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**THE INTERACTIONS OF MIDDLE-CLASS LIFESTYLES
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ISLAMIZATION IN TURKEY**

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Türkiye’de Orta Sınıfın Yaşam Tarzlarının İslamlaşma Bağlamında Etkileşimleri

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FOREWORD

Before starting my Ph.D. process, I was aware that finding answers to some of my questions would be difficult despite the fact that I had closely examined certain lifestyle choices of the different segments of the middle class during my career in marketing. During the course of my doctoral program these questions became even clearer. In my professional life, I was frequently referring to categories such as “Anxious Moderns”, “Modern Conservatives” –terminology introduced by the Konda research which has substantial influence in LS studies – however, these descriptions didn’t fully make sense in my daily practices. And, for me, this stood in the way of clarifying class categories in Turkey. The category of “anxious moderns” mentioned here, were modern in terms of their lifestyles and secular values, whereas they seemed to be authoritarians in their views of the military and political party closure and they also presented a profile that is against change. The modern conservatives, however, were conservative in terms of cultural values, but they were against political party closures and seizure of power by the military and they represented a segment that is more open to change. Such representations were not matching with my daily experiences. For instance, me and my close circle were represented in the first category. Although, we have supported party closure we were against death penalty, we did not have negative views against Kurds and Armenians, xenophobia, hostility towards democracy or authoritarian tendencies. The idea behind supporting party closure in the past, was to block a potential movement that may aim religious totalitarian regime. And I observed in-myself to be a strong advocate of gender equality and respect LGBT rights. Similarly, I realized that my personal acquaintances who represented modern conservatives and progressive conservatives showed right wing authoritarian tendencies. We differed fundamentally in our views on xenophobia, gender issues, death penalty and LGBT.

Due to this and similar contradictions, in my PhD process, I frequently asked myself if I was an anxious modern who might be perceived as a guardian of secularity or a nationalist? Was I being defeated by my prejudices in defense of

democracy? Was I able to interpret the changes in social life and lifestyles objectively? Was I prejudiced toward certain social groups? All these observations and thoughts have driven me to analyze the following questions. How did these social groups interact with one another? In which aspects did they tend to differ? What are the boundaries delineating these categories? Was there really a polarization, and, if so, what was the main reason behind it? How would social life be influenced by a polarized society? All these complicated questions and processes have led me to analyze middle-class lifestyles within the context of the rising Islamization and how it relates to social class structure in Turkey.

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LIST OF THE ABBREVIATIONS

NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
MC	Middle-Class
LS	Lifestyle
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CCT	Consumer Culture Theory
ID	Identity
ANAP	Motherland Party
AKP	Justice and Development Party
CHP	The Republican People's Party
AKUT	Search and Rescue Association
KADEM	Women and Democracy Association
SGK	Social Security Institution
TUSIAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businesspeople Association
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessman Association
DİSK	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions
YHK	High Board of Arbitration
DP	The Democratic Party
AP	Justice Party

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ABSTRACT

The primary objective of this research is to examine middle-class lifestyles within the context of the rising Islamization and how it relates to social class structure in Turkey. In this thesis, ideologies and cultural systems have been viewed as the main elements affecting and shaping lifestyles, while consumerism is considered as both a cultural system and an ideology.

In recent years, we have witnessed a rise in reactionary populist movements globally. Unlike traditional conservative ideologies, these movements are open to consumption culture, new technologies and change and they use media effectively. For this reason, they were considered as social movements that are open to cultural innovation and that can mobilize different fractions of society. In parallel with this argument, post-orientalists perceived the dissolution of the welfare state and its replacement with consumerism as the erosion of the institutional structure that was built upon meta narratives of modernity. They argued that cultural diversity can be achieved through consumption and that it can give voice to the silenced minorities and thus it has an emancipatory potential that would even help bring social consensus. These movements were perceived similarly in Turkey; they were perceived as bottom-up movements that are open to change which carry the unique potential to bring freedom in cultural sphere.

However, today it is observed that these movements cannot go beyond right-wing populism. This thesis criticizes post-orientalist approaches to Islamist social movements that apply a positive-normative perspective based on the premise that such movements bring about social mobilization through cultural innovations, inspire new lifestyles, and transform identities in a progressive manner. According to this, these approaches exaggerate the role of social movements as agents of change and overlook their populist and reactionary potentials. This oversight is largely due to the emphasis on cultural change through identity politics at the expense of class-based political ideology. These approaches have shaped as a reaction to the reduction of culture to ideology and this reaction has caused to

separate culture from ideology and began to treat culture as independent from ideology. To classify civic society as the “cultural” and the state as the “ideological,” thereby separating the inherently intertwined concepts of hegemony and domination and assumptions that are based on the thought that cultural freedom will bring reconciliation in society are inspired by Gramsci’s concept of hegemony but unfortunately missed the essence of his concept. The failure to establish a healthy connection between culture and ideology can lead to the diffusion of hegemony through cultural freedom, that are built on discourses and symbols instead of dogmatic ideologies. These views, which are based the assumption that the domination emanates from the state, the army, the education system, or the powerful elite and that the civil society is the free sphere in a way evokes the practice of “laissez faire, laissez passer” concept in the cultural domain. These views that overlook the inequalities in the distribution of power tend to interpret social changes as bottom-up movements. However, social changes in the cultural sphere have the potential to be manipulated by the capital owners, religious men, politicians, media etc. just like the economic sphere being regulated by the powerful figures for their own interests. In other words, both areas will be shaped in favor of the interests of the more established and the more powerful.

Within this framework, in contrast to these approaches, this thesis underlines the fact that domination and hegemony are intertwined and takes government as an entity that is a part of this intertwined system instead of center of domination. For this reason, it considers the analyses that are merely based on culture as incomplete and interprets class analysis multidimensionally by adopting the Marxist concept of politics, culture and ideologies as parts of a whole. In this context, based on Bourdieu’s analysis, life-styles of middle class in Turkey has been revisited by analyzing socio-cultural structure statistically, “quantitative”, and by discourse analysis, “qualitative”.

Accordingly, the first method entailed the analysis of Konda 2008 and Konda 2015 data in a critical manner. Social classes are mapped based on values opinions and life styles by using exploratory and confirmatory pattern detection algorithms. This research, instead of using the original, established Konda categories

(Individualist-Collectivist, Conservatism-Innovativeness, Authoritarianism-Democracy, Secular-Anti-secular, Global-Local) has used bottom-up approach and has explored data transparently. For sure, this path, which was followed in the original analysis of Konda, is not a wrong or unscientific way but bottom-up analysis has provided more opportunity to explore and reinterpret the data. In reliability analysis, some inconsistency has been observed in assumed categories.

It is observed that in the current Konda analysis, modernity is examined only in terms of openness to new products and technologies and having positive views on open economy. Therefore, Konda study's approach to modernity and globalism in a sense shows that economic liberalism is assumed as an equivalent of social liberalism and modernity. Again, it was observed that the ones who are open to new products and changes differ negatively with their views on matter that require social tolerance. Science, certainly, progresses through questioning as long it is done with transparent and methodological rules, and every research, every theoretical concept must be open to criticism; this is basically what is done in this study. Data has been explored by applying bottom-up approach, correlated with precognition hypothesis, compared and confirmed transparently and analyzed by using R codes, and the research is repeatable.

In summary, while ideologies and lifestyles were mapped to class in the first phase of the analysis, in in the second phase, the qualitative analysis, discourse analysis was carried out in order to elaborate on the dynamics of current scene. In general, it is aimed to understand and interpret how cultural hegemony, which is a part of the class struggle, changes the daily struggle in terms of symbolic power and what kind of subjectivity it creates.

It should be underlined that this is not a study to approve or disapprove an ideology. The findings and conceptual framework are open to discussion and questioning. This study is especially considered to have the potential to influence later research on class-based analysis in Turkey by demonstrating how cultural ideologies, class coalitions and discursive and symbolic constructions are intertwined and how they are variable. New critical studies to challenge this thesis will take research in this field further. This thesis proves that we need more

information, new models and different perspectives for understanding the daily life and multidisciplinary scientific models that are ideologically, culturally and economically multidimensional.

Key Words: Lifestyle, cultural hegemonic struggle, consumerism, new social movements, ideology culture, symbolic and discursive constructions

ÖZET

Bu araştırmanın temel amacı, yükselen İslamlaşma bağlamında orta sınıf yaşam tarzlarını ve Türkiye'deki sosyal sınıf yapısıyla ne şekilde ilişkilendiğini incelemektir. Bu çalışmada, ideolojiler ve kültürel sistemler yaşam tarzlarını etkileyen ve şekillendiren ana unsurlar olarak görülmüş, tüketimcilik ise hem kültürel bir sistem hem de bir ideoloji olarak ele alınmıştır.

Son yıllarda, küresel çapta muhafazakâr popülist hareketlerin yükselişine tanık olduk. Geleneksel muhafazakâr ideolojilerin aksine, bu hareketler tüketim kültürüne, yeni teknolojilere ve değişimlere açık ve medyayı iyi kullanabilen hareketler olarak karşımıza çıkar. Bu nedenle de kültürel innovasyona çok açık, toplumun değişik kesimlerini mobilize edebilen, sosyal hareketler olarak değerlendirildiler. Bu argümana paralel olarak, post-oryantalistler refah devletinin dağılmasını ve tüketimcilik ile yer değiştirilmesini modernliğin meta anlatılarıyla inşa edilen kurumsal yapının erozyonu olarak algıladılar. Tüketim yoluyla kültürel çeşitliliğin hayata geçirebileceğini ve susturulmuş azınlıklara ses verebileceğini, dolayısıyla özgürleştirici bir potansiyeli olduğunu ve hatta toplumsal uzlaşmayı da beraberinde getireceğini savundular. Türkiye’de de bu hareketler benzer bir şekilde yeniliklere açık, aşağıdan-yukarı gerçekleşen, kültürel alanda özgürlüğü getirebilecek özgün bir güç olarak algılandılar.

Ancak bugün bu hareketlerin sağ popülizminin ötesine geçemediği görülmektedir. Bu tez, bu tür hareketlerin kültürel innovasyonla toplumsal harekete sebep olduğu, yeni yaşam tarzlarına ilham verdiği ve kimlikleri ilerici bir biçimde dönüştürdüğü ön kabulüne dayanan ve İslamcı sosyal hareketlere pozitif-normatif bir bakış açısı ile yaklaşan post-oryantalist yaklaşımları eleştirmektedir. Bu yaklaşımlar, değişimin araçları olarak toplumsal hareketlerin rolünü abartabilmekte, popülist ve gerici potansiyellerini gözden kaçırabilmektedirler. Bunun büyük ölçüde nedeni, sınıf tabanlı siyasi ideoloji pahasına kimlik siyaseti yoluyla kültürel değişime yapılan vurgudan kaynaklanmaktadır. Başta, kültürün ideolojiye indirgenmesine tepki olarak ortaya çıkan bu yaklaşımlar kültürü

ideolojiden ayırmış ve bağımsız olarak ele almaya başlamıştır. Sivil toplumu “kültürel” ve devleti “ideolojik” olarak sınıflandırmak, böylece doğal olarak iç içe geçmiş hegemonya ve tahakküm kavramlarını birbirinden ayıran ve kültürel özgürlüğün toplumsal bir uzlaşmayı da beraberinde getireceği öngörüsüne dayanan bu yaklaşımlar, Gramsci’den esinlenmiş ancak onun özünden uzaklaşmıştır. Kültür ve ideoloji arasında sağlıklı bir bağlantı kurulamaması, hegemonyanın dogmatik ideolojiler yerine, kültürel özgürlükle söylemler ve semboller üzerinden yayılmasına neden olabilmektedir. Tahakkümün devletten, ordudan, eğitim sisteminden veya güçlü seçkinlerden kaynaklandığı, varsayımına dayandırılan, sivil toplumun ise serbest alan olarak değerlendirildiği bu görüşler, bir bakıma ekonomik alanda bırakınız geçsinler (laissez faire, laissez passer) anlayışının kültürel alanda uygulanmasını çağırıştır. Gücün dağılımındaki eşitsizlikleri göz ardı eden bu yaklaşım, sosyal değişimleri de aşağıdan yukarı hareketlenmeler olarak yorumlama eğilimindedir. Oysa, kültürel alandaki sosyal değişimler de her zaman tıpkı ekonomik alanı güçlü olanın kendine göre düzenlenmesi gibi, kültürel alanda da din adamları, sermaye sahipleri, politikacılar, medya vb. tarafından manipüle edilme potansiyeline sahiptir. Yani her iki alanda da daha güçlü ve yerleşik olanın çıkarlarının lehine sonuçlanacaktır.

Bu yaklaşımların aksine, bu tez, hegemonya ve tahakkümün iç içe geçmiş olduğu gerçeğinin altını çizmekte, devleti ise bir güç merkezi olmak yerine bir varlık olarak bu iç içe geçmiş sistemin bir parçası olarak ele almaktadır. Bu nedenle yalnızca kültüre dayanan analizleri eksik olarak kabul etmekte ve Marksist siyasi kavramı benimsemektedir. Bu doğrultuda, kültür ve ideolojiler bir bütünün parçaları olarak ele alınmış ve sınıf analizi çok boyutlu olarak yorumlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Bourdieu’nün metoduna dayandırılarak, Türkiye’deki orta sınıf yaşam tarzları, sosyokültürel yapının istatistiksel analizi “nicel” ve söylem analizi “nitel” ile yeniden gözden geçirilmiştir.

Buna göre, ilk yöntem kullanılarak Konda 2008 ve Konda 2015 verileri eleştirel bir şekilde analizi edilmiştir. Sosyal sınıflar, keşfedici ve sağlayıcı örüntü algılama algoritmaları kullanılarak değerler ve yaşam tarzlarına dayandırılarak haritalanmıştır. Bu araştırma, orijinal Konda araştırmasının önceden öngördüğü

kategoriler (“Bireysel-kolektivist”, “Muhâfazakar-Yenilikçi”, “Otoriter-Demokratik”, “Laik-Anti-laik”, “Küresel-Yerel”) yerine yani yukarıdan-aşağı yerine aşağıdan-yukarı yaklaşımı benimsemiş ve dataları şeffaf olarak analiz etmiştir. Elbette orijinal Konda araştırmasında izlenen bu yol bilimsel anlamda yanlış değildir. Ancak aşağıdan-yukarı yaklaşım dataları keşfetme ve yeniden yorumlama anlamında daha fazla olanak vermiştir. Güvenilirlik analizinden elde edilen bulgularda ise, bazı kategorilerde tutarsızlıklara rastlanmıştır. Buna göre mevcut Konda analizinde modernliğin sadece yeni ürünlere ve teknolojilere açık olup olmamak, ekonominin dışı açık olmasını onaylamak açısından irdelendiği gözlemlenmiştir. Dolayısıyla, orijinal Konda çalışmasının, modernlik ve küreselliğe olan yaklaşımı baz alındığında, bir bakıma ekonomik liberalliğin sosyal liberalizm ve modernlikle eşdeğer tutulduğu ve bunun da teorik yapılara dayandırıldığı görülmüştür. Yine yeni ürünlere ve değişimlere sıcak bakanların toplumsal hoşgörü gerektiren alanlarda olumsuz olarak farklılaştıkları gözlemlenmiştir. Elbette, bilim, şeffaf ve yöntemsel kurallarla yapıldığı sürece sorgulayarak ilerler ve her araştırma, her teorik kavram eleştiriye açık olmalıdır; temel olarak bu çalışmada verilerin şeffaf analizi ile yapılan şey budur. Datalar, aşağıdan yukarı analiz edilerek ve ön kavramsal varsayımlar ile ilişkilendirilerek, istatistiksel analiz araçları olarak R paketleri kullanılarak şeffaf bir şekilde karşılaştırılmış ve doğrulanarak, analiz edilmiştir ve tekrar edilebilirdir.

Özetle analizin birinci fazında ideolojiler ve yaşam tarzları haritalandırılırken, ikinci faz olan nicel analizde durağan fotoğrafın dinamiklerini incelemek amacıyla söylem analizi yapılmıştır. Genel olarak, sınıf mücadelesinin bir parçası olan kültürel hegemonyanın, günlük mücadeleyi sembolik güç açısından ne şekilde değiştirdiğini ve ne tür bir öznellik yarattığını anlamayı ve yorumlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Bu tezin, bir ideolojinin onayı veya onaylanmaması için yapılmış bir çalışma olmadığına altı çizilmelidir. Bulgular ve kavramsal çerçeve tartışma ve sorgulamaya açıktır. Sınıfsal analizlere çok boyutlu yaklaşan bu çalışmanın, özellikle kültürel ideolojilerin, sınıf koalisyonlarının, söylem ve sembolik yapıların nasıl iç içe geçtiğini ve dinamik yapısı nedeniyle de değişkenliğini göstererek,

Türkiye'deki sınıf tabanlı yaşam tarzı analizlerine ve daha sonra bu alanda yapılabilecek arařtırmalara katkısı sağlayabileceđi düşünölmektedir. Bu tezi zorlayacak farklı kritik çalıřmaların ortaya çıkması bu alandaki arařtırmaları elbette bir adım daha ileri taşıyacaktır. Bu tez, sosyal sınıfın dinamik yapısını ve gündelik yaşamı anlamak için daha yeni modellere, farklı bakıř açılara ve çok disiplinli, ideolojik, kültürel ve ekonomik olarak çok boyutlu bilimsel modellere ihtiyaç duyulmakta olduđunu kanıtlar niteliktedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yařam tarzı, kültürel hegomonik mücadele, tüketimcilik, yeni toplumsal hareketler, ideoloji ve kültür, sembolik ve söylemsel inřalar

INTRODUCTION

Content and Structure

This thesis revisits socially, economically and politically the important “middle class” in Turkey. Although, the middle class has been described as “the backbone of both the market economy and democracy in most advanced societies” (Birdsall, 2000), the current and historical observations have shown that the middle class may display an authoritarian stance as well.

The role of the middle class in economic development is certainly undeniable. On the other hand, the middle class is perceived as providing welfare for people and, therefore, has also been perceived as a progressive class. It has been associated with welfare capitalism, modernization, and privatization of religion and secularization of the public sphere. However, a neoliberal economy does not necessarily lead the way to liberal values. Liberalism in the economic sense and liberalism in the cultural field are different. Welfare capitalism is open to be confused with ideological and institutional patterns. Therefore, generalizations asserting that the middle class is progressive or democratic may be misleading.

Contrary to fundamentalist rejections of the Westernization of market capitalism since the 1990s in Turkey, the Islamic class has developed new consumption practices in line with the dominant Western consumption culture and created their own alternative consumption strategies. This class started demanding quality of life, more freedom to enjoy life, a rule of law that supports business, all of which have been seen indicators of modernism and progressivism in some academic work. In contrast to their conservative values, it was suggested that the Islamic class is now open to new ideas due to the influence of capitalism (Göle, 2009-2012; Atasoy, 2005; Al-Azmeh 2003). The argument was built upon a presumed correlation suggesting that open mindedness towards liberal economics and new products would bring along tolerance and democratic tendencies (Nasr, 2009).

This thesis proves that approval of change for the sake of change and open mindedness towards new products does not in itself, indicate progressiveness as a cultural value. This thesis emphasizes the idea that progressiveness needs to be evaluated in terms of social rights and democratic values, and its capacity to provide better and sustainable conditions in health and education and take the society further by developing it culturally rather than the concept that capitalism alone presents progressiveness within consumerist sign system.

This thesis underscores the need to examine the lifestyle of the middle class in Turkey in its historical integrity and dynamic structure by adopting a multidimensional approach without excluding the ideological aspect. Therefore, class descriptions that are reduced to such relationships as oppressor-oppressed, pious-impious were criticized, and the dynamic, fragmented structure was emphasized. In this sense, this research tries to explore the data by staying within the methodological rules, and a coherent structure was arrived at through regularities and patterns, and individual subjects-items were examined, thereby creating a holistic picture. In short, a hermeneutic process was followed that moved between the whole and its parts. During this process, the fact that every country has its own fractional class structure, and the need to study them in their own constructs and struggles was taken into consideration, the fragmented structure of middle class was observed, and their heterogeneous nature was detailed with qualitative research.

Motivation and the Background of the Problem

Konda's 2008 lifestyle research is one of the most influential studies of its time, introducing categories such as "anxious moderns," "conservative moderns," and "polarization". These categories have been perceived as sociological realities through media diffusion. The starting point of the research presented in this thesis is the idea that these categories ("modern conservative" or "progressive conservative") may have some contradictions within themselves when their everyday life practices are observed. Contrary to the Konda report, it is argued here

that being open to novelties, new products, and innovation might not be a sufficient factor for explaining being modern but may be an instrumental characteristic.

Every scientific research must re-examine the accumulated knowledge that is accepted as irrefutable fact. Knowledge is certainly not independent of social influences; it consists not of only facts but also includes experiences and is not free from social influences and not entirely objective (Jasanoff, 2004; Latour, 1987; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Even the most objective research incorporates interpretation of the available information. The processes employed in this thesis therefore utilized quantitative data but interpreted them with a hermeneutic approach, starting from preconceptions. The goal of this research is not to replace the “sociological reality” established by the Konda report with a new one but to provide an alternative explanation supported by evidence, transparent methodology, and sound argumentation.

Every researcher has his/her own established perspective thus a pure and direct observation cannot exist, since it is inevitable that the scientist is influenced by the social environment and the period that he/she lives in. Fleck, (1935) claims that the development of truth in scientific research is not an achievable goal because every researcher has his/her own thought style and belongs to collective thought and these collective thoughts create their own language or symbols. It is not possible to talk about an absolute truth, truth can't evaluate independent from the collective it belongs, which means that what is comprehensible might be incomprehensible in another collective, and the same goes for validity. Normally, every scientist has its own past experiences and view of life and it is not about only to collect new information, but it is also about to re-analyze old information. “Change can be only possible when members of two thought collectives meet and cooperate in observing and formulating hypotheses” and this thesis adopts the comparative epistemology that Fleck's advocated which has also contributed to the development of critical science (Fleck,1935).

The above discussion was the motivation behind this research. The goal was to re-analyze the “progressive conservative” or “modern conservative” and

anxious modern” lifestyles multidimensionally and question their “modern” and “progressive” positioning.

Research Design & Methodology

Konda’s 2008 and 2015 data were used in order to test the queries and examine them in a reflective manner. This research revisits the socially, economically, and politically important “middle class”. Although every researcher is right in his or her own way, the truth is a matter of interpretation, and such interpretations must be transparent and made in accordance with the accepted rules in order to be legitimate.

Staying within the boundaries of scientific methodologies, available data were re-examined, and the findings were fine-tuned by applying several exploratory and confirmatory processes. The main goal was to arrive at a coherent structure through observed patterns, thereby creating a holistic picture. In short, a hermeneutic process that moved between the whole and its parts was followed. I sought to reflexively eliminate subjects that did not fit into this holistic picture emerging from the data itself and then to contemplate and make a thoughtful account of the reasons behind such incompatibility. I tried to detect patterns in the data showing how cognitive space is organized in Turkey in order to map how singular values are structured in a low dimensional space. Then, I explored how certain classes are positioned in this map.

However, statistical pattern detection techniques can only result in a reduced view of the cultural context framing lifestyles. Ideas, values, lifestyles are not isolated entities but often come into view to support certain social movements aiming to organize the social space according to some higher ideal or ideology. Social movements emanate from the mobilization of ideas from a top-down or from bottom-up organization of society. In line with Skocpol’s approach, this thesis considers culture and ideologies as the main driver. As the Iranian revolution originally started as a social revolution and then was ideologically driven by the Islamists, in Skocpol's approach, culture is considered as an intermediary between

ideology and the classes. It acts as a network between people's daily lives and symbols. This thesis also examines the class structure in Turkey by exploring the relationship between everyday life and cultural hegemonic symbols without excluding ideology. This means the quantitative pattern analysis needs to be complemented with a qualitative analysis.

Based on the afore mentioned framework and in line with Bourdieu's arguments suggesting that social life must be understood in terms of social constructs, group norms, individuals, and objective measures, this research is focused on class-based social life. Based on Bourdieu analysis, statistical analysis of the socio-cultural structure should be applied first, and then a discourse analysis employed. Following this approach, the middle class in Turkey has been revisited in terms of lifestyles. This combined approach provides a more comprehensive understanding of the social life of a fragmented class.

In the first phase, the quantitative phase, Bourdieu's "multiple correspondence analysis" is used. Theoretically, Bourdieu's concept provides interplay between economic, social, and cultural capital (Bennett, 2008; Crompton, 2008; Savage, 2010). This multi-dimensional approach allows a framework for qualitative analysis. Ideology and other confirmatory factors were analyzed through data mining, and different models were examined. Social class segments were explored via correspondence mapping. Common items were chosen, and changes in each social segment were tracked. The R data science tools were used to analyze the data and patterns have been identified.

In the qualitative section, patterns which were obtained from the quantitative research were applied for thematic analysis, which helped to order the data to facilitate interpretation. First, in order to obtain tangible sociologic clusters, a grounded coding process was applied, and, finally, abstract categories were created. For this analysis, the QDA5 software tool was used. The most important contribution of this research is that it reveals how these classes define each other under the influence of the discursive hegemonic struggles that exist between them. The overall analysis will provide us with extensive knowledge of actively constructed lifestyles.

Sample Coverage of the Study

In this thesis in which special attention is drawn to the role of culture and ideologies in social life and social structuring, life-styles have been analyzed by taking in consideration, the coalitions built by the classes, the way the society is discursively and symbolically organized, and how they have been mobilized. The exclusion of ideologies and the fetishizing of cultural identities miss out on the possibility that such a movement may be reactionary-populist and regressive. Accordingly, lifestyles are analyzed through discursive and symbolic construction based on the fluid and fragmented structure of middle class.

This study queries the analyzes that create a kind of dichotomous polarization that take culture as a single dimension by ignoring class dynamics and its fragmented social structure. Accordingly, class analysis is considered with its many dimensions and studies that are based on Şerif Mardin's center-periphery paradigm, and those that tend to reduce to a single dimension are criticized. Instead of categorizing the society into "upper, middle, and lower" layers as in Weber's social stratification, middle class lifestyles are analyzed by adopting the Marxian approach that claims culture and ideologies go hand in hand and constitute a more complex structure.

Accordingly, the first chapter covers how consumerism emerged and the way consumerist ideology affected life styles, economic and politic fields. In this context, the reduction of "freedom of choice" to consumerism and the consequences are examined. It is asserted that, in a consumerist society, the concept of happiness began to be defined in terms of visible criteria while true equality based on democratic principle started to emerge in the form of social success and happiness. Based on this visible criteria, quality of life has become a commodity. The postmodernist penchant for encouraging the formation of market niches, both in lifestyle choices and in consumer habits, and cultural forms, surrounds the contemporary urban experience with an aura of freedom of choice in the market (Harvey, 2012). It is thought that consumer was able to cultivate multiple, situation-specific self-images by engaging in a variety of disjointed consumption experiences

(Firat, 1992; Firat & Venkatesh, 1995). As Gabriel and Lang (1995) point out, the many faces of the consumer correspond to certain social roles in which the consumer is empowered, such as “chooser,” “communicator,” “identity-seeker,” “hedonist,” “rebel,” “activist,” and even “citizen.” This is precisely the point that is criticized in this thesis. While individualist competition is being exalted, on the other hand, “freedom of choice” has been reduced from social rights to consumerist culture. This is not a world of “freedom of choice” this is the individualism that is based on consumption choices and consumerist culture. However, the concept of “freedom of choice,” which is based on consumerist culture, limits individual rights instead of being in the area of social rights. The growing importance of the culture industry and media, the privatization of media, and the media’s unregulated manipulative qualities have led to unauthentic, bottom up directed cultural practices. This is in point of fact, an understanding of “freedom of choice and “well-being” that is reduced to consumerism that masks the absence of democracy under the pretext of democratic principles.

The second chapter elaborates on how the new social movements should be evaluated. The critical role of ideologies and culture in this analysis is discussed. The role of cultural hegemonic class struggles, class mobilizations, discursive constructions, and symbols in assessing the progressiveness of a movement is underscored. The post-orientalist approaches to Islamist social movements are criticized in this respect because these approaches exaggerate the role of social movements as agents of change and overlook their populist and reactionary potentials. Again, in this chapter, the critical role of populist discourses and ideologies in the definition of middle class is emphasized. Populism is considered as a discourse, as a form and, in line with Laclau’s argument, this thesis take populism as a form that both right and left ideologies need for gathering different classes. According to Mouffe (2000, 2013), the key characteristic of all populism is the identification of a “people” who are distinguished from a kind of adversary, a distinction that serves to unite and mobilize them. It means that populism was seen as an instrument of mobilization that can be adapted to the strategies of different political actors aiming to mobilize large mass of people who feel excluded.

It means that populism has a dimension of the action that is shaped by political discourse.

The formation of the middle class in Turkey is discussed within this framework, and cultural hegemonic struggles, class mobilizations, and coalitions are reviewed in a historical process and in relation to the “turban” symbol. When we look at the literature, we can see that the class that uses the turban is sometimes referred to as the New Elite (Göle,) or the lower class (İzberk). In other words, there are different approaches to the turban and the class it represents, which creates confusion in the perception of turban users. However, the turban is often attributed to the lower class and, based on the center periphery paradigm, to the segment of society that cannot benefit from the facilities of the center. This thesis criticizes these approaches and interprets the class represented by the turban, explaining the turban’s role and its transformation in middle class within the context of Islamization. Moreover, the approach which assumes the turban as a symbol that functions as a mediator between modernism and Islam and the thought that Islam can be compatible with modern values is criticized.

This thesis approaches the turban as a symbol which used to be an ideological before it turned into sign after becoming culturally hegemonic, and, after the 2000’s, new ways of wearing/tying the turban appeared, that is, Turban users have differentiated among themselves too and replaced the “başörtüsü”. This finding also came out in quantitative research, and it was observed in the qualitative research that the turban has been ascribed meanings by middle class factions that are different from the past.

Accordingly, while interpreting today’s MC, it is crucial to understand how sign system construct reality, and how ideology and meanings are generated in a discursive process. Having derived the premises that semiotic construction is not an absolute imposition of a fixed meaning, this process is a discursive formation determined according to the level of political struggles and material circumstances.

Within this frame, this thesis analyzes middle-class lifestyles within the context of rising Islamization and its interactions with other class factions using a critical approach. This research is not based on assumptions or established

constructs but scientifically reanalyzes Konda data and uses the obtained patterns to design qualitative research and queries “how various groups interact with one another, how they evaluate each other, how they differentiate themselves with their lifestyles, and how ideology culture symbolically constructs their everyday life”.

CHAPTER I

CONSUMERISM

1.1. THE CONCEPT OF CONSUMERISM

1.1.1. The Emergence of a Relationship between Consumption and Lifestyle

Consumption as an economic concept, helps determine the growth of the economy. It is simply defined as the final purchase of goods and services by individuals. In economy, it leads to the final demand for goods and services (Smith 1937). Smith interprets consumption as the substructure of all production and the welfare of the producer ought to be attended to, for sure it is necessary to promote consumer for the product that is produced (Smith 1937). These definitions that approach consumerism from an economic angle usually tackle the concept of consumerism on the base of economic topics that focus on income which is based on Keynesian theory and discuss that current real income is the most important determinant of consumption, spending habits and consumer demands. However, although consumption seemed to be in the realm of economists, advertisers and market researchers in the beginning, it needs to be considered within a broader spectrum now, due to its multiple social and socio-psychological dimensions.

During the twentieth century, the social and cultural processes related to consumption in Western capitalism have been carried by various social status groups to large masses. Consumption as a set of social, cultural and economic practices that, together with its associated ideology of consumerism, has started spreading and has been criticized as serving to legitimize capitalism.

When we look at how consumerism has evolved, the baby boomer generation, one of the most crucial demographic characteristics of the 1945-1963, seems to be an important factor. During that period, birth rates were at a high level and the dramatic increase resulted in high percentages of young people in 1960s

who had a crucial role in the emergence and growth of the consumerist life style. By the 1950's, following a pattern already established in America, the UK and then the rest of Western Europe followed suit and -mass consumption- began to develop across all. Thus, even people with very low purchasing power started appearing as “consumers”. Also, a new group of consumers emerged in the period of “Fordist” mass production and mass consumption—a group that started displaying preferences of their own in their purchase decisions. These developments paved the way for establishing brands. Advertising targeted and reached these young, earners. Criticism of consumption started gaining importance in the same years with mass consumption's rise. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1979) coined the term -culture industry- to designate the products and process of mass culture.

Adorno, and the other Frankfurt School theorists, asserted that mainstream cultural styles can't be original, innovative, and express inconvenient cultural experience. Rather than challenging the *status quo*, music, film, and other forms of entertainment have even industrialized consumer culture. Within this context, according to Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) from Frankfurt School, -culture industry- is based on the identicalness of the entire mass culture that is dominated by monopolies. The culture industry and advertising have grown to be so intertwined with one another that they have both become an operational tool for the process of -manipulating people-.

The 1960s were different than 1940s and 1950s which have often been characterized as conformist, in the sense that a number of transformations started to occur that shaped lifestyle. Living standards started to increase dramatically and a new phenomenon -consumerism- started making an impact. One's socio-economic class has been seen as determined by more than income and consumer expenditure patterns. The way of life has been linked to the working class. This concept was more than some -common-sense- idea wherein different classes have different ways of living, which affect consumption patterns. It implies a link

between daily work routines, household chores, leisure, moral values, and beliefs (Williams, 1958).

To understand the role that consumption played in late Twentieth Century capitalism, the concept of consumption comes into prominence within a social theoretical frame work. Today modern consumption is the result of developments that Marx would have termed, as -commodity production -. With the rapid increase in the amount of production and other factors, consumerism has become an area of interest for sociologists. This change also formed the basis for structuralism that was developed by French anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1979) to analyze societies. He emphasized the role that the signs and symbols played in structures of myth and ritual in societies. The importance of signs and symbols have highlighted consumption in late-Twentieth-Century; consumerism has thus begun to be viewed as a social and cultural process involving cultural signs and symbols, rather than just an economic function Levi-Strauss (1979). The works of Veblen on (1899) -consumption of prestige-, Weber (1958), and the early work of Marx (1844)-alienation- have influenced structuralists. In the contemporary age, Marx's theory of alienation considers the relation of subject and object within political economic conditions. In Marx's alienation theory, for workers, producing commodity is a tool for realizing himself. In a political economy, a worker becomes alienated in the face of the commodities he produces, he becomes less himself thus falls away from his essence. Differing from Marx, Baudrillard's discourse discusses alienation in terms of social and cultural bases. Baudrillard's (1976) alienation discourses includes arguments in terms of consumerism and technology and expands his transformation of Marxism in his later work, particularly his discussion of workers and symbolic exchange. Baudrillard claims that workers have always been primarily excluded and excommunicated by the system. Class struggle has always been a struggle against being treated as subhuman or relegated to a marked term. The core of capitalism is not exploitation but the code of normality. Accordingly, he uses simulation is the exchange of signs with signs, symbolic exchange is the exchange of signs with the real (Baudrillard,1976)

In Weber's sociological analysis, as a distinctive theoretical discourse, the concept of social status was developed. A status group has been defined as a distinctive pattern of living, of eating, drinking, dressing, entertaining, in sort of consuming. These patterns help define the members of a group, its status, its sociocultural esteem both in its own eyes and in the eyes of the others in the social area who share similar cultural values.

Veblen (1899) analyzed the role of women in the American leisure class, home furnishing, clothes, jewelry, eating and drinking expensive foods, alcoholic drinks and he contributed how status can be defined on consumerism. Consumption has become a well-established factor in terms of defining social status and economic class categories as well as its central role in people's way of life and that was dominant between the 1950's and 1980's. It means that whereas one's job used to be deemed as enough of a differentiator, in terms of defining a person, by the end of Twentieth Century, it was replaced by a new approach that defined people according to what they did outside of work. Consumption practices became at the center of one's way of life. Even today, the consumer culture tends to define people through the products or services that they consume or prefer not to consume. Ownership of these products and services has been directly linked with the assertion of wealth and the reinforcement of power. In that time, lifestyle research concept was mostly based on how to segment people of the basis of values, according to socioeconomic and demographic variables. They were grouped based on their responses, using such statistical procedures as factor analysis. Companies and managers in marketing have started to rely on lifestyle information and have started to see it's a component for predicting and building brand loyalty.

Coming closer to our point in time, after the mid-1980's, post-modern capitalism - a primary focus for the academy as well - has arisen based on symbolic constructions; consumption began to be affected and surrounded by these processes, too. In advanced capitalist societies, people have begun to desire the same social and cultural practices that are imposed by consumerism regardless of their own economic condition and social status. Consumption, at this stage, is therefore seen

as being based increasingly upon desires, not simply upon need (Bourdillard,1998). In a social manner, consumption has become linked with desires, by using signs and symbols for selling products to majority of consumers. As a matter of fact, an accurate interpretation of consumption depends on analyzing the interactions that create these processes and symbolic constructions correctly. Symbolic value within a constructed sign system are meant to signify certain lifestyles and/or identities reflecting the positions of their possessors in the eyes of other members of society (Levy, 1959). The quality of a brand, product or service does not come from its original feature or its image but from its quality to convince the people to buy into a semiotically constructed lifestyle and Worldview (Thellefsen, 2008).

As noted above, the concept of consumption has many meanings -, depending upon the major theoretical framework being utilized. For this reason, recent decades have witnessed an explosion of sociological research on the changing role of consumption, entertainment, and leisure. Consumption has been viewed as central to everyday life, identity and social order and became crucial subject for sociologists “social class, identity, group membership, age and stratification” became main subjects. Age, gender, ethnicity and socio-economics have stood as variables and dynamics (Giddens, 1991).

1.1.2 Lifestyle and Social Class and Social Status

When we speak of “lifestyle”, a sociological meaning is ascribed to the word rather than just referring to it as a distinctive style of life of specific status groups (Weber 1968, Sobel 1982, Rojek,1985) within consumer culture, lifestyle has been shown individuality, self-expression, the way of showing stylistic self-consciousness. Clothes, speech, leisure pastimes, eating and drinking preferences, home, car, choice of holidays, etc. are seen as indicators of the individuality of taste and sense of style of the consumer (Featherston 2007). It means that mass consumption, changes in production and marketing techniques have started to build their strategies on “the possibility to make a greater choice”. It’s also means that with freedom of behavior, lifestyle concepts can influence the choices that people

make over time and with the power of choice, people can decide which lifestyle they want while a lack of choice relates to lack of power (Veal, 1993). But today these definitions that focus on consumers' freedom of choice remain incapable to understand lifestyle and the position of the consumer in social space. Baudrillard (1976), argues that the dominance of exchange-value (instead of use-value of products, exchange value become crucial) has resulted to transform commodity to a sign. It means that products are lost their natural values and they must be understood as a consumption of signs. So, today analyzing lifestyle concept within a consumer culture that is heavily surrounded by mass-mediated, postmodern and cultural products in a sign system have become quite challenging. Certainly, consumer culture and lifestyle cannot be merely explained in terms of individuality, self-expression and a stylistic self-consciousness because they don't form entirely by one's will but are in constant interaction with several other constructions.

Max Weber's association of subculture to 'class', 'status', and 'power' has made a substantial contribution to the concept of lifestyle. Different from the approach in this thesis, Weber rejects the notion that economic phenomena directly effects, the nature of human ideals; he considers these concepts independent from class interest and distinguishes class situation from status situation (Weber, 1958). Accordingly, a status group is number of individuals who share the same situation that provides social prestige or esteem (Weber 1968). A status group unlike classes, are almost always conscious of their common position. But according to Weber, status groups may act to influence in a direct way the operation of the market that affects class relationships and class hierarchy is not a factor in this sense. In this thesis, instead of using Weber's social stratification, middle class lifestyles are analyzed by adopting the Marxian approach that claims culture and ideologies go hand in hand and constitute a more complex structure.

This thesis also embraces Bourdieu's lifestyle concept. Bourdieu (1984) with his -Habitus- concept, in which he uses in the context of consumption practices, lifestyles and habits also to reveal certain values of identity and, suggests that social relations and interactions could not be disassociated from ideology's penetration to everyday life forms and appearances. According to Bourdieu, every

society, every culture, every group of people who recognize themselves as a collective, has ideas about the world and their place in it. This world view and their place in their mind are learned or constructed and people turn them into everyday life practices.

The relation between consumption and life style from Bourdieu's point of view (1984) is that; socially constituted system and notion of taste that shapes "thoughts, perceptions and expression & actions emerges as the generative formula of lifestyle and in this way, it can be reflected symbolically in different dimensions. In other words, people's taste is closely related to the social class to which they belong to or they want to belong. We can underline "Distinction" as the premise of social collectives first formed in the arena of consumption. In the arena of consumption, there is a wide variety of data on practices and preferences including "canonized" forms of culture (art, literature, music, theatre, etc.) and these terms have sociologic meanings (food, sports, newspapers, clothing, interior décor, etc.).

In general, Bourdieu's theory draws on three basic concepts: "habitus", "capital" and "field". Habitus is the central of his theory of practice. According to Bourdieu, one's practices and actions are influenced by social structure and every human action is reflection of it. A person internalizes them all through habitus; social structure affects one's actions with his/her own habitus. Habitus can be defined as the internalization of the elements of social structure and the social class which one belongs to. So, habitus is the dynamic intersections of structure and action, society and the individual. (Bourdieu, 2000).

Bourdieu's (1984), social space is structured also in terms of power relations. According to him, there are three different types of capital: economic capital, social capital (valued relations), cultural capital (legitimate knowledge of one kind or another. Bourdieu demonstrates differences within both the dominant class and the petty bourgeoisie according to the composition of the capital. For instance, people with higher economic capital tend towards luxury consumption and the ones with higher cultural capital, such as university professors, artists are more inclined to cultural consumption. In this thesis, in quantitative research,

classes are mapped based on educational capital. This is a concept that expands the theoretical ideas of Bourdieu's social, symbolic and cultural capital.

Bourdieu (1984), sheds light on present consumer and cultural research and he accepted the two major ideas about classes, according to him social space is fragmented and, class consciousness boundaries are symbolically constructed. In a fragmented social space, consciousness is not a passive class position. An actively constructed boundary creates politically charged identities and includes or excludes others; hence, these boundaries do not simply reflect economic class boundaries but also coalitions between groups, which could be either within an economic class or across classes. This means that social classes are fragmented and, the identities are developed both by life style and discursive interactions.

1.2. THE IDEOLOGY OF CONSUMERISM

Consumerism as an ideology was born as an alternative model to prevent American workers from following the Soviet model, and American managers used marketing techniques to combine consumption with freedom, democracy, civilization, and success (Ewen, 1976). In the Twentieth Century, this model of modernity has globalized after the World War II and the Cold War. When consumer capitalism first appeared in the nineteenth century, under the -Protestant ethic-, Americans, concluded that they could be both spiritually and materially successful. Many social scientists and theologians assumed that consumer affluence would diminish religious commitment but, quite to the contrary, American Protestantism has been remarkably adaptive to the consumer ethos (Weber,1904-1905).

The rise of mass consumption as mentioned above was fueled by Fordism in America. The concept of mass production is synonymous with the automobile and the rise of the automobile is linked to the Ford Motor Company and General Motors. These two companies laid the groundwork for the American Dream. They became powerful actors responsible for shaping the Americanism. During these early stages, mass consumption allowed for the boom in mass productivity by

keeping big business profitable. This also paved the way for liberal ideals that support the American Dream.

There are two main scholarly approaches taken to the analysis of mass consumption; -mass culture theory- and the -theory of consumer agency-. As mentioned above, mass consumption theory began almost as soon as mass consumption became available for the Middle Class in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Consumption which used to be a practice of the rich transformed into globalizing phenomenon directed at the masses (Sklair,2012). Globalization of consumerism after the collapse of Soviet socialism through -soft-cultural means (e.g brands, dress, food, Hollywood films and design) led to a peak in consumer demand for Western goods in developing countries. The terms such as McDonaldization, -homogenization of the culture- (Ritzer,2008), McWorld -globalization and the corporate control of the political process- (Barber,1992) and -Coca-colonization- American cultural imperialism by expanding American ideals through the spread of consumer goods- (Wagnleitner,1994) appeared as a common terms. So, the most visible export to international markets by America has not only been goods, but also culture, a way of life that an identify an image of the free land. Cultural Americanization operates with a very reductive concept of culture, it assumes that economic success is the same as -cultural imposition-. It means that the success of American companies in placing products in most of the markets of the world, is understood to mean -cultural success-. Consequently, consumption has begun to be perceived as a tool to achieve their vision of the good society and the good life, and the way to achieve them (Aldridge 2003:26). Consumerism impels buyers who cannot resist their impulses, to spend. Even though, consumerism describes consumer culture as materialism, at the same time it was presented as core value for social life by penetrating and conquering the lives of people. This has resulted in a growing number of leisure and consumption activities in contemporary Western society and for some scholars, is linked to egalitarianism and individual freedom (Featherstone, 1990).

Capitalism has started in United States and has been managed and spread by global corporations and transnational capitalist class and organized politically than other countries like Japan, Western Europe and other parts of the developed world, to the newly industrializing countries have been affected. Even globalization of consumerism had been criticized for being ruthless to the solidarity, spirituality and community of local cultures by establishing its own cultural ethos that values conspicuous consumption over moral and spiritual development (Tomlinson,1999). Yet, the rise of consumerist culture could not be interrupt and mass media had played leading role to spread new consumerist lifestyles all over the world. Media became extraordinarily efficient vehicles for the broadcasting of the culture-ideology of consumerism globally (Sklair, 2002).

As a result, consumerism which started in America in the 1950s became the hegemonic discourse on a global scale, preaches the allocation of resources to the private sector production of consumer goods rather than public spending and investment for producing public goods. Hence, the dominant meaning system in branding is an ethnocentric one; its symbolism refers to ‘western imaginary’ reflecting a common mentality which views the world from western consumerist values (Cayla and Arnould, 2008).

Consumerism has naturalized some statements like, “freedom of choice”, individualist “pursuit of happiness” and the competition that provides “opportunity for social mobility” as the fundamental human rights. As a matter of fact, these statements stand for the ethos of American liberal capitalism, which is packaged by the consumerist sign system as the progressive and modern model set for the rest of the world (Suerdem, 2016).

The point to be most dwelt upon and examined among existing definitions is the idea of the consumer’s -free choice- since consumerist cultural system embraces -freedom of choice-, individualist -pursuit of happiness- and the -opportunity of social mobility through competition- as fundamental human rights, based on the ideology of personal well-being and self-satisfaction (Shaw et al. 2006). The changed conception of happiness with the industrial revolution has led

to the emergence of personal well-being ideology. Accordingly, the whole political game of the welfare state and consumer society has been based on an idea that equality is expected to be achieved by increasing production, distributing it to an increased number of people and thus reaching an increased level of well-being for all (Baudrillard,1998). However, it is observed that in a consumer society the concept of -happiness- began to be defined in terms of visible criteria while true equality based on democratic principle now emerges in the form of social success and happiness. Based on this visible criteria quality of life has become a commodity. Accordingly, consumer was able to engage multiple consumption experiences (Firat, 1992; Firat & Venkatesh, 1995). According these arguments, consumption practices can fashion multiple identities instead of accepted meanings and this assumption has caused to perceive “freedom of choice” in consumption like a freedom of choice in social field. Even though consumers have seen empowered; such as “chooser, “communicator”, “identity-seeker”, “hedonist”, “rebel”, “activist”, and even “citizen” (Gabriel and Lang, 1995), they were open to manipulate. Actually, marketing tools can fragment consumption by signs and can configures them by using fashion and style (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995).

To summarize, the concept of -freedom of choice- which is based on consumerist culture limits individual rights instead of being in the area of social rights. According to Baudrillard, this is the democracy of TV, the car and, apparently concrete but, in fact, equally formal democracy that, beyond contradiction and social equalities, corresponds to the formal democracy enshrined in the constitution (Baudrillard,1998). This point of fact an understanding of -freedom of choice- and -well-being- that is reduced to consumerism has started to mask the absence of democracy with the pretext of democratic principles. The growing importance of the culture industry and media, privatization of media and media’s unregulated manipulative qualities have led to unauthentic, up to bottom directed cultural practices. Those who have power over media build cultural domination and people who are convinced that they have -freedom of choice- are thus manipulated. It means that deregulated media technologies may be transformed into system-supportive tools as propaganda relying on market forces, internalized

assumptions and self-censorship, functioning without overt coercion (Herman and Chomsky, 1988).

1.2.1 Neoliberalism and Construction of Consumer Identity

During the 1980s, a discursive shift in technocratic language in terms of denouncing the welfare state as a regulatory redistributive mechanism was observed and, market mechanisms was favored as the regulator of economic activity and social organization. A new orthodoxy emerged within the political class of most Western countries regarding how society and economy should be organized. This orthodoxy included the belief that the market is the natural state. Accordingly, the state should not have a developmental role but merely a regulatory one. The state should not interfere in markets. That means that the government cannot control the market. The logic to justify this notion was embodied in neoliberalism's -laissez-faire- concept. Markets should be the main order-creating mechanism in society. Due to neoliberal policies, institutions were transformed into contractual arrangements as well and neoliberals see as self-interest as the driving force of human behavior, which is beneficial for all society. This idea, however, has caused many constituents that hold the society together and protect it from capitalism, to begin to dissolve.

Neo-liberal ideology used consumerism to convince that redistributive policies were an obstacle against the -freedom of choice- and expanding the market economy would increase the availability of consumer goods for all. The international policy organizations, academics and mass media have propagated the idea that redistributive policies constitute an obstacle for macroeconomic stability (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004). As the traditional marketplace transforms into the market and the market becomes institutionalized in modern societies, the market assumes a crucial role in organizing social life, establishing new class structures, and replacing new values (Slater and Tonkiss 2001; Venkatesh, Penaloza, and Firat 2006).

Neo-liberal technocratic discourse presented within this market-oriented ideology no longer carried the agenda of special interests and political parties; Rather, the neoliberal model became a sort of -common sense-, and conventional wisdom endorsed by parties of the left and right alike. In the political arena, where different actors compete for pushing their redistributive agendas have started to lose its significance. The difference between right and left-wing ideologies was reduced to identity politics. Today the belief that no difference remains between right and left- wing ideologies has also lost its validity: the masses were forced to choose between those who were not very different from each other in terms of economic policies (Mouff,1999).

It is possible to argue that evaluation of today's conjuncture keeping in mind the neoliberals defending deregulation and moving away from welfare proves Polanyi right. Polanyi (1944), describes in his work "the great transformation" how European civilization has transformed from the preindustrial world to the era of industrialization and how ideas, ideologies, and social and economic policies that accompanying it has been shifted. He clarifies the interplay between ideologies and interests: how free market ideology supports new industrial interests, and how those interests used that ideology selectively and point out how government intervention was called when needed to maintain their own interests. Polanyi (1944), defines market as an institution that is socially unsustainable. Market exchanges do not always cause consistent organization. Commodification of social relation can cause damages, market must be embedded in social relations that consist cultural values, moral, religion and politics (Polanyi,1944). Polanyi sees the economic system as a main function of social organization and argues that once the free market attempts to separate itself from the fabric of society, social protectionism as a society's natural response may appear which he calls -double movement-. The social cohesion through re-embedding back into the market exchange helps to provide new configurations according to the socio-historical background of markets (Polanyi 1944). However, while social reorganization actualizes, battles occurs over government regulation, over the provision of public goods and services, and over international flows of labor, goods, and money. These battles generate in

political field by aiming to achieve and exercise organized control over the state. Nation-states set the stage for a legitimate polity as the domain of enforcing and exercising citizenship rights and obligations (Weiss, 2007).

While neoliberal de-regulation produces outcomes that Polanyi underlines, postmodernists advocate de-regulation in the cultural sphere. Indeed, the new relativism of postmodernism matches the laissez-faire attitude of neoliberals. Postmodern scholars perceived the dissolution of the welfare state and its replacement by consumerism as a breakdown of the institutional structure, opening the gate for actualizing cultural diversity through consumption and giving voice to the silenced minorities generating emancipatory potential. These approaches are based on identity and highly focused on expression of the local which sometimes led to undermining embedded power relations and ideologies. However, social changes in cultural sphere will always result in favor of the more powerful established interests just like the economic area. As consequence of this approach in cultural area has caused growing cultural significance of local hybrid cultures and reciprocity began to be perceived as an effort of self-expression of the local.

The dissolution of the welfare state was offering new opportunities for reconfiguring rights and citizenship at both local and transnational levels (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). While domination is evaluated as state, army, education system, or market, “that is, based on a prediction that domination was provided by a state monopoly”, civil society has been evaluated as a freer sphere. The approaches that are based cultural agency usually tend to celebrate glocalization because of its potential to open new windows of opportunity for the self-expression of the local cultures within a global context. Glorifying all cultural movements as freedom of expression overlook the role of class struggles in terms of shaping culture and ideology. As a matter of fact, agency is detached from larger social categories and individuals are disengaged from collective actions, sociality is maintained by more local and immediate ties such as lifestyle, community, and identity (Featherstone, 2000). Consequently, as individual competition increased, and collective action decreased, social disintegration has occurred.

1.2.2 Consumer Resistance, Modernity and Islam

Globalization of consumerism after the collapse of Soviet socialism through “soft” cultural means (e.g. brands, dress, food, Hollywood films, and design) led to a peak in consumer demand for Western goods in developing countries. This change was quite strange because contrary to fundamentalist rejections of the Westernization of market capitalism, Islamic classes have developed new consumption practices in line with the dominant Western consumption culture and created their own alternative consumption strategies. As mentioned previously, main idea in neo-liberal thought is that “Human well-being- can be best way to liberate individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” (Harvey, 2005). Accordingly, in developing countries people have started to ask greater for quality of life, to enjoy more freedom, to find rules or law that support business. This situation has opened the gate for arguments that are built upon the presumed correlation suggesting that open-mindedness towards liberal economic policy and new products would foster tolerance and democratic tendencies (Nasr, 2010). With the rise of neo-liberalism, Western-centered conceptualization of modernity significantly started to be challenged with the idea of -alternative modernity. This concept and the assumptions on it have caused the perception that Islam and modernism could reconcile and engage in dialogue. This argument that is discussed extensively in chapter II, has overlooked that, neo-liberal economy does not necessarily lead the way to liberal values in social rights and being liberal in economic field is insufficient to replace Western-type modernity.

According the arguments that are based on alternative modernity has considered to be an outcome of globalization. -this situation was considered to be an outcome of localization–adaptation and objectification of global market culture in local contexts in which culture has acquired a major role–thus becoming a focus of consumer culture researchers (Askegaard, Arnould and Kjeldgaard 2005; Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006). With the rising importance of local context, anthropological studies in Nigeria (Arnould, 1989), Romania and Turkey; (Ger,

Belk, and Lascu 1993) provide valuable insights about how the foreign products have symbolic values in economically less-advanced countries. The symbolic and social dimension of these products caused a high degree of admiration for -western-lifestyles that have had a powerful effect on consumers (Wilk 1995; Belk 1988; Coulter, Price, and Feick 2003; Eckhardt and Houston 2002; Friedman 1990). Brands have become cultural forms and give ideas about the way people should live and think. Branding which is a specific form of communication offers a certain way of perceiving the world (Askegaard, Kjeldgaard and Arnould 2009). Accordingly, consumerism has spread America's ideology, geopolitical and corporate interests into a symbol system that acts as a means for opening the gates for political and economic domination. According to Baudrillard (1998), the whole discourse on consumption aims to make the consumer a universal man, to make him the general, and turn consumption in to a beginning for human liberation that is to be achieved instead of, and in-spite of the failure of political and social liberation.

However, in this globalization process, purchasing power generally fails to match the abundance of market offerings in many of these developing countries and creates increasing resentment among those who cannot afford them. The constructed discourse on consumption defined as above met some resistance in various forms of anti-consumerist behavior such as boycotts, culture-jamming, and de-marketing aiming for re-establishing spirituality and solidarity (Penaloza and Price, 1993).

Moreover, it can be said that not all resistance was solidarity-oriented, it was also performed as Puritanical activist identity, religious ideologies, particularly fundamentalism, shaped consumer resistance. The revitalization of Islam in many developing countries in Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East has been interpreted as a critique of capitalism and consumerism (Ray 1993; Sklair 1995) Ger and Belk (1996), have evaluated organized ideological movements like Islamic fundamentalism as a rejection of Western consumer influences and have interpreted them as a critique of modernization, capitalism and consumerism (Barber 1996; Huntington 1993, 1996; Ray 1993). Islamic fundamentalism has been perceived as

the most powerful threat to the global consumerist ideology. Fundamentalist rejections against Westernization of market capitalism and the transformation that it brings to other cultures, have brought social justice and brotherhood feelings between Islamist consumers motivating them to stand against global brands (Izberk Bilgin, 2008). Studies conducted in various fields of the social sciences have discussed the rise of Islamist movements and the spread of political Islam in connection to globalization that express resistance to Western-style modernization and secular modernity (e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000; Dekmejian, 1995; Esposito, 1998).

Nevertheless, contrary to fundamentalist rejections of the Westernisation of market capitalism since the 1990s in Turkey Islamic sector have developed new consumption practices in line with the dominant Western consumption culture and created their own alternative consumption practices. Although they are totally against Western-style consumption started demanding quality of life, rules of law that supports business; all of which was evaluated as being an indicator of modernism/progressivism in some academic works. Instead of their conservative values, it was suggested that they are open now to new ideas due to the influence of capitalism (Göle, 2009-2012; Atasoy, 2005; Al-Azmeh 2003). The argument was built upon a presumed correlation suggesting that open mindedness towards liberal economics and new products would bring along tolerance and democratic tendencies (Nasr, 2009). Actually, to approve change for the sake of change and open mindedness towards new products does not indicate progressiveness as a cultural value in and of itself. It is not enough just to prove a close relationship between neo-liberalism and the practice of everyday life based on consumerism.

In today's Turkey, we witness the rising Islamism freely engaging in - conspicuous consumption. Surely, the concept of consumerism always protects such consumption culture, but progressiveness should be evaluated by taking into consideration how people internalize modern values. It means that openness to new products and technologies under the influence of Western- style consumption may not necessarily bring about a change in terms of adopting a democratic attitude.

Welfare capitalism needs to be examined in the light of its relationship with its ideologic and institutional mode.

CHAPTER II

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS

2.1 NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The reactionary populist movements that we are witnessing in recent years, unlike traditional conservative ideologies which are usually distant from consumerism, are intensely grounded in the mass consumerism of late-stage capitalist culture.

Until the late 1990s, these movements were generally interpreted as reactionary or as movements against globalism and modernism. The revitalization of Islam in many developing countries in Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East has been interpreted as a critique of capitalism, consumerism (Ray, 1993; Sklair, 1995), and modernization (Barber, 1996; Huntington, 1993, 1996). Ger & Belk (1996) have evaluated organized ideological movements as a rejection of consumerism. Islamic movements have been perceived as a threat to the global consumerist ideology. Furthermore, it may be observed that reactions to market capitalism and the changes it brings to other cultures have led to the developing of alternative ideologies. Those who lacked the necessary means to consume and those who could not benefit from these changes gathered and formed an identity by using their own Islamist ideologies. We can see that they have moved with feelings of social justice and brotherhood and have united against global brands (Izberk Bilgin, 2008). Accordingly, studies conducted in various fields of the social sciences have discussed the rise of Islamist movements and the spread of political Islam in connection to globalization as a movement that express resistance to Western-style modernization and secular modernity (e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000; Dekmejian, 1995; Esposito, 1998).

However, after the 2000s, with the influence of neoliberalism and the Islamic movement's adoption of consumerism, it was seen that Islam and

modernism could reconcile and engage in dialogue. Islamic movements that were totally against consumerism started demanding quality of life, more freedom to enjoy life, the rules of law that supports business— all of which seen as an indicator of modernism/progressivism in some academic work (Nasr,2009). Modernity started to be challenged in a significant way with the idea of “alternative modernity.” One of the main reasons for the emergence of this concept is the expansion of the opportunities offered to the middle class and to all layers of society. With consumer products becoming cheaper, consumerism has spread throughout society with much greater effect and this caused Islamic movements to adapt to consumerism as well. These movements, which were previously against global brands and consumerist culture, started to become intertwined with consumerism and western-style modernism. This situation considered to be an outcome of localization–adaptation and objectification of global market culture in local contexts in which culture has acquired a major role—thus becoming a focus of consumer culture researchers (Askegaard, Arnould, & Kjeldgaard, 2005; Kjeldgaard &Askegaard, 2006).

Accordingly, in the case of Turkey, it was suggested that Islamic sector is now open to new ideas instead of their conservative values due to the influence of neoliberalism (Göle, 2009-2012; Atasoy, 2005; Al-Azmeh, 2003). The argument was built upon a presumed correlation that suggested that open mindedness towards liberal economics and new products would bring tolerance and democratic tendencies (Nasr, 2009). The “forbidden modern” of Göle (1996) forms the basis of these ideas. Particularly, the turban as a symbol has seen as a mediator between modernism and Islam, and it was thought that Islam could be compatible with modern values. However, it was also argued that this symbol represents the middle-class women and that the middle class was more open to change compared to the state which supports the status quo. This approach has also caused perceiving civic society as the “cultural” and freer space and state as the “ideological” and authoritarian.

This thesis argues that the consumerism-based definition of modernism and the arguments developed accordingly are incomplete and inadequate. In line with

this approach, in order to a movement to be evaluated as progressive, it should be related to make a progress in the area of social rights, in democratic values, provide better and sustainable conditions in health and education, and take the society further by developing it culturally.

In a similar way, the leadership in these movements has also been evaluated as modern in the sense that innovation and technology are used in the best possible ways and have an extremely liberal approach in economic and corporate aspects; however, they tend to be socially reactionary. They do not make progress in the area of social rights and limit individual rights to the concept of "freedom of choice" in the consumerist area. While this concept is reduced to consumerism, this became a dominant ideology which is based on the idea that the more production, the more people will have access to these products and more consumer satisfaction, and, as a result, the less inequality within society. The whole political game and consumer society has been based on the idea that equality is expected to be achieved by increasing production, distributing it to an increased number of people, and thus reaching an increased level of well-being for all (Baudrillard, 1998). International policy organizations, academics, and the mass media have propagated the idea that redistributive policies constitute an obstacle to macroeconomic stability (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004). As the traditional marketplace transforms into market and the market becomes institutionalized in modern societies, the market assumes a critical role in organizing everyday life and replacing old values with new ones (Slater & Tonkiss, 2001; Venkatesh, Penaloza, & First, 2006).

The "laissez faire/laissez passer" mentality in the economy was established with the rise of neoliberalism and translated into the cultural domain. Post-orientalist approaches to Islamic social movements traditionally apply a positive-normative perspective based on the premises that such movements bring about social mobilization through cultural innovations, inspire new lifestyles, and transform identities in a progressive manner. Unlike earlier social movements which were directed against the state or demanded power from the state, the new vision is more concerned with the democratization of structures of everyday life and focuses on forms of collective identity. It means that new social movements

(NSMs) are no longer “political,” and the struggle continues at symbolic and identity levels (Kauffman, 1990; Weiner, 1982). The NSM literature has put the transformation of identities at the center of analysis unlike the other established perspectives in social movement studies (Melucci, 1996). This literature demonstrates that movements can lead to social change by focusing on culture and society (Cohen, 1985).

These approaches exaggerate culture as an agency undermine the embedded power relations of ideologies. Consumerist ideology reduces the idea of freedom to “freedom of choice” and cultural rights overlooking the role of social and political rights on determining the free will of individuals. The approaches that are based cultural agency usually tend to celebrate glocalization because of its potential to open new windows of opportunity for the self-expression of the local cultures within a global context. Interpreting social change merely in terms of lifestyles tend to dismiss the relation between ideology and culture. Glorifying all cultural movements as freedom of expression overlook the role of class struggles in terms of shaping culture and ideology. The failure to establish a healthy connection between culture and ideology can lead to the diffusion of hegemony through cultural freedom, that are built on discourses and symbols instead of dogmatic ideologies.

However, social reality is constructed and through structuration that are determined by the economic and mediated by the symbols and discourses (Bourdieu, 1984). According Bourdieu (1984), the position of the groups in social space, can be defined in relation to another. Within the social space, dominant groups maintain boundaries between themselves and less powered like middle-class and popular, or high-brow, middle-brow and low-brow and utilize cultural forms to exclude or include others but these groups in social space are not yet social class. For being active social class, they still need political mobilization. Bourdieu (1984) does not describe culture as a passive agency and this thesis follows Bourdieu argument and interprets social class in dynamic structure of the social.

In fact, this modern and reactionary leadership effectively uses the newest trends in the culture industry to mobilize the masses around a common identity.

Identity politics and social movements, which were once seen as major vessels of progressive social change in an allegedly post-proletarian age, now largely belong to the arsenal of these reactionary populist organizations. The growth of identity politics has shifted the focus from socio-political to cultural. Liberal scholars interpreted these movements as authentic and view them as the nexus of state-independent political and cultural activity. In the same vein, postmodern scholars perceived the dissolution of the welfare state and its replacement by consumerism as a breakdown of the institutional structure built by the meta-narratives of modernity. These scholars argued that this opens the gate to actualizing cultural diversity explanations that are inadequate for describing social categories which, through consumption, give voice to previously silenced minorities and suggest a potential for emancipation. According to them, the postmodern globalization of media and information represents liberation from the authority of nation states, allowing non-state entities to control cultural circulation and to liberate ideoscapes and mediascapes (Appadurai, 1996).

The major weakness of these approaches is to explain the juxtaposition of neo-liberal globalization with reactionary cultural movements and these movements have been seen as the self-expression of the local cultures. Social changes have been interpreted only in terms of lifestyles and symbols by excluding ideologies and class struggles. Consumption has been spread to the bottom-level, but that does not mean that those who carry out social movement change or abandon their own ideologies. In social changes, discursive construction class coalitions and mobilizations also play an important role. This means that consumption can be used instrumentally and strategically for ideological and cultural hegemonic achievements.

Similarly, it may be observed that some scholars interpret these social movements as cultural diversity (Sandıkcı 2007, Gökarınel 2010), and the liberation they underline is a sort of cultural *laissez faire/laissez passer*. *Laissez faire/laissez passer* in the cultural sphere based on the assumption that the distribution in cultural sphere will be equal for everyone. In fact, social changes in the cultural sphere will result in favor of the more established interests same in the

economic area. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that these social changes are authentic and are always bottom-up mobilizations. It also should be remembered that they can be branded by using marketing technologies as well.

In Turkey, before being replaced by the turban, the “başörtüsü” was a casual head cover worn by women. Traditionally, covering the hair by başörtüsü varied according to regional tastes in the fabric, headscarf design and tying styles. As such, it was called different names based on the region or use, and the colors, motifs, lace designs, and stitching patterns were influenced by local traditions and often reflect the creator's style. In modern urban areas, women typically wore the başörtüsü to funerals and other religious services, regardless of their socioeconomic status. The başörtüsü was thus acting as inclusive symbol, bonding women of every class and world view. First, Turban was representing religious and educated urban women and the debate was based on freedom to use of this symbol without considering the embedded ideology and power relations. In the literature, the class that wears the turban is sometimes referred to as being considered the "new elites" (Göle, 1997) and sometimes as the lower class (İzberk Bilgin, 2012). The reason is the interpretations that does not take in considerations class coalitions and mobilizations. So, the assumption that is made based on the turban does not imply cultural diversity but points out to a counter-hegemonic struggle that is created by using marketing technologies. Instead of being shaped and produced by the society in a bottom up manner, the structure and semiotics of cultural norms are now highly controlled thanks to the industrialization of culture.

As the mass media of the modern world plays an important role in discursive construction, deregulated media technologies may transform into system-supportive tools as propaganda relying on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship functioning without overt coercion (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Therefore, consent-manufacturing technologies can also be used as brand political identity claims and can market them as private consumer goods. Accordingly, we are witnessing a considerable increase in Islamic branded products, services, lifestyles, and financial services in business and market segments (Jafari, Suerdem 2012). Islamic dating sites, fashionable veiling

(Kılıcbay, & Binark, 2002; Sandıkcı & Ger, 2010), and Islamic resorts (Sandıkcı & Ger, 2001), huqqa coffee shops, fish restaurant without alcoholic beverages point to the emergence of a global Islamic culture industry (Gokarıksel & McLarney, 2010).

For this reason, this thesis not separates culture from ideology and focuses how Islamic symbols get their meanings within the context of semiotic system interacting with the other layers of social life such as identity discourses; “political, economic, social, and ideological dynamics; consumer agency and resistance and the changing landscape of religion” (Suerdem, Jafari, 2012). Accordingly, symbols in the everyday practices are themselves grounded historical, political, social, and economic contexts (Karababa & Ger, 2011). Parallel to criticized subject, the turban was also seen as a symbol and was discussed in terms of the freedom to use of this symbol without considering the embedded ideology and power relations.

Accordingly, one of the objectives of this thesis is to present the idea that symbols are also a part of ideologic struggles. In this sense, culture and ideology cannot be separated which means that the separation of cultural “hegemonic struggles” from “class struggles” is one of the major causes of an incorrect interpretation of the rise of the reactionary modern middle class. Perceiving civic society as the “cultural” and state as the “ideological” and separating hegemony and domination, which are essentially intertwined, are a misinterpretation of Gramsci’s thoughts. While domination is evaluated as state, army, education system, or market, “that is, based on a prediction that domination was provided by a state monopoly”, civil society has been evaluated as a freer sphere. However, domination and hegemony are in fact intertwined. Gramsci does not separate class struggle from hegemonic struggle; like all Marxists, he analyses in terms of classes. Cultural hegemony struggle as a part of class struggle is shaped throughout everyday struggles over symbolic power, which is ultimately the power to define the subjectivities of the people. Contrary to political domination, which involves direct coercion mechanisms, cultural hegemony requires a discursive process to persuade the popular masses to the truth value of its statements (Gramsci, 1971). In that respect, domination may arise by creating false consciousness among the masses.

This means that manipulation may also take place in the cultural sphere. The discursive function, on the other hand, configures shared artefacts and cultural resources that reside in the popular imagination within a symbol system as a means of creating a common language for negotiating public issues (Süerdem, 2013).

Although ideologies basically reflect the interests of a dominant class, to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, they need to persuade a majority of the society for the universality of their claims. Since there is no pure left or pure right ideology (the political spectrum consists of a line or continuum from left to right with varying shades of opinion in between), social classes and ideologies have fractions and this fragmentation is one of the main factors in “class coalitions”. Progressiveness or reactionism are not related to being against domination, but, instead, they are about which cleavages in the society form coalitions and how the society is organized. Here, certainly, progressiveness means better and sustainable conditions in health, education, culture, and welfare, generally carrying the society further by developing it culturally rather than the concept that capitalism alone presents progressiveness within consumerist sign system

To summarize, the exclusion of ideologies and the fetishizing cultural identities missed out on the possibility that such movements may, in fact, have negative impacts on social progress and that these movements may be reactionary-populist and regressive (Laclau, 2005; Žižek, 2006). While cultural and social movements can be an element of social change, they do not always guarantee a “better life” than the status quo (Süerdem, 2013). Progressiveness should not be evaluated as adaptation to consumerist culture. In this thesis, for a progressive society, a “better life” is considered as the society’s access to better and sustainable conditions in health, education, culture, and welfare, and that the outcomes of social change should take the society further.

Based on the afore mentioned framework and in line with Bourdieu’s arguments suggesting that social life must be understood in terms of social constructs, group norms, individuals, and objective measures, this research is focused on class-based social life. This thesis also examines the class structure in Turkey by exploring the relationship between everyday life and cultural hegemonic

symbols without excluding ideology. Accordingly, during analysis, the focus was on how classes are ideologically positioned in the society, how their class boundaries are drawn in the social space, and how social changes have been affected by the politics of cultural hegemony.

2.2 MIDDLE-CLASS LIFESTYLES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ISLAMIZATION

2.2.1 Defining the Middle Class: “Populist Discourses and Ideologies”

The main objective of this research is to examine the overlap of middle-class lifestyles within the context of Islamization in Turkey. The middle class has been described as “the backbone of both the market economy and of democracy in most advanced societies” (Birdsall, 2000) and has also been associated with political stability and social cohesion (Barro, 1999).

The idea of a robust middle class being the engine of healthy and sustainable development is expressed by Barrington Moore’s (1966) well-known mantra, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.” This mantra has been the common coin of liberal social scientists with both left and right inclinations. For example, in a globalized world, the emergence and growth of a “middle class” in emerging countries has been recognized as an indicator of market potential, an instrument of economic growth, and a stimulus for competition and the quality of democracy (Cavusgil, Knight, & Riesenberger, 2012). Likewise, Huntington argues that complex societies generate middle classes that demand political pluralism. The progressive social position of the middle class was assumed to have resulted from their skill, knowledge, and experience of navigating the complexities of globalization (Berger, 1992). Although he rejects this position in his later work, Berger says the worldview of this class tends to be secular humanistic. Berger (1992), particularly pointed to the importance of the educated and working segment of the middle class that makes their living on knowledge production and emphasized the potential impact of this sector (which is usually middle and upper middle) on social change due to its virtual

control over the society's educational apparatus, technical expertise, mass media; its demographic concentration in urban areas; and its general affinities with the world view of modernity (Berger,1984).

However, these views usually overlook the authoritarian tendencies of middle classes, both in the past and the present. Despite the considerable weight of these views, there are many examples of the middle classes retreating from democratic processes or even actively supporting authoritarian rule under certain circumstances. Even today, it may be observed that today's rapidly spreading "authoritarian populist" leaders and forms of government behave as if they are above the law by claiming that they are taking their power from the people and that their practices can be supported by the middle class (i.e. "Trump,") (The Economist, August 2018).

The role of the middle class in economic development is certainly undeniable. However, the MC is perceived as providing welfare for people and, therefore, has also been perceived as a progressive class. It has been associated with welfare capitalism, modernization, and privatization of religion and secularization of the public sphere. However, a neoliberal economy does not necessarily lead the way to liberal values. Welfare capitalism has confused with ideological and institutional patterns. The MC has a fragmented structure and, as mentioned in the previous section, the kind of class coalitions and how these coalitions are mobilized play an important role in class-related analysis. Therefore, generalizations asserting that the middle class is progressive or democratic may be misleading.

In recent years, despite the prediction that modernization would lead to privatization of religion and secularization of the public sphere, religion has gained importance and a new visibility in the global political economy (Steger &Wilson, 2013). As mentioned above, the change in the religious landscape is linked to the growing influence of neoliberalism and the growth of consumerism. In social science, the strengthening relationship between religion, the economy, and politics has caused the rise of a critical approach to religion and has begun to emerge with marketing scholars (Izberk, 2012; Sandıkçı & Ger, 2010; Jafari & Süerdem, 2012). These studies focus on how religion interacts with marketing dynamics, shaping

and being shaped by consumption practices. Parallel to these, in this thesis, middle-class lifestyles within the context of rising Islamization and its interactions with other class factions are analyzed by a critical approach. In this section, the focus is on class mobilizations and social interactions of middle-class fractions based on the politics of cultural hegemony.

In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that different fractions of the middle class could be brought together around identity politics and common identities, emphasizing that the undermining of ideology may lead to insufficient explanations of social changes. Today, the rise in populism and the consequences of this rise have led to a questioning of ideas based only on culture and identity. In this thesis, populism is considered a discourse, and the fact that it is not an ideology is emphasized. There are contemporary efforts to assess populism as a discourse (Laclau, 2005; Hawkinks, 2003; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Although they have several differences in their perspectives, they have consensus on populism as a discourse.

An important insight provided by Laclau concerns that populism could be combined with socialism. Laclau, in his early work suggested that many of socialist revolutionary experiences were populist and they were using the same antagonistic discourse that facilitate their electoral success (Laclau, 1977). In other words, both right and left ideologies need populism to gathering different classes. According to Mouffe (2000,2013), the key characteristic of all populism, is the identification of a “people” who are distinguished from kind of adversary, a distinction that serves to unite and mobilize them. It means that populism has seen as an instrument of mobilization that can be adapted to the strategies of different political actors aiming to mobilize large mass of people who feel excluded. It means that populism has dimension of the action that is shaped by political discourse. Accordingly, in this thesis populism has taken as a form and pattern that both left and right ideologies need to use it to mobilize different classes.

Ideologies are characterized by class coalitions and, since they have cleavages, they may also take different forms. This means that the tone of progressiveness or reactionism may vary. Moreover, progressiveness or

reactionism can vary in different countries and contexts. Both fascism and social democracy is driven by the MC, so to speak. Undermining ideologies while considering populism a right-wing ideology has led to an incomplete analysis of social change and class struggles.

Again, the belief that no difference remains between right and left wings ideologies has lost its validity. However, the difference between right and left wings ideologies were reduced to identity politics. When we look at the process, we see that the masses were forced to choose among those who were not very different from each other in terms of economic policies (Mouff, 2000). According to Bell (1962), with advances in the modern welfare state, political differences between social classes increasingly diminish as technocracy prevails to manage political and social problems and the coordination of society to mobilize for social objectives is conducted through an administrative-technocratic hierarchy. Social issues have been problematized and solved by large organizations representing macro social categories in an instrumental manner. Such solutions to social issues differentiate only at the technical level. Regardless of their ideological positions, political parties start offering similar agendas. The “social state” becomes independent from politics while offering universal education, basic medical care, and social security for all citizens and in return they offered conformity, discipline, and respect for order. Social protection has provided by functional mechanism instead of welfare state and the institutional mechanism has started to maintain social cohesion while pushing ideological contestation out of politics. An accurate comprehension of this issue is critical; the conclusion, which claims that everything emanating from the state is positive, should be avoided or being individualist does not necessarily imply conservatism. People expressing themselves through consumerism may have been commodified by the state, and, similarly, state-supported education may also be exploited. In this thesis, progressiveness, is taken as the degree to which society is actively involved in the shaping of education, health polices, and the like needs to be considered; and how much society can benefit from such rights needs to be evaluated. The best indicator, in this sense, is whether a society has been depoliticized and disorganized or not.

In the framework described above, progressive and conservative policies, which were previously easily distinguished based on the left-right distinction, gave way to increasingly complex structures, and identity politics have become a main issue and class-based political ideology have been expensed. According to a widespread belief, the distinction between the left and the right, between progressives and conservatives in politics, is basically a difference between the relative weights that they give to equality and to freedom. The leftists or progressives would be those who give priority to equality, the conservatives or liberals would be those who put individual freedom first. The leftists also gave respect to the established institutional arrangements, redistribution, and regulation. For conservatives, freedom is prominent accordingly they thought that individual initiative and self-determination have priority and they give respect to the established forms of market economy and constitutional democracy that gives opportunity for less regulation and less redistribution. In other words, left and right also differ in their views on how the society will be kept together.

On the other hand, right wing ideologies put a special emphasis on traditional values, the family, and ethnicity in order to maintain social cohesion, and contrary to the left, they tend to favor limitations in the role of the state while at the same time accepting moral responsibility for social welfare. They do not totally reject the role of the state but, in fact, they favor state intervention to organize the morals of the society. Intervention by the state is required for keeping established traditions, respect for authority, and religious values in order to prevent the hazards of rapid social change. While they advocate a liberal and individualist stance on economic issues, they are against carrying this liberalism over to social, cultural, and political issues. Dornbusch (1991), criticizes this approach of the right wing in the economic and the social arenas by commenting that because of the way Latin America attaches importance only to growth and income, budget deficits and the risk of inflation increase. And, in this way, low market economic agents may become unable to invest. In other words, he argues that destructive reactions can be also seen in the form of populist policies.

If we consider the above-mentioned role of ideology in class struggles and discursive constructions, we may say that, if there are classes and politics, there will be a power struggle about how the society will be organized. In this sense, culture and ideology cannot be separated. However, in these processes where identity politics and cultural hegemony gained importance while ideology was underestimated, hegemony and domination were also discussed separately at times. This means that cultural “hegemonic struggles” and “class struggles” were separated from each other. Yet, such a distinction is one of the major causes of incorrectly interpreting the rise of the reactionary modern middle classes. Perceiving civic society as the “cultural”, and state as the “ideological” and separating hegemony and domination which are essentially intertwined are misinterpretation of this thoughts. While domination is considered emanating from the state, military, education system, or market, “that is, based on a prediction that domination was provided by a state monopoly,” civil society has been evaluated as a freer sphere. However, domination and hegemony are, in fact, intertwined. Gramsci doesn’t separate class struggle from hegemonic struggle; like all Marxists, he analyses in terms of classes. As mentioned previously, progressiveness or reactionism are not related to being against domination but are related about which cleavages of the society form coalitions and how the society is organized. For this reason, in class analysis, the discussion should include the ideological dimension, whether “class coalitions” and society can acquire constitutional rights, and individuals’ degree of participation in social policies, education and health—in other words, whether individuals have the power to shape their own lives. A society needs to be organized to have such a characteristic.

To summarize, culture and ideologies cannot be separated. And when cultural elements are used instead of ideologies, social mobilization can be possible through a discursive process. When social organization is weak, discursive structures become much stronger. Thus, the way in which society is organized and on which side of the cleavages these coalitions take place play a critical role. Of course, social order needs to be in favor of certain classes; however, how the cultural hegemony struggle, as a part of the class struggle, changes the everyday

struggle in terms of symbolic power and what kind of a subjectivity it creates needs to be focused as well. It should be noted that discursive constructions will become more prominent when the society is unorganized and depoliticized. Accordingly, middle class everyday struggle is analyzed in terms of discursive constructions and symbolic power relations as well.

2.3 A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE CLASS IN TURKEY: A HISTORY OF THE PRESENT

As mentioned above, the approaches, that emerged as a reaction to the reduction of culture to ideology, separated culture from ideology and began to treat culture as independent from ideology. These approaches are based on a prediction that domination is provided by state monopoly and civil society is evaluated as a freer sphere, hegemony and domination are separated, but which are, in fact, are inherently intertwined. If there are classes and politics, there will be a power struggle about how the society will be organized. In a sense, the failure to establish a healthy connection between culture and ideology has led to the dissemination of hegemony, not with dogmatic ideologies but through cultural freedom, in a discursive and symbolic way. The cultural hegemony struggle as a part of class struggle is shaped through everyday struggles over symbolic power.

Perceiving civic society as the “cultural” and state as the “ideological,” and separating hegemony and domination may cause may lead to incorrect and incomplete interpretation of today’s fragmented middle classes. Contrary to political domination which involves direct coercion mechanisms, cultural hegemony requires a discursive process to persuade the popular masses of the truth of its statements (Gramsci, 1971). In that respect, domination may arise by creating a false consciousness among the popular masses.

Class analysis that does not take the intertwining of domination and hegemony (in other words, that does not see cultural hegemony politics as a part of class struggle and domination is considered to be emanating from the state, military, education system, or market, “that is, based on a prediction that domination was

provided by a state monopoly,") is generally based on Şerif Mardin's center-periphery paradigm. The center-periphery model, which became an important paradigm in analyzing Turkish politics, started to attract attention, especially after the 1980 coup d'état. And after the second half of 1980's, this model attracted interest in parallel with conservative trends that had emerged in western Europe and the US that prioritized the releasing of the market from the bureaucratic control of the state and identifying market with civic society (Köker, 2008), and this model emphasized the importance of civil society and demanded the increase of its sphere. The concept, suggested by Şerif Mardin as a center-periphery model, was inspired by Edward Shils. However, Mardin made a remarkable contribution by adapting this conceptual framework to the institutions in the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey and their cultural differences and power struggles. According to this concept, "society has a center," There is a central zone in the structure of society that influences, in various ways, those who live within the ecological domain in which the society exists. Membership in the society, in more than the ecological sense of location in a bounded territory and of adaptation to an environment affected or made up by other persons located in the same territory, is constituted by relationship to this central zone (Shils, 1975). In other words, society is integrated around a center, and it is argued that society takes shape in terms of its relationship to this center. Shils' center-periphery analysis emphasizes the centrality and the autonomy of culture as well as the one-dimensional nature of power. This analysis, however, does not include the economic and ideological origins of power.

Shils, in parallel with Weberian approaches, gives bureaucracy and political elites an autonomous, privileged role in the process of social reproduction. However, with the term "center," Mardin means the autonomy of the state separate from the society and refers to the ruling elites who have power in the economy of the country (business and industry) as well as its cultural life and art scene, and, as for "periphery," he implies the groups that are passively trying to beware of the state law and regulations, who cannot be a part of the exercise of power, and who constantly provide resources for the center and they are actually the ones who are ruled. Starting from this point of view, the founding elites of the republic, the center,

and the other part of the society who cannot benefit from the same opportunities, namely the periphery, form the basis of much most of the social and class analysis in Turkey. According to Mardin, it is the cultural values that hold the periphery together, and he puts special emphasis on religious values in this respect. In his articles titled "Religion and Politics in Turkey," Mardin (1991), mainly notes that the military and the secular intellectuals are not able to fully grasp the profound meanings that underpin religious communities and sectarian differences. Mardin adopted Weber's culturalist approach as methodological guidance. We may observe that, notably Mardin and schools of modern thought, base the dilemma between "positivist-modernist-Westernist bureaucracy" and the "people" on cultural identity and limit their arguments to this element, thus drawing on the classical center-periphery paradigm as an alternative to Marxist method in socio-cultural analysis. The center-periphery paradigm, while distinguishing between domination and hegemony, also influenced different class analysis approaches that came thereafter. Mardin and Shields move with the idea of the development of a civil society and, in fact, as mentioned above, "individual freedom," which is the basis of right-wing ideology, is the main thought that underlies this approach.

Especially, after the coup of September 12, 1980, the growing emphasis on Atatürk, "Kemalist Thought System" voiced by the generals, and the perception that love for Atatürk has become synonymous with approving the dominant role of the military in Turkish politics had caused some reactions. In such an environment, researchers such as Serif Mardin, Nilufer Gole, Taha Parla and Levent Koker believed that the only way to be freed from military domination that suffocated the Turkish society and politics was to bulldoze through the assumptions that were presumed to be true (Aytürk,2015). These approaches, which also led the way to identity politics, in fact, partially missed historical integrity. Integral development model had been applied so far in Turkey from 1980 to 1950 (the integration model that aims to achieve progress also in education and culture), then this model was abandoned and "economic development model" was adopted (Akşin, 1997), Parla (1989, 1991 and 1992) and Köker (1990) showed with a different viewpoint how much the model applied until 1980 was Jacobean, top down, elitist and under

political tutelage (Ünal, 2000) and criticized heavily the established thought that early republic was a positive stage that had to be experienced on the path to democratic Turkey (Aytürk,2015).

Whereas these views, it is sure that for community development, culture and education need to be regulated to a certain extent by government. Arnould (1869) argued in “culture and Anarchy”, that state must have regulatory role in the name of freedom, and culture without it, public life must always be diverted towards the interests of one or other class. For sure regulatory role of the government must be limited the criticized subject here is to classify civic society as the “cultural” and the state as the “ideological,” thereby separating the inherently intertwined concepts of hegemony and domination and assumptions that are based on cultural freedom that will bring reconciliation in society. In this thesis, government has taken as an entity and underlines that domination and hegemony are intertwined. Social changes in cultural sphere will always result in favor of the more powerful established interests just like the economic area.

Assumptions that are based on cultural freedom that will bring reconciliation in society can be found in Göle’s book “The Forbidden Modern” (1996) that laid the foundations for a major debate by interpreting one of the greatest acquisitions of the early republic; the revolution of women achieving equal legal and political rights with men, in a different way. She argues that the equality of men does not mean the emancipation of women and that the real liberation requires a different understanding of modernization, and that it is not necessary to accept Western dress norms and that women who prefer wearing headscarves can be free and modern (Aytürk,2015).

Rifat Bali's (2002), “Tarz-ı Hayat” book has similarities with these arguments and very close to Mardin’s center-periphery dichotomy. In describing "New Elite", Bali discusses white-collars and managers, who are attracted to consumption and define their identity through it. Although, he tries to describe Turkey’s process leading to modernization and bourgeoisification by associating it with many factors, his definition takes into consideration the combined power of media, business world and government and he positions the middle-lower segment,

which he describes as “the periphery”, against them. In other words, he puts an oppressed lower class against the elites.

Different from Bali’s argument, this thesis underlines how elite class are fragmented and criticize workers in managerial positions instead of marked them as a “New Elite”. As detailed in the following section, although this thesis, likewise, criticizes the white collars in managerial positions because they began to define themselves through consumption, it underlines the fact that they are not organic intellectuals, as Gramsci explained. Thus, this thesis criticizes how the knowledge workers in managerial positions began to define themselves as upper-middle class and began to be resented, although they are workers, not owners, when their position is considered in terms of Marxian means of production. In other words, unlike Bali, white-collar people are not defined as “new elite” and they are criticized for not fulfilling their class role.

Again, we see that Ayşe Bugra’s assumption bases her class analysis on the military and civil society relationship or the “deep state” and “civil society” relationship. In her work, she refers to the state and the ones with economic power as the center. Keyder (2009) and Bugra (2014) focus on approaches that lay special emphasis on civil society. Bugra articulates TUSIAD members as an elite group, not only by virtue of their small number but also due to the geographical concentration and the large size of their enterprises. Keyder, on the other hand, examines the periphery, which articulates passively against bureaucracy. According to Keyder, when the bureaucracy attempts to control the transformation of social structure, it establishes an alliance with a bourgeoisie that it has “chosen” and “developed.” Keyder says, “The bourgeoisie is allowed to dominate certain fields of economy as long as it falls in line with the rules of the alliance that was established with the bureaucracy” who did not consider the state an area of struggle for power, gave it a role that is “supra-class” and even assumed that it is a force that “bring classes into line (Keyder, 2009). The influences of the center-periphery paradigm can also be observed behind the current government’s discourses such as “the transformation of the periphery via its move to the center”, “democratizing effect of the provincial bourgeoisie,” etc.

The weakness of these approaches is that they distinguish domination and hegemony, which are intrinsically intertwined, and leave out class struggle and ideology. Additionally, they can be criticized for not taking the conditions of the day into consideration and making analyses that exclude the specific position of the state in regulating social space in an unorganized society. The center-periphery paradigm, since it has generally been reduced to one dimension, remains an incomplete model for class analysis. In various models of class analysis, society is categorized in terms of “upper, middle and lower” layers based on Weber’s stratification while the Marxist approach, which lays special emphasis on economy and underlines class society and class conflict, speaks of “bourgeoisie, proletariat, and petty bourgeoisie.” Different from Weber’s social stratification, in Marx’ approach, politics, culture and ideology go hand in hand and constitute a more complex structure.

Analyses which are mostly based on a Weberian approach have paved the way for discussion comprising terms like “the issue of middle class,” “the urban middle class,” and “the new middle class.” These approaches, which allow discussion at a cultural level, are considered as incomplete in this thesis. Today, it is understood that cultural analyses based on identity politics with only postmodern eye are inadequate. So, this thesis argues that class analysis and understanding habits, life styles, and the changes that have occurred cannot be explained merely based on observations and considered a matter of sociology. Within this context, today, the middle class cannot be assumed to be a single, homogenous whole or thought to have a structure that consists of binary cultural oppositions such as pious-un-pious, oppressor-oppressed, Instead, in this thesis classes have been evaluated in terms of progressiveness and reactionism that includes both ideology and lifestyles values. Here progressiveness certainly means better and more sustainable conditions in health, education, culture, welfare, and that progressiveness must carry the society further. In this line of thought, the coalitions and mobilizations of these fragmented classes and the past existence of the middle class are given special attention, and the ways in which the consent of the people can be manipulated by discursive construction and symbols are shown.

As explained in the previous section, manipulations can take place in cultural area as well. The emphasis shifts from disruptive public confrontation with authorities to the challenging of dominant codes and creation of new meanings (Melucci, 1996); that is, the liberal economy, as claimed by some, does not provide equal sharing—*laissez faire*—in the cultural sphere. There are struggles of various groups, and what may seem a class coalition can, in fact, be a steering, manipulation of certain forces.

In particular, the progress of cultural industry has resulted in the monopolization of the cultural area. Discursive constructions and cultural hegemonic politics have started to gain importance. The discursive function configures shared artefacts and cultural resources that reside in the popular imagination within a symbol system as a means of creating a common language for negotiating public issues (Levi-Strauss, 1979). As mass media plays an important role in discursive construction in the modern world, deregulated media technologies may transform system-supportive tools into propaganda, relying on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship, functioning without overt coercion (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). So, not all who wants to own state power is progressive, and not all who are established are reactionary. This idea also includes the civil and social rights that have been acquired throughout the years. In other words, instead of merely addressing civil society and culture, adopting a perspective in which culture and ideology are intertwined, and including class struggles and discursive constructions can provide us with a wider perspective about social structure and progressiveness.

2.3.1 Background of the Class Structure in Turkey

Despite some efforts in this direction after the 1960 coup (such as establishment of trade unions and accepting such establishment as a constitutional right), we cannot talk about a strong, organized society in Turkey. The socio-economic developments in the 1960s led to the formation of newly organized worker groups and entrepreneurs. Later, however, the organizing in the society gave

place to a clientelist structuring, and we can say that, after the 1980's with the process of unorganized society, this clientelist order was established in cities, as well. As the state's regulatory role in economics diminished in the 1980's, its role in industrial relations has also changed. New neoliberal conditions led to a new approach which was based on an understanding that stressed "fewer regulations, less legislation and more flexibility, freedom in business life." The state tended towards establishing regulations that specified procedures rather than rules set out by law. In addition, the state made amendments to the trade unions and collective-labor bargaining laws that weakened the trade unions and narrowed the scope of collective-labor. The suspension of trade union activities, the prosecution of DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions) executives, the ban on strike, the shift of the wage setting process from collective agreements to YHK (High Board of Arbitration) can be given as examples to such practices (Borotav, 1997). Large-scale real and relative deteriorations occurred in civil servant salaries, retirement bonus, severance pay, and agricultural support.

Moreover, in Turkey, local solidarities functioned mostly through family ties, neighborhood relations, and similar relationships of regional origins; this has traditionally been a common practice in Turkey due to its underdeveloped social state structure. However, the social, economic, and political developments led to dissolution, re-shaping, and discursive construction of these ties. When rigid categories that define social supported by welfare state have left their place to nation state that allow to reconfigure social rights and citizenship both local and transnational levels, (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994) social categories and individuals are disengaged from collective actions. This social and political relations have forced social actors to engage in the process of -hegemonic construction (Laclau, 1990). Because struggle has been moved from "political" level to symbolic and identity levels (Kauffman, 1990; Weiner, 1982). As a matter of fact, agency is detached from larger social categories and individuals are disengaged from collective actions, sociality has started to be maintained by more local and immediate ties such as lifestyle, community, and identity (Featherstone,

2000). Consequently, individual competition increased, and collective action decreased, social disintegration has occurred.

Laclau and Mouffe's 'us-them' discourse (1985) suggests that 'us' can be constructed in different ways, and discursive constructions can be effective rather than the negotiations among the organized classes, and institutional organizations. These discursive constructions are the symbols or discourses that provide legitimacy, but they do not bear their determinate meaning, and they may serve bringing people together by providing standard perceptions. Something political can turn into "will" for these people that was brought together by symbolic and discursive constructs. The emergence of this situation always requires the definition of a 'them' who are held responsible for whatever problem may exist. This is not a descriptive operation, but rather the generation of meaning (Laclau, Mouffe, 1985). It means that discursive constructions become more prominent when the society is unorganized and depoliticized.

On the other hand, in 1980's the manipulative practices that targeted the lower classes, spread through media diffusion and they were especially aimed at the poor masses of the city. And large groups of people who lacked class consciousness and who would surrender to the programs and ideology of capital were created. (Boratav,1997). Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) encouraged owners with small capital in Anatolia by providing immunity from taxation and they tended towards industrial sectors that do not require big investments such as food, textile, furniture, and, most notably, construction. Also, in this period, a religious press and religious media outlets like radio and TV channels were allowed to open. The growing importance of the culture industry and the media, the privatization of the media, and the unregulated manipulative qualities of the media led to unauthentic, top-down directed cultural practices and began to change the shape of rituals. In Turkey, the middle class formed discursively, and new class coalitions and mobilization actualized. Within these developments, Islam played an integrative role and was used as a "common identity."

2.3.2. Turban as a Sign & Symbol and Its Relations to Class Struggles and Coalitions

Since the mid-80s, a new type of head-covering, commonly called the “turban,” has started to become popular, first among the students and then extending to the urban middle class and lower-class women. As a matter of fact, the assumption of the turban as a symbol, an integral part of the formation of Islamic fractions of the middle class, may help to analyze how these cultural rituals have started to dissolve, and how dominant symbolic codes and new meanings have been produced. In Turkey, the “başörtüsü” was a casual head cover worn by women. Traditionally, covering the hair by başörtüsü vary according to regional tastes in fabric, headscarf design, and tying styles. As such, it had different names based on the region or type of use, and the colors, motifs, lace designs, and stitching patterns were influenced by local traditions and often reflected the creator's style. In modern urban areas, women typically wore the “başörtüsü” to funerals and other religious services, regardless of their socioeconomic status. When it comes to rituals, the “başörtüsü” thus acted as an inclusive symbol that bonded women of every class and world view while. Totally different from “başörtüsü” in both style and use, the turban is a uniform way of totally covering the hair with a large headscarf wrapped around the neck and draped over the shoulders (Sandıkçı & Ger,2005).

The military coup in 1980 enforced a strict dress code banning the wearing of certain styles allegedly associated with certain ideologies in universities and public offices. Although these restrictions did not specifically target the turban, the hegemony of conservative values were endorsed by the military, Islamists used this as an opportunity to reclaim the turban as a symbol of repressed identity. Again, in the same period, turban became the main theme in political debates between President Kenan Evren and Prime Minister Turgut Özal and began to be increasingly politicized. Issues such as the right to wear turban in public institutions were frequently discussed and thus politicized. ANAP has adopted a stance in favour of the turban and added to the YÖK (Council of Higher Education) law a clause that allowed “Covering the neck and hair with head cover and turban due to

religious beliefs”. However, upon Evren’s appeal to the Constitutional Court, this article was canceled in 1989. With Turgut Özal replacing Kenan Evren as President, Turban began to be for political purposes and was politicized by Islamists thereafter.

In Turkey, women who wear new style of veiling, the turban, have created own symbolic boundaries between themselves and other groups. Through these symbolic boundaries, they distance themselves both from the traditional Islamic women who wear a “başörtüsü” in rural area and secular women. In countries with unmatured democracy and where bureaucracy is malfunctioning, informal traditional networks and clientelism becomes crucial parts of survival strategy. Supporters and members of traditional Islamic communities and religious orders (tarikats) which are consistent with the traditional identity, organizational structure and life style, may increase rapidly. In addition, the adoption of Turkish-Islamic synthesis politics by the state, lead to the politization of the differences in society and transformed to culture. Cultural hegemony arose in lifestyles. Religious groupings, which have crucial functions for cultural identity and economy, started to redefine themselves more in the realm of politics. It means that traditional Islam has been politicized to a large extent and traditional Islamist groups have been articulated to the political and social system. It will not be incorrect to say that turban has been transformed into cultural hegemonic symbol within this process. Turban was turned into a cultural matter because of political purposes and began to be a life style symbol, and the users of turban, the urban women, became a “status community”. And this covering style as an attractive consumption choice has started to serve as a means of gaining status (Lury, 1996; Ger & Sandıkçı, 2010).

According to Bourdieu (1984), following Weber, the distinction takes as its object the relation between social classes and status groups defined by a “uniformity of lifestyle”. Bourdieu stresses the role of symbolic systems and boundaries between classes. Accordingly, participants in Islamic consumption culture and the dynamics of fashion, aesthetic, and taste help to underlie this practice of head covering (the turban) and merged this new consumption with the increasing politicization of Islam and the polarization between secularists and Islamists

(Kılıçbay & Binark, 2002; Sandıkcı & Ger, 2001, 2002). This status community also engaged in consumption practices which reflect their acceptance of cultural norms and contributed to reproduction of existing relations of power.

Analyses that reduce class struggle merely to symbolic space and leave out the totality and the values represented by the symbols will certainly be incomplete. Symbols cannot stand alone—they are not isolated they gain meaning within the system. Approaches that are highly focused on identity and too much focus on the local culture sometimes overlooked embedded power relationships and ideology. Likewise, the turban was considered a symbol and was mostly discussed with respect to the freedom to use this symbol. In fact, turban was an ideological symbol but lost this characteristic after becoming hegemonic and became a sign of distinction. Therefore, like most "signs," Turban does not convey a single point, but rather, communicate a larger statement about the wearer. A "floating signifier" may convey different ideas for different people, and thus can be interpreted in any number of ways (Chandler, 1984). In Turkey After the 2000s, new ways of wearing/tying the turban appeared, which also points to a differentiation among women who wear the turban and became heterogenous. This differentiation may be considered to prove the correctness of how turban was ideological before and prove that cultural hegemony is mostly shaped through everyday struggles over symbols. Accordingly, while interpreting today's MC it is crucial to understand how sign systems design and construct reality, and how ideology and meanings are generated as a discursive process. Having derived the premises that semiotic construction is not an absolute imposition of a fixed meaning, this process is a discursive formation determined according to the level of political struggles and material circumstances.

In the literature, we can see that the class that uses the turban is sometimes referred to as the new elite (Gole, 1997) or the lower class (Izberk, 2012). In other words, there are different approaches to the turban and the class it represents. The turban is often attributed to the lower class and, based on the center-periphery paradigm, this segment of society has seen as a class that cannot benefit from the facilities of the center. In fact, the reason for such interpretations are the networks that were established between the owners of small-scale business production and

their employees after the 1980's. These owners, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, always existed in Turkey yet they didn't have a role in production, they were mainly land owners. After the economic liberalism, in Turkey, informal sector has expanded, state's cutbacks of the expenditures on social security has caused problems in social security system. Health, education, wage levels have fallen, and life standards have deteriorated. In the face of the increasing competition for employment and the decrease in life standards, have caused an increase of the number of informal cliental networks. And in this environment where the owners have just started bearing a role in production, loyalty of the lower segments who became the clients of these new actors, was demanded in return for protection. It means that between these owners and their workers there was a patrimonial protection instead of class contradiction.

2.3.3 Clientelist Organization of Social Structure in Turkey

The afore-mentioned owners of small-scale production have always existed in Turkey, and they were land owners who had capital. In some studies, this group of people with small capital was defined as a group that did not invest in productive areas and that, even if it did invest in such areas, it lacked a competitive edge (Buğra, 2014). This claim is based on the belief that a monopoly exists. According to this argument, the class, which cannot benefit from the opportunities, feels resentment and this is namely the conservative class. However, during the period between 1950-80s, when the right-wing parties DP (Democratic Party) and AP (Justice Party) were in power, there was a progress in industry and many infrastructures were established; it will not be wrong to say that the private sector and the capitalist class, a significant part of which consists of the industrialists, have emerged in this period. In other words, the big industrial corporations, which are considered to form the center together with the political power and leave out the others, gained strengthened during the rule of right-wing parties. And contrary to what is suggested, small capital groups called the Anatolian capital, grew under these big capital corporations. The relation of the big capital and Anatolian capital

were amalgamed. Anatolian capital acted as a subsidiary industry for large-scale companies, and they were intertwined in terms of both the dealership system and investment.

Before, this capital owners did not invest in productive areas, and they operate their capital based on rents, just like the owners called *Bezirgan* during the Ottoman times. They were also encouraged during the *Özal* period and transformed into companies that provided intermediate production materials by gravitating towards light and subsidiary industries. Contrary to the monopoly view that *Buğra* argues, companies grew rich under big capital; Anatolian capital and big capital companies were intertwined in terms of both the dealership system and investment. In this way, they were able to participate in the export business and, thanks to their networks, they could employ people without social security with the consent of those same employees.

The importance of the networks established by these small-capital enterprises stems from the fact that they were able to transmit state incentives and facilities to the lower class in this way. With charity activities such as providing gifts and rations on religious holidays, a bond was established between these business owners and their employees. The reason for the degeneration of the planned economy was non-tax paying economic classes that developed informally without any social security and which, in fact, comprised the basis of the regime. In this way, the lower classes were discursively mobilized by a patron-client relationship.

In this respect it may be observed that there seems to be no problem when the available resources are high, but, at times of crisis, friction occurs due to limited resources. *Özal*, when his party was in power, abandoned financial discipline to avoid losing votes and started right-wing populism; in this way, he formed a social base for his political power. *MUSIAD* (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association) was also established in the same period (1990) as an alternative to *TUSIAD* (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association) which was founded in 1971, *MUSIAD* claimed to defend a fair mechanism based on consumer benefits, one which is exempt from tax (*Gökarıksel & Secor, 2009*). The middle class was

heavily intertwined economically with unorganized groups in the society. So, it may be true to say that cultural bonds and social capital do not always come into being by themselves; they usually exist within the hierarchical structure, and this hierarchical structure influences the formation of class coalitions. However, these networks of vertical ties between the influential patrons and their poor clients formed the basis of the clientelist system which also existed for those who need assistance in finding jobs, getting medical help or food or access to municipal services.

While these networks were developing in this way, white-collar workers, on the other hand, started to define themselves through Western-style consumption and began to change culturally in terms of how they position themselves in the workplace, thereby creating a “class” of their own (cultural capital). In this process, culture, on the one hand, has been defined through consumerist symbols, and the main role of the intellectual, on the other hand, which is to track and transform culture as a reflection of the social, has started to lose its functions. These knowledge workers have adopted “The Model of Good Life”, has abandoned their social duties and/or disregarded their class consciousness as a worker. Members of this class may still be considered as workers when their position in production is considered; however, in terms of their consumption behaviors, they displayed middle class qualities. This seemingly conflicting social status has lessened the ability of an individual to perform his/her social functions and appear to evoke resentment from those who no longer had social security and worked in patron-client relationship.

Gramsci (1971) divides intellectualism and its functions into two types. One is composed of the traditional intellectual (teachers, lawyer, academicians, doctors, etc.) who also feels also a responsibility to society and government, and the other one is the organic intellectual (capitalist entrepreneurs, industrial technicians, specialists in political economy, organizers of a new culture or of a new legal system, etc.). Gramsci believed that organic intellectuals are actively involved in society; that is, they are in struggle to change minds and expand markets. According to Gramsci, today everyone who works in any field connected with the production

or distribution of knowledge is an intellectual "organic intellectuals" (Said, 1994). However, we can see that, in Turkey, most of them remain knowledge workers, and become intellectuals of the bourgeoisie class in their executive positions, even though they do not own the means of production, and they do not value labor rights such as union rights. So, instead of staying an organic intellectual, they become a member of the upper middle class although they belong to the working class. They have the potential for progressiveness, but, since they are intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, they lose these properties and begin to define themselves through consumerism.

However, In Turkey before the 80's, traditional intellectuals positioned themselves as the elite class and felt themselves responsible to society and the state. After the 80's, they were largely replaced by the knowledge workers, who are workers but can also be considered bourgeoisie due to their managerial roles (while they don't own the means of production, they sell knowledge); therefore, we may say that a duality exists in their position, and they defined themselves through Western consumption and are dissociated from the society (people exchange through cultural codes which are symbolic). This class has concentrated on consumption to acquire status and they have forgotten to act as a voice for the working class. This group of people, who found themselves within the realms of a lifestyle and consumption ability, have tried to define themselves as upper middle class through their consumption patterns although they were workers. Consumerism has become the agent for climbing up the status ladder. Accordingly, neo-liberal globalization has created resentment among the disempowered masses who were not able to benefit from the outcomes of this type of globalization, and they, in turn, placed great emphasis on the local and the religious, and boundaries were developed, both on the part of this class and on the part of the group who were basically leading the movement of resentment. Culture is defined through symbols, and the main role of the intellectual, which is to track and transform culture as a reflection of the social, has started to lose its functions. In other words, in the post-80's period, while the patron-client networks were formed on one hand, the knowledge workers who started to define themselves through consumerism

appeared on the other. With these mobilizations in the society, we can speak of a structure that does not fulfil the functions that Gramsci expects from organic intellectuals—a structure that cannot transform and direct the social.

Ideology that is pushed out of politics and the industrialization of politics in an unregulated cultural sphere, can offer vast opportunities for political entrepreneurs to organize identity politics in the form of political machines operating as informal holding companies. Since machine politics do not involve ideology, there are groups that gather around the bosses' populist discourse. Instead of ideology, machine politics are more interested in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing benefits to those who work for it than in political principles (Scott, 1969). Political machines usually rely on a coalition of grassroots patronage networks that comes together around a strong political boss who buys loyalty in return obtain incentives “money, jobs, social protection, tenders”. These group buy interest with the influence of opinion leaders, and, in fact, they are very likely to dissolve in case of conflict. In this context, the aim of identity politics is not to create democratic group subjectivities for organizing subaltern groups to defend their rights and interests but to mobilize them to capture state power on behalf of opportunistic political bosses. It is difficult for machine politics, which mostly works in municipalities, to function at the national level since it is not ideological. It must be combined with discursive constructions to spread nationally. The creation of a new reality by using symbols and the discursive construction of the truth may be considered a natural reality. Powerful bosses provide social mobilization through a discursive process rather than gaining the support of other classes naturally. These discourses sometimes include some groups, sometimes exclude, and help draw boundaries and interact with the masses. As a semiotically constructed communities, these networks operate as political machines covering a wide range of actors: businessmen, cliques in government offices, private security contractors, tribal groups, mercenaries, terrorist organizations, charity associations, NGOs, political parties, social movements, and the like (Süerdem, 2016).

In other words, social values and habits are outcomes of different processes, and the social structure is in continuous evolution. This goes beyond the view that

suggests that subcultural codes are alienated by high culture codes, and, for this reason, it is necessary to also analyze how these processes interact. The main criticism here is the way in which these movements are defined as operating in the realm of the cultural production of social relations, symbols, and identities rather than in the realm of economic production and the political redistribution of resources (Melucci, 1995). With cultural elements replacing ideology, social mobilization was possible through a discursive process rather than through the society persuading various segments to protect their own interests in the face of power. However, it appears that it may be misleading to explain classes in terms of working class and Islamic class or worker and capitalist when ideologies are taken into consideration. The working class is fragmented, just like the middle class. It may be observed that there is not a standard type of working class when ideological dimensions are considered, and even small business owners who establish networks differ among themselves. We also can see that social classes became more fluid after the 80's. As explained above, one can be a knowledge worker and belong to middle class and have access to high economic means but belong to a lower level in terms of lifestyle. Therefore, in this thesis, the concepts of an Islamist class and pious and un-pious classes are particularly avoided, and the LSs are analyzed through discursive and symbolic construction based on the fluid and fragmented structure of MC.

Accordingly, populist discourse always creates an us—they dichotomy; however, this also may vary according to class coalitions and us—they may take different forms. According to Laclau, “them” is constructed and all facts even a universal one is the result of the political struggle for hegemony (Laclau,2005). In Turkey, different class fractions were brought together by the AKP government by positioning Islam in the center, and discourses and symbols were built by deploying strategies that utilized the peripheries, thus constructing “them” in this way. With the democratization of consumerism after the 2000s, us-them began to be governed through consumerism. Together with globalization, these capital owners (who always existed, as described above) began to compete by bypassing the big capital. Again, in the same period, MUSIAD began to rise. After the rise of the AKP, the

lower class and these capital owners began to differentiate themselves. Also, an increased desire for consumption is noteworthy in this period. Wearing designer brands from head to toe, excessive logo usage, expensive suits, luxury jeeps, convertible cars, Swarovski studded parquets, high-tech gadgets, the latest models, overseas holidays, and shopping abroad, etc. began to differentiate this segment, both from the lower class and the people who are described as “seculars”. As the research also shows, this segment stood out the most and became the most criticized group in the among all layers of society. If we evaluate this kind of modernity and the use of technology in the context of consumption, this may imply the modernity of this segment, but we cannot talk about the existence of modernization in the sense of becoming organized and providing public’s basic needs. However, while evaluating whether a certain class is progressive and modern, other factors such as the level of cultural development, respect for other values, environmental awareness, democratic values, and social awareness towards the public need to be considered. Otherwise, merely consumerism-related change is rather artificial. Such fallacy largely stems from the tendency to overlook the interaction between ideology and culture.

In short, cultural hegemony is mostly shaped throughout everyday struggles over symbolic power. Those who can control the cultural sphere can influence people about their identities. Cultural space and everyday symbols have been utilized intensively in order to mobilize common identity. In fact, today, post-Islamist movements construct a largely Islamist transnational identity through the deployment of symbols within the cultural sphere in addition to their direct political activities for recruiting supporters. There is substantial research in consumer culture literature noting the massive re-Islamization of the consumption scape both in Muslim countries and western countries (Kilicbay & Binark, 2002; Gole, 2003; Sandıkçı & Ger, 2007; Gökarıksel & Secor, 2010; Yaqin, 2007). After discovering the power of lifestyle statements and brand symbolism, current governments may deploy these according their own political strategies. Within this sphere, these consumption practices may be linked to a whole system of culture Fashionable ways of covering, colorful turbans, different kinds of non-alcoholic gathering

places, the increase in the number of shisha places like Huqqa, Islamic-style vacations, phone applications, etc., all of these are reminiscent of Islamization through consumption rather than alternative modernity. The consumption patterns and the venues preferred by this segment may carry the danger of using marketing as an Islamization tool. A similar example can also be seen in conspicuous morality, for example, the increase in the number of people who go to Friday prayers, women who cover for show and for self-interest, daily usage of expressions such as “Be entrusted to Allah” (“Allaha emanet ol”), “Peace be upon you” (“selamın aleyküm”), “With god’s will), “Have a blessed Friday” (“Hayırlı cumalar”), etc.

Within the framework explained above, this thesis asserts that approaches which are merely status- or culture-based prove to be incomplete and also that class coalitions that are established around a common discourse like “Islam” instead of ideology are not natural either. While today the unifying discourse is “Islam,” another discourse can create a “common identity” for the same masses in the future. The reduction of the role of the state with the influence of neoliberalism has also prevented the forging of natural coalitions among classes while discursive construction has gained in importance. Since the paternalist system is based on voluntary obedience and the tendency to move as a group, it becomes easier for discursive construction in society. Therefore, it is of great importance to understand how these movements are organized; such an understanding can open the way to a better grasp of the structure of today’s middle class. When evaluating the social structure, whether it is progressive or reactionary is not related to how it is positioned in terms of civil society vs the state, but rather it is related to how it is organized according to its vision of reorganizing the society. Changes can happen for different reasons and should not always be assumed as progressive movements; the outcomes brought about by changes and the way the society is organized are the essential points to be considered. Social values and habits are outcomes of different processes, and the social structure is in continuous evolution. This goes beyond the view that suggests that subculture codes are alienated by high culture codes, and, for this reason, it is necessary to also analyze how these processes interact. Resistance to the dominant cultural hegemony does not always guarantee a more

progressive society. In fact, what needs to be understood as progress is the organizing of the masses to improve their social, political, economic, and cultural rights, and the increasing of social welfare in a sustainable manner.

Within this framework, the standpoint of this thesis is neither entirely structuralist nor based on a purely agency approach. While analyzing the middle class, data was explored by staying within the methodological rules, and a coherent structure was arrived at through regularities and patterns, and individual subjects/items were examined, thereby creating a holistic picture. In short, a hermeneutic process was followed that moved between the whole and its parts. During this process, the fact that every country has its own fractional class structure and that it is necessary to study them within their own constructs and struggles was taken into consideration, the fragmented structure of the middle class has been observed, and the heterogeneous nature of the middle class has been detailed with qualitative research.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FRAME

3.1.1. Why Konda Data Has Been Analyzed

When we examine the Konda 2008 research sample, it is seen that it was prepared based on the 2007 General Election Electoral Registers and election results. It has been selected by computer with the random method and TUIK 12 regions were selected as a region and at least one province was selected from 26 regions based on TUIK 26 sub-region distinction. When considered from this point of view, the raw data is very valuable to be able to represent Turkey. For this reason, the data were used in the re-analysis of Konda data and unlike original Konda research, MC is also analyzed in some breakdown and obtained patterns have been used for quantitative research.

2008 Konda research "Who we are / The Cultural, Economic and Social Life Styles" has been designed with the assumption that there are two most important concepts identity and multiculturalism are in the background of the discussions on the problem of development and modernization. This research was conducted with the motivation of discussing what it means to be multicultural in a country where nesting of different cultures like Turkey, how it might constitute a ground for ensuring societal peace and understanding and creating new initiatives.

Konda's 2008 lifestyle research based upon this framework is one of the most influential studies of its time, introducing categories such as "anxious moderns," "conservative moderns," and "polarization". These established categories have been perceived as sociological realities through the media diffusion. The starting point of the research presented in this thesis is the idea that these categories ("modern conservative" or "progressive conservative") may have some

contradictions within themselves when their everyday life practices are observed. Contrary to the original Konda research that has used top-down method, this research has used bottom-up process and has explored some inconsistency in assumed categories. Top-down established categories such as; (Individuality-Collectivism, Conservatism-Innovativeness, Authoritarianism-Democracy, Secular-Anti-secular, Conservative-Modern, Global-Local), were analyzed as transparently and bottom-up method was preferred. In fact, this path, which was followed in the original analysis of Konda, is not a wrong or unscientific way, bottom-up method has provided more opportunity to explore and reinterpret the data. This transparent approach helped to reveal new analysis model.

3.1.2. Exploring Data: Konda 2008


As mentioned above, the values from analyses of data exploration and reliability that conducted with the bottom-up method are explored under two headings as "values opinion and ideology" and "values of life styles". In this research, value opinion and ideology includes; individualistic or collectivist, tolerance, the approach to changes (this question group is considered as the conservatism / innovation axis in the original research, but it was seen that their reliability was not consistent as seen in the next section) globalism, authoritarianism/democracy, media, Kurds, diversity, secular, gender values are explored. In life style values; forms of clothing, shopping on the internet, evaluating their savings, eating out with family or friends, holiday preferences, sensitivity to the environment, going to sports, hanging out with friends in a coffee-shop etc. modern and conservative values of life-style are clustered and analyzed by factor analysis (see appendix for detailed analysis).

3.2. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS

3.2.1. Konda 2008 “Values Opinion” Analysis

3.2.1.1 Data Preparation, Descriptive and Internal Reliabilities

Figure 4.1. Value Opinion Bar Chart Example: “Change”



(For all bar charts see the appendix)

Descriptive and internal reliabilities analysis showed some differences compared to the original research (for all analysis see the Annex).

Before reaching final dimensions, first reliabilities were checked, and it has seen that some data were not fitting and at the end of the research, two main dimensions were found instead of the axes determined in the original analysis. In most axis like individualistic-collectivist, authoritarian-democratic, locality-global etc. was not fully correlated. For full analysis (see the appendix).

Below are some examples of reliability analysis. The data that is collected under the “individualistic-collectivist” axis; (the good of my family comes first, the good of neighbor comes first, the good of fellow citizen comes first, the good of my

country comes first, my own good comes first) the correlation is only seen between my own good comes first and my family good comes first.

Table 4.1. Example of Reliability Analysis-1

##	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	
## Family good	1	6481	1.93	0.26	2	2.00	0	1	2	1	-3.31	
## Neighbor good	2	6481	1.54	0.50	2	1.55	0	1	2	1	-0.15	
## Fellow citizen	3	6481	1.48	0.50	1	1.47	0	1	2	1	0.08	
## Country good	4	6481	1.81	0.39	2	1.89	0	1	2	1	-1.60	
## Own good	5	6481	1.45	0.50	1	1.44	0	1	2	1	0.19	
##		kurtosis	se									
## Family good		8.95	0.00									
## Neighbor good		-1.98	0.01									
## Fellow citizen		-1.99	0.01									
## Country good		0.55	0.00									
## Own good		-1.96	0.01									

Figure 4.2. Example of Reliability Analysis




Table 4.2. Example of Reliability Analysis-2

```

> descr(individualistic)
      vars   n mean   sd median trimmed mad min max range  skew kurtosis   se
Family_good 1 6481 1.93 0.26    2    2.00  0  1  2    1 -3.31    8.95 0.00
Neighb_good 2 6481 1.54 0.50    2    1.55  0  1  2    1 -0.15   -1.98 0.01
Fellowcountr 3 6481 1.48 0.50    1    1.47  0  1  2    1  0.08   -1.99 0.01
Country_good 4 6481 1.81 0.39    2    1.89  0  1  2    1 -1.60    0.55 0.00
Own_good     5 6481 1.45 0.50    1    1.44  0  1  2    1  0.19   -1.96 0.01

Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:
  5 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:
      1      2  logit
Family_good      0.0721 0.9279  2.5555
Neighb_good      0.4627 0.5373  0.1493
Fellowcountryman 0.5201 0.4799 -0.0806
Country_good     0.1881 0.8119  1.4625
Own_good         0.5471 0.4529 -0.1891

Frequencies of total scores:
  0 1 2 3 4 5
Freq 0 0 0 0 0 119

Cronbach's alpha:
              value
All Items      0.5206
Excluding Family_good 0.5004
Excluding Neighb_good 0.3152
Excluding Fellowcountryman 0.3236
Excluding Country_good 0.4596
Excluding Own_good 0.6330

Pairwise Associations:
  Item i Item j p.value
1      3      5    0.8
2      2      5    0.3
3      1      5  5e-04
4      4      5  1e-06
5      1      4 <2e-16
6      1      3 <2e-16
7      1      2 <2e-16
8      2      4 <2e-16
9      3      4 <2e-16
10     2      3 <2e-16

```

```

> descr(authoritarian)
##          vars      n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range skew
## democracy      1 6481 4.17 0.80      4    4.29 0.00  1  5     4 -1.33
## military        2 6481 3.08 1.31      3    3.11 1.48  1  5     4 -0.24
## party close     3 6481 3.18 1.28      4    3.22 1.48  1  5     4 -0.30
##          kurtosis  se
## democracy        2.92 0.01
## military         -1.18 0.02
## party close     -1.09 0.02

```

Again, when we look at authoritarianism, only a correlation can be seen between the party can be shut down and the troops can intervene. At the same time, the Cronbach alpha of this data, which determines the authoritarian axis, which is quite conjectural, is too low to be considered as authoritarian.

Figure 4.3. Reliability Analysis “Authoritarianism”




Table 4.3. Reliability Analysis “Authoritarianism”

```
## Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
## Sample:
## 3 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values
## Proportions for each level of response:
##           1      2      3      4      5
## democratic 0.0148 0.0265 0.0785 0.5292 0.3509
## military   0.1603 0.2046 0.1545 0.3512 0.1295
## party close 0.1353 0.1998 0.1640 0.3543 0.1466
## Frequencies of total scores: ##           3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15
## Freq 30 8 30 212 538 732 717 957 822 1257 536 273 369
## Cronbach's alpha:
##           value
## All Items      0.4617
## Excluding democracy 0.6569
## Excluding military 0.1049
## Excluding party 0.0070
## Pairwise Associations:
## Item i Item j p.value
## 1      1      3 <2e-16
## 2      1      2 <2e-16
## 3      2      3 <2e-16
```

As it can be seen in the analysis above, in correlations, party can be shut down and the troops can intervene appear together. For this reason, in re-analysis, these were separated, “tolerance”, “diversity” and “authoritarianism” were set a side and then explanatory class analysis was done (see the Appendix).

For example, someone who is in the opinion of "political party can be closed" should not say that my daughter or my son can marry from a person from a different religion or sects, but a total opposite situation is observed, they have high scores in terms of tolerance. The ones who say military may come in power, political parties can be shut down and Kurds are provoked by foreign countries are highly conjunctural. The Kurdish issue which appears under authoritarianism should be discussed separately as another point at issue. In order to be accepted as a dimension, it should be defined as an ideology space, and should not considered

conjecturally. It can be said that the original Konda research progresses over some assumptions, but it is observed that general judgments cannot be reached.

Table 4.4. Reliability Analysis “Globalization”

```
> descr(global)
      vars   n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range  skew kurtosis  se
Foreigns   1 6481 1.15 0.36     1   1.06  0  1  2     1  1.98    1.93 0.00
Buy properties
Econ_open  2 6481 1.72 0.45     2   1.77  0  1  2     1 -0.98   -1.04 0.01
to foreign
TK_envr    3 6481 1.80 0.40     2   1.87  0  1  2     1 -1.49    0.23 0.00
protection_actv
```

When we look at “globalization”, it is revealed that what is taken as “globalization” is a kind of economic liberalism. But, liberalism in the economic sense and liberalism in the cultural field are different. In this way, the axis that was mentioned as “modern / global” in Konda original analysis, has single dimension. If we check in detail, we see that there is a matter of progressivism faced to globalization. Even Konda research did not mention ideological dimensions, there are already there. Ideological dimensions here, have been limited to a one-dimensional ideology that has been reduced to globalism (Foreigners can buy property in Turkey, Economy can open to foreigners, Turkey must be in environment protection activities).

Figure 4.4. Reliability Analysis “Globalization”





Table 4.5. Globalization

Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set				
Sample:				
3 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values				
Proportions for each level of response:				
	1	2	logit	
Foreigns_buy_property	0.8520	0.1480	-1.7506	
Econ_open_foreign	0.2802	0.7198	0.9435	
TK_envr_protection_actv	0.2007	0.7993	1.3817	
Frequencies of total scores:				
	0	1	2	3
Freq	0	0	0	539
Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:				
	Included	Excluded		
Foreigns_buy_property	0.5545	0.1190		
Econ_open_foreign	0.7336	0.2271		
TK_envr_protection_actv	0.6353	0.1565		
Cronbach's alpha:				
		value		
All Items		0.2989		
Excluding Foreigns_buy_property		0.3090		
Excluding Econ_open_foreign		0.0697		
Excluding TK_envr_protection_actv		0.2413		
Pairwise Associations:				
Item i	Item j	p.value		
1	1	3	0.004	
2	1	2	<2e-16	
3	2	3	<2e-16	

3.2.1.2 Deep Exploration

Deep exploration provides different ways of seeing the structure in the data. This will inform Confirmatory factor analysis. With the deep exploratory analysis bottom-up constructs have been explored and for cross validity, k-means and clustering have been done alternatively.

Figure 4.5. Deep Exploration




Cluster analysis shows which value opinions are progressing with which ones. Accordingly, while the values such as "new product, new idea, new technology, innovations affect my life positively " go together, values such as "Judge can cover her head, girls in primary and secondary school can cover their heads, there must be role for religion in the primary education of the children, religion classes must be obligatory " go together.

"States should support different religions, abortion may be conducted, women can shake hands, Turkey should take an active role in environmental protection, the state should support the different ethnic groups, foreign governments are provoking the Kurds, military may come into power, a party can be closed down" are the values that accompany each other. Authoritarian values that Konda stated such as" Military can come to power, party can be closed down" go together with modern social values. In fact, it can be thought that this situation may have

arisen due to the perception of people holding modern and democratic values who think that regime is in danger because of the conjuncture. Because otherwise, people with authoritarian values should have lower social tolerance.

Figure 4.6. Cluster Analysis



Based on the cluster analysis, these groups are named as follows:

Liberal (LIB): Women can shake hands, abortion, tube-baby

Change (CH1): New product, new technology, new idea

Change (CH2): I support changes, changes make me positive

Tolerance (TLR): Groom/bride different ethnicity, Groom/Bride different sect
Groom/Bride different religion

Not Secular (NOT SEC): Judge can cover her head, Primary and middle school students can cover their head, religious law, religious classes must be obligatory, Religion must have role in kids' moral education

Diversity (DVR): Government must support ethnic groups, Government must support other religions

Global (GLB): Economy can be open to foreigners, Turkey must support environmental activities


Modern (MDRN): Woman can live with a man without civil or religious marriage, Religious marriage is a must for living together, civil marriage is a must, Women need to get permission from their husbands to work.

Media (MED): Newspapers give misinformation for their interest, newspapers are all the same

Kurds (KRD): Kurds want new government, Foreign countries provoke Kurds


Authoritarian (AUTH): Military may come into power, a party can be closed

Figure 4.7. Cluster Analysis-2



[1] 0.5409263

Figure 4.8. Cluster Analysis-3



"Change1", Change 2" and "Globalism" goes together. They are the ones that take modernity as a change and economic liberalism and the others are the ones that are liberal in a cultural way. In this cluster, tolerance and modernity go together.

Table 4.6. Principal Components Analysis

```
## Principal Components Analysis
## Call: principal(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  TC1  TC2  TC3  h2  u2  com
## MDRN    5  0.74          0.55 0.45 1.1
## NOTSEC  11 -0.73          0.57 0.43 1.2
## TLR     4  0.62  0.31     0.51 0.49 1.6
## LIB     6  0.61          0.33 0.55 0.45 1.7
## CH2     2          0.64     0.40 0.60 1.0
## GLB     3          0.62     0.42 0.58 1.2
## CH1     1          0.59     0.43 0.57 1.3
## DVR     7          0.53     0.36 0.64 1.6
## KRD     8          0.70 0.50 0.50 1.1
## AUTH    9          0.66 0.48 0.52 1.2
## MED    10          0.40 0.21 0.79 1.4
```

```

##                TC1  TC2  TC3
## SS loadings      1.97 1.66 1.35
## Proportion Var   0.18 0.15 0.12
## Cumulative Var   0.18 0.33 0.45
## Proportion Explained 0.40 0.33 0.27
## Cumulative Proportion 0.40 0.73 1.00
## with component correlations of
##      TC1  TC2  TC3
## TC1 1.00 0.05 0.04
## TC2 0.05 1.00 0.09
## TC3 0.04 0.09 1.00
##
## Mean item complexity = 1.3
## Test of the hypothesis that 3 components are sufficient.
##
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.11
## with the empirical chi square 8233.02 with prob < 0
##
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.44

```

Figure 4.09. Component Analysis




Table 4.7. Component Analysis

```
## Factor Analysis using method = minres
## Call: fa(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  MR1  MR2  MR3   h2  u2 com
## NOTSEC  11 -0.63          0.413 0.59 1.1
## MDRN    5  0.63          0.385 0.62 1.0
## TLR     4  0.48          0.325 0.68 1.8
## LIB     6  0.48          0.419 0.58 2.0
## CH1     1          0.45    0.258 0.74 1.3
## GLB     3          0.44    0.219 0.78 1.3
## CH2     2          0.44    0.183 0.82 1.0
## DVR     7          0.35    0.137 0.86 1.4
## AUTH    9          0.43 0.209 0.79 1.1
## KR      8          0.41 0.176 0.82 1.2
## MED    10          0.063 0.94 1.9
##
##
##              MR1  MR2  MR3
## SS loadings    1.33 0.89 0.56
## Proportion Var    0.12 0.08 0.05
## Cumulative Var    0.12 0.20 0.25
## Proportion Explained 0.48 0.32 0.20
## Cumulative Proportion 0.48 0.80 1.00
##
## with factor correlations of
##      MR1  MR2  MR3
## MR1 1.00 0.09 0.12
## MR2 0.09 1.00 0.21
## MR3 0.12 0.21 1.00
## Mean item complexity = 1.4
## Test of the hypothesis that 3 factors are sufficient.
##
## The degrees of freedom for the null model are 55 and the objective function was
0.95 with Chi Square of 6149.89
## The degrees of freedom for the model are 25 and the objective function was 0.05
##
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.02
## The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is 0.03
## The harmonic number of observations is 6481 with the empirical chi square 375.
64 with prob < 2.9e-64
## The total number of observations was 6481 with Likelihood Chi Square = 327.8
8 with prob < 1.5e-54
```

```

## Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 0.891
## RMSEA index = 0.043 and the 90 % confidence intervals are 0.039 0.047
## BIC = 108.46
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.97
## Measures of factor score adequacy
##
## Correlation of (regression) scores with factors
## Multiple R square of scores with factors
## Minimum correlation of possible factor scores

```

	MR1	MR2	MR3
Correlation of (regression) scores with factors	0.83	0.74	0.66
Multiple R square of scores with factors	0.68	0.54	0.44
Minimum correlation of possible factor scores	0.37	0.09	-0.13

3.2.1.3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Factor analysis was done with patterns that were obtained from cluster analysis and cross validity.

Table 4.8. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Latent Variables:	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)
secular =~				
N_frm1_rlgsmrr	1.000			
Relgs_mrrg_mst	1.574	0.066	23.797	0.000
wmn_ndprmt_twr	1.692	0.077	21.888	0.000
women_shak_hnd	1.464	0.070	20.945	0.000
Abortion	1.630	0.078	20.795	0.000
Tubebaby	0.732	0.053	13.773	0.000
GroomBrid_thnc	1.300	0.077	16.881	0.000
GroomBride_sct	1.502	0.081	18.633	0.000
GroomBrid_rlgn	1.770	0.082	21.647	0.000
Judge_coverhed	-1.962	0.090	-21.807	0.000
Prmry_mddl_sc_	-1.562	0.078	-20.146	0.000
Rlg_lssn_blgtr	-1.738	0.081	-21.340	0.000
Kds_mrl_d_rlgn	-1.517	0.069	-22.048	0.000
global =~				
Econ_open_frgn	1.000			
Newproduct	2.964	0.206	14.383	0.000
Newidea	2.971	0.206	14.443	0.000
Newtech	3.302	0.225	14.683	0.000
Supprt_chg	1.509	0.185	8.141	0.000
Chg_makem_pstv	1.566	0.129	12.165	0.000
National =~				
Krds_wnt_nwgvn	1.000			
Frgnc_prvk_Krd	0.969	0.112	8.662	0.000
Military	1.226	0.195	6.299	0.000
Party_closed	2.667	0.336	7.939	0.000
Newsp_misinfrm	1.198	0.161	7.440	0.000

```
> fit.indices <- c("chisq", "df", "cfi", "rmsea", "tli", "bic")
> round(fitMeasures(fit, fit.indices), 2)
```

chisq	df	cfi	rmsea	tli	bic
2187.86	219.00	0.94	0.04	0.92	167996.46

The comparative fit index (CFI) is in acceptable range “90-95%”. The discrepancy between the data and the hypothesized model have been examined and it has seen that the model is fitting. The purpose here is to move based on the obtained patterns without imposing of any kind. And to this end, multiple methods were used, and a model was developed by comparing and confirming.


Even though, the ideological dimension is not directly analyzed in the original Konda research (there are no items measuring left-right ideology dimension; social state and the approach to democracy in social space are not directly queried), items concerning cosmopolitanism are implicitly assumed as a dimension of progressiveness dimension. However, this analysis revealed that this might not be the case. Unlike Konda research, two different dimensions emerged in this analysis. One of them is “cultural liberalism” and the other is “cultural conservatism”. Distinctions of Konda research, such as “authoritarian” and “democratic”, have not emerged as dimensions in this analysis. Therefore, Bourdieu’s statistical technique “Multiple Correspondence Analysis” has been used instead of unidimensional analysis.

3.2.1.4. Social Class Mapping

Main challenge in this analysis is the identification of the house holder’s occupation. House holder's job, and its occupation has been matched. Then, to determine if the position of the respondent, again householder’s occupation with position has been crossed. Then it has been crossed with income level (below or above median). Finally, it has crossed with education capital (mother’s education, father’s education and self * 1.3); This has provided finer defined class categorization. The reason for this approach is that the level of consciousness is important besides the class positions. This is approached in such a way because it


is important to have a high level of education in order to have a high level of awareness. 1 is used for "low education" while 2 is used for "high education" in the following map next to occupations.

Figure 4.10. Social Class Mapping (Globalism-Secularism-1)




There are two different axes in the map. One is globalism and the other is secularism. According to this, people who are less secular and have more global values are the managers with low level of education, professionals, unemployed and farmers with high education capital. And the ones with both high global values and more secular are civil servants, business owners, retirees and unemployed with high education capital. The people with high secularism and low global values are professionals with high education capital, students with low education capital. And the ones with both low global and low secular values are housewives with low education capital, farmers and lower class, students. It is seen that there is a positive correlation between secularism and education capital. It needs to be pointed out that the questions determining globalism concentrate more on economic liberalism (Economy can be open to foreign, Turkey must support environmental activities).

Figure 4.11. Social Class Mapping (Globalism and Uncertainty)-2



The axes in this map are globalism and uncertainty. The ones with high global value and who think that there is an uncertainty are civil servants with high education capital, retirees and professionals.

Figure 4.12. Social Class Mapping (Uncertainty and Secularism)-3




Uncertainty increases concurrently with the secular values. When secularism is high, nationalism is increasing as well.

3.2.2. Life Styles 2008 Analysis

In life-style values, from bar-charts, we can see a polarization in most issues, disagree and agree are bi-modal, make two peaks. Hence, it has decided to recode into binary values

Figure 4.13. Life Style Values Bar-Chart




(*For all bar-chart and reliability analysis see the Appendix)

3.2.2.1. Deep Exploration

The classical representation of a binary tree generated by a hierarchical clustering is a node-link-based visualization denoted as a dendrogram and it allowed to explore in a simple way the clusters and the relationships between instances (for k-means and factor analysis see appendix).

Figure 4.14. Cluster Dendrogram





As seen above they are two main clusters that are divided to small clusters.

Table 4.9. Cluster Size

##	cluster	size	ave.sil.width
## 1	1	29	0.09
## 2	2	14	0.05

Figure 4.15. Cluster Pilots (Lifestyles)



[1] 0.7367165

Each cluster is grouped and named as follows and the optimum model is applied.

Activity (AKT) = Listens to music, Goes to Gym, Fashionable dressing

High technology (HITECH) = Follow the news from the internet, Banking transaction online, Food shopping online , Follows technologic products, Buys technologic products

Out=Goes to restaurant with family, Goes to resaurant with friends, Goes to cultural activities, Goes sea or mountain holiday

Engage (ENG)= Active in politics, Active in enviromental organisations, Participate in NGOor publicdemonstration

Religious (REL) = Performs prayer regularly, Fasts regularly, Goes to Friday prayer

Patriarchal (PAT) = Woman does clothes shooping, Foods shopping from bazaar, Clothes shooping from dstrictbazaar, Man gives the buying decision for car, Man give the buyingdecision for whitegoods

Low Technology(LOTECH)= Man goes to coffeeshouse, Goes to hometown for holiday, Watches news on TV, Makes the banking transactions in banks

Matured (MATR) = Man does foodshopping, Man cooks in a house

Modern (MDRN) = Makes makeup, Wears swimsuit, Wears armless t-shirt, Celebrates newyear


Saving (SAV) = Invests in real-estate, Invest in interestfree trust companies

Big stores (BIGST) = Clothes from big, shopingmall, Foods from big shoppingmall

Table 4.10. Cluster Size (Lifestyle)

##	cluster	size	ave.sil.width
## 1	1	8	0.15
## 2	2	3	0.10

Figure 4.16. Cluster Pilot (Lifestyles)-2



Two main clusters were observed. When Cluster Plot was examined, it was seen that “Low Technology” and “Patriarchal” values go hand in hand, “High-Technology”, that is internet usage in daily life, and activities like listening to music, doing sports and dressing fashionable move in parallel. Investments, such as investing in real estate, have appeared with being politically active.

Table 4.11. Principal Components Analysis

```
## Principal Components Analysis
## Call: principal(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  TC1  TC3  TC4  TC2  h2  u2 com
## BIGST    8  0.78                0.55 0.45 1.2
## OUT      3  0.72                0.66 0.34 1.2
## HITECH   2  0.69                0.55 0.45 1.1
## AKT      1  0.58                0.49 0.51 1.4
## REL      5      -0.81                0.70 0.30 1.1
## MDRN    10  0.43  0.58                0.64 0.36 1.9
## ENG      4                0.76                0.58 0.42 1.0
## SAV     11      -0.37  0.66                0.59 0.41 1.7
## NEWS     9                0.46  0.47                0.45 0.55 2.0
```

```

## PAT      6      0.78 0.61 0.39 1.0
## LOTECH   7      0.75 0.58 0.42 1.0
##
##          TC1  TC3  TC4  TC2
## SS loadings      2.29 1.53 1.37 1.24
## Proportion Var   0.21 0.14 0.12 0.11
## Cumulative Var   0.21 0.35 0.47 0.58
## Proportion Explained 0.36 0.24 0.21 0.19
## Cumulative Proportion 0.36 0.59 0.81 1.00
##
## With component correlations of
##          TC1  TC3  TC4  TC2
## TC1  1.00  0.25  0.26 -0.03
## TC3  0.25  1.00  0.04 -0.08
## TC4  0.26  0.04  1.00  0.16
## TC2 -0.03 -0.08  0.16  1.00
##
## Mean item complexity = 1.3
## Test of the hypothesis that 4 components are sufficient.
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.1
## with the empirical chi square 3542.74 with prob < 0
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.77

```

Figure 4.17. Components Analysis (Lifestyle)




Table 4.12. Factor Analysis (Lifestyle)

```

## Factor Analysis using method = minres
## Call: fa(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  MR1  MR2  MR3  MR4  h2    u2 com
## OUT      3  0.80                0.616 0.3838 1.0
## HITECH   2  0.63                0.429 0.5713 1.1
## AKT      1  0.53                0.372 0.6282 1.1
## BIGST    8  0.52                0.230 0.7697 1.0
## MDRN    10  0.48          -0.36    0.490 0.5098 1.9
## NEWS     9                0.146 0.8545 2.2
## LOTECH   7          1.00                0.995 0.0046 1.0
## REL      5                0.88    0.771 0.2290 1.0
## ENG      4                0.61 0.380 0.6199 1.0
## SAV     11                0.151 0.8486 2.3
## PAT      6                0.091 0.9087 3.5
##
##
##              MR1  MR2  MR3  MR4
## SS loadings      2.00 1.06 1.02 0.60
## Proportion Var    0.18 0.10 0.09 0.05
## Cumulative Var    0.18 0.28 0.37 0.42
## Proportion Explained 0.43 0.23 0.22 0.13
## Cumulative Proportion 0.43 0.65 0.87 1.00
##
## With factor correlations of
##      MR1  MR2  MR3  MR4
## MR1  1.00 0.04 -0.36 0.42
## MR2  0.04 1.00 0.14 0.17
## MR3 -0.36 0.14 1.00 -0.01
## MR4  0.42 0.17 -0.01 1.00
##
## Mean item complexity = 1.6
## Test of the hypothesis that 4 factors are sufficient.
##
## The degrees of freedom for the null model are 55 and the objective function was
as 1.79 with Chi Square of 5229.64
## The degrees of freedom for the model are 17 and the objective function was 0.02
##
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.01
## The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is 0.02
##

```

```

## The harmonic number of observations is 2932 with the empirical chi square 50.91 with prob < 3.1e-05

## The total number of observations was 2932 with Likelihood Chi Square = 70.17 with prob < 2e-08

##

## Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 0.967

## RMSEA index = 0.033 and the 90 % confidence intervals are 0.025 0.041

## BIC = -65.55

## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 1


## Measures of factor score adequacy

##
## Correlation of (regression) scores with factors
## Multiple R square of scores with factors
## Minimum correlation of possible factor scores

```

	MR1	MR2	MR3	MR4
Correlation of (regression) scores with factors	0.89	1.00	0.89	0.72
Multiple R square of scores with factors	0.80	1.00	0.80	0.51
Minimum correlation of possible factor scores	0.60	0.99	0.59	0.02

Figure 4.18. Factor Analysis (Lifestyle)-2



(For details see Annexes)

3.2.2.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Table 4.13. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

```

## Latent Variables:
##           Estimate Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)
##   aktif =~
##     Listens_music      1.000
##     Goes_Gym           0.955    0.058   16.383    0.000
##     Fashinabledressup 0.814    0.049   16.661    0.000
##   hitech =~
##     Follownewsonnet    1.000
##     Banking_net        0.564    0.033   16.842    0.000
##     Food_shopping_Net  0.138    0.018    7.743    0.000
##     Follow_tech_products 1.501    0.075   20.140    0.000
##     Buy_tech_procut    0.670    0.039   17.319    0.000
##   out =~ Restaurant_withfamily 0.7689  0.5833
0.7954  0.5978
0.7542  0.5529
##     Restaurant_withfamily 1.000
##     Resaurant_withfriends 1.205    0.038   32.003    0.000
##     Cultural_activity    1.165    0.042   27.582    0.000
##     Holiday_sea_mountain 0.953    0.043   21.988    0.000
##   engage =~
##     Active_inpolitics    1.000
##     Active_enviroment    1.075    0.047   22.674    0.000
##     NGO_publicdemonst.  1.028    0.044   23.155    0.000
##   relig =~
##     Performprayer_regular 1.000
##     Fasting_regularly    1.199    0.054   22.237    0.000
##     Fridayprayer        1.404    0.062   22.517    0.000
##   patr =~
##     Woman_shopping_clothes 1.000
##     Foods_shopping_bazaar 1.691    0.268    6.312    0.000
##     Clothes_dstrictbazaar 2.128    0.321    6.629    0.000
##     Man_buyingdecision_  1.485    0.240    6.180    0.000
##     Man_buyingdecision_wgoods 1.494    0.228    6.563    0.000
##   lotech =~
##     Man_coffeehouse      1.000

```


```

##      Holiday_hometown  0.990   0.131   7.545   0.000
##      News_from_TV     0.614   0.099   6.219   0.000
##      Banking_banks    0.772   0.113   6.841   0.000
##      matr =~
##      Man_foodshopping  1.000
##      Man_cooks         1.281   0.176   7.291   0.000
##      modern =~
##      Makeup            1.000
##      Swimsuit          1.154   0.026  44.215   0.000
##      Armless_tshirt    1.102   0.027  41.545   0.000
##      Celebrate_newyear 0.856   0.028  30.435   0.000
##      saving =~
##      Investing_realestate          1.000
##      Investing_interestfreetrustco 0.769   0.073  10.498   0.000
##      chisq      df      cfi      rmsea      tli      bic
##      2497.04   508.00   0.90   0.04   0.88 90830.63

```


3.2.2.3. Social Class Mapping

Figure 4.19. Social Class Mapping (Life-Style 2008)



Life style values have been mapped on occupation and education capital. Based on this, the ones who are religious and patriarchial values are the shop owners with low education capital and the retirees. The shop owners with high education capital are more closer to modern values. And the ones with modern lifestyle values are high level managers and business owners with high education capital, professionals and students. There are differences between retirees with high education capital and low education capital in terms of their lifestyle values. Patriarchial and religious values occur less in workers with high education capital. Again, the ones who are modern, socially active and go out, are the high level managers and business owners with high education capital. And it is observed that, managers and business owners with low education capital are backward compared to high education capital owners in terms of using internet in daily life. Also, they tend to differ by going to coffeshops in their daily life, going to their hometowns for holidays, following the news from TV and doing their bank transactions in the bank branches but they invest in real estate and in interestfree trust companies.

Figure 4.20. Social Class Mapping (Turban Usage)




3.2.3. Konda 2015 “Value Opinion and Ideology”

2015 Konda research differ from 2008 Konda research in terms of focusing more on lifestyle values. However, it covers similar questions regarding social tolerance, modernism and conservatism as well. This parallelism is given attention especially in value opinion and ideology analysis. Since lifestyle questions are wider in scope, more patterns were obtained for qualitative research.

3.2.3.1. Data Exploration and Internal Reliability

For data preparation and exploration and descriptive and internal reliability (see appendix).

Figure 4.22. Deep Exploration (Value Opinion and Ideology)



[1] 0.8381278

Figure 4.23. Cluster Dendrogram (Value Opinion and Ideology)




Table 4.14. Cluster Size (Value Opinion and Ideology)

##	cluster	size	ave.sil.width
## 1	1	5	0.12
## 2	2	4	0.07
## 3	3	5	0.16
## 4	4	3	0.06

Figure 4.24. Cluster Plot (Value Opinion and Ideology)





Table 4.15. Principal Components Analysis (Value Opinion and Ideology)

```

## Principal Components Analysis
## Call: principal(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  TC1  TC2  TC3  h2  u2 com
## TOL      4  0.88          0.81 0.186 1.1
## NOSEC     1 -0.75          0.76 0.245 1.5
## LFT       2          0.97          0.94 0.060 1.0
## GEND      3          0.99 0.97 0.033 1.0
##
##              TC1  TC2  TC3
## SS loadings          1.35 1.06 1.07
## Proportion Var          0.34 0.27 0.27
## Cumulative Var          0.34 0.60 0.87
## Proportion Explained  0.39 0.31 0.31
## Cumulative Proportion 0.39 0.69 1.00
## With component correlations of
##      TC1  TC2  TC3
## TC1  1.00 0.12 -0.29
## TC2  0.12 1.00  0.11
## TC3 -0.29 0.11  1.00
## Mean item complexity = 1.2
## Test of the hypothesis that 3 components are sufficient.
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.12
## with the empirical chi square 911.33 with prob < NA
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.77

```

Figure 4.25. Component Analysis (Value Opinion and Ideology)



None-Secular (NONSEC): To believe in Allah dominate lifestyle, Religion must play a role in Kids' moral education, Religious marriage must be done, Intimacy must be banned on TV

LEFT: Nuclear power station should be built, Courts judge people according they are rich or poor, Courts support companies against consumer, People must struggle for equality

Tolerance (TOL): My daughter or my son can marry someone who is from other religion, Daughter or son can marry someone who has different ethnicity, can marry someone who has different sexual choice, Abortion, Plastic surgery is normal

Gender (GEND): A man can both love and beat. Woman's earning more than man would create problems. Woman must get her husband's permission in order to work

3.2.3.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Table 4.16. Factor Analysis (Value Opinion and Ideology)

```

## Factor Analysis using method = minres
## Call: fa(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  MR1  MR2  MR3  h2  u2 com
## NOSEC   1  0.67                0.55 0.45 1.1
## GEND    3  0.61                0.30 0.70 1.1
## LFT     2          0.58        0.32 0.68 1.2
## TOL     4          0.49        0.51 0.49 1.9
##
##                MR1  MR2  MR3
## SS loadings      0.93 0.60 0.13
## Proportion Var    0.23 0.15 0.03
## Cumulative Var    0.23 0.38 0.42
## Proportion Explained 0.56 0.36 0.08
## Cumulative Proportion 0.56 0.92 1.00
## With factor correlations of
##      MR1  MR2  MR3
## MR1  1.00 -0.22 -0.53
## MR2 -0.22  1.00  0.28
## MR3 -0.53  0.28  1.00
## Mean item complexity = 1.3
## Test of the hypothesis that 3 factors are sufficient.
## The degrees of freedom for the null model are 6 and the objective function was
s 0.39 with Chi Square of 2016.99
## The degrees of freedom for the model are -3 and the objective function was 0
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0
## The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is NA
## The harmonic number of observations is 5222 with the empirical chi square 0
with prob < NA
## The total number of observations was 5222 with Likelihood Chi Square = 0 wi
th prob < NA
## Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 1.003
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 1
## Measures of factor score adequacy
##
##                MR1  MR2  MR3
## Correlation of (regression) scores with factors 0.81 0.72 0.59
## Multiple R square of scores with factors        0.65 0.51 0.34
## Minimum correlation of possible factor scores    0.31 0.03 -0.31

```

Figure 4.26. Factor Analysis (Value Opinion and Ideology)




Table 4.17. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Value Opinion and Ideology)


##	chisq	df	cfi*	rmsea	tli	bic
##	1148.71	82.00	0.94	0.05	0.92	236144.31

* Cfi “Comparative fit index” is in acceptable limit. It means that data fits the hypothesis.

3.2.3.3. Social Class Mapping

Householder’s job and occupation have been matched. Then, to determine if the position of the respondent again householder’s occupation with position have been crossed. Then we cross with income level (below or above median) for taking Middle Class. Finally, we cross with education capital (mother, father and self *1.3); this provided a finer defined class categorization.

Figure 4.27. Social Class Mapping (Value Opinion and Ideology)




Again, in the social class map “value opinion and ideology” of 2015, it may say that conservatism has grown in linear terms. While professionals, students, retirees, managers, business owners and civil servants with high education capital are closer to left-wing ideology and they don’t have conservative values. Housewives, employees, shop owners and farmers with low education capital move towards high conservative axis and different tones of conservatism observed. MC housewives, workers, lower income student, although they are close to left wing ideology, they have also some conservative values but compared to who have low capital education their conservative values are very low.

3.2.4. Konda 2015 “Life-Style” Analysis

For data preparation and exploration and descriptive and internal reliabilities (see appendix).

3.2.4.1. Deep Exploration

Figure 4.28. Deep Exploration (2015 Life Style)



[1] 0.7437111

Kokos (Fancy)

Follow latest fashion, latest model mobile phone is important, want to be realized in crowded place, does not care to pay to perfume, thinks that brand makes him/her different, reward herself without necessity, entourage's likes are important for buying decision, luxury goods are qualitative, impressed comments on net, car brand gives idea about the driver.

Culture

Listens to radio, reads a book, can play music instrument and/or interest in art, reads newspaper everyday

Yuppie

Goes abroad for business, goes abroad, drinks alcohol at home, goes out at night, goes beach vacation in religious holiday

High Tech

Boycott some brands on political purpose, being influenced by comments on net, share internet, surfing net instead of TV, visits social network every day, for getting information first address is the internet, internet is safe for shopping, banking transactions on web, likes fast-food

Modern

Wears armless t-shirt, makeup, swimsuit

Religion

Friday prayer, pray regularly, fasting regularly, halal food is important, Islamic bank is important

Conscious

Read info on-pack before to buy, check nutritional elements on pack, check-up, try to lose or protect their weigh, check prices in supermarket

Everyday fam

Foods shopping from supermarket, spend time out of living place, goes to cinema regularly, makeup, goes beaches for holiday, dine out with family, like fast-food, householder shops form big-stores, goes to discount stores

Traditional

Goes hometown for holiday, usually watches Football, picnic with family, buys what their kids prefer, man goes to coffee-shops

Industry

Frozen foods are healthy as fresh, tolerate factories' pollution for growth in economy, adds are honest

Basic

Makes tomato sauce and tarhana soup, Prefer Turkish manufactured products, prefer cash instead of credit-card, pay more for organic foods, political boycott for some brands

Figure 4.29. Component Analysis (2015 Life Style)




Table 4.18. Principal Components Analysis (2015 Life Style)


```
## Principal Components Analysis
## Call: principal(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
          TC1  TC2  TC4  TC3
SS loadings  6.26 4.98 3.82 2.74
Proportion Var  0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05
Cumulative Var  0.11 0.19 0.26 0.30
Proportion Explained  0.35 0.28 0.21 0.15
Cumulative Proportion 0.35 0.63 0.85 1.00

With component correlations of
      TC1  TC2  TC4  TC3
TC1  1.00 0.35 0.27 0.23
TC2  0.35 1.00 0.12 0.03
TC4  0.27 0.12 1.00 0.06
TC3  0.23 0.03 0.06 1.00

Mean item complexity = 1.7

Test of the hypothesis that 4 components are sufficient.
The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.05
with the empirical chi square 25549.62 with prob < 0
```

Figure 4.30. Factor Analysis (2015 Life Style)
Factor Analysis



3.2.4.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Table 4.19. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)-2015 Life-Style

Latent Variables:				
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)
kokos =~				
Fllw_lfst_fshn	0.736	0.026	28.114	0.000
Lfst_md1_mbl_m	0.599	0.024	24.530	0.000
wnt_rllzd_thrn	0.650	0.028	23.550	0.000
Dsnt_cr_tpy_pr	0.649	0.031	20.755	0.000
Brnd_mks_m.dff	0.456	0.025	17.994	0.000
Rwrdr_hrs1f_wt_	0.640	0.029	22.025	0.000
Entrg_lks_mpr_	0.473	0.029	16.355	0.000
Luxury_gg_qlty	0.477	0.030	15.696	0.000
Imprssd_cmmnt_	0.321	0.035	9.165	0.000
Cr_brnd_gv_d_d	0.262	0.031	8.434	0.000
culture =~				
Listen_radio	0.481	0.037	12.908	0.000
Reading_book	0.866	0.037	23.101	0.000
Msc_nstrmnt_rt	0.494	0.033	15.198	0.000
Rds_nwsppr_vry	0.545	0.035	15.606	0.000
yuppie =~				
G_brd_fr_bsns	0.251	0.021	11.876	0.000
Go_abroad	0.281	0.021	13.571	0.000
Drink_alchl_hm	0.658	0.032	20.721	0.000
Go_out_at_nght	0.565	0.026	21.853	0.000
G_bchvctn_n_r_	0.397	0.026	15.160	0.000
hitech =~				
Brnds_pltcl_by	0.359	0.039	9.171	0.000

Imprssd_cmmnt_	0.436	0.034	12.878	0.000
Share.Internet	1.038	0.032	32.687	0.000
Srfng_nt_n_TV	0.919	0.026	34.685	0.000
Vsts_scl_ntwr_	1.140	0.028	40.156	0.000
Intrnt_frs____	0.933	0.030	31.194	0.000
Intrnt_sf_fr_s	0.565	0.026	21.539	0.000
Bknng_trnsct__	0.571	0.032	18.022	0.000
Likes_fastfood	0.381	0.044	8.616	0.000
modern =~				
Armlss_tshrt__	1.228	0.029	42.172	0.000
Makeup_at_home	0.767	0.039	19.518	0.000
Swimsuit	1.194	0.030	40.192	0.000
relig =~				
Friday_prayer	1.064	0.033	32.013	0.000
Prfrm_rtl_pryr	1.138	0.035	32.889	0.000
Fasting_regulr	1.007	0.033	30.485	0.000
Hall_fd_mprnt	0.495	0.024	21.044	0.000
Islmc_bnk_mprt	0.536	0.030	18.031	0.000
consc =~				
Rd_nf_npck_bf_	0.679	0.030	22.694	0.000
Chck_ntrtnl_l_	0.903	0.034	26.650	0.000
Check.up	0.326	0.030	10.811	0.000
Ls_r_prtct_wgh	0.398	0.033	12.148	0.000
Chck_prcs_nspr	0.266	0.033	7.937	0.000
everydayfam =~				
Foods_suprmrkt	0.435	0.032	13.579	0.000
Spnd_tm_tf_lv_	0.508	0.030	16.829	0.000
Go_cinema_rglr	0.663	0.027	24.850	0.000
Makeup_at_home	0.295	0.038	7.701	0.000
Go_beachs_hldy	0.786	0.033	24.025	0.000
Dine_out_famly	0.690	0.026	26.248	0.000
Likes_fastfood	0.330	0.045	7.375	0.000
Hshld_shps_bgs	0.622	0.030	20.830	0.000
Discount_store	0.633	0.032	19.887	0.000
tradi =~				
Go_homtnw_hldy	0.412	0.045	9.086	0.000
Uslly_wtchs_Ft	0.351	0.049	7.241	0.000
Picnic_family	0.552	0.036	15.156	0.000
By_prfrd_by_kd	0.460	0.042	10.981	0.000
Man_gos_cfshps	0.095	0.043	2.215	0.027
industry =~				
Frzn_fds_hlt__	0.346	0.041	8.538	0.000
Tlrt_fctrs_pl_	0.325	0.041	7.829	0.000
Adds_honest	0.377	0.037	10.219	0.000
basic =~				
Mk_tmt_sc_trh_	0.487	0.050	9.798	0.000
Prfr_Trksh_mn_	0.424	0.036	11.622	0.000
Csh_nstd_f_crd	0.162	0.031	5.199	0.000
Pay_mr_rgnccfs	0.213	0.031	6.880	0.000
Brnds_pltcl_by	0.298	0.044	6.751	0.000


chisq	df	cfi	rmsea	tli	bic
5444.58	1587.00	0.84	0.04	0.83	276693.68

*Cfi is 0.84, data did not fit very well but acceptable. The reason is the category named “basic” that includes; “Makes tomato sauce and tarhana soup, prefers

Turkish manufactured products, prefers cash instead of credit-card, pays more for organic foods, political boycott for some brands”. Because this category includes both traditional and modern values today tarhana soup, making traditional and healthy food at home became very popular for people who have modern values as well and people who has aim to boycott some brands in political purpose mostly have modern values. This aim is also confirmed in qualitative research. For the future research, the distinction between modern and traditional lifestyle values must be specified in detail. When we take out this category it has seen data the data is fitting well.

3.2.4.3. Social Class Mapping

Figure 4.31. Social Class Mapping Life-Style




Since LS may be more related to income, occupations were taken into consideration (as seen in the figure 4.31.), and the analysis was done by taking education capital into consideration just like the 2008 analysis.

When data analysis is examined, students with low education capital appear to be more industrial than the students with high education capital. The ones with high education capital are more high-tech (Brand political boycott + Impressed comments on net+ Share Internet + Surfing net instead of TV + Visits social

network everyday +For getting information first address is internet +Internet is safe for shopping +Banking transactions on web+ Likes fast-food). The ones with low education capital approach industrialization more positively and find advertising more honest. The ones with high educational capital have more modern values and are conscious consumer (professionals, state officials, managers and retirees with high educational capital). The values that is mentioned above as “Culture and Yuppie” are high in managers who have high educational capital. Religious and basic values (making the traditional tarhana soup at home, preferring the products that are made in Turkey, use cash instead of credit card) tend to be higher in shop owners, business owners and managers with low education capital.

Based on social class maps, informants (representing different segments of MC) were determined for qualitative research. And turban, “başsörtüsü” usage and partisanship were mapped on classes.


Figure 4.32. CA-Biplot Life-Style



In the above table, it is seen that AKP voter consists more of shop owners with low education capital, civil servants and unqualified workers. And CHP voter tends to be the high-level retirees with high education capital, employees and

managers. MHP voter is concentrated more on housewives with high education capital and the unemployed with low education capital. It can be said that, with the decline in number of political parties compared to the year 2008, AKP represents a wider base.

Figure 4.33. CA-Biplot Life-Style-2



Again, when we map “başörtüsü” and “turban” usage on classes, we see that, compared to 2008, Turban is gradually replacing “başörtüsü”. As the methods of tying differ among Turban users, it started replacing başörtüsü in different class fractions.

3.3. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

3.3.1 The Aim of Qualitative Research

The main aim of this qualitative research is to gain a deep understanding of the ideological, social, and cultural aspects of the lifestyles of specific social groups in Turkey rather than surface description of a large sample of a population. Although the Konda data analyses are based on a study with a large questionnaire and broad participation, they do not provide in-depth information about “how various groups interact with one another, how they evaluate each other, how they

differentiate themselves with their lifestyles, and how ideology culture effects their choices.”

Essentially, patterns that are obtained by re-analyzing the Konda data are used for qualitative phase. Semi-structured questions were prepared based on tested hypothesis and patterns obtained from the quantitative phase. In this way, the presumed polarization, the social perceptions, and the symbols that stand out in everyday life in the society were examined. This allows a more detailed interpretation of the discursively constructed social boundaries and fragmented classes that may provide a roadmap for further research

3.3.2. The Process of Data Collection

3.3.2.1 Informants

Qualitative data was collected through fieldnotes, photographs, and audio recordings. Interviewees were selected based on quantitative data by focusing on characteristics of the middle-class fractions, that would enable examination in the best possible way. This approach is the criteria-based approach or purposive sampling (Mason, 2002; Patton, 2002). The sample units were chosen because they have particular-features or characteristics that provide a detailed explanation and understanding of the central themes. Since informants in the target sampling had to be members of the middle-class and the discussion subjects were related to economics, politics, and ideologies, one of the key criteria for participants was that they should be, at minimum, a high school graduate. Informants were selected from a wide a range of backgrounds as much as possible by considering their occupations, lifestyles and ideology culture. Special attention was paid to recruiting a sample that include main LS groups that obtained in quantitative research.

Table 4.20. Informant Characteristic

Pseudonym	Gender	Age	Occupation	Education
Burak	M	25	Security	High School (State)
Elif	F	26	Corporate Communication/NGO	Master's Degree
Göknil	F	47	Finance and Banking Manager	Master's Degree
Derya	F	46	Translator	University-Bilkent
Ahmet	M	31	Security	HighSchool (Com)
Mehmet	M	35	Trainer and Football Referee	University (State)
Mesut	M	40	Manager in NGO/Municipal	University (State)
Damla	F	42	Lawyer	Master's Degree
Oya	F	59	Housewife	High School (State)
Eva	F	38	Financer	University (State)
Yıldız	F	40	Market Keeper	University (State)
Zeynep	F	26	Foreign Affairs (NGO)	University-Koç
Özlem	F	30	Founder of Active Life Platform	University (State)
Halil	M	22	Student	High School (State)
Şenay	F	35	Beauty Expert	High School (State)
Kumru	F	39	Curator	PhD (State)
Gökhan	M	64	Senior Executive	University (State)
Nurdan	F	35	Public Relations and Marketing	University (State)
Gökтуğ	M	28	Consultant and Instructor (NGO)	University (State)
Mine	F	65	Government Officer (Retired)	University (State)
Selene	F	27	Business Development	University -Bilkent
Nurcan	F	46	Mobile Technology	University (State)
Pelin	F	48	Bank Employer	University (State)
Melisa	F	42	Riding Referee/Housewife	University-Bilkent
Dilay	F	30	Accountant	High School (State)
Özgür	M	44	Lawyer	PhD (State)

All the informants, whether as individuals or at institutions, lived in one of the three major cities or were born and raised in these cities: (ISTANBUL “Esenler, Alibeyköy, Bolluca, Göktürk, Şişli, Levent, Bahçelievler” İZMİR: “Bornova, Bostanlı, Çiğli”, ANKARA Bahçelievler, Gaziosmanpaşa).

3.3.2.2. Semi-Structured Interview

Semi-structured questions were prepared based on findings and patterns obtained from the quantitative research. In Phase I, the quantitative section, patterns that differed in areas such as lifestyle, consumption habits, political preferences, cultural divisions, and identity were considered. To this end, correspondence maps were interpreted and elaborated upon. Accordingly, the interview subjects were grouped under the following topics: Cultural and Social Activities, Consumption Habits, Religion-Beliefs and Life Style, and Political Orientation and Identity (perception and symbolic boundaries).

The interview began with “engagement” that includes, informing informants about the purpose of the research and the topics that will be covered, and it continued with a conversation about daily life, social and cultural activities, the role of religious beliefs, and morals. How these values and behaviors influence the informants’ attitudes towards other groups and how symbolic interactions take place between these groups, how these people define their own identities and their perspectives by different ethnic and religious identities are questioned. Identity boundaries were interpreted by examining the effects of identity politics on their daily lives and world views. In general, during the interviews, it has been attempted to reveal the participants’ perspectives on social, cultural and political values as much as possible. Since the most important part of this research is to reveal how these class fractions define each other with the influence of discursive hegemonic struggles, all questions and discussions were targeted to provide extensive knowledge about actively constructed lifestyles.

As participants were from different segments of the middle class, and their knowledge, language skills, cultural background were different, the socio-cultural

contexts of open-ended questions were changed according to the participant's characteristics. Since the research subjects were quite sensitive and covered lifestyle, social-political approaches, and cultural values, questions with a strong positive or negative association were avoided.

Accordingly, it is crucial to understand civil society representatives' vision on how society should be organized. In order to make an in-depth interpretation, people who are engaged in civic participation by working in associations and non-governmental organizations as volunteers were also interviewed. (Akut "Search and Rescue Assoc.", Sosyal Akıl Derneği "Social Intelligence Assoc.", HABITAT Assoc., Göktürk Hayvan Severler Derneği "Animal Protection Assoc.", Aktif Yaşam "Active Life", KADEM "Women and Democracy Association"). The informants' levels of civic participation consciousness and their motivations for civic participation were examined; also, the determination of which fragmented groups they represented within the middle class was attempted.

3.3.2.3 Coding Frame

Labelling has been applied to all texts obtained from the interviews with the 26 informants after the process of reading and re-reading in which all the fieldnotes have been read several times to get a sense of the interview and the observation. However, this was not a simple process, Thorne (2000), characterized data analysis as the most complex phase of qualitative research.


First, a grounded coding process has applied in order to get tangible sociologic clusters, as much as possible, and, finally, abstract categories has been created. In this research, each case has been coded and added to combine and, new codes have developed when necessary. In vivo coding that is easily helpful for data involving cultural special circumstances such as: everyday cultural practices, social rules, relational interactions or cultural identities among others have been used. These codes as below facilitate the development of categories. In vivo coding emphasis on the actual spoken words of the participants. This also permit to highlight the voices of participants.

Figure 4.34. Codes for Categories



As the most important contribution of this research is revealing how these classes define each other under the influence of the discursive hegemonic struggles that exist between them, in vivo coding helped to analyze relational interactions and cultural struggles. Almost every sentence had at least one code applied to it and categorized using several codes. All the texts examined and, the applied codes have checked in terms of consistency of interpretation and to see whether additional levels of coding is needed or not. The labelling of the texts has been done by using the QDA5 software tool which allowed for easy segmentation of the texts, a code word has assigned for each segments and terms from the literature have been used as much as possible (see Figure 4.35). This process created a total of 61 initial codes. New codes are created to capture the meaning of groups of initial codes and differences between the codes are checked in order to start grouping them. Finally, all the codes have grouped under ten categories: “Conservatism, Conspicuous Consumption, Favoritism, Identity, Liberalism, Lifestyle Activities, Cultural Activities, Polarization, Hegemony, and NGO.”

Figure 4.35. Labelling with QDA5 Software



The category “conservatism” is used for texts that showed frequency for labels that represent conservative family structure, religious values, symbols that stand out in everyday life, and for attitudes that hold men superior to women. Specifically, texts that refer to taboos between men and women and approve of such differences fall within this group. The heading “Conspicuous Consumption” includes luxury consumption and simplicity as the new conspicuous consumption and conspicuous morality, e.g. the wearing of the turban for show or religionist practices done for show, etc. are coded in the text. Under the Favoritism category, texts that include mentions of political, economic and favoritism in everyday life and injustice are coded. Relationships based on self-interest and interest related to group conflicts are also coded under this heading. Under the Identity category, people’s perception of their own identities and their approach to the identities of the social groups that they criticize are examined and the way they express their thoughts has explored. It is observed that they connect their identities with their professional status or personal characteristics, or they defined themselves more politically with their liberal, democrat or ethnic identities or only with their personal values. Under the Liberal category, responses that attached importance to

democratic life and democratic values, sensitivity to women's rights and approaches to religion in spiritual and moral terms rather than from a political perspective have been coded. The Lifestyle category included food, technology, beverage, brand and consumption preferences; the reasons for protesting certain brands (if any); the places they spend leisure time; the choices of activities with their family and friends; how they spend their holidays; from whom they differentiate their lifestyle and why; and their preferences in general. Under the Polarization category, different areas of polarization are observed—such as life style polarization; political polarization; cultural, symbolic, and religion polarization—and the coding in the texts are made by taking these distinctions into consideration. Under the Culture category, books, art, music, film, newspaper, and TV series preferences are coded. Cultural differences have been determined based on informants' preferences and opinions. The codes grouped under the headline “Hegemony” are politization of religion and cultural symbols, limitation of freedom of thought, to avoid self-expression in social media and daily life, freedom of life style, sexist discourses and symbolic pressure on women's wearing styles. Codes are created after reading the texts several times and interpreting them.

After coding and analyzing the all data, broader patterns of meaning considered in creating the themes, the patterns have been reviewed to ensure that they fit the data, and then the themes are named and defined. Finally, based on segmentation of the texts and literature review, five themes are obtained: Life Style Polarization, Civic Participation vs. Clientelism, Conspicuous Consumption, Ideology Culture and Cultural Consumption, and Class Struggle and Hegemony.

3.3.3. Thematic Analysis

3.3.3.1. Theme 1: Lifestyle Polarization

As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis' approach is to examine lifestyles, moving from the idea that cultural hegemonic struggles exist discursively between classes. As previously mentioned, polarization is in fact, the strategic

expansion or restriction of boundaries. Polarization is always the creation of us versus them by the populist discourse; however, this also may vary according to class coalitions and us versus them may take different forms. Laclau (2005), refers to populism as an antagonistic political logic based on irreconcilable opposition that gathers the people and mobilizes them against the “other,” the enemy; thus, polarization is the *raison d’etre* of populist discourse. According to Laclau, “Them” is constructed. The fact that some particular struggle is elevated into the “universal equivalent of all struggles is not a pre-determined fact, but itself is the result of the contingent political struggle for hegemony.”

Accordingly, in this qualitative section, the relation between classes, ideology and culture is discussed. This theme aided in understanding how Islam is used as a “common identity” gathering upper and lower classes together against “them (secular elite)” and how the government party has based its discourse on “Islam” and used its periphery in different forms strategically in line with its political objectives. When we consider that “them” is constructed (Laclau, 2005) and cultural hegemonic struggles among classes continue, we can observe that the divide between the supporters of the governing party and others mostly called “the seculars” is increasingly being reduced to one dimension (or even to a level where being pious vs impious is being discussed) due to the populist discourse and the symbols in the country. However, as it is also seen in quantitative analysis, to utter that seculars are impious or non-religious will be a misinterpretation when we consider the fact that majority of the population has strong religious values. Especially, it will be an unfair judgement and an insufficient distinction for those who internalize their beliefs in moral or spiritual terms.

Several examples may be given to how “Islam” is used as a common identity today and in what ways populist discourses and symbols are utilized: The speech of Erdoğan at the assembly of AKP youth members in 2012 where he mentioned their wish to “raise pious generations”, the dramatic increase in the number of TV series where women are depicted as asserting their existence only through their relations with wealthy men, the views on “how many children a woman should have” being declared too often, or how Turkish Parliament Speaker Binali Yıldırım

draws attention to the support given to women in order to answer the demands of “older men” who wish to get remarried and declaring that “degree of social state has to be carefully adjusted” and a powerful symbol; the mosque built in Camlica hill that has a clear view of the entire city which is the largest mosque of Turkey with its six minarets etc. These are tactical discourses and symbols that put Islam at the center and their periphery changes accordingly. All of them step into the domain of class struggle by penetrating into daily life and influencing the lifestyles.

As seen in this research, the middle class is fragmented. There are cleavages for both antagonistic classes; it is crucial to understand how cultural Islamization of the civil society has now aligned all cleavages along a single polarization of religious (pious) versus secular. One of the interesting findings of the qualitative research is the fact that, while the right wing forms the class under Islamic discourse more easily, they are also fragmented in terms of lifestyle and religious beliefs; “some of them strongly criticize people who have religious practice just to show which status group they belong to, and get social and economic benefits, or they criticize how some people who live in luxury wear the turban,” and these people also belong to different cleavages of polarization similarly left side of the polarization feel resentment to this group.

Figure 4.36. Lifestyle Polarization



Citys Nisantasi

Huqqa “Dinner”

Huqqa “Fruit juice in Carafe”

On the other hand, almost all cleavages of right during interview, never mentioned and spoke about women rights. It was seen that those who are considered secular are not able to gather under a common discourse, and they are also fragmented, and even though they share a similar lifestyle, they are different in

terms of cultural consumption. However, almost all cleavage of left agrees on women rights and the scope of education, and they assert that intolerance and disrespect have increased in society. It seems that is the one of the crucial subjects that these fractions agree each other about discrimination against women even though almost every fragmented group in the society prefers to interact only with their own environment.

In this research, it is observed that informants representing different fractions of the middle class differed from each other in terms of religious, cultural, and political values. Important symbols of life style choices appear to include styles of dress like wearing the turban, tesettur, or mini-skirts; and activities like going to Friday prayer or consuming alcohol or not. However, once the texts have been examined in depth, different dimensions of this separation had been discovered. The judgement regarding whether a populist movement or a class cleavage is progressive or not should not be made based on its openness to innovation and change but it should be assessed by questioning the democratic values it holds, its views on children's and women's rights, its approach to education and whether it would take the society further in terms of social values and in this sense, ideologies certainly play an important role. From this perspective, ideologies have an important place in class coalitions and struggles, and this is, of course, reflected in lifestyles and cultural consumption preferences, too (see Table 4.25).

Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, the "Laissez faire, laissez passer" mentality in economy established with the rise of neoliberalism and translated into the cultural domain. Laissez faire, laissez passer understanding in cultural area, has caused to explain the juxtaposition of neo-liberal globalization with reactionary cultural movements as the self-expression of the local cultures. Laissez faire, laissez passer in cultural sphere has based on the assumption that everyone is equal and therefore social changes are generally perceived as bottom-up mobilizations. In fact, social changes in the cultural sphere will result in favor of the more established one as in the same economic area. In culture and Anarchy Arnould (1869), argued that state must have regulatory role in the name of freedom, and culture without it, public life must always be diverted towards the interests of

one or other class and the state must guarantee the transmission of culture. For this reason, culture needs to be regulated to a certain extent for taking societies further.

Again, it is observed that due to the discursive construction and cultural hegemonic built on “Islam” in society, new sets of behavior and changes occurred in daily life. In fact, in some cases, even extremely religious people seem to react to such changes.

“For example, my oldest brother is religious. Also, my younger brother has become religious because of his wife, and now he is even more religious than her. He tells me that people older than him offer their seats to him in the metro, saying “Haji, take my seat.” He feels very uncomfortable about it. He says he grows his beard because it is a religious tradition, and that he doesn’t of approve it becoming an element of respect.” - Y

Moreover, it is interesting to see people who are more tolerant to ethnic and sectarian differences yearn for some traditional values like neighborhood and family. We can say that it would not be correct to conclude that a person leading a modern life style and with liberal political views has no traditional values and practices has no beliefs.

“I have grown up with Atatürk’s republican values. I studied, I had freedom of travel and rights to education. I became a lawyer and married the person I wished when I wanted to. These are very important. This was all possible thanks to republican values; I want all women in my country to have such rights and I expect the women and the children to stand up for their rights.” For me, religion is morals. Morals is the reference of all religions. I try to practice my moral and conscientious stance in my daily life. But I don’t think that life can be sorted out with rules of religion. I choose to trust in God. I mean I believe every cloud has a silver lining. I thank god quite often. For example, I start the day by reciting “bismillah”. Some people showed reactions like ‘I wouldn’t expect that’ when they hear I was a believer. It may surprise them.”- D

It's clear that secular people have beliefs, mostly based on moral and spiritual values, and do not want to show them off. Again, this group of people with similar characteristics also complains about the increasing disrespect and intolerance in society.

One of the informants, who votes AKP, asserted that there is also a dangerous group of people who are not part of a single polarization of religious (pious) or secular (non-religious). According to him these people are dangerous because nobody knows how they will react. As a matter of fact, this interpretation is quite interesting since it also shows that clear-cut definitions have been constructed in Islamist minds and when they notice other people who fall outside these boundaries and their existing interpretations, it creates a feeling of uncertainty. Accordingly, there is only one correct version of Islam in Islamists minds. Contrary to seculars, it seems there are main symbols and style of worship in the mind of Islamists.

During the interview, almost all the informants stated that society is being increasingly polarized into two opposite ends because of the government's polarized discourse and political practices. Throughout the interviews, the reactions by the fragmented groups of the secular segment, were mostly in terms of the political dimension of polarization, and the reflection of this polarization in their lifestyles was observed.


The groups on the other end of the polarization (religious/pious) appear to put too much emphasis on religious hostility. For instance, the thread of the "Social Mind" association noted, "We have new project 'Fight Islamophobia,' The Ministry of Youth and Sports supports this project. West is against us, so this project is really important for Islam". When, as an interviewer I reminded him about the demonstrations against governments throughout America and Europe protesting prejudice towards Muslims and asked the informant's opinion about these protests, the informant responded, "These demonstrations take place on an individual base and can't change the outcome; we are against Zionism" and, immediately after making this comment, the participant asked to, "I wonder if you are Jewish?" This, in fact, shows the lack of flexibility towards different approaches to Islam and West.

Another interesting point about the interview was the informant’s shaking hands at the beginning and saying at the end that he had to rush away for the Friday prayer and has gone without handshake.

During the interviews, it was observed that, although the fragmented classes that were defined as religious claimed themselves to be more humanist than the seculars and did not mention polarization very much compared to seculars, they appeared to have more clear boundaries about the subject. Again, one of the informants said he was aware that religion was being used as a political tool, yet he felt like he would be committing a sin if he didn’t vote for the ruling party. As a matter of fact, all this shows how class boundaries are drawn by taking Islam and its peripheries in the center of their lives. Judging all seculars as non-religious shows prejudice and contributes to us-them relations.

The other side of the antagonism (seculars) mostly differentiate themselves on cultural choices, ideology and they think that cultural hegemonic struggle has started effecting their daily lives thanks to the government’ politics and discourse.

Table 4.21. Coding frequency table for “Lifestyle Polarization”

	Count	% Codes	Cases	% Cases
 Polarization				
• polarization is political not because of the religion	9	1.7%	7	26.9%
• Religious polarization	7	1.3%	4	15.4%
• we dont have smilar tastes	1	0.2%	1	3.8%
• Cultural level is important for me	1	0.2%	1	3.8%
• construction sector do investment for art but not because they are lover of art because of their interest	1	0.2%	1	3.8%
• drinking alchool or not and places that we prefere differantiate us evenwe have same incomes	2	0.4%	1	3.8%
• increasing intolerance and disrespect	2	0.4%	2	7.7%
• Turban	5	0.9%	4	15.4%
• If you wear mini skirt and you are not fasting	2	0.4%	2	7.7%

The coding frequency of Polarization indicated that mostly polarization has seen as political, and as religious. In third place, we see “turban” as one of the symbols of polarization. Mini-skirts and consumption of alcohol, not fasting in Ramadan also create pressure in daily life and this is the one of the other indicators of life style polarization.

3.3.3.2. Theme 2: Conspicuous Consumption

Conspicuous consumption refers to the competitive and exaggerated consumption practices and leisure activities aiming to show membership to a status group. Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption (1899) is still part of the contemporary capitalist landscape although today luxury goods are more accessible than in Veblen's time (1899). Luxury is still important to show one's social status and wealth. However, today, class divisions not only manifest themselves through the consumption of luxury products but also by bringing morals and religion forward in an exaggerated manner or by using plain and designer clothes instead of popular brands and by seeking simpler preferences and reflecting this in their life style, thus distinguishing themselves from those who are extreme luxury consumers.

Conspicuous morality may appear by turning religious symbols and worship into an element of showing off instead of keeping them as private practices (Suerdem, 2013) (e.g. people starting to attend Friday prayers, an increased usage of the turban and religious clothes, a sharp rise in donations to religious causes, a heightened demand for non-alcoholic venues, and an extravagant usage of religious and Arabic symbols in those places and daily life "at home, in business").

On the other hand, new conspicuous consumption includes using products with no logo signs, preferring functional and lifestyle products over flamboyant ones, and selection of health-conscious and boutique products. People with such choices usually express their status through prizing knowledge and building cultural capital, preferring to spend on, education, services and human capital over material goods. This new status of behavior and simple dressing codes (clothes without logos etc.) become differentiating and help their users to set themselves apart from others. Therefore, this type of consumption may also be described as conspicuous consumption since this group whose members believe that they have different consumption patterns due to their cultural and lifestyle differences set themselves apart from other people with their simple style of dress; sometimes their preferences can even act as a reaction, a stance against people who are into expensive brands and conspicuous consumption.

In this research, the following diverse details were observed. The group preferring new conspicuous consumption emerge in two different forms. People in the first group, prefer simple clothes without logo, try to follow the daily cultural activities, do sports but are interested in trendy ones, they read but they prefer popular books by writers like Elif Şafak, Dan Brown and Ahmet Ümit, they follow capsule wardrobe trend and they are into yoga, meditation and positive energy. Just like the other group with similar qualities, their notion of holiday is related with experience, however they don't have different preferences than the ones that are trendy in social media. They are included in this group consciously; people in the advertising industry, life coaches who are trendy in recent years, bloggers, some middle and top-level managers and university students are usually part of this group. The other group with similar consumption preferences are more developed in terms of cultural capital. They especially differ with the subjects they choose to read, with their area of interest and with their social media posts and holiday choices. They are conscious about consuming food in their own seasons rather than organic products and they differ with their sensitivity towards social events and the emphasis they place on education. In fact, the most important point here is the fact that for both groups, the way they express themselves remains at a certain level and they cannot find common and a more effective way of expression that would turn into social will. In this research, the following diverse details were observed. The group who prefer new conspicuous consumption arises in two different forms.

Conspicuous consumption emerged in different forms, both on the secular and the conservative side. Luxury consumption (branded products in clothing, bags etc., especially with large logos), and conspicuous morality (the turban, Friday prayer, Islamic cultural branding etc.) have been criticized by people who have different political views and different social and economic status. The interviews and observations point out that the fraction of the Islamic class who tends towards using branded products and prefer luxurious brands in clothing, cars etc. not only draws the attention and reaction of the people who are called the secular group but also some religious segment of the society. Again, non-alcoholic venues such as fish restaurants and restaurants with Arabic style interior designs (golden color

ornaments etc.) and hookah cafes in districts like Kuruçeşme, Karaköy and Nişantaşı have become quite remarkable. It was observed that this produced many reactions in various fractions of the middle class. Again, it was observed that the increased participation in Friday prayers, showing off by worshipping, the use of expressions like “With God’s will” (“Allah’ın izniyle”), “Be entrusted to God” (“Allah’a emanet ol”), “Have a blessed Friday” (“Hayırlı Cumalar”) etc. are increasingly being criticized. These expressions have strongly penetrated in daily lives. Some participants even claimed that if the government changed today, some people would stop wearing turban and change their style of dress and the participation of Friday pray will decrease. These criticisms generally are reflected with thoughts such as “Religion must be between God and the person,” “Religion cannot be used to show off,” “The number of people who go to Friday prayers has increased,” “They go to prayers just to be seen there,” and. “They become more privileged this way.” Again, people who state that religion is an important part of their daily lives express their criticism by raising the question, “Is this the essence of Islam?” In addition to all of this, a group representing the liberal section of the upper middle class has become increasingly simplistic and has begun to attach importance to quality and style instead of brand names, thus differentiating themselves from others by manifesting different consumption preferences. The frequency of codes related to Conspicuous Consumption is shown below.

Table 4.22. Coding frequency table for “Conspicuous Consumption”


	Count	% Codes	Cases	% Cases
Conspicuous Consumption				
• Luxury	4	0.8%	4	15.4%
• New consp./simplicity	6	1.1%	5	19.2%
• religion show off	12	2.3%	8	30.8%
• Turban (show-off)	4	0.8%	4	15.4%

As seen as above, the most commonly occurring codes are related to conspicuous religion, and the second most common codes are related to new conspicuous consumption.

3.3.3.3. Theme 3: “Favoritism”

Favoritism was the most frequently mentioned topic by most of the informants. There is a strong belief in the society about the existence of political and economic favoritism and that, especially in the economic arena, people act based on their self-interest. Moreover, there even seems to be a consensus among groups both end of the polarization as to who gains the most advantage from this system.

Table 4.23. Coding frequency table for “Favoritism”

	Count	% Codes	Cases	% Cases
 Favoritism				
• Political f.	6	1.1%	6	23.1%
• economic f.	12	2.3%	11	42.3%
• Injustice	4	0.8%	3	11.5%
• Daily Life f.	2	0.4%	2	7.7%

Favoritism, in fact, stems from clientelism and such a case is observed in different periods throughout history in Turkey. Flynn (1974), states that clientelism is personalized relationship between actors and provides unequal wealth or status. Favoritism offers mutual benefit for both who gain loyalty and for who obtain wealth or status. Since clientelism involve mutually beneficial transactions, it also has an intimate relationship with machine-based party politics that address the unequal socioeconomic relationship between patrons and clients. It is also important to note that the transactions are not necessarily financially beneficial to the client.

In this sense, patron-client relations, explained in Chapter II, have proven to be very efficient in Turkey. In Turkey, after 1980’s, they were owners who produce supplement products with small capital. These owners did not provide insurance to their employees but supported them by aid as a favor. These owners formed their own network; in other words, these networks do not need to be political and may appear spontaneously. These MCs formed their own networks and formed the basis of today's AKP.

The networks mentioned above has also potential to combine with machine politic. According to the “political machine” concept in the literature, primary aim of a political machine is to keep itself in power but also aims centralize authority that makes easier to improve services and facilities and to expanse economy. In this system, votes are often rewarded with patronage jobs. However, patronage can result in poorer services to society because of the unqualified or low performance employees. These networks are also closely related to non-governmental organizations and donations. For example, the machine may accept donations or can find funds to NGOs from businesses owners and in return for such favors as tax or may give support to certain business contracts or whip up public opinion to support large scale projects.

Since machine politics doesn't involve ideology, mostly works in municipalities. To function at the national level, it must be combined with discursive constructions to spread nationally. There are groups that gather around the boss' populist discourse. Instead of ideology, machine politics interest more in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing benefits to those who work for it than in political principles (Scott, 1969). Political machines usually rely on a coalition of patronage networks grouped around a strong political boss who provides incentives like money, jobs, social protection, and privilege in government tenders in return asks their buy loyalty.

In this frame, during interviews, “favoritism” or “patronage” which are frequently mentioned by the participants and this theme elaborated and connected to other themes. The context of the interviews shows us there is link between cultural hegemony struggles and favoritism. In this context, it has seen that identity politics is not creating democratic group subjectivities for organizing subaltern groups to defend their rights and interests but mobilizes them according the interest of political boss. In this thesis case, powerful boss provides social mobilization through a discursive process rather than gaining the support of other class naturally. These discourses sometimes include, sometimes excludes some groups and help to draw boundaries and hold interact these masses. Mentioned networks that cover wide range of actors such as: businessmen, cliques in government offices, private

security contractors, tribal groups, mercenaries, terrorist organizations, charity associations, NGOs, political parties, social movements and the like (Süerdem, 2016) semiotically construct communities.

Favoritism has frequently voiced during the interviews and it has seen that the turban is seen as a symbol that combines economic and political interests, not as a religious symbol. And it may prove that cultural hegemony is mostly shaped through everyday struggles over symbols. The belief that religion is being exploited is expressed quite openly in interviews and, as explained in the previous chapter, the perception that certain groups in society use religion to gain social and economic benefits is now quite established. Accordingly, in this analyze it was seen that some right and left class fractions view Turban as different from the past and see it as a symbol combining economic and political interest. It means that Turban has moved to a different direction and became a “floating signifier”.

“I think some people wear the turban in order belong to a certain group and use it as an advantage to do business. This kind of people exist even among my relatives. I see them as people with masks. Generally, people feel the need to belong to a group. That’s why religious sects are favored as well.” - N

“For me the most disturbing thing of all is, the judges wearing the turban because I think this becomes an element of pressure on people who don’t share the same political views.” – O

Again, a similar case that was expressed related to favoritism appeared during interviews with NGOs. Essentially, civic participation and NGOs are anything that facilitates individual or collective actions generated by a network of relationships. In the modern world, social capital debates focus on keeping the community together, building generalized trust, and creating individual free choice to create a more cohesive society (Ferragina, 2010). Accordingly, social capital is seen as a necessary condition for modern liberal democracy and a low level of social capital is led to a rigid political system and corruption. Bourdieu (1986), defines social capital; “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked

to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. On the other hand, Bourdieu argues that social capital as a symbolic resource plays crucial role in social conflict. He suggests that social capital is linked to economic capital as well but cannot be reduced simply to an economic form.

According Bourdieu’s argument and interviews, it has seen that social capital should interpret by taking in consideration the institutions that NGO provide their funds from, and the content of the NGOs’ main task. And additionally, should be analyzed how the NGOs are organized in terms of creating control or pressure in social and this pressure or control takes society forward or not. Without analyzing these answers, we can’t be sure the existence of non-governmental organizations is a factor for the continuation of modern liberal democracy as it is meant to be or not.

During interviews it has seen that favoritism may also occur occasionally in this area. Secondly it may has seen that the area of social responsibility may be determined by the potential of getting funds, not by taking in consideration society’s priority needs.

In addition to the situation above, it was also observed in the research that the reasons for many of the young people to work at NGOs is to get connected, to find jobs more easily, or to be able to work in these institutions on a paid contract. However, there are also volunteers who work entirely for conscientious reasons; they stand out as more mature and more conscious people and mostly prefer to find aid through their own efforts.

3.3.3.4. Theme 4: “Ideology Culture and Cultural Consumption”

The underlying view is that people's cultural consumption in their daily lives is related to the common values and aesthetic standards they possess. Different types of cultural consumption choices have been studied in terms of the interactions between codes and symbols; how they tend to differ in different groups. Practices and preferences in the arena of consumption of these differentiated groups has been

questioned as forms of culture (art, literature, music, theatre, food, sports, newspapers, clothing, interior décor, etc.).

According to Bourdieu (1998), different preferences and practices generate in different sectors of social space and, individual continuously classifies him or herself and, simultaneously, all others as alike or different. In this research, we it has seen that individuals with different cultural consumption habits also tend to have different ideologies. Therefore, the correlation between their cultural consumption habits and their views on issues such as women's rights, equality, individual rights, equality of opportunity, death penalty, economic policies, income, health, education, minorities, immigrants, global warming and climate change has been studied.

It is also seen that being open to new technologies and change is entirely different from being culturally and ideologically developed. It means that symbolically constructed plastic culture needs to be distinguished from cultural capital. It can be observed that, while one who is ideologically a democrat and a secular may not be very open to technology and innovations in terms of consumption, a person who seems to be open to technology and change may be close to positive shifts in areas such as education, democratic values and women's rights.

3.3.3.5. Theme 5: "Hegemony"

As discussed in chapter II, today it is not possible to talk about a civic cultural hegemony struggle and an independent civic cultural will in the Gramscian sense. Gramsci counterposed hegemony to coercion; these were two analytically distinct process through which ruling class secure the consent of the dominated. Contrary to political domination, which involves directly coercive mechanisms, cultural hegemony that requires a discursive process to convince the popular masses of the truth value of the statements of an ideology (Gramsci, 1971).

As mentioned in previous chapter, the working class has started to lose its power of developing a higher consciousness of itself and other social classes. As in

modern world mass media plays an important role in discursive construction, deregulated media technologies may transform into system-supportive tools as propaganda relying on market forces, internalized assumptions and self-censorship, functioning without overt coercion (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Therefore, consent-manufacturing technologies can also be used brand political identity claims and market them as private consumer goods.

In this sense, during the interviews, hegemonic symbols and discourses have been observed and it was seen that, discourses on women, such as “how women should dress”, “how many children a woman should have” and the government party’s discourse on child marriage invisibly affects the perception of the women in society. There are discursive constructs that are far from approaching woman as an individual, they underline her motherhood of women and attribute sacredness to her. Casting her a role only as a spouse and a mother is a mythical indicator, therefore it is possible that the society may not understand how statements made about women become tools of political struggle. As a result of these discourses and symbols, a common language on women has formed and has started to change the perception of women in society.

One of the female informants can be given as an example; she really liked cycling but almost gave it up since it was a dominantly male sport, and at one point, she started feeling uncomfortable exercising mostly with men because of peer pressure.

“I love cycling. I was professionally interested. However, I was thinking of quitting from time to time because there was no woman cyclist. The fact that there was no woman cyclist made me upset. There was also peer pressure because I did this sport with men. I often thought about quitting” – Ö.

Again, during the interviews, the male-dominated society and the rapid decline in respect for women were frequently criticized.

“In the last 5 years, rudeness and disrespect have increased, especially disrespect from men. We witness things like, men sitting in improper ways

in public places (opening their legs: manspreading) or taking your place when you are about to park. Men began to bring their masculinity to the fore in such ways because they don't have anything solid in the background. I think they show it that way. When respect ends, society disappears. I blame also covered women they are characterless because they invite these kinds of behaviors from men.” –M

“Leading a certain life style has become difficult. This situation has influenced women's status in society. People are expected to have similar views (freedom of expression) and they lead the next generations in this manner.” – N.

“What is undemocratic is telling women what to wear or what not to wear, lack of freedom of thought; all these point out the absence of democracy.” – O.

When art is considered, while a new taste in art, and a return to phenomenological painting was observed.

“Today, there is a return to the phenomenological painting and rising interests in abstract painting. Every ideology and culture and every government generate their own understanding of art and spread their understanding of art to bottom layers.” K

Figure 4.37. Painting exhibition–NGO / Meeting- İstanbul October 2017



One of the informants expressed the idea that, because of some invisible control mechanisms in their daily lives, people feel the need to be careful about how they dress, how they express themselves, and their behavior during Ramadan.

“When we consider myself and the people in my circle, as much as we try to live in our own worlds, I believe we all have developed kind of self-adjustment system. For instance, I often realize that I pay attention how I should be dressed, what kind of clothes would be proper for certain places. We are also influenced by the attitudes during Ramadan. I don’t feel comfortable sharing my views in social media and I don’t post.”-K

As an example of discourses that refer specific people with expressions such as “my head scarfed sister” (başörtülü bacım) and “my Muslim brother” (Müslüman kardeşim) exclude some of the people while including others in the society. These discourses have been reflected in daily life with mass housing projects, holiday villages, non-alcoholic bars, educational institutions, Islamic fashion magazines, and cultural reforms. In fact, these changes in daily life are not the only result of the creation of a new demand. It is also imposing a new concept of consumption.

During interviews, some reflections of the cultural hegemonic struggle in daily life was seen and a criticism of how power has become a way of life and how rudeness and disrespectfulness have increased in society. This means that some people are cowed by the people who feel powerful and see rudeness as their right.

“When they are in a group of 20-30 people, they see themselves as entitled to every kind of rudeness and feel powerful. This is what counts now. This can be observed from top to bottom. People believe this is the right thing to do and see themselves superior by acquiring power. This has nothing to do with being civilized. Power has become a way of life. And this kind of wrong approach has spread even more with leaders setting a bad example. The powerful get the respect, the powerless get the beating. People use brute force to survive, to make a living, and to keep their status.”- M

Codes headlines: Authoritarianism, economic anxiety, political uncertainty, politicization of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of life style, religious discrimination, sexism, ethnic discrimination, government dominance, limitation of freedom because of being a woman were the headings of related codes.

Table 4.24. Coding frequency table for “Hegemony”


	Count	% Codes	Cases	% Cases
 Hegemony				
• economic anxiety	2	0.4%	2	7.7%
• politic uncertainty	3	0.6%	3	11.5%
• government uses religion to achieve its purpose	8	1.5%	7	26.9%
• no freedom of expression	3	0.6%	3	11.5%
• freedom of life style	7	1.3%	6	23.1%
• discrimination (religious)	8	1.5%	4	15.4%
• sexism by government	3	0.6%	3	11.5%
• ethnic discrimination	4	0.8%	4	15.4%
• head of government can make all decisions	4	0.8%	3	11.5%
• low income compared before	1	0.2%	1	3.8%
• no freedom because i'm a women	4	0.8%	4	15.4%

Table 4.25. Selected Informant Statements and Field Notes

Lifestyle Polarization	Favoritism	Conspicuous Consumption	Ideology Culture and Cultural Consumption	Hegemony
<p>1.1 I personally started wearing my miniskirts on purpose. Some of them try to manipulate you, the covered ones make direct comments</p>	<p>2.1 After the refugee problem, too many NGOs were established. They were able to get a lot of funding. The government therefore supported it. However, many people were shown as NGO employees. This also happened after the earthquake. The IMC (International Medical Corps) is said to hire 1,000 employees. But now it's closed. We are now doing the work of 1,000 people with 3 employees.</p>	<p>3.1 My neighbor is 86 years old, he is a civil engineer, and he performs five-time prayer. He doesn't show off with this. He says that my skirts are too long and that I am young, and I should dress more colorful. This is the way it should be. I think worshiping is done for showing off. This is not the essence of Islam or other religions. The next phase will be first switching from black to pink and then putting head scarfs away (referring to turbaned women). Is this the essence of Islam? No, it is not. It is purity, cleanliness and simplicity... driving luxurious cars is not really convincing.</p>	<p>4.1 There is a demand for art from the Islamic segment of society too because, after all, these people are trying to acquire an identity as a bourgeois class by following the methods we know. This is a matter of identity. Not because they are art lovers, this is a conscious effort on their part. For instance, last year there was the National Culture Council (National Culture Conseil) The president was at the opening; even I was invited. I was in one of the commissions. We shouldn't forget this; ideologically, every government has its own taste in art. They form a taste in art that would not scare the followers of its ideology. We can see this all around the world. Even national socialism has its own visual practice. This was the case for Russian revolution in 1930. These are not new concepts that are unique to Turkey. This happens in all geographies, all ideologies, and for all who do their own silent revolution</p>	<p>5.1 When they are in a group of 20-30 people, they see themselves as entitled to every kind of rudeness and feel powerful. This is what counts now. This can be observed from top to bottom. People believe this is the right thing to do and see themselves superior by acquiring power. This has nothing to do with being civilized. Power has become a way of life. And this kind of wrong approach has spread even more with leaders setting a bad example. The powerful gets the respect, the powerless get the beating. People use brute force to survive, to make a living and to keep their status.</p> <p>5.2 I don't feel comfortable sharing my views in social media, and I don't post.</p> <p>5.3 Leading a certain life style has become difficult. This situation has influenced women's status in society. People are expected to have similar views (freedom of expression). and they lead the next generations in this manner</p>
<p>1.2 If you don't fast, they think you are impious, if you're wearing a miniskirt, you're a slut. The prime minister talks about the outfit of a woman who gets off a boat in Istanbul and says he doesn't like it, this is just unbelievable. Telling women how to dress proves the absence of freedom of thought and shows that there is no democracy any longer</p>	<p>2.2 There are AKP supporters in the community. But I don't think this is more than 10%. These people vote for their self-interest, to get their things done. Hypocrisy and economic interests shape political life.</p>			
<p>1.3 The most determining factor is the turban. The women who wear the turban directly differentiate themselves from others.</p>				

TABLE 4.25 (Continued)

1.4 I believe we don't prefer the same places as some of the people who are from the same income group as me. I think they don't get out of their own environment much; for instance, they don't consume alcohol, and this is the point where our notion of having fun differs. I believe they prefer to spend time with people who are like them and choose to stay within their own circle of family and friends

1.5 In the last 5 years, polarization has increased. Rudeness and disrespect have increased, especially disrespect from men. We witness things like, men sitting in improper ways in public places (opening their legs) or taking your place when you are about to park. Men began to bring their masculinity to the fore in such ways because they don't have anything solid in the background. I think they show it that way. When respect ends, society disappears. I find covered women vulgar and characterless because they invite these kinds of behaviors from men

2.3 I think some people wear the turban in order belong to a certain group and use it as an advantage to do business. This kind of people exist even among my relatives. I see them as people with masks. Generally, people feel the need to belong to a group. That's why religious sects are favored.

2.4 The balance of power in Turkey has changed; people were separated from each other with a project. In 15 years, the powerful have become more and more brutal. There is a relationship based on self-interest, they began to gather for economic and political interests.

2.5 For me the most disturbing of all is, the judges wearing the turban because I think this becomes an element of pressure on people who don't share the same political views.

2.6 For example, my oldest brother is religious. Also, my younger brother has become religious because of his wife and now he is even more religious than her. He tells me that people older than him offer their seats to him at the metro saying "Haji, take my seat." He feels very uncomfortable about it. He

3.2 Almost everyone closes their shops on Friday. I believe they do it to show off. They would go back to their own life style if the government changes. Usage of expressions such as "Allah'a emanet ol", "Hayırlı Cumalar" have increased. The number of covered women has gone up

3.4 We were taught that religion is between you and Allah. Today, people who gather around religion are show offs. I think they are not believers, but they pretend to be. Religious communities are the same way

3.5 I prefer plain clothes, I don't like designer clothes much or exaggerated brand preferences. I never wear fur. Bags and clothes with big logos, too much make up and revealing clothes would never be my choice. I prefer plain clothes and don't like wearing fashion brands. I really dislike extravagant brand choices

4.3 I am more interested in the outcomes such as how Ali Elmacı's "Vahdettin" sculpture was attacked in Contemporary İstanbul two years ago or again how Koç's collection was attacked in Abdülmecit mansion during the biennial this year. Some members of the middle class, in the name of their ideologies, appeared as big collectors and big players in the art scene in big companies; those were only for show. In order collaborate with international companies, they had to create an image that was above their real individual and family status and ideological values. Being a collector is the best way to appear as a member of the company

4.4 I am a big fan of Dostoyevsky. My favorite book is Harper Lee's "To Kill a Mockingbird". I liked the movie too. As for music, I listen to any kind of music I find some emotion. I like jazz. For the last couple of years, I took an interest in ethnic music; lately I like listening to Iranian music.

5.4 What I understand from democracy is to be free. The head of state can take all decisions. I believe that we deteriorated economically; our salaries are not enough. In the past, one member of the family could earn a livelihood for the entire family but now the whole family has to work.

5.5 What is undemocratic is telling women what to wear or what not to wear, lack of freedom of thought; all these points out the absence of democracy.

5.6 What is undemocratic is telling women what to wear or what not to wear, lack of freedom of thought; all these points out the absence of democracy.

5.7 I love cycling. I was professionally interested. However, I was thinking of quitting from time to time because there was no woman cyclist. The fact that there was no woman cyclist made me upset. There was also peer pressure because I did this sport with men. I often thought about quitting

TABLE 4.25 (Continued)

1.6 We probably don't enjoy the same kind of music and places, but this wouldn't prevent us from living together. I want girls to be educated, not married at a young age. This is the point where my intolerance begins.

1.7 I wouldn't want to be attached to AKP supporters politically. I value people because they are humans. My best friend at college wears the turban but if we clash politically, we can't stay friends.

1.8 I think the country is being deliberately polarized. There is absolute oppression from government; economically, legally and in terms of life style. This is best reflected in president's words: "Either you take sides, or you are set aside." I think that polarization is not about religion. It is entirely economic; majority of people's hands are tied.

1.9 When we consider me and the people in my circle, as much as we try to live in our own worlds, I believe we all have developed a kind of self-adjustment system. For instance, I often realize that I pay

says he grows his beard because it is a religious tradition and that he doesn't approve it becoming an element of respect

3.6 My dressing style is sporty classic. I stay away from large logos. I like simplicity and I am an advocate of Capsule Wardrobe trend.

3.7 They like show off. People who have the means can certainly buy and wear designer brands but being covered and luxury are not really compatibles.

3.8 We were taught that religion is between you and Allah. Today, people who gather around religion are just show offs. However, I think they are not true believers, some of them pretend. Some of the religious communities are like that too.

3.9 On Friday, almost everyone closes their shop. This has increased a lot. I think they do this to portray a certain image. If the government changed, they would return to their old way of life.

4.5 I have two favorite films, and both are about second world war. One of them is "La Vie est Belle" and the other is "Pianist". I like them because they are both about human tragedy and discrimination. I experienced this in my workplace too. France accepted the genocide and everyone at work rushed to my office to find out what I was thinking - Armenian

4.6 I like political and social novels. "Kite Runner", "Kaplumbağalar" by Fakir Baykurt, Ahmet Arif, Sabahattin Ali, Nazim Hikmet, Yasar Kemal are my favorites.
Music: Protest music and Folk music.

5.8 Different voices in society disturb some people. I experience this problem in the association I work. People in my own environment are usually mild-mannered not go-getters. I make all the decisions, actually this is not a good thing, there needs to be a number-two because I ultimately I will have to hand over the baton and my real objective is to develop a "local think tank. Today, it is the same case with our president, there is no number-two person to follow him.

5.9 In this country, foreigners are sympathized more (Syrians and Arabs). We are not sympathized in our own country. My mom tells me, when I was born, in 80's there was the 1980 military coup and persecution towards Alawites, and because of this many of my relatives immigrated to Germany. And now I want to do the same with my spouse. The only way to live humanly in this country is to have a lot of money. The current government is enriching its own environment. There is no chance for others to live.

attention how I should be dressed, what kind of clothes would be proper for certain places. We are also influenced by the attitudes during Ramadan. I don't feel comfortable sharing my views in social media and I don't post

1.10 Being religious is something (it exists in every religion), but 'religionist' is something else; that is about exploitation of religion. Going to Friday prayers doesn't give a person the right to judge others; no religion gives such rights. These people seeing themselves entitled to this is very disturbing. There is symbolic intervention. When such interventions happen outside my own environment, I can't step in of course, but I don't allow it in my immediate circle.

1.11 You can tell the degree of polarisation from Cübbeli Ahmet Efendy (imam) saying, "Close the ranks!"

1.12 We have new project "Fight Islamafobia". The Ministry of Youth and Sports supports this project. The West is against us.

TABLE 4.25 (Continued)

5.10 I believe there is a lot of people who support the AKP because of religion. AKP is using this. You can see this in their talks about religious fellowship. There is always a religious content, so emotions and religion are being exploited.

5.11 I think the country is being deliberately polarized. There is absolute oppression from government; economically, legally and in terms of life style. This is best reflected in president's words: "Either you take sides, or you are set aside." I think that polarisation is not about religion. It is entirely economic; majority of people's hands are tied.


5.12 I voted AKP. I know they are using religion actually, but my inner voice doesn't permit to vote for another party because of my faith in Islam. if I don't vote AKP, I feel that will be wrong

3.3.4. Cluster Analysis

Cluster analysis may be defined as “the classification of similar objects into groups, where the number of groups, as well as their forms are unknown” (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). In qualitative phase, grounded coding process was applied in order to get tangible sociologic clusters, as much as possible, and, finally, abstract categories were created. For this analysis, the QDA5 software tool was used. Similarities have been measured by using **Jaccard's coefficient** that permitted to measure asymmetric information on binary (and non-binary) variables.

This allowed observing how the similar lifestyles values of the informants were grouped. (see Figures 4.38 and 4.39).

Figure 4.38. Jaccard’s Coefficient (Occurrence)-2D



The following lifestyle values groups have been observed by interpreting the cluster analysis and reviewing the interviews of the people who have the characteristics of these groups.


For example, one of these values groups was, “Consume alcohol with friends outside, dress casual or chic depending on the occasion, have new conspicuous consumption habits (simplicity), read books and go the cinema, like trying new tastes in food, do not follow technology but benefit from it” the other group’s lifestyle patterns were “conspicuous consumption and conspicuous morality, wear turban, go to places that serve alcohol if required but never consume alcohol, believe that there should be religious education in schools, the working segment of this group reads personal development books, usually own small or middle size business or they are at managerial position in government agencies or NGO’s, a group who wear turban but also can go out with friends, follows new trends and may smoke”

In the figure 4, values groups have been showed in a dendrogram. In this figure, similarities have been analyzed both in the group and between the groups. It was seen that some values show parallelism with each other among different groups. For instance, people who reflect traditional LS patterns such as, friendships in their close circles, spending time with their friends in shopping malls, living with family or have some similar values with people who have modern life style, going out to drink with friends rarely (although not liked to be mentioned) and listening to music and want to go concerts. This group, which has relatively low economic income and educational capital, was observed to be particularly against conspicuous morality even religion is important in their lives.

The group, which is named as Kemalists and republicans, is similar values compared to the group that has high social awareness and social sensitivity, but they differ in their tone of nationalism and approach to certain social events.

Those who highlight their Ethnic Identities and those who have liberal and high cultural values show some parallels, especially in terms of views on minorities and cultural activities. It was seen that different groups were parallel in terms of some values. Their differences and boundaries were interpreted by considering cluster analysis and interviews. These fluidities are shown in “Figure 4.39” by arrows.

Figure 4.39. Jaccard's Coefficient (Occurrence)



3.3.4.1. Characteristics of Life-Style Groups

Low Levels of Economic, Low Social and Cultural Capital, but Shows “Urban-Modern” Qualities

- This group is predominantly AKP voters, but they often criticize the government for use of religion as a political tool, for restriction of freedom, and the deterioration of the economy. The group they criticize are the ones whom they think practice religion only for show. However, majority of this group says if there is an election today, they will vote for the AKP.
- They prefer popular books like Dan Brown’s novels or “Çılgın Türkler”. They prefer to watch TV series like “Kurtlar Vadisi” and comedy shows like The “Tolga Show”. They go for summer holidays and stay at a hotel.
- They rarely drink alcohol with their friends and, even if they do it rarely, they still find it difficult to admit it.
- They rarely go out to dinner with friends
- They believe the “Turban” has become an element only for show for a group of people, and that religion is being exploited
- They believe self-interest is prevalent and that economic and political favoritism exists in daily life as well.
- They go to shopping malls with their neighbors or with friends from primary school in their spare time.
- Even though they are different from the group wearing the turban and employees in public institutions, they have similarities in terms of a limited social circle and family.
- They relate identity to profession, not to religion or ethnic.
- They believe there should be religious education at schools since families may be inadequate in this function.
- They point out that the biggest change in their life is in economic terms. They say, while in the past, one member of the family could earn a livelihood for the entire family, now they could hardly make ends meet even though the whole family works.

The Easy-Way Seekers Who Say “ME FIRST”

- They primarily work in sectors like public relations, advertising, and consulting.
- Their social capital is higher than cultural capital
- They tend to reason out religion.
- Usually, their families have liberal political views too.
- They think there is economic and political favoritism.
- They do outdoor sports (ski, trekking, cycling etc.)
- They eat out more frequently.
- Their religious beliefs don't influence their daily life. But, some of them fast in Ramadan.
- They act more on their own personal values.
- They are blamed by social democrats for not being sensitive to corporate interests and social events, thus being selfish and only thinking of themselves.
- They stand out as a group that is relatively less conscious of social problems, tending to live in their own world and not acting as long as their own self-interest is in question, and they usually continue their struggles based on competition.
- They appear to care about knowledge and career, but usually they wish to accomplish things without hard work and take the easy way out. They seem to be the kind of people who are more interested in getting ahead of others on the way to their personal targets. Their culture is superficial, limited with knowledge they get from social media. They mainly prefer personal development books.
- They are more entrepreneurial than other groups.

Working, Urban & Wearing Turban (Herself or The Spouse)

- Paid employee at NGO, holding managerial position/civil servant at municipalities or state institutions, mostly with college degree.

- They don't go to places that serve alcohol unless necessary, do not drink alcohol.
- Criticize authoritarian rule and bossism, think people around them are bland and passive, accept the situation but makes self-criticism too. They say they run into problems because of this issue mostly in the NGO's they manage. And later in the discussion, a concern was raised regarding the lack of an alternative to lead the government.
- From a conservative family.
- Work, wear the turban, may use luxury brands with logos, may smoke.
- One of the fragmented groups of the conservative section of society.
- Watch TV series such as "Jet-set", "Payitaht Abdülhamit" and prefer sci-fi foreign TV series.
- Interested in books about personal development but do not tend to read novels
- Express that they are open to foreigners and different religions, but they believe that the West is discriminatory in terms of religion yet remain distant to different religions and ethnic groups.
- Extremely enthusiastic about attending training programs abroad for technology and innovation and think that this will contribute to their personal development.
- Keen and open to see new places.
- Define themselves as statist not party partisans but they vote for the AKP.
- They think there is polarization in Turkey, but they also believe that there is another group that are not belong to this polarization and they think that this create stress on society because it is very difficult to estimate their behavior.
- Spend time with family, go out to eat.
- Go out to drink tea with friends.
- Believe that there should be religious education at schools.
- Go to Friday pray and fast.

Religious Practice Intertwined with Ideology

- Extremely conservative attitude towards women rights.
- Have taboos in their thoughts about women and men.
- Even if they suffer discrimination, they don't blame institutions but criticize people.
- Never drink alcoholic drinks.
- They are open new products and technology
- Spouse wears the turban; they think a woman wearing turban should behave in appropriate manners; she should not smoke, kiss in public etc.
- Less educated compared to the other conservative groups.
- Think that there should be religious education at schools.
- Use religious symbols in their daily lives frequently.
- Go to Friday pray and wish to go to hajj and umrah.

Conservatives Who Display Conspicuous Consumption

- They have high amount of economic capital, open to luxury consumption.
- Usually company owners in the construction sector.
- They have conservative sense of art (interested in abstract painting)
- Pay special attention to go to Friday prayers.
- Technology has an important place in their lives.
- Eat out frequently.
- Go to holidays in Turkey and abroad.
- Luxury consumption (at home, at the workplace, and in clothing)

This group is perceived by liberals, seculars and low-income conservatives, and some Islamic groups in these ways:

- Using religious symbols in everyday life, but they are using luxury brands, cars etc. to show off. Both the secular and the religious say this is not the essence of Islam.

- Being interested in art only because of self-interest; it is believed that they invest in art as an obligation because of their owner status and interest.
- They are the group of people who benefit most from economic and political privileges.

Libertarian and High Cultural Values

- They have zero tolerance for intervention in their life styles and want respect for freedoms
- They read *Cumhuriyet* newspaper and follow *T24*, *DİKEN* and foreign press on web
- They are culturally engaged class.
- Have high cultural tastes about art, follow film and music festivals, and are selective in cultural events they participate.
- Read Elif Şafak, Orhan Pamuk, books on philosophy, psychology etc.
- They don't discriminate ethnically.
- Some of them doesn't use the Pınar brand.
- Think left is fragmented in terms of material value. He/she thinks some liberals, despite the education and the opportunities they have, make different choices and prefer popular places to show off and that even their holiday choices are made in this way. Usually, they react most strongly to this group.
- Usually prefer casual clothes; the quality is important, but they don't have specific brand choices, and they are brand sensitive if it is related about their hobbies.
- Tend to differentiate people according to their cultural activities and backgrounds.
- Think that there is cultural polarization and believe that class struggle occurs over cultural values.
- Do Pilates and fitness.
- Engage in social responsibility activities for fulfillment of their conscientiousness.

New Conspicuous Consumption Habits, High Education Capital

- Usually senior executives of large or international companies and people who are in managerial positions in the financial sector are in this group.
- High level of social capital, mid and high level of economic income. Cultural capital varies according to person but always higher than the average.
- They have their own understanding of luxury consumption. They specifically avoid big logos, exaggerated and ostentatious clothing styles, prefer to dress simply and elegantly, and tend to enliven clothes with designer jewelry.
- They say that they prefer to go to the movies, read books, and socialize with friends and their close circle in their free time. They attend festivals (the popular ones).
- Usually prefer popular movies.
- This groups of people in the past, as white-collar professionals, used to be interested in art because of their artistic notions, but this class is nowadays far from being art collectors when their purchasing habits are considered. In the past, doctors, lawyers, bank managers were interested in art (although in a very limited way, some still are), but they don't collect anymore and are removed from this interest because of the shift of capital to different segments of society.
- They complain about political uncertainty yet do not choose to become a part of change individually or by participating in NGOs.
- Have their kid study in private or foreign schools.
- They don't follow technology but benefit from it.
- They do Pilates/fitness.
- They believe that there is symbolic polarization (tend to identify differentiation with the turban) and this polarization is supported by government.
- Decorate their homes in a modern style.
- Prefer organic food.

- Drink alcohol with their friends.
- They think that there is a polarization in terms of lifestyle and express this by saying “To start with, we socialize in different ways because they don’t drink.” They mostly say they try to live in their own world, and they believe that they all have developed a kind of self-adjustment system.
- They follow the newspapers online.
- Sometimes they dress up because of work but usually prefer casual clothes.
- Tend to identify being cultured with watching TV series in English or going to abroad and experiencing some special events.

Kemalist, Republican and Follow Politics Regularly

- They are usually from teacher, lawyer or high-level civil servant families.
- They read *Sözcü* or *Aydınlık*
- They like action movies and watch films about Independence War.
- They make a lot of political criticism.
- They don’t want their children to marry people of different ethnic origins (however, they have positive attitude if he or she is Christian or other religion but Turkish.) They are more open to sectarian differences rather than ethnic differences; they don’t want people of different sects to be socially, economically and politically discriminated against.
- Listen to both alternative foreign music and Turkish music. They also like folk songs.
- They never use Ülker brand and remain distant to brands such as BIM and Torku.
- They think that there is serious economic and political favoritism. They don’t criticize polarization but believe that there is polarization in the political sphere. Their basic criticism is about the inequality and injustice in economic and political life.
- They think that religious education should be given to students who choose it, and that it should be at a certain level

High Social Consciousness and Sensitive to Social Events and social Changes

- High-level white-collar professionals, former bureaucrats, retirees, teachers, faculty members, artisans are in this group. Actually, this is the most heterogenous groups in terms of socio-economic status.
- They have a high culture sense of art.
- They have high culture interests. They engage (or would like to) in a field of art or sports branch even if it is at an amateur level.
- They read *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and follow columnists and foreign press. (After the *Hurriyet* newspaper was taken over by the Demiroren group, some readers have stopped reading *Hurriyet*.)
- They read Russian classics and prefer the books of Hakan Günday, Atilla İlhan, Yaşar Kemal, Sabahattin Ali, Bekir Yıldız, Haruki Murakami and follow foreign publications in their area to interest.
- Listen to jazz, rock or classical music
- They complain most about people getting increasingly disrespectful and intolerant
- They think there is gender discrimination, and they are very much against it.
- They approach religion from a moral and spiritual perspective and thinks there should be no intervention in this area.
- Although they wouldn't object to their children marrying people from a different religion, sect or ethnic origin, they would never want them to be with a radical religionist.
- They complain that new executives and white-collar professionals are selfish, doesn't read, seek shortcuts in everything.
- They think male dominance is spreading and complain that men bring their masculinity to the fore because they don't have any other qualities to put forth, and that covered women allow this to happen.
- They care about being a good and honest person.

- They don't approve of religious education in schools. Some say, if religious education is to be given, then it should be at certain level and according to every student's own religion and sect or should be taught from a cultural perspective.
- The number of brands they protest is higher in this group: Ülker, Mado, BIM, A 101 etc.
- Republic and related values are important for their life.
- They like socializing and they care about environmental problems.
- While they have some similarities with the nationalist wing of the left, they differ from them with their interest in art and literature, their sociability.
- They think there is no freedom of expression.
- The desire to work socially or for a charity in an association is seen most in this group.
- They think conservatives are also fragmented among themselves.
- They don't believe in organic food but try to consume healthy and in season.
- Very sensitive about women and children's rights.

Minorities Who Live in Their Own Communities with a Closed Lifestyle

- They read *Cumhuriyet* and follow columnists.
- Think the turban is only for show.
- They believe there is religious discrimination and religious polarization
- They think there is favoritism in the economic sense, and there is political support from almost all segments of society for the sake of self-interest.
- Have a relatively higher sense of art.
- They think there is no freedom of expression.
- Listen to jazz and classical music.

Those Who Are Uncomfortable with The Change in Society

- Some of their life-styles patterns are intertwined with other groups
- Usually vote for "MHP", but voted for "İyi Parti" in the last election

- They are conservative because of their family structure and have strong family ties
- They strive to upgrade their social status one step further than their families
- They complain about how forming of factions and the strong oppressing the weak has become common in society.
- They try to follow the latest trend and go to the popular venues.
- They tend to emphasize the brand name in products like cars and motorcycles.
- They believe that religion is between man and his god and blame others for showing off.
- Relatively educated, generally studied in general high schools and state universities.
- They believe in the importance and values of the country, and this belief is a factor in their movie and book choices.
- They are interested in what is going around them.

Political Identities Are at The Forefront in Their Lives

- Read “*Birgün*” newspaper and follow “*Diken* “on internet.
- Listen to protest music and folk music.
- Prefer ideological books.
- They are against TV series because of their content.
- Complain about economic and political uncertainty.
- There is more than one brand they protest.
- They don’t feel uncomfortable being friends with people who wear the turban. Boundaries become evident when religion is approached ideologically. They say they prefer not to socialize with them if religion is approached ideologically.
- They think that, in the past marriages of different sects and ethnic origins created problems, but today this is usually not an important issue; however, they would never marry or let their daughters marry radical Islamists and ultranationalists.

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this thesis was to examine the overlap of middle-class lifestyles within the context of Islamization, and its approach is neither entirely structuralist nor based on purely agency approach. This thesis criticizes pure agency approaches that overemphasize culture and undermine the embedded power relations of ideologies. Consumerist ideology tends to reduce the idea of freedom to “freedom of choice” and cultural rights while overlooking the role of social and political rights in determining the free will of individuals. The approaches that are based on cultural agency usually tend to celebrate glocalization because of its potential to open new windows of opportunity for the self-expression of the local cultures within a global context. Interpreting social change merely in terms of lifestyles tend to dismiss the relation between ideology and culture. Glorifying all cultural movements as freedom of expression overlooks the role of class struggles in shaping culture and ideology.

This thesis adopts a dynamic approach to ideology and culture and examines the class structure in Turkey by exploring the relationship between everyday life and cultural hegemonic struggles without excluding ideologies. Accordingly, ideas, values, lifestyles are not isolated entities but often come into view to support certain social movements aiming to organize the social space according to some higher ideal or ideology. In this frame, drawing on Bourdieu’s life-style class analysis, middle class in Turkey has been revisited. While socio-cultural structure was analyzed statistically, class dynamics was examined through discourse analysis.

In quantitative part, first, a bottom-up modelling has been applied and the data were explored staying within the methodological rules. A coherent structure was arrived at through recognizable regularities and patterns of individual subjects-items were examined. Second, Bourdieu’s correspondence analysis was used in exploring socio-cultural structure and social space was discussed multidimensionally. Re-analysis of Konda data revealed some confusion between the concept of welfare capitalism and progressiveness. It is observed that in the original Konda analysis, modernity is examined implicitly in terms of openness to

new products and technologies and having positive views on open economy. In original Konda, it is observed that modernism has been correlated to globalism that is reduced to support open economy - to foreign countries and foreign investments. However, it is seen in the correspondence maps that such concept of modernity does not match with democratic values and secularism. Evaluation of globalism only in terms of supporting open economy - to foreign countries and foreign investments - is superficial; what is universal is social tolerance. When the Konda research was re-analyzed; it is seen that those who are open to new products and change do not show the same attitudes about social tolerance.

Even though, the ideological dimension is not directly analyzed in the original Konda research (there are no items measuring left-right ideology dimension; social state and the approach to democracy in social space are not directly queried), items concerning cosmopolitanism are implicitly assumed as a dimension of progressiveness. However, my analysis revealed that this might not be the case. This thesis emphasizes the idea that progressiveness needs to be evaluated in terms of social rights and democratic values, and its capacity to provide better and sustainable conditions in health and education and take the society further by developing it culturally rather than the concept that capitalism alone presents progressiveness within consumerist sign system.

Unlike Konda research, two different dimensions emerged in this analysis. One of them is “cultural liberalism” and the other is “cultural conservatism”. Distinctions of Konda research, such as “authoritarian” and “democratic”, have not emerged as dimensions in this analysis. It can be observed that the values determining authoritarianism (the ones who say military may come in power, political parties can be shut down and Kurds are provoked by foreign countries) are highly conjunctural. The Kurdish issue which appears under authoritarianism should be discussed separately as another point at issue. In order to be accepted as a dimension, it should be defined as an ideology space, and should not be considered conjuncturally. For this reason, authoritarian axis in the Konda research needs to be questioned. Another prominent finding appears in educational capital. Secular

values increase concurrently with the educational capital and the lifestyle values differ accordingly regardless professional position.

In this field of research which has social consequences, it can be dangerous to reflect the research findings as a social fact. The fact that such researches can artificially create social realities through media diffusion should always be considered. It should be noted that the findings are often fiction as well, however I would like to underline that the word fiction here doesn't refer to manipulation. Certainly, every researcher has his or her own point of view; what is important in this kind of research is its confirmable with scientific methods. Especially in lifestyle and social structure analysis, relations between the research and media should be more transparent and open to discussion. In this sense, half-baked facts should particularly be avoided.

In terms of lifestyle values, two main groups emerge in re-analyze of Konda research. In the first group, despite their differences in some values, "religious" and "patriarchal" values in their life come to the front. In this group we see, shop owners with low education capital, middle class retirees with low education capital, middle class housewives, unemployed with low education capital, managers with low education capital. The ones who don't use internet in their daily life and banking transactions, who invest in real estate and have religious and patriarchal values have differentiated as managers and business owners with low education capital. Second group that has more modern LS values appears as; owners, student, professionals, managers, government officials, retirees with high educational capitals. Based on these results, fragmented structure and the heterogeneous nature of these two basic groups, which differ from each other in terms of LS values, have been detailed in qualitative research. In the first phase, classes were evaluated in terms of lifestyles and values based on these maps that were developed by drawing on Bourdieu's social class analyses. Thus, an evaluation of the static picture made and in the second phase - the qualitative analysis - discourse analysis was carried out in order to elaborate on the dynamics of the middle class. As a result, the daily economic and political struggles and boundaries of the fragmented classes were examined and interpreted.

One of the most striking findings that appear in the qualitative research is that these two different groups are highly fragmented than expected and each have struggles within their own group and they are aware of their boundaries. It is observed that although they have common values, each of these fragmented classes in society has tendency to live in their own environment and they do not have much contact with other groups.

In the qualitative analysis, five basic themes emerged and changes in conspicuous consumption, conspicuous morality, cultural hegemony and favoritism appear as the major differences in everyday life. The group that attracts the resentment of both classes is the group that wears Turban and dressed head to toe with luxury brands. Their lifestyle and consumption choices have been criticized by fractions of both conservative and secular classes. This segment differentiates itself from other conservative middle-class fractions. This group is criticized heavily since it is believed that such behavior and consumption can never be a part of Islam's essence and these people bring conspicuous morality to the front due to their economic and political interests as well. Thus, in discourse analysis it became apparent that Turban increasingly being evaluated by some fractions of middle class as a symbol that combines economic and political interests, rather than a religious symbol, or freedom to use. While this mentioned class fraction differentiates themselves in such a manner, the secular segment of the middle class appears to become simpler in their consumption behaviors that is called as a "new conspicuous consumption" in this thesis.

The other crucial theme "cultural hegemony" appears in discourse analysis. As seen in this research, cultural hegemony is mostly shaped throughout everyday economic and political struggles over symbolic power. This thesis emphasizes that those who can control the cultural sphere can influence people's understandings and conceptions about their identities as well. Cultural space and everyday symbols can be utilized intensively in order to mobilize common identity. And the symbols that are full of meanings, offer propositions about how the world should be. Accordingly, it may be seen that these symbols are used for political mobilization and aimed to implement certain ideology for making it dominant in society. In

qualitative analysis, it is seen that Islamic symbols, including Turban, have emerged as rigid borders in order to differentiate the user from the others and therefore has turned into signs. The ruling party has popularized them and help them become signs instead of symbols, they have lost their meanings and have begun to establish borders that differentiate themselves from other groups of class. In other words, these symbols have become “Floating signifiers” (Baudrillard, 1993). In this sense, these symbols are used as manifestation of a group identity, a group with close ties with the powerful, regardless of the true beliefs and views the individual within the group, allowing observers to witness the demolition of the original and making kitsch copies as a semiotic construction.

As a matter of fact, places such as “Huqqa” mentioned in the research, serve as a good example in explaining this situation. Sisha and pompous sisha places, which are essentially traditional and not relevant with young people, today have become distinguishing objects. However, “Huqqa” is not any different from Reina, a popular venue of its time. At the same time, an “empty signifier” paves the way for a floating signifier and thus new areas of freedom emerge. This is best seen in Turban example. Turban has been freed from ideological burden of the past and replaced “başörtüsü” and therefore different interpretations are encountered. In other words, Turban of 2000’s is different from Turban of 1990’s. In 1990’s, being against Turban meant being against totalitarian ideology, however today, being against Turban, which replaced “başörtüsü” and for which different tying styles have emerged, is out of question. It is seen that the main problems of the people I interviewed with were not related about wearing Turban, it was largely criticized because of the functions it possesses as a sign. In this sense, their reaction was that the group that differentiate them-self from the rest of the society as a “privilege sign”. In other words, it is observed that economic and political struggles were made over signs and Turban has lost its value meaning by turning into a sign of distinction (Baudrillard, 1993).

Today it is evident that MC cannot be directly attributed a progressive role. This points out to the importance of taking mobilization and economic and politic struggles into consideration in class analysis and the significance of

multidimensional analysis. Clientelist networks and mobilizations that emerged in the past are among the most effective factors that shape the MC in Turkey. In 1980's the exclusion of social security and economic rights of the working class from the category of legal-public rights has brought along various socio-economic problems that had the potential to create social tension like mass impoverishment. Patron-client networks were established in that environment. It can be said that the presence of a highly developed charity mechanism in a conjuncture where unemployment and poverty are increasing rapidly. With charity activities such as providing gifts and rations on religious holidays, a bond was established between small capital business owners and their employees. And these networks form the voter base of today's governing party, AKP. When these networks are examined, it is seen that the sharing of resources has changed into economic and political struggle. Thoughts mentioned about this subject are grouped under the theme "favoritism" and it emerges as the theme with the highest frequency. In this sense, favoritism offers mutual benefit for both who gain loyalty and for who obtain wealth or status.

In this frame, this thesis sets forth the importance of class mobilizations in understanding lifestyles and everyday struggle that generate in the dynamic structure of the social space. This study queries the analyzes that create a kind of dichotomous polarization that take culture as a single dimension by ignoring class dynamics too. In class analyses, distinctions such as "pious-impious" or "oppressor-oppressed" should be avoided due to its highly fragmented and transitional structures. For example, as seen in qualitative research, those who have a modern lifestyle, social tolerance and high secular values can also have religious and moral sentiment. Or there are tradesmen who have a liberal vision and a modern lifestyle. Results shows that the working class also differs within itself. Therefore, it should be noted that classes can be mobilized in different ways due to discursive and symbolic construction. In class struggles, symbols are not only cultural, they are also used politically. The important point here is whether this political ideology intends to bring the society forward or backward.

This thesis, which doesn't leave out the ideological dimension, adopts a different and versatile method in understanding the middle class in Turkey today.

This has led to the questioning of past perspectives and studies at a certain level, and a different model has been developed by considering culture as an intermediary between the whole and its parts.

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
APPENDIXES

KONDA 2008 DATA ANALYSIS


DATA PREPARATION AND EXPLORATION

1. Values Opinion Ideology


Individualistic/collectivist




Conservatism/Modernism




Globalism




Authoritarianism/Democracy




Tolerance




Media




Kurds




Diversity



Secular





Gender



2. Life style Values

From bar-charts, we can see a polarization in most issues, disagree and agree are bi-modal, make two peaks. Hence, it has decided to recode into binary values






Descriptive and Internal Reliabilities (Value Opinion Ideology)

```
##          vars      n mean   sd median trimmed mad min max range skew
## Family good      1 6481 1.93 0.26      2    2.00  0  1  2     1 -3.31
## Neigboor good    2 6481 1.54 0.50      2    1.55  0  1  2     1 -0.15
## Fellow citizen   3 6481 1.48 0.50      1    1.47  0  1  2     1  0.08
## Counry good      4 6481 1.81 0.39      2    1.89  0  1  2     1 -1.60
## Own good         5 6481 1.45 0.50      1    1.44  0  1  2     1  0.19

##          kurtosis   se
## Family good          8.95 0.00
## Neigboor good       -1.98 0.01
## Fellow citizen      -1.99 0.01
## Counry good          0.55 0.00
## Own good            -1.96 0.01
```



```
> descr(group)
      vars      n mean   sd median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis   se
Family_good 6481 1.93 0.26      2    2.00  0  1  2     1 -3.31    8.95 0.00
Neighb_good  2 6481 1.54 0.50      2    1.55  0  1  2     1 -0.15   -1.98 0.01
Fellowcountr 3 6481 1.48 0.50      1    1.47  0  1  2     1  0.08   -1.99 0.01
Country_good 4 6481 1.81 0.39      2    1.89  0  1  2     1 -1.60    0.55 0.00
Own_good     5 6481 1.45 0.50      1    1.44  0  1  2     1  0.19   -1.96 0.01

Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:
  5 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:
      1      2      logit
Family_good  0.0721 0.9279  2.5555
Neighb_good  0.4627 0.5373  0.1493
```

```

Fellowcountryman 0.5201 0.4799 -0.0806
Country_good     0.1881 0.8119  1.4625
Own_good         0.5471 0.4529 -0.1891

```

Frequencies of total scores:

```

    0 1 2 3 4 5
Freq 0 0 0 0 0 119

```

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

```

                Included Excluded
Family_good     0.4254  0.2406
Neighb_good     0.7518  0.4835
Fellowcountryman 0.7460  0.4732
Country_good    0.5641  0.3007
Own_good        0.4186  0.0348

```

Cronbach's alpha:

```

All Items                0.5206
Excluding Family_good    0.5004
Excluding Neighb_good    0.3152
Excluding Fellowcountryman 0.3236
Excluding Country_good   0.4596
Excluding Own_good       0.6330

```

Pairwise Associations:

```

  Item i Item j p.value
1       3       5    0.8
2       2       5    0.3
3       1       5 5e-04
4       4       5 1e-06
5       1       4 <2e-16
6       1       3 <2e-16
7       1       2 <2e-16
8       2       4 <2e-16
9       3       4 <2e-16
10      2       3 <2e-16


```

> descr(change)

```

      vars   n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range  skew kurtosis  se
Newprod   1 6481 1.68 0.47     2   1.72  0  1  2     1 -0.75   -1.43 0.01
Newidea   2 6481 1.71 0.45     2   1.76  0  1  2     1 -0.93   -1.14 0.01
Newtech   3 6481 1.73 0.44     2   1.79  0  1  2     1 -1.06   -0.88 0.01
TK_chg_frust 4 6481 1.47 0.50     1   1.46  0  1  2     1  0.13   -1.98 0.01
Supprt_chg 5 6481 1.49 0.50     1   1.49  0  1  2     1  0.04   -2.00 0.01
Chg_positive 6 6481 1.47 0.50     1   1.46  0  1  2     1  0.12   -1.99 0.01

```



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

6 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Newproduct	0.3234	0.6766	0.7382
Newidea	0.2896	0.7104	0.8973
Newtech	0.2659	0.7341	1.0158
TK_chg_frustrating	0.5322	0.4678	-0.1289
Supprt_chg	0.5090	0.4910	-0.0361
Chg_makeme_positve	0.5297	0.4703	-0.1189

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Freq	0	0	0	0	0	0	507

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

	Included	Excluded
Newproduct	0.6353	0.4349
Newidea	0.6747	0.4949
Newtech	0.6581	0.4786
TK_chg_frustrating	0.4221	0.1551
Supprt_chg	0.6700	0.4649
Chg_makeme_positve	0.6896	0.4925

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.6841

```

Excluding Newproduct      0.6363
Excluding Newidea        0.6173
Excluding Newtech        0.6235
Excluding TK_chg_frustrating 0.7280
Excluding Supprt_chg     0.6253
Excluding Chg_makeme_positve 0.6152

```

```

> descr(global)
      vars   n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis  se
Foreigns   1 6481 1.15 0.36    1   1.06  0  1  2    1  1.98    1.93 0.00
Buy properties
Econ_open  2 6481 1.72 0.45    2   1.77  0  1  2    1 -0.98   -1.04 0.01
to foreign
TK_envr    3 6481 1.80 0.40    2   1.87  0  1  2    1 -1.49    0.23 0.00
protection_actv

```



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

3 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Foreigns_buy_property	0.8520	0.1480	-1.7506
Econ_open_foreign	0.2802	0.7198	0.9435
TK_envr_protection_actv	0.2007	0.7993	1.3817

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3
Freq	0	0	0	539

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

	Included	Excluded
Foreigns_buy_property	0.5545	0.1190

```
Econ_open_foreign      0.7336  0.2271
TK_envr_protection_actv 0.6353  0.1565
```


Cronbach's alpha:

```
value
All Items      0.2989
Excluding Foreigns_buy_property 0.3090
Excluding Econ_open_foreign      0.0697
Excluding TK_envr_protection_actv 0.2413
```

Pairwise Associations:

```
Item i Item j p.value
1      1      3  0.004
2      1      2 <2e-16
3      2      3 <2e-16
```

```
> descr(tolerance)
      vars n mean d median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis  se
GroomBride
ethnic      1 6481 1.54 0.50  2   1.56  0  1  2    1 -0.18  -1.97 0.01
GroomBride      2 6481 1.44 0.50  1   1.42  0  1  2    1  0.24  -1.94 0.01
sect
GroomBride      3 6481 1.30 0.46  1   1.25  0  1  2    1  0.88  -1.23 0.01
reign
Bride_maycover_head 4 6481 1.60 0.49  2   1.62  0  1  2    1 -0.41  -1.83 0.01
Different      5 6481 1.10 0.30  1   1.00  0  1  2    1  2.61   4.83 0.00
sexual_preference
```



```
## Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
## Sample:5 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values
## Proportions for each level of response:
```

```


##              1      2  logit
## Ethnic      0.4556 0.5444 0.1779
## Sect        0.5601 0.4399 -0.2416
## religion    0.7010 0.2990 -0.8519
## cover head  0.4001 0.5999 0.4051
## sexual pref. 0.8971 0.1029 -2.1652
## Frequencies of total scores:
##      0 1 2 3 4   5
## Freq 0 0 0 0 0 1271
## Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:
##              Included Excluded
## Ethnic              0.7676   0.5626
## Sect                0.8023   0.6203
## religion            0.7652   0.5818
## cover head         0.5292   0.2329
## sexual pref.       0.3705   0.1782
## Cronbach's alpha:
##              value
## All Items        0.6763
## Excluding ethnic 0.5589
## Excluding sect   0.5278
## Excluding religion 0.5542
## Excluding cover head 0.7156
## Excluding sexual pref. 0.7078

```

```

> descr(authoritarian)
##          vars   n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range skew
## democracy    1 6481 4.17 0.80     4    4.29 0.00  1  5    4 -1.33
## military     2 6481 3.08 1.31     3    3.11 1.48  1  5    4 -0.24
## party close  3 6481 3.18 1.28     4    3.22 1.48  1  5    4 -0.30
##          kurtosis  se
## democracy      2.92 0.01
## military       -1.18 0.02
## party close    -1.09 0.02

```



```
## Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
##
## Sample:
## 3 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values
##
## Proportions for each level of response:
##           1      2      3      4      5
## democratic 0.0148 0.0265 0.0785 0.5292 0.3509
## military   0.1603 0.2046 0.1545 0.3512 0.1295
## party close 0.1353 0.1998 0.1640 0.3543 0.1466
##
## Frequencies of total scores:
```

```
##           3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
## Freq 30 8 30 212 538 732 717 957 822 1257 536 273 369
##
## Cronbach's alpha:
##           value
## All Items      0.4617
## Excluding democracy 0.6569
## Excluding military 0.1049
## Excluding party 0.0070
```

```

> descr(media)
      vars   n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis  se
Newsp      1 6481 1.79 0.41    2    1.86  0  1  2    1 -1.42    0.01 0.01
write_govern
mistakes
Newsp      2 6481 1.73 0.44    2    1.79  0  1  2    1 -1.06    -0.88 0.01
misinform
Newsp      3 6481 1.36 0.48    1    1.33  0  1  2    1  0.57    -1.68 0.01
allthesame

Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:
  3 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:
              1    2  logit
Newsp_write_govn_mistakes 0.2109 0.7891  1.3194
Newsp_misinform            0.2660 0.7340  1.0150
Newsp_allthesame          0.6363 0.3637 -0.5594

Frequencies of total scores:
  0 1 2  3
Freq 0 0 0 427

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:
              Included Excluded
Newsp_write_govn_mistakes 0.5695  0.0951
Newsp_misinform           0.6748  0.1903
Newsp_allthesame          0.6245  0.0583


```

```

Cronbach's alpha:
              value
All Items    0.2115
Excluding Newspaper_write_govn_mistakes 0.1874
Excluding Newspaper_misinform -0.0393
Excluding Newspaper_allthesame 0.2883

Pairwise Associations:
  Item i Item j p.value
1    1    3    0.1
2    2    3 <2e-16
3    1    2 <2e-16
> descr(kurd)
      vars   n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis  se
Govern_behave 1 6481 1.33 0.47    1    1.29  0  1  2    1  0.71  -1.50
differtto_Kurd
Kurds_want    2 6481 1.66 0.47    2    1.70  0  1  2    1 -0.69  -1.53
newgovenm
Foreignc      3 6481 1.80 0.40    2    1.87  0  1  2    1 -1.47   0.18
provoke_Kurds
              se
Govern_behave_differtto_Kurd 0.01
Kurds_want_newgovenm        0.01
Foreignc_provoke_Kurds     0.00

```



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

3 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Govern_behave_differtto_Kurd	0.6672	0.3328	-0.6955
Kurds_want_newgovenm	0.3374	0.6626	0.6747
Foreignc_provoke_Kurds	0.2032	0.7968	1.3664

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3
Freq	0	0	0	555

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

	Included	Excluded
Govern_behave_differtto_Kurd	0.5623	0.0203
Kurds_want_newgovenm	0.7331	0.2634
Foreignc_provoke_Kurds	0.6265	0.2019

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.2785
Excluding Govern_behave_differtto_Kurd	0.4893
Excluding Kurds_want_newgovenm	-0.0710
Excluding Foreignc_provoke_Kurds	0.1135


Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	1	3 0.006
2	1	2 1e-06
3	2	3 <2e-16

Browse[1]> descr(gender)

	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew
Family_bankacc_women	1	6481	1.63	0.48	2	1.66	0	1	2	1	-0.54
women_shake_hand	2	6481	1.74	0.44	2	1.80	0	1	2	1	-1.08

Abortion	3	6481	1.45	0.50	1	1.43	0	1	2	1	0.22
Tubebaby	4	6481	1.77	0.42	2	1.84	0	1	2	1	-1.29
No_formal_rel.marriage	5	6481	1.14	0.35	1	1.05	0	1	2	1	2.05
Religious_marriage_must	6	6481	1.79	0.40	2	1.87	0	1	2	1	-1.45
Formal_marriage_must	7	6481	1.90	0.30	2	2.00	0	1	2	1	-2.72
Women_needpermit_towork	8	6481	1.69	0.46	2	1.74	0	1	2	1	-0.83
women_earnmore_problem	9	6481	1.42	0.49	1	1.40	0	1	2	1	0.32
Daught_marry_no_familypermission	10	6481	1.66	0.48	2	1.69	0	1	2	1	-0.65
				kurtosis	se						
Family_bankacc_women				-1.71	0.01						
women_shake_hand				-0.84	0.01						
Abortion				-1.95	0.01						
Tubebaby				-0.33	0.01						
No_formal_religiousmarriage				2.19	0.00						
Religious_marriage_must				0.11	0.01						
Formal_marriage_must				5.39	0.00						
women_needpermit_towork				-1.31	0.01						
women_earnmore_problem				-1.90	0.01						
Daught_marry_no_familypermission				-1.57	0.01						



```
## Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
## Sample:
## 10 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values
##
## Proportions for each level of response:
##
##          1      2      logit
## family bank acc. women      0.3706 0.6294 0.5296
## women shake hands          0.2629 0.7371 1.0308
## abortion                  0.5536 0.4464 -0.2153
```

```

## tube baby                0.2287 0.7713  1.2158
## no formal religious marriage 0.8577 0.1423 -1.7966
## religious marriage must    0.2063 0.7937  1.3474
## formal marriage must      0.0972 0.9028  2.2286
## women need permit to work 0.3080 0.6920  0.8096
## women earn more problem   0.5797 0.4203 -0.3215
## daught.no need family permit to marry 0.3447 0.6553  0.6424
##
## Frequencies of total scores:
##      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

```

```

## Freq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
##
##
## Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:
##
##              Included Excluded
## family bank acc. women    0.4425  0.1541
## women shake hands         0.4749  0.2207
## abortion                  0.5187  0.2356
## tube baby                 0.4878  0.2493
## no formal religious marriage 0.1609 -0.0586
## religious marriage must   0.2173 -0.0370
## formal marriage must     0.2474  0.0636
## women need permit to work 0.2193 -0.0715
## women earn more problem   0.3178  0.0091
## daught.no need family permit to marry 0.4950  0.2214
##
## Cronbach's alpha:
##
##              value
## All Items                0.2796
## Excluding family bank acc. women 0.2281
## Excluding women shake hands  0.1960
## Excluding abortion          0.1782
## Excluding tube baby                0.1847
## Excluding no formal religious marriage 0.3189
## Excluding religious marriage must  0.3184
## Excluding formal marriage must    0.2730
## Excluding women need permit to work 0.3435
## Excluding women earn more problem  0.3083

```

```
## daught.no need family permit to marry 0.1902
```

```
## Pairwise Associations:
```

```
## Item i Item j p.value
```

```
## 1 7 10 0.906
```

```
## 2 9 10 0.301
```

```
## 3 4 7 0.253
```

```
## 4 1 7 0.193
```

```
## 5 4 5 0.013
```

```
## 6 4 9 0.005
```

```
## 7 2 7 0.003
```

```
## 8 3 9 0.001
```

```
## 9 1 9 1e-05
```

```
## 10 1 6 6e-06
```

```
## vars n mean sd median trimmed mad min max range skew
```

```
## EU 1 6481 3.55 1.14 4 3.66 1.48 1 5 4 -0.76
```

```
## muslim 2 6481 3.44 1.12 4 3.51 1.48 1 5 4 -0.55
```


```
## turki 3 6481 3.60 1.02 4 3.67 1.48 1 5 4 -0.67
```

```
## kurtosis se
```

```
## EU -0.21 0.01
```

```
## muslim -0.43 0.01
```

```
## turki 0.02 0.01
```



```
## Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
```

```
## Sample:
```

```
## 3 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values
```

```


## Proportions for each level of response:
##           1      2      3      4      5
## EU       0.0762 0.1143 0.1747 0.4487 0.1861
## Muslim   0.0679 0.1404 0.2291 0.4078 0.1548
## turki_   0.0404 0.1075 0.2344 0.4499 0.1677
##
## Frequencies of total scores:
##      3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15
## Freq 72 21 41 206 260 459 832 1093 913 1595 421 179 389
## Cronbach's alpha:
##
##           value
## All Items      0.5051
## Excluding EU   0.7010
## Excluding Muslim 0.1367
## Excluding Turki 0.2818
##
## Pairwise Associations:
##   Item i Item j p.value
## 1      1      2 <2e-16
## 2      1      3 <2e-16
## 3      2      3 <2e-16

```

```

Browse[1]> descr(fear)
      vars  n mean  sd median trimmed  mad min max range  skew kurtosis  se
Fear      1 6481 4.02 0.94      4   4.17 0.00   1  5   4 -1.22   1.44 0.01
Bad.economy
Fear.sharia 2 6481 3.44 1.30      4   3.55 1.48   1  5   4 -0.45  -1.02 0.02
Fear.drought 3 6481 4.10 0.85      4   4.22 0.00   1  5   4 -1.21   1.86 0.01
Fear      4 6481 3.94 0.94      4   4.08 0.00   1  5   4 -1.10   1.13 0.01
Disengage
tradition
Fear      5 6481 3.86 1.13      4   4.02 1.48   1  5   4 -1.06   0.35 0.01
Division
country
Fear      6 6481 3.14 1.22      3   3.17 1.48   1  5   4 -0.24  -0.99 0.02
alienated_EU
Fear      7 6481 3.62 1.17      4   3.73 1.48   1  5   4 -0.71  -0.48 0.01
nolifesafety
Fear_     8 6481 3.87 1.08      4   4.01 1.48   1  5   4 -1.01   0.32 0.01
poverty
Fear_     9 6481 4.00 0.95      4   4.15 0.00   1  5   4 -1.17   1.25 0.01
notget_goodedu
Fear_    10 6481 3.79 1.10      4   3.92 1.48   1  5   4 -0.88   0.00 0.01
restriction_
freedom
Fear_    11 6481 3.89 1.07      4   4.03 1.48   1  5   4 -1.01   0.36 0.01
no_socialsecurity

```



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:
11 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5
Fear_badeconomy	0.0236	0.0694	0.0835	0.5073	0.3162
Fear_sharia	0.0929	0.1986	0.1227	0.3442	0.2416
Fear_drought	0.0122	0.0548	0.0776	0.5342	0.3212
Fear_disengage_tradition	0.0233	0.0776	0.1037	0.5291	0.2663
Fear_division_country	0.0535	0.1052	0.0770	0.4518	0.3125
Fear_alienated_EU	0.1176	0.2097	0.2139	0.3331	0.1258
Fear_nolifesafety	0.0583	0.1625	0.1080	0.4393	0.2319
Fear_poverty	0.0400	0.1106	0.0909	0.4590	0.2995
Fear_notget_goodedu	0.0230	0.0753	0.0870	0.5081	0.3066
Fear_restriction_freedom	0.0418	0.1253	0.1089	0.4468	0.2771
Fear_no_socialsecurity	0.0372	0.1075	0.0947	0.4539	0.3066

Frequencies of total scores:

Score	Freq
11	8
12	1
13	3
14	2
15	4
16	8
17	4
18	6
19	19
20	7
21	10
22	62
23	33
24	43
25	33
26	56
27	39
28	72
29	76
30	94
31	101
32	115
33	153
34	158
35	14
36	6
37	162
38	184
39	251
40	39
41	40
42	41
43	42
44	43
45	44
46	45
47	46
48	47
49	48
50	49
51	50
52	51
53	52
54	53
55	54
56	55
57	230
58	320
59	300
60	501
61	412
62	707
63	276
64	259
65	253
66	175
67	216
68	147
69	223
70	126
71	139
72	73
73	274

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.8642
Excluding Fear_badeconomy	0.8532
Excluding Fear_sharia	0.8589
Excluding Fear_drought	0.8531

```

Excluding Fear_disengage_tradition 0.8591
Excluding Fear_division_country 0.8505
Excluding Fear_alienated_EU 0.8733
Excluding Fear_nolifesafety 0.8437
Excluding Fear_poverty 0.8442
Excluding Fear_notget_goodedu 0.8465
Excluding Fear_restriction_freedom 0.8443
Excluding Fear_no_socialsecurity 0.8498


```

Pairwise Associations:

	Item i	Item j	p.value
1	1	3	0.001
2	1	4	0.001
3	1	9	0.001
4	3	4	0.001
5	3	5	0.001
6	3	7	0.001
7	3	8	0.001
8	3	9	0.001
9	3	10	0.001
10	3	11	0.001

```
Browse[1]> descr(demnewspaper)
```

	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Newsp	1	6481	3.94	0.88	4	4.04	0.00	1	5	4	-1.02	1.30	0.01
Write gov_n_mistakes													
Newsp_misinform	2	6481	3.78	1.02	4	3.90	0.00	1	5	4	-0.98	0.55	0.01
Newspallthesame	3	6481	2.96	1.10	3	2.96	1.48	1	5	4	0.03	-0.94	0.01



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

3 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5
Newsp_write_govn_mistakes	0.0170	0.0597	0.1342	0.5445	0.2446
Newsp_misinform	0.0401	0.0949	0.1310	0.5100	0.2240
Newsp_allthesame	0.0827	0.3109	0.2427	0.2927	0.0710

Frequencies of total scores:

	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Freq	13	8	18	71	179	431	708	1627	1262	1305	450	232	177


Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.1732
Excluding Newsp_write_govn_mistakes	0.1171
Excluding Newsp_misinform	-0.0990
Excluding Newsp_allthesame	0.3222

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	0.001
2	3	<2e-16
3	2	<2e-16

secular



```

## Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
Sample:
  7 items and 6481 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:
           1      2  logit
Judge_coverhead      0.4706 0.5294  0.1177
Primary_middle_sch_cover 0.6721 0.3279 -0.7178
Secular              0.2183 0.7817  1.2754
Religious_Law       0.7767 0.2233 -1.2467
Relig_lesson_obligatory 0.4703 0.5297  0.1189
Kids_moral_edu_religon 0.1963 0.8037  1.4098
Govn_must_secular   0.1176 0.8824  2.0156

Frequencies of total scores:
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Freq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:
           Included Excluded
Judge_coverhead      0.6624  0.4032
Primary_middle_sch_cover 0.6255  0.3723
Secular              0.1737 -0.1024
Religious_Law       0.4902  0.2373
Relig_lesson_obligatory 0.6241  0.3499
Kids_moral_edu_religon 0.5927  0.3774
Govn_must_secular   0.1695 -0.0456

Cronbach's alpha:
           value
All Items              0.4816
Excluding Judge_coverhead 0.3464
Excluding Primary_middle_sch_cover 0.3688
Excluding Secular      0.5738
Excluding Religious_Law 0.4394
Excluding Relig_lesson_obligatory 0.3776
Excluding Kids_moral_edu_religon 0.3795
Excluding Govn_must_secular 0.5328

Pairwise Associations:
  Item i Item j p.value
1       6     7  0.379
2       3     6  0.001

```

3	5	7	1e-05
4	3	5	3e-12
5	4	7	<2e-16
6	1	7	<2e-16
7	1	3	<2e-16
8	2	7	<2e-16
9	3	4	<2e-16
10	2	3	<2e-16


```

grm(data = dd)
Coefficients:
                Extrmt1  Dscrmn
Family_good      -2.354   1.396
Neighb_good      -0.103   3.600
Fellowcountryman  0.053   4.251
Country_good     -1.618   1.106
Own_good         3.616   0.052
Log.Lik: -16413.97


Likelihood Ratio Table
                AIC      BIC  log.Lik  LRT df p.value
fit1   34814.20 34854.86 -17401.10
fit2   32847.94 32915.71 -16413.97 1974.26 4 <0.001

```

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Call:

```
grm(data = dd)
```

Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Newproduct	-0.876	0.971
Newidea	-0.925	1.194
Newtech	-1.056	1.183
TK_chg_frustrating	0.379	0.378
Supprt_chg	0.060	4.276
Chg_makeme_positve	0.042	15.641

Log.Lik: -22303.1


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	45973.83	46021.26	-22979.91			
fit2	44630.20	44711.52	-22303.10	1353.62	5	<0.001

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Foreigns_buy_property	3.166	7.430000e-01
Econ_open_foreign	0.091	1.311253e+15
TK_envr_protection_actv	-6.943	3.029132e+14

Log.Lik: -23802.34


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	128231.70	128258.80	-64111.85			
fit2	47616.69	47657.35	-23802.34	80619.01	2	<0.001

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Item Information Curves



Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
GroomBride_ethnic	-1.159	1.193521e+15
GroomBride_sect	-0.457	2.185000e+00
GroomBride_relign	0.187	1.820000e+00
Bride_maycover_head	-1.421	5.270000e-01
Different_sexual_prefernce	3.684	5.450000e-01

Log.Lik: -18383.34

Likelihood Ratio Table


AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
-----	-----	---------	-----	----	---------

```


fit1 99306.08 99346.74 -49647.04
fit2 36786.69 36854.45 -18383.34 62527.4 4 <0.001

```

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Democratic	6.334	-1.609069e+14
Military	1.157	1.366320e+15
Party_closed	0.655	1.048000e+00

Log.Lik: -19700.52


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	103011.57	103038.7	-51501.79			
fit2	39413.04	39453.7	-19700.52	63602.53	2	<0.001

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2




```


Coefficients:
                Extrmt1      Dscrmn
Newsp_write_govn_mistakes  -0.615  1.299973e+15
Newsp_misinform            -0.256  1.017243e+15
Newsp_allthesame           1.128  4.713884e+14
Log.Lik: -32037.22

Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC  log.Lik      LRT df p.value
fit1 48160.01 48187.12 -24076.00
fit2 64086.44 64127.10 -32037.22 -15922.43 2      1
    
```

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Govern_behave_differtto_Kurd	1.087	1.557997e+15
Kurds_want_newgovenm	-0.665	1.274784e+15
Foreignc_provoke_Kurds	36.055	-3.850644e+13

Log.Lik: -30396.84


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	136036.91	136064.02	-68014.46			
fit2	60805.68	60846.34	-30396.84	75235.23	2	<0.001

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Family_bankacc_women	-1.013	0.561
Women_shake_hand	-0.844	1.950
Abortion	0.173	1.816
Tubebaby	-1.270	1.217
No_formal_religiousmarriage	1.693	1.405
Religious_marriage_must	1.186	-1.615
Formal_marriage_must	2.262	-1.224
Women_needpermit_towork	0.853	-1.202
Women_earnmore_problem	-1.046	-0.315

```


Daught_marry_no_familypermission  -0.928  0.786
Log.Lik: -34131.78
Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC  log.Lik      LRT df p.value
fit1 72775.90 72850.45 -36376.95
fit2 68303.56 68439.09 -34131.78 4490.35 9 <0.001

```

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Dscrmn
TK_should_joinEU	-5.523	-3.238	-1.265	3.264	0.467
TK_should_join_MuslimU	-1.585	-0.886	-0.197	1.083	4.113
TK_should_join_TurkiRepublics	-2.344	-1.352	-0.389	1.279	1.906

Log.Lik: -25972.54


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	53281.42	53369.51	-26627.71			
fit2	51975.08	52076.73	-25972.54	1310.34	2	<0.001

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Dscrmn
Fear_badeconomy	-2.496	-1.572	-1.065	0.658	1.919
Fear_sharia	-1.945	-0.791	-0.312	1.073	1.427
Fear_drought	-2.732	-1.719	-1.177	0.624	2.058
Fear_disengage_tradition	-2.826	-1.711	-1.076	0.933	1.562
Fear_division_country	-1.880	-1.130	-0.797	0.621	2.122
Fear_alienated_EU	-2.796	-1.032	0.205	2.755	0.771
Fear_nolifesafety	-1.685	-0.814	-0.460	0.864	2.578
Fear_poverty	-1.790	-1.028	-0.676	0.588	2.934
Fear_notget_goodedu	-2.032	-1.258	-0.843	0.562	3.040
Fear_restriction_freedom	-1.787	-0.964	-0.573	0.668	2.867
Fear_no_socialsecurity	-2.013	-1.150	-0.747	0.621	2.312

Log.Lik: -79423.07


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	161633.1	161938.1	-80771.57			
fit2	158956.1	159328.9	-79423.07	2697	10	<0.001

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Newsp_write_govn_mistakes	-0.615	1.299973e+15
Newsp_misinform	-0.256	1.017243e+15
Newsp_allthesame	1.128	4.713884e+14

Log.Lik: -32037.22


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	48160.01	48187.12	-24076.00			
fit2	64086.44	64127.10	-32037.22	-15922.43	2	1

Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Govn_must_supp_ethnic	-0.896	1.55300e+00
Govn_support_oth_relig	-1.239	9.20363e+14

Log.Lik: -6889.164

Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	20369.43	20389.76	-10181.71			
fit2	13786.33	13813.43	-6889.16	6585.1	1	<0.001

Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Judge_coverhead	-0.079	3.017
Primary_middle_sch_cover	0.510	3.205
Secular	2.151	-0.644
Religious_Law	1.388	1.106
Relig_lesson_obligatory	-0.134	1.073
Kids_moral_edu_religion	-1.300	1.491
Govn_must_secular	2.963	-0.749


Log.Lik: -23131.06

Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	49505.93	49560.14	-24744.97			
fit2	46290.11	46384.99	-23131.06	3227.82	6	<0.001


Item Information Curves







3. Deep Exploration

Different ways of seeing the structure in the data. This will inform Confirmatory factor analysis.







Cluster Dendrogram



##	cluster	size	ave.sil.width
## 1	1	11	0.03
## 2	2	4	0.08
## 3	3	20	0.04
## 4	4	7	0.10




Final exploration:







[1] 0.7109354


Cluster Dendrogram






Aggregated data exploration:
Cluster Dendrogram






```
## [1] 0.5409263
```

Cluster Dendrogram



##	cluster	size	ave.sil.width
## 1	1	4	0.04
## 2	2	6	0.04
## 3	3	1	0.00



```
## Principal Components Analysis
## Call: principal(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  TC1  TC2  TC3  h2  u2 com
## MDRN     5  0.74          0.55 0.45 1.1
## NOTSEC   11 -0.73          0.57 0.43 1.2
## TLR      4  0.62  0.31    0.51 0.49 1.6
## LIB      6  0.61  0.33    0.55 0.45 1.7
## CH2      2          0.64    0.40 0.60 1.0
## GLB      3          0.62    0.42 0.58 1.2
## CH1      1          0.59    0.43 0.57 1.3
## DVR      7          0.53    0.36 0.64 1.6
## KRD      8          0.70 0.50 0.50 1.1
## AUTH     9          0.66 0.48 0.52 1.2
## MED     10          0.40 0.21 0.79 1.4
##
##              TC1  TC2  TC3
## SS loadings      1.97 1.66 1.35
## Proportion Var    0.18 0.15 0.12
## Cumulative Var    0.18 0.33 0.45
## Proportion Explained 0.40 0.33 0.27
## Cumulative Proportion 0.40 0.73 1.00


## With component correlations of
##      TC1  TC2  TC3
```

```

## TC1 1.00 0.05 0.04
## TC2 0.05 1.00 0.09
## TC3 0.04 0.09 1.00
##
## Mean item complexity = 1.3
## Test of the hypothesis that 3 components are sufficient.
##
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.11
## with the empirical chi square 8233.02 with prob < 0
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.44

```

Components Analysis



```

## Factor Analysis using method = minres
## Call: fa(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  MR1  MR2  MR3  h2  u2 com
## NOTSEC  11 -0.63          0.413 0.59 1.1
## MDRN     5  0.63          0.385 0.62 1.0
## TLR      4  0.48          0.325 0.68 1.8
## LIB      6  0.48          0.419 0.58 2.0
## CH1      1          0.45  0.258 0.74 1.3
## GLB      3          0.44  0.219 0.78 1.3
## CH2      2          0.44  0.183 0.82 1.0
## DVR      7          0.35  0.137 0.86 1.4


```

```


## AUTH      9          0.43 0.209 0.79 1.1
## KRD       8          0.41 0.176 0.82 1.2
## MED      10          0.063 0.94 1.9
##
##              MR1  MR2  MR3
## SS loadings      1.33 0.89 0.56
## Proportion Var   0.12 0.08 0.05
## Cumulative Var   0.12 0.20 0.25
## Proportion Explained 0.48 0.32 0.20
## Cumulative Proportion 0.48 0.80 1.00
##
## With factor correlations of
##      MR1  MR2  MR3
## MR1 1.00 0.09 0.12
## MR2 0.09 1.00 0.21
## MR3 0.12 0.21 1.00
## Mean item complexity = 1.4
## Test of the hypothesis that 3 factors are sufficient.
## The degrees of freedom for the null model are 55 and the objective function w
as 0.95 with Chi Square of 6149.89
##The degrees of freedom for the model are 25 and the objective function was 0.05
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.02
## The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is 0.03
## The harmonic number of observations is 6481 with the empirical chi square 375
.64 with prob < 2.9e-64
## The total number of observations was 6481 with Likelihood Chi Square = 327.88
with prob < 1.5e-54
## Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 0.891
## RMSEA index = 0.043 and the 90 % confidence intervals are 0.039 0.047
## BIC = 108.46
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.97
## Measures of factor score adequacy
##              MR1  MR2  MR3
## Correlation of (regression) scores with factors 0.83 0.74 0.66
## Multiple R square of scores with factors 0.68 0.54 0.44
## Minimum correlation of possible factor scores 0.37 0.09 -0.13

```

Factor Analysis



Histogram of residuals



```
## [1] 0.3868506
```

CFA (Classify Factor Analysis)

lavaan 0.6-3 ended normally after 239 iterations

Optimization method	NLMINB
Number of free parameters	81
Number of observations	6481
Estimator	ML
Model Fit Test Statistic	2187.861
Degrees of freedom	219
P-value (Chi-square)	0.000

.GroomBride_ethnic ~~					
.Judge_coverhed	0.026	0.003	8.849	0.000	
.Newproduct ~~					
.Supprt_chg	-0.008	0.005	-1.554	0.120	
.GroomBride_sect ~~					
.Judge_coverhed	0.023	0.003	7.691	0.000	
.GroomBride_relighn ~~					
.Prmry_mddl_sc_	0.022	0.002	9.112	0.000	
.Newproduct ~~					
.Chg_makem_pstv	-0.003	0.003	-0.790	0.429	
.GroomBride_relighn ~~					
.Judge_coverhed	0.024	0.003	9.174	0.000	
.Newproduct ~~					
.Newidea	0.020	0.005	4.208	0.000	
.GroomBride_sect ~~					
.Prmry_mddl_sc_	0.020	0.003	7.054	0.000	
.Religious_marriage_must ~~					
.GroomBride_sct	-0.005	0.002	-2.588	0.010	
.GroomBrid_thnc	-0.007	0.002	-3.326	0.001	
.GroomBride_ethnic ~~					
.Kds_mrl_d_rlg	0.010	0.002	4.964	0.000	
.Religious_marriage_must ~~					
.Wmn_ndprmt_twr	0.019	0.002	9.462	0.000	
.Kds_mrl_d_rlg	-0.015	0.002	-8.942	0.000	
.GroomBride_ethnic ~~					
.Prmry_mddl_sc_	0.018	0.003	6.520	0.000	
.GroomBride_sect ~~					
.Kds_mrl_d_rlg	0.005	0.002	2.583	0.010	
.Newidea ~~					
.Supprt_chg	0.002	0.005	0.319	0.750	
.Newtech ~~					
.Supprt_chg	-0.007	0.005	-1.442	0.149	
.Newidea ~~					
.Chg_makem_pstv	0.007	0.003	1.982	0.047	
.No_formal_religiousmarriage ~~					
.Relgs_mrrg_mst	0.014	0.002	9.131	0.000	
.Kurds_want_newgovenm ~~					
.Frgnc_prvk_Krd	0.054	0.003	21.034	0.000	
.Military ~~					
.Party_closed	0.078	0.005	17.057	0.000	
secular ~~					
global	0.001	0.000	3.269	0.001	
National	0.004	0.001	7.375	0.000	
global ~~					
National	0.003	0.000	6.839	0.000	

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)
.N_frm1_rlgsmrr	0.104	0.002	52.998	0.000
.Relgs_mrrg_mst	0.119	0.003	46.799	0.000
.Wmn_ndprmt_twr	0.162	0.003	49.567	0.000
.women_shak_hnd	0.156	0.003	51.307	0.000
.Abortion	0.200	0.004	51.490	0.000
.Tubebaby	0.167	0.003	55.544	0.000
.GroomBrid_thnc	0.218	0.004	51.108	0.000
.GroomBride_sct	0.206	0.004	49.300	0.000
.GroomBrid_rlg	0.154	0.003	46.263	0.000

```

.Judge_coverhed    0.181    0.004    45.845    0.000
.Prmry_mddl_sc_    0.177    0.004    49.318    0.000
.Rlg_lssn_blgtr    0.196    0.004    50.438    0.000
.Kds_mrl_d_rlgm    0.117    0.002    47.965    0.000
.Econ_open_frgn    0.191    0.003    55.849    0.000
.Newproduct        0.128    0.005    24.192    0.000
.Newidea           0.114    0.005    22.175    0.000
.Newtech           0.082    0.006    14.186    0.000
.Supprt_chg        0.226    0.006    37.590    0.000
.Chg_makem_pstv    0.224    0.004    51.007    0.000
.Krds_wnt_nwgvn    0.215    0.004    53.354    0.000
.Frgnc_prvk_Krd    0.154    0.003    52.298    0.000
.Military          0.237    0.005    49.062    0.000
.Party_closed      0.191    0.007    27.141    0.000
.Newsp_misinfrm    0.183    0.004    51.104    0.000
secular           0.018    0.001    13.364    0.000
global            0.010    0.001    7.951    0.000
National          0.008    0.002    4.714    0.000

```

```


> fit.indices <- c("chisq", "df", "cfi", "rmsea", "tli", "bic")
> round(fitMeasures(fit, fit.indices), 2)



```

chisq	df	cfi	rmsea	tli	bic
2187.86	219.00	0.94	0.04	0.92	167996.46

Social Class Mapping

Main challenge here is the identification of the HH occupation. We match householder and its occupation. Then, to determine if the position of the respondent we again cross HH occupation with position. Then we cross with income level (below or above median) Finally, we cross with education capital (mother, father and self*1.3); this will give a finer defined class categorization.





Descriptive Reliability (Life Style)

```

grm(data = dd)

Coefficients:



                Extrmt1  Dscrmn
Listens_music          -0.610   1.750
Plays_musicinstrument   1.779   1.671
Goes_Gym                0.752   1.634

```


```

Fashionable_dressup      1.573   1.228
Log.Lik: -5677.704
Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC log.Lik  LRT df p.value
fit1 11375.28 11405.18 -5682.64
fit2 11371.41 11419.25 -5677.70  9.87  3   0.02

```



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Listens_music	1	2922	1.67	0.47	2	1.71	0	1	2	1	-0.72	-1.49	0.01
Plays_Music.instrument	2	2922	1.11	0.31	1	1.01	0	1	2	1	2.50	4.25	0.01
Goes_gym	3	2922	1.30	0.46	1	1.25	0	1	2	1	0.86	-1.25	0.01
Fashionable_dressup	4	2922	1.18	0.38	1	1.10	0	1	2	1	1.67	0.80	0.01



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
 Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

4 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Listens_music	0.3313	0.6687	0.7024
Plays_musicinstrument	0.8905	0.1095	-2.0957
Goes_Gym	0.6985	0.3015	-0.8401
Fashionable_dressup	0.8210	0.1790	-1.5232

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3	4
Freq	0	0	0	0	783

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

	Included	Excluded
Listens_music	0.6901	0.3190
Plays_musicinstrument	0.5523	0.2936
Goes_Gym	0.7090	0.3617
Fashionable_dressup	0.6036	0.2882

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.5213
Excluding Listens_music	0.4462
Excluding Plays_musicinstrument	0.4720
Excluding Goes_Gym	0.4005
Excluding Fashionable_dressup	0.4684

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	<2e-16
2	4	<2e-16

```

3      3      4 <2e-16
4      1      4 <2e-16
5      1      3 <2e-16
6      2      3 <2e-16

```

```

grm(data = dd)

```

```

Coefficients:

```

```

              Extrmt1  Dscrmn
Follownewsnet      0.697 49.514
Bankingtransaction_net 1.731  1.782
Food_shopping_Net   5.130  0.752
Follow_tech_products 0.656 40.338
Buy_tech_product    1.831  1.787

```

```

Log.Lik: -5489.465

```

```



Likelihood Ratio Table

```


```

              AIC      BIC  log.Lik    LRT df p.value
fit1 10383.70 10419.58 -5185.85
fit2 10998.93 11058.73 -5489.47 -607.23 4      1

```



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Follownews													
Onnet	1	2922	1.21	0.40	1	1.13	0	1	2	1	1.45	0.10	0.01
Bankingnet	2	2922	1.11	0.31	1	1.01	0	1	2	1	2.57	4.60	0.01
Food	3	2922	1.03	0.16	1	1.00	0	1	2	1	5.83	31.99	0.00
shopping_Net													
Follow_tech	4	2922	1.36	0.48	1	1.33	0	1	2	1	0.57	-1.67	0.01
products													
Buy_tech													
product	5	2922	1.09	0.29	1	1.00	0	1	2	1	2.82	5.96	0.01



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

5 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Follownewsnet	0.7936	0.2064	-1.3470
Bankingtransaction_net	0.8946	0.1054	-2.1385
Food_shopping_Net	0.9730	0.0270	-3.5832
Follow_tech_products	0.6379	0.3621	-0.5663
Buy_tech_product	0.9079	0.0921	-2.2887

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Freq	0	0	0	0	0	1569

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

	Included	Excluded
Follownewsnet	0.7081	0.4136
Bankingtransaction_net	0.5950	0.3508
Food_shopping_Net	0.2875	0.1368
Follow_tech_products	0.7525	0.4059
Buy_tech_product	0.5786	0.3471

Cronbach's alpha:


	value
All Items	0.5642
Excluding Follownewsnet	0.4497
Excluding Bankingtransaction_net	0.4966
Excluding Food_shopping_Net	0.5851
Excluding Follow_tech_products	0.4679
Excluding Buy_tech_product	0.5011

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	3	4 0.02
2	1	3 2e-05
3	2	3 1e-12
4	2	5 2e-13

5	3	5	3e-14
6	1	5	<2e-16
7	2	4	<2e-16
8	1	4	<2e-16
9	4	5	<2e-16
10	1	2	<2e-16

	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Restaurant withfamily	1	2922	1.21	0.41	1	1.14	0	1	2	1	1.40	-0.03	0.01
Resaurant withfriends	2	2922	1.29	0.45	1	1.24	0	1	2	1	0.92	-1.15	0.01
Cultural activity	3	2922	1.23	0.42	1	1.16	0	1	2	1	1.28	-0.36	0.01
Holiday sea_mountain	4	2922	1.37	0.48	1	1.33	0	1	2	1	0.56	-1.69	0.01



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:
4 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Restaurant_withfamily	0.7871	0.2129	-1.3077
Resaurant_withfriends	0.7098	0.2902	-0.8944
Cultural_activity	0.7697	0.2303	-1.2065
Holiday_sea_mountain	0.6345	0.3655	-0.5516

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3	4
Freq	0	0	0	0	1370

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

	Included	Excluded
Restaurant_withfamily	0.7689	0.5833
Resaurant_withfriends	0.7954	0.5978
Cultural_activity	0.7542	0.5529
Holiday_sea_mountain	0.6820	0.3983

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.7359
Excluding Restaurant_withfamily	0.6476
Excluding Resaurant_withfriends	0.6337
Excluding Cultural_activity	0.6627
Excluding Holiday_sea_mountain	0.7561

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	4 <2e-16
2	3	4 <2e-16
3	1	4 <2e-16
4	1	3 <2e-16
5	2	3 <2e-16
6	1	2 <2e-16


Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Restaurant_withfamily	0.915	3.115
Resaurant_withfriends	0.607	3.968
Cultural_activity	0.903	2.468
Holiday_sea_mountain	0.587	1.203

Log.Lik: -5704.058

Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	11598.14	11628.04	-5794.07			
fit2	11424.12	11471.96	-5704.06	180.02	3	<0.001







Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Active_inpolitics	1.240	1.951000e+00
Active_enviroment	0.091	1.376593e+15
NGO_publicdemonstration	1.200	1.786000e+00

Log.Lik: -3224.573

Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	15170.30	15194.22	-7581.15			
fit2	6461.15	6497.03	-3224.57	8713.16	2	<0.001



```

vars      n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis  se
Active_
inpolitics  1 2922 1.10 0.30      1  1.00  0  1  2    1 2.61    4.82 0.01
Active_
enviroment  2 2922 1.16 0.37      1  1.08  0  1  2    1 1.82    1.33 0.01
NGO_
Public
demonstration 3 2922 1.12 0.32      1  1.02  0  1  2    1 2.36    3.57 0.01

Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
Sample:
  3 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values
Proportions for each level of response:
      1  2  logit
Active_inpolitics      0.8970 0.1030 -2.1642
Active_enviroment      0.8371 0.1629 -1.6368
NGO_publicdemonstration 0.8816 0.1184 -2.0076


Frequencies of total scores:
  0 1 2  3
Freq 0 0 0 2231

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:
      Included Excluded
Active_inpolitics      0.7763  0.5239
Active_enviroment      0.7964  0.4724
NGO_publicdemonstration 0.7801  0.5060

Cronbach's alpha:
      value
All Items      0.6830
Excluding Active_inpolitics 0.5625
Excluding Active_enviroment 0.6337
Excluding NGO_publicdemonstration 0.5783

Pairwise Associations:
  Item i Item j p.value
1      2      3 <2e-16
2      1      2 <2e-16
3      1      3 <2e-16

```




Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Performprayer_regularly	0.696	1.961000e+00
Fasting_regularly	-0.374	1.206429e+15
Fridayprayer	-0.204	1.892000e+00

Log.Lik: -4921.299

Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	26488.05	26511.97	-13240.02			
fit2	9854.60	9890.48	-4921.30	16637.45	2	<0.001



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:
3 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Performprayer_regularly	0.6608	0.3392	-0.6671
Fasting_regularly	0.2707	0.7293	0.9910
Fridayprayer	0.3867	0.6133	0.4611

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3
Freq	0	0	0	598

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:


	Included	Excluded
Performprayer_regularly	0.7466	0.4269
Fasting_regularly	0.7835	0.5192
Fridayprayer	0.8067	0.5220

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.6751
Excluding Performprayer_regularly	0.6591
Excluding Fasting_regularly	0.5431
Excluding Fridayprayer	0.5339

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	<2e-16
2	3	<2e-16
3	2	<2e-16





Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Man_foodshopping	-0.225	0.510
woman_shopping_clothes	-0.398	0.274
Foods_shopping_bazaar	-0.275	0.460
Clothes_dstrictbazaar	1.068	0.594
Man_buyingdecision_car	-0.289	1.971
Man_buyingdecision_whitegoods	0.362	2.979

Log.Lik: -11440.44

Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	23149.55	23191.41	-11567.78			
fit2	22904.89	22976.65	-11440.44	254.67	5	<0.001



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis
Man_												
foodshopping	1	2922	1.53	0.50	2	1.53	0	1	2	1	-0.11	-1.99
woman_shopping_												
clothes	2	2922	1.53	0.50	2	1.53	0	1	2	1	-0.11	-1.99
Foods_shopping_												
bazaar	3	2922	1.53	0.50	2	1.54	0	1	2	1	-0.12	-1.99
Clothes_												
dstrictbazaar	4	2922	1.36	0.48	1	1.32	0	1	2	1	0.60	-1.65
Man_												
buyingdecision_car5	2922	1.59	0.49	2	1.61	0	1	2	1	-0.35	-1.88	
Man_buyingdecision6	2922	1.38	0.48	1	1.35	0	1	2	1	0.51	-1.75	
whitegoods												
				se								
Man_foodshopping				0.01								
woman_shopping_clothes				0.01								
Foods_shopping_bazaar				0.01								
Clothes_dstrictbazaar				0.01								
Man_buyingdecision_car				0.01								
Man_buyingdecision_whitegoods				0.01								
Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set												
Sample:												
6 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values												
Proportions for each level of response:												
					1	2	logit					
Man_foodshopping					0.4730	0.5270	0.1083					

woman_shopping_clothes	0.4733	0.5267	0.1069
Foods_shopping_bazaar	0.4699	0.5301	0.1206
Clothes_dstrictbazaar	0.6427	0.3573	-0.5871
Man_buyingdecision_car	0.4134	0.5866	0.3499
Man_buyingdecision_whitegoods	0.6225	0.3775	-0.5003

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Freq	0	0	0	0	0	0	194

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:


	Included	Excluded
Man_foodshopping	0.4371	0.1309
woman_shopping_clothes	0.4510	0.1470
Foods_shopping_bazaar	0.5592	0.2790
Clothes_dstrictbazaar	0.5697	0.3059
Man_buyingdecision_car	0.5732	0.3016
Man_buyingdecision_whitegoods	0.5994	0.3410

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.4902
Excluding Man_foodshopping	0.5056
Excluding woman_shopping_clothes	0.4975
Excluding Foods_shopping_bazaar	0.4279
Excluding Clothes_dstrictbazaar	0.4145
Excluding Man_buyingdecision_car	0.4159
Excluding Man_buyingdecision_whitegoods	0.3949

Pairwise Associations:

	Item i	Item j	p.value
1	1	2	0.572
2	1	3	0.156
3	1	4	0.029
4	2	5	0.002
5	2	6	9e-04
6	3	5	1e-05
7	3	6	2e-07
8	4	5	1e-07
9	2	4	2e-14
10	1	5	<2e-16




Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Man_coffeehouse	0.595	12.318
Holiday_hometown	2.581	0.230
News_from_TV	-7.127	0.183
Bankingtransaction_banks	-5.053	0.157

Log.Lik: -7027.707

Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	14023.21	14053.11	-7006.60			
fit2	14071.41	14119.26	-7027.71	-42.21	3	1





```
> descr(lotech)
      vars   n mean  sd median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis  se
Man_
coffeehouse 1 2922 1.31 0.46      1   1.26  0  1  2    1  0.83  -1.31 0.01
Holiday
_hometown    2 2922 1.36 0.48      1   1.32  0  1  2    1  0.60  -1.65 0.01
News_
from_TV     3 2922 1.79 0.41      2   1.86  0  1  2    1 -1.39  -0.08 0.01
Bankingt.
banks       4 2922 1.69 0.46      2   1.73  0  1  2    1 -0.81  -1.34 0.01


Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:
  4 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values
Proportions for each level of response:
              1    2    logit
Man_coffeehouse      0.6916 0.3084 -0.8078
Holiday_hometown     0.6427 0.3573 -0.5871
News_from_TV         0.2149 0.7851  1.2955
Bankingtransaction_banks 0.3121 0.6879  0.7903

Frequencies of total scores:
  0 1 2 3  4
Freq 0 0 0 0 142

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:
              Included Excluded
Man_coffeehouse      0.5402  0.0914
Holiday_hometown     0.5766  0.1169
News_from_TV         0.5146  0.1190
Bankingtransaction_banks 0.5616  0.1165

Cronbach's alpha:
              value
All Items      0.2258
Excluding Man_coffeehouse 0.2055
Excluding Holiday_hometown 0.1706
Excluding News_from_TV 0.1704
Excluding Bankingtransaction_banks 0.1712
```




Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Makeup	0.698	3.124
Swimsuit	0.686	19.280
Armless_tshirt	0.625	4.617
Celebrate_newyear	0.586	1.771

Log.Lik: -5145.553


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	10579.70	10609.60	-5284.85			
fit2	10307.11	10354.95	-5145.55	278.59	3	<0.001





	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Makeup	1	2922	1.27	0.44	1	1.21	0	1	2	1	1.06	-0.87	0.01
Swimsuit	2	2922	1.24	0.43	1	1.18	0	1	2	1	1.20	-0.56	0.01
Armless_tshirt	3	2922	1.27	0.45	1	1.22	0	1	2	1	1.02	-0.97	0.01
Celebrate_newyear	4	2922	1.33	0.47	1	1.29	0	1	2	1	0.72	-1.48	0.01



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
 Sample:
 4 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Makeup	0.7348	0.2652	-1.0190
Swimsuit	0.7574	0.2426	-1.1382
Armless_tshirt	0.7266	0.2734	-0.9772
Celebrate_newyear	0.6694	0.3306	-0.7055

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3	4
Freq	0	0	0	0	1554

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

	Included	Excluded
Makeup	0.8054	0.6456
Swimsuit	0.8736	0.7651
Armless_tshirt	0.8428	0.7054

Celebrate_newyear 0.7335 0.5159

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.8274
Excluding Makeup	0.7858
Excluding Swimsuit	0.7327
Excluding Armless_tshirt	0.7584
Excluding Celebrate_newyear	0.8464

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	1	4 <2e-16
2	3	4 <2e-16
3	2	4 <2e-16
4	1	3 <2e-16
5	1	2 <2e-16
6	2	3 <2e-16

Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Dscrmn
Investing_realestate	1.865	8.360000e-01
Invest_banking	0.038	1.413626e+15
Investing_interestfreetrustco	2.112	1.072000e+00


Log.Lik: -3603.337

Likelihood Ratio Table


	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	20423.56	20447.48	-10207.78			
fit2	7218.67	7254.55	-3603.34	13208.89	2	<0.001

Item Information Curves





	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis
Investing												
_realestate	1	2922	1.16	0.36	1	1.07	0	1	2	1	1.90	1.60
Invest_banking	2	2922	1.15	0.36	1	1.06	0	1	2	1	1.96	1.83
Investing_												
interestfreetrust	3	2922	1.09	0.29	1	1.00	0	1	2	1	2.86	6.20
Investing_realestate				0.01								
Invest_banking				0.01								
Investing_interestfreetrustco				0.01								



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

3 items and 2922 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	logit
Investing_realestate	0.8443	0.1557	-1.6905
Invest_banking	0.8498	0.1502	-1.7327
Investing_interestfreetrustco	0.9100	0.0900	-2.3136

Frequencies of total scores:

	0	1	2	3
Freq	0	0	0	2070

Point Biserial correlation with Total Score:

	Included	Excluded
Investing_realestate	0.7146	0.2667
Invest_banking	0.7064	0.2629
Investing_interestfreetrustco	0.6442	0.2913


Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.4435
Excluding Investing_realestate	0.3568
Excluding Invest_banking	0.3627
Excluding Investing_interestfreetrustco	0.3257


Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value	
1	1	2	<2e-16
2	2	3	<2e-16
3	1	3	<2e-16


Omega





Hierarchical (multilevel) Structure




ICLUST




Cluster Dendrogram





[1] 0.5761121



##	cluster	size	ave.sil.width
##	1	29	0.09
##	2	14	0.05




Cluster Dendrogram




[1] 0.7367165

Cluster Dendrogram



##	cluster	size	ave.sil.width
## 1	1	8	0.15
## 2	2	3	0.10

Cluster plot




```

## Principal Components Analysis
## Call: principal(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  TC1  TC3  TC4  TC2  h2  u2 com
## BIGST   8  0.78                0.55 0.45 1.2
## OUT     3  0.72                0.66 0.34 1.2
## HITECH  2  0.69                0.55 0.45 1.1
## AKT     1  0.58                0.49 0.51 1.4
## REL     5          -0.81          0.70 0.30 1.1
## MDRN    10  0.43  0.58                0.64 0.36 1.9
## ENG     4          0.76                0.58 0.42 1.0
## SAV    11          -0.37  0.66          0.59 0.41 1.7
## NEWS    9          0.46  0.47          0.45 0.55 2.0
## PAT     6          0.78 0.61 0.39 1.0
## LOTECH  7          0.75 0.58 0.42 1.0
##
##              TC1  TC3  TC4  TC2
## SS loadings      2.29 1.53 1.37 1.24
## Proportion Var   0.21 0.14 0.12 0.11
## Cumulative Var   0.21 0.35 0.47 0.58
## Proportion Explained 0.36 0.24 0.21 0.19
## Cumulative Proportion 0.36 0.59 0.81 1.00
##
## With component correlations of
##      TC1  TC3  TC4  TC2
## TC1  1.00  0.25 0.26 -0.03
## TC3  0.25  1.00 0.04 -0.08
## TC4  0.26  0.04 1.00  0.16
## TC2 -0.03 -0.08 0.16  1.00
##
## Mean item complexity = 1.3
## Test of the hypothesis that 4 components are sufficient.
##
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.1
## with the empirical chi square 3542.74 with prob < 0
##
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.77

```

Components Analysis



```

## Factor Analysis using method = minres
## Call: fa(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  MR1  MR2  MR3  MR4  h2    u2 com
## OUT      3  0.80                0.616 0.3838 1.0
## HITECH   2  0.63                0.429 0.5713 1.1
## AKT      1  0.53                0.372 0.6282 1.1
## BIGST    8  0.52                0.230 0.7697 1.0
## MDRN    10  0.48        -0.36    0.490 0.5098 1.9
## NEWS     9                0.146 0.8545 2.2
## LOTECH   7         1.00                0.995 0.0046 1.0
## REL      5                0.88        0.771 0.2290 1.0
## ENG      4                0.61 0.380 0.6199 1.0
## SAV     11                0.151 0.8486 2.3
## PAT      6                0.091 0.9087 3.5
##
##
##              MR1  MR2  MR3  MR4
## SS loadings   2.00 1.06 1.02 0.60
## Proportion Var 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.05
## Cumulative Var 0.18 0.28 0.37 0.42
## Proportion Explained 0.43 0.23 0.22 0.13
## Cumulative Proportion 0.43 0.65 0.87 1.00


```

```


##
## With factor correlations of
##      MR1  MR2  MR3  MR4
## MR1  1.00  0.04 -0.36  0.42
## MR2  0.04  1.00  0.14  0.17
## MR3 -0.36  0.14  1.00 -0.01
## MR4  0.42  0.17 -0.01  1.00
## Mean item complexity = 1.6
## Test of the hypothesis that 4 factors are sufficient.
## The degrees of freedom for the null model are 55 and the objective function w
as 1.79 with Chi Square of 5229.64
## The degrees of freedom for the model are 17 and the objective function was 0.02
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.01
## The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is 0.02
## The harmonic number of observations is 2932 with the empirical chi square 50.
91 with prob < 3.1e-05
## The total number of observations was 2932 with Likelihood Chi Square = 70.17
with prob < 2e-08
## Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 0.967
## RMSEA index = 0.033 and the 90 % confidence intervals are 0.025 0.041
## BIC = -65.55
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 1
## Measures of factor score adequacy
##
##      MR1  MR2  MR3  MR4
## Correlation of (regression) scores with factors 0.89 1.00 0.89 0.72
## Multiple R square of scores with factors 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.51
## Minimum correlation of possible factor scores 0.60 0.99 0.59 0.02

```

Factor Analysis



Histogram of residuals



```
## [1] 0.1674628
```

```
## lavaan 0.6-3 ended normally after 383 iterations
## Optimization method NLMINB
## Number of free parameters 122
## Number of observations 2932
##
## Estimator ML
## Model Fit Test Statistic 2497.041
```

```

## Degrees of freedom                508
## P-value (Chi-square)              0.000
## Parameter Estimates:
## Information                        Expected
## Information saturated (h1) model   Structured
## Standard Errors                    Standard
##
## Latent Variables:
##           Estimate Std.Err z-value P(>|z|)
##
## aktif =~
##   Listens_music      1.000
##   Goes_Gym           0.955    0.058  16.383   0.000
##   Fashinabledressup 0.814    0.049  16.661   0.000
##
## hitech =~
##   Follownewsnet     1.000
##   Banking_net       0.564    0.033  16.842   0.000
##   Food_shopping_Net 0.138    0.018   7.743   0.000
##   Follow_tech_products 1.501    0.075  20.140   0.000
##   Buy_tech_procut    0.670    0.039  17.319   0.000
##
## out =~ Restaurant_withfamily 0.7689 0.5833
0.7954 0.5978
0.7542 0.5529
##   Restaurant_withfamily 1.000
##   Resaurant_withfriends 1.205    0.038  32.003   0.000
##   Cultural_activity     1.165    0.042  27.582   0.000
##   Holiday_sea_mountain  0.953    0.043  21.988   0.000
##
## engage =~
##   Active_inpolitics     1.000
##   Active_enviroment     1.075    0.047  22.674   0.000
##   NGO_publicdemonst.    1.028    0.044  23.155   0.000
##
## relig =~
##   Performprayer_regular 1.000
##   Fasting_regularly     1.199    0.054  22.237   0.000
##   Fridayprayer          1.404    0.062  22.517   0.000
##
## patr =~
##   Woman_shopping_clothes 1.000
##   Foods_shopping_bazaar  1.691    0.268   6.312   0.000
##   Clothes_dstrictbazaar  2.128    0.321   6.629   0.000
##   Man_buyingdecision_    1.485    0.240   6.180   0.000

```

```

##      Man_buyingdecision_wgoods      1.494      0.228      6.563      0.000
##      lotech =~
##      Man_coffeehouse      1.000
##      Holiday_hometown      0.990      0.131      7.545      0.000
##      News_from_TV      0.614      0.099      6.219      0.000
##      Banking_banks      0.772      0.113      6.841      0.000
##      matr =~
##      Man_foodshopping      1.000
##      Man_cooks      1.281      0.176      7.291      0.000
##      modern =~
##      Makeup      1.000
##      Swimsuit      1.154      0.026      44.215      0.000
##      Armless_tshirt      1.102      0.027      41.545      0.000
##      Celebrate_newyear      0.856      0.028      30.435      0.000
##      saving =~
##      Investing_realestate      1.000
##      Investing_interestfreetrustco      0.769      0.073      10.498      0.000
##
## Covariances:
##
##              Estimate Std.Err z-value P(>|z|)
## . Foods_shopping_bazaar ~~
## . Clothes_dstrictbazaar.      0.051      0.006      7.864      0.000
## . Man_buyingdecision_car ~~
## . Man_buyingdecision_wgoods      0.078      0.005      14.413      0.000
## . Banking_net ~~
## . Banking_banks      -0.034      0.002     -13.810      0.000
## . Clothes_dstrictbazaar ~~
## . Man_buyingdecision_      -0.013      0.004     -3.151      0.002
## . Restaurant_withfamily ~~
## . Resaurant_withfriends      0.024      0.003      8.766      0.000
## . Follownewsonnet ~~
## . Banking_net      0.019      0.002      9.042      0.000
## . Fashinabledressup ~~
## . Makeup      0.019      0.002      8.743      0.000
## active ~~
## hitech      0.036      0.002     14.475      0.000
## out      0.046      0.003     16.355      0.000
## engage      0.015      0.002      9.096      0.000
## relig      -0.018      0.002     -8.795      0.000

```

##	patr	-0.005	0.001	-4.124	0.000
##	lotech	0.006	0.002	3.378	0.001
##	matr	0.013	0.002	5.992	0.000
##	modern	0.034	0.003	13.179	0.000
##	saving	0.006	0.002	3.265	0.001
##	hitech ~~				
##	out	0.040	0.002	16.931	0.000
##	engage	0.014	0.001	10.192	0.000
##	relig	-0.010	0.002	-6.480	0.000
##	patr	-0.004	0.001	-3.843	0.000
##	lotech	0.001	0.001	0.784	0.433
##	matr	0.012	0.002	6.331	0.000
##	modern	0.030	0.002	14.046	0.000
##	saving	0.010	0.002	6.359	0.000
##	out ~~				
##	engage	0.015	0.002	10.101	0.000
##	relig	-0.020	0.002	-10.498	0.000
##	patr	-0.006	0.001	-4.590	0.000
##	lotech	0.006	0.002	3.523	0.000
##	matr	0.017	0.002	6.881	0.000
##	modern	0.050	0.003	19.131	0.000
##	saving	0.007	0.002	4.026	0.000
##	engage ~~				
##	relig	-0.002	0.001	-1.585	0.113
##	patr	0.002	0.001	2.444	0.015
##	lotech	0.008	0.001	5.244	0.000
##	matr	0.010	0.002	6.006	0.000
##	modern	0.013	0.002	8.048	0.000
##	saving	0.016	0.002	10.036	0.000
##	relig ~~				
##	patr	0.008	0.001	5.518	0.000
##	lotech	0.012	0.002	6.498	0.000
##	matr	-0.003	0.001	-2.190	0.028
##	modern	-0.047	0.003	-17.081	0.000
##	saving	0.013	0.002	7.171	0.000
##	patr ~~				
##	lotech	0.010	0.002	5.747	0.000
##	matr	0.001	0.001	1.398	0.162
##	modern	-0.008	0.002	-5.330	0.000

```


##      saving                0.003    0.001    3.171    0.002
##    lotech ~~
##      matr                0.002    0.001    1.160    0.246
##      modern             -0.006    0.002   -3.375    0.001
##      saving                0.012    0.002    6.512    0.000
##    matr ~~
##      modern                0.015    0.002    6.345    0.000
##      saving                0.004    0.001    2.740    0.006
##    modern ~~
##      saving             -0.002    0.002   -0.938    0.348
## Variances:
##
##              Estimate Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)
## . Listens_music      0.170   0.005  32.242   0.000
## . Goes_Gym           0.164   0.005  32.609   0.000
## . Fashionable_dressup 0.112   0.003  32.197   0.000
## . Follownewsonnet    0.124   0.004  32.807   0.000
## . Banking_net        0.081   0.002  35.655   0.000
## . Food_shopping_Net  0.025   0.001  37.820   0.000
## . Follow_tech_products 0.137   0.005  26.862   0.000
## . Follow_tech_products 0.065   0.002  33.839   0.000
## . Restaurant_w.family 0.102   0.003  30.510   0.000
## . Resaurant_w.f riends 0.112   0.004  28.486   0.000
## . Cultural_activity   0.089   0.003  27.911   0.000
## . Holiday.sea.mountain 0.172   0.005  34.845   0.000
## . Active_inpolitics   0.050   0.002  23.523   0.000
## . Active_enviroment   0.086   0.003  28.535   0.000
## . NGO_publicdemon.    0.059   0.002  25.083   0.000
## . Prayer_regular      0.161   0.005  32.864   0.000
## . Fasting_regularly   0.107   0.004  25.948   0.000
## . Fridayprayer        0.113   0.005  22.561   0.000
## . Woman.shop.clothes  0.237   0.007  36.020   0.000
## . Foods.shop.bazaar   0.215   0.008  28.034   0.000
## . Cloths.dstrictbazaar 0.175   0.008  20.829   0.000
## . Man.buydecision.car 0.216   0.007  30.169   0.000
## . Man.buydecis.wgoods 0.208   0.007  31.703   0.000
## . Man_coffeehouse     0.194   0.006  33.399   0.000
## . Holiday_hometown    0.212   0.006  34.020   0.000
## . News_from_TV        0.162   0.004  36.439   0.000
## . Banking.banks       0.202   0.006  35.894   0.000

```


KONDA 2015


I. Values, Opinions, Ideology

Data Preparation and Exploration



Descriptives and Internal Reliability

	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew
Nuklear_power_station	1	5222	3.39	1.16	4	3.44	1.48	1	5	4	-0.35
Courts_judge_rich_poor	2	5222	3.38	1.10	4	3.42	1.48	1	5	4	-0.36
Courts_support_co_against_consumer	3	5222	3.49	1.03	4	3.54	1.48	1	5	4	-0.50
Must_struggle_for_equality	4	5222	4.18	0.78	4	4.29	0.00	1	5	4	-1.27
				kurtosis	se						
Nuklear_power_station				-0.80	0.02						
Courts_judge_rich_poor				-0.68	0.02						
Courts_support_co_against_consumer				-0.31	0.01						
Must_struggle_for_equality				2.72	0.01						



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

4 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5
Nuklear_power_station	0.0628	0.1886	0.2252	0.3443	0.1791
Courts_judge_rich_poor	0.0523	0.1838	0.2432	0.3713	0.1494
Courts_support_co_against_consumer	0.0393	0.1377	0.2612	0.4136	0.1482
Must_struggle_for_equality	0.0117	0.0289	0.0766	0.5360	0.3468

Frequencies of total scores:

	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Freq	2	1	5	12	48	69	213	277	607	546	876	683	922	378	244	139	200

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.4871
Excluding Nuklear_power_station	0.5428
Excluding Courts_judge_rich_poor	0.2449
Excluding Courts_support_co_against_consumer	0.2240
Excluding Must_struggle_for_equality	0.5493

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	1	4 0.001
2	2	4 0.001
3	3	4 0.001
4	1	2 <2e-16
5	1	3 <2e-16
6	2	3 <2e-16



```

Call:
grm(data = dd)
Coefficients:
                                Extrmt1 Extrmt2 Extrmt3 Extrmt4 Dscrmn
Nuklear_power_station           -6.728  -2.746  -0.283   3.796  0.413
Courts_judge_rich_poor          -2.041  -0.930  -0.119   1.259  2.348
Courts_support_co_against_consumer -1.886  -1.007  -0.201   1.088  4.111
Must_struggle_for_equality       -17.535 -12.758  -8.189   2.565  0.248


Log.Lik: -26651.2

Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC  log.Lik    LRT df p.value
fit1 55262.48 55374.01 -27614.24
fit2 53342.40 53473.61 -26651.20 1926.08 3 <0.001

```



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis
Beleiving_Allah												
dominate_LS	1	5222	4.06	0.94	4	4.20	1.48	1	5	4	-1.21	1.54
Kids_moral_edu												
_religion	2	5222	4.02	0.97	4	4.17	1.48	1	5	4	-1.19	1.32
Religious												
marriage_must	3	5222	3.98	1.11	4	4.16	1.48	1	5	4	-1.16	0.60
Intimacy_mustbe												
banned_TV	4	5222	3.17	1.27	3	3.21	1.48	1	5	4	-0.19	-1.08
				se								
Beleiving_Allah_dominate_LS				0.01								
Kids_moral_edu_religion				0.01								
Religious_marriage_must				0.02								
Intimacy_mustbe_banned_TV				0.02								



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

4 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5
Beleiving_Allah_dominate_LS	0.0262	0.0481	0.1151	0.4646	0.3460
Kids_moral_edu_religion	0.0278	0.0603	0.1067	0.4711	0.3342
Religious_marriage_must	0.0465	0.0900	0.0812	0.4016	0.3807
Intimacy_mustbe_banned_TV	0.1222	0.2126	0.2061	0.2959	0.1633

Frequencies of total scores:

	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Freq	21	23	23	36	88	72	127	177	338	332	619	613	1020	554	421	361	397

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.6731
Excluding Beleiving_Allah_dominate_LS	0.5947
Excluding Kids_moral_edu_religion	0.5584
Excluding Religious_marriage_must	0.5659
Excluding Intimacy_mustbe_banned_TV	0.7095

Pairwise Associations:

Item i Item j p.value

1	1	2	0.001
2	1	4	<2e-16
3	2	4	<2e-16
4	3	4	<2e-16
5	1	3	<2e-16
6	2	3	<2e-16

Call:
 grm(data = dd)

Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Dscrmn
Beleiving_Allah_dominate_LS	-2.666	-1.959	-1.179	0.506	1.966
Kids_moral_edu_religon	-2.399	-1.671	-1.055	0.509	2.446
Religious_marriage_must	-2.304	-1.483	-1.051	0.386	1.927
Intimacy_mustbe_banned_TV	-2.685	-1.030	0.122	2.137	0.842

Log.Lik: -25631.83


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	51868.75	51980.28	-25917.37			
fit2	51303.66	51434.87	-25631.83	571.09	3	<0.001


Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Man_love													
and_beat	1	5222	2.15	1.18	2	2.01	1.48	1	5	4	0.84	-0.36	0.02
women	2	5222	2.87	1.20	3	2.86	1.48	1	5	4	0.10	-1.11	0.02
earnmore_problem													
women	3	5222	3.52	1.18	4	3.62	1.48	1	5	4	-0.70	-0.51	0.02
needpermit_towork													
Man													
Never													
cries	4	5222	2.38	1.15	2	2.29	1.48	1	5	4	0.70	-0.42	0.02



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

4 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5
Man_love_and_beat	0.3617	0.3525	0.0984	0.1446	0.0427
women_earnmore_problem	0.1281	0.3284	0.1745	0.2871	0.0820
women_needpermit_towork	0.0766	0.1586	0.1182	0.4615	0.1852
Man_never_cries	0.2202	0.4374	0.1348	0.1528	0.0548

Frequencies of total scores:

	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Freq	122	123	169	289	469	467	743	580	780	373	466	217	232	85	57	26	24

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.5801
Excluding Man_love_and_beat	0.4556
Excluding women_earnmore_problem	0.5176
Excluding women_needpermit_towork	0.4811
Excluding Man_never_cries	0.5720

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	3	4 <2e-16
2	2	4 <2e-16
3	1	4 <2e-16
4	1	2 <2e-16
5	1	3 <2e-16
6	2	3 <2e-16

Call:

grm(data = dd)

Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Dscrmn
Man_love_and_beat	-0.488	0.772	1.224	2.464	1.731
women_earnmore_problem	-1.993	-0.171	0.574	2.469	1.178
women_needpermit_towork	-2.351	-1.103	-0.539	1.467	1.330
Man_never_cries	-1.700	0.876	1.787	3.717	0.845

Log.Lik: -28753.71


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	57676.62	57788.15	-28821.31			
fit2	57547.43	57678.64	-28753.71	135.2	3	<0.001

Item Information Curves




Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew
Daughter_marry	1	5222	2.38	1.25	2	2.29	1.48	1	5	4	0.52
other_religion	2	5222	2.94	1.27	3	2.95	1.48	1	5	4	-0.19
Daughter_marry_ethnic	3	5222	1.91	1.08	2	1.72	1.48	1	5	4	1.10
Abortion	4	5222	2.49	1.23	2	2.42	1.48	1	5	4	0.41
Plastic_operation_normal	5	5222	2.42	1.09	2	2.36	1.48	1	5	4	0.47

	kurtosis	se
Daughter_marry_other_religion	-0.92	0.02
Daughter_marry_ethnic	-1.21	0.02
Daughter_son_dfifferent_sexual_pref	0.38	0.01
Abortion	-0.97	0.02
Plastic_operation_normal	-0.65	0.02



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:
5 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5
Daughter_marry_other_religion	0.3041	0.3102	0.1392	0.1896	0.0569
Daughter_marry_ethnic	0.1823	0.2101	0.1723	0.3535	0.0818
Daughter_son_dfifferent_sexual_pref	0.4697	0.2892	0.1344	0.0795	0.0272
Abortion	0.2532	0.3223	0.1622	0.2034	0.0590
Plastic_operation_normal	0.2133	0.3855	0.2030	0.1666	0.0316

Frequencies of total scores:

5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	2	3	4
5	294	115	277	289	406	604	502	509	418	395	337	255	228	189	138	113	62	32	24	17	1	8

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.7317
Excluding Daughter_marry_other_religion	0.6321
Excluding Daughter_marry_ethnic	0.7066
Excluding Daughter_son_dfifferent_sexual_pref	0.6836
Excluding Abortion	0.6794
Excluding Plastic_operation_normal	0.7184

Pairwise Associations:

	Item i	Item j	p.value
1	3	5	0.001
2	2	5	<2e-16
3	2	4	<2e-16
4	1	5	<2e-16
5	3	4	<2e-16
6	1	2	<2e-16
7	1	3	<2e-16
8	1	4	<2e-16
9	2	3	<2e-16
10	4	5	<2e-16

call:

grm(data = dd)


Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Dscrnm
Daughter_marry_other_religion	-0.541	0.342	0.773	1.786	3.229
Daughter_marry_ethnic	-1.274	-0.296	0.309	2.124	1.528
Daughter_son_ddifferent_sexual_pref	-0.094	0.915	1.664	2.704	1.835
Abortion	-1.038	0.312	1.012	2.593	1.336
Plastic_operation_normal	-1.540	0.495	1.660	3.888	0.990


Log.Lik: -34783.87

Likelihood Ratio Table


	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	70115.89	70253.66	-35036.95			
fit2	69617.75	69781.76	-34783.87	506.14	4	<0.001




Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2




Deep Exploration






Cluster Dendrogram



##	cluster	size	ave.sil.width
##	1	5	0.12
##	2	4	0.07
##	3	5	0.16
##	4	3	0.06



Aggregated data exploration:


```
## Principal Components Analysis
## Call: principal(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  TC1  TC2  TC3  h2  u2 com
## TOL      4  0.88          0.81 0.186 1.1
## NOSEC    1 -0.75          0.76 0.245 1.5
## LFT      2          0.97      0.94 0.060 1.0
## GEND     3          0.99 0.97 0.033 1.0
##
##          TC1  TC2  TC3
## SS loadings      1.35 1.06 1.07
## Proportion Var    0.34 0.27 0.27
## Cumulative Var    0.34 0.60 0.87
## Proportion Explained 0.39 0.31 0.31
## Cumulative Proportion 0.39 0.69 1.00
## With component correlations of
##      TC1  TC2  TC3
## TC1  1.00 0.12 -0.29
## TC2  0.12 1.00 0.11
## TC3 -0.29 0.11 1.00
```

```

## Mean item complexity = 1.2
## Test of the hypothesis that 3 components are sufficient.
## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.12
## with the empirical chi square 911.33 with prob < NA
## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.77

```

Components Analysis



```

## Factor Analysis using method = minres
## Call: fa(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
## Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
##      item  MR1  MR2  MR3  h2  u2 com
## NOSEC   1  0.67          0.55 0.45 1.1
## GEND    3  0.61          0.30 0.70 1.1
## LFT     2          0.58  0.32 0.68 1.2
## TOL     4          0.49  0.51 0.49 1.9
##
##              MR1  MR2  MR3
## SS loadings      0.93 0.60 0.13
## Proportion Var    0.23 0.15 0.03
## Cumulative Var    0.23 0.38 0.42
## Proportion Explained 0.56 0.36 0.08
## Cumulative Proportion 0.56 0.92 1.00
## With factor correlations of
##      MR1  MR2  MR3
## MR1   1.00 -0.22 -0.53
## MR2  -0.22  1.00  0.28
## MR3  -0.53  0.28  1.00
## Mean item complexity = 1.3

```

```

## Test of the hypothesis that 3 factors are sufficient.

## The degrees of freedom for the null model are 6 and the objective function was 0.39 with Chi Square of 2016.99

## The degrees of freedom for the model are -3 and the objective function was 0

##

## The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0

## The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is NA

## The harmonic number of observations is 5222 with the empirical chi square 0 with prob < NA

## The total number of observations was 5222 with Likelihood Chi Square = 0 with prob < NA

## Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 1.003

## Fit based upon off diagonal values = 1


## Measures of factor score adequacy


##
## Correlation of (regression) scores with factors
## Multiple R square of scores with factors
## Minimum correlation of possible factor scores

```

	MR1	MR2	MR3
Correlation of (regression) scores with factors	0.81	0.72	0.59
Multiple R square of scores with factors	0.65	0.51	0.34
Minimum correlation of possible factor scores	0.31	0.03	-0.31

Factor Analysis






CFA


```
## [1] 0.679442
##      chisq      df      cfi      rmsea      tli      bic
## 1171.18    83.00    0.94    0.05    0.92 236158.22
##      chisq      df      cfi      rmsea      tli      bic
## 1148.71    82.00    0.94    0.05    0.92 236144.31
```



2015 SOCIAL CLASS MAPPING (VALUE OPINION)







2015 LIFE STYLE ANALYSIS


DATA PREPARATION AND EXPLORATION











DESCRIPTIVES AND INTERNAL RELIABILITY

```


Call:
grm(data = dd)

Coefficients:
Extrmt1 Extrmt2 Extrmt3 Extrmt4
Follow_latest_fashion      -0.969    0.570    1.117    2.441
Latest_model_mobile_important -0.924    0.954    1.590    2.655
want_reialized_throng     -1.300    0.387    0.982    2.582
Doesnot_care_tpay_parfume  -1.347    0.330    1.050    2.761
Brand_makes_me.different  -1.177    0.898    1.654    3.332
Reward_herself_with_necessity -1.348    0.468    0.973    2.842
Entourage_likes_imp_buydecis -1.799    0.375    1.142    3.581
Luxury_goog_quality       -2.563   -0.261    0.693    3.061
Impressed_comments_net    -1.399    0.262    1.059    3.243
Car_brand_give_idea_driver -3.524    0.035    1.428    6.050


          Dscrmn
Follow_latest_fashion      2.038
Latest_model_mobile_important 1.655
want_reialized_throng     1.697
Doesnot_care_tpay_parfume  1.169
Brand_makes_me.different  1.417
Reward_herself_with_necessity 1.448
Entourage_likes_imp_buydecis 1.109
Luxury_goog_quality       0.961
Impressed_comments_net    1.184
Car_brand_give_idea_driver 0.543
Log.Lik: -31836.65
## Likelihood Ratio Table
##           AIC      BIC   log.Lik   LRT df p.value
## fit1 64228.11 64465.98 -32073.05
## fit2 63773.30 64063.39 -31836.65 472.81 9 <0.001

```

Item Information Curves




Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	Vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad
Follow_latest_fashion	1	2445	2.34	1.08	2	2.26	1.48
Latest_model_mobile_important	2	2445	2.17	1.02	2	2.04	1.48
want_reialized_throng	3	2445	2.51	1.11	2	2.47	1.48
Doesnot_care_tpay_parfume	4	2445	2.56	1.22	2	2.50	1.48
Brand_makes_me_different	5	2445	2.23	0.99	2	2.13	0.00
Reward_herself_without_necessity	6	2445	2.51	1.14	2	2.47	1.48
Entourage_likes_important_buydecision	7	2445	2.57	1.10	2	2.55	1.48
Luxury_goog_quality	8	2445	2.91	1.15	3	2.93	1.48
Impressed_comments_net	9	2445	2.56	1.16	2	2.53	1.48

	10	2445	2.73	1.14	2	2.74	1.48
	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se	
Car_brand_give_idea_driver	1	5	4	0.65	-0.44	0.02	
Follow_latest_fashion							
Latest_model_mobile_important							
Want_reliarized_throng							
Doesnot_care_tpay_parfume							
Brand_makes_me.different							
Reward_herself_without_necessity							
Entourage_likes_important_buydecision							
Luxury_goog_quality							
Impressed_comments_net							
Car_brand_give_idea_driver							



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

10 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Follow_latest_fashion	0.2432	0.4452	0.1185	0.1396	0.0285	0.0249
Latest_model_mobile_important	0.2639	0.4977	0.1053	0.0904	0.0260	0.0167
Want_reliarized_throng	0.1741	0.4324	0.1404	0.1930	0.0362	0.0239
Doesnot_care_tpay_parfume	0.2390	0.3633	0.1316	0.1873	0.0500	0.0289
Brand_makes_me.different	0.2036	0.4799	0.1327	0.1348	0.0216	0.0274
Reward_herself_without_necessity	0.2061	0.4324	0.1136	0.1905	0.0278	0.0297
Entourage_likes_important_buydecision	0.1501	0.4131	0.1450	0.2417	0.0308	0.0193
Luxury_goog_quality	0.1101	0.3070	0.1884	0.2957	0.0707	0.0282
Impressed_comments_net	0.2342	0.3547	0.1463	0.1949	0.0289	0.0410

```

Car_brand_give_idea_driver          0.1281 0.3744 0.1563 0.2848 0.0379 0.0186

Frequencies of total scores:
   10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34
Freq 46 27 50 72 77 87 125 120 168 174 315 275 382 310 359 283 375 258 271 216 228
169 123 97 121
   35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
Freq 76 84 43 43 31 39 26 17 11 13  8  8  5  5  5  2  2  2  2  3  5  3  5  3  0 53

Cronbach's alpha:
                                     value
All Items                           0.8308
Excluding Follow_latest_fashion      0.8039
Excluding Latest_model_mobile_important 0.8120
Excluding want_reliarized_throng     0.8078
Excluding Doesnot_care_tpay_parfume   0.8178
Excluding Brand_makes_me.different    0.8112
Excluding Reward_herself_without_necessity 0.8099
Excluding Entourage_likes_important_buydecision 0.8182
Excluding Luxury_goog_quality         0.8209
Excluding Impressed_comments_net      0.8173
Excluding Car_brand_give_idea_driver  0.8336

Pairwise Associations:
  Item i Item j p.value
1      1      2  0.001
2      1      3  0.001
3      1      4  0.001
4      1      5  0.001
5      1      6  0.001
6      1      7  0.001
7      1      8  0.001
8      1      9  0.001
9      1     10  0.001
10     2      3  0.001

```

```



Call:
grm(data = dd)

Coefficients:
                                     Extrmt1 Extrmt2 Extrmt3 Extrmt4 Extrmt5 Dscrnm
Listen_radio                       -1.358   -0.349   0.903   2.316   4.545   1.055
Reading_book                        -0.741   -0.006   0.794   1.588   3.176   1.961
Music_instrument_art                 0.688    1.195   1.775   2.399   3.341   1.540
Reads_newspaper_everyday            -1.458    0.072   1.092   2.557   3.869   1.024


Log.Lik: -29758

Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC  log.Lik  LRT df p.value
fit1 59694.75 59832.53 -29826.38
fit2 59564.00 59721.46 -29758.00 136.75 3 <0.001

```



```
##          vars   n mean   sd median trimmed  mad min max range
## Listen_radio    1 2445 2.88 1.28     3   2.85 1.48  1  5   4
## Reading_book    2 2445 2.90 1.31     3   2.87 1.48  1  5   4
## Music_instrument_art 3 2445 1.77 1.20     1   1.52 0.00  1  5   4
## Reads_newspaper
##   everyday      4 2445 2.87 1.23     3   2.84 1.48  1  5   4
##          skew kurtosis  se
## Listen_radio   -0.03  -1.07 0.03
## Reading_book    0.03  -1.11 0.03
## Musicinstrumentart 1.41   0.78 0.02
## Reads_newspaper  0.07  -1.04 0.02
```



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

4 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Listen_radio	0.2332	0.1934	0.2643	0.2003	0.0944	0.0144
Reading_book	0.2857	0.2126	0.2317	0.1578	0.0990	0.0132
Music_instrument_art	0.6850	0.1128	0.0904	0.0565	0.0370	0.0184
Reads_newspaper_everyday	0.2229	0.2922	0.2036	0.1863	0.0649	0.0301

Frequencies of total scores:

	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Freq	244	328	436	520	539	576	579	491	423	366	234	172	116	67	34	24	26	6	1	0	40

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.6121
Excluding Listen_radio	0.5602
Excluding Reading_book	0.4843
Excluding Music_instrument_art	0.5454
Excluding Reads_newspaper_everyday	0.5723

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	0.001
2	3	0.001
3	4	0.001
4	2	0.001
5	2	0.001
6	3	0.001


```

Call:
grm(data = dd)Coefficients:
                                Extrmt1 Extrmt2 Extrmt3 Extrmt4 Extrmt5
Dscrmn
Go_abroad_for_business          1.122   1.342   1.585   1.839   2.001   4.150
Go_abroad                       1.166   1.443   1.695   1.974   2.124   4.086
Food_shopping_home             13.686   8.164   1.859  -2.745 -70.005  -0.185
Drink_alcohol_home              1.058   1.422   1.935   2.415   2.780   1.340
Go_out_at_night                 0.969   1.363   1.856   2.234   2.469   1.986
Go_beachvacation_
in_religious_holiday           0.735   1.416   2.206   2.672   3.166   1.61
3


Log.Lik: -26233.01
Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC  log.Lik  LRT df p.value
fit1 52933.67 53137.05 -26435.83
fit2 52538.03 52774.21 -26233.01 405.64 5 <0.001

```


Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew
Go_abroad_for_business	1	5222	1.33	1.01	1	1.04	0.00	1	6	5	3.44
Go_abroad	2	5222	1.31	0.97	1	1.04	0.00	1	6	5	3.53
Food_shopping_home	3	5222	3.67	1.25	4	3.79	1.48	1	6	5	-0.57
Drink_alchool_home	4	5222	1.62	1.30	1	1.26	0.00	1	6	5	2.19
Go_out_at_night	5	5222	1.46	1.11	1	1.16	0.00	1	6	5	2.72
Go_beachvacation_in_religious_holiday	6	5222	1.51	1.07	1	1.25	0.00	1	6	5	2.46
				kurtosis	se						
Go_abroad_for_business				11.44	0.01						
Go_abroad				12.25	0.01						
Food_shopping_home				-0.54	0.02						
Drink_alchool_home				3.78	0.02						
Go_out_at_night				6.95	0.02						
Go_beachvacation_in_religious_holiday				5.92	0.01						



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

6 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Go_abroad_for_business	0.8711	0.0425	0.0327	0.0188	0.0094	0.0255
Go_abroad	0.8717	0.0465	0.0306	0.0205	0.0079	0.0228
Food_shooping_home	0.0770	0.1042	0.2206	0.2848	0.3007	0.0128
Drink_alchool_home	0.7637	0.0666	0.0645	0.0412	0.0237	0.0402
Go_out_at_night	0.7993	0.0733	0.0596	0.0282	0.0119	0.0278
Go_beachvacation_in_religious_holiday	0.7409	0.1206	0.0768	0.0253	0.0172	0.0191

Frequencies of total scores:

	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Freq	222	325	718	944	1211	366	356	211	197	158	108	64	57	58	38	31	20	20	15	14	8	6
	9	8	7	2	4	33	34	35	36													
Freq	2	8	5	30																		

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.7043
Excluding Go_abroad_for_business	0.6238
Excluding Go_abroad	0.6265
Excluding Food_shooping_home	0.7786
Excluding Drink_alchool_home	0.6487
Excluding Go_out_at_night	0.6312
Excluding Go_beachvacation_in_religious_holiday	0.6555

Pairwise Associations:

	Item i	Item j	p.value
1	1	2	0.001
2	1	3	0.001
3	1	4	0.001
4	1	5	0.001
5	1	6	0.001
6	2	3	0.001
7	2	4	0.001
8	2	5	0.001
9	2	6	0.001
10	3	4	0.001

Call:
 grm(data = dd)

Coefficients:


	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Extrmt5	Dscrmn
Share.Internet	0.111	0.457	0.948	1.539	2.476	2.146
Surfing_net_instead_of_TV	-0.567	0.385	0.878	1.580	2.123	2.920
Visits_social_network	-0.446	0.261	0.613	1.279	1.906	3.766
Internet_first_coming_mind_for_info	-0.844	-0.111	0.263	1.372	2.156	2.490
Internet_safe_for_shopping	-0.682	0.418	1.419	2.399	2.666	1.651
Banking_transactions_on_web	0.995	1.290	1.733	2.231	2.983	1.463

Log.Lik: -38423.83


Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	77771.76	77975.14	-38854.88			
fit2	76919.65	77155.84	-38423.83	862.1	5	<0.001


Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew
Share.Internet	1	5222	2.20	1.50	1	1.97	0.00	1	6	5	0.91
Surfing_net_instead_of_TV	2	5222	2.41	1.34	2	2.25	1.48	1	6	5	0.85
Visits_social_network	3	5222	2.53	1.48	2	2.37	1.48	1	6	5	0.65
Internet_first_coming_mind_for_info	4	5222	2.91	1.46	3	2.84	1.48	1	6	5	0.15
Internet_safe_for_shopping	5	5222	2.30	1.23	2	2.16	1.48	1	6	5	0.99
Banking_transactions_onweb	6	5222	1.66	1.32	1	1.33	0.00	1	6	5	1.95
				kurtosis	se						
Share.Internet				-0.46	0.02						
Surfing_net_instead_of_TV				0.01	0.02						
Visits_social_network_everyday				-0.67	0.02						
Internet_first_coming_mind_for_info				-1.05	0.02						
Internet_safe_for_shopping				0.83	0.02						
Banking_transactions_on_web				2.63	0.02						



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

6 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Share.Internet	0.5253	0.1092	0.1388	0.1191	0.0806	0.0270
Surfing_net_instead_of_TV	0.3020	0.3171	0.1607	0.1432	0.0429	0.0341
Visits_social_network_everyday	0.3305	0.2526	0.1245	0.1791	0.0737	0.0396
Internet_first_coming_mind_for_info	0.2365	0.2026	0.1302	0.3110	0.0810	0.0387
Internet_safe_for_shopping	0.3070	0.3112	0.2323	0.1032	0.0124	0.0339
Banking_transactions_on_web	0.7493	0.0588	0.0691	0.0527	0.0412	0.0289

Frequencies of total scores:

6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	
26	27	28	29	30																
Freq	675	216	253	265	448	290	309	242	269	242	281	218	252	238	208	187	168	107	77	48
	76	32	19	10	5															

31 32 33 34 35 36

Freq 19 8 4 1 2 53

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.8423
Excluding Share.Internet	0.8199
Excluding Surfing_net_instead_of_TV	0.8025
Excluding Visits_social_network_everyday	0.7895
Excluding Internet_first_coming_mind_for_info	0.8070
Excluding Internet_safe_for_shopping	0.8281
Excluding Banking_transactions_on_web	0.8458

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	0.001
2	5	0.001
3	6	0.001
4	5	0.001
5	5	0.001
6	5	0.001

```

7      5      6    0.001
8      1      3 <2e-16
9      1      4 <2e-16
10     2      3 <2e-16

```

Call:

```
grm(data = dd)
```


Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Extrmt5	Dscrmn
Armless_tshirt_at_home	0.298	0.635	1.057	1.480	2.136	3.679
Makeup_at_home	-0.347	0.293	1.021	1.607	2.570	2.113
Swimsuit	0.423	0.710	1.045	1.375	1.982	3.585


Log.Lik: -17274.35

Likelihood Ratio Table


	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	34779.75	34884.72	-17373.87			
fit2	34584.69	34702.78	-17274.35	199.05	2	<0.001



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Armless													
Tshirtat	1	5222	1.98	1.49	1	1.67	0.00	1	6	5	1.35	0.54	0.02
home													
Makeupathome	2	5222	2.35	1.44	2	2.14	1.48	1	6	5	0.82	-0.35	0.02
Swimsuit	3	5222	1.87	1.50	1	1.54	0.00	1	6	5	1.56	1.07	0.02



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set
 Sample:
 3 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

```

          1      2      3      4      5      6
Armless_tshirt_at_home 0.6229 0.0979 0.1019 0.0739 0.0643 0.0391
Makeup_at_home         0.4075 0.1894 0.1903 0.1061 0.0756 0.0310
Swimsuit               0.6836 0.0787 0.0728 0.0552 0.0651 0.0446
Frequencies of total scores:
      3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Freq 1870 670 550 359 319 242 238 144 149 183 118 74 162 9 2 133
Cronbach's alpha:
                                value
All Items                       0.8560
Excluding Armless_tshirt_at_home 0.7357
Excluding Makeup_at_home        0.8736
Excluding Swimsuit              0.7747
Pairwise Associations:
  Item i Item j p.value
1      1      2 <2e-16
2      1      3 <2e-16
3      2      3 <2e-16

```

```


Call:
grm(data = dd)

Coefficients:
                Extrmt1 Extrmt2 Extrmt3 Extrmt4 Extrmt5 Dscrmn
Friday_prayer      -1.680  -1.136  -0.541   0.032   2.569   2.101
Perform_ritual_prayer -1.121  -0.482   0.067   0.472   2.643   2.951
Fasting_regular    -1.626  -1.105  -0.641  -0.116   2.770   2.515
Halal_food_important -4.491  -3.047  -2.198   0.379   4.372   0.976
Islamic_bank_important -1.579   0.058   1.016   2.574   3.713   0.991


Log.Lik: -34751.11
Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC  log.Lik    LRT df p.value
fit1 70628.37 70798.94 -35288.18
fit2 69562.23 69759.05 -34751.11 1074.14 4 <0.001

```


Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Friday_prayer	1	5222	3.92	1.39	4	4.11	1.48	1	6	5	-0.85	-0.47	0.02
Perform_ritual_prayer	2	5222	3.32	1.50	3	3.39	1.48	1	6	5	-0.18	-1.33	0.02
Fastingregular	3	5222	4.00	1.36	5	4.22	0.00	1	6	5	-1.02	-0.24	0.02
Halal_food_important	4	5222	4.23	0.93	4	4.37	1.48	1	6	5	-1.24	2.01	0.01
Islamic_bank_important	5	5222	2.70	1.36	2	2.58	1.48	1	6	5	0.55	-0.47	0.02



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

5 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Friday_prayer	0.0975	0.0862	0.1430	0.1748	0.4715	0.0270
Perform_ritual_prayer	0.1614	0.1741	0.1934	0.1367	0.3198	0.0146
Fasting_regular	0.0898	0.0869	0.1147	0.1676	0.5262	0.0147
Halal_food_important	0.0193	0.0486	0.0642	0.4403	0.4065	0.0211
Islamic_bank_important	0.2112	0.3066	0.1882	0.1963	0.0601	0.0375

Frequencies of total scores:

	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Freq	41	47	47	60	79	120	125	160	209	226	277	277	399	379	455	442	539	399	383	282	19

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.7528
Excluding Friday_prayer	0.6824
Excluding Perform_ritual_prayer	0.6588
Excluding Fasting_regular	0.6779
Excluding Halal_food_important	0.7482
Excluding Islamic_bank_important	0.7559

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	0.001
2	3	0.001
3	4	0.001
4	3	0.001

5	2	4	0.001
6	2	5	0.001
7	3	4	0.001
8	3	5	0.001
9	4	5	0.001
10	1	5	<2e-16

Call:
grm(data = dd)


Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Extrmt5	Dscrnm
Read_info_onpack_before_buy	-2.168	-0.861	-0.288	1.499	2.804	1.968
Check_nutritional_elements_pack	-1.854	-0.635	-0.106	1.407	2.495	2.146
Check.up	-2.818	0.047	0.962	3.501	4.889	0.914
Lose_or_protect_weigh	-2.804	-1.057	-0.256	2.081	4.205	0.994
Find_affordable_price	-4.313	-1.519	-0.472	2.389	5.530	0.770
Check_prices_insupermarket	-2.642	-0.773	-0.158	2.180	4.170	1.130
Good_at_bargain	-3.464	-1.053	0.222	2.360	5.444	0.743


Log.Lik: -52332.91

Likelihood Ratio Table


	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	105311.6	105547.8	-52619.82			
fit2	104749.8	105025.4	-52332.91	573.82	6	<0.001



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew
Read_info_onpack before_buy	1	5222	3.43	1.14	4	3.44	1.48	1	6	5	-0.29
Check_nutritional elements_pack	2	5222	3.31	1.23	4	3.31	1.48	1	6	5	-0.09
Check.up	3	5222	2.76	1.14	2	2.73	1.48	1	6	5	0.53
Lose_or_protect_weigh	4	5222	3.34	1.23	4	3.36	1.48	1	6	5	-0.23
Find_affordable_price	5	5222	3.44	1.15	4	3.46	1.48	1	6	5	-0.27
Check_prices insupermarket	6	5222	3.24	1.20	4	3.25	1.48	1	6	5	-0.17
Good_at_barga in	7	5222	3.22	1.26	3	3.22	1.48	1	6	5	0.02
			kurtosis		se						
Read_info_onpack_before_buy			-0.41	0.02							
Check_nutritional_elements_pack			-0.65	0.02							
Check.up			-0.34	0.02							
Lose_or_protect_weigh			-0.68	0.02							
Find_affordable_price			-0.64	0.02							
Check_prices_insupermarket			-0.81	0.02							
Good_at_bargain			-0.84	0.02							



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

7 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Read_info_onpack_before_buy	0.0492	0.2034	0.1628	0.4644	0.0950	0.0253
Check_nutritional_elements_pack	0.0707	0.2384	0.1637	0.3991	0.0952	0.0329
Check.up	0.0927	0.4288	0.1733	0.2535	0.0341	0.0176
Lose_or_protect_weigh	0.0793	0.2141	0.1605	0.4077	0.1134	0.0251
Find_affordable_price	0.0433	0.2168	0.1647	0.4224	0.1339	0.0190
Check_prices_insupermarket	0.0732	0.2622	0.1386	0.4182	0.0896	0.0182
Good_at_bargain	0.0843	0.2503	0.2126	0.2917	0.1385	0.0228

Frequencies of total scores:

	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	
Freq	1	2	5	9	18	26	44	86	101	174	197	285	291	413	392	487	419	501	413	409	272	241	
	132	89	46	39	13	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42									
Freq	24	20	7	4	6	4	2	3	47														

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.6664
Excluding Read_info_onpack_before_buy	0.6086
Excluding Check_nutritional_elements_pack	0.5930
Excluding Check.up	0.6431
Excluding Lose_or_protect_weigh	0.6471
Excluding Find_affordable_price	0.6475
Excluding Check_prices_insupermarket	0.6212
Excluding Good_at_bargain	0.6530

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	0.001


2	1	3	0.001
3	1	4	0.001
4	1	5	0.001
5	1	6	0.001
6	1	7	0.001
7	2	3	0.001
8	2	4	0.001
9	2	5	0.001
10	2	6	0.001

```
Call:
grm(data = dd)Coefficients:
Foods_supermarket      Extrmt1 Extrmt2 Extrmt3 Extrmt4 Extrmt5 Dscrnm
Spend_time_outof_living_place -1.152 -0.070  1.084  2.304  3.440  1.316
Go_cinema_regular       0.119  0.822  1.588  2.254  2.748  2.061
Go_beaches_holiday     0.186  0.639  1.311  2.070  2.963  1.619
Dine_out_family        -0.851  0.100  1.246  2.146  2.882  1.880
Likes_fastfood         -0.046  0.668  1.419  2.179  3.270  1.500
Household_shops_bigstores -1.203 -0.261  0.722  1.673  2.879  1.787
Discount_store         -1.030 -0.283  0.863  1.909  3.264  1.404


Log.Lik: -57410.52

Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC  log.Lik  LRT df p.value
fit1 115150.6 115419.5 -57534.27
fit2 114917.0 115231.9 -57410.52 247.51  7 <0.001
```


Item Information Curves



Item Response Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis
Foods_supermarket	1	5222	3.08	1.34	3	3.07	1.48	1	6	5	0.03	-0.86
Spend_time_outof_living_place	2	5222	2.63	1.29	3	2.53	1.48	1	6	5	0.49	-0.36
Go_cinema_regular	3	5222	1.88	1.21	1	1.64	0.00	1	6	5	1.49	1.84
Go_beachesholiday	4	5222	2.05	1.40	1	1.81	0.00	1	6	5	1.13	0.20
Dine_out_family	5	5222	2.45	1.21	2	2.34	1.48	1	6	5	0.69	0.22
Likes_fastfood	6	5222	2.08	1.35	2	1.86	1.48	1	6	5	1.12	0.33
Household_shops_bigstores	7	5222	2.82	1.30	3	2.74	1.48	1	6	5	0.32	-0.56
Discount_store	8	5222	2.74	1.36	3	2.64	1.48	1	6	5	0.32	-0.68
				se								
Foods_supermarket				0.02								
Spend_time_outof_living_place				0.02								
Go_cinema_regular				0.02								
Go_beaches_holiday				0.02								
Dine_out_family				0.02								
Likes_fastfood				0.02								
Household_shops_bigstores				0.02								
Discount_store				0.02								



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

8 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Foods_supermarket	0.1568	0.1898	0.2455	0.2560	0.1258	0.0260
Spend_time_outof_living_place	0.2350	0.2501	0.2723	0.1643	0.0534	0.0249
Go_cinema_regular	0.5393	0.2089	0.1501	0.0597	0.0188	0.0232
Go_beaches_holiday	0.5534	0.1224	0.1475	0.1009	0.0498	0.0260
Dine_out_family	0.2597	0.2750	0.2989	0.1107	0.0326	0.0232
Likes_fastfood	0.4927	0.1915	0.1526	0.0908	0.0500	0.0224
Household_shops_bigstores	0.1869	0.2321	0.2876	0.1867	0.0816	0.0251
Discount_store	0.2503	0.1758	0.2930	0.1746	0.0804	0.0259

Frequencies of total scores:

8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26		
27	28	29	30	31																
Freq	117	104	131	158	235	257	240	281	318	277	327	291	275	306	285	241	225	180	206	1
55	125	94	81	65																
	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48			
Freq	58	34	32	14	13	9	5	6	1	7	2	15	6	3	8	0	35			

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.8159
Excluding Foods_supermarket	0.8006
Excluding Spend_time_outof_living_place	0.8005
Excluding Go_cinema_regular	0.7863
Excluding Go_beaches_holiday	0.7980
Excluding Dine_out_family	0.7862
Excluding Likes_fastfood	0.7996
Excluding Household_shops_bigstores	0.7879
Excluding Discount_store	0.8005

```

Pairwise Associations:
  Item i Item j p.value
1      1      2  0.001
2      1      3  0.001
3      1      4  0.001
4      1      5  0.001
5      1      6  0.001
6      1      7  0.001
7      1      8  0.001
8      2      3  0.001
9      2      4  0.001
10     2      5  0.001

```

```

Call:
  grm(data = dd)

Coefficients:
`Go_hometown_holiday`
  Extrmt1  Extrmt2  Extrmt3  Extrmt4  Extrmt5  Dscrmn
-1.108    -0.388    0.654    1.806    4.158    0.861
Usually_watches_Football
  Extrmt1  Extrmt2  Extrmt3  Extrmt4  Extrmt5  Dscrmn
-0.231    0.330    1.065    2.148    5.035    0.834
Shooping_shoopingmall
  Extrmt1  Dscrmn
  7.335   -0.306


Picnic_family
  Extrmt1  Extrmt2  Extrmt3  Extrmt4  Extrmt5  Dscrmn
-2.081   -0.732    0.999    2.474    3.904    1.119

Buy_prefered_by_kids
  Extrmt1  Extrmt2  Extrmt3  Extrmt4  Extrmt5  Dscrmn
-1.054   -0.091    1.079    2.037    2.799    0.878


Man_goes_cofeeshops
  Extrmt1  Extrmt2  Extrmt3  Extrmt4  Extrmt5  Dscrmn
-0.818    0.582    2.271    4.193    7.463    0.477
Log.Lik: -42634.11
Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC  log.Lik  LRT df p.value
fit1 85637.52 85814.66 -42791.76
fit2 85332.23 85542.17 -42634.11 315.3 5 <0.001

```


Item Information Curves



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Go_hometown_holiday	1	5222	2.88	1.58	3	2.80	2.97	1	6	5	0.21	-1.24	0.02
Usually_watches_Football	2	5222	2.47	1.61	2	2.32	1.48	1	6	5	0.55	-1.19	0.02
Shooping_shoopingmall	13	5222	1.90	0.30	2	2.00	0.00	1	2	1	-2.68	5.21	0.00
Picnic_family	4	5222	2.92	1.17	3	2.89	1.48	1	6	5	0.25	-0.15	0.02
Buy_prefered_by_kids	5	5222	2.78	1.64	3	2.60	1.48	1	6	5	0.58	-0.78	0.02
Man_goes_cofeeshops	6	5222	2.44	1.51	2	2.26	1.48	1	6	5	0.67	-0.75	0.02



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

6 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

`Go_hometown_holiday`

	1	2	3	4	5	6
0.3047	0.1252	0.1925	0.1768	0.1633	0.0375	

\$Usually_watches_Football

	1	2	3	4	5	6
0.4600	0.1028	0.1264	0.1446	0.1457	0.0205	

\$Shooping_shoopingmall

	1	2
0.099	0.901	

\$Picnic_family

	1	2	3	4	5	6
0.1264	0.2152	0.3757	0.1953	0.0647	0.0226	

\$Buy_prefered_by_kids

	1	2	3	4	5	6
0.3118	0.1752	0.2112	0.1304	0.0693	0.1021	

\$Man_goes_cofeeshops

	1	2	3	4	5	6

```

0.4096 0.1586 0.1725 0.1337 0.0952 0.0304
Frequencies of total scores:
   6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31 32
Freq 2 65 113 150 220 365 417 465 509 512 512 483 352 291 211 153 113 92 41 50 30
18  9  4  2  1 42

```

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.4335
Excluding Go_hometown_holiday	0.3766
Excluding Usually_watches_Football	0.3645
Excluding Shooping_shoopingmall	0.4602
Excluding Picnic_family	0.3475
Excluding Buy_prefered_by_kids	0.3499
Excluding Man_goes_cofeeshops	0.4091

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	3	0.088
2	2	0.008
3	1	0.004
4	1	1e-03
5	1	1e-03
6	2	1e-03
7	2	1e-03
8	4	1e-03
9	3	2e-04
10	3	2e-06

Call:

```
grm(data = dd)
```


Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Extrmt5	Dscrmn
Frozen_foods_healty_as_fresh	-1.456	0.775	1.789	3.100	3.738	1.093
Tolarate_factories_pollution_economy	-1.444	1.130	1.988	4.068	4.840	0.872
Adds_honest	-0.849	1.649	3.208	3.996	4.257	0.943

Log.Lik: -20912.04

Likelihood Ratio Table

	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	41860.08	41965.05	-20914.04			
fit2	41860.09	41978.18	-20912.04	3.99	2	0.136



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

3 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Frozen_foods_healty_as_fresh	0.2116	0.4510	0.1718	0.1139	0.0239	0.0278
Tolarate_factories_pollution_economy	0.2488	0.4519	0.1210	0.1404	0.0176	0.0203
Adds_honest	0.3357	0.4558	0.1442	0.0314	0.0067	0.0262

Frequencies of total scores:

	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Freq	313	476	764	1220	855	752	355	245	89	53	31	24	11	5	1	28

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.4020
Excluding Frozen_foods_healty_as_fresh	0.2753
Excluding Tolarate_factories_pollution_economy	0.3183
Excluding Adds_honest	0.3312



Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	0.001
2	3	0.001
3	2	0.001


```

Call:
grm(data = dd)
Coefficients:
                                Extrmt1 Extrmt2 Extrmt3 Extrmt4 Extrmt5 Ds
crmn
Make_tomato_sauce_tarhana_soup    -2.133  -1.270  -0.216   1.118   5.287   0
.695
Prefere_Turkish_manufact_products  -3.789  -1.856  -0.748   1.912   4.543   0
.893
Cash_instead_of_creditcard         -4.350  -2.904  -1.966   1.144   4.919   0
.779
Log.Lik: -23147.7
Likelihood Ratio Table
      AIC      BIC    log.Lik  LRT df p.value
fit1 46330.3 46435.27 -23149.15
fit2 46331.4 46449.49 -23147.70 2.89 2  0.235

```



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew
Make_tomatosauce											
tarhana_soup	1	5222	3.37	1.57	4	3.42	1.48	1	6	5	-0.29
Prefere_Turkish											
manufact_products	2	5222	3.60	1.13	4	3.65	1.48	1	6	5	-0.45
Cash_instead_of											
creditcard	3	5222	3.98	1.07	4	4.11	1.48	1	6	5	-0.99
				kurtosis	se						
Make_tomato_sauce_tarhana_soup				-1.27	0.02						
Prefere_Turkish_manufact_products				-0.21	0.02						
Cash_instead_of_creditcard				0.97	0.01						



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

3 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Make_tomato_sauce_tarhana_soup	0.2070	0.1063	0.1576	0.2015	0.2968	0.0308
Prefere_Turkish_manufact_products	0.0456	0.1480	0.1714	0.4525	0.1578	0.0247
Cash_instead_of_creditcard	0.0421	0.0730	0.0889	0.4860	0.2821	0.0280

Frequencies of total scores:

	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Freq	7	13	45	104	276	372	674	719	820	683	768	403	253	39	9	37

Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.2645
Excluding Make_tomato_sauce_tarhana_soup	0.2145
Excluding Prefere_Turkish_manufact_products	0.1683
Excluding Cash_instead_of_creditcard	0.2033

Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value
1	2	0.001
2	3	0.001
3	2	0.001

Call:
 grm(data = dd)


Coefficients:

	Extrmt1	Extrmt2	Extrmt3	Extrmt4	Extrmt5	Dscrnm
Natural_medication_cure	3.105	0.932	-0.043	-2.827	-4.739	-1.021
Pay_more_organicfoods	7.174	3.477	1.623	-2.753	-7.323	-0.514
Brands_political_boycott	3.850	-0.494	-2.048	-6.196	-9.842	-0.353


Log.Lik: -23095.4

Likelihood Ratio Table


	AIC	BIC	log.Lik	LRT	df	p.value
fit1	47024.53	47129.50	-23496.27			
fit2	46226.79	46344.89	-23095.40	801.74	2	<0.001



Item Response Category Characteristic Curves - Category: 2



	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
Natural													
medication_cure	1	5222	3.20	1.11	3	3.22	1.48	1	6	5	-0.16	-0.66	0.02
Pay_more													
organicfoods	2	5222	3.74	1.06	4	3.80	1.48	1	6	5	-0.52	0.05	0.01
Brands_political													
boycott	3	5222	2.71	1.38	2	2.60	1.48	1	6	5	0.51	-0.70	0.02



Descriptive statistics for the 'dd' data-set

Sample:

3 items and 5222 sample units; 0 missing values

Proportions for each level of response:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Natural_medication_cure	0.0603	0.2543	0.1976	0.4111	0.0636	0.0130
Pay_more_organicfoods	0.0274	0.1268	0.1588	0.4814	0.1802	0.0255
Brands_political_boycott	0.2108	0.3344	0.1264	0.2241	0.0728	0.0316

Frequencies of total scores:

	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Freq	9	20	84	226	492	810	871	1064	636	537	222	133	52	28	7	31


Cronbach's alpha:

	value
All Items	0.2335
Excluding Natural_medication_cure	0.1485
Excluding Pay_more_organicfoods	0.1684
Excluding Brands_political_boycott	0.1945


Pairwise Associations:

Item i	Item j	p.value	
1	1	2	0.001
2	1	3	0.001
3	2	3	0.001


DEEP EXPLORATION LS




Hierarchical (multilevel) Structure



ICLUST





```
[1] 0.7437111
```

```
> FA(lsl5[-c(1:8)])
```

```
Principal Components Analysis
```

```
Call: principal(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
```


```
Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
```

	item	TC1	TC2	TC4	TC3	h2	u2	com
Visits_social_network_everyday	56	0.79				0.6230	0.38	1.1
Surfing_net_instead_of_TV	58	0.74				0.5591	0.44	1.1
Share.Internet	45	0.73				0.5461	0.45	1.0
Internet_first_coming_mind_for_info	55	0.65				0.4678	0.53	1.1
Internet_safe_for_shopping	54	0.59				0.3571	0.64	1.0
Go_cinema_regular	35	0.57				0.4706	0.53	1.3
Banking_transactions_on_web	50	0.52				0.3606	0.64	1.5
Likes_fastfood	29	0.50				0.3584	0.64	1.4
Impressed_comments_net	7	0.46			0.33	0.3973	0.60	1.8
Reading_book	41	0.45				0.3530	0.65	2.0
Spend_time_outof_living_place	36	0.45				0.2936	0.71	1.6
Music_instrument_art	42	0.37				0.2033	0.80	1.3
Usually_watches_Football	44	0.37				0.1239	0.88	1.3
Brands_political_boycott	53	0.34				0.1305	0.87	2.3
Go_beaches_holiday	47	0.33	0.32			0.4215	0.58	3.2
Dine_out_family	30	0.32		0.32		0.3688	0.63	2.7


Go_abroad_for_business	49		0.1861	0.81	2.8	
Go_abroad	48		0.2006	0.80	3.0	
Foods_internet	26		0.1239	0.88	1.9	
Good_at_bargain	12		0.0875	0.91	3.0	
Shooping_shoopingmall	18		0.0864	0.91	2.0	
Friday_prayer	37	-0.74	0.4961	0.50	1.2	
Armless_tshirt_at_home	21	0.72	0.5817	0.42	1.1	
Fasting_regular	39	-0.71	0.4698	0.53	1.1	
Swimsuit	22	0.70	0.5929	0.41	1.2	
Perform_ritual_prayer	38	-0.64	0.4501	0.55	1.1	
Halal_food_important	15	-0.54	0.3420	0.66	1.4	
Drink_alchool_home	33	0.53	0.3364	0.66	1.1	
Islamic_bank_important	52	-0.49	0.2721	0.73	1.3	
Makeup_at_home	20	0.49	0.4061	0.59	1.6	
Go_out_at_night	32	0.31 0.42	0.3442	0.66	2.0	
Go_beachvacation_in_religious_holiday	40	0.39	0.2322	0.77	1.4	
Make_tomato_sauce_tarhana_soup	28		0.0882	0.91	2.1	
Cash_instead_of_creditcard	51		0.0584	0.94	2.8	
Check_nutritional_elements_pack	13	0.57	0.3265	0.67	1.3	
Read_info_onpack_before_buy	1	0.55	0.2878	0.71	1.1	
Foods_supermarket	25	0.49	0.3078	0.69	1.2	
Household_shops_bigstores	24	0.48	0.3798	0.62	1.6	
Pay_more_quality	3	0.46	0.2854	0.71	1.5	
Pay_more_to_make_life_easier	2	0.44	0.2717	0.73	1.5	
Pay_more_organicfoods	16	0.42	0.2004	0.80	1.7	
Buy_prefered_by_kids	27	0.41	0.1824	0.82	1.1	
Lose_or_protect_weigh	14	0.40	0.1894	0.81	1.7	
Discount_store	23	0.39	0.3222	0.68	2.1	
Picnic_family	31	0.37	0.2124	0.79	1.8	
Food_shooping_home	19	0.36	0.1598	0.84	1.9	
Prefere_Turkish_manufact_products	5	0.35	0.1925	0.81	2.1	
Reads_newspaper_everyday	59		0.2553	0.74	3.1	
Listen_radio	43		0.1730	0.83	2.5	
Go_hometown_holiday	46		0.1623	0.84	3.3	
Man_goes_cofeeshops	34		0.0068	0.99	3.3	
Brand_makes_me_different	6		0.63	0.3922	0.61	1.0
Want_reliabilized_throng	9		0.62	0.4496	0.55	1.1
Follow_latest_fashion	10		0.58	0.4920	0.51	1.4
Luxury_goog_quality	11		0.53	0.3124	0.69	1.2

Reward_herself_without_necessity	8	0.46	0.3800	0.62	1.7
Doesnot_care_tpay_parfume	4	0.37	0.3210	0.68	2.2
Adds_honest	57	0.0890	0.91	1.3	
Froozen_foods_healty_as_fresh	17	0.0627	0.94	1.1	
		TC1	TC2	TC4	TC3
SS loadings		6.26	4.98	3.82	2.74
Proportion Var		0.11	0.08	0.06	0.05
Cumulative Var		0.11	0.19	0.26	0.30
Proportion Explained		0.35	0.28	0.21	0.15
Cumulative Proportion		0.35	0.63	0.85	1.00
With component correlations of					
		TC1	TC2	TC4	TC3
TC1		1.00	0.35	0.27	0.23
TC2		0.35	1.00	0.12	0.03
TC4		0.27	0.12	1.00	0.06
TC3		0.23	0.03	0.06	1.00
Mean item complexity = 1.7					
Test of the hypothesis that 4 components are sufficient.					
The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.05					
with the empirical chi square 25549.62 with prob < 0					
Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.92					

Components Analysis



Factor Analysis



```

Factor Analysis using method = minres
Call: fa(r = dd, nfactors = nf, rotate = "oblimin")
Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
  item MR1 MR2 MR3 MR4
Visits_social_network_everyday 56 0.81
Surfing_net_instead_of_TV      58 0.74
Share.Internet                 45 0.71
    
```

Internet_first_coming_mind_for_info	55	0.63		
Internet_safe_for_shopping	54	0.52		
Go_cinema_regular	35	0.50		
Banking_transactions_on_web	50	0.45		
Likes_fastfood	29	0.43		
Impressed_comments_net	7	0.42		
Reading_book	41	0.38	0.31	
Spend_time_outof_living_place	36	0.36		
Music_instrument_art	42	0.31		
Usually_watches_Football	44			
Brands_political_boycott	53			
Good_at_bargain	12			
Shooping_shoopingmall	18			
Man_goes_cofeeshops	34			
Armless_tshirt_at_home	21	0.70		
Swimsuit	22	0.69		
Friday_prayer	37	-0.68		
Fasting_regular	39	-0.65		
Perform_ritual_prayer	38	-0.59		
Halal_food_important	15	-0.50		
Drink_alchool_home	33	0.49		
Makeup_at_home	20	0.45		
Islamic_bank_important	52	-0.43		
Go_out_at_night	32	0.41		
Go_beachvacation_in_religious_holiday	40	0.36		
Go_beaches_holiday	47	0.31		
Go_abroad	48			
Make_tomato_sauce_tarhana_soup	28			
Go_abroad_for_business	49			
Foods_internet	26			
Cash_instead_of_creditcard	51			
Check_nutritional_elements_pack	13	0.47		
Household_shops_bigstores	24	0.46		
Read_info_onpack_before_buy	1	0.45		
Foods_supermarket	25	0.45		
Pay_more_quality	3	0.39		
Discount_store	23	0.37		
Pay_more_to_make_life_easier	2	0.37		
Picnic_family	31	0.35		
Buy_prefered_by_kids	27	0.35		
Dine_out_family	30	0.33		
Pay_more_organicfoods	16	0.33		
Lose_or_protect_weigh	14	0.31		
Reads_newspaper_everyday	59			
Food_shooping_home	19			
Prefere_Turkish_manufact_products	5			
Listen_radio	43			
Go_hometown_holiday	46			
want_reliialized_throng	9			
Brand_makes_me_different	6			
Follow_latest_fashion	10			
Luxury_goog_quality	11			
Reward_herself_without_necessity	8			
Doesnot_care_tpay_parfume	4			
Adds_honest	57			
Froozen_foods_healty_as_fresh	17			
	MR1	MR2	MR3	MR4

SS loadings 5.20 4.46 3.26 2.19
 Proportion Var 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04
 Cumulative Var 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.26
 Proportion Explained 0.34 0.30 0.22 0.14
 Cumulative Proportion 0.34 0.64 0.86 1.00

With factor correlations of
 MR1 MR2 MR3 MR4
 MR1 1.00 0.39 0.31 0.34
 MR2 0.39 1.00 0.18 0.08
 MR3 0.31 0.18 1.00 0.12
 MR4 0.34 0.08 0.12 1.00

Mean item complexity = 1.7
 Test of the hypothesis that 4 factors are sufficient.

The degrees of freedom for the null model are 1711 and the objective function was 15.92 with Chi Square of 56735.75

The degrees of freedom for the model are 1481 and the objective function was 4.05

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.04
 The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is 0.04

The harmonic number of observations is 3585 with the empirical chi square 18748.64 with prob < 0

The total number of observations was 3585 with Likelihood Chi Square = 14424.85 with prob < 0

Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 0.728
 RMSEA index = 0.05 and the 90 % confidence intervals are 0.049 0.05
 BIC = 2303.59
 Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.94
 Measures of factor score adequacy

	MR1	MR2	MR3	MR4
Correlation of (regression) scores with factors	0.94	0.93	0.89	0.87
Multiple R square of scores with factors	0.89	0.87	0.80	0.76
Minimum correlation of possible factor scores	0.79	0.75	0.60	0.51

CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS (CFA)

Tavaan 0.6-3 ended normally after 48 iterations

Optimization method	NLMINB	
Number of free parameters	183	
	Used	Total
Number of observations	1595	2338
Estimator	ML	
Model Fit Test Statistic	5315.799	
Degrees of freedom	1587	
P-value (Chi-square)	0.000	

Parameter Estimates:

Information	Expected
Information saturated (h1) model	Structured

Latent Variables:	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)
Standard Errors				
Standard				
kokos =~				
Fllw_ltst_fshn	0.736	0.026	28.114	0.000
Ltst_md1_mbl_m	0.599	0.024	24.530	0.000
wnt_rllzd_thrn	0.650	0.028	23.550	0.000
Dsnt_cr_tpy_pr	0.649	0.031	20.755	0.000
Brnd_mks_m.dff	0.456	0.025	17.994	0.000
Rwrdr_hrs1f_wt_	0.640	0.029	22.025	0.000
Entrg_lks_mpr_	0.473	0.029	16.355	0.000
Luxury_gg_qlty	0.477	0.030	15.696	0.000
Imprssd_cmmnt_	0.321	0.035	9.165	0.000
Cr_brnd_gv_d_d	0.262	0.031	8.434	0.000
culture =~				
Listen_radio	0.481	0.037	12.908	0.000
Reading_book	0.866	0.037	23.101	0.000
Msc_nstrmnt_rt	0.494	0.033	15.198	0.000
Rds_nwsppr_vry	0.545	0.035	15.606	0.000
yuppie =~				
G_brd_fr_bsnss	0.251	0.021	11.876	0.000
Go_abroad	0.281	0.021	13.571	0.000
Drink_alchl_hm	0.658	0.032	20.721	0.000
Go_out_at_nght	0.565	0.026	21.853	0.000
G_bchvctn_n_r_	0.397	0.026	15.160	0.000
hitech =~				
Brnds_pltcl_by	0.359	0.039	9.171	0.000
Imprssd_cmmnt_	0.436	0.034	12.878	0.000
Share.Internet	1.038	0.032	32.687	0.000
Srfng_nt_n_TV	0.919	0.026	34.685	0.000
Vsts_scl_ntwr_	1.140	0.028	40.156	0.000
Intrnt_frsc___	0.933	0.030	31.194	0.000
Intrnt_sf_fr_s	0.565	0.026	21.539	0.000
Bnkg_trnsct__	0.571	0.032	18.022	0.000
Likes_fastfood	0.381	0.044	8.616	0.000
modern =~				
Armlss_tshrt__	1.228	0.029	42.172	0.000
Makeup_at_home	0.767	0.039	19.518	0.000
Swimsuit	1.194	0.030	40.192	0.000
relig =~				
Friday_prayer	1.064	0.033	32.013	0.000
Prfrm_rtl_pryr	1.138	0.035	32.889	0.000
Fasting_regulr	1.007	0.033	30.485	0.000
Hall_fd_mprtnt	0.495	0.024	21.044	0.000
Islmc_bnk_mprt	0.536	0.030	18.031	0.000
consc =~				
Rd_nf_npck_bf_	0.679	0.030	22.694	0.000
Chck_ntrtnl_l_	0.903	0.034	26.650	0.000
Check.up	0.326	0.030	10.811	0.000
Ls_r_prtct_wgh	0.398	0.033	12.148	0.000
Chck_prcs_nspr	0.266	0.033	7.937	0.000
everydayfam =~				
Foods_supmrkt	0.435	0.032	13.579	0.000
Spnd_tm_tf_lv_	0.508	0.030	16.829	0.000
Go_cinema_rglr	0.663	0.027	24.850	0.000
Makeup_at_home	0.295	0.038	7.701	0.000
Go_beachs_hldy	0.786	0.033	24.025	0.000


Dine_out_famly	0.690	0.026	26.248	0.000	
Likes_fastfood	0.330	0.045	7.375	0.000	
Hshld_shps_bgs	0.622	0.030	20.830	0.000	
Discount_store	0.633	0.032	19.887	0.000	
tradi =~					
Go_homtwn_hldy	0.412	0.045	9.086	0.000	
Uslly_wtchs_Ft	0.351	0.049	7.241	0.000	
Picnic_family	0.552	0.036	15.156	0.000	
By_prfrd_by_kd	0.460	0.042	10.981	0.000	
Man_gos_cfshps	0.095	0.043	2.215	0.027	
industry =~					
Frzn_fds_hlt__	0.346	0.041	8.538	0.000	
Tlrt_fctrs_pl_	0.325	0.041	7.829	0.000	
Adds_honest	0.377	0.037	10.219	0.000	
basic =~					
Mk_tmt_sc_trh_	0.487	0.050	9.798	0.000	
Prfr_Trksh_mn_	0.424	0.036	11.622	0.000	
Csh_nstd_f_crd	0.162	0.031	5.199	0.000	
Pay_mr_rgnccfds	0.213	0.031	6.880	0.000	
Brnds_pltcl_by	0.298	0.044	6.751	0.000	
Covariances:					
		Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)
.Go_abroad_for_business ~~					
.Go_abroad		0.293	0.015	19.614	0.000
.Foods_supermarket ~~					
.Hshld_shps_bgs		0.431	0.033	13.172	0.000
.Drink_alcohol_home ~~					
.Go_out_at_nght		0.083	0.024	3.375	0.001
.Internet_safe_for_shopping ~~					
.Bknng_trnsct__		0.236	0.028	8.533	0.000
.Go_beachvacation_in_religious_holiday ~~					
.Go_beachs_hldy		0.160	0.025	6.291	0.000
.Reads_newspaper_everyday ~~					
.Uslly_wtchs_Ft		0.404	0.046	8.810	0.000
kokos ~~					
culture		0.233	0.035	6.567	0.000
yuppie		0.321	0.034	9.433	0.000
hitech		0.543	0.023	23.517	0.000
modern		0.218	0.029	7.527	0.000
relig		-0.136	0.031	-4.403	0.000
consc		0.143	0.033	4.381	0.000
everydayfam		0.521	0.026	19.838	0.000
tradi		0.251	0.044	5.663	0.000
industry		0.395	0.048	8.323	0.000
basic		-0.305	0.051	-5.965	0.000
culture ~~					
yuppie		0.501	0.038	13.347	0.000
hitech		0.494	0.030	16.688	0.000
modern		0.424	0.031	13.667	0.000
relig		-0.235	0.035	-6.730	0.000
consc		0.345	0.036	9.615	0.000
everydayfam		0.643	0.029	21.830	0.000
tradi		0.448	0.050	9.041	0.000
industry		-0.074	0.055	-1.342	0.180
basic		-0.018	0.059	-0.310	0.757
yuppie ~~					
hitech		0.462	0.030	15.277	0.000

modern	0.567	0.029	19.891	0.000
relig	-0.643	0.028	-22.638	0.000
consc	-0.045	0.038	-1.203	0.229
everydayfam	0.646	0.030	21.853	0.000
tradi	0.283	0.050	5.614	0.000
industry	0.035	0.055	0.644	0.520
basic	-0.494	0.058	-8.587	0.000
hitech ~~				
modern	0.339	0.026	13.127	0.000
relig	-0.294	0.028	-10.675	0.000
consc	0.011	0.031	0.335	0.737
everydayfam	0.683	0.020	34.083	0.000
tradi	0.300	0.042	7.196	0.000
industry	0.063	0.046	1.388	0.165
basic	-0.329	0.050	-6.555	0.000
modern ~~				
relig	-0.605	0.021	-28.998	0.000
consc	0.036	0.031	1.160	0.246
everydayfam	0.599	0.023	26.290	0.000
tradi	0.167	0.043	3.932	0.000
industry	-0.024	0.046	-0.523	0.601
basic	-0.370	0.048	-7.702	0.000
relig ~~				
consc	0.120	0.032	3.720	0.000
everydayfam	-0.319	0.030	-10.696	0.000
tradi	0.063	0.044	1.427	0.154
industry	0.094	0.047	1.988	0.047
basic	0.633	0.049	12.846	0.000
consc ~~				
everydayfam	0.146	0.034	4.335	0.000
tradi	0.254	0.046	5.490	0.000
industry	-0.010	0.050	-0.197	0.844
basic	0.443	0.053	8.423	0.000
everydayfam ~~				
tradi	0.736	0.042	17.651	0.000
industry	-0.063	0.050	-1.277	0.202
basic	-0.338	0.053	-6.384	0.000
tradi ~~				
industry	0.027	0.068	0.395	0.693
basic	0.375	0.073	5.167	0.000
industry ~~				
basic	-0.120	0.077	-1.552	0.121
Variances:				
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)
.Fllw_ltst_fshn	0.619	0.028	22.524	0.000
.Ltst_md1_mbl_m	0.598	0.025	24.328	0.000
.Wnt_rllzd_thrn	0.784	0.032	24.722	0.000
.Dsnt_cr_tpy_pr	1.067	0.042	25.670	0.000
.Brnd_mks_m.dff	0.735	0.028	26.402	0.000
.Rwrdr_hrs1f_wt_	0.899	0.036	25.269	0.000
.Entrg_lks_mpr_	0.979	0.037	26.758	0.000
.Luxury_gg_qlty	1.089	0.041	26.888	0.000
.Imprsd_cmmnt_	0.902	0.034	26.711	0.000
.Cr_brnd_gv_d_d	1.216	0.044	27.877	0.000
.Listen_radio	1.409	0.054	26.198	0.000
.Reading_book	0.933	0.053	17.508	0.000
.Msc_nstrmnt_rt	1.025	0.041	25.258	0.000

.Rds_nwsprr_vry	1.212	0.048	25.182	0.000
.G_brd_fr_bsns	0.491	0.018	26.914	0.000
.Go_abroad	0.462	0.017	26.494	0.000
.Drink_alchl_hm	0.691	0.037	18.750	0.000
.Go_out_at_nght	0.435	0.025	17.543	0.000
.G_bchvctn_n_r_	0.728	0.028	26.045	0.000
.Brnds_pltcl_by	1.479	0.055	26.764	0.000
.Share.Internet	0.919	0.038	24.029	0.000
.Srfng_nt_n_TV	0.594	0.026	23.105	0.000
.Vsts_scl_ntwr_	0.515	0.027	19.137	0.000
.Intrnt_frs___	0.858	0.035	24.601	0.000
.Intrnt_sf_fr_s	0.825	0.031	26.844	0.000
.Bkng_trnsct__	1.267	0.046	27.298	0.000
.Likes_fastfood	1.111	0.041	27.193	0.000
.Armlss_tshrt__	0.411	0.030	13.563	0.000
.Makeup_at_home	0.997	0.039	25.417	0.000
.Swimsuit	0.515	0.031	16.524	0.000
.Friday_prayer	0.916	0.043	21.328	0.000
.Prfrm_rtl_pryr	0.955	0.046	20.654	0.000
.Fasting_regulr	0.962	0.043	22.359	0.000
.Hall_fd_mprtnt	0.624	0.024	26.088	0.000
.Islmc_bnk_mprt	1.048	0.039	26.741	0.000
.Rd_nf_npck_bf_	0.641	0.034	18.856	0.000
.Chck_ntrtnl_l_	0.508	0.047	10.843	0.000
.Check.up	1.005	0.037	27.150	0.000
.Ls_r_prtct_wgh	1.167	0.044	26.824	0.000
.Chck_prcs_nspr	1.276	0.046	27.679	0.000
.Foods_supmrkt	1.305	0.047	27.520	0.000
.Spnd_tm_tf_lv_	1.124	0.041	27.141	0.000
.Go_cinema_rglr	0.760	0.030	25.367	0.000
.Go_beachs_hlly	1.175	0.046	25.654	0.000
.Dine_out_famly	0.710	0.029	24.886	0.000
.Hshld_shps_bgs	1.032	0.039	26.411	0.000
.Discount_store	1.194	0.045	26.616	0.000
.Go_homtwn_hlly	1.933	0.072	26.748	0.000
.Uslly_wtchs_Ft	2.365	0.086	27.395	0.000
.Picnic_family	0.839	0.042	20.120	0.000
.By_prfrd_by_kd	1.565	0.061	25.821	0.000
.Man_gos_cfshps	1.883	0.067	28.166	0.000
.Frzn_fds_hlt__	0.880	0.038	22.925	0.000
.Tlrt_fctrs_pl_	0.979	0.041	24.076	0.000
.Adds_honest	0.512	0.030	17.088	0.000
.Mk_tmt_sc_trh_	2.072	0.080	25.853	0.000
.Prfr_Trksh_mn_	0.940	0.040	23.498	0.000
.Csh_nstd_f_crd	0.974	0.035	27.804	0.000
.Pay_mr_rgnccfs	0.915	0.033	27.383	0.000
kokos	1.000			
culture	1.000			
yuppie	1.000			
hitech	1.000			
modern	1.000			
relig	1.000			
consc	1.000			
everydayfam	1.000			
tradi	1.000			
industry	1.000			
basic	1.000			

chisq	df	cfi	rmsea	tli	bic
5315.80	1587.00	0.84	0.04	0.83	275685.19

SOCIAL CLASS MAPPING (LS)



**ETİK KURUL DEĞERLENDİRME SONUCU/RESULT OF EVALUATION BY
THE ETHICS COMMITTEE**

(Bu bölüm İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurul tarafından doldurulacaktır /This section to be completed by the Committee on Ethics in research on Humans)


Başvuru Sahibi / Applicant: Müge Öztunç

Proje Başlığı / Project Title: Interactions of Lifestyles within Changing Social and Class Structures in Turkey


Proje No. / Project Number: 2018-30813-83

1.	Herhangi bir değişikliğe gerek yoktur / There is no need for revision	XX
2.	Ret/ Application Rejected Reddin gerekçesi / Reason for Rejection	


Değerlendirme Tarihi / Date of Evaluation: 10 Temmuz 2018


Kurul Başkanı / Committee Chair


Doç. Dr. İtir Erhart


Üye / Committee Member

Prof. Dr. Hale Bolak


Üye / Committee Member

Prof. Dr. Koray Akay


Üye / Committee Member


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Prof. Dr. Aslı Tunç

Üye / Committee Member

Prof. Dr. Turgut Tarhanlı


Üye / Committee Member

Prof. Dr. Ali Demirci