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Monopolization of Possibilities

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**Monopolization of Possibilities
Olanakların Tekelleştirilmesi**

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ABSTRACT

The study was conducted in order to approach the concept of “possibility” along with that of “power” in a domain where ontology and social philosophy intersect. How power, specifically capitalism, manages space, time, language, humans and non-human living beings conceptualized under the name of the “monopolization of possibilities” was examined. Methods of transcending the monopolization of possibilities were considered and both individual and social examples of those methods were scrutinized. Despite having originated from philosophy, this study, which is presented as a contribution to modern theory and daily practice, points to an interdisciplinary research.

ÖZET

Çalışma, ontoloji ve toplum felsefesinin kesiştiği bir alanda “olanak” kavramının “iktidar” kavramıyla beraber ele alınması için yürütülmüştür. İktidarın, özelde de kapitalizmin, mekânı, zamanı, dili, insanı ve insan dışı canlıları “olanakların tekelleştirilmesi” adıyla kavramsallaştırılan bir durum üstünden nasıl yönettiği incelenmiştir. Olanakların tekelleştirilmesini aşma yolları üzerine düşünülmüş ve sözü edilen yolların hem bireysel hem de toplumsal örnekleri irdelenmiştir. Çağdaş teoriye ve gündelik pratiğe bir katkı olarak da sunulan çalışma, felsefe kaynaklı olmasına rağmen disiplinlerarası bir araştırmaya işaret etmektedir.

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. Subject of the Study

This study is undertaken with the goal of evaluating the ontological, political and ethical level achieved by our civilization. However, the study does not examine every aspect of civilization while evaluating the mentioned ontological, political and ethical level but questions the relationship between the concept of power and the concept of “possibility” during the progress of our civilization. Despite the fact that power is traditionally defined in terms of force and verticality, the study shows that power can penetrate very different domains using many different methods and that this is possible most of all by the monopolization of a potentiality belonging to the subject which is called “the domain of possibilities”. The monopolization of possibilities draws attention not only to methods such as physical restriction, punishment and obstruction but also to internalized, familiarized and mostly invisible methods used by power. In this respect, the study implies the existence of invisible aspects of power alongside its visible aspects and the revelation of these hidden aspects in daily life.

The specific power discussed while conceptualizing power and explaining how it monopolizes possibilities is the power of capitalism. Even though understandings of power in different periods have been referred to, the focus is on the power of capitalism and its consequences. While examining the power of capitalism, not only the economical criterion but all social consequences are encapsulated in the study. The study has been divided into two sections to better examine the monopolization of possibilities by capitalist power.

In order to combine a theoretical angle with a practical framework, the first section of the study approaches the monopolization of possibilities under different subtitles: space, time, language, humans and non-human living beings. Functionalization and exploration of space have been focused under space. While examining time, the phenomena of debtfare and debt bondage have been taken under consideration accompanied by the concepts of loss of time, “free time” and “occupied time”. The bond language forms between the I-other distinction and discriminatory ideologies has been examined. Aside from all of these, the way humans are transformed through slavery, surplus value exploitation and alienation and how non-

human living beings are turned into property are especially laid bare. Rather than being independent, each heading has been integrated with power, capitalist power and the monopolization of possibilities.

In the second section of the study, first of all, the meaning and possibility of transcending the monopolization of possibilities have been associated with concepts of convergence and play. Secondly, social and individual examples of transcending the monopolization of possibilities have been examined. The Tiananmen Uprising and the Gezi Resistance have been relayed as social examples. Temporary Autonomous Zones including squats, the secrets parties of Iran, Food Not Bombs and the deep web are examined amongst individual examples.

The study concludes by considering the expansion of the investigated issues.

§ 2. Purpose of the Study

The study has two purposes.

The first purpose of the study is to show that a concept such as power that monopolizes possibilities should be studied holistically and defined in a flexible way. The holism mentioned above contains the understanding that power can live off of different domains and has a dispersible and formative meaning. In the name of remaining true to the purpose, power has been introduced not as an abstract concept that has simply been defined and moved on from, but as a mobile concept that has been manifested with different faces in different domains.

The second purpose of the study is to show that despite the capillarity of power and the fact that it can only be comprehended as a whole, there are many individual and social ways to transcend and overcome the monopolization of possibilities. In order to clarify the purpose instead of defining the transcendence of monopolization of possibilities in a single way, real life examples are examined since the existence of many ways to monopolize possibilities implies that there are various ways to transcend this monopolization.

Generally speaking the study intends to present an authentic approach by combining these two purposes.

PART ONE
MONOPOLIZATION OF POSSIBILITIES

§ 1. Concepts of Possibility, Domain of Possibilities and Monopolization of Possibilities

I. Concept of Possibility

The concept of possibility is crucial to the understanding of the domain of possibilities and monopolization of possibilities. It can be said that two issues must be addressed in order to explain the concept of possibility: the first being “What is possibility?” and the second being “Who has possibilities?”. These two questions concretize the analysis of the concept of possibility.

Encountering and interacting with things, that is to say the mobility of the subject in the world, is comprised only and only of “possibilities” which render its existence possible. Possibilities, thus, are the interactions that are immanent to the existence of the subject and necessary to realize the subject’s existence. The concept of “subjectivity” is a characteristic of existence comprised of possibilities. Subjectivity is a characteristic that can be constructed by a living being oriented to the future from the past with awareness of its consciousness and only a living being who has subjectivity can have possibilities.

But who is this subject who exists with his possibilities and who can construct subjectivity? We will approach the subject not as a fixed concept but as a zone of embodiment and argue that it includes all living beings who are conscious of living and who have the will to act. In fact, we will further aggravate this argument by conveying that we must reopen the subject -which had previously been thought of as being defined as a result of traditional scientific and philosophical arguments- to discussion and we will relay that, otherwise, if we do not open it to discussion; it will not be inaccurate to claim that we have created a closed, insulated and shunned constant. On top of it all, we accept that the definition we think we are forming now is not a definition but a proposal of a definition; and that the predicates we use to describe the subject may change, because the way the subject as a zone of embodiment includes differences (the distinction of each subject from the other) and questionable boundaries (babies, comatose beings, sleeping beings, children raised in nature

who are animalized, susceptible plants, machines...) and the fact that both the differences and the boundaries may change the definition proves that the subject is not something definable but something for which we can propose definitions. The subject transpired as the species of *homo sapiens sapiens*, although of course it also included some of the living beings residing in the sky, under the water and inside of the earth that biology differentiates from *homo sapiens sapiens*. The subject may be redefined once again in situations such the invention of powerful artificial intelligences or alien encounters, as it shall be; on the other hand it is not difficult to imagine a definition of the subject that is not conceptually close to the current definition being generated as a result of the development of the species of *homo sapiens sapiens* and living being outside of the *homo sapiens sapiens* species. In this respect, accepting the non-uniformity of the subject while defining a subject with possibilities means accepting the continuous changeability of the states of having and not having possibilities.

II. Concept of Domain of Possibilities

Every subject has a domain of possibilities. The domain of possibilities is a network affected by variables such as subjects, objects, societies, spaces, times, languages, emotions, ideologies, religions, laws of nature and state, nutrition habits and particles, and its openness to influence reveals a biological, anthropological and sociological historicity. Phenomena such as the traumas and illnesses that have permeated the colonized minorities in South Africa during the evolutionary process, the gestures of respect that have taken root in the culture of non-violent societies such as the Jains of India and have been relayed from generation to generation, the right to association guaranteed by countries where the laws exclude classically despotic administrations, such as those in Europe who have relatively liberal laws, are examples that are passed on to the subject from the environment it interacts with and that are sooner or later inherited by the subject: all things transferred by historicity that affect or have the potential to affect the subject after its birth form the domain of possibilities while regulating the forms of interaction between the subject, itself and its surroundings. It makes sense to say that the domain of possibilities is not a given mold but the authenticity of the subject; an authenticity that is determined in the precession of relationships, energies and by historicity and that is open to influencing and to being

influenced. As a matter of fact, the domain of possibilities is an alliance of choices and drifts that encapsulates the probabilities, intersections and predilections, which influence and is influenced by more variables than can be counted. Thus, the domain of possibilities is not an existence dominated by the I, situated in a cartesian solipsism that separates the I from the non-I, but a concept constructed by the subject while interacting with countless things. It is true that whereas the domain of possibilities does not point at the nature of the subject, it rather points at the lack of origin of the subject because of its constant changing since everything constantly affects everything at every moment and the domain of possibilities of the subject is not free from this phenomenon. Agamben says:

“Of the two modes in which, according to Aristotle, every potentiality is articulated, the decisive one is that which the philosopher calls ‘the potentiality to not-be’ (dynamis me einai) or also impotence (adynamia). . . able to not-be; it is capable of its own impotence” (The Coming Community 35).

He points at Glenn Gould, the Toronto born pianist, as an example: for the pianist has *“the potential to play and the potential to not-play”*. Agamben says that *“[Gould] plays, so to speak, with his potential to not-play” (The Coming Community 36)*. In this case, the domain of possibilities of the pianist includes both the possibilities of playing and not playing the piano, and this leads us to another concept: freedom. When the finesse discovered by Agamben is intersected with the concept of freedom, it is made clear that freedom is comprised of the contrary coexistence of doing and not doing, and that freedom cannot exist without this coexistence. For freedom, doing and not doing must be present as choices: we encounter freedom as a possibility in which both choices can be realized. In other words, we must have the possibility to do or not do something in order to label the situation at hand as freedom and the action resulting of our choice as free. Even though freedom as a concept has been exposed to endeavors of abstraction many times in history, at the end of the day it is revealed in embodiment, in permeation, in practice. There can only be freedom when there are the choices of both picking up and not picking up the dropped spoon, both riding and not riding a bike from Tehran to Kuala Lumpur, both painting and not painting a boat with colors. So, as soon as the judgment “I have the freedom to do it” is made, one must follow with the often unnoticed judgment “I have the freedom to not do it”. This dialectic law of utmost simplicity also implies the backbone of freedom: if we have only the “choice” to do

something but not the choice to not do it, what we have is actually not the “choice” to do something but the obligation to do it.

Seeing as freedom can exist in the domain of possibilities, must it be defined as existent or non-existent, or is it a scalable phenomenon? For example, if visual acuity that is a precondition for piloting is non-existent in a subject (in other words, if visual acuity required by aviation is not in the domain of possibilities for the subject) we can easily say that the subject does not have the freedom to choose or not to choose to be a pilot, and thus does not have the freedom to be or not be a pilot because the subject is obligated to not be a pilot. But, does having the visual acuity necessary for piloting make one equally free as another with same visual acuity in the matter of choosing or not choosing to be a pilot? When we approach freedom holistically, there are many elements that diminish or fortify the degrees of freedom involved in the possibility of one’s choosing or not choosing to be a pilot: two subjects with the same visual acuity cannot be equally free in terms of the variables such as the pay provided by the job of piloting, the presence of a family member who opposes piloting and the presence of fear of heights; because the things that liberate or oppress them can never be the same. As another example, we may consider an election under the domination of a terrorist organization held under the threat of guns in which ballot boxes are dominated by a terrorist organization that gains its power from violence, drugs and rape. The gun wielding private poised over the voters also influences the degree of freedom of the voter in the moment of voting to a certain degree. Even if the weapon, which kindles fear through its image and is the hallmark of institutional infiltration of tyrannical power, does not eliminate the freedom to vote or not (or the freedom to vote or not to vote for a specific party), it diminishes it. This means that during an election held under the shadow of a terrorist organization, the constituent has the freedom to vote or not to vote for the part of said organization because both situations are in the domain of possibilities; however the degree of this freedom is quite low. Here, we can separate ontological freedom from material freedom: we can say that while ontological freedom is the capacity to choose a possibility in the domain of possibilities that derives from existence, material freedom is the permission allowed to the subject by the conditions in regards to using this capacity during the process before its use. In this case, the world may present various obstacles for the subject who is free to do or not do the things in the domain of possibilities and thus lessen the degree of freedom

in a material way. Similarly, Heidegger introduces Dasein as an “opening”: the human as the Being-in-the-world is embedded in the domain of possibilities and even if the subject is, as Heidegger says, thrown into the world, it can define itself as a liberated being thanks to the changeability of the boundaries of the domain of possibilities. Human subjects are open, they find their actions and directions fluctuating at the point of the present time just like the way they affect, refine and transform everything they penetrate while building bridges from the past to the future. Our addition to Heidegger’s openness lies in the momentary changeability of possibilities: Heidegger’s contextual embeddedness in the world is accepted and it is argued that it constantly changes from one moment to the other. In a way, while the openness of the subject always remains, what it is open to, how it is open and how open it is, perpetually change. The relationship between the subject and humans, animals, plants, objects and other things is like a perpetual whirlpool whose content, waves and severity change perpetually: the situations that effect and condition the subject are not the same from one moment to the next. In this respect, the domain of possibilities and freedom are realized as a never ending reproduction, a disengagement and an articulation, a system of changes, a sequence of uncertainties and a climate where everything comes to be and vanishes as if at once, where the subject takes over the process of becoming a subject. The domain of possibilities and freedom at a specific moment cannot have the same structure as the specific domain of possibilities and freedom at the preceding or following moment: thus, the subject finds his openness in the will to create an order inside of disorder.

III. Concept of Monopolization of Possibilities

If the transformation of the domain of possibilities is a permanent quality for the subject, it is necessary to gravitate towards the concept of “power” when the questions are posed about whether a system that changes, directs and evolves possibilities can be discussed or whether there are some dominant variables in the domain of possibilities which develop autonomously or as a result of various coincidences. Since power can also be realized as a transmission of words, images, perceptions, beliefs, rules and objects not only in a violent vertical fashion but also horizontally, from subject to subject or from things to humans without violence or through an unrecognized violence, the embodiment of power in the

domain of possibilities can also come about in rather secretive ways. Since power fundamentally inflicts an ontological violence on the subject in order to shape it, it attempts to close, formalize and influence the “Heideggerian” openness of the subject. The inflicted ontological violence is embodied not by the criterion of whether there is or is not physical pain but by the application of methods, strategies and designs that could *monopolize* the domain of possibilities. Power sides with *objectifying ontology* rather than *subjectifying ontology* where the subject can construct itself independently of power; in truth, what makes power power is the fact that it has been able to establish objectifying ontology and that it can only be deployed through objectifying ontology. The situation which can be revealed as an application of objectifying ontology and with the name of the *monopolization of possibilities* points to the tension between freedom and power: the tension is the product of a sum of contradictions that are the result of the will of someone to use their domain of possibilities as much as they wish while someone else, or a system, bans some possibilities in the domain of possibilities or attempts to sweepingly reconstitute it. The ontology created by the tension is an objectifying ontology, in other words, the subject or the system treats the subjects it encounters as if they are objects and tries to construct the subject by attempting to transform, in every way, the domain of possibilities it owns. Since, in a way, the value of the subject and the immunity afforded to the subject’s will vanishes because the system is socialized by its administrators, exploiters and brokers, the relationship between the system and the subject turns into a relationship between objectifier and objectified. All the same, the parties in the relationship between objectifier and objectified are not only the system and the subject. Since the capillaries of the system are also comprised of subjects, when we lift the mask we are face to face with a group of subjects that are constantly objectified and that objectify constantly, that are objectified in turn while they had previously been the objectifier.

Objectifying ontology aims to waste the freedoms which the subject can experience thoroughly in the domain of possibilities and contains the effort to turn the subject into a product of social engineering; it has a structure that focuses on function and result. Power will inevitably lay claim to objectifying ontology whether it moves with good or with evil. Subjectifying ontology, to the contrary, avoids objectifying the subject by recognizing his quality of being a subject and facilitates, and if necessary introduces the subject to the use of the domain of possibilities that is presented to the subject as an advantage of being a subject;

it does not use its influence with the motivation of becoming dominant or supervising the flow. Subjectifying ontology, in which the domain of possibilities and freedom emerge, is contextual like objectifying ontology. One who is experiencing or sustaining subjectifying ontology can suddenly become one who is experiencing or sustaining objectifying ontology and, of course, the reverse is true as well. For example a father who allows his child to do somersaults in an airport allowing him to experience his subjectness and temporarily lifting some of the unnamed limitations brought about by the airport (low intensity movement, tidiness of behaviors, attempting a silence labeled as being respectful) may be being objectified by the security guards or cameras because he has a long beard because of his religious beliefs; similarly, the child, who is subject to subjectifying ontology, may be trying to take his brother's fruit by force and treating his brother's existence as an object. Therefore, in our daily lives we exist in temporary modes of existence in which we shuttle between the implementer-implemented of subjectifying ontology and implementer-implemented of objectifying ontology; objectifying ontology and subjectifying ontology reveal themselves as simultaneous or sequential series.

When Foucault says that power

“operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions” (341)

actually implies the complex relationship between power and the domain of possibilities. While studying the monopolization of possibilities by any power, and specifically that of capitalism, which is within the actual scope of this study, we may not be able to array the effects it has on subjects one by one; but we can easily notice the directions in which the methods of interference of power have dispositions in social terms or how they monopolize possibilities by using Foucault's statement as a foundation. Focusing on how an octopus system such as capitalism monopolizes possibilities introduces us to a base motivation, or in other words an underlying desire: that is the surplus value, the profit, attained as a result of calculation, supervision and seizure by infiltration of the domestic and global spread. A base

motivation such as profit speaks of the monopolization of possibilities done around the axis of profit and of how things other than profit are ignored or crushed by the system: the domain of possibilities, in a way, is being domesticated and losing the flightiness it had before capitalism. The fact that capitalist power is the power of profit reveals the objectifying ontology of monopolization of possibilities and necessitates examination on a level of space, time, language, humans and non-human living beings.

§ 2. Monopolization of Space, Time, Language, Humans, Non-Human Living Beings and Possibilities

I. Space and the Monopolization of Possibilities

A- Concepts of Space, Interspatiality and Spaces

1. Concept of Space

It can be said that space is a zone of embodiment which affects the subject and is transformed by the subject during the subject's life, and in which the subject is dispersed once its life is over. The concept of space which has been examined beginning with early approaches such as the *ākāśa* in the *Vedas*, Euclidian geometry, pre-Descartian topology and continuing with those such as Farabi, Newton, Leibniz, Mack, Poincaré and Einstein who have discussed the absoluteness and relativity of space and the publicly announced experiment of the European Organization for Nuclear Research, is still trying to be comprehended. Furthermore, along with Georges Lemaître, scientists have suggested that the universe, which can be considered to be the superset of everything, is expanding. Even though we have made substantial discoveries from mathematics to physics, from chemistry to biology, from archeology to anthropology, from geography to history, it is true that we have not yet achieved the capability to analyze space, one of the basic ontological concepts, from head to toe. It can be expressed that no matter what, one must exist in space; that is to say that one is condemned to space because be it on land, in oceans or on planets, we are after all in a space. It is also known that the shape, permeability, laws, particles drawn to and

dissipated from, name, objects, subjects, general content, and conditions of space have an effect on the use of possibilities. Space affects the domain of possibilities first of all with the concept of boundaries: because while space, as the width and narrowness of the domain of possibilities, presents persons the things within its boundaries, it also deprives them of the things that are outside of these boundaries, that is to say the things that may be presented by another space. Thus space directly affects the domain of possibilities and how possibilities will be used.

2. Relationship of the Concept of Space to Interspatiality and Spaces

Being obliged to space and the identification of our domain of possibilities by space to a specific extent requires the displacement of the previous possibilities by the next space. Interspatiality is the difference that is manifested in the space while passing from one moment to the other or the emergence of a new space as a result of this difference. The arbitrariness of language can be an example of this (the situations of balcony door being open and somebody closing the door implies two different spaces), or the isolation of one space from the other by the determination of boundaries because of necessities (separating Havana and outside of Havana to be able to define Havana) is also possible. Discursively and from the viewpoint of power, we can distinguish space as spaces we are in (kitchen, street, city) and spaces we are not in (pool, airport, Jupiter). The domain of possibilities granted by/withheld by each space in which we are or are not foresees the need for our interactions, our freedom and boundaries to interact at different points and be tangents to different points. We doubtlessly feel the influence of the space we are in on our domain of possibilities in a profound way. (If we are in a space structured to complete a ceremony of mourning, say a cemetery, we may not be able to find a toilet.) In the same way, as a result of the contracting and loosening of the space with social values we reorganize our relationship with the context provided by it. (We try to stop coughing as soon as possible during a serious business meeting and may have to leave the office if we cannot.) Even if we feel that the space we are in affects our domain of possibilities in a more radical way compared to other spaces, sometimes spaces we are not in are just as influential on our domain of possibilities as the spaces we are in. Our need for the rays of the sun, a space which we are not in, means that we

cannot live without the sun, and so we need to be able to constantly obtain sunrays; or the noise coming from a space we are not in very well might draw our attention to what is happening there.

Although we are conveying how we form an experience of interspatiality by dividing space into spaces, when we look at it ontologically, there are no spaces, there is only one space and therefore it becomes clear as a concept which contains everything, where everything interacts with each other, and which transforms our domain of possibilities not with its plurality but with its singularity. Because the other states of matter, dimensions, relationships and the other states of reality create indistinct integral saturnalia, the contradiction of the spaces we inhabit and those we do not, assumed by interspatiality, dissipate inside each other to leave behind a network of singularity; space does not accept contradictions, separations or blanks. However, when we divide space into spaces, it means that we have ignored the totality of the reality of space: spaces are constructed sociologically by isolation from space on the condition of descent upon language. In other words, there are no space“s” in nature, there is the space, because the space becomes the space“s” of language and power by being atomized by the decisions, desires, principles and labels of the subject and society. At first, spaces exist in language: the monopolization of possibilities is realized not through space but through space“s”, because even if the laws of nature condition the domain of possibilities of the subject within the space, there is still no power that can be verified by the sociological definition. However a sociologically identifiable power has, after all, been articulated to the laws of nature in the space“s”, the subject and its power creates, lays claim to, inserts the identity and sets the rules of space“s”; this comes about with the functionalization and discovery of the space.

B- Relationship of the Functionalization and Exploration of Space to the Monopolization of Possibilities

1. Relationship of the Functionalization of Space to the Monopolization of Possibilities

Functionalization of space indicates the monopolization of possibilities. The functionalization of space can be discussed in two contexts.

The first context is our separation of the space which we inhabit as a living being, a species, a someone and in which we form relationships into multiple spaces. The emphasis here is on the fact that humans, as a member of the *homo sapiens* species, are advanced enough to prevail over the space which has spontaneously been formed by nature and the forces originating from it, as well as the other living beings inhabiting the space alongside them. Humans functionalize the existing space for themselves, according to themselves and as they see fit for themselves. However, the functionalization of existing space implicates the distinction between the one who functionalizes and the functionalized. The transformation of mountainsides and wetlands into town halls with gardens, hotels with fountains, nuclear war shelters and ski tracks reminds us of the power of the human, or in other words, its ontological domination of the domain of possibilities. It can be said that humans have advanced to the role of game makers in regards to molding space into one form from another. Then, the human can influence the seizure of space by both their own species and other living beings: he can dominate their domain of possibilities. However, what is important here is whom can functionalize space. This brings us to the second context of the functionalization of space.

The second context of the existing functionalization of space is the politicization of space by humans that accompanies it: the space which is functionalized by someone, a community, a minority, a majority or a system leads to political results regardless of the intent of functionalization. In any case, the potential of a power to change the space it formed according to its desires, and thus the possibilities of the subjects that interact with the space is expressed. The transformation of space into space“s” and hence its functionalization corresponds to the radical alteration of the domain of possibilities provided to the subject by the space: after all, even a space that is structured in the most lenient fashion affects the subject that interacts with it in some way. The division of space into spaces in the agricultural society with private property has influenced thousands of years and led to the housing problem of capitalism: while a large-scale interaction with space becomes ordinary for privileged persons, classes and governments it also becomes a luxury for a fraction that struggles with hunger, thirst and low and unfair life standards. It will be revealed that private property -when the Marxist conceptualization of the word, that is to say the domination of the bourgeoisie over the means of production, is set aside and the regular meaning is kept-

monopolizes the possibilities of millions of homeless people or people who live in housing that is not fit for “human dignity”: in a life where all people are nomads and temporary between birth and death, where all causes and effects are epistemologically blurry, transforming space into spaces and bequeathing the spaces on the basis of blood ties, a notion from periods of tribe morality, reveals that private property is one of the largest tools of power. So, private property is one of the most important examples of the monopolization of the possibilities of humans. When examined profoundly, private property is the non-ability of a person to claim spaces outside of their private property and their existence as a being whose possibilities of interacting with other spaces has been monopolized within the previous dividedness of the world because of reasons such as war, inheritance and greed. The person is as much as their private property. The neighbor’s bedroom, the friend’s field, the enemy’s pool, the government’s airport does not belong to them. Moreover, it is not just a question of areas such as housing or soil, they require a passport to leave the country to which they are tethered by a bond of citizenship and which claims to function under the assumption of public property. Politicians who line up to prevent the influx of immigrants caused by extraordinary causes, social hardships, dreams and desires are the living breathing examples of how tyrannical a power can be created by the division of space into spaces. The ownership of private property and stakeholderhood in public property, which causes arbitrary distinction on the basis of countries, thusly, as a result of the complex and seemingly non-existent relationships of space both monopolize the possibilities of the Other by closing, locking, stealing the space and work for the benefit of a handful of minorities. Water, as a space, is now for sub-sea tunnels that energy flows through; the skies, in which the winds and pressures wander are, again as a space, for aircrafts. The comprehension of the untouched spaces of nature as architectural events where the human represents its own style shows the presence of power in the relationship between human and space. The transformation of an island into a tourist paradise with hotels, beaches with piers and bars is a product of ever-complicated geography operation techniques and constantly changing architectural traditions. Going a step further, the political side of the functionalization of space can be explained by the development between space and architecture. As a result of the feeling of political dominance, humans may very well change a space they had previously established, for example a stadium, in order to position a figurativeness or to destruct another figurativeness:

changing the aesthetic arrangements or the specific rules of a stadium after a revolution corresponds to the change of the paradigm. Moreover, the corrosion or the complete transfiguration of the burdens applied to the space by the losing party reveal the fact that the winning party explicates, announces and affirms its dominance through space. The weakness of the culture of forming local units based on direct democracy and compromise in decision-making mechanisms of countries with no political disturbances and with the most developed representative democracies is actually proof that the subject may have minimal interference over spaces: when we think of those who hold the power of the government instrument, spaces such as squares, parks and town halls, while being assumed to be essentially public, are actually governmental. Public can only exist in a reality where spaces belong to nobody and thus to everybody; the publicity put forward by the government points to governmentality formed in the framework of laws, directives and supervisions: governmentality is hidden in the discourse of publicity. Since it is not possible to interfere with spaces reported as being public by the government in any way other than sanctioned by the government, spaces are decorated by the language of a power that hides power. Thus, space is subjected to politics in the measure that it is functionalized through spaces. The functionalization of space working in coordination with politics is the monopolization of possibilities.

2. Relationship of the Exploration of Space to the Monopolization of Possibilities

Even though the functionalization of space through its transformation and change conveys that it has become a new space, new spaces also carry the implication that, thanks to technology, new structures in forms never before witnessed have been developed in places never before captured on the globe. Alongside the tendency to spatialize the untouched areas of the world, there is a sort of expansionist boldness. Humans previously commenced the process of creating new spaces in the areas under their power upon which they cannot have an impact but they have de facto dominance even if they can't have de jure dominance: as can be seen in the administrations in the Middle Ages, in the occupation of India by imperialist England, in countries where internal conflicts are experienced and in terror organizations such as Islamic State; generally the borders of the territories are occupied in

geographies under occupation and due to technical deficiencies, new spaces inside occupied borders are not sufficiently created or not created at all. Hence, the territory whose borders are identified cannot be fully utilized and even the area inside the borders is not completely recognized. However the issues related to the cited problems tend to decrease in the 20th century because supervisory competence of the government is strengthened as a parallel to communication, transportation and mapping technologies. Then, while power encircles space and transforms it into spaces while dissipating it in the existence of power it closes space; the space without limitations which is full of uncertainties leaves its place to the expertise of cartography as a science, to determined spaces with drawn limits. Cartography, in this respect, is one of the techniques of governing space. It is known that we are close to transitioning to the use of “living maps”, examples of which we are already witness to, instead of maps that offer a stable representation of geography; plans of referring to maps which can capture the momentary movement of someone entering a store, the actions of a beaver, a leaf stirring, a balloon popping, in short of everything. In this respect the freedom of humans is made more open to monopolization with their apprehension of being watched. The relationship formed between humans who try to cover the world with spaces and knowledge, the government of these humans and space is also, similarly, born of a similar concern for dominance; trying to close the map of the universe by deriving new spaces that weave the power of humans into an endless space such as outer space, in essence, harbors little more than ensuring the situatedness of power as a concept.

The relationship formed between power and space is symmetrical: while power chases new spaces to create, space is considered as having surrendered to power from the moment it was constructed, because it has now transformed into an area that reflects the power that dominates it. It had previously been emphasized that the power erected by humans through the creation of new spaces is of equivalent value to ontological dominance; now we will take a step further and it will be argued that power no longer leaves space and that the concept we call space is losing its quality of being “adrift”. Space cannot/will not be left adrift; because, if it were, it would mean the loss of its functionality, the dissolving of ideological burdens and its reduction to nothingness in the perspective of power. As a result, let alone leaving the space, the establishment and reestablishment of space, the organization of the meanings and values ascribed to space -no matter who or what system the power is- is

witnessed intensely. The unability to leave spaces implies the monopolization of possibilities because of reasons such as power bringing its own ideology into the space and directing the possibilities of subjects.

C- Two Philosophers Pointing to the Relationship of Space and the Monopolization of Possibilities: Heidegger and Agamben

1. Space and its Relation to the Monopolization of Possibilities in Heidegger

Heidegger, who has reflected his thoughts relating to space onto his philosophy, points to the bond between space and the monopolization of possibilities. To do this, Heidegger examines the Rhine River and criticizes technology. According to Heidegger, technology establishes power over space and power deeply affects the living spaces of subjects.

Heidegger wishes to wrest the Rhine River, which is born of the Swiss Alps and traverses Liechtenstein, France, Germany and Holland, away from the modern technology that he feels endangers it. Even though Heidegger does not touch upon the relationship between technology and capitalist power, he considers the way technology, which has become more and more developed as a yield of capitalism, makes us crave the traditional relationships formed between the subject and matter to be dangerous. Modern technology is parasitic and hostile according to Heidegger:

“The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging forth. That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end. Neither does it run into the indeterminate. The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through regulating their course” (The Question Concerning Technology 16).

The phenomenon referred to as “setting-upon” by Heidegger means somehow discovering the Being through thought, refinement and experience. Setting-upon is, in a way, the revelation, the dissemination and the development of the reality of the Being (*alethia*); in other words, it is the subject interacting with and experiencing the reality of something in the most intense and varied way. That is to say, it is the discovery of life itself by the subject. For Heidegger, modern technology is a sort of setting-upon, because it is, after all, the discovery of matter. However, the negative aspect of technology is the way it challenges and attacks things, because it exploits matter and nature. On the other hand, modern technology transforms nature and matter according to its own will and this transformation is systematized. In other words, how, through which operations and in how much time nature and matter will be transformed has been determined long ago. Since the mentioned process, in turn, determines who will use the space for how long, it is a detriment to the relationship of the subject and the space because the space no longer belongs to the subject but to the power that uses it through modern technology. This means the monopolization of the possibilities of the subject in the space: *“This regulating itself is, for its part, everywhere secured.”* (*The Question Concerning Technology* 16). Space is designed by the individuals, communities, institutions, bureaucratic organs, governments, states and international organizations in order to create specific use, and the said manner of use is anchored by officers, directives, supervisions and punishments: *“Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of the challenging revealing”* (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology* 16). A space like a river functions as an area for energy, tourism and hunting; the astonishing aspects of its clarity and murmur on an artistic level is reduced to the command of an economic structure. As previously stated, Heidegger expresses this as a challenging bringing-forth and, on top of that, points to the existence of a power that supervises the space:

“What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station. In order that we may even remotely consider the monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast that speaks out of the two titles, 'The Rhine' as dammed up into the power works, and 'The Rhine' as uttered out of the art work, in Holderlin's hymn by that name. But, it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how? In no

other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry” (The Question Concerning Technology 16).

If any power had not been monopolizing the possibilities of the subject by regulating the river according to its own wishes and rules, there would have been a great number of transactional relationships we could form with the river: we could drink from it, swim in it, bathe in it, go rafting and realize the many opportunities we could find. However, when a power, for instance an administration recruited from capitalism takes over the river and the river turns into a domain of function with which people are not able to form a relationship anymore because they cannot claim it and they cannot create a direct relationship that is free of power with the river. Power, especially capitalist power, directs the subject to realize only the possibilities that may benefit profit and monopolizes the domain of possibilities of the subject. In some cases, a power may embellish a space with some possibilities that were not previously present in that space. For example, the river may be turned into a convenient space where boat tours for bird watching can be organized without harming the river and thus the influence of capitalism over the space may not be thought of as being negative. However, the actual problem is not whether or not the power arrives at a space like the river with new possibilities, but the power removing the possibilities the space can present to the subject; a form of domination cannot justify the possibilities it steals for only its own development without protecting the rights of the subjects relating to the space by giving that space new possibilities. After all, a power that appropriates spaces to its existence eventually usurps the right to life of the subjects as well, the ecological crises and unsustainable practices that have become more and more violent in past centuries have caused problems such as unhealthy life, unplanned urbanization, gentrification and city zones becoming charged as well as undermining the principle of publicity while suspending the democratic rights of the subject who live in and interact with those spaces: possibilities are monopolized or removed by the power who sees the space as an extension of its own existence.

Can the domination formed over space which is granted discursivity by Heidegger under the name of setting-upon exist outside of challenging the space? According to Heidegger it can, as “bringing-forth”. From Heidegger’s perspective the relationship between a craftsman and his raw material is direct; he refines the Being independently from power, and his creativity and independence are the cornerstones of the activity of bringing-forth:

“Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis. Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis. Physis is indeed poiēsis in the highest sense. For what presences by means of physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (en heautōi). In contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g., the silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing forth not in itself, but in another (en allōi), in the craftsman or artist” (The Question Concerning Technology 10).

The highlighted example of Heidegger is the craftsman of Ancient Greece who refines materials and creates meanings of it; the craftsman transforms the objects he directs with his movements with his unique interventions and has woven an emotional and spiritual bond in his repertoire with the work he has created. Bringing-forth frees materials as with *tékhnē* because the subject is forming a transparent and flexible relationship with things, and can understand the Being. Hence, let us return to poetry, where independence is a prerequisite for realization: “poiēsis”, the root of poetry, meaning “to do”, “to perform” is not a coincidence, doing-performing must be independent so that the domain of possibilities may be equipped with creative action. We may think of the example of someone making an abandoned cave into a shelter to take refuge in: the sharp edges of the walls are smoothed, the cave is turned into a geometric shape with the wood that is cut and gathered brush is placed in empty spaces to keep out the heat. During the process of turning the cave into a shelter the person touches material, the aim is clear and he constantly struggles to achieve what he wants; but more than all, he can suddenly change his desires by blending them with his creativity and thus the cave can be transformed from a shelter into something completely different, for instance a food depository. In this example the acts that come to pass between the subject and the space develop freely of the direction of power and cannot be institutionalized. A space not being taken over by power means that there may be a potential bringing-forth bond between us and the space; space, as a product of a universal partnership that we are a part of, with its characteristic of being an area we can form a direct democratic relationship, becomes an area we can bring-forth, not an area that is challenged. However, as it has been implied previously, the relationship formed between power and space in a challenge is far from being open

because power does not refine space without the urge for profit, and if it does it is either a breakthrough aimed at the continuity of the system such as the creation of rest areas for workers with the intent of ensuring higher performance or the absence of courage to touch some rights earned through petitions, voices of civil society, elections, principles of architecture and authority of architects, protests, tendencies to Reclaim The Streets, citizen battles that believe in urban rights and ideological inspirations. There are spaces that power has not yet transformed in order to challenge; when Hasan Ali Toptaş said:

*“From time to time, I think of this: people will run to the country in crowds to be able to breathe a little, to be able to remember the thing called tranquility and to be able to get even a small taste of slowness. But, they will not be able to find it there.”*¹
(Uluşahin 18)

In an interview maybe Toptaş was inwardly indicating that spaces that have not yet been transformed sooner or later will be. In this respect, the country being transformed into the city or the transformation of spaces into profitable hotels, malls, cinemas and cultural centers in the wake of urban renewal is not bringing-forth; it is a challenge to the possibilities space can offer us; it is not the rights-based organization of possibilities but their monopolization through the conservatism of profit. Like the subject, capitalism is also condemned to space and one of its priorities is to transform space in ways it has never been transformed in any stage of civilization; space is being organized as a revenue earner with its minerals, sounds, geography, trees, animals and persons.

2. Space and its Relation to the Monopolization of Possibilities in Agamben

As in Heidegger, the phenomenon of space being controlled by power is examined in Agamben’s work. Agamben explains the bond between space and the monopolization of possibilities through the practice of museumization.

In *Profanations*, Agamben says that:

“. . . the museum can coincide with an entire city (such as Evora and Venice, which were declared World Heritage Site), a region (when it is declared a park or nature reserve) , and even a group of individuals (insofar as they represent a form of life that

¹ Translation is mine. - F.A.

has disappeared). But more generally, everything today can become a Museum, because this term simply designates the exhibition of an impossibility of using, of dwelling, of experiencing” (84).

The situation called “impossibility of experiencing” by Agamben is essentially the monopolization of possibilities: the collectivism constructed by the system starts to influence individualism as possibilities are monopolized. In its primary meaning, museum may express the transformation of a certain space by a certain power, the transformation into property of the association formed with the participation of objects and persons and the temporary stabilization of various information, discourse and values; at the same time the museum as a space is summarized as an area shaped according to the tendencies of its administrators who are in positions of power and institutions, where knowledge and activities are generally transferred from the center to the particular, that carries ethical and sociological properties and that has been invented in the past few centuries. Power controlling the museum is that which decides what and what not to include, which materials and discourses will be used to present the contents, what kind of ideology will be carried, how far the boundaries of participants will be drawn. Then, the museumized space is dominated by power which really does direct and supervise how we perceive, feel and experience it in a dominant way. In other words, the values, rules, directives, principles of far and near, transactional molds that are brought about during the museumization of space are the monopolization of possibilities of the subject through space: after all, *“The impossibility of using has its emblematic place in the Museum”* (Agamben, *Profanations* 83) because while trying to give the impression that it transforms space into an immaculate place where knowledge is neutralized, the museum, on one hand, being the epistemological arena of power presents information of the power that has won the struggle, and on the other hand formalizes the mobile bond between space and subject.

When we begin to think of museums as simple metaphors we may call any space bound by capitalism in the world a museum of capitalism. As Agamben indicates almost anything can be a museum and ever since space itself has been taken under supervision by power the practice of museumization has actually been refined. Similarly, it can be said that our body as a space has also been museumized. Because of the intervention of capitalism to our body, which can be considered to be a space, and the monopolization of our domain of

possibilities, perhaps we can be named museums of capitalism as well. By laying claim to our homes as private property, going to school and receiving education, becoming indebted to hospitals and not breaking the rules of public squares, we may become subjects of the process of museumizing and museumization by making our bodies instruments of the other spaces of capitalism. So, power, which has begun by playing with a concept such as space that is visceral to geography, to design, to the object and to the subject gravitates toward dominating subjects that are ontologically sentenced to space. This attempt of domination makes every space where domination is formed into a museum and our bodies as spaces are museumized under the domination of power.

II. Time and the Monopolization of Possibilities

A- Concept of Time

While time has been defined differently by different philosophers it can be comprehended as a tool to measure differences. Time is also used to arrange individual and social activities, a concept which has been measured since the beginning of the history of civilization and which is very important in human lives. However, the relationship formed between society and time changes. While this relationship changes, time is also used for the monopolization of possibilities.

B- Relationship of Debtfare to Time and Monopolization of Possibilities According to Hardt and Negri

Jonathan Martineau underlines the medicalization of birth in the industrial society, in other words the treatment of the singular miracle of emerging from the fetus as a statistical event, as the announcement of the commodification of bodies and activities in the process of creation of labor (152). Thus, the medicalization of birth and approaching life through statistics-time is important because it reveals the relationship to the monopolization of possibilities. One of the tools that constructs life temporally and statistically is the calendar. Lately, calendars, in their own right, have become an economic indicator. After all, the

dominant function of contemporary calendars is to separate workdays and holidays to construct the previously specified finite time through a duality. Especially those who live with the working conditions of the city feel the pressure of time more profoundly, the urbanization of the rural and the metropolitanization of cities means not being able to have the serenity, arbitrariness and idleness of the old days. In city documentaries, the city flows by like a dream –whose beginning is unknown and who convinces the viewer it will not be interrupted- in bird’s-eye scenes of sped up pedestrian and vehicular traffic where we watch day leaves its place to night; even though that state of existence gives the impression of finite time flowing into infiniteness the city has begun to be constructed around working activities. Now that the ends-means relationship we form in terms of finite time has become more distinguished with capitalism in comparison to before capitalism and calendars are referred to more because of certain economic concerns, structuring time around work is considered normal. Debtfare is one of the most apparent of the systems that complete the connections between time, calendar and work and monopolize the possibilities of the subject through time.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri emphasize that neo-liberalism creates new “*subjective figures*” (6) in their *Declaration* published in 2010 during the Occupy Movement in Wall Street involving speculators, in Tunisia where Muhammed Bouazizi’s body was burned, in Egypt where Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in Tahrir Square, during Indignados which arose in Madrid and Barcelona, during Syntagma Square occupation in Athens and other rebellions, conflicts and movements in Asia, Africa, Europe and America continents. Subjective figures can be defined as people types that neoliberalism tries to create. One of the personalities that Hardt and Negri call a subjective figure is the “*indebted*” (6) who may be helpful to understand that possibilities are monopolized in the context of time: the indebted upsurge as a significant example for understanding which way neoliberalism bends vital activities, productive forces and, perhaps as a keyword, the desires of the subject and how possibilities are monopolized through time.

Hardt and Negri claim that we have transitioned “*from a system of welfare to one of debtfare, as loans become the primary means to meet social needs*” (6). In the context of capitalist exchange, debts that are borrowed from financial institutions for reasons such as health, education and housing on the condition that interest will be paid can be thought of as

the debtor binding the possibilities that may be refined by the indebted in the future to itself in an effort to guarantee benefits. The thing that debtfare intends to attach to and consume is not essentially money, but time implied by money and the domain of possibilities implied by time. Hardt and Negri say:

“Capital increasingly exploits the entire range of our productive capacities, our bodies and our minds, our capacities for communication, our intelligence and creativity, our affective relations with each other, and more. Life itself has been put to work” (7)

and continue:

“In order to survive the indebted must sell his or her entire time of life. Those subject to debt in this way thus appear, even to themselves, primarily as consumers not producers. Yes, of course they produce, but they work to pay their debts, for which they are responsible because they consume” (8).

Debtfare, for this reason, begins with the subjects producing in order to consume or to pay off the debts of what they have consumed and continues to grow stronger with subjects putting aside free time and things they enjoy. In this respect debtfare reveals the monopolization of possibilities of subjects by capitalism through the rational design of time. The phenomenon of rent, mentioned by Hardt and Negri when they say *“The capitalist accumulates wealth primarily through rent, not profit—this rent most often takes a financial form and is guaranteed through financial instruments”* (8) points to a transition to a system of rent which may spread throughout the entire lives of subjects through financial tools, notably loans. For example, students who become indebted to universities today will spend the next half year, one year, two years, five years, ten years under the bondage of capitalism, which has mortgaged this time by way of debt, on tenterhooks against the situation of having to spend and afraid of not being secure during the process of finding/keeping jobs. Debtfare limits or removes from the domain possibilities the foods that may be consumed by students, the trips they can take, the movies they can see, the activities they can participate in. When students begin working or encounter “economy” they become indebted and constantly rent out the time that makes their lives valuable, and because of this very reason they trade the things they could experience in the time they do not rent out with the things they have to experience because of debt; frequently undesired possibilities take over desired possibilities.

As a system similar to debtfare, “debt bondage”, an application of monopolization of the possibilities of a subject by another subject that is one of the most effective in rendering the subject powerless, has gained wide currency, toppling continents from Ancient Rome to Peru of the Middle Ages, from colonized Cameroon to the southeastern Asian countries of our millennium. Debt bondage essentially means the subject working in violent conditions in order to complete his debt; however the debt is multiplied, spread out over the long term and made impossible to pay off. With the “Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery” signed by the United Nations in 1956, debt bondage was eliminated on paper. However, according to 2012 data there are still more than 20 million people existing under the ontological and sociological violence of debt bondage and several forms of slavery (International Labour Organization). Like debt bondage, debtfare can also cast over a significant period of or near the entirety of the life of the subject, so both debt bondage and debtfare are interested not in the present but in the future and imply the possibilities monopolized through time by power. The difference is that there are attempts to eliminate the extreme poverty caused by debt bondage and replace debt bondage with debtfare, which is created by banks that act to discover the subjectness of the subject, that is measured and divaricated. Since debtfare is an evolved form of debt bondage it also monopolizes possibilities in a different way.

C- Relationship of the Uncertainty of Time to the Monopolization of Possibilities

In his study examining the birth of the precariat, Guy Standing points at the changes to time engendered by globalized capitalism and the birth of a new class these changes were applied to: the precariat is a class that lives with flexible and precarious working conditions and feels future anxiety exceedingly. While examining the precariat, Standing claims that there are two usages of time by economic systems before globalized capitalism: (1) the society originating from agriculture where time is divided according to the weather and seasons, and (2) the society that appeared with industry that works systematically with certain jobs where time is divided into blocks (115-116). Standing says that people work according to the rhythm of nature in the first period while they have constructed and standardized “time zones” and work 10-12 hours a day in the second. All the same, Standing says that we must

define “*tertiary time*” after the agricultural and industrial societies (116). According to him, “tertiary time” is the systematic of time in which the precariat precesses as a class.

“*The idea of doing a certain activity in a certain definable space of time is less and less applicable*” (119) says Standing. In relation to the precariat who live, before anything else, with the constant anxiety of finding employment Standing says:

“*Some other work-for-labour is complementary to the labour a person does in a job, such as networking outside office hours, commuting or reading company or organisational reports ‘at home’, ‘in the evening’ or ‘over the weekend’*” (121).

The point underlined by Standing is the uncertainty of time in relation to work. The traditional duality that is determined by the division of “working time” and “off-hours” has now been destroyed and replaced by “tertiary time”. Tertiary time means the uncertainty of working time. The uncertainty of working time carries being unable to foresee the future, being ready to work at any time and constantly being under the threat of receiving workload because of information and communication technologies with it. The uncertainty of working time dispossesses the subject of its right to use its possibilities as it wishes because the subject who is face to face with the possibility of receiving work at any time cannot distinguish the time when it can remain separate from the work life and spare for itself. When it is possible even to argue that there is theoretically no free time because of the possibility of receiving work, it is a matter of the monopolization of possibilities.

D- Relationship of “Free Time” and “Occupied Time” to Monopolization of Possibilities

“Free time”, which is left after the work necessary to live, inherently calls about “occupied time” which is contrary to it. Even though occupied time mostly expresses work as it is also considered with mandatory education and public service, which are seen as a “debt” to the government citizens are bound to. The free time which we perspire for remains suspended as something to be experienced as the embodiment of self-realization and authentic actions, something to be lost for a long while and be inside of for a time. However, free time is an invention just as occupied time is: according to John Zerzan the trio of “*conformity, repetition, and regularity*” (11) have been the buttresses of the development of civilization; in the process starting from the invention of numbers and leading to the

invention of time, the loss of “*spontaneity, enchantment, and discovery*” (11) of life has come to pass.

The tourism sector which attracts masses like a magnet is one of the possibilities that is created by capitalism in order to regain the spontaneity, pleasure and feeling of discovery emphasized by Zerzan. Development of the tourism sector occurred as a parallel to the distinction between free and occupied time: when free time that is set aside to prevent unproductiveness and “loss of resources” by charging the subjects worn out by occupied time in capitalism is reduced to the discourse of holiday, it implies that even free time is processed and that an addiction to consumption desired by capitalism is created through time. The creation of the tourism sector by renting/selling sunbeams, beaches, seas, mountains, lakes, roads, activities and possibilities in general is an intervention for free time being put into the mold of vacations. The free time vacations are in is now also a time for profit; people give what they earn from what they produce back to capitalism.

III. Language and Monopolization of Possibilities

A- Concept of Language

Words are molds that put things into associative ensembles, categorize them, gain functional tasks and aim at the commonization of subjects for communication. Language, as the integration of words, patterns of expression and sounds is a structure that is subject to chronic, cumulative, cultural corruptions and renewals that leads to comprehension, a neurologic activity. The importance of language in the context of the monopolization of possibilities is great and the relationship of language and power goes back a long way.

B- Role of Language in *Genesis* and its Relation to the Monopolization of Possibilities

In theological sources, the beginning of language has been attributed to God transferring language to humans. The relationship between God and language transforms as the *Genesis* chapter of the Tanakh goes on; first word and action follow each other, there is a mere moment between the two, however later on the word becomes a compromise, a domain

of transaction between God and humans and the time between word and action becomes longer. We read that God commanded *“Then God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was light”* (Genesis 1.3); in this respect the word has the power of law, it reports the coming of God’s action, in a way God’s word is the harbinger of God’s action. Long afterwards when God cannot make humans listen, that is to say, in the process that develops with humans not taking God’s power seriously it is understood that God can also be the god of wrath and the prophets line up to dissuade and convince God. What is striking is that the word of God, which was previously simultaneous with action was now debatable: Lot being able to greet the angels at the gates of the city and use the power of word to retain them from their task and feed them with yeast cake at his home when God sent his angels to decide whether or not Sodom and Gomorrah were sinful and should be destroyed means the impediment -of course also with the permission of God- of the command of God stemming from His desire (Genesis 19.1-3). Through language, God had been transformed into a being whose actions’ direction can be changed; language is now a neutral zone that can be met in to reach a compromise between the power of God and the power of humans, in fact it is a safe zone in emergencies. So, in Genesis language is represented both as a legislative power and a force that can provide liaison between power.

God giving things names (light “morning”, dark “night”, the dome “sky”, dryland “land” and gathered waters “sea”) and creating Adam and calling him “Adam”, is the first of the chapters that makes the hierarchic distinction between God and things, and God and Adam clear. God allowing Adam to name the animals after having named him corresponds to a power giving someone he sees as being below him power over other someones who appear to be even lower: *“So out of the ground the Lord God formed every animal of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what he would call them; and whatever the man called each living creature, that was its name”* (Genesis 2.19). After all the animals cannot name Adam; God gives man in his own image authority to be *“have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth”* (Genesis 1.26) and grants humans, whom he sees as being above other living beings, permission to name animals. Adam naming animals caused new words to come into existence or the words created by God to get into circulation: rhinoceros, deer, raccoon, bat, swift, nightjar, whale,

squid, seahorse... The duality of namer and named is an important example to reflect the relationship of language and power: the namer of things becomes dominant over them and inevitably leaves certain roles and hierarchic structures on those things. Just as God, who has named the human, has formed a dominance over humans that transforms their rights and wrongs, their freedoms and prohibitions, humans who have named the world and the things within it have evolved to the point of being, through language, the natural owner of a power that emulates God, that emulates absolute power. *Genesis*, in this case, tells us that humans have been aware of the relationship between language and power since long before; after all, even though in *Genesis* language reflects the dominance of God over humans or of humans over non-human living beings, it can very well be deduced that language is a power over humans as well. After all, many aspects such as the anthropological traditionality, scientific breakthroughs, in-group labels and psychological well-being of the person using language exist dependently on language. Thus, the structure and usage of language reveals the monopolization of possibilities as well.

C- Distinction of “I” and “the Other” Present in Language and its Relationship to the Monopolization of Possibilities

At our birth there are predicates directly passed on to us and values and ideologies brought along with these predicates. It can be said that the distinction between “I” and the “other” lies at the center of these values and ideologies. For example, even a simple knowledge habit like the mother and father dialectic that babies conceptualize (are left to, directed to, forced to conceptualize) earliest in life reminds us of gender roles, being inside of nuclear family, adult-children roles, and being a property of the family; it also causes babies to make the distinction between the I and the other. As a matter of fact, the distinction of the I and the other is in the nature of the word. For instance when one says “Klimt’s painting”, Klimt’s painting is pulled away from jarred pickles, a computer mouse or a shopkeeper living in Shanghai. Our separation of objects by way of words is the anxiety of convenience for usage and administration; we classify and instrumentalize objects. The results of power formed over subjects through language are different than those of power formed over objects: mingling with power in language cannot be limited to struggling with the mordacious aspect

of a subtext which was decided to be malicious during communication; power in language points to the effort of certain words, discourses, sayings, proverbs and habits of speech that are traditionalized, that saturate and riddle language to both shape subjects and reposition the subjects in the perceptions of other subjects by giving them identities, roles and behaviors, and thus to a facsimile. It indeed would not be erroneous to say that the monopolization of possibilities in language is a facsimile because the reality created in language is copied and actualized in daily life or the reality existing in daily life is reinforced in daily life by language. The monopolization of possibilities through language the formalization of the domain of possibilities of the subject who is instrumentalized in the language of power and thereby the power of language. Because of this, the I and other distinction created by the very structure of language provides a suitable foundation for power to grow and spread.

Even though the distinction of I and other in language provides the foundation the monopolization of possibilities there may not be an indicateable I or other who monopolizes possibilities through language. In this respect, while discussing the monopolization of possibilities through language, there is value in emphasizing that language is not a subject, that subjects who use language or who are strong enough in society to administrate do not monopolize the possibilities of other subjects out of nowhere. It is because of the historicity of language that it has the ability to condition complicated analyses and to stay alive with the help of the cultural path it follows despite fallen and established civilizations; and because of local, national and international structures, language generates a mixed pool of discourses. Professing language to be uniform and completely manageable is to do its ever-changing structure an injustice. In fact, when compared to feelings, spaces and regimes language may be the one most bendable, most open to liberation, most experimental at the individual level. A substantial amount of resources may be necessary to organize a space, changing a feeling may mean the hardship of recycling the sediments remaining from repetitions, criticizing a regime and campaigning for its transformation can be punishable by a lifetime in jail, but language, which can be resonated by the subject in its private space, for now preserves the possibility of exercising in the ghettos that power has not yet been able to usurp. Language, in this respect, still has the plasticity to not act and not be made to act the way power wishes no matter what, because even though it has been wounded by decades old dominants and power, during its own process of evolution, language gives its talent of being open to

anything and everything, of transcending the monopolization of possibilities to the subject. A subject who administers language and ceases to exist, the cultural heritage of those who use language, and those who have been able to administer language in certain degrees reveal the archeology of the values that monopolize possibilities. Because the oppressive ideologies that cause changes in the perceptions, behaviors and relationships of those who are attached to language, who milk language, who interact with language have been influenced by said ideologies from childhood to old age, even the domain of leisure created by language cannot always avert the monopolization of the domain of possibilities.

In the following section some oppressive ideologies that monopolize possibilities through language will be examined: sexism, nationalism, racism, and speciesism. Additionally, “functionalism” as a state of consciousness which develops via capitalism will be discussed.

D- Discriminatory Ideologies in Language and the Monopolization of Possibilities

1. Sexism

Swearing is an element generally structured with sexuality that contaminates the surroundings with sexism starting with it being thought, uttered and written as the psychological outpouring of unrelated feelings—enjoyment, rage, relief, distress. Swearing represents a stark phallocracy to the extent of its conceptualization of predominantly women, occasionally homosexual males, transgender people, sex workers and people with different sexual identities-orientations or the individuals who are not liked as vile persons who ought to be incapacitated, as persons with no voice, and under some conditions, as persons, with their potentials to take the penis in their body, worthy of-fit for-open to humiliation; it becomes more than a tool to belittle the subjects in the society because of the characteristics they possess: it becomes the regenerator of the cultural fabric that limits the subjects. As the efforts of swearing to marginalize subjects become widespread in the daily usage of language, the relationship formed between society and those subjects indeed starts to change; sexism, which does not initially allow freedom for the subjects and which advances with occasional jokes, renders violence and rape easy by letting the concepts grow in language and

it directs, degrades, limits and annihilates subjects' method of interaction with the world and the others. In short, sexism monopolizes their possibilities. Now, a woman is a deficient person suitable for catcalling and desexualized by nature only because she has a cavity that can take the penis in; the possibilities for her to walk in a dim street -where men are found- are restricted. A homosexual man cannot introduce his boyfriend to his family, he is surrounded by prejudices. A transgender is practically condemned to being unemployed. Sex workers should be invisible and chased from wherever they are seen. As a result of swearing and sexist expressions that have been transferred to the current culture from the previous one and that will be transferred to future generations through frequent usage, some subjects are exposed to overt or covert physical, emotional and social difficulties that may even last until the end of their lives. When examined from another perspective, sexism that monopolizes the possibilities of subjects in the language reproves and breaches sexuality and loads silences: it situates the perception that sexuality is a practice that definitely has to be addressed via caricaturization and dilutes the opportunity to comfortably talk about sexuality; therefore, liberation of sexuality and freedom of the subjects that experience it are crippled by language.

2. Nationalism/Racism

One of the nationalist/racist judgments voiced with the *Grexit* crisis was that the Greeks were lazy; in fact the “Lazy Greeks” search had seen the highest numbers in the last ten years on Google Trends during the 2015 July referendum (*Google Trends*). The tendency of identifying Greeks as lazy took such a hold in language that politicians who were doubtful of the European Union project, for instance Anders Borg, Swedish Minister of Economy, kept coming back to and referring to as an “argument” to not show solidarity with Greece (Coleman). An offensive, small, inciting word with no equivalent in reality that was functionalized to define millions of subjects with different patterns of behavior, working conditions, class characteristics and life views was transformed into an international debate theme to which “loans were given” and “investments were made”. In the country which witnessed the rise of the left the Greek were blamed of not working and getting trapped in debt and their identities were depicted in the focus of the crisis. Thus the bill of the crisis was made out to the Greeks, the revelation of the privileged relationship of the dynamics of

capitalism and the crisis was sidestepped and it was attempted to keep the Greeks from receiving a share of international prosperity. This situation has pauperized many Greeks. Similar things may be said for the immigration influx in Europe: the immigrants who were termed “Eastern” and put in one basket, who were feeling the destruction of war were accused of being “barbarians” by the politicians of the countries that bombed them; in fact the Denmark parliament who perceived the immigrants as being “dangerous” passed a law on January 26, 2016 to confiscate the property of immigrants entering the country if it surpassed a certain amount. Generally speaking nationalism/racism is known for transforming the subjects it interferes with in discourse and making “representative caricatures” of them that can be generalized to the society they are a part of. The resulting representative caricatures highlight arbitrarily distilled characteristics and monopolizes possibilities by compressing subjects into reductive connotations. Discriminatory ideologies like nationalism and racism work with a background of essentialism. Essentialism is the illusion that a certain being or community of beings has universal, unchanging and independent qualities. Like the example of the Greek being lazy, a generalized statement such as Arabs being dirty is also supported by essentialism in the creation of representative caricatures. When someone who has known one, a few, thousands of, tens of thousands of Arabs spreads a judgment that is attached to millions of Arabs like one that says that Arabs are dirty, he implies that this representative caricature is an indispensable part of the Arab society. Eventually, representative caricatures can be produced in two, positive and negative, way: the first with praises, favors, affinities and affirmations; the second with belittlings, insults, curses and negations. While it obvious that having limited data, that is to say certain experiences that very well may verify the representative caricature provides a defense in the context of harboring discriminatory ideologies such as nationalism and racism, the fractions whose relationships with subjects are hierarchized to their detriment, whose socialization possibilities are removed temporally and spatially, who are forced to struggle with emotional disturbances, who may be considered unqualified in the workforce, whose constitutional freedoms are endangered, and are exposed to social disadvantages because of the representative caricature carried by essentialism. It can be said that the representative caricature is opposed to the spectral structure of life and foresees a sterile society. So, language monopolizes the possibilities of the subject in nationalist and racist ideologies.

3. Speciesism

Speciesism, that is to say the understanding that one specie is superior to another, which is another type of oppressive ideology, has the trait of spreading quickly in human-centric society. The relationship we form with non-human living beings who can feel and who have life awareness causes wounds equivalent to those opened by other oppressive ideologies: phrases that are present in every language, like the Turkish variants “killing two birds with one stone”, “cutting off the head of the rooster who crows out of time”, “one cannot eat the meat of every bird”, “name the dog, ready the stick” and “getting oil from a fly/penny pinching” entrenches the beliefs and the behaviors that correspond to these beliefs such as we may inflict violence upon non-human living beings, that they are of lower quality, that we may kill them and that they can be our resources. Because of the speciesism in language both the possibilities of non-human living beings are monopolized, everything is normalized and we have made questioning speciesism difficult with the comfort derived from the habit of not questioning. Another result of speciesism is the concept of “absent referent” developed by Carol J. Adams in *The Sexual Politics of Meat*: living breathing animal flesh turns into “meat” in the chain it passes through from being butchered to being consumed. Let us read Adams: “*Through detachment, concealment, misrepresentation, and shifting the blame, the structure of the absent referent prevails*” (67). It is detachment because calling animal flesh meat implies our alienation to reality, our being outside of reality, the necessity of our discovering reality. It is a concealment because transforming animal flesh into meat due to a little word game is similar to calling marriages made because of relationships based on mutual interest love; it is a marketing tactic, giving something inappropriate an appropriate packaging. It is a misrepresentation, because the isolation between us and animal meat does not point directly to what is being eating, it produces a warp that makes it seem as if what is being eaten is a randomly found object rather than a subject. It is shifting the blame, because as we hear from meat consumers, even if meat is “produced” through savagery those who “consume” it are not guilty, after all, there is -allegedly- an ethical distinction between the production and consumption of meat. Since the consumers are “not those who” perpetrate the savagery how can they be responsible? Language has the capacity

to change the quality of the relationship we form with non-human living beings. As with all oppressive ideologies, there is a fraction who monopolizes possibilities and a fraction whose possibilities are monopolized with speciesism and language causes the bond that ethically should not be formed between them to be tightened: today a crushing majority of people are born into a culture that applies, grounds and justifies speciesism and consciousness cannot form immunity to that which it is used to. Perhaps the hardest part of defeating speciesism is the fact that humans who have noticed speciesism are the ones who will end it because we cannot communicate with non-human living beings, so it is not difficult to foresee that the eradication of speciesism from language, which monopolizes the possibilities of non-human living beings through language, will not come to pass in the near future.

4. Functionalism

A habit which we can define as functionalism and which permeates our daily lives from the moment people meet each other to the them opening up to each other, to their phone calls, their e-mail correspondences has reached its peak in the process of capitalism. Functionalism can be read as a kind of revelation of the anxieties of calculating, measuring and being useful that comes with modernism. To scrutinize functionalism, one can return to the concepts that Heidegger names “idle talk” and “curiosity” in *Being and Time* and that cover the mode of the human (of Dasein) being able to understand himself and communicate transparently with himself. Idle talk, according to Heidegger, is born of the intersection humans’ consciousness and behavior and does not require bad intentions:

“Discourse, which belongs the essential constitution its disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk, and as such of not really keeping in being-in-the-world open in an articulated understanding, but of closing it off and covering over innerworldly beings. To do this, one need not aim to deceive. Idle talk does not have the kind of being of consciously passing off something as something else” (Being and Time 158).

Idle talk: it can be thought of as a sort of empty chatter, brushing by and brushing off in which the word is no longer something that is understood but is reduced to being an element that is used. Idle talk quickly has begun to work in coordination with speed in society

where a functionalist approach is dominant: we cannot be attentive to a laughing baby or the stone of a windmill or a destroyed anthill in the midst of the busy agenda. The relationship of idle talk to the monopolization of possibilities can be read in reverse: before all else, idle talk can be interpreted as an indicator of possibilities being monopolized. In the capitalist speed of dailiness, along with work, duties, necessities and working hours becoming flexible, attentiveness in the relationships subjects form with other subjects is pushed aside, attentiveness is replaced with learning quickly. We have the tendency to move attention, the basis of attentiveness, with the urge to ensure maximum advantage in minimum time in order to use it “economically” as well. Attentiveness becomes atomized as the day becomes atomized and an involuntary functionalism anxiety is present in people who interact during those times that are as open as can be (conversations, meal tables, walks, etc.). When Heidegger says “*Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere*” (*Being and Time* 161) he is actually saying that curiosity urges a symbiotic relationship with idle talk: even if we are curious about people when we speak to them, that curiosity now “*takes care to see in order to understand what it sees, that is, to come to a being towards it, but only in order to see*” (*Being and Time* 161). Because of both our motivation to “progress”, which is exacerbated by capitalism, and the consciousness being designed in capitalism to consume things, curiosity and attentiveness are no longer as they should be. On the one hand, thanks to knowledge breaking into pieces and dispersing and information technologies humans, who are lost in speed, can connect over anything; on the other hand attentiveness is falling to pieces and becoming indistinct. We can state that idle talk and curiosity undermine certain ways of acting and thinking with the help of functionalist capitalist ideologies. “How are you?”s are the prerequisite of plunging into a conversation: idle talk likes to regurgitate stereotyped expressions most of all. When language is not used attentively it points to a society whose possibilities have been monopolized and which has kept in step with the speed of capitalism because while words which are transmitted without full thought being paid to what they are harm the relationship of knowing-being known between subjects and the ontological awareness in regards to things the monopolization of possibilities becomes so strong that even our way of using language becomes compressed into the context of carrying out the tasks capitalism demands of us. Of course, the alteration of language by capitalism did not occur in a day; as people’s way of production, personal boundaries and understanding

of relationships developed with a system that focalizes profit motives the issues of what we understand of language while we use it and whether we consciously refine language or not have come to the forefront. Language translating consciousness and consciousness translating language goes on forever like a reciprocal relationship of push and pull. In this respect language monopolizes the possibilities of the subject according to the desires of capitalism through functionalism.

IV. Humans, Non-Human Living Beings and Monopolization of Possibilities

Although it seems as if the objectifying ontology, aimed to be made sustainable by the system which sets out to monopolize the possibilities of humans and non-human beings through space, time and language, points to the lack of necessity in making people and non-human beings the subject of independent inspection, it also necessitates disclosing the structures that monopolize the possibilities that directly gravitate towards them. In this section three structures that monopolize possibilities will be approached: (1) slavery, (2) surplus value exploitation, and (3) alienation. Alongside the forms of monopolization of possibilities like slavery, which has been in the seed of power for many a long year, and surplus value exploitation, which is in the nature of capitalism, struggling with the globalizing structure of a phenomenon such as alienation once more reveals that the possibilities of humans and non-human living beings are monopolized.

A- Humans and the Monopolization of Possibilities

1. Slavery

The ontological context that changes with the temporary or permanent seizure of the domain of possibilities of the slave by the master is crowned by the free exploitation of the domain of possibilities, which while fundamentally belonging to the slave, has now been transferred to the master and been conceptualized as a resource. The domain of possibilities which had been at the disposition of someone who is a prisoner of war from the day he was born until the day he was enslaved is transferred to the master because of reasons such as

occupations following bloody battles, legal treaties, threats and power relationships. In other words, almost every decision that can be made by the slave during his lifetime, and thus almost every possibility that falls into the domain of possibilities and that can be refined using his will is under the supervision and arbitrariness of the master. The master can do most things, maybe all things, he wants to his slave: he can shave his head, withhold his child, whip him for his mistakes, teach him gardening, shower him with gifts, make him dance... When we consider the domain of possibilities of the master as a cluster, it can be argued that the domain of possibilities of the slave or some of the possibilities in this domain are added to this cluster as a subset: the will of the master has stolen the will of the slave and dissolved the will of the slave in that of the master. Slavery, in this respect, is the most radical form of monopolization of possibilities.

Lovejoy says:

“In the context of slave societies, freedom involved a recognized status in a caste, a ruling class, a kinship group, or some such corporate body. Such an identification included a bundle of rights and obligations that varied considerably with the situation but were still distinct from those for slaves, who technically had no rights, only obligations” (2).

Departing from Lovejoy, the changeability of even a concept such as freedom through a master or the laws of a slaver society can be understood. The changeability of even the definition of freedom through a master or the laws of a slave society proves the adherence to an objectifying ontology as well as the monopolizing effect of slavery on the domain of possibilities. A concept like freedom being subject to change according to the will of a subject other than the subject or a community means a result much more radical than the possibilities in the domain of possibilities being acquired one by one: that leads to the problem of the decision regarding how wide or how narrow the domain of possibilities will be, along with the definition of freedom as a whole, being given to someone other than the subject. Slavery creates a much more visible and violent pressure than that created by forms of power that monopolize possibilities by gradually establishing power over the subject through indirect or invisible ways; because it has the power to easily displace the domain of possibilities as a concept.

2. Surplus Value Exploitation

The monopolization of the possibilities of the subject changes along with capitalism; the process of power that distinguished itself with slavery has shifted its weight towards different ways of establishing power. In capitalism power is generally not established through an equation that, like slavery, includes brute force and pain, because

“the techniques it [capitalism] uses are not negative or limiting and exclude physical violence because rather than limit and, at the extreme, destroy the biological life of the individual and the forces it has, it has to enhance, use in the best way, organize and supervise them”² (Keskin 17).

Surplus value is, by its classic definition, the surplus that comes to be when the value of the product exceeds the market value more than the necessary labor expended to produce a good or a service; and for this reason questions like how surplus value will be divided, how much will be transferred to who, who will have the authority to make decisions related to it involuntarily point the arrows at the properties and identity of power. The privileged class who confiscate the surplus value in economic activities draw a boundary between themselves and the classes whose labor is thus exploited. The mentioned boundary is a boundary of power that was unintentionally created: it is, at the same time, a marker of the alienation between those who have power and those who do not.

Marx’s analysis of surplus value is still able to represent the nature of capitalism despite being framed as an outdated economic-politic approach in the context of focusing on the factory. However, one can foresee sociological-anthropological results of confiscating surplus value that surpass even Marx’s approach; the confiscation of surplus value, that is to say the subject ending up with a smaller share of the total than he should be getting (moreover not even having a right to decide how the total is divided socially) is the contraction of the domain of possibilities, or more precisely it is certain possibilities that could have been in the domain of possibilities being removed and thrown away. Privileged classes monopolize the possibilities of the classes that are beneath them through surplus value: the expression “monopolize” can mean reducing the lower class to generally similar molds of living, culture and consumption just as it can imply forcing them to all drink from

² Translation is mine. - F.A.

the same juice, pushing them to all buy the same toilet paper and trapping them all in the same shortness of vacation. Tens, hundreds, thousands, millions, billions of subjects not receiving their economic shares in contrast to the subjects who confiscate the surplus value and being members of the army of exploited is not a small enough social issue to handle with economic reforms or social welfare approaches because the basic issue is more ontological than economic or sociological and it cannot be fixed until the ontology is reestablished.

A phenomenon such as not being able to receive the deserved share of the total amount brings tendencies such as fatigue caused by working hours, not being able to create space for satisfying occupations because of stress, anxiety of futurelessness and precarity, emergency health problems, communicative disorders and constant wallowing in the “American dream” along with it. The presence of surplus value means that possibilities are not being divided equally and it is truly horrifying that a formidable privileged class minority has caused loss for the domain of possibilities of the lower class. It must be remembered that as long as the confiscation of surplus value is depicted as a “success” that is full of appeal or the “gift of a process full of resolution and talent” for the privileged classes, the resulting social exploitation will be affirmed through naturalism. Privileged classes enlarge their own domain of possibilities with the possibilities they steal from the classes they exploit; they have possibilities undefinable to the lower classes such as close relationships that can be formed with political blocs, quality education, access to expensive medicine, latest technology items, exotic fruits and taking unplanned trips. For this reason the concept of inequality between classes cannot be compressed into the variable of material difference: class conflict is essentially the war to divide up the domain of possibilities.

The domain of possibilities that can be refined as a result of equality and rights being ensured is many times more than the domain of possibilities that can be refined by members of the lower class at present because under capitalism the domain of possibilities has been accumulated in the will and freedom of privileged classes. It is explicit that capitalism works with objectifying ontology in the dichotomy of privileged classes/lower classes because no matter the personal proximity they may have with the members of the lower class, the members of the privileged class restrict their domain of possibilities and thus diminish their subjectness, that is to say, their competence of subjectness. The tension begins with the reality that a subject cannot be put under object captivity, and yet there are those who try to

push the subject into the position of object through the process of the monopolization of possibilities. On the hand the economic system pushes the domain of possibilities of the subject towards the empty domain of possibilities of the object thanks to surplus value, on the other hand the subject, being aware of his freedom, inwardly realizes that that field of possibilities should not be emptied. Privileged classes who fatten their domain of possibilities thanks to the approximation of the subject to the object and an ontological theft struggle to justify the relationship they form with lower classes through law.

3. Alienation

While revealing power, objectifying ontology also corresponds to the epistemological rift between the I and the other. This ontology which stays alive by courtesy of a background that alienates social sections to each other has gained the power to sharpen a previously relatively weaker form of alienation thanks to globalization. The global scale of connections, in an odd fashion, also causes disconnections to be on a global scale and leads to the psychological infrastructure of the monopolization of possibilities. It can be stated that the mentioned form of alienation is born of the concepts of *threshold of reality* and *threshold of sensitivity*: with the raising of these thresholds, the subject is alienated to problems such as genocides, global poverty, ecological disasters, refugee crises and autocratic regimes and allows capitalist power.

The threshold of reality is the whole of the experiences needed in order to accept realities as being ordinary: when the reality experience does not surprise, when it is accepted as ordinary this means that we have not yet raised our threshold of reality. Our threshold of reality is raised as we encounter scientific innovations and others in society, in other words the list of things we would conceptualize as extraordinary gets shorter because we have experienced more and interacted with more things. It is said that when Auguste and Louis Lumière, the first film producers, screened *Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat* in France in January of 1896, the audience screamed and ran (Barnouw 8). Even if the story of reality is not like reality itself, it can be speculated that a state of immersion was experienced, similar to the state of immersion experienced by children during a magician's show: the children are either rendered passive by their astonishment or are frightened and wish to run and hide. In

both situations the threshold of reality has been transcended because previously experienced reality does not match up to the reality currently being experienced or, in other words, either because reality has been subject to deconstruction or because new realities have been encountered. The threshold of reality had been raised by this transcendence: now other “extraordinary” experiences will be necessary for the transcendence of the barrier. It can be said that it is completely normal for things that are below the threshold of reality to be less interesting than those that can transcend it. Hence we can argue that we get used to the things that are below the threshold of reality, and that accordingly we are less sensitive to these things because of this. In a way, the things we are used to cause us to raise our threshold as a result of the threshold of reality. In this respect, it can be said that there may sometimes be an inverse proportion between the exposure to something and paying attention to, regulating and interacting with it. We are easily able to read news of a bombing in the press every morning, be it a precision strike by a military plane in a completely different part of the world or a suicide bomber laying waste to his surroundings. As our sensitivity threshold becomes higher, the news stories that used to shock us become a sum total of information that do not even glance at. Some of us who have lower sensitivity thresholds may still be affected by news stories of bombings as though they are extraordinary, perhaps they are at the very top of the hierarchy in terms of morals. However, not pausing on news of a bombing while changing the channels or moving on to an entertainment program after being exposed to news of a bombing is not regarded as being odd by the subject who is changing the channels or by the subject sitting next to him. If it is accepted that passing by the news of a bombing is in conflict with “what must be done” (not passing the news by and thinking on the news story and acting being a moral task), mulling over the mentioned conflict for even a moment requires additional energy and inquiry vitality. Since exposure to news of bombings has started being below our threshold of reality it tends to create emotional paralysis, and thus lethargy. The passiveness caused by the lethargy turns the subject into a supporter of the status quo in an emotional sense. So, an alienation has been revealed by the lowering of the threshold of reality in face of the evils of the world because the subject who is exposed to the evils through the press is no longer affected by them, and this brings us to the threshold of sensitivity.

While our access to the knowledge of evil has advanced thanks to communication technologies our threshold of sensitivity has become hard to transcend because of this exposure to evil, because we have become hardened to evil: since the evil we see, hear and read of has become ordinary in perception, it is not surprising that our enthusiasm to change what comes to pass has diminished when we are facing evil. As a result of our threshold of sensitivity becoming higher we lose feeling, memory and values and miss the reality that we inevitably have a global bond with the subjects, events and topics towards whom our sensitivity has diminished or disappeared. Subjects who do not live on the edges of poverty and who have average purchasing power began mulling over the things they purchased after Rana Plaza, which housed the sweatshops of multinational corporations in Bangladesh, collapsed in 2013. Workers and children who produce, who are in fact forced to produce in destituteness were killed and maimed under the collapsed structure of Rana Plaza, a representation of repeated sweatshops. The international echoes of the event were followed by regulations relating to work conditions, boycotts of multinational corporations, creations of relief funds and political reprimands. As the result of a disaster, subjects felt a need to look into the backyards of the multicultural corporations they walk past in the street and where they shop out of necessity, pleasure and socialization and fortunately saved their dying empathy. In the very least, the short-term rescue of empathy enabled the things that were under the thresholds of reality and sensitivity to come back into focus if for only a short while. Perhaps, while speaking in the context of ethics, we have to try again and again to revive the awareness of evil; and while we revive this awareness that can have curative properties, our questioning the thresholds of reality and sensitivity may urge us to first think about our global responsibilities and then to act on them. It is not surprising that we are sometimes given, by the shockwaves registered by our thresholds of reality and sensitivity as a result of extraordinary events, the courage to reevaluate and bravely face the evils to which we have become alienated. However, the similarity between the shockwaves we experienced as children face to face with extraordinary things and those caused by the reexamination of things that have regained their extraordinary quality as a result of the revelation of evil after we forgot and became alienated to them is surprising. In a way, we pay a short visit to or maybe even return permanently to our childhood level specific to our thresholds of reality

and sensitivity; in this way it makes sense to seek ethical traces behind the nostalgic and pastoral praising of the childhood.

As can be understood from events like Rana Plaza there is now a new type of alienation in our globalized world, and this mentioned type is shaped through distance, through lost recollections, through neglecting what is known. We become passive to the workers who produce the computer whose keyboard we touch under difficult conditions, to the war weary children we watch on the evening news and to the patients we read about who demand euthanasia is made legal because of the acclimation of our reality and sensitivity. Yet we used to buy tomatoes from the neighbouring broken fenced farm, shoes from the old cobbler on the street; we were directly witness to the content and refinement of the raw material and the working conditions of employees. The direct relationships we formed with them served as ethical stimulants in comparison to the relationships we form indirectly or most of the time not at all with the workers of multinational corporations. Moreover, we lived in times when the poor were not visible outside of our street, when nature crises only affected our roofs; who could have known that there were bad things happening outside of our comfort zone? However, contrary to the past, relationshiplessness inside of relationality perfectly reflects the spirit of today: our ability to reach the results of capitalism thanks to the possibilities created by technology, and yet the state of indifference and alienation born of this ability. Relationshiplessness inside of relationality causes a similar situation to arise between the exploiting subject and the exploited subject: as the production or domain of service grows the singular value of workers starts to drop and the formed sincere relationships begin to become indistinct; the ontological and ethical context of the relationship is transformed radically. The exploitation of capitalism rings out like a fictional reality to those with high emotional thresholds. Because of the alienation created by distance, or in a more general sense not bearing witness and the raising of the thresholds of reality and sensitivity by indirectly bearing witness, exploitation is kept out of the focus of the subject. In Nicholas Tampio's article "Assemblages and the Multitude: Deleuze, Hardt, Negri, and the Postmodern Left" a similar opinion from Deleuze's perspective is as follows:

"The left is 'a phenomenon of perception'. To be on the right means starting from one's own concerns and interests and moving outwards, to other people, cities, countries, and species. Citizens of wealthy industrial countries tend to think first

about their own financial status, then the gross domestic product of the country, and then, remotely, the effects of global capitalism on other people, regions, animals, or plants. The left strives to invert this perspective” (392-393).

Indeed, anticapitalist left as a “phenomenon of perception” initially appears as a tendency to think, feel and realize: we prioritize humans over numbers, equality over income, solidarity over competition. In this respect that which is at a distance should not be any different than that which is close; the Other is the Other everywhere and the objectifying ontology which was created by alienation and which differentiates subject from subject must be radically changed. When we reflect on the bond of power to alienation and objectifying ontology onto the monopolization of possibilities we grasp that the monopolization of possibilities is a phenomenon that is based in perception and that can be related to how we perceive what. Just as the raising of thresholds of reality and sensitivity push us to being passive because of accustomedness, and the alienation born of passiveness facilitates the monopolization of possibilities both ethically and practically because it makes us forget the Other and the subjectness of the Other.

One of the methods that ensures the facilitation of alienation and the monopolization of possibilities is, as has been previously mentioned, the neoliberal model Foucault calls “governmentality” which has become the system of directing subject to do what is wanted using desires.

The subject whose possibilities are monopolized in capitalism is no longer in the position of a slave in governmentality; he passes through such a sieve that his perception and desires have been prepared in such a way to notice or resist the monopolization of possibilities the least. The point that is emphasized here is that governmentality exists with a “dispositif”: the mechanism is hybrid and may not point to a set consisting of a single thing or similar things.

“Further expanding the already large class of Foucauldian apparatuses, I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, judicial measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing,

literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and--why not--language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses--one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without realizing the consequences that he was about to face.” (Agamben, “What Is an Apparatus?” 14)

The dispositif may become evident as a tool of exploitation, as something to make the necessity of paying taxes felt, as a directive to go to school, as an addictor to the health system or most simply as a distinguisher of alienation that presents an individualist lifestyle. Agamben, at a similar point, summarizes the dispositif in this manner:

“a. It is a heterogeneous set that includes virtually anything, linguistic and nonlinguistic. under the same heading: discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, and so on. The apparatus itself is the net work that is established between these elements.

b. The apparatus always has a concrete strategic function and is always located in a power relation.

c. As such, it appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of knowledge.” (Agamben, “What Is an Apparatus?” 2-3)

In this case the dispositif in capitalism is nothing but a modern tool to monopolize possibilities by individualizing subjects and representing a system that makes them work in a profit-driven way and directing them to consume; the neoliberal power that capitalism is trying to establish may apply pressure through laws and the police force, but essentially it attempts perception management: after all, in an order structured so that the economy, education, health, family and media are to the advantage of capitalism perception management rises to prominence and the subject who is individualized because of alienation lowers his threshold of sensitivity. In capitalism where individualization is emphasized and the threshold of sensitivity is lowered because of alienation, the monopolization of possibilities walks hand in hand with accepting the evil, injustice and violence directed at the Other without acting because the subjectification of the subject is revealed not through social anxiety in which ethical values are glorified, but through the thought of creating areas of comfort and thusly becomes the tool of the monopolization of possibilities.

B- Non-Human Living Beings and the Monopolization of Possibilities

Taking note that the choice of the word “subject” is handy in the sense that it does not only indicate humans, it can be argued that the question “Are the possibilities of only humans as subject monopolized?” is striking because it reveals disregarded truth. Doubtlessly, the possibilities of not only humans but also non-human living beings are monopolized. The possibilities of non-human living beings not being identical to those of humans is interpreted by some as their rights not being supposed to be identical as well. The important thing is not possibilities being exactly identical but the presence of possibilities that can meet at common denominators: for instance, of course a penguin cannot have the right to vote because it does not have the characteristics that necessitate the competence of voting; but it being a feeling living being like us means that it too has the rights not to be turned into property, not to have violence inflicted on it and not to be killed. Moreover, one cannot reach a conclusion such as feeling living beings having a domain of possibilities that is directly smaller than ours; for example *Nucifraga columbiana* can keep 5.000-20.000 maps in mind but we have difficulty remembering even one side street (Krulwich, “National Geographic”). On the other hand our not being able to keep maps in mind does not mean the restriction of our right to drive. The domain of possibilities is like a bottomless well and it is difficult to define it. For this reason, when we communize humans with non-human living beings in general principles such as feeling, being aware, being able to practice freedom, common rights emerge.

A cow that has not entered into human domination can be approached; under normal circumstances it frolics in the meadows, gives life to a calf, suckles it and raises it, moves freely in groups. It lives on in its domain of possibilities formed by nature, inside of nature which cannot possibly objectify it and experiences life with the resources it finds and the other animals it lives with without ever knowing what species dominance is. The cow, who is “domesticated” after encountering the human, is trapped in depositories in milk farms, bull sperm is trickled into its uterus, or more plainly it is made pregnant through rape so that it will give milk, it is milked for hours with cables attached to its nipples and it is torn from its child, its twenty five year life reduced to five years; it is tortured. When the human takes the milk a cow produces for the calf for itself it monopolizes the possibilities of both cow and calf. Since neoliberalism cannot direct the mind of the cow for the continuation of capitalism

the way it can with the human, it continues to deem proper a slavery type of captivity for the cow: the cow, who is the tool of another species that enslaves its body, feelings and life fights for its life in a space where even its right of movement is restricted. It is easy to witness the monopolization of the possibilities of the calf: humans condemn the calf to hunger or unqualified, unhealthy food by withholding the calf's food because of the nutritional value inside of it.

The tyranny established by humans over other feeling beings through technology is the monopolization of possibilities even on the level of food particles. Human dominance, which uses science and technology, begrudges the health of another living being in order to transfer to humans and human children the particles inside of the milk that should be transferred to the cow's calf. Just as one of the inequalities between classes is the problem of surplus being amassed on one side, the inequality between species is the problem of one species attracting the food particles of the other species to its own side with a magnet. Moreover, the monopolization of the possibilities of the cow and calf by their particles being dominated, health concerns aside, is done for profit. In an order where milk production has become a sector and governments allow the milk sector to monopolize the possibilities non-human living beings the situation is more than transfer of nutrition; beyond the food transferred from cow to human and stolen from the calf, there is capital feeding of the animal and a gentry feeding from that capital. Actually, in the 731. Unit in Japan, the aim of the experiments conducted on thousands of humans in war conditions was to monopolize the particles of humans and use those results of these particles for the good of other governments, war, humanity and money. The thought of animal enslavement should be as disturbing as that of a human being being enslaved, even if done for the health of others: according to the official data of Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations in only one year, tens of billions of animals are put through abattoirs and exposed to violence. The monopolization of possibilities thus presents a danger that will perhaps not be taken seriously for centuries, a danger not only to humans but to non-human sentient living beings as well.

PART TWO

TRANSCENDING THE MONOPOLIZATION OF POSSIBILITIES

§ 1. Concept of Transcending the Monopolization of Possibilities

The transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities is the construction of a new way of being that may be realized in different ways on individual, group and social scales and that does not always mean the abolition of the monopolization of possibilities but mostly its suspension, or going on the defensive against the negative aspects of the monopolization of possibilities: be it hard-core obstinance in creating utopia or a volatile experience a few hours long, the monopolization of possibilities can be transcended in one way or another. On the other hand, transcending the monopolization of possibilities may not lead to holistic results; the subject can transcend the function of language that monopolizes possibly by using his expressions with awareness, but not be liberated from the weight of the government's taxes. For this reason, the predicate of "transcending" the monopolization of possibilities is an experience that has the competence of leaping from the narrowness of an individual moment to the width of a social movement and that makes the subject experience limit-experiences; it does not have universal qualities.

Equality is usually fictionalized through material criterion such as money, goods, services and resources. However, equality ultimately is achieved through dividing up possibilities equally and transcending the monopolization of possibilities; transcending the monopolization of possibilities itself can come to be through the horizontalization of the experiences created by possibilities and these experiences becoming accessible rather than money, goods, services and resources being made equal. The possibilities stolen from lower classes by upper classes who hunt possibilities will be dispersed to the lower classes in a natural process with the eradication of the monopolization of possibilities and equality will become evident thanks to experience: after all, since the funds that would be used by a Wall Street speculator for his vacation trip to Cameroon in his helicopter will go to the hungry in Honduras in a social order where upper classes cannot monopolize the possibilities of the lower classes; possibilities and the experiences comprised of these possibilities being collected in the reserve of a subject or class will be out of the question. Doubtlessly,

“equality”, “experience”, “justice” and “freedom” are concepts that can never be embodied and that can never realize themselves as absolutes. Moreover, whenever they are thought to have been achieved they move themselves a step further up, because the standards are now higher for everyone and the standards should be presentable to everyone.

Transcending the monopolization of possibilities can be examined separately on space, time, language, humans and non-human living beings. For instance, if we are to think of space, since private property not existing cannot lead to an individual accumulation to the detriment of society, it cannot monopolize possibilities; a similar result is valid for a society where surplus value is not stolen for time.

As another example, a cultural revolution will be necessary in language; liberation cannot be achieved as long as the expressions that monopolize possibilities are not consciously eradicated from memories, dictionaries, writings and conversations. Experiences being democratized in a way and the prevention a social order that renders possibilities disproportionate on the behalf of certain fractions are the foundations of the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities. For this reason, no matter how much social projects, donations and services contribute to the horizontalization of possibilities they cannot capture lasting success in a world constructed according to the essence of objectifying ontology.

The following section of the study will approach the concepts and examples of transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities. After it is indicated that transcending the monopolization of possibilities is a concrete process as much as an abstract one, first of all the concepts of “convergence” of Isabelle Stengers and “play” of Agamben will be examined.

I. Relationship of Concept of Monopolization of Possibilities to Convergence

Transcending the monopolization of possibilities is related to the concept of “convergence” mentioned by Stengers in an interview where she examines the alternative globalization movement. Convergence expresses movements or communities that are different, in fact sometimes foreign to each other, coming together to withstand power by using different practices. Convergence, by Stengers’ saying, is “*real-time, demanding, creative process*” (quoted in Zournazi 254). In 1999 hundreds of thousands of workers,

students, white collars and unemployed had become partners around the principles of equality and justice in order to protest the meeting of the International Trade Union in Seattle. Some peaceful communities who had come together in Seattle had revolted against companies that caused heavy working conditions, formed directly democratic models and produced public art. For instance, according to Stengers, Starhawk, the antiglobalizationist neopagan witch had taught activists the philosophy of nonviolence through stories beginning from before the start of the protests and ensured that the movement would continue in a framework of non-violence (quoted in Zournazi 254-255). Unlike other communities, some violence-friendly communities had realized property harming direct actions. In that respect the movement had continued in two directions, peaceful and violent. However, since the aim of the communities forming the Seattle movement was shared even if they had resisted the power that monopolizes possibilities in different ways, they had converged.

There are two conclusions of the relationship of the monopolization of possibilities and the concept of convergence.

The first is that communities who are trying to transcend the monopolization of possibilities do not have the same material and moral circumstances; for this reason it is difficult to compromise on a general definition that can be valid for the communities who are trying to transcend the monopolization of possibilities. However, since it is accepted that the possibilities of different communities can be monopolized it can be said that communities whose possibilities are monopolized are not uniform.

The second is that the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities is not the realization of a predetermined design. The methods, behaviors and productions can be experimentalized –like in Seattle- during the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities. Because of this the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities is reproduced as a one of a kind and unique experience every time; there is no one way, ideology or tool of transcending the monopolization of possibilities. This displays that the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities is a structure that can evolve constantly.

II. Relationship of the Concept of Monopolization of Possibilities to Play

The concept of play provides certain tips to the meaning of transcending the monopolization of possibilities. Play reveals the state of transcending the monopolization of possibilities as a metaphor, because play has liberating power. Agamben mentions this liberating power through “profanation”. For Agamben profanation points at the distinction between the part of the sacrifice offering that are considered sacred and those that are not: while the holy parts of the sacrificial offering, for example “*the liver, the heart, gallbladder, lungs*” (Agamben, *Profanations* 74), were separated for the gods, the parts that were not considered holy belonged to humans. In this respect profanation means “*to return them to the free use of men*” (Agamben, *Profanations* 73) because the parts that are given to humans and not considered holy are used by humans as they wish. In a way, the law of god and the law of humans are different.

A situation similar to the different laws for god and humans relating to the sacrificial offering appears during child’s play. The child succeeds at the profanation of objects that are organized according to a certain law and that have political, economic and social functions by liberating them of that context and thus at being liberated from the law imposed upon himself. For example in child’s play money may become drafts of sketches, pills may become the building blocks of palaces and light bulbs may become musical instruments. Thus, the child rejects the contextuality provided him through objects and creates his own contextuality. The liberating power of play is not only related to objects. Play can liberate space, time, language, even subjects. Within the game the child is playing, the meeting room becomes a space whose walls are meant to be hit, story time an interval during which one can scream, the word, which is defined by its functionality, an element of communication that can be used meaninglessly. In fact, from time to time we witness child who begin to play in politicians’ laps. Those children transform the context of a president of a country, someone who is surrounded by a wall of flesh so that no one can even get close because of his political contextuality and someone with whom joking must have a certain measure, because the child has transformed this president into someone whose nose has been pinched and whose ears have been squeezed as the game called for it. He has realized a profanation of the president if for only a moment.

Play allows us an important perspective in regards to the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities. Transcending the monopolization of possibilities is turning

one context into another and play is the best representation of this. The old rules, principle, law and forms do not exist in the transformed context. However, beyond this, transcending the monopolization of possibilities opens brand new domains of usage for space, time, language, object and subject. Opening never before tried domains of usage and thusly having the possibility to define things in new contexts is the basis of transcending the monopolization of possibilities.

§ 2. Social and Individual Examples of the Concept of Transcending the Monopolization of Possibilities

I. Social Example of Transcending the Monopolization of Possibilities: Singularity

Agamben gives the social example of transcending the monopolization of possibilities with his idea of singularity. However, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the concept of identity and the monopolization of possibilities before moving on to singularity; after all singularity and identity are two very deeply related concepts. The concept of identity itself is better understood between the concepts of community and society.

It was noted that the monopolization of possibilities was the effort to shape, according to a certain tendency, the domain of possibilities and the space, time, language, institutions, laws, habits and molds that form the domain of possibilities in social systems. A teleological approach, that is to say the tools of power which are focused on “goal”, “aim” and “result” coming from the root of *telos*, is necessary for the monopolization of possibilities. These tools of power are comprised of mechanisms that “transform community into society”. The transformation from community to society also explores how possibilities are monopolized. Community is the term that names a network of individuals who have not found common ground, and even if they have are not aware of the identity they have formed or who have not attained consciousness of defining themselves through identity. Society may be conceptualized as a structure that emphasizes the common ground it provides and which is constantly reestablished and reinforced through this common ground. Communities are generally small in population and too weak to brood over dominance; societies can aspire to world domination. Moreover communities are not in a practical or discursive interlock, in

other words they do not have the codes to serve a goal. In societies, on the other hand, a goal stemming from an awareness of entirety and consciousness of identity is a must. One of the best examples of the passage from community to society is the establishment procedures of nation states. Governments trying to procure acceptance of an identity or a few identities as basic elements during the establishment process and putting these in the constitution leads to the formation of a presumptive society and the polarization stemming from the presumption causes the togetherness of subjects to be shattered. For example, the understanding that prioritized the English identity and rejected other identities in the United Kingdom caused separatist voices to come to be in the country. Similarly, polarizations in societies under dictatorial rule sometimes come about when the goal is to aggrandize a race, religion or group; the fact that the tribes and groups split into communities or formed communities separately at the time when Gaddafi's Libya was overthrown but that Gaddafi still tried to govern the country as if Libya was still a single community by prioritizing his own power is a great example to show how domineering presumptive communities are. Another example is the presence of death penalty for homosexuals in Saudi Arabia and the representation of homosexuality as an identity not being permitted indicates sexual possibilities of subjects being monopolized by the goal of anti-homosexuality. For this reason a goal must attempt to control many mechanisms that fall within the boundaries of a society for the monopolization of possibilities on the level of society; of course, goals may change as periods change. From these examples we can comprehend that the monopolization of possibilities can be done around the concept of identity. Giving identities, presuming identities or aggrandizing a certain identity has now become a tool of power. Giving, presuming or aggrandizing this identity comes into question in the context of (1) the past or (2) the future.

The example of giving, presuming or aggrandizing identities based on the past is the search for origin (arkh ) or immanence. By saying that

“the lost, or broken, community can be exemplified in all kinds of ways, by all kinds of paradigms; the natural family, the Athenian city, the Roman Republic, the first Christian community, corporations, communes, or brotherhoods—always it is a matter of a lost age in which community was woven of tight, harmonious, and infrangible bonds and in which above all it played back to itself, through its

institutions, its rituals, and its symbols, the representation, indeed the living offering, of its own immanent unity, intimacy, and autonomy” (9)

Jean-Luc Nancy conveys that societies that were envisaged around the framework of different principles are cherished and that a return to those lost, eroded, destroyed societies is the aim. Based upon Nancy it can be said that establishing the societies that are said to have perfectly experienced original principles (freedom, equality, fraternity, unity, solidarity) in the present requires a teleological effort: for example, if a politician wishes for the perfect conservatism he believed was experienced in Mohammed’s era to become dominant again he aligns his aims with Islam while taking his references from the Qur’an and historical practices. Doubtlessly, while defining administration models, bureaucratic relationships and activities through the conservative aim, the Islamic alignment also monopolizes the possibilities of subjects. The monopolization of possibilities, therefore, can exist with an identity that is carried with the search for origin. According to Nancy the society that is believed to have been established or that is being fought for is “immanent”; that is to say it is defined around an identity and is absolute. It is its own work, it makes itself absolute. Since immanence implies the previously indicated objectifying ontology it implies that a totalitarian page is being formed in social history. For this reasons identity takes a state of monopolizing possibilities as soon as it gravitates towards identity, origin or the search for immanence.

On the other hand, identity being given, presumed or aggrandized by way of emulating the past can be done through the future as well. Marxism is an example where possibilities are monopolized through the future: although Marxist teleology does not find its buttress in origin it attempts the monopolization of possibilities. For example, power being given to the workers by way of the soviets which will be established after the revolution and classlessness being the final goal attempts the monopolization of possibilities depending upon the aim of equality against the profit impetus of capitalism. The fraction whose possibilities are monopolized is now the minority rather than the majority; in communism built according to Marxist ideals the power of the minority over the majority will be broken by the bourgeoisie being turned into workers, and the possibilities which had been stolen from the workers and amassed by the bourgeoisie in their own domain of possibilities are horizontalized. Objectifying ontology objectifies the bourgeoisie in order to destroy itself and provides an important example to prove that communism which carries the flag of

classlessness is not free of the monopolization of possibilities. In this communism also prioritizes immanence and uses its theoretical and practical tools to defend immanence no matter what the cost. Still, it can be said that the Marxist ideal is free of the search of origin because it does not wish to return to the primitive communal society it finds to be more equal than capitalism but, to the contrary, moves with the dream of a society where that equality is further developed. After all, communism is a higher stage where there are no classes, governments, classes or money, where the principle of “*From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!*” (Marx 31) is used as based, and which has predefined molds. In this respect Marxism creates itself with the volition of creating a society that has no origin but hangs someone in the future and by making this society absolute with the identity of “*From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!*” monopolizes its possibilities to exist around principles more egalitarian than it.

Identity can have results that monopolize possibilities individually as well as making the difference between community and society clear. The person who manipulates a political movement suddenly becomes a “leader”, the mother of a soldier who elegizes for the end of the war a “matriarch”, a worker who demands a raise in pay a “union member”; a weight has been placed upon them and they are met with those identities. Identities are no immanently evil elements, however they are facilitators of the monopolization of possibilities in some situations. Men being made to assume the identity of “breadwinner” and women that of “homemaker” after the Second World War in order to raise economic activity is an important example because gender roles have installed man and woman in society in those ways after this. However there is a concept Agamben names “singularity” and enlarges to that which is social in time. Singularity is a significant example of being able to transcend the monopolization of possibilities through identities.

Agamben, who returns to Latin, quotes “(quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum seu perfectum—*whatever entity is one, true, good, or perfect*)” (*The Coming Community* 1) while beginning to explain the idea of singularity. Focusing on the phrase “quodlibet ens” Agamben conveys that he prioritizes the translation is “*being such that it always matters*” rather than “*being, it does not matter which*” (*The Coming Community* 1). Furthermore, Agamben says:

“In this conception such-and-such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims)—and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-such, for belonging itself. Thus being-such, which remains constantly hidden in the condition of belonging (“there is an x such that it belongs to y”) and which is in no way a real predicate, comes to light itself: The singularity exposed as such is whatever you want, that is, lovable.” (The Coming Community 1-2).

As an example, one who falls in love loves the one he falls in love with with his singularity, it is kind of a “fetishism”:

“Love is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, being small, being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid generality (universal love): The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such as it is” (Agamben, The Coming Community 2).

Friendship can be another example to understand what singularity is. For instance, Ada is a farmer’s child, is of liberal persuasions, is a cinema lover, an atheist, bisexual, and has too many other identities to count. Taking these identities as belonging absolutely to Ada or choosing one out of the many identities Ada has and prioritizing it means casting a shadow over Ada’s singularity. Ada is Ada with his changing identities and Ada’s singularity lies in his evolving totality; accepting Ada as a friend means accepting all kinds of Ada’s identities. Another phenomenon Agamben receives aid from while explaining singularity comes from language; his example is “example” (*The Coming Community* 9) as a concept. For instance, the word “photograph” encapsulates both an F set (universal) where all photographs are gathered and f (singular), which is a photograph inside of set F. Using something as an example, in that case, is equivalent to dissolving the distinction between the universality and singularity of that thing: *“Being-called-the property that establishes all possible belongings (being-called-Italian, -dog, -Communist)—is also what can bring them all back radically into question”* (Agamben, *The Coming Community* 10). The subject who defines himself as “young” exists in a superset created by definitions of other subjects defined as “young” while ascribing being “young” to himself according to his own definition: young is not in a state to be a given definition, since it is always recreated, it cancels itself and reproduces itself

constantly. Singularity is the sum of all kinds of identities that can be attributed to the word “young”. As in the examples of love, friendship, example and young, since singularity is actually the acceptance of all kinds of identities of the subjects and in that respect the possibilities of the subject not being monopolized because the acceptance of all identities of the subject is the liberation of the subjects from the oppressive ideologies that try to define them on the basis of one or a few of the identities they have. At the same time subjects are accepted as they are and are not anchored to one or a few of the identities that they have.

Social media platforms are, rather than a domain where the singularities of subjects can be expressed one by one, communicable networks where certain representable identities are brought to the forefront; because of this subjects create themselves through writing, photographs, videos and other types of sharing. Various identities that are attempted to be constructed or brought into the forefront may be “attractive”, “melancholic”, “bookworm”, “fan of the president”, “sensitive”... While saying “*What was technologized was not the body, but its image*” (*The Coming Community* 50). Agamben, in a way, was voicing that the images on social media close singularity. This closing of singularity is the person to monopolizing his own possibilities on an imaginary level and attempting to give the other a message along with this monopolization. Agamben expresses the dangers of canceling out singularity by saying “*Advertising and pornography, which escort the commodity to the grave like hired mourners, are the unknowing midwives of this new body of humanity*” (*The Coming Community* 50). According to Agamben pornography is a domain that is made more and more pornographic and the face of the pornography actor has the quality of being a “*pure means*” (*Profanations* 90). In other words the pornography actor is able to get into a certain character and erase all experiences he is having at the moment, good or bad, because of the message he wants to relay to the viewer. In a way pornography geared towards gain, advertisement and messages destroys the singularity of the actor by giving him a certain identity: said identity is sometimes ravished with delight, sometimes dominant and sometimes crafty. However, in the early examples of pornography that do not have the intention of relaying a message, for instance in the pornographic human images in the Amsterdam Sex Museum that do not contain acting, there is a very small presence of actors trying to immerse themselves in an identity; they are only displaying themselves—and only themselves, without tending towards an identity. For this reason, the identity creation process

tended towards by the pornography actor acting for the camera has a negative aspect that intersects with the identities that are created and brought to the forefront on social media. The destruction of singularity in both examples points to a context in which the possibilities of the subject are monopolized through certain identities.

Departing from Agamben, the bond between singularity and transcending the monopolization of possibilities is formed through singularity destroying the representation of identity and, in that respect, liberating the subject to define itself and be aware of its possibilities. It should be noted that the problem expressed when conveying that creating identities is used as a tool of alienation is not the regression of the success of twentieth century rights and recognition demands: women, as subjects prioritizing their “women” identity, demanded certain rights such as the right to vote, equal pay, and respect and were successful. Similarly, the identity embraced by workers, Africans and homosexuals liberated them on a social scale. Yet, certain power where winds of totalitarianism are blowing by way of methods such as states of emergency, immigration evaluations, mechanisms of supervision and refinement of personal data are becoming threatening with their attempts at giving up the heritage of identity movements. The gains of identity movements are not being rejected while singularity is being praised, only and only power who uses identity as a mechanism of alienation is being denounced.

Moving from all these examples, one thinks of how the function of identities that monopolizes possibilities can be evaded. Moreover, the actual issue comes to light as the question of how to liberate identity from monopolizing possibilities on a social scale. The idea of singularity Giorgio Agamben develops in *The Coming Community* present a special community, the coming community, as an answer. According to Agamben, the coming community has become a social example to the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities by transforming the concept of identity through singularity.

A- The Tiananmen Uprising

With “Tiananmen” Agamben can apply singularity from theory to practice:

“What was most striking about the demonstrations of the Chinese May was the relative absence of determinate contents in their demands (democracy and freedom

are notions too generic and broadly defined to constitute the real object of a conflict, and the only concrete demand, the rehabilitation of Hu Yao-Bang, was immediately granted)” (The Coming Community 85).

The Tiananmen event which actually began in 1976 April was essentially a mass uprising where the demands of the Chinese youth such as freedom to resist political oppression, liberty of expression and freedom of press were combined with protests against corruption. The value of the Tiananmen uprising is that it revealed the government placing its preference regarding conflict with a society that exists through identity rather than one that exists through singularity; because the demands of a society that exists through identity may be accepted sooner or later: after all the government can very well grind up subjects in the system who have had to become politicized in the opposite direction because of their demands by recognizing the identity and the following demands partially or completely. Those who struggle for education in the mother tongue, for suitable meals for vegan prisoners, who have demands to popularize inner city bicycle usage are organized around a representable identity; their demands are tangible and there is marathon they want to complete in the long term. In these situations the government plays or does not play the card of violence depending on its pragmatic paradigm, the national and international context and the power of the masses. However, in the end it has the ability to know how to act in response to communities organized around certain identities because it recognizes them. All the same, a community that can exist with its singularity, that is to say without a representable identity, organized like as a network, whose evolution cannot be foreseen and whose comprehensiveness is possible as a state, for the government, corresponds to a state of emergency where the microbe cannot be named and so the medicine to be used cannot be directly determined. For this reason singular community is “coming”:

“The novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization” (Agamben, *The Coming Community* 85).

Since the coming of the singular community is not and will not be completed it cannot out forward identities with the competence to represent and because of this cannot undertake the identity of “*affirmation of the social in opposition to the State*” (Agamben, *The Coming*

Community 86). Even if including the singular community into an identity is what is noteworthy for a government (Agamben, *The Coming Community* 86) the singular community is, in the measure that they resisted identity “*is the principal enemy of the State. Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear*” (Agamben, *The Coming Community* 87). The principal aim of the government in Tiananmen had been to define the coming community, that is to say the singular community around an identity; however it had not been able to achieve this goal. If the government had been able to define the community around an identity in Tiananmen it would have been able to monopolize its possibilities; meaning it would have been able to include it in the system by giving it its wishes or marginalizing it. However the singular community at Tiananmen was able to escape the government’s power to monopolize possibilities with its peaceful movement, its demands such as democracy and freedom and most importantly its absence of a representable identity. The singular community at Tiananmen neutralized and unseated the tools of the government that monopolized possibilities because the government was not able to find a representable identity. In this respect the Tiananmen uprising was able to make the unmet right seeking demands of a community heard much more loudly in the national and international domains thanks to its singularity and thusly the government monopolizing the possibilities of a community through identity did not come to pass.

B- The Gezi Resistance

In the early period of the Gezi Resistance when individuals did not arrive with the organizations they were a part of or when they did not prioritize these organizations the Gezi Resistance was also a singularity where possibilities could not be monopolized. Components who had not touched each other met during conflicts with the police in the area from the Tunnel to the Gezi Park: social democrats met anti-capitalist Muslims, Kemalists met homosexuals, anarchists met liberals. These meetings did not happen through subjects telling other subjects the identities they represented or an organization meeting another organization socially but through small conversations, discussion groups, ordinary forums and random encounters where subjects met subjects without an emphasis on identity. The spontaneity that

power could not inhibit during the Gezi Resistance was destroying the identities assigned by the changing governments of the Turkish Republic to certain groups (like Kurds being identified as terrorists or LGBTI people being identified as sex workers); on the other hand the identities commonly assigned to others in social fractions (like Kemalists thinking turbaned people are sharia supporters) were also shattered. Because of this phenomena like power taking actions that monopolize possibilities as a result of systematically turning one fraction against the other through identities (staging a coup) and monopolizing the possibilities of others by creating others (state of emergency) were revealed thanks to the meeting inside of the singularity of the Gezi Resistance.

The foundation that made it easy to transcend the monopolization of possibilities in the singularity of the Gezi Resistance was the recognition of the uniqueness of each other's domain of possibilities thanks to subjects getting to know those who were marginalized or the marginalized getting to know the others who were marginalized and that specific feeling of solidarity that ensured respecting each other's domain of possibilities. In a way different identities began to object to the monopolization of the domain of possibilities of different identities, fractions and subjects all together no matter the justification or manner of the monopolization. Singularity prescribed subjects leaving aside the objectifying ontology they had and not attempting to monopolize the domain of possibilities of others, and the temporary, if nothing else, suspension of the power that causes the monopolization possibilities and thus a structure that can transcend the monopolization of possibilities in the framework of ideological interventions. For exactly this reason, what was being organized at the beginning of the Gezi Resistance was the "coming community". Singularity, of course, owed having a characteristic such as its spontaneity to the absence of a representable identity: after all, relatively abstract demands such as "respecting different lifestyles" and "expansion of individual freedoms" had been the defining lines of the resistance alongside the demand of preserving the Taksim Gezi Park.

On the other hand, transcending the monopolization of possibilities does not mean transcending all forms of monopolization of possibilities within the singularity and the Gezi Resistance is proof of this. It can be said that two aspects of the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities was revealed with the Gezi Resistance: this first was being able to temporarily, if nothing else, avoid or be freed from the monopolization of possibilities

of the subjects in the singularity. The second was the abolition of subjects monopolizing each other's possibilities in the bonds they form with each other. Feminist women erasing the swear words that monopolized the possibilities of the female identity at first through certain micro-relationships and later on by generally influencing the social structure, which were written on the walls to protest power was both proof of the attempt at the monopolization of possibilities of protestors by other protestors and a good example that made it clear that the possibilities of female protestors could not only be monopolized by power. Swearing turning into a mechanism that can monopolize possibilities and an attack on women's bodies, sexualities and freedoms thanks to the anthropological and evolutionary power of language transmits how challenging it can be to transcend the monopolization of possibilities even in a singularity. It is not meaningful to expect every resisting subject to shed the customary and widespread forms of monopolization of possibilities since political movements that become prominent with their singularity are, after all, hybrid organizations that embrace different blocs. Instead of expecting the monopolization of possibilities to be transcended at the moment singularities are formed, it appears to be more sufficient to await the transformation of values, behaviors and consciousnesses in the passionate environment of singularities. In this respect, the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities in singularities is not possible through randomness but through a process of learning and teaching. Singularities not becoming prominent with a representable identity mandatorily transforms the power relationships between the subjects in the singularity while essentially destroying the power of one identity over another. While any kind of result of the monopolization of possibilities in the context of macro power influences micro relationships singularities attempt to turn around the state of monopolizing possibilities which is intangible but can be experienced and felt through micro relationships. In conclusion, singularity being a social example of the transcendence of monopolization of possibilities reveals that, as Agamben also states, political movements that come into existence through singularity form a structure that the organism known as the government has a hard time dealing with.

II. Individual Example of Transcending Monopolization of Possibilities: Temporary Autonomous Zones

Religious leaders who are given titles of “prophet”, “holy” and “saint”, especially those who have been able to take the world by storm with their teachings and gather millions of followers (Buddha, Moses, Jesus, Nanak, Bahá'u'lláh) went through reclusions before spreading their calls and messages. Sometimes they have turned reclusion into a practice. In these periods reclusion became a method used to get away from power as much as other people in domains that were not taken under control or that were undiscovered. They were not only a method of getting away, but also of escaping and gathering strength. It was argued that one could contact God and other supernatural beings and receive signs in the absence of power; poems were written, laws were built. In this respect reclusion was a respite that did not express only a stark loneliness, in fact maybe did not even express loneliness at all, but the subject being with itself and thus not being the subject stuck in between itself and others. Now, going to reclusion is associated with a possibility that we are deprived of more and more in the age of capitalism, in fact it is associated with an occupation that can be monetized. Subjects pay for plane tickets, hotels and trips in order to be able to go into reclusion in our day. Reclusion has opened a domain of profit that is based on the supply and demand equilibrium and is full of contradictions in the tourism sector. Subjects who wish to be free of the suffocating calculating working life of capitalism choose to be far from the public eye on vacation and try to fill the emptiness inside of them with reclusion. Temples, monasteries and halls of residences that used to open their doors to recluses, some of whom used to be fugitives of the law, have now been relegated to nothing but historical symbols; spaces that were formed specifically for recluse before capitalism which are becoming indistinct cannot be used anymore because of power being able to reach almost everywhere. Yet the practice of reclusion is still being carried out with a limited authenticity by some in the deserts, wild forests and icy lakesides where power has not yet been able to touch or is not interested in. The decrease of the old kind of reclusion means the increase of spaces and times than can be seized by power; in this respect the loss of reclusion is equivalent to the facilitation of the monopolization of possibilities. However, there are similarities between the suggestion of “temporary autonomous zones” presented by Hakim Bey to be free of power and the practice of reclusion. Both reclusion and temporary autonomous zones struggle to transcend the monopolization of possibilities. They have a personal approach while struggling to transcend the monopolization of possibilities because they do not prioritize the

form of social movement. Reclusion can be considered one of the earliest examples of Hakim Bey's temporary autonomous zone idea.

Hakim Bey writes

“Burglarize houses but instead of stealing, leave Poetic-Terrorist objects. Kidnap someone & make them happy. Pick someone at random & convince them they're the heir to an enormous, useless & amazing fortune — say 5000 square miles of Antarctica, or an aging circus elephant, or an orphanage in Bombay, or a collection of alchemical mss. Later they will come to realize that for a few moments they believed in something extraordinary, & will perhaps be driven as a result to seek out some more intense mode of existence” (10)

in relation to poetic terrorism, arguable to be the interpellative of the temporary autonomous zones. He also speaks of *“bolt[ing] up brass commemorative plaques in places (public or private) where you have experienced a revelation or had a particularly fulfilling sexual experience, etc.”* or *“go[ing] naked for a sign”* under the heading of poetic terrorism (10). Poetic terrorism is “terrorism” because it distinguishes itself as a design that can come against the orderliness of civilization built on order. On the other hand it persists in “poetic”ness because it plays havoc with the ordinary cycle of life with creative methods. While watching the evening news of politics and thinking of how little chance of intervention we have over that which is social, poetic terrorism gives us clues to how the individual, not the social, can turn the system about. For this reason, despite the tendency of the social to monopolize possibilities, the individual intends to transcend the monopolization of possibilities by clearing itself some areas and constructs the foundation of the idea of temporary autonomous zones. By saying *“I don't intend the TAZ [temporary autonomous zones] to be taken as more than an essay (“attempt”), a suggestion, almost a poetic fancy”* (92), Hakim Bey does not compress temporary autonomous zones into an absolute definition. Thus it is implied that the temporary autonomous zone experience —contrary to the identities and definitions of capitalism and power that monopolize possibilities- has a structure that liberates possibilities and allows the subject *“to express & experience (as much as I [he] can) a life & an art of life based on self-valuating ‘peak experiences,’ as well as ‘conviviality’ (which also possesses its own reward)”* (119).

One of the striking aspects of temporary autonomous zones is that they do not openly wage war on the government while transcending the monopolization of possibilities; instead of using customary methods of revolt like protests, collecting signatures, infinite hunger strikes and armed organization to gather masses, temporary autonomous zones depend on subjects freely becoming subjects. After all, the monopolization of possibilities occurs thanks to capitalism which intensely permeates the subjectification of subjects, and temporary autonomous zones allow, in a way, subjects to capture openness and creativity while abolishing the permeativeness of capitalism. Temporary autonomous zones at least give subjects a chance and opens the door for the subjectification of the subjects without being bound to strategies. The temporary autonomous zone

“is like an uprising which does not engage directly with the State, a guerilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it” (Hakim Bey 95)

which excludes power institutions that monopolize possibilities and daily capitalist habits. Temporary autonomous zones which require effort to remain temporary and that can exist against threats only and only with the uniqueness of experience are just as liable to be exploited as they are to blowing up because temporary autonomous zones are a reality that is constructed, that exists, that scatters and that disappears. However, the temporary autonomous zone which Hakim Bey mostly associates with chaos, can be read as a struggle to transcend the monopolization of possibilities that has the potential to initiate social change by an ever-growing aura and in which an isolated community can live by itself.

There are also concrete examples of temporary autonomous zones. Hakim Bey, who writes that temporary autonomous zones begin with a *“simple act of realization”* (95) attributes the inspiration for the temporary autonomous zones to the “pirate utopias” formed by the pirates of the 18th century. In this *“information network”* there were islands, castles whose needs could be met through solidarity and where trades were made and pirates were in *“whole mini-societies living consciously outside the law and determined to keep it up, even if only for a short but merry life”* (92). Similarly, the contextuality in which Middle Age assassins remained at war with the government and yet were able to remain just as invisible by hiding out in the mountains and castles, in which they shared information is another example of temporary autonomous zones of Hakim Bey (92). However, the evaluation of the

lives of pirates and Middle Age assassins as appropriate or inappropriate, right or wrong, good or bad according to ethical criterion has nothing to do with the affirmation or negation of temporary autonomous zones. The essential point is pirates, and Middle age assassins, being able to flee power through temporary autonomous zones. *“Modern technology, culminating in the spy satellite,”* says Hakim Bey, *“makes this kind of autonomy a romantic dream. . . In the future the same technology — freed from all political control — could make possible an entire world of autonomous zones”* (92). Hakim Bey conveys that power has increased its central power frighteningly with modern technology in our phase of civilization. Based on Hakim Bey’s views, it is implicated that we are living under the threat that leads to the motivation that no deficits should be allowed and that the deficits can be exposed since potentially all activities and data for everyone can be monitored, supervised, processed anytime. In this respect the chance of our attempts at forming temporary autonomous zones or our temporary autonomous zone experiences not being noticed by the government is inevitably decreasing. Temporary autonomous zones being caught, dispersed and prevented by the government -especially as temporary autonomous zones massify- is more likely. When it is considered that temporary autonomous zones are an attempt to transcend the monopolization of possibilities temporary autonomous zones being made difficult corresponds to the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities being made difficult as well. However, temporary autonomous zones can still be constructed and temporary autonomous zones can be diversified: for example squats, the secret parties of Iran and the deep web are examples of temporary autonomous zones.

A- Squats

Squats are an example of contemporary temporary autonomous zones because squats abolish the effect of monopolizing the possibilities that spaces that have been turned into property have. Thanks to squats, temporary autonomous zones can from time to time dissolve and be reinstated over time in a completely different place under completely different circumstances with completely different people. If, after being invaded, squats are deprivatized in illicit ways and opened to everybody’s intervention they have the effect of liberating spaces the government wants to confine to private property. Before all else, squats

liberate the subjects who interact or may interact with the space by liberating the space itself and by changing the space's status of property through the solidarity formed around the space. Thus, squats enter into the struggle of transcending the monopolization of possibilities. The absence of a structure to monopolize possibilities while the future of the space and the subjects who are linked to the space is being determined is a matter of discussion in the context of the decisions made based on the direct democracy or consensus that is at work in squats. If the states such as the space being opened to neighborhood residents, homeless people, artists, intellectuals, students, nomads, workers, the unemployed and other persons; the openness and transparency in the process of decision making; the characteristics of the space being bendable all the time and in any way are truly operating healthily, limitations that emulate a power that monopolizes possibilities are out of the question. Even the subjects who partake in the decision making process and are opposed to the decisions made are aware of the changeability of their relationship with the space; for this reason –contrary to the macro-political mechanism in which our participation in the decision making process is minimal-one cannot reach the conclusion that possibilities are being monopolized. Temporary autonomous zones are possible with the social, not political, organization of the opposition to and reversal of power in a place such a squat, with face to faceness of the communication between people, with the presence of public art and most importantly, with everything being openable and closeable.

B- Secret Parties of Iran

The secret house parties of Iran, which were examined in *Passionate Uprisings: Iran's Sexual Revolution*, Paris Mahdavi's ethnographic study, can be given as an example of temporary autonomous zones. Since the pressure Iran puts on inter-gender and intra-gender relationships and sexual experiences has been passed from consciousness to consciousness, action to action, experience to experience as an accumulation that has molded culture and has been molded by culture, that has been put into laws, has redesigned institutions from head to toe and has been transferred from discourse to discourse certain members of society have formed their own temporary autonomous zones and thus the house parties that protest the oppression of genders and sexual experiences in Iran and that have developed between the

upper and middle class members have become widespread lately. The obligation to cover one's head, ethical policing, difficulties in political representation, practices like gender apartheid in daily practices have caused Iran to use genders and sexuality in a way that monopolizes possibilities. The coming together of opposite sexes, European style dress and music, alcohol and drugs which can be called an experience revolution of sorts and which is, for now, being continued in closed spaces by the Iranian families who live well creates their attempt at transcending the monopolization of possibilities. As in Hakim Bey's definition, those who participate in the secret house parties are not directly entering into conflict with the government; they are subjects trying to find the peak of their experience before the government discovers and catches them. The police may, at any moment, find the youths who have experienced the abundance of living away from the eye of the vice squad, quietly as can be, as unarmed as the intragender and intergender encounters, the formation of sexual awareness, and this coincides with the "temporary" quality of temporary autonomous zones. As Hakim Bey says, temporary autonomous zones are also a festival (98). According to him, "*nearly a third of the year*" (98) was full of festivals in the Middle Age; perhaps there is nothing that corresponds to such long-lived festivities in our day but the house parties in Iran can be conceptualized as the festival of a youth strangled by the monopolization of possibilities.

C- Food Not Bombs

Practices that revolt against the food sector are temporary autonomous zones as well. Capitalism monopolizes our possibilities through food because foodstuffs which are of the essential requirements to live are turned into property in order to profit. However, there are temporary autonomous zones that are constructed against the food sector. Food Not Bombs, which has volunteers in many cities, even capitals, in Europe, works to reestablish the context in which possibilities were monopolized through food and nutrition. Food Not Bombs, where a temporary autonomous zones is created and the monopolization of possibilities is transcended, prepares a kitchen that is open to all and against poverty, the pillage of nature, the waste brought by the consumerist culture, where vegan meals are prepared. Food Not Bombs weaves a new paradigm that allows the transcendence of monopolization of

possibilities by (1) going from place to place while gathering the food, not paying a charge and using the resources that are set aside by grocers/supermarkets as leftovers, (2) preparing the meals collectively and experiencing a consciousness education during the process and (3) giving the food to those who need it, who cannot pay for food. The autonomous zone created by Food Not Bombs is also structured in a way that, once again, does not enter into conflict with the government yet creates micro-scale change and can dissolve itself in the face of government intervention when the time comes. The food sector corresponds to even nutrition as a necessity, a culture and political attitude being managed by governments, essentially through natural resources being privatized or governmentalized. The monopolization of the relationship formed between food and humans by said management is clear because millions of poor people cannot access enough food and food is sent to the trash because of the demand-supply balance. Moreover, the food sector's monopolization of possibilities through food can be determinant on vital things such as lifestyle, length of life and quality of health. Food Not Bombs as an example of a temporary autonomous zone takes responsibility for the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities by the food sector; in fact Food Not Bombs is able to reach the victims of the monopolization of possibilities. In this respect, Food Not Bombs abolishes the food relationship the system tries to form with the subjects and acclimates the subject to and replaces that relationship with a new one.

D- Deep Web

The deep web is also a temporary autonomous zone. Even though the nature of the deep web is open for discussion it is the existence of content that users with average know-how cannot reach and a relatively free zone being rendered possible in a certain portion of the internet. Moving from Hakim Bey terming the internet as "*totality of all information and communication transfer*" in its early stages (101) it can be seen that there may be an area free from the supervision of power on the internet. Even though dirty business such as political supervision, human trafficking and child pornography is realized the deep web also made scandals like WikiLeaks possible:

"The TAZ has a temporary but actual location in time and a temporary but actual location in space. But clearly it must also have 'location' in the Web, and this location

is of a different sort, not actual but virtual, not immediate but instantaneous. The Web not only provides logistical support for the TAZ, it also helps to bring it into being; crudely speaking one might say that the TAZ 'exists' in information-space as well as in the 'real world.' The Web can compact a great deal of time, as data, into an infinitesimal 'space.' We have noted that the TAZ, because it is temporary, must necessarily lack some of the advantages of a freedom which experiences duration and a more-or-less fixed locale. But the Web can provide a kind of substitute for some of this duration and locale — it can inform the TAZ, from its inception, with vast amounts of compacted time and space which have been 'subtilized' as data” (Hakim Bey 102).

In this respect users who can expose the government or disappear from the eyes of the government for a while can move in the deep web, their temporary autonomous zone of their own construction. For this reason, even a network of data is important because it can become a temporary autonomous zone that can disturb power.

CONCLUSION

There are four points of conclusion of the study that focalizes space, time, language, humans and non-human living beings, which are dominated by power through the monopolization of possibilities, and the study proposes solutions to the problem of the monopolization of possibilities.

The first conclusion of the study is that the modern method adopted by power is to monopolize possibilities and that the monopolization of possibilities has an open-ended, insidious as can be and wide tendency. The monopolization of possibilities has permeated many domains and has the potential to permeate many more domains depending on scientific-technological advancements. So, the monopolization of possibilities is not a concept definable with definite limits but a network of power relations that can expand in any direction and any shape. Because of this network-like structure space, time, language, humans and non-human living beings are exposed to the monopolization of possibilities within different relationships every day. However, the modern method of power does not only dominate things but also ensures that the things it dominates applies the power relationship to other things.

The second result of the study is the historicity of the monopolization of possibilities. The monopolization of possibilities does not belong to one specific power (for example, capitalism), but it has also developed in tandem with the birth of the power distinguished by various phases of civilization. Since the examples such as private property, discursivity of oppressive ideologies, human and animal exploitation, which have also been examined in the study, are not phenomena that began with capitalism, the monopolization of possibilities did not begin with capitalism either. The monopolization of possibilities has changed appearances to exist ontologically everywhere power exists. However, even though the monopolization of possibilities is not specific to capitalism, thanks to recent technological developments capitalism can realize the monopolization of possibilities in a much less visible way and condition subjects to its applications while realizing its construction. Thanks to the method it utilizes, capitalism recognizes and assumes the historicity of the monopolization of possibilities.

The third conclusion of the study is that the ontological violence which comes to be during the monopolization of possibilities rarely turns into physical violence in the classical sense. For instance, a phenomenon like slavery which, is mostly physical violence has transformed into the uncertainty of space-time present in the working hours of the precariat, or debt bondage which sometimes functions with threats and torture has transformed into debtfare, which calls for one to pay debts until the end of their life. The monopolization of possibilities under capitalism seems to be a lifestyle rather than a punishment and is presented as ordinary: the ordinariness and situatedness of the monopolization of possibilities has tried to have direct and openly striking result like those of physical violence and be as purified of mechanism that directs the dominated subjects' energy towards rage as possible. After all, capitalism has discovered the methods to develop the tools to minimize subjects' actions that can turn into a destructive opposition towards the system.

The fourth result of the study is that the individual/social togetherness of the methods of escape expressed as "transcending the monopolization of possibilities" that are examined in the second section of the study is important. Just as the monopolization of possibilities is not solely individual and points at a social construct, the transcendence of the monopolization of possibilities is possible through both individual and social methods. However, since development of the monopolization of possibilities is unforeseeable it would be meaningless to prescribe specific prescriptions for individual/social resistance and liberation struggles. The methods of transcending the monopolization of possibilities specified in the study may or may not include the other methods of transcendence that may be renewed in the future. Still, the point that can be argued is that in order to transcend the monopolization of possibilities an alliance must be formed between individual and social resistance and that a resistance practice where one or the other will be preferred must not be prioritized.

On the other hand, new studies can be produced moving forward from and developing upon this study.

Merging the study with a desire-centric power theory (subjects being constructed personally by the power to desire what it desires) may be considered. Even though the importance of desire in terms of its relation to power has been demonstrated by philosophers such as Foucault, Deleuze and Agamben, the essential requirement is to reveal how power directs desire and how that desire is appropriated by subjects rather than reiterating the

relationship of desire and power. A desire-centric power theory that has the capacity to become a theoretical determinant of the future may be quite useful in explaining how the subject is subjectified and thus how the subject gains an identity.

The section of the study that addresses non-human living-beings is open to development. Even though the exploitation of non-human living being was explained, the approaches that may ensure the transcendence of the monopolization of the opportunities of non-human living beings have not been discussed profoundly. Since non-human living beings who live from one factory to the next and the existence of a sector that survives thanks to massacres/exploitation are in question transcending the monopolization of possibilities becomes a complicated issue in regards to non-human living beings. Because of this transcending the monopolization of possibilities must be thought of holistically, not only for human subjects but for non-human living beings as well; it is essential that the rights of both groups are established in such a way that they do not contradict each other during this process of thought.

Last of all, the study can be developed so that it embraces different methods of transcending the monopolization of possibilities. Seeing as the monopolization of possibilities has distinguished itself and gained capillarity with technology new methods, especially technologic methods, of transcending the monopolization of possibilities can be found: even though methods such as the street protests of the Tiananmen Uprising and the Gezi Resistance are effective, it is inevitable that resistance will become more technological where power does. Those new methods of resistance being put forth by intellectuals who have a command of knowledge and mass mediums will provide a great contribution to the development of the study.

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