

ABSTRACT

Lausanne Treaty's (1923) section on the 'minority protection' has a unique character as it brought the concept 'mutual responsibility'. Since then, highly related to Turkish-Greek relations, 'mutual responsibility' has been perceived as 'reciprocity rule' which is implemented usually negatively but also positively by Greek and Turkish states for the Muslim minority in Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox minority living in Istanbul respectively in cultural, social and economic fields.

Whereas, reciprocity rule has not been applied in the political field. The thesis mainly aims to understand *why two minority communities have different characteristics of political representation?* Inspired by Fredrik Barth's theory, the study claims that ethnic political behavior is not primordial but shaped according to the political institutions of the society they live in, and tests the assumptions by comparing the macro-level and micro-level factors that are expected to influence the possibility of minorities' political representation. For this purpose the thesis utilizes a qualitative comparative method 'historical institutionalism' analysis, where for each electoral period (7 elections in Turkey and 31 elections in Greece in which minorities are represented in the national parliament) the political events and changes in the political institutions that are expected to influence the conditions of the minorities are examined.

Historical institutionalism analysis; archival work on the minority MPs' Parliamentary speeches, minority press evaluations and interviews conducted with prominent figures of the minority communities showed that despite the common assumptions, political representation potential is independent from bilateral relations and international organizations, however Muslim-Turkish minority continues to base its political choices on being part of Greek-Turkish relations. 'Reciprocity rule' has not been applied in political sphere due to legal issues; lack of political will; mutual distrust; and problems in negotiations. In general micro-level and macro-level factors matter for the political representation of Romioi and Muslim-Turkish minority: 'party-identification' is low; 'localism', 'political cleavages' and 'ethnic bloc-voting' are higher in Muslim community; while better 'language skills' increased the effectiveness of Romioi MPs and the community's integration to the society. Increase in the professional skills of the Muslim MPs in Greece after 1977 improved their effectiveness in the parliament despite the fact that their number reduced. As expected, minority MPs are more effective in the parliament when the host-country has a more democratic atmosphere. Interviews with the minority members stressed a common point: the minority members respect the political system of the country they live in, and believe they should play within the same political game; however they do not trust the political system and they believe 'quota system' for political representation will increase the ethnic tension rather than diminishing it. 'Reciprocity rule' has negative associations for the Romioi community, while Lausanne Treaty has been perceived as a constitution by the Muslim-Turkish minority. Close-list PR electoral system with dominant party has potential to offer higher political involvement for the Romioi community; while it increases the ethnic tension in Western Thrace. Open-list PR system with multi-party systems provides the best conditions for Muslim-Turkish minority's political representation. Minority MPs' work in the parliament is more effective when they are elected with a party ticket (especially party in power) versus independent ticket.

Key Words: Political Representation; Reciprocity Rule; Greek-Orthodox Minority; Muslim-Turkish Minority; Historical Institutionalism; Greek-Turkish Relations.