

ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE PROGRAMS
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THOUGHT MASTER'S DEGREE PROGRAM

KARL MARX AND MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE CONCEPT OF
IDEOLOGY

Umut Mahir ÖZEN

118679016

Assoc. Prof. Ferda KESKİN

İSTANBUL

2021

Karl Marx and Michel Foucault and the Concept of Ideology

Karl Marx ve Michel Foucault ve İdeoloji Kavramı

Umut Mahir Özen

118679016

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ferda Keskin (İmza).....
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

Jüri Üyesi: Doç. Dr. Zeynep Talay Turner (İmza).....
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

Jüri Üyesi: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ömer Albayrak (İmza).....
29 Mayıs Üniversitesi

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih: 26.06.2021

Toplam Sayfa Sayısı: 61

Anahtar Kelimeler (Türkçe)

- 1) Karl Marx
- 2) Michel Foucault
- 3) İdeoloji
- 4) Hakikat
- 5) İktidar

Anahtar Kelimeler (İngilizce)

- 1) Karl Marx
- 2) Michel Foucault
- 3) Ideology
- 4) Truth
- 5) Power

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	v
ÖZET.....	vi
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER I: BIRTH OF A CONCEPT: IDEOLOGY.....	4
1.1. DESTUTT DE TRACY AND IDEOLOGY.....	4
1.2. A SOLID SYSTEM.....	6
1.3. INSPIRERS OF TRACY.....	9
CHAPTER II: KARL MARX ON IDEOLOGY.....	13
2.1. FROM TRACY TO MARX.....	13
2.2. IDEALISM, MATERIALISM AND IDEOLOGY.....	14
2.3. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM IN THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY.....	17
2.4. FROM IDEOLOGY TO COMMODITY FETISHISM.....	21
2.5. FETISHISM OF COMMODITIES.....	24
CHAPTER III: MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY.....	28
3.1. INCAPABILITY OF THE CONCEPT.....	28
3.2. GAMES OF TRUTH.....	30
3.3. EXPERIENCE, PROBLEMATIZATION AND DISCOURSE.....	32
3.4. THE HISTORY OF TRUTH.....	36
CHAPTER IV: KARL MARX AND MICHAEL FOUCAULT.....	39
4.1. RAMIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT.....	39
4.2. FOUCAULT ON MARX AND MARXISM(S).....	40

4.3. MARX AND MARXISM.....	43
CONCLUSION.....	47
REFERENCES.....	51

ABSTRACT

In *The German Ideology*, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels accept the material life, that is, all the intellectual and physical activities, as a result of the activity carried out by humans to earn their living. Thus, the mode of production "conditions" the material life itself. The concept of ideology belongs to this discussion. Michel Foucault, on the other hand, focuses on the relationship between subject and truth while working on why the existing human relations and the "material life" take place the way they are through experiences such as the madness, crime, and sexuality. The polemics on ideology are essentially a discussion of the understanding of truth. In this study, the ideas put forward by Karl Marx and Michel Foucault on this subject will be examined.

Even though Marx and Foucault are seen or depicted as opposites or adversaries, a review of Foucault's texts can clarify this issue. Contrary to what one might think, what Foucault and Marx said about ideology, discourse or truth is not contradictory, but rather complementary. Michel Foucault is not an adversary of Marx but a thinker who has read and implemented Marx. His problem is with a kind of reductionist and determinist understanding of Marxism.

Keywords: Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, Ideology, Truth, Power

ÖZET

Karl Marx ve Friedrich Engels *Alman İdeolojisi*'nde, maddi yaşamı yani içinde bulunulan düşünsel ve fiziksel faaliyetler bütünü, insanın geçimini sağlamak için yürüttüğü etkinliğin bir sonucu olarak kabul eder. Dolayısıyla üretimin biçimi, bu maddi yaşamın kendisini de “koşullar”. İdeoloji kavramı ise bu tartışmada kendisine yer bulur. Michel Foucault da delilik, suç, cinsellik gibi deneyimler üzerinden mevcut insan ilişkilerinin, “maddi yaşamın” nasıl olup da bu şekilde işlediği üzerine çalışırken özne ve hakikat ilişkisini odağına alır. İdeoloji üzerine yürütülen polemikler, özünde bir hakikat anlayışı tartışmasıdır. Bu çalışmada Karl Marx ve Michel Foucault'nun bu konu üzerine öne sürdükleri düşünceler incelenecektir.

Marx ve Foucault birbirlerine karşıt ya da hasım olarak görülseler ya da öyle lanse edilseler de Foucault'nun metinleri üzerine yapılacak inceleme bu konuyu netliğe kavuşturabilir. Düşünülenin aksine Foucault ile Marks'ın ideoloji, söylem ya da hakikat üzerine söyledikleri birbirlerine aykırı değil, büyük ölçüde tamamlayıcıdır. Michel Foucault Marx'a düşman değil, Marx'ı okuyan, Marx'ı işe koşan bir düşünürdür. Onun sorunu bir tür indirgemeci ve determinist Marksizm anlayışı iledir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, İdeoloji, Hakikat, İktidar

INTRODUCTION

Someone who is involved with philosophy would notice the importance of concepts in a short time. Concepts - i.e., terms and notions - help a reader or writer to understand or articulate ideas clearly. Usefulness of concepts arise not only from the fact that they can create common sense between people but also that they make it possible to “do” philosophy. In their book *What is Philosophy?* Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari describe philosophy as the “knowledge through pure concepts.” According to the writers of one of the most pathbreaking books of the twentieth century, *Anti-Oedipus*, “concepts are and remain signed” such as “Aristotle's *substance*, Descartes's *cogito*, Leibniz's *monad*, Kant's *condition*, Schelling's *power*, Bergson's *duration*”. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 7) There is a very tight link between concepts and their “creators” that connects authors’ thoughts to the narrative they seek to tell. One can use the notions of one’s forerunners by “purifying” and “polishing” them, but this is not an adequate way to interact with them. However, a philosopher should “make” and “create” concepts to convince people to use them according to Nietzsche. (as cited in Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 5) They are like “forbidden apples”: When a philosopher “creates” a concept, it starts an irrevocable process. Concepts are like barges which take new meanings from every port they stop by or unload their “surplus” that is decided by a new shipman. Nonetheless, as is in the example of the Ship of Theseus, is it possible to say that this is still the same conveyance? Furthermore, is there only one barge anymore? These questions might seem irrelevant to this inquiry. Yet, the history of the concept of ideology, from the “creation” of this notion to the present, visited the system of thought of numerous philosophers.

Karl Marx and Michel Foucault are among the thinkers who reflect on this concept and express their thoughts in various ways. Although these two thinkers are portrayed as hostile figures by the mainstream philosophical traditions, a discussion around the concept of ideology can have an effect that will shake the foundations of this “idea of contrast.” Yet, it would be both inadequate and

inappropriate to discuss here the philosophical or political justifications which caused these two figures to be regarded as opposites. However, it is necessary to mention the main reasons why this assertion of opposition among these thinkers can be easily put forward. It is possible to mention several excuses for this. One of them is the secondary texts on the thought of Marx and Foucault, which are often among the factors that consolidate this so-called contradiction. As we often see, almost every secondary text creates “its own” Marx or Foucault. In general, it is not so easy (or possible) to save Marx or Foucault from the author. In order to understand what both thinkers really put forward, the first thing to do is to review the entire corpus of the two thinkers starting from the fundamental texts. However, it is not always possible to have sufficient time and opportunity to carry out this kind of inquiry exhaustively. For such reasons, a study that will be carried out by focusing on a common concept that both thinkers have worked on, and the thinkers' texts will make it possible to overcome the aforementioned problems. In this study, the ideas put forward by Marx and Foucault on the concept of ideology will be examined and possible correspondences or contradictions between the thought systems of the two thinkers will be revealed.

While analyzing this topic it was an inevitable necessity to deal with the thoughts of Destutt de Tracy on ideology since he coined the term and sought to explain the conceptualization of the notion to his contemporary thinkers and humanity by his corpus. On the other hand, a study on the thought of Tracy would also require investigating the potential roots of his ideas, beliefs, and reasoning. The concept was also a “product” of the French Enlightenment and the French revolutionary process. Therefore, it was necessary to examine the historical and philosophical background from which the concept emerged. This research is essential to understand the relationship of Karl Marx and Michel Foucault with this concept.

Consequently, in first chapter of this study, entitled “Birth of a notion: Ideology”, I will undertake to summarize the history of the birth of the notion to build a foundation in order to help the reader to understand further chapters of this

dissertation without difficulty. In second, entitled “Karl Marx on Ideology”, I will examine several fundamental works which are going to help us to understand Karl Marx (and Friedrich Engels)’s approach to ideology. In third, entitled, “Michel Foucault and The Concept of Ideology”, I will undertake to show philosophical methodology and relation to concept of truth of Michel Foucault in order to explore potential links between Marx and Foucault. In the fourth and last chapter, entitled “Karl Marx and Michel Foucault”, I will investigate Foucault's relation to Marx and Marxism, and will point out some of the differences between Marx and 20th century Marxism.

CHAPTER I

BIRTH OF A CONCEPT: IDEOLOGY

1.1. DESTUTT DE TRACY AND IDEOLOGY

The concept of ideology, the subject of this study, is also “signed” by a thinker, like the former and latter notions that came into existence in the history of thought. Despite the fact that sometimes it is hard to trace the origins of a notion, this cannot be said for the concept of ideology since one can identify the very beginning of the term conveniently. Even so, when French Enlightenment philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy coined the term as “science of ideas” in his work *Eléments d'idéologie (Elements of Ideology)* in the year 1801, during revolutionary times of France, he probably did not expect it to take its current place in western philosophy. Antoine Destutt de Tracy’s magnum opus has been published in French between 1801 and 1815 in four volumes: *Idéologie proprement dite* (1801), *Grammaire* (1203), *Logique* (1805), and *Traité de la volonté et de ses effets* (1815). The English edition of the book was translated and edited by the U.S. president and American intellectual Thomas Jefferson, who played a unique role in the American Revolution. Jefferson chose the volume *Traité de la volonté (Treatise On the Will)*, as a fundamental part of the opus and published the book by changing the original name to *A Treatise on Political Economy* in 1817. (Terrell, 2009, p. ii)

12

The word ‘Ideology’, in French ‘*idéologie*’, is a combination of Greek words ‘*idéā*’ and ‘*logiā*’. There is an important relation between the history of the concept of ideology and the French Revolution as mentioned above. *Institut de France*, which is founded by the Convention in 1795, is an institution that Tracy

¹ See Tracy, A. L. (1817). *A Treatise on Political Economy*. (T. Jefferson, Trans.), Georgetown, D. C.: Joseph Mulligan)

² I will make use of the reprinted edition by Ludwig von Mises Institute in 2009 in this dissertation. (see Tracy, A. L. (2009). *A Treatise on Political Economy*. (T. Jefferson, Trans.) Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute.)

and other French revolutionaries were members of.³ (Lichtheim, 1965, p. 165) The main figures who worked with Tracy in the Institute were Cabanis, Francois Thurot, Wenceslas Jaquemont, Jean-Baptiste Say, Garat, Marquis de Lafayette, Dupont de Nemours and others. (Terrell, 2009, p. ii) The motive behind the foundation of the Institute was to start a higher education system that seeks to contribute to the philosophy of Enlightenment across the country. (Lichtheim, 1965, p. 165) On June 20, 1796, Destutt de Tracy announced “ideology” as a new science because it was a necessity: “‘Metaphysics’ was too discredited and ‘psychology’ implied a knowledge of the soul, knowledge which no one could any longer claim to have.” (Kennedy, 1979, p. 354) For Tracy, thanks to the Greek origin of the word, the concept would not cause any confusion since it does not bear any “doubtful” or “unknown” meaning for people. Contemporary historians easily adapted themselves to this “new science” because of its satisfying explanations and overlooked the comprehensive meaning of the notion. (Kennedy, 1979, p. 355) Academicians from the Institute named themselves ideologists after the acceptance of this new “rationality”.⁴ George Lichtheim who wrote a detailed article about the heritage and the theoretical background of Destutt’s and ideologists’ approach says (Lichtheim, 1965, pp. 165-6):

The "ideologists" of the Institute were liberals who regarded freedom of thought and expression as the principal conquest of the Revolution. Their attitude was "ideological" in the twofold sense of being concerned with ideas, and of placing the satisfaction of "ideal" aims (their own) ahead of the "material" interests on which the post-revolutionary society rested. They could put up, at least temporarily, with an enlightened dictatorship which safeguarded the major gains of the Revolution, but not with a regime which visibly steered back towards an absolutism supported by established religion.

³ Ironically, Napoleon Bonaparte was the “honorary member” of the institute from 1797 until he closed the institution in 1801. He even signed some proclamations to the Army as "*General en chef, Membre de l'Institut*" during the campaign of Egypt in 1797-98. (Lichtheim, 1965, p. 165)

⁴ Napoleon, who is the lifetime enemy of the “liberation” that the ideologists seek to achieve, were calling them cynically “ideologues”. (Terrell, 2009)

1.2. A SOLID SYSTEM

In 1805, Tracy referred to Ideology as “a solid and well linked system” in the volume “*logique*” of the *Elements*. (Kennedy, p. 363) This was not very surprising given that there was a struggle between ideology and “theology” at that time. The reason of the past centuries, theology of Christianity, was the mainstream theoretical approach of “humanity” until Descartes’ attempt to justify the idea of “God”.⁵ (Descartes, 1993) This move of Descartes opened up a path for the “new philosophy”, according to the general acceptance about the history of thought. English empiricist John Locke who was influenced by but “deviated” from René Descartes’ position by replacing his conception of the *ratio* with the idea of the *tabula rasa* and his adfected successor, French sensationalist Étienne Bonnot (Abbé) de Condillac were the two main figures that influenced Destutt’s concept of *idéologie* and the system of thought of the Enlightenment philosopher. (Klein, 1985) (Lichtheim, p. 167) Condillac’s “liberalism and deductive methodology” influenced Tracy, and he built his ideas -especially on the economics- upon this approach. Lockes’s contribution to the ideologists and Tracy’s ideas reveal themselves in Destutt’s articles about “property rights”. It is also possible to say that the positivist philosophical tradition played a fundamental role in his works. Jean-Baptiste Say’s paradigm on “subjective-value tradition” and his stance against calculative and algebraically expressed versions of the social sciences may have been anticipated by Tracy before Say had published them. Tracy and the ideologues differ from the French positivists who were trying to employ physical sciences’ tools in the social sciences: “It would be a misunderstanding of ideology to say that its purpose was to unify the physical and social sciences.” (Terrell, p. ii) Despite the fact that they recognized the principal difference between social and physical sciences the ideologists preferred to apply deductive methods in these two divergent fields as Daniel Klein wrote (Klein, pp. 53-4):

⁵ see Descartes, R. (1993). *Discourse on method and Meditations on First Philosophy*. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.

Some historians have seen the *idéologues* as forerunners of French positivism because of the close affiliation of the physical and the moral in their work. The language of the *idéologues* does indeed often suggest this and left room for later misunderstanding, yet their main thrust was actually to make separate sciences. The mode of analysis is the same in all endeavors: to establish primary principles which come from the most simple ideas (hence the name ‘ideology’), which in turn come directly from our sensations. What distinguishes the different sciences is the object being investigated, and the *idéologues* definitely believed that the social sciences give way to a very differently structured body of thought than do the physical sciences.

Destutt de Tracy and Condillac were of the same opinion on accepting “sensation” as the main principle of the formation “knowledge”. Tracy expresses his opinion that people’s notional or theoretical considerations should be based on a first principle by referring to Condillac: “This grand idea of Condillac, that all the truths are one and that they are all contained in a first, will be realized, and it will be evident that it is so only because the attributes of all our possible propositions - when they are true- are but secondary attributes of a definite first proposition.” (cited in Klein, p. 62-3) Yet there are fundamental issues on which Tracy does not agree with Condillac about central elements of his system of thought. According to Condillac, knowledge had “an immaculate, all-encompassing tautological structure” and this smooth understanding resided in God’s mind. However, it was probable that Destutt de Tracy was an atheist. (Klein, p. 63) Tracy’s possible atheism and secular approach can be seen in the articles that he wrote anonymously in the journal *Mercure* of 1799, by summarizing Charles-François Dupuis’ work titled “*Origine de tous les cultes*” (Origin of all cults) to show all the religious beliefs -including Christianity- are some kinds of zodiac or sun worship. (Kennedy, p. 356) In fact, when we consider “religious” attacks to the French Enlightenment tradition of thought, it is very hard to say that this courageous step in the history of philosophy is not in a relationship with the historical background which has been a stage for the “war” that happened among a number of distinct groups adhering to diametrically opposed political and philosophical “values”. Divergence among

these French philosophers was not only about the “divine source” of knowledge but also about Condillac’s use of the term ‘reasoning’ synonymously with ‘calculation or algebraic expression’. Tracy did not agree with this understanding and objected to these “reasonings” (as cited in Klein, p. 63)⁶:

...the *langue des calculs* of Condillac, so eminently remarkable for the excellence of its author’s method and the perfection it shows in stating his ideas, does not satisfy me completely, and appears to rest on a principle that is not quite correct. It is related to our discussion of the subject and predicate of the same proposition. They are not perfectly equal; but the one contains the other. ... A calculation is not only a reasoning; it is a reasoning on the ideas of quantity, and susceptible, by that circumstance, to be done with particular signs; in a word, it is a reasoning having the characteristics which are typical for it. This is why one can say, a calculation is a reasoning, and one cannot say reasoning is a calculation. Reasoning is the genus; calculation is only the species. Therefore, you can transform all calculation into a reasoning, but you cannot transform all reasoning into a calculation. (Tracy, 1818, p. 321-22)

The concept of ideology of Destutt de Tracy was based upon these theoretical distinctions. Outcomes of this discussion with Condillac reveal themselves in Tracy’s opus magnum of. Despite Condillac’s inclination to qualify “...his naturalism by retaining the traditional religious emphasis upon the substantive reality of man’s soul and the uniqueness of man compared with the animal creation”, Tracy praises Locke and Condillac’s approaches for prologizing into “natural history of ideas”, which is, “the scientific description of human mind.” (Lichtheim, p. 167) Destutt also postulates the study of ideology as a part of zoology by combining “materialist” thoughts of Cabanis with “Lockean sensationalism of Condillac.” (*ibid*) Emmet Kennedy, who focuses on Destutt de Tracy’s philosophy and the notion of ideology, writes that “at stake was a whole political and social philosophy, a conservative post-Thermidorean liberalism of a part of the propertied

⁶ I have had to make use of Daniel Klein’s translations and quotations when using his emphasis’ in this study due to the difficulty of finding old and French editions of the volumes Destutt de Tracy had written.

class, an Ideology which was strongly materialist in its conception of the relationship between the physical and moral” when describing Ideology, and also highlights secular and “earthly” aspects of the concept. (Kennedy, p. 356) Tracy’s particular interest in economics and social relations put his conceptualisation to a different position than his predecessors’. Yet, Condillac’s place in this process can be seen as a ring that chains “scholastic” theoreticians of economy to the secular ones such as Destutt de Tracy, Louis Say and so on. (Klein, p. 64)

1.3. INSPIRERS OF TRACY

The “revolutionary” heritage of Tracy and ideologues was not only to suggest secular ideas against the illiberal regime of monarchy but also to transform society by pedagogical methods. Approaching society from this materialistic point of view gave ideologists a “right” to organize people in the order of the “reason”. In accepting ideology as a part of zoology, Tracy argued that human psychology must be analyzed in terms of biology, that is to say one should bypass religion in this process. By using the word “any other solid base” in the first paragraph of *Éléments d'idéologie* Tracy was implying this “reality”: “At the end of my logic, I have traced the plan of the elements of ideology, such as I conceived they ought to be, to give a complete knowledge of our intellectual faculties, and to deduce from that knowledge the first principles of all the other branches of our knowledge, which can never be founded on any other solid base” (de Tracy, 2009, p. xx) “Naturality” of the ideas that were inferred by the “ideological” studies, gave the ideologists the opportunity to explore “true” laws of society, by reducing individual ideas to generally accepted notions. Ultimately, the natural was the social since humans discovered the rules of society by a neologism which was acknowledged as “scientific methodology”. “Science of ideas” also had the potential to provide the “true knowledge” to the lawgiver to make “him” rule society in a manner that was based on the “common good”.

As Condorcet mentioned in *Tableau historique*, Tracy and he were sharing the same “dream” in order “to lay bare the guiding principles of republican citizenship” so “once human nature is properly understood, society will at last be able to arrange itself in a harmonious fashion.”⁷ (Lichtheim, p. 167) This attitude of Tracy and other ideologues rested upon the French Enlightenment tradition which was enriched by such philosophers as Francis Bacon, Abbé Condillac, Paul Henri Thiry baron d'Holbach, Claude Adrien Helvétius, and so forth. Cartesian rationality that influenced the thought cast of the whole western civilization was also another factor. The ties of “morality” to its religious bases were severed and morality was tied to “nature”, which was described by the ideologists under the light of “reason”. Condillac, by changing Bacon’s concept of *idolum* which means unlogical icons that have to be destroyed (Bacon, 1902) into the notion of *prejugé* which “retard(s) the progress of knowledge and lead(s) us into so many errors” (Condillac, 1756, p. 319) presented Holbach and Helvétius a novel term. Holbach, in the preface of his book *Système de la Nature ou Des Loix du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral*, (*The System of Nature or, the Laws of the Moral and Physical World*), underlines humans’ “ignorant” situation on the earth and the necessary act for salvation with the notions of Condillac (d'Holbach, 1839, p. v):

The source of man's unhappiness is his ignorance of Nature. The pertinacity with which he clings to blind opinions imbibed in his infancy, which interweave themselves with his existence, the consequent prejudice that warps his mind, that prevents its expansion, that renders him the slave of fiction, appears to doom him to continual error ... To remove this Cimmerian darkness, these barriers to the improvement of his condition; ... It exacts more than common exertion; it needs a most determined, a most undaunted courage—it is never effected but by a persevering resolution to act, to think for himself; to examine with rigour and

⁷ French thinker and founder of the discipline of sociology Émile Durkheim, who lived almost half a century later than ideologists’ era, was arguing almost the same opinions about the society we live in. The idea of the need for a scientific basis -Durkheim was mourning for the lack of this knowledge on his time- to understand the society completely, is very similar to the ideologists’ approach to examine socio-economic conditions. *See:* (Durkheim, 2014) (Eagleton, *Ideology an Introduction*, 1991, p. 110)

impartiality the opinions he has adopted. He will find that the most noxious weeds have sprung up beside beautiful flowers...⁸

These Baconian *idols* were now *prejugés* in contrast to “reason”, which should be restored by the effort to create an “unprejudiced” understanding of nature. Helvétius, who has views similar to Holbach’s and others’, takes this approach one step further by concluding that “our ideas are the necessary consequence of the societies in which we live.” (as cited in Lichtheim, p. 168) Moreover, Helvétius says, “education can do anything” in order to ground his insight which accepts “prejudices” as an unavoidable production of the “social constraint and narcissistic interest” that can be avoided by reason. (Helvétius, 1810) The heritage they acquired from their ancestors and doctrinized as an “ideology” of the brand-new regime of the French Republic was this belief in a broad sense, yet “the point here is that, for all the inherent scepticism with respect to shared beliefs, the power of rational thought was not seriously called in question.” (Lichtheim, p. 169)

At the time ideologues were actualizing their “revolutionary” ideas and thereafter, Napoleon and the establishment started to smear them by blaming them of being “dangerous dreamers” and “...vilified not only for venality, and for propounding metaphysics (which they actually wished to bury), but also for bringing into power Robespierre whom they all abhorred.” (Kennedy, p. 359) As early as 1800 another Enlightenment intellectual who believed in the liberal values as -almost- much as Tracy and others, Benjamin Constant (Welch, 1985), wrote the following sentences in a newspaper article to criticize the ideologists during the revolution years:

The civilian faction is also called by the name metaphysical faction or ‘idéologues.’ Flatterers of Robespierre, they drove him to death, by the very excess of power they allowed him. They used the Directory to proscribe talents which

⁸ This rich elaborate literary style of the Holbach was not unrelated to the experience of ideologists either. Most of the people who joined the combat to change the “world” have been massacred by the “Cimmerian darkness” he mentioned, and the survivors -all together with their “comrades”-, have been the bold “warriors” fighting for their ideals.

overshadowed theirs. They looked for heroes to bring down the Directory. Today they have hatched new plans. (as cited in Kennedy, p. 358)

The authoritarian “nature” of Ideology was also criticized by Victor Cousin, the spokesman of the dominant group, the Doctrinaires, which fed the Second Empire by their philosophy that regularly was called “eclectic or spiritualist.” Even though Cousin remained distant from materialist thoughts of his century and saw Ideology as “almost like a religion”, he admired Destutt. Nonetheless, Cousin still criticized Tracy and the ideologues’ “systematization of ‘free thought’” as “being dogmatic and intolerant.” (Kennedy, p. 363)

As it can be seen, the emergence of the concept of ideology and the meaning ideology undertakes over time cannot be separated from the French enlightenment tradition and the fate of the revolution. Although Destutt de Tracy has put forward a "neologism" that he thinks will be for the common benefit of all humanity with good intentions, the emerging pedagogy issue and the totality of the concept are questioned by various thinkers. Of course, Tracy and the ideologues are not solely responsible for the pejorative usage of the concept. However, it must be admitted that the "science of ideas" has some philosophical and political dilemmas. In this context, Karl Marx asks "who will educate the educators?" and he shows the limits of pedagogical methodology and takes a critical position against ideologues. This critical approach will be discussed in the next chapter of this study while examining Marx's approach to the concept of ideology.

CHAPTER II

KARL MARX ON IDEOLOGY

2.1. FROM TRACY TO MARX

The main objective of the first chapter was to prepare a solid base for Karl Marx's approach to the concept of ideology by summarizing the historical and theoretical background of the notion's different aspects such as empiricist, positivist, sensualist, pedagogical, rationalist, “metaphysical”, and “revolutionary.” Successors⁹ of Tracy and other ideologists did not follow the footsteps of their “predecessors”. In the course of time the notion of ideology, as argued at the end of the previous chapter, gained a pejorative meaning given by the political and philosophical opponents of the coiners of the methodology.¹⁰ Yet, this hostility was based upon divergent causes: in the case of Napoléon it was a political enmity or in the case of Victor Cousin and Auguste Comte¹¹ a theoretical disagreement. According to the Destutt de Tracy and other ideologists’ optimistic rationality, “truth is correspondence with reality” says David McLellan and can be obtained by “people of good will” by observation and reason with a methodology which is not radically dissimilar to the methodology of natural sciences’. However, there is another path which is in contrast with the French one and which has German roots, which was originally affiliated with G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx, and which goes through Karl Mannheim to Jürgen Habermas. This line intended to accept “truth” as a product of social relations that are not concrete and there is a suspicion about the “objective acceptance” of what is “true”. This philosophical tradition seeks not to observe the “truth” but how the “truth” is made. (McLellan, 1986, pp. 8-9) In this

⁹ Successors mentioned here are German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The word “successor” does not imply any continuity among them and Destutt de Tracy along with other French Enlightenment thinkers who used the term of ideology as “science of ideas”, as we would show.

¹⁰ There is a general acceptance on the issue of the transformation of the “meaning” of the concept in the historical process. see: (Eagleton, 1991) (Eagleton, Introduction, 1994) (Kennedy, 1979) (Lefebvre, 1982) (Lichtheim, 1965) (Maynard, 2017) (McLellan, 1986) (Welch, 1985)

¹¹ Comte on *idéologie*: “Metaphysics finds itself radically discredited by a metaphysician who believed he had escaped it because he had the firm intention to do so, the whole effect of which was essentially limited to the simple change of names.” (as cited in Kennedy, p. 365)

chapter, I will examine Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' approach¹² to the concept and the theory of truth by making use of their literature, specifically "*The German Ideology*" (1845), (*Die deutsche Ideologie*); "*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*" (1852), (*Der 18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon - Die Revolution*); "*A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*" (1859), (*Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*); "*Capital. Volume I: The Process of Production of Capital*" (1867), (*Das Kapital. Erster Band. Buch I: Der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals*) to emphasize and trace their world of thought.

2.2. IDEALISM, MATERIALISM AND IDEOLOGY

The concept of ideology in Karl Marx's thought is a very hard topic to comprehend. As many scholars assert¹³, ideology is the part of theory of alienation and historical materialist view of Marx which has roots that can be traced from "*Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*" to his magnum opus *Capital*, and that "evolved" or clarified in time. But of course, there is no consensus on the issue. Yet, there is a pathway to track, and I will attempt to examine this matter by using their works mentioned above starting with *The German Ideology*.¹⁴ According to Terry Eagleton, Napoleon's critique of ideologues was based on the idea that there was an irrational aspect in excessive rationalism. Eagleton adds that "... the term ideology gradually shifts from denoting a sceptical scientific materialism to signifying a

¹² Even the concept of ideology has been discussed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in "The German Ideology" in extenso, understanding Marx's ideas on the "theory of truth" requires reading his opus in detail, as the reader can see onward. For this reason, I used only Marx's name in the title of the study but it does not mean that Engels was not a part of this theorization or contribute it.

¹³ See: (Barrett, 1991) (Eagleton, 1991) (Lefebvre, 1982) (McLellan, 1986) (Mepham, 1972) (Parekh, 1982)

¹⁴ The German Ideology is a very "problematic" work of Marx and Engels. Even though it did not have been published until the 1920s, it has a fundamental effect on the discussions around the concept of ideology. Despite Marx mentions that they "abandoned" it to the mercy of mice and Engels underlines "incompleteness" of their knowledge at the time they wrote the work, there is enough "content" to obtain. (Marx & Engels, 1977, pp. 183, 585) While discussing the significance of *The German Ideology* regarding the course of the concept of ideology in Marx's thought, Jorge Larraín accepts the analysis conducted in *Capital* which clarified the "origins and functions of ideology" and suggests that it was development, "not the abandonment of the ideas sketched in *The German Ideology*". (Larraín, 1983, p. 17)

sphere of abstract disconnected ideas; and it is this meaning of the word which will then be taken up by Marx and Engels.” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 70) This shift of the notion can be discerned in the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels especially in the *German Ideology*, (*Die deutsche Ideologie*), in which they discussed the ideas of Hegel and contemporary famous German “ideologues” or “idealists” such as Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner who are labeled “Young-Hegelians”. In the said work and other books such as “*Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*” (*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*)¹⁵ and “*The Holy Family*” (*Die heilige Familie*), Marx & Engels use the term ideology instead of idealism and the notion of idealist (for Hegel, Bauer and Stirner) instead of ideologist. (Parekh, 1982, p. 1) In one of the crossed-out passages of *The German Ideology*, Marx & Engels also talk about the issue of idealism of Hegelian philosophy:

There is no specific difference between German idealism and the ideology of all the other nations. The latter too regards the world as dominated by ideas, ideas and concepts as the determining principles, and certain notions as the mystery of the material world accessible to the philosophers.

Hegel completed positive idealism. He not only turned the whole material world into a world of ideas and the whole of history into a history of ideas. He was not content with recording thought entities, he also sought to describe the act of creation. (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 30)

The critique of Marx and Engels was not only directed to “positive idealism” of Hegelian thought but it was also targeting Feuerbach’s “old materialism”. Marx's approach to Hegel's idealist view, which accepts "ideas" as the executive power of the human activity, can be reviewed within the scope of the discussion about the "true" constitutive force of reality. According to Marx, reality is a “sensuous human activity, practice” and neither idealism -taking consciousness

¹⁵ In this work, Marx criticizes the Hegelian idealist philosophy clause-by-clause on the issues of state, civil society, role of estates, sovereignty, and so on. Marx argues that “Hegel should not be blamed for describing the essence of the modern state as it is”. (Marx & Engels, 1977, p. 127) This approach is so crucial because he is aware that “the origin of the Hegelian inversion was in reality itself: the bourgeois state itself is an abstraction separate from civil society”, so it is possible to say the idea of “ideology stem from reality itself” can be found in early writings of Marx. (Larrain, 1983, p. 12)

as independent from material conditions- nor old materialism -suggesting consciousness is a “passive reflection of external reality”- may explain existing conditions of humankind. (Larrain, 1983, p. 18) Marx, mentions old idealism and old materialism in *Thesis on Feuerbach*:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in *Das Wesen des Christenthums* [*The Essence of Christianity*], he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity. (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 569)

Idealism, for Marx, is based on the various beliefs on human consciousness such as autonomy, self-sufficiency, and capability of being examined and studied. As explained in the previous chapter of this study, French ideologists had almost the same assumptions about human consciousness. Bhikhu Parekh, writer of *Marx's Theory of Ideology*, emphasizes this issue by referring to Destutt de Tracy¹⁶:

As he uses the term, idealism is a theory about the nature of consciousness, and covers not only what is generally called idealism but also empiricism. For Marx empiricism challenges idealism at the epistemological but not at the deeper level, and continues to share its basic view of the nature of consciousness. As such it is a form of idealism. Like the idealists, the empiricists detach consciousness from its socially situated human subject, and study ideas and sensations in an

¹⁶ Relationship between Marx and Tracy was enquired by Emmet Kennedy on his study about Destutt de Tracy and he notices that “The uniqueness of Tracy’s liberal economics is its title, which Marx frequently cited as an exemplary defense of capitalism. Ideology, thanks to Tracy, became for Marx neither simply science of ideas nor liberal political theory, but a system of thought which seeks to justify the existing mode of production and the social relationships which spring from it.” (Kennedy, 1979, p. 368)

asocial and ahistorical manner. Hence Marx's conclusion that the basic assumptions of de Tracy and the other empiricists were the same as those of the German philosophers. (Parekh, 1982, p. 7)

This "ahistorical" or "dehistoricized" understanding, can be seen in the thought of Feuerbach, especially in his work, *The Essence of Christianity*, in which he seeks the foundations of the religious illusion in humankind's real living conditions. However, Marx and Engels reject Feuerbach's heritage and claim that he "does not see that the 'religious sentiment' is itself a social product." For Marx and Engels, the point was to change the world, and not only "interpret" it in various ways as philosophers had done before. By resolving "the essence of religion into the essence of man", Feuerbach had to presuppose "an abstract human", define "religious sentiment" (*Gemüt*) as in itself and abstract it from the "historical process." The abstraction of the so-called essence of humankind from its historical background, led Feuerbach to not understand that his analysis of the "abstract individual" "belongs to a particular form of society." (Marx & Engels, 1998, pp. 570-1) These two different interpretations of German philosophers, idealism and old materialism, made it possible for Marx and Engels to open a path to what they called "historical materialism".

2.3. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM IN *THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY*

"By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their material life." (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 37) This sentence is the first indicator of the historical materialist approach put forward by Marx and Engels. At the beginning of the text, Marx and Engels state that their premises were the real individuals, their actions and the material conditions of their life, both already existing and produced by their actions. Hence, their first premise is the existence of living people. In this sense, according to Marx and Engels, the first "fact" to be determined is the physical organization of individuals and the consequent relationships they establish with nature. "All historical writing" says Marx and

Engels “must set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.” (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 37)

As argued above, the features that distinguish humans from other animals emerge through their production processes “conditioned by their physical organization.” This mode of production is also a form of “expressing their life”, a “mode of life” which gives an idea about what they are. In conclusion, “what they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.” (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 37)

According to Marx and Engels, the fact that production has such an intricate and strong conditioning force is related to population growth. Population growth brings the division of labor with it. According to them, the level of development of the division of labor also reveals how advanced the productive forces of a nation are. Each productive force also leads to the further development of the existing division of labor. Marx and Engels describe the consequences of the division of labor by giving historical examples¹⁷:

The division of labour inside a nation leads at first to the separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labour, and hence to the separation of *town* and *country* and to the conflict of their interests. Its further development leads to the separation of commercial from industrial labour. At the same time through the division of labour inside these various branches there develop various divisions among the individuals co-operating in definite kinds of labour. The relative position of these individual groups is determined by the way work is organised in agriculture, industry and commerce (patriarchalism, slavery, estates, classes). These same conditions are to be seen (given a more developed intercourse) in the relations of different nations to one another. (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 38)

¹⁷ Here Marx and Engels discuss various forms of property such as tribal property (Stammeigentum), ancient communal and state property, and feudal or estate property with a detailed account of their historical processes. Since the subject of this text is the social world dialectically “created” by these forms and processes, those details will not be covered here.

Certain individuals who engage in certain productive activities take part in certain social and political relations. According to Marx and Engels, in each case, empirical observation has to reveal the relationship between the social and political structure and production without any fictitious or confounding approach. In this context, the social structure and the state always emerge from the life processes of certain individuals. However, as mentioned above and explained by Marx and Engels with historical examples, these individuals are real people who act, produce and “work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.” (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 41) According to them, production of ideas, notions and consciousness is also directly related to the “language of real life”, material actions and material relations of humans. Mental relations of human beings still occur as the “direct efflux” of their material actions. Likewise, mental production is created by these actions. In other words, ideas and notions are produced by real people who are conditioned by their material relations.

Hence, by arguing that “consciousness [das Bewusstsein] can never be anything else than conscious being [das bewusste Sein], and the being of men is their actual life-process”, Marx and Engels reveal their conception of consciousness. (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 42) For Marx and Engels, the upside-down approach of “ideologies” to people and to their relations as in a “camera obscura” results from these material life conditions. Likewise, as people move their material production and material relations forward, they change their ideas and the products of these ideas along with their actual world. Therefore, “it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.” (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 42) According to Marx and Engels, this is the ultimate result of the actions of active, acting and producing individuals. Therefore, history ceases to be “an imagined activity of imagined subjects” as it is with the idealists, and it becomes “empirically perceptible”.

Marx and Engels repeatedly discuss the historical acts of humanity and their consequences. The first historical act is the production of the means to satisfy the primary necessities like food, housing and clothing, thus, production of the material

life itself. Humanity continuously performs this historical act to sustain itself. This act constitutes a fundamental condition for all history. In addition, new needs arise as a result of the satisfaction of the first one and this is regarded as the first historical act by Marx and Engels. The third relationship which is a part of historical development is that people “propagate themselves” by making new people; it is the family relationship between parents and children, men and women. These three “moments” are not connected to each other by a hierarchical set of relations. These are the aspects that coexisted from the emergence of humanity to the present day.

The production of one's own life by labor and the production of new lives through reproduction make the production of life a dual relation for humanity. This relation is natural on one hand and social on the other. According to Marx and Engels, it is “social in the sense that it denotes the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end.” (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 49)

Therefore, when "co-operation" itself is accepted as a productive force and since the factors that determine the social situation result from the existing productive forces available to humanity, the history of humanity should always be studied together with the history of industry and commerce. For the reasons mentioned above, this was first put into practice by the English and the French, not the Germans:

Therefore in any conception of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance. It is well known that the Germans have never done this, and they have never, therefore, had an earthly basis for history and consequently never a historian. The French and the English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, especially since they remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry. (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 48)

2.4. FROM IDEOLOGY TO COMMODITY FETISHISM

It would not be fair to evaluate Marx's conception of ideology by merely making use of *The German Ideology*. This does not mean that Marx's ideas changed fundamentally in years, but that they evolved and became concrete in the course of his intellectual activity. To do justice, one should examine the prominent texts of Karl Marx such as the *Preface* and *Capital* to "totally" understand his approach to the concept of ideology or see the pathway from his early writings to *Capital*. In the *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*¹⁸, referring to the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx argues that "civil society" (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) should be examined under the field of political economy. According to him legal relations and forms of state cannot be grasped on their own or on the basis of "human mind's general development" but they have "roots in the material conditions of life". After this argument, which was built on his former investigation, Marx explains this new application to the structure of society:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production. constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (Marx & Engels, 1977, pp. 181-2)

In the passage above Marx puts forward two new concepts: base and superstructure. For him, the economic structure, i.e. the base, "conditions"¹⁹ the

¹⁸ Described by Stuart Hall as which "provides, so to speak, the pivotal transitional point between the *German Ideology* and *Capital* itself". (Hall, 1977, p. 56)

¹⁹ In the German edition, Marx uses the word "bedingt" as conditioning. In the sentence following this statement, he uses "bestimmt" to say determining. (Marx & Engels, 1971, pp. 9-10)

“superstructure” that arises from this base. “Social, political and intellectual life processes” are the elements of the superstructure which are based on the “mode of production”.

However, the relation among these aspects of society brings us a new polemic to discuss. Stuart Hall, in his article entitled “*Re-Thinking The ‘Base-and-Superstructure’ Metaphor*”, seeks to analyze Marx’s approach to the topic by researching almost his entire corpus. (Hall, 1977) Hall suggests that there are “three levels” of social formation in a long quotation from *The German Ideology*. For Hall, this account appears in the *Preface* after a decade. The first²⁰ of the three levels is “the ‘material production of life ... and ‘the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production’.” Second is the “‘civil society . . . and also its action as the State’.” Finally, the third one is: “‘all the different theoretical productions and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc.’” Then he underlines a crucial point about Marx’s choices of words to describe the principle of determination: “the variety of ways in which the principle of ‘determination’ is rendered: ‘connected with’; ‘created by’; ‘in its action as’; etc.” (Hall, 1977, p. 47)

Marx’s assertion about consciousness can be seen to be an ontological claim since it presupposes a universal state -as in the case of “base-superstructure”. Marx grounds this idea on the constitution of the human animal in historical process. Yet, in this situation “the historical” also seems universal. According to Terry Eagleton “this is an ontological, not just an historical claim” that asserts determinacy of social being on the consciousness of human contrary to determinacy of consciousness on social being of human. (Eagleton, 1991, p. 81) Despite the fact that the base-superstructure doctrine can be understood as a static and mechanical comprehension of the social order, it is possible to think it in another way as Eagleton claims. For him, the doctrine does not assert “that prisons and parliamentary democracy, school rooms and sexual fantasies, are any less *real* than steel mills or sterling.” Elements of superstructures such as churches and cinemas are as actual as the mines -which is the part of the “base” that conditions

²⁰ Not in a hierarchical manner.

superstructure- but they are not able to be the final catalysts of revolutionary change of society: “The point of the base-superstructure doctrine lies in the question of determinations - of what 'level' of social life most powerfully and crucially conditions the others, and therefore of what arena of activity would be most relevant to effecting a thoroughgoing social transformation.” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 82)

Eagleton says that material production, i.e. the economic structure, is essential and it is a “precondition of the whole of our thought” after explaining the fundamental role of it as forming the main narrative of history up to the present, and in the absence of this “narrative” it would not be possible for other stories to appear. Concerning the superstructure, Eagleton defines it as a “relational” term, mentions its twofold character and at the end explains whether Marx or Engels would agree with him:

It designates the way in which certain social institutions act as ‘supports’ of the dominant social relations. It invites us to contextualize such institutions in a certain way - to consider them in their functional relations to a ruling social power. What is misleading, in my view at least, is to leap from this ‘adjectival’ sense of the term to a substantive - to a fixed, given ‘realm’ of institutions which form ‘the superstructure’, and which includes, ... You can examine a literary text in terms of its publishing history, in which case, as far as the Marxist model goes, you are treating it as part of the material base of social production. ... once you explore that text’s relations to a dominant ideology, then you are treating it superstructurally. The doctrine, in other words, becomes rather more plausible when it is viewed less as an ontological carving of the world down the middle than as a question of different perspectives. (Eagleton, 1991, p. 83)

Jorge Larrain in *Marxism and Ideology* suggests that after 1859, the notion of ideology loses all of its significance for Karl Marx. Even in the early works of Marx that focus on the critique of Hegel and religion which is essential to understanding the formulation of the term, the notion of *ideology* is absent. Moreover, even though the concept of ideology almost disappeared in *Capital*, Marx analyzes the “capitalist mode of production”, especially commodity fetishism, which is pivotal to understanding the unique workings of capitalist

ideology. (Larrain, 1983, p. 8) Despite the fact that he does not directly use the term ideology, in the Section Four of the first chapter of *Capital* titled “The Fetishism of Commodities and The Secret Thereof”²¹ Marx stresses the distinction between the “nature” of capitalist societies’ phenomenological forms and the relations of production that serve a basis to them. Yet, all of the writers who deal with Marx’s concept of ideology accept “commodity fetishism” as his final approach to the discussion.

2.5.FETISHISM OF COMMODITIES

In *Capital*, Karl Marx coins the term of “fetishism of commodities” in order to explain how market -that seems natural and unchangeable- conceals -in the exchange processes- the social nature of labour. For Marx, social relation between people is seen by the humans as the relation between “things”, i.e. commodities, not the relation between themselves. As Ben Fine puts it in *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* which was edited by Tom Bottomore, “commodity production constitutes a social relationship between producers... Marx enquires how this relationship appears to the producers” or to society in general. (2001, p. 102) The passage below which is quoted most frequently, formulates the main attitude of Marx on the topic:

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour... There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things... This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. (Marx K. , 2010, pp. 82-3)

In early stages of his intellectual development, Marx concluded that the reproductive practice of humanity brought the domination of material conditions

²¹ See: (Marx K. , *Capital* Volume I, 2010, p. 81)

over individuals. As he argues in the quote above, by making an analysis of the capitalist economy, Marx noticed that capitalist material practices “are not revealed as they are, in their totality.” (Larrain, 1983, p. 31) Then, he accepts two separate processes of capitalist material practice as the sphere of exchange and the sphere of production.²² His approach, emphasizing the importance of practice when explaining ideas, now had to deal with the concealment of the actual character of practice by appearances. As mentioned before, the reversed character of reality was inferred by Marx in his early writings. But now, this relationship was seen by him directly. Then Marx proposed that reality itself, which is constituted in this relationship, is “mediated” and “complexified” by a level of appearances. Thus, “ideology conceals the contradictory essential relations,” says Larrain “not only by inverting in consciousness an already inverted reality, but also because it is based on a sphere of reality which reveals the contrary to its essential relations.” (Larrain, 1983, p. 32)

The metaphor of *camera obscura* is now fitted in a new approach. The reversed picture of social reality in the *camera obscura* is not a metaphor anymore since the overturn is implicit to reality itself. Marx's inquiry about the capitalist society and the capitalist mode of production led him to forge a concrete link between his early ideas about “consciousness” and relations of production. However, Marx, in *Capital*, does not suggest that in capitalist society commodities *appear* to apply a “dictatorship” upon social relations, for him they actually do so. Thus, ideology is not a matter of consciousness anymore, but it is tied up to the daily economic activity of the capitalist mode of production. Eagleton, by presupposing that this explanation is valid, propounds that “ideology has been ... transferred from superstructure to the base, or at least signals some peculiarly close relation between them”. So, ideology cannot be accepted to be primarily a matter of beliefs, discourses and “superstructural” institutions. (Eagleton, 1991, p. 85) It is one of the functions of the capitalist economy itself, that “produces its own

²² It is acknowledged by the vast majority of scholars that this distinction is based on Hegel's comprehension about “essences” and “phenomena”.

misperception” as Alex Callinicos underlines. (Callinicos, 1983, p. 131) Also, for Marx, ideology was not synonymous with superstructure, since superstructure contains both ideological and non-ideological factors. David McLellan argues that Marx “drew a distinction between the ‘ideological component parts of the ruling class’ and the ‘free spiritual production of this particular social formation’” in the *Theories of Surplus Value* when he discusses the relationship among metaphysical and material production. (McLellan, 1986, p. 17)

The mystical character of the commodity originates from abstraction of the labour during production process. However, this fetishization conceals the “real” nature of the commodity and also elements of the capitalist mode of production such as wage, price, profit, and so on. Jorge Larrain, briefly explains how phenomenal forms mask the production process by building on Marx’s understanding:

... the circulation of commodities is the source of surplus- value, and profit appears as the difference between the selling price of a commodity and its cost-price ... all these appearances fostered by the market are merely the outward phenomena of a process which operates ‘behind’ them: the production process. It is at this level that value is created by labour. However, the problem is that production is not merely manifested through, but it is also concealed by, the phenomenal forms. Thus the idea of profit which is generated in the market conceals the appropriation of labour-time by the capitalist, a process which occurs at the level of production. The concept of a fair wage conceals the division of the working day into necessary labour and surplus-labour, and the fact that the latter is unpaid. (Larrain, 1983, pp. 32-3)

So, profit is an ‘appearance’ of surplus-value which can conceal the actual ground of its existence, and competition is a phenomenon that obscures the assessment of value by labour-time. In other words, certain social relations between humans are disguised by the value-relation between commodities. Hence, it would not be wrong to accept mystification as an -almost- ‘objective’ contingency which is inherent to the character of capitalism. However, despite the fact that all “natural” objects of the capitalist mode of production are distorted according to Marxist

approach, fish-blooded bourgeois doctrinaires²³ assert that all people are “free” in the market when they exchange their commodity or labour. Marx understands the bourgeois political ideological suggestions as products of market relations rather than embodiment of pure ideas. For Marx the sphere of market, “within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man”, and he asserts freedom, equality, property, and - continuing cynically- Bentham to be the rulers of this sphere:

Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour power, are constrained only by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. (Marx K. , 2010, p. 186)

When it comes to the exchange of commodities, there is an equivalence between exchange values. This equality ceases to exist at the level of production because the employer seizes the surplus-value created by the worker. In appearance, workers are free to make an agreement with an employer by taking their own interest into consideration. However, in reality, workers do not have a choice but sell their labour-power to continue their lives and this is actually the result of being bereft of the means of production. Therefore, Marx argues that the freedom of the worker is “merely an illusion.”

²³ In German, *fischblütige Bourgeoisdoktrinär*. Karl Marx uses this term for Destutt de Tracy, the coiner of the concept of ideology, in *Capital*.

CHAPTER III

MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

3.1. INCAPABILITY OF THE CONCEPT

The concept of ideology is tied to the notion of “truth” with strict bonds. First debates on ideology that were conducted by French Enlightenment thinkers were about how can people reach “true” or “natural” ideas for humanity.²⁴ Eventually Karl Marx suggested a new analysis of the condition of human beings on earth by explaining the effects of production and its impact on people in extenso.²⁵ He did not only focus on “revealing the truth” from life itself, but he also showed that the realm we experience is somewhat “distorted.” That is to say, the history of thought continued with the contributions of the successors of various perceptions as Marx and the others did. The French philosopher Michel Foucault was one of these successors not because he followed Marx and others but because he reinterpreted the discussion on ideology and “social reality”. The problem of the “relation between subject and truth” -which is related to the discussion on ideology- is a very fundamental element in his project that he calls a “Critical History of Thought”.

Foucault was one of the fascinating figures in the twentieth century’s universe of thought. He was usually criticized by other thinkers for being a post-modernist since he rejects the idea of a universal ‘truth’. Karl Marx and the so-called Marxist tradition have had their shares of Foucault’s criticism. In this chapter I will examine the main concepts and approaches of Michel Foucault in order to show his *réflexion*. I will make use of his essential works such as *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), (*L’Archéologie du savoir*); *The History of Sexuality*, (*Histoire de la sexualité*); *Dits Et Écrits*²⁶, his Courses at Collège de France, and so on.

²⁴ As I shown in the first chapter of this study.

²⁵ As I explained in the second chapter of this study.

²⁶ The English edition of this work was published in three volumes, in an order close to the original, under the title "*Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*". The Turkish edition is presented to the reader in six volumes as "*Seçme Yazılar*". Both editions will be used in this study.

Michel Foucault was the representative of a new way of thinking that emerged under the influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger. The approach taken by Foucault and this critical view worked on the philosophy of subject and consciousness. Foucault makes an important contribution to this understanding, also called "anti-humanism", by addressing the problem of subjective experience and the subject. While making this contribution, Foucault advocated an analysis of power systems instead of dealing with the subject in isolation. The model of power he put forward differs fundamentally from the model accepted by the followers of Karl Marx and his political philosophy.

Foucault questioned the methods and perspectives in every field he dealt with and emphasized the importance he gave to the self-reflection of thought, which he called *réflexion*. (Keskin, 2016a) Foucault maintains his critical attitude in his approach to the concept of ideology. In his famous interview titled "Truth and Power", he expresses why he does not use the concept of ideology or why he finds it unfunctional. (Foucault, 2001, pp. 111-154) According to Foucault, there are three reasons that make the concept of ideology unfunctional. The first reason is that the notion of ideology stands in potential opposition to what is supposed to be truth. However, Foucault argues that the problem is not to distinguish between what belongs to truth and what belongs to other things in a discourse. According to him, there are discourses that cannot be handled in terms of truth or falsehood. Therefore, what needs to be done is "seeing historically how the effects of truth are produced within the discourses". The second reason is that the concept of ideology perhaps inevitably or necessarily refers to a kind of subject. Third and last, ideology is at a secondary level against "structures" that function as its infrastructure²⁷ or material determinant. (Foucault, 2001, p. 119)

The three drawbacks that Foucault puts forward regarding the use of the concept of ideology are related to the main reference points in his thought system. According to him, truth is not given, but emerges according to historical conditions

²⁷ Although this concept was expressed as "base" in the previous chapter, the word infrastructure was preferred in this section, since the term is used in this way in the English editions of Foucault's texts.

and as a result of a verification-falsification mechanism, a set of rules, that he calls “games of truth” (*jeux de vérité*). Foucault also argues that subjective experience rather than the subject should be examined, and thus rejects “anthropologism” and phenomenology which assume an understanding of “subject” on the basis of a universal human nature or universal transcendental functions of the human mind. For Foucault, forms of subjective experience are not universal but “singular” because they do not originate from a universal human nature or the transcendental functions of the human mind and they are established throughout history to meet specific needs. This leads Foucault to the conclusion that experiences must be studied specifically according to their singular histories. However, as he argues in stating why the concept of ideology is useless, he thinks that the base-superstructure model would be insufficient or even wrong in making this analysis. Because, according to Foucault, the pro-Marxist tradition, which bases its analysis on the base-superstructure model, considers subjective experience as ideological contents determined by the economic base. (Keskin, 2016b, p. 12) Although all of Foucault's concepts we have mentioned are interconnected, we will examine as far as possible his views on subjective experience and their examination below, starting with games of truth.

3.2. GAMES OF TRUTH

The article for *Dictionnaire des Philosophes* that Denis Huisman requested from François Ewald, Michel Foucault's assistant at the Collège de France who worked with him for years, is a short but profound text that facilitates our understanding of Foucault's philosophy. The text, however, was written almost entirely by Foucault who used the pen name of ‘Maurice Florence’ as his signature. For Foucault, a “Critical History of Thought” is an “analysis of the conditions under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified” within certain modes of objectivation and subjectivation, rather than being a history of ideas that consists of retrospectively accounting for some errors. (Foucault, 1998, s. 459) However, these relations must also be constitutive of “a possible knowledge”

(*savoir*²⁸). For Foucault, the point is to determine “the mode of subjectivation” of the subject. The mode of subjectivation expresses the conditions, the statuses, the position -imaginary or real- that the subject must occupy, which enable the subject to become the legitimate subject of this or that kind of knowledge (*connaissance*) because the subject also differs depending on “whether the knowledge has a form” such as “an exegesis of a sacred text, a natural history observation, or the analysis of a mental patient's behavior.” (Foucault, 1998, s. 460) At the same time, the other thing to do, according to Foucault, is to determine “under what conditions something can become an object for a possible knowledge (*connaissance*)”, how it can “be problematized as an object to be known”, “what selective procedure (*procedure de découpage*)” it can be subjected to, and what part of it is considered appropriate. In other words, it is necessary to determine the “mode of objectivation” of the object according to “the type of knowledge (*savoir*) that is involved”. (ibid) At this point appears the notion of the “games of truth” (*jeux de vérité*) that comes into being from the interconnection and mutual development of this subjectivation and objectivation. “Games of truth” are not an effort to discover true things, but rather a set of rules regarding what the subject can say about certain things in the context of the "true or false" dichotomy. In other words, as Ferda Keskin states, “a set of rules that historically establishes human existence as an *experience*, that is, as something that can and should be thought; in other words, a set of rules which is used to produce certain truths about the problematized thing.” (Keskin, 2016b, p. 13)

²⁸ The words “*savoir*” and “*connaissance*”, translated into English as “knowledge”, have different meanings in French and in Foucault's texts. The word “*savoir*” means a whole consisting of particular knowledge (*connaissance*), and the word “*connaissance*” means particular forms of knowledge such as biology and economics. In a footnote of *Archaeology of Knowledge*, in an unsourced statement by the translator, Foucault says “By *connaissance* I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. *Savoir* refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to *connaissance* and for this or that enunciation to be formulated.” (Foucault, 2002, pp. 16-17) In this study, only the term “knowledge” will be used, and its meaning will be given in parentheses if it is necessary.

3.3. EXPERIENCE, PROBLEMATIZATION AND DISCOURSE

In the famous introduction to the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault argues that his aim was to write a history of sexuality as experience, insofar as we accept the aforementioned concept of “experience” as “the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity.” (Foucault, 1990b, p. 4) Foucault's purpose in this study was to see how an “experience” that enables people to see themselves as subjects of “sexuality” is constituted in Western societies. Problematization is another concept that we encounter as part of this process. According to Keskin's reading of Foucault, subjective experiences are constituted, developed, and transformed through problematization. Foucault uses the term ‘problematization’ in an interview while describing what he did and did not do in *The History of Sexuality*: “... I am not writing a history of morals, of behavior, a social history of sexual practices, but a history of the way in which pleasures, desires, and sexual behavior were problematized, reflected upon, and conceived in Antiquity in relation to a certain art of living.” (Foucault, 1990a, p. 256) In other words, problematization is an important term for us to understand how the human subject is constituted by being or being made the object of various practices, and therefore to understand that the practice of subjectivation is actually one of objectivation.²⁹ Foucault explains what he means by problematization with the following words:

²⁹ In his well-known article titled *The Subject and Power* Foucault claims that it was not the goal of his work to analyze phenomena of power but “create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” (Foucault, 2001, p. 526) Then he mentions three different modes of objectification by referring his works. First one of them “is the modes of inquiry that try to give themselves the status of sciences”. For him, “the objectivizing of the speaking subject” in the fields of philology, linguistics and *grammaire générale* was an example of this mode. Likewise, “the objectivizing of the productive subject, the subject who labors, in the analysis of wealth and of economics” was also related to this mode. (ibid) In the second part of his work, Foucault studies how the subject is objectified by what he calls “dividing practices”: “The subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys.’” (ibid) In his latest study period, he works on “the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject. For example, I have chosen the domain of sexuality—how men have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of ‘sexuality.’” (ibid, p. 527) That is to say, “not power, but the subject” is the general theme of his research. (ibid)

Problematization doesn't mean representation of a pre-existing object, nor the creation by discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It is the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.). (Foucault, 1990a, p. 257)

As can be seen, Foucault is again mentioning “the play of true and false” that is, a game of truth. However, this time, we come across “discursive and non-discursive practices” that constitute something as a subject, i.e. an object for thought.³⁰ Here is where the concept of discourse has its place in Foucault's thought: it is a pillar of the “totality of practices” that constitutes such experiences as madness, crime, sexuality. Trevor Purvis and Alon Hunt suggest several definitions for discourse in their article (Purvis & Hunt, 1993) aiming to achieve a “peace” between Marx and Foucault by comparing discourse and ideology discussions. According to one of the definitions, the essential feature of discourse is to introduce a system of interrelated signs, and discourse “refers to the individual social networks of communication through the medium of language or non-verbal sign systems.” (ibid, 485) Another definition, as quoted by Hunt and Purvis, belongs to Stuart Hall: “sets of ready-made and pre-constituted “experiencings” displayed and arranged through language.” (as cited in ibid) Another debate about discourse is whether anything can be external to discourse. However, we can understand from the passage quoted above that Foucault distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive practices while explaining how subjective experience is constituted. For Foucault “discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking,

³⁰ “By thought,” says Foucault in the unpublished and different version of preface of *The History of Sexuality*, “I mean what establishes, in a variety of possible forms, the play of true and false, and which as a consequence constitutes the human being as a subject of learning (*connaissance*); in other words, it is the basis for accepting or refusing rules, and constitutes human beings as social and juridical subjects; it is what establishes the relation with oneself and with others, and constitutes the human being as ethical subject.” (Foucault, 1984, p. 334) Therefore, according to him, the history of problematizations is actually “history of thought”, and thought should be sought in all forms of speech, doing or behavior in which human emerges as a subject, rather than only in philosophical or scientific theoretical expressions. (Keskin, 2016b, p. 13)

knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined. It is a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed.” (Foucault, 2002, p. 60)

If we come back to the issue of problematization, Foucault argues that there are axes in this context when he talks about the constitution of sexuality as an experience. According to him, the constitution of sexuality as a historical and singular experience has three main axes: “(1) the formation of sciences (*savoirs*) that refer to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects of this sexuality.” (Foucault, 1990b, p. 4) In other words, knowledge (*savoir*), power and ethics as a relation established to oneself. So, there is a need for tools capable of examining the unique characters of these axes and the interrelations between them. Fortunately, Foucault had acquired the tools for the first two axes through his earlier studies of medicine and psychiatry, disciplinary practices and punitive power. In the works that Foucault mentioned which were related to the field of knowledge, namely *The Birth of the Clinic*, *History of Madness*, *Order of Things* and *Archeology of Knowledge* (the book in which he explains the archeological method that he used in his previous works), making an analysis of discursive practices enabled him to trace “the formation of disciplines (*savoirs*)” bypassing the “dilemma of science versus ideology”. And, the studies in the field of power in which he focused on the “analysis of power relations and their technologies” were *The Birth of the Clinic*, *History of Madness*, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, and first volume of *The History of Sexuality*. Thanks to these studies, he described power relations as “open strategies” and he was thus able to get rid of the understanding according to which power is domination or simulacrum. Afterwards, in the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*, he examines the form of the relationship that people establish with themselves in the context of the mentioned fields of knowledge and power in historical process.

Thus, as Ferda Keskin claims, “to make a historical ontology of ourselves” we should ask these questions: “how we are constituted as subjects of knowledge, subjects of power relations, and ethical subjects of our own actions.” (Keskin, 2016b, p. 14) What Michel Foucault does in the above-mentioned works is to seek answers to these questions. There are complex relations among these three axes: They are interconnected, and they allow each other to exist. Foucault uses the methods of archeology and genealogy to analyze these practices of subjectivation. However, contrary to the criticisms, these two methods are not independent of each other. Although it is claimed that the archaeological method only examines the field of discourse, Foucault, in his commentary on the field of study of history in *The Archeology of Knowledge*, speaks of “books, texts, accounts, records, acts, buildings, institutions, laws, techniques, objects, traditions”. That is, he mentions elements that belong to the discursive and the non-discursive realms. Therefore, according to Foucault's approach, archaeological study must take non-discursive elements into account while revealing the rules that determine the formation of discourse. (Keskin, 1999, pp. 20-21) While he was working on the construction of experience of sexuality, Foucault was expressing the purpose of his genealogical investigation in these words:

...with this genealogy the idea was to investigate how individuals were led to practice, on themselves and on others, a hermeneutics of desire, a hermeneutics of which their sexual behavior was doubtless the occasion, but certainly not the exclusive domain. Thus, in order to understand how the modern individual could experience himself as a subject of a “sexuality,” it was essential first to determine how, for centuries, Western man had been brought to recognize himself as a subject of desire. (Foucault, 1990b, pp. 5-6)

So, according to Foucault, genealogy means the analysis of power relations and the political techniques formed in these relations. For example, Foucault needed genealogy for “a historical and critical study of desire and the desiring subject” since studying the construction and development of experience of sexuality without genealogy would be deficient. Foucault mentions the necessary theoretical shifts that he has made when examining the field of knowledge and power so far that

make his current analysis possible. Now, a third theoretical shift has become required in order to conduct research on the ethical relationship that the individual establishes with himself/herself, which enables him/her to constitute himself as a subject and see himself/herself as a subject. While explaining the context in which archeology and genealogy are used together, Foucault also stated that he was working on “the history of truth”.

I seem to have gained a better perspective on the way I worked—gropingly, and by means of different or successive fragments—on this project, whose goal is a history of truth. It was a matter of analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their “ideologies,” but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought—and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed. The archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyze their formation out of the practices and the modifications undergone by the latter. (Foucault, 1990b, pp. 11-12)

3.4. THE HISTORY OF TRUTH

According to Foucault, social practices not only produce new objects, concepts and techniques but also create fields of knowledge (*savoir*) that give rise to new forms of subjectivity. Therefore, the subject of knowledge has its own history, that is, truth itself has a history. (Foucault, 2011b, p. 164) We have shown that, for Foucault, who sees the axes of knowledge and power as the subject of analysis of archeology and genealogy, the analysis of discursive and non-discursive practices cannot be separated. Also, we stated above that the main problem for Foucault was the “relation among subject and truth” since the problem of “truth” is a fundamental aspect of the relationship between discursive and non-discursive practices. In his well-known interview titled “The Political Function of the Intellectual”, Foucault asserts that:

...truth isn't outside power, or deprived of power (contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, it isn't the reward of free

spirits, the child of prolonged solitudes, or the privilege of those who have been able to liberate themselves). The important point here, I believe, is that Truth is of the world: it is produced by virtue of multiple constraints. And it induces the regular effects of power. (Foucault, 1977, s. 13)

Foucault's claim that truth belongs to this world is based on the assumption that knowledge becomes "valid" through a play of true or false. The subject of knowledge we are talking about is established in history, not given. Foucault conceptualizes this through a study of Nietzsche's analysis of religion and poetry. According to Foucault, Nietzsche draws a contrast between the concepts of origin (*ursprung*) and invention (*Erfindung*). Neither religion nor poetry has a counterpart in human nature. They were invented at a certain time in history in response to a need. So, knowledge is also invented and cannot be founded in human nature. According to Nietzsche, who describes knowledge as the spark between two swords, knowledge is neither instinctive nor friendly to instinct. Knowledge is counter instinctive. (Foucault, 2001, pp. 4-8) According to Foucault, this analysis leads to a double break in the tradition of Western philosophy: the first one is the break between knowledge and things, and therefore the break with theology. Because in Descartes, and even in Kant, it is God who gives knowledge the power to be known. So, "If there is no relation between knowledge and the things to be known, if the relation between knowledge and known things is arbitrary, if it is a relation of power and violence, the existence of God at the center of the system of knowledge is no longer indispensable." (Foucault, 2001, p. 10) The second break is based on the assumption that there is only a relationship of rupture, domination and enslavement between knowledge and instincts. According to Foucault, if this assumption is true, "it's not God that disappears but the subject in its unity and its sovereignty." (ibid)

According to traditional Western philosophy, which we can start with Descartes, "the unity of the human subject" was provided by the continuity from "desire to knowledge (*connaissance*), from the instincts to knowledge (*savoir*), from the body to truth." (ibid) These assumptions ensured the existence of the

subject. However, if the conflicts between knowledge and instinctual mechanisms, the games of desire, the mechanisms of the body, and the will are separated, the need for the unity of the human subject also disappears. Hence “We can grant the existence of subjects, or we can grant that the subject doesn't exist.” (ibid)

Thus, Foucault once again reveals that there is no given subject or given knowledge with a Nietzschean approach. One of the reasons Foucault was wary of the concept of ideology was that the notion referred to a kind of subject. One of Foucault's criticisms of an academic conceptualization of Marxism in this context is that “there is always the underlying idea that relations of force, economic conditions, and social relations are given to individuals beforehand but at the same time are imposed on a subject of knowledge that remains identical, except in relation to ideologies construed as errors.” (ibid, 15) For Foucault, ideology plays a negative role in the traditional Marxist approach. The concealment of the relationship between the subject and the truth by the political forms imposed from the outside on the subject of knowledge is accepted as a mediation of ideology. According to Foucault, political and economic living conditions are not an obstacle for the subject of knowledge. But knowledge relations, and therefore truth, are formed through these relations. Therefore, we can do a “history of truth” only by getting rid of these great subject of knowledge understandings and maybe by appealing to Nietzsche when necessary. (ibid)

CHAPTER IV

KARL MARX AND MICHEL FOUCAULT

4.1. RAMIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT

When the concept of ideology or ideology discussions are handled in the context of the philosophical approaches of Karl Marx and Michel Foucault, it can be considered as a *réflexion* on how "truth" is produced because, as suggested in the previous chapters, both thinkers argue that social reality is "somewhat" and historically constructed, not given. Two examples will be illustrative to show the diversity of approaches to ideology. In the first chapter of his book *Ideology, An Introduction*, Terry Eagleton asserts 16 different definitions of ideology that he says are currently in use. These are examples that have different meanings and connotations, such as "the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life", "systematically distorted communication", "semiotic closure" and so on. (Eagleton, 1991, p. 1) The second example is Malcolm B. Hamilton's article titled "*The Elements of the Concept of Ideology*". (Hamilton, 1987) In this article, Hamilton first puts forward 27 different defining elements of ideology, then evaluates these elements from a philosophical point of view or associates them with a specific thinker, presenting the readers with both a bibliography and an anatomy of the concept.

From these examples, we can deduce the following two conclusions, both in terms of form and content: If we look at it formally, the issue of ideology has been widely discussed, and no consensus has been reached. It has been in the field of interest of many thinkers and it has been ramified in time. On the other hand, considering the debates on the definitions put forward, it would not be wrong to say that the recent ideological debates are based on Marx's works on this topic. In this context, every thinker interested in the issue of ideology -or maybe anything- after Marx has argued with him, pondered upon his ideas, used -"purified and polished"- or dismissed his claims, or maybe "distorted" his ideas. Foucault himself relates to

Marx in another way. As Alessandro Fontana and Mauro Bertani said while they are situating the lectures in *Society Must Be Defended*, there is an “uninterrupted dialogue” (*dialogue ininterrompu*) between Marx and Foucault. (Fontana & Bertani, 2003, p. 277) In fact, Foucault's works can be seen as an endless effort of discussion with and interpretation of Marx, even though he did not mention him much in his last works. (Taylan, Laval, & Paltrinieri, 2020, p. 14)

4.2. FOUCAULT ON MARX AND MARXISM(S)

As Pierre Macherey points out in his presentation in the colloquium “Foucault au Collège de France: une aventure intellectuelle et éditoriale”, the problem or duty for Foucault, was not to try to uncover what this so-called distortion is, as the “scholastic commentators” do. (Macherey, 2015) To understand Foucault's approach to this issue, it would be appropriate to look at his view that he conceptualized as “author-function”. According to Foucault, although we think that meanings have proliferated thanks to this transcendent author, the truth is the opposite. In the Western culture, the author is a “functional principle” that prevents the free use of fiction by “limiting, excluding, or selecting”, that is to say, author is “an ideological figure” who hinders “proliferation of meanings.” (Foucault, 2014, pp. 248-9)

In his works or interviews, Foucault often directs his criticisms to some forms of Marxism or “Marxisms” which accept Marx as “an ideological figure” when they make use of his texts, rather than of Marx. Foucault constantly distances himself from and criticizes the Marxisms that “scholastic commentators” represent or pursue. “It certainly doesn’t mean demonstrating,” says Foucault in an interview with Japanese Marxist Philosopher Takaaki Yoshimoto, while he is emphasizing the importance of being in relation to Marx in examining power relations, and continues, “for example, with the Althusserian method, how the gospel of the prophet Marx has been misinterpreted.” (as cited in Chitty, 2012) Moreover, in one of his interviews, Foucault calls Marxism a dogma (Foucault, 2016, p. 131) and in

another interview he states that a “simple Marxism” argues that power operates only on ideology (Foucault, 2011b, p. 146). At the same time, he criticizes those who want to prove that Marxism is a science or is scientific by trying to impose the power effects on Marxism that have been imposed on science since the Middle Ages. (Foucault, 2011a, p. 93) In other words, according to Foucault, there is a problem of Marxisms claiming to be “science”, hence “truth”. And also, the main aim of the aforementioned Marxisms is to establish a unity between the author and the work by “quoting and commenting”. On the other hand, while Foucault deals with a literary text or a historical document, he analyzes the discursive and non-discursive elements specifically with the archaeological method, as we mentioned in the previous section. In this way, he tries to save the text as much as possible from the author's limitations or the author's influence on the text.

It is also possible to argue that Foucault tried to detach Marx from “author-function” which imposed on him by Marxists. (Taylan, Laval, & Paltrinieri, 2020, p. 15) In an unpublished article entitled “*Réponse à la première question*” from his archive, recently protected by the Bank of France, Foucault describes his work on Marx's texts with these words: “I therefore retain only one way of doing things with Marx's texts: the possible implementation of their forms of analysis, of their theoretical propositions, and of their concepts; and this not to ensure repetition, but to produce from it, if possible, something new.” (as cited in *ibid*, p. 17) Hence, what is important for Foucault is to reveal the capacity of a text to be implemented, and to use the tools provided by this way effectively in his studies. In his elaborated article, “Towards a Socialist Art of Government: Michel Foucault's 'The Mesh of Power'”, Christopher Chitty discusses Foucault's relationship with Marx's texts and provides an analysis of how Foucault “implemented” Marx:

Foucault is attempting to trace the genealogy of a social form in which commodity relations predominate by grasping the historical specificity of the isolated individuals of exchange. This transformation is *not* the inevitable outcome of the technological development of the forces of production. Instead, the moment of transition has to be understood as a contingent outcome of a new form of politics, which Foucault calls, again following Marx, “discipline.” The relevant passages in

Discipline and Punish explicitly cite Marx's discussion of "cooperation" in *Capital*, volume 1, and his exchanges with Engels about the origins of factory discipline in military discipline. Foucault asks how a tributary sovereign power to levy a tax – on produce, blood, trade, etc. – transitions to a productive economic power generative of surplus. (Chitty, 2012)

For Chitty, this line of thinking about the origins of capitalism and his careful play on Marxist manner of expression, can be traced in all of Foucault's work. However, while Foucault quotes Marx directly in "Mesh of Power" and *Discipline and Punish*, his references or implications in other works are not so "clear". Despite this ambiguity, it is possible to understand what Foucault thinks about Marx and Marxism from the abovementioned conversation with Takaaki Yoshimoto. (Foucault, 2011a, pp. 238-263) In this interview, Foucault says he agrees with Yoshimoto's opinion after a lengthy question implying that it is necessary to distinguish between Marx and Marxism, as an object to get rid of. Because according to Foucault, Marxism plays an important role in the lack of political-social imagination of the age they live in. However, some of Marx's statements are accurate, and they are undeniable for Foucault. Thus, Marx and Marxism cannot be approached in the same way. Since, for Foucault, who uses Marx's methods in his works and claims that it is not possible to suppress or reject Marx, Marxism is a "modality of power".

For Foucault, three aspects of Marxism are inescapably linked to the ensemble of power relations: Marxism as scientific discourse, Marxism as prophecy, and Marxism as state philosophy or class ideology. The first two of these are interconnected. Because according to Foucault, Marxism is a science born from the heart of rational thought and Marxism as a science has coercive effects on a certain truth. At the same time, the discourse of Marxism is not only retrospective but also prospective, that is to say, it is a science of prophecy. Finally, the reason why Marxism is a state philosophy or class ideology is that Marxism needs a

political party³¹ or state -which can be based on a philosophical basis since the French Revolution³²- in order to function. At this point, Foucault argues, the problem is not only to get rid of a Marxism that has such an approach, but to get rid of the power relations dynamic that makes it possible for Marxism to perform these functions. According to Foucault, an academic discussion focusing on what Marx actually meant is useless because the issue gets stucked again in a “true-false dilemma” with this kind of polemic. So, the presupposition that Marx can be the “owner” of the truth must be refuted to suppress Marxism.³³

4.3. MARX AND MARXISM

Michel Foucault, at one point in his conversation with Takaaki Yoshimoto, expresses how the debates on Marxism developed “in France”. (Foucault, 2011a, p. 245) In other words, he discusses the practices of the French Communist Party, of which he was a member, and the understanding of Marxism of the French Academy. Also, anyone familiar with Foucault's philosophical approach could say that he does not make a general or universal comment on Marxism, rather he mentions specific-singular types of Marxism at one point in history. From this perspective, it might be necessary to cite a few examples, not to show who the authentic Marx was, but to show for which needs his ideas were “distorted” or how “truth” changes in historical context.

One of the elements frequently encountered in Marxism is the concept of “false consciousness”, which does not appear in any text of Karl Marx. David McLellan argues that the concept of false consciousness is used with reference to a

³¹ For, Jean-François Bert's article entitled “Cartographier les marxismes avec Foucault : les années 1950 et 1960”, which contains very detailed information about the various Marxisms that Michel Foucault identified, along with his thoughts and experiences during his membership of the French Communist Party, see: (Bert, 2020, pp. 139-148)

³² For *Gendai no Kenryoku wo tou*, the conference -which is titled as “The Analytic Philosophy of Politics” when it was published- given by Foucault in Japan, see: (Foucault, 2011a, pp. 196-215)

³³ As discussed in the previous section, Foucault “proved” that truth is produced through various “plays of true or false” and that there is no universal truth.

letter³⁴ that Engels sent to Mehring. There is no record of Marx using this expression, and even Engels did not use it very often. (McLellan, 1986, p. 18) Göran Therborn also criticizes the identification of ideology with false consciousness. Because such interpretations do not take Marx's works other than *The German Ideology* into account. According to Therborn, Marx does not act with a dichotomy of true-false, his approach is ambiguous; for Marx, ideology is not a logical or empirical fallacy, but a superficial expression of a “truth” which has emerged in historical conditions. (Therborn, 1980)

Also, one of the debates on consciousness is about the analyses and propositions of Vladimir Lenin, one of the leading figures of the Soviet Revolution, which he put forward in his work *What is to be done?*. This discussion begins when the views expressed by Lenin in the mentioned book are placed on a “philosophical” level by Georg Lukács. If we put it roughly, Lukacs, in his book *History and Class Consciousness*, argued that consciousness or class consciousness can only be transferred to the working class from outside, based on Lenin's propositions. He claimed that the proletariat was the carrier of the universal truth and he aimed to establish the identity of the subject and the object with a Hegelian³⁵ understanding. (Lukács, 1972) Irish Marxist thinker John Molyneux, on the other hand, states in his book “Marxism and the Party” that basing Lenin's theory of the party and his thoughts on class consciousness only on this book is an erroneous approach. According to Molyneux, Lenin's work argues with “economism”, a line in the socialist movements of the period, and has a periodic nature. Lenin soon replaced many of his claims in this book with almost exact opposites. Even a few years after he wrote the book, in 1907, he states that the pamphlet meant nothing but the correction of economist distortions. Contrary to assertion of Lenin in *What is to be Done?* which asserts that consciousness can only be carried from outside, he also

³⁴ “Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces. Because it is a process of thought he derives its form as well as its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors.” (Marx & Engels, 1965, p. 459)

³⁵ Lukacs self-criticizes himself for this approach in the preface of a 1967 edition of the book.

argues that the working class spontaneously became “Social-Democratic” afterwards. Therefore, according to Molyneux, there is no dogmatic understanding of the party or a description of consciousness in Lenin, and his approach changes over time and is renewed according to historical conditions. (Molyneux, 2015, pp. 91-93)

These examples on consciousness and ideology have a common feature. In both cases, what has been done has the effect of abandoning the views of Marx or Lenin - and thus to some extent Marx - in favor of a “universal truth” that does not exist in their theoretical approach. As examined in the second part of this study, Marx does not have an opaque, constant, or dogmatic understanding of ideology, and he does not even use this concept in last periods of his intellectual life. Lenin, too, avoids a stable approach by constantly updating his propositions, political practices and party theory according to the conditions of the time. Could Marxism, which has become the state philosophy that Foucault speaks of, could have been the work of Lenin, who wrote “So long as the state exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom, there will be no state,” in his book *State and Revolution*?

We see that Foucault often uses Marxism, which he accepts as the Soviet state philosophy, as a synonym for Stalinism. He often compares the practices of Stalinism with fascism. According to Foucault, the impact of Hegel's philosophy on Bismarck's administration and Nietzsche's guide to Hitler and Mussolini's fascism were sad and at the same time ridiculous developments. In addition, Foucault argues that the support of philosophy to the powers is more than the dogmatic support of religions. For Foucault, Stalinism was a philosophy that actually was identical to the State in the middle of the 20th century, in Hobsbawm's words the “age of excesses”, and was more advanced than any other example in this regard. (Foucault, 2011a, pp. 201-2) However, Stalinism and fascism were responses produced in a “certain and specific” conjuncture. (Foucault, 2011a, pp. 197-8) Foucault's suggestion for a solution to this issue of power is that philosophy should discuss the problem of power in terms of existence, not the concepts of good and bad. Philosophy should analyze, explain and make visible the struggles around

power, the strategies of the enemies in power, the tactics used and the focus of resistance. The role of philosophy is not to seek out or discover what is hidden somewhere, but to make the observable visible, that is, to show us what is directly and tightly connected to us. (Foucault, 2011a, p. 203)

*“they are dreamers, dangerous dreamers”*³⁶

CONCLUSION

In this study, we tried to cover the path followed by the concept or comprehension of ideology since its emergence. The concept is presented in the first part by Tracy as a branch of “science” connected to “zoology”; in the second part, by Marx as a mental universe in which we live, produce, produce ourselves while producing, and become alienated from the product and ourselves as a result of our own action; in the third part, on the other hand, it emerged as a dysfunctional conceptualization within Foucault's approach. Those who wish to establish antagonism, enmity or hostility between Marx and Foucault first focus on the “inconsistencies” between the two names or hastily suggest that Foucault is the “last bulwark of the bourgeoisie”.³⁷ However, in the last part of this study, an answer was sought as to who really broke up with Marx. To make a more general assessment, the concept of ideology, which emerged in a period that Marx and Foucault described in their work as “transition from feudalism to capitalism” or “transformation from a ‘juridico-discursive’ power to a ‘bio-power’”, is a concept that affects present day while differentiating over time.

Ideology, which was initially a specific science of “ideas”, soon gained a pejorative meaning both politically -with Napoleon's intense effort which even includes his complaint to the Prussian king- and philosophically due to the contradictions it contained. Marx also used the concept for a while, as explored in chapter two, but slowly abandoned it after a ten-year hiatus. In his masterpiece *Capital*, the word occurs only a few times to refer to theoretical approaches. Today's debates on ideology, on the other hand, are carried out with a version of the ideology that is used like Plato's concept of *doxa*, as briefly mentioned in the fourth chapter.

³⁶ Napoleon for idéologues.

³⁷ *Dernier rempart de la bourgeoisie*. From an unpublished text from the archives of the Central Bank of France, Foucault's answer to a question by an unknown person about his relationship with Marx and Marxism. This is the first of ten qualifiers listed by Foucault that Marxists ascribe to him. (Taylan, Laval, & Paltrinieri, 2020, p. 15)

Ideology is like a mental universe in which humanity lives in the same “reality” - but not free from “material life conditions”. Therefore, the evaluation to be made when considering Marx's understanding of ideology should notice this difference and take it into account. In this study, this has been done as much as possible, and an attempt was made to handle Marx's thoughts on this subject over time in a way that does not tend to stereotype.

In the study, Foucault's relationship with the concept of ideology was tried to be discussed and, in this context, his basic philosophical claims were examined. On the other hand, it has been tried to show that the relation between Foucault and Marx is not a surpassing or rejection, but a practice of “putting into work” or implementation of methods. In other words, it has been argued that Foucault's opposition to a “certain academic” Marxism did not stem from a hatred of Marx. The seeds of discord sown by those who have an angular and incomprehensible approach among two of the most prolific and wise names in the history of philosophy, are not insurmountable through careful studies.

To conclude, it would not be a very bold move to say that there is something common between the two thinkers. While talking about how to eliminate the alienation caused by the division of labor in *The German Ideology*, Marx says that we must live in a world where everyone can do everything at once, rather than being just a carpenter, a painter, or a vagabond. The way to this is the change of the existing relations of production, the abolition of private property and the division of labor. Somewhere in *Capital*, Marx also writes “The belated scientific discovery that the products of labor, in so far as they are values, are merely the material expressions of the human labor expended to produce them, marks an epoch in the history of mankind's development, by no means banishes the semblance of objectivity possessed by the social characteristics of labor” along with “and this is true both before and after abovementioned scientific discovery”. (Marx K. , 1990, p. 167) That is, according to Marx, no matter what scientific discovery was made, no matter how much people were told about the “concealed truth”, the condition of changing the world was not scientific activity. Because people were a part of the

world (labor processes, power relations, the results of their own actions) they lived in, and the problem did not seem to Marx solvable with some kind of “enlightenment”. However, the analyses made by virtue of the discoveries of “science” can be a propaganda tool of the working class - which is the condition of the possibility of this capitalist mode of production - during the struggle, or the “mystical atmosphere” of the earth can be cleared up a bit in this way. It is no secret that Marx also has been trying to carry out an organized political activity throughout his life. (Molyneux, 2015, pp. 23-58) Consequently, it is difficult to say that in his mid-twenties, when he said that the main problem is not to understand the world, but to change it, he knew that some of his followers will try to use his ideas as a pedagogical tool -even though he criticizes ideologues by asking “who will educate the educators”.

Michel Foucault, in an interview with Gilles Deleuze, referring to Marx, says that we had to wait until the 19th century to know what exploitation is, but power has not yet been fully discovered. (Foucault, 2011a, p. 37) Also, Foucault, like Marx, said that the point is not to understand the world, to be aware of what is happening now or to focus on the present; the point is to reject what we are rather than discovering what we are. (Foucault, 2016, p. 68) On the other hand, there are those who think that Foucault makes struggle impossible by atomizing everything and arguing that power relations are everywhere. This critique is perhaps the most widespread of the critiques leveled at him by certain Marxists. Foucault has important answers to these accusations. The first is the understanding he put forward in his abridged interview titled “The Political Function of The Intellectual” and in unabridged version of same interview. (Foucault, 1977) (Foucault, 2011a, pp. 46-53; 59-85)

According to Foucault, there are two types of intellectuals. One of them is the “universal intellectual” who claims to convey a given truth to people, and the other is the “specific intellectual” who can establish the partnership of the universal and the specific by dealing with specific issues, as he does. Since the intellectual, by definition, is the person who carries his knowledge to the political struggle, the

approach of the intellectual is also reflected in the way he/she does politics. For Foucault, what needs to be done is to undertake specific struggles, and while doing this, we should think of political problems in terms of “truth/power”, not in terms of “science/ideology”. Foucault then asserts two propositions on "truth", which he bases first on knowledge and then on the field of power: according to this, truth is a set of procedures and is in a cyclical relationship with power systems. This regime, which Foucault defines as the “Regime of Truth”³⁸, “is not an ideological or superstructural one, but a political, economic and institutional regime that produces truth.” The problem is therefore to liberate the power of truth from the forms of economic, cultural, and social hegemony in which it currently operates. It's not about changing people's minds or consciousness. (Foucault, 2011a, p. 84)

In the continuation of the aforementioned interview with Deleuze, Foucault also points to the effort of perpetuating capitalist exploitation as the reason why power is exercised in this way today. Therefore, the struggle becomes generalized when the people take part as an ally to proletariat in a struggle against the power in which everyone participates based on their own activity or inactivity, that is, based on their specific-singular fields. If the proletariat, like its allies, is struggling with all the control and coercion that ensures the continuation of power, the movements of women, prisoners, patients and LGBTI+s are also related to the revolutionary movements of the working class. In fact, since power is everywhere, it also makes the generality of this struggle possible. The resistance to power needs the audacity, courage, and ability to change the conditions behind the production of truth, the source of the inequality we live in, with no one educating another. Foucault complains about lack of political imagination. Therefore, I consider it appropriate to end this study with the following words: “Hayal gücü iktidara!”

³⁸ For an assessment of how Foucault's use of the concept changed between 1975 and 1980, based on his Lectures at the College de France, see: (Lorenzini, 2015)

REFERENCES

- Bacon, L. (1902). *Novum Organum*. (M. Joseph Devey, Ed.) New York:: P.F. Collier.
- Barrett, M. (1991). *The Politics of Truth From Marx to Foucault*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Bert, J.-F. (2020). Foucault ile Birlikte Marksizmlerin Haritasını Çıkarmak: 1950'li ve 1960'lı Yıllar. In F. Taylan, C. Laval, & L. Paltrinieri (Eds.), *Marx & Foucault Okumalar, Kullanımlar, Yüzleştirmeler* (pp. 139-148). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Bottomore, T. (Ed.). (2001). *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought Second Edition*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Callinicos, A. (1983). *Marxism and Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chitty, C. (2012). *Towards a Socialist Art of Government: Michel Foucault's "The Mesh of Power"*. Retrieved 2021, from Viewpoint Magazine: <https://viewpointmag.com/2012/09/12/towards-a-socialist-art-of-government-michel-foucaults-the-mesh-of-power/>
- Condillac, E. d. (1756). *An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, Being a Supplement to Mr.Lockes's Essay on the Human Understanding*. (T. Nugent, Trans.) London.
- de Tracy, A. L. (2009). *A Treatise on Political Economy*. (T. Jefferson, Trans.) Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). *What is philosophy?* Columbia University Press.
- Descartes, R. (1993). *Discourse on method and Meditations on first philosophy*. Indianapolis : Hackett Pub. Co.

- d'Holbach, P. H. (1839). *The System of Nature or, the Laws of the Moral and Physical World*. (M. D. Mirabaud, Trans.) London: B. D. Cousins.
- Durkheim, É. (2014). *The Rules of Sociological Method*. (S. Lukes, Dü., & W. D. Halls, Çev.) New York: Free Press.
- Eagleton, T. (1991). *Ideology an Introduction*. London: Verso.
- Eagleton, T. (1994). Introduction. In T. Eagleton (Ed.), *Ideology*. New York: Longman Publishing.
- Fontana, A., & Bertani, M. (2003). Situating the Lectures. In M. Foucault, A. Fontana, M. Bertani, & A. I. Davidson (Eds.), *Society Must Be Defended Lectures at The Collège de France 1975-76* (D. Macey, Trans., pp. 273-291). New York: Picador.
- Foucault, M. (1977). The Political Function of the Intellectual. *Radical Philosophy*(17), 12-14.
- Foucault, M. (1984). *The Foucault Reader*. (P. Robinow, Ed.) New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1990a). *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*. (L. D. Kritzman, Ed., & A. Sheridan, Trans.) New York: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. (1990b). *The Use of Pleasure Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality*. (R. Hurley, Trans.) New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (1998). *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology (Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 2)*. (J. D. Faubion, Ed., & R. Hurley, Trans.) New York: The New Press.
- Foucault, M. (2001). *Power (Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 3)*. (P. Rabinow, J. D. Faubion, Eds., & R. Hurley, Trans.) New York: The New Press.

- Foucault, M. (2002). *Archaeology of Knowledge*. (A. M. Smith, Trans.) New York: Routledge Classics.
- Foucault, M. (2011a). *Seçme Yazılar 1: Entelektüelin Siyasi İşlevi*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.
- Foucault, M. (2011b). *Seçme Yazılar 3: Büyük Kapatılma*. (F. Keskin, Ed., I. Ergüden, & F. Keskin, Trans.) İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.
- Foucault, M. (2014). *Seçme Yazılar 6: Sonsuza Giden Dil*. (I. Ergüden, Trans.) İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.
- Foucault, M. (2016). *Seçme Yazılar 2: Özne ve İktidar*. (F. Keskin, Ed., I. Ergüden, & O. Akinhay, Trans.) İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.
- Hall, S. (1977). Rethinking the 'Base and Superstructure' Metaphor. In J. Bloomfield (Ed.), *Class, Hegemony and Party* (pp. 43-72). London: Lawrence and Wishard.
- Hamilton, M. B. (1987). The Elements of the Concept of Ideology. *Political Studies*(XXXV), 18-38.
- Helvétius, M. (1810). *A Treatise on Man: His Intellectual Faculties and His Education* (Vol. 1). (W. Hooper, Trans.) Paultry: Albion Press.
- Kennedy, E. (1979). "Ideology" from Destutt De Tracy to Marx. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 3(40), 353-368.
- Keskin, F. (1999). Söylem, Arkeoloji ve İktidar. *Doğu Batı*(9), 15-23.
- Keskin, F. (2016a). Michel Foucault. In M. Foucault, & F. Keskin (Ed.), *Seçme Yazılar 2: Özne ve İktidar* (I. Ergüden, & O. Akinhay, Trans., pp. 7-10). İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.
- Keskin, F. (2016b). Özne ve İktidar. In M. Foucault, & F. Keskin (Ed.), *Seçme Yazılar 2: Özne ve İktidar* (pp. 11-24). İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.

- Klein, D. (1985). Deductive Economic Methodology in the French Enlightenment: Condillac and Destutt De Tracy. *History of Political Economy*, 1(17), 51-71.
- Larrain, J. (1983). *Marxism and Ideology*. London: The Macmillan Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (1982). *The Sociology of Marx*. (H. Guterman, Trans.) New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lichtheim, G. (1965). The Concept of Ideology. *History and Theory*, 2(4), 164-195.
- Lorenzini, D. (2015, 1 1). What is a "Regime of Truth"? *Le foucauldien*.
- Lukács, G. (1972). *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. (R. Livingstone, Trans.) Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Macherey, P. (2015, June 18). *Lire Foucault*. Retrieved from Hypotheses: <https://philolarge.hypotheses.org/1666>
- Marx, K. (1990). *Capital A Critique of Political Economy Volume One*. (B. Fowkes, Trans.) London: Penguin Classics.
- Marx, K. (2010). *Capital Volume I*. Lawrence & Wishart Electric Book.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1965). *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected correspondence*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). *Werke Band 13*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag Berlin GmbH.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1977). *SELECTED WORKS In one volume*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1998). *The German Ideology*. New York: Prometheus Books.
- Maynard, J. L. (2017). Ideology. In W. Outhwaite, & S. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of Political Sociology*. SAGE.

- McLellan, D. (1986). *Ideology*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mepham, J. (1972, Summer). The Theory of Ideology in Capital. *Radical Philosophy*(002), pp. 12-19.
- Molyneux, J. (2015). *Marksizm ve Parti*. (Y. Alogan, Trans.) Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları.
- Parekh, B. (1982). *Marx's Theory of Ideology*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Purvis, T., & Hunt, A. (1993). Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology... *The British Journal of Sociology*, 44(3), 473-499.
- Taylan, F., Laval, C., & Paltrinieri, L. (2020). Giriş. In F. Taylan, C. Laval, & L. Paltrinieri (Eds.), *Marx & Foucault Okumalar, Kullanımlar, Yüzleştirmeler* (İ. Birkan, Trans., pp. 9-25). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Terrell, T. D. (2009). The Economics of Destutt de Tracy. In A. L. de Tracy, *A Treatise on Political Economy* (pp. i-xii). Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute.
- Therborn, G. (1980). *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology*. Londra: Verso.
- Welch, C. B. (1985). Liberty and Utility, the French Ideologues and the Transformation of Liberalism. (E. Kennedy, Ed.) *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 4(18), 561-566.