

Why Autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa are Persistent:
A Game Theoretic Approach

A Dissertation
Submitted to Istanbul Bilgi University
In Partial Fullfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Deniz Güvercin

Dissertation Director: Koray Akay

September 2015

Başlık (orjinali)

Başlık (Türkçesi/İngilizcesi)

Why Autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa are Persistent: A Game Theoretic Approach

Öğrenci Adı Soyadı

Öğrenci Numarası

Deniz Güvercin

110806003

Tez Danışmanı Doç. Dr. Koray Akay

Jüri Üyesi Prof.Dr. İpek Özkal Sanver


Jüri Üyesi Doç.Dr. Bilin Neyaptı

Jüri Üyesi Prof.Dr. Burhan Şenatalar

Jüri Üyesi Yrd. Doç.Dr. Orhan Erdem

Tezi Onaylandığı Tarih

Toplam Sayfa Sayısı



03.09.2015

126

Anahtar Kelimeler (Türkçe)

- 1) Persistent Authoritarianism
- 2) Islamic Civil Society
- 3) Political Liberalization
- 4) Community Services
- 5) Political Capacity

Anahtar Kelimeler (İngilizce)

- 1) Kalıcı Otokrasi
- 2) İslami Sivil Toplum
- 3) Politik Liberalizasyon
- 4) Kamu Hizmetleri
- 5) Politik Kapasite

Abstract

This Ph.D. thesis is on the persistent authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. This study explains the persistency of authoritarian regimes in the region by centralizing the role of social initiatives. Social initiatives in particular Islamic civil society in the region by providing social, economic and political goods complement the functions of the state in the Middle East and North Africa. Social initiatives do not just carries the social demand it also satisfies it. Thus, Islamic social initiatives provide closures for regime weaknesses. We consider differently from literature which focuses on the division and conflict between key elites .We emphasize the strategic interaction between the single ruler regime and the social initiatives. We model such a strategic relation with game theoretical models. One sided and two sided incomplete information game theoretical models are used to model the relation between different type of regimes and the social initiatives. In the literature studies either focus on the non- strategic factors or strategic factors. Our model provides explanation for different type of authoritarian regimes with nonstrategic factors (political, economic, and cultural) along with strategic factors by centralizing the strategic relation between the regime and the Islamic social initiatives.

Özet

Bu doktora tezi Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika otoriter rejimlerinin devamlılığı üzerinedir. Bu çalışma Sosyal girişimlerin (Sivil toplum kuruluşları) rolünü merkeze alarak Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'da otoriter rejimlerin devamlılığını açıklamaktadır. Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'da sosyal girişimler özellikle İslami sivil toplum sosyal, ekonomik ve politik mallar üreterek devletin fonksiyonlarını (görevlerini) tamamlamaktadır. Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'da İslami sosyal girişimler sosyal talepleri bir taraftan taşırlarken diğer taraftan karşılarlar. Sosyal girişimlerin bu katkısı otoriter rejimlerin zayıflıklarını gidermektedir. Literatürdeki çalışmalar çözülme aşamasına gelmiş otoriter rejimler için yönetim tabakasındaki ayrışmadan ve çatışmadan hareketle rejimlerdeki politik değişim ve

politik durađanlıđı aıklamaktadır. Bu alıřmada hegemonik tek adam rejimlerinin sosyal giriřimlerle stratejik iliřkisinin aıklayıcı gc vurgulanmaktadır. Oyun teorik modeller, tek taraflı belirsizlik ve ift taraflı belirsizlik altında oynanan, farklı tiplerdeki rejim ve sosyal giriřimler arasındaki stratejik iliřkiyi modellemek iin kullanılmıřtır. Literatrdeki aıklamalar stratejik olan veya olmayan etmenler zerinden bir aıklama sunmaktadır. Modelimiz farklı tiplerdeki Orta Dođu ve Kuzey Afrika otoriter rejimlerinin devamlılıđı iin İslami sosyal giriřimler ve rejim arasındaki stratejik iliřkiyi merkeze alarak, stratejik etmenler ve stratejik olmayan etmenlere deđinerek bir aıklama sunmaktadır.

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List of Abbreviations

BAR	Broadened Autocracy
CAR	Cooperative Autocracy
CSO	Civil Society Organization
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut
FLN	National Liberation Front
GCC	Gulf Council Council
GNP	Gross National Product
LAR	Liberalized Autocracy
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MPCD	Mouvement Populaire Constitutionnel et Democratique
MUR	Mouvement of Unity and Reform
NAR	Narrowed Autocracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIF	National Islamic Front
PJD	Party for Justice and Development
PVA	Private Volunteer Association
SAR	Status Quo Autocracy
WVS	World Values Survey

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INTRODUCTION

Democratic transition literature has focused on in recent decades to examine rapid transformation of group of non-democratic regimes following two decades to 1970s¹. In Middle East and North Africa, until Arab Spring there has not been strong demand of political change. However, Arab Spring which was seen as the beginning of new wave of democracy has not produced democratic institutions, political freedom, and even has not brought end to the dictatorial regimes except in Tunisia where there is sluggish transformation towards the democratic system.

Why Middle East and North Africa authoritarian political regimes have been so resilient and persistent? Why wind of political transition in the rest of the world was absent in the region? Literature argues that insufficient political and economic capacity of regimes which became democratic, constitute the environment for regime change. Can we conclude that Middle East and North Africa regimes own strong economic and political capacity so that they survive from this wind of political change? How the ruler can constitute his hegemonic position for long period of time such as of Qaddafi in Libya, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali in Tunisia? These questions are the subject of this dissertation.

Literature discusses the factors determining the persistent authoritarianism in the region and the conditions for democratic transition. It is emphasized in the literature that the certain political and social (class) structures should be in place so that democracy can be inaugurated. Main structural factors are cultural conditions, economic and socioeconomic structure, or historical trajectory of political institutions- colonial experience. Studies in the literature applying structural methodology sets socio- economic conditions, cultural structure, class structure etc. as an explanatory variables. These studies focus on the association of the democracy with culture and social structures. It is argued that social and

¹ Huntington calls this process of change as the Third wave of Democracy

cultural structures imposes the exogenous constraints which reduces the set of feasible social and political patterns, and pathways to democratic transition.

In the literature the tribalism, Islamism, traditions, norms and (lack of) political culture, particular class structure, rentier state, lack of strong political institutions or foreign intervention has been pointed as reasons for persistent authoritarianism. As opposed to structural explanations, strategic choice explanations emphasize interactions between key political elites, political interest and strategies, political calculus of elites.

Explanations focusing either structural core features such as tribalism, patrimonialism, Islamism, rentier economic structure, lack of political culture or the political elites' strategic seek of self-interest or the institutional structure in the region leads us incomplete or indeterminate conclusions. Dissertation is an attempt to find the correctly defined system of explanation without sorting out any political and economic dynamics in the region. We argue that dynamics between structural and strategic factors lead us to the correct answer for puzzling persistent authoritarian structure in the Middle East and North Africa.

The core of the state society relation in the Middle East and North Africa centered on cultural ground. Islam produces value system compassing the relation among whom ruled and between ruled and ruler. Islam is beyond any earthly, secular source of information. If the ruler is endowed with significant religious symbols, moral capital, then he can control the reproduction of the information on cultural ground. Islamic symbolism therefore is the ground that regime can derive political legitimacy.

Political dynamics in the region closely related with the dynamics in the cultural ground. Islamic civil society and secular NGOs strive for political reforms, economic prosperity, and social justice. Islamists are most active group in the region. Islamists generate strong political, economic and social dynamics. These dynamics come existence with their strategic interaction with the regime. We attempt to include strategic interactions of key elites with their connections to the structural parameters in the Middle East and North Africa to explain the political resilience of the regime.

Islamic organizations in the Middle East and North Africa are more operative even than state and carries out functions of the state. Particularly in poor economic conditions cultural ground provides conditions for mobilization of Islamists. Islamists obtain social popularity by providing social services. In this way, they can create specific political attitude, economic production and social culture.

Islamists' demand for political changes, their strive to get involved in political, social and economic realms pragmatically materialized by the regime for regime survival. As they base their demands on the Islamic ground they directly interact with the ruler. Ruler with strong moral capital has an ability to control the political, economic and social processes Islamists generate. We focus on this interrelation and explains it as the essence of the social and political changes.

The extent of Islamists' mobilization in the society depends on the cultural boundaries determined by the size of the moral capacity of the state. If the regime has strong capacity to use religious symbols then the Islamists' room of maneuver is limited. Therefore Islamists cannot mobilize society in radical lines. Ruler if not hold strong moral capital such as in former military personalist regimes do not actively involve in religious affairs but regulates the cultural domination of Islamists by which it derives political legitimacy. In such a cultural environment radical Islamists can mobilize for regime change. In other words, if the regime does not have capacity of using religious, traditional symbols and ceremonies then Islamists mobilizing on these grounds mobilize society in radical lines. Therefore, there are different patterns of regime society relation which occurs according to regime's relative supremacy in the cultural ground.

Islamists' provision of significant size of economic and social services rebalances social dissatisfaction for Middle East and North Africa cash strapped countries. Islamists also provide political goods in their political foundations and parties. Regimes providing limited space of mobilization to Islamists cultivate political and economic gains in the form of foreign aid and political consent from secular, leftist political wings. We claim in this study that Islamists interacting with the regime provides economic and political goods which

enables the regime survival. The regime by liberating, controlling, repressing Islamists eases social dissatisfaction, reduces accommodation cost of keeping authoritarian structure, extract rents and seeks global consent. In other words, the regime controlling Islamists which is the main social force demanding political change controls the social and political demands of the society and global community. Islamists through their community services decreases economic and social inequality and injustice as the regime allocates funds to the coercive apparatus and supporting loyal groups.

In the literature on persistent Middle East and North Africa authoritarianism there is not a study centering strategic interaction between the regime and Islamists. We claim in this study that the structural factors emphasized in the literature are effective on the explanation for the persistent authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. However these factors constitute the environment that the regime and the society interacts. We argue that the strategic interaction between strategically inclined regime and the society brings an explanation for the persistent authoritarianism in the region.

The regime uses its cultural supremacy in the political realm. It institutionalizes its position of reproducing the cultural information in cultural ground. The regime benefits from crafting an institution² on the cultural ground to gain political and economic legitimacy. Islamists contribute significantly to such legitimization mechanism. We in this study attempt to distinguish structural and strategic grounds and clarify how these grounds are related. It brings multidimensional view and provides explanation within the manifold space of interrelations of structural, institutional and strategic factors.

We argue that differences in regime types occurs because of the different patterns in the regime-society relation. Because Islamists are the main social and political actor channeling social demand their relation with the regime determines the conditions for the emergence of different type of authoritarian structures in the region.

² North(1990) defines the institution as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction

In this study we use game theory to model the strategic interaction between the regime and the civil society. Przeworski's (1991) benchmark model of political liberalization is on the strategic interaction between liberalizers/reformers (group advocating the liberal agenda against the hard-liners' agenda) in autocratic regime and the civil society. In the model, soft-liners in order to gain leverage against the hard-liners and broaden their social base, open space for the civil society activities. To this end, soft-liners release restrictions on the civil society and include them in politics as they gain political power. This study emphasizes the strategic relation between the division within the government rather than the civil society. The study defines the political liberalization as the transition process for the regimes which came to edge of dissolution rather than survival mechanism.

Blaydes and Lo (2011) extend the Przeworski's model of political liberalization by introducing (two sided) uncertainty into the model. Model implies that democratic transition is possible if preferences of key elite actors is not certain and the repressive capacity of the regime is above certain threshold and the soft liberalizes interact with the moderate civil society. Blaydes and Lo (2000) order the civil society ideologically where both opposition group is anti-systemic. Excluding systemic, moderate, organizations limit the generality of the explanation for the persistent autocracy in the Middle East and North Africa. They apply the Przeworski's model with very weak implications to structural factors.

Weingast (1997) and Lust – Okar's (2005) model is on the strategic interaction between moderate- radical opposition and government. These models explain the persistent autocratic state in the Middle East and North Africa by emphasizing the level and the type of interaction between the opposition groups and the regime. The model implies that government can manipulate the opposition groups in particular moderates using different incentive and punishment strategies to avoid the conflict. However these models give limited answer with emphasizing just the functionality of the policy space and ignoring the social and political context and other relevant structural factors.

In the literature, there is not strong emphasis on significant place in regime survival. However Islamists contribute significantly to the public good. In particular in times of

economic and political crisis regime opens space-limited- for Islamists to ease class antagonism, to prevent radicalization of middle class, sustain patrimonial relations, and manipulate secular and left-wing. Therefore model missing such a contribution is not complete. We include Islamists, into the political and social realms in stages to show the political consequences of political liberalization. Studies miss political and social mechanisms behind the limited liberalization, broad liberalization, and regime transition. We model the strategic interaction between the regime and Islamists in the extensive form game including stages of liberalizations.

We also do not ignore the uncertainty and observability. We model the interaction as one sided and two sided incomplete information. Incomplete information game model between regime and moderate Islamists give strong implications for the politics of Morocco, Jordan, and between regime and radical Islamists, give strong implications for the politics of Iraq, Syria. One sided incomplete information model gives strong implications for Sadat's and Mubarak's political liberalization experiments. We sort types of the regime according to whether coercive apparatus willing to repress or not in our two sided incomplete information model. Two sided incomplete information model gives important implications for Arab Spring and Algerian civil war.

We in this study emphasize the interconnectedness of the social and political context specific actors and factors. We analyze the persistency of autocratic regime by centering the regime Islamists interrelations. Underlying analytical foundation of dissertation is pragmatic nature of regime and its exploitation of Islamists' mobilization for political and economic survival. We claim that such an interaction is not trivial and has significant determination power in social and political changes.

In the first chapter we refer the Middle East and North Africa authoritarian structures and foundations of the regime Islamists interrelation. In chapter 2 we model the interaction between regime and moderate, radical Islamist in which the regime can observe type of Islamists. In Chapter 3 we model the interaction between the regime and Islamists in which the regime cannot observe the type of Islamists. In Chapter 3, we also extend the finite game

to the infinite time dimension and discuss Islamists' moderation through time. In Chapter 4 we model the interaction between the regime and Islamists in which both players cannot observe other players' type. For each game, we give empirical cases that corresponds to political equilibria.

CHAPTER 1

1. Authoritarianism

The term, Autocracy, we use through this study is the general classification for the political regimes where the ruling is not shared with the society or any particular group. Specific person with specific qualifications who is not under the control of any legal institution rules the state. An autocracy can be dictatorship or monarchy. The Monarchy in Greek means that “single or alone” and the archy means the “rule”. Monarchy is used to mean one-man rule or single ruler. Power transition in Monarchy is hereditary. The key feature of the monarchy system is the hereditary succession. Bernard Lewis argues that “the dynastic principle and the practice of hereditary succession remained powerful, deep rooted, and virtually universal in the Islamic Middle East and North Africa” (Lucas, 2004 in Lewis, 2000). Dictator and Autocrat connotes almost same but Dictator has more negative meanings (Hitler and Mussolini were dictators). Political propaganda is the instrument that the dictators use intensively to survive. Aristocracy is the system where privileged small class rules. Democracy is the system where the ruler shares the power with the parliament according to the principle of separation of powers (Lewis, 2000).

Geddes (1999) Linz (1975) makes classification of autocratic regimes along three dimensions: pluralism, ideology and mobilization. Linz (1975) features the totalitarian regimes as the main type which solely was convenient in that period of time. After 1980s, studies on democratization waves have accounted other dimensions for classification. Geddes (1999)'s classification is along three dimension which are legitimation, repression and co-optation. Geddes actually focus on the survival needs and means of the regimes. According to her classification; Single ruler authoritarianism, Military authoritarianism, Personal rule authoritarianism are existing authoritarian regime types. According to statistics for the period of 1946-1999 in Geddes (1999) the longevity of the military regimes is 8.8 years, personal regimes is 15,1 years and one-party regime is 22,7.

The Military authoritarian regimes are ruled by military officers. For example, Brazilian military regime (1964-1985) was led by the military officer who is selected by a group of military officers. Geddes (1999) gives records of the military dictatorships which evolved to the single officer dictatorships such as Rafael Trujillo's Dominican Republic (1930-1961), Idi Amin's Uganda (1971-1979) and Jean Bedel Bokassa's Central African Republic (1966-1979).

Military dictatorships apply coercive means to survive from mass mobilization against the regime.

Repression which is main control mechanism for military autocracies and the last resort for other type of autocratic systems. There is strong empirical evidence about the effectiveness of repression in regime survival. The recent work on the repression level and the survival rate of the autocracy indicates that the more repressive the regime is, the longer it persists (Escriba, Folch, 2013).

Single party authoritarianism is the single party ruling. According to the Geddes (1999) single party regimes survive because the system depends not only on the repression but also on co-optation of the civil and political society. Geddes (1999) argues because single party authoritarian regime allows for political participation and increase the space for political contestation, it lasts longer.

In Single party regime, party has the authority to change the leader's political decision, to control the rent allocation and to organize political campaigning which does not occur in personalist regimes. Partido Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico, Revolutionary Party of Tanzania and Leninist Parties in Eastern Europe are examples of single party regimes (Geddes, 1999).

Majority of single party authoritarian regimes in recent decades are more populist and do not base legitimization on ideological ground. Therefore for example Mubarak's Egypt or Ben Ali's Tunisia is classified as personalist regime.

Personalist regimes are more responsive to demands of the society than military dictatorships. Essential feature of the personalist authoritarian structure in the Middle East and North Africa is that single ruler absorbs hegemonic power by distributing benefits to military and bureaucratic ranks and social groups. Depending on economic and political circumstances these regimes alter the scope of political participation and switch social and political actors they co-opt.

In the Middle East and North Africa military autocracies evolved to the personal rule authoritarianism which occurred in uncompetitive political realm by means of co-optation, rent allocation and electoral engineering. Sadat in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia co-opted social groups particularly Islamists, and Mubarak additional to co-optation manipulated intensively by political processes.

Electoral authoritarianism is the type of authoritarianism that the regime engineers political processes and channels, designing electoral rules, for its political survival. Election is an institutional façade of democracy in electoral authoritarian regimes, either it is monarchy (constitutional monarchies such as Morocco, Jordan) or republics (such as Egypt, Tunisia). Electoral authoritarianism also implies the uncompetitive political processes, unfair elections, vote rigging, discriminatory election rules, electoral fraud, and restriction to the mass media. To this extent, the regime designs political institutions for political survival particularly electoral processes for distortion of popular electoral preferences.

Single ruler arranges, controls, organizes social, political and economic process. He has an authority over military, party and bureaucracy. Geddes (1999) distinguishes personalist authoritarian regimes with their longevity. She argues that these regime vulnerable to the death of the leader or the violent overthrow. Personalist regimes, except monarchy form which comes with hereditary succession, develop after military intervention or come with electoral victory. Single ruler who wins the competition for power³ receives support from specific group or institution. Therefore, single ruler regimes need to distribute political and economic benefits to his domain of support to survive which is military in general. Therefore patrimonial relations are in the domain of political machine⁴. Although, in most of cases single ruler establishes the political party to create social base and political appeal, personalist regime does not evolve to the single party regime which has strong ideological core. Personalist regimes to secure political longevity and control political dissatisfaction co-opt with social groups.

³ For example; in military authoritarian regimes, military officers transfer their political power to one officer who can lead the regime

⁴ Political machine is a political organization in which authoritarian leader distributes benefits according to their efforts and effectuality

To absorb threats and challenges against the regime within the ruling elite the regime sets up absorptive institutions such as juntas, consultative councils and political bureaus. Therefore even the regime constructs the democratic institutions such as parliament, it just functions as a check on opposition group's power. For example, in Jordan, King Hussein co-opted with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is moderate Islamic civil society, to broaden regime's social base and reduce the popular dissatisfaction in the society. Polish communists repeatedly sought participation of some Catholic group (Gandhi, Przeworski, 2007). Kuwait mobilizes marginal social groups to gain leverage against main opposition groups.

1.1. Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa

Since Portugal's Carnation Revolution, autocratic regimes in global scale underwent transformation to the democratic system. Huntington (1993, page 15) defines the wave of democracy as "a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period". Autocratic regimes in Africa such as Ghana, South Africa and in Europe such as Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic), Portugal, Spain, and Greece and in South Asia such as Taiwan, Indonesia, and Philippines underwent transition to the democratic system, however, interestingly Middle East and North Africa (MENA) autocratic regimes did not.

There are two form of personalist autocratic regimes in MENA: Monarchy and former military authoritarian regimes. Personalist regimes in the form of military authoritarian developed into personalist regimes where the ruler establishes political machine, constructs patrimonial relations. Certain Monarchy regimes in MENA developed into constitutional monarchy (semi-parliamentary) in which monarch exercises power on parliament or did not in which ruler (from royal family) exercises power arbitrarily which is called as absolute monarchy.

Table.1.1. Classification of Autocracies in the MENA

Absolute Monarchy	Constitutional Monarchy	Former Autocracy	Military
Qatar	Jordan	Tunisia	
UAE	Morocco	Iraq	
Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	Syria	
Oman	Bahrain	Egypt	
		Algeria	

Absolute Monarchy derives its legitimacy from hereditary succession. Colonial explanations on absolute monarchy emphasizes the sustainability of the regime with its colonial conditions and the colonial powers’ mutual interest with regimes. Anderson (1991) emphasizes that rather than religion or tribal lineages, the Britain’s interest and support affected monarchs’ sovereignty. However such an explanation lacks the strength of religious legitimization these regimes base their sovereignty on. Middle East and North Africa politics cannot be characterized without religious and traditional legacy of the ruler. During Ottoman period and before, the piety of the ruler was the main criteria for determination of the successor. Most of the time, Islamic council assigned the ruler which based decision on whether the ruler can apply *sharia* in political and social realms.

Post-colonial Middle East and North Africa monarchies legitimized their ruling with national and religious ties⁵. For example, The Moroccan King is the leader of the independence movement and *amir al muminin*. Al- Aziz who maintained Saudi state project with British assistance is nation builder, *khadim al-haramayn* (custodian of the two holy places) and practitioner of *sharia*. In other words, monarchs of Middle East and North Africa have utilized Islamic symbols and tribal lineages for legitimization.

⁵ Through identity politics, Islamic symbolism.

Middle East and North Africa monarchs, thus, use their hereditary distinctions or religious symbols to secure their power holding such as in Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. For example, Fandy (2001) argues that people care more family connections and social status than economic ties and social class in Saudi Arabia. The social fabric of the Middle East and North Africa societies, thus, is very convenient for the continuation of the monarchies.

Middle East and North Africa monarchies fortify the sovereignty by actively imposing regime's sacredness and religious supremacy which reproduces ruler's domination in cultural ground. Reinforcing such social ties including religious, traditional loyalty and maintaining a societal environment in which such social capital, in particular tribal and religious identities, persists, renders persistent regimes in the region. Anderson who claimed the weakness of explanation based on cultural ground in explaining persistent absolute monarchy regimes in MENA gives sufficient credit to these explanations in the final page of her work "When so many countries of the Middle East are decades old, however, and when popular loyalties are uncertain and political institutions untried, the advantages of legitimated absolutism are considerable. The ability of a monarch to appeal to traditions, albeit often invented, to reassure the existing elite, to rely on his own kinsmen-perhaps even to hobnob with international bankers and ride horseback with presidents- it is useful indeed." (Anderson, 1991, page 15).

Military autocracies which developed into personalist regimes by time have not derived power from (not primarily) cultural symbols. Military regimes derive legitimation from national ties, nationalism, identity politics which were popular right after colonial period. Military regimes came to power with successful coup such as in Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt and developed into personalist regime. Personalist regimes in this form legitimize its existence with its nation building projects which attracted social appeal and national sentiments such as Nasser's and Bourguiba's socialist and nationalist development project. We argue that their legitimization arguments after ruler secured its position determine pathways to various social and political consequences. Military official who won the rivalry between military officers exercises its power by deriving support from the army (or specific faction in army). Their base of domination therefore depends on nationalism discourse rather than Islamic rhetoric which distinguishes these regimes from monarchies. However, some personalist regimes developed from military autocracies to broad social base of the regime adopted religious rhetoric such as Sadat in Egypt or Ben Jedid in Algeria.

Personalist regimes to survive co-opt social groups and distribute economic and political benefits to their base of support. For example; Mubarak in initial decade of his presidency allocated huge economic and political benefits to the military. Sadat's co-optation of Islamists also another example for the extent of survival mechanism that the regime adopts. However, if the regime if does not have sufficient political and moral capacity⁶ to co-opt the political society it is attracted to society by economic populism.

Additional to politic and economic populism autocratic regimes use coercive methods and means for political survival. Mean policy score of repression was -7.8 in Arab regimes compared to -5.2 for non-Arab regimes (Elbadawi, Makdissi, 2007). Bellin (2004) implies that the Middle East and North Africa regimes have robust coercive apparatus which deter social dissent and revolts. Personalist regimes which developed from military autocracies apply coercive means. Particularly against anti-systemic groups, regime use its coercive apparatus to check their mobilization in political, economic and social realms. Basic conclusion of this would be high economic cost of having robust coercive apparatus would push regime for political co-optation. We distinguish of having coercive apparatus and using coercive apparatus which is determined by the military-regime interrelations. We focus on this distinction and its political and social outcomes in the final chapter.

Monarchies, on the other hand, have rarely applied coercive methods and means rather these regimes provide moral and economic good to strengthen subordination of society to the existing regime. Monarchs, in particular oil rich monarchies, provide public good and resource transfers. Michael Hudson argue that monarchs promote technological development and innovation, provide better infrastructure and education system, and motivate the economic initiatives. They put similar or further economic and social reform agenda in practice than revolutionary (former military) leaders propose (Kostiner; 2000 quoting Hudson, 1968).

Autocratic regimes' success on sustaining its sovereignty depends on how society responds to economic, social and political developments. Is society responsive to political, economic and social demands or hardly responsive? Which channels are used to conduit economic social and political demands by society? , How does the regime respond these demands? Are regimes able

⁶ It is an ability and capacity of the regime in using Islamic symbols in political and social realms.

to control social, political demands? Is there a mechanism these regimes implement to revoke social dissatisfaction and satisfy demands without incurring economic, social and political costs? We emphasize the cultural structure in explanation of Middle East and North Africa's "exceptional" situation. We emphasize that regime by using Islamic symbols and rhetoric control social demands and limit social mobilization.

Particularly after failure of Pan-Arabism and national socialist ideologies, Islamism gained society's appeal and became central point of reference. Regimes and factions in society used Islamic arguments to mobilize. Political Islam is an extension of Islamic tradition in the political domain. Even the regime and Islamists give different references of Islam, they carry Islamic traditions in political domain. Additionally, Islamists politicized Islamic references by bringing Islamic symbols and traditions such as *zakat*, *shura*, *jihad* into the public domain with political references.

Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia even Egypt have legitimized the regime on the religious base however personalist regimes such as Tunisia (religious legitimization attempt failed), Algeria (failed), Iraq (failed) based their legitimization on populist national development arguments.

Populist, secular, patrimonial regimes had to struggle with Islamists' strive of building Islamic state formation. Regimes struggling with Islamists needed to give Islamic references particularly in economic and political crisis times to not lose social appeal and demobilize Islamists. Therefore without giving reference to cultural ground in Middle East and North Africa resiliency of authoritarian regimes cannot be completely understood.

Interestingly, regimes opening space for Islamists (Jordan, Morocco) survived from political turmoil or gave place to other authoritarian regime after collapse (Egypt- Arab Spring). However regimes that failed to do this, collapsed and came to edge of termination (civil wars after regime collapse in Libya, Iraq, and Syria brought this countries to edge of termination). Tunisia is a unique example that the regime had its way towards democracy after Arab Spring. Tunisia successfully repressed Islamists and created secular social domain which restricted the political Islam's influence in social, economic and political realms. We argue that political Islam unwittingly support authoritarian regimes with their economic and political goods

provision and narrows the space by that liberal democratic social groups radicalize against authoritarian forces.

1.2.Persistency of Autocracy in the Middle East and North Africa

Scholars working on MENA mainly research for singularity of the resiliency of autocratic regimes in the region. Anderson (2006, page 189) argues that even “ American ,and, indeed, Middle East and North Africa, political scientists had spilled considerable ink on the question of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, but they seemed to have found no satisfactory answer” Dissertation argues that explanations on the Middle East and North Africa lacks coherency because they do not categorize the Middle East and North Africa politics as a unique and singular form but deviation from the “ideal path of democracy” .

Explanations based on the comparative perspective which implicitly imposes singularity of historical trajectory of political development cannot completely capture the authenticity of politics in Middle East and North Africa.

However, studies which incorporate “relationship between social, economic and intellectual forces and contemporary political trends in the countries of the Arab world” is very rare (Halpern, 1963 in Anderson, 2006, page 193). We in this extent aim to research on the social and political dynamics which is manipulated by radical control mechanisms pledging on bringing economic prosperity and “democratic integrity”

1.2.1.Cultural Explanations

Cultural explanations focus on the systemic implications of the culture: religion, tradition, tribal lineages, family values, norms and rituals. Regime “used local nationalist traditions to imagine both the regime and the state into the past to solidify their rule” (Lucas, 2004).

In the earlier Western literature, Max Weber (1905) associated cultural patterns (protestant ethics) with trajectory of economic development. Huntington (1993) associated international

political relations (struggle) with the cultural heritage of nations. Why the culture does is so determinate? Why does person's beliefs, ethics, norms affect the economic system or international disputes or trajectory of political system?

Culture provides point of view. It is a reference point (depending on its embeddedness in society) in maintaining business transaction, preparing election speech, or setting principles of association in any form. It establishes main pillars of thinking process. It separates local and universal on the historical trajectory of society. It is cumulative and connects pre and post societies. Therefore it is significant in explaining political, economic state of the world of the society. How culture is related to democracy? Does Cultural foundation, enable transition and consolidation of democracy? Improve the quality of democracy?

In MENA, people in social protests shout slogans such as "Islam is the solution". This slogan does not connote struggle of the society for democratization, because Islam provides the best form of political system. Political Islam qualifies other political solutions, but Islam as the "suboptimal, imported".

Inglehart (2000) argues that democratic system to survive and consolidate, the institutional structure as well as the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens should be compatible with the democratic system. Scholars argue that the value system in the Middle East and North Africa is incompatible with the essence of democratic system therefore it had been futile to impose it.

Studies on the Islam's role in democratic stagnation emphasizes the incompatibility of essence of Islam with the democracy. Islam has two main sources; one is Quran another one is Prophet's practices (and people close to him). Islam therefore encapsulates the divine knowledge and practical information on society, politics and economy, political organization and organization of the state.

Islam's presence thus affects political thinking process, political organization of civil society, dimension of economic and financial transaction, dimension of social cohesion, integrity with democratic principles, and survival strategies of the regime.

MENA regimes formulating political future of the society, references Islam and legitimize the regime on cultural ground. Today's Arab regimes were under domination of Ottoman Empire which constituted society- regime ties over religion. Empire was the Islamic state and imposed sanctions and restrictions on society on religion base. Anderson (1986, page 62) describes how state's operations were connected to religious base "Thus, for example, tax obligations were defined by religion. Muslims-members of the community-paid taxes understood to constitute religious obligations, such as *zakat*, "alms" while non-Muslims were subject to special levies reflecting their non-adherence to the community of faithful. Similarly, military service was cast as a religious duty, as participation in a holy struggle, or *jihad* , and non-Muslims were ordinarily exempted from military". Therefore, Muslims in the region in very close history were ruled with religious ties and lived under religious based institutional structure.

Legitimization on cultural ground with political references explain how the regime on the one hand can carry out secular socio-economic development, develop western style institutions (colonial experience also shaped this), and on the other hand refute Western intervention, "imperialism", and emphasizes uniqueness of their cultural roots. Hinnebusch (2010, page 203) argues that " The persistence of mass Arab-Islamic identities makes legitimacy in the Arab states contingent on their defense of the supra-state community against its enemies (imperialism, Zionism), but this frequently conflicts with the interests of regimes dependent on the US hegemon, which must therefore contain rather than express domestic identity".

Regime easily manipulate through divide and rule principle this dichotomy. Their democracy project itself creates different reflections on secular and cultural domains which have been exploited by Middle East and North Africa regimes. We emphasize that regime's legitimization on cultural ground creates different reflections on secular and cultural domains, dissolve social integrity, imbalance society, and discourage mass mobilization. Political Islam is the main political stream in recent decades carries Islamic principles on political realm. Political Islam provides materialization of Islamic principles in political realm which is dominated by "imported" political notions.

Scholars explaining "democratic stagnation" in the Middle East and North Africa stuck in trap of cultural determinism. They claim there are epistemological reasons behind the Middle East and North Africa authoritarianism which is very basic argument of orientalist view point. They

argue that Islam as a source of knowledge generate contradictions to democratic system. They also emphasize pragmatic domain of Islam in politics which is also considered in this study. They claim that the political backwardness of the region is attached to Islam's intolerant, hostile principles which dictates patriarchal political system. Barber (2003) argues that there is "a certain lack of affinity between Islam and democracy". Kedourie (1994) argues that "polls showing the majority of Egyptians demanding democracy and Shari'a are an indication that the Arabs do not understand what democracy is" Francis Fukuyama asserts that "Islam has stood as a major barrier to democratization". "Deep confusion in the Arab public mind, at least about the meaning of democracy. To confusion is, however, understandable since the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam" (Kedouire, 1992 in Schwedler, 1995).

They base their claims on that Islam discourages intellectual hungriness and encourages uncritical acceptance of the authority. Democracy on the other hand, requires openness, competition, pluralism, and tolerance of diversity which are not elements of Islamic value system (Tessler, 2002). Al-Braizat (2002) found empirical evidence supporting this view. His findings indicate that actual democratization correlates positively with Human Development Index and negatively with religiosity. He concludes that results show that there is a correlation between modernization and democratization given that religiosity is declining. Anderson (1995) criticizes the views that sees the Islam and the transcendental notions of divine sovereignty or tribal culture as the main source of backwardness.

There are empirical studies negating this view. Tessler (2002)'s empirical findings support this view. According to the results religious attachment does not have very strong explanation power for persistent authoritarian systems in the region. He records that support for democracy is not necessarily lower among strongest Islamic zealots. His evidence shows that Islamic life and attitudes do not preclude democratic political attitudes. Additionally World Values Survey (WVS) results indicate that the Arab people value democracy as the best form of government which is higher than other region in the world. Fish (2002) claims that Muslim societies are not more violent than other societies.

Islamism creates its political, economic and social domain. Islamic movement appeared on social realms as they interact with society for social appeal. Islamic foundations, civil society activities are Islamists' efforts to dominate social, economic and political processes. Through

cross cutting cleavages they encompass the unity and integrity. Tessler (2002) argues that civil society organizations in the form of Muslim associations, Islamic study groups, welfare organizations, financial institutions have been very successful at attracting new followers including well educated people. They are active and vivid in social, economic and political realms.

Islamists re-emphasize to the society its intrinsic values and give the reference point for the form of political, economic and social processes in the new age of “*modernization*”. Islamists to differentiate their position on cultural ground from the regime stressed their authenticity in Islam rhetoric, control the economic processes and design society. We explore dimensions of regime and Islamic civil society relation and its systemic consequences in further pages.

Fish (2002) refers family values and place of women as the explanatory variable. She argues that the social (subordination of women), political (distant from ideology domain) and economic (not employed) conditions of the Muslim (Arab) women explains the democratic deficit in the region. According to Fish (2002) female subordination in family in particular male dominance in the family replicate itself in broader society and generates a culture of domination, and dependency in social and political life. Ross (2001) link women economic power and political attitudes. He argues that particularly in oil producing countries female labor is supplied less. Women is less connected with workplace, thus, socio-economic economic relations are limited. They are home oriented, more dependent on husband, family income, thus, become less social and more subordinate.

1.2.2. External Factors

We read in newspapers or watch from television events occurring in the Middle East and North Africa. Ordinary person from any location of the world hear the name of the countries in the region more than any other specific area. Why the Middle East and North Africa is so popular? terrorist attacks are the reason for such a big popularity or the rich oil reserves?

Middle East and North Africa has more than half of the oil reserves. Particularly Gulf region has power to determine the parameters in global oil market which affects all global markets in the economy. Foreign powers need to control and regulate the oil market to have stable domestic economies. One another reason that the foreign powers are intervening into the political and economic processes in the region, is the rising radical political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa that carried their domain of the activity to the global scale. Radicals target the Western countries, particularly super powers. Foreign powers, thus, need to control the radicalism in the region otherwise they jeopardize their own domestic security. Therefore foreign powers for economic or security reasons control economic, political and social processes in the Middle East and North Africa.

Foreign aid comes with their democratization pressures and pushes for liberalization. Political inclusion, liberalization on mass media, social and economic processes pushes for the formation of the dynamic civic and political culture. They target to downsize radical Islamists' mobilization because creating alternative political and social channels (NGOs) to conduit political and social demands of the society generates the loss of popularity of violent terrorist organizations. Democracy exportation of the foreign powers get them to involve in the domestic process in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular oil poor regimes in the region received the foreign aid to continue on repressing radical Islamists and supporting super powers' interests. Economic and political foreign support have become the guarantee of regimes against economic and political crisis which is another reason that these regimes can sustain. Regimes gain another leverage with such an external dynamics. Regimes attract middle class people with liberalization practices and create its interpretation of the Islam that is compatible with democracy and the incompatible with the terrorism.

Foreign powers interest in this point coincides with the incumbents' interests which wish for the domination in the cultural ground by controlling Islamists' social and political appeal through its institutions (for example al-Azhar in Egypt) and its form of Islamic rhetoric. Regimes aim to transform Islamic movement into state apparatus and Islamic discourse to social control mechanism. In other words, regime strove to transform Islamic civil society into the state institution generating economic and political gateways by which regime can flee from social pressure. Therefore the inclusion of Islamists into the social and political processes gives

the regime internal and external political and social anchors. Islamists in the region is in the central forces determining political future of regimes.

US supported King Hasan II of Morocco against student protests. US supported King to prevent regime switch to the socialism. Additionally, US also supported military coup in Algeria in 1991 after Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the 80 percent of the seats in the parliament and 50 percent of the vote (Kivimaki, 2012). According to Cole (2007); George W. Bush was intimate about its democratization project in the region. He pushed for democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa because Islamists would not get in deal with US for its interests in the region. Democratization was project of limiting Islamists' power for US's domestic security concerns. Ayubi (1995) states that American policy in the Middle East and North Africa is not pro-democratic. He argues that in Iran in 1951 and in Jordan in 1957, United States did not side with democratic forces but autocratic regimes. Lucas (2004) argues that without US assistance in postwar period Sabahs would not able to re-establish the political stability. According to Lucas (2004), the United States unlike in Japan and Argentina in Middle East and North Africa does not allow for regime transition. If the obedient autocratic regimes are defeated in war, United States help them for reconstruction. "With the U.S. backing the security threats to monarchies are unlikely to lead toward a path of democratization" (Lucas, 2004).

However, given the fact that significant portion of foreign aid melted in the bureaucracy and went to the pocket of some particular cronies and used as subsidy for military expenses it did not made real influence on real economy. There are also political implications of regime – West relations. Political opposition particularly Islamists mobilize society on interrelationship between regime and "imperialist" foreign powers. Additionally foreign powers' push for democratization changed the domestic strategy space which is constituted by the strategic calculation between domestic actors. Regime's push for secular development risks its relation with society and its domestic security (radical Islamists). Political Islam gained legitimacy as regime stepped forward to protect foreign powers' interest, increased despotism and application of secular development project. Therefore, regime's seek of foreign powers' interest in its domain, increases cost of repression, imbalances political optimization process.

1.2.3. Institutions

Yom (2012) argues that institutional structure formalizes the accession to power and routines of policy making. Additionally it formalizes the sustainment of regime. Repressive apparatus of the regime, military, has been used for sustainment of the regime. Przeworski (1991) connects political survival strategy of the regime, political liberalization, with its repressive capacity. According to Przeworski (1991), regime with strong repressive apparatus does not face autonomous civil society mobilization because in that case the regime can terminate their mobilization capacity (high cost of rebellion). Therefore regimes of the Middle East and North Africa experimenting in political realm must have strong repressive capacity. Bellin (2004, page 143) argues in the same line “Democratic transition can be carried out successfully only when the state’s coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it. Where that coercive apparatus remains intact and opposed to political reform, democratic transition will not occur”. Therefore the coercive apparatus must have will to repress. According to Bellin (2004) Regime’s patrimonial ruling provided economic and political benefits so far so that the military had had will to repress. Bellin (2004, page 146) argues that “Coercive apparatus’ capacity and will to hold on to power is shaped by the degree to which it faces a high level of popular mobilization. Violently repressing thousands of people, even it is within the physical capacity of the security forces, is costly. It may jeopardize the institutional integrity of the security forces, international support, and domestic legacy”.

However, Bellin (2004, page 143) argues that “The will and capacity of the state’s coercive apparatus to suppress democratic initiative have extinguished the possibility of transition. Herein lies the region’s true exceptionalism” which is her main hypothesis conflicting with what actually happened in Arab Spring. Therefore, she concludes that the regime’s strong repressive capacity and its will to repress is the main reason why authoritarian regimes had existed.

However, keeping the military in check requires certain amount of economic power. Regimes in the Middle keeping military’s share of budget fixed cut the share of investment, education, health care where Islamists come to play a role in the economy by providing economic support

and social services for the poor and middle class. Islamists provision of community services filled this gap and let the regime finance the military expenses. Bellin (2004) records that even Egypt regime signed IMF accord that required 14 percent reduction in basic goods subsidy the regime increased its military budget by 22 percent.

According to Acemoglu (2009), political institutions correspond to the rules and regulations affecting political decision making including checks and balances which are instruments to control the power of presidents, prime ministers etc. However, distorted political institutions in the Middle East and North Africa are devised to control the self-interest of the ruler including checks and balances on the society. Political institutions in Acemoglu's definition does not comply with pragmatic and contemporary nature of Middle East and North Africa political institutions. For example Husni Mubarak told once "the only problem... with free elections is that you cannot predict the outcome" (Anderson, 2006, page 205).

Democratization experiment of the regime is half-hearted which is not designed to mobilize the society for its rights but mobilize them in limited space for the social, economic and political survival of the regime. Therefore, political processes and channels are under strict monitoring and manipulation. Regimes of Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia provided political space with varying degrees. However, it is naïve to consider that this opening is to improve the democratic conditions in the country. Okar & Jamal (2002) argues that in the Middle East and North Africa, strong incumbent elites provide limited openings to the opposition to decrease the political stress and popular dissatisfaction. Bianchi (1989, page 23-24) argues that "Pluralist policies can operate not as catalysts for disruptive participation and demand-making but as valuable instruments of social control", "Pluralism can help to support stable authoritarianism in several ways". We refer cases how regime manage political liberalization and enable the process to not transform into democratic transition in further pages.

Political, social, economic institutions are designed in the Middle East and North Africa regimes for regime survival. Political engineering is the term connotes electoral process design, campaign silencing, election silencing, or electoral fraud to ensure low political participation. Posusney (2005) argues that electoral rule design in Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Palestinian Authority which is Winner Takes All electoral systems contribute to successfully survival of authoritarian regimes from any political competition. In Morocco, parliament is designed in a

way that the cabinet is responsible to the king and not free to make significant political changes. In Egypt, there is an emergency rule which gives power to the regime to arrest people in attempt of organizing to overthrow regime⁷

Anderson (2001, page 2) argues that “ As it turned out, the regimes proved far more resilient and inventive in devising ways to refashion their autocratic hold on power than anyone except” which sheds light on the pragmatic nature of the political institutions in the Middle East and North Africa and the regime’s ability to extend its patronage on political realm. Why Middle East and North Africa regimes can devise tools for its survival without facing social objection? We emphasize the significance of social and cultural context by which the regime rationalize its political hegemony through distorted “democratic” institutions.

1.2.4. Lack of Civil Society

Anderson (2001, page 4) argues that “Clearly many factors have contributed to shaping the political regimes in the Arab world. These regimes are partly reflections of local cultural predispositions, partly remnants of imperial impositions and partly results of deliberate choices by domestic and international policy makers ” which lacks the factor of interrelation between domestic key political actors and their position in cultural domain. Civil society is one of the significant political actor strategizing their actions to make political changes in favor society.

Schwedler (1995) argues that civil society refers to a sphere of activities involving challenge against the state if there is a violation of individual rights which implies its role in democratic transition. Norton (1993) emphasizes that functioning civil society is at the core of the participant political system which implies its role in democratic consolidation.

In the absence of inclusive political institutions, civil society organization is one of the strongest check and balance on regime. It checks if there is overuse of power on society. Through the

⁷ Even if there was no physical evidence of threat, the rule could be applied

mass media channels and processes, social organization processes, it exerts power on regimes (i.e. publicizing corruption). Society through civil society activities optimizes its exertion of power on the regime. For example in Philippines, civil society led to the collapse of Marcos' authoritarian ruling. Philippine's major civil society, National Citizens Movement, publicized the Marcos' electoral fraud and mobilized almost million people to reclaim the re-election which led to collapse of Marcos regime (Bunbongkarn, 2001). Therefore, civil society activities which induces mutual- trust and collective action may push for revolution.

Putnam (1993) claims that a vigorous civil society paves the ways for democratic consolidation. If the civil society organizations (civic community) provide the networks of trust, reciprocity, and habits of co-operation then it is easier to reach developed economy and democracy. Putnam (1993) emphasizes the association between the performance of the civil society and quality of political institutions in the modern Italy. He reports that in modern Italy, regions have different propensities for civic engagement, solidarity, trust and tolerance. He found out in his empirical research that public order affairs are more successfully managed in more civic regions.

Bellin (2004) argues that if there is no strong civil society in the country, associational life is weak. The weakness of the associational life contracts the opportunities for citizens to participate in collective deliberation, thus, restricts the development of civil disobedience in the country. In particular for countries which don't have strong political society the civil society is only channel that the society conduit their dissatisfaction with the regime. In particular if the political society is absent, civil society organization organize in political realms to exert influence on the authoritarian regime.

Yom (2005) argues that in Latin America, Central and East Europe, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa civil society pushed for regime change by imposing limits on state repression, increasing cost of repression, and seeking international support for reforms. However, this is universal deterministic approach.

In the Western literature it is emphasized that there is strong association between civil society and democratization. However, universal determinism applied by the scholars for the Middle

East and North Africa restricts the explanatory power of civil society (forms of civil society) on political processes.

Moroccan King, VI Muhammed emphasized historical trajectory of the society rather than universal determinism without giving connotation of orientalist view point “Morocco has a lot to do in terms of democracy. The daily practice of democracy evolves in time. Trying to apply a Western democratic system to a country of the Maghreb, the Middle East and North Africa or the Gulf would be a mistake. We are not Germany, Sweden or Spain. I have a lot of respect for countries where the practice of democracy is highly developed. I think, however, that each country has to have its own specific features of democracy” (Anderson, 2001, page 6). This view on democracy is also view point of significant number of residents of the region. We can argue out of this view emphasizing universal indeterminism is that society’s cumulative knowledge and practice on cultural ground (religion, tradition landscape) is the reason there are different forms of “civil society” in the region.

Civil society organization in the western traditional sense is not effective in the region except “Islamic civil society”. According to Yom (2005) the region outnumbers in civil society organizations most of the other region in rest of the world (for example number of NGOs across the region was 20, 000 in 1970s and was 70,000 by the mid-1990s). Foreign aid flew to their pockets rather than for the implementation of democratization project. NGOs, syndicates, trade unions focus on different arguments which restricts their integrity for their contribution to democratization in the region. Therefore even there are large numbers of civil society organizations, their mobilization capacity is low. Yom (2005, page 17) argues that “three most important advances of MENA democratization in 2005- competitive national elections in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, and Lebanon-resulted not from years of arduous struggle by domestic activists but rather by immediate political and military shocks”. However, Islamists actively involve in politics and social life, hold cross cutting cleavages. Islamists through their education activities get new generations tied to Islamic values.

Islamists, particularly mobilize in economic realms. Under developed economies, dominance of patrimonial relations within the ruling elite and with specific groups, and elites’ interrelationship with coercive apparatus limits the economic resources left for social service, health care, education, unemployment subsidies. Islamists mobilize on this ground effectively.

It is the Islam suggests to provide social services for community of believers. Majority of members of Islamic organizations who mobilize through provision of social services carry out their contribution due to Islamic reasons. Political returns to providing benefits are attached to the process. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria gained their political legitimization with their immense size of charity activities. Interestingly, regime did not terminate their activities or halt their mobilization but puts restrictions, and limits.

Although Islamists mobilize on social, political and economic realms their contribution to regime change are controversial. Abootalebi (1998, page 46) argues that “ The challenge to the state by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria or the National Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, for example, have failed to change the state’s domestic and foreign policies”

Abootalebi (1998, page 46) “ Modern states have become more efficient in using persuasive and coercive means to achieve their goals” We argue that Islamic civil society in the Middle East and North Africa took systemic shocks onto itself through the regime’s persuasive means. Regime emphasizes its superiority in cultural ground, reveals Islamists as the regime threat and uses Islamic organizations as state apparatus in economic realms to revoke economic dissatisfaction of the society, and as the interlocutor of the repressive means which legitimizes (radical Islam is a threat against stable social system) the ruling elites’ application of coercive apparatus.

In this extent, we argue that civil society consequently does not serve for the regime democratization which is emphasized in the western literature as its traditional mission. We argue whether Islamist’ are autonomous or not in further subsection.

1.2.5. Economic Structure

In the Middle East and North Africa, economies performing in various ranges. Economies vary in terms of production structure and size of natural resource reserves. Gulf countries’ economies based on the oil wealth whereas economies such as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco based on production of economic goods (production structure depends on in which stage of development the state is).

In the Middle East and North Africa, class coalitions and development strategies vary across stages of development. Agricultural export was the main engine of economy in the period following independence wars. Political elites were in close coalition with landed class in this period. In following stage, military form personalist regimes imposed Import Substitution Policy, initiated land reform, and supported industry vs. agriculture, empowered middle class and workers which induced overconsumption. Regimes in this staged constituted national capitalist class. In this stage, economic resources were depleted by populist nationalist political machine which can be seen from table 1.2. Average growth rate in all countries in 1960-1980 period decreased dramatically to low levels in 1980-2000 period which pushed next stage of development. In the next stage, to find solution for bottlenecks in foreign exchange, low level of savings and economic growth rate, Middle East and North Africa regimes integrated with world capitalist economy (*infitah*) which requires competitiveness of export industry. (Hinnebusch, 2010)

Table 1.2. Economic Growth –Growth Rate of GDP per capita

Country	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000
Algeria	1.2	2.8	-0.2	-0.3
Egypt	2.9	4.4	2.9	2.3
Jordan	n.a.	n.a.	-1.8	0.6
Morocco	2.0	2.7	1.6	0.4
Saudi Arabia	n.a.	7.9	-5.7	0.0
Syria	2.0	6.4	-1.1	2.1
Tunisia	3.2	5.0	1.1	3.1

Source: Noland, Pack, 2007, *Arab Economies in Changing World*, Washington, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Table 1.3. GNP, Sectoral Value Added and Trade Deficit in MENA (in billion \$)⁸

Countries	GNP		Service Value Added		Agriculture Value Added		Industry Value Added		Trade Deficit	
	1970	2009	1970	2009	1970	2009	1970	2009	1970	2009
Egypt	7,6	216	2,8	88	1,8	67	1,9	24,5	0,4	12
Iraq	3,6	61,9		10,52		6,81		44,6		
Jordan	0,65	25,7	0,410	14,6	0,068	0,648	0,112	7		
Morocco	3,9	25,7	2,1	44,7	0,788	13,3	1	23,1	0,156	1
Tunisia	1,4	39,6	0,898	24,6	0,245	3,1	0,296	11,9	0,040	0,7
Syria ⁹	2,2	50	6,5	22,6	3,1	10,5	8,5	16,8	0,077	1
Saudi Arabia	4,1	384,4	1,6	174,5	0,245	3,1	3,1	190,1	1,6	40

Table 1.3 shows that most striking facts in the region from 1970 to 2009 is GNP increase¹⁰, decrease in agriculture's share in economy, and increase in share of industry and service sector in GNP. However, regimes could not build strong industry which can survive in global market.

Egypt and Tunisia sustained modest economic growth while oil exporters such as economies of Algeria, Saudi Arabia, performed in wide range from deep down to top levels depending on the developments in oil market. Across region, during 1980-2000 life expectancy increased by more than eight years and labor force has grown. To solve growing problem of unemployment, regimes liberated trade and spurred export industry, foreign direct investment. However the level of export and FDI inflow have been very low level.

⁸ Source: Genc Hamdi, Sayim Ferhat; 2011, Ortadogu ve Kuzey Afrika Ülkelerinin Ekonomik Yapısı Mena Ülkelerinin Ekonomileri, MKM yayınları, Bursa

⁹ Values under the column of 1970 for Syria is for year of 1986

¹⁰ Even the percapita income increases wealth variations between middle class and crony capitalist class increased dramatically.

Crony capitalist relations between regime and political alliances reduced economic productivity through inefficient distribution of economic resources. Political imperatives imposed economic disintegration and protection of interests of small group of elites. Political uncertainty and unstable political realm reduces the level of investment and growth.

Table 1.4. GDP per capita (PPP in \$)

Country	1950	2000
Average GDP per capita of Greece, Portugal, and Spain	2,063	13,778
Algeria	1365	2792
Egypt	910	2920
Morocco	1455	2658
Tunisia	1115	4538
Saudi Arabia	2221	8002

Source: Noland, Pack, 2007, *Arab Economies in Changing World*, Washington, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Table 1.4. shows the divergence between European countries which embraced democracy after 1970s and Middle East countries which did not undergo democratic transformation. In the table it can be seen that oil rich Saudi Arabia had higher GNP than oil poor regimes.

According to Dasgupta et al. (2002) there are three different groups of countries producing crude oil. The first group includes the Gulf Countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) in whose economies the crude oil production is at the center and whose primary goal is to obtain big portion of the rents in the global energy markets by maximizing long run prices. The second group includes Iran, Algeria, Syria and Iraq for which the crude oil production is at the center but whose primary goal is more diverse (not solely based on enhancing economic development with the oil revenue). Third group includes countries Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan for which the crude oil extraction is at very low levels but whose economies are affected

by the oil production in the region via their labor markets (remittances, immigration, etc.) and export and import markets.

Table 1.5. Share of Rents in Government Revenue and in GDP (%) ¹¹

Country	Year	Share of Government Revenue	Share of GDP
Algeria	2000	70	24.9
Kuwait	1999	85.2	29.4
Saudi Arabia	2000	83	30.3
Qatar	2000	79.2	30.5

Source: Noland, Pack, 2007, *Arab Economies in Changing World*, Washington, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Table 1.5. shows the size of rents in government revenue (no tax revenue) that come from oil revenue and foreign aid is large. Rent also constitutes big portion of GDP in oil rich regimes. Oil poor economies depend on external transfers (i.e. foreign aid) to cover the cost of repression and maintain robust coercive apparatus (Bellin, 2004). However, given that economic and political cost of repression is high they use a mixture of populism and repression to emasculate autonomous organizations (Kamrava & Omara, 1998).

In oil-rich monarchies the probability of widespread social dissent is very low given that regime buy off social dissent with oil wealth. Hertog (2012, page 2) argues that “The paternal distributional state not only brought material comfort but also had a profound effect on political life. It is no coincidence that the few oppositional strings the Kingdom had witnessed in the 1960s largely stopped in the 1970s. The omnipotent state used its resources to buy off potential opponents and envelop society in ever expanding networks of formal and informal patronage. Patronage was not new to Saudi politics, but never before had it reached all strata of society. By 1979, the rentier social contract, in the making since the 1940s, had come to define national

¹¹“ Rents consist of entrepreneurial and property income (which includes income from stateowned enterprises) and grants (from abroad, including from supranationals, and from other general government units). Data for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia correspond to oil revenue only” (Noland, Pack, 2007,page 27)

politics” Gulf countries by employing its oil wealth, developed patrimonial relations with public, eased class struggle (particularly after 1973 oil price boom which returned to middle class with raised salaries, most of the manual work has been carried by non-citizen workers), and weakened civil society (which was weakened by loss of support from middle class, and nationalist left).

The size of subsidies and the redistribution is in significant size in Gulf countries. In Mena countries for example the elasticity of energy consumption to growth was about 1 for the period 1980-2011 which is higher than world average. This indicates that energy subsidies are positively correlated with real growth (Sdravovich et al., 2014).

Abundant natural resources in particular oil reserves is referred as the one of the main cause of persistency of autocratic regimes in the region. It is argued in the relevant literature that the autocratic regime redistributes oil money to buy off society’s consent. They do not tax but make wealth transfers to satisfy popular dissatisfaction. Fish (2002) argues that regimes in particular Gulf regimes which hold huge oil reserves use their immense size of wealth for regime security. The state has a legacy of producer and distributor of the national income and the employer of the majority of citizens. Therefore, majority of population is in the position of beneficiaries of the economic opportunities provided by the regime which weakens the motivation for the emergence and sustainment of countervailing powers in the society. Oil revenues give the regime an economic power to weaken the strength of civil society. Oil wealth gives the regime an opportunity of buying off political unrest. This explains the absence of vivid civil society in Gulf regimes.

Fish (2002) claims that if economic development increases popular expectations, creates more sophisticated populations, and increases cost of repression the regime transition would be more likely. However, none of these happening in the Middle East and North Africa. Gulf countries are most politically closed regimes in the region and citizens do not demand further (democratic) political rights. Why political Islam is not so pervasive in Gulf Council Countries? Because Gulf regimes use tribal and religious identities and symbols to impose their supreme position in cultural ground therefore there is not economic or cultural ground that Muslim Brotherhood type of organization attract social appeal.

Income does not get equally distributed across region particularly in oil poor regimes. Particularly, personalist regimes seeking support of social groups and institutions provide these groups economic benefits and privileges. These institutions do not transform economic sources into productive assets (do not make investment, but conspicuous consumption). Therefore, the regime to survive distorts economic potential of the country and exacerbates distribution of wealth. Income inequality affects economic development significantly in the region. One percent change in income equality decreases the economic growth by 0, 57 percent (Ncube et al., 2013). Therefore as the income distribution gets more unequal the economy develops less. However, mineral rents (oil reserves) affects economic development significantly. One percent change in mineral rents increases the economic growth by 0, 61 percent (Ncube et al., 2013). In particular, for oil rich countries mineral rents redistribution increases the economic growth.

Given that sustaining economic cost of accommodation of closed regime is high and accommodation is highly dependent on allocation of funds to supporting groups and institutions, regime do open the political and social realms. Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria opened political space for Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood exploited the crisis conditions to develop a politics of absorption (Tugal, 2009) by sharing economic cost of maintaining authoritarian regime.

Throughout the region, Islamist groups in the form of civil society organization carry out tasks of the state such as security, education, health care etc. that many Middle East and North Africa states cannot maintain any longer in times of economic crises (Clark, 2003). The high appeal among the populace originating from these social activities constitutes the basis for the public mass support for the Islamic movement.

Islamists do not just employ religious rhetoric but also they are eager political activists. Secular groups do not operate on strong ideological and cultural rhetoric (not exist). Islamists on the other hand do not just attract funds from Islamic investors in global scale but also use it to finance charity services and activities. Therefore, both regime and the society enjoy the financial support these organizations receive from international finance capital (Islamists) which is provided without any condition. Hence, regime in this way enjoys the closure of systemic economic deficiencies by the external sources.

Islamists in the region had political victories (Muslim Brotherhood in 2005, 2001 in Egypt reserved large number of seats, Justice and Development Party in 2011 elections in Morocco and Islamic Action Front in 2003 and 2007). We consider that their political victories connected with their success at provision of economic and political goods. The organization successfully transfer the economic and moral satisfaction of the people with the service provision into the political processes. Ebough et al. (2003, page 413) defines the Islamic charity organizations as “Organizations rely on religious values, beliefs, activities or experiences in information processing and decision making”. People contacted with Islamists interpret the social, economic and political realities on cultural ground. Islamists by occupying cultural ground with their own interpretation of Islam materialize the social dissatisfaction of people on political ground. They affect their decision making and information processing in the way so that followers, members, sympathizers, or ordinary people are served by these organization evaluate economic, social and political developments with Islamists’ (factions’) point of view. Therefore Islamists successfully created the strong cognitive processes that they can manipulate in political realm.

Islamists’ success is the natural consequence of the state’s failure in social service provision. Dergham (2011)¹² clarifies this as “ When the state is unable to relieve the people of poverty, mosques come in as financial, social, investment and security institutions, drafting instructions to emerge from poverty through grants, hospitals and housing projects, and also brainwashing seminars. This is what the Salafist Jamaa Islamiya, the Muslim Brotherhood and others have done, peddling themselves as the new identity of the Arab region”

Islamists are major opposition in the MENA. Rather than civil society in traditional sense Islamist challenged autocracies in the region. They are well organized and financially autonomous. Islamic organizations developed web of network to reach out people in every corner of the society from any occupation. Through these branches Islamists diffused into the society and derived their political support. Brooke (2014) emphasizes that without Islamists’ social service provision the state would not have space for economic policy making. Al-Arian

¹² Dergham, Raghida, 2011, “Talk of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Role in the Arab Spring is exaggerated”, Huffington Post

describes Islamists as the state within state as the group became strong competitor to the state for service provision in the social realm (Al-Arian, 2014).

Lynch (2014) argues that providing social services enables the self-actualization and reflection of the faith the group possess. Therefore, the economic goods they provide to the society is not just the effort taken to reduce the economic inequality and social injustice but also has metaphysical meaning.

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt thanks to Islamic economic sector “capitalized on the proliferation of services, jobs and material benefits.”, “As Hisham al-Awadi (2005) observed, the Brotherhood made use of its financial capacities and organizational network to increase its popularity. Financed by a parallel Islamic economic sector, the organization provided jobs, education and health care and helped out with hardship funds and other charitable services. Thus, Islamists took over the task of providing social services which had been largely abandoned by the state” (Albrecht, Wegner, 2006). They also obtained the majority in the boards of the engineers, the doctors and the lawyers’ syndicates (Albrecht, Wegner, 2006).

In Egypt, in 2010-2011 fiscal year, the Brotherhood medical institutions treated 1.5 million patients. In 2013 during the campaign of “Together We Build Egypt” caravans (of Brotherhood) providing medical care treated 1,75 million patients. There are 30 hospitals that are managed by the Islamic Medical Association (IMA) which is established by the Muslim Brotherhood. IMA officials recorded that as of 2013 spring they employed 10,000 Egyptians. All IMA medical facilities provide high quality medical services. Muslim Brotherhoods’ health care provision substitutes the state’s very low quality health care provision. (Steven Brooke, 2013) Tarek Masoud clearly argues the place of Islamists in social care provision “Inasmuch as social-service provision is something that any party could decide to do, why is that only (mainly) Islamists do it? Is there anything to prevent nonreligious parties from distributing the bottles of oil and bags of sugar that many of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood detractors credit with that movement’s rise to power in 2011?” (Masoud, 2014).

Islamists voluntary community services squeezed the middle class' mobilization space. Islamists by providing social services eases the class struggle, rebalance social equilibrium and reduces economic and social inequalities and mass mobilization against regime (particularly, significant portion of middle class are employed by Islamists' institutions, schools, hospitals, soup kitchens, universities-madrassa- , etc.)

In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood is well established, organized civil society. Its hierarchical organization is well defined. It has Supreme Guide (al Murshid al-Amm) at the top of organization with his two deputies. It has executive boards, offices and branches. They fill the major positions in schools, universities, student unions, clubs and charity organizations.

Moroccan Islamist movement provides social care, education, organize social and cultural events. They organize to provide education social care and missionary activities (Albrecht, Wegner, 2006). Their success in mobilization the youth reflects on the numbers significantly. By early 1990s almost 50 percent of university students got involved with Islamists. Harak al Tawhid wa al-Islah was the Islamic movement in Morocco which later became a part of political party, Mouvement Populaire Constitutionnel et Democratique (MPCD). Islamists were accepted by the regime as the political actor after they left the revolutionary agenda and accepted reformist agenda.

Islamic organization, National Islamic Front (NIF), in Sudan is main opposition force. They mobilize through wide networks in political, economic and social realms. Members of NIF dominate social services, schools and diplomatic services. They operate parallel intelligence, police, and paramilitary forces and are major power in economy.

Jordan opened Islamists, Muslim Brotherhood, political space same as in the Morocco. Given Islamists' high mobilization capacity autocrats used them as the stabilizer of the political system by supporting them against the secular and anti-regime organizations. In Morocco, Hassan II to stabilize the political system which includes political forces from left and national independence movement included Islamists. In Egypt, Sadat against secular and Nasserist groups opened political space for Islamists. Therefore Islamists do not just provide economic security but also political security for the regime. In Jordan, Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is most effective

social initiative. JMB organizes charitable activities whereas the Islamic Action Front which is the political wing of the JMB organizes in political realm. JMB is at the center and ideological core which is officially charitable organization. JMB employs Islamic Center Society for charitable activities. ICS provides social services to the 20.000 orphans employs 35000 people and runs 55 schools. ICS holds significant size of property which is the result of zakat and other type donations and announced that the asset values of it is 1, 5 billion \$.

However there is a limit of inclusion of Islamist into political and social realms. As much as they obtain political power the risk of regime overthrow increases. As the Muslim Brotherhood got power the state limited their mobilization and organization capacities. State intervened and halted liberalization process because MB broadened extent and success of the organization- they organize successfully in political realms through political channels. However to control the mobilization regime needs to have sufficient coercive capacity. In Egypt, Mubarak in 2000s after he initiated liberalization he developed strong ties with capitalist class. Through selective incentives for the new capitalist class, regime impoverished and foreign debt increased. Regime reduced military's budget share which put the military integrity by excluding them from rent allocation mechanism. Military responded regime with not oppressing street protests and declaring that they would not shoot any citizen of Egypt which resulted in revolution. We will explore this in Chapter 4.

1.3. Space of Interaction between the Regime and Islamists: Political Liberalization

Political liberalization precedes democratization. Regimes through political liberalization becomes accountable, provides space of mobilization, establishes functioning jurisdiction and rule of law, and craft political institutions to ease the political dissatisfaction. Liberalization produces backlashes and rebounds, thus, de-liberalization may be initiated following liberalization¹³

¹³ This is why there is wave of democracy getting backward.

However the number of democratic regimes in the world increased after wave of democracy is completed. However, in the Middle East and North Africa political liberalization episodes do not lead to democratic transition. Regimes initiating political liberalization, limited extent of it and have never transformed to the democratic system. What are the mechanisms blocking society's reach to democracy? and extent of liberalization? Who became key political players with liberalization (selectiveness)? Are political processes competitive? Is there any intersections in any domain of legitimization of the regime and the opposition? Does Political liberalization (liberating political and social rights) precede authoritarian building or democratization (establishing inclusive competitive political processes, free and fair elections)?

According to Ibn Khaldun, state formation (in Arab-Islamic culture) come existence through repeating cycles. In the first stage charismatic prophet mobilizes his followers through communal connections in cultural ground (social-religion) and in the following stage he adopts inclusive politics and provides autonomy. We argue that Islamists play a vital role to enable the regime to have control in inclusion and repression stages. Islamic mobilization stabilizes this cycle and soak the overshoots (as we emphasized before Islamic mobilization has political and economic pros and cons, regime's legitimization on cultural and political domain).

Given that there is not strong political society on secular lines in the Middle East and North Africa, Islamists' occupation in the political realm constitutes genuine political attempt for regime change in the region. Illiberal democracy comes existence under monarchy given that Islamists and the regime legitimize on the same domain given that regime has superior role than Islamists. In other words, certain structural domain imposes collaboration between regime and Islamists. Monarchy and illiberal democracy can be attainable and tenable for countries such as Jordan, Morocco. Interestingly, monarchies are more close to liberal democracy than military form personalist regimes. In countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia regime - Islamists challenge, under controlled political liberalization, serves for the regime survival. These regimes' relation with Islamists determine the extent of liberalization.

Limited inclusion of radical Islamists give the regime leverage so that they can legitimize usage of coercive apparatus, if necessary, which decreases social cost of repression, legitimizes political power of the regime. Regime struggling with radicals have attracted domestic and global appeals which came with financial support. Regime by including Islamists generates

dichotomy in cultural ground (regime's Islam rhetoric vs. Islamists' rhetoric). Regime struggle with Islamists' occupation of cultural ground by bringing their rhetoric on its domain. Regime justifies its position through state's religious institutions (al-Azhar in Egypt, Religious Affairs in Algeria) and negates their point of view with political arguments (they emphasize their attachment to universal values such as democracy and emphasize compatibility of Islam and secular values). In this way, regime gain legitimacy from secular, Arab nationalist left and moderate Islamist section of the society and manipulates Arab nationalist left's desire of political change. Therefore Islamists provide economic and political benefits for the regime unwittingly.

Hinnebusch (2010, page 214) claims that "this article's contribution to post-democratization studies is : .. 4) Its identification of a convergence toward "liberal autocracy" explained as an outcome of universal state building challenges and of globalizing forces, rather than a manifestation of Middle East and North Africa exceptionalism". However without giving reference to pragmatic attitudes of the regime in cultural ground, the regime's identity, nationalist and Islamist formulations in state building cannot be conceived. We argue that Middle East and North Africa exceptionalism lies in its populist politics, political manipulation by historical heritage, and ties through which it engineers main lines of social mobilization. Regime's state building efforts does not lead to authority building by political liberalization but political liberalization shapes and gives the codes of state building¹⁴. It is more populist than authentic and in recent decades based on co-optation with Islamists.

Parties, parliaments, associations, committees and unions are fields of politics that the urban, upper and middle class people in particular mobilize. Lower class people are poor, illiterate, and under-educated so that they don't have sufficient social, political and economic capital to mobilize in the political field in the Middle East and North Africa. People in this class usually get down to streets to demand their rights. Therefore, political mobilization and mass participation in politics do not completely prevent any social rise up sparked in the street (Pridham 1995 in Albrecht, 2008). Therefore to control and satisfy economically powerless and

¹⁴ Hosni Mubarak stated that " the only problem... with free elections is that you can not predict the outcome"

enable social integrity regime co-opt Islamists providing significant size of community services.

Regimes which do not have Islamic symbols (heritage ties to Prophet(Jordan Hashemite), symbolic titles such as leader of Muslim people (Moroccan King) or custodian of holy places (Saudi King)) fail to center itself in the cultural ground (Mubarak, Ben Jedid).

The interaction between regime and Islamists varies across region. The interrelation of Morocco's king with Islamists is not in the same line with the Egypt's president's relation with Islamists. Therefore regime's reliance on Islamic symbols to induce political loyalty is not working out well for every regimes in the region. For example in Saudi Arabia the opposition mobilize against the regime which has strong religious legitimization. Therefore, radical Islamists such as, Usame bin Laden could not find sufficient space to mobilize the society on Islamic causes (Fandy, 2001). Therefore, the space to mobilize the society on Islamic grounds is connected to the regime's level of "moral capital".

The regime if cannot observe the type of the Islamic organizations then it may not open space. Even the Islamic organizations declare its support, the regime may not observe whether their support is instrumentalist or not. Therefore, even there is significant chance that the organization is moderate the regime may not open space for the organization.

Norton (1992) separates moderates from radical civil society. Moderates are those that do not use violence and hold revolutionary agenda. Moderates are systemic and puts pressure for reform through existing political channels and processes such as parliamentary elections and judicial reviews. Moderate civil society organizations in particular moderate Islamic organizations which are allowed to mobilize through political parties (such as in Morocco, Jordan, Yemen and Kuwait) are controlled by the regime by mix of co-optation and coercion (Albrecht, 2008). According to Kramer (2000) Islamic organizations in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco don't organize to overthrow the regime but call the regime for basic reform and re-organization of the political realm. They are reformist and cooperative rather than revolutionary (Lucas, 2004).

Radicals, on the other hand, aim to overthrow the regime and set up new regime on (Islamic) new principles and use force if necessary (such as Islamists in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, or Shia movement in Bahrain). Anti-systemic oppositions in this category which are main threat for the regime can be included into the political realm depending on the political and coercive capacity of the regime. Radicals emphasize their strong ties with Islam if regime lacks strong cultural legitimization symbols (which are personal regimes developed from military regimes) and employ secular nationalism for political legitimization.

Monarchs in the Middle East and North Africa have developed strategies to survive from the social dissent, riot, revolt, social upheavals. (Partial) Liberalization is the strategy most of the regimes in the Middle East and North Africa employ. Ayubi (1995) argues that regimes in the Middle East and North Africa limitedly liberalize to enable system maintenance against systemic shocks. He argues that it is the result of two factors. One factor is the financial crisis of the state and other is globalization. Regimes in this way partly share the cost of financial exhaustion.

Another strategy that the regime can use against the opposition is that exclusion. Norton (1995) argues that if the civil society organizations become serious threat to the regime then they are excluded from the political and social processes. Therefore as the regime sees the civil society organizations becoming threat to the regime's political authority then they are excluded from political and social processes. Regime limitedly liberalize political, social and economic realms for Islamists and have not attempted to terminate their existence. Regime through partial inclusion and exclusion control their organization capacity so that they cannot solve collective action problem.

Albrecht, Schlumberger (2004) states that persistence and durability of the regime depends on the combination of repression and inclusion. Extent of the political inclusion depends on the political characteristics of the included factions in the society. After Ottoman Empire collapsed and Arab revolt erupted in 1916, nationalism was mainstream ideology which pushed regimes for innovation of artificial statehoods. However, after eclipse of Islamists the populist nationalist legitimization failed particularly in non- monarchy regimes. Regimes therefore after 1960s faced with Islamists as the interlocutor. Regime included Islamists limitedly to the political, economic and social realms to derive political legitimacy. Regimes used domestic and

international actors as the control mechanism on the extent of Islamists' mobilization by which they manipulate political realm in domestic and global scale.

Zartman (1988) was the first researcher referred that the system may get stabilized if the opposition is active. He emphasized the complementarity of interests between government and opposition which reinforces the government's existence. Albrecht (2008) argues that political opposition under authoritarianism challenges incumbents, but, at the same time, its existence ultimately contributes to the stability of the political system. In the Middle East and North Africa this is valid for some regimes (which are former military regimes derived legitimacy from national sentiments). Islamists serve these regimes' survival as they oppose which has been strictly controlled by the regime. Islamists in monarchies can limitedly derive religious legitimacy as the state dominate this domain. In Jordan and Morocco, stable autocracy can be attributed to mutual interest between the government and (moderate) Islamists.

Economic crisis is one of processes that can trigger the regime transition. Society in particular opposition forces benefit from the opportunity to challenge against economically fragile state which is also a reason that oil poor, weak economies of the region open the political and social space for the society. On the other hand, Latin American autocratic regimes collapsed with deep economic crisis even they opened political space for the society. Middle East and North Africa regimes use the liberalization to avoid such a collapse and manage through crisis processes via various political tactics. One of the benefit of political liberalization is that regime reduces burden of economic crisis by having Islamists to provide economic aid and ease the economic circumstances in post-economic crisis period. One of the scenario after regime collapse may realize is the rise of Islamists and their control of the political processes which pushes back seculars, Arab national left from taking an active role in the social mobilization. Therefore, after economic crisis political opening may lead to regime's broadening of its social base.

Regime controls the process of liberalization to not to lose its sovereignty but fully absorb the benefits from broadening of the social base. There is significant chance that regime would create conditions which would jeopardize its own existence. In particular, regime collapse may occur if the regime can't monitor whether the organization is moderate or radical and for instance opens wide open space for the radical civil society organization. Political liberalization process ended up with civil war and narrow authoritarian system in Algeria where Islamists

developed discourse stressing economic and political failures of the regime. Main reason of failure of political liberalization in authoritarian building in Algeria was that the regime lacked political capacity to control the political liberalization process (and weak ties to religious symbols which could have been employed to ease the social dissent). However, monarchies of Gulf region after oil price bump and in Morocco, Jordan after bread riots, regimes successfully included opposition in political realm to ease the economic crisis' ripple effects on society. Even there was back and forth in political liberalization experiments in Morocco and Jordan, by which regime controlled political processes, regime successfully manage the liberalization. Therefore the regime changes the scope and the extension of the liberalization to prevent the regime transition. For example compared to the initial period, in the final period of Sadat regime there were more restrictions on mobilization of Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood) (Tugal, 2009).

In Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan Islamists mobilized through political channels and processes by developing political units or mobilizing in existing political units. For example MB in Egypt won significant number of seats in 1984 (in New Wafd party, 15, 8 %), in 1987 (in Labor party, 17%), in 2005(run as independents, 88 seats out of 444) and in 2012 (run as Freedom and Justice party %47,2) elections. Islamists In Algeria (FIA in 1990, %54), in Jordan (JMB in 1989 %41.3, IAF in 1993 20 %, in 1997 15%, 2003 17 %) in Morocco (JDP 42 seats in 2002, 52 seats in 2007, 107 seats in 2011) they won high vote share (Krömer, 2001). Regimes experimenting political liberalization, thus, needs to have political capacity to manage political processes to avoid regime transition through political channels.

Arab parliaments' legislative power is limited. Regimes through political rules and regulations control the political processes to guarantee regime existence such as in Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia. Parliaments are dysfunctional. Because there is no autonomous strong civil society and political society in the region, parliaments do not work properly, and different views and ideologies of the social groups are represented very superficially. The regime intervenes into the political processes in particular to the elections. Even Albrecht & Schlumberger (2004) defines the political opening as "window dressing", Przeworski & Gandhi (2007) claims that it must have an effect on the policy outcomes. "Because they are the result of strategic choices and have an impact on the survival of autocrats, they should also have effects on policy outcomes." (Przeworski & Gandhi, 2007).

Modernization theory argues that as the economy develops society becomes more complex and mobilized to be governed by authoritarian means (Hinnebusch, 2010). Why Middle East and North Africa regimes did not experience democratization even their economies developed, transformed¹⁵? We argue that strategic political liberalization halted political and social mobilization. Regime's interaction with Islamists provide the ground for re-production of authoritarian structure. In every contracted or broadened space of interaction, the regime-Islamists redefine authoritarianism which covers "almost" all possible social complexities that regime can deal with. In other words, regime's interaction with Islamists reduce the social complexities and mobilization down to the domain that the regime predominantly can legitimize itself.

In the literature political and economic contribution of Islamists to the regime survival has not been formalized. Islamists' political participation and pragmatic electoral attitudes have been emphasized as moderation effects of liberalization and Islamists' eagerness in political mobilization. Hinnebusch (2006, page 375) argues that "Islam is no deterrent to democratization. Survey research shows that strong Islamic attachments do not discourage support for democracy. Islamic movements have participated in elections in many countries, tend to be moderated by playing the electoral game, and are likely to become an obstacle to democratization only when radicalized by exclusion"

Inclusion into the political realm does not bring political equality¹⁶ (inclusiveness) or political competitiveness (political liberalization). Political liberalization which is very limited serves for the authority building in periods of economic and political crisis.

Regime strictly controls the liberalization processes and intervenes before the formation of systemic risks. The regime liberalizing limitedly restricts activities of civil society organizations, Islamists, if they organize beyond limits. In Egypt, the regime gave space for the MB to organize, however it controlled the space of mobilization. Albrecht (2008) argues that liberalization in Middle East and North Africa can't go beyond certain thresholds and do not result in concrete democratic transformation. For example liberalization efforts in post -

¹⁵ The trade pattern transformed from exportation of primary goods into the exportation of industrial goods

¹⁶ The regime controls the political processes. Regime restricts for example the space of mobilization of seculars, and national left but increases space for Islamists (or vice versa, periodic inclusion)

Khomeini Iran, in reunified Yemen (1991-1995), in Egypt during the 1980s, in Bahrain since 2001, and in the recent ‘Springs’ in Damascus, Beirut, resulted in release of restrictions over the media, elections, and the revival of civic society but not the regime change or complete liberalization. (Albrecht, 2008).

Brumberg (2002) argues that Middle East and North Africa regimes in last decades experienced a “transition” away from and then back toward-authoritarianism. We consider in our model the swing of the system happens within the limits of the liberalization. As it is emphasized before that this cycle of liberalization around full autocratic regime is the result of tactical inclusive policies. Although Islamists, leftists, secular liberals, NGO activists, and women’s organizations embrace the openings with big hopes, the system did not evolve to the competitive democracy (Brumberg, 2002).

The regime may choose to repress after first stage of liberalization which can be in different forms including harsh press laws, massive crackdown by police force, and repeated postponement of elections which would result in narrowed authoritarianism. The regime to close the systemic gaps and reduce the strength of the organization represses harshly, hence, the restrictions after repression would be stricter than status quo situation.

As we referred before the regime may choose to repress the civil society organization, start second stage of liberalization or retains first stage liberalization. Therefore, after first stage liberalization the political and social realm may become narrowed, broadened or limitedly broadened. Political participation, pluralism, semi stable limited liberalization or regime transition results from broadening of social base. In Egypt, the inclusion of the MB into the political realm resulted in limitedly liberalized regime where the limits of the liberalization is strictly controlled. On the other hand, in Morocco inclusion of the MUR into the political arena brought political stability (Albrecht & Wegner, 2006).

The main reason of not opening political space is that perceiving the organization as the potential threat. Regime may abstain from liberalization if the civil society organization is radical or the regime cannot perfectly monitor the type of the organization. For example, MUR in Morocco to overcome such uncertainty used different mechanisms to convince the regime

that its type is moderate contrary to the other Islamic organizations such as radical al Adl wa al-Ihsan (this organization prohibits the politics and using political channels for their “da’wa” (Albrecht, Wegner; 2006).

Lucas (2004) also argues that the open and liberalized regime can put forward political and economic policies right in time before tremendous economic or political crisis. Therefore these regimes can intervene and apply right policies which can be Orthodox or Keynesian economic policies. Therefore these regimes is not same as the post totalitarian regimes which make decision on the ideological or bureaucratic ground. We can conclude therefore that even these regimes face the threat of regime overthrown or regime transition, by controlling and contending the liberalization process they gain political flexibility, economic benefits, social and political stability, stable international relations, and resilient system.

CHAPTER 2

2. Literature Review: Game Theoretic Models on Persistency of Middle East and North Africa Autocracies

Przeworski (1991)'s political liberalization model is the first model which was constructed to explain the political liberalization which takes its theoretical roots from O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) study. All theorists working on topic based their study on the O'Donnell and Schmitter's work which says that political liberalization precedes the democratization which is sparked by the division between key political elites. Hard-liners do not support the democratic transition but the continued authoritarian system. Soft-liners differ from the hard-liners by their support for the open nondemocratic system. Hinnebusch (2006, page 387) refers about transition theory "elites need not be committed democrats to initiate democratization if the alternative is a less desirable crisis or stalemate situation that cannot otherwise be overcome. In this respect, transition theory holds that the optimal scenario for elite-led democratization is a combination of (a) elite divisions inside an authoritarian regime and (b) the formation of an alliance between regime liberals and an opposition that is both moderate yet popularly credible, in order to marginalize the hard-liners in both camps and incorporate the masses in a way compatible with regime reform rather than collapse. This alliance would reach a pact, embodying a compromise preserving elite interests while accommodating and promising the opposition increased influence through a gradual democratization"

If the regime cannot produce economic and political privileges and gains, patrimonial base of authority building gets dismantled. Soft liners seek forming alliances with the organized factions of society, civil society, to initiate the political liberalization. Liberalization may end up narrowed authoritarianism, broadened authoritarianism or democratization. Elites' preference structure whether they are proto democratize or not, cost of rebellion, willing to civil society to mobilize against elite determines the consequent political outcome. Przeworski (1991) introduces the different preference structure for the soft-liners in his model that generates significant political outcomes (proto democratizer or not). There are soft liners who prefer the democratic transition to the narrowed authoritarian regime and soft liners who prefer the narrowed authoritarianism to the democratic transition. He argues that if the soft liners' preference structure changes after initiation of liberalization, civil society's organization may lead to democratic transition. Additionally he argues that if the probability of successful repression declines after the civil organization begins to organize, opening may lead to

transition. Studies following Przeworski (1991) model of political liberalization and transition have similar model set up. Lo and Blaydes's (2011) study extends the Przeworski's (1991) model for the Middle East and North Africa in two sided game theoretic model.

According to Przeworski's (1991) game; opposition decides on to organize to push for liberalization or collaborate with the existing regime whereas the soft-liners decides on whether to keep status quo or open the space for the civil society. Przeworski's (1991) model assumes that soft-liners already possessed enough power to be able to open the political space for the opposition. According to model the regime and the opposition form a compact or they cooperate to initiate political reform. Each cooperation results in different authoritarian regime. In seminal work of O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) transition process is defined as the uncertain and unpredictable which may boil down to various political outcomes. For example; O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argues that "the present volume - introducing uncertainty- deals with transitions from certain authoritarian regimes toward an uncertain "something else". That "something" can be instauration of a political democracy or the restoration of a new, and possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule."

In Przeworski's model the game begins with the soft-power's obtainment of the political power. In Crescenzi 's (1999) model, nature determines whether the power holder is soft-liners or hard-liners. Marks (1992) models the struggle between factions within the elite, if hard-liners lose their power and soft liners gain power then the liberalization becomes more viable. According to Marks's (1992) model if hard liners have stronger capacity than soft liners there will be not liberalization but repression. However if soft liners are stronger and have more intense preferences then hard liners go along with toleration.

In our model there is not soft liners and hard liners. We consider that because regime constructs patrimonial and clientelist relations with bureaucratic mechanisms, army, and political elite, soft liners do not emerge. Ruler also allocates political positions to most trusted cronies, family or tribal members therefore they constitute institutional integrity.

In Przeworski's (1991) model conditions for the political liberalization already exists. Soft liners hold the strong political positions and have strength to reform. We consider that there is

not such a division and it is best interest of the regime to open space¹⁷ for the civil society, Islamists, if certain conditions are satisfied such as if the regime has strong repressive capacity, political capacity.

Blaydes and Lo (2011) extended the Przeworski's (1991) benchmark model and examined empirical political regularities in Middle East and North Africa autocratic regimes with two sided incomplete game theoretic model. Uncertainty on the civil society organization is that whether the regime liberalizers willing to repress. Uncertainty on the soft-liners is that whether the civil society organization willing to commit to the democracy. Model implies that the transition to democracy is only possible when the repressive capacity of a regime exceeds a certain threshold. However, political, historical, and sociological analysis are absent in their analysis. They state that "like Przeworski's original conceptualization, the model that we describe represents a partial equilibrium and captures just a snapshot of the strategic interaction between two key actors when a rift emerges in the authoritarian elite. While neither the Przeworski model nor the model extension here incorporate underlying political economy factors that may lead up to the modeled transition" (Blaydes, Lo; 2011, page 7)

Weingast (1997) examines the interaction between the state and two civil society organizations. He finds out that the regime uses repression and cooptation to control civil society organizations' room of maneuver and prevent their union against the regime. According to Weingast (1997) the state by creating selective incentives diversifies the opposition and also deepens the division in the society which is the reason that the state can have enough social base and support to rule for long period of time. State supports one civil society organization against another in one time and vice versa in other time in order to keep the organizations apart, weak and unable to solve collective action problem. Weingast (1997) argues that ethnic divisions and the conflict of interests among society which constitutes social coordination problem provide the regime space of political manipulation.

Wintrobe's (1998) work emphasized the clientelistic nature of the surviving autocratic regimes. His model is not very different than Weingast's (1997) model in terms of the evaluation of the

¹⁷ We consider the political liberalization as survival mechanism of the "hard liners"

nature of the regime. However his model includes one civil society organization and ignores the coordination problem.

Okar's (2005) model is in the same line with Weingast's (1997) model. She constructed three player complete information game, moderate and radical opposition, and the regime. Moderate and radical distinction is ideological. There is a conflict analysis; whether the conflict is joint or not, and a cooperation analysis; whether there is cooperation between the radical and moderate opposition, between the regime and the moderate opposition. She observes that the regime by manipulating political realms and parameters such as political and economic cost of conflict can block conflict.

In our model, we emphasize the organization power of Islamists. We differently from previous models emphasize the political, economic and social dynamics CSOs bring into the whole spectrum of relations between the society and the regime. Additionally, we evaluate liberalization in stages to reveal the nature of the strategic interaction between civil society organizations and the regime in different stages of the liberalization. In our model differently from literature hard liners employ political liberalization as the political survival mechanism. Our classification of types and construction of game is different than works in the literature.

2.1. Introduction to Game Theoretic Model

In this part of the chapter, we model the strategic interaction between the strategically inclined autocratic regime and the civil society, Islamists, in the game theory framework. Islamists are key political, social actor mobilizing against the regime and form the hard core opposition. They demand political inclusiveness and competitiveness. In particular, in times of economic crisis the civil society organizations put pressure on the regime to have more pluralist, transparent, open and functioning political system. In other words, in times of economic and political crisis the accommodation cost of keeping status quo increases. The autocratic regime, thus, faces with the demand of political participation by the civil society organization.

Autocratic regimes seek the way to reduce the uncertainty and re-impose his patronage in times of economic crisis. We argue that regime's selective political inclusiveness, which is limited or

extended, gives the regime the room to correct the economic and political imbalances and to rebuild its authority. Political liberalization, thus, is the tool for authority building in the Middle East and North Africa. By including Islamists to the political, economic and social processes regime re-impose its authority in cultural, political, social and economic domains, reduces cost of repression by easing social dissatisfaction, reducing class antagonism (obstruct radicalization of middle class), creating political and cultural dichotomy that the regime can manipulate. Therefore inclusion of Islamists to political, economic and social realms is utilized by the regime.

Type of the civil society, Islamists, depend on the motivation of the organization whether it organizes to overthrow the regime or not. Moderate enjoys the cooperation, collaboration, and even challenge to the regime without demanding systemic change. Radical type, on the other hand, organizes to overthrow the regime. Regime or radicals manage the revolution process to become successful. The outcome of the struggle is either revolution or regime repression. Since moderates do not organize in the fashion radicals do, they do not face with repression threat. Moderates mobilize society, ease social dissatisfaction, and reduce class struggle. In other words, moderate Islamists provide economic and political good so that regime benefits from their mobilization.

We introduced two stages of mobilization, political liberalization. Limited liberalization is the stage that civil society, Islamists, mobilize in limited space. Regime controls and restricts the mobilization space so that the organization, radicals, cannot mobilize in the way that they can solve the collective action problem and attempt to overthrow the regime. We consider that there are two methods for regime change. Organization, radical Islamists in our case, can mobilize physically and through street protests, riots which may lead to revolution. They can also mobilize through political channels and processes which may lead to the regime change. In the first method radical Islamists must convince people to rise up which is costly, because if the attempt is not successful the cost of rebellion is high. Organization must have strong structure and discourse to convince people for rise up. Given there is strict regime control and degree of credibility is low therefore the revolt cannot occur because collective action problem is present. However organization can mobilize in political realm by legal processes and procedures to overthrow the regime without need of solving collective action problem, for example through (free) elections. Therefore the regime must have sufficient political capacity, and authority in

political realm to block radicals' reach to the political power. In limited liberalization regime employs security services and military to control Islamists' mobilization in the extent they cannot go beyond the limited space of mobilization (through mass mobilization or political channels).

The regime may liberalize the space of mobilization further in which radicals can solve the collective action problem for revolt. The regime will not further liberalize unless it is certain that the organization will not revolt or have power to overcome state repression. However if regime liberalizes further, it may exploit Islamic society's resources in wider dimension. However the regime must have sufficient political capacity to control Islamist's political mobilization.

In the beginning of the game closed authoritarian regime decides on to stay closed or open the regime. However, If the regime chooses to stay as closed political system it would face the possibility of regime collapse due to social pressures and dissatisfaction with the regime which blazes in economic and political crisis periods. Regime can accommodate cost of keeping the regime closed or not. Regime can keep the status quo depending on its economic resources, cultural legitimacy, its patrimonial and clientelistic ties, and the coercive capacity.

2.2. Incomplete Information Model for Moderate Type

In incomplete information game model players don't know certainly the payoffs that they receive from various outcomes (including its own payoff) (Mas - Colell , Whinston, Green; 1995). Nature moves and determines the outcome after the regime chooses to keep status quo situation. Therefore the regime does not know certainly the payoff for keeping status quo so that the game is incomplete information game.

We consider the regime's liberalization experiments in stages. In initial decision node regime decides on whether to liberalize limitedly or not. In this first stage of the liberalization the

relation between regime and Islamists is in its primitive stage. Islamists in this stage of liberalization can't organize mass mobilization. Islamists need to have space to mobilize and organize to be able to solve collective action problem. In Egypt, the regime allowed Islamists to mobilize in limited space, (for example the regime prohibits the establishment of political party by Islamists), and however, it did not restrict their entrance into the parliament through joining other legal parties and running as independents. Muslim Brotherhood won important number of seats in elections by participating elections as independent candidates or in existing political parties. There was always possibility that the MB would use political channels effectively to push for regime change. In Algeria, once the regime opened the political space for Islamists, they won the majority (which was not expected by the regime) in local elections however regime prohibits their participation then after. In the second stage regime can be overthrown in two channels; political channels or by mass mobilization (they have sufficient space to solve collective action problem). Therefore the regime must have sufficient political and repressive capacity to open further space for radical Islamists.

If the regime in the initial node did not decide to initiate the liberalization then nature assigns the outcome which is either the regime collapse or status quo authoritarianism. Regime makes its decision of opening the regime, depending on its ability to cover the accommodation cost of keeping status quo, accommodation capacity. Bellin (2004, page 147) argues that "The elite is forced to ask if the cost of repression is worth the benefit. The regime makes its decision of opening depending on its ability to accommodate the social dissatisfaction particularly in times of economic and political crisis."

If the regime opens limited space for the moderate (radical) organization, the civil society, moderate (radical) Islamists, decides on to whether to organize or not. If it does not organize then it just enjoys the liberalized environment, and enter a compact with the regime. If Islamists organize in political and social channels then the regime decides whether to repress, to keep limited liberalization or to initiate the second stage liberalization. If the regime represses the organization it leads second worst outcome, Narrowed Authoritarianism (NAR). If the regime keeps the limited liberalization it leads second best outcome which is Broadened Authoritarianism (BAR) (or the regime transition, it depends on the (relative) political capacity of the regime). If the regime initiates the second stage liberalization it leads to the best outcome for both players which is Cooperative Authoritarianism (or regime change, revolution).

2.2.1. Extensive Form of the Incomplete Information Game: Moderate Type

I = Finite Set of Players, $I = 1, \dots, I$

X = Finite Set of Nodes, $x \in X$

Z = Terminal Nodes, $Z \subset X$

$i(x)$ = The function that assigns the node to the players.

$A(x)$ = The set of possible actions at node x . $x \in X/Z$

$n(x, a)$ = The successor node (resulting from action a)

$h_i(x)$ = Information set which includes the possible nodes given what $i(x)$ knows.

H_i = Collection of Information sets of player i . $H_i = \cup_{x \in X} h_i(x)$

$d(h_N(x))$ = Probability function assigning probabilities to the actions at information set for Nature at node of x .

$\Gamma = \{I, X, Z, H, A(x), i(x), n(x, a), (U_i)_{i(x \in Z) \in I}\}$

$I = \{Regime, Civil Society Organization, Nature\}$

$X = \{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j\}$

$Z = \{b, c, e, g, h, i, j\}$

$A(a) = \{Keep Status Quo, Limited Liberalization\}$, $A(c) = \{Organize, Not Organize\}$

$A(e) = \{Keep Limited Liberalization, Repress, Liberalize Further\}$.


$i(a) = Regime$, $i(c) = Civil Society Organization$, $i(e) = Regime$,

$h_r(a) = \{a\}$, $h_s(d) = \{d\}$, $h_t(f) = \{f\}$

$n(a) = \{c, d\}$, $n(c, Limited Liberalization) = \{d, e\}$, $n(e, Organize) = \{f, g, h\}$.

$d(h_N(j)) = \{h, 1-h\}$

2.2.2. Representation of Incomplete Information Game: Moderate Type



$U^i (. ; .)$ is the payoff, monotonic and differentiable utility, function that assigns values according to strategies chosen by players. Each strategy is mapped to the $(w, pc; is, ps, cs)$ vector. For each strategy set there is unique values of $(w, pc; is, w, ps)$. W is wealth of the regime, pc is political consent the regime received, PS is political satisfaction of the Islamists, and W^S is wealth of Islamists. (we consider that poor and middle class Islamists receive higher transfers and services, and political demands (ideological demands in political realm) are better conduit as the Islamist movement get organized in broader space)

$$U^R_{SQ} = X = U^R(W_{SQ}, PC_{SQ})$$

$$U^S_{SQ} = U = U^S(W^S_{SQ}, PS_{SQ})$$

Because we consider that by including Islamists, economic and political capacity of the regime increases, liberalization leads to increase in payoff corresponds to level of economic wealth of

the regime and political consent of society. Therefore $U^R_{CAR} = 1 > X = U^R_{SQ}$ where $U^R_j(.)$ is monotonic utility function. Islamists by having broader space of mobilization they are provided with more community services (Islamists provide), have higher political and ideological satisfaction. Therefore, $U^S_{CAR} = 1 > X = U^S_{SQ}$ where $U^S_j(.)$ is monotonic utility function.

$$U^i_{CAR} > U^i_{BAR} > U^i_{LAR} > U^i_{SAR} > U^i_{NAR} > U^i_{RC}, \quad i = \text{Regime, Islamic Civil Society}$$

$$1 > b > l > u > f > 0, \quad 1 > z > y > x > d > 0$$

$$d \in (0,1), x \in (d,1), y \in (x,1), z \in (y,1); f \in (0,1), u \in (f,1), l \in (u,1), b \in (l,1)$$

To ease the exposition I make normalization. Outcomes are ordered, depending on the preferences, in the [0,1] range. The least preferred outcome is 0 and the most preferred one is, 1. Payoff for the outcome of Regime Collapse is 0 and for the Cooperative Authoritarianism is 1. Other terminal outcomes take values depending on the preference ordering.

Moderate organization make political and economic demands without demanding system change. The regime in second stage of liberalization provides offices, allows for political participation and establishment of the political party, releases restrictions over organization's media and press, decreases controls to the minimum level. In this stage the civil society, Islamists, have wide space of mobilization. Islamists mobilize significant number of people, conduit political and economic demands of constituency while it satisfies their political, social and economic demands (and open space for the regime so that it reproduces its moral authority). Therefore CAR provides both players best outcome. Broadened Authoritarianism (BAR) is the outcome for first stage of liberalization. In this stage the regime controls the political and social processes of the civil society. Liberalized Autocracy (LAR) represents the situation where the civil society organization do not organize by political and social channels and processes but enjoys the liberal political environment. They receive funding and aid from government and international institutions and obviously they enjoy release of restrictions such as freedom of speech or press. Narrowed Authoritarianism (NAR) represents the second worse situation and least preferred outcome of the game. The Status Quo outcome represents closed political system but is preferred to the Narrowed Authoritarianism. The regime collapse represents the situation that the regime cannot cover the accommodation cost of social dissatisfaction and repression so that transition occurs (in general coup terminates the regime). This case worst case also for the moderate opposition because they could not have same set of privileges in under new established military or oligarchic regimes.

2.3. Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the Complete Information Game

2.3.1. Nash Equilibrium in Normal Strategic Games

Definition:

H_i denotes the collection of player i 's information sets, A denotes the set of possible actions in the game, and $C(h(x)) \subset A$ the set of actions possible at information set $h(x)$. A strategy for player i is a function $s_i: H_i \longrightarrow A_i$ such that $s_i(h_i(x)) \in C(h_i(x))$ for all $h_i \in H_i$.

Definition:

$U_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) > U_i(s_i, s_{-i}^*)$, $\forall s_i \in \forall S_i$, $i \in I$ then the strategy s^* is the Nash Equilibrium of the Game, Γ

2.3.2. Nash Equilibrium in Extensive Games: Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium

Definition:

If $\forall \Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma$ $U_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) > U_i(s_i, s_{-i}^*)$, $\forall s_i \in \forall S_i$, $i \in I$ then the strategy s^* is the Nash Equilibrium of the Game, Γ where Γ' is proper sub-game of Γ

Kreps (1990) emphasized that in the complete and perfect information games the sub game perfection is applied. Because every node is a singleton set, an information set, every node begins a proper subgame and subgame perfection leads to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Subgame perfect Nash Equilibria is the set of Nash equilibria not including equilibria on the “off the equilibrium path”. For finite complete and perfect information games the equilibria of the game reached by backward induction is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria.

2.4. Sub Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the Incomplete Information Game

If $\forall \Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma \sum_{x \in \Gamma'} d(h_N(x).U_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*)) > \sum_{x \in \Gamma'} d(h_N(x).U_i(s_i, s_{-i}^*)), \forall s_i \in S_i, i \in I$ then the strategy

s^* is the Nash Equilibrium of the Game, Γ

Proposition 1 : *The equilibrium of the game between moderate Islamists and the regime is Cooperative Authoritarianism.*

We solve the game backwardly. We start from the final decision node of the regime. The regime chooses liberalization further which gives greatest payoff. Civil society plays either organize given that the regime liberalizes further or not organize. Civil society organizes since it gives higher payoff. The regime then decides to whether stay or open space for the organization. The regime opens the space for the organization because it gives higher payoff.

O stands for the Organize, R is for repression, KLL is for keep limited liberalization, LF for liberalize further, NO is for not organize, KS for keep status quo, LL for limited liberalization.

$$U_R(LF; O) = 1 > z = U_R(KLL; O) > d = U_R(R; O).$$

Cooperative Authoritarianism gives greatest return for the regime given that the game comes down to the second decision node of the regime. In previous node, Islamists decide whether to organize or not by comparing the payoff for the organization and not organization given that if Islamists organize the regime liberalizes further in the next stage.

$$U_S(LF; O) = 1 > b = U_S(LF; NO).$$

Because the Cooperative Authoritarianism gives greater payoff than Liberalized Authoritarianism, Islamists choose to organize. Given that the civil society organization organizes, the regime decides whether to keep status quo or liberalize limitedly.

$$U_R(LL, LF; O) = 1 > x.h = U_R(KS, LF; O).$$

Keeping Status Quo gives smaller payoff than Limited liberalization, thus, regime chooses limited liberalization given that Islamists organizes (rationality is common knowledge). Therefore the equilibrium is {Limited Liberalization, Liberalize Further; Organize}

2.5. Empirical Relevance of the Equilibrium: Cooperative Authoritarianism

In this section, we explore country cases. We select our country cases depending on the nature of strategic interaction between regime and Islamists. In Morocco and Jordan Islamists are moderate and strategic interaction between the regime and Islamists correspond to the strategic interaction in our game model. Islamists' mobilization, channels they mobilize, regime's political strategy against Islamists correspond to the equilibrium outcome of the game.

2.5.1. Morocco

In Morocco, Alaui dynasty has held the political power since seventeenth century. Moroccan independence was declared in 1956. Muhammed V and his son Hassan II held power sequentially. Currently, Muhammed VI is holding political power. In Morocco the change of political power is based on heritage succession. Nationalist movement, Istiqlal (Independence party), effectively mobilized on nationalist issues. King Muhammed V used political party, UNFP, to control the post-colonial politics. Hassan II constituted multiparty democracy and opened limited space for political parties to control political demands. Parliamentary system is functioning currently in Muhammed VI's term. However, parliamentary system is not autonomous and free of patrimonial relations. The monarch has been above the parliament and has power to introduce regulations, decrees and to intervene into the political processes. Political inclusion is selective. Regime manipulates political realm and impose discretionary politics.

Compared to the Jordan, Morocco has deep historical roots based on Sunni Muslim of the Malikite rite (Krömer, 2001). Moroccan sultan exerted religious authority in his capacity as descendant of the Prophet (*shariff*), who was, moreover, endowed with religious charisma (*baraka*), commander of the faithful (*amir al muminin*) and supreme *mujtahid*.

Therefore, Muslim Brotherhood, its local associates or the any group inspired by radical Islam is not attracted to the society in Morocco. Organizations such as, al Adl wa al-Ihsan, which has revolutionary agenda couldn't root in the society and was terminated by the regime. The Islamic opposition in the Morocco is moderate.

According to Rustow (1970) transition to the democracy and democratic consolidation can happen if there is adaptation of elites for such a change. However, King's supremacy in cultural domain given that the Moroccan society values religious and tribal ties provide him domination in political and social realms thus without his consent, religious or ideological formations cannot flourish in Moroccan land.

There is no strong, radical, Islamic opposition in Morocco. The regime represses and imprisons radical Islamic activists. Regime dominates the cultural domain with its inherited Islamic and tribal legacy. Ulama (religious scholars) is co-opted by the regime.

The regime initially encouraged Islamists against seculars and national left wing. Regime repressed radicals such as Islamic Youth, al Adl wa al-Ihsan. Radical Islamists could not mobilize in cultural ground which is dominated by regime. On the other hand, regime continued on cooperation with moderate Islamists unless they organize to overthrow the system.

Islamists organizations in Morocco are in two forms; one is charity form and another one is political party. Al- adl wa al-Ihsan, Movement of Unity and Reform are in the charity form. They supply economic goods, ease the class struggle. However Al- adl wa al-Ihsan operated in radical lines. Regime co-operated with Movement of Unity and Reform and repressed al Adl wa al-Ihsan.

Movement of Unity and Reform integrated into political party, Mouvement Populaire Constitutionnel et De'mocratique (MPCD). Even regime prohibits foundation of Islamic party, didn't revoke their integration MPCD which is renamed as Justice and Development Party (JDP) in 1998 (Albrecht, Wegner,2006). JDP now holds majority of the seats in the parliament, and Movement of Unity and Reform continues on its community services.

The inclusion of the Islamic organization into the political realm is different in Morocco than Egypt. Albrecht, Wegner (2006) argues that the main reason for this different type of inclusion is that Moroccan king enjoys the religious and traditional legitimacy where the Egyptian autocrats derives the legitimization from coercive tools, populist nationalist political machine. They argue further that Moroccan king in post-colonial process used nationalist and religious legitimization arguments to build its political arbiter position above political realm. King Hassan II once declared this as “I will never be put into equation” (Zartman, 1986 in Albrecht &Wegner, 2006)

King is supremely aware of the social changes and developments which is emergence of new middle class, development of complex social relations in urban space, increasing literacy rate, and formation of ideological groups. Regime to control the social and political space and re-organize society on cultural ground co-operated with Islamists. Moderate Islamist have been carrier of official religious rhetoric which has enabled the re-institution of Islamic hegemony of the ruler. Islamists, in this way, prevent the radicalization of the new middle class and flourish of radical ideological formations. Islamists carry political and social demands to the parliament which is responsible with internal and foreign affairs seemingly, and operates to protect political interests of the King and royal family. Therefore the regime instituted politically sophisticated channels to avoid radicalism, rebellion, social dissents and attempts of revolution as well as democratic transition by mass mobilization.

Inclusion of Islamists into the political realm was not instant but phase by phase. He imposed his authority in cultural ground and repressed radical Islam’s development. He include Movement of Unity and Reform after they became compatible with regime’s political agenda. In Muhammed VI’s term they achieved majority in the parliament and designing political policies congruent with regime’s political benefits. Regime in this way attracted foreign aid, and appeal, eased social dissatisfaction, and class struggle and formation of radicalism.

Regime actively re-impose its nationalist and religious hegemony through different conduits. For example; King used dispute with the Algeria over the Western Sahara as an domestic political legitimization or for example; National TV in Morocco broadcast the religious duty of the King, as he practice *cum ’a* prayer,

King Hassan II acquired a reputation of unique mastery by handling and manipulating religious institutions, symbols, and rituals such as the *baya*, the oath of loyalty and obedience rooted in Islamic tradition- in order to preserve and legitimize his monopoly of power (Krömer,2001) King Hassan who is master of institutionalizing religious concepts associated with self to preserve the regime. He was a *sharif* with *baraka* and *Amir al muminin* and have on authority of deciding on matters of Qur'anic exegesis and practitioner of the Islamic law. Compared to both Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Morocco's religious field is much more complex (Krömer, 2001). Moderate Islamists because regime dominates the cultural ground in Morocco, do not organize in anti-systemic lines and cooperate with the regime.

2.5.2. Jordan

Jordan became a hereditary kingdom under British rule. Colonial design of national border and formation of nationality which afterwards caused the emergence of irredentism and pan-Arabism, and ethnic rebellion exemplifies itself in Jordan. British colonization project secures King's position by providing economic and political support. King Abdullah, first monarch of Jordan who derived the legitimacy by ancestral ties to Prophet Muhammad and royal family's primary role in the independence war against Ottoman Empire.

Ethnic division is severe in Jordan, Palestinian minority challenged with the regime and put the identity building process at risk¹⁸. Therefore regime lack historical legitimization and faces with ethnic anarchy. First victim of such a socially complex landscape, was King Abdullah who lost his strong national image after the occupation of the West Bank of Palestine and was murdered in 1951.

King Hussein (Abdullah's grandson) became king after King Abdullah. King Hussein emphasized cleverly his authority with nationalist and religious symbols to curb ethnic rebellion

¹⁸ Palestinian nationalism led to the civil war in 1970

and constitute Jordan nationality. His emphasize on his religious and historical position was not less than King Hassan II. He strove to found national identity and religious ties to the King , he was portrayed as the family father, father of all Jordanians, to control the masses.

Hashemites, which is the family Kings descended from, successfully integrated different social ethnics and groups even though eruption of severe ethnic insurgencies. The process of identity building was flux. King Hussein used repressive means and coercive methods to form a Jordan's unity and Jordanian identity. Regime staggered with severe economic crisis in 1970s and 1980s. Regime to ease social dissatisfaction sought the social consent by introducing political channels and processes, parliament. King Hussein allowed for limited political liberalization. King Hussein to control political processes and to ensure political moderation emphasized his tribal, Islamic and Arab nationalist credentials to the constituency. Political liberalization, reorganization of political realm provides regime way out of economic turmoil.

Islamists, Muslim Brotherhood, different than its counterpart in Syria and Egypt is moderate in Jordan (Lucas, 2003). Regime included Muslim Brotherhood in politics and social processes with discretion. Regime's continuous emphasize of its authority and credentials in cultural ground, tribal, nationalist and Islamic, restricts the space of mobilization of Muslim Brotherhood and pushed them to the moderation. Muslim Brotherhood has been active in economic, political and social realms. They voluntarily provide economic goods and community services. They also have political faction which has run in elections and reserved significant size of seats in the parliament. "The Jordanian MB, had enjoyed a relatively cooperative relationship with the regime, though in the 1980s the MB began to back a reformist agenda increasingly opposed to royal policies, if not to the monarchy itself" (Lucas, 2003).

Jordan regime is one of the resilient autocracy in the region challenges with economic and political crisis and social complexities arose with economic development. Susser (2000) claims that the kings of the Jordan are very talented politicians and conduct pragmatic diplomacy and cleverly use Islamic and tribal credentials, and Islamic symbols. Susser (2000) claims that beyond the personal reasons and capabilities and charisma of kings there are factors that contribute to the persistence of autocracy. Regime checks the society by its coercive apparatus and eases economic inequality, opening economic gap between different class formations, with

Islamists' community service provision and their moderate way of political Islam. King Hussein never repressed the Muslim Brotherhood with harsh measures. Because King Hussein and MB share common interests and adversaries they have peaceful relations¹⁹. Most notably, he promoted the Muslim Brotherhood against secular opponents.

Jordan is constitutional monarchy where the executive, legislative and judicial functions of the state is primarily carried out by the monarch who is also the commander of the army and can appoint or dismiss prime minister and dissolve or convene the parliament (Susser,2000).

Regime has not hold genuine democratic agenda. Lucas (2003) argues that “despite official claims to the contrary, the political openings of the early 1990s were never designed to produce full-fledged democracy in Jordan” . Regime even suppressed parliamentary politics time to time but he did not terminate its relation with MB in social and economic realm.

2.6. Incomplete Information Game Model: Radical Type

Classification of Islamist in the literature is ideologic, Przeworski (1991) and Blaydes & Lo (2012). We categorize types according to their tendency to overthrow the regime. Moderates do not organize to overthrow the regime. Moderates can be loyalist which organize to enable the subordination of society through politics in return for economic and political privileges. Moderates can be reformist which organize through political channels for reformation of political and social landscape.

Radicals are anti-systemic and their ultimate goal is the termination of current political system. They organize to overthrow the regime. Radicals can make the system change either by physical means or by political mobilization. Radicals can overthrow the regime through physical means if they can solve their collective action problem. To solve the collective action problem and convince society for mass mobilization radicals need space of mobilization which is under the state control.

¹⁹ Even MB challenged with the regime through political channels they have not organized to overthrow the regime

Radicals benefit from the political liberalization and space provisions by the regime. The regime must control the mobilization of Islamists so that it would not lead to regime change. Regime controls the physical capacity of radicals and restricts the social space through which radicals can mobilize masses. Additionally, regime controls political process through radicals can organize to make systemic changes. Therefore the regime providing political and social space to radicals, engineer political landscape that would ease the popular dissatisfaction and ease the popular pressure on the regime.

Additionally the regime may open further space to radicals in which radicals can solve collective action problem and organize social dissent to overthrow the regime. Radicals value most regime change and revolution. Contrarily, the regime values least the regime change and revolution. Regime collapse can happen through different ways. It may happen through coup d'état, social mass mobilization, and foreign intervention. The regime collapse is the worst outcome for the radicals because the process leads generally in Middle East and North Africa to the political chaos and military coups where the new authoritarian regime apply most strict discretionary politics against radical factions.

The success of the revolution is determined by the capacity of coercive apparatus, which is the main factor, cost of rebellion, strength of organization's capacity and foreign support. Therefore if the Islamic civil society revolts then the outcome cannot be wised up by the regime and Islamists which means that the outcome is either the revolution or repression.

Radicals can set up their own party and win elections such as in Algeria in 1991 or they can organize in other parties (if the regime liberalizes limitedly, for example by prohibiting the political parties' attendance to elections). Radicals' political organization capacity is strictly controlled by the regime in limited liberalization stage. Algeria and Egypt controlled political capacity of radicals. In Algeria, regime intervened and cut the electoral process that would provide Islamists electoral victory in general elections. In Egypt, the regime controlled political organization of radicals through political repression. In the case of limited liberalization, even the organization can't solve collective action problem they can push for regime change through political processes (given that the military willing to repress). Therefore, political liberalization process may lead to the regime transition or Broaden Authoritarianism.

However, In Egypt, radicals' come to power was motivated by military in Arab Spring. Military by its declaration of irresponsiveness during the protests provided opportunity for radicals to overthrow the regime, formula for collective action problem.

If the regime liberalizes further the radical type can solve collective action problem in broad space of mobilization. They organize to overthrow the regime via political channels or physical means through mass mobilization. The attempt of revolt may result in the revolution or the regime repression, Narrowed Authoritarianism. Therefore the outcome is not certain and the process is probabilistic, players don't have prior knowledge about the outcome. As we mentioned before the physical capacity of the regime and the radicals' organization capacity is main factor affecting the outcome. On the other hand, if radicals do not revolt they organize within the boundaries of the regime by using political channels and processes which may lead to regime transition (democracy, theocracy, progressive democracy, etc., constitutional monarchy, etc.) or cooperative autocracy where the regime manipulates Islamists' political agenda. Therefore the outcome is not certain and probabilistic. As we mentioned before political capacity of the regime is the main factor affecting the outcome.

2.6.1. Extensive Form of the Incomplete Information Game: Radical Type

I = Finite Set of Players, $i = 1, \dots, I$

X = Finite Set of Nodes, $x \in X$

Z = Terminal Nodes, $Z \subset X$

$i(x)$ = The function that assigns the node to the players.

$A(x)$ = The set of possible actions at node x . $x \in X/Z$

$n(x,a)$ = The successor node (resulting from action a)

$h_i(x)$ = Information set which includes the possible nodes given what $i(x)$ knows.

H_i = Collection of Information sets of player i . $H_i = \cup_{x \in X} h_i(x)$

$d(h_N(x))$ = Probability function assigning probabilities to the actions at information set for Nature at node of x .

$\Gamma = \{ I, X, Z, H, A(x), i(x), n(x, a), d(h_N(x)) (U_i)_{i(x \in Z)} \in I \}$

$I = \{ \text{Nature, Regime, Civil Society Organization} \}$

$X = \{ a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, r, s \}$

$Z = \{ b, c, e, h, l, m, n, o, p, r \}$

$A(a) = \{ \text{Keep Status quo, Limited Liberalization} \}, A(c) = \{ \text{Organize, Stay Out} \}$

$A(e) = \{ \text{Keep Limited Liberalization, Repress, Liberalize Further} \}, A(h) = \{ \text{Uprise, Not Uprise} \}$

$A(f) = \{ \text{Broadened Authoritarianism, Regime Transition} \}, A(i) = \{ \text{Revolution, Narrowed Authoritarianism} \}, A(j) = \{ \text{Cooperative Authoritarianism, Regime Transition} \}$


$i(a) = \text{Regime}, i(c) = \text{Civil Society Organization}, i(e) = \text{Regime}, i(h) = \text{Civil Society Organization}, i(j) = \text{Nature}, i(f) = \text{Nature}, i(i) = \text{Nature}$

$h(a) = \{ a \}, h(d) = \{ d \}, h(f) = \{ f \}, h(i) = \{ i \}, h(j) = \{ j \}, h(k) = \{ k \}, h(s) = \{ s \}$

$n(a) = \{ s, d \}, n(c, \text{Limited Liberalization}) = \{ e, f \}, n(e, \text{Organize}) = \{ g, h, \text{\$} \}, n(h, \text{Liberalize Further}) = \{ j, k \}, n(f, \text{Keep Limited Liberalization}) = \{ l, m \}, n(i, \text{Uprise}) = \{ n, o \}, n(j, \text{Cooperate}) = \{ p, r \}$

$d(h_N(g)) = (w, 1-w), d(h_N(j)) = (q, 1-q), d(h_N(k)) = (r, 1-r), d(h_N(s)) = (h, 1-h)$

2.6.2. Representation of Complete Information Game Model: Radical Type



Nature is another player determining outcome of the game in certain nodes such as in g, j, k. At these nodes players hold prior belief that at which probability nature assigns outcome. Therefore players take into account these probabilities as they calculate their expected payoff. As we mentioned before the outcome of the game depends on certain factors such as physical capacity of players at node j. Nature assigns the outcome according to the relevant factors we referred previously and the irrelevant factors such as weather condition.

Because we normalize the payoffs between 0 and 1, and the regime collapse is least preferred outcome for both players. They receives 0 payoff for the regime collapse. Because the regime transition and the revolution is the most preferable outcome for the radicals, they receive payoff, 1 and the regime receives payoff 0. Other strategies are between 0 and 1.

$$1 = U_R(CAR) > U_R(BAR) > U_R(LAR) > U_R(SAR) > U_R(NAR) > U_R(Regime Transition) = U_R(Revolution) = U_R(Regime Collapse) = 0$$

In parameter form it is:

$$1 > z > y > x > d > 0$$

$$1 = U_S(Regime Transition) = U_S(Revolution) > U_S(CAR) > U_S(BAR) > U_S(LAR) > U_S(SAR) > U_S(NAR) > U_S(Regime Collapse) = 0$$

$$1 > c > v > t > n > k > 0$$

The game is incomplete information game because regime does not have prior knowledge of payoffs. Because nature determines the outcomes at certain nodes the player moving on relevant node must compare expected values of strategies. Using backward induction method we find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game.

Proposition 2.1. : *If $r(1 - c) > q(1 - k)$, $xh > zw$, and $xh > r$, $zw > r$, $zw > d$, $xh > d$ then the equilibrium of the game between the regime and radical Islamists is Status quo Authoritarianism.*

{Keep Status Quo, Keep Limited Liberalization; Organize, Uprise}

We give other equilibria and conditions for the equilibria in the Appendix.

q , is the probability that the regime successfully represses the revolt. Regime successfully repress the revolt if it has high level of repressive capacity. w , is the probability that the regime can successfully control the political processes. Regime successfully limits and restricts radicals 'intention of political change if it has high political capacity. r , is the probability that the regime successfully control the political processes given that the regime opens wide space of mobilization for the organization. h is the probability that the regime successfully accommodate the pressure for political opening. Depending on the context r may be greater than w . Accommodation capacity requires certain amount of repressive and economic capacity

$r(1-c) > q(1-k)$ implies that $r > q$ (given k is smaller than c)

$xh > wz$ implies that $h > w$ (given that z is greater than x)

$xh > r$ implies that $h > r$ and $x > r$

$wz > r$ implies that $w > r$ and $z > r$

Conditions imply that the regime has high accommodation capacity but low repressive and political capacity (relative to accommodation capacity). Therefore given that weak regime has high capacity of accommodation the regime keeps status quo.

Proposition 2.2 : *If $r(1 - c) < q(1 - k)$, $xh > zw$, and $xh > r$, $r > zw$, $r > d$, $xh > d$ then the equilibrium of the game between the regime and radical Islamists is Status quo Authoritarianism .*

{Keep Status Quo, Liberalize Further; Organize, Not Uprise} is the equilibrium strategy set of the game.

$r(1-c) < q(1-k)$ implies that $r > q$ or $q > r$ (given k is smaller than c)

$xh > wz$ implies that $h > w$ (given that z is greater than x)

$xh > r$ implies that $h > r$ and $x > r$

Regime has high accommodation capacity than political capacity. Regime has sufficient repressive capacity to discourage the revolt. With regard to parameter restrictions ($h > r$ and

$x > r$) h is also greater than r , - that means if the regime opens the system the regime can not improve its political capacity sufficiently (given that $w < h$).

2.7. Empirical Cases

Parameters that appear in the equilibrium such as w , q represents the capacities of the regime in different dimensions. We determine the magnitude of parameters by referring to case studies for Middle in the literature.

Table 2.1. Size of Capacity Parameters for the MENA

	Q	W	r	h	Economic Capital	Moral Capital
Morocco	Low	High	High	Low	Low	High
Jordan	Low	High	High	Low	Low	High
Egypt	High	High	Low	Low	Low	Low
Iraq	High	Low	Low	High	Low	Low
Syria	High	Low	Low	High	Low	Low
Tunisia	Low	High	Low	Low	Low	Low
GCC	Low	Low	Low	High	High	High

2.7.1. Empirical Relevance of the Equilibrium: Status Quo Authoritarianism

2.7.1.1. Syria

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) was the most effective civil society in Syria. It was established in 1945-46 by Mustafa as-Sibai in the form of local associate (branch) of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They participated in parliamentary elections after the country gained independence in 1946 (winning 4 seats in 1947, 3 seats in 1949, 5 seats in 1954, and 10 seats

in 1961) and held ministries in governments. SMB politically mobilized organization which was increasing its political capacity gradually before military regime came to power.

As the secular, nationalist Baath party got in power in 1963, they repressed the SMB and the urban, Sunni merchant class that supported the movement. The regime saw the MB as the regime threat and outlawed in 1964, exiled its leader Isam al-Attar. Eventually the regime and the SMB interaction evolved into the different path in which the SMB became radical and violent organization. Politically isolated SMB in 1964 organized social dissent against the regime which erupted in the city of Hama that repressed by police force of the Ba'th regime. SMB organized bombings of government building and assassination of government officers. For example; in 1979, the SMB organized mass killing by killing 83 unarmed people in Aleppo and unsuccessful assassination of the president. As a retaliation the Assad regime issued Law No.49 which states that being a member of the SMB is crime and the punishment is death penalty. (Talhamy, 2012)

Secular regime of Syria, Ba'th party, did not see the Muslim Brotherhood as moderate and systemic organization but radical and anti-systemic as they came power in 1963. Ba'th party did not derive legitimacy in cultural domain. Ba'th party did not have chance to survive in Syria where the majority of population is Sunni. Ba'th regime gained consent of Alawi minority and derived legitimacy from nationalist and secular rhetoric. Radicalization of Islamists provide regime ground of legitimization for keeping status quo and applying coercive means.

Formerly military authoritarian regime developed into personalist regime. Regime has strong repressive capacity (q is big) but lacks political capacity (w and r small). Regime's role in suppression of violent radical Islamists, robust coercive apparatus, is one of the main legitimization ground along with its patrimonial, clientelist relations with specific groups and institutions (h is big compared to w and r) and sectarian favoritism.

2.7.1.2. Iraq

In Iraq, identity, nationalistic sentiments or patriotic social mosaic are not attracted to the society so that the ruler cannot manipulate society on these social ties for legitimization. King Faysal I who was the first Iraqi leader once states that “There is still and I say this with a heart full of sorrow- no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever” (Dawisha, 1999, page 554). However, Ba’th Party which came to power with coup d’état and legitimized the authoritarian structure with nationalist populist political machine. Iraqi leaders did not play religious legitimization card due to lack of Islamic symbols inherited or concocted.

There was severe sectarian tensions (Shi’i and Sunni) and ethnic fragmentation (Arab and Kurd) in Iraq society. Regime tried to build legitimization on the unified democratic socialist Arab notion. Hussein by linking Kurds, Shi’a and Sunnis tried to enable social integration “Saddam’s hegemony over Iraq’s policy-making domain, and his institution of a highly personalized, consciously mobilization rule meant that, more than in any preceding period, identity would be persistently used to serve Saddam’s political needs and interests” (Dawashi, 1999, page 556). Saddam Hussein” was the ultimate dispenser of justice and the sole formulator of policy” (Dawashi, 1999, page 556).

The prominent Sunni Islamist organization in Iraq has been the Muslim Brotherhood. The MB was founded in Iraq in 1948 with the name of Society for the Salvation of Palestine (Jam’iyyat Inqadh Filastin). Iraqis who had been influenced by the achievements of MB in Egypt became follower this organization. Muslim Brotherhood political mobilization was on political, economic failures of the regime and its lack of Islamic foundations. Regime’s political stance against religious organizations was ruthless. The regime killed and arrested the prominent figures of Islamic movements. Regime terminated Islamists’ network by repressing activities of organizations. Followers of MB are either dead, imprisoned or exiled because they rejected new state on the secular value system established by the Baath party. “Sunni Islamism, long dormant, and suppressed under Saddam Hussein. The ruthless character of the Baath Party dictatorship absolutely dominated decades of Iraqi politics.” (Fuller, 2003, page 2).

Regime garnered social support by providing free education and health care, distributed free gas, water electricity, constructed high ways and provided free transportation. Regime held

robust coercive apparatus and dominated social and political realms by coercive methods. Populist nationalist political machine as it isolated and radicalized all political and social factions could not liberalize political realm. h was high in the beginning which is enabled by patrimonial and clientelist relation likewise other populist nationalist regimes. However the regime because of high cost of eight year war with Iran, populist expenses, the accommodation capacity reduced. To increase h regime initiated Faith Campaign to gain social consent and re-legitimize itself on the cultural ground, initiated war against Kuwait for economic and political reasons, however it failed with these attempts. h decreased and the regime lost its credibility in global scale. The regime has low level of political capacity, w and r . Regime even tried to bridge gaps after 1990s with religious groups he did not open political space. Saddam's half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti once stated that "The alliance with the religious trends is a true mistake because the Ba'th texture and modern thinking cannot be married to the religious thinking." He once said Saddam "the religious trend will achieve power after it removed him (Saddam)" (Baram, 2011; page 8) which pictures the fear from Islamists' mobilization.

CHAPTER 3

3. Incomplete Information Game Model: Islamists' Types Not Observable

In previous chapter the regime can observe the type of Islamists. However it does not cover all space of interaction between regime and Islamists. Uncertainty on the regime about the type of Islamists constitute a space of interaction which corresponds to various political outcomes. In this chapter we consider the space of interaction in where the regime cannot observe the type of Islamists. The regime in this model takes into account payoffs it receives for each outcome for different types. First player in this game is the nature. It assigns the type of Islamists which cannot be observed by the regime. Both players hold belief regarding the physical and political repressive capacity of the regime, and the regime holds belief regarding type of Islamists.

3.1. Extensive Form of the Incomplete Information Game Model with Unobservable Types

I = Finite Set of Players, $I = 1, \dots, I$

X = Finite Set of Nodes, $x \in X$

Z = Terminal Nodes, $Z \subset X$

$i(x)$ = The function that assigns the node to the players.

$A(x)$ = The set of possible actions at node x . $x \in X / Z$

$n(x, a)$ = The successor node (resulting from action a)

$h_i(x)$ = Information set which includes the possible nodes given what $i(x)$ knows.

H_i = Collection of Information sets of player i . $H_i = \cup_{x \in X} h_i(x)$

Θ = Type Space. $\phi \in \theta$

$\Delta(\Theta)$ = Probability Space for Types.

$d(\Phi) \in \Delta(\Theta)$ = Probability distribution of types.

$d(h_N(x))$ = Probability function assigning probabilities to the actions at information set for Nature at node of x .

$$d(h_N(x)) = d(\Phi)$$

$$\Gamma = \{ I, X, Z, H, A(x), i(x), \Theta, d(h_N(x)), n(x, a), (U_i)_{i(x \in Z) \in I} \}$$

$$I = \{ \text{Nature, Regime, Civil Society Organization} \}$$

$$X = \{ 0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, X, Q \}$$

$$Z = \{ c, d, e, f, i, j, r, s, t, u, v, w, y, z, x, X \}$$

$$\Theta = \{ \text{Radical, Moderate} \}$$

$$\Delta(\Theta) = [0,1] \times [0,1]$$

$$d(\Phi) \in \Delta(\Theta) = (p, 1 - p)$$

$A(0) = \{ \text{Radical, Moderate} \}$, $A(a) = \{ \text{Keep Status quo, Limited Liberalization} \}$, $A(b) = \{ \text{Keep Status quo, Limited Liberalization} \}$, $A(g) = \{ \text{Organize, Stay Out} \}$, $A(h) = \{ \text{Organize, Stay Out} \}$, $A(k) = \{ \text{Keep Limited Liberalization, Repress, Liberalize Further} \}$, $A(l) = \{ \text{Keep Limited Liberalization, Repress, Liberalize Further} \}$, $A(k) = \{ \text{Broadened Authoritarianism, Regime Transition} \}$, $A(o) = \{ \text{Uprise, Not Uprise} \}$, $A(m) = \{ \text{Revolution, Narrowed Authoritarianism} \}$, $A(p) = \{ \text{Cooperative Authoritarianism, Regime Transition} \}$, $A(q) = \{ \text{Regime Collapse, Status quo Authoritarianism} \}$, $A(Q) = \{ \text{Cooperative Authoritarianism, Regime Transition} \}$

$i(0) = \text{Nature}$, $i(a) = \text{Regime}$, $i(b) = \text{Regime}$, $i(g) = \text{Civil Society Organization}$, $i(h) = \text{Civil Society Organization}$, $i(k) = \text{Regime}$, $i(l) = \text{Regime}$, $i(n) = \text{Civil Society Organization}$, $i(m) = \text{Nature}$, $i(o) = \text{Nature}$, $i(p) = \text{Nature}$, $i(q) = \text{Nature}$, $i(Q) = \text{Nature}$


$h(a) = \{ q, Q \}$, $h(b) = \{ q, Q \}$, $h(g) = \{ g \}$, $h(h) = \{ h \}$, $h(k) = \{ k, l \}$, $h(l) = \{ k, l \}$, $h(m) = \{ m \}$, $h(n) = \{ n \}$, $h(o) = \{ o \}$, $h(p) = \{ p \}$.

$n(a, \text{Radical}) = \{ q \}$, $n(b, \text{Moderate}) = \{ Q \}$, $n(g, \text{Limited Liberalization}) = \{ i, k \}$, $n(h, \text{Limited Liberalization}) = \{ j, l \}$, $n(k, \text{Organize}) = \{ m, r, n \}$, $n(l, \text{Organize}) = \{ z, x, X \}$, $n(n, \text{Further Liberalize}) = \{ o, p \}$, $n(m, \text{Keep Limited Liberalization}) = \{ s, t \}$, $n(o, \text{Uprise}) = \{ u, w \}$, $n(p, \text{Not Uprise}) = \{ v, y \}$.

$$d(\Phi) \in \Delta(\Theta) = d(h_N(0)) = (p_1, p_2)$$

$$d(h_N(k)) = (w, 1-w), d(h_N(m)) = (q, 1-q), d(h_N(n)) = (r, 1-r), d(h_N(q)) = (h, 1-h) d(h_N(Q)) = (h, 1-h).$$

3.2. Representation of Incomplete Information Game Model



3.3. Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the Incomplete Information Game Model

$$\sum_{\phi_{-i} \in \theta_{-i}} d(\phi_{-i} | \phi_i) \left[\sum_{x \in \mathcal{A}^T} d(h_N(x).U_i(s_i^*(\phi_i), s_{-i}^*(\phi_{-i}))) \right] > \sum_{\phi_{-i} \in \theta_{-i}} d(\phi_{-i} | \phi_i) \left[\sum_{x \in \mathcal{A}^T} d(h_N(x).U_i(s_i(\phi_i), s_{-i}(\phi_{-i}))) \right]$$

$i \in I$, $\phi_i \in \theta_i$, $s_i \in S_i$ then the strategy s^* is the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the Game for $i = \text{Regime, Civil Society Organizations}$.

Players calculated expected payoffs for example:

$$U(LL, S|O, U; OU) = \beta wz + (1-\beta)z$$

By Bayesian rule:

$$prob(\text{Radical} | \text{Organize}) =$$

$$\frac{p(\text{Organize} | \text{Radical}).p(\text{Radical})}{p(\text{Organize} | \text{Radical}).p(\text{Radical}) + p(\text{Organize} | \text{Moderate}).p(\text{Moderate})} = \beta$$

$$prob(\text{Moderate} | \text{Organize}) = 1 - \beta.$$

Proposition 3.1. : *If $r(1-c) < q(1-k)$, $z + p(wz - z) > xh$, $z(1-p) + pwz > (1-p) + pr$ then the equilibrium of the game between the regime and Islamists might be Broaden Authoritarianism.*

$$r(1-c) < q(1-k); \quad q > r \text{ or } r > q \text{ (given that } k \text{ is smaller than } c)$$

$$z(1-p) + pwz > xh;$$

$$z(1-p) + pwz > (1-p) + pr; \quad z > r \text{ and } w > r$$

First condition states that regime has sufficient repressive capacity to discourage the revolt. Second condition implies that even if the regime knows certainly that the organization is radical then it may open the space for the organization given that it does not have very small political capacity (relative to accommodation capacity) or the accommodation capacity is very small. Third condition implies that the regime loses its political capacity if it opens broad space.

Proposition 3.2. : *If $r(1 - c) < q(1 - k)$, $z + p(wz - z) < xh$, $z + p(wz - z) > (1 - p) + pr$ then the equilibrium of the game between the regime and radical Islamists might be Status quo Authoritarianism.*

$$r(1-c) < q(1-k); \quad q > r \text{ or } r > q \text{ (given that } k \text{ is smaller than } c)$$

$$(1-p)z + pwz < xh; \quad h > w$$

$$(1-p) + pr < xh; \quad h > r \text{ and } x > r$$

$$z(1-p) + pwz < (1-p) + pr;$$

First condition states that regime has sufficient repressive capacity to discourage the revolt- but it does not say the regime has high repressive capacity. Second and third conditions imply that the regime has low political capacity and high accommodation capacity given that it has medium belief that the organization is radical.

3.4. Empirical Relevance of the Equilibrium: Status Quo Authoritarianism

3.4.1. Saudi Arabia

We can consider Gulf countries as exceptional particularly after oil price boom in 1973. Economic and cultural domination of the regime restricts the natural landscape of social, political mobilization. Clientelist, patrimonial and rentier state distributes citizens significant economic benefits. Islam's (Saudi-Wahhabi alliance) overarching approach provides society base to solve social complexities. Therefore accommodation capacity of status quo, h , is very big even the regime suffers from immense size of economic cost of redistribution. Political liberalization in these countries can be implemented to reduce the accommodation cost rather than to draw upon economic, and political benefits of political liberalization. However given that Gulf countries has very low political capacity (w and r are small) and medium belief that there is some probability that the civil society is radical (p is not very small), they do not open space for them.

Blaydes and Lo (2012, page 17) argues that in Saudi Arabia “the royal family exists within both civil society and the state simultaneously; to suppress civil society would almost

necessarily be the violent repression of one's own". Therefore, if regime opened space there is certain probability that the regime would face with radicalization of civil society and loosening internal political integrity²⁰. Therefore in Gulf region royal families' ties with society²¹ create different pattern of politics than Morocco and Jordan in where regime derives legitimacy from Islamic symbolism and mobilization of Islamists²².

3.5. Empirical Relevance of the Equilibrium: Broaden Authoritarianism

Broaden Authoritarianism is the one of the possible outcome of the equilibrium when the repressive capacity of the regime is sufficient to discourage rebellion, regime faces with radical Islamists with high probability and it has high political capacity. However given that political capacity of the regime decreases with the space provided for Islamist mobilization it did not have an incentive to initiate second stage liberalization.

If regime has medium belief that Islamists is radical and low political capacity (however even the level is low it is sufficiently high to motivate the regime for political liberalization) then the regime initiates the liberalization. However, regime cuts the liberalization process, keeps limited liberalization and does not open further space given that the regime's political capacity get lower as the space of mobilization is extended.

3.5.1. Egypt

The regime opened political and social space for CSOs in particular for Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood) after the Nasser period which was highly repressive period. Albrecht (2007) argues that the main hardcore opposition organization was the Muslim Brotherhood in the country. Wickham (2004) argues that Muslim Brotherhood has well defined goals and organization structure so that it is most powerful opposition in Egypt.

²⁰ Awakening movement of Islamists in 1970s even repressed by regime may have dismantled tribal's leaders relation with the royal family.

²¹ Royal family through marriage and family connections (particularly with tribes)has increased its size in society by time

²² In Morocco and Jordan regime repressed radicals even they attracted very weak social appeal. In Saudi Arabia regime may not prevent radicals mobilization even they have small social base. Because in this small base through ties with tribal leaders they can get powerful.

In the initial period, the organization was in the form of charity organization. It played important role during British invasion in Egypt. It organized protests, boycotts, and riots against British presence in Egypt. Muslim Brotherhood during British invasion of Egypt derived legitimization from nationalist discourse and religious rhetoric which shows the manifold of space they can mobilize. The social appeal and interest the organization attracted disturbed the Nasser regime.

Nasser same as the Ba'th in Iraq and Syria came to power with coup and legitimized the regime with populist nationalist politics. Nasser was not centered Islamic legitimization but nationalist discourse and held nationalist secularist political agenda. Nasser initiated land reform, reduced the power of landlords, increased wages and economic power of middle class. In the Meanwhile, he initiated crackdown on Islamists particularly on MB. Nasser based its authority in political, economic and social realms on robust coercive apparatus and populist nationalist political machine. However economy decayed and resources that can sustain such a regime (to sustain patrimonial relations and robust coercive apparatus) depleted, *h* decreased dramatically.

Nasser's repression politics changed the MB's set of the goals and its main rhetoric. Sayyid Qutb was this period's primary figure who was prisoned by the regime after Nasser's assassination. He completed his *Ma'alim fi-l- Tariq* which is manifesto of political Islam and *Quran Fi Zilal al Qur'an* in prison. These books represent transformation of his ideas and the road map for political Islam. His revolutionary approach to the politics gave masses in local and global scale an inspiration to involve in political Islam and spurred radicalism within MB. Sayyid Qutb "from his jail cell concluded that any Muslim that could inflict such punishment, oppression, and torture on other members of the *umma* was in fact not a true Muslim at all, but an apostate (*kafireen*)" (Bennett, 2007). Violent Islamic groups emerged in different regions in the peninsula. Islamist radicalization triggered the emergence of militant groups and splinter factions in the Muslim Brotherhood. Such underground extremist movements including the *Islamic Jihad* ('Struggle'), the *Jama'a Islamiya* ('Islamic Group'), and the *Takfir wa al-Hijra* ('Excommunication and Flight'), differently from the Brotherhood, employed armed factions made struggle to overthrow the Egyptian regime for thirty years (Ansari 1984; Gerges 2000 in Albrecht, 2008).

Sadat came to power after Nasser's assassination. Sadat, given that populist nationalist political machine decayed, utilized new legitimization and economic development strategy. Sadat liberated economic and political realms. Islamists, Muslim Brotherhood, was the main coalition partner for the regime. After repressive period of Nasser, Muslim Brotherhood strove to open new page with the regime. They stated their support for the regime and separated out radical factions within the organization.

Sadat's aim was to mobilize the MB against Nasserist, Marxist, and Nationalist wing, to garner social and political support from the society in cultural domain, and to open space for Islamists' community service provision. He initiated new land reform and reformation in economic realm which targeted to reduce the middle class' economic power and increase the capitalist class' economic power. He privatized state assets and liberalized trade. Muslim Brotherhood's broad community services in this policy formulation was implemented to be a remedy for class antagonism and income inequality. In politics, Sadat introduced multi-party democracy. On the one hand, he motivated Islamists for political mobilization on the other hand, struggle with radical political Islam. Therefore he was in the position of prudent liberalizer who controls the political processes so that radical Islam do not get powerful in legal, official political processes. Regime managed the inclusion of Islamists in political realm. Regime has high political capacity and repressive capacity.

The organization provided to the society particularly to Muslim poor people education, health care, accommodation, employment, economic security, etc. Islamists in this way reached out the Muslim and poor people. The organization attracted people and mobilized them on economic, political, social and cultural grounds. The organization control the political and social mobilization via its religious rhetoric.

Sadat intensively referred Islamic rhetoric to make connection with the social base of Muslim Brotherhood and pious people. Sadat was ambitious to derive political benefits from the social service provision of the MB. He strove to unfold the benefits of mobilization of Islamists in different dimensions. One of these is secular and socialist ground that is created in Nasser era. He want to end the secular socialist and Nasserist demands of regime reformation by supporting Islamists. Changing economic development strategy and keeping robust coercive apparatus was very costly. To share this cost he cooperated with Islamists. He changed the domain of discourse

and used al-Azhar to stabilize its supremacy on cultural ground and immobilize the MB's own Islamic view.

Sadat's project of inclusion MB into the social and political processes diverted the trajectory of economic, social and political development, level and scope of political activism. However we should concur that Muslim Brotherhood provided economic resources to specific segment of the society. As radicalism lost vitality regime could not exploit the radical political Islam to ease the middle class antagonism (particularly left wing middle class) which erupted in Arab Spring. Therefore, Sadat's cooperation with MB marginalized middle classes – the so-called 'lumpen intelligentsia' and increased mobilization of radical political Islam by time.

MB is most organized and potentially strong anti-systemic opposition force in Egypt. They organize particularly in universities. Thinkers and activists of new generation of MB emerged in this process. University students became hardcore of new generation MB. Members of MB who were university students of 1970 became 'middle generation' of activists (*gil al-wasat*) and the 'generation of the 1970s' (*gil al-saba'inat*) (Albrecht, 2008).

MB has well developed and organized large network and organization facilities. It is well organized along hierarchical arrangements and has most developed network structures among political forces in Egypt which affected positively its political performance. MB's web of network is so organized that even under the regime repression they get active and reach every point in the country and seek the crucial positions in the professional syndicates, schools, universities and student unions, clubs, and charity organizations. Muslim Brotherhood got active in universities in 1970s and controlled the student unions by the end of the 1980s (Al-Awadi 2005 in Albrecht, 2008).

MB organized in moderate lines and formed electoral alliances with different fractions including secularists, liberals and participated six elections. With High quality network structure, organization capacity and high degree of personal dedication they had magnificent political success in 2005 and 2011 parliamentary elections. MB achieved this political success particularly by serving for social needs of people. MB's economic transactions evolved to the immense size which led to the parallel economic sector including Islamic banks, investment

companies (Wickham 2002). The regime has not entirely terminated the organization but intervened and restricted the space they mobilize. Regime controlled the mosques and sermons by which the MB provided their own view of Islam. Wickham (2002) reports that in 1993, out of 170.000 mosques 30.000 were sanctioned and controlled by the state. Although, regime enjoyed the public goods Islamic sectors providing during economic crisis and it controlled and took countermeasures to halt the growing parallel Islamic sector (Al-Awadi 2004).

In first years of Mubarak, regime kept the regime in the political realm with controlling their activities. Mubarak regime supported MB against more radical Islamic organizations such as Jama'a Islamiyya and Jihad which were using armed forces (The Jama'a Islamiya emanated from Islamist student groups whereas Jihad was separated from Muslim Brotherhood).

Because in Egypt the regime does not hold strong legitimization arguments such as in Jordan, Morocco opening parliaments and elections exposed the regime to more severe dangerous political consequences than in other authoritarian regimes in the MENA. To overcome this, Mubarak strengthen ties with the religious centers and used al-Azhar actively as *fatwa agency*. The regime in this way produced its own Islamic view and propagated it through state's religion institutions.

Another precaution regime took was repression. Regime kept MB's mobilization in social and economic realms restricted as they pushed forward boundaries of liberalization set by the regime. For example MB succeeded to obtain majority in the professional syndicates and in boards and trade bodies for example in boards of doctors and engineers (Albrecht & Wegner, 2006) and reserved significant number of seats in parliament. Therefore, the regime limited their political participation and reduce their effectiveness in political and social realms. The regime prohibited establishment of Islamic political party in particular the establishment of political party by MB, therefore MB cooperated with other parties to get in the parliament (in 1984 with Neo - Wafd, in 1987 with Liberal and Labor parties). Regime regularly controlled MB's activities. MB members were monitored and harassed by the security forces. Police forces made random arrestments for the Brotherhood's rank and file. The regime in particular before parliamentary elections in 1995 and 2000 severely hampered prominent activists and Islamist candidates during election campaigns. Furthermore, some independent elected members of MB removed from parliament because they had been perceived by the regime as all regime threat

(Albrecht, 2008). In this way Mubarak regulated its supremacy in the political realm and legitimized its application of coercive methods by its struggle with “Islamic threat”.

MB on the other hand showed its strong intentions for collaboration with the regime. Although, MB got involved in politics more densely in Mubarak’s term, its activities have been monitored and controlled. However, despite the harsh repression against the MB, regime never has attempted to destroy the organizational capacities of them and retained the limited space for their social and political mobilization.

The regime’ repressive capacity, q , was high, and successfully repressed Islamists as they push the boundaries of limited liberalization. p , prior probability that the organization is radical, was not small. Regime did not cooperate with Islamists by extended the space of mobilization beyond limited liberalization because regime do not have sufficient political capacity to blockade political Islamists actively involvement in politics in broad space of mobilization. Quoting from *Massoud* (2008, page 2) “Charles Onians (2004) quotes an unnamed Egyptian leftist activist who tells him that “if there were elections tomorrow, the Brotherhood would win 60 percent of the seats”. Hisham Mubarak, the late Egyptian human rights activist, confided to Miller (1996) that “if the Brotherhood ever ran in a free election, it would win overwhelmingly” Comparatively modest was the analysis of the Jerusalem Report more than a decade ago, which ascribed to “many observers” the belief that if the Brotherhood “ran free elections and was given free access to media, its supporters would take no more than 10 years to become the parliamentary majority” ” shows that , w is greater than r ,. Therefore, had a chance to mobilize in broader political realm they would change the course of the politics.

3.6. Infinite Horizon Incomplete Information Game Model

In this subsection, we assume that players live infinitely. If the regime played keep status quo and the regime did not occur then the same game is played in the next period and then after, if not collapse in the next period as well. If, however, the regime had chosen the limited liberalization then the game terminated in any terminal of the extensive game between the regime and Islamists.

Therefore if the regime plays the status quo infinitely players receive following pay off stream where δ is time discount factor The payoff vector below is three tuple payoff vector where each entry represents the payoffs for the regime, the radical type and the moderate type.

$$\left(\sum_{t=1}^k xh\delta^t, \sum_{t=1}^k n\delta^t, \sum_{t=1}^k u\delta^t \right), \text{ regime collapse occurs in } k+1 \in N$$

Because payoffs are not function of time we can re-write the payoff stream for the regime as it plays keeping status quo, keeping limited liberalization and liberalization further.

$$\left(\frac{xh(1-\delta^{k+1})}{1-\delta}, \frac{\beta r + (1-\beta)}{1-\delta}, \frac{\beta zw + (1-\beta)z}{1-\delta} \right)$$

$$xh(1-\delta^{k+1}) > \beta r + (1-\beta) \text{ and } xh(1-\delta^{k+1}) > \beta zw + (1-\beta)z$$

Regime under this settings have less freedom to choose keeping status quo compared to previous finite case if the time discount rate is not 0. (Regime has none patience). Therefore, regime under this setting, given that he does not surely know k and each period has belief h , which is that given regime did not collapse the probability of it collapses in current period, are more motivated to liberalize.

What happens if h decreases by time? The set of parameter range in which the regime can play keeping status quo decreases therefore the regime becomes more motivated to liberalize. What happens if β changes? This changes the expected value of playing keeping limited liberalization and liberalization further. Increase in β means that it faces with higher probability with radical Islamists and it means that it would have less expected payoff from playing strategies other than keeping status quo. Regime keeping status quo under this setting would not change its choice and keeps status quo.

What happens if β decreases within certain period of time? Then the regime may choose liberalization after it plays certain period of time(the first period after that $\beta zw + (1-\beta)z$

exceeds xh) however it may postpone the liberalization to receive more expected payoff (because β decreases by time). However this decision comes with cost which is the difference between $\beta zw + (1 - \beta)z$ and xh for each postponed period

3.6.1. Moderation through Exclusion

What happens if β increases by certain amount of time and then decreases by certain period of time when h is fixed? (Which depends on the organization's flexibility). Then regime keeps status quo in the period β increasing and opens liberalization after the period it gives more expected payoff -within the period β decreasing. (Tunisia case)

What happens if β increases by certain amount of time and then decreases by certain period of time as the h got smaller? Then the regime would have more motivation to initiate liberalization without postponement. (Egypt case)




Figure 1. Relation between Time under Status Quo and Radicalization for Egypt and Tunisia

3.6.2. Egypt & Tunisia

In the Middle East and North Africa former military, personalists regimes have same origin. Ba’thist regime in Syria and Iraq, Tunisia even Egypt had been ruled along the same lines and with core principles. Because these regimes, Ba’thist regime in Iraq and Syria and Nasser in

Egypt, followed populist national project, there had been no place for radical organizations such as Muslim Brotherhood in the politics and social sphere of the society.

Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Hussein in Iraq, Assad in Syria, Nasser in Egypt applied coercive means to impose secularist development which was the political legitimization for the regime. Regimes do not have sufficient capacity to use religious symbols and ceremonies for legitimization and faced with radical political Islam in their lands. There was backlash to the regime repression from radical Islamists. Syrian Muslim Brotherhood which was cooperative and open to dialogue became radical and violent organization. The main reason of such transformation is the repressive and isolative politics of the Ba'th regime. In Egypt, Brotherhood in the beginning was in the form of moderate (charity) organization which was cooperating with the regime. However, the Nasser's repressive politics led to the transformation of the organization to the radical organization. Bourguiba had never permitted mobilization of Islamists and strove to terminate the organization.

In both Egypt and Tunisia, radicalization and violent attacks against regime increased. However after certain period of time MB in Egypt and Tunisia became to mobilize in moderate lines, more regime oriented and committed to the political stability. Sadat, successor of Nasser, given that h decreased dramatically, initiated limited liberalization whereas in Tunisia this did not happen. Even Ben Ali successor of Bourguiba took some steps to set good relations with Islamists, but he retracted and postponed the liberalization.

Given the religious legitimization is limited in Egypt they did not push for more reduction in β because h was getting smaller because of Nasser's populist politics. Therefore, in Egypt co-optation of Islamists is earlier than Tunisia. However in Tunisia regime co-opted cleverly, military was weak and had small share in budget thus regime was able to construct richer distribution mechanism than Egypt for its patrimonial relations so the class antagonism was low (h was not small) ,thus, they postponed the liberalization. However after certain period of time h decreased and the regime collapse occurred. In the Meanwhile Islamists, Ennahda, got more moderate. In first election after the removal of former Ben Ali regime Ennahda won 89 seats out of 217 seats in constituent assembly. After the election, Ennahda formed three-party coalition with two center-left parties.

CHAPTER 4

4. Two Sided Incomplete Information Game Model

In previous chapters, we model strategic interaction between the regime and Islamists under the case in which regime can observe whether Islamists are radical or not and under the case in which the regime cannot make such an observation.

In this chapter we introduce types of regime into the game. We determine types according to regime's interrelation with the coercive apparatus. If the regime is soft then the regime cannot force military to take role in repression of social dissent. It uses security agency for repression which has limited repression capacity. Tough regime can use military and security agency for repression of social dissent. We consider such classification arises as if the regime cannot sustain its patrimonial relations with military.

The regime in some occasions may not control its defensive power or use coercive means to oppress social upheavals, riots such as in times of economic or political crises. Reduced military support or the dramatically reduced economic wealth which is distributed to the society to ease popular dissatisfaction are main reasons of the regime's inability to use repressive means. Regime's relationship between military is determining factor of effectiveness of its call the military for repression because the military may not will to repress. Bellin (2004, page 143) argues that, "Some conceptual clarifications are in order. First will and capacity are two independent qualities that do not covary and ought not to be collapsed into one"

Therefore if the soft regime opens social and political space, social rise up organized by radical civil society organization, Islamists, is going to be successful if the security agency fails to repress the dissent. However, if same anti systemic organization faces with the tough type regime which uses repressive means effectively success of the social rise up is less probable. The game between the tough regime and the radical Islamists is not different than games between Islamists and the regime in previous chapters. Therefore the game played between the regime and Islamists varies according to the types of the regime and the organization. For example the game between the soft regime and the radical organization is not equivalent of the game between the tough regime and moderate organization. There are four different games. These games are between the tough regime and the moderate organization, tough regime and

the radical organization, the soft regime and the radical organization and the soft regime and the moderate organization.

The game SR represents the incomplete information game between the soft regime and radical civil society organization, Islamists. Radical Islamists can revolt successfully with higher probability under this setting. TM and SM represents the incomplete information game between the soft regime and the moderate Islamists and incomplete information game between the tough regime and the moderate Islamists respectively. As we emphasized before moderate organization is anti-systemic and does not organize to overthrow the regime. Therefore game format is same as in previous chapters. TR represents the incomplete information game between the radical civil society organization and the regime which is equivalent of the game between the regime and the radical Islamists in previous chapters. Nature in the beginning of the game determines types so that these games occur with certain probabilities. Islamists has a prior belief that the type of the regime is soft with probability, σ and the regime has a prior belief that the type of Islamists is radical with probability θ .

4.1. Extensive Form of the Two Sided Incomplete Information Game Model

I = Finite Set of Players, $I = 1, \dots, I$

X = Finite Set of Nodes, $x \in X$

Z = Terminal Nodes, $Z \subset X$

$i(x)$ = The function that assigns the node to the players.

$A(x)$ = The set of possible actions at node x . $x \in X/Z$

$n(x,a)$ = The successor node (resulting from action a)

$h_i(x)$ = Information set which includes the possible nodes given what $i(x)$ knows.

H_i = Collection of Information sets of player i . $H_I = \cup_{x \in X} h_i(x)$

Θ = Type Space. $\phi \in \theta$

$\Delta(\Theta)$ = Probability Space for Types.

$d(\phi) \in \Delta(\theta) =$ Probability distribution of types.

$d(h_N(x)) =$ Probability function assigning probabilities to the actions at information set for Nature at node of x .

$$d(h_N(x)) = d(\phi)$$

$$\Gamma = \{I, X, Z, H, A(x), i(x), \Theta, d(h_N(x)), n(x, a), (U_i)_{i(x \in Z) \in I}\}$$


$$I = \{ \text{Nature, Regime, Civil Society Organization} \}$$

$$\Theta = \{ \text{Radical, Moderate} \} \times \{ \text{Soft, Tough} \}$$

$$\Delta(\Theta) = [0,1] \times [0,1] \times [0,1] \times [0,1]$$

$$d(\phi) \in \Delta(\Theta) = (\theta, 1-\theta; \sigma, 1-\sigma)$$

4.2. Representation Of The Two Sided Incomplete Information Game Model



Proposition 4.1. *If $\sigma + (1 - \sigma)k > t$, $r > wz$, $r > od$, $d > wz$, $r > x\omega$, $\theta d + (1 - \theta)y > xh$
 $\mu(mw + (1 - w)) + (1 - \mu)(wv + (1 - w)) < \mu(ok + (1 - o)) + (1 - \mu)k$, $q(1 - k) > r(1 - c)$,
 $\sigma + (1 - \sigma)f < l$ and $d > r$ then the equilibrium of the game between the regime (tough) and
Islamists (radical) is Narrowed Authoritarianism.*

{(Limited Liberalization, Liberalize Further; Limited Liberalization, Repression);(Not Organize; Organize, Uprise, Not Uprise)} is the equilibrium strategies (for soft, tough regime; moderate, radical Islamists)

ω is accommodation capacity of the soft regime $\omega < h$

o is capacity of security forces $o < q$

μ is the belief regime holds that the organization is soft given that the regime keeps limited liberalization

We assume that $f > k$ which says that moderates are affected more severely from repression than radicals.

Conditions:

$q(1 - k) > r(1 - c)$ implies that $q > r$ or $r > q$

$\sigma + (1 - \sigma)k > t$ implies that σ is sufficiently big (bigger than 0.5 for sure)

$\sigma + (1 - \sigma)f < l$ implies that f is small which is assumed

$d > wz$ implies that w is not big

$\mu(mw + (1 - w)) + (1 - \mu)(wv + (1 - w)) < \mu(ok + (1 - o)) + (1 - \mu)k$ implies that μ is big

$\theta d + (1 - \theta)y > xh$ implies that h is not big or θ is not very big

$d > r$ implies that r is small

$r > x\omega$ implies that ω is small

$r > wz$ implies that w is small

$r > od$ implies that o is small

Proposition 4.2. If $(1-\theta)z + \theta od > (1-\theta)$, $(1-\theta)z + \theta d > (1-\theta) + \theta qd$, $\sigma + (1-\sigma)f > l$, $\sigma + (1-\sigma)((1-q) + qk) > rc + (1-r)$, $\sigma(ok + (1-o)) + (1-\sigma)k > t$, $(1-\theta)z + \theta od > x\omega$, $(1-\theta)z + \theta d > xh$, $(\sigma(mw + (1-w)) + (1-\sigma)(wv + (1-w))) < \sigma(ok + (1-o)) + (1-\sigma)k$, then the equilibrium of the game between the regime (tough) and Islamists (radical) might be Revolution.

{(Limited Liberalization, Keep Limited Liberalization; Limited Liberalization, Keep Limited Liberalization);(Organize; Organize, Uprise, Uprise)} is the equilibrium strategies (for soft, tough regime; moderate, radical Islamists)

Conditions:

$(1-\theta)z + \theta od > (1-\theta)$ implies that θ is small, (prior belief that Islamists are radical)

$\sigma + (1-\sigma)f > l$ implies that given that f is small σ is big

$\sigma(ok + (1-o)) + (1-\sigma)k > t$ implies that σ is big

$\sigma + (1-\sigma)((1-q) + qk) > rc + (1-r)$

$(1-\theta)z + \theta od > x\omega$ implies that ω is not very big

$(1-\theta)z + \theta d > xh$ implies that h is not very big

$(\sigma(mw + (1-w)) + (1-\sigma)(wv + (1-w))) < \sigma(ok + (1-o)) + (1-\sigma)k$ implies that w is big

4.3. Empirical Cases

Equilibrium conditions for the two sided incomplete information game in propositions imply economic, social and political restrictions. Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. correspond to the historical turning points in Algeria and Egypt. Equilibrium conditions give the explanation for that why

these significant political events occurred in these countries. I give detailed account of this in the following subsections.

4.3.1. Algeria

How conditions in the Proposition 4.1. explain the historical turmoil in Algeria in 1990s? How we can relate these parameter restriction with the economic, political and economic circumstances and structures in Algeria?

Algeria had been governed by single party regime, FLN (National Liberation Front) since 1962. It was more military regime than personalist regime. Growing inequality and unemployment, crisis in oil market, reduced economic transfers increased cost of accommodation, so that h got smaller, which pushed the regime to open up the political realm.

FLN had used economic resources in particular oil revenues to accommodate the social and political dissatisfaction. However after 1986 with oil price collapse, the economic wealth melted down dramatically (60% of total revenue came from oil export), unemployment level rose to the 28 %. Economic worsening led social protests, strikes and riots. Entelis (2001, page 46) describes these social uprising as “Probable no single event so revealed the depth of failure as the nationwide riots of October 1988 which by their scope, destructiveness and loss of life rocked the Algerian state to its very foundations.” Social dissent led the government to take political measures for the regime survival. In July 1989 the regime issued the new law on party formation which resulted in proliferation of political organization in which the FIS (Islamic Action Front) occupied the leading position.

Algerian bloody independent war was most fierce independent struggle in Arab nations. This process of gaining independence fostered national identity and created national ties which created space of political mobilization for state and civil society actors. FLN successfully occupied this space for decades until the October 1988 social riots. FLN strategy was to provide limited space for the civil and political society so that they can regain political legitimacy.

Additional to populist nationalist discourse Algerian political elites (military elites) used Islam for legitimization which also broadened their social base and cemented their rhetoric. Same elites in post-independence period controlled Islamic movements. Ministry of Religious Affairs were established for this purpose.

On the other hand, through social service provision that includes “schooling, business development, tutoring sessions, neighborhood beautification, and economic assistance for needy families” (Ellister, 2001, page 66) Islamists strengthened their social position. Even in the time of economic crisis Islamists did not halt their services. Ellister (2001) argues that Islamist charity work returns as the political appeal and mass base of support. Ibrahim an Algerian teenager supporting FIS stated that “In this country, if you are a young man, you only have four choices: you can remain unemployed and celibate because there are no jobs and no apartments to live, you can work in the black market and risk being arrested; you can try to emigrate to France to sweep the streets of Paris or Marseilles; or you can join the FIS and vote for Islam” (Mark Tessler, 1997, page 93)

Islamists created discourse that do not intersect with military elites’ nationalist discourse. Their political critics and discourse was on economic collapse and social injustice. They created counter hegemony against the regime’s nationalist populism by stressing economic issues and failure of regime in economic affairs.

The regime was designing the political opening same as in the Sadat’s Egypt, controlled liberalization. However, Algeria which had strong army and defense technology did not have high political capacity to manage political processes and channels. For example Mubarak used political channels for its benefit through political engineering (designing electoral rules, and processes, designing political ground and political discourse). However, Benjedid (president of Algeria before civil war) of Algeria could not manage political processes and arrange political regulations to control political success of Islamists.

Regime’s goal was to open the political and social realms to the civil society so that they gain legitimacy. Regime through artificial channels strove to constitute the moral justification to control radicalism. They released radical Islamists from prison, regulate the family code

according to Islamists' view, constructed religious institutions and mosques and tolerated preaching. Regime believed that they can control the radicalism and push for moderation on cultural ground.

After oil price collapse regime took political steps in rush to survive from regime collapse. We argue that regime saw this political turmoil as the opportunity to include Islamists into the political realm so that they can control political, social and economic processes by regime's moral authority on cultural ground. However, regime's previous attempts to be center in the cultural ground did not give desired results. Islamists once using economic causes for political appeal began mobilizing on religious ground. By Islamists mobilization in political realm, regime believed that Islamists are radical²³ (in equilibrium path moderates do not organize because their payoff gets very small if repressed, therefore even there is not very big probability that the regime is tough, they do not organize). Political opening led to the political victory of political Islam then the regime initiated crackdown on Islamists and halted their reach to the political processes.

Restating the parameter conditions in proposition 4.1., regime have sufficient capacity to discourage Islamists, q is sufficiently big, However regime does not have high political capacity w and r small. Islamist believe that regime is soft, σ is big because FIS did not expect that the military is going to intervene into the political processes given that Ben Jedid was reformist and military was pushed out from political realm. However Ben Jedid's political maneuver was on short term political pragmatism. Military ranks was the backbone of the regime and the administrations was the token unit carrying out their political orders.

Regime's accommodation capacity was small, h is small. Equilibrium condition indicates that main reason that the regime opens space for Islamists is h is very small. Given that in equilibrium path if the regime liberalizes radicals organize the regime receives payoff $\theta d + (1 - \theta) y$ which is greater than as xh , xh is small but not very small given that regime has strong coercive apparatus, θ is not very big, regime held belief even with not big probability that the organization is moderate. As we discuss before economic conditions and social demands for

²³ Hachani who is leading figure in FIS after regime's intervention stated that "FIS will remain within the legal framework without renouncing its plan for an Islamic state." (Agence France-Presse, January 15, 1992)

political reform pushed the regime for opening. Radicals believe that they face with soft regime but they faced with tough regime with high repressive but low political capacity.

We bring an explanation to the Algerian Narrowed Authoritarianism that occurred after Islamists obtained authority in political processes. Algerian regime attempted to arrange the economic, political and social processes centering itself on cultural ground. However, the regime which lacks political capacity could not manage to control the radical political Islam by emphasizing its position in cultural ground led to the Narrowed Authoritarianism.

4.3.2. Egypt

How conditions in the proposition 4.2. explain the political change in Egypt in 2011? How we can relate these parameter restriction with the economic, political and economic circumstances and structures in Egypt?

In Egypt military was not the central institution configuring the political and social order of the society. It was an institution that the regime used for repression. However, military's subordination depended on economic rents which was in very small size in the final decades of Mubarak regime and political privileges? In the initial years of Mubarak regime contrary to Sadat, who cut the budget share of military expenses dramatically, Mubarak provided army economic benefits and space of mobilization under his control. There are external factors such as Israel threat, Israel was increasing its military power in this while, to keep the military in force and domestic reasons such as controlling domestic dissent. Regime's interrelation with Islamists constitute the ground to have strong military force. As the regime opened political space for Islamists, they gain political and social appeal which must have been checked. Therefore, the regime as keeping interrelation with Islamists kept the army force strong to check Islamists' rise. Additionally the military's involvement in social realms through social service provision restricted the Islamist occupation in social and economic realm.

Army's premier position in economic and political decision making, its huge share in budget did not last long. After a decade the Mubarak regime gradually decreased military's share in economy, and their political involvement. He forged a cooperation with new crony capitalists.

He initiated political and economic liberalization. However the Muslim Brotherhood was the organization benefitted from regime's political opening after 2000s (Ranko, 2012)

Military responded regime's strategy of decreasing involvement of military with decreasing their consent with the regime, in other words they did not go back to their barracks. Mubarak lacked Sadat's discourse national independence which mobilized the military even the Sadat's policy of decreasing military's involvement. Particularly, in final years of Mubarak the international area was more secure for the Egypt than Sadat which constitutes the ground for popularity loss for military.

Arab Spring is the political event that did not lead to the quelling by army. Army declared that "The army forces will not resort to use of force against our great people. Your armed forces who are aware of the legitimacy of your demands and are keen to assume their responsibility in protecting the nation and citizens, affirm that freedom of expression through peaceful means is guaranteed to everybody"²⁴ . After this statement regime adversaries hold the streets and 100,000 people was on the Tahrir Square following day.

Mubarak failed in many respects. He could not posit its position on the cultural ground, he could not maintain the regime- military interrelation enabling social and political stability in times of economic and political crisis. He could not control the mobilization of political Islam. He recently invested his all political hopes in regime - new capitalist class coalition by which he disconnected the military's involvement in the economic realm. He attempted to forge a link with new capitalist class to solve economic bottlenecks, to control Islamists' economic power, decrease army's power in political and economic realm.

We argue that Mubarak's big fallacy come from its economic and political opening by which he faced with overthrow. Relying on regime's political capacity and legacy of military – regime relation, the regime opened political and economic space for the civil society, new capitalist formation particularly for Islamists. Even though the regime was economically successful

²⁴ Karon, Tony, 1 February 2011, "Egyptian Military Proving to be Rival Power Center to Mubarak, Time Magazine

(economic growth and investment grew dramatically after economic liberalization) could not alleviate poverty (%40 of the population was under 2\$). Although the regime initiated crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood from time to time it never ended the organization. Islamists became state apparatus correcting consequences of economic and social policies (social and economic inequalities) of the regime.

Islamists by providing social service to the society have generated public appeal and political base. They successfully transformed economic and social demands of the society to the political demand. Islamists, therefore, benefitted from such an opening by which it used political and economic channels to get social and political appeal particularly through their social service provision.

Mubarak's loose relations with the military changed the political consequences of the political and economic opening. Tough regime era ended and soft regime era began. Soft regime initiated economic and political liberalization which led to the regime overthrow. Soft regime which did not halt the process of opening given that it has sufficient control over the civil society.

Arab Spring was not initiated by Muslim Brotherhood however they got engage to the protests after protests escalated. In the beginning of process there were severe street clashes which halted as the Muslim Brotherhood took control of the process (Aknur, 2013). Muslim Brotherhood took the front lines and clashed with Mubarak's police power on February 2 (Kerckhove , 2012). Muslim Brotherhood participated as the protest got its course and successfully managed the process till Mubarak overthrow.

Equilibrium pathway indicates that revolution emerges if the soft regime which keeps limited liberalization cannot repress the radicals by its security forces, σ is small, given that they cannot motivate military for repression. Regime's authority on the Muslim Brotherhood and their moderation and (restricted) mobilization in moderate lines in political realm convinced the regime that MB became moderate with high probability θ is small, which is the one of the main reason Military lost its priority. Additionally, regime increased its political capacity so that they can manage the political inclusion of Islamists, w big. Tough regime has sufficient repressive capacity and political capacity (political capacity is also high for the soft regime) to

manage political process and stabilize the social dissent, q and w are big. Islamists held strong belief that the regime is soft σ is big. Military's exclusion from politics and economic realms and Military's irresponsiveness during Arab Spring motivated Islamists to initiate revolt against the regime.

Tough regime, represents the regime in the period in which the Mubarak regime provided economic and political benefits to the military, did not open further space for the organization repress and contain the organization and keep them in limited space of mobilization. However Soft regime, which is the regime in the period in which the Mubarak initiated large scale economic liberalization, political opening and provided economic and political benefits to the new capitalist formation, has prior belief that the organization is moderate and initiated economic and political opening led to the regime overthrow.

CHAPTER 5

5. Conclusion and Discussion

Why Middle East and North Africa autocratic regimes are so persistent and stubborn to change as the rest of non-democratic regimes transform to the democratic regimes? Why single ruler can stay in hegemonic position for a long time in the Middle East and North Africa? In this study, we argue that, Islamic, civil society- regime interaction generates conditions for political survival and persistency of hegemonic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. We claim that cultural, political and economic structures in the Middle East and North Africa affect the significance of the interaction. Islamic civil society is the main pillar of the analysis. Islamic civil society channels the political demands of the society to the political realms through their demand of political changes same as other forms of civil society. However, Islamists have more effectively process political demands than other form of organizations in the Middle East and North Africa.

Islamic civil society in the Middle East and North Africa generally is in the form of charity organization. Satisfying economic needs of the society, correcting social injustice is in domain of the state. However, Islamists occupy this domain by channeling economic demands to their own network. Islamists in this way do not just create the social support and social base but also satisfy the social dissatisfaction. Islamists, therefore is the main channel the society uses for channeling and, at the same time satisfying, political, economic and social demands. These organizations do not just channel demands they also satisfy it. We try to fill the gap in the literature on authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa by featuring the positive role of Islamists and the regime's exploitation of it for sustainment of patrimonial populist authoritarian structure.

Middle East and North Africa regimes with varying degrees endow with moral capital. Ruler possessing significant religious and traditional position use it to gain legitimization. Moral capital of the state draws the boundary for the Islamic movement activities. Islamists specify their set of goals and their method of mobilization with regard to the cultural, social and economic structure in the country which also includes the moral and economic capacity of the regime. Islamists providing economic and political goods become the main actor that can

demand political changes from the regime. Do the regime is only space provider for mobilization? Interestingly, in the Middle East and North Africa, Islamists open the space for the regime unwittingly by which regime imposes its own interpretation of Islam and its moral justification. Regime creates the space of cultural domination or dominate cultural space by which they attract social appeal including leftist and secular wing. Islamists by carrying the social dissatisfaction on Islamic ground provides the regime the way of suppression of political demands with its moral, religious, tribal authority. Therefore the regime can reconstitute its power base as Islamists mobilize on Islamic ground.

Islamists by providing economic and political goods through their community services and political units serve in best way for regime survival. Regime initiates limited (controls Islamists' mobilization) or extended political liberalization by which regime extracts Islamists' provision of political and economic goods. Political liberalization thus reduces social, economic and political cost of staying in autocratic system. It eases social dissatisfaction, creates broader tax base , eases class antagonism, reduces social and economic inequality and open space for the regime in the way that regime uses dichotomy between secularism and Islamism.

The regime holding strong moral capital in this region can control Islamists so the political , economic and social realm. Because in this context controlling Islamists connotes the controlling the society. We argue that the regime interacting with the Islamic civil society secures its sovereignty. Islamists' such various impacts on the regime changes with the moral and economic capacity of the regime. In the Middle East and North Africa there are different type of authoritarian structures. We argue that various interaction types occurring between Islamic civil society and the regime in the region causes the formation of different type of authoritarian structures. In other words, we argue that in Egypt the interaction type and outcomes of the interaction between the regime and the civil society, in particular Islamists, are not equivalent of the type and the outcomes of interaction in Morocco.

Why republics are more repressive than monarchies in the region? Why they spend big portion of their budget for the defense expenses? Why they apply more coercive means? We explain this with the variation between structural factors and its effect on the strategic interaction between the society and the regime. Republics in the Middle East and North Africa compared to the monarchies are weak. They lack economic and moral capacity. The ruler does not possess

significant religious, traditional symbols and positions and the economy is oil-poor. Therefore, the ruler does not have significant means to control the society. Civil society particularly Islamists have different set of goals and means in these countries. Radical civil societies, Marxists or radical Islamists are more powerful and have wider social base. Our model of incomplete information game model of strategic relation between radical civil society and the regime indicates the regime's restrictive behavior. It indicates that regime faces with more political risk in these countries so that they close the political and social realm for these organizations. Islamists particularly possess wider space of mobilization on Islamic grounds in these countries because the ruler lacks moral capital and the systems' check and balances for Islamic fundamentals are weak.

Why republics in the Middle East and North Africa face with overthrow attempts? What sort of mechanisms motivate the society or state institutions to change the ruler? In Chapter 2, we give incomplete information game between moderate Islamists and radical Islamists. In Monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, regime cooperates with moderate Islamists. Even this interrelationship serves in best way for regime survival it also brings democratic (semi) institutions into existence. However republics such as Iraq and Syria which are closed political system abstained from forging a link with radical Islamists brought these regimes to the end. Political Islam have strong mobilization arguments, given that the regime lacks moral capital, and popularity in society. Political and economic capital Islamists provide for regime survival did not come existence in Iraq and Syria contrary to Morocco and Jordan. Main reason for such difference stems from regime's lack of moral and political capital.

We use game theory for modelling of the all sort of interactions in simple context where the players, actions, types of the players, parameters are defined. Game theory allows us to include the structural factors into the strategic interaction between civil society and the regime. In such a framework we easily derive conditions for the various authoritarian structures. Incomplete information game between the regime and the moderate Islamists, models the interaction occurring in monarchies which have strong moral capital. In such a context moderates mobilize for political appeal to the society. Political demands from society is channeled through Islamic civil society's political wings which cooperate with the regime and put no action beyond demanding political reforms. The model indicates the cooperation relation between the regime and the, Islamic, civil society. This shed lights on the civil society's passive and reformist

agenda in monarchies. Monarchies absorb the social dissatisfaction through the tolerated political Islamists. Islamists in these systems do not move to change the political system. Structural factors impose such a relationship among strategic actors. In other words, state of the world in the incomplete information game between moderate opposition and the regime provides both political actors with benefits. Islamists' achievements secure the regime because the regime needs the controllable conduit to position itself above the society in times of crisis.

If Islamists can persuade regime that they are moderate the interrelation between radicals and regime may occur depending on certain conditions. The radical Islamic civil society to gain the legitimacy from the regime changes their discourse, and set of means. They declare their support for the regime and their commitment to the system. The regime as a strategic decision maker decides on to initiate the political inclusion or not depending on their belief of the organization's intimacy. Our model in this way sheds light on the inclusion of the radical Islamic organization such as the Muslim Brother. In Chapter 3, we explore interrelation between regime and Islamists which has history of operation both in moderate and radical lines. Political inclusion of the radicals explains why the republics are more prone to face with the overthrow than monarchies with high moral capacity. Political inclusion brings politic risks. Radicals use political mechanisms to make political changes or even system changes. Dissertation in this point brings the political uncertainties with the concept of political capacity of the regime. In such an environment together with structural factors, political dynamics and the political capacity of the regime gets involved to the explanations which enriches the content of dissertation.

Additionally the timing of inclusion of radicals is also crucial in this point. In Iraq and Syria regime repression led to radicalization of Islamists however in Egypt and Tunisia it led to the moderation of Islamists. However Egypt included Islamists into the political and social processes before Arab Spring. We consider that it is the matter of maximization of expected payoff. If the regime initiates opening earlier it would lose the opportunity of including more moderate organization in political processes.

We touch on the recent developments in the region. Arab Spring is the most important political event in the region. It contains almost all countries of Arab peninsula except Gulf countries. The dynamics of the uprising was mysterious or obvious? Why such a small spark (self-

immolation of Tunisian vendor) spread to the region? Why some regimes could stop the uprising, but some could not? We can't come up with strong explanations if we ignore the role of the military- regime relations. In the Middle East and North Africa in particular in republics the military holds strong political and economic power. Steinman (2012) argues that the military intervention is not the decision that can be made by civilian leader in the most of the Middle East and North Africa regimes. He argues that Middle East and North Africa military institution enjoys autonomy from the ruler. Military in some Middle East and North Africa regimes did not intervene to the social dissent during Arab Spring but in some regimes they did. Therefore some Middle East and North Africa regimes had a functional military system in the service of the regime in this recent political turmoil but in some it did not have.

Countries facing with radicals need to control these organizations' mobilization and limit their reach to the society. To prevent their penetration to the society, as they exploit their economic political and social services, the regime must have political capacity and strong defense technology. If the regime cannot employ its defense technology then radical organizations can easily mobilize people against regime. In other words, radicals solve collective action problem in the absence of physical power of the state and demand political changes. In chapter 4, in our model of two sided incomplete information game we bring an explanation for the irrevocable political changes happened in some countries with Arab Spring. According to model the regime which does not have functional security system can fail to complete limited or extended liberalization. The liberalization of the political and social spheres leads to the revolution if it opens space for radical organization but the military does not will to repress.

Our formal modelling framework, game theory, allows us to classify types of the autocratic regime in the region and relate their emergence and sustainment to the certain context specific parameters. It allows us to include wide set of parameters and pre-conditions such as the type of the civil society organization, political environment, political qualifications of the key political elites, organization structure of the social initiatives, repressive capacity of the regime, moral and economic capital of the regime, physical and political capacity of the regime, social fabric of the society, social capital, historical conditions, tribal structure, external dynamics, developments in the oil market, uncertainty in the political decision making, political sophistication and talent of the regime and the civil society, defensive technology, military and the regime's interrelationship. We conclude that even cases differ, strategic interaction between

the Islamic civil society and the regime reproduces the specific authoritarianism (depending on structural factors and strategic interaction) and extends the regime's sovereign over internal dynamics of the society.

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APPENDIX

Table.A. Incomplete Information Game Model: Radical Type

Outcomes	Regime	Radical	Conditions
<i>BAR/Regime</i> Transition	<i>(LL, KL)</i>	<i>(O, U)</i>	$r(1 - c) > q(1 - k)$ $zw > xh, zw > r$
<i>Status quo</i>	<i>(KS, KL)</i>	<i>(O, U)</i>	$r(1 - c) > q(1 - k)$ $xh > zw, xh > r$
<i>CAR</i> <i>/Regime Transition</i>	<i>(LL, LF)</i>	<i>(O, NU)</i>	$r(1 - c) < q(1 - k)$ $r > zw > xh$
<i>Status quo</i>	<i>(KS, LF)</i>	<i>(O, NU)</i>	$r(1 - c) < q(1 - k)$ $xh > r > zw$

Table.B. Incomplete Information Game Model Equilibria: Islamists' Types Unobservable

<i>Outcomes</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Radical</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Conditions</i>
CAR/ Revolution/NAR	(LL,LF)	(O,U)	(O)	$r(1 - c) > q(1 - k)$ $1 + \beta(qd - 1) > z + \beta(wz - z)$ $1 + \beta(qd - 1) > xh$
CAR/Regime Transition	(LL,LF)	(O,NU)	(O)	$q(1 - k) > r(1 - c)$ $1 + \beta r - \beta > z + \beta(wz - z)$ $1 + \beta r - \beta > xh$
BAR/Regime Transition	(LL,KL)	(O,NU)	(O)	$r(1 - c) < q(1 - k)$ $z(1 - \beta) + \beta wz > 1 - \beta + \beta r$ $z + \beta(wz - z) > xh$
SAR	(KS,KL)	(O,U)	(O)	$r(1 - c) > q(1 - k)$ $1 + \beta(qd - 1) < z + \beta(wz - z)$ $z + \beta(wz - z) < xh$
SAR	(KS,LF)	(O,NU)	(O)	$q(1 - k) > r(1 - c)$ $1 + \beta r - \beta > z + \beta(wz - z)$ $1 + \beta r - \beta < xh$
SAR	(KS,LF)	(O,U)	(O)	$r(1 - c) > q(1 - k)$ $1 + \beta(qd - 1) > z + \beta(wz - z)$

Table .C. Two Sided Incomplete Information Game Model Equilibria

	Outcomes	Soft	Tough	Radical	Moderate	Conditions
i)	CAR/Regime Transition	(LL,LF)	(LL,LF)	(O,NU,U)	(O)	$(1-\theta) + \theta qd > (1-\theta)z + \theta wz$ $\sigma + (1-\sigma)((1-q) + qk) > t$ $(1-\theta) > (1-\theta)d + \theta od$ $(1-\theta) > (1-\theta)z + \theta wz$ $\mu(mw + (1-w)) + (1-\mu)(wv + (1-w)) > \mu(ok + (1-o)) + (1-\mu)k$ $\sigma + (1-\sigma)((1-q) + qk) > rc + (1-r)$ $(1-\theta) > x\omega$ $(1-\theta) + \theta qd > xh$
ii)	If regime is tough Narrow Authoritarianism	(LL,KL L)	(LL,Repress)	(O,NU,U)	(NO)	$wz > od$ $\sigma b + (1-\sigma)f < l$ $\sigma(mw + (1-w)) + (1-\sigma)k > t$ $d > wz$ $\mu(mw + (1-w)) + (1-\mu)(wv + (1-w)) > \mu(ok + (1-o)) + (1-\mu)k$ $q(1-k) < r(1-c)$ $wz > x\omega$ $(1-\theta)y + \theta d > xh$

iii)	If regime is tough Narrow Authoritarianism	(LL,LF)	(LL, Repress)	(O,U,NU)	(NO)	$\sigma + (1 - \sigma)k > t$ $r > wz$ $r > od$ $d > wz$ $\mu(mw + (1 - w)) + (1 - \mu)(wv + (1 - w)) < \mu(ok + (1 - o)) + (1 - \mu)k$ $q(1 - k) > r(1 - c)$ $(1 - \theta)y + \theta r > x\omega$ $(1 - \theta)y + \theta d > xh$ $d > r$
iv)	BAR, Revolution or Regime Transition	(LL, KLL)	(LL, KLL)	(O,U,U)	(O)	$\sigma + (1 - \sigma)((1 - q) + qk) > rc + (1 - r)$ $\mu(mw + (1 - w)) + (1 - \mu)(wv + (1 - w)) < \mu(ok + (1 - o)) + (1 - \mu)k$ $(1 - \theta)z + \theta od > (1 - \theta)$ $(1 - \theta)z + \theta d > (1 - \theta) + \theta qd$ $\sigma(ok + (1 - o)) + (1 - \sigma)k > t$ $(1 - \theta)z + \theta od > x\omega$ $(1 - \theta)z + \theta d > xh$

	Outcomes	Soft	Tough	Radical	Moderate	Conditions
v)	SAR	(KS,LF)	(KS,LF)	(O,NU,U)	(O)	$(1-\theta) + \theta qd > (1-\theta)z + \theta wz$ $\sigma + (1-\sigma)((1-q) + qk) > t$ $(1-\theta) > (1-\theta)d + \theta od$ $(1-\theta) > (1-\theta)z + \theta wz$ $\mu(mw + (1-w)) + (1-\mu)(wv + (1-w)) > \mu(ok + (1-o)) + (1-\mu)k$ $\sigma + (1-\sigma)((1-q) + qk) > rc + (1-r)$ $(1-\theta) < x\omega$ $(1-\theta) + \theta qd < xh$
vi)	SAR	(LL,KL L)	(LL,Repress)	(O,NU,U)	(NO)	$wz > od$ $\sigma b + (1-\sigma)f < l$ $\sigma(mw + (1-w)) + (1-\sigma)k > t$ $d > wz$ $\mu(mw + (1-w)) + (1-\mu)(wv + (1-w)) > \mu(ok + (1-o)) + (1-\mu)k$ $q(1-k) < r(1-c)$ $(1-\theta)y + \theta wz < x\omega$ $(1-\theta)y + \theta qd < xh$

vii)	If regime is tough Narrow Authoritarianism	(LL,LF)	(LL, Repress)	(O,U,NU)	(O)	$\sigma + (1 - \sigma)k > t$ $r > wz$ $r > od$ $d > wz$ $\mu(mw + (1 - w)) + (1 - \mu)(wv + (1 - w)) < \mu(ok + (1 - o)) + (1 - \mu)k$ $q(1 - k) > r(1 - c)$ $(1 - \theta) + \theta od > x\omega$ $(1 - \theta) + \theta d > xh$ $d > r$
viii)	BAR , Revolution or Regime Transition	(LL, KLL)	(LL, KLL)	(O,NU,U)	(O)	$\sigma + (1 - \sigma)((1 - q) + qk) > rc + (1 - r)$ $\mu(mw + (1 - w)) + (1 - \mu)(wv + (1 - w)) < \mu(ok + (1 - o)) + (1 - \mu)k$ $(1 - \theta)z + \theta wz > x\omega$ $(1 - \theta)z + \theta wz > (1 - \theta)$ $(1 - \theta)z + \theta wz > (1 - \theta) + \theta qd$ $(1 - \theta)z + \theta wz > xh$ $\sigma(ok + (1 - o)) + (1 - \sigma)k > t$