LIVING WITH THE "OTHER": GREEK CYPRIOT EDUCATION AFTER 1960

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ÖTEKİ İLE YAŞAMAK: 1960 SONRASI KIBRISLI RUM EĞİTİMİ

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Abstract

The primary objective of the Greek Cypriot Education since 1960 has been ethnic nationalism, which focuses on the suffering of the 'Self' and the negative perceptions of the 'Other' creating an understanding of an unbreakable national identity. Given the 1974 events and the absence of interaction between the two communities for years, this thesis aims to examine the Greek Cypriot Educational System and its aims since 1960, and find whether a climate of peaceful co existence was ever promoted, and if so under which circumstances. National Identity and its construction at school, the political scenery of each time since 1960 up to this day, the dominant tendencies, the aims of education at each given time and analytical programs will be examined.

Özet

1960'dan beri Kıbrıs Rum Eğitimi'nin temel amacı, kesilmeyen (devam eden) bir ulusal kimlik anlayışı oluşturarak, acılı öz ve ötekinin olumsuz algılanmasına dayanan etnik milliyetçilik olmuştur. 1974 olayları ve iki toplum arasında yıllarca süren etkileşim eksikliği dikkate alındığında, bu tez Kıbrıs Rum Eğitim Sistemi'ni ve söz konusu sistemin 1960 yılından beri süregelen amaçlarını incelemeyi ve daha önce iki toplumun barış içinde birlikte yaşamasının teşvik edilip edilmediğini; eğer edildiyse hangi koşullar altında yapıldığını (gerçekleştiğini) bulmayı hedeflemektedir. Ulusal kimlik ve onun okullarda inşaası, 1960 yılından bu yana her dönemin siyasi sahnesi, baskın eğilimler, belirlenmiş her zaman içinde eğitimin amaçları ve analitik programlar incelenecektir.

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Introduction

Cyprus is an island located in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to mythology, Cyprus is the birthplace of the Goddess of beauty and love Aphrodite, and therefore it is pegged as the *Island of Love*. Can a place that lived intense dual ethnic conflict in the past and it is up until today *de facto* divided be called the island of love? Can hope lie behind this saying, implying that this island will indeed turn into a place of love and co existence one day? It is exactly in this realm that this research concentrates on.

Cyprus was under the Ottoman control for about three hundred years, from 1571 to 1878 when Britain held the administration of the island. Greek and Turkish Cypriots had been living side by side accepting the religious and linguistic diversity of the island until April 1955 when Greek Cypriots began the guerilla war of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) aiming the withdrawal of the British Colonials and *enosis* (union with Greece). The British seeing that leaving Cyprus at the time was not in their interests succeeded in rallying the support of the Turkish Cypriot community by using *enosis* as a red cloth. Turkish Cypriots formed their own organization demanding *taksim* (partition).

Yet, the 1960 London-Zurich Agreements excluded both *enosis* and *taksim* and granted Cyprus its independence. Three years later though, the tradition of peaceful co existence collapsed once again as a result of the Greek Cypriots' determination to proceed with constitutional amendments regarding thirteen points that were considered not workable. Inter-communal fighting (1963-1964) soon broke out resulting in the Turkish Cypriots' receding from their position in the government and the establishment of the period of enclaves (1963-1967).

Negotiations aiming integration were disintegrated by the launch of the Greek Junta's coup d'état in July 1974, intending to take control over Cyprus and implement union with Greece. Turkey, who was a guarantor power, used this and the safety of the Turkish Cypriots as a pretext to invade[1] the north part of the island. In consequence of the latter, all Greek Cypriots living in the north (nearly 165,000) were forced to flee to the south part of the island as displaced persons. Similarly, all Turkish Cypriots living in the south (about 45,000) that had not fled from their houses during the period of enclaves choose to do so now and settled themselves in the north part. Cyprus has been *de facto* divided ever since and the two communities live apart. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independence proclaiming the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". However, the latter is recognized only by Turkey. Negotiations aiming settlement of the Cyprus issue and peaceful co existence continue until today.

Therefore, the troubled history of Cyprus led to the formation of different identifications as well as the development of different collective memories for the two communities throughout the years. The various identities of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have become subject of interest for social scientists during the last years and many are those who suggested the development of a common identity, such as the civic, as a solution to the prolonged conflict.

[1] The Greek Cypriot position is that July 20th 1974 consists of the "Turkish Invasion" while Turkey claims that this consists of a military intervention aiming the restoring of order and thus it is generally known as "1974 Peace Operation." The European Court of Human Rights in the *Loizidou v.Turkey* case ruled that Turkey had violated Mrs. Loizidou's human rights, by not allowing her to return to her home and that Turkey should pay compensation to her for denying her the right to freely enjoy her property. Thus, for all the inclusive purposes of this research henceforth the term "invasion" will be used.

Social constructivists argue that education plays the most significant role in building national identity. State-controlled education seeks to bring together all difference from within, and develop uniform understandings of the history and culture of a country. At the same time, if national identity is to be built up, then inevitably images of "Self" and "Otherness" develop. A glorious image of the 'self' accompanied with the demonization of "national others" occurs, especially in the case of Cyprus in which these were used as the baking powder of the formation of national identity.

The main subject under study in this thesis are the aims of education at each given time since 1960, how education faces the 'Others' (the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks that is) and if this attitude ever contributed or contributes to a peaceful co existence or at least desire for it.

The reason for choosing 1960 as a landmark is simply the declaration of the independence of Cyprus, time during which the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks become among the protagonists of the game we call "Cyprus problem" (officially at least). As we will see, the inter-communal fighting of 1963-64, the rise of Junta in Greece, the Turkish Invasion of 1974, the rise of the right in the 1990s, Cyprus' apply to join the European Union, its accession in 2004, leftist party AKEL's victory of the 2008 elections consist of the main landmarks that shaped educational policies from 1960 to 2012.

Since identity has been the keystone on the formation of images of "us" and "them", it is only natural that their various and rather complex types are studied. The first chapter therefore, deals with theoretical framework of identity, concepts of the Greek Cypriot identity and their types.

The second chapter focuses on identity construction within education. The role of education in building national identity is analyzed in conjunction with images of "self" and "otherness" not only as they are presented within the classroom but as they are perceived within the wider Greek Cypriot society as well.

The second part deals exclusively with the educational system, its formation its alterations according to the prevailing political tendencies and its aims at each given time. Moreover, analytical programs will be analyzed, as these consist of concrete material that will help us understand the goals of each period better.

By examining all these, we can draw some significant conclusions on what were the main goals of education all these years and see how education faced the "Others" throughout time.

Finally, the last chapter is a presentation of the 2008 initiative of the Ministry of Education regarding the advancement of coexistence and the so far reactions noted. Attempts to make suggestions on what should be done in the context of conflict resolution will be made.

Lastly, it shall be observed by the reader that throughout the research extensive analysis of school textbooks has not been done. Even that school textbooks and their content are at the end of the day among the *sine qua non* factors that determine the national identity and the feelings towards the "Other", gathering all relevant textbooks (history, literature, geography, civics and religious education's textbooks) from the time of independence until today, proved to be a difficult and a frustrating process. For this reason references are made to those textbooks able to be found, and for the rest secondary sources are used.

I

CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY

Who is the Greek Cypriot?

Although a comparatively new area under research, the issue of identity has concerned a wide range of social science researchers. Identity examination helps us understand ethnic conflicts better, of which *inter alia* is the case of Cyprus, a place that lived both inter-communal conflict and dual ethnic coexistence in the recent past, giving rise to various identity forms for both communities. Moreover, presentations and representations of the past are utilized so as to become part of the official historical discourse upon which ideologies and then national identities are built.

Cyprus, an island located in the Eastern Mediterranean, ironically known as the *Island of love* as it turned to a place of conflict between its two ethnic communities throughout the years, was under the Ottoman rule until 1878 when the administration of the island was granted to Britain. It became a crown colony in 1925.

During the mid 1950s the guerrilla war of the Greek Cypriots' organization EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) against the British colonial authorities, which was thought to lead to their national dream of union with Greece (*enosis*), started. As a reaction to the Greek Cypriots' efforts, the Turkish Cypriots encouraged by the British began uttering their demands for either partition (*taksim)* or return of the island to its predecessor, Turkey. The British hired Turkish Cypriot policemen employed against the Greek Cypriot insurrection which led to

interethnic killings[2] as well as to provocative riots by the newly constructed and juxtaposed to EOKA, Turkish Cypriot fighters' organization TMT in 1958 (*Turkish Resistance Organization*).

Yet negotiations between Britain, Turkey and Greece led to the formation of an independent Republic of Cyprus[3] in August 16th 1960, excluding both *enosis* and partition. Nevertheless, within three years of independence, the dispute that occurred due to the proposal of the Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios for amendments in the 1960 constitution, resulted in the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the Cabinet, prolonged inter communal violence (1963-1964 and 1967) and the establishment of the period of *enclaves* (internal territorial divisions) for the Turkish Cypriots. As the interethnic fighting continued, Greek Cypriots began dividing in two major camps; those who still desired *enosis* and those favoring *enosis* if possible sometime in the future. The situation worsened in 1967 with the rise of the military junta in Greece with the assistance of whom the paramilitary and extremist organization EOKA B endeavored to fulfill the aim of the previous EOKA, the most wanted union with Greece, by launching a coup d'état in 1974 against President Makarios. Turkey, as a guarantor power grasped the opportunity to substantiate a military invasion, exploiting the safety of the Turkish Cypriots, leading to a *de facto* partition of the island to this day. Negotiations for a solution to the problem continue to this day.

[2] Yiannis Papadakis, "Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a Contested Process," *American Ethnologist* 25, no. 2 (1998): 151.

[3] When it comes to the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey refers to it as "The Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus" proclaiming that the official state of the Republic of Cyprus collapsed in 1974 as a result of the Greek Junta's coup d'état. However, the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized state, and for this reason and for all the inclusive purposes of this research it would be reasonable if henceforth we refer to it as *Republic of Cyprus*.

Hence, the relations of the two communities took several forms ranging from peaceful symbiosis to congregation, conflict, armed violence, war[4] and finally *ipso facto* unmitigated separation.

In this context of problematic history and relations, Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, ended up with various forms of ethnic identity, which like every other form of identity, do not consist of stable and invariable elements. They are about cognitive constructions that are formed gradually and according to intricate civic, cultural, social, and historical procedures.[5] My intent in this chapter is to examine the various forms of the variable we call identity, in relation to Cyprus and particularly the Greek Cypriots, and show how these are shaped or amended under specific circumstances.

[4] Nikos Stamatakis, "History and Nationalism: The Cultural Reconstruction of Modern Greek Cypriot Identity," *The Cyprus Review* 3, no. 1 (1991): 61.

[5] Laoura Maratou-Alypranti and Paraskevi Galinou "Politistikes Taftotites: Apo to Topiko sto Pagkosmio?," ("Cultural Identities: From the Local to the Universal?",) in *Emeis kai oi Alloi: Taseis kai Sy*mvola (*Ourselves and Others: Trends and Symbols*), ed. Christos Konstantopoulos et al. (Athens: Typothito-G. Dardanos, 2000), 110.

Identity: A polymorphous concept

"Isn't it about time to stop killing each other in the name of national, racial, religious or any other identity of ours?"

Amin Maalouf

The concept of identity refers to the perceptions, convictions and emotions that deal with an individual's self.[6] Our self consists of multiple identities and roles, some of which include the gender, the family, ethnicity, and sometimes religion. The rationale of the identity examination is to study the structure of an individual's personality or as mentioned previously, comprehend the raison d'être of ethnic conflicts in the international arena. What is significant for us is the latter as it is beyond the scope of this research to examine the features incorporated in the former. Besides, personality deals with specific characteristics that an individual cannot do much to change whereas identity requires some form of choice.

Identity is socially constructed; therefore its formation depends firmly on the social milieu that the person is involved in and the cultural and economic dynamics that create experiences with which the person identifies with and defines his or her identity. In other words identity is shaped under social constructions, among the most important of which are gender, class and culture.[7]

[6] Thalia Dragona, "Taftotites kai Eterotites: Taftotita kai Ekpaidefsi," ("Identities and Differences: Identity and Education,"), *Ekpaidefsi Mousoulmanonpaidon 2002-2004* 19, nos. 19/34 (Athens: University of Athens, 2003): 18, available at http://www.kleidiakaiantikleidia.net/book19/book19.pdf (accessed January 11, 2012).

[7] Kath Woodward, "Questions of Identity," in *Questioning Identity: Gender, class, ethnicity*, ed. Kath Woodward (London: Rutledge, 2004), 6.

In addition, and as Erickson says, the notion of identity is based on a double elaboration, on the perception of the resemblance and continuity of our existence in space and time, and on the perception that others recognize this resemblance and continuity.[8] Hence, difference is another aspect of identity; to be the same with a group of people and simultaneously be different from others.

Mead too argues that identity is formed partly through recognition, or not recognition, but sometimes through too much recognition by others.[9] Additionally, symbols and representations are essential for the making of an identity, as they help us understand abstract concepts such as the nation. Imagine for instance being in another country among foreigners; suddenly you hear people speaking your language. Don't you want to speak with them, or if not, doesn't a sense of sameness with them surround you? Sure enough it does. Thalia Dragona correctly points out that the question is not simply "who I am" but "who I am in relation to others, how I see these others and how others see me".[10]

However, the way others see us does not always indicate what or who we are. Consider for example the way some Greeks think about Turks or vice versa. Turks are considered to be atrocious by the former, whilst Greeks are considered by the latter to be lazy.

In simpler terms bring in mind how teachers might think of a 16 year old boy who smokes; probably that he is a troublemaker and that he will not succeed in his life. Notwithstanding, in

[8] Erik H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968), 50 quoted in Dragona, "Taftotites kai Eterotites, "19.
[9] George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), 68 quoted in Kath Woodward, "Who are you? What can Social Science Tell us?," in *Questioning Identity: Gender, class, ethnicity*, ed. Kath Woodward (London: Routledghe, 2004), 12.
[10] Dragona, "Taftotites kai Eterotites," 19.

the manner discussed above, difference has a dissimilar import making it possible to create the "category of strangers".[11] Woodward makes an extensive analysis of the meaning of identity and sets down its main aspects: a link between the personal and the social, some active engagement with those who take up identities, being the same with some people and different than others and a tension on how much control we have on constructing our identities and how much control is exercised over us.[12] Likewise, identity has both aspects of one's personal characteristics and of the milieu he/she is acting in. The identity that deals with the notion of "belonging somewhere" is called collective and is further discussed below.

Collective Identity

As discussed in the previous lines, identity is constructed both from an individual's engagement and his understanding of self but also from his interaction within social groups as well. This latter, viz. the notion of "we" is incorporated in the so called collective identity. Thus from a cross-cultural angle, we could define this type as the extent to which individuals define themselves in terms of their relationships with others and to social groups.[13] In other words, the collective identity is the capacity of a person within a social group and the common characteristics that the social group and the person share. Many researchers have analyzed the motivational properties of collective identities as the fundamental "need to belong" as an innate feature of human nature. Woodward indicates that a collective identity determines the way that a social group sees itself, or at least wants to see it, and how others see it. Hence, the

[11]Woodward, "Who are you?," 12.
[12] Woodward, "Questions of Identity," 6.
[13] Brewer Marilynn and Wendy Gardner, "Who is this 'We'? Levels of Collective Identity and Self Representations," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, no. 1 (1996): 83.

collective identity comprises of a self appreciation together with a stereotypical image that others have about it.[14]

With respect to the case which concerns this study, the Greek Cypriots' collective identity endured several fluctuations throughout the years. In the late Ottoman Era for instance, the collective identity of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots was determined via religion as the members of the two communities were identified as Christians and Muslims under the *millet* system.

Albeit, following the annexation of Cyprus to Britain and especially after declaring it *Crown Colony* in 1924, the British Colonials followed a rather modernizing policy over Cyprus. Due to their viewing of the *millet* system as anachronistic, and since they were determined to limit the power of the Orthodox Church to exclusively religious activities (as up until then the Church of Cyprus had a leading role within its flock), they began classifying the members of the two communities in national terms rather than religious,[15] viz. as Greeks and Turks. This classification was just the beginning of the development of a broader but rather complex and problematic Greek Cypriot identity (and Turkish Cypriot identity). By adopting this avant-garde policy of identification, the British blocked the way for establishing a common collective identity for the Cypriots and planted the grains of future conflict.

To return to the previous discussion about the collective identity, it would be worth to note that any discussions on Greek Cypriot collective identity would be highly problematic, due to

[14] Woodward, "Who are you?," 12.
[15] Nodav Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms," *Nationalism and Ethnic Policies* 10, no. 4 (2004): 604.

the danger to fall into false hypostatization (fallacy viz. when an abstraction is treated as concrete) as Berger and Luckmann indicate,[16] as knowledge and people's belief on reality, and in our case identity, are socially constructed accordingly.

According to them it is more advisable if we instead isolate "types of identity" which are "observable" and "verifiable" in pre-theoretical experience (everything that passes as knowledge within the society).[17] Identity types as said again, are developed in different frameworks which need to be examined in order to understand the dynamics hiding behind this construction.

Nationalism: Ethnic vs. Civic

According to a wide range of researchers and scholars, the concept of nation is not an inborn trait but rather socially constructed, an abstract notion that specifically derived as a result of the Enlightenment and then of the French Revolution. Perhaps this is the basic reason that hides behind the delayed study of what came to be, to use Anderson's term, *imagined communities*. Imagined not because the nation per se is not veritable, but due to the fact that "even the smallest nation will never know most of its fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each one lives the image of their communities".[18] In this

[16] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treaty on the Sociology of Knowledge*, (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 208.
[17] *Ibid*., 174.
[18] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso: London/New York, 2006), 6.

manner one can support "safely" that nation is indeed a modern construction, but not in a way that espouses the extremist views of some modernists; that *ethnie* appeared *ex nihilo*.[19]

According to Peristianis, the reason that allowed the study of the nation and its by products, nationalism, national identity and ethnicity, only after the 1980s is the up until then anthropology's focus on concrete and small communities that could be studied with the traditional tools of the trade (participant observation, interviews and surveys).[20] Therefore it should not be peculiar that many contradictions have arisen regarding its meaning, its definition, which were the first nations and when it became a major political power.[21]

A definition given by Smith is that the nation is "the nominated people who share a historical territorial province, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, common economy and for all its members common by law rights and obligations."[22]

Nationalism, one of the very first derivatives of nation, is defined as "the strong emotional identification of a group of people with a political entity i.e. a nation." Smith argues that it is nationalism that creates national identity.[23] The concept of national identity is included in a wide spectrum of notions such as the nation, nationalism and nationality. Simultaneously, language, ethnicity, cultural tradition, common history, even religion are among the *sine qua non* ingredients upon which a national identity is built. Before moving to the analysis of the

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[19] Ceasar Mavratsas, *Opseis tou Ellinikou Ethnikismou stin Kypro: Ideologikes Antiparathesis kai I Koinoniki Kataskevi tis Ellninokypriakis Taftotitas 1974-1996* (*Facets of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus: Ideological Contest and the Social Construction of the Greek-Cypriot Identity 1974-1996*), (Athens: Katarti, 1998), 29.
[20] Nicos Peristianis, "Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics," in *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*, ed. Yiannis Papadakis et al. (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 100.
[21] Mavratsas, *Opseis,* 27.
[22] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, (London: Penguin, 1991), 14.
[23] *Ibid.*, 71-72.

Cypriot identity, at this point it is essential to note the two kinds of nationalism that seem to prevail.

A researcher is more likely to come across two major variants when it comes to the analysis of the rather perplexing concept of nationalism, that are generally 'acceptable' as an ideal typology. The first theoretical school includes the *civic*, also known as Western type of nationalism due to its growth in Western Europe and America during the 18th century.[24] This type of nationalism sees the nation as a political community of citizens that inhabits a given territory and whose members are equal before the law irrespective of ethnicity, religion, class or other particularistic criteria.[25] In other words, civic nationalism is a state-led brand which underestimates the ethnicity and at the same time accentuates the citizenship of people regardless of their ethnic identification. To be more accurate it emphasizes on the state which is believed to form a sense of national identity. The national identity that falls into this category obtains essence when people give emphasis on the territorial dimension rather than the ethnic, cultural, linguistic or historical ties.

The second brand of nationalism is the *ethnic* nationalism, also known as Eastern, as it was developed in the end of the eighteen and in the beginning of the nineteen centuries in Central and Southeastern Europe.[26] This type sees the nation as cultural community formed on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie* and ethnic ties while it focuses on the native history and customs of a group of people.[27] Even though the distinction of these two brands is very well explained

[24] Mavratsas, *Opseis,* 40.
[25] Peristianis, "Cypriot Nationalism," 101.
[26] Mavratsas, *Opseis*, 40.
[27] Peristianis, *op.cit*., 102.

elsewhere, it is useful to provide a brief description of the two so as to be able to understand the intricate Cypriot identity.

Greek Cypriot Identity: A twofold case

Cyprus is Greek

Slogan used by the right-wing followers

Cyprus belongs to its people

Slogan used by left-wing followers

Nationalism in Cyprus: Ethnic vs. Civic

Ethnic nationalism in Cyprus is highly associated with what came to be called *Hellenocentrism* which views the Greek Cypriots as part of the whole Hellenism. Greek nationalism has its roots in the period of the emerging Greek irredentist ideology which developed during the second half of the 19th century and lasted until 1922. As Greek irredentism's main aspiration was the liberation of those Greeks being "in bondage" of foreign yoke, Cyprus consisted of an appropriate place for the impartation of such an ideology as the *Megali Idea*.[28]

The construction of nationalism in Cyprus was done gradually but steadily, both through local and exogenous mechanisms such as the educational system, activities of voluntary associations formed by intellectuals that had been educated in Greece, as well as through the Greek Consulate,[29] and generally through the process of what Billing has called "banal nationalism", term alluding to everyday representations of nation (flags, national songs, symbols on money, domestic and international news and so forth). As Mavratsas indicates though, the researcher

[28] *Megali Idea* was basically promoting the goal of creating the "Greece of Two Continents and Five Sees"; recapture of Constantinople and the revival of the glorious Byzantine Empire, the expansion of the Greek state to areas inhabited by Greeks that were still under foreign rule.
[29] Mavratsas, *Opseis,* 43.

should not neglect the importance of the social and cultural history of the island, a history of which integral part constitutes of the Greek ethnicity.

At this point, since the main concern of the following chapters will be the educational system, it is worth saying that although most of the literature argues that the educational system became the keystone for the development of nationalism and thus national identity mainly under the British administration, in effect this separation and dyadic character of the educational system had began within the framework of the *Tanzimat* reforms[30] during the end of the 19th century. This process would inevitably lead to the rise of Greek and Turkish nationalism and the will for political union with either of the respective motherlands.

Along these lines, the origins of the Greek nationalism in Cyprus then, lie in the period of the Greek Enlightenment, when the Greeks began developing an identity that separated them from the rest citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, a feeling of ethnic distinction began to fade in among a diminutive part of the Greek Cypriots, mainly the Greek Cypriot elite, who arrived not only from Greece but from other centers of Hellenism at the time, such as Asia Minor and Egypt.[31]

Under a thorough process then, the Greek Cypriots started gradually identifying sturdily with Greece. Signs of this became evident in 1931, when *enosist* activists rioted against the British, demanding the union of the island with Greece for the first time. The British immediately took

[30] The Tanzimat (reorganization) of the Ottoman Empire was a period of reformation that began in 1839 and ended with the formation of the first constitution in 1876. Among the various efforts to modernize the Ottoman Empire, Ottomanism was born, as an attempt to unite all the different ethnic groups of the empire in order to stem the hide of nationalistic movements within the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the introduction of ethno-religious groups gradually led to the development of nationalism among Christians and Muslims of the Empire.
[31] Mavratsas, *Opseis,* 42.

measures in order to suppress the signs of Greek nationalism (ban of hanging the Greek flag in official buildings, ban of celebrating the Greek Independence Day), but not only these measures did not deaden the *enosist* sentiment but on the contrary they reinforced it.

On the contrary, what came to be called as *Cyprocentrism*, represents civic/territorial nationalism and sees all Cypriots as one people, irrespective of ethnicity. In other words, the Cypriot nationalism underlines the significance of the territory and the cohesive elements that unite its people under one roof viz. Cyprus. Cyprocentrism does not deny the Greek or Turkish ethnicity of the inhabitants of the island and their cultural origins[32] but supports the idea of eliminating the notion of having a motherland, in this case, Greece (and at a larger context Turkey for the Turkish Cypriots). Therefore, for the Cyprocentrists' motherland can only be Cyprus, which is autonomous and different from Greece in many fields (history, politics, social fabric and culture). Within this framework, the Cypriotists plead the saliency that Cyprus has formed, as it has never been a part of either Greece or Turkey, in order to justify their arguments regarding the Cypriot identity.

The opponent of ethnic nationalism made its appearance in the 1920s introduced by the then Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK), the predecessor of today's leftist party AKEL, and the Rural Party of Cyprus (AKK). These two newly for their time formed parties, declared that Greeks and Turks of the island should struggle against imperialism together with the aim of achieving

[32] Mavratsas, *Opseis,* 85.

independence under a worker-peasant government.[33] Distinctive is the proclamation of the party's newspaper in the beginning of the century:

> *"Our main concern is to eliminate any racial hatred that lies among the people of our island, to teach the masses that people are no longer distinguished as Greeks or Turks so as to quarrel for their mother countries, but as rich and poor […] Believing that the happiness of a place comes with the real freedom, we will confront the jingoist nationalists and we will fight for the independence of Cyprus…"*[34]

Hence, it goes without saying that Cypriot nationalism was against the idea of *enosis*, a result of which was the little resonance it had among the masses. As Peristianis points out, the party could not manage to get much resonance due to the conservative tendencies of the Cypriot society (I would add *at the time*), the attachments of the peasants to religion and the Orthodox Church, and the absence of a proletariat in conditions of underdevelopment, which rendered its proclamations unrealistic and its power and impact insignificant.[35]

After KKK being proclaimed by the British as illegal, in the early 1940s, AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) superseded the KKK by managing to rally around it people with communist and social propensity. As its antecedent, AKEL emphasized the need for Greek and Turkish Cypriot workers to unite against imperialism and in effect was successful in creating the strongest interethnic linkages through which institutional interethnic cooperation took place. Unlike KKK, AKEL maintained a rather ambivalent stance on the issue of *enosis* as the party's

[33] Peristianis, "Cypriot Nationalism," 102.
[34] Nicos Peristianis, "Deksia-Aristera, Ellinokentrismos-Kyprokentrismos: To Ekkremes ton Syllogikon Taftiseon Meta to 1974," ("Left-Right, Hellenocentrism-Cyprocentrism: The Pendulum of Collective Identifications after 1974,") in [(*Anatomia Mias Metamorphosis. H Kypros meta to 1974 – Koinonia, Oikonomia, Politiki, Politismos*) (*Anatomy of a Metamorphosis. Cyprus after 1974 – Society, Economy, Politics, Culture*)], (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1995), 127.
[35] Peristianis, "Cypriot Nationalism," 103.

leaders tried to capitalize on the emotional power of this slogan while at the same time worried about the persecution of the Left in Greece.[36] In addition, AKEL's exclusion from the EOKA struggle on the grounds that "atheist communists could not be Greeks"[37] was escorted with shame and marginalization in political matters for a long time.

Anyhow, despite the advent of independence in 1960, these two forms of nationalism persisted in the Greek Cypriot community, prolonging the division of people in two main camps. In fact I would say that this division is continued to this day, if not in an even reinforced shape, in a form that is still halving people to a large extend in two opposing camps; the Greeks and the Cypriots (as if the former negates the latter).

With regards to the 1960s now, most of the Greek Cypriots accepted the independence just nominally expecting that this was the harbinger of the most desired union with Greece or even worse, some others insisted on immediate union at whatever cost. Paradoxically though, the majority did rally around Archbishop Makarios either foreseeing union at some point in the future, or viewing independence as the only solution. They thus became known as *Makariakoi* (pro-Makarios or pro-independence) while their extreme right opponents as *Grivikoi* (pro-Grivas[38] and pro-*enosis*), making the intraethnic tensions more intensified. Makarios, realizing that the ethnic nationalistic goals were no longer doable, adopted a pro-independence stance

[36] Papadakis, "Greek-Cypriot Narratives," 154.
[37] *Ibid*., 127.
[38] George Grivas, also known by his *nom de guerre,* "Digenis", was a Cyprus-born general of the Greek Army. He is known as the leader of the guerilla war of 1955 and later on as the leader of the Paramilitary Organization EOKA B, considered as responsible for the implementation of the coup d'état as well as for the murders of many Turkish Cypriots. He turned against Makarios in the realm of achieving *enosis* even after 1960.

in order to solve the crisis both on the internal and on the external level. He declared that although *enosis* was the desirable (*efkteo*), it was not a realistic (*efikto*) goal at the time.

Moving forward, the years after 1974 can be characterized as the golden age of Cypriot nationalism which started gaining ground among the *vox populi* due to the "betrayal" of motherland Greece; the provocation of Junta's coup and the "inability" to prevent the Turkish invasion. The political right, under the newly formed party of DYSI (Democratic Rally) together with its Hellenocentric views was superseded by the ascent of Cypriotism, at least during the period after 1974 until the mid-1980s, when the rise of the right and Greek nationalism prevailed again.

The tragedy of the summer of 1974 and its consequences led the Greek Cypriots overhaul and incorporate a pro-independence stance including *rapprochement* with the Turkish Cypriots. In its effort to convince the international community and the Turkish Cypriots that only a federal solution was serving Cyprus' interests, *epanaproseggisi* (rapprochement), the new motto replacing the *enosist* one declared that the enemy was the Turkish expansionism and that the two communities could coexist again as had done in the past. By suppressing the period of 1960-1974 during which the Greek Cypriots had largely ignored the interests and the fears of the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot government underlined that Turkey and her jingoist representatives among the Turkish Cypriots were the real enemies victimizing both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots.[39] Besides, as said above, the consequences of the fascist coup, i.e. the invasion, refugees, prisoners of war and missing persons were highly associated with Greece

[39] Mavratsas, *Opseis,* 84.

and therefore the rhetoric of *enosis* along with the identification with nationalistic Hellenic symbols was considered that it should be abandoned.

Moreover, the anger and disappointment felt for the Greek Junta led some in extreme equations as *Junta = Greece = Hellenism = Right = Nationalism = Fascism*.[40] It could be again argued that extreme ideas like this are still felt by a portion of left wing supporters who still encounter anything Greek with distrust arguing that Cypriots are not Greeks, but just Cypriots (found in slogans such as *Ellines eiste kai feneste* viz. *You are Greeks (we are not) and look like it*).

Henceforth, basic aspects of the recent political past are reinterpreted accordingly. Likewise, the guerilla war of EOKA is presented as anti-colonialist and pro-independence instead of one that aimed union with Greece.[41] In the same manner, the Independence of Cyprus starts to be celebrated (as it was almost never celebrated as a national day before) while the Cypriot flag starts for the first time to be used extensively or at least put side by side with the Greek one.[42] Constituent part of the new order was the Neo-Cypriotist Organization (founded in 1975) that aimed at creating a new Cyprus based on different directions. Worth to note is that the Neo-Cypriotist Organization was the first which among others declared that Cypriots should learn from their mistakes and be taught a lesson. Characteristic is the following part:

> *"This place is inhabited by Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites and others, that despite our differences, real or constructed, we have common interests and goals that specify our identity as Cypriots, that only we can understand and protect […] The most important reason of today's*

[40] Peristianis, "Deksia-Aristera," 132.
[41] Mavratsas, *Opseis,* 82.
[42] *Ibid.,* 82.

degradation is that the two bigger communities lived in total ignorance for each other, without contact, with wrong impressions about each other. Important was also the wrong rhetoric and slogans […] Although we cannot forget our national descent, we have to […] start thinking above all as Cypriots and then as Greeks or Turks [...] Albeit that the Republic of Cyprus exists for fifteen years, it has not managed to gain citizens […] that love it, respect it and believe in it."[43]

During the mid 1980s however, with the Cyprus issue remaining unsolved, and a Cyprus Republic in need of support against Turkey, Hellenocentrism reappeared in the political scene, finding expression in a new alliance with the democratic, now, and member of EEC Greece. More to the point, the nationalistic narrative expressed by the newly elected government of Papandreou stating that he would "render the Greeks as the only sovereigns in their country" and that no discussion with Turkey is possible until the "last Turkish soldier" leaves Cyprus gave the impression of a new Greece to be created, with no similarities with the one that betrayed them before.[44] What is more, the unilateral formation of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus let the Greek Cypriots turned to Greece again for support vis-à-vis their occupied land which was now turning to a "Turkish province", and a propos Turkey.

In addition, the disability of the Non-Aligned Movement and of the "socialist countries" to help reverse the *fait accompli* in Cyprus created a fertile ground for the comeback of the Hellenocentrism in the late 1980s. As Peristianis correctly proclaims, under these circumstances and many others, and since Cyprus, (the Republic of Cyprus) lived the "economic miracle" at

[43] Peristianis, "Deksia-Aristera," 134.
[44] Mavratsas, *Opseis*, 100.

this juncture, the need to support the state has debilitated while problems of "cultural fall" accompanied with problems of cultural identity had emerged.[45]

Thus what is called *neo-nationalism* occurs under these new developing conditions. This neo-nationalism, might for certain share some commonalities with the traditional ethnic one but has also differences regarding issues of social equality as well as liberation from all kinds of authoritative relations, both in personal and collective ground.[46] According to neo-nationalism's beliefs, the main problem in the Cyprus issue is Turkey's expansionism, rather than the bad relations of the two communities and thus a vigorous stance will help the liberation of Cyprus as well as gaining assistance from Greece (found in slogans like *"Hellas kalipse kai emas"* viz. *Hellas support us too*).[47]

Hence, taking all the above into account we see that identity is indeed a constructed phenomenon that relies largely in the context a person lives in. Therefore the researcher should always look at the milieu in which one expresses identification in terms of national identity at least. Yiannis Papadakis adequately defines the Greek Cypriot identity as follows:

> *"On the one hand, Greek Cypriots' dependence on Greece and belief in their Greek origins and cultural heritage requires emphasis on the "Greek" aspect. On the other hand, the need for rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots leads to an emphasis on the common "Cypriot" dimension. In effect, this means Greek Cypriots must choose to situate themselves somewhere on a continuum between an exclusively Greek and exclusively Cypriot extreme."*[48]

[45] *Ibid.*, 141.
[46] *Ibid.*, 143.
[47] Peristianis, "Deksia-Aristera," 144.
[48] Papadakis, "Greek-Cypriot Narratives," 153.

Therefore, the question "Greek or Cypriot" can be at a great extend but not always defined in terms of the environment and trends that prevail during a specific period of time. Therefore, a Greek Cypriot is likely to lean towards a more Greek or more Cypriot identity according to the Internal situation in Cyprus, international politics, relations with Greece or Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. As Mavratsas writes, the answer to the above question is rarely fully exclusive of either of the two terms, while the ideal type of "Greek-Cypriotness" includes both nationalist and Cypriotist elements.[49]

In effect, Greek Cypriots tend to identify themselves according to the interlocutor with whom a particular discussion takes place. For instance, a person who feels both Greek and Cypriot at the same time, in a discussion with a fellow nationalist is likely to feel more Cypriot whereas in a discussion with a fellow Cypriotist is likely to feel more Greek. In the same manner, when a Greek Cypriot speaks with a Greek from Greece tends to feel closer to Greece whereas in a discussion with a Cypriotist Greek Cypriot about the mainland Greeks is more likely to lean towards Cyprus expressing even derogatory words about them such as the common *kalamaras*[50] which alludes to feelings of distance and difference.

At this point we must note that despite the desire for *enosis* both before and after 1960, there was a portion of Greek Cypriots that were no longer in favor of union with a country of low economical level as they were afraid of losing important privileges gained during the

[49] Ceasar Mavratsas "National Identity and Consciousness in Everyday Life: Towards a Sociology of Knowledge of Greek-Cypriot Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 5, no 1 (1999): 94.

[50] The word *kalamaras* derives from the Latin word *calamare*, which means squid, in this case used to denote the squid in pen. In this way the term was used to label the educated scholars and administrators from Constantinople and later on Athens that were coming to Cyprus to educate people. At the same time, it expresses difference between "those educated of the mainland" and "us, the illiterate peasants of the national periphery". Today the term is used in Cypriot Greek to define the mainland Greeks and it is sometimes used in a derogatory sense.

cosmopolitanism of Cyprus during the 1960s. In addition, Greek Cypriots' negative stance towards the mainland Greeks is fortified with the presence of Greek army officers in the island after 1974; not only were they found at odds with the freedom which the communist party started engaging after '74, as they were keen anticommunists, but were also accused of being immortal due to their freely engaging in sexual relations with the Cypriot girls.[51] Of course the majority appreciated the presence of the Greek army in the island after the invasion, but due to a series of facts mentioned above, they could not help constructing negative stereotyping which now referred to all mainland Greeks. This relation of *love and hate* between Greek Cypriots and Greeks from Greece perhaps occurs due to barriers found in everyday life. Apart from a hidden inferiority complex related to art, language (viz. the Cypriot dialect), and expressive culture,[52] in their everyday lives, Greek Cypriots are confronted with a series of 'indigenous' Cypriot institutions which in most cases differ significantly from their counterparts in Greece,[53] let alone being a different state and never been part of Greece.

A wide variety of Cypriot institutions including the political parties, economy, the judicial system, the media, the church, the sports, even the educational system compose the scenery of Cypriot everyday life that inevitably leads to a distance between the two countries and their people. It goes without saying that most of these systems have strongly been affected by the Greek ones, especially the educational system, which beyond a doubt constitutes the main tool through which the national-Greek identity is constructed.

[51] Stamatakis, "History and Nationalism," 72.
[52] Stamatakis, "History and Nationalism," 72.
[53] Mavratsas, "National Identity," 97.

It is quite obvious then and thus can be generally agreed that Cypriot daily life differs significantly from the Greek one, a fact that creates a certain distance between the two people. One of the major differences that sometimes seems to hinder a relation on the basis of "we are all Hellenes" is definitely the linguistic issue, which makes either of the two, Greek Cypriots or mainland Greeks feel that do not belong to the same nation, or in simpler terms that are not the same. Whilst Greek Cypriots have no difficulty understanding mainland Greeks, of the latter many are those who have difficulties fathoming Cypriots or even worse some do not understand them at all. In this context, efforts have been done in the past, by ethnic nationalists to 'hellenize' the Cypriot Greek dialect so as to sound more like standard Greek, with unsuccessful results though. In the same manner, some of the extreme civic nationalists argue that the Cypriot dialect has all the credential a language needs in order to "stand on its own". Thus it is believed that this way will enable the formation of the covetable Cypriot nation which will finally start taking shape.

In a nutshell, all of the above bipolar identity-views continue to exist to this day, and to a large extend continue to divide people in two main camps. The ethnic nationalists are known for their various rejections regarding a solution to the Cyprus problem, their close relations with Greece together with their obsession of hellenizing everything, as well as for their less tolerance towards the Turkish Cypriots and Turks and their detest and abhorrence for them.

On the contrary, the civic nationalists are known for their loyalty to the state, the Cypriot identity and the itch of *rapprochement* with the Turkish Cypriot compatriots that would

eventually lead to a compromise between the two communities and the attainment of a solution which would reunify Cyprus.

What seems to be absent though, or at least sidelined, is the formation of a strong identity which would include both constituents of Greekness and Cypriotness in such a way that people would learn to appreciate both without having to neglect one of the two ingredients that form their identity and/or exclusively lean towards the Greek camp or the Cypriot one, together with a tolerant attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks.

In this way, the schizophrenia that characterizes the Greek Cypriot society would gradually begin to purge. What would you think if you attend the celebrations for the independence of Cyprus where "Greeks" and "Cypriots" are participating? Imagine the former swinging only Greek flags and the latter swinging only Cypriot flags and even worse shouting slogans as *Cyprus is Greek* and *Cyprus belongs to its people* respectively, contesting whose slogan is mostly heard. It's therefore not peculiar for a foreigner observing this situation to think that "since they don't internally accede, how can they compromise with the Turkish Cypriots?"

One way or another, even the keenest Greek Cypriot ethnic nationalist should admit that Cyprus, as a separate state which has never been part of Greece, has its *sui generis* character, lifestyle and differences from the mainland Greeks, fact which produces the concept of Cypriotness and thus the Cypriot identity. On the other hand though, even the most ardent civic nationalist or Cypriotist, should admit that the influence and effect of Hellenism or of the Greek nationalism on Cyprus, has been huge throughout the years, let alone the language itself, fact that forms the Greek identity at the same time. In fact, both Greekness and Cypriotness should

be taken into account and considered interactive as with the absence of either of the two the identity of the Greek Cypriots cannot be comprehended.

European – Supranational Identity

During the last years, European Union has extended from a union strictly economical and administrative to a social and cultural community as well, leading its members to gradually adopt notions such as the European cultural identity and citizenship.

While European citizenship is mainly based on a set of formal norms that are supplementary if not derivative of nationality,[54] European Identity, if any, is a rather complex and not clarified I would say notion. Is it a collective identity, a variety of collective identities, a political identity of European Union or is it a cultural defined category?

One is called European not due to citizenship rights that Europe offers but due to the fact that this person is culturally European, in other words shares some unique characteristics that make up what we today call Europe. As the concept was initially introduced in 1973 and has ever since been highly ideologically loaded and in that capacity has been contested,[55] the national identity therefore emerges first and is considered an important premise that allows the formation of the European Identity. In other words, an individual has to carve out a national identity first and then become part of the broader European group.

[54]Delanty Gerard, "Models of Citizenship: Defining European Identity and Citizenship," *Citizenship Studies* 1, no. 3 (1997): 297.
[55] Bo Strath, "A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept," *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no. 4 (2002): 388.

There are scholars of course who question the existence of a European identity, as this is a rather new and largely under development concept, such as Lowenthal.[56] The latter particularly notes the raison d'être which he argues stands as an obstacle for the realization of a European identity, and that is the linguistic diversity of the nations-members of the European Union, the disparities of size and resources, viz. powerful countries might create imbalance and threat to several smaller and economically weaker members and enduring cultural discourse, as member-states might have conflicts between them dated a long time ago. He also sets forth that the notion of Europeanness might be interpreted as negative, as Europeans like to conjure up a heritage of democratic progress, mercantile entrepreneurship, Christian, humanist tradition and devotion to art and learning as the core elements that make up the European legacy, instead of their real heritage which is simply the involvement in fascism, racism and colonialism[57], not to mention that the intersection between people is mostly done in the realm of sports and media (which more or less reinforce nationalism) that are rather inadequate for the building of a strong community.

At times, there have been several attitudes towards the European Union, both positive and negative. European Identity can be considered, as the result of the collective identity, in which the sense of "we" prevails, and as Kielmannsegg argues, collective identity would need communities that share communication, experience, and a common memory in order to develop, stabilize and or hand down.[58] However, Europe, even so Western Europe is not a

[56] David Lowenthal, "European Identity: An Emerging Concept," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 46, no 3 (2000): 318.
[57] Lowenthal, "European Identity," 318.
[58] Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, "Integration und Demokratie," ("Integration and Democracy,") in *Europaische Integration (European Integration)*, ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (Opladen: Leske and Budrich,

communication community, hardly a community of common memory and in a very limited sense a community of experiences.[59] Smith, in the same manner notes that national identifications possess distinct advantages over the idea of a unified European Identity. What is meant to be said is that while the national identity is based on "shared myths of origin and historical memories of community" the European Identity is deficient as an idea, as it lacks "a pre-modern past or prehistory".[60]

On the other hand, those who support the existence of a European Identity believe that a united Europe and thus a common identity shared by all, might enrich the cultural heritage of each state, might help to the better understanding of different cultures, and above all help the construction of a more tolerant to each other European Society. Hence it is believed that the difference and variety of cultures should consist of a strong element within Europe and not dividing.

Research done so far has shown that people do not identify with the European Identity that much. The identification with national identity seems to be more powerful. People identify with their national identities more and in the cases which people consider that the two identities function at a different level, national and European identities can coexist at the same time. In those cases that people believe that the two identities are mutually exclusive and thus function

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1996), 55 quoted in Silke Nissen, "European Identity and the Future of Europe," in *Europe in Motion: Social Dynamics and Political Institutions in an Enlarging Europe*, ed. Maurizio Back et al. (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 2006), 156.

[59] Silke Nissen, "European Identity," 156.

[60] Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* 68, no. 1 (1992): 62.

at the same level, they cannot coexist as the European identity is believed to be a threat to the national one.

According to Arts and Halman, people firstly identify with the place they live, then with their country and then, with Europe (the amount that does identify is quite small). They indicate however that the interest and support of people for Europe is relatively high. Their research has also shown that national identity remains stable throughout the years, but what changes, is the geographical identification and the national tendencies of people.[61] What is observed is that there is not a stable motive of transnational differences. There is as they say ethnocentrism and europeanism. Arts and Halman proceed to warn that this positive connection might easily convert into negative stance and create nationalism.[62]

How is Europe and European identity connected to the Greek case and Cyprus though? According to the research of Klein *et al.* who have conducted research among Greek students, the more Europeans the Greek students felt, the less negative prejudice they had towards the Turks. As they indicate, "prejudice towards the Turks is strongly associated to Greek identity, but is contrary to the norms of tolerance associated with European identity."[63] In other words, European Identity is based on the promotion of tolerance and acceptance between people of different ethnicity and the more European oneself feels the more tolerant he is towards others.

[61] Wil Arts and Loek Halman, "Identity: The Case of European Union," *Journal of Civil Society* 2, no. 3 (2006): 183.
[62] *Ibid*., 183-185.
[63] Klein Olivier et al., "How European Am I? Prejudice Expression and Presentation of Social Identity," *Self and Identity* 2, no. 3 (2003): 251.

Philippou also argues that in a context where Europe is "normativity" and the "Other" is polarized, the European dimension might be useful to hybridize a European Identity, so as to be able to include "Others".[64]

In the following chapter, I will examine the process of building of this identity through the major mechanism of construction viz. the educational system. The chapter is concerned with the development of national identity within education, and moving a step further, examines how national identity is depended on notions of otherness, and how these "others" are confronted and therefore built up in students' minds.

[64] Stavroula Philippou, "Policy, Curriculum and the Struggle for Change in Cyprus: the Case of the European Dimension in Education," *International Studies in the Sociology of Education* 17, no. 3 (2007): 250.

II

The role of education in building national identity

"Education is a gun whose consequences
depend on who holds it and towards whom it is turned"
Joseph Stalin

The junction between national identity and education is a subject still largely uncharted and for the time being remains principally under research. Especially unexplored is the intersection between national identity and education within the Greek Cypriot society, a problematic if not schizophrenic society where the construction of identity relies highly on the political and/or historical context. This chapter aims to examine the process through which the construction of national identity is obtained within education, and as a further step concentrate on images of 'self' and 'other' as integral part of national identity.

According to social constructivists, education plays the most significant role in the construction of national identity. What is more, with the rise of nationalism back in the 19th century and the concurrent rise of nation-states, education has served the purpose of its consolidation and reproduction. State-education therefore does not only aspire to propagate knowledge but to cultivate national identity as well by reproducing an ideology that validates it. In other words, as Anderson *et al.* write, state-controlled education seeks to unify and homogenize all

difference from within, to create uniform understandings of history and culture, in short, to naturalize the nation.[65]

From this perspective, in the modern nation-state education and particularly school ensures the constitution, the consolidation and the reproduction of national identity through courses that promote national education such as history, language, geography but also by way of other activities including national celebrations taking place at school, school trips to archaeological museums and so on.[66] National education therefore consists of the canvas upon which the national identity is woven. Additionally, the national educational systems reproduce a romantic concept of the nation as "natural" entity, according to a "natural narration that recalls common memories and characteristics".[67]

Efi Avdela denotes that the Greek case is representative in the field of the national historical narration, as the continuity of Hellenism from antiquity to this day, consists of a basic component of the Greek identity which is constantly taught through courses noted above.[68] This is broadly agreed among the social scientists that tangled with Cyprus (Koutsellini-Ioannidou 1997, Spyrou 2006, Christou 2006, Philippou 2007). According to them this is accomplished through the analytical program which consists of the key for the maintenance of the national culture, the national myths, symbols, heroes, ideals and historical traditions mainly through social sciences' courses as noted above. Generally agreed is also the fact that while

[65] Spyros Spyrou, "Ideology and the National Self: The Social Practice of Identity Construction in the Classroom," *The Cyprus Review* 12, no. 1 (2000): 62 quoting Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1983.
[66] Efi Avdela, "Ethniki Taftotita sto Sholeio," ("National Identity at School,") in [*Ti ein'i patrida mas? Ethnokentrismos stin Ekpaidefsi* (*What is our Country? Ethnocentrism in Education*)] ed. Anna Fragkoudaki and Thalia Dragona, (Athens: Aleksandria Press, 1997), 31.
[67] *Ibid*., 34.
[68] *Ibid*.

notions of nation are found in courses of social science, the most significant role in maintaining the retention of nation is played by the course of history.

However, as Spyrou very well indicates, whether in the classroom during the teaching of history or during a national celebration when students partake into the history of nation through ritual, the aim is the same: to establish the nation's unbroken continuity through time, to illustrate it with historical examples, and to create loyal members who will uphold it above all else.[69] If the nation is to continue to exist therefore, a sturdy national identity should be established and beyond a doubt the school is the primary bearer that follows through this task. The main bearers that we will concentrate on are the analytical programs, the textbooks and the role of the teacher. Of course the role of the latter in the whole process should not be underestimated, as without the presence of the teacher the reproduction of nation and national identity would not be attained. Nevertheless, let us first take a close look at the analytical programs and the textbooks which consist of the baking powder of the ingredients that are used to form the national identity.

An analytical program is "a series of thought-out activities which are intended to have pedagogical consequences for one or more students."[70] From a sociological angle though, an analytical program is a political and social construction which reflects particular goals and ideologies of the educational system and the society.[71] In both Greece and Cyprus, the

[69] Spyrou, "National Self,", 63.
[70] Yiannis Hadjigeorgiou, [*Gnothi to Curriculum. Genika kai Analytika Themata Analytikon Programmaton kai Didaktikis (Understanding Curriculum. General and Analytical Topics of Analytical Programs and Education*)] (Athens: Atrapos, 1998), 101.
[71] Stavroula Philippou, "The 'Problem' of the European Dimension in Education: a Principled Reconstruction of the Greek-Cypriot Curriculum," *European Educational Research Journal* 4, no. 4 (2004): 350.

production of schoolbooks is done through the commission of the Minister of Education to professors that might also be partners of the Pedagogical Institute. Each time new analytical programs are going to come out, a relevant decision including detailed instructions about the content of the book, the techniques, and its pedagogical specification, as well as the content of the respective book guide for the teacher or professor is produced.[72] Every time the content of the textbooks should be in juxtaposition with the strict instructions of the analytical program as this is formed by the Ministry of Education and the Pedagogical Institute.

Having seen the above, we understand that the system which produces the books (applies both for Greece and Cyprus) is largely aggregative, and as Efi Avdela notes "the textbook that follows faithfully the analytical program, consists of the backdrop upon which the political and ideological choices of the government as well as the ways to practice the collective control are imprinted."[73]

In addition, as the educational policy is largely, if not fully, affected by the historical events and each government on power[74] in Cyprus at least, we can examine the models and the dimensions towards which students are taught to espouse each time an event of major importance occurs or a party is in power. We can examine how school wants students to react towards major issues as family, social relations, and of course of national "others".

Nonetheless, what seems to have escaped the attention of scholars and other researchers, is the blending of the content of these books with what I call "Living with the 'Other'". In other

[72] Avdela, "National Identity," 40.
[73] *Ibid*.
[74] See for example Mary Koutsellini-Ioannidou, "Curriculum as Political Text: the Case of Cyprus (1935-90)," *History of Education* 26, no. 4 (1997): 395-407.

words, how are the school text books or generally education in Cyprus deals with the prospect of reunification and thus living with the Turkish Cypriots again? As we will see in the following chapters, students are taught that they should *not forget and struggle* for the liberation and reunification of their country. What does this reunification mean though? Under which circumstances will reunification occur? Who are the Turkish Cypriots? What are their common characteristics and the differences with "us" has not been promoted. Thus, how are the students expected to act warmly towards coexistence when they learn how bad and mean Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are? These, will be further discussed in the last chapter.

To return to our previous discussion, scholars[75] who have researched the schoolbooks and how these reinterpret history and the "other" are well indicative but in regards with the enablement of learning to coexist, in-depth research has not been done so far (at least to the extent that such a topic can be examined). Perhaps the centralization of the system itself is so strong which renders the examination and the enhancement of these books a rather difficult task to proceed with, let alone the reactions that such a decision will give rise to. Put it simply, the Greek Cypriot society might not be ready to coexist with the "others" yet, and whether the government in power or the parties are willing to move a step further for a viable solution to the problem, they recoil so as not to incite people against them and end up by losing votes. The vicious circle that characterizes the reciprocal relation of government and/or parties with the people, does not give enough room for further efforts, especially in the field of education which has always been the main tool for the reconstruction of images that discard the "other". These

[75] See Fragkoudaki 1978, Makrinioti 1986, Katartzi 1991, Toyias 1988, Papadakis 1993, Millas 2001.

will be particularly examined in the following chapters so let us take a closer look at the school textbooks and their role in the formation of the national identity.

How do textbooks manage to form a sense of unity, and how is unity treaded? How is the past, the present and the future presented? How is the "national memory" presented?

As we have seen above, the schoolbooks are prepared by agents of the state, and therefore can be seen as the official view of it,[76] but at the same time, as the vicious circle mentioned above denotes, they cannot but represent the views of the people themselves as well. The view *par excellence* that school textbooks present, even though sometimes differences might occur from one author to another, that the nation is a reality from antiquity to this day, seems to prevail.

School textbooks, particularly those of history, geography and language, present a cohesive and unchangeable through time image of the "national self" which consists of the major ingredient for the build up and the identification of "national others".[77] The past, the present and the future are put on the linchpin of continuity with evident constituents of myth and construction. Particularly, idealization of the glorious past, quandary about the present and fear of the unknown future are the main protagonists of the setting of schoolbooks. Of course this continuity is a subjective interpretation, a view that is shared almost by all researchers. Not surprisingly, this comes in contradiction with what people believe and hence is rather taken as menace for the nation by many.

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[76] Herculas Millas, *The Imagined 'Other' as National Identity: Greeks and Turks* (Ankara: CSDP, 2002), 68.

[77] Anna Fragkoudaki, "Apogonoi ton Ellinon apo ti Mikinaiki Epohi: I Analysis ton Egxeiridion tis Istorias," ("Descedants of Greeks from the Myceanean Epoch: The Analysis of the History Handbooks,") in [*Ti ein' I patrida mas? Ethnokentrismos stin Ekpaidefsi,* (*What is our country? Ethnocentrism at Education*),] ed. Anna Fragkoudaki and Thalia Dragona (Athens: Aleksandria Press, 1997), 344.

The main characteristics that form the image of the Greek national "self" and keystones of the Greek national identity emerge in the textbook's rhetoric of the following categories: continuity, maintenance, unity, resistance and superiority.[78] The national "self" is determined by the unalterable continuity within time as well as through the Greek civilization's contribution to the rest of the world, particularly the Western. Therefore the national identity is initially formed through the past upon which the present, the future, our self and the others are built. Supreme love for homeland is gradually constructed and at the top of the scale we usually meet values as bravery, resistance and freedom.

Furthermore, Efi Avdela notes that schoolbooks intent to transfer the world civilizations on a chain of command, with the European being on top, and then the "self" and its ability to resist foreign threats.[79] What is aspired to be transferred is that the European civilization lies on the top of the scale due to the great influence it leaves upon other nation-states, perhaps less developed one, and also due to the input of the ancient Greek civilization without of which would basically not be what it is today. As a result, the national "self" is presented as heir of a civilization universally recognized, while references to national others and external threats suggest a sense of menace to the identity[80] for the handling of which several strategies are implemented. According to almost all textbooks, the unity against foreign threats maintains the continuity of the nation, and this seems to be the status of the Greek case and extensively of the Cypriot one.

[78] Avdela, "National Identity," 55.
[79] *Ibid*., 58.
[80] Dragona, "Taftotites kai Eterotites" 72.

More specifically, history comes to confirm this through its narration of the fraught past and the extensive threats of other countries, especially those of the "atrocious Turks", in combination of course with the interests of the Great Powers at the expense of small and helpless Greece (and Cyprus). Of course this is said in juxtaposition with the puissant resistance of the great heroes of our nation. The identification of some with glorious ancestors consists of a source of pride and a sense that we all belong to the same continuing group. (In this excessive manner some Greek Cypriot ex-backbenches used to tout that they are more than proud that they hail from Plato and Aristotle, even Alexander the Great.)[81]

What follows is a remarkable absence of vital parts of this past, which consist of the so called "selective memory"[82] the purpose of which is the lifting of the national sentiment and the remembrance that we should all remain united under the same national roof. Particularly remarkable is the absence of internal differences, the disagreement of many for certain decisions of the *vox populi*, their red-blooded crackdown and the ferocious killings of a notable number of Turkish Cypriots by ultranationalist Greek Cypriots, in the Cypriot case, mainly known as "bicommunal clashes".

One thing is certain, the national identity and the negative image of the "other" are interdependent concepts, in a way that the former cannot exist without the presence of the latter. In other words, if you are to be Greek then automatically you have the Turks, in this case, as the eternal enemies of your nation-state and some make sure that these notions and feelings are taught and well embedded in pupils' minds.

[81] Mavratsas, *Opseis*, 115.
[82] Dragona, "Taftotites kai Eterotites," 72.

In the context of the classroom, undoubtedly the teacher has the initial authority and tends to have a dominant role within it, a role that allows defining the ambiance as well as the topic around which a discussion takes place each time. At the same time as Cazden says, the teacher talks most of the time, interrupts but is not interrupted, at least to the same extend that students are,[83] decides who is going to talk, when, how long for and the topic around a discussion takes place. The teacher has also the power to accept, reject, or ignore a student's comment, and to decide when a response is adequate or not.[84]

Therefore, the position of the teachers in the educational system renders them as barriers of a particular ideology, as they control what is said in the classroom and not simply as simple executive branches. On the contrary, they can express their opinion about the pedagogy, the analytical program, the content of the knowledge taught at school, the grading of the students, the sense of discipline, the model of the good student as well as of the human and citizen that that is molded at school.[85]

However it must be noted that teachers behave as described above as they barely have room to take initiatives. Even if they disagree with what they have to teach, they are required to transfer those that are included in the analytical programs. Therefore, they act according to the instructions of the Ministry of Education and the content of the textbooks, which opens a great subject we will deal with in the chapters to follow.

[83] Spyrou, "National Self," 65 quoting Courtney B. Cazden, *Classroom Discourse: The Language of Teaching and Learning*, (Portsmouth: NH Heinemann, 1988).
[84] *Ibid.*
[85] Avdela, "National Identity," 34.

The discourse that forms the nation and ethnocentrism within the school textbooks is skirted by a variety of activities that the teacher requires from the students to do. Firstly through the textbooks and the exercises or the questions in them, their sections, the images, the maps, and any other caption that frames them. Then there is the daily practice viz. the school celebrations for national holidays and the decoration of the classes. All these are consolidated through the teacher's revision, comments and emphasis, said with a particular tone of voice that hides an emotional dimension underneath.

Last but not least, the power of the teacher to manipulate the discussions that take shape in the classroom leads to the attainment, if not of the initial, of the most significant target of the educational system, that of the reproduction of national identity. The monologue that portrays the harangue around the nation and the "glorious past of ours" is the keystone that helps the formation of a sense of commonality and loyalty to the nation that we all belong to. In other words, monologue discourages reflection while dialogue opens up the possibility for alternative discursive constructions that allow for negotiation and reinterpretation.[86]

Hence, this monologist discourse leaves students with little space for expression of their own opinions, impugns those said and even worse, sometimes leaves no space for questioning at all. Spyros Spyrou who has examined the development of national identity closely, typically reports the following incident noted during his field research in a Greek Cypriot classroom:

> *[6th grade]*
>
> *Nikiforos: "Sir what about the children and the women if there is war?"*
>
> *Teacher: "We said that only those who can fight will fight in a war."*

[86] Spyrou, "National Self," 67.

Marinos: "Adults say that if war takes place they will go and hide."

Teacher: [Upset] "Marinos, you should not listen to what they say in the neighborhood."[87]

Here, the teacher gets control without proceeding to discuss what the student has commented on, and on the contrary forms a scenery in which only the teacher is the bearer of the knowledge, the true and real knowledge, and any other form of information is not appropriate. In other words, what is called "pre-theoretical consciousness" has no place in the classroom, as the teacher is the only one to whom children can rely on in regards to knowledge and truth.

Hence, students' contributions to the class might never manage to get the floor, especially if they are dissenting to the teacher's sayings. Of course within the classroom, children are indeed expected to express their own views as well, but introducing information should be approximately always in conjunction with the teacher's sayings. Besides, how can the student ensure high grades if he or she does not say the "right" answers in the class?

However, it would be simplistic if we apply these in all the teachers, all the schools around the globe. Such behaviors are mostly met in societies were critical thought is not encouraged and children are expected to consist of a sponge which absorbs anything taught without criticizing it. Societies that are in desperate need of constructing history the way it suites them are more likely to apply such ways of teaching.

What is more, since children with the spur-of-the-moment that characterizes them are indeed expressing their own or others' opposite views to the class, even though there are times they are not considered valid by the teacher, this consists of an insinuation that students do have

[87] *Ibid.*

critical thought and are able to undermine anything having to do with nation or national identity in the near future.

Of course we shouldn't underestimate other factors that can play significant role in children's sayings in class, such as peer pressure. The need that many pupils have, to change attitudes and behavior in order to conform to a peer group or stick out, can also consist of a factor that plays important role in the things children say in class.

The 'self' and the 'other'

The Turkish Cypriots' identity drifts along the same lines as the Greek Cypriots'. Especially noteworthy is the situation that prevails within the Turkish Cypriot community, which is exactly the same as the Greek Cypriots'. Notions of extreme Cypriotness as well as Turkishness are the key characteristics that compose the Turkish Cypriot identity's scenery. According to the political setting and the environment that exists, people lean towards the former or the latter. During the late 1950s with the incitement of the British and the Turks, the Turkish Cypriots' majority espoused Turkish nationalism and desired partition as it seemed the only solution vis-à-vis the danger of *enosis*. This stance endured during the years after the '74 invasion as well and reached its zenith in the beginning of the 21st century when it gained ground through Denktash's declaring that Turkish Cypriots consist part of Turkey and as *bona fide* Turks should assert their rights and stay away from the Greek Cypriots. The continuous immigration of Turkish settlers to the north part of Cyprus from 1974 onwards, has stuffed Turkish Cypriots so much that not only a great number has immigrated to Britain, they have started being dwarfed as well. The situation with the Turkish settlers consisting the major power within the north part

of Cyprus nowadays, has led Turkish Cypriots flood in roads demanding Turkey to withdraw from the island. More than that, the fact that the so called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus depends economically, politically and militarily from Turkey has caused the suffocation of the Turkish Cypriots who have began voicing their demands in bulk, something which finds particular reflection in the *''Ayşe dön evine''* (Ayshe return home) slogan. Hence, all these have caused the rise of Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots who seem that they do not get along well with the Turkish setters of Anatolia. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have turned to the south and the Greek Cypriots in order to find anchor. Thousands are those who cross the barricades every day to go to their jobs in south, to go to hospitals, or even travel through the airport of Larnaca, in order to go directly and not via Turkey, (as they would through the airport in the north part) to their destination. However, the economical rise of the Turkish Cypriots observed after the opening of the barricades in parallel with the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots, has also caused the lack of trust on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots who now seem to prefer their present-day way of life; work in the south, but avoidance of coexisting with the Greek Cypriots who at the end of the day rejected the plan revealing that they do not want to live together again.

Although an extensive analysis of the Turkish Cypriot identity *per se* is beyond the scope of this research, a brief introduction would be helpful in order to understand the views of the Greek Cypriots vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks. A foreigner might observe that in a discussion of Greeks or Greek Cypriots about politics, the Cyprus issue, and therefore the Turks, is the focal point. The Turks, in whatever category they are discussed inspire the moral and

national imagination of many people in mainland Greece and Cyprus.[88] In other words Turks are the centre of attention when it comes to the "other" of the Greeks, both in Greece and Cyprus where the situation is even worse due to the Turkish invasion of 1974. Of course Greek Cypriots find themselves justified when they engage in negative representation of Turks, and some do not even want to hear a good word about the "other".

The Greek Cypriots' views of the Turkish Cypriots in particular, vary as some might see them as Cypriots, others as Turkish Cypriots and others as Turks. The ones that see them as Cypriots are of course those that belong to the civic nationalist camp, or supporters of the left, who believe that Turkish Cypriots are equally Cypriots as they are. They support that the two communities have more in common that make them just Cypriots, and they do not need any mother countries as Greece and Turkey. This is reflected in some of the radical leftists' slogan *Oi tourkoi tis Kyprou ine aderfoi mas* viz. *The Turks of Cyprus are our brothers*. Except for the supporters of the left, these ideas are also shared by people that lived side by side with the Turkish Cypriots in the past or happened to have worked together and seem to face the whole matter of coexistence cordially. Proof of this can be found in expressions such as *Tourtzia dika mas* viz. *Our Turks*.

The second group is those who see Turkish Cypriots as both Turks and Cypriots as they are considered to be at the same time. The element of Turkishness renders them different from 'us' while their Cypriotness brings them closer. People do not feel disquiet when it comes to hear the word Turkish *Cypriot*, as they would in the listening of the word *Tourkos* viz. Turk.

[88] Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, "Introduction: The Turks in the Imagination of the Greeks," *South European Society Politics* 11, no. 1 (2006): 2.

Last but not least, a third group is the one where the Turkish Cypriots are seen as Turks just as Turks of Turkey. Here, people believe that Turkish Cypriots cannot be Cypriots like 'us', and even if they live in Cyprus and call themselves Cypriots, they cannot possibly be, as the separation of the two communities after 1974 has engendered their turkification. This view is shared by extremists of the right that do not support the betting of a viable solution and coexistence. It is met rather rarely, but in the cases which does, it can become vicious, vicious as people tend to believe that Turkish Cypriots, just like Turks, are barbarians, *koulloufoi* viz. dirty and above all enemies of the Greek Cypriots, as their ultimate goal is to accomplish the nasty plans of Ankara and the extinction of Hellenism. It is to be noted, that for these people Turks in general, exist as something abstract in their minds, which cannot possibly be human, let alone amicable or trustworthy.

Hence, comments like *o Tourkos en Tourkos*, viz. *the Turk is a Turk* and no matter what he does cannot change his (and not hers as there are no women, children or old people Turks in people's minds) odious character. This image of the Turk has mainly been constructed after the invasion of 1974, the consequences of which (refugees, rapes, prisoners of war etc) rendered hatred and such emotions an easy case. The nationalistic ideology is attributed to all Turks, and Turkish Cypriots, and not to those responsible for these acts. People therefore, do not think outside the 'box' while others prefer to live with their stereotypes and express derogatory words like *vromotourtzoi*, piss Turks that is, that are certainly not empirical.

Of course, perceptions and stereotypes are easier to crop up when there is complete absence of the atrocities done by Greek Cypriots at times before the invasion, or as Scheff argues,

"hatred for others could be a defense of group against hiding feelings of shame and alienation under the cover of ethnic pride."[89] Hence, the notions such as "us and them" can be well formed when the self is idealized and the other is demonized.[90]

Of course let us not forget that there are Greek Cypriots born before 1974 that have no experience of how Turkish Cypriots really are. Negative images for them can occur today, since they have never seen or spoke with a Turkish Cypriot, not even before '74, perhaps due to the period of enclaves that the Turkish Cypriots were 'caged' their own areas,[91] at a time during which the two communities might not have had any contact with each other.

The hiatus was reinforced after 1974, when the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were geographically separated, something that boosted the dividing wall between them. Only after twenty nine years of distance were they able to meet each other again or even meet for the first time when the barricades opened in April 2003. Their feelings were bittersweet. Touched to see their home again, sad that they were there as guests. If the owners were Turkish Cypriots they came back saying "Thank God, our house is in good hands, they keep it clean you know", if the owners were settlers they were coming back in disappointment saying "They changed everything, we used to have it tidy and clean, it's nothing but dirty now".

[89] Michalinos Zembylas, "The Politics of Trauma: Empathy, Reconciliation and Peace Education," *Journal of Peace Education* 4, no. 2 (2007):212 quoting J. T. Sheff, "Emotions and Identity: A Theory of Ethnic Nationalism" in *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, ed. C. Calhoon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 277-303.
[90] Zembylas, "Trauma," 212.
[91] Turkish Cypriots were somehow forced to alienate themselves from the Greek Cypriots for a time of four years, 1963-1974, due to Greek Cypriots' obsession to be the only sovereign power on the island, way that would lead to their national dream of *enosis*. With the constitutional changes the Greek Cypriots asked, the Turkish Cypriots abandoned the Parliament.

Those who had encountered Turkish Cypriot families living in their home, were somehow perplexed, as they understood that they too must have been refugees, and they felt the place as their home now. A sense of sympathy arose, but at the same time a sense of abash occurred between them while Greek Cypriots were checking the rooms and the garden trying to find out if everything is as it used to.

Noteworthy is the fact that the *Turk* in the minds of the Greeks, (or the Greek Cypriots at least) might have very little in common with the actual Turks living in Turkey,[92] as not only have they never seen a Turk in their lives before but even if they have, this is the Anatolian settler who lives in Cyprus and perhaps is not a representative example of actual Turks living in Turkey. Despite their helpfulness in understanding better Greek Cypriots' views for the 'other', Turkish Cypriots or Turks, these incidents open a whole new chapter and as this is beyond the scope of this research, let us go back to the notion of 'self' and 'other' and see how this is met at school.

School and Images of 'Self' and 'Otherness'

As we saw above, the genesis of the nation-states is immediately reinforced by education which assures the maintenance of the nation as well as the construction of national identity. Education as an officially authorized institution has played a crucial role in this and still does. As Alonso has argued, it is through epic discourses, broadly conceived, that the nation is particularized and centered, imagined as eternal and primordial, and that nationalist love

[92] Theodossopoulos, "Imagination," 3.

becomes sacralized and sublime sentiment, indeed, a form of piety'.[93] Therefore, students start imagining themselves in relation to 'others'. They are of course superior while the 'others' are inferior and even uncivilized. The students' sense of their identities will depend greatly on how these 'others' are constructed, not merely within school, but in the larger society as well. The educational system in Cyprus is to this day largely nationalistic, mainly due to the political situation of the island and its occupation by Turkey. Through a nationalistic and authoritative discourse, the educational system strives to impart a unilateral side of history, through which the construction of national identity can be accomplished.

Bakhtin writes that as a discourse of power and authority, nationalism seeks to canonize, to eliminate if possible heteroglot messages, and to facilitate one authoritative yet often naïve reading of the world.[94] The nationalistic discourse is so powerful that it makes people imagine themselves as descendants of a deep and unambiguous nation, which makes it possible for millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.[95]

The nationalistic presentation of "our" history in school textbooks and in the careful use of the language the teacher exploits could not but leave out the role that the "other" plays in the whole scenery.

In the Greek case, which includes Cyprus, students are taught that they are descendants of a nation and people from time immemorial. Thus, the nation is a continuous concept and thus,

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[93] Ana Marta Alonso, "The Politics of Space, Time, and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23 (1994): 338 quoted in Spyros Spyrou, "Images of the 'Other': 'the Turk' in Greek Cypriot Children's Imaginations," *Race Ethnicity and Education 5,* no. 3 (2002): 259.

[94] Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: TX University of Texas Press, 1981), 425 quoted in Spyros Spyrou, "Images of the 'Other': 'the Turk' in Greek Cypriot children's imaginations," *Race Ethnicity and Education* 5, no. 3 (2002): 259.

[95] Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 7.

Greeks and Greek Cypriots are believed to be direct descendants of ancient Greeks sharing the same blood, characteristics, culture and history. At the same time, what is also believed is that the 'other' in the case of the Greeks, the present day Turks, are exactly the same with the warlike Ottomans. Thus, if the Ottomans had expansionist tendencies and were brutal, then present day Turks must have expansionist tendencies and be brutal as well (Besides, as they think, this was well proved by the 1974 invasion in Cyprus). As Spyrou notes, through this process of illustrating the "other" historically, an eternal enemy is constructed; an enemy who like "us", is immutable, unchanging, and primordial. By collapsing time and historical contingency, identity is fully essentialised.[96]

At the same time, in the case of the Greek Cypriot students, another perception is made. Pupils can reconstruct the image they are taught to have about Turkey very easily, as they have the case of their own country as backdrop. Students are aware of Turkey's invasion and up to this day occupation of a large part of the island. Hence, not only do they have the national history as proof of Turkey's intentions and character, but they have their own island's milieu to confirm that *Turks are Turks* and can never be trusted.

Whatever happens today, whether Turkey threatens the Republic of Cyprus or men are killed in the buffer zone by ultranationalist Turks, students and people in general, reaffirm that the "other" remains as cruel as in the past, assessing history and the present quite subjectively. For them though, history is indeed objective when it is repeated in the present.

[96] Spyrou, "Images of the 'Other'," 261.

The nationalistic diction that the teachers often employ helps the construction of national identity and at the same time creates notions such as "us" and "them". On occasion they would appropriate highly loaded and emotional language full of imagery.[97] The "Other" is perceived and portrayed negatively (an enemy, an invader, a potential danger)[98] as this "Other" has always been a great part of "our" heroic and national past. In this manner, teachers use an exaggerated nationalistic discourse which makes children imagine the superhuman qualities of national heroes as Kolokotronis who fought against the Turks in the 1821 revolution; "When they heard just his voice the Turks ran away."[99] What is intended to be said is that although the enemy is larger in numbers, we are larger in power, we have heroes in other words that thanks to them our nation is saved. Of course it would be simplistic to think that all teachers engage in the dredging of stereotypes, as not all share these views, and there are examples of broad minded teachers in fact that are endeavoring to present the "other" in a more positive light. Yet, except for being few in number, those who do endeavor seem to encounter several hurdles by right wing supporters or too religious principals.

Vassos Argyrou argues, that this change neither invalidates the relational nature of identities nor it is meant to take anything away from the status of Greek identity as plentitude.[100] I find particularly interesting what Spyros Spyrou witnessed during his field research. Consider the following statement made by a teacher regarding her answer on whether children are fanaticized against Turks:

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[97] *Ibid*., 259.
[98] Millas, *The Imagined 'Other'*, 74.
[99] Spyrou, "Images of the 'Other'," 259.
[100] Vassos Argyrou, "How Greeks Think: About Turks for Example," *South European Society and Politics* 11, no. 1 (2006): 135.

> *"Since this thing [i.e. fanaticism] takes place in all peoples, in all countries, there is no other solution. The same must happen with us. I don't like the world as it is, personally. But since you see the Russian growing up and being a fanaticized Russian, the American the same, the British the same… While I believe and feel that all people are siblings… but this thing might also be a mistake. But since there is this thing happening, there is no other way of defense as a state, as an ethnicity, apart from being fanaticized with regard to your nation and your homeland. There is no other way of defense. How will you defend [your homeland]? You will either become subjugated or you will resist".*[101]

For this teacher, fanaticism is perhaps the only choice. For this teacher there can't by any strong nation if there is no "other" to construct the national identity on, let alone reason in order to "liberate our occupied areas from the enemy." It is probably thought that even if they do not demonize the image of the "other" they have to present an unchanging strong image of the nation "we" all belong to. Or as Spyrou indicates, how does one paint a humane picture of the enemy?[102]

However, students' reactions to nationalism and the Turks in general, vary depending on each one's consciousness, skills and background. Students that come from a family whose parents fled in terror from their homes in 1974 are more likely to participate actively in such discussions which might leave a great impact on them. Others might take less interest than children who come from refugee families, and others might not care at all as they find these topics boring and outside their interests.

[101] Spyrou, "Images of the 'Other'," 264.
[102] *Ibid*.

On the other hand though, there are students that might react to all these nationalistic discourses showing that they have critical thought or simply disagree with certain ideologies due to their cultural and family environment. They are thus likely to express their disagreement towards the strict nationalistic way pupils are taught to follow and asked to embrace.

What is more, there are also those cases in which students might turn out to be rather confused due to the contradictions they encounter in their daily school and outside school worlds. Students keep encountering contradictory discourses, values and positions which they are called to make sense of.[103] Consider for instance the haziness in a student's mind when the teachers keep paying particular emphasis on the Greek element of the national identity, and on the Cypriot Hellenism, while at the same time they are called to celebrate Cyprus' independence every year. What is more contradictory is that while they are called to fight by every means to liberate their occupied areas from the occupier, they are at the same time also told that we should avoid war as this is a practice in which only warlike Turkey engages to.

As Papadakis notes, "societies that are centrally located within the hierarchy of power are able to develop more stable representations of 'others', while those located outside the centers of power only develop ephemeral and shifting interest in other societies, beyond the usual specific preoccupations with neighboring 'national enemies'".[104] In other words, weaker and vulnerable societies use those means that are able to use, in the case of Cyprus, emphasizing on the Greekness of "our" nation but in a lighter way, in a sense that we are all people and thus we are

[103] Spyros Spyrou, "Children's Educational Engagement with Nationalism in Divided Cyprus," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 31, nos. 9/10 (2011): 538.
[104] Yiannis Papadakis, "Discourses of 'the Balkans' in Cyprus: Tactics, Strategies and Constructions of 'Others'," *History and Anthropology* 15, no. 1 (2004): 15.

more or less the same. Therefore, how are the children expected to deal with all these contradictions and ambiguities presented to them day by day?

Concluding Remarks

In the two chapters that we have extensively talked about the national identity of the Greek Cypriot and how this is formed during school years, we end up with the conclusion that Greek nationalism remains the dominant power in the Greek Cypriot political world and up to a certain degree among education's primary goals.

In the daily life's level and pre theoretical consciousness what seems to be prevailing is the civic identity and people's adhesion to Cypriotism. These two tendencies are considered as the principals upon which the tension and dispute occurs regarding the construction of the Greek Cypriot identity. The majority of Greek Cypriot politicians today support the spread of the Greek nationalism in Cyprus and seem to be in quarrel with the traditional left, which as we will see in the following chapters has promoted a policy supporting not only the *rapprochement* between the two communities but a viable and sustainable solution to the Cyprus issue. These *bona fide* efforts made by the current leftist government find the right wing parties as opponents which have unfortunately remained trapped in myths and perceptions of the nationalist ideology and seem unwilling to support a solution to the Cyprus problem.

As illustrated above, the nationalist ideology which remains the official dynamic on the theoretical level at least could not but constitute a central power within education. Education, as the main tool for the construction of national identity is basically used for the development of a Hellenic consciousness which simultaneously leads students to construct a negative image

of the "other". Stereotypes and perceptions about the "other" allow children to make sense of the world without challenging their already existing frameworks for understanding it.[105] They thus serve the function of preventing students think beyond what they are told. Of course they create a simplistic and full of negative imagery about others, let alone fostering critical thinking.

Notions of "us" and "them" in Greek Cypriot pupils' minds are certainly not surprising if we take into account the recent history of Cyprus, and the daily environment they live in. This is reinforced at school where they learn that the Turks consist of "our" national enemy. Given the occupation of a significant territory of the island by Turkey, the latter directly becomes the "other" who is responsible for all the suffering of "our side". What is more, as long as this situation is continued, and people have Turkey's occupation and provocative stance in mind, it is rather not possible for people to construct a more positive image of the Turks and deconstruct their views about them.

However, what is interesting to be noted, is that students and people in general, do have some alternative, to use Bakhtin's term, ideological voices, which compete the dominant view. *All the people are the same, and thus it is not all Turks' fault*, based on religious notions, or what seems to be said sometimes that *the responsible for Cyprus' situation are the Turkish politicians and not ordinary people*, view that might also consist of a stereotype as most of the people duplicate politicians' views. In addition, it would be rather simplistic to think that these minor and rare expressions could compete the dominant national ideology. Nevertheless they can be seen as a testimony that people could think in a more positive light, if not to deconstruct exclusively what they believe about the "others".

[105] Spyrou, "Images of the 'Other'," 268.

III

EDUCATION IN CYPRUS

1960, consists of a historical landmark for Cyprus, its people and its institutions. Following a rather unstable period of conflicts and national contention, the signing of the London-Zurich agreements gave Cyprus a kind of independence according to which Turkey, Greece and Britain constituted the three guarantor powers. The latter would also have the right to maintain two military bases in the south part of the island. Of course this *novus ordo* did not satisfy the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots who had previously fought for their self determination that would finally lead to union with Greece. As Archibishop Makarios observed, "These Agreements have not been the result of the free expressions of the will of the people of Cyprus. They were imposed upon them from outside. Rejection of the agreements would have meant denial of Independence and increased bloodshed."[106]

Foreign statesmen seemed to be pleased with the development in Cyprus and were rather optimistic that a new state together with a new nation would emerge. However, such great hopes divulged the unawareness and the real situation prevailing, not only between the two communities but between the "motherlands" as well. The so called Turkish yoke that resulted in the Greek Revolution in 1821, the Turkish-Greek War in 1922 that ended with the Asia Minor Catastrophe (for the Greeks at least) and severe damages to both Greeks and Turks, consisted

[106] Extracts from the Archbishop's speech on the non-aligned countries at Cairo, Egypt, on October 9th, 1964, quoted in Andreas Georghiou Karagiorges, *Education Development in Cyprus 1960-1977*, (Nicosia: MAM, 1986), 38.

of facts that were well embedded in people's minds, not to mention the volatile decade that the communities had just come out from. Therefore, people were not ready to bridge the deep gap that separated them from one day to another, especially when their aspirations for union or partition were met with disappointment.

Nevertheless, the signing of the agreements granted Cyprus its independence and made Archbishop Makarios III president while Dr Fazil Küçük became the vice president of the new Republic. The new constitution was accepted so that further adverse development would be refrained. However, as it has already been said, a portion of Greek Cypriots reacted negatively towards the new agreements. The reasons for this reaction were plenty, mainly sentiments of injustice, fear and insecurity and of course unfulfilled national aspirations. Sentiments of injustice occurred due to the "special privileges" that were granted to the Turkish Cypriot Community. Sentiments of fear arose due to the installation of a portion of Turkish Military Forces on a permanent basis and due to the right given to Turkey to militarily intervene under specific circumstances.[107] As we saw in the previous chapter, these feelings of fear and insecurity gradually led to the segregation of Greek Cypriots between those supporting Makarios and independence until circumstances allowed *enosis* with Greece, and those supporting Grivas and union with Greece immediately and at any cost.

The same situation seemed to prevail within the Turkish Cypriot community as well, as the Independence did not meet the expectations of the Turkish Cypriots who had previously

[107] Panayiotis K. Persianis, [*Ta politika tis Ekpedaifsis stin Kypro kata tous Telefteous dyo Aiones (1812-2009)* (*The Politics of Education in Cyprus during the Last two Centuries (1812-2009*)], (Athens: University of Nicosia 2010), 62.

demanded either annexation of Cyprus to Turkey or partition. Despite the *malis avibus* that the new era had started with, the agreements were put forth and began to be implemented.

Characteristic example of the period is Turkey, who had showed a rather deterrent factor behind the scenes. The Deniz affair which happened in 1959 is a characteristic example of the climate of the period: A Turkish caique loaded with arms and ammunition for the secret Turkish Cypriot army revealed the geostrategic intensions of Turkey granted by her new role as a guarantor power of the island. It seems that from 1960 onwards the intensions of Turkey had been planned quite well and it was all a matter of 'right timing'. In fact this was revealed openly by Turkish Cypriot politicians as well as Küçük's statement in 1963 that "[…] Cyprus will be divided whether the Greeks want it or not […]".[108] At the same time according to Turkish Cypriots' complaints, it seemed that the Greek Cypriots were also being secretly supplied with arms, planning a kind of rebellion to authorities, fact that strengthened the hiatus between the two communities.

The exercise of power therefore, was not an easy task since people were not 'loyal' to the state and its institutions, constantly searching for other ways that would implement their national dreams. Hence, the parallel pursuance of the agreements together with the uprising of both the intercommunal and intracommunal conflicts created problems to the exercise of power. The lack of allegiance to the state and its institutions was more than evident. The situation was even hindered due to the discontent of the Greek Cypriots in regards to what they considered as extremely big privileges granted to Turkish Cypriots by the Independence Agreements. These

[108] Halkın Sesi, *turkish cypriot newspaper*, 11th October 1963 quoted in Stelios Petrou, [*Kypriaki Ekpaidefsi: Os Diadikasia Sygkroysis – Epylisis tou Kypriakou Provlimatos* (*Cyprus Education: As a Process of Conflict-Solvent of the Cyprus Issue)*], (Athens: Gkiurdas, 2001), 147.

privileges given were considered to create a rather difficult political situation at the expense of the majority. Their provisions were such that was thought to lead to an unstable and not well balanced sharing of the power as was supposed to according to the number of the communities. Although the Greek Cypriots represented the 75% of the population and the Turkish Cypriots only just the 18%, the ratio applied was of 70:30 within the public sector and of 60:40 within the military.

In other words, the ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks was applied within the public service, the council of ministers, as well as the seats in the parliament, despite the fact that Turks numbered only the 18% of the population. Other assets considered to be dissentious were the separate election of the President and Vice President. The former would be elected by the Greek Cypriot majority while the latter by the Turkish Cypriot minority, as well as from the members of the parliament. In addition, the separate majorities within the parliament regarding tax issues, the separate municipalities, the right of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President to use veto and last but not least the separate communal chambers regarding education were seen as divisive elements for the people of Cyprus.

Therefore, and after Makarios' proposal for adjusting the 13 points of the constitution in 1963, which in his view needed to be modified, disputes began to arise between the two communities. The proposal among others included the abolishment of the veto right, the administration of justice to be unified, the division of the security forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished, unified municipalities to be established, the constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities in the House of Representatives to be abolished, the

Communal Chambers to be abolished so that new system would be devised in order to bring education into the general development planning of the Government. The Archbishop in the preamble of his proposals, also noted that one of the consequences of the difficulties created by certain constitutional provisions was, "to prevent the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from co-operating in a spirit of understanding and friendship, to undermine the relation between them and cause them to draw further apart instead of closer together, to the detriment of the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole".[109]

The provisions of the Constitution aggravated an already serious situation, which was created not only by the bitter experiences of the past laid down above, but also by the absence of a University or other educational or cultural institution which could work as point of contact between the two communities and as a factor paving the way towards cooperation and understanding.[110]

What was also missing was a common factor, a strong ideology perhaps that would keep people united, under the same camp. There were in fact some progressive voices which called for the building of cooperation and trust among the two communities, as the one of Mr. Nicos G. Demetriou, a very well known businessman of the time who became later Minister of Commerce for two years (1968-1970). In an article published in the newspaper "Cyprus Mail" in the day of the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus he described his ideology as follows:

[109] "Cyprus, the Problem in Perspective," *Public Information Office* (Nicosia: Revised 1969):11 quoted in Karagiorges, *Education Development*, 38.
[110] Panayiotis Persianis, *The Political and Economic Factors as the Determinants of Educational Policy in Independent Cyprus (1960-1970)*, (Nicosia: Proodos Press Ltd, 1981), 62.

> *"We should bury the past; let the present emerge clear and hopeful and the future come forth in happiness, peace and prosperity. We have to give to our youth a national purpose, which should be the consolidation of the independent State of Cyprus and how to make of it a happy and prosperous country, worthy of its people and its mission to the world. We have to mobilize the latent moral forces in our youth, who should realize that communism prevents the spirit of man so that he will finally become an unwitting tool in the efforts of the communists towards a takeover for the sole purpose of serving the interests of international communism and not of Cyprus and her people."*[111]

As we saw in the previous chapter, Leftists had suggested a common Greek and Turkish Cypriot battle against imperialism. When this suggestion failed, in 1968 they even proceeded to propose the adoption of communism which was thought to function as a common ground between the two communities,[112] and that is what perceptive Demetriou talks about in the above article of his. In addition, the difficulties noticed during the actual practice of implementing the Constitution and which were discussed in the newspapers of both communities diminished the possibilities of mutual confidence and co-operation between them.[113]

In a short period of time, inter-communal fighting broke out and the power-sharing government collapsed. Turkish Cypriots are said to have withdrawn from the government so as to form their own, or because they were forced to. Others chose to withdraw in fear of their lives due to the most recent erupted fighting. From that point onwards Cyprus moved from the bad to worse, while things have never returned to normal ever since.

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[111] Persianis, *The Political and Economic,* 63.
[112] *Ibid*.
[113] Karaghiorges, *Education Development*, 38.

The power-sharing government that was supposed to function as the unifying element between the two people, led to further alienating and increased bloodshed, affecting all fields of the constitution. Thus, not only the separate educational system of the two chambers was not adjusted but the two communities were forced to make another step towards separation. Since education is the main concern of this research let us take a closer look at the system and its vicissitudes during the independence period and up until 1974.

In the pages that follow we shall attempt to describe the educational system and the scopes of education as they have developed since 1960. As Koyllis points out though, "it is never an easy task to give a clear and coherent picture of the educational system of any country."[114] What is more, education, although having permanent characteristics, has at the same time the alterations of a developing country which is changing, integrating itself into constant demands and circumstances. Likewise, several incidents that followed the independence period (inter-communal fighting from 1963 to 1967, or the so called Turkish Cypriot Insurgency, the menace for Turkish invasion in 1964 and 1967, invasion in 1974 and the occupation of the 37% of the island's territory), resulted in the complete alteration of the Greek Cypriots' views about themselves, the others, the relation of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey and the relation of the present with the past and the future.[115] According to the new perceptions, the Cyprus State did not consist of misfortune and anathema any more, on the contrary it became the *Ark of Salvation* that ensured the physical and natural survival of the Greek Cypriots, as the

[114] Leonidas K. Koullis, *Greek Education in Cyprus* (Nicosia: The Education Office Greek Communal Chamber, 1964), 1.
[115] Persianis, *The Political and Economic*, 62.

persistence of its existence and the international recognition of it, would foil the plans of Turkey for full takeover of the island.

These notions led Greek Cypriots think totally different than before, moving from the rejection of the state in the 1960s to its endorsement in the late 1970s and 1980s, and finally to feelings of pride in the late 1990s and early 2000 when Cyprus managed to enter the European Union as equivalent member state.

Therefore, all these vicissitudes could not but influence the formation of the educational policy throughout the years. Literature review indicates that we can discern two main periods that designate the Greek Cypriot Education; the independence period up until the Turkish invasion of 1974, and the period from the latter to the present. The second can be divided into two lesser periods, the first from 1974 up until the opening of the University of Cyprus in 1992, and the second from 1992 up until the present day.

The first period, is the time during which the educational system was inextricably linked with the system in Greece. At this juncture, the aim was as much communion with the Hellenic system as possible, with minimal deviations that were imposed from imperative local economical and social needs.[116]

The second period now, is the severance period from the Hellenic Educational System, gradually first but more rapidly afterwards especially during the 2000 decade, during which lots of twists and turns occurred in the political arena. As long as Cypriotism, or as Persianis notes,

[116] Persianis, *The Political and Economic*, 63.

the Cypriot state is sank in Greek Cypriots' consciousness, the more boldly become the steps done towards the disconnection of the Cypriot system from the Greek one.[117]

[117] Persianis, *The Political and Economic*, 63.

The Educational System 1960-1974

"We in Cyprus will either make progress
with Greece or be destroyed together"
Constantinos Spyridakis

During the transition period, 1st May 1959 to 15th August 1960, the educational system was in the hands of a legally constituted body for the administration of education, the so called Greek Board of Education.[118] The administration of the primary education was strictly collective and had up until then been exercised by the colonial government, whereas the secondary education was not under the control of the latter, fact that eased the transition to the system of Communal Chambers.

Right after the signing of the agreements, the administration of the educational system was granted to the Greek Educational Council. Subsequently, the administration was transferred to the so called Greek Communal Chamber which constituted of 23 elected members of the Greek Cypriot community that were supposed to change every five years. Its counterpart Chamber, the Turkish Communal Chamber was held responsible for the administration of the Turkish Cypriot Education.

Worth to be noted, is that the main factor for the development of education in Cyprus even up until the British era, which was no other than the church, loses its leading role vis-à-vis the educational matters. The only field that is able to exercise a kind of influence are the *katihitika sxoleia* viz. Sunday schools, which function on a voluntary basis.

[118] Koullis, *Greek Education*, 1.

The system set forth, was collective as every decision regarding education was taken by the Chamber which was held responsible "[…] for all educational, informative and didactic matters […],[119] perhaps due to the absence of the theory of human capital and education as an important investment.[120] It is characteristic that during the first five years of independence (1960-1966) no development at all was noted regarding education. However, when the theory regarding the human capital gained ground in Cyprus, discussions over the development and possible transformation of education began to arise. In any case, the nominations, the reassignments, the elevations as well as the analytical programs, the school text books, and the didactic methods were decided by the Greek Communal Chamber. This about-face in the administration of the educational system triggered vital changes regarding the curriculum and the purposes of education.

The disappointment that the Greek Cypriots felt right after the signing of the independence agreements, is somehow comprehensible as what they had struggled and wished for, consisted now a far flung likelihood. What is more, they were expected to co operate with and view the Turkish Cypriots as an equal community, who at the end of the day had not strived with the Greek Cypriots for the same ideals.

Hence, the fact that education was not controlled by the government, and even when it did, it underlay the keystone for the implementation of the new goal set forth, the cultural *enosis*, as the political one was now prohibited by the London-Zurich Agreements.

[119] Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, article 87 (3).
[120] Persianis, *The Political and Economic*, 64.

In this context, remarkable as well as representative is the decision made by the Greek Communal Chamber right after the collision with the Turkish Cypriots, upon which the new objectives and goals aiming a national identity were drawn up:

> *"Whereas education constitutes the basis of the national tradition of the Greeks and an unsurpassable value in the nation's creative process, and because the education of the Greek children of Cyprus, which have strived for ages against thousands of plots originating from the various conquerors of the Island, and has reserved its national character alive, achieving its liberation through the epic 1955-1959 struggle its full independence, and because the national education of Cypriots is independent of political forms its future is interwoven with the national future of Cyprus and of the entire nation. Thus,*
>
> *The Greek Communal Chamber decides that:*
>
> *1. The Cyprus Education is coincided with regard to its directions and curricula to the educational reform which is introduced in Greece.*
>
> *2. The Chamber's Administrative Committee plans the necessary legislation or other measures with the view to achive the fullest and quickest possible identification".*
>
> *3. The Administrational Council studies further the taking of more legislative and administrational measures for full communion of the educational matters of Cyprus with those of Greece."* [121]

As a matter of fact, measures were taken at an early stage so as to strengthen the cultural and emotional links between Greece and Greek Cypriots, who were expected to form a strong

[121] Cyprus Government Gazette, 4th supplement, no. 333 (July 9th 1964), 149 quoted in Stelios Petrou, [*Kypriaki Ekpaidefsi os Diadikasia Epilysis – Sygkrousis tou Kypriakou Provlimatos* (*Cyprus Education as a Process of Resolution-Conflict of the Cyprus Problem*)], (Athens: Gkiourdas, 2001), 149.

Greek national identity and consciousness through education. Among the very first measures taken were:

> *a) the change of curriculum of primary schools and those of secondary schools which were in any way under the control of the Colonial Administration.*
>
> *b) the abolishing of the teaching of English in primary schools.*
>
> *c) the use of the Greek language as the medium of instruction in the Teacher's Training College which changed its name into Pedagogical Academy, and the Technical Schools.*
>
> *d) the intensification of the teaching of Greek History in schools at all levels with special emphasis in primary education.*
>
> *e) the use of the Greek language in correspondence between the Education Authorities and the schools.*[122]

A characteristic example is the mission of the Greek Director of Primary Education in 1963, who pressed the Cypriot educational authorities to orient education in Cyprus in the direction of Hellenization. He exercised heavy criticism on any Cyprus centered school syllabuses, noting among others that "separatism tendencies have been noticed in the curriculum of primary education and the educational laws".[123]

In addition, they stressed the need so as certain terms such as Cyprus Education, Cyprus History, and Cyprus Geography are avoided as they give the impression that Cyprus is something distinct from Greece.

[122] Karaghiorges, *Education Development*, 37.
[123] *Ibid*.

On the 25th June 1964, the Greek Communal Chamber, decided for "the full identification of Cypriot education with that in Greece"[124]. Concurrently with the decision, all the books taught at all levels at school were the same as those used in the mainland, all the secondary teachers were trained in Greece while the whole curriculum of education, with minor exceptions perhaps, followed *ad litteram* the Greek educational system, bringing the aspiration of cultural *enosis* closer to realization.

In spring 1965 however, the responsibilities of the Greek Communal Chamber were handed over to the central government.[125] After the House of Representatives passed the relative law, all the administrative functions of the Greek Communal Chamber were transferred to the newly formed Ministry of Education. Other responsibilities of the Chamber were handed over to other Ministries. Dr C. Spyridakis, who was up until then the Chairman of the Greek Communal Chamber, was appointed as the first Minister of Education. The Minister of Education has the same status and eminence as the other Ministers who are all appointed by the President of the Republic and they are at the same time members of the cabinet. The Ministry of Education is the policy making and administrative organ of the central government which regulates and supervises all the institutions under its jurisdiction. The Ministry was responsible for all the Greek schools, along with those that aligned themselves with the Greek Cypriot community. Needless to say that the Ministry of Education had no authority on the Turkish schools which continued to operate under the Turkish Communal Chamber.

[124] Karaghiorges, *Education Development*, 37.
[125] Michalakis Maratheftis, [*To Kypriako Ekpaideftiko Systima: Stathmoi kai Themata* (*The Cyprus Educational System: Issues and Watersheds*)], (Nicosia: 1992), 37.

The Ministry of Education continued the policy of modeling the curricula on those of secondary schools in Greece and both the Cyprus and the Greek governments continued to have a strong influence on the educational policy and functioned on the basis of the national ideology.[126] One of the paradoxes of this "Hellenization of education" period, is that the Ministry had even introduced changes to the curriculum in the middle of the school year, if such changes occurred in Greece, with the excuse that, as in the words of the Minister of Education, "practical and political considerations are much more important than educational considerations".[127] As Koutsellini-Ioannidou points out, "it is exactly because of these considerations that Cyprus did not develop or promulgate an educational policy of its own during the period of independence".[128]

The Minister of Education, who was well-known as the main expert in educational matters of the time, had been accused for the lack of development of education, which was considered intentional and a political choice. The "practical considerations" referred to the recognition of the public secondary schools by Greece and therefore to Cypriots' open admission to Greek universities. Here, worth to be noted is that Cypriots have always preferred to be educated in Greek Universities, as until nowadays their number is said to be quite large (51,2% of the students studying abroad in 2009-2010[129]). A most favorite field study is philology at the University of Athens, which combines philosophy, classical Greek literature, and history and is

[126] Mary Koutsellini-Ioannidou, "Curriculum as Political Text: the Case of Cyprus (1935-1990)," *Journal of the History of Education Society* 26 no. 4 (2006): 400.
[127] Constantinos Spyridakis (Minister of Education), *Agon*, (Statements made in August 10th, 1964) quoted in Persianis, *The Political and Economic*, 113.
[128] Koutsellini-Ioannidou, "Curriculum as a Political," 400.
[129] Statistics of Education 2009/2010*, Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus*, available at http://www.mof.gov.cy (assessed May 30, 2012).

considered by many a of a worthwhile to be earned knowledge since it includes the history and literature of what is believed as all periods of Hellenism (Ancient, Byzantine, Modern) that will lead students see themselves as heirs of a great and unbreakable civilization. These students have traditionally had the monopoly on positions in Greek secondary schools in Cyprus, in the Inspectorate and in the Ministry of Education[130] until this date.

In any case, to get back to the 1960s, all the changes occurred until 1967 at least, were not the results of educational development but of the duplication and application of the Greek system. Characteristically, when the reforms of 1964 concerning the struck of Ancient Greek from the first three years of Gymnasium and the elimination of the sophisticated form of Modern Greek from the primary school were set forth, the changes were also applied in Cyprus and heralded as a means "for the qualitative improvement and adjustment of education to the new needs of our society".[131]

Before the changes were fully implemented though, the Papandreou Government in Greece was dismissed and the subsequent governments introduced other changes and to a large extend took away many of the '64 reforms. The inconsistency lies on that Cyprus adopted immediately the new changes made, without examining the incentives or the ideological background of them. Characteristic is the reaction of many who had previously greeted the policy of identifying the Cyprus Education with that of Greece. Among these, the reaction of the socialist intellectual Takis Hadjidemetriou. In 1966 he wrote: […] It is therefore natural to apply the curriculum of the educational reform as well […] When all the obstacles to the education of

[130] Anthony A. Kouzis, "Constructing Higher Education in Cyprus: the State, Society and Conflicting 'Knowledge Traditions'," *European Journal of Education* 35 no. 2, (1997): 202.
[131] Koutsellini-Ioannidou, "Curriculum as a Political", 400.

the Greek children are overcome […] then the educational union with Cyprus and Greece will be complete" whereas in 1967 he wrote:

> *"After the Ministry of Education of Greece has prescribed the textbooks there can be no illusions with regard to the educational policy of the Athens dictatorship… The people in charge of our education should stand up and tell the Athens junta that if the dictatorship favors obscurantism, the Cypriot people's struggle for freedom calls for enlightenment".*[132]

Nevertheless, as we saw in the previous chapters, after the inter communal fighting of 1963-1967, the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the government, and the Turkish threats for invasion in 1967, President Makarios realized that *enosis* was no longer a realistic goal and decided to set forth the policy of the desirable (*efkteo)* and feasible (*efikto*); the abandonment of the desire for union with Greece once and for all and the beginning of the development of an Independent and prosperous Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, the orientations that education should have, began to be disputed, but no significant change is noted regarding the content of school textbooks which keep maintaining their Hellenocentric character. Indicative is the reading book for the sixth grade of primary school of 1967 which on a great scale glorifies the Greek nation, demonizes the Turks and prepares children for the possibility of war "Kolokotrona, Kolokotrona! That's what the little Turks in the depths of Asia were saying and their blood froze," or "Farmakis […] killed eighteen Turks with his hand." What is more, "[…] the first martyrs of the Greek freedom were the leaders of religion, patriarchs and high priests."[133]

[132] Persianis, *The Political and Economic*, 111.
[133] Extracts taken from the 1967 Reading Book for the sixth grade of Primary School.

On the one hand, the nationalists persevered on the identification of the Cyprus education with that of Greece as any other choice would lead to severance from the national stem, while on the other hand rationalistic voices tugged the rope towards divergence from the Greek system and introduction of innovations that would lead to economical rise and development of the newborn state. Characteristic is the dispute that arose between the Ministry of Education and the Ministries of Labor and Finance vis-à-vis the desirability to change the curriculum of the secondary schools according to the new changes done in Greece. The opponents of the changes were in fact supporting weakening of the policy of *enosis* and reinforcement of the independent state. Having realized this, the Minister of Education accused the proponents of changes of "hidden objectives" because they supported an independent state at the expense of *enosis*.[134] The area of dispute was then centered on what is important knowledge and what should be included in the core curriculum. Together with the support of an independent policy (which would be applied in education), the Ministry of Labor moved on to demand the enhancement of a vocational school due to the huge number of unemployed graduates as well as the need of skilled laborers and technicians. The Ministry of Education dismissed the demand to transform classical gymnasiums into vocational schools, but it did permit the Ministry of Labor to enhance its own vocational institutions in order to ease employment in Cyprus. New technical schools were added to the technical education of Cyprus, but with an orientation very similar to that of the gymnasiums, with Ancient Greek being taught at all levels of technical schools.

[134] Newspaper, *Kypros* (December 14th,1969), quoted in Mary Koutsellini-Ioannidou, "Curriculum as a Political," 401.

Finally, the dispute "national vs. economical education" ended up with a twofold solution; the curriculum of the secondary education continued to exist with its previous hellenocentric orientation and the enhancement of new technical schools and courses. Hence, from this we understand that educational policy was not diverged from its classical Hellenic orientation; on the contrary it continued to consist of the appropriate nursery for the growing of Greek children.

Also significant, is what bibliography indicates so far, that during this period educational matters were not an issue concerning the parties but the Ministries themselves. Thus, if we look at things from a sociological angle, the curriculum in Cyprus does not reveal any rivalry between authority and the lay classes, as the neo-Marxist fundamentalistic interpretation suggested with respect to the Greek curriculum, with emphasis on the class structure of Greek society, nor does it identify the restraining power of opposing parts as the functional-liberal interpretation suggested.[135] This was due to the debate regarding the '64 reform in Greece which was influenced by neo-Marxist writings which disputed the ideological basis of cultural education.[136]

Hence, the decisions taken in Cyprus at this point in time, reveal that there wasn't any prospect for further development in the wider society as the persistence of the Ministry of Education on the policy of educational *enosis,* despite the change of course in the political scenery, after 1967, set the way of thought of the Cypriot people towards this direction and prevented co operation with the Turkish Cypriots. It is generally agreed that the way to modernization

[135] Koutsellini-Ioannidou, "Curriculum as a Political," 402.
[136] *Ibid*., 400.

presupposes changes at all levels, the economic, the sociological, the political and of course the educational.

The Educational System 1974-Today

Just like 1960, 1974 consists of a historical landmark, turning point in fact, for Cyprus and its people, a rather disastrous and tragic milestone we'd say. The Greek Cypriot education sustains a mighty agitation caused by the Turkish Invasion of July 1974. About 40% of the schools are lost while more than 40% of the students and teachers become refugees.[137] The post 1974 era marks a period during which ideologies are reconsidered and priorities are reconstructed. The Cyprus state from the miasma that it was considered to be in the 1960s becomes the desirable, aiming a united and independent Cyprus (which now included the Turkish Cypriots as well). As it was said in the first chapters, nationalism and hellenocentrism were to blame for the catastrophe that attained Cyprus facilitating the ascent of Cypriotsim, ideology which called upon rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots and allegiance to the state and its institutions.

The rise of Cypriotism at this stage is quite explicable in terms of sociology. Greek Cypriots had always constructed their identity (hitherto at least) based on their national self believing that their preservation was profoundly depended on the maintenance of the Greek ideals and character. Hence, their self-actualization could only be achieved through union with Greece. The frustration resulting from the 1974 disaster and the occupation of Cyprus though, combined with the ontological physical insecurity this brought about, contributed to the

[137] Maratheftis, *Kypriako Ekpaideftiko Systima,* 40.

existential anxiety and doubt over the prevailing ideology,[138] and provide a logical explanation of the questioning of "our identity" and "who we are".

The problem of becoming a new person within these changes was also reflected in education, in the curriculum as well as in schooling and teaching, causing a significant change in educational matters in the post 1974 era. This turn towards Cypriotism was not an easy case though because of the resistance provided by the so called pre-established organizational economy of identity within schools, as well as due to the various perceptions of teachers and students.[139]

Education was suddenly transformed from the vector of Greek Christian Ideals that it was, to the supporter of the survival of the Cypriot state. The new educational aim had no longer as a prerequisite to connect Cyprus to Greece and the Greek Christian values; on the contrary it stressed the preparation of democratic citizens, the preparation for occupations, the enhancement of Cyprus as an independent state and the promotion of friendship among the various communities in Cyprus and among nations.[140]

In addition, significant changes regarding the curriculum start taking place in the post 1974 era. In an attempt to reach higher and better levels of education that would lead to retrofit and meet the economical and economic needs of the island, curricula becomes more specific; the Lyceum of Optional Studies is introduced to all secondary schools in 1981,[141] comprising of core subjects, combination of subjects as well as specializations. Among the most interesting

[138] Philip Wexler, *Becoming Somebody, Toward a Social Psychology of School* (London: 1992), 8 quoted in Koutsellini-Ioannidou, "Curriculum as a Political," 404.
[139] Koutsellini-Ioannidou, *Ibid*.
[140] Chrysostomos Sofianos, *Basic Issues of Educational Policy* (Nicosia: 1980), 12.
[141] Maratheftis, *Kypriako Ekpaideftiko Systima*, 42.

changes is the reduction in course offerings of ancient Greek and its alteration to an optional course, together with the annulment of being taught in the Gymnasiums. The content of the philological courses kept following *ad literram* the Greek curriculum though.

At the same time, there was an increase in the course offerings of foreign languages, and especially of English, issue that induced reactions vis-à-vis the estrangement from the mother tongue. Characteristic are the words of the new Minister of Education, Chrysostomos Sofianos, "We are living in a world in which the second language is not only useful but also indispensible."[142] At this point, we should draw a parallel with the British rule, time during which the English Language was seen as a threat to the mother tongue and hence national identity. This can be attributed to the fact that English was the language of the ruler and thus the enemy, and should not be taught. We will see the same reaction in the 1990s when the Turkish and Middle Eastern Department of the University of Cyprus was established. Right wing parties had then negatively reacted demanding the closing of the department, as the language and history of the "enemy" should not be learned.

However, English no longer consisted of a threat to the nation and its aims during the post 1974 period. On the contrary, it became useful for the internationalization of the Cyprus problem as well as for Cyprus' economical ascent during the "economic miracle phase."

During the mid and late 1970s, the Cypriot Ministry of Education introduces fundamental changes that bring about differentiations from the Greek curriculum. The new changes were orientated towards a new Cypriot centered education that would initiate fidelity to the state

[142] Sofianos, *Basic Issues*, 16.

and form a Cypriot identity. This new orientation was aiming at the development of an anti-national ideology, which engendered both the negative and positive reactions of the political parties. The progressive voices called for the reinforcement of this policy in contrast to the conservative ones that supported the cancellation of the new reforms and return to the previous hellenocentric educational policy.

Within the context of reforms, the memory of the occupied land is kept alive and the pupil's morale whiles the determination for the island's national and physical survival is strengthened.[143] For the first time new subjects such as History of Cyprus and Elements of Democratic Forms of Government are added.[144]

According to the new Minister of Education, C. Sofianos, who was appointed in 1976, the fanatical opponent of the educational reform of 1976-1980 was the reactionary party of the right, which viewed the reform as a "lethal danger for the Cypriot Hellenism".[145]

All those responsible for the fascist coup of July 15th 1974 as well as their counterparts/followers of the Greek Junta of 1964-1974, could not possibly accept the fact that the new reforms were to encourage the fostering of critical thought and the creation of democratic citizens. For years, schools consisted of nurseries of nationalism, and thus the new orientation could only consist of miasma and anathema for them. Critical thought would have meant the revealing of the truth lying behind the catastrophe that attained Cyprus. Besides,

[143] Sofianos, *Basic Issues*, 15.
[144] *Ibid*., 29.
[145] Chrysostomos Sofianos, ["H Ekpaideftiki Metarrythmisi stin Kypro 1976-1980: Prospathies, Eksartisis, Antidrasis," ("Educational Reform in Cyprus 1976-1980: Efforts, Dependencies, Reactions,")], in [*Oi Ekpedaiftikes Metarrithmisis stin Ellada 1976-1980: Prospathies, Adieksoda, Proooptikes* (*The Educational Reforms in Greece 1976-1980: Efforts, Stalmates, Prospects*)] ed. Andreas Kazamias and Michael Kassotakis (Rethymno: Orthodox Academy of Crete, 1986), 147.

many of the followers of the extreme right were teachers and "intellectuals" that shared primitive mentality and conservative philosophy a propos education. Of course, let us not forget the defended of Hellenism, which is no other than the church, which had put forward the very well known *troparion* about the "Greek-Christian Ideals". Worth to be noted is the reaction and answer of the Minister of Education to this:

> *"The supporters of the "Greek-Christian Ideals" have never proceeded to explain what exactly they mean with this phrase. The basic Greek values are freedom, justice and democracy. Love on the other hand, is identified with the Christian values. That is exactly what we are trying to transmit to the modern Cypriot education […] There is however the historical reality which indicates that the "Greek-Christian Ideals" were identified with dark attitudes, silly and chauvinistic rants, the paranoid advantage of the sacred and holies of the nation. Is it coincidental that as much conservative the Greek state was getting the greater was the adhesion to the "Greek-Christian Ideals?" For example, the Greek Junta identified herself with the "Hellas, Hellenon Christianon"* motto viz. *"Greece of Christian Greeks". Thus the "Greek-Christian ideals" do not mean freedom, justice, democracy, love any more […]."*[146]

While the Minister was implementing governmental educational policy, he was openly blamed by Greece of being "anti-Greek", "atheist", "communist" and other similar adjectives.[147]

Nevertheless, after 1980 the reactions against the Cyprus educational policy had lessened, despite the fewer offerings of Ancient Greek courses.[148] The reason is again political. The 1976 reforms were seen as a reaction of the Progressive voices of Cyprus against the Right Government of Greece and the "Greek-Christian Ideals". However, the change of government

[146] *Ibid.,* 149.
[147] *Ibid.,* 150.
[148] Koutsellini-Ioannidou, "Curriculum as a Political," 406.

in Greece in 1980, giving the Socialist Party the governance, led to alteration of the political scene, as the identification of the Cypriot curricula with that of Greece seemed to serve both camps; the Right Parties which supported identification with the Greek educational system, and the Left Parties which favored the changes introduced by the new Greek socialist government.[149] The 1981 government successfully introduced changes that included the abolition of Ancient Greek from gymnasiums. The 1992 government reintroduced the subject and Cyprus as a "loyal dog" followed the change and reintroduced the subject as well.

A significant change that was introduced during Spyros Kyprianou's presidency (1977-1988) was the establishment of the Program Development Service (Yphresia Anaptyksis Programmaton). This service came to satisfy the need in textbooks and educational material that emerged from the introduction of new subjects within the framework of the new system of the subject optional lyceum.

The most significant change occurred during George Vasiliou's presidency (1988-1993), was the establishment of the University of Cyprus in 1989 and its function in 1992.[150] The discussion on whether a university should open in Cyprus, lasted for over than 30 years. In fact when President Makarios paid an official visit to America, President Kennedy proposed the opening of a university in Cyprus with the prospect to bring Greek and Turkish Cypriots closer and develop their relations.[151] Five American Professors had then visited the island for this purpose. Due to

[149] *Ibid.*
[150] Today the University of Cyprus has six faculties: the Faculty of Humanities, the Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences, the Faculty of Social Sciences and Education, the Faculty of Economics and Management, the Faculty of Engineering and the Faculty of Letters. In 2008 establishment of Medicine was proclaimed.
[151] Petrou, *Kypriaki Ekpaidefsi,* 170.

national reasons though, the effort soon came to nothing.[152] Of course the supporters of the identification of the educational system with Greece had strongly disagreed with such a possibility. They stated that a university in Cyprus would little by little weaken the cultural and educational relations of Cyprus and Greece, whereas on the contrary, the supporters of the independent education defended the establishment of a university for economical, political and cultural reasons.[153] The establishment of a university, as they believed, would contribute to the economical and social development of the island.

Among the most significant changes done during Vasiliou's presidency were the insertion of unified exams which helped the equalization and credence of the baccalaureates as well as the lifting of the educational level of lyceums.

The subsequent government, that of Glafkos Clerides (1993-2003), managed to introduce the so called *Eniaia Lykeia* viz. Unified Upper Secondary Schools and the in-service training for all candidates for the position of professor at secondary schools.

The Unified Upper Lyceum encompassed three categories of courses: a) mandatory courses b) core-optional courses and c) optional courses. The first grade in lyceum was aggregate for all the students and the specialization concerned only the second and third grade.

The second novelty concerned the training of all the candidate professors before their appointment in the position of professor in secondary schools. This training lasts an academic year and all participants take pecuniary compensation.

[152] Persianis, *The Political and Economic,* 193-194.
[153] *Ibid.*, 72.

The third novelty done during Clerides' presidency was the formation of the all day primary school. The idea of introducing this institution came from Greece but it functions according to the Cypriot reality.[154]

During the presidency of Tassos Papadopoulos (2003-2008), significant changes were introduced, of which *inter alia* is the establishment of the Cyprus University of Technology in 2007,[155] and the establishment of the Open University of Cyprus. The most crucial introduction though, which concerns this research and the people of Cyprus in general, is the appointment of a seven member ad-hoc committee aiming the submittal of proposals for a major educational reform. President of the committee is the professor of Comparative Pedagogy of Madison Wisconsin University (U.S.A) A. Kazamias. The Committee has submitted its report in 31 August 2004. The report consists of four parts: 1) the Philosophical and Historical backdrop – Cypriot Education within Europe of Euro, Knowledge and Citizens, 2) The Problem of Cypriot Education and Manifesto of Educational Reconstruction and Modernization, 3) From the Basic Education to the University - Structure and Amendment of the Educational System; Governance Context, educational institutions and content, and 4) General Educational Matters.

According to the report, the Cypriot Education was at the time "Greekcyprocentric, ethnocentric and culturally monolithic". For this reason, it proposed "the deletion of the ethnocentric, monocultural and extensively the ethnodualistic elements" and the addition of aims such as "the cross-cultural and mutli-cultural ideology that connects the Cypriot traditions

[154] Persianis, *The Politics of Education,* 74.
[155] The Cyprus University of Technology has six faculties: the Faculty of Geotechnical Sciences and Environmental Management, the Faculty of Management and Economics, the Faculty of Health Sciences, the Faculty of Applied Arts and Communication and the Faculty of Engineering and Technology.

with the knowledge of the cultural of others" as well as the "implantation of principles of democracy that would include the Turkish-Cypriot ethno community".[156] At the same time, the committee suggested full independence of the Cypriot Education from Greece. Referring to the analytical programs and text books that come from Greece, the committee pointed out that: "The Greek books will always be welcomed, but it would be more productive and useful for the Cypriot Education if they constitute an alternative – complementary solution. We should finally become self-sufficient and requite the offer".[157]

The suggestions of the committee consist of an avant-garde motion for the Cypriot reality, especially if we take into account that since 1980, none of the Ministers of Education at each given time considered the universal restructuring of education and its goals important. In addition, this is perhaps the first time that the Turkish Cypriot Community is referred *per se* in the analytical programs and their aims. Turkish Cypriots, who have always comprised of an equal community of the Republic of Cyprus, were never mentioned until recently, not even before 1974.

For this reason, and after AKEL won the elections of 2008, the former Minister of Education, Antreas Dimitriou set forth a large program of Reforms within Cypriot Education during his tenure (2008 - 2011), which included the formation of new curricula across all courses and grades from preschool to lyceum and the development of the university system of the country. This policy initiative immediately provoked the reaction of both the teacher community and the

[156] Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture, [*Dimokratiki kai Anthropini Paideia stin Evrokypriaki Politeia* (*Democratic and Humanistic Education in Eurocypriot State*)] (Nicosia, 2004), 95 available at http://www.paideia.org.cy/upload/ekthesi_epitropis.pdf (assessed May 25, 2012).
[157] *Ibid*., 284-5.

wider society. The heated discussions concentrated on the correctness of such an initiative given the ongoing occupation of the island and its consequences that still consist of open wounds.

Among the aims set by the former Minister, is the reconciliation not only with the Turkish Cypriot Community but above all with Greek Cypriot themselves who should finally realize the reality in Cyprus. Below, I quote a part of the former Minister's answer to those who hustled to blame him for alleged efforts to extinct the national identity:

> *"It is a huge fault and great insult. I have several times declared that our education cannot but be just Greek. Our education's goal is to brighten and magnify our culture in all its levels. On the other hand though, I believe that the fact that Cypriot Hellenism will from now on exist in a separate state, the Republic of Cyprus, is generally acknowledged. Our education therefore, should be oriented towards this reality. It should to wit lead society to reconciliate firstly with herself. Old traumas that had initially separated us should be healed. Of course, we should love this country, so that we will create those circumstances that will enable us to have confidence in our relations with the other communities and especially the Turkish Cypriot Community. We need lucidity in order to heal the wounds of the past you know, in order to move on and correct mistakes of the past, as much as we can of course."* [158]

This situation, of blaming the Minister of Education that his efforts will lead to extinction of the Greek national identity, can be contrasted with the situation that prevailed right after 1974 and Minister Sofianos. The same reaction by the same people years later is attributable to the fact that Greek Cypriots, some of them at least, have still a long way to traverse with respect to

[158] Antreas Dimitriou, interviewed by Chrysanthos Tsouroullis, *Sigma Live*, November 2, 2008 available at http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/80503 (assessed June 2, 2012).

their perceptions about the "Other" and about themselves as well. Every time that a Minister proceeds to transform education into a vehicle of critical thought and learning to have mutual respect for others, the right wing parties and their followers proceed to blatantly unleash searing attack claiming that the reforms will lead to alteration of the national character and backing of the "Others".

If explanation of what a solution would look like, and of whom Turkish Cypriots are, consist of acts of betrayal and danger for the Cypriot Hellenism, then what is the point of struggling for the solution of the Cyprus issue and reunification of the island?

The Analytical Programs

As we briefly saw in the first chapter, the analytical program is an educational developmental program which sets a) the general aims and goals of an educational process, b) the ways, the means and the activities for the implementation of the goals and c) the methods and the requisite tools for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the educational act.[159] From a sociological angle though, an analytical program, beyond being a tool of reproduction of cultural capital,[160] is a cultural and social construction, which mirrors particular aims and ideological preferences of the mechanisms of the educational policy and society.[161]

[159] Mary Ioannidou-Koutsellini, *Analytika Programmata kai Didaskalia* (*Curriculum and Education*), (Nicosia: 2009), 1.
[160] Michael Apple, *Ideologia kai Analytika Programmata* (*Ideology and Curriculum*), (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1986), 84.
[161] Stavroulla Philippou, "On the Borders of Europe: Citizenship, Education and Identity in Cyprus" *Journal of Social Science Education* 6, no. 1 (2007): 72.

The first time that an analytical program was introduced in Cyprus is in 1886 and followed the analytical program of Greece.[162] Previously, during Ottoman times, when education was religiously centered, the textbooks were the church books. Writing and arithmetic was taught only if it was known by the teacher.[163] As we saw in the previous chapter, things did not change dramatically during the colonial rule, as the main goal of education was the conveying of the Greek Christian Values and the formation of a strong national Greek identity, except from the decision of the British government to reduce significantly the offerings of Greek history and geography and introduce the English language teaching.

The Analytical Program of 1949 now, brings the course of Greek history back and resets the educational proceedings of the time. A major novelty at this time is the introduction of the civics course for the fifth and sixth grade of the primary school. In 1959, with the formation of the Greek Educational Council the English language offerings come to an end.

After Independence the lingering sentiment of union, created an ambiguity that maintained the dependence of the educational system on that of Greece and thus, books, curricula and secondary school teachers continued to come from Greece.[164] In general, no significant change was done during Independence and up until 1974.

After 1974, as we saw again in the previous chapter, the policy of *enosis* is abandoned once and for all and the need for the formation of a strong and united Cyprus is put forward. In addition, there was the need to teach the young generation, and especially those born after 1974, not to

[162] Andreas P. Polydorou, [*H Anaptyksi tis Dimotikis Ekpedaifsis stin Kypro: 1830-1994* (*The Development of Primary Education in Cyprus: 1830-1994*)], (Nicosia: Cultural Services of the Ministry of Education of Cyprus, 1995), 87.
[163] *Ibid*.
[164] Miranda Christou, "A Double Imagination: Memory and Education in Cyprus," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 24, no. 2 (2006): 288-289.

forget the occupied lands. Specifically, as Miranda Christou points out, curricular changes soon followed by the Ministry of Education that directed teachers to incorporate in their courses references to the events of 1974, the plight of Greek Cypriot refugees and the importance of remembering the part of Cyprus that was occupied by Turkey.[165] The primary education for instance, had used five courses that would be possible to incorporate a vital part about the occupied lands. These are the Greek language, history, geography, music and art. These books and courses would help the integration of images, poems and songs that would talk about the life of the refugees before 1974 and likewise, they would help remembering the occupied land in the north.

In general, the necessity to reconstruct priorities and ideology in the post 1974 era, leads to discussions concerning the alteration of the analytical programs. This period, the subject of *Den ksehno kai Agonizomai* viz. *I don't forget and struggle* is introduced in the analytical program and in 2001 is changed into *Gnorizo, den ksehno kai agonizomai* viz. *I know, I don't forget and Istruggle*. Particularly, the analytical program of 1981 refers to:

> *"the form of free and democratic with round developmental personality, spiritually cultured, righteous, healthy, active and creative citizens, that will contribute with their work and conscious action to the social, scientific, economical and cultural development of our country and to the furtherance of cooperation, mutual understanding and love between people aiming at the maintenance of freedom, justice and peace".* [166]

The clash of hellenocentrism with the cyprocentrism during this period causes a dispute between the followers of the two camps. The hellenocentrists obviously annoyed by the

[165] *Ibid*., 289-290.
[166] Polydorou, *H Anaptyksi*, 105-106.

development reveal once more their support for the remaining of the previous policy, while cyprocentrists express their will for an independent Cypriot educational policy. It can be said that the 1976-1980 reforms of Minister Sofianos are ascribed to the context of cyprocentrism. With his departure from the position of the Minister, things go back to "normal" and hellenocentrist policies come back.

In 1990, Cyprus applies for membership in the E.U. and declared its European orientations of its formal education.[167] The prospect of EU membership was firmly welcomed by Greek Cypriots, due to anticipation of economic profits as well as because it was believed that European Union would play an important factor in the founding of a solution to the Cyprus issue.

However, the introduction of European dimension in Cyprus and especially within education, led to several discussions due to the fear of deadening the national identity as well as, as we have seen so far, because identity consists a major issue within the Cyprus Issue. The encouragement of European Union and the Council of Europe to introduce a European dimension in the member-states' education and curricula, has affected the construction of nation and Europe within education, causing the introduction of new elements in the analytical programs and school textbooks.[168]

Persianis has diagnosed a resistance to the European cultural space due to the traditional role of Greek Cypriot education to inculcate the Greek national identity.[169] The Ministry of

[167] Mary Koutsellini-Ioannidou and Athena Michaelidou, "The Meaning of Rationale of Greece-Cyprus Unified Education: A Teacher's and Parents' Beliefs Study," *Educational Research and Evaluation: An International Journal on Theory and Practice* 10, no. 2 (2004): 185.
[168] Stavroulla Philippou, "Re-Inventing 'Europe': The case of the European dimension in Greek-Cypriot geography and history curricula" *The Curriculum Journal* 18, no. 1 (2007): 58.
[169] Philippou, "The struggle for change," 253.

Education had declared in 1996 the need to turn our education towards a "European Dimension" that consisted of the primary goal for the primary education.[170] However, the Ministry had construed Europe with the EU, associating it with technological and economic development so that perceived EU standards in these fields are reached and which confine it with the addition to EU languages and participation in exchange programs.[171] This reaction had let the ethnocentric aspect of education untouched and the potential of a European identity as a means to remove nationalistic tendencies unexploited.

Specifically, the Analytical Program of 1994, which was a bit revised in 1996 and was valid up until 2007, declared the following:

> *[…] The Hellenic Cypriot Education is democratic, fighter and humanistic in its content, encourages love for the country, reinforces the desire and determination for the liberation of our occupied land, safeguards our national, religious and cultural tradition and is provided to all children of Hellenic schools of the Republic of Cyprus according to the constitution […] Concerning the orientations of Primary Education, catalytic role, among others, play the ongoing occupation of a huge part of Cyprus, the uprooting of a great portion of the population […] and last but not least the European Dimension and the prospect of full accession of Cyprus to the European Union in parallel with the challenges of the 21st century […]."*[172]

Thus, up until 2007, despite the formation of the committee for the evaluation of the educational system in 2003, the orientation of the Greek Cypriot Education was rather ethnocentric, emphasizing the Greek national character of the Cypriots and the need to liberate

[170] *Ibid*.
[171] *Ibid*.
[172] Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture, *Analytical Programs for the Primary Education in the context of the ninth year old education* (Nicosia, Department of Primary Education, Program Development Service, 2007), 17.

the occupied part, without explaining what a solution would like or would mean for the island though. Indicative is the research of Spyros Spyrou, (used in previous chapters), in the mid 1990s which reveals that children learn that they are Greeks, heirs of a bright past and that they are expected to liberate their country. They are also taught that Turkey and the Turks consist of the enemy of both the nation and the country creating negative stereotyping about them. However, when Cyprus became a member-state of the European Union in May 1st 2004, the cyprocentrist ideology gains some ground again and love and pride for the country become usual sentiments at the time.

This kind of educational policies can create a huge obstacle to the development of relations of the two communities and the future of the island. Education is not going to solve the Cyprus issue but it can create a climate that allows the government to move on with its handlings,[173] and prepare the ground for solution and co existence. It was not until 2008 that steps towards attainment of a peaceful co existence started within education. The formation of a committee of experts to examine the analytical programs let to their reformation and circulation in 2010.

Education, in both sides, among others factors, can contribute to the deconstruction of the negative stereotypes that were being formed for years. Besides, it is factual that education has played a drawback role concerning the rapprochement between the two communities and the possibility of co existence. This can be found in attitudes observed in 2004, right before the transaction of the referendum for the Annan Plan such as *Are we going to live with the Turks now?* (i.e. who have done so many atrocities to us?).

[173] Antreas Dimitriou, interview by Chrysanthos Tsouroullis, *Sigma Live*, November 2, 2008 available at http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/80503 (assessed May 20, 2012).

The new analytical programs of 2010 have a totally brand orientation. The main aim of education is the illumination of whom the Greek Cypriots are and which is their identity. The youth is called to learn to live in a multi ethnic environment with respect to everyone. For instance, the new analytical program has set the following goals vis-à-vis the history course for the sixth grade of primary school:

> *"[…] The Cypriot participation in the Second World War, the independence and the quirks of the Cypriot political system. The conditions of co existence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the inter communal fighting of 1958 and 1963-64 […] discussion of the role of all citizens of the Republic of Cyprus within the peaceful reunification of the Cypriot territory and the preservation of independence of a common and united homeland."* [174]

As we've seen from previous policies, this is the very first time since 1960 that the word *co existence* is mentioned in an analytical program and hence set as a goal to be promoted at school. The fact that Turkish Cypriots were and still are part of Cyprus and therefore living with them goes without saying, or at least should go without saying, has never so far been referred within school and the aims of the country. It wasn't even mentioned after 1960 and before 1974. If it had been in the first place, perhaps things could have been different and much better for Cyprus and its communities.

[174] *Analytical Programs for the Primary Education in the context of the ninth year old education*, 172.

IV

Education for Co Existence

"We should meet the other community,
Its sensitivities, its needs
and lead it towards doing the same for us"
Antreas Demetriou

Having examined the troubled history of Cypriot life during the last fifty years, and its ramification on education, we realize that Cyprus is indeed a conflict ridden area. The reason for not carrying forward all these years is perhaps that wounds were and are to a certain degree still open or subsisted in order to remain open. Hence, what do countries that are war-torn do in order for the wounds to be healed? How can people who fell victims of atrocities or made atrocities themselves return to a situation of peaceful co existence? How can people who have been taught to abhor the Turks learn to live with them? Should people forget what they or their communities been through in order to construct new identities that are not based on past traumas? "Should we remember, is it good, is it healthy to do so? Is it better to forget and move on?" asks Bourguignon.[175]

Thus, how can educators prepare the ground for co existence if they are first called to deal with poignant issues? Here, the question set can be amended; it is not about forgetting or reinterpreting the traumatic past differently but exploiting the past in order to make children understand that forgiving and coming together will enable people live side by side again.

[175] Erika Bourguignon, "Memory in an Amnesic World: Holocaust, Exile and the Return of the Suppressed," *Anthropological Quarterly* 78 (2005):64 quoted in Michalinos Zembylas and Zvi Beckerman, "Education and the Dangerous Memories of Historical Trauma: Narratives of Pain, Narratives of Hope," *Curriculum* Inquiry 38, no. 2 (2008): 126.

Besides, if education was able to intensify the chasm between the two communities and subsist it for years, isn't it able to repair the "damage" or to put it differently isn't it about time to changed orientation?

As we have seen above, the new initiative set by the Ministry of Education in 2008 has set orientations that aim to pave the way for the reconciliation with the Turkish Cypriots and the promotion of peaceful co existence. What does education for co existence mean though? Let us first provide a brief meaning and then go back to the initiative and its goals.

According to Bar-Tal, education for co existence refers to the process through which society members are supposed to acquire the beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that are in line with the ideas of co existence.[176] This process does not concern only pupils but the wider society as well. In other words, since there is the need to set forth such a program at schools, it means that society holds a repertoire that is in contradiction with the values of co existence. It means that society supports discrimination, prejudice and as we have seen in chapter two, wrong perceptions and negative stereotypes, that were at a great extend formed via education.

The new initiative emphasizes that "education must cultivate those elements that unite us and characterize us as one people […] [preparing] the children and youth for peaceful co existence and collaboration between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots".[177] The circular particularly stressed the role the teachers should have and the values that education should embrace in order to reach co existence:

[176] Daniel Bar-Tal, "Nature, Rationale and Effectiveness of Education for Coexistence," *Journal of Social Issues* 60, no. 2 (2004): 261.
[177] Ministry of Education and Culture*, Circular for the academic year 2008-2009: Stohi Sholikis Hronias 2008-2009* (*Aims for the school Year 2008-2009*) (August 27th, 2008) *available at* www.schools.ac.cy (assessed June 2, 2012).

> *"Our teachers are called first to get closer and become acquainted with the cultural expression of the two communities, so that they can transfer it to the students. Principles helpful for this task and in line with contemporary intercultural approaches include: the cultivation of the possibility to place ourselves in the others' position and see the world through their perspective, solidarity, intercultural respect, the axioms of the equality of cultures and the provision of equal opportunities."* [178]

The circular also added that the values of reunification and co existence should be included in all aspects of school life and that they should be accompanied and reinforced by special activities which can be implemented in-school or out-school.

Yet, as it was to be expected, the circular caused reactions and heated debates regarding the new goals of education, not only within the teachers' community but within the media, the press and the wider Greek Cypriot society. The pretext used was that no such activities can be implemented as long as a big part of the island is still under Turkish occupation. The Pancyprian Organization of Greek Teachers (POED) stood up against the new circular and proceeded to issue its own circular stating its strong disagreement concerning the visit of Turkish Cypriots to Greek Cypriot primary schools.

These reactions are indicative that teachers are indeed able to support such initiatives as well as sabotage the efforts for reconciliation. According to literature for teachers' emotions in a context of reforms,[179] the reasons for this disagreement can be a threatening sense of self-

[178] Ministry of Education and Culture*, Circular for the academic year 2008-2009: Stohi Sholikis Hronias 2008-2009* (*Aims for the school Year 2008-2009*) (August 27th, 2008) *available at* www.schools.ac.cy (assessed June 2, 2012).
[179] See Klass Van Veen and Sue Lasky, "Emotions as a Lens to explore Teacher Identity and Change: Different Theoretical Approaches," *Teaching and Teacher Education* 21, no 8 (2005): 895-898; Michalinos Zembylas, "The Politics of Trauma: Empathy, Reconciliation and Peace Education," *Journal of Peace Education* 4, no. 2 (2007): 207-224; Andy Hargreaves, "Inclusive and Exclusive Educational Change: Emotional Responses of Teachers and

image and identity,[180] the work overloaded that such processes entail, especially for the older teachers who are not that enthusiastic anymore and teachers' feelings of being excluded from decision making.[181]

According to the results of the recent research of Zembylas *et al.* about teachers' emotions and views on the initiative, teachers indicated that human rights violation, the conflicts' open traumas, the objective's potentially negative impact, the unresolved political problem, the objectives' leftist political character and the lack of institutional support as the main barriers for a normal transaction of the reforms.[182]

The teachers' answers reveal their unwillingness to implement the objectives set by the Ministry of Education. They can however consist of useful material for future initiatives in the field of co existence education. Interesting finding is the reaction according age. Older than 46 years old (46-60) teachers expressed a significantly higher degree of agreement in contrast to those under 36 years (born after 1974).

In the case of Cyprus, age seems to play a crucial role. If we bring in mind the results of the referendum for the Annan Plan in 2004, we will see that the age between 18-25 had the highest percentage in voting NO while the highest percentage in voting YES were those older than 60 years. Hence, the generations born after 1974 seem reluctant when it comes to co existing with the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks.

Implications of Leadership," *School Leadership and Management: Formerly School Organization* 24, no. 3 (2004): 285-307.

[180] Van Veen and Lasky, *Ibid*., 896.

[181] Hargreaves, *Ibid*., 295.

[182] Michalinos Zembylas et al, "Promoting Peaceful Co Existence in Conflict Ridden Cyprus: Teachers Difficulties and Emotions towards a New Policy Initiative," *Teaching and Teacher Education* 27, no. 2 (2011): 337.

As we have so far seen, although education was very ethnocentric before 1974, those who lived that period are more willing to coexist again. A possible explanation is that significantly less people were going to school before 1974 and that people know from firsthand how the "others" are. The fact that a barbaric Turk was not constructed in their minds, and that they have a personal experience of living together, consist of crucial factors regarding co existence. On the contrary, younger generations that had never seen or met a Turkish Cypriot before, and have been taught to be repulsed by the hearing of the word "Turk", seem very unwilling to learn the other side and try to live with it.

If we return to our previous discussion about the reactions of teachers to the initiative, we will see that in the realm of the human rights violations a teacher gave the following answer:

> *Marina: Reconciliation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots means everything that applies all around the world, I mean free movement, everyone able to freely enjoy their properties. And then once we have these, reconciliation will take place […].*
>
> *Interviewer: What feelings does the prospect of reconciliation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots bring out in you? Your personal opinion.*
>
> *Marina: Personally I believe that such a thing does not exist and will never exist.*[183]

This answer is representative of the preconditions (free movement, return of all Greek Cypriot refugees to their houses, withdrawal of all Turkish troops from the north) set in order for reconciliation process to begin within education and the wider society. The teacher seems to

[183] Zembylas et al., "Promoting Peaceful Coexistence," 337.

have concentrated only on the Greek Cypriots' rights and pass by the Turkish Cypriots' rights or simply has never thought about them.

Regarding the conflicts' open traumas teachers have said the following:

> *Kostas: The wounds from the [Turkish] invasion are still fresh. You cannot hastily push someone who is wounded and still carries the stigmata [of trauma] to reconcile with the other, and therefore I don't think you can introduce such an objective.*
>
> *Melina: Ok, you [Ministry of Education and Culture] are my employer… But it [the new objective] caused us feelings of contempt, for those in the Ministry who have no idea that I'm obliged to teach refugee children, children that they have missing persons in their family, and I have to face this situation.*[184]

Here, the two teachers have concentrated on the open traumas from 1974 which are up to a certain degree still concrete. This is characteristic of the cultural technologies that were employed all these years within the Greek Cypriot society. These include the press, the media (documentaries regarding the Greek Cypriot sufferings every 20th of July) and of course the *Den Ksehno kai Agonizomai* subject taught in all primary schools in the realm of keeping the memory of the occupied land alive and thus establishing collective remembering.

Even worse, some others although seemed willing to implement the program, if there was some guidance on how to do so, were prevented from narrow-minded headmasters. Indicative is the following statement:

> *"This year, yeah, many teachers did not like the objective… but on the other hand, we were never told how to implement it either! We were left with this vague thing the circular mentioned and*

[184] Zembylas et al., "Promoting Peaceful Coexistence," 338.

that's it. Plus the fact that our head-teacher did not actually wanted it to be implemented, it never did. End of the story."[185]

Other teachers, stressed separation as barrier for the implementation of the initiative as "I don't feel ready; to feel ready I would like to have more contact with the Turkish Cypriots which I don't have […]."[186] It is true that the two communities had lived completely separated for years, and therefore knowledge about the 'Other' is difficult to exist. Some others have never met a Turkish Cypriot or Turk before, despite the fact that there is the possibility to do so nowadays. This is either because they consider crossing to the other side betrayal or simply because they haven't run into each other yet.

Similarly, others stressed the need to be somehow informed about Turkish Cypriots in order to be able to talk about them in class. A teacher had said the following: "I would be willing [to implement the objective] if they organized first some training seminars, if they taught me something, a Turkish dance or whatever, I am willing to show it. Or a song, if I had a CD and knew how to sing it, I am willing."[187] Zembylas notes that some other teachers said that the only thing they received was the circular without any instructions for the facilitation of the new aims. The circular itself though, seems to provide detailed instructions on activities that could be done so that pupils understand the commonalities between the two communities, learn their differences and learn about the prospect of living together.

Specifically, the circular of 2008 refers to the undertaking of assignments regarding common characteristics of the two communities (struggles, occupations, food, dance, ways of

[185] *Ibid.*
[186] *Ibid*., 339.
[187] *Ibid*.

entertainment etc), potential difficulties of co existing and ways to overcome them, assignments to students of lyceum that learn the Turkish language (contrast with Greek and interaction), formation of association that will promote the co existence of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, tuition of Turkish Cypriot literature that promotes co existence, organizing conferences with the objective to meet and learn the other community's members as well as educational conferences for the teachers themselves at commonly used places such as the Ledra Palace Check Point or the mixed village of Pyla, in order to learn the "Others" better and be able to talk about them in class.[188]

At this point it should be noted that the circular referred to the promotion of coexistence as an ideal and that no changes have been so far made as propos the content of the school text books used nowadays at schools. Research done on these text books reveals that they remain at a great extend ethnocentric. Indicative is the civics textbook, used for the sixth grade of the elementary school, which highlights the Greek origins of the people of Cyprus. However it slightly poses questions on how "Greeks and Turks of Cyprus" can cooperate in order to live harmoniously on the island.[189]

Regarding the Cyprus Anthology for the children of primary school now, it dedicates a large part on poems and texts about the Turkish Invasion and the occupied land in the north. Some of the texts keep constructing negative stereotyping vis-à-vis the Turks by exploiting images of war such as "[…] The Turkish Invaders loot, torture, kill. The following short story tells the story of

[188] Circular of the Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture (August 27, 2008), 3-4 available at http://www.schools.ac.cy (assessed June 2, 2012).
[189] Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture, [*Ginomai Kalos Politis* (*I Become a Good citizen*)] (Nicosia: Department of Primary Education, Program Development Service, 2011), 46.

an old man losing his geriatric who was killed by the Turks because she had no money or jewels to give them […]. [190]

However, there are short stories that do not demonize the "Other" and on the contrary they talk about genuine humane relations, such as "[…] She stands at the point […] where love and friendship is above wars and races, where man stands above hatred and people. Eleni was mature now. She saw friendship clashing the hatred, she saw love growing man. Kamil was not a Turk for Eleni anymore. Kamil is a human being. As long as people like Kamil exist on this earth, friendship and love will survive […]."[191]

Thus, se wee that the efforts to promote coexistence are in contradiction with the content of the textbooks used at schools today. These schoolbooks consist of a reprint of those firstly published in the 1990s without any alterations that would orient children towards the humanization of the Turks and the desire for coexistence.

Nevertheless, despite the growing recognition that education for peaceful co existence can consist of a way to promote non-violence, the field has been long marginalized by mainstream education authorities,[192] within schools such as headmasters and teachers.

In spite of the instructions on the 'do-able' activities and 'use-able' material within the classroom and outside, most of the teachers expressed their strong disagreement with the

[190] Charis Anastasiades, [" I Gidostani" ("The Goat Ranch")], in Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture, [*Kypriako Anthologio gia ta Paidia tou dimotikou* (*Cyprus Anthology for the children of Primary School*)] (Nicosia: Department of Primary Education, Program Development Service, 2011), 23.
[191] Nitsa Anastasiou, [("O Gyrismos") ("The Return"], in *Cyprus Anthology* (Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture, Nicosia, 1981), 29.
[192] John P. Synott, "Peace Education as an Educational Paradigm: Review of Changing Field Using an Old Measure," *Journal of Peace Education* 2, no. 1 (2005): 4.

initiative while others said that they didn't have any help on how to implement these things simply because they have no knowledge about the Turkish Cypriots. Hence, what should it be done in order to facilitate the program and help teachers realize that co existence has become an imperative need for Cyprus?

Peace education that promotes reconciliation

Building empathy and reconciliation requires imagery and narratives that would be quite different than those which fortified the traumas of the past. It is important to deepen awareness and criticality in children about how trauma stories can be used to build fear, hate and mistrust,[193] and establish a black and white understanding worldview. In the process of building empathy and understanding it is helpful to spot those narratives that have been so far used for the demonization of the "Other" and replace them with those that make the "Other" look friendly, similar to "us" and that bring out the humanistic side of the *altera pars*. Perhaps, the complete replacement of this imagery would not be advisable as there is the danger of replacing the negative stereotypes with positive ones. Narration however, should be done very carefully along the lines of reciprocity I would say, that would emphasize on that mistakes were done by both communities and that the same pain of lost homeland and missing persons was experienced by both sides. At the same time, it should be understood that each other's traumatic experiences consist of real events which were used for the demonization of the "Other" and thus, since they were developed as such can be transformed and explained in a different way.

[193] Zembylas, "Trauma," 214.

Lederach, defines reconciliation as follows: "[…] a social space, a point of encounter […] between the open expression of the faithful past, on the one hand, and the search of articulation of a long-term interdependent future, on the other hand."[194] He then emphasizes the role relationships play in the process of reconciliation:

> *"The relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long term solution […] Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups' affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship."*[195]

Contact and social interaction therefore, that can lead to formation of relationships, can help people understand each other, meet their sensitivities and needs and engage themselves in a humanization process of the "Other". If notions of hostility, hatred, abhorrence and anger are to be altered, then people should come together, speak of their traumatic experiences so that both see things from the other's perspective, and show empathy for one another. For example, the division of the island, being refugees, having lost beloved ones can be explained by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots so that one experiences the conflict with the other's eyes. Halpern explains that empathy is different than sympathy, as the latter is about experiencing shared emotions with another person, while the former involves imagining and seeking to understand the perspective of another person.[196] In other words, when a person shows empathy for

[194] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in divided societies* (Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 29.
[195] *Ibid.*, 26.
[196] Zembylas, "Trauma," 215 quoting Jodi Halpern, *From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

somebody else, it means that considerable effort is being made in order to understand what this person is facing.

In addition, once these people come together it can be taken as a step towards co existence, or at least desire for it. Despite the fact that the meeting might end with no understanding or empathy towards one another, this very first encounter can consist of a component that something starts to change. Bar-Tal indicated that peaceful coexistence does not necessarily mean reconciliation, notion that includes deeper and longer psychological work that fundamentally transforms attitudes between the sides in long-term dispute. Within this context, peaceful co existence is an intermediate step that is easier to attain and is a necessary phase in reaching the final goal of reconciliation.[197] Coming together and getting to meet each other is an imperative need therefore in Cyprus. As said again, meetings can be arranged at commonly used places, so that teachers and students from both sides can attend.

Halpern and Weinstein suggest that empathy consists of three main qualities that help the attainment of reconciliation. First it entails the seeking of individual perspective of another person rather than generalizing or stereotyping. Second, empathy involves being genuinely curious about the other's perspectives. In contrast, war involves closing one's mind towards the other's experiences, and presuming that one can already predict the other's behavior. Third, empathy involves emotional as well as cognitive openness, and tolerating the ambivalence this might arouse. Of course, the will to listen to the other's traumas and experiences does not necessarily mean identifying or agreeing with them. Rather empathy involves the ability to

[197] Bal-Tal, "Nature, Rationale and Effectiveness," 269.

criticize, see the other's experiences in similar ways of the self's own side and re-establish one's own understandings and views about the Cyprus issue in our case.

At this point, I would like to propose the engagement of people in this process who have known the "Others", perhaps lived with them for a while and speak their language, for the training of both teachers and students. In this way, people will get to know the "Others", their culture, their language, learn about the commonalities and differences the two communities have, get to ask things about them, perhaps meet them, and finally begin to see the Cyprus issue outside the small box that they have been locked up for years. This way will lead them, some of them at least, agitate their worlds and everything they know so that they will finally be able to facilitate and support education for co existence.

As we have seen above, these very first steps to approach the "Other" can be considered as a step towards peaceful co existence or at least desire for it. The objective is also associated with terms such as "mutual respect" and "collaboration", yet excludes references to significant notions as "forgiveness", "apology", "justice" or "individual healing",[198] which would perhaps prove valuable for the process. As a matter of fact, notions like these mentioned, can smooth the process, as swimming in deep water from the beginning can lead to the drowning of the apprentice.

Moreover, if this process could be supported by the wider society as well, then it would be more than beneficial, but as in democratic states there is no centralized control over channels, the press or several organizations, no one can be forced to proceed with such initiatives. On the

[198] Elizabeth Cole, "Introduction: Reconciliation and History Education," in *Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation* ed. Elizabeth Cole (Lanham L.D: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 1.

contrary, some of the communication channels are able to present things in their own perspectives, formulate their own ideas and present them in ways that reinforce their views and ideologies.

Additionally, these efforts of co existence between conflict ridden communities usually begin with a small number of people, a minority we would say, that is marginalized by the mainstream ideologies. In Cyprus as we have seen, such initiatives are interpreted as efforts to extinct the national identity and even betrayal as it includes communication and the development of relationships with the "enemy". Thus, the followers of the mainstream ideologies do their best for the process to be hampered.

Last but not least, Beckerman and Maoz suggest alternative ways that can be used in education for co existence. Particularly, they point out that co existence education can be better achieved if emphasis on separate identity and culture is somewhat relaxed.[199] According to them, strengthening of the national identity which includes notions of otherness and collective memory, cannot lead to reconciliation. Thus, educators should either find alternative ways of connection with the "Others" or emphasize on a third dimension that opposes the nationalistic sentiment, collective memory and creates possibilities of re-imagining identity. An important way that pushes such connections is to avoid becoming enclosed in past identities that have been historically associated with nationalism. Struggle to invent a democratic citizenship that critically reconsiders past feelings of belonging would be more appropriate.[200]

[199] Zvi Bekerman and Ifat Maoz, "Troubles with Identity: Obstacles to Co Existence Education in Conflict Ridden Societies," *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research* 5, no. 4 (2005): 349.
[200] Zembylas, "Trauma," 217.

Finally, a powerful pedagogical strategy that can be used in education for co existence and curricula pedagogies is what Zembylas calls *critical emotional literary*.[201] Critical emotional literacy refers to the ability to question deep embedded beliefs and emotions. In other words in this strategy an individual steps outside of the small box he or she has been taught to live in and think critically and how this individual has been taught to see things (or not to see them). Managing to implement this rather difficult strategy will mean that students will realize the political manipulation of the traumas of their community, how these traumatic experiences were used and that traumas of the other community were simply never mentioned. Critical emotional literacy also entails creating spaces for epistemological and emotional problematisations of individual and collective emotions, collective historical memories, and one's sense of self, and encourages an atmosphere of critical respect for difference and inquiry into the nature and implications of the politics of trauma.[202]

The strategies discussed above, if implemented, can facilitate the peace efforts by deconstructing the system of the entrenched trauma narratives and teach students and teachers to view the conflict from a different perspective. The policies of demonizing the Other will inevitably lead to further alienation and division of the communities.

In this regards therefore, peace education strategies and pedagogies must be designed and put forth, in order to help both children and teachers criticize so far taken for granted assumptions and at the same time lead people who lived the trauma or grew up in its consequences to work through their feelings. Meeting Turkish Cypriots that lived the same difficulties might prove to

[201] *Ibid*.
[202] *Ibid*.

be quite effective. Certainly, further research regarding ways to bring people closer to each other should be done.

Conclusions

The aim of this thesis has been the examination of the Greek Cypriot educational system since 1960, and through its goals and representations vis-à-vis the "Other", find out whether there was ever any potential for promoting co existence and being able to live with the Turkish Cypriot community.

In the first chapter we primarily provided some theoretical framework on notions of identity and the sense of the need to belong somewhere. National identity and its types were examined in order to be able to proceed with the analysis of the Greek Cypriot identity and its views on the other community. A "local color" was added to these theories so that Greek Cypriots' views and reactions are understood better. Putting the literature review in juxtaposition to the Greek Cypriot identity, we deduce that two main types of identities prevail; the national and the civic. Those who have espoused the former seem to be less tolerant towards the Turks while the supporters of the latter seem to show a kind of empathy towards them and seem to be more ready if not to coexist, then surely to meet and learn the "others".

We then proceeded to examine European Identity and whether such a notion is under construction and if it is, what is the impact it has on pupils. We infer that such an identity has not yet been well embedded in people's minds, and in the few cases it does, it co exists with the national one. Important is that in the cases that such an identity exists, pupils seem to feel less prejudice against the Turks. The less powerful their Greek identity gets, the more tolerant they become with the Turks.

Chapter two, deals with the role of education in building national identity. We saw that the intensive emphasis on the unbreakable continuity of the nation and its idealization in contrast to the demonization of "others" and especially the Turks, can easily construct well embedded national identities. This is reinforced by the use of textbooks, narrations of past traumas and collective memory as in the case of *Den Ksehno kai Agonizomai* course taught in primary schools. We then adduced information on how Greek Cypriots understand themselves and how they perceive the "other".

Chapter three gave us detailed information on how education and its goals were formed all these years. We saw that Turkish Cypriots had never had a place among Greek Cypriot education, primarily due to the separate systems and then because Greek Cypriots had up until 1974 been busy with the implementation of the cultural *enosis*, if not with the political one. After 1974, when ideologies were reconstructed and goals were altered, education finally decides to promote sentiments of love for the country and the Turkish Cypriot compatriots in the realm of the rise of Cypriotism and reunification of Cyprus. Unfortunately, not only these reforms occurred quite late, but the Minister putting these reforms in place was blamed by some for marginalizing the Greek Christian Ideals, fact that resulted in a behind of the scenes sidelining of him.

Only when in 2004 the formation of the ad-hoc committee for the evaluation of education and its orientations was established wind of change blowed away. Yet, the results of the committee and its propositions were only put forth in 2008. New analytical programs were issued and the new goals aiming the advancement of peaceful co existence were circulated to all primary and

secondary schools. However, the currently used school textbooks have not been amended, and if there is to be an orientation towards coexistence, then the content and the orientations of these textbooks should certainly be different.

Taken together, by what we have examined It appears that despite the positive reactions when it comes to reconciliation and solution of the Cyprus issue, these were for a long time restricted on a rhetoric level only. When it comes to action, ideological, emotional and practical difficulties consist of insurmountable barriers to the implementation of the process. Therefore, in order to ensure the commitment for promoting the program by the teachers, important measures need to be taken. Zembylas, suggests that action should be done on a political and on a psychological level; on a political level, teachers seem to be in need of a widely accepted discourse on these issues, while on the psychological level, well-designed efforts could work the handling of such sensitive issues around the promotion of peaceful co existence.[203]

However, it seems that Greek Cypriot teachers feel “blocked”, “pushed”, “not understood” and “not listened to” in the whole process and are rather unprepared for participating in such a program. The sensitive, painful and even tabooed issues that the circular touched upon caused the blockage of the process in many cases. For these reasons the initiative was seen as inappropriate and that it is not a collective effort that takes into account all dominant Cypriot views.

[203] Zembylas et al., “Promoting Peaceful Coexistence,” 340.

Therefore, the last chapter consisted of a both personal and based on the literature review proposal in the realm of conflict resolution. Surely, this thesis is not enough for the solution of the issue but it can at least provide food for thought for both communities.

Extremely important is the implementation of such initiatives by the Turkish Cypriot Community as well. The implementation of such an objective within the Turkish Cypriot Community will firstly enable people to see the conflict from the other's' perspective, and secondly it will increase the interest for more support in the Greek Cypriot community.

Bi-communal think tanks, designed by non-governmental organizations perhaps, can be developed with the prospect to contribute towards a creative and constructive social debate for a long-term sustainable future by helping to bridge the existing gap between the two Ministries and the general public. These think tank groups can conduct further academic research on the fears of teachers and implement seminars for their decrease. If teachers are willing to promote the initiative then half of the work is done!

The initiative should have the support of all governments at each given time. If every time the party on power changes the initiative and this is marginalized or not implemented at all, then this place cannot hope for a better future in terms of peaceful coexistence for its people. Quoting Shelley's words "If winter comes, can spring be far behind?"

Last but not least, further research on the educational system of both communities in parallel with the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey could be done in order for the about-faces and if these have an impact on education to be noted. Since most of the school textbooks come from Greece for the Greek Cypriots and from Turkey for the Turkish Cypriots, education and its

goals can be examined in the broader context of the Greek-Turkish relations. In this way, we will get to see Greece and Turkey's reactions on education (particularly on the Cyprus issue) after important turning points occur and whether these arise in a reciprocal framework or not.

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