

**ETHNIC HOMOGENIZATION IN TURKEY:  
THE CASE OF TOPONYMIC PRACTICES IN ISTANBUL**

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ETHNIC HOMOGENIZATION IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF TOPONYMIC  
PRACTICES IN ISTANBUL

Türkiye’de Etnik Homojenleştirme: İstanbul’da Yer Adlarının Değiştirilmesi

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ABSTRACT

This study scrutinizes how renaming streets of Istanbul serves to the process of building an ethnically homogeneous nation. Based on a field research conducted in Istanbul with non-Muslim minorities, the study argues that there is a common recognition that renaming targeted the past and the heritage from non-Muslims. With macro-scale anti-minority implementations of the republican era, demographic diversity of the city fade away and non-Muslim presence disappeared in the public sphere and all aspects of everyday life. This study investigated renaming policies as a part of this transformation in Turkey.

TÜRKİYE’DE ETNİK HOMOJENLEŞTİRME:

İSTANBUL’DA YER ADLARININ DEĞİŞTİRİLMESİ

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, İstanbul’daki sokakların yeniden adlandırılmasının, etnik olarak homojen bir ulus yaratma sürecine nasıl hizmet ettiğini incelemektedir. İstanbul’da gayri Müslim azınlıklarla yürütülen alan araştırmasına dayanarak, yeniden isimlendirme politikasının geçmişi ve azınlıklardan kalan mirası hedeflediği belirtilmektedir. Cumhuriyet dönemindeki geniş kapsamlı azınlık karşıtı politikalar, kentteki demografik çeşitliliğin zamanla yok olmasına ve azınlıkların varlıklarının gerek kamusal alanda gerekse gündelik hayatın her alanından silinmesine neden olmuştur. Bu çalışmada yer isimleri değiştirme pratikleri de bu dönüşümün bir parçası olarak ele alınmıştır.

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*To my father Mustafa Akgül;*

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

*“Extermination plan: destroy the grass, pull up every last living thing by the roots, sprinkle the earth with salt. To colonize consciences, suppress them; to suppress them, empty them of the past. Wipe out all testimony to the fact in this land there ever existed anything other than silence, jails, and tombs. It is forbidden to remember.”<sup>1</sup>*

*Eduardo Galeano*

Renaming of settlements has been in the spotlight from the last years of the Ottoman Empire until the Republican era in Turkey. In accordance with *raison d’etat* of the Republic, throughout the years, successive governments from various ideological perspectives have executed similar policies on the idea of intervention towards geographical place names. In 2008, renaming issue became one of the most debatable issues in domestic politics. Hasip Kaplan, then banned pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) Şırnak Deputy, introduced a bill on the bilingual use of place names. In 2010, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, decided to use road names on the signboards both in old (Non- Turkish, mostly Kurdish and Armenian) and current (Turkish) versions. In 2011 former President Abdullah Gül preferred to refer to Güroymak with its previous name as Norşin during a speech in the province. In the meanwhile, provincial councils approved restoring the former names of settlements. However, governors mostly rejected decisions of local authorities. In the cities; such as Urfa, Hakkari and Van, there were also significant local attempts to retrieve the old names of hamlets, villages and districts. “Democratization Package” of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, *Adalet ve*

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<sup>1</sup> Eduardo Galeano, *Days and Nights of Love and War*, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp.165, 2000.

*Kalkınma Partisi*) government was announced in September 2013 and one of the issues in the package was about reforms on language, including restoration of place names in Kurdish localities.

Applications on restoring the former place names gained acceleration with the proclamation of the package. Deputies from pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, BDP) introduced in a large number of bills for various provinces and Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) also demanded the names of some settlements in the Black Sea Region to be restored.

On the political platform, discussion generally started and proceeded among Kurdish provinces. Moreover, demands were also raised from other parts of the country. The Laz Cultural Association (*Laz Kültür Derneği*) submitted a petition to the Prime Ministry in order to return Lazuri settlement names. It can be called that Kurdish movement became a pioneer on recalling former toponymic orders and these attempts became a model for other regions.

Though in limited numbers, several settlements retrieved their former names in this period. Alagöz, the name of a Syriac village in Mardin province, was officially changed back to its Aramaic name, *Bethkustan*. The Ministry of Interior approved the application of villagers in the Black Sea region on changing the name of their village Murat, back to its traditional name in Laz language, *Komilo*. This was the first time that a Lazuri place name was restored. Lastly Van Metropolitan, Municipal Council restored the old names (Armenian and Kurdish) of 704 neighborhoods in 2014.

These few instances would not mean that there was a serious progress in reclaiming old names. It could be argued that more of these attempts were rejected or ignored by the authorities and local councils. Since 1923, especially in the Eastern Black Sea and Southeastern regions of Turkey, governmental authorities altered almost all settlement names. However, Nişanyan (2011) emphasizes that since 1990s, only 110 town and village names were restored. Although renaming policy of the state

had been on the political agenda in recent years, the drastic transformation in the politics of the government removed place names from the agenda.

There is a broad academic literature on the renaming policies of nation states from various geographies and time. However, the issue was largely ignored in Turkey. Besides, existing literature mainly focuses on the names in the Eastern Turkey. Naturally, this has reasonable causes as almost all the names are Turkified in Eastern Anatolian provinces. Moreover, the ongoing Kurdish problem and Kurdish struggle over the demands of rights highlight toponymic issues more than other regions. Thus, differently, this study argues that toponymic operation in Istanbul deserves a particular attention to be paid. Istanbul used to have a heterogeneous demography, a rooted spatial memory and rich cultural heritage over the centuries. These features as an inheritance were reflected on the names of settlements in the city. Because of its multi-ethnic character, Turkification process had a great impact on the city. Policies against non-Muslim groups changed the demographic structure of the city in time. In line with anti-minority spirit of newly-founded state, all names with non-Turkish and non-Muslim evocations and meanings were altered at the very first years of the republic.

Literature based on critical geography and politics of place naming started to be developing after the mid-1990s. Within this frame, place names have been analyzed “as a strategy of nation-building and state formation and a heavy emphasis was therefore placed on how governmental authorities have constructed new regimes of toponymic inscription to promote particular conceptions of history and national identity” (Rose-Redwood, et al., 2010). In this study, the renaming will be interpreted in the context of forming a nation state. In order to do so, the study uses Kerem Öktem’s concept of “toponymic engineering” as a proximate notion to demographic engineering. In the nation state building processes, founders carry out destructive and constructive policies for the notion of establishing a homogenous homeland. Those policies fall under the implementation of demographic engineering, which is a toolbox for a socially constructed nation. Demographic engineering is “a state directed removal or destruction of certain communities from

a given territory... and prepare the conditions for the nation state to project its vision of space and time.” (Öktem, 2008, p. 8) It comprises policies; such as displacement, ethnic cleansing, population exchange as destructive dimension and establishment of national institutions, making up stories, heroic myths and toponymic practices as constructive policy.

On the other hand, toponymic engineering is: “... the ‘archeology’ of place names and its replacement with an alternative toponymical order that conforms with the time and space vision of the nation state.” (Öktem, 2008, p. 9) In this respect, it is argued that renaming policy should be regarded both as an inclusion and an exclusion policy in nation building process. Renaming as a destructive policy is a way of eliminating undesirable identities of the past from the collective memory. On the other hand, it gives an opportunity to serve as a formation of a new nation by the new names. The study tries to find out discourses of nation states on language, memory and geography and link up their interactions with renaming practices.

In the second chapter, symbolic significance of place names will be analyzed. Toponymy as a concept will be scrutinized. Furthermore, the relationship between place names and collective memory will be examined. As a spatio-temporal design, renaming policies of the nation-states will be elaborated. In the nation state building process renaming is one of the tools for creating a national identity. How renaming policy serves to the process of building a new nation? Nation states’ approach towards geography and toponymic engineering implementations is studied in this chapter.

In the third chapter, toponymic practices in Turkey will be examined in the light of the toponymic engineering concept. This part includes a brief history of renaming practices in Turkey. The study claims that renaming is one of the pillars of Turkification policy of the state. Renaming practices firstly appeared during the Ottoman state. However, the Ottoman era will not be included within the scope of the research. Still, inclusion of the Young Turk era as the origins of ethnic Turkification and homogenization is crucial. In this context, it could be safely

argued that there is a remarkable continuity between the Young Turk era of 1908-1918 and the early republican practices of Turkey rather than a rupture, in terms of the idea of creating an ethnically, religiously, linguistically homogenous identity. This understanding has excluded non-Muslims and non-Turk subjects from the newly established Turkish identity. Aktar (2010 p.23) underlines that years between 1913 (By the time Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power) and 1923 is a transition period in converting the country of Turks into a “Turkish Fatherland”.

Following the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, Kemalist cadre spread Turkification policies to all areas of daily life. The policies were implemented aggressively to impose a hegemonic identity. Population Exchange (*Mübadele*) between Greece and Turkey after the Lausanne Treaty (1923), Campaigns; such as “Citizen, speak Turkish!” (*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!*, 1928), Twenty Classes (*Yirmi Kur'a Nafia Askerleri*, 1941), economic policies against non-Muslim minorities; such as Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*, 1942), 6-7 September Pogrom (*6-7 Eylül Olayları*, 1955), deportation of Greek Pasaport owners in İstanbul (1964) may be considered clear instances of the attitude of the state against non-Muslim subjects from the early years of the republic.

These state practices also signify the transformation of İstanbul in terms of its cultural, demographic, economic and social structure. Parallel to the implementations, in the ideological course, the bureaucratic elite tried to systemize and institutionalize the imposed hegemonic identity. Foundation of Turkish Historical Society (1931), Turkish History Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*, 1932), Holding the 1st Turkish History Congress (1932), The Sun Language Theory (*Güneş Dil Teorisi*, 1935), 1st Geography Congress (1941) are the samples of the attempts to establish an ideological basis to create ethnically homogenous Muslim/Turk identity in accordance with *raison d'etat*. To sum, Turkification policies during 1930's until the end of the Democrat Party government rule will be analyzed in the third chapter and a comprehensive regulatory context of the Turkification and specifically renaming policies will be investigated in details.

In the fourth part of the research, the main aim will be to elaborate renaming practices of Istanbul within this context. The subject matter of the study is the changes in place names during the republican era in İstanbul between 1923 and 1960. In this part, the main problem of the study is how the renaming of settlements in Istanbul played a role in the projection of demographic engineering, namely construction of Turkish identity and destruction of the “other”. The main objective of this research is to analyze the link between the state-led toponymic engineering as a system of creating a national identity and renaming operations in Istanbul. The study aims to find out if Turkifying settlement names in Istanbul served to construct a demographically homogeneous identity. At this point, it is important to compare the policies executed in Istanbul with the implementations in other regions, in terms of reasonability, implementation, and sustainability. This analysis enables us to find out whether the renaming of settlements in İstanbul overlaps the general toponymic policies in Turkey or not.

As in almost all provinces of Turkey, Istanbul had its share from renaming policies. In 1927 all non-Turkish street and square names were changed. Sevan Nişanyan (2011, p.51) asserts that 52 of the 274 names in Istanbul (19% of all) were renamed. Moreover, Harun Tunçel (2000, p.6) that indicates 21 village names in the city were changed during the Republican era. Within the scope limits of the thesis, this chapter does not intend to itemize renamed settlements in Istanbul. Instead, the aim is to analyze the symbolic meanings of some old and new names and to make a contribution to the toponymy literature in Turkey with the help of insurance maps of 1920’s, and Istanbul city guide of 1934’s.

It should be underlined that since 1920’s, Turkification policies have influenced and transformed Istanbul deeply because of its multicultural and ethnically heterogeneous structure. Regulations, which prevented minorities from practicing many professions, de facto pressures on foreign companies, policies to encourage recruitment of Muslim-Turks, had affected economic and demographic structure of the city in the long-term.

Methodologically, the study is based on a comprehensive literature survey and archival resources as sketched in the second and third chapters. The official records are utilized to observe the content and history of renaming policy in Turkey. The naming and renaming of villages are analyzed through the directories of the Provincial Administration of the Interior Ministry's publications (1928, 1933, 1940, 1946, 1968, 1977 and 1985). One of the main objectives of The First National Geography Congress held in 1941 was naming of places. Therefore, proceedings of the Congress are helpful to understand perceptions of the state-elites and bureaucrats on the issue. Turkish Place Names Symposium of 1984 proceedings is significant documents to comprehend the work of the Expert Commission on Name Changes. The research also utilizes quantitative data to see the scope of the renaming operations all over the country. Sevan Nişanyan and Harun Tunçel have significant contributions to about the data collection on renamed/Turkified/changed names.

Archival maps of Istanbul are other sources to show the settlements affected from renaming implementations in details. Newspaper archives are reviewed to see press's approach towards Turkifying place names. Memories, autobiographies of the witnesses of the period have also been included to the research. The most significant one is the works of Osman Nuri Ergin (1934) who is defined as the pioneer of Turkifying/renaming Istanbul. Ergin worked as a bureaucrat in Istanbul Municipality for 45 years and his major role was to organize the street names. He supervised the mapping processes and naming/renaming of the streets in Istanbul.

Lastly, and more crucially, a qualitative study will be conducted in order to write an oral history of İstanbul in such terms. For this purpose, results of in-depth interviews with twelve participants will be given to scrutinize how Stambouliote non-Muslim minorities of today perceive and evaluate the renaming process. Seeking a qualitative method in order to a deep investigation based on the experiences and memoirs on the space, extensive interviews were conducted and semi- structured questions were addressed to participants, composed of 12 Stambouliote non-Muslim inhabitants, 4 of them being female and 8 of them male.

Ethnic origins of participants were Armenian (6), Greek (2) and Jewish (4). The youngest participant is at the age of 56 and the oldest is 78. The average age of the participants is 66.5. An age quota was applied, as all the interviewees were older than 55, which would cause more stories on past experiences. In the field study the main aim is to examine how non-Muslim minorities perceive state-led toponymic practices. Do they attach importance to changes? Are they aware of renaming streets? It is observed that 7 participants were informed of the renaming before and 5 participants learned during the interviews that place names were changed in Istanbul. All of them were not surprised to see such a change. One can argue that this situation indicates that as a result of living in a “habitus of denial”<sup>2</sup> for a long time, even if this habitus makes them feel uncomfortable, non-Muslim minorities get used to live with it and normalized its practices.

Interviews were generally held in the homes and offices of the participants. 10 of the interviewees have comfortable attitude and did not see a problem with voice recording. Moreover, they were eager to talk. They even underline that the use of their actual names is not a problem for them. On the other hand, 2 interviewees a few times repeated that they did not want their names used. One of them joked that she has a difficult name, probably I cannot remember and she would not mention it once again. In order to preserve confidentiality of the participants, the original initials of the names and surnames have been changed to provide anonymity. The similarities that may arise from this situation are coincidences. The same two people did not get a voice recording, and they wanted information about my workplace, phone, and so on. On the other hand, they were also very eager to talk with a Muslim-Turk student.

It can be said that during the interviews some participants got excited and angry, especially in the questions of today's social exclusion practices in the public sphere.

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<sup>2</sup> Talin Suciyan’s definition “habitus of denial” is a concept that refers to state-led organized policies, against identities that seen as the target of state. Denialist habitus notion constitutes daily life with its various forms. It refers to normalized hatred in the public sphere, in the media and even in juridical system. (Interview with Suciyan, *Agos*, 13.08.2013)

However, I observed that, they are adapting to life in a "habitus of denial" in general. The striking instance of this situation is an interpretation of a participant. She indicates that while issuing the identity of now-borns, they leave the religion section empty to avoid discrimination in the future. She also adds that they get so accustomed to doing such things, as a minority and this act does not even seem as a trouble for them.

The fact that none of the participants has expressed a thought about restoration of the names could be related to the general acceptance of being "other". This situation might also imply that such change is not perceived as possible by the interviewers.

## CHAPTER II

### ARCHEOLOGY OF RENAMING

#### 2.1. Place names as a reservoir of collective memory

Place names can be defined as the mere and technical signifiers of geographical locations. A feature of the local environment or a social element could inspire naming process. Cultural and economic features, climate, human communities, lineage and clans from the past also affect them (Tunçel, 2000; Çoban, 2013) or they are given due to commemorate historical figures and events.

Toponymy, on the other hand, is “a study of place names”. The Greek origin word comes from τόπος-place (Karatzas & Tuncay, 1994) and όνομα-name (Karatzas & Tuncay, 1994). Based on the geographic information, toponymic researches analyze and classify place names etymologically and historically. Toponymic literature focuses on the linguistic evolution of the names. It also pays attention to the renaming processes due to the political processes. (Britannica, 1998)

Although topographers and cartographers generally disregard toponymy and oftenly focus on recording of names and mapping processes, after the mid 1990s, critical toponymic studies figured out that place names are not just an encyclopedic information. Researchers from various disciplines discover that geography can be ‘transformed, manipulated, invented, characterized apart from merely physical reality with various instruments’. (Said, 2000) Henceforth, toponymy has been taking place in the various studies as one of the main instruments of reshaping human geography in compliance with power relations. This reveals the recognition of critical toponymic studies, which mainly focus on meaning of names and nomenclature process of settlements in order to understand power struggle among geography.

Beyond being a reference system for demarcation of a location or a space, names have been becoming part of local cultural life in time and they are active participants

of collective memory which refers to a shared past, historical information and collective knowledge in the memoirs of a group or a society. In order to get insights from the historiographical importance of renaming, its link with collective memory should be illuminated.

Connerton (1989) underlines that present experiences commonly depend upon knowledge of the past and the images of the past are largely legitimate current social order. The concept of the collective memory is an accumulation of socially constructed knowledge that is handed down. Following the lines of Lewis Coser (1992) collective memory is fundamentally a reconstruction of the past in the light of the present. It is not an inert and passive, instead it is active participant in which past incidents are “selected, reconstructed, maintained, modified, and endowed with political meaning”. (Said, 2000) The founding father of the “collective memory” studies, Maurice Halbwachs (1980), specifies that collective memory is dependent on time, space and historical conditions. In line with this argument, place names are aspects of the spatial dimension of the collective memory. Place names are in use through long ages, therefore they are hosting traces of the past and local information about space and they are significant source of knowledge about human history. They shed light to the history of a society and histories of humanity just like archaeological remains, historic buildings, inscriptions and sepulchral monuments (Nişanyan, 2001). The historians can utilize them in order to reveal ancient movements of the human past or they can be a clue for forgotten ages (Tichelaar, 2002). They are identifying elements of local, regional, national culture. (Nişanyan, 2001) Place names are seen in the idioms and narratives that are in the part of local cultures. Due to these features, geographical place names gain importance in time.

Andreas Huyssen (2003) states that memory is not merely related with the past, it have become a part of political legitimacy of regimes. Political turmoil and historical breaks shape collective memory and implicitly place names. With this sense they are laden with full of reflection of the historical events. For instance when one say Auschwitz, German Nazi concentration camps during World War

Two is the first thing come to mind rather than a geographical location, a town in Poland. (Said, 2000) . Reflections of a place names' symbolic meaning can be differ from one group to another. Same place refer to quiet different connotation in the collective memory of social units. As an instance Jews, Muslims and Christians have different collective memory about same place, Palestine (Ibid, 2000).

In a nutshell, settlement names are essentially significant due to their connotations in collective memory and the cognitive, emotional, ideological and social hidden meanings. A toponymy signifies the ideology, which underlies and legitimates its use as a proper nomenclature. (Azaryahu & Golan, 2001) Thus, place naming and renaming processes evinces specific power relations in a place and of a time.

Political authorities intervene to names in order to handle and consolidate the control of the area, establish sovereignty, testify its hegemony and reinforce its power. Renaming settlements phenomenon generally appears within three main leading contexts:

- “Conquests: imperial, colonial, national and all forms of political and cultural acquisitions or claims: annexation, settlers and frontier colonization, ethnic cleansing, incorporation, military occupation, territorial claims through cartography.
- Revolution, meaning a radical change of the political order, like the fall of empires, that of authoritarian regimes which have shaped the society and its space for a long time.
- Emergence, of new territories such as the ones produced by new regionalism – understood as the making of new procedures and new spatial entities for local, metropolitan and provincial government.” (Giraut, et al., 2012, p. 6).

In addition to them, renaming can spring as a way of counter-hegemonic resistance by the ignored and historically marginalized groups, as in the African Americans' challenge to usage of street names with discriminative commemorations or the ones that wipe off their historical entity (Alderman, 2014). ‘The renaming of streets for

Martin Luther King is the most widespread example of African American efforts to contest the hegemonic place-name landscape' (Rose-Redwood, et al., 2010, p. 464).

In similar vein, Kurdish political movement in Turkey considers Turkification of Kurdish toponymy during the republican era as an assimilation policy targeting Kurdish identity. Çakır (2014, p. 24) notes that "linked to memory and collective identity, the strategies of using Kurdish pronunciations for Turkified place names, re-introduction the original names of rural settlements and deploying alternative names in urban settings have recently been the core of the Kurdish resistance to republican renaming."

Renaming is a common feature of political regime changes since the French Revolution. Hebbert (2004, p. 582) claim that 'it has been an obligatory accompaniment to the political change'. Azaryahu (1997, p.3) exemplifies that following the French Revolution; "Place Louis XV" was changed and became "Place de la Revolution". In 1918, following the Soviet Revolution, Palace Square renamed Utrisky after the murder of the Bolshevik commissar in Russia. (Boym, 2001) Azaryahu (1997) also shows how East Berlin Street names were changed in accordance with the city's post-communist political geography in 1990's. Anderson (2006) remarks that the European imperial powers exercised renaming practices in their colonies in order to widen their hegemony.

Öktem (2008) highlights that, during nation state foundation process in Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, settlement names changed in accordance with the newly established state's nationalist ideology. By the same token, in 1948, Israel renamed the evacuated Arab villages with Hebrew names. As Azaryahu and Golan underline street names also changed during the establishing period of Israel nation states (Azaryahu & Golan, 2001). During The Second World War, with the order of Hitler, East Prussian place names changed by the aim of "Germanization". At the end of the war, names that evoke Nazi regime renamed (Azaryahu, 1997). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a large number of settlement names replaced with the aim of reject communist heritage in Romania and Budapest. Bosnia and

Herzegovina had interfered names with the aim of removing the heritage of other ethnicities, particularly Serbs (Kuran, 2010).

Names are ‘embedded into the structures of power and authority’ (Azaryahu, 1997, p.2). As several examples show us, renaming is a widespread phenomenon that handled in numerous geographies and times by the political authorities. Its influence on the collective memory causes them to be significant objects of political authority symbols like other spatial instruments like monument and maps. The purpose of renaming can be to break ties with the past, shatter the effect of a dominated culture or language, creating a collective identity that fit better to state ideology (Nişanyan, 2001).

## **2.2. Demographic engineering and renaming national toponymy**

As aforementioned before, toponymic practices also performed in the nation state building processes. There is a vast amount of literature on nationalism and nation building formations. Discussions mainly turn around modernist view and ethno-symbolic approach. Ethno-symbolists analyze ideologies and sense of identity in terms of traditions, memories, values, myths and symbols and stress that pre-existing ethnic identities play a major role in the shaping the formation of modern nations (Smith, 2009). They reject the concept that nations are recent forms. Ethno-symbolists assert that nation is a historical community, which dates back to pre-modern era, and pre-modern ethnicities are at the center in the nation state building (Smith, 2009).

On the other hand, the modernists argue that nationalism is “a primarily political principle which holds that the political and cultural unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). According to modernist approach, nationalism is closely related to political and social transformations, namely, modern development processes like industrialization, language, literacy and printed capitalism (Hutchinson, 2005; Hobsbawm, 1990). For the modernist interpretation, the main causes of nationalism are: the loss of identity, the need for modernization and industrialization and development of communication and printed capitalism (Göl,

2005). According to modernists “an imagined political community” nation is based on common interests and common sense of belonging of the people. (Anderson, 2006) In imagined community, each member is aware of being part of some greater communal whole, but in which individual members do not necessarily all gather. Calhoun (1997) also states that recognition, as a nation requires social solidarity, namely, integration among the members of the nation and collective identity.

Following Calhoun (1997), boundaries, indivisibility, sovereignty, culture, common decent, historical relation with territory are some of the features of the rhetoric of nations. Hobsbawn (1990) verbalizes that social and political engineering are inevitable policies in nation state building process in order to embody the national identity. The invention of history and reproduction of geography, space and architecture are ways of political and social engineering in the modern nationalism concept. (Öktem, 2008) In this sense, the reproduction of geography is mainly determined by the political concerns of the nation state. A modern nation requires secular political units and consolidated territories (Hutchinson, 2005).

Territory has a role in the development of nationalist thought (Penrose, 2002). For the purpose of creating a national identity, nation states intend to control territorial landscape, which is a primary geographical expression of power. Geography is a socially constructed and maintained sense of place, constitutive role of space in human affairs (Said, 2000). Nation state builders aim to establish their sovereignty and reinforce their authority by controlling geography with several tools. The main instruments to shape and control geography is the re-writing of the national map, producing geographical knowledge and renaming of settlements. The naming of places is a strategy for claiming ownership of a space.

Reproduction of geography starts with envisaging an abstract space known in the map as a “homeland” concept that contains the physical requirements of life and the sentimental requirements of belonging of (Penrose, 2002). National geography requires a homeland. Therefore, the nation state ideal is the integration of cultural values and political boundaries in a limited and intangible space (Durgun, 2011). In

order to create a national identity and bind people together, narratives about the heroic past of a nation, glorious history and origins of it, myths are invented. Beyond doubt those stories that reflect the uniqueness of a nation, occur in a specific place and that place generally refers to a “eternal” homeland.

As in the past two hundred years, nation-states have emerged and became the dominant order in the world; interventions to geography and place names became a frequent phenomenon. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the systematic construction of ‘national’ toponymy was an aspect of nation building and state-formation. Place names play a part in the cultural construction of the national territory.) Besides being a spatial strategy, renaming is also an instrument of language engineering. Reshaping toponymy in a nationalist context is also an important example of a language planning method. “The age of modern nationalism demanded the exclusive use of the national language, and the renaming of landscapes accompanied state-formation situations where the theme of “national revival” featured prominently” (Azaryahu & Golan, 2001, p.181). Language, memory, geography and identity are tightly coupled with place names. “The nationalistic language planning aims to foster the national language as a tool for unity and authenticity. The plan also involves the ‘purification’ of the national language from foreign influences, deemed as ‘impurities’ and hence undesirable” (Azaryahu & Golan, 2001). Besides its influence on cultural heritage among memory, purification language from “foreign” words is another dimension of renaming policies of nation states.

Since place names have such a strong influence on collective memory and accordingly national identity, the area witnessed to struggle among names in the case of claiming ownership. As an instance; during the last 100 years, there is a bitter struggle between Zionist-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs, both claiming the territory to be their own national homeland. Greece Hellenized Turkish, Slavic and Italian place names in 1830, Hungary in 1987, Poland after 1945 changed place names. In fact after World War II, the Polandization of former German toponymy

was coordinated. Poland, Turkey, Israel established special agencies for renaming (Azaryahu & Golan, 2001).

Demographic engineering is a state-led technique to manage ethnic diversity in a line with states interests. It is a concept that “aim to increase the political and economic power of one ethnic group over others” by manipulating population through various methods such as forced migrations and ethnic cleansing (Şeker, 2007). In other words it is cluster of governmental policies, which are designed to affect the size, composition, distribution and growth rate of a population. (Teitelbaum & Weiner, 2001) Since the modern era has been shaped by nationalism a number of states have been based on ethnocentric formation and the nations “ethnicized” (McGarry, 1998). Kerem Öktem (2008) defines demographic engineering as “a state directed removal or destruction of certain communities from a given territory and prepare the conditions for the nation state to project its vision of space and time.”

Naturally, minority- based nationalist movements play a role in seeing as an “enemy” and a threat to state security, especially in times of war. (McGarry, 1998) However, this argument does not provide a basis of justification to legitimize harsh violent actions of the states against its “non-favored” subjects. Moreover one can assert that, it is a pretext to legitimize assimilationist goals of the states. Following Öktem’s lines (2008), demographic engineering and the renaming practice of places are closely relevant policies in formation of nation states by means of a geographical reproduction.

Toponymic engineering is also directly related to language policies, which is one of the main pillars of the nation state building process. One can argue that, due to its connections with geography, language, politics, toponymic engineering is a relative for both demographic and language engineering.

### **2.3. Toponymic Engineering as a system of create ‘self’ and destroy other**

The state-led concept ‘toponymical engineering’ is in close causal relationship with ‘demographic’ and ‘social engineering’. (Öktem, 2008) In the nation state

formation past is used to connect social units and boundaries that both unite and divide space. (Öktem, 2008) “The creation of territories gives physical substance and symbolic meaning to notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’.” (Penrose, 2002, p. 280) Territory was converted from a geographical term of cultural identity into the main basis for describing group and individual identities. (Penrose, 2002) Herkül Millas (2010) argues that identity is a combination of a self-identification, which includes a sense of a past and a real or imagined clique with which the citizens correlate themselves. He states that in modern nation-states, citizens need to feel honored by ‘their’ heritage and they enjoy portraying this heritage and history in a manner that is not traumatic to their identity. “The Other” has a significant role in this process in order to define what ‘we’ do not want to be. (Ibid, 2010)

Since “the identity is territorially defined” (Penrose, 2002, p. 284), one can argue that there is a close causal relationship between identity politics and toponymic interferences. In the nation state formation renaming generally targeting remembrances inherited from “other”ised elements. Following to Jongerden (2009), in the extermination process of ‘the Other’ from spatial representation, one of the leading tactic in geographical reproduction process is renaming.

#### **2.4. Concluding Remarks**

Place names are one of the oldest living parts of human testimony and transferring from generations for hundreds of years. They are vital part of everyday practices, language and thus, collective memory. They are the bearer of historical information and they create a collective identity, which arises from the sense of belonging to a group- a nation in our case-. They have an influence on ethno political conflicts and utilize in order to distorting and manipulating historical testimonies and creating a hegemonic time-space order.

In recent years, the study of place names became a field of interest for numerous disciplines such as geography, history, anthropology, and political science. Literature started to focus on toponymy not only as a taxonomic measure, also the

meaning and symbolic importance of names are examining. The 20th century witnessed a range of political regime changes and renaming was implemented with communist, colonialist, de-colonialist, nationalist considerations. Since the research will focus on the issue in the frame of nation state building formation, the casual relationship between nation state building process and place naming practices need to be emphasized.

In the context of nationalism, geography is something to be manipulated to prepare the conditions of nation state and consolidate state's sovereignty. In the emerging processes of nations, various communities were exposed to demographic engineering policies such as assimilation, resettlements, and deportations. Those destructive policies pave the way for othering excluded former identities that belong to that place once. State founders aim to impose a national identity by instrumentalizing history by using ethno-symbolic myths and narratives that emphasizing the glorious and unique past of the nation. In addition to that, geography -and place names- has a significant position for the created narratives which need a "from all eternity homeland". In line with this historiography, reconstructing geography by interfering the map-making process, fabrication of the geographical knowledge, furnishing the territory with monuments and renaming. Moreover, nation-state achieves its objective of interfering and changing collective memory in accordance to the national and cultural identity through changing names.

In a nutshell, nation states undertake series of activities in order to claim ownership on the territory ethnically and to legitimize their sovereignty in the territories that they established on. Renaming of toponymy, mapmaking, geography education in schools are the instruments of interference to geography. In the nation-state building processes various states changed place names due to shape toponymic order. The strategically significance of the toponymy is their contribution to shape a state-will ideology.

Toponymic engineering is utilized to exclude the traces of the identities, which are seen as "disloyal" and "unwanted". Some scholars assume that nation state needs to define "other" for self-definition. That means, by othering ethnic, linguistic or

religious groups formerly within the country, one can define himself/herself as the main elements of the nation. In the following part of the study, the renaming practices, as an episode of modern nation state establishing process in Turkey, will be analyzed comprehensively.

## CHAPTER III

### RENAMING POLICY IN TURKEY

#### 3.1 Historical Background of Toponymic Practices

As a part of demographic engineering, renaming policy had been started in 1913, during the late Ottoman State period. The new established Republic had undertaken the implementation in 1923 and implemented by successive governments in years. Turkifying toponymy started with demographic engineering practices of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The loss of the Balkan provinces in the wake of the two Balkan Wars had an enormous effect on the political and administrative elite of Ottoman State due to the history and the economic importance of the missed provinces that were the most developed and richest ones. Moreover a great majority of the CUP officers hailed from the Balkan provinces. (Zürcher, 2008) This trauma prompts them to focus on Asia Minor as the Turkish heartland from 1913 onward. (Ibid, 2008) The CUP decided to follow a strategy of aggressive Turkish nationalism targeting the non-Muslim population of the Empire (Şeker, 2007) and a notion of creating a Muslim majority all over Anatolia, in order to prevent what had happened in the Balkans. (Zürcher, 2008) The creation of ethnically Turk and Muslim national identity rather than Ottomanism<sup>3</sup> became the objective of the CUP leaders and shaped political life of the following years drastically.

Renaming emanated as a part of resettlement policy after the Balkan Wars, during the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was in power. The policy officially appeared in 1913 with the *Iskan-ı Muhacirin Nizamnamesi* (Regulation for the Settlement of Immigrants). In 1915 the CUP declared a deportation law for “those opposing the government in times of war” and a million of Armenians and other ethnic communities (Syriac Christians, and some Kurdish) who are the one of the

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<sup>3</sup> Ottomanism following Şeker’s (2007, 463) definition: “Official policy of the Ottoman State from the beginning of the *Tanzimat* era in 1839, which promoted an inclusive Ottoman citizenship to form a supra-nationality transcending ethnic and religious identities through installing the principle of equality in the Ottoman legal System”.

most ancient population of Anatolia were uprooted from their ancestral lands and force into exile. (Öktem, 2008) Evacuated villages were planned to resettle with Balkan immigrants. Previously, it was planned to rename those villages with the order of the Ismail Enver Pasha who is one of the leaders of the CUP.

‘It has been decided that provinces, districts, towns, villages, mountains and rivers, which are named in languages belonging to Non-Muslim nations such as Armenian, Greek or Bulgarian, will be translated into Turkish...In order to benefit from this suitable moment, this aim should be achieved in due course.’ (Dündar, 2002, p.82)

Newly given names should refer to the “hard-working, exemplary and praiseworthy” glorious military past of Turks. It was underlined that places that experienced war should name with glorified events of the past and present wars. If it is not possible name should be given due to commemorate persons who had the most honorable personality and rendered good service to the country as an inspiration to future generations. (Dündar, 2002) Following the order, certain instances of renaming were implemented. *Kızılkilise*- Red church (Dersim) became Nazimiye, *Megri* changed to Fethiye (Muğla), *Atronos* to Orhanili (later renamed as Bursa in 1918) (Kuran, 2009). However, renaming implementation complicated communication of the army in wartime, thus the order was invalidated. (Öktem, 2008) On the other hand Öktem addresses the local military commanders followed a policy of *fait accompli* and renamed toponymies (which had a Greek or Slavic origin) that regained from Greek army ‘to efface the memory of the ‘enemy’ from the territory they had just liberated’. (Öktem, 2008) Following the expulsion of Greek troops from Western Anatolia, the chief of the General Staff asserted the need for changing place names in a correspondence with Interior Ministry. Öktem (2008) adds that although the Interior Ministry agreed on the necessity of renaming, it insisted on ‘a scientific examination’, which would bring a systematized and integrated renaming policy in the following years.

The Kemalists, who were the ideological successors of the CUP, continued the toponymic nationalization process. In the most fervent days of the Greco- Turkish

War, the issue was discussed in the Parliament. In 1921, Gaziantep Deputy Yasin Bey made a statement for the changing the name of Rumkale (the Greek Castle) in Gaziantep.

‘...Today, as a compatriot, I do not want to carry a nations name who wants to attack like a dog to our honor, entity, future...I request that Greek word throwing out right now’<sup>4</sup> (Koraltürk, 2003, p. 98)

In spite of sharp nationalist-Turkist demands of deputies, the government desired to handle the issue in a systematic plan. In the meantime, in 1922 sub-district *Çanlı* (in Sinop and refers to the cross) renamed to Osmanlı, *Ayandon* to *Türkeli*, *Davgana* (Konya) to *Doğanbey*, *Ermış* (İzmit) to *Budaklar*, *Makriyali* (In the Lazistan sanjak and means long waterside in Greek) to *Kemalpaşa* (refers to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk), *Ağros* (Isparta) to *Atabey*, *Cebel* to *Ağlasun*. (BCA cited in Koraltürk, 2003)<sup>5</sup>. In 1925, comprehensive changes were made in İzmir. Street and district names were “secularized” and the names that reminded the old regime were changed. (Serçe, 2000) The main changes had undertaken during the Republican era in bulk and renaming appeared as an instrument for controlling geography and ethnic homogenization policy of the Turkish nation-state.

### 3.2. Turkification Policies and Renaming

A great majority of the literature in the field asserts that the emergence of Turkish nation state has a modernist- Westernized form. Indeed, the founder elites sought a radical transformation on traditional social, economic, and political structures of the Ottoman Empire and focus on creation of ethnically and religiously homogeneous, westernized nation state. Therefore Turkification phenomenon that left its mark on the following years, which emerged to serve the objectives of the founders.

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<sup>4</sup> “... *Bugün bizim namusumuza, mevcudiyetimize, istikbalimize köpekler gibi saldırmak isteyen bir milletin ismini ben o memleketli olmak sıfatıyla taşımak istemiyorum...Bu Rum kelimesinin şu saatte atılmasını rica ediyorum.*”

<sup>5</sup> General Directorate of State Archives of The Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (BCA), Bakanlıklararası Tayin Daire Başkanlığı (Üçlü Kararnameler) Tasnifi. Yer No.2.9.17. (Cited in Koraltürk)

Turkification process and toponymic engineering are two inextricably related practices and it is not possible to understand the insight of the renaming practices without illuminating the Turkification phenomenon. Thus, toponymic engineering is a sub-set of the ethnic Turkification process, which had started from the last days of the Empire to the inception of the Republic of Turkey in continuity.

As a result of political operations such as deportation of the Armenians from Anatolia in 1915, forced population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923, arrival of the Muslim Balkan immigrants to Turkey at the end of the two Balkan wars, the population composition ethnic and religiously changed drastically. Keyder (1989, p. 167) underlines that ‘Before the war (First World War), one out of every five person living in present-day Turkey was non-Muslim, after the war, only one out of forty persons was non-Muslim. Yet, before the inception of the Republic of Turkey, wars and political turbulences culminate with outstanding changes in the ethnic composition of demography but a considerable number of ethnic and religious minorities still lived in Turkey.

**Table 1. Non-Muslim population in some cities**

<b>Administrative District</b>	<b>1897</b>
İstanbul	378.367
Edirne	446.727
Sivas	168.755
Trabzon	229.724
Erzurum	121.319
Aydın	272.963

Source: Karpat, K. 1985, *Ottoman Population 1930-1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics*, The University of Wisconsin Press, p.160

In parallel with these demographic alterations, according to Dündar, Kemalist nationalism defined the nation as an ethnic group (Turks), denying the existence of ethnic differences within the new founded Republic. (Dündar, 2002) The main concern of the founders of the Republic was to prove the belonging of “Misak-ı Milli” territories to Turks and more precisely to Muslims live in here. They aim to

confute the possible arguments about presence of Pontus, Armenian and Kurdish political formations enrollment. (Aydın, 2005) A range of policies, namely Turkification was implemented with this purpose from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Turkifying all aspects of life was the primary objective of the state. Before explaining them in details, there is surely a need to define Turkification by noting Aktar's (2009, p. 29) comprehensive explanation: "Turkification policies are the way in which Turkish ethnic identity has been strictly imposed as a hegemonic identity in every sphere of social life, from the language spoken in public to the teaching of history in public schools; from education to industry; from commercial practices to public employment policies; from the civil code to the re-settlement of certain citizens in particular areas."

Nationalizing the economy and creating a national bourgeoisie is the reflection of the nationalist discourse to the economic life and one of the main aspects of the Turkification process. The implementations had started after the collapse of the desired *İttihad-ı Anasır* (The Union of the Elements) with the Balkan Wars and the CUP opted an economic policy favored Muslims. Ziya Gökalp, one of the main ideologue of the CUP, asserts that a society in which Muslim-Turk entity is soldier and state officer and non-Muslim communities are merchant and craftsman could not turn to a modern state, because there is no common conscience between Turks and non-Turks. (Toprak, 1995)

The first discriminatory practice was the Muslim Boycott of 1913-1914. Published notices and leaflets asked for Muslims not to trade with non-Muslims and listed name and addresses of Muslim shopkeepers and grocers. (Toprak, 1995) In May 1915, using French and English in commercial correspondences was banned. Employment of ethnically Turks started in private companies and Levantines who are active in business life but could not write and read in Turkish were aimed to eliminate. (Keyder, 2014, pp. 83-84) Same year capitulations- a trade contracts between the Ottoman Empire and European Powers- abolished unilaterally. (Toprak, 1995)

Designing a new social layer- national bourgeoisie- was adopted throughout the Kemalist one party rule. (Toprak, 1995) During the 1920's firms, companies, doctors, lawyers were stimulated to employ Muslim Turks and hire non-Muslim employees. (Aktar, 2009) Accordingly, 75 percentages of the employees in foreign companies had to consist of Muslim Turks. Laws introduced to regulate the practice of liberal professions like lawyers and doctors and was stated that Turks can only exercise liberal professions. Which refer to the 'Turkishness' as a ethno-religious denomination instead of being Turkish Republic citizen. (Aktar, 2010) National Turkish Commercial Union (Milli Türk Ticaret Birliği) was founded in 1923 aided the gradual takeover of the finance and banking business by a number of Turkish businessmen due to enjoying the backing of the government. (Alexandris, 1922)

The exclusionist policies were continued to exercise against non-Muslims in the economic life during the 1930s. The law of 1932 (Law No. 2007) enacted by Turkish Parliament banned non-Turks from practicing certain professions like street vendors, musicians, photographers, barbers, construction workers, drivers, waiters, singer in bars etc. The process -of necessity- is culminated by migration to Greece of almost 9000 non-exchanged native Greeks losing their jobs (Aktar, 2003).

One of the crucial instances of assimilating non-Muslim population from economic life is the Wealth Tax of 1942. The proposal approved by the Parliament (Official Gazette, November 12, 1942) with the aim of acquiring huge income by utilizing from Second World War environment. Following the lines of Aktar, it was not a merely economic measure it has also political point of view and it is a great example of "anti-minority" policies of one party rule. (Aktar, 2013) It is striking that the law was carried out especially on non-Muslims, Jews particularly, despite it is said that it would be applied to all citizens. A great majority of taxpayers were non-Muslims who pay the ultimate prices (Ökte, 1951). It is plausible to say that the Wealth Tax directly was targeting non-Muslims in order to transfer of the capital to the Muslim-Turk elements. Before the law the public opinion was prepared. Articles and caricatures that have deteriorated and discredited non-Muslims have started to be printed intensely. (Öztürk, 2013) Assessed taxes were non-proportional and

unfairly determined with illicit and arbitrary methods. (Ökte, 1951) If a taxpayer cannot afford to pay his share, their landed properties were impounded or sold niggardly. All those properties were belong to non-Muslim citizens. (Okutan, 2009) Those who cannot pay their share were sent to working camps in Aşkale/Van.

Another significant subject of Turkification policies is language that was perceived as one of the primary material and lightest symbol of the nationalist ideology by the supporters of this political view (Okutan, 2009). Forming a national language is vital for the founders of the Republic in two aspects. First, forming a completely Turkish language by purification it from foreign words, serve nationalistic purposes. In the Turkish Hearths Congress of 1926 linguistic assimilation of Non-Turkish elements was discussed (Ibid, 2009). Secondly Latinizing the alphabet broke off Turkey's ties with Islamic East and facilitated internal communication as well as the Western World. (Lewis, 1999) In this sense, we can assert that, there is continuity in the Turkification aspect of language reform from Ottoman era to the Republican period. On the contrary, in terms of Westernization, it can also be defined as a rupture considering Script reform of 1928, purification of the language from Arabic and Persian influences and cutting States linguistic ties with Islamic heritage. (Lewis, 1999)

In 1923, a law proposal was introduced into the Grand National Assembly called *Türkçe Kanunu* (Law on Turkish), providing for creation in the Ministry of Education of a Commission for the Turkish Language. Technical terms would be Turkicized, text book, official document and new laws would be prepared according to the rules of Turkish and no newspapers breaching the rules would be licensed. (Lewis, 1999) Despite the law was not accepted, this attempt shows that a language reform is on the political agenda. Hence, the Script Reform (*Alfabe Reformu*, 1928) is an important milestone for this aim.

The Sun-Language Theory (*Güneş-Dil Teorisi*) supported by Mustafa Kemal and called the Turkish language as the ancestor of all other human languages developed in 1935. The atmosphere that theory created underpins the Turkish History Thesis according to which all civilizations emanated from central Asia. (Özdoğan, 2001)

‘Turkish Linguistic Society (1932)’, ‘Society for the Study of Turkish History (1931) were established in this term in order to provide ‘scientific’ basis to policy.

Surname Law (*Soyadı Kanunu*) was another policy of language engineering adopted in 1934. Türköz highlights that it was one of modernizing and secularizing measures that loosened the new republic’s ties to its imperial past and a broader Islamic geography (Türköz, 2007). It is also serve purification the language from non-Turkish words. The third article of the law forbades taking names related to foreign ethnicity and nationalities. Besides, surnames must be in Turkish. Suavi Aydın (2005) remarks names that evocate the Middle Asian Past like Börteçine, Oğuz, Tunga, Gökbörü was in great request and Türkoğlu, Türkmen, Öztürk is quiet common. Following to Türköz, addition to Surname law, the Law on the abolition of such appellations and titles as efendi, bey, and pasha (*Efendi, bey, paşa, gibi lakab ve ünvanların kaldırıldığına dair kanun*) banned all religious, military, tribal and other honorific titles which had been in use under Ottoman rule (Türköz, 2007). By the same token, in 1928 a campaign was an launched with the support of Turkish government titled Citizen, speak Turkish! (*Vatandaş Türkçe konuş*) which aimed to broaden the use of the Turkish in public by pressure. (Bayar, 2011)

In addition to a systematic regulations and bureaucratic procedures, several events performed in order to eliminate minorities with the support of the governments. The Thracian Pogrom of 1934 against Jews, the incident of 20 Kur’a Askerleri<sup>6</sup> (*The affair of the twenty-term military recruits*), 6-7 September 1955 Istanbul Pogrom were held in order to systemic eradication of the native non-Muslims of Turkey. 1964 is a sharp turning point for the demographic change in the Greek population of Turkey. In relation to the tension about the Cyprus issue between Greece, native Greeks (Rum) who had the Greek passport ownership got deported. 13 thousand

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<sup>6</sup> Turkish government conscripted non-Muslim men between the ages 27-40 to the army during the Second World War and instead of doing military service they were sent to work in labour battalions for the construction of roads and airports. See Rifat N. Bali, II. Dünya Savaşında gayrimuslimlerin Askerlik Serüveni, Yirmi Kur’a Nafia Askerleri, Kitabevi Yayınları, 2008

Greeks of Turkey forcibly migrate to Greece and the population decrease under two thousand (Dağlıoğlu, 2014).

One of the main features of the Turkification process is to convert the country into fatherland. Aforementioned policies carried out to exclude ‘other’ ethnic, religious and linguistic groups who once lived in the same geographical location (Aktar, 2010). From Ottoman era to the first years of the Republic, the policy targeted primarily non-Muslims in the country. In addition to that, with the inception of the Kurdish rebellion in the East after 1925’s, systematic assimilation policies were harshly implemented to the non-Turk elements and names inherited from them changed sharply.

One of the main tools for creating an “exclusively” Turkish geography is renaming policy, which seeks to recreate toponymic order in the country. Turkification of territories as a systemic way was firstly scrutinized in the First Geography Congress of 1941. The attitude displayed in this congress was to harmonize the geography with the current state discourse (Durgun, 2011). The congress’ agenda involved following issues: curriculums, geographical terms, geography textbooks and naming of places in the geography of Turkey. Despite the majority in the congress agreed on Turkifying place names, opposing views also sprang with scientific reasons. A. Macit Arda (1941, p. 109) argues that ‘like an archeologist’s exploring an historical artifact and detect its production date...a geographer can explore the historic geography of a local unit with geographical names. As long as there is no absolute necessity, names should not change.’

Controlling over geography by the state means controlling the organization, naming, mapping process of interior space and the re-production of geographical knowledge (Durgun, 2011). Nomenclature with a political aim is an indicator of power and control. Nation states change place names in order to homogenize space and declare its hegemony, to prove that they are the real owner of lands (Ibid, 2011).

### 3.3. Renaming Implementation (1957-1978)

Throughout the republican period, state-led renaming policy targeted natural topographies, towns and cities, hamlets and villages, personal names, zoological nomenclature so forth. The process actively started in December 1924. The province Kırkkilise (Fourth Churches- Σαράντα Εκκλησιές in Greek) change of Kırklareli (Land of the Forties) after the heated debates in the Parliament. (Öktem, 2008; Koraltürk, 2003) All names in Artvin province that mostly in Georgian language, changed in 1925 with decision of the provincial assembly. (Tunçel, 2000) Hatay is another province where all names were changed as a whole. (Nişanyan, 2001) In 1925, a motion was discussed in the Parliament on returning of letters and telegrams that came from the abroad entitled with the address ‘Konstantinopl’. (Koraltürk, 2003) In the same year non-national district names in the center of the Edirne province replaced with new ones with a government order. (Koraltürk, 2003) Accordingly, Iskarletoğlu became Lalaşahinpaşa, Aya Isıtıratı became Doğan, Aya Yorgi became Hasil Beyi, Aya Yani changed to İsafaki, Aya İstefanos to Midhat Paşa, Aya Nikola to Hacibedrettin, Papa Koçanos to Mimar Sinan, Panaiya to Dilaverbey, Papasoğlu to Kadripaşa, Feristos to Yahşifaki, Mihalkoç to Malkoçbey, Karapolit to Yakuppaşa, Madanoğlu to Talatpaşa, Tüccar Napoyat to Devlet-i İslam (Koraltürk, 2003).

It can be said that although Westernization was one of the primarily concern of the new state and language engineering policies aim to cut off Turkey’s ties with Islamic World, as it is seen in this case, new names are referring to Ottoman Pashas and Islam. This dichotomy can be explained as the renaming was carried out with arbitrary and non-systemized ways in the very first years of the Republic and/or the state officers preferred Islamic connotations rather than Christian resonances.

Öktem defines the years between 1922-1950 as a preparation and ground-working period. In this term changing settlement names did not required many bureaucratic endeavor. (Öktem, 2008) Hence, from the second half of the 1930’s town and city names were changed with the approval of the cabinet. Aziziye (Afyon) province renamed as Emirdağı (1931), Alaiye (Antakya) turned to Alanya (1933), Sulaniye

in Konya province renamed as Karapınar (1934), The city of Bayazıt replaced with Ağrı (1935), Gevar district (Hakkari) became Yüksekova (1936) in this period. (Kuran, 2010) Dersim was renamed as Tunceli in 1935. It can be argued that the province has one of the most well known former names, in fact some still call the region by its original name. This formation comes from the Dersim massacre of 1938, which gave a symbolic importance to region in the collective memory of people, Kurds and Alevis particularly. Using former name come in possession of a counter-hegemonic resistance in a sense.

Institutionalization about Turkifying toponymies started during the 1940s. Changing settlement names was officialized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs with a curricular (no. 8589) which “called for changing into Turkish all toponyms in foreign languages or with foreign roots” in 1940. (Tunçel, 2000, p. 27) Fikri Gökçeer narrates that:

‘From the 1940’s, the issue seen directly related with our national entity and Turkification of place names considered as a state policy. Following, a curricular was released by our Ministry that request from governorship to detect names came from foreign languages and roots, listing and sending them to the Ministry. Although from 1942 those files were started to scrutinize, due to the difficulties and confusions in the Second World War period, renaming could not implemented until 1956’. (Gökçeer, 1984, p. 1)

In 1949, with the Law for Provincial Administration renaming gained a legal basis. The second article stipulates “Village names that are not Turkish and give rise to confusion are to be changed in the shortest possible time by the Interior Ministry after receiving the opinion of the Provincial Permanent Committee.” (Öktem, 2008) Nişanyan notes that after the 1950s; Turkification policy went beyond political powers and became a state policy (Nişanyan, 2001). In 1957, The Expert Commission for Name Changes founded and worked actively until 1978. The commission was composed of the representatives of the Office of General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the Faculty of Letters, History and Geography of Ankara University, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Public Works, the General Directorate of Cartography, and the Turkish Language Society. Preparations implemented following the military

intervention of 1960. The commission met three times a week (Öktem, 2008) and examined the proposals that brought by the Ministry of Cartography and a board of Professors from Ankara University. The Commission worked on 1/25,000 scaled maps. It is important to note that scale is up-close and shows even really small units and details in the land. Provincial Administrations and Provincial councils review the lists prepared by the commission and the lists were send for the approval of Interior Minister, the Prime Minister and the President and the decisions were published in the Official Gazette. (Kuran, 2010) In four months, around ten thousand village names were Turkified with this system. (Nişanyan, 2001)


“The Commission examined natural place names on a number of maps with different scales. It examined village names and related names, names of train stations, gendarmerie posts, lighthouses, capes and bays. It suggested Turkish names to the responsible provincial councils. According to the Provincial Administration Law (No. 5442), the necessary decrees were passed and these place names were Turkified”. (Öktem, 2008, p.15)

Estimated numbers on place names are close to each other in various works on the issue. Harun Tunçel, whose work is one of the most referred studies about the issue, indicates that from 1957 to 1978, the commission investigated 75 thousand names and changed 28 thousand of them. (Tunçel, 2000) Öktem states that while in 1968, already 12 thousand out of total 40 thousand village names were Turkified. (Öktem, 2008) Jongerden express that 85 thousand villages were scrutinized and 25 thousand of them renamed. He adds that 12.884 of them were hamlets and 12.211 were mostly villages. (Jongerden, 2009) According to publication of the Interior Ministry, *Köylerimiz* (Our Villages) (1968), the Expert Commission changed 12-thousand village names until March 1968. (Tunçel, 2000) Sevan Nişanyan (2001), highlights that more than one of three dwelling unit renamed. In the opening speech of the Turkish Place Name Symposium, Fikri Gökçeer remarks that the commission examines 75 thousand settlements and 27.889 names were changed. (Gökçeer, 1984) Following the 1980 coup d’etat, in 1983 the commission restarted working on the issue.

According to Tuncel, 12 thousand of 28 thousand changed names were belong to villages and hamlets. Beside settlements, mountain, stream and geographic elements names were Turkified. During renaming the main concern is to Turkify names. The other reasons are unpleasant connotations (*Hüyükaptallar* (refers to stupidity), *Çirkini* (ugly), *Kötüköy* (Bad village), *Kıllı* (hairy), *Şeytan* (devil) etc.) effacement of the names that evoke non-Muslim entity in the country (Kızılkilise-church, Ayazma, çan- church bell, Manastır- Monastery, Haç- the cross (IIB, 1968) and names involve non-Turkish ethnic belonging (Tunçel, 2000) (like Ermenikaçağı, Kürtleravşarı etc (IIB, 1968) Some names were adapted to written Turkish with a few letter changes (Yürük to Yörük, Şeyh instead of Şih etc.). During the Democratic Party rule, ugly, humiliating, insulting or derisive names, even if they were Turkish, were subjected to change.


Renaming executed far and wide in the territory but not evenly in all parts of the land. Black sea Region, Southeastern Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia are shaken by the policy mostly. (Figure.1 and 2)

**Figure 1. Renamed villages in Turkey. (A point indicates 5 villages)**



Source: (Tunçel, 2000, p. 30)

**Figure 2. Map on the changed names in Turkey**



Source: (Nişanyan, 2001, p. 52)

In the Black Sea Region former names were mostly in Greek, Laz language, Armenian and Georgian and in the East part of the country names were generally in Kurdish, Armenian, and Arabic. In Trabzon, 78 percentages of the names were changed. This rate is 79 % in Rize, in Artvin 88 %, in Bayburt 80 %, in Şırnak 92 %, Hakkari 86 %, in Batman and Bitlis 84 %. (Nişanyan, 2001, p. 51)

Öktem (2008) specifies a local resistance against name changes. Despite the commission work systematically, provincial councils slowed down the process, as the changes had to be approved by elected councils rather than appointed governors. The General Directorate started an amendment in order to impose changes without having to wait approval of locally elected. This amendment accelerates renaming process.

#### **3.4. Military Interventions and Place Names**

It is remarkable that renaming executions gain momentum following the military interventions in Turkey. Following the 1960 coup the renaming practices were accelerated and mostly of the changes in the entire territory was implemented in this era. Following the military intervention of 1960, not only renaming of settlements accelerated, also the commission intervened to the natural elements of the geography like bay, cape, island, mountain, pastures and those elements were redenominated. Changing them performed after 1960's when renaming almost all settlement names was completed. Bay and cape names in Tenedos and Imbroz the Aegean islands, which were exempted from population exchange of 1923, were changed. (Kuran, 2010) According to the 1927 census, the population of Imbros consists of Greeks only, except 186 Turkish state officers and 12 Jews inhabiting with commercial goals.<sup>7</sup> It is plausible to state that since all inhabitants of the island were Greeks but island left to Turkey by the Lausanne Treaty, the island was desired to Turkify. During the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdish, Greek and Armenian geographical elements were Turkified. (Kuran, 2010)

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<sup>7</sup> Elçin Macar, An official report dated 1928 on Imbroz and Tenedos .

It is seen that high-level military officers' names were given to the streets, barracks, and schools after the coup d'états. They were given to the places that commonly used in everyday life. After the 27 May 1960 military intervention. Cemal Gürsel's name was given to a stadium in Erzurum, to a barracks in Van and again schools. (Şahin, 2012) Principal architect of September 12<sup>th</sup> coup, Kenan Evren's name was given to many schools and boulevard in different provinces. Primary, secondary and high schools are named after the five chief of the 1980 military coup.<sup>8</sup>

In 1983 deactivated commission restarted works and was updated related to "needs" following the 1980 coup detat. Öktem defines this term as second stage of demographic and toponymic engineering where the first one seen in 1915 Armenian massacre. (Öktem, 2008) Turkifying names went parallel with the assimilation policy against Kurds. The ongoing Kurdish insurgency is the main reason of the policy in this term. On the other hand, there is no struggle with other ethnicities, especially non-Muslims in the post-coup process. Since the names in Armenian and Greek were changed following the 1960 coup and they could not be a "threat" for the state anymore, the commission focused on Kurdish provinces. Starting from 1983, renaming evoked conspicuously in Southeast and Eastern Anatolia where a great majority of population is Kurdish. İbrahim Sediyanı (yayın 2009) argues that there is not almost an acreage plot of ground that did not affected by the policy.

The post-coup periods are relatively open to arbitrary implementations and/or semi-autonomous spaces. Besides, ideology of military and mindset of the military interventions overlap with the official mindset of the nation-state's identity policies, thereby renaming policy. Military intervention periods are the harshest parts of Turkifying settlement names.

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<sup>8</sup>Kenan Evren İlköğretim Okulu/Giresun, Kenan Evren Paşa İlköğretim Okulu/Osmaniye, Org. Kenan Evren Bulvarı/Gaziantep-Şahinbey, Kenan Evren İlköğretim Manisa/Kula, Kenan Evren Ortaokulu Diyarbakır/Ergani, Orgeneral Kenan Evren Mesleki Ve Teknik Anadolu Lisesi Alaşehir, Kenan Evren İlkokulu Hatay - Dört Yol - Karakese, Konak Kenan Evren Anadolu Lisesi İzmir/Konak, Tahsin Şahinkaya İlkokulu Ankara/Kazan, Nurettin Ersin İlkokulu Ankara – Etimesgut, Nurettin Ersin Ortaokulu Ankara – Etimesgut, Orgeneral Nurettin Ersin İlkokulu ve Ortaokulu Çanakkale - Gelibolu – Evreşe, Ankara - Etimesgut - Sedat Celalun İlkokulu Ve Ortaokulu (Source: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (*Ministry of Educaiton*) web site, Available from <http://www.meb.gov.tr/baglantilar/okullar/> . [10 November 2016]

We need to note that besides settlements and geographic elements, numerous of symbolic places renamed with the hegemonic purpose too. One of the most well know is General Mustafa Muğlalı Barrack. Muğlalı was an officer in Ottoman Army and became general in Turkish Army and in 1943, he was held responsible the shot of 33 villagers on charges of smuggling and espionage which known as ‘33 Bullets Incident’. (Beşikçi, 1993) Despite he is accused and sentence to prison and died there, the state made restoration of honor and his name was given to the Barrack in Van, where the 33-bullet incident took place. In 2011 the name of the Barrack changed with the objection of the murdered villagers relatives. Recently, various initiatives were made for the collapse of the names of those who signed the coup d’état from 27 May to 12 September, 28 February to 27 April.

### **3.5. Concluding Remarks**

Nationalism appeared with experiencing political, economic and social devastations in the first quarter of the 20th century in late Ottoman era as a result of the wind that affected other Balkan nations. Following the inception of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the main objects of the newly established states appeared as creating an ethnically homogenous and a Westernized country. In line with those aims state elites used a range of methods. Turkification policies applied all aspects of everyday life in order to create a new social formation consists of Muslim-Turks. Interference to the geography is come insight as an episode of Turkification process.

As a Turkification policy, renaming can be perceived as a never-ending process due to its continuity from the late Ottoman era to one party and multi-party periods. Renaming of a toponymy has constructive and destructive dimensions. As an inclusion policy it is exploit to Turkify territory and support the creation of ethnically homogeneous “homeland”. As a destructive policy, it excludes undesirable identities by erasing them from the collective memory by instrumentalize language and geography. Renaming villages, hamlets, towns, cities, and natural topographies can be evaluated as an episode of those activities. It targets to transform collective memory in accordance with state-ideology. Because names penetrate collective memory in time as long as they are in use, wiping them out

means removing traces of other ethnic and religious communities from the collective memory of the society.

We have to note that from the late Ottoman Empire period to the 1920's, the policy mainly targeting non-Muslim place names in parallel with anti-minority policies. Thus the state desired to purge the country from the reminders of non-Muslim ethnicities. Toponymic engineering exercised to suppress non-Muslims and Turkifying all aspects of life as one of the main object of the founder elites. In addition to that names having connotations to Alevis (Red Head, *Kızıl*, *Kızılbaş* etc.) changed in this term as a denominational ignorance policy.

Following years the state pursued a policy that aim to wipe out everything inherited from non-Turks, precisely Kurds. It is evident that started Kurdish rebellions with Şeyh Sait Rebellion in 1925, the state started to see Kurdish ethnicity as a danger; it attempts to assimilate it with various policies. In line with this understanding, Kurdish and Zaza settlement names were started to change.

Before toponymic practices in Turkey, settlements and geographical elements in the territory was in Greek, Armenian, Persian, Arabic, Lazuri, Kurdish, Georgian, Circassian etc. Despite names in those languages seen as “foreign” in the eye of new founded state, they were native languages of the citizens of the country. Since that ethnic and religious diversity undesired and excluded from the “Turkish” identity definition of Turkish nation state, non-Turkic settlement names were seen as an obstacle in the creation of a national identity.

In a nutshell, with the intent of nationalize space and make it “home” for Turks, Turkifying place names was executed all over the territory. Toponymic practices started with irregular, arbitrary practices in the first 15 years of the republic and proceeded by systematizing after the 1940s. The establishment of Expert Commission for Name Changes in 1957 accelerated the transformation, and geography renamed in bulk rapidly. Generally analyzing current names of the places, new names are not the translations of former ones in Turkish. They do not express the religious, ethnic and political meanings in general, however some of

them deliberately refer to Turkishness directly as in the examples; Turan, Mustafa Kemal, Atabey.

Looking new and old names under the hood guide us to make sense of renaming. As an instance, in Edirne, all the changed names were in Greek and hint the non-Muslim past of the places. Diametrically newly given names imply Islamic connotations like Hacı, Paşa, Devlet-i Islam. In general, new names do not resonate Islamic or Ottoman attributions but since the province renamed in the very first years of the Republic and the policy did not systematized and regulated yet, religious reference can be given with the anti-minority spirit. It can be said that in any case they are more acceptable than non-Muslim place names. Likewise Turkifying bays of Imbroz and Tenedos is a way to erase traces of the Greeks who are as old habitants as Turks in the country and almost all the habitants in those two islands. By the same token, Atina which directly refer to Greekness as the name of the Greek capital (in Rize) changed to Pazar, a neutral name that do not carry a identical meaning. The instances can be duplicable such as; the name Rum in Çorum became Yeni Çamlıca, or in Kayseri, Dimitri province became Turan.

It is necessary to emphasize that policy of renaming was not limited to place and personal names. Turkish state alerted also against nomenclature of animals and plant names in Latin, which include “expurgatory” words. In 1993, Edip Polat, a biologist published a book entitled *The Kurds and Kurdistan in the Language of Science* in which he lists plants and animals which have a reference to *Kurdistan* in their Latin classification. Using the Word *Kurdistan* as if it had a political status separate from the state of Turkey made him to be accused by "making separatist propaganda" in October 1992 and he was sentenced to prison. In 2005 a zoological nomenclature in Latin were interfered by the Turkish Ministry of Environment and Forestry and names include the words “Armenia” and “Kurdistan” in the Latin nomenclature of three subspecies removed from literature and renamed on account of the fact that “given names against Turkey's unity”. As an instance; a subspecies of a wild sheep *Ovis armeniana* became *Ovis orientalis anatolicus*. Those names were given during the 19th and 20th centuries mainly and according to taxonomic

nomenclature rules and the International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature registered them. In the scientific terminology they refer to the region that they exist and do not attribute to any ethnic and linguistic identity. Kurda, Kurdistanicus, Lazia, Armeniacus, Pontica were expurgate words and names include them were changed.

Since the “Democracy Package” of 2013 projects restoring the former names of the settlements, several bills were introduced in the parliament, mostly by the Kurdish parliament, to retaking names or using them bilingually. A limited numbers of place names replaced with old ones however since “peace process” came nothing and political practices of the government changed the direct opposite way, return of settlement names were off the agenda. Thus the officers of political power enunciate that the power is against using renaming and also deny the existence of the former names.<sup>9</sup>

As a last note, it is observable that in some part of the country, local people of the settlements still uses former names in everyday life and names handed down from generation to generation as a part of collective memory. Besides using former names come in possession of a symbol in representation of the identity and a form of counter-hegemonic resistance for some groups, particularly for Kurds and opposing parties. As an instance, changing Dersim (Silver Door in Kurdish) to Tunceli following the Kurdish rebellion in 1937 create a counter hegemonic form of discourse and the name of Dersim became preferable for not only Kurds and Alevi for also those opponents of renaming as a assimilation policy. After this background of the subject, in Chapter 4, it will be attempted to illuminate insights of renaming policy in İstanbul in line with this historical process.

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<sup>9</sup> Erdoğan: Adam çıkmış Amed diyor, Amed ne ya!, *Evrensel*, 30.10.2015 <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/263964/erdogan-adam-cikmis-amed-diyor-amed-ne-ya>

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **RENAMING STREETS OF ISTANBUL: A SPATIO-TEMPORAL DIMENSION OF HOMOGENIZATION**

In the previous chapters, the study analyzed the significance of place names and the concept of renaming settlements. Places are generally named with their physical characteristics and social elements of a location or with an intention to commemorate important events and personages of the area. Those features, chain of events and personalities provide insights on social life, history and culturalism of any locality. Thus, names of settlements contain traces of the past and they are one of the bearers of cultural heritage of a settlement. Since they are reproduced in everyday life in the course of time, they permeate to individual memory and they are handed down to following generations. This way, they exist in the collective memory of the society in that area.

Renaming is a spatio-temporal instrument of political regimes and may be considered as an intervention to the collective memory to reproduce political power relations. As discussed in previous chapters, such renaming policy is mostly available for many national contexts, particularly during the times of regime change and revolutionary turbulence. Following the French Revolution, pre and post-Second World War periods in Germany and Poland, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the state elites pursued renaming policies. Place names were used to control and strengthen sovereignty in colonies by the imperial powers and it was also strictly executed during decolonization and independence war times. Furthermore, name-changing implementation was often seen as a part of the nation building processes. Israel, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey and various states renamed settlements and places in accordance with the aim of creating a homogeneous nation-state. Renaming also emerged as a counter-hegemonic creation and a strategy of resistance to the dominant power. Kurds' reclaiming former names of the localities in Turkey, African-Americans' demands on wiping away

discriminative place names and racist commemorations against their identity are the instances of challenges to the hegemonic spatial design.

As mentioned in Chapter III with reference to the Turkish case as the subject matter of this study, during the nation-state formation process, toponymic practices in Turkey were put into effect as a part of ethnic homogenization policy. The continuation of the systematic character of renaming practice could be easily encountered in Turkey as well, even in the ongoing debates on the issue. Renaming of the localities started in the first years of the republic, however, the major changes were extensively observed between 1957 and 1978. In this period, almost two- third of the place names were changed with the efforts of a special commission called Commission for Place Name Changes (*Yer Adlarının Değiştirilmesi Komisyonu*).

Istanbul has been a kind of microcosmos for centuries. Therefore, the city has encountered with remarkable ethnic homogenization process. As a part of the Turkification policies, the city was confronted with renaming implementations in the very first years of the republic. In this chapter, the main objective is to uncover the renaming policy in Istanbul. By examining the literature, archival sources, maps, and memoirs, it is attempted to scrutinize the extensive name changing process from the 1920s to early 1960s in the city.

Additionally, this chapter may be considered as an attempt to an oral history work. Before a discussion on the outcomes of the study, methodological features need to be emphasized in advance. It is based on thirty days of field research between November and December 2016; in various districts of Istanbul such as Kurtuluş, Bakırköy, Moda, Suadiye, Pangaltı, Bakırköy, and Osmanbey. Seeking a qualitative method in order to a deep investigation based on the experiences and memoirs on the space, extensive interviews were conducted and semi- structured questions were addressed to participants, composed of 12 Stambouliote non-Muslim inhabitants, 4 of them being female and 8 of them male. Ethnic origins of participants were Armenian (6), Greek (2) and Jewish (4). The youngest participant is at the age of 56 and the oldest is 78. The average age of the participants is 66.5. An age quota was applied, as all the interviewees were older than 55, which would cause more

stories on traumatic past experiences. Beside their individual experiences and perceptions as a member of an ethno-religious minority in the city, testimonies could also play role in discourse. Participants mostly witnessed the period from 1955 onwards. Most of them had a clear vision about the major anti-minority practices, such as 6-7 September Riots (Istanbul Pogrom) (1955), Deportation of Greek Passport owners (1964) and the tension over Cyprus Issue (1974) which would lead to a negative impact on non-Muslim existence in the city. They also grew up by listening to traumatic events their family had to experience, such as Twenty Classes (*Yirmi Kur'a Nafia Askerleri*, 1941) and Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*, 1942). It is generally accepted that all those tragic experiences had a peculiar importance in the collective memory of minorities.

During the interviews, three approaches among interviewees became prominent on name changes. The first cluster attaches quiet importance to name changes. The second cluster evaluates anti-minority politics of the state on a macro scale and pays less attention to naming policy. In the last cluster, interviewees normally respond to renaming. They generally ground their opinion by specifying that the policy be implemented in other states too.

With an attempt to illuminate the spatial perceptions of minorities on Istanbul and reactions to spatio-temporal act of renaming in particular, personal and family memoirs on the space in their individual memory, this study particularly questions and problematizes how minorities express the practice of renaming of places as a part of the “past” and everyday life. It should be also noted that this study will also reveal the current situation of Stamboulite non-Muslim population. Prior to an elaborate discussion on renaming the streets of Istanbul, it is necessary to mention the demographic and social structure of the city and main events that altered this composition.

## 4.1. Remembering the historical past

### 4.1.1. Demography, culture and population of Istanbul

Istanbul had a multicultural population as a center of attraction for centuries. City-dwellers consisted of Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews, Italians, Latins, Turks and many other ethnicities during the Ottoman Era. In his book, *Istanbul* (1874) Edmond De Amicis, a famous Italian writer of the 19th century, portrays the city as

‘At every hundred paces all is changed. Here you are in a suburb of Marseilles, and it is an Asiatic village; again, a Greek quarter; again, a suburb of Trebizond. By the tongues, by the faces, by the aspect of the houses, you recognize that the country is changed... An experienced eye discerns still among the waves of that great sea, the faces and costumes of Caramania and Anatolia, of Cyprus and Candia, of Damascus and Jerusalem, the Druse, the Kurd, the Maronite, the Croat, and others, innumerable varieties of all the anarchical confederations which extend from the Nile to the Danube, and from the Euphrates to the Adriatic.’ (1981, p. 29)

In a similar manner, population censuses of the Ottoman State reveal the approximate distribution of the population. Multi-ethnic demographical structure of the city can be easily identified as a result of these censuses. (Table 2. and Table 3.)

<b>Table 2. Ethnic Distribution of Istanbul in 1897</b>	
<b>Ethnic Groups</b>	<b>Number (thousand)</b>
Turks	597
Albanians	10
Kurds	5
Greeks	236
Armenians	162
Jews	47
Serbians	1
Christian Arabs	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.059.000</b>

Source: Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1930-1914*

<b>Table 3. Population of Istanbul</b>				
	<b>1884 (estimate)</b>	<b>1856 (estimate)</b>	<b>1878</b>	<b>1886</b>
Muslims	195.836	214.229	203.148	384.836
Greeks	75.994	97.136	96.044	152.741
Armenians	85.438	80.179	97.782	149.590
Bulgars	-	-	2.521	4.377
Catholics	10.303	10.874	5.610	6.442
Jews	24.083	26.047	19.223	22.394
Protestants	-	468	511	819
Latins	-	1.241	396	1.082
Foreigners	-	-	122.202	129.243

Source: (Shaw & Kural Shaw, 2002) p. 242

On the ethnic composition in the 19th century, Hagop Baronyan (2015) explains the population and lifestyles of the 34 Istanbul districts of the late 19th century. In regard to the literature on the city, Tatavla, Pancaldi (*Aya Dimitri*), Yeşilköy (*Ayastefanos*), Şişli, Kandilli, Burgazada, Büyükkada were mainly Greek, while Samatya, Boyacıköy, Gedikpaşa, Kumkapı were mostly Armenian districts. In Makrihori (Bakırköy), Üsküdar and Kadıköy, inhabitants consisted of Greeks and Armenians alongside Muslims. In Fener, Greeks and Jews were mostly dominant on the population. Hasköy and Balat inhabitants were mostly Jews. Europeans were mainly settled in Galata and Pera. Sütlüce was a Christian district.<sup>10</sup>

Non-Muslim inhabitants of the city were generally the most active subjects of the economic life. Unlike Muslims, who generally serve in public services, they were engaged in trade (See Table 3.) Sula Bozis (2011) lists the shops of the non-Muslims of Pera (Taksim) in details and notes that florists, bakeries, diners, beerhouses, jewelers, photographers and many other professions were mostly

<sup>10</sup> For a further literature on demographic structure of the city in the late 19th and 20th century, see Alexandris (1992); Amicis (1981); Baronyan (2015); Scognamillo (1990); Türker (2010); Yerasimos (2015)

owned by non-Muslims. Moreover, they used to perform as lawyers, doctors, and pharmacists. In the financial activities, bankers of Galata were non-Muslim individuals of the city (Ergüder, 2011).

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>Greek</b>	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>Jew</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Total</b>
Artisan, Craftsman, Tradesman	38.3	25.4	27.0	5.3	4.0	100.0
Civil Service	95.3	1.5	2.1	0.4	0.7	100.0
Madrasah and School Students	47.8	24.6	21.2	5.3	1.1	100.0
Non-occupied, children and other	55.8	20.5	15.5	7.5	0.7	100.0
Total	49.4	22.5	20.6	5.5	2.0	100.0

*Source: Cem Behar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve Türkiye'nin Nüfusu 1500-1927.*

The entertainment industry is another source of profession for non-Muslims. Musicians, cinema and theatre owners were mostly Greeks. They actively participated in social life as benevolent associations and sports clubs were managed by non-Muslims. In 1921, Greek citizens owned more than half of 257 restaurants and almost all of the beerhouses and wholesale stores (Alexandris, 1992, p. 108). Shortly, non-Muslim population began to constitute an important component of the economic life and city culture in the Ottoman Istanbul. Despite the number of the minorities declined sharply in time, some features of this structure continued until 1960s.

‘When I was a child, there were many minority groups in Moda Street; Greeks in particular. For example, there was the Sasuli Bakery, Yorgo the Baker and so on. There were plenty of them. In İstanbul, mihlayıcı (*craftsmen that carved gold and things made of gold and placed precious stones there*) and sadekar (*masters who carved the metal with sketches*) masters were Armenians. There is still some Armenians and Assyrians engaged in this profession in Istanbul.’ *O.D (67), Armenian*

‘We used to walk down Beyoğlu with my parents for shopping. We would especially go shopping to Mayer (*German*) store; you know, for coats and things like that. Sylvio store, Lazzaro Franco (*Italian store, closed and the owner left the country after 6-7 September Pogrom in 1955*) were other shops that went to. All shops used to be named after its owner.’ J.K. (67) *Jew*.

To sum up, Istanbul had a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual population with respective, religious diversity. The city was the capital of the Empire and was the heart of trade and finance. The total Muslim and non-Muslims entity in the 19th century was close to each other. Hence, non-Muslim population’s physical existence and everyday practices in the public sphere shaped the culture and the economic life of the city. Following the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the idea of creating a homogeneous Muslim-Turk homeland was put into practice extensively. This process, as a clear example of the continuity thesis from late Ottoman to the Republican era, got stronger with the establishment of the Republic.

#### **4.1.2 Istanbul in the memories**

Prior to the discussion on the state-led policies, which affected the presence of minorities, there is a need for analyzing what Istanbul represents in the collective memory of the interviewees. At first, I would like to specify some observations on the field study of the thesis. Scrutinizing the perceptions of the interviewees on Istanbul, their memoirs and relations with the city was one of the clusters of the field study. However, during the interviews, the initial emergent was not the spatial old and pleasant memories, which is the limitation of the study. Before asking the questions, some of the participants started as ‘6-7 September was so scary’ or ‘I know Hrant very well, we used to study at the same primary school’. Tragic stories on the city predominated the interviews. One of the primary reasons could be the need to tell. It could be due to the thought that these issues are wondered in interviews with minorities.

Moreover, spatio-temporal macro transformations are fresher in individual memories and this understanding dominates projections about the city. By the time interviewers were asked about their views on today's Istanbul, the transformation of the city comes into prominence, rather than their individual experiences. Stories are mainly shaped by the changing demography, the rapid transformation of the city with the sense of business and irregular urbanization. One can argue that connection with time and space ruptured to a large extent. The conversations were shaped due to the politics against minorities rather than their own experiences. Personal memories, recollections of daily life remain in the background. It was difficult to delve into more personal and individual stories. But at least, I was able reach a comparison on how they comprehend the transformation.

‘It is impossible to make a comparison between the old and new İstanbul. Today we went to Bomonti with my wife. There used to be streambed and spring water. I would hunt birds with my father there 50-60 years ago. Now there are skyscrapers built instead. They are all vanished. We heard that there is a place called Bomontiada. I offered my wife to go and see what it’s like, as we live in Şişli. When we went there, it was lunchtime. It was a simple, trendy place with people coming to have lunch. I was boggled. I used to go there with my mom. There was a Bomonti beer garden. My mom and her friends used to get together with friends and do some handcrafts, and kids would play around with buckets and soil. There were huge chestnut and plane trees. None of them exist now. There was a shrine which I couldn’t even find today. No river, no spring water, no trees. There was nothing there that attracted me. Where is that beauty?’ *Y.P.(69) Greek*

‘There was a beach at Moda. In summer all locals used to go to the beach with their baskets, towels, and swimsuits. The society was more civilized, more European. Clothes for instance... before leaving home, people used to brush their hair, dust their shoes, check if the trousers

needed ironing. Now everyone wears everything. Trousers are already bought torn now. This is degeneration.’ *O.D (67) Armenian*

‘In summer, our community used to go to Büyükada. The island was so beautiful. We raised our children there. They had a great childhood. Now, no one lets their children out alone (*because of insecurity*) Arabs and day-trippers are everywhere. Büyükada is unrecognizable. Island culture is disappearing in our community. You cannot swim, you cannot take a ride on the phaeton, there is always queue ...’ *H.O. (56) Jew*

‘I remember vaguely, Fatih was like Paris to us. My mother used to take me to cinema there. There was a cinema called Renk. Fatih was such an elite neighbourhood for me compared to Balat. Balat was covered in mud. Fatih was so clean. After the cinema, we would walk to Vefa Bozacısı. Ah, how much I liked that boza. My happy memories are all related to Fatih.’ *K.G.. (58) Greek*

The participants underline that, in the past, they lived pleasantly with all Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors together without any discrimination. It is easily understood.

‘I grew up in Şişli. Most of our neighbors were Greeks, Jews, and Armenians at that time. We were always together. Armenians and Greeks are gone. They went to France or something. Some of them abandoned their houses. But we stayed. Now my mom still lives at the same apartment and no one knocks on her door.’ *H.O. (56) Jew.*

‘We used to live in an apartment with 11 flats. There was only one Muslim. He once wittily said “Enough! You always call each other Misyö Misyö (monsieur). Please call me Monsieur Recep from now on. I feel uncomfortable.’ *A.S. (65) Armenian*

In this part stories reveal a notable nostalgia for the multi-ethnic past of Istanbul. Macro transformations, such as demographic change, technology, migration to the city and irregular urbanization, influenced the city deeply and, affected their perceptions on the city. However, the interaction is not related to belonging to a minority group; it was rather being an old Stambouliote to some extent.

#### **4.2. Ethnic homogenization practices and social exclusion**

Despite the fact that demographic engineering and Turkification policies adversely affected ethnic, linguistic and religiously mixed structure of the city, multicultural presence continued during the first 40 years of the Republican era. Before the establishment of the Republic, founders used to perceive Greeks, Jews and Armenians as “other” with the idea that they “threaten” the Ottoman State. The native elements of the geography turned out to be disloyal and unwanted subjects. The Lausanne Treaty determined the social status of the Non-Muslim Jews, Armenians and Greeks as “minorities” in 1923 (Okutan, 2009, pp. 65-67). The treaty also projects a population exchange between Greece and Turkey. With Greeks on the islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada (Imbroz and Tenedos), Istanbulite Greeks who were the majority of the minority population were exempted from the exchange. However, due to the political strategies of newly founded Republic, non-Muslim minorities faced with economic and political pressures and traumatic events. Respectable numbers were forced to migrate to other countries from the very first years of the republic and the rest lost their effectiveness and visibility in public space. Turkification policies and the idea of creating a homogeneous nation influenced Istanbul deeply by virtue of its non-Muslim population. Anti-minority policies transformed the city irrecoverably.

As discussed in the previous chapter in detail, creating a national bourgeoisie was the economic dimension of the Turkification purposes of the newly founded state. In the Ottoman period, Muslims used to work as hired hand, state officer, soldier, and non-Muslims as tradesmen, banker, merchant, and craftsmen. They were also in high profile professions such as doctors, pharmacists, engineers and lawyers (Okutan 2009, p.199). Following the first constitutionalist period in 1908, with the

liberal and equalitarian environment, Muslim-Turk elements also got involved in business. However, they failed as a result of lacking capital and experience. Most of the companies established back then, again, belonged to non-Muslims. (Toprak 1995, p.103) When the CUP came into power, economic nationalization gained importance. In the years of World War I, the CUP used the war environment and directly intervened in the economic life. They supported Muslim-Turks in economic life and condoned to speculative earnings.

It continued after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Nationalizing the economy was regarded as the inextricable fragment of political independence in the eye of the state ideologists. Ziya Gökalp, (cited in Toprak, 1995) highlighted that, national economy could become a reality with the ethnic homogeneity. However, the dominant elements of economic life were non-Muslims. Therefore the state implemented several discriminatory regulations in order to exclude non-Muslims from economic life. Due to its demographically cosmopolitan structure, Istanbul was deeply affected by this transformation. These regulations are already mentioned in Chapter III; therefore, they will not be further explained here. Instead, I will focus on the events that came to the forefront during the field study. It must be stressed that, events that minimized the presence of non-Muslims, dominated the stories of the fieldwork. Almost half of the interviewees started to tell the breakouts that minority and their families in particular faced, before I asked them. Some of them experienced the events as the very first hand.

Since the stories are mostly shaped around them, it is necessary to mention prominent policies that caused major breakouts in the exclusion of non-Muslims from economic life. Wealth tax of 1942, as discussed in Chapter III, is of great importance as a destructive implementation to the detriment of non-Muslims. The aim was to transfer of the capital and properties to Muslim-Turks. The tax adversely affected non-Muslim city dwellers in Istanbul. According to Ökte (1951), total number of taxpayers was 114.368 and 54 percent of them lived in İstanbul. Calculated tax amount was 465.384.820 and Stamboulite's share was 317.275.642

(68%). Paid wealth tax was almost 315 million and 221 million of it was paid by non-Muslims from Istanbul.

‘Non-Muslims did business and earned so much money. How can you take those earnings from them? Wealth tax, of course. My grandfather had a capital of 10 thousand liras and was imputed a tax of 10 thousand liras. Because of a small amount missing, sequestrators came our home and tried to take everything we had: beds, carpets, quilts and so on. We had a politically powerful neighbor. He came and –I remember it like it was yesterday- and said: “I stand as a guarantor for Davut Aga, he will pay his tax”. Those days, Germany mass troops were along the border. My father was scared. If they broke in, they would wipe all the Jews out, beginning from Edirne. We moved to Israel. This is a story of Wealth Tax and World War II.’ *L.E. (76) Jew*

‘My father was engaged in hardware and iron in Sultanhamam, Marputçular Hanı. When the law on tax was put into effect, my father and uncle gave everything they had including jewelry of my mom and aunt.’ *J.K. (67) Jew*

‘My grandfather was a well-known, wealthy furniture seller in Balat. He faced with a serious tax. He sold everything he had and barely paid the tax. But the stress hit him hard and he died in one or two weeks of a heart attack. My father was a secondary school student at that time. A very big amount of tax was imputed to him too, by mistake. This represents how the tax was determined in an arbitrary war.’ *M.D. (58) Jew*

6-7 September 1955 Istanbul pogrom was another event that left a scar in the memories of non-Muslims. Since there is a comprehensive literature on the September events, I will not delve into the subject. Briefly, the pogrom was the state-led organized attacks against minorities, more particularly towards Greeks. As Alexandris (1992, p.263) argues, it is universally accepted that the government in

order to initiated the events “emphasize the strong Turkish interest in the future of Cyprus”. As a result of the events, 1004 houses, 4348 shops, 27 pharmacies, 73 churches, factories, 26 schools and 5 athletic clubs were destroyed (Alexandris 1992, p. 259).

‘When the attacks broke out, they came our house and vandalized it. One of the three floors was vanished. Even the roof was destroyed. The damage was severe. Besides the destruction, they wanted to kill, frighten and rape people. In the garden, there were a small coop. 20-30 people in my family hid in there. They heard the screams of rape victims from neighbor houses. My mother took a knife with her. She planned to kill her sister first and then she, in case they were found and attempted to be raped. My one year older cousin was a baby and started to cry. Her mother asked others whether to strangle her baby to death or not! This is how they were scared.’ K.G.. (59) *Greek*

‘Abandoning Fener-Balat was after the 1955 events. Because the district was severely damaged. The only thing left was the walls in my grandmother's home during the events.’ Y.P. (69) *Greek*

‘Our apartment at Kadıköy had a strange name called “Debreşe”. They thought it was a residential for Greek. In the next morning, I realized that they had plundered the little Greek bakkal (market) shop. All the canned food were rolling on the tracks of the tramway. My grandmother's house was in Ortaköy/Dereboyu. All of her neighbors were Turks. So she jumped from the window with her grandchild down to her Turkish neighbor who hid them. She knew they would attack her house. They knew that the house belonged to a Jew. They broke my grandmother's door. Radio and all the machines were thrown out from the window, all the carpets were torn into pieces.’ Z. C. (69) *Jew*

‘I was six. We used to live in Altiyol. They came at night because they were attacking to another part of the district during the day. They climbed into the stores with a light and read the names on the signboards and said “It is

gavur” and vandalized the stores. After that day, every shop owner wrote the names of their Turkish business partners on signboards or their names as if they were Turkish’ *O.D (67) Armenian*

The plan focused on Greeks in Istanbul; but other minorities were also harmed. During the interviews, it is often noticed that other minority groups had also considered moving from Turkey. Financial circumstances and the feeling of having nowhere to go prevented them.

‘All non-Muslims are ‘gavur’ in the collective memory. 6-7 September was against ‘gavurs’. Maybe the main target was Rums but Armenians were forced to have the same destiny’ *G.Y. (63) Armenian*

‘At least, they (Greeks) had a place to go: Greece. We (Armenians) did not. Of course they suffered a lot, but at least they were able to go somewhere. Our roots are from Anatolia.’ *A.S. (65) Armenian*

With reference to the literature and testimonies of the interviewees in the field study, 6-7 September Pogrom did not result in a sharp decline in the number of minorities in Istanbul. Although one interviewee stresses that the target was non-Muslims- “gavurs”-, the revolt was primarily against Greeks. The only possible choice was to go to Greece for these people. However, Greece was in a tight squeeze financially, after the civil war of 1946-1949. They did not have to opportunity to rebuild their lives from nothing. The ones with a better financial condition left Turkey but the number of those is quite few.

‘My mom and aunt were both engaged and were preparing to get married in 1955. My uncle-in-law was a jeweler in Beyoğlu and they could be regarded as wealthy. He abandoned everything and they went to Greece and got married there immediately. My mother and father were teachers. They did not have a wide range of opportunities. They

stayed. Most of the people stayed even though they wanted to go. After all, there were job opportunities in İstanbul.’ *K.G. (58) Greek*

The people who stayed, moved to districts with more minority population. On the other hand, they clarified that they would stay in their own country. On September 15, Embros, an Istanbul-based newspaper in Greek language, published an editorial that the Rums of the city would not leave the city and resist as much as they could:

“We will stay in this country, where we were born and raised, where our forefathers’ graves lie, albeit damaged. We will make a new world out of the damaged graves, and out of the churches, schools, shops and flats that have been reduced to ruin. Through perseverance and courage, we will put our lives in order again amid the ruin. We will raise our voices and shout out that this tragedy that befell us should not have taken place. We will exclaim that the country that we live in is our home and we are not here as anyone’s hostage or captive and that we do not have to leave simply because some want to see us leave. We will stay here. Like a sycamore embracing the earth with its roots, we will constantly remind others that we have our roots in this country. They may cut off our branches but the deep roots of our old tree are beyond anyone’s reach. Our presence here has not been granted as a favour and does not depend upon anyone’s whim. We are here because we have a right to be here. We do not seek special protection from the government. What we demand is the maintenance of the notion of government as citizens of this country. There can be no government in a country where safety is not provided. So long as the state of Turkey lives, we will live in it. We will forget about what we have been through and stay here. But we do demand that our future be safeguarded. With the help of God Almighty and the security provided by the government, Turkish Greeks will rise from the ashes in no time. (*Translation: translateforjustice.com*)

Although they insisted on staying, 1964 was the year when everything tore down. After ten years of an ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus Issue, the debate ended up as a nightmare for the Greeks of Istanbul. As it did the same in initiating 6-7 September events 10 years ago, Turkey decided to use Greeks of Istanbul as a diplomatic confrontation against Greece (Alexandris 1992, p. 280). Turkey unilaterally canceled 1930 Convention on the settlement issue between Greece and Turkey and 13.000 city dwellers holding Greek passports -but had never been to Greece and had no difference from Greeks (Rums) with Turkish citizenship-were deported. Following them, their families moved away within months and almost 50.000 inhabitants of the city were forced to leave their homes. Rum population was 105.000 in 1955, which declined to 30.000 in 1965 and to 5.000 by 1975 (Turan, Pekin, Güvenç 2010, p.9). The trauma of 1964 affected following migrations of 1970's and 1980's (Yücel & Yıldız, 2014).

‘Those departures became a part of my life. I experienced that. I would make plenty of friends. Suddenly, I found out that they were all gone. Then, I would start all over again and make new friends.’ K.G. (58)  
*Greek*

“The year 1964 was such an important breaking point that those who were not deported started to move as well. It broke the social life in Istanbul. Then, the rapid decline in Greek population occurred” G.Y.  
(63) *Armenian*

So the policy actually transformed the structure of the city demographically. Not only the number of the non-Muslim population, but also the cultural heritage and collective memory profoundly changed. Beyond being a strategy about current politics, the attacks of 1955 and 1964 were against non-Muslims' existence, it was also a continuation of anti-minority and Turkification policies that suppressed minorities.

‘When the Turkish troops went to Cyprus, a friend of mine whom I loved a lot, was called out from the police station. But it was that exact

day. That is the period of intense ongoing war. Operations were proceeding. He kissed his children and went to the station. They told him that he had to leave his house in a week. The man was so glad that he almost hugs and kissed the police, as he expected much worse. Despite having been forced to leave his home, he was happy. Because he survived.’ *K.G. (58) Greek*

In addition to the major turning points, their perceptions on being a minority were fictionalized as well, among social exclusion in their personal memoirs. In respect to this, policies such as renaming seemed as minor and secondary. All the interviewee stated that they had all been subject to discrimination in public life.

“I studied literature and I was a hardworking student. The head of Zoğrafyon High School offered me to become a teacher. I already wanted to be a teacher. I prepared and submitted all the documents. There was no return. The only respond I got was “Not eligible”. No explanation. I went to Ankara once and told them that I was waiting to be appointed somewhere. They, once again, said that I was not eligible and I asked the reason. The mayor said, “You should go and ask your people”. I said “I do not understand. You mean Greece?” He said “yes”. I threw my identity on the table and said: “I am a Turkish citizen. I don’t have any relation with any other country. I did my military service, I am paying my taxes and I want to have my right to work as a teacher” I couldn’t become a teacher until the age of 40 and I was not the only one! *A. P. (69) Greek*

Stories on discrimination at military also require a special attention regarding the pressure on public sphere.

‘I did my military service in a very bad time, in 1982. Number of non-Muslims was quite few there. There was a captain. Every morning, he told me to stand up and tell how Turks drove Greeks into the sea. I was very upset. I used to get so angry. There were also the children of

generals with us, who also felt uncomfortable. Later, I learned that they told their fathers to warn the captain. Then the captain got a warning on not to “disturb the kid”. *K.G. (58) Greek*

‘I had difficulties in the military service because of belonging a minority. Since I was a musician, I was the head of the band. Later, commander of the company changed. The newcomer was such a racist. The first thing he did was to remove my ranks. He said a Jew could not be a senior and I had to vigil duple. But I was a band sergeant that required ranks. Regiment commander heard it and said “It is an order; you will raise rank. This is not the liberty hall. No one can take it from you without court decision”. This time, the captain dragged me into the store and tortured me.’ *M.D. (58) Jew*

‘I was a soldier during the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974. That time Greeks were subject to a lot of torture. They were beaten every day; although they had no fault! I had two Rum friends. They ruined them, honestly! They didn’t stay, anyway. In a couple of years following the military service, they both moved to Greece. They were in such a great position, actually. They were the hairdressers of corps commander’s. Still, they were beaten every day’ *H.P. (65) Armenian*

The interviewee emphasizes that they still encounter discriminative policies in every aspect of life including public and private sector recruitments. They also state that in order not to be overcome as a result of their identity, they hide their own names in business life. Plus, they state that they are unable to enjoy the same rights as the rest of the population, due to unwritten otherization policies.

‘Was I born here upon my own request? Don’t we get wet under the same rain? Don’t we get warm under the same sun? They say that Turkey belongs to Turks. Minorities are not welcomed. This is not true. We are parts of the mosaic.’ *M.T. (78), Armenian*

‘To be honest, we were unable to work even as a garbage collector. You could not become a cabin crew or a pilot in an airline. My niece was admitted to İTÜ with a very high ranking. Back then, THY was searching for people at universities to employ. They offered him to take exams for employment. Upon some background checks, they said “Sorry we cannot accept you”. He would become a pilot, not fly war crafts! Teachers are state officers, right? Our teachers in Armenian schools worked at worker status, not an officer. Those seem to be little nuances but they are reflect a discriminative attitude.’ A.S. (65)  
*Armenian*

#### **4.3. Imagined time and space in Istanbul**

In spite of the tragic experiences, dark memories of the past and stories on social discrimination, when it comes to their personal relation with the city today, one can argue that there is a strong bond with the hometown. As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, the nostalgia of old Istanbul remains and interviewees feel that the most of the pleasant things linger in the past in a macro view. Nevertheless, individual relations with the city are so well preserved.

‘In summer, water-sellers on the streets still call out in Armenian language in Kınalıada.’ A.S. (65) *Armenian*

‘Istanbul is heaven! So beautiful. Once you get used to living here you cannot easily give it up. Everyone loves their own hometown. But Istanbul has a plus. It has so beautiful small oases to take a breath.’  
*K.G. (58) Greek*

‘I traveled the world. There is no place like İstanbul. Venedik smells like shit! In Istanbul, you can get to an island by one ferry; you are in the sea. You are in touch with the nature.’ *N.B. (78) Armenian*

As much as they feel quite attached, they can still feel the pressure as a minority in today's İstanbul.

'Newspaper distributors used to deliver *Agos* to us. We would always find the paper torn. I knew people from the apartment did that; the ones who lived upstairs. This really gets on my nerves.' H.P. (65) *Armenian*

'While issuing the identity of my grandchild, they left the religion section empty to avoid any kind of discrimination as a result of religion. You get so accustomed to doing such things that, they do not seem as a trouble anymore.' H.O. (56) *Jew*

'Let me tell you something. I am still very careful, even today. For instance; I never share anything about politics on Facebook. I realize that my neighbor who is a Muslim does so. I know that we share the same idea on that issue but I can never act as free as a Muslim. My mum used to say that we must be quiet as long as we live in this country. See no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil. That's it!' T.N. (72) *Armenian*

'I can't even express how sad I was when he (Hrant Dink) was killed. We had had a little hope that our voice was being heard. On the other side, we were afraid that he could be a target. After his death, we happened to be more introverted. We were very hopeful. You lose your faith in such events. A.S. (65) *Armenian*.

#### **4.3.1 First census and toponymic changes in İstanbul**

In the light of implementations on ethnic homogenization process and the effects of the policies in the stories of minorities, the renaming policy in the city will be analyzed. How the toponymic practices served as a destructive and constructive implementation to redesign space, time and memory of the city and serve to the ethnic homogenization policy will be investigated. Thereby, it is aimed to

illuminate the effects of the state-directed removal. Lastly, a spatio-temporal act of renaming of the city in the eye of the minorities will be analyzed.

On October 28th, 1927, four years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the state conducted the first population census (TÜİK 1995). Until then, as a result of war conditions, reshaped borders and population movements in recent years, there was not enough source to portray the size and structure of the population of the newly-founded Republic. However, beyond being a necessity as Tamer and Bozbeyoğlu (2004) point out, the census was also an instrument for nation-building process and considered as a necessity to be a modernisation/Westernisation project. Determining the size of “Turkish population in Turkish land” was one of the main objectives of the census (Dündar 2000, p. 36). Hence, the questions on mother tongue and religion were asked in order to find out the ethnic and religious homogenization level. Dündar asserts that the outcomes of the first census would give an idea to state officers about their future policies in the way of building a homogenous nation state.

Preliminary works were launched in 1926. Central Statistics Department (Merkezi İstatistik Dairesi) was founded and the department carried out pilot schemes in several cities. Furthermore, the state propagandized the necessity of the census via press and the media presented participation in the census as a national duty. As a part of preparations, buildings were given numbers, streets were named and those with a name were renamed. Soon after, the census became a national matter to such an extent that the atmosphere started to disturb minorities. In fact, Jews announced that they would declare their mother tongue as Turkish. (Dündar, 2004, pp. 39-49)

According to the press, preparations in Istanbul has a particular importance in order to see if the multicultural structure of the city continued and on what level it became a Muslim-Turk locus politically and economically. (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 29.10.1927 cited in Tamer and Bozbeyoğlu 2004) Census data would show how many were “from us” and how many were from “them”. The distinction was religious rather than ethnical origin. (Tamer and Bozbeyoğlu, 2004)

The census results showed non-Turkish population was under 2 percent of all; hence, such a quantity would not cause trouble. (Dündar, 2004, p. 45) It also reveals that 13.648.270 of them were from “us”. Outcome of the census revealed that the distribution of the population in İstanbul in terms of religion was as: 547.126 Islam, 23.930 Catholic, 4.421 Protestant, 100.214 Orthodox, 53.129 Armenian, 16.696 Christian, 47.035 Jew, 1.229 Other religions, 664 unknown or nonbeliever. (Umumi Nüfus Tahriri, cited in Dündar, 2004) The total population of the city was 794.444 and 31 percentage of the city dwellers were still non-Muslims.

As figured in the literature and press archives, being a multicultural city, İstanbul had a significant position in the state during the census process. Dündar also asserts collected data from the census was instrumentalized for the future politics of the state against non-Muslims. Since most of the minorities were living in İstanbul, as discussed above, anti-minority policies of the rulers had a strong impact on İstanbul during the one party rule.

In order to elucidate renaming policy in İstanbul, the whole process and the event must be considered. Regarding law no.1003 published in 20.04.1927 in the Official Gazette, “Giving numbers to the buildings and naming streets” became compulsory. The main name changes in İstanbul were implemented during the preparations for the first census of Turkish Republic. Regarding the law, all street, square, and avenue names were replaced with names of Turkish-origin (Ölçer, 2014). Osman Nuri Ergin, who was a historian, lecturer and served in various positions in İstanbul Municipality (Şehremaneti), was in charge of naming the streets of İstanbul. In 5 months, he named -and renamed- 6.214 streets (Yılmaz, 2013).

Here, it needs to be clarified that this study does not intend to introduce an inventory of all renamed settlements. Inasmuch revealing all the names required a broad research and it is far more beyond of this thesis’s limited scope. Additionally, scope of the inspected area is limited with districts where non-Muslims used to live or still do. Besides, in “Renamed villages in Turkey” Harun Tuncel indicates that 21 village names in İstanbul were changed. Periphery of the city where village and locality names were Turkified are observed (Appendix 1).

During changing the names of streets in Istanbul, Osman Nuri Ergin particularly chose names with Turkic resonance. He was attentive to names of streets with historical Turkish statesmen. Following the naming process, he prepared a guide containing 38 maps of the city (İstanbul Şehri Rehberi, p. 134) and first city guide of Istanbul published in 1934. As a result of this work, streets of Istanbul converge a “national identity” (Yılmaz, 2013, p. 155). In Istanbul, as a reflection of its multicultural structure, place names were used to come from the words of different languages and different ethnic and religious connotations. In the peripheral area Byzantine names continued to exist. In the center of the city, names used to reflect the historical past of the district.

In 1925, Pervititch prepared the first and most comprehensive insurance map of Istanbul. His elaborated work enables us to observe the names of the streets before the introduction of name change policy. The first city guide of Istanbul, which was published in 1934, reveals the renamed places. The literature on the districts of Istanbul also enlightens the old and current names of settlements. Prior to exploring manners of the former and current names, the list of the 300 names is provided below.

<b>Table 5. Old and New Names of Some of the Streets in Istanbul</b>				
<b>Old Name</b>	<b>New name</b>		<b>Old Name</b>	<b>New name</b>
Adalı Dimitri	Adalı Fettah		Kilise	Nevizade
Ahrida	Gevgilli		Kilise	Kandilli Bahçe
Aleon	Alyon		Kilise	Karayel
Analipsi	Akıncı		Kilise	Ahi Çelebi
Ananyadis	Alakır		Kilise	Akgünlük
Anderliç	Hidayet		Kilise	Ateşbaz
Andonaki	Trablus		Kilise	Baçtar

Araba Meydanı	Er Meydanı		Kilise	Cibinlik
Aranik	Drama		Kilise Arkası	Alçakdam Arkası
Avramaçı	Tufan		Kilise Arkası	Omuzdaş
Ay Serios Konstantinos (mah.)	Hamalbaşı		Kilise Arkası	Hasret
Aya Dimitri	Alaçam		Kilise Arkası	Küçükparmalık Arkası
Aya Dimitri	Ateşböceği		Kilise Caddesi Birinci Çıkmaızı	Sadullah Bey
Aya Dimitri	Zağnos Paşa		Kilise Caddesi İkinci Sokak	Mesut Bey
Aya Dimitri (Meydan)	Son Durak		Kilise Caddesi Üçüncü Sokak	Martı
Aya Dimitri Kilisesi	Palalı, Kırkambar		Kilise Camii	İbadethane
Aya Kiryaki	Eflaki Dede		Kilise Camii Arkası	İbadethane Arkası
Aya Kiryaki	Teşrifatçı		Kilise Çıkmaızı	Günlük Çıkmaızı
Aya Mina	Bestekar Hakkı		Kilise Meydanı	Takım Ağası Meydanı
Aya Nikola	Yılmaz türk, Karaca Bey, Sait Halim Paşa		Kirilos	Kadife
Aya Nofri	Dulkadiroğulları		Kirkor Kalfa	Mütesellim
Aya Tanaş	Yeni Alem		Kiryakidis Hamamı	Sefa Hamamı
Aya Yani	Nekre Tıflı		Koçina	Behlül
Aya Yorgi	Oruç Reis		Kokino	Ferace
Aya Yorhi	Muallim Feyzi		Kolçiyari	Böğürtlen
Aya Yorhi	Yüce Tepe		Kondori	Sekbanlar
Ayazma	Avukat		Kosti Kalfa	Azak

Ayazma	Melek Şah		Küçük Kilise	Ayhan
Ayazma	Meserret		Kürkçü Kırkor	Kürkçü Mümin
Ayazma	Molla Mehmet		Lazari	Hacı Zeynel
Ayazma	Alitekin		Leon	Yurt Sahibi
Ayazma	Bakidede		Linardi	Eski Çiçekçi
Ayazma	Banka		Linardi	Vekilharç
Ayazma	Çakırbeyler		Linardo	Karakurum
Ayazma	Damataşı		Livadakia (Çayırlar)	Lozan Zaferi Caddesi
Ayazma	Kayabaşı		Livadya	Çandarlı
Ayazma	Lokumcu		Livadya Aralığı	Çayır Aralığı
Ayazma	Azık		Lorando	Şair Nefi
Ayazma	Çakırgöz		Lorando	Korsan
Ayazma	Halat		Makri Dibek	Tatar Beyi
Ayazma	Keresteciler		Malakof	Havahoş
Ayazma	Kızıl Serçe		Malakof	Sarı Asma
Ayazma	Keseci		Manastır	Gönüllü, Paşa, İsmet Paşa
Ayazma	Kayabaşı		Mangasar	Serdar Ömer Paşa
Ayazma Adası	Tombala		Mangasar	Kaşkaval
Ayazma Adası	Tombala		Mangasar Bostanı	Kalkan Bostanı
Ayazma Arka	Kurt Bağı		Margirit	Küflü Çıkı
Ayazma Deresi	Yeşil Çimen		Mariya	Revani

Ayazma İskelesi	Öğdül		Marki Kalfa	Dev Süleyman
Ayazma Mevkii	bebek-Arnautköy Yolu		Marya	Atsıznefer
Aznavur	Çopur Ahmet		Mercan Kirkor Sokak	Mercan Sokak
Bakkal Filip	Hıdırelles		Meryem Ana Kilisesi	Altınmermer
Balıkçı Kevork Sokak	Balıkçı Sokak		Mimar Andiriya	Koç Yiğit
Balıklı Kilise	Seyit Nizam		Miseyani	Mekik
Başsıvacı Ohannes	Hamursuz		Moiz	Elmastraş
Bedros Kalfa	Çelik Çomak		Moskof Kilise- Mektep Sokak	Dershane
Berber Kalost	Berber Şefik		Muiz	Halis Efendi
Berber Yanko	Semender		Murat Molla Caddesi	Same
Bomonti Caddesi	Silahşör Caddesi		Narliyan Livadyası	Nar Çiçeği
Boyacı Artin	Tayyareci Muammer		Neopolis (mah.)	Yenişehir
Constantin	Baysungur		Nikoli	Kahkaha Çiçeği
Çapato	Çavdar		Olivo	Liva
Çeşme Meydanı	Sefa Meydanı		Pamukçu Tatyos	Pamukçu
Çıkmaz Ermeni Odaları	Kırk Odalar		Panagia (Manastır)	Refah Şehitleri
Daskalos	Çakıltaş, Oltacı		Panaya	İsa Çelebi
Demirci Ohanes	Talip Paşa		Pangaltı	Cumhuriyet Caddesi
Demirci Oskiyan Sokak	Demirci Osman Sokak		Papa Yani	Remzi baba
Despor	Kokoroz		Papa Yorgi	Tabakçı
Despot Boğos	Kara Kuş		Papaz	Bahriyeli Şükrü Bey

Edirneli Artin	Ahmet Dayı		Papaz	Feylesof
Efraim Ođlu	Ak Geyik		Papaz	Kundakçı
Efraim Sinagog	Mahlül		Papaz	Kuřakçı
Eleni	Yeniçeri Ađası		Papaz	Müverrih Sadettin
Ermeni Bostanı	Türk Bostanı		Papaz	Selamet
Ermeni ÇıkmaZ Odalar	Horozlu		Papaz	Tatar Musa
Ermeni Kilisesi	İnci Çiçeđi, Kaval, Mabet, řahadet		Papaz	Tuđrakeř
Ermeniler çeřmesi Sokak	Emirler Çeřmesi Sokak		Papaz	Bahriyeli řükrü
Evangelistriyas (mah.)	Dolapdere		Papaz Abraham	Isırgan
Faraç Avram	řatafatlı		Papaz Abraham	Palalı Ahmet
Fenerli Hristo	Not in 1934 city guide but, today the name is the same		Papaz Aralıđı	Bahriyeli řükrübey Aralıđı
Feriköy Ermeni Kilise Sokak	Feriköy Fırın Sokađı		Papaz ÇıkmaZı	Ziver Bey ÇıkmaZı
Feriköy Hamam Caddesi	Ergenekon Caddesi		Papaz Kiork	Keserci
Feriköy'de Papaz Sokak	İmam Sokak		Papaz Köprüsü	Yaya Köprüsü Sokak
Filipos	Mahmut Dayı		Papaz Köprüsü ÇıkmaZı	Köprü ÇıkmaZı
Foti Ođlu	Dođanbey		Papaz Mihal	Dede Korkut
Fotika	Babadađı		Papaz Ođlu	Dumlupınar
Franko	Ak Akçe		Papazođlu	Gülleci
Frenk Kilise Sokak	Satırcı Sokak		Papazođlu	Gülleci
Gemici Ohannes	Reisülküttap		Papazođlu Hanı	Kızıl Han

Glavani	Kallavi		Papazzade	Kazmacı
Grand Rue- Cadde-i Kebir	İstiklal Caddesi		Paskal	Şehbal
Hacı Fotaki	Özdemir		Patrik	Alageyik
Hacı İbrahim Paşa	Tokathıoğlu		Patrik	Gazi Mihal
Hacı Kosta	Varyemez		Patrikhane	Şarapnel
Hacı Maghak	Süleyman Nazif		Patrikhane	Halet Efendi
Hacı Manol	Hacı Manav		Pisa	Tırsık
Hacı Mansur	Koca Mansur		Polidefski-Polidefkos	Mekkaracı
Hacı Serkis	Eski Türk		Polonya	Nur-i Rıza
Hacı Yanako	Kabadayı		Protestan Kilisesi	Tokaç, Zühre
Hacı Yorgi	Kaydırak		Pulcu Enop Sokak	Pulcu Sokak
Hacı Foti	Ali Yazıcı		Rençber Matyos	İspir
Hahambaşı	Kuzguncuk		Rodolf	Bostancıbaşı
Hançerli Kilise	Ulubatlı Hasan		Rouso	Türk Beyi Sokak
Haşacı İstefan	Haşacı		Ruhban Mektebi	Ümit
Hıristos	Yeni Asır		Rum Fırını	Ay yıldız
Hıristos	İsa Tepesi		Rum Kabristanı	Yeniköy Tepe
Hıristos	Kadıyoran		Rum Kabristanı	Meşelik
Hıristos Çamlık	Büyükçam		Rum Kilise Arka Sokak	Lala Şahin
Hrisso	Ali Ağa		Rum Kilise Ön Sokak	Evranozade
Hristo	Yeni Asır		Rum Kilisesi	Danişment

Hristoduli	Ekşi Nar		Rum Kilisesi	Hacı Murat
Hristodulos	Civan		Rum Kilisesi	Mirasyedi
İlardi	Kahya Bey		Rum Mehmet Paşa Camii	<b>Non-changed</b>
İraklis Spor Kulübü	Kurtuluş Spor Kulübü		Rum Mektebi	Köy İçi Mektebi
İskinavi	Hacet		Saatçi Sehpus	Müneccimbaşı
İstavrinos	Palamut		Samatya Doktor Miricanyan Sokak	Mercan Sokak
İstavroz	Kuşbakışı		Saray İçi Kilisesi	Saray İçi
Kahya Serkis	Sübyeci		Sarı Aleksi	Aksi
Kalipso	Çakmak		Sarı Yanko	Uçbeyi
Kaliyari	Kara Osman		Sarraf Agop	Sarraf Tahsin
Kalost Kalfa	Kalfa Efendi		Serkis	Eczacı Başı
Kaptan Nikola	Gündüz Bey		Sideri	Küleyhan
Karabet	Şair Celal		Sinagog	Sarı Çizmeli
Karabet Kalfa	Kurt Çelebi		Skordaliya	Alay Beyi
Karabet Kalfa Değirmeni	Selami Değirmen		Şişman Ohanes	Şişman Ağa
Karanlık Karnavula	Karanlık Bakkal		Taşçı Manok	Taşçı Mahmut
Karayani	Taravet		Tatavla	Kurtuluş, Tavla
Karnavula	Kara Kurum		Tatavla Meydanı	Kurtuluş Meydanı
Kastelli	Peşkeş		Tatavola	Tavla
Kerasohori (mah.)	Kirazlıköy		Teatro	Sahne

Keşiş	Efe		Sinagog	Aziz
Kilise	Ebüzziya Çağatay		Tekke Arkası Sokak	<b>Non-changed</b>
Kilise	Tebdil Eskisi		Tekke İçi Sokak (Selamiali)	<b>Non-changed</b>
Kilise	Vaiz		Tensof	Talaşçı
Kilise	Yeni Bahar		Tensof	Maruf
Kilise	Kamış		Timoni	Gönül
Kilise	Kara Biber		Timyani	Temenna
Kilise	Kara Bulut		Topal Oskiyan	Topal
Kilise	Karapapak		Topalıyan Hanı	Kaputçular
Kilise	Karatay		Trandafil	Ak Gül
Kilise	Müsteşar		Türebeler Araplar Sokak	<b>Non-changed</b>
Kilise	Panayır		Ulah Kilisesi	Badya
Kilise	Tandır		Üsküdar'da Keresteci Sarkis Sokak	Keresteci Sokak
Kilise	Tanrıverdi		Valsami	Akdemir
Kilise	Çaparı		Venedik	Balyoz
Kilise	Durmuş Dede		Yahudi	Takkeci
Kilise	Emir Nevruz		Yanaki	Can Eriği
Kilise	Görümce		Yanaros	Hamlacı
Kilise	Hamit Vehbi		Yazmacı Kaspar Sokak	Şırlağan Sokak
Kilise	İbni Sina		Yeni Kilise	Omuzdaş

Kilise	İlhan		Yorgi Kalfa	Kantaşı
Kilise	İnşirah		Yorgolu	Yörük Ali
Kilise	Kamacı		Yoroz	Caferbaba
Kilise	Hacı İlbey		Zarifi	Zerafet
Kilise	Nevizade		Ziso Oğlu	Mestan Oğlu
Kilise	Kandilli Bahçe		Kilise	Ahi Çelebi
Kilise	Karayel			

Sources: (Ergin, 1934; Marmara, 2001; Pervititch, 2000; Türker, 2016; Türker, 1998)

Beginning with the general scheme, the changed names changed are categorized into four main fragments. The first fragment includes names stressing Turkishness. The second category is composed of the names changed arbitrarily. The third category is the change in personal names. The fourth category consists of the names changed because of their unpleasant connotations experienced in villages out of the town.

It is obvious that state act was extremely strict about the renaming places in İstanbul. The most striking names are the ones that evoking non-Muslim structure of the settlements and those referring to religions other than Islam. Kilise (church), Ayazma (holy spring water of Orthodox Christians), Papaz (monk), Sinagog (synagogue) were all changed without exception. They were generally changed into different names arbitrarily.

In addition to that, non-Muslim names were completely Turkified as well. Marki, Aleksı, Kosti, Eftimiya, Kosta, Dimitri, Kevork, Sarkis, Ohannes, Bedros, Kalost, Artin, Constantin, Boğos, Hristo were all Armenian and Rum names. It is remarkable that all the names come after a qualifier word indicating an occupation;

such as balıkçı (fisherman), terzi (tailor), mimar (architect), demirci (hammersmith) or keresteci (shantyman). The names indicate that these people were well-known personalities, such that the location is remembered with their own name. While renaming the districts, the adjective was kept and only the names of persons were replaced with Turkish ones. For instance, Demirci Ohannes became Demirci Osman, Berber Kalost turned to Berber Şefik.

There is one exception at this point. The word Hacı (Hadji) almost never preserved in non-Muslim person names. Instead, name of the place was completely changed. Hacı Serkis Street being renamed as Eski Türk, renaming Hacı Yanako as Kabadayı are some of the examples. At first sight, one can argue that the name Hacı itself contradicts with a state logic which is struggling for secularity and Westernism. However, other examples prove that this is not the case. Indeed, renaming Lazari to Hacı Zeynel, Rum Kilisesi to Hacı Murat demonstrates that the word itself do not constitute a drawback. Likewise, renaming Ayazma as Molla Mehmet, Papaz Street as Imam Street shows a similar attitude. We can conclude that, a Christian Hacı annoys policymakers, which is not surprising, while a reference to Muslim Hacı is acceptable. It is also remarkable that, if the previous name of a street refers to a non-Muslim belonging like Kilise, they could be replaced with names like Hacı. However, even if the original names are related to Islam; such as Hacı, they still transformed them into secular names.

All street names containing the word “Ermeni” (Armenian) were changed. They were sometimes replaced with arbitrary names like Horozlu, İnci Çiçeği, Kaval or İhsaniye. They were rarely changed in accordance to assonance, as in the case of Ermeniler Çeşmesi Sokak being renamed as Emirler Çeşmesi Sokak. Besides, the word was directly Turkified like “Ermeni Bostanı” becoming “Türk Bostanı”. Renaming Yaylacıkürtler as Yaylacık can be classified under this category. The same thing happened for Kurdish names as well; they were also Turkified.

New names generally referred to Turkishness and the Turkish nation. Bozkurt, Türkbeyi, Gazitepe, Türk Bostanı, Eski Türk, Yılmaztürk, Göktürk, Türkoba are the significant examples of this category. In addition to that, names; such as Akıncı,

Er Meydanı, Savaş, Babayığit, Silahşör, Dev Süleyman recalled an offensive and hegemonic attitude. Renaming Tatavla (Ταταύλα in Greek) as Kurtuluş may be classified under this category; yet it is accepted almost nationwide that the name Kurtuluş (salvation) implies the salvation from Greeks of the district.

Lozan Zaferi caddesi (Livadakia), Ay yıldız Street (Rum Fırını), Refah Şehitleri (Rue Panaghia) are other significant current names referring to the superiority of Turkish state. The first name itself defines the Treaty of Lausanne as a triumph. It is not a coincidence that the names were given to the streets of Heybeliada, where Rum minorities were dominating elements. Another group of new names is the one with no political or social association. They would be given with reference to a feature of the street or again in an arbitrary manner. Fırın, Lokumcu, Çakmak, Çavdar, Yeşilyurt, Yeşilköy are examples of this kind of change.

Finally, names with unpleasant connotations were changed in the city. It must be noted that the names in this category were only the ones on the periphery of the city. No such example for this category was encountered in the center of Istanbul. Domuzdere (Gümüşdere), Çöplüce (Güzelce), Haraççı (Gazitepe), Sürgünköyü (Ortaköy) are some of the samples of this category. In conclusion, it must be emphasized that before renaming practices came into force in 1927, villages around the city were used to have their Byzantine or Greek names. Petnaxor (Göktürk), Nifos (Kocasinan), Kalitarya (Şenlikköy) are some of the examples.

As seen, in 1927, an extensive “cleansing” from non-Turkish names was executed. New names were put into practice and were firstly documented in Osman Nuri’s city guide in 1934 (İstanbul Şehri Rehberi). Since all the names were Turkified in a lump, a systematic renaming was not necessary in the following years. Various acts of renaming were confronted in the city until today but those are mostly individual instances. In 1950, Makarios Hill in the Heybeliada (halki) was named as Domuz Tepesi (Pig Hill) (Türker, 2008). Makarios is a Greek name and used to be given to the monks. According to Orhan Türker, the name was not associated with Greek Cypriots Archbishop Makarios and Domuz was given because the area kept pigs, rather than being an offensive choice. (Hürriyet, 25.01.2013) Other

prominent name changes on the island would be naming Papaz Dağı as Ümit Tepesi and Kutrilomilo to Değirmentepesi (Millas, 2015; Türker, 2008, p.12; Sezer & Özyalçın, 2010, p.).

The renaming policy was all-out and it did not include the streets of Istanbul only. Names of hamams (Turkish bath), sports clubs, bus stations, schools and cinemas were also Turkified on different periods. Kiryakidis Hamamı became Sefa Hamamı in Kurtuluş. The oldest sports club in the city, which was called Tatavla Heraklis Jimnastik Kulübü, was renamed as Kurtuluş Gençlik Kulübü. Alhambra, Eclair, Etoile, Luxemburg, Russo-American, Orientaux, which are some of the names of cinemas, were changed as Melek, Yıldız, Saray, Sümer, Taksim (Türker 2016, p.44). In 1960's bus station of Samatya was renamed as Kemalpaşa in a night. (Türker 2010) In Şişli, Beş Çınar İlköğretim Okulu, was changed as *44. Mektep*, because it is the 44th school according to the board of education. When the classification with numbers abolished as a regulation, the school named as Talat Paşa.

In the appendix of the “Capital Tax 19419 44: Economic and Cultural Genocide”, owners of the sequestrated properties' and their addresses are listed. According to this documents, names in 1928 were replaced with new ones and were in effect between 1942-1943. (Bozkurt, Fırın etc.); while the name “Tatavla” still exists in the document (Çetinoğlu, 2009).

During 1950's and 1960's, daily newspaper Milliyet published a caricature series called Abdülcanbaz'ın Maceraları (The adventures of Abdülcanbaz). The main locale of the series was Tatavla and the characters were also from Tatavla. This reveals that the name was still in use back then or at least hadn't been erased from the collective memory yet. The publication also proves that there was no legal barrier to use the former name, unlike the mass renaming of 1960's and 1970's.

Kerem Öktem categorizes renaming policy in Turkey into four different views. Renaming works in Istanbul in the last years of 1920's came across as a second wave. There was not a systematic renaming practice policy back then. One can

argue that Istanbul turned into a laboratory for the renaming policy in the following years. In respect to the symbolic references of old and new names, one can argue that new names were given in order to underline the sovereignty of the dominant identity, vengeful reflexes, the aim to prove ‘superiority’ of the Turkishness. Changing the names, which referred to undesired and excluded identities, also was an attempt against the collective memory. They are designed to remove the traces of untrusted entities from the collective memory of the city in the long run. There is no doubt that, the policy went hand in hand with other homogenization practices. In fact, the demographical decline in non-Muslim population, who could be the perpetrator of previous names, helped to forget the names easily. Since the city constantly allows immigrants, the newcomers naturally adopted new names and have no idea about the old ones.

#### **4.3.2. Perceptions on renaming**

In the field study, the main aim is to learn how non-Muslim minorities perceive the state-led renaming policy. Almost all the participants define the policy as a hegemonic, nationalistic implementation. There is a common recognition that the act targeted the past and the inherited from non-Muslim.

‘This is such an undeniable nationalism. Who do you think you are fooling changing your name? You look like an ostrich; your head is under the ground but your butt is out! What are you changing? There is no Greeks left to use Tattavla. Today’s youngsters call it Pera instead of Beyoğlu. It is Pera and you should be proud with it. The world loves it and acknowledges it as Pera. Why do you insist on changing its name? Renaming eliminates all the non-Muslim patterns in the neighborhood. Therefore, we sometimes feel like stuck in the middle. All those names of Akıncılar, Bozkurt, Türk Bey... What on earth are these?’ A.S. (65) *Armenian*

‘I was thinking of these street names. I said, "What's that?". Ergenekon, Bozkurt, Türkbeyi and so on. We had a patriarchate in

Fener. The street of Unkapanı which leads there was named after the Paşa who hanged Patriarch 5<sup>th</sup> Grigoryus; as if there was no other name! Recently, you know, a political party was established in Western Thrace (territory in Greece with Turkish minority). Its president was Sadık Ahmet. I do not know who he was but I am sure he did some good for his people. He died in an accident. They named the street after him, instead of the Patriarchate. They changed the old signboard. They changed the name as if there is no other place in Istanbul to give his name? What do they mean with that? If your concern is honoring the man, name another street after him; why should it be the street of the Patriarchate? What a mentality! "Look! I will show you! This does not make sense to me. These are such chauvinist moves. I do not understand it.' *Y.P. (69) Rum*

Two different interviewees mentioned the execution of the Patriarch and the following renaming implementation.

‘Execution of the patriarch is such a traumatic event in the history of Rums in Turkey. After a war, the patriarch was the one to put the blame on for the defeat of the Ottomans and Ali Paşa hung him in front of the patriarchate’s front door. Rums did not have the right to object but they did not use that front door ever again. Until today, Turkish people have called that door the "door of grudge" but the way this grudge is expressed was different. They not only hung the patriarch but also named the street after the Paşa who did it. This is what we call the attempt to make surrender, take revenge, suppression or enforcement. Likewise changing name Tatavla to Kurtuluş (liberation) refers to getting rid of Rums. Naming the neighborhoods, which still has Armenian or Rum population, as Bozkurt, Ergenekon etc. means exactly same. It is not a coincidence that the primary school in their neighborhood was named after "Talat Paşa".’ *G.Y. (63) Armenian*

Some of the interviewees approach the policy with a broader perspective and embrace current renaming practices of the city.

‘In my opinion, changing names means wiping the minorities off, it is an effort to Turkify the whole life. Silently and slowly casting out. For instance, Boğaziçi Bridge, which held this name for 40 years had its name, changed. The name of a hill, which had not even officially been named as Beleştepe, was changed into Şehitler Tepesi (martyrs hill). If this is happening today, I think what happened in the past was not a coincidence. I don’t even know there were such streets in the past.’  
H.O. (56) Jew

‘There is not even a place called Beleştepe. People made it up themselves. It is not a geographical spot, not a street, not an authentic hill. Nothing is more absurd than naming that spot as Şehitler Tepesi (martyrs hill). Put there a sculpture to commemorate the day, write down what happened there and announce that the monument is built in the memory of those people. This is so reasonable. However, renaming a place which did not even exist before is nonsense.’ G.Y.  
(63) Armenian

The old names are in use only as a result of a conscious counter-hegemonic attitude. Using Tatavla instead of Kurtuluş is an example to it. In a similar vein, replacing the signboard of Ergenekon Street with Hrant Dink on every January 19<sup>th</sup>, and constant initiations to make this change happen are the examples of such an attitude. Field study indicates that no one in the minority communities uses Tatavla today in their daily lives.

‘I work in a Rum school, as a writer and translator. I also use Greek language. So does my wife. However, our kids have studied in Turkish schools since the secondary education. They do not have a single Rum friend. They only speak Greek at home with us. So it can be funny to say Tatavla in daily life! The word lost its function in time. It does not have to be in the chain of command. It happens by itself’ A. (58) *Rum*

Despite the participant thinks that the loss of the word Tatavla is not a top-down strategy, I assume it is the other way around. Previous names are forgotten through demographic engineering policies and thus, new names penetrate to the collective memory of the transformed city more easily.

During the field study, I observed a common opinion that new names aimed at non-Muslim presence of the city and was a cluster of Turkification policies. On the other hand, regarding the personal views and feelings of the participants, there are three striking attitudes that stood out. The first one attaches quiet importance to name changes, which can be summarized as:

“Giving up names meant giving up lots of things” *G.Y. (58) Armenian*

The second cluster evaluates anti-minority politics of the state on a macro scale and pays less attention to naming policy.

“I do not care about renaming much. Compared to the experiences my mother, grandfather, my family faced, it does not bother me whether it is called Kurtulus or Tatavla since I can no longer live there. After having taken my home away and killed my relatives, it doesn't matter at all” *K.G. (58) Greek*

In the last cluster, interviewees normally respond to renaming. They generally ground their opinion by specifying that the policy was not peculiar to Turkey.

“They change the location names not only in Turkey but in Armenia as well. We went to Erivan. The Armenian people who migrated from here named their neighborhoods and streets as New Van, New Diyarbakır. I think changing names is normal. We have a cemetery in Baglarbası. Graves of the famous Balyan family are still there. Few charitable families restored their graves. Head of the city municipality came to the opening ceremony. He is an architect as well, you know. Somebody asked him during the ceremony "Is it possible to name a

street after Balyan maybe?". He did not reply. He cannot. Turkey does not want to acknowledge these.' (78) *Armenian*

'There is no Armenians or Rums living in that street anymore but only Turks. So, the name must be something that the population who lives there can understand. If we consider this as a program, in Germany or France, there are neighborhoods where Turkish people live. You may name them as Turkish street but once they leave, the street name would not make any sense. I do not know the actual purpose of doing this. There must be one, but I do not think as they do; so I cannot understand.' *O.D (67) Armenian*

'They even changed names of people in Russia or Bulgaria. Changing street names did not attract my attention until now. I am telling to myself, I am a reasonable man. I live in Turkey. When thought rationally, I shouldn't feel uncomfortable of these name changes. But if they say, "you cannot be Moiz, you will be Mustafa", that would be horrible. Changing people's name should be really disturbing but when it comes to the other issue (changing names of neighborhoods and streets); if I look from the state's perspective I think changing location names is normal. Israel did this too. I do not consider this as something against my individuality. My mother and father named me, I did not choose my language, my religion or my name but we live in Turkey. I am surrounded by Turks. If they want to change the name of a street called "Moiz", it is their right to do so. In Israel, they say "we have sovereignty in here". They allocated two districts for Arabs. As they consider themselves as dominant in the area, they may also replace the name with something in Hebrew. If I claim sovereignty in a land I can change the name. This is my right. Neighborhood and street names can be changed. Actually, it is changed all the time. Something is getting lost. If you are going to mind all of them you are going to be sad. If the residents do not embrace the name, that will not

be used anyway. If there were Rums still living here, the new name would not be embraced by them. There is Atatürk Street in every city. If you try to change it, that would not work, for instance. If they change the name of Or-Ahayim Hospital that would disturb and upset me; because it is my property, street is not. It is a 150 year-old hospital.' *L.E. (76) Jewish*

#### **4.4 Concluding Remarks**

Along the same line with the rest of the country, renaming streets of Istanbul appeared as a spatio-temporal design and memory politics in favor of the creation of a homogeneous national identity. It is evident that recreating toponymic order is closely associated with the anti-minority policies of the republican period in Istanbul. While the existence and presence of non-Muslims in the city were exterminated with adamant policies and heavy pressure, the state implemented micro policies, such as renaming, which would transform the collective memory in the long run. Collective memory is an active and living concept, which changes due to the interactions in the society by permeating everyday repetitions. Thereby, in the case of Istanbul, minorities were not only forced to migrate or exclude from the public sphere, it was aimed to eliminate their traces as if they had never existed.

Although renaming the streets of İstanbul before the first census of republican period might seem as a necessary implementation, alteration of currently existing names was actually an attempt to eliminate anything that is non-national from language, region and public memory. In 1928, the newly founded republic needed to plot a route for itself and conducted the first census of the new regime. It was also considered as a necessity, because the wars, migrations and the long period of devastation transformed the borders sharply. Plus, the regulations and standardizations were regarded as an endeavor of modernization. However, the census is also significant to observe the current demographic situation in the country. In other words, the state wanted to find out how many of “us” and how many of the “other” there were. That's why the census was seen as a tool in order to determine the policies of the state in the following years. With this aspect, the act of renaming in Istanbul itself is a direct intervention to non-Muslim identity. Furnishing the streets of the city with names that evoked Turkishness was a declaration of ownership and superiority. It is necessary to note that renaming policy was mainly implemented in districts where minorities predominantly live.

Alongside with similarities, Istanbul differs from other localities both in practice and in results. First and foremost, with the implementation revealed before, the state started to systematize renaming policy in 1949 with regulations, laws, and a special commission. Although the field study is not broad enough to make a generalization, it is observable that interviewees agree that the aim of the operation was to wipe away the traces of multicultural structure of the city. One can argue that interviewees, who found the name changing policy appropriate, have indigenized state reflexes. Notwithstanding, they generally accept the idea that if minorities were not displaced, the previous names could inherently be in use today.

Türker remarks that locals kept using the name of Pera in the daily life after it had been renamed as Beyoğlu in Ottoman era. However, the drastic decline of non-Muslim population in the area over the time eased the adaptation period for the newcomers to the changed names, resulting in the elimination of previous names from collective memories in time. It is possible to estimate that if macro politics had not targeted the minority population and they had still lived in the city in high numbers of population, the old names could at least be in use on a daily life-basis, if not in official authorities and documents.

Beyond doubt, receiving migration all over the country during the years eased the adoption of new Turkish names. Naturally, the newcomers of the city indigenized and got accustomed to using current names. With this in mind, one can argue that state has achieved its objective on renaming policy in Istanbul. This is another difference comparing the consequences of the policy with the rest of Turkey; particularly with Kurdish provinces. Although both instances has different and unique dynamics, since Kurdish entity is in the country with a large population, former names are still in use as a part of daily life, except governmental agencies. Despite pressures on the Kurdish identity –or in a sense, as a result of pressures- using old names and demanding restoration also appears as a counter-hegemonic action to the predominant politics of the Turkish state.

Very few examples appeared in a similar vein, in today's Istanbul. Replacing the signboard of Ergenekon Street with "Hrant Dink" on every 19<sup>th</sup> January as a dedication to his death anniversary is one of the well-known attempts on street names. Furthermore, a signature campaign was launched in order to change the name officially. In 2012 former Mayor of Şişli, Mustafa Sarıgül responded positively and asserted that the issue was on the political agenda. The name Ergenekon itself comes from a Turkish myth and it also evokes deep state organization.

In 2005, HDP rallied for Hrant Dink on the date of his death anniversary and the group changed the signboards of the streets symbolically. The group replaced Kurtuluş Street with Tatavla, Baysungur Street with Konstantin Street and Ergenekon Street with Hrant Dink Street. (*Agos*, 1.18. 2015)

Academicians, activists and those who consider Turkification of names as an offensive and othering policy, placed a symbolic resistance against that. Some of the academic studies were conducted to revitalize collective memory of the years when old names were in use. Tatavla (Kurtuluş) in particular, gained significance on the public sphere with this aspect.

Even though the names that belonged to non-Muslim identities were given to a couple of streets in Istanbul – (Mabed to Dadyan Street in Bakırköy, Ölçek to Papa Roncalli in Pangaltı and Çardaklı to Doktor Kalangos in Yeşilköy), they can be described as symbolic or even perfunctory actions. On the other hand, it is striking that there is no demand for restitution of old names in Istanbul; whereas it remained on the agenda for a long while in various cities of Turkey, from Black Sea region to Eastern-Southeastern Anatolia. No questions were addressed to interviewees on restitution during the interviews, and they did not comment on this matter either. This situation might imply that such change is not perceived as possible by interviewers.

The state did not attempt to Turkify Non-Muslims of Turkey; they were rather forced to migration. The elements that they attempted to Turkify were the

ones they actually left behind them; such as names. Within the frame of Turkification policies, the possessions of minority foundations were seized, they were forced to migrate and banned from economic activities. Also, their literature foundations were closed and its archives were confiscated. As a result of immigration and declining population of minorities, their schools were also closed and festivals such as “Baklahorani” and “Apokria” faded away over time. Thus, it is not surprising that minorities have disappeared from public space and collective memory. In this context, the alteration of street names should be evaluated as a part and foreshock of Turkification process.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

Besides being a geographical indicator, place names are also important sources of information on location. A neighborhood is named after as a result of its physical features or social elements. They are also associated with the cultural background of a place. In this respect, place names serve as a source for historical information. Therefore, alteration of such names can be deemed as an intervention to the past.

Toponymy can be simply defined as the study of place names. Based on the geographical information, toponymic research analyzes names semantically and linguistically. Toponymic works scrutinize the evolution of place names and renaming processes. After the mid-1990s, researchers from various disciplines noticed that toponymy is not merely a process of mapping and name recording. This enabled the emergence of critical toponymy. This way, naming and renaming processes started to be analyzed more closely in order to see in which ways toponymy is used to reshape human geography.

Toponymy is in the repertoire of several disciplines from geography to history, from linguistics to political science. In the context of this thesis, in order to insight the historical and political significance of renaming, its link with collective memory must be further explained. Collective memory is an accumulation of socially constructed knowledge that is handed down to the following generations. It is a vital and active phenomenon that occurs with everyday repetitions. It is related to time, space and historical conditions. Place names are the aspects of spatial dimension. The names stay in use for a long period, play a part in the stories, they carry the traces of the culture and therefore, become a part of the collective memory.

Political powers intervene in place names in order to recreate a collective memory, redesign space and display its hegemony or reinforce its power. The renaming settlement is a widespread phenomenon and it appears in radical changes in the political order; such as revolution, colonization, ethnic cleansing, military

occupation, nation building periods. In addition, renaming can be regarded as a counter-hegemonic resistance by ignored and socially marginalized groups.

During the period of nation state foundation renaming was put into force by various countries; such as Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Israel. In this cases, settlements were renamed in accordance with the national identity that the state imposes. The purpose of renaming is breaking ties with the past, efface the influence of dominant culture or language and creating a collective identity which fits state ideology.

As in the past 200 years, nation states have emerged; interventions to geography have become a frequent phenomenon. For the purpose of creating a national identity, nation states intend to control territorial landscape. Furthermore it is necessary to establish sovereignty and reinforce authority. In line with this purpose, mapmaking, geographical education in schools and creating national toponymy appeared as instruments of building a nation.

As a strategy of nation building, demographic engineering policies were held in order to manage ethnic diversity –size, composition, distribution of population- in line with state interests. Demographic engineering and renaming practices are closely relevant policies by the means of geographical reproduction. With this aspect, toponymic engineering is a state-directed removal against “non-favored” subjects from language, geography, and collective memory. In a nutshell, the state defines the “main elements” of the nation by othering ethnic, linguistic and religious groups.

Renaming can be defined as a never-ending process due to its continuity from the late Ottoman period to the one-party and multi-party rule of Republic. The policy was initiated in the first quarter of the 20th century in Turkey. After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, creating ethnically homogenous and a Westernized country was the primary objective of the state. In line with this, the state used a range of homogenization and Turkification methods which applied in all aspects of life in order to create a new social formation that consists of Muslim-Turks. Renaming practices has two dimensions. Constructively, it Turkifies the

territory and supports the creation of an ethnically homogeneous “motherland”. As an exclusion policy, it eliminated “undesirable” identities from the collective memory with the help of language and geography. With this in mind, names of the cities to towns and villages, streets and squares, even desolated small parts of natural topographies were altered. Since names penetrate collective memory in time, wiping them out means removing the traces of “other” not only from maps and geography, but also from the history of society.

It is important to note that from the late Ottoman era to the 1920s the policy mainly targeted the names of non-Muslim places in parallel with an anti-minority soul of the policies. In addition to this, names that affiliated to Alevi belief were also changed accordingly, as a denominational ignorance policy. Following the inception of Kurdish rebels in 1925, the state adopted a policy that aims to demolish everything inherited from non-Turks. In line with this perception, Kurdish and Zazaki settlements started to change. In brief, with the intent of nationalizing the area and making it “home” for Turks, all names of settlements in Greek, Armenian, Kurdish, Persian, Arabic, Lazuri, Georgian, Circassian etc. were changed.

Toponymic practices started with irregular and arbitrary implementations. Its systematization was acquired after 1940’s. Establishment of the Expert Commission in 1957 accelerated the nomenclature of the geography and renaming implemented in bulk. Between 1957 and 1978 almost 35% of the villages were renamed. In the post-coup period of 1980’s, renaming revived again. Since no other remarkable “internal enemy” left in the eye of the state, this time, the policy directly targeted Kurdish localities. The ongoing counter-hegemonic political struggle of Kurds turned them into the first enemies of the state. With the human rights violations such as forced migration of Kurds, can be considered as implementations of demographic engineering. As a part of the policies, once again, state renamed Kurdish localities as a toponymic engineering.

It is important to note that after the renaming process of 1960’s, using “any foreign” word was prohibited and also the publication of maps, which had the potential to threaten “national unity”, was banned. It is also necessary to emphasize that policy

of renaming was not limited with the names of places, persons and natural elements. Turkish state alert also against nomenclature of animals and plant names in Latin, which include “expurgatory” words.

Lastly, this study analyses the renaming policies in Istanbul. As a spatial aspect of nation building process, Istanbul was confronted with renaming implementations in the very first years of the republic. During the recent years, renaming has been academically and politically discussed through the implementations from Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia, namely Kurdish provinces. Although this has valid reasons, the manner of renaming policy in Istanbul deserves more attention. This thesis can be considered as an attempt to evaluate renaming policy as a state-directed spatial act and as a memory politics in Istanbul. Turkification of place names was an attempt to transform the multi-ethnic, linguistic and religious Istanbul into a pure Turkish land. It aimed to wipe off the traces of “others” from the maps and the memories. The names were perceived as “non-domestic” (gayrı milli) and evoked “unwanted” subjects of the new-founded state.

The study reveals that the most significant change in naming the settlements of Istanbul occurred in 1927, prior to the first population census. The city had a particular importance in terms of seeing how the city became a Muslim-Turk locus. In 5 months, 6214 streets were named and renamed. The state conducted an extremely detailed examination on the alteration of place names in Istanbul. Names that evoke non-Muslim structure of the city were renamed. As an instance all names with the words of Kilise, Ayazma, Papaz, Sinagog, Ermeni were changed. Proper non-Muslim names such as Marki, Aleksî, Kosta, Dimitri, Ohannes, Bedros Kevork were also Turkified.

Given names generally refer to Turkishness and the Turkish nation. Bozkurt, Türkbeýi, Gazitepe, Türk Bostanı, Eski Türk, Yılmaztürk, Göktürk, Ergenekon, Türkoba are the examples of such street names. In addition to that, various new names has an offensive and hegemonic impression, such as Akıncı, Er Meydanı, Savaş, Silahşör. Similarly, several names such as Lozan Zaferi, Ay yıldız, Refah

Şehitleri were given to the streets of Heybeliada where the population was mainly Greek.

In respect to the symbolic manners of old and new names, it is arguable that new names were given in order to specify the sovereignty and vengeful attitude of the national identity; and to prove ‘superiority’ of the dominant identity. It is evident that recreating toponymic order is closely related to the anti-minority policies of the republican period in Istanbul. While the existence and presence of non-Muslims in the city were exterminated with adamant policies and heavy pressure, the state implemented micro policies; such as renaming, which transformed the collective memory in the long run. Alongside with similarities, Istanbul differed from the other localities both in practice and also in outcome. First and foremost, the implementation was forced before the state started to systematize renaming policy in 1949 with regulations, laws, and a special commission.

This study also argues that renaming policy achieved its goals in Istanbul and new names were adopted. It is important to remind that recreating toponymical order is inextricably associated with other nationalizing policies of the state, particularly demographic engineering. It is possible to estimate that if macro politics did not target minority population and they still live in the city in high numbers, the old names, at least, could be in use in daily life, even if not in official authorities and documents. In Kurdish localities, for instance, former names are still in use in everyday life. Beyond doubt, sustaining their existence in the country with a high population plays a major role in this. In addition to that, Kurdish people have been an active political agent and able to raise their demands. In addition to the annihilation of minorities, the effect of being a migration-receiving city all over the country eased adoption of the Turkified names. Naturally, the newcomers of the city indigenized and adopted current names.

Renaming also appears as a counter-hegemonic act to the state’s Turkification policies. In this respect, the use of previous names in areas where mostly Kurdish people live symbolizes a resistance against the official state policy. Likewise, demands and official application on having the old names back emerged in such

areas first. Also, the attempts to restore previous names, which were in Laz language, in Black Sea Region can be regarded as similar. On the other hand, because of the aforementioned reasons, there is no clear demand for back-naming in Istanbul. The field research reveals that although it is an unappreciated policy, new names are generally penetrated into everyday life.

There is continuity in renaming process all over Turkey, including Istanbul. Lastly, following the 15 July 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, Bosphorus Bridge, bus stations, student dormitories, street names have started to be renamed with the names of those who died in these events. Aim of such name changes is to place this event in the collective memory in the long run and to indicate spatial ownership against "internal enemies". Similarly, the name of the street, which was named after the Ali Pasha who hung the patriarch, was quite disturbing for Rums. It was re-changed later; but with the name of a Western Thrace Turk's leader Sadık Ahmet. These and other examples demonstrate that the anti-minority spirit is still alive. On the political scene, the use of the word "Armenian" as an insult is an indication that the anti-minority spirit of the *raison d'état*. As a matter of fact, the field study has revealed that minorities still feel as "the other", even today.

As the concluding remarks of this study, it was argued that toponymic practices have been a crucial component of the ethnic homogenization and Turkification process since the early republican years. This was particularly visible in Istanbul as elaborated in the research and Turkish-Muslim identity has been dominant with the erosion of the *past*, which cannot be considered without ethnic-religious minorities in the space, through such practices. It could be also stated that those policies and practices have been unfortunately successful in drastic change of the collective memory about the city. This is due to the fact that names of the places or attributions to the space are inevitable and vital components of social and cultural life of the cities. It is thus important to extend studies on the relation between space and memory in general and toponymy of Istanbul in particular. An elegant and detailed analysis of toponymy would give more details about the everyday life on the space. Besides, an oral history field study can be conducted with young generation of

minorities. Centered on toponomic practices, this study can provide important data on intergenerational recall and forgetting practices on the city.

As a policy suggestion, such a focus would be helpful to develop sound decisions on the elimination of the negative outcomes of renaming on the city culture and collective memory. In such way, moreover, lore and information about the history of the city could be transferred to the next generations. More crucially, it would also pave the way to develop dialogue and empathy with the ethno-religious minorities, as well as eliminating tensions within the society. This study based on the interviews with the representatives of ethno-religious minorities reveals that they still feel as “other” in socio-cultural life of Istanbul, as a result of such discriminative practices resulting in a serious kind of trauma for them. Although I am not hopeful about the future of such progress on the transformation of toponymic policies, more comprehensive and detailed analyses would be helpful for the development of the literature on the issue, to keep the issue on the agenda of local and national political actors, as well as the future execution of sound policies initiated with the political will aiming such transformation.

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**Appendix 1: Renamed villages in Istanbul**

Old name	New name	Year
Ađviran	Akören	1928
Alaton	Aydınlar	1928
Anarşı	Gürpınar	1946
Avas	Atıřalanı	1928
Ayapa	Kirazlı	1928
Ayastefanos	Yeřilköy	1928
Ayazama	Taşoluk	1928
Biğados	Selimpařa	1928
Bojdar	Hořdere	1954
Çöplüce	Güzelce	1946
Domalı	Sahilköy	1968
Domuzdere	Gümüřdere	1928
Ekřinoz	Esenyurt	1946
Ermeniköyü	İhsaniye	1928
Eski Eređli	Gümüřyaka	1946
Gardan	Kavaklı	1928
Gelevri	Yolçatı	1928
Germiyan	Deđirmen	1928
Haraççı	Gazitepe	1928
Kalikratiya	Mimarsinan	1928
Kalitarya	Şenlikköy	1928
Kalyos	Kıraç	1928
Küçük Arnavutköyü	Türkoba	1928
Lazari	Yazlık	1928
Litros	Esenler	1928
Makrihori	Bakırköy	1928
Muha	Yeřilbayır	1954
Nifos	Kocasinan	1928
Petnaxor	Göktürk	1928
Playa	Tepecik	1928
Podima	Yalıköy	1955
Stranza	Istranca	1928
Sürgünköyü	Ortaköy	1928
Tarakatiya	Yakuplu	1928
Terkos	Durusu	1928
Vidos	Güngören	1928
Yaylacıkkürtler	Yaylacık	1928

Source: T.C. Dahiliye Vekaleti, Son Taksimati Mülkiyede Köylerimizin Adları, Ankara 1928, T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, Meskun Yerler Klavuzu, Ankara, 1946, T.C. Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 14 July 1954, p.5