SİNEMA: ZAMAN ESTETİĞİ / CINEMA: AESTHETICS OF TIME

GÜLŞEN DİLEK AKBAŞ
109679006

İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
FELSEFE VE TOPLUMSAL DÜŞÜNCE YÜKSEK LİSANS PROGRAMI

KAAN ATALAY
2012

Sinema: Zaman Estetiği / Cinema: Aesthetics of Time

Gülşen Dilek Akbaş
109679006

Tez Danışmanının Adı Soyadı (İMZASI) : Kaan Atalay
Jüri Üyelerinin Adı Soyadı (İMZASI) : Ferda Keskin
Jüri Üyelerinin Adı Soyadı (İMZASI) : Ömer Albayrak

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih: 08/06/2011

Toplam Sayfa Sayısı: 117

Anahtar Kelimeler (Türkçe)
1) Sinema / Sinematokrafik-imge
2) Zaman / Süre
3) Estetik
4) Henri-Louis Bergson
5) Immanuel Kant

Anahtar Kelimeler (İngilizce)
1) Cinema / Cinematographic-image
2) Time / Duration
3) Aesthetics
4) Henri-Louis Bergson
5) Immanuel Kant

ÖZET:

Bu tez sinemayı estetik bağlamda şu soru ile analiz edecek: Sinema sanatı içinde güzel nasıl yaratılmıştır? Alman filozof Immanuel Kant'ın (1724 – 1804) estetik yargı teorisi bu analizdeki aksiyom olacak. Fakat, Kant'dan bağımsız olarak estetik yargının objenin kaynağıyla direk ilişki içinde olduğunu savunacağım. Bu nedenle sinemanın estetiğini tanımlamak için sinema konusuna, ontolojik açıdan yaklaşacağım. Sinemanın estetiğini anlamak ve güzelin bunun içinde nasıl yaratıldığını keşfetmek için sinemanın kaynağını araştıracağım. Bunu bulmak için de, sinematografik-imge sinema sanatındaki en küçük birim olduğundan ve kaynağın bu en küçük birimde belirgin olacağından, sinematografik-imgenin keşfi ve ontik ilkesi yoluyla sinematografik-imgenin kaynağını araştıracağım. Bu kaynağın zaman olduğu ortaya çıkacak ve insan aklına bağlantısı bakımından zaman kavramını inceleyeceğim. İnceleme sonunda, sinemanın kaynağındaki zaman kavramının Henri-Louis Bergson'un (1859 – 1941) süre kavramı olduğu anlaşılacak. Ardından sinemaya tekrar döneceğim ve sinematografik-imgeyi bir kez daha, doğası ve yapısı bakımından analiz edeceğim. Ayrıca sinematrografik-imge ile sinema arasındaki bağlantıyı farklı sinematik eğilimlerle anlamaya çalışacağım. Bu son bölüme öncülük edecek ve burda sinematik estetiği açıklayacağım. Sonuç olarak da bu tez şunu önerecek, sinemadaki estetik; zaman estetiğidir.

ABSTRACT:

This dissertation will analyze cinema in the context of aesthetics by simply asking the question: How is beautiful created in the work of the art of cinema? German philosopher Immanuel Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment will be the axiom to explore this. However, independently of Kant, I will argue that aesthetic judgment is in direct relation to the origin of the object. Therefore I will follow an ontological approach to the subject of cinema to define its aesthetics. In order to understand its aesthetics and to discover how beautiful is created in it, I will search for the origin of cinema. Since cinematographic-image is the smallest unit of the work of the art of cinema and the origin will be evident in it, through its invention and ontic principle I will investigate the origin of cinematographic-image to find out the origin of cinema. This will expose, as time and I will inquire the concept of time, in regard to its relation to human mind. The kind of time concept that is in the origin of cinema will disclose as Henri-Louis Bergson's concept of duration. Then I will turn back to cinema and analyze cinematographic-image once more through its nature and structure. I will also try to understand the relation of cinematographic-image and cinema through different cinematic impulses. This will lead to the last chapter, where I will elucidate the aesthetics of cinema. As the conclusion this dissertation will propose that the aesthetics in cinema is the aesthetics of time.

CONTENTS

CINEMA: AESTHETICS OF TIME

"Time becomes the very foundation of cinema: as sound is in music, color in painting, character in drama."[1]

Andrey Tarkovsky

[1] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 119

0. INTRODUCTION

"The beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction." [2]
Immanuel Kant

Cinema is the practice of signs and images either on analytic or on aesthetic ground. If one wants to understand what cinema is, questioning what cinema expresses within its context won't help him much. Since cinema appears as an artistic phenomenon, then only understanding aesthetics of cinema can help us to understand what cinema is. Thus, this dissertation analyzes cinema in the context of *aesthetics* by simply asking the following question: How is *beautiful* created in the work of the art of cinema?

Aesthetics is the philosophical inquiry into art and beauty. Such an inquiry tries to disclose how we aesthetically value an object through its *aesthetic properties, aesthetic experiences* and *aesthetic judgments*. In terms of aesthetic properties and aesthetic experiences, both are in connection to aesthetic judgment, because while the former one ascribes aesthetic judgments, the latter one grounds them. On the other hand aesthetic judgment determines the aesthetic value of the object, i.e. defines whether it is beautiful or not. If aesthetic judgment is in the center of aesthetic philosophy, then we should analyze the aesthetics of cinema in terms of aesthetic judgment and find out how *beautiful* is created in cinema.

German philosopher Immanuel Kant's (1724 – 1804) theory of aesthetic judgment will be our axiom to explore the aesthetics of cinema. Kant's aesthetic philosophy investigates the nature of such judgment, regardless of what the image expresses. Therefore, this approach proves to be an effective tool for the analysis of the aesthetics of

[2] Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Bernard, J. H. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005 p. 10

cinema, even though Kant did not—and could not—have in mind the "moving pictures". Kant's definition of beautiful is not related to the judgment that occurs following a cognitive decipher, but rather to an immediate and disinterested affection.

According to Kant, the aesthetic value of an object is far from being attributed to the object itself, instead the object reflects such value as *the free play of imagination*. This internal process is an intuitive and a subjective process. However, the judgment of beauty should be *universally valid.* Such validity does not show that everyone agrees on the same aesthetic judgment, but rather it shows that they *ought to* agree on, i.e. beautiful *ought to* be the same for everyone. In other words, since the non-cognitive judgment of aesthetic beauty through *the free play of imagination* works as affection and upon our feelings, it seems to occur without any rule. On the other hand, this process ends up with a universally valid judgment, which requires that everyone *ought to* see the same beauty. In short, aesthetic judgment occurs without any rule but in a rule governed way. We cannot show proof to our judgment, but intuitively and through our feelings we can justify it. In this sense the judgment can only take itself as the law and the aesthetic value relates to the subject more than anything:

> If pleasure is bound up with the mere apprehension of the form of an object of intuition, without reference to a concept for a definite cognition, then the representation is thereby not referred to the Object, but simply to the subject, and the pleasure can express nothing else than its harmony with the cognitive faculties which come into play in the reflective Judgment, and so far as they are in play; and hence can only express a subjective formal purposiveness of the Object.[3]

This purposiveness rests on the immediate pleasure in the form of the object in the mere reflection upon it, and it is relative to the subject. It means that the object of art can

[3] Ibid., p. 38

only called purposive, when its representation is immediately combined with the feeling of pleasure. That's why beautiful is the purposiveness of the object.

Obtaining this purposiveness and having an aesthetic judgment based upon it means, in the case of cinema, that the work is reflected and related to one's feelings in such a way that the core of cinema is intrinsically revealed, grasped and implemented, in short experienced by him. This core, whatever that makes cinema a unique form of art, and each movie a singular example of the aesthetic effort based on that form, cannot not be a posteriorly attributed property of cinema: it should constitute and contain the essence of cinema—an essence incorporating its origin, that is, the source and point at which cinema comes into existence, including the conditions of possibility for a movie to be conceived as a work of art are determined and satisfied, which in turn gives cinema the order of its being.

In terms of the object of art, the origin of the artistic form is the origin of the object as well. The origin, without any connection to the subject, appears within the art object, but not as a kind of substance, instead as its ontic principle that governs the art object. In a way it is a metaphysical origin. This metaphysical origin is to be sought in the underlying nature and reality of cinema as an art form in such a way as to bring forth the critical element, which enables cinema to exist and convey meaning as a distinct and unique narrative. This purposive manifestation of the origin in the form of the cinematic work of art, one's mere reflection upon it, triggers aesthetic communication between the art object and the subject and gives positive satisfaction. When this happens, the aesthetic value directly represents the origin of it. Then to understand the aesthetics of cinema and to discover how beautiful is created in it, we need to find out its origin.

Therefore we will follow an ontological approach to the subject of cinema to define its aesthetics and find out the ontic principle, the metaphysical origin that governs it. This origin should reside and be evident in its smallest unit, i.e. in the cinematographic-image. Thus, in the first chapter, to discover the origin of cinema, we will try to understand what the cinematographic-image consists of. In order to understand and explain the process in which the cinematographic-image emerges, we need to explain how cinema is made possible and structured by its ontic principle in such a way as to contain, manifest and exhibit its origin. It is because of this, we need to start with the question "how the idea of capturing motion was developed?" and conclude the analysis with an exposition of "what does the ontic principle of that artistic form consist of?"

In the following chapter, the origin of cinema as an art form will be discussed and disclosed as *time*. In the second chapter the concept of time will be examined with regard to its relation to the mind. The elaboration concerning the question whether time is an objective or a subjective phenomenon, will lead to the conclusion that the notion of time inherent to the origin of cinema seems to echo French philosopher Henri-Louis Bergson's (1859 – 1941) concept of *duration*, which is defined as *temporal subjectivity* constituting a metaphysical entity, not an empirical reality.

In the third chapter we will investigate the cinematographic-image itself to see whether the origin, *duration*, manifests itself in the cinematographic-image. Thus, we will try to understand the nature and structure of the cinematographic-image, through which the cinematographic-image offers an immediate perception of the universe: it opens up another point of view, where we can see "in motion". However, this perception differs from our empirical perception in such a manner that we can view not just the

illusion of motion, but also the real-motion. If the origin of the cinematographic-image is *duration,* then real alteration as *duration* in the cinematographic-image should be a metaphysical kind as well. Unlike *the time of a clock*, alterations in *duration* are not quantitative but rather qualitative. Therefore the perception that the cinematographic-image offers as its nature is an alternative to our empirical perception.

With the cinematographic-image we experience time as Bergson's concept of *duration* and its structure also reflects this *temporal subjectivity*. The way the cinematographic-image communicates *time (duration)* to the viewer (the subject) opens up a new subjectivity that arises when the object (the image) and subject become one. Such process occurs as the cycling interpretation of the image by the subject and interpretation of the subject by the image. This process reflects Pierce's triad semiotics but also displays the heterogeneousity of *duration*, which is in the image.

However, this only shows us the relation between real-time/*duration* and the cinematographic-image/ artistic form but it does not necessarily prove any relation between cinema/the work of art and real-time/*duration*. Therefore, in the third chapter we will also question how this *temporal subjectivity* of the cinematographic-image manifests itself in a film, or whether it can do it at all. We will see that it is possible to for a film not to accommodate *temporal subjectivity* as it manifests organizing principle, but these works/cases do not create an alternative perception of time. Juxtaposing images to create the cinematic work of art brings a critical hindrance: the perception of space, which is an empirical one, impedes the communication of the cinematographic image's perception of time as *temporal subjectivity*.

In the last chapter, we will define the cinematic *beautiful* in the way described above and inquire whether such a thing exists within the accepted notions of cinema. Those notions include various ideas of beauty, according which a movie is labeled *beautiful*. Finally it will be argued that *beautiful* in cinema is experienced as the free play of imagination, but only if cinema can reflect the origin of the cinematographic-image. In this case *time* will appear as the apprehension of the object, which is reflected to our feelings and immediately pleases us without any concept or purpose. In cases otherwise, namely, when a film does not reflect the origin of the cinematographic-image, we are not necessarily watching a bad movie or anything *ugly*, however due to other evaluations, the judgment concerning that movie can't be an aesthetic one, but only about its *goodness*: the work can be *good for something else* or *good in itself*. Such works still use the same artistic form and the same practice of signs and images but that does not necessarily mean its aesthetic value is of a cinematic kind, if there is an aesthetic judgment at all.

This dissertation will ultimately emphasizes that the kind of cinema that aims to present *temporal subjectivity* creates *aesthetic judgment.* In this kind of cinema, time (*duration*) appears as its aesthetic value, i.e. the *beautiful*. In the light of these considerations, this dissertation will conclude by proposing that *the aesthetics in cinema is the aesthetics of time*.

0.1. KANT'S CONCEPT OF BEAUTIFUL

According to Kant, the faculty of judgment is the faculty for thinking the particular under the universal, which means that one can reach universal judgment via single incident or an object. Kant argues that judgment stands between the legislation of understanding and the legislation of reasoning. All three appear in the faculty of

knowledge, which is cognitive. In fact, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, understanding, judgment and imagination are Kant's "schematism" of concepts. In the account of Kant, judgments can be either determined or reflective. In the case of "schematism" of concepts, judgment is determined. This role subsumes particulars under concepts or universals, which are already given. If that is the case, then judgment cannot operate as an independent faculty separate from understanding. Kant, in the *Critique of Judgment*, points out that

> If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it is determining. But if only the particular is given, for which the universal has to be found, the judgment is merely reflecting.[4]

Thus, in his third critique, judgment has a more discrete function: the capacity to reflect. Reflective judgments find the universal for a given particular. Thus it only takes itself as law. Such judgments are "*pure*", while determined judgments fail to be pure. In terms of aesthetics, Kant mostly deals with pure judgments, but he also argues that most judgments about art fail to be pure.

Judgments of beauty fail to be pure if they are influenced by the object's sensory or emotional appeal. In this case the beauty would be dependent on the object's existence. In such situations, the object is judged as *beautiful* because it belongs to this or that kind. Kant suggests that all judgments of beauty about fine arts, which are valued through the cultural codes, are judgments of dependent beauty rather than of free beauty. They are impure. According to this, non-representational formative arts such as painting, sculpture or architecture, for which design is essential, and all music without a text, can cause a pure, thus aesthetic judgment. In this sense it is the pure judgment of beauty that gives us *beautiful.*

[4] Ibid., p. 32

In the "Analytic of the Beautiful" with which the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" begins, Kant tries to capture what is distinctive about the judgments of beauty. He starts by citing that judgments on beauty are always based on feelings. But feeling is not something sensational, rather it is the feeling of *pleasure.* Kant also emphasizes that the kind of pleasure we gain as the result of encountering an art object should be *disinterested*. If the pleasure is bound up with interest, then it happens depending on the existence or non-existence of the object. Such satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the existence of an object occurs in the faculty of desire, which is a cognitive faculty.

If the judgment is bound up with interest, then the judgment would be agreeable, either as good or pleasant. Agreeable judgments are the kind of judgments, which are expressed by simply stating that one likes something or finds it pleasing, thus gratifying us. Judgments on the agreeable, such as pleasant, please our senses in sensation. It's the sensation of the object that happens in relation to its existence, thus it is objective because sense is something we understand through cognitive faculties (lovely, enjoyable, etc.). If the judgment were based on objective sensation such as the color of the object, this would be a cognitive judgment. This judgment would solely be based on the empirical perception of the object, e.g. the object is blue. *Good* on the other hand, can be something good in itself or good for something else. A judgment like *good* is about the moral goodness of something and about its goodness for particular non-moral ends.

In the case of *beautiful,* judgment occurs differently, which is a *pure aesthetic judgment*. Such judgment is bound up with disinterested pleasure. Unlike interested pleasure, it does not depend on the subject having a desire for the object, nor does it generate any desire. This character of *disinterestedness* distinguishes the aesthetic

judgment from other judgments, because it is solely based on feelings. The pleasure arises as a result of disinterested and immediate satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the object's representation to our feelings, thus as a pure judgment.

Within Kant's aesthetic theory, such character also relates to the unintentional quality of *purposiveness.* Kant says that beauty is the form of *purposiveness,* which means that the object does not intend to have any purpose but unintentionally reflects an end. As we can see, the judgments on good or pleasant presuppose an end or purpose, which the object has to satisfy. An end is "the object of a concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object."[5] This means it has a purpose and it is the real ground of its possibility. *Purposiveness*, on the other hand, is "the causality of a *concept* in respect of its *Object*"[6] and it is contingent. Thus the quality of *purposiveness* demands disinterested relation with the object.

Disinterested judgment that determines *beautiful* is a pure aesthetic judgment and it is related to the faculty of *taste*. Taste is the faculty of judgment on the object of representation by satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The judgment of taste, which we use to decide whether the object is beautiful, should be pure, not empirical, because empirical judgments rely on cognitive faculties. It is, of course, inescapable that in order to grasp what beautiful is, the object should be in time and space within an empirical perception, but the judgment should be intuitive. We understand the satisfaction or dissatisfaction but we do not reason with it. Therefore the judgment of taste only occurs in the relation of the object to its representation through the feeling of pleasure or pain. It is not based on an objective sensation or any kind of goodness. That kind of judgment cannot be

[5] Ibid., p. 19
[6] Ibid., p. 19

determined, because there is no cognitive understanding of the object. In the end judgment of taste is mere intuition and reflection, and not an empirical judgment, thus it is subjective.

If the judgment of taste is of an aesthetical kind, and is not cognitive, then the subject's relation to the object cannot be defined with an analytic approach. If it is an intuitive phenomenon, the communication between the subject and the object should not happen as a result of a decision but rather as an immediate, pure affection. However, this subjective immediacy *ought to* be a universal judgment as well because the judgment on art is of a reflective kind: particular to universal. The universality of an aesthetic judgment does not mean that it is a judgment on generalities, because universal validity is different than taking a singular judgment and building a cognitive judgment upon it. For example, 'The rose is pleasant' is a sensual judgment and 'Roses are good' is a practical judgment. However, if you say 'The rose is beautiful' then that is an aesthetic judgment. On the other hand if you say 'Roses are beautiful', that is a cognitive judgment, since I come to that conclusion by taking the knowledge of an aesthetic judgment as a ground for the roses.

If you come to a conclusion by taking anything as an example, that would be general and cognitive, since it relies on the existence of the object. It has nothing to do with the feeling of it, whereas aesthetic judgment has to be singular, subjectively universal and immediate. Generalizing from singular judgment is similar to *exemplary validity* and *ideal. Ideal* means that the representation is adequate to the idea. *Exemplary validity* is the ideal norm, which can turn into a rule for everyone. If you come to a conclusion by taking anything as an example that is general and cognitive as well.

There are also no rules as universals by which someone can be compelled to judge that something is beautiful or prove the judgment on beauty. The reason for that is because universality with regard to aesthetic judgments is not something that is cognitively achieved or put in order. The universality of an aesthetic judgment is not based on concepts but rather appears as an automatic reflection. Such universality happens in a way that everyone ought to agree on the same aesthetic judgment, without any interest, as the immediate reflection. Namely, it does not drive from any kind of sumption; rather it occurs as affection and via feelings, purposively. If this is the case we cannot lay out a map to reach that judgment. We cannot define the process or reason with it. Without any definite rule the judgment takes place but also there is something universal about aesthetic judgment, which requires a kind of law. The law of such judgment happens to be the *lawfulness without a law,* because the judgment can only take itself as the law. Which means that aesthetic judgment occurs without any rule but in a rule governed way. This is related to the process of aesthetic judgment, i.e. *the free play of imagination.*

Kant describes *beautiful* as *the free play of imagination*, which happens within our faculties without any distinct order. This *free play of imagination* is about adapting the application of concepts to the objects, which are presented to our senses without any particular concept being applied. According to Kant, concepts correspond to rules due to our imagination, which synthesizes or organizes the data of sense perception. Therefore imagination functions without being governed by any rule or a law in particular but in a rule-governed way.[7]

Kant's depiction of the judgment of beauty as something "subjectively grounded" is

[7] Kant, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-aesthetics/

objected and challenged that these judgments are actually nonetheless objective in the same sense that judgments on secondary properties of an object such as its color or shape are objective. According to this argument, the free play is no more than a manifestation of the object's empirical perception. In fact, if we say that everyone ought to share the same perception of an object in regard to its secondary properties, then we must also say that everyone ought to share the same perception of the object in which our faculties are in free play cognitively. Thus, the judgment becomes objective and cognitive. However, Kant's theory of aesthetics finds *beautiful* through disinterested and immediate relation of the subject with the object of the judgment:

> In order to distinguish whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the representation not by the Understanding to the Object for cognition, but by the Imagination to the subject.[8]

This imagination is in free play and it is the subjectivity of the judgment. Thus the concept of beauty is subjective, not in a way that the subject's senses are affected, but rather how the subject can discover the object's beauty and relate to it through the free play of imagination. In this sense Kant's *Aesthetic Judgment* can only be possible not by revolving around the object to understand it analytically, but rather by going into the object intuitively.

If we consider Kant's aesthetic philosophy, the most common notion of an aesthetic judgment is beauty. As opposed to it there is no definition of *ugly,* furthermore he does not mention whether we can have an aesthetic judgment of *ugly*. According to Kant's understanding of the term, aesthetic judgment only functions with pleasure. Therefore, he discusses *beautiful* in distinction to another aesthetic judgment, *sublime*. *Sublime* is the negative pleasure due to the greatness of the object. While *sublime* appears in art as

[8] Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Bernard, J. H. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005 p. 3

infinite and beyond concepts, which we are overwhelmed by, either by size or by force of fear, *beautiful* appears through the free play of imagination and as the positive pleasure. However, in the end *beautiful* and *sublime* are aesthetic judgments and what is not beautiful is not equal to *sublime*. In fact, we either have the aesthetic judgment or not.

Opposed to the judgment on *beautiful,* Kant's aesthetic theory offers the judgment on *agreeable.* This cognitive judgment can be on moral ends, as in good in itself or good for something. Or it can also be on pleasant in accordance with our interest. Therefore in Kant's aesthetic theory, opposed to an *aesthetic judgment,* either in the case of *beautiful* or *sublime,* there is a *cognitive judgment.* Kant's theory of beautiful "carves off aesthetic reflection from our mundane, pragmatic concerns, and shows why it is that a judgment of taste seems unable to be true or false"[9]. According to Kant, art is a unique and automatic reflection, which transmits as judgment.

His theory defines *beautiful* as the reflection of the representation of an object to our feelings through the free play of imagination, which pleases us immediately without any concept or purpose. This process of imagination is the happening of *beautiful*, and due to its universality everyone ought to agree on the same aesthetic judgment of an object and share one's pleasure in it. Kant himself does not argue on the existence of any relation between aesthetic judgment and the origin of the object, but purposiveness of the judgment refers to that kind of relation. As the causality of a concept in respect of its object, purposiveness rests on the immediate pleasure in the form of the object in the mere reflection upon it. The art object can be called as purposive, if only the representation of it can immediately combine with the feeling of pleasure. To achieve such purposive object and have an aesthetic judgment via it, the reflection of the object to

[9] Ibid., p. xiii

our feelings must relate to it without any interest. This disinterested relation to the object can only happen with something that governs the object's way to be, and not with something that is a substantive property of the object. The origin does not mean the material or immaterial substance that conditions its being, but rather it is a metaphysical origin, which is to be sought in the underlying nature and reality of the object. This shows us that the object, in order to be *beautiful*, should reflect its origin to the subject through undetermined, automatic ways, through its nature.

0.2. WHERE DO WE LOOK FOR BEAUTY IN CINEMA?

From the above exposition of Kant's aesthetic theory, it can be deduced that discovering what constitutes beauty in cinema-as-a-form-of art involves, in the first place, finding out what it is that pleases us immediately without any concept or purpose in cinema-as-a-work-of-art. In order to do that we need to investigate cinema in terms of its material(s) and form(s) peculiar to its nature, which hopefully will reveal cinema's aesthetic value. Each field of art has its own specific kind of material and form, which, on their own terms, define the aesthetic value and concept of beauty unique to that field. In terms of image-based aesthetics, the basic artistic object comprising both the material and the form consist in the static, framed image and within the image the aesthetic value is revealed. For example, in photography the artistic form reveals the composition of light. It is true to say that colors and lines are also important, but again it is the light that communicates them in a photograph. The light draws the limits for them. Painting, on the other hand, it is the composition of color that creates the image and gives its aesthetic value. Arts such as music, which do not involve the articulation of an image, also have their own artistic form. Musical aesthetics is developed upon the dimensions of rhythmic

and harmonic organization, which reveals the artistic form as a simple composition. What is the specific artistic form of cinema; does it even have one?

Italian film theorist Ricciotto Canudo (1879–1923) who labeled cinema "the seventh art" refers to cinema as "plastic art in motion"[10]. He believes that cinema is the inevitable end of prior art forms and is the combination of spatial and temporal arts. In fact, it is true that cinema can reflect all forms of art either temporal or spatial. Painting, photography, sculpture, etc. are all considered as spatial arts because they are permanent. On the other hand, there are temporal arts, which last as long as the medium lasts. Performance arts such as, dance, music, song and acting are temporal because they last until the performers stop.

Which category does cinema belong to? The recorded image is permanent on film or in digital material, but it also ends when the tape, film rolls or downloaded data is finished. We can argue that since cinema is the combination of all forms of art, instead of a unique one, it can carry the marks of the aesthetic values of other forms of art. If so, then other artistic forms should justify cinematic beauty. However, if cinema does not have any artistic form or aesthetic value specific to its nature, then it cannot be accepted as the seventh art. If cinema is to be regarded an independent, autonomous form of art, one cannot define cinema solely on the basis of its connections to other forms of art. Cinema calls for its own aesthetic inquiry by its nature.

Then what is cinema's own artistic form that reveals its aesthetic value? If we take the previous chapter into account, in aesthetic judgments, the object reflects its origin as *beautiful*, which is far from being attributed to the object itself. Therefore, in order to find out how the art of cinema gains its aesthetic value, we first need to find the origin of it.

[10] Stam, Robert. Film Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2000. p. 35

The origin should be in its smallest unit, and *beautiful* should be created in that unit. What is that unit in cinema? Is it a frame, a shot or a scene? In physical reality, it is one single static picture, one of the "moving" 24 frames per second. On the other hand, this static shot has no cinematic communication at all. It is not different than any regular photograph and it does not contain movement. Yet still it is part of movement. Since we cannot reach the whole motion with one immobile part we cannot experience cinematic communication with a single frame. Then what is the smallest unit of cinema that can also cinematically communicate?

If the cinematographic-image is not one single frame then it can be a shot, a scene or even the whole movie. The length of the image is not what matters, as long as it contains the origin. Movement is something fundamental for the cinematic practice. This means movement can be the determining element to draw the borders of units, but movement of what? What we see in these units of a movie (shot, scene, etc.) is determined due to the movement of the pictures, but also the camera view as the observer limits what is seen and draws the borders of the cinematographic-image. Film camera's relation to its object is not a simple, plain recording. In a way, film camera does not solely record; it has the possibility of capturing the object's *higher degree of reality*, because it observes the object in such a way that it re-creates its own object from the observed object. In determining the smallest unit of cinema that also contains its aesthetic origin, it is important to realize that the movement of the pictures is continuous throughout the movie but the point of views change, which may possibly define/redefine the units inherent to the work. This means the smallest part of cinema should be delineated primarily on the basis of the movement of the camera, the observer. When the camera starts to look and

ends the look, the borders of the cinematographic-image become determined. If the cinematographic-image is in such borders, then in a single shot the origin can manifest itself.

It is from this image the art of cinema builds itself, which means it is also in and through this image that one witnesses the *beautiful* in cinema. For example photography is the art of still images. Still images reveal *light* as the origin of this spatial art, because their being depends on capturing light. Thus, if *cinema is the art of the cinematographic-image*, then this artistic creation should disclose what the origin of cinema is. The origin becomes the material of the cinematographic-image and through the form it receives in the constitution of the cinematographic-image is also revealed as its aesthetic value.

In conclusion, in order to find the origin of cinema, one needs to investigate the cinematographic-image. This metaphysical origin can be found within the underlying nature and reality of the cinematographic-image. The outer development of the cinematographic-image and its ontic principle are in directly related to this origin. Therefore in the following chapters, after discussing how the idea of capturing motion is developed, the ontic principle of this art form will be elaborated. Then the nature and structure of the cinematographic-image will be examined with regard to its origin. After investigating whether and how the structure of this cinematographic-image can manifest itself in a film, the aesthetic value of cinema and how *beautiful* is created in it will be critically re-evaluated in the final chapter.

1. THE ORIGIN OF CINEMA

"For the first time in the history of the arts, in the history of culture, man found the means to take an impression of time."[11]
Andrey Tarkovsky

If cinema is the art of the cinematographic-image, the search for the origin of cinema can only be possible via the search for the origin of the cinematographic-image. In order to do that, we first need to examine the cinematographic-image in terms of its outer and inner dynamics. The study of its outer dynamics will require the historical analysis of how this image is invented. And the inquiry concerning its inner dynamics will concentrate on the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image, which hopefully will help us explain why people need, love and appreciate cinema, why they were amazed by it from its beginning. This survey, by revealing the essence of the cinematographic-image, will provide an insight into what the origin of cinema is.

1.1. INVENTION OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE

Aristotle (B.C. 384- B.C. 322) seems to have conceived the first glimpse of what will evolve into the cinematographic-image. He noticed that an illuminated image, when passed through a pinhole, projected an upside-down image. Later in the 17th century, a German Jesuit scholar, Athanasius Kircher, developed a device that had a lens on the pinhole and could be used to project an image. He named it *camera obscura*. In Latin "camera" means "chamber/room", "obscura" means "dark", the combination of which means "dark room". The image was projected through the "dark room".

Another primitive image projector developed in the 17th century was known as the *Magic Lantern*. The name was more about the magical effect of the image. In the 18th

[11] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 62

century frightening images were projected using magic lanterns in order to startle the audiences in *Phantasmagoria*, which was a form of theatre. The name *Phantasmagoria* evoked fantasy, as the name implies. In a way, these inventions had the quality of technological magic, but there was still no motion in the image. The desire of man was simply to imitate reality, or intervene reality with projected still images. No one had yet considered capturing "the reality in motion".

In the 1820's an optical toy called the *Thaumotrope* was marketed. The name roughly translates as "wonder turner". It is the combination of two Ancient Greek words: "θαυμα-thauma" meaning wonder and "τρόπος-tropos" meaning turn. When the disk spun, the two images on either side were perceived as one by the eye. This happens as a result of the way the mind functions during perception.

In 1824, the British scientist Peter Mark Roget introduced the phenomenon called *the persistence of vision*. He argued that an image leaves an imprint on the eye and after the image is gone the imprinted image is mentally related to the next image. In the case of *Thaumotrope* the eye assumes the two images as one. This opened the door for "moving pictures" and inspired the emergence of cinematographic-image. It was realized that if there were snapshots of an action in motion and if the snapshots could move fast enough then the eye would assume there is movement and would not recognize what's in between, due to the persistence of vision.

In 1800's, a device called *Phenakistoscope* added a revolving shutter to the image. It displayed animations produced by the rotation of a single drawing. As a result of the persistence of vision it gave the illusion of movement. The name was the combination of Ancient Greek words "φενακιστής-phenakistēs" meaning cheat, imposter and "σκοπέω-

skope" meaning examine, look to or into. Through the device, one was able to "look into the cheating image". Imitation of movement was something sought after from then on.

In 1825 French inventor Joseph Nicéphore Niépce produced the world's first known photograph and photographs took the place of drawn images in the imitation of movement. After the illusion of movement with photographs, the desire to project and capture *real* movement was inevitable. In 1870, the invention *Phasmatrope,* which consisted of eighteen glass photos on a wheel with a light projected from behind, enabled an audience of 1500 to view the first brief motion pictures on screen. Even though such a device was able to imitate motion via photographs, it wasn't yet questioned whether it was possible to capture motion in real time.

In 1872 an English photographer called Eadweard J. Muybridge, as a result of his photographic experiments, initiated such an attempt. Muybridge was hired to find out whether all four of a horse's hooves are off the ground at the same time during a gallop. Muybridge photographed a running horse by using multiple cameras. In the end he was able to capture the horse in fast motion. In fact all four of the horse's hooves were off the ground at the same time during the gallop. More important than the proof of this, Muybridge captured the movement and pioneered the invention of camera with this experiment. He proved that if you can shoot fast enough you could capture the movement as if it's real. As a matter of fact, in 1874 French scientist Étienne-Jules Marey invented a "chronophotographic gun" which could expose 12 photos per second. At first he photographed the stars, then he went onto capturing birds in flight. The first photos he printed were on glass, then paper, and finally on rolls of celluloid.

French inventors Lumiére Brothers invented *Cinematograph* in 1890. *Cinematograph* was a film camera and also served as a film projector and developer. The name comes from the Ancient Greek word "κίνημα-kinema" which translates as movement. It was the first projection device that had "movement" in its name. While this was happening in France, in the United States, inventor and businessman Thomas Edison was developing a device by the name of *Kinetoscope.* The device used 50-ft rolls of celluloid threaded over a series of spools and backlit by an electric bulb. One person at a time could view the pictures by looking in a binocular eyepiece. *Kinetoscope* is again derived from the Greek roots "kinema" (movement) and "scopos" (to view). After these devices were developed the cinematographic-image, as we know today, that is, successive still images on a celluloid film, tape or data creating a moving picture, was invented.

But this was just the beginning. In its early years inventors were amazed by the idea of having a device that could capture motion and re-play it whenever wanted. For inventors like Edison, who were also businessmen, the device had the potential to become a very lucrative product. It was crucial to attract potential customers to this new amazement, the cinematographic-image. The first public showing of a projected motion picture with the first movie poster took place in 1895. This was Auguste and Louis Lumiére's "cinematographe".

Following this, the art of cinema developed very quickly and attracted millions to theaters. However, how and why this new form of art became so popular so quickly cannot be explained merely on the basis of its outer dynamics. Therefore, in the following section, we will look into the ontic principle that makes possible and conditions the cinematographic-image.

1.2. THE ONTIC PRINCIPLE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE

It is important to say that the origin of an art object never refers to any kind of substantive being or a substance. The origin of an artistic form is what the art itself is born from. More than an element, it is the source of this form and it becomes the matter/material of the object of art created accordingly. In other words, the origin appears in the artistic form as its ontic principle. Ontic principle is the kind of principle that reveals the way things come 'to be'. It does not ground but rather governs. It reveals the underlying nature of the artistic form. Therefore by questioning the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image, we aim to reach the origin of it.

Tarkovsky states that cinema is the first art form that is the direct result of a technological invention in answer to a 'vital need'. The 'vital need' Tarkovsky talks about is an instrumental need that is ontically required:

> It was the instrument which humanity had to have in order to increase its mastery over the real world.[12]

This instrumental character comes to life with technology, however technology is just a medium. As the medium of an art form, which itself is the pure result of a technological revolution, technology appears as the main tool in all the outer developments and for the expression of the inner dynamics of cinema. However, what is important about the invention of cinema isn't its medium, but rather the 'vital need' it fulfills. According to Tarkovsky, the function of cinema in terms of answering that vital need concerned with increasing man's mastery over the real world should be explained on the basis of its unique features. He first points out that cinema, with regard to its subject matter, seems not much different than any other art form:

[12] Ibid., p. 82

> Cinema should be a means of exploring the most complex problems of our times, as vital as those, which for centuries have been the subject of literature, music and painting.[13]

However, after stating that "the domain of any art form is limited to one aspect of our spiritual and emotional discovery of surrounding reality"[14], Tarkovsky argues that cinema has the potential to re-discover our surrounding reality without any limit and it is only the art of cinema that is able to fully cover the real human experience. For him cinema can fulfill man spiritually and reform our empirical reality. This is the vital need cinema answers. Then the question is: how can cinema fulfill this need?

The outer development of the cinematographic-image starts with the desire to project still images. This is followed by the desire to project moving images and then the desire to capture movement. It is already mentioned that the word *cinema* comes from the Greek word "*κίνημα-kinema»*, which means movement, and, at first glance, this seems to be the distinctive aspect that separates cinema from plastic arts. This is the common attitude of the early silent era. Back then, filmmakers and theorists were trying to understand cinema in terms of its contrast with other arts. As the movement of the visual became the main point of reference, such theorists as Ricciotto Canudo saw no problem in describing cinema as *sculpture in motion, painting in movement, architecture in movement.*[15] They had a point because while the rest of the visual arts are static, cinematographic-image directly re-presents movement since its invention. If that is the case and also if cinema, as a technological development, stems from the desire to capture and project *movement*, can't this be the ontic principal of cinema? In fact, its capability to capture reality in motion seems to be the unique aspect of this new art. Even today, the fundamental

[13] Ibid., p. 80
[14] Ibid., p. 82
[15] Stam, Robert. Film Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2000. P. 33

achievement of this technical development is to give the spectator a possibility of interaction with some other reality. However, the nature of movement captured and reproduced by cinema comprises more than just a simple action, or a simple outer alteration. It actually contains time in its nature as its fundamental condition of possibility. Therefore, any investigation that takes movement as the ontic principle of cinema should eventually address and analyze the issue concerning the cinematic conception and representation of time.

In fact, even imagining the possibility of capturing motion required new mental conditions, new forms and associations. Before then, captured movement was unthinkable for many reasons, but most importantly it was unthinkable because man wasn't able to have a mastery over time, over the past. With the cinematographic-image, he obtained the ability to freeze time and re-play it when he wanted. In other words, not only movement but also time was captured in the cinematographic-image. It became possible to represent time as something relative to the subject. We will discuss the concept of time in the following chapter, but for now it should be noted that such an approach to the concept of time refers to subjective time. Before Kant, time was considered as the measurement of motion and change, but after him it was regarded something relative to the subject in which movement becomes just a perception of time.

With the invention of cinema, man who can now capture and re-create time unconditionally re-placed himself in the world. The idea of being the master of time, governed the birth of cinematographic-image because with cinema, more than anything, man became able to *take an impression of time*. For Tarkovsky, this is the real dramatic development of cinema:

> No 'dead' object—table, chair, glass—taken in a frame in isolation from everything else, can be presented as it were outside passing time, as if from the point of view of an absence of time.[16]

Within the visible, time, which Tarkovsky takes to be prior to the creation of the cinematographic-image, can be recorded no matter what and this makes time the main element, the very foundation of cinema. Time "can vanish without trace in our material world for it is a subjective, spiritual category"[17]. However in cinema, with each image a new series of time opens and when it finishes the series ends as well. Thus, when cinema takes an impression of time, in each impression time reveals its nature as the multiplicity of time in the form of captured and re-playable time series. Therefore the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image lies within this definition of time. The cinematographic-image, by its very nature and constitution, represents time subjectively, as solely related to man, and not necessarily as an actual entity that clocks measure.

The influence of the cinematographic-image on cultural structures was immense: Today capturing time is so easy; one can do it even through a cell-phone. The idea of time constituting a multiple reality is already accepted; it is a notion we explicitly or implicitly utilize almost in every form of social interaction based on mass media and the Internet. However, this paper does not question long-term effects of cinema on cultural structures or formations; it only proposes that the ontic principle governing the cinematographic-image lies in its ability to present itself as a unique artistic problematization of the subjectivity and multiplicity of time. And this is how cinema fulfills the vital need Tarkovsky refers to.

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[16] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 68
[17] Ibid., p. 58

If the ontic principle is connected to time then could time be the origin of cinematographic-image? Then time should manifest itself in the structure and nature of the cinematographic-image as a factor that conditions their being. In other words, the structure and nature evolves around the origin, which functions like their first cause. This metaphysical origin, as the ontic principle, governs the happening of the cinematographic-image. It gives rise to and conditions the nature of the cinematographic-image. The origin manifests itself within the image as its way of communicating to the subject, and it structures the image. Therefore, how the cinematographic-image conveys time becomes essential to understanding its origin. If we can prove that time is in the nature and structure of the cinematographic-image, then we can try to find out whether the same essence exists in cinema as well, that is, whether a movie, as a cinematic work of art, is able to convey its content and establish communication with the viewer in the same structurally determined way as its single unit, the cinematographic-image, does. Assuming this is established, then we can conclude that time constitutes the origin of cinema, therefore its aesthetic value. However, before all this, we need to understand what time is.

2. THE CONCEPT OF TIME

"Time is invention or it is nothing at all."[18]
Henri Bergson

For an analysis of the concept of *time*, first we need to elucidate what is actually meant by "time." Is it the totality of units, which substantiate the concepts of past, present, and future; line up one's memories chronologically; and indicate the alteration of the material things? Or it is pure intuition that affects us imperceptibly as the continuity of our being: an intuition hidden behind the definition of *time* as the measurement-unit of movement to make the imperceptible perceptible via space? Is time an objective entity or an element of human subjectivity?

2.1. OBJECTIVE TIME

If *time* has objective reality, then it has to be an actual entity that exists outside the human subjectivity, therefore it cannot be the product of human mind. Man, therefore, is a simple observer of time, perceiving it as the property of the object or as its category. Namely, time exists independently of the subject.

Aristotle conceives of time as an actual entity, which has objective reality. He considers man as a simple observer who perceives time but has no part in its existence. In this observation, man perceives changes in the object and experiences time due to these changes. Thus, according to Aristotle, the experience of change is prior to the perception of time and the experience of time depends on the perception of change. In this sense, it is only through change that one can explain the concept of time. Then what is Aristotle's account of change?

[18] Bergson, Henri-Louis. Creative Evolution. Mitchell, Arthur. Cosimo Classics, Inc. 2007. p. 371

The nature of change is explained in *Physics*, Book I, as if the object loses something and gains something else. In Book III change is explained as the potentiality of the object.

> Hence we can define motion as the fulfillment of the moveable qua moveable, the cause of the attribute being in contact with what can move so that the mover is also acted on.[19]

Ursula Coope, in *Time Of Aristotle*, interprets this explanation as change being the actuality of that which potentially is, qua such. If there is a change within the object, this change happens towards a certain end state, and the object, which has the potential to be in such an end state of change, can be actualized. If we take bronze for an example and its potential to be a statue, *becoming a statue* is a potentiality of *being bronze*, which can be actualized. This means that change is the actuality of the statue and not the actuality of *being bronze*. Thus not as *being a statue* but as *becoming a statue*, potentiality lies in *being bronze*, because it is always potential.

In a way change is always incomplete. The different stages of the change will be successively present. These new present moments point out that change always goes forward but never backwards. Nothing becomes what it was before: there is a path that change follows, i.e. there is something prior to change and it is followed by change.

According to Coope, the magnitude over which a change occurs is a spatial path associated with the change. Change follows magnitude, the way time follows change. Magnitude is like the path of the movement; as the movement follows the path, change follows magnitude. Aristotle argues that since between any two points on a line there can always be another point, spatial magnitude is continuous, which means change is continuous because of spatial magnitude. In fact change is infinitely divisible too;

[19] Aristotle. Physics. South Dakota: NuVision Publications, 2007. Book III – 2. p. 46

between every change there is another change. This means we cannot divide change in numbers and count it. It is the continuity of the spatial magnitude as the *before and after* that explains the continuity of change. Which means change follows the *before and after*, which is the magnitude.

If time follows change then such *before and after* are always the part of time. As a result, time will be continuous too. Time follows change, which means that time depends on change. Change, on the other hand, can only be conceivable if we can designate the passing time between two present moments. If there were no distinctions between antecedent and subsequent moments, then change would take no time. Since change is infinitely divisible, then it must happen in the course of an infinitely divisible period of time. If we claim that there can be no time unless there is change, since change will happen in a place, then there can be no time without spatial movement:

> The distinction of 'before' and 'after' holds primarily, then, in place; and there in virtue of relative position. Since then 'before' and 'after' hold in magnitude, they must hold also in movement, these corresponding to those. But also in time the distinction of 'before' and 'after' must hold, for time and movement always correspond with each other.[20]

In time, present moments are ordered as "before and after" according to the state of change they are in. But why is there only the present, and not the past or the future? In *Physics*, Aristotle divides *time* into parts to investigate it, then questions which parts exist. One of the parts (past) had existed, which means it does not exist anymore. Another part (future) will exist, which means it does not yet exist. Since a thing that only consists of non-existing parts cannot exist, if something exists, even if not all the parts exist, some parts of it must exist. Then there is only *present* left for time to exist. *The present moment* is in the middle and carries the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Thus the

[20] Ibid., Book IV – 11. p. 81

present moment has no borders and is variable. Between every two present moments there is always another present moment. It is infinitely divisible. However time cannot have actual divisions like a line would have.

The present moments divide time into potential divisions infinitely; between every two present moments there can be another present moment. Every *end*, that is, the border of time, will always be within a *present moment* and therefore every end will always be the mark of a new beginning as well, which means that *time* will never end. It also means that the present moment is the part that changes and it is the actuality of that which potentially is, qua the end of the past moment and the beginning of the future moment. In a sense *present moment* can only divide time potentially. Present is variable, infinitely divisible and has no borders. It is a potential division of time.

Aristotle says that we know time has passed whenever we distinguish between two different 'nows' or instants. Time is the order of continuous present moments that line up one after another. It only exists as the successiveness of present moments. Thus according to such definition of time, if the present moment was not a variable thing, but immutable, *time* would not exist. Namely if there is no change between present moments, there would be no time. Variable borders between the past and the future would not exist and time would not flow, which, in turn, means that if there isn't any present moment then there isn't time.

Yet, Aristotle does not consider the present moment as a part of time. Since all the things that contribute to the whole have to be measured and the present cannot be measured, it is not a part of time. Even though the present does not have borders, but it is the border between the past and the future. What measures the present moment and

designates the borders of time is the designation of the present moment between the past and the future. Therefore we designate the change that follows spatial magnitude by the designation of different presents.

Despite this close relation between change and time, neither change nor movement is time. According to Aristotle, movement and change of each thing is only in the changing thing itself or wherever the moving or changing thing itself happens to be. Change is always localized. It is always within the changing thing and always at some specific place. On the contrary, time is ubiquitous: it is both everywhere and within everything the same, because the number of equal and simultaneous movements is everywhere one and the same. This is one reason to say that time is not the same as change.

Aristotle also says that change can become *faster* or *slower,* but *time* cannot. Regardless of that, by definition, speed of change is connected to time; according to whether the change is greater or smaller within a set amount of time, change can be either slow or fast. However, Aristotle thinks that time cannot be defined by time, therefore change cannot be time. Yet he also states that change is all there is for us to understand the concept of time. Then time is not change but it is 'something of change' because time can be experienced only if there is change.

We know that we perceive the change of things within a magnitude as the *before* and the *after*. We also know that we designate changes through present moments. Then it means that time is something we mark out in changes, in a way it is the *number of changes.* By that, Aristotle refers to something that can be counted. But if we consider that time only consists of potential divisions, such as the present moment, then how can we count change?

There are two kinds of numbers, the ones that we count and the ones that are *countable*. "Number" here means measuring the size of sets. For something to be counted in numbers, it has to be a discrete collection of things, but something that is continuous can also become countable by its potential divisions. The important thing to distinguish here is the difference between the numbers, which we count and which are countable. Something that is countable is essentially ordered, whereas what we count is essentially a quantity. In this sense we count the collections of discrete things but we *measure* the continuous magnitudes. Time, which is continuous and follows magnitude via change, is something that is countable and essentially ordered; it is potentially divided by present moments. It has nothing to do with counting units, but rather time occurs as the measurement of change or measurable by the change. In this sense *time* becomes *the number of changes between before and after.* In other words, time is the number of present moments.

If we want to measure change (since it is continuous too) the present moments need to be marked out. But to be able to measure, like in counting, we will need a unit to measure accordingly. To measure change and thus to mark the present moments as a unit, we will need a standard such as a change that is continuously repeated. Aristotle thinks it is the cycling motion of the universe, the movement of the sphere, which we can measure accordingly:

> The other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement.[21]

Since change follows magnitude and magnitude is before and after in a place, then the movement of the universe as the path that change follows, is prior to time. This

[21] Ibid., Book IV- 14. p. 88

movement is also a spatial change and it is perceived by the designation of two different present moments:

> Hence motions may be consecutive or successive in virtue of the time being continuous, but there can be continuity only in virtue of the motions themselves being continuous, that is when the end of each is one with the end of the other.[22]

Thereby time is the number of measurement, but because it has beginning and end, it is not the number of the same point, more likely the endpoints of a line. If we consider time something like a line then the present moment would be something like the endpoints of the line; between 'before' and 'after'. However, according to Aristotle, if the present moment were an endpoint, then the topology of such time would not be a straight line. If this were so, then the endpoints would be as separate as black and white and they would never coincide. There can be no continuity. If only the motion is circular, the continuity of time can occur. Therefore for Aristotle, the concepts of alteration and continuity (which are related to time) are only possible if time is in circular motion.

As a matter of fact, Gilles Deleuze, in his *Four Lectures On Kant*, defines Aristotle's time view as *circular time.* He also indicates that *circular time* and *circular motion* was a commonly accepted concept in Ancient Greece. This concept was ever-present: everything from tragedies to Platonic cosmology consisted of circles. A world that is governed by circular motion unfolds time as successive continuity in which the present moment links the past and the future, and therefore every moment follows the next according to the law of nature, meaning the *before moment* always conditions the next one and it is always the cause of it. The end is fixed from the very beginning. In this sense time has no relation to the mind whatsoever. Such objective time refers to the

[22] Ibid., Book V- 4. p. 100

succession of changing relations and man becomes an object within time, or a simple observer of time.

Fatalism is a great example to see the possible ethical implications of this philosophy of time. In Fatalism, time flows between two points, from the beginning to an end as objective time. Hence, the future is seen as something inevitable and inflexible. This shows us the ethical concern of Aristotle's time philosophy: time dominates what is to come under the cover of fate. As the result of that, in Greek tragedies—which gave birth to dramatic structure—time was aestheticized as already written fate in Aristotle's *Poetics*. For example, in *Oedipus Rex*, the character's fate is already written. Oedipus tries to escape from the seeker's prophecy but his fate pursues him and eventually catches up with him. Time unfolds as cause and effect and brings forth fate – or at least this is how Aristotle's *Poetics* defines the underlying truth in this play.

On the other hand, could it be Oedipus' own character that shapes his fate? In the first major incident of the play, Oedipus literally finds himself at a crossroads. This is clearly a metaphor for the three choices that he has. One: he can choose to go back to his family who raised him (and never kill his parents). Two: he can start a new journey (in which he never kills or marries anyone, disproving the oracle). Three: he acts as the oracle foresaw (killing his father and marrying his mother). In fact, Oedipus, despite what he is told, kills a man and marries an older woman. He knows that he is making choices that could be fulfilling the prophecy, yet he does not stop. So in the end we can still question if this circular time is even the real underlying meaning of the Ancient Greek plays. In such interpretation of *Oedipus Rex*, Oedipus's character creates the cycling motion of Aristotle's time.

If time is Oedipus's written fate, like Aristotle argues, then time mimics the cycling movement of the universe via the law of nature in man's life. The continuity of cause and effect as a kind of magnitude like *before and after* directs one's fate, but it is strictly determined. Aristotle's time, as in the belief of fate, is transmitted within a cycling motion and manifests itself within the law of nature. In this case everything is perceived as the reflection of cause and effect and the next moment is already fixed by the former moment, i.e. it is predetermined.

Such understanding of time, where it merely refers to objective changes, cannot be the origin of the cinematographic-image. The concept of time that structures the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image is relative to the subject. In this sense, time that works according to the law of nature cannot be the origin that refers to how man can master the real world, by capturing, freezing, and re-playing time. If man can play with the order of time by capturing it and re-playing it, then it must be something other than the number of changes that follow magnitude and only move forward. Time that is the origin of the cinematographic-image is not objective. In the next section, various conceptions of subjective time from Augustine to Kant will be investigated in order to see whether subjective time could be the origin of the cinematographic-image.

2.2. SUBJECTIVE TIME

2.2.1 AUGUSTINE'S ACCOUNT OF TIME

After Aristotle up until Leibniz and Kant, many philosophers considered time as an objective phenomenon. Kant achieved the real breakthrough in terms of re-defining the concept of time. But long before him, a thinker from the early Christian era, Saint Augustine (C.E. 354 – C.E. 430) assigned an important subjectivity to time:

> I measure as time present the impression that things make on you as they pass by and what remains after they have passed by—I do not measure the things themselves which have passed by and left their impression on you. This is what I measure when I measure periods of time. Either, then, these are the periods of time or else I do not measure time at all.[23]

In such measurement of time, *time* is what one gets by the investigation of the present and the *present moment*. The act of measurement is not the measurement of an objective alteration but rather an alteration of the scattered moments within the eternal present. Like Aristotle, Augustine thinks that time consists of present moments, but unlike Aristotle, Augustine considers them as equal to time.

In fact, according to Augustine, the past and the future do not exist. If they exist, they would only exist as the present time, because they cannot exist in the present time as the past, or as the future. Then how do the past and the future exist in the present? For Augustine, they only exist, as they are experienced in the mind. When the present moment moves to the past it also moves into the memory. What is in the mind is just the reflection of the past (or the future) and never the real thing. The past and the future can only exist in the mind and in the memory as the present. As a result of that, man's time is reduced to the present.

Augustine's understanding of time evokes the doctrine that only the objects of the present can be real, and the objects of the past and the future do not exist. According to this doctrine called *presentism*, even though time is only in the present tense, it is still real and different than space. In fact, Augustine follows the same logic and rejects the existence of the past and the future. The only possibility of existence is in the present. *Presentism* considers locational existence as true existence, so does Augustine.

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[23] Saint Augustine. Confessions. Outler, Albert C. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955. Book XI, Chapter XXVII-36. p.191

Since the past and the future are located in the mind, Augustine defines them in terms of their relation to the mind. Augustine denies tripartite time (the past - the present - the future) and instead he offers threefold time (present time regarding the past - present time regarding the present - present time regarding the future). They basically refer to memory, intuition and expectation. Thus, Augustine views time as a product of the mind, because one creates this subjective concept of *time*, by living the past and the future in the mind. The mind collects the past and the future as memories and expectations in the present as a momentary intuition.

If we analyze Augustine's philosophy of time only in regard to its relation to the mind, we can easily say it is subjective. However for him, time is the property of God, i.e. it is the property of another substance. In *Confessions,* Augustine starts to investigate time by asking "what did God make before he made the heaven and earth?"[24] He replies that heaven and earth came out of nothing, since God is the creator. Therefore before anything has been created there cannot be anything, i.e. before God creates heaven and earth there cannot be anything that God was doing. If there cannot be anything before he created it, then before anything is created, God couldn't have been waiting since he had not yet created time:

> There could be no time without a created world.[25]

Because God created time, it can exist independently of the mind, but cannot exist independently of God. Thus, albeit time has no substance, it still is a property of another substance: time is the property of God. The existence of time in this sense does not lie within the human mind or human subjectivity. Augustine reduces time and ontology to

[24] Ibid., Book XI, Chapter XXX. p.193
[25] Ibid., Book XI, Chapter XXX. p.193

God and therefore time becomes something that is created and the mind becomes the tool for time to be recognized by man. Therefore, time, for Augustine, even though is connected to the human mind, is not, in its essence, relative to the subject.

Time's dependence on God cannot manifest itself in cinematographic-image. We have mentioned that the origin of cinema evolves from its ontic principle, the manipulation of time, which arises in answer to a vital need of man to master nature. In this case time that is in the origin of cinematographic-image must be relative to the subject and not to any higher power. Thus, Augustine's time that is not subjective in its essence is also not the kind of time concept that is in the origin of cinematographic-image.

2.2.2. KANT'S ACCOUNT OF TIME

Kant's philosophy of time offers a more profound approach to the concept of time in terms of subjectivity. Kant does not explain time on the basis of its relation to God. But more importantly, he creates a real breakthrough and defines time regardless of movement and change, in which they become the perception of time. In fact, time was considered as the measurement of motion and never given full subjectivity until Kant. He puts forward an elaborate analysis of the concept of time in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this book, Kant aims to find and establish the limits of human reasoning. Heidegger, in *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, defines the finitude of mankind as the source of Kant's philosophy.

In Kant's philosophy world has two parts, world of appearances *(phenomenon)* and world of *thing in itself (noumenon).* Since man, as one of the beings on the earth belongs to the world of phenomenon, he cannot experience the *thing-in-itself*. Kant thinks that we

cannot have any knowledge of the world of noumenon because it is not perceptible by our empirical perception. However, Kant also thinks that there is only one way to gain knowledge and that is the empirical way. The data, which comes from the thing-in-itself, is organized or rather 'synthesized' by *a priori* forms of sensible intuition and *a priori* concepts, i.e. categories of understanding. These forms and categories belong to the faculties, hence to structure of the mind. It is because of these forms and categories that the empirical world is experienced the way it is. These formal principles do not belong to the world of phenomenon; they set the limits for all sensible perception, condition all possible experiences, and are the same for everyone. The appearances are the way we perceive them because of the structure of the human mind, not because of their own reality. All given data can only be experienced within these forms and we can only comprehend things within them. While categories help us to understand, forms make the experience possible. Thus when we use the filter of forms in order to understand by categories, *thing in itself* disappears and we perceive things as *phenomenon*. According to Kant, time is one of the two *a priori* forms of sensible intuition:

> Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be removed.[26]

Kant argues that time belongs to the structure of the human mind and it is not something that is produced by it. For Kant, the mind produces appearances, which is the physical world, but time is not something that belongs to the objects of this world either. On the contrary, time is about our point of view, our perception of the object, but it is never a quality that belongs to the object itself. Thus unlike Aristotle, Kant argues that

[26] Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul and Wood, Allen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 162

change can be conceivable because of time, and not vice versa. Everything that changes becomes a sensible object and is placed in order by time. If we say that the perception of change cannot happen without the concept of time, then time becomes a universal form of the world of phenomena.

Even though time is a universal form, it is also relative to the subject and therefore it is also subjective. Time has no other presence than being a form of intuition and belonging to the mind's structure. Thus *time,* according to Kant, is a subjective condition and a pure intuition, which exists by the nature of man's mind, and gives order, provides uniformity to sensed objects. It is the structure of the mind that demands one common time perception for everyone. Therefore time has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive. Different times are just the different parts of one and the same time.

Moments follow one another and it is a single time concept; there is no multiplicity of time series but rather one temporal reality. Although it is subjective, if there is not multiplicity of different subjectivities but a single time perception (which is universal and shared by everyone), then how can time be subjective to everyone? We already said that Kant's subjective time is *a priori* form and therefore it conditions experience. In other words it is subjective because it is relative to the subject, but also Kant's subjective time is *transcendentally objective*. If this is the case, then Kant's concept of time cannot offer a pure subjectivity, either.

Kant gets close to the multiplicity of subjectivities when he gives the power of opening new *series* to the subject. However, such series are never temporal but causal series connected to Kant's account of time. This is explained in the first critique, in the

antinomies of rational cosmology. Antinomies of rational cosmology occur because of *Transcendental Illusion* and they are basically a kind of syllogism. If we look at the categories of understanding, we see that antinomies are a *hypothetical* kind of syllogism. This means that it refers to such premise as 'If A, then B': If every composite substance consists of simple parts, then there is such a thing as simple parts. Kant starts his argument with the antithesis of the thesis he would like to discuss. For example, to analyze the thesis about simple parts, he starts with assuming "that composite substance do not consist of simple parts…"[27] In the end both the thesis and the antithesis are proved and Kant essentially underlines the contradiction of such an idea.

It is the third antinomy that is important for us, because it proposes a kind of time topology, which is different than Aristotle's circular time. This antinomy questions the possibility of another causality other than the laws of nature. In this antinomy, Kant's thesis is "Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them"[28]. In order to prove this proposition he negates it and assumes the law of nature as the only causality. This means that every case conditions an effect, and without any cause there cannot be any effect. There has to be a first cause for everything to start if the law of nature is the only causality. Reason, however, looks for the beginning that exists without a cause. Therefore the statement, which would say that the only causality is through the law of nature, conflicts with itself. If the laws of nature are the only causality then there cannot be any beginning since every effect needs a cause. On the other hand since everything works within such a law, there

[27] Ibid., p. 476
[28] Ibid., p. 484

cannot be any progression either. If the former incident is the condition of the latter one, then the cause and the effect will already be determined. If everything happens as cause and effect, there can't be any effect either, since the future is already set. Therefore such causality cannot exist on its own.

In this antinomy Kant also talks about *transcendental freedom*. Such a thing happens if the causality comes up as an absolute causal spontaneity beginning with itself. For Kant free cause is the only way for any kind of causality and therefore movement. If we say there is a single causality, and if it is through the law of nature, then there has to be only one initial cause, which we said is contradictory. There has to be multiple free causes, those that can start new series. Therefore *transcendental freedom* also makes experience possible and the beginning becomes unconditioned.

> . . . transcendental freedom, without which even in the course of nature the series of appearances is never complete on the side of the causes.[29]

According to Kant man is capable of opening such series because man who is an appearance along with the other appearances in the world, also has a part of noumenon in himself, and it is his Reason. This view opens up Kant's philosophy from metaphysics to ethics in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. For him free will is the only way for mankind to be moral beings. Not because he thinks he proves theoretically that we are free or we can ever get the knowledge of such an act, but because we are able to start new unconditioned series without cause: that way we can be *practically* free. Since we are coming to that point by free will and not as an effect, there are possible moral values for the action – right and wrong. Therefore acting upon free will becomes ethical choice:

> Pure reason is a practice by itself and it gives mankind a universal law, i.e., moral law.[30]

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[29] Ibid., p. 484

[30] Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason. Pluhar, Werner S., September Hackett Publishing Co., 2002. p. 29

Man who can differentiate freely between right from wrong, by using his reason, can open up new causal series. Deleuze describes it with a quote from Hamlet: 'time is out of joint'. In the play, when they send Hamlet to exile, free cause is created because after that point Hamlet acts in a way that no one expects him to, i.e. the coming events are not determined by past events. Hamlet's spontaneity after his exile demonstrates that a man can act using his free will and can start a first cause. This is the reason why Deleuze defines Kant's time, which is a form of intuition, as linear time, because time is relative to subject, no one can know what can happen next, and unlike in circular time, the future is unknown. Aristotle's man is enslaved by time due to law of nature.

In such freedom Kant finds lawlessness. For him laws of nature and freedom are two separate things; as law and lawlessness. Laws of nature present the synthesis of the experience, which happens by conditioning the conditioned, whereas the latter presents an unconditioned causality that moves by itself, since freedom cannot have any given law. According to Allen Wood, Kant wants to show that on the one hand we are obligated to the laws of nature, but on the other (as *noumenon*) we are affected by reason's causality according to freedom and these two do not conflict.

In the end we can say that Kant considers time as a subjective notion and thereon movement becomes the perception of time. However, along with this he also argues that time is universal and it is the same in everyone's mind as a form of intuition. As a result Kant's subjective time becomes transcendentally objective. Therefore, his linear time is like the time of a clock, which is within empirical reality and only one time series.

In terms of the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image during its invention, time's relativity to the subject is close to Kant's linear time, where the subject creates the

next moment. However, the subjective time, which is the origin of the cinematographic-images, has to have a different kind of nature. If man can capture time and re-play it whenever he wants, then it means he also creates multiplicity of time. Not simply in terms of causality but also in terms of temporality, since the images all have their own time series. What I mean is this: with the cinematographic-image a series of captured time starts, and when the image stops, the temporality of the series of images ends. Therefore this kind of subjective time also has to have multiplicity. In this sense the cinematographic-image is re-defined time in multiplicity. If this is the case then the kind of multiplicity, which the cinematographic-image offers, cannot be explained with Kant's account of time. Such multiplicity is best conveyed in Henri Bergson's concept of *duration.* Thus in the next section we will investigate Bergson's account of time.

2.3. DURATION – TEMPORAL SUBJECTIVITY

Subjective time must relate to the mind. It cannot be a property of a substance, because if it is, then it cannot be relative to the subject essentially. Even if time belongs to man's mind and has no substantive reality other than being a form that belongs to man's mind, we can still question it in terms of its universality. As we have seen in the account of Kant, time is a form of intuition and it belongs to the structure of the mind. Because of that structure, we perceive time as one numerical unity, i.e. as a single time series. As a result, man's concept of time is universal. Therefore the universal validity of the concept of time makes it objective to everyone and we can question whether time (even though it is relative to the mind) can be subjective. However, what is in question here is that if such a concept of time is the origin of the cinematographic-image or not. To

answer such a question, the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image is the only hint we have.

In regard to the ontic principle, we know that the cinematographic-image has the power of creating new time series. Being able to capture and re-play time is actually the power to open new temporal series. If this is the case then subjective time consists of multiple subjectivities. Therefore the kind of subjectivity of time, which the cinematographic-image refers to, has to have no other presence other than being in relation to the subject, but also, since there are multiple subjects, time must be within a kind of multiplicity. Bergson's concept of *duration* is such a concept of time; it is related to memory and intuition, thus it is particular for every person.

Bergson talks about two kinds of multiplicity as well as two kinds of time: 'mathematical time' and 'real and psychological time'. Mathematical time is in the field of analytical perception. Bergson does not include this in his study, because he argues that analytical perception only consists of representations. Mathematical time is the time of a clock and it is the reflection of empirical perception. It is homogeneous, static, infinitely divisible and absolute. In connection to that, *time* appears as the dimension of space. Time, as well as space, can be divided, counted and altered in terms of quantity. Such a concept of time would be in quantitative multiplicity, which is homogeneous. It is a whole that consists of successive units, which are the moments that follow each other within the cause-and-effect relationship. In such a perception, 'before' and 'after' are contiguous, conscious moments, which are lined back to back and come from a fixed point of view.

According to Bergson, while being one of the images in this material world like everything else, our body makes choices too, to eliminate its own deprivation. It separates what it needs from what it does not. This process of empirical perception is the work of intellect. While revolving around the object we translate symbols that we see from our point of view and line them up back to back to create analytic perception. This is our empirical perception, which has a discontinuous view of the material world and cannot pass over the given data. Bergson, in *Matter and Memory*, says that

> Pure perception, in fact, however rapid we suppose it to be, occupies a certain depth of duration, so that our successive perceptions are never the real moments of things, . . . but are moments of our consciousness.[31]

It is only through a subjective process that one can experience the real moment of things. Time as we know is not the result of such a process and therefore time of a clock is not the real-time. Bergson's doctoral thesis *Time and Free Will* (1889) starts with the explanation of real-time as the multiplicity of duration and defining the concept of *intuition.* Bergson defines *intellectual sympathy* in his book *Creative Mind* as *intuition*. It entails conceiving the object by going into the object instead of revolving around it. According to him we take snapshots of the passing reality and recompose the object artificially. But instead of this we can attach ourselves to the inner becoming of things intuitively. Such relation gets rid of the difference between the subject and the object, because the subject realizes the difference of the object and goes into it by sympathy. This *intuition* is the intuition of the self, which is produced by the ego. Such intuition is very different than analytical perception, which happens by perceiving in parts. This kind of analytical approach never gives us the reality, because we can never conceive it as a whole.

[31] Bergson, Henri-Louis. Matter and Memory. Paul, N. M. & Palmer W. S. New York: Zone Books, 1991. p. 69

In *intuition* 'before' and 'after' do not necessarily follow magnitude as in the case of Aristotle, rather they interact each other. By intuition Bergson finds a way to reach this whole. Conceiving the object by going into it, by sympathy, actually happens by going into one's own self. This is not simply self-awareness, but it is more like catching the harmony of inner becoming of the self. This kind of sympathy towards one's self touches the world around us; it expands heterogeneously. If a person can concentrate enough on the sympathy towards him or herself, to conceive the self, this person can self-locate within the duration and expand to the absolute duration. Duration, which is particular for everyone, flows via qualitative alterations within the whole. In this sense the kind of multiplicity duration has is in accordance with quality.

The multiplicity in accordance with quantity is homogenous and with quality heterogeneous. Unlike space, *duration* is indivisible and cannot be measured in a numerical, mathematical fashion. It is the totality of different moments, which are like emotions. Bergson himself gives emotions as an example of multiplicity in accordance with quality. Emotions, which are all different from one another, can exist singularly but can still intervene and affect each other. Multiplicity occurs because duration, which has no borders, qualitatively differs from each and every duration. *Duration* is nothing more than successive qualitative alterations and has no quantitative determination. Bergson defines pure duration as

> . . . the form, which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states.[32]

We cannot see change in terms of numbers or before and after, but we can experience it more like the inner change. Those alterations cannot be expressed in any way because

[32] Bergson, Henri-Louis. Time and Free Will. Ponson, F. L. Montana: Kessinger Publishing Company. p. 100

they are the states of *becoming*. Every moment is distinctive to others, but not because of its chronological place, but rather it depends on its relation to the other moments in terms of affection. The material world that consists of images becomes the trigger and duration moves by the tension of the past. As a simple act inside the subject, which carries the trace of the past up until today, intuition enables the continuity of memory. As a result, the immobile empirical perception becomes mobile, on the ground of memory.

The way Bergson speaks about the past and future and their relation to memory is different than Augustine's account of time, which is the product of the mind. Augustine argues that the past and the future are only present while the subject is thinking about them in the present moment. Bergson also talks about the present as something that happens by association of past memories and the images of the past within the memory. In both of them, time seems variable and determined by the subject. But Bergson mentions two kinds of memories. One is the habitual-memory, which is the memory of the empirical perception and the other one is the pure-memory, which is intuitive and is always variable. Unlike habitual memory, which is chronologically ordered, intuitive memory is subject to change based on the affection of the subject. Bergson's concept of memory is never the memory that memorizes and learns the needs of daily life, but rather it is a kind of sense memory, which can interact and be altered. It is pure-memory which realizes the alteration of the metaphysical movement of duration. However, the kind of memory Augustine refers to is more like the habitual memory. The mind collects the past and the future as memories of daily life and expectations within the empirical reality.

The memory Bergson talks about is variable not only because the future becomes the present and the present turns into the past, but also because of the fact that real-time is the

internal affection within pure-memory and it can effect the reality of past memories. That's why duration is utterly subjective. Duration is pure affection, which moves by the tension of the past as an inclination toward something, thus it can always change. The real process happens metaphysically and relative to the subject.

> Within myself a process of organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going on, which constitutes true duration.[33]

Duration as the flow of time becomes the subject itself because it is the *becoming* of the subject that is in constant alteration. Therefore we perceive this metaphysical intuition as the uttermost subjectivity. But such subjectivity is temporal more than anything, because *duration* is a temporal value, which means that *duration* is the *temporal subjectivity*. This internal time is the flow of consciousness: the continuity of one's immanence to one's self that is in a continuous progress. In the end, duration is the consciousness of the self that is in motion. Thus the kind of motion, which pure duration describes, is a movement that is in the everlasting and metaphysical:

> . . . in the human soul there are only processes.[34]

In fact, along with time, Bergson does not accept movement and change as real, because everything that refers to *process* in the material world is an illusion for him. Bergson defines the material world as the same process as Aristotle's, which relies on perception and analytical knowledge. However he does not find reality in analytical perception, it is in the intuitive one. Bergson believes that the material world consists of representations, which are images. They are less than objects, because images are the result of the empirical perception process. In such perception we translate symbols as those we see from our fixed point of view while revolving around the object and taking

[33] Ibid., p. 108
[34] Ibid., p. 131

snap shots. We line those discontinuous, immobile snapshots back to back, as successive moments. By adding these immobile sections as the positions in space or instants in time, the abstract idea of a succession occurs.

Bergson in *Creative Evolution* calls this process *cinematographic illusion*, because how the intellect approaches reality is similar to how motion is created in the cinematographic-image:

> Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside of them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality. . . We may therefore sum up . . . that the *mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind*.[35]

According to his analogy, intellect can never communicate with reality because intellect, with its analytical approach, resembles the cinematographic-image that consists of immobile sections. Thus the motion and alteration of the material world are illusions as well as time. What is real is the metaphysical motion of duration and its qualitative alterations. It is indivisible but is also particular for everyone. On the one hand it is the part of the whole, on the other, it is the most radical subjectivity that is singular to each and every subject. It is in this sense that real time is the multiplicity of durations.

It is clear that Bergson believes time is different than duration. Time, as we know it, is the representation of *pure duration* via space. Real-time cannot be represented since it is an intuition. However, when we want to express it, we reflect it to space and call it time, because intuition is not something that can be represented. Space becomes the vehicle in this representation and as a result of that, time is read via the motion of space. Since time is such a representation and it is not real, Bergson's duration points out the

[35] Bergson, Henri-Louis. Creative Evolution. Mitchell, Arthur. Cosimo Classics, Inc. 2007. p. 332

falsity of time. Thus time that is successive and homogeneous is not real. On the other hand, ‘real and psychological time’ is not time; it is duration.

Then time as the origin of cinema must be presented in the cinematographic-image, not as the spatialization of duration but rather as the most radical subjectivity. As we have mentioned, approaching time as if it is a multiplicity of different times is in the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image. In regard to duration there is such multiplicity. In a way, each and every cinematographic-image can transmit duration as the temporal subjectivity of the image. Thus in spite of Bergson’s analogy of the cinematographic-image, such images have the possibility to convey duration. In the following chapter I will investigate the cinematographic-image and explain the kind of subjectivity it proposes. This will demonstrate more clearly how time (duration) manifests itself in the cinematographic-image and what the structure of such an image consists of.

3. THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE

"The image itself is the system of the relationships of time from which the variable present only flows."[36]
Gilles Deleuze

All arts have their own artistic forms. As we have already mentioned, for visual arts, still image is that form. On the other hand, the artistic form can be melody – as in music – or art can be in the structure of drama – as in theatre and acting. When we inquire about cinema, the cinematographic-image reveals itself as the artistic form of cinema. Then we need to ask what the cinematographic-image is. Is it merely visual? Is it a single image or composition of images? Where does sound fit in it? What defines its form? Which element of the cinematographic-image transmits the aesthetic value and its origin to the spectator? In this chapter we will answer these questions while investigating the nature and the structure of the cinematographic-image. In the end, if we can detect time within the nature and the structure of the cinematographic-image, then we will also investigate if time constitutes the origin of cinema as well.

3.1. THE NATURE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE

What is the nature of the cinematographic-image? When we question the nature of it, we do not look at what the image tells us within its context. For example, film theories question what the cinematographic-image tells us via the visible. They investigate the perception of space, lighting, colors and the form of the image, via the design of the set or the style of the character. However, the nature of the cinematographic-image should be in relation to its origin and it should be same for all the captured moving images, beyond the

[36] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. [xi]i

intentions of its creator, i.e. the created moving image has to have the same nature no matter what.

We have already mentioned that the cinematographic-image was created only visually (without sound). In modern cinema, however, the cinematographic-image cannot be imagined without sound. Sound design of a film can be very important and change the mood of the film. What does sound communicate that was already in the moving picture since the invention of it? Deleuze argues that there was a readable *speech-act* communicated via the visible such as body language in silent movies. A *speech-act* is an act that a speaker performs when making an utterance and, according to Deleuze, it is what has been shown in silent movies as an alternative language to the linguistic language, because only a visual form of communication was possible. In silent movies everything was transmitted by and through the visible. There was a visual conversation and an exchange between people. Thus *speech-act* was seen in the image because it traces a path in the visual image. With the invention of sound in cinema, what was once shown started to be heard in plain dialogue in the form of and functioning through the act of speech. However, as well as visible, sound also developed very quickly in cinema and we started to hear more than just the *speech-act*.

The sound component of the cinematographic-image is more than just dialogues. Sound in cinema is the composition of pieces of noise, dialogue, voice-over, music and silence. The most important aspect of sound in cinema that separates it from theatre or radio series is its reference to an *out-of-field* angle. The term *out-of-field* is a Deleuzian concept and it refers to the sound of what is not visible.

> It refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present.[37]

We can consider this *out-of-field* as not only the spatial atmosphere but as the signification of the inner world as well. Sound *dwells* in this world.

> It is true that it is not sound that invents the *out-of-field*, but it is sound which dwells in it, and which fills the visual not-seen with a specific presence.[38]

Inner world here means the un-empirical, sensational world of the image. This state of sensational subjectivity is the underlying reality of the image. In fact even though the sound in the cinematographic-image is most likely spatial, which means it appears as the sound of something, it is also an important tool to represent the un-empirical reality of the image. In regard to acting, such inner world can be transmitted as the action. If it is the lifeless object that is in the image, then such sensational subjectivity transmits with an extra value, with light, color etc. However, with sound entering to cinema the inner world of the image has the potential to be heard, the way visible *speech-act* of the silent movies started to be heard. Thus sound in the cinematographic-image, no matter what the image is, adds an extra value and communicates outside the empirical world of which we most likely see in the visual component of the cinematographic-image. Again as we have already said, sound has the potential to manifest the sensational subjectivity of the image.

Inner world of the image however, is always in a process. As in Bergson's concept of *becoming,* it is not possible to divide sensational subjectivity within a quantitative manner. The image, like the *becoming* of the self, processes through qualitative alterations of the inner world of the cinematographic-image. Therefore there is an everlasting motion and continuum in the cinematographic-image as well. This is exactly

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[37] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1983). Tomlinson, Hugh & Habberjam, Barbara. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. 17

[38] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p.226

what Deleuze calls *sound continuum*. *Sound continuum* is the uncut flow of sound from one piece to another by an overlap or by crossing and cutting between the pieces. In modern cinema there is an atmospheric sound, which actually holds the rest of the soundtrack together and conditions the continuum. All the elements of sound form a continuum as something belonging to the visual image and it is never a kind of signifier for the visible, but rather it is an important component. For example, in live performances there exists no *sound continuum*, so sound cannot gain visibility, i.e. cannot be realized as an image. That could be the reason why live performances cannot create the same response with cinema. In the case of cinema, sound gains visibility.

> . . . the talkie, the sound film are heard, but as *a new dimension of the visual image, a new component.* It is even for this reason that they are image.[39]

In other words, image in modern cinema is an audio-visual image. This image has sound image and visual image as one, but sound and visual can exist separately as a cinematographic-image as well. That means the nature of the cinematographic-image could be read from the sound component as well as the visual. In terms of sound component the nature is the *continuum* via *out-of-field* references. If that is the case then via sound we experience an alternative perception in continuum, which is the opposite of our discontinuous empirical perception.

In our perception of the empirical world, there is no true continuity and everything is perceived in parts. Such a continuous world dwells only in mathematical reality and analytic knowledge. Some of the famous paradoxes of Zeno of Elea, the most important scholar of Parmenides, reveals that it is logically impossible and incompatible to establish any sort of correlation between empirical and mathematical reality because the former

[39] Ibid., p. 218

lacks continuity due to the way perception works, that is, it can never be experienced as a continuous whole. Zeno created these paradoxes in the form of antinomies to support Parmenides' doctrines: for him all was one indivisible, unchanging reality, and any appearances to the contrary were illusions, to be dispelled by reason.

Parmenides, who lived in the early 5th century (BC), rejects pluralism and the reality of any kind of change. He argues that being (that which is) is one, indivisible and unchanging and any appearances to the contrary are illusions to be dispelled by reason. Zeno, in many of his paradoxes, in order to ground and defend Parmenides' position, questions motion. These paradoxes show the impossibility of movement within our sense perception by attacking such axioms as "every finite unit can divide into infinite units", or "it is not possible to traverse or make contact with unlimited things individually in a limited time" and concludes that motion is not possible. For example, even if we take the fastest runner, since every finite unit can be divided into infinite units, when this runner starts to run, there will be infinite numbers of finite units for him to run. Hence supposing every time he steps further, he is still left with an infinite number of finite distances to run. Logically this would take infinite amount of time and therefore can go on forever. Hence, the runner, let alone passing any other competitor or finishing the race, cannot even start the race. Since the infinite numbers of unit can never be passed, neither movement nor change can occur. If this is the empirical world and if motion cannot take place, then what do we experience?

By arguing that motion is not possible in the empirical world, Zeno tries to prove that such empirical world is false. According to Parmenides, too, such a physical world was false. The real world was 'one being' that is an unchanging and indivisible whole. Thus

Parmenides believed that truth cannot be reached by sensory perception. What we experience as motion is just an illusion. If that is the case, then the empirical and mathematical world cannot be the real one. The real world should be indivisible and an unchanging 'one being'.

David Hume's analysis of induction and causality, more than two millennia later, makes it clear that we do not "really" experience the world as a whole. We experience it in parts. This partial perception seems like a whole due to our habits of thinking. Induction is a universal affirmative proposition, such as 'all swans are white'. However, without seeing all swans that existed and will exist, we cannot make the assumption that all swans are white. According to Hume, in order to have such an induction, we should assume

> that instances of which we have had no experience, must resemble those of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.[40]

However, it is impossible to provide an experiential/perceptual grounding to this claim. Hume argues that the same empirically unfounded assumption is present in the concept of causality, in the notion of establishing a constant conjunction between two types of events as cause and effect. This relation is not a logical one but rather, by depending on the experience we assume there is a cause and effect relation. Such kind of human reasoning he calls matters of fact:

> All reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent, he would give you a reason, and this reason would be some other fact.[41]

[40] Hume, David. A Treatise on Human Nature. Digireads.com Publishing 2010. p. 57
[41] Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Forgotten Books 2008. p.18

We have, on the other hand, propositions that are discoverable by reason, without depending on its real existence in the universe. Such propositions are called relations of ideas. Since experience is the only way of gaining knowledge, Hume applies his empiricist view to causality as well. Instead of taking the notion of causality for granted, Hume challenges us to consider what experience allows us to recognize as cause and effect. If there are two instances, where the two always occur together and one of them causes the other, then whenever the first one occurs, the other one would be expected to occur, as well. Meaning they would be constantly conjoined with a cause and effect relation.

In *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, he uses the example of billiard balls to prove the impossibility of cause and effect relation.

> When I see, for instance, a billiard ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse, may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from the cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasoning a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference. In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary.[42]

Thus Hume concludes that

> . . . there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we can never observe any tie between them. They seemed conjoined, but never connected.[43]

If we don't truly experience the tie between them, then we can't experience the interval. In the case of Zeno's paradox and in the case of the billiard balls, this interval, which we cannot experience, is movement. And movement as we know seems only to be

[42] Ibid., p. 20
[43] Morris, Herbert. Freedom and Responsibility. California: Stanford University Press 1961. p. 71

an illusion; therefore the world as we know it is actually partial and discontinuous, thus reality is not within empirical perception.

If the empirical world is discontinuous, then the kind of continuum we experience in the cinematographic-image via sound could be experienced through the intuitive perception, the metaphysical phenomena we discussed in the analysis of the basics of Bergsonian metaphysics. In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image,* Deleuze argues that for Bergson, movement is missed in two ways.

> On the one hand, you can bring two instants or two positions together to infinity; but movement will always occur in the interval between the two… On the other hand, however much you divide and subdivide time, movement will always occur in a concrete duration; thus each movement will have its own qualitative duration.[44]

What Deleuze means here is that even though Bergson thinks that the world consists of immobile images, movement will always be in the interval, and this interval has its own distinction from the rest. However, the difference is not quantitative, but rather something qualitative, thus concrete duration is interval's distinct quality.

Bergson's *process ontology* explains the concept of movement with qualitative alterations and as metaphysical phenomena. We cannot see change in terms of numbers or before and after, but more like the inner change, or rather *becoming*. With these metaphysical alterations the real movement occurs. Bergson argues that an object from a material world can have mobile alterations if a person can focus on the object's place in the memory instead of the perception of it. As a matter of fact, for Bergson, real movement occurs by the association of the past within the memory. His concept of memory is never the memory that memorizes and learns the needs of daily life, but rather it is a kind of an intuitive memory, which can interact with and alter itself.

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[44] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1983). Tomlinson, Hugh & Habberjam, Barbara. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. 1

Bergson talks about two kinds of memories. One is the habitual-memory, which works within the sensory-motor mechanism, and the other one is the pure-memory. Pure-memory is an intuitive process and is always variable. The first one is in the service of physical survival, and that is the memory of empirical perception. The second one is the memory of intuition. As a simple act inside the subject, which carries the trace of the past to today, intuition enables the continuity of such memory. The immobile sections of the perception process become mobile on the ground of memory. Bergson says these images are snapshots and instead of concentrating their spatiality, concentrating to their temporality with memory, the metaphysical movement happens. Subject is also in alteration and in constant *becoming* since intuitive process is merely internal and happens by memory. According to Bergsonian process ontology, the real movement is not the alteration of things but rather, as the everlasting-metaphysical movement it is the alteration of the self. Movement of matter in the physical world regarding to our empirical perception is not possible and therefore what we experience is just an illusion of movement. Thus change is not in terms of quantity but rather in terms of quality.

We have mentioned in the chapter of the concept of time that the cinematographic-image seems to work in a very similar vein with the intellect. Bergson's description of how ordinary knowledge is attained is a proof of that.

> Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside of them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality . . . We may therefore sum up . . . that the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.[45]

For Bergson the cinematographic-image is an analogy on how the intellect approaches reality. In cinema movement occurs along with static images. Hence,

[45] Bergson, Henri-Louis. Creative Evolution. Mitchell, Arthur. Cosimo Classics, Inc. 2007. p. 332

according to his analogy, intellect can never communicate with reality because intellect, with its analytical approach, resembles the cinematographic-image that consists of immobile sections. If that is the case then movement in the cinematographic-image is false movement and the same as our intellect, therefore the cinematographic-image cannot represent reality. In spite of that, movement appears as the unique element of the visual component of the cinematographic-image since its invention.

The visual component of the cinematographic-image is the composition of light, color, depth, form and movement. The other visual arts such as painting, photography or sculpture cannot imitate movement. Also performance arts, such as acting or dance, which can be realized within motion, do not re-create movement as in cinema. In performance arts, movement of the performer is a mere reality happening in front of our own eyes in real time. In cinema, movement is something that is created or captured, which offers an alternative present instead of real time (real time here does not mean *duration,* it means that the action happens at the same time we see it). Thus no matter what, *movement* is the unique visual component of the cinematographic-image.

If it is only false movement that is in the image, then we should be able to explain the visual only with a technical approach, i.e. by explaining how we empirically perceive this false movement. In fact, as we mentioned before, for a long time, the mind's persistence of vision was the answer to how we experience movement in cinema. According to the persistence of vision, if the person looks at an image long enough, then after the image disappears, the vision of the image still remains. In regard to cinematic illusion, if the snapshots can move fast enough, then the eye won't see the blank (space) between the two snapshots. Eyes can only recognize movement.

However, this theory becomes inadequate in time due to new scientific inventions. In 1912, Max Wertheimer, a Czech-born psychologist, proposes a new theory that justifies the cinematographic illusion. He argues that the mind has two kinds of perceptual illusions: phi phenomenon and beta movement. These optical illusions happen as the optic nerve's response to light and as a result of un-existing information. A number of questions emerge: is the cinematographic-image only an optical illusion? Is the optical illusion the effect of the cinematographic-image? Is it because real time performances lack optical illusions that they cannot produce the same effect as cinema?

German-American psychologist Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916) argues that there is a unique aspect in cinema, which lets all suggestions such as depth, motion, etc. to be considered and registered as real. In *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study*, he examines the psychological factors involved in watching silent "moving pictures". First, he points out the differences between *photoplay* (cinema) and theatre in terms of depth and movement. In fact, while theatre has three dimensions, *photoplay* is just a flat picture. However, it has the possibility of not being just a picture.

> That flatness is an objective part of the technical physical arrangements, but not a feature of that which we really see in the performance of the photoplay. We are there in the midst of a three-dimensional world, and the movements of the persons or of the animals or even of the lifeless things, like the streaming of the water in the brook or the movements of the leaves in the wind, strongly maintain our immediate impression of depth.[46]

He argues that everything we see on the screen is our own creation. After the associations we make, we create depth in the flat screen and we create the movement of immobile snapshots. A movie is actually an ongoing movement of snapshots on a celluloid film and the image can only suggest movement. Thus movement in the

[46] Münsterberg, Hugo. The Photoplay A Psychological Study (1916). Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=1499682&pageno p. 15

cinematographic-image that is the result of successive alterations is just an illusion, as in the material world.

According to Münsterberg's approach to cinema, in spite of the direct relation between technology and cinema, technology is only a medium for the ontic principle that conditions the cinematographic-image, and it cannot relate to the nature of the cinematographic-image or explain how all the suggestions are registered as real. In the end, technical approach may be able to explain how the illusion of motion is created but, for example, cannot explain how the flat screen is registered as if it is three-dimensional. Moreover, in the sound and visual components of cinema, we conceive a metaphysical reality. The capacity of a flat screen to communicate through the suggestions it proposes is a metaphysical phenomenon. Thus, due to the captured alternative present, what we actually experience by false movement is the continuity of the internal process, which is in real alteration and real motion. Because of this false movement, *photoplay* is registered as if it is three-dimensional. In the end, cinema and the cinematographic-image is the practice of signs and images; it is a practice, which inevitably incorporates the viewer to the process as an active participant and ends with his or her interaction. It is never a mere technical phenomenon. Thus, any kind of optical illusion or the mind's cinematographic process cannot comprehensively explain the nature of the cinematographic-image. Then the question is: how can false movement disclose real movement?

Hugo Münsterberg thinks it is actually *time*, which appears as another dimension and which enables all other suggestions to be possible. In fact the nature of continuum and movement are not so different to each other and they both refer to *time*. Moving image is an image that unfolds in time and continuum is basically time passing. Either as empirical

illusion or metaphysical reality, both movement and continuum are inevitably in time. If we say movement and continuum are happening in the cinematographic-image as a metaphysical phenomenon, then time should also be experienced not only as subjective time, but also as *pure duration.* Pure duration is the flow of consciousness: the continuity of one's immanence to one's self that is in continuous progress. Thus, it only has qualitative alteration within its progress. This metaphysical phenomenon, which is indivisible in terms of units and heterogeneous, becomes *time*, when we want to express it. *Pure duration* can only be experienced via sympathy and intuition. In *pure duration*, motion and alteration belong to the inner self and they are everlasting, thus also metaphysical and intuitive.

In the chapters *The Concept of Time* and *The Ontic Principle of The Cinematographic-image,* we mentioned that the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image calls for the multiplicity of time. Because each and every image starts a new time series and when it finishes the series ends. It is the multiplicity of duration, which can reflect such a principle. If we take the above point into account, now we can say that the kind of time series a cinematographic-image opens is not in quantitative manner, but rather as the concrete duration, within its own distinct quality. Therefore the way the cinematographic-image captures time is very different from any other kind of art.

Photography also captures time, but the cinematographic-image is different than plainly capturing time. André Bazin (1918 - 1958), French film theorist and film critic, in his book *What Is Cinema?,* argues that photography brings a new side to realism:

> Hence the charm of family albums. Those grey or sepia shadows, phantomlike and almost undecipherable, are no longer traditional family portraits but rather the

> disturbing presence of lives halted at a set moment in their duration, freed from their destiny…[47]

Bazin asserts that such a work of art *embalms* time in the image because reality of the image comes from its ability of capturing the object's time. Both photography and cinema can capture time, but there is a fundamental difference in the way they achieve this: Photography happens as an instant and it is static. It can't move any further. However, in cinema, a moving picture that is in continuum fabricates another reality. Such reality is of a temporal nature.

> Now for the first time, the image of things is likewise the image of their *duration*, change mummified as it were.[48]

Therefore cinema is the objectivity of time. In other words, that cinematographic-image does not capture time necessarily as a moment limited to one static shot, like photography, but rather as it's passing, as something in motion and thus, in continuum is what distinguishes cinematography from photography. In a photo we can never experience image that is unfolding in time, but in the cinematographic-image we encounter an alternative time perception that is in continuity. For example in photography the image is perceived as a part of our perception, in our reality and in our time. However, in cinema, the image is perceived with another perception with its own reality, and its own time. Such power to create an alternative perception is the nature of the cinematographic-image and time is what is perceived. Tarkovsky emphasizes this cinematic capability:

> For the first time in the history of the arts, in the history of culture, man found the means *to take an impression of time.*[49]

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[47] Bazin, Andre. What is Cinema? Gray, Hugh. California: University of California Press, 2005. p. 14
[48] Ibid. p. 15
[49] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 62

Unlike photography, with the cinematographic-image this *impression of time* isn't a defined moment but it is the *temporal subjectivity* of *real-time, duration*. By spatialization of what is temporal, as its nature, the cinematographic-image offers an alternative perception, in which we experience *duration* and we experience movement and continuum as metaphysical happenings. Everything that is temporal and internal becomes spatial and then re-temporalizes again through this spatialization. In cinema with such spatialization a new kind of perception is created. This cinematic perception is fundamentally more complex than, and potentially opposed to, our empirical perception, which is tainted with spatial and temporal discontinuity. It also contains the conditions of possibility of a new form of subjectivity because it offers a new vantage point for another, radically different subject/object relationship. The structure of the cinematographic-image will show us how such perception of time is conveyed to the viewer and explain the new subjectivity it offers.

3.2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE

How do we experience time in the cinematographic-image? The answer lies in its structure. The very same answer also reveals how the cinematographic-image communicates its origin and meaning to the viewer. This again isn't about what the image tells us but in which structure it reaches out, no matter what the object of the image is. For a long time the cinematographic-image was analyzed in connection with semiotics, because since the first narrative, films were analyzed by the relation of images. It is true that cinema is the practice of signs and images, and due to this, within the cinematographic-image there has to be a kind of sign functioning or a kind of referential structure, but is this the structure of classical semiotics?

Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857 – 1913) lays the foundation for semiotics and points out linguistic sign functioning. Saussure argues that in language words are types of signs. A word, namely a sign, as a signifier, signifies what it stands for, and that is referred to as the signified. That which is signified is the concept or the object that a sign refers to. The theory of semiotics is not limited to just linguistics, rather, it can be valid for any kind of sign. In fact, the history of film theory relies on the sign functioning of the signifier and the signified. With the practice of semiology, classical film theory shifts to classical film semiotics and linguistics is applied to the practice of images and signs. Thus the semiology of cinema is the discipline that applies linguistic models to images as constituting to its principals.

The use of linguistic semiology starts with the structuralist film theory. Structuralist film theory is a branch of film theory that is rooted in structuralism, which is based on structural linguistics itself. The structuralist film theory emphasizes how films convey meaning through the use of codes and conventions, which is similar to the way languages are used to construct meaning in communication. Film semioticians justify using structural linguistics to study cinema by saying that natural language and cinematic language have a resemblance that emphasizes the underlying reality of the images. According to such theory, as in language, cinematic language also has its codes, a system of signs and conventions, i.e. cinematic language builds on the relation between the signified and the signifier.

French film theorist Christian Metz (1931 – 1993) argues that since cinema is constituted within a narrative as an historical fact, then images, in fact every shot, is reduced to a proposition or a kind of oral utterance. If that is the case, then the smallest

unit of linguistics is missing: word. A shot can only be considered as a 'sentence' such as 'man is walking'. In fact according to Metz linguistic semiotics cannot be applied to the cinematographic-image, because images are un-coded. Un-coded here means that "the image becomes what it shows, to the extent that it does not have to signify it anymore." Thus the shot turns into expression rather than signification. Expressiveness is the expressiveness of the world, and according to Metz this is what is done in cinema. 'Meaning' naturally derives from the signifier without resorting to a code. Therefore, a language system, which is a highly organized code, does not explain what cinema is.

Language, on the other hand, covers broader areas. Saussure, for example, explains language as the combination of *language system* and *speech*. Metz, who considers a 'shot' a way of speech (since it is a sentence), argues that cinema is a language, but is different from verbal language. Syntax of such language is a syntactical one and done through montage.

> The moment of ordering (montage) in film is somehow more important—linguistically at least—than the choosing of the images (cutting).[50]

He argues that art in cinema starts with the visual and it continues on the level of sequence or of the composed shot. Therefore for Metz an image is always a kind of speech but it is not a unit of a language system. Montage's act of ordering creates syntactical-basis syntax and not a morphological one. Thereon the 'cinematographic language' begins.

Deleuze, on the other hand, argues that cinema is not a language. It is a new practice of images and signs, which can produce conceptual objects:

[50] Metz, Christian. Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema. Taylor, Michael. The University of Chicago Press, 1990 p.68

> Cinema is not a universal or a primitive language system [*langue*], nor a language [*langage*]. It brings to light an intelligible content, which is like a preposition, a condition, a necessary correlate through which language constructs its own 'objects' (signifying units and operations).[51]

In this sense the referential structure of the cinematographic-image echoes American philosopher and mathematician Charles Sanders Pierce's (1839 – 1914) triad semiotics, which is an alternative to Saussure's dual semiotics. In Pierce's semiotics, there is a triadic system of sign functioning between "sign" "object" and "interpretant." According to what Peirce calls "the sign relation", the sign (also called the representamen) is the term that is ordinarily said to represent or mean something. Signs are qualities, relations, features, items, events, states, regularities, habits, laws, and so on, which have meanings, significances, or interpretations. The object is what ordinarily would be said to be the "thing" meant or signified or represented by the sign, what the sign is a sign *of*. The interpretant of a sign is said by Peirce to be that *to which* the sign represents the object. However, what exactly Peirce means by the interpretant is difficult to pin down.

> It is something like a mind, a mental act, a mental state, or a feature or quality of mind; at all events the interpretant is something ineliminably mental. . . . The interpretant of a sign, by virtue of the very definition Peirce gives of the sign-relation, must itself be a sign, and a sign moreover of the very same object that is (or was) represented by the (original) sign. In effect, then, the interpretant is a second signifier of the object, only one that now has an overtly mental status. But, merely in being a sign of the original object, this second sign must itself have (Peirce uses the word "determine") an interpretant, which then in turn is a new, third sign of the object, and again is one with an overtly mental status. And so on.[52]

According to Pierce, if there is any sign at all of any object, then there is an infinite sequence of signs of that same object. So, everything in the world of appearances, which he calls "the phaneron," and which consists entirely of signs, being a sign itself, begins an infinite sequence of mental interpretants of an object. The key point of Pierce's semiotics

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[51] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. 251

[52] Burch, Robert. Charles Sanders Peirce in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#triad

is that the interpretant has a similar relation to the object with the object's original representamen and therefore the interpretant becomes a representamen to another interpretant. That is, if there is a sign there is an infinite sequence of representations of an object and an infinite circulation. Thinking, for example, is a process of sign interpretation, because thoughts consist of signs. Thoughts, which follow the law of mental associations, suggest something to a following thought. As a result, the former thought becomes a sign to the next thought. Every single thought is interpreted by another thought; in a sense, they feed off each other. In fact no thought can occur in an instant. In time, thoughts continuously follow one after the other, like a moment. Therefore within different moments there are different thoughts. This is the principle of continuity of thought as stated by Pierce, because there is a never-ending cycle of interpretation.

Pierce's semiotics is critical for our purposes because it provides a philosophical explanation and critical understanding of how *duration* manifests itself in the cinematographic-image. In the cinematographic-image we experience *time* within a referential structure that is singular to the image, but also derives meaning in connection to the "interpretant". Pierce's sign relation justifies that the real subject of the cinematographic-image should be the effect of the interpretant(s) that create(s) the function of signs. If we say that the cinematographic-image has such triad referential structure then the subjectivity of the cinematographic-image cannot be defined simply by the difference between subject and object.

According to Münsterberg's analysis, in terms of the cinematographic-image there are only suggestions. It means that, there has to be an interpreter for all suggestions on

movement, depth, etc. to signify something and to become real. If the interpretant is the viewer and the representamen is the image, as the result of viewing the image, the interpretant will have a similar relation to the object with the object's original representamen. Following this, the interpretant, the mental content created by the viewer upon seeing the image, becomes a representamen to another interpretant. This interpretant, which interprets the viewer's thoughts, is the image. After the interpretation of the subject or the mental content created by the subject the cinematographic-image that is in motion and in continuum flows within the perception of the viewer and it becomes the representamen again.

As a result of this triad sign functioning, an everlasting circulation occurs within the mind of a single viewer. Therefore the relationship of the cinematographic-image to what is represented will always be the result of the endless relation of the cinematographic-image to its interpreter. The formal or structural relations of these images, which would include their relation to what they stand for and who interprets them, would be the singular syntax of the cinematographic-image.

Duration manifests itself within the cinematographic-image via this syntax. At this point, Bergson's concept of sympathy and *duration* are very important. According to him, conceiving the object by going into it, by sympathy, actually happens by going into one's own self, i.e. by feeling sympathy towards one's self. Such sympathy can expand to others heterogeneously. If a person can concentrate enough on the sympathy towards one's self, in order to conceive it, this person can locate himself within the *duration*, and expand to the absolute *duration*. The cinematographic-image may not be able to express *duration* (since when it is expressed it becomes *time*) but can create such affective

inclination. This will help the viewer to concentrate his/her own *duration* and the present becomes variable. The captured past re-plays in the present time, which creates the viewer's present through his/her private memories/past. Deleuze explains this as the flow of present:

> It is not quite right to say that the cinematographic image is in the present. What in the present is, what the image 'represents' but not the image itself… The image itself is the system of the relationships of time from which the variable present only flows.[53]

According to him, the temporality of the variable present of the image cannot be defined simply with the chronological present-past-future relations and by their alterations. Even though the captured past is becoming the present of the viewer, while the present is constantly moving towards the past, it does not explain the flow of present. Instead through the referential structure of the cinematographic-image the flow of present can be explained. It is because what is in the present is never the image itself, but what it 'represents'. If the referential structure of the image is the cycling interpretation of the viewer and the cinematographic-image, then it is this relation that creates the variable present. This motion of present is only perceptible by the subject and it is relative to subject. In this case the flow of present is in a metaphysical sense and the alterations of the variable present is in qualitative manner. This 'variable present' is *temporal subjectivity*. It is as if the *duration* of the image and the *duration* of the spectator are interpreting each other within an everlasting cycle and are creating a new memory.

In fact, in the cinematographic-image, the concept of memory regarding *time* and *duration* transforms. We deal with the mutual-memory of the image and the private-memory of the viewer. Mutual-memory is the cinematographic-image's referential

[53] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. [xi]i

structure, which is singular but also shared by everyone who watches it, therefore making it mutual. On the other hand, private-memory is not just the personal history of the viewer, which differs for every each person, but it is also the pure-memory, which means it is always changing. The syntax of the image is within the common grounds of these two kinds of memories, because in the cinematographic-image, there is a constant communication between the subject (viewer) and the object (the image) as the image continues. The viewer perceives triad sign functioning of the cinematographic-image as the immediate perception due to the immediate encounter of the constantly progressing image. As in Bergson's phenomenology, object and subject become one, and the subject experiences the object by going into it, i.e. by sympathy.

Tarkovsky explains this new subjectivity in a different way. He argues that through the poetic connections in cinema, feelings become heightened and the spectator becomes an active participant in the work. Poetic relationality creates an emotional space and especially helps the spectator to join the act of understanding life, since it does not present ready resolution nor does it depend on the writer's demands. Tarkovsky points out that the spectator

> becomes a participant in the process of discovering life, unsupported by ready-made deductions from the plot or ineluctable pointers by the author. He has at his disposal only what helps to penetrate to the deeper meaning of the complex phenomena represented in front of him. Complexities of thought and poetic visions of the world do not have to be thrust into the framework of the patently obvious. The usual logic, that of linear sequentially, is uncomfortably like the proof of a geometry theorem.[54]

This structure starts with the spatialization of everything that is temporal and internal in nature, as the immediate perception of the universe. Within the cinematographic-image, due to such spatialization, a new kind of perception is created. First, data enters

[54] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 20

with images and they are always immobile. Then within the memory, by reflecting the past to the present, the metaphysical movement, *becoming*, occurs. During this process, spatial output, the cinematographic-image, re-temporalizes with the participation of the spectator. Memory temporalizes the perception through qualitative alterations. The relation of the self with these images in the mind is the pinnacle subjectivity and it is temporal. In a way the spectator experiences himself within another time series, i.e. within another perception of time. Thus, the perception of the camera becomes the perception of a new subject. It is true that the cinematographic-image appears in space and time, but also in hyper-reality. The cinematographic-image creates an alternative perception, in which *time* is re-created as the immediate reflection of *temporal subjectivity*.

Our analysis thus shows us how the cinematographic-image develops from being an immobile spatial shot into a kind of articulation of subjectivity through many channels. In the end, the structure of the cinematographic-image manifests itself as the structure of real-time, *duration* that is in metaphysical motion. As we have seen in the previous chapter, *duration* is something that is internal and expresses itself on the grounds of memory. In memory it turns into *becoming* with the constant interaction of the images. Such structure is present in every moving image, but does it work within cinema? Can a movie, as a work of art, reflect the structure or the nature of the cinematographic-image? Can it even reflect the origin of the cinematographic-image?

In the following section, we will question the relation between the cinematographic-image and cinematic impulses. If cinema's origin is also time and if it also revolves

around time, then we will be able to determine whether *time* is the aesthetic value of cinema or not.

3.3. CINEMATIC IMPULSES AND THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE

In the first chapter we inquired about the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image through its development. We saw that with the cinematographic-image man achieves mastery over time. In this chapter we investigated the nature and the structure of the cinematographic-image, which brought about the articulation of such concepts as movement, continuum and time. As a matter of fact, movement, which is in continuum, requires change and that only happens in the course of time, thus the origin of cinema reveals itself as time.

We also saw in the previous chapters that such concepts as time, movement, and change, as long as they constitute a continuum, cannot be grounded on and justified by the perceptual experience of the empirical world. They only justify their reality within the framework of and in reference to qualitative processes. If that is the case, then in real life and in cinema, physical movement is false movement and time of the clock is abstract time. The real movement in cinema, as well as in the empirical perception, is a metaphysical kind. Therefore the cinematographic-image offers an alternative time perception. This perception enables the cinematographic-image to register as the *temporal subjectivity*. Such subjectivity is the real-time, *duration*. If duration is the origin of the cinematographic-image and also if it shapes its nature and its structure, then we need to explain how duration manifests itself in cinema. How does cinema maintain such effect of the cinematographic-image? And is there a possibility that cinema may reduce the effect of the cinematographic-image?

According to Bergson, movies represent time but not *duration* because they are spatializing everything that is internal. As we have seen, Bergson argues that time, as in clock-time, is just a spatialization of real-time, *duration*. Real-time cannot be represented to the intellect and when it is, the intellect becomes a spatializing mechanism by nature. When film cameras were initially invented, the formal nature of the cinematographic-image was very different than what it is today. There was no sound, montage or a mobile camera eye but just fixed shots, which had the same apparatus as a projector. In fact, these films were still under the influence of theatre and photography. They were filmed from an immobile viewpoint, in which the film camera was just used as a passive recording device. Without understanding the aesthetical effect of the cinematographic-image, the film camera, after its invention, was mostly used for plane documentations. The effect of first experiments such as *The Arrival of a Train at the Station* was lost within such desire to record reality. A fixed camera was filming the streets and urban life, but not with any subjectivity, rather as a mere recording device of the space and the motion within the space. On the other hand, if they filmed indoors, they used the film camera as the fourth wall, the same as the standpoint of the audience in the theatre. The angle never changed and it was seen as the space within three walls, just like a stage. In this early cinema, images were transmitted as spatial due to what it represented, which was movement and spatialized time.

Therefore duration, real-time, which is the origin of the cinematographic-image, is communicated only when the cinematographic-image is and remains temporalized. Temporal image, the opposite of spatial image, represents the metaphysical alteration of the inner-self, i.e. it represents *temporal subjectivity*. Such "unempirical" alteration can

be experienced in cinema only if the image stops being an imprint of space and transmits its duration. Deleuze in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* defines temporalized images as virtual and spatialized images as actual. Virtual can be define as having all of the properties of x while not necessarily being x. If this is the case, virtual image represents all the qualitative alterations, whereas actual image represents quantitative alterations. Therefore virtual image, which is temporal, communicates as the internal expression and cannot be actualized fully. On the other hand, actualized image is spatial and determined by the law(s) of nature.

> Virtual image (pure recollection) is not a psychological state or a consciousness: it exists outside of consciousness, in time.[55]

Virtual image is not in connection to cognitive understanding of the image, but is rather like an inner circuit that connects to qualitative alterations of the inner-self, i.e. to *duration*. In fact virtual images carry the *sign* of the past, which is a *sign* of a temporal perspective, and they are actualized in relation to a new present created with the participation of the spectator. As virtual image, the cinematographic-image becomes a circuit between the past and the present, an internal circuit between the virtual and its actual. If that is the case, then temporal aspect reveals itself in cinema only if the film camera is used less as an objective recording device and more as a tool for an articulation of something that is internal.

From that perspective, the most important invention in terms of the articulation of subjectivity in the history of cinema can be considered as the accidental discovery of the traveling shot. As a result of placing the fixed camera inside a boat it became mobile and the camera was moving through the landscape. This accidental discovery was actually re-

[55] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. 77

discovering the principle of relativity, which is the chance of movement that is given to the absolute observer. According to German author, art and film theorist Rudolf Arnheim, (1904 – 2007) the process of discovering subjectivity in the objective recording of a machine is what proved cinema as a new art form. As a result of this, the film camera became more than a mechanical recording tool and it was re-discovered as a narrative tool. In fact with the "traveling gaze" of the mobile camera, cinema becomes something radically more complex and fundamentally different than an objective recording process: it now interprets its object, because the eye of the camera becomes a kind of consciousness that perceives and interprets constantly, as does the spectator.

This subjectivity temporalizes the image, because it represents the inner *duration* of the image and it can expend heterogeneously to others. This means the subjectivity of the mobile viewpoint can expand to the spectator. By re-creating reality or by freeing the observer (the camera eye), spatial shots of the early silent era, which were solely recording urban life, become subjective and temporal again. More importantly, as people discovered and enjoyed the subjectivity of the cinematographic-image, the cinematographic-image established itself as a popular tool for narrative. After this point, cinema as narrative, as how we know it today, was formed around the art of the cinematographic-image.

Within the narrative path, cinema parented two basic forms: a classical form and a modern form. In both forms, the cinematographic-image is used in different ways. Either cinema is taken as the art of such an image or the image is treated just as one of the blocks within the determined whole. In the former one the image has its own value and its own sensational subjectivity outside the whole work, thus, image forms the narrative.

On the other hand, in the latter one, without connection to the whole the image cannot communicate its own value. In such classical form, the plot as the narration shapes the image. We can experience modern forms in very old films and we can also experience classical forms in today's films. It is not a matter of time or era, but just different approaches to the art of cinema. These two different impulses in cinema compass the effect of the cinematographic-image in two different forms. By investigating the classical and the modern forms of cinema we will attain if cinema reduces or increases the effect of the cinematographic-image.

3.3.1. Classical Form

The classical form of cinema due to its montage technique evolved as the result of narration. In the classical form, the plot of the movie molds the cinematic impulse, incident by incident, like a chain reaction. In fact classical form of cinema is conceived within a cognitive perception, and not intuitively. As the result of watching and understanding via mental processes, such work of cinema functions in organic nature.

American filmmaker D. W. Griffith established the foundations of the classical form of cinema. Deleuze names Griffith's editing technique as *American Organic Montage*. Deleuze considers Griffith's montage to be "organic" because in his films shots are put in order to create natural relation between them and nothing artificial. They are combined according to *sensory-motor schema*, which is the empirical process of perception depending on the law of nature and not in any other way. Every shot is put in order just to define empirical perception of the character. Today's invisible editing, where cuts are almost imperceptible, is the continuity of Griffith's organic montage. In such films, it is our empirical perception that works in sensory-motor schema and functions within the

law of nature, i.e. it works through intellect. Since it is not against what the intellect expects, the viewer does not realize the cuts but rather concentrates on the plot of the movie. If that is the case then time appears as transformed space, and not as *duration*, since intellect can only work analytically, whereas *duration* can be experienced only intuitively.

Within such a schema even a subjective perception like a close-up can only appear as a spatial shot. Again it was Griffith who used the close-up for the first time in the history of cinema. In his movie *The Lonedale Operator* (1911), Griffith especially uses the close-up shot to emphasize the female character's action. We see a close-up of a wrench as the female character tries to fool the other character as if it were a gun. By the insertion of close-up shots, subjectivity is reduced to the action of the subject instead of being experienced internally. The action of the subject is controlled by intellect and happens only as cause and effect. Thus, the insertion of a close-up enables the viewer to select what to perceive, or what is important to perceive within sensory-motor schema. This is not the only effect of the insertion of the close-up, but this is the way Griffith used it in his organic montage.

Griffith's organic montage is actually characterized with *parallel cutting*. Before Griffith, another American filmmaker, Edwin S. Porter, used the technique of *parallel cutting* in his film *The Great Train Robbery* (1903). In the movie, Porter used many techniques to reinforce the narrative, but *parallel cutting* was the most innovative one. It was through the use of this technique that, for the first time, the director was able to tell the story with parallel actions which happen at the same time but in different locations. Until then, cinema could only tell stories of people who share the same space. Parallel

cutting brings different locations within one time line, but also it enforces the unity of diversity to underline narration.

Especially in Griffith's movies there is a great organic unity of differentiated opposites, which appear as the organic unity of the whole, such as man and woman, poor and rich, country and town. He unites these diversities with parallel storylines and through them he creates the organic relation within shots. In *parallel cutting* the convergent actions do not only tend towards a single end, as the unity of diversity, but also as the unity of time. In fact in this kind of cinematic impulse time always stays as something objective to everyone and as one, single thing. If this occurs then montage reduces effect of the cinematographic-image and it offers the perception of space. It is because in such montage we conceive the fixed and defined perception of a character within a determined perception, time discloses as the unity of successive sections. It happens as the minimum unity of time or the absolute 'gaze' as the totality of time. If the structure of the cinematographic-image is covered by the unity of time due to its narrative, then the perception of time is being reduced to the perception of space, which gives the effect of time, but it does not represent time directly. Such cinematic impulse represents movement because what we experience is just the transformed space, like the early silent movies. Thus in Griffith's organic montage, the image organically develops to the whole, as the unity of time but it cannot represent *duration*.

Soviet filmmakers created their own montage technique as a critique of the American style, yet they also ended up with a conception of montage that serves as a tool to display the perception of space. In spite of vast ideological differences, Soviet dialectic montage has an organic nature very similar to that of American style. Russian film director and

theorist Sergei Eisenstein conceptualized the idea of montage as a technique in accordance with dialectic dynamics. His inspiration was his mentor, Russian filmmaker and film theorist Lev Vladimirovich Kuleshov (1899-1970).

Kuleshov is best known for his cinematic experiment in which shots of an actor were intercut with various random images in order to show how montage can change the viewer's interpretation of the image. The idea is, if you put two images one after another, these two should conflict and create a third thing in the mind, which also should build a relation with the next coming image. Thus, according to Kuleshov, cinema consists of montage and juxtaposition of images. Eisenstein, after realizing the effects of juxtaposing cinematographic-images, followed Kuleshov's footsteps but re-conceptualized the method in terms of ideological purposes and went on to invent dialectic cutting.

In order to create dialectic form Eisenstein uses two opposite sides, but unlike Griffith, his opposite sides are not only different but also in conflict with each other. Eisenstein believes that there is always conflict in art; either with regard to its social mission, or with regard to its nature or methodology, conflict is fundamental for the existence of an art form. It can be set up as verbal utterance, in space, in physical movement, or by visual communication. In Eisenstein's cinema, dialectic dynamics were embodied in *conflict* and it was reflected by the juxtaposition of images. Thus, in his dialectic cutting Eisenstein creates two parts which are opposed and in conflict with each other. He places *parallel montage* with the *montage of opposition*.

Deleuze states that there are formal and absolute alterations, because what alters is not relative, it is rather formal. In Eisenstein's montage we do not experience the image in progression, because transitions appear as a jump between shots instead of as an

organic link. As a result of that, change happens in terms of its quality as the development of a new dimension in consciousness. Such dialectic montage does not construct empirical reality, instead it constructs dialectic reality, which constantly produces itself and grows. If this is the case, then like making a literary argument, Eisenstein constantly argues a point by using images, because the image emphasizes an ideology instead of concentrating on its object's reality. This happens in the intellect, as in Griffith's organic montage. Therefore, since in dialectic montage the control is also in the intellect, shots are inevitably designed within the *sensory-motor schema*.

We can see that at the beginning of cinema, montage shaped this cinematic impulse, or rather used as an important tool to reflect the underlying reality of the narrative. In the case of classical form the law of nature is what such an impulse is based. This classical approach to cinematic form is still alive and well. The contemporary mainstream film industry mostly produces films within this form. Even in film theories, this "classicist" impulse is deemed and employed as an analytical tool. For example, Cognitive Film Theory of 1990's analyzes an image in accordance with the same principles. Cognitivists reflect the physiological and cognitive systems onto everything. They argue that all suggestions of the cinematographic-image (dimension, movement, depth, etc.) seem natural because they function according to the norms of human perception. However, Cognitivists deny the psychoanalytic and structuralist semiotic film theories. Instead they focus on the cause and effect narrative and space-time relations. The reason they try to find meaning through the process of the intellect is because the same process of making sense is present in our everyday life experiences. This is basically the sensory-motor schema and in the end it is pure intellect that molds the cinematic experience. Such a

theory can be valuable only within the classical form, because it is the classical form that works within the sensory-motor links governing the operations of an isolated pure intellect.

The classical form's relation to intellect creates two problems. Such an impulse of cinema cannot communicate the origin of the cinematographic-image, which is *duration.* It is because as long as such films work within the law of nature, i.e. progress as cause and effect relations, they cannot create time as an alternative perception. If we think that the only causality can exist through the law of nature, as in sensory-motor linkage, then time that we experience can only be in cycling motion, as we have seen in Aristotle's case. Thus such a time concept cannot have subjective relation to the viewer; instead it remains as an objective category, which relies on change. In this sense what we observe through the changes of the character has no connection to the real origin of the cinematographic-image, which is duration. As we have already mentioned in the previous chapter, real-time duration cannot be conveyed by the intellect or within the analytical process. As a result, in classical form of cinema we cannot have the metaphysical experience of *duration,* but rather experience the perception of space, via empirical expressions. In classical form as the spatial motion and empirical expression, action of the plot builds the narration.

It follows that the classical form of cinema cannot convey the nature or the structure of the cinematographic-image either, because they revolve around *duration.* The sensory-motor links of narration and montage cuts off the communication of the cinematographic-image. As we have mentioned the cinematographic-image conveys time through everlasting cycling of signification. The object and the subject become one and beget a

new subjectivity as the alternative perception that the cinematographic-image offers. However in the classical form of cinema image is actualized through its determined links within the sensory-motor schema. Which means the subject objectively perceives the image as the perception of space. Thus in classical form of cinema the real artistic form, the cinematographic-image and its effect is restrained.

This brings us to the second problem of the classical form's engagement to intellect. If we think in terms of aesthetics and consider Kant's theory, then we can say that such determination causes different judgment than aesthetic judgment, because intellect only works within cognitive process through determined cause and effect relations, whereas aesthetic judgment is neither determined nor empirical, it is pure affection. Thus in classical form of cinema judgment is always cognitive and on the agreeable. If this is the case then such impulse of cinema is hardly an artistic practice or the art of cinematographic-image.

Since the classical form cannot reveal *duration* as its origin, we cannot say that the origin of cinema is *duration*, unless the modern form is able to reveal *duration* as its origin and emphasizes the effect of the cinematographic-image. Therefore, in the next section we will investigate the modern form of cinema and see how the effect of the cinematographic-image and duration works in this form.

3.3.2. Modern Form

The modern form of cinema is neither necessarily experimental nor independent but rather it is a directorial cinema. If the film is designed within an objective law of nature, again we can only be left with an objective perception, which is the perception of space. On the other hand if we can encounter the director's own subjective perception within a

movie, this will expand to another kind of subjectivity in which object and subject become one due to the heterogeneity of duration. In such modern form, it is not the plot or the character that forms the narration; instead it is the audio-visual image, i.e. the cinematographic-image.

If we look back to Neo-Realism, French New-Wave or films of Tarkovsky we can see a perfect example of directorial cinema. Unlike commercial movies, directors of such films can easily be recognized:

> You will always recognize the editing of Bergman, Bresson, Kurosawa or Antonioni; none of them could ever be confused with anyone else, because each one's perception of time, as expressed in the rhythm of his films, is always the same. On the other hand, if you take a few Hollywood films, you feel they were all edited by the same person.[56]

Since the modern form does not create an objective point of view, it does not fully actualize the image. Rather as the virtual image, such films carry the marks of the director's inner-world. The thing that stands out in this way of filmmaking is the virtual image and not the image that is actualized due to its narration and montage.

Soviet film director and theorist Dziga Vertov criticizes Eisenstein for his narrative and accuses him to have the same bourgeois concerns with American filmmakers. Both cinematic impulses are constructed on narration in the same manner and thus in Eisenstein's dialectic montage nature is still as organic as in Griffith's. In fact Vertov rejects the human drama of old films because he finds them un-true to life:

> We declare the old films, based on the romance, theatrical films and the like, to be leprous. Keep away from them! . . . They are mortally dangerous! Contagious![57]

For Vertov, the plot has no importance, however, what *is* important is truth and fact, which are the forms of writing and a medium in cinema. Writing within the forms of truth and fact can only happen through the visuals (it should be noted that he made movies

[56] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 121
[57] Stam, Robert. Film Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2000. p. 44

during the silent era); therefore Vertov creates the concept (or the character) of *kino-eye* and molds his films in regard to this concept.

> Our eye sees very poorly and very little… The movie camera was invented in order to penetrate deeper into the visible world, to explore and record visual phenomena.[58]

He emphasizes the unreality of our empirical perception and proposes that the cinematographic-image should reflect reality, which is the opposite of the empirical one. According to Vertov, film camera can capture truth. His *kino-eye* captures such truth and facts, with the qualities of speed and machine. Vertov defines himself as the man with the moving camera and becomes the *kino-eye*:

> I am a kino-eye. I am a mechanical eye. I, a machine show you the world as only I can see it. …I free myself from human immobility. I am in constant motion.[59]

It was neither realism nor narrative that Vertov was influenced by; he was interested in Futurism, and defining communism in accordance with such an impulse. It is true that Vertov defines this effect as a technical property, however, he actually finds the truth in the mechanical eye (the camera): not in terms of mere recording, but rather as revealing the truth of the image via such mechanism. In Vertov's *Man with a Movie-Camera* (1929), we experience a comparison between life-as-it-is and life-in-the-film, but the relation is more likely created by the images' own qualities rather than what is cognitively or semantically associated. There is a fine composition of images in this movie due to their own authenticity. He shows man present in nature, through his actions, his life, but within a mechanical progress of the non-human and superhuman dialectic. After such kinematic rendering, Vertov reaches truth with this dialectic method, i.e. the duration of an object.

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[58] Ibid., p. 44
[59] Ibid., p. 44

Vertov's rejection of human drama opens a path for the modern form, but it wasn't cinematically realized until a few decades later. According to Deleuze, it is World War II, which causes a break in cinema:

> Why is the Second World War taken as a break? The fact is that, in Europe, the post-war period has greatly increased the situations, which we no longer know how to react to, in spaces, which we no longer know how to describe. . . . Situations could be extremes, or, on the contrary, those of everyday banality, or both at once: what tends to collapse, or at least to lose its position, is the *sensory-motor schema* which constituted the action-image of the old cinema.[60]

After this break, the linearity of cause-effect breaks down in cinema, and this cinematic impulse intends to make time and thought perceptible, by giving them visibility and sound. Instead of actualized image of classical form, here we experience the virtual image, which substantiates the narration of modern cinema.

Italian Neo-Realism and French New-Wave are both results of this break. They both resemble the modern form. Neo-Realism was born in Italy to show the economic and moral conditions of regular people's everyday life following World War II. Neo-Realistic style is characterized by filming on real location with the use of non-actors to tell stories of poverty and the struggle of working class people. It presents a new form of reality. Deleuze says that in Italian Neo-Realism, instead of representing the reality or the object of reality, the aim was to replace such reality or the object of reality. In such cinematic impulse, actual image cuts off from the *sensory-motor schema* and forms a circuit with its virtual image, because its objective reality is actually the most intimate reality of the object. The internal dynamics are emphasized via visual and sound images. They make what is internal perceptible without using a metaphor. Such internal dynamics appear as intuition rather than a determined, intellectual output. Therefore the image works outside

[60] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. [xi]

of the cause and effect relation. Regardless of classical realism's distinction of real and imaginary, neo-realism breaks reality and passes to imaginary by the effect of the cinematographic-image. In Neo-Realism directors do not represent but re-write the reality as the higher degree of reality via audio-visual images. Therefore in Neo-Realism such objective reality of this image becomes the alternative perception of time.

After Italian Neo-Realism, French New-Wave emerges. Rejecting classical cinematic form, French New-Wave aims for alienation, rather than reality. Through jump cuts, long tracking shots, sudden changes in the scene and shots which go beyond the common 180° axis, they propose the unreality of the reality, which the viewer lives in. In French New-wave *duration* appears through *false movement* as *false continuity*. This resembles empirical perception's illusion of movement and time. Thus *false continuity* with *false movement* actually refers to metaphysical motion and metaphysical alteration by emphasizing the deception of the empirical perception. With the false movement and the false continuity of French New-Wave, sensory-motor links (cause and effect relations) are interrupted and cinematic narrative is derived from images.

Deleuze defines such impulse as critical objectivity and gives Godard's films as the best example of this. In Goddard's cinema, his critical objectivism turns into the most intimate subjectivism, which is actually reminiscent of Bergson's concept of sympathy. According to Deleuze, Goddard's critical objectivism, "in place of the real object, (…) put visual description, and made it go 'inside' the person or object."[61] It means that the object and the subject become intertwined. In this kind of cinema, the new subjectivity as the temporal subjectivity is only thing that is offered to the spectator as in the cinematographic-image.

[61] Ibid., p. [11]

Narration of the classical form was already in the plot, because in such cinematic impulse, action of the plot builds the narration. However, in the modern form of cinema, narration is built through cinematographic-images. It is not only by linking the images to each other that the narrative is shaped, but also in the way such images communicated to the viewer. Thus through the cinematographic-image, the narration of the modern form of cinema is created in regard to its effect on the viewer. Therefore not only the empirical reality of the film, but also the metaphysical reality of the narration progresses within the viewer. Which means, in the modern form of cinema a viewer can have a metaphysical experience, which is the nature of *duration*, the origin of the cinematographic-image. Thus we can say that via image, it is *duration,* which shapes the narration in such films of the modern form.

In his discussion of the modern form, Tarkovsky argues that traditional theatrical writing, which became the narration in cinema, links images through rigidly logical and linear development of the plot, meaning it is in accordance with the law of nature and cause-effect relations. He thinks that "poetic reasoning is closer to the laws by which thought develops, and thus to life itself, than is the logic of traditional drama"[62]. In fact, poetic links create associations, not only as a rational appraisal, but also intuitively. It is important to note that for Tarkovsky poetry is not a literary genre, but rather "is an awareness of the world, a particular way of relating to reality."[63] Naturalism as the explanation of the pattern of life can be poetic. In fact he considers cinema as the most realistic of arts. This is a different kind of reality, though. In cinema, image is the observation of subjectivity, thus cinema can only find its pure meaning within an internal

[62] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 20
[63] Ibid., p. 21

approach. For him, an image can represent one's emotions on an object as an observation. Within that observation he finds layers of meaning. He argues that an image tries to reach to the infinite and to the absolute. It is a kind of a formulation, which defines the relationship between our mind, which is limited to space and truth, and the infinite. And that's exactly 'how time makes itself felt in a shot':

> When you realize, quite consciously, that what you see in the frame is not limited to its visual depiction, but is a pointer to something stretching out beyond the frame and to infinity; a pointer to life.[64]

To create such poetic logic within a film that can reach to the absolute, the director should concentrate on the objects' own *time* (*duration*) and find its rhythm throughout the course of the shooting. According to Tarkovsky, the cinematographic-image comes into being during shooting. Organizing the process of editing, which is used in many art practices, gives the essential nature of the filmed material, but this is not what gives the film its rhythm.

> . . . every art form involves editing, in the sense of selection and collation, adjusting parts and pieces. The cinema image comes into being during shooting, and exists *within* the frame.[65]

Tarkovsky argues that the rhythm of the film lies in the frame. In Tarkovsky's cinema, the cinematographic-image represents image's own time and this time-preserving image molds the story with its own rhythm. Rhythm of the film cannot be dependent on any law and it is made possible only by the director's intuition. The quality lies within the rhythm of the image, because it is the dominant factor in the narration of the film. In fact we can effect by it even in a simple shot, without any editing. Which means, this dominant factor has to be within each cinematographic-image and must be considered from the shooting period. Where does this power of rhythm come from? For Tarkovsky,

[64] Ibid.,. p. 117
[65] Ibid., p. 114

time is within the frame and reveals itself as the rhythm of the film, thus the power of rhythm comes from its direct representation of time:

> The distinctive time running through the shots makes the rhythm of the picture; and rhythm is determined not by the length of the edited pieces, but by the pressure of the time that runs through them.[66]

He argues that even though there is no editing, no acting and no décor, the rhythm of the film will still be there, because *time* via movement will always exist within the frame. Tarkovsky with this unique insight into the nature of cinema defines time as the main element, which is prior to the creation of the work of the art of cinema. This is why he finds time as the unavoidable element of cinema and he thinks that via rhythm time manifests itself as subjective and as a spiritual category of the subject.

Mirror reflects this intuitive process in many layers. In the end, however, what we encounter is the director's uttermost subjectivity. In the film the mother-son relations actually refer to Motherland Russia. In many different ways his subjective relation to the concept of motherhood builds the dynamics of the images in the film and therefore it also shapes the narration of the film. *Mirror* successfully offers an alternative time perception through Tarkovsky's sympathy towards his own self. He said many times that some of the scenes in the film were from his own memories about his mother and his mother also acts in the film. On the other hand, we cannot find any ego-pole in *Mirror*. In classical dramatic structure, the subject/protagonist is always an ego-pole and always moves under the force of the universe that is connected with his ego. In *Mirror,* the subject appears like a dream subject, in which the subject's point of view transforms within personas.

Another cinematic impulse of the modern form emerges in 1990's with *Dogme 95* movement. *Dogme 95* is in search of the virtual image, which, it claimed, was lost within

[66] Ibid., p. 117

the visual mechanics of the narrative. Big budget film productions already define the cinematographic qualities, but the movement of *Dogme 95* opposes them. They aim to counterbalance the dynamics of big budget commercial movies. This is why they refuse to use any expensive, spectacular special effects and lighting. They set up some ground rules to concentrate on the story and the performance of the actors. Some of these rules are: filming must be done on real location, the camera should be hand-held, optical work and filters mustn't be used, etc. In such movies, the cinematographic-image comes in very rough form, because of the conditions *Dogme 95* requires. In a way the films of *Dogme 95* are roughly done and filmed almost immaturely with poor knowledge of the technicality of filming. This roughness won't let the visual component of the image actualize fully. Along with that the intensity of the characters and the story creates virtual image. Through the story and the conflict of the character, i.e. through his/her emotional states, which are impulsive, irrational, and therefore never in the rational form of cause-effect relations, the virtual image arises. Since the visual component is never actualized and film is in intensive subjectivity, images in such films remain virtual. It is because of that in such films we encounter the real-time, *duration*.

One of the founders of this movement was Danish film director Lars Von Trier (1956). The *Dogme 95* movies of Lars Von Trier are perfect examples of how these films reveal the virtual image by purifying the filmmaking. Trier's movie *Dogville* demonstrates how such a rough cinematographic-image can appear as the virtual image. In this movie Trier does not use any real space, instead he uses a minimalistic approach and physically draws the space, the whole set design and most of the props on stage. They all remain as mere suggestions. By using all kinds of material elements in minimal

scale, Trier reinforces the internal arc of the film through the acting and the story. By doing this, the image stays as the pure virtual image. The only thing that is represented as real is such virtuality, i.e. the *temporal subjectivity* of the image. Because a virtual image cannot be actualized the same way the present flows in the image, there is no determination but mere suggestions.

In conclusion, we can say that modern form designates a kind of cinema where we encounter the director's artistic statement. Modern form searches for *virtual image* and shapes the narration along and through it. In other words, in modern form the origin of the cinematographic-image, *duration*, is reflected throughout the whole film. As Tarkovsky argues, time is in the image no matter what, but by the juxtaposition of images this structure is either emphasized or restrained for the unity of time. If it is not emphasized then the effect of the cinematographic-image is reduced to the spatial perception of a shot, which is empirical and happens within the determined cause-effect relations. Thus the classical form cannot reflect the origin or the structure of the cinematographic-image as we have mentioned in the previous chapter. If the structure of the cinematographic-image, which echoes the concept of *duration*, is present throughout the film, then aesthetic judgment about cinema seems possible. The modern form of cinema is this kind. It is shaped by virtual images and it does not have any determination. It is a *sign* of a temporal perspective and it is about temporal subjectivity. Then we can also inquire whether time is the aesthetic value of cinema in regard to modern form. In the following chapter, we will try to demonstrate how *duration* manifests itself as the aesthetic value of the cinematographic-image and cinema, by defining the aesthetics of time.

4. AESTHETICS OF CINEMA

"A new esthetic cocoon is broken; where will the butterfly's wings carry him?"[67]
Hugo Münsterberg

If we try to understand what cinema is in terms of its contextual quality, we are left with the classical film analysis. Without questioning *beautiful*, the classical analysis of cinema tries to understand what the image tells us, or what the visual image means semantically. Since cinema is a form of art, it can only be understood by its aesthetics. Thus classical analysis of cinema does not help us to understand what cinema is nor does it help us to define the ideas of beauty in cinema. In fact, giving meaning to the image through already fixed structures such as linguistic semiology or psychoanalysis have nothing to do with aesthetic judgment in cinema, because they are cognitive judgments, and, as Kant points out, cognitive processes cannot create disinterested aesthetic judgment. Thus any contextual insight of the image or the script does not reveal *beautiful* either. If this is the case then, how does cinematic practice create *beautiful* and cause aesthetic judgment?

The first aesthetic concept in the history of cinema was *Photogenie.* Even though this concept was used by many filmmakers and by many theorists in the silent era, there wasn't a clear explanation or understanding of what *Photogenie* actually meant. Louis Delluc called it the "law of cinema"[68]. Jean Epstein called it the "purest expression of cinema"[69].

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[67] Münsterberg, Hugo. The Photoplay A Psychological Study (1916). Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=1499682&pageno p.11
[68] Stam, Robert. Film Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2000. p. 34
[69] Ibid. p. 34

> *Photogenie* was thus that ineffable quintessence that differentiated the magic of cinema from the other arts. In another sense, the emphasis on the generation of new knowledge linked cinema to artistic modernism as a project of challenging conventional perception and understanding.[70]

In the end this concept existed to try to define something in the cinematographic-image that is unique but also un-definable. Deleuze believes that it was the aspect of movement that created such aesthetic definition:

> When Delluc, Germaine Dulac and Estepin, speak of 'photogeny', it is obviously not a question of the quality of the photo, but, on the contrary, of defining the cinematographic image in its difference from the photo. Photogeny is the image as it is 'majored' be movement.[71]

It was true that since the first movie there has always been a different kind of an artistic view within the moving picture than the rest of the visual arts, but regardless of that, ideas of beauty in cinema developed mostly as an extension of other art forms.

Within cinematic practice, there are references to other art forms. It refers to photography, painting, architecture, music, theatre, etc. Ideas of beauty in today's cinema find *beautiful* in relation to such art practices. To define the aesthetics of cinema and to find how *beautiful* is created in the work of the art of cinema first, we will explore the most common aesthetic qualities in it. In the end, these ideas of beauty transmit as cognitive judgments and since aesthetic judgment is non-cognitive and has to be pure, these common qualities cannot convey how *beautiful* is created in the work of the art of cinema. Then again how does beautiful occur in the work of the art of cinema?

In the previous chapters we mentioned that if the art object is able to reflect its origin it can also be defined as *beautiful*. Then if time, as the origin, has the possibility to appear in the work of the art of cinema unintentionally, it also has the possibility to ground the

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[70] Ibid., p. 34

[71] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1983). Tomlinson, Hugh & Habberjam, Barbara. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. 45

aesthetic judgment about it. If this is the case, then in cinema, beautiful should appear via time as well. Therefore in this chapter we will elucidate how time can be of aesthetic value, i.e. what is *time aesthetics*? In the end I will argue that the *time aesthetics* define the idea of beauty in cinema.

4.1. Ideas of Beauty In Cinema

Cinema, unlike any other art, has attracted and touched millions. However, if we consider cinema's possibility of representing the most radical subjectivity, which is heterogeneous, it is not a shock. Regardless of such power of cinema, ideas of beauty are reduced to the relation of cinema with other arts. Especially photography and painting define the cinematographic quality. On the other hand *dramatic structure*, as its set in Aristotle's *Poetics,* is still the backbone of today's cinema. Within the general ideas of beauty in cinema, there are also technology and reality. The concept of *reality* is about capturing the reality as it is seen or being as real as the life is. Technological value, however, comes forward in relation to other qualities. Namely, technology becomes a vehicle again for any of these qualities to shine. In spite to that instrumental value of it, technology, as well as drama, cinematographic-quality and reality, is what today's audience amazed by, values, and consumes. Then the question is, can *beautiful* be created within these general ideas of beauty in the work of the art of cinema?

Drama or dramatic structure has been the centre of cinema since the silent era. This structure or the art of drama was born in Ancient Greece and represented an aesthetic value for theatre, but it also constitutes the backbone of cinema, even today. Dramatic structure begins with a life-altering incident for the protagonist, which Aristotle refers to as the *change of fortune*. With *reversal of the situation* and *recognition* of the hero,

his/her *change of fortune* occurs. In his book *Poetics,* Aristotle defines the essential element of drama, either within tragedy or comedy, as the plot.

According to Aristotle's description, *plot* is the imitation of actions, by the arrangement of incidents. A poet designs every second of his play by arranging the incidents in the predestined structure, which has to be within a three-act structure (beginning-middle-end) and dramatic unity. It should be one, single action that has structural parts and if one of them were taken out, the structure would fall apart, which means that they have to be organically connected. Aristotle also says that if the poet forces things to happen instead of looking at what the plot requires, like in the *poem-required recognition,* that would be *Deus ex Machina.* In this dramatic structure, the gods enter the plot to bring the play to a close. Thus dramatic unity means that everything should be within the law of possibility or necessity, i.e. within cause and effect. Besides the plot, characters should also follow the law of possibility or necessity by talking and acting in accordance to it.

In other words, Aristotle offers a schema for the characters and for the text. By connecting each part as cause and effect, the play is building to a cathartic point. The kind of dramatic structure Aristotle proposes or structures, through the character's change of fortune, creates pity and fear on the audience. This means that Aristotle's dramatic structure defines and forces a realization of right and wrong. With the force of fear and pity, the audience would be purified from their desire and reach *catharsis*.

The defining key word today in cinema's understanding of drama is *dilemma*. The character's *dilemma*, which leads to the turning points of the plot, creates the dramatic structure. Therefore, we can say that for classical cinematic narration the principles

defined by Aristotle in *Poetics* are still valid. In the classical form of cinema within cause and effect relations, the main character has an arc of development and s/he changes through the incidents. This is the basic classical narrative, but the real dramatic structure builds by the incidents and the cathartic end. Thus, in such narrative, the plot is triggered with the turning point (change of fortune) and still in three-act structure (beginning-middle-end).

Taking the above into account, cinema becomes the last art of drama. This approach to narration constructs a kind of cinema in which the filmmaker plans beforehand what emotion or conclusion s/he will squeeze from the audience, and because of that narration appears within a determined agenda in classical cinema. The idea of demanding a specific emotion from a specific scene is similar to classical cinema's organic montage, where every image is designed within the sensory-motor links. In this sense the problem is, since the plot or the screenplay is constructed upon a cause and effect relationship within a determined agenda, in regard to Kant's theory of Aesthetic Judgment, such practice cannot result with an aesthetic judgment and cognitive judgment takes place. However, *beautiful* can only be reached through aesthetic judgment.

According to Kant's definition of *beautiful* and *good work*, such movies are judged as *good work*, because it *gratifies* us with its unity and dramatic effect. They can also be *gratifying arguments,* because instead of aesthetic judgment, we gain cognitive judgments due to following logically valid arguments of the plot or through its images. Such arguments are most likely to be morally correct, because with such moral ends the judgment would be on *goodness* as in good in itself. This is still the continuity of Aristotle's concept of *catharsis*. Aristotelian concept of *catharsis* relies upon the definite

understanding of right and wrong. It is because of this that tragedies and comedies, which possess *dramatic structure*, can inspire fear and pity within the spectator. Either s/he feels the fear of being in the character's place, or s/he pities the character because of what his actions have cost him. Through ethical codes, the audience agrees on the same lesson and thereon they would be purified from their desires and reach *catharsis*. Unlike dramatic structure, aesthetic judgment cannot produce either right or wrong. Therefore there cannot be any aesthetic judgment within catharsis. Instead, due to this cathartic end, one cannot reach aesthetic judgment, but rather gets to the judgment of the agreeable.

Since cinema is an art form, when we feel satisfaction or dissatisfaction, this should be the result of an aesthetic judgment. If such contextual quality is not what makes the movie aesthetical, or cannot justify the beauty of a cinematographic-image then we should look for another aesthetic quality. One possibility is that the beautiful lies in the quality of the picture. It is true that especially after color is added to the cinematographic-image, the art of cinematography in terms of light and colors, as in the photographic quality, becomes the most important idea of beauty in cinema. Big-budgeted spectacular studio movies are realized as the continuity of this idea of beauty. Good lighting, vivid colors, and clear pictures become mandatory unless otherwise required by the narration.

There are two problems if cinematographic quality is the valid idea of beauty in cinema. One, the cinematographic-image is the composite of two components, sound and vision. If we take only one of them as the defining element, then we cannot actually conceive the art of the cinematographic-image. Two, the quality of the picture cannot create a singular and subjective judgment – unlike the medium of photography, where

light is the artistic form. It is because such cinematographic-quality defines the aesthetic value of the work only by reducing it to *exemplary validity*.

Kant defines *exemplary validity* as the generalizing of singular judgment, which is an *ideal norm*. Since ideal is the representation that is adequate to the idea itself, it has the potential of turning into a rule for everyone. Such judgment can only be a cognitive one, because it occurs due to an example that is general and depends on the existence of the object. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, an aesthetic judgment is a non-cognitive and pure judgment, which is disinterested. Disinterested judgment solely relies on the feeling of the object and not the existence of it. In terms of cinematographic-quality, the value of the picture is determined due to former achievements in cinema in terms of lighting and color, or solely due to the art of photography. The world as we perceive it also can be the ideal norm which the picture tries to capture. This is similar to Kant's example of the judgment on the rose. He says that if we say 'roses are beautiful' that would be a cognitive judgment, since I come to that conclusion by taking the knowledge of an aesthetic judgment as the ground for roses.

If the filmmaker wants to create a picture as real as our empirical perception, *reality* and *technology* appear as other ideas of beauty in cinema. Today's high-quality pictures impress the audience by how well the world is captured as close as possible to the way we experience it with the naked eye. In fact, in today's filmmaking, technology actually tries to fulfill the craving for reality in cinema via the quality of the picture. In the search for reality, cinema invents new technologies, in order to record more clearly, more vividly and even in three dimensions. If this is the case, then the search for reality only takes place within human perception.

This way of representing reality has nothing to do with the *real* itself because human mind cannot perceive real-motion, real-time, or real-alteration, and so on. Thus, regardless of how equal the cinematographic-image is to our empirical perception, *real* is not within such perception. The definition of beautiful in cinema, regarding cinematographic-quality can only be referred to as *exemplary validity*, because it can only reflect the *ideal norm.* Therefore if the cinematographic-quality were defined by taking what is already there as beautiful or as reality as an example, this would be general and cognitive, whereas aesthetic judgment has to be singular, subjectively universal and immediate. In the end, technology (as we mentioned in the first chapter) is just a medium for the cinematographic-image to come to life and also for cinema to develop as a practice. However, what pleases us in cinema is never technical but rather aesthetic, in which technology can only be a medium.

Other approaches to reality in cinema are through realistic storylines, dialogues, acting, etc. In this kind of cinema what marks the reality is our everyday life that is projected onto the screen. In such films the realism lies within the cause and effect relations of the plot and its ability to reflect an ordinary day. In this classical form, "reality" is determined by the empirical world again. Thus, whether with technology or without, the expression of the reality in cinema results with the judgment on the agreeable and never the beautiful, because the judgment is never pure or disinterested but is merely cognitive. In fact, according to Tarkovsky, films that are considered true-to-life are actually the ones that are un-realistically emphasized and overwritten:

> Of course such reproduction of real-life sensations is not an end in itself: but it can be given meaning aesthetically, and so become a medium for deep and serious thought.[72]

[72] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 23

Therefore the cinematographic-image's loyalty is not towards the reality of the empirical world, but rather to the reality of one's subjectivity. Neither with the help of technology nor with realistic acting, set design or a plot, the film does not necessarily represent reality. Reality, if aimed at, is transmitted to the viewer, but it cannot be reproduced. As Deleuze points out in his analysis of Neo-Realism,

> . . . real was no longer represented or reproduced but aimed at.[73]

This takes place within modern forms of cinema, where the narrative is constructed via audio-visual images, rather then the causal relations of the plot. In this case, cinema offers an alternative perception in which reality appears as a continuum and builds on the reality of the inner world that is apart from the empirical perception. Thus, *reality* actually does not appear as a mere aesthetic value but as the articulation of the temporal subjectivity.

In conclusion we can say that the pure aesthetic value of cinema cannot be the photographic quality or the successful expression of drama. It does not matter whether the movie aims for reality or for the magical. Those films in which reality is represented by its photographic quality or by its dramatic effect do not necessarily result in an aesthetic judgment. This is because they do not leave enough space for the viewer to have free play of imagination as the picture moves. Neither the screenplay, which is the context of the movie and forces the viewer to feel a definite feeling with its determined agenda, nor the cinematographic quality, which is an *exemplary validity,* can create the aesthetic value. Kant suggests that all judgments of beauty about fine arts, those that are valued through the cultural codes, are judgments of dependent beauty. If this is the case

[73] Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International Publishing, 2005. p. 1

then all the general ideas of beauty in cinema are dependent because they all work on some cultural codes, and engage with an interest of some kind. Thus they work cognitively. In such manners, the object is judged as *beautiful* because it belongs to either this or that and therefore fails to be pure. In the end, we cannot argue that such films are *ugly*; however we can say that the judgment on such works cannot be an aesthetic one. Through the deciphering of the screenplay or with the quality of the picture, we can only have a judgment of the agreeable, and never of the beautiful. As a result, today's filmmaking, which is dominated by Hollywood, produces films, which obey what has already been presented to them as beautiful, and constantly repeats the same aesthetic ideas of beauty only by slightly adjusting them to new technologies and to new social structures.

It seems that general ideas of beauty in cinema are not aesthetically valid. In such empirically determined compositions, can there still be a place for *aesthetic judgment*? Such possibility has to manifest itself in its smallest unit, in the cinematographic-image. We have already said that the origin of art is in connection to its aesthetic value and it is what makes the work *purposive*. If this is the case, then to have the judgment of *beautiful* in cinema we need to elucidate time and the cinematographic-image one more time. Thus we will look at whether time is reflected in the cinematographic-image as its aesthetic value or not.

4.2. Cinema: Aesthetics of Time

Tarkovsky asserts that "time becomes the very foundation of cinema: as sound is in music, color in painting, character in drama"[74]. We have already proposed that time is the origin of cinema, but how does time become an aesthetic value? In order to understand

[74] Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter-Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 119

this, we need to go back to Kant's aesthetic theory, since we said that his definition of beautiful is our axiom. His understanding of beauty is a *subjective priori*. Such subjectivity does not mean that the senses of the subject are affected, it denotes how the subject can discover the object's beauty and relate to it as the free play of imagination through feelings. This *free play of imagination* is the condition of an aesthetic experience. However, even if the free play occurs for everyone, since there is no rule to define it, such an act of imagination cannot be understood analytically. In this sense Kant's *aesthetic judgment* happens rather by going into the object intuitively and beautiful appears as an immediate and automatic reflection.

In Kant's theory, aesthetic judgment is the center of aesthetic philosophy and judgment of taste is the ground of aesthetic judgment. Judgment of taste is the judgment on the object's representation to our feelings by satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This subjective judgment happens as a mere intuition and reflection. On the other hand, it is also universally valid, i.e. everyone who has a good taste *ought to* have the same judgment. If we don't judge the aesthetic value of the object through the judgment of taste, then it means we use our faculty of desire.

Faculty of desire meets with satisfaction or dissatisfaction not by the representation of the object, but rather by its existence, thus it is bound up with interest. Then the judgment we have would be cognitive. In this case we can claim the object as *pleasant* or as *good* either as good in itself, i.e. morally good, or as good for something else or as good for oneself, but not as *beautiful*. Namely the pleasure would be in the agreeable. Unlike these kinds of pleasures that please our senses, pleasure in beauty is *disinterested*. Such pleasure does not engaged with desire in any way; it is neither based on desire nor does it

produce desire. This disinterested aesthetic judgment happens as the immediate affection. Thus Kant's aesthetic judgment requires two basic conditions: *disinterestedness* and *immediacy*.

For Kant, beautiful is what pleases us immediately without any concept or purpose as the free play of imagination. This immediacy comes as the result of disinterested judgment. If the judgment of taste on the reflection of the object is of an aesthetic kind and not cognitive, then the subject's relation to the object cannot be defined with an analytic approach. If it is an intuitive phenomenon, the communication between the subject and the object should happen as the pure sympathy, by the immediate givenness of the object. Givenness of the object means having the specific quality beyond any question or doubt. Such quality can be found in the object's underlying nature and reality. If it is the case, then the immediate givenness of the object is related to the metaphysical origin of it. It is this immediate givenness of the object that discloses the beautiful through the free play of imagination.

In accordance with what is said above, if in cinema the origin is *time* then the immediate givenness of the work of the art of cinema has to be *time* as well. *Beautiful* should happen if a movie can transmit its origin through its artistic form, the cinematographic-image. Namely, the reflective judgment happens, which is particular to universal, if the work of art is able to reflect such origin without meeting with interest. If this is the case, then it is the origin of the cinematographic-image that makes the judgment of the work *purposive*: the origin does not relate to any interest or desire, rather it relates to everyone beyond them. If a movie's use of time, which is the origin, is expressed in a way that the work can build upon it, due to our *good taste* we *ought to*

experience *beautiful*. If this is the case, then how does *time* manifest itself as an aesthetic value?

Tarkovsky says that man who simultaneously reproduces time on screen, often also has "acquired a matrix for *actual time*"[75]. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the cinematographic-image is the variable present. The structure of the cinematographic-image, the triad-sign functioning, causes an everlasting cycling of interpretation. In the cinematographic-image, time as the temporal subjectivity is in such everlasting motion. It is not only because time as duration is always in flux, but also because of the structure of the cinematographic-image such everlasting motion occurs.

Tarkovsky points out that even the most ordinary cinematographic-image has the chance to be singular, because its referent comes within the image itself. This is different than montage's power of relationality. Because, with montage, relationality still creates itself by depending on the logic of cause and effect linearity. The singular syntax of the cinematographic-image, i.e. the variable present, as an intuitive process, appears as the immediate givenness, in each and every cinematographic-image. The spectator without any interest immediately encounters with the temporal subjectivity of an alternative perception within a continuum. In the end, through the everlasting cycling of interpretation, as it is the free play of imagination, aesthetic judgment realizes along with all the suggestion of the cinematographic-image, without any rule but in a rule-governed way.

The perception of the camera becomes the perception of the subject. The object and the subject intertwine and this produces a different kind of heterogeneous subjectivity. That's why the cinematographic-image appears in hyper-reality and creates an alternative

[75] Ibid., p. 62

perception, in which time is re-created as the immediate reflection of the variable present. Without any concept or purpose an immediate expression of *time* causes the free play of imagination by its triad sign functioning, while re-defining our subjectivity. We experience the cinematographic-image as a metaphysical phenomenon and the free play of imagination comes intuitively. The cinematographic-image reflects a representation of such time perception to our feelings and meets with satisfaction or dissatisfaction of positive pleasure. Thus, it is the singular syntax of the cinematographic-image's triad sign functioning structure that pleases us immediately in the moving picture.

The cinematographic-image, by its nature, is actualized within motion and continuum. However, this empirical perception is not the real effect of the image, but both motion and continuum of the visible and sound actually communicates *real time, duration.* Especially due to its continuous (empirical) motion, the cinematographic-image has the possibility of creating the uttermost immediate reflective judgment. Since the image always processes in the period of time, it creates the cycling interpretation, without intention yet inescapable. This effect of the cinematographic-image has the quality of *purposiveness.* Within Kant's aesthetic theory beauty is in the form of *purposiveness.* It means that the object reflects an end, even though does not intend to have any purpose. Spatialized image, with the participation of the viewer, re-temporalizes the image without any interest and as the immediate reflection.

Judgments on goodness or pleasantness presuppose an end or purpose, which the object has to satisfy. In the case of cinema, judgments on photographic quality or the dramatic effect of a movie presuppose such an end; cinema tries to satisfy these expectations. Its technical nature, which is being in continuous motion, is the medium for

this end. On the other hand, *time* appears in such an image as the causality of the concept in respect of its object. It is the *purposiveness* of the judgment on duration of the cinematographic-image that causes *beautiful* to be realized. This disinterested judgment, since it is all about feelings, happens to be pure and we experience *free beauty*. On the other hand, judgments on the photographic quality or the dramatic effect of the plot in cinema fail to be pure. Then if time, as duration, is the aesthetic value of the cinematographic-image, we need to find out if it is the same for the work of the art of cinema.

Cinema is the practice of signs and images, but since it is also an art form, this practice should at the same time yield an aesthetic judgment. We have seen that the cinematographic-image by its nature offers an alternative time perception. This nature of the cinematographic-image manifests itself in its metaphysical and ontological statements. What is important is whether these statements have analytic ends or intuitive ends. While the first one produces a cognitive judgment, the latter one produces an aesthetic judgment. In fact, when we investigate the cinematic impulses in regard to its origin we see that juxtaposition of images respond in two ways. Either it emphasizes the structure and creates virtual images, or it moves them towards the whole as the unity of time and creates actual images, which dismisses the real effect of the cinematographic-image.

The triad sign functioning of the cinematographic-image is still present both in classical form and modern form. However, this cycling of interpretation does not necessarily occur as the free play of imagination in classical form, which reduces the effect of time as an aesthetic value, due to montage's sensory-motor linkage. The

judgment on such films is always related to the agreeable, and never to the beautiful, i.e. it happens as a cognitive appraisal. The modern form, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, relies on the communication of the cinematographic-image, because via such images the narrative is shaped. Therefore cinema still has the possibility of reflecting *time* as its own aesthetic form, since it is the origin of the cinematographic-image. This possibility can only be real if the work can manifest that the art of cinema is the art of the cinematographic-image. Such a form of cinema, which shapes its narrative through the cinematographic-image, presupposes time as its aesthetic value by re-claiming the duration of such an image and freeing the imagination of the image's reflection.

The reason is because this kind of cinematic impulse does not aim for analytical end in the movie. Relation of the images defines the sensational subjectivity of the film and they are formed by the participation of the spectator. In such an understanding of cinema, the spectator does not follow the causal links, but rather follows the duration of the image along with his/her own duration. Therefore, the cycling interpretation of images happens intuitively as *the free play of imagination* and ends with an aesthetic judgment. In this case, it concludes that the aesthetics of cinema is the aesthetics of time.

When the Lumiére Brothers showed *The Arrival of a Train at the Station* to their first audience, the crowd got scared and they tried to run away from the train. Being able to capture *past* movement was unthinkable for them at the time, but with cinema they were able to. Time within the moving picture came as the immediate perception of the universe, and resulted with an intuitive, aesthetic judgment. Therefore, intentionally or not, in *The Arrival of a Train at the Station,* the Lumiére Brothers opened up a new aesthetic cocoon: *aesthetics of time*.

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