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Islamophobic Discourses of Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen

Donald Trump ve Marine Le Pen'in İslamofobik Söylemleri

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ABSTRACT

Since Marine Le Pen was elected President of the National Front in January 2011, her strategy for winning power has involved a kind of “de-demonization,” aiming to give the FN the image of a party “like the others.” This includes showing that she is neither racist nor xenophobic and wildly nor anti-Semitic. She even presents herself as the best bulwark of the Jewish community against "Islamic anti-Semitism", seeking but unsuccessfully to seduce a part of this electorate. She also targeted the Muslim voters, as evidenced by her party's campaign in Île-de-France for the regional elections when we saw some leaflets distributed bearing the words "Muslim perhaps, but French first". However, this strategy is not unanimous in the party, if judged by the numerous defections of recruits, disappointed to discover a reality a thousand miles from the speeches of the President. For instance, after several public declarations, Marine Le Pen has been accused of being responsible for promoting anti-Muslim policies and supporting the widespread of Islamophobia.

Likewise, President Donald Trump's diplomacy is often presented as a "break" from that of his predecessors. Outspokenness, breaches of protocol, threats to enemies and allies alike, abusive use of Twitter... The style seems at the very least to contrast with that of Barack Obama, rich in nuances and subtleties. For the majority of Muslims, the decisions of the Trump administration mark a new era. Yet, many believe that the rhetoric used by the current tenant of the White House is mainly responsible for the recent increase in Islamophobic attacks and acts for the excellent reason that Trump has often been accused of promoting a xenophobic, even racist view. Many examples of controversial statements, starting with the criticisms addressed to Obama, whose American citizenship was questioned by his successor. Donald Trump's apparent closeness to the far right, in particular the "alt-right" (the "alternative" right), as well as a series of outrageous statements or speeches, have led many observers to link his politics to the theories of Professor Samuel Huntington, the latter being highly appreciated by ethno-nationalist movements. In the context of this study, the aim has been to understand to what extent Trump and Le Pen's Twitter rhetoric on Islamophobia can be considered a strategy for a political end. For example, we are interested in looking at how the National Front, through its different responsible, has always defended and promoted some anti-Muslim policies.

Keywords: islamophobia, populist leader, nationalism, discrimination policy, refugee

ÖZET

Marine Le Pen, Ocak 2011'de FN başkanlığına seçildiğinden beri, iktidarı kazanma stratejisi, FN'ye “diğerleri gibi” bir parti imajı vermeyi amaçlayan bir tür “şeytandan arındırma” içermektedir. Bu, onun ne ırkçı ne yabancı düşmanı ne de özellikle anti-Semitik olduğunu göstermeyi içermektedir. Hatta kendisini Yahudi cemaatinin "İslami anti-Semitizm"e karşı en iyi siperi olarak sunuyor, başarısızca bu seçmenlerin bir kısmını baştan çıkarmaya çalışıyor. Ayrıca partisinin Île-de-France'da bölgesel seçimler kapsamındaki yürüttüğü kampanyadaki dağıtıldığı broşürlerin üzerindeki "Belki Müslüman, ama önce Fransız" in kanıtladığı gibi, Müslüman seçmenleri de hedef almaktadır. Bununla birlikte, başkanın konuşmalarından bin mil ötede bir gerçeği keşfetmenin hayal kırıklığına uğradığı yeni acemilerin sayısız ayrılımlarına bakılırsa, bu strateji partide oybirliğiyle olmadığı apaçıktır. Bu yüzdendir ki Marine Le Pen, birkaç kamu açıklamasından sonra, Müslüman karşıtı politikaları desteklemekten ve İslamofobinin yayılmasını desteklemekten sorumlu olmakla suçlanmıştır.

Aynı şekilde, Başkan Donald Trump'ın diplomasisi, genellikle öncekilerin diplomasisinden bir "kopuş" olarak sunulmaktadır. Açık sözlülük, protokol ihlalleri hem düşmanlara hem de müttefiklere yönelik tehditler, Twitter'in kötüye kullanımı. Stil, nüanslar ve inceliklerle dolu Barack Obama'nın stiliyle en azından tezat oluşturuyor. Müslümanların çoğunluğu için Trump yönetiminin kararları yeni bir dönemi işaret ediyordu. Yine de birçoğu, Beyaz Saray'ın önceki kiracısı tarafından kullanılan söylemin, İslamofobik saldırılardaki son artıştan büyük ölçüde sorumlu olduğuna inanıyor ve Trump'ın sık sık yabancı düşmanı, hatta ırkçı bir görüşü desteklemekle suçlanmasının iyi bir nedeni için hareket etmektedir. Amerikan vatandaşlığı, halefi tarafından sorgulanan Obama'ya yöneltilen eleştirilerden başlayarak, tartışmalı ifadelerin pek çok örneği var. Donald Trump'ın aşırı sağa, özellikle de "alt-sağ" ("alternatif" sağ)'a belirgin yakınlığı ve bir dizi çirkin ifade veya konuşması, birçok gözlemcinin siyasetini etno-milliyetçi hareketler tarafından çok takdir edilen Profesör Samuel'in teorileriyle ilişkilendirmesine neden olmuştur. Bu çalışma bağlamında, Trump ve Le Pen'in Twitter'da İslamofobiye yönelik söylemlerinin ne ölçüde siyasi bir sonlandırma stratejisi olarak değerlendirilebileceğinin anlaşılması amaçlanmıştır. Örneğin, FN'nin farklı sorumluları

aracılıđıyla her zaman bazı Müslüman karşıtı politikaları nasıl savunduđuna ve desteklediđine bakmakla ilgileniyoruz.

Anahtar kelimeler: Islamofobya, Populit Lider, Milliyetçilik, Ayrımcı Politika, Mülteci

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FN : Front National

USA : United States of America

OIC : Organisation for Islamic Cooperation

CBMI : Runnymede Trust' Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia

EUMC: European Union Military Committee

NATO : North Atlantic treaty Organization

UMPS : Union pour un Mouvement Populiste et le Parti Socialiste

CFCM : Conseil Français du Culte Musulman

CCIF : Collectif contre l'Islamophobie en France

MEP : Member of the European Parliament

PRG : Parti Radical de Gauche

PCF : Parti Communiste Français

EELV : Europe Ecologie Les Verts

LFI : La France insoumise

INTRODUCTION

Islamophobia emerges as a term used to express irrational feelings such as fear and hatred towards Muslims, Islam, Islamic institutions and organizations, and an active discrimination against Muslims. Recently, this term has become more common in Europe due to the intense immigration from Muslim countries to Europe and the debates over whether the immigrants can integrate into the majority. As such, how Muslims are affected by this situation has also become an important issue for the Islamophobia literature. For this purpose, this thesis

In this study, the social insecurity of Islamophobia practices, which have become widespread both in the political and social arena in Europe, on Muslim minorities is analyzed and the reactions of Muslim minorities against this insecurity are analyzed. The study discusses the limitations of social security understanding, which is often used to explain the security perceptions of national communities, to examine the security perceptions and understandings of minority communities. In this context, the study argues that the concept can be used to understand the construction of social insecurity of minority communities. In this context, in the study, living in Europe.

The process of building social insecurity of Muslim minority communities is examined and the security-referenced movements of Muslim minorities are analyzed. Although Europe's meeting with Muslims can be traced back to the beginning of the interaction between Islam and Christianity, it was with the conquest of Spain in 711 that Muslims took shape in the minds of Europe. Apart from this conquest, the Muslim influence in Europe continued with the Ottoman land conquests in Europe. Later, colonialism and post-colonial interactions also started the process of settlement of Muslims in the European continent. However, the intensive formation of Muslim minorities in this continent emerged as a result of workers' contracts after the Second World War.

At the end of the years 1950 and 1960, the migrations of the working-force have engendered the settlement and the development of new Muslim communities in so many countries member of the European Union. Originally, these migrated communities were essentially formed of men at the age of being able to work. Most importantly, they were defined by the economic function (Migrated workforce), their skin colour or their nationality. In the aftermath of the restriction of the economic migration in the 1970, a process of settlement and familial gathering has been implemented. As women and

children started joining the men, the attention has been drawn on the development of infrastructures in communities. A raising proportion of the Muslim proportion is now formed by Muslim of second and third generation, born in Europe. In the 1980, The North Europe has as well received some Muslim refugees which happened to require for asylum as they came from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Lebanon etc, and later in at the beginning of the 1990, from the ancient republic of Yugoslavia and Somalia. In some cases, those refugees were some qualified staff coming from urban centres.

Since the September 11 attacks in the USA, so many Muslims settled in some countries members of the European Union have been seriously influenced by a hard climate, as described in 2001 and 2002 by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) in so many of its reports, highlighting that Muslims have been the target of a raising hostility, en thus although some positive initiatives bringing together Muslims and other religious groups and aiming at encouraging mutual respect and to ameliorate the social participation and the positive integration of Muslims in the European society.

The 2016 presidential elections in the United States of America can arguably be considered as one of the most hostile and aggressive campaigns in the history of America. It was the only election in the country's history at the end of which the entire world was left astonished due to its outcomes. According to some studies, the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President, primarily because of his lack of political background, has been a surprise to the international community and the international public opinion (Gabriel et al., 2018). It is worth reminding that this extraordinary race was opposing the Republican candidate Donald Trump to the state's ex-secretary and Democratic Candidate Hillary Clinton, who lost in favour of the former (Lilleker, 2016 in Khan et al. 2019). Some of the factors that made these elections special are the extraordinary political rhetoric, the recurrence of distasteful discriminatory tones and especially an emphasized invective on Muslims through an anti-Muslim discourse. For example, throughout his presidential campaign, Trump promised his sympathizers and supporters that he would ban Islam in America. Afterward, he tried some attempts to restrict Muslim access to the United (Husain, 2018). Such an attitude has been the source of critics and controversies about the candidate not only in the US but in the entire world. Likewise, after the attack of the San Bernardino in December 2015, Trump's predecessor Barack Obama while asking Americans for justice and tolerance towards the Muslim community, emphasized that America was at war with terrorism but not Islam (Tesler, 2018).

On the other side, Lebourg (2016), while arguing that Islamophobia did not appear in the public debate in connection with the nationalist movement of the Far Right in the period between the nineteenth century until the events of the September 11, asserts that in the recent decades, Islamophobia has been able to emancipate itself from underground movements by becoming mainstream because of the confusion that exists to a great extent in the French debate. According to him, in the post September 11, Islamophobia's capacity to reorganize the political sphere on the left has been an opportunity for it to become a central preoccupation of the French society. One of the most exciting cases can be the example of the Charlie Hebdo murders, which in this context have been sources of heated disputes. Beyond this, it seems that Islamophobia has been used to give sense to the framework resulting in the deep cultural crisis that has been politically translated into the recent electoral success of Marine Le Pen (Lebourg, 2016). As it was in the case of the United States, France's debate around Islamophobia has become so present in the last decades, whether within academia or in the media. While examining the discourses of Le Pen and Donald Trump, first of all, the lives of Donald Trump and Le Pen will be briefly mentioned. Afterwards, the presidential candidacy process of Donald Trump and Le Pen and the most prominent discourses in this process will be listed briefly.

The most important source of the thesis is its discourses towards Muslims. In the first place, the racist words and anti-Islamic statements Trump used in his statements as a result of the terrorist attacks in the United States will be examined. Most of these discourses are official sites in America where the statements of American presidents and presidential candidates are available. Although the Twitter resource is intended to be used for both Trump and Le Pen, these resources are limited. Especially Donald Trump's Twitter account was open before he started his thesis, but after he started the thesis, his Twitter account was closed. The resources and influence processes used by Le Pen will be shaped together with the party policies, cabinet and his own discourses.

The Islamophobic rhetoric in the content of Le Pen and Trump's speeches was conveyed exactly. By keeping the main purpose of this thesis, Donald Trump's relations with Muslim countries and what he said about these countries will be examined in particular. Because every word that comes out of Trump's mouth has reflections on America's foreign policy. Similarly, it will be tried to show how Le Pen influenced Macron and domestic politics. is happening. We can see that Donald Trump has been criticized by

many countries for his role in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, especially by taking the side of Israel. We can see the policy effects of Le Pen's cabinet.

To put it briefly, the rationale, research method and sources of the thesis will be presented in the first chapter. In the second part, along with the historical processes, the sources of the Islamophobia discourse in Europe and America will be specified. These sources will be analyzed together with historical events and facts. In the third chapter, Le Pen's rhetoric as well as the politics shaped by the discourses of the party and the people in his cabinet will be discussed. It will be covered in the historical process underlying these policies. In Chapter 4, Trump's rhetoric, policies and relations with other countries will be discussed. In the conclusion part, the analysis and evaluation of the written thesis, the conclusion reached and the subject that can be studied in the future will be concluded.

1.1. Background

If the presence of Muslim populations in Europe and North America is old, its visibility in the public space seems now to constitute a significant political issue for Western societies. The social sciences have taken mainly up this research object since the 1980s. Still, the subject remains sensitive, and "studying the 'Muslim question' in the Western world amounts as much to analysing the object as the symbolic struggles that define its contours and determine salience in public debate" (Geisser, 2012 in Asal 2014). In other words, to study the place of Islam and Muslims in that part of the world, it is necessary to check the main issues that it reveals and, in particular, that of its rejection.

In fact, since the spread of Islamophobia and its development worldwide, its definition remains subject to debate. And these debates about the legitimacy of Islamophobia arose in a context where various mobilizations and confrontations centered on the figure of the Muslim (Sayyid 2014). For example, Lean and Esposito (2012) stated that since the catastrophic events of September 11, which exacerbated developments of Islamophobia, Islam and the Middle East have been dominated by negative headlines. Kaya (2014) argued that the criticism related to the discussion of Islamophobia refers to the consequences resulting from the misuse of the concept or its uses for political and ideological goals.

And effectively, several institutions and actors participate in speech production in the scientific, political, and media fields, reflecting the political and ideological questions that the use of this new notion raises. For example, the emergence of Donald Trump, former

President of the United States presidential candidate, and his victory over Hilary Clinton has been a subject of discussion in academia and an issue of debate and division in our political sphere (Khan et al., 2021). Many commentators and authors interpret Trump's previous Twitter activism as a way that has contributed to the construction of Islamophobic discourse and the ideological structures that go with it.

On the other hand, the place that Marine Le Pen, through the Front National, has reserved for the Muslim community of France has led France to become politically, socially, and economically polarized in ways as much closer to that of the United Kingdom the United States. The attempt of Donald Trump to ban Islam after having promised it during his campaign in 2016 (Nuruzzaman 2017) and its further assertions that America is at war against terrorism but not Islam are just some attitudes among so many others so deep in understanding its anti-Muslim rhetoric. One might think that the position of both Trump and Le pen on Islam takes its sources respectively in the September 11, 2001's attack on the World Trade Centre and in the numerous terrorist attacks perpetrated in France. Such an assumption has resulted in a situation where the Muslim population worldwide, and that of the USA and France in particular, are being the target of discrimination, racism, and even aggression.

1.2. Conceptual Framework

1.2.1. Early Conception and Historicization of Islamophobia

As well as studies on orientalism, the history of the diffusion of a negative image of Islam in the West has been abundantly addressed to enable people to measure the impact of the different imaginaries today. Between medieval orientalism, building upon religious struggles between Christianity and Islam, the enlightenment period rejecting the Muslim religion as irrational and backward, or the colonial period that shapes the image of Muslims in France, historical analysis is essential (Bruter, 2007; Thomson, 2005). In addition to drawing on European history, studies made on the US build their basis on race-building and evoke contemporary imperialism. As shown in several texts contented in the collective work of Esposito and Kalin 2011 (inland Moten 2012), imperialism is thought to be the cause of the ongoing Islamophobia as the 19th-century orientalism. It presents itself as a process of othering serving to legitimize Western military, political and cultural domination. According to this hypothesis, as Alan Sheehi (2010) asserted,

Islamophobia is perceived as an ideological construction that justifies American hegemonic power.

The first chapter of the collective work of Maleiha Malik constantly comes back to the representations of Muslims in the XVI-XVIII centuries by showing how the political threat of the Ottoman Empire was transformed in the British writings of that time into the conflict between Christianity and Islam (Malik, 2013; Matar, 2009). Many authors working on the current Islamophobia dwell to a great extent on its historical roots, evoking, for example, the Crusades and the Spanish Reconquista¹ (a kind of maurophobia according to Lorente, (2010) or the conquest of America (Rana, 2007). According to Grosfoguel and Martín-Muñoz (2010), the causes of the creation of the modern borders of otherness and a racial and ethnic hierarchy in the world system are these internal conquests in Spain and that external (toward America).

However, some established analyses rely more on theoretical than empirical documentation. Even if it is true that the link between contemporary Islamophobia and the writings of the past is not always explicitly stated or convincing, the work of historians brings some exciting light to these continuities. Nevertheless, these reflections show that the events of 11 September do not represent an actual rupture but instead fall within a historical continuity.

Considering the specific character of national contexts, particularly that of France, as demonstrated by the birth of the word at the beginning of the 20th century, we can hardly lose sight of the colonial period, the Algerian War, and the history of immigration. That is why most of the first analysis on the rejection of Islam and Muslims insists on essential factors such as history and colonialization. In 1997, while Jocelyne (1997) was describing the construction of the negative image of Islam in the story, precisely during the colonial period, Farhad was making mentioned: “a non-resolved historical litigation, the feeling of a fraudulent belonging of immigrants to the nation, the general impression that young people issued from immigration reject the French civilization by their ostentatious adhesion to Islam” (Khosrokhavar, 1997: 37-38 in Hamès 1998).

¹ The Reconquista is the name given to the period of the Iberian Middle Ages between the Umayyad conquest of Visigothic Hispania and the fall of the Nazari Kingdom of Granada. In other words, it represents the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula, under the Muslim rule since 711, by European Christians.

1.2.2. From International Relations to State Policies

The above reflections about Islamophobia in history show a double interest. On the first hand, it allows us to question the different scales of analysis of islamophobia, which means that the global, the national, and the local dimension must be taken into account, as well as the history of each particular country. When we look around, we quickly realize that joint research that proposes case studies on Islamophobia in many countries shows the importance of contextualizing studies in history (Morgan et al., 2012; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010). According to Asal (2014:17), contemporary international relations and their influence on States' politics significantly contribute to building racism and its alteration tools. He mentions, for example, the continuity of a foreign and domestic policy logic vis-à-vis of certain groups on matters related to immigration, borders surveillance, or administrative practice. The logic of the war against terrorism is perceived as linked to security laws at the national level in some countries et al.(Didier et al., 2008). Asal (2014) argues that in France, the building of Islam as an external and internal threat debates immigration coincides with the security issue that mixes terrorism and criminality. For example, young people of immigrant origin in the suburbs who coincidentally are "Muslims" are targeted by speeches on urban riots, delinquency, and Islamic radicalism in French mosques (Deltombe, 2013; Mucchielli & Le Goaziou, 2007).

On the other side, the historicization and the analysis of different scales broaden our view on the exclusion and racism process at the state level. Therefore, beyond the society's feelings of hostility vis-à-vis of Islam because of the historical litigation, it is also about analyzing the role of the state and institutions. However, to explain the construction of otherness and the nation's borders by the political sphere, one must consider Islam's institutional workings and the different kinds of treatment in various public sectors. For example, in France, Asal (2014) asserted that the role of an institution such as the High Council for Integration must be analyzed to disseminate a particular conception of secularism and the circulation of actors between militant organizations, institutions, and political spheres. The same fact remains true regarding the laws that refer to secularism and confusion around its practice, visibility and meaning linked to Islam in their application. Besides, the mention of various questions related to Islam on the political agenda shows some mechanisms of power that in-depth investigations into each controversy can reveal. Thus, in her analysis of the 2003-2004 veil case, which she considers a "textbook case," Lorcerie (2008) shows that it is a political enterprise led by

“privileged entrepreneurs who have some good relationship with the government,” who has brought together a coalition of actors from the militant world and the media around the cause.

1.2.3. The Contemporary Conception of Islamophobia

Arguably, Islamophobia seems to be a concept that emerged to do the work that categories like racism and other things were not doing. It names something that existed for a long time but lacked appellation. And though we said that it has emerged only in the recent decades, until today, it has been realized that most of the debates around this concept are somehow due to its conceptual lack of clarity. Such a lack of transparency causes him a disagreement about specifically which practice or behaviour meets the criterion of what constitutes Islamophobia (Sayyid 2014). For example, while stating that Islamophobia is a problematic term to define, Ayhan argued that this concept is a much used by little-understood term (Kaya, 2011, p. 6). It is likely because, as stated by the author, there is no legally agreed definition of Islamophobia, mainly because social scientists haven't reached a consensus on defining the concept of Islamophobia. This is why some people usually misuse images related to Islamophobia without paying attention to the fact that it is unrelated. In a 2014's Report published by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, authors defined Islamophobia as “a kind of modern age racism and xenophobia motivated by fear, distrust, and hatred towards Islam and Muslims. “(p. 264). The report further states that Islamophobia is a product of actions that fictionalize Muslims' appearance in European societies rather than its accurate portrait. In this perspective, we see Islam described as a kind of modern age racism and xenophobia motivated by a certain feeling of insecurity and hatred (OIC, 2014). The report, while stating that Islamophobia and racism are like practiced through public discourses, exposing some surfaces of intolerance, discrimination, unfair treatment, prejudices, hatred, and hostility, it emphasizes the difference that exists between Islamophobia and classical racism.

Sayyid (2014: 13) cited the Runnymede report by mentioning that the last report conceptualizes Islamophobia as a product of the articulation between Orientalism and racism. Such a conception supposes that the three concepts here are different and should be used in their respective images. However, Ayhan observes that Islamophobia is discussed within the broad concept of racism and race (Kaya, 2011: 7). Though different, Islamophobia can be considered a kind of racism or discrimination. There is even a consensus in academia that Islamophobia is cultural racism (Yel 2021, 1; Lauwers 2019;

Kaya 2011: 9). Likewise, Sayyid 2014) argued that whatever discrimination or prejudice is said against Muslims is purely and simply racism. For Kaln (2017:47), Islamophobia brings together other phenomena such as religious, ethnic, and cultural racism and discrimination.

Another concept to bear in mind is Xenophobia. While Xenophobia embraces both the feeling of fear and hatred (Hervik, 2015), Islamophobia is seen as a much more aggressive and predatory entity (Appadurai, 2006). Ayhan and Kayaoğlu (2017), inciting Robin (2012), also made a distinction between Islamophobia and related concepts such as anti-Muslimism, “intolerance against Muslims,” anti-muslim prejudice, and antimuslim bigotry, hatred of Muslims, and Muslimophobia. Acknowledging a fluidity between Muslimophobia and Islamophobia, Alan Erdenir (2010, 29) argued that the former resembles anti-Semitism while the latter resembles anti-Judaism but targets Muslims as citizens or residents of European countries as Islam as a religion. According to Carr (2011:576), cultural racism; is a phenomenon in which cultural differences such as religion, language, and ethnicity are based. The exclusion of other groups other than a homogeneous dominant culture is rationalized. In this context, Carr states that Islamophobia is another name for the marginalization and exclusion of Islam by certain groups because it does not comply with the homogeneous cultural structure of Europe.

When we look at all these developments, we see a perpetual circulation in the public debate that testifies how seriously it needs to be addressed. In choosing to address the issue of Islamophobia, we understand that there might be a kind of confusion with the related concept, and therefore, our choice is to clarify this confusion by stating the difference with the related notion. However, the relation wanted to study Islamophobia particularly and not something else related to the position of our exciting subjects on the issue. Initially, Islamophobia was defined as “an unfounded hostility toward Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” (The Trust Commission on British and Islamophobia, 2004). According to that first definition and secondly, we want to try to understand how Islamophobia evolve in the political career of Trump and Le Pen, which have been both seen as Islamophobes.

1.3. Problem Statement

The Italian historian Federico Chabod argues that the concept of Europe is "constructed by non-European things, and this particular identity gains meaning by comparing it with non-European things. In other words, the construction of a European "I" can only be

achieved by comparing it with an "other." Throughout history, this "other" has been groups such as Persians, Asians, Arabs, Africans, Turks, and Jews. Interestingly, this *other* has always been seen as a stranger who constitutes a threat to the well-being of the society that he built. In the case of Muslims, this is more than true when we analyze their situation in Europe or America.

In the United States, all the people who racially look Muslim are likely to be vulnerable to Islamophobia. They are from South America, India, Italia, Algeria, and even China. No matter where they come from and to which religion they are affiliated, many people have often had Islamophobia just because of their race. Some authors argued that the rise of Islamophobia had been facilitated by the policies of Trump, which has reinforced among the American public the idea that Islam is a threat. Likewise, in France, the issue of Muslims has been long at the center of diverse controversies and repeated on so many occasions, thus questioning the legitimacy of the Muslim's presence in France, whether they are strangers or nationals. Here too, among the sizeable political class of the French Republic, a popular opinion has been formed according to which the National Front has been responsible for the Muslims being eaten in French. Does it mean that the National Front has always defended and promoted some anti-Muslim policies through its different reliable? After several public declarations, Marine Le Pen has been accused of being responsible for fostering anti-Muslim policies and supporting the widespread Islamophobia. How can, in both the case of Trump and Le Pen, relate their intentions to the development of Islamophobia? Could it mean that they are deliberately doing it, or is it just a misinterpretation leading to such claims?

1.4. Research Question

As we previously stated, many questions are going on when one decides to study the current situation of Islamophobia in countries such as France and the USA. In the framework of our research, we will focus on answering the following central question: To what extent can Trump and Le Pen's discourse rhetoric on Islamophobia be considered a strategy for the political end?

1.5. State of the Art

The role of social media, particularly Twitter, in the transformation of democracy has undoubtedly some heavy consequences. It provides a platform for the general public and political leaders worldwide to communicate efficiently (Grant et al., 2010) actively. In

the last decades, Twitter has been mainly used in campaigns. The evolution of this trend for governments and leaders for political ends has been the subject of various academic studies. For Campos Domínguez (2017), Hendricks and Kaid (2014), Twitter has become one of the most important theoretical concepts in political communication. Strandberg (2013) asserted that Twitter operates as a tool of mobilization for political aims, as in Barack Obama's presidential campaign in the 2008 and 2012 elections (Hong and Nadler 2012). Twitter's substantial outcomes, in politics mainly, have won the attention of researchers who have been, for a moment, trying to explore its effects on the elections since it influences public opinion (Liu 2017). Apart from this, in the past, Twitter also serves as an awareness tool on social issues such as #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo, respectively, in the protest against violence against Black people and sexual harassment of women in the workplace (Müller and Schwarz 2018).

However, this research focuses on analysing the rhetoric of Trump and Le Pen in their discussion about and to Muslims. Bazian (2018) argued that Islamophobia has risen from Huntington's "clash of civilizations," in which he discussed the concept of "Islamic Extremism." Likewise, it argued that Islamophobia is a reorientated Clash of Civilisations that has confronted Islam and the Middle East against the West, represented by the United States as a proxy for and guardian of Western Civilisations (Beydoun 2018). The author stresses that if the clash of civilizations theory has been converted into a national security strategy and policy, it is because the media misrepresented Islam, which primed the polity for the war on Muslims a long time ago before the war on terror. There is then the question of the role of policymakers and especially government officials in the misrepresentation of Islam in developing policies against Islamophobia.

There is a considerable number of authors, among which Khan et al. (2021), who qualified the attitude of Trump as Islamophobic. They argued that Donald Trump raised anti-Muslim sentiments that remained on the agenda throughout their presidential campaign in 2018 (Khan et al., 2019, Khoirunisa & Indah, 2018; Müller and Schwarz, 2018). Moreover, Louati (2016) and McCaw (2016) argued that in the same campaign, Trump focused on the notion of "Islamodiversion"; in other words, the act of blaming Muslims to raise the inevitability of dire economic and political policies. Additionally, Kazi (2019) and Nuruzzaman (2017) stated that Islamophobia was one of the most prominent features of Trump's campaign in the elections of 2016. In the same way, some authors theorized that the rise of Islamophobia in France is imputable to the Front National's politics (Benveniste and Pingaud 2016), whose President happened to be Marine Le Pen.

1.6. The Rationale of the Research

In recent years, Islamophobia has become one of the most influential political concepts employed in various studies in academia. Many researchers have used the concept in classifying the roots, consequences, and the seriousness of what some have called anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim feelings and sentiments. But the fact that it is a developing concept in social sciences makes it a generic, narrow, and vague idea that changes from time to time and, of course, from author to author (Khan et al., 2019, Bleich, 2012).

Sheridan (2006) argued that until now, most of the academic research had been carried out has addressed racism, while religious discrimination has been largely ignored. In other words, there are very few educational materials available on the subject of religious intolerance, especially when it comes to that committed by government officials. And the majority of the studies that focused on Islamophobia have only been finalized with findings more generalizable, where it was supposed to be specific and concise. This study then contributes to the enrichment of the literature by providing unique research on the analysis of Trump and Le Pen's discourses on Islamophobia.

1.7. Methodology

This research has been designed as a qualitative study, in which a model discourse analysis will be used as a method. This choice aims to examine the discourses of Le Pen and Donald Trump in-depth and try to depict the reasons behind these discourses. Who speaks how and why? Who is listening or silencing? The discourse analysis starts with questions such as who writes or acts how or from uncertainties rather than assumptions. It is pragmatic in discourse analysis that focuses on details. In other words, in response to the question of what people using language do with language, the linguistic features in a discourse examine to understand what they are doing. At the same time, discourse analysis is the study of language with its simplest expression. However, this review is not a simple examination of the linguistic elements expressed; it requires going beyond the syntactic and semantic boundaries of expressions/words and examining the meaning and content that lie beyond it. In this case, I believe that discourse analysis will be more descriptive and appropriate for its purpose.

Dijk (1993, 2001, 2006) states the revised principles of discourse analysis as follows; Language users and analysts are concerned with "meaning" and focus on two specific types of questions: "what does this mean in this case?". Therefore, the quality of the

research is likely to be increased by asking such questions. At the same time, the statements of the EU commission chairman and institutions, the discourses of the Spanish and Italian prime ministers, foreign ministers, reports to the newspapers, and articles written about this discourse will be discussed.

Wodak (2009) stated that having a method that identifies its dynamic argumentative and rhetorical features is essential while analyzing political discourses. Therefore, to make a proper and suitable analysis of the address of our sample, I choose to go with a broader strategy that consists of using Tweets and other social media platform interventions to proceed to the analysis. Many discourses of Trump and Marine Le Pen on this subject have been determined by newspapers, TV programs, social media, and their statements. However, proceeding with a particular canal (although the others can still serve as complementary) is so fundamental because it contributes to our goal, which is to decode how language is used to achieve political, social, and psychological goals. That being said, we will use Twitter as the first tool of analysis and complement it with the information collected on other platforms such as TV interviews and journal posts. For the investigation, the matrix of thematic context targeted is the negative emphasis on Muslims, Islam, and Islamic countries by the two officials of our study, namely Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen.

However, Trump and Le Pen's discourses about Muslims can be ongoing for a very long period. Discourse analysis is concerned with the level and layers of address as well as the interrelationships between them. One of the standard features of the two leaders in Tambura is the manipulative speeches on Islam in their election speeches (we can put statements from their lessons in this field) reveals. Also, discourse is inevitably produced by speakers positioned in a social and historical matrix, where cultural, political, economic, social, and personal realities determine the address as one of the standard features of the two leaders in their use of populist discourse and their anti-Islamic views. Some others, like Silverman (2020), Baker (2006), Sandelowski (1995), and Waikar (2018), stated that in discourse studies, samples for the analysis are chosen accordingly to the keywords provided by the text aimed at being analyzed. They further argued that the data collection in such studies must focus on the quality of the text rather than on the quantity (in that part, we can use the same discourse said by both leaders Le Pen and Trump).

Discourse is a concept that can be explained differently based on different approaches. According to some researchers, discourse is considered as all speech and writing actions, while according to some researchers, it is considered only as applications consisting of speech network derivatives, whereas Foucault sees discourse as more general, historical and developing language applications.

Discourse analysis is a genuine social method that focuses on the intersubjective mind components that occur when individuals are conversing with others. Discourse studies; It is not a narrow language analysis based on the sentence as seen in semantic, phonology, syntax, morphology and pragmatic approaches. On the contrary, it is an approach that examines the larger parts of language use within the context of sociocultural context.

Discourse varies depending on the function in which it is used, and in this respect, the concept of variability forms the cornerstone of discourse analysis. The main emphasis in discourse analysis is what is done and achieved with language. This is clearly seen in the discourses of Trump and Marine Le Pen. Their discourses are often the beginning and test of a policy. These policies are often discriminatory and marginalizing. Discourse analysis answers questions beyond discourse. In Trump and Le Pen, this example is very important. In the thesis, we see that these questions are answered in the discourses generally made.

As a result, we can say that it is the determination of in-depth policies together with discourse analysis and showing how Islamophobia is processed at the same time. Discourse studies; It is not a narrow language analysis based on the sentence only on the basis of what is said. It can be considered as a qualitative research method that focuses on how language structures the social environment, similarly in the social environment/language users, and provides a high-level interpretation of how the meaning construction based on all these takes place, and offers a comprehensive perspective to the field of social sciences. Islamophobia and other policies actually emerge with this analysis.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. General Overview

According to Cesari, the term “Islamophobia” was first coined in an essay written in 1922 by Etienne Dinet, a French orientalist painter. He developed an interest in Arabic culture and Islam throughout his career. As cited in Ekman, Kayaouğlu stated that Islamophobia” has advanced into an accepted concept that implies hatred or animosity targeted to Islam (Ekman, 2015).

However, as we mentioned in the first chapter, the concept in its current sense came into the everyday language with its use in 1997 in the British Runnymede Trust Commission report “Islamophobia: A challenge for us all.” Runnymede Trust, a British Thinktank, expressed that the word *Islamophobia* becomes shorthand, referring to a dread of hatred of Islam or fear and dislike towards Islam through dislike and suspicion. In this report, Islamophobia was expressed as a viewpoint or worldview that includes unfounded fear and discontent toward Muslims. It is considered a social exclusion and discrimination against Muslims (The Runnymede Trust 1997, p. 2). As mentioned earlier, the history of Islam in England is mentioned in the report. Various information is presented on how Islam is pictured in the media and religious and ethnic attacks. The report is essential because it shows that Islamophobia in the Western world was an important issue that was being addressed before September 11, 2001, attacks (The Runnymede Trust 1997, p. 4; in Esposito and Kalin 2015, p. 48).

Likewise, when we look at the etymology of the word Islamophobia, we see that it is formed by combining the words 'Islam' and 'phobia,' which means fear in Greek. “Phobia,” taken solely, originates from “Phobos,” known as the god of fear and terror in Greek mythology. So, the 'Fear of Islam,' or the fear of Islam and Muslims, has turned into hostility over time and corresponds to the meaning of 'enemy of Islam.' In other words, *phobia*, which generally expresses fear, adds a sense of fear to the terms it is added to and adds a kind of grudge and hatred towards the phenomenon, object, or situation that the word describes. Likewise, as Alan (Ekman 2015:1988) quoted, Miles and Brown consider Islamophobia hostility towards Islam. It manifests itself towards Muslims and interacts with racism and hatred of Islam. For Gardell, Islamophobia is seen as a socially reproduced prejudice regarding Islam and an aversion to Muslims through actions and practices that attack, exclude, or discriminate against people based on what they are or not (Ekman, 2015: 1989).

When we look at its development in history, the word Islamophobia is a word that was created by comparing the words xenophobia (xenophobia/fear of strangers) and homophobia (fear and dislike of homosexuals).” In this regard, Horowitz and Spencer (2011) argued that the suffix contented in Islamophobia was purposely added to suggest that any fear associated with Islam is irrational. Through Islamophobia, Robert spencer (2011) stated that Islam is a natural totalitarian religion because, according to him, Islam is attempting to establish a global Islamic state aiming at imposing Islamic Law. Such a theory argues that when Islam becomes a state’s religion, violations of Islamic doctrine and heretical thought will inevitably be seen as crimes against the state (2011:6). Such an attitude will result in the violent persecution of Christian and believers of other categories such as infidels and non-Muslims and, therefore, denial of their fundamental rights. Yet it is not a secret that the opposite effect has led “Islamophobia” to become a common phenomenon in the Western world.

A study conducted by a multi-religious and multi-ethnic commission of 18 people analysed the problems faced by Muslims in England. At the end of the research, the difficulties faced by Muslims are categorized under four headings. The first of these is “exclusion.” Muslims are excluded from government, administration, business, administration, and responsibility. The second is "violence." Violence is divided into physical violence, destruction of property, and verbal abuse. The third is "prejudice." According to the report, prejudice emerges in the media and everyday speech. In the last category, “Distinguishing” appears. Muslims are distinguished in employment practices, education provision, and health care. Therefore, when we think about it in terms of concepts, we can say that Islamophobia is a concept that is conceptualized on the one hand that it is constantly misunderstood and feared. This will be better understood when we include the dimension of various thinkers and researchers.

According to Edward Said, “... Whenever Islam is at stake, Europe's fear, if not respect, is awakened.” (Said, 1991:102). It would not be wrong to say that the foundations of this fear mentioned by Said were laid in Andalusia. Spread first in the Arab world and North Africa, Islam spread in the Eastern countries such as China, India, and Indonesia in the following centuries. The foundations of the fear of Islam in Europe were laid when the religion of Islam, which gathered supporters at a dizzying speed, was transferred to Western Europe during the Umayyad Period.

According to Aliboni (2006:2), "Islamophobia, which is defined as the expression of fear and hostility to Islam, is a part of a broad-spectrum expression of the inability of a

country's citizens to tolerate citizens coming from abroad." Also, Charles Tilly examines this type of action, which he calls collective action, under three main headings: defense, attack, and preparation (in Kaya 2021). Discussed in this way, it acts on the existential foundations of the other party in this regard. And effectively, the society, which we will call a minority when using this path, actually establishes these three phenomena on existential foundations. This example is included in Ali Shariati's book titled 'The four Dungeons of Man' as follows; Man wants to prove himself within the existential framework (p. 65-70). Tilly, as cited in Kaya (2021:207), on the other hand, classifies radical food riots, tax riots, field occupations, and conscripted resistance in contemporary Europe as defensive forms of mobilization. At this point, Islam remained as a minority in Europe and other Christian societies. Being a minority has developed the need to prove themselves at this point and to act because they can be felt.

2.2. The Terms of the Islamophobic Debate in France

Conceived as the first French academic book on the subject, *La nouvelle islamophobie*, is a book written by Vincent Geisser. He primarily emphasizes that to understand Islamophobia in France, one needs to consider the National context. For example, he claims that Islamophobia in France expresses the rise of a phenomenon built around a "historical dispute" at the same time that it is unfolding as a new form of rejection of immigrants when Islam has become a Franco-French reality. The author sees Islamophobia as not a simple transposition of Anti-Arab, anti-Maghreb, and anti-suburban youth racism. He supports his claims by qualifying this as a kind of "religiophobia," which can be combined with some more traditional form of xenophobia that unfolds autonomously (Vincent, 2003: 10-11).

Such a debate makes anti-Muslim speeches in France not considered as part of hatred of religions distinct from anti-Arab addresses. Yet, although such an attitude is not considered as a form of racism, it is legitimized and even claimed in the name of the freedom to criticize religions. All this is happening in a context where for over a century, France undertook the concept of *laïcité*, a policy that aims at promoting a secularist socio-economic structure. In regards to the recent development, Marwan Muhammad reports in a journal in 2020 that "the French government is applying some arbitrary measures and infringing on fundamental freedoms..." before writing that the current situation has evolved into a position where we assist in the development of a *neo-laïcité*, used to

describe the discrimination observed against minorities, especially Muslims who are seen sometimes confronted for practicing their religions and cultural traditions, including the growing of beards, the fasting in the month of Ramadan and the wearing of Hijab in public². The author emphasizes a previous study by the Observatory for Defence of Rights, according to which “young Arab and Black men are 20 times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police, three times more likely to be insulted verbally, and 2.5 times more likely to be physically attacked.”³ A parallel study shows as well that “Muslims face physical assault twice as often as their fellow citizens”. While affirming that such acts of violence perpetuate the way toward the continuation of the racist and Islamophobic rhetoric normalized by the French government through its treatment of its Muslim citizens, Marwan argues that the French government’s relationship with its Muslim citizens is a further reflection of Islamophobic rhetoric which plagues French society and the world⁴. Such a statement confirms that France’s political elites have built with time an assumption according to which their electoral subjects only vote for them based on the position on Islam in France. For example, in pre-electoral campaigns in which Eric Zemmour declared his candidacy for the presidential election, the latter made some statements that raised concerns about the place that he reserves for Muslims. Analysts concluded that anti-Islam propaganda had been the core of Zemmour’s campaign based on its numerous debates on TV and other media. Since a court reprimanded him last week for racist and Islamophobic comments he made in September 2020, most of his words to Maariv imply that the far-right political candidate is subtly toning his typically harsh views on immigrants and Muslims. While he was working as a political pundit at the French television channel CNews in September 2020, Zemmour criticized unaccompanied migrant children with some statements in which we could see that he labeled them "thieves," "murderers," and "rapists." Taha Kılınç, writer for the Turkish media *Yeni Safak*, argued that Zemmour built his journalistic career on his hostility towards Muslims’ presence in France⁵. He stated that even if Islamophobia and the anti-Muslim sentiment only influenced his career to a small extent, Zemmour was an opportunist who took advantage of the xenophobic tendencies of the French society.

² Marwan Muhammad’s in the journal *Middle East Eye*, April 2021, cited in Farida Mohamed 2021.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Marwan Muhammad, (April 2021). *The rise of Islamophobia in France*, Project Censored.

⁵ Will Eric Zemmour's Islamophobia win him the French presidency? 2 January 2022, *Yeni Safak*.

In his book, Vincent analyses what he considers to be the “arguments of detractors” of Islamophobia according to whom freedom of expression and blasphemy are threatened. Suppose the concept of religiophobia seems according to so many ambiguous due to the fact that it does not take into consideration the specific character of the rejection of the Muslim religion in particular. In that case, the question of the faiths is mingled with that of secularism; it seems to become more and more central inside the public debate in France. By affirming that “Our secularized societies are haunted by religion,” the specialist of Islam, Olivier Roy, affirms that laicity in France does not just imply the separation of the church and State (Roy, 2005). Another analyst, Jean Baubérot, a historian who specialized in secularism, devoted several books to this question by denouncing that in the current situation of the Muslim question, there is an erroneous and restrictive interpretation of a misguided interpretation of an historical secularism (Jean, 2012). Some discourses on gender equality overlap with debates on secularism and, therefore, mask what Alan Geisser(2010:43-44) sees as a form of Islamophobia. This French specificity embodied in the discussions on the interdiction of the veil in public schools has caught the interest of some essential anglophone researchers like Asad (2006), Bowen (2010), Scott (2007), etc., who proposed some interesting analyses explicitly focused on the French conception of secularism.

The main interest in Geisser’s work lies in the fact that he proposed an analysis of the construction of discourse and the legitimization of the different arguments that have participated in the development of Islamophobia in the public space. He suggests a definition that combines some aspects present in the English literature while introducing specifically French dimensions such as the question of secularism. However, it is essential to notice that the question of discrimination is not addressed, and his definition of Islamophobia failed to mobilize the sociology of racism.

Another more generalized perspective on defining Islamophobia is considered a new form of aerophobia. This concept takes on an exciting heuristic dimension and refers to more general research on *otherness*. A special in the history of radicalism nationalists, Lebourg analyzes different forms of rejection in Europe that have the same approach based on processes of exclusion and the separation of the other from a constituted whole (like the nation). The author demonstrates that nationalists have been able to reinvent aerophobia throughout history by reinventing themselves constantly. He considers that Islamophobia is the latest of “alterophobic pejorations” (Lebourg, 2011).

Further going on, he analyses the shift between the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the nationalist far-right and arguments denouncing the Islamization of Europe. As the denominational dimension has only appeared in the years 1990-2000, those in the foremost of this identity rhetoric are immigrants (Lebourg 2011:48-49). Some other research, namely by Alan Gay (2011) and Lebourg (2011), argued that during the general strikes of the early 1980s in France, political elites and the media relayed the idea that the striking citizens who had immigrant roots were Islamists funded by Iran. Later on, they stated that several events generated a social demand for products legitimizing Islamophobia (Lebourg, 2011:50). Such an analysis follows some early studies on the question of Islamophobia as the new form of racism promoted by the European far-right, whose ideas have spread more widely. The secular left, which once defended immigrants' rights, is indignant today that their children display a Muslim identity and, as Roy (2005:8-11) put it, "sometimes sticks, despite itself to positions which were those of the National Front." Edited by Eric and Didier Fassin, the collective work on the kingship and racial question in France describe the religious difference as a hardened relationship to otherness: "the most evident and in many ways, the most astonishing expression by the publicity in regard of the legitimacy given to it in the public space is Islamophobia which is not just the rejection of religious fundamentalism, but which often mixes explicit forms of exclusion of the racialized other." (Fassin, 2006: 32). The work of these authors seems to demonstrate that otherness is at the heart of the discourses falling under a set of rhetorical, institutional, discriminatory, etc., processes. Vincent (2003:10) stated that all these processes consider "Muslim as an irreducible identity marker between "Us and "Them."

Nevertheless, contrary to the analyses mentioned above, intellectuals such as the renowned researcher in the field of Racism, Pierre-André Taguieff, who left the camp of the left, categorically reject the concept of Islamophobia. According to this research, Islamophobia is an "intellectual terrorism" as any criticism of Islamic fundamentalism is immediately pointed out and condoned as a manifestation of Islamophobia (Taguieff, 2002:127). He develops a concept of Islamo-leftism in *La nouvelle judéophobie* published in 2002, to which Vincent Geisser responded with *La nouvelle islamophobie* in 2003. It was in the following year that Thomas Deltombe introduced his Book *L'islam imaginaire: La construction médiatique de l'islamophobie en France, 1975-2005*, from the same publisher.

The more recent essays, particularly that of Edwy Plenel, *Pour les Musulmans (la Découverte, 2013)* and Claude Askolovitch, *Nos mal-aimés, ces musulmans dont la France ne veut pas (Grasset, 2013)* addressed the question with a counter-offensive. For example, the latter, while ending his book, states in the last chapter that:

“Whether on the left or on the right, what France has built for twenty-five years through laws and denials scandals, nostalgic lies, is the idea of Muslim otherness, irreducible to reason and irreducible to the Republic; the proclamation of an endangered identity, national or republican to preserve it...”

From the side of progressist catholyte came the same response:

“At a time that Arab revolutions bear witness to a thirst for democracy on the part of Muslims, the fear of Islam plagues the atmosphere in France... Didn’t Sarkozy request a debate on Islam's place in the Republic? He thus takes up one of the favorite themes of the National Front.”⁶

For Jean Baubérot, a specialist in the sociology of religions and secularism:

“From everywhere, we are witnessing the proliferation of primary indignations, of stereotypical remarks which want to take on obvious value by their repetition a thousand times through means of mass communication (...). The West is the *free world* adorned with all the virtues in the face of a monolithic and demonized Islam.”⁷ Follows in the same article a parallel between antisemitism during the Dreyfus affair and the rise of Islamophobia at the beginning of the 21st century: “Such stereotypes are permanent: only scapegoats minorities change...the fight against intolerance does not exempt from the fight against hateful stupidity....”

2.3. The Rise of Islamophobia in the US

For all the apparent reasons, America has always been considered among the world's most prominent international politics and foreign affairs actors. However, its military intervention in the fight in Iran and Afghanistan has been paid for by its loss of international reputation. When the BBC conducted a poll in 2007, the result revealed that America was ranked fourth on the list of the most unpopular countries globally. And in a

⁶ *Revue Goliath*, n. 137, march 2011.

⁷ *Le Monde*, 6 October 2006.

context that it has been getting involved in as many countries as it was yesterday, there won't be any doubt that its worldviews continue to worsen. But what does explain such public opinion of great America? The United States has always shown itself as the pioneer of freedom, the beacon of human rights, and the leading State regarding the righteousness and humanity in the world's fight against al-Qaida. Nevertheless, this pictured freedom and human rights long proclaimed and promoted by America have been falling apart since the events of the 9 September. The general picture of the dreamed America is suffering under the weight of its political foreign policies, which were reportedly enforced as the result of September 11. Yet, far from being some rightful law, it has also contributed to the worsening public perception of Arabs. Such circumstances have led to some critical questions in academia, such as where America's fear and hatred toward Islam come from?

After the attacks of the 9 September, America faced an unprecedented trend toward Islamophobia due to the increase of intolerance toward the Muslim and Arab world. Figures show that in the months that preceded the attacks, hate crimes against Muslims and American citizens judged to be Arab increased to 40 times before the attacks. For example, the discrimination against Muslims observed in public places and workplaces quadrupled just in the year after September 11. Together with the media representations, the famous USA PATRIOT ACT⁸, which legalized interventions with the civil law of perceived Arabs and Arab-Americans, has just contributed to fuelling Arab's perception as a *terrorist*. With time, Arab-Americans and Muslim American citizens have been associated with issues linked with terrorism and national security, behind the assumption that "Islam constitutes a threat to American security, to American National interest, and its way of life" (Saghaye-Biria, 2012). Such a discourse manifested when the perpetuation of the idea that Americans must be protected from the potential threat of terrorism both abroad and within the country. As the American Muslim citizens are being pointed out as a potential threat the US security, they inevitably experience scrutiny even from the law as well as racial treatment. As Maira put it, "After the terrorist attacks, widespread feeling was that 'somebody had to pay domestically and internationally to restore the national security for Americans (...). For this, immigrants and Arabs Americans' civil rights have been considered as expendable..." (Maira, 2004:221). This has led to a situation where

⁸ The full text of the USA PATRIOT ACT can be accessed here.

some studies show that Muslim Americans found themselves being faced with scrutiny because they are often labeled as “unAmerican” (Selod, 2015:77).

Such treatment had a consequence on Muslim citizens' behaviours as they found it necessary to change or modify their social behaviours and, in some cases, to vary how they display their Muslim identity in public (O'Connor and Jahan, 2014). These treatments continued and even became more common after the post-September 11 era, where radical Islamic terrorism hasn't left the mainstream media's agenda. This has led the public opinion to link every terrorist attack post September 11 to Muslims and Islam (Powell, 2011). So, we see here the perpetration of Islamophobic rhetoric by US media that promotes stereotypes or embrace hostile generalizations about Muslims and Islam (Barkdull et al., 2011). As hostilities increased in the cultural environment and the prevalence of discriminatory policy, Islam has become synonymous with terrorism, patriarchy, misogyny, and anti-American sentiment” (Selod, 2015:77).

An ideological shift such as this, in the sense that it is conferred on the American identity and its inevitable clash with Muslim identities, had some acute effects on the daily experience of Muslim citizens as they've been radicalized. Such a reality was already confirmed by some previous studies, namely that of Johnson and Frombgen (2009), according to which America is a nation that has always been built on ethnicity and race. The authors emphasized the widespread discrimination and radicalization experienced by Arabs and Muslims in the post-September 11 as “reproducing political contestation over race in a new and combustible way” (John and 650. In the same perspective, Shklar (1991: 3) researched the struggle for citizenship in America and stated that “it has been overwhelmingly a demand for inclusion in the policy rather than an aspiration to civic participation as a deeply involving activity.”

Hajnal and Rivera (2014) studied the link between Islamophobia against American Muslims and discrimination. They found that the widespread representations of Islamophobia in the United States had some consequences, including racial profiling and targeting of Latinos in the country. Most of the authors who study the question in this perspective referred to the role of Brown Threat. A new dimension of ethnic and racial profiling was added to the concept of Islamophobia after 11 September 2001. In this dimension, non-white and non-black bodies are both considered a potential threat to America (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014).

In the reluctant fundamentalist, the author Mohsin Hamid addresses the repercussions of racial discrimination in America and dismantles the existing biases of the Western communities in Religions like Muslims. Such an approach helps to clear stereotypes toward Islam and the Muslim world in general. Nevertheless, it works after being seen as ambiguous and labelled as anti-American. The author's narration is built from his will to connect the developing human characters with symbolism. In his scenario, he confronts two characters, the principal being Changez, through which the story is addressed in the form of dramatic monologue toward the second character, referred to as "the American," reputed to be a silent listener. In adopting such a narrative approach, the author reached a double achievement, the first being that he makes America hear the other side of the story and the second being that the author makes the reader perceive the story from the perspective of the American. In that way, the author places the reader in a position where the latter is forced to decide by themselves on who makes the story. In other words, the reader is expected to determine whether the American is harmless or an undercover agent and whether the principal author, Changez, is a fundamentalist terrorist or just an average person.

ISLAMOPHOBIA HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1. Introduction

As a constant and unchanging phenomenon from past to present, Islamophobia (Sardar, 1995, p. 14) refers to the re-emergence of historical Islam and anti-Muslim opposition¹. Accordingly, that perception, Islam, and anti-Muslims take a deep place in the memory of European societies. The perception of Islamophobia continues linearly from as early as the 7th century, when the parties first interacted, to the present day. Likewise, as a new and contemporary phenomenon independent of history, Islamophobia is seen as a recent phenomenon with no connection with the past, based on the September 11 Incidents.

Having historical roots but adapting to current contexts, Islamophobia as a modern-day phenomenon two whose origins, as stated by Geaves et al., (2004, pp. 115–129; Haddad, 2004), lie in history but which does not come from the past to the present unchanged, in a fixed manner; It is seen as a phenomenon of modern times that adapts to different contexts. Accordingly, different understandings of Islamophobia emerge in various experiments. CBMI also accepts this interpretation and defines Islamophobia as a new concept used for a recent phenomenon without ignoring its historicity.

There are several existentially essential ingredients in the original story of Islamophobia. Xenophobia is one of these issues. Xenophobia is derived from the Greek Xenos/foreigner and Phobos/fear, which means 'fear of strangers.' Since fear brings hostility over time, xenophobia has been replaced by the concept of xenophobia. Although terminologically, the word Islamophobia seems new, it has stood out since the first period of Islam.

3.2. Europe and the Origin of Islamophobia (The Crusades)

3.2.1. Background

From the very first moment when the Prophet Muhammad (SAV) spread Islam, concerns about the disappearance of the religion of their ancestors by the Meccan polytheists, the prevention of their sovereignty, and the loss of their voices are based on the same basis. Later, the spread and acceptance of Islam alarmed Christianity, and it was staged as an untrue and perhaps familiar false fear for the advancement of Christianity.

According to Sheridan, the first known printed use of the term Islamophobia was in the February 1991 issue of the "Runnymede Trust," a periodical published in the USA. It has been in the "Oxford English Dictionary" since 1997. This term is functionally similar to "Xenophobia," which refers to xenophobia. It offers a convenient shorthand tool to refer to Islam's fear, horror, and hatred. In addition, EUMC explains that in the definition made by The Runnymede Trust in its 2006 report after the September 11 attacks, the concept of Islamophobia is based on the following criteria (*Bernard, 2017:18*):

1. The religion of Islam as a whole block is closed to change and does not progress.
2. The religion of Islam is "different" and "different." It has nothing in common with other cultures.
3. The religion of Islam has lagged compared to Europe and is barbaric, irrational, sexist, and primitive.
4. The religion of Islam is aggressive, violent, threatening, prone to terrorism, and inciting the clash of civilizations.
5. The religion of Islam is an ideology used for political or military benefit.
6. Criticisms about Europe made by Muslims are immediately rejected.
6. Islamophobia is used to justify discrimination against Muslims and their exclusion from society.
7. Hostility towards Muslims is shown as normal and natural.

From the report mentioned above, it can be seen that there is historically constant xenophobia. The biggest reason they are seen as different and different is that there are severe problems against the religion of Islam, especially in the eyes of people. On the other hand, Europe is one of the countries that profoundly experience this. The shifting power relations model, the clash of civilizations model, the political Islam model, and the oversimplified information model. Chris Allen discusses the changing power relations model from these. In the encounters between the West (in the period mentioned above, when the West was referred to primarily in European geography) and Islam, there are different power relations and perceptions towards each other fed from them.

Although there are no definite borders between the mentioned periods, it is seen that the first encounters in bilateral relations are generally evaluated under the hegemony of the Muslim world. This period, dominated by Islam, started in 622 and 1492; in addition to specific events focused on Islam-Westernism, developments such as the Enlightenment,

Renaissance, and Reformation in Europe from the 15th century shaped the perceptions of religion in general and Islam and Muslims in particular. It is known that, especially since the 15th century, within the scope of the Reform Movement, the Catholic Church began to lose its influence on Europe, and this situation led to developments in Islam in Europe. In this direction, Europeans began to re-evaluate Islam from a secular point of view in the post-Reform period.

The fact that the Ottoman Empire remained the dominant power in Europe for many years caused the fear and hostility of Turks and Muslims to settle in the subconscious of the Europeans. With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the colonialist European States occupied some Muslim lands with their revanchist mentality and put into practice the persecution and assimilation that the Ottomans did not make of the Christian people in Europe. When they had to leave the Muslim lands, they put rulers close to their mentality, causing the Muslim society to be ruled anti-democratic for many years (Karsli, 2013, p. 82).

3.2.2. Causes of the Crusades

3.2.2.1. Religious Reasons

Some Christians, who were very close to their religion, believed that the places considered holy had to be taken due to the instigation of the Kuluni Sect. Members of the sect, God and Hz. They began to say that Jesus wanted this too. In addition, according to the Christian belief, Hz. Anyone who dies for Jesus' sake would go straight to heaven, just as he would be saved from his sins. The constant complaints of those who had previously visited the holy places and returned to their countries from Muslims fuelled the idea of taking Jerusalem back from the Muslims.

3.2.2.2. Economic Reasons

The Turkish and other Muslim states, which had the silk and spice routes, which were the trade routes, became very rich in this way. However, Europe was in poverty; the peasants were hungry, the people were poor, and many of the nobles were unemployed. Seeing the abundance of goods they needed, the wealth of Islamic countries, and the welfare of their people, they exaggerated their country. Hearing these, the European people began to look for ways to seize these places. When the lord's and knights' desires for adventure were added to these, it became inevitable to organize expeditions.

The crusades, also known as the war of civilizations, caused Muslims to view the crusaders as "barbarians." At this point, it will be very well understood in the historical processes that there is a severe contrast between the two communities.

3.2.3. The Post Runnymede Trust Developments of Islamophobia

Geographical and identity wholes have an essential effect on forming the perception of Islamophobia. It is seen that the dichotomy of the West (mainly Europe) and Islam comes to the fore, especially in Islamophobia. One of them refers to the geographical area and the other to a religious belief. For this reason, the tendency to compare religion, i.e., Islam, with a geographical region (the West) is sometimes wrong (Hippler & Lueg, 1995, quoted in Shahid and Koningsveld, P170-179). But both concepts are much more than a geographical and religious whole. In this context, it is observed that Lewis argues that Europe/West and Islam are the products of efforts to define their civilizations and can be accepted as equivalents of each other (Lewis, Bernard: 2017:18). In the definition of the West, it is seen that Europe points to a cultural and political entity.

Although it is thought to have had a divisive effect on the formation of Europe due to the Catholic-Protestant wars, religion emerged as a unifying factor, especially outside its geography. For example, in the Crusades or the defence of the Habsburg Empire against the Turks in the late 1600s, it is seen that the Europeans always acted within the framework of joint action against Muslims as an external threat. If we need to talk about the Crusades, it is clear that the subject will be better understood.

After the 1071 Malazgirt victory, the Seljuk Turks entered Anatolia, and in 1075 they captured Iznik and tried to make it the center of the state. The entry of Turks into Anatolia disturbed all European states, especially Byzantium. This was because Byzantium was in danger of invasion, which meant that the Turks would make raids on Europe, thus paving the way. During the Crusades, the idea of seizing Jerusalem, which was in the hands of the Fatimids, on the one hand, and expelling the Muslims from the Middle East, was dominant in the minds of the European states.

When we looked at Europe in the 11th century, problems such as hunger, misery, epidemic diseases, and increasing population rate have emerged due to severe drought. On the other hand, people who are tired of the looting of their cities have been worried about the safety of life and property. This has been a significant factor in people's great

interest in the Crusades with their dreams of attaining the riches of the east. At the same time, there was a considerable chaotic period in Europe where feudal families were fighting each other, and the knights were terrorizing. This gave rise to the idea that the primary target for the counts and dukes participating in the Crusades was financial gain and possession of new lands. These conditions were enough reasons for him to make the East a paradise in the eyes of the West and to see the East as a treasure.

The Crusades were born with the beginning of the 'Reconquista (Reconquest)' movement, which started to expel the Muslims from Spain and Portugal. Muslims in this period established dominance in Spain and Sicily. This movement was created to take the cities into the hands of the Muslims, who became the common enemies of the Christians and the Kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula and lasted from the 9th century to the end of the 15th century. Due to the Turks' attacks on the Byzantine Empire, Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Commons, known for his political success, asked the Pope for help against the Turks. The Pope did not refuse the Byzantine emperor's request for help. But the Pope aimed to seize the eastern lands and Jerusalem rather than helping Byzantium. The Pope wanted to keep the "heretic (deviated from religion)" Eastern Christians under control and to get rid of the crisis in Europe.

In the Council of Clermont convened in 1095, the Pope invited the Christians to the Holy War (Spirit of the Crusades) to seize Jerusalem and the Eastern lands, mainly to save the "Holy Lands" from the hands of the Muslims. The Pope made many earthly and otherworldly promises to those who would join the war. At that time, it was a point to be noted that the church was not only a religious institution but also wanted to be the ruler of extensive lands and political authority to persuade the people to join the Crusades.

The historical roots of the phenomenon of Islamophobia, which is produced as a language of conflict, go back to the Crusades and the contact with Christians during the first spread of Islam. The perception of Islam among the early Eastern and Western Christians is the prototype of the Islamic perception that is still dominant today but which was secularized in the 19th and 20th centuries. The themes of Islam and Muslims being closed to change, incompatible with western values, irrational and gender discrimination, the lack of rationality of the Muslim mind, and the themes of Islam glorifying violence by its essence date back to the early periods of Islam. However, it is incorrect to claim that Islam's static and negative perception and image are always dominant in Western and Christian

worldviews. There have been long periods when there were positive and opposing views. Therefore, the claim that "the inevitable form of relationship between Muslims and others is in conflict" is unrealistic. Moreover, it is clear that historical data do not support this claim and that this is the claim of Islamophobic circles.

3.3. Colonialism, Orientalism, and Islamophobia

3.3.1. Colonialism

Colonialism is not fundamentally Islam-oriented, but Europe began to expand imperially over Muslim countries during this period. The Islamic world dominated a large part of the world for about 400 years. This situation also affected the shaping of the Western perception of Muslim societies in modern times; In the resistance against European colonialism and imperialism, he took refuge in Islam as an upper identity and led to the emergence of Islamic awakening movements.

For colonialism and Orientalist studies intertwined in the colonial period, Bierman (1979, p. 36) states that what he calls modern Orientalism began in 1870 and that it was the period in which colonialism spread most in the Orient⁶ In this period, the West, Muslims, and Islam He treated it as his antithesis. While colonizing the lands corresponding to the Orient, inhabited mainly by Muslims, he expressed the legitimate justification of his actions by understanding that Islam and Muslims, which are seen as the "Other," should be civilized and enlightened Zebiri (2014, pp. 170–177). In the Middle Ages, Islam was the other of European civilization for religious and theological reasons; Towards the modern period, when colonialism came to the fore, it was seen that the same "Other" perception continued through secular arguments. Since this period, it has been witnessed that both the West and both sides perceive each other as the "Other."

3.3.2. Orientalism

Dinet and Ibrahim (1930) briefly summarize the relationship between Orientalism and Islamophobia in their 1930 work, "Le pèlerinage à la Maison sacrée d'Allah." In the study in question, the authors mentioned two types of Islamophobia, pseudo-scientific and spiritual Islamophobia. While Islamophobia is seen as related to some Evangelical missionaries who are trying to convert Muslims to Christianity; the so-called scientific Islamophobia, on the other hand, was expressed as "the work of some Orientalists" as

addressed by authors such as Hafez (2010); Reid (1994); Smith (2011) without providing any examples, and Islamophobia was directly identified with Orientalism.

In his work "Orientalism," Alan (1979) Edward Said analyses the role of the non-Western other in the formation process of modern Western identity and how the contemporary self-constructs the different by othering. According to Said, European culture in the post-Enlightenment period established its power and identity by positioning it against the identity it defines and characterizes as the "East." In this context, Orientalism can be defined as "the process of the West establishing its hegemony over the world by establishing the East at the discursive level and producing an anti-Western traditional identity, and thus the marginalization of the different" bibliography, according to E. Fuat (2002:21).

Post-Renaissance scientific developments in Western Europe played an essential role in developing Orientalism. In this period, it was seen that most of the Orientalists were generally philologists. The concept in the past, "Visiting the Middle East and North Africa," has been used to express a kind of science related to Western European painter groups who depict what they see or imagine in a more romantic and extravagant, sometimes pornographic way. Today, the meaning of Orientalism has become ambiguous, and in some cases, it has begun to gain a new sense with insulting content.

The Orient, which is the "Other" for Europe, has been represented by different communities from time to time. Although different groups such as Jews, Ottomans, immigrants, minorities, and Asians are generally constructed as the "Other" of Europe, for about a thousand years, when the word "Orient" was mentioned, it was seen that Arabs and Islam were meant.

3.3.3. September 11 Attack and Impact on Islamophobia

After the attack on the twin towers in the USA on September 11, 2001, Islam became a priority topic in the media, meetings, and broadcasts worldwide. In this context, conflicts and conflicts between religions, cultures, and civilizations began to be mentioned and work started to be produced in this direction. In such a period when the discourse of conflict and polarization intensified rather than interaction and dialogue between civilizations and cultures, one of the most frequently and widely used words were "Islamophobia." Although the word Islamophobia has become more heard and

pronounced after the September 11 attack, it is possible to trace its recent past back to the early 1990s and its distant past to the birth of the Orientalist approach because the first thing that this concept brings to mind is the East-West dichotomy or dichotomy.

The enemy's place, which disappeared in international politics after the cold war, was filled with the September 11 attack. The discourse that will make Islam an object of fear came with the September 11 terrorist attacks. The differences in the Islamic world have been turned into a security problem by the marginalization of Muslims and placing them in the position of enemies through images and images through the media. While the media's capacity to reproduce the inter-communal boundaries of identities reinforces the offered essentialist identities, it has the power to otherize different hostile identities. The "war-oriented international relations" produced by the USA after September 11 are dangerously reproduced globally. The function of the media is to create a political attitude; Fox News Television's reporting of the establishment of a multi-purpose Islamic center in Manhattan as a discussion of 'planting a mosque in place of the Twin Towers' and reporting it in a news format related to the September 11 attacks was enough to mobilize the American society against mosques (Tuncay & Erdag, 2015: 379-404 cited in Köstem, 2015 and Gözen, 2019). In this context, the post-Cold War era led to the globalization of political Islam by defining itself against the West. On the other hand, the West began to perceive Islam as a security problem and began to see it as an "other" that needed to be changed and harmonized with modernization with September 11 (Dönmez, 2004, pp. 81–114; Aktaş, 2014, p. 47).

The most crucial trauma for fear and opposition to Islam is the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in New York. Immediately after the attack, US President George Bush made the following statement: "The crusade against terrorism... This is a time when every nation must decide on every region of the world. They are either with the terrorists or with us." But terrorism was identified with Islam. Anti-Islamism had been seen as a threat and a problem until then, and with this event, fear and insecurity prevailed worldwide. Distrust and fear have begun against minorities, Muslims, Turks, and foreigners in many countries, especially in America and Europe. Anti-Islam/hostility, which has deep roots, has become more and more acute with the rapidly increasing terror and attacks since September 11th.

According to Iqbal, Islamophobia is a form of religious intolerance. Various manifestations of this can be found in the observed wars, conflicts, and genocides. The rapid spread of Islam in a short period also played a role in its perception as a danger and threat to other religions as a religion. Recently, xenophobic people have started to stay away from their Muslim neighbours. They had peaceful relations until yesterday, limiting their connections and interactions with them, and they have begun to display an Islamophobic attitude and behaviour. The integration problems of Muslim immigrants also played a role in the emergence of a modern, secular anti-Islamic discourse and practice toward Muslims in the public sphere. However, as Gardner et al. (2008, p. 120) supported, this situation reached a severe level of discrimination and racism after September 11, 2001. When the most significant wars and terrorist incidents in history are examined, The Crusades exemplify the political use of religion and racial sentiment in the Second World War. Recent history will show that the twin tower terror tragedy of September 11, 2001, is an example of the war of cultures and civilizations for political gain (Nevzat Tarhan, 2014:125-128).

With symbolic identity politics and the damage done by the Klu Klux-Klan type lynching in Abu Ghraib to the mission of bringing democracy to the USA, it is discussed and questioned what it is trying to do with its national identity. A striking example of symbolic identity politics in the United States shortly after the event was the fact that US President George W. Bush appeared in front of the media in a military uniform to give the impression that they were in the war when there was no counter-action and a reality that would legitimize violence through the image. In this process, how a political identity, belief, tradition, or culture is perceived as a threat through postmodern representations of domestication and marginalization is determined by ontological assumptions, central and legitimate, and outside and hostile.

The relations of terrorist organizations, which became globalized after September 11 and after, with global actors can be evaluated. Many examples can be given of states' use of terror as a tool: Native American genocide in America, massacres of Stalin and Hitler, Aboriginal massacre of Australia, 1992 Khojaly massacre of Armenians, Bosnia-Srebrenica massacre, Israel's massacre of Palestinian people in 1947, city by city siege and destruction, the US invasion and massacres in Iraq, and the massacres committed by the Syrian state against its people. The break-in on September 11 and Islamophobia brought new developments that did not exist before. First of all, it is an effort to put the

secular thought and understanding of secularism, which has become dominant around the world, into a confrontation with religion and push religion into the background. Second, the changing political balances globally have changed their perspectives on ideologies and Islam. Third, the shock caused by the shift of economic and financial power centers from the West to other places and especially to the East has been effective. Finally, the concentration of energy and wealth resources in Islamic lands has created tremendous resentment and jealousy.

It is used against Muslims. After September 11, many films were made to establish an identity between Islam and terror and Islam and violence. Terrorist organizations and drug gangs fought in American TV series were generally composed of Muslims. A Muslim was cast as the villain in the movies. For example, in the film mentioned above, "Uçuş 93", terrorists who hijacked the plane have constantly recited the Qur'an, the Word of Martyrdom is brought, or prayers are made. The camera angles and the tone of the music are so adjusted that the message is intended to convey to the audience that anyone who reads the Qur'an is such a "wild and cruel" person. The fact that the holy book, which is the primary source of Islam, is presented to the audience by being imprisoned in a specific framework over the terrorists who went to carry out the September 11 attack shows that the main issue is not the fight against terrorism. Still, the image of Islam is directly targeted. The repetition of this approach in all films on the same subject points out how the Islamic world faces dangerous fiction and challenges.

As a result, with the information war led by the USA after September 11, there has been an intense increase in defamation, insult, discrimination, and hate crimes against Muslims. One of the most lasting consequences of such broadcasts, which the mainstream media in the West do not refrain from raising a dish, is the normalization of targeting Islam and attacking Muslims in the middle of the street. This type of behaviour, which was mainly considered abnormal before September 11, continued to fill its sails with marginalization and xenophobia after the US wind took its back and gradually replaced the strange with the normal. There are similar data encoded by the media siege behind the spread of Islamophobia from country to country like an epidemic.

After the September 11 attacks, the heaviest bill was born by citizens living in the USA and carrying a Muslim identity who entered and exited the USA. After the attack, the address of the first attack by the USA on the intelligence of Osama Bin Laden, the leader

of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, is hiding in Afghanistan, was Afghanistan. In the post-September 11 period, US President George W. Bush revealed the stance of the American administration and insistently underlined that the struggle to be waged was not just about defence and that the American nation would fight against the countries that support terrorism. Less than a month after the September 11 attacks, the war launched against the Taliban administration in Afghanistan confirmed the determination of the Bush administration. Against the Taliban Afghanistan, a country excluded from the international community, the US administration had succeeded in convincing the United Nations Security Council and its NATO allies. Likewise, close relations between al-Qaeda and the Taliban were evident, and the Taliban administration confirmed that Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan. The clear connection between al-Qaeda and the Taliban government, the international public's understanding of the dramatic suffering of September 11, and its allergy to the Afghan regime legitimized the US war against Afghanistan on 7 October.

On November 12, Kabul fell, and a new era began in Afghanistan. However, it soon became clear that the success of the invasion of Afghanistan further encouraged rather than calmed the Bush administration. The focus of the war on terror has ceased to be Afghanistan, and it has been frequently emphasized that a global war is ongoing. The dominant discourse that emerged after the September 11 attacks saw the roots of the Islamic terrorism threat faced by the United States in the Middle East.

The USA could not solve the problems it planned to solve in the post-Cold War Middle East and went through a sweeping policy change after the September 11 terrorist attacks. As mentioned before, the Middle East region has been the region most affected by September 11. The containment policy of the 90s left its place to the doctrine of preventive war, especially the countries and their regimes that George W. Bush defined as the "axis of evil" faced the direct threat of the USA (Özpek, 2012). While Iran and Syria were living with the anxiety of this threat, Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq personally experienced this reality. This policy change also shows that the USA is redefining its aims in the Middle East policy (Altunışık, 2009).

In summary, the causes of anti-US radicalism continued to strengthen in the post-September 11 period. While the Israeli-Palestinian problem, which is one of the factors supporting this radicalism, was dragged into a deadlock with the coming to power of an

actor like Hamas, the American military presence in the Middle East increased thanks to the invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration's war on terrorism has also put the responsibility for Israel's actions on the United States. The democratization strategy has brought radical groups to an active point in political systems unexpectedly. The Middle East policy adopted by Washington after September 11 could not prevent the rise of radicalism and even produced new equations that feed radicalism.

DISCOURSE OF MARINE LE PEN ABOUT ISLAMOPHOBIA

4.1. Islam and the Extremist Nebula

Under at most minuscule two prisms, and sometimes at the cost of cleverly maintained confusion, the theme of Islam seems to appear today as temporary unifying in the eyes of a part of the public opinion and the far-right militant world. The first of these prisms is that of the reference to the history of France (or the West) and to the symbolic resources that it offers to those who, behind their nevertheless deep disagreements on the national novel, will endeavour to see in the combat which would be essential today a continuity with that which delivered the crusaders or, in the contemporary period, the partisans of French Algeria. The necessary for that is a productive misunderstanding or that a modest veil covers the differences and, behind an eternal and radiant France of which the “Mahometan” would be one of the hereditary which is in fact in agreement on little in their reading of the social, cultural, economic and political history of France and of the world.

The second prism through which Islam is likely to offer a common standard and convenient target is immigration and, therefore, otherness, whether this is apprehended in terms of nationality, cultural, ethnic, or racial origin. As the immigrant's religion, Islam is then that of this threatening other that we would instead designate for the widespread condemnation as we do so under cover of a cultural differentials defending itself from racism.

This common front is undoubtedly betting as much on a common misunderstanding within public opinion as on deliberate confusion between migration and religion and between culture, religion, race, identity, or civilization circulating in the extreme right-wing circles. But again, here and with a certain number of limits, the anti-immigration discourse can constitute a sufficiently robust cement to erase, for a time and in appearance, the disagreements between convinced racialists pleading for white Europe and assimilationist sovereigntists, small groups that are explicitly Islamophobic or National socialist for whom the immigrant is finally not the main enemy.

Nevertheless, this potentially homogenizing power of hostility to Islam finds its limits when we leave the register of the famous slogan “nous sommes chez nous” (which

literally is translated as *we are at home.*), as we understand thus a sort of ambiguity that it allows or it has precisely the function of masking. The objective becomes to integrate the theme of Islam into a shared vision of the world, a consistent and systematic doctrine, and a program of action. Therefore, a much more contrasting landscape is revealed where values, priorities, and strategic choices confront each other; some of which seem all the less negotiable as they affect, if not the very foundation of the commitment of individuals, at least to the dogmatic content that justifies the existence of militant groups. Thus, some of the stances undertaken (when they do not assert themselves as Islamophiles) revealed to be much more ambivalent regarding Islam than a hasty and globalizing reading suggested by the “fatosphere.”

In such a context, has risen at the same time, some discourses fundamentally hostile to the Muslim religion in its cultural and religious dimension, within small groups which also gravitate in the orbit of the Front National. This raised then the question to know where does the fact that the theme of Islam arouses such different, even antagonistic positions come from within networks of actors who know each other, cross paths in specific demonstrations, comment on each other, and share certain battles?

In fact, according to Lebourg (2016, 2), *Islamophobia* has been used to provide a coherent framework to make sense of a profound cultural crisis that has translated politically into the recent electoral success of Le Pen. However, the author argues that such a dynamic forced Le Pen to change course. Because having witnessed the Identity Block's communicational dynamism, she appropriated attacks against halal food and prayers in the street for her benefit since later 2010. For instance, her reaction against the Islamist attacks of 2012 informed that “What happened is the beginning of the advancement of green fascism in our country...”. (See 4.4.3). She continued her speech by saying that “How many Mohamed Merah arrive in France every day in boats and planes filled with immigrants?” Together with qualifying radical Islam as gangrene and a cancer, she swore that she would bring it to “its knees” in the coming weeks if she became president (Lebourg, 2016, p. 8).

4.2. The National Rally (Front National) and Islam

At a relative distance from the extremist galaxy, the treatment of Islam by the FN is part of the strategic repositioning carried out by the Lepenist formation over the past 20 years. Using the terms “demonization” initially theorized in its time by Bruno Mégret, Lepenist

electoralism is characterized by the constant search for an optimum between the affirmation of a different ideological radically and the quest for respectability and credibility. The discourse of the FN on Islam is constructed today in the permanent tension between these two competing poles, each of which mobilizes specific symbolic resources, values, and discursive options, borrowing to better revise them from doctrinal bodies that are themselves heterogeneous, sometimes historically irreconcilable.

Due to its almost effortlessly construction, as underlined, the junction between a growing part of public opinion and the more confidential circles of the groupuscular extreme right, the prism of an Islam grasped through questions of immigration and alterity dominates the ethnic-nationalist agenda of the FN, testifying to a strong continuity with the traditional Lepenist vision of the issue. The conception of Islam as the religion of immigrants provided the FN the opportunity to dramatize its favorite “immigration” issue, perpetuating the reading of identity that was that of the Front under Jean-Marie Le Pen. However, the militant people now welcomed by the traditional “on est chez nous” are not mistaken. The promises of an unfailing defense of national identity against the dangers of “Islamization.” Thus, when Le Pen denounces the threat of a “migratory submersion,” a “destructing” factor of national identity, agitating the fear of new barbaric *invasions* and going so far as to predict a replacement of the constitution by the “sharia.”

The “communitarianism” against which Le Pen claims to stand as the ultimate rampart is nothing other than a dusted-off and watered-down formulation of the old Lepenist antiphons of “Islamization,” “Lebanization” or “Balkanization” from France. From halal to Charlie Hebdo, going through special menus in schools’ canteens, swimming pool timetables, the veil, the burqa, the burkini, or the “occupation” through streets, it is indeed the unique figure and undifferentiated from the “Muslim” as a threatening and essentially expansionist [o]ther that is at the heart of Frontist rhetoric.

It obliterates any semantic gradation by constantly playing on the confusion of religious, national, ethnic, or cultural categories. It also suggests a system of equivalences, skilfully confusing the multiple signifiers of the “threat”: immigration, multiculturalism, radical Islam, Islamic terrorism, radical Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, communitarianism, or green fascism represent as many interchangeable terms which structure in depth the amalgamating discourse of the FN on the Islam and Muslims.

As we can realize, the frontal vision of Islam remains deeply rooted in an old ethnic-nationalist radicality where the imagery of conspiracy and enemies both outside and inside are still mixed. And it is precisely through which the FN poses as a slayer of the presumed libertarian-multiculturalist status quo dominating among some so-called “globalist” elites. The new enemies of France take the face of Qatari investors or Saudi Wahhabism, accused by the FN of financing international jihadism with the collaboration of some French and European political and economic elites such as the UMPS caste. The FN constitutes the elites mentioned above as a single actor, instigator of uncontrolled immigration that destroys people and identities, to serve the dark designs of interbreeding and cosmopolitanism with the ultimate goal of creating a large class of workers without being tied down and under the yoke of global capitalism.

4.3. Marine Le Pen, the Far-Right and islamophobia

4.3.1. The Shock of the Iranian Revolution

In 1979, the seizure of power in Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini fascinated political radicals around the World. However, the radical far-right serves as an ideological spur to the whole of the far right. It has been renewing itself ideologically since 1945, essentially by re-employing the current known as the conservative Revolution during Germany from 1919-1933 by imitation of foreign experiences. As the German political scientist Stefan Breuer pointed out, the new regime in Tehran is not without evoking this conservative Revolution. Therefore, the Italian and then French nationalist-revolutionaries and neo-rightists did not hesitate to put this regime in the spotlight and see a model in the re-rooting of peoples against the American Empire.

The radicals were also praised for the populations of Arab origin who settled in Europe; an identity closed to Islam to avoid cultural and inter-ethnic mixing. When the debate ignites around the “veil at school” (1989), the inappropriate media use of the Iranian term “chador” underlines the cleavage. While the proponents of the Atlantic system are worried about Iranian influence, the nationalist-revolutionaries of new resistance⁹ and the neo-rightists of Greece take up the cause of young girls and denounce “anti-Muslim racism.”

⁹ Jean-Yves Camus, october 2008, La Nouvelle droite : bilan provisoire d’une école de pensée. Tempsprésents.com

The idea that radical Islam and the European far-right jointly represent cells of resistance to “globalism” is then taken up from all sides by the far right. Identity, the theoretical review of the National Front, under the influence of megretist executives from the new request, considers that faced with the “cosmopolitanism” of the “new world order,” Islamism would be above all the sign of a “resistance” corresponding “to the desire for rootedness and identity” of the Arabs. Indeed, although Marine Le Pen has been shrewd enough to grasp that her father’s anti-semitic provocations offer little or almost no benefit to the Front, her strategy represents a continuation of a process underway since 1972 (Wolfreys, 2013, p. 71).

4.3.2. Those FN Candidates Who Want to “eliminate” Islam

Let’s skip over the link between anti-Muslim acts and those targeting short people for which there are no overall statistics. Marine Le Pen’s comparison between anti-Muslim acts and those targeting women is hardly more convincing. If the insults and acts of violence aimed at women are numerically more numerous than those aimed at people of the Muslim faith, let’s remember that women constitute more than 50% of the French population against only 8% of Muslims. The denial of the president of the FN on Islamophobia and anti-Muslim acts in France is all the more surprising since specific candidates of the far-right party have recently been singled out for remarks precisely calling for the “elimination” of the “Mohammedans.” The tweets of Chantal Clamer, a municipal officer of the FN in the Tour-du-Crieu (Ariège) and candidate for the departmental, are thus unambiguous.



CLAMER chantal
@claningegi



L'Islam et les Mahometans sont la nouvelle peste bubonique du 21^o siècle A combattre à éliminer sans hésitation par tous les moyens possible

04/01/2014 12:53

Translation: *Islam and the Mohammedans are the new bubonic plague of the 21st century to be fought and eliminated without hesitation by any means possible.*

FN candidate in the Hauts-de-Seine, Gérard Brazon, also distinguished himself by advocating the “ablation” of Islam. If he denies on his blog being the author of the sentence “Islamophobia is a right, fight Islam is a duty,” he claims to be “in phase” with this declaration. And to conclude: “Islamophobia is not a crime.”



4.4. Ambiguities and Frontlist Fractures: The Difficulties of Marine Le Pen

As the far-right party took the lead for the departmental elections in 2015, Marine Le Pen revealed in an article posted online on Thursday, 5 March, by the British newspaper her program for an exit from the Euro. She renewed her criticism against “anarchic mass immigration,” which she linked to the rise of religious radicalization. Though, in all this, it is a quote about Islam that seems to have caught people’s attention.

“There are no anti-Muslim acts, no more than against women... or people of small high”, she explains while acknowledging “the rise of antisemitism.”

Such an assertion can only be astonishing regarding the outbreak of fever targeting Muslim places of worship, which followed the attack on the editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo in mid-January. Contacted by the FTVI site¹⁰, the president of the FN persists and signs: in her eyes, the CFCM figures marking a surge in anti-Muslim acts are “bogus.”

Yet, as revealed by Le Figaro¹¹, only 48 hours after the attack of Charlie Hebdo, were noticed some shootings against a prayer room in the Aude and a mosque in the Tarn, shots

¹⁰ Anne Brigaudeau, 06/03/2015. Pour Marine Le Pen, "il n'y a pas d'islamophobie en France". France Televisions.

¹¹ En 48 heures, les attaques contre les mosquées se sont multipliées, Le Figaro, 08/01/2015.

aimed at a Muslim family in the Vaucluse, throwing of grenades against a mosque in the Sarthe, “death to Arabs” tags inscribed on the Poitiers Mosque or the explosion of a Kebab restaurant in the neighbourhood of the Ville (Rhône) mosque.

On January 19, in Lillebonne (Seine-Maritime), a young veiled woman was attacked by two attackers with tear gas who ripped her veil off. According to the victim, they pulled her hair, banged her head against the vehicle, insulted her religion, and repeatedly punched her in the stomach.

In all, 128 facts targeting Muslim people or institutions were identified in two weeks, almost as many as for the whole of 2014. According to the Collective against Islamophobia in France (CCIF¹²), the number of “Islamophobic” acts increased by around 10% in 2014 compared to 2013 and by 70% since the attack on Charlie Hebdo compared to the same period the previous year. This independent association of the French Council for Muslim worship (CFCM¹³) identified 764 “Islamophobic” acts in 2014: an increase of 10.6% compared to 2013, according to the inventory sent to the press. Among these acts are 22 physical attacks, 586 discrimination, and 25 attacks against institutions (mosques in particular), still according to the CCIF.

For Marine Le Pen, the debate organized with Gérald Darmanin (LREM) on February 11th, 2021, on France 2 served as training to prepare for her anticipated dual with Emmanuel Macron in the framework of the two rounds of the presidential election of 2022.

As in 2017, but this time (she hoped), she was much better prepared to forget her failed performance. And effectively, what better training partner than the Minister of the interior in office, Gérald Darmanin, for someone whose stable programmatic base is security, immigration, and identity? This is such a crucial confrontation because, in most cases, on most subjects, the exchanges did not focus on substantive differences or objectives but on the reality of the government action, figures, or means.

The program was entirely devoted to the anti-separatism dedicated the anti-separatism bill, currently being examined by the Parliament, even if this means jamming the debate on those already underway in Parliament and forgetting themes on which viewers would

¹² Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France

¹³ Conseil français du culte musulman

undoubtedly have liked to hear Marine Le Pen: the health crisis, the social and economic crisis.

4.4.1. Opposition to the Veil

“How could one go from a book against Islamism, which could have got my support, to a small administrative police law on the principles of the Republic? There are still plenty of shortfalls in the racket”,

said Marine Le Pen about the Pamphlet¹⁴ just published by his opponent: “You have to work for the next presidential debate,” explained Gérald Darmanin, denouncing the lack of “seriousness” and the “approximations,” even the “nonsenses” of Marine Le Pen, visibly sometimes destabilized. To such attacks, Marine Le Pen so many times answered by saying, “I am not going to argue with you over the numbers and figures”. A divergence nevertheless: the wearing of the veil, which Le Pen described as “Islamist,” and not Islamic, and which she was expecting to ban in public spaces as an ostensible religious sign. “The veil is a garment of territorial appropriation of Islamism,” said the President of the National Rally. Your target is wrong... It is better to attack responsible, to men who excerpt community pressure than women,” responded Darmanin.

Furthermore, in 2010, Le Pen compared the sight of Muslims praying in the street to the Nazi occupation of France¹⁵. Almost a year later, the government banned such a comparison in the road. In the aftermath of the banning of the burqa and the niqab, the Leader of the National Rally advocated for the hijab to be outlawed on public transportation.

4.4.2. Inverted Front

Finally, the President of the National Rally accused the government of not having sought a *consensus* on the above-mentioned law. “She asserted that the government limits everyone’s freedoms by saying that “I don’t want a state that inserts itself into families and religions.” In fact, by adopting such a speech, the candidate for the presidential election seemed to have taken on the beautiful role by relaying the concerns of the cults: Islamism is not a religious problem... it is an ideological problem. We must fight against

¹⁴ Le séparatisme islamiste. Manifeste pour la laïcité (Éd. de l’Observatoire).

¹⁵ Nicholas Rushworth, 13 December 2010. Marine Le Pen controversy over "Muslim occupation". France24.com

Islamist ideology, which can be perfectly separated from religion, as we fight against racism. *I don't mean to attack neither Islam nor the other religions; it is a mistake.*”

As we already say, such a discourse confirms the positioning of Marine Le Pen, the position of someone more moderate than Islamophobes like Eric Zemmour, who consider Islam and not just Islamism, is problematic. Not sure, however, that this is the line of the majority of executives and activists of this party. In front of her, Darmanin was therefore surprised by some exchanges often seen as “reverse front.” I am more challenging than you are. You are soft; you are not even ready to legislate on cults. Yet, to close radicalized places of worship, it is necessary to take measures concerning places of worship!”

This debate has undergone a way that finally confirmed that it wasn't about personal opinions but more about people trying to defend ideologies of some representations. For sure, one had an interest in giving the image of a credible extreme right to exercise power. The other of an interior minister belonging to a majority of the center but the firm had to save the image of its political representation.

Nevertheless, beyond a debate without major substantive differences, the Minister of the Interior also supported the introduction of a dose of proportionality in the legislative elections: “it is in the program of the President of the Republic meant to be implemented“. Likewise, the president of the National Rally (RN) wrote an open letter to Christopher Castaner to denounce an escalation in the occupation of “groups” after the broadcast of a video supposed to show a call to prayer in a village of the Doubs.

This was happening at a moment when Le pen said that France would be better if she was the President of the Republic at a time that the COVID pandemic was affecting almost all the countries. During these times, thanks to a video calling for prayer recorded in a village in the Doubs, the far-right party got an occasion to talk about what seemed to be most essential for them: the country's Islamization. Filmed in Valentigney (10,000 inhabitants), it was relayed by a Twitter account, “Domes and minarets,” with some obscure motivations, but followed by the fatosphere, which presented it as coming from a Turkish mosque in the town. In this video, we see the French countryside from afar, filmed by an inhabitant, and a few small buildings where the muezzin's call seems to resonate.

From this video, the marinist coalition jumped on it to make a montage. Among the numerous titles through which it was manifested could be read this tweet from the party's

Twitter account: Scandal: calls to Islamic prayer are multiplying throughout the country in total illegality. The Islamists are taking advantage of the health crisis. This is how she has even written this open letter to Castaner, in which she ensures that some mosques in Lyon and in Valentigney (Doubs) take advantage of the lockdown instructions. We are witnessing a new escalation in the illegal occupation of the public domain through sound”. Except that the call in question (the one in Valentigney) wasn’t coming from the mosque since that mosque was closed at the beginning of the lockdown. According to an investigation conducted by France 3, all this was coming from the balcony of the inhabitant who was recording the video.

4.4.3. Green Fascism?

What happened is the beginning of the advance of green fascism in our country,” stormed Marine Le Pen in her speech. The relationship between fascism and Islamism is a complex rhetorical weapon. It is positive that François Duprat, former number 2 of the FN assassinated in 1978, made such analogies. But his sympathy went, in sound ideological logic, above all to the nationalist and secular Syrian Ba’th. This was as well why he had launched in 1970 a slogan constantly taken up by Jean-Marie Le pen from the first war against Iraq when he was claiming “nationalists de tous les pays, unissez-vous”¹⁶. It is under this ideological influence that the radicals began to wear the Keffiyeh. The famous GUD¹⁷, from which many of Marine Le Pen’s friends come, moreover showed his sympathy for Hamas.

However, the analogy has turned negatively connotations on the far right for two reasons. First of all, the dislocation of the former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) changed the situation. The Great Serb nationalists resurrected the Islamic Declaration, a manifesto for a great Islamic republic written in 1970 by Alija Izetbegovic (Ansari, 2006), leader of the Bosnian cause. On this basis, Serbian nationalism responded to the Bosnian, presenting itself as facing a red-brown” or even “Nazi” monster and arguing that its war was not imperialist but a defence of Europe against the constitution of an Islamist regime that would destabilize it. In the early time, like in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, rumors were widely disseminated, assuring that the Muslims were preparing for the “genocide” of the

¹⁶ Nationalists of all countries unite!”.

¹⁷ Nicolas Lebourg, February 2010. L’Odyssée des Rats noirs : voyage au coeur du GUD, tempsresents.com.

Serbs. With the war in Kosovo (1999), this discourse was introduced into the French radical far-right. From being an ally against the “American-Zionist” order, Islam has become its puppet responsible for destroying Europe. Yet, the same year was the megretist split of the FN. Bruno Mégret takes the radical with him. They have faced the need to legitimize their separation. The National Republican Movement thus began to produce leaflets combining Islam and insecurity, a new theme that Jean-Marie Le Pen was accused of not taking into account. Islam became something between the two rival parties. Samuel Maréchal, the son-in-law of Jean-Marie Le Pen, seeks to push the megretist to the margins by going so far as to recognize that France is de facto a “multi-confessional” country.

4.4.4. Analyses and Discussion

The transfer between communism and Islamism is done on a much larger scale. In speeches in 2005 and 2006, President George W. Bush made “Islamofascism” the global enemy the West would face after defeating previous “totalitarianism, fascism and Stalinism. He also took up Ronald Reagan’s conception according to which all world terrorism was secretly centralized and organized by the Kremlin, replacing the latter with the single movement of the Islamic fascism secretly constituted by Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda.

The discourse on the Islamist danger (which should not be underestimated) thus often slips into the forms of the anti-subversive imaginary that Western societies integrated during the Cold War. Medical metaphors, for example (Marine Le Pen referring to it as Cancer and Gangrene in her speech), are typical. In France, the discourse denouncing communist subversion was also often made with the call to the Republic, an approach that is not absent here.

Marine Le Pen presented on Friday, 29 January 2021, a bill to fight against Islamism and respond to “a somewhat brutal truth”:

“We are facing the first world war of the 21st century, which originated with the Islamic revolution in Iran, and its official outbreak, a sort of terrorist Pearl Harbor on September 11, 2001”.

The proposal intends to ban “Islamist ideologies” since the government’s project on separatism would have “given birth to a legislative mouse”: “The Darmanin project, days

after days, went from the word “Islamism” to “separatism” then to “secularism”, to end with some vague ambitions to reinforce republican principles”, declared the President of the National Rally (RN) while the executive bill will be debated in the hemicycle of the National Assembly from Monday, February 1. It is a laborious production that is infinitely technocratic and insufficiently political”. The RN’s bill, drafted essentially by MEP and former magistrate Jean-Paul Garraud, first tries the difficult task of defining these Islamist ideologies. These would be ideologies incompatible with the rights recognized by the Constitution, “in particular the dignity of the human person or freedom of conscience and expression, or the refusal to “respect the secularism of the State, democratic procedures, institutions,” even “threats to the unity of the nation.” This would concern ideologies having links with foreign powers, or which would support crimes committed in the name of one of these ideologies, or which would force people to adhere to or renounce a religion.

The text presented is also as brutal and gives a precise idea of what the party intends to promote once it comes to power. For example, she estimated in one of her meetings that every single person, particularly (from the *France insoumise*), who would go for a (prepared) demonstration will be hand in hand with the Islamists. She assured to the press on the sidelines of a visit to the “Made in France” show in Paris that, “the demonstration was set up by the islamists. All those who go to this demonstration will be hand in hand with the islamists. By saying this, I mean those who develop in our country a totalitarian ideology aiming at fighting the laws of the French Republic.

In fact, after the attack on the mosque¹⁸ and some new tensions around the veil¹⁹, about fifty personalities launched a call to demonstrate on November 10, 2019, in Paris to say “STOP Islamophobia” and the “growing stigma” of Muslims. However, the terms agreed upon and the identity of certain initiators of the call published in *Liberation* on November 1 caused a part of the left (PS, PRG, the boss of the PCF Fabien Roussel...) to not join the demonstration and another part, such as the European MP EELV MEP Yannick Jadot and LFI MP François Ruffin to relativize its main support.

¹⁸ A.T, October 2019, Attaque à la mosquée de Bayonne : l’auteur voulait «venger Notre-Dame de Paris», leparisien.fr

¹⁹ Christel Brigaudeau et Pauline Théveniaud, October 2019, Pourquoi le voile divise toujours, Leparisien.fr

According to the President of the RN, “they are bearing a weighty responsibility, those who are going to be part of this demonstration, and they will very probably have to answer for it electorally.” During the European campaign, when I called la France insoumise La France islamiste, I think that I was right mainly in this area too”, she said. She continued by asserting that “I can still remember a Jean-Luc Mélenchon many years ago who was known for fighting against Islamic fundamentalism, against the term islamophobia, and even against the veil. I see that he threw all that in the trash; I see that he is in an operation of real betrayal of his sympathizers and his voters.” Yet, the Thursday of the same week, Jean Luc Mélenchon in a blog post²⁰ conversely judged that “when the essential is at stake, we must know when to unite” supporting once again the controversial demonstration, without specifying whether he will assist or not”.

²⁰ Jean Luc Mélenchon, 07.11.2019. La diabolisation permanente, melenchon.fr

DISCOURSE OF DONALD TRUMP ABOUT ISLAMOPHOBIA

5.1. Background of Donald Trump

Donald Trump, who was elected president of the USA in the November 2016 election, is a June 14, 1946's born in Queens, New York. Known as one of the most famous businesspeople in the world until the time he was president, Trump is known as a real estate tycoon. The rhetoric he made during the presidential campaign covered a wide range of media both in the United States and in the international media. Arguably, we can say that the media's interest in his speeches was because they included hatred and discrimination against women, homosexuals, and different races and religions many times.

Donald Trump dropped out of high school in the 1960s and attended the military academy. After 1968, he studied business science at the Wharton Institute in Pennsylvania. Trump, who started his business life with his father, Fred Trump, has achieved great success in the real estate field. First, he restored the Commodore hotel and turned it into a Grand Hyatt hotel. After this work, Trump, constantly on the agenda, built the 68-floor Trump Tower, which he calls his most outstanding achievement. Later on, he progressively became known as the Real Estate King, who made many hotels, golf courses, and casinos. Donald Trump has increasingly become a famous businessman in the media and in America. In addition, his interest in television and cinema has kept him constantly on the screen, and in 2003 he appeared on the show "The Apprentice" Trump is looking for an apprentice" on NBC TV. Trump, who always likes to be in the spotlight, has also bought beauty contests such as Miss USA and Miss Universe. In addition, his book "How to Get Rich" received significant attention in America.

Donald Trump has been married three times and has five children. He has declared his children as "The Next Generation" of his own company. He wanted his children to be successful like himself, and Trump wanted his success to continue after him. Because Donald Trump was considered one of the best in America as a contractor and politician, Forbes, one of the most influential magazines in the business world, included him in the list of the 400 wealthiest business people in the world. Although Forbes says that Trump has \$ 3.1 billion, Trump announced that he has \$ 10 billion. When we look at the personality of such a wealthy and successful businessman, he is generally described as selfish, aggressive, inconsistent, materialistic, believing in success and himself,

charismatic, and always wanting to be ahead. To understand Donald Trump, I briefly talked about his life.

5.2. Donald Trump's Presidential Candidacy

Before Donald John Trump ran for president of the United States, he was a businessman known as the "Real Estate King." In June 2015, Trump announced his candidacy from the Republican Party for the 2016 election. Suddenly, a presidential candidate appeared globally, who made unexpected propaganda and hard exits. Trump has had many election promises, harsh policies, and rhetoric throughout the election process. In short, when we look at Trump's election promises, we can see tough immigrant and Islamophobic rhetoric. As the first example, He has had rhetoric about building a 12-meter wall along the Mexican borders to prevent immigrants from coming. With such a discourse, an idea of anti-immigration can mean is clearly defined. At the same time, against the Muslims in the United States; Keeping Muslims in the USA under control, keeping mosques under surveillance. As can be understood from the rhetoric, what is promised in the president's election is to target the Muslim minority directly. This target clearly shows that oppression is applied against this group, which is a minority in the country.

As another presidential election promise against Muslims, He uses the rhetoric of preventing Muslims from entering the country. It is understood from this discourse that, together with the creation of the "other" enemy discourse, we see that it creates a hate speech against the Muslim segment. In Marine Le Pen, Donald Trump also feeds and benefits significantly from this opposite discourse. When the frequency analysis of threatening tweets about Muslims between 2016-2020, when US President Donald Trump was in office, is examined, it is seen that he generally uses the pronoun 'they' in threatening discourses against Muslims. The use of 'they' instead of 'you' for Muslims creates the perception that Muslims are not addressed directly, and the United States does not manage Muslims by establishing superiority over the other side. Thus, he took a serious stance against the Muslim people, who are a minority. Nihad Awan, the President of American-Islamic Relations, spoke about Donald Trump's actions during his candidacy as follows:

“It's no secret that American Muslims are concerned about what Donald Trump has said throughout the campaign. They were worried that they would impose limitations on themselves if elected, and now he is elected. Now they are terrified.

Trump needs to allay these fears and convince Muslim Americans that everyone, including themselves, will become President and that he will not target any faith group simply because of their beliefs."

We have observed that Islamophobia has increased in the last 1.5 years. Hate crimes and attacks against Muslims, which we did not see much in the past, have increased. Republicans are fueling fear against Muslims in the country. We hope that this will not become one of the cornerstones of the new administration. But we have to be realistic. Donald Trump is like that and will not change. His rhetoric during the campaign indicates what he wants or hopes to do. We should hope for the best and be prepared for the worst. We understand from his first appointments that he will not choose names that unite America. And unfortunately, the signals he has given so far are alarming," as expressed in his concerns on this issue.

Along with the opposition mentioned above, deporting 11 million immigrants in the USA is one of these views. In this anti-immigrant discourse, we see that there are also Muslims. Xenophobia is actually one of the main points at this point. To put it briefly, the September 11 attack based on the United States is one of its most basic reservations. Xenophobia has been on the rise in Europe since the beginning of the 2000s. In this trend, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the economic crisis that started in 2008, and the Arab Spring movements that affected the Middle East and North Africa in 2009 formed the breaking points. Enmity has come to mean almost the same as attitude towards Muslims. Due to the adverse effects of the economic crisis on vital welfare, the fact that far-right ideas with racist and populist discourses found more support in the politics of European states after 2000 almost normalized the rise in xenophobia. Donald Trump, on the other hand, is a person and politician who always puts his populist and nationalist personality at the forefront.

In addition to this opposition, he said he would pave the way for individual armament. In fact, when we look at the candidacy processes and rhetoric, it can be clearly stated that Trump wants to gather votes because of his opposition and political stance. This is due to an Islamophobic point of view.

5.3. Donald Trump and his 'Others'

Donald Trump declared his candidacy for the 45th President of the United States on June 16, 2015. On the day he announced his candidacy in New York, the most striking topics

in his speeches were the Mexican border and immigrants, ISIS, and Islamic terrorism. When Donald Trump spoke of Islamic terrorism in his first speech of his candidacy, "Islamic terrorism is eating up a large part of the Middle East." (Peters & Woolley, 2014, p. 6). Trump has focused a lot on Islamic terrorism. Obviously, he looks at all Muslims as terrorists, and his Islamophobic rhetoric has garnered reactions in America and all over the world. As it is known, the concepts of Islamophobia and Islamic terrorism increased after the September 11 attacks.

5.3.1. Muslim Minorities

From the birth of Islam to the Crusades, from the Ottoman period to the present century, Muslims have faced demonic beings, barbarians, and many other false accusations. Thus, the term Islamic terrorism has been used since the Soviet era. Charges were made with the idea that Islam equals terror and terrorists equal Muslims, and Muslims were marginalized. In the period following Donald J. Trump's appearance on the political scene, the issue began to be looked at differently. When it comes to how national security will be ensured and the measures envisaged to be taken in this area, it has become a prominent issue that Muslims living in the country will be subject to effective control, including filing. In this period, the visa ban for the citizens of some Muslim countries is remarkable in terms of showing how the new administration looks at the Muslim minority. Although Trump, as a candidate, did not systematically deal with the issue of labelling Muslims as a candidate during the campaign, when asked by journalists who wanted to keep this issue alive, he appeared in an attitude indicating that he did not ignore such a practice.

In the period following the November 2016 elections, the news that the advisers in Trump's team seriously predicted the stigma of Muslims received comprehensive coverage in the press and on social media. It has been observed that these consultants have argued that the internment of Japanese origin living in this country, most of whom are also US citizens and forced to reside in camps during the Second World War, may set a precedent for the profiling of Muslims. Carl Higbie, a prominent Trump supporter, stated that internment camps are a terrible practice, his main point being that the Korematsu decision sets a historical and real precedent for doing some politically unpopular, even wrong, work for the sake of national security (New York Times, 18.11.2016). Carl Higbie refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in 1944, under the

conditions of World War II, in the trial of Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-born US citizen. The latter opposed internment practices and refused to comply with them. Information on this subject was given as follows as Keith Madison, a member of the American Congress House of Representatives, summarized the situation in his country as follows:

“Islamophobia is on the rise in America because so many people are taking advantage of it. There are many associations and organizations that fuel this increase. Those who have economic and social difficulties are said to be the reason for the situation they are in. Of course, this situation affects not only Muslims but also Latin American society, for example. Black Americans are the first group to suffer from Donald Trump's hate speech. Trump actually criticizes black Americans in every speech. He emphasizes law and order. We must all stand together against those who try to divide us.”

5.3.2. Immigrant Minorities

Donald Trump thinks that Muslims coming to America are contrary to Western values. According to Trump, Radical Islam is anti-women, anti-gay, and anti-American. He has repeatedly emphasized that he will not allow Muslims living in America to torture and inflict violence on Christians, homosexuals, and Jewish people. However, Donald Trump was a presidential candidate who emerged with his racist rhetoric. There are hate speeches against Muslims and women, homosexuals, Jews, and Mexican citizens. His insults to his rival Hilary Clinton received great reactions from feminist groups. In addition, Donald Trump's racist statements about Barack Obama and black people attract a lot of attention. For blacks and Arabs living in America;

“Just because Blacks and Arabs look like humans doesn't mean they are smart... If God wanted us to be equal to blacks and Arabs, He would have created us all with the same color intelligence. But he didn't. We are smarter than them. I believe white people are honest. But blacks and Arabs can't control themselves. If you give them weapons, they will kill each other. They are only good at making noise, dancing, polygamy, alcohol, witchcraft, sex, being seen in church, jealousy, fighting, and ridiculous complaints...” (YouTube, 2017).

As seen, in his rhetoric, he belittled Arabs and made black people look like fools. It has been claimed that Donald Trump's father, Fred Trump, is a member of a racist organization. At the same time, the murder of George Floyd was placed on the neck of

the African-American suspect George Floyd, who was handcuffed and lay face down on the ground by white police officer Derek Chauvin, one of the police officers who came to Minneapolis in the evening on May 25, 2020, to report a fake 20 US dollar bill. The death of George Floyd is actually seen not only by Muslims but also by many people from other people. Mentioned in the statement are the Black and Muslim minorities. As can be understood from the meaning of the word, minorities are people who are suppressed by power and condemned to obedience.

5.4. Government Relations' Impact of Islamophobia on Foreign Policy During Trump Eira

There is an underlying feature in the infrastructure of many policies and works; ideology. Islamophobia is a view that Trump has treated as racism throughout his life and presented as a view of life. This view seems to be possible with the names of the people on Trump's team. Thus, it seems pretty likely to say that the policies made were realized in the opinion of this group. Trump has made many ideological, symbolic, and economic policies that will directly affect the Muslim world. I mainly examine them in the following headings.

5.4.1. US-Israel Relations and the Palestine Problem

The 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump, sympathizes with Israel; his attitude towards the Palestinian issue and his role in the Israeli-Palestinian case after he was elected President has been much discussed. Trump has said in many election campaigns that he will ally with Israel and support Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although these statements received a lot of backlashes, Trump did not give up on this idea. Trump did not hesitate to praise Israel many times in his rhetoric. Trump; "I will meet with Netanyahu. I know him very well. "We will work together to bring peace and stability to Israel and that region," said Netanyahu. He said, "I love Israel, in the rest of his speech. I love Israel. My daughter Ivanka is about to give birth to a beautiful Jewish baby. The Jewish State will exist forever" (Trump, 2016, p.5). Trump showed that in the new solution package, the ties with the past negotiations would be cut and tried to prepare the political ground for the Vision. The steps in question aim to surround and isolate Palestine and restrict Palestinian diplomatic activities against Israel. Therefore, one of the most distinctive features of Trump's Palestinian-Israeli policy has been the marginalization of the Palestinians.

The Trump administration has already demonstrated its pro-Israel stance with its close working group. The administration appointed David M. Friedman as Israel's ambassador and appointed Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner and his lawyer, Jason Greenblatt, to head the team that will prepare 20 Vision. Friedman is a name that shows his pro-Israel stance by expressing that he believes Israel's annexation of the West Bank will not be illegal. Trump, whose everything is to keep the state of Israel alive and put it on solid foundations, has clearly stated that the role of the UN is not of great importance with his actions and rhetoric.

On the other hand, we see that the people, who continue their lives as minorities worldwide, are always crushed into the background by a group of people. This is one of the main problems and problems. While Trump was making this statement, many sectors remained silent.

Trump also met with Israeli President Netanyahu. The statement released on September 26, 2016, after their meeting was as follows: "Trump has stated that Jerusalem has been the eternal capital of the Jewish people for over 3000 years, and under Trump, the United States' Jerusalem has finally become the indivisible capital of the state of Israel (CROWE, 2016, p. 151). Making such a statement for a place considered sacred by many religions shows Trump's thoughts toward the Muslim community. We can clearly see this thought in another interview he made.

"They teach Palestinian children to grow up to be terrorists," Trump said. They need to put an end to this. They must end terrorism. And they must respect Israel's right to exist as a Jewish State." (CROWE, 2016, p. 151)

On Wednesday, December 6, 2017, Donald Trump stated in one of his memorable speeches: "My statement will bring a new approach to the conflict between Israel and Palestine today. For 20 years, the United States has been waiting for Israel's decision to move to Jerusalem. It's no use repeating the same formulas; it's time for different decisions. Therefore, it is time to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel officially." (Woolley, 2016, p. 10). Shortly after these statements, US President Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the official capital of Israel, despite all the reactions from the Islamic world, and announced that the US embassy in Tel Aviv would be moved to Jerusalem (Bbc, 2017, p.2).

One of the reasons why Donald Trump is so interested in the Israeli government and the Jews may be the Jewish assets and economic power in America. Or it could be the promises he made to the Jewish people who helped him in the election. But this is not the only flash decision Trump has made. At the same time, Trump, who is known for his closeness to Erdogan in relations with Turkey, has been very different with embargoes.

5.4.2. US-Turkey Relations

After Trump's Jerusalem decision, it would not be possible to pass without mentioning Turkey. Turkey actively kept the Jerusalem policy on its agenda during the Erdogan government. Many people know Trump's relations with Turkey. In addition, one of Trump's most significant investments in Turkey is Trump Tower Mall, which was built in partnership with Doğan Holding in 2012. After the September 11 attacks, Trump, who also heavily criticized the American government, has become the spokesperson of Islamophobia with all his rhetoric. This harsh rhetoric of Donald Trump has interested Turkey closely. The biggest problems between Turkey and the United States are the foreign policy implemented by the United States.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan has followed an active Jerusalem policy, especially since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, because Jerusalem is essential for Muslims. Likewise, for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, since he comes from the proper generation, these currents are the currents that have come from Necmettin Erbakan until now. Saying that it would be helpful to mention his background briefly, Erdoğan emphasized this situation a lot.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said: "The capital of Palestine is Jerusalem, and it will remain so. This decision taken by Rump has no value on our front," he said. Also, Recep Tayyip Erdogan; "We are following closely that this decision is not only disturbing the Muslim section but also the Christian side. But I am not surprised by this: a leader who can support YPG, PYD and all the terrorist organizations he is in contact with can do this very easily" (Sözcü 13 December 2017).

The Trump era has taken an exciting turn after 2017. The Trump-Turkey relationship can be listed chronologically as follows;

- March 2017 Halk Bank Case
- May 2018 Steel and aluminium taxes increase

- July 2018 Reverend Brunson case
- August 2018 Customs Doubled.
- Removed from the June 2019 F-35 Programme.

It is clearly seen that Trump severely embargoed 2017 after the speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and as a result, it caused both economic and political concerns in Turkey. In another section, we see the ongoing opposition to predominantly Muslim countries. Iran, which is the immediate neighbour of Turkey, is another target of Trump.

5.4.3. US-Iran Relations

Before and after the election, the President of the United States clearly identified Iran as the enemy and adversary. Our operation's reason is the discourses and investments made in Iran, a Muslim country. The nuclear agreement signed between the United States and Iran during the Obama era was not seen as a correct agreement by Trump. One of the reasons for this is that this agreement does not defend US interests. Thinking that this agreement should be renegotiated, Trump stated that this agreement would be abandoned or its articles should be changed again.

As it is known, the fact that Trump sees Israel as the democratic heart of the Middle East and that Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and adviser, is Jewish, is seen as a minor reason why he supports Israel in the conflict between Iran and Israel. While Trump says that a Muslim country supports terrorism, seeing what Israel did to Palestine as a democracy may result from his prejudice against Muslims. However, if we come to his rhetoric, it was seriously harsh and sanctioned against Iran. Trump has used expressions such as “the number one terrorist state” for Iran, “Iran is playing with fire,” and “Iran was about to collapse until the US came and extended a 150-billion-dollar lifeline under the name of the Iran deal” (Criterion 2017, March). Rouhani, on the other hand, stated that it is a psychological war aimed at planting seeds of division among Iranians. He said that Iran is a terrorist state because it supports radical groups. Since this statement, he has continued his sanctions very repressively. It has destroyed the complexity in the Middle East on Iran.

5.5. Analysis and Discussion

Regarding the historical process, as we have seen in the chapter on the Crusades, the Ottoman Empire and the attacks of September 11, 2001, were examined. The purpose of our study of the Crusades was to understand the hostility towards the religion of Islam. The main point I wanted to investigate in the Crusades section was the image of the Muslim. And accordingly, it came out that the idea of the Muslim, whose influence continues to this day, was caused by the demonization of Muslims in the Crusades. It would not be wrong to say that the image we are examining here is an image that exists under the current definition of Islamophobia. Our examination of the Crusades allows us to see the hidden history of Islamophobia. This grounding will deal with all the concepts that we have covered above.

In chapter (4) on Donald Trump, Trump's life and personality are briefly mentioned as well as his presidential candidacy process. What has been realized is that Donald Trump's character has influenced his lifestyle and political thoughts to a great extent. This has been seen in both his domestic and foreign policies after he became president. While writing this thesis, Trump's tweets were expected to be used as references to support our argumentation. Unfortunately, this hasn't been possible because Trump's Twitter account was suspended. Instead, our analyses have been processed on with various discourses from the sites. Finally, a brief summary of Donald Trump's relations with other countries is given. The rhetoric of Donald Trump on his relations with these countries has been examined. Especially his relations with Muslim countries greatly influenced his discourses. The nuclear energy agreement with Iran, its active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with Turkey, and the visa crisis can be shown as reflections of Trump's perspective on Muslims. Undoubtedly, those close to Donald Trump have been the people who influenced Trump the most ideologically. To see the significant influence of Trump in his decisions, these people briefly mentioned it.

Trump's presidential candidacy process is as well mentioned. Donald Trump's personality has also influenced his lifestyle thoughts. Trump's domestic policies after he became president. Their foreign policies were also mentioned. In the Twitter analysis section of Donald Trump, which is one of the most striking parts of the thesis, the tweets that were tried to be taken from Trump's official Twitter account and the analysis of these tweets were attempted to be made. Because after starting the thesis, Trump's Twitter account

was closed. Finally, a brief summary of Donald Trump's relations with other countries is given. The rhetoric of Donald Trump on his relations with these countries has been examined. Especially his relations with Muslim countries greatly influenced his discourses. The nuclear energy deal with Iran, the active role it played in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and his thoughts on Turkey can be shown as reflections of Trump's perspective on Muslims. Undoubtedly, those close to Donald Trump have been the people who influenced Trump the most ideologically. As a result, Donald Trump has many Islamophobic discourses and sanctions against Muslims in the process from his candidacy to the presidency until today. This thesis has been written with the hope that it will lead to research on this subject.

As for Marine Le Pen, on the other hand, rather than the discourses taken from Twitter accounts, the historical origins and organs that were created were mentioned. Le Pen made these statements with his cabinet, which he clearly supported. Unlike Trump, we can see that Le Pen openly says that there will be bans in the public sphere as well. While this thesis was being written, he had an idea to ban the headscarf as a way of mourning the elections in France. She said that she would activate this with the election.

CONCLUSION

The concept of Islamophobia has taken its place on the agenda in the Western world, especially in European countries where Muslims live heavily. The increase in the religious and cultural visibility of the Muslim population in these countries and the strengthening of the religious institutional structure have begun to increase the discomfort in the Western society. The fact that Muslim population began to increase in these countries, especially in the II. It was formed because the need for labour, which emerged with the industrialization move after World War II, could not be met by the Western countries, and other countries, including Muslim countries, tried to meet them.

Since the 1960s, the Muslim population in Western European countries has started to increase every year. When colonial migration and refugee movements and family reunifications were added in the 1980s, the Muslim population in Western European countries rose to its current level. When these people, who were perceived as "temporary workers" and "seasonal workers" in the first years, felt that they were permanent in the following years, governments and peoples made great efforts to return immigrant Muslims to their countries. In this process, problems began to be experienced between Muslim immigrant groups and the central society. Over time, as a result of the conjunctural efforts of politicians and the media, the opportunity for these two different societies to live together has been gradually narrowed.

Although the studies in the field of Islamophobia gained momentum after the September 11 attacks, we believe that Islamophobia as a phenomenon has a reality that goes back to the depths of history. In short, we think that Islamophobia, which emerged as a result of the encounter of European societies with Muslim Andalusia, the Crusades, the advance of Turks to Europe, and the practices of orientalism, colonialism and imperialism between the Muslim World and the Western World in the recent past, is a product of history.

The problems caused by Islamophobic behavior in Europe are short-term problems. In the long run, it can have more radical and more devastating consequences. Approximately 7-8 million Muslim immigrants live in Western European countries. This group is raising its third generation in the European geography. The idea of return for Muslim immigrants is now largely over. Europe has become the homeland of the social group. For the continuation of this idea, European societies should adopt a multicultural society structure. However, considering the recent policies, we can say that this situation is

increasingly endangered. If assimilation policies are imposed within the framework of the integration discourse, using the phenomenon of Islamophobia as an excuse, it will be very difficult to talk about a multicultural Europe.

The impact of Islamophobia on the Middle East energy resources of the Western world. If it becomes a political material as a tool of their planning, it will create artificial conflict areas on a world scale and this situation will pose a great danger to world peace. As an example that feeds this concern, as a result of the September 11 attacks, the US government's invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the increased international pressure on Iran and Syria can be given. We see from the discourses of both Trump and Le pen that their purpose is actually to gather power. Support for these two leaders, who are advancing in coordination with the racist, is not to be underestimated. For example, Islamophobia in the French republic is likely to be understood only with the questioning of the cultural structures of the country. In fact, with the long experience of terrorist attacks in France, its society has remained very concerned with the possibility of any terrorist attacks at the steady rate of 50% of the results of a survey conducted between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Islamist attacks perpetrated by Mohamed Merah in March 2012. Furthermore, the dismantling of jihadist branches over the country has come to prove that this phenomenon was more to be considered as foreign but rather, was meant to be understood as implicating French people of all regions. But it is to be recalled that such a fact has engendered a ubiquitous anxiety over terrorism. As a matter of fact, 93 percent of the sample interviewed in research said they were being anxious as the result of the January 2015's attacks. Even if such state of public opinion has rational causes, the negative image of Islam according to which 45% of the participants in 2014 acknowledge to hold does not necessarily rely on rational and empirical basis. Based on such analysis, we can affirm as Georges Sorel that Islamophobia is a myth whose representation is capable of mobilizing and directing collective action. The traction gained by Marine Le Pen on this comes from her capacity to render this myth resonate with the myth of France's unity.

With the regulation that came into force in France in 2004, students in primary and secondary schools were prohibited from using "flashy religious symbols and clothing". After these bans, the way was cleared by Le Pen and FN party. The ban on the burqa, which was tried to be put into effect in 2010, came into force in 2011. In the context of burqa bans, wearing the burqa and veil in public is prohibited with the regulation that

came into force in April 2011 in France. Belgium followed France first, and in July 2011, wearing clothes that completely or partially cover the face was banned in public places. Le Pen brought the headscarf ban to the agenda in its 2022 election promises. Le Pen openly stated in his statement that "a uniform imposed by the Islamists". Will France accept this law in the parliament just like the burka law? In particular, the economic crisis experienced in recent years and the inflation spreading with the effect of covid 19 have resulted in xenophobia. It is going to be considered in the future.

If the first globalization witnessed the success of racist theories and practices, we cannot say it for the second as its cultural impact has generated a social authoritarianism. Arguably, this explains the success of the Far right in France, while in some countries such like Spain the Far Right does not exist. In fact, the widespread of Islamophobia in the French Republic stems from deep transformations in the relationships between the state, society and the market. The welfare State's societies' socioeconomic fragmentation is attributed to a multicultural society and such multiculturalism is reduced to the question of the presence of the people originating from Arab-Muslim countries. As it presents itself as the sovereigntist global solution to the cultural, economic, ethnic, and social destabilization, the FN has managed to gather a scattered clientele. Therefore, the debate concerning Islam in fact conceals a much larger question which is that of understanding if as a culture and a Republic, France is willing to be compatible with a liberal postmodern society?

Speaking in an exclusive interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, French far-right politician Le Pen defended Trump's presidential decree that stopped all immigrants for 120 days and banned citizens of 7 Muslim countries from entering the country for 90 days. This is clearly an indication that they think alike. Also, Le Pen said, "I think most of the reactions are malicious. This is a temporary measure. It targets 6 or 7 countries responsible for terrorist threats. I think Donald Trump and the intelligence services are there to prevent potential terrorists who could enter the US and launch an attack, just like in France," Le Pen said. He wants to establish a set of criteria," he said. Le Pen and Donald Trump also express their rhetoric with some of their cabinets as a similar method. We have examined this subject in detail in the Le Pen section.

On the other side, we still hear the news of armed conflict and massacres in the United States every day. The sociological dynamics have been deeply shaken with this created

other discourse. Because of these discourses, we see that the principle of equality, which forms the basis of the public sphere, is seriously affected. Of course, it is evident that this is not wanted by certain segments. With this thesis, the main subjects of racism can be discussed within the framework of Islamophobia. One of the missing parts in the literature is to analyse its sociological effect, which shows an avalanche-like growth effect. Today, while the dates show 2022, even Türkiye is of the opinion that it will remain in the middle of these extreme racist discourses. I would like to state that the sociological grounding of this can be done with discourse analysis.

In short, it can be said that humanity has many opportunities for more just and peaceful world order. In straightforward terms, if we learn to live with people different from “us” within the framework of universal moral hopes, the real problem will disappear. The first condition of being at peace with the “other” is being at peace with ourselves. Therefore, Islam and the West that are at peace with themselves and do not see the negative aspects of each other will make an outstanding contribution to world peace.

In our study, we briefly discussed how the perception of Islamophobia was formed together with the historical process. Le Pen and Donald Trump, the two leaders who built this perception, were the main actors of the thesis. I think it would be useful to investigate Muslim identities, which are the subjects of Islamophobia, for future thesis studies. Is it only the other side that feeds Islamophobia? Do Muslims have anything to do with it? These questions are topics that can be studied in the future.

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