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A COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HUMAN CONCEPTIONS OF THOMAS HOBBES AND ADAM SMITH

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A Comparative and Critical Analysis of Human Conceptions of Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith

Thomas Hobbes ve Adam Smith'in İnsan Doğası Konseptlerinin Karşılaştırmalı ve Kritik Analizi

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine how the modern state functions in accordance with the political and economic structures that fragment the collective life. As being inventors of the social contract theory and political economy, Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith consider society as a summation of isolated human beings bonded together with individual interests. This thesis criticises their quest for certainty and their deterministic approach to human nature by examining their method. We argue that Hobbes's and Smith's human conceptions reflect the social interactions resulting from the related period's defined relations of production. We try to show that their theoretical frameworks seem to contradict with their observations.

Keywords: Human Nature, Property, Commodification, Labour, Individual Liberty

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, modern devletin işlevini sağlayan politik ve ekonomik yapıların insanların birlikte kurdukları üretim ve yaşam biçimlerine müdahalesini araştırmaktır. Toplumsal sözleşme teorisi ve politik ekonominin mucitleri olan Thomas Hobbes ve Adam Smith için toplum, bireysel çıkarları için bir araya gelmiş izole insanların toplamından oluşur. Bu tezde Hobbes ve Smith'in, kullandıkları metod göz önüne alınarak, kesinlik arayışları ve sınırlı insan doğası yaklaşımları eleştirilmiştir. İnsan doğası yaklaşımlarının, dönemlerinin üretim ilişkilerinden kaynaklanan sosyal etkileşimleri yansıttığı ve teorik çerçevelerinin gözlemleriyle çeliştiği görüşü savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsan Doğası, Mülkiyet, Metalaştırma, Emek, Bireysel Özgürlük

INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation, the human conceptions represented by Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith are critically and comparatively analysed regarding the ethical and political consequences of their descriptions. Their take on human nature are assembled from their observations of the exchange relations that emerged before their time. As a consequence, they base the competitive drive by addressing human beings as selfish profit calculators. Moreover, they assign these qualities to human beings of all times and places. As we will try to show in the following chapters, their theories are closely related to the desires of a group of society presented by the people who seek possessions under the name of 'individual liberty'.

Law and *nature* are two crucial concepts to acknowledge Hobbes's and Smith's definitions of human beings. They construct their theories on laws through ontological exploration of nature. The historical relations of human beings reflect their conditions, how they produce life as a collective. However, Hobbes and Smith consider that society is associated through mutual benefits between individuals. Furthermore, they define specific behaviour patterns as the *nature* of human 'kind'. Before how they interpret nature is summed up, the transformation of the concept, *nature*, shall be inspected first.

Physis, the Greek origin of the word *nature*, comes from the verb *phyein* which means 'to grow, to become, ...', traced in various works of Greek literature: "Dionysus grows (*phuei*) the vine for mortals; a father begets (*phuei*) a son."[1] The connection between the verb *phyein* and the noun *physis* becomes apparent in Aristotle's approach to the relation between *polis* and human beings. He underlines that *physis* is the end of a process: "for we say that each thing's nature —for example, that of a human being, a horse, or a household— is the character it

[1] C. S. Lewis, *Studies in Words*, p.34.

has when its coming-into-being has been completed."[2] I.e., households grow into a community constituted out of several villages, which grows into existence for a good life, namely, *polis*.[3] The *polis* is a natural space where a human being could realise his nature by performing an activity.

The possibility that Aristotle found out seems to be ignored by modern philosophers who attempt to describe the natural elements of human beings. Within the preceding approaches, nature is defined as a character of a species, i.e. nature of man. It emerges as a distinction between natural and conventional aspects of human existence; natural elements of man become what the irrational part of them is. Men become rational using the conventions, laws, and regulations provided by the state. Within these descriptions, the conventions carried through history are eliminated to extract the *nature* of human beings. We argue that there is no such distinction between 'natural' and 'political', and all the rules are the products of the social existence of human beings.

It is apparent in history that with the rise of the idea of appropriation, laws and regulations concerning private property manifest themselves. The first rule brings its eternity. As Herman Melville tells in his book *Moby Dick*[4], the troubles begin once the fish is fastened. He mentions two whaling laws authorised by the legislative forces of Holland:

> "i. A Fast-Fish belongs to the party fast to it.
> ii. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it."[5]

The fish becomes the property of the person who marks it with a certain symbol of possession. What if the whale hunt is performed in a process accidentally by two different groups? Reasonably, they would share the product. However, in the case that Melville narrates, the pleading and the counter-pleading are proceeding

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[2] Aristotle, *Politics*, p.3. [1252b]
[3] *Ibid*.
[4] Chapter 89: Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish.
[5] Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*, p.366.

from this story: a whale escapes from a group of hunters dragging their tools and boat. Unfortunately, another boat hunts it, seeing it as a half-fastened loose-fish, and claims its rights. With all pleadings considered, the judge decides that the whale and hunting tools attached to it belong to the last possessor; yet, the first attempters of the hunting retrieve their boat dragged on the whale because they abandoned it for the sake of 'survival'.

Before the case is over, the lawyer of the second boat crew defends his clients with an example that regards human beings as property. Indeed, it sketches out tragically that there is no difference between these two laws and the ones that forced by state authority. Melville claims that these two laws reflect the foundations of all human jurisprudence.[6] Once the fish is considered as possession, so the idea of the *loose-fish to be possessed* is settled, there appears a plenty of fields for exploiters to presume on, material things or human minds. Melville ends this chapter by asking the reader questions:

> "What was America in 1492 but a Loose-Fish? (...) What are the Rights of Man and the Liberties of the World but Loose-Fish? What all men's minds and opinions but Loose-Fish?"[7]

The relations of production examined in this thesis indicate that collective production gradually turns into power relations through the spread of private property. According to Marx, production and consumption are two aspects of a single act.[8] Since the process of production uses up raw materials, tools, and the powers, production is necessarily a case of consumption.[9] Besides, consumption is also a case of production because human beings produce their wellnesses to reproduce their own power as labourers through it.[10] However, production is different from consumption in the sense that it is the activity which constitute the

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[6] *Ibid*., p.367.
[7] *Ibid*., p.368.
[8] Allen W. Wood, *Karl Marx*, p.27.
[9] *Ibid*.
[10] *Ibid*., p.27-28.

human life process itself.[11] Raw materials are transformed by labourers using the common tools; hence, any aspect of the life process is produced. Despite that, when the balance of these three factors are shifted due to the legal structure, the life itself begins to be consumed; it becomes a raw material along with labourers who become the tools of property owners, and the capital becomes the force that sustains this activity that exploits people's lives.

Once private property is required to be justified, the commodification of labour must be justified as well in order to legalise the activities inherent to the capitalist mode of production. Hobbes lived in England when feudalism was fighting against the rising market economy. Almost a hundred years later, Smith records different modes of production performed in his era. Despite differences, Hobbes and Smith accept private property as necessary and assume labour as an exchange commodity.

Hobbes's theory is to bring peace to the brutal exchange relations by suggesting 'subjects' to transfer their rights to the authority. In his approach, individuals are the tools of authority. On the other hand, Smith suggests removing authority's restrictions on trade procedures to free the exchange activity. He insists that countries and individuals both have the best outcome if commercial activity is not restricted. Though they claim that their discourses are scientific theories, indeed, they are bear the mark of their free market ideology. They argue that what they found to be 'laws' have a truth value because they presuppose that specific characteristics inherent to man's nature cause those laws.

Contrary to Aristotle's conception of *physis*, Hobbes thinks that natural and political aspects of human existence are two opposite things that could not exist together. According to him, man has specific faculties, and behaves egotistically as a result of them. 'State of nature' emanating from those behaviours is a constant

[11] *Ibid.*

war; thus, 'laws of nature' suggest that individuals leave their 'natural' existence behind. Hobbes serves his theory as a hypothetical thought experiment. However, once he describes 'natural' elements of men, other philosophers follow this fashion interpreting it by relating natural and political aspects considering empirical observations of different parts of the world. In the period of Smith, some of them were already discussed in depth the natural and political elements of human existence. According to Smith, though man is selfish, there is a sense of justice inherent to the nature of man. 'Laws of natural justice' is bound that keeps human beings as political entities, which is found out upon the natural sense of justice common to all human beings.

With the belief that the concept of nature refers to the universal character of a species, 'scientific' activity carries new 'inventions'. Laws issued by authority and commodification of labour founded upon those inventions are justified with a deterministic approach to human beings. His nature determines the character of man, and he cannot act otherwise. According to Hobbes and Smith, competition is the fundamental drive of man regardless of time and place. While Hobbes's consideration was to abolish that nature, Smith's was to make it a 'fair game'. However, the history of property relations shows that competition is the behaviour of the actors of market society. Considering the consequences of Hobbes's and Smith's thoughts, it is apparent that these two philosophers contribute to the consolidation of existing exchange relations.

The following chapters present the analysis of the characteristics of these relations, and how Hobbes and Smith interpret them. The first section of the chapter on Hobbes deals with the criticism of his method, which reduces human beings to a "system of self-moving, self-guided matter in motion."[12] The following section focuses on his concept of the good and his approach to life and happiness. Since he regards human beings as isolated matters in motion, these

[12] C. B. MacPherson, *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p.18.

beings necessarily produce selfish desires. In the last section, his description of the 'state of war' —resulting from man's constant drive for competition, glory, and diffidence— produced by isolated human beings is discussed as his pretext for the social contract theory. He derives necessity from his description of human nature to base his assertive theory empowered by 'laws of nature'. The rules that constitute moral obligations through nineteen articles.

The second chapter is an attempt to comprehend Smith's approach to human beings. In the first section, his analysis of language is criticised, focusing on the self-centred motive that he attributes to men in primitive society. Besides, his approach to the division of labour is examined in terms of collective property and private property. The following section investigates his records of Europe after the fall of Rome and how new associations were formed on abandoned lands. The process pertaining to production relations in those lands forms a new class, 'the burgers', and reflects their motives. This historical approach demonstrates the expansion of market relations and the urge for labour to be commodified. In the final section, Smith's moral theory is studied, criticising his normative turn of expression by which he explains what moral sentiments are, and prescribes virtues that could sustain the existence of the market.

In the third chapter, the common and different interpretations of Hobbes and Smith concerning human nature are comparatively criticised. The most significant issue in this analysis is the struggle between the characteristics of authoritarian governance and the characteristics of market society. These two sets of features give clues about Hobbes's and Smith's approaches to human beings. How Hobbes depicts human nature is similar to the qualities of the sovereign he imagines: irrational, capable of killing, has right to do everything. He observes exchange relations in a coming-to-be market society and defines competition as the fundamental motive of man. According to him, this nature of man must be abolished so that the 'body politic' can be substituted and protected by an

omnipotent sovereign. Smith also thinks that the competition is the motive of human actions, yet, his attitude towards this motive is supportive. He believes that the competition as free activity of human beings is beneficial for both individuals and the state. In other words, Hobbes and Smith think that people act by calculating their own profits; however, Hobbes wants this nature to be suppressed, Smith offers it to be reproduced.

In the conclusion, the anthropological interpretation of the power relations and the link between the actors of those relations are investigated. It is apparent in this interpretation that primitive societies do not accept an authority that forces or forbids them to do something. However, with the expanse of private property, laws and regulations regarding relations of property are required to be protected by a superior authority. Once superiority forces moral obligations rendered from private property, it begins to produce new rules and compels human beings to establish relations based on economic structure forced by the state authority.

CHAPTER I

THE HUMAN CONCEPTION OF THOMAS HOBBES

The conflict between medieval tradition and modernity brings forth a series of crises concerning knowledge, state governance, and property. Hobbes lived in the seventeenth century when a power struggle between property owners and the Monarch had culminated. In the introduction of Hobbes's book *Behemoth*, Stephan Holmes describes the actors of this era as they were "bewitched by irrational passions and tragically misled by doctrinal errors."[13]

In Christian doctrine, subjects are created and determined by God, and there is a hierarchical and authoritative relationship between God and human beings: the latter must unconditionally obey to the former. Representing the divinity, the Church enforces the moral rules transmitted from God through the Bible to the subjects, and controls the community members with the fear of divine justice, while the king or queen had the right to the adjudication as a representative of God. Similarly, yet without any ecclesiastical framework, Hobbes composes a juridical core. Both Christian doctrine and Hobbesian framework intimidate human beings with the uncertainty of the future and assign the fear of death as the 'essence' of human existence.

Hobbes observes the issues the British society of that period had to deal with and proposes peace by inventing the social contract theory. The theory he devises suggests a society under the rules of the sovereign who has absolute power over his subjects. In order to base his theory, he gives a detailed description of human nature and behaviours such that necessity results from that nature. He expresses the nature of things as *automata* and explains all relations as mechanical processes; a human being as an engine is capable of sensing, imagining, thinking, and acting through cause and effect relations.

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[13] Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth*, p.2.

According to Hobbes, men are selfish matters in motion, and they survive by exploiting each other; thus, they are required to be rewarded and punished by a sovereign to follow their 'conscience'. Otherwise, they are condemned to be in the 'state of nature' that comprises 'the war of all against all'. His hypothetical theory composed of three phases of society; state of nature, state of the contract, and state of society. He claims that there is no society in the state of nature; individuals are entirely isolated and disassociated. Besides, the moral and legal structure should be constituted with the contact to prevent war.

In his book *Leviathan*, Hobbes presents the commonwealth as the sum of all men in society, and since it is constituted by the population, it represents an artificial man; the character of the sovereign. Besides, he declares that a sovereign who governs the 'nation' must 'read' himself and all the mankind[14], and analyses the powers of human nature.

I.I. Faculties of Body and Mind

Hobbes regards a human being as an engine, and this engine's desires, thoughts, and behaviours are determined by a mechanical processes. He gives an objective appearance to this mechanical process by explaining it through causality-based power relations. In *The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic,* he explains human faculties as two sorts of power; faculties of the body and faculties of the mind. He calls these as 'natural' powers which also present two definitions of man; animal, and rational. He sums up the faculties of the body in three headings; power nutritive, power motive, and power generative.[15] The faculties of the mind is

[14] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.5 [x-ii].
[15] Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law*, Nature & Politic, p.2.

divided in two; cognitive or imaginative or conceptive; and motive.[16] As the division proceeds, each power produces different capabilities.

Hobbes regards the force of human action as the *power motive.*[17] He recounts that the consistency of images or representations of the qualities of 'external things' in motion is processed through cognitive capacity. He calls this capacity as *power cognitive*, or *conceptive*, the power of knowing or conceiving.[18] He declares that conceptions proceeding from the actions of the matters are discerned by sense organs, "and the thing by whose action the same is produced is called the *object* of sense."[19] The conception of qualities resulted from the relevant sense organs is caused by the quality or *nature* of the external object, and the humans reconstruct 'the object' in the mind.

According to Hobbes, motion is the primary quality and it is inherent in the object, and motion of the object causes impression on sense organs transmitting the secondary qualities such as sound, color, smell, texture and taste. For instance, sound is not inherent in the object but an effect caused by the motion of the object. He gives an example; echoes are the multiplication of original sound, and since they are not in one and the same place, they cannot be inherent in the body who produce them: "the clapper hath not sound in it, but motion, and maketh motion in the internal parts of the bell so the bell hath motion, and not sound."[20]

He concludes that things in the 'external' world are the objects by which motion is initiated. When a man acts or the external motion presses his body, *power motive* makes him reveal an outward image, concept, or representation. Since sensation is an image in our perception, how can one have a correct knowledge of

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[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*, p.21.
[18] Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law*, Nature & Politic, p.2.
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*, p.5.

the thing? And following this, how can human beings communicate if they are only matters in motion?

There is one prominent faculty for Hobbes that makes perception and communication possible; *power cognitive* —manifested from the counter-pressure and gains capabilities throughout human development. He assumes that the thing called 'object' possesses all the qualities called *sensible* by motion, and this motion of the object causes the body to act and produce a *fancy*[21], including these qualities. Representations of qualities are relative in terms of each human's cognition, yet the qualities themselves are attributed to the entity with motion as its motion. Accordingly, fancy has this constant motion, but the sensible qualities are not inherent in the object. It implies a necessary connection between motion and fancy, but Hobbes does not explain why this link should occur in a material realm with causality.

If the act of perception is not competent in imparting knowledge of the thing but constitutes data in continuous motion, then there is no evidence to say that representation is caused by an object. For an impression to occur, it requires active and passive elements; perceiver and perceived. However, since there is no evidence to say that the motion of the object is identical to the motion of human cognition, there is no reason to claim that the human mind becomes active by external pressure. Activeness and passiveness should occur symmetrically within the moment that the impression occurs.

To be able to detect the qualities, one has to be capable of distinguishing and isolating the data received. Hobbes calls this practice *train of thoughts* and dissociates it from *discourse in words*, and names the former *mental discourse*.[22] There are two kinds of train of thoughts: unguided and regulated. As the *train of*

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[21] The etymology of the word *fantasia* manifests that receiving and constituting data process is not limited to the sense organs but also names.
[22] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.12 [9-10].

thoughts unguided is regulated by some desire or design of an agent —human or animal—, one generates thoughts of some means to achieve a goal.

Hobbes considers any living being in motion as an isolated automata; however, aiming for something requires a differentiation between the aim and the tools, which should emerge after an experiential process. In the process of sensation, our sense organs are passive in the sense that they take and transfer to the mind whatever data they receive; but when it comes to having an idea of an end and means, the power cognitive enters into play. Considering the agent's desire, it can learn to desire as a consequence of an experience that includes meeting its needs continuously by an activity it establishes with the other. Mutual activity seems to be the entrance for a human being to encounter an outer world.

Hobbes asserts that *the train of thoughts regulated* functions in terms of survival. In addition, he gives an explanation of the distinction between humans and all other creatures on earth. *Train of thoughts*, when they are regulated by *discourse in words*, "the mind of man has no other motion, thought by the help of speech and method."[23] Hobbes imagines a man that had no use of speech at all: "If he set his eyes a triangle, and two right angles, (...) he may by mediation, compare and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to those two right angles that stand by it."[24] He concludes that a man without speech cannot *remember* the rule that he discovered —since he does not know the words to count 'three' and use the term 'triangle'.

The case of the man without speech demonstrates that a man is capable of detecting and isolating a quality from the rest without the input of speech. Even so, how does man unify the data as a singular object of particular qualities? The man without speech is capable of discovering the equality, yet he has to rediscover

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[23] *Ibid.*, p.15 [15-18].
[24] *Ibid*., p.18 [14-15].

when another consequence of the same equality happens. This reveals that the generalisation of a rule is within the realm of possibility when judgment comes to light.

A rule in Euclidean space can be universalised because identity is conceivable within that flawless topography. However, our perceptual object is produced by our sense organs. We may visualise through its discovered rules, but we do not encounter geometrical objects —or an individual is not identical to another. Notwithstanding that, Hobbes considers humans as equals; he detects the survival interests of a specific period of history and calls them 'human nature'. Why would Hobbes's judgment be effectual? Since man is ignorant in the realm of fancy, how is he able to claim the truth considering that realm?

The desire of the knowledge of the fact produced by mental activity ends with a presumption of '*it will be*, or *it will not be*, or *it has been* or *has not been*', all of which is *opinion* in the inquiry of the truth of *past*, and *future*.[25] Absolute knowledge of the fact is beyond the limits of possibility, and "the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future is called *judgement*. (...) the whole chain of opinions alternate in the question of true or false is called *doubt*."[26] In this case, judgment is an opinion that should always be considered with doubt. So as to the opinion of the fact is a fancy of *remembrance*, Hobbes acquires 'conditional science' through *consequences of words*. He argues that through general affirmations and syllogisms, the last sum or conclusion is at most 'conditional knowledge'. How does it differ from the opinion?

Conceptualisation through the operation of *speech* leads *mental discourse* in an unequivocal course of action. Words remark patterns and transmute them as notes of remembrance. Hobbes argues that remembrance is practical for calculating

[25] *Ibid.*, p.35 [49-52].
[26] *Ibid.*

words, to register causes of anything that is found out by cognition, present or past, and what is found out in the present or in the past may produce an effect.[27] And he assigns this as the ratiocination activity of the *reason*. What he calls *science* is to seek the causal relations between one fact upon another because he believes that "when we see how anything comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects."[28] It seems that this is merely a belief; how our cognition convinces us that dependence of one fact upon another is real.

Let the discussion go on with the premise of Hobbes: 'the things that are in the world without us are motions by objects' which also explains man as an isolated matter in motion. How does this judgment arise? It is what fancy consists of, thus turning to be actual by opinion at the moment *affirmation* defeats *negation*, so *doubt* disappears. Since the counterpart of the motion in the objects is various sensations in human beings, and fancy is constructed mentally; he cannot ensure with his premise that even if fancy corresponds to something or not. Contrarily, human mind tends to justify 'the external realm' in order to affirm the 'internal' one. Hobbes seems to allege it to detect some patterns out of that realm and call them 'nature'. The patterns produced by humans for survival.

The body has to maintain its survival by the satisfaction of its needs, which means that it is not self-sufficient. That being the case, the calculation or ratiocination is merely the limited function of reason which performs in conformity with possessing the externality to sustain physical existence. Since survival depends on the 'external world', ratiocination implies a tool of generating the necessary conditions for needs to be complied with, the knowledge of the specific object or situation. Conceptualising the future associated with past experiences following the rules possessed is prominently a conditioned activity of reason which gives

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[27] *Ibid*. p.17 [18-21].
[28] *Ibid.* p.25 [32-35].

man a tool to produce opinions or judgments perpetually. The history of human interactions is fraught with common opinions —what can be considered as conscience. A human being may obtain some of them, or try to contemplate a new understanding.

If Hobbes's presumption of isolated human nature is disregarded, there is no basis to say that reason is a faculty located in the body and limited by its nature. The empirical world where he detects new rules seems to be the creation of human activity. The experiential process whereby humans gain capabilities and what kind of needs these capabilities serve is tied to the historical process and human artefacts that will be sought out and discussed in the conception of human nature by Adam Smith.

I.II. The Relativity of Good and Evil

Hobbes approaches human actions in terms of the opposition between *appetite* and *aversion*, which leads men to desire and love *the good*, or omit something by aversion and hate *that evil*. He claims that the motion caused by the actions of the things triggers *power motive* to constitute a fancy to create an act in mind. When interior motion is upon an object, the passion named 'desire' presents itself. As long as the object is obtained for pleasure, man swells with the passion called *delight*; otherwise, the sense of occurring motion is called *trouble of mind*. These passions have their roots in men's biological existence. Since the body insists on certain urges, human cognition is retained to behave in a certain manner, which presents a differentiation between the end and the means to achieve that end to hold delight resulting from the action involved.

However, for a human's desire to be upon an object, he must learn how to constitute an object first. Since human beings cannot attain further knowledge

regarding what is beyond the fancy, there is no evidence that *appetite* and *aversion* are caused by the object. Hobbes indicates the origins of the notions of *appetite* and *aversion* in Latin, which point out the motions of approaching and retiring.[29] These two directions of motion between attaining and avoiding should relate to the body's survival sensations throughout the experiential process before fancy occurs. If the premise *tabula rasa* is accepted, a human should learn distinguishing, to understand the difference between the end and the means to achieve that end.

Hobbes analyses human actions from the point of the relativity of good and evil. He underlines a distinction between desire and love as well as aversion and hate; by desire and aversion, a man signifies the absence of the object; by love and hate, the presence of the object.[30] Furthermore, a man calls the object of his desire *good* and the object of his aversion *evil*, and since the constitution of a man's body is in 'continual mutation', it is impossible for the same object to always cause the same appetites and aversions in him.[31] The whole operation works upon the existence of the object; the presence of an object of desire affirms the feeling of *love* because it possesses the qualities a human being needs and calls *good* at that moment.

Since human is a biological organism with survival needs, to end each of the endless discomforts, eventually, man must learn how to participate in an activity using his tools. A man appears to be taught to aim in a very distinct manner which pushes him to use the tools or the *objects* around him for any *pain* to go away and to preserve *delight*. For the reason that human learns (how to locate a pain by being fulfilled repeatedly, imagine an end for that specific pain, and detect means

[29] *Ibid.*, p.28 [23-25].
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*

to achieve that end) entirely within the mutual activity, desire for anything could be conceptualised all over the experiential process.

Hobbes surveys the *good* in English language in three concepts; "good in the promise, that is *pulchrum*[32]; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called *delightful*; and good as the means, which is called *utile*, *profitable*."[33] He declares that there are two sorts of aims or ends of actions, nearer and farther, and the things which please a man as the way to a farther end is called *profitable*.[34] The nature of human action Hobbes describes proceeds by the calculation of its necessary survival prosperity. However, it appears that a man is conditioned by historical human activity to interact with the world by calculating *profitable* tools.

Hobbes discusses *felicity* as a continual pleasure and distinguishes two kinds of pleasure: pleasures related to body and those related to mind. Sensual pleasures are for a man to preserve his individual self. Besides, *joy* is pleasure, and *grief* is the pain of the mind which "arise from the expectation that proceeds from the foresight of the end or consequence of things."[35] All the passions in mind he postulates are derived from appetite and aversion, love and hate, joy and grief. He describes a set of the passions starting with hope and despair, and builds a train of sentiments accompanied by the act of attaining and avoiding, which drives him to define felicity as maintaining the desired passions of the body and the mind.

Consequently, he thinks that a society abstracted from political authority will be in struggle, as men ought to seek power towards each other to boost their power in order to maintain individual felicity. He describes a scene where each individual manipulates and uses others as tools to make profit. Moreover, he assigns this calculation ability as 'nature' to human beings. Hereat, the conduct of men in the

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[32] *Fair, beautiful, handsome, gallant, honourable, amiable.*
[33] *Ibid.,* p.29 [39-42].
[34] Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law*, Nature & Politic, p.23.
[35] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.30 [25-27].

state of nature is composed of *competition*, *diffidence*, and *glory*, which will be analysed in the following section, and concluded that the scene that Hobbes builds from a man to society is a problematic deduction.

Hobbes deems the process of human choices estimating appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning the same thing. The process which he calls *deliberation* comprises calculating the good and evil consequences of related action; "the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes, and fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible."[36] Besides, the last appetite or aversion before the action is called the act of willing.[37] He highlights that the matters in motion cause conceptions, and the object of the conception causes appetite and aversion, which causes a precedent deliberation that ends with the will; finally, a voluntary act is set.[38] He then clarifies the voluntary actions bearing the conditioning process regarding reward and punishment, as if to say, hope and fear, in the realm of opinions. He claims that the cause of men's appetites and fears are proceed from the idea of reward and punishment, consequently, "our wills follow our opinions, as our actions follow our wills."[39]

Hope and fear are essential manners in Hobbes' approach to the human community as he upbuilds social contract theory over a desire for peace, which develops out of fear of death and hope for a commodious life. Each man "has a perpetual and restless desire of power after power"[40], and it is because they aim to use their present means to ensure future benefits. The 'natural' powers of men are instrumentally used to obtain more power, which leads to a condition of 'war' that he describes as the 'state of nature'.

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[36] *Ibid.*, p.33 [45-49].
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law*, Nature & Politic, p.47.
[39] *Ibid.*, p.48.
[40] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.58 [47-49].

In Hobbes' approach to human actions, all the elements of the *good* procured are utilised on behalf of the individual needs of human beings. He asserts that "there is no such a thing as s*ummum bonum*"[41], and "felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another." The objects of desire of men are not only to enjoy once but also to ensure their future desires, so men's voluntary acts tend to procure and ensure a contented life.[42] To sum up, Hobbes concludes that men are greedy engines; they act upon self-interest, their felicity depends on exploiting the goods and each other to make profits, and they need peace because, in the state of nature, they are also hostile to each other.

I.III. Justice of the Commonwealth

Hobbes's approach to human beings is explored in the first two sections regarding how they constitute conceptions. He presupposes that motion of the brain, which is called 'conception', proceeds to the heart and produces passions; men take notice of the passions they named —from the innumerable things that please and displease— in a few, of which also are many without name. He cites that there are three sorts of conceptions; *sense, remembrance*, and *expectation*. And he considers the power of men, either natural or instrumental, as "present means to obtain future apparent good".[43]

He compiles the greatest instruments of human powers and points out that engaging in their power is the most delightful practice that men could participate; the conception of the future is a presumption proceeding from the remembrance of the past as men become aware that there is something in the present that has the power to produce hereafter the future. He states that in addition to the natural

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[41] Greatest good.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.*, p.50 [41-42].

abilities of the body and the mind, there are such further powers that are instrumentally used as powers of their nature. The signs such as actions, gestures, countenance, and speech are the signs by which men acknowledge their power and the signs by which other men know, and this acknowledgement of power is called *honour*.[44]

Hobbes defines *honour* as a competitive society's benchmark. Since the "joy arising from the imagination of a man's power and ability is the exultation of the mind called glorying"[45], in the state of nature, *glory* is the fundamental passion that leads to conflict —because it is a pleasure of the conceptualisation of the future as well as personal power above the power of someone in dispute. Self-aggrandisement or oppression, he reveals, is seemingly the manipulative power of *speech*. He points to the abuse of speech with these words: "Nature had armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve him with the tongue."[46] It appears that speech is the tool that comprises both doing science and cunning; in a sense, good and evil.

Hobbes addresses humans as equals by their 'natural' behaviours and finds out three principal causes of argument in the state of nature; *competition*, *diffidence*, and *glory*.[47] Glory is the power of the 'reputation' that men seek for, which is examined presently. The primary conflict in the state of nature is the need for commodities in a scarcity situation. To the point that humans believe in their abilities equally, their hope in attaining the ends are also equally appropriated, "therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies."[48] Moreover, if a man controls the power of

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[44] Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law*, Nature & Politic, p.26.
[45] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.31 [43-45].
[46] *Ibid.*, p.17 [18-21].
[47] *Ibid.*, p.76 [61-63].
[48] *Ibid.*, p.75 [109-112].

another to invade for goods, other invaders may then unite to dispose of his life or liberty, so the invaders are permanently at risk of other invasions. From a *competitive* climate where the engines compete to fuel with the resources to move, *diffidence* (constant fear of being attacked) proceeds. Diffidence leads humans to attack others in order not to be attacked. These three arguments in the 'state of nature' form a vicious cycle that does not include an outrun; since one and all of men must attack another to protect his possessions, this invasion cycle produces a state of 'war'.

Hobbes describes a state of nature in which individuals are necessarily potential enemies to each another because they are preconditioned to attack to survive. Thereupon, he associates 'peace' with 'a common power that keeps them in awe'. The situation he describes seems to have a historical context that evolved into his era's power struggle. By abstracting a society from a civil war, with the remembrance of its former prosperous era —which was under the domination of a government, he justifies political authority. Moreover, he devises an agreement by using the reason as a tool, asserting that it suggests convenient articles of peace to be followed by people who fear death, and desire necessary things for commodious living; therefore, they would drawn to agreement.[49] The dictates of reason allied with the right of nature that he prescribes have a universal path under the name of 'laws of nature'.

Following the rules of reason leads to the establishment of a contract. Through the use of the contract, the sovereign becomes the protector of *justice* and *property*; without contract, these notions are not binding in the state of nature. First, he describes a state of nature where humans seek power for securing individual goods; afterwards, by basing the fundamental human passions as 'fear of death' and 'hope for a contented life' in 'natural war' circumstances, he qualifies a safe route to make a bolt for 'peace'.

[49] *Ibid.*, p.78 [63-64].

He begins his arguments by clarifying the distinction between *right* and *law*: right is the liberty to do or forbear, while law defines and binds to one of them: therefore law and right differ as much as *obligation* and *liberty*, which are contradictory in the same thing.[50] He then describes the right of nature as the liberty of each man in using his own power for preservation of his life, which in his judgment and reason.[51]

Hobbes emphasises that preservation of individual life is the most crucial task in the 'condition of war', thereby 'every man has right to everything', even to kill others to survive. Therefore reason dictates the first general rule, which commands "*to seek peace, and follow it*."[52] The second rule contributes to the contract theory by dictating the idea of the 'right to everything' must be laid down with an agreement which proposes that each participant must mutually transfer their rights to an overwhelming power, to whom who is willing to protect them. As transferring the natural rights, men become obliged to those whom such right is granted. The notion of justice gradually dawns. Hobbes decides to develop a law above the rules, which keeps men in awe; the third law of nature, *justice*. He builds an indissoluble bond between justice and sovereignty through nineteen laws of nature. Three of them are cited, and the rest will be summed as his contribution to 'moral philosophy'.

Hobbes simulates each man as a judge in the state of nature, so there is no place for accusation which is based on positive laws; but if the rights are transferred through the contract, in this civil state, "the accusation is followed with punishment, which being a force, a man is not obliged not to resist."[53] Then he paves the way for the conditions of civil obedience resulted from insecurity. As a man transfers any right, he is also obliged to transfer "the means of enjoying it, as

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[50] *Ibid.*, p.79 [115-117].
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*, p.80 [64-65].
[53] *Ibid.*, p.87 [126-129].

far as lieth in his power."[54] In this case, men become organs of the *Leviathan* to function by using their power to exploit and triumph upon the universal run.

Since Hobbes believes that the object of men's voluntary acts is 'good to self', to ground the contract theory with the good, he outlines three unalienable rights that serve as liberty: i. the right of resisting to any force that assault to take away his life; ii. the same for imprisonment; iii. the means of preserving life.[55] The rest of the rights are alienable on behalf of peace. For the covenants made to perform following 'peace', the third rule of reason, justice should be guarded by a coercive power that exists after the erection of a commonwealth. Hobbes indicates that there is no property in the state of nature, but somehow, the main trouble is about property. Since the 'condition of war' is caused by the competition for goods in scarcity, private property becomes the primary issue of justice. He remarks that when the covenants are valid under the authority of the commonwealth, then the propriety begins.[56]

After the alienable rights are transferred, the covenant is made, and justice and property are guaranteed by the sovereign; Hobbes tries to specify what just and unjust actions are, and how those actions shall be judged by civil laws under the political authority. The other laws of nature are, in brief, telling men what is normal to do, to feel, and to act. Hobbes calls these descriptive rules 'moral philosophy'. From the eleventh to nineteenth law of nature, he specifies the terms and conditions of equity, witnesses, judge, and justice. He summarises the rules with this statement; "*Do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself*".[57] For him, laws of nature are eternal, and they oblige in conscience always, but only in effect where there is security.[58] Also, humans' judgment

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[54] *Ibid.*
[55] *Ibid.*, p.82 [120-123].
[56] *Ibid.*, p.89 [129-131].
[57] *Ibid.*, p.99 [142-145].
[58] *Ibid.,* p.100 [79-81].

considering the fact might be erroneous. He addresses a tie among judgment and conscience; though a man who is not subject to civil laws follows his own reason and commits a sin against his conscience; he lives in a commonwealth, where there is the law as public conscience, by which he is undertaken to be guided.[59]

The rules delivered from common opinions refer to conscience; therefore, how could the 'laws of nature' he detects be the essential rules of human reason? What is the source of these commands? What is 'public conscience'? The first general rule, *to seek peace, and follow it,* reveals that the 'needs' of the era that Hobbes lived in dictated 'peace' to the common or 'right reason'.

In his book *Private Property: The History of an Idea*, Richard Schlatter pictures the contract theory as "a revolutionary theory serving the middle classes in their battles with royal absolutism."[60] The conflict that arises between the middle class and royalty in that era indicates a power struggle which presents itself as a series of civil wars. Even though Hobbes claims that it is an abstracted state of nature, the condition he describes is an actual war condition; and his book *Levithan* was published in 1651, two years after the second English Civil War had ended up along with the execution of Charles I, and the republic was introduced.

Hobbes wrote a dialogue titled *Behemoth* inspecting the English Civil War. In the first two chapters, characters of the book —an observer of the war and a student— discuss the causes of the war, focusing on the actors of that era. There are plenty of events and people in the period, but only some of them that are subjected to this dissertation will be considered. To acknowledge the relevance of Hobbes' approach, three leading powers and their motives should be examined.

The first power is the ruler; the Monarch. During the war, Charles Stuart was the King of England, Scotland, and Ireland; a united kingdom left by James Stuart.

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[59] *Ibid.*, p.212 [168-170].
[60] Richard Schlatter, *Private Property: The History of an Idea*, p.124.

Hobbes describes him as a tyrant: "a man that wanted no virtue, either of body or mind, nor endeavoured anything more than to discharge his duty towards God, in the well governing of his subjects."[61] The absolute rule of King Charles I was irritating the entire realm, although most of the population believed in God and accepted his divine rule as the King.

The second one is the power of belief that generates morality. The Christian doctrine developed a crisis that culminated in the aggregation of the Church into antagonistic forces. The doctrine seems to be controlled and manipulated by the Emperors as regarded to their political line. According to Hobbes, there were three varieties of Christian actors who had contributed to the circumstances of war; Presbyterians, Papists, and Independents.[62] Charles I was imposing arbitrary religious policies, and finally, the Presbyterian resistance started in Scotland.

The third one is the Parliament, a united economic power counter to the King. The conflict between the Monarch and the Parliament was long-standing strife in England. In the course of the rule of Charles I, the Parliament had been abolished in 1629 and did not summon until 1640, till the King's treasury hit very low to wage war against the Presbyterian rebellions in Scotland. Although the House of Lords and Commons had discordance in between, they met on common ground and refused to provide the money to the King, plus took the occasion to dominate him. The former Parliament demanded some rights called Petition of Right (concerning the economy, the King was prohibited from raising taxes without the commission's consent); however, the re-associated Parliament imposed more to have a clear voice in legislative, judicial, and executive powers.

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[61] Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth*, p.104.

[62] Independents were coteries who interpret the Bible privately. The Papists believed that the Christian people should be ruled by the Pope, who they thought was Christ's vicar. Lastly, Presbyterians called themselves as ministers of Christ; "and sometimes, in their sermons to the people; they claim to have a right from God to rule each one of his parishes, and the entire nation in their assembly." *Ibid.*, p.105.

Indeed, the anarchy that led to the outbreak of war was a power struggle between the republic's leaders and the monarchy —which, for Hobbes, ended up with an oligarchy. The warfare was consisted of the domination contest over governance. The Parliament was affected to monarch but intended to prevent the King's absolute power "and bring the government to a mixed monarchy, as they called it; wherein the absolute sovereignty should be divided between the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons."[63]

The events occurred with the intention of dividing the ruling power, but the second warfare ended up with the King's execution by the Rump Parliament. The House of Commons —which represents the general public— had formerly proclaimed the supreme power of the state to be in their control; they voted for the House of Lords to be useless and dangerous.[64] Hobbes calls the consequences of this domination an oligarchy.

The oligarchy ended up with the authority of Oliver Cromwell, who was the commander of the army during the wars. He strengthened his hand with treasury received from taxes, all of which was his own in the right of the army.[65] The supreme power shifted to Cromwell, "who was obeyed as general of all the forces in England, Scotland, and Ireland."[66] The wars could be summed up as a power struggle between the property owners and the King, and how they defeated the King to claim legislative power. The Commonwealth of England was constituted, and the cardinal power that the Parliament succeeded in was to ensure its existence until today.

The King's authority derives its power from God, yet Hobbes manages to legitimise the authority without any religious doctrine. The power of sovereignty

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[63] *Ibid.*, p.128.
[64] *Ibid.*, p.224.
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] *Ibid.*, p.225.

he constitutes against the kingdom of God presents another faith; consideration of the human beings as determined and limited not by God but their mechanical nature. Thus, they remain in the state of war if their nature is not eliminated from the society. Each individual's liberty in the sovereign state is to save their own life, yet elected sovereign justifies utilising the society to get profits by manipulating them with the doctrine of the 'right reason'.

How Hobbes discusses the seducers of the war could be scanned as a state of human behaviours, beliefs, actions, and praxis. The state of nature he accounts for seems to reflect this society; greedy merchants, smart alecks, faithful successors, broke people roaring to war, and the despotic royals who lost out on. The question was to acknowledge why Hobbes' theory of the social contract based on the notion of justice in a fashion that reason commands men 'to seek peace and follow it'. Competition, diffidence, and glory appear to be the human behaviours in some circumstances of a particular era. It is very problematic to accept it as an essential human nature and assign it to all times and places.

Since there is no *own* in the state of nature, where does this idea of property come from? How did it rule human society in such a manner to make them self-interested? Adam Smith might answer these questions in his book *The Wealth of Nations*, which will be examined in the following chapter. The main issue is that the notion of 'property' is a rule constituted by humans, which then became the ruler of them in the 'state of nature'.

CHAPTER II

THE HUMAN CONCEPTION OF ADAM SMITH

Amidst all technological inventions in the eighteenth century's Scotland, philosophers were examining human beings in relation to the societies they live in. Most of them adopted the idea that an individual is a reflection of society, who explores the rules by himself through communication. Following the Scottish approach, Smith holds the idea of humans' progressive nature. He discusses humans as social beings since he assays them according to their historical activity depending on the relations of production. His records of the different societies infer the idea that there is no eternal 'state of nature' or essential human character. However, he attributes competition as an essential human motive in general. In this chapter, his approach to human societies will be examined focusing on the link that he sets between property, labour, and justice.

Smith investigates relations of property within the context of 'natural history'. Though his observations prove that private property is instituted by historical human actions, he analyses it as a natural right possessed by the first occupier. His analysis of 'natural history' tells that different modes of production influenced the ruling 'nature' of human beings. He compiles a chronology from his observations of different societies; for the Age of Hunters, he states the North American savages; for the Age of Shepherds, the Tartars and Arabians; for the Age of Agriculture, the North American Indians; and for the Age of Commerce, Europe.

He states that humanity passes through from one age to another by production procedures, and "in these severall ages of society, the laws and regulations with regard to property must be very different."[67] *Theft* is the first crime to be punished, which emerged in the age of shepherds with the rise of the idea of appropriation. The first rule carries with it further laws and regulations. As the

[67] Adam Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, p.16.

'subjects' of private property increased in the age of commerce, laws and regulations became "necessary to maintain justice and prevent infringements of the right of property."[68] First, humans began to possess nature, and with the rise of commerce society, they started to own estate and tools as private property.

Each issue in Smith's philosophy is connected to the commerce society and its actors' characteristics. By introducing the virtues of commerce, he explains the basis for 'natural' passions to be suppressed and 'unsocial' feelings to be trained. According to him, humans examine their own actions and become a judge themselves after they continually observing the conduct of others and sketch a set of rules resulting from their experiences. In his representation, a well-ordered society consists of moral agents who calculate what ought to be done or not, pertaining to the rules they observe. It appears that human activity created the rule of property, and it had to be justified as a natural right for the market to grow. Thus, the rules of morality and legality had to be initiated; the rules justify nature as a material and human life as a tool.

II.I. Fragmentation of Labour

In his context of the division of labour, Smith treats human capacities as individual powers that increase the wealth of the countries. He disregards the idea of collective production and estimates the human collective as an association united out of exchange relations where there are members who calculate individual profits. In this section, Smith's study of language will be criticised, focusing on the connecting link between language and property according to collective life; and how humans as political beings are identified with personal attributes. This criticism will lead to his justification of property as labour which

[68] *Ibid*.

seems to be formed in order to justify the occurring exchange relations. Throughout the growth of the commerce network, labourers had lost their grasp on production activity, and forced to exchange their labour by creating the simplest part of a good. Even though Smith expresses it as economic growth, it will be discussed in this section that he justifies exploitation with his arguments.

Smith argues that the degrees of abstraction using linguistic abilities indicate the mental progress of mankind. He conjures up two savages who are not taught to speak, and bred up remotely from any society. He suggests that when they meant to denote certain objects, they would naturally begin to form a language by uttering certain sounds, with the aim of making their mutual wants intelligible to each other.[69] He emphasises that they would name particular objects concerning their needs, such as *shelter*, *hunger*, and *thirst*, which are denominated by the words *cave*, *tree*, and *fountain*, or by whatever they think proper to mark them.[70]

If they behove to point out a new object that appears to be almost the same but a little different from the one they named before, they would naturally call the new one with the same word. Smith concludes that a species is simply a collection of objects that share some degree of similarity, and are therefore given a single name that can be used to describe all of them.

When a specific object is to be mentioned, it must be distinguished from the other objects that share the same general name; hence, two other sets of words are required; "the one should express quality; the other, relation."[71] Smith continues with the function of adjectives and prepositions to categorise the objects. To qualify something is a personal expression, and "qualities are almost always the objects of our external senses; relations never are."[72] An adjective is a general and

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[69] Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1853)*, p.507.
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] *Ibid.,* p.510.
[72] *Ibid.,* p.516.

abstract word, and it must indicate the concept of a particular species that was generalised before. The word green denotes the peculiar quality of an object, and it is considered as equally applicable to any other object who possesses the same quality.[73]

In the precedent of savages, Smith does not mention how two men bred up; could learn to need; be sheltered, drink, and eat, to point out a particular object. As soon as a human is born, he passively listens, and the only sound he can make is screaming to get rid of any kind of discomfort. To create a particular sound like 'o', first, he should learn to differentiate sounds he detects and then imitate them using his tongue and lips. To express something by uttering certain sounds, he should have been taught by 'the other' with sounds and gestures, and he should understand relations between these sounds and concepts. The first sentiences he tries to express with sounds seem to be the feelings. After hearing specific patterns repeatedly, he could unify a word by implying what content he attributes to it by the company of experience. The first manner for humans to express their mental content seems to be echoey, which could be organised through the experiential process when relations with 'the other' are developed so that the doer could imply a purpose.

For instance, since the body cannot remain alive without drinking, the concept of 'fountain' should be conceptualised by the utterer as something like 'the source of life' with the usage of the capacity of unification over constituted relations with the other. Furthermore, a concept could be pointed out as an object with a particular sound the savages agree on, people shall name 'fountain', after they have learned how to use their hands and fingers to point out different exciting patterns, and to have an understanding about them by engaging. They should be able to ask questions and form judgements. So the savages should be taught to speak and think in a certain manner to form a language by pointing out objects.

[73] *Ibid.,* p.511.

The way humans as an organism are capable of while producing unified concepts as thought is by way of communication. It represents reason's capability of unification through mediation, the capability of unifying the experiential data that rests upon the relations with 'the other'. Therefore, 'bundle of properties' as a unified object has no experiential explanation; a mental operation of a human being is required for the qualities to get together and form an object. Relating two objects, i.e., the relation of a tree and a cave, necessitates a complex mental operation that requires the emergence of prepositions of time and place —so that 'the tree is above the cave' could be associated by someone. A particular tree and a particular cave could be implied after a certain stage of awareness is commenced. It appears that sustaining a 'bundle of properties' requires an agent capable of estimating spatiotemporal relations by words.

Since Smith considers the history of language as the mental development of mankind, it seems that humans could be able to form judgements after their linguistic abilities improved. He considers the impersonal verbs the first words invented. A natural event is unique as it is a combination of several factors; it has no doer, it is cosmos. According to Smith, impersonal verbs represent the perfection of language —before the events divisibly expressed by human beings with the usage of nouns substantive. He educes that the impersonal verbs express a complete event in one word,

> "which preserve in the expression that perfect simplicity and unity, which there always is in the object and in the idea, and which suppose no abstraction, or metaphysical division of the event into its several constituent members of subject and attribute."[74]

Up to this point, the activity and the relations seem to be the prerequisites to express nature. The concept of impersonal verbs is not atomised into its elements; hence, they do not require a subject and object relation; they "express a complete

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[74] *Ibid.*, p.524.

affirmation". To abstract the perfect unity, the division is needed concerning the performer; to "divide the event, as it were, into two parts, the person or subject, and the attribute, or matter of fact, affirmed of that subject."[75] The progress of linguistic abilities seems to give rise to thought as objects when attribution is confirmed by the subject.

Smith examines the division of the event to highlight the imperfection of language following the transformation of verbs from impersonal to personal; "in nature, the idea or conception of Alexander walking, is as perfectly and completely one simple conception, as that of Alexander not walking."[76] He claims that along with the progress of language, almost all verbs have become personal. However, the transition of thought into speech with a substantive verb refers to a singular person, the one who manifests, and also brings out a passive voice attributing to self, i.e., 'I am told'.

The word 'I' is not the name of a species of a kind, "like the word *man* denotes a particular class of objects separated from all others by peculiar qualities of their own."[77] 'I' is a general word, capable of being predicated on an infinite variety of thoughts, "whatever speaks may denote itself by this personal pronoun."[78] It is not rigid and continuously constituted by activity. If 'I' is a thought which indicates the capability of unifying through relations, and it is constituted through the activity of humanity after they developed their linguistic abilities combining with their hands and fingers, then 'the state of being an object' is an artificial state which gives rise to an artificial distinction. A human being could examine and try to tell events after he remembers his experiences in a continuum: "What are called

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[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] *Ibid.*, p.528.
[78] *Ibid.*

the personal pronouns, it may be observed, are among the last words of which children learn to make use."[79]

To sum up, it seems that human beings became able to individuate themselves from the society after linguistic progress initiated with particular rules regarding their activity. This supposition indicates a milestone that admits them to live a political life; have a dialectic relation between self and society. However, Smith's study of production relations illustrates that after individuals became capable of unifying themselves as objects with specific properties, the opposition between collective and private objectives generated tension in societies.

In a society where the life is produced collectively and the goods are shared commonly, there would be no need for accusation or trial. Since the society itself is the productive force, there would be no ruling class. In his book *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith begins to attribute some qualities to human beings and assumes collectivity as a product of division of labour. He argues that the division of labour is a "gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another."[80] He thinks that as a necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, men make contracts distinctly from any other kind of animal.[81] The opposition between collective and private objectives is apparent here if reason is taken to be the 'calculation of words'. In nature, there are lots of species that live collectively. Although they must be communicating to produce in accordance with their differences, they do not have to make contracts. However, men made tools and shared them; and over time, they claimed to own those tools.

Smith interprets the origin of property as a tool for moral justification; to justify the possession of a subject. He asserts that occupation is the first right for

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[79] *Ibid.*, p.529.
[80] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, p.25.
[81] *Ibid.*

property: "a man by pulling an apple should be imagined to have a right to that apple and a power of excluding all others from it."[82] The labourer 'subject' would not think if he possesses the apple or not until a particular circumstance occurs to trigger him to think about the proper action. Smith concludes that it is more reasonable for the labourer to own the apple. In any circumstance no one would threaten him from owning it because he bestowed his time and pains while occupying himself with the production of apple.[83] Thereby, he submits that the right of property is associated with occupation and labour is a power to satisfy individual needs. Smith determines his direction of justice for the benefit of invaders of nature. The producers of life (i.e., natives in America before it was 'discovered') are transformed into enemies or slaves of the strongest occupiers.

By justifying the origin of property morally, Smith legitimises labour exchange. He attributes a self-interested nature to all humanity as they are in the exchange society in which the agent calculates "give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want."[84] This approach explains his analysis of the division of labour and differences in talents. Althought the historical human activity demonstrates that societies develop new capacities through the relations of production. However, Smith thinks that men improve their talents to make profit, and categorises the capacities of man as talents by their value according to the demands of the market.

In a society where occupation is a right of property and tied to a political authority, the commodification of labour could be justified with the rules of the right reason. Smith agrees with Hobbes that wealth is power.[85] He argues that "labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all

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[82] Adam Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, p.16-17.
[83] *Ibid.*, p.17.
[84] *Ibid.*, p.26.
[85] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, p.48.

things."[86] Although prosperity and talent depend on the fortune of each individual, all of them have the power, namely labour, to purchase other talents.

Smith states that "men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single object"[87], and suggests an advantage for 'possessors of talents' to improve their skills and produce more what they are capable of performing. He prefers all professions to be divided as much as possible to produce more efficiently. He suggests that individuals direct their minds to the simplest objects to increase the quantity of work in three circumstances: i. to increase dexterity; ii. to save time; iii. "to the invention of a great number of machines which (...) enable one man to do the work of many."[88]

In manufactural production, a labourer is attributed to a specific part of work; hence the quantity of materials is equal to the number of men who work. He states that as stock accumulates, production increases, so division is divided into more sections. As productive force is subdivided more, "operations of each workman are gradually reduced to a greater degree of simplicity, a variety of new machines come to be invented for facilitating and abridging those operations."[89] Individuals are persuaded to function as a part of machines, and their indirect invention produce new tools for them to work in decreased time with increased efficiency. Even though they ultimately lost 'the right' on their activity, Smith states that it is beneficial for more production hence consent for more 'employment'.

The society Smith justifies represents the urges of a new social class which possesses the private property, and increases their capital by exploiting labourers. For this type of society to grow in which human beings are attributed to some

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[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *Ibid.*, p.20.
[88] *Ibid.*, p.17.
[89] *Ibid.*, p.277.

subdivided works as workers of the market to process, the population is required for production and consumption. As the commerce activity developed along on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea long before, the consumption network seems to have forced the exploiters to seek more accessible methods of commerce. Incidentally, an unexpected source came in sight after a man ventures far-off beyond the pillars of Hercules.

II.II. Giving and Taking

Smith introduces different instruments of commerce and traces the exchange relations considering the determination of money. Before metals circulated in the market, many different 'commodities' had been employed for exchange. "After food, cloathing and lodging are the two great wants of mankind"[90], and if there was no foreign commerce, the more significant part of the goods produced would be thrown away as things of no value.[91] Smith cites that lodging materials were inconvenient to exchange, yet, clothes generate the first surplus value that leads foreign neighbours to exchange. However, in all countries, men seem at last to prefer metals above every other commodity[92] so that they could stock.

Metals effectuate an instrument that builds a measure for exchange; even so, it is an entity that glamorises humans visually. Smith records that these metals had value merely in ordinary beauty used by the inhabitants of Cuba and Santo Domingo as ornaments when they were discovered by Spaniard.[93] He underlines that they were astonished to observe the rage of Spaniards to obtain them, without knowing that a very small quantity of those ornaments maintain a Spaniard family

[90] *Ibid.*, p.178.
[91] *Ibid*.
[92] *Ibid.*, p.38.
[93] *Ibid.*, p.192.

for many years.[94] The discovery of new lands and modes of living provide the resources that sought by the commerce society. Those metals that have arbitrary value in use but have high 'value in exchange' were approved as the leading exchange commodity by this network before Smith proposed a more 'profitable' and 'efficient' way to calculate the exchange value of commodities.

Smith investigates the value of the various products according to the quantity and quality of the labour they entail. He indicates that after the discovery of mines in America, the value of gold and silver in Europe reduced to about a third of what it had been before.[95] Signifying that the metals as "a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own value can never be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities"[96], he concludes that money is the nominal price of commodities that variates depending on the quality and quantity of labour. He determines the labour as the real price by which "all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared."[97]

After the division of labour has taken place, a man's own labour cannot supply him with necessities, conveniences, and amusements of life.[98] He should procure them from other people's labour, and he becomes "rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase."[99] Therefore, the value of commodity in exchange becomes the quantity of labour that enables men to purchase or command.[100] By affirming labour as "the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities"[101], Smith explains how people relate to each other in terms of social relations: "Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the

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[94] *Ibid.*, p.193.
[95] *Ibid.*, p.49.
[96] *Ibid.*, p.50.
[97] *Ibid.*, p.51.
[98] *Ibid.*, p.47.
[99] *Ibid.*
[100] *Ibid.*
[101] *Ibid.*

society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society."[102] He justifies a society where individuals purchase each other's labour to live, and possessors of the capital have access to trade the labour of others.

Since the value of nominal price varies due to different circumstances and factors, Smith decides to stabilise the real price of labour "to consist in the quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which are given for it."[103] Smith discusses labour as a proper tool for comparison, and pleads the principal circumstances explaining the differences between wages of labour determined by the market. How could the market gain such importance to lead human life? How could the goods produced for living generate occasion to trade for money? Why did Smith define human beings as 'self-interested'? These questions lead to many others, all concerning the private property.

According to Smith, after the fall of the Roman Empire, the chiefs and principal leaders of German and Scythian people occupied the greater part of the lands of western provinces of Europe.[104] These landlords became legislators in peace and leaders in war for their tenants, or 'subjects'. The proprietor was preoccupied with protecting his lands and expanding his jurisdiction and authority over his neighbours; hence he had no time to cultivate the land.[105] In addition, slaves of lands who work for maintenance had no motive to produce more since they had no property right over the product. Gradually, more profitable ways of production were shaped by estimating the motivation of both the worker and the landlord.

Meanwhile, in the cities, the remnants of the invasion spawned a new social class; the burghers who had privileges in contradistinction to slavery. Running with the power of the wealth they possess as 'free-traders', the burghers constituted

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[102] *Ibid.*, p.37.
[103] *Ibid*., p.51.
[104] *Ibid.*, p.382.
[105] *Ibid*., p.385.

magistrates and a town council of their own. The lords of the lands in the country despised the burghers considering them as 'emancipated slaves'.[106] The burghers and the King were united out of fear against the despotic lords, and the burghers gradually represented in the states-general of all the great monarchies in Europe.

The 'liberty' and security of individuals were established in the cities by the government's order. Men who content themselves with their necessary subsistence in countries ran away to a town to enjoy the fruits of their industry and to acquire not only necessities but also the conveniences and elegances of life.[107] Therefore, the industry which aims "more than necessary subsistence was established in cities long before it was commonly practised by the occupiers of land in the country."[108] After a while, mass production gathered steam and introduced a taste for the finer and more improved manufactures by foreign commerce into societies where there is no such objects.[109]

Within the context of the country's improvement by the contribution of the increase of commercial and manufacturing towns, Smith underlines the objective of burghers and introduces the concept of 'liberty'. He remarks that "a merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects"[110], while the lords save from their expenses if they have to. This praxis indicates that the burghers advanced their ability to calculate the most profitable ways to produce, and since they were ambitious to become country gentlemen, they partially purchased lands to cultivate. Thus, for Smith, they sustained individuality in the country by introducing 'order and good government' as individual liberty among the inhabitants of the country, who servile dependency upon their superiors.[111]

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[106] *Ibid*., p.402.
[107] *Ibid*., p.405.
[108] *Ibid*.
[109] *Ibid*., p.407.
[110] *Ibid*., p.411.
[111] *Ibid*., p.412.

By presenting humans of his era as merchants, Smith indicates that each human being is willing to act most profitably to exercise command on the other's labour, and continually exerts "himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command."[112] He expresses by his theory of *the invisible hand* that there is harmony between the benefits of the individuals and society. As long as the individuals pursue self-interest, they produce the greatest value and gain more wealth. Their way of calculation increases the 'exchangeable value of labour', or wealth of the annual revenue of its inhabitants[113], when they employ their capital in support of domestic industry for production or to exploit the inhabitants. He argues that foreign trade is beneficial because each country exchanges the labour that exceeds the home consumption for something demanded, and this extensive market encourages them to improve their productive powers.[114]

Smith defines improvement in terms of the diversification in the division of labour and points out how it increased after the discovery of America. A new set of exchange relations between America and Europe took place, bringing new commodities to the market. As a result of Columbus's representations about the goods that engaged his attention, the Council of Castile decided to take possession of countries where the inhabitants were incapable of defending themselves.[115] Smith states that "the pious purpose of converting them to Christianity sanctified the injustice of the project."[116] Contrary to Greek colonies which derived their origin from necessity[117], the European colonies in America and the West Indies were established as a utility from the motive of generating great profits.

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[112] *Ibid*., p.454.
[113] *Ibid*., p.489.
[114] *Ibid*., p.447.
[115] *Ibid*., p.561.
[116] *Ibid*.
[117] The different states of ancient Greece possessed a very small territory, and when the people in one of them multiplied beyond what that territory could easily maintain, a part of them were sent in quest of a new habitation in some remote and distant part of the world; the warlike neighbours who surrounded them on all sides, rendering it difficult for any of them to enlarge very much its territory at home. *Ibid*., p.556.

Indeed, Smith describes how human life became a profitable tool for capital to grow. The market's dynamics embody self-interested habits, and different human beings are born into societies controlled for the welfare of this market. It seems that 'toil and trouble' that waged among the talent is politically and morally justified by Smith. First he commodifies human force by defeating labour as the right of property, then he tries to justify this exploitation by describing what is morally right or wrong.

II.III. The Virtues of Commerce

Smith furnishes his attitude to morality in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. He refers the social existence of human beings by introducing the virtues —which individuals obtain if they control their 'natural' existence— that organise a well-governed society. A virtuous person, he suggests, is a person who adopted all the rules that are imposed on him. The truth of the matter is that he defends the 'virtues' for the market to function without objection. These great virtues are justice, beneficence, and prudence.

For Smith, the notion of justice is associated with hope and fear. He mentions that the religious way of punishment considered after death, is not binding in all circumstances.[118] Hence for the order of society to be maintained, injustice ought to be punished in this life. He thinks that just because different members of a society need each other's assistance, they are bound together by love, affection, and beneficence. However, if this society subsists among different men as merchants from a sense of its utility, solely with the laws, a society built-in commercial activity could sustain its peace and continue to function. Thereby, he concludes that justice is the foundation for the existence of a society.

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[118] Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.91.

Smith attempts to explain nature as if it is a clock made by a refined and enlightened reason, and approaches human nature as a system whose operations could be deduced from a single principle; justice.[119] To base the principle of justice, he discusses the passions of *gratitude* and *resentment* in all animals inclined by pain and pleasure. He associates them with merit and demerit and sees humans as enslaved animals by justifying the system of reward and punishment. To acknowledge how he utilises human existence by suggesting laws, the unsocial, social, and selfish passions he depicts will be summed up first.

Smith examines passions segmentally by attributing them natural and political contents within his concept of *sympathy*.[120] He claims that expressing the appetites that take their origin from the body could not be sympathised by other individuals and breeds aversion. Hence, they should be confined and restrained within limits: "In the command of those appetites of the body consists that virtue which is properly called temperance."[121] Restraining appetites within those bounds, regarding to health and fortune prescribes, is the part of prudence.[122] Fortune refers to the 'rank and credits' of each individual. Whoever the individual is, avoiding and suppressing extreme desires while acting is prudence. After prescribing how to be prudent by concealing 'natural' passions and acting free of risk, he imparts the social and unsocial passions which take their origin from imagination. He considers the unsocial passions —which are derived from resentment— as the undisciplined nature of men.[123] Although untrained resentment is dangerous for a society, it is given by nature for self-defence and might be admitted to be generous and noble if it is guarded and qualified in the tones of speech.[124]

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[119] *Ibid*., p.87.
[120] He describes sympathy as our fellow-feeling with the passions of others.
[121] *Ibid*., p.28.
[122] *Ibid*., p.28.
[123] *Ibid*., p.34.
[124] *Ibid*., p.38.

Smith addresses that all expressions of anger could be recognised as a divided sympathy because the spectator's feeling is split up while sympathising with the agent of anger and its object. As opposed to this, he propounds another set of passions —"generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and esteem, all the social and benevolent affections"[125]— which redoubles sympathy and renders it peculiarly agreeable and becoming. Besides these two opposite sets of passions, there are selfish passions in the middle; joy and sorrow. However, these passions conduce to virtue by the capability of sympathy. He concludes that although pain is a more pungent sensation than pleasure, sympathy with the joy of others is more agreeable than sympathy with sorrow.

Smith correlates his concept of sympathy with the ambition of pursuing wealth and power by suggesting that "to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from"[126] prosperity. He questions the motive of human beings based on the belief that the great purpose of human life is prosperity. The poor emulates the rich and the rich 'glories in his riches' because he believes that he is the object of attention and approbation.[127] Though the man of rank becomes the object of envy, everybody is still "eager to look at him, and to conceive, at least by sympathy, that joy and exultation with which his circumstances naturally inspire him."[128] Smith asserts that people sketch out to themselves a final object of their desires, and they feel a peculiar sympathy with the satisfaction of those who are in it.[129] Therefore, the sympathisers "favour all their inclinations and forward all their wishes."[130] He exemplifies it with the misfortune of kings and lovers that are among the chief interests of theatre:

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[125] *Ibid*.
[126] *Ibid*., p.50.
[127] *Ibid*.
[128] *Ibid*., p.51.
[129] *Ibid*., p.52.
[130] *Ibid*.

> "The prejudices of the imagination attach to these two states a happiness superior to any other. To disturb, or to put an end to such perfect enjoyment, seems to be the most atrocious of all injuries."[131]

He emphasises that men attach more importance to the passions of the rich and the powerful than themselves: "All the innocent blood that was shed in the civil wars provoked less indignation than the death of Charles I."[132] The man of rank could be anyone since he possesses the properties that the agent does not, and he sketches as a perfect being by examining the experiential rules that grabbed his attention.

In the society Smith describes, each individual considers himself as an object in the eye of the other individuals that have variant ranks. Although he mentions this in the circumstances of prosperity, becoming the natural object to any subject is not acceptable under any circumstance. The qualities attributed to any individual are created by both society and the person who attributes them.

Smith designates the qualities of deserving reward and punishment as a path to his principle of justice. The agent of action entitles merit and demerit depending on the propriety or impropriety of the consequence of his action, "therefore, he must appear to deserve a reward, who appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude; and he to deserve punishment, who appears to be that of resentment."[133] Consequently, Smith deduces that resentment and gratitude are the natural passions of men that should be trained with reward and punishment, and in the end, ought to be governed by the state. Eventually, he proposes a virtuous man to obey whatever the rules are, the laws determined by the superior authority.

Smith explicates how the agent judges his own conduct while fitting into society. By presenting *conscience* and *the impartial spectator* as a tool for an agent to

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[131] *Ibid*.
[132] *Ibid*.
[133] *Ibid*., p.69.

compare the interests of his and the others, he derives universal moral laws from moral judgements. He states that people reflect each other's opinions, sentiments, and conducts, and they would not be able to criticise their own if they do not view themselves within the eyes and station of others. For an individual to fit in a society with real love and virtue, nature "has endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in other men."[134] Whatever judgment he forms concerning his conduct, it "must always bear some secret reference, either to what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others."[135] Smith calls this 'the principle of self-approbation and self-disapprobation'. Ultimately the agent forms a set of rules from his observations upon the conduct of others concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided.[136] Thus he creates an impartial judge or a ruler in his mind who trials his opinions, sentiments, and conducts.

All beyond those passions which are social, unsocial, and selfish, Smith mentions 'a more forcible motive' that makes humans capable of counteracting the most vital impulses of self-love, which exerts itself when interests of individuals clash: "It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct."[137] It encourages people to act in a just manner.

The man shapes his moral attitude in society and generates rules upon examining his experiences by calculating the approval and disapproval aspects of the events. Since he is conscious that he is on trial regarding his conduct, he avoids punishable actions and wishes for rewards. He is set to obey any rules imposed on him. Smith introduces these rules as 'moral laws' by attributing them a universal

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[134] *Ibid*., p.117.
[135] *Ibid*., p.110.
[136] *Ibid*., p.159.
[137] *Ibid*., p.137.

content. He suggests that what is to be approved or disapproved of should be generalised "when they are universally acknowledged and established, by the concurring sentiments of mankind."[138] However, the general rules that constituted with the consent of general opinions are the rules created out of human beings and used as a tool for power.

According to Smith, the existence of human society depends on the members' observance of duties with their 'sense of duty', the only principle by which mankind is capable of directing their actions towards the general rules.[139] By replacing God with an enlightened reason —in reference to the clockmaker who wants its product to function perfectly, he describes a modification of the Christian way of power: "those important rules of morality are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will finally reward the obedient, and punish the transgressors of their duty."[140] What Smith approves is the idea of an authority that aims to control individuals with the rules of justice, while the 'subjects' are willing to obey the authority to sympathise with its power.

After all, Smith enthrones his approach to the social existence of human beings with two aspects by which he contributes to the market relations: the first suggests that it is more profitable to produce life within the relations of labour exchange, and the other offers individuals to be trained with reward and punishment for them to obey the rules without any objection depending on their classes. The set of rules he qualifies could embody morality after morality is constituted with the belief of God, which limits human existence with its properties. Smith describes a rational copy of this technology which functions by retaining the same operation. Since "the legal right must be grounded in a public belief that it is morally right"[141], the rulers of it acted with a different purpose which is concerned with

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[138] *Ibid*., p.160.
[139] *Ibid*., p.162.
[140] *Ibid*., p.163.
[141] M. C. MacPherson, *Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions,* p.11.

the right of property, justification of whatever the property is. Property is the notion in question to comprehend how the relations of production became the tool of the power relations with the aid of 'the mutual transferring of right', namely, the contract.

CHAPTER III

COMPARISON OF HOBBES'S AND SMITH'S APPROACHES

Hobbes and Smith observe the urges of the exchange relations and interpret the social existence of human beings by discussing ethical, political and economic aspects of their union. As examined in the previous chapters, they both consider that knowledge is possible through sensation and empirical data. Hobbes's description of the 'state of nature' is a hypothetical theory which he claims that it is not based on observation. Whereas, Smith deduces arguments founding upon his anthropological observations. Therefore, Hobbes's theory of social contract is constructed upon a hypothesis, while Smith's approach to society is based on empirical data referring to historical activity of human beings.

The society Hobbes lived in was in transition according to the market activity, and was in a civil war that reflects different objectives of its actors. He describes human nature by extracting 'natural' components from the institutionalised existence of humanity. Though his description represents the behaviour patterns of a particular era, he states that it is the character of men. He admits that men's natural condition is a state of war where each individual functions as an engine, which necessarily seeks and competes for more power over others to sustain its movement. By basing the competitive 'nature' of men with his materialistic description, he suggests a contract that forms the political existence of them by excluding the dangerous 'natural' elements, and that shall be guarded by a sovereign who will always remain in the state of nature to protect it by using his limitless power on his subjects and other states.

The time period between Hobbes's and Smith's eras could be considered a transition period characterised by certain urges of some actors. Smith states his observations and bases them as natural laws considering the well-governed and growing society. He criticises the rules that limit and threaten commercial activity

and proposes a 'free market' that depends on humans' self-interested yet also divine nature making human associations functioning perfectly as a clock. Although he attributes moral capacity to human beings, he asserts that they unite to provide assistance in collective production by their propensity to calculate individual profits.

Human relations are reduced to property exchange by both philosophers considering the powers of the individuals as their property that can be transferred with the contracts. In this chapter, compositions of these power relations will be in question focusing on the common and different elements of Hobbes's and Smith's descriptions of human nature. They describe specific characteristics of human beings transpired from their observations of the events around them. Although they interpret these observations with different explanations, they both reduce human beings to machines calculating profits perpetually. The certain characteristics of their considerations about the relations between individual and society will be summarised first to acknowledge their approach to human nature.

Hobbes and Smith both adopted the idea of nature as a mechanical process. In Hobbes, man is a disassociated and atomised engine which is fueled by exercising its power over nature and other individuals. However, he does not impart how human beings proceeded from an atomised existence to a social condition without any guidance in terms of communication, i.e., language or awareness of good and evil. He seems to suppose humans as disassociated matters in motion to base the most significant principle cause of quarrel in his description of the state of nature; competition.

On the other hand, for Smith, an engine, i.e. clock, is the morality that bounds human society and functions with the rules that its maker created perfectly. His attitude on morality and relations of production supports his approach to the sociability of human beings. Although his examination of language as mental

progress indicates that human beings became capable to individuate themselves from the society they live in after their linguistic abilities improved, he admits that men produce life by calculating their own profits. He assigns a self-interested attitude even to a primitive man who produces a specific tool for his tribe's sustenance. Since he also supports the idea that an individual is a reflection of society, thereby, for a human to calculate profits and become self-interested, he should be surrounded by agents who perform the same calculation.

Previous analysis of both philosophers' human conceptions indicates that a human being capable of questioning nature should live in a society with certain rules created by human activity. Each individual is born into a different society where he discovers himself through dialectical activity. Despite the existence of different types of societies, Hobbes introduces human association as a state of war in which machines compete to sustain their movements. They are self-sustained, but somehow, they jump into a state of nature where they communicate and glorify by comparing themselves with each other. He regards these machines as moving with the power which represents their 'presents means to obtain future apparent good'. Thus, they move by exploiting their surroundings to increase their 'present means'.

Despite Hobbes' mechanical approach to individual beings, Smith considers collective life as a machine and individuals as parts of it. He admits the discovery of the laws of nature to be progress and imagines a refined reason as an architect who wants his product to function perfectly. Although he was aware that human habits vary with the life they take part in, he attributes a self-interested quality and competitive motive to human beings of all times and places considering the general assent.

The most peculiar concept in their descriptions of human nature is that they derive laws from the observations of significant behaviour patterns around them and clarify these laws with their methods. For them, the common characteristic of men

is their calculative way of thinking. Whatever men do, they do it by calculating the most profitable result. Hobbes bases this idea with his deductive method, which is built on contradictory presuppositions, i.e. 'man is a matter in motion'. Thus, self-interested nature is necessary for humans because it is how they function; matters seek more power depending on their objectives to sustain their motion; otherwise, they are dead. Smith compounds self-interest with sympathy; although the agent has an urge to act with self-love, he also has the capacity to compare his interests with others and might be driven by his reason to act justly. Still, the agent calculates his profits, yet he is able to regulate them by calculating what ought to be done or not to fit in a society with the rules he observes.

Hobbes and Smith describe how people act and upon which motives; since they both suppose that the ability of calculation —which enables them to estimate the following results— is their nature which drives them to act by aiming for the most profitable result, Hobbes and Smith suggest that human beings communicate to each other in terms of exchange relation. Individuals mutually transfer their powers or abilities, and live by comparing themselves with each other considering the qualities they possess.

According to Hobbes, power exists when it is exercised above another because "the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another."[142] A man can only be aware of his power and glorify it by comparing it with the powers of others. This kind of state means a constant war because the competitors are equal in terms of insecurity; thus, they should decide that their tyrannical nature must be abolished with contract so that they can exploit each other in peace.

The transition between Hobbes's and Smith's eras is prominent because it points out the legitimisation of this war as an exchange. Hobbes argues that with the

[142] Thomas Hobbes, *Elements of Law*, p.26

contract the property owners and those who have 'natural property in some useful art' could mutually transfer their property to each other by mutual contract.[143] Futhermore, the rights are all belong to the sovereign who appoint what kinds of contract between subjects are to be made.[144] Thereby with the commonwealth, property owners can exploit the labourers legally; the powers of humans could be transferred under the protection of a sovereign as the 'sovereign power'.

What Hobbes calls the sovereign power is examined as productive powers by Smith. He believes that the differences in talents arise from the division of labour. Since the talents are compared depending on their quality, individuals are driven to better themselves to increase their exchange quality to purchase or command more of what others produce or possess.

Hobbes's approach was to eliminate the 'nature of man' from society, and for inhabitants of it to transfer their rights to sovereign power. Since the sovereign remains in the state of nature and holds the rights of his subjects, his authority and judgments risk the free activity of individuals. Smith's discussion is to free the circulation by free contracts for individuals to compete by self-betterment depending on the market demands, which also expands the country's wealth. Hobbes and Smith both described motivations of the actors that urged exchange relations to be legalised so that property owners could operate their functions risk-free. The transition era between Hobbes and Smith could also be viewed as a transition of power, from the authority who claims the knowledge to those who possess the property.

The common concept of Hobbes's and Smith's approaches to human relations is property. According to Hobbes, there is no distinct *mine* and *thine* in the state of nature, but each man can keep what he gets as long as he can.[145] However, with

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[143] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.163 [235-238].
[144] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.163 [235-238].
[145] *Ibid*., p.78 [63-64].

the contract, individuals own what they occupied or could be occupied as property and transfer their rights to a sovereign to exchange them with each other legally. According to Smith, the original foundation of all other property is labour. Furthermore, individuals live by contracts that make their goal achievable in a shorter period by the division of labour; hence, they exchange their labour with each other as property. Thereby, Hobbes and Smith agree that labour is man's property, an exchangeable commodity within a well-organised society. One establishes property to end the state of war; the other does it by justifying it morally and effectually. Indeed, since property itself is created by humanity and seized by them individually with the 'age' of commerce, Hobbes and Smith both serve the dynamics of appropriation by justifying its products additively with labour exchange.

Hobbes and Smith conclude that man qualifies himself by competition. Hobbes signifies that man has more or less desire of power for riches, knowledge, and honour,[146] while Smith remarks how a man might become avid derived from these desires in terms of competition: "In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors."[147] Hobbes concludes the process by expressing the results: "Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war."[148] These excerptions reveal that Hobbes's and Smith's observations unite around three components of competition: honour, wealth, and desire to command or purchase.

In this competition, the value of each participant is estimated through other participants' value. Hobbes clarifies this idea with the following relations: "The *value*, or worth of a man, is as all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as

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[146] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.41 [59-63].
[147] Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.83.
[148] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.58 [47-49].

would be given for the use of his power; and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another."[149] The reputation which arises from 'honourable' possessions and generates glory to a man represents his value. Smith addresses what is "honourable and noble in human conduct; to the desire, not merely of obtaining, but of deserving the approbation and applause of his brethren."[150] This urge is called 'the love of praise-worthiness'.

Hobbes and Smith treat human beings' collective force as a fragmented quantitative power; individuals obtain comparative values from the eyes of each other wherein their glances are warped by the market. They are honoured with the values that the market asserts on them —which is composed of their prosperity, and 'usefulness' of their capabilities. The individuals are categorised according to their dignity, and their capacities are comparatively appraised by the demands of the market. Hobbes and Smith subscribe to the idea that individuals' objectives of desires and their passions vary depending on some combinations, and they are honoured or rewarded by each other according to their qualities categorised by the market, and dishonoured if they do not possess valuable qualities. The concept of honour is associated with dominion and worthiness by both philosophers. Their conceptions are based on the fundamental technology used to operate human associations; reward and punishment, or hope and fear.

The objectives of the actors of Hobbes's and Smith's eras were varied considering the processes they were surrounded by. The historical process they observed comprises a state of power struggle, a conflict between the characteristics of the sovereign and the market. Hobbes defines a sovereign as an artificial man composed of man's natural properties, with limitless power, knowledge and authority. This omnipotent man is the measure of good and evil in the sense that it has the right of making rules:

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[149] Ibid, p.51 [73-76].
[150] Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.127.

> "where by every man may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects and this is it men call propriety."[151]

This lawmaker is also the judge, and he is committed to rewarding with riches or honour and delivering corporal or peculiar punishment. As with his power, the honour of the sovereign ought to be limitless; 'he is the fountain of honour'. The servants or subjects of him shall be honoured if they act within the rules of *propriety*. Propriety depends on the sovereign power who determines the rules considering public peace and civil obedience; because, in his hypothetical state of nature, the engines exist, clash, and destroy each other constantly where there is no institution or tradition. Hence the sovereign also must determine what is just and unjust.

The 'subjects' of a sovereign morph into the moral agents of a refined reason in Smith's approach to moral philosophy. His conception of *propriety* comprises the laws that the agent make calculations upon what ought to be done or not to be approved of conserving the general rules. He describes the laws of approbation or disapprobation on the grounds of general assent; the moral duties of men, the rules of justice are the records of the sentiments of humanity in different ages and nations, and they are "naturally attended with the consciousness of deserving, and the dread of suffering punishment."[152] These duties should be protected by the public magistrate, whose necessity is to employ the commonwealth's power to enforce these 'positive laws' —which are dictated by the 'natural sense of justice'.

Smith examines the 'general principles of law and government' in different stages of society and justifies the origin of natural rights as the right of property. He calls natural rights 'the rights that belong to man as a man'. For him, the right of property commences with the occupation "by which we get any thing into our

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[151] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.114 [91-93].
[152] Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, p.335.

power that was not the property of another before"[153], and it is an exclusive right of excluding others from using what one possesses. There arise the 'personal rights' which are proceeded from property relations. Thus, he contributes to the concept of natural right that Hobbes constituted, by justifying the property as a right to private property empowered by the occupier. He enjoys the best of both worlds by justifying private property and labour in one explanation.

Our investigation on Hobbes's and Smith's conceptions of human nature indicates that human relations are gradually reduced to property exchange in terms of historical human activity since the concept of property was associated with personal possession on land, goods, and labour. In his book *Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions*, MacPherson emphasises that property is an 'enforceable claim', a 'political phenomenon'; "For any given system of property is a system of rights of each person in relation to other persons."[154] He evinces the contradiction derived from the resemblance between 'the right to use common things' and 'the exclusive rights which are private property':

> "Common property is created by the guarantee to each individual that he will not be excluded from the use or benefit of something: private property is created by the guarantee that an individual can exclude others from the use or benefit of something. Both kinds of property, being guarantees to individual persons, are individual rights."[155]

Therefore, these individual rights are neither natural nor social; the state enforces them: "The state creates the rights, the individuals have the rights."[156] Besides, the idea of individual rights is "a modern phenomenon —an invention of the liberal seventeenth century."[157] With the spread of the capitalist market economy, the concept of property changed and began to carry off the property in land, capital, and labour. MacPherson asserts that "the very concept of property should be

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[153] Adam Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, p.13.
[154] C. B. MacPherson, *Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions*, p.4.
[155] *Ibid*., p.5.
[156] *Ibid*.
[157] *Ibid*., p.206.

reduced to that of *private* property —an exclusive, alienable, 'absolute' individual or corporate right in things"[158], thus all labour and resources could be convertible into a property for the market to operate fully and freely, and do the whole job of allocating labour and resources among possible uses.[159] Therefore, for the capitalist market economy to grow, the legal edifice comprising the natural rights had to be justified morally.

MacPherson's analysis exhibits that the concept of property becomes a moral issue after the spread of private property. This issue is followed both by Hobbes and Smith obtaining similar and different attitudes. Hobbes legitimised an omnipotent sovereign to protect the contract by which subjects give up their 'right to do everything', have a natural right for survival, and live a political life by exchanging properties they possess —where the rules are determined by the sovereign. As for Smith, beyond those positive laws carried by tradition and protected by the sovereign, there are 'natural laws' to defend the existence of 'a man as a man'. They arise from natural rights, and he affirms them by justifying the labour force as a right to private property. He underlines that positive laws are constituted by the different imperfections and improvements of the laws of different countries; thus, lawyers should direct their reasonings to an inquiry into what the 'natural rules of justice' are independent of all positive institutions what might properly be called natural jurisprudence.[160] By suggesting lawyers to examine 'natural rules of justice', he proposes a particular enumeration of the general rules of justice.

In short, Hobbes defines a specific universal human nature that must not be allowed to the state of society because of insecurity. As a rational choice, people commit to surrendering their natural rights to the authority. However, Smith

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[158] *Ibid*.
[159] *Ibid*., p.10.
[160] Adam Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, p.341.

notices the magistrate's authority with respect to traditions, yet he also admits that the natural rights shall be numbered in the name of 'natural rules of justice', which represent the natural rights of all humanity. The first affirms the occurring situation by presupposing a universal human nature, and the second offers to base the universal rules of justice —derived from ontological observations— as natural rights. They both justify the fragmentation of life: Hobbes divides the human existence as 'natural' and 'political', and there is a political authority to whom the natural engines are 'subject' to; and Smith justifies this fragmentation by invigorating the interactions between these separated 'things' —one can say individual against the state.

To conclude, a comparison of Hobbes's and Smith's human conceptions should have more or less include the problematisation of exchange relations, and the power struggle of their period and geography. As discussed above, the market itself constituted the competitive 'nature' by creating a place where individuals compare themselves with each other considering their power; prosperity and the *values* attributed to them. Hobbes and Smith seem to describe the natural elements of human existence to legitimise the urges they observed by affirming them as 'natural'. However, an omnipotent creature would not allow the invisible hand to wander around idly. Thereby, the powers of this creature had to be limited by natural rights empowered by the 'individual liberty'. Hobbes defines a dichotomy between 'natural' and 'political', which enables him to determine moral rights and political obligations. Over time, necessary conditions were set for Smith to proceed with the details of these rights and obligations. The whole process manifests how collective activity is divided, conditioned, governed, and conducted for the sake of 'power'.

CONCLUSION

The problem that transpires from our survey on Hobbes's and Smith's analyses of human nature is how collective existence is divided into two general groups: the ruling and the obeying ones, so that the desire for power pierced the societies and aspired individuals. This permeation represents the individual's resistance against his surroundings; human beings continuously give judgements comparing the worth of self and others through the relations they have with each other. In the following passages, anthropological interpretation of these relations comprising the ethical and political consequences are investigated. It is concluded that human beings' relations in a society as isolated powers is a destructive power that fragments the collective life.

Hobbes and Smith impart the idea of laws through different explanations — founded upon 'nature'— by offering to regulate the society. Hobbes asserts that men proceed from the state of nature to society escaping from constant state of war. Smith follows societies within the Scottish context of natural history, considering the laws and regulations. They both allege that society should exist as an institution governed by laws.

However, Pierre Clastres, in his article "Society Against the State", argues that in primitive society where the production activity is based on basic needs, there is no separated power as a ruler. Then, why did some societies evolve into entities where a state power is separated from the rest of the society? Or how the primitive society is 'civilised'? There are three characteristics of primitive society evident in Clastres's text: i. it does not produce more than minimum necessities; ii. society as such is the real locus of power; iii. therefore, there is no separated and hierarchical ruling power.

He highlights that in primitive societies, society as whole works for basic needs:

> "This means that once its needs are fully satisfied, nothing could induce primitive society to produce more, that is, to alienate its time by working for no good reason when that time is available for idleness, play, warfare, or festivities."[161]

There is no accumulation, and the only technology they have is their ability to meet their needs in a given environment.[162] They are not in full-time search for food as men work full-time for individual subsistence in a capitalist society. Moreover, no one in a primitive society "feels the quaint desire to do more, own more, or appear to be more than his neighbor."[163] That is to say, the way primitive societies produce and exchange goods and services continually prevents the private accumulation of goods, making it impossible for the desire for possession —that is actually the desire for power— to develop.[164]

In primitive society, society as such is "the real locus of power that exercises its authority over the chief"[165]; it "would never tolerate a chief transformed into a despot."[166] The task of chieftainship as a peacemaker is to restore order and harmony with the use of speech:

> "(...) not even to arbitrate between the contending parties, because the chief is not a judge; but, armed only with his eloquence, to try to persuade the people that it is best to calm down, stop insulting one another, and emulate the ancestors who always lived together in harmony."[167]

Besides his technical qualities such as rhetorical talent, expertise as a hunter, ability to coordinate martial activities, there is a primitive law that makes him a part of the society; *you are worth no more than the others*. Whereas, one way for primitive societies to maintain social harmony is by refusing to permit an individual, central, separate power to emerge.[168] Hereunder, "primitive society is a

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[161] Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State*, p.197.
[162] *Ibid*., p.191.
[163] *Ibid*., p.204-205.
[164] *Ibid*., p.205.
[165] *Ibid.*, p.207.
[166] *Ibid*.
[167] *Ibid*., p.206.
[168] *Ibid*., p.212.

society where all the exits are blocked; therefore, it ought to reproduce itself perpetually without anything affecting it throughout time."[169]

Nevertheless, once the chief is qualified as a warrior or 'plays the chief', the prestige that originates in victory might lead to authority. Clastres highlights the link between power and honour: "The unfortunate thing about a primitive warrior's life is that the prestige he acquires in warfare is soon lost if it is not constantly renewed by fresh successes."[170] As a warrior, the chief becomes addicted to power resulted from the prestige, and his thirst for prestige is actually a thirst for war. Therefore, a *compulsion* keeps him "continually wanting to organize martial expeditions from which he hopes to obtain the (symbolic) benefits attaching to victory."[171] Since he is conditioned to desire prestige and directs his methods for victory to fulfil that desire, the status quo where *the chief is in the service of the tribe* transforms itself into a new one where *the tribe is in the service of the chief*. However, once the war chief permits a war that the tribe does not agree with, "primitive society does not permit the desire for prestige to be replaced by the will to power."[172] There are a couple of examples in the article concerning the execution of those chiefs who are imprisoned by glory.

Clastres points out the essential feature of primitive society; it prevents any of its sub-groups from becoming autonomous by refusing them a central power, which means that it holds all the internal movements which maintain social life within the limits and direction prescribed by the society.[173] He believes that the demographic domain might have disturbed the atomised harmonic universe. By following the Tupi-Guarani as a different association from the usual primitive world, he points out two matters: "*the demographic density ratio* of their tribes or

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[169] *Ibid*.
[170] *Ibid*., p.209.
[171] *Ibid*., p.208.
[172] *Ibid*., p.210.
[173] *Ibid*., p.212.

local groups clearly exceeds that of the neighboring populations; moreover, *the size of the local groups* is out of all proportion to the socio-political units of the Tropical Forest."[174] The primitive tribes located in different areas seem to be surrounded by the Tupi-Guarani villages that "located thousands of miles from one another; but, living the same kind of life, practicing the same rites, and speaking the same language."[175]

These observations concerning tribes when they were discovered by the Europeans does not explain the process of a harmonic society's division and reunion as a state. The presence of an external force could not preclude the absence of the state in society and how it would proceed to be unified as a state if it was not disturbed by states. Even so, there appears a link between collective harmony and divided power that could be explained in terms of the Western civilisation's characteristics.

Clastres states that there are two axioms forced by Western civilisation: "the first maintains that true societies unfold in the protective shadow of the State; the second states a categorical imperative: man must work."[176] Indeed, the second one is constituted upon the first one: men produce for others only if they are forced to. In primitive society where the production activity is the collective activity, if their goods surpasses the group consumption; "that surplus, obtained without surplus labor, is consumed, consummated, for political purposes properly so called, on festive occasions."[177]

However, once those societies are governed with military or religious power, production activity is reversed by this domination; it deviates from its aim and makes it towards production for surplus. Primitive man becomes obliged to those

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[174] *Ibid*., p.213.
[175] *Ibid*., p.81.
[176] *Ibid.*, p.193.
[177] *Ibid*., p.196.

who govern them. Clastres emphasises the difference between the Amazonian Savage and the Indian of the Inca Empire:

> "the first produces in order to live, whereas the second works in addition so that others can live, those who do not work, the masters who tell him: you must pay what you owe us, you must perpetually repay your debt to us."[178]

According to him, the economic relations of exploitation yield from the political relation of power: "Alienation is political before it is economic; power precedes labor; the economic derives from the political; the emergence of the State determines the advent of classes."[179] Economic activity is apparently attached to political activity; there is no 'economy' in primitive societies before the political authority enforces them to produce owing to the ruler an obligation. With "the monopoly of legitimate physical violence"[180] inherent in the division of society, the formation of the state and alienation of labour present themselves. Thus, the 'economy' begins with the alienation of labour.

Taking into account that exploitation of labour depends on the alienation of political existence, individuals' 'duties' do not originate in the divine organisation; they collectively and unintentionally organise those circumstances. In 'almost' primitive societies, although the chief desires prestige once he is qualified as a warrior, the rest of the society is willing to honour him considering his victory, or disposed to obey once they are 'protected' by him. There is a conditioning cycle between the ruler and the ruled forces; the ruled desires to be ruled because he is *needy*, and the ruler desires to rule because he is addicted to honour. These motives are what Hobbes defines as 'desire of *ease*' and 'desire for power'.

The observation of the other side of the world explains Hobbes's description of sovereignty. The conditions in which the omnipotent creature might be born are

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[178] *Ibid*., p.198.
[179] *Ibid*.
[180] *Ibid*., p.204.

this way become visible, even so, what is the invisible hand that emerged from the 'self-interested nature' of man? One should remember the axioms Clastres claims about the Western civilisation forces: i. societies should be protected by the state; ii. man must work. The latter follows the former; the state machine forces the surplus and establishes the economy as a system, so that men become obliged to work for others in order to sustain their basic needs.

In a society without a state, society as a whole produces its basic needs; hence, it does not calculate the surplus value of labour. Conversely, since the capitalist mode of production is based on surplus value, it functions by producing the products that create artificial needs, redundant variety of commodities to be consumed, so that the capitalists make a profit, and the system works with the capital they own. Contrary to productive activity, owning capital is exploitation. The idea of 'ownership' leads to a fracture in society and changes how it produces life. Society splits into antagonistic forces; producers and exploiters. Besides, it forces social life to be produced under the conditions of exchange relations. This mode of production keeps human beings in a contradictory state within society. It subjects them to produce a surplus, which is an activity that contradicts the collective objective.

As we examined in the previous chapters, relations of production generated laws considering the procedures they required. With the rise of private property, the urge of the new laws are observed by Hobbes and Smith, and justified as a liberty for the sake of the new social class that has political privileges rendered from its economic power. These two philosophers' approaches to social life are similar to the axioms that Clastres mentions: for them, i. property relations constitute society; thus, justice regarding them must be guarded by the laws; ii. labour is an exchange commodity that individuals possess as private property. Within their theories, society is constituted for its members' beneficence resulted from property relations.

Contrary to this approach, we argue that collective life is the activity that human beings discover human capacities, turn them into capabilities by exercise, and produce activity. Human beings learn to participate in an activity through theoretical and practical exercise arising from their experiences in society — which is the learning, labouring process. In the Aristotelian approach, ethics and politics are a unified concept which means the realisation of the possibilities in the *polis*, where speech and action could be best actualised.[181] The *polis* is a community that constitutes the conditions of the good life, which could be realised by the praxis of knowing and acting.

However, since the description of 'natural' and 'political' elements of human beings legitimised by the natural rights, and economic activity is detached from them; "economic reason and its moral foundations could no longer be dealt with within the confines of Aristotelian practical philosophy."[182] A critical approach to dichotomies arising from the concept of the 'state of nature' is established by Hegel as there are methodological issues about normative argumentation regarding the idea of 'universal human nature'. According to him, natural right theories are problematic because in their method, "the guiding principle for the a priori is the a posteriori."[183] They eternalise "the current state of society, and view it as presenting the human condition as such."[184] The empirical method they use determines their considerations about what human beings ought to be or might have been like in the state of nature.[185]

Hegel's concern about these theories is the bifurcation of ethical life. Individual rights reduce the collective life to mere legality by constituting a sphere in which the principle is the labour and accumulation for physical needs —which is a

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[181] Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, p.5.
[182] *Ibid*., p.6.
[183] *Ibid*., p.25.
[184] *Ibid*.
[185] *Ibid*.

system of political economy.[186] The historical dissolution of ethical life begins with the selfish drives of economic individualism.

In his book *Karl Marx*, Allen Wood claims that capitalism is fundamentally an exploitative social order; its social relations encourage people to take an exploitative attitude toward each other in their productive life.[187] The drive of economic individualism 'alienates' the productive relations of human beings because it forces them to exchange their labour as a commodity. Between the artificial opposition of ethical and political, there appears an economic interaction in the middle that is regulated by political authority rendered from the laws of modern society —which is based on morality and legality.

Hegel's approach to labour as an epistemological category is the grounding principle for his criticism of dichotomies. Influenced by Kant —"that thinking is a synthetic activity, giving unity and intelligibility to the data of experience"[188]—, Hegel asserts that reality has a structure of the thinking spirit's creative activity by which a knowing mind grasps intelligibility.[189] By emphasising that each opposites require the existence of the other, he believes that he confirms the organic view of reality *a priori* in though.[190] Some opposites are complementary sides of the same thing, such as above and below, front and back,[191] i.e., 'the road up and the road down is one and the same.'[192] Some pairs are comparatives that are based on negation. For example, to conceptualise a quality such as size; 'that is great which is not small' and 'that is small which not great' both should be pointed out to the same object calculating its relations with other objects in the same place.

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[186] *Ibid*., p.28.
[187] Allen W. Wood, *Karl Marx*, p.263.
[188] *Ibid*., p.200.
[189] *Ibid*., p.202.
[190] *Ibid*., p.209.
[191] *Ibid.*
[192] Heraclitus, *Fragment 60.*

That being so, Hegel suggests that "an organic whole is essentially made up of different, functionally opposed and even reciprocally negating processes, which constitute the thing by their complementarity or homeostasis."[193] Belonging to the same essence, the opposites indicate the organic development; thus, self-difference and self-negation constitute the essence of inherent tendencies to the developmental process.[194] Marx agrees with Hegel about the development tendencies, but argues that the structure of the world is not a mystic creative essence, or it can not be understood employing a priori principles because it is a complex empirical fact concerning the nature of material reality.[195] His opposition to Hegel is that the dialectical structure of thought is not a cause for the dialectical structure of reality; it is a consequence of the thought's function to mirror a dialectically structured world.[196]

For Marx, human activity or production is different from other animals because of the human being's consciousness and purposiveness regarding the activity, that is to say, he "makes his life activity an object of his will and consciousness."[197] Human beings are 'objective' because labour involves an 'outward' orientation towards purposes. They are capable of judging their mode of life regarding if it suits them or not, and make conscious decisions by abandoning the false perspectives. This 'consciousness' is merged with the use of tools that makes the human being aware of the activity by practising towards an objective. Therefore, the tools are the organs of the labouring activity that only human beings can conceptualise.

Human labour is the conscious activity of human beings; this being the case, it is thinking and acting towards an objective. Since humans are essentially practical

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[193] *Ibid*., p.210.
[194] *Ibid*., p.211.
[195] *Ibid*., p.217.
[196] *Ibid.*
[197] *Ibid*., p.32.

beings, "then knowledge must be treated as an integral part of their practical relation to the world."[198] Accordingly, not only individuals have purposes, but also the society has the tendency to develop its skills to be practised by collective labour time. Therefore, Hegel's claim about ethical life as unity is examined by Marx, and is reclaimed by the indissociable relation between theory and practice.

Marx thinks that the actualisation of the 'human essential powers' is to be found in production. The production activity happens with raw materials, means of production or common tools, and productive powers. These could be seeds, sowing or growing tools, and collective force, as well as thoughts, politics, and good decisions. The production of life as a unified activity is the exercise in which 'development' of the human beings' 'objective essential powers' is possible.

This conception points out that human beings are aware that they are part of nature, that is because a human being is 'objective' beyond the natural conditions of subsistence.[199] However, with the establishment of laws regarding private property, the capitalists who own the raw materials and means of production exploit labourers by creating surplus value from their productive force. People are compelled to produce and consume for the capitalists to make a profit. This being the case, externalisation of the production activity as to produce surplus prevents labourers from self-actualisation.

Since the capitalist economy functions employing surplus labour, the 'alienation' is inevitable for a labourer who is restrained from actualising himself in production activity. Production as an externalised activity fails to satisfy the way collective force exercises or actualises the human essential powers, and to satisfy human beings to affirm themselves in their humanity.[200] The market society forces people to produce for the gratification of individual needs. However, Marx thinks

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[198] *Ibid*., p.184.
[199] *Ibid*., p.27.
[200] *Ibid*., p.36.

that "the human being truly produces only in freedom from physical need."[201] Once a human being produces in the 'realm of freedom', then the production becomes the actualisation of labour. Otherwise, the 'alienation of productive activity' consists of the labourer who "develops no free physical and spiritual energy but mortifies his *physis* and ruins his spirit."[202]

The word *physis* evokes the analysis by Aristotle concerning the *polis*, suggesting that human beings and society naturally produce each other towards realising the character of the *polis*; the good life. His analysis comprehends human activity as the integrity of theory and practise, which is similar to what Marx implies as a mode of productive life that is practised with knowledge. Marx indicates eliminating the characteristics of fragmented society through theoretical and practical exercises towards a new understanding devoted to the unified approach to life. To this respect, once the chaotic cooccurrence of pain and pleasure produced in the pursuit of expectation disappears, human beings manifest the capability to act within the rules of harmony, unity, and beauty. Though the political obligation and economic structure of society poses obstacles to human activity, Marx thinks that in the post-capitalist society, change and development will occur through conscious, collective human decisions.[203]

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[201] Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*; as cited in Allen W. Wood, *Karl Marx*, p.37.
[202] Allen W. Wood, *Karl Marx*, p.6.
[203] *Ibid*., p.26.

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