

*The region-of-origin effect on voting behavior: The case of Turkey's internal migrants**

Ali T. Akarca **,†, Cem Başlevent ***

Received 01 July 2010; received in revised form 01 October 2010;
accepted 04 October 2010

Abstract.

In this paper, the relative importance of the origins and destinations of Turkey's internal migrants on their voting behavior is examined. By using a pre-election survey from 2007, it is first demonstrated that migrants vote differently than non-migrants. Then province-level election data is brought into the analysis to determine whether migrants' political tendencies are associated more with the voting patterns prevailing in their host provinces or the provinces they are originally from. According to the results of the econometric models estimated, a positive and significant 'origin' effect exists for most migrants, but a significant 'destination' effect is lacking. The origin effect estimate implies that if the vote share of a party exceeds its nationwide average by 10 percentage points in a given province, then the probability that this party will be chosen by a migrant born in that province increases by about 5 percentage points. This finding is attributed to continued cultural and economic ties of the migrants with their origins and with fellow migrants from their hometowns at their destinations.

Keywords: Internal migration; Assimilation; Voter behavior; Party choice; Turkey; Logit
JEL Classification: D72, R23.

Özet. Oy verme davranışında orijin etkisi: Türkiye'nin iç-göçmenleri örneği

Türkiye'de iç-göçmenlerin oy verme davranışlarında, göçün başlangıç ve bitiş bölgelerinin görece önemleri incelenmiştir. Önce 2007 yılında yapılmış olan bir seçmen eğilimleri anketinin verileri kullanılarak, iç-göçmenlerin parti tercihlerinin yerli seçmenlerden farklı olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Daha sonra, il bazında oy oranlarının da analize katılması ile, göçmenlerin parti tercihlerinin, yaşadıkları illerdeki ('destinasyon'daki) politik ortamdan ziyade, doğdukları ildeki ('orijin'deki) oy verme örüntülerine bağlı olduğu sonucu elde edilmiştir. Kestirilen ekonometrik modeller, bir partinin orijinde ülke ortalamasının yüzde 10 puan üzerinde oy almış olmasının, o ilde doğmuş bir göçmenin o partiyi oy verme olasılığını yüzde 5 puan artırdığını göstermektedir. Bu bulgunun, göçmenlerin ayrıldıkları yörelerle ekonomik ve kültürel bağlarının devam etmekte olmasından ve destinasyonlarında da hemşehrileriyle yakın ilişkilerinin sürmesinden kaynaklandığı öne sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İç göç; Asimilasyon; Seçmen davranışı; Parti tercihi; Türkiye;

Logit

JEL Sınıflaması: D72, R23.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 10th International Conference of the Middle East Economic Association, held in Istanbul, Turkey, 24-26 June, 2010, where we received some useful comments. The constructive criticisms and suggestions made by Paul Miller and the anonymous referee of this journal were very beneficial as well. We are also grateful to Konda Research and Consultancy for providing the micro data and to Güvenç Gürbüz for his help with the preparation of the macro data.

** Corresponding Author, University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Economics. E-mail: akarca@uic.edu

*** Istanbul Bilgi University, Department of Economics. E-mail: cbaslevent@bilgi.edu.tr

† Address for correspondence: Ali Akarca, University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Economics (mc 144), 601 S. Morgan Street, Chicago, Illinois 60607, USA.

1. Introduction

During the last sixty years, about 7 to 8 percent of the Turkish population has moved from one province to another in every five-year interval.¹ This movement was essentially from the east and north towards the west and south, that is from the less developed and poorer parts of the country to the more industrialized and richer regions. As a consequence of this massive internal migration, the urbanization rate has increased from about 25 to 75 percent, and the share of agriculture in total employment has decreased from about 77 to 24 percent between the 1950's and 2008. According to the most recent census conducted in 2000, twenty-eight percent of Turkey's population of then 68 million resided in a province other than the one they were born in. As can be observed in Figure 1, this ratio is the highest in provinces surrounding the western, northern and eastern shores of the Marmara Sea and those lying across the southern Aegean and the Mediterranean coastline between İzmir and Adana, as well as the three inland ones between the Marmara Sea and Ankara in the center. These sixteen provinces with migrant shares of over one-fourth incorporate 45 percent of Turkey's population and 75 percent of those living outside their birth provinces. Migrants make up 47 percent of their aggregate population. In İstanbul province which includes Turkey's largest metropolis, this ratio is even higher at 61 percent. With such large numbers, it is natural to expect migrants to have a strong influence on the country's political affairs. Just noting that 54 out of the 70 members of the parliament elected from İstanbul in 2007 were born elsewhere should be sufficient to make this point. Therefore, to predict and make sense of political outcomes and their likely consequences, one needs to account for the behavior of migrant voters and understand whether it differs from that of the natives or not.

There are several reasons why the political behavior of migrants should be expected to differ. First of all, they are likely to have different demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and therefore different political ideologies and economic interests than the natives. Secondly, the problems faced by the migrants at their destinations are likely to be different than those who have been living there a long time. Thirdly, the migrants are likely to maintain some ties with the locations from which they have originated and vote accordingly. They might care about the loved ones left behind and might still own property in their hometowns. Finally, ideology and party choices of a person are likely to be influenced heavily by the environment in which he/she has been raised. It is unlikely that the habits and the worldview ac-

¹ The official figures for this rate are available only for the 1975-2000 period, but they are believed to be similar during 1950-1975 for which no detailed migration statistics are available, and for the post-2000 period for which the statistics will be available after the 2011 census. It is generally accepted that the internal migration in Turkey began in earnest in 1950. This can be ascertained from the fact that the urbanization rate was almost unchanged between 1935 and 1950 (24 and 25 percent, respectively), but it reached the level of 34 percent in 1965.

quired in formative years can change overnight. In fact, we would not only expect migrants to differ from the natives, but also from migrants from other regions, with different cultural backgrounds. Therefore, the speed with which migrants integrate with the destination community is also likely to vary according to their region of origin.

Our aim in this paper is to first illustrate empirically that the migrants' party choices are indeed different from those of the natives, and then test whether their behavior can be explained by their continuing emotional or economic ties with their original hometowns or the people who have also migrated from the same area. In so doing, we observe the relationship between the party choices of the migrants and the political climates prevailing in their provinces of origin and residence, controlling for their socio-economic, demographic, and ideological characteristics. We obtain our empirical estimates using data drawn from a nationwide survey conducted shortly before the 2007 national elections and official province-level data from the same elections. The survey data allows us to identify the respondents who currently reside in a province other than the one they were born in, that is, the 'life-time migrants'. In the absence of more detailed information such as the exact timing of or the reason for their relocation, we classify all of these individuals as migrants and the rest of the sample as non-migrants (or natives). To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to bring individual and province-level data together to perform an econometric analysis of the party preferences of internal migrants using discrete choice models.

The next section of the paper contains discussions on the concepts of assimilation, origin effects, and hometown ties between the migrants and how they apply to the Turkish context. In section 3, we present some descriptive statistics pertaining to our data and compare the characteristics of migrant and native voters as well as migrants from different regions. In section 4, we present our econometric findings. Multinomial logit estimates are used to reveal the impact of migration status on the party choice, and conditional logit results are presented to discuss the patterns related to what we call the 'origin' and 'destination effects'. Finally, in section 5, our conclusions are listed.²

² Determining the socio-economic reasons behind internal migration in Turkey is beyond the scope of our paper. The general finding of the many articles which study this matter is that the push and pull factors proposed in the international literature apply to the Turkish case as well (for a review, see Çelik, 2007). The Kaya (2009) study, on the other hand, focuses on the 'forced migration' out of Eastern and Southeastern Turkey throughout the 1990's due to security concerns. One of the main themes of the reported in-depth interviews is that these migrants feel very little attachment to their new surroundings, but are also unwilling to return home. This book also has a comprehensive record of the existing studies on internal migration in Turkey including a listing of the Master's and Ph.D. theses on the subject.

2. Theoretical Framework

The basic premise of this study is that migrants do not ‘assimilate’ into their host regions politically. Therefore, it will be useful to begin by clarifying what is meant by assimilation, as the term is used and defined in different ways in different fields. In the economics literature, assimilation refers to the progress of immigrants towards the levels enjoyed by natives in economic outcomes such as labor market earnings (Chiswick, 1978, 1979; Borjas, 1985), and the same idea has been extended to other variables such as the rate of home ownership (Chua and Miller, 2009).

Political scientists, on the other hand, use the term not only to explain the process through which immigrants (or ethnic groups in general) begin to behave like the native population in terms of the heterogeneity in their political preferences (Dahl, 1961), but also in terms of the intensity of their participation in political affairs (Verba and Nie, 1972). Therefore, empirical studies in this field are concerned with the testing of hypotheses regarding the evolution of political tendencies (Jackson, 1988; White, et al. 2008) as well as participation patterns (Lien, 1994; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999).³ In addition to the abovementioned traditional approaches, there is also a growing literature dealing with the ‘economics of ethnicity’ where economic outcomes are associated with assimilation - or its lack thereof - in the political sense (Chiswick, 2009). This strand of literature classifies migrants into four states based on the relative strengths of their attachment to their origins and the host society, namely integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization, thus allowing for a more thorough examination of the relationship between ethnic identity and economic behavior (Constant and Zimmermann, 2008).

Naturally, there are also empirical studies addressing the more general question of whether and why immigrants have different attitudes on political issues than natives. These can be branched into three groups: those investigating attitudes of inter-regional migrants in a particular country (McMahon, et al., 1992, on Britain; Campbell et al., 1960, Converse, 1966, Brown, 1981 and 1988, Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2001 and 2003, and MacDonald and Franko, 2008, on the U.S.), those investigating behavior of expatriates in their home country elections (Fidrmuc and Doyle, 2004, on Czechs and Poles living in Western Europe, North America and Australia; Marcelli and Cornelius, 2005, on Mexicans residing in the U.S.; and Escrivá et al., 2010, on Peruvians residing in Spain), and those studying voting behavior of international migrants (Humphrey and Louis, 1973, on Greek immigrants in the U.S.; Finifter and

³ As Skerry (2000) points out, sociologists have long been making the point that assimilation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, and that the social, economic, or cultural assimilation of immigrants does not necessarily lead to their political assimilation (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Gordon, 1964). This view suggests that political assimilation is even less likely to occur when the ‘acculturation’ of an ethnic group is not complete.

Finifter, 1989, on American immigrants in Australia; Black et al., 1987, on British, South European, East European, and British West Indian immigrants in Canada; Garcia, 1987, and DeSipio, Uhlaner, 2007 and Bassler, 2008, on Mexican immigrants in the U.S.; Correa, 1998, Latin American immigrants in the U.S.; Bass and Casper, 2001, on migrants of various origins in the U.S.; Dancygier and Saunders, 2006, on Scot, black, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants in Britain and migrants from the countries of guest workers as well as from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in Germany; White et al., 2008, on migrants of various origins in Canada; and Luttmer and Singhal, 2008 on migrants from various countries living in variety of nations).

Of the three groups of studies, the one most relevant for our study is obviously the first. One lesson that can be drawn from those studies is the need to consider political environments both at the origin and at the destination for a definitive understanding of migrant behavior. For example, Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1966) find that political preferences of voters remain largely unchanged after their migration. However, Brown (1981 and 1988), McMahon, et al. (1992), and MacDonald and Franko (2008) argue that when the political environment at the destination is different than the one at the origin, migration does have an impact on the voting behavior of a migrant. We should emphasize that these studies focus on whether the party identifications of the migrants change following their relocation. In other words, they contrast voting patterns at the origin in the past (i.e. at the time of migration) with the ones prevailing at the destination at present. In view of the cultural and socio-economic structures specific to Turkey, we intend to go one step further and measure the impacts of current voting patterns both at the origins and the destinations.

Although it may appear that only the first of the three branches of literature is of direct relevance to the issue being examined in this paper, the many concepts and theories developed in relation to other branches, and their findings, are applicable to internal migrants as well. The circumstances of an expatriate or an international migrant are not that different from an internal migrant, especially in the case of Turkey, which exhibits a great deal of regional diversity in terms of demographic, linguistic, economic, social, and cultural characteristics. The presence of a large ethnic-Kurdish population with its own native language, sectarian differences among the predominantly-Muslim population, and varying degrees of Western and Middle-eastern/Islamic influences on cultural values across the nation imply that many of the factors that motivate international studies on migrants have much relevance to the Turkish case. For instance, the paper by Luttmer and Singhal (2008) is of particular relevance to the current study, as it utilizes a rich cross-country data set to show the impact of a persistent cultural component to political

preferences. The authors estimate models with country fixed-effects that explain the immigrants' preferences for redistribution by the average preference in their birth countries, controlling extensively for individual characteristics as well as country-of-residence fixed effects. In their review of the literature, they note that country-of-origin effects have been found to be useful in explaining the effects of cross-country heterogeneity in cultural norms on other outcomes such as fertility, savings, employment rates, and wage gaps.

The empirical literature dealing specifically with origin and destination effects on internal migrants in Turkey is rather sparse. The one study we are aware of in this regard is Shmuelewitz (1996). This study brings province level results from three elections together with provincial in- and out-migration rates to uncover the potential link between internal migration and voting behavior in Turkey. Rather than arguing for the presence of region-of-origin effects, the author's main argument is that migrants are likely to turn to extremist parties in response to the adverse socio-economic conditions they encounter at their destinations. However, the author's attempt to verify the paper's basic premise that migration from villages to cities contributed to the strengthening of the extreme and religious right in Turkish politics does not prove to be conclusive.

There is also a large body of sociology literature which offers a specific and comprehensive description of the web of relations that account for the political behavior of Turkey's internal migrants. Although primarily theoretical or anecdotal in nature, these studies provide convincing explanations as to why the political assimilation of migrants is especially unlikely, and the origin effects are likely to be strong, in the Turkish context. Many of these studies examine economic and political outcomes by focusing on the concept of *hemşehrilik*, a term used to describe the links between *hemşehris*, i.e. people who are originally from the same town or region (Kurtoğlu, 2005). Their basic argument is that people who have the same roots of origin engage in collective political behavior to pursue their common economic interests in both the origin and the destination. For most groups of migrants, the informal links between them have been formalized in the shape of 'hometown associations' which probably exist in greater numbers in Turkey than anywhere else in the world. The mere existence of these associations can be seen as a reflection of Turkish migrants' need for not only an expression of identity, but also economic survival. According to Hersant and Toumarkine (2005), these associations are "not so much meeting places publicising pre-existing community solidarity", but rather "the points at which political and social networks fuse giving rise to a means of communication with the political-institutional system."

Also drawing attention to the clientelistic chain of relations between po-

litical organizations, hometown associations, and their members, Narlı (2002) argues that the failure of certain political parties to ‘mobilize’ the voters has to do with their disregard for the ‘primordial’ ties between the *hemşehris*. She claims that these informal and formal networks have provided the suitable setting for the grassroots politics that pro-Islamist parties have engaged in to great electoral success during the past two decades. As discussed in Kalaycıoğlu (2007), the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the party in power since 2002, probably owes its success not only to its ability to appeal to the value systems of conservative masses, but also to “providing for rapid improvement in socio-economic welfare” to those who otherwise would have a much smaller chance of upward social mobility. Öniş (2000) also notes that such informal networks provide a rudimentary form of welfare provision, and that they are crucial to the understanding of the volatile electoral politics in Turkey. According to Narlı (2002), it is mainly through the above-mentioned links that people are able to make economic gains ranging from finding jobs to obtaining construction permits or title deeds to the pieces of land that they illicitly occupy. Ayata (2008) also argues that the place of origin plays a significant role in community formation and land occupation around the city especially in the early stages of migration. Assuming that the majority of internal migrants lack the financial means to purchase proper housing at the time of their arrival at the destination, it makes sense that their political choices are likely to be affected by their prospects of becoming a part of this redistributive process.⁴

In sum, the hypotheses put forth and the empirical evidence presented in the literature point to the economic significance, and thus political relevance, of the ‘hometown ties’ among the internal migrants and also to the fact that some political movements have been more successful than others in taking advantage of this social structure. Without ruling out the potential role of other factors such as the development of a certain worldview in the origin prior to migration, the empirical findings to be presented here can be interpreted as evidence in favor of or against these theories.

⁴ Given the prevalence of squatter housing in Turkey especially in densely-populated (and migrant-receiving) metropolitan areas, the last point made could be more relevant to political outcomes than it might at first seem. The political-economy behind illegal housing attracts attention from different fields as Turkey witnesses the increasing influence of the *gecekondu* (literally meaning ‘built (or landed) overnight’) neighborhoods in political and cultural life (e.g. Erman, 2001). Focusing on electoral outcomes, Özler (2000) finds that the pro-Islamist Welfare Party fared better in the 1995 national elections in neighborhoods with larger shares of squatter voters. Yalçıntan and Erbaş (2003) also carry out an extensive study demonstrating the strong link between the *gecekondu*s and election outcomes in İstanbul. Buğra (1998) points to the economic consequences of squatting and refers to this phenomenon as the “immoral economy of housing in Turkey”. Finally, Başlevent and Dayıoğlu (2005) and Dayıoğlu and Başlevent (2006) address the illegal housing issue from an income distribution perspective and find empirical evidence suggesting that *gecekondu*s have a sizeable equalizing effect on income inequality which is larger in metropolitan areas.

3. The Data and Descriptive Statistics

The micro data we work with is drawn from a survey conducted by research company Konda in 34 of Turkey's 81 provinces three weeks prior to the 22 July 2007 general elections, and predicted the outcome of that election remarkably well. The data set contains information about the party choices of the respondents in the 2007 elections, in addition to their socio-demographic characteristics, ideological tendencies, and views on the state of the economy. Another bit of information available in the data set allows us to identify the respondents who currently reside in a province other than the one they were born in. As mentioned earlier, we classify these individuals as migrants and the rest of the sample as non-migrants.

The original survey sample was obtained by a multi-stage stratified sampling method based on the 2000 General Census and the 2002 General Election results. The sampling process involved the stratification and grouping of neighborhoods and villages (which are the primary sampling units in urban and rural areas, respectively) according to province, statistical region, educational attainment level, employment data, census data, and election results. The neighborhoods and villages in the sample were selected randomly based on population size. From the full sample of 3,591 observations, we had to exclude the 47 respondents for whom the 'province of birth' information was missing. We also eliminated the 562 observations involving undecided respondents and the 260 'no answer' cases. The exclusion of 37 observations due to miscellaneous missing information meant that the econometric work would be carried out on a sample size of 2,685 in which the share of migrants is 25 percent.

Utilizing the 12-way regional classification of the country by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) is a reasonable way of looking for the spatial factors of migrant voting behavior. With the birthplace information available in the data, each migrant respondent can be identified with one of those regions. The twelve TurkStat regions are contiguous and composed of provinces that are similar in terms of their socio-economic characteristics and are meant to provide the basis for measuring regional differences and also for obtaining nationwide statistics. These are also the very same regions involved in the sampling process of the survey from which our data is taken. However, our preliminary work revealed that the twelve regions can be further aggregated into three groups, without any loss of meaningful information for the purpose at hand. Therefore, we aggregated the Eastern Black Sea and Western Black Sea regions, made up of 16 provinces, and named this larger region the North. We also aggregated the Northeast, Central-east and South-east Anatolia regions, comprising 24 provinces, and named it the East. The remaining seven TurkStat regions were combined to create the West. The last region, consisting of 41 provinces, is obviously too large to be considered as

a homogeneous unit in terms of political tendencies. However, we found that considering its sub-regions does not produce significant results with regard to the aspects of the voting behavior of migrants that we are interested in. Our three-way grouping, depicted in Figure 2, makes sense considering the voting patterns in these regions and their ethnic compositions. Many of the provinces grouped together here also end up in the same groups of provinces obtained through cluster analysis performed in Akarca and Başlevent (2010). While the Eastern provinces are heavily populated with voters of Kurdish origin, the residents of the Black Sea provinces are also known to have strong ties with their fellow townsmen which manifests itself in both economic and political life. These two regions are also associated with high rates of out-migration. In our working sample, 24 percent of migrants were born in the North, and 35 percent were born in the East, whereas the sample shares of these two regions' residents are 12 and 17 percent, respectively.

The descriptive statistics pertaining to our sample are given in Table 1. It is obvious from the reported figures that the party choices of natives and migrants differ considerably. The popularity of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is much higher among the migrants than among the natives. Party choices of migrants vary also from one region of origin to another. The support the AKP gets from the migrants originating in the North and the East is higher than the support it gets from the migrants with origins in the West and the natives in general. The support given for political parties is more evenly distributed among the migrants originating in the West. The Republican People's party (CHP) gets its support essentially from the migrants born in the West and from non-migrants.⁵

It turns out that migrants and non-migrants are similar in terms of their demographic characteristics. This more-or-less applies to migrants from various regions of the country as well except those originating from the East, who appear to be older and more male. Interestingly, migrants from all regions have a higher level of education and income than the natives.⁶ Migrants from the West are richer and more educated than migrants from other areas. The likelihood of a migrant residing in an urban area is considerably higher than it is for a non-migrant. While 60 percent of the natives reside in urban locations, the corresponding figure for migrants is 83 percent. The proportion reaches 90 percent among the migrants from the North.

⁵ Of the two parties mentioned, the CHP is the oldest party of Turkey and is currently the main opposition party in the parliament. This party is considered to be at the center-left of the political spectrum, although it has become increasingly nationalistic in recent years. The AKP, the party in power since 2002, on the other hand, is a relatively young conservative party with roots in the banned pro-Islamist Virtue Party. However the party has disavowed the Islamist and anti-Western stands of its predecessor and has moved towards the center.

⁶ This is consistent with the Filiztekin and Gökhan (2008) finding from census data that migrants are better educated than non-migrants.

The migrants from the East and the North appear to be less concerned about acts against the secular nature of the state than their counterparts originating in the West, and the natives (See the notes to Table 1 for variable definitions). They are also more satisfied with the economic performance of the government. These may partially explain why a greater portion of them vote for the AKP. While the migrants from the East are more likely to support the idea of European Union membership than the natives, the migrants from the West and the North are not. This pattern may be explained by the tendency of Kurdish voters to be pro-EU in anticipation that membership will bring about improvements in their civil rights.

4. Econometric Analysis

In the first step of the econometric work, we examine whether migration status has a significant effect on a Turkish voters' party choice in the 2007 election. Since nearly half of the respondents express an intention to vote for the AKP, and another 20 percent claim to be supporters of the CHP, we focus on the three-way choice made between these two parties and the rest.⁷ More specifically, our methodology involves the explanation of a respondent's tendency to vote for the AKP, the CHP, or another party, using his/her demographic and socio-economic characteristics, economic evaluations, and migration status. To do this, we fit multinomial logit regressions to the full sample of respondents, results of which are presented in Table 2. Since the AKP is defined as the reference category, positive coefficient estimates should be interpreted as a positive association between the explanatory variable in question and the likelihood of choosing the alternative in question over the AKP.⁸

The estimated impacts of the party dummies and the socio-demographic variables are mainly in line with those discussed in detail in Akarca and Başlevent (2009). In the interest of brevity, here we will just note that being younger, less educated, poorer, more optimistic about the economy, and less worried about threats to secularism increase the likelihood of voting for the AKP over both of the remaining choices. Since our focus is on the role played by the migration status variable, the key finding of the model is that

⁷ Caution should be exercised in examining the estimates pertaining to the 'other parties' category, since this category comprises of many dissimilar parties which were combined due to their small sample sizes. The three-way choice, however, turns out to be quite adequate in producing the results which are the primary concern of our study.

⁸ It is well-known that the Multinomial Logit model makes the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and that in many cases the assumption turns out to be too strong. The post-estimation routines developed by Long and Freeze (2005) for software package STATA allow for the testing of the IIA assumption using the tests presented in Hausman and McFadden (1984) and Small and Hsiao (1985) which rely on the stability of the estimated coefficients when the model is re-estimated after the observations relating to one of the choices are omitted from the sample. In our case, with p -values of the chi-squared test statistics ranging from 0.36 to 1.00, both tests reach the conclusion that the IIA assumption is valid.

the AKP is more popular among the migrants as implied by the statistically significant negative coefficient estimates of the MIGRANT dummy. To be specific, these coefficients measure the change in the logarithm of the odds of choosing an outcome over the base category in response to a change of the migrant dummy from zero to one. Since it is difficult to make sense of these quantities, one common practice is compute the marginal effects of the explanatory variables, i.e. the changes in the probabilities of the three outcomes in response to the change of the migrant dummy from zero to one. It turns out that when the rest of the variables are held constant at their sample means, being a migrant has a 14.1 percentage points of positive impact on the probability of voting for the AKP, whereas the corresponding figures for the CHP and 'Other' are -5.6 and -8.5, respectively. Since these results have been obtained controlling for the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of voters and other factors known to impact party preferences, it is obvious that there are other, less obvious, factors that shape the behavior of the migrants.⁹

In an effort to uncover the reasons behind the different voting behavior of the migrants, we estimated modified versions of the basic model, which we will only summarize here.¹⁰ In one variant, we differentiated between migrants from different parts of the country. When we re-estimated the multiple choice model with three region-specific migrant dummies instead of one, we found that the AKP's strength among the migrants is not nationwide. While migrants from the Northern and the Eastern regions are more likely to choose the AKP over the other two options, a similar effect is not observed for those born in the West. Transforming the estimates of this 'regional differences' model into marginal effects, we find that the marginal effects are larger in the case of migrants from the North for whom the figures for the AKP, the CHP, and Other are 31.0, -20.0, and -10.9, respectively. For migrants from the East, the corresponding figures are 14.6, -10.0, and, -4.6. For migrants from the West, the marginal effects are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.

To consider the possible behavioral differences between migrants making inter-regional versus intra-regional moves, we repeated our empirical exercise using only the observations from 13 provinces all of which fall into our Western region.¹¹ These provinces account for 81 percent of all migrants in our data and, by definition, host only the inter-regional migrants from the

⁹ Since the survey does not provide information relating to ethnic origins, we are unable to control for this factor in the econometric work. However, as will be discussed subsequently, our key findings are not driven by the patterns in regions where ethnic voting is believed to be the most prevalent.

¹⁰ The results discussed in the remainder of this subsection are available from the authors upon request.

¹¹ These provinces, chosen based on migrant shares in their population, are the following: Adana, Afyon, Ankara, Antalya, Balıkesir, Bursa, Denizli, Eskişehir, İstanbul, İzmir, Kocaeli, Manisa, and Tekirdağ.

North and the East. In other words, this exercise allows us to concentrate on those one might consider a true migrant. However, since the key findings of our models remained unchanged, we decided to proceed with the full sample to make our conclusions as universal as possible.

Finally, we estimated a full-interaction model that allows for different slope parameters for migrants and non-migrants. This specification resulted in a significantly larger coefficient of the years of education variable for the migrant subsample in both the ‘CHP vs. AKP’ and the ‘Other vs. AKP’ equations and caused the main effect of the MIGRANT dummy to become insignificant. In the ‘Other vs. AKP’ equation, the coefficient of the SECULARISM dummy is also larger for migrants. It appears that the reason why a positive level effect was observed for migrants in the basic model was that less educated migrants and migrants who felt that secularism was not in danger had a higher tendency to vote for the AKP than their non-migrant counterparts. This observed pattern, however, falls short of providing a behavioral explanation for the voting patterns among migrants.

In summary, the findings from the various versions of our 3-way party choice model reveal not only that there are differences between migrant and non-migrant voting behavior, but also that there are significant differences among the behaviors of migrants, depending on their individual characteristics such as the level of education, as well as the geographical aspects of their relocation. Thus, there is a strong hint that the origin of a migrant exerts a crucial influence on his/her party choice through cultural, sociological, and anthropological channels. In the rest of the paper, we will pursue this line of thinking and look for evidence to determine whether this is the case or not.

4.1. Empirical results from a model involving destination and origin effects

The hypothesis we aim to test in this section is that the voting behavior of migrants is associated with the voting patterns in the areas from which they have emigrated. Our presumption is that such an effect is observed when they have strong ties with their origins or those who also migrated from the same region. As these ties weaken, we expect the migrants’ voting patterns to become more similar to those observed in their current locations. In order to operationalize this idea, we need to bring in additional information to our econometric model that can serve as a proxy for all of the hometown ties that may be at play, as well as a control for the political climate prevailing in the destination.

To accomplish this, we once again examine the 3-way party choice, this time focusing on the sample of migrants alone. We add two new explanatory variables to the basic model. One of these variables, ORIGIN, measures the

relative strength of the three alternatives in the original province, the second one, DESTINATION, does the same for the destination province.¹² To be specific, we have two variables each of which contain three different bits of information: (i) ‘the AKP vote share at the origin (destination)’ defined as the deviation from the AKP’s nationwide vote share (46.6%), (ii) ‘the CHP vote share at the origin (destination)’ defined as the deviation from the CHP’s nationwide vote share (20.9 %), and (iii) a figure computed in a similar manner for the ‘Other’ alternative. The vote shares used here are measured in percentages and are official election figures available for all 81 provinces (as opposed to sample shares which are available for only 34 provinces).¹³ The use of the ‘deviation from the mean’ is necessary in our context so that we have comparable figures for the three alternatives. Obviously, these are alternative (or choice)-specific variables which take on the same values for all individuals who have migrated from the same province. Therefore, the estimation of the new model requires the application of a conditional logit model which allows for both individual and alternative-specific variables.

In its basic form, the conditional logit model calculates only 1 set of coefficients for the explanatory variables instead of $k-1$ (where k is number of alternatives) and thus can be thought of as a restricted form of the multinomial model.¹⁴ However, it is a more accurate representation of the decision-making process as it accounts for the fact that the impacts of certain factors do not vary across the alternatives being compared. In our model, the definition of ORIGIN and DESTINATION as alternative-specific variables implies that larger (or smaller) values of these variables may increase the likelihood that the party for which the large (or small) value is observed will be chosen, and also that the magnitude of this effect does not vary across the parties. Therefore, inferences made using these variables will not pertain to a specific party, but to parties in general.

To help the readers visualize how the data needs to be set up so that the conditional logit model can be estimated in STATA, we list below the observations for two imaginary individuals, one of whom ($id=1$) chooses the CHP and the other one ($id=2$) chooses the AKP. Since ‘Age’ is an individual-specific variable, it has no variation across the three observations pertaining

¹² Our use of provinces as geographical units was mandated by the place of birth information being available only at the province level. However, this is not a handicap, as an analysis conducted at this level, rather than at village, district, or larger regional levels, is probably more appropriate. Provinces not only provide the heterogeneity required for the examination of the patterns we are exploring, but they are also the geographical units by which most Turkish migrants identify themselves.

¹³ The source of province-level election data is the Turkish Statistical Institute (Prime Ministry, Republic of Turkey).

¹⁴ In fact, the number of coefficients to be estimated under the multinomial setup is $k \times (k-1)$ instead of 1, if the information given in an alternative-specific variable is treated as coming from k individual-specific variables.

to a given individual, unlike the alternative-specific variables ORIGIN and DESTINATION. In province X, for example, the AKP’s vote share is 3.2 percentage points below its nationwide average, but in province Y, it is 5.1 percentage points above it. Note that (i) by definition, the deviations add up to zero for each individual, and (ii) both imaginary individuals have chosen the party which is relatively the strongest in their original provinces.

id	Age	Choice	Province of origin	Destination province	Party	ORIGIN	DESTINATION
1	23	0	X	Z	AKP	-3.2	0.6
1	23	1	X	Z	CHP	4.2	2.5
1	23	0	X	Z	Other	-1.0	-3.1
2	42	1	Y	W	AKP	5.1	2.9
2	42	0	Y	W	CHP	1.1	-4.0
2	42	0	Y	W	Other	-6.2	1.1

The key finding of our conditional logit model is that, controlling for individual characteristics, the relative strength of the parties at the origin has a significant effect on the party choice of the migrants whereas the relative strength at the destination does not.¹⁵ The positive coefficient on the ‘origin’ variable should be interpreted to mean that after correcting for the relative strengths of the parties at the national level, migrants are more likely to support the party which is stronger in their original provinces than another party. However, whether this effect is large enough to be of any political significance can not be deduced from the coefficient estimates. As was the case with the multinomial logit model, this can be accomplished in a more comprehensible manner with the use of marginal effects (See Table 2).

In the case of the conditional logit model, the calculation of the marginal effects is more complicated than it is in the multinomial version. First of all, it requires, in our case, the handling of three observations simultaneously. Secondly, because the marginal changes in the origin (or destination) variable have to add up to zero, we can’t simply be asking such a question as “What happens when the AKP-Origin figure goes up by 1, while the others remain

¹⁵ This is similar to the conclusion reached by Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1966) in regards to the U.S. However, as noted before, here ‘origin’ represents the current political conditions at the migrant’s birth place rather than at the time he/she migrated.

the same?” Fortunately, the ‘asprvalue’ routine presented in Long and Freeze (2005) allows for the calculation of marginal effects following the conditional logit model at user-specified values of the variables. We invoked this command to observe the changes in the probabilities of the three outcomes when the origin figure for one of them is increased to exceed its sample mean by 1 unit while the figures for the others are both taken down 0.5 units below their means.¹⁶ The individual-specific variables were held constant at their alternative-specific means, i.e. the means in the sub-samples defined according to the alternative being handled in the computations. Using this method, we obtained three different marginal effect figures for the origin variable, since the estimates depend on the initial predicted probabilities which are about 0.49, 0.14, and 0.37 for the AKP, the CHP, and Other, respectively. The predicted increase in the probability that the AKP is chosen when the AKP-Origin figure goes up by 1 (and the others go down by 0.5) is 0.0065. The figures obtained similarly for the CHP and Other are 0.0032 and 0.0061, respectively. However, in keeping with the spirit of the conditional logit model, it is more appropriate to compute the average of these figures and speak of the marginal effect for an unspecified party. Therefore, the general statement we make is that, on average, if the vote share of a party exceeds its nationwide average by 10 percentage points in a given province, then the probability that this party will be chosen by a migrant originating from that province increases by about 5 percentage points.¹⁷

4.2. Further analysis of the origin and destination effects

To gain more insights about the prevalence and strength of the origin and the destination effects, we built upon the basic specification and estimated more comprehensive models the results of which are summarized in Table 3. The basic model is given as the first model in that table to facilitate comparisons. The other models listed allow the origin and destination effects to vary by the party chosen (Model 2), the region of origin (Model 3), education level (Model 4), age category (Model 5), urban/rural residence (Model 6), mean absolute difference in destination and origin vote shares (Model 7), and

¹⁶ Due to its statistical insignificance, we did not conduct a similar exercise for the destination variable.

¹⁷ STATA’s **margin (mfx)** command works for the conditional logit model only if the “predict(pu0)”, i.e. the fixed-effects are zero, option is specified. This option is inappropriate in our context since under this definition the predicted probabilities of the outcomes do not add up to one. We still ran this command and obtained a marginal effect of 0.0041 for the origin variable which actually is not far from the estimates obtained using the proper method. As a final alternative, the **listcoef** command reports the factor changes in the odds of an alternative being chosen in response to the changes in the explanatory variables. The figure reported for the origin variable is 1.0175. Under the assumption that the three alternatives were equally likely to be chosen before the change occurred, i.e. the initial value of the odds was 0.5, this factor change corresponds to a probability increase of 0.0039 when ORIGIN goes up by 1 unit.

the difference between female shares in non-agricultural employment at the destination and the origin (Model 8). The categories used in Models 4 and 5 and the continuous variables used in Models 7 and 8 are defined in the notes to Table 3. Due to small sample sizes, we had to examine the effects of these potential factors one at a time, rather than by generating more complex interaction variables.

An interesting, and perhaps unexpected, pattern that emerges from these set of results is that the origin effect is the strongest and most significant among the most educated and the oldest migrants. These are the two groups for whom we would have expected to see the highest degree of assimilation into the destination society. Under the assumption that assimilation is positively linked to the level of education and time spent at the destination, we must interpret these findings as evidence that other factors (such as the economic ones discussed in section 2) have precedence over the assimilation effect. Furthermore, the finding that the origin effect is applicable to migrants from all regions and that it is more than twice as large for those from the West and the North, compared to those from the East, suggests that this kind of behavior does not necessarily have to do with the prevalence of ethnic voting which would be associated the most with the eastern region. In fact, our finding that the eastern migrants are relatively more assimilated into the host society is consistent with the finding of previous studies that migrants of Kurdish ethnic origin residing in urban areas have different voting behaviors than those living in the Southeast (Pınarcıoğlu and Işık, 2009).

Another intriguing result we observe is the difference in the direction of the estimated origin and destination effects for the supporters of the parties under examination. The destination effect is significant only for the CHP supporters and is in the opposite direction as the ones observed for the other parties. While the origin effect is significant for all parties, it is negative only for the CHP. These findings can be interpreted as evidence of the CHP voters being more assimilated to the host region than the supporters of other parties. However, they are more likely to be a manifestation of the Eastern migrants' voting for the CHP in those western provinces where city administrations are under the control of this party, probably for the economic reasons we elaborated on in section 2. In this regard, we should note that the CHP has significant presence only in the West and receives a negligible proportion of the votes in the East, implying that the origin effect would have to be negative for its voters in the West. As for the positive destination effect, an examination of the party's migrant support in Turkey's two highly-populated provinces could be quite revealing. In our sample, the CHP gets the support of 8.6 percent of the voters residing in the East (40 out of 463). However, 39.5 percent of the Eastern migrants residing in İzmir (15 out of 38) express a desire to vote

for the party compared to only 7.8 percent (7 out of 90) in İstanbul. When this information is viewed together with the knowledge that pro-Islamist or Islamist-rooted parties have won all of the mayoral elections in İstanbul since 1994 and that İzmir has emerged as a CHP stronghold during the past decade, it can be taken as empirical evidence in favor of the argument that, besides other factors, migrants' voting behavior is driven by economic pragmatism.

The only other instance a significant destination effect is observed involves the migrants from the North for whom the effect is negative. In this case, the observed effect is very much likely to be related to a peculiarity of the data. When migrants predominantly vote for a party which is relatively weaker in their provinces of residence, it shows up as a negative destination effect which happens to be the case for northern migrants living in İstanbul. This province is the destination for 66 percent of migrants from the North (106 out of 161), among whom 73 percent are AKP supporters (77 out of 106), and 21 percent (22 out of 106) support a party in the 'Other' category.¹⁸ According to province-level election results, however, the AKP and Other are 1.4 and 4.7 percentage points below their nationwide averages in İstanbul, respectively, whereas the CHP is 6.1 percentage points above its nationwide average. The relationship picked up by the conditional logit model is that these 99 respondents (i.e. 93 percent of northern migrants residing in İstanbul) prefer a party which is relatively *weaker* in this destination. Consequently, a negative destination effect is observed for the sample of northern migrants dominated by İstanbul residents. In short, both of the significant destination effects observed in the analysis have to do with specific situations and do not really constitute exceptions to the general finding that a destination effect is not present in the data.

The last two models summarized in Table 3 are intended to capture the importance of political and cultural differences, respectively, between the destination and origin provinces. The estimates from these models suggest that migration has some moderating effects politically when the move is between two environments with sharply different political and cultural climates. In Model 7, the coefficients of the interaction terms between origin and destination variables and the mean absolute difference in vote shares are statistically significant and of the opposite sign as the origin and destination variables, respectively. In other words, the positive origin and negative destination effects get smaller in magnitude as the differences between the origin and destination vote shares increase. Similarly, in Model 8, involving female shares in non-agricultural employment, the coefficients of the two interaction terms are close to being statistically significant at conventional levels and are of

¹⁸ On the whole, İstanbul is the destination of 39.5 percent of the migrants in our sample.

the opposite sign as the main effects.¹⁹ Both of these sets of findings suggest that even though their political assimilation may never be complete, migrants have a tendency to be influenced less by their origins and more by their host community when their new political/cultural environment is very different from the one they were born in.²⁰

One aspect of assimilation we have not dealt with is its possible association with the attitudes of natives towards the migrants. Using data from Germany, Kahanec and Tosun (2009) show, in an international migration setting, that negative attitudes towards foreigners discourage the immigrants from assimilating into the host society (which they measure using the immigrants' degree of interest in ascending to German citizenship). Of course, a reverse causality is also possible. Political preferences of the natives can be influenced by the preferences or the presence of migrants. For example, the emergence of strong Turkish nationalist tendencies in the Mediterranean provinces of Turkey such as Adana and Mersin has followed the massive inflow of ethnic-Kurdish migrants from the Southeast. Cultural disparities and economic struggles between the natives and the migrants have inevitably caused ethnic tensions, and thus internal migration itself has contributed to the decoupling of voting preferences among migrants and natives. Since such feedback effects have not been controlled for, caution should be exercised in interpreting the observed gaps between the two groups.

Yet another caveat about the present study is that it has not dealt with potential self-selection issues. For instance, it might be that many of the observed migrants are those who have preferred to leave locations in which they found themselves in political minority and opted for destinations which offered them a more comfortable political environment.²¹ Note, however, that this argument is not supported by our findings regarding the size and the sign of the origin and destination effects. Also, the need or the ease of moving from one province to another might be greater for people with certain outlooks on life that are associated with certain political views.²² Thus, it might be more appropriate to interpret the results presented here as associations between certain variables and outcomes, rather than causal effects.

¹⁹ More detailed examinations of this point reveal that the results are more significant in the subsamples of CHP voters and eastern migrants, meaning that they may also be reflecting mainly the impact of the presence of CHP supporters of eastern origin in the west of the country.

²⁰ This finding is in conformity with those of Brown (1981 and 1988), McMahon, et al. (1992) and MacDonald and Franko (2008) discussed in section 2.

²¹ This possibility is mentioned by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) in explaining the partial assimilation of East German migrants residing in the West. McMahon (1992) shows that while self-selection does take place, it explains only a little portion of the regional divisions in Britain.

²² Gimpel and Schuknecht (2001) indicate that, in the U.S., costs of mobility determine who moves and who stays put, and cite it as one of the reasons why areas with large migrant populations exhibit a bias in favor of the Republican Party. This phenomenon does not seem to have much relevance to the Turkish case either.

5. Conclusions

With the increase in the mobility of the world's population, the political behavior of immigrants has become the subject of a large body of international literature, and the persistence of the origin influences has been a recurring theme in this line of research. In this paper, we adopted the concept of origin effects to a within-country setting to examine the party choices of Turkey's internal migrants. Our novel application of the conditional logit model allowed us to examine the origin effect in a simple yet illuminating manner. Micro data from a survey of voter tendencies was augmented by province-level election data to determine to what extent the party choice of a migrant was influenced by the political climate prevailing in his/her provinces of origin and residence. In view of the theories and empirical evidence on the political behavior of internal migrants in Turkey, we conceived of the origin information as a proxy for the cultural and economic ties migrants have with their fellow townsmen with whom they remain in close contact in the destination as well as the ties with their regions of origin. Variants of the basic model were also estimated to find out whether the strength of these effects varies between various subgroups. While the destination effect was found to be broadly insignificant, the origin effect turned out to be highly significant and positive even among the groups of migrants who would be expected to have been assimilated into the host society. Thus, the origin effects observed in other countries in inter-regional and international contexts, apply to the case of Turkish internal migrants as well.

Besides being statistically significant, the origin effect we have estimated is also large in magnitude. We found that the vote share of a party exceeding its nationwide average by 10 percentage points in a province, raises the probability that this party will be chosen by a migrant born in that province by about 5 percentage points. Therefore, our results also reveal that in countries like Turkey, where internal migrants make up more than a quarter of the population, understanding the political behavior of migrant voters is paramount to making sense of election outcomes, political parties' discourses, and government policies. Viewed in this respect, the redistributive policies carried out by the ruling AKP since the party came to power, and the recently-launched democratic initiatives, aimed at empowering the periphery and giving more rights to ethnic and religious minorities can be seen as hitting two birds with one stone: maintaining the party's popularity in the East and North, and indirectly in the West through the origin effect we have demonstrated. In contrast, the increasingly nationalistic posture taken by its main rival CHP appears to be aimed at capturing the support of Western voters who may feel threatened and overwhelmed by the massive influx of migrants. However, the efforts of the new leadership of the CHP to revive the dwindling support for the party

in the East suggests that they too have realized that reaching out to the more remote areas of the country is of critical importance for nationwide electoral success.

The empirical finding regarding the political significance and persistence of the origin effect in Turkey does not come as much of a surprise given the speed and magnitude of internal migration, the degree of ethnic and cultural diversity across geographical regions, and the manner in which political parties take advantage of the migrants' tendency to stick together with their fellow townsmen. Therefore, it would be interesting to see if similar patterns are observed in other contexts where people's political views are shaped more individually and where their economic interests lie with the larger society rather than those with whom they happen to share a common cultural background. In case any significant differences emerge from such an analysis, it could be taken as evidence for one factor that distinguishes the more individualized societies from those guided by ethno-cultural and conservative tendencies.

References

- Akarca, A. T., & Başlevent, C. (2009). Inter-party Vote Movements in Turkey: The Sources of AKP Votes in 2007. *İktisat, İşletme ve Finans*, 24(285), 32-47. [doi:10.3848/iif.2009.285.2511](https://doi.org/10.3848/iif.2009.285.2511)
- Akarca, A. T., & Başlevent, C. (2010). Persistence in Regional Voting Patterns in Turkey during a Period of Major Political Realignment. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, forthcoming.
- Alesina, A., & Fuchs-Schündeln, N. (2007). Good Bye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences. *American Economic Review*, 97(4), 1507-1528. [doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1507](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1507)
- Ayata, S. (2008). Migrants and Changing Urban Periphery: Social Relations, Cultural Diversity and the Public Space in Istanbul's New Neighbourhoods. *International Migration*, 46(3), 27-64. [doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2008.00461.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2008.00461.x)
- Bass, L. E., & Casper, L. M. (2001). Impacting the Political Landscape: Who Registers and Votes among Naturalized Americans?. *Political Behavior*, 23(2), 103-130. [doi:10.1023/A:1013013530506](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013013530506)
- Bassler, C. (2008). White Dreams and Red Votes: Mexican Americans and the Lure of Inclusion in the Republican Party. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(1), 123-166. [doi:10.1080/01419870701538950](https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870701538950)
- Başlevent, C., & Dayıoğlu, M. (2005). The Effect of Squatter Housing on Income Distribution in Urban Turkey. *Urban Studies*, 42(1), 31-45. [doi:10.1080/0042098042000309685](https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098042000309685)
- Black, J. H., Niemi, R. G., & Powell, G. B. (1987). Age, Resistance, and Political Learning in a New Environment: The Case of Canadian Immigrants. *Comparative Politics*, 20(1), 73-84. [doi:10.2307/421921](https://doi.org/10.2307/421921)
- Borjas, G. J. (1985). Assimilation, Changes in Cohort Quality, and the Earnings of Immigrants. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 3(4), 463-489. [doi:10.1086/298065](https://doi.org/10.1086/298065)
- Brown, T. A. (1981). On Contextual Change and Partisan Attributes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 11(4), 427-447. [doi:10.1017/S0007123400002738](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400002738)
- Brown, T. A. (1988). *Migration and politics: The Impact of Population Mobility on American Voting Behavior*. Chapel Hill, United States: University of North Carolina Press.

- Buğra, A. (1998). The Immoral Economy of Housing in Turkey. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 22(2), 303-317. [doi:10.1111/1468-2427.00141](https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00141)
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. (2010). *The American Voter*. New York, United States: Wiley.
- Chiswick, B. R. (1978). The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-Born Men. *Journal of Political Economy*, 86(5), 897-921. [doi:10.1086/260717](https://doi.org/10.1086/260717)
- Chiswick, B. R. (1979). The Economic Progress of Immigrants: Some Apparently Universal Patterns. In Fellner, W. (ed.), *Contemporary Economic Problems 1979*, Washington, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri: American Enterprise Institute, 357-399.
- Chiswick, C. (2009). The Economic Determinants of Ethnic Assimilation. *Journal of Population Economics*, 22(4), 859-880. [doi:10.1007/s00148-008-0190-y](https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-008-0190-y)
- Chua, J., & Miller, P. (2009). The Impact of Immigrant Status on Home Ownership in Australia. *International Migration*, 47(2), 155-192. [doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2008.00504.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2008.00504.x)
- Constant, A., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2008). Measuring Ethnic Identity and its Impact on Economic Behavior. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(2/3), 424-433. [doi:10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.424](https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.424)
- Converse, P. E. (1966). On the Possibility of a Major Realignment in the South. In Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., and Stokes, D. (eds.), *Elections and the Political Order*, New York, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri: Wiley.
- Çelik, F. (2007). Türkiye’de İç Göçler: 1980-2000 [Internal Migration in Turkey: 1980-2000]. *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 22(2007/1), 87-109.
- Dahl, R. A. (1961). *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven, United States: Yale University Press.
- Dancygier, R., & Saunders, E. N. (2006). A New Electorate? Comparing Preferences and Partisanship between Immigrants and Natives. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), 962-981. [doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00227.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00227.x)
- Dayıoğlu, M., & Başlevent, C. (2006). Imputed Rents and Regional Income Inequality in Turkey: A Subgroup Decomposition of the Atkinson Index. *Regional Studies*, 40(8), 889-905. [doi:10.1080/00343400600984395](https://doi.org/10.1080/00343400600984395)
- DeSipio, L., & Uhlaner, C. J. (2007). Immigrant and Native: Mexican American Presidential Vote Choice Across Immigrant Generations. *American Politics Research*, 35(2), 176-201. [doi:10.1177/1532673X06296197](https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X06296197)
- Erman, T. (2001). The Politics of Squatter (Gecekondu) Studies in Turkey: The Changing Representations of Rural Migrants in the Academic Discourse. *Urban Studies*, 38(7), 983-1002.
- Escrivá, A., Cruz, U. S., & Bermudez, A. (2010). Gender, and Politics: The 2006 Peruvian Elections Abroad. *Latin American Perspectives*, 37(5), 106-120. [doi:10.1177/0094582X10380391](https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X10380391)
- Fidrmuc, J. & Doyle, O. (2004). Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior. Paper presented at the ZEI conference on “Advanced Perspectives on Migration and Mobility,” Bonn, September 30-October 1, 2004.
- Filiztekin, A. & Gökhan, A. (2008). The Determinants of Internal Migration in Turkey. Paper presented at the 7th International Conference of the Middle East Economic Association, 29-31 May, Famagusta, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
- Finifter, A. W., & Finifter, B. M. (1989). Party Identification and Political Adaptation of American Migrants in Australia. *The Journal of Politics*, 51(3), 599-630. [doi:10.2307/2131497](https://doi.org/10.2307/2131497)
- Garcia, J. A. (1987). The Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Examining Some Political Orientations. *International Migration Review*, 21(2), 372-389. [doi:10.2307/2546321](https://doi.org/10.2307/2546321)

- Gimpel, J. G., & Schuknecht, J. E. (2003). Interstate Migration and Electoral Politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 63(1), 207-231. [doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00065](https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00065)
- Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. P. (1963). *Beyond the Melting Pot*. Cambridge, United States: Harvard University Press.
- Gordon, M. (1964). *Assimilation in American life: The Role of Race, Religion, And National Origins*. New York, United States: Oxford University Press.
- Hausman, J., & Mcfadden, D. (1984). Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model. *Econometrica*, 52(5), 1219-1240. [doi:10.2307/1910997](https://doi.org/10.2307/1910997)
- Hersant, J., & Toumarkine, A. (2005). Hometown Organisations in Turkey: An Overview. *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, Thematic Issue, No: 2 (Hometown Organisations in Turkey), Document No: 397.
- Humphrey, C. R., & Louis, H. B. (1973). Assimilation and Voting Behavior: A Study of Greek-Americans. *International Migration Review*, 7(1), 34-45. [doi:10.2307/3002492](https://doi.org/10.2307/3002492)
- Jackson, B. O. (1988). Ethnic Cleavages and Voting Patterns in Los Angeles. Institute for Social Science Research Working Papers in the Social Sciences, 4(15).
- Jones-Correa, M. (1998). Different Paths: Gender, Immigration and Political Participation. *International Migration Review*, 32(2), 326-349. [doi:10.2307/2547186](https://doi.org/10.2307/2547186)
- Kahanec, M., & Tosun, M. S. (2009). Political Economy of Immigration in Germany: Attitudes and Citizenship Aspirations. *International Migration Review*, 43(2), 263-291. [doi:10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00765.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00765.x)
- Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2007). Politics of Conservatism in Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 8(2), 233-252. [doi:10.1080/14683840701312211](https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840701312211)
- Kaya, A. (2009). *Türkiye'de İç Göçler: Bütünleşme mi Geri Dönüş mü? [Internal Migration in Turkey: Integration or Returning Back?]*. Istanbul, Turkey: Istanbul Bilgi University Press.
- Kurtoğlu, A. (2005). Mekansal Bir Olgu Olarak Hemşehrilik ve Bir Hemşehrilik Mekanı Olarak Dernekler [Townsmanship as a Reality of Locality and Organizations as a Locality of Townsmanship]. *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, Thematic Issue, No: 2 (Hometown Organisations in Turkey), Document No: 375.
- Leighley, J. E., & Vedlitz, A. (1999). Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations. *Journal of Politics*, 61(4), 1092-1114. [doi:10.2307/2647555](https://doi.org/10.2307/2647555)
- Lien, P. (1994). Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican Americans. *Political Behavior*, 16(2), 237-264. [doi:10.1007/BF01498879](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01498879)
- Long, J. S., & Freese, J. (2005). *Regression Models for Categorical Outcomes Using Stata* (1. ed.). College Station, United States: Stata Press.
- Luttmer, E. F. P. & Singhal, M. (2008). Culture, Context, and the Taste for Redistribution. NBER Working Paper, No: 14268.
- MacDonald, J. A., & Franko, W. W. (2008). What Moves Partisanship? Migration, State Partisan Environment Change, and Party Identification. *American Politics Research*, 36(6), 880-902. [doi:10.1177/1532673X08319649](https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08319649)
- Marcelli, E. A., & Cornelius, W. A. (2005). Immigrant Voting in Home-Country Elections: Potential Consequences of Extending the Franchise to Expatriate Mexicans. *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 21(2), 429-460.
- McMahon, D., Heath, A., Harrop, M., & Curtice, J. (1992). The Electoral Consequences of North-South Migration. *British Journal of Political Science*, 22(4), 419-443. [doi:10.1017/S0007123400006475](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400006475)
- Narlı, N. (2010, October 06). İlksel Bağlar, Hemşehrilik, Gettolaşma [Primary Ties, Townsmanship, Ghetto Formation]. Retrieved 2010, October 06, from <http://bianet.org/>

bianet/bianet/8376-ilksel-baglar-hemsehrilik-gettolasma

Öniş, Z. (2000). Neoliberal Globalization and the Democracy Paradox: The Turkish General Elections of 1999. *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), 291-306.

Özler, Ş. İ. (2000). Politics of the Gecekondu in Turkey: The Political Choices of Urban Squatters in National Elections. *Turkish Studies*, 1(2), 39-58.

Pınarcıoğlu, M. M., & Işık, O. (2009). Segregation in Istanbul: Patterns and Processes. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 100(4), 469-484. [doi:10.1111/j.1467-9663.2009.00553.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9663.2009.00553.x)

Shmuelevitz, A. (1996). Urbanization and Voting for the Turkish Parliament. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32(2), 162-176. [doi:10.1080/00263209608701109](https://doi.org/10.1080/00263209608701109)


Skerry, P. (2000). Do We Really Want Immigrants to Assimilate? . *Society*, 37(3), 57-62. [doi:10.1007/BF02686176](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686176)

Small, K. A., & Hsiao, C. (1985). Multinomial Logit Specification Tests. *International Economic Review*, 26(3), 619-627. [doi:10.2307/2526707](https://doi.org/10.2307/2526707)

Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York, United States: Harper and Row.


White, S., Nevitte, N., Blais, A., Gidengil, E., & Fournier, P. (2008). The Political Resocialization of Immigrants: Resistance or Lifelong Learning?. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 268-281. [doi:10.1177/1065912908314713](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314713)

Yalçınan, M. C., & Erbaş, A. E. (2003). Impacts of 'Gecekondu' on the Electoral Geography of Istanbul. *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 64(October), 91-111.



Source: Authors' computations based on data for the year 2000 provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Prime Ministry, the Republic of Turkey).

Figure 1: Proportion of migrants in Turkey's provinces



Provinces in the Western Region: TR1 (İstanbul): İstanbul; TR2 (West Marmara): Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli, Balıkesir, Çanakkale; TR3 (Aegean): İzmir, Aydın, Denizli, Muğla, Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak; TR4 (East Marmara): Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova; TR5 (West Anatolia): Ankara, Konya, Karaman; TR6 (Mediterranean): Antalya, Isparta, Burdur, Adana, Mersin, Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye; TR7 (Central Anatolia): Kırkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir, Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat.

Provinces in the Northern Region: TR8 (West Black Sea): Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın, Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop, Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya; TR9 (East Black Sea): Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Arvin, Gümüşhane.

Provinces in the Eastern Region: TR4 (Northeast Anatolia): Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt, Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan; TRB (Centraleast Anatolia): Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli, Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari; TRC (Southeast Anatolia): Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt.

Figure 2: Three-way partition of Turkey's provinces based on TurkStat's 12-region classification

34 **Table 1: Means of explanatory variables and party dummies in subsamples**

	Non-migrants	Migrants			Migrants by origin			All sample		
			West	North	East	West	North	East	AKP	CHP
AKP07	0.44	0.50	0.38	0.63	0.56					
CHP07	0.21	0.18	0.24	0.12	0.17					
OTHER07	0.35	0.32	0.38	0.25	0.27					
FEMALE	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.46	0.40			0.46	0.44	0.41
AGE44+	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.32	0.37			0.33	0.41	0.32
SCHOOLING	7.16	7.81	8.57	7.25	7.27			6.57	8.22	7.80
ECONOMY	3.34	3.31	3.12	3.41	3.48			4.25	2.34	2.69
INCOME	2.42	2.73	2.86	2.72	2.60			2.45	2.62	2.50
PRO-EU	0.41	0.39	0.38	0.32	0.45			0.47	0.40	0.32
URBAN	0.60	0.83	0.81	0.90	0.82			0.66	0.68	0.65
SECULARISM	0.21	0.18	0.22	0.14	0.15			0.12	0.41	0.19
MIGRANT								0.28	0.23	0.23
Sample size	2,011	674	280	161	233			1,224	547	914
Share (%)	(74.9)	(25.1)	(41.5)	(23.9)	(34.6)			(45.6)	(20.4)	(34.0)

Notes to Table 1:

- * AKP07 equals one if respondent has chosen the AKP, and zero otherwise. CHP07 and OTHER07 are defined similarly.
- * GENDER equals one in the case of a female respondent, and zero in case of a male respondent.
- * AGE44+ equals one in the case of a respondent who is 44 years of age or older, and zero otherwise.
- * SCHOOLING is constructed from the information about the highest level of schooling completed such that it takes on the value of zero for illiterates, 2 for literates with no diploma, 5, 8, 11, and 15 for elementary, middle, and high school, and university graduates, respectively. It is equal to 18 if the respondent has a master's or Ph.D. degree.
- * ECONOMY is a composite variable taking on values between 1 and 5 such that larger values correspond to more positive evaluations. It has been obtained by averaging 'retrospective socio-tropic', 'retrospective pocketbook', 'prospective socio-tropic', and 'prospective pocketbook' evaluations pertaining to the past and upcoming five years.
- * INCOME takes on values between 1 and 5, depending on the quantile the respondent places himself/herself in the income distribution, with 5 representing the highest income group.
- * PRO-EU equals one if the respondent believes that Turkey must join the European Union, and zero otherwise.
- * URBAN equals one in the case of a respondent residing in an urban area, and zero otherwise.
- * SECULARISM equals one if the respondent picks "Acts against secularism" in response to the survey question "In your opinion, which TWO of the following are the most urgent problems of Turkey?" where "Poverty", "Corruption", "Acts against democracy", "Insufficiency of social security system", "No Opinion", and "No Answer" are the remaining choices.
- * MIGRANT equals one in the case of a respondent residing in a province other than the one s/he was born in, and zero otherwise.

Table 2: Multinomial and conditional logit estimates of the 3-way party choice

	Multinomial Logit		Conditional Logit	
	CHP vs. AKP	Other vs. AKP	CHP vs. AKP	Other vs. AKP
<i>Individual-specific var's.</i>				
FEMALE	0.137 (0.327)	-0.101 (0.395)	-0.112 (0.705)	-0.380 (0.125)
AGE44+	0.545 (0.001)	0.087 (0.513)	0.478 (0.153)	-0.160 (0.534)
SCHOOLING	0.130 (0.000)	0.102 (0.000)	0.212 (0.000)	0.156 (0.000)
ECONOMY	-1.823 (0.000)	-1.469 (0.000)	-1.881 (0.000)	-1.609 (0.000)
INCOME	0.338 (0.000)	0.227 (0.007)	0.307 (0.180)	0.177 (0.323)
PRO-EU	0.198 (0.246)	-0.196 (0.168)	0.541 (0.062)	-0.272 (0.256)
URBAN	-0.022 (0.941)	-0.140 (0.550)	-0.553 (0.269)	0.001 (0.998)
SECULARISM	1.170 (0.000)	0.214 (0.222)	1.351 (0.001)	0.737 (0.020)
MIGRANT	-0.679 (0.001)	-0.532 (0.001)		
<i>Choice-specific variables</i>				
ORIGIN			0.017 (0.004)	
DESTINATION			0.004 (0.619)	
Constant	3.009 (0.000)	3.874 (0.000)	2.547 (0.005)	3.590 (0.000)
Number of obs.	2685		674×3 = 2022	
Pseudo-R ²	0.2955		0.3906	

Note: Base category is the AKP. In parentheses are the p-values of the coefficients. These values were obtained using robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the neighborhood/village level. Shaded cells denote statistical significance at $\alpha=10\%$. ORIGIN contains the vote shares of the AKP, CHP, and Other (in %) in the July 2007 elections at the province of origin, each of which are expressed as deviations from nationwide averages. DESTINATION contains the vote shares of the AKP, CHP, and Other (in %) in the July 2007 elections at the destination province, each of which are expressed as deviations from nationwide averages. The reason for the large number of observations for the conditional logit model is that its estimation in STATA requires the expansion of the data set to three observations per individual.

Table 3: Summary of conditional logit estimates

Alternative-specific variable:	Coef.	p-value	Alternative - specific variable:	Coef.	p-value
<i>Model 1 (Base model)</i>					
ORIGIN	0.017	(0.004)	DESTINATION	0.004	(0.619)
<i>Model 2</i>					
ORIGIN × AKP	0.028	(0.006)	DEST. × AKP	-0.004	(0.813)
ORIGIN × CHP	-0.023	(0.091)	DEST. × CHP	0.052	(0.100)
ORIGIN × Other	0.027	(0.023)	DEST. × Other	-0.026	(0.151)
<i>Model 3</i>					
ORIGIN × West	0.029	(0.018)	DEST. × West	-0.007	(0.479)
ORIGIN × North	0.028	(0.072)	DEST. × North	-0.023	(0.090)
ORIGIN × East	0.012	(0.063)	DEST. × East	0.022	(0.151)
<i>Model 4</i>					
ORIGIN × Educ1	0.018	(0.027)	DEST. × Educ1	0.017	(0.210)
ORIGIN × Educ2	-0.011	(0.483)	DEST. × Educ2	-0.029	(0.146)
ORIGIN × Educ3	0.013	(0.213)	DEST. × Educ3	0.008	(0.573)
ORIGIN × Educ4	0.049	(0.000)	DEST. × Educ4	0.001	(0.942)
<i>Model 5</i>					
ORIGIN × Age1	0.022	(0.026)	DEST. × Age1	-0.001	(0.921)
ORIGIN × Age2	0.010	(0.199)	DEST. × Age2	-0.007	(0.540)
ORIGIN × Age3	0.020	(0.018)	DEST. × Age3	0.018	(0.265)
<i>Model 6</i>					
ORIGIN × Rural	0.014	(0.421)	DEST. × Rural	0.010	(0.456)
ORIGIN × Urban	0.018	(0.005)	DEST. × Urban	0.003	(0.783)
<i>Model 7</i>					
ORIGIN	0.071	(0.000)	DESTINATION	-0.042	(0.044)
ORIGIN × ABDIS	-0.003	(0.000)	DEST. × ABDIS	0.003	(0.067)
<i>Model 8</i>					
ORIGIN	0.030	(0.002)	DESTINATION	-0.004	(0.616)
ORIGIN × FEMSH	-0.001	(0.105)	DEST. × FEMSH	0.002	(0.135)

Notes: $ABDIS = [abs(AKP-des - AKP-ori) + abs(CHP-des - CHP-ori) + abs(Other-des - Other-ori)] \div 3$, where 'abs' denotes the absolute value function and 'X-ori/des' denotes the vote share of party X in the origin/destination province. FEMSH is the difference between the female shares (in percentage points) in non-agricultural employment at the destination and the origin. The level of education dummies: Educ1=1 if the highest level of education completed is elementary school or less, Educ2=1 if 'middle school', Educ3=1 if 'high school', and Educ4=1 if 'university or more'. Age group dummies: Age 1=1 if age < 29, Age2=1 if age is between 29 and 43, and Age3=1 if age is 44 or more. In parentheses are the p-values of the coefficients. These values were obtained using robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the neighborhood/village level. Shaded cells denote statistical significance at $\alpha=10\%$.