioned in the middle of the right of *taking life or letting live*.²²

As Western civilization went through radical changes, power evolved into new forms and assumed new relationships. Hence following the sovereign form, *bio-power* came to the scene. Differing from the former in terms of its evaluation of life, bio-power initially was defined by Foucault as an outbreak of innumerable and various techniques to perform and maintain the *subjugation*

²⁰ J.L. Godard, *Masculin Féminin*, 1966.

²¹ M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 135

²² *Ibid*, p.136

of bodies and the control of populations.²³ To put the matter more elaborately,

Foucault states that

“by this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called bio-power.”²⁴

Although the term *bio-power* was used again and again in the following works of Foucault and its characteristics were studied thoroughly in his later works, a main pillar has never changed about the notion: *bio-power* interferes in life in two basic forms. The first form of bio-power centers on the human body as a machine and is called *anatomo-politics* by Foucault. This form is known for disciplining and also optimizing the capabilities of the body, extorting its forces, simultaneously increasing its functionality and its docility, and incorporating it into systems of coherent and economic controls. In other words, *anatomo-politics* of the human body exercises practices of power in order to create a *disciplinary society*. The second aspect of *bio-power*, which is formed somehow later than the first form, focuses on the body as a species. In this form the body is seen to be loaded with mechanisms of life, and taken into

²³ Ibid, p.140

²⁴ M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction*, trans. R. Hurley, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 140

consideration in terms of basic biological processes such as reproduction, birth and death, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity or any circumstance that can lead to a change in these. Therefore, *bio-politics* of the population acts on entire series of regulating mechanisms in order to create a *society of control*. A two-sided power on life is thus established by a *discipline* of the individual's body and a *regulation* of the population. This two-sided technology constituted by anatomic (anatomy-political) and biological (bio-political) forms is directed toward bodily performances, and unlike sovereign power the function of this form of power is to enhance life in every way rather than to kill.²⁵

²⁵ Ibid, p.139

A.1.2. Panopticon and Practices of Surveillance

“Power is not discipline, discipline is a possible procedure of power.”²⁶

We live in an age where direct interventions on the human body or any kind of physical punishment are considered inhuman. Civilization has developed to the degree that physical disciplinary methods seem outdated. Nowadays, bodies are more precious than they ever were, and they represent the most fundamental provinces of the private sphere. Obviously, this was not the case before.

As I have argued above, the initial formation of bio-power was the anatomo-politics of the body which created a disciplinary society. The formation of this disciplinary society can be characterized in terms of the emergence of two seemingly opposite phenomena. At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, in various countries worldwide and especially in Europe, the *juridical* and the *criminal* systems were reevaluated. Even though the qualifications, scope and historical background of these reevaluations differ in different countries, they have in common the *economic dynamics* which highlights the similarity between these transformations even if they took place in different geographies.

The most apparent transformation of all was unquestionably the revision of the

²⁶ M. Foucault, “Politics and Ethics: An Interview”, by P.Rabinow, R.Rorty, and C.Taylor in University of Berkeley, April 1983, *The Foucault Reader*; trans. P.Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, p.380

criminal justice system. Getting acquainted with *Panopticon*, which was created by J. Bentham, would help us understand the reason behind such a transformation. Panopticon is an architectural form which lays the groundwork for applying power of one will on another. This architectural form is applied especially in hospitals, houses of correction, schools, factories, orphanages or any disciplinary space. What Bentham named “Panopticon” is a circular shaped building in which there exists an empty space like a yard with a tower in the center. This circular shaped building consists of cells open to gaze from both inside and outside. In every cell, there is at least one person acting upon himself/herself according to the rules of the disciplinary institution that he/she is in. If it is a prison, there is a prisoner who is to be corrected; if it is a school, there is a pupil who is to be learning to write or if it is a factory, there is a worker who is to be working. Under Foucault’s interpretation “*the Panopticon would induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic function of power.*”²⁷ This is because there exists an observer in the tower who can see everything in the cells of the circular building but who himself is never open to any gaze.²⁸ On the other end of this *practice of surveillance*, the observed one, namely the prisoner, the pupil or the worker, would never know when or by whom they are observed. With the uneasy feeling of not seeing the observer, they are expected to feel like they have to act according to the expectations of the surveillance system as if they

²⁷ M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of Prison*, trans. A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1995, p. 197

²⁸ M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, p.155

were under constant surveillance.²⁹ Hence Panopticon is the representation of the accepting of discipline by pupils, workers and prisoners for the very reason of anonymous conditions of surveillance. Thanks to the invisible character of surveillance in the panoptic form, an *u(dys)topia to establish discipline* becomes real. Panopticon, therefore, is not an element of a sci-fi movie but a form of power and a dystopia that eventually became a social reality.

In institutions where the panoptic form is applied, wide ranging regulations were applied in order to discipline actions of the body with the help of empirical and calculating methods. These methods serve the two basic purposes of docility and material pragmatism: *compatibility to a regulating technique* and *fruitfulness in the name of material production performance*. Both perspectives make possible the manipulation, analysis or colonization of the body and its subjection to bio-power. In other words, human body becomes part of the mechanics of power which examines, dissects and reunites it. Hence an anatomical understanding of politics, which also is a subjugating technique, arises. In this technique called “anatomo-politics,”³⁰ some individuals claim right over another individual’s body or some individual decides what should the other individual do with which technique, speed or productivity.³¹ Unlike the sovereign system, the ultimate function of this network of extralegal panoptic organizations (such as police for surveillance or psychology,

²⁹ M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar 3*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2000, p.224

³⁰ M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality, Volume 1, An Introduction*, translated by Robert Hurley, Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 139

³¹ M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of Prison*, trans. A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1995, pp.306-309

psychiatry, criminology, medicine or pedagogy for rehabilitation) is *not to penalize* legal violations by individuals, but to adjust their productive potential to the service of the system.³²

However, the scope of transformative nature of surveillance practices was not limited to architectural buildings or institutions. *Investigation*, for instance, which is a legal method of learning what happened or applying the testimony of a third person did no longer play an essential role after the introduction of panoptic practices. Rather, an actual observing and inspection from a panoptic tower was preferred.³³ Not to reconstruct an event according to a fiction that someone created, but to observe something or especially someone as a whole became crucial. Moreover, not only the style of getting information, but also the qualification of the knowledge obtained changed within the atmosphere of the panoptic system thus created. With *surveillance* practices a new kind of information emerged which does not confirm facticity of a thing, but which states whether the individual acts, follows rules or makes progress as required. With this modification of the qualification of knowledge, a normative fiction of reality was created around which new kinds of information practices of surveillance and observance shaped.

Panoptic practices are distinguished from the punishment practices of pre-modern or legal societies not only in terms of method but also in terms of their ultimate goal. In premodern societies, the person who had the authority to

³² M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar 3*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2000, p.223

³³ *Ibid*, p.225

apply punishment, i.e. the sovereign, also claimed right on the prisoners', workers' or villagers' body. The one who had the power used to punish whenever it was deemed necessary by using physical violence or by placing prohibitions. Sometimes the holder of power used to punish in order to confirm his right to punish even when punishment was not required at all, hence with the intention of inducing docility. Peasants, for instance had to obey any rule that the feudal lord commanded while soldiers had to die for their kings unquestioningly. By contrast, in disciplinary societies where the panoptic method was applied, a much more liberal ruling form was embraced. The ruler was required to make room for any action or thing which would promote material production. This also meant that anything he/she performed for this cause was legitimate.³⁴ Thinking about a panoptic environment in a factory of the 19th century Liverpool, one can easily imagine the following scene: A factory worker who tries to fit in the expected criteria of productivity, who acts upon the belief of being observed at all times although he actually is not. This shows how constrained was the ability to move for a factory worker in the hours of work by the frame of normative experience that had been favored. It is not hard to guess that women and children who previously were familiar with the notion of docility were more dependent on these practices of surveillance and restriction. In many patriarchic traditions women are expected to obey their husbands just as children are expected to obey their parents. After all, both women and children as elements of the disciplinary society knew by experience that there was an invisible observant eye right behind their backs at

³⁴ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp.57-59

home or outside which constantly tried to make them docile in a way similar to the panoptic practices .³⁵

A.1.3. Norms and Laws

Beginning with the 19th century, a new power mechanism penetrated different layers of Western society with a new set of norms that were not determined by law. In other words, although bio-power uses the legal system, it does so in order to maintain normative institutions that shape individual and social behavior. As Foucault describes, there is a component circulating between disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms. This component, which is *the norm*, is applied to the body and to the population³⁶ in order to *control and regulate* them. In more concrete terms, what is in question when norms are applied to an individual is *discipline* and *anatomo-politics*, whereas when norms are applied to a population what is in question is *regulations* and *bio-politics*. Additionally, being unbound to any legal system or law makes norms extra-legal apparatuses. In other words, modern lives are disciplined and regulated on the basis of norms created by extra-legal apparatuses.³⁷

Before bio-power mechanisms, laws were responsible for restrictions on freedom, and they would take one's right to live at the extreme case. However,

³⁵ M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar 4*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2003, p.103

³⁶ With the notion of population, F. talks about an individual biological entity, a social body, but not a totality. It has its independent birth-morbidity rates, health level, life expectancy and welfare production etc. T. Lemke, *Biopolitics*. New York: NYU Press, 2011, pp. 36-37

³⁷ M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. D. Macey. New York: Picador, 2003, pp.252-53

bio-power cannot afford wasting bodies, because the object of bio-power is *life* itself. Bio-power constructs mechanisms which regulate and control life with the help of norms. And in the end, it is the legal system that has to keep up with norms. Hence, with bio-power the society of law was left behind in favor of a new society focused on life. The new society forced its people to obey the norms.³⁸

Foucault argues that in modern bio-power some kind of normativity, which may serve as the foundation of the law, is intrinsic to any legal imperative. However, we should notice that such a normativity should not be confused with what Foucault ultimately wanted to identify as the *procedures, processes, and techniques of normalization* peculiar to bio-power.³⁹ To put it differently, techniques of normalization can develop from or below the law either by being a foundation to it or by being against it. However, although norms and laws can come this close, the systems they belong to stay distinct. A good verification of this distinction may be as follows: In the system of law only what is forbidden is determinate and what remains indeterminate is *de facto* allowed whereas in the disciplinary model, which works through imperatives, what is indeterminate is prohibited.⁴⁰ Thus, norms and laws have different territories and styles of restrictions, and they belong to different systems of power.

A.1.4. A Leap of Power: from Sovereign Power to Biopower

³⁸ F. Keskin, *Michel Foucault: Seçme Yazılar 2*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2000, p.18

³⁹ M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.84

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.69

In *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault formulates three different models of power characteristic of Western civilization, following but never negating each other since Middle Ages. These models are referred to as “sovereignty”, “discipline” and “governmentality” in a chronological order. Forms of state which correspond to these power models are summed in turn as follows:

First, the state of justice, born in a feudal type of territoriality and broadly corresponding to a society of customary and written law, with a whole interplay of commitments and litigations; second, the administrative state that corresponds to a society of regulations and disciplines; and finally, a state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, and, for sure, the territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of its components.⁴¹

Although, as mentioned above, sovereignty was bound to law with a body of legal proceedings, the most prominent character of sovereignty, which made the sovereign the supreme leader, was unquestionably *the right to kill*. When sovereign power was on board, the right that we can talk about as the principle of life and death was in fact the right to kill. The sovereign performed his sovereignty at that very moment when he could kill or order death.⁴² However, with modernity a new right grew alongside the old right of the sovereign. The right to take life or let live was sovereign’s old right; with bio-power, however,

⁴¹ M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.145

⁴² M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. D. Macey. New York: Picador, 2003, p.240

the authority, which is not the sovereign any more, has the right to make live and let die.⁴³

It is not surprising that this discussion swirls around the living body. According to Foucault, the moment at which the human species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society's political strategies, is the threshold of this society's biological modernity. This is the place where natural life becomes the object of the mechanisms and calculations of state power, and politics turn into bio-politics.⁴⁴ In Foucault's own words:

*"For millennia man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question"*⁴⁵.

However, the picture gets more complicated as bio-power doubles its models.

⁴³ Ibid, p.241

⁴⁴ G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. D. Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p.3

⁴⁵ M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction*, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 143

A.2. Governmentality

A.2.1. Biopolitics as a Companion to Anatomopolitics

Beginning with the second half of the 18th century, major practices of surveillance and architectural buildings based on the panoptic model started to ease the operability of bio-power. However, these strategies based on surveillance and observance became insufficient and unequipped for bio-power to govern modern societies.⁴⁶ Bio-politics overcame this insufficiency. With *bio-politics*, it becomes clear that power is not something applied to individual human beings only, but something which can be applied to the population as a whole.

The threshold of biological modernity for a society is located where both the species and the individual as mere body are essential to the political strategies of daily life. Hence the nation's biological life and health, which previously were the concern of sovereign power, become part of the government of men. And with the newly emerging technologies, docile bodies which are made so by *disciplinary* control mechanisms properly serve the needs of capitalism.⁴⁷ The story of how "life" became a problem in the sphere of political thought is hidden in the story of technologies and mechanisms of power. In the 17th and 18th centuries, power emerged as a technique centering on the individual body. This concentration on the body contained spatial distributions such as

⁴⁶M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar 4*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2003, p.87

⁴⁷ G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. D. Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p.3

*separation, alignment, sterilization, and surveillance.*⁴⁸ These techniques were also available, for example, for controlling individuals' bodies to increase their material productivity. For this purpose, a whole system of surveillance, hierarchy, inspection and any technology that can be described as disciplinary have served well.⁴⁹

In the second half of the 18th century, a new mechanism of bio-power focusing on the population made an appearance. Interestingly, this technology of power did not exclude the previous disciplinary technology, but, on the contrary, it easily integrated it because their fields of influence did not intersect with each other. These two power mechanisms acted upon different layers of social life and used different instruments to establish their control over people.⁵⁰ The new non-disciplinary power is concerned with *man-as-species*,⁵¹ while technologies of the disciplinary form used to address men to the extent that they are individual bodies. This new model, which is the *bio-politics* of the human race, is interested in human beings as a global mass that is sensitive to birth, death, production, illness and anything affecting the population. Hence it works as a *totalizing* rather than individualizing technology.⁵² Both mechanisms of power indubitably are concerned with and aim at the body. However, while one

⁴⁸ M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. D. Macey. New York: Picador, 2003, p.241

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp.241-242

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.242

⁵¹ Ibid, p.243

⁵² Ibid, p.243

individualizes the body as an organism equipped with certain potentials, the other replaces it with general biological methods.⁵³

It should be noted that speaking about bio-power here does not mean speaking about one specific kind of power fading from the scene to leave its role to another. The effective union of anatomo-politics with bio-politics, which together constitute bio-power, is still maintained in Western societies.⁵⁴ Disciplinary practices⁵⁵ continuously have been applied until the 1960's. Since then, however, it seems to have been agreed that with less disciplinary practices it is possible to control bodies in industrial societies.

Works of Foucault give us the chance to get to know the bio-political nature of the new paradigm of power, which is less disciplinary in comparison to the previous form. Bio-politics regulates, follows, comments on and absorbs social life and reformulates rather than disciplines it, since power can only be effective on the entire life of the population if it becomes something coming from inside. Power works and *life becomes an object of power* only if it is welcomed by the population⁵⁶. This is exactly what capitalism needs. Although docile individuals fixed by disciplinary institutions of anatomo-politics may look more appealing, they do not fit into the consuming habits, productive

⁵³ Ibid, p.249

⁵⁴ M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar 4*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2003, p.41

⁵⁵It would not be wrong to say that some disciplinary practices have not ended yet in Turkey, especially when we think about body fetishizing national holiday celebrations which are just called off and took a lot of debate in terms of ending the symbolic power of secularism in Turkish Republic. G.Zencirci, "Secularism, Islam, and the National Public Sphere Politics of Commemorative Practices in Turkey", *Visualizing Secularism and Religion: Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, India*". Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2012.

⁵⁶ M. Hardt and A. Negri, "Biopolitical Production", *Biopolitics A Reader*. London: Duke University Press, 2013, p.216

practices and socialization styles of today. In the disciplinary society, the relationship between the individual and power was not a kinetic one. It allowed only a unidirectional relationship in which the invasion of power was correlated to the opposition of the individual. But when the power mechanism is bio-political, the social body is made of power itself, where it allows an open, two-directional relationship.⁵⁷ Thus, power is able to come from the inside.

A.2.2. Dispositives

Historically, Foucault uses the term “dispositive” to signify both the material methods to apply power and the strategies, techniques and forms which are applied by power to obtain subjugation. As the main concern of Foucault’s analysis of power shifts from juridical mechanisms to bio-power, the term dispositive turns out to be a critical notion. Dispositives involve both discursive and non-discursive aspects of daily practices. Thus, the term “*episteme*,” which was used until 1960s by Foucault to refer to discursive mechanisms only, is replaced with “dispositive” which embraces both discursive and non-discursive mechanisms.⁵⁸

As the perspective of disciplinary power gradually faded away from the new world scene and as violence gained a much more cultivated form in power relations and in daily life, new techniques were needed to apply bio-power. To

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.217

⁵⁸ J. Revel, *Foucault Sözlüğü*. İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2012, pp.64-66

invest body by power, new techniques called *apparatuses/dispositives* emerged, and they were able to penetrate the entire society. According to Foucault, these sophisticated regulations, namely dispositives, which are heterogeneous ensembles, consist of discourses, institutions, regulatory decisions, scientific-philosophic propositions, legal decisions etc. In a nutshell, *dispositives* are systems formed by discursive and nondiscursive practices that have been pointed out above. These practices constitute experiences and assign people the subject positions of these experiences. By making people believe that they are the subjects of these experiences, they impose upon them a law of truth. Thus power invests the human body and makes it docile, neither by using violence nor by obtaining assent, but by bringing the subject and the experience together under this truth.⁵⁹ For this very reason, dispositives are always bound to the boundaries of a knowledge which also determines power itself.

Similar to his treatment of the term “governmentality,”⁶⁰ Foucault specifies three meanings for the term dispositive/apparatus. The first meaning is an *association of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory*

⁵⁹ F. Keskin, *Michel Foucault: Seçme Yazılar 2*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2000, p.18

⁶⁰ Foucault means three things by the word governmentality. First, the association of *institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics* which permit the practice of the very particular kind of power. The scope of this new power is the population, as said earlier, and its leading form of knowledge is the political economy. The second meaning of governmentality is the superiority over all other types of power forms, including sovereignty and discipline, throughout the West. This superiority has created an environment for a set of particular *governmental apparatuses or dispositives* and *a set of knowledge (savoirs)* to flourish. The last meaning Foucault infers from the meaning of governmentality is, the outcome of the procedure that the state of justice transforming into state of administration. This procedure started in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and states slowly become *governmentalized*. M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.144.

*decisions, laws, etc.*⁶¹ Those are the elements that constitute an apparatus/dispositive. On a second level, the relations between these elements too establish apparatuses/ dispositives. The second meaning Foucault picks for dispositives is the very relationship, i.e. *the nature of the connection* itself that can subsist between these elements. Apparatuses/ dispositives thus can act as a mask or a means to any practice in order to establish a new field of rationality.⁶² Thirdly and finally, apparatuses/dispositives have a strategical purpose, which makes possible subjection of many conceptions in the name of a specific kind of economic style.⁶³ Thus, *apparatuses can act as a mechanism which regulates the population to make it fit to the ultimate needs of economy.*

⁶¹ M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, p. 194

⁶² Ibid, pp.194-195

⁶³ Ibid, p.195

A.3. Identity

A.3.1. The Political Double Bind

In his final years, during a seminar he gave in the University of Vermont in 1982, Foucault clarifies the inner mechanism of how the voluntary surrendering mechanism of the individual works. This is a two-sided system, in which, both the state and the individual have homework to do. On one side, the state assumes the care of the natural life of individuals, such as being super-interested in personal health, birth control methods, etc. The first step, *objective totalization*, lets the state intervene in daily life without looking oppressive. On the other side, the individual binds himself/herself to his/her own identity given by the state mechanisms through a process of *subjectivation*, and simultaneously subjects himself/herself to an external power by his/her own will. The second step, the willingness of the individual, lets the first step intervene easier. Foucault combines these two processes of bio-politics which ends up with an individual self-willingly bound to the system, and he names it a “political double bind.”⁶⁴

This political double-bind⁶⁵ is a matter of identity that cannot be observed in sovereignty or in disciplinary society. The individual is neither something passive that is smothered or smashed nor it is in the outside or against power.

⁶⁴ G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. D. Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p.5

⁶⁵ Foucault explains the same problem by using various names and steps in his early or late various works. In political double bind, individual is held as being not a property, or an owner but a part of the process. A second version of the problem with identification, which focuses on the importance of *knowledge* more with a deeper philosophical content, will be explained in this chapter further.

The individual is one of the primary effects of and, at the same time, an instrument of power.⁶⁶ Thus, if there is a reciprocal relationship between power and the individual, power should be analyzed as something circulating and working as a chain. In other words, with governmentality power is not a domination that someone or some group exercises over another one or a group. It is not something shared between owners and non-owners like a property. It never is something to be possessed like a commodity. On the contrary, individuals use power and they are not approving passive servants. With the help of the two steps of the *political double bind*, as Foucault names it, bio-power is not simply applied to individuals, but is carried by them. This is the way power operates through individuals in governmentality.⁶⁷ Therefore, bio-politics regulates social life internally. Power may become an effective regime over the life of a whole population only if every individual embraces it in her/his own way and regenerates it.⁶⁸ This is why *homo-economicus* is the one who is extensively *governable*, since it easily fits into changes that bio-politics brings with whether in terms of material production or consumption.⁶⁹

Thus it would be wrong to classify the individual as a passive object just as it would be wrong to classify bio-power as an external force which crushes and destroys individuals. One of the primary effects of power is that it transforms the body into an individual by making it think, feel and act in certain ways.

⁶⁶ M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar I*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2000, p.106

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.106

⁶⁸ M. Hardt, A. Negri, *Empire: The New World Order*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.23-24

⁶⁹ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.270-71

Power operates through the individual which it builds. The modern individual is not exterior to or against power, but primarily an effect of power. Further, the individual is a means of power depending on his/her efficiency.⁷⁰ *Norms and games of truth* established by *discursive and non-discursive practices* play a crucial role here and the modern individual develops, commits and positions himself/herself according to these created norms through self-control and without any outer restriction or oppression.

A.3.2. Objectification of the Individual and Problematization

Although the use of the word “subjectivity” was sometimes vague in Foucault’s terminology, he seems to take it to mean a *relationship of consciousness* that one establishes with oneself or a *representation* of one’s being under a certain concept. As soon as this relationship is established, the mode of being in question becomes one’s the *subjective* experience. And an individual assumes an identity by taking the subject position of the specific experience(s) that constitute this identity. For instance, if at some point a certain kind of behavior or a mode of being previously known as insanity or crime is conceptualized as mental illness or delinquency, if these forms of experience are attributed to one, and if one goes along with this attribution, it follows that one accepts the identity of the mentally ill or of the delinquent.⁷¹ Thus an experience is built from and around the behavior of individuals, which are conceptualized by fields of knowledge and regulated by normative systems

⁷⁰ M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar I*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2000, p.108

⁷¹ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), p.10

of power, i.e. discursive and nondiscursive practices. When individuals relate to their being and conduct through the dispositives of knowledge and power, they become the subjects of the experience that they take part in.⁷²

Identities can be classified as desirable or undesirable on the basis of religious, moral, legal, scientific, etc. norms. This classification has a serious practical implication since it gives a certain kind of normative license to, for example, the exclusion of the person so classified from society. These practices are, therefore, ways of manipulation of those who are classified under certain identifications. However, they have another and more economical and widespread functionality. For if an individual suspects that certain kind of conduct may cause sanctions such as confinement or isolation, then he/she would at least try to avoid it. In other words, the individual would voluntarily constrain one's field of action in order to avoid such sanctions, which makes the whole system very economical.⁷³ That is exactly the spirit of governmentality, which was possible neither for the anatomo-politically ruled disciplinary society nor for sovereignty.

However, what makes bio-politics so manipulative is yet another characteristic. If an individual takes over a specific kind of classification as undesirable at the personal level, such that if he/she is convinced that she/he does not wish to be classified as mentally ill or delinquent, then this individual would probably keep behavior at bay which are specific to that classification. Here, again the individual would voluntarily avoid the kind of behavior specific to these identities. But there is a fundamental difference between this case and the

⁷² M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume 2*, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990, p.4

⁷³ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), p.10

previous one. While in the previous case the individual constrains himself/herself by avoiding a certain kind of behavior without accepting it as undesirable, the latter involves an individual who is personally convinced that a certain kind of behavior is actually undesirable. Consequently, the individual behaves in line with norms in public even if he/she can do otherwise.⁷⁴ This kind of manipulation is the strongest, and what we'll examine in Chapter 2 is this kind of effectiveness of bio-politics.

Foucault calls the process of objectification of the individual “dividing practices.” The reason for the choice of the word “dividing” here is to imply the divided nature of the individual, either in itself or from others. This very process of dividing is a practice of objectification through binary oppositions such as sane-insane, healthy-ill, criminal-innocent. Hence the subject who is divided into such oppositions is objectified.⁷⁵

The whole process of objectification that divides individual in terms of binary oppositions, is compatible with the notion of *problematization* used by Foucault to highlight the constitution of human beings as subjects in Western civilization. Just like the *political double-bind* discussed above, *problematization* is the consideration of modes of being or behavior as a problem at a given period of time and the eventual objectification of these modes of being or behavior by discursive and non-discursive practices. This

⁷⁴ Ibid, p.11-12

⁷⁵ M. Foucault, “Subject and Power,” in H. L. Dreyfus and P Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982, pp. 208-209

process of problematization is the introduction of certain forms of being and behavior into *games of truth*. In other words, specific modes of being or behavior are conceptualized according to the fields of knowledge fabricated within these systems, which also means that they are reclassified and reformed as new types of human experience. When people believe in these new fabricated truths and, accordingly, consider their modes of being as new forms of experience, they also give consent to being the subjects of these experiences. Thus people act upon the norms constitutive of the experiences that they are subjected to.⁷⁶

Games of truth, which provide the conditions of possibility of a certain experience, are therefore the historical *a priori* for this experience. Games of truth are predetermined and historically situated sets of rules which determine the ways in which a certain mode of being is articulated with a certain discourse, conceptualized, and thus thought. Games of truth are historical because this articulation takes place not only in a specific time and place, but also because discourses themselves are historical.⁷⁷

Various games of truths may constitute various experiences from and around the same forms of behavior or modes being by articulating them with different discourses which are deemed to be true. This possibility is directly related to the manipulative and objectifying function of identities, for certain modes of being are constituted as undesirable experiences and consequently as

⁷⁶ M. Foucault, "The Subject and Power", *Critical Inquiry*, Vol.8, no.4., 1982. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p.781

⁷⁷ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), p.57

undesirable identities. And undesirability of these identities makes it possible to make individuals restrain their own fields of action.⁷⁸

According to Ferda Keskin, Foucault's description of the processes of problematization can be reformulated in terms of the three axes described in the Introduction to *The History of Sexuality*, V. II. The constitution of an experience through a problematization starts with a) developing various knowledge fields that are related to a certain type of behavior; continues with b) the establishment of a normative power system which regulates the practice of this behavior; and is completed with c) the individual's relating to himself/herself through the fields of knowledge in (a) and the normative systems in (b). This is the explanation of how subjective experience and identities are created and how they do constrain human conduct.⁷⁹

A.3.3. The Economy of The identity

Without doubt, bio-power was necessary for a growing capitalism. As Foucault argues, capitalism is an economic system, where liberalism is a political regime. It is liberal governmentality which enables capitalism to transform and reproduce itself. Capitalism would not be possible if bodies did not methodically take part in the production processes and if the population was not accommodated to economic operations. Because capitalism needs both, it

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp.23-24

⁷⁹ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), pp.61-62

optimizes life and transforms the process of ruling. However, the body and population are not the sole needs of capitalism.⁸⁰

Paul Virno, quoting Marx, equates *labor power* with the *potential to produce*. Capitalism is interested in the life and body of the worker because this life/body has the potential to produce. The living body, thus, turns into an object and many human characteristics (speaking, thinking, remembering, being active, etc.) are thought under the umbrella of labor power. Therefore, Virno finds the non-mythological history of bio-politics in the history of labor power.⁸¹

What Virno focuses on reveals itself as the labor power as such. The new definition of economics implies the primary role of human behavior.⁸² Economy thus becomes an analysis of a relational mechanism between things and processes. Economy is therefore not the analysis of processes but the analysis of the “internal rationality” or, in other words, of the *strategic programming of individuals’ activity*.⁸³

For instance, with liberalism and after, the time spent by a mother near her newborn baby has become a concern of the economy. Economy is interested in this new mother-baby relationship not only in the negative sense that the

⁸⁰ M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction*, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, pp. 135-145

⁸¹ P. Virno, “An Equivocal Concept: Biopolitics”, *Biopolitics A Reader*. London: Duke University Press, 2013, p.271

⁸² M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 222

⁸³ *Ibid*, 223

mother will be off due to maternal leave, but in the positive sense too that the expectation of compatibility of the children to society grows as the time mother spends with her children increases, which brings an indirect contribution to the economy. Thus any topic related to health, including birth and child rearing, would be a concern for what is called “human capital” and economy.⁸⁴ Therefore the time and the care the mother spares for her children corresponds to an investment which can be measured with units of time. Thus the investment, so to speak, the mother makes by spending her time for her child becomes an input for children’s human capital, which will produce an income either as salary or otherwise in the future. Meanwhile, the mother who sacrificed her own salary for the sake of her children’s salary is not empty-handed. She will have the *contentment* from mothering her children and from the consciousness that she has in fact been successful. According to the neoliberal analysis, this is a psychological and economic profit in return to an investment.⁸⁵

A.3.4. Neoliberalism and Freedom of The Subject

Neoliberalism is a doctrine that theoretically developed after 1930 by different schools but precisely put in practice in 1970’s. As Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval argue, neoliberalism can be defined as a set of discourses, practices and apparatuses that regulate a new mode of government of human beings in

⁸⁴ Ibid, 229-230

⁸⁵ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp.243-44

accordance with the universal principle of competition.⁸⁶ Such a definition may be regarded as a re-interpretation of Foucault's definition of neoliberalism. According to Foucault, neoliberalism is neither a theory nor an ideology, but a *practice* or a *way of doing things* with its own goals, which reforms itself by constantly reanalyzing itself.⁸⁷

Given the influence of *bio-politics* on *identity*, one can conclude that neoliberalism is indeed neither an ideology nor an economic policy even without reading what Foucault says in *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Neoliberalism must be thought in terms of the notion of governmentality, since both are firstly and essentially rationalities which incline to structure and organize not only deeds of rulers, but also the behavior of the ruled. By creating a behavioral norm and suggesting a model of subjectivation, neoliberal rationality, i.e. governmentality builds its essence.⁸⁸

If liberalism is considered to be an art of government, which involves practices of constituting power, and if neoliberalism is considered as an attempt to relocate liberalism on a global scale depending on new power relations, it should be stressed that each geography may have its unique kind of governmentality. This is why Foucauldian analyses may shed light on non-Western exercises of power given specific historical, discursive, economic, cultural genealogies of unique factual situations. Foucault, did not take notions like state, society, hegemony as *a priori*, but was concerned with multiple

⁸⁶ P. Dardot, C. Laval, *The New Way of The World: On Neoliberal Society*, trans. G. Elliot. New York: Verso, 2013, p.8

⁸⁷ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.318

⁸⁸ P. Dardot, C. Laval, *The New Way of The World: On Neoliberal Society*, trans. G. Elliot. New York: Verso, 2013, p.8

mechanisms that give rise to these notions.⁸⁹ For example, state is not perceived as the source of power but an *effect* of a regimen that includes multiple forms of government. Therefore, for Foucault, the process of *governmentalization of the state*⁹⁰ rather than the state itself should be the proper object of study.⁹¹

The neoliberal political rationality, as it is analyzed by Dardot and Laval,⁹² builds both a productive and a destructive relationship with the notion of freedom. The ongoing system can work only if freedom exists. However, what is in question here is not this or that freedom or the need to guarantee this or that freedom. The neoliberal system provides freedom, because it can only function insofar as certain freedoms such as freedom of the market or freedom to buy and sell do actually exist. As long as the liberal system and the its governmental reason produces freedom, the very same system or the new art of government consumes it. But no longer in the sense of the imperative “*be free!*” , as it was in the disciplinary system, for neoliberalism clearly expresses the following: “*I am going to produce what you need to be free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free.*”⁹³

⁸⁹ İ. Oranlı, “*Biyo-Politikanın Doğuşu ve Foucaultcu Eleştirisi*”, *Cogito*, n.70-71, 2012. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p. 43

⁹⁰ M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.109

⁹¹ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.77

⁹² P. Dardot, C. Laval, *The New Way of The World: On Neoliberal Society*, trans. G. Elliot. New York: Verso, 2013, p.10

⁹³ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.63

Although neoliberalism must produce freedom, this production also requires the building of certain constraints, controls, forms of oppression and responsibilities depending on threats, etc.,⁹⁴ if power requires so in order to increase productivity. Therefore, one can still talk about a form of control which allows freedom to increase and which introduces additional freedoms through ironically additional mechanisms of control and intervention.⁹⁵ The second part of this thesis will deal in subtextual form the story of how governmentality works by using freedom as it finds it convenient.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p.64

⁹⁵ Ibid, pp.67-68

B. PRONATALISM AND PROFAMILISM IN TURKISH CONSERVATISM

B.1. Biopower and The Ottomans

“Sexuality exists at the point where body and population meet. And so it is a matter for discipline, but also a matter for regularization.”⁹⁶

In the first chapter, we discussed power forms including sovereignty in which the sovereign has an external and transcendent place in relation to his subjects and give priority to his own security. The same model can certainly be applied to the Ottomans. Nevertheless, even mainstream history books reveal that the modernizing reforms, emerging at the end of 18th and at the beginning of 19th century, can be interpreted as the disciplinary power mechanism’s coming into play. Just like Europe during more or less the same period, disciplinary power mechanisms evolved through military reforms in the Ottoman Empire during the period of Mahmud II. Although some reforms were implemented earlier, with the new disciplinary mechanism focused especially on military, the modernization period took a strong turn by including reforms in education, administration, schools, city planning, architecture, etc.⁹⁷

The peak point of disciplinary model was, however, the Republican Period for

⁹⁶ M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. D. Macey. New York: Picador, 2003, pp.251-52

⁹⁷ F. Keskin, “Hükümlerlikten Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm”, *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. Istanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.77

Turkey. Such is the example of “*Talim ve Terbiye*,” which directly refers to the nation’s system of education and which literally means “*Training and Taming*” and shows the appetite of the New Turkish Republic for disciplinary mechanisms. By making bodies docile through the institution of “*Talim ve Terbiye*” disciplinary modernity was well adopted by the state.⁹⁸

According to Foucault, sexuality stands at the point of convergence of *anatomo-politics* and *bio-politics*. Sexuality exists at the intersection of *disciplinary* practices for the body on the one hand and practices of *regulation* for the population on the other. Because of this function, sexuality was a political apparatus that made of society a mechanism of production in the 19th century. The first part of this chapter will cover how discipline was adopted in Turkish modernity especially through women’s bodies due to their *fertility*. As we discussed in the first chapter, power needs apparatuses that make its application possible. Bio-power used women’s bodies as apparatuses, and this process eased the operation of making people docile and subject to discipline. Through pro-natalist politics, discipline was “taught” and applied to Ottoman women who, unlike men, were largely beyond the scope of military, administrative or formal education. In what follows, we will try to follow the traces of the procedures and processes of discipline applied to women’s bodies through historical publications, which are not only formal books, but also interpretations of primary literature involving handbooks and legal codes.

B.1.1. Introduction of Disciplinary Power into The Ottoman Society

⁹⁸ F. Keskin, “Hükümlerlikten Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm”, *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.77

If we want to dig into the roots of contemporary conservative understanding of pro-familism, we need to evaluate pro-natalism in the late Ottoman era, which certainly was introduced into the society with the help of discipline. And if we want to talk about discipline entering the Ottoman Society, we cannot avoid putting Mahmud II to the top of the list. Known for his revolutionary moves especially in the Ottoman Army, Navy and the Administrative System, Mahmud II was also the progenitor of many reforms related to social life known under the headline of “Tanzimat.” Since he was literally the father of the sultan who introduced Tanzimat, Abdülmecit, many historians consider Mahmud II’s revolutionary establishment of the modern army as the kick start of the reforms all over the Empire. In other words, in the last decade of the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1876) Ottoman reforms were started, and this laid the basis for what followed. The Tanzimat period was the time during which his work was carried further under the reigns of his two sons.⁹⁹

Sultan Mahmud II began to develop a program that he had a chance to implement only in the remaining 6 years of his reign. However, this rather short period provided the backbone of the Tanzimat era. The scope of the reforms extended from the military to all other aspects of Ottoman life.¹⁰⁰ He started with charging Janissaries, which was the classic Ottoman army established in the 14th century, with the defeats at big wars. Mahmud II compared Janissaries to the armies of Ottoman Empire’s enemies and enhanced

⁹⁹ S.J. Shaw, E. Kural-Shaw, *History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, Preface vii

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p.35

the new modern army of Egypt, which was ruled by an old Ottoman minister Muhammad Ali. In the end, Mahmud II assembled the chief members of Ruling Class and made them sign a declaration that supports modernization of the military in order to *save the empire*.¹⁰¹ This declaration was followed by the destruction of Janissary corps and of other institutions connected to them, such as the sufi order of “*Bektaşis*”. The whole event was called the *Auspicious Event* (Vaka-i Hayriye, 1826). It certainly was a major moment in Ottoman history, since for the first time an old institution was overthrown in order to make way for a *modern* substitute. Furthermore, abolishing the Janissary corps, which had strong ties to the Ruling Class as a secondary power mechanism, made also impossible to resist with violence against further reforms in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰² Replacing an old institution with a modern one and setting an environment in which the rival thoughts will not rise against reforms, may have made Sultan Mahmud II the father of Ottoman reforms.

Although, ultimately, Ottoman reforms could not be maintained, they brought the empire closer to the contemporary European society.¹⁰³ Mahmud II’s reign produced not only a new perception of the West but also a feeling that the traditional Ottoman ways had to be given up for the sake of the Empire and that this would make the Ottomans stand firm against a technologically developed Europe. The Ottomans could no longer afford disdaining the West,

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.19

¹⁰² Ibid, p.21

¹⁰³ Ibid, Preface viii

and the change penetrated various fields of their lives from wearing western dresses to language, thought, and even entertainment.¹⁰⁴

According to the *father of the reforms*, a modernized military needed not only reforms but also renewed technologies. The Naval Engineering School and the Army Engineering School were enlarged and reinvigorated, and in 1827 the Army Medical School (Tıbhane) was opened.¹⁰⁵ Abolishing Janissaries or founding a new modern army with an elaborate technology is in the scope of this thesis, because it is the turning point at which Turkish ruling mechanisms left sovereign power behind and met the new model of bio-power. Just like what happened simultaneously in Europe, changes in the central government,¹⁰⁶ juristic changes,¹⁰⁷ changes in the taxation system,¹⁰⁸ establishment of a postal system,¹⁰⁹ introduction of identity cards for the entire population,¹¹⁰ creation of the first separate police system in cities,¹¹¹ and of course educational revisions allowing especially a parallel secular education¹¹² (without abolishing the current religious education), etc. were the reasons why Mahmud II is the symbol of Ottoman modernization and discipline. By using surveillance and training and by establishing a new army and new schools, as

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p.49

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p.29

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.36

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p.37

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p.40, 47

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p.40

¹¹⁰ Ibid p.41

¹¹¹ Ibid, p.46

¹¹² Ibid, pp.47-48

Mahmud II did, discipline meant, using a Foucauldian terminology, “*adjusting power mechanisms to the individual body.*”¹¹³ In the first half of the 19th century, Ottomans were following Europe just a foot behind and discipline was the easier and more convenient thing to adopt.¹¹⁴ This was achieved by Sultan Mahmud II and his followers in the limited structure of panoptic institutions such as schools, hospitals, barracks, workshops, and so on.¹¹⁵

B.1.2 Ottoman Pronatalism

Throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman state had lost huge parts of its population predominantly because of territorial reduction and relocation campaigns.¹¹⁶ Despite improved health services, better recovery conditions and slightly increasing birth rates, the population could not protect its growth.¹¹⁷ Intellectuals and chief statesmen held the decrease in population responsible for the weakness of the economy, of the government and of the military in accordance with similar beliefs in most European countries. However, after pro-natalist bureaucrats noticed that they were unsuccessful in managing large scale factors effecting the number of population, they became interested in the female domain of reproduction. Ottoman women received extraordinary

¹¹³ M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. D. Macey. New York: Picador, 2003, p.250

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p.250

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.250

¹¹⁶ K.H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, p.160

¹¹⁷ G. Balsoy, *Admonitions to Pregnant Women: Advice Books for Expectant Mothers and the Medicalization of Pregnancy in Late Nineteenth Century Ottoman Society*, p.1, (Accessed in September 2016)
[h t t p s : / / w w w . a c a d e m i a . e d u / 7 3 9 1 7 4 7 / Admonitions_to_Pregnant_Women_Advice_Books_for_Expectant_Mothers_and_the_Medicalization_of_Pregnancy_in_Late_Nineteenth_Century_Ottoman_Society_G%C3%BCIhan_Bal soy](http://www.academia.edu/7391747/Admonitions_to_Pregnant_Women_Advice_Books_for_Expectant_Mothers_and_the_Medicalization_of_Pregnancy_in_Late_Nineteenth_Century_Ottoman_Society_G%C3%BCIhan_Bal soy)

attention as the bearers of the future population during the course of the century. Therefore, various points of female reproduction including pregnancy, childbirth and abortion became the object of legal, medical, and institutional mechanisms.¹¹⁸

Gülhan Balsoy points out that “*saving the mothers’ and children’s lives and decreasing maternal and infant death rates was not a humanitarian, but a political issue, in the Ottoman Empire,*”¹¹⁹ and this was a process basically established by a set of re-conceptualizations. *Manuals of advice for pregnancy* or medical and institutional developments changing the practices of childbirth including the *abolishment of midwifery* were all parts of a new conceptualization of the pregnant body. The literature of guidance on pregnancy put tough requests on women by ordering them to control and discipline their bodies and feelings. Similarly, these publications assigned agency and responsibility to pregnant bodies,¹²⁰ which of course belonged to society, and pregnancy thus became a national duty.¹²¹

Not only a larger population but also the management of that population including health policies, reduction of infant mortality, prevention of epidemics and endemic diseases etc. were seen to be ways of enhancement especially in early trade based economies. At the end of the 18th century, public hygiene and

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p.2

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.2

¹²⁰ Ibid, p.6

¹²¹ Ibid, pp.3-4

social medicine became essential for states again, and they became a part of the general structure of bio-power.¹²² Following Europe and starting with the reforms of Mahmud II, the Ottoman society took the necessary steps of bio-power like a well-behaved child. *The management of state forces*, as Foucault argues, were achieved without hesitation thanks to the modernization processes. And exactly like European societies, the goal of bio-power in the Ottoman society was to deal with the population as a group of living beings which has both biological and pathological characteristics and which is made docile by particular forms of knowledge and particular techniques.¹²³

B.1.3. Instances of Pronatalism in the Late Ottoman and the Early Republican Turkey

Pronatalist politics were perceived by many as the most essential pillar that would affect the destiny of the whole Ottoman nation. The whole process may be addressed under the headline that may be found in Balsoy's text: "The Politicization of Reproduction in the Ottoman Society."¹²⁴ Thus opening up Midwifery Schools in order to make the profession gain a modern medical perspective and more precisely in order to "survey" midwifery practices was part of a bigger picture of saving the nation through pro-natalist politics.

¹²² M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.424

¹²³ Ibid, p.424

¹²⁴ G. Balsoy, *Admonitions to Pregnant Women: Advice Books for Expectant Mothers and the Medicalization of Pregnancy in Late Nineteenth Century Ottoman Society*, p. 3-4, (Accessed in September 2016).
[h t t p s : / / w w w . a c a d e m i a . e d u / 7 3 9 1 7 4 7 / Admonitions_to_Pregnant_Women_Advice_Books_for_Expectant_Mothers_and_the_Medicalization_of_Pregnancy_in_Late_Nineteenth_Century_Ottoman_Society_G%C3%BCIhan_Bal soy](http://www.academia.edu/7391747/Admonitions_to_Pregnant_Women_Advice_Books_for_Expectant_Mothers_and_the_Medicalization_of_Pregnancy_in_Late_Nineteenth_Century_Ottoman_Society_G%C3%BCIhan_Bal soy)

Prohibition of the abortion, encouraging poor families to have more children by giving financial support or publishing guidebooks prescribing pregnancy were all part of this program that aimed to increase the population, and especially the Muslim population of the Ottoman nation.¹²⁵

B.1.3.1. Procreation Politics in the Late Ottoman and Early Republican Period

In Anatolian territories, after the wars but also in the early republican period, pro-natalist politics were developed as a way to make up for the population deficit especially in the fields of farming, industry and military. In this context, policies aiming to increase birth rates and national health standards need to be analyzed within the framework of pro-natalist politics together with policies aiming to decrease morbidity rates and epidemics.¹²⁶

Ottoman pronatalists held midwives largely responsible for loses of mother or baby during birth, stillbirths, and mutilations during birth. Thus midwifery transformed into a professional field which had to be documented, regulated and surveyed. Before, midwifery was an experience between women only and only gained by experience. It was a field in which a common language between women was established despite different ethnicities, class, cultural or religious

¹²⁵ G. Balsoy, *The Politics of Reproduction in Ottoman Society, 1838-1900*. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013, p.119

¹²⁶ T. Demirci-Yılmaz, “Annelik, Osmanlı ve Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Modernleşmesinde Annelik Kurguları (1840-1950)”, *Cogito*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2015, p.79

differences. In those times, midwives were responsible not only for coaching the birth, but also were the primary supporting advisor of women and babies during pregnancy and after birth. Besides, they were primary consultants in instances where women were wounded or raped, working as an intermediary between society and the state. With the *medicalization of birth* and consequently professionalization of midwifery, this unique position of midwives changed and they became assistants of birth only.¹²⁷

Popular guide books of the late Ottoman period defended the *medicalization of pregnancy* for the health of the society rather than for the health of women as individuals. Because the body of woman did not belong to herself (especially from the moment on she got pregnant), the pregnant woman's body was *loaded* with a national mission and it had to be disciplined. Both *Haml ve Vaz'-ı Haml* (which was translated from French into Ottoman Turkish by the famous writer Halit Ziya, and which expanded upon popular topics such as sexuality and self-care during pregnancy), and *Gebelik ve Gebelikte Tedabir* (translated from French by physician Besim Ömer, with additional advices for pregnant women by the translator) emphasize the importance of discipline over bodies for women.¹²⁸ According to Balsoy's interpretation, late Ottoman population policies are about controlling bodies of women and their sexuality. This is an important example of how state intervenes into the private sphere by making it a subject to politics.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ G. Balsoy, "Geç Osmanlı nüfus ve Kadın Bedeni Politikaları", *Toplum ve Bilim*. n.134, 2015. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.8-9

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, pp.21-23

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p.27

Previously, power was characterized in terms of its right to take life or let people live.¹³⁰ In the age of bio-power, this simple codification of sovereignty radically changed. Not only letting people live became the role of power, but also deciding on what to do with one's body in terms of procreation became part of politics.

Hence a considerable part of Ottoman pronatalism was the campaign against abortion. According to a significant number of bureaucrats of the period, one of the main reasons of population decrease was the prevalence of abortion. At the early stage of this debate and until the end of the 1850's, the moral and religious aspect of abortion was the outstanding theme. The moral and religious discourse maintained that abortion was the act performed by *corrupted women* who refused to give birth and raise a child. However, after it was noticed that this discourse was not as effective as expected, the issue was brought to the economic level. According to the economic discourse, financial insufficiencies made people apply such techniques to have less children in the family. Therefore, they needed to be financially supported.¹³¹ It is crucial to note that, until the codes of the Tanzimat period, abortion was perceived as a daily practice that could be applied in certain cases such as life-threatening

¹³⁰ M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction*, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 136

¹³¹ G. Balsoy, *The Politics of Reproduction in Ottoman Society, 1838-1900*. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013, p.121

dangers.¹³² With the norms created by pro-natalist discourse, however, religious law was recoded and served for the good of the system. In other words, as norms determined laws when needed by bio-power.

Codes forbidding abortion can be perceived as the first serious criticism against practices of Ottoman motherhood. A set of bylaws about motherhood were issued step by step between 1786-1904, and an attitude against abortion was established at the level of state. According to these bylaws, it was legitimate for the state to accuse women of being “devoid of womanhood and of the nature of motherhood” in case of their decision to have an abortion. Moreover, according to Ottoman highbrows, decisions of abortion meant “endangering the future of the state and the nation,” even though these decisions literally concerned women’s own bodies.¹³³ In the Ottoman society a woman was respected and valued according to the number of children she had born. Therefore, a woman who did not have the chance to be a mother and actualize her “ultimate functionality”, was seen as a “half” woman.¹³⁴

It’s not hard to guess that in many patriarchic cultures at that period women were seen as “baby makers.” As it was the case in many countries including European ones in the late 19th century, women’s liberty was an instrumental issue in the Ottoman modernity and it was only desired as long as it was related

¹³² According to Hanefi sect (which is a more flexible interpretation of Islam and was widely embraced in Ottoman society), abortion can be accepted within 120 days after the conception. Moreover, abortion was allowed in case of the mother has any issues related to her health (including breastfeeding an other baby and not being financially sufficient enough to hire a wetnurse. D.L. Bowen, “Abortion, Islam and the 1994 Cairo Population Conference”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.161-184; and also T. Demirci, S.A. Somel, “Women’s Bodies, Demography, and Public Health: Abortion Policy and Perspectives in the Ottoman Empire of the Nineteenth Century”, *Journal of the History of Sexuality*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008, pp.377-420.

¹³³ T. Demirci-Yılmaz, “Annelik, Osmanlı ve Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Modernleşmesinde Annelik Kurguları (1840-1950)”, *Cogito*, n.81, 2015. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p.70

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, p.69

to motherhood. Rather than questions such as equal rights with men, the problems related to women concerned the transformation of the role of motherhood. For this very reason, Ottoman women were conceptualized as citizens who had duties but not liberalized.¹³⁵

Pronatalist politics continued after the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. In the early republican period, restrictions against abortion (in 1926, 1930 and 1936) gradually increased. With a total prohibition, abortion as a practice became a crime that faced severe penalty under a policy aiming at the maintenance and increase of the population. After all, abortion was a “*crime against society*.” On the other hand, women who gave birth to six or more children were awarded a gold medal and the healthcare of newborn babies became part of state responsibility.¹³⁶

In addition to modern practices added to the daily care of women such as medicalization of pregnancy, any regulation that would increase the growth of population after war was taken to be legitimate within the codes of the new republic. With the code passed in 1938, the legal age limit for marriage amongst women became 15, which previously was 17, in order to promote early marriages and consequent early motherhoods. Early motherhoods were encouraged since it meant more fertile ages during marriage and, consequently, more children. Thanks to local customs affirming early marriage, the state tried to take advantage of women’s fertility.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Ibid, p.77

¹³⁶ Ibid, p.81

¹³⁷ Ibid, p.82

However, policies aiming to increase the population had contradictory outcomes in the late Ottoman and in the early Republican Turkey. While the informed, well-educated model of motherhood was the goal, decreasing the age limit for marriage gave counter results. Because of this limit, women got married in younger ages, had less chance to have higher education and had more children to raise. The number had increased indeed, but the expected mother profile was not achieved.¹³⁸ Intellectual deficiency was somehow accepted for the sake of number of children to be born. But anatomo-politics could not compensate for the bodily quality of the baby-carrier mothers. Hence one of the interesting facts about early republican period was that women's health, since they all were candidates of being mothers, was fetishized and encouragement of women into sports became a national issue. Sports which support a better built of feminine curves were emphasized.¹³⁹

Eventually, with the end of two world war, the pro-natalist politics, which was inherited from late Ottoman period to the early Republic, was reconsidered because of the extended increase of the population. This time, anti-natalist policies against unplanned births and population increase have been applied in the name of a new disciplinary understanding. In this context, between 1965-83, prohibition of abortion was moderately applied because of the new perspective of the state over the population and women's movement.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Ibid, p.82

¹³⁹ Ibid, p.84

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.90.

B.2. Biopower and Contemporary Turkey

“There is no such thing as society. There is living tapestry of men and women and people and the beauty of that tapestry and the quality of our lives will depend upon how much each of us is prepared to take responsibility for ourselves and each of us prepared to turn round and help by our own efforts those who are unfortunate.”¹⁴¹

The Industrial revolution changed not only economic dynamics but also other dimensions of the private sphere including the *family* and its relationships. As we have discussed in the first chapter, the agent of bio-power, which also is an effect of bio-power, is the *population*. As soon as the population was problematized in response to the changes brought about by the industrial revolution, governmentality became a need. *Oikonomos*, or economy, which used to be a practice dealing with the family and its administration, took a step forward and became part of state management. Thus a new field of knowledge, which is called “economy-politics” (or “political economy”), emerged given that to govern the state needed to measure and regulate the activities of the population.¹⁴²

The second part of this chapter will briefly cover the contemporary model of bio-power applied to women’s bodies in Turkey. Although the idea of governmentality was subtly penetrating into the Ottoman State in 19th century with the doctrine of liberalism, it was interrupted by disciplinary power

¹⁴¹ <http://www.margarethatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689> (Accessed in September 2016)

¹⁴² F. Keskin, “Hükümranlıktan Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm”, *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.75

mechanisms¹⁴³ again and again.¹⁴⁴ However, since the 1980's and especially after 2002, governmentality and bio-politics secured their position thanks to continuous neoliberal politics. Neoliberalism became the main pillar of Turkish politics with the Özal era in the 1980's, and after a short pause it became even stronger with AKP governments. At the macro level AKP policies go totally by the book of neoliberalism and rule the state according to neoliberal dynamics, while at the micro level AKP seeks to govern Turkish people according to the normativity of a *neoliberal conservatism* that goes pretty well with the history of their political ideology.¹⁴⁵

B.2.1. Neoliberal Profamilism: The Rise of The Population and The Fall of The Family

For the pre-modern era and for early modernity, family was a necessary structure that produced and prepared bodies in the service of power. It created bodies to “sacrifice,” we may say, in the name of the sovereign, and it produced individuals who were nurtured in the name of a disciplinary society. However, the contemporary philosophy of production begs for more, and bio-politics is concerned with the *population* rather than a community of well-disciplined individuals. The notion of family lost its priority after it was understood that population cannot be reduced to the cellular structure of the

¹⁴³ Here we talk about military coups which were succeeded in making the country turn back to disciplinary rule, except the recent coup attempt of July 15, 2016.

¹⁴⁴ F. Keskin, “Hükümlerlikten Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm”, *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.78

¹⁴⁵ F. Keskin, “Hükümlerlikten Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm”, *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.78

family. In other words, family became an internal element of the population rather than its creator. But, although it has lost its priority over population, family continues to preserve its importance in being a reference point mirroring the population. Especially on issues like sexual conduct, demography, consumption etc. family still acts like a sequence to the population. In other words, family preserves its privilege according to its relevance to the population and as its reflection. Behind many campaigns such as those directed at decreasing the rates of morbidity, encouraging marriage or vaccination, the notion of family plays a major role as a means to enhance the population. Thanks to the family, it is easier to monitor and hold statistics of the population.¹⁴⁶

One can see that population is important for modern governments at the macro level but it needs to be shown that it is also important at the micro level. Here we need to add bio-politics into the game and ask again: How will bio-politics play its part as the regulatory mechanism in order to spread at the social level? Or how will bio-politics encourage the population growth? At the macro level, bio politics needs a tool which is compatible with almost every social class, at every socio-economic level or with every ethnicity in society. This tool is the old-school *family*. In bio-politics, family appears to be a component of the population and as a basic program in its government. In addition to its legitimacy at every level of society, only the model of family allows the art of government to act as expected. It can easily penetrate lives of the bodies which

¹⁴⁶ M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.141

constitute the population.¹⁴⁷ In juridical states, the state used to materialize, regulate and confirm law for citizens' advantage. So it's not new that states were concerned with the benefits that subjects gain or lose. However, according to Foucault, modern states direct their concern to the advantage of the population, not towards individuals. This concern with the population is represented by economy-politics, a new model of knowledge. At this point, the notion of family comes into prominence, because family establishes a place where the body is both physically and morally produced and where the population is formed as a unique entity.

When we turn back to our main concern, the notion of an obviously conservative and patriarchic family was inevitable for Turkish political thought. Pro-familism has always been one of the basic characteristics of Turkish politics. Although since 1980's there has been a more equalitarian perspective adopted about the participation of women into the political and economic life, popular political parties in general have pursued a policy defending the traditional mode of family and sexual division of labor. In this regard, we can say that compared to the party programs of central-right parties (like ANAP) of post-1980's, AKP is more comprehensive in women-related perspectives in its party program. However, these comprehensiveness is unfortunately devoted to emphasizing the role of women within the traditional mode of family rather than encouraging an egalitarian perspective. In its party program prepared for the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, AKP emphasized the importance of a family model that is shaped by an ideological

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 141

normativity. Unsurprisingly, this normativity implies the identification of women within the context of motherhood only and her reduction into the capacity of reproduction.¹⁴⁸

There are two important factors that lie behind the rise of pro-familism in Turkey. First, the ruling party, which identifies itself as conservative democrat and which claims to embrace the entire society, is actually prone to the ideologies of neo-ottomanism, islamism and nationalism. Secondly and most importantly, the notion of family is perfectly compatible with the 21st century neoliberal dynamics.¹⁴⁹ The uniqueness of pro-familist politics of the current regime lies in the fact that it is a partnership of Turkish islamist conservatism with neoliberal governmentality. Courses for marriage, centers of family consultancy, parent schools, financial support for low-income families to get IVF treatments, conditional (only for women who lost their spouses) financial support for needy women etc. may all be seen to be non-discursive practices, i.e. apparatuses of the neoliberal conservative patriarchy in Turkey.¹⁵⁰ Pro-familism as an ideology does not only mean putting norms on marriage, maternal ethics, gender apartheid or particular kinds of productive behavior, but it also involves the legitimization of specific political frameworks. In other words, pro-familism embraces both practical dynamics and processes of

¹⁴⁸ E. Öztan, "Türkiye'de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi", *Toplum ve Bilim*. n. 130, 2014. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014, pp.180-81

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.181

¹⁵⁰ E. Öztan, "Türkiye'de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi", *Toplum ve Bilim*. n. 130, 2014. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014, pp.186-87

intervention by religious, conservative, ethical, national, modern norms intertwined with neoliberal rationality.¹⁵¹

B.2.2. Production and Abolition in The Family

As Foucault noted in one of the courses he gave in College de France, the change in the dynamics of power “*revolves around population, and consequently around the birth of political economy.*”¹⁵² Words like “birth” and “population” brings us to the topic of the physiological birth of a baby literally. It is not surprising that in the neoliberal political atmosphere in Turkey, both producing and abolishing bodies are considered to be essential to the future of the nation.

It is significant that IVF processes came under the social insurance during a conservative party rule which centers its ideology around the notion of family. The call to women saying “*Bring forth at least 3 children*” by the founder of the party and the current President Erdogan already became a catchword for the pro-familist discourse. The inclusion of IVF processes in the scope of national health insurance system increased the access of low-income families to these technologies and the process gained momentum seriously.¹⁵³ Although it is limited to married couples, middle and low-income families benefit from this service funded by the government. It is noteworthy that by restricting the

¹⁵¹ E. Öztan, “Türkiye’de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi”, *Toplum ve Bilim*. n. 130, 2014. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014, p.177

¹⁵² M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.142

¹⁵³ C. Özbay, A. Terzioğlu, Y. Yasin, *Neoliberalizm ve Mahremiyet: Türkiye’de Beden, Sağlık ve Cinsellik*. Ankara: Metis Yayınları, 2011 p.83

service to married couples only and by funding it, two goals are simultaneously achieved by the government: First, no additional donor is allowed so that reproduction securely stays within the family. Secondly, thanks to IVF, the traditional conservative pro-natalist mind which goes on well with the neoliberal mind gets satisfied.¹⁵⁴ As we have already discussed in the first chapter, increasing the population at all costs is inevitable for neoliberalism. Therefore, in vitro fertilization methods (IVF), which are open to discussion for Muslim scholars in many countries, is not brought into question despite the conservative mind setting of the government, because “*techniques of normalization can develop from or below the law, either by being a foundation of law or by being against it,*”¹⁵⁵ and legitimizing IVF processes in the eye of a conservative populations may not be as hard as it seems for governmentality.

On the other hand, debates on abortion became one of the most outstanding themes on women’s bodies and reproduction rights during AKP governments. The act of ending the pregnancy on purpose, which is principally unacceptable for current conservative discourse, became such a debate sparking issue in the entire country that the PM Erdogan said: “There is no difference in killing the fetus in a mother’s womb or killing a person after birth.”¹⁵⁶ Although the intensity of criticisms made the government step back about new restrictions on the abortion law, gradual changes have come about anyway. Regulations pushing women to requestion their decision about abortion, the right to

¹⁵⁴ E. Öztan, “Türkiye’de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi”, *Toplum ve Bilim*. n.130, 2014. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014, p.185

¹⁵⁵ Please see p.8 of this assignment.

¹⁵⁶ http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/world/europe/turkish-premier-calls-for-more-abortion-restrictions.html?_r=0 (Accessed in September 2016)

conscientious objection and refusal to perform abortion for gynecologists,¹⁵⁷ the increase in penalties for illegal abortions are all indications that bio-power may achieve its goal by using legal mechanisms when needed.¹⁵⁸ However, what makes this case interesting is not the sanctions that followed PM's words. Creating a normativity based on neoliberal conservative ideology, PM Erdogan presented a *persona non-grata* whom he held to be committing the crime of homicide. As we have discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, calling for actions based on a certain normativity makes people give up certain sets of actions even when they are not legally banned.¹⁵⁹ So if the person foresees that certain forms of action may cause sanctions like confinement or isolation, the person would at least try to avoid performing them. In other words, one would voluntarily restrict one's field of possible actions in order to avoid such sanctions. Thus even when abortion is not legally banned, the *persona non-grata* who is involved within this atmosphere voluntarily holds back from the act. What is more striking is that one can even be convinced that a certain kind of action is actually undesirable, which would lead to the situation in which one may behave appropriately according to the public norms and even defend the sanctions against abortion although one can legally do otherwise.¹⁶⁰

B.2.3. Identity and Profamilism

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/04/istanbul-hospitals-refuse-abortion-gov-attitude> (Accessed in September 2016)

¹⁵⁸ E. Öztan, "Türkiye'de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi", *Toplum ve Bilim*. n.130, 2014. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014, p.185

¹⁵⁹ Please see page 19-21 of this assignment.

¹⁶⁰ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), pp.11-12

Pro-familism differs from pro-natalist politics since the latter has no capability to deal with identity or individuality while the former encourages people to procreate at all costs. As Foucault argues, bio-power is a “form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life, categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and that others have to recognize in him.”¹⁶¹

Here Foucault highlights how bio-politics deals on an everyday basis with bodies that constitute the population. Bodies, which used to be subject to anatomo-politics of the disciplinary society, are now just pieces of a population. Metaphorically, this equation can be applied to the relationship between *pro-natalism* and *pro-familism*. In pro-natalist politics, which also was part of the disciplinary society and in which anatomo-politics was the model of power, the identity of the individual was not a question. Pro-natalist politics deals with the individual and its docility only without interrogating its inner dynamics. Obeying laws and giving birth to more children, performing sports in order to preserve a healthy body, being examined during their pregnancy, etc. were what was expected from individuals by the Ottoman pro-natalist politics. As long as the individual physically obeyed what bio-power asked for, pro-natalist politics was satisfied. However, when it comes to *pro-familism* and bio-politics expectations are directed towards bodies seen to be constitutive of the population and not to individuals any more. Bodies, which are asked to give up their identities, are bound to *games of truth* and to the norms

¹⁶¹ M. Foucault, “Subject and Power,” in H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982, p.212

established by (and which also establish) power. Bodies are *regulated* through the pro-familist discourse and gain a “so called” privilege of “*laissez-faire*,” because they are capable of adopting an identity constituted by governmentality only if they are free to circulate in the system of bio-power.¹⁶² Thus bodies that constitute the population are self-willingly involved in a system of governmentality by being directed towards a *field of possible actions* before them.¹⁶³ In case of governmentality, people are guided through a regulation of things rather than being enforced to obey laws. Tactics that can make people incline towards things are more effective than law, and, moreover, even laws can serve as tactics. Tools of governmentality are, in the end, not laws but tactics.¹⁶⁴

Regulating hours people can buy alcohol but not banning it totally, encouraging people to bear this many children but not making it obligatory, creating a *persona grata* model of motherhood which chooses children over her career but not making this model mandatory etc. are all examples of “*laissez-faire*”¹⁶⁵ philosophy of the pro-familist discourse within bio-politics. All these tactics make body gain a secondary identity constituted by power, and in the end a certain experience is adopted by the person as her/his own experience.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² F. Keskin, “Hükümlerliktan Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm”, *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.74

¹⁶³ F. Keskin, “Hükümlerliktan Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm”, *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.75

¹⁶⁴ M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar I*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2000, p.273

¹⁶⁵ F. Keskin, “Hükümlerliktan Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm”, *Felsefelogos*, n.63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.74

¹⁶⁶ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), p.56

The scope of this thesis would not be sufficient to analyze every case that the pro-familist discourse may have affected. Above, we've tried to name some basic claims made by governmental authorities in order to *direct* people to behave in a certain kind of way. Drastic changes due to these pro-familist tactics will probably appear in the long run. However, I would like to end this section with a recent study made on population statistics. Studies show that fertility rates in Turkey decreased almost fifty percent in the last 30 years. Put another way, women on average were giving 4,33 births in 1970's, but this rate is reduced to 2,16 in 2000's.¹⁶⁷ However, in the last 5 years this number has increased by 0,1 countrywide and the average birth rate for women became 2,23. Hence it seems it is not a coincidence that the new prevailing discourse on encouraging women to give more birth, i.e. the "Bring forth at least 3 children" principle contributed to the increasing birth rates.¹⁶⁸ Thus neoliberalism in Turkey achieves its goals via tactics which make people adopt the subject position of certain kinds of experience and voluntarily disdain other kinds of subjectivity.

¹⁶⁷ TNSA, 2008 Turkish Population and Health Research by Hacettepe University, 2008. (Accessed in September 2016) <http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/TNSA2008-AnaRapor.pdf>

¹⁶⁸ E. Öztan, "Türkiye'de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi", *Toplum ve Bilim*. n. 130, 2014. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014, p.179

CONCLUSION

To come to a final point appears to be impossible while much is still going on that would fall into the scope of this thesis. The neoliberal mind sweeps economic, political and social life in Turkey as well as in the rest of the world despite its irremediable consequences. Bio-politics intervenes in daily lives and behavior of bodies through economic practices. One of the main outcomes of these interventions is certainly the politics of population. Generally speaking, a crowded and young population is an inevitable driving force for mechanisms like production and consumption which are basic for capitalist economy. Thanks to the *homo economicus* that constitutes the crowded and young population flexible in relation to capitalist demands, production increases while costs decrease, which lead to more consumption and investment that keep economy alive.

Homo economicus, is not only an individual who consumes but also a participant and an entrepreneur who eventually eases processes of neoliberalism. On the other hand, women always seen as the weakest link of the chain, are widely exposed to the neoliberal mind. The booming of the discourse on motherhood, for instance, is one of the consequences that appear in daily life. While the anti-feminist and conservative discourse on motherhood is becoming widespread even in the western world, a consuming, chic, organic feeding, blog writing version of the “neoliberal mother” is more and more seen in pop culture and in media.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ E. Öztan, “Annelik, Söylem ve Siyaset”, *Cogito*, n.81, 2015. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p.91

The intention behind this study was to lay bare the philosophy under gender politics in Turkey. However, it ended up claiming to unveil the secret equation between two power forms and two population based politics. After discussing in general what bio-power is, my refocus was the on pro-natalist and pro-familist politics in Turkey drawing on conservatism. It also was interesting for me to find disciplinary power (or anatomo-politics) and pro-natalist politics so compatible. But noticing the securely tight bound between bio-politics and pro-familism, in which the latter shows very basic characteristics of bio-politics in the service of neoliberalism, snatched the leading role of this thesis. Thus, I would like to conclude my thesis with highlighting *what is so characteristic of pro-familism that differs from the early pro-natalist discourse*. To underline this point, we need to remember the processes that *homo economicus* undergoes.

The notion of *human capital*, which is explained by Foucault as a tendency, ability or a set of skills belonging to human beings that make them gain income to make a living, plays an essential role for the homo economicus.¹⁷⁰ He particularly stresses that the notion of human capital has an economic meaning which spreads through a wide scope of human actions including leisure activities, “self”-improvement and family relations. Obviously, this is not just a mere outcome of liberalism going deeper into the history of humanity. As I wanted to lay bare through this thesis, *demography* plays a major role in making the notion of “capital” more complex. Knowing that the early disciplinary method of bio-power was enthusiastic about the quantity of human beings in order to meet the demographical needs of the system, the neoliberal

¹⁷⁰ M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp.215-233

mind acts in more complex ways and in terms of expectations on human capital. Raising the quality instead of quantity¹⁷¹ is perceived as an alternative to early pro-natalist politics which was the only way out of the low population problem in Europe after the Second World War. This is basically a step back from what Foucault says about homo economicus, who is not only an individual who consumes but also a participant in the system, an entrepreneur and even an enterprise.¹⁷² An entrepreneur whose qualities are enhanced with neoliberal characteristics – educated, healthy, consuming, self-caring, body-fetishized etc. – is both a participant in and also a client of the *enterprise*. When it comes to the pro-familist discourse that aims to maximize the quantity of homo economicus, qualifications that human factors have need to be regulated within the pro-familist framework in order to satisfy both the neoliberal quality/quantity balance and conservative doctrines.

From the coupling of neoliberal and conservative politics arises pro-familism as a combination of bio-politics and governmentality. The pro-familist perspective which intervenes into the private and daily life by aiming to regulate women's bodies, differs in terms of its scope and philosophy from the early pro-natalist discourse of disciplinary society in Turkey.¹⁷³ The pro-familist discourse, as both an effect and a cause of neoliberalism just like many other aspects of bio-politics, needs the art of government to direct women into

¹⁷¹ Talking about the quality instead of quantity in terms of the population makes humanitarian factors measurable and fertilizable. However, theories of Gary Becker focuses on the negative correlation between fertility and income and claims that the quality of children is a package of capacity which can be enhanced with smart investments including; investments on education, healthcare and nutrition. G. Becker, "An Economic Analysis on Fertility," *Demographic and Economic Changes in Developed Countries*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960, p.209-231.

¹⁷² L. Paltrinieri, "Niteliği Nicelemek: Ekonomi, Demografi ve Eğitim Arasında İnsan Sermayesi", *Felsefelogos*, trans. F. Keskin, n. 63, 2016. İstanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.31-47

¹⁷³ E. Öztan, "Türkiye'de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi", *Toplum ve Bilim*. n. 130, 2014. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014. p.177

special courses of action. At the macro level, neoliberal strategies proceed via economic and political regulations. Sanctions, laws, taxes etc. are all apparatuses used at the macro level to orient people toward certain types of behavior. However, at the micro level, economic and political regulations do not suffice to get into the lives of individuals. Bio-politics needs, therefore, a combination of bio-political processes, i.e. a *problematization* in Foucauldian terms, to intervene into the daily life of the population. And family becomes a good playground for the whole process leading the individual into being voluntarily attached to the system.

As I already have discussed, the constitution of an experience through a problematization starts with a) developing various knowledge fields that are related to a certain type of behavior; continues with b) the establishment of a normative power system which regulates the practice of this behavior; and is completed with c) the individual's relating to himself/herself through the fields of knowledge in (a) and the normative systems in (b).

The combination of these three axes, which is rather complex provides an explanation of how subjective experience and identity are constituted and how they constrain human conduct.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, certain modes of being and forms of action are conceptualized through the knowledge fabricated within these systems, which also means that they are classified as new human experiences. When people believe in these new fabricated truths and, accordingly, consider their modes of being as new forms of experience, they also give consent to being the subjects of these experiences. Thus people act

¹⁷⁴ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), pp.61-62

upon the norms which are imposed by the newly constituted experiences that they are subjected to.¹⁷⁵ By securing the position of the family at the micro level, I think the whole process is crosschecked by creating a small scale environment of normativity. The three axes of problematization are easily repeated and checked within the family and in the nuclear life of the individual the process of problematization is well adopted.

If a certain course of action or mode of being, let's say having an *abortion*, which previously was taken to be a choice, is conceptualized as *corruption* at a certain point of time, if this form of experience is attributed to me, and if I accept these attribution as my subjective experiences, it follows that I do accept the *identity* of being *corrupted*.¹⁷⁶ Thus an experience is built from and around the behavior of individuals by fields of knowledge and normative power systems, i.e. by discursive and non-discursive practices. Once human behavior is conceptualized as subjective experience, and once individuals evaluate their being and action through the dispositives of knowledge and power, they become the subjects of the experience in which they take part.¹⁷⁷ Whenever I accept the conceptualization that having an abortion brings with, I become the subject of a certain experience. If anyone in my family puts the subject of this experience forth, I voluntarily condemn the approach, since I already am the subject of this experience by accepting the relevant conceptualization.

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¹⁷⁵ M. Foucault, *Seçme Yazılar 2*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2000, p.64

¹⁷⁶ F. Keskin, *Bilgi, İktidar, Etik*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, (*preparing for publication*), p.10

¹⁷⁷ M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume 2*, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990, p.4

Finally, I would like to talk about the erratic neoliberal conservative mind that the current government has adopted in the last few years. I have already argued that although the disciplinary and governmental models of power continuously interchanged their roles through military coups in modern Turkish history, and that disciplinary power mechanisms are out of the circuit since 2001. Since then, society has been governed with a neoliberal rationality at the macro level and with a neoliberal/conservative normativity at the micro level. However, neoliberal politics in Turkey recently came across practical and theoretical opposition as in the rest of the world. *Gezi Park Protests* for example, showed an obvious uprising against the kind of subjectivity dictated by the neoliberal conservative normativity.¹⁷⁸ Another crisis in the same year resulted in a massive evacuation of the liberal wing of the government which alone was capable of applying governmentality. The evacuation of this group of people, who previously were heavily staffed in governmental organs, ended up with an administrative crisis at the macro level disclosing how serious the weakness of management was. To face these two crises, the government has since reverted to disciplinary practices and even went so far back as to sovereignty. Impeding the freedom of circulation of information by slowing down the internet under “special” conditions or declaring a state of emergency in order to secure the *life of the sovereign* are two examples of each steps.¹⁷⁹ As I have argued earlier, these models of power do not negate each other but use each

¹⁷⁸ F. Keskin, “Hükümranlıktan Yönetimselliğe Türkiye’de Neoliberalizm,” *Felsefelogos*, n. 63, 2016. Istanbul: FESATODER Yayınları, p.78

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp.79-80

other's techniques when need be.¹⁸⁰ However, in the end, the use of these techniques and their ultimate goals are different. Thus, creating a society of control by using techniques of disciplinary or sovereign power does not have to mean the end of neoliberal conservative mind, since their goals remain consistent. Within this framework, I personally find the pro-familist politics crucial, since its discourse is compatible with all of three forms of power. The politics of preserving the family or raising the qualitative quantity of the population will presumably stay for long until the end of neoliberal governmentality, because thanks to the possibility that pro-familist politics create, it is easy for any form of power to penetrate the identities and daily lives of individuals without using sanctions or laws. Just through creating a *persona grata*, pro-familist discourse is capable to intervene into daily life.

¹⁸⁰ M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.84

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https://www.academia.edu/7391747/Admonitions_to_Pregnant_Women_Advice_Books_for_Expectant_Mothers_and_the_Medicalization_of_Pregnancy_in_Late_Nineteenth_Century_Ottoman_Society_G%C3%BClhan_Balşoy

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