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CONSERVATIVE HABITUS AND MIGRATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on conservatism and migration phenomena in the Turkish context through Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, field, and capital. We conceptualize conservatism as the identity-based source of practices and thoughts of the current dominant social group of Turkey while we refer to the Syrian migrants' influx to Turkey as the migration phenomenon. Syrian migrants came to Turkey thanks to the open-door policies of the conservative sovereignty, obtained some rights in 2014 and 2016, accommodated in the neighborhoods that are known as conservative social spaces, and selectively incorporated through an ethnoreligious approach. As of 2019, three events indicated a transformation in the reception policies of Syrian migrants. Firstly, conservative social groups started to associate the Syrian migration phenomenon with the deteriorated economic situation, and this resulted in the Turkish governments' loss of İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Following this, the Interior Ministry banned the entry of Syrian migrants to İstanbul while started to send away those who already resided in the city. Secondly, the repatriation discourse of Syrian migrants was embraced by the conservative social groups during and after the Turkish Armed Forces' third operation to northern Syria in 2019. Lastly, following the Idlib crisis in 2020, Turkish government opened the western borders of the country for migrants to move to Europe which, again, was embraced by the conservative social groups. These incidents made us scrutinize the reasons for the embracement of conservatives to evacuation strategies of Syrian migrants considering their relatively welcoming attitudes towards them. Hence, we asked how this transformation in reception policies impacted the relations of conservative social groups and Syrian migrants and why conservatives failed to incorporate Syrian migrants who reside in their social spaces. We focused on the Fatih district of İstanbul to gather empirical data with a qualitative field study design and came up with four intertwined reasons of exclusion. One reason is the density of Syrian migrants and the fallouts of this situation which made migrants an important social force in terms of obtaining enough social capital to compete with inhabitants' networks. The second reason is the protracted stay of migrants in the conservative social space which made migrants become settled populations which resulted in contestation among

social groups in their practices of daily life. A further reason is the deterioration of the unifying impact of the ethnoreligious bridges between social groups which were replaced with the construction of symbolic capital that made to emphasize the differences. The final reason is the macro transformation in political sphere that has started to engage with Syria-related issues through the security lenses which provided a top-down legitimization to the exclusion attempts in the social space. This study is an attempt to contribute to the works of literature on conservatism and migration in the context of Turkey. The dynamics of conflict and competition among the migrants and inhabitants of the conservative social space is an emerging issue. Hence, this study focuses on that aspect of conservative social space that stayed under the shadow of cultural intimacy-based analyses up to now.

Keywords: Migration, Conservatism, Fatih, Pierre Bourdieu, Social space and Habitus

ÖZET

Bu çalışma muhafazakarlık ve göç olgularına Pierre Bourdieu'nun habitus, alan ve sermaye kavramlarıyla birlikte odaklanıyor. Muhafazakarlığı Türkiye'nin mevcut baskın sosyal grubunun kimlik temelli uygulama ve düşüncelerinin kaynağı olarak kavramsallaştırırken, göç olgusuna Suriyeli göçmenler özelinde atıfta bulunuyoruz. Suriyeli göçmenler Türkiye'ye açık kapı politikaları vesilesiyle geldiler, 2014 ve 2016 yılında bazı haklar elde ettiler, muhafazakar sosyal alanlar olarak bilinen yerlerde ikamet ettiler ve etnik ve dini nosyonları bir arada barındıran seçici bir yaklaşımla topluluklarla bütünleştirilmeye çalışıldılar. 2019 yılı itibarıyla üç olay bize Suriyeli göçmenlerin karşılanma politikalarında dönüşüm yaşandığını gösterdi. İlk olarak, muhafazakar sosyal gruplar göç olgusunu bozulan ekonomik durumla ilişkilendirmeye başladılar ve bu durum 2019 yerel seçimlerinde Türk hükümetinin İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi'ni kaybetmesinde önemli bir rol oynadı. Bunun üzerine İçişleri Bakanlığı, Suriyeli göçmenlerin İstanbul'a girişini yasaklarken, şehirde halihazırda ikamet edenleri de başka yerlere göndermeye başladı. İkinci olarak, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin 2019'da Suriye'nin kuzeyine düzenlediği üçüncü askeri hareket sırasında ortaya atılan geri gönderme söylemi muhafazakar gruplar tarafından sahiplenildi. Son olarak, 2020'deki İdlib krizi sırasında, hükümet ülkenin batı sınırlarını göçmenlerin Avrupa'ya serbest geçişi için açtı ve bu süreç muhafazakar gruplar tarafından desteklenip benimsendi. Muhafazakarların Türkiye'deki sosyal gruplar arasında Suriyeli göçmenlere göreceli olarak daha pozitif baktıkları düşünüldüğünde bu olaylar bizi muhafazakarların Suriyeli göçmenlerin tahliyelerini desteklemelerindeki sebepleri araştırmaya itti. Bu doğrultuda, kabul politikalarındaki dönüşümün muhafazakar sosyal gruplar ile Suriyeli göçmenlerin ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediğini ve muhafazakarların kendi sosyal alanlarında ikamet eden Suriyeli göçmenleri neden bünyelerine dahil edemedikleri üzerine sorular sorduk. Bu bağlamda nitel bir saha çalışması tasarımı ile ampirik veriler toplamak için İstanbul'un Fatih ilçesine odaklandık ve burada iç içe geçmiş dört dışlama sebebi bulduk. Birinci sebep, göçmenlerin ilçedeki yüksek nüfus yoğunluklarının sonuçlarıyla ilgiliydi. Buna göre, göçmenler süreç içerisinde yerellerle rekabet edecek düzeyde sosyal ağlar oluşturmuşlardı bu durum göçmenleri ilçede önemli bir sosyal güç haline getirmişti. Sonuçta ortaya çıkan rekabet, dışlama pratiklerini desteklemişti. Göçmenlerin ilçede uzun süreli ikamet etmeleri dışlamanın ikinci sebebiydi. Yerel sosyal gruplar tarafından

göçmenler artık yerleşik nüfus olarak algılanıyordu ve bu durumda gruplar arasında dışlayıcı kapanma ön plana çıkıyordu. Üçüncü sebep ise göçün ilk yıllarında ortaya atılan etnik ve dini temelli birleştirici düşüncelerin ilçedeki etkisinin zayıflamasıydı. Etnik, dinsel ve günlük hayat pratikleri bağlamında inşa edilen farklılıkları vurgulayan sembolik sermayeler göçmen/yerel ilişkilerinde daha belirleyici hale gelmişti. Son olarak, Suriye iç savaşı konusunda yaşanan makro dönüşüm konuyla ilgili bütün meseleleri güvenlik perspektifinden ele almaya tepeden inmece bir meşruiyet sağladı. Bu durum ilçede yerellerin göçmenlerle olan ilişkilerinin ana belirleyicilerinden biri haline geldi. Muhafakar mahallede göçmenlerle yereller arasındaki çatışma ve rekabet süreçleri bugüne kadar kültürel yakınlık temelli analizlerin gölgesinde kalmıştı. Bu bağlamda bu araştırma göç ve muhafazakarlık literatürlerine katkıda bulunuyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Muhafazakarlık, Fatih, Pierre Bourdieu, Kent Sosyal Alanı ve Habitus

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

The research question of this thesis is why conservative habitus failed to incorporate Syrian migrants who have migrated to Turkey as of 2011 as a result of a multilateral insurgency in Syria that has started with the Arab Spring movements of 2011. This thesis is a case study that focuses on Fatih district of İstanbul and discusses empirical data that gathered by a qualitative design which is based on semi-structured interviews. According to our findings, conservative habitus failed to incorporate Syrian migrants particularly in the district of Fatih because of four intertwined reasons. Firstly, the population of Syrian migrants in some neighbors of the district has become equivalent to the settled population. Secondly, the Syrian migrants have turned into a settled population because of their protracted stay in the district and in this period, they have increased their economic and cultural capital. Thirdly, related to the protracted stay of Syrian migrants, the determinants that have created intimacy between the Syrian migrants and settled populations of the district in terms of their identities, have failed to sustain its impact. Fourthly, the course of events in Syria deteriorated for the Turkish government which led to its direct military interventions which resulted in the securitization of political processes regarding Syria at the level of government. The reflection of this securitization from the above mentality regarding Syria has paved the way for inhabitants of the district to perceive the Syrian migrants through a securitization perspective which resulted in the Syrian migrants' exclusion.

The insurgency in Syria has turned into a full-scale civil war that paved the way for more than 6 million displacements among pre-war Syrian population of 21 million which took refuge in neighboring countries of Syria such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey in addition to the numerous internal displacements whose whereabouts have been changing because of the continuous power struggle among states as well as proxy groups who have been operating in Syria.

Turkey has been the country that is hosting the highest number of Syrian migrants in the world from the year of 2014. There have been several reasons of this density. Firstly, two countries have about 909 kilometers border which has opened way to the influx

from the northern parts of Syria to Turkey. Secondly, Turkish government has actively interfered the course of events in Syria as of 2011 which led Turkish government to be a one of the prominent actors on the ground that has impacted back by the shifting course of events in Syria especially regarding the flow of migrants among its borders with Syria.

Currently, the number of Syrian migrants in Turkey is 3.7 million (DGMM, 2020). As of 2013, most of the Syrian migrants have moved to the urban spheres of the country. As a result, İstanbul has become the place with the highest number of Syrian migrants in Turkey with the number of approximately 550.000 people (IOM Turkey, 2019). If we consider the total population of İstanbul which is currently around 16 million, Syrian migrants have become an important social group in terms of their population size. Turkish government has not come up with any regulation to specify where Syrian migrants will live in İstanbul. In addition, most of the necessary needs of Syrian migrants left to the local municipalities' efforts which have co-opted with civil society organizations as well as the private sector without a legal framework.

This situation paved the way for Syrian migrants to make their accommodation choices by themselves in light of identity as well as class-related dimensions which eventually led to the density of Syrian migrant population varies in terms of districts of İstanbul. In that regard, the districts which are known with their conservative characteristics such as Fatih, Başakşehir, Sultangazi and Sultanbeyli became the main destinations of most of the Syrian migrants, especially those who came from Aleppo and Damascus provinces of Syria. In this regard, Fatih district has become a significant case to study Syrian migration phenomenon because it hosts approximately 182.000 migrants of which Syrian migrants have constituted 80 percent of this total number (IOM Turkey, 2019). If we consider that the total population of Fatih district is about 436.000 people, the migrant population constitutes about 41 percent of the total population which, therefore, makes Fatih district a significant case to study Syrian migration phenomenon as well as the repercussions of migrant and inhabitant encounters.

Syrian migration phenomenon is a dialectical issue where sociological dimensions intertwine with political dimensions. In that regard, what happens in Syria affects the Turkish government's approach to Syria and the relations between Syrian migrants and

the settled populations in Turkey. Therefore, this situation paves the way for the researcher to incorporate distinct units of analysis in his/her study. However, this study does not take for granted the unit of analysis of state with its ontological understanding where bureaucratic as well as political bodies embody a structure. Rather, it focuses on the state in line with Bop Jessop's (2008) configuration that the state is controlled by a certain social group who mobilizes strategies for reinforcing the sovereignty of the social group whose characteristics impact the state through the certain period when that particular social group obtains the material and ideational capabilities of state. Following, this study also does not take for granted the unit of analysis of society with monolithic understanding in light of a certain characteristic such as "Turkish society". Rather, it focuses on the ideational and material characteristics of a certain social group in the context of Turkey whose values, ideas and strategies turn into policies at the state level. Conservatism is the concept that crosscuts these two distinct units of analysis and provides an opportunity for dialectical analysis of the dialectical issue which is Syrian migration phenomenon. Therefore, this paper scrutinizes the conservative social groups' approach towards the migration phenomenon.

Turkish government has actively involved in the course of events in Syria from the beginning of the insurgency. Firstly, it became part of diplomatic efforts to convince the Syrian government to come up with a constitution which involves reforms that give concessions to certain opposition movements. Later, as a reaction to the refusal of Syrian government, Turkish government became part of anti-Syrian government coalitions and allied with the United States and Gulf countries of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to unite certain opposition groups and provide them assistance, training and military equipment. In this context, southern parts of Turkey became the hub of supported opposition movements in where they mobilized political and military efforts to take the place of Syrian government. However, the expectations of sudden fall of Syrian government failed as a result of the unexpected resiliency that Syrian government has shown with the involvement of pro-Syrian government states as well as proxy groups into the equation.

The number of Syrian migrants in Turkey was around 100.000 in 2012. Turkish government placed them in camps in southern districts of the country (Erdoğan, 2019).

However, as of 2013, the density of flow of Syrian migrants to Turkey increased dramatically. As a result, Turkish government liberated Syrian migrants from the camps, and they mostly dispersed to the urban areas of the country for seeking a better life. In this process, Turkish government put pressure on its allies and international community for the creation of a safe zone in the Aleppo province of Syria, where was the central province in terms of economy and culture in pre-war Syria, to control the migration flow towards the north by settling down internally displaced Syrian people around Aleppo province and create a safe haven for the supported opposition groups.

However, the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and its rapid advancements towards the ungoverned eastern and northern parts of Syria shifted international community's attention from the Syrian government towards the rising threat of ISIS because this phenomenon has not only created geopolitical challenges but also has impacted domestic affairs of the states by rejuvenating civilizational tensions. As of 2014, therefore, not only Syrian migrants but also their economic capital flowed to Turkey because ISIS control of the northern and eastern parts of Syria result in de-industrialization through diminishing economic activities of the people and their means of survival. In this regard, anti-ISIS coalitions turned the insurgency in Syria into a full-scale war that contained several actors including states, proxies and mercenaries. This situation also fragmented Turkish government and its allies' supported opposition movements in Syria and thus created a more complicated environment in terms of migration and political equation in Syria which eventually resulted in Turkey's championship in terms of the numbers of Syrian migrants in the country as of 2014. Moreover, as of that year, migration from Syria has become an international migration phenomenon because Syrian migrants have started to reach beyond the border states of Syria to European continent and elsewhere.

This complexity in Syria diminished the expectations of the sudden return of Syrian migrants in Turkey. Therefore, Turkish government came up with regulations that focused on the Syrian migrants' status in Turkey. Accordingly, in 2013 and 2014, two laws were passed in the Turkish Parliament, namely the Law of Foreigners and International Protection and the Law of Temporary Protection (İçduygu, 2019). These laws have provided several rights particularly to the Syrian migrants in Turkey such as

the right to stay in the country and the rights to utilize state services of education and healthcare. More importantly, these developments made Syrian migrants be able to obtain residence permits which eventually made them important social groups in urban areas in light of their population and they have started to become part of socio-economic processes which have reinforced the prospects of their permanency. In that regard, the Syrian migration issue, which approached by the Turkish government and its constituencies through an ethno-religious humanitarian perspective that compensated rights-based approaches of the international refugee regime especially in its initial years, became a sociological issue whose repercussions started to impact the political sphere as well as relations and cleavages among the distinct social groups of Turkey.

Turkish government has welcomed Syrian migrants in terms of their identity. Therefore, Syrian migrants in Turkey are mostly based on the provinces of Aleppo and to some extent Damascus; thus, in that regard, one should contextualize this homogeneity of Syrian migrants and its repercussions in the context of Turkish government and its constituencies' identity-based preferences and strategies.¹ In that regard, the social groups who oppose the sovereignty of conservatives firstly claimed that the existence of Syrian migrants in Turkey is detrimental to the national cohesion of Turkey because of their concerns based on demographic change. Following, the deterioration of Turkish economy that has started as of 2013, their opposition to the existence of Syrian migrants in Turkey shifted towards the emphasis of Turkish peoples' concerns about their precarious economic situations where they argued Syrian migrants receive privileged status in terms of social benefits at the expense of the benefits of the citizens of Turkey. In this respect, Syrian migration phenomenon has started to become one of the subject of election agenda starting from the 2015 general elections that have asserted by the opposition circles through the incorporation of ethnic as well as economic concerns.

¹ While Turkish government has come up with reception policies in terms of the identity of the Syrian migrants, it is argued that it has taken into account class-based characteristics of the Syrian migrants such as economic and cultural capitals in terms of their qualifications when providing them Turkish citizenship (Akçapar and Şimşek, 2018).

However, as of 2017, the political economic conditions in Turkey have further deteriorated and Syrian migration phenomenon has become the crosscutting concern of distinct social groups of Turkey (Erdoğan, 2017; 2018; 2019). In addition, the war in Syria turned into a deadlock where pro-Syrian government forces took control of approximately 70 percent of the Syrian territory as of 2017 while former allies of Turkish government allied with Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces to topple ISIS forces located around northern and eastern parts of Syria. As a result, Turkish government lost its spheres of influence in northern Syria where Turkish-backed opposition groups have weakened as a result of the power struggle among the abovementioned actors which paved way for Turkish government to lose its hopes on a safe zone in northern Syria to repatriate the Syrian migrants in Turkey. Following, starting from 2016, Turkish government has directly intervened in Syria with four consecutive military operations of Turkish Armed Forces which have become the impetus of the shift that turned open-door reception policies to a mentality that approaches any process regarding Syria with securitization and instrumentalization.

In that respect, the Syrian migrants inside Turkey started to be perceived as economic and political burden to the country by not only the opposition circles but also the constituencies of the Turkish government. Especially on the eve of 2019 local elections, the density of the Syrian migrants in urban areas became a hot topic that complained by the conservative social groups. Turkish government put forward several exclusionary implementations on Syrian migrants and it restricted their free movement in the country after the 2019 local elections where it is argued that the complaints of Syrian migrants were among one of the major reasons for conservative sovereignty to lose its stronghold which is İstanbul.

The temper of conservative social groups regarding the Syrian migration phenomenon has exacerbated especially after the EU started to implement externalization policies for Syrian migrants who have been seeking to reach the European continent with illegal routes from Turkey. Especially after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, the west embodied as the “ultimate other” who is seeking to diminish the conservative sovereignty in Turkey. In this regard, conservatives, who once saw the existence of Syrian migrants in Turkey as their sovereignty’s moral and material superiority and the reflection of its high

capability to absorb people in need, began to perceive the existence of Syrian migrants as a burden that imposed on them by the “West”. This mentality has been further exacerbated as a result of the course of events in Syria. In 2019, pro-Syrian government forces have started to attack İdlib province of northern Syria where has left the only opposition stronghold after the fall of Aleppo in 2016. Turkish government told the international community that if İdlib falls, it will direct the migration flow to Europe by ensuring its free passage through its borders. Even though İdlib province has not fallen as of 2020, promotion of repatriation of Syrian migrants from Turkey to northern Syria, as well as European continent and elsewhere, exacerbated as a result of two-sided exclusion of Syrian migrants by both the Turkish government and its constituencies in urban areas of İstanbul as a result of abovementioned processes.

Gary King and his colleagues (1994) argue that competent research must obtain two characteristics. One is that the subject of the research must be important in the real world and the other is that research must contribute to the literature that deals with that subject. For the former criteria, because of the density of their population as well as their increasing impact on the debates of political and economic spheres of Turkey, Syrian migration phenomenon is a subject that brings out hundreds of burning issues related to institutional arrangements, sociological issues, international relations, geopolitics and power struggle of states as well as non-state actors in Syria and Turkey in particular and in the Middle East region as well as in European continent in general. For the latter criteria, the scholarly community has mostly dealt with Syrian migration phenomenon with institutional frameworks that have reduced this multidimensional issue to a subject of institutional arrangements on the migration regime as well as related law enforcement. On the other hand, this study focuses on this issue through the lenses of recent sovereign social group in the field of the Fatih district of İstanbul by incorporating the units of analysis of social groups and state. Moreover, this study puts forward a theoretical framework inspired by the prominent sociologist Pierre Bourdieu that has not been studied on this subject matter before.

After this introductory chapter, I move to discuss the methodology of the study in chapter two. Then, I move to discuss the theoretical framework and provide a vast literature review section in chapter three. In the fourth chapter, I move to the empirical

side of the study where I discuss the formation of the conservative habitus in the Fatih district and put forward the reasons why conservative social groups in that field failed to incorporate Syrian migrants. Consequently, I finish the discussion with the conclusion in chapter five.

CHAPTER 2 – METHODOLOGY

My research question is why conservative people in Istanbul have failed to incorporate Syrian immigrants. This research primarily uses a qualitative field work design in order to gather empirical data. King and Powell (2008), Creswell (2013), Mahoney and Goertz (2006) agree on that if there is an enough knowledge about a subject-matter, it is better to conduct quantitative research because it allows researcher to obtain inferences which are relatively more scientific and systematic than the qualitative field work setting. However, if there is not enough knowledge in the literature about a certain subject-matter, the qualitative method may be more appropriate. The subject-matter of this research is an emerging issue which is not yet studied enough to create a preliminary research capacity to quantitative statistical analyses. From this perspective, field research gives an opportunity for perceiving and understanding an unprecedented social phenomenon. In other words, we have an opportunity to focus on a subject with methodological settings which seek to solely reveal dynamics and processes in an explanatory fashion of that particular case. This is also called as idiographic approach. Second, the research focuses its subject-matter through a case which is the Fatih district of Istanbul. Case study is an attempt to understand a case through a comprehensive analysis of the subject. Mario Luis Small (2009) argues that the objective in a case study design is saturation. Through literal replication a similar case is found to determine whether the same mechanisms are in play; through theoretical replication a case different according to theory is found to determine whether the expected difference is found. Furthermore, Gary King and Eleanor Powell (2008) argues that maximizing the empirical data in order to obtain validity and further test the theoretical framework provides maximizing the leverage to a research. This research will take these both perspectives as guidance in accomplishing saturation through maximizing its leverage. Moreover, qualitative design enables researchers to make their research during the event. Conservative sovereignty and Syrian migration are ongoing events; thus, this gives an opportunity for utilizing from this characteristic of qualitative design. Tourangeau et al. (2000) points out four psychological processes about interviewing: comprehension, retrieval, judgment and reporting. For the retrieval, they argue that respondent's perceptions' shape by the indoctrination as well as several exposures that

cause a manipulation on their own opinions and thus shape their answers and thoughts according to the exposure that they are exposed to. Therefore, this methodological design attempts to overcome this difficulty by conducting a qualitative field work which operates during the event so that the respondent's opinions may transmit to empirical process without or minimal manipulation. Likewise, this also potentially improve the validity and reliability of the empirical findings. In addition, qualitative field studies are valuable instruments for to study the encounters in the social spaces. Conservative encounter with the 'other' would be effectively studied with the instruments of qualitative method.

This research uses semi-structured in-depth interviews to obtain empirical data from the field and uses process-tracing method to utilize from the secondary sources related with the subject-matter. We conducted 17 semi-structured in-depth interviews in Fatih district of İstanbul. Likewise, process-tracing method has used in order to associate the discussion to the related context and periodization. The reason as to why in-depth interviews are conducted is that in-depth interviews allow the research to interact with the interviewees in the field and reveal their opinions about the subject-matter. Likewise, this research follows sequential interviewing procedure which are explained by Mario Luis Small (2009). M. Luis Small explains sequential interviewing that is semi-structured and progresses with the number of interviews. Therefore, according to his explanation, the researcher starts with a battery of questionnaire, but that battery improve itself –and changes according to the empirical data that gathered– through the interview processes by gradually updating itself in each interview. This strategy may provide the researcher to obtain inferences from not only analyzing a particular interview but also integrating all interview process in a way to get inferences from them cumulatively as a continuous process.

The units of analysis of the field research is the individuals, or the social agents in Bourdieu's sense, who consist of distinct social groups of the Fatih district particularly the conservatives, who are currently the sovereign social group of the district and Syrian migrants, who are the subordinate social group of the Fatih district. The sampling frame generated with the non-probabilistic sampling methods because this research focuses on a 'particular' group of people in particular locations but not the whole population.

King et al. (1994) argue that random selection is inappropriate for research designs with a small number of cases, instead, they further argue, the researcher should seek to obtain maximum efficiency by selecting a community which capable of represent the rest of the country.

The field research of this study is carried out in Fatih district of Istanbul. The reason for this preference is the density of the Syrian migrant population in Fatih. Fatih district is one of the districts that hosts the highest number of Syrian refugees under temporary protection in Istanbul (IOM Turkey, 2019). Fatih district consists of 57 different neighborhoods, but the population of Syrian migrants is not evenly distributed in every neighborhood of Fatih. For example, the population density of Syrian immigrants in Ali Kuşçu, Molla Gürani, Karagümrük and Akşemsettin neighborhoods is quite high compared to other neighborhoods (IOM Turkey, 2019). In fact, it is seen that the population of Syrian migrants in the Akşemsettin neighborhood has reached a level that is equal to the local population (IOM Turkey, 2019). The main reason for this situation is that migrants accommodate in certain neighborhoods through their social networks and over time they become a settled population in these neighborhoods. For these reasons, the field part of this study is carried out in the abovementioned four neighborhoods of Fatih district. Therefore, it should be known that generalizations to be made in the form of "Syrian migrants in the Fatih district" throughout the study will be made in light of empirical data obtained from these four neighborhoods. Although the Syrian migrants in these four neighborhoods are homogeneous groups in terms of identity, they differ when we consider them from a class perspective. For example, Syrian migrants in the Ali Kuşçu neighborhood are predominantly self-employed tradesmen. In Akşemsettin, on the other hand, entrepreneurs and professionals predominate. When we look at the Syrian migrants in Molla Gürani and Karagümrük, wage workers working in the service sector and textile sector predominate. In addition to this situation, different neighborhoods of Fatih, such as Balat and Ayrvansaray, are included in the study through secondary sources. Throughout the study, the abovementioned class-centered differences will be emphasized at points that are thought to affect the context of the discussion.

In this equation, conducting the research in the mentioned neighbors apply with King et al.'s (1994) perspective. This research generates its sampling frame through the non-probabilistic sampling methods of purposive sampling, snowball sampling and reliance on available subjects. For the purposive sampling, we have reached the respondents through political parties' district headquarters, mosque associations, civil society organizations as well as hometown associations, and enterprises of tradespeople in Fatih district. For the snowball sampling, the research takes into consideration the contacts of the individuals who participated to the in-depth interviews. Consequently, the research uses reliance on available subjects in the social spaces of the neighbors. This sampling method obviously has many limitations. For instance, the sampling frame cannot generalizable to a large meaningful population. However, King and Powell (2008) argues that there is no reason to feel inferior about the lack of representativeness of the study: if the small number of cases are truly important, then they are not representative almost by definition. Also, Small (2009) argues sampling logic is superior when asking descriptive questions about a population; case study logic is probably more effective when asking why and how questions about processes unknown before the start of the study. Nevertheless, with the help of these methodological choices, the research tries to make itself capable of generalizing and representing a meaningful portion of the social groups in the field.

There have been several limitations especially regarding the field research of this study. To begin with, the COVID-19 pandemic has hit the world starting from the end of 2019. In the context of Turkey, the pandemic emerged around March 2020 and first peak regarding COVID-19 cases emerged in April 2020 which led to the closure of the public sphere to a certain extent until 1 June 2020. However, by November 2020, it has been revealed that Turkish government had been hiding the actual numbers regarding the COVID-19 cases in the country. Therefore, Turkey has experienced the second peak regarding the COVID-19 cases and Turkish government has come up with restrictions again around December 2020. These restrictions lasted until the 1 March of 2021. However, the third peak regarding the number of COVID-19 cases emerged around April 2020 which led to approximately 60.000 cases a day. This time, around 26 of April,

Turkish government has introduced full lockdown restrictions for the first time of the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic up until 17 May of 2021.

Because this study initiated by the time of 2020 November, it has been severely affected by the abovementioned restrictions especially in the part of the field research. In April 2021 full lockdown measures interrupted the field research part of this study which started to conduct at the end of May 2021. Moreover, COVID-19 restrictions as well as its tension that reflected upon the people, impacted their social practices and if we consider that this research has purposed to discuss the practices of the social groups in the field, this environment severely impacted the empirical data that gathered from the field in terms of its quantity as well as quality. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has blurred the lines among the concepts of physical distance and social distance in the field. There have been already both physical distance and social distance among the social groups of Fatih in the pre-pandemic era. However COVID-19 pandemic has further legitimized these forms of distances as natural and necessary which eventually further polarized the social groups of Fatih in the form of health precaution.

The second limitation has emerged in the context of the diversity of respondents. The empirical part of this study consists of the data gathered from 17 respondents. However, 14 respondents are inhabitants of the Fatih while only 3 of them are Syrian migrants. In that regard, the Syrian migrants were reluctant to speak and reveal their practices to a foreigner who does not speak Arabic. Therefore, after many attempts to establish a network with Syrian migrants through the snowball method, we have convinced limited numbers of Syrian migrants to semi-structured in-depth interviews. Other than them, however, some refused to be a part of this interview process but expressed their willingness to provide information about the situation. Moreover, the third limitation emerged regarding the gender dimension in which our respondents, both inhabitants and migrants, are male because, especially in the context of Fatih, the women have been invisible in the public sphere and, given the researcher is a middle-aged men, it has become very difficult even to find women to explain the research and ask for a contribution.

The fourth limitation is related to the repercussions of the 2020 İdlib incident which created an anti-migrant environment in the field of Fatih which led Syrian migrants to

perceive the subject matters related to their existence in Turkey with hesitation. Therefore, this conjuncture has created an environment where Syrian migrants started to rely on survival mechanisms especially with the repatriation discourse that started with the Operation Peace Spring military campaign of Turkish government that started in 2019.

CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK and LITERATURE REVIEW

My research question is why conservative habitus failed to incorporate Syrian migrants. In this chapter, I put forward three parts. In the beginning, I discuss Pierre Bourdieu's sociology in general and his epistemology as well as his methodology in particular. Then, I move to discuss Bourdieu's concepts of field, habitus and capital. Consequently, I connect them with my subject-matter through discussing related literature of both conservatism and Syrian migration issue in the context of Turkey. After, I will conclude this chapter with discussing how studying this subject-matter with Bourdieu make sense, then I will point out how my thesis will contribute abovementioned literatures in relation with this theoretical framework.

3.1 Epistemology of Pierre Bourdieu

To begin with, Pierre Bourdieu who was born in 1930 in a southern village of France, Denguin, started his career as a student of philosophy in 1950s. Until his service term in France military in Algeria, he inclined to be an academic of philosophy. However, while serving his term in military, Bourdieu also witnessed the processes of the Algerian societies' transition from a pre-capitalist mode of production to a capitalist mode of production (Schwartz, 2012). This experience has shown to Bourdieu not only the France's colonialist struggle but also the complexities of social structures and has convinced him to go beyond the deterministic explanations and theories regarding to the inquiries in social science. Hence, Bourdieu has changed his direction from having merely theoreticism of philosophy to emphasizing the importance of more empiricism which meant a move from the philosophy of abstractions to the social science concreteness, however, he did not eliminate the contribution of the philosophy approach but he incorporated that to an equation of theoreticism and empiricism (Schwartz, 2012).

In 1950s and 60s the intellectual field in France was dominated by two distinct modes of thinking: structuralism and phenomenology/existentialism. The former has emphasized the importance of objective conditions regarding the explanations of actions of human

beings while the latter emphasized the subjective conditions which rely on the actor's capabilities when facing the structural constraints (Jourdain and Naulin, 2016). Structuralism considers external factors such as culture, societal structure as well as mode of production as the determinants of human condition and that any human struggle without considering these sorts of objective conditions may be irrelevant and useless to consider as a determinant in constituting a perspective. In this context, Marxism can be an example because of its emphasis on the role of economy as a mode of production that is the primary determinant in the human condition and the other determinants are 'others' that are only meaningful when the mode of production instrumentalizes them for the sake of its hegemony. Although Althusser's modification of Marxism through incorporating the cultural sphere a bit more made a significant contribution, he gave the economy the priority of determining the social condition "in the last instance" thus Marxism has sustained a structuralist path in the context of the 1950s and 60s of France (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003).

Swartz (2012) argues that Sartre/Levi-Strauss dichotomy reflects as the personification of the dichotomy of subjectivist and objectivist paradigms in the intellectual sphere of France in those conjunctures. He points out that Sartre, from the point of view of Bourdieu, was the intellectual that had the qualifications of a "prophet" who has written any subject-matter and has felt himself responsible to interfere in any discussion. Again, for Bourdieu, Sartre's position was relying on the subject in giving meaning to social conditions which meant the subject as being "subject" was the primary determinant on the course of events.² On the other hand, Levi-Strauss represented an objectivist "scientist" who approached his subject-matters as objects, in the sense of positivism, which needs to be considered from the point of view of general laws and patterns. Swartz (2012) further

² Bourdieu does not participate in a discussion with Sartre directly. He rather puts forward his argument through a study about French novelist Flaubert. Accordingly, he points out the structural determinants by the time Flaubert started writing. Moreover, he points out the subjective determinants such as the Flaubert's socio-economic situation in addition to an analysis about his cultural, social and symbolic capitals. Eventually, Bourdieu showcases Flaubert's position in the area of literature in his time and this made him to come up with a study that synthesizes a novelist's subjective capabilities with the objective conditions. Sartre, on the other hand, was arguing Flaubert's "genius" qualifications as to coming up with a successful literature (Webb, Schirato and Danaher, 2002).

argues that even though Bourdieu disagreed with both Sartre and Levi-Strauss, he did not refuse the contributions of both. Bourdieu, therefore, has thought neither of them could be completely right or wrong thus he proposed an alternative perspective which accepts some of the merits of Sartre's subjectivity as well as Levi-Strauss's objectivity (Webb, Schirato and Danaher, 2002).

In light of this, Bourdieu has positioned his epistemology against the dichotomies of agent/structure, subjective/objective, interpretivist/positivist, macro/micro, materialist/idealist that were hegemon epistemologies that have operated through binary oppositions in the social sciences. Furthermore, he argued that these dichotomies are politically constructed thus they do not have any base on the science itself. In his understanding, these dichotomies served to the agents who are seeking to protect their places on the "intellectual field" thus their promotion depended on their supporters' places on the field of academia (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

On the other hand, in his book, *Distinction* (1984), Bourdieu criticizes epistemologies of phenomenology, positivism and existentialism by saying that they are "subjectivist" in the sense that they are fond of substantialism. He says substantialism gives more importance to the "ordinary and practical experience" and does not recognize any alternative by taking the reality of subject's experiences for granted (Bourdieu, 1984). He says that three of them abstract the attributions of individuals and groups from the societal and historical contexts. In contrast to that, Bourdieu proposes relational and reflexive approach as an alternative which, according to him, identifies the truth with complex sets of relations that researcher also contributes to it (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu argues that the reality in the societal fields hid with invisible relations which are the apparatuses of reproducing the domination of the sovereigns thus Bourdieu argues that the science, which has a relational method, should construct the cultural and societal relations as geometry takes into account its object through giving meaning to its objects with the existence of the other its objects (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu conceptualizes his position as "constructivist structuralism" in which he argues that it creates a framework to overcome dichotomies and proposes a reflexive agenda to social science endeavors (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). However,

when analyzing cultural practices Bourdieu also puts forward dichotomies such as high/low, distinguished/vulgar, pure/not pure, and aesthetical/practical. Thus, his relational approach requires qualities to exist in relation with its opposite. According to this approach there is always dominant vs. dominated relationship in any field of the society which paves a way, eventually, that Bourdieu tries to displace paradigms that cause the reproduction of epistemological dichotomies while he places dichotomies to social by arguing that those are the essence of the existence of the social fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

Brubaker (2004) discusses the relations of Bourdieu's notions with Marx, Weber and Durkheim. To begin with, as mentioned above, Bourdieu refuses to the separation of the cultural sphere from the economic sphere and he proposes the concept of *field* in order to incorporate these two societal spheres. Likewise, even though Bourdieu takes Marxist concept of capital in explaining his economic capital notion, he disagrees the class perception that derived from Marxism. Bourdieu does not perceive social classes as they are objective things in real life. Instead, he thinks that social classes are constructs thus cannot mobilize as Marxism argues naturally that it needs to be mobilized but not as a result of assumed ontological "classes" such as working class but as a result of strategical social constructions (Brubaker, 2004). For Bourdieu, social class is made up of three contributing factors: economic capital, cultural capital and social capital (Bourdieu, 1995). Thus, he puts forward two additional determinants to Marxist notion of class in addition to the material capabilities to determine social agents' social classes. Accordingly, the sum of these three give the habitus of a certain social agent/s and that reveal the social class of the social agent/s. Moreover, in accordance with the "constructed" narrative of Bourdieu, one can examine classes through an empirical analysis of the tastes of the social agent/s. Hence, while the working class represents the taste for necessity, middle and high classes showcase taste for freedom and selection (Bourdieu, 1995). However, the relations of three separate capitals as well as their consequences as being habitus of certain social agents does not imply that differences regarding to their characteristics pave a way to a mechanic mobilization. In other words, for Bourdieu, social classes cannot be mobilized just because they consisted with the similar social groups. Thus, contrary to "class on paper" approaches, being a class is a

result of a political struggle of mobilization. Accordingly, a social group can be a social class only if it sustains their political struggle and accomplishes a symbolic capital that make them to transform their theoretical existence to a practical social reality. (Bourdieu, 1995)

Furthermore, Brubaker (2004) argues Bourdieu took inspiration from Weber, particularly his work on the political economy of religion, in his studies on political economy of culture. According to Bourdieu, while Weber analyzes the religion with materialistic approach, he does not diminish the symbolic aspect of the religion. Thus, Bourdieu tries to expand this approach of Weber to the subject-matter of religion to the cultural and societal fields. Moreover, Bourdieu also takes inspiration from Weber's charismatic authority when he puts forward the notion of symbolic capital (Arlı, 2007). Accordingly, Weber argued that charismatic authority legitimizes elites' domination by showing that as a natural phenomenon (Arlı, 2007). Bourdieu agrees on that; however, he does not perceive that as an ideal type concept and expands it beyond to other classes and conceptualize it as symbolic capital. Weber's comparison between the prophet, priest, and wizard gives an inspiration to Bourdieu's concept of field (Brubaker, 2004). Accordingly, the prophet, priest, and wizard compete for power and legitimacy in the religious field thus their purpose is to enhance their interests through utilizing from their charismatic authorities and dominate each other. (Arlı, 2007). Bourdieu agrees with this type of conflict and competition however he believes this reasoning cannot be limited only with the field of faith. Hence, according to Bourdieu, this kind of competition exists in all social spaces and fields (Brubaker, 2004). Last but not least, Brubaker (2004) argues that Bourdieu resembles Durkheim in his struggle to reveal the societal behind what is supposed individual behaviors thus he tries to explore the societal behind the most subjective known aspects of agents as Durkheim. This brings us to the Durkheim's suspicion on taking the individuals as the only units of analysis and sample in social inquiries (Brubaker, 2004). Durkheim thought that social inquiries must rupture from the ordinary representations of daily life in order to reach a scientific understanding (Arlı, 2007). In many ways this aspect resembles Bourdieu's "epistemological break" prerequisite for a relational approach and next paragraph will elaborate this in light of the discussion of Bourdieu's epistemological standpoint.

In *The Craft of Sociology* (1991) Bourdieu discusses his epistemological standpoint with his colleagues Chamboredon and Passeron. Bourdieu builds his epistemology on the works of Gaston Bachelard. Bachelard argues that the scientific knowledge is construct and dialectic. Thus, for him scientific knowledge cannot be based on absolute facts and it is a progress of fixing the mistakes of the past and current thoughts (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1991). In this regard, Bachelard proposes a reflexive epistemology (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Up to this point even if this reasoning resembles with Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), it differs from that because Bachelard believes an emerging paradigm does not create a rupture and diminish its predecessor but it does incorporate its predecessor and in this way build a more comprehensive framework (Schwartz, 2012). Dialectical reason, for Bachelard, can reconcile theories that are contradictory through integrating them in a broader framework. (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Thus, the old scientific knowledge does not mean rejected knowledge. Bachelard believes the old knowledge represents the "taken for granted" knowledge that started to be questioned by the emergent paradigm. Thus, this process paves the way for new knowledge that eventually leads what Bachelard calls "epistemological break" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). For Bachelard, immediate changes in the scientific reasoning does contribute to the scientific knowledge more than the cumulative knowledge (Schwartz, 2012). Kuhn's paradigm shift opens a completely new venue for the emergent paradigm by displacing the old paradigm as a result of a similar process that Bachelard depicted (Kuhn, 1962). However, the difference is that for Bachelard the epistemological break gives way to new knowledge, but it does not diminish the existing one rather it reconciles with the new reasoning (Schwartz, 2012). Then, the question arises as to how this way can be opened so that the scientific knowledge would flourish. Bachelard argues that the dialectic reasoning of science works with falsification that is always open to challenges to the method in progress as it makes the science a subject to continuous discussion (Wacquant, 1998). Thus, Bachelard's dialectic provides dynamism to the scientific sphere by refusing to give universality to the current knowledge. In this regard, Bachelard's ways of opening ways for the new scientific knowledge resembles with the Karl Popper's hypothetical deductive reasoning (Sprenger, 2011). However, Bachelard is

suspicious about positivism and empiricism and thinks them as the orthodoxies in the scientific field that have potential of impeding the epistemological breaks. Also, he thinks that daily practical knowledge is also an obstacle to scientific knowledge because it is the impetus for the continuity of unquestioned knowledge to reproduce itself (Schwartz, 2012). Thus, he urges scientific endeavor to be aware of the human mind's inclination to accept the things as it seems and the fallacy of accepting them as rigorous experiences that lead to truth. Bourdieu constructs his social inquiries on this epistemological framework that criticizes both empiricism and positivism (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). In *The Craft of Sociology*, there is an emphasis on the importance of the research process itself, as *modus operandi*, than the knowledge that comes out after the research (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1991). In this regard, Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1991) emphasize that the research is a process that the researcher has an impact on all stages thus the research cannot contribute to the scientific knowledge without a reflexive approach. For this reason, Bourdieu says researcher does not only has to objectify her/his subject-matter but also s/he has to objectify her/his position too (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Consequently, there are three inferences that Bourdieu took from Bachelard regarding to his epistemology: (1) scientific knowledge must perform an epistemological break from both the institutionalized scientific notions that taken for granted and daily practical knowledge, (2) scientific knowledge is a knowledge that is constructed and which should be constructed through using existent batteries of knowledge, (3) the scientific knowledge that has acquired as a result of these stages should be verified through an empirical inquiry (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003; Schwartz, 2012; Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1991).

Wacquant (1998) states that Bourdieu's concepts are not the instruments for him to have a theoretician identity. Rather, he uses concepts and theories to reach scientific knowledge and avoid what he calls "fetishism of theory". That is the reason, for Wacquant, Bourdieu has never written any book for the purpose of explaining his

theories/concepts.³ Hence, Wacquant argues Bourdieu does not consider any theory or concept without the side of empiricism and without a historical context that is constructed through. In this regard, Bourdieu's studies *Distinction* (1984), *Homo Academicus* (1984) and *The Social Structures of Economy* (2005) are the studies that Bourdieu discusses his concepts through empirical studies. For another explanation to this approach, we should revisit Bourdieu's criticisms on positivism. Accordingly, positivism uses concepts in an ideal-type method that creates limitations for the usage of concept and eventually closes them to further contributions that may transform their meanings. Hence this leads to a scientific knowledge that is unquestionable and monolithic. To avoid this, Bourdieu suggests that his concepts can be constructed through distinctive studies as well as in very different contexts.

In the book, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (1992), Bourdieu argues that a theory without empirical research is empty and an empirical research without a theory is blind. He refers the former as the fetishism of theory, while for the latter he thinks that even the most fundamental empirical attempt carries traces of some sort of theoretical framework because he believes that it is theoretical framework that shapes the form of the empirical (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Furthermore, Bourdieu argues that concepts/theories are instruments to arm social scientist in her/his attempt to reveal the dynamics of domination. For him, a theory is important only if it contributes to the process of accomplishing scientific knowledge (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Hence, theory plays a complementary and instrumental role in his *modus operandi*. Furthermore, he proposes an equilibrium between theoricism and empiricism; however, this does not mean that he puts forward a template for an "ideal" research proposal because he defends flexibility for the sake of practicality (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu (1992) believes that rigorous methodological directives which are represented by major method textbooks are products of positivism that are results of the struggle for its domination in the field of social science. Moreover, Bourdieu (1992) labels researchers, who adhere themselves to using only a specific method, as

³ In *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (1992) Bourdieu gives to general explanations to his concepts. However, this is not a theoretical definition book, it covers the conversations between Wacquant and Bourdieu about his sociology in general.

methodological monotheists. He criticizes constructed limits of using several distinct methods in a study and he criticizes the presuppositions such as that symbolic interactionists only work through ethnographic research (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Besides, Bourdieu (1992) participates modernist vs. postmodernist debate with defending the field of science. He adheres to enlightenment values but on the condition that it leads to create an autonomy for the field of science (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Thus, even though he criticizes the hegemony of positivism on the course of modernization paradigm, his arguments are not taking its impetus from the postmodernism's criticism of positivism and modernity because he thinks that postmodernism causes a way to relativism and nihilism (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). After this discussion on the epistemology and methodology of Bourdieu, next section carries the discussion to the framework of Bourdieu's sociology.

Wacquant (1998) depicts four distinctive characteristics of Bourdieu's sociology. Firstly, he says Bourdieu is against dualisms as it is explained in the first pages of this chapter. Secondly, Bourdieu's practice of thinking exceeds disciplinary, theoretical, and methodological divisions as it is also explained above (Wacquant, 1998). Thirdly, Wacquant (1998) argues that Bourdieu's perception of social life is based on differences and as a result of this notion Bourdieu concludes that there is a continuous competition and conflict among social agents. Fourthly, Bourdieu's thought does not imply that agents consciously pursue strategies for to increase their income, status, and power even though Bourdieu says every action of social agents are "interested". Rather, Wacquant (1998) argues that the basis of action for Bourdieu lies on the agent's desire for reputation. Thus, he does not refer to a utilitarian societal action theory and Bourdieu's philosophical anthropology, as Wacquant (1998) puts forward, is not based on interest but recognition and misrecognition.

One must clarify how Bourdieu defines "the agents" and "being interested" before moving to a discussion about his concepts. He uses "agents" to refer human beings for both their individuality and collectivity. The reason why he is not using "actor/s" is that it is implying the rhetoric of rational-choice theory that emphasizes individuality and reasoning that takes for granted the cost and benefit calculation as the dominant

determinant for human action (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Bourdieu opposes this reasoning and argues that it is deterministic because it overlooks objective conditions of agents and reduce it to one particular subjective condition that connotes a simple cost/benefit scale. Likewise, Bourdieu argues that all social fields are filled with agents who are pursuing their interests. For him, some fields can be autonomous from the influences of other fields but there is not any field that is autonomous and isolated from the “interested agents”.⁴

Even though Bourdieu uses same rhetoric with the orthodox economic theories by saying “interested”, he defines it differently as being adjusted to the rules of the game in the particular social field. He argues that it refers to a learning process of some occupation but not only the formal rules but also its informal and implicit codes that needs to be accepted and performed by the agents (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Bourdieu conceptualizes this notion with *doxa*. According to this concept, social agents accept the legitimacy of taken for granted assumptions, which is imposed by the ones who dominate, in order to operate in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). In other words, *doxa* is sort of a latent contract that all social agents, whether dominant or dominated, agree to act in accordance with the field’s presuppositions. Furthermore, if social agents believe the field’s possibilities of rewards, benefits and compensations, they will think it is worth to accept *doxa* and enter the field which Bourdieu conceptualizes this process with *illusio*. (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Moreover, Bourdieu uses the concept of *doxa* instead of using ideology because he argues that the existence of ideology implies that there is a possibility of not having an ideology or it implies the possibility of “overcoming” the hegemonic ideologies (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Therefore, it gives room to the notion that there would be an objective and rightful sets of thought if ideology is displaced. He refuses to this assumption because he argues that social agents play the game of living through misrecognition and *doxa* and these are what make agents’ action possible; thus,

⁴ In *Homo Academicus* (1984), Bourdieu studies the field of academia. He states that what is being generally known and accepted as “sacred” and “disinterested” occupations are the ones who accomplish such a symbolic capital that disclosures its “interested” situation. Bourdieu argues that being a science person cannot be out of this context.

Bourdieu does not leave any room to a possibility of existence of social fields without misrecognition and the relations of dominant and dominated (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003).

3.2 Bourdieu's concepts: Field, habitus and capital

Bourdieu overcomes the dichotomies of volunteerism and determinism, freedom and necessity, choice and obligation with his concepts field and habitus. Accordingly, field and habitus are in an "ontological complicity" that they only operate in relation with one another. The concept of field is based on the argument that social units develop their identities according to their opposite identities and in order to sociologically characterize them in all aspects, one should position them in an area where is the place of their competition and conflict (Kaya, 2007; Arli, 2007).

Social units are competing for the resources that determine the hierarchy of the field namely the "Capitals" (Schwartz, 2012). The social units who are in the position of domination put forward protection strategies while social units who are dominated shows destruction strategies (Kaya, 2007; Arli, 2007). However, Bourdieu also points out a third type of action which is tracing strategies that sometimes some dominated units accept the principles that is imposed by the dominant groups and act in accordance with them instead of revolting (Wacquant, 1998). However, the ultimate purpose of social units is to accomplish the capitals that are necessary in the field to become the determinants of hierarchy (Wacquant, 1998). Social units/agents who are willing to participate a particular field should contain the capital type that is prerequisite to enter that field. For instance, one should have cultural capital in the field of art, and one should have scientific capabilities in the field of science (Kaya, 2007). Hence, after entering the field, they start to compete for to be the monopoly that determines the hierarchy which is the sum of distinct capitals. The orthodoxy of a field sets the rules of the game, which are never fair, through using its symbolic capital (Jourdain and Naulin, 2016). Moreover, symbolic capital is also the source of the legitimacy of domination of the orthodoxy. For instance, it gives the power of stigmatization as well as the power of imposition to other social agents on the field (Webb, Schrirato and Danaher, 2002).

In accordance with the abovementioned explanations, it is important to distinguish between notions of conflict and competition of field and the notion of competition in market reasoning. In this equation, market reasoning gives its actors a reasoning that is rational, stationary and unidimensional that they are responsive to the signals which are coming from the market which, assumingly, operate through a supply and demand mechanism. However, Bourdieu's social agents come to the field with their predispositions in the first place. They also receive signals from the field, but they perceive them with adding a subjectivity that is creative, historical, and flexible. Moreover, the signals that they are receiving from the field is based on the characteristic of the field. Bourdieu argues that thinking, as if there is a supply and demand mechanism, is naivety because social agents are not acting and competing to meet with something that is external to themselves but the product that show up from the field is the result of power struggle of social agents who are struggling to keep and control a corner of a field and thus continue to their struggle of expanding their influences other corners of the field. Hence, there is no place for demand in the concept of field but there are only social agents in a conflict of gaining and keeping the control of the means of supply.

Bourdieu (2003) substitutes the concept of society with the concepts of field and social space because he argues that society is an empty concept that implies homogeneity of social groups thus overlooks the divergences and differences that cause vicious cycle of competition and conflict. Thus, he argues, differentiated social groups cannot exist in a common culture, inclusivist authority and intersected interests and there is always a way to differentiate them (Bourdieu, 2003). Field and social spaces have relative autonomy thus they also cannot be reducible to a monolithic structure. Communal life's separation and relative autonomy necessitate the reasoning that each sect has its own values and its own organizing principles. Accordingly, Bourdieu (2003) classifies the variables that separate the fields and social spaces as economic, political, religious, aesthetic, intellectual and cultural. Bourdieu (2003) says there is a hierarchy between fields and the economic field is on the top of this hierarchy. Therefore, it penetrates other fields by suppressing their autonomies. However, Bourdieu does not accept this a

priori because he argues that in modern times the field of economy has developed more rapidly and strongly comparing to other fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Hence, economic field is on the top of the hierarchy of fields, but this is a historical situation and it can change. Bourdieu (2003) elaborates on that each field contains a degree of uncertainty that provides probability, reward, compensation, benefit and punishment to its participants. Furthermore, field does not have an ontological existence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). It exists as long as there are participants who adhere to its principles and who seek to accomplish them. Bourdieu (2003) argues that the boundaries of a field is located where the influence of the field terminates that one can only determine the boundaries of a field through an empirical work. The concept of field is relational with the concept of capital. Therefore, a field's characteristics are determined by the capital which is dominant in that field; thus we may put forward a simple interpretation that the economic capital determines the dominant vs. dominated relationship in the field of economy (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Consequently, one may start studying the dominant capital of the field if s/he intends to know about that field. It seems that Bourdieu uses the concept of field as an equivalent to structure because he says the fields have the power to shape and limit the agents. However, there are two significant differences structure and field that Bourdieu gives relative autonomy to the agents who operate on the fields and Bourdieu depicts the field as a socially constructed theoretical or spatial venues thus has no capacity to exist without the existence of the social agents.

If external factors are not imposed an action mechanically what is the thing that gives action a pattern, then, how come social life is such a regulated and predictable space? Bourdieu gives his concept of habitus as answer to these questions (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Accordingly, habitus is creative, innovative and constructive but in the spheres of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). In *Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong?* (2003) Nicos Mouzelis argues that the concept of habitus stands in between structuralism, phenomenological and ethnomethodological approaches because he thinks that habitus represents a shift from theoretical reasoning to practical reasoning which contains actions that are flexible and multilayered in terms of emotions and predispositions. Hence, he argues that habitus is a post-structuralist concept (Mouzelis, 2003). He also distinguishes habitus from the verb of habit by explaining that the latter

refers to a mechanic, automatically repeating, and copied process; while the former refers to a creative, generative and strategic process (Mouzelis, 2003). Mouzelis (2003) argues that habitus ensures us to produce our existence's (i.e. our subjectivity) communal conditions and it is not fate or self that isolated from historical conditions but it is a principle that produces strategies for us that rely on our past experiences and assist us to adjust changing conditions and ensures us to fulfil our duties and provides us an idiosyncrasy and dispositions. However, Wacquant (1998) points out that even though both sides of analysis (i.e. structure and subjectivity) is necessary for habitus, they are not equivalent. Epistemological priority is based on the structure because agents' point of view change in accordance with their position in the social space (Wacquant, 1998).

This paragraph elaborates Bourdieu's (2003) emphasis on strategy and practicality regarding to his concept of habitus. Firstly, with the concept of strategy, Bourdieu does not imply conscious, deliberate and planned patterns of behavior which come into effect as a consequence of cost and benefit calculation. Even though Bourdieu's agents do not follow conscious rules or act with predetermined and calculated objectives, they do act through consistent and comprehensible patterns of behaviors that are objectively determined by the relationality of the field that they operate, the habitus that they contain, and the capitals that they want to achieve or protect. Secondly, Bourdieu says the sentiment of practicality represents the social sensitivity that accompanies us. Furthermore, he states, it constructs the world around the agent through foreseeing the world's inherent dispositions by itself thus equipping itself with an extensive vision of game. The sentiment of practicality detects the competitor's and partner's acts and gives meaning to them while they are acting. Hence, it reacts and mobilizes inspiredly without withdrawing from the action for thinking through consulting to the calculated reasoning. The sentiment of practicality analyses probabilities that would transform the field beforehand and treats them as if they are happening at present. Bourdieu argues that past, present and future tenses are intersecting in habitus. Thus, habitus embedded in deep-seated of the body which waits to be reactivated to encounter the actions in the field. Consequently, Bourdieu emphasizes his approach of practicality and strategy is neither intentioned nor pragmatist and with field/habitus/capital trilogy he restricts the

area of pragmatism and intentionism and expands the idea of his interested action argument.

Bourdieu and Passeron draw a palpable framework regarding where the habitus start and how it develops through time in their book of *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (1990). Accordingly, habitus is obtained by birth, but it differs as life conditions differ through time. Thus, a child's habitus is generated depending on what kind/s of capital/s of her/his family possess (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Furthermore, Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) state that habitus also starts with the language, values of the society, and continues through education and socialization. Thus, even though birth has a major influence on what kind of a habitus an agent obtains, habitus differs in accordance with the changes in conditions of life through time (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). However, Bourdieu gives very small possibility of chance to a social mobility in every aspect of an agent's habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). In other words, an agent who born in a village will carry her/his baggage of characteristics through her/his entire life even if s/he attends the most prestigious colleges, hired by them as professors, and accomplishes to become one of the leading intellectual of her/his time. But we should note that this success story is a very exceptional situation because Bourdieu thinks that education itself, from a village school to a most prestigious college, is the instrument of the means of reproduction the existing hierarchies of the society (Bourdieu, 1984). Besides, habitus can be both collective and personal. In this regard, if a group of people have more or less similar socio-economic characteristics, we can conclude that they have same habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). This allows Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) to talk about habitus from the perspective of class such as labor habitus, petty-bourgeoisie habitus and bourgeoisie habitus. However, the class, in other words the economic capital cannot be the only determinant of an agents' habitus, as the example above shows as well as the paragraph that mentioned from utilizing the Brubaker's (2004) analysis on Bourdieu's perception of class, other determinants such as identity which is crafted by the cultural capital of an agent, may be equally important.

Bourdieu depicts fields as the social spaces where the resources are distributed unevenly thus, they are the fields of power and conflict (Bourdieu, 1984; 1988; 2005; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). Agents struggle to protect their power, or they struggle to displace the domination through using their capitals. Thus, this framework brings us to Bourdieu's third concept which is capital. According to him there are four types of capitals: economic, cultural, social and symbolic (Webb, Schirato and Danaher, 2002). Economic capital refers to material capabilities of agents while cultural capital refers to the values that are ideational. Patterns of behavior, use of language, religious knowledge, intellectuality as well as degrees that obtained can be the sources of cultural capital. (Webb, Schirato and Danaher, 2002). Bourdieu distinguishes cultural capital into three types: corporeal, objective and institutionalized (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Furthermore, social capital refers to the attendance and belonging to social networks such as business world, social clubs and communities (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Finally, symbolic capital is related with perceptions. It is the symbolic power that comes from the sum of all capitals. Symbolic capital can be instrumentalized to get recognition and to legitimize a groups' privileged position (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Moreover, it gives the power to stigmatize other social groups. Consequently, there are positive capitals and negative capitals in a field where the former gives advantageous possibilities and the latter cause problems to social agents (Bourdieu, 1984; 1988; 2005). Therefore, social agents struggle to obtain capitals that are valuable in the field and they dominate the field to the extent of their capitals and they start to protect the value of their capital and increase them with the power that they gain. On the one hand, the ultimate aim in the field is to gain the monopoly of the prevailing capitals and, on the other, is to struggle to devalue the opponents' capitals (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

3.3 Studying Conservatism and Migration in the context of Turkey with Bourdieu

Bourdieu's relational sociology or constructivist structuralism proposes an unprecedented set of tools to have empirical analysis of conservatism. Firstly, Bourdieu's relational approach force us to realize that there are different fields in the

sphere of conservatism and all of them are constructed. Thus, we can separate conservative field of politics, literature, philosophy, civil society, education as well as institutions. Hence, approaching conservatism with this conceptualization prevents researcher from methodological individualism and methodological collectivism thus creates obstacles to researcher in making generalizations from obtaining empirical data from one field of conservatism and coming to a conclusion for covering all of those conservative fields. Consequently, it provides us a different toolbox to conceptualize conservatism other than the structural approaches who are the orthodoxies of this literature.

The orthodoxy of this literature, as they will be elaborated on the literature review paragraphs, is inclined to take intellectual discourse of conservatism and integrate it to the political discourse and treats the conclusions of these analyses as the reality of conservatism which is capable of representing all fields of it. Bourdieu's approach proposes a relational way of thinking to avoid these kinds of methodological fallacies (Akçaoğlu, 2018). For instance, we can separate conservative agent as an individual or as a group referring to their habitus and, in this way, we can overcome the methodological collectivism of the orthodoxy of the literature about conservatism.

Bourdieu's approach saves the conceptualization from the caricatures of social actor/s and abstract collectivities by paving a way to grasp the social reality of the concept that is not limited with the ideological constraints and political affiliations. In other words, his approach provides an empirical definition to the concept rather than a definition that is created on paper (Akçaoğlu, 2018). However, Bourdieu's approach is not externalizing the structural explanations for the sake of practicality but intertwines it with the practices of the object/s which is under the study. Therefore, in a nutshell, Bourdieu puts forward the concept of field in order to counterbalance the methodological structuralism but he also puts forward the concept of habitus in order to counterbalance the methodological individualism by emphasizing the contextual and structural inside the peculiarity.

Moreover, Bourdieu argues that habitus of the social agent/s in social spaces and fields are operating with the practical knowledge (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). This concept, practical knowledge, forces us to think beyond structural conceptualizations

regarding the literature of conservatism because, firstly, it penetrates to the structure and find the agent and, secondly, it brings into the question of practicality in the ideational depiction of the conceptualization (Akçaoğlu, 2018).

In addition to that Bourdieu's approach is not only helping to conceptualize the social agents but it also proposes unprecedented insights regarding to their social spaces (Akçaoğlu, 2018). As it is explained in the second section of this chapter, Bourdieu puts forward the concept of field to explain his argument that social spheres are constructs of relatively autonomous fields of domination. In this regard, we can think of a social space in İstanbul's Fatih district as a field, where's ideational and material characteristics have been constructing through history, as a result of conflict and competition of the social agents who have participated there. Thus, this way of thinking paves a way to studying not only the social actors as conservatives but also their social spaces as a field of venues for their current practices and the historicity of their conflict and competition. In this regard, my thesis focus to to Fatih with not only its' spatial existence as a neighbor of İstanbul but a constructed social space in line with Bourdieu's theoretical standpoint. In this way, we can approach it as a field, thus, a construction of power configurations and practices because of an ongoing conflict and competition. This way of thinking saves us from substantialism of taking the conservative social agents' sovereignty in Fatih as granted.

This study is not the only work which tries to implement Bourdieu's concepts to an empirical effort about conservative habitus on the social spaces. Next sections will cover the studies which cover their subject-matter in line with the framework that explained above. However, this study separates itself from them by specifically focusing on the encounter between the social agents of conservative social spaces and migrants. Hence, the studies, which will be referring in the next paragraph, mention the issue of migration and migrated populations of conservative fields as one of the group of "others" of the conservative field. However, approaching migration and treating its alterity as a homologous social phenomenon is not possible because in several social spaces of İstanbul including Fatih, Sultanbeyli, Esenyurt and Başakşehir, the existence of migration as a social phenomenon is visible in light of the number of migrated people.

Consequently, it must be dealt with separately and this thesis seeks to fill that gap on the literature.

Bourdieu's refusal to accept a monolithic conceptualization of society and his way of compartmentalizing the social groups in accordance with their differentiated habitus and capitals have a direct empirical equivalence in the context of political and economic cleavages among the social groups in Turkey. In a general framework, we have been seeing that social groups victimize one another when they obtain state capabilities, *meta capital* in Bourdieu's sense, and mobilize their identity-based characteristics as their symbolic capitals, such as being a Kemalist, political Islamist, leftist, pro-Kurdish, *ulusalci* and nationalist, on their struggle of accomplishing the capitals that pave way to them to be the dominant social group. This process has turned into vicious cycle of conflict and competition over the material and ideational resources. From the point of view of comparative politics, one may explain this phenomenon with lack of institutionalization; thus, lack of administrative units that in line with the liberal democracy as well as lack of a constitution that serves the mentality of separation of powers (Robinson and Acemoğlu, 2012). On the other hand, Bourdieu's approach shifts the unit of analysis from the institutional explanations to the power configurations of social groups that starts from micro level analysis. Therefore, it does not determine the intensity of the struggle by depending on the characteristics of the regime type and institutional configurations that the social groups are operating into. This choice paves a way to a more palpable explanations regarding to the cleavages among social groups and its direct empirical equivalence in the context of Turkey can be seen through the works of Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci's (2018, 2020) consecutive studies about polarization that deal with the cleavages among the social groups that conceptualized with political party partisanship in the context of Turkey. Accordingly, it is difficult to talk about a monolithic "Turkish society" because the ruptures and cleavages among the social groups. Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci (2018, 2020) reveal the distinction among them in the level of emotions which refer to both ideational ruptures as well as palpable ones which can be traced on the field. Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci (2018, 2020) believe that the ruptures reflect the political party preferences and, in this regard, we see in findings intertwining cleavages which are mainly based on the identity-based variables

of social agents that incorporated with the dimensions of cultural and ideological identities of social groups.

Nonetheless, one may argue that, even though social groups become polarized in most of the subject-matters, 86 percent of them share negative notions about the presence of Syrian migrants. Thus, one may conclude that, at least in the context of this thesis's problematic, this report does not provide a meaningful evidence. However, if we problematize the reasons of refusal, we see a different picture.⁵ The difference on the reasons of refusal can be traced with the qualitative works. In one of them, Saraçoğlu and Belanger (2019) focus on İzmir to reveal the reasons of refusal of Syrian migrants by the natives. They point out two distinct reasons of refusal: for one group of respondents the presence of Syrian migrants is a threat for losing the national unity, thus, their reason of refusal related with identity-based ideological dimensions while for another group of respondents the presence of Syrian migrants means the potential loss of their bargaining capabilities about occupational dimensions. Saraçoğlu and Belanger (2019) points out this difference goes hand in hand with the spatial difference of the respondents, thus, they conclude class related variables on the respondents' reasons of refusals. Space related polarization among social groups also contribute further evidence to the argument of difference in refusals. IOM Turkey's report (2019) shows that Syrian migrants prefer to live the districts that are known as conservative districts. Some put forward "cultural intimacy" notion to explain this phenomenon while some argue class-related notions which both are sort of reproduce the center and periphery paradigm in the context of Syrian migration phenomenon.⁶ The reasons of this pattern

⁵ In the same report, the complaints about the situation in economy vary with three different contexts: inflation, unemployment and poverty. %49.9 believe that the unemployment is the main problem of the country while %46.8 believe the inflation which led increase in prices is the main problem and %14.9 believe that the poverty is the most urgent problem of the country. Even though to sum of this percentages implies a homogeneous response regarding that the economy is the main problem, the fractions within reflect differentiations in perception of the problem (Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci, 2018, 2020). Thus, this thesis argues that about the refusal of Syrian migrants, there are several distinct contexts at work as well. Further qualitative studies may reveal those contexts and this thesis is one of the candidate of that purpose.

⁶ For instance, the number of population in the district of Fatih is 443,090 and the number of registered migrants there is 182,440. Therefore, native-migrant ratio 41.2% in Fatih. On the other hand, the number of population in the district of Kadıköy is 482,713 and the number of

are not the primary concern of this thesis but its existence directly connotes that some refusals are based on the perceptions of the respondents and, on the other hand, some refusals are based on the encounters and as a result of practices of the respondents which, eventually, reveals another cleavage among the refusals.

Furthermore, Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci's (2018, 2020) reports show that some social groups believe that their thoughts are represented in the level of government meaning that some social groups' thoughts are more inclined to turn into policy processes than others. If we correlate this finding with what has happened in the context of Syrian migrants through tracing general headlines, from 2019 to 2021, we see, not surprisingly, that sovereign social groups' thoughts about migration phenomenon have a capacity to turn into policy processes much more than other social groups' concerns and thoughts.

In 2019, Turkish Armed Forces conducted its third operation in the Northern Syria, which is Operation Peace Spring, in order to advance government's agenda of creating a safe zone through the Turkish-Syrian border for both stopping the emergence of a corridor of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and create a safe zone to place migrants. The process of this military operation went hand in hand with the preparation of 2019 local elections. Therefore, the domestic agenda that securitize the presence of high level of Syrian migrants intertwined with the securitization discourse and policies of government through the Northern Syria, particularly around the Idlib province. Although rising population of migrants became an agenda on the 2015 elections period as well, the difference lies in that in 2015 the opposition parties directed their attention to this issue but there were relative acceptance among the JDP government's supporters and the conservative strongholds of the cities. Thus, made JDP to put forward its own agenda and saved JDP from losing its place in the elections because of this rising insurgency among the opposition. However, when we come to the political economic context of Operation Peace Spring in 2019, the supporters of JDP also raised their voices against the presence of Syrian migrants in cities. As a result, we see several actions of government that aimed to please this rising tension among its constituency. For instance, in 2019, the Interior Ministry announced that the Arabic signboards of the

registered migrants there is 22,566 thus this makes the native-migrant ratio 4.7% in Kadıköy (IOM Turkey, 2019).

migrant's stores must be pulled off by the owners and after a short time municipal policies, or *zabita*, intervened to pull off the signboards and this paved a way to a change in the atmospheres of the city where especially labelled as "ghettos" of the migrants. This process led an abrupt situation emerge because even though *zabitas* pulled off the Arabic signs, they let English words to stay on the signboards as well as allowed Turkish versions of the Arabic names to stay on the signboards. When epistemic community, who study on Syrian migrations, focused on the fallouts of this particular instance, they found out that most of their respondents in Fatih appeased by this act of government and expressed that they did not feel that they were living a districts where belong to them before Arabic signboards were visible around the district that they live in (Rottman and Kaya, 2020; Kaya, 2017; Kaya, 2020). Moreover, in this conjuncture, the provincial politicians of the opposition Good Party, which has a secular, nationalist and educated popular base, came up with an anti-Syrian campaign for the local elections. The candidate of Good Party for the district of Fatih, İlay Aksoy, labelled, who were seeking to find occupations through consulting the Directorate of General Migration Management which located on Fatih, as parasites who seek to dispossess of the occupations of educated Turks. After several similar conducts such as circulating banners of "Fatih is not belong to the Syrians", the Good Party and other parties in the opposition side of the political spectrum, established their propagandas through the subject-matter of the presence of Syrian migrants and their alleged animosity towards Turks as well as their alleged misconducts on the public spheres such as parks, schools, transportation services and hospitals.

The point here, however, was the inertia of conservatives, who are dominant social group in Fatih, to such actions and discourses of the opposition. Thus, we saw a latent acceptance to the opposition's claims by the conservatives about the Syrian migrants. Consequently, even though JDP saved its place by winning the Fatih municipal election, it lost major metropolises such as İstanbul and Ankara. When asked the reasons of the loss, the respondents on this conservative stronghold expressed two reasons: the presence of Syrian migrants on their district and the presence of Berat Albayrak, who is the son-in-law of President Erdoğan, on the top of the Turkish economy. Not too long after the Istanbul municipal elections, Interior Ministry announced that Syrian refugees

who were registered in other Turkish districts had to leave Istanbul by 30 October to the provinces that they registered in the first place and who do not have papers transferred to the camps in order to get their registration IDs (Adar, 2020).

In the beginning of 2020, Idlib province, where is the only place left from the Astana process-led creation of four de-escalation zones⁷, attacked by the Assad, Russia and Iran forces and the possibility of a new migrant influx started to emerge towards Turkish border as a result of a potential military victory of abovementioned coalition. Turkish government has urged the international community of EU and NATO about the potential influx of refugees from the province of Idlib if not intervened and sent additional troops to the area to impede this possibility to happen. However, on February 27, pro-Syrian government forces advanced their military actions and attacked on the Turkish troops and Turkish observation posts in Idlib. As a result, Turkish Armed Forces suffered from the loss of 36 soldiers that marked as the record level of loss in a single attack on its history. Following to that, due to the lack of concrete support from the EU and NATO, Turkish government has used the domestic migrant population card and opened its Greece border for the free pass of migrants who seek to asylum to the EU that meant the suspension of the EU-Turkey 2016 migration agreement.⁸ On February and March 2020, the busses in Fatih filled with migrants who wanted to pass the border and

⁷ Four de-escalation zones have established as a result of the starting point of Astana process in January 2017, which led by Russia, Iran and Turkey for the purpose of generating an alternative platform to the UN-led Geneva process which aimed to solve the Syrian conflict through political dialogue. An important consequence of the Astana process has come in its fourth round on 4 May 2017. Accordingly, four de-escalation zones have created in Idlib, eastern Gouta, northern Homs province and southern parts of Deraa and Quneitra. This agreement has guaranteed the safety of inhabitants of those provinces by providing medical assistance as well as creating no-fly zones. However, the pro-Syrian government coalition have continued military offensives towards the de-escalation zones and, by 2018, they have captured three out of four de-escalation zones and only Idlib province has remained on the opposition. In the beginning of 2019, however, the pro-Syrian government forces started offensives towards Idlib.

⁸ On March 2016, EU and Turkish government came to an understanding to prevent the illegal pass of migrants from the Turkish soil to the Europe continent. Accordingly, Turkish government ensured EU on prevention of the illegal passes from its soil, in return, EU provided 6 billion euro assistance package to the Turkish government as well as migration related civil society organizations to strengthen their capabilities while providing assistance to the migrants in Turkey. Also, EU has accepted to admit one refugee from Turkey in each refugee that it depart to Turkey as a result of an illegal pass. Further, EU ensured Turkey to advance a visa-free policy to Turkish citizens who seek to travel EU countries.

according to some this process not only encouraged by the Interior Ministry but also organized by the Directorate of General Migration Management office and related civil society foundations to accelerate the process of exiting. Even the Interior Minister, Süleyman Soylu, has announced from his Twitter account day by day the numbers of exits of the migrants from the Turkish border to Greece.⁹ It is ironic that the harsh reaction of Greek police officers to the ones who seek to pass the border has criticized vocally by the ones in Turkey as a validation of “civilizational” arguments while ignoring the appeasement of the inhabitants. Hence, these developments welcomed by the people interviewed in Fatih where some of them expressed anger and asked “why they stayed so long if such measure can be taken by the government?” and some expressed that they would better repatriated to the areas in Northern Syria “where Turkish Armed Forces cleared from the terrorists and made safe for the migrants' repatriations”. Nevertheless, Turkish government convinced Russian government to a ceasefire on Idlib on the fifth of March 2020 while its negotiations with the EU sort of advanced and calmed down the situation on the Greece-Turkey border. Thus, with both of these tentative agreements and the eruption of coronavirus pandemic, Turkish government has sort of obtained a status quo ante both on the city center of Idlib¹⁰ and on the İstanbul’s districts regarding to the Syrian migration issue. On 26 January 2021, however, the Directorate of General Migration Management announced suspension of new applications of migrants for residence permits in Esenyurt and Fatih districts which mean that the migrants, except short term residence permits of students and

⁹ Sert and Daniş (2020) surprised to see that same government figures, refused to give actual numbers of Syrian migrants in Turkey - registered and unregistered - when asked, but when the case turns out to sending the migrants to somewhere else, they immediately informed and then share with the public the “exact” numbers of repatriations and exits.

¹⁰ As a result of Assad forces’ attacks that mentioned above, Turkish Armed Forces lost the control of M5 highway which connects Aleppo and Idlib provinces which provides strategic geopolitical advantages to one who controls the highway. Moreover, Turkish government has accepted to carry out joint patrols on M4 highway, which connects Latakia to Seraqib through west-east direction, with Russian army as a result of the concessions that Turkish government gave to Russia for the ceasefire agreement on the March 5, 2020. Thus, even though Turkish government has lost strategic points, it has sustained the status quo on the city centre of Idlib which continued to be controlled by the non-state actor Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham’s administrative unit of “Syrian Salvation Government”.

tradespeople, would not be able to rent any apartment in those districts.¹¹ To sum, this periodization can be interpreted as an empirical evidence to how sovereign social groups' shifting attitudes reflect upon the policies of the conservative government which also makes meaningful to study the Syrian migration issue through the point of view of the current sovereign social group of Turkey. Hence, starting from the next paragraph, I will move to discuss literatures of conservatism and migration to better point out the place of my study among the both epistemic communities.

The research question, which is why conservative habitus failed to incorporate Syrian migrants, refers to two distinct literatures that are conservatism and the Syrian migration phenomenon in the context of Turkey. Therefore, it is a difficult, but a manageable, task to discuss two distinct works of literature at the same time. I try to manage this difficulty by categorizing the studies in both works of literature to come up with a clear understanding. Hence, from the next paragraph, the studies about conservatism will be discussed and then will be pointed out how this thesis will provide an empirical contribution to that literature. Consequently, the studies that cover the Syrian migration issue will be discussed and then will be pointed out that how this study will provide a theoretical as well as an empirical contribution to that literature.

The literature that covers conservatism in the context of Turkey can be categorized into four. First group approach to conservatism with focusing on its historicity that is constituted as a political project by the opinion leaders of the political sphere. Second group focuses it through a political economy perspective that is perceived as the main determinant in the constitution of the identity as well as its transformation through the different conjunctures. Third group puts forward a culturalist perspective that purposes to uncover the sentimental determinants behind conservatism as a political phenomenon. By taking into consideration of preceding three categories' approaches as well as their findings, the studies in the fourth group come up with a reconciled approach that incorporates structure and agency, in other words, an approach that is appropriate to Bourdieu's epistemology but not necessarily leaning to his conceptual

¹¹ Up to this date, migrants were allowed to have residence permit if they are registered and if they obtain a rental contract but with this announcement they restricted to rent any place in Fatih and Esenyurt.

toolbox and conceptualizes conservatism through the practices of the agents on their spatial areas. Hence, this study aims to contribute to that particular literature, however, it is vital to engage with the preceding categories.

The studies in the first group focus on how the ideology of conservatism has emerged with the 19th century Tanzimat period of Ottoman Empire. This narrative conceptualizes conservatism as an ideology created by the elites and strengthened through the opinion leaders such as ulema in addition to particular groups in the bureaucracy then participated in the power competition and conflict in determining the tone of the policies of the Ottoman modernization period (Koyuncu, 2014; Bora, 2016a, 2016b; Mollaer, 2009, 2016, 2017). Moreover, according to this narrative political sphere of conservatism integrates with the spheres of art and literature; thus, the conceptualization of conservatism through “elitism” incorporates not only opinion leaders as politicians as such but also the writers who labelled as conservative in the sense of their mind set. For instance, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Peyami Safa, and Yahya Kemal Beyatlı are the prominent writers of whose ideas about modernity as well as related issues in relation to their conjuncture traced as the notions that represent the ideology of conservatism in the political and social spheres (Mollaer, 2016). Therefore, according to the studies of this category, conservatism in the context of Turkey is a set of ideological propositions which facing the debates of the particular conjunctures that established by the opinion leaders and for a long-time discussed at that level without the participation of the masses (Bora, 2016b). However, with the establishment of the Turkish Republic with a secularist, modernist, and positivist ideological setting, conservatism started to become a reactionary ideology, which was perceived as an instrument for the opposition. From the 1970s, however, conservatism started to be perceived through the equation of center and periphery paradigm and gradually became a matter of identity rather than sets of thoughts regarding the particular policies (Mardin, 1973). Thus, following this narrative, the studies in this category perceive conservatism as a top-down ideology whose impetus comes from the “conservative” politicians, artists, writers as well as opinion leaders and the “conservative” agents, or the people, are the reflections of sets of opinions that arise from the abovementioned groups of “conservatives”. Nevertheless, there is no monolithic understanding of being a

conservative according to this narrative but one dimension of conservatism is absolute for the studies of this literature that conservatism crosscuts all the rightist perspectives of the political spectrum such as political Islam, center-right, and nationalism. The tone of it as well as the degree of the combination, however, depends on the conjuncture of the studied time and context (Bora, 2016a). Thus, one can criticise this approach by referring to its intense emphasis on the political thought of conservatism which ignores the conservative agent's practices and regards them as if they are the passive shadows of the conceptual framework generated through studying the opinion leaders.

The studies in the second group point out the transitions and their fallouts in the regime of international political economy, particularly the neoliberal transitions that started at the beginning of 1980s, as main determinants of the discussions regarding conservatism in the context of Turkey (Tuğal, 2009, 2012, 2016; Hoşgör, 2011, 2015; Öztürk, 2015; Tanyılmaz, 2015; Savran, 2015; Aktoprak 2016). Accordingly, neoliberalism encompasses economic, political, and social administrative units and instrumentalizes the ideologies that could achieve the consent of the masses for its hegemony. According to this narrative, conservatism, especially emphasizing religion as one of its main components, has achieved this role in the context of Turkey. From a theoretical perspective, that Cihan Tuğal's studies (2009, 2016) put forward a Gramscian understanding that incorporates civil society, which refers to people who vote, live, and make propaganda in accordance with the policies of political Islamist and conservative political parties, and political society, which refers as the pro-market and pious politicians who mobilize the civil society that has the similar characteristics (Tuğal, 2009). In this equation, political society mobilizes civil society in order to absorb the latter to the structure, which is the neoliberal hegemony, and accomplishes its consent in consolidating that structure. In this equation, the subjectivity of the conservative/Islamist agent depends on what the structure imposes upon them; thus, leaves no room for any sort of manoeuvring whether economic or political. According to this narrative, while conservatives/Islamists were radicals in the 1990s because of the radicalism that political Islamist party, *Refah*, promoted at that time, in the 2000s conservatives/Islamists became moderates because they absorbed by the neoliberalism, with the help of the moderate conservative party AKP (Tuğal 2009, 2016). In elsewhere, Hoşgör (2011) approaches the concepts of

conservatism and Islamism with considering only one determinant which is religion. In doing so, she conceptualizes both conservatism and political Islam as interchangeable but not according to the empirical data but according to the hegemon political economic rationale of the conjuncture that she is focusing on. Therefore, according to her, both concepts are instruments of capital accumulation of a social group and that social group is also an instrument of the global political economic structure (Hoşgör, 2011). Besides, what makes an agent conservative or political Islamist is not her/his practices and thoughts but her/his consent to the policies of political society that represents the pious as well as rightist political spectrum of the political sphere. Hence, while political Islamists mobilize interest-free cooperation projects in the context of the 1990s as part of their capital accumulation strategy, they put forward conglomerates that have more professional therefore more appropriate strategies to the neoliberalism's merits but constantly legitimizing their positions through the pious discourse (Hoşgör, 2015; Öztürk, 2015). In the context that conservative/political Islamists cadres started to achieve the power of the state apparatus of Turkey in the context of 2000s political Islamist political society have accomplished the Gramscian passive revolution (Tuğal, 2009, 2012, 2016). In elsewhere, Aktoprak (2016) claims that the conservative/political Islamist cadres use the division in cultural dimensions, which has taken its impetus from the center and periphery paradigm, in order to identify themselves and their "other" but, in this equation, Aktoprak (2016) claims that there is no political economic differentiation whatsoever that implying the conservative/political Islam social agent's mobilization of her/his identity to the social and economic mobility that, in Poulantzas's conceptualization, become the power bloc (Aktoprak, 2016). Thus, competition and conflict for material resources are the primary concern for conservative/political Islamist circles and culturalist struggle instrumentalized by the political society for the accomplishment of the consent of its civil society. For instance, the establishment of conservative/political Islamist business association, which is MÜSİAD, in 1990 perceived by this literature through Cox's concept of social force¹² that explained as the

¹² Robert Cox (1981) argues it is a necessary condition for a class to institutionalize its power grip to impact on the power struggle of implementing their political economic project. Even though abovementioned studies do not refer to Cox when they study on the conservative/political Islamist cadres' attempts on mobilize their power grip through institutions, they approach

mobilization of social network that based on cultural dimensions for political economic transition of social groups who seek to impact as well as gain hegemony through the sphere of political economy (Tanyılmaz, 2015; Savran, 2015). Consequently, what is economic; thus, what is related to the material dimensions are the primary determinants for this literature in the discussion of and in the conceptualization of conservatism.

On the other hand, studies in the third group conceptualize conservatism in accordance with its historical definition that dates back to the reaction of the French Revolution in 1789. Accordingly, conservatism as an ideology emerged as a reaction to the revisionist movements towards the *ancien regime* by the works of a British philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke (Jones, 2017). According to Burke's thought, conservatism is a set of notions that proposes a prudent relationship with one's own capabilities, as an individual social agent, and the status quo that represents values, tradition, and institutions that are rooted in life as they perceived as natural but not as socially constructed (Jones, 2017). Hence, one can refer to those set of thoughts as conservative in the sense that protecting the existing values but at the same time open to the changes as well as adjustments but not for the sake of destroying the existing ones. Religion, as a significant variable of the status quo, is appreciated by this definition but not the religiosity per se; thus, it is instrumentalized to the way in which it becomes bound with the values and traditions which hold the existing structure together and operates as an antidote to radical revisionism. In the Turkish context this set of thoughts operationalized through a Weberian ideal-type conceptualization of conservatism (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009; Öniş, 2009; Toprak et al., 2009; Engin and Pals, 2018; Yeşilada and Noordijk, 2010; Hale and Özbudun, 2009). Therefore, in accordance with this, conservatism depicted with certain adjectives that are referring to the idea of appreciating the values and traditions, both in the senses of material and ideational dimensions, of the majority for the sake of reducing the uncertainties as well as overcoming the perceived threats (Engin and Pals, 2018; Yeşilada and Noordijk, 2010). Moreover, these depictions assumed to be existing in the real life as they are depicted and operating in the social agents' life by determining their both actions and

through abovementioned definition and put all of the consequences of their attempts under the same basket as if they constitute a homogeneous entity.

perceptions. In the Turkish social science context, this broad framework is utilized by several significant studies regarding conservatism. These studies emphasize the paradigm shift in the global political context when studying conservatism (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). Therefore, the cold-war paradigm, which defined through the geopolitical rivalry in a bipolar world order, ended at the beginning of the 1990s and this created a political vacuum that caused conflicts that could not be explained by the cold-war paradigm; thus, left out uncertainties that could not reconcile with the emerging world order (Huntington, 1993, 2000). In this equation, Huntington's civilizational approach became the dominant paradigm and thus became the successor of the cold war paradigm (Huntington, 1993, 2000). Accordingly, the conflicts that arise from the 1990s are interpreted as the conflict and competition of not the geopolitical calculations but the conflict of identities and values of the parties. Hence, these identities and values are defined with religion and positioned against its perceived other (Huntington, 2000). In this structural equation, social agents have embraced their religion and defined their identities through the directives of it in the unit of analysis of individuals but this is caused by the phenomenon of the paradigm shift towards the civilizational perspective in the unit of analyses of international system and states. (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). Thus, the traditional left-right nexus as well as geopolitical calculations implying the cold war bipolar order sort of weakened and cleavages in accordance with the social agents' identities, and their representation from the state level through a civilizational discourse to the international system, became hegemon (Öniş, 2009). In line with the periodization of this narrative, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009) come up to test the hypothesis of this rising conservatism of individuals through identity-based politics in the context of Turkey. In their study, they use a battery of questions that reflect the historical conceptualization of conservatism and thus they incorporate that definition into their case. Questions in their battery are significant to understand their both methodological and empirical approach. For instance, one question, which is "is there one truth in life?", directly connotes that the positive answer to this question reveals the conservatism of the social agent (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). The problem with this method of measurement is that firstly it begins with an on-paper definition of conservatism that is assumed to be incorporated by the social agents on the field. Secondly, with such questions, they may measure

something else other than the conservatism itself. For instance, the positive answer to those may imply close-mindedness as such that may put into the basket to the social agents whose practices may be identified with the other ideologies than conservatism such as seculars, who may also believe that there is only one truth in life, which may be the Kemalist modernism or any ideology that count its reality as ultimate without a question as such. Thirdly, in line with the first two methodological problems, the studies in this literature focus on the perceptions of the social agents whose self-declared conservatism is the only determinant in measuring their identity. Fourthly, without a theoretical framework, the studies in this category imply positivism in a sense that their position implies as if they will grasp the reality of social agents by their self-declared positions without acknowledging any potential omitted variable/s. In elsewhere, Binnaz Toprak et al. (2009) measures the conservatism in the context of Turkey by studying the victims of it and relying on the definition of the concept similar to Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu. But Toprak et al. (2009) put forward a theoretical difference, which is the concept of *mahalle baskısı* of Şerif Mardin (2008), to make their analysis appropriate to the Turkish context. However, they only reverse Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu's (2009) methodology by trying to measure the conservatism of Turkey through asking self-declared positions of "non-conservatives" in other words people who are suffering from the consequences of rising conservatism in Turkey (Toprak et al., 2009). In addition, this methodological difference causes that they make ecological fallacy by generalizing the self-declaration of the non-conservatives about conservatism as if their sample is capable of representing all country. Consequently, the studies in this category emphasize structure more than agency by, firstly, focusing on the paradigm shifts in international politics, and secondly, they take for granted the consequences of such shifts in the level of agency, in other words in the level of political leadership as well as individuals, and thirdly, they take self-declared responses of the social agents as representing the ultimate reality, in this regard, they overlook the practices, thus measure the concept through merely a political ideology as the only determinant in measuring their conservatism as well as proving their hypotheses.

The studies in the fourth group focus on conservatism through a rather unique conceptualization which is Neo-Ottomanism. The concept of Neo-Ottomanism used to

define the political economic context of the 1980s in order to describe the emerging open market economy's cultural impetus (Laçiner, 2003, 2009; Yavuz, 1998; Çolak, 2006). Accordingly, economically liberal but culturally conservative consecutive governments of Motherland Party through the 1980s have come up with softening Kemalism's monolithic narrative of secular Turkish history in order to promote the influx of foreign exchange to the emerging sectors of tourism, services and export-oriented industries (Çolak, 2006). In this regard, the Ottoman heritage, which overlooked by the Kemalism through construction of an alternative historical narrative that based on the Turkish heritage as opposed to Ottoman past that perceived as anti-secular as well as anti-modern, encouraged to be instrumentalized for the sake of expanding the country's export ambit through regions that have Ottoman past and conservative orientation (Laçiner, 2003, 2009). On the other hand, with the Justice and Development Party coming to power in the context of 2000s, the concept of Neo-Ottomanism started to exceed the abovementioned economy-based definition and became to be perceived in a broader context that refers to a collective ideological position (Yavuz, 2016; Yang Erdem, 2017; Tokdoğan, 2018; Wastnidge, 2019; Uzer, 2020; Çınar, 2020). In this regard, Ünal Çınar (2020) refers to it as "reinvention of the ancestors" in order to have an impetus in the domestic power struggle to conservative social groups while also mentioning that this reinvention emphasizes a shared collective memory that glorifies the memory of Ottoman past and makes it related with recent political subject-matters (Çınar, 2020). The studies in this category focus on the issue through a rather unprecedented manner that incorporates individual social agent to the collectivity of a social political movement with regards to not only political participation but also emotional attachment (Yavuz, 2016; Tokdoğan, 2018; Çınar 2020). However, here the discussion is not limited to the conservatism of the social agents and conservatism of the city space emphasized in relation to the conservatism of the social agents. Therefore, the conservatism of the city space with the abovementioned periodization referred to as "conquering the city" through making İstanbul appropriate for the conservative taste thus make the space itself to obey the conservative ideological hegemony (Wastnidge, 2019; Uzer, 2020). Therefore, one must appreciate the contribution of the studies in this category to the literature because they bring mostly overlooked social agents' emotions to the analysis. Here, contrary to rational choice paradigm's assumption, the social agents are not

merely material beings who give consent to political and economic projects which led them to strengthen their position in the sense of material capabilities. Rather, especially it is very visible in Tokdoğan's (2018) study that the social agents depicted as ideational beings who rely on emotional interaction with the political actors as well as collectivity of the social group and seek to establish emotional ties among them and feel as if they are constituting "us" and therefore rely on emotionally this socially constructed phenomenon, which constituted upon the loyalty of the cult of leadership in terms of a charismatic leader as well as in terms of metaphors and symbols of the fictional narratives of the past, when facing and struggling with "them" (Tokdoğan, 2018). Therefore, the empirical resources of these studies are the analyses of symbols, discourses and myths that are related and become subject to the conservative/Islamist narratives. Nevertheless, even though the studies in this category seem to be distinct from a Cartesian approach, they, ironically, pull out from the notion of conservatism as a civilizational project that all variables, such as symbols and myths of the constructed historical narrative, directly connote that each practice of social agents, regarding those variables, are calculated towards the strategy of rebuilding and protecting their civilization (Yavuz, 2016; Yang Erdem, 2017). In addition, conceptualizing pious individuals, political Islamists, as well as conservatives with all-encompassing concept of Neo-Ottomanism, implies that the studies in this category overlook the differences among them. Likewise, they depict social agents as if their sociality completely relies on the theoretical construct of a concept because this is caused by the difficulty of studying a subject-matter through a conceptualization that has not equivalence on the field. Thus, we can infer practices of social agents, who fall into one of the abovementioned three categories, through the concept of Neo-Ottomanism if we are convinced to do so. Although the studies in this category have an unprecedented approach because they focus on emotions and study symbolisms of the spaces, they stick with merely on the collectivity thus they emphasize the structure over the agency and imply as if social agents are merely the products of collective sentiments and memories and thus their subjectivity isolated from the analysis. Consequently, regarding sampling strategy, Tokdoğan (2019) focuses on Instagram accounts whose titles inspired by the conservative and political Islamist oriented historical figures in a fictional manner such as Abdülhamid the II and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, as they are the personification of the of

conservative and political Islamist social agents, and their posts which exhibited as the empirical data for the arguments and hypotheses. Obviously, this methodological choice brings out questions about the validity and accuracy of the findings of the studies in this category which eventually incorporate with the setbacks in conceptualization of the subject-matter and led to the problem in methodology merge with theoretical side of the matter.

The last category in the literature of conservatism focuses on the practices of conservative social agents in their social spaces. Accordingly, current government of JDP represents the conservative sovereignty but its policies do not exactly reflect upon the conservative social spaces and the theoretical choice here is to study conservatism through not isolating from the sovereignty in the level of government, but in accordance with that, to reveal their agency level differences as well as similarities with the structure level determinants (Durak, 2013; White, 2014; Doğan, 2016; Çavdar, 2016; Özet, 2019; Akçaoğlu, 2020). Here, the context is crucial thus in order to study in accordance with the context these studies focus on cases to reveal their context's unprecedented characteristics. Hence, there is an implication in this regard that the case that they study has determinants in which a scrutiny that accomplished through a structural unit of analysis would disregard them and this is what may be defined as context. The context may be the empirical spatial existence of a conservative space as well as it may be the theoretical analysis of the space. However, one thing is common that these studies focus on case studies; the cases such as spaces in the city with conservative characteristics that are assumed to be the conservative strongholds. Methodologically, these studies gather empirical data through qualitative techniques such as interviews, focus groups, and ethnographic designs. Therefore, they incorporate and then compare and contrast discourses of their respondents with their practices. In addition, they use the historicity of the space that is under the scrutiny and, in many respects, they use comparison in order to enforce their findings' representation capabilities as to be able to represent not only to their case but also the other strongholds which, assumingly, have similarities regarding the identities of social agents in those spaces (Durak, 2013; White, 2014; Doğan, 2016; Çavdar, 2016; Özet, 2019; Akçaoğlu, 2020). In this regard, Akçaoğlu (2020) focuses on Ankara's Çukurambar district

to study how conservative agents' ideology, taste and practices have transformed through time. However, the important theoretical distinction is that Akçaoğlu (2020) analyses the abovementioned three determinants of conservatism through tracing the transformation in the agency level integrating this with the transformation on the space. Thus, he concentrates on the space, where in his case is Çukurambar, as a structural phenomenon while trying to incorporate its transformations' reflections to the level of agency who in his case are the conservative social agents. Hence, with this approach Akçaoğlu (2020) accomplishes to showcase how Çukurambar has transformed through changes in the political economic contexts of the country and how conservative social agents participated this transition through contributing and through impacting this transformation and, consequently, how their tastes, ideologies and practices impacted back by the space as a result of their active contribution (Akçaoğlu, 2020). In elsewhere, Doğan (2016) focuses on the İstanbul's Kağıthane in which she puts forward a historical materialist perspective thus approaches her case where conflict and competition over gaining the material resources is the primary motivation of the social groups. Hence, Doğan (2016) problematizes how political Islamist, conservative and rightist field has established in Kağıthane and how the relations of different social classes and social groups impelling in this environment and how this structure reproduced. Doğan (2016) discusses the roles of structure, which is the current mode of production strategy in the district, and agency who are the conservative/political Islamist/rightist people who are performing in accordance with the local party politics. Furthermore, Durak (2013) focuses on an industrial district in Konya where he studies the middle-size enterprises of owned by conservatives and their relations with the labor. Durak (2013) investigates how the relations have established in between the labor as well as the employers of the district, both conceptualized as conservative/political Islamist oriented social agents, and how their similarity in terms of their identity plays a role in the current political economic status quo in the industrial district of Konya. Similar to Akçaoğlu (2020) and Doğan (2016), Durak (2013) emphasizes peculiarities in his case through exploring them on studying practices of both employers and labor, however, contrary to them, Durak (2013) does not approach his case with a theoretical understanding thus perceives it merely a place to gather empirical data. On the other hand, Özet (2019) focuses on İstanbul's Fatih and Başakşehir districts, where the former is known as the conservative

stronghold much before the JDP's took over of the government and the latter known as whose' disperse has materialized in accordance with conservative and political Islamists' consecutive election victories in local and central governments. The main research problem of Özet (2019) is to discuss how sovereignty that accomplished in the level of government reflected upon conservative social agents' daily life on the field in the light of the transformation in their habitus and as a result of this and how their interactions with "others" evolved after accomplishing economic, social, cultural and symbolic capitals in the level of agency. Özet (2019) uses the Weberian concept of social closure to discuss his findings. However, he puts all of the "others", who labelled by the conservatives, on the same basket with the concept of subalternity (Özet, 2019). Hence, this makes the meaning of secular, Kurdish, Gypsy as well as Syrian "other" of conservatism as if they constitute a homogeneous entity (Özet, 2019). Nevertheless, his research questions whether this social closure happened as a result of mobilizing the identity-based differences or class related differences or if they both operate at the same time which one is dominant in the process of othering and exclusion are significant questions that open unprecedented venues for research. Çavdar (2016), too, focuses on Başakşehir and discusses how urbanization has impacted the conservative social agents' practices as well as their ideologies. In this regard, Çavdar (2016) scrutinizes how the district of Başakşehir has established in the beginning of 1990s and how it has transformed as a space and how that transformation on the characteristics of a space impacted by as well as impact on the conservative social agents. Hence, in accordance with her findings, Çavdar (2016) conceptualizes conservative social agent not with regard to the historical dichotomy, which is secular versus pious, but with how conservative social agents have become "earthly" but not reflecting the secularism as such but more of a combination of conservative taste in line with the current political economic conjuncture. This approach brings out unique venues for further research of conservatism as such that Çavdar (2016) reveals that it is very possible to discuss a conservatism as a homogeneous entity in the context of Başakşehir because abovementioned transformation of the conservative social agents led to the creation of distinct social classes among them. Thus, once a homogeneous peripheral space that is constituted by the "periphery of society", Başakşehir transformed from a theoretical metaphor of this stereotype towards a space that has divergent identity and class based

social agencies within the conservative social agents themselves (Çavdar, 2016). Besides, White (2014) uses a combination of concepts in order to define the social agents in her findings. She uses “Muslim nationalists” to define them (White, 2014). Therefore, her case has not a spatial characteristic; but has a social agent based and anthropological peculiarity. Accordingly, White (2014) traces how religiosity combined with the ethnic as well as cultural understanding of Turkishness paves the way to a certain characteristic of living on the spheres of economy, politics, and culture of pious conservative social agents. In elsewhere, Yankaya (2014) focuses on businessman association of MÜSİAD, known as an establishment of pious elites, to study reflections of conservative social agents’ thoughts and practices about political economic processes to their own enterprises and then the association that has incorporated those enterprises. Thus, Yankaya’s (2014) case as well is not reflecting a spatial characteristic; but showcasing an institutional framework of conservative social agency. If we turn back to the studies in the second group in order to better perceive Yankaya’s approaches’ (2014) peculiarity, we see how Hoşgör (2011) perceives MÜSİAD, with sort of Cox’s concept of social force, through emphasizing merely of its mobilization capabilities on the conservative/political Islamist hegemony. Yankaya’s (2014) more or less phenomenological approach, however, sets to reveal the patterns, contradictions as well as divergences within the MÜSİAD itself; thus, paving the way to a more nuanced understanding that disregards reductionism.

Consequently, abovementioned studies contribute to the literature of conservatism in the context of Turkey through studying it in on the field with focusing on the conservative social agents’ practices and thoughts. In doing so, they reconcile structure and agency by emphasizing historicity of their cases and political economic transformations of the country and how conservative agency perceive them, get affected by them and participate on the constitution of the impacts of those processes. Some studies do this through utilizing from Bourdieu’s epistemological as well as conceptual approach, but some others do this relying on more of their empirical data than a theoretical perspective. Even though these studies put forward significant contributions, conservative agent and migration phenomenon studies very little or not at all because those studies mostly refer migration issue as migrated population on the

conservative spaces is one of the others of conservative social agents. Hence, this study seeks to contribute the literature of conservatism with studying on the encounter between conservative social agents and migrants on the conservative space.

The studies in migration literature cover the Syrian migration issue from various perspectives. This paper divides them into four: institutionalist approach, perception evaluative approach, political party approach, and anthropological approach. Even though it is possible to categorize the studies in the literature of migration that deal with the fallouts of the migration from Syria to Turkey in accordance with abovementioned categories, there are several studies that are crosscutting to those categories. For instance, Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerçi (2020) focus on Adana as a case to study the local-migrant relationship. In their study, the economic setbacks that have created by the de-industrialization of the city, which is related with structure, come across with the arrival of Syrian migrants, which is related with the agency, that the locals perceive as if this arrival is the reason of the economic setbacks that they are suffering (Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerçi, 2020). Therefore, this study crosscuts the categories of perception evaluative approach and anthropological approach. Furthermore, Yıldız and Uzgören (2016) focus on İzmir as a case in order to reveal the local perceptions about Syrian migrants, they also focus on the institutional framework regarding to the legislative process. Similarly, Saraçoğlu and Belanger (2019) focus on İzmir to assess anti-Syrian xenophobia through an ethnographical framework which interlinks perception evaluative approach to the anthropological approach. Consequently, some pieces of Doğu Şimşek (2018, 2019) can be interpreted as they crosscut institutionalist approach, perception evaluative approach as well as anthropological approach. After emphasizing these exceptions, starting from the next paragraph, this paper will discuss the migration literature that deals with the Syrian case through the abovementioned four categories.

Firstly, institutionalist approach focus on the migration regime of Turkey and how legislative arrangements shapes the lives of migrated populations in the country (İçduygu, 2015a, 2015b; İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016; İçduygu and Millet, 2016; İçduygu and Diker, 2017; İçduygu and Nimer 2019; İçduygu and Sert 2019; Korkut, 2016; Şimşek, 2017; Adalı and Türkyılmaz, 2020; Civelek, 2017; Canefe, 2016; Baban, Ilcan & Rygiel, 2016; Köşer Akçapar and Şimşek, 2018). Institutional perspective puts forward a

historical approach in comparing the influxes through the perspective of how the migration regime meets the demands of moving populations and how it treated those who seek to integrate themselves to the host community. This literature emphasizes the need for a strong legislative framework and implementation of it when dealing with the Syrian migrated population. Thus, for this reason, the studies focus on the Laws on Foreigners in 2013 and 2014, the establishment of “Temporary Protection Regime” in 2014 and the establishment of bureaucratic body of migration in 2013, which is the Directorate of Migration Management (DGMM) as well as 2016 law that gave work permit to migrants who assigned to the temporary protection regime. However, there is a strong emphasis on legislative framework on this literature for not only the context of Turkey but also for the countries, especially the members of EU, which affected by the migration. Therefore, for instance, while İçduygu emphasizes the enforcement of the role of Turkey’s institutional capabilities in dealing with the migration issues, he also stresses that international refugee regime and particularly to the EU’s effort in implementing that crucial because İçduygu emphasizes the strong legislative framework for the migration issue requires international perspective as well as parallel efforts on solving the issues related with migration (İçduygu, 2015a, 2015b). Moreover, this literature, by pointing out institutional regulations of states as prerequisites for dealing with the migration issue, is emphasizing the long-term strategies over ad hoc regulations as reactions to growing numbers of migrants. Likewise, this literature points out a structuralist approach because it deals with “Turkish state” as if it has an ontological existence that is isolated from the political, ideational, economical etc. differences among governments. Besides, it historicizes “Turkish state's” migration regime through a structuralist perspective because it compares the different influxes and the reaction to those influxes in different conjunctures and contexts; thus, this paves a way to interpret that this literature is structuralist not only dealing with the Turkish state as an ontological being but also it is structuralist in dealing with the institutional refugee regime of the country. Moreover, this literature perceives the migration issue through the normative lenses and emphasizes that migration issue is above from politics because it emerged because of wars, forced deportations and alike humanitarian disasters; thus, one must put this on top of his/her analysis. In relation with these, the status of migrants is significant because it implies how they are going to be treated by the host

country for this literature. Therefore, by pointing out the constraints that produced for Syrian migrants by the Turkey's signature to the 1951 Geneva Convention, it emphasizes the need for giving migrants appropriate status through accepting their condition of being refugees and granting them the rights which are in accordance with the merits of international refugee regime. Hence, the overall implication is that when the state establishes a legislative framework that meets the needs of migrated population, then they will be integrated to the hosting society. While emphasizing the importance of institutional framework, this literature limits itself with the institutional approach and overlooks the sociological, political as well as economic aspects of the migration issue. The direct connotation of the argument, which is top-down legislative regulation could solve the divergences and conflicts regarding the migration issue, is isolating the several major aspects that will be mentioned in the coming paragraphs.

Secondly, especially after the influxes from Syria in 2013 and 2014, the studies, which have been attempting to measure the perception of both the host communities as well as the migrated population, have emerged. Thus, this literature focuses on whether the host communities identify themselves with the migrants as well as whether migrants feel close to the natives. Therefore, this literature measures the perceptions and regards them as the driving force in dealing with the policies of migration (Erdoğan, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2019; Gülyaşar, 2017; Yıldırım alp and İslamoğlu, 2017; Kirişçi, 2014; Biner and Soykan, 2016; Çorabatır, 2016). The importance of this literature has increased due to an increase in the number of migrants. Starting from 2014, the ISIS takeover to the provinces of Northern as well as Northeast parts of Syria has led to greater influxes to Turkey, in addition to that, Assad/Iran/Russia bloc's efforts to take back the populous city of Aleppo in 2016 from the Turkish backed rebels also led the population there to move to Turkey. Therefore, these two processes have caused an intense wave of influxes to Turkey; thus, causing a significant rise in the number of migrants settling in the country. Therefore, the attention of the public opinion regarding to such migration influxes increased in parallel of the population of the migrated people. By the time the political parties proposed policies for 2015 elections, the migration issue from Syria appeared as one of the debated subject, putting forward especially by the opposition. Thus, measuring what Turkish society thinks about "Syrians" became

important for explaining the migration phenomenon through the host community's lenses. However, there are several setbacks in these studies because it does not give explanations but only provides descriptions. Moreover, as the abovementioned literature treats Turkish state through an ontological perspective, this literature does the same while arguing to reveal "Turkish people's" perception of refugees by leaving out the question of which "Turkish people" are we talking about. Likewise, by focusing on the "perceptions", this literature leaves aside the practices as well as interactions and fallouts of inhabitant-migrated encounter. The IOM Turkey report (2019) shows that all "Turkish people" is not experiencing the migration phenomenon in practice because while the numbers of the migrated people are high in some parts of the country as well as in some parts of the big cities, there are many parts of the country as well as parts of the big cities that are isolated from this issue because the number of migrants in those places are very low that make them non-existent in the eyes of the public there. In this regard, a survey that has a sampling which can represent the country may not produce meaningful findings in practice even if it is valid from the perspective of scientific merits because of the abovementioned fact. Likewise, it relies on the subjectivity of the agency and their self-declared propositions about "Syrians" through isolating them from structural contexts. This equation proposes a monolithic subject, which is "Turkish people" regarding to a monolithic segment of people, which is "Syrians" by leaving divergences both in former and the latter aside in order to make generalizations about findings. These methodological choices imply as if those studies aim to find out or measure in what degree the perceptions of "Turkish people's" about migration impact their voting behaviour. Consequently, here the findings show us not what is happening on the field in terms of inhabitant-migrated population encounters but show us what is on the minds of "Turkish people" about "Syrians".

Thirdly, there are several studies which focus on the migration issue through the units of analysis of governing party politics. Accordingly, how JDP, which has been the ruling party from the starting point of migration from Syria in 2011, puts forward policies regarding to the Syrian migration influx and how those policies have been shifting through different periods in accordance with domestic as well as international political dimensions, and how the JDP has been legitimizing its policies to its constituency and

public of Turkey. (Gümüş and Eroğlu, 2015; Tür and Kumral, 2016; Memişoğlu and Ilgıt, 2017; Polat, 2018; Ongur and Zengin, 2019; Altıok and Tosun, 2019; Sert and Daniş, 2020; Balkılıç and Lloyd, 2020). The studies in this category are all using the methodology of critical discourse analysis to cover the policymakers' speeches regarding Syrian migration issue. In addition, process-tracing method is common in order to reveal the continuities and differences through the reception period of the migrants from Syria from 2011 to today and creating a causation reasoning to the policies of the government. For instance, analysing the *ensar/muhacir* discourse of the JDP when welcoming migrants from Syria with an open-door policy is a popular subject-matter of the studies in this category. Likewise, how the reception strategies of JDP connect with the political calculations about the future domestic politics of Syria in addition to a broader geopolitical understanding about the Middle East region is a subject-matter that studies in this category are struggling with. Besides, the studies in this category are crucial in recognizing the peculiarities and similarities of the current government's policies towards migrants; thus, subjectification of the government through analyses of its identity-based characteristics. Hence, this methodological choice allows us to realize that the migration issue from Syria is unprecedented and the government which has been dealing with this issue has a particular identity, therefore, the approach here is far away from the ontological understanding of the studies in abovementioned first category which have preferred to objectify the government as the "Turkish state" rather than subjectify its peculiar characteristics. However, the studies that focus on the characteristics of current JDP government approach disregard the sociological processes of the migration such as the encounters between migrants and inhabitants and, thus, reduce the whole migration issue to a JDP's policy making processes.

Fourthly, the anthropological approaches to the Syrian migration issue cover this subject-matter through case studies aiming to perceive the experiences, practices, and perceptions of the Syrian migrants. Therefore, where the migrants settle in when they come to Turkey, how those kinds of decisions are made as well as what kinds of determinants impacted their decisions and what kinds of processes that they face regarding their destination, occupation and living conditions are the main questions that this literature seeks to deal with. Therefore, in contrary to two preceding works of

literature, this literature does not perceive migrants as if they belong to a monolithic identity in terms of ethnicity and cultural belonging, class as well as world views; thus, recognizing the need for conceptualizing migrated populations in accordance with their differentiated identities, classes, social backgrounds as well as related dimensions (Kaya, 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Kaya and Kıraç, 2016; Kaya and Rottman, 2020; Şimşek, 2020; Kılıçaslan, 2016). Hence, migrated population is not reflecting a holistic existence as generalizing through the umbrella of being a “Syrian” and the hosting communities are not reflecting a common “Turkishness” in their interaction but rather they are showing a diverse set of experiences and practices depending on a spatial as well as a context of conjuncture. According to this literature, consequently, the harmony, tension, or inertia could not emerge merely with one’s experiences, observations, ideologies, or perceptions but it can be revealed through studying actual practices of one’s life through revealing the crosscutting impacts of both ideational and material aspects. Kaya (2016) traces the origins of Syrian migrated populations in İstanbul and finds out that %86 percent of them are coming from the city of Aleppo. In addition, he reveals that there are patterns regarding to their destinations in İstanbul; thus, they prefer certain districts to live. Likewise, he scrutinizes why this is the case through a theoretical framework of “cultural intimacy” and “social network”. By doing this, he studies on the identity and culturally based determinants of migration. He seeks to find out why there are thousands of migrants in some districts of İstanbul while in some neighbours they are almost non-existing. In addition to identity-based similarities based on religion, Kaya also puts forwards cultural dimensions such as music, food, social activities and moral/cultural values when he studies the inhabitant and Syrian migrant encounter (Kaya, 2016; Kaya and Rottman, 2020). However, if we put the period of 2012-2016 aside, cultural intimacy hypothesis is disrupted by the rising insurgency among conservative strongholds of İstanbul due to the accelerated increase in the number of migrants and rising economic setbacks such as inflation and unemployment are happening at the same time. Therefore, the hospitality that promoted by the president, as well as incumbent government figures’ speeches, have turned into exasperation especially after the consecutive Turkish incursions into Northern Syria, starting from 2016, and it appears that the public opinion on the conservative strongholds started to be convinced on the perceived safety of the Northern areas of Syria thanks to the

Turkish incursion; thus, questioning the current situation regarding the intensity of the migrant population in their districts as unnecessary and inappropriate. Nevertheless, whatever the reasons, perceived or real, are whether if the natives' thoughts of economic downturn are a misrecognition of blaming on migrants or the perceived safety on the Syrian soil, the palpable situation on the field is that there is a rising tension among the locals about the migrants. Therefore, once successfully reveal the reasons for accommodation of migrants on conservative districts of the cities and their sort of harmonious participation in daily life in those districts, cultural intimacy approach fails to respond the shifting realities on the field. For this reason, this thesis approaches this subject-matter through Bourdieu's conceptual toolbox that puts forward explanations on conflict and competition among social groups.

In addition, abovementioned studies (Kaya, 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Kaya and Kırac, 2016; Kaya and Rottman, 2020; Şimşek, 2020; Kılıçaslan, 2016) focus on the districts such as Sultanbeyli, Küçükçekmece, Esenler, Fatih, Esenler, Başakşehir and Bağcılar where the Syrian migrants' population is high with a comparative perspective. I choose to study Fatih with a similar motivation. However, there is a theoretical difference which is while abovementioned studies focus on these places to gather empirical data, my study does not only seek to utilize the potential empirical abundance in Fatih, but intend to focus there through Bourdieu's concept of field. Accordingly, as emphasized before, my thesis will emphasize Fatih with not only its spatial importance for this subject-matter, but more importantly, it will emphasize Fatih as a constructed social space where power configuration among social groups in general and conflict and competition among social agents in particular will be addressed. Thus, when this materialized, it will provide a theoretical contribution to this part of the literature. Şimşek (2020), on the other hand, also shifts this perspective from resemblance on identity-based variables to class dimensions that reflect differences and showcases how migrants' life is changing in accordance with their status based on class. For instance, Şimşek (2020) shows that Syrian migrants, who have certain economic as well as social capital, experience different life in where they are migrated and how those, who have little or zero social and economic capital, struggle to live in where they are migrated (Şimşek, 2020). Moreover, by focusing on the neighbours of Küçükçekmece, a periphery in İstanbul, as

her case study, Kılıçaslan (2016) analyses the encounter of internally displaced Kurdish people of Turkey and Kurdish Syrian migrants. Accordingly, this encounter took place in a periphery of the big city where unofficial economy is the main source of people's income. Kılıçaslan (2016) shows how the empathy turns into competition and conflict after a period of time and how this creates cultural divergences. Kılıçaslan (2016) analyses this process in the neighbour in accordance with the process of what happened in Syria. Thus, she interlinks structure with agency, a conflict which is happening in macro level, in other words in the units of analysis of international and state, to a micro level, in other words, in the units of analysis of individuals in a spatial environment (Kılıçaslan, 2016). Thus, abovementioned studies crosscut the structural and agency level explanations and by proposing an analysis of particular case in where the impact of Syrian migrants are visible, thus, the encounter between local inhabitants and migrants is intense. Because it is a case study that focuses on the encounter of conservatives and migrants and the practices that emerge as a result of this encounter, this thesis is attempting to contribute to the Syrian migration literature particularly in this category because of its theoretical and methodological choices, however, it will be utilizing from the findings and approaches of also from the studies that of the first three categories.

Consequently, even though the subject-matters of conservative sovereignty and Syrian migration phenomenon in the context of Turkey studied by the epistemic community with a great competence, they did not address the crosscutting research question of why the conservative habitus failed to incorporate Syrian migrants on the conservative fields of İstanbul. Therefore, firstly, this thesis seeks to fill this gap in both of these works of literature. Secondly, studying conservatism and migration with Bourdieu's epistemological and conceptual understanding will make a difference especially on the side of migration. On the side of studies about conservatism, Bourdieu has utilized on many cases; thus, studying conservatism with Bourdieu will not bring any unique theoretical contribution but will provide fresh empirical data from the field especially in terms of the encounter of conservative social agent and migrants. On the other hand, as it emphasized, the studies that deal with the Syrian migration phenomenon stuck with the choice of focusing the issue through structure or agency point of view in which the former disregards the practices of agents while the latter disregards the fallouts of

political economic processes, which is structure in this regard, to the social agents on the field. In this aspect, studying with Bourdieu will overcome this binary opposition through incorporating structural explanations to the agency level of the issue.

CHAPTER 4 – CONSERVATIVE HABITUS FORMATION AND MIGRATION

This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I discuss the formation of conservative habitus in the Fatih district. Specifically, I discuss the question of how the conservative habitus established in the Turkish context through emphasizing the implications of nation-state formation, internal migration flows, political economic processes as well as political party movements which played significant roles on the formation of conservative habitus. Following, I discuss the question of why the conservative habitus failed to incorporate Syrian migrants in Fatih while, again, emphasizing intertwined contexts which impacted on the process of inclusion and exclusion of migrants who became part of the Fatih as a social group due to the Syrian civil war. In this part, I provide empirical data from the field. Likewise, I provide a process-tracing approach to discuss the abovementioned contexts. Thus, this chapter start with the first part in where I try to bring out the context. My aim here is to put forward a case study while assisting explanations through discussing the contexts which impacted the course of events in the migration issue of Fatih. One must clarify, however, I do not approach Syrian migration case, which started in 2011, as an unprecedented migration flow for the case of Fatih because, as it will be clarified in the first part, Fatih district has experienced several migration flows both internal and external throughout the Turkish Republican history. However, the unprecedented issue here is the fact that Syrian migrants welcomed by the social group who were the subaltern social group of the district before the conservative sovereignty. Therefore, I approach to the Syrian migration case as a recent migration flow to Fatih and analyze what happened as a result of this wave.

Fatih district has become an important avenue to observe the conflict and competition among the social groups in the context of Turkey. From the establishment of the newly Turkish Republic in 1923, it has become an avenue of diverse social groups that inherited from the complex Ottoman social system. Therefore, in accordance with a broad categorization, Muslim –both Turkish and non-Turkish heritage- as well as non-Muslims –Greeks and Jews- constituted the natives of the district from 1880s to 1950s.

The nation-state formation of Turkish state elites reflected upon the district starting from the early years of the republic, particularly from the early 1920s to 1950s. The nation-state formation required a homogeneous social setting in terms of both heritage and religion. In other words, two pillars of the newly established republic, which are ethnicity –both in the sense of heritage and cultural belongings of the people- and religion became the determinants of the “ideal” citizens of Turkey (Üstel, 2016).

In accordance with this understanding Fatih district transformed through socially and economically. Prior to that natives of the district constituted of non-Muslim population of Ottoman Empire who were also elites of the economic sphere in terms of being the bourgeoisie class of the society (Keyder, 1987). The migration from rural areas to the city as well as the population exchanges of Muslim populations from the Balkans to the İstanbul impacted Fatih district as well. From 1950s, therefore, Muslims started to become the dominant social group in the district.

Even though this was the case, it did not create a dramatic breaking point in the history of Fatih because the Muslim natives of the district mostly protected their status as well as their population contrary to the non-Muslims who displaced as a result of formal and informal policies of the state. Native Muslims of the district inherited the capabilities of the non-Muslim population of the district. For instance, as emphasized early, there were not Muslims as a social group in the bourgeoisie class of late Ottoman social setting as well as early republican era. Moreover, the “center”, which depicted as the urban population, composed of mostly non-Muslims who established economic as well as social relations with the administrative elite of the Ottoman bureaucracy and with the transnational capitalists of Europe (Keyder, 1987).

However, in the case of Fatih, even though the non-Muslim population controlled the accumulation of capital, there were not strict market relations among the constituencies of non-Muslims because non-Muslim population appreciated with skills of craftsmanship and strong trade tradition which were mostly contradicted with the market relations of center capitalist economies of the era (Cagaptay, 2006). Through the decades of interaction with the non-Muslims, the Muslims inherited the capabilities of their production as well as life habits and therefore adopted themselves to the habitus of the district (Cagaptay, 2006).

Obviously Fatih had the characteristics of conservatism before the 20. century which inherited from the Ottoman ulema class as well as tarikats that were the Islamic establishments of the state and mostly operated as unofficial civil society foundations. However, there was an important distinction in relation to their interaction with the other social groups. Most importantly, they were not exclusionary foundations and they were mostly respected the Ottoman *millet system* which recognized the difference on populations' beliefs. With the nation-state formation, however, the Turkishness absorbed Muslimness in a way to exclude non-Muslims from the social formation of the state (Keyder, 1987). Despite the formal discourse emphasized Turkishness through culturalist thus inclusive form of citizenship of Turkish nation-state, the practices that reflected from the policies implied and required ethnic characteristics of the social groups in order to be accepted by the state (Üstel, 2016). Thus, in a nutshell, early conservatism of Fatih constituted of inclusive cultural characteristics which were based on religion that respect and respected other religions, the nation-state formation era of conservatism constituted exclusion through ethnic characteristics which intertwined with the religion of the social groups.

However, this difference did not pave the way for institutionalization of conservatism on the Fatih district. On the contrary, through the secularism aspect, the state banned the religious foundations and labeled them as the antidote of the concept of modernism thus restricted capabilities of Islamic foundations in terms of education, social and economic relations (Cagaptay, 2006). The palpable instruments of this policy reflected upon the foundation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs which monopolized and centralized the control of Islam by the state (Cagaptay, 2006). Moreover, through the Directorate of Religious Affairs the state has Turkified the Islam through replacing Arabic call for prayers with Turkish call for prayers and pushed Islam to the private sphere of the people. Thus, in the early era of the republic we have seen that Fatih district gradually became dominated by Turkish and Muslim social groups, but their conservatism restricted by the secularist characteristic of the state.

This form of relations has sustained through the single party era of Turkey from 1923 to 1950 and the frozen dynamics of Muslimness on the public sphere has paved the way for populism by the newly established political parties for the sake of rejuvenation of

religion among Muslim social groups (Keyder, 1987). In 1950, the Democratic Party has taken over the government from the Republican Peoples Party through the discourse of emancipating of identities of the social groups (Keyder, 1987). This incident went hand in hand with the vast migration movement from the rural areas to the city spheres which solidified the domination of Turkish-Muslim social groups in the district of Fatih (Erdoğan and Kaya, 2015). From that time, Democratic Party government has recalled some strict policies of single party era about the religion. For instance, the call for prayers started to be announced again in Arabic and some religious foundations, who were loyal to the government, began to operate again (Cagaptay, 2006).

Moreover, the political economic mentality of the single party era was based on the emphasis of a classless society that pursue its motivation for the sake of the survival of the newly established nation in an environment of immense world wars and conflicts (Keyder, 1987). However, the political economic context of 1950s allowed the establishment of economically liberal order that puts the motivation of social mobility above anything else. This mentality reflected on the election campaign of Democratic Party through 1950s with the slogan of its chair Adnan Menderes “we will create a millionaire from every neighbor” (Keyder, 1987).

This mentality has intensified the tension among Muslim and non-Muslim social groups. The competition among them on becoming the dominant social group on the social and economic spheres gave rise to conflicts. The most striking incident on this matter happened on 5 and 6 September in 1955 in İstanbul (Bora, 2016a). This incident caused by the rumors that the Muslim Turkish population of Greece treated badly and the household of Atatürk damaged as a result of anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim demonstrations created an outbreak in İstanbul. Thousands of people attacked the places that were known as possessed by non-Muslim people and destroyed their shops, homes as well as foundations (Bora, 2016a). One of the significant avenues of this incident was the Fatih, especially its neighbors Balat and Ayvansaray, where known with its densely non-Muslim populations. This incident caused the further elimination of non-Muslims of Fatih and paved the way for the further Turkish-Muslim social groups' domination (Keyder, 1987).

The vast migration movement that started in 1950s from rural areas to the city is not only created a rupture between the Muslim and non-Muslim social groups but also created polarization among the native Muslim population and migrated Muslim population in the context of Fatih district. The emergence of homogeneous atmosphere in terms of identity did not diminish the differences among the Turkish and Muslim social groups (Erdoğan and Kaya, 2015). On the one hand, the natives depicted as the modernist elites of the newly established Turkish Republic, who belonged the classes that reflect high status such as bureaucracy and notables of tradespeople that inherited skills and craftsmanship from their outgoing non-Muslim masters/competitors. On the other hand, the newly arrived people depicted as people who aspire to rapid social mobility thus engaged in labor and self-employment that pursuing the effort of becoming part of the city spheres (Erdoğan and Kaya, 2015).

This polarization in Fatih among the social groups became more crystallized in the political economic context of 1960s in which post-coup governments shifted Turkish economy from liberal understanding to protected import-substitution industrialization. Accordingly, the economic structure has established for the purpose of meeting the domestic demand with domestic production. State-led industrialization efforts became hegemonic especially in the emerging urban peripheries (Keyder, 1987). Hence, several industrial areas have established in the district of Fatih especially through the Haliç strip where Ayyansaray, Balat and Cibali neighbors are located (Özet, 2019). The dominant class and the identity of social groups in Fatih, therefore, shifted towards working people who were part of the continuous migration towards there for to be incorporated by the diverse industries on the region which created a duality on the Fatih district where from one side it sort of protected its historical center position while most parts of it gradually became a peripheral working-class district (Özet, 2019).

However, this process did not pave the way for a class-based dynamics to be the main determinant regarding to the relations among the social groups because the identity-based dynamics have predominated. Özet (2019) argues that social groups mobilized their social capital when moving to the district of Fatih thus especially people from Sivas and Kastamonu provinces constituted the majority of the migrants who migrated to Fatih district for seeking job opportunities. As a result, the accumulated social capital of

the emerging social groups has institutionalized by the migrants, who arrived earlier than their fellows, through establishing hometown associations in the district (Özet, 2019).

Özet (2019) discusses the political orientations of the migrants who arrived at Fatih on the consecutive decades of 1960s and 1970s. Even though political Islam movement established as a political party in 1970 under the name of National Order Party, Özet (2019) argues that social groups in Fatih were mostly nationalist-conservatives who adhered center-rightist governments as well as rightist political figures of those decades. Therefore, contrary to the example of Kağıthane district in where leftist organizations became significant social forces through the mobilization of class-based associations as a result of a more or less similar industrialization process with Fatih at that time (Doğan, 2016), the social groups of Fatih supported pro-status quo rightist parties and mobilized through identity-based hometown associations as well as identity-based solidarity networks.

In the context of 1980s, however, several drastic changes impacted upon the dynamics of social groups in the district of Fatih. To begin with, following the 12 September 1980 coup Turkish economy transformed to a free market economy with adjusting itself to the emerging neoliberal economic structure of the world economy (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). Thus, several industrial districts around Fatih has started to be privatized and then displaced by the government as well as municipal administration of Motherland Party. Bedrettin Dalan, who were the mayor of İstanbul, transferred the industrial zones around Fatih to the further peripheries of the city. Hence, the 1960s and 1970s atmosphere of production as well as industrialization of Fatih disrupted and as a result of this private entrepreneurship became dominant socio-economic engagement in the district (Özet, 2019). For instance, the industrial zone of Cibali, where is near to Balat and Ayvansaray neighbors, transferred to elsewhere. Moreover, Kurdish movement became militarized as a result of harsh response of the coup regime to the political affairs of left as well as ethnic movements (Özet, 2019). In 1984, Kurdish movements' military wing, which is PKK, has realized its first armed attack in Eruh, Siirt. Turkish state responded harshly and started to displace many villages around the east Anatolia. As a result of this conflict, thousands of Kurdish people displaced and moved to the cities and

İstanbul, İzmir and Ankara became the main destinations (Yörük, 2012). From that time up until late 1990s, Kurdish people moved especially to Fatih where they established social networks similar to the early arrivals in 1960s and 1970s. Fatih became a hub of Kurdish internally displaced people thus this impacted on the dynamics among the social groups of Fatih district (Özet, 2019). Former industrial districts, which abandoned as a result of changing political economic context, became cheap and practical accommodations of internally displaced people (Özet, 2019).

Turkish state mobilized religion through absorbing it with the Turkishness and created a new formula which started to emphasize religion much more for the first time of the Turkish Republic. The formula has established around the Turkish-Islamist synthesis which adhered to religion in order to give government and state establishments an ideological strength when facing with anti-market leftist movements as well as ethnic movements (Bora, 2016b). There were drastic implications of these policies in the district of Fatih where several strong religious organizations have operated throughout decades but without a legitimacy because of the secularism aspect of the outgoing state mentality. Firstly, Turkish government co-opted religious organizations which were operating in Fatih in order to create a “green belt” around the “unwanted” social groups of Fatih. In this context, especially Fener Greek Patriarch labeled as unwanted therefore dangerous to the Turkish-Muslim social groups of Fatih and contained through a xenophobic discourse which externalized its society because of the allegations that they were practicing a hidden agenda that will dominate and control the entire Fatih one day (Özet, 2019).

This ideological mobilization intertwined with the emerging neoliberal economic structure. In this context, the state has abandoned its social policy responsibilities for its citizens therefore an immense vacuum has emerged (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2016). The fallouts of this further solidified the legitimacy of religious organizations such as İskenderpaşa and İsmailağa cults of Fatih because they started to fill the vacuum of the state’s social policy responsibilities by acting as the primary solidarity networks for the Muslim social groups of Fatih. The religious organizations substituted for the civil society organizations of neoliberalism in the context of Fatih and they started established as pious foundations which started to operate through several aspects such as trade,

education, tourism as well as construction which were the main pillars of the neoliberal economic structure (Yankaya, 2014). Moreover, neoliberalism has prioritized small and medium scale enterprises, which have flexibility to maneuver through the market requirements, and purposed to produce export-oriented products with low costs (Yankaya, 2014). These enterprises were mostly established by the pious organizations as well as entrepreneurs who inherited to the social capital of the pious organizations as well as hometown associations of the Fatih district (Özet, 2019). Furthermore, Turkish economy has expanded through the Middle East region in order to find export destinations for its products. In this context, the enterprises that flourished at that time found a significant resource there. Likewise, the same establishments attracted the attention of the Gulf countries which have accumulated enormous economic capital as a result of the fallouts of the oil crisis of 1970s, started to invest on Turkish/conservative establishments (Yankaya, 2014).

One of the unintended consequence of softening the secularism principle of the state in the context of 1980s was the rising impact of the newly established political Islamist Welfare Party (WP thereafter) (Gülalp, 2001). Even though WP (1983-1998) has established as a continuation of consecutive political Islamist parties of National Order Party (1970-1971) and National Salvation Party (1972-1982), it surpassed its predecessors in terms of its impact on several aspects: number of votes that it gained, its capability of advocating the rights of whom excluded from Kemalist modernism and its capability of adjusting its policies in accordance with the international political and economic contexts (Gülalp, 2001). Gülalp (2001) argues that political Islam movement co-opted with postmodernism's criticisms on modernism and transformed those criticisms towards the Kemalist modernism in the context 1980s' Turkey. Accordingly, the modernist ideologies have lost their impact because of their failure in meeting the demands of the diverse social groups, who migrated to cities, in terms of material capabilities such as secured occupations as well as adequate housing. Moreover, they also failed to be in compliance with ideational aspects of the social groups such as accepting the authenticity of their culture and their identity (Gülalp, 2001). The distinctness of WP from its predecessors came in this regard because WP has utilized from these insufficiencies of modernism through incorporating the social groups which

sidelined by pro-status quo parties of Turkey who followed the suit of waning modernist paradigm (Gülalp,2001). WP has further incorporated excluded social groups after obtaining several local municipalities of İstanbul by the end of 1980s such as Sultanbeyli and Kağıthane districts where became micro cosmos of WP's attempts to create conservative habitus among incorporating different social groups under the umbrella of religiosity (Yavuz, 1997). WP has created public councils in those districts; thus, its incorporation purpose went beyond merely a discourse strategy to palpable participation of social groups on the political economic processes of the districts (Doğan, 2014). However, WP's abovementioned anti-status quo outlook caused its failure of obtaining municipality elections in the Fatih district until the end of the 1990s. Social Democrat and Peoples Party as well as Motherland Party dominated the local elections in the context of Fatih through 1980s as well as 1990s. Nevertheless, WP mobilized its constituencies at those decades in the level of social groups and advocated the rights of excluded social groups including its own base who were political Islamists as well as several social groups such as internally displaced Kurds in the 1990s whose, thanks to the social networks that established by the early arrivals, primary destination has become Fatih district (Özet, 2019).

In the international aspect, the intellectual capacity of political Islam has flourished as a result of the declining impact of the ideologies of bipolar world order. Hence, political Islamist intellectuals in Egypt as well as in Iran have started to advocate alternatives orders to the capitalist west and socialist east of the world (Tuğal, 2009). At that time, Ali Şeriati's writings from Iran and Hasan el-Benna's writings from Egypt distributed to the conservatives and Islamists of elsewhere who mobilized around their ideologies of advocating alternative, in a sense Islamic, political, social and economic order (Tuğal, 2009). In the Turkish context, their works have translated to Turkish and circulated around the political Islamist cadres of urban spheres. As a result, WP constituencies around the city spheres left the much of their rural discourse and transformed themselves through the intellectual discussions about establishing an ideal order while preserving their cultural and identity-based characteristics (Tuğal, 2009). WP has established an unprecedented political doctrine which flourished as a result of this context and labeled it as 'just order' which positioned itself as the middle and right path

that claimed as it has obtained the good of the capitalist west and the socialist rest and adjusted them to the movements' authenticity (Tuğal, 2009).

The primary determinant of the conservative habitus formation has been the Manichean us vs. them dichotomy (Kaya, Robert and Tecmen, 2020). This state of mind provide categorization to a social group to perceive themselves through a polarized environment where "us" meant insiders who relying on the identities of social agents without noticing the class-based differences among the participants of the group. The "them" meant, however, the outsiders, who might be the social agents, institutions, states as well as economic agents, are the ones that purposing to diminish the authenticity of the formers' identity, culture, life space as well as means of survival (Kaya, Robert and Tecmen, 2020). The justification of this dichotomy rests upon a civilizationist discourse where the identity of social groups is the main determinant as to decide who are among us and who are among them (Kaya, Robert and Tecmen, 2020). However, we cannot take for granted the identity-based inheritance in the formation of this dichotomy because this dichotomy requires performative action of the social agents in order to emerge. Hence, one must participate to this discourse through acknowledging it as a symbolic capital of his/her habitus and thus one must reproduce it through performative action such as constructing the image of the "other" while giving his/her consent to the construction of the image of "us" (Kaya, Robert and Tecmen, 2020). In the conservative habitus the main determinant of being one of "us" is to be a Sunni-Muslim social agent. But one should distinguish the meaning of being a Sunni-Muslim in the nation-state formation of Turkey with the meaning of being a Sunni-Muslim social agent in the conservative habitus (Üstel, 2016). Accordingly, the difference lies in the perception of Sunni-Muslimhood which instrumentalized by the Kemalist paradigm as a centralization, stratification and homogenization policies. Likewise, in conservative habitus, Sunni-Muslimhood perceived as the resource of performative actions of social agents and in this case social agents inspire from it while participating to the public sphere and thus extend the meaning of Sunni-Muslimhood through the all spheres of live including political, economy, social and cultural fields (Yankaya, 2014). The "them", on the other hand, constituted of the social groups who are consentient of Western-oriented ideologies and institutions. Therefore, governments who pursued EU accession efforts

labeled as the enthusiastic of become a part of a “Christian club” while the army members who pursued NATO-oriented strategies labeled as puppets of imperialists and the capital owners, especially TÜSİAD members who were pro-Western, labeled as perpetrators of exploiters of the resources of the people. This mindset gained ground from one of the dominant paradigm on the explanation of dynamics among social groups in the Turkish context which is center and periphery approach (Mardin, 1973). Because it legitimized the explanations of identity-based dichotomy among social groups and placed modernists as the elites who located in the center and who monopolized the state resources including material and ideational aspects and the ones who located in the periphery and who lacked from utilizing from the resources because of the hegemony of the center.

According to Erder (2002) migration to urban peripheries paved the way for solidarity among the migrants and they established dynamic opposite solidarist networks to the established order. In this early stage of habitus formation, there were inclusive relations among the social groups in Fatih where the primary determinant in participating this habitus was the externalized condition of social agents. This condition realized because of the will of survival of the social agents in an antagonistic social order (Erder, 2002). Therefore, civil society organizations, political party wings, religious organizations and hometown organizations who possessed conservative/Islamist orientations became the main pillars of this strategy of survival. However, Özet (2019) relates these early strategies of conservative social groups with their position on the hierarchy of social groups where in time, he states, conservative habitus has obtained exclusive actions towards other social groups synchronously with the sovereignty that it gradually obtained in the hierarchy.

The earlier representations of the habitus of Fatih district constituted by the nationalist-conservative urban middle class social groups as well as non-Muslim social groups. In the early stages of the formation of the conservative habitus in 1980s it was the low-class rural cultural determinants which formed the basis of the characteristics of social agents (Özet, 2019). However, the religiosity of social agents became a significant aspect that started to shape the emerging conservative habitus in the Fatih district. There were several aspects which became impetus of this process. Firstly, the flourishing intellectual

capacity of political Islam paved the way for the improved political party organization of WP (Tuğal, 2009). In that regard, the WP mobilized unconventional strategies to reach social groups in urban spheres. For instance, the face-to-face interaction with different social groups as well as political Islamists' effective use of emerging mass media platforms such as TVs, newspapers, journals and books made WP accessible therefore inclusive political force (Tuğal, 2009). This strategy paved way for WP to accomplish the municipal elections of İstanbul in 1994 as well as to accomplish the highest vote count in the general elections of 1995 (Tuğal, 2009). Obviously, the loss of impact of the center parties played an important role in this matter as well. Secondly, as emphasized earlier, political economic context of post-12 September era paved the way for rising importance of the pious entrepreneurs and local notables (Yankaya, 2014). Hence, political Islamist cadres mobilized this situation by establishing a business association in 1991 which was *Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği*, MÜSİAD (Yankaya, 2014). Accordingly, conservative habitus became institutionalized in the sphere of economics and the association became a significant social force that started to have impact on the political economic processes. Thirdly, with continuous migration waves towards the urban areas, the demographics of urban spheres changed, and the migrated people became the dominant population (Erder, 2015). In that regard, they mostly externalized by the ongoing social and economic processes thus they eventually incorporated by the conservative habitus and they became an important part of the formation and continuation of the emerging conservative habitus. Thus, consequently, conservative habitus formed upon the religiosity in post-1980s started to predominate the conservative habitus which continued with the nationalist characteristics (centrist) of the early inhabitants, who were middle-class urban social groups, of the Fatih. One of the respondents on the field, who was born in 1960 in the district; thus, named himself as the native of Fatih, talked about this shift as:

I remember that Fatih inhabitants composed of, for instance, the surgeon generals of the hospitals in İstanbul in 1970s and 1980s. There were university professors, journalists and bureaucrats as well. The urban structure was also very different than today. There were large houses with gardens where one family resided. Of course, these people were not the only people in Fatih.

There were people in need and low class of course. But if I explain the general atmosphere there was a harmonious tranquility at that time. The urbanization that led by the rising migration flows changed all of this atmosphere. The houses became apartments that started to accommodate several families. After that the natives of Fatih started to move elsewhere such as Ataköy. In the 1990s, there were people who started to come from the old Soviet countries and Central Asia. In addition, Kurdish people came here for seeking jobs. In time, the demographics of Fatih changed in favor of migrants. The elitism of the district has gone but it sort of protects its prestige thanks to its closeness to trade places such as Laleli and Beyazıt and religious places such as Sultanahmet and Hırka-ı Şerif.

According to Bourdieu (2004), social groups compete on the fields to accomplish economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals. In that regard, every field has distinct type of capitals which are valuable therefore provide impact upon the social hierarchy of social groups. Besides, the social groups' impact which obtains state capital, meta-capital in Bourdieu's words, penetrates each field by determining the value of capitals and which capital becomes the impetus of dominance in a particular field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2004). In her analysis on the social groups' compete and conflict in obtaining the state resources including the material and symbolic capitals, Koyuncu (2014) puts forward the concept of "in turn elitism" in which she explains the power struggle among the social groups by providing a periodization in accordance with the social groups' capacity of determining the course of events in line with their habitus. Even though conservative habitus temporarily challenged by the pro-status quo social groups in the 28 February 1997 process, it has gained a momentum of consolidation of its capitals starting from the beginning of the 2000s. In the beginning of this process, conservative habitus shifted its discourse from civilizationist counter-EU stance to a discourse which instrumentalize and co-opted with EU process that partially liberalized the institutions which pro-status quo powers used to surpass the impact of the conservative habitus (Koyuncu, 2014). Following, with the establishment of Justice and Development Party (JDP thereafter) in the beginning of 2000s by the elites of the former political Islamist parties, the conservative habitus consolidated its impact on enhancing its capitals

among the conflicting social groups on the each field. Consequently, conservative habitus has started to become the sovereign social group in the context of the field of state (Koyuncu, 2014).

Koyuncu (2014) puts forward palpable events to exemplify the formation of the conservative habitus' sovereignty in the context of the material and ideational power struggle of social groups. Accordingly, JDP represents the formulation of today's conservative habitus through materializing policies that have been enforcing sets of thoughts as well as practices in accordance with the field of nation-state and the capitals of national identity. Koyuncu (2014) puts forward several instances which have moved to center through increasing their influence as capitals in this period. Firstly, she discusses the celebrations of the conquest of İstanbul which took place in an informal setting and represented a practice of being opposition to the existing national identity's approach to this historical event.¹³ Conservative sovereignty leads this celebration to move to the center by making its' significance as a prerequisite to the doxa of its national identity. Koyuncu (2014) points out that even opposition parties, such as Republican Peoples Party, are celebrating the conquest of İstanbul; thus, AKP made this capital imperative not only for conservative habitus but also the national identity of the nation-state. Secondly, contentious historical opinion leaders known as conservative and Islamist such as Mehmet Akif Ersoy, who was the poet of Turkish National Anthem, moved to center and became the backbone of the general framework of policies in education and culture regarding to raising "religious and contemporary" generations. Thirdly, contentious political figures such as Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal have labeled as "nation's men" and this perception become the backbone of the economic policies which are in line with their terms in office. Moreover, Holy Birth Week, which represents the birth of Prophet Muhammad, centralized through institutionalizing in Directorate of Religious Affairs and Ministry of Education. In this regard, both institutions have been providing themes to cover for that week in line with the political

¹³ However, Koyuncu (2014) notes that there is a conversion in the content of capital when it moves to center from periphery. In this regard, the celebrations of the conquest of İstanbul had anti-establishment tone before the conservative sovereignty. When it moved to the center, it has lost that tone and had new content which was in line with the emerging political setting. Thus, moving from periphery to center or heterodoxy to orthodoxy do not imply a smooth transition the content and meaning of it is subject to change in accordance with the current situation.

conjuncture. Koyuncu gives two instances: first is regarding with the Kurdish opening between 2009 and 2014 in which conservative/Islamist habitus has established in order to incorporate the “conservative” Kurdish population to this habitus.¹⁴ Second is regarding to compensation of social policies. Accordingly, Koyuncu says that with the religious discourse such as “the one who sleeps full while her/his neighbor is hungry is not one of us” instrumentalized to compensate the lack of social policies through relying on social networks and individual initiatives which take impetus from the sub-capital of religion. Yanaşmayan et al. (2019) seek to elucidate why Syrian migration phenomenon did not create similar reactions with the European style populism among the social groups of Turkey. They put forward an argument based on the abovementioned capitals’ existence on the Syrian migrants in an environment where conservative habitus determines the value of capitals of the social groups. Hence, Yanaşmayan et al. (2019) conclude that this situation prevented Syrian migrants to be perceived as the ultimate other by the social groups in the context of Turkey.

One can explain the reflections on these processes in the context of Fatih with the conservative habitus becoming the dominant social group on the field. If we compare conservative habitus in Fatih before and after its sovereignty, we see its sociological dynamics moved from being an inclusive social group to exclusive social group. In Bourdieu’s sense, therefore, conservative habitus shifted from destruction strategies to protection strategies after obtaining the domination in the field. Özet (2019) summarizes this process with three intertwined changes that happened on the characteristics of the conservative habitus in the context of Fatih. Firstly, conservative habitus has experienced a polarization among its own constituencies. In this regard, on the one side, an emerging middle-class, whose activities intensified in the service sector, has become professionalized in the context of global economy constituted the benefiting side of the dichotomy. On the other side, however, a precarious class that obtain unqualified labor force, who sidelined in the context of global economy, constituted the subaltern side of the dichotomy. Secondly, the incorporation capacity of conservative habitus declined with its centralization on the hierarchy of social groups in

¹⁴ Through a religious discourse of “love the created for the creator’s sake”, JDP has attempted to create a framework that emphasize Sunni-Muslimness as upper identity. This meant the exclusion of non-conservative Kurdish population from this equation (Koyuncu, 2014).

Fatih, therefore, Kurds and Romans labeled through a securitization discourse whose existence in the district imply insecure heterogeneity. Thirdly, solidarist relations of conservative habitus shifted to a motivation of social mobility which takes its impetus from the mentality of economic rationality, thus, conservative habitus started to perceive the “other” social groups through a zero-sum game mentality. Consequently, conservative habitus came up with exclusive cultural capital requirements and it externalized abovementioned social groups through their “not modern” practices on the field such as their large family structures, noise, the shoes that abandoned in front of the apartments and extensive smell of food (Özet, 2019). One example from the field of Fatih is that conservative habitus has attempted to discharge the Roman social groups who were located around the Sulukule neighbor of Fatih starting from the year of 2015. In that example, the Fatih municipality, with the coordination of the state-led construction agency *TOKİ*, has started to build housing estates in the further peripheries of the city for the Roman neighbors of Sulukule and their properties confiscated as a result of that project and most of the Roman population moved to those areas which constructed by *TOKİ*. This homogenization effort became sort of successful, however, did not bring an end to the heterogeneous social space of Fatih because in time Roman people came back in Fatih. Nevertheless, it has proved the conservative habitus’ strength in its efforts to create a homogeneous space. Likewise, the Kurdish social group has labeled as they had a hidden agenda of dominating the Fatih district as it claimed before in the context of Fener Greek Patriarch. In that regard, JDP Fatih major Mustafa Demir, who won consecutive three local elections on Fatih from 2004 to 2014 with JDP, perceived as the mastermind of Kurdish attempts of domination because of his Kurdish ethnic background (Özet, 2019). On the field, this mindset paved way for the ghettoization of Kurds. For instance, Kurdish people consolidated their population around the Balat district as well as Ayvansaray. This space oriented ghettoization perceived in line with the class-related as well as identity-related insecure perception of conservative habitus. Hence, these neighbors notoriously referred by the social agents of Fatih. This perception consolidated in accordance with the rising rupture among the classes of social groups in Fatih and even these districts became a subject-matter of a famous Turkish TV series, the Pit, where a family of mobsters control the Balat district with the help of its inhabitants and neither police officers nor any government agency is

allowed to enter to the neighbor where each day several people are dying because of the clashes.

On the other hand, when this homogenization efforts proved to be unsuccessful, the social agents of conservative habitus, especially who realized social mobility, moved to the gated conservative habitus where established outside the Fatih district. Başakşehir is a significant example of this phenomenon where has established as a result of “alternative” social space establishment efforts of conservatives in the middle of 1990s (Çavdar, 2016). In the beginning, Başakşehir was a gated community but showing peripheral characteristics such as accommodating the ones who displaced because of their culture, identity and life habits (Çavdar, 2016). However, in the context of conservative sovereignty, it has become a gated community of conservative habitus where showed the characteristics of homogenization in terms of identity as well as class (Çavdar, 2016). Therefore, Başakşehir incorporated the conservative social agents, who realized their dreams of social mobility, and as a result it has transformed to a homogeneous therefore “secure” social space for conservative agents (Çavdar, 2016).

According to Bourdieu (2004), habitus does not have essential properties. It is not a finished building. It is dynamic and changeable. This change can occur in many contexts. For example, social groups that include habitus can adapt to changing conjunctures, and in this case, habitus changes. In addition, social groups that challenge and defeat a particular dominant habitus can make their habitus dominant in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2004). In the context of Fatih district, these two features of habitus, first of all, the conservatives becoming the dominant social group in the field since 1980 and incorporating some of the other social groups and demolishing some of them by the 2000s coincides with the first chapter. The second feature is that this conservative habitus has many different features from the time it was formed, that is, from the subaltern period to the reign, in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s and today. This habitus is sometimes inclusive, sometimes exclusive, sometimes the victim and sometimes the dominant. But more importantly, it is not mutually exclusive, therefore, it may contain several of the abovementioned at the same time while excluding some or several of them. In this context, the conservative habitus of Fatih transformed several times. Recently, in 2020, the conservative habitus under the umbrella of JDP showed

ruptures among its constituencies. Accordingly, two parties have emerged because of this rupture namely the Future Party led by former foreign and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Democratic and Progress Party led by former foreign and economy minister of Ali Babacan. In the context of Fatih, Future Party established its district presidency in January 2021 while Democratic and Progress Party established its district presidency in February 2021. While I was conducting my interviews on the field, I had a chance to participate the efforts of their establishment. The both parties' Fatih district presidents were Southern Anatolia origin and they both complained about the monolithic structure that emerged in the JDP as one of the aspect of the reasons of their breaking up from the JDP.¹⁵ The Future Party district leader emphasized their reasons as follows:

The JDP leadership showed weakness in their efforts of dealing with peoples' problems. There were ethical problems as well. People were sidelined as a result of authoritarianism. That's why Future Party leadership has established a movement. It is obvious that there are several cliques in the JDP. This destroys the harmony within the constituency. The echo chamber within the leadership of JDP spread its local constituency.

The district president of the Democratic and Progress Party emphasized similar notions while adding more institutional aspects that he believed are necessary while dealing with the state and people. However, they did not bring any discussion about the migration issue in the context of Fatih and emphasized that they established their organization recently and their board, which will deal with the issues about migration, is yet to be established.

¹⁵ After it has established a de facto coalition with the Nationalist Movement Party in 2015, JDP has criticized with elimination of its several constituencies. Hence, the JDP became represented by the people of the Black Sea origin. The reflections of this process in Fatih were obvious. The cadres within the district presidency started to be composed of people from the Black Sea region as well. If we consider how the former mayor of Fatih, Mustafa Demir, perceived by the conservative habitus, this process certainly implies getting consent from the conservative social agents of the Fatih district.




Map 1. The map of Fatih district. The right side of the map indicates the historical peninsula while the center region that pointed out with a square indicates the district center of Fatih district where the settled population of the district accommodated. Source: <https://daktilo1984.com/forum/fatih-nasil-kirmizi-oldu/>.

Fatih district obtains a complex social space in terms of population and way of living. Hence, one should elaborate on the field of the study specifically due to the heterogeneity of social spaces in the district. Accordingly, in the first step, we stratify the regions of Fatih district into two: historical peninsula and Fatih district center. Following, in the second step, we stratify the sub-region of Fatih district center into two: the neighborhoods around the golden horn and the neighborhoods around the district center of Fatih.

According to this stratification, the first region locates on the right side of the first map, known as the historical peninsula, consists of tourism centers of İstanbul. In that regard, Eminönü, Sultanahmet, and Sirkeci are the main avenues of tourist destinations of İstanbul. In this part of the Fatih district, the density of the population differs depending on the season as well as different times of the day. Hence, there is significant mobility that makes the region known not with its resident characteristics but historical as well as touristic values. These characteristics, especially the fluidity of population in the region,

are preventing us from concentrating on the area in terms of analyzing the relations of social groups in that particular social space. Hence, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to come up with generalizations as well as detailed analysis of social groups because of the huge gap among the resident population and flow of people on daily basis.



Map 2. The map of neighbourhoods of Fatih. There are 57 neighbourhoods in the Fatih district. Source: <https://www.qzt.com/skyroad/fatihin-mahalleleri--1-3547073>.

On the other hand, the second region, known as the district center of Fatih that pointed out in the first map with a square, consists of neighborhoods that have settled populations. Therefore, we focus on this region of Fatih to gather our empirical data. However, it is also not possible to make generalizations from the field of Fatih by dividing it into two because the district center of the Fatih also differs in terms of several

variables including identity, class and the relations of social groups with their social spaces. Hence, we also divide the district center of Fatih into two sub-regions in accordance with those variables.

The first sub-region locates on the upper side of the first map which is known as 'Golden Horn' because it consists of neighborhoods located through the strip of the Golden Horn. The neighborhoods of Ayvansaray, Balat, Yavuz Sultan Selim, Cibali, Yavuz Sinan, Hacı Kadın, Demirtaş, Hoca Giyasettin and Molla Hüsrev are the neighborhoods in this sub-region. These neighborhoods are known as "slums of the sub-province" where the lowest income social groups of Fatih accommodated (IOM Turkey, 2019). Moreover, another distinctive feature of this sub-region is that the neighborhoods there, especially the Çarşamba which borders with the Balat neighborhood, hosts most of the religious institutions of the Fatih district. When it comes to the analysis of social groups, internally displaced Kurdish people of Turkey, as well as Syrian Kurdish social groups predominate other social groups of the neighborhoods. In addition, migrants from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan also accommodate these neighborhoods.

There is no certain sector that predominates the economic affairs of residents of this sub-region. Nevertheless, recently, the flow of people has increased due to the popular culture-based tourism which flourished as a result of the distinctive spatial characteristics of this sub-region, where the vintage houses and old neighborhood culture predominate, attracted the film industry as well as popular culture actors such as the designers and social media influencers. However, this attraction does not make this sub-region define with tourism. As a matter of fact, the economic activities are very limited through this sub-region. For his reason, the social groups of this sub-region generally work outside of this sub-region. For instance, many residents work in the textile industry of Zeytinburnu district where is the adjacent district of Fatih near the neighborhood of Yedikule of Fatih district. Likewise, many residents work in hotel service industry of the Aksaray neighborhood especially the social groups that Caucasian origin in addition to the Kurdish speaking social groups. Moreover, most of the Afghan migrants of the neighborhood work in paper collection business.

The second sub-region locates in the center of the first map where the neighborhoods of Dervişali, Atikali, Aksaray, Hırka-i Şerif, Ali Kuşçu, Akşemsettin, İskenderpaşa and

Karagömrük are located. Syrian Arabs form the majority of migrants in these neighborhoods while the Turkish speaking people, who came from the Black Sea region, predominate other social groups in terms of economic, social and cultural capitals. In addition, Iraqi people, who moved to this sub-region after the Gulf War of 1990s, constitute another important social group especially in terms of their economic capitals. Besides, in this sub-region, migrants settle with their families, and they have better economic and living conditions comparing the migrants in the first sub-region in particular and comparing the Syrian migrants who reside elsewhere in İstanbul in general (IOM Turkey, 2019).

Ali Kuşçu, Hırka-i Şerif and Akşemsettin neighborhoods have distinct features comparing the other social spaces of the district. To begin with, Akşemsettin neighborhood has the largest Syrian population within the sub-province (IOM Turkey, 2019). In addition, it is a territorially large neighborhood where Syrian residents are in a higher position socioeconomically than the average neighborhood (IOM Turkey, 2019). Besides, in terms of cultural capital, Syrian migrants, who receive education at the university level, are the highest within the sub-province (IOM Turkey, 2019). The Syrian migrants in this sub-region engage in business and service industry and they mostly live and work in the same neighborhood that makes them an important social force in terms of population size as well as economic capabilities. Middle and high-class representations of migrants are predominant in these neighborhoods as is the case in the Aksaray neighborhood. Nevertheless, there is heterogeneity in Aksaray in terms of the ethnicity of migrants where the density of African migrants of Somalia and Senegal, as well as migrants of Pakistan, are high.

We can make generalizations from the findings gathered from the second sub-region because in this sub-region there is a relatively settled social space where settled migrants and inhabitants live together and share a common public sphere. We define this social space with the concept of conservative habitus to emphasize the primary characteristic of the field where the religiosity-based identity of social groups is predominant. In addition to religiosity, neoliberalism is another component of the conservative habitus. Hence, religiosity, as well as neoliberalism, form the basis of the interactions of the social groups in this social space.

In the context of religiosity, many mosques encircle the narrow streets, and they are mostly full during the usual prayer times. In addition, the mosques represent not only religiosity but also the piety-based public sphere. Hence, the yards of mosques start to be filled with people before the prayer times and the attendees discuss the agenda with each other. The dominant attitudes of people in these interactions are prudence and modesty. Likewise, in the context of Fatih, the mosques do not merely represent the piety of the social space, but also represent the historicity of the dominance of the conservative habitus. In this regard, Fatih mosque and Hırka-ı Şerif mosque are the primary examples that host not only the inhabitants of Fatih but the diverse conservative social groups who come to visit those places from outside the Fatih district.

These places are inclusive, therefore, host heterogeneous social groups in terms of ethnicity under the umbrella of Sunni-Muslimhood. Nevertheless, the inclusivism of the social space based on religiosity differ according to the neighborhood. Hence, for instance, the İsmailağa mosque represents a particular religious organization of Fatih district and the attendees of that mosque usually are the members of that religious organization. The respondents that are the representatives of these mosques including the *imams* as well as civil servants mostly spoke in the name of the inclusive character of İslam through a welcoming attitude and emphasized their role in the incorporation of “different” people to the district. These respondents have been the opinion leaders whose teachings are mostly perceived as directives by the conservative social groups of the Fatih district despite the normative tone of these teachings which mostly contradict the daily life practices of the social groups. Furthermore, most of the symbolisms in the social spaces of Fatih district refer to the religiosity such as the names of civil society organizations, neighborhoods, streets and schools.

The religiosity of the conservative social space has become a contested issue because there has been upward social mobility in the conservative social groups that have brought out the questions whether this process led to a change in the attitudes, choices, and taste of the conservative social groups and whether it led to a transformation in the religiosity of the conservative social space. Even though this debate is out of the scope of this study, it is important to point out where our case stands in this discussion. Çavdar (2016) puts forward two distinct forms of religiosity: urban İslam and traditional İslam.

Accordingly, the urban İslam represents the changing taste and attitudes of conservatives who succeed the upward social mobility (Çavdar, 2016). The urban İslam, according to Çavdar's (2016) narrative, is "profane" and prioritizes earthly well-being in terms of accomplishing economic and social security and the practices of religiosity are symbolic; thus, it is a mechanical process that implemented by the conservatives seeking to accomplish a ritual. Çavdar (2016) tries to prove this categorization through the story of a family that moved from Fatih to Beşiktaş because their new habits and consumption preferences were criticized and gossiped about being contrary to traditional İslam in Fatih district. Even though this finding is valuable, Çavdar's (2016) comparison refers to the Fatih district as it has homogeneous, static, and low class-based representations of religiosity. We could not reach such linear conclusions; as a matter of fact, what we found is that urban forms of religiosity, as well as traditional forms of religiosity, simultaneously exist in the social space of Fatih district.

Moreover, the gender roles, which have taken its impetus from religiosity, is another significant determinant that defines the characteristics of the social space of the Fatih district. To begin with, women are absent in most of the public domains of the Fatih district except the times when they go out to meet the needs of their homes in the daytime. Men are dominant in the economic activities; thus, the management of stores, as well as the employees of the stores, are male. Women only work in the economic sphere that targets the women as the customer. For instance, the small and medium-size stores, which sell clothes and accessories for women, are mostly managed by women. However, women do not work especially in the service sectors including restaurants and cafes that require them to engage with males. This point is crucial because the service sectors in particular and the economic sphere in general constitute most of the public domain of the district. Hence, male hegemony in those areas paves the way for a very limited field for women to interact and participate in the social space.

As a matter of fact, the strict gender roles intertwine with the insufficiency of the open public sphere in the district for its inhabitants because Fatih district has a congested landscape because of the density of buildings there are not many open spaces such as parks, gardens, and big avenues. In this regard, public parks are left as one of the few places for women to socialize. Likewise, when women interact with the social spaces of

the district, they participate in this interaction not with their individuality but with a collectivity that provides them moral security. This issue is significant because there is no chance to build a concrete gated community with walls that exclude unwanted from the social space of Fatih. After all, this district has an extroverted social space that is based on neighborhoods contrary to, for instance, the Beşiktaş district where is composed of introverted housing estates surrounded by walls that represent gated communities. For this reason, segregation efforts based on gender in the social spaces of Fatih are much more complex and multi-layered. Even though the social space of Fatih has taken for granted norms regarding gender roles in the sense of excluding the women, the degree of exclusion depends on or differs through the variables of class and ethnicity. Thus, the women who obtain economic, social, and cultural capitals have chances of becoming relatively more visible in the social space of Fatih.

On the other hand, neoliberalism is another component of the social space in Fatih district. We referred to the neoliberalization process of the Fatih district when we discuss the macro transformation in the Turkish political economy. In this paragraph, we discuss how neoliberalism has intertwined with the social space. Neoliberalism in the context of the social space of Fatih district has three layers.

Firstly, the hotels, shopping malls as well as service industry are encircling the main avenues in the strip of Vatan Street constitute the first layer. In this layer, luxurious black Mercedes Vitos are passing by the narrow streets of the district center of Fatih to provide transportation services for the customers of the five-star hotels. The hotels as well as the service industry which intertwines through the tourism sector led to spatial segregation between inhabitants' social space and the spheres of the tourism industry. However, currently, the lines of this segregation are hardly visible because the tourism industry has expanded through the neighborhoods that crosscut Vatan Street, obviously because it has reached its limits spatially, in the form of renting the flats on a daily and monthly basis for the tourists. In addition, Historia shopping mall, which locates in the same strip, is another prominent component of this layer. These avenues in the social space of Fatih district are safe havens for the ones who seek liberated areas where the religiosity aspect of conservative habitus is relatively weaker.

As is emphasized earlier, the economic landscape of Fatih has shifted in accordance with the transition of the Turkish economy from production-based industries targeting the domestic market to the export-oriented free-market economy in the 1980s and 1990s. In this regard, the second layer of neoliberalism is related to the occupations of social groups in the district. There are four dominant forms of occupations: self-employed professionals, local entrepreneurs, employees and landlords. The first represents the emerging urban-middle-class social groups, who utilize their cultural capital in their efforts to be the part of the economic sphere with their proficiencies, the second represents the employers of stores and restaurants of the district who mobilize their economic capital in their efforts to be the part of the contestation of service providers. The third represents the labor force of the second while the last represents the winners of the dramatic increase of the values of the properties.

The third layer of neoliberalism is visible in the policies of local government and civil society organizations. Nevertheless, in this paragraph, the discussion is limited to the issues related to migration rather than broad neoliberalism and local government agency debate. Accordingly, if we discuss these interactions in light of the migration phenomenon, the civil servants in Fatih Municipality indicated that the municipality does not possess the numbers of the migrants in the district; thus, the municipality does not directly engage with migrants unless inhabitants complain about certain situations that related with the migrants in the district. Likewise, the inhabitants' statements related to the municipality confirmed this mentality because their expectations or their interactions with the municipality were mostly based on the law enforcement side of the local government rather than its service provider aspect. Recently, the removal of Arabic signboards and carrying out sentences to those who rent out flats on daily basis, which are associated with the migrant population by the inhabitants, by the municipal police have been the two incidents that consolidated this mentality. In the context of civil society, there have been two types of organizations: state-centric organizations and community-based organizations. The former collaborates with central and local bureaucracy as well as EU-based international organizations while the latter mobilizes its social capital in the district to reach out to people.

As of 2011, a new wave of migration came to the Fatih district. Syrian migrants, who fled from the civil war in their country, moved to Turkey to take shelter. In the beginning, they placed in the camps but as of 2013, Turkish government liberated their movements in the country. After that the urban areas of Turkey saw flow of Syrian migrants. In a short period of time İstanbul became the primary destination of the Syrian migrants.

There were particular destinations of Syrian migrants in İstanbul in terms of districts. They moved to the districts known with their conservative identity characteristics such as Fatih, Sultanbeyli, Başakşehir and Esenyurt. The scholarly community of migration studies has discussed extensively the reasons of the Syrian migrants' destination choices. Social network theory, cultural intimacy approach, class-based and identity-based analyses are the primary frameworks of this discussion (Kaya, 2016; Şimşek, 2020). However, this chapter focuses on the repercussions of Syrian migrants' movement on Fatih district. One of the significant repercussion of this influx to Fatih district is the encounter of conservative social groups and Syrian migrants in Fatih district and the sociological dynamics which came into being as a result of this encounter.

Even though at the earlier stages of the influx there were traces of interaction as well as contact based on religious narratives that made inhabitants of Fatih to create some sort of empathy with the incoming Syrian migrants, the changes on the conjuncture as well as the change on the sociological dynamics with the density of the arrivals of the migrants, changed the course of events in the Fatih district regarding the relations among the Syrian migrants and the sovereign social group of conservatives in the Fatih district.

In that regard, conservative social groups in Fatih have started to display exclusionist practices towards the Syrian migrants. We reach several palpable reasons as to why conservative sovereignty failed to incorporate the Syrian migrants in the field of Fatih as a result of a field research. Firstly, with the year of 2018, the population of Syrian migrants became equal with the inhabitants in some neighbors of the Fatih as a result of their continuous influx to the district (IOM Turkey, 2019). This situation lead to increasing tensions among the inhabitants as they started to complain about the

repercussions of the rising number of Syrian migrants among the district as well as the social and economic practices of them.

The second reasons of the exclusionary practices of conservative social groups came with the emerging prospects that Syrian migrants will become the settled population but not temporary social agents in the field of Fatih. In this regard, Syrian migrants started to become socio-economic social actors who started to obtain economic resources of the district and started to impact the course of events in the Fatih district and this situation made conservative social groups of Fatih to perceive Syrian migrants as the competitors with whom they must tackle with. Therefore, in time, Syrian migrants, in some neighbors of Fatih, moved from the status of the social group in need to the social group who participate the economic and cultural spheres of the Fatih district.

Thirdly, even though Syrian migrants and conservative social groups in Fatih has met in a common denominator in terms of identity, which is the Sunni-Muslimhood, in time the differences of daily life practices as well as the differences in the cultures of migrants and the inhabitants started to reveal. Therefore, conservative social groups started to complain about the Syrian migrants' behaviors and attitudes in the public sphere as they are not comply with theirs; thus, stigmatized them as "inappropriate" social groups.

Fourthly, the change in the conjuncture, which led the Turkish government to approach what happens in Syria through the securitization lenses, caused the Syrian migrants, who resided in Turkey, to be perceived with similar securitization perspective by the distinct social groups of Turkey. Therefore, the geopolitical shift also caused conservative social groups in Fatih to approach to a sociological issue, which is the Syrian migrants' existence in their district, through a geopolitical lenses which promoted a securitization issue due to the conflicting complex course of events in Syria.

Consequently, as a result of these four intertwined processes, the sovereign social group of Fatih, which is the conservatives, failed to incorporate the Syrian migrants because the first interactions among them, which took its impetus from the Ansar/Muhajirun mentality, turned into competitive relations that paved the way for Syrian migrants to establish their own alternative conservative habitus in the district of Fatih. Following

paragraphs analyze these processes in detail and provide empirical data to confirm the notions that emphasized in this section.

After 2011, the Syrian migrants in İstanbul became an emerging social group due to the continuous growth of their population. Syrian migrants have chosen some districts in İstanbul to accommodate themselves. The European side of İstanbul, particularly the districts of Esenyurt and Fatih, became the main destination of the migrants. The scholarly community has discussed the reasons and implications of this situation. Some claimed that class-related dynamics became the impetus of this process while some put forward identity-based related explanations (Şimşek, 2020; Kaya, 2017). In the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Turkish government opened its borders but welcomed the migrants to the camps in the Southern regions of the country. However, when the Syrian migrant population exceeded the 100.000 people, Turkish government allowed their exodus from their camps and their migration to the city centers starting from the year of 2013. The flow of migrants to İstanbul has coincided with this decision and the number of migrants in Fatih started to escalate with this process. One of the respondents on the field explained this process as:

In 2012, there were people who came to Fatih because they were fleeing from the war zone. We placed some of them to the hospitals but after a period of time many found their way to accommodate themselves with their own capabilities. These were the first people who arrived to Fatih and I believe they were happy because they survived their life. However, in time, especially after 2014, the Syrian people, who came to Fatih, had further motivations than the survival. They were purposing to move to Europe and many realized their purposes.

In the first years of Syrian migrants' arrival, Turkish government has mobilized the rhetoric of "Ansar/Muhajirun" in order to incorporate the Syrian migrants to the Turkish social groups (Kaya and Kuyumcuoğlu, 2019). This rhetoric is based on a religious understanding where Prophet Mohammed migrated to Medina with his people to flee from the atrocities of the Mecca people. Hence, in a short period, Medina people welcomed Mohammed and his people and in that city Prophet Mohammed prepared a military campaign in order to turn to the city of Mecca with a victory. Therefore,

according to this narrative, Prophet Mohammed realized his purpose with the assistance of Medina people and thus arrived back to Mecca with a victory. The JDP government has mobilized this narrative in order to obtain the consent of especially its own constituency for the flow of Syrian migrants in Turkey. Obviously, the calculation has been made by expecting a sudden fall of current regime in Syria in which “Muhajirun” Syrians in Turkey would come back very soon to take back their country from the current regime (Kaya and Kuyumcuoğlu, 2019).

In the Fatih district earlier perceptions of Syrian migrants were based on the “temporariness” implications of the “Ansar/Muhajirun” equation. Therefore, with the extensive media campaign that presented Syrian migrants as the “victims of atrocities of the Syrian regime”, Syrian migrants found a place where they could survive. In this process, the Syrian migrants depicted in Fatih as people in need. Hence, there was a class-based hierarchy among their relations with the other social groups in Fatih district. The inhabitants of Fatih, therefore, were the “Ansar” who recognized the victimhood of the Syrian migrants thus they were ready to assist them. Accordingly, this perception further consolidated with the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings such as “the hand that gives is better than the hand that takes”. One should recognize the construction of a hierarchical discourse in those citations. Accordingly, therefore, the consent of the social agents of the conservative habitus has been taken by directly connotating that the inhabitants are superior to the Syrian migrants, Syrian migrants’ existence is a temporary phenomenon and they are Sunni-Muslims thus they are similar to the conservative habitus (Kaya and Kuyumcuoğlu, 2019).

Conservative sovereignty in the level of state in the context of Turkey presented as an ideal form of governance for the Muslim populated countries in the Middle East by the U.S. as well as EU leadership in the first decade of 2000s (Tuğal, 2016). There were several reasons for this immense international support for the conservative sovereignty. Firstly, in line with inclusion-moderation thesis, political Islamist cadres’ inclusion to a secular state absorbed their radicalism and they transformed to a pro-status quo actors as a result of that process. This situation prevented anti-status quo cadres challenge the international and regional power balance. Secondly, conservative sovereignty supported the pro-market reforms in Turkey and this paved the way for gaining the support of the

international finance spheres. In line with that, conservative sovereignty showed capabilities of making institutional reforms as well as providing economic development that implied the possibility of Western liberal values to flourish in a Muslim populated country and this could have debunked decades long arguments that Western values, at least some sort of a procedural democracy with neoliberalism, cannot survive in a Muslim populated country (Tuğal, 2016). The so-called 'Turkish-model' further emphasized as a role model in the context of Arab Spring movements. Turkish government took impetus from this international support to expand its sphere of influence in the Middle East region. It is claimed that the societies in several Middle Eastern countries supported the implementation of 'Turkish model' in their countries in post-Arab Spring era. In order to solidify this ideational influence, Turkish government sustained "proactive" policies regarding to the events in Syria and Egypt (Tuğal, 2016). In that regard the Turkish government asserted the reason of its open-door policies to the Syrians who fled from war with the term "act of responsibility" from 2011 to 2015 (Kaya and Kuyumcuoğlu, 2019). Especially in two countries, in Egypt and Syria, Turkish government supported cadres which had the capability of emulating the Turkish conservative sovereignty's state/society relations. However, the expectations on exporting the 'Turkish model' to elsewhere were disrupted with the changing course of events in Egypt and Syria (Tuğal, 2016). In the former, military coup ended the government in 2013 which was the potential importer of the model while in the latter the government showed unexpected resilience in the ongoing civil war. Moreover, domestic problems of conservative sovereignty inside Turkey also made impossible to sustain this formula even in its birthplace because of the polarization phenomenon that started to be imposed by the conservative sovereignty after 2013 with the Gezi protests, the end of the peace process with Kurds in 2015, de facto withdrawal from Western alliance in 2016 and the establishment of a new constitution in 2017.

Conservative sovereignty could not expand its sphere of influence with the international PR campaign that mentioned above. The support given by the international system to expand the sphere of influence of the conservative sovereignty beyond the borders of Turkey at the beginning of the process was minimized in post-Arab spring conjuncture especially with alleged support of Turkish government to the jihadists in Syria in 2013.

This situation intertwined with the emergence of ISIS and its expansion in Syria; thus, paved way for Western policy shift from toppling the Syrian government to containing the rise of ISIS.

In the end of the 2014 from north of the Syria to its east of Iraqi border Al Abu-Kamal district, was in the control of ISIS. From that time, attention of international community has shifted from the atrocities of Syrian regime to the expansion of ISIS. Therefore, Turkish government left alone with its expectations and strategies in toppling the Syrian regime. In 2015, Russia started its military campaign in Syria where it mobilized its efforts to prevent the collapse of the Syrian government with the assistance of Iranian proxies as well as its military wing Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Furthermore, in 2014, the ISIS reached to the Kurdish enclave Ayn Issa and US government decided to intervene to Syria with a broad coalition that co-opted Kurdish PYD's military wing YPG as a military force on the ground under the umbrella of Syrian Democratic Forces. In this equation, Turkish government showed a reluctance in being part of any coalition that shifted its attention from toppling the Syrian government to diminishing ISIS. This created a perception of Turkish government as if it supported the ISIS enlargement for the expense of Syrian government and the Kurdish movement in Syria. After 2016, the bipartite attempts of diminishing ISIS from Syria gave palpable results and both coalitions, US-led anti-ISIS pro-SDF coalition as well as Russia and Iran-led pro-Syrian government coalition, expanded their sphere of influence in Syria. The SDF started to control from the eastern side of Euphrates to the western side as well as Raqqa and northern Aleppo. Syrian government, on the other hand, recaptured several opposition enclaves such as Aleppo and this created a post-ISIS environment in Syria where, on the one hand, north of the country stayed on the control of SDF as well as disordered opposition groups of Syrian government and, on the other hand, on the west, center and the south of the Syria recaptured by the Syrian government and its allies Russia and Iran.

In this context, Turkish government shifted its policy of toppling the Syrian government to the creation of security zone in the northern Syria where SDF's influence minimized through co-optation with Syrian opposition groups. Turkish government has operationalized both diplomatic and military operations for the purpose of achieving

this objective. For the former, Astana process operationalized with Russian, Iranian and Turkish governments in 2017 and as a result of this process Turkish government solidified its position at least in the northern part of Syria where it reinforced the positions of opposition forces and transferred the pro-opposition Syrian people inside the areas of its control such as in Idlib province. For latter, Turkish government has realized three consecutive military operations to northern Syria starting with the 2016 August Euphrates Shield Operation which aimed to control the ISIS region among the Turkish border and which also aimed to cut off the SDF corridor among the Turkish border. Second operation came in 2018, namely the Olive Branch Operation, which purposed to capture the SDF controlled areas in the northern Syria particularly the Afrin province. Moreover, third operation came in 2019, namely the Peace Spring Operation, which purposed to create safe zone among the northern Syria particularly the east-west strip of Turkish border in order to neutralize SDF among the Turkish border as well as in order to realize the purpose of settle the Syrian migrants inside Turkey to the de facto safe zone which realized as a result of this three consecutive military operations to Syria. Turkish President made a presentation at the United Nations about constructing dozens of briquette houses around northern Syria to repatriate the Syrian migrants inside Turkey as well as to create “safe havens” for the ones who stuck around the Idlib province in 2019.

In particularly 2014 and 2015, we saw that the Syrian migration issue became an international migration issue because the Syrian migrants have used Turkey as a transit country to reach the European continent. The illegal crossings through the Turkey’s western borders created a refugee influx towards the European countries and as a result the EU started to realize externalization policies towards Syrian migrants because of its own political economic dynamics that prevent its flexibility in the context of acceptance of Syrian migrants in EU member countries. This paved a way for EU-Turkish government negotiations about Syrian migration issue and in 2016 March 18 it resulted with EU-Turkish government convention in which EU gave some economic concessions as well as promises on reform in the dynamics of modernization to customs union between the EU countries and Turkey. As a result, Turkish government promised to keep the Syrian migrants inside its borders and restricted the illegal flow of Syrian as well as other

migrants towards the European continent. This situation paved way for the instrumentalization of Syrian migrants inside Turkey and inside northern Syria by the Turkish government in former relations with the EU. Furthermore, it also paved the way for the further incorporation of Syrian migrants in the discourse of civilizationist as well as culturalist mindset of the conservative sovereignty. Hence, the act of responsibility regarding the Syrian migrants inside Turkey shifted towards sharing the responsibility of the burden that created by the Syrian migrants' influx to Turkey.

We saw the repercussions of this shift in the clashes on the Idlib province among the Turkish Armed Forces and Russian, Syrian and Iranian military units. Starting with the February of 2020, the latter units started an extensive military campaign towards the last opposition hold Idlib province and as a result the possibility of an extensive migrant influx towards Turkish border emerged. In that regard, Turkish government realized its prior threats to EU on opening the former's borders to free pass of Syrian as well as other migrants resided in Turkey to the European continent. Therefore, in March 2020, Turkish government opened its Pazarkule border, which located near the province of Edirne, to the free pass of migrants. As a result, in one month time, EU reassured Turkish government on realizing its promises regarding to giving assistance to Turkey about the Syrian migration issue as well as providing diplomatic assurances on Turkish government's geopolitical concerns regarding to the province of Idlib. In domestic political sphere these incidents clashed with the 2019 local elections period where the Turkish government restricted Syrian migrants' free movement inside Turkey as a result of constraints about the migration issue not only from the opposition circles but also its own constituencies and send the Syrian migrants from İstanbul province to where they were registered in the first place. According to Erdogan (2021), the result of this whole process caused the social groups in Turkey to perceive the Syrian immigrant issue from the security aspect. Hence, accordingly, recently the sociological dimension of the issue has been pushed aside and its military dimension has come to the fore. Erdoğan (2021) explains the social dynamics that emerged as a result of this process and the fact that Syrian refugees have started to be dealt with from a securitizing perspective that goes beyond a sociological perspective, with the concept of "securitization from below".

Aleppo evacuation process impacted significantly to the Syrian migration issue in Turkey because the number of Syrian migrants increased dramatically to 3 million after this policy change in Syria in 2016. The images of people, who had to migrate from Aleppo to elsewhere, circulated in the media and this process rejuvenated the perception of victimhood of Syrian migrants. In addition, people who fled from Syria because of ISIS advances on the northern part of the country also played a significant role on the dramatic increase of the Syrian migrants' arrivals to Turkey. According to Kaya (2017) %86 of Syrian migrants in İstanbul are from Aleppo where was among the primary provinces of Ottoman Empire in 19th century and where was the industrial and trade center of the Syria today known with its Sunni-Muslim dominated demographics. In the context of the Fatih district, most of the Syrian migrants there were coming from the Aleppo province. When I asked about the reasons of this situation a tradesman of center Aleppo origin, who migrated to Turkey in 2015, responded as:

When we came to Fatih in 2014 from Aleppo, we found Fatih very similar to our city because it was resembling Damascus, Tartus and Aleppo in terms of buildings, people and environment. Soon, our people found easier to make trade in Fatih. In the first years, we remitted our families and relatives. Then, when the things went bad they urged them to come here because we were gaining enough to support at least in the beginning.

This citation is confirming the cultural intimacy thesis in explaining the Syrian migrants' accommodation choices in İstanbul's certain districts where known with their conservative characteristics. Bağcılar, Esenyurt, Başakşehir and Fatih districts are among the primary destinations of Syrian social groups who migrated to İstanbul. The scholarly community draws different pictures about the reasons of this phenomenon such as the housing expenses in those districts relatively lower than most of the districts of İstanbul that implying the class-based variables in elucidating the reasons of this choice. Nevertheless, these districts also differ through the class perspective because while Bağcılar and Sultanbeyli are among the districts of lower-class, labor, as well as small shopkeeper people, Fatih and Başakşehir are among the districts of middle and high class people in operating service sectors. Hence, one palpable conclusion that reached upon this phenomenon is identity factor as being the common denominator of those

districts. Accordingly, Erciyes (2016) claims that cultural and ethno-religious resemblance are the primary reasons of Syrian migrants' accommodations on certain districts. However, Kaya (2017) claims that the ways in which the inhabitants of certain districts perceive the Syrian migrants is also a significant factor in shaping their decisions on accommodation. For instance, Kılıçaslan (2016) elucidates how the Syrian migrants, who came from the northeast Syria where the density of Kurdish population much more higher than other places of Syria, have been accommodated in Küçükçekmece and how the inhabitants of Küçükçekmece, who mostly composed of the internally displaced Kurds of Turkey, perceived and accepted them (Kılıçaslan, 2016). Furthermore, Kaya (2017) extends the cultural affinity thesis from ethno-religious resemblance to much more palpable aspects. For instance, he claims that there is a similarity on the gastronomic and musical tastes of inhabitants and migrants in those districts. Accordingly, Arabic cuisine became popular thanks to its historical background which made it appealing to the inhabitants. Likewise, the sound of Arabic music, which echoing a resemblance with the Turkish Arabesque music, is another aspect which has created bridges among migrants and inhabitants (Kaya, 2017).

Even though one should appreciate the explanatory power of the cultural intimacy thesis regarding the accommodation choices of Syrian migrants in İstanbul, it must be emphasized that the cultural intimacy thesis fails to recognize the difference of the field and social groups within the field. As abovementioned citation of the Syrian migrant reveal, Syrian migrants, in the context of Fatih, have showed cultural intimacy towards the ideational reflections of the field itself but not the social groups inside the field. Hence, our findings indicate that regarding to the cultural intimacy situation, Syrian migrants distinguish the field from the social groups within the field. This does not mean, however, that Syrian migrants refuse the intimacy of social groups on the field while accepting the intimacy of the field. As Kaya and Rottman (2020) indicate the Syrian migrants show "constructed intimacy" towards the social groups on the field in order not to be perceived as antagonists by the dominant social groups of the field. Moreover, the latest public opinion research regarding the relations among social groups of Turkey and Syrian migrants also reveals that the intensity of encounters between inhabitants and Syrian migrants do not lead to their interaction without establishing contact

mechanisms among them (IstanPol, 2020). Therefore, the field of Fatih itself, where consists of both Syrian migrants and inhabitant social groups, does not directly connotate that there is an intimacy between them. As it will be discussed in the light of empirical data from the field in the coming paragraphs, the Syrian migrants in the context of Fatih has created alternative conservative habitus that restricted both themselves and other social groups to generate the contact mechanisms.

In the field of Fatih, the status of Syrian migrants shifted from people in need to the ordinary people of Fatih. This shift happened because their numbers have constantly increased in time. Even though the institutional framework which regulates the situation of Syrian migrants has also changed especially in between the years of 2013 and 2016, the perception of Syrian migrants in the field of Fatih has not been in line with the institutional framework that Turkish government operationalized in order to deal with the rising numbers.

Syrian migrants accepted as guests in Turkey in the first years of their arrival through the abovementioned Ansar and Muhajirun mentality. However, by the time their numbers have aroused, Turkish government has come up with an institutional framework that partially served the needs of migrants. Accordingly, Temporary Protection regime has established in 2013 and it gave Syrian migrants several rights such as non-refoulement and access to education as well as health services. In 2014, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM thereafter) has established which located in the Fatih district in order to operationalize these regulations. Besides, in 2016, the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners has established for seeking the official adaptation of Syrian migrants into the Turkish labor market (İçduygu, 2016).

The scholarly community which start their analysis of the Syrian migration issue in Turkey with a conceptualization that refers to the 1951 Geneva Convention which regulated how the official process operationalize in defining who accepted as refugees by the Turkish government, seeks to come up with explanations through relying on the refugee conceptualization. However, the empirical data from the Fatih district showed indifference of social groups to the institutional processes by both the Turkish citizens as well as Syrian migrants of Fatih. Likewise, no respondent was aware of the periodization of abovementioned processes as well as their substance except two groups. One group

of people, who deal with consultancy services for Syrian migrants, were aware of the institutional framework because they said they were work through those processes in order to deal with the requests of Syrian migrants. One of the employee, who was also a Syrian migrant, of such consultancy office¹⁶ explained as:

We mostly deal with the residence permit issues of Syrian migrants who arrive at Fatih. We have several experts who deal with different institutions such as DGMM, Fatih municipality, neighbor units of Fatih as well as landlords of apartments around Fatih. Our operations intensified after 2015 because of the density of the numbers of arrivals. In the beginning, people were coming here through their own arrangements. But, in time, people needed professional assistance in their accommodation arrangements in Fatih. So we thought we could help them. Because we were also dealing with tourism in our home country. Therefore, we know how to handle the needs of the people.

The other group, who constituted of “opposition” to the conservative sovereignty of Fatih, were fully aware of the abovementioned institutional processes and they were also instrumentalizing the repercussions of these arrangements in their criticism of the Turkish government. I reach to these people through the district presidency of Good Party which represents the urban and secular nationalists who broke away from the National Movement Party after it participated a de facto alliance with the JDP. One of the member of that party, who declared that s/he has resided in Fatih more than 40 years, explained as:

These institutional arrangements favor Syrians. These actually make them superior to the Turkish citizens. They (Syrians) obtain public offices, became doctors without taking the necessary exams as Turks are taking. Obviously, there is a plot behind all of these arrangements because one must accept that the war is over in Syria and if there is a need for an institutional arrangement that must

¹⁶ The density of consultancy offices around Akşemsettin neighbor is very visible because of several factors. Firstly, Akşemsettin neighbor is the host of institutions such as Fatih Municipality, DGMM, Vatan Police Station and tax office. Secondly, the socio-economic feasibilities of the migrants in this neighbor convenient to buy services from those establishments. Thirdly, the consultancy firms in Akşemsettin are not only serving for the official processes of migrants but they also act as real estate agencies. Whereas in Karagümruk and Molla Gürani neighbors, the consultancy offices are absent and conventional real estate agencies provide services there.

be an arrangement of how to provide them an institutional mechanism that purposes their return to their home country.

Even though many reports revealed the complaints about Syrian migrants converge on distinct social groups, our findings revealed a difference on the reasons of the complaints about the Syrian migrants in the context of Fatih district and these reasons are based on the conventional cleavages among the social groups in Turkey.

The reason why the members of the Good Party and the former district chair of the party was assertive when talking about Syrian immigrants was not only the case of representing the citizens of the host country that give them the symbolic capital when encountering with the Syrian migrants on the field. What took place in the context of Fatih and in the context of this particular social group was the inherent superiority of a modern community, which considers itself superior to the "Arab" other in terms of education and lifestyle, over an unmodern social group. The reflections of this superiority in the field were revealed when explaining why the Syrian migrants could not adapt to the life of the Turkish social groups in the district. According to this narrative, Syrian migrants were "missing" in many respects, and this gap could only be closed with assimilationist education policies, and the most important dynamic here could begin with the learning of the Turkish language. However, even such a process would not have made it possible for migrants to adapt because, according to this view, immigrants had internal deficiencies and it turned out that these deficiencies could not be compensated by taking into account the period of their stay in Turkey. Therefore, these shortcomings could not be remedied by any adjustment process, and in this case, their return was the only viable option.

This superiority in keeping up with modernism gained strength as of 2019, with the partial adoption of this discourse by the conservatives in the Syrian migrant and conservative encounter in the Fatih area, with the impact of the current conjuncture. Accordingly, conservatives were now complaining about the shoes that Syrian migrants left in front of their doors and their excessive number. In the field, the modernist discourses, in which conservatives emphasized their superiority with, gained weight

when the conservatives compared their own practices with the Syrian migrants' practices in their daily life.

Conservatives' partial adoption of the modernism discourse did not include them in the ranks of the urban nationalists who have constituted a minority social group in the Fatih district. Because the first social group, which is the dominant social group in Fatih, was ultimately the responsible for the existence of Syrian migrants in Fatih because of the political circles that they represent. Therefore, even if the first group was not equated with the Syrian migrants, they had to be rehabilitated just like Syrian migrants because of their "misrecognition" of the political processes that caused the influx of Syrian migrants in Fatih particular and Turkey in general for the urban nationalists. Therefore, according to this narrative, conservatives in Fatih would be under the urban nationalists of Fatih if a social hierarchy to be formed based on the concept of modernism in the district.

In his article, İrfan Özet (2020) examines the reflections of the 2019 local elections in the conservative field. Accordingly, Özet (2020) claims that the shift on the conservatives' voting behaviors in Fatih, who favored the Republican Peoples Party candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu in the repeated İstanbul metropolitan elections in June 2019¹⁷, revealed the need for a renewed conceptualization for the conservative social groups. Hence, for Özet (2020), this shift can be explained with the concept of "urban nationalism". Accordingly, Özet (2020) claims that conservatives became urban nationalists as a result of the existence of the migrants around their social spaces and the competitive environment that the neoliberalism imposes upon them. This situation pushed them in a precarious position and as a result conservatives left aside their ideational liabilities that made them to accept the burden of the migrants in their social spaces (Özet, 2020). Hence, they now behave through economic rationality just like the urban, secularist and educated social groups (Özet, 2020).

¹⁷ Republican Peoples Party made an alliance with Good Party in the local elections of 2019 in İstanbul. Thus, Ekrem İmamoğlu was the candidate of both parties. In that regard, Özet (2019) implies that conservative social agents shifted to vote for secularist, educated and modernist politicians who conflict with conservative sovereignty regarding to the Syrian migration issue.

However, our empirical data from the field revealed contradictory outcomes with the abovementioned arguments. First of all, as I mentioned above, the conservative habitus was criticized by urban nationalism itself with the formers' redundant tolerance towards the Syrian migrants who took away Turkish citizens' occupations as well as the formers' lack of capacity in contending with Syrian migrants' assertive diffusion around their social spaces and in state institutions. The second conflicting issue was how the urban nationalists were perceived in the field by conservative social groups. According to conservatives, urban nationalist social groups were the elites who were representing the minority in the field and the reason for their opposition in the context of migration issue to the conservative sovereignty was "ideologically motivated". In the context of 2019 local elections, these discussions were frequently brought up in Fatih district. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, there were "We will not hand over Fatih to Syrians" banners that circulated around the district by urban nationalists of Good Party. When the pictures of this election campaign have shown to the JDP İstanbul metropolitan candidate Binali Yıldırım, he criticised it by accusing them of "cheap populism". As a result of the election, the Good Party, representing the urban nationalists in Fatih, received 4% of the vote. Subsequently, the party's candidate resigned from its Fatih district presidency. The third conflicting issue emerged after the clashes in İdlib in 2020. Secular nationalists in Fatih evaluated the losses in the İdlib conflict as a result of Turkish government's meddling in the internal affairs of other regional countries while conservatives stuck with the JDP discourse which claimed that Turkey had lost its soldiers in İdlib so that no more refugees would go to EU countries, so Europeans had to do their part. Accordingly, they would either help the Turkish state to defend İdlib or accept the Syrian refugees who would come to their borders. Hence, the complaints about Syrian migrants do not converge on the distinct social groups in the context of Fatih because the source of the complaints are different.

On the other hand, Syrian migrants conceptualized in the light of several variables such as their socio-economic conditions and the duration of their residences in Fatih. One respondent, who resided in Akşemsettin neighbor, proclaimed as:

In Akşemsettin, I talk about them as settled population. Because they have homes, occupations, everything that ordinary inhabitant have here.

However, the official representatives of conservative sovereignty sustained a discourse of “brothers and sisters” when talking about Syrian migrants. One of the respondent, who worked as a civil officer in DGMM and resided in the Fatih district for 20 years, proclaimed as:

I cannot define Syrian migrants as “refugees”. I cannot define them through a Western vocabulary. Refugee concept is a Western invention. We have more sincere approach.

Therefore, while inhabitants of conservative habitus came up with an approach that recognize Syrian migrants as a social group in Fatih, the official representatives of the conservative habitus came up with an identity-based culturalist and civilizationist conceptualization which is based on a total ambiguity. These empirical data reveal that the Syrian migrants in the context of Fatih district alienated through, first, normalizing their existence by emphasizing a comparison of their material capabilities with the natives and, second, incorporating them to a discourse of culturalist nativism that recognize every Western-oriented phenomenon as the ultimate other through the abovementioned Manichean us vs. them dichotomy.

Furthermore, according to our inferences from the field, the conceptualization of Syrian migrants varies according to their location. In some neighbours, such as in Karagümrük and Molla Gürani, they are perceived as migrants under temporary protection, while in another, such as in Akşemsettin, they are called one of the local communities. There is a bipartite reason for this situation. Firstly, it is the class characteristics of the Syrian migrants which determine how inhabitants perceive them and the other is the class characteristics of the space, in other words the neighbour that they located, determine how they are perceived by the inhabitants.¹⁸ In addition to that, Syrian migrants, who have been living in a certain region for a long time and who live within their own means, are perceived as “settled population”, while Syrian immigrants who have recently

¹⁸ For example, in the *Malta Çarşısı*, Syrian migrants were called “tradesmen”. In Akşemsettin, they were mostly called “resident population” and “settled population”. The situation was different in Karagümrük and Molla Gürani. Here, the “needs” side of Syrian immigrants was taken into consideration. Therefore, the mentality of the “Ansar/Muhajirun” was still sort of effective there. But in Akşemsettin, for instance, it was not present.

arrived who want to reach certain needs are seen as temporary people who are needy and who are living under temporary protection of the government.

These inferences lead us to Doğu Şimşek's (2020b) argument that Syrian migrants are going through a class-based integration process in Turkey.¹⁹ Accordingly, Şimşek (2020b) claims that Syrian migrants in Turkey can or cannot be integrated into the country according to their economic resources regardless of the region that they live and regardless of the identity that they have.²⁰ According to Şimşek (2020b), a Syrian migrant who owns a restaurant in Gaziantep has the opportunity to integrate himself and his family into Turkey more easily than a Syrian migrant working in Istanbul. Şimşek (2020b) strengthens his argument by adding social groups in Turkey to her analysis. According to this, existing social groups in Turkey see Syrian migrants who have jobs as migrants who "benefit" Turkey. Hence, they are more tolerant towards them. However, on the other hand, existing social groups in Turkey regard Syrian migrants, who either have a salary or cannot get along at all, as a burden. Therefore, whether Syrian immigrants have economic resources or not determines their integration into Turkey for themselves and also determines whether they are accepted from the existing social groups in Turkey. One should appreciate the explanatory power of such an argument. However, in the context of Fatih district, economic capitals of Syrian social groups do not conduce to their incorporation in the field by sovereign social groups. On the contrary, obtaining economic capital gave Syrian social groups the capability of creating gated communities around Fatih district.

In this regard, one example is the abovementioned Akşemsettin neighbor where, with the year of 2018, the number of Syrian migrants equated with the number of Turkish citizens in the neighbor.²¹ Akşemsettin neighbor starts in the south where the Vatan Police Station (known as *Emniyet*) located and finishes until the north where the Hırka-i

¹⁹ In this citation, Şimşek (2021) use the concept of integration not through obtaining institutional rights as a result of an official recognition but through the adjusting her/himself and being accepted in the daily life practices of the country where a migrant resides.

²¹ The number of Syrian migrants in Akşemsettin was 21703 in 2011. It shifted to 27941 in the year of 2018 (TEPAV, 2019).

Şerif neighbor located. The Syrian migrants became a social force not only as a result of their rising number but also their social and economic activities in the field. Accordingly, 65 of the 70 stores in the Akşemsettin Street are now managed by the Syrian entrepreneurs. Most of the stores in Akşemsettin Street were managed by the people of Black Sea region before 2011, who in time left this street because the landlords hired the stores to Syrian entrepreneurs. One of the respondent, who resides in the Akşemsettin Street, explained this process as:

Syrians paid lots of goodwill money (*hava parası*) to hire these shops. Landlords took out the Turkish tenants as a result of this. There is still big competition among people. But this competition is now between the Syrians. Even some restaurants have known by people outside the Fatih. Many people come here. Only two or three Turkish shops have left in this street. One of them is *Barbaros Yoğurt*. It has survived because it has a history that goes beyond 100 years but the rest passed to Syrians.

Syrian establishments are mostly based on restaurants in the street. However, there are bakeries, spice-sellers, phone shops, perfume shops, hookah shops, hairdresser shops, women's clothing shops and consultancy service shops operated as well around the neighbor. In addition to that most of the apartments also rented by the Syrian migrants, thus, this created a perception of Akşemsettin, especially the Akşemsettin Street, as if it became an enclave of Syrian migrants.²²

²² The outlook of the neighbor is sort of a place that seems to be appropriate for a middle-class taste. This observation is based on the characteristics of the service sector and their target audience in Akşemsettin. The conservatism of the Syrian migrants in the district was visible in terms of their daily practices. There was a separation between people not only based on the division of migrant-inhabitant but also the men-women. Thus, men live, trade, interact with men in the public sphere and women interact with women at home as well as in parks in their everyday life. This behavior crosscuts age differences. Even in the firms of consultancy, the women sit on the opposite side from men while operating. Therefore, the migrants' conservative habitus have certainly stricter codes regarding to the men-women relations than their Turkish peers. In addition, except the stores that sells women clothing, all shop assistants were Syrian men. During the Ramadan month of 2021 between the months of April and May, no one is smoking, drinking, and eating anything on streets. This does not mean or prove all people feasting though. But it is clear that if one does smoke, eat, or drink, it would be an opposite behavior for the migrants' conservative habitus. Thus, conservative habitus does not strictly urge to feast but it is certainly make the ones who are feasting and who are not feasting to abide the conservative habitus' codes during the Ramadan period. The daily habits of elderly, middle aged

For the inhabitants of Akşemsettin, the space has become an avenue of conflict and competition among themselves and Syrian migrants. In this regard, there were competition in the sense of obtaining the economic sources of the neighbor. In this case, Syrian migrants' success in obtaining the economic resources in terms of the density of their establishments, became a matter of complaints of the inhabitants. One of our respondent in the district compared the rent prices of the apartments in pre and post Syrian migration phenomenon as:

In Akşemsettin neighbor the price of renting an apartment was 650TL in 2015, then it went up to 1200TL in 2017. Recently, the prices are around 1500TL – 1700TL but there is not much apartment available because the Syrians did not left much.

On the other hand, for the inhabitants of adjacent neighbors of Akşemsettin, it became an alienated avenue because of the density of Syrian migrants and their dominance in the socio-economic spheres of the main street of Akşemsettin. One of our respondent referred Akşemsettin as:

Now, when I look there (referring to Akşemsettin street) I see problems. I mean what happens there is on the control of no one.²³

and young men were distinct. The elderly mostly attend prayers on mosques, talk with people after the prayers as well as participate daily shopping activities for their home-based needs. The middle aged and youngsters, however, participate on the service sector and work on their stores. Dress code was also an important distinction regarding to this generational difference of Syrian migrants. Middle aged men wear shiny shoes, white shirts, golden rings, casual jackets and printed shirts while young people mostly wear sweatshirts and jeans of the world brands such as Armani, Versace, and Philipp Plein. On the other hand, elderly wear prudent outlook, mainly dark-blue as well as coffee jackets, shirts and cardigans. Both middle aged and elderly use bead, but middle aged use shorter versions of beads and more shiny and valuable ones as an accessory while elderly uses the longer types as well as the prudent ones both in the sense of color and value. In sum, Syrian migrants in Akşemsettin, especially the men because they were the visible ones in the public sphere, were displaying petty-bourgeoisie habits which obviously confirmed that Syrian migrants of Akşemsettin neighbor differentiate in terms of class characteristics than their peers in other neighbors in the Fatih district.

²³ This discourse that implies “insecurity” resembles the tone of the conservative social agents of Fatih when they were talking about the Balat neighbor. However, there were a difference

In 2021 February, Turkish Ministry of Interior announced that it suspended the applications for residence permits of migrants particularly in the districts of Esenyurt and Fatih except the students and tradesmen who seek for temporary residence permit in a particular time period. Obviously, this act of the Turkish government aimed to control the density of migrants in those districts. When we add this instance to our questionnaire, we were expecting the respondents' high attention because this policy would eventually mean the reducing impact of migrants in the field of Fatih. Besides, this directive would also mean stricter policies would come regarding to the Syrian migrants in the context of Fatih district. Nonetheless, the reactions of our respondents to this instance were conflicting because most of our respondents were either indifferent or suspicious about this situation. However, one of them argued as:

This regulation means nothing because they (Syrians) overcome legal issues. Why do you think there are many consultancy firms around here? When there is an apartment become empty, they (Syrians) fill immediately. So, how this can happen? For to take residence permit, one must show rental contract to *Emniyet*. So, everything related to overcoming the legal processes. It does not mean anything practically.

This issue points out that, even if it is true or false, there were informal mechanisms among Syrian migrant social groups that make inhabitants of Akşemsettin become sort of suspicious about practicality of any legal procedure regarding to Syrian migrants in the neighbor.

Syrian migrants' attempts on establishing informal mechanisms among themselves caused a disruption in their relations with the notables of the conservative sovereignty in the field of Fatih. One of our respondent, who were a member of Fatih Municipality's City Council, referred to a cooperation process between the City Council and opinion leaders of the Syrian migrants in Fatih:

because Balat implies ethno-religious diversity as well as lower class representations, while Akşemsettin neighbor implies the emerging social group of Syrians who constituted of mostly homogeneous ethno-religious background.

We decided to do a project in 2017. We agreed with their opinion leaders in Akşemsettin. We said, let us provide education service. We said it could be a Turkish language course and other courses. We said anyone who wish to participate is welcomed. But they demanded other things. They asked from us to give them some place that they can establish their cultural centers. Later, these issues were cancelled. So, there is not much communication left.²⁴

Moreover, the daily practices of inhabitants and Syrian migrants in the district revealed contradictions through time. These divergences were based on the perception of family and how the two social groups use their life spaces. One of our respondent correlated crowded family structure of Syrian migrants with his growing feeling of insecurity as:

I live with my family. I have three children, one of them got married. My two children and my wife are at home. Now a Syrian has come to rent on the top floor. The number of shoes on his doorstep is eight pairs on his quietest days. We are thinking about this now. I mean, we think about how it would be with these people.

Consequently, due to the several intertwined reasons such as the length of Syrian migrants' stay, their rising population, the shift in Turkish governments' approach to Syria and the rising differences among daily life practices of Syrian migrants and conservative social groups of Fatih, the sovereign social group that is conservatives failed to incorporate the Syrian migrants in their habitus. As a result, in some neighbors of the Fatih, Syrian migrants have established their own habitus which paved way for

²⁴ TEPAV's (2019) report shows that the Syrians in the Fatih region either do not benefit from the services of the Municipality at all or that they are able to receive some services at certain times as a result of the partnerships of Fatih Municipality with the private sector as well as civil society organizations that have close partnership with the Fatih Municipality. Accordingly, the report shows that Fatih Municipality does not officially register the immigrant population in the district and it does not operate any official process related to the population numbers of Syrian migrants in the neighbors of Fatih. It can be said that there are some events that can be considered as an exception to this situation. As in the cases of banning the Arabic signboards of the Syrian migrants' enterprises and prohibiting daily basis apartment renting because of the complaints of potential illegal activities as well as prostitution show that Fatih Municipality approaches to deal with Syrian migrants only in line with the complaints of the Turkish inhabitants of the district.

them to become closed communities around the field. Nevertheless, this process never went in a linear and one-sided direction. Syrian migrants, in many cases, preferred to establish their own informal cultural networks.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

This research has attempted to answer the question that why conservative habitus failed to incorporate Syrian migrants. There is no study which deals with this question in the scholarly literature. However, one must realize that this question crosscuts two distinct works of literature. One of them is conservatism and the other is migration. This research has attempted to associate these two phenomena that both works of literature have not yet focused upon together.

In terms of the numbers, the Syrian migration phenomenon is a vital topic in Turkey. Several determinants are interrelated with this question and it is an unprecedented phenomenon that has implications through diverse units of analysis: individual level, society, the state as well as the international system. In terms of the sociological aspect of the phenomenon, there are more than 500.000 Syrian migrants are living in İstanbul. Hence, their situation on the ground as well as their relations with social groups of Turkey is a vital topic that has vital implications for the future of the issue. In addition, the Syrian migration phenomenon has started to be a subject of the election agenda of political parties as well as candidates of the presidency starting with the year 2015. Even though it has not become an impetus for change in the political equation, local elections of 2019 revealed that the Syrian migration phenomenon would become a hot topic in upcoming elections, especially for the 2023 general elections. Furthermore, the situation of Syrian migrants in Turkey will directly impact the future of northern Syria particularly the situation in Idlib, Afrin, Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ayn because if conservative sovereignty will consider that they are going to lose elections because of the constraints of the existence of Syrian migrants in Turkey, the repatriation of Syrian migrants to northern Syria would become one of the significant options. But of course, what will happen in Syria regarding the new constitution as well as the situation in Idlib will bring Syrian migrants in Turkey to the top of the agenda. Besides, the Syrian migration phenomenon has become the primary agenda of the EU and Turkish government since 2015. The 18 March 2016 convention between the EU and Turkish government has recently expired and the EU and Turkish government have been sustaining their relations regarding migration issue with ad hoc measurements. The Pazarkule incident of 2020 revealed the

fragility of the EU and Turkish governments' understanding regarding migration issue and the situation of northern Syria and the situation of Syrian migrants in Turkey would directly affect the implications regarding the relations of the EU and Turkish government.

In the context of conservatism, the scholarly literature primarily focuses on how the conservative social group has gained the economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals through the period that it has obtained sovereignty in the context of Turkey. Therefore, this literature focuses on how the conservative social groups' attitudes and practices have transformed through their way of obtaining sovereignty. Some studies focus on the political party aspect of this phenomenon in which they analyze the political elites' role in obtaining sovereignty and how this reflected upon the social groups who are part of this political project. In addition, some studies focus on the micro aspects of this phenomenon in which they analyze how conservative taste as well as how conservative habits transformed in a material and ideological sense in this period. The most striking point here is the findings related to how conservative taste and habits started to resemble its ultimate other, which is secularism, in the period of conservative sovereignty. Some studies, on the other hand, have incorporated the analysis of conservatism with neoliberalism that they argued the latter utilized the mobilization force of the former in establishing its hegemony. Some others have related sovereignty of conservatism with the system level of transformation wherein post-Cold War era identity-based civilizationist approaches gained strength and this mobilized the efforts of conservative social groups to strengthen their capitals when facing "others". All of these approaches have been providing meaningful contributions to the scholarly literature of conservatism. However, they have not focused on conservatism in the context of migration. Therefore, this thesis has attempted to relate conservatism with migration.

In the context of migration, the scholarly community has discussed the migrants' and local community members' encounter extensively. But here we have posed this type of research question because, firstly, we think the conceptualization of the local community is problematic because the scholarly community have put all social groups to the same basket under the umbrella of "Turkish society". However, the relations and

interactions of distinct social groups of Turkey with the Syrian migrants have never been the same; thus, an inclusive conceptualization such as Turkish society, hosts or locals fails to grasp the repercussions of the differences on perceptions and practices of distinct social groups. We decided to deal with the issue from the perspective of the conservatives, who have become the most important actor of the “Turkish society” pot because of its sovereignty. Because, upon what we saw on the field, their feedback on this issue turned to a policy reflection more precisely and faster comparing to other social groups in the pot. The repercussions of the local elections of 2019 and the İdlib issue of 2020 confirmed this hypothesis. Secondly, the scholarly community has added the Syrian migration issue to the migration literature and handled it as one of the phenomena in the migration history of Turkey. However, the course of events in Syria, as well as their impacts on Turkey and the Turkish governments’ impact on the course of events in Syria, and the relations among Syrian migrants and dominant social group in Turkey differentiate this phenomenon from the other incidents and therefore it requires to be handled through a dialectical approach. Moreover, in terms of numbers, the Syrian migration phenomenon has become an unprecedented issue as well. Likewise, the empirical data we obtained from the field also confirmed this situation because there was a completely different situation in the field than the discussions in most of the studies in the migration literature. As a matter of fact, the dominant approaches of the migration literature were highly abstract and institutionalist compared to the situation on the ground.

This study has attempted to associate the two phenomena which are conservative sovereignty and Syrian migration in Turkey. In doing so, this study has put forward a case which is Fatih district because Fatih district is a valuable case in terms of its capacity to represent both phenomena. However, we have not perceived this case as merely an avenue where we gather empirical data. Rather, we have incorporated it into the theoretical framework particularly Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of field. Hence, we have approached to Fatih district as a field where distinct social groups have been operating. In that regard, we have analyzed social groups with Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and his notion of capital. Accordingly, we conceptualized the social groups of Fatih through their habitus and capitals. This theoretical framework has allowed analyzing the social

groups and shedding light on their differences regarding life habits, opportunities and tastes. Moreover, this theoretical framework also has allowed putting forward a historical approach towards the field and analyze the continuities and disruptions regarding the power struggle among social groups. Earlier studies in the migration literature emphasized the notion of cultural intimacy and put the same basket of migrants and inhabitants because of the conservative characteristics of both social groups as well as the field of Fatih. However, this study emphasized the conflict and competition among social groups in the field of Fatih. Even though the findings could not be generalizable to the all Syrian migrants and conservative social groups of İstanbul, it can be said that the case that focused upon in this study could be replicable in some senses to other districts of İstanbul that also known with its conservative characteristics and similar density of Syrian migrants. Therefore, this study contributes to the works of literature on conservatism and migration in the context of Turkey with two aspects. Firstly, it puts forward a research question that both works of literature have not yet touched upon together. Secondly, it comes up with a theoretical framework that has not yet been utilized in the studies of migration literature.

Our findings put forward four intertwined reasons as to why conservative habitus failed to incorporate Syrian migrants in the context of the Fatih district.

Firstly, as of 2013, in some neighbors of Fatih, the Syrian migrant population has become equivalent to the population of inhabitants of the neighbors. This situation has created tension among both social groups because conservative social groups have started to complain about the repercussions of this influx. According to our findings in this context, conservative social groups started to perceive Syrian migrants as “they” who become competitors in their habitus in terms of obtaining symbolic, economic and cultural capitals. In that regard, conservative social groups have seen the avenues of Fatih where the density of Syrian migrants is high with suspicion. Several respondents approached these areas with suspicion, some claimed that they do not know what is happening in those places which implied as the mentioned areas are invaded by whom they do not know the implications of this situation. Consequently, in the context of these findings, the density of Syrian migrants, as well as their activism on the economy and social spheres of Fatih, created tension among social groups. However, according to

our findings, this tension is valid in the context of the dominant social group of Fatih, which are conservatives, and the relatively minority social group of the district, which are urban secularists who are opposing not only the existence of Syrian migrants but also the tolerance of conservatives regarding the density of the Syrian migrants in Fatih district.

Secondly, according to our findings, Syrian migrants have been perceived as the settled population rather than refugees, migrants or people in need in the district of Fatih by the dominant social group of conservatives. This dimension is also related to the class-based characteristics of Syrian migrants who accommodated in the district of Fatih. Hence, especially in recent conjuncture, the perception of Syrian migrants has shifted from war-related compulsory migration to voluntary accommodation choices of a certain group of people. This perception has reinforced when properties such as stores as well as flats in Fatih district have changed hands and Syrian migrants have become incoming owners and tenants of properties in places where dominant social groups of Fatih were the owners and tenants before the influx. Most of the respondents, especially in the neighborhood of Akşemsettin, referred to this situation with phrases that imply Syrian migrants' opportunities especially in the economic sphere became equivalent with themselves. Moreover, some respondents expressed that Syrian migrants have established a social capital in Fatih that conduces them to overcome legal issues such as maneuvering around the ban of residence permits that introduced in February 2021. Besides, some respondents claimed that if they would unpack their flat, for instance, they would not be capable of finding an alternative flat to accommodate or return their flat because Syrian migrants would hire or buy the flat that they emptied. Consequently, in the context of these findings, there has been a zero-sum mentality operating among social groups of Fatih district where they suppose their loss will be a net win to other social groups and this mindset has been an impetus for exclusion.

Thirdly, our findings have indicated the determinants that have used to be the bridges between the Syrian migrants and conservative social groups of Fatih such as Sunni-Muslimhood, shared Ottoman heritage, and the perception of Syrian migrants as the victims of an atrocious regime have lost their impact through time. In this regard, differences regarding daily life practices have become the primary determinant of the

relations among Syrian migrants and conservative social groups in the context of Fatih. Most of the respondents have expressed phrases related to distinguishing themselves from the Syrian migrants in terms of daily life habits as well as attitudes and behaviors in the public sphere of the Fatih district. There were two primary examples in that regard. One of them was the complaints about the way how Syrian migrants express themselves while they are speaking. Our respondents complained about Syrian migrants' loud voice, compared the attitude of speaking with themselves, and found disrespectful. The other one was the family structure of Syrian migrants. Our respondents claimed that Syrian migrants live in crowded homes, and they implied feeling insecurity when referring to the excessive number of shoes in front of the Syrian migrants' flats. Consequently, the socially constructed values, which have been put forward by the Turkish government to obtain the consent of its constituencies regarding the influx of Syrian migrants to their social spaces, have lost their impact because of the protracted existence of migrants in the fields that conservative social groups dominate. As a result, according to our findings, the conservative social groups have started to differentiate themselves in terms of palpable determinants, such as daily life habits, from the Syrian migrants and this has paved the way for further exclusion of Syrian migrants.

Fourthly, according to our findings, the change in the conjuncture regarding how the course of events in Syria has deteriorated in terms of the Turkish governments' perspective has led to changes in the perceptions and attitudes of conservative social groups in Fatih towards the Syrian migrants. In the post-ISIS situation of Syria, where the Syrian government, as well as Syrian Democratic Forces, have become main actors, the Turkish government has faced the danger of losing its sphere of influence. This resulted in the Turkish Armed Forces' consecutive four military operations that have addressed northern Syria starting from 2016. In the Fatih district, our respondents claimed that there is a safety situation of northern Syria thanks to the Turkish governments' military operations and suggested that Syrian migrants should return to those areas. Moreover, the EU also has emerged as a significant actor in this conjuncture by externalizing the influx of Syrian migrants from the European continent by ad hoc co-optations with the Turkish government since 2016. The Turkish government, in this regard, has been using an instrumentalist discourse regarding the Syrian migrants with the participation of the

EU in the Syrian migration matter. Consequently, the complex picture that has emerged in the post-ISIS conjuncture regarding the course of events in Syria has clashed with the complaints about the density as well as activism of Syrian migrants in the social spaces of conservative social groups of Fatih district. This resulted in the exclusion of Syrian migrants based on the suggestions of the repatriation to northern Syria as well as putting forward them as burdens that need to be taken care of by the EU countries.

The findings of this study contribute to the works of literatures on conservatism and migration in the context of Turkey in five aspects. Firstly, the findings have revealed the dynamics of competition and conflict among dominant social groups of Fatih and Syrian migrants. In this regard, the works of literature, which have focused upon the question as to why Syrian migrants live in the districts of Istanbul known with conservative characteristics, focused on the determinants that have established bridges between the social groups of the focused district and Syrian migrants. Even though those findings are significantly valuable, they are insufficient to analyze the recent dynamics which caused conflict and competition. Secondly, from the beginning, the findings of this study have been incorporated into the distinct units of analysis. Hence, the discussion that has been ongoing through the paper associates the context, which has been referring to the unit of analyses of states as well as regional situation, and the practices as well as the discourses of the social agents in the district of Fatih. This aspect has avoided the research from the fallacy of reductionism by incorporating the agency-level explanations to the structure-level explanations in Bourdieu's sense. Thirdly, the findings have revealed that there is a difference in the attitudes and perceptions of different social groups of Turkey regarding the existence of Syrian migrants in their social spaces despite they recently have reached a consensus on objecting to the Syrian migrants' existence. Fourthly, the findings, which derived from secondary sources, have historicized the power struggle of social groups in the district of Fatih and incorporated the Syrian migration phenomenon into the discussions of that context. Lastly, but more importantly, the findings revealed that how an international migration phenomenon has been perceived in the field and how the relations of migrant population and dominant social groups transformed through time.

There have been several limitations related to both exogenous and endogenous factors that have impacted the empirical data gathering process of this study. Firstly, in terms of exogenous factors, the COVID-19 pandemic has made it very difficult to conduct field research not only for us but also all researchers and social scientists who are seeking to conduct field research. The plot field research of this thesis has conducted in 2020 February in the middle of the Idlib crisis when there was not any announced COVID-19 case in Turkey. Hence, we thought that COVID-19 would not pose a problem in the field. However, from March 2020 to April 2021, Turkey has witnessed three consecutive peaks regarding COVID-19 cases. Paradoxically, this situation has made social scientists and researchers, who have supposed to reduce the uncertainties of social life with their studies, vulnerable to uncertainties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic when conducting field research. Therefore, all writing, as well as field research period of this study, have clashed with the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions which have made it very difficult to conduct the research process through a prepared schedule. For instance, the 26 April 2021 full lockdown measures have coincided with our field research process and we had to postpone interviews to the last two weeks of May 2021. But this time our writing process has clashed with the thesis deadline period of Graduate Institute of Bilgi University. Likewise, COVID-19 related limitations have also effective when we succeeded to make field research. We had to cancel focus group discussions because of the restrictions. Also, we have lost the most significant tool of a researcher, which is being insistent on people to make in-depth interviews, because many people showed reluctance to our requests of interview by putting forward, rightfully, pandemic related excuses. Also, we have faced difficulty when conducting interviews because many places such as restaurants, cafes, and parks were closed due to the restrictions and people, again rightfully, were hesitant to invite us to their homes and workplaces. Hence, we had to make some in-depth interviews around the streets of Fatih district. Secondly, in terms of endogenous factors, we could not make interviews with Syrian migrants in the Fatih district as much as we expected. There have been several reasons for this failure. To begin with, the language barrier has alienated contacted Syrian migrants. When they see a researcher, who is speaking Turkish and asking about their situation, as well as the situation of the district, they showed reluctance, or they tried to overcome the researcher immediately. To build a relationship based on trust, we tried the snowball

sampling methodology to overcome this limitation. However, it has created bias because if we consider that Syrian migrants in the district differ in terms of class-related factors, this method has provided us to reach respondents who were very similar in terms of class-related characteristics. Eventually, this situation has led our findings to be based on one-sided narratives of conservative social groups of the Fatih district. More importantly, our findings point out that there has been an alternative habitus created by the Syrian migrants, especially in the neighborhood of Akşemsettin, but we could not discuss this situation because we could not build a network of respondents among Syrian migrants. But, nevertheless, we consider this limitation as proof of our hypothesis that conservative social groups excluded Syrian migrants from their habitus in the Fatih district.

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QUESTION FORMS

[MUHTARLIK SORU FORMU]

GENEL GİRİŞ

- A.01. Kendinizden genel olarak bahsedebilir misiniz? Yaşınız, ikametiniz, mesleğiniz ve memleketinizden başlayabiliriz.
- A.02. Ne zaman Fatih'e yerleştiniz? Eğer buraya yerleşmenizden bir göç hikayesi varsa bunu anlatır mısınız?
- A.03. Fatih ilçesi hakkında görüşleriniz nelerdir? Özellikle göç ve şehirleşme bağlamında bu ilçede şahit olduğunuz süreçlerden bahsedebilir misiniz?
- A.04. Siyasi ve sivil toplum hareketlerine katıldınız mı? Eğer katıldıysanız bunlar hangi parti/ler ve hangi sivil toplum kuruluşu/ları oldu?
- A.05. Siyasi ve sivil toplum hareketleri ile Fatih'in nasıl bir ilişkisi oldu? Buradaki toplumsal yapıya siyasi süreçlerin etkisi olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer olduysa nasıl ve ne derecede oldu? Sözelimi muhafazakar çevrelerin 1990'lardan itibaren Türkiye'nin yerel ve merkezi yönetim süreçlerine dahili Fatih'i nasıl etkiledi ve şuan nasıl etkiliyor?
- A.06. Fatih ilçesindeki toplumsallaşma süreçleri nasıl işliyor? Sözelimi toplumsallaşma süreçlerini yöneten dinamikler nelerdir? Hemşehri dernekleri, cemaatler, parti grupları, esnaf, zanaatkarlar ve profesyoneller bu dinamiklerin nerelerinde yer alıyorlar? Muhtarlık bu bağlamda nerede yer alıyor ve bu dinamikleri nasıl etkiledi ve etkiliyor?
- A.07. Görev sürenizden bahsedebilir misiniz? Resmi olan görevleriniz nelerdir? Buna ek olarak resmi olmayan, sizin inisiyatifinizde olan görevler yürüttünüz mü? Bunlar görev aldığınız bölgeyi nasıl etkiledi?

Suriyeli Göçmenler ve Fatih

- A.08. 2011 yılı itibarıyla Fatih'te ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlediniz? Eğer kayda değer demografik değişiklikler yaşandıysa bu değişime Suriyeli göçmenlerin rolü nedir?

- A.09.** Suriyeli göçmenler neden Fatih ilçesinde yaşamayı tercih etti? Bu tercihin bağlamı ekonomik mi yoksa kültürel mi? Bu konuda gözlemlerinizi, düşüncelerinizi nelerdir?
- A.10.** Fatih'e gelen Suriyeli göçmenler ile ilçede bulunan toplulukların ilişkisini hakkında neler düşünüyorsunuz?
- A.11.** Karşılaştırma yapacak olsaydınız, Suriyeli göçmenler ile Fatih'teki yerleşik toplulukları nasıl tanımlardınız? Arada farklılıklar olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer varsa bu farklılıklar sizin bulunduğunuz makamın yaklaşımını farklılaştırıyor mu? Sözelimi, muhtarlık perspektifinden Fatihliler ve Suriyeli göçmen Fatihliler arasında bir fark var mı? Eğer varsa bu farklılıklar hangi bağlamlarda daha görünür?
- A.12.** Önceki soruyla bağlantılı olarak, Fatihliler ile Suriyeli göçmen grupların oluşturduğu Fatihliler arasındaki etkileşimlerden örnekler verebilir misiniz? Aklınıza birbirleriyle çelişen veya uyum barındıran örnekler geliyor mu?
- A.13.** İlçedeki kurumların Suriyeli göçmenlerle olan ilişkileri nelerdir? Hangi alanlarda etkileşimler var? Sözelimi muhtarlığın kurumsal olarak herhangi bir girişimi var mı? Fatih 'deki bireysel ve sivil inisiyatifler ile kurumsal süreçleri karşılaştırabilir misiniz?
- A.11** Size göre Fatihliler ile Suriyeli göçmenlerin oluşturduğu Fatihliler arasındaki etkileşimleri iyi veya kötü diye net bir ayrımla tanımlayabilir miyiz? Suriyeli göçün tarihselliği bağlamında bu etkileşimlerin dönüştüğü söylenebilir mi? Özellikle 2015 sonrası ekonomik daralmanın Suriyeli göçmenler üzerindeki algıları değiştirdiği söylenebilir mi? Eğer bu algılar dönüşmekteyse pratiklere ne ölçüde yansıyor? Sözelimi ekonomik daralma süreci öncesi Fatihlilerin Suriyeli göçmenlerle olan etkileşimleri pratiklere nasıl yansıdı? Eğer bugün ile nasıl karşılaştırabiliriz?

KAPANIŞ

- A.13** Son olarak eklemek istediğiniz bir şey var mı?

[SİYASİ PARTİLER SORU FORMU]

GENEL GİRİŞ

- A.01. Kendinizden genel olarak bahseder misiniz? Yaşınız, ikametiniz, mesleğiniz ve memleketiniz den başlayabiliriz.
- A.02. Ne zaman Fatih'e yerleştiniz? Eğer buraya yerleşmenizde bir göç hikayesi varsa bunu anlatır mısınız?
- A.03. Fatih ilçesi hakkında görüşleriniz nelerdir? Özellikle göç ve şehirleşme bağlamında bu ilçede şahit olduğunuz süreçlerden bahsedebilir misiniz? Özellikle bir önceki soruyla bağlantılı olarak, kendi durumunuzu Fatih'in göç ve şehirleşme bağlamında ilişkili olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer düşünüyorsanız bunları açıklar mısınız?
- A.04. Şuan bağlı bulunduğunuz siyasi topluluktan bahseder misiniz? Daha önce farklı bir siyasi toplulukta yer aldınız mı? Eğer katıldıysanız bunlar hangi partiler oldu ve görevleriniz nelerdi?
- A.05. Şuan bağlı bulunduğunuz siyasi topluluğun ilçe ve il düzeyinde Fatih ile ilişkisi nasıl? Parti bu ilçeyi nasıl görüyor? Sözelimi, Fatih özelinde partinizin oluşturduğu siyasi süreçler nelerdir? Bunların başka ilçelerle farklılık gösterdiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
- A.06. Partinizin Fatih'in toplumsal alanları ile olan ilişkisini açıklar mısınız? Sözelimi, partinizde görev alan paydaşlarınız ve sizin Fatih'te bulunan hemşehri dernekleri, cami dernekleri, muhtarlıklar, sivil toplum kuruluşları, meslek örgütleri ve diğer partiler ile nasıl bir etkileşiminiz var? Partinizin bu alanların hangilerinde daha etkin? Eğer eksik kaldığını düşündüğünüz alanlar varsa bunlar hangileri?
- A.07. Partinizde olan görevinizden bahseder misiniz? Resmi görevleriniz ve kendi inisiyatifinizle yürüttüğünüz görevler nelerdir? Bu görevlerinizin Fatih'i etkilediğini, katkıda bulunduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer öyleyse katkıda bulunduğunuz alanlar nelerdir?
- A.08. Partinizin Fatih özelinde yürüttüğünüz politikalardan memnun musunuz? Parti politikaları ve parti görevlilerinin yaklaşımları arasında farklılık görüyor musunuz? Sözelimi, partinin belirli bir yaklaşımını benimsemeyen, bunları uygulamaktan çekinen veya partinin uygulamaktan çekindiği yaklaşımları benimseyip kendi özel hayatlarında

da olsa uygulayan partililer var mı? Partinizin perspektifinden Fatih'te özel alan ve kamusal alan arasında bir farklılık var mı? Sözelimi, eğer bir parti politikasını içselleştiremediğinizde bunu özel hayatınızda uygulamama durumunuz var mı?

SURİYELİ GÖÇMENLER VE FATİH

- A.09. 2011 yılı itibariyle Fatih'te ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlediniz? Eğer kayda değer demografik değişiklikler yaşandıysa bu değişimde Suriyeli göçmenlerin rolü nedir? Eğer bu yıllarda partinizde görev aldıysanız partinizin sürecin başında göç olgusuna yaklaşımı nasıl oldu? Bugünle nasıl karşılaştırırsınız?
- A.10. Fatih'e gelen Suriyeli göçmenler ile ilçede bulunan toplulukların ilişkisini hakkında neler düşünüyorsunuz? Fatih'te "Suriyeliler" ve "Türkler" veya "göçmenler" ve "vatandaşlar" gibi ayrımlar var mı? Eğer varsa, siz kendinizi bu ayrımların birinde görüyor musunuz? Eğer görüyorsanız partili kimliğinizle mi bu ayrımda yer alıyorsunuz yoksa kişisel veya partili olmayan kimliklerinizin biriyle mi bu ayrımda yer alıyorsunuz?
- A.11. İlçeye gelen göçün sürekliliği 10 yılı aştığı düşünülürse bu süreçte hem partinizin hem de Fatih'teki toplulukların göç olgusuyla ilişkisini nasıl gözlemlediniz? Süreçten karşılaştırmalı olarak bahsedebilir misiniz?
- A.12. Partinizin Suriyeli göçmen olgusuna yaklaşımıyla ilçedeki Türkiye vatandaşlarının yaklaşımı arasında fark görüyor musunuz? Eğer görüyorsanız bu farklılıkların sebepleri neler olabilir?
- A.13. Partinizin Suriyeli göçmenler özelinde politikaları oldu mu? Olduysa hangi yıllarda oldu, şuan devam eden bir proje, çalışma veya partililer olarak sizlerin inisiyatifinizde gerçekleştirdiğiniz çalışmalar var mı? Diğer partilerin politikalarıyla kendi partinizin politikalarını karşılaştıracak olsanız neler söylediniz?
- A.14. Karşılaştırma yapacak olsaydınız, Suriyeli göçmenler ile Fatih'teki yerleşik toplulukları nasıl tanımlardınız? Arada farklılıklar olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer varsa bu farklılıklar sizin bulunduğunuz partinin yaklaşımını farklılaştırıyor mu? Sözelimi, partinizin perspektifinden Fatihliler ve Suriyeli göçmen Fatihliler arasında bir fark var mı? Eğer farklılıkların olduğunu düşünüyorsanız bu farklılıklar hangi bağlamlarda daha görünür? Sözelimi, ideolojik ve etnik bağlamlarda mı, yoksa günlük hayatın ortaya çıkardığı topluluklar arasındaki, örneğin mutfak kültürü, giyim/kuşam, yürüyüş tarzı, sosyalleşme araçları vb. gibi doğal farklılıklar mı?
- A.15. Fatih'te bulunan Suriyeli göçmenler perspektifinden partinizin nasıl algılandığını düşünüyorsunuz? Bugüne kadar nasıl geri dönüşler aldınız? Suriyeli göçmenler partinizin ilçe teşkilatında yer aldılar mı? Eğer böyle bir talep olsaydı bu konuda ne düşünürdünüz?

- A.16.** Önceki soruyla bağlantılı olarak, partililer ile Suriyeli göçmen grupların oluşturduğu Fatihliler arasındaki etkileşimlerden örnekler verebilir misiniz? Aklınıza birbirleriyle çelişen veya uyum barındıran örnekler geliyor mu? Özellikle parti çerçevesi dışında, yani partililerin özel hayatlarında Suriyelilerle karşılaşmaları nasıl gerçekleşiyor, Suriyeli göçmenler hakkında neler düşünüyorlar? Komşuluk ilişkileriniz nasıl, Suriyeli göçmenlerin işletmelerinden alışveriş yapar mısınız? Suriyeli göçmenlerin lokantalarında yemek yer misiniz? Eğer partiniz Fatih'teki Türklerin girişimlerinden değil de Suriyeli göçmenlerin girişimlerinden hizmet tedarik etseydi bu konuda ne düşünürdünüz?
- A.17.** Bağlı bulunduğunuz partinin perspektifi size ve diğer partililere Suriyeli göçmenlere belirli bir açıdan yaklaşmayı dayatıyor mu? Yoksa partinizin politikaları Fatih'teki günlük dinamiklerle ve sizin Suriyeli göçmenlerle olan ilişkileriniz, etkileşimleriniz ve düşünceleriniz ile uyum içerisinde mi?
- A.18.** Size göre Fatihliler ile Suriyeli göçmenlerin oluşturduğu Fatihliler arasındaki etkileşimleri iyi veya kötü diye net bir ayrımla tanımlayabilir miyiz? Bu soruyu partiniz, yani partiniz ve partililerinizle Suriyeli göçmenler arasındaki etkileşimler bağlamında da sormak isterim.
- A.19.** Suriyeli göçün tarihselliği bağlamında bu etkileşimlerin dönüştüğü söylenebilir mi? Özellikle 2015 sonrası ekonomik daralmanın Suriyeli göçmenler üzerindeki algıları değiştirdiği söylenebilir mi? Eğer bu algılar dönüşmekteyse günlük hayatın pratiklerine ve parti politikalarına ne ölçüde yansıyor? Sözgelimi ekonomik daralma süreci öncesi Fatihlilerin Suriyeli göçmenlerle olan etkileşimleri pratiklere nasıl yansıdı? Bugün ile nasıl karşılaştırabiliriz?

KAPANIŞ

- A.20.** Son olarak eklemek istediğiniz bir şey var mı?

[CAMİ DERNEĞİ VE CEMAATİ SORU FORMU]

GENEL GİRİŞ

- A.01. Kendinizden genel olarak bahseder misiniz? Yaşınız, ikametiniz, mesleğiniz ve memleketiniz den başlayabiliriz.
- A.02. Fatih ilçesi hakkında görüşleriniz nelerdir? Özellikle göç ve şehirleşme bağlamında bu ilçede şahit olduğunuz süreçlerden bahsedebilir misiniz?
- A.03. Siyasi ve sivil toplum hareketlerine katıldınız mı? Eğer katıldıysanız bunlar hangi parti/ler ve hangi sivil toplum kuruluşu/ları oldu?
- A.04. Cami cemaatinizde genel olarak hangi toplumsal gruplar var? Bu grupların ortak paydaları neler?
- A.05 Cami derneğinizden bahseder misiniz? Cami cemaatinin derneğinizde temsil edildiğini düşünüyor musunuz? Cemaatinizi toplumsal meselelere ilgili topluluklar mı oluşturuyor yoksa sadece ibadetini yapmak için gelenler mi çoğunlukta?
- A.06 Derneğinizin Fatih'teki siyasi partiler, sivil toplum kuruluşları, girişimciler, esnaf, zanaatkarlar ve diğer paydaşlarla olan ilişkileri nasıl? İşbirlikleriniz var mı? Eğer varsa hangi alanlarda ve hangi gruplarla gerçekleşiyor?
- A.07. Derneğinizden bahseder misiniz? Ne zaman, kimler tarafından kuruldu? Siz ne zaman katıldınız? Sizin görevleriniz neler? Resmi ve kendi inisiyatifinizde yürüttüğünüz çalışmalar, etkinlikler neler? Derneğinizin faaliyetleri nelerdir? Hangi alanlarda çalışıyorsunuz?

SURİYELİ GÖÇMENLER VE FATİH

- A.11 2011 yılı itibariyle Fatih'te ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlediniz? Eğer kayda değer demografik değişiklikler yaşandıysa bu değişimde Suriyeli göçmenlerin rolü nedir? Eğer bu yıllarda derneğinizde görev aldıysanız göç olgusuna yaklaşımınız nasıl oldu? Bugünle nasıl karşılaştırırsınız?
- A.12 Suriyeli göçmenler neden Fatih ilçesinde yaşamayı tercih etti? Bu tercihinin bağlamı ekonomik mi yoksa kültürel mi? Bu konuda gözlemleriniz, düşünceleriniz nelerdir? Fatih'e gelen Suriyeli göçmenler ile ilçede bulunan toplulukların ilişkisini hakkında neler düşünüyorsunuz?
- A.12 Fatih'e gelen Suriyeli göçmenler ile ilçede bulunan toplulukların ilişkisini hakkında neler düşünüyorsunuz? Fatih'te "Suriyeliler" ve "Türkler" veya

"göçmenler" ve "vatandaşlar" gibi ayrımlar var mı? Eğer varsa, siz kendinizi bu ayrımların birinde görüyor musunuz? Eğer görüyorsanız dernek üyesi olan kimliğinizle mi bu ayrımda yer alıyorsunuz yoksa kişisel veya dernek üyeliğinden bağımsız olmayan kimliklerinizin biriyle mi bu ayrımda yer alıyorsunuz?

- A.13 Fatihliler ve Suriyeli göçmen Fatihliler arasında bir fark var mı? Eğer farklılıkların olduğunu düşünüyorsanız bu farklılıklar hangi bağlamlarda daha görünür? Sözelimi, ideolojik ve etnik bağlamlarda mı, yoksa günlük hayatın ortaya çıkardığı topluluklar arasındaki, örneğin mutfak kültürü, giyim/kuşam, yürüyüş tarzı, sosyalleşme araçları vb. gibi doğal farklılıklar mı?
- A.14 Suriyeli göçmenler cami cemaatinde aktifler mi? Eğer aktiflerse namaz ibadeti dışında hangi alanlarda görünürler?
- A.15 Cami derneğiniz bugüne kadar Suriyeli göçmenler için ne yaptı? Hangi çalışmalarda bulundunuz?
- A.16 Suriyeli göçmenler caminiz ve derneğiniz için ne yaptı? Hangi/ne tür yardımlarda ve etkileşimlerde bulundular?
- A.17 Suriyeli göçmenler ve Türkler gibi cemaat içinde farklılaşmalar var mı? Eğer varsa bu farklılaşmalar hangi bağlamlarda daha görünür? İbadette görünen farklılaşmalar mı yoksa usul anlamında mı? Sözelimi, ibadetin nasıl yapıldığı değil de nasıl algılandığı gibi.
- A.18 Camiye ve derneğe en çok hangi toplumsal gruplar yardım yapıyor? Bağışlarda önkoşul veya şerh öne sürenler oldu mu? Örneğin "şu gruba vermeyin, bunlar için harcamayın" gibi bağışlarını şartlı yapan insanlar oldu mu? Cemaatin gözündeki camide ibadet edenlerin ve dernekte aktif olanların etnik kimliği, kültürel farklılıkları esas alınıyor mu?
- A.19 Cami cemaatinde ve derneğinizde bulunan Türkler ve Suriyeli göçmenler arasındaki etkileşimlere örnekler verebilir misiniz? Örneğin Ramazan ayında birlikte iftar organizasyonu yaptılar mı, yardım anlamında işbirlikleri oldu mu?
- A.20 Derneğin ve cami cemaatinin gözündeki Suriyeli göçmenler sadece pasif ihtiyaç sahibi insanlar mı? Suriyeli göçmenlerin cemaate katılımının da ötesinde dernekte söz sahibi olmaları gibi bir durumu cemaat ve cami derneği üyeleri nasıl karşıladı?
- A.21 Size göre Fatihliler ile Suriyeli göçmenlerin oluşturduğu Fatihliler arasındaki etkileşimleri iyi veya kötü diye net bir ayrımla tanımlayabilir miyiz? Suriyeli göçün tarihselliği bağlamında bu etkileşimlerin dönüştüğü söylenebilir mi? Özellikle 2015 sonrası ekonomik daralmanın Suriyeli göçmenler üzerindeki algıları değiştirdiği söylenebilir mi? Eğer bu algılar dönüşmekteyse pratiklere ne ölçüde yansıyor? Sözelimi ekonomik daralma süreci öncesi Fatihlilerin

Suriyeli göçmenlerle olan etkileşimleri pratiklere nasıl yansıdı? Bugün ile nasıl karşılaştırabiliriz?

KAPANIŞ

A.22 Son olarak eklemek istediğiniz bir şey var mı?

[TCCAR, GİRİŐİMCI, ESNAF, ZANAATKAR SORU FORMU]

GENEL GİRİŐ

- A.01. Kendinizden genel olarak bahseder misiniz? Yaşınız, ikametiniz, mesleğiniz ve memleketiniz den başlayabiliriz.
- A.02. Ne zaman Fatih'e yerleştiniz? Eğer buraya yerleşmenizde bir göç hikayesi varsa bunu anlatır mısınız?
- A.03. Fatih ilçesi hakkında görüşleriniz nelerdir? Özellikle göç ve şehirleşme bağlamında bu ilçede şahit olduğunuz süreçlerden bahsedebilir misiniz? Özellikle bir önceki soruyla bağlantılı olarak, kendi durumunuzu Fatih'in göç ve şehirleşme bağlamında ilişkili olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer düşünüyorsanız bunları açıklar mısınız?
- A.04. Herhangi bir siyasi toplulukta yer alıyor musunuz? Eğer alıyorsanız bunlar hangi partiler oldu ve görevleriniz nelerdi
- A.05. Ticari hayatınızdan bahseder misiniz? Hangi iş kolunda faaliyet gösteriyorsunuz? Daha önce farklı iş kollarında bulundunuz mu?
- A.06. Fatih ilçesini ekonomik bağlamda değerlendirir misiniz? Hangi sektörler ilçenin ekonomisinde daha baskın? Fatih'te nasıl para kazanılır? Burada nasıl başarılı bir girişimci olunur?
- A.07. Müşterileriniz kimler? Fatih'in demografik çeşitliliği ticaretinize etki ediyor mu?
- A.08. Fatih'te mal almam/hizmet sağlamam dediğiniz bir grup var mı? Eğer varsa bu tercihinizin sebeplerinden bahseder misiniz?
- A.09. İşinizle ilgili herhangi bir derneğe veya meslek topluluğuna/kuruluşuna üye misiniz?
- A.10. Fatih'te tüccarlar/girişimciler arasında dayanışma ağları var mı? Eğer varsa bu ağlar resmi süreçlerle mi işliyor, yoksa kişisel inisiyatifler neticesinde mi ortaya çıktılar?

SURİYELİ GÖÇMENLER VE FATİH

- A.11** 2011 yılı itibariyle, Suriyeli göçmenlerin Fatih'e yerleşmeleriyle birlikte ilçede ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlediniz ve bu değişiklikler sizin girişimlerinize ne gibi etkilerde bulundu?
- A.12** Suriyeli göçmenler neden Fatih ilçesinde yaşamayı tercih etti? Bu tercihin bağlamı ekonomik mi yoksa kültürel mi? Bu konuda gözlemlerinizi, düşüncelerinizi nelerdir?
- A.13** Fatih'e gelen Suriyeli göçmenler ile ilçede bulunan toplulukların ilişkisini hakkında neler düşünüyorsunuz?
- A.14** Suriyeli girişimciler hakkında neler düşünüyorsunuz? Fatih'te "Suriyeli girişimciler" ve "Türk girişimciler" gibi ayrımlar var mı? Eğer varsa, siz kendinizi bu ayrımların birinde görüyor musunuz?
- A.15** Suriyeli girişimciler ile Türkler arasında kültürel farklılıklar var mı? Eğer varsa ticari alanda bu farklılıklar ticari etkileşimlerde ne derece etkili?
- A.16** Eğer kültürel veya etnik farklılıklar varsa bunların Fatih'teki piyasa mantığıyla ilişkisi nasıl geliyor? Sözelimi eğer bir mal tedarik edecek olsaydınız ve bu malı en uygun fiyata Suriyeli bir girişimci sağlıyor olsaydı onu tercih eder miydiniz? Eğer ediyorsanız bu tercihinizi başkalarıyla paylaşır mısınız, yoksa gizli kalmasını mı istersiniz?
- A.17** Hem sizden hem de Suriyeli girişimcilerden alışveriş yapan müşterileriniz var mı? Müşterilerinizin sizden beklentileri neler? Beklentilerinde piyasa mantığı mı baskın yoksa kültürel ve etnik değişkenler de onların tercihlerini etkiliyor mu?
- A.18** Esnaflık, zanaatkarlık ve girişimciliği algılama ve uygulama anlamında Türkiyeliler ve Suriyeli girişimciler arasında farklılıkların olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer varsa bu farklılıklar nelerdir?
- A.19** Fatih'te Suriyeli göçmenler gelmeden önce ticari hayat nasıldı? Karşılaştırma yapar mısınız?
- A.20** Hükümet, belediye ve zabıta gibi devlet kurumlarının Türk ve Suriyeli girişimciler arasında ayrım yaptığını düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer düşünüyorsanız örnekler verebilir misiniz?

KAPANIS

- A.21** Son olarak eklemek istediğiniz bir şey var mı?