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HAPPINESS AS A (MORAL/ETHICAL) PROMISE
ARISTOTLE AND NIETZSCHE

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
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Happiness As a (Moral/Ethical) Promise: Aristotle and Nietzsche
Ahlaki veya Etik Bir Vaat Olarak Mutluluk: Aristoteles ve Nietzsche

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ABSTRACT

Happiness as a (Moral/Ethical) Promise: Aristotle and Nietzsche

In this thesis, I conduct a discussion on the concept of happiness as a moral/ethical promise mainly with a comparison of two important philosophers: Aristotle and Nietzsche. My aim is to debate what kind of human freedom and flourishing we can imagine based on Nietzsche's philosophy. I also ask questions like "what does it mean to think of the good human life as our moral/ethical aim?" or "is there really a promise of happiness that we should seek as our final end?". In the line of these questions, I focus on whether the pursue of happiness opens or conceals some political possibilities for freedom of a person or a culture? Based on his criticism of the Christian morality and its bad influence on the modern spirit, Nietzsche offers returning to a noble evaluation of the *good* for a tasteful and healthful life. In this direction, I also examine if it is possible to return to an Aristotelian or Stoic account of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*). For this investigation, I basically focus on what Nietzsche means by self-knowledge as the necessary condition of creating new values and living according to them and what the role of our passions is in this process. This is also closely related to the question of whether self-knowledge is an ultimate end, by promising a kind of happiness where we overcome our passions and suffering, or it serves for something else, for instance a life experiment welcoming suffering as a very vital part of our life and passions as well as rational judgements as a part of ourselves.

Keywords: Happiness, self, passions, rationality, suffering.

ÖZET

Ahlaki veya Etik Bir Vaat Olarak Mutluluk: Aristoteles ve Nietzsche

Bu tezde, iki önemli filozofun, Aristoteles ve Nietzsche'nin bir karşılaştırması aracılığıyla ahlaki ve etik bir vaat olarak mutluluk kavramı üzerine bir tartışma yürütmekteyim. Amacım, Nietzsche'nin felsefesi üzerinden, insan için ne tür bir özgürlük ve iyi olma hali hayal edebileceğimizi tartışmaktır. Ayrıca "iyi yaşamı insan için nihai bir amaca sahip ahlaki veya etik bir sorumluluk olarak görmenin ne anlama geldiği" veya "gerçekten bize mutluluk vadeden bir nihai amacımızın olup olmadığı" gibi sorular sormaktayım. Bu sorular doğrultusunda, mutluluk fikrinin bir kişi veya bir kültürün özgürlüğü için bir takım politik imkanları kapayıp kapamadığı üzerinde durmaktayım. Hristiyan ahlakı ve bu ahlakın modernizm üzerindeki kötü etkisine dair eleştirisi ile, Nietzsche bize sağlıklı bir yaşam için, *iyinin* soylu bir değerlendirmesine dönmeyi önermektedir. Bu doğrultuda, özgürlük ve iyilik (*eudaimonia*) kavramlarını değerlendirirken, Aristotelesçi veya Stoik bir anlayışa geri dönüp dönemeyeceğimize bakmaktayım. Bu araştırma boyunca, temel olarak Nietzsche'nin yeni değerler yaratma ve sadece bu değerlere göre yaşamının koşulu olarak kendilik bilgisinden ne anladığı üzerine durmaktayım. Bu mesele, kendilik bilgimizin, duyguların ve acının tamamen alt edildiği bir mutluluğu vadeden nihai amaç için mi yoksa daha farklı bir şey, örneğin yaşamın temel bir parçası olarak acıyı ve kendiliğin bir parçası olarak duyguları kabul ettiğimiz bir yaşam deneyi için mi takip etmemiz gerektiği sorusuyla yakından ilişkilidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mutluluk, kendilik, duygu, rasyonellik, acı.

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INTRODUCTION

Happiness looks like a significant topic for many contemporary disciplines such as psychology, sociology, economy politics as well as philosophy; but its origin can be traced back to the ancient Greek philosophy. The current meaning of happiness is generally related to a kind of life satisfaction or psychological state of feeling good or simply pleasure. On the contrary, in the ancient Greek philosophy, it refers to the human flourishing (*eudaimonia*), that is a virtuous (good) activity including the whole life, in accordance with the ultimate aim of human being. I think that there is a bond between those different meanings, because happiness is still regarded as something that we should seek for a good life. Therefore, happiness as an idea, seems to have a moral value associated with the question of “what is good?” So, today too happiness appears as a promise of a good life.

However, the relation of each inference of happiness with the practical life and the politics is quite different. While in the ancient Greek, good life is possible by the virtuous (ethical) practice in accordance with the ultimate goal of the human being (*eudaimonia*), today it seems possible by being happy only in our inner moral world. In addition, happiness is now associated with certain normative life styles that have gained some moral values within a historical, political and cultural context. Most of the people tend to live depending on these values that promise them a kind of moral satisfaction, without questioning whether these values are really appropriate for themselves. So, I am not sure if the idea of happiness does really work in our lives. Our fixed ideas about what will make us happy, most of which are culturally (and emotionally) imposed, makes us think of certain ideals as the condition of happiness and the good life. Thereby, following happiness means following and fitting the ideals determined normatively. Falling outside this normativity causes bad conscience, guilt, shame, self-disappointment or remorse with the idea that it would be possible to act and desire “properly”. The thing that makes someone feel bad in such a situation is actually being outside the norms of society, which shows us how the idea of happiness works as an alienation mechanism for the disadvantaged people or groups in society. So, it can be fair to

think all this in a framework that we would call “morality of happiness”. My criticism to this morality is that the meaning of the good life and happiness have been reduced only to an inner/individual emotion as a result of living in accordance with the dominant values¹ in society and that the value of the good has been distanced from the power of practice and passions.

At the point of criticizing the moral burden of both happiness and unhappiness (or bad feelings) and normativity of it, I think Nietzsche's critique of the Christian morality and its bad influence on the modern spirit seems very important. He says that the long-term dominance of Christianity's slave morality on the western tradition, leads us to believe that we are morally responsible to live in accordance with certain moral values as if they are fixed and universal, and also that we are responsible to suffer for our actions which are opposed to these moral values. He defines this as the source of our sickness and he asks if it is possible to imagine a different kind of a good life according to some new values by healing ourselves. He answers this question by saying that it is possible only by seeking a self-knowledge outside the ideas imposed externally, creating our own values by feeling and listening to ourselves, and living according to these values. What he means by self-knowledge does not refer to a universal and fixed knowledge of Truth, but it is something making sense only by our interaction with the external world. According to Nietzsche, life includes a continuous struggle of opposite drives and our interaction with the world always bring about a different perspective. This is the perspective of the will to power which manifests itself in our actions, passions, desires, instincts and our rational judgements in different ways, depending on certain power relations within the culture or within ourselves. Thereby, such self-knowledge requires also a life experiment that involves welcoming our passions, desires, instincts as well as our rational judgements and also welcoming our suffering that is a natural result of life. Only this makes us stronger, helps to know ourselves, and leads to live a tasteful and healthy life; however, this whole practice of self-knowledge does not necessarily promise happiness.

¹ We can call these values as “some dogmatic beliefs and thoughts” using Nietzsche's terminology.

Very briefly, Nietzsche criticises the Christian moral values derived from a slavish re-evaluation of the *good* and also for its bad influence on the modern spirit; and we have forgotten to look for ourselves as a result of the long-term dominance of this moral tradition. To understand what Nietzsche means by a re-valuation of values and accordingly by the idea of creating new values, it is necessary to go back to an Aristotelian or a Stoic sense of good life. This is because we encounter a different account of happiness (*eudaimonia*) in the Ancient Greek. Nietzsche's understanding of "healthy life", rejecting some dogmatic beliefs and thought and rather suggesting to create new values depending on self-knowledge and self-observation, is character-development oriented. In this line, Nietzsche shares some ideas with Aristotle's virtue ethics, but understanding Nietzsche only through Aristotle, is missing some points. Thus, I look at the Stoics as well and try to explain the parts which he is influenced by them. For this aim, I pursue the following steps:

In the first chapter, I discuss Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here, the basic theme is how Aristotle defines the good. In order to understand this, I focus on his function argument in which he defines the distinctive function of the human being as rational capacity. According to this function, he defines the chief good for the human life as *eudaimonia*, the actualization of this rational capacity, which is desired only for itself. It means not directly happiness in the modern terminology, but a kind of human flourishing. It is also important that Aristotle distinguishes the human soul into two parts: rational and irrational parts, thereby the human life into two parts: theoretical life and practical life. Even though the theoretical life is the best among the other types of life (because it leads someone directly to *eudaimonia*), it is not possible without an ethical life that refers to the regulation of the practical life in accordance with the rational part of the human being. This is why the most important issue of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is how an ethical life is possible to guarantee the ultimate aim of the human being. Therefore, his virtue ethics deals with the question of how we can achieve the moral virtues (the virtues considering the irrational aspect of human life). Here, the most important point related to Nietzsche, is that having a virtuous character is something completed with the virtuous action, proper passion/emotion and desire toward the virtuous action.

That is, the value of the good is not independent from the human action and its passions and desires. In his conceptualizations of ignorance, incontinence, continence, and temperance, we see this more clearly. However, we see also the necessity of controlling these irrational parts of the human being in a certain *true* way by the help of the true education to achieve the practical wisdom (*phronesis*).

After clarifying all these features of Aristotle's virtue ethics, in the second chapter, I elaborate certain points about Nietzsche's philosophy in the four section: 1) The perspectival aspect of good; 2) the role of actions and passions in creation or re-evaluation of the values; 3) philosophy as a function of self-treatment; and finally 4) the role of suffering in our life. In the first section, I focus on Nietzsche's criticism of idealism and the concept of "ideal happiness" in his *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886). In this direction, I try to emphasise the perspectival aspect of the good, and how the value of the good always depends on some power relations and different perspectives according to circumstances of the people or the culture who creates or re-evaluates the values.

In the second section, I discuss the methodology of Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morality* (1887) and the importance of this. Accordingly, Nietzsche shows us how the origins of moral values are in close relation with the power of our actions and passions at first, but with the victory of slave revolt, we encounter a split from this power. But still Nietzsche argues that at the very beginning of this revolt, there was a will to get the power in the future. With the long-term influence of Christian morality over the modern spirit, we are unable to see this will, just believing in these moral values with a "herd instinct". He suggests returning to a noble way of valuation and reconnecting the value of the good with ourselves. So, Nietzsche's concepts of "will to power" and "self" become very important in pursuing self-knowledge and creating new values in respect to our inner drives. Even though Nietzsche's philosophy shares an important feature with Aristotle's virtue ethics (for a noble way of life) at the point of reconnecting the relation of the good with our actions, passions and desires, it seems very different from Aristotle's metaphysics that distinguishes both the human nature and the human life into two parts (rational and irrational). Aristotle claims that the irrational elements of human

life should be regulated and controlled by an intellectual virtue namely practical wisdom which considers the changing aspects of life. In the "Introduction" of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, David Ross notes that for studying "unchanging objects and necessary truths", Aristotle presents another intellectual virtue, philosophical wisdom (*sophia*) which leads us to "the highest activity" so-called "contemplation". That is, philosophical wisdom does not consider excellence of the practical life (the ethical life), but it aims merely "excellence in theoretical, i.e. philosophical, thinking" (xvi-xvii). Aristotle clearly presents the contemplative life as the best among all types of life because it leads us directly to *eudaimonia*. On the other hand, he also says that this life is not possible without an ethical life out of the social aspect of human nature. Thus, Ross also tells that there are different interpretations in the literature about Aristotle's attitude toward the moral virtues. From one perspective, "the best life will include the best combination of those goods we desire for themselves". That is the "practice of moral virtue" is necessary as well as "contemplation". Explaining the other perspective, Ross states that "alongside indications that happiness is an inclusive end, Book I already hinted that happiness would be identified with the best of the best activities (1099a30)" (xvii), that is happiness is identified with "contemplation". Despite all this distinction, his virtue ethics seems mostly concerned with the practical aspects of human life. Leaving this contradictory question in Aristotle's ethics aside, what matters in this thesis is that he somehow distinguishes between practical and theoretical life, and that he exposes philosophical wisdom only to theoretical life and practical wisdom to practical life.

Nietzsche does not provide a metaphysical explanation for human nature, nor does he think of it in a two-part structure. Hence, he does not consider our rational judgements and passions as the characteristics of two different parts of human nature. Rather, he presents an original concept of the self that manifests itself in our body and action, as will to power. His "will to power" does not refer to a metaphysical explanation about human nature, but he takes it as a very material and natural aspect of life based on continuous struggle of different forces. However, this struggle is not between rational and irrational parts as Aristotle claims, between

opposite drives that do not include the dichotomies between rational-irrational, true-false, mind-body. Seeking self-knowledge means observing and examining our actions in order to investigate which drives are dominant over other. And Nietzsche takes philosophy as a self-governing treatment in this process without a distinction between theory and practice. Regarding this, I think that he gets closer to the Stoic tradition in terms of their conceptualization of human nature.

In the third section, I focus on the Stoic philosophy² as an art of self-healing. Here I try to show the differences between Aristotelian and Stoic accounts of *eudaimonia* based on Martha C. Nussbaum's *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (2013) and explain why Nietzsche is much closer to the Stoics rather than Aristotle. At the point of taking the human nature as a very material and natural part of the universe without dividing it into two different parts (rational and irrational), it can be said that Nietzsche seems to agree with the Stoics in the ontological sense. Beside this, his emphasis on the self-therapy for extirpating the destructive emotions (like self-pity) has a very Stoic feature. He criticises seeing suffering as a moral responsibility in the context of the Christian morality. Especially in his earlier works (e.g. *Human All Too Human* and *Daybreak*), we encounter the idea that overcoming these emotions is necessary for the excellence of the self because they prevent us to know ourselves and to live a healthy life. On the other hand, he thinks that being open to affection, as an inevitable result of our interaction with the world, is important for our enhancement and growth. So, he does fully agree with the Stoic idea that we should extirpate all the passions in order to get rid of our suffering.

The Stoics says that self-therapy is only possible by the active practice of reasoning in order to see the rational principle of the universe, which leads someone being free from his/her passions and acting in the rational way. Just like Nietzsche, the Stoics think that our passions say something about us and our perspective about the world, but they take this perspective as a false judgement that should be cured

² I am aware that the Stoic tradition includes a large literature and has differences within itself. So, I would like to point out that in this thesis I discuss the Stoicism in a very general way based on Martha C. Nussbaum's reading of the Stoicism.

by transforming them into the rational judgements. Where the Stoics evaluate the human nature (as a part of the universe) with the principle of rationality, Nietzsche definitely avoids making such a normative definition for the human nature or the universe, rather emphasises the power of passions as a manifestation of the self, and the struggling nature of opposite forces in life. In his later works, we encounter even more affirmative attitude toward the passions and also the human suffering³ as a part of this life. So, at the end of this section I draw on Aurelia Armstrong's "The Passions, Power, and Practical Philosophy Spinoza and Nietzsche Contra the Stoics" (2013) in order to show how Nietzsche's philosophy differs from Stoicism about the "freedom from passions and suffering".

Nietzsche's treatment is based on being open to affection and welcoming suffering as a very vital part of life and also as a necessary condition of the freedom of the self. In order to better explain why we should not accept totally a Stoic attitude toward suffering, I turn to Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morality* in the fourth section and I try to show how suffering, as a natural part of life, always plays an important role in creating value based on the power relations between opposite forces. He especially focuses on the slave morality that aims to overcome meaninglessness of human suffering. In addition, Nietzsche closely associates the "memory", developed by the cultures, with the human suffering and tells that this is one of the most important principles of humanity. Memory helps the cultures to remember the power what is desired once but not satisfied yet. Nietzsche criticises the slave morality not only for its effort to overcome the meaninglessness of suffering, but also for the self-negating and life-negating attitude in its effort to overcome the life itself. If the suffering is a very vital part of life, and if we seek some new values which are not out of life, then the Stoic approach does not look very promising.

³ Here the suffering which Nietzsche affirms should be understood as something triggering the will to power in creating new values, but not as a moral responsibility which he defines as an obstacle for the freedom of the self.

THE CHAPTER 1

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF EUDAIMONIA

INTRODUCTION

In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss how Aristotle defines “the chief good”⁴ as *eudaimonia*⁵ in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Like many thinkers in the ancient Greek, Aristotle assumes that the ultimate aim (*telos*) of human being is *eudaimonia*. Even though *eudaimonia* can be translated as “happiness” in English, it does not refer to a psychological state or an emotion. It is a life process, as a whole, until death. Because of its misleading connotations, some scholars prefer to translate it as “flourishing” or “fulfilment”. According to Aristotle, flourishing of anything depends on the actuality of its ultimate purpose and the ultimate purpose of human being is basically “the activity in accordance with virtue” (1176b25). It must come with an ethical/moral/political life in which practices/actions, passions/emotions and desires are regulated according to practical wisdom (*phronesis*). This is why the central topic of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the question of how an ethical life is possible. A theoretical life is not enough for *eudaimonia* because human being is a political being as a part of the social community. So, living a good life requires also being a good citizen. In order to regulate the social order, proper passions/emotions and desires toward the virtuous actions are necessary. This means Aristotle does not deny the importance of the irrational part of the human soul when it comes to leading an ethical life. However, he presents a prescription⁶ of which actions are virtuous and how passions/emotions and desires can be proper for the virtuous actions.

In the second section, I discuss the moral/character virtues that belong to the irrational part of the human soul. Since Aristotle divides the human soul into two parts as the rational and the irrational, he defines two kinds of virtues: intellectual

⁴ The Chief Good is the good of the human life, which is desirable only for itself.

⁵ In this thesis, I sometimes use the term “ideal happiness” for *eudaimonia*.

⁶ This prescription should be the work of a noble politician according to Aristotle (1181a5-10). Aristotle uses the words of “good”, “virtuous” and “noble” very interchangeable in general.

and moral/character virtues. According to his prescription, the ethical life means living in accordance with *phronesis*, that is an intellectual virtue which belongs to the rational part of the human soul, but it is in a close relation with the irrational elements (passions/emotions and desires) of the human soul. The moral/character virtues are about having passions/emotions and desires which include rational judgements with the repetitive practices of virtuous actions. Aristotle claims that a person cannot have a virtuous character without them. And this is what distinguishes his ethical understanding from Plato. In Plato's ethics, the standard of the *good* is the world of *Forms* (Ideals) that can be reached through the "pure reason", and passions/emotions belong to the world of *doxa* (mis-knowledge). Plato's concept of *eudaimonia* is something reached only by pure reason, in contrast to Aristotle's.

In the third section, I will try to better explain Aristotle's virtue ethics in respect to the role of passions/emotions and desires for the virtuous actions as "voluntary choices" of a human being who has a rational capacity. It should be emphasised that Aristotle does not separate the virtuous character from both the action and the emotion. In this line, I will mention four themes in Aristotle's virtue ethics: "self-ignorance", "incontinence", "continence", and "temperance". Only the temperate person can be regarded as having a virtuous character, first of all because he/she has a rational capacity and thereby *phronesis*, secondly because he/she acts in accordance with *phronesis*, and finally he/she has proper passions/emotions and desires (*appetites*) toward the virtuous action. According to Aristotle, *eudaimonia* is something self-sufficient and desirable only for itself. If a person has a virtuous character, then he/she always aims at the virtuous action with a rational will⁷.

⁷ In the context of Aristotle's virtue ethics, I use the word "will" referring to appetitive elements (passions and desires) of the irrational part of the soul.

1.1. The Chief Good: The Ultimate Aim of Human Life

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle starts with inquiring what the *good* means. One important aspect of the *good* is that it should be something desirable and pleasurable. It is hard to think of the *good* as undesirable and painful. What it means may vary according to different people, different cultures, and different circumstances. Moreover, some things regarded as good look like better than the other good things as they are merely some means in order to reach the better ones (1094a). Aristotle accepts the relativity of the meaning of *good*, so he wants to seek a “self-sufficient good” which is desirable and pleasurable only for itself. According to him, there should be a “chief good”, as an ultimate aim for the human life which is not a mean for another *good* (1097a25-30).

Aristotle defines three types of life in accordance with the criteria of the *good* as the final end of life: 1) the life of vulgar people who think that the *good* is pleasure⁸, 2) the political/ethical life in which the *good* is about the practical aspect of human life, regulated in accordance with *phronesis* and; 3) the contemplative life which can be reached only by *pure reasoning* (1095b15). Aristotle criticises the first one because it does not coincide with his definition of *eudaimonia* (ideal happiness). Such a life can be *good* neither for a single “human being” nor for a “good society” in the ultimate aim of human life. Aristotle defines the criteria of the *good* for anything as the actuality of that thing’s potentiality, which is the distinctive function (*ergon*) and the ultimate purpose of it at the same time. For instance, the *goodness* of a table depends on whether its function/potentiality is actualized or not. He says that “the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies reason”, and that “human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting virtue” (1098a5-15). So, according to Aristotle, the function of human being is the “rational activity” which is the distinctive feature from all other living

⁸ Aristotle says that most of the people tend to identify the aim of the human life as pleasure and he defines this type of people as “quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts” (1095b20).

beings. This is why Aristotle says that the most desirable of all is the last one, “contemplative life”, because it means the activity of pure reasoning (philosophical wisdom or having the knowledge of Truth). A person who has this knowledge as an intellectual virtue, “philosophical wisdom”, can be called as *eudaimon*. However, Aristotle claims that contemplative life is not the most important of all because *eudaimonia* (ideal happiness) cannot be thought without a “good social order” in which the “practical life” is regulated by “reason”. He says that human being by its definition is a social and political being (1097b10). Therefore, ethical life is the most important one among these types of life. In this line, the main topic of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is about how an ethical life is possible. Aristotle answers this question as such: it is possible with the moral/character virtues. It should be noted also that virtues do not directly refer to *eudaimonia*, but having them makes us *eudaimon*. That is, virtues are good as some means to *eudaimonia*, which is something *godlike* (which is self-sufficiently good and desirable-pleasant only for itself) (1099b15). What leads a person to *eudaimonia*, and thereby the virtuous action, is rational capacity. Even though the virtuous action and virtuous passions are necessary for the human flourishing, the most important thing for the virtuous character is a rational human being (1099a5).

As will be better explained in the next section, Aristotle claims that having moral/character virtues means is to act in accordance with practical wisdom (practical knowledge), with the rational passions/emotions and desires. To sum up, beside the definition of *eudaimonia* as the actualization of rational capacity (that refers to the contemplative (theoretical) life), it can also be defined as a state of well-being through a “virtuous life activity according to practical wisdom”.

1.2. The Moral Virtues: The Virtues of The Irrational Part of The Human Soul

Aristotle divides the human soul into two parts as “rational” and “irrational”. Because of the twofold structure of human soul (1102b), there are two kinds of virtue (1103a): “Intellectual virtues” that belong to the rational part, and “moral/character virtues” that belong to the irrational part. As explained in the previous section, practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue, the one in relation to the ethical life, because it considers the irrational elements of the human nature. That is, practical wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, helps us to have moral virtues, which refers to our praise characters (1103a) regarding how we are good in controlling our passions and desires in the way of guaranteeing our final end.

According to Aristotle, the irrational part also is divided into two as the “vegetative element” that shares nothing with the rational part (refers to the requirements of every kind of living creature), and the “appetitive/desiring element” that has a bond with reason (1102b5-15). As it can be seen, Aristotle does not separate appetitions (passions/emotions) and desires from the human soul, but rather he suggests that they must be in accordance with *phronesis* in a way that will fulfil the ultimate aim of human being (*eudaimonia*). Moral virtues are about becoming a virtuous citizen that has some rational passions/emotions and desires toward the virtuous activity. Repetitive practice is crucial in this process. He says that “we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (1103b1). As will be explained in the next section, neither action nor the passion/emotion and desire are sufficient alone for having a virtuous character; but most importantly, a rational agent who can get *phronesis* is necessary.

Some moral/character virtues which Aristotle mentions in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, are “courage”, “temperance”, “liberty”, “magnificence”, “good temper”, “friendliness”, “truthfulness”, “ready with”, and finally “justice”⁹. All of these virtues are about finding/calculating the intermediate between the “vicious

⁹ There is also a quasi-virtue named as “shame”.

extremes” through *phronesis*. That is, the formula that Aristotle offers in order to have a virtuous character is “avoiding excess and defect”, as we can see in the following quotation:

. . . exercise either excessive or defective destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues (1104a15).

Very basically, the intermediate cannot be many and various. Just as the “ideal good” (*Eudaimonia*) is the *One/Truth*, reached by the pure reason, there is always a mean as the one good that can be found/calculated by *phronesis* in despite of the variable passions/emotions and desires in accordance with the different conditions in practical life. For example, “courage” is a moral virtue only if it represents a mean between “fear” and “confidence” (1106b20). Both of them refer to the excessive passions/emotions (toward an action which is not *good*) (extreme fear is “cowardice” and extreme confidence is “rashness”) and harmful both for the single individual and the social order in general. However, it should be noted that there are some things that do not have their mean, because they are already bad (such as “spite”, “shamelessness”, “envy”, “murder”) (1107a10). The knowledge of which things are bad by themselves can only be achieved with the rational capacity.

Aristotle gives a significant role to “pleasure” and “pain” as a sign of virtuous character, especially at the end of Book VII. As explained before, Aristotle criticises the life that aims only pleasure, this is because the things that give pleasure can be variable in different conditions. According to his argument about the intermediate, the *good* cannot be variable; when the things that give pleasure are not rational, they cannot be regarded as good. This is why getting pleasure cannot be the chief good for human being. However, he accepts both pleasure and pain as some important motivations for human being as well as for all the other living things. This is why he claims that pleasure is not always bad. It can be good, but only in a limited sense. Accordingly, both pleasure and pain should include the rational judgements. In other words, the rational activity of human being should

include a kind of pleasure that has a quality of intelligence (1099a20). He says that someone who has such an intellectual pleasure for his virtuous character becomes never miserable even in the face of an external event that might have a negative impact on him/her. Regarding with this, we can look at the following quotation:

If activities are, as we said, what determines the character of life, no blessed man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances of life . . . the happy man can never become miserable (1101a5).

According to Aristotle, the motivation behind our moral actions should not be “avoiding the pain” just as it should not be “getting pleasure”. Sometimes rational actions cause physical pain. In such a case, what is important is having an intellectual pleasure of the rational activity only for itself despite the physical pain. In sum, it can be said that in every situation, having the virtuous character requires passions/emotions that include rational judgements and it should be self-sufficiently pleasurable. Associated with this issue, Aristotle discusses the second moral virtue, “temperance” which corresponds to the mean between extremes of response to the bodily pleasure (especially the pleasures about the senses of touch and taste which the other living species also have). He makes a distinction between a temperate person and a self-indulgence person. Accordingly, a temperate person desires and acts in accordance with his/her reason, the indulgent person only cares about his/her bodily pleasures (1118b30). This prevents the indulgent person from having a virtuous character because *eudaimonia* (ideal happiness) is about the rational part of the soul, not about the irrational part which all the other living things have.

One of the important points in respect to moral/character virtues, is that the intermediate in passions/emotions and desires and in actions can be different from person to person, from condition to condition. This is because Aristotle does not reject the variable aspect of the practical life. He suggests that a person should firstly know his/her own passions/emotions and see the error; and then he/she should find/calculate the mean between the extremes (1109b5).

1.3. Eudaimonia and the Voluntary Choice of The Rational Agent

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*' second book, Aristotle explains how the virtues are acquired. As mentioned in the previous section, each of the intellectual virtues corresponds to some kinds of knowledge (wisdom). So, we acquire them theoretically by learning. However, the moral/character virtues cannot be learned through theoretical knowledge, but achieved through the repetitive habits (1103a15). This is because they are about practical (ethical) life, not theoretical life. In practical life, what matters is how our actions, passions/emotions and desires are properly regulated in accordance with rationality through habits. In this direction, it can be said that there are three indispensable ingredients of a moral virtue: a rational agent, the virtuous action (practice), and the proper passion/emotion and desire toward the virtuous action. The most important of all is the first one, because the other two cannot be subjected to an ethical assessment without a rational agent.

In relation to this nature of the moral/character virtue, Aristotle examines the matters of "choice" and "voluntariness" in the *Nicomachean Ethics*' third book. Very basically, choice requires a rational capacity, that is a rational agent. On the other hand, voluntariness does not require such capacity. For instance, any animal or any ignorant person can be voluntary in his/her action, but this action cannot be regarded as a choice because of lacking rationality. Voluntariness is merely about having a certain sense of circumstances and feeling good about it (1111a20). So, it would not be wrong to say that voluntariness concerns with passions/emotions and desires while choice concerns with rationality. In order to better explain the difference between voluntariness and choice, we can look at the difference between passions and moral virtues in the matter of choice: Aristotle says that ". . . we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice" (1106a5). In this line, choice has a closer relation with the moral virtue. But choice should always include voluntariness for a virtuous character. In other words, if someone has a virtuous character, his/her choices always aim for the good. His/her choices have to include voluntariness for the virtuous action (1113b5).

In closely relation to the idea that choice (as a fundamental feature of moral virtue) requires a voluntary action, I will dwell on four concepts of Aristotle: Ignorance, incontinence, continence, and finally temperance. Here, only the last one is to do with the moral/character virtue. Ignorance represents the lack of rational judgement that belongs to a rational agent. Because rationality is the most important condition of moral virtue, ignorance is the most distant situation to have a virtuous character. Beside this, an ignorant person cannot be regarded as *bad*, according to Aristotle, since he/she is outside the ethical evaluation. Secondly, Aristotle claims that if a person has the practical knowledge (*phronesis*) about how to act in a situation but does not act in the way of his/her *phronesis*, then he is incontinent. Such a person is someone who cannot make a rational choice, thereby he/she does not a virtuous character. Here, we see that in order to be subject to an ethical assessment, someone must have the practical knowledge like incontinent, continent, or temperant person. Incontinence is about having *phronesis* but not acting in accordance with it, which is the reason that he/she can be subjected to an ethical evaluation. If a person has *phronesis* and acts in this way, but with some opposite passions/emotions and desires, then he/she is "continent". In this situation, this person makes a rational choice, but he/she is not voluntary for this action. Therefore, he/she cannot be regarded as having a virtuous character yet. However, Aristotle claims that continence is still better than incontinence. And finally, if a person has *phronesis* and acts in this way with the proper passions/emotions and desires (that includes rational judgements), then he/she is temperate, that is he/she has a virtuous character. This is because he/she makes a rational choice including also voluntariness for this action.

What we can see here is that neither *phronesis* as an intellectual virtue nor appetitive (passions/emotions) and desiring elements are enough for having a virtuous character; but a combination of them is needed. But first of all, a rational agent is needed for making a rational choice. Secondly, a rational action (a rational choice) is needed. And finally, the passions/emotions and desires should include rational judgements about the rational choice, which refers the voluntariness of the rational agent. Only then a person can be considered as *eudaimon*.

1.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, there are three significant points about Aristotle's concept of *eudaimonia* (ideal happiness), which will be crucial in my comparison of Aristotle and Nietzsche. 1) Aristotle makes a definition of the "ideal happiness" as the ultimate aim of human life and thinks of it as universal for every human being (it is also what determines the human being) derived from a self-sufficient chief good; 2) Aristotle divides the human soul into two parts and define the rational one as the distinctive feature of human being that should regulate the irrational part. Beside that it is also important that he thinks of passions and desires compulsory for a virtuous character and he accepts the variable conditions of the practical life in respect to the goodness of a thing even though there is always *one* good for every condition; and finally, 3) Aristotle makes a definition of a rational agent who has a moral/ethical responsibility in the face of an ideal good as the ultimate purpose of human life. And this responsibility is not about bodily pleasure, but about an intellectual pleasure. Even though sometimes this requires accepting the physical pain, *eudaimon* person is always "noble" and never miserable.

CHAPTER 2

NIETZSCHE'S CRITICISM OF IDEAL HAPPINESS

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will discuss what Nietzsche thinks about the concept of *Happiness* as an “ideal good” of human life. First of all, it can be said that he is opposed to any kind of idealism that is claimed to determine the moral values of our actions and passions/emotions, and also opposed to the concept of a rational capacity (superior over passions/emotions) guiding the human being to an ultimate end. However, it is also possible to claim that he has a sense of “good life” (healthy life), which can mean “flourishing” and “freedom” as a life experience of the self. He takes freedom of the self as connected with the dynamic essence of life, considering a continuous struggle of opposite drives (basically commanding and obeying drives). Accordingly, the value of *good* is neither fixed nor free from perspective, it is always in a close relation with certain power relations between different political or cultural forces or between different inner forces within a single individual.

His most significant suggestion for a healthy life is getting rid of some dogmatic thoughts and beliefs that shape our lives in a way that drive us away from ourselves, observing and listening the power of our actions, passions, desires as well as our rational judgements in order to achieve self-knowledge, and living in accordance with our own values created in a noble way. He thinks that living in accordance with some external values as if they are fixed and universal makes us “sick”; it prevents us from a healthful life in which we seek a self-knowledge. He opposes to any external authority that is needed for the approval of this world we live in. This is why he criticises all moral systems (especially the Christian morality), all metaphysical dichotomies like truth-falsity or rationality-irrationality since Plato, and all assumptions for an otherworldly conceptualization of *happiness* as a promise.

I think that Aristotle's understanding of good life (*eudaimonia*) and Nietzsche's understanding of healthy life seems different at three points each of

which I discuss in three sections: 1) While Aristotle defines the “ideal good” (the chief good) as the value-determining of human life since it is the ultimate purpose of all human beings, Nietzsche, in *Beyond Good and Evil* rejects any kind of idealism that detects an end for human life because he advocated the interpretational and perspectival aspect of *good*. “Difference” is a central theme of his perspectivism. 2) While Aristotle suggests that having a virtuous character requires acting and desiring in *one* true way in accordance with *phronesis*, Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morality* shows that there are always different (naturalistic) drives behind the belief in (A moral/ethical) Truth and also the rationalization of that Truth; the meaning and value of *good* is never fixed and universal. Beside this, he emphasises a historical turning point in the evaluation of *good* that starts with the “slave revolt” and adds that it becomes a dominant slave morality through the long-term dominance of Christianity. This change starts with the transformation of political superiority into spiritual superiority and continues with the renunciation of the power of actions and passions in the evaluation of *good*. If we need new values, Nietzsche offers returning to a noble way of evaluation. Accordingly, we can ask if we can return to an Aristotelian sense of *good* since his virtue ethics cannot be regarded as a slave morality in terms of thinking of the good associated with the power of action and passion.

When we look at where Nietzsche finds the origin of values, we see power of the will that manifests itself in passions, desires and rational judgements, which is the main creative power in creating or re-evaluating the values. In regard to the source of value of the good, Nietzsche seems to agree with Aristotle, but unlike Aristotle Nietzsche says that this origin cannot be traced in a universal Truth. 3) Nietzsche also disagrees with Aristotle about the twofold nature of human being and human life. Nietzsche does not think of passions and desires as “irrational” elements that should be controlled by the rational part, rather he says that they, as well as the rational judgements, are only some different manifestations of the self. In order to create new values with the help of a self-knowledge, Nietzsche argues that we cannot take care merely our rational capacity, we should observe our

passions as well as our rational judgements. This is the only way to cure ourselves and to live a healthful life. At this, point, Nietzsche gets closer to the Stoics.

So, in the third section I will dwell on some differences between Aristotle and the Stoics by drawing on Martha C. Nussbaum's book, and then I will focus on the Stoic influence on Nietzsche's philosophy, based on Aurelia Armstrong's article and on some contrast ideas about the ascetic ideal that requires being free from passions and the human suffering. Just like the Stoics, Nietzsche claims that there is not an intrinsic difference between our passions and our judgements, that is they do not belong to different parts of the human nature. In addition, Nietzsche holds with Stoicism in that there is no distinction between practical and theoretical life based on twofold nature of human being. But, the significant distinction between Nietzsche and the Stoics is the recognition of the sickness that should be cured. According to the Stoics, the sickness is our passions that makes us vulnerable to suffering. Accordingly, their account of sickness refers to our suffering derived from our false judgements (passions) and we should heal ourselves by an active practice of reasoning. In Nietzsche's philosophy, sickness is derived from attaining a moral or ethical meaning to our suffering or our happiness out of this life and thinking of this meaning as universal and fixed, especially when this idea comes from some dogmatic beliefs and thoughts. Even though Nietzsche agrees with the Stoics in his suggestion of changing our value judgements in order to get rid of some kinds of suffering which are obstacle for our health and in presenting philosophy as a way of self-treatment, he is more affirmative toward the passions and the human suffering since they are very important for the growth of our power. Only if we can welcome them, there is a chance to be stronger and to know ourselves.

And finally, in the fourth section, I concentrate on how Nietzsche gives an important role to suffering in creation and re-evaluation of the moral values throughout the history. Accordingly, I also show how suffering is in a close relation with the creation of a subject who has responsible for his/her inner suffering as if he/she could act or feel differently, that is in accordance with some moral values. Especially the moral way of suffering as an inner suffering (bad conscience, guilt,

self-punishment) is very important in the sense of showing how they are closely related to some power relations (specifically the creditor-debtor relation) within the culture. The freedom of the will does not mean “the freedom of a subject” who has a “free will” in order to make true choices in accordance with some moral values. He does not think of the self as responsible for an external authority, rather takes it as “the body” or “the will to power”. Thereby, the freedom of the will means “the self-flourishing” as a continuous life experiment in company with the pursue of self-knowledge. For this process, he suggests to observe ourselves (that is our body and actions) and obey only our inner drives willing to power.

However, this life experiment is not easy; because commanding (ourselves) is more difficult than obeying (someone else). It is not safe and pre-calculative. It includes many risks for an individual. There is not a promise of ideal happiness (as a state of rest) that can be approved by an external authority, divine or not. This experiment is about accepting suffering (especially the meaninglessness of suffering) as a very vital part of life. It should be noted that Nietzsche does not draw on some rational justifications to refute the ideas about *Truth* or *Ideal Good/God* coming from the Platonist or the Christian tradition. He has a more naturalistic sense of philosophy that can lead the “free spirits” to a healthier life experiment in accordance with their own rules. According to him, every claim about *Truth* that can be reached from an objective and neutral perspective, is only a different interpretation of will to power even though these claims tend to reject very vital (passions/emotions, desires, instincts) of life. This is why his genealogy of morality aim not to present some arguments about a metaphysical explanation of the human life, but rather to evoke an affect in the reader, trying to show why the sickness that should be cured is the slavish way of living, but not the human suffering since it is a part of life.

2.1. The Perspectival Aspect of Good

In the preface of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche defines the spirit of Christianity as a kind of Platonism for it invents a superior *Truth* over the material and the

natural world. Nietzsche calls "Plato's invention of pure spirit and the Good in itself" as "the worst, most prolonged, and most dangerous of all errors to this day" (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 4). Nietzsche criticizes the metaphysical question of "what is *Truth*?" that all goods derive from and that can be discovered from an objective and neutral perspective; rather he prefers looking at the inner drives behind the philosophers' or the priests' creation of *Truth*. Accordingly, what determines the value of *good* is not a metaphysical *Truth*, but "will" (to power) that always manifests itself with a different perspective and interpretation depending on its position within a power relation. Every moral system, every philosophy, every religion, every single thought includes and mirrors the characteristics of its creators. All justifications for them are valid only in their own logical system. Viewed from a distance, all universalisations are some "dogmatic prejudices" and "superstitions". He develops his critique of the western philosophy and thinking from that point of view. According to him, it was nearly realized that what all moral assumptions have been based on:

. . . - some piece of folk superstition from time immemorial (like the soul-superstition that still causes trouble as the superstition of the subject or I), some word-play perhaps, a seduction of grammar or an over-eager generalization from facts that are really very local, very personal, very human-all-too-human (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 3).

When Nietzsche looks at the dominant moralities throughout the history, he basically observes two kinds of morality regarding the perspective in valuation or re-evaluation of the *good*: master and slave morality (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 153). From masters' point of view, they are already the powerful ones. The masters' valuation of the *good* is based on a physical and political power and the feelings of proud and distance (toward the weak). They do not need for an "evil enemy" or an "external authority" (like a divine power of a divine justice) that proves their greatness on a universal ground. Their valuation of the *good* is based on only themselves. While defining themselves as the "noble" and the "good", the weak as the "despicable" and the "bad" (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 154). The noble does not have a feeling of "pity" for the "unfortunate" or for himself/herself as a kind of moral responsibility. Their happiness comes from their proud for himself/herself and a

certain feeling of distance toward who is not the noble. This is why Nietzsche says they have an “innocent”, “honest” and “self-affirming” attitude in their healthy and noble way of creating value.

From the slave’s point of view, the situation is different. The slaves are “violated, suffering, unfree, exhausted, and unsure of themselves” (Nietzsche, 2002, pp. 155-156) in their relation with their “cruel” masters¹⁰. The slaves’ re-valuation of the *good* is based on their physical and political weakness. The slave who cannot take his/her revenge from the master as a proper physical and political response, has the feelings of “fear”, “hate” and “resentment” toward the master and the feeling of pity for themselves for a long time. When these feelings, especially the feeling of resentment, make the slaves to create an external divine justice in order to see their masters’ values as morally “evil” in a universal ground and to see their weakness, sickness, and self-pity as morally “good” values in front of this authority. In other words, they reverse the master’s “bad” into the universal and moral “good”, and reverse the master’s “good” into the “evil”. The reason for Nietzsche’s defining the Christian morality as a slave morality is the dependence of its value creation on an external and otherworldly justice together with an evil enemy.

Accordingly, the slavish mode of creating value is “self-negating” because it does not do it based on its own physical and political power, and it is also “life-negating” because its “goodness” is dependent on an otherworldly justice (God). It should be noted that the slave morality offers an ideal and otherworldly happiness as a promise of God (a divine *Truth*) in return for some moral responsibilities. According to Nietzsche, it is important here to see the hope of recapturing the power in the future by the promise of a divine God and its divine justice. Nietzsche criticises that people of the modern spirit cannot see even this hope of the will (to get power in the future) anymore and believe only in some moral values (which are only some dogmatic prejudices and superstitions) with a “herd instinct”. He says that very few spirits, who are the “exceptions”, are interested in “independence”

¹⁰ Behind the master’s cruelty, there is not any moral responsibility, but only a feeling of enjoyment as will be explained in the fourth section.

because it is a dangerous and lonely path (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 30). They are not interested in the “human norm” which the majority follow, but interested in a “self-knowledge” which leads them to create their own laws (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 27).

To sum up, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche criticizes the Christian morality in terms of both inventing a *Truth* (as an ideal good) as an objective and neutral perspective about the value of the things (which has a bond with the Platonic tradition) and doing this in a slavish way, that is being dependent to an external authority and an evil enemy. In Nietzsche’s emphasizing on the distinction between the master (the noble and independent) and slave (dependent to an external authority) morality, we see the perspectival aspect of the *good* in relation to the power relations between the cultures and the “will to power” behind their evaluation and re-evaluation of the values from their own perspective. The noble way of creating value is a healthy, life-affirming and self-affirming one. On the other hand, the slavish way is a sick/unhealthy, life-negating and self-negating one. One significant aspect of his criticism of Christianity as a slave morality, is its bad influence on the modern spirit. Thinking all the human beings on the same universal ground, and with the same moral responsibility in front of an invented concept of Justice, is sickness. Whether divine or not, the idea of justice does not have a transcendental meaning. This is why his sense of human “well-being” is not something that can be achieved by an invented and external authority.

Regarding Nietzsche’s criticism of the Christian morality as a slave morality, I want to go back to Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Aristotle does not draw on an external authority (like God) that presents a divine knowledge of what the good life is. He has a more naturalistic attitude, partly like Nietzsche, while examining the particular things in order to detect what the “good” can mean in terms of their distinctive function. His definition of the “chief good” for the human life comes from his understanding of human nature. In this line, the chief good (*eudaimonia*) means human flourishing (well-being) on the ground of its own nature, rather than based? a fictional and external authority. However, he presents a metaphysical definition of human nature while regarding the rational capacity as the distinctive function of the human being, and thereby a metaphysical definition for the ultimate

purpose of human life. This is what Nietzsche exactly criticizes about all moral traditions. According to him, there is not such a universal definition for human being and an ultimate end, so called *eudaimonia* (ideal happiness) as a promise in return to a certain type of life. Nietzsche essentially tries to emphasise “difference”: the difference of spirits, of dynamics, of perspectives, of interpretations, and of moralities. Therefore, I think that Nietzsche’s criticism of the slave morality does not suggest returning to an Aristotelian sense of *eudaimonia* as well as any ancient master morality considering the value of the *good*, but rather what Nietzsche suggests is a noble way of creating new values just like they did. This is because one’s living in accordance with some others’ values means living a “dull” life without knowing oneself. A good and healthy life is possible only with self-knowledge that reflects our own perspective willing the power, which is very related to his concept of “will to power” as will be discussed later. Nietzsche says that only the “free spirits” can create their own values because only the free spirits are strong enough to create their own laws and obey them.

Another important point that I want to discuss in this section is whether or not Nietzsche’s philosophy has a political aspect. In Aristotle’s virtue ethics, we see an obvious political purpose, which is the pursue of “good society” as a necessary condition of the final end of the human life. Some can think that Nietzsche’s philosophy lacks such a political aspect since he imagines the freedom of the self (the will) as lonely and apart from the society. I think that the only thing he tries to do is to reject making or following some universal definitions such as the “ideal good”, the “ideal happiness” (as a final end of the human life) and the “ideal society”. He always takes the value of the good together with some historical, political and psychological contexts which cannot be detached from power relations between people or cultures. Emphasizing the difference, he defends the pursuit of self-knowledge for each individual and says that there is no possibility for a final state of rest that all dangers end, because it is opposed to the essence of life itself. There will be always danger, loneliness and suffering for the free spirits who does not follow an ideal happiness as a promise, but follows only their own inner drives. I think this idea is very political in respect to opening different possibilities for more

healthy spirits and cultures, other than living a dull and tasteless life under the command of others. I think that this kind of a life cannot be imagined in there everything remains same and fixed just like the life stops, and thereby there is no struggle and suffering.

2.2. The Origin of Moral Values: Body and Action

Nietzsche thinks that all moral values must be questioned by asking what if the “good” that are regarded as beneficial to the advancement of humanity, is actually a drug that distances us from ourselves, offering a safe, but tasteless life on the back of the promise of an ideal happiness? At the very beginning of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, he says: “We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers: and with good reason. We have never looked for ourselves, – so how are we ever supposed to find ourselves?” (p. 3). This is exactly what he defines as obstacle (living without knowing ourselves) for the greatness of both a single individual and cultures. So, we can ask what kind of values does Nietzsche offer us to create for a good life? For the answer we should look at where Nietzsche finds the origins of the values. Accordingly, these origins have a close bond with the “self” (or the culture) that manifests itself, as a “will to power”, in its actions, passions/emotions, desires, instinct, and even its rational judgements and each time from a different perspective; and always related to a power relation. And thinking the origins of moral values as fix and universal (based on some metaphysical definitions for an “ideal good”) and living according to this are helpless for a tasteful and healthful life. This is the importance of that he takes the moral values seriously and makes a genealogical analysis of them, even though they look like unquestionable.

Firstly, it should be said that Nietzsche’s genealogical method is very different from that of the other philosophers or scholars who investigate the origin of our actions’ and passions/desires’ value in a universal starting point. The origins of moral values which he explores are the contingent results of some power relations. According to Nietzsche, the essence of life does not refer to a single *Truth* that can be found out in an objective and neutral perspective, rather life has a

dynamic nature, including a continuous struggle of some natural drives (commending and obeying). These drives can be both the inner forces of a single individual or the physical or political forces of a culture, which struggles for the “power”, “growth” and “expansion”. Looking at the origins of “good and bad” or “good and evil”, he recognises this nature of life revealing itself as an interpretation of will to power. So, each moral system reflects the perspectives of its creators as their effort to interpret life in a way that respects its present power or its future power. As I explain in the previous section, this is why a moral system can be never perfect on a universal ground.

In the first essay (*‘Good and Evil’, ‘Good and Bad’*) of the *Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche starts with explaining why he finds the English psychologists’ (especially Dr Paul Rée) declarations about the “origin of morality” insufficient. They emphasise the “utility” of the “unegoistic actions”, and argues that what is “useful” becomes the “good”. According to this approach, over the course of time, people happen to forget the real origin of certain unegoistic actions’ values and become to think of them as goods in themselves. However, Nietzsche claims that they look for the origin of the good in the wrong place. He highlights that the cultures attained the value of the *good* for the first time by their own physical and political power over the weak and only later this type of valuation of the *good* has been reversed by the slave revolt in morality. In relation to this, we can look at the following quotation:

. . . the judgment ‘good’ does not emanate from those to whom goodness is shown! Instead it has been ‘the good’ themselves, meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded, who saw and judged themselves and their actions as good, I mean first-rate, in contrast to everything lowly, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was from this pathos of distance that they first claimed the right to create values and give these values names: usefulness was none of their concern! (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 11)

Their attaining a utilitarian value to the unegoistic actions and emotions, by presenting a kind of universal explanation, is derived from the perspective of the utilitarian tradition to which they belong. Nietzsche says their point of view is not sufficient because it is far from seeing the “pathos of nobility and distance”

(Nietzsche, 2007, p. 12) behind the first valuation of the “good and bad”. In order to show this nobility and distance, he looks at the etymological origins of the words related with “good and bad” in the languages created and shaped by those who are politically powerful. Nietzsche says that “the word ‘good’ is absolutely not necessarily attached to ‘unegoistic’ actions: as the superstition of these moral genealogists would have it” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 12). Rather he seeks the origin of unegoistic actions’ moral value in the “*decline* of aristocratic value judgments” as will be explained in this section.

So, Nietzsche attacks any explanation being prone to think of the values in a universal context. In order to understand creations and evaluations of moral values, we need to look elsewhere, namely, some power struggles between different groups, political and/or cultural, and resentment. Nietzsche’s genealogy challenges some standard genealogies which claim that moral notions can be traced back to a single, fixed origin. Rather he argues that there are fundamental transformations, disruptions and inventions (moral or not) that emerge in specific historical and cultural contexts.

Thus, Nietzsche analyses that in many different languages the word “good” derives from the same origin with the words like “noble” and “aristocratic” because the ones who determine the value of the *good* by themselves are the “nobles” and the “aristocrats” out of their political power. In parallel with this, the word “bad” derives from the same origin with the words like “common”, “plebeian”, “low” because of the people to whom the noble has a feeling of distance (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 13). In the ancient Greek aristocracy, the “good” is very close relation with the words “truthful” and “noble” that implies the noble’s “political superiority” over the “deceitful” and “common” man. However, with the “decline of the aristocracy”, he explains how the word “noble” gains merely a “spiritual” (psychological) meaning in the historical, political and cultural context (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 14).

When the “clergy caste” is the “higher caste”, we see that the political superiority also implies the psychological (spiritual) superiority. But the concepts pointing to this superiority had their non-symbolic meaning before their spiritual meanings, he says and gives the following example:

From the outset the 'pure man' was just a man who washed, avoided certain foods which cause skin complaints, did not sleep with the filthy women from the lower orders and had a horror of blood, – nothing more, not much more! And yet the very nature of an essentially priestly aristocracy shows how contradictory valuations could become dangerously internalized and sharpened, precisely in such an aristocracy at an early stage . . . (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 15-16)

Accordingly, the concepts of "pure" and "impure" show up as the indicators of the priest caste at first, implying previously the political power, and secondarily the spiritual meanings in relation to the religious aspect of their cultures. This is why we should not think of the origins of these words as if they always had implied some psychological or spiritual meanings. Before gaining other meanings, they did not have some "symbolic" meanings.

When this priest aristocracy (Judaic priests) becomes suppressed caste by the noble who hold the political power, Nietzsche mentions something unhealthy that appears in their valuation of the *good*. In spite of their politically powerless situations, priests think that they are also noble and they want to distinguish themselves from those who hold the power. Here, we have the first transformation of the values. They transform the values in a very clever way: the moral values of the noble are replaced by the moral values of the priest and the priestly values are now centred around the idea of purity. So, those who are "pure" (not sinful) are "good", whereas those are "impure" (sinful) are "evil". Nietzsche defines this transformation as "turning away from action" and turning into something merely spiritual associated with the feeling of resentment of those who suffers and wants to overcome this suffering. He says that the solutions they propose to recover this suffering (like "certain diets (avoidance of meat), of fasting, sexual abstinence, the flight 'into the desert'") are even more dangerous than the sickness they try to cure (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 16). Looking at their ascetic solutions, there is a suggestion for getting rid of the bodily instincts and desires. Thus, they do not only separate the value of the good from the power of action, but also make bodily instincts and desires sinful that should be redeemed. Despite this transformation of the value-judgement in an unhealthy way, Nietzsche seems to appreciate the effort of these clever priests since somehow their opposite attempt to the will and the life itself

made the human being “an interesting animal” and transformed it into a being that can be “evil for the first time” for its actions, passions, and desires. And he adds that “. . . - of course, these are the two basic forms of man’s superiority, hitherto, over other animals! . . .” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 16)

In this turning point where the (Judaic) priestly method of valuation splits from the chivalric-aristocratic method (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 16), we can see the break of the value of the *good* away from the power of action, passions and desires. Nietzsche calls this event as the “slaves’ revolt in morality” and says that Christianity inherited this revolution from the ancient Jews¹¹. The most powerful creative emotion behind their revolt and later the Christian belief in Jesus’ redeemer “love” is a feeling of resentment (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 18) and a desire for revenge. He says that the only reason of why this was forgotten is that their revolution was successful after two thousand years and their values become the unquestionable values of the western culture, especially along with the idea of universality. As criticising this transformation of the value-judgement, Nietzsche, on the other hand, emphasises the desire to acquire the power in the future even if this depends on an external and divine power. In this line, the most dangerous influence of Christianity on the modern spirit is not its origin, but its result that people become unable to connect the value of the *good* with the will. Even though the church has lost its power, he argues that the Christian values continue by the so-called new values of modernism based on the universality of morality and responsibility. Nietzsche asks if it is possible to have an alternative attitude toward life and ourselves and to create new values in a noble way?

Regarding with this question, I think Nietzsche’s concepts of the “self” and “will to power” are very important. Looking at where Nietzsche finds the origin of the values, it can be said that we need to rediscover the power in our actions, passions and desires. This also shows us how to seek a self-knowledge because “self”, according to Nietzsche, is not a subject (a spiritual subject) apart from

¹¹ Because of Nietzsche's referral to the Judaism, anti-Semitic views (Nazism) manipulated his ideas, which is quite unfortunate. However, I think that his passages about the Jews do not prove his anti-Semitic stance. What he deals with, as a genealogist, is the Christian morality and its historical relation to the Judaism.

actions, passions/emotions and desires. Here, we should also note that Nietzsche attacks the concept of “I” as a moral subject, diagnosing it as a mistake of the language (grammar). In order to better explain this, he gives the example of “lightning flashes” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 26). As we can see, here lightening is not the subject even if it looks so in grammar. Actually, they are same. Therefore, “self” manifests itself as actions, passions/emotions, desires, instincts, and even as rational judgements.

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883), he says that “. . . Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man – he is called self. He lives in your body; he is your body” (p. 23). This is the reason of why we should feel and listen to our body in order to know ourselves. However, this is not easy, because Nietzsche thinks that self is not an open book identified with a thought that can be known immediately and certainly, unlike the Cartesian tradition argues. He perceives the self as something that involves many different forces, belonging to the natural and material world, and these forces struggling for power, growth and expansion, are not always very clear about our evaluations of the world. So, what kind of a method does Nietzsche propose us to understand our most powerful drives and create new values according to this? In the *Gay Science* (1882), he suggests partly to make a copy of the scientific method by saying that “. . . we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to be able to be creators in this sense” (p. 266). This does not mean to find a scientific *Truth* about ourselves that has an objective and neutral perspective.

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he tries to show different possibilities for creating new hypotheses and concepts about the “Spirit” like the “mortal soul” and the “soul as subject-multiplicity” and the “soul as a society constructor out of drives and affects” (p. 14). In order to seek a self-knowledge based on new hypothesis, we should also embrace a life experiment and observe our own body in which the strongest will manifesting itself. This life experiment requires being open to a constant struggle between commanding and obeying drives, which is the origin of all values, always in relation to a power relation. He says:

All willing is simply a matter of commanding and obeying, on the groundwork, as I have said, of a society constructed out of many "souls": from which a philosopher should claim the right to understand willing itself within the framework of morality: morality understood as a doctrine of the power relations under which the phenomenon of "life" arises. (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 20)

In the last section of *Beyond Good and Evil (What is Nobility)*, he claims that every culture and every person try to find a balance between "commanding" and "obeying" forces. But only the free spirits can do this. In order to understand what Nietzsche means, we can look at his *Zarathustra* in which he says that "Whoever cannot command himself should obey. And though many a person can command himself, much is still missing before he also obeys himself!" (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 159). In other words, "will to power" is senseless without obeying. Some people think that commanding others makes them stronger, but Nietzsche does not agree with this. What he calls as will to power, is not about commanding and dominating others. Rather, it is more about one's obeying his/her own commanding. In another part (*On Self-Overcoming*) of *Zarathustra*, he claims that commanding is more difficult than obeying and follows:

And not only that the commander bears the burden of all obeyers, and that this burden easily crushes him: – In all commanding it seemed to me there is an experiment and a risk; and always when it commands, the living risks itself in doing so. Indeed, even when it commands itself, even then it must pay for its commanding. It must become the judge and avenger and victim of its own law (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 89).

Accordingly, such a life experiment requires also welcoming the risks of this because neither the life nor ourselves is predictable even though we come out with some hypotheses. This is the only way in order to seek a self-knowledge and create new values. As we can see, "self" is not a rational agent/subject, but it is simply a body. As opposed to the Cartesian dualism, he suggests a kind of body-soul unity. I can understand my self only by looking at my deeds. This is why I should always observe my own deeds in order to understand myself. Thereby, I can determine myself and obey only my own laws in accordance with my inner drives. It can be said that this is what Nietzsche understands from human freedom and

flourishing. His account does not offer any recipe for such a life based on an “ideal good” which has an objective or neutral aspect.

If we turn back to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, we encounter both similarities and differences between their understanding of the *good*. Like the other philosophers in the ancient Greek, Aristotle’s definition of “human being” is not detached from the human action. Even though he highlights the rational capacity as the distinctive function of the human nature, he does not think of the human flourishing apart from passions and desires as well as actions. In this sense, Aristotle and Nietzsche seem to think in the same way about that good life is possible only by taking our actions, passions and desires seriously and observing whether they fit our hypothesis or not¹².

Aristotle’s definitions of “human being” and “ideal good” of human life have a metaphysical aspect. Accordingly, having a virtuous character means to act and desire in *one* true way in accordance with *phronesis* (practical knowledge) which is an intellectual virtue considering the rational part of the human being. In this line, our actions, passions, desires, and thereby our characters gain a moral/ethical value that refers to a kind of responsibility for an “ideal good” (the ultimate aim) of the human life. This responsibility is not subject to an external and divine authority, but basically to our rational capacity as the distinctive function of the human nature. Both of Aristotle and Nietzsche seek the value of the good in a human-related place, not in a divine power. However, Nietzsche differs from Aristotle in his criticism of any metaphysical explanation for human nature just as in his criticism of all moral systems as I discussed in the previous section as well. He is not concerned with such a universal human nature and an objective Truth about it. He does not consider our bodily instincts, desires, passions that should have some moral/ethical values in front of a universal Truth. Rather, he argues that we should always feel and listen to them since they say something about ourselves, which is never fixed, certain or complete. I think that this does not mean excluding

¹² Here, we should not forget an important distinction between Aristotle and Nietzsche. While Nietzsche implies that we may be mistaken in our hypotheses, we can say that a hypothesis for Aristotle would be probably based on a rational knowledge of Truth which cannot be wrong in any way.

the rational judgements from the self, but it can mean thinking of the rational judgements as a part of the body in terms of expressing a cognitive action for will to power.

Most importantly, Nietzsche seems to disagree with him about the twofold nature of the human being and the human life. By dividing the human nature into two parts (rational and irrational) and defining two kinds of virtue (intellectual and practical/moral), Aristotle distinguishes theoretical and practical aspects of human life. While he thinks of philosophical wisdom (*sophia*) as subject to only theoretical life, he proposes political or practical wisdom (*phronesis*) as subject to practical life, considering the regulation of irrational elements of human nature. Even though both of these wisdoms belong to the rational part, only practical wisdom is necessary to achieve "moral or character virtues" for the sake of an ethical life (a noble life). Aristotle suggests that there is a need for political science whose work is the regulation of the social order in accordance with *phronesis* in order to lead the citizens living in a noble way. However, it should be noted that this does not require a blind obedience of the citizens to some dogmatic moral values derived from a divine authority out of the human life. Rather there is a need for a proper education that can help each individual to achieve practical wisdom and moral virtues through the repetitive actions in accordance with this. Therefore, his virtue ethics demands an intellectual virtue considering the rational capacity, but only the practical wisdom, not the philosophical wisdom. In contrast to Aristotle, Nietzsche opposes any dichotomy between rational and irrational, considering the human nature or the human life. Beside this, he does not propose philosophy as a function of achieving a theoretical knowledge of *Truth*. He thinks of philosophy as a mean of self-knowledge, by challenging the traditional ideas based on the distinction between rational-irrational, true-false, or mind-body. Accordingly, he accepts passions and desires, as well as rational judgements, as parts of the self since all of them say something about the self. Given all this, it is fair to say that we cannot return to an Aristotelian understanding of good life and value-judgement

Regarding with this distinction between their way of seeing philosophy, I think that we can look at the Stoics who consider philosophy in a different manner

from Aristotle. They have a monistic account for the human nature and the human life, rather than twofold nature of the human being. Beside this, they propose philosophy as a function of self-therapy (therapy of the passions) for each individual in the world. So, in the next section I investigate whether we can find some Stoic influence on Nietzsche's philosophy.

2.3. Philosophy as an Art of Self Therapy: The Stoics and Nietzsche

In the previous section, we see how Nietzsche defines "sickness" of the modern spirit based on his criticism of slave morality, especially with the long-term influence of Christianity. It basically refers to a departure from the power of body in the criteria of value-judgement and the belief in some dogmatic and supernatural ideas. In this respect, in his suggestion for returning to a noble way of creating new values, I concluded that Nietzsche seems to agree with Aristotle at the point of re-establishing the link between action and passions in the evaluation of the *good*. However, I also emphasise an important distinction between their way of seeing philosophy. While Aristotle divides the human soul into two parts as rational and irrational, and the virtues into intellectual and moral virtues, he also makes a distinction between theoretical and practical life. For an ethical/political life, practical wisdom and practical virtue seem to be enough since it is about the irrational elements of the human life. Philosophical wisdom is outside this life even though it leads someone directly to the theoretical life¹³, the best of all types of life. Therefore, as taking of action, passions/emotions and desires as necessary elements of the human flourishing, we also encounter an outside intervention by imagining a social order that regulates the practical life in accordance with the ultimate aim of the human life, rather than presenting philosophical knowledge as a therapy for each individual's own evaluation of the *good*. In contrast to Aristotle, Nietzsche does not suggest such a prescription for the well-being of the self, based on a twofold nature of the human being, but rather a knowledge of the self (as the will to power) that

¹³ Aristotle claims that this life is not possible without an ethical life because he defines human being, by its nature, as a social and political being.

manifests itself in its actions, passions/emotions, desires, instincts, and also rational judgements. At this point, I want to mention the Stoics who define the human flourishing differently from Aristotle. I think that Nietzsche seems closer to the Stoic tradition in their conceptualization of the human being since they do not divide it into two distinct parts as rational and irrational. In other words, they make a closer bond between our passions/emotions and our rational judgements and thereby present philosophy as a therapy of each individual in a society. In this section, firstly I will draw on Martha C. Nussbaum's *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, which is about some features of the Stoic therapy, and I will try to show the differences between Aristotle and the Stoics. After that, I look at Armstrong's article namely "The Passions, Power, and Practical Philosophy Spinoza and Nietzsche Contra the Stoics", which is about some similarities and important distinctions between the Stoics and Nietzsche and I try to find an answer to the question of "can we think of Nietzsche's philosophy as a Stoic philosophy of art?".

Firstly, I focus on Nussbaum's book's ninth chapter (*Stoic Tonics: Philosophy and the Self-Government of the Soul*), that shows us some similarities between Aristotle and the Stoics in terms of their definition of *eudaimonia* as *the highest end of human life*; and also, their distinctive accounts for the human nature and methods of acquiring virtues. In this chapter, Nussbaum starts with explaining how the Stoics see the philosophy just like "a medical art of the soul" (p. 316). By referring to Cicero, Seneca and Chrysippus she focuses on "the Stoic use of the medical analogy" in order to better explain how they present "philosophical art" as a mean of the "therapeutic treatment of the passions". They regard philosophy as a "necessary" and "sufficient" condition of the ultimate aim of human life (*eudaimonia*) (p. 317). In addition, Nussbaum dwells on the "teacher-pupil relationship", especially referring to Nikidion¹⁴ as a pupil, to show how the Stoic therapy requires a "self-governing of the soul" by each individual in the society.

¹⁴ Nussbaum notes that Nikidion is a character who has to change her social status in different historical processes and presents varied identities across different schools, especially when she has to move from Greece to Roma. In the Stoics, we encounter her name as a pupil who conducts a "polymorphous research" for the good life (p. 45).

This is the necessary condition of a good society. Otherwise, they argue both the individuals and the whole society should be regarded as sick.

According to Nussbaum, the medical analogy is very important in terms of showing the “proper function” of philosophy as a mean of self-treatment guiding an individual to *eudaimonia* and “discovering and justifying a concrete account of its content, methods, and procedures” (p. 317). Accordingly, the Stoics consider philosophy as a “compassionate doctor” for its tendency to cure the sickness of the human beings and leading them to be happy (*eudaimon*). At this point, Nussbaum mentions two important themes¹⁵ in the Stoic tradition: “human self-sufficiency” and “tranquillity”. The Stoics claim that a philosopher, like a doctor, should help to the individuals who are sick, but “. . . The patient must not simply remain a patient, dependent and receptive; she must become her own doctor” (p. 317). If the function of philosophical art (as an “active practical reasoning”) is *eudaimonia*, this requires also the self-sufficiency of each individual in their philosophical treatment. In this respect, Nussbaum shows the difference between Aristotle and the Stoics (p. 318). I think that this is the main difference in relation to my own discussion, which is about their suggestion to achieve the ultimate purpose of the human life. This also refers to the difference between their political attitudes in their philosophy. Just as in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, the Stoics regard the human being as a political being but they do not place the philosophical wisdom out of the ethical life, rather they propose philosophical therapy of passions as “the task of producing a just and humane society” (p. 319). Accordingly, without the active practical reasoning of the citizens, the society has the “political disorder”. This is why the active practical reasoning is a “political virtue” as well as the virtue of an individual. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics do not distinct theoretical life and practical life. That is, the Stoics do not make an intrinsic distinction between philosophical wisdom and practical wisdom. While Aristotle suggests to find the intermediate between excesses and deficiency in our passions through practical wisdom, the Stoics tend to encourage each individual to find the logical error in their passions and desires

¹⁵ Nussbaum says that these themes exist in the Epicureans and Sceptics, too (p. 317).

and to transform them into the true judgements by their own art of philosophy in order to be wise and *eudaimon*. Their method is not about controlling the passions, but transforming them into the true judgements that brings about also a “love of fate” (*amor fati*). They argue that philosophical activity, as a self-treatment, is necessary for each citizen. This shows the practical aspect of their philosophy unlike Aristotle’s account of philosophy.

Nussbaum also focuses on the example of Nikidion and her way of seeing philosophy saying that “. . . She longs for things she does not control, and is not satisfied by the things she does control. She wants to be in charge of her own life, and she also wants to be in love (p. 320). What she understands from “philosophy” (as an “active practical reasoning”) is “to understand herself”. Our capacity of “reasoning” does not only distinct us from the other living things, but also it is the power of our own and our own virtue (philosophical wisdom). So, she wants to live according to her own thoughts and evaluations rather than some dogmas, since only this way of living is worth to live. She sees this as “self-government of the soul”, by continuously examining her own thoughts and beliefs. Beside this, she sees herself as “a member of a community” and “care for the good of all human beings in the community” (p. 320). So, just like Aristotle, Nikidion also emphasizes the importance of teaching, but as a self-teaching in a sense. Nussbaum imagines Nikidion “as a Roman Stoic pupil” by also regarding the Stoics’ respectful attitude toward the pupils¹⁶ (p. 321). At this point, the feature of teacher-pupil relationship seems very important in Stoicism. The role of teacher is not merely giving some advices to the pupil, but rather making him/her to use his/her reason. Accordingly, the teacher makes the pupil to be the teacher of himself/herself through a “thoughtful dialogue” (p. 335). This requires also considering everyone, even the teacher, as a pupil (p: 318). In other words, teacher cannot be an external authority pushing someone toward a virtuous action (p. 344).

¹⁶ Nussbaum also emphasizes the “genderless” aspect of the Stoic philosophy, especially in relation to the example of Nikidion. She also mentions Musonius’ idea that “anyone who possesses the five senses, plus reasoning power and moral responsiveness, should study philosophy” (p 330).

Nussbaum mentions also the practical aspect of the Stoic philosophy, which is “connected with practical choice and avoidance” (p. 326). Accordingly, the active practical reasoning, which is a “divine power” of the human being which is shared with the universe¹⁷, presents someone a virtuous will toward the virtuous action (p.327). In the example of Nikidion, the aim of philosophy is to lead her (as a pupil) to a “self-examination”. This means the examination of her own thinking and selecting the best one among her evaluations and beliefs about something (p. 328). Nussbaum says that “. . . The job of living actively in accordance with one’s own reason, rather than passively, in the grip of habits and conventions, requires vigilance and probing. The teacher’s job is to awaken and assist this complex activity” (p. 328). The teacher is also a doctor who examines her patient (pupil) by looking at how her interaction with the external world affects her in daily life; and the teacher guides her to have a deep understanding about her own emotions and thoughts and to have a true perspective toward life. Nussbaum defines this process as “the intimate medical education” (p. 329) and presents main features of this education of philosophy.

1) “*practical goal*”: In the Stoic tradition, the aim of philosophy is to make the human life more “tolerable” with the help of the true “choice” of one’s own active reasoning among her thoughts and beliefs about something. And if this is necessary in the situation of every single individual rather than only a small minority in society, then there is a need for “many different shapes and forms” of philosophical teaching (p. 331) because each pupil or patient has a different background, which always requires a different process of healing.

2) *Value-relativity*¹⁸: This is about “the integrity of the person and the dignity of reason” (p. 332). Based on finding the error¹⁹ in each individual’s thoughts and beliefs and healing them, she mentions about “the important Stoic idea of innate orientation to the good (*oikeiösis*), the human being’s complex adjustment to the design of the universe” (p. 332). Accordingly, the aim of philosophy leads

¹⁷ Here, Nussbaum notes the Platonic influence in the Stoic idea.

¹⁸ Nussbaum mentions this aspect of philosophical healing in the chapter 10 in more detail.

¹⁹ Nussbaum returns to the origin of error in the chapter 10 as well.

one to be philosophically wise in her inner state in accordance with the nature of the human being that is shared with the universe. This is possible by a critical examination and questioning of some dogmatic ideas that have been convinced by society inappropriately to the nature. Nussbaum says that "Stoic value-relativity is in some important ways different from Aristotelian value-relativity" (p. 333). Just like Aristotle, the Stoics claim that the highest end of each human being is "living in accordance with reason" (in accordance with the nature of human being) and there is a need of a "correct teaching" for this. Aristotle defines the rational part of the human soul, referring to *reason*, as a function that is distinctive from all other living things. Beside the similarities at the point of having this rational capacity as a privilege other than other living things, the Stoics define "reason" in a different manner. According to them, there is a *logos*²⁰ ordering the universe in a certain way with all the members of it. And reason refers to sharing *logos* with the universe as a human capacity. Since only the human being can get the knowledge of *logos* by his/her active practical reasoning, only the human being can be wise (virtuous) and *eudaimon*. So, while Aristotle relates *eudaimonia* (as the "human excellence") with a reason that derives only from the nature of the human being (rationality), the Stoics relate it to fitting to a general order (*logos*) of the universe that manifests itself as a logical/natural tendency toward the *good* (p. 333). It can be said that while Aristotle thinks of bodily passions and desires independent from the rational part of the human being especially if someone is unable to use his/her rational capacity, the Stoics argue that our body (but of course in an ascetic state of being) will be already in accordance with *logos* of the universe unless they are damaged²¹. The common point shared by all the human beings is "reason" and the "superficial distinctions of status, class, origin, gender, wealth" (p. 334) are only external factors to be indifferent. Nussbaum says that ". . . They really believe that prejudice, error, and bad conduct result from incorrect reasoning, not from original evil, or even

²⁰ Here Nussbaum does not use the word *logos* but rather mentions about "a virtuous god, whose self-sufficiency the truly virtuous life attempts to emulate" (p. 333).

²¹ Damage in our body (nature) refers a logical error that manifests itself as passions and desires as the main source of suffering, but I discuss this later.

original aggressiveness or lust or unruliness” (p. 335). So, reasoning will ultimately enable someone to be in accordance with her/his nature.

3) *Responsiveness to the particular case*: Nussbaum starts saying that “. . . Therapeutic argument may take many forms. It may give general theoretical accounts or more concrete precepts. For the teacher, it is very important to take care of “the pupil’s concrete situation” (p. 335). Each individual’s treatment requires a different examination, because the error within one’s thoughts and beliefs would be different depending on the circumstances. Every human being will have a different background in her personal life experience. Even though an education of philosophy is necessary to make the active-practical reasoning possible for each individual, a general prescription is helpless in the examination of the specific cases²². In addition to this, a general education of philosophy is not enough since this is an incomplete process (there is always something to do throughout the life process) (p. 336). Regarding with this “responsiveness to the particular case”, they consider two important things in order to motivate the pupils to see the errors in their false beliefs: “the focus on the concrete and the use of examples” (p. 338). These are regarded as more helpful in conviction rather than giving an advice based on a general argument. At this point, Nussbaum emphasises the significant impact of the narrative on the pupils or patients. The narratives based on vivid examples (*exempla*), with the support of a teacher, encourage the individuals to question their thoughts and beliefs by an active practice of reasoning²³. In the line of all these features of the Stoic tradition, we can say that they have a very different attitude from Aristotle in their emphasis on the self-treatment, even though they agree with him in considering the social and political aspect of the human being. While Aristotle suggest a proper rule of the society and the obedience of the citizens to these rules, the Stoics try to care a continuous questioning of the existing social

²² Nussbaum gives the examples from Seneca and Cicero in order to explain this. She says that “. . . Just as in diseases of body a doctor must choose the appropriate time for the administration of treatment in the particular case, so too with diseases of the soul” (p. 335).

²³ With this, Nussbaum also shows the “inside” nature of the Stoic treatment by a philosophical activity (p. 340).

order. In the political context, we encounter a more critical attitude in the Stoic idea (p. 341).

4) Nussbaum explores the political difference between Aristotle and the Stoics. Accordingly, both of Aristotelian and the Stoic traditions show the importance of caring “the good of other human beings”, and they do not suggest a normative end that can be reached at a point of someone’s life, such as being rich or being very respectful or “well-educated” person. However, while Aristotle presents the *polis* as “the unit within which human self-sufficiency and the good life are achieved”, the Stoics think of the individuals as the “citizen of the world”²⁴, that is as a member of the whole universe like in the example of Nikidion (p. 344).

5) and 7) *Practical reason has intrinsic value*: They recognize the “teacher-pupil relationship” as “symmetrical and anti-authoritarian” (p. 344). An unexamined life means the passivity and denial of the human being’s true nature, thereby a worthless²⁵. They do not suggest merely reading the book, but also and more importantly the “internalization” of them (p. 346). When the books cannot lead someone to the true reasoning or they are misunderstood, there is a danger of being authoritative or misleading for the pupil’s teaching/healing process. In order to ensure the proper activity of philosophy, they give a great importance to “training” and “training weights” (that are “the most important works of the major traditions of moral philosophy”) for “one’s own independent thought” (p. 347-348). In this line, the books seem incomplete without one’s use of them for her independent self-treatment.

6) *Value of logic*: As Nussbaum explains, especially referring to Epictetus, the logical education is very important in reasoning process because the error in one’s thoughts and beliefs must include some inconsistencies that can be detected by the correct use of logic (p. 348-349). If the pupil cannot use the logic correctly, this will lead her in the wrong way.

8) Here, Nussbaum evokes another difference between Aristotle and the Stoics. While Aristotle suggest to calculate the intermediate and to find the only

²⁴ *politēs tou kosmou*, Epict. 2.10.3 and passim (p. 343)

²⁵ Nussbaum presents the Socratic idea that the unexamined life is not worth living (p. 344)

“true one” among “many”, the Stoics emphasize the value relativity much more. They offer reading many different books, also which are non-Stoic as there is always something to learn. They think that “good ideas are public property”, whether or not they belong to their tradition (p. 351). 9) and 10) They defines the philosophical wisdom as both “health-giving” and “delightful” as well as “pleasurable” (p. 353) just like Aristotle but they take this pleasure with a practical aspect of it.

Nussbaum, then, focuses on the Stoic account of the passions/emotion in relation to the “cure” that they offer for the ultimate aim of the human being, namely *eudaimonia*. Firstly, she explains how the Stoic virtue that refers only to the “inner state” of an individual independently from any external condition, is necessary for *eudaimonia* “intrinsically” and “self-sufficiently” (p. 359). At this point, she emphasizes both similarities and differences between Aristotle and the Stoics. Aristotle defines some virtues like “love” and “friendship” as having “intrinsic worth”, which are at some points dependent to the external factors (p. 360). And Aristotle says that some external goods (like wealth or health) can be regarded as having good value in terms of being helpful someone to be good even though the most important thing is to have virtuous character whether the conditions are good or bad. However, the Stoics have a sharper attitude toward the disinterestedness of the external conditions. In Aristotle’s virtue ethics, the virtuous act is not enough to have a virtuous character and be *eudaimon*, the virtuous passions/emotions and desires also are necessary. But he notes that being continent (self-control or *enkrateia*) is better than incontinence (*akrasia*). Accordingly, we see that he gives a moral value²⁶ to the virtuous action even though the motivation behind this is not completely virtuous. Obviously, the inner states of both the continent and the incontinent individuals seems very close to each other. This is why the Stoics do not care such a conceptual distinction between *enkrateia* and *akrasia*.

Nussbaum says that the Stoics judge people only for “their intentions and motives and thoughts” (p. 364) and also says that “what happens internally just is

²⁶ Even though it is a secondary value since it is still not enough for having virtue. Only temperance can be regarded as a moral virtue

an action" (p 365). So, the Stoics virtue is an "inner activity" (p. 366) and they do not a conceptual distinction between practical wisdom and philosophical wisdom like Aristotle does. The most important thing that they deal with is "the analysis of the passions", regarding them as the part of our "rational faculty", and "the description of a philosophical therapy" (p. 367). Nussbaum says that "there is in Greek thought about the emotions, from Plato and Aristotle straight on through Epicurus, an agreement that the emotions are not simply blind surges of affect" (p. 369). As Chrysippus says, "passions are forms of false judgements of false beliefs" (p. 366). That is, the passions include our evaluations about the external things. Differently from Aristotle, the Stoics suggest the therapy of these evaluations (false judgements and beliefs) by the "art of reason". Our interaction with the external world sometimes causes the emergence of false evaluations or beliefs such as fear, grief, anger, envy, pity (p. 370) and they become the sources of our suffering and the obstacles for the human flourishing. This is why they suggest that we should cure them, by looking at our judgements (including the ones causing these passions or emotions) about the external world, and by "seeking out the correct ones and installing them in place of the false", which means the "total extirpation of the passions" (p. 367).

According to Aristotle, the human soul is divided into two parts: rational and irrational, and the appetitive elements (passions and desires) of the irrational part should include some rational judgements for the human flourishing. He suggests the control of the passions and desires in accordance with *phronesis* (practical wisdom). However, Nussbaum says that "The Stoics recognize only a single part of the soul, namely the rational part" (p. 373). This is because the passions actually belong to this rational part of the human being, but not the irrational element of the human soul. The virtue is dependent on the virtuous evaluations of the external things, which means an indifferent attitude toward the thing that are not under the control of the human being like the "vulnerable" external goods that we can easily have and lost. Only our opinions can be good or bad, that is rational or irrational. So, we can clearly see that the Stoics consider passions and desires as our cognitive judgements, but the false ones, about the world.

Beside this, Nussbaum also mentions about “an affective side to emotions that we have difficulty housing in the soul’s rational part” and “the fact that the Stoic reason is dynamic, not static. It moves, embraces, refuses. It can move rapidly or slowly; it can move directly or with hesitation” (p. 380). Based on Chrysippus’ argument, it is wrong to say there is an intrinsic distinction between passions/emotions and the rational faculty of the human being. There is only a therapy of them by the rational activity. In order to better explain the Stoics’ critical attitude toward the twofold nature of the human being (rational and irrational parts), Nussbaum mentions Chrysippus’s “analysis of ethical conflict”. When Aristotle divides the human nature into the two parts, we encounter the picture that “. . . Reason leads this way, desires push that way” (p. 383), which points to an ethical conflict in one’s inner state because of the struggle of the rational part and the irrational part as two opposite drives. She states that “Chrysippus would urge us, instead, to regard the conflict as an oscillation of the whole soul between recognition and denial” (p. 383) by giving example of Nikidion who loses his lover and mourn for his death with grief for a long time. Accordingly, when Nikidion accomplishes her therapy, she will get rid of this struggle derived from her oscillation and her denial of the true judgement about the death of her lover and thereby have the only virtue of her true reasoning.

Of course, this process of healing can take time, just as in the healing of an open wound, because of the dynamic nature of the Stoic reason. The “freshness” of the event causing a pain in one’s inner state (in the example of Nikidion, her grief for the lover’s death) can make this process harder to cure the pain immediately. And actually, the resistance to be free from pain is not derived from another part of the human being, so-called irrational part (passions and desires), but it is derived from the false judgements that belong to the rational part (the only nature of the human being). Nussbaum, by drawing on Chrysippus’ argument, defines one’s vulnerable conditions toward the passions like love, fear, or grief out of the false beliefs (like beliefs in the extreme importance of “money” or “passionate love”) as a “chronic illness” (*nosema*) (p. 388). Such an illness in the soul makes someone open to these destructive passions (including also anger, pity, envy or being anxious

about the future) for *eudaimonia*. This is the main reason of that “. . . The Stoics teach Nikidion that the passions should be not moderated but extirpated” (p. 389) because they make us vulnerable and ill. They are the false judgements that should be cured. So, a wise person is who frees from her passions. The true motivation behind our actions should be our true judgements, but not passions or desires even if they are proper to these judgements. The aim of the Stoic therapy is to make the human soul as not being affected by any external factor whether it seems good or bad.

In the direction of all this, some similarities between the Stoics and Nietzsche begin to emerge, especially in their way of seeing philosophy as a self-therapy and their thinking of the passions as the things that say something about our evaluations. In order to explore these similarities and to see the Stoic influence on Nietzsche's philosophy, now I focus on Aurelia Armstrong's "The Passions, Power, and Practical Philosophy Spinoza and Nietzsche Contra the Stoics". Even though she considers both Spinoza and Nietzsche in relation to Stoicism, I draw on only the parts about the relation between Nietzsche and the Stoics. Armstrong discusses especially the conception of "immanence" (considering the nature of the human being as being completely belonging to this material world, which refers to a "dynamic power") and the "therapeutic enterprise for the human freedom and flourishing" in her comparison of Nietzsche and the Stoics. Beside the close bond between their philosophy, she also highlights Nietzsche's affirmative attitude, unlike the Stoics, toward human vulnerability derived from passions and human suffering as a supportive and increasing condition of human freedom and flourishing.

Starting with the concept of "immanence" both in Stoicism and Nietzsche's philosophy, Armstrong says that for the "human perfectibility" or the "self-overcoming", we need to live in accordance with the immanence of the nature, which also refers to an "ethical naturalism". Nietzsche, who calls this nature as the basis of will to power, says that the human nature, as a part of the whole, tends to move towards the "self-formation" or "self-transformation" through its own capacities (p. 6). This requires also accepting and loving the fate in both Stoicism

and Nietzsche's philosophy, through a philosophical therapy in order to change the "way of seeing the world" (p. 7).

Armstrong looks at different literatures about the Stoic influence on Nietzsche and defines "three major themes": 1) As mentioned before, Nietzsche has a "naturalistic perspective" toward the human being with an affirmative attitude toward "fate". He does not accept twofold nature of human being, unlike Aristotle, but he thinks of human being as a very "natural" and "material" part of the whole universe, by suggesting welcoming all things as a very vital part of the life, and also the fate. 2) Some scholars think that Nietzsche has a very Stoic attitude in his criticism of "pity" or the "unegoistic emotions" (p. 8). 3) There is a discussion on whether Nietzsche agrees with the Stoics or not in assessing the role of passions in the human life. This last theme is the central one in Armstrong's article.

Regarding the first theme, she presents some scholars' comments about the Stoic impact on the Nietzsche "in conceiving of ethics as a form of cognitive psychological therapy that provides techniques and strategies whereby we can change our beliefs, thought processes, and affective states in order to free ourselves from the false evaluations of external events that are the cause of emotional turmoil" (p. 8). Just like the Stoics, Nietzsche also suggests the examination of the passions even though he does not offer the extirpation of them. The Stoics who think of the passions derived from some false evaluations about the external things out of our control make a great emphasis on "psychological independence", "tranquillity of mind", "self-control" and "self-sufficiency" mainly suggesting that we should become indifferent to the external events with healing ourselves by our own reasoning independently to any external authority. So, regarding the third theme – the role of the passions – Armstrong presents two different arguments for the question of "whether Nietzsche has a Stoic attitude toward the passions for the human freedom and flourishing" (p. 9). 1) From the first side considering this question, there is an agreement on that Nietzsche definitely has a Stoic attitude especially on his criticism of pity as a moral emotion. Armstrong says that Martha Nussbaum is one of the most important advocates of this idea. This is because Nussbaum argues that Nietzsche suggests to get rid of this moral emotion with his

criticism of Christian morality, and in order to do this, he embraces the Stoic position in terms of suggesting the “extirpation of the passions” and the “vulnerability” of the human being for freedom and flourishing. In contrast to this perspective, Armstrong mentions Michael Ure’s argument about the Stoic influence in Nietzsche’s philosophy. According to Ure, there are significant changes in Nietzsche’s attitude toward Stoicism during different phases of his thinking” (p. 10). It is fair to say that in the late 1870’s Nietzsche, for instance in his *Human All Too Human* (1878) and *Daybreak* (1881), thinks that the human suffering and vulnerability, mostly caused by the metaphysical and religious ideas in society, as something that should be cured with the help of a philosophical therapy. In this line, he defines the human misery as being under the control of our inner state rather than an external factor, so we need to change “our value judgements” (Armstrong, 2013, p. 10). Beside this, Ure shows that in the early 1880s, for instance in his *Gay Science*, Nietzsche clearly moves away from the Stoic idea based on the extirpation of the passions for *eudaimonia*.

Following all these arguments, Armstrong claims that there is an obvious similarity between the Stoics and Nietzsche in terms of seeing philosophy as a therapy for the human freedom and flourishing, but also a significant distinction in their attitude toward the passions and suffering. Nietzsche is much more affirmative in his accepting both passions and suffering as a very vital part of the human life. The Stoics thinks of the passions as obstacle to the ultimate aim (*telos*) of the human being, which means living in accordance to the nature by the true reasoning, because passions make us vulnerable and open to the affection of the external things and make us to falsely evaluate these things without the understanding that they are not “up to us” (Armstrong, 2013, p. 11). In this line, they suggest two main therapeutic strategies: affirmation of our power of voluntary rational assent and affirmation of divine determinism (p. 12).

This first one refers to the independence of the self in his/her philosophical therapy and to the dissolution of the boundary between the self and the world since they think of the passions as the inconsistencies in our judgements about the external world. The second one refers to a fatalism that is shared by Nietzsche’s

philosophy as well. Regarding these Stoic strategies, Armstrong says that Nietzsche does not seek to find and dissolve an inconsistency in our judgements because he does not claim that the only true essence of the human nature is rational just like the all universe. In other words, he does not agree with the Stoic understanding of “soul atomism” (p. 13).

In contrast to the Stoics, Nietzsche sees the life as a continuous struggle which is the source of our creativity and also health and he criticises the Stoic position for expressing “a negative evaluation of our capability to be affected” (p. 14). This criticism is closely related to his distinctive attitude toward human suffering. Armstrong says that according to Nietzsche, especially in the *Gay-Science*, “. . . The reduction of our capacity for suffering also reduces our capacity for joy” (p. 18). Referring to an important quotation from his *Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSA), she explains Nietzsche’s view that the Stoics cannot see the value of the “pain”, “stimulation”, and “suffering”.

As a counter idea, Peter Groff says that the Stoics accept the inevitability of suffering just like Nietzsche. Groff makes a conceptual distinction between suffering and sorrow and says that what the Stoics want to get rid of is actually sorrow, which is an inner suffering because of the external things (Armstrong, 2013, p. 19). But still there is an obvious difference between Nietzsche and the Stoics because of their different accounts for the human vulnerability. Even though Nietzsche believes that the transformation of the passions can be helpful in dealing with the destructive evaluations and interpretations as some obstacles for the human freedom and flourishing, he does not suggest a total extirpation of them because they are necessary for “the enhancement and growth of human power” (p. 20). He detects the desire behind their ascetic ideal as overcoming the human suffering that come with the life itself. So, he defines the Stoics motivation for the extirpation of the passions as a “sign of weakness” and a “fear of the world and its contingencies” (p. 20), which is a life-negating attitude. So, without making a distinction between the inner and the outer world, he affirms our capacity of both affecting and being affected (as necessary for the possibility of growth and expansion) by his dissolution the Stoic boundary between the self and the external world. Rather than

taking the self as a subject to only the cognitive capacity, he affirms the “internal multiplicity of the self” (p. 21). Rather than getting rid of them, he suggests observing them as the things that say something about ourselves in our interaction with the world.

According to Nietzsche, “love of fate” (*amor fati*) means being open to affection as a necessary result of the interaction of the self with the external world and accepting some possible suffering as a very vital part of life. It is the only way to know ourselves and to live according to this knowledge, that is to live according to our own nature, which is our fate in a sense. This is what Nietzsche offers for the human freedom and flourishing as well. But we need to remember that Nietzsche does not define the human nature as something fixed and same for everybody deriving from a universal order like *logos*. It can be said that his understanding of nature makes sense only in relation to some power relations between the opposite drives (commanding and obeying) and always as something that manifests itself in a different way from a different perspective. This is the essence of life that we should welcome for a healthy life, but not a logical order. Probably, Nietzsche would interpret the proposition of living according to a logical order without no passion and no suffering, as a desire of mastery over the essence of life and the self. But thinking this ascetic ideal as a requirement of a good life cannot be possible in his philosophy. In *Zarathustra*, he says that “Wherever I found the living, there I found the will to power; and even in the will of the serving I found the will to be master (p. 89). Though everyone, even every group, has the will to power, when it (will to power) manifests itself via commanding and attempting to dominate the other, whether this other be a person or a group, then neither the obeying nor the commanding group can have a strong will. Trying to define the human by referring to an Ideal Good and/or through an essence, and accordingly, coming up with some universal moral values and rules, is nothing but an attempt to name, tame and dominate the human individual by making him/her calculable, predictable and reliable. Culture, Nietzsche says, always wants order and it can do it via making the individual deny himself/herself, in other words, by defining the individual as a rational being who has the ability to obey the rules and regulations.

In the next section, I will try to show how Nietzsche places the role of suffering in human life as a necessary condition of it, and each effort to get rid of suffering is actually an effort to interpret life by a certain will to power, which is always a matter of commanding and obeying and the struggle of these drives. He takes the idea of “moral subject”, who is responsible for his/her moral choices, as an invention of the cultures because of the will to remember and continue to desire what is willed once. And it is important to show what the role of suffering is in this process of invention of a memory and the responsible subject by culture. Thereby, we see more clearly why we cannot turn back to an understanding of a human flourishing and freedom that excludes human suffering.

2.4. Suffering and The Freedom of The Will

In the Second Essay entitled *Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Related Matters* of his *Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche starts with discussing how the human animal develops the “prerogative to promise”. He appreciates an “active forgetfulness” as a sign of “spiritual ingestion” which is necessary for “happiness, cheerfulness, hope, pride, immediacy in the past” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 35). However, “this necessary forgetful animal, . . . has bred for himself a counter-device, memory, with the help of which forgetfulness can be suspended in certain cases – namely in those cases where a promise is to be made” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 36). It is about remembering what was willed once. The memory of the cultures who desire the power even though they suffer out of their powerless situation, leads them to think of happiness as a promise. And this promise makes the human being and the future calculable and predictable. In other words, the human being began wanting to see the future and its power not as contingent, but necessary. This is how Nietzsche explains the origins of “responsibility” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 36). This idea of responsibility arises from several power relations throughout the history and from an instinct of “conscience” (we can also call it as the “instinct of freedom” or the “will to power”) as an internalized interpretation of the will. The most important product of this project of seeing the self as a responsible subject is the “sovereign

subject” who has the privilege of “self-mastery . . . mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all creatures with a less enduring and reliable will (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 37). The most important point here is that the idea of responsibility and the value of “guilt” and “bad conscience” is not something universal and fixed, but historical and evolved in company with the contingent results of some power relations. And the most significant instinct concerning the creation of memory, the ability of making promise, seeing the self as responsible for this promise, and the power that he/she gets from this responsibility has a close relation with the pleasure of cruelty in the human animal, the meaninglessness of suffering for the one who suffers and the effort to overcome it. It can be said that this is also an attempt to end the power relation (the essence of life itself) causing suffering. He also considers the ascetic ideal on this ground, saying that asceticism includes the project of fixing certain ideas, fixing the human life and getting free from the passions, and thereby suffering itself. Here, we encounter a life that there is no struggle, conflict, contradiction, and so on.

According to Nietzsche, memory has been always related to suffering²⁷. He says “only something that continues to hurt stays in the memory - that is a proposition from the oldest psychology on earth” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 38). In order to exemplify this, Nietzsche looks at the origins of the practice of “punishment” and emotions of “bad conscience” and “guilt” and how they are attained a moral meaning by the memory of the cultures in relation to suffering derived from some power relations, especially the creditor-debtor relationship. Depending on this relationship, he says that cultures develop the concept of responsible subject who promises to pay his/her debt, and that the source of this responsibility is the debtor’s fear of being punished cruelly by his/her creditor. Nietzsche claims that for a very long time, people used to punish others very cruelly, not for a divine Justice, but only for their enjoyment of revenge and applying their power over the weak one (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 41). While the practice of punishment refers to such a meaning for those who apply power over others, for those who suffers from this practice, it

²⁷ What Nietzsche means by “suffering” here is not something that have a moral value, rather it is a suffering without any meaning beyond life itself.

is meaningless, which is the most painful part of it (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 44). Since the slaves who cannot take revenge and response properly to their masters, had to suppress these instincts and turn them into themselves as a self-torture as if it is a moral responsibility for an imaginary concept of justice (God). Thereby, they approve their suffering and make it meaningful. From the side of the slave who suffers for his/her debt, they become think of suffering as a debt over time, and the self-torture becomes an important part of this responsibility. Nietzsche says “this is what I call the *internalization* of man” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 57). He also explains this transformation in the meaning of suffering with the slaves’ feeling of resentment and their desire of a revenge (actually a will to power) by an external authority, God and his Justice (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 49). With the victory of Christianity that inherits this memory of the culture, this will to power gives the biggest fruit as an idea of “sovereign subject” who has a great power over the life in general with his/her free will. This project of the sovereign subject is regarded as not only “a means for use in the fight between units of power”, but also “a means against fighting in general” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 50). The desire of being oppose to the essence of life itself is actually derived from an instinct of freedom according to Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 59), but not from a concept of “free will” which refers to a kind of spiritual subject who has a moral responsibility to an external divine authority. Nietzsche evaluates this project as a sickness of culture when it becomes the dominant morality in the culture. In this direction, he also criticises other concepts, such as “good naturedness”, “equity”, all “good will”, all “objectivity” on earth (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 46) that have taken their places as some universal and fixed ideas in the culture.

Nietzsche finds the similar relationship (between creditor and debtor) in the relationship between “present generation” and “its ancestors since the original tribal associations” in the primeval times, in relation to the sickness of bad conscience and the privilege of making promise (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 60). In the tribes, he says, there is always an idea of *indebtedness* toward the earlier generations who found the tribe and made many sacrifices for its powerfulness. As an indicator of the tribes’ power, their ancestors (as powerful and fearful creditors) continued to be

kept alive spiritually. In this line, the present generations try to pay their debt with some “sacrifices, feasts, chapels, tributes, above all, obedience for all traditions”. Nietzsche says that as the power of the tribes increased over time, their *awareness of having debts* to these spiritual ancestors and the ancestors’ influence on the tribes increased even more. At one point, “inevitably the ancestor himself is finally transfigured into a god” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 61). Universal reigns bring about the formation of universal gods. “The advent of the Christian God as the maximal god yet achieved, thus also brought about the appearance of the greatest feeling of indebtedness on earth” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 62).

Regarding both the creditor-debtor relation and the present generation-ancestors relation, Nietzsche argues that the moralization of having debt and their internalizations as bad conscience (as a self-torture), is actually an effort to pay the debt and close the account. Because of the impossibility of this, Nietzsche argues that it is transformed into the “eternal punishment” in Christianity and the debt, which is impossible to pay, find the body in Adam’s “original sin”, directing it to the “cursed ancestors” (creditors). And finally, the Christian God sacrifices himself in order to pay the debt with his own suffering, only because of his *love* for the debtors (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 63).

To sum up, Nietzsche tries to show that all the moral value of inner suffering is about the cruelty derived from several power relations in the human history and the instinct of getting rid of the meaninglessness of suffering by the means of the God and his “love” and “justice”. This process led to a mental sickness and it becomes contagious especially with the influence of Christian morality. This sickness is generally about thinking of inner suffering as a moral responsibility for an imaginary (ideal) Justice that is promised by the cultures’ memory. This unshaken belief in justice and “ideal good” and its moral responsibilities seem to play a role in resolving the meaninglessness of suffering much more offering a real health and happiness for people. Nietzsche suggests a “reverse experiment” is possible. This experiment, in principle, includes “the redemption of reality: redeem it from the curse which its idea has placed on it up till now” (Nietzsche, 2007, p.

66). In the other word, there is a need to redeem the meaning of both suffering and happiness from their moral responsibility.

Looking at how Nietzsche places the role of suffering in cultures' creating a Truth of a God that promises an Ideal Happiness in return to a certain type of life as a moral responsibility, we can clearly see that the main source of this creative power is the life itself that includes a continuous struggle of the opposite drives. So, if we want to create our own values as he suggests, we should take this source seriously and accept this essence of the life. This requires also welcoming the suffering, but not an inner suffering as a moral responsibility to an imaginary concept of justice out of life and ourselves. Welcoming our own struggle and suffering means seeking a life experiment that also includes risks, which means the freedom of the will as well. Such a life does not propose a fictional "ideal happiness", but a tasteful and healthy life together with knowing ourselves. Every attempt for attaining a divine or metaphysical value to our lives that bring always suffering too, is actually derived from an instinct of freedom and a desire for overcoming ourselves and the life itself. If these values have not some universal and fixed meanings out of life and ourselves, we should redeem both happiness (as a moral promise of the good life) and suffering (as a moral responsibility for an imaginary justice) from their moral meanings, accepting that there is no greater meaning over the life itself, and creating new values according to our own will in order to live an healthy life. In the direction of these ideas, it can be said that returning to a Stoics' ascetic ideal for the human flourishing and freedom looks like helpless at the point of getting rid of our passions and suffering that are the necessary conditions of the human life, because even the ascetic ideal is derived from a will to power that manifests itself in the desire of a self-mastery. Just like the Stoics, Nietzsche accepts our rational judgements as part of ourselves, but he does not think of them as the only true nature of the human being. He considers our rational judgements all together with our passions, desires, instincts as different perspectives of ourselves as different manifestations of will to power always within an inner and outer struggle of the opposite drives (commanding and obeying). So, in order to obey only our commanding, we should observe and welcome all of these

indicators that say something about ourselves. Nietzsche tells us that we cannot have an immediate, certain and unchangeable knowledge of ourselves because he affirms the inner multiplicity of the self and the continuous struggle of these inner drives according to different circumstances in its interaction with the external world. This is why seeking a self-knowledge required being open to affection by the external world, this is the only way to know ourselves and develops an original attitude and perspective toward the life. This also requires a life experiment with its all risks that can bring about suffering too. Moreover, suffering as a natural result of such a life experiment, is a significant part of what make us who we are, and if we can embrace it rather than reject it, this only makes us stronger.

CONCLUSION

The most intriguing question that led me to start this thesis was “how does the idea of happiness affect our lives both philosophically and politically?”. Actually, it was Sara Ahmed’s books namely *The Promise of Happiness* (2010) and *The Cultural Politics of Emotions* (2014), which led me to think deeply about this question. Sara Ahmed says that all the history of thought is a history of happiness at the same time because of the obvious expectation that there should be an aim of the human life and achieving this aim should make people happy in a way (Ahmed, 2010, p. 19). Instead of asking what is the purpose of the human life and exactly what does happiness means as a natural result of actualization of this purpose, she asks another question: What does happiness do?

She considers happiness as something sticking to the values of certain life styles and thus gaining some values (p. 44). In parallel with this, certain life styles, as some ideals, gain an affective value by creating an expectation that they make people happy. Besides people follow these values in order to be happy, happiness becomes a kind of duty when people achieve these values (p. 7). When people fall outside of these ideals, they become unhappy. Not only that, they can even become the source of unhappiness through the cultural circulation of emotions²⁸. Sara Ahmed gives examples of “feminist killjoys”, “unhappy queers” and “melancholic migrants”, by showing how these people or groups are affectively associated with the ideas about unhappiness. And she prefers to look at some “unhappy archives” emerged from “the feminist (chapter 2), queer (chapter 3), and anti-racist histories (chapter 4) as well as in socialist and revolutionary modes of political engagement (chapter 5)”. She claims that these stories tell much about different possibilities for the politics rather than happy stories, or “happiness dystopias” in her words. (p. 17-18). In general, she tries to present an alternative history of happiness, by showing the unhappy aspect of this history. It can be said that she wants to challenge the

²⁸ Sara Ahmed, in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, explain this process by the concept of “affective economies”. As an example, she focuses on the “hate” and shows “how hate works by sticking ‘figures of hate’ together, transforming them into a common threat, within discourses on asylum and migration” (p. 15).

negative connotations of “unhappiness” as an obstacle for an ideal happiness, a good life. I think that her political attitude, which does not exclude unhappiness from the life, is quite parallel with Nietzsche’s thought which totally rejects a life in accordance with certain moral values for the sake of a promise of ideal happiness and for the hope of getting rid of suffering.

In this direction, the purpose of this thesis, at first, was to analyse the points that Nietzsche had in common with Sara Ahmed based on his critique of Christian idealism and morality. In addition to this previous aim, I wanted to look at Aristotle who finds the origin of the value of the *good* in a different place from most of the people does today. Thereby, I wanted to find an answer to the question of “is it possible to return to Aristotle’s concept of *eudaimonia* as an alternative to today’s meaning of *happiness*, based on Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals and Ahmed’s genealogy of happiness.”

Nietzsche makes a distinction between two kinds of suffering. The first one is that has no meaning beyond this life, and that we should welcome as a part of life. The second one is the inner-suffering such as bad conscience, guilt and shame that should be cured since they are the obstacle for our greatness. He defines these emotions as re-active, self-negating and not literally creative, while defining the happiness of the noble as active, self-affirming and creative. Ahmed obviously rejects this attitude. She offers to challenge the dichotomies between active-passive, affirmation-negation in the part entitled *Happiness, Passivity, Activity*. She says that regarding the emotions such as bad conscience, guilt, shame, fear as some obstacles for someone’s greatness makes the subjects of these emotions as the sources of “unhappiness”. Such an attitude means to underestimate the power of these emotions in terms of presenting different possibilities for politics. She does not want to evaluate these emotions under the dichotomies of activity-passivity, affirmation-negation and claims that the subjects of these emotions who says “no”, may “do” something even though they look like “passive” and their re-active attitude may be more creative from the noble ones who are “proud of their power and happiness” (which is appreciated by Nietzsche). But I think that Sara Ahmed and Nietzsche uses some concepts about emotions in very different contexts. While Ahmed takes

all emotions as social facts, Nietzsche criticises some emotions as a part of the Christian morality and thereby suggests to get rid of these emotions. Since this distinction between them would make my thesis very complicated, I had to give up the part that was related to Ahmed and I conducted my discussion by adhering partly to my second question based on Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity as a slave morality.

So, in the first chapter I explained how Aristotle defines happiness as *eudaimonia* (rational activity of human being), which is the chief good (desired only for itself) of the human life, based on the idea that the distinctive function of the human being is the rational capacity. Even though Aristotle does not demand an external authority out of human being in evaluating the value of the good (his definition of the good is definitely noble), he presents an "ideal happiness" as a final end of the human life. As explained in the first section of the chapter 2, Nietzsche rejects any kind of idealism (divine or not) based on a metaphysical explanation for the good, by emphasising the "difference": the difference of spirits, of dynamics, of perspectives, of interpretations, and of moralities. So, even though Aristotle's virtue ethics presents a noble morality considering the value of the good, I concluded that we cannot turn back to an Aristotelian sense of happiness out of its metaphysical aspect.

In the first two sections, I focus on where Nietzsche looks for the origin of the values and what kind of an attitude, he suggests in order to create new values. At this point it is very significant that Aristotle distinguishes the human soul into two parts: rational and irrational, thereby the human life into two parts: theoretical and practical. Even though the theoretical (contemplative) life is the best among all types, his virtue ethics is mostly about "how an ethical life is possible to guarantee the final end of the human life" because he thinks that theoretical life is not possible without taking the irrational elements of the human nature seriously. Accordingly, we should observe our actions, passions and desires whether they are in accordance with the practical wisdom. So, Nietzsche's proposal to restore the bond between the value of the good and the action/passions/desires seems to share some similarities with Aristotle. However, Nietzsche does not provide a metaphysical explanation

for human nature, nor think of it in a two-part structure. Hence, he does not consider our rational judgements and passions as the characteristics of two different parts of human nature.

So, I realized that Nietzsche could be closer to the Stoics at the point where he dissociated with Aristotle. However, in spite of the similar attitude to take philosophy as a self-treatment for a healthy life, I saw that it cannot be possible to return the Stoics ascetic ideal that suggests the extirpation of passions and thereby the human suffering. Nietzsche's understanding of human flourishing and freedom refers to an incomplete path that in the end there is no final state of rest, since it is an experiment. Thinking happiness as both the modern sense and the Aristotelian or Stoics sense (as an ideal good) is helpless for such a life experiment because it prevents us to know ourselves and to create our own values according to our inner drives. Welcoming suffering seems much more helpful for the chance of our power, growth, and expansion, when we think of it as a very vital part of life. What makes us sick is not our suffering, but the moral meaning we attain to both our suffering and the blind hope that there is an ideal good that promises us an ideal happiness.

In the second essay of his *Genealogy of Morality*, it is obviously seen that Nietzsche sees life as a continuous struggle of opposite drives both in the context of the struggle of different cultures and the context of the struggle of different drives within a single individual. He shows us that all the attempts to create new values or revaluations of them throughout the history, from the perspective of master or slave, politically powerful ones or the weak ones, has been always related to suffering which is the natural result of the life. Therefore, if we create new values in a noble way, but not a slavish way, we need to welcome our suffering rather than rejecting because this makes us stronger. Of course, in order to create our own values, Nietzsche says that we also continuously seek a self-knowledge which is never immediate, clear, or completed. For such a self-knowledge, we should always subject ourselves to a life experiment and be open to the affection of the external life. This is because only then we can discover something about ourselves in our struggle with other wills. All the actions, passions, emotions, desires, instincts, and even rational judgements as some manifestations of will to power, tell something

about our perspective, our interpretation about the life. So, we can know ourselves only by observing them and live only according to our own values created by the power of them. And such a life experiment clearly does not have a promise of an ideal happiness, but rather requires welcoming our suffering and affirming our own power that comes with our suffering.

To sum up, presenting the similarities and differences between Nietzsche's philosophy, Aristotle's virtue ethics and the Stoicism, I basically try to show what kind of a relationship Nietzsche establishes with the world and also himself. Accordingly, trying to get rid of suffering is an empty effort because it is opposed to very essential dynamics of life. Returning to the political aspect of my thesis which was much more obvious at the beginning, I want to say that the philosophical traditions focused on "happiness" ignore the situation of disadvantaged groups. All the effort is related to the question of how the human beings achieve happiness as an ideal good. But this requires thinking of the human kind on a universal ground. In a world shaped by this though, the pursue of happiness seems a positive attitude for the benefit of humanity. But we need to take a closer look at what happens when we listen our actions, passions and desires and what do they say about ourselves and also about "happiness" as a promise of a "good life"? I think these questions bring us to this conclusion that the pursue of happiness is actually lack of seeing the power of the unhappy emotions. Attaining a moral meaning to both happiness and suffering make people to think of happiness and suffering conditionally, which is a very restrictive perspective in the political sense. Based on Nietzsche's philosophy, only if we realize that there is not an ideal happiness as a promise of a certain type of life, we can turn back to ourselves even if this is a hard and risky path. This experience is not about finding and reaching a *Truth* about ourselves or generally about humanity, but being open to affection and struggle as well as being ready to listen ourselves even though there is not a promise of happiness at the end.

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