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**PERCEPTUAL CHANGES OF NEOLIBERAL CITIZENSHIP THROUGH  
COMMODIFICATION IN THE TURKISH CASE**

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**NEOLİBERAL VATANDAŞLIĞIN METALAŞTIRMA YOLUYLA ALGISAL  
DEĞİŞİMLERİ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ**

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*To my uncle*

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## ÖZET

Antik Yunan'dan beri vatandaşlık devlet ve toplum arasındaki ilişkiyi belirleyen bir statü olmuştur. Ancak özellikle ulus devletin gelişimiyle beraber ciddi değişikliklere uğramış ve bir yandan hak ve ödev nosyonunu güçlendirmiş, diğer yandansa vatandaşlığın içinde gömülü olan dışarıda bırakma pratiklerini korumuştur. Neoliberalizmin bir ekonomik ve düşünsel sistem olarak gelişmesiyle beraber vatandaşlık da değişime uğramaya başlamıştır. Özellikle son zamanlarda revaçta olan gayrimenkul edinme ya da satın alma yoluyla vatandaşlık sağlayan programlar da neoliberal vatandaşlığın etkisi olarak ele alınabilir. Ancak yalnızca satın alma yoluyla statü sağlayan programlara odaklanmak, neoliberalizmin yurttaşları nasıl birer ekonomik özneye dönüştürdüğünü anlamak açısından eksik kalabilir. Bu tez bu eksikliği iş kurma yoluyla sahip olunabilen vatandaşlık programlarına bakarak gidermeye çalışmaktadır. Refah ülkesinde doğan ve doğmayan vatandaşların arasındaki farklılıklar neredeyse onların tüm hayatlarının yaşam standartını belirleyecek düzeydedir. Dolayısıyla, gelişmiş bir ülkede doğmayan ve vatandaşlık programları satın alamayan insanlar alternatif göç yöntemlerini araştırmaktadır. Artan ekonomik belirsizlik ve sosyal koşullar Türkiye'de de etkisini orta sınıf eğitilmiş insanların göçlerinin hızlanmasıyla göstermiştir. Türkiye vatandaşı olmanın getirdiği bu eksiklikleri telafi etmek adına, ortalama bir yatırıma sahip olanlar iş kurma yoluyla İngiltere'de yaşamaya ve çalışmaya imkân veren Ankara Antlaşması'nı yoğun ilgi göstermişlerdir. Neoliberalizmin vatandaşlık algısı üzerindeki etkisi, İngiltere'ye Ankara Antlaşması yoluyla göç eden kişilerle derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılarak araştırılmıştır. Bu tezin temel amacı, neoliberalizmin vatandaşların gözünde vatandaşlık algısını nasıl dönüştürdüğü hipotezine ampirik ve teorik kanıtlar sunmaktır. Böylece neoliberalizmin yurttaşların motivasyonlarını nasıl etkilediği ve varlıklı devletlerin göç politikalarını insan sermayesine göre nasıl şekillendirdiği gözlemlenebilir.

## ABSTRACT

Since ancient Greece, citizenship has been a status that determines the relationship between the state and society. However, it has undergone profound changes with the construction of nation-states. On the one hand, the notion of rights and responsibilities has changed, while on the other, it preserved the practices of exclusion that are embedded within citizenship. The strengthening of neoliberalism as a rational and economic system also contributed to the transformation of citizenship. Specifically, the mushrooming of citizenship programs that allow the acquisition of citizenship status through investment or owning real estate should also be considered as an example of neoliberal citizenship. However, concentrating merely on programs that provide status through purchase would be insufficient to comprehend how neoliberalism transforms citizens into economic subjects. This gap may be filled by looking into citizenship by business programs that provide a legal status. Since citizenship status has turned into a sort of commodity amongst the ultra-rich and states, people who cannot afford it and live in a non-affluent country seek for new alternatives. Since the only method to acquire this status is entrepreneurship, neoliberalism reduces them to economic subjects. The disparities between citizens born in welfare countries and others are so enormous that they largely influence their whole standard of living. Therefore, people who were not born in an affluent country and cannot afford citizenship programs seek alternative immigration methods. The increasing economic uncertainties and social circumstances in Turkey have accelerated the migration of the educated middle-class. At this point, in order to compensate for these deficiencies of being a Turkish citizen, those who had an average amount of savings have shown an interest in the Ankara Agreement, which allows them to live and work in the UK through establishing a company. The influence of neoliberalism on citizenship perception was investigated through in-depth interviews with people who migrated to England by the agreement. The primary aim of this thesis is to provide empirical and theoretical evidence for the hypothesis that neoliberalism has transformed the perception of citizenship in the eyes

of the citizens. Thus, it would be observable how neoliberalism affects the citizens' motivations and how affluent states shaped their migration policies according to the human capital.

## **Introduction**

Since Ancient Greece, the people's status in a given territory has always been controversial regarding rights and responsibilities. The importance of this status is that it determines the individual's relations both with the state and society. Despite the alteration of citizenship forms after the nation-states, it retains its importance as a subject of rights for citizens. Thus, as long as societies and the authorities exist, the status that consists of a sense of belonging, participation, and social rights will keep its timeliness. The plethora of specializations, varying from law to sociology, have intersected with citizenship in order to comprehend how people's status in relation to the state and society is interconnected. Each discipline treats the concept of citizenship via its own lenses. However, the intersectional character of citizenship requires unique lenses from various theories. Therefore, all concepts regarding citizenship are interconnected.

The definitions of citizenship are affected by economic and political structures and relations between countries. In this thesis, two significant factors that influence citizenship are considered fundamental: the reason behind the motivations of the migrants to utilize citizenship programs, and the role of neoliberalism. The consequences of the intensification of inequality between countries are reverberated among citizenship's values. So, especially people who are dissatisfied with his/her country's social or political situation tried to migrate somewhere else where they view as affluent. Regardless of methods, migration would turn into a solution for those who want to improve their conditions. In that sense, this research aims to interpret these motivations' background by taking neoliberalism as a main subject. The spread of neoliberal policies throughout different continents has boosted the transformation of citizenship into a subject of the market economy. As a result of marketization and commodification of all the spheres, social and economic disadvantages of the states became a burden to citizens. In other words, non-affluent countries are having trouble

providing equal opportunities as much as affluent ones in terms of wealth, mobility, and rights. I presumed that to compensate for these deficiencies, they begin to look for alternative migration methods. The importance of neoliberal citizenship emerges in the fluxional relation between citizens and regimes. Today, countless citizenship and residency firms cooperate with states to facilitate bureaucratic processes. Even these firms' existence can be considered as evidence of this transformation because it proves how corporations take the obligation to select citizens instead of states. The European Commission issued a report in 2019 warning about the risks of citizenship programs and the potential negative consequences of their outcomes (European Commission, 2019). Cyprus and Malta were charged with infringements for "selling" EU citizenship by the committee in 2020 (European Commission, 2020).

While lots of essential organizations and scholars criticize the sale of citizenship, there has been little discussion about the role of entrepreneurship in the transformation of citizenship. Taking into account the Foucauldian conceptualization of neoliberalism, this thesis argues that the transformation of citizenship is not only about its sale, but commodification is a much broader concept that is connected with rationality. As a result, perceptual changes in citizenship are also encompassing migrants who attempt to acquire citizenship status through business. In order to highlight the consequences of these programs' reflections on the perceptions and definitions of citizenship, the research conceptualizes neoliberal citizenship as a phenomenon that transforms people's perceptions of citizenship into the state of entrepreneurship, and how becoming an entrepreneur affects their view regarding citizenship.

Through citizenship programs, the unequal division between citizens and non-citizens shifts to the citizens of affluent and non-affluent countries. In that case, citizenship programs have been posited as the center of the alteration of the citizenship regime. For a couple of decades, citizenship programs have offered either permission to live and work or official status to those who live in non-affluent countries. However, since investments or entrepreneurship have become the primary determinant of being a

citizen, each citizen's perception began to vary. Recent trends in citizenship programs have led to a proliferation of studies that focus on these programs' side effects. Despite reports and research in the literature stressing the outcomes of citizenship programs, most of them focus on political consequences. The perceptual changes and the structure that affected it are not adequately investigated. To date, there has been little concern on the correlation between citizenship by business programs and citizenship perceptions. Yet, as much as investment programs, business programs are also part of the current citizenship regimes. Those who do not have enough money to purchase a work or residency permit look for other options in the market.

So, just as citizenship by investment programs that allow to buy the official status, people are selling their human capital to acquire citizenship. By doing so, people who live in a non-affluent country both aim to guarantee their residency and citizenship status. This thesis seeks to observe whether citizenship programs acquired through business programs developed in response to neoliberal policies alter the perception of citizenship. Whereas there are numerous political and social motivations for acquiring citizenship from another country, the acquisition method and the reason to choose it is critical. Further, this research attempts to comprehend the participant's motivations, focuses on what they understand by citizenship and ultimately examines whether citizenship by business affects the participant's perception of citizenship. The research's primary questions consisted of how commodification changes citizenship, how the transformation of citizenship through the economy affects people's perception of citizenship, and how the Ankara Agreement would be a symbol of the transformation of citizenship through business, along with what Turkish migrants who utilized the agreement have to say about this.

The research hypothesis relies on the correlation between the change of perception of citizenship and citizenship programs. Before the interviews were conducted, it was assumed that there was a negative relation between neoliberalism and citizenship. The claim was that citizenship lost its political and democratic validity by virtue of

neoliberalism. However, since neoliberalism is a broad term, acquisition methods through business were specifically taken into account to understand the negative consequences of the shadow of neoliberal policies on citizenship. So, it was assumed that citizenship by business programs is a significant part of neoliberal citizenship. As hypothesized, these programs both transform the state's definitions of citizenship from subjects of rights to subjects of the market and distort the citizenship perceptions of people by removing its political connotations and making them an economic subject. In that regard, Turkey would be a representative case of demonstrating the perceptual changes due to two incidents. Firstly, the neoliberal projects were forcibly implemented by the military forces in the 1980s. So, the neoliberal policies as an economic system were beginning to transform state structure in terms of state-supported privatization, trade liberalization, and encouragement of competition. Secondly, along with the financial and political instabilities rising, people's motivation to migrate increased.

Especially, educated middle-class people are looking for alternative citizenship acquisition methods to fulfill their expectations regarding money and lifestyle. The rising rate of outgoing migration in Turkey and student mobility might indicate an increasing migration trend. Despite there is no clear data whether people were back to the country in 2019, 84.863 Turkish citizens departed the country (TUIK, 2020), and the total number of mobile students abroad is 47.628 (Statistics, 2021). According to the United Nations' statistics on the Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students, three countries are the most popular destinations for students: the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Statistics, 2021). Turkey is a representative case as a country of high-skill emigration. The effect of the citizenship programs resulting from strengthened neoliberal reforms could also be related to this trend. Since the 1980s, Turkey has been witnessing the neoliberal transformation in terms of economy and administration. This shift also has a reflection on the citizenship regime and citizenship perception of Turkish citizens.

Nevertheless, the data of the outgoing people from Turkey could not simply explain the migration trend since there are many reasons and methods to settle in another country. However, the increasing number of applications to the Ankara Agreement could gain insights into why people are involved in the agreement. As a result, as one of the most popular citizenship programs among Turkish citizens, The Ankara Agreement symbolizes the rise of demands on economic citizenship. In accordance with this, as the UN's data on student circulation demonstrates, England is the third receiving country of immigration. Between 2010 and 2020, 13.590 people applied for the Ankara Agreement. Each year the number of applicants has increased incrementally. After England suspended the agreement in 2020, applications increased by more than 200 percent (Erem, 2020; Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2020). Despite the suspension by England, the representation of the Ankara Agreement as a neoliberal policy is still valid to show neoliberalism's effects on the transformation of citizenship because it demonstrates both the state's new standards on migrations and people's adaptation to those criteria.

By employing qualitative modes of inquiry, this thesis attempts to illuminate how neoliberal citizenship policies alter citizenship perception. Since conducting qualitative research by in-depth interviews makes it possible to investigate specific motivations of the participants through their own words, it can enable one to identify whether there is a changing phenomenon. The fundamental studies that sought the new characteristics of citizenship and its impact on citizens conducted qualitative methods to eliminate bias within the questionnaire. All the questions of the interviews consist of semi-structured open-ended questions. In-depth interviews were conducted with eleven different people who are either residents or citizens. Since all the participants live in England, all interviews were conducted online. To overcome environmental limitations and build confidence between the participants and the surveyor, snowball sampling was used, and it was assumed that they could openly and genuinely demonstrate their

motivations without any hesitation on their political concerns. To preserve their anonymity, all interviewees' names were changed.

The questionnaire has three main parts that overlap with the theoretical framework of the thesis. The first section of the questionnaire required respondents to give information on their unique experiences regarding the Ankara Agreement. It included questions about their motivations to leave, the reasons to migrate to England, and whether their expectations were satisfied. In the second section, questions are drawn from understanding how shifts in citizenship shape respondents' political attitudes and adaptation to a new status. In order to understand the perceptual changes of participants, political features of citizenship that relied on voting, participating, and claiming were taken into consideration. The last set of questions focuses on the participant's perceptual changes by meeting the shifting in the sense of belonging, the distinction between nation and the citizen, and motivations that determine the decisions. How participants define the requirements of being a citizen along with their feelings, are the crucial questions of this part.

This thesis begins by historicizing of modern citizenship through following its fundamental features dating back to Ancient Greece. This chapter aimed to illustrate the roots of modern citizenship and fundamental concepts embedded in citizenship. The historical epochs of citizenship are conceptualized by Ancient Greece, The Roman Empire, and The French Revolution. Even though countless events and eras have influenced modern citizenship, the chapter limited itself to citizenship relation to democracy, exclusion, and rights and responsibilities. It is argued that those concepts have always been the constitutive part of citizenship. Marshall's conceptualization of citizenship is taken as constituent research that identifies modern citizenship history. However, since plenty of research stresses the new concepts regarding citizenship, the analysis compares new concepts to themselves and Marshall's. Then, neoliberal transformation and new acquisition methods as a result of the transformation are explained. The chapter emphasized citizenship programs that allow being a member of

a given society and its consequences by comparing and explaining the motivations of the states.

In the second chapter, Turkey is a representative case to understand how neoliberal citizenship reshapes citizenship perceptions. In that sense, as a country where neoliberal policies were applied through coercion at the beginning of the 1980s, Turkey has been under the influence of neoliberal transformation. Turkey's neoliberalization process is conceptualized with the evolution of the citizenship regime in Turkey. The chapter argued that the oscillation of the country's citizenship regime is related to the nation-building process and construction of ideal citizenship. Although the ideal type varied in each period, neoliberal policies have taken over the hegemony since the 1980s. So, Turkey's implementation of citizenship programs that allow purchasing citizenship by investment or real estate is related to the transformation of Turkish citizenship. In that sense, while the research's aim is not to examine Turkey's citizenship policies, it is crucial to explain since these policies affect Turkish citizens. Thus, at the end of the chapter, Turkey's acquisition methods derived from the commodification of citizenship are clarified.

Chapter three discusses the specific methods by which the research and analyses were conducted. The central part of this chapter is how the participants were selected, the number of active participants, the sampling method, and the research design. The analysis focuses on Turkey's political and economic crisis and how the middle-class, educated people reacted to it by migrating through business programs. In-depth interviews were held with people who migrated to England by the Ankara Agreement. Only two out of eleven had not reached the country yet, despite their application being approved. The semi-structural approach was chosen because it allows finding particular thoughts and ideas of participants. The three concepts of the questionnaire are explained in this section. The conceptualization and aims are explained after the research analysis. Finally, participants' ages, amounts of years spent in England, and

critical quote are briefly described to illustrate how and why they picked the Ankara Agreement.

The final chapter of this thesis is divided into three findings. The main findings of the interviews are interpreted in this chapter. By using the data, the theoretical framework of the governmentality school, which is led by Foucauldian conceptualization, is employed. In the subsection, Does Leaving Heal the Scars?, the pull and push factors are reconsidered by looking at the leading motives of using the Ankara Agreement. Also, the section seeks the statistics of Turkey's current social and political situation that would encourage people to migrate. The second part, New Regime of Citizenship presents the new citizenship regime as a diminishing of politics in citizenship and how the participants view the relationship between politics and citizenship. Their lack of interest in English politics is explained by their view of the country as a workplace rather than a nation. The last subsection, Change of Perception ties together the main elements of sections mentioned above under the concept of change of perception. By merging the findings of previous sections, which derived from the motivations of the migrants and the transformation of the citizenship regime, this section introduces the perceptual changes. It stresses the discussion of the data and covers the features of the Ankara Agreement and its reflection on the Turkish citizen. The governmentality school is valuable to find out how middle-class Turkish citizens embrace methods to be entrepreneurs despite the risks they face. As a result, citizenship becomes a commodity, and countries become a workplace for people who wish to leave to overcome their hometowns' unfair circumstances. The following section is the discussion section which summarizes the thesis' findings.

## 1. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF MODERN CITIZENSHIP AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

Citizenship is a complicated and eclectic concept in which there is no consensus. Throughout the different phases of history, understanding of citizenship has constantly been changing. In a world of every state that recognizes itself as a nation-state within a given territory, citizens have become members who have rights and obligations recognized by the states. Although it is hard to think of citizenship without a nation-state, its roots have extended from Ancient Greece and Rome, where nation-state-like institutions were born. Both Ancient Greece and Roman types of citizenship had a direct relationship with the city (Polis) and politics. Aristotle conceptualized the citizens as active participants in politics who are both rulers and ruled on behalf of themselves (*Aristotle, Politics, Book 3, Section 1283b*, n.d.). People made claims and discussions in Polis, where the sphere of community and the sphere of power interacted entailed a common unity (Cassin et al., 2014).

Citizens could directly participate in the decision-making processes that concern society and everyday life. In Rome it roughly corresponded to Res Publica, a public thing. Compared to Ancient Greece, Rome's citizenship concepts are more inclusive since the republic depends on citizens' freedom that is always encouraged. Also, it comprised groups that were excluded from Ancient Greek (Joppke, 2019). However, Ancient Greek citizenship did not contain the women or slaves who consisted of half of the society. Even though every free property-owning man had a right to participate in politics, it was only a tiny part of the society. Thus, others who could not fulfill these criteria have been deprived from representation, the right to elect and be elected, and the right to participate in politics. So, here we come to one of the most contradictory topics of citizenship: its extent, or in other words, parameters of its inclusion and exclusion. It makes no difference how citizenship provides rights if only just a tiny proportion of the population has it. Though citizenship's mechanisms regarding limits

and rights have been changed throughout history, there have always been others who even could not reach the fundamental rights and were excluded from the public sphere. Therefore, citizenship cannot merely be interpreted in terms of rights, but also its limits or extent should be taken into consideration.

Hegemonic classes of people shared prerogatives through the exclusion of others (Ozkazanc, 2009). Even other responsibilities such as compulsory military service, voting, or tax payment become the prerogatives among some (Ibid). The exclusion of others from citizenship reveals the contentious dynamics that exist between citizens and non-citizens, as well as between citizens and the state (Isin & Turner, 2007). As a result, from obligations to privileges, non-citizens who do not have an official recognition are turned into treated as outsiders. The status of the women and slaves in Ancient Greece was an example of this exclusion. Even though the status of citizenship embraces active participation in the democratic processes, possessing the citizenship itself contains discriminatory practices for slaves, women, and the poor. In other words, the unequal distribution of the rights compounded the inequality among different groups of the society. As a result, the structure of citizenship has been shaped by a myriad of factors, including class and gender. Even after the women and slaves were included in citizenship status, their access to rights is questionable. Their inclusion in the public sphere as a citizen did not provide an equal opportunity as well as the property-owning men. This brings the second contestation between citizens and the state as Isin and Turner underlined. Those who have been denied citizenship try to get it to enjoy the privileges that come with it, whereas citizens who have been granted citizenship seek more in order to broaden the scope of their rights (Isin & Turner, 2007). Balibar defines this exclusion by emphasizing the mutual relation between power and inclusion practices (Balibar, 2015). He argues that the exclusion of some from being a citizen means exclusion from the inclusion. So, there has always been a mutual connection between inclusion and exclusion. The internal exclusion, that far more than remaining outside of the community, keeps others away from the claiming

and decision-making processes (Ibid). These ideas would be elaborate by looking at the historical roots of citizenship.

During the Roman Empire, the character of citizenship began to change after Ancient Greece. Unlike the Ancient Greece citizen status, where people had direct access to politics on their behalf, they turned into vassals who lost the representation power. Nonetheless, their rights increased along with the spreading of the citizens status (Smith, 2012). Thus, the special status of being a citizen of Ancient Greece vanished, and it expanded to the masses. It turned upside down with the Roman Empire through the encouragement of the citizens to engage in politics. The political model of Greek citizenship, which encompasses the few groups of the society, turned into legal citizenship that consisted of hierarchical structures thanks to Roman citizenship (Joppke, 2019). More inclusive policies, on the other hand, came with the defunctionalization of citizenship in terms of political participation (Smith, 2012). It could be argued that, ironically, the more citizens' ties to politics are severed, the more people are able to take part in citizenship status. This notion of citizenship has shaped the modern sense of citizenship because of the rise of the number of citizens by expanding its definition and its decreasing effectiveness in politics.

The other two significant improvements that affect modern citizenship are the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the French Revolution in 1789. These two events engendered sovereignty and nationality, which redefined the status of citizenship as well as states. Following the end of the Thirty Years War, European powers signed the Westphalian peace treaty, culminating in the diminishing of religious hegemony within the governance on the one hand and shaping the borders of the empires on the other. The Westphalia system created strict spatial boundaries among states, and people who live in the 'inside' have been distinguished from the people in the 'outside.' As a natural result of this distinction, many other dichotomous concepts emerged such as territorial and non-territorial, sovereign and not sovereign (Caporaso, 2000). Through the foundation of the states, which consisted of strict borders, the relations of territories,

rights, and populations began to be embedded within it (Ibid). While Ancient Greek citizens only consisted of free men who lived in Polis, it extended from city to whole nation after the border drawing among nations.

Last but not least, the French Revolution is another crucial stage of the foundation of modern citizenship. In his well-known study, Brubaker lists four perspectives regarding the French revolution. These are the bourgeois revolution, democratic revolution, national revolution, and bureaucratic revolution. By using these perspectives, he emphasizes some unique features of the revolution: the emergence of equality before the law regardless of their social or economic situation, the institutionalization of political rights that encourage citizens to be active at least in general status, creation of nation-state and nationalism by engendering common ideals that comprehend French, and centralization of the state by the sweeping heritage of old monarchy (Brubaker 1992, p. 39-49). As Brubaker emphasizes, these developments bear the touchstone of citizenship as we know today because it exacerbates the antagonism between the locals and the foreigners by defining the *citoyen* and institutionalizing the nation and its official ideology. As the state has been rationalized and centralized within a given territory, the modern notion of modern citizenship, as Brubaker defines it, has been constituted by the idea of equality before the law (Brubaker, 1989). Besides, the sharp draw of boundaries as a sovereign state against the other states distinguished France's 'strangers' and 'locals.' (Ibid). Thus, the legal side of the revolution lighted citizenship rights and duties as a sort of mechanism of determination. Then, the concept of citizenship shifts from the people who look for state protection to those legally recognized by the state (Isin, Engin; Turner, 108). This recognition came with new duties and responsibilities such as taxation and military service toward the state (Isin and Turner 2007, p. 3).

All in all, the heritage of pre-modern citizenship to modern citizenship could be divided into three main concepts as aforementioned: political participation, contestation, and exclusion. All three have a direct connection with each other within the society.

## 1.1. Modern Citizenship

The main consequence of the conceptualization of citizenship in a modern sense would be the distribution of rights. While some people have always been enjoyed citizenship rights, modern citizenship distributed the rights through the principle of equality before the law for everyone. Women and the working class were able to enjoy citizenship status as much as property-owners. One of the key differences between the slave and the proletariat, according to Marx, is the proletariat's involvement in civil society as a *person* rather than a *thing* (Marx & Engels, 2016, p. 38). Consequently, the modern conceptualization of citizenship introduces us to acquiring rights, their validity toward others, and the role of the class.

It would be enlightening the roots of neoliberal citizenship to separate modern citizenship by comparing its positive and negative sides. The positive sides constituted by T.H. Marshall takes the modern citizenship regime as a mechanism of an equality driven by capitalist development. According to this view, even though capitalism encompassed inequality, the relationship between the welfare regime and the capitalist relationship resulted in citizenship rights, which helped reduce disparities among different groups (Hamilton & Marshall, 1951). The emergence of civil, social, and political rights are subject to minimize the inequalities (B. S. Turner, 1997).

The crucial point, according to Marshall, is not to investigate the contribution of capitalism to citizenship, but instead to look at how citizenship turns into a protective mechanism for those oppressed by capitalism (Hamilton & Marshall, 1951, pp. 29–31). What is known about the evolution of citizenship is largely based on the classification of Marshall with three concepts: civil, political, and social rights. Individual freedom, including freedom of expression, thinking, and religion, is emphasized by civil rights, which also ensure people' equality before the law. Political rights are composed of participation in politics as either elector or candidate. Social rights are derived by participation in broader structures of the society like economic welfare and security.

By looking at these concepts, he argues that there is mutual relation between the evolution of rights and capitalism. However, after the 19th-century, citizenship went beyond patriotism, so it could spread among the masses. Even though capitalist development fostered the notion of modern citizenship, it ruptured from capitalism after a while. It turned into an opposite mechanism that balanced unequal consequences of social classes that emerged in the capitalist system (Hamilton & Marshall, 1951). Therefore, Marshall insists that citizenship tamed the negative consequences of capitalist development by limiting wealth transfer for both sides, expanding cultural phenomena shared by the masses, and finally, through strengthened education and occupational status, equalizing distinctions between classes.

So far there has been little agreement on the characteristics and nature of citizenship. Thus, lots of studies have been published which demonstrated the blind spots of Marshall's theory. The main objections to the Marshall can be conceptualized under three topics. The blind to the role of 'others,' transnationality alters nation-state relations and conflicts that constitute citizenship. Firstly, Marshall does not include any conflicts or social movements that made the rights more accessible to women, LGBTBI+, workers, blacks, and many others (Grewal, 2005; Lister, 2012). Instead, he stresses the construction of the rights and duties by looking at the state's role; hence the 'subaltern cannot speak' in this view <sup>1</sup>. However, social movements and claims also shaped the citizenship rights as well as the states. Secondly, in a world where global capitalism strengthened enough to distribute the labor force and production throughout the world's different areas, territorial borders began to fade out through the foundation of new international institutions such as the European Union, the United Nations, and G20. As a result, in a world where countries have direct influence over one another, citizenship responsibilities and rights transform spatiality and redefine nation-state citizenship (Ong, 1999). Third, since Ancient Greece, contestation and power relations

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<sup>1</sup> Chakravorty, Gayatri. "Spivak" Can the subaltern speak?." (*Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988*) 271 (1999): 313.

have always played a role in shaping citizenship. This kind of power has two sides: the conflict that constitutes citizenship, and citizenship that procreates conflict (Bookchin, 1992; Ozkazanc, 2009). It can also theorize through the struggle to exist in the public sphere as an autonomous subject. However, Marshall overlooks these reciprocal conflicts between the oppressor and oppressed. As a result of these gaps in Marshall's theory, his concepts would not be adequate for a detailed analysis that includes historical content and recentness. Nevertheless, critiques against him encourage us to find plenty of unique concepts embedded in citizenship.

The main concepts that criticized Marshall's view have focused on different configurations and relations. More specifically, critiques against the classical view are divided into plenty of concepts. Those are consisted of power relations (Bookchin, 1992; Isin & Turner, 2007; Mouffe, 1991), labor-capital contradiction (Balibar, 2015), gender (Grewal, 2005; Lister, 2012), and governmentality (Brown, 2016; Foucault, 2008; Mavelli, 2018a; Wacquant, 2012). Although Marshall accepts the relations between capitalism and citizenship, he disregards that citizenship also creates unequal conditions as social classes. The evolution of citizenship rights has always been controversial because there is no consensus on whether citizenship reduces inequality, or whether it is embedded with capitalist relations. Marshall tries to set out citizenship's features by conceptualizing them under the different rights: civil, political, social. Yet even the equivalent of the rights within themselves are questionable (Turner 1993). Turner clearly emphasizes the contradictory structures of those rights by highlighting the lack of political and civil rights notions regarding their harmony with the capitalist mode of production (Turner 1993, 7). This comment brings light to the other missing point of the Marshallian view regarding citizenship class relations. As Balibar emphasizes, citizenship is also an embedded concept with the class struggle which engendered in the capital and labor contradiction. So, it must consider the role of class struggle in establishing the citizenship regime. Those are not independent of each other; in fact, capitalist development throughout history altered the notion of citizenship. It is

not the rights that constituted citizenship but different historical dynamics that change every period of history. He conceptualizes citizenship by looking at its historical epochs, so it would be possible to understand different variables. Like other critics, Balibar emphasizes another function of citizenship beyond rights and duties, which preserves the status quo. Instead of minimizing embedded inequalities within capitalism, citizenship opens a space to authority by maintaining discipline over the labor force (Balibar 2015). Since Marshall has never reckoned citizenship as an instrument of the state, this approach directly targeted the main definition of him. A parallel perspective is also shared by Mouffe through a radical democratic paradigm. As Balibar, she underlies citizenship's relation with the relation of power but in a different sense. By borrowing the concepts from Mao and Gramsci, she offers two main approaches to conceptualizing radical democracy: agonism, a conflict that occurred in the public sphere as a way of claiming, and antagonism, which is a direct struggle between frontiers (Mouffe, 2013). In the agonistic model, both sides have in common regarding sharing democratic values, but they still continue to fight to become a hegemonic (Mouffe, 2013, pp. 17–27). Mouffe's ideas would be interpreted as the agonistic model is barely applied without the existence of the different contestation spheres. Thus, the substance of citizenship also derived from different relations and struggles. In this sense, Marshall ignores the democratic struggle both in the constitution of citizenship and in between subjects. On the other hand, Balibar is dubious about the relation between democracy and citizenship while Mouffe insists on a strong reciprocal connection. However, both standpoints show that citizenship cannot reduce to the legal status, nor are citizens reduced to passive recipients. Rather, they have consisted of many common political identities that are always claimed (Mouffe, 1991). Mouffe clearly summarizes her view by saying “The problem with such an approach is that it ignores the limits imposed on the extension of pluralism by the fact that some existing rights have been constituted on the very exclusion or subordination of the rights of other categories.” (Ibid, P.80). Marshall leaves the others of the society outside of the door and neglects the status of women, disabled, unemployed and

migrants. State's protective role merely focuses on the economical side, which is reduced to employment in Marshallian theory. In that case, Isin stresses on human rights in order to expand the boundaries of citizenship while Mouffe uses radical democracy. The reason why Isin uses human rights is because of the internationality of human rights and its intersection with citizenship. Isin argues that identity and citizenship are deeply connected because citizenship is also a lived experience. He separates a human right that exists independently of any government, and citizens' rights that embraces duties, taxation, and services. Citizenship should deal with human rights instead of being its competitor. To achieve that, citizenship must be recognized as a cosmopolitan mechanism, so we can conceptualize citizenship's rights and duties which exceed the boundary of state. Therefore, rights and responsibilities are not dependent on states. Rather, an alternative mechanism against nation-state citizenship like a cosmopolitan taxation system could offer cosmopolitan rights and new responsibilities that are more inclusive (Isin, Engin; Turner, 1 C.E.; Isin & Turner, 2007). Relatedly, Grewal conceptualizes citizenship as a fluid concept that is always flowing amongst nation-states and belonging. So, the discussions regarding cosmopolitanism and multinationalism have also challenged Marshall's concepts. Grewal combines other dynamics that affect citizenship by arguing that the tensions and conflicts within the belonging have always existed in the citizenship. Thus, neither the tensions nor the sense of belonging to the nation-state that Isin or Mouffe emphasize have emerged in modern citizenship, according to her, but there is another idea reshaping the sense of belonging: a new form of consumer culture (Grewal, 2005). Spreading of transnational values facilitate that new consumer culture through new technologies of consumption, production, and communication. Therefore, neither human rights nor cosmopolitan citizenship are able to conceptualize extra-territorial elements of citizenship that (re)produced by the institutions and discourses (Ibid).

However, none of these theories adequately explain how citizens' perception is transformed. Instead, most of them considered citizenship a dependent element of state structure and ignored how neoliberalism transformed its definition and people's rationality. Understanding the complexity of a citizenship's perceptual change is vitally important if the research attempt to reveal critical dynamics that transformed citizenship perception, and its definition. Hence, as discussed in the following section, the governmentality school would clarify how economic norms regulate the citizens and citizenship. This inquiry underlines the significance of Foucault's neoliberalism discussion.

## **1.2. Acquisition of Citizenship and Neoliberal Transformation**

As stated in the first part, the criteria for the determination of citizenship status distinguished individuals into those who are included and those who are excluded. After empires fell apart and nation-states took their place, people's citizenship status was beginning to define by spatiality and blood tie. So, the possession of citizenship was transmitted through spatiality (*jus soli*) or hereditary (*jus nexus*). Since both are not a concrete concept that can be seen, or touched, the state has a last word on determination of the status. These acquisition methods are emphasized the imaginary structures of the nations, as Anderson's claim. Throughout the nation, the shared symbols such as unknown soldier statues are the subject of national unification since they encompass even the smaller part of the society (Anderson, 2006, pp. 9–20). So, all the parts of society could be chained to a similar sense of comradeship regardless of knowing each other (Anderson, 2006, pp. 1–7). Citizenship would make communication possible by connecting the state and the people under the umbrella of itself. However, since the state is the exclusive authority for determining citizenship boundaries, the relevance of acquisition types has increased. Hence, the states are having a chance to change the acquisition types or definition of citizenship in different eras. Hence, the states have a chance to change the acquisition types or definitions of

citizenship in different eras. They could either define ideal citizens (Tuğal, 2009, pp. 39–41; Üstel, 2008), or add new programs to citizenship such as citizenship by business or investment to enhance the economic activity. In the era of the increasing cooperation between states and companies, those requirements are mostly determined by the economic profits of the states. Especially, along with golden-visa, citizenship-by-investment programs, citizenship by business programs redesigned the acquisition types. Since some European countries such as Malta or Bulgaria began to operate investor citizenship programs, those programs are submitted by the European Commission. The commission recognize the alternative naturalization procedures which *award citizenship to a foreigner on the basis of “national interest”* (European Commission, 2019, p. 2), but, they have concern regarding the risk of the programs such as security, money laundering, tax evasion, transparency and governance (European Commission, 2019, p. 10–20). Furthermore, European Commissions opened infringements to Malta and Cyprus for investor citizenship schemes (European Commission, 2020). These publications have illustrated European concerns regarding citizenship programs, but they also have neglected the role of business programs in diminishing welfare citizenship.

The significance of the citizenship programs is that they allow acquiring citizenship or residency permits in exchange for money or human capital. So, those who want to compensate for their economic or social deficiencies applied for those programs. Especially people who live in a country where economic and political instability occurred are applying for these programs. In that sense, Ankara Agreement could be an example of this motivation since it provides a business opportunity in England. Also, it is one of the most popular options amongst Turkish citizens. Thus, nowadays, new acquisition types of citizenship have spread throughout the world. The citizenship status turned into a commodity that was either engaged by investment or business. Ultra-riches prefer to use assets to possess European citizenship, while the middle-class select other alternatives that permit them to use human capital.

There are three main actors of citizenship programs: states, intermediary institutions, and demanders (Altan-Olcay, Özlem; Balta, 2017). States' roles consist of regulating and facilitating the citizenship programs as a supplier. As a result, states compete to attract the ultra-rich attention and increase the money flow within the country (Shachar & Hirschl, 2014, p. 231–257). Visa-free travels, naturalization of family members, tax benefits, and real estate values are leading factors that make one country's citizenship fashionable (Shachar, 2018). Henley & Partners Passport Index, a well-known citizenship programs company, compares countries according to their visa-free accesses. For instance, Afghan citizens have only access to 23 countries without a visa, an Iraqi has 28, and a Syrian has 29. On the contrary, countries that welcomed citizenship programs are ranking higher. A Maltese has access to 184 countries, and a St. Kitts and Nevis's, where investment citizenship programs apply, have access to 156 countries (Henley Passport Index 2006 to 2020). Intermediaries are the institutions that facilitate the naturalization processes. One of the exciting things is that they advise clients and states to design or launch citizenship programs<sup>2</sup>. So, states become both the clients and producers. Thirdly, another actor is people who seek new citizenship. In her research, Surak explains the motivations of demanders to apply programs under four topics: present mobility, future mobility, business benefits, and tax benefits. They are looking to compensate for the economic and social inequalities embedded in citizenship by changing their status. Possessing second citizenship is triggered by plenty of motivations, from educating their children to increasing reputation amongst other business actors (Surak, 2020). Residency permits also encompasses similar actors in the citizenship programs. Since some countries, such as China or India, forbid dual citizenship, people seek residency permission as an alternative to enjoy another country's rights.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.henleyglobal.com/government-advisory-practice/> Access Date: 4 Jan 2020

Whereas many researchers have examined how citizenship is shaped in historical contexts or in relation to the welfare state, few studies have systematically investigated the way it is acquired. Despite the popularity of dual citizenship, the new forms of dual citizenship derived from citizenship by investment or other similar policies are a new issue. These discussions are hand to hand with the political-economic system of the world and how those structures shapes people way of thinking to find alternative official status. Thus, it has to be examined how different studies conceptualized neoliberalism and how neoliberalism shapes and limits people's perceptions. The importance of the neoliberalism is its role in the alteration of citizenship by redefining the relation between state and citizens. Recently, all those topics have emerged in the citizenship programs. Studying exceptional acquisition of citizenship consists of many different types.

Citizenship or residency permission can be obtained by the purchase of real estate, investment, or cash. Since either states or private firms facilitate the naturalization process, describing them as suppliers would reveal their function in these policies. The majority of the critical studies on citizenship focus on the role of the state. Those scholars addressed the normative claims. For those scholars, citizenship selling would damage political rights and dissolve the notions of citizenship (Shachar 2018; Bauböck 2018). Others conceptualize the selling of citizenship through neoliberal policies that remake the state and its citizens as market object (D. Harvey, 2005). Similarly, governmental studies go beyond the economic-based literature on neoliberalism and stress how the neoliberal as rationality and governmental technology conduct society and the state. So citizenship turns into a subject of governmental technology under the specific normativity (Brown, 2016; Dardot & Laval, 2014; Foucault, 2008; Mavelli, 2018b).

The discussions that concentrated on cosmopolitanism, social movements, and governing technology required new concepts. Since neoliberalism as a governmental technology, political-economic system, and rationality has been hegemonizing all

spheres of life, it is necessary to consider its place in citizenship studies. Although there is no consensus on the definition of neoliberalism, the common view emphasizes the state's shifting position in favor of the market. However, since the research mainly concerns perceptual changes, the structures that affect people's decision-making process is significant. In that sense, neoliberalism is taken as a phenomenon that goes beyond the economic structure. Foucauldian interpretations highlight neoliberalism as a governmental technology that disseminates economic calculations into everyday life and administration. It turns individuals into entrepreneurs of themselves who act and think under the guidance of market rationality (Foucault, 2008). As a result, the neoliberal subject becomes an entrepreneur in their own business, everyday life, health, and love. Therefore, besides the economic system, neoliberalism also provides a new form of governmentality with specific governing objects. New discourses of neoliberalism aim to transform society by changing the concepts regarding society and economy. The political motivation behind it relies on the depoliticizing of the state and society. So, individuality which prioritizes individuals as independent subjects superseded the society which emphasizes being organized (M Foucault, Davidson, and Burchell 2008; Brown 2015; Dardot and Laval 2014; Mavelli 2018; Lemke 2015).

Another perspective highlights neoliberalism's economic component by emphasizing financial dynamics and fiscal policy. The financial institutions' hegemony remakes the subject through the instrument of indebtedness, precarity, and flexibility (Hardt & Negri, 2012; Konings, 2009). Harvey points out that neoliberalism's political and economic features, which claim individual welfare, can only be achieved through market endorsements. Therefore, free-market hegemony is a compulsory phenomenon for neoliberalism, which is encouraged by the state. The state's role in practice is either to provide a good investment climate for capitalists or to take a stand in favor of the financial institutions (D. Harvey, 2005, p. 70–80). Deregulation of capital, impoverishment of welfare policies, and labor dysfunction are some of the outcomes of the neoliberal project (D. Harvey, 2005). On the contrary, Wacquant brings a new

perspective that rejects neoliberalism's economic-based concepts. By looking at the state-level to identify neoliberalism and defining it as "market-confirming state crafting" projects, he claims that it is a political project rather than governmental technology or a financialization process (Wacquant, 2012, p. 71). It would be argued that the main argument of Wacquant and Foucault regarding governmental technology is more or less similar to each other. While Foucault uses governmentality, Wacquant puts the political system forward. Since neoliberal policies both as a state crafting project and governmentality have referred to the specific design of the power through the economy, they can explain the transformation of the citizenship's perception.

Neoliberal studies emphasize the universalization of competition and endorse market-based actions amongst individuals and institutions (Foucault, 2008). Citizenship programs can also be conceptualized under this competition and market-based policies. There is a mutual relation between the citizens and the states in the citizenship programs. From the state's point of view, citizenship programs help to increase economic activity and human capital in the country. According to migrants, they facilitate the migration process by offering alternatives. Since neoliberalism takes human capital as a social and political life criterion, it became the hegemonic discourse of market rationality (Brown, 2016). Besides this, it gains its effect on different spheres of life. Therefore, both states and citizens try to increase their productivity for enhancing human capital. So that citizens can reach the rights, and states can increase profits (Read, 2009). States are regulated their migration policies according to people's qualification such as their education or work experience. By taking human capital as a main criterion, states pick successful people such as athletes, scientists, artists. In turn, citizenship is turned into a prize for talented third world citizens (Shachar, 2011, p. 2095–2097).

Furthermore, citizenship programs provide revenue to the many states. This notion is vitally important especially for small countries. Economic citizenship programs accounted for 25% of the GDP of St. Kitts and Nevis in 2015. It is also reported that

Portugal's plans made up 13% of its foreign direct investment inflows in 2014 (Myers & Content, 2016). Henley and Partners estimated that \$2bn was spent in 2014 to acquire a second passport (Gittleston, 2014). Those numbers show that, as Foucault emphasizes, the critical element of neoliberalism is not the step back of the states from economics. Instead, the state works for the sake of economic development (Foucault, 2008). In other words, the state itself turns into an economic actor that seeks the benefits of citizenship programs regardless of their political or social corruption. However, the problem emerges in these programs because they transfer political rights to those who acquire citizenship by money or entrepreneurship (Shachar & Baubock, 2014). Both state and market reshape political rights through the opening of a corridor to the ultra-rich. So, while the state instrumentalizes the citizenship as a prize, it keeps the ones who could not afford the prices or who do not have enough human capital out of the border. These policies are directly connected with citizenship by business programs since the rules are derived from the market, and they only include entrepreneurs. The main problem of these programs is not only their negative effects on the citizenship political values, as Barbulescu claims (Barbulescu, 2018a). Instead, the motivation of people to apply for these programs and how they took risks are broader issues. So, the diminishing of citizenship's political values is an embodied concept in transforming citizenship into entrepreneurship. This would be conceptualized by taking neoliberalism as rationality and governmental technology.

Nonetheless, the citizenship programs could not be considered problematic in and of themselves, but they could be symptoms of inequality. Thus, it would be misleading to consider citizenship programs as the only distinct form of inequality. Inequalities in citizenship are a result of inequalities between states. The limits of citizenship consist of the nation's limits where a person is born into it (Surak, 2020). Therefore, the *jus soli* type of citizenship possession is part of property relations because it solely depends on "luck" (Shachar, 2009). While Shachar emphasizes the role of property relations in citizenship acquisition as a source of inequalities and underpins programs that replicate

this mechanism, Spiro draws a different conclusion from the same argument. He suggests that in a world where the political and social notion of citizenship has already lost its values, these programs can only be a cause instead of a consequence (Spiro, 2018).

Another crucial side of the commodification of citizenship is related to the demand for their programs. Although there is considerable literature on the hazardous relationship between citizenship and money (Shachar and Baubock 2014; Shachar 2018; Barbulescu 2018b; Altan-Olcay, Özlem; Balta 2017), there have been few investigations on the demand side (Harpaz, 2016). The study aims to reveal how programs, as a neoliberal alternative, reproduce inequality and who may benefit from it by including the demand-side. To keep the pressure on the demand side, it is important to remember that uneven economic conditions are embodied with country inequality. So, regardless of the wealth of people, citizenship of affluent countries have turned into an instrument that offers mobility and prestigious. Since inequalities among countries directly reflect on the inequalities of citizenship, the distinction between the people who live in non-affluent countries and those who live in affluent ones has increased. Milanovic employs the term "citizenship penalty" to distinguish between the poverty that results from being a citizen of a poor country and the "citizenship premium" that emphasizes the financial opportunity of a citizen of a wealthy country (Milanovic 2019,129-134). Then he poses the following question: "Is the citizenship premium a rent?"(Milanovic 2019, 131). Along with the middle-class people, even the richest members of society are faced with hassle situations in business because of mobility (Surak 2020). In Surak's interview with a lawyer, a well-earned naturaliser said that "He may be rich, but if he cannot travel to London whenever he wants, he will always be second the class" (Surak 2020,11).

As aforementioned, citizenship has always contained exclusionary practices, and this notion has even been amplified with the expansion of the nation-state and the consolidation of neoliberalism. However, the current inequalities are composed of, as

Milanovic says, between-country inequality (Milanovic 2012), hence people who live in non-western countries are more likely to be deprived of fundamental rights, security, or education. However, it is ambiguous to how citizens view their situation in his theory. Milanovic argues that even the situation of the poorest Americans is better than in many other countries in terms of the fact that they live in a wealthy country (Milanović, 2012). So, the single solution for those who are living in a non-affluent country is to reach an affluent country with official status according to him. “I conclude with something that resembles a slogan: either developing countries will become richer, or poor people will move to rich countries. These two developments can be seen as equivalent. Development is about people: either poor people have ways to become richer where they are now or become rich by moving somewhere else. Looking at from above, there is no real difference between the two options. However, from the point of view of real politics, there is a whole world of difference.” (Milanovic 2019, 208). So, people who are struggling with the tough political and economic situation of the country are trying to find alternatives. In this case, holding a second citizenship are "Plan B" proposals that offer security in the event of a political or economic crisis (Surak, 2020) and "compensatory" to access first-tier citizenship that contains more security, rights, and opportunity (Harpaz, 2016, 2019).

However, although citizenship values depend on the country's power, two other questions remain. Firstly, since not all citizens of the non-affluent countries tried to migrate, viewing the country as a non-affluent is also a perception. Especially, middle-class or riches complain about their citizenship status because they are anxious about losing their privileges. Secondly, although Milanovic compares the countries' situation according to data and offers a new variable to the concept of inequality, his hypothesis is inadequate to explain how citizens of non-affluent countries describe their country or their situation. In other words, regardless of the inequality data presents, viewing citizenship depends on the specific normativity. In order to comprehend the role of inequality as a migration motive, it would be helpful to keep in mind Milanovic's

theory. Still, it has to be extended with subjectivity to explain the transformation of perception.

## **2. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE TURKISH CASE**

The early sign of citizenship was rooted in the Ottoman Empire, with the superseding of "kul" to "tebaa". Increasing rights was the leading factor that led to this distinction. While Kul has no political and social rights over the emperor's rules, tebaa's obedience to the emperor is relatively limited (Gürses;Pazarci 2010). After the foundation of the republic, this object was replaced by the citizen for the first time. However, while the term "citizen" refers to rights and duties in the traditional sense, it is a source of contention in Turkey due to the way it is defined. Under the influence of the social and political environment, Turkey's citizenship regime can be divided into three major epochs. Single-party era, multi-party, and military coup eras that occurred during the 50s to 80s, and the 80s to current day (Icduygu et al., 1999). Especially the military coups were the force behind constitutional and ideological changes. By following the examples of the major historical events that touched Turkey's citizenship regime, the study concentrates on how neoliberal citizenship policies have transformed the definition and practice of Turkish citizenship through commodification and new governmentality. Although there has been limited research on the citizenship program that is based on a market relationship, the research aims to address this gap by examining the evolution of Turkey's citizenship programs. The Turkish citizenship regime also has an impact on the local perceptions of citizenship. As a result, it would be critical to focus on how the dynamics of the Turkish citizenship regime have influenced the perceptions of individuals.

In the early period of the republic, the new regime struggled to transmogrify both the state and society's structure. Secularism and nationalism were the two leading

ideologies of the transformation. Zürcher divides the secularist policies' institutionalization into three parts, which are: state, education, and law (Zürcher, 2017, p. 176–182). By adopting secular and nationalist views, the regime targeted those three areas (Ibid). The new regime sought to delegitimize Islam, limit religious symbols in the public sphere, and orient the country toward European values (Zürcher, 2017, p. 186–195). Secular policies were rapidly implemented, especially between 1923 and 1930. Hat reform (1925), closing of Closing dervish lodges (1925), and removing the religion of the state article from the constitution (1928) are examples of the secular concerns. These changes were intended to reshape society by following to western-based secular ideas and placing religion under governmental control. However, the secular policies were mostly targeted to empower the state's hegemony over the society and religiosity. The establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1924 and continuous displacement efforts towards non-Muslim people demonstrate a dilemma of secular policies (Kadioğlu, 1996, p. 184–186). While the religious identity tried to be abolished, it combined with Turkishness and preserved its notion in the determination of an ideal citizen. So, the displacement of religion intersected with national identity under the authority of the state rather than losing its importance. For instance, during the exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey, Muslims living in Greece and Orthodox Christians living in Turkey were displaced. Lewis claims that the exchange took place between Muslims and Orthodox rather than Turks and Greeks (Lewis 1969, p. 355). In other words, the identity that led to this displacement was not an ethnic one, but a religious one. Another example is the Gagavuz Turks. Even though they identify themselves as Turks and use Turkish in everyday life, they are barely welcomed by the state because of their Christian origin (Lewis, 1969, p. 8). In both cases, religion determined the national identity regardless of common language or culture. The Turkish identity is embedded with Islam (Ibid). The hidden role of religion makes the Turkish secularization process paradoxical. Therefore, stressing class dynamics that construct secularism and its use as an instrument could reveal the Turkish secularization's paradoxical character and how it

shaped citizenship. Boyraz conceptualizes the secularization of Turkey by emphasizing class relations and hegemonic struggles. He emphasizes the significance of secularism in the comprehensive transformation of the country by oppressing the ongoing opposition force of religion during the single-party era (Boyraz, 2019, p. 83–85). So, they had to either abolish or take religion under control to restrain the potentiality of contestation and strengthen the new hegemony (Ibid). Beyond the ideology, secularism was instrumentalized by the republican elites in order to empower the state sovereignty and to construct bourgeois social relations (Peker, 2016).

The construction of Turkish nationalism has shared the same motivations as the political economy of secularism. Citizenship was influenced by both secularism and nationalism. The instruments of the reforms were the constitutional, educational, and social reforms. Through nationalism and secularism, these instruments shaped the ideal citizen in all spheres of social and economic life. In order to create a new ideological form, the regime tried to replace religious identity with a nationalist view through Turkification (Yeğen, 2011). As aforementioned, the reason why they choose nationalism is to suppress religion's contentious capacity (Boyraz, 2019). So, the regime devised new myths and symbols such as the Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language to construct a new nationalist identity which was supposed to supersede religious identity (Icduygu et al., 1999, p. 195). The common point of these top-down myths is that they aim to displace religious identity with a national and secular one. Those myths argued, without any scientific evidence, that all languages descended from the Turkish or Turks were the forefathers of civilization. On one hand, the primary motivation was to disempower religiosity, taking religion under the state's control. On the other hand, the new ethnic-based ideology brought with it the distinction between Turks and non-Turks. The origins of Turkish nationalism have been oscillating between several forms of nationalism because the new rulers tried to adopt a new identity with Western principles (Kadioğlu, 1996).

The oscillation is derived from the asymmetrical relationship between national identity and the definition of citizenship. The heterogeneity of the population makes this distinction more complicated. We can distinguish the topic by separating it into two main terms: the nationalist policies for the "outsiders" and the "insiders." As aforementioned, outsiders were either non-Muslims or ethnic minorities, while insiders were Muslim Turks. Kirişçi stresses the importance of migration policies to conceptualize the "outsiders." He claims that proximity to "Turkish descent and culture" determined the people's adoption into the country, as well as their religious identity. The oscillation is derived from the asymmetrical relationship between national identity and the definition of citizenship. The heterogeneity of the population makes this distinction more complicated. We can distinguish the topic by separating it into two main terms: the nationalist policies for the "outsiders" and the "insiders." As stated, outsiders were either non-Muslims or ethnic minorities, while insiders were Muslim Turks. Kirişçi stresses the importance of migration policies in conceptualizing "outsiders." He claims that proximity to "Turkish descent and culture" determined the people's adoption into the country, as well as their religious identity (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 4). Precisely, during the first period of the republic, the new regime encouraged people who had Turkish origin in order to fasten the nation-building process. The dimension of the closeness to Turkishness is linked with the nation-building process, and this categorization divides plenty of branches. Hence, he takes language as a distinctive feature, those who spoke Turkish and belonged to the Turkish culture, those who did not know Turkish but were deemed to be of Turkish culture, and then who did not speak Turkish nor practiced Turkish culture (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 4–7). Some M. Kemal's or İnönü's speeches affirmed the importance of the Turkish language, e.g., "Language is one of the nation's most distinctive features. One who claims to be Turk should speak

Turkish before everything. It would not right if one who does not speak Turkish claims that he/she is a Turk or belongs to Turkish culture”<sup>3</sup> (Kocatürk, 1985, p. 182).

In research where Brubaker discusses the variations between the German and French types of citizenship and nationality, two crucial distinctions come to ground. In the French case belonging to the citizens consists of belonging to the state, and it contains assimilationist policies. In the German case, the nation is constituted by ethnoculturalism, which contains differentialist policies (Brubaker 1992). In that sense, the first period of the republic had some similarities with the French ca. He also notes that membership to a nation-state is more than being a citizen because of the homogeneous population instrumentalized by the state. it instrumentalizes it to construct a cohesive and homogeneous. During the first period of the republic, the new regime's motivation to homogenize the population was directly related to the nation-building process, and citizens as a symbol of modernity and nationality were among the most remarkable subjects. According to a definition of Kadioğlu, Turkish nationalism is a manufactured project instead of an ideology that spontaneously triggers the national consciousness (Kadioğlu, 1996). Thus, citizenship was an instrument of the manufacturing process.

So, even though the new regime recognized the people as citizens instead of a tebaa (vassal), the interests of the state have taken priority above the rights of citizens (Köker, 1997). The desire to create a new nation through “voluntary amnesia” (Kadioğlu, 1996, p. 188) intertwined with the process of a construction of new citizen who symbolizes the nation his/her everyday life and personal ideology (Keyman, Fuat; İçduygu 1998). Therefore, the first era's importance is regarding its constitutive over Turkey's citizenship by using concepts of nationalism, security, and the ideal citizen.

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<sup>3</sup> Utkan Kocatürk, Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri (Ankara: Turhan Kitabcvı, 1984), p. 182.

Many studies have conceptualized the citizenship policies of the first era of the republic through nation-building (Icduygu et al., 1999; Kadioğlu, 1996), security (Rubin, 2017), and ethnic division (Yeğen, 2004). However, the structure of the citizenship regime in Turkey has always been controversial because of its way of development. In Turkey, citizenship has not emerged from the social movements from below. Instead, elites provide it to strengthen the state's power (Arat, 1998). As a result, without always guaranteeing people's rights unconditionally, the regime constructed an ideal citizenship that, on one hand, represents the nation's modernity, while on the other hand, protects the nation's ideals from ideological and political opponents (Rubin, 2017).

After the first election that resulted in the victory of the Democrat Party (DP), the ideal type of citizenship designed by the first government was preserved in large. However, religious practices in the public sphere eased, secular discourse decreased, and private entrepreneurship was encouraged as opposed to the first government. Also, through rising internal migrations, society's structure began to change, and the population of the rural areas diminished while the metropolitan populations expanded (Zürcher, 2017, p. 164–165). Although new regulations emerged in the public sphere and industrialization expanded, these mechanisms did not affect citizenship rights as much as the 1960s coup. Assimilative citizenship policies along with national and security concerns have been preserved in their role. However, the conflict between the new government and the old elites began. After DP took over, it attacked the RPP's by closing the People's House and village institutes. The role of religion was the main argument of the DP to attack the old elites. At the beginning of the republic, religion's role in the public sphere sparked a debate between the official ideology and opponents, yet this time the current government sided with the opponents. It resulted in an increase in DP's popularity. One of the most cited studies which explains the victory of the DP is written by Mardin, who conceptualizes the tension of the transition to the new republic's values through the center-periphery distinction. Mardin views the DP's

victory as the victory of the periphery against the center, represented by the RPP (Mardin, 1973, p. 184–185). As a result of the new periphery distinction, the concept of citizenship changed, and a secularist crisis arose among the old elites and the DP. After a decade, the military reacted to the conflict between DP and the old elites regarding religion that ended with a military coup. The military rapidly implemented amendments to restrict government operations since the DP benefited from prior single-party era privileges through state authority. The army-drafted constitution has created an environment in which civil and democratic rights can flourish. There were severe changes, such as the right to strike, universities' autonomy, jurisdiction, and the context of citizenship. After the coup d'état, the military has tried to legitimize intervention by questioning DP governance and prioritizing the "national will" within the civic knowledge lessons. The discourse of responsible citizens, who are subjects of the national revolution, has been instrumentalized for the sake of national will (Üstel, 2008, p. 275). The main features of citizenship were transformed through the alteration of the aim to be modern and civilized. The junta encouraged participation and responsible citizenship (Caymaz, 2007, p. 36). By comparing the official textbook's lessons regarding citizenship, Üstel points out that the ideal type injected by the founder elite to spread nationalist discourses lost its validity. "Partisan citizenship" superseded "episodic citizenship," which reduces citizens' notions to voting, paying taxes, and fulfilling duties (Üstel, 2002, p. 282). Another discourse analysis conducted by Gürses and Pazarıcı focusing on textbooks, also verified Üstel's claims and has been emphasizing that compulsory military duty and the right to elect and be elected are described as 'debt' (Gürses, Fatma; Pazarıcı, 2010, p. 18). It is controversial that transition of citizenship from the partisan to the episodic is led to the empowering of democratic citizenship, which encompassed the rights. Civic participation became solely part of citizenship, and all other dynamics of citizenship were reduced to the narrow sense of rights and duties (Üstel, 2002, p. 282). The citizenship's ethnical references lost their validity, and the citizenship turned into a sterile phenomenon that was surrendered by the positive judicial norms (Üstel, 2008). Therefore, even though

citizens' civil rights were relatively increased, these improvements were neither permanent nor effective. The following coup d'état in the 1980s transformed citizenship more than its predecessors. Since one of the main targets of the junta was to limit social movements and strengthen the state's power over society, a new political agenda and discourse have been pumped. Economic freedom and Turkish-Islam synthesis were the driving concepts of the new regimes. From institutions to the official ideology, these two ideas preserved their hegemony from the '80s to today. Once again, partisan citizenship became hegemonic and crushed the democratic citizenship values of 1960's citizenship (Üstel, 2002, pp. 282–283). Similar to the first-party era, citizenship began to be instrumentalized by the state to establish a particular identity (Keyman, Fuat; İçduygu 1998). However, contrary to the first-party era, there were plenty of political organizations among different fractions that questioned the junta's authority. Thus, a strong sense of unity, widespread unionization, and mass movements challenged the junta's legitimacy, but they failed. Hence, security became a main concern of the junta to oppress mass mobilization. Parallely, citizenship loses its notion of rights and is reduced to duties such as paying taxes or fulfilling compulsory military service, as in the 60s coup in a more brutal way (Üstel, 2008). The contract between the people and the state regarding rights was turned upside-down, and the state prioritized security and identity-based policies. The embedment of Turkish identity with Islam determined the criteria of palatable citizens. As Islam's dominance grew, so did Turkishness discourses, and religious identity became ingrained in the sense of belonging of Turkish identity. So, different phases of nationalism, such as official language and ideology, are combined with religion (Gürses, Fatma; Pazarci, 2010). The empowerment of Turkishness could also be observed in differentiations of constitutions. Aside from the fact that the articles detailing Turkish citizenship in the 1982 and 1962 constitutions were equivalent, “The people of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, would be called Turkish in terms of nationality” (Article 88 in 1962, Article 66 in 1982), some classes had precedence over others not only in terms of ethnicity but also of religion in practice (Yeğen, 2004, p. 57–60). This asymmetric relationship, according to Yeğen,

is the outcome of a blurred definition of the state and citizens in both constitutions (Yeğen, 2004, p. 62). Thus, the idea of Turkishness has always remained, and for the same reason, the practice of Turkish citizenship contradicted the textual definition (Ibid). As a result, the exclusion of various sects, ethnicities, and religious identities has grown more than ever by narrowing the ideal citizenship perceptions after the coup.

Another crucial point of citizenship in the 1980s was the flourishing of neoliberalization. The January 24 Decisions that were made before the military takeover but were previously unable to be implemented, began to be forcibly applied. This decision encouraged market competition by opening the domestic market to the international market. The articles of the Washington Consensus briefly summarized what happened to Turkey and the rest of the world. In sum, as its analogous 24 January Decisions contained trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization of state enterprises, competitive exchange rates, and the abolition of state regulation over the free market economy (Williamson, 2000). However, similar to the Latin American countries, the implementation of these policies required a coercive method, and the military coup was perfectly suited to this. Thus, to fasten the neoliberal transformation, many authoritarian policies were implemented, such as the closure of the syndicates, limitation of the political parties, depoliticizing of society, and the arrest of hundreds. As a result, there was no suitable environment for the development of citizenship policies other than the production of militant citizens. Instead, even the exercise of constitutionally protected fundamental rights and freedoms was limited within national cultural boundaries (Tanör, 1994). By referring to the 'national,' the junta directly referred to the Turkish-Islam synthesis, which depicts the ideal citizenship within the country. The triangle of nationalism, Islamism, and neoliberalism have reified under the term of Turkish-Islam Synthesis. By adding Islam to the Turkish nationality, the regime aimed to solve the hegemonic crisis beforehand and expedite neoliberal reforms' consolidation (Boyras, 2019). Although Islam played an important role in defining Turkishness (or Turkish citizens as defined in the 1962 constitution) and

suppressing opposing ideologies such as communism (Meşe 2007), it was not the official ideology until the 1980s. Nevertheless, Turkish nationalism has always had an instrumental alliance with Islam (Koyuncu Lorasdağı, 2011).

All these historical epochs determined the construction of citizenship regime and opened it to debate. Arat emphasizes that since rulers have always been the sole decision-maker of citizenship rights instead of the masses, these rights have become a strategic tool for the rulers. So, they could not be stable nor democratic (Arat, 1998). İçduygu, Çolak, Soyarik shared similar opinions. However, they conceptualize the instrumentalization of citizenship by claiming that Turkey's citizenship appears more like a cultural status than a political or social one because it attempted to regulate the public and private sphere (Icduygu et al., 1999, p. 197,198). Through the cultural transformation, the regime portrayed citizenship by strengthening national identity with secular values (Ibid). Similarly, Kadioğlu identifies citizenship by emphasizing its instrumental relation with the state. After she conceptualizes the paradoxical character of the establishment of Turkish nationalism as the manufactured identity determined by top-down decision, she argues that citizenship turns out to be an instrument of the nation-building process (Kadioğlu, 2011; Kadioğlu, 1996). Besides, since national consciousness had no role in the construction of Turkish nationalism, the nation-state remained a project of the 'state in search of its nation'. For the same reason the regime did not achieve total transformation of the society, instead, they were stuck in a contradictory situation (Kadioğlu, 2011). Relatedly, Üstel mentions the word "acceptable citizen" to describe the variable characters of ideal citizens according to the state (Üstel, 2008). Through examining and comparing the official textbooks of citizenship, she underlines the influence of militant-citizenship in the definition of citizenship, especially during the single-party period and the 1980s (Üstel, 2002). Consequently, instead of enjoying the rights, citizens burdened the duties for the nation's sake (Ibid). To conceptualize official ideology's pattern regarding citizenship, Keyman and İçduygu argue that the citizenship design of Turkey functions as a

disciplinary technique in a Foucauldian sense since the citizens are both subject and object of the ideological concern of the Kemalist regime in the first period and the 1980s (Keyman; İçduygu 1998). Particularly, Keyman employs the governmentality concept in the discussion of secularism by arguing that secularism's role in expanding the new regime's expansion was creating the new self who governs themselves (Keyman, 2007).

Recently, considerable literature has grown up around the theme of the instrumentalization of Turkish citizenship throughout the republic's history. It is a controversial topic because of the inorganic establishment of the citizenship regime and its ideological usage by the state. Moreover, since the beginning Turkey's citizenship regime has never motivated citizens to be active, instead it has been restricted and instrumentalized by different ruling elites. The passive nature of Turkish citizenship tends to keep out the political discussion from the public sphere and reduce political rights to the voting. As a result, it could be argued that the passive character of citizenship facilitates the adaptation of neoliberal citizenship in terms of seeing citizenship as an ideological apparatus regardless of its conflictual structure.

These points have in common the belief that the Turkish citizenship regime is indeed a state-based instrument that subjectifies each citizen via official ideology. Moreover, the argument implies that the state's consideration of citizens has compounded the asymmetrical relationship between citizens and the state as a matter of obligation rather than a subject of rights.

## **2.1. The Acquisition Types**

Although numerous studies have recognized citizenship through its changing content by the different governments, research has yet to systematically investigate the effect

of citizenship programs in the making of citizenship regimes. As indicated in the section on neoliberalism, citizenship programs give ultra-riches a plethora of choices for preserving their wealth in the event of a crisis and expanding their travel options through strong visas. Furthermore, it develops the receiver country's labor market by welcoming skilled workers and increasing the money circulation. However, it is ambiguous that how the citizenship programs affect Turkish citizens. The effect of the Turkish citizenship regime on citizens has not yet been comprehensively examined despite neoliberal interventions. Thus, it may be helpful to identify the expansion of citizenship programs applied by the state first and look at how the Turkish citizens use the citizenship programs of other countries to gain opportunities that Turkish citizenship does not involve. In order to understand this pattern, it would be beneficial to observe how Turkish citizens use the citizenship programs. In that sense, the motivations to apply for the Ankara Agreement would be a strong case of the perceptual changes of Turkish citizens.

Dual citizenship has always been an issue for Turkey since the labor migration to Germany. Plenty of migrants stayed there after many Turkish workers had gone to Germany for work. The growing Turkish guestworker population in Germany has led to many crises, from the political rights of migrants to mobility. Thus, both for the state and the migrants, the concept of dual citizenship was crucial (Kadırbeyoğlu 2012). The restrictions on dual citizenship controlled the mobility of migrants to Turkey, and their relationship with Turkey remained ambiguous. In 1981, Turkey accepted dual citizenship as a solution to the workers' conflicting status, and many immigrant Turks were able to naturalize in Germany without losing their Turkish citizenship (Icduygu et al., 1999). However, the implementation of dual citizenship encouraged the development of other citizenship programs based on investments and business. Consequently, while Turkey offers alternative programs to those living in a worse condition, Turkish citizens seek the better alternatives.

The acquisition of Turkish citizenship through investments or real estates started in 2009, but it has not been facilitated until 2017. The acquisition of Turkish citizenship through investment is defined in the 12th article of the Exceptional States in the Acquisition of Turkish Citizenship as "persons who have brought industrial plants into Turkey or who have rendered or are being considered to render outstanding services in the scientific, technological, economic, social, sporting, cultural, and artistic fields and about whom a reasonable offer has been made by the relevant ministries." (2016, 5901, Turkish Citizenship Law). Acquiring Turkish citizenship demands purchasing immovable property worth at least \$250,000 and not selling it for three years, employing at least 50 people in Turkey, and keeping \$500,000 in cash in a Turkish bank (Yabancı Yatırımcıların Türk Vatandaşlığını Kazanmaları (5901/12-B), n.d.). After 2020 economic citizenship programs began to run by state-private collaboration. As in the privatization process of the health sector or other state institutions, private companies turned into the main agent of citizenship programs. This is indeed a paradoxical situation to Turkish citizenship because contradicts with the 'acceptable citizen' in terms of the patriotism. The reasons behind the increasing demand for citizenship programs could be identified by the diminishing of the official nationalist recognition of the citizenship.

The conduction of the neoliberal policies has varied from countries, and it may be emerging as an authoritarian regime or a welfare regime. Since neoliberalization of Turkey could not be separated from authoritarianism, the citizenship ideas have always been limited in terms of democratic rights or even mobility. Thus, in the Turkish case, neoliberalism has two faces. On one hand, it combines with authoritarianism, which prioritizes duties over rights; on the other, it welcomes those who make investments in the country without considering racial or religious criteria. Both faces reveal how the state can transform the citizenship through economic concerns. Similar to Turkey, other countries such as Malta or Cyprus also allow citizenship programs. The value of the countries is determined by their passport power, and economic and social stability.

These criteria lead to competition amongst the countries to take the peoples' attention (Shachar, 2011). Thus, people who wanted to migrate compare the countries regarding their mobility and power. Turkish citizens who have higher purchasing power seek alternative citizenship or residency to preserve their money or extend their mobility power. Compared to countries with a similar economic structure, such as Malta or Cyprus, Turkish passports have less travel opportunities. Henley & Partners places the Turkish passport at 51st position (*Henley Passport Index 2006 to 2020*, n.d.). Therefore, as in the other less developed countries like Chile, economic citizenship based on the real estate sector is the most popular one fostered by the state. Nevertheless, Turkey has some advantages over other Middle Eastern and North African countries. It offers a more secular lifestyle to those who live in theocratic regimes. The majority of citizenship candidates consist of citizens of Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and Palestine. 2.611 investors attained Turkish citizenship in 2019 (Anadolu Agency, 2019).

### **3. PERCEPTION OF NEOLIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: RESEARCH DESIGN**

This thesis explores how neoliberal policies promote citizenship programs such as citizenship by business or investment, which impact people's perceptions of citizenship. Many countries have recognized dual citizenship or residency permits, while neoliberalism offers an alternative way of acquiring through the market. So, people who live in authoritarian governments or non-stable economies are now able to migrate to European countries by making businesses or investments. However, the market's criteria became the main determinant of the acquisition process. It is expected that people are required to be competitive entrepreneurs in a given market space in order to obtain work permits or passports. As many other non-economic spheres of life, neoliberalism has injected its mentality by suppressing other options (Dardot & Laval, 2014). The migration also comes under the influence of the market. The citizenship programs which offer citizenship status to strangers through real-estate or investment

would be the most notable examples of how the neoliberal view affects citizenship. In that sense, despite its dissimilarities with other programs, citizenship by business also reflects the commodification of citizenship because it solves the problems within the market. For instance, the solution of Gary Becker regarding refugees can be an example of neoliberals' belief in the market. He proposes that refugee status be sold to the public, and those who cannot pay should be compensated through a credit-like system (Becker & Coyle, 2012). In Becker's proposal, the market becomes the sole solution to regulate migration under given rules. Thus, through citizenship programs, including citizenship by business, people have no choice but to integrate themselves into the market. As a result, their perception of citizenship becomes problematic. In this case, the significance of the Ankara Agreement is taken as one of the better known among other programs. It offers approximately similar solutions to Becker by making entrepreneurship compulsory. Therefore, even though it ended at the end of 2020, it maintains the importance to manifest the alteration of citizenship both for the states and people. Thus, the crucial question that this research is seeking is whether the process of acquiring citizenship through investment/business changes the perception of citizenship.

### **3.1. Method**

In order to conceptualize the patterns of the people's views about citizenship, research was conducted with people who have either residency permits or citizenship. In total, 11 interviews were conducted with different people. Four interviews conducted with people who did not apply the agreement and used another method to migrate were removed from the analysis. Two of them were university students with bachelor's and master's degrees. Both were actively planning to settle in another country, but they had yet to decide whether they would apply for the agreement. Lastly, one participant's interview was removed because he went to Holland as an expat instead of the Ankara Agreement applicant. Nevertheless, two more participants' interviews were added

whose applications were accepted but not started yet. Since the acquisition method of residency or citizenship was of importance, their parts were added in order to depict the citizenship's perception on the early period of people before they are settled by the agreement. The rest of the interview subjects went to England by the Ankara Agreement and had obtained work permits.

The data consist of a total of 11 in-depth interviews, six women and five men. The interviews were conducted from May to October in 2020. One of them was a United Kingdom citizen who acquired it by Ankara Agreement after five years of working, and others were holding working permission. The interviewees range in age from 26 to 40. The average age is 33. Because other methods would be technically challenging for online interviews, the sampling was the non-random snowballing sampling.

Qualitative data were collected using a semi-structured questionnaire. The semi-structured approach was chosen to clarify participants' unique points of view about citizenship and describe their perceptions with their own words. As a result of semi-structural methods, the questions varied on the participants' responses. All the participants were found by using snowball sampling. The snowballing sampling made it difficult to reach other participants who could contribute to the research with new responses. Even though all interviewees did not share the same thoughts, since they suggested their friends from a close distance, their responses were relatively similar to each other. Besides, the environmental limits as pandemic and distance have adverse effects on the research. There were other problems that were faced during the conduction of interviews. Firstly, since there was limited time, it would be difficult to reach different people to increase the research's validity and representation. Along with the time limit, the distance also restricted other methods outside of online meetings. For the same reason, it was challenging to find new participants by zoom meetings, and people had already been sick and tired of zoom conferences during the pandemic. If it would have been possible to conduct face-to-face interviews, it would be much easier to find other people because it would offer a broader comfort space for participants.

However, during the online interviews, constructing a confidential social environment was challenging because of the deficiency of eye contact or body language. So, an attempt was made to build a comfortable atmosphere by asking questions about their everyday life or making small talk to overcome this problem. Still, one of the participants hesitated to talk because of political concerns. However, other participants gained trust because their references were acquaintances. The trust among the participants and the surveyor was made possible thanks to those relatives. This also would be one of the pros of snowballing sampling. Moreover, to protect their privacy and build a cozy space, the names of all respondents were changed.

Since there were limited participants, it did not require any additional programs that code the quotes; instead, I manually wrote their answers. There were plenty of concepts that the participant's replies would deduce. However, I employed sections of the responses relevant to the research topic. I did not show other responses because they contained off-topic issues. Nevertheless, I tried to show their ambivalence as much as possible regarding some questions to provide valuable data. Especially in the discussion section, their responses tried to be conceptualized with various theories explained within the research. The major themes in conceptualizing the responses were citizenship perception and migration motives.

All in all, the research has been challenged by the pandemic, sampling method, confidence, similar participants, and online meetings, however these obstacles were dealt with the best they could by finding solutions.

There are three main parts of the interviews. Before the main questions, their names, ages, current citizenship and residency permission, acquisition method, occupational status, and lastly, their level of education were asked. The meeting session was to decide mainly whether they were suitable for research. Besides this, it was preferable to know their educational and class background to clarify their conditions in Turkey. All the participants were either university graduates or had an ongoing university

education. Four of them finished a master's degree, and two have an unfinished master's degree. So, interviewees were qualified in terms of education, and most of them had learned English before going to England.

### **3.2. Analysis**

All participants agreed that Turkey is amidst a political and economic crisis. While some complained about economic instability, such as the Turkish lira's depreciation, unemployment, a low minimum wage, or unsatisfactory working conditions, others complained about political instability that impacts their daily lives. The consensus of participants has been drawn by the desire to leave the country regardless of the method. However, since everyone has at least a graduate degree, or most of them have remarkable work experience, the way they choose to migrate is not the same as the method the working-class chooses or ultra-riches. They are all high-skilled and secular migrants for sure. It is helpful to operationalize them as a middle class because they are not as rich as people who buy residency permits and not as poor as the working-class who could not even imagine migrating somewhere else. Besides, although the country's economic or social situation is tumbling according to many data, participants' hesitation to live and work in Turkey is not shared by everyone in Turkey. Hence, this motivation is also part of their rationalizing process regarding migrating. They believed that the group of people they belong to faces social and economic problems. So, their class position and habitus shape their view toward living in Turkey. The majority of them lived in Kadıköy or Beyoğlu regions which consisted of upper-middle-class populations. Thus, their economic and social crises insights depend on their social and economic capital. The motivations that influence their decision-making process also highlight their socioeconomic classes because they are not solely derived from labor participation. They were trying to enhance their network, have good career circumstances, and even see nice theaters. They want to use their human capital, which is constituted by education and experience. Thus, it was not like the Germany-Turkey

worker migration during the 60s, but something more "elegant," as one of the participants said. The common point amongst them is that they all try to find an alternative way to migrate to western countries. In this sense, they have this common with high-skilled migrants (W. S. Harvey, 2010; Kõu, Anu;van Wissen, Leo;van Dijk, Jouke;Bailey, 2015).

### 3.3. Questions

There are three main chapters in the questionnaire. They all have open-ended questions that ask participants to indicate their experiences, thoughts, and perceptions regarding migration through the agreement.

The first set of questionnaires was designed to ascertain the elements of participants' decision-making regarding migration. This part tries to reveal both the motivations of participants to apply to citizenship programs and what they faced during the process. Questions are, *have you ever desired to live the rest of your life in another country? When did you consider living in another country? Which country, why? How was your personal experience on migration to somewhere else through business? Has your life changed after you settled there?* These questions could clarify the participants' social and economic motivations together with their circumstances. As citizenship programs are targeted at wealthy individuals, participants are expected to be at least upper-middle-class in terms of social and economic capital. However, due to the Ankara Agreement's accessible standards compared to other programs, participants who identified themselves as wealthy were less than others. In this case, there were no questions about their income either in Turkey or Britain, but it can be grasped by looking at other answers. Only four interviewees identified themselves as wealthy. Regardless of class, the consensus among the participants was their desire to leave the country through citizenship programs. Therefore, conceptualization was attempted based on their attitudes by considering this common point in whole research.

Other central concepts that the interview pointed out are mobility and convenience. These can reveal the participants' motivations toward citizenship programs and leaving the country. Their motivations to leave were not merely dependent on the economic factors, but it varied from their children's future to education opportunities or lifestyle. Those motivations were probably triggered by their level of education and economic situation in Turkey, which make them high-skilled migrants. In this sense, the neoliberal policies allowed the people to acquire a residency or working permission together with citizenship status by encouraging them to be entrepreneurs. Thus, they thought that they would both enhance their purchasing power, income and assure their child's future.

The second section of the questionnaire aimed to discover the participants' perspectives on citizenship regarding political rights and responsibilities. This section attempted to examine how the new citizenship regime has taken root in people's minds, regardless of core citizenship values such as politics, political rights, or social rights. There are three questions in that part: *Do you actively follow the political news of the receiver country? Do you know the language of the country that you are currently living in? How would you describe citizenship rights, and could you enjoy these rights?* Marshall's statements of rights and responsibilities were used (Hamilton & Marshall, 1951). Despite its blind spots to class, identity, and exclusion mechanisms within citizenship, because they conceptualized the fundamental citizenship features by using rights and duties. According to Marshall, the right to elect and to be elected shapes political rights. Thus, to understand how people's perception of citizenship has changed, questions related to political participation were posed. Then, the research asked questions about their description of citizenship and its rights, along with whether they could enjoy them. So, it would come to ground how the citizenship that consisted of the rights and duties has altered and which concept superseded its place.

The third section aimed to reveal participants' responses regarding citizenship and residency statuses. So, the research directly conceptualizes both the respondents'

distinctive perceptions and their transformation regarding citizenship. The questions are, "*Do you think you are going to feel like an citizen of X (receiver country), why?, How would you feel like an X?, Will you keep your Turkish citizenship once you acquire X citizenship?, What does it mean to be a Turkish citizen?, What does it mean to be an X citizen?, Which factors would change your decision to renounce your Turkish citizenship?, What do you think about the citizenship programs offered by Turkey? Do you support it?*". This part attempted to find how the people describe citizenship and how the perception of different countries' membership alters according to the participants. The core research question of this part is whether people who use citizenship programs, perception of citizenship, in general, has changed. Anderson's theory plays a vital role in the sense of belonging within the community. So, his theory was used to explain the structural background of a sense of belonging. Also, the question of whether they support the citizenship programs offered by Turkey is also a part of their perception.

### **3.4. Participants Information**

Since the participants' responses depend on their social baggage, it is vital to concern their social background. Therefore, the fundamental characteristics of the participants are explained in the following section. It includes their ages, education, how long they have been living in the UK, their occupation in UK and Turkey, and the sum of their impressive responses.

#### **Ergin**

Ergin<sup>4</sup>, a 28-year-old participant, was the first person to be interviewed. He had a master's degree from an English university. His first reason for coming to England was for a master's degree, but after spending years there, he decided to stay. Then, he

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<sup>4</sup> Names of the participants are intentionally changed to preserve their private life and make them more comfortable.

applied to the Ankara Agreement 5 years ago while continuing his master's degree. Unlike most others who came with the Ankara Agreement, he had never married and not had a child when he came to England. This is probably because he came for educational purposes only, and he already had relatives in the country. Also, because of his Kurdish origin, he said that he has never felt like a Turk. Turkey is a kind of different country as he views it. However, he does not give up Turkish citizenship as long as partially exempted paid military service continues. It would be argued that his ethnic background affected his adaptation process positively.

He established an advertising firm that served as a media consultant. He has been working in similar sectors since he obtained bachelor's degree. His company aimed to facilitate the Turkish companies' work by serving language services. Before he came, his family had been insistent that he settle in England. So, he already had relatives who could make his social and economic adaptation faster and better. Those relatives also affected his choice to go to England. At the same time, since he learned English during his bachelor's studies, the language was another motivating factor. He underlines that "At least, unlike other languages, there was no linguistic barrier in England. I didn't have to start from the beginning. Also, unlike other European states, England is more liberal. I knew that your life depended on your effort here before I came. I have never dreamed of working at the same wage." Despite not introducing himself as a businessman, the conditions that England offered have convinced him to be a businessman. Then, he turned into a businessman because of the circumstances, as he said. "It sounds more prestigious to run a company than to work in one. So, even though the wages are better here, and the Ankara Agreement inhibits the chance to choose another employment, many prefer it. However, ironically none of the people who came through the Ankara Agreement knew about the commerce". Furthermore, compared to other participants, Ergin was one of the most involved people considering business opportunities. While he had a comfortable life in Turkey, such as living in a decent

place in İstanbul, holding many investments, etc., his family convinced him to live in England.

### **Özlem**

Özlem is 34 years old. She has been living in England for four years. She graduated with a bachelor's degree. Her job areas in Turkey were business intelligence, and she has continued in similar areas in England. In the IT sector, she is doing reporting, collecting data and so on. Ozlem has a company where she works as a contracted employee. She was married in Turkey but gave birth to her child in London. She heard that her co-worker had migrated to Holland, but she had never thought of relocating to another country until she married. She did not have an exact idea to settle in. Before she applied for the agreement, they looked at Australia or Holland, but she decided to go since she had a relative in England and had visited there before going there. The language was another primary motivation to choose England. She was satisfied to settle in England; nevertheless, she still felt homesick. "I would like to take my life, home, and neighborhood here to İstanbul." She underlined that if the work conditions and living standards have to be the same in Turkey for her to come back. Almost all reasons why she might want to go back to Turkey are about her cultural belonging, relatives, and the mobility limits of the agreement. She complained about her child's residency permission being granted so late that they could not go to the funeral of her husband's mother. Furthermore, afterward, she mentioned her homesickness; she said that "If Turkey unnerves me, I will not hold my Turkish citizenship, and would not take dual citizenship either."

She could not decide whether her coming to England was good for her. Nevertheless, she clearly said that her purchasing power and living standards have increased. Therefore, she seems to be satisfied with living in England.

### **Erdinç**

Erdinç is 29 years old and immediately applied for the Ankara Agreement after graduation. He graduated from the department of business. He has been working in a management and marketing consulting firm in London for two years. Erdinc applied for the agreement with an advertising firm with a moderate amount of money. Before he went, he had no job in Turkey. However, he wrote an Erasmus project for the Erasmus Entrepreneurship Program. He has always been involved with entrepreneurship since his bachelor's degree. While Erdinc explained his reason to settle in, he referred to the business advantages of England. Unlike other participants, he took on the business adventures into consideration for the sake of entrepreneurship. He was also the only participant who felt like an English citizen already. Despite the homesickness and feeling of loneliness, he supported that being an English citizen is as simple as drinking a beer. He has never been faced with any kind of xenophobia or racism. He did not see his experience in England as something new; instead, he found similarities between England and Turkey in terms of his unique experiences. This is probably because of his lack of professionalism in Turkey; he immediately went to England after his graduation. Nevertheless, before the interviews, he had hesitation to speak up and barely agreed to do an interview due to political reasons.

### **Serkan**

Serkan is 40 years old and came to England through the quota of his wife rather than involving a business himself. He worked as an electrical technician, a sailor, and a cook in Turkey, among other occupations. He received his diploma from the faculty of open education. He has continued to work in a kitchen in England. They decided to migrate to England after just a couple of days after they had gotten married. Before the marriage, they never thought about migrating somewhere else. However, after the wedding, he convinced his wife by reckoning their child's indefinite future to migrate, as he said. While explaining in detail their migration, he mentioned failed coup attempts, referendums, and anxiety about the future. Even though his responses are

valid, and he did not run a company as other participants, he was the first one who insisted on migrating and convinced his wife.

Like the workers who immigrated to Germany in the first period, he plans to return after their child grows up. He mentioned the reason for settling is solely for the sake of his child. However, on the contrary, he also noted that his wife has no intention of returning. He stated that could quickly give up his Turkish citizenship if he had a sudden change of mind. However, he did not complain about everyday life in England while he felt more isolated. "As you entered the door, this is Turkey," he said. The things that he did not get used to are derived from homesickness and kind of loneliness. However, he insisted on returning to Turkey in the end. He said that he has not been exposed to racism or exclusion and that no one has even heard of them. He says that he can benefit from all the rights provided to citizens.

### **Orhan**

Orhan is 37 years old and has been living in London for four and a half years. He is planning to apply for British citizenship next year. He is continuing the same job in England, business intelligence. His interesting remark was, "Instead of coming to England, we wanted to get away from Turkey." He began to think about migration after his child was born. He worried about the challenging conditions of growing a child in Turkey in terms of social and economic. So, before England, he tried to go somewhere else, such as Canada. However, because of the grading system of Canada, they were eliminated. When they applied for Australia, they faced similar problems. Finally, they applied for the Ankara Agreement to gain British residency. The loss of sense of belonging to Turkish citizenship and the religion alienates him to Turkey. According to him, citizenship is nothing but a piece of paper. So, when he talks about the positive sides of British citizenship, he refers to mobility power and other practical things. However, he admits that he would have been unsure of immigrating to England if his children were not born.

## **Zuhal**

She is the only English citizen who was acquired through the Ankara Agreement. Zuhal has been living in England since 2013. In Turkey, she was a publisher, but she began work as a peer coach after settling in England. She decided to migrate at a very early age. After 2011 she began to feel like her life was in danger. Thus, she accelerated her investigation for alternative migration methods. She picked London as the most acceptable option to reside in after visiting it by chance. Her interest in theatre also plays a role in her decision. However, after a year in London, Zuhal said that the Ankara Agreement could be used as a torture method. After two years, I was burnt out. Nevertheless, since I knew that living in London was my last exit before the bridge, I would not have missed it. "She complained about the complicated bureaucratic process that makes her burn out. However, despite all the challenging conditions, she emphasized that she would rather live in London than live in Turkey. Before deciding to migrate, she admired that she had a strong sense of nationalism. However, after leaving was her primary purpose, her ideas turned upside down. Now she does not view citizenship as more than a legal boundary.

Zuhal is the second responder who actively followed English politics. Furthermore, she is so interested in politics that she wants to be a candidate for local elections. She makes the connection between being a citizen and being a good politician. So, her actively following local news could be regarding her interest and background regarding politics.

## **Serap**

Serap is a 37-year-old woman. She accompanied her husband and children to England. She received her master's degree in Turkey. While she lived in Turkey, she worked as an editor in many universities and publishing houses. She has continued to freelance but is now the owner of an organic children's clothing company in England. She has always thought about getting out because of her ethnicity. She mentioned that she did not belong to Turkey but only to İstanbul. She did not feel a sense of belonging to

Turkey, but she has felt insecurity both for herself and her family. Her feelings of uncertainty and her desire to leave grew stronger following the killing of Hrant Dink. However, she had not intended to migrate somewhere else until her children were born. After the birth, Serap and her family began to seek a country to live in. They applied for America and Canada first, then France. Despite having relatives in France, she renounced going there because her husband did not speak the French language. They agreed to settle in after they could not go to the US or Canada via the Ankara Agreement. So, the only reason to apply for the agreement instead of other alternatives is nothing but its convenience.

She is the first responder who is currently following British politics as much as Turkish politics. However, this may be related to her political science master's degree and personal interest in politics.

## **Nari**

Since her application to the Ankara Agreement was refused, Nari is the only one who could not live in England. However, regardless of her application being rejected, her perception of citizenship is representative as others in terms of perceptual changes. As other interviewees, she has been looking for an alternative method that may result in settling in an affluent country. She is currently trying for any methods that can facilitate the migration process. For instance, she stated that "it does not matter where I should live as long as it is not Turkey" She is aware of the challenging situation that would be faced, but even the idea of "riding a bike freely" has convinced her to settle in another country.

Her interest in politics stems from pragmatic considerations that might have an impact on her. So, Nari doesn't care about other countries' news that would not affect her situation. So, it would be argued that even if she lived in England, she would not be interested in politics.

## **Hazal**

She was the youngest participant at the age of 26. Unlike the majority of the participants, she has not married before coming to England. Before applying for the Ankara Agreement, Hazal received her master's degree in England at the food innovation program. So, she is already used to the agreement and England. Her English boyfriend affected her decision to come to England before her master's degree, then she decided to apply for the Ankara Agreement. Before she settled in the country, her profession was an advertiser. In England, she turned to be a chef food consultant. She mentioned the differences between England and Turkey by feeling secure in everyday life and better economic situations. Even though she earned less than when she was in Turkey, living in England is much better in terms of lifestyle for her. So, she might give up Turkish citizenship if it would cause any problem. Hazal defines being an English citizen as being a wealthy and prestigious individual. The high mobility and prestige of the English passport convinced her to become settled in England.

## **Ahmet and Hülya**

The interview with Ahmet and Hülya was scheduled at the same time since they requested it. They have been married for a couple of years. Ahmet is 38, and Hülya is 29 years old. After their vacation to Holland, they decided to live in another country. Before Ahmet applied for the agreement, they had been looking for jobs in the Netherlands and other European countries. The high rate of people who can speak English also encouraged them to apply to Holland. However, since they didn't have an adequate network there, they gave up seeking jobs after a short time. Then they discovered the Ankara Agreement. Ahmet was the main applicant to the agreement. Hülya came with him as his wife. In Turkey, Ahmet worked as a freelance editor. He set up the commitment into practice by running a content marketing and publishing consulting company.

While Hümeyra referred to the social conditions that disrupt her in everyday life, Ali added economic and political instability. Indeed, Hülya confirmed that she did not think about migration before the marriage, but as she was impressed by the standards that she saw on the internet, she wanted to try. On the other hand, Ali has been thinking about leaving for a decade. The practical feature of consulting to the agreement encouraged them. The key factors that encouraged them to settle in England were living in peace and comfort, especially Ahmet, who came from an affluent family, referred to these concepts. Hülya also uses the term neighborhood pressure. They did not complain about their economic situation in Turkey, nevertheless, the unstable economy made them worried about the future. Thus, they knew that their comfort zone would diminish after the migration, but they still took risks.

Since they were found through the internet, they were concerned for their privacy. Some other participants also had this kind of hesitation. This would be evidence of their concern about the authoritarian regime in their country of birth. However, they believe that the system in England is much more equal than in Turkey in terms of superiority of law and preservation of fundamental rights.

## **4. FINDINGS**

### **4.1. Does leaving heal the scars?**

The first part of the interview questionnaire targeted to analyze, as mentioned before, the motivations behind choosing the countries along with the wish to live and work abroad. This chapter analyses the data gathered and addresses the first part of the research questions in turn. After measuring people's attitudes regarding migration, the chapter draws various findings of the significance of the acquisition method that the participants' responses have revealed. Finally, it discusses how the Ankara Agreement becomes the sole method for living in a wealthy country. Before looking at it, it would

be crucial to look at how people's motivations for leaving spread through such factors as inequalities amongst countries, and dissatisfaction with their countries of origin.

Taking a comparative approach, Milanovic argued that inequality shifted from class to country. According to this hypothesis, the place of birth determines one's income because of the between-country inequalities (Milanović, 2015). He bases his hypothesis by looking at countries' GDP and income. The poorest Americans' income was higher than most of the others who live in non-wealthy countries (Milanović, 2012), or "only about 40% of the Chinese population is richer than the poorest Germans. This percentage is even smaller in the case of India" (Milanović, 2015, p. 3). So, according to him, the location became a chief determinant of one's social and economic position more so than class. The new type of inequality is "shifting from proletarians to migrants" (Ibid). Consequently, to overcome the inequality that came from birth, participants are prone to believe that they could solve social and economic problems by migrating to affluent countries. In their thrilling research, Sennett and Cobb emphasized the invisible signs of inequality between the working class and bourgeoisie in terms of everyday life. They underlined the reflection of class differences into the everyday life and culture. So, being a worker goes beyond the economic exploitation to the perception. (Sennett, Richard; Cobb, 1977). Likewise, it would be argued that the hidden injuries of the participants are derived from not being a citizen of an affluent country. However, the majority of the participants had a modest life standard in Turkey. As middle-class and upper-middle-class they are concerned to maintain their standards both socially and economically. Thus, one of the main injuries was derived from their lack of access to the government. Some participants emphasized that the decision to leave the country is not arbitrary but compulsory because of social and economic circumstances, or others argued that they will not raise children in Turkey. They tried to heal these injuries by leaving by taking the risk of living in another country and relinquishing their life standard in Turkey. So, Milanovic's

arguments do not speak with domestic perceptual variation between different classes within the country.

Generally, the acquisition of citizenship is transmitted by either territoriality (*jus soli*) or blood (*jus sanguinis*). As a result, people who do not hold a citizenship of a wealthy country do not have the same advantages as citizens of affluent countries. Shachar underlines the coincidence of citizenship status by emphasizing its transmission by birth. So, being born in an affluent society turns into a *lottery* (Shachar, 2009). People who pick the winning number in the lottery can be positioned at the top of half of the world in terms of economic situation or social rights. In this case, the new policies of the governments regarding citizenship selling began mushrooming together with people's desire to improve their conditions. The position of citizenship programs can be located in-between the people's demands and the governments' supply (Altan-Olcay, Özlem; Balta, 2017). People have demanded it to compensate for their deficiencies of better working conditions, higher salaries, mobilities (Harpaz 2015; 2016), whereas the governments have supplied it to enhance human capital (Shachar, 2011; Shachar & Hirschl, 2014). Both motivations can intersect under the umbrella of neoliberalism. Although the definition of neoliberalism is controversial, it could be considered both as rationality (Foucault, 2008) and as an economic system (D. Harvey, 2005) in the case of citizenship. Foucauldian view enlightens how middle-class people in Turkey rationalizes their migration motives by thinking that settling into England would provide a better economic or social situation.

“I do not believe that Turkey can satisfy my standards in terms of everyday life or prosperity. For instance, even though I barely earn a decent salary, it allows me to fulfill my standards. I can go running, play tennis and so on. Unlike Turkey, my essential spending for food or bills has never brought me any trouble. I also have more leisure time to get either to socialize or something else “. (Hazal).

They have lost faith in their country because of its inability to provide the better salary or purchasing power they expected. So, leaving the country somehow became a primary target. By achieving it, they reckoned that they would enjoy the benefits. Hazal's thoughts regarding migration could confirm this argument since she simultaneously referred to social activities such as tennis or running and income. She believed that there are different facets of inequality between Turkey and Britain, from everyday life to economic life. Her willingness to migrate possess the idea of climb the social ladder. She believed that she would not enjoy the same economic and social life in Turkey as Britain.

Nari, whose application rejected, says that "It is like choosing a university after the exam. You would say the department does not matter where it is as long as it is Boğaziçi. The country does not matter where it is as long as it is not Turkey"<sup>5</sup>. Just like Nari, most of the participants are uninterested in wherever they want to settle as long as it is in a wealthier country. Hülya, another participant whose application to the Ankara Agreement was accepted, thought similarly "We had always planned to go to Europe, but we were not sure about which country to go to until we discovered the Ankara Agreement." Even though the country they are about to migrate to is crucial in economic and social circumstances, participants tacitly said the specific country. Thus, the hierarchy amongst the countries creates new demands consisting of selling citizenship (Harpaz, 2016).

People's motivations and purposes explain their endeavor to leave the country. By contributing to Ravenstein's idea of "Laws of Migration" (Ravenstein, 1885), Dorigo and Tobler conceptualized the triggering motivations of the migration under the terms of "push" and "pull" factors. According to them, there are two key variables that influence people' decision to migrate. Those are "push" factors that emphasize the

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<sup>5</sup> Despite Nari's responses were removed because of her unfitness to the research, this quotation would represent other attitudes towards leaving.

dissatisfaction of the one within his/her location and the "pull" factors that make the receiving country desirable in the eyes of potential migrants (Dorigo & Tobler, 1983). In the Ankara Agreement, the pushing factors derived from the oppressive political system, unstable economy, and ambiguous future of their children. It could be proved by looking at the overwhelming majority of participants explicitly referring to the country's social and political situation in their migration decision-making.

In the recent index of V-DEM, which is one of the most well-known organizations that measure countries' democracies, different variables are related to Turkey's democratic backsliding. According to V-DEM, along with its significant decline in terms of democratic values, the regime type of Turkey has been shifted from an electoral democracy to electoral authoritarianism (V-DEM, 2021). The country's atmosphere is intersected with the migration motives in the participants' eyes. All the applicants felt uncertainty towards the future in various spheres of life, from economic to social. Zuhaila feels suffocated in the country and even said she would have committed suicide if she lived in Turkey. In her case, to migrate somewhere else was not a choice but necessary.

On the other hand, pull factors are derived from the development of the welfare regime, purchasing power, and social life in a country. In this case, these countries are frequently either Western European or North American countries. A survey conducted by the SODEV (Social Democracy Foundation) provides more detailed information on the implications of the desire to migrate. According to this data, the overall percentage of young people who want to live abroad is 62.5 percent. Even the 47.3 percent of youth who is AKP (Justice and Development Party) voters, and the 68.6 percentage of MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) voters want to live abroad (Türkiye'nin Gençliği Araştırması, 2020). Another research conducted by MAK underlines similar results, according to their research regarding whether the youth want to live abroad for either educational or business purposes, 76.2 percent of the youth want to go abroad without any hesitation (Gençlik Araştırması, 2020). However, it has also been taken into consideration that they do not simply want to live somewhere else, but as SODEV's

research demonstrates, they want to live in western countries. 72.2 percent of the total would rather live in Sweden with 5k dollar salary, than live in Saudi Arabia with 10k salary per month (Türkiye'nin Gençliği Araştırması, 2020). Since the Ankara Agreement's receiver country is England, this inquiry could show peoples' tendency to migrate to western countries using the agreement. The Ankara Agreement could connect the pull and push factors by encouraging people to participate in entrepreneurship regardless of their interests or experiences. The agreement requires less investment than the other citizenship or residency programs such as citizenship by investment or real estate. Thus, middle or upper-middle-class people tend to use the agreement because they did not have enough investment to buy citizenship or real estate from a welfare country. For the same reason, the importance of the Ankara Agreement is that it embraces all kinds of people with different motivations.

Many other countries throughout the Middle East have oppressive political systems that increase the *push* factors. Since the oppressive political system has shaped people's lives in all spheres of life, from economic to social, they have become a push factor that encouraged people to migrate. It would be correct to say that it is a kind of avoidance mechanism. By saying avoidance emphasizes that to get rid of the embedded problems of the country to somewhere else where economic stability is trustful. This concept underlies that in a country where there are social and economic problems, or a country that is non-affluent, people tend to suffer more problems in all spheres of life. So, they seek for alternative migration options. Through citizenship programs, they are able to obtain the privileges of another country. The citizenship programs requires either a high amount of investment or success in doing business within a given European country. In this case, people who applied for the Ankara Agreement differ from those who used their investments to acquire citizenship or residency since they could not afford that amount of investment. In any case, neoliberalism either uses people's human capital or economic capital to figure out problems within the country. Through investments, ultra-riches found a corridor to acquire affluent country's

passport or permissions, while others have to become successful entrepreneurs. As Foucault claims, neoliberalism as rationality makes people entrepreneur under the guidance of the economy (Foucault, 2008, p. 215–233). So, this argument is showing that the overlap between the ultra-riches and other people who want to migrate is derived from neoliberal values. Those who could not afford the price of citizenship are trying to find alternative methods, just like how Ankara Agreement became the primary method for Turkish citizens. Individuals as an entrepreneur by themselves have no option but to get out of the country where they face plenty of problems by using their business skills. They are trying to compensate for the social and economic problems by moving to another country.

Serap said that "The idea of leaving the country has always been in my mind. We are an Armenian minority. Plenty of ours agreed that we have to go somehow. Turkey is not a place I could live. I always knew it" (Serap). Compared to the other interviewees, Serap's position was different because her ethnic background makes her subject to extreme nationalist or religious attacks. As mentioned in the literature section regarding the construction of Turkish citizenship, the exclusion mechanism within Turkish citizenship has also been related to the exclusion of religious minorities<sup>6</sup>. Thus, she decided to apply to the Ankara Agreement to overcome the challenging social and political situations. On the contrary, Ahmet, who came from a wealthy Turkish family and went to a decent high school, refers to the economic conditions. "The money's exchange value decreases day by day, so it becomes tough to work in Turkey. Nevertheless, we decided to try no matter what it costs". The consensus of these two participants from different backgrounds intersects in applying the Ankara Agreement. Despite their various objections, both have in common regarding using the agreement. As a result, the commodification of citizenship has spread by restricting choices and making citizens an entrepreneur. People only had a few alternatives if they wished to

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<sup>6</sup> Looking back at Turkish citizenship regime section

live abroad; hence their objectives melted in the commodification of citizenship, regardless of whether political or economic concerns drove them.

The business skills determine the requirements of the citizenship programs. So, if someone starts complaining, they know that establishing a corporation enhances their possibility of leaving the country to move to Europe. In that sense, work permission or citizenship status becomes compensatory, as Harpaz conceptualizes. As mentioned in the literature review, Harpaz argues that holding second citizenship in the Western country compensates for the deficiencies from the original citizenship (Harpaz, 2016; Harpaz, 2019). Consequently, having a residency permit or citizenship from a European welfare country becomes a strategic tool for keeping people away from problems in their birthplace (Harpaz, 2016). So, they would both overcome issues such as employment and empower their mobility. In the context of Turkey, where a visa is required to travel to Europe, people are seeking the most cost-effective solution: to set up a business. All the interviewees agreed that they came to England because of the easiness of the Ankara Agreement. So, the convenience of the conditions determines people's decision to settle in Europe, and the business makes possible this convenience. Only one interviewee came to the UK by using the family corporation. Participants do not intentionally choose England, but thanks to the relatively easy conditions of the Ankara Agreement, many of them can meet the requirements. So, they decided to run a corporation in England, but they could have settled in another wealthy country if they had a similar method. Orhan and Serap clearly emphasize this: "It was the easiest place to settle in... Even though England was far away, we chose it for its convenience."

These outcomes come up with the significance of the acquisition type of citizenship and residency. Even though people also considered linguistic or cultural similarities while deciding the country to live in, business opportunities determined the result at the end of the day. The centrality of the Ankara Agreement has occurred in its broader contexts. Almost all participants used the agreement as a backup plan after failing to get documentation from other nations. They had no option but England. Subsequently,

the convenience determined the desire to live and work abroad. Orhan says, "Our purpose was to get away from Turkey somehow instead of coming to England. We firstly looked at United States, Canada, and France conditions. Then both because of the language and the Ankara Agreement, we chose England". The current situation of citizenship is directly about this attitude: not to choose the best place, but to choose an economical place in terms of requirements and conditions. This view also emphasizes the centrality of the Ankara Agreement among other programs.

As Foucault emphasizes, neoliberalism is not only an economic system but also rationality (Foucault, 2008). As the neoliberal rationality turned people into an entrepreneur of themselves who always tried to maximize their capital, the new way of thinking has changed (Foucault, 2008, p. 286). So, on one hand, even the spheres that do not belong to the market began to be subjects of markets, such as family, love, or citizenship. On the other hand, individuals have become an instrument governed by self-interest economic rationality (Ibid). People who tried to migrate with citizenship programs can be recognized in this category. While they complain about their country's situation, they calculate their profits through market rationality as an economic subject. Through citizenship by business, they will be able to do business in a developed country and increase their purchasing power. Even though most of the participants faced difficulties after they settled in terms of socializing, fitting into the new lifestyle, or even finding a place to stay compared to Turkey, they decided to pay its costs. So, it would be argued that they reckoned that at least in terms of economic welfare leaving can heal the scar. However, as participants point out, it also causes other scars such as lack of social integration and five years of mobility restriction.

#### **4.2. New Regime of Citizenship**

The main themes covered in this chapter are the connection between citizenship's notions and the fragmentation of politics. The sprawl of apoliticality embraces two

distinct terms. Firstly, it comprises the people's feeling of alienation after settling in a different country. The distinctive factor of settling in the England is often about its convenience compared to other countries' programs for the participants. As it mentioned in the first section, England was the backup option if other options were eliminated. The second factor is derived from the exclusion of political regime in neoliberalism regardless of authoritarian or wealthy. Neoliberalism has several faces in different regions of the world. In Turkey, it would be authoritarian tendencies, whereas it would be welfare in England, Thus, while people migrated from Turkey for political and economic reasons, engaging in politics loses its meaning in England. In the second section of the questionnaire this attitude is analyzed by asking interest in politics.

The academic literature on citizenship has revealed the emergence of the concepts of rights and duties. According to T.H Marshall, citizenship has emerged as a kind of equalization mechanism that comes from the unequal conditions of the social classes. Citizenship is defined as the allocation of rights to citizens who have less privileged circumstances. So, the evolution of citizenship has constantly been developed with the rights (Hamilton & Marshall, 1951). Despite many criticisms against this view, as I aforementioned in the literature section, the distribution of the rights and duties kept its importance since all citizens do not share the same conditions. However, along with the spreading of the citizenship programs, the perceptions of those rights have been changed in the eyes of naturalizers and the states. One of the primary purposes of the interviews was to find the alterations in the political and social notion of citizenship. Since those rights are also part of people's motivation to leave, they are determinative toward the indicator of perceptual changes.

As the neoliberal governances strengthened, the political status of citizenship dissolved due to economy-based formations through the state. So, reactive citizens responsible for obedience suppressed the proactive citizens who were autonomous subjects regarding politics (Roche, 1987). In other words, other political dynamics that

construct citizenship as a subject of rights began to dissolve. Roche makes a solid criticism by taking the decline of the labor force into account. However, the main point of Roche relies on the depoliticization of citizenship. In that case, it would not be surprising that people who acquired residency permits, or citizenship later are not raising their voice in the public sphere because even people whose status is transmitted by heritage are not interested in politics. Only two of the participants are currently following the local news. The reason why one is interested in politics could be because she had a political science master's degree.

Serkan said that "I do not follow the news or current politics at all. I have just learned that there was an election two days ago. Before that, I had never even heard of it. I do not vote in Turkey either." In his case, citizenship loses its efficacy in politics regardless of the country he lives in. He had never thought about who to vote for in the next election. Similarly, the majority of the interviewees do not have an idea regarding whom they would vote for. Orhan explains this tendency by saying, "If I have to vote, I will look at ideologies instead of active politicians." Since right-wing parties usually strive to limit immigrants' rights, Orhan's standpoint is reasonable. His thoughts regarding politics and voting are not different from his thoughts in Turkey. His definition of citizenship as a paper-based bureaucratic mechanism contradicts Turkey's nationalist view of citizenship, which idealizes citizens on behalf of the nation. Therefore, while his attitude makes him a political person in Turkey, he becomes apolitical in England. So, along with the arbitrariness of picking a country to live in, the view toward the country is transformed. If other countries have similar programs which offer a residency or work permission majority of the participants would have preferred it. However, the combination of the program's convenience and the country's wealthiness led them to settle in England.

Nonetheless, another side of the migration and the agreement is its difficulties. Those difficulties could be divided into three main parts: economic, bureaucratic, and social factors. Every participant has agreed on the challenging situation of England in the first

period. First, before they start using Pounds, they must exchange Turkish Lira for Pounds, which is about twenty times more valuable<sup>7</sup>. So, that makes all the investments more expensive. Besides, many of them have to pay their five- or six-months rent before settling in because of prejudice towards Ankara Agreement-based immigrants. Secondly, they must prove their business with documents regularly, and during the first periods, they are not allowed to leave the country. If their child does not have a valid residency card, the process will be more difficult. Özlem complained about a similar situation they faced: “Even though my mother-in-law passed away, we could not go because of our child's status.” Another participant Zuhail said that "Ankara convention even can be used as a torture method. It is tough to hold a Visa since your deal with the state is only about the business." Zuhail's quote is so critical to understanding how the state views the participants. Their business success constructs the state's attitude towards the participants. Despite the participants agreeing that they can enjoy health benefits or similar rights, their life in England strongly depended on their business unlike citizens. Thus, the state prioritizes their role in the economic activity by ignoring their other needs. Lastly, the social factor is one of the leading motivations that caused a struggle for migrants. Especially people who have never lived or visited England suffered more than others because of the different social life and rules. Interviewees who have no friends or relatives faced loneliness for a couple of months or even years. Marrying before migrating could be an example of self-protection instincts in this case. They are all aware of the hardness of to integrate another country as a migrant.

Even though some interviewees accept that their child will be more integrated into the country's culture and politics than they were, they are aware that their integration will be incomplete. As a result, despite the fact that they have lived in England for many years, they believe that their interest in English politics is not the same as their interest in Turkish politics. They regard the country either as a workplace or insurance for their

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<sup>7</sup> December 16,2021 currency. Almost every day tumbling of the Turkish Lira has been increasing.

children. Orhan, for example, cites the high cost of education as a factor for his migration, or similarly, Serap says that she firmly decided to settle in other countries after her child was born. In their cases, migration is something different than business advantages. Besides, Orhan plans to return to Turkey after their child grows up and gets a job. They have ambivalent feelings about returning and staying. On the contrary, Erdinç referred to business advantages. However, both motivations result in the disinterest in politics. There occurs a division between where they feel a sense of belonging and where they must reside. England's economic well-being shapes their decisions regardless of whether they leave Turkey for political or economic reasons.

Ahmet, whose application has been accepted but has not left Turkey yet, emphasized the political situation as a motivation to leave. He explained his motivation as "One of my friends who has gone to Europe changed my mind. He argued that in here, a country where you intentionally came, at least you struggled with difficulties that you chose. So, I want to face the problems of somewhere where I intentionally came, regardless of my birth country. That is why I came here, to face the problems that I chose." He also emphasizes the political problems of the country. While his point of view is inevitably political because he is sick and tired of political and economic instability, his response toward it relies on getting rid of politics, or at least Turkish politics. Furthermore, questioned whether he followed or would follow politics, he stayed unsure. This could also relate to alienation since he believes he would be uninterested in politics before leaving.

Similar attitudes occurred in everyday life as well. Serdar underlined that their intense cultural commitment in their private sphere by saying, "Our house is Turkey, as you entered through the door." From the language spoken in the home to the dishes, most of them are related to Turkey. Unlike the other respondents, he intends to return to Turkey after their kid has reached the age of adulthood. In that case, his position is similar to the first-generation workers who immigrated to Germany. Besides, compared to the others, Serkan did not learn English during university but instead in England.

His adaptation to England took time compared to others because of his age and language barrier. However, his perspective on England is similar to that of the others, seeing England as a foreign nation they will never fully adapt to, either culturally or socially, regardless of years passed. Therefore, Serdar's situation, which barely adapts to England's lifestyle, on homesickness is reminiscent to the others in terms of politics or lifestyle.

Citizens turn into a self-governing subject in order to fit themselves to the conditions of competition and entrepreneurship by using specific market rationality (Brown, 2016). However, these responsibilities are abused mainly by the governments to apply austerity policies (Brown, 2016). So, by following Brown's hypothesis, the state views Ankara Agreement utilizers as human capital and the subject who could be sacrificed if needed. So, there are two main results; on the one hand, migrants are not engaged in politics because they do not have to as long as their business success well, on the other hand, neoliberal policies of the state encouraged the diminishing of political notions of the citizenship. Participants' neglect of English politics extended when these consequences intersected with the sense of alienation toward the receiver country.

### **4.3. Change of Perception**

This chapter analyzes how the perception of citizenship of the people who migrated through the Ankara Convention has changed as a result of changing citizenship regime and their motivations before settling in. The main aim of this section is to merge previous sections. As aforementioned, the convenience of the agreement would determine the participant's decision to migrate. Then, the main argument of the second session was how the new citizenship regime, which neglects the role of politics, and the new acquisition methods dissolves the political participation of the participants. The third section of the questionnaire ties together the various theoretical and empirical

strands to identify the impacts of the Ankara Agreement towards the change of citizenship perception.

Since being an active part of the economy provides several opportunities from getting a UK passport to work permissions, it keeps its importance to one who wants to acquire these statuses. As one of the well-known conventions the Ankara Agreement requires being an active figure in the labor or economic market by opening a market, managing the company, or somehow setting up a business. Consequently, the conditions of the agreement encourage people to run a business. Instead of taking applicants' amount of investment into account as in the citizenship by investment programs, the agreement cares the people's business skills. The interview questions of the Ankara Agreement could show the priorities that the authority has been looking for. These are accessible in the social media group created by the applicants to help each other. There are thirty-three questions, as an uploader stated. Those questions consist of the detailed description of their CVs, knowledge about the future profession, detailed business plans, awareness about potential opponents in the business, prices of the services, and their comparison with other firms, estimated annual income, and profit, estimated first-month income, the plan for finding customers, the expected stereotype of the customers, the sufficiency of the English, and the source of the investments<sup>8</sup>. It is more akin to a job interview than a migration application. Therefore, economic discourses and calculations shape people's perceptions toward the country from the very beginning. In order to analyze these shifts in perceptions, the study asked participants whether they preserved Turkish citizenship in relation to their characterizations of being Turkish and British citizen. Consequently, it may be predicted whether their sense of belonging to their native country and their feelings of citizenship in both nations have transformed. However, making comparable predictions for all respondents would be an overgeneralization because many other variables, such as

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1964489506984432/posts/3773641772735854>

race, gender, and social status, influence. Thus, it again recaps the interviewees' social and economic features to overcome this issue, as mentioned in the participants' information section. That addition would improve the analysis by underlying other dynamics.

People who applied for the Ankara Agreement must continue their business in England for five years to acquire citizenship. Therefore, their status remains unclear until the five-year period ends. Although their migration method relies on the economic activity that can facilitate their adaptation to others, it is not enough for full integration. There is a plethora of reasons that negatively affect migrants' adaptation from bureaucratic limitations to cultural differences. So, those difficulties also shape participants' perceptions of citizenship. Their description of citizenship was divided into two attitudes sentimentally and officially. On one hand, they took citizenship as a paper-based bureaucratic material that has no inner value while, on the other hand, they took it as a cultural phenomenon beyond the documents when asked about their feelings or feelings of belonging towards it. Both perspectives are connected. The majority of participants maintain their Turkish identity in terms of a sense of belonging because migrants believe that their adaptation is a never-ending process and it is hard to break away from the habitat they used to live. On the contrary, the value of English citizenship for them is mainly about utilities on business or mobility. So, it turned into a paper-based document that conserved their life standard. Furthermore, it is helpful to remember that, since all participants are middle-class, their worry about limiting their access to the government and economy is one of the main motives of the migration.

When asked whether she would feel like an English citizen, Özlem sarcastically said, "When the Queen's husband died, I would say God rest his soul, and I would not worry on it. I do not think the papers have anything to do with that feeling of belonging here". She does not share the same concern with other England citizens as many migrants. In that case, the sense of belonging was not transmitted through the acquisition of citizenship but instead constructed by sharing similar symbols, as Anderson

emphasized (Anderson 2006). For the same reason, if those communal symbols can learn like a language, naturalization procedures could include other individuals (Anderson 2006, p. 145–46). According to Anderson, the roots of the connection within the community are neither organic nor fabricated, but it is imagined that it contains a specific image of the given communion (Anderson, 2006, p. 5–7). However, in the case of Özlem, she thought that she had to get out from the borders of her imagined community to improve her family and herself, living standards, and wealth. Nevertheless, regardless of the number of years that she could spend, her sense of belonging will remain in Turkey, as she pointed out. "When I came there, I was twenty-nine, so I came along with all of my experiences and habits. You must rediscover things that you may not have noticed before during the first period. Thus, I had to modify all those things I knew from the very beginning". Every decision they took to migrate to England led to the relinquishment of something they used to. Nevertheless, purchasing power, future expectations, or a child's well-being are decisive in the last instance.

It would be worthwhile comparing the adaptation of their child and themselves to the country in the eyes of participants. Especially the thoughts of parents regarding citizenship are different from those who do not have a child. When the subject is a child, the parent's perspective about citizenship differs from being a citizen of England. While they regard English citizenship as a bundle of rights and opportunities they could not obtain in Turkey, they see it as a cultural concept for their child. They thought their children's adaptation will be easier than themselves because they are sure that their child will talk or eat like an English. Serap underlined this issue as, "Even though I know English very well, it is unlikely to speak like natives from now on." This problem can be answered in Özlem's thought "We put our past to the baggage while we came here. Those are things that do not change easily. So, I will not be an English citizen however I want. The code of citizenship in there also defines ours' situation as naturalizes. However, my child will feel more British than I because he will grow up there and socialize with locals." They want their child to be British to enjoy the rights.

As a matter of fact, some participants' primary motivation to settle in England is driven by their children's future. Serkan explained their reason through his child's vague future "My son's future will undoubtedly be far brighter than ours. Our concern on his future was, in fact, the main factor for us to move here. I had little faith in Turkey's education, and I could not afford to pay for a private school. As a result, we decided to come." Thus, just as settling in another welfare country through business is similar to finding a decent job that offers many opportunities, the situation of the children could also be taken as one of the opportunities that the company offers to parents. Also, obviously the point is not only about education because it is not cheaper to go to a college in England than Turkey, but beyond the education this attitude encompasses political concerns.

Participants wanted to relocate to another country with a high degree of wealth to compensate for the lack of prosperity in the country where they were born despite their condition in Turkey was nearly better than many people. So, their rationalizing process to migration is related to how they integrated themselves into neoliberal subjectivity. In the case of the agreement, subjectification is derived from the being successful entrepreneurship. Western Europe or North America are the main options before they applied for the agreement. Therefore, they tend to use any method that would make it easier to settle in citizenship by the business regardless of their skills in the market. Under the umbrella of economic activity, persons like Ahmet or Serap, who have never been interested in business or been involved in marketing, and Erdinç, who have always been interested in business and entrepreneurship, interact. Serap used this method to overcome threats against her Armenian background. She has been in identity confusion since an early age and lives in insecurity. So, she had been seeking a country to live in with her family safely, but she decided to migrate to England because of the language and convenience. On the contrary, Erdinç, who graduated from a respected university and is not involved in disadvantageous groups in terms of race or sex, has always been involved in the business. He took Erasmus Entrepreneur grant, which encourages start-

up entrepreneurs by covering their contributing travel and subsistence costs. Serap and Erdinç's common motivation relies on Erdinç's response to why he chose England: "It was the most accessible place to settle in." However, the sacrifice of the agreement is, as Ergin mentioned, they have no choice but to be an entrepreneur. Ergin mentioned that he would never feel like an English citizen, and at the same time, he mentioned that the conditions of the Ankara Agreement made him an entrepreneur. Therefore, as Ergin showed us, the notion of entrepreneurship also chokes the cultural adaptation of the participants as much as the notion of citizenship's rights and duties.

Since all people find the agreements' method appropriate, they have to disregard other options and choose the useful and quick one. So, the country to migrate loses its importance as long as its affluent. The country they settled in could have been different if other countries offered Ankara Agreement-like conditions. For instance, even though Holland also accepts Ankara Agreement, most people decided to apply to the UK because they require less effort compared to Holland. The main aim of the participants is to migrate somewhere else affluent to compensate for the social and economic deficiencies that they have faced. The viewing of these deficiencies is also related to specific perceptions. Thus, the point is fitting to the neoliberal governmentality determines their way of migration and rationalization. Both people who continue to live in Turkey and those applied to the agreement are neoliberal subjects. However, those who want to migrate for some reasons have to integrate themselves into market conditions. So, they have been subjectified under the specific governmental technology. The technology of subjectivity which embraces the self-government is merging different migration motivations. Serap, who came from an Armenian background, said that "I have been thinking whether I will get Armenian citizenship for a while because of its advantages. If I acquire it, my child will also be enjoying its benefits."

## 5. DISCUSSIONS

There is a well-known Turkish saying, the people's motherland is not a location to be born, but rather a place to be nourished. It underlies how the borders among nations are fragile when the point is to be nourished. The overwhelming majority of interviewees shared parallel viewpoints while thinking about their experiences on migration through the agreement. This study set out to investigate the impacts of the Ankara Agreement as one of the most widespread citizenship by business programs by dividing them into three small chapters. First, it focused on how people motivate themselves to work and live in another country and how the migration became the primary solution. In this section, all participants agreed to live and work in Turkey could not satisfy their economic and social needs. To atone for it, they decided to move somewhere else. Regardless of the method, they choose the most convenient method like the Ankara Agreement to speed up the migration process. However, an interesting point of this process is that the Ankara Agreement was the second option for the majority of participants. This fact would be proof of how the convenience of the method was the driving factor and they do not care about to receiver country as long as it is affluent. The second chapter analyses the findings of the second part of the questionnaire which stresses on how the political viewpoint of the participant has changed. Taking citizenship in this case not only encompasses the Marshallian way of citizenship, but also Roche's critiques towards modern citizenship. It could be argued that there is a correlation between the commodification of citizenship by making it a corporate phenomenon and diminishing of its context of politics. The final chapter presents the research findings focusing on the previous chapters by following the significance of the acquisition method and diminishing politics within citizenship. Then, it draws on how participants describe the perception of citizenship according to their experiences. Participants from various backgrounds and experiences shared the same destiny by applying to the agreement. The state regards them as an economic subject instead of a subject of rights because their life there depended on business success. Hence, both

participants who left the country for political reasons and others who left there for business advantages were melting in the same pot. The final chapter tries to substantiate these motivations and make predictions regarding how all these circumstances affect the perception of citizenship.

The aim of the Ankara Agreement, which was signed between Turkey and the European Economic Community, is "to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and living conditions of the Turkish people" (Article 2(1), Ankara Agreement). According to the Turkish Statistical Institute's report on international migration statistics in 2019, the rate of migration from Turkey has increased year by year (TUİK, 2020). Especially, the group of ages in the range of 25-29 was the highest group among them (Ibid). Despite there being no precise statistics for the qualification of the migrants, all the people that were interviewed had at least a bachelor's or a master's degree and professional experience. Moreover, there is much news about the qualifications of people who migrated from Turkey called brain drain (Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 2021; Efe, 2018). Those statistics can gain insight into which groups of people desire to migrate and how immigration rate is increasing. Motivations of participants were not only about the economic situation. Some of them are coming from minority groups, which makes them more vulnerable, and they have less sense of belonging to the state. For the same reason, they were more likely to migrate to somewhere else where they could feel safer. The convenience of the methods has an impact on their decision-making process. Since the Ankara Agreement does not require a significant investment, people from all facets of society, from minorities to upper-middle-class Turks, have applied to it.

Since people moved to Britain by business, their perception toward British citizenship differs from the classical type of citizenship as Marshall describes, it is more about loss and benefits. So, they reckon that if being a British citizen can increase their rights,

mobility, and income, they are more likely to try and acquire it. One of the participants said that some people who migrated via the agreement did not apply for British citizenship despite its benefits. However, the reason why she will refuse it is not sentimental reasons, but she thinks that the agreement's condition is adequate to her in terms of advantages. The more advantages citizenship has, the more people will try to acquire it. If the benefits of residency permission are compatible with the applicant's reckoning, then they choose it without any efforts to possess citizenship. However, this case is not so typical as long as both countries have recognized dual citizenship. They are less likely to seek citizenship status if they believe that remaining in status under the agreement guarantees rights such as health or mobility. However, even though the status of the agreement or citizenship rights is the same to everyone, their perceptions toward these statuses vary. When asked whether they enjoy the same rights as citizens and whether they are satisfied at the end of the day, the answers were different. Some of them agreed that their status is quite equal with the citizens in terms of health services or states' subventions during the pandemic, others underline its limits about the free mobility, bureaucratic hurdles, occupation, xenophobia, or even hidden racism. One of the interviewees tells a story about an annoying situation he faced. During an emergency, he had called the police, but they came too late. So next time, he convinced another British employee to call the police instead of himself and the police arrived earlier than before. This would be another example of how the migrants have faced racism in everyday life. Although other participants did not complain about racism, the majority of them underlined that they felt stranger when they were together with locals or when they went to government departments. So, despite it is unclear whether they found the conditions they wished before, the significant part is how their motivations shaped by leaving decision regardless of the risks. The function of the agreement sharpened this motivation through encourage them to be an entrepreneur.

Their experiences toward residency or citizenship affect people's perception of citizenship. In that sense, as well as challenging situations or bureaucratic barriers, the

method of acquiring citizenship or work or residency permissions also affects their perception of citizenship. When their thoughts on citizenship turn into a profit-loss calculation, as Foucault (Foucault, 2008) or Brown (Brown, 2015) argue, the rights and responsibilities embedded within the citizenship status begin to dissolve. We would see it by looking at how the participants regard politics or citizenship status. In order to gain insight into their approaches towards politics a question was asked regarding whether they would have voted if they could. All but two, do not have any idea whom they will vote for in Britain. They lean this attitude on the insignificance of politics in their life. One participant said: “Here is not like Turkey you do not have to check the news every day, it does not affect your everyday life”. However, the apolitical attitudes of the participants are not only about their apathy to English politics but much more comprehensive. All but one of them have been following Turkish politics even after they went. One participant who said that he has never followed Turkish politics or news is also aware of Turkey's current news. Other participants who had been following English politics regularly began to do so after they had settled in. Once again, it would show that none of the interviewees chose England intentionally, just as they did not choose the Ankara Agreement. The convenience of the agreement in terms of the amount of investment made them potential applicants to the agreement. In other words, there were a few reasons why they chose Britain to do business: proper conditions and familiarity with the language. The main motive of immigration is the convenience of migrating to England. Serap could have gone to France, Orhan applied to Canada to immigrate at first. He said he would have been living in Canada instead of England if his application was not rejected because of the granting system. Ergin could not have consulted to the agreement if he did not have relatives, etc. Thus, the factor that determines their decision is not their longing to go to England, but something more pragmatic.

The majority of the participants have agreed that a passport or national identity is nothing but a paper document. They already criticize how the borders of the countries

draw or how the nations are established. However, the problem is that cosmopolitanism is not led to the weakening of the borders, on the contrary, it strengthens the borders of the affluent countries. In other words, while people who live in non-affluent countries' desire to migrate, affluent countries make it difficult to the criteria for acquiring citizenship or residency. So, people do not choose the country they will migrate to, but the country chooses the people. Therefore, the convenience of the method became the main motive of the migration in the eyes of participants. Also, the search for the convenience can prove how they prepared the migration plan before leaving. Through governmentality, they already began to think accordingly to the market.

As a matter of fact, it was expected to find other reasons that explain their immigration before the interviews were conducted. However, as the interviews went on, it was made clear that Britain was the second choice for more than half of people when they could not go to their first option.

In sum, there are two motivations for leaving the country. Firstly, the economic and social problems that came up with authoritarian neoliberalism encourage people to migrate to welfare countries. Orhan's response could explain, "Rather than going to England, we needed to move away from Turkey". Then, the convenience of the country's expectations determined not only the country to settle in but also what they will do for a living. In this case, Ankara Agreement offers a good deal in terms of employment and investment. The cost-effective features of the agreement compared to other citizenship programs make it popular. Therefore, regardless of the people's motivation or experience Ankara Agreement encourage them to be an entrepreneur. If they wanted to establish a new life for either themselves or their children, the most advantageous option is nothing but Ankara Agreement. Nevertheless, the conditions of the agreement consisted of the business skills of the people. As a result, those who applied for it were treated as if they were a corporation rather than a subject of the state's rights and obligations. In other words, the state gives residency permission to the corporations, not to the people. This both affects people's and the state's perception

of citizenship. Both the participants and the state regard citizenship as a commodity that can be a subject of exchange. So, along with citizens migrants turn into demanders, and the state turns into a corporation. Even though citizenship or residency status directly encompasses the state's responsibility, too many intermediary companies take care of it. Thus, even the existence of the intermediary companies would be evidence of commodification of citizenship (Dorigo & Tobler, 1983; W. S. Harvey, 2010).

## CONCLUSION

In a world where inequalities among people and countries have dramatically increased, the market became the main determinant of all spheres of life. The combination of inequality and market-driven policies resulted in temporary economic solutions for individuals who aspire to improve their living conditions. Citizenship is one of the areas that underwent a corruption by neoliberal policies after being incorporated into the business category. So, despite it engendered as an organic part of democratic society, citizenship which determines the relationship between the individual and the state has turned into a fortune for those who hold an affluent country status, and a calamity for those who do not. In the history of all hitherto development of citizenship as a legal status, the problem has arisen at the determination of insiders and outsiders. While the dominant identities and classes could control the borders of citizenship, there have always been others who are deprived of enjoying the rights embedded within the status. Similar to Marx's distinctions between the oppressor and the oppressed throughout all existing societies, other divisions have emerged between citizens and non-citizens. Especially after the Syrian war, this distinction once again brutally came to light in the case of refugees.

In that case, citizenship programs that allow buying a membership of an affluent country either as a citizen or resident draw a line among migrants according to wealth. The doors that are closed to refugees open to wealthy migrants. So, wealthy people who live in non-affluent countries and aspire to relocate in order to enhance their reputation or mobility are able to purchase statuses. However, other skilled, educated people who hold a fair investment but cannot afford to purchase real estate seek other options. They tend to find other methods that would help them settle in a different country. Thus, citizenship by business programs are becoming a common trends among those who face economic and social problems in their country of birth. In this regard, Turkey represents a comprehensive examination of citizenship by business programs both as a receiver and a supplier of migrants. The incidents that make Turkey

representative is the increasing number of middle-class migrants due to their untruthfulness toward the governance and the neoliberal transformation of citizenship. The migration of the skilled population rises each year due to a variety of reasons. The result of the study considers that those motivations are triggered by the unstable economy, children's future, restrained mobility, and insecurity. Another reason why Turkey is an example is that it has been undergoing a neoliberal transformation at the levels of state and society 1980s. Thus, the historicity of the citizenship regime in Turkey is explained in detail to understand its impact on the perceptual changes of Turkish citizens.

The thesis raised the following questions: What do Turkish migrants who left the country through the Ankara Agreement tell us? What is the role of the Ankara Agreement in neoliberal citizenship? How the citizenship perception changed in the eyes of individuals and states?

The Ankara Agreement was a valuable case that could demonstrate how the business programs were turned into an instrument for Turkish citizens who could not afford to purchase citizenship. Through the agreement, Turkish citizens could immigrate to England by running a business. Compared to other methods, the Ankara Agreement does not require a high amount of investment but a well-planned business plan for the next decade. Therefore, it became one of the most widespread methods of migration amongst Turkish citizens. Between the years 2010 to 2019, 13.590 people applied to the Ankara Agreement (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2020). Even though the English government suspended the agreement, it clearly shows how one of the wealthiest countries designed migration requirements and decided for whom the gates would be open. The result of the thesis showed that if Turkish citizens, who could not afford citizenship programs, want to migrate to compensate for the insufficiencies of their country of birth, the only choice is to become an entrepreneur. Regardless of their interests or occupation, all participants have been involved in a business by managing a company, so that they could succeed in settling in England. As Foucault

pointed out, the new subject of neoliberalism is derived from the economic individual who is the entrepreneur of themselves. Neoliberalism is not confined to the economic system, it also implies a rationality that determines the individuals' way of thinking under the influence of economic calculations (Foucault et al., 2008). The governmentality technology would reveal the motivations of the participants to migrate. This also applies to people who continue to live in Turkey, but especially to those that are anxious regarding loss of accesses to government and economy are trying to compensate for their complaints by being an entrepreneur. This thesis operationalized these groups of people as middle-class in order to make possible the comprehension of the ways in which their motivations for leaving are constructed.

The Ankara Agreement has two aims for the state and the applicants. The state enhances the country's economic activity by encouraging profitable investments and distinguishes migrants according to their human capital. For Turkish citizens, it gives them a chance to improve living standards, guarantees their children's future, and gives them a strong passport if they can maintain a business for five years in England. However, neither the state nor the participants view their current position in England as a citizen despite the fact that they could enjoy similar social rights similar to the country's citizens. So, this reflects on some attitudes of migrants such as their interest in politics. The majority of respondents do not follow the local news. Almost none of them have any idea who to vote for or think they will succeed in becoming a British citizen. On the contrary, they view the country as a colossal workplace that can provide better social and economic conditions. So, even though the agreement does not directly relate to the commodification of citizenship due to the lack of money exchange, it is a consequence of neoliberal policies. Turkish migrants tell us the role of the Ankara Agreement as an example of the neoliberal citizenship acquisition method in the transformation of citizenship perception and how citizenship perception has changed in the eyes of individuals and states. Furthermore, the commonality of the participants

regarding their class position allow to find other dynamics that affect citizenship perceptions.

All the participants agreed that citizenship is nothing more than a legal tie. They decided to leave the country long before they applied to the agreement. The reason why they chose the agreement is its convenience. The application to the Ankara Agreement is the common point of many participants from various backgrounds. The participants who belong to the minority groups in Turkey and others who belong to the dominant identity but want to expand their business opportunities are melting in the same pot. Before conducting the interviews, it was presumed that participants would have a specific reason to apply for the agreement. However, the results showed that there is no specific reason to emigrate to England but the agreement. Before they tried England, almost all the participants tried to acquire other affluent countries' citizenship, such as Canada, the US, or Australia. This can be considered as the proof that neoliberal citizens as subjects of entrepreneurship guided by the market only seek appropriate options regardless of their content. What matters is how their motives are formed by their perception of migration as the only answer, regardless of the risks. The agreement's purpose honed this incentive by encouraging them to start their own business. So, neoliberal rationality occurs as a kind of thinking map that point out the address whenever they feel stuck in the country, and the final destination is nothing but entrepreneurship.

Since the research focuses on the transformation of the citizens' perception, the proper technique is derived from the method that can find the unique thoughts of the participants. Then, it would be possible to find the patterns or similar attitudes to provide valid data. The study uses qualitative analysis in order to gain insights into how people who have different social and occupational backgrounds have been starting a business as a result of the Ankara Agreement. Although the quantitative method could have found more participants compared to qualitative methods, it could not emphasize the themes that emerged from the interviews. Establishing trust between the

participants and the interviewer was ensured by changing their names and pausing the recording whenever they felt uncomfortable. Also, snowballing sampling was used to increase the familiarity of the participants with the research.

In future inquiries, it would be possible to expand the level of analysis from Turkey to other countries where there is a high amount of skilled immigration. So, it could be possible to compare how the tendency of the middle class to migrate affects their citizenship perception and if there is any correlation among different citizens regarding the transformation of this perception. This thesis chose Turkey and the Ankara Agreement because they could provide a proper investigation regarding how neoliberalism transformed citizenship both on the levels of perception and the state. Furthermore, much of the available literature on citizenship conceptualizes multinationalism or cosmopolitanism without referring to the neoliberal policies or transformation of citizenship perception. The literature that focuses on citizenship programs, primarily stresses the golden visa, or citizenship by investment programs. It would contribute to find the role of business programs in the context of migration of individuals who do not lack necessary financial investment. Further research would fill these gaps in the citizenship literature.

This study was faced with numerous obstacles which could restrain it from providing a fully comprehensive data source due to constraints such as distance, hesitations of participants due to political reasons, and its timing which took place during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, despite these obstacles, the limits were pushed in order to contribute to the literature and shed further light on the ever-changing definition of citizenship throughout society. With the stimulation of additional research, it would be possible to paint an even broader picture of the dynamic ethos of citizenship within modern society and how it may impact intercultural perceptions, immigration, economics, along with social and political standpoints for the future.

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## APPENDIX

Have you ever desired to live the rest of your life in another country?

When did you consider living in another country?

Which country, why?

How was your personal experience on migration to somewhere else through business?

Has your life changed after you settled there?

Do you actively follow the political news of the receiver country?

Do you know the language of the country that you are currently living?

How would you describe the citizenship rights, and could you enjoy these rights?

Do you think you are going to feel like a citizen of England, why?

How would you feel like an England?

Will you keep your Turkish citizenship once you acquire English citizenship?

What does it mean to be a Turkish citizen?

What does it mean to be an X citizen?

Which factors would change your decision to renounce your Turkish citizenship?

What do you think about the citizenship programs offered by Turkey; Do you support it?

## **ETHICS BOARD APPROVAL**

Ethics Board Approval is available in the printed version of this dissertation.