

LANGUAGE EDUCATION AS A TOOL OF DECONSTRUCTING
STEREOTYPES TOWARDS THE OTHER: THE CASE OF CYPRUS

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Abstract:

The collapse of the Empires led the world to new formations: the nation states. For a nation state to be established, national myths, narratives and the representation of those are employed in order to reinforce the notion of 'groupness' and therefore the emergence of national identity. States through the interpretation of historical past choose what to remind constantly to their citizens and what to erase from history. Remembering and forgetting has been a great contribution to the construction of a stereotypical image of the Self and the Other. In the case of Cyprus this process was intensified and reinforced through the representations of the 1974 events, which resulted to the partition of the island. This study, conducted in the Southern part of the island in 2011-2012, questions whether Turkish language education to Greek Cypriot students may have a contribution to the communication between the two communities and therefore play a significant role to the deconstruction of these stereotypes facilitating eventually, their peaceful coexistence.

Özet:

İmparatorlukların çöküşü dünyada yeni oluşumlara öncülük etmiştir: ulus devletler. Ulus devletin kurulması sürecinde, ulusal efsaneler, anlatılar ve bunların temsili, grup fikrinin oluşmasını kolaylaştırarak ulusal kimliğin ortaya çıkmasını sağladı. Devletler, tarihsel geçmişin yorumlanmasıyla nelerin vatandaşlarca sürekli hatırlanacağını ve nelerin tarihten silineceğini seçtiler. Hatırlamak ve unutmak, klişeleşmiş Biz ve Öteki imajının inşasına büyük katkı sağlamıştır. Kıbrıs örneğinde bu süreç, adanın ikiye bölünmesine neden olan 1974 olaylarının tasviri aracılığı ile pekiştirilmiş ve sağlamlaştırılmıştır. Adanın Güney kesiminde 2011-2012 yılları arasında yürütülmüş bu çalışma, Kıbrıslı Rum öğrencilere verilecek Türk dil eğitiminin iki toplum arasındaki iletişime bir katkısı olup olmayacağını ve böylece iki toplumun barış içinde yaşaması için stereotiplerin yok edilmesinde etkili bir rol oynayıp oynayamayacağını sorgulamaktadır.

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Introduction

The aim of this study is to examine whether language as a carrier of culture has the capacity to deconstruct or at least differentiate the stereotypes of a society towards another.

Societies, in order to establish their national identity implement through their public or private institutions and mechanisms a specific perception of the Self, which then becomes a stereotypical image. At the same time, the way of representing historical past mainly through education and media -the main pillars of propagating ideas- assigns a stereotypical image to the Other as well. Contemporary states enforce their existence through a national identity assigned to people and on the basis of which they ought to be members of a specific entity. This thesis researches whether language education may reverse the process of negatively stereotyping the Other and especially for the case of Cyprus, whether it may promote the peaceful co-existence of the two communities through the effective communication between them.

This master's thesis aspires to prove that Turkish language education to Greek Cypriots would be a great contributor to the conflict resolution project. Specifically, my hypothesis is that language education and the consequent intercultural communication are capable of deconstructing negative stereotypes towards the Other.

This study is divided in three main parts which are interrelated. The first part refers to representations of historical past, memory and forgetting policies and their role to the construction of stereotypical images towards the Other in the framework of the nation building process. Emphasizing the case of Greek Cypriots I would be discussing the representations on the basis of which, Greek Cypriots construct both the image of the

Self and the Other. That is because I consider representations to be major contributors to the construction of national identity since they have the capacity to form our perspectives, which ultimately constitute our perceptions of reality.

The Greek Cypriot identity is a very complex issue to address since there is not a unique, accurate answer as to what ethnically and nationally a Greek Cypriot is. The formation of a local Cypriot identity was neither encouraged by the British colonial power nor by the independent state later. The Republic of Cyprus¹ had never aimed to the construction of an identity for its citizens, Greek and Turkish Cypriots and instead, all its efforts were aiming to the maintenance of the umbilical cord with 'motherland' Greece. Thus, through the educational system and with the immense support of the Church, the salient policy was to infuse a Greek-centered identity to the people, which even after independence it was carrying an irredentist quality.

The image of the Other for Greek Cypriots was just a reproduction of the image shared by Greeks for Turks. Until our days Greek Cypriots are educated in an "ethnocentric" educational system, which retain important bonds with the Greek one since the majority of educational material and textbooks are imported from Greece. Moreover, the historical past of Cyprus and mainly the 1974 events² along with their interpretation and representation by Greek Cypriots enforce this negative image of Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Several scholars have studied Greek Cypriot attitudes

¹ The Republic of Cyprus is referred to by Turkey as the 'Greek Cypriot Administration of South Cyprus', since it is considered that the official state established in 1960 collapsed with the 1974 coup. However, the 'Republic of Cyprus' is the only internationally recognized state in Cyprus and for all inclusive purposes of this research it would be more reasonable to refer to it as Republic of Cyprus.

² The 1974 events are perceived by Turkey as the 1974 Peace Operation for safeguarding the Turkish Cypriots and restore order, while Greek Cypriots refer to the events as Turkish Invasion. Since the present state of affairs was found by the European Court of Human Rights illegal with the *Loizidou v. Turkey* case (Turkey found guilty for violating refugees' rights) it would be more appropriate if we refer to as Turkish Invasion. More specifically, it would be more advisable, to use this terminology as my research deals extensively with the Greek Cypriot society and the realities emerged throughout the years; it is a determining factor, thus, to approach the issue from a Greek Cypriot perspective.

towards Turks and Turkish Cypriots and it is remarkable how children even from primary school are able to self-categorize in their group and by extension adopt the socially imposed enemy.

The second part considers the link between language and ethnicity and in particular, the usage of language as a component of sameness and coherence to the nation building project. Sociolinguistics as the science which studies the impact of language on society and national identity could not be ignored. Prominent scholars have been studying this cohesive quality of language many years ago, whereas German Romanticism and Enlightenment examined language as a social phenomenon in detail. Since then, language's role to the 'groupness' and diversification of people was realized by leading figures of states who started implementing policies for its control.

This thesis wishes to emphasize on the case of Cyprus and thus, the linguistic status of Greek Cypriots and the state's policy to ignore the local dialect and simultaneously advance the status of Standard Modern Greek holds important place in this research. Moreover, the fact that Turkish language is more or less treated as a foreign instead of the second official language of the state and the continuous policies for the expansion of Standard Modern Greek in all aspects of life in the expense of Greek Cypriot Dialect, encourage the generation of an identity accentuating on the ethnic membership status of the Greek Cypriots instead of citizenship status which would also include Turkish Cypriots.

The subject under study in the third part is Turkish Language Education to Greek Cypriot students and whether this influences their stereotypes turning them to more positive and humanistic approaches towards their 'enemy' Other. This project's standpoint is that this is possible to happen since language is strongly connected to

culture and thus, by learning language Greek Cypriot students would also be socialized in the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot culture. People tend to search for similarities and differences from other groups since the only way to understand them is by constructing them in relation to the Self. This identification of similarities and differences between the Self and the Other ultimately leads to the elimination of feelings of fear, suspicion and threat for a paradigm, which would become approachable.

The easing of movement restrictions in 2003 was a turning point for Cyprus history. People have the opportunity to meet with each other and communicate facilitating the development of relations between them and give an important boost to the peace building project. Turkish language teaching is already included in the Greek Cypriot educational system; nevertheless, it is only offered on a voluntary basis. State does not offer compulsory Turkish language courses and due to that, competence levels remain low. For the purpose of this study, a questionnaire was undertaken among Turkish language students of the University of Cyprus which aimed to indicate a differentiation in the perceptions of students towards the Other.

To sum up, this thesis considers language as a major component of national identity and at the same time examines how second language acquisition is added to our pre-existent national identity. In specific, acquisition of the language of the Other and cross-cultural meanings emerging, provide citizens with a broader view of the world and turn them to humanistic approaches alienating them from ethnic stereotypes and hostilities. For definite conclusions on the issue of Other's language teaching as a tool of deconstructing stereotypes and enforcing peaceful coexistence further research needs to be provided to literature by the academic community.

Part One: Stereotypical Images of the Self and the Other

I. Representations as a Memory Constructing Identities

Representations could be considered as those mechanisms which provide common understandings and meanings among the members of a community in order for them to be able to communicate their thoughts, feelings and so on. Consequently, representations provide the members of a group with the same codes of communication through which their social interactions are facilitated.

As far as the national identity is concerned, every society needs to represent its historical past in a manner, which would assume an imagined national continuity with the present and future and would infuse the perception of sameness among the in-group members. Bell considers representational practices as being related to the national identification process and explains that

to mould a national identity – a sense of unity with others belonging to the same nation – it is necessary to have an understanding of oneself as located in a temporally extended narrative, and in order to be able to locate one as such, nationalist discourse must be able to represent the unfolding of time in such a way that the nation assumes a privileged and valorized role.³

Society interprets and represents events through official and unofficial institutions, traditions, and political symbols aiming to formulate a collective memory. The different evaluations of history are called, by Papadakis, narratives and they provide a specific historical consciousness and memory, which are the keystones for infusing collective identities. Accordingly, each actor adopts the narrative which best serves

³ Duncan Bell, "Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology and National Identity," *The British Journal of Sociology* 54, no. 1 (2003): 69.

own interests, the one which would legitimize own stance and censure the ‘enemy’. As Papadakis puts it: “each narrative suggests a different story through which issues of identity and otherness, self-justification and blame are negotiated in order to define the ‘imagined community’ of the nation, its enemies and its pertinent history”.⁴

In an abundantly politicized society like Cyprus, historical narratives could not but acquire different interpretations on the basis of individual’s political orientations. These different narratives despite incorporating in their most part the same period, and specifically the recent history of the island, they choose to accentuate different facts. These differentiations are basically expressed in the right-wing and left-wing narratives and promote the creation of different collective identities, different perception of the Self and consequently, different perception of the Other as well.

Nevertheless, these differentiations exist basically in the unofficial level of tradition in the Greek Cypriot society. That is because of the fact that after the 1974 invasion and the partition of the island, the possibility of a civil war between right-wing and left-wing supporters became a distinct risk. Thus, for the sake of unity, (‘για χάρη της ενότητας’) as it was the slogan back then, Greek Cypriots sacrificed the “objectivity of history”⁵ to vindicate Greek Cypriots’ mistakes and promote only one ‘enemy’, the one ‘occupying their lands’. Thus, the established narrative and the official representation of the historical events, is the one assuming external and not in-group others. History became politicized in the base of interpretations promoted mainly by political parties and their contesting ideologies but the official interpretation, the one

⁴ Yiannis Papadakis, “Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus,” *History and Anthropology* 14, no. 3 (2003): 253.

⁵ “The ‘historical truth’ was sacrificed on each side of the Green Line to empower political claims”. Marleen Brouwer, “Different Images of the Same Past: The Institutionalization of Historical Narratives in Cyprus as Reflections of Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms” (master’s thesis, Utrecht University 2009), 14.

also taught in schools, is established prominently as the generally accepted as true narrative.

A society's stereotypes are not only structured through the education provided to its members; to this process we could not ignore the immense influence of the media (electronic and print). As far as the Greek Cypriot society is concerned, my goal is to indicate the general atmosphere in which a Greek Cypriot is born and raised. I would be examining the issue of Greek Cypriot identity from the viewpoint of the native researcher since being myself a Greek Cypriot I have kept a very close watch on this stereotyping project.

The research focuses on representations of specific events of the history of Cyprus mostly through local media. What is more, the influence of the educational system could not be disregarded from the study of stereotypes, since it is the main institution through which national identity is assigned and therefore, in the analysis followed, I would be making some references to school textbooks but only from secondary sources. That is because prominent studies and researches by various scholars have already dealt with the specific subject extensively and I would like to concentrate my research on stereotypes constructed through other aspects of a Greek Cypriot's daily life.

For the purpose of understanding the emergence of the stereotypical image of the Self and the Other as it is today in the Greek Cypriot social imagination, it is of crucial importance to briefly present the Greek Cypriot official historical narrative.

To begin with, Cyprus had become a part of the Ottoman Empire in 1571 and remained as such for three centuries. In 1878, with the Cyprus Convention between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the administration of the island was handed

over to the British. In 1914, formal annexation was determined and Cyprus remained a British colony for about fifty years. The Greek nationalism in the island was already predominating from the mid-19th century and thus, the people's aspiration for *enosis*, union with Greece was not considered as a surprise.⁶

In 1955, Georgios Grivas Digenis a Cypriot born General of the Greek Army, came to Cyprus and founded a group of underground fighters, E.O.K.A. (*Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters*) to fight for the fulfillment of the *enosis* objective. The armed struggle against the British persisted for four years, in the duration of which extreme nationalism was the prominent ideology and had as a result the opposing increase of nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots who now demanded partition (*taksim*) of the island.

The Zurich – London Agreements came as a response to both communities' demands. They were signed in 1959 and 1960 between Turkey, Greece, Great Britain and the two communities' leaders (Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük). A Constitution was provided to Cyprus and on the 16th of August the Republic of Cyprus was officially declared. According to the official historiography, because of the fact that the Constitution was obstructing the proper functioning of the state Makarios was forced to put forward thirteen points for Constitutional amendments. Turkish Cypriots, who disagreed with this action of Makarios withdrew themselves from the government and in 1963 major interethnic violence led to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping unit in Cyprus.

⁶ Greek Cypriots developed Greek-centered self-awareness and considered as the only way to fulfill their national aspirations the *enosis*, union of the island with mainland Greece.

The Turkish invasion in Cyprus is perceived as the fulfillment of a national objective of Turkey, which is always described as a state with expansionist policies. The coup⁷ is only referred to as brought from the outside, specifically from the Junta in Athens and was performed with the support of some local extremists. Five days after Makarios' overturning from power, as a result of the July 15th coup d'état, Turkey being a guarantor power, according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, exploited the safety of the Turkish Cypriots and grasped the opportunity to invade. About a month after the cease fire and the Geneva Meetings of the two communities' leaders aiming to the end of the dispute and to a peace agreement for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, Turkey attacked again on the 14th of August.

Since then, the island remains partitioned while the two communities' leaders under the auspices of the United Nations, are continuously engaging in a negotiation talks process for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue. About ten years after the invasion, viz. on November 15 1983, the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was unilaterally declared and is up to this date a "state" recognized only by Turkey. The negotiation talks seem to have not carried forward, except for some chapters that the two communities agreed on.

The easing of restrictions on the freedom of movement in April 2003 has stirred up the island in which the two communities had no interaction since 1974. Greek and Turkish Cypriots can now move to the whole island. In addition, the negotiation process brought the two Communities very close to the solution of the Cyprus issue for the first time in 2004. The Annan Plan, named after its initiator, the Secretary

⁷ On the 15th of July, 1974, Greek Cypriot extreme nationalist paramilitary organization EOKA B supported by Greek Junta performed a coup aiming to the execution of President Archbishop Makarios. Especially after Archbishop Makarios' policy shift and stance to support the Republic and discontinue the enosis' policy, his deposition seemed to be the only way to achieve the enosis' goal.

General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan was the heyday of all these years of intense negotiations. It was rejected by the majority of the Greek Cypriots, of whom the 76% voted NO for the referendum. In May 2004, Cyprus became a member – state of the European Union and four years later entered the Euro zone.

The above historical incidents of the island are taught in an educational system, which according to the Report of the Committee of Educational Report appointed in 2004, was “helleno-ethnocentric and religious in character.” In addition, the Committee stated that “the ideological-political framework of contemporary Cypriot education remains Greek-Cypriot centered, narrowly ethnocentric and culturally monolithic”.⁸

The first thing a researcher of the Greek Cypriot educational system would observe is its strong connection to the Greek one, since almost all school textbooks come from Greece with very few additional materials published in Cyprus exclusively for Greek Cypriot students. Most importantly for history lesson, there is usually a small textbook of Cypriot history in each class, which is taught as an extension to the Greek one and to which much less teaching time is devoted.⁹ The national identity is communicated in Greek Cypriot schools in approximately the same way as in Greek schools and therefore a Greek Cypriot is educated to feel as much a Greek as a native one.

Greek Cypriots are very frequently referred to in school textbooks, by politicians especially of the right-wing parties and by the media as ‘Cypriot Hellenism’; hence,

⁸ In 2004, under the orders of the Minister of Education and Culture, a Committee for Educational Reform comprised by seven scholars, was formed in order to evaluate the Greek-Cypriot educational system and prepare a report including suggestions for its rehabilitation and modernization. Yiannis Papadakis, “Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the ‘History of Cyprus’”, *History & Memory* 20, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2008): 134-135. Quoting EEM, *Demokratiki kai Anthropini Paideia stin Evrokypriaki Politia (Democratic and Humanistic Education in the Eurocyriot Polity)* (Nicosia: n.p., 2004), 36, 63. May 23, 2012, http://www.paideia.org.cy/upload/ekthesi_epitropis.pdf.

⁹ Papadakis, “Narrative, Memory,” 131.

the Self is perceived as part of a wider Greek nation. Indicatively, during his fieldwork in Greek Cypriot primary schools during the 1996-1997 school year, Spyrou would listen to a teacher communicating to students that “with Greece we have the same civilization, the same language, should I say the same history? The first settlers on the island were Greeks. Greek blood runs through our veins. We have the same descent”.¹⁰

But even if we leave the textbooks coming from Greece and their influence out of this analysis and instead examine the history textbooks published in Cyprus for Greek Cypriot schools, we would still notice a cognitive link between the historical past of the island and Greece, creating a misleading belief of a common fate shared by Greece and Cyprus. Specifically, in the book of the 5th and 6th grade of primary school ‘History of Cyprus’ (*Ιστορία της Κύπρου*) the first chapter is ‘The Conquest of Greece by the Romans’ and the second one is ‘The Conquest of Cyprus by the Romans’¹¹ creating thus, a perception of a common historical past, which inflicts solidarity and sympathy for those who had the ‘same bad experiences’ with Us. This link promotes the notion of solidarity, which could be considered as the basis of the construction of a national community’s membership and identity.

Additionally, the Empires’ periods except for the Byzantine are called with the suffix ‘-kratia’, which means domination. For instance, there was *Enetokratia*, *Fragkokratia* and so on. Byzantine period in the island is not perceived as domination, but rather as a liberation from previous dominations; a period of progress in civilization, culture and people’s daily lives. The Byzantine Empire is perceived and characterized as a Greek Orthodox while on the contrary, the Ottoman Empire is perceived as a Turkish

¹⁰ Spyros Spyrou, “Children’s Educational Engagement with Nationalism in Divided Cyprus,” *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 31, no. 9/10 (2011): 536.

¹¹ Papadakis, “Narrative, Memory,” 132.

one (*Τουρκοκρατία / Tourkokratia*) and a period of regression for the island. For instance, in the same history textbook, the chapter referring to the Ottoman period in the island is titled: ‘The Conquest of Nicosia by the Turks’. The chapter begins by emphasizing on the expansionist nature of the Ottoman Empire: “It was obvious that one day the Turks would try to grab Cyprus. The way that the state of the Sultan expanded, little Cyprus appeared like a weak mouse in the claws of a wild lion”.¹²

Specifically, the Ottoman Empire is illustrated as uncivilized, cruel, corrupt, perverted and exploitative power while the Ottoman period in Greece and in Cyprus is represented as a period of despotism, backwardness, darkness.¹³ Indicatively, in the Cyprus history textbook for the gymnasium the students are taught that “as a part of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus followed the fate of the rest of Hellenism: Insults, humiliations, oppression”.¹⁴ The inclusion of Cyprus in the wide picture of Hellenism is again prominent while the Ottoman Empire is described as insulting, humiliating and oppressing its subjects.

In the school textbooks one can even find descriptions of tortures performed by the Ottoman rule to Greek Cypriots, most frequently, in the form of testimonies or even pictures. These narrations, testimonies from people who are said to have experienced the events are vastly used since this form of narrated historical facts leaves no doubt for their truthfulness and objectivity to the reader. These narrations are taken for granted by the students and ultimately, become part of the official historiography of Cyprus. According to White the usage of narrations and their inclusion to

¹² Ibid., 133.

¹³ Hercules Millas, “Perceptions of Conflict: Greeks and Turks in Each Other’s Mirrors,” in *In the long shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Postnationalism*, ed. Kalypto Nicolaidis et al., (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 2009), 96.

¹⁴ Papadakis, “Narrative, Memory’,” 133.

historiography is of crucial significance to the formulation of negative stereotypes against the Other.¹⁵

According to the history textbooks, the high ideals of Hellenism were safeguarded, despite all the rulers' efforts to dehellenize the population. Thus, the 'Greeks' of Cyprus have managed to keep their religion, glorious civilization and culture when their oppressive rulers fought them for that and even if their life was at risk. During the Ottoman Period essentially -according to the official historiography and traditional narrations- the church fought for the preservation of the Greek orthodox character of the island by building schools, churches and fighting against the Ottoman Empire for the emancipation of the island. Consequently, the Church of Cyprus became a respectful institution, which has a lot of power and influence in the Greek Cypriot society until our days.

When Christou asked some primary school students to describe the history of Cyprus as they would say it to a tourist, most of them said that "Cyprus has always been the nexus of geographical and cultural crossroads that it has fallen as a victim of many conquerors, and that the current political problem (one-half of the island is occupied by Turkey) remains unresolved". Without any references to pre-1974 turbulent years of Cyprus history most of the students said that "in 1974 the Turks invaded and Cyprus has been occupied ever since".¹⁶

Brouwer wrote in her Master's thesis that in many cases the national history is shaped by 'pain, pride, self-centeredness and denial of own committed atrocities'.¹⁷ The

¹⁵ Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins university Press, 1990), 3, 10, 25. Quoted in: Papadakis, "Narrative, Memory," 133.

¹⁶ Miranda Christou, "The Language of Patriotism: Sacred History and Dangerous Memories," *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 28, no. 6 (2007): 713.

¹⁷ Brouwer, "Different Images," 28.

above scheme could be regarded as representative of the Greek Cypriot identity, since the above elements occupy an important place in the official historiography. According to Anderson, “selective memory and forgetting are essential elements of the historicity of a nation and its efforts to achieve homogeneity and continuity”.¹⁸ Because of that, history is used “to propagate a narrative focusing on the suffering of the nation” and simultaneously “silencing the suffering of others”.¹⁹ This practice could be considered as the basis of the stereotypical images’ constructions of the Self and the Other, since it ignores own mistakes, the pain and suffering caused to the Other by the Self, while it overemphasizes on sufferings caused by the Other.

Within the Greek Cypriot society, there is absolutely no representation of Turkish Cypriot sufferings. For instance, a Greek Cypriot would never hear stories or see photographs –at least officially- of people who were killed during intercommunal violence, people who lost their homes and became refugees after the war when they had to move to the North. The Turkish Cypriots’ pain is absent from the official discourse but prevails along with the Greek Cypriots’ pain in bi-communal programs, through which approaches of common suffering and solidarity between the two communities are encouraged.

Officially, the interethnic conflicts in the 60’s are briefly mentioned and only as the consequences of the ‘Turkish rebellion’ (*τουρκοανταρσία / tourkoantarsia*). The atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots in the Christmas of 1963 against Turkish Cypriots are overlooked or considered as provoked by ‘mutineer Turks’, while the

¹⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991). Quoted in Hakan Karahassan and Michalinos Zembylas, “The Politics of Memory and Forgetting in History Textbooks: Towards a Pedagogy of Reconciliation and Peace in Divided Cyprus,” in *Citizenship Education: Europe and the World*, ed. Alistair A. Ross, (London: CiCe, 2006) 701.

¹⁹ Papadakis, “Narrative, Memory,” 128.

consequent bombings of Turkish air forces in 1964 are referred to as the attacks which “spread catastrophe and death among the civilian population”.²⁰ According to Theodossopoulos, the Greek Cypriot narrative “disregards intercommunal conflict prior to the division of the island and puts forward a vision of happy coexistence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots”.²¹

Thus, the Turkish attacks do not seem to make any sense, appear as completely irrational while the reference to civilian population indicates the unfairness of the bombings since fighting against unarmed population is a crime of war and considered as inhuman and brutal fighting technique against innocent people. As a result, Greek Cypriots subsume the bombings in the framework of the ‘undifferentiated, aggressive, arrogant and expansionist policies’ of Turkey and a proof of its ‘untrustworthy and devious nature’. Furthermore, by not referring thoroughly to the intercommunal violent acts of those years promote the perception of happy and peaceful coexistence between the two communities, who was threatened exclusively by external powers, while internal extremism is completely ignored. Thus, the external powers are to blame for ruining the ‘preexistent good relations between the two communities’.

The Turkish invasion of 1974 became the most important event used for the construction of the Greek Cypriot identity and the Cyprus Question became a part of the daily life of a Greek Cypriot. In addition it is considered as a confirmation of the perception of the Self as the permanently powerless victim and the Other as the perpetrator, since Greek Cypriots’ approaches towards their Other are stigmatized by what they perceive as their historical past, remembrance and memory deriving mostly

²⁰ Ibid., 134.

²¹ Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, “When Greeks Think about Turks: the View from Anthropology”, in *When Greeks think about Turks: the View from Anthropology*, ed. Dimitrios Theodossopoulos (London: Routledge, 2007), 13.

of the 1974 events. It has been a very significant task for the governments in Cyprus to maintain these memories among the Greek Cypriots and infuse these same memories to future citizens. This process is led mainly by schools, where students become acquainted with the past, their parents' and grandparents' places of origin, which their ethnic Other occupies.

Official historiography makes only a brief reference to the coup and only as a devious plan executed by the Greek Junta; on the contrary, the Turkish invasion dominates the Cyprus History teachings. What matters here, is the manner according to which the Turkish invasion is represented. It is not represented as a war; military operations are almost completely absent from official narrative. Instead, there is a preference in stressing the invasion's consequences: dead, refugees, missing persons, loss of properties, and destruction of cultural and desecrate of religious heritage.

Klein would refer in 2000 to a "memory industry" existing in Cyprus, which as Eppert would add three years later, it "aligns forgetting with evil forces".²² The reason for that is according to Christou, the fact that "forgetting about the occupied part would mean renouncing any rights over it, but more so, it would mean disrespecting those who have already suffered from the invasion and occupation".²³

The representations of sufferings are mostly done through photographs captured during the turbulent days of the war and some days later. Indisputably, visual representations are more easily embedded in the subconscious and are recorded indelibly to our memory. Distressing photos are vastly used and in accordance with

²² Karahassan and Zembylas, "The Politics of Memory," 702. Quoting Kerwin L. Klein, "On the Emergence on Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (Winter 2000): 127-150. Claudia Eppert, "Histories Re-imagined, Forgotten and Forgiven: Student Responses to Toni Morrison's *Beloved*," *Changing English* 10, no.2 (2003): 185-194.

²³ Miranda Christou, "A Double Imagination: Memory and Education in Cyprus," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 24, no.2 (2006): 292.

the imagined solidarity among the members of a group construct a notion of sympathy and a perception of the Self as the powerless victim. The majority of the characters of these photographs are women, children and elders, who are commonly perceived as the vulnerable, weak and defenseless members of societies. Photos of dead bodies, although few, are highly influential and according to Yashin “these photographs capture those moments in history, a past that is embodied in our souls and imply our unavoidable separation from those generalized ‘others’ who are responsible for this”.²⁴

The Turkish invasion in Cyprus is represented as the most suffering and painful event of the history of the island, through emotional and dramatic illustrations. In the history textbooks, a student would very frequently come across pictures of harassed elders or children. But even if school textbooks are omitted, this kind of photographs would still be present in classroom decorations, national celebrations and definitely in the media (print and electronic). In other words, the images cited below are either published in newspapers or broadcasted in various television programs, documentaries, news report and definitely easily found online on the internet. These photographs constitute a serious part of a Greek Cypriot’s daily life, hence well established in memory and major input to the construction of collective memory. Specifically, photographs construct the Self to be the victim of the invasion whereas the Other is constructed as the one to be blamed for causing all this pain and anguish.²⁵

²⁴ Neshe Yashin, “School is a Textbook: Symbolism and Rituals in Turkish Cypriot Schools,” in *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education*, ed. Christina Koulouri (Thessaloniki: Petros Th. Ballidis & Co., 2002), 420.

²⁵ Figures described below are attached in Appendix A pp. 116-121.

A Greek Cypriot very frequently in his/her life encounters a picture of a tent in the refugee camp (fig.1), which was used as a school for the children in order to continue their education. For a Greek Cypriot, this picture is immensely influential since education is always perceived as a high ideal of Hellenism. It is noteworthy that Greek Cypriots perceive themselves as descendants of the Ancient Greeks, who extracted civilization and culture to the whole world. The myth of 'kryfo scholeio' (*secret school*) is the proof that 'Hellenism' was always fighting to preserve its glorious civilization and considered education as equal to human subsistence. Thus, what we extract from this picture is the Greek Cypriots' determination to educate themselves under any conditions and circumstances, despite how difficult this might have been.

Moreover, there is a picture of children making up a Christmas tree communicating that refugees would have to spend their Christmas in the tents of refugee camps (fig.2). Most importantly, however, the photo that appeals to the Greek Cypriots' emotions is another one from the refugee camp, illustrating children making their 'first footsteps' as refugees (fig.3) and another one illustrating elders and children with the footer "Refugees in their own homeland" ("*Πρόσφυγες στην ίδια μας την πατρίδα*") (fig.4). The phrase 'their own' emphasizes on the property ownership status of the refugees stating that their belongings were taken from them violently; despite owning their homeland, they became refugees and this consists 'injustice' and 'unfairness'.

Another issue which played major role in the construction of a negative image of Turks is the case of the missing persons. I vividly remember myself during my childhood watching on television every now and then, the mothers and relatives of the missing people in their vast majority dressed in black clothes and discussing about

their tragedies. These people were also systematically demonstrating and demanding to find out any little detail about the fate of their beloved ones at the Ledra Palace crossing in Nicosia. The missing persons' issue is also represented mostly through photographs of them with footers like: "it is basic human need to be informed about the fate of our beloved ones" (fig.5). Specifically, a picture which someone would come across repeatedly is the one with five soldiers, which are said to have been arrested by the Turkish army and missing since then (fig.6).

More importantly, there is one photo with a boy around the age of five with a wedding picture of his parents in his hands and an expression of a person in despair. The footer of the picture is "Where are my parents?" and signifies the unfairness of the war, which left a child without its parents. Children are not the ones to blame and thus, feelings of anger towards the offenders are promoted (fig.7, 8).

The issue of the missing persons after the war is an issue that has not been researched a lot at an academic level by scholars. However, there are some outstanding studies in my viewpoint, by a prominent scholar in the field, Prof. Paul Sant Cassia examining the representation of the missing persons in the Greek Cypriot society. According to the argument of Cassia, this case of the Missing persons is both a "symptom and a cause of the hostile relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots".²⁶ That is because both communities used the missing persons issue as a proof of their preexistent negative stereotypes about the other. As Cassia states in his article, Greek and Turkish Cypriots aimed at creating a victimized image of the Self, which would justify their stereotypes towards the Other and their upholding stance during the negotiation process.

²⁶ Paul S. Cassia, "Guarding Each Other's Dead, Mourning Persons and Missing Past in Cyprus," *South European Society and Politics*, 11, no. 1 (2006): 116.

In his analysis, Cassia moves on to a very interesting comparison of the representation of the Missing Persons' case in both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot Community. At first, Turkish Cypriots refer to their missing persons as 'kayıplı', which could be translated as disappeared, lost or dead as he argues. These people are claimed to be civilians that were lost during the years of interethnic conflict from 1967 to 1974. The Turkish Cypriots were encouraged according to Cassia, to perceive their relatives as dead making it easier for the Turkish Cypriots to perceive the Greek Cypriots as 'criminals', 'untrustworthy' and a 'threat to their own survival'. Thus, according to this interpretation, it is self-evident that peaceful coexistence between the two communities is impossible and therefore the present state of affairs should be preserved.²⁷

On the contrary, Greek Cypriot leadership wants the case of the missing people to remain open in order for people to assert their cognitive rights and therefore, insist on the resolution of the Cyprus Issue. Greek Cypriots have been referring to their missing persons as 'αγνοούμενοι', thus, 'of unknown fate'. These people are implied to have been missing since the date of the Turkish invasion and are either living prisoners or dead, who were not properly buried. The fact that among the missing persons, there are women and children and the cultivation of the approach that Turkey is reluctant to assist the process of verification of their fate is perceived as another symbol of Turkish brutality. In other words, whatever the sight of observation is, the missing person's issue is perceived as an unfinished business, which exactly as Cyprus Issue needs to be resolved.

In addition, the mistreatment of the cultural heritage but most significantly, the desecration of Orthodox churches, religious symbols and even cemeteries located in

²⁷ Ibid.

the North was another issue that came out after the division of the island. Since 2003, a Greek Cypriot is able to see with own eyes what has been listening to or seeing in pictures from before. About fifty churches have been converted into mosques, another fifty changed into stables, hostels or hotels and about thirty villages' cemeteries were desecrated. Pictures of cemeteries with open and broken graves (fig. 9, 10) and thrown cross on the floor (fig. 11) are pictures well-embedded in Greek Cypriots' minds constructing the stereotype, according to which disrespectful, uneducated and uncivilized Turks do not respect any other religion except for Islamism and do not even show respect for the dead. Thus, the Asian, Oriental Other has nothing to do with the modern, European Self, who in contrast allows the operation of the mosques located in the South.

In order to keep the desire of a solution to the Cyprus Question alive, the official Greek Cypriot policy is to create memories to students that would associate them with the northern part of the island. Students, the future of the Greek Cypriot society as they are very frequently called, need to remember in order to continue the struggle for uniting their country. Memory became an educational goal posed in the school curriculum as a necessity and responsibility of the teachers to fulfill.

National memory is safeguarded in Cyprus and promoted through a well-established slogan, which because of its broad meaning leaves enough space for a variety of interpretations and understandings. Because of that, irrelevantly of the different perceptions that may emerge, Greek Cypriots are socially united under a slogan and this is one of the ways through which common suffering and solidarity provide the notion of homogeneity to national identity. Thus, the 'real struggle' for Greek Cypriots is to remember and use this memory as a resistance to the enemy's anticipations. Indicatively, a study conducted in 2000 by Christou proved that

students consider remembrance as their ‘responsibility’, as an ‘obligation’ equally important to their ‘national duty’ and a proof of love for their homeland.²⁸

To a question of the meaning of ‘I Don’t Forget and I Struggle’ a student answered: “it means that we will never forget what happened because this is what the Turks want us to do. They want us to forget as time goes by. . . . And I think that we have to remind every young person, every human being, about what happened . . .”²⁹

In Greek Cypriot primary schools, students are provided with notebooks, which are to be used during the six years of primary school. The particularity of these notebooks lies on the fact that both on the front and on the back cover there are pictures from significant monuments, churches, schools and so on, from villages located in the northern part of the island. Below this picture, there is the motto ‘I do not forget’ (*Δεν ξεχνώ*), which became a well-established slogan after the invasion. “Schools are decorated with posters that showcase the slogan “I don’t forget and I struggle” (*Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι/Den Xechno kai Agonizomai*). The desire to return to the occupied areas of the island is expressed in the teaching of history, literature, the arts, and other activities”.³⁰

In the mid-1990 the slogan was changed to ‘I Know, I Don’t Forget and I Struggle’ (*Γνωρίζω, Δεν ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι/Gnorizo, Den Xechno kai Agonizomai*) after teachers’ warning that the previous slogan was vague for children of this generation and was leading to pathetic attitudes and indifference.³¹ I still remember myself being a student of the sixth grade of primary school, when our teacher said that the slogan changed to ‘I Know, I Don’t Forget and I Struggle’ and that we should get acquainted

²⁸ Christou, “A Double Imagination,” 292-293.

²⁹ Ibid., 292.

³⁰ Ibid., 286.

³¹ Ibid., 292

with the northern part of the island and perceive them as part of Greek Cypriot's subsistence and reality and not just as an old myth or a bedtime story of the faraway past.

At the same time, a book bearing the above slogan as its title was first published in 1994 and given to students of the first two grades of primary school. The area under discussion is the sorrowful consequences of the war. The book includes emotive literary texts, poems in the form of narrations of true stories, where protagonists grieve for what they have lost: either for their beloved who died or missing, or their properties. It is a colorful book, full of heartrending images of crying figures and what prevails in the majority of the texts is the desire to return; the phrase 'I will be back' (*Θα ξαναγυρίσω/Tha ksanagyrisw*) is repeated vastly in various texts. Moreover, some of the stories concern with old people narrating the extraordinary beauty of their homes and villages and their sorrow for the present situation. Illustrations of mothers of missing persons as black-clothed figures, which experienced the tragedy of losing their beloved ones are common as well as the narrations from old people to young children, with which a student of the primary school could identify him/herself.

A directive with the title 'Upgrading the goal of 'I Know, I Don't Forget and I struggle'' was sent to Greek Cypriot schools by the Ministry of Education and Culture in October, 2001. According to it, teachers should dedicate some extra time in awakening the interest of students and provide them with some knowledge about the island's occupied areas. Among others, the directive noted that teachers should cultivate and enhance the morale of their students to struggle, make them realize

their rights and duties as citizens of a semi-occupied country with European orientations and ultimately, distance themselves from hatred and bigotries.³²

The slogan ‘I don’t forget’ (*Δεν Ξεχνώ / Then Xechnw*) was used for the first time for the formation of a symbol reminding the Turkish invasion on the 14th of August, 1974 on the day of Attila II operation, which had as a result the partition of the island. Nikos Dimou designed this symbol, which illustrates Cyprus split where the Green Line is today, and the Northern part of the island red colored and bleeding. The, until then, unknown motto ‘I Don’t Forget’ is written with white letters to the blue background above the map of the island. This illustration became a symbol commonly used as sticker, image in books, media and so on (fig. 12).

Maps are the tools for a person to realize the areas of sovereignty belonging to his/her ‘imagined community’³³ and its power in comparison to other contested territories. Anderson underlines the significance of maps by defining them as “fundamental mechanisms for conceptualizing territoriality, and thus constitute one of the primary tools of nationalist symbolism”.³⁴ The geographical location despite its constant nature, receives different understandings based on cognitive approaches of an individual. Essentially, in the case of Cyprus, where distance from Turkey and Greece holds national and political connotations the geographical location of the island would be dependent on individual’s perceptions.

³² Ibid.,303.

³³ According to Anderson communities are imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined”. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.

³⁴ Yiannis Papadakis, “Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a Contested Process,” *American Ethnologist* 25, no.2 (1998): 150. Quoting Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 170 – 178.

Greek Cypriots need to imagine themselves closer to Greece rather than Turkey. Indicatively, in maps issued for Greek and Greek Cypriot schools, Cyprus is placed in a box in the down eastern corner; hence it seems as located in the eastern coast of Crete. This representation of Cyprus' geographical location implies that Cyprus is geographically part of Hellenism and thus, as Loizos would put it, "the Turkish minority had no rightful place in the 1960 independent republic".³⁵

Flags are used to express and symbolize the national pride of people for their historical past and represent the ethnic similarities among the in-group members. In the case of Cyprus, there is a simultaneous coexistence of the Greek and Cypriot flag. The Greek flag is considered to represent the Greek Cypriot's nationality while the Cypriot represents only their citizenship and due to that, the majority of them feel like using the Greek rather than the Cypriot flag. Most frequently, Greek Cypriots use both flags as far as public schools and state buildings are concerned.

Taking all the above into consideration, it is obvious that the chapter of representations and perceptions of historical past is of huge importance for the construction of national identity and also for the nation itself. Through representations; poignant contexts and emotive language use, people construct myths and narratives, which are necessary for the categorization of the Self and the differentiation from the Other.

³⁵ Peter Loizos, "Notes on Future Anthropological Research in Cyprus," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 268, no. 1 (1976): 361.

II. The Greek Cypriot Identity: The Image of the Self

When in the third year of my undergraduate studies and in the very first lesson of a course our teacher in order to introduce us to the theories of nationalism, asked the students: ‘How do you identify yourselves in terms of national identity?’

That question with the brainstorming it caused and the discussions among the students thereafter, was an inconceivable experience for me. At first, despite having an idea a priori, I saw it also in practice that Greek Cypriots have a great variety of perceptions about their identity and secondly, despite being a politicized enough person myself until my turn was to come I was also thinking what my answer was going to be. A variety of answers was given by students identifying themselves as Greeks, Greek Cypriots or Cypriots exclusively. This question was a small survey from which it became more than obvious that school, media and in general the state at the highest level failed to enforce and promote a common ethnic identity for all its citizens.

In order to understand the Greek Cypriot identity, an analyst should always keep in mind two things: firstly, the fact that the Republic of Cyprus is a recently formed state, which did not emerge as a response to a rise of Cypriot nationalism. In other words, it was neither, like the Republic of Turkey which implemented a top-down nationalism -a state-controlled process for the infusion of the Turkish national identity to the citizens of the state- nor there was a down to top process like Greece to which the state came as a response to the surge of Greek nationalism. For Greek Cypriots, nationalism was directed and concentrated on a perceived Hellenized past and on the irredentist ideology because of which they perceived the island as Cypriot residue

(*'Kypriakon ypoloipon'*)³⁶ of the 'glorious' Greek past, history, civilization and most importantly Greek state. Thus, nationalism in Cyprus was a Greek-centered nationalism, which although struggling for *enosis*, union with Greece, what managed to get eventually was the unwanted, unexpected and most of all unorthodox solution of independence.³⁷

The second thing that an analyst must keep in mind is the fact that even after independence, the state did not promote and thus the people did not experience any process of enforcing at least a civic identity (a devotion to the state) for its citizens Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the state was never supported as an ideology and from the moment of its establishment, it basically "undermined its own existence"³⁸ by encouraging and advancing Greek nationalism. The Republic of Cyprus was doomed from the beginning to fail as a common state, roof for all its Cypriot citizens: Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

To the question of the Greek Cypriots' identity one must be certain that there is no accurate or precise answer. Greek Cypriot identity is a very complex issue to address, since people in Cyprus do not share the same, homogenized national consciousness, but rather a multi-dimensional; a consciousness which is strongly affected by the individual's religious, political, historical and cultural identity. Furthermore, the job of an analyst becomes even more complex considering the fact that Greek Cypriot identity does not remain constant through time and on the contrary is strongly influenced by political and social developments.

³⁶ Caesar V. Mavratsas, "National Identity and Consciousness in Everyday Life: Towards a Sociology of Knowledge of Greek-Cypriot Nationalism," *Nation and Nationalism* 5, no.1 (1999): 95.

³⁷ Translation is mine. Caesar Mavratsas, [*Opseis tou Ellinikou Ethnikismou stin Kypro: Ideologikes Antiparathesis kai I Koinoniki Kataskevi tis Ellinokypriakis Tautotitas 1974-1996 (Aspects of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus: Ideological Conflicts and Social Construction of the Greek Cypriot Identity)*] (Athens: Katarti, 1998), σ. 50.

³⁸ Mavratsas, "National Identity and Consciousness," 97.

In this framework, Mavratsas considers Greek Cypriot identity as being ‘context dependent’ since transformations in consciousness are directly “attached to the political and social procedures”.³⁹ According to Billig, “whenever there is an opportunity, such as at a political rally / campaign before election time, opposing concepts, themes and stereotypes are ‘awakened’, so that old adversaries will face each other in battle once again”.⁴⁰ Specifically, in times of peace and harmony someone might observe a turn to a perception of Greek Cypriot identity emphasizing more on Cyprocentrism, whereas in periods of tension or disappointment, for instance concerning the talks for the Cyprus issue, Greek nationalism predominates again.

i. Identity in History:

Cyprus was still an Ottoman Empire’s part when in 1878; the island was to be given to Britain through the Cyprus Convention and eventually in 1914, became a Crown Colony. Back then, an individual’s personal identity was referring mostly to his membership in a family, village and so on. It is important to mention here, that the inhabitants of the island were discriminated for administrative purposes, in the previous Ottoman period on the basis of millet, according to their religious affiliation; one was Christian, Muslim and so on. Turkish and Greek Cypriots had a common history in rebelling together against an oppressive ruler. Thus, the average Greek

³⁹ Translation is mine. Mavratsas, *Aspects of Greek Nationalism*, 100.

⁴⁰ Nicos Peristianis, “Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity and Politics,” In *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*, ed. Yiannis Papadakis et al. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 117. Quoting Michael Billig, *Ideology and Opinions* (London: Sage, 1991).

peasant shared more commonalities with another Muslim peasant rather than with other Greek members of the bourgeoisie.⁴¹

This scenery was to change after the Greek State's independence and the emergence of the ideology of 'Great Idea' (*Megali Idea*) as a political and strategic goal. Ethnicity began to be politicized and ultimately replaced religion as the main identifying attribute.⁴² One factor, which influenced the emergence of the Greek nationalism in Cyprus, even before the establishment of the Greek State, was the admiration originated by the battles between the revolving Greeks and the Ottoman rulers. Indicatively, "after the Greek War of Independence, many Greeks in the towns started giving their children Hellenic names; sure sign of ethnic self-awareness".⁴³ The Independent Greek State of 1830, implemented an irredentism-centered policy of the ethnically Hellenes of Asia Minor and Cyprus aiming to liberate all the 'Greeks under Turkish yoke'. The Greek State's policy to gain this land encouraged the emergence of the Greek Cypriot nationalism focusing on a 'common descent' of Greeks and Greek Cypriots.

The policy of irredentism was undertaken at the domestic level by the Church, who was responsible for the education provided to the people and what is more, clerics were the ones playing the role of the teachers in most of the cases. In schools, children were educated to identify themselves not only as members of the Orthodox culture

⁴¹ Nadav Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10, no. 4 (2004): 599. Quoting Rolandos Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Center, 1996), 52.

⁴² Caesar V. Mavratsas, "Approaches to Nationalism: Basic Theoretical Considerations in the Study of the Greek-Cypriot case and a Historical Overview," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 22, no.1 (1996): 87

⁴³ Morag, "Greek and Turkish Nationalisms," 599.

and thus, bearing some similarities with Greek Orthodox community, but also as part of the Greek nation.⁴⁴

During the first years of the 20th century there was a significant increase in the numbers of children going to school and teachers appointed. In general, children going to school during this period were socialized by their teachers as members of a bigger community in population but mostly in significance than their local land, a nation, which resided in Athens. In schools, “much time was devoted to the teaching of Greek history and language, to the celebration of Greek heroism in 1821, and so inevitably, to the creation of a national identity for Greek Cypriot children.”⁴⁵

Most importantly, however, someone should not forget that in 1821, Greeks were revolting against the Ottomans, who just like the Turkish Cypriots spoke Turkish and were Muslims. This could not but affect immensely the relations between the two communities, which supported the two contesting parties in the war: the Ottomans and the Greeks. The rise of nationalism had ultimately its consequences on the relations of people who absorbed Greek nationalism and those who did not.

The nationalistic education was enforcing and promoting the discrimination on ethnic bases between the island’s inhabitants: Turkish and Greek Cypriots. During this period, the education was being formed by two separate councils: a Greek and a Turkish, which were applying the Greek and Turkish curriculum respectively. People of Cyprus were educated to be irredentist communities entirely attached to their respective motherlands. The bipolarity and the antagonism between the two communities were naturally, encouraged by the British government since their ‘divide

⁴⁴ Peter Loizos, “How Might Turkish and Greek Cypriots See Each Other More Clearly?” In *Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997*, ed. Vangelis Calotychos (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 44.

⁴⁵ Peter Loizos, “The Progress of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus: 1878-1970,” in *Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Mair*, ed. John Davis (London: Humanities Press, 1974) 117.

and rule' policies were becoming, in this manner, more easily implemented.⁴⁶ Morag characterized this Dual Educational System "as the seeds of the future conflict", since "it socialized young Cypriots to be Greeks and Turks".⁴⁷ Indicatively, in 1891, there were 346 mixed villages however; this number decreased thirty years later to 252.⁴⁸ The first time that the British administration involved in the community's educational policies was after the 1931 riots and the consequent burning down of the House of the British representative. At this period, Greek Cypriots were clearly identifying themselves as Greeks and for the first time the British government came across the Greek nationalism. The colonial government imposed some measures as it was the press' censorship, curfews, the banning of demonstrations and symbols like the Greek flag and the Greek national anthem and control on the schools. Greek maps were not imported anymore and the Greek Independence Day was not celebrated.⁴⁹

In the 15th of January, 1950 Church organized a plebiscite, to which the Greek Cypriots with a percentage of 95,7% voted for union with Greece, wherefore the Greek national identity of those times became more than apparent. The colonial administration did not recognize this plebiscite and in 1955, a group of nationalist fighters called EOKA aiming to completion of the Greek Cypriots' aspiration for enosis, launched an armed struggle.

In 1960 Cyprus was granted independence, which would be safeguarded by the three guarantor powers: Greece, Turkey and Great Britain through the Zurich and London Agreements. The agreements established a state with a presidential polity, with a

⁴⁶ Adamantia Pollis, "Role of Foreign Powers in Structuring Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," in Calotychos, *Cyprus and its People*, 92.

⁴⁷ Morag, "Greek and Turkish Nationalisms," 605.

⁴⁸ Vangelis Calotychos, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives: Difference at the Heart of Cypriot Identity and its Study," in Calotychos, *Cyprus and its People*, 5.

⁴⁹ Morag, "Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", 606.

Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President with veto powers. In the first years of the Republic of Cyprus there were only 114 mixed villages left⁵⁰ after the surge of nationalism in both communities and the bicomunal rioting. (EOKA on behalf of the Greek Cypriots-TMT on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots).

Stephen G. Xydis' book's title describes perfectly what the Republic of Cyprus was at the first years of its establishment and up until the moment of writing in 1973: 'Cyprus Reluctant Republic'. The features of the island's contemporary history could be described very briefly as follows:

Since the fifties, the problem of Cyprus has taken many different aspects. It has been in turn, or even simultaneously, a problem of self-determination, of decolonization, of religious and communal strife, of a war of liberation, of a conflict between communism and anticommunism, of a clash between Greek and Turkish nationalism, of a power-political rivalry between the great powers in the Middle East. It has been a bilateral, a trilateral or a fully international problem; a West European or a Near Eastern problem.⁵¹

All these turbulent years of Cypriot history had a decisive effect on the nationalist orientation and the identity of the inhabitants. The Republic of Cyprus' independence did not respond to the desires of people: both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who both perceived themselves as members of a nation outside their state. What is more, even after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek Cypriot education maintained its links to the Greek educational system and curriculum and thus, students were more and more socialized in the Greek national identity and history. Consequently, what the government was doing was to encourage

the maintenance and strengthening of national loyalties *at the expense of state patriotism*. There was no attempt to create a common basis for life on the island. The allocation of positions in the government, the bureaucracy and the military on the basis of ethnic origin;

⁵⁰ Calotychos, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives," 6.

⁵¹ Alexander G. Xydis, "Cyprus: What Kind of Problem?" in *Cyprus Reviewed*, ed. Michael Attalides (Nicosia: New Cyprus Association, 1977), 22. Quoted in Calotychos "Interdisciplinary Perspectives," 4.

the self-government – via the communal assemblies and separate municipalities of each national community; the continuation of the policy of separate educational systems and the direct link to the respective Greek and Turkish mainlands through stationing of Greek and Turkish troops –all contributed to the further solidification of rival national identities.⁵²

As a result of the outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1963-64, the number of the mixed villages was further decreased to 48. Soon after the summer of 1964 there were some rumors that the leader of EOKA organization, who was notorious for his anti-communist action in the framework of Cold War and during the Greek civil war General Grivas, returned to Cyprus. According to the Greek Cypriot centrist newspaper 'Kypros' a secret organization was formed, whose aim was "to strife communism, to suppress every move for the cultivation of a Cypriot consciousness and to strive for a revival of the Greek virtues and Greek consciousness. The organization's oath bound members to enosis as the only solution".⁵³

After the establishment of independence, Makarios changed his policy and increasingly distanced himself from the goal of enosis introducing a policy of loyalty to the state.

In 1968, he declares publicly that: "what is feasible does not always coincide with what is desirable".⁵⁴ In other words, despite Greek Cypriots' aspirations for enosis with Greece as a completion of their national status, this was impossible to be substantiated due to that period's specific circumstances. The independence oriented policy created two opposing pillars on the island: the pro – Makarios (people who

⁵² Emphasis added. Morag, "Greek and Turkish Nationalisms," 617.

⁵³ Ibrahim H. Salih, *Cyprus: an Analysis of Political Discord* (Brooklyn: Theo Gaus Sons, 1968), 131. Quoted in Michael A. Attalides, *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics* (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979), 69.

⁵⁴ Andreas Theophanous, "Ethnic Identity and the Nation State in the Era of Globalization: the Case of Cyprus," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 24, no.1-2 (2011): 52.

supported the new state and the independence of Cyprus) and pro – Grivas or pro – enosis (people who insisted on the ideal of enosis with Greece).⁵⁵

Indicatively, on the 26th of October, 1964 a ‘Times’ correspondent reflecting the situation in Cyprus wrote:

The issue here is no longer whether Archbishop Makarios himself genuinely desires enosis or is scheming to keep the island independent. It is whether, if enosis were agreed upon as a lasting solution or were offered as a choice under self-determination, it would be accepted by the majority of the Greek Cypriots.⁵⁶

The coup in the 15th of July 1974, the consequent invasion and partition of the island had tremendous effects on Greek Cypriot identity. Surprisingly enough, the invasion became a source of power and support to the ‘reluctant’ Republic of Cyprus. After 1974, an Independence Day, in order for the independence to be memorized and celebrated, was for the first time established and the governmental buildings added the flag of the Cypriot state on their flagpoles. The economic prosperity “led many Greek Cypriots from the leadership down to view enosis, as increasingly, less attractive, supporting the view that Cyprus could be more prosperous on its own.”⁵⁷

Greek Junta was thought as bearing the biggest responsibility for the disaster in Cyprus and thus, Greek Cypriots’ motherland came to be perceived as the traitor of Hellenism and the enosis’ ‘ideal’. Cyprocentrism increasingly gained wide acceptance and support by the people, who also engaged themselves in a process of Rapprochement with their Turkish Cypriots compatriots. Cyprocentrist ideology was emphasizing more on the peaceful coexistence between the two communities in the past and considering the rapprochement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as the

⁵⁵ Peristianis, “Dual Identity and Politics,” 104.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Attalides, *Nationalism and International Politics*, 77.

⁵⁷ Morag, “Greek and Turkish Nationalisms,” 611.

only solution to the Cyprus issue. Contested nationalisms were considered as responsible for everything that Greek and Turkish Cypriots had to suffer.

However, the election of Andreas Papandreou as the Prime Minister of Greece in 1981 caused a turn to Hellenocentrism, which increasingly became the dominant ideology again. The nationalistic narrative expressed by Papandreou, who stated that he would “render the Greeks as the only sovereigns in their country” and that “no discussion with Turkey is possible until the last Turkish soldier leaves Cyprus” gave the impression of a new Greece bearing no similarities with the one that betrayed the Greek Cypriots before.⁵⁸ Moreover, the declaration of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ paved the way to a pessimistic point of view, since people were convinced that no solution was soon to come. After this ‘treacherous’ declaration as it was perceived by Greek Cypriots and the 1996 events,⁵⁹ where two Greek Cypriots were killed by extreme nationalists near the Green Line, gave a boost to Hellenocentrism. People started thinking that there is no possibility of cohabitation and cooperation with Turkish Cypriots and thus, they fell back on Greece again.

ii. The Opposing Views on Greek Cypriot Identity:

“Are the islanders Cypriots, Greeks and Turks, or are they Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots? Or are they a number of other ‘labeled’ minorities? The answer of course depends on who you ask”.⁶⁰

The two main opposing camps of Greek Cypriot identity are, as scholars on the field have identified, Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism (or Cypriotism). On the one

⁵⁸ Mavratsas, *Aspects of Greek Nationalism*, 100. For Papandreou’s quote see Pantelakis Pantazi, [To odiporiko mias mirasmenis patridas (The Trek of a Divided Homeland)], *Xaravgi*, September 29, 2011, <https://haravgi.com.cy/site-article-11665-gr.php>. Translation is mine.

⁵⁹ Calotychos “Interdisciplinary Perspectives,” 19.

⁶⁰ Anne Jepson, “Gardens and the Nature of Rootedness in Cyprus,” in Papadakis, *Divided Cyprus*, 159.

hand, Hellenocentrism emphasizes on the history of Hellenism, the nation. It also pays attention to attributes like language and religion, which unify the members of the nation and differentiate them from all the others (i.e. Turkish Cypriots). We could describe Hellenocentrism as an expression of romantic or ethnic nationalism. On the other hand, Cyprocentrism emphasizes on the state membership as identifying attribute and the commonalities among the citizens. Cyprocentrism could be described as an expression of civic nationalism. In essence, what differentiates these two approaches from one another is which features of identity each one chooses to emphasize on.⁶¹

The supporters of the Hellenocentrist ideology identify themselves as descendants of the glorious Ancient Greek civilization and culture claiming a historical continuity. According to this ideology, Greek Cypriot is primarily and most importantly identified on the basis of one's loyalty to the nation. Hellenocentrists feel proud of the Greek nation and their links to it and at the same time they do not consider the island as a separate entity from Greece. Hellenocentrism considers the origins of the main Greek Cypriot characteristics to be traced in the Ancient Greek history, heritage and civilization.⁶²

In the 1990's the ideology has abandoned its irredentist nature and its enosis' aspirations of the past.⁶³ However, Hellenocentrists consider still, the Greek national identity as the only way for Greek Cypriots to survive nationally and they would very often say: 'we may not manage to unite with Greece but we are and should remain

⁶¹ Nicos Peristianis, [Deksia-Aristera, Ellinokentrismos-Kiprokentrismos: to Ekkremes ton Sillogikon Tavtiseon Meta to 1974 (Left-right, Hellenocentrism-Cyprocentrism: The Pendulum of Collective identifications after 1974)], in [Anatomia mias Metamorfosis: I Kypros Meta to 1974 (*Anatomy of a Metamorphosis: Cyprus after 1974*)], eds. Nicos Peristianis and George Tsaggaras (Nicosia: Intercollege,1995), 127.

⁶² Peristianis, "Dual Identity and Politics," 110.

⁶³ Mavratsas, *Aspects of Greek Nationalism*, 100.

Greeks'.⁶⁴ Hellenocentrists most frequently are less tolerant towards Turkish Cypriots and less conciliatory in their approach to the Cyprus Problem.⁶⁵ Because of that, they are very often characterized by their opponents as nationalists and utopists.

In a survey conducted in 2000 asking the question "as regards the issue of collective identity, which of the following best describes how you feel?" 47% of the respondents identified themselves as Cypriots, 10% as being more Cypriot than Greek, 35% equally Cypriot and Greek, 3% more Greek than Cypriot and 5% as exclusively Greek.⁶⁶

In the framework of the above survey of 2000, interviews were also conducted to the participants. To these interviews, Hellenocentrists would state that: "I feel more Greek than a Cypriot, because I see no reason to separate out a tree from the wood. Cyprus is Greek". Hellenocentrists identify themselves "first as Greek and then islanders". "I feel very proud of being Greek Cypriot, Cypriot says nothing. Cyprus has no history of which it could be proud, whereas Greece can be proud of its struggles. I am very proud as a Greek Cypriot, for many conquerors passed through Cyprus, but Cyprus managed to maintain its Greek identity". "Cyprus can be thought of as a part of Greece, in the same way that Crete and Rhodes may have their own local traditions, but they simultaneously partake in the panhellenic heritage which unites all Greek people, including Greek Cypriots".

⁶⁴ Ibid., 113.

⁶⁵ Mavratsas, "National Identity and Consciousness," 94.

⁶⁶ Peristianis, "Dual Identity and Politics," 107. The Survey's title is: "Understanding Bi-communal Perceptions and Attitudes: a Survey on Political and National Perceptions"

There were even extreme Hellenocentrists, who stated: “I am ready myself to fight for my country at whichever time. I even contest [the loss of] Constantinople, Agia Sofia, in the same way as [I contest the loss of] Kyrenia and Apostolos Andreas”.⁶⁷

As opposed to Hellenocentrism, Cyprocentrism assigns emphasis on the state as the central and main referring point. According to this approach, the prevalent factor is not ethnicity but citizenship. The notion of belonging to a state is irrelevant to the ethnic ancestry or ethnicity’s characteristics like language, religion and culture. Members of the nation are the inhabitants of state boundaries, who share the rights and duties that this implies. While not denying the Greek ethnicity of the Greek Cypriots, it emphasizes more on the commonalities between the two main composing communities of the state. They also argue that Greek Cypriot cultural identity naturally shares some elements with the Turkish Cypriot compatriots’ one, after so many years of cohabitation. Cyprocentrists use the Cypriot flag, which does not represent any ethnic or religious symbols; features of differentiating the Self from the Other, the Greek Cypriots from the Turkish Cypriots. Specifically, the flag of Cyprus is the map of the island in the color of copper and two olive branches representing peace. The extreme Cyprocentrists identify themselves by highlighting the differentiations from Greeks while they also deny the Greek Cypriots’ Greek ethnicity.⁶⁸ For instance, they would state that “I don’t believe that we are brothers with the Greeks. I used to believe that when I was young. Nowadays, I’ve changed my mind”. There were Cyprocentrists who differentiate themselves from mainland Greeks in order to self-identify: “I feel Cypriot, I am Cypriot. Greeks for me are foreigners/strangers (*ξένοι/xenoi*). They are those who destroyed us. I feel Cypriot, I believe in the independence of my country, I believe we should have our own national

⁶⁷ Ibid., 112.

⁶⁸ Calotychos, “Interdisciplinary Perspectives,” 16.

anthem and hoist our own flag”. “Our national identity as well as our citizenship must be Cypriot. Greece destroyed us. Greeks are crooks, liars and self-interested (συμφεροντολόγοι/*simferontologoi*). They are not hospitable (φιλόξενοι/*filoxenoi*). I also want to stress that we should only have a Cypriot flag and must be called Cypriots and not Greek Cypriots”.⁶⁹

Although Cyprocentrism seems to be an ideology that somehow facilitates the coexistence of the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, making the conflict resolution more possible, it “never became structured and expressed as a political ideology but rather misrepresented and most frequently in the defensive position”.⁷⁰

Peristianis instead, divides the above two categories in three: the “Hellenocentrism: loyalty to nation”, “Cypriotism: loyalty to state” and “dual identity: balance of loyalties”. According to this categorization, Hellenocentrists and Cypriotists hold the two edges while the third one is in the middle, a rather modest approach of identity. In this category, there is a collective identity, including characteristics from both the Greek ethnicity and Cypriot citizenship. According to this ideology although Greek Cypriots speak the same language, have the same religion, culture and habits they are also members of a particular state, which provides them with rights and duties. Dual identity supporters express the idea that “feeling Greek does not mean support for enosis” or that “Greece should get involved in the affairs of Cyprus”; Cyprus should remain an independent state, however, it would be a mistake to “abort our Greekness”. Lastly, they feel that “Cypriots are more Greek than mainland Greeks” since “our tradition” is more “pure”.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Peristianis, “Dual Identity and Politics,” 112.

⁷⁰ Attalides, *Nationalism and International Politics*, 59.

⁷¹ Peristianis, “Dual Identity and Politics,” 114.

iii. Hellenocentrism, Cyprocentrism and the Political Parties:

“Cyprus is a highly politicized society therefore, Greek Cypriot children live in a divided society where identities are highly politicized and where being a particular kind of person implies a particular sense of political being”.⁷²

The way a Greek Cypriot chooses to self-identify in terms of his/her nationality may be an indication of this individual's political party affiliation; in specific, the characterization an individual chooses (Greek, Greek Cypriot or Cypriot) to identify the Self makes simultaneously a statement for the political stance and political party he/she supports. That is because in Cypriot society, political parties became the voice and representatives of the two prevalent approaches on identity. In fact, the political parties are strongly influenced in their policies by the power that each of these camps gain at particular times and simultaneously are responsible for the formation of these approaches of identity.

Nowadays, there is a prevalent belief among the population that the history of Cyprus after the independence is not written down officially and determinedly. Consequently, instead of one and only approach of history there is a variety of different conflicting interpretations of the past. Each of the antagonistic political parties adopts the interpretation, which will applaud their past policy decisions and forgives their mistakes. “The two antagonistic political ideologies and nationalist discourses in Cyprus provide Greek Cypriots with identity-securing interpretive schemes through which they may comprehend the social world, the recent history of Cyprus and everyday reality”.⁷³

⁷² Spyros Spyrou, “Children Constructing Ethnic Identities in Cyprus,” in Papadakis, *Divided Cyprus*, 121.

⁷³ Peristianis, “Dual Identity and Politics,” 106.

For the requirements of this analysis, references will be made only to the two largest political parties in Cyprus, since they are supported by the 1/3 of the electorate and therefore the percentages of these two parties are higher than the half. The remaining percentage consists of four political parties and other political movements and thus, this research considers them as of less importance.

Cyprocentrism has traditionally been expressed by left-wing party (henceforth AKEL) and its adherents, who give the status of their 'imagined community' to the state and its citizens excluding Greece and Turkey as motherlands. On the contrary, Hellenocentrism has been the dominant ideology of the right – wing party and their adherents (henceforth DISY).

The national identity by support of political party became recently easy to determine after a survey - also mentioned earlier - conducted in 2000. According to the results of the survey, the vast majority of the AKEL adherents with a percentage of 69,8% identify themselves 'exclusively as Cypriots', whereas the same opinion is shared by the lower enough percentage of 29,8% of the DISY adherents. 11% of the AKEL and 7,9% of the DISY adherents identify themselves as 'more Cypriot than Greek'. The biggest percentage of the DISI adherents, 47,9% identify themselves as being 'as much Cypriot as Greek', whereas the same answer is given by the 17,9% of the AKEL adherents. The people who identified themselves as 'more Greek than Greek Cypriot' was by 0,3% AKEL adherents and the 9,1% of them DISY adherents.

DISY, as a carrier of Hellenocentrism, considers Cyprus as a part of the wider Hellenism. They place Cyprus at the edge of Hellenism ('*Akritiki Megalonisos*'), constructing thus an 'imagined community' (in accordance to Anderson's theory) and identify themselves as members of a broader unit of Hellenism (*Ellinismos*). DISY,

addresses the Greek Cypriots as ‘Cypriot Hellenism’ and adopts as most important dates to commemorate, those strongly linked to Hellenism and highlighting the glory of the Greek nation. At the same time, DISY also chooses to forget the embarrassing events like the Junta Years in Greece and the coup in Cyprus and on the contrary, makes strong references to the invasion as performed by ‘barbarous Turks’.

The Greek Revolution of 1821 is one of the most important dates that DISY commemorates, since it signifies the independence of the state which became later on, the motherland for Greek Cypriots. Moreover, DISY approaches this date as a legendary victory against the Turks, the ‘archetypal enemy’ of Hellenism. The Capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans is also commemorated along with the Greek-Turkish War of 1922 always refer to as Asia Minor Catastrophe, and narrated as the persecution of Orthodox Greeks from their land. Moreover, in these national celebrations a link between the ‘Orthodox Greeks’ of Constantinople, Asia Minor and Cyprus is implied. The independence of the Republic of Cyprus is not commemorated and what is more, the flag of Cyprus is not used to any of DISY’s events, whereas the Greek flag predominates. Surprisingly enough, the former United States Ambassador in Greece, Monteagle Stearns in his 1992 book: *Entangled allies: U.S. policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* would write: “the flag has its defenders. In the summer of 1990 the president of the National Assembly in Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides, told the author that the flag of Cyprus is ‘the best in the world’. When asked why, he replied ‘because no one would die for it’”.⁷⁴

Interestingly enough, Glafkos Clerides was member of the EOKA organization and in 1976 he founded the right-wing party Democratic Rally. Moreover, a year after the

⁷⁴ Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 172.

publication of the above book, in 1993 Clerides was elected as the president of the Republic of Cyprus and he remained in office till 2003.

DISY came to express politically EOKA organization's view of Hellenocentrism and in 1976 provided to the ex-fighters of EOKA and EOKA B a political roof. The outbreak of the anti-colonial struggle with the ultimate goal of union with Greece, on the 1st of April, 1955 is tremendously commemorated by DISY, which perceives the strong will of the people in those times for enosis with Greece as a proof for the Greekness of Greek Cypriots. Makarios granted amnesty to the coupists in order to put an end to the deep division among the population and DISY, using the same argument chooses not to remember the coup of 1974 and focuses on the invasion perceiving it as independent of the inner conflicts and the coup since 'Turkey would invade anyway' as they claim. As far as the traumatic 1974 is concerned, DISY gives more importance to the invasion of 'barbarous Turks' and undervalues the responsibilities and blame of the coupists; the Greek Junta and the extreme nationalists of EOKA B. Thus, the invasion is not approached as a consequence of the bicomunal conflict and the coup; it is rather a natural evolution based on the 'threatening and expansive character of Turkey'. According to DISY's narrative, remembering the period of the clash of nationalisms and the coup would promote and reinforce the division among Greek Cypriots.

On the other hand, AKEL addresses to Greek Cypriots as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus: 'Cypriot people' (*Kypriakos Laos*'), a reference which includes both Greek and Turkish Cypriots while it excludes any reference to former motherlands. The Independence Day on the 1st of October, is the most significant commemoration of AKEL, since it signifies the recognition of Greek and Turkish Cypriots as the two halves of a whole. The murder of Mishiaoulis-Kavazoglou by extremist TMT is

commemorated as a proof that Greek and Turkish Cypriots were fighting together, side by side for the enhancement of the Republic of Cyprus and the peaceful coexistence of the two communities, however, extreme nationalism did not permit it. Furthermore, EDON – AKEL’s youth organization, organizes a bicomunal festival for rapprochement lasting usually for ten days in the memory of Mishiaoulis-Kavazoglou.

In contrast to DISY’s position, AKEL commemorates both coup and the invasion, addressing to them as the ‘dark anniversaries of the coup and the invasion’. For AKEL, the major responsibility for what happened in Cyprus is not the expansionist nature of Turkey-which places in the imperialist framework⁷⁵ - but extreme nationalism of Greek Junta and EOKA B’. According to this approach, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were the victims of a treacherous policy implemented by Greece, Turkey and their local co-operators.⁷⁶ The Greek flag is almost never used in AKEL’s commemorative events, since it symbolizes Greece as a motherland, which policies are accused as equally responsible to Turkey’s for the pain and violence caused in the island. The prevalent slogans to these events are: “the people don’t forget the fascists and the tanks” and “the people don’t forget what right-wing means”.⁷⁷

Taking all the above into consideration, it is obvious that the Greek Cypriot identity is not a unidimensional but rather an open to various interpretations concept. The turbulent history of the island along with internal and external actors’ policies concerning the island led to a formation of an inconsistent population. Hellenocrist

⁷⁵ Yiannis Papadakis, “Enosis and Turkish Expansionism,” in Calotychos, *Cyprus and its People*, 78.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁷⁷ For a more detailed analysis on the commemorations used for the construction of identity by the two biggest political parties see: Papadakis, “Narrative and Commemoration,” 253-270.

and Cyprocentrist identity divide the Greek Cypriots into two contesting camps, encouraged and reinforced by the two biggest political parties.

III. The Ethnic Other: The image of the Enemy

The self-identification is prominently codified in the literature of personal identities as a two-way process: the self-categorization and the self-differentiation from some negative other. A person identifies the self in terms of what the individual is and what is not, in opposition to the other. In other words, the existence and characterization of some other on the basis of individual's cognitive process is indispensable for the identification of the self. Applying this same motive to group or national identity, the Other would be the one opposing and threatening the interests of the group one perceives the Self to be a part of.

People need to bear a group membership achieved by including themselves in a group based on perceived similarities very early in their life and after that, they tend to compare and separate their group from other. For instance, children distinguish themselves from children of the opposite gender, of another skin color, mother-tongue and so on whereas moving a step further they tend to include themselves in a group bearing some common characteristics. The national membership status based on society's constructions and stereotypical images of the Other become ultimately realized and embedded in children mindsets as well.

According to Katz and Braly's definition, "stereotypes are beliefs shared by a large number of people within a culture".⁷⁸ The construction of stereotypes is based on and leads simultaneously to fallacies and misperceptions. "The tendency to simplify things has led us to discard some of the presumed characteristics of stereotypes and prejudice that were integral to early conceptualizations" which are codified as

⁷⁸ David S. Shneider, "Modern Stereotype Research: Unfinished Business," in *Stereotypes and Stereotyping*, ed. C. Neil Macrae et al. (London, New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), 420. Quoting D. Katz and K. Braly, "Racial Stereotypes of 100 College Students," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 28, no. 3 (1933): 280-290.

inaccuracy, negativity and overgeneralization by Allport.⁷⁹ That is because since it is impossible to know all the members of one group, any general assumption could never be proved and confirmed as being true. Assuming the characteristics of one or more members of the group and considering them as patterns for the whole of population is a fallacy which leads the societies to the production of stereotypes about the Other. This stereotypical portrayal is a construction, which does not represent reality and is inaccurate, since it does not include all different kinds of attributes; instead it has excessive use of negative and absence of positive characteristics of the Other.

The overgeneralization of group characteristics either this refers to one's own group or to the Other's has as a result the misperception of homogeneity. Elizabeth Kirtsoglou makes a correlation between homogeneous groups and Anderson's 'imagined communities' according to which the Self perceives the Other's identity to be homogeneous and consequently the members of their group to bear the same attributes. An individual categorizes the Self as a member of a national group through the realization of perceived commonalities among all the members of this group and contrasts with the Other.⁸⁰ In this framework, Hughes would write in 1994 that: "an ethnic group is an ethnic group because the people in it and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the ins and the outs feel and act as if it were a separate group".⁸¹

⁷⁹ Charles Stangor, "The Study of Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination within Social Psychology: a Quick History of Theory and Research," in *Handbook on Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination*, ed. Todd D. Nelson, (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), 2. Quoting Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 1979).

⁸⁰ Elisabeth Kirtsoglou, "Phantom Menace: What Junior Greek Army Officers Have to Say about Turks and Turkey," *South European Society and Politics* 11, no. 1 (March 2006): 164.

⁸¹ Everett Hughes, *On Work, Race and the Sociological Imagination*, ed. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 91.

Consequently, for the Self, the Other's group is a national unity; there are no differentiations between its members and this is exactly the perception which naturally leads societies to the creation of stereotypes.

For giving a specific pattern of the Greek Cypriot Other as a stereotype, it is of great importance to keep in mind the strong bonds of the Greek Cypriot identity to the Greek nation. Greek Cypriots consider themselves, as part of the Greek nation and they are essentially educated to do so. State and society's mechanisms -like education and media- encourage Greek Cypriots to self-categorize fundamentally as Cypriot citizens of Greek national origin. In the process of formulating the Self, Greek Cypriots, could not but have the Other posited by their membership in the 'glorious' Greek nation and their memories of the 1974 events: the 'traditional, eternal enemy'.

School could be considered as an institutionalized way of infusing stereotypes through the process of constructing and infusing a national identity to the students. Greek Cypriot education is vastly affected by the Greek one since almost all school textbooks, for lessons like history, geography and Greek language, are the same used in Greek schools. As a result, education promotes the cultivation of stereotypes and utterly, the identical stereotypical image of the Turk in the mindsets of Greeks and Greek Cypriots. The Other is, in general terms, portrayed among the Greeks and Greek Cypriots as well, as an: "undifferentiated, aggressive, expansionist, uncivilized, an enemy".⁸²

The fact that the Ottoman period in Greece, is most frequently described as a 'Turkish rule' (*Tourkokratia*) facilitates the correlation with contemporary Turks. Thus, the Turk was and will always be the 'barbarous, violent and evil' enemy of the Greek

⁸² Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, "Introduction: The 'Turks' in the Imagination of the 'Greeks'," in Theodossopoulos, *When Greeks think about Turks*, 13.

nation, whose expansionist nature was proven by what they consider as the fall of Constantinople, the destruction of Asia Minor and ultimately, the invasion in Cyprus. On the contrary, the Self is perceived as the 'innocent and good', a victim of this expansionist nature of the powerful Other.⁸³

According to Spyrou, the Turkish invasion and the occupation of the northern part of the island is considered as the 'most important event in the recent history of the island', adding to the already negative image of the Turk, who became the 'principal Other'.⁸⁴ Generally speaking, the Cyprus Question became the focal point constructing the Greek Cypriot identity and the image of the Other. The society's state or private institutions proceed to an interpretation of the invasion and occupation, using mostly emotional appeals and dramatic language which reinforces these negative feelings towards the Other.

In the shadow of the 1974 events, their representations and interpretations this negative image of the Turk as the Greek Cypriot's national Other and the hostility towards the Turks and Turkey are considered as 'justifiable' by the Greek Cypriots.⁸⁵ Specifically, a two-year ethnographic study conducted by Zembylas in three Greek Cypriot primary schools during 2007 and 2008, demonstrated the intention of justifying prejudices and stereotypes constructed by societies and specifically the racist attitudes against the Other. The above mentioned study was conducted in three schools with Turkish speaking students, who composed the 37% of the students' population of the first school, the 12% of the second and 8% of the third. The units of analysis were actually the teachers and their behaviors towards the Turkish- speaking

⁸³ Peristianis, "Dual Identity and Politics," 111.

⁸⁴ Spyros Spyrou, "Constructing the Turk as an Enemy: The Complexity of Stereotypes in Children's Everyday Worlds," in Theodossopoulos, *When Greeks think about Turks*, 97.

⁸⁵ Vassos Argyrou, "How Greeks Think: About Turks, for Example," *South European Society and Politics* 11, no.1 (2006): 42.

students; the data was collected through interviews, ethnographic observation for eight weeks in each of the schools and examination of documents such as the curriculum, teaching materials and students' work.

The significance of this study is placed upon the fact that a teacher is, in students' eyes, a 'wise' personality whose sayings are rarely questioned. Since students engage in the questioning and doubting process very late in their school life, the teachers' ideologies gain significance in the formation of students' opinions. The study demonstrated that despite the humanistic ideas, the need to educate students in the values of justice, equality and love for your fellow men, all included in the official curriculum provided to schools, teachers were engaging in a kind of racist behavior. During the teachers' interviews one could easily observe the separation line they draw between Greek speaking and Turkish speaking students. One of them stated:

Turkish speaking students are distinguished by their external appearance, darker skin complexion, they are extremely dirty and untidy, especially the Roma and they don't speak any Greek. *They usually stink and this is a cultural thing.* Anyway, they don't have the habit of cleaning themselves so our children (Greek Cypriots) don't like to play or sit with them. And there is, of course the hostility against the Turks.⁸⁶

Turkish speaking students are characterized as "poor", "uncivilized", "aggressive", "unclean" and enjoying "financial aid and various benefits from the government". In addition, they are presented as needing to become "civilized" since they have "no manners from home". Some other teachers claimed that "we do everything possible to be fair", "but given the threat we face to become extinct as Greeks, I think we are *justified* to be a bit racist. It's a matter of survival". Consequently, according to

⁸⁶ Emphasis added. Michalinos Zembylas, "Greek Cypriot Teachers' Constructions of Turkish-Speaking Children's Identities: Critical Race Theory and Education in a Conflict-Ridden Society," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33, no. 8 (2010): 1381.

teachers, racist behavior must be forgiven and justified, since it is a matter of subsistence. Nevertheless, there were teachers, who choose to implement in practice the values of the official curriculum and take a stance against prejudice and racist behaviors challenging thus, the stereotypical behaviors of the other teachers.⁸⁷

As Theodossopoulos very efficiently puts it, Greeks are kind of “obsessed” with the Turks since they “think and talk a lot about them”.⁸⁸ Greek Cypriots especially, when coming together, they almost always discuss about the Cyprus Question and Turks. Especially, some months before the Annan Plan referendum of April 2004, this phenomenon advanced to an extreme level; the Cyprus Issue and the negative Other became the only issue to be discussed in family and other gatherings. From all these official and unofficial discussions, debates in television programs, printed brochures and so on, one could clearly extract feelings of suspicion, fear and the notion of being threatened by the powerful, untrustworthy Other.

Taking this ‘obsession’ for Turks into consideration, it is surprising to find out that describing the outer appearance of a Turk is not an easy task for a Greek Cypriot. That is because, when Greek Cypriots refer to Turks, they never refer to a specific image; not even a stereotypical image of the Other’s outer appearance to which they would appeal to if necessary. The Other is “a genderless (if not male) figure. He is faceless and nameless and is likely to remain so”.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, if someone insists on a specific description of the Other’s appearance, most Greek Cypriots would give a description of a young or middle aged male, dark skinned with a mustache and of great physical strength. Most importantly, whenever a Greek Cypriot refers to Turks rarely has in mind children, women or elderly figures; those are completely ignored.

⁸⁷ Ibid.,1386.

⁸⁸ Theodossopoulos, “Imagination of the ‘Greeks’,” 2.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 9.

In essence, Greek Cypriots fail to include in their descriptions what is commonly perceived as members of the weak and vulnerable groups, since these do not coincide with the intrepid profile they assign to the Other.

This blur picture of the Other's outer appearance becomes crystal clear when a Greek Cypriot refers to the character of the Other, which is described with adjectives like "barbarians, bad, egoists, terrorists, torturers, warmongers, quarrelsome, rapists, wild, murderers, vandals, looters, heartless, revengeful, hateful, malicious, devious, ungrateful, unfair, jealous, illiterate, impolite, dirty, liars, foolish, crazy and thieves".⁹⁰

The characterizations cited above are adjectives students used to draw a portrayal representing the Other, during discussions that Spyrou had with them during his fieldwork. This is of the most significant studies in the field and was undertaken in two elementary schools; one from an urban area of Nicosia very close to the Buffer Zone and one from a rural area of Pitsilia during the July 1996-July 1997 period. One of the most impressive results of the study was extracted through a questionnaire that was given to students, who had to give some opposites of the word Turk. Students wrote 'Cypriots', 'Greeks', 'Orthodox' and 'good'. On the basis of the principle that the Other is what we are not, children in order to give opposites to the word Turk, they ended up naming attributes of what they perceive as the Greek Cypriot identity. Seemingly, children perceive themselves to be 'good' and since the Other is the opposite of what the Self is, the Turks are not 'good'.

Children are not just influenced by their school textbooks but certainly, by their teachers too. According to the fieldwork mentioned above, teachers move on to

⁹⁰ Spyrou, "the Turk' as an Enemy," 103.

emotional appeals in order to convince the already influenced students by the media and family for the negative nature of the Turk. For instance, a teacher in order to help the students answer about the Egyptian civilization asked: “From what we read, were they (i.e. the Egyptians) people with civilization? Were they, let’s put it this way barbarians like the Turks, the Ottomans, who *have always been barbarians*?”⁹¹

Stereotypes become obvious in teacher’s narrations and choice of words when communicating specific historical incidents. For instance, another teacher in relevance to the 1453 capture of Constantinople said: “the Turks entered Constantinople and slaughtered the Greeks”⁹² hence, confirming the barbaric and wild nature of Turks. Additionally, when a third teacher compared Turkey’s and Greece’s stance to the Second World War, proved that Turkey was “morally irresponsible” and “not interested in world peace” whereas Greeks are “superior” and peace loving people.⁹³ In a lesson concerning the 1996 events in the buffer zone in Nicosia, the teacher asked the students: “How do you feel about the way they (i.e. the Turks) killed them, about the barbaric, barbaric way by which they killed them?”presupposing a student’s answer: “Miss, the Turks don’t have a heart”.⁹⁴

In general, Turks are perceived to be Easterners, Orientals and inferior; totally different from the European and superior profile, with which a Greek Cypriot identifies the Self. When Spyrou was talking to a teacher of the third grade about Turks, he was told that Turks are “uncivilized” and have a “different and very Asian mentality”.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Emphasis added. Ibid., 99.

⁹² Ibid., 98.

⁹³ Ibid., 99.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 100.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 101.

Although the 1974 events are reminded every day to a Greek Cypriot and the Other is methodically stereotyped, there were also, some complex understandings of the 'enemy'. Some children distinguished the official state, politicians and the military, whom they perceive as responsible for the Cyprus Question, from the people, who are instead perceived as victims of these policies. Furthermore, they make a distinction between people coming from Turkish mainland and Turkish Cypriots. Indicatively, Spyrou listened to students stating that Turkish Cypriots are "good people", they resemble "Us" and they are "victims of the Turkish occupation" as well. Some students moved a step further identifying, ultimately, their enemy as Turks, vindicating thus the Turkish Cypriots. These children stated that "our problem is not with Turkish Cypriots", "but with the Turks who occupied Cyprus".⁹⁶

The diversification of perceptions towards Turkish Immigrants and Turkish Cypriots were elaborately studied by Danielidou and Horvath. In particular, they examined the attitudes of 106 Greek Cypriots over the age of 46, all resided in Limassol, Cyprus, of whom the 48,1% were refugees from the northern part of the island whereas the 51,9% non-refugees. The researchers examined the possibility of three predisposing factors: social identity perception, victimization experiences and perceptions of injustice influencing the attitudes towards Turkish Immigrants and Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots perceive themselves as the powerless victims in the 1974 events. They see Turkey as the powerful actor who did not hesitate to invade, kill, proceed to massacres, sent them out of their homes and so on. The 1974 events and the occupation of the 37% of the island are perceived as human rights violations according to the European Convention of Human Rights and Greek Cypriots make

⁹⁶ Ibid., 104-105.

strong references to the United Nations and European Union as the associations, which administer justice and thus, ought to find a 'just' solution to the Cyprus Issue.

According to the results of this research, Greek Cypriots are more willing to cohabit with Turkish Cypriots rather than Turkish Immigrants, since Turkish Cypriots are somewhat, perceived as part of the in-group and they share a common identity. They are also perceived as Cypriots because of living together in the mixed villages of the past and their coexistence until 1974 in the bicomunal state of the Republic of Cyprus. On the contrary, the only memories of a Turk that a Greek Cypriot has, are associated with the 1974 war and thus, Turkish Immigrants are perceived as out-group, a threat from which Greek Cypriots need to protect themselves.⁹⁷

From the Turkish invasion in Cyprus until very recently the relations between Turkey and Greece were unstable and rather intense. In 1976 and 1987 Greece and Turkey's relations came on edge in the shadow of discovering oil in the Aegean. Although the two countries signed the 'No-war Agreement' in Davos in 1988, they would again be brought to the brink of war in 1996 over the Imia/Kardak islets. Through all of these years, air battles over the Aegean and incidents, which cost the life of 'honorable' and brave Greek pilots were extensively broadcasted by the media in poignant reportages with strong emotional appeals. What matters here, as far as the construction of Greek stereotypes towards Turks is concerned, is the fact that "two generations of Greek citizens have reached adulthood in this climate of constant tension, nurtured by the idea that Turkey is the traditional 'enemy' of Greece".⁹⁸

⁹⁷ This study is published in Liana Danielidou and Peter Horvath, "Greek Cypriot Attitudes toward Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Immigrants," *The Journal of Social Psychology* 146, no. 4 (2006): 405-421.

⁹⁸ Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, "Politics of Friendship, Worldviews of Mistrust: the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement in Local Conversation," in Theodossopoulos, *When Greeks Think about Turks*, 196.

This intense atmosphere was meant to change after the earthquakes of the August 1999 in Greece and a month later in Turkey. Both countries sent help to their neighbor and then, the two foreign ministers, Cem and Papandreou met each other to discuss issues of friendship and co-operation between Greece and Turkey in the framework of the so-called earthquake diplomacy. On this occasion, the media instead of reporting about people killed and slaughtered by Turks used their dramatic language and emotional pleas to report news about the sufferings of plain people who had nothing to do with politics, aggressiveness and so on, provoking feelings of sympathy and solidarity among people of the two countries. As Theodossopoulos puts it: “Human suffering facilitates a break away from generalizations and stereotypes and cuts across national divisions”.⁹⁹ Hence, images of Turkish people sufferings, which were broadcasted in Greece changed a lot the prominent image of the aggressive, arrogant and powerful Turk of the past. Interestingly enough, the Other was not a faceless abstraction anymore; it was re-humanized and personified.

Among the Greek Cypriots’ camp, there was no note-worthy change of perception of the Other although similar images of suffering broadcasted in Cyprus too. The most probable is that the occupation of the northern part of the island and the non-solution of the Cyprus Question did not allow for this change to occur. About two months earlier in the middle two weeks of June 1999, Yiannis Papadakis researched the media in Cyprus. Although the research was conducted before the earthquakes it is indicative of the unwillingness and reluctance on behalf of the media to change negative perceptions and stereotypes. As the research showed both sides (Greek and Turkish Cypriot) chose to report negative news about the other side, news having to

⁹⁹ Ibid., 202.

do mostly with crime, violence, and militarization.¹⁰⁰ The fact that the Greek Cypriot media chooses obviously to report negative profiles indicates their negative predisposition and prejudices towards the Other.

In 2003, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash announced the lifting of restrictions on the free movement from the one side of the island to the other. In spite of the first numbness and surprise, a big percentage of Greek Cypriots traveled to the northern part of the island. Most of them had negative expectations for their houses and properties since they thought that they would not have been taken good care of. They went to the north in order to ‘confirm their negative feelings about Turks and Turkish Cypriots’ and ‘they tended to find what they were looking for’.¹⁰¹ Because of the fact that Greek Cypriots were negatively prejudiced, whatever the condition of their homes they tended to perceive them as being in poor condition. Nevertheless, for the first time, Greek Cypriots had the opportunity to meet with Turkish Cypriots. Even people who never passed the Green Line met with Turkish Cypriots in workplaces, in shopping malls and other public places and that is why, Turkish Cypriots became “three-dimensional beings” as Loizos characterizes them, rather than “hate-cartoon characters produced by partisan and irresponsible media”.¹⁰²

To sum up, it is of great significance to refer to stereotypes as society’s constructions to self-identify. The fact that Greek Cypriot society avoids references to positive qualities, or good deeds performed by Turks and it even ignores other members of the group like women, children and elderly instigates the construction of stereotypes. As

¹⁰⁰ Peter Loizos, “Bicommunal Initiatives and their Contribution to Improved Relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots,” *South European Society and Politics* 11, no.1 (2006): 182.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 191.

Millas very aptly, puts it “it is not, the recurrence of the negative Other that creates stereotypes; it is the striking absence of positive Turks”.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Hercules Millas, “Tourkokratia: History and the Image of Turks in Greek Literature,” in Theodossopoulos, *When Greeks think about Turks*, 52.

Part Two: Nationalism and Language

I. Theoretical Framework of Language as a Component of National Identity and its Role to the Nation Building Project

When considering language solely as a means of communication we may define it as a system of grammar, vocabulary and syntax, which enables the communication of individuals' ideas and thoughts. However, language is constructed on the basis of cultural traits and consequently, the communication among the members of a society is based on the meanings that this society assigns to words and literary expressions. In other words, the members of a community interact using that vocabulary, which bears the socially constructed content representing the pre-existent particular mental images.

Edwards argues that “the essence of human language is a communication system composed of arbitrary symbols which possess an agreed-upon significance within a community. Further, these symbols are independent of immediate context, and are connected in rule-governed ways”.¹⁰⁴ Sapir would agree with the above mentioned definition while he also considers language as a human construction of symbols produced by communities. According to his definition, “language is a cultural construct purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbol”.¹⁰⁵

Considering language exclusively as a tool of facilitating the social interactions of a person into the community would be a superficial and cursory task. Apart from a

¹⁰⁴ John Edwards, *Multilingualism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 19.

¹⁰⁵ Edward Sapir, *Language: an Introduction to the Study of Speech* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921), 8.

communication tool among the group members, language has an extremely significant role to play to the nation building process and the safeguarding of coherence among the members of nation states. In this chapter, the views of the most prominent scholars on the field will be extensively used in order to provide the reader with a theoretical background concerning this cohesive power of language and its role to the nation building project.

Language's usefulness to the construction of a community was codified very early in history. Herodotus, the first who wrote history as early as the 5th century B.C., categorizes the Athenians in a group and differentiates them from enemies. For the Self-identification and differentiation from the Other, Herodotus introduces four components: "the kinship of all Greeks in blood (*ομόαιμον, homoaimon*) and *speech (ομόγλωσσο, homoglosson)*, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have in common, and the likeness of our way of life (*ηθέα τε ομότροπα, ithea te omotropa*)..."¹⁰⁶ The significance of language became even more salient when Greeks used to call people who spoke "inarticulately" or in an "unintelligible" manner as *barbarians* considering their civilization to be superior and equal only to civilizations like Roman and Egyptian while they used to accept people of other descents as of equal status in society only if they had the ability to express themselves in Greek.¹⁰⁷

Using the example of Herodotus, it seems like even before the rise of nationalism and Enlightenment and very early in the world history, language was already a trait to an individual's notion of 'groupness'. Thus, people would self - identify in terms of their ethnicity, they would include themselves in a group, based on a linguistic sameness;

¹⁰⁶ Emphasis added. Herodotus with an English Translation, trans. A.D. Godley, in Open Library, <http://www.archive.org/stream/herodotuswitheng04herouoft#page/n9/mode/2up> (Accessed May 5, 2012): 152-153.

¹⁰⁷ Emphasis added. Harald Haarman, "History", in *Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity*, ed. Joshua Fishman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65.

and then, they would even distinguish themselves from them, who spoke another language, the Other.

Very interestingly, in the 18th century, a significant period for the rise of nationalism as we know it today and the establishment of nation states, linguists would develop the theory of ‘Linguistic Nation’.¹⁰⁸ This idea was very soon adopted and thoroughly used by politicians in various countries, aiming to instill an identity to their people dependent on the language they spoke. In other words, political leaders would implement language policies and practices aiming to the advancement of this language, which would promote a common pattern of ethnic identity for the establishment of a homogeneous community. According to Edwards:

Ethnic identity is allegiance to a group – large or small – socially dominant or subordinate – with which one has ancestral links. There is no necessity for a continuation, over generations, of the same socialization or cultural patterns, but some sense of group boundary must persist. This can be sustained by shared objective characteristics (language, religion etc.), or by more subjective contributions to a sense of ‘groupness’, or by some combination of both.¹⁰⁹

Despite the fact that Self categorization and differentiation from the Other on the basis of ethnic characteristics already existed from before, what changes in the endings of 18th and beginnings of 19th century, is that “the desire for political autonomy, for self-government is added to the belief in shared characteristics”.¹¹⁰ In the contemporary context of nation states, ethnicity would acquire a new meaning; self-government of an ethnic group would become a public demand and thus ethnicity would receive national aspirations and political orientation.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 64.

¹⁰⁹ Edwards, *Multilingualism*, 128.

¹¹⁰ John Edwards, “Language and Nation,” in *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism*, ed. Athena S. Leoussi (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 170.

The Enlightenment along with the German Romanticism were the most significant ideological movements of the era and with all the ideas that signified led the world to new formations: the nation states.

Contemporary nation state as an administration of a territory came either as a response or as a promoter of nationalism after the Imperial and Colonial regimes of the past. Weber characterized modern states as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”,¹¹¹ whereas for Hobsbawm “state is a territory, preferably coherent and demarcated by frontier lines from its neighbors, within which all citizens without exception come under the exclusive rule of the territorial government and the rules under which it operates”.¹¹²

The already existing and multi-cultural states like England and France would engage their population in a nation building process on a political basis whereas the literate and intellectual elites of Germany would build the nation state on an ethno-linguistic basis.¹¹³ Thus, two different kinds of nationalism emerged: the civic and the ethnic, and the distinction between these two became the most well-established on the field of nationalism studies. For the formation and effective function of a state, language is considered as of huge importance for both ethnic and civic nation states for different reasons. For the ethnic state, language becomes a marker of individual’s national identity; while for the civic state official language becomes the tool of communication for the multilingual, multicultural society. In order to understand the role of language

¹¹¹ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. Hans H. Gerth and Wright C. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.

¹¹² Eric Hobsbawm, “Language, Culture and National Identity,” *Social Research* 63, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 1065.

¹¹³ Tomasz D. I. Kamusella, “Language as an Instrument of Nationalism in Central Europe,” *Nations and Nationalism* 7, no. 2 (2001): 237.

in the different states, we should first of all give some important information for the context of the two overlapping types of nation states.

To begin with, civic nationalism constructs a framework of in-group membership on the basis of the geographical boundaries of the state and national unity derives from the loyalty to state's laws and institutions. As Smith codifies it "the components of the standard, Western model of the nation" are the "historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members and common civic culture and ideology".¹¹⁴ Ignatieff characterizes the civic nation as a "community of equal rights-bearing citizens united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values",¹¹⁵ while according to Abbé Sieyès is "the totality of individuals united by living under a common law and represented by the same legislative assembly".¹¹⁶

In civic nation states, people are united under the notion of patriotism according to which people living inside the boundaries are considered as com-patriots independently of their cultural, religious, or linguistic differentiations. Patriotism could be explained as the devotion of the individual to the state and its acknowledgment as the ruling authority. Shulman, sets very clearly five main components according to which national unity is accomplished in civic nations which are: "attachment to a common territory, citizenship, belief in the same political

¹¹⁴ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), 11.

¹¹⁵ Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar Strauss & Giroux, 1995), 6.

¹¹⁶ Hobsbawm, "Language, Culture and National Identity," *Social Research* 63, no. 4 (1996): 1066. The quote is an English translation of Theodor Schieder, "Typologie und Erscheinungs-formdes Nationalstaats in Europa" in *Nationalismus*, ed. Heinrich A. Winkler (Athenaeum: Königstein/Ts, 1985), 122.

principles or ideology, respect for political institutions and enjoyment of equal political rights, and will to be a part of the nation”.¹¹⁷

There are two contesting approaches concerning the role of language to the construction of national identity in the civic model. According to the first one, since civic nationalism does not refer to language and cultural traits as components of national identity, then language is neither a requirement for the development of solidarity among the members of the civic state nor functions as a differentiation factor from the out-group members. As Cobban puts it, “nation is the result of a collective desire of people to live together”;¹¹⁸ in other words nation is people’s will to share the state’s territory and obey its laws and constitution.

Renan, a French scholar and one of the major contributors to the theory of patriotism, during a speech held in the beginnings of 19th century would make the well-regarded reference to the “nation’s existence” as a “daily plebiscite”.¹¹⁹ Individuals need to confirm their will to be a part of the state every day and this, becomes the unifying dynamic of the state. Civic nationalism ignores the importance of language and cultural traits and instead, emphasizes on the notion of patriotism. According to Safran, the members of a civic nation state share “a feeling of closeness to the land depending on rootedness, love of the soil and familiar physical surroundings and spatially defined kinship associations, which can be expressed in more than one

¹¹⁷ Stephen Shulman, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies,” *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 5 (June 2002): 559.

¹¹⁸ Alfred Cobban, *the Nation State and the National Self Determination* (New York: Crowell, 1970), 121-122.

¹¹⁹ Renan’s famous lecture ‘What is a nation?’ (Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?) was delivered at a conference in Sorbonne in 1882. For the reference to the ‘daily plebiscite’ see Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?,” in *Oeuvres Completes* 1 (1947): 891. Quote also available in English translation in Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?,” in *Becoming National: A Reader*, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, trans. Martin Thom (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 45 or “What is a Nation,” in *Modern Political Doctrines*, ed. Alfred Zimmern (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1939), 190.

language”.¹²⁰ Safran under the influence of Renan’s ‘what is a nation?’ writes that “language is less important than common experiences, common values and the will to share a common fate”.¹²¹

On the other hand, according to the second approach concerning the role of language in the civic nation model, even if civic nation states do not take into account a person’s ethnicity to provide the citizenship status and all the rights and duties deriving from it, a state still, needs an official language in order to function properly and effectively, a *lingua franca*. Consequently, even if language is not considered as an indicator of a citizen’s national identity, it goes without saying that a state needs a medium of communication for political and generally, official interactions. In this context, “many French intellectuals” argue that “political values and commitments are easier to share with the possession of a common language”¹²² and acknowledge the necessity of a *lingua franca*, an official language which would ensure the state’s functionality.

However, the inclusion of language as a crucial feature of the civic model by many scholars attributes to the civic nation some ethnic elements as well. In this framework, Smith would express the viewpoint that “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized”.¹²³ Moreover, Calhoun would write that although existing literature considers France and Germany as the most typical models for civic and ethnic nations respectively, “all of Western and Eastern Europe, have been shaped by the

¹²⁰ William Safran, “Nationalism” in *Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity*, ed. Joshua Fishman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 87.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 88.

¹²³ Smith, *National Identity*, 13.

international discourse of nationalism—including both ethnic claims and civil projects of popular political participation”.¹²⁴

This school of thought supports the idea that a state needs to provide a common language to its citizens in order to facilitate the communication among them. However, from the moment the state chooses a specific language for the state-citizens interactions or language of instruction in public schools and since according to Horowitz “language is a symbol of domination”¹²⁵, then, it also chooses a dominant group, a culture which will be considered as the prevalent character of the state. As Barry puts it:

Political communities are bound to be linguistic communities, because politics is (in some sense) linguistically constructed. We can negotiate our way across language barriers but we cannot deliberate together about the way in which our common life is to be conducted unless we share a language. Where historic communities based on language exist already, there is no satisfactory alternative to recognizing them as political communities as well, at any rate where they occupy geographically compact areas.¹²⁶

Thus, civic nationalism project, -in order for citizens to feel as equal members of the same political unit- needs to protect the linguistic varieties producing thus, a multilingual context. For all citizens to be equal against the law, the state must provide and safeguard the “right to economic opportunity and democratic participation”¹²⁷ of all without exception. Nevertheless, a polyglot state would neither be functional nor effective and thus, the state needs to establish a lingua franca overriding the multilingual status of the population. Thus, state may be forced to

¹²⁴ Graig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 89.

¹²⁵ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 219.

¹²⁶ Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 227.

¹²⁷ Anna Stilz, “Civic Nationalism and Language Policy,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 37, no. 3 (June 2009): 266.

withdraw the right to distinct linguistic identity for its citizens in order to provide to them equal status before state and the ability to communicate.

For the ethnic nationalism, language is one of the major markers of national identity along with descent, history, culture and so on. One of the most significant roles that language plays is that it becomes the tool to communicate national myths among the members of a society and therefore creates a collective memory, which is essential in the nation building project. National myths along with cultural features are used to educate people in a specific perception of their past and consequently facilitate the realization of themselves (the membership status in a community) and the hostility towards the Other (the enemy). “With their ability to communicate human beings can build communities, which then provide, among other things a powerful source of identity for their members”.¹²⁸ The praise of own cognitive achievements and the condemnation and criticism against the Other -central factors to the infusion of national identity- are goals mainly attained through the vocabulary used.

Interestingly enough, societies tend to use expressions to describe historical events in accordance to their stance towards them. For instance, what the ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’ or the ‘Turkish invasion in Cyprus’ for Greeks and Greek Cypriots are, become the ‘War of Independence’ and the ‘Happy Peace Operation’ for Turks and Turkish Cypriots signifying thus, the completely different interpretation of historical events but most importantly, the different understandings emerging from the words we choose. The way we perceive our historical past is immensely influenced and even constructed by language, and thus, its great contribution to the nation building project shall be undisputable.

¹²⁸ Sue Wright, *Language Policy and Language Planning: from Nationalism to Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 7.

In this framework, Herder argues:

What a *treasure* language is when kinship groups grow into tribes and nations! Even the smallest of nations in any part of the globe, no matter how underdeveloped it may be, cherishes in and through its language the history, the poetry and songs about the great deeds of its forefathers. *The language is its collective treasure, the source of its social wisdom and communal self-respect.*¹²⁹

The movement of German Romanticism was a turning point for the emerging of language as an element of ethnic nationalism. The most representative figures of German Romanticism are Wilhelm von Humboldt, Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. As Smith would state, it is Herder's influence which led to "the notion that nations are really language groups and therefore that nationalism is a linguistic movement".¹³⁰ Trabant moved a step further, arguing that "there is no other philosopher of the 18th century who was 'haunted by language in the same passionate way as is Herder'".¹³¹

Language is cognitive since the meaning that each society gives to words shapes perceptions; it even shapes the common reason of a community according to Herder, and is fundamental for every idea and thought.

Wilhelm Von Humboldt followed the steps of Herder and had very similar viewpoints about language as a mental process tied to human nature but did not consider it as a human construction. He considered language as an "involuntary emanation of the mind, no work of nations but a gift fallen to them by their inner destiny". In 1797, Wilhelm von Humboldt would also write that "languages are bound and dependent on

¹²⁹ Emphasis added. Johann G. Herder, "Essay on the Origin of Language", in *Herder on Social and Political Culture*, ed. and trans. F. M. Barnard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 165.

¹³⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Duckworth, 1971), 182.

¹³¹ Jurgen Trabant, "Herder and Language," in *A Companion to the Works of Johann Gottfried Herder*, eds. Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke (New York: Camden House, 2009), 117.

the nations to which they belong”¹³² and that “language is always the spiritual exhalation of a nationally individual life”¹³³.

In 1922, Johann Gottlieb Fichte would state that it is undeniable that “wherever a separate language is found there a separate nation exists which has the right to take independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself”.¹³⁴ In his addresses to the German Nation in 1807, he assigns huge importance to the purity of language, which should remain intact and “depicts the German language as the “mother tongue” that gives birth to the ‘fatherland’ of Germany”.¹³⁵

Fichte argues that the Germans as a people owe their identity to the uniqueness of their language. The Germans, he warns, should not fall prey to the seductiveness of foreign words, which persuade by means of their ‘foreign, fashionable, and harmonious sound’ and the ‘prestige of antiquity and of foreign countries’.¹³⁶

Emphasizing on the immense significance of language to the people’s national identity and their sense of ‘groupness’, Fichte would claim in his thirteenth address to German Nation that:

The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand each

¹³² Wilhelm von Humboldt, *On Language: The Diversity of Human Language-Structure and its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species*, trans. Peter Heath, ed. Michael Losonsky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 24.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 59-60.

¹³⁴ Johann G. Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, trans. G. H. Turnbull and R.F. Jones (Chicago and London: Open Court, 1922), 215.

¹³⁵ David Martyn, “Borrowed Fatherland: Nationalism and Language Purism in Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation,” *The Germanic Review* 72, no. 4 (1997): 303.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 304.

other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole.¹³⁷

The approach of romantic nationalism and the pillar, upon which an ethnic nation state rests, is that “communities of ethnic descent, language, culture, religion and so on ought to find expression in territorial states”.¹³⁸ Ethnic nationalists consider the ideal state to be the one, which is consisted of an ethnically, culturally, and linguistically homogeneous population. Actually, world history of modern years offers various examples of leaders who in their effort to attain the goal of the ideal state implemented policies (in their multi-ethnic or multi-lingual areas) like for example mass expulsions, genocides, or forced assimilations of minorities into the dominant culture.

Taking all the above into consideration, it is notable that language may be a strong unifying factor when ethnic aspirations gain a political dimension. In the cases of both civic and ethnic nation states language has a remarkable role to play to the communication of patriotism or cultural values and ultimately the formation of a collective memory. Overall, while “language is not in fact an essential requirement for national identity, however, this does not alter the fact that it is often seen as the pillar of ‘groupness’”¹³⁹ on the basis of an instrument for “mobilizing large numbers of people around symbols and values with a high emotional potential”.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Fichte, *Addresses*, 223.

¹³⁸ Hobsbawm, “Language, Culture,” 1066.

¹³⁹ Edwards, “Language and Nation,” 170.

¹⁴⁰ Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), 303.

II. Realization of the Importance of Language: Examples of Language Policies in Europe

Language as a tool promoting solidarity and coherence in a society and its use to the nation building process is being examined and analyzed in depth mostly since the eighteenth century. Practices like codification, standardization and dissemination of the linguistic idiom to the people consist some of the most important mechanisms for the formation of a linguistic identity and provide the people with the ability to communicate along with the perception of sameness with the other speakers of the same language.

Language policy for the maintenance or infusion of a common linguistic identity to a group's members was in most of the times implemented after a state was provided with a specific geographical territory and governing authorities. The language's unifying power was recognized as early as the establishment of totalitarian regimes with their monarchies and huge bureaucratic mechanisms. The most indicative examples were the cases of François I, who under the Edict of Villers-Cotterêts in 1539 established the "maternal French language and no other" as the language for all official elaborations and the 1536 Act of Union in Britain with which competence in English became a prerequisite for public servants and the language of courts.¹⁴¹

In the years of the surge of nationalism in Europe in the endings of the 18th and 19th century language policy was addressed to members of a wider group, a national community. New geographical territories with their own governing authorities were being gradually established; the contemporary nation states. In the nation building process in Europe, language has been a keystone since in order for leaders to build a unity between the members of their national group they should at the first place make

¹⁴¹ Wright, *Language Policy*, 30.

them able to communicate and provide them a common culture structured by language. Thus, it was important for recently formed states to develop a language policy which would be able to ensure national unity and obedience to the central state. Indicatively, the turning point for the whole of humanity, the French Revolution, established the acquisition of French as a “patriotic and revolutionary *duty* for citizens”.¹⁴²

The significance of the case of France is the fact that even if according to the principles of the French Revolution national identity is based on ideas like equality, state membership and loyalty to it, rather than an ethnic nationalism based on cultural similarities, language still plays a major role to the establishment of solidarity and coherence among the citizens. According to a language census conducted by Abbé Grégoire in the beginnings of 1790's only 3 out of the 25 million inhabitants of France spoke French while an even smaller figure could also write in French. Another 6 million, the 40% of the population of France back then had no competence at all in French.¹⁴³ On the 10th of September, 1791, Talleyrand, a French diplomat stated in the National Assembly that:

The national language... remains inaccessible to such a large number of inhabitants... Elementary education will put an end to this strange inequality. In school all will be taught in the language of the Constitution and the Law and this mass of corrupt dialects, these last vestiges of feudalism, will be forced to disappear.¹⁴⁴

About a decade later, state offered the ability to all citizens to be educated through an educational system responsible for infusing a national identity. Academies were founded all around the world to deal essentially with language issues; standardization,

¹⁴² Emphasis added. Ibid., 31.

¹⁴³ Conrad M.B. Brann, “National Language Policy and Planning: France 1789, Nigeria 1989,” *History of European Ideas* 13, no. 1/2 (1991): 100. For the English translation of the questionnaire upon which the language census was based, see the article's Appendix p. 111-113.

¹⁴⁴ Wright, *Language Policy*, 62. Quoting Talleyrand, Speech to Assemblée Nationale 10 July 1791, *Archives Parlementaires*, 1re Sér., vol XXX (1787-1799), cols. 472. For the English translation see

development and so on. The French Academy was established in 1635 and published the first dictionary of the French language; it gradually, gained more and more significance and eventually became a major contributor to language issues. Through the years, the French government imposed language policies and practices their heyday of whose, was the declaration of French as the official language of the Republic in 1992.

Following the model of the French Academy, the Swedish Academy was founded in 1786 and according to its regulations its aim was to “develop the purity, strength and nobility of the Swedish language”.¹⁴⁵ The existence of a Swedish Academy becomes even more important if we examine the geographical location of Sweden as one of the countries in the Scandinavian region. Swedish, Danish and Norwegian are considered as related languages and because of that, countries encouraged policies promoting the differentiation between them.

The case of Greece is equally remarkable since after the independence from the Ottoman Empire the Greek state would come across a language issue because of which, the country suffered from political and social instability for many years. Katharevousa¹⁴⁶ was declared as the official language of the state in 1834 but was to be replaced from state’s official language by the Demotic when language question was eventually resolved in 1976. The viewpoint of Katharevousa’s supporters was that as much closer to the ancient version of language a vernacular is, so pure it is. Accordingly, language should remind the past and imply continuity and sameness with the ancient cultural characteristics, in order for an individual to self-identify as a member of the Greek nation.

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in Lars S. Vikør, “Northern Europe: Languages as Prime Markers of Ethnic and National Identity,” in *Language and Nationalism in Europe*, eds. Stephen Barbour and Cathie Carmichael (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 110.

¹⁴⁶ Katharevousa is a version of Greek language closer to the Ancient Greek whereas Demotic is the modern version closer to the vernacular variety.

Leaders determine the language policies and practices to be implemented on the basis of existent social, political and geographical realities in their states. For instance, there are cases like Finland and Hungarian, where language policy was aiming to the advancement of the official language as a medium for all formal interactions. On the contrary, for cases of similar languages and mutual intelligibility among citizens of neighboring states the language policy emphasized on the pre-existent or even produced differentiations among the varieties. These policies' goals was to provide the in group members with a unique identity and empower the notion of solidarity. Indicative examples of these kinds of policies are Croatia and Slovakia, which will be discussed below.

Language has also the power to undermine a union of two cultures into a state, indicative of which is the case of Czechoslovakia. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Treaty of Versailles following the First World War the Czechoslovakian Republic was established and in 1920 through the Language Act the Czechoslovak language was declared as the official language of the new state. However, Slovakian linguists did their best to stress the differentiations between Czech and Slovak and as a result there was never a process of cultivation of a common Czechoslovakian nationalism and the ultimate collapse of the state was a matter of time.

The case of former Yugoslavian countries should also be taken into account when considering language as a tool of the nation building process. Firstly, in the case of Croatia a Croat Literary-Cultural Foundation (*Matica Hrvatska*) was established by Janko Draškovićin in 1842 and a year later, Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski one of the leading figures of Croatian nationalism was the first to deliver a speech in front of the Parliament solely in Croatian. In 1847 in another speech of his in front of the Sabro

(Croatian Parliament), he supported the idea of replacement of the official Latin language with Croatian. In 1967, a “Declaration on the Name and Situation of the Croatian Language” was published by Matica Hrvatska which emphasized on the need to protect the linguistic identity and specifically the Croatian language from influences coming from Serbian.¹⁴⁷

The language issue became even more important in the recent years; mostly after the declaration of Croatia’s independence from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Croatian governments deal a lot with producing and enforcing differences between Croatian and Serbian mainly through funding various linguistic institutions and organizations aiming to the standardization and dissolution of Croatian language through the production of dictionaries and grammars. Indicatively, from 1996 to 2001, Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport funded the Institute for Croatian Language and Linguistics in order to engage in the procedure of producing dictionaries of the standard Croatian and its dialects.¹⁴⁸

Serbia also applied language policies for differentiating the Serbian from the Croatian variety. A major figure of the production of the Serbian linguistic variety was Vuk Stefanović Karadžić who wrote the first Serbian dictionary and had an important contribution to the advancement of the Cyrillic alphabet.

According to Wright, one of the ways to differentiate the Self from the Other and produce a unique linguistic identity is the conversion of alphabet.¹⁴⁹ In order to indicate the power of alphabet, the author uses the example of the Romanians of Wallachia and Moldavia, who changed their alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin. In 1779,

¹⁴⁷ Mitchell Young, “Croatian Language Policy: Establishing National Identity in the Era of Globalization,” in *Nationalism in a Global Era: The Persistence of Nations*, ed. Mitchell Young et al. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 182.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 184-5.

¹⁴⁹ For an extremely interesting analysis on the issue of language policy during the rise of nationalism era and its contribution to the nation building project see Wright, *Language Policy*, 42-68.

the first book in Latin alphabet ('Prayer Book for the Piety of the Christian') was published by Samuil Micu and a year later he and Gheorghe Sincai published the first grammar demonstrating the Latin roots of the Romanian language. The Roman alphabet was gradually spreading out and ultimately in the 1860's it was 'introduced as an affirmation of national identity'.¹⁵⁰ The significance of Roman alphabet is its ability along with the Romance tradition and culture to accentuate the differences to Bulgaria and Ukraine (both of them have Cyrillic alphabets) to the southern and northern borders respectively.

The most arresting conversion of alphabet is, in my point of view the case of Turkey. When Kemal Ataturk decided to apply a policy, which set Turkey to the group of European countries in the West and simultaneously distanced it from the East, which was considered as being anachronistic, language came on the fore. The old Perso-Arabic alphabet was to be replaced by the Latin script in 1929 and the Turkish nation building project was more easily applied and adopted by the people since it emphasized on differences between the Ottoman past and the modern Turkish present. Another language practice that was applied a lot to various countries was the purification of language: this cleansing of foreign loans from the standard official language provides and develops a unique linguistic identity to the members of the group. The practice of purification was implemented vastly in contemporary world. For instance, the Society for Research on the Turkish Language, currently Turkish Language Association, was established in the 1930's under the guidance of Kemal Ataturk and for two decades produced great work in replacing the Arabic, Persian, Greek and French-rooted to other Turkic rooted words. Thus, for many years after the independence and the foundation of the Turkish Republic, policies which aimed to the

¹⁵⁰ Wright, *Language Policy*, 52.

infusion of a national identity and devotion of the people to their nation were emphasizing a lot to the acquirement of a specific linguistic identity.

In our world there are various examples of multilingual states, where a specific linguistic identity is not a prerequisite for citizens and not even pursued by the state, the most significant of which is Switzerland. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that Switzerland became an independent Republic long before the rise of nationalism era and also that the cantons enjoy a sense of autonomy due to the con-federal polity of the state.¹⁵¹ Moreover, out of 26 cantons, the 17 have German as their official language, whereas only three of them are not monolingual. Consequently, since communication among the members of a society is crucial, a dominant or common language enabling interactions among them is most likely to occur.

Taking all the above into consideration, language could be considered as a tool facilitating the construction of cultural realities upon which ethnic nation building project is based. Thus, language becomes a tool constructing commonalities, glorifying myths, continuity; all, components of ethnic-national identities. But even in a civic nation context, based on the political equality of –culturally different- citizens, still an official language, a medium of communication among them is still required and eventually established.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 45-46.

III. The Case of Cyprus: the Coexistence of Standard Modern Greek and Greek Cypriot Dialect

“Language equals nationality and nationality equals language”.¹⁵²

The above is a quote of Joshua Fishman, a prominent scholar on sociolinguistics and refers to language’s power as a marker of nationality. Fishman actually expresses the idea that language is equivalent and in accordance to someone’s nationality and at the same time one’s nationality is in accordance to his/her language. This quote may very efficiently, explain the relationship and particularly, the link between language and identity in Cyprus, where mother tongue has been an element of extreme significance for the categorization of local communities.

The link between language and national identity becomes complicated in the case of Greek Cypriots mainly because there is not one and only language of communication and interaction among the inhabitants of the island. The local vernacular, the Greek Cypriot Dialect (henceforth GCD) coexists and even overshadowed in some aspects, by Standard Modern Greek (henceforth SMG) which is used vastly in the media, as the language of instruction in public schools and as an indicator of refinement, politeness and respect among Greek Cypriots.

Most scholars on the field refer to the language situation in Cyprus as “classic *diglossia* in the Fergusonian sense”¹⁵³ according to which “two forms of the same language, the standard ‘official’ form and a dialect are used side by side on a daily

¹⁵² Joshua Fishman, *Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays*, (Massachusetts: Newbury House, 1972), 48.

¹⁵³ For the exact definition of diglossia see Charles Ferguson, “Diglossia,” *Word* 15 (1959): 325-340. For the diglossic status of Cyprus see indicatively Evgenia Kounnapi “Greek Cypriot Children’s Language Attitudes in a Bidialectal Setting: The Case of Primary Education in Cyprus,” (paper presented at the 9th Pancyprian Conference of Cyprus Pedagogical Association, June 2-3, 2006).

basis”.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, Papapavlou and Pavlou consider the diglossic status of Cyprus differently since it is not a common case where some people prefer to speak the dialect while some others use the standard language. On the contrary, the same person may use in oral communication and informal discussions GCD and code-switch into SMG while in certain circumstances.

GCD is spoken by approximately 800,000 Greek Cypriots, the majority of the Armenian and Maronite communities of the island, about 300,000 Greek Cypriots of the diaspora along with a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots residing in the southern part of the island. People speak different varieties of the dialect: acrolect, mesolect and basilect. As far as acrolect is concerned that is the version of the dialect which is closer to SMG and which is spoken mostly at urban areas. Basilect is generally spoken by elderly people thought of as uneducated and mostly at rural areas, whereas mesolect is the middle variety.¹⁵⁵

Greek Cypriots’ native linguistic variety, their mother tongue is a Greek dialect, which resembles the one of Crete and Rhodes. As Pavlou codifies them, the differences between SMG and GCD are: phonology (i.e. a set of consonants exist only in the dialect), morphology (i.e. epenthetic –e in the past tense), syntax (i.e. the position of clitics) and semantics/lexicon (there are many words in the GCD which have Arabic, French, English, Italian and Turkish origin).¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Andreas N. Papapavlou and Pavlos Pavlou, “A Review of the Sociolinguistic Aspects of the Greek Cypriot Dialect,” in *Contemporary Sociolinguistic Issues in Cyprus*, ed. Andreas Papapavlou, (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2005), 16.

¹⁵⁵ Amalia Arvaniti, “Linguistic Practices in Cyprus and the Emergence of Cypriot Standard Greek,” *San Diego Linguistic Papers* 2 (2006): 4.

¹⁵⁶ Andreas N. Papapavlou and Pavlos Pavlou, “Issues of Dialect Use in Education from a Greek Cypriot Perspective,” *International Journal of Applied Linguistics* 14, no. 2 (2004): 248-249.

In order to analyze the link between language and nationalism in Cyprus, it would be of paramount importance to see exactly when language began to be associated with national identity and national aspirations.

Language gained substance as a marker of national identity only after the withdrawal of the Ottomans, when the millet system of categorization based on religious affiliation was not valid anymore. Language has been a marker of identity and national discrimination among the Greek and Turkish-speaking inhabitants since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent British colonialism. During the endings of the 19th century and the beginnings of the 20th, British decided to introduce language as an element of categorization. As Goutsos and Karyolemou put it, at this period, Cyprus was a “multilingual place” since standard Greek and Turkish varieties along with their respective dialects and certainly the language of the colonial power English were used by the inhabitants of the island.¹⁵⁷

During the British colonial period in the island intra-governmental communication was in English; however, the fact that for the effective communication between the government and the people, translation was absolutely necessary indicates that English never became a lingua franca.¹⁵⁸ As far as the local languages are concerned, it seems like British held an unfavorable stance towards the Greek language and supported the Turkish language as the mainstream. According to a Greek Cypriot newspaper’s publication, there was “no application written in Greek”, which is being characterized as “the general tongue of the island and spoken even by the Turks”.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Dimitra Karoulla-Vrikki, “Language and Ethnicity in Cyprus under the British: a Linkage of Heightened Saliency,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 168 (June 2004): 22.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

Greek Cypriots involved themselves in the Language Question in Greece and specifically into the dispute of Katharevousa and Demotic Greek as it is proven by newspapers of that period.¹⁶⁰ It is important to mention here the fact that in those newspapers there is no reference to GCD as a local vernacular and at the same time, Greek Cypriots set themselves as part of this Language Question.

According to the 1960 Constitution, the official languages of the Republic are Greek and Turkish. Nowadays, whereas everything in official documents, applications and most importantly on identity cards and passports are written simultaneously in Greek and Turkish, Turkish is almost totally absent from Greek Cypriots' daily lives. That is because after the division of the island in 1974 the two communities were completely separated in the northern and southern part of the island. The geographical separation of the two communities had as a result their linguistic separation as well (Turkish-speaking north and Greek-speaking south).

In order for a person to self-identify in Cyprus, language plays an enormously significant role. Turkish and Greek Cypriots throughout the turbulent years in the 1960's had always as their priority to rescue their standard varieties (in the case of Greek Cypriots, Church and education were always working for the promotion of SMG as the prevailing language) since they consider it as one of the most powerful links to their respective mainlands and simultaneously as a justification and legitimization of their 'enosis' or 'taksim' demands and aspirations. Fishman argues that "just as ethnic identity is fostered by intergroup grievances so the language use corresponding to such identity is fostered".¹⁶¹ And this "may lead communities to

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 25.

¹⁶¹ Joshua A. Fishman, "Sociolinguistics", in Fishman, *Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity*, 154.

struggle to foster their ethnic identity by fostering the language corresponding to that identity”¹⁶².

According to scholars GCD is strongly influenced by the standard variety in its structure and status and as a result, a “linguistic change” has occurred in the last thirty years.¹⁶³ Despite differentiations mainly to the pronunciation, GCD has received important influences from SMG and it resembles it more and more as time goes by. That is because the language policy implemented ignores the GCD and advances the status of SMG, the maintenance of which, throughout the years is considered as an irrefutable proof for the Greekness of the island. The notion of common historical past and political coalition in the foreign policy along with the strong cultural influences coming from the frequent visits of Greek Cypriots to Greece either as students or as tourists and at the same time broadcasts of Greece-originated programs by Greek-Cypriot television channels are strong influences for the local linguistic variety.

To sum up, we could refer to the linguistic situation in Cyprus as representative of the issue of identity. The local character is overridden and instead, a Greek character is advanced; in the same manner GCD is overridden and SMG is supported and promoted as the refined version of spoken language and the official variety in written speech. Consequently, the linguistic situation in Cyprus is briefly the coexistence of two linguistic varieties and the habit to code-switch depending on the circumstance.

i. State’s Policy and its Significance to the Construction of Identity

In the diglossic status of Cyprus, it is extremely interesting to study the relationship between SMG and GCD and how these two coexist in the same settings. State has

¹⁶² Vrikki, “Language and Ethnicity,” 23.

¹⁶³ See for instance Pavlos Pavlou, “Greek Dialect Use in the Mass Media in Cyprus,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 168 (2004): 101.

formed a specific language policy which in general, emphasizes on the promotion of SMG in the expense of GCD. This policy is strongly connected to the state's will to provide Greek Cypriots with a Greek-centered national identity. Because of that, GCD is neglected from any formal aspect of a Greek Cypriot's daily life and is only introduced in the framework of folk tradition; strictly local, ethnic but not national.

Although Weinreich in 1945 defined language as "a dialect that has an army and a navy",¹⁶⁴ Cameron about fifty years later, expressed the idea that "standards are nowadays mainly enforced through the educational system, the mass media and the central bureaucracy and not so much by the army and the navy as used to be the case in the past".¹⁶⁵

Weinreich and Cameron agree to their perception concerning the political power as a determining factor of language. According to their views, what is language and what is just a dialect is based on the political power of the people who speak this linguistic variety. The difference between the two approaches is what exactly defines the political power per se. In other words, although army and navy used to verify political power in the past, in the contemporary world political power is the ability to control people for serving your interests; thus, every mechanism which has the ability to influence or even form people's opinion –the educational system, the mass media and the central bureaucracy as Cameron himself puts it- constitutes the political power.

The formerly existing approach of 'linguistic liberalism' was to change to a period of 'linguistic interventionism' after the translation of Cypriot legislation. According to

¹⁶⁴ Max Weinreich, "YIVO and the problems of our time," *Yivo-bleter* 25, no 1 (1945): 13. For the english translation of the quote see Edwards, "Language and Nation," 169. The exact origin of this quote is blur since "Weinreich, himself, attributes this quote to a young man who came to his lectures, and he decided: "I must bring to a large audience this wonderful formulation of the social fate of Yiddish"". Quoted in William Bright, "Notes," *Language in Society* 26, no. 3 (1997): 469.

¹⁶⁵ Pavlou, "Greek Dialect Use," 102. Quoting Deborah Cameron, *Verbal Hygiene* (London and New York: Rutledge, 1995).

Karyolemou Cypriot community has applied this policy shift considering that “language is a social institution and that, therefore, corrective measures can be applied to it”¹⁶⁶ and in this framework, Greek Cypriots have issued, from 1896 to 1994, several measures targeting the maintenance of the status and use of SMG. The above mentioned approach is understood when placed in the framework of Fishman’s distinction between “the groups for whom language merely constitutes a ‘marginal and optional’ expression of ethnicity and the groups for whom language constitutes a ‘prime’ indicator of ethnicity”.¹⁶⁷

Putting the case of Cyprus to the above format of Fishman’s theory we may refer to language as a ‘prime indicator’ which along with the Orthodox religion constitute the two most important elements of Greek Cypriot identity. That is because SMG was and is until our days used as a tool of the nation building process and component of identity through the promotion of Greek-centered consciousness and exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots, also citizens of the 1960’s Republic. Consequently, the state’s intervention and the language policies implemented favoring SMG and the almost total neglect of GCD, served as a unifying factor with mainland Greece and promoted the instilment of a Greek-centered national identity to people.

The gradually increasing public interest is easily proven through the examination of articles from the Greek Cypriot newspaper ‘*Fileleftheros*’. Consequently, Greek Cypriots would read an article on language every two months in 1970, while six years later they would read an article every two weeks in 1976 and eventually an article

¹⁶⁶ Papapavlou and Pavlou, “Sociolinguistic Aspects,” 22. Quoting Marilena Karyolemou, [Glossa kai Taftotita stin Kypro Simera: Apo ti Theoritiki Proseggisi stin Praktiki Rithmisi (Language and Identity in Cyprus today: from the Theoretical Approach to Language Policy),” (paper presented at the Symposium on Language and Identity, Intercollege, Nicosia, 1996).

¹⁶⁷ Joshua Fishman, “Language and Ethnicity: the View from Within,” in Handbook of Sociolinguistics, ed. Florian Coulman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 330.

every four days in 1994.¹⁶⁸ Language became a part of political opposition and antagonism between the political parties in Cyprus. Some of them, coming mainly from the right-wing accuse the state that public education is not Greek enough, do not emphasize enough to the Hellenistic ideals and this would have enormous consequences for the Greek Cypriot community. However, their opponents coming mainly from the left-wing express the viewpoint that education is too Hellenic-centric and neglects absolutely the political realities, local character and cultural differentiations of the island from Greece. Specifically, right wing supports the idea of the ‘drastic elimination’ of the local dialect and the further promotion of SMG in the spoken domain as well. On the other hand, leftwing is in favor of the enclosure of GCD in school curriculum.¹⁶⁹

In the remaining chapter, the reader is able to find the domains to which official policies promote SMG disregarding GCD. SMG is both promoted in the mass media and in education provided to public schools. Through advertising, news reports, TV series and so on, media provided society with a specific approach according to which GCD is inferior to SMG.

Language policies in the Greek Cypriot educational system are determined through official curriculum sent to schools by the Ministry of Education and Culture and according to it “students are expected to shift from the linguistic idiom to the pan-Hellenic demotic”.¹⁷⁰ Based on Ioannidou’s explanation the terminologies used are indicative of the existing value system, which perceives the GCD as an ‘idiom’, a

¹⁶⁸ Marilena Karyolemou, “From Liberalism to Legal Regulation: The Greek Language in Cyprus,” in Papapavlou, *Contemporary*, 43.

¹⁶⁹ Papapavlou and Pavlou, “Sociolinguistic Aspects,” 19.

¹⁷⁰ Elena Ioannidou, “Using the ‘Improper’ Language in the Classroom: the Conflict between Language Use and Legitimate Varieties. Evidence from a Greek Cypriot Classroom,” *Language and Education* 23, no. 3 (May 2009): 265.

linguistic variety very close to the SMG, while it perceives at the same time the SMG as ‘Pan-Hellenic demotic’ claiming and attributing a national/universal appeal. What is more, in a survey conducted by Ioannidou including interviews, classroom observations and audio-recording of class discussions, in a primary school, one policy marker described SMG as “the language of the Greek world”, the one which “connects Greeks as a nation”.¹⁷¹ What was easily observable during class discussions was that there was a type of ‘legitimate middle’ variety, a mixture of SMG and some dialectal features that were acceptable established.

However, the teachers’ practices of correcting, or ignoring the native language of the students, implying inferiority from the standard variety, have negative implications to their progress. As Edwards argues: “language and identity are so strongly intermeshed that any attack on the way we speak is likely to be perceived as an attack on our values and integrity. Thus, if children’s language is undervalued or rejected in school, they may well respond by withdrawal or defiance”.¹⁷²

Diachronically, there had been a protectionist policy towards the SMG reproducing to the letter the Greek Ministry’s policy on language. In 1984 the Greek Ministry of Education’s textbook ‘*I glossa mou*’ was also introduced in Cyprus and was taught in primary schools till very recently. In 2006 another textbook was introduced, which promoted the oral communication in language lesson, and because of which dialect use by the students was not to be ‘incriminated’ anymore.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 265, 276

¹⁷² Viv Edwards, *Language in multicultural classrooms* (London: Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd, 1983), 9.

¹⁷³ Christalla Karmellou, “Language Policy in Education and its Affect in Cyprus Issues on the Development of Identity and Interethnic Relationships: Issues on the Development of Identity and Interethnic Relationships,” (November 25, 2008), 7-8, Dialog, ERIC, ED503438.

As far as the media are concerned, programs with serious context are always broadcasted in SMG whereas GCD only appears in the form of code-switching and when the presenter or the guests are employing a humorous or emphasizing effect. GCD is also used in cases of reportages when eyewitness statements are broadcasted. In the framework of a survey, newspapers' journalists stated that they use GCD when they wish to "stress an idea or make a point, to criticize or comment sarcastically on a person or a situation or to give a humorous tone in the text and make famous quotations from the literature written in the GCD".¹⁷⁴ That is because, "the choice of styles to be employed for news broadcasting is based on the perceived status of the audience".¹⁷⁵

As far as advertisements in the media are concerned, Corston-Oliver refers to this process as a two-way one and emphasizes on advertizing as a reflection and at the same time construction of social reality: "representations of society in advertising have their basis in the social order, but at the same time, the social order is constantly being recreated by reference to model discourses such as advertising".¹⁷⁶

GCD is used in advertising mostly in radio and television and is almost totally absent from written press. Those advertisements have to do mostly with local products associating to customs and traditions. In these cases GCD is preferred in order to emphasize on the local identity of the audience and create feelings of solidarity and the perception of common descent with the 'producer-advertiser'; consequently, Greek Cypriots would show a preference to the local products fulfilling the aim of this

¹⁷⁴ Pavlou, "Greek Dialect Use," 114.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 103. For a detailed analysis on the issue see Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media*, (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991).

¹⁷⁶ Monica C. Oliver, "The 'White Wedding': Metaphors and Advertising in Bridal Magazines," in *Engendering Communication: Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Women and Language Conference, April 24, 25 and 26*, ed. Suzanne Wertheim et al. (Berkeley: Women and Language Group, 1998), 156.

advertiser. According to a survey conducted in 1997 by Pavlou most of those advertisements are humorous and are broadcasted on the radio every Sunday before and after ‘Cypriot Sketch’ (a type of radio theatrical written in the GCD). That is because, for Greek Cypriots, Sunday is very commonly perceived as the day for family gatherings which are strongly attached to local tradition.

ii. People’s Stance and Attitudes towards GCD and SMG

People realize the existence of the two linguistic varieties as their formal and informal variety, the GCD supposed to be used in oral speech and informal settings and the SMG which is a sample of politeness, and always used in the written speech. Greek Cypriots feel more familiar with the dialect which is perceived more as a piece of local culture and some of them would refuse to code-switch even in classroom discussions or formal occasions.

Greek Cypriots have developed specific attitudes towards the GCD and SMG and the reasons for that are best codified in my viewpoint by Papapavlou. Specifically, Papapavlou provided the literature with some reasons responsible for Greek Cypriots’ behavior to code-switch on specific circumstances. According to his analysis, Greek Cypriots’ attitudes towards the dialect and the standard variety are strongly linked to Greek Cypriots’ feelings of admiration and respect for a goal they have never achieved: the adoption of SMG as their native language. Moreover, their desire to lean towards modern societies leaving their agricultural past behind, along with the official policies to promote Greek national values and simultaneously to discourage

the emergence of a local, Cypriot consciousness are other reasons behind these attitudes.¹⁷⁷

At this point, it is of extreme significance to note an oxymoron concerning the perception of the GCD by the local society. Although one could easily come across discussions referring to the GCD as the purest form of SMG because of the fact that it is closer to Ancient Greek and ‘the language of Homer’, with the same ease could come across characterizations of inferiority for GCD (Greek Cypriots refer to their dialect as *xoriatiki* meaning village =heavily accented). Thus, they feel at the same time ‘proud’ and ‘ashamed’ for their native language. Another oxymoron is that despite the fact that it is of higher prestige for someone to talk in SMG, when this someone is a Greek Cypriot in most of the times, is assessed negatively since s/he is thought of as pretending a high status and prestige. Greek Cypriots have formed a medium variety in order to compose the feelings of equality and coherence with the inferiority they feel about their dialect: an ‘urban variety of GCD’, an idiom including both SMG and GCD features.

There have been several surveys conducted in order to analyze these attitudes and make them more specific. One of the most significant is one conducted by Papapavlou using the matched-guise technique and according to its results SMG speakers were judged as “more attractive, ambitious, intelligent, educated, interesting, modern, dependable and pleasant”. Nevertheless they were not characterized as being “friendlier, kinder or more humorous” than the GCD speakers.¹⁷⁸ The adjectives attributed to SMG speakers could be those representing the image of a Greek for

¹⁷⁷ Andreas N. Papapavlou, “Attitudes toward the Greek Cypriot Dialect: Sociocultural Implications,” in Papapavlou, *Contemporary*, 62.

¹⁷⁸ Papapavlou and Pavlou, “Sociolinguistic Aspects,” 19-20.

Greek Cypriots. Greeks are characterized with adjectives of superiority but not as close and approachable as members of the local community.

The unofficial status of GCD was studied by Sciriha and Koukouni: despite the fact that according to Sciriha's survey of 1995, Greek Cypriots stated that dialect's place is limited to informal settings¹⁷⁹ in another study carried out in the same year by Koukouni, the respondents stated that they do not feel uncomfortable to use GCD. Furthermore, they showed their preference to GCD stating that they do not want the SMG to substitute their dialect and lastly that they only code-switch when they have a discussion with mainland Greeks.¹⁸⁰ In 1995 again, 96% of university students managed to identify correctly, from the pronunciation, Greeks and Greek Cypriots reading the same passage in SMG and characterized Greeks as more intelligent, cultivated and attractive than Greek Cypriot speakers.¹⁸¹

Another interesting survey, which approves the perception of SMG speakers as more educated is the one by Economidou. In the framework of this survey, respondents were asked to give the occupations of nine speakers and unsurprisingly enough they attributed to the GCD speakers occupations like taxi-drivers, mechanics, and builders and to SMG speakers, occupations like teachers, professors and medical doctors. At the same time, a third category emerged; the one with speakers of a mixture of SMG and GCD, to whom occupations like secretaries, policemen and insurance agents were attributed.¹⁸² Moreover, according to a Papapavlou survey in 1988 Greek Cypriot high

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 20-21. For the survey see Lydia Sciriha, "The Interplay of Language and Identity in Cyprus," *The Cyprus Review* 7, no. 2 (1995): 7-34.

¹⁸⁰ M. Koukouni, "The Use of Language in Cyprus" (Unpublished Manuscript, University of Cyprus, 1995). For the results of the survey see Papapavlou, "Attitudes," 56.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 53-64.

¹⁸² Maria Economidou, "The Effects of Education and Occupation on the Usage of the Cypriot Dialect", (Unpublished Manuscript, University of Cyprus, 1995). For the results of the survey see Papapavlou, "Attitudes," 57.

school students did not describe GCD as ‘less precise or lacking in clarity of expression compared to SMG’.¹⁸³

Pavlou noticed some differentiations on these attitudes occurring when taking into consideration the socioeconomic status. The 1997 survey’s respondents were students from an upper class kindergarten located in an urban area and a lower-middle class kindergarten located in a semi-rural area. The results of the survey showed that children of higher socioeconomic status hold favorable attitudes towards SMG in opposition to children of lower status who seem to prefer GCD.¹⁸⁴ As the author himself admits however, further research needs to be done in this subject in order to reach more definite conclusions.

To sum up, it seems like despite the state’s policy to neglect the GCD, Greek Cypriots support their variety and consider it as a component of their membership status to their community. Due to that, Greek Cypriots trust and consider friendlier someone who speaks the same linguistic variety with them. SMG, while the superior variety and indicative of someone’s high educational and cultural status, still, it is not felt familiar, but rather as a tool indicating refinement and high prestige.

¹⁸³ Papapavlou, “Mind Your Speech: Language Attitudes in Cyprus,” in Papapavlou, *Contemporary*, 67.

¹⁸⁴ Pavlou, “Children’s Attitudes toward Cypriot Greek and Standard Modern Greek in Cyprus” (paper presented at the Third International Conference on Greek Linguistics, Athens, 1997). See also Papapavlou and Pavlou, “Sociolinguistic Aspects,” 20.

Part Three: Turkish Language Education as a Tool of Deconstructing Greek

Cypriot stereotypes

IV. Language–Culture: Language Education Promoting Interculturalism

Language should be considered as a component of culture and maybe even its initiator since language is the tool producing representations and thus, culture. Therefore, along with other elements, language is a major contributor to an individual's identity. My hypothesis of language as a tool capable of deconstructing stereotypes towards the Other is based on the interdependence between language and culture and the suggestion that a bicultural community can be accomplished through bilingualism.

Prominent scholars in the field have realized this huge importance of language and underlie that “a second or foreign language can *rarely* be learnt or taught without addressing the culture of the community in which it is used”.¹⁸⁵ Hinkel summarizing Sapir's work on the interactive relation between culture and language writes that “a language and the culture of its speakers cannot be analyzed in isolation”. Besides, “language can be seen as a way to describe and represent human experience and understanding of the world and members of a language community share systems of belief and assumptions which underlie their constructions of the world”.¹⁸⁶ In other words, language is a tool of communicating the perception someone has even for his/her own existence and therefore it is powerful enough to formulate our national identity; our self-identification and differentiation from others.

¹⁸⁵ Emphasis added. Eli Hinkel, “Introduction: Culture in Research and Second Language Pedagogy,” in *Culture in Second Language Teaching and Learning*, ed. Eli Hinkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-3. Quoting Edward Sapir, *Culture Language and Personality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1921).

Consequently, the correct teaching practices as far as the books and educational material is concerned; those should include cultural features of the language speakers. Kramersch finds this exposure of students to the other culture inadequate and argues that when language education is to include cultural artifacts these would emphasize more on “foods, fairs, folklore and statistical facts”.¹⁸⁷ However, the influence of culture to language education is something more than “the four Fs” and consequently “the teaching of language” needs to be composed “to that of culture”.¹⁸⁸

The need to communicate the Other’s culture to students through language education is imperative since people are generally afraid of a socially constructed stereotypical image which they never met. The paradigm constructed is based on fallacies derived mainly from overgeneralization and homogenization and consequently by introducing different images for the Other, students may not deconstruct their stereotypes but they will surely replace them with other, more positive ones. Many teachers have realized the importance of this linguo-cultural method of teaching a language and they include songs, television series, poems and so on in their teachings; traits which are major representatives of a people’s culture and when in a high level of learning they even organize trips to this language’s mainland.

Brøgger introduced to literature on the field the below illustrated schematic representation to describe the relationship between literature, language and culture:

¹⁸⁷ Claire Kramersch, “Culture in Language Learning: a View from the United States,” in *Foreign Language Research in Cross-Cultural Perspective*, eds. Kees de Bot et al. (Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing Co., 1991), 218.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 236.




Figure: Schematic Representation of the Interdependence between Literature, Language and Culture¹⁸⁹

This model illustrates each one of the three components as a circle and all three of them inextricably connected to each other. Language is definitely crucial for literature to emerge, while at the same time literature advances and shapes language. Culture owes some of its characteristics to language and literary tradition and due to that Brøgger drew it as a big circle composed of two other circles: language and literature. What we can extract from the above scheme is that language reflects and simultaneously affects culture; it is a mirror and an initiator of it.

Brøgger's illustration becomes even more efficient when we take into consideration the parts of each circle that are not included in another. The purpose of this as Brøgger himself explains is the fact that there are "symbolic forms other than that of language", "which give expression to general assumptions and values – for example

¹⁸⁹ Fredrik Brøgger, *Culture, Language, Text: Culture Studies within the Study of English as a Foreign Language* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992), 108.

gestures, clothes, rituals and artifacts”.¹⁹⁰ In addition, “language is sometimes of such an individual or idiosyncratic character that it cannot be said to reflect the dominant cultural assumptions”.¹⁹¹

Brøgger considers culture and language to be “inextricably interrelated and interdependent” and in the end of his book reaches at the conclusion that “culture, it repeatedly turns out, is language, and language is culture”.¹⁹² Byram and Morgan built up to this viewpoint and even considered it “axiomatic” for “cultural learning” to be an “integral part of language learning and vice versa”.¹⁹³ Consequently, in order to be able to communicate effectively with speakers of a language it is necessary to learn not only the language but also the non-verbal methods of communicating feelings and ideas.

Second language learners meet a new culture, which would not be threatening or afraid as the unknown. Thus, the language of the Other may become the carrier of this Other’s culture which contributes to the deconstruction of negative stereotypes. Learning and understanding a culture leads to a more humanistic approach since through language learning, people get to know at the same time a people’s customs, lifestyle, way of thinking and so on. An individual would come across similarities and differences with the Other’s culture and therefore, second or foreign language education should have as its ultimate aim the development of qualities like tolerance and understanding towards other cultures. According to the results of a study conducted by Robinson-Stuart and Nocon in 1996, “it is possible for learners to develop positive attitudes toward the cultural perspective of members of different

¹⁹⁰ Brøgger, *Culture, Language, Text*, 109.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid., 135.

¹⁹³ Michael Byram and Carol Morgan, *Teaching and Learning Language and Culture* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1994), 5.

speech communities as a result of an instructional program that brings learners into meaningful interaction of the members of the same culture”.¹⁹⁴

During the process of learning a second language, human beings do not develop a second mental mechanism for the new information and details. Everything learned is added to the previous knowledge of the learner, who discards what is no longer necessary and formulates new understanding of the world composed of his/her previous and recently acquired skills. As Fiske puts it “new knowledge is not an evolutionary improvement on what precedes it; rather, new knowledges enter adversarial relationships with older, more established ones, challenging their position in the power play of understandings, and in such confrontations new insights can be provoked”.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, Kramsch underpinned that “as they become more and more proficient in a second language and familiar with a second culture, language learners try to articulate their new experiences within their old one, making it relative to their own lives”.¹⁹⁶

The significance of the second language acquisition is the fact that it manages to question previous knowledge and primarily the previous feeling of superiority for the native language. Therefore, learning a second language facilitates the emergence of intercultural behavior and more open-minded approaches. What is more, according to Kramsch “from the clash between the familiar meanings of the native culture and the unexpected meanings of the target culture, meanings that were taken for granted are

¹⁹⁴ Hinkel, *Culture in Research*, 29. For the results of the study in detail see: Gail S. Robinson and Honorine Nocon, “Second Culture Acquisition: Ethnography in the Foreign Language Classroom,” *Modern Language Journal* 80, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 431-449.

¹⁹⁵ John Fiske, *Understanding Popular Culture* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 194. Quoted in Claire Kramsch, *Context and Culture in Language Teaching* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 238.

¹⁹⁶ Kramsch, *ibid.*

suddenly questioned, challenged, problematized”.¹⁹⁷ Consequently, implementing what Kramsch suggests on the case of Greek Cypriots, it seems quite possible for them to discard formerly existent approaches concerning Turkish language and put their perception of the Other in question.

The intercultural advantages of learning a second language have been used by states to promote peace in their multilingual areas. In order to facilitate the peaceful coexistence among members of different communities living in the same state system we need to ensure the effective communication between them. This is not an easy task since communicative competence is not accomplished through a language education emphasizing strictly and exclusively on language and linguistic rules. For the effective communication of native and nonnative speakers of a language Troike considers as prerequisites not only the “linguistic knowledge” consisted of “the phonological, grammatical and lexical components of a language and to their denotational and referential meaning” but also the “interactional skills”. These are:

both knowledge and expectation of who may or may not speak in certain settings, to whom one may speak, when one should remain silent, how one should talk to people of different statuses and roles, what nonverbal behaviors are appropriate for one to use in various contexts, what routines one should use for turn-taking in conversation, how one should ask for and give information, how one should make a request, how one should offer or decline assistance or cooperation, how one should give commands and how one should enforce discipline.¹⁹⁸

In practice, language education provides students the ability to communicate with native speakers of other languages. This would be of great significance for Greek Cypriots who would learn Turkish and consequently, have the ability to directly

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Muriel S. Troike, “Extending Communicative Concepts in the Second Language Curriculum: a Sociolinguistic Perspective,” in *Culture as the Core: Perspectives on Culture in Second Language Learning*, eds. Dalf L. Lange and R. Michael Paige (Connecticut: Information Age Publishing, 2003), 5.

communicate with Turkish Cypriots. The two communities would be able to interact and develop relationships not only due to the communicative competence but also through the more positive attitude towards each other that would emerge through language education.

On the other hand, even if we ignore the enhancement of communication through language learning and instead we communicate exclusively linguistic rules providing to students the skills to write, read, understand and speak the language of the Other, it again influences the learners' stereotypes. For instance, Greek Cypriots when referring to Turkish language, more often than not, evaluate it as Asian, bearing resemblance with Arabic, and even sounding aggressive. This perception is likely to change as soon as they acquire some competence in Turkish language since it would sound more familiar. This change in the perception of the Other's language would result to the change in the perception of culture as well and ultimately deconstruct the previous negative perception. Nevertheless, this theory needs to be further researched in order to reach at more accurate conclusions.

Overall, the contribution of language education to peace in multicultural areas is huge since it makes it possible for learners to develop values such as tolerance and acceptance of the Other. Learning the language of the Other provides to the learner the ability to communicate, exchange ideas and emotions, mark cultural similarities and differences and puts in the place of the preexistent abstract image a real figure.

II. Language Education in Cyprus: Turkish Language in the Greek Cypriot educational system

As it is already discussed in the first part, Greek Cypriot identity construction is based on perceptions and stereotypical images for the Other and is strongly connected to traits such as insecurity, suspicion and weakness in opposition to a ‘powerful’ and ‘threatening’ enemy whom Greek Cypriots are afraid of. Thus, learning the language of the Other, whom society through its mechanisms –media, education, literature, museums and so on– has constructed as the traditional enemy, is by itself a highly prejudiced task to take.

Millas characterized language education “that is associated to a group perceived as negative (enemy, threat, unreliable, dishonest)” as “troublesome and unproductive”. Referring to own experiences as a teacher of the language of the Other to both Greek and Turkish, Millas says that “the students and the citizens are not only prejudiced but do not even suspect that they may be biased”. He also emphasizes on the inhospitable or even hostile environment, where the language of the Other is taught and on the political and ideological dimension of the project, which require special treatment: teaching the language of the Other may not be handled strictly linguistically as if it were any other foreign language.

Millas considered the fact that his students never heard of terms like “nation state, nation building, national identity construction, imagined community, stereotype, the Other as a part of our identity, building of history and tradition, memory and

forgetting, racism, national paradigm and so on”¹⁹⁹ as a drawback and an obstacle to realizing own prejudices.

During the Ottoman years in Cyprus multiculturalism, multilingualism and multi religionism existed in the island just like ottoman-controlled areas. At first, Ottoman Turkish was the language of authority and supremacy, whereas the local Church authorities were allowed to use the Greek Language. Moreover, Dragomans, who were the translators between the Ottoman authorities and Church communicated in both languages; thus, a group of diglossic people was established, who were also holding bureaucratic occupations. For instance, they would be responsible for translating the incoming and outgoing correspondence between the Ottoman authorities and Church.

When the administration of the island was held to the British in 1878, Ottoman Turkish language handed its place to English as the language of bureaucracy and official interactions. English became the language of power. A Greek-speaking person who wanted to learn a foreign language, s/he would not choose Ottoman Turkish anymore but English.²⁰⁰ The gradual rise of nationalism in Europe and then in the island as well, had as a result the drastic decrease of mixed villages. People were to construct more linguistically and religiously homogenized communities and simultaneously distanced themselves from the perspective of multiculturalism.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ Hercules Millas, [Pleonektimata kai Meionektimata sti Didaskalia tis Glossas tou Allou: Ellinika, Tourkika (Advantages and Disadvantages of the Other’s Language Teaching: Greek, Turkish)] in *Languages for Intercultural Dialogue* eds. Jack Burston et al. (Nicosia: Ministry of Education and Culture, 2008), 38-47.

²⁰⁰ Eftychios Gavriel, [Mathenontas ti Glossa tis Allis Koinotitas: i Periptosi tis Ellinikis kai tis Tourkikis sthn Kypro (Learning the Language of the Other Community: the Case of Greek and Turkish in Cyprus)] in Burston et al., *Languages for Intercultural Dialogue*, 272.

²⁰¹ The gradual decrease of mixed villages is discussed in Part One.

Cyprus was granted independence in 1960 and through its constitution Greek and Turkish became the two official languages of the Republic. The turbulent years of the 1960's as well as the coup of 1974 and the consequent invasion and partition of the island established new realities. The two communities were separated almost completely and consequently, a monolingual environment was established. Despite the fact that Turkish was one of the two official languages of the Republic, the almost completely homogenized environment of the south treated Turkish as a foreign and not as the second official language. Moreover, after the Cyprus' accession to the European Union, Greek was nominated as the only official language of the Republic and thus, Turkish did never become a European Union language.²⁰²

The Republic of Cyprus, as a member-state of European Union, had to take into consideration the 2003 EU guide for the development of Language Education Policies according to which:

For individuals, [foreign languages] contribute to quality of life, the multiplication of personal contacts, access to other cultural products, and personal development and achievement. *For societies, knowing each other's languages may provide the basis for peaceful coexistence, while multilingualism can be an enrichment of the environment and recognition of minority and foreign languages a precondition of democracy [...]* The acquisition of language thus involves acquisition of cultural competence and the ability to live together with others.²⁰³

After the partial lifting of restrictions on movement, the Republic of Cyprus declared "Measures of Support to the Turkish Cypriots". Among these measures was the

²⁰² Sarah S. Ludford, "Turkish Cypriots Betrayed by Language Decision," last modified November 28, 2003, <http://www.sarahludford.org.uk/news/64.html>.

²⁰³ Emphasis added. Jean Claude Beacco and Michael Byram, *Guide for the Development of Language Education Policies in Europe: From Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2003) 34, 46. Quoted in Constadina Charalambous and Ben Rampton, "Other-Language Learning and Intercultural Communication in Contexts of Conflict," (working paper, Urban Language and Literacies, Open University Cyprus and King's College London, 2010), 2.

introduction of Turkish Language as an optional course to secondary education.²⁰⁴

Turkish language lessons are available for Greek Cypriots only in the sphere of voluntary. For instance, Turkish language is offered in the secondary level of education, where students of second and third year may choose Turkish as the one of two foreign languages. English language education, on the contrary, is compulsory for all students as early as the fourth class of primary school, gymnasium and first class of high school.

The Ministry of Education and Culture offers afternoon Turkish classes to students who wish to register. Levels and classes are arranged by the ‘State Institutions for Further Education’ according to demand and the tuition fees are not too high (€225-€385 per year) in order to be approachable for people who may not afford high cost. Furthermore, free Turkish language classes are also offered by the ‘Adult Educational Centers’, another department of the Ministry of Education. Lessons are not equally intense to the former and take place only once a week.²⁰⁵

The department of Turkish Studies of the University of Cyprus was founded in 1989 and accepted its first students in 1992. There, students have the opportunity of learning Turkish language along with Ottoman and Turkish history, culture and so on. What is more, the Language Center of the University of Cyprus offers three levels of Turkish language for students coming from other departments. All the students of University of Cyprus are asked to complete three levels of English and three semesters of any other foreign languages in order to complete their degree. There are

²⁰⁴ Charalambous and Rampton, *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁰⁵ “Since 2003, within the framework of the materialization of the Governments’ decision for the creation of bridges of communication between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, free lessons of Greek are offered to Turkish Cypriots and Turkish to Greek Cypriots”. “State Institutes for further Education,” accessed May 24, 2012, http://www.moec.gov.cy/en/state_institutes.html. ‘The centers also offer opportunities for Greek Cypriots to learn the Turkish language’. “Adult Educational and Training Centers,” accessed May 24, 2012, http://www.moec.gov.cy/en/adult_education.html.

some students, who choose to have three levels of the same language whereas others prefer to have three semesters of different languages. At the same time, students need to choose five lessons from any other department besides their own in order to graduate. There has been an important increase noticed in the number of students choosing Turkish as one of these five courses or as their foreign language of choice offered by the Language Centre.²⁰⁶

These changes need to be put in the context of the new beginning marked by the ability for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to communicate and come closer since 2003 as well as the optimistic climate for a solution to the Cyprus Issue of the last years. As senior Ministry of Education officials stated in an interview with Charalambous on the 9th of January 2007:

We are a bicomunal state and it is definitely good...*the knowledge of Turkish for our side, for us Greeks... will definitely help the cohabitation in this island, the peaceful and harmonious cohabitation (...)* if the accession of Turkey to EU proceeds and the Cyprus Problem gets resolved, we will definitely have to be taught Turkish and they will have to be taught the Greek language in their schools...*It is the best way to come closer, I believe.*²⁰⁷

Turkish language seems to gain more and more importance since it is increasingly demanded as a desirable or even prerequisite qualification for employment. Despite the increase on Turkish language students, the levels of bilingualism in no way reach those of the past.

During an ethnographic study in Turkish language classes of secondary education and adult afternoon classes, Charalambous observed that in secondary schools Hellenocentrism and the impact of historical past was prevailing. The study which

²⁰⁶ The increase in the numbers of students choosing Turkish the last years were indicated by a survey of the Language Center of the University of Cyprus. The bar chart is attached in Appendix B.

²⁰⁷ Emphases added. Charalambous and Rampton, "Other Language Learning", 4.

took place from September 2006 to January 2007 indicated that students hold negative attitudes to their teachers' attempt to introduce positive representations. According to Charalambous, Turkish language teacher was to receive negative comments from fellow teachers, family and friends but even worse the 21 children were to report in interviews that they had been called traitors because of their option to learn "the language of the enemy". Interestingly enough, teacher decided to "disassociate the language from its speakers and its cultural context, as well as from the political situation on the island" by avoiding any reference to the Other.²⁰⁸

Necdet Osam and Ali Sıdkı Ağazade conducted in 2004, a study concerning the attitudes of Greek Cypriot students of the University of Cyprus towards the Turkish language. The questionnaire was given to 1160 University students from the age of 18 to 28, who were randomly selected. In this survey 54, 6% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the thesis that 'they would love to learn Turkish'. As far as the question whether Turkish is as important as Greek 38, 4% of people disagreed or strongly disagreed while 28, 3% remained neutral. Only 20, 9% of the respondents thought Turkish is a prestigious language. To the question whether Turkish should be taught in Greek Cypriot schools, 38, 7% of the respondents disagreed, 35, 1% remained neutral and the rest of them agreed. 47, 6% of the respondents disagreed with the statement 'bilingualism should be reinforced', 29, 9% was neutral and 22, 5% agreed. Lastly, to the question whether the status of Turkish should be raised, almost half of the respondents disagreed and only 20 % agreed.²⁰⁹

Greek Cypriots indicated negative attitudes towards Turkish language and seem unready for bilingual settings and biculturalism. Nevertheless, we should keep in

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 5.

²⁰⁹ Necdet Osam and Ali S. Ağazade, "The status of Turkish in the Republic of Cyprus and the attitudes of Greek Cypriots towards Turkish language learning," *Turkic Languages* 8, (2004): 271-288.

mind the time consequence of this survey; in 2004 Greek Cypriots came across the Annan Plan, and someone could clearly notice a rise of nationalistic attitudes among them. Thus, the answers to these questions may reflect the uneasiness or reluctance of some Greek Cypriots to co-exist with Turkish Cypriots or even their negative attitudes towards the Annan Plan.

Four years later, Pelekani conducted a study among the students who are taught Turkish to Limassol's 'State Institutes for Further Education' and according to the results, the biggest percentage of students learning Turkish comes from the age group of 26-35. The importance of this study is found onto the fact that to the question whether their stance and attitudes towards Turkish culture changed positively during their studies, only 19% responded negatively while the much higher 70% responded positively.²¹⁰

To sum up, it seems like Turkish language teaching to Greek Cypriot students is a taboo issue in Cyprus. While Turkish is still being approached as a foreign language and not as the second official of the Republic of Cyprus, we still need to acknowledge the increase of Greek Cypriots who wish to learn Turkish. This is an encouraging fact, which could be perceived as indicative of a change that began to occur.

²¹⁰ Chryso Pelekani, [Egxeiridio Tourkikis Glossas: Anaptiksi enos Diapolitismikou Analytikou Programmatos gia tin Tourkiki Glossa]" in Jack Burston et al., Languages for Intercultural Dialogue, 192-202.

III. The Language of the Other and its Impact on Student's Stereotypes

This chapter aspires to provide an answer to the question whether language education may deconstruct stereotypes towards the Other through the findings of a research I conducted myself. I have concentrated my research on the case of Cyprus and specifically, I would be trying to prove that Turkish language education may diminish Greek Cypriot stereotypes towards Turks and Turkish Cypriots.

Methodology:

My research questions were: a) what are the self-reported perceptions and stereotypes of Greek Cypriot students of Turkish language towards the Other, Turks and Turkish Cypriots? and b) does Turkish language education to Greek Cypriots deconstruct their stereotypes towards the Other? I would thus, examine the relation or the transformation of these stereotypes as classes further and Greek Cypriots acquire more and more competence in Turkish. The hypotheses and expectations of the outcome of this research were:

Hypothesis 1: Greek Cypriots hold more favorable behavior towards the Turkish Cypriots rather than Turks.

Hypothesis 2: Students tend to change or transform their stereotypes towards the Other as they further their Turkish language competence. Thus, students of the second (henceforth Group B) and third semester (henceforth Group C) are expected to hold more favorable attitudes towards the Other in contrast to those of first semester (henceforth Group A).

The research instrument for my quantitative survey was an anonymous questionnaire consisted in its vast majority of closed-ended questions in a Likert-scale model of

answers from 1 to 5.²¹¹ The survey was administered in April and May, 2012 and my respondents were Greek Cypriot students of the three levels of the course; thirty students from each level, except for the third level which composed of only 14 students. Because of that, I conducted the research to students who have completed the course a semester or two semesters before and have managed to gather totally 24 questionnaires. For its completion it was given in classes at a specifically allocated time whereas for the students that completed Turkish language courses one or two semesters before, the questionnaire was sent via e-mail. No other variable except for Turkish language education was taken in mind and thus, students from all the departments and years of study were included in the sample.

The questionnaire is divided in four parts: in the first part there are questions researching the readiness of the respondent to co-exist with Turkish Cypriots and their willingness to co-operate for language learning in a classroom context. In this group of questions we would easily extract the different feelings students have for Turks and Turkish Cypriots since the same question is asked for both of them. In the second part, students are clearly asked to judge the three groups: Turks, Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the basis of a 1 to 5 scale of absolutely applicable and not applicable at all. For the purpose of this question a table was used with several adjectives which students attributed to the degree they wished to each of the national groups.

After that, the questions of the third part were seeking to detect students' prejudices and biases towards the Other. The aim of these questions is to find out the readiness of Greek Cypriots to coexist with the Other; whether they possess feelings of tolerance and understanding or if they contrastingly develop racist behaviors. Lastly,

²¹¹ The questionnaire as this was given to students (in Greek) is attached in Appendix C and the English Translation is in Appendix D.

the fourth part consisted of demographic questions. Respondents were University of Cyprus' students of both sexes from the age of 18 to 25.

The relatively small number of questionnaires, made it possible for the data to be analyzed in Microsoft Office Excel and Microsoft Office Power Point.

Findings and Discussion:

According to the research, (First Part: Question 1) the three dominant reasons for which Group A students chose Turkish was the fact that they considered it to be an easy course (37%), that Turkish language acquisition would be demanded in the job market in the future (24%) and because Turkish is the second official language of the Republic of Cyprus (21%). In Group B 6% increases to 19% of students who chose Turkish because they like the language. It is obvious thus, that after a semester of Turkish language learning, students' perception of language changed positively. An equal percentage of 22 answered that they chose Turkish because of the good grade they expected to take and because they thought it would be required for finding a job in the future. The Group C students stated that they chose Turkish because it is the second official language of the state with the huge percentage of 42% and with an equal percentage of 17 because they thought it would be required in the future and because they like the language.

A huge differentiation I observed was to the question concerning the feelings of students to the free movement of Turkish Cypriots to the whole of island (Question 6). Group A answered with a percentage of 12 that it extremely bothers them and the highest percentage (37) answered that it bothers them. Only 6% said that it does not bother them at all. However, the 26% of Group B answered that it did not bother them at all and another 48% of them answered that it does not bother them. Students of the

Group C had even more positive reactions since no one of them said that the free movement of Turkish Cypriots extremely bothers them. On the contrary, 46% and 25% answered that it does not bother them and it does not bother them at all respectively, while 17% of the students remained indifferent.

In the question concerning the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Question 8) the biggest percentage (31) of the Group A gave moderate answers and 27% and 6% said that they are quite a lot and very similar. The scenery however was to change when the question referred to Turks (Question 9). The huge percentage of 46 along with a percentage of 39 answered, respectively, that Greek Cypriots do not at all and not very much resemble Turks.

Group B's answers provided an even higher percentage of resemblance between Greek and Turkish Cypriots since they considered Greek Cypriots to resemble quite a lot (45%) and very much (7%) to Turkish Cypriots. The answers to Question 9 of Group B were also differentiated a lot in comparison to those of Group A. Specifically, a percentage of 19 from Group B considers Greek Cypriots to be quite a lot or very similar to Turks whereas the not at all and not very much similar decreased to 52%.

The 17% and the 33% of the Group C students resembled themselves quite a lot and very much to Turkish Cypriots while their 42% of this Group's students answered that Greek Cypriots are slightly similar to Turkish Cypriots. The percentage of perceived resemblance with Turks in Group C is quite the same with the other two groups. Specifically, 54% and 25% answered that they are not similar and not similar at all to Turks whereas 21% of the students answered that they are slightly similar, similar or very similar.

The answers that respondents gave to the questions of the second part of the questionnaire are not analyzable. That is because students indicated a feebleness to assign the characteristics provided to the three national groups. However, I found extremely interesting and maybe the most encouraging finding, the fact that most of my respondents were incapable of characterizing Turks and Turkish Cypriots with the adjectives provided; essentially students were unable to stereotype them. Specifically, most of the students said that they could not know because they have never met a Turk or Turkish Cypriot indicating thus, a disbelief and lack of trust to their own stereotypes. Students avoided assigning characteristics to the three national groups based on their socially constructed perceptions towards them.

What is even more interesting is the fact that students, as they said to me, could not treat these groups as a homogenized unity and assign to them overgeneralized or oversimplified adjectives since they considered that one can find these qualities to people of each of the groups. People were treated as different personalities, who had their individual characteristics. Those who ultimately, managed to answer the question, assigned some negative characteristics to Greek Cypriots and some positive to Turks and Turkish Cypriots despite the fact that my expectation was that they would assign positive characteristics to Greek Cypriots and negative to Turks and Turkish Cypriots. The presence of a positive Other to students' imagination is the most determinant indication of the deconstruction of stereotypes since, as it was mentioned earlier, it is not the negative images that enforce stereotypes but the complete absence of positive ones.

In the third part of the questionnaire, students of the Group A with a percentage of 12 and 27 considered as not acceptable at all and not acceptable to have Turkish Cypriot neighbors. However, the biggest percentage was that of acceptable (37%). To the

same question, 88% of the students of Group B considered it acceptable and very acceptable to have Turkish Cypriot neighbors. Students of Group C gave almost the same answers: 42% and 46% of them marked the 'very acceptable' and 'acceptable' answer accordingly. Students gave in general positive answers to the next question of how acceptable it would be to have Turkish Cypriot colleagues; yet, there are again differentiations in the three Groups. The negative percentage (not acceptable and not acceptable at all) of 27 of the Group A decreased to 18 of the Group B and was eventually reached at the 8% of the Group C. Even to the question whether it would be acceptable for a Turkish Cypriot to be their manager, research showed decrease of non-acceptance as students moved further to Turkish language acquisition. Specifically, in Group A 47% of students considered it unacceptable to have a Turkish Cypriot manager whereas in Group B this percentage decreased to 39. Group C then, decrease this percentage even more to 29.

The question to which students of Group A and B did not show any differentiation was the one referring to intermarriages. Both groups gave a percentage of about 75 to the options not acceptable and not acceptable at all. That is mainly due to the fact that Greek Cypriots are in their vast majority Orthodox while, Turkish Cypriots are Muslims and religion plays a very important role to the traditional Greek Cypriot society. On the other hand, the Group C showed a remarkable change: only 50% of the respondents answered not acceptable and not at all acceptable, while the high enough percentages of 33 and 17 answered acceptable and very acceptable.

Implications:

The biggest of the implications that I had to cope with was that students who choose to have Turkish language course are generally, students who show already (before

having any Turkish language lessons) either neutral or positive attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots. There is nowhere compulsory Turkish language courses taught and that was a drawback for my research. Having this in mind, I did not expect to have huge differentiations between the three Groups.

Another implication that I came across was that I could not perform the questionnaire to students before and after the impact of Turkish language learning and compare the results. The questionnaire took place in the endings of semester thus, I did not have the opportunity to have students who chose but still not taught Turkish language at all, which could be succeeded if questionnaires were to be given to Group A in the beginnings of semester. Lastly, Group C consisted of 14 students only and in order to solve this problem, I decided to perform the questionnaire to students who had Turkish language courses before and completed the series of the three semesters.

Overall in order to understand the huge importance of the results of the research we need to keep in mind these implications. On the basis of this research, my hypothesis of language education as a tool facilitating the deconstruction of stereotypes seems to be self-evident. However, the small sample and its restriction to University of Cyprus' students reveal that more research is needed in order to reach at indubitable and definite conclusions.

Conclusions:

This thesis aspires to add new knowledge in the field of conflict resolution and peace building project and to provide a scientific background and theoretical framework to the Other's language education as a useful tool of deconstructing stereotypes. The first step to the establishment of peace is the promotion and development of trust and confidence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Language education and the ability for effective communication would lead to mutual understanding and tolerance towards the Other.

This thesis argues that learning the language of the Other is a great influence to the people's perceptions and stereotypes thus, deconstructing negative attitudes and behaviors towards the Other. The biggest percentage, which voted for 'no' in the Annan Plan referendum in 2004 was the young generation (from 18 to 25 years old) who had most probably, graduated from the Greek Cypriot educational system and at the same time did not have any significant experience of living with the Other. This 'demonizing the Other' project undertaken by the educational system and nationalistic media, established the negative Other as a component of the image of the Self and cohesive dynamic of the Greek Cypriot community derived from common sufferings. People who even experienced the war and its huge consequences were more willing to live with the Other, with whom they had been co-existing before 1974 and had a realistic image in mind. Thus, taking the Annan Plan exemplar and without examining whether this was a good or a bad plan, someone could assume from their reactions that Greek Cypriots were not ready for co-existence with those constructed by their society as their 'enemy' Other. Consequently, it is of great importance to provide the two communities with more realistic images of the Other instead of the stereotypical paradigm in order for them to be able to share their common homeland.

Moving a step further, language education would produce a new generation of people that will not be negatively prejudiced against the Other and will be able to consider with as much objectivity as possible the resolution of the Cyprus Issue. This thesis does not suggest forgetting or ignoring the historical past. Besides, in order for a society to progress it should face critically its own mistakes in order to avoid their revival. But at the same time, it is not the language's job to examine and communicate sensitive and subjective topics like the turbulent historical past. What this thesis suggests is that people should be provided with the ability to dissociate themselves from negative perceptions towards the Other and to also acknowledge the imperfection of the Self.

The deconstruction of stereotypes could be succeeded through the project of doubting the national myth and historical narratives however, this thesis aspires to remark the significance of language education to this process. Language provides to its speakers the great gift of communication and intercultural interactions. Through the communicative competence, citizens would develop relations with the Other and they would most probably create in their mind a realistic image; not an abstraction with inhuman characteristics but a figure corresponding to a human being.

European Community has realized the importance of bilingualism and interculturalism as tools which work against racism and prejudices and through various acts suggested to states the development of foreign languages learning mechanisms. Especially for the European Union, multiculturalism is of crucial importance for its own existence and enhancement since it consists of many different states, which also consist of many different cultures and linguistic varieties. The only way for all these differentiations to be negotiated and co-exist is to advance the communication between them aiming ultimately to tolerance and understanding.

Despite the fact that states have been applying language policies for centuries, learning the language of the Other as a tool of deconstructing stereotypes is not yet researched adequately. This thesis aspires to give a boost to this kind of initiatives by the two communities' leaderships in order to hope for a resolution of the Cyprus Issue. Besides, the importance of effective interaction between the two communities was already acknowledged by the United Nations, which introduced through the Annan Plan in 2004 the compulsory learning of the language of the Other in secondary education for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

An overall conclusion is that language seems to be a great tool in the hands of leadership for preparing Greek Cypriots to coexist with Turkish Cypriots. The interaction among Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the exchange of ideas, the identification of similarities and differences would promote a process of self-awareness and understanding towards the Other. However, further research needs to be done in fields like the practices or teaching methods of the Other's language in order to function as a tool of deconstructing stereotypes in the framework of peace-building projects.

APPENDIX A:

Figure 1:



Figure 2:



1974

*Χριστούγεννα στην προσφυγιά.
Christmas in a refugee camp.*

Figure 3:



Figure 4:




Figure 5:



*“Έχουμε δικαίωμα να μάθουμε τι απέγιναν”.
“We have the right to know about their fate”.*

Figure 6:



*Συνελήφθησαν από τον Τουρκικό στρατό. Σήμερα αγνοούνται.
They were arrested by Turkish soldiers. Since then they are missing.*

Figure 7:



Figure 8:



Figure 9:



Figure 10:




Figure 11:



Figure 12:



APPENDIX B:



Appendix C:

Βασικές πληροφορίες ερωτηματολογίου:

Καλημέρα/καλησπέρα σας. Ονομάζομαι Βασιλική Κουκουνίδου και είμαι φοιτήτρια μεταπτυχιακού στο τμήμα «Διεθνών Σχέσεων με έμφαση στις Ελληνοτουρκικές Σχέσεις» του πανεπιστημίου Bilgi της Κωνσταντινούπολης.

Το πιο κάτω ερωτηματολόγιο διεξάγεται στα πλαίσια της συγγραφής της μεταπτυχιακής μου εργασίας και απευθύνεται σε μαθητές εκμάθησης της τουρκικής γλώσσας. Η συμπλήρωσή του θα πάρει λίγα λεπτά αλλά θα παρέχει πολλές και χρήσιμες πληροφορίες για τη συγγραφή της μεταπτυχιακής μου εργασίας. Δεν υπάρχουν σωστές και λάθος απαντήσεις, μας ενδιαφέρουν **μόνο** οι προσωπικές σας απόψεις. Η **ανωνυμία** των συμμετεχόντων στην έρευνα θα τηρηθεί αυστηρά και θα διαφυλαχθεί η **εμπιστευτικότητα** των στοιχείων. Όλες οι απαντήσεις στις ερωτήσεις του ερωτηματολογίου θα τύχουν άκρως εμπιστευτικής μεταχείρισης.

Ημερομηνία:

Πρώτο Μέρος:

1. Γιατί διάλεξες τα τούρκικα ως μάθημα επιλογής;
 - Σκέφτηκα ότι θα ήταν εύκολο μάθημα
 - Σκέφτηκα ότι θα μπορούσα να πάρω καλό βαθμό
 - Μου αρέσει σαν γλώσσα
 - Σκέφτηκα ότι θα έχουν ζήτηση στο μέλλον
 - Σκέφτηκα ότι είναι καλό να γνωρίζω τη δεύτερη επίσημη γλώσσα του κράτους μου
 - Σκέφτηκα ότι πρέπει να μάθω τη γλώσσα του εχθρού
 - Άλλο (παρακαλώ διευκρινίστε):
2. Είχες οποιαδήποτε προηγούμενη επαφή με την τουρκική γλώσσα;
 - Πάρα πολύ
 - Πολύ
 - Αρκετά
 - Λίγο
 - Καθόλου

3. Έχεις συναντήσει ή συνομιλήσει ποτέ σου με Τουρκοκύπριο;
- Πάρα πολλές φορές
 - Πολλές φορές
 - Αρκετές φορές
 - Λίγες φορές
 - Σπάνια / Ποτέ
4. Έχεις συναντήσει ή συνομιλήσει ποτέ σου με Τούρκο;
- Πάρα πολλές φορές
 - Πολλές φορές
 - Αρκετές φορές
 - Λίγες φορές
 - Σπάνια / Ποτέ
5. Η διάνοιξη των οδοφραγμάτων:
- Με ενοχλεί πολύ
 - Με ενοχλεί
 - Μου είναι αδιάφορο
 - Δε με ενοχλεί
 - Δεν με ενοχλεί καθόλου
6. Από το 2003 οι Τουρκοκύπριοι μπορούν να διακινούνται ελεύθερα σε ολόκληρο το νησί:
- Με ενοχλεί πολύ
 - Με ενοχλεί
 - Μου είναι αδιάφορο
 - Δε με ενοχλεί
 - Δεν με ενοχλεί καθόλου
7. Μεταβαίνεις στα κατεχόμενα:
- Πολύ συχνά
 - Αρκετά συχνά
 - Κάποτε
 - Σπάνια
 - Ποτέ
8. Νομίζεις ότι οι Ελληνοκύπριοι με τους Τουρκοκύπριους:
- Μοιάζουν πολύ
 - Μοιάζουν αρκετά
 - Μοιάζουν λίγο
 - Δε μοιάζουν
 - Δε μοιάζουν καθόλου
9. Νομίζεις ότι οι Ελληνοκύπριοι με τους Τούρκους:
- Μοιάζουν πολύ
 - Μοιάζουν αρκετά
 - Μοιάζουν λίγο
 - Δε μοιάζουν

- Δε μοιάζουν καθόλου
10. Για ένα Ελληνοκύπριο το να αναπτύξει δεσμούς/σχέσεις με έναν Τουρκοκύπριο
- Είναι πολύ εύκολο
 - Είναι εύκολο
 - Ούτε εύκολο ούτε δύσκολο
 - Είναι Δύσκολο
 - Είναι πολύ δύσκολο/αδύνατο
11. Για ένα Ελληνοκύπριο το να αναπτύξει δεσμούς/σχέσεις με έναν Τούρκο
- Είναι πολύ εύκολο
 - Είναι εύκολο
 - Ούτε εύκολο ούτε δύσκολο
 - Είναι Δύσκολο
 - Είναι πολύ δύσκολο/αδύνατο
12. Θα παρευρισκόσουν σε εκδήλωση με στόχο τη γνωριμία Ελληνοκύπριων και Τουρκοκύπριων μαθητών μεταξύ τους;
- Σίγουρα ναι
 - Μάλλον ναι
 - Μάλλον όχι
 - Σίγουρα όχι
 - Δεν γνωρίζω/δεν απαντώ
13. Στο ενδεχόμενο επίσκεψης Τουρκοκύπριου μαθητή στην τάξη, με στόχο την εξάσκηση για παράδειγμα στο διάλογο ή συμμετοχή σε άλλες δραστηριότητες στα πλαίσια του μαθήματος θα ήσουν:
- Πολύ θετικός/ή
 - Αρκετά θετικός/ή
 - Ουδέτερος/η
 - Αρνητικός/ή
 - Πολύ αρνητικός/ή
14. Στο ενδεχόμενο επίσκεψης Τούρκου μαθητή στην τάξη, με στόχο την εξάσκηση για παράδειγμα στο διάλογο ή συμμετοχή σε άλλες δραστηριότητες στα πλαίσια του μαθήματος θα ήσουν:
- Πολύ θετικός/ή
 - Αρκετά θετικός/ή
 - Ουδέτερος/η
 - Αρνητικός/ή
 - Πολύ αρνητικός/ή
15. Στο ενδεχόμενο επίσκεψης Ελληνοκύπριου μαθητή σε τάξη Ελληνικών στα κατεχόμενα με στόχο την εξάσκηση για παράδειγμα στο διάλογο ή συμμετοχή σε άλλες δραστηριότητες στα πλαίσια του μαθήματος θα ήσουν:
- Πολύ θετικός/ή
 - Αρκετά θετικός/ή

- Ουδέτερος/η
- Αρνητικός/ή
- Πολύ αρνητικός/ή

Δεύτερο Μέρος:

1. Στην πρώτη στήλη του πιο κάτω πίνακα υπάρχουν κάποια χαρακτηριστικά. Ποια από αυτά πιστεύεις ότι χαρακτηρίζουν την πλειοψηφία των ομάδων που αναγράφονται πιο κάτω; Χρησιμοποιήστε την κλίμακα 1-5 όπου 1=ισχύει απόλυτα και 5=δεν ισχύει καθόλου

Χαρακτηριστικά	Ελληνοκύπριοι	Τουρκοκύπριοι	Τούρκοι
Ευγενικός			
Εγωιστής/ατομιστής			
Επιθετικός			
Φιλικός			
Έμπιστος			
Προδότης			
Ήρεμος			
Βάρβαρος			
Ειρηνόφιλος			
Πολεμοχαρής			
Έξυπνος			
Πονηρός			
Συμφεροντολόγος			

Τεμπέλης			
Εργατικός			
Υπομονετικός			
Νευρικός			
Απόγονος σημαντικού πολιτισμού			
Αναχρονιστικός			
Μοντέρνος			
Αγράμματος			
Μορφωμένος			

Τρίτο Μέρος:

Σε μια κλίμακα από το 1 μέχρι το 4 όπου 1 σημαίνει 'καθόλου αποδεκτό' και το 4 'πολύ αποδεκτό', πόσο αποδεκτό ή όχι θα ήταν για εσάς προσωπικά:

1. Να έχετε Τουρκοκύπριους γείτονες	1	2	3	4	ΔΑ
2. Να έχετε Τουρκοκύπριους συναδέλφους	1	2	3	4	ΔΑ
3. Να έχετε Τουρκοκύπριο προϊστάμενο	1	2	3	4	ΔΑ
4. Τα παιδιά/αδέλφια σας να παντρευτούν Τουρκοκύπριο	1	2	3	4	ΔΑ
5. Τα παιδιά/αδέλφια σας να φοιτούν σε κοινά σχολεία Ελληνοκύπριων και Τουρκοκύπριων	1	2	3	4	ΔΑ
6. Να δημιουργηθεί κοινό πανεπιστήμιο (στο οποίο θα χρησιμοποιείται η αγγλική γλώσσα)	1	2	3	4	ΔΑ

Τέταρτο Μέρος:

Δημογραφικά στοιχεία:

- i. Φύλο: Άνδρας Γυναίκα
- ii. Έτος γέννησης:
- iii. Εθνικότητα:
- iv. Επίπεδο εκπαίδευσης:
 - Πρωτοβάθμια
 - Δευτεροβάθμια
 - Ανώτερη (πτυχίο, δίπλωμα κτλ).
 - Μεταπτυχιακό
 - Άλλο

- v. Σε περίπτωση φοιτητή πανεπιστημίου παρακαλώ συμπληρώστε τμήμα και έτος
.....
- vi. Είσαι εσύ ή κάποιο μέλος της οικογένειάς σου πρόσφυγας; Αν ναι ποιος;
.....
- vii. Εδώ και πόσο καιρό ασχολείσαι με τα τούρκικα;
.....

Appendix D:

Important information about the questionnaire:

Good morning/afternoon. My name is Vasiliki Koukounidou and I am a graduate student at the department of “International Relations with a concentration on Greek - Turkish Relations” of Istanbul Bilgi University.

In the framework of writing my MA thesis I am conducting this questionnaire to students that are learning the Turkish language. The questionnaire’s completion will take only a few minutes but it will provide lots of useful information on the writing of my thesis. There is no right or wrong answer; we are **only** interested in your personal opinions. All information will be kept strictly **confidential** and you will remain completely **anonymous**.

Date:

First Part:

1. Why did you choose Turkish as course of choice?
 - I thought that it would be an easy course
 - I thought that I could take good grade
 - I like the Turkish language
 - I thought that it is a language which will be required in the future
 - I thought that it is good to know my state’s second official language
 - I thought that I should learn the language of my enemy
 - Other (please specify):
2. Did you have any previous contact with the Turkish language?
 - A great deal
 - Quite a lot
 - Somewhat
 - Not very much
 - Not at all
3. Have you ever met or discussed with a Turkish Cypriot?
 - Many times
 - Several times

- Sometimes
 - A few times
 - Rarely/Never
4. Have you ever met or discussed with a Turk?
- Many times
 - Several times
 - Sometimes
 - A few times
 - Rarely/Never
5. The opening of the barricades
- extremely bothers me
 - bothers me
 - is indifferent to me
 - does not bother me
 - does not bother me at all
6. Since 2003, Turkish Cypriots can move freely to the whole island
- It extremely bothers me
 - It bothers me
 - It is indifferent to me
 - It does not bother me
 - It does not bother me at all
7. You pass to the Northern part of the island?
- Very often
 - Quite often
 - Sometimes
 - Rarely
 - Never
8. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
- Are very similar
 - Are quite a lot similar
 - Are slightly similar
 - Not similar
 - Not similar at all
9. Greek Cypriots and Turks
- Are very similar
 - Are similar
 - Are slightly similar
 - Not similar
 - Not similar at all
10. For a Greek Cypriot to develop bonds/relations with Turkish Cypriots is
- Very easy
 - Easy

- Neither easy nor difficult
 - Difficult
 - Very difficult / Impossible
11. For a Greek Cypriot to develop bonds/relations with Turks is
- Very easy
 - Easy
 - Neither easy nor difficult
 - Difficult
 - Very difficult / Impossible
12. Would you participate to an event aiming in the acquaintance of Greek and Turkish Cypriots?
- Definitely yes
 - Probably yes
 - Probably no
 - Definitely no
 - No response
13. Would you be positive/negative or neutral to a Turkish Cypriot student's visit in the class, in order to have dialog practice or participation in other activities in the framework of the lesson?
- Very positive
 - Positive
 - Neutral
 - Negative
 - Very negative
14. Would you be positive/negative or neutral to a Turkish student's visit in the class, in order to have dialog practice or participation in other activities in the framework of the lesson?
- Very positive
 - Positive
 - Neutral
 - Negative
 - Very negative
15. Would you be positive/negative or neutral to a Greek Cypriot student's visit to a Greek language class to the North part of the island in order to have dialog practice or participation to other activities in the lesson's framework?
- Very positive
 - Positive
 - Neutral
 - Negative
 - Very negative

Second Part:

1. In the first column of the following table there are some characteristics. Which of these are applying to the biggest percentage of the three groups of people listed, in your opinion?

Mark in scale from 1 to 5: 1-it is absolutely applicable, 5=not applicable at all

Characteristics	Greek Cypriot	Turkish Cypriot	Turk
Polite / kind			
Egoist/selfish			
Aggressive			
Friendly			
Loyal/ Trustworthy			
Traitor			
Calm			
Barbarous			
Pacifist			
Bellicose/warlike			
Clever/Intelligent			
Sly/Crafty			
Self-seeker			
Lazy			
Hard-working			
Patient			
Quick-tempered			
Descendant of significant culture			
Anachronistic			
Modern/contemporary			
Illiterate			
Educated			

Third Part:

Mark to a scale from 1=not at all acceptable to 4=very acceptable, how acceptable or not would be for you personally:

1. To have Turkish Cypriot neighbors	1	2	3	4	N/A
2. To have Turkish Cypriot colleagues	1	2	3	4	N/A
3. To have a Turkish Cypriot manager	1	2	3	4	N/A
4. For your brother /sisters/children to marry to a Turkish Cypriot	1	2	3	4	N/A
5. For your brother/sisters/children to go to common schools with Turkish Cypriots	1	2	3	4	N/A
6. For a common university to be established (to which English language would be used as the medium of communication)	1	2	3	4	N/A

Fourth Part:

Demographics

- i. Sex
 - Male
 - Female
- ii. Year of Birth:
- iii. Nationality:
- iv. Level of Education:
 - Primary Education
 - Secondary Education
 - Secondary Education
 - Higher Education
 - Master's degree
 - Other:
- v. Department and year of studies:
- vi. Are you or some member of your family a refugee? If yes, who?
- vii. For how long have you been dealing with the Turkish language?

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